

UNIV. OF  
TORONTO  
LIBRARY







Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2008 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation


LE. Lt.  
E.

I

# The Edinburgh Review or Critical Journal

JULY, 1919 ——— OCTOBER, 1919

To be continued Quarterly



Edited by HAROLD COX

JUDEX DAMNATUR CUM NOCENS ABSOLVITUR

*Publius Syrus.*

VOL. 230

15-5306  
15-16/20

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.

London, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras

LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION COMPANY, New York

1919



# CONTENTS OF VOL. 230

No. 469

JULY, 1919

	PAGE
The Peace Settlements: 1815 and 1919	Prof. W. ALISON PHILLIPS 1
Conceptions of War in 1914	22
Conscript Armies	DAVID HANNAY 43
Egyptian Nationalism	Sir MALCOLM McILWRAITH, K.C.M.G., K.C. 60
The Colour Problem in South Africa	W. C. SCULLY 78
The Future of British Agri- culture	93
Trade Combinations	C. ERNEST FAYLE 110
The Physique of the Nation	130
Recent Moral Arguments for Theism	Rev. F. R. TENNANT 142
The Higher Criticism of Homer	A. J. B. WACE 161
Individual Liberty and the Constitution	Sir HENRY CUNYNGHAME, K.C.B. 172
The Future of Oxford and Cambridge	J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY 178
The Ethical Side of Socialism	EDITOR 190

No. 470

OCTOBER, 1919

Munitions and Mr. Lloyd George	Major-Gen. R. MAHON, C.B., C.S.I. 207
England and America	A. MAURICE LOW 227
France and the British Army	Capt. STEPHENGWYNN, M.P. 241
Sully's 'Grand Design'	Sir GEOFFREY BUTLER 262
Ulster and Sinn Fein	R. J. LYNN, M.P. 279
The Finance of China	Sir C. S. ADDIS 297
Municipal Housing	BERNARD HOLLAND, C.B. 309
The Drink Problem	HUGH ELLIOT 326
The Public Schools	Major ORLO WILLIAMS, M.C. 340
Democracy in England	E. STRACHAN MORGAN 358
Taxation of Capital and 'Ability to Pay'	J. C. STAMP, C.M.G. D.Sc. 371
More Economic Fallacies in Industry	Sir LYNDEN MACASSEY, K.C., D.Sc. 387





# The Edinburgh Review

JULY, 1919

No. 469

---

---

## THE PEACE SETTLEMENTS

1815 AND 1919

WHILE the issue of the war was yet undecided, the peoples fighting on the side of liberty were upheld by the belief that their victory would herald the dawn of a golden age. This, it was said, was 'a war to end war'; in the settlement to follow, the evil traditions of the old diplomacy were to be set aside; a wholly new spirit was to inform the counsels of the nations; and in place of the old 'balancing of powers' was to be established a community of power. In conjuring up this vision of the ideal future, statesmen contrasted its glorious promise with the sordid reality of what had happened the last time Europe had risen in revolt against a militarist domination. A hundred years of democratic development had, they claimed, made possible a wholly new foundation for international relations. In the peace settlement there would be no room for the selfishness and narrow views which had characterised the proceedings of the Powers which in 1814-1815 had remodelled the geography of Europe to suit their own needs. The Conference at Paris, conducting its proceedings in the full light of publicity, would have nothing in common with the Congress of Vienna, with its secret debates and its back-stairs intrigues. The League of Nations, the crowning achievement of the Conference, the very keystone of the arch built up by its

---

All rights reserved.

efforts, would be open to none of the criticisms which had been directed against the 'Holy Alliance.' Indeed, though the experience of Europe a hundred years ago might serve as a warning, it could in no sense serve as a precedent, still less as an example; for the spirit of the times had completely changed; nations had succeeded to States, democracies to autocracies, and, above all, the war had created among the people 'such a keen 'international consciousness' as there had never before been in the history of the world.

Now it is doubtless possible to exaggerate the analogy between the situation of the world now and that of a century ago. The drama which ended in 1919 was played on a much vaster stage than that which ended in 1815; wholly new situations have arisen; and the problems to be solved are enormously more complex than any which confronted our predecessors. But if the differences are striking, the analogies are hardly less so, and these have tended to become more clearly defined in the course of the peace negotiations. Like causes, as was to be expected, have produced like results; and as the vision conjured up during the excitement of the great conflict has faded, the underlying realities have become more and more disconcertingly obvious, and the world is preparing itself for a disillusionment perhaps more complete than that which followed the settlement of 1815.

The work of the Congress of Vienna, for all its shortcomings, did at least give Europe forty years of peace; and if men were disappointed at its outcome, this was mainly because they had been led to expect more from it than was reasonable in the circumstances of the time. 'Men had promised themselves,' wrote Gentz, 'an all-embracing reform of the political system of Europe, guarantees for universal peace; in one word, the return of the golden age.'\* They had been encouraged in the belief by the language of the dynasts in summoning the people to the war of liberation, language which anticipated that of statesmen during the recent war. The Emperor Alexander I. of Russia, especially, had made himself the champion of ideals which are now associated with the name of President Wilson, proclaiming a new reign of 'morality,' appealing to the 'rights of humanity,' and advocating in season and out the creation of a 'universal

---

\* Prokesch-Osten, 'Oesterreichs Theilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen,' p. 44.

'union' for the protection of religion, peace, and justice. The Holy Alliance was, of course, from the first suspect among the peoples, for reasons which at the outset were not justified; for it was certainly not conceived as a league of despots against liberty. It was, in fact, not taken seriously by any in high places save its author; its principles were never given any general application; and the effective Alliance which in Europe succeeded to the hegemony exercised by Napoleon was based, not on any abstract theory of right, but on the practical necessities of the moment, which were the restoration and the preservation of peace.

The success of the Allies in then accomplishing this task was, in my opinion, due to the wisdom of those statesmen who realised that if the questions at issue had to be settled on general principles, nothing would ever be settled. But if Castlereagh forced Alexander to 'descend from his abstractions' into the world of reality, this did not mean that he was an opportunist, in any evil sense of the word. He too recognised the existence of a common good, to which the nations must be prepared to make sacrifices, even in their own interests. At Vienna he had only been saved by the sudden return of Napoleon from Elba from committing himself to the idea of a League of Nations. To the last, in spite of the clamour of public opinion in England and of his own increasing realisation of the fundamental cleavage of principle in the councils of the Allies, he clung to the conception of 'Europe' as a group of States acting in common for common ends. But he was an opportunist in the sense that he steadfastly refused to commit his Government, by any general engagement based upon abstract conceptions of right, to 'eventual exertion' in circumstances which could not be foreseen. Great Britain, in his opinion, ought to be bound by the treaties and the treaties alone; if circumstances unforeseen were to arise to which the treaties did not apply, it would be time enough to concert measures to meet them. The order of Europe, in this view, depended on the principle of public honour expressed in the sense of the inviolability of public engagements; and such engagements could only be preserved inviolate if they were of the nature of particular contracts entered into with a full sense of all their implications. A vague general engagement, contracted without any such sense, would break down with the first serious clash of the interests involved; and its collapse would endanger all the rest.

It is generally admitted that the settlement embodied in the treaties of 1815 was far from being an ideal one. As a result of a process of not always dignified chaffering, the interests represented at Vienna had agreed on a series of compromises, which were collected in that final act which was for half a century to come to be the foundation of the public law of Europe. It is easy to criticise this settlement in the light of later history. It wholly neglected claims which were already articulate; it failed more especially to take account of that new revolutionary force of nationality by which in the end it was to be overthrown. Of late this criticism has taken a loftier tone. The root fault of the old diplomacy as exhibited at Vienna, it is urged, was that it was less concerned with the effective assertion of principles than with the problem of finding an accommodation between conflicting interests. Of this view, President Wilson has been the most distinguished exponent. In the historic speech at Rome, delivered on 3rd January last, in which he enunciated his idea of the task that lay before the Peace Conference, he proclaimed the necessity for a complete breach with the diplomatic traditions of the past.

‘There is only one thing that holds nations together, if you exclude force, and that is friendship and goodwill. The only thing that binds men together is friendship, and by the same token the only thing that binds nations together is friendship. Therefore our task at Paris is to organise the friendship of the world, to see to it that all the moral forces that make for right and justice and liberty are united, and are given a vital organisation to which the peoples of the world will readily and gladly respond. In other words, our task is no less colossal than this—to set up a new international psychology; to have a new atmosphere.’

Speaking at Manchester, on the 30th December last, he had expressed the same idea in somewhat different terms:—

‘Interest does not bind men together. Interest separates men; for the moment there is the slightest departure from the nice adjustments of interest, then jealousies begin to spring up. There is only one thing that can bind peoples together, and that is a common devotion to right.’

The chief merit of Machiavelli, according to Bacon, was that he described ‘not what men ought to do, but what they are ‘wont to do.’ In this respect President Wilson certainly cannot be accused of Machiavellism, but it may be useful to apply the Machiavellian test to his sentiments. Now it is a truism to say that, if we exclude force, what binds nations together is

friendship and goodwill. The root question, however, is what produces such friendship and goodwill? The President implies that they are the outcome of a common devotion to the conception of right, and he argues that in the same way friendship and goodwill will grow up between nations when these too show a common devotion to right. If there were any common conception of right to which nations might show their devotion, this would doubtless be true enough. But, though all may be agreed that it is right to do the right thing, there is no agreement as to what is the right thing to do; it is clear, for instance, that President Wilson's conceptions of right, justice, and liberty differ fundamentally from those of the Bolsheviks. The truth is that men's ideas of right have always differed, and still differ fundamentally; and all experience proves that it is precisely in the realm of these ideas that compromise is impossible, whereas conflicts of interest, whether in private or public affairs, are more often compromised than not. And thus it has come about in the past that, while conflicts of interest have slain their thousands, conflicts between different conceptions of right have slain their tens of thousands.

It is, moreover, in my opinion, false to assert that interest does not bind men together. In an essay on 'Europe and the Problem of Nationality,' published in this REVIEW,\* I sought to show that the strongest binding force of a national group is precisely the vivid sense of the community of its interests; and similarly I believe that the only secure bond of an international system will be the growth of a strong sense of the essential community of interests among the nations that compose it.† The *sine qua non* of the growth of such a sense seems to me to be the casting down of the tariff walls between nations. My immediate object, however, is not to argue in favour of Free Trade, the obstacles to the universal acceptance of which are now obvious, but to insist that in 1815 those statesmen were right who, like Castlereagh, realised that the restoration and maintenance of peace depended, not on the proclamation of abstract principles of right, but on the reconciliation of conflicting interests and the creation of a balance between them.

---

\* No. 451, Vol. 221, January 1915.

† In an essay on 'National Federations and World Federation' I sought to point this moral by an examination into the causes of the strength or weakness of federations of States. See *Edinburgh Review*, No. 416, Vol. 226, July 1917.

It is often asserted that in one very important respect the conditions governing the present world-settlement differ wholly from those obtaining a hundred years ago, namely, that public opinion, as an effective force, had then no existence. Without doubt, the development of democratic institutions has given to public opinion a new weight ; but it is an error to suppose that it carried none when the world was mainly ruled by autocrats. All government, as Sir William Temple long ago pointed out, ultimately rests upon the consent of the governed, and the language even of the autocrats of the Holy Alliance, when they were in difficulties, showed that they recognised the fact. Public opinion played its part in 1814-1815 as it is doing now, and it may be added that it was often as far as it is now from realising the only conditions upon which the peace for which the world longed could be made secure, and was as disturbing to the efforts of true statesmanship as it is now, in proportion to its prejudices and its ignorance of the true issues at stake. It was not only the limitations of his own outlook, but the public opinion of Russia, which prevented Alexander I. from carrying out his full plans for the restoration of Poland. It was the gathering volume of hostile public opinion in France that ultimately compelled the evacuation of the country by the allied army of occupation.\* Then, as now, the prejudices and fears aroused by years of aggression on the part of a military power tended to blind people to the true problem of the restoration of peace. Public opinion, in England as well as in Germany, clamoured for the dismemberment of France ; and it was reserved for the most unpopular of British statesmen to define in a single sentence the whole difference between a policy inspired by far-seeing statesmanship and one dictated by popular passion. 'Our business,' wrote Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, 'is not to collect trophies, but to bring back the world to peaceful habits.' †

That, and nothing else, was also proclaimed as the main business of the Paris Conference ; and it is by the measure of its success in bringing back the world to peaceful habits that its work will ultimately be judged. How far do the proceedings of the Conference and their results, as at present known to us,

---

\* See Wellington's Memorandum cited in my 'Confederation of Europe,' p. 162.

† *Ibid.*, p. 143.

give promise of such success? In attempting to answer this question it will again be profitable to see what light is thrown upon it by the experience of a hundred years ago.

So far as the procedure of the Paris Conference is concerned, it is clear that history has repeated itself in a very striking way. At the outset statesmen were eloquent in their repudiation of the spirit and the methods of the Congress of Vienna. President Wilson, especially, made himself the champion of a new diplomacy which was to have no secrets from the public, and he embodied this principle in those Fourteen Points which were accepted by a war-weary world as a supplement to the Decalogue. But political human nature, even in America, proved too strong for the idealists, and the proceedings of the Conference seem to have conformed closely to the precedents of Vienna. The public sessions of the Conference, to which alone the Press was admitted, were mere full-dress parades; the real work of the Conference was done, as at Vienna, in secret sessions of the representatives of the Great Powers, in informal conversations, and by a series of committees *ad hoc*; and, as at Vienna, though the theoretical equality of all sovereign States was admitted, the ultimate decision on all questions was reserved to the Great Powers alone. It could not be otherwise; and if the democratic world has cause for complaint, this is not in the fact that statesmen had to bow to the inevitable, but that they had consciously or unconsciously, in the passion of speech-making, misled the peoples into a belief in the impending realisation of an unrealisable ideal.

As to the spirit of the Conference, we may say with truth that it displayed little of the petty personal motives which deformed the proceedings at Vienna. The plenipotentiaries in Paris were in too serious a mood to dance; and if their progress seemed to an impatient and ignorant world irritatingly slow, this was not due to the interruption of business by frivolity, but was in part due to the vast complexity of the problems to be solved, in part, doubtless, to the insistence in certain quarters on priority being given to the settlement of general principles on which opinions differed, and of which the practical application was largely a matter of speculation. But if the selfish rivalry of dynasts, big and little, was absent, the far more serious rivalry of nations was conspicuously present; and, as at Vienna, the only forces making for compromise were the overwhelming need for peace, and in the last resort the fiat of the superior Powers.

The really fundamental difference between the situation in 1919 and that in 1814 was in the conditions which determined the relation of the Great Powers to each other and to the world at large. In 1814 the downfall of Napoleon had left the four Powers of the Alliance in complete control and with their forces unbroken; the problem was no more than that of adjusting their claims and of securing a stable equilibrium between them. This problem, moreover, was made easier of solution by the fact that one of these Powers, Great Britain, owing to her unchallenged supremacy at sea, had been in a position to put forward at a very early stage of the negotiations a settlement of all the colonial questions at issue, which was not only at once accepted, but was held up as an example of that moderation and consideration for the general weal which it was hoped would throughout inform the counsels of the Powers. Thus the discussions at Vienna were not only narrowed down to the question of the territorial rearrangements necessary in Europe, but Great Britain was in a position to play in them a decisive mediating part, since her only interest in them was to secure a stable peace.

The situation with which the Powers at Paris were faced was vastly different. The problems to be solved touch every corner of the earth, and there is no single Power whose interests are not vitally involved in the solution of at least some of them. Moreover, the stability of all political organisms, national or international, ultimately depends on an equilibrium of the contending interests within them, that is to say on the balance of power, and it was the recognition of this fact which gave to the work of the Congress of Vienna, in spite of all its shortcomings, a very real value. But no such 'just equilibrium' as in 1815 produced an unprecedented period of peace in Europe is possible in the circumstances of the present. The balance of power presupposes the existence of a system of stable States, and in vast spaces of the world such States have now no existence. What was Russia is now chaos; the Habsburg Monarchy has dissolved into its elements; the German *Reich*, though still substantially intact, is prostrate. Among the ruins a medley of mutually antagonistic nationalities are struggling in the name of 'self-determination' to assert their 'just rights,' often in regions where the colours on the ethnographical map are as indeterminate as in shot silk. Thus a whole complex of questions connected with Eastern Europe and a large part of Asia are



still unsolved, and until stable bodies politic take shape out of this confusion, no settlement can be more than provisional. It is this fact that provides the main justification for the experiment in international control known as the League of Nations. It may be of interest to examine how far the experience and the debates of a hundred years ago throw light on the prospects of the League, whether as a temporary expedient or as a permanent organisation for the benefit of mankind.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, accepted by the representatives of the Powers on 28th April, though it appears to consecrate that principle of the Universal Union for which the Emperor Alexander contended, is in effect, like the Quadruple Alliance of 1815, a continuation of the league of Powers associated in the war for the purpose of preserving peace. It is true that in the Assembly provision is made for the representation of all the lesser States, and these are to have, as well, elected spokesmen in the Council of the Great Powers. But, though this arrangement gives the weaker nations the right and opportunity to make their opinions heard, the ultimate decision in all cases is still reserved for the Great Powers alone. All questions in dispute have, in the first instance, to be brought before the Council, where the representatives of the Great Powers are in the majority; and though, by Article XV., the Council may refer a dispute to the Assembly, the opinion of the Assembly is only to be decisive 'if concurred in by the representatives of those 'members of the League represented in the Council.' Under Article IV. it is provided that 'any member of the League not 'represented on the Council shall be invited to send a representative to act as a member at any meeting of the Council 'during the consideration of matters especially affecting the 'interests of that member of the League.' This principle was consistently acted upon a hundred years ago,\* but it did not prevent the minor States from resenting and protesting against the 'dictatorship exercised by the Great Powers.'

The League of Nations, then, as it has emerged from the Peace Conference, is essentially an alliance of the Great Powers; and no one can dispute that, if peace is to be preserved, such an

---

\* The Allied Sovereigns may in all such cases pursue the course which they have hitherto adopted, of placing themselves in relation with the particular State upon whatever may constitute the object of common interest to be treated of. Castlereagh to Earl Cathcart. 27th March 1818. Wellington, 'Supplementary Dispatches,' xii. p. 445.

alliance will for a long time to come be very necessary. Where it is open to criticism seems to me to be precisely in those points which Castlereagh criticised in the similar schemes for a 'universal guarantee' put forward at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. He objected, and I think rightly, to the meetings of the Powers being erected into a regular and permanent system, on the ground that, so far from allaying unrest, it would tend to increase it, because States dissatisfied with the settlements effected would have a perpetual opportunity for reopening the discussion. It was for this reason also that he opposed the conversion of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle into a Congress, as 'it might give rise to ideas of change not desirable to encourage.\*' Bathurst, in the name of the British Government, also objected to 'a new treaty,' on the ground that it would 'set the mind of Europe again afloat,' would offend excluded Powers, and would lead to 'quarrels as to their future admission.'† The last objection is very applicable to the League of Nations. The experience of 1818 proved how impossible in the long run it is to isolate a Great Power, however dangerous it may be considered to come to terms with it; and it was the military recovery of France, culminating after her admission to the alliance in the claim to 'restore order' in Spain, which ultimately broke up the League. The Germans are diligent students of history, and very clever in applying its lessons.

The constitution of the League of Nations, in spite of the imposing machinery it has set up, provides no means by which such a breach is to be avoided. Council and Assembly are essentially mere meetings of diplomatists; their decisions will be arrived at by the usual diplomatic methods and determined by the usual international considerations; votes will most certainly, as in the old Hungarian parliament, be 'weighed, not counted'; the *liberum veto* will be overcome as it was in the old Polish Assembly—by the threat of consequences; and the stability of the whole elaborate international edifice will depend, after as before, on the balance of power. The most that can be hoped is that, as Gentz believed, the organisation will help to keep the balance steady. The Secretariat and the international archives will doubtless serve a useful purpose in facilitating the progress towards an international juridical system.

---

\* To Cathcart, 27th March 1818. *Ibid.*

† To Castlereagh, 13th November 1818.

But the most difficult problem connected with this system, the constitution of an International Court, has been shelved. Nor is this surprising, since it is a problem the best brains of both hemispheres have for years past laboured in vain to solve.\*

This being the general character of the League of Nations, as at present projected, it may be of value to test some of its provisions by the principles laid down as fundamental by the British Government a hundred years ago. The Covenant of the League expressly repudiates the principle of 'intervention' (Article XV.), and in this respect it honours the British tradition; but the 'Holy Alliance' equally repudiated it—yet on occasion intervened. It was from the first obvious that there were likely to be lively controversies in the councils of the League as to what are or are not 'disputes solely within the jurisdiction of 'domestic law'; and the action of the Foreign Relations Committee of the American Senate in pressing the claims of 'republican' Ireland to representation at Paris was, almost avowedly, not dictated by any deep concern for the supposed rights or wrongs of the Irish people, but by the desire to show how easily the League might at any moment be turned into a real menace to the independence and domestic peace of the nations. The attitude of the Committee can hardly be described as considerate towards Great Britain, though all hostile intention was repudiated; but it at least provides a very useful object lesson for all who have eyes to see. It shows how, quite apart from the possibilities of intervention due to the application by the League of the old principle of 'vicinage,' nations will be exposed to the risk of concerted action provoked by dissatisfied minorities within them, and set in motion, not necessarily in the general interest, but in the interest of the most influential member or members of the League.

In this connection, too, one wonders whether British statesmen have fully grasped the possible consequences of the admission as a member of the League of 'any self-governing 'State, Dominion, or Colony.' This provision was probably inevitable, in view of the new self-consciousness of the Dominions, but its consequences may none the less be portentous. When it was proposed at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818,

---

\* See the numerous schemes, none, in my opinion, satisfactory, published among the *Rapports* of the Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable at The Hague.

that the German States, who had adhered separately to the Holy Alliance should be admitted as such to the suggested general league of mutual guarantee, Castlereagh objected that this 'might dissolve the Germanic Confederation' of which the States would be 'subject to a double jurisdiction, the German 'and the European.'\* This objection may have little weight at present, or for many years to come, in the case of the British Dominions, which are bound to the Empire by ties of sentiment and self-interest. It is easy to imagine, however, what would happen if Ireland, endowed with 'Dominion self-government,' were to be represented in the International Assembly.

A shrewd criticism of Castlereagh on the projected league of guarantee was that it would destroy 'all moral guarantees 'in the minor States,' which would be placed in a position to agitate and make themselves unpleasant in every way without running any risk.† This, it appears to me, will be equally true of the League of Nations. There will not be a petty State with a real or imagined grievance but will carry it to Geneva, where a crowd of international jurists will be deeply interested in keeping it alive. The litigious spirit, in the case of private persons, is held in check by the cost of litigation; but no such check would operate in the case of self-assertive nationalities. Great Britain, especially, with her world-wide relations, might thus be exposed to an infinitely irritating juridical guerilla warfare, which might easily prove extremely costly, and would certainly not make for a peaceful atmosphere. The United States, which in this respect is threatened mainly by the alarm and jealousy of the Latin-American Republics,‡ has very wisely contracted out of the League in respect of the western hemisphere.

The true character of this portentous exception is disguised in the Covenant of the League by the ambiguous definition of the Monroe Doctrine as a 'regional understanding.' Now the Monroe Doctrine has, as a matter of fact, been understood in a great variety of ways by American statesmen, and the substitution of the phrase 'regional understanding,' new to diplomacy, for the older phrase, also very modern, of 'sphere

---

\* To Bathurst, 9th November 1818. F.O. Continent. Aix. Castlereagh. No. 29.

† *Ibid.*

‡ See 'The New Monroism,' by the present writer, in the *Edinburgh Review* for January 1914.

'of influence,' only serves to disguise from the world the nature of the concession made by the Powers to the spirit of the old Adam. President Wilson, of course, claimed that the League of Nations grew naturally out of the Monroe Doctrine, was indeed but an extension of the Doctrine to all the world, and he asserted that in making his proposals for the League he was acting strictly in accordance with the tradition and policy of the United States as a nation, and in fulfilment of all that it had 'professed and striven for.' This claim I have already criticised in the pages of this REVIEW, and here I need only repeat that there is little in American history to show that the United States have been less prone than other nations to take advantage of the weakness of their neighbours. As Professor Bushnell Hart put it, from the time of President Polk onward,

'instead of the peaceful doctrine that America ought to remain as it was, the United States now began systematically to rearrange the map of North America at the expense of their neighbours, and to maintain with all their might that there was a mysterious thing called the Monroe Doctrine, which prevented anyone from interfering with the Latin-Americans—except ourselves.' \*

This 'mysterious thing' has now received the consecration of the Peace Conference, without any attempt being made to unveil its mystery.† It is not without significance that the formal protest attempted by certain of the weaker Latin-American States was treated by the Conference with marked contempt.

In making these comments I have no intention of directing any adverse criticism against the policy of the United States either in the past or present. I only object to the claim, which has tended to mislead public opinion, that their policy has been consistently less self-seeking than that of other nations. After all, the true principles of national policy, which will continue to obtain so long as nations exist, were laid down by a great American in words which remain as true to-day as they were when first written: 'Under every form of government,' wrote Alexander Hamilton, 'rulers are only trustees for the interest

---

\* 'The Monroe Doctrine,' p. 112.

† The 'explanation' offered by British ministers, that it would be interpreted by the League as occasion arose, need not have fluttered the doves in America. For this purpose the League would mean its most powerful member, namely the United States.

‘and happiness of their nation, and cannot, consistently with their trust, follow the suggestions of kindness or humanity towards others, to the prejudice of their own constituents.’\* It may not be true, as Hamilton said, that ‘vicinity, or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies’; but, since every frontier drawn is in essence a declaration of war, they are at least potential enemies. That this conception persists, and is likely to persist, is proved by the strong opposition to the whole idea of the League in America itself, an opposition so powerful that it compelled the safeguarding of the Monroe Doctrine, to which reference has been made. There is, in short, but little sign on either side of the Atlantic of that general disposition to subordinate purely national interests which alone would make a League of Nations in itself effective for the preservation of peace. Peace will depend, after 1919 as after 1815, not upon any particular engagements of the Powers for ‘eventual exertion’ against anyone that shall at any time threaten it, but upon the justice and the wisdom of the terms of the present settlement, and the effective balance of forces which will result from it.

In comparing, from this point of view, the peace treaties already formulated at the Paris Conference with those concluded in 1815, we are struck by the far greater influence exercised on the former by the pressure of public opinion in the victorious countries, which has not unnaturally clamoured for retribution and the transference of the financial burdens created by the war on to the shoulders of those responsible for it. From the point of view of abstract justice there is everything to be said for this demand, and nothing could be more natural than the righteous passion which has inspired it. But the concern of the statesman is not with the past, but with the future; not only with what is lawful, but with what is expedient; and his vision, when dealing with a defeated foe, should be unclouded by any sentiment, whether of compassion or revenge. It was because Castlereagh realised this that France, in 1815, was saved for Europe, and Prussia, whose ‘insatiable appetite’ was even then recognised, was kept within bounds for fifty years. France was spared and even encouraged, not because she had ceased to inspire fear and distrust, but because her existence as a prosperous and powerful State was rightly considered necessary to the stability

---

\* ‘Letters of Pacificus,’ No. IV. ‘The Federalist,’ ed. 1818, p. 458; footnote.

of the European system. Had public opinion prevailed, France would have been dismembered, and Prussian militarism would have been placed in a position to mature its plans for the domination of the Continent far earlier and in far more favourable circumstances than has actually been the case.\*

In estimating the quality of the statesmanship which inspired the peace terms presented to Germany, the root question is whether a reasonably contented, prosperous, and powerful German nation will or will not be necessary to the stability of the European States system; and, if it be necessary, whether the terms to be imposed give a reasonable prospect of the German nation becoming, within a measurable time, contented, prosperous, and powerful. The necessity has been admitted by all responsible statesmen; and indeed the dullest imagination can see that a discontented and disorganised mass of some sixty million people, set in the centre of Europe, would not make for stability and peace. Moreover, since it is impossible to foresee what will emerge from the welter of confusion in the Slav world, it is at least possible that Germany may once more be needed as a bulwark of order, with or without the co-operation of the Poles, the constitution, character, and limits of whose regenerated Republic are still on the knees of the gods. How far do the terms of peace offered conform to these actual and potential needs of Europe?

But little light is thrown on the question by the clause in the Covenant of the League which provides for the ultimate inclusion of a chastened and repentant Germany; for, as I have already pointed out, the constitution of the League does not affect the question of the relative weight of the Powers which compose it. Inside or outside, a hopelessly crushed Germany would be impotent for good as for ill. From this point of view the prospective existence of the League merely confuses the issue. In one way, indeed, it even makes the solution of the practical problem more difficult. Castlereagh, contending for the substantial integrity of France, remarked on the greed of 'the limitrophe Powers,' and added that they did not seem 'to fear a kick from the lion when his toils were removed.' The League proposes to meet this objection in the case of Germany by providing in

---

\* At Vienna, and again after the Waterloo campaign, Prussia claimed for Germany not only Alsace and Lorraine, but the Netherlands and Switzerland, as former parts of the *Reich*.

effect that the toils shall never be removed ; and, from the German point of view, it modifies little in the situation that the victorious Powers are nominally to be enmeshed in the same net. At the same time the peace terms are such that it is calculated that for half a century to come the lion will have no kick left in him.

This policy may be necessary in view of the general situation ; it is clearly just, in so far as it inflicts on the Germans the fate which, in the event of their victory, they had proclaimed their intention of inflicting upon us. But if the necessity of these measures be admitted—the question of justice is wholly secondary—it is possible to regret that circumstances do not allow us to pursue in regard to Germany a policy more closely modelled on that which in 1815, under the influence of Wellington and Castlereagh, we pursued in the case of France. The guiding idea of this policy was that France, which had been led astray by evil principles, should become reconciled as quickly as possible with Europe ; that in order to make this possible her substantial integrity should be maintained and all unnecessary humiliation of her pride avoided. The indemnities imposed were very large, but not such as to reduce an industrious people to despair ; and though both the internal affairs and the external policy of France were kept under the surveillance of the Allies through the Council of Ministers in Paris, it was clearly understood that this tutelage would cease the moment she gave certain guarantees for good behaviour. It may be noted, too, that even this modified system of tutelage proved impossible to maintain ; and if it was removed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, this was certainly not due to any restored confidence in the stability and peaceable disposition of the French people, but to the conviction, of British statesmen especially, that it caused more evil than it cured. Not even the fact that the recrudescence of revolutionary propaganda in France proceeded *pari passu* with the reorganisation of the French army moved Castlereagh from his conviction that it would be a mistake for the Alliance to take any overt action ; it would operate best, he said, ‘ by the ‘ silent force of its inactivity.’ The sequel proved that he was right. The reconciliation of France with Europe was rapid ; it was more than thirty years before another Napoleon began to dream of healing the wounds inflicted on her in 1815 ; and above all, a hundred years of peace with Great Britain, unbroken in spite of occasional quarrels, prepared the way for the momentous Alliance of 1914.



If we set aside the passionate resentments of the moment—as fortunately for us and the world at large they were set aside in 1815—we shall recognise that in the future Europe will have need of Germany as she has need of France. In what respects do the terms of peace give promise of the supply of this need? So far as the territorial sacrifices demanded of Germany are concerned, I do not think that, with possibly one or two exceptions, these will inflict any unhealable wound. The excision of the Poles, the Danes, and the Alsace-Lorrainers from the German body politic will remove a constant source of irritation of which liberal Germany, in its resentment at the discredit cast upon the whole country by Prussian methods, has never ceased to complain.\* The exceptions are the mutilation of Prussia and separation of Danzig, the occupation of the Saar valley, the incorporation of the Bohemian Germans in the new Czecho-Slovak Republic, and the surrender to Italy of a part of German Tyrol. Of the first of these the best that can be said is that it is the result of an honest attempt to solve an insoluble problem—that of finding a reasonable *modus vivendi* between two bitterly hostile races at a point where their interests and ideals are in the most complete conflict. The restoration of Danzig to its ancient status of a free city, with certain definite rights reserved to Poland, is probably the best solution that could have been found. It has, however, the obvious fault of all compromises—it satisfies neither party; and, since neither the Poles nor the Prussians are distinguished by the spirit of moderation, its permanence depends entirely on the effectiveness of the League of Nations.

The temporary occupation of the Saar valley is, I think, just in itself, and ought not to cause any lasting sense of grievance in the Germans, if they are prepared to see reason. Quite apart from the question of compensation for the wanton destruction of the coal-mines of northern France, the Germans should remember that Saarlouis and the surrounding district were taken from France in 1815 under false pretences. Prussia's claim was based on the necessity of Saarlouis for the defence of lower Germany; her real motive, as is now known, was to secure the valuable, as yet unexploited, coal basin of the Saar, so as to

---

\* See the remarkable series of articles on the Prussian régime in Poland published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* during 1911.

place the industries of northern France at a disadvantage compared with her own.\*

The incorporation of the 'German fringe' of Bohemia in Czecho-Slovakia is a more real, if a less immediately tangible grievance. But the Germans themselves will recognise in time that it was dictated by an overwhelming series of economic, strategical, and historic necessities. In view of the extremely rapid absorption of the German by the Czech elements in Bohemia even before the war, it is possible that the problem created will solve itself. But if the German fringe retains its Germanism the *Reichsdeutschen* may be reconciled to the situation by the realisation of the fact that the existence of this powerful German element in Bohemia will form a strong link between regenerated Germany and that one of the Slav peoples which has been and is most closely in touch with western civilisation.

Of all the cessions that of the upper valley of the Etsch, including Botzen, in order to perfect the strategical frontier of Italy, is likely to prove the most permanently wounding to German sentiment; for this region, the home of Walther von der Vogelweide and other medieval poets, was the cradle of German literature, and in more recent times the heroic exploits of Andreas Hofer, still celebrated in song, have given it a special value in the eyes of German patriots.

That there is a risk of the continued existence of a bitter German irredentism cannot, then, be denied. It is a risk that, in the circumstances, has to be run; but a wise statesmanship will see to it that it is modified, not only by the vigilance of the Powers, but by a serious effort to secure for the Germans the hope of a tolerable existence within their narrower limits. How far do the peace terms to be imposed hold out such a hope? We may note, to begin with, that the terms are, in three important respects, far more severe than those imposed upon France in 1815, namely in the matters of the indemnity, of the colonies, and of enforced disarmament. From the point of view of abstract justice there is nothing to be said against this; for the ruin wrought by the crimes of Germany has been immeasurably greater than that wrought by the crimes of Revolutionary France. But I am concerned here, not with justice, but with policy. It is just to demand that

---

\* See Vidal de la Blache, *La France de l'Est*.

Germany shall make all the reparation in her power; it is bad policy to formulate this demand in terms so vague as to make it impossible for her to see any limit to her punishment. It is, in my opinion, of the first importance that the sum to be enacted by way of indemnity, however large, should be fixed; for it is essential to the health of the world that Germany should become once more a rapid wealth-producer; it is essential even to the securing of the indemnity itself; and no people can work with a will if it feels that, do what it may, all the fruits of its toil will go to others. The indemnity imposed upon France in 1815 was fixed at a very large sum, which was subsequently somewhat reduced.\* An extremely large sum imposed upon Germany, with some hope of its reduction in return for good behaviour, would be far more wholesome in its general effect than the imposition of a comparatively small indemnity with the prospect of its indefinite increase.

The question of the German colonies has been decided, and no one can doubt that the arguments against their restoration carry immense weight. At the same time we must face the possible consequences of depriving the Germans of such safety-valves for expansive national energy as colonies provide. The pressure to expand was the main cause of the war, and it is well to realise the reason of this pressure. It was not growth of population, for the industrial and agricultural needs of Germany before the war caused annually a vast immigration of Slavs; it was not mere Pan-German megalomania. The true reason was given to me by an eminent German in a conversation I had with him in the spring of 1914; it was that the German educational system was producing a large class of highly trained men for whom no work could be found at home, and who, in the absence of such outlets as we possess in India or Egypt, were becoming a danger to the State. This particular problem was and is, of course, not confined to Germany; it is present wherever educational systems are at work producing a supply for which there is no demand. But it is idle to suppose that Germany can be made a peaceful and helpful member of the European States system if she is not only deprived of her colonies, but cribbed, cabined, and confined within her own limits by a boycott, official or unofficial,

---

\* It was paid off in 1818 by means of loans raised by Messrs. Hope of Amsterdam, and Baring, who received in exchange French *rentes*.

of her goods and her nationals. I am told by those who have recently been in Germany that the general attitude of the people is one of complete apathy, varied by sudden outbursts of unreasoning rage. Neither apathy nor rage is a mood which it is desirable to encourage. The health of the world necessitates that, as soon as possible, normal relations of intercourse shall be re-established between the Germans and the rest of mankind. Germany cannot receive back the oversea power which she abused, but no artificial barriers should be erected against the legitimate restoration of her foreign intercourse.

A generous policy in this respect is indeed necessary, if the provisions of the Peace Treaty with regard to armaments are to obtain the desired result. The compulsory disbanding of the vast corps of professional soldiers is likely to produce in Germany results similar to those produced in France in 1814 by the disbandment of Napoleon's veterans—that is, the creation of a large class of discontented men, trained to nothing but the profession of arms. In Germany, I understand, many of the ex-officers have already been absorbed into commerce; but the absorption of the whole body presupposes a revival of industry on a great scale. Without this, Germany would become—as she once was—a vast reserve of mercenary soldiers, ready for adventures in any part of the world, and most certainly not an element of stability.\* In general, too, it may be noted that the proposals for the functions of the League of Nations in watching over German armaments widely depart, whether rightly or wrongly, from what was considered just and wise in the case of France a hundred years ago. Even the second Treaty of Paris, after the object-lesson of the Hundred Days, contained no provision for the limitation of French armaments; and though the Powers watched with misgiving the activities of Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr in reorganising the army, all idea of collective interference was overruled by Castlereagh in the name of the British Government. The motive was not confidence in the good intentions of France, but the root objection to external interference in the internal affairs of States, so long as these had not developed into an ostensible danger, and the conviction that any unnecessary wounding of

---

\* The *Times* special correspondent at Helsingfors reported on 11th June that 'the Red General Staff is said to contain 60 per cent. of Germans, either former prisoners of war or new arrivals.'

the national *amour propre* would be likely to create the very danger it was sought to avoid. The provisions for the immediate cutting down of the German armaments, under the supervision of the Powers, is a natural counsel of expediency; I doubt the expediency of making this supervision permanent. Periodical incursions of international inspectors into Germany may or may not be effective for the purpose intended; they will certainly cause profound resentment and be a perpetual source of irritation.

With the peace terms offered to the rump of the Austrian Empire, and to Hungary, and with the fate of Turkey, I do not propose to deal. There is no analogy whatever between the situation in Eastern Europe at the present time and anything which obtained in 1815. But, though I sympathise with the reasonable aspirations of the nationalities which have risen out of the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy, I cannot share to the full the popular satisfaction at the total disappearance of a power which, with all its faults, did at least for centuries succeed in keeping some sort of peace between them. Voltaire said that if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him. I am inclined to say the same of the Austrian Empire. The 'Balkanisation' of Eastern Europe is perhaps the most ominous of the signs of the times, and it may be doubted whether in the long run the League of Nations will prove an effective substitute as a peace-keeper for the ancient prestige of the House of Habsburg. The principal question arising out of the break-up of Turkey, on the other hand, is one which exercised the minds of the great long before the French Revolution overset the old order in Europe. The Prince de Ligne has left us an account of a conversation between the Empress Catherine II. and the Emperor Joseph II., which he overheard in the intervals of dozing in the gorgeous coach which in 1787 carried the imperial party on their journey to the recently annexed province of the Crimea. The talk of those exalted personages was about the impending war with Turkey, and the assignment of the spoils. It closed with the Emperor throwing himself back in his seat, and saying 'Enfin, que 'diable faire avec Constantinople?' The question was unanswered. It remains unanswered still.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS.

## CONCEPTIONS OF WAR IN 1914

1. 1914. By Field-Marshal VISCOUNT FRENCH of Ypres. Constable. 1919.
2. **Forty Days in 1914.** By Major-General SIR F. MAURICE, K.C.M.G., C.B. Constable. 1919.
3. **The Times Documentary History of the War, Vol. V.** Printing House Square. 1918.

IT has long been a commonplace among students of military history that the first crop of books produced by any war contains but little of real permanent value. As a general rule it is not until many years have elapsed, eliminating from the stage of life the more prominent figures whose activities, be they successful or otherwise, have influenced the course of the passionate drama we know as war, that in the fulness of time the facts which influenced momentous decisions can be rightly appraised. Rightly or wrongly national prestige is held to be involved in the reputation of this or that statesman or general, and in the conduct of this or that unit or formation which wears the national uniform. As a rule the confidence of an army in its leaders is considered to be a plant of a growth so tender that until fresh leaders have arisen to replace those removed by time it is considered inadvisable to lift the veil which shrouds the dark sanctuary where statesmen and generals perform the more secret rites appertaining to the worship of Mars. True, the outer courts of the temple are made resplendent with decoration, the air is made heavy with the intoxicating fumes of national incense; in the porticos impressive figures pass and repass; but behind the veil?—what of the great men?—and what of their acolytes the brethren of the General Staff? The story of the war of 1866 was not given to the world in adequate detail until the war of 1870 had become but a memory: we were but just learning what happened in 1870, and why it happened, when our western civilisation was rocked to its very base by the cataclysm of 1914. And yet already, while the sound of the last 'barrage' is still ringing in our ears, we have presented to us two books—widely different, it is true, in scope and in merit—which enable us to peep for a brief moment behind the veil which covers the jealously

guarded sanctuary where a few men think, plan, and take decisions fraught with momentous consequences to all mankind. It is worth while to pause for a moment to consider this curious phenomenon, this unwonted unveiling of the Holy of Holies by a High Priest, and by one of his most accomplished adepts—one who for long was in something more than minor orders.

Let us at once begin by saying that the history of the Great War of 1914-18 will not be found in the two books before us. Neither writer has set himself so impossible a task as to endeavour to accomplish single-handed the superhuman effort involved in knowing and co-ordinating the necessary facts of even one phase of the struggle. This would postulate access to the documents in possession of our enemies as well as those of ourselves and our Allies, and yet no book can be considered to be adequate as a history in which all significant facts have not been collected, sifted, and properly ordered. It is clear that, as heretofore, we shall have to wait—and wait some considerable time—for history to be written. In the meantime the student of war to-day may be thankful for what he has been given; it is more than has been vouchsafed to former generations of his kind so soon after the close of great operations. In Lord French's book, '1914,' and in Sir Frederick Maurice's admirable study of the movements of the German armies during the critical period covered by 'Forty Days in '1914,' we have a well-known commander and an accomplished staff officer telling us of great events in which they themselves played a part, and—what is more important than any narrative, however complete it is as a thing in itself—telling the story in such a way as to enable us to see the working of the human mind in relation to the problems involved in the use of force as an instrument to carry out national policy. Sir Frederick Maurice tells us in his preface that his book owes its origin to curiosity, to a desire to find out for himself what the Germans were planning and doing during the retreat from Mons. Thanks to this curiosity he has made all British soldiers his debtors for the instructive, stimulating, and yet, as becomes a staff officer experienced in the difficult task of acting as the confidential adviser of a commander, perfectly discreet study he has produced of a phase of operations in which the British army played a part so great as almost to be decisive. By piecing together items of information obtained in accounts of the war published in Germany, France, and neutral countries

—and not forgetting the evidence of the presence at definite times and places of enemy troops afforded by the trail of atrocities blazed across Belgium—he has been able to reconstruct not only the march tables of German formations but, what is infinitely more important to the student of war, the processes of that corporate and amoral mind, the Great General Staff, when, after two generations of intellectual and material preparation it went to work, at its own time, and in a theatre of its own choosing, to justify its existence by providing its country with a war thoroughly German in conception and execution.

The relation between German theory and German practice and their action and reaction on the fate of the British army in France, so well developed by Sir Frederick Maurice, is a side of the question to which we shall return later in this article, after considering some aspects of the book written by the former commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force, which has been given to the public day after day in the pages of the *Daily Telegraph*. If General Maurice is at pains in his preface to disclaim any suggestion that he is writing history, the highly personal form in which Lord French tells his story should ensure for him immunity from being judged as an historian. We must take the book for what it is, and not for what it cannot possibly be. It is a personal narrative by a commander in whose mind events and impressions are still fresh; it is not history, but if read with discrimination it is a contribution to history.

One of the many difficulties which beset the path of the student of war is appraising justly the personal factor in the higher command of this or that army in some past campaign. When the dust of dead generals has been covered by the grey flagstones of national sepulchre—when to reconstruct the man, the chief, the leader, we have to depend on a few typewritten orders and the uncertain recollections of former staff officers and subordinates, we may well feel that the task of reconstituting the personality which has moulded events is one beyond our powers. Lord French has seen to it that the future historian of the events of 1914 shall not lack some expert guidance, at any rate along one particular path, which seems, however, to lead to the conclusion that the measure of the success achieved by the British Expeditionary Force is in no small degree due to the wisdom and firmness of its commander-in-chief, while its disappointments and its failures



were the fault of his superiors at home, and of some of his principal subordinates in the field. How far the future historian may be disposed to follow Lord French along the path so obligingly marked out for him we may leave to that probably much harassed individual. If every commander of eminence, who at intervals of four and a half years of unparalleled strain and sustained effort has found himself at loggerheads with his superiors and his subordinates, feels it incumbent on him to give the world his own version of what has happened, it is probable that the seeker after truth, half lost in a maze of controversy, will turn with a sigh of relief to the pages of the official historian, where he may hope to find not only the truth, but the whole truth, and nothing but the truth—though he will have to wait for it.

Readers of this REVIEW will remember that a few years before the outbreak of the great world conflict, whose conclusion we have now happily seen, the conceptions of war which prevailed in the French and German armies were examined in the pages of the EDINBURGH REVIEW, and an attempt was made to estimate how the British army stood in relation to what is commonly called 'a doctrine of war.' In two articles\* was emphasised the importance of General Langlois' dictum: 'Sans doctrine, les textes ne sont rien: à des textes sans doctrine, serait de beaucoup préférable une doctrine sans textes, ce qui était le cas à l'époque napoléonienne,' and after dealing with the suggestion that the divergence in the French and German doctrines of war is due either to the relative position of those countries or the degree of preparation of their armies, the writer went on to say:—'An examination of the French and German doctrines, as presented on the one hand by Colonel Foch, and on the other by General von Caemmerer, shows that throughout the whole course of a campaign the exponents of each school of thought maintain an outlook on war which in many essentials is radically different.'

The Colonel Foch, whose illuminating book on war was commended to the readers of this REVIEW seven years ago, has since proved himself to be the greatest soldier in Europe, while the brilliant writers and hard thinkers of the French General Staff, the men who from their study of past wars evolved the

---

\* 'The British Army and Modern Conceptions of War,' April 1911, and 'The Place of Doctrine in War,' January 1912.

French conception of war, have proved the justice of what was said of them in April 1911: 'They have forced upon a reluctant Europe, somewhat contemptuous after Sedan, recognition of the fact that the philosophy of war is not an inalienable Teutonic possession: without a shot fired they have rehabilitated the French army, and they have not tricked it out in clothes stolen from Berlin.'

To what extent was the German catastrophe due to the conception of war held in the German army and to the fact that the outlook on war of Marshal Foch and his assistants differed as widely as the poles from that of Marshal von Hindenburg and General von Lüdendorf and their highly-trained fellow workers of the Great General Staff? Sometimes consciously, more often unconsciously, Sir Frederick Maurice and Lord French have a good deal to tell us on this subject, and the pages in which they do so are those best worthy of the attention of the student of war, who can safely postpone his judgment, until fuller information is forthcoming, on other questions of purely personal interest, such as whether Mr. Asquith and Lord Kitchener did all they could in the supply of munitions, and whether Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was right or wrong to fight at Le Cateau. These and other personal issues have been raised by Lord French in a manner which cannot but react unfavourably on the army to which he belongs, whether his statements are correct or incorrect. A commander who takes it upon himself to teach his army that it is possible to remove by intrigue the Government whose trusted servant he is, has taken a big step towards teaching his own subordinates that it may be possible to effect a change in the higher command by the same methods.

It is inevitable, and it is right and proper, that on the appointed day dirty linen shall be washed, and washed in public, but no subordinate—and in this matter even a Field-Marshal is a subordinate—has any business to do so before the appointed washing day. Once the official history is out the floodgates of controversy are unloosed, and it is open to any commander who feels himself aggrieved to publish his own version of the story, but till then discretion is something more than a virtue—it is intimately bound up with discipline, the life blood of an army, without which an army is but a mass of corruption, useless except for political and social evil. It is well known that the compilers of our official histories do not

put pen to paper without calling for and carefully weighing all the diaries, reports, and statements, which can help them to elucidate the problems of a war. There is no reason to believe that the narrative of a Field-Marshal is treated with less respect than those of his subordinates, nor are there any grounds for supposing that the officers of the General Staff of the British army who may be entrusted with the task of writing an adequate and final history of the rôle of their army in this the greatest of all wars, would suppress the truth or pervert it for any purpose whatsoever—even to enhance the reputation of 'politicians' at the expense of that of a distinguished soldier.

As said above, the examination of French and German teaching in past numbers of this REVIEW shows that it is not only at the beginning—in the opening moves of the great game—but throughout the whole course of operations, that a fundamental difference of outlook on the problems of war characterises the French and German doctrines of war. From this dictum Sir Frederick Maurice dissents. While admitting that: 'When the 'first groupings of the opposing armies are compared, we get at 'once the key to the mentality of the French and German 'leaders, and to the principles which guided them,' he insists that these principles were the outcome of the study of the several factors which confronted each nation in solving its particular problem, and emphasises his dissent from the theory of 'doctrine' in the following words:—

'Consideration of all these factors by the French and German General Staffs during the years which preceded the outbreak of war, had led each of them to inculcate certain methods of procedure, which were sometimes labelled, erroneously, the French and German doctrines of war. They were not doctrines applicable to war in general, but solutions of the special problems of a war between the Central Powers and Entente in Western Europe.' \*

Sir Frederick Maurice is well known to the army not only as an accomplished staff officer and serious student of his profession, but, what is much more important, he has earned the respect of his comrades by showing at a critical moment that the interests of what he believes to be the truth are more to him than personal success and a brilliant career. His intellectual integrity is so far beyond question that we may accept without reservation any statement of fact which he advances to support

---

\* Maurice, p. 23.

a proposition which he maintains, knowing well that he will not colour any fact to fit any theory. It remains to be seen whether the facts which Sir Frederick Maurice discloses in his study of the operations in 1914 do in truth support his contention that German teaching does not comprise a body of doctrine applicable to war in general, but merely solutions of the special problems of a war between the Central Powers and those of the Entente on the Western front.

In considering the opening moves of the campaign on the Western front, Sir Frederick Maurice quite rightly lays great stress on the German predilection for envelopment, an inheritance from Moltke much elaborated by Schlieffen, who continued the Moltkean tradition when Chief of the Great General Staff. To this adherence to the doctrine of envelopment we owe the rape of Belgium. In his chapter on 'The German Plan,' he says:—

'Having received the endorsement of the Emperor, the theory of envelopment was preached in the military text-books of Germany and practised sedulously at the German manœuvres, yet it was obviously out of the question to get round the large and highly-trained armies which France could place quickly on the 150 miles of common frontier. If the armies of Germany were confined to such narrow limits, they would find that frontier manned by the French from end to end before they could reach it in sufficient strength to develop their attack. Therefore, if the theory of war in which the German General Staff had believed for years, the theory which they held to be confirmed by the lessons of recent wars and by the developments of modern armaments, if this theory was to be translated into practice, it was absolutely necessary that a way round should be found by violating the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg. No explanation of the invasion of Belgium which Germany has issued squares even superficially with the known facts, and on military grounds alone it is out of the question that what happened should have happened except as the result of deliberate, cold-blooded, and careful calculation. Honour and treaty obligations counted as nothing in the Prussian military mind, where expediency appeared to point the way, and it does not appear to have taken the Prussian military mind long to convince the German political mind that its plan was the only safe one, and that all questions of morality must go to the wall. No doubt Germany did not want to fight Belgium; fighting a secondary foe meant waste of time, men, and material, and delay in getting at the chief enemy; but she was quite determined to march through Belgium, and if Belgium refused to be terrorised into acquiescence, force would be necessary, so force was prepared.'\*

---

\* Maurice, p. 6.

Of the German plan he tells us that it

'was in conception bold, simple, and based upon a careful abstract study of war. It was, at the same time, utterly ruthless and immoral in its cold-blooded contempt of national pledges and of the rights of the weak, and was fundamentally defective in its disregard of the psychology both of potential enemies and of possible allies. It was, in fact, a *chef d'œuvre* of Prussian militarism naked and unashamed, and, like all plans which defy the laws of morality, it contained the germs of weakness which were to bring it to failure. For it made Great Britain a certain enemy, Italy a certain neutral, and turned against Germany the sentiment of the greater part of the civilised world.'\*

In General Maurice's opinion the plan was good, but its execution was faulty, as

'fortunately for the world the successors of the elder Moltke were not, in 1914, of his calibre, and though their plan was flexible and adaptable to the changes and chances of war, the idea of envelopment had become with them such a fetish that it was, for a time at least, regarded consciously or subconsciously as an end in itself, rather than as a means to the one end of operations of war—the decisive defeat of the enemy.'†

On this, our only comment is that when 'adherence to one idea caused opportunity after opportunity to be missed,' it‡ begins to look as if we were justified in our contention that we are here face to face with something more than a method selected to deal with a special problem, and that what is in question is a doctrine or conception of war which held the German mind as in a vice, and that that doctrine or conception was fundamentally unsound. But perhaps a consideration of the course of operations will make the point clearer.

The French answer to the enemy's probable opening move was to adopt a disposition which would enable them to take advantage of opportunities to create occasion for the action of their reserve, held back for the purpose of delivering a decisive blow at the right time and place. That the French Army could not hope to envelop a wing of the German Army until an opportunity to do so occurred, 'had,' General Maurice tells us, 'long been recognised by French students of war, and particularly by Foch, who had taught the French Staff how to counter envelopment by a return to the Napoleonic principle 'of manœuvre with a general reserve.'§

The unexpected weight which the Germans threw into their turning movement against the Franco-British armies on the

\* Maurice, p. 16.

† *Ibid.*, p. 17.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Sambre, and its unexpectedly wide scope, led to a situation on 21st August, which Sir Frederick Maurice describes in the following words :—\*

‘Almost before they had fired a shot the French and British armies on the left flank were compromised. The enemy had already won the initiative, because he had carried through remorselessly, and without material change, a carefully-thought-out plan, and by combining great skill with complete lack of scruple had succeeded in shrouding in mystery both his strength and his intentions. The French Headquarters had been compelled, by circumstances which they could not control, to change their plan at the last moment, and were not until a later date able to recover the loss of time this change involved. These first manoeuvres for position had brought into real and practical conflict the principles of the two opposing schools of military thought, which had, as I have described, for many years before the war been engaged in paper controversy. In accordance with their theory of war the Germans had developed from the outset, and in the shortest possible time, the maximum of force which was to go relentlessly forward until the decisive battle, the goal of the whole vast manoeuvre, had been fought and won. . . .

‘The French theory of war aimed, as I have said, at keeping in hand a considerable reserve, or mass of manoeuvre, to be thrown into the conflict as occasion arose, either from the enemy’s mistakes or from the success of other parts of the army. The enemy did make a mistake, and Joffre seized his opportunity, but not until the Germans had gained such a commanding position as could not wholly be wrested from them. The French Commander-in-Chief had to abandon his first project of offence, extend his left northwards, strengthen it by moving troops from his extreme right, throw his reserve immediately into the line, and set about creating a fresh mass of manoeuvre. While all this was doing, the Germans were marching forward in agreement with their pre-arranged plan. The German General Staff had in effect out-maneuvred the Allies in the first deployment by a combination of treachery and skill.’

The opening phase of the campaign of 1914 had thus shown the traits, which we noted in April 1911, as characteristic of German war. That the great enveloping movement failed to achieve its purpose was due to two factors: the successful fighting of the French right wing and the action of the British Army at Mons on the extreme left, which was withdrawn before it was shattered by the overwhelming weight of the attack. The immortal story of how our small Expeditionary Force of four divisions and one cavalry division held its own against great odds, broke every attack which was launched upon it, and then

---

\* Maurice, pp. 54, 55.

fell back with discipline intact to turn again at the battle of the Marne, is well told by Sir Frederick Maurice.

Not only was the German Great General Staff wedded to the idea of double envelopment for which they had set the pieces to give them a Sedan on the line Verdun-Sambre, but the subordinate commander who had to see the plan through by crushing the British Army, General von Kluck, the First Army Commander, seems also to have been a true neo-Moltkean. General Maurice tells us :—\*

‘The German general’s action in the battle may be judged by his conduct later.

‘Von Kluck had the extraordinary good fortune to bring to action an enemy very inferior in numbers and completely ignorant of the extent of this inferiority, and it was an occasion for a bold and comprehensive plan. But he seems to have made the mistakes, first of attacking before he was ready, and thereby failing to employ sufficient force at the outset to make complete success certain ; and next, of relying on the slow process of envelopment by troops at a distance from the enemy, at a time when it was a question of seizing a chance which might disappear. In the morning when he began the battle he struck with no considerable preponderance of strength ; in the evening he had, in immediate touch with Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien’s two divisions, more than sufficient force to overwhelm them, and it is to the undying glory of the infantry of the Old Army that by that time they had taken the sting out of such of the First Army as had attacked them, and had inspired the German commander with such respect that he was afraid to try for complete victory until the chance had slipped away. Up to 5 P.M. von Kluck had the advantage of surprise, and was unable to make use of it. After 5 P.M. the surprise was gone and his hand was exposed, for by then Sir John French had received Joffre’s message, informing him of the strength of the German First Army and of the retreat of the French Fifth Army.’

At Le Cateau General von Kluck repeated his Mons operation, although ‘it was out of the question that the British could ‘oppose any but very inferior numbers to the four corps and ‘three cavalry divisions which he had within reach of the ‘battlefield.’ This does not look as if the teaching imbibed by the German general, when a younger man, had had to do merely with the opening moves of a campaign ; it seems rather to have been, as we have contended, a comprehensive doctrine which coloured his whole outlook on war. Although Sir Frederick Maurice does not agree with what we have written as to the prevalence of real doctrines of war, or conceptions of

---

\* Maurice, pp. 85, 86.

war, in the French and German armies, we find him saying of the battle of Le Cateau :—\*

‘Fortune had a second time presented von Kluck with the chance of inflicting an annihilating defeat upon the British Army, and a second time he had failed to take the chance when it came. Obsessed as he was with the idea that by a wide envelopment alone could decisive success be won, the detours of his flanking columns brought them too late to the battlefield, and this, combined with the respect for British rifle fire and British shrapnel, with which his infantry was imbued, and with the cool leadership of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, enabled our Second Corps to escape from what, on the morning of the 26th, appeared to be certain destruction.’

With one more quotation from General Maurice we may leave the question as to whether or no the German Army operated in 1914 in accordance with that definite doctrine of war which we have attributed to it. In discussing the situation at the end of August, from the point of view of the German Staff, he says :—†

‘The time appeared to have come for the pincers to be closed on the French armies. September 2nd, the anniversary of Sedan, was approaching, and dreams of a greater Sedan than had ever before been conceived by man began to kindle the thoughts of the Emperor and his advisers to an extent which clouded their military judgment, and made them, in order to follow a will-o'-the-wisp, turn away from the solid advantages which they might have gained by destroying the British Army, by scattering Manoury's force before it had time to concentrate, and by occupying Paris, which lay at their mercy. This was the consequence of a pedantic adherence to theory.’

A different theory of war, one in which the ‘preconceived ‘battle’ plays no part, where the intellect is kept keen and the mind retains its freedom to deal with situations as they arise by the intervention of big reserves, would not have directed the First German Army to the Marne.

We have now followed the influence of German thought on German operations. During this period, how did it fare with the French?

The original French plan was offensive, but as the French Government, not endowed with the cold-blooded cynicism of Berlin, was mindful of the rights of neutrals, the advance of the French army was limited to direct attack across the German frontier. The French invasion of Alsace-Lorraine has been

---

\* Maurice, p. 115.

† *Ibid.*, p. 134.



wrongly criticised as a purely sentimental and political adventure. It was nothing of the sort, for as General Maurice tells us:—\*

‘It was the one alternative either to waiting passively for the enemy’s attack, and exposing French territory to the ravages of war, without an effort to prevent such a disaster, or to outvying the enemy in immorality by transferring the scene of battle to the country of a weak and neutral power.’

Out of his available sixty divisions the French commander intended to employ thirty divisions for an offensive across the Franco-German frontier, while an army (Fifth Army) of nine divisions watched the exits from the Ardennes, while another army (Fourth Army) of ten divisions formed a General Reserve behind the centre.

As we have seen, the speed, weight, and direction of the German offensive compelled the French to conform, and so General Joffre formed a second plan on the facts as known to him at the time. He decided to strike at the flank of the German armies moving through Belgium, using for the purpose his general reserve (Fourth Army) which he hoped to push forward through the Ardennes, while his Fifth Army and the British Army held the German turning movement. On 23rd August this plan had begun to develop, but by 27th August the bottom had fallen out of it: the German onslaught on the Fifth French Army and the British Army had forced back the whole Allied left. Since a French plan of operation is less a cut and dried scheme than it is an attitude of mind we find General Maurice saying, as if it were the most natural thing in the world:—

‘Joffre’s second offensive plan had therefore failed to mature, but in no wise discouraged he immediately set about preparing a third. As early as 25th August he issued the following order:

“As it has not proved possible to carry out the offensive manœuvre which had been planned, the object of the future operations will be to reconstitute on our left flank, with the Fourth and Fifth Armies, the British Army, and new forces drawn from our right, a mass capable of resuming the offensive while the other armies contain the enemy for the time necessary.

“A new group will be formed in the neighbourhood of Amiens between 27th August and 2nd September.”

‘This was the birth of Manoury’s Sixth Army.’

Manoury’s army was originally intended to advance from

---

\* Maurice, p. 21.

the Somme, but Kluck's movements were too rapid, with the result that on the evening of 4th September Manoury was covering Paris on the north-east, and being rapidly reinforced until considerably superior to the German force immediately in front of him. Kluck, at that moment, was deeply committed with the greater part of his army across the Marne.

'The time was ripe for Joffre's counter-stroke.

'The French commander-in-chief had not been content with the formation of a Sixth Army, for his principle, in accordance with the whole trend of modern French military thought, being to manœuvre, not on a fixed plan, but in agreement with the development of the situation, he required to have in his hand as large a reserve as possible, so that he might either take advantage of opportunities as they presented themselves or be ready to parry an unexpected blow. Therefore, on 29th August, when it had become clear that Manoury would have to fall back from the Somme, he had ordered the formation of the Ninth Army, under General Foch. To create this he drew partly upon his right and partly upon the Fourth Army, which had been the least tried of any of his forces. By this means he obtained for Foch an army of eight infantry divisions, and a cavalry division, and, as soon as it became evident that the German south-easterly movement was bringing the enemy's main weight to the south of Rheims, he interposed this new army between the Fourth and Fifth Armies, so that the Fifth Army, taking ground to its left, might be able to intervene more effectively in the attack upon von Kluck, and the centre of his line between Paris and Verdun might be held safely while that attack was maturing. Accordingly, on the evening of 4th September, Foch had taken his place in the line to the south of the St Gond marshes with his centre about La Fère Champenoise.

'With these dispositions completed Joffre was ready, and on 4th September he issued the following order :

"It is necessary to profit by the dangerous situation in which the First German Army has placed itself by concentrating against it the efforts of the Allied armies on the extreme left. During 5th September all arrangements will be made to begin the attack on the 6th."

The result of those orders is known in history as the battle of the Marne. To the world at large it is of importance as the battle which saved our Western civilisation; to the student of war in the narrow sense, the student of war as an art, it is significant as marking for all time the bankruptcy of the German conception of war. At the Marne, the German theory of the preconceived battle of envelopment was tested against the Napoleonic practice from which the thinkers of the French General Staff have evolved the French doctrine of war; the rigid mind was pitted against the active mind; the meticulous spirit of preparation against the genius spirit of creation; the German

brain against the French brain—and the French brain triumphed. General Maurice is inclined to attribute the German failure too much to mistakes by General von Kluck and other subordinates ; he thinks that the plan was good, but that the execution was faulty. From this we dissent.

It is easy to point to this or that mistake made by German commanders in carrying out their appointed tasks during the days which led up to the battle of the Marne ; probably every mistake by a German subordinate could be matched by some equivalent error by a commander of equal rank on the side of the Allies, for to err is human and generals are only men. The significant fact is that because the German conception of war eliminates genius in the commander-in-chief and trusts to a high average in his subordinates the failures of subordinates compromise the whole operation ; whereas the French conception of war admits of much human frailty among subordinates, and the commission of many mistakes by minor generals without the whole scheme being imperilled, since success depends mainly on the brain and nerve of the commander-in-chief. So long as *he* does not himself blunder or lose his head nothing irremediable has happened. So long as he really commands, and so long as he is worthy to do so, he can remedy the errors of his own subordinates and turn to good account the mistakes made by the subordinates of his opponent, which are irreparable because that opponent's very method of operating has put it out of his power to rectify the blunders of column commanders.

During the great events at which we have looked through the eyes of Sir Frederick Maurice we have seen the German Army operate in accordance with the German conception of war and the French Army put in practice the opposite or French conception of war. It is a matter of considerable importance to the British peoples to ascertain what conception of war, if any, governed the operations of the Expeditionary Force we landed on the Continent in August 1914, to intervene in the conflict of vast masses composing national armies struggling for victory by applying their respective national conceptions of war. In April 1911 when we considered the position of the British Army in relation to modern conceptions of war we closed our examination of the question by expressing the hope that various reforms in organisation and administration then announced by Mr. Haldane might soon justify our General Staff in infusing our

army with a definite and coherent conception of war in which empiricism would find no place.

It is to the pages of Lord French's book that we must turn to see to what extent our hopes were realised during the course of the first great operations undertaken by the British Army since Mr. Haldane had endowed it with a General Staff, for no man living is better qualified to tell us how his own mind worked, and why he took various decisions, than the former Commander of the British Expeditionary Force. This disclosure of the mind of a commander should reveal the corporate mind of the General Staff, since where a General Staff is a real entity the commander is merely its embodiment in visible form: the flesh under the uniform is that of the son of the commander-in-chief's father but the thoughts under the gold laced cap are those of the General Staff of the army; better in quality no doubt, keener and quicker, as befits a man set in authority above his fellow-men, but in no way different in kind. If the commander's thoughts differ in kind from those of his subordinates whose duty it is to translate them into action the whole army machine will creak ominously and it may well break without cause obvious to the casual onlooker, for the army will neither be commanded nor be capable of being commanded.

Now the first and most important order given to an army is contained in the instructions issued to the Commander-in-Chief by the Government whose intentions he and his army exist to carry out, for these instructions define the task to be accomplished and indicate the broad lines on which the Government mean their general to act. Lord French gives us *in extenso* the instructions which he received from His Majesty's Government before leaving England, from which we quote the following paragraphs:—

‘The place of your assembly, according to present arrangements, is Amiens, and during the assembly of your troops you will have every opportunity for discussing with the commander-in-chief of the French army the military position in general and the special part which your force is able and adapted to play. It must be recognised from the outset that the numerical strength of the British force and its contingent reinforcement is strictly limited, and with this consideration kept steadily in view, it will be obvious that the greatest care must be exercised towards a minimum of losses and wastages.

‘Therefore, while every effort must be made to coincide most sympathetically with the plans and wishes of our Ally, the gravest

consideration will devolve upon you as to participation in forward movements where large bodies of French troops are not engaged, and where your force may be unduly exposed to attack. Should a contingency of this sort be contemplated, I look to you to inform me fully and give me time to communicate to you any decision to which His Majesty's Government may come in the matter. In this connection I wish you distinctly to understand that your command is an entirely independent one, and that you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any Allied general.

'In minor operations you should be careful that your subordinates understand that risk of serious losses should only be taken where such risk is authoritatively considered to be commensurate with the object in view.'

In this document, it will be observed, two instructions are emphasised, and the history of former wars, as that of this war itself, tells us equally emphatically that they strike at the very roots from which spring success in war: unity of command on the Western front is forbidden, and the commander of a portion of the battle front has his eyes directed rather to the avoidance of casualties in his own command than to the success of the cause of the Allies as a whole. The situation in Great Britain in 1914—a country ignorant of the fundamental facts about modern war—may have necessitated the incorporation of such orders in the instructions issued to the commander of the first British Expeditionary Force, but they unquestionably made his already difficult task much harder. Unlike Lord French, Marshal Joffre has not yet taken the world into his confidence on secret matters concerning his Government and his Allies. Should he ever do so it will be instructive to read his comments on the orders issued by the British Government to his comrade in arms. If these orders made Lord French's task difficult they seem to us to have made Marshal Joffre's task still more so by importing into his operations an element of doubt as to whether he could definitely rely upon the British Army helping in any given undertaking and an element of delay in the necessity of consulting and persuading a colleague instead of giving orders to a subordinate. We have travelled a long way since those instructions were issued by a British Government, so in criticising them it is as well to remark that in August 1914 it was only professional soldiers, and not all professional soldiers by any means, who appreciated either the importance of unity of command or the relentless character of modern war, which constantly demands the most complete sacrifice of a part for the good of the whole, and that without waiting on the ponderings

of Cabinet Ministers in a distant capital. One thing and one thing alone might have nullified the evil effects of the two orders in the instructions to Lord French which we have quoted, and that is if a doctrine of war held in common by the French and British armies had formed an unbreakable spiritual bond between the General Staffs of the two armies, so that the representative soldiers who happened to be at the head of affairs saw eye to eye with one another and had but one outlook on the problems of war. It is not possible to read Lord French's book without realising that this was not the case in 1914, whatever may be the case to-day. On his own showing, on several occasions the commander of the British Expeditionary Force did not agree with the appreciation made by Marshal Joffre, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, or General Lanrezac, who commanded the Fifth French Army which was on the right of the British Army. Who was right and who was wrong is beside our present point and may be left safely to the historians to settle on evidence more complete than is now at our disposal: it is enough for us to note that there was divergence of view between Allied generals on important points. We are more intimately concerned with whether or not there was unity of opinion within the British Army itself during the critical days of August and September 1914.

In Lord French's dispatch on the retreat from Mons, made accessible to the general public in the useful publication called 'The Documentary History of the War,' which we owe to the enterprise of the *Times* newspaper, there is no indication of any real divergence of opinion between the commander of our Expeditionary Force and his subordinates. His praise of his corps commanders is ungrudging, and is strengthened by references to the good work they had done, and to the skilful handling of their corps in difficult situations. It is therefore the more surprising to find that in his book, '1914,' Lord French tells us that on several occasions the commander of the Second Corps, General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, did not see eye to eye with his Commander-in-Chief, and took decisions which the Commander-in-Chief did not approve of. For instance, in writing of the events of the 23rd August, he says:—

'After my conference with the corps commanders on the morning of the 23rd I left General Smith-Dorrien full of confidence in regard to his position, but when I returned to my headquarters in the afternoon reports came to hand that he was giving up the salient at Mons because

the outpost line at Obourg had been penetrated by the enemy, and that he was also preparing to give up the whole of the line of the canal before nightfall. He said that he anticipated a gap occurring in his line between the third and fifth divisions in the neighbourhood of Mariette, and he went so far as to make a request for help to the First Corps. Up to this time there was no decided threat in any strength on Condé; Sir Horace, therefore, need not have feared an imminent turning movement, and, as regards his front, he was nowhere threatened by anything more than cavalry supported by small bodies of infantry.

‘At that time no directions for retreat had been issued at Headquarters . . .’

This is but a small point: the main question at issue between the Commander-in-Chief and one of his principal subordinates is the latter's action in fighting the battle of Le Cateau. Lord French gives his reasons for ordering the retreat to be continued in the following words:—

‘To hold the Le Cateau position, in view of the heavy threat on my front and western flank, was a decision which could only be justified if I were sure of the absolute determination of the French commander to hold on all along the line with the utmost tenacity; but our Allies were already a day's march in rear of us, and every report indicated continual retreat. At least one army corps and two cavalry divisions of the enemy were engaged in an outflanking movement on my left, in which they had already made some progress, and the only help I could depend upon in that quarter was from two French reserve divisions spread out on an enormous front towards Dunkirk, and very hastily and indifferently entrenched. It was unlikely that they would be able to oppose any effective resistance to the enemy's flank movement. If this flank attack were successful, my communications with Havre would be practically gone. There had been neither time nor labour available to make the Le Cateau position strong enough to withstand a serious onslaught by the superior numbers which were advancing against my front, and the British troops, which had been almost continuously marching and fighting since Sunday morning, stood in much need of rest, which could only be secured by placing some serious obstacle, such as a river-line, between my troops and the enemy. After long and anxious deliberation, it seemed clear to me that every consideration pointed to the necessity of resuming our march in retreat at daybreak on the 26th, and orders to that effect were accordingly issued.

‘I determined to direct the march on St. Quentin and Noyon.’

Orders were issued to give effect to the Commander-in-Chief's decision. After describing the splendid fight of the 4th (Guards) Brigade of the First Corps at Landrecies, Lord French continues:—

‘Sir Douglas Haig, although his troops were very tired, and handicapped also by heavy rearguard fighting, still proceeded to carry out the instructions he had received, and the retirement of the First Corps

was continued in excellent order and with complete efficiency. Things did not go so well with the Second Corps. General Allenby, who had been most ably covering the retreat of the army with his cavalry, had already materially assisted the rearguard of the 3rd Division to surmount their difficulties at Solesmes. McCracken's Brigade (7th) did not reach the Le Cateau position until 10 or 11 P.M. on the 25th. His men were, of course, nearly done up, and he had suffered severe losses. Colonel Ansell, commanding the 5th Dragoon Guards, one of the finest cavalry leaders in the army, who fell at the head of his regiment a few days later, gave information to General Allenby at about 2 A.M. regarding the nature of the German advance. This seemed of such great importance that the latter at once sought out Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and warned him that, unless he was prepared to continue his march at daybreak, he would most probably be pinned down to his position, and would be unable to get away.

'Sir Horace asked General Allenby what, in his opinion, were the chances he had if he remained and held the position, adding that he felt convinced his troops were so exhausted as to preclude the possibility of removing them for some hours to come. Allenby's reply was that he thought, unless the commander of the Second Corps made up his mind to move at daybreak, the enemy probably would succeed in surrounding him. Nevertheless, Sir Horace determined to fight.'

Lord French contradicts the statement which has been made in more than one of the accounts of the retreat from Mons, that he or one of his staff had approved of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand and fight at Le Cateau. The position then is this: The Commander-in-Chief, on his appreciation of the general situation, orders the British Army to retreat, and is of opinion that the safety of his army, which involves that of the Allies, whose threatened left flank is covered by the British Army, will be jeopardised if any important fraction of it gets pinned by the impending German attack; the Second Corps commander is of opinion that he cannot resume his retreat until he has dealt with that attack, as he thinks his men are too exhausted to march, whereas his information is to the effect that the enemy will advance and close with him early in the morning in greatly superior strength. The commander of the Second Corps disobeys the Commander-in-Chief's order, and thereby commits to a severe battle more than half the British Army. The Commander-in-Chief, in a dispatch written soon after the event, approves of his subordinate's action, but now tells us that he then wrote in ignorance of the facts of the case, and lets it be seen that subsequent inquiry has confirmed him in the belief that the battle of Le Cateau was unnecessary. He sums up its consequences as follows;—



'A stupendous repetition of Sedan might well have resulted. The magnificent fight put up by these glorious troops saved disaster, but the actual result was a total loss of at least 14,000 officers and men, about 80 guns, numbers of machine guns, as well as quantities of ammunition, war material, and baggage, whilst the enemy gained time to close up his infantry columns marching down from the north-east, at the cost of losses not greater than, if as great, as our own, but which were, in view of the immense superiority he possessed in numbers and fighting power, infinitely less important to him. The effect upon the British Army was to render the subsequent conduct of the retreat more difficult and arduous.

'The hope of making a stand behind the Somme or the Oise, or any other favourable position north of the Marne, had now to be abandoned, owing to the shattered condition of the army, and the far-reaching effect of our losses at the battle of Le Cateau was felt seriously even throughout the subsequent battle of the Marne and during the early operations on the Aisne. It was not possible to replace our lost guns and machine guns until nearly the end of September.'

It is not germane to our present purpose to inquire whether Lord French is right or wrong in his recorded opinions as to the advisability of fighting the battle of Le Cateau or as to its consequences. What does matter is that holding the opinions he tells us he held after subsequent inquiries he yet retained Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien in command of the Second Corps. That he did so shows conclusively that he himself was untouched by the French conception of war, which postulates a tight control over the whole army by its Commander-in-Chief, a control which is deliberately sacrificed in an army imbued with the opposite or German conception which admits, nay, encourages, greater latitude in the interpretation of orders and more initiative on the part of subordinates. The abdication by the Commander in-Chief of the functions of command during the retreat from Mons thus disclosed in the pages of Lord French's own book shows that the spirit of the French doctrine did not infuse the British Army in 1914, although many individuals in that army are known to have been influenced by it.

This confirms the general impression produced by the two books we have been considering. Neither Lord French, a commander, nor Sir Frederick Maurice, an important officer of the General Staff, seems to approach the problems of the early days of the war or to examine solutions of the problems from any definite point of view. Their outlook is essentially empirical. It is in keeping with the omission of an important

sentence from the reprint of 'Field Service Regulations' prepared shortly before the war. It is the sentence in 'Field Service Regulations' (Part I.), 1909, which advocated what we call the French method as being 'usually most suited to the circumstances of our army.' To the dangers of empiricism—the 'doctrine of no doctrine,' as we described it in considering 'the place of doctrine in war'—we drew attention in this REVIEW in January 1912. For a confirmation of its evil effects on the British Army in 1914, we commend our readers to the pages of Lord French's interesting and ingenuous revelation of the mind of a commander and his inevitable difficulties when he and his army are alike anarchical in matters of doctrine. Perhaps the conclusion the reader will come to is that if the Allies were fortunate in 1914 in that their left flank was covered by an army so indomitable and so well disciplined as was the British Expeditionary Force, they were doubly fortunate in that the fate of their cause as a whole and the future of civilisation depended not on the decisions of Sir John French, but on the brain, the educated indoctrinated brain, which conceived the battle of the Marne. Every soldier of the Allied armies may thank God on his knees for the thinkers of the French General Staff who first conceived and then, when the time came, practised the very definite French doctrine of war.

## CONSCRIPT ARMIES

THE war has taught much, and has left mankind more to learn. Years must pass before the best qualified judge will be so fully enlightened by experience as to be able to estimate all its still latent meanings for politics, commerce, or morals. But it has done one thing beyond peradventure. It has proved that universal military service produces ruin by exhaustion. 'There is,' said Raleigh, 'a certain proportion both 'by sea and land beyond which the excess brings nothing but 'disorder and amazement.' He was speaking of fleets and armies operating in war, but his maxim has a wider application. There is 'a certain proportion' between what a people can give to war and must keep for production, by which alone it can maintain war. Universal military service, when it passes beyond being a theory or a theme for eloquence, destroys that proportion, and we have only to look about us to see what 'disorder and 'amazement' must ensue.

Now when the fog of war has lifted there is no excuse for ignoring a patent fact. Germany has not been vanquished on a stricken field. Her armies failed to win on the west, but in the east they were triumphant. Even on the west they were delivering tremendous blows down to the eve of the day when the country which created and supported them sank worn out. We have a natural disposition to account for the collapse by the pressure of our blockade. It certainly helped by aggravating the burden on Germany. Yet if an excessive proportion of the men who must do the main part of the work in agriculture, manufacture, and transport had not been drawn to fill the ranks of the army, the strain might well have been endured for long. More would have been produced. Nor is it rational to confine ourselves to the case of Germany. How much has France lost, how much will she continue to lose, because such multitudes of men were taken from productive work for military service—taken too in a terrible proportion never to return? Our own case we know. It differs only in degree from that of all the combatants, with the exception of one. The United States alone have not been diminished in population and wealth by the war. They came in late, and when they did, they could

draw on ten million men of military age to fill their armies. They took a bare fourth, and many of them for a very short period. Military age in the United States meant from twenty to thirty—not to forty-five or fifty. Therefore the States were under no necessity to deprive their agriculture and their industry of hands. For them the war has been what the wars of the eighteenth century were to us—a stimulus and an opportunity—not what it has been to the peoples of Europe, an enfeebling drain on their vital forces. For America universal service has been a mere theory, a text for rhetoric, for us it has been a dreadful reality.

There is no novelty in this demonstration of a truth which infallibly forces attention to itself whenever it is disregarded. Napoleon fell in 1814 because he had exhausted the sources of conscription, and could no longer replace his losses. He strove desperately to hide his growing weakness by profuse mendacity. His anger with his brother Joseph, who had been boasting publicly that the Emperor's last victories had been won by small forces, and over greatly superior numbers, was comic in an odious way. Joseph was right, but Napoleon knew that the enemy relied on being able to wear him down, and he wanted to make the Allies believe that he had two hundred thousand men, when he could not have put a fourth of that number on a field of battle. He believed with Mahomet (or was it only with the Arab proverb?) that the lies which the captain tells in war to deceive the enemy will not be brought up against him on the Day of Judgment, being unavoidable and therefore innocent, together with those which a man may tell to reconcile friends who have quarrelled, or husbands use when they make promises to their wives. So he lied and lied enormously but to no purpose in 1814, for his words could not cover the obtrusive facts. What is new to-day is the rapidity of the demonstration. Napoleon fell after twenty-two years of warfare, and after he or his predecessors had exhausted France by enormous levies and by anticipated conscriptions which took mere boys. Four years have been enough to show that universal military service kills the people who fail to win the victory at once. Germany has suffered more than others, more in all probability than Austria—as was just—but on our side there were some who had reached the limit of their power to endure. They were relieved because the insane arrogance of Germany's military masters forced the United States to intervene.

When we look at the story of warfare as a whole, one truth concerning it stands out clearly. Long wars can be waged without bringing destruction more or less complete to the victor as to the vanquished only when care is taken to maintain a just balance between the numbers of those who bear arms, and those who by industry and by production maintain the fighting men. The eighteenth century was well aware of that fact. Its view, the teaching of a long experience, is admirably stated by Gibbon, to whom was given an unsurpassed ability to put much into a few sentences 'too full for 'sound or foam':—

'In the system of modern Europe, the power of the sword is possessed, at least in fact, by five or six mighty potentates; their operations are conducted on a distant frontier, by an order of men who devote their lives to the study and practice of the military art; the rest of the country and community enjoys in the midst of war the tranquility of peace, and is only made sensible of the change by the aggravation or decrease of the public taxes.'

The ancient world could preserve the balance easily enough, for its whole order was based on slavery. The bondmen laboured and the freemen fought. When under the pressure of dire need some slaves (never many) were drawn on, they thereby became free, and for them military service brought promotion to a higher social scale. The modern world, when it had passed through the stage of migratory barbarism and was beginning the formation of nations, relied on calling out the whole body of 'fencible men' from sixteen to sixty, or some similar limits of age. A king or other great man had his *husknechts*, *buccellarii*, his *posse*, his *mesnaderos* or *mesnadieri*, his *paniaguados*. By many names men knew them, and they were always the same—the members of the great man's household who wore his livery and ate the rations he gave, who were his bodyguard, to be employed for good or for evil by him. A 'husknecht' was a 'mesnadero,' and a beefeater is a *buccellarius*. The beef and the soldier's biscuit were alike supplied by the lord. And these domestic swordsmen were the predecessors of the soldiers as Gibbon knew them—the order of men who made a study and a practice of the art of war. They were few, for the lord was poor. He drew his revenues, and made his payments in kind. To feed a troop of bravos who would fight (or murder) for him was as profitable a use as he could make of such wealth as he had at command. But simply because the lord was poor, even when

he was a king, these bands were small. They were admirable as signs of the great man's greatness, and were useful as 'looty wallahs,' to take a most accurate name from the vocabulary of Hobson Dobson. It was not possible to make an army with them alone. So when the realm was in peril, or another realm was to be invaded, there was a need to call out the 'fencible men' from sixteen to sixty or so, each bringing such arms as he had, and so many days' rations in a bag at his own cost. That was universal military service.

Sentimental persons have often dwelt with affection on this ancient device for fulfilling the obligations to defend your country. Its weakness was that it could not defend, be its will ever so good. It was by its very nature unable to do more than produce a mob. But this did not matter much so long as the mobs had only other mobs like themselves to fight. The real and fatal defect of the general levy of men capable of bearing arms was that it could not keep the field. By whatever name it was known—the fyrd, the ban, the fonsadera—it was detestable as an army. It could not be called out in spring, because if the fields were not sown there would be no harvest, and they could not be ploughed nor 'eard' if the whole male population was called out. It could not be kept in the autumn, because the harvest must be taken in under penalty of starvation for the king and the great men themselves. As for lying out in the fields during the winter that was not to be thought of. There was only one time when kings could use the general levy, and that was in summer. Then it could be employed to meet an invader, or it could invade in a way. The aim of a military invasion carried out with such support was to destroy growing crops, and so force an enemy to submission, or, at any rate, to make him pay a ransom. A 'looty wallah' operation of this character might be repeated year after year, and realms might be so conquered. King Alfonso VI., who had the misfortune to be the King of the Cid, and has been shamefully libelled by the biographers of Ruy Diaz of Bivar, took Toledo by this process. Year after year he carried out raids—the Castilian name is *aceifa* or *acefa*—on the Toledan territory, till at last he fairly starved the Moors into accepting him as king. And that is how it was generally done. If the conquest of England by William of Normandy appears to be an exception, the reason is, no doubt, that the Conqueror having much plunder to distribute, could keep his army together, and no opponent he met in England could.

The worthlessness of the general levy was as visible to kings of the Dark Ages as it is now. They were always trying to find some force on which they could rely. How to make an army that would last was the great problem of the ages. Till it was solved there was no sure way of preventing war from being a long drawn out example of the 'military operations' recorded in the verse history of Taffy who was a Welshman—and also was a thief. By sea or land it was always the same story of raid and counter raid. Fire-raising, plunder, rape, and murder, and very little that was effectual done in the end, save the promotion of brutality and mutual hatred. A victory was almost as fatal as a defeat. The successful side went off to put its booty in a safe place. The unsuccessful who escaped from the field ran off home to hide their belongings. When in later ages the general levy was used it never failed to work in the same way. Montrose was deserted by his Highlanders after every victory. The royalist chiefs of La Vendée were unable to make full use of their victories because they could not keep their followers together. The fields must be sown, the harvest taken in, and the men must be there to do the work.

Two ways of providing a permanent armed force which could be called on at all times, and could serve without a break, were discovered in medieval times. The endowment of warriors with feudal benefices was *not* one of them. A prudent man will abstain as much as he can from meddling with feudalism lest he be taken up short as one who speaks irreverently of a mystery. How can you be sure of saying something which is true of countless multitudes of arrangements, contracts, engagements, of a network of personal obligation, two, three, or four layers thick, overlapping and not seldom contradictory, which differed from one country to another, from one part of the same country to another? There was one feudalism of England and another of France; one of Normandy and another of Burgundy. From the twelfth to the fourteenth century was a far cry, though both were feudal. There is nevertheless one truth concerning feudalism which can be affirmed with confidence—namely that as a military organisation it was hopeless for the purpose of keeping armies together. No army, in any sense the word conveys to us, could be made out of a host of men who owed specific services to particular lords for definite benefits. When their wills were not good they could always play the trick which the two earls played on Edward I. They

could insist on rendering just the kind and amount of service for which they were liable by the terms of their tenure and no more. When their will was good their resources were not equal to prolonged and still less to continuous service. They also had to think of the sowing and the harvest. If the king wished to keep them he must support them. Rulers were forced to recognise that they had better begin where they would certainly be forced to end—by relying on paid men. When the Cinque Ports had provided the number of ships and the crews they were bound to produce by the terms of their charters, and the men had served fifteen days at their own charges, they were free to return home unless the king could and would pay them. It was better for him to have his own ships and galleys. And it was better for him on land to have his mercenaries, than to be forced to rely on feudal services. Nothing could be more obvious. The difficulty was to find the money. One method of raising it was to let the tenants on feudal tenure pay in place of rendering personal service, and to devote the proceeds of these fines to the payment of professional fighters.

There was another and more gracious method of forming a professional army known to the Middle Ages. The military friars of the Temple, of the Hospital, Teutonic Knights of the Sword, or of Santiago, Calatrava, Alcántara, of Christ and of Avis, when their romantic names and religious vestures are disregarded, are seen to be professional soldiers, always embodied, well armed, and disciplined, and provided for by grants of land. But their use was limited to frontiers against the heathen and the Moslem—to the Holy Land, to the eastern marches of Germany, and to the 'frontera' of the Christian kingdoms of Spain. Elsewhere they easily became a danger to the king himself. A Grand Master of the Temple was too great a man for a subject when he could set in motion a better army than the king's. Therefore the Templars were first envied and calumniated, then suppressed. In Spain alone they were protected, and when the Order was dissolved by the Pope they were reconstituted as the Knights of Montesa. They were doing their proper work in the Spanish kingdoms. Yet even in the Peninsula the time came when the 'clavero' of Santiago had also become too great a man for a subject, and the Catholic Sovereigns annexed the Grand Masterships to the Crown and used the revenues of the orders for the general purposes of their government, or to pay pensions.



The great resource of sovereigns who could make nothing of the general levy, and who found a feudal host more trouble than it was worth, lay in mercenary soldiers—by whatever name they were known, Brabanters, Routiers, Almudgáveres, Ecorcheurs, White Companies or Black Bands. They were paid when the king had money, and they paid themselves by plunder when he had not. The armies of our Henrys and Edwards were not feudal. They were composed of hired men who made a business of war. Foreigners were numerous among them. Or the king contracted for the service of his subjects with this earl or that knight to raise what later was called a 'proprietary regiment.' He paid enough to cover expenses and leave a margin of profit. The earl or knight looked to pillage and ransom to make his contract truly profitable. It was no good way of raising an army, but it was better than the feudal method. An army of hired men who served for wages would obey orders so long as the pay was forthcoming. No security could ever be found that a feudal army would obey. The French armies were very feudal, and as an inevitable consequence they were bad. A crowd of gentlemen, all extremely touchy on the point of honour, all determined to make the finest possible display of themselves and let nobody go before them, constituted a mere mob. Wherever they were artfully dealt with, not only by us but by others, they were cut to pieces. Nobody would endure the indignity of being kept in reserve, all would rush in headlong, and the calculating professional soldier could play on their folly with confidence. They completed the demonstration of the vital truth that if kings wanted good fighting they must employ the man who made fighting an intelligent business and not a mere sport and display of personal prowess at tournaments. So they took to hiring their soldiers or pressing them. The Welshmen who were levied by the Lords Marchers, or the Irish Kerns who were packed off to serve our Henrys and Edwards, were no more feudal than the pressed men in a British man-of-war in the eighteenth century.

The kings of the past were poor. To-day, when the spending of thousands of millions is treated as no great matter, one has to make an effort to realise what twenty thousand pounds meant to potent monarchs for many centuries. The professional soldier who knew himself to be indispensable, charged a good price for his services. The man-at-arms at the time of Henry V. who received a shilling a day was a highly paid man. It is

true that he never saw one, for the shilling was still a money of account. If he had he would have fingered a coin much more like a florin, for the shilling was still the thirtieth part of a Tower Pound, which was indeed smaller than a Pound Troy, but only by three-fourths of an ounce. What he actually got was the equivalent in some coin of the due weight and fineness of the thirtieth part of a Tower Pound of silver. It is difficult to get a precise account of the purchasing power of money in different periods, but it may safely be said that a shilling a day in the reign of Henry V. lifted the recipient high above the level of the labourer and the artisan.

Thus these early professional armies were very heavy burdens on poor treasuries. Therefore they were small, not only when they are compared with modern armies, but when they are considered as percentages of the populations of the time. Nobody can know what the populations of the dominions of Francis I. of France and the Emperor Charles V. were in say 1525 with precision. But we are sure each of these potent monarchs ruled over millions of vassals and subjects. Yet between them they could not contrive to bring fifty thousand men to the field of battle at Pavia. Francis I. was the richer sovereign, but he was often troubled to find the needful moneys. As for Charles V., though he had exceptional resources in his share of the Burgundian inheritance, namely the wealthy Netherlands, the Empire and the hereditary possessions of the House of Austria, with Naples and Sicily, Spain and the Indies, which were just beginning to pay, he was for ever pulling the devil by the tail for a good deal less than the price of a modern torpedo boat destroyer. And so were Queen Elizabeth and James I., and all other sovereigns.

The great and redeeming merit of the armies of this epoch was precisely that they were not large. They mutinied and plundered; they left desolation wherever they went; but because they were not numerous they did not cover extensive regions, and they did not draw an excessive proportion of the peoples from productive industry. The wrongs they inflicted on those who were so unfortunate as to be in their way were atrocious, but they did not make it necessary to sweep into the ranks, or into munition factories and cannon foundries, nearly all the most useful part of the working population between the ages of twenty and forty-five. The damage they did was cruel, but it was local. Industry not only went on, but increased in

spite of them, and so did the population. A kind of balance was kept between those who worked and those who fought. When peace came there was no lack of labour to repair the ravages of war. Disbanded soldiers could often find no employment, and were driven, by sheer inability to meet with honest work, to take to courses which led to the gallows. The moral evil they did was enormous, but it is far from certain, or even probable, that the material damage they inflicted was so great or had such lasting effects as we shall find has been produced by the five years just passed of suspension of industry, and disorganisation of all life throughout by far the greater part of Europe. And this change for the worse is mainly due to the adoption of universal military service.

If any one man was more responsible than another for inflicting this military curse on mankind that sinner was King Louis XIV. He it was who began the formation of large standing armies. When Gibbon was giving his account of the legions of the Roman Empire he noted how small a military force they constituted when compared to the 400,000 soldiers whom King Louis put in the field in one year. He added that France still felt the effects of that extraordinary effort. We do not know with certainty what the population of France was at the time of the War of the Spanish Succession. It was comparatively large. There would be nothing rash in the assumption that it was at least 16,000,000, or forty times 400,000. Thus King Louis only drew at most  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the whole number of his subjects for military service. And we have to consider how his soldiers were obtained. A king of France, like all other kings of the time, depended first of all on his recruiting sergeants, who were nicknamed by way of abuse *racoleurs*, i.e. crimps. They might sometimes kidnap the unwary, but as a rule they caught the volunteer. We do the young man who became a soldier of his own free will no wrong if we take it for granted that he was better fitted for the army than for productive industry. And when he was caught he was kept for a long time. He was only one deduction from industry, whereas under compulsory service several men would be taken in succession to fill the place he held.

The rulers of Europe never parted with the right to compel the service of their subjects in fleets and armies. Though they relied mainly on free enlistment for the formation of their standing armies, they also maintained militias in which service was

compulsory. And it is true that men were tempted, or drafted from the militia, to the ranks of the regular regiments. But it is not enough to note that the principle was maintained; we must consider how it was applied. The militia service was always for home defence in theory and was so limited in general practice. It was enforced for parts of the year, so that the militiaman was not wholly lost to industry. It was a rule that he was given leave during harvest, not only in peace but in war, unless there was immediate need to keep him. The obligation was never imposed on all the young men of a certain age; and in practice service was voluntary. The royal government of France did indeed endeavour to enforce a rule that militia service must be compulsory. All who drew a *billet noir* were to serve, and they only. But as a matter of fact the ranks of the French army militia were largely filled by volunteers, in a way which is lucidly explained in Turgot's 'Lettre sur la Milice,' written in 1773 for the Minister of War, the Marquis de Monteynard. When the lads of a French village were called together to ballot, it was the custom for all of them to put a small sum into a fund officially known as the *mise au profit*, but popularly called the *mise au chapeau*, to be given as a solatium to that one of them who drew the *billet noir*. Now it might, and did not uncommonly, happen that one of these youths would volunteer to take the *billet noir* and the *mise au chapeau*. The Minister of War tried to stop this practice, but the village authorities were banded against him. They were much of opinion that the spirited youth who volunteered to take the *billet noir* and the bounty (for that is what the *mise au chapeau* really was) could be spared. If he then volunteered for the army, well he was better employed in defending his king and country on a distant frontier, than in getting himself (and another person) into trouble in the village. Turgot could see no harm in the *mise au chapeau*. The youth followed his natural inclination. The other youths were preserved for productive industry, and the king obtained a volunteer who was far better worth having than a pressed man. The philosopher, who was also a very capable administrator, said rather tartly that he knew all about the principles, but that a man of sense will always apply a principle in the easiest and least injurious way. To take no more men than you must, to take the volunteer by preference, and to spare all you possibly could for industry, seemed to him the course dictated by common sense.

The rulers of Prussia themselves were much of that opinion. To form a standing army of long service men by voluntary enlistment or crimping, to provide for increasing it in the day of need by the compulsory service of a part of the rural population which had a militia training in peace, and to exempt the inhabitants of important industrial centres altogether, so that in war the business of life might go on undisturbed behind the barrier provided by the army, was the regular policy. However unjust or absurd it may seem to those who are in love with uniformity, that a boy born in Berlin should be exempted from military service, but not one born in Potsdam, it is a substantial fact that Prussia could not have endured the strain of the Seven Years' War with a system of universal military service. Four years of complete sacrifice of everything to the army have been enough to exhaust the incomparably richer and more populous Germany of to-day.

Our own policy was the same. We used the press-gang, even for the army, in some cases down to the American War. We always used it to obtain 'prime seamen' for the fleet because as the wages in merchant ships went up in war time they would not volunteer for the poorer pay of the navy. Marines could always be found without the press, and so could the large element of mere 'sea labourers,' the so-called 'waisters,' who pulled ropes on deck—in the waist—or worked under the mate of the hold below, but who were not expected to go aloft or to set up rigging like 'prime seamen.' We could impose the ballot for the militia, and we put a gentle pressure on men to join volunteer regiments by telling them that they would have to ballot for the militia if they did not. But we never drew the whole population between this age and that age. The list of exemptions is a notable feature of the Militia Acts. The Act of 1801-2, which was stricter than some others, exempts peers, resident members of universities, clergymen, teachers, apprentices, and all poor men who could produce more than one child born in wedlock, and all workmen employed in H.M. docks and gun-wharves. The exemption of married men with more than one child must have tended here, as in France, to promote early and improvident marriages, but it must also have prevented the transfer of a whole generation of workers to the ranks of the army.

Universal military service reappeared in the French Revolution, and even then not at once, nor without qualifications.

The conscription, as organised by Jourdan, dates from 1798, when the revolutionary war had lasted for seven years. Between 1792 and 1798 the various administrations which had replaced the royal government, drafted men in numbers which were fixed according to the estimated needs of the service. The drafts were undoubtedly large; one of them reached the great figure of 1,200,000. But even if they were fully enforced, which in the then condition of France must be doubtful, they never included the whole male population of military age. Service was universal in theory, but fell short of universality in practice. The revolutionary governments began by exempting married men. It is a well-known fact that in France as in England the prospect of escaping military service by taking a wife promoted early marriages, which for a time at least were very fruitful. In spite of the great loss of life on the battlefield, and the still greater loss by disease, although the years from 1789 to 1798 were hungry years of generally bad harvests, the population of France increased. We know that our own grew rapidly, and this could not have been the case with either people if the whole of the younger men had been swept into the armies and the fleets.

What France began, Prussia completed, at first under the pressure of necessity, and then under the stimulus of ambition. And when Prussia had established its supremacy in the German Empire, the whole people became subject to the same call. It is a commonplace that before the war the Imperial German Government did not call out all the men it was entitled to summon. As a matter of fact, it took a lower percentage than the French, who, having a smaller population to draw on, and yet desiring to have a large army, could not afford to dispense with recruits. But the men exempted because the government could not afford the expense of embodying them all, remained liable to serve. They were embodied when the war broke out. The result has been that the Germans put themselves in this position—that if they did not win at once they must be worn out by the drain inflicted on them by their own policy of so-called defence. They have forced allies and neighbours, who had but too good reason to fear their attack, to adopt the same ruinous device. And the end of it all is what we see. The result has been so terrible, and is likely to be so evil in the future, that one is unwilling to use words which may appear to have an air of levity. But what is it all but

a *reductio ad absurdum* of universal military service? The device which sentimentalists, military and civil, have belauded for its nobility, and as a cause of strength, has turned out to be a broken reed of Egypt which will go into a man's hand and pierce it. The failure and the ruin have been worst where the service has come nearest to being universal.

And it has had consequences not merely economic which must surely suggest gloomy reflections to the more intelligent of its admirers.

It is safe to assume that men do not read the French royalist Rivarol much in these days. But there is one sentence of his, which though it was written a century and a quarter ago almost to a year, sounds like a comment on the latest piece of news provided by the daily papers. 'Les Souverains ne doivent jamais oublier que les écrivains peuvent recruter parmi les soldats, et qu'un général ne peut recruter parmi les lecteurs.' The sovereigns have since become well aware of this truth. When Rivarol made what was then a new observation, the sergeants of the Garde Française had just taught them the lesson. It was one they were sure not to forget, and they have striven stupidly ever since to keep the soldier away from the persuasions of the author, by censorship, imprisonments, and capital punishments. We have only to look at what is passing on the continent to find copious evidence that the sovereigns—whatever their modern titles may be—have striven in vain, because they have defeated their own purpose. The writers have recruited among the armies with a vengeance. And they have found favourable and attentive hearers because they have met so small a proportion of 'soldiers' in their audience.

The reader is respectfully begged to pause for a moment before deciding that he is being asked to tolerate an undergraduate epigram. It may sound absurd to say that there are few soldiers, when the Old World and the New are in arms, and millions of men have been fighting much and well. None the less, it is a simple statement of fact, and will be seen to be one when we realise what the soldier was and what the trained men who compose a modern army are. When the old professional soldier was trained (Napier tells us that four years were considered to be necessary for the formation of the British soldier) he was kept till he was elderly and stiff in the joints. He was allowed to marry when all remnant of the recruit had been drilled out of him. His wife was 'on the strength,' his

children were 'enfants de troupe.' The barracks and camps of the order of men who devoted their lives to the honourable profession of arms swarmed with women and children, who did a good deal of the work which would now fall to an Army Service Corps. An 'old band,' an 'established regiment,' composed of these elements, was a tribe with its tribal loyalty. Their women and children also belonged to the tribe. They were not 'Waacs,' nor were they like the women who could be found on the lower decks of men-of-war, cooking for the mess, washing and mending, living with their husbands in quarters marked off by canvas partitions. A ship's company was unstable. It was paid off at the end of the commission, and its members drifted far apart. An old band, an old established regiment, had a long history, a body of traditions, a patriotism of its own.

The merit of the old soldier was that his government could trust him. He was not the kind of man who was likely to be found sitting on a soldiers' and workmen's soviet. He stood by his tribe, and that was an instrument of government. Sovereigns could rely on him to put down a popular rising. If the pékin was not exactly an enemy at all times, he was another kind of man, and an inferior one, who might become an enemy. The main reason why the rising of Pougatchef did not plunge Russia into as utter an anarchy as she is in to-day, was that Catharine's old regiments were invincibly loyal. The memoirs of Dampmartin show how slowly, and in the face of what instinctive repugnance, the poison introduced into the old French Royal Army by the sergeants of the Garde Française, was able to spread. Grillparzers' famous line to Radetzky 'In deinem Lager ist Oesterreich,' is far more than a poetic flourish. Every nationality in the Austrian Empire was represented in Radetzky's camp in Lombardy. All the peoples from which the soldiers came were more or less discontented. Some were in revolt. Yet the Magyars, Croats, Czechs, the very Italians, as much as the Tyrolese and Austro-Germans, fought for the Empire like soldiers. And the reason is that this is just what they were. The regiment was their home, the flag was the symbol of the faith, and military honour was their religion.

No such people set apart is now to be found. A universal obligation to serve is not incompatible with the training of good fighting men. We have seen from the Tigris to the



Seine that it is perfectly compatible with the production of good armies. And it is indispensable for the composition of very large armies which can expand rapidly on the outbreak of war. But it creates the exact contrary of the conditions and the influences which bred the old soldier as the world knew him with his good and his bad.

The immediate consequence of universal service has been that the period spent in the ranks which is the preliminary to transfer into the reserve has tended to become ever more brief. Conscription first took men 'for the war.' In Revolutionary and Napoleonic times that was found to mean for twenty years. Then soldiers in the old sense were formed. They were the men who restored Napoleon in 1815, and who made their last appearance as 'the Brigands of the Loire,' at least as an organised body. When they were disbanded large numbers of them volunteered for the new Royal Army. They had not forgotten 'l'autre' who was now 'là-bas dans l'île,' but the regiment had become their home, and they could not live away from it. But *les vieux troupiers* passed and conscription went on. The term of service with the colours was shortened till it fell as low as two years, which in practice often worked out at eighteen months. Meanwhile the period during which a man belonged to one or another class of the reserve, and was liable to be called out, was no less steadily lengthened. Now it follows as the night the day that while those who are thus drawn for short periods of teaching may and do learn how to fight, they cannot be endowed with the military character. They are no class by themselves; they have not the same tribal loyalty. The people from which they have just been drawn, and to which they will so soon return, is not alien to them. Its feelings are theirs.

And a good thing too? Well, yes, on a certain condition. It is that there must be no discontent, social, racial, political, or other in the nation which has a universal service army. When there is, then we have in the ranks of the army itself the very danger against which the professional army of long service soldiers is as sure a defence as human wisdom can find. In Reform Bill days some draftsman drew a plate on which could be seen a countryman who was going to enlist, and was being implored by his mates not to make a fool, or perhaps it was an enemy, of himself. And he says, 'You fools, cannot I help you 'better with a gun in my hand than without one?' About 1830

there was no danger in that drawing. As we may see from the memoirs of 'Somerville the Soldier,' an isolated man who went into a regiment where the old soldier predominated might hold those sentiments, but he was helpless. Is he, is he likely to be, when he comes in by the thousand, when he is surrounded by sympathisers, and when he knows that there are plenty like-minded in other regiments? The late rulers of Central and Eastern Europe would see nothing harmless and still less jocose in that drawing. The discontented men have found their power. 'Tout ce qui se perfectionne par progrès p rit aussi par progr s.' Conscription has bred universal service and huge reserves. The civil world has come into armies. The very machine which was framed to increase the power of the rulers has been found to be alive and full of passion. Universal service has produced the soviet, the organised masterpiece of the workman and soldier.

And that also is a good thing, since our enemy has suffered from it? Well, to that extent, yes. Yet we have to remember that the first to suffer was an ally. Nor can we assume that the end will be within the borders of our enemies. Given a conscript army with short service, the peril will be everywhere, where there is discontent. The sanctity which hedged military discipline has been conspicuously defouled. Mutiny has revived in a new and far more deadly form. It is not the explosive rage of unpaid, unfed, overdriven men; it is the revolt of social discontent, of envy, of ambition. The officers have not been assailed because they have been oppressive, though no doubt the harsher among them have been the worst used. They have been attacked as a body because they represent the social order which the mutineers detest. In the universal service army there is a sharp division between the officers who are professional soldiers for life, and the ever moving, constantly passed on and renewed floods of civilians who are being trained. The sentiments of the two may well not be the same. Short service brings all the discontents, spites, aspirations, and delusions of the whole community into the ranks. The discontented learn their strength. They see how easy it must be for a thousand of them with guns in their hands to make an end of fifty or sixty officers. The ancient military code of morals had a strong hold, but the charm has been broken. The workman who is in the ranks against his will, has found what a seemingly simple business it is to go over with his gun to the workman who is outside,

and together they are irresistible. How can you fight a combination of your enemy and your own fighting men?

That may be no unmixed evil if it cures governments of the passion for large armaments, which has been the disease of Europe for generations. If the world reverted to voluntary enlistment, there would soon be no armies millions strong. The League of Nations could choose no better means of reducing armies than the abolition of compulsory service. With voluntary enlistment all would be small, and many countries could not have any. But if that is too much to hope, something will be gained if governments have been taught to keep down the number of their soldiers in order to avoid the danger of arming their enemies.

DAVID HANNAY.

## EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM

I N November last a deputation of Nationalist leaders approached the British High Commissioner in Egypt, and presented demands embodying, in the words of the official mouthpiece of the Foreign Office in the House of Commons on 20th March last, 'a policy of complete autonomy for Egypt, which would have meant to Great Britain only a right of supervision with regard to the public debt and the Suez Canal.' The object of the following observations is to warn British sympathisers, insufficiently acquainted with the conditions of the country, of the great danger to the true interests of the Egyptians themselves which would inevitably be caused by unwise action in the direction demanded.

The two main planks in the Nationalist platform for many years past have been, first, greater rights of self-government by means of largely extended powers for the Legislative Assembly; and, secondly, a larger share in the administrative and executive sphere for Egyptians by diminishing—if possible almost to vanishing point—the number of posts in the Civil Service held by Europeans, and more particularly by British officials. The former is by far the more important of these two main causes of discontent. It becomes, therefore, very material to inquire what have been, hitherto, the nature and powers of Egyptian representative institutions, what their attitude has been towards the Executive Government, and how far their working has conduced to the welfare of the community at large, and demonstrated the fitness of the Egyptian to be entrusted with wider powers of self-government.

As early as the time of Mohammed Ali the principle of government with the assistance of representative consultative bodies was recognised, and in the reign of that Viceroy a Council of elected village sheikhs and provincial notables was established, but does not appear to have taken a very prominent part in the government of the State. Later, in the time of Ismail Pasha, there was a Chamber of notables, established by a law of 1866, which, in the reign of Ismail's successor Tewfik Pasha, 'fell under the control of self-seeking politicians and

'remained so until the Arabi rebellion.'\* That this Chamber undoubtedly sowed the first seeds of what, later, came to be known as 'Nationalism,' there can be little doubt, and it was encouraged and supported in its action, at that time, by the principal British officials in Egypt—Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin. The Arabi movement was indeed essentially an Egyptian National movement directed against the Turkish military oligarchy; and the British Government, which had no interest in supporting Turkey *versus* Egypt, was urged by its representatives in Egypt to take no steps which would be construed as hostile to the popular movement. The Chamber of notables, however, was swept away by the events of 1882, and shortly afterwards Lord Dufferin was sent out to devise a new constitution for the country. He caused to be promulgated the Organic Law of 1883, which with some minor modifications remained in force for thirty years until it was materially altered, by the late Lord Kitchener, in 1913.

Lord Dufferin's institutions consisted of Provincial Councils, a Legislative Council, and a General Assembly. Roughly the constitution may be summarised as follows. The village by manhood suffrage elected certain representatives. These elected Provincial Councils. The Provincial Councils in their turn elected fourteen members for the Legislative Council, twelve others being nominated by the Government, thus forming together a Council of thirty members. The General Assembly consisted of eighty-two members, viz., the thirty members of the Legislative Council, forty-six delegates elected by the representatives of the villages, and eight ministers.

As regards the Provincial Councils, their functions under the Organic Law were not very numerous or important, and those functions were still further restricted in practice by the infrequency of the Councils' meetings and the failure to provide them with means of effectively participating in the general administrative life of the province. Indeed, beyond giving their opinion on the annual programme of the rotation of crops and the establishment of agricultural roads, their chief importance consisted in their electoral powers in respect of the Legislative Council. These Provincial Councils therefore were reorganised and given considerably extended powers in the time of the late Sir Eldon Gorst by a law of 1909, which was intended to con-

---

\* 'Egypt,' No. 1 (1914), p. 3.

stitute a first instalment of more extensive powers of self-government for the people. Notably, important powers and duties were assigned to them in educational matters, and they thus became the real and effective local authority for all that concerned elementary education in the province.

Sir Eldon Gorst also made some rather timid and tentative steps in the direction of extending in practice the powers of the Legislative Council and Assembly, by allowing more extensively than formerly questions to Ministers, and by submitting to those bodies for their opinion matters which it was not strictly necessary to refer to them—in short, as he described it, ‘by granting them an opportunity of making their voice heard in matters of importance.’\*

In general, however, the Legislative Council and the General Assembly remained substantially unchanged by these reforms. The Legislative Council remained as originally intended a small, select, and highly organised body to assist Ministers in the elaboration of their measures, and to act as a check on unsuitable and oppressive legislation. It was intended to contain a certain number of distinguished men of experience and high social status, as well as a representative element of Coptic Egyptians. All laws or decrees involving administrative change had to be submitted to the Council before being actually approved. The Council could make suggestions as to the internal legislation and the administrative action of the Government, it could ask the Ministry to consider and reply to any petitions forwarded through it; it could criticise and make suggestions on the budget and departmental expenditure; and, finally, it could seek explanation or information from the Ministers on any point or subject about which it desired to be informed. The General Assembly on the other hand was a more democratic body, with its two representatives from each province and a proportionate number from the towns. Its functions were to discuss questions affecting the interests of the whole country. It possessed the same privilege of discussion, criticism, and suggestion as the Legislative Council, but exercised it at rarer intervals and with reference to more important subjects. The concurrence of the Assembly had to be obtained for any measure involving the imposition of fresh general taxation.†

---

\* ‘Egypt,’ No. 1 (1911), p. 2.

† Cf. ‘Egypt,’ No 1 (1914), p. 3.

In 1913 Lord Kitchener made considerable alterations in this organisation. These changes are exhaustively analysed and explained in a dispatch published at the time,\* and it will be sufficient to recall here the main features of the reform effected. The Legislative Council with its thirty members, and the General Assembly with its eighty-two members, comprising the Legislative Council itself, formed a dual organism which in reality served no useful purpose, and in no wise corresponded to the system of an Upper and Lower Chamber of Western constitutions. The General Assembly met very rarely—ordinarily only once in two years—and had no effective legislative powers beyond the right to ensure that no new direct taxation should be imposed without its assent. The Legislative Council, on the other hand, though it possessed nothing but consultative powers, took in practice a far more real and effective share in the work of legislation than its more numerous counterpart. Lord Kitchener therefore amalgamated the two bodies into one, under the name of Legislative Assembly, increasing the number of its members and extending its functions.

The new body is composed of 91 members, viz., 66 elected by two degrees of election, 17 nominated by the Government, and 8 Ministers. The election is by uni-nominal ballot and two degrees of election (instead of three as formerly), each elector-delegate representing fifty primary electors. The principal advantages presented by the composition of the new Assembly over that of the former bodies, and the increased powers and attributions accorded to it, are:—

(1) The power of the Assembly to delay legislation, when it thinks that further time is required for reflection and investigation ;

(2) The necessity for the Government to justify its persistence in passing legislation in spite of the disapproval of the Legislature, certain elaborate machinery for consultation between the Government and the Chamber being provided for this purpose ;

(3) The power to initiate measures and decrees on its own responsibility ; and

(4) The establishment of machinery, by which the Government can directly consult the electors on any proposal to which the Assembly is opposed.

---

\* 6th July 1913. 'Egypt,' No. 3 (1913).

Such are, in broad outline, the nature and powers of the principal Egyptian representative institutions at the present time. To complete the picture, mention must be made of the municipal institutions, the representative element in which has been introduced entirely by the British administration since the Occupation, viz., the Alexandria Municipality, the Mixed Municipalities, and the local Commissions. As a result of British reforms, forty-eight towns, representing a population of some 1,300,000 inhabitants, or approximately a tenth of the whole community, enjoy the benefit of full representative government in municipal affairs.

Let us now see what has been the attitude of the representative bodies above described, and how they have discharged their functions, and generally comported themselves. During the early years of the British Occupation the Legislative Council attracted little attention. This was mainly due to the fact that it took its tone—as such bodies are apt to do in the East—from the Head of the State, and that the Khedive, Tewfik Pasha, was almost uniformly friendly to the British. He was, in Lord Cromer's words,\* 'fully aware that the sole aim of English policy in Egypt was to secure the welfare and prosperity of the Egyptian people, and he regulated his conduct accordingly.' But no sooner had his son, the Khedive Abbas II., ascended the throne, and set the example of violent and systematic opposition to British influence and advice, than the attitude of the Legislative Council completely changed, and became distinctly hostile and obstructive. Its activities at that time, viz., in the winter of 1892-93, are described by an independent and unofficial critic in the following graphic terms:—

'It began by attacking two of its members for having, as a matter of courtesy, called upon Lord Cromer in Cairo, and on that point brought upon itself a sharp rebuff, alike from the British representative and from the Egyptian Government. It then proceeded to attack the Budget, especially the estimates of the War Department and the expenses of the Army of Occupation. It proposed to abolish the Prisons Department, the Municipality of Alexandria, and the Department for repressing the slave trade. It recommended a large reduction of the grant for Public Works and of the salaries of European officials. It appointed a Committee to inquire into the alleged unsatisfactory administration of the Domains, demanded a reduction of the Secret Service money, denounced the extravagance of the Government, deplored the rapidly increasing poverty and distress of the Egyptian people, and, in short, behaved

---

\* 'Egypt,' No. 3 (1892), p. 2.



generally as an oriental legislative body, called into existence by western experimentalists, would be likely to comport itself towards the authors of its being.'\*

Lord Cromer himself has given an account of the origin and working of these institutions in various parts of his Reports. In the Report for 1891,† he said:—

'No one—and certainly not Lord Dufferin, under whose auspices the plan was conceived—supposed that institutions, such as those which I have described above, would readily take root in the somewhat uncongenial soil of Egypt. . . . Lord Dufferin subsequently wrote to me that "these institutions were a good deal ridiculed at the time, but as it was then uncertain how long we were going to remain, or rather how soon the Turks might not be reinvested with their ancient supremacy, I desired to erect some sort of barrier, however feeble, against their intolerable tyranny. On the other hand, I felt that, as you have most justly said, if English superintendence were to endure, they might be fostered and educated into fairly useful institutions, proving a convenient channel through which the European element in the Government might obtain an insight into the inner mind, and the less obvious wants, of the native population."‡

In 1904 he wrote further:—§

'Sufficient experience has now been gained to justify the statement that Lord Dufferin's main design was wisely conceived. He wished to create institutions which should be "consultative rather than law-making." Although one of the institutions which he designed was called the "Legislative Council," it was, as a matter of fact, not intended to legislate, but rather to advise about legislation. . . . I think it may fairly be said that, more especially in recent times, the Legislative Council has occasionally performed some useful functions in the direction intended by Lord Dufferin.'

Two years later, in 1906, he analysed more fully the working of the Legislative Council as follows:—

'The Legislative Council may be said to have passed through three separate phases of existence. For the first few years of the British occupation it attracted little notice. The country was in danger of being throttled by bankruptcy, whilst the affairs of the Soudan occupied so prominent a place in Egyptian politics as almost to monopolise the attention of the Government and the public. The second phase may be said to have begun about the year 1892. The Council drifted, about that time, into an attitude of hostility against the Government. || This

\* 'Lord Cromer,' by H. D. Traill. London, 1897, p. 300.

† 'Egypt,' No. 3 (1892), p. 3.

‡ See Sir Alfred Lyall's 'Life of the Marquis of Dufferin,' vol. ii. p. 260.

§ 'Egypt,' No. 1 (1904), p. 10.

|| This is the period above described by Mr. Traill.

phase was fortunately of short duration, and may now be said to have entirely passed away. We have now entered the third stage, which is of good augury for the future.'

Unhappily, Lord Cromer's hopes were not realised, and the third stage proved to be of equally short duration. Five years later, in 1911,\* we find Sir Eldon Gorst describing, with considerable asperity, the attitude of the Legislative Council and General Assembly as follows:—

'Although non-contentious projects and measures, in which no political considerations were involved were, on several occasions, discussed in a fairly business-like spirit by the Council, and several useful amendments proposed, this body, and also the general Assembly, displayed in 1909 and the first half of 1910 a steadily increasing tendency to become mere instruments of the Nationalist agitation against the occupation. Their repeated demands for full constitutional government, the acrimonious attacks on the Government in connection with the Budget and the Soudan, and the unreasonable hostility and suspicion displayed in the discussion of the Suez Canal scheme, were, in their essence, manifestations of Anglophobia, stirred up by the Nationalist party. The main idea of this party has been to bring the occupation to an end by making its task an impossibility, and the chief methods employed consist in undermining the influence of the Anglo-Egyptian officials by constant abuse, insulting all Egyptians who do not take up an antagonistic attitude to British control, and inciting to disorder, whenever an opportunity offers. In the execution of this programme, the General Assembly and Legislative Council lent themselves as auxiliaries, with the result that their newly acquired importance † was used as a weapon against those to whom they owed it.'

There is then here, it will be observed, evidently little improvement on the state of things eloquently described by Mr. Traill as prevailing nearly twenty years previously, namely, in 1892. On taking up his appointment in Egypt in 1911, Lord Kitchener at once set to work to endeavour to remedy this state of affairs by remodelling these institutions on the lines above described. The new Legislative Assembly, on an improved electoral basis, and with considerably extended powers, was opened by the Khedive Abbas with great ceremony in January 1914. Great things were hoped for from this new Chamber, which was constituted on far more democratic lines than its predecessor, and had been accorded wider legislative powers. Its attitude and behaviour, however, throughout its first and

---

\* 'Egypt,' No. 1 (1911), pp. 2 and 3.

† Reference is here made to the innovations with regard to questions and joint consultation referred to above, p. 62.

only session—the war shortly afterwards suspended its activities—was a profound disappointment to all who had taken part in its inception. There was certainly no lack of energy or disinclination for debate on the part of its members, and the sittings were often of the most animated, not to say turbulent, description, but the practical results of the session were negligible.

The questions which led to the most impassioned discussion were often of a wholly unpractical nature, and the sittings afforded abundant evidence of a spirit of bitter antagonism and opposition to almost all Government proposals on the part of a large proportion of the Chamber. Of the twelve projects of law before the Assembly at its opening, only one—and that an insignificant matter concerning civil procedure—had been passed and promulgated by the end of May, though the Assembly, up to that date, had held no less than thirty-two sittings, most of them of very long duration. All the other laws were still in various stages of development. The matter which had chiefly occupied the attention of the Chamber was the question of the Standing Orders (*Réglement intérieur*) regulating its own procedure; and such questions as which of the two Vice-Presidents—whether the nominated or the elected Vice-President—should preside in the absence of the President, gave rise to some of the lengthiest and most impassioned debates of the whole session. Yet the practical importance of the question may be gauged by the fact that, as one of the speakers pointed out in the course of the debates, the contingency in question had only once occurred in the former Legislative Council during the thirty years of its existence! The two main tendencies which emerged most clearly from this orgy of talk were:—

(1) An unduly subservient attitude towards the Chamber on the part of the Egyptian Ministers, who evinced a deplorable desire to curry favour with the popular Assembly, even at the cost of sacrificing at times important principles of their measures, if by so doing they could secure a favourable vote; and this although the Assembly, being an advisory body, had no power to dismiss them from office, or even ultimately to reject their proposals; and

(2) A settled determination on the part of the Assembly itself not to be content, even provisionally, with the new powers accorded to it, but to endeavour steadily to extend them *vis-à-vis* the Government, and to acquire the status of a full-

fledged Legislature with the right to reject finally official measures. This attitude is traditional in similar assemblies in Egypt, and was notably a marked feature of the situation in 1881, on the eve of the Arabi rising, when the Chamber of notables, summoned under the Ismail law of 1866, loudly demanded larger powers.\*

This attitude of the Assembly, and the nature of its proceedings throughout the session, were the subject of severe comment by Lord Kitchener. In his Annual Report for 1913, he wrote in the following trenchant terms:—

‘. . . Representative bodies can only be safely developed when it is shown that they are capable of performing adequately their present functions, and that there is good hope that they could undertake still more important and arduous responsibilities. If representative government, in its simplest form, is found to be unworkable, there is little prospect of its becoming more useful when its scope is extended. *No Government would be insane enough to consider that, because an advisory Council had proved itself unable to carry out its functions in a reasonable and satisfactory manner, it should therefore be given a larger measure of power and control.*’†

Throughout the session of 1914, and since that time, the opposition to the Anglo-Egyptian administration has been led by the elected Vice-President of the Assembly, Saad Pasha Zaglul, who, for the last five years, has been the acknowledged leader of the Nationalist party in Egypt, and is by far the most able and the most popular of the four agitators whose deportation to Malta was the starting point of the recent outbreak. Throughout the session of the Assembly he conducted the campaign against the Government with no little skill, and with an intensity of violence and a passionate animosity towards all official proposals which, in an ex-Minister of Education and of Justice, was surprising. Saad Zaglul, however, is a man of a highly combative and refractory disposition, to whose fiery and pugnacious temperament opposition is really more congenial than office. He resembles, in this respect, the typical Irish agitator, who is always ‘agin the Government,’ no matter what it may do. He does not belong to the old Turkish *grand seigneur* stock, from which Egyptian Ministers, in the past, have so frequently been drawn, but is essentially a man of the people, being I believe of pure fellah origin. He has, indeed, much of the dogged

\* See ‘Modern Egypt,’ by the Earl of Cromer, vol. i. p. 225.

† ‘Egypt,’ No. 1 (1914), p. 6. The italics are mine.

obstinacy and unconvincible *entêtement* of that sturdy race. But he has also many excellent and attractive qualities, and during the two years of my close association with him at the Ministry of Justice, I had for him feelings of sincere regard and esteem. He is a virile and striking personality who stands out, somewhat conspicuously, among the generality of modern Egyptians. It is, therefore, greatly to be regretted that this man, who has undoubtedly by far the largest personal following among his fellow-countrymen of any Egyptian statesman, should have become our most bitter enemy; but he is, unfortunately, profoundly convinced that he has good grounds for the sentiments he entertains towards us. He has in short personal grievances against the British regime, connected with the circumstances of his summary dismissal from office in 1912, which have rankled deeply. All this however, which is mainly a personal matter, cannot condone, though it may to some extent excuse, the lengths to which he has allowed his bitter resentment against us to carry him. When Lord Cromer, who with his unflinching political sagacity perceived the advantage of enlisting in the government ranks one of the most distinguished members of the Nationalist party—appointed Zaglul Minister of Education, he wrote:—

‘The main reason for his appointment was a desire to associate an able man and enlightened Egyptian, of this particular section of society, with our work of Egyptian reform. The experiment, for such it is, will be watched with interest. Should it succeed, as I hope and believe will be the case, some encouragement will be afforded to move further in the same direction. Should it fail, the necessary consequence will be to throw the continuance of the work of reform, to a greater extent than formerly, into European and notably into British hands. In any case there can be no retrogression.’\*

Zaglul Pasha may, perhaps, now reflect with melancholy on these words. Whatever may have been his theoretical aims and ideals, his conduct has not been that of a true patriot, for such a one would never have allowed his personal animosities to prejudice the interests of his country, as there is too much reason to fear has been the case with him. By his violent anglophobia and the rash and subversive doctrines he has preached, he has plunged his country into strife and bloodshed on a scale which has astonished the oldest inhabitants. It will, doubtless, put back the clock of Egyptian progress and prosperity for years, for besides the great loss of life and material damage it has

---

\* ‘Egypt,’ No. 1 (1907), p. 8.

occasioned, it has greatly alarmed the European residents, and will probably frighten away European capital for some time to come.

Amid all these great misfortunes the outbreak has had, however, two advantages for us. In the first place, it has demonstrated conclusively the total want of any real political capacity or statesmanship among the ranks of the Egyptian Independence party, the leaders of which were astounded and alarmed at the proportions of the fire they had kindled, but found themselves powerless to extinguish or control. In the second place, it has shown that confidence may in general be felt in the Egyptian police and higher native officials, many of whom have behaved with exemplary courage and devotion—in some cases unhappily at the cost of their lives. In short, as in the Alexandria riots of December 1905, 'it became apparent that twenty years \* of good government have produced one of the results they were intended to produce. A conservative class, who are opposed to all disorder and disturbance, has been created.' † When the present effervescence has subsided, the lesson will probably not be lost upon the great mass of law-abiding inhabitants who dislike political agitations, but are too weak to resist the flowing tide, when the current sets in that direction.

Finally, on this aspect of nationalism, *i.e.*, the demand for wider powers of representative government, reference should be made to the illuminating chapter on the whole subject in Lord Cromer's last Report, from which I may quote the following striking passage:—

'I am not aware that the Egyptian National Party have ever formulated their programme in any very precise terms, but so far as I am able to judge, they advocate the creation in Egypt of an institution similar to the British House of Commons. . . . Leaving aside doubtful points, I conceive I shall be right in holding that what is proposed is, first, the creation of a Ministry responsible to the Chamber, and dependent for its existence on the maintenance of a majority; and secondly, complete control over the finances of the country, such as that exercised by the elected Chambers in the United Kingdom, and in other European countries.

'The adoption of the first of these proposals would, unless I am much mistaken, produce a state of things which may, without exaggeration, be termed chaotic. Intrigue of all sorts would be rife. The system of bribery and corruption which was at one time so prevalent in the country, and which is even now only dying a lingering death,

---

\* Now nearly forty years.

† 'Egypt,' No. 1 (1906), p. 10.

would receive a fresh impulse. *It is more than probable that, under the specious title of free institutions, the worst evils of personal government would reappear.* The adoption of the second proposal—that of handing over complete financial control to the Chamber—would almost inevitably lead to national bankruptcy. It requires, indeed, some mental effort to discuss these proposals seriously. Can any sane man believe that a country which has, for centuries past, been exposed to the worst forms of misgovernment at the hands of its rulers, from Pharaohs to Pashas, and in which, but ten years ago, only 9 per cent. of the men and 3 per cent. of the women could read and write, is capable of suddenly springing into a position which will enable it to exercise full rights of autonomy with advantage to itself and to others interested in its welfare? The idea is absurd. The programme of the National Party is quite incapable of realisation at present, *and it may well be doubted whether, in the form in which it is now conceived, it can ever be realised.*\*

Has the situation materially altered since those words were written? I submit that it has not. Turning now to the second demand, viz., the diminution of British influence in the Civil Service. This matter has been, for many years past, the subject of constant diatribes in the native Press. Lord Cromer has explained, in numerous reports, the principle on which he consistently proceeded in this matter, and has pointed out that, so far from wishing to flood the Egyptian Civil Service with young Englishmen, his difficulty had been to check the demands in this respect made by Egyptians themselves. This, as he observes, is not at all surprising. 'An individual Egyptian 'has some personal grievance, real or imaginary. . . . Neglect-ful of the general issues at stake, and mindful only of his 'special grievance, he rushes, somewhat characteristically, to 'the conclusion that such things could not occur if British 'influence were more prominently asserted in every branch of 'the administration.†

As early as 1892—ten years after the commencement of the occupation—Lord Cromer stated his views on the principle involved in the following terms:—

'No one recognises more fully than myself the excellent work done by European officials in Egypt. No one sees more clearly that, for the time being, their employment is essential to the welfare of the population. But even the remarkable moral and material progress which their presence in the country has ensured will, in many respects, have been dearly bought unless the ultimate tendency of any reforms which have been or may be executed is to decrease, rather than increase, the necessity for employing European agents; and unless a capable

---

\* 'Egypt,' No. 1 (1907), p. 7.

† 'Egypt,' No. 1 (1903), p. 39.

body of native officials is trained who may, not abruptly indeed but gradually and tentatively, work the administrative machinery initiated under European guidance.\*

Eleven years later, in 1903, we find him still harping on this string:— †

‘It is quite conceivable, though by no means certain, that if a large number of young Englishmen had been brought into the country and if, after having been taught the language, they had been appointed mudirs, judges, heads of police and so on, better administrative results would have been achieved than has been actually the case. *The policy was, however, deliberately rejected.* It was decided not to anglicise the administration more than was absolutely necessary. It was thought better to tolerate a certain amount of inefficiency, and to be content with relatively slow progress, rather than to adopt this extreme process of eliminating native agency from the administration. Broadly speaking, it may be said that, with rare exceptions, mostly of a nature where technical knowledge was required, almost the whole of the subordinate and the greater portion of the superior appointments, whether judicial or executive, were left in native Egyptian hands.’

Finally, in his last Report,‡ he exhaustively reviewed the whole subject and analysed the proportions in the various departments, showing how small a proportion, on the whole, the European staff bore to the native personnel. Thus, in one of the most important departments—the Ministry of Justice—out of a total staff of 1600, only 36 were European. He then stated once more that the

‘General policy which has been pursued, since the British occupation of the country took place in 1882, has been *to limit the number of Europeans in the employment of the Government* as much as possible; to employ Egyptians in the very great majority of the subordinate and in a large number of the superior administrative posts; and gradually to prepare the ground for increasing the number of Egyptians in high employment.’

For the benefit of those who might not understand why European assistance was essential, he explained that European agency is required in Egypt for two reasons:—

‘In the first place, to supply the technical knowledge which, until very recently, the Egyptians have had no opportunity of acquiring; in the second place, to remedy those defects in the Egyptian character which have been developed by a long course of misgovernment.’

It is, in reality, all a matter of discretion and degree. No doubt, as far as new posts are concerned, no European should

---

\* ‘Egypt,’ No. 3 (1892), p. 36.

† ‘Egypt,’ No. 1 (1903), p. 39.

‡ ‘Egypt,’ No. 1 (1907), pp. 33-44.



now be appointed until it has become quite certain that no suitable Egyptian can be found for the post. Whether, however, any wholesale reduction of the existing proportion of Europeans to natives should be made—as is advocated in some quarters—is far more doubtful. A British Adviser, for instance, deprived of all his English inspectors, upon whom he mainly relies and must rely for delicate and confidential missions, would be in a ridiculous and almost impotent position. But if it be impracticable to reduce, to any large extent, the numbers of the European, and more particularly of the British, staff in the Civil Service, for some time to come, it does not follow that no improvement whatever can be made in their selection, with a view to removing some of the objections to their appointment at present complained of.

Lord Cromer in one of his Reports, doubtless moved by complaints which reached him from time to time, wrote :—

‘I cannot, indeed, too strongly impress on all the British officials in this country that it is their duty—as I feel convinced it is also their desire—not only to do all in their power to thoroughly understand the Egyptian view of any question which may be brought before them, but also to accord a sympathetic consideration to that view, even when it may, to some extent, clash with their own opinions.’\*

It is indeed often alleged against us that we are, as a nation, wanting in sympathy and tact towards foreigners, and, what is graver, towards natives in our eastern dependencies. There is, no doubt, considerable truth in this allegation, and it occasionally produces very untoward results. I recently received two letters from Egypt about the same time, from two residents of long standing in the country, both of them highly competent critics of local affairs, who, unknown to each other, appear to be in complete accord as to one of the (doubtless minor) causes of the present trouble. The first, writing on 10th March, the day of the outbreak, after giving some account of it, observes :—

‘Altogether there is the worst muddle here you ever saw, *just by bad handling*. How far Zaglul’s preaching has penetrated I don’t know, but if there is any sort of rising in the country, there will be bloodshed—a terrible thing, when one knows how amiable and easy to govern these people are by tact and firmness at the right moment.’

And he then gives instances of what he calls ‘lack of human sympathy’ on the part of certain prominent officials.

The second—a distinguished member of one of the Allied

---

\* ‘Egypt,’ No. 1 (1905), p. 89.

nations—writing about a month earlier, apropos of the Ministerial crisis, says :—

‘J’ai beaucoup regretté ces incidents. Quand deux peuples doivent vivre ensemble, tout doit être fait pour rendre leurs rapports de tous les jours plus faciles et plus agréables. L’Angleterre ne peut pas abandonner l’Egypte, et si elle le faisait, j’ai la conviction que ce serait malheureux pour l’Egypte. Mais il faut qu’elle essaie de faire passer cette conviction dans l’esprit du peuple *et de “se faire aimer” par ce peuple*. Elle a fait beaucoup de bien ici. Elle peut en faire plus encore; *peut-être tous ses fonctionnaires n’ont-ils pas toujours “la manière” de faire apprécier les services rendus*. Je dis “la manière,” parce que je songe à cette expression courante chez les Egyptiens “qu’on obtient tout d’eux avec les bonnes manières.”’

Several other letters have reached me since, to much the same effect.

There does then plainly seem to be a certain consensus of opinion on this point. It is a delicate matter to discuss in public, but it is not primarily so much a question of persons as of principle, and there does appear to be considerable evidence to be derived from past experience, in support of the view that the Foreign Office or the Cabinet itself would be well advised, so far at any rate as Egypt is concerned, to pay more attention to this consideration than has hitherto been customary in making selections for the more important posts in the Anglo-Egyptian administration.

In conclusion, it is unhappily manifest that recent events involve a severe set-back to Egyptian progress. The sense of security and confidence which prevailed till lately among the European colonists has been largely shattered, and the friendly and often cordial relations which subsisted between European residents and the upper classes of Egyptians have also sustained a certain shock. It is doubtful how far and how soon such relations can be resumed. But when a measure of, at least, outward tranquillity has been achieved it is practically certain that great pressure will be put on the British Government to grant a larger measure of autonomy to Egypt.\* The object of these remarks, once more, is to enter a plea for caution, based on past experience, and a *caveat* against too drastic and far-

---

\* Among other difficulties is the proposed abolition of the capitulations. It may well be questioned whether in the light of the recent events, Europe will feel disposed to abandon her privileges in this respect. The abolition of the capitulations would appear to be incompatible, at present, with ‘self-government’ for the Egyptians.

reaching action in this direction. Lord Cromer has indicated quite clearly the nature of the danger to be apprehended, in words which sound like a prophetic warning; and one more quotation may be permitted from the almost inexhaustible store of political wisdom and prescience which his reports contain. After remarking that, though he often heard his régime in Egypt alluded to as a 'benevolent despotism,' he was himself, in reality, answerable to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Parliament, and ultimately to British public opinion, he proceeded as follows:—

'The possible danger in the future for Egypt lies, as it would appear to me, not so much in any serious risk of abuse of power by any individual on the spot, as in the occurrence of some incident which may lead to the active exercise of the dormant powers vested in authorities at a distance. British public opinion is not always very well informed on the affairs and precise conditions of foreign countries. It is conceivable that, at some future time, well-intentioned efforts to foster somewhat too rapidly the growth of self-governing institutions might result in the re-establishment, in another form, of personal power of the kind which, at no very remote date, did so much harm to the country, and which has left behind it habits and traditions as yet far from being extinct. This contingency, however paradoxical it may appear to many of my own countrymen, will scarcely be considered altogether fanciful by those who have lived in the East, and who have made a special study of Egyptian character. To these latter there would be nothing astonishing in the fact that, in the country which has been aptly termed the "Land of Paradox," a return to the exercise of personal power of an oriental type should assume, in the first instance, the attractive garb of a movement in the direction of self-government. Indeed, the one will almost inevitably be the accompaniment of the other, until a generation of Egyptians has come to maturity, who will have the courage to express their true opinions, not merely to the alien on whose justice and toleration of contradiction they can confidently rely, but also to their own indigenous magnates, who may possibly be somewhat less tolerant of freedom of speech.'\*

In other words, and less diplomatic language, if the well-meaning efforts of liberal-minded British Parliamentarians, desirous of freeing the Egyptians from an alien bureaucratic control, should succeed in bestowing upon Egypt large powers of self-government before the people have attained to the requisite level of education and moral character, the sole result will be to substitute for the disinterested guidance of British officials the traditional principles of autocratic government which are more or less ingrained in almost every oriental

---

\* 'Egypt,' No. 1 (1906), p. 13.

ruler, however highly civilised and enlightened he may appear to be.

No doubt, under existing conditions, this danger is no longer what it was when the ex-Khedive Abbas II. sat upon the throne. But princes come and go, while principles and traditions—especially in the East—remain more or less the same, and it would be difficult to feel much confidence that similar conditions might not recur. In that case, we should probably witness a culminating and possibly final paradox, whereby the last state of the land would be considerably worse than the first. However melancholy and discouraging the present situation may be to those who have spent the best years of their life endeavouring to train the Egyptians, morally and materially, to govern themselves, and however much we may sympathise with the natural aspirations of a small minority of the nation—some of whom are really able and enlightened men—we have to face the facts of the situation as a whole. We have seen how even representative assemblies, which may be supposed to contain the *intelligentsia* of the community, comport themselves, when gathered together in session,\* from the description of their proceedings by Mr. Traill in 1892, by Sir Eldon Gorst in 1911, and by Lord Kitchener in 1914. On the other hand, the recent outbreak has demonstrated conclusively once more that the vast mass of the lower classes are, when their religious or chauvinistic passions are aroused, highly dangerous fanatics. As at Alexandria in 1905, and at Den-shawai in 1906, 'an additional warning has been given, if, indeed, 'one was needed, that the turbulent character of the mob in these 'Egyptian towns constitutes a danger. No policy of reform will 'ever make any alteration in this respect. The only effective 'measure to guard against whatever risks exist, lies in the 'maintenance of a sufficient police force to repress disorder.' †

The raging crowds who clubbed to death a number of British officers in upper Egypt and Egyptian high functionaries and police officers—from Provincial Governors downwards—in lower Egypt, and besieged small bands of Europeans at Beni Suef and Assiout, were not the wild and lawless Bedouin tribes of the desert, but the so-called 'peaceful fellaheen' and petty

---

\* It is perhaps fair to acknowledge that Egypt is not singular in the respect that her representative assembly represents unfavourably even the relatively low standard of national intelligence. One is reminded of the Latin adage, 'Senatores boni viri, senatus autem mala bestia!'

† Cf. 'Egypt,' No. 1 (1905), p. 10.

tradesmen and shopkeepers of the towns and villages of the Delta. Such people are, in reality, utterly unfit to be entrusted with the franchise, and to take an intelligent share in the government of their country. They would be totally incapable of exercising any effective check on the proceedings of their representatives.

The experience of Egyptian popular Assemblies related above has not been of a nature to justify the grant to them, at present, of more extensive powers. Great Britain which, by force of circumstances, has been compelled for a generation to make herself responsible for the financial stability and internal order of the country, as a trustee for the people of Egypt and, in reality, as the mandatory of Europe, ought not to jeopardise the magnificent results attained by the efforts of her administrators for nearly forty years by premature concessions to a noisy little band of native demagogues, supported by a handful of their admirers in this country. The British occupation has conferred untold benefits on Egypt, both moral and material, which it would require pages to enumerate. Those who know the country best, both Englishmen and natives, are firmly convinced, and many even of the latter do not hesitate openly to declare, that five years of a Nationalist regime would sweep these benefits away and lead to hopeless chaos and disorder.

If, by any large measure of self-government to Egypt, British control on the administration were materially relaxed, the large landowner and Pasha class would secure place and power by bribery or intimidation, and thereafter would do little or nothing for the people, except exploit them. The country would then relapse once more into the conditions of the past with which we are so familiar, with a handful of leading opportunists and time-servers at the top, more or less in the hands of the Native Ruler, and the vast inarticulate masses underneath, once more the helpless victims of oppression and misgovernment, as they were for centuries before the British occupation. If Egypt is not to fall back into the morass of bankruptcy and anarchy from which we rescued her in 1882, with the still greater terrors of Bolshevism, of which there are already sinister indications, superadded, we must continue steadfastly to shoulder our burden there, and not weakly endeavour to shuffle it off on those who have, as yet, given no proof whatever that they could bear it successfully.

MALCOLM MCILWRAITH.

## THE COLOUR PROBLEM IN SOUTH AFRICA

○F the many problems now confronting the Empire, and pressing for settlement in the near future, that of satisfactorily adjusting the relations between the European and coloured races is surely the most urgent as well as the most difficult. Of the four hundred and thirty millions of people owing allegiance to the British crown, only some sixty-six millions are of European birth or descent. These numbers are according to the census of 1911; since that year the race-disproportion has certainly become even more marked. In the hour of the Empire's dire need, the non-European races responded to the call. There is nothing more certain than that these races will, before long, insist upon a practical recognition of their political rights. In this relation the South African Union, together with the adjacent territories which will in all probability sooner or later be included therein, is the danger area.

India, though many reforms may be needed, is governed mainly in the interests of the native Indians. In Canada and Australia the 'Native Question' has solved itself through the practical disappearance of the aboriginal inhabitants. In New Zealand race prejudice seems to have died down, while the Maoris, unexpectedly adapting themselves to changed conditions, are recovering that virility which at one time they seemed to be in danger of losing. But in South Africa we are confronted by a very ominous situation. Within the Union limits there is a population of over six million souls, only a million and a quarter of whom are European, and throughout the greater area comprised by the four provinces—Cape, Transvaal, Free State, and Natal—such a stringent and illiberal colour line is drawn, that not alone have the non-European inhabitants no voice in the management of the country, but their social and economic conditions are such as to practically debar them from advancement. Moreover, they are subjected to vexatious discriminating laws, and are the victims of a deep and growing race prejudice on the part of the Europeans. This involves a serious retrogression from the principles laid down by the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, in his

dispatch transmitting the approved constitution for the Cape Colony in 1853 :—

‘It is the earnest desire of Her Majesty’s Government that all her subjects at the Cape, without distinction of class or colour, should be united by one bond of loyalty and common interest.’

Until comparatively recent times, a band of stalwarts in the Cape Parliament followed the liberal and beneficent course suggested in the foregoing extract. Unfortunately, however, the scythe of time has been busy among their ranks ; to-day but an insignificant remnant is left. Those elected to fill the vacant places tend to become more and more imbued with colour prejudice. In the Union Parliament illiberal ideas on the colour question undoubtedly prevail. Many people are under the delusion that the English South African, as a rule, is the natives’ protector, while the Dutchman is habitually the natives’ oppressor. Unfortunately this is by no means the case. Neither race is prepared to treat the native or the coloured man with liberality ; but having, through an official experience of thirty-eight years, had special opportunities of judging, I can truthfully say that the South African Englishman is, on the whole, more unreasonably prejudiced against the native than is the South African Dutchman. The following case—unfortunately one of many of its class—may be taken as typical in this relation :—

On the 30th January 1913 two natives, a man and a woman, left the farm ‘Lowlands’, in the Ladybrand district of the Free State, with eleven head of cattle and thirty-eight sheep in their possession. Their destination was Basutoland. As they did not arrive at their home, a search was instituted by their friends. The stock was traced to one, P——, a Boer, who was known to be in financial difficulties. He had sold some of the stock, and with the proceeds satisfied a judgment against him, in which a writ had been taken out. In P——’s maize field two skeletons were found, with bullets in the skulls. These bullets corresponded with a revolver found in P——’s possession. P—— was tried before the circuit court at Bloemfontein in the following September, and acquitted by a jury of Englishmen. The verdict was hailed with the wildest enthusiasm, the accused being carried out of court on the shoulders of his admirers. In the following April P—— was tried before the circuit court at Ficksburg for theft of the stock, found guilty, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with hard labour. In passing

sentence the judge president made some significant remarks—remarks from which it could only be inferred that he regarded the accused as guilty also of the crime of which he had been acquitted at Bloemfontein.

Here is another case showing the methods by which so-called justice is meted out to natives in the Free State:—

On the 24th October 1916 a native girl, named Sanna, was alleged to have deserted from her master, an Englishman. A native policeman was sent to her home to arrest her. The ordinary procedure would have been to issue a summons. The girl's father, when told that the girl was to be brought before a special justice of the peace—a class of official usually both ignorant and prejudiced—refused to permit the girl to go, stating at the same time his willingness to convey her himself to be tried before the resident magistrate of the district. The policeman departed and returned with the girl's master and another man, all three carrying firearms. The girl, her father and mother and another man were the only ones at the kraal. The armed party shot the girl's father dead with a rifle bullet, wounded the girl severely in the back and thighs with shot, beat her mother unmercifully with the butt of a rifle, and broke a gun-stock over the second man. The three braves were tried before the circuit court and acquitted.

The law regarding natives and coloured people is different in the four respective provinces of the Union. In only one particular is it uniform—in the Parliament of the Union no native or coloured man may take a seat. In the Cape Province, white, black, and coloured have an equal right to the franchise, but in various Acts of Parliament, discrimination between the races is distinctly made. One important measure—the Natives' Land Act of 1913—which forbade, under stringent penalties, the hiring of land to natives practically throughout the Cape Province, has been declared *ultra vires* on the ground that it conflicted with the Act of Union, but there is little doubt that before long the latter Act will be amended to suit the situation. Of late years laws of increasing stringency on the subject of squatting have been enacted. A special law relating to Cape Town and Port Elizabeth has been passed, which provides that no native who is not a registered voter can sleep in either of these cities except a domestic servant on his master's premises. Locations with sheet-iron huts have been established in the environs, but these are disgracefully overcrowded—as many as



sixteen people sometimes sleeping in one small room. It is in fact impossible for all the natives employed at the docks, or in handling merchandise, or at other unskilled labour, to be accommodated in the locations referred to. Nevertheless natives are continually arrested for breaking a law which it is a physical impossibility for them to obey. Yet the very existence of the communities involved depends upon the labour of these natives. If the latter were to be eliminated, all business would stop as inevitably as would a watch with a broken spring.

The conditions under which the natives live in the locations established in the environs of the towns of the Cape Province—and, in fact, of South Africa generally—are most pitiful. There is no fixity of tenure, and the plots allotted are preposterously small. The inhabitants are heavily taxed, but the taxes are not spent for their benefit. Utter squalor and discomfort usually reign. At places such as Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, and Somerset East, while the European death-rate is about 14 per 1000, that of the natives is in the neighbourhood of 70. There is no possibility of social or intellectual advancement. Municipal officers administer the local bye-laws fitfully, often reviving some long dormant regulation, of the existence of which the natives were unaware. During an outbreak of typhus fever in Queenstown, Cape Province, in 1917, sick people were pulled out of bed, and their bedding, after being soaked in disinfecting liquid, was thrown back at them, wet.

It is a marvel that under such circumstances the native is enabled to retain an atom of self-respect—and yet he does. It is very pathetic to see the result of the efforts made by many to retain the elements of order and decency in their humble homes. The spotlessly clean dresser, the carefully kept sewing machine, the snow-white sheets and pillows, and the carefully swept floor are often strikingly in evidence. When resident magistrate of Port Elizabeth I undertook, with a modicum of success, the reorganisation of the Government location in its vicinity. Delegations from other towns used to come and inspect the place. On one occasion I took the delegation to various dwellings in the location. In one of these was a small harmonium. When we emerged, one of the delegates burst out laughing and remarked: 'Fancy a damned nigger with a 'harmonium.'

That the natives have not evolved a definite criminal class is, under the circumstances, marvellous. That such a class will

be evolved in the near future is certain. In what are known as the 'Native Territories' attached to the Cape Province—a tract lying on the coast littoral between the Cape Province and Natal—there are approximately a million natives. There is little room for additional population, for the seasons are becoming more and more irregular, and oftener than not the harvest is a failure over the greater extent of the cultivable area. These territories form the great reserve of unskilled labour. More and more the pressure of increasing numbers forces the young men out to the mines, the cities, and the farms. Cattle comprise the only form of wealth the native values. When, after long and faithful service on a farm, a native employee has acquired a small herd, he is apt to be dismissed because his master grudges him pasturage. It is not uncommon, especially in one of the often-recurring droughts, to see natives wandering along the roads with their dwindling herds of emaciated kine, vainly seeking a refuge. In the end the few animals left alive will be purchased for the price of an old song by some European, and the unhappy seller will again enter service, with the prospect of a repetition of his gruesome experience in view.

In the mines and cities the native, cut off from family life and from the salutary influence exercised by contact with his clan, loses his ethical basis. In a large number of cases he takes to drink, and forms casual connexions with women of his class. And yet, wonderful to relate, he remains law-abiding and responsive to sympathetic treatment. One strange peculiarity of the native is his power of moral resilience. A European who has once made a bad false step seldom or never fully recovers his self-respect. No doubt society is largely responsible for this. But with the native it is quite different; under sympathetic treatment an habitual criminal will become quite trustworthy. One of the most estimable natives I know was a few years ago a member of a gang of murderous robbers which terrorised Johannesburg. Yet this man I would now implicitly trust in any capacity.

Natal was granted a liberal constitution in 1856, but in 1865 a law was enacted which practically disfranchised the native. In the Free State both natives and coloured people are disfranchised, and are subject to inconvenient and degrading disabilities. They have to carry passes when moving from place to place, and are not permitted even to hire grazing from

European farmers. Some of the municipal regulations in force are grotesquely oppressive. For instance, no girl of the age of sixteen is permitted to live, even with her parents, in a location unless she be in European service. In the Free State there is a law in force—common to all municipal areas—under which all females over the age of sixteen have to take out passes, for which a substantial charge is made. The police are in the habit of making domiciliary visits, and bitter complaints are made regarding their treatment of girls approaching the taxable age. The municipal locations are unspeakably wretched places, as a rule. The miserable huts are built upon small plots, and are thus huddled grievously together. Yet in many of these locations any native found outside the door of his hut after nine o'clock P.M. is liable to arrest, fine, and imprisonment. Section 33 of the municipal regulations for the town of Reitz reads as follows :—

*'Every resident in the location shall be obliged to report immediately to the Town Clerk the arrival of any strange native whose apparent intention is to remain for twenty-four hours, and shall point out where such strange native is staying.'*\*

This is collective responsibility with a vengeance. Moreover, if a stranger arrive seeking work, he is only allowed to remain for forty-eight hours. If unsuccessful in getting a master, he has to move on. And if a European were to hire a native or coloured man who had been forty-nine hours unemployed within the municipal limits, such European would be liable to a fine. It may be here noted that some of the most drastic of these preposterous regulations have been enacted since the Free State has been under the Union Jack. The foregoing points to a thinly-disguised system of slavery—slavery in which there are many masters instead of one, and in which there is no individual responsibility for the welfare of the slave, or for his maintenance when decrepit.

In the Transvaal conditions are approximately similar to those of the Free State, except that certain disabilities in respect of coloured people are, although actually, not legally in force. Under the Mining and Municipal Regulations at Johannesburg, the employment of black or coloured men at any form of skilled labour is prohibited. There is no doubt, however, that this prohibition is *ultra vires*. But so strong is the colour prejudice on

---

\* Enacted in 1916.

the part of Europeans that were even a quadron to be employed, in skilled or even semi-skilled work, by a public body or by the management of a mine, strikes certainly and pogroms probably would ensue. So the disabled classes accept the situation with wisdom and meekness. But this acceptance has a very adverse effect upon the prosperity of the country. The skilled labour upon the Rand is now mainly performed by Dutch South Africans, who are paid very high wages. One result of the embargo on skilled black and coloured labour in mining is a serious restriction of the gold output. While the Empire and the world at large are starving for gold, there are many large areas of low-grade reef which are unpayable in terms of the high rate of wages which European labour demands, but which would pay handsomely under the reasonable rates at which black and coloured skilled and semi-skilled labour could be employed. And de Launay ('The World's Gold') has made it clear that the production of gold from low-grade mines is of greater benefit to the country in which such mines are situated, than production from mines that are rich. In many instances the so-called skilled labour of the European consists of supervision. The European sits by, while his black or coloured employees do the actual work. That this system can last is an economic impossibility, but there will be some rough work before the inevitable change comes about.

Up to 1917 coloured men were employed at Johannesburg in the loose packing of ore—a form of semi-skilled labour requiring about as much skill as the building of a rick with oat sheaves. A strike occurred among the Europeans. The Minister of Mines went to arbitrate towards a settlement. One of the provisos of his award was that no more coloured loose-packers were to be employed. At this time many of the coloured men had enlisted, and were absent upon military duty. On their return they will find their occupation gone, and European slackers filling their places. On the occasion of the arbitration there was some straight talking. The coloured men spoke in impassioned terms of the hard lot of their families—of the women-folk of a class whose earnings were insufficient to maintain families in decency. At Union they had hoped for some indication of a desire, on the part of the Government, to better their status; but time had brought only a tightening of the chains which bound them to a life of poverty and squalor. There appeared to be no hope of their attaining a life of decency

and comfort to which their ability and character entitled them, and which would be theirs in any but their native land.

A native recruiting meeting was held in Pretoria in June 1917. One native speaker said :—

‘We are not against the King of England ; in fact, he is our only hope. But as for the Union Government, it has thrown us away like filthy rags. We are loyal, but what about these police who kick us and shove us out of the way ? They are open rebels ; their disloyalty is known to every one. Their native assistants are big Zulus—cowards, who strut about the streets interfering with our women. They demand our passes, which they hold upside down, because they cannot read. They drag us to gaol upon the slightest pretext, and swear by a stranger God to anything that suits their case. When we speak of joining the oversea contingent our women curse and spit at us, asking us whether the Government, for whom we propose to risk our lives, is not the one which sends the police to our houses at night to pull us and our daughters out of bed and trample upon us.’

The laws relating to natives and coloured people in the Transvaal are so severe that they cannot be carried out—except sporadically. It is impossible for such people to exist in any town or village without continually violating some often preposterous law or regulation having the force of law. But the police are familiar with these laws, and thus have endless opportunities of working off grudges or levying blackmail. These police are either Dutchmen of the ‘poor white’ class—a class often physically and mentally below the native—or else big, brawny Zulus, who cannot speak the language of the Transvaal natives.

As instances of how the laws affecting natives are carried out in the Transvaal, the following recent authentic cases are cited :—

(a) A girl of fourteen was convicted before the magistrate of Wolmaranstad of living in the location in the home of her father. Not being in service, she had rendered herself liable under the local municipal law.

(b) On the 1st October 1916 the Rev. Benjamin Mavi, an ordained minister of the Wesleyan Church and a man of the highest character, happened to be on the railway platform at Volksrust. Mr. Mavi was the holder of a certificate exempting him from the operation of disabilities under the Pass Laws. His business at the moment was seeing off some female delegates to a church congress. He was endeavouring to find the conductor of the train, so as to arrange that the women might travel in a separate compartment—a highly advisable step.

A Zulu constable, who had on three previous occasions examined Mr. Mavi's certificate, demanded production of the latter. As the train was almost on the point of departing, Mr. Mavi turned aside to speak to the conductor who happened to be passing, saying that he would produce the certificate in a moment. The constable arrested and handcuffed him, and marched him down the street to the charge office. The constable may have been privately reprimanded, but he received no punishment for this flagrant and disgraceful misuse of his authority.

(c) On the night of the 28th June 1916, Anna, a respectable married native woman, was returning from a religious meeting under escort of the Rev. Ramushu, an elderly ordained Wesleyan minister of the highest character. She was arrested, lodged in gaol among criminals, and next day fined by the magistrate.

Investigation of matters connected with natives is not unattended with danger in the Transvaal. Here is a legal proviso still in force:—

‘If any person . . . shall be found to meddle with the natives in any way . . . or in any way to meddle or interfere with affairs respecting the natives without having been specially authorised thereto by the Government . . . he shall be liable to a penalty, for the first offence, of a fine of £ 200 or one year's imprisonment with hard labour; for the second offence, to a fine of £ 500 or two years' imprisonment with hard labour; and for a third offence, to three years' imprisonment with hard labour.’

A great opportunity for improving the lot of the natives was lost when the treaty of Vereeniging, under which the Transvaal and Free State submitted to British dominion at the close of the Boer War, was signed. Had the spirit which actuated the Secretary of State in 1853, when approving the Cape Constitution, been then remembered, and the representation of the natives in the councils of their own land been insisted upon, the pitiful state of things which to-day exists would have been avoided. Mill's axiom to the effect that where one race holds dominion over another, exploitation, the inevitable end of which is slavery, is bound to supervene, is having ample and melancholy confirmation in South Africa to-day.

Our leading politicians from time to time utter lofty but vague generalities as to the duty of uplifting the natives, but ‘sermon thru and come to du’ the result is a further tightening

of the bonds—an addition to the disabilities under which the unfortunate people suffer. Up to a few years since large numbers of natives were employed in the lower ranks of the railway service. Now all these have been discharged—although it is admitted by all capable of forming an opinion, that they performed their duties with faithfulness and efficiency. The place of these natives has been taken by ‘poor whites,’ on double or treble the wages drawn by their black predecessors. These ‘poor whites’ are mere human wastage; they have sunk so low in the physical and mental scale that their regeneration is hopeless. As the population grows, the ranks of these people are more and more reinforced. They cannot exist without support, for their forefathers led such an easy life for centuries that the discipline of the struggle for existence has been missing; invertebracy has been the inevitable result. Thus another apparently insoluble problem has been imposed upon South Africa by the inscrutable fates.

In 1891 native customs were systematised in an Act of Parliament, and thus made into an inelastic, unchanging code, one of the provisions of which conferred practically the *patria potestas* upon the head of the family, who might be an inexperienced youth. Under the old rule of the chiefs, laws were continually being altered to suit changing conditions; but the Natal code solidified and made permanent many of the most reactionary principles of savage rule. It stands, a monument to short-sightedness and stupidity, like a feudal keep in a democratic land—a reproach to those who permit such an anachronism to continue.

South Africa possesses, in its splendid supply of black and coloured labour (a distinction is always locally drawn between the black and the coloured man, the former being mainly negroid and the latter of much mixed blood), an unrivalled asset. Black labour has built our railways and harbour works; it has developed our mines and worked our farms. Not only is the dusky South African industrious, but he is amenable to control and easy to satisfy when treated with common fairness. There is not an industry in the country which is not dependent upon his muscle. He is, on the whole, a very reasonable being; far more reasonable than the European labourer in any land. He recognises that his standard of living is lower than that of the European, and would be content with such a lesser wage as would enable him to exist under moderately decent conditions. While the

wages of the ruling race have risen to meet the increased cost of living, those of the black man remain the same. Therefore his morale and physique are suffering.

European agitators, prompted by some occult, sinister purpose, are doing their best at some of the larger labour centres to poison the black man's mind—to imbue him with a spirit of spurious socialism. What these fishers in troubled waters expect to catch it is difficult to conceive. If they succeed in their endeavours to promote strikes among the natives, South Africa will become a hell on earth. In this connexion one sometimes hears the wish expressed that another native rising might be provoked, so that a deeper and more hopeless servitude could be imposed upon an already oppressed race.

On the 27th February 1909 Lord Selborne addressed the following words of weight to the congregation of the University of the Cape of Good Hope:—

'I will only ask white men to consider whether they have ever calculated the cumulative effect on the natives of what I may call the policy of pin pricks? In some places a native, however personally clean, or however hard he may have striven to civilise himself, is not allowed to walk on the pavement of the public streets; in others he is not allowed to go into a public park or to pay for the privilege of watching a game of cricket; in others he is not allowed to ride on the top of a tram-car—even in specified seats set apart for him; in others he is not allowed to ride in a railway carriage except in a sort of dog-kennel; in others he is ungraciously and unfeelingly treated by white officials; in others he may not stir without a pass. And if, for instance, he comes—as thousands of natives do—from a farm where he resides, to work in a "labour district" (established under a law which is highly beneficial to the State and commendable in the eyes of all white men), he does not meet with facilities but with elaborate impediments. In the course of his absence from home he may have to take out eight different passes, for several of which he has the additional pleasure of paying—though he would be much happier without them; and it is possible that, in an extreme case, he may have to conform to no fewer than twenty different pass regulations. Now, let a white man put himself in the position of a black man, and see how he would like it; and let him ask whether such regulations and laws really make his task easier.'\*

Since these words were spoken the black man's burthen has increased, and there are indications that it may increase still

---

\* Recently some of the Pass Laws were slightly relaxed, it being found that their extreme stringency interrupted the labour supply. But in the main the disabilities under which the native and the coloured man live are as heavy as ever.



more—even to a point at which it will no longer be bearable. And this takes place under the British Flag!

The following indictment by a native author is, unfortunately, largely true:—

‘When the Union of the South African Colonies became an accomplished fact, a dread was expressed by ex-Republicans that the liberal native policy of the Cape would supersede the repressive policy of the old Republics, and they lost no time in taking definite steps to force down the throats of the Union Legislature, as it were, laws which the Dutch Presidents of pre-war days, with the British suzerainty over their heads, did not dare to enforce against the native people then under them. With the formation of the Union, the Imperial Government, for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained, unreservedly handed over the natives to the colonists, and these colonists, as a rule, are dominated by the Dutch Republican spirit. Thus the suzerainty of Great Britain, which, under the reign of Her late Majesty Victoria, of blessed memory, was the natives’ only bulwark, has now apparently been withdrawn or relaxed, and the Republicans, like a lot of bloodhounds long held in the leash, use the free hand given by the Imperial Government, not only to guard against a possible supersession of Cape ideas of toleration, but to effectually extend throughout the Union the drastic native policy pursued by the province which is misnamed “Free” State, and enforce it with the utmost rigour.’\*

The author is incorrect in stating that there was a suzerainty—at all events so far as the Free State was concerned—nevertheless the fact remains that the repressive ideals of the Republics were largely held in check by the knowledge that the application of such ideals would be resented by Great Britain. Moreover, the Cape ideals were not held by the British colonists at large, but were maintained by the influence of a group of Cape politicians whose high character and influence enabled them to maintain a noble but unpopular line of policy. Again, many of the repressive enactments of the Republics are not yet in force in the Cape Province, but that there is a terrible danger of their being so enforced no intelligent observer can deny.

One result (inevitable, of course) of the unfair and unsympathetic treatment of the natives has been the engendering of a deep distrust of the European and his methods. This sentiment takes strange and unexpected forms. The Mission Institution of Lovedale is situated in the eastern portion of the Cape Province—a much over-populated region. This institution stands for the most enlightened methods of dealing with colour

---

\* ‘Native Life in South Africa,’ by S. Plaatje.

problems; native students from all parts of Africa seek its haven. A monthly journal, *The Christian Express*, is there published. During the recent epidemic the Lovedale staff was active in rendering assistance to the stricken people. Here is an extract from the journal above referred to:—

‘Perhaps the saddest experience was to see the distrust and lack of confidence at first shown by the native towards the European—they could not believe us capable of helping them, even in such a season of calamity, unless we had some scheme behind it of bettering ourselves. . . . In one village the men demanded a definite answer, YES or NO to the question: Would Government force them to pay for the help that was offered to them? . . . When they were informed that the Government had no such intention, the first patients to be received into the improvised hospital would give no names, and had to be identified by numbers; or else they gave fictitious names. . . . There were occasionally cases where the feeling was so strong that it verged on madness. The dread of any fresh imposition by Government of a burden that to a European would seem insignificant, was also a revelation of anxious, bitter poverty.’

South African conditions tend to render the native incapable of progress; they practically inhibit that gradual and often almost imperceptible adjustment to changing conditions, in the absence of which retrogression is inevitable. That the native is often a slovenly and shiftless peasant—an accusation often brought against him—is true, but success in husbandry requires constant application, and the definite, deliberate policy of the ruling race in South Africa has for years had for its object the forcing of the native to leave his village and do the rough work at the mines, the ports, and at the construction of railways. Thus, even as regards the pursuit of agriculture in its more elementary forms, the conditions imposed tend to make the unhappy native more and more inefficient—more and more a wage-slave cut off from all the gates leading to avenues of advancement by fences of prejudice and unreason. As the native’s understanding develops he becomes additionally conscious of this—increasingly distrustful and dissatisfied. Persecution gave a razor-edge to the intellect of the Jew, but to-day the Jew largely controls commerce, and the scope of his control is increasing. The spirituality of his religion has saved him from the misfortune of hating his persecutors. But in the case of the native we have destroyed what took the place of religion, and present tendencies are giving a razor-edge to his hatred of those who exploit him,

It is an old truism that history repeats itself. The monstrous spectre of slavery is arising from its unhallowed sepulchre ; it exists in all but the name in the Free State. In Europe the capitalist enslaved the worker throughout many dolorous generations ; to-day it looks as though the one-time slave were about to become the master. The probation of races, as of classes, is still proceeding. What we term civilisation is in inverse ratio to the birth-rate. The European in South Africa is playing and profiteering on the edge of an abyss.

Natives and coloured people volunteered freely for military duty ; as a rule their services were accepted only for menial and undistinguished work ; had they been asked to go as fighters, the response would have been immensely greater. In South-West Africa, in German East Africa, in Arabia, and in Mesopotamia, they played their unnoticed part in the recent life and death struggle in which the Empire was engaged. On the battle-fields of the land held sacred as the cradle of Christianity, in the pestilential swamps of the East African hinterland, they died by thousands uncomplainingly for that stepmother land, in whose professed principles lay enshrined their only hope. Even in the Free State the enslaved coloured women spent their poor savings in the purchase of material which they worked by the light of dim candles in their scanty hours of leisure, into garments for the distressed Belgian women and children. And these people are practically unrepresented in the councils of their native land, whereas tens of thousands of openly disloyal Europeans who would have hailed the victory of Germany with delight, possess votes, and are shamelessly truckled to by politicians. And still, in the sacred name of Democracy, the local representative of a democratic King sanctions enactments which turn true democratic principles into a scandal and a hissing. Under the hollow fetich of constitutionalism he probably has no choice but to do so.

One seeks vainly for an immediate remedy. Direct interference from outside would do no good ; possibly it might lead to incalculable harm, for it would contravene the principles underlying the Dominion constitutions. The mischief has been done, and for the time being appears to be irrevocable. However, a further evil can be avoided by the firm refusal of the Imperial Government to hand over to the Union (without adequate guarantees of a more liberal policy—which, it may be stated, would be almost impossible to impose) any of the territories, the

administration of which is vested in the High Commissioner. I refer to Basutoland, Swaziland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. These contain a population of upwards of 650,000. Specious arguments in favour of such handing over will no doubt be advanced—unity of native policy, for instance. It is to be hoped that the Secretary of State for the Colonies will not be taken in by any such false coinage. In spite of the occasional utterance of lofty generalities by one or other of our prominent politicians, it is a melancholy truth that South Africa has no policy relating to the native or the coloured man, except that of getting them to work as hard as possible for the lowest possible wage, and keeping them from having any hand in the shaping of their own—so far—dolorous destiny. It would be an unpardonable fault to hand over another six to seven hundred thousand human beings to inevitable exploitation by a race which has not yet proved its fitness to rule the millions already subject to it.

I claim to have had special opportunities, during fifty-one years lived through in South Africa, of gauging conditions and tendencies. Of these years many have been spent in administrative capacities which involved direct contact with various native tribes. In 1917-18 I was Chairman of the Committee for demarcating areas under the Native Lands Act, and once more travelled through the principal native territories of the Cape Province. Hence my warrant for the foregoing.

WILLIAM CHARLES SCULLY.

## THE FUTURE OF BRITISH AGRICULTURE

FOR many years before the war the condition of agriculture and the possibilities of improving it were a subject of discussion. After attaining, between 1835 and 1870, a state of considerable prosperity and a standard of performance that was justly regarded as a model in all other countries, British agriculture was broken by the fall of prices that continued from 1875 to 1895. Not only were many of the proudest farmers of the old school ruined, but all confidence in the business was destroyed. Landowners and capitalists turned to other outlets for their money; young men of enterprise, even if country-bred, sought for openings in commerce or industry. The advances of science and the opportunities for improving the output of the land that came to light were neglected, so firm had become the conviction that farming was not a progressive industry, but a routine within which a living could be earned only by close economy in details.

On the naturally good land of the country reductions of rent enabled the old skill to survive, shorn doubtless of some of its former polish, and in certain districts a fresh generation found its profit in new branches of the business. The ever-increasing demand for milk provided the most general way out; the arable was laid down to grass, and men from Scotland and Devon brought their more economical methods into the home counties, where they could get land more cheaply than in their own neighbourhood. There were still commodities to be produced that were free from foreign competition. Potato growing was profitable in itself, and enriched the whole rotation; the fruit-growers and market gardeners opened up new districts with steadily rising skill; little specialities developed like the Blairgowrie raspberry growing or the Heathfield chicken cramming. From the beginning of this century even the occupant of the ordinary mixed farm began to feel more confidence that prices were likely to rise rather than to fall. Profits were being made, but the general level of the industry, and the esteem in which it was held as a means of livelihood, continued low. Labour was the doubtful factor which still seemed to be running against the farmer whether as regards price, quantity, or quality.

It is significant that the first movement 'back to the land,' in the shape of the small holding campaign of 1905 or thereabouts, occurred among those whose ears were nearest the ground. It was the small men in the country and in the semi-urban districts who perceived that money was again to be made out of land, who demanded access to it and an opportunity of trying high cultivation instead of the cheap methods that were good enough for the large farmer with plenty of lowly rented land. Otherwise agriculturists said as little as possible about their returning prosperity; they kept their more backward neighbour's case well before the public eye, and let their landlords, who were by far the latest to awaken to the changed conditions, continue to talk about the impossibility of making farming pay without Protection. The need for the education of the farming class became a common theme, and, chiefly by the efforts of those who stood outside the industry, an organisation for agricultural education and for the acquisition and dissemination of information was getting built up in the country. It was, as it still is, little better than a sketch, more blanks than performance, but it was growing and making good, it showed what was wanted and what would answer. It was characteristic of this movement that it conceived of the betterment of agriculture entirely from the point of view of individual improvement; it had no views about the reconstruction of the industry. The use of more fertilisers, the introduction of better varieties of seed, the wider dissemination of pedigree sires, new implements, modern appliances like silos and milking machines, were to provide the means for progress. There was no suggestion of a regimentation of farmers towards an increase of the plough land and less grass, or of the general drainage of the wet lands. The conditions were accepted, the problem was individual, and the criterion was personal profit.

The later years of the war have changed the point of view. As the weight of the submarine menace accumulated, as tonnage became progressively more and more diverted to the carriage of soldiers and munitions, as the foreign exchanges mounted against us, every extra ton of food that could be grown in the British Isles became of double value as an economy and an insurance. What was asked of the farmer was to produce, and men began to consider whether it was possible to render the country self-supporting as regards food. Mr. T. H. Middleton's comparison of the results of German and British use of the land, and Mr. A. D.

Hall's 'Agriculture after the War,' started an attack on grass farming which seemed rank heresy to many farmers and nearly all landowners, but which formed the basis of the policy of Mr. Prothero and Lord Lee, when the national attempt to increase agricultural production was begun in 1917. At once the cry was raised: what is to become of our flocks and herds if grass is to be ploughed up? or how can the milk supply be maintained? The answer was ready enough; land in grass means a low, if cheap, standard of production. Leaving aside the question of wheat, or other direct human food, land under the plough will yield cattle food that can be converted into three or four times as much meat or milk as can be obtained from the same land under grass. The argument was pressed home by the cutting off of the importations of maize and other feeding stuffs upon which the grass farmer had depended both to supplement the inferior feeding power of his pastures and the lack of keep during the winter months.

In addition, the organisation of war executive committees and their district committees brought about a close survey of the lands. Bad farmers were told to improve their methods or give up their farms; to every occupier was allotted a certain proportion of grass to plough up and sow with corn of some sort; production was to be increased, even though the individual could make better profits by limiting his enterprise. But the difficulties resulting from the decay of the arable area during the previous forty years then became apparent. The labourers had left the districts which had been laid down to grass, buildings had decayed, ploughs and horses were lacking, in some parts even the knowledge of arable farming had died out. So late in the war was the plough programme embarked upon that the opportunity had almost slipped away, and costly improvisations had to be made; the still imperfect tractors were brought in, and novices trained to use them. As might be expected, the waste was enormous at first, but in twelve months tractors got a testing that would have required as many years in peace time to work through, and the surviving types and drivers grew efficient. The Food Production Department never lost heart nor relaxed its pressure, and amid much groaning and continued protestations, a big piece of work was accomplished. Some two and a half million acres were added to the cropped area, half as much as had gone back to grass since 1872, the old high-water mark of English farming.

Increased tillage does not necessarily mean corn growing, as it had to do during the war. When people have to be rationed down close to the margin of subsistence, and when labour is also short, the wheat crop ranks very high as a means of obtaining absolute food from the soil. Potatoes will yield perhaps twice as much real food per acre, but require far more labour, and are less valuable from the point of view either of nutrition, transport, or storage. In a war-time emergency we must always grow wheat, but when the seas are open again, wheat will play a subsidiary part in British agriculture and become only an item in rotation with other crops giving higher pecuniary returns. The price of wheat in Great Britain will always be kept down by its cost of production in the newer countries where land is cheap, because of all agricultural products, wheat is the most easily handled and transported. Moreover, no other crop will grow with so little labour and under such rough conditions; it is the ideal first crop on which to begin the taming of the wilderness. An Australian farmer, working with a gang plough and a stripper and harvester will, single-handed, grow and harvest a hundred acres or more of wheat on land that has been newly taken in. The yield per acre may be small, not averaging half that attained on good English or Scotch farms, but the yield per man is double, since we must allow one man to every twenty-five acres under the plough in Great Britain.

As long as ocean freights are low and virgin land is cheap the English wheat grower, using more intensive and, therefore, costly methods, will find it difficult to compete. If the oversea price falls low enough competition becomes impossible, except by the adoption of correspondingly cheap and extensive methods. It is the gross return per acre which determines the character of the farming that is economically possible, and intensive methods can never so increase the yields of low priced crops as to pay for the extra cost involved. The intensive method has to be confined to products which are secure from the competition of cheap processes. It needs very fine farming to grow six quarters of wheat per acre worth, at pre-war prices, ten guineas, whereas the same sort of farming would raise potatoes worth twenty-five to thirty pounds. Intensive cultivation only secures quantity at an inordinate cost; its rôle is to produce things of a quality unattainable in any other way.

The development of British farming lies, then, in eliminating as far as possible the crops producing a small monetary return,



and replacing them by others more valuable. This applies to the rotation as well as to the individual crop. The typical Norfolk rotation of turnips, barley, or oats, seeds, and wheat only obtained two crops for sale within the four years; for the turnips and hay were turned into beef with little or even no profit to the farmer. The lengthening of the rotation by the introduction of a third corn crop improved matters by increasing the proportion of saleable crops; while some farmers did better still by growing four corn crops in six years. Could the turnip crop be wholly, or in part, exchanged for sugar beet, saleable at even as little as twelve or fifteen pounds an acre, the gross return from the rotation would be raised. A still greater benefit results from bringing in a potato crop. Flax, peas, cabbage, and other vegetable crops afford possibilities of heightening the output for sale. At the very top of the scale comes market gardening and fruit growing. Here the output may be worth from forty to a hundred pounds an acre, but the extension that can be given to such cultivation depends on the extent to which the market can be widened, and that is an affair of wages and education. If the bulk of our population can retain anything like a war scale of wages the demand for the finer vegetables will expand enormously; thirty years ago tomatoes were virtually unknown, nowadays they are hawked in the meanest streets.

Nor is the possible intensification of output confined to crops. Meat and other animal products had become the mainstay of British farming before the war; in future their place will be enlarged because the same great cause, comparative relief from the competition of the cheaper land of the new countries, will still be in operation. It is true that 40 per cent. or more of our meat was of foreign origin, and that beef can always be produced at a minimum of cost for labour where great grazing tracts exist as in the Argentine, the Brazils, and parts of Australia. But frozen or chilled meat from the ranches will never possess the quality of the more rapidly grown meat of the British Isles, and refrigerated freights are not likely again to be at the low level that prevailed before the war. One cannot foresee with any clearness what the effect of the destruction wrought in Europe is going to have upon the world's market, but in the years immediately preceding the war it was clear that the consumption of meat was tending to outrun the production. The United States, with its increasing population and wealth, was ceasing to have any meat for export, and the great American packing

houses were looking round for new sources of supply. The hold they had on South America was not sufficient, and they were extending their activities into Australasia in their desire to obtain enough material to meet the demand.

There may be some apprehension as to the results of the extraordinary control which the American Meat Trust has obtained over the wholesale trade, a power which has been enormously strengthened during the last year or two, and which can only be met by combination among our own farmers to give the meat retailers the same facilities in handling fresh meat as they obtain with imported meat. But if we can assume that the purchasing power of our own and the American public will remain at its old level, still more if it increases as a consequence of the general rise of wages, the production of meat will become in the future more, rather than less, remunerative to the British farmer. As a stock raiser he is in a strong position at the present time. The cattle herd in the United Kingdom has been maintained almost intact during the war; the older beef cattle have declined a little, but the younger ones and the dairy herd have increased. As soon as trade can get under way there will be an enormous foreign demand for British cattle in order to recreate the depleted stocks of Europe.

Again, the British farmer has learnt something during the war in the direction of the cheaper production of beef. It had often before been urged that excessive waste was going on in cattle feeding. The eastern counties grazier who bought 'stores' for winter fattening gave them his turnip crop, often a good deal of his seeds, hay, and in addition cake in quantities that reached as much as 10 lbs. per head per day. If his returns paid only for the cake bill he was not discontented, for he assumed that the dung paid for the roots and hay and straw. Argument and experiment were of little avail to change this practice. It was a point of pride to turn out 'prime,' which, from any economic standpoint, meant overfattened bullocks; the 'best' farmers did it, and that was answer enough to all objections. However, the scarcity of feeding stuffs during the last two winters has forced farmers to adopt the more economical methods which the experimenters have shown to be sufficient for fattening bullocks. In addition, the dead weight basis of selling which has been introduced under the control of the Ministry of Food, has enlightened butchers as to the wastefulness of the super-fat animal.

The waste in beef production was only part of a general excessive use of feeding stuffs. Professor T. B. Wood has shown that the total consumption of cattle food, home-grown and imported, in the years immediately preceding the war, was at least twice as great as was necessary to produce the meat, milk, and other animal products that were being turned out in the same period. Theoretical yields we may never hope to attain, but it is clear that there is room for a considerable economy in working. Careful observers also contend that we were taking too long to get our bullocks to market. Although early maturity in cattle was a British conception, we were not pursuing it as well as some of our competitors; the Argentine and certain continental countries were working more economically by producing 'beeflings,' cattle fit for slaughter at under two years old.

From another point of view it is desirable to extend the production of milk and bacon rather than of beef. Both the dairy cow and the pig are more efficient converters of raw materials into human food than cattle are; both again are more adapted to arable farming, and are less dependent upon grass. It is true that under no circumstances can milk be produced so cheaply as on the good pastures of the western counties in the summer months; but grazing of this kind yields little or no winter milk, and if cheap in labour is wasteful of land. The small holder cannot spare three acres on which to graze each cow, but on one acre of arable he can grow green crops yielding as much food as three acres of grass will provide. These same green crops, by the use of the silo, can be made the basis of economical winter feeding. Arable dairy farming has been neglected in this country because grass land requires less labour. But on a small holding the expenditure of labour is of less account than the magnitude of the output. Even in large scale farming the feeding of cows and the fattening of cattle from arable crops present many possibilities which have never been studied in this country, where such devices as tethering cows on seeds or other green arable crops are dismissed without inquiry, though they may be the universal practice, under very similar conditions, in France or Holland.

But the main point is, that the market for milk is still capable of enormous expansion. The average consumption of milk in this country varies from half a pint per head per day in one or two rich towns like Bournemouth, down to a seventh of a pint, or even less, in badly situated industrial areas. London averages

about a quarter of a pint, yet it is stated that the New York average is half a pint. As milk before the war was the cheapest of all animal foods, it can retain some of the war-time increase of price and still compete with other foods. But, in order to enlarge its use among the poorer classes, the farmer must produce it in more cleanly fashion, and so endow it with better keeping qualities. On these lines milk, free as it is from foreign competition, will be part of the foundation of the new policy of increased production.

The principal outlines of this new policy are plain enough. Land has increased in value, and will continue to do so as more men are wanting a share of it. Hence it follows that the land will have to produce much more in order to pay both for itself and for the higher labour costs involved by increased production ; and the chief method by which production can be intensified is the conversion of grass into arable. Prices are and will remain high ; it is not now as it was in the 'eighties and 'nineties of last century, when wisdom lay in reducing expenditure, because high farming was no remedy for low prices. That policy depended upon cheap land, and English land had become as cheap or cheaper than colonial land of no greater productive power, yet thousands of miles away from its markets. But the extension of arable land does not mean increased corn growing. In normal times the farmer must grow produce less affected by overseas competition and bringing in higher cash returns. As long as the land is under the plough he can instantly turn to corn growing if the pressure of war should again arise.

The problem of agriculture must also be examined from the point of view of population. In the thirty years between 1871 and 1901 the population engaged in agriculture in England and Wales declined by 317,697, or about one-quarter of the whole. It rose slightly in the next decade, but only just overtopped a million at the last census. The mean density of employment was about three and a half men per hundred acres of land, but this figure is somewhat exaggerated by the inclusion within the statistics of all holdings of upwards of an acre. The average mixed farm was employing perhaps three men to the hundred acres, the grass farms much less ; only on the purely arable farms, the potato lands and market gardens and the like, did employment exceed four men to the hundred acres. And yet in Denmark, at the same period, the density of employment was as high as thirteen men per hundred acres, though neither

Danish land nor the Danish climate is as suitable for agriculture as ours. Admittedly, the whole of this difference is not explained by the superior farming methods employed in Denmark. It has to be realised that their population had not the same outlets in other directions, and that the standard of living of the Danish farmer was distinctly lower than that of the English farmer. As compared with his Danish colleagues the amount of remuneration an English farmer expected was altogether out of proportion to the work and skill he put into his business.

The truth is that far too much English land is held by men who do not farm it properly. Their skill and methods are not equal to obtaining from the land a satisfactory return per acre, but they succeed in making a larger aggregate income than they deserve in view either of their capital or of their competence, merely because they can obtain a large holding cheap. Before the war a profit of a pound an acre could be earned by unenlightened routine, and men could be found obtaining a return of 20 up to 40 per cent. on the capital they employed on holdings of 200 to 400 acres. It is true that this return included payment for management as well as interest on the capital, but the management was not really worth more than a pound or so a week. How is this low standard of farming to be raised? The one and only way is to widen the demand for land, and to get such a number of new and capable competitors for the farms that the incapables are either driven out or forced into better ways. Every landowner and agent will confess that he has had to tolerate miserable farming and insufficient rents merely because he felt no confidence that he could obtain better men.

It is here that the new movement towards the land, the desire expressed by so many men who have been fighting to obtain a settlement on English land, will have its effect. Here is the new blood. Men who have been stimulated out of routine and convention by the searching experiences through which they have passed, will, if they can once get a footing upon the land, ask themselves how they can make the best living out of the soil, and will not allow their enterprise to be numbed by the disapproval of neighbours who are wedded to traditional methods. It is this fresh outlook, this determination to have a shot at it somehow, this freedom from tradition, which has enabled inexperienced men to succeed in the colonies; why not here, where land and markets are better? Many of these new men will fail of course, but, if precedents are worth anything

in human affairs, the men who have been through a great war develop unexpected capacities in all directions. In an active race like ours the essential stuff of human nature is always there, but custom cloaks and stifles it like a heavy blanket. Many a master man makes ledger entries, or carries coals to-day and to-morrow, because he did so yesterday; once give him his stimulus and force him to hold his head up, and the world is his oyster. We may deplore industrial unrest, but discontent is the great driving force towards progress, and its fundamental value lies in its determination to rip up the entanglements of circumstance that the elaborate organisation of civilisation winds round the majority of men. Let us have some adventure and some adventurous men in farming; many will go down as they did in France, but the mates of those who fell on the Somme are camped along the Rhine to-day.

We must have new men on the land, and the only way of giving them a trial without inordinate expense is to start them in a small way. The arguments against small holdings are patent to every one; they are not the ultimate way of securing production, nor are they applicable to much of English land, but they almost invariably represent more intensive cultivation and harder work than prevails upon the soil to-day, and they will bring in a new race of cultivators. A considerably increased number of small holdings can be formed without any injury to large-scale farming, and the men who succeed on small holdings will be capable of setting a new stroke in the business of farming. We need two movements, an increase of small holdings on the right land, and their elimination from the poorer and heavier soils. In many districts the fifty-acre farmer is the poorest and most backward member of the farming community; he has been left on his holding during the war, but has done little for food production. He has been the despair of agricultural executive committees, he makes nonsense of guarantees of prices, for the level that will keep him on his legs means inordinate profits for the competent farmers. It will not help matters to replace him by more small holders; these wretched farms want amalgamating and running as business propositions.

On these areas, roughly the clay and the chalk, what is wanted are not small holdings but cottage holdings, a good cottage with perhaps half an acre of garden ground, or two or three acres of grazing attached to it. The occupier is not to be expected to live off his holding, but to work for wages; the

land is for his spare time, to enable him to grow his own food and to produce a little extra for sale. Less than half an acre is garden ground enough for the needs of a family, and more than half an acre a man cannot cultivate in his spare time; but if, in addition to his vegetable ground, he has one-quarter of an acre planted with carefully selected fruit, he can obtain therefrom a substantial addition to his income without trespassing inordinately on his leisure or enslaving his family. The fruit trees should be of standard varieties, also grown by his neighbours, and there must be a local co-operative marketing organisation to give him any possibility of selling the crop to advantage. The nucleus of the organisation already exists in the marketing societies set up by the Food Production Department during the war. The shorter hours established by the Agricultural Wages Board give the men a chance of putting in the extra work required on their own gardens or cottage holdings without breaking themselves by excessive toil, as was the case when the insufficient wages of the south Midlands had to be eked out by the crops raised from an acre allotment. In the grass districts land should be set aside for common pasturage, over which the cottage holders would have grazing rights. Poultry and rabbits may be made considerable sources of income from the labour of the wife and children rather than from that of the man himself. Nor should such cottage holdings be confined to the workers upon farms. In every village there are men with part-time occupations. The postman, the publican, the smith, the railwayman, and many of the small shopkeepers, can find time to attend successfully to a cottage holding.

From these cottage holders, as they acquire experience and find they have a taste and aptitude for the work, can be drawn the best small holders, because they and their wives know what the work is like, its possibilities and its limitations. It will be impossible within the next year or two to furnish small holdings for the hundred thousand or more ex-service men who are said to want to go on the land. It is not practicable to find enough land of the right kind in the time, nor have the men sufficient experience. But at the present rates of wage, they will take service upon the land, provided they can obtain a decent home and a cottage holding, which will also furnish the right kind of training and testing ground for such as desire to become small holders. Unskilled men cannot, in any numbers, be trained to the business of a small holder; a year is the

minimum unit of experience, and even that only takes a man once through his routine ; the pupils cannot be taught in classes, each has to do the operation for himself. Experience is the only school, and a man can get that experience on a cottage holding without risking either his own or the State's capital. It is agreed that we must take risks, but the odds are too great against a novice starting on a full-blown small holding to make it a speculation on which to adventure either the State's capital or the man's livelihood. But, as has been demonstrated during the war by the Women's Land Army and the Labour Companies, a man and a woman can be taught in a month or two certain farm operations which will enable them to earn their wages upon a farm. A skilled farm labourer, and how skilled and full of judgment some of them are has only been realised by the public during the recent pinch, is the growth of years. Fortunately there is a nucleus of them left, and on the large organised farms the routine can be got through with a fair proportion of only partially skilled men. It is the little holdings that only employ three or four men which call for all-round knowledge and experience, because every labourer has to turn his hand to any kind of job, and must be able to do it without direction or supervision.

The argument for the cottage holding may be extended to the suburban or village allotment. The war emergency revealed the instinct for the land that is latent in so many Englishmen, but which had been smothered by the growth of towns. The desire for a garden plot, on which a man can both indulge his inborn passion for construction, and satisfy his economic and æsthetic needs, had been visible in the upper and middle classes during the last generation. In one rank of life men and women were to be found laying out hundreds of pounds on their rock gardens, but for one who could go that length, there were thousands aspiring for the day when they could exchange a house with a yard for a house with a garden. And below them came the millions who lived in narrow streets and never could aspire. Whispers floated up, and local authorities were given powers to acquire land for allotments, but, being mainly composed of persons interested in the development of building estates, they were not going to waste land on aspirations and instincts which could not be commercially exploited. It took the war to make allotments general, thereby letting loose the old sympathies and the inbred desire to dig and grow something, and the result is the current clamour for the maintenance and increase of the urban allotment.



Clearly enough these demands cannot be satisfied on building land at a £1000 or even at £500 an acre. But the problem is solving itself. Industry after industry is preparing to move out of the towns. They are proposing to establish themselves along the railways, and the schemes for transmitting electricity and power-gas from great central sources will accelerate the process. With this movement will come a greatly extended diffusion of the allotment proper, on which a man grows stuff for his own consumption and not for sale. And the allotment means new recruits for small holdings and eventually for farming, for, trivial as may seem the knowledge to be acquired on a sixteenth of an acre, it is none the less a knowledge of principles which are equally true on sixty or six hundred acres. Moreover this coming infusion of the town into the country, combined with the greater leisure the new-found power of labour is ensuring, will in time restore some life and society to our dead villages. In the towns there is society and amusement of the wrong type, crowds to join with, picture houses and football matches to frequent. The village has its pale copies in magic lantern entertainments and concerts 'got up' by the church or the anti-church. But the result in town or country is equally dust and ashes; man gets no permanent satisfaction out of amusements in which he is passive; he must be doing something or making something. In the great towns there has been no room for action, in the country no energy. If we can get industries spread about the countryside so as to constitute small varied communities with different interests and occupations, but with some space and leisure, men and women will develop their own active amusements again and enjoy them. This may seem remote from agriculture, but landowners and farmers have got to realise that unless the labourers obtain a chance of life and leisure they are not going to stop in the country, or if bitter necessity forces them to stay, it will be with a Bolshevik determination to seize the land for themselves. If existence is to be all work, why not work for oneself?

We mention landowners advisedly because the landowner has peculiar opportunities and peculiar difficulties. Nobody, as yet, wishes him ill in England; he has let his land cheap, he has made things easy for old and failing tenants, he has rarely rack-rented, and has been liberal in his subscriptions. His agricultural land has not been paying him, and he has accepted all the increased charges of the war, actual outgoings in the shape of heavier tithe and mortgage interest, and he has left

all the benefit of the enhanced prices to the tenants. But he is not liking it, especially as abuse rather than thanks is going round. Why, under these conditions, should he hold land for which he gets a pound a year, subject to outgoings and carrying other obligations, when he can sell it for £40 cash, which will bring him in two pounds a year net? So he is selling, or thinking of selling.

The natural consequence is an agitation among farmers for security of tenure. They can make out a strong case about the hardship of being disturbed in their career of food production and served with a notice to quit merely because the owner wishes to sell the estate. The tenant does not know whether the new owner will renew the tenancy, or whether his holding may not be bought by another farmer for his own occupation. He hesitates whether to make an endeavour to buy himself, for he knows that the better he has been farming in the past, the higher the condition he has brought his land to, the bigger the price he will have to pay at auction. Matters are made worse for him if the estate has been sold, in the first instance, as a whole to a land speculator, who then proceeds to sell it piecemeal, for in such a case every device will be employed to exploit the occupier's reluctance to leave. Abundance of hard cases of the sort can be quoted, but it is difficult to see how to right them without creating more and greater injustices. In the first place, granting that the landlord-tenant system of land holding is to have a commercial basis, English tenants were sitting at uneconomic rents before the war, and as a result of the profits made during the war and the changed value of money the capital value of land has nominally been enhanced. Security of tenure for the sitting tenant at his current rents would mean making a present to him of the margin between the present rent capitalised and the real value, and to this present he is but rarely entitled in virtue of any constructive improvement he has effected in the holding.

The undoubted troubles and occasional injustices that accompany the rental system arise from the general wish of farmers to hold on a yearly tenure; they want the security of a lease without its obligations. They allege that a farmer's business is such as to involve great losses on removal, not to be covered by the terms of the Agricultural Holdings Act, and yet they will accept none but a yearly tenancy. Other businesses are liable to the same or greater loss of connexions and improvements on disturbance, and no commercial man would

dream of embarking upon them without securing such a lease of his premises as will enable him to provide for his exit or the fine that is likely to be demanded for a renewal. Is the big town draper prepared to build up a business and risk rack-renting on a yearly tenancy? Why should the farmer alone expect to be placed in a position of unreciprocal security? The agitation against the landlord's right to sell is idle in view of the difficulty and odium he experiences in attempting to raise rents to their just level. If the farmer had recognised the position and let his landlord know that he was prepared for an adjustment of rent, there would have been fewer sales ; but the notices to quit, which are the owner's only method of enforcing a revision of rents, have very often been met by a public agitation. Even the land speculator, unnecessary profiteer as he appears to be, has often been forced into the scene. The owner would have preferred to sell to his tenants, but when he made the proposal he found such trouble raised, such insufficient offers, so many appeals to his generosity, that it was easier to cut the whole responsibility and take the offer of the speculator as better than anything he could obtain directly from his tenants.

If the farmers persist in their refusal of leases and in their demand for security of tenure under a system of yearly tenancy there is no alternative but a Land Court to fix rents, and without doubt it will be chiefly and immediately appealed to by owners as a means of raising rents. Indeed, many owners might welcome a Land Court in order to provide machinery for restoring rents to an economic level and for getting rid of bad tenants without incurring the personal unpleasantness that now attaches to the process. But even with a Land Court permanent security of tenure can hardly be granted to the tenant if the owner, old or new, wishes to farm the land himself, or if the State wants the land for such public purposes as the creation of small holdings. One of the chief difficulties, especially in Scotland, in acquiring land for small holdings, lies in the displacement it may involve of the sitting tenants. They want things crystallised as they are, and they will equally hold up the small holdings movement and any desire of owners to embark upon intensified systems of farming. It is vain to suppose that the existing race of farmers, if confirmed in their possession, will reform their methods and meet the needs of the State for greater production and more employment. Mere security of tenure would only rivet grass farming on English land.

Possibly we are nearing the end of the landlord and tenant system which has so long prevailed in England, and are witnessing the beginning of the break up of the great estates held for the sake of the position and influence they confer. Let us endeavour, however, to exchange the old system for something more flexible, that will permit of the free transfer of land and the easy entry of new men and new capital. Such forms of security of tenure as amount to dual ownership have always proved detrimental to good farming and to the easy displacement of the occupier who is not making the best of the land. A transition to occupying ownership is doubtless desirable in order to leave the farmer free to exercise his enterprise and develop his land, but the path to it is sale in the open market, not an involved system of adjustment of rents and weighing up of interests by a State authority, especially as the tenant in England has rarely acquired any equitable title to a portion of the capital value of the land in virtue of the improvements he has effected.

If the rental system is to be preserved it will only be by the landowners seizing their opportunity to become once more leaders of the industry instead of mere rent receivers. They have a golden chance to farm their estates themselves on big business lines, satisfying thereby the national demand for production and for the most effective use of the soil. If they cannot farm all they possess, they or their agents must at least farm enough of it on hard commercial lines to know what rents can be earned and what are the difficulties of their tenants. It is in relation to their tenants that owners have been for the last half-century so conspicuously lacking in leadership. Very few of them have tried to press education upon their tenants, or to organise them co-operatively for buying or selling, or have taken any steps to improve labour conditions, or arrest the depopulation of the rural districts. When the normal supply of good tenants has been failing few owners have had the courage to aim at a new source by applying to an agricultural college for promising young men, or by sending thither picked sons of tenants with a view of lending them capital and going into partnership with them later. Their only contribution to agriculture has been the breeding of live stock in competition with one another at a loss. Often, with the best of motives, they have been content to lose money over both the farming they did and over their landowning. A new and sterner generation will not raise a finger for a class that does not render service but merely foregoes possible profit.

Moreover, what the landlord bought by his uneconomic rents—position and sport—are losing their distinctive values. If the successors of the agricultural executive committees continue to do their duty, the days of high game preserving are over. The slatternly coverts which stood for woodland in England will have either to grow timber, or be grubbed to liberate the land for farming; the woodman's methods can no longer be dictated by the gamekeeper. Indubitably, a big stock of game, such as the modern shooting estate carries, does interfere with farming. No one can quarrel with a natural stock of partridges or pheasants; the good they do at least balances the occasional damage. But an artificial stock will often punish the crops, and it is rarely that the farmer obtains adequate compensation. Again the best lover of the old order in the countryside must admit that game means trouble in the village. Some of the best youngsters will go poaching, and on detection the penalty is severe; the culprit either leaves the village or joins the 'bad lots' for life.

Game preserving involves also the shutting up of the woods and fields. The children must keep to the roads; no countryman can enjoy the pleasure of watching wild things or of hunting rare plants—that keenest enjoyment for many of the leisured classes—without becoming suspect: the gamekeeper is often the suspicious tyrant of the village. The townsman has his interest in this aspect of the country; when the boys who have been taught 'Nature Study' in all the elementary schools get a little older the taste for wild things will be more common and become aggressive as men find they are 'kept off the grass' in the interests of game. But it is less the landlord who makes trouble over game than the shooting tenant—the manufacturer, or the financier, or the city lawyer, who does not mind spending money, but cannot give many days to sport and therefore wants his shooting concentrated and his bag big. He is generally pretty lavish in the village, but he will have no tampering with his 'rights' and his keeping is the more rigorous. The executive committees and the Board of Agriculture may do something to keep the game preserver within bounds; and the growth of population in rural areas will itself tend to keep game down. But the only effective solution of the problem is to abolish the Game Laws, and to revise completely the law of trespass, giving every citizen the right to roam at will over uncultivated land, subject to severe penalties for doing wilful damage.

## TRADE COMBINATIONS

Report of the Committee on Trusts. Cd. 9236. 1919.

**F**EW things are more detrimental to clearness of thought than the use of labels and catchwords. Whatever their original significance, they tend inevitably to acquire a secondary meaning which appeals directly to some popular prejudice, and as they are employed by different writers and speakers with entirely different meanings and applications, all sense of definition is soon lost, and only the prejudice remains.

For this reason it may be regretted that the short title of 'The Committee on Trusts' should have been given to the Committee appointed by the Minister of Reconstruction to consider and report 'in view of the probable extension of trade organisations and combinations, what action, if any, may be necessary to safeguard the public interest.' The word 'Trust' has become so closely associated with specific cases or allegations of monopolistic exploitation, that its use in this connexion will probably be taken as branding with suspicion any form of combination among manufacturers or merchants, without regard to its character, object, or effects.

This is the more regrettable because the problem of trade combinations calls imperatively for serious study. It is a problem at once exceedingly important and exceedingly complex. While public interest has been aroused from time to time by the revelation of vast organisations existing in particular trades at home and abroad, very few people to-day realise the extent to which, in this country, trade combinations of different kinds have replaced the old system of unrestricted competition, and changed the whole economic basis of industry and commerce. Fewer still have realised clearly or fully the causes which have led to this change, the manner of its operation, and the advantages and dangers which it involves. Nor, indeed, have the data been easily available upon which a judgment could be formed.

We may, therefore, welcome without hesitation the Report of the Committee, whether or no we agree with its conclusions. The information contained in the Report itself is somewhat fragmentary and inconclusive, consisting chiefly of lists of trade

organisations, extracts from isolated expressions of opinion by various witnesses, and quotations from the commercial laws of the Dominions and foreign countries. It has, however, four valuable appendices. One of these—'Notes on the Law Relating to Combinations,' by Sir John Macdonell—relates mainly to the legal side of the problem; the others are primarily concerned with forms of combination and their economic effects. They include a 'Study of Trade Organisations and Combinations in the United Kingdom,' prepared from the evidence given before the Committee by its Secretary, Mr. John Hilton; a 'Report on Combinations in Building Material Trades,' by Mr. W. G. Storer, and a 'Memorandum on Industrial Combinations,' by Mr. Percy Ashley. There is thus bound up with the Report a considerable mass of analysed and digested data by which to check its conclusions. The document needs to be studied as a whole, and if so studied it will afford ample food for reflection.

'We find,' say the Committee, 'that there is at the present time in every important branch of industry in the United Kingdom an increasing tendency to the formation of Trade Associations and Combinations, having for their purpose the restriction of competition and the control of prices.' It is, on the whole, impossible to quarrel with this verdict, though it may be suggested that there is a tendency to overload the emphasis. There are still many branches of production and distribution in which organisation is non-existent or rudimentary, and even where it exists, competition frequently plays a larger part in the process than would be gathered from some paragraphs in the document before us. Nevertheless, the Committee's statement remains broadly true.

Exactly how far combination has actually replaced free competition it would be impossible to say. The Committee have found evidence of the existence of over 500 associations exercising some measure of control over output and prices in the United Kingdom. From the Ministry of Munitions alone comes a list of nearly a hundred associations with which that Department has come in contact, ranging from the Cordite Ring to the Lancashire Clogmakers' Association. A list of associations in the iron and steel industry which does not pretend to be exhaustive enumerates thirty-five separate bodies, twenty-five of which are stated to include between them over three hundred firms. In shipbuilding, on the other hand, cut-throat

competition is still the order of the day. A very careful inquiry into the supply of building trade materials has led to the conclusion that 25 per cent. of these materials are fully, and 33 per cent. partially controlled. In many other industries, a single association, in some cases a single consolidated concern, controls from 80 to 100 per cent. of the whole output. Among the branches of trade in which organised control has been most highly developed are, in addition to iron and steel, the brass and copper, electrical, chemical and soap, lighting oil and petrol, glass bottle, cement, salt, tobacco, and wallpaper industries. In the ordinary weaving branches of the textile trades it has made comparatively little progress, but the spinning (especially cotton and thread), dyeing, printing, and bleaching branches, as well as the manufacture of carpets, are almost entirely dominated either by restrictive combinations, or by small groups of powerful consolidations. The multiple shop and the tied-house are indications of the same tendency in the retail trades.

It would be a grave mistake, however, to assume that all this growth of organisation implies simply the exploitation of the consumer by capitalist monopolies. The problem is not quite so simple. The various 'trade organisations and combinations' which have come within the scope of the Committee's investigation vary widely in their form, object, power, and methods, and many of them bear only the most remote resemblance to the ordinary idea of a Trust. Some of them control the whole or practically the whole of a particular industry and are, in fact, monopolistic in character; others are subject to the competition of other associations or of important independent concerns. Some of them allow a large measure of competition between the component firms; others exclude it altogether. Some control absolutely the output of each individual member and the price charged to the consumer; others do so, if at all, only indirectly and partially. Moreover, while the dangers arising from these developments have been, perhaps, imperfectly realised, the benefits which they confer upon the consumer as well as upon the producer have been even less clearly recognised. The problem of how to obtain the benefits of combination without incurring its disadvantages will not be quickly or easily solved, and any attempt to solve it by some one simple formula is likely to be disastrous.

To begin with, the tendency to combination may be taken as inevitable. The unrestricted competition which was the ideal



of the nineteenth-century economists had its merits. Up to a certain point it undoubtedly stimulated efficiency by providing the strongest possible incentive to effort, while it protected the consumer against exploitation by compelling the manufacturer or trader to work to a reasonable margin of profit, under pain of being outbidden by his rivals. In practice, however, neither cheapness nor efficiency were universally attained. Too often competition took the form of reckless price-cutting, which reduced the margin of profit to so low a level that capital was no longer attracted to the industry, and the resources of the firms were too much depleted to permit expenditure on new machinery or improved methods of production. While the turnover of successful firms might be large, profits were small, and while prices might be low in comparison with the actual cost of production, they were high in comparison with a figure which would have yielded good returns had the capital and energy wasted on fighting been devoted to improving methods. Moreover, the isolation of individual concerns implied in unrestricted competition was all against efficiency. Each firm had to work out its problems for itself, and the knowledge obtained from experiment and experience was jealously guarded. Specialisation was discouraged, since every manufacturer endeavoured to comply with every requirement of his customers; plant had to be laid down which was only intermittently employed, and patterns stocked for which there was no regular demand. Materials were purchased and the finished products distributed in small parcels, and the greater the number of the separate concerns, the larger was the proportion of the final selling-price absorbed by overhead charges.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that manufacturers and traders began to combine for the purpose of collective buying and collective selling, the pooling of knowledge, the definite allocation of specialised lines, and the steadying of prices. The Anti-Trust agitation in the United States, and the outcries raised with regard to the competition of the German Kartels directed public attention rather to foreign than to home developments; but the organisation of British industries, while less spectacular and more elastic, lacked little in efficiency as compared with that of foreign rivals. If little was heard of combines and associations in this country, it was not because they did not exist, but because they rather shrank from attracting attention. The laws relating to 'restraint of trade' left the

legal status of trade associations uncertain and precarious, the public was inflamed by revelations concerning the big American trusts, and inclined to regard all attempts at combination with suspicion. As a result of these conditions, the activities of the British combinations have been carried on in an atmosphere of unhealthy secrecy which is fair neither to them nor to the public. It has tended to accentuate the dangers of combination, and to hamper the development of its advantages.

In this, as in so many other respects, the war has brought about a revolution. It brought the Government into the field as buyers on an unprecedented scale, comparatively careless as regards price, but vitally interested in securing quantity and rapidity of output. The necessity for rationing materials and grading various demands in order of priority, obliged them to exercise a close supervision over many branches of industry. Whether as buyers or as controllers, it was obviously easier for them to deal with a single big trade association than with a large number of individual firms, while the firms, on their side, found that it was only through the medium of such an association that they could effectively approach the Government on matters relating to their interests. The result of the war has thus been greatly to increase the tendency to combination, and at the same time to give it a more clearly recognised place in our national economy.

The first step towards obtaining a better understanding of the problem thus created is to form a clear conception of the various forms which trade organisations and combinations may take.

In the first place, there are many forms of association, such as Employers' Federations, Chambers of Commerce, and the like, which have been formed primarily for dealing with labour questions, or for watching over the general interests of traders in a particular district or in a particular industry. Even among purely industrial organisations, there are many which confine their activities mainly to such matters as the opposing or promotion of legislation affecting the industries, the compilation of statistics, or the discussion of technical questions. The influence of these bodies is very considerable; but they are not trade combinations in the sense in which the word is here understood. They interfere hardly at all with the independence of the individual firm as regards buying, production, marketing, or prices.

The association which aims directly at the regulation of trade finds its simplest expression in the 'honourable understandings,' or 'gentlemen's agreements' as to prices and division of business, frequently arrived at by local traders. These informal arrangements have their use in restraining cut-throat competition and preventing overlapping, but their very nature prevents them from playing an appreciable part in the promotion of business efficiency, and they lend themselves readily to exploitation of the consumer.

More important, in every way, are the associations formed for the definite purpose of regulating trade, whose activities cover a large part of the industrial field. Their distinguishing feature is that the component firms retain complete financial independence and freedom of all action in all matters not covered by the rules of the association. These rules, however, may extend far. In some cases they simply bind the members to work to an agreed schedule of prices; others impose certain definite restrictions on the methods of tendering for contract work; others comprise arrangements for the partitioning of the market, and restrain members from competing outside their own agreed area; in the most advanced type of all, they lay down the quota of the whole output of the industry to be contributed by each individual firm. In the last-named case the price to be charged is not necessarily fixed. The method adopted is to give the secretary access to the books of each member of the association, for the purpose of determining the ratio in which the trade was divided between them during an agreed period. On this is based a 'quota' known only to the secretary and the individual member concerned, and at the end of each month the secretary receives from each firm particulars of its output or sales, for comparison with this quota. Any firm which has exceeded its proportion of the total for that month pays an agreed percentage of the excess into a pool, from which any firm which has done less than its quota draws a sum equal to an agreed percentage of the deficiency.

In all these associations, whether belonging to the more or less highly developed type, the whole arrangement rests upon a terminable contract. In the present state of the law, associations are precluded from registering under the Companies Acts, but the majority of them do register as trade unions, and as such they suffer the disabilities, while they enjoy the immunities of the trade union proper. They can neither en-

force their rules at law, nor prevent members from withdrawing from the association, nor enter into enforceable contracts for collective buying or selling.

In order to avoid these disabilities, and to ensure a greater permanence than is attainable under the association form, the combine proper has come into being. The distinguishing feature of the combine is that the component firms, whether or no they retain their separate identity, become financially interconnected through one central organisation. In the looser type, the firms composing the combine do retain their identity, receiving shares in the central organisation in proportion to the extent of their business, and possibly receiving in addition a bonus on the output of their own establishment. In the more compact type, the individual firms are practically merged in the holding company, and are worked simply as branch establishments of the combine. Even in the looser form it is common for the buying and selling to be done collectively through the central organisation.

Finally we come to the consolidation, wherein a number of firms become completely merged in a single company, by which their whole capital and business is taken over. While combines are usually 'horizontal' in character—that is to say, they are composed of firms engaged in the same line of industry and at the same stage of production—consolidations are frequently 'vertical,' involving a fusion of firms representing successive stages of production. In the iron and steel industries especially, it is not uncommon to find amalgamations which control the whole process of production, from the extraction of the ore to the construction of the ship, gun, or girder.

It is obvious that the possibilities of these great organisations must be immense, whether for good or for evil. Their achievements have been considerable: their potentialities are almost unlimited.

In the first place, it is self-evident that the consolidation or combine, operating on a vast scale, and backed by a great aggregation of capital, can both buy and sell to better advantage than the small individual firm. It can obtain easier credit and larger discounts, can make better terms as to freightage and transport, can dispense with middlemen, and hold larger stocks. In some cases it can acquire its own mineral deposits or other sources of supply, thus ensuring a steady flow of raw materials while cutting out all intermediate profit. In selling

it can do a much larger trade with fewer agents and a reduction of advertising expenses.

To associations these advantages, as we have seen, are only partially open, yet co-operation, whether formal or informal in character, in the purchase of materials and the marketing of products, can be carried on by them to a considerable extent. Particularly is this the case in the export trade. The conduct of international commerce by direct communication between an individual buyer in one country and an individual seller in another is a singularly wasteful and inefficient process. Collective representation, collective advertising, collective study of the markets, not only cuts out a large amount of duplication and unnecessary expenditure, but enables the needs of the buyer to be studied and served in a way that is impossible under purely individualist methods.

Further economies in selling may arise from the demarcation of markets, which is a feature of associations as well as of combines. In the case of associations the arrangement is frequently of an informal character, but it appears to be generally respected, and the result is to ensure that the customer shall, as a rule, be served by a neighbouring firm, and that the expense of long delivery journeys shall be eliminated.

In the actual process of production the advantages of co-operation are still greater, and are to a great extent as open to the association of independent firms as to the combine or the consolidation, though it must be said that they have been as yet very imperfectly realised. The standardisation of types, patterns, and sizes in all articles which lend themselves to repetition manufacture is a boon alike to the producer, to the distributor, and to the public. It enables the manufacturer to produce in larger quantities and at lesser cost; it reduces the amount and variety of stock which the distributor has to carry, and it benefits the user by rendering the fittings of one maker interchangeable with those of others.

Along with standardisation, the organisation of firms in associations or combines facilitates the introduction of specialised production. It becomes possible for each establishment to concentrate on the production of its own particular lines, and to pass on to other members of the group orders for varieties and patterns for which it has no regular demand, and to avoid the expense of maintaining plant or stocks which it can only use intermittently. The result is not only to effect economies

in production but, by ensuring concentration of effort, to improve the quality of the output.

In securing a more equal distribution of work among the firms composing an industry—thus avoiding both short time and overtime—the group of manufacturers is at a great advantage as against the individual concern. The combine or consolidation can, of course, distribute orders among the various establishments which it controls with absolute freedom; and the pooling and quota system adopted by many associations, while it has at times resulted in some firms withdrawing altogether from manufacture and simply continuing to draw their 'compensation' from the pool, appears, on the whole, to have the effect of reducing inequalities and ensuring a tolerably steady business to the majority of the members.

But perhaps the most important of all the advantages of co-operation is the pooling of knowledge. In this respect associations have lagged far behind the more compact types of organisation, but their failure has arisen rather from lack of foresight than from lack of opportunity. It is not simply a matter of co-operative experiment and research. At least as important is the collection and dissemination of full and accurate trade statistics and general information as to the course of the markets, the available supplies, and the general trade outlook—and this can be accomplished by an association through its central bureau as readily as by a combine including within itself the whole forces of an industry. Hardly less important is the standardisation and interchange of costings. It is, to a great extent, the rule-of-thumb method by which prices have been calculated which has given its worst features to the competitive system. In the absence of any scientific method of computation, prices were fixed by the 'higgling of the market,' and the desire to underbid a competitor led to ruinous price cutting, often fatal to the producer and, in the long run, unsatisfactory to the consumer. With the adoption of a standardised system of costing, based on the interchange of information among the firms concerned in an industry, and a comparison of the results, it becomes possible to obtain an accurate datum line by which prices can be fixed, and by which the manufacturer can check the efficiency of his organisation and methods.

How far the economies effected by combination in any of its forms will be passed on to the consumer in the shape of reduced prices will be decided by other considerations to be

hereafter discussed ; but it is evident that so far as combination or co-operation tends to the improvement of plant, processes, organisation, and methods, so as to produce a better article or give a more effective service, its benefits are shared by the consumer. Even the regulation of prices, while undoubtedly open to abuse, is not without its beneficial side. In the case of an association fixing prices but leaving the members financially independent, the element of competition remains in operation, but it is transferred from price to quality and service. The individual trader, being no longer able to cut out his competitors by underbidding, is obliged to look for any increase in his business to the production of a superior article. In the case of the combine and consolidation, the competitive element is to a much greater extent excluded ; but even here, so long as the monopoly power is not abused, there is an advantage to the consumer as well as to the producer in the greater stability of prices as compared with the violent fluctuations produced by the competitive system.

Stability is indeed the keynote of combination. The new developments represent in very large measure an attempt to remove from business the element of unhealthy speculation ; to ensure a steady supply of materials, to keep out the outside speculator who manipulates the market without taking any share either in production or distribution ; to enable the business man to calculate his risks and prospects with a reasonable measure of certainty. In so far as combination achieves these objects, and is confined to them, it deserves well of the public as well as of the trader.

Unfortunately the monopoly or quasi-monopoly powers arising from trade organisation are—like all power by whomsoever held—capable of abuse as well as of use. It is probable that even the American Meat Trust, about which we have heard so much, has done good service by eliminating waste and increasing supplies ; but during the war, if not before, its monopoly was unquestionably used to extort profits far greater than the services rendered could justify.

With regard to combinations in the United Kingdom, we may probably accept the conclusion of the Committee that apart from certain specific cases in which fantastic prices have been extorted from the Government or the public during an emergency, there is no evidence that the introduction of combination has raised prices to any great degree. Nevertheless its tendency

has undoubtedly been towards raising the price-level, especially in cases where the commodities controlled are so essential to the community that the elasticity of demand is small. Even where prices have not been raised, they have been maintained at a higher level than was necessary to give the former margin of profit, in view of the economies effected.

It is, however, the potentiality of exploitation which is the vital factor. In the case of essential commodities not easily replaceable by substitutes, and the whole or nearly the whole output of which is controlled by a powerful consolidation or combine, there appears to be little limit to the price which may be charged other than the producer's sense of what is fair and decent, and while the Committee believe that this sense has in fact operated to prevent gross extortion, they emphasise the danger of leaving the decision as to what is reasonable to an interested party, upon whom there is no competitive check.

One point which the Committee appears to have overlooked in this connexion is the danger of Labour organisations in a controlled industry using the employers' organisation as a stalking horse to exploit the public by forcing up wages beyond an economic level. So long as an industry remains open or only partially controlled there is a limit beyond which wages cannot be forced, and there is a possibility that any increase will come, to some extent, out of the owners' profits. But where a combination of employers exercises monopolistic control of an essential commodity, every increase can be passed on to the consumer automatically, and Labour and Capital together can bleed the public for the benefit of each in turn.

Restriction of output for the purpose of keeping up prices is so closely associated with the question of exploitation as hardly to call for separate mention ; but there are other dangers in the tendency towards combination which have little or nothing to do with the price question. The merging of independent firms in great combines and consolidations removes much of the incentive to personal initiative and enterprise which was undoubtedly fostered by the old system of unrestricted competition. The business man who stood to sink or swim by the result of his own energies and his own decisions becomes in effect, if not in name, a salaried manager carrying out the instructions of a central board. Initiative is replaced by routine, and what is gained in scientific organisation may well be lost in resourcefulness and individuality.



Where the big combinations in any industry are independent of each other, or where the commodity produced is subject to the competition of possible substitutes, something of the old stimulus may remain. There are, however, cases in which the supply of an indispensable article, not easily, perhaps not possibly, replaceable, is concentrated in a single great combination, or in two or three combinations which are themselves financially inter-connected. In such cases the monopoly is complete, and the danger of the whole industry sinking into complacent stagnation is real and great.

It may be said, of course, that there is always the possibility of competition from newcomers to the industry, outside the ranks of the combine; but this possibility is theoretical rather than practical. The position of the great combines and consolidations is fortified not only by their financial strength but by a monopoly of information, by control over the supplies of raw material, by tying clauses in agreements with merchants and retailers which can be enforced by the forfeiture of conditional commissions and deferred rebates. In the case of one trade organisation controlling at least 80 per cent. of the supply of shoe machinery in Great Britain, the Committee found that the monopoly was protected by an elaborate system of tying clauses in the machine leases which rendered it practically impossible for any customer who had hired a machine from the combine to hire or purchase a machine from any other maker. This case is probably exceptional, but in most cases where a combination controls 80 per cent. of the output of an industry—and with a less percentage it has been found impossible to exercise effective price control—the entry of a newcomer is hedged about with so many difficulties as to prevent any real competitive check on the exercise of the monopoly, and to deprive the industry itself of the stimulus derived from new blood, new men with new ideas and methods.

Apart from the economic drawbacks of such a condition, there is a distinct disadvantage in the resultant loss of personality in business. With all his defects, the small man who stood on his own business feet was a type which the country can ill afford to lose, and the personal element in business relations had a value for which no adequate substitute has been found by the large impersonal concern.

There are thus grave dangers and disadvantages to be set off against the benefits derived from combination, and it is the

question of how these dangers and disadvantages are to be overcome which has now become urgent. Any attempt to stem the tendency towards combination is probably doomed to failure. The development is a natural one, and has arisen, as we have seen, from adequate causes and for sound reasons. Moreover, the advantages of organisation, as regards both economy and efficiency, are so great that it would be folly to throw them away. In an addendum to the Report, Mr. Sidney Webb, Mr. J. A. Hobson, Mr. Ernest Bevin, and Mr. W. H. Watkins, who are sufficiently alive to the dangers of combination, say :—

‘ We do not suggest that any action should be taken to prevent or obstruct combination or association in capitalist enterprise. Apart from the experience that no such interference can be made effective, we have to recognise that association and combination in production and distribution are steps in the greater efficiency, the increased economy, and the better organisation of industry. We regard this evolution as both inevitable and desirable.’

It requires some courage to-day to deny the utility of a law forbidding water to flow down hill ; but there can be little doubt that repressive legislation is, in this field, a very uncertain remedy. While associations may be rendered illegal, it is impossible, in practice, to prevent the fusion of firms into great amalgamations, which is perhaps the form of combination most capable of abuse. Nor is it possible, whatever penalties may be imposed on tying contracts and fixed price schedules, to prevent informal agreements and boycotts which may be equally effective. The Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts in America have given rise to interminable and exceedingly costly litigation, but it is very doubtful how far they have succeeded in stamping out organisations in restraint of competition, and the general effect of such measures is to force combination underground, where it operates almost wholly for the purpose of restricting competition and keeping up prices, and has little effect in promoting efficiency.

State control of profits or prices is almost equally unsatisfactory. The taxation of excess profits may secure for the State a proportion of monopoly gains, but it does nothing to restrict the general evils of monopoly control, and experience has shown that it tends to become simply an indirect tax upon the consumer. Profit limitation by the fixing of a maximum percentage on the cost of production or on the capital employed is easier to work out in theory than in practice. The great

difficulty is to obtain a satisfactory datum line which will exclude the possibility of evasion by 'watering' capital or by loading working expenses with unduly heavy salaries, directors' fees, commissions, and depreciation charges. An effective scheme, even if attainable, would probably involve an expenditure both of time and money in inspection and accountancy, which would go far to neutralise the results achieved. In the case of certain natural monopolies the 'sliding scale' method already applied to gas companies might, perhaps, be employed; but the number of industries to which this method is applicable is comparatively small, and its effects on quality and price are not quite beyond dispute.

The direct fixing of maximum prices is on paper an easier matter. The actual effects of price limitation on output, efficiency of services, and cost of living are not, however, by any means certain. Further inquiry, based on much fuller evidence as to war experiences than is yet available, is needed; but what is known as to the effects of price limitation, both in this country and in Germany, suggests very strongly that the difficulties of preventing evasion are almost insuperable, and that even where the fixed prices can be rigidly enforced, the method is not without serious drawbacks. It is a matter of common experience that maximum prices tend to become minima, and that competition in quality is discouraged by equalising the rewards of superior and inferior service. The application of fixed prices as a check on monopoly gains is further complicated by the difficulty of deciding, in the majority of cases, whether the control exercised by a particular combination is, or is not, monopolistic in the full sense of the word, and what proportion of its gains can properly be attributed to this control, as distinct from the rewards of superior ability and organisation.

It must be remembered also that the majority of the most highly organised industries are concerned in the production of essential commodities. This is, admittedly, a strong argument in favour of protecting the consumer by any practicable and equitable means; but to single out these industries for the application of price or profit limitation may lead to the paradox that the trader who is rendering the most valuable service is the one who receives the smallest reward, and the temptation will be strong to divert capital and effort into the luxury trades.

It is not surprising that in view of the inherent difficulties of these various methods of State control, the signatories to the

addendum have come to the conclusion that where an essential industry has fallen under monopolistic control, nationalisation is the only effective method of protecting the consumer against exploitation. Indeed their approval of the tendency to combination, previously quoted, appears to be based mainly on the principle of fattening the goose before killing it—or at any rate acquiring a lien on its golden eggs.

We may freely admit that the arguments in favour of private enterprise lose much of their force in the case of vast combinations in which the replacement of personality by system has already introduced something not unlike a bureaucratic regime. It must, however, be remembered that even in the case of a monopolistic consolidation, the annual profit and loss account supplies an acid test of efficient management which it would be almost impossible to keep unimpaired under State management. It is, indeed, suggested in the addendum that State ownership need not imply State management, and that the enterprise or industry might be leased to a co-operative society or joint-stock company, under a schedule prescribing wages, prices, and other necessary conditions. Both this suggestion and that put forward in the Coal Inquiry for obliging all combines in a highly organised industry to coalesce into a single trust operating under a legal charter, deserve careful study. They suggest at least a possible method of dealing with exceptional cases; but it is obvious that their applicability extends over but a small part of the vast field covered by industrial combination in its various forms, and they are not in themselves without pitfalls. These great managing companies or chartered trusts might easily become Frankenstein's monsters, and produce all kinds of undesirable entanglements between economic and political interests. At the best, they involve the pushing of combination to its most extreme form, and the replacement of associations which leave a large measure of individuality and even of competition by consolidations which deny those elements any existence.

Nevertheless, the dangers arising from the existence of great *imperia in imperio* having vast actual power and little tangible responsibility are too great for the State to contemplate without concern, and unless a better way can be found, resort to some one or other of the remedies already discussed may become imperative. We have now to inquire whether this better way has been found in the recommendations of the Committee. These recommendations amount in effect to this :—

That the Board of Trade shall be instructed to obtain all possible information as to the existence, nature, and operations of trade organisations and combinations in the United Kingdom, and to report annually to Parliament thereon—a special department being presumably created for this purpose :

That where the Board of Trade consider, as the result of a complaint made against any such organisation or of their own investigations, that there is *prima facie* evidence that the public interest is adversely affected, they shall refer the matter for investigation and report to a special tribunal, consisting of a legal chairman, and from two to seven members chosen from a panel appointed by the Board in consultation with trade organisations, co-operative societies, and trade unions ; such tribunal to be empowered to take evidence on oath and to call for the production of all relevant books and papers, and to have wide discretion as to its methods of inquiry :

That on receiving the report of such tribunal, the Board of Trade shall make recommendations as to such State action, if any, as shall be necessary.

These recommendations will not satisfy the believers in sweeping and spectacular measures, and they have already been criticised on the ground that fifteen months' investigations have only taught the Committee that somebody else should be appointed to investigate. Yet this is precisely the point which it was necessary to establish. Previous attempts to deal with the problem have failed, and all attempts to find a single, definite, and permanent remedy must fail, for three very good reasons. In the first place the character, power, objects, and effects of trade organisations and combinations vary widely and in essentials, and it would be impossible for legislation to cover the whole field without a complexity leading to much uncertainty and to much expensive litigation. In the second place, the development of combination is not static but dynamic. It is a process which is continually going on in various forms and under varying conditions, affected by innumerable factors in the course of trade and finance. Any attempt to deal with the question once and for all is foredoomed to failure by the very nature of the problem. Finally, the good and evil in combinations are inextricably entangled, and the balance between them can only be struck as the result of observing the effects produced in each particular case. Sweeping legislation on the subject must inevitably hamper the development of actual advantages in the attempt to avert potential dangers.

In this complexity of the problem lies the strongest possible argument for the establishment of a permanent department holding a watching brief over the whole field, and empowered to obtain, if necessary by compulsion, all relevant information. The powers of such a department would, indeed, need to be carefully defined, and its personnel carefully selected. Otherwise it might easily become either supine and negligible or mischievously meddlesome. Properly conducted it would enable the policy of the Government to be framed, and any necessary revision of the laws to be effected in the light of knowledge and experience, and to be varied from time to time as new developments may require. At the same time the proposed tribunal of investigation would enable appropriate action to be taken in proved cases of extortion or misconduct without imposing unnecessary shackles upon legitimate trade. Any of the various remedies which have been proposed—limitation of profits, fixing of prices, public competition, nationalisation, compulsory incorporation under a charter, prosecution under the existing laws relating to restraint of trade—might be practicable and effective in a particular case, though no one of them would cover the whole field or could be generally applied without the risk of stultification and injurious reactions. In dealing with so complex and so fluctuating a problem, drastic action taken *ad hoc* in particular cases will be far more effective than any attempt to lay down once for all a comprehensive code.

The most important effect of the Committee's proposals—though its importance is hardly brought out adequately in the Report—is, however, the publicity which they would entail. It is proposed that 'when it shall be proved that acts injurious to the public interest have been committed, such facts as are relevant to the particular offence shall be published immediately on the conclusion of such inquiry,' apart from any other action recommended by the tribunal. If this were all, the effect might be to concentrate public attention upon isolated scandals; but the annual reports presented to Parliament would, of course, be published, and these would cover a wide field. It is, indeed, essential that the widest possible discretion should be left to the department as to the matter to be included in these reports. Details of organisations or costings obtained from a particular concern or association would presumably be regarded as confidential; but it would be perfectly practicable to publish statistics relating to any industry as a whole, showing the per-

centage of fluctuation in annual output, the relation of prices to cost of production and of profit to capital, together with a general sketch of any developments in the organisation of the industry. Nor is there any reason why returns should not be given showing all important new fusions and amalgamations, new issues of capital, and changes—especially interchanges—of directorate.

Much of this information is already on record in the files of Somerset House, or in the columns of trade and financial journals; but it is not available in any collected and easily accessible form. Yet until it is made accessible, we shall be at the mercy of the less scrupulous combinations on the one hand, of recurring panics and doctrinaire legislation on the other.

Greater publicity would in itself go a long way towards preventing the exploitation of the consumer or objectionable methods of freezing out competition. Even the strongest combines are notoriously exceedingly nervous of anything approaching a scandal. Apart from the fear of public reprobation leading to drastic State interference, a scandal is in every way bad for trade. It involves friction with distributors, consumers, and shareholders; it destroys confidence, decreases demand, and goes far to break down the goodwill which is the most valuable asset of a great business. Moreover, publicity would strongly reinforce the sense of what is fair and decent, and the pride in the good name of the concern, which are real factors throughout the greater part of the business world. Secrecy is an unhealthy atmosphere, and many things are done 'under the rose,' which would not be done—apart from fear of consequences—in the light of day.

The positive results of publicity would be still greater than its negative achievements. While the powers given to the tribunal to investigate complaints and to pillory proved cases of misconduct would inspire confidence in the consumer, the publication in accessible form of information relating to the organised trades would enable the public to judge for itself as to the effect of combination on prices and output, and would relieve many unfounded or exaggerated suspicions. What is more, it would have an invaluable effect in educating the consumer, the investor, the legislature, and the business man himself in the meaning and possibilities of business co-operation.

There is no greater obstacle to the revival of trade than the suspicion with which the business world is riddled. Labour distrusts Capital, the distributor distrusts the producer, the

producers distrust each other, and the consumer distrusts them all. In the absence of any adequate data by which to judge the reasonableness of prices, wages, or profits, of any common knowledge as to the extent to which competition is restricted, or as to the actual ownership of apparently competing articles, not only are malpractices encouraged, but an undeserved doubt is thrown upon the operations of the honest trader. Allegations of profiteering or exploitation, for which there is little or no foundation, are caught up as readily as those in which there is too much truth; jealousies and bickerings, causing endless worry and waste, are produced between competing firms; the investor is nervous, and enterprise is discouraged.

The rise of the associations may itself be taken as evidence that the policy of secrecy in business is being rapidly exploded. So much is this the case that great strides are being made in America with a system of 'co-operative competition,' based on the association of firms, not for the purpose of fixing prices, restricting output, or delimiting markets, but simply for the interchange of information as to costings, processes, stocks, shipments, supplies, and the general course of trade. What is now needed is that this pooling of knowledge should be carried a little farther, and that the public should be admitted to a share of the results. Publicity will at once remove the stigma from combination and create a new sense of responsibility on the part of those concerned.

There is one legal point, however, which requires further study. The organisation of independent firms for mutual assistance is in many ways preferable to the consolidation or combine, inasmuch as while it obtains the advantages of co-operation it retains the elements of personality and individual enterprise. It is, indeed, often the only means by which the 'small man' can secure his position. Hitherto the legal disabilities of the associations have weighted the scales against them and provided a strong incentive to fusions and amalgamations which the law does not restrain. In order that the advantages of co-operation may be fully realised, it will be necessary for the law to be amended so as to enable them to obtain the legal status and freedom of action now only attainable by amalgamations. This question is rather shirked by the Committee, presumably because it inevitably raises the still more thorny question of trade union status; but it is one which must be faced, and it would form a very proper subject of investigation by the proposed new department.



Other minor modifications of the law will no doubt suggest themselves as the result of experience; but if the growth of combination is neither to become a menace to the community, nor to be hampered in its beneficial effects by injurious restrictions, there are two things which are essential—the fullest practicable publicity, and a realisation by traders themselves of their opportunities. In the hard years which are coming we shall sorely need the greater efficiency of production and service which only co-operation can supply; but freedom of combination is not likely to be granted unless it is possible for the public to judge for itself to what ends that freedom is employed.

C. ERNEST FAYLE.

## THE PHYSIQUE OF THE NATION

THE primary object of the organisation of the Medical Department of the Ministry of National Service was to conduct the examination of all men of military age called up for medical examination under the Military Service Acts. Incidentally, the fulfilment of this task afforded the opportunity to make a far-reaching survey of the male population of Great Britain and, to a limited extent, also of Ireland. The recognition and the acceptance of the principle that in the new organisation Medical Boards should deal only with physical considerations, greatly simplified the problem of those engaged in the examination of recruits. It was necessary that men of widely different physical capacity and development should be supplied to the army, because there was not a sufficient number of perfectly fit men in the country to supply all the needs of the army as laid down by the Government. A modern army is a collection of individuals not differing in kind from a large industrial community. Speaking broadly, therefore, every man who is fit to earn his living in civilian life is also fit to be employed in some capacity suited to his condition within the army. Employment in a modern army embraces all conditions of existence, ranging from that of the clerk—who lives in his own home, works regular hours, and has suitable food at fixed times—to that of the fighting man who leads a life of strenuous activity, has to make forced marches in all conditions of climate, weather, fatigue, and lack of food, and to take part in savage hand-to-hand fighting.

It was, therefore, necessary to establish certain broad principles of classification of the men supplied to the army. A Medical Board can note physical deformities, detect organic soundness or unsoundness, estimate from experience whether a man's unsoundness is likely to increase or prove fatal within a certain space of time, and determine with fair certainty whether a man is suffering from contagious or infectious disease. It cannot reasonably be expected to give an opinion whether a man can or should be fitted into a particular niche in the army for any one of the multifarious duties of a soldier.

Experience had shown that men of military age could be sorted into four broad groups, according to their physical fitness.

These groups or grades, as they were henceforth termed, formed the foundation upon which the whole structure of this physical census was built, and were defined as follows:—

GRADE I.—Those who attain the full normal standard of health and strength and are capable of enduring physical exertion suitable to their age. Such men must not suffer from progressive organic disease, nor have any serious disability or deformity. Minor defects which can be remedied or adequately compensated by artificial means will not be regarded as disqualifications.

GRADE II.—Those who for various causes, such as being subject to partial disabilities, do not reach the standard of Grade I. They must not suffer from progressive organic disease. They must have fair hearing and vision, be of moderate muscular development, and be able to undergo a considerable degree of physical exertion of a nature not involving severe strain.

GRADE III.—Those who present marked physical disabilities or such evidence of past disease that they are not considered fit to undergo the degree of physical exertion required for the higher grades. Examples of men suitable for this Grade are those with badly deformed toes, severe flat foot, and some cases of hernia, and of varicose veins; other instances of those who should be placed in this Grade are indicated later under the headings of the various diseases and disabilities. The third Grade will also include those who are fit only for clerical and other sedentary occupations, such as tailoring and boot-making.

GRADE IV.—All those who are totally and permanently unfit for any form of military service.

These definitions, amplified and explained by various and detailed instructions, necessitated by their application to the individual and by administrative requirements, represent the standards of each of the four grades, in one of which every man who was called up for medical examination under the Military Service Acts was placed. It will be noticed that they are concerned solely with physical considerations, and it is this characteristic that makes the records of the men examined and graded by these standards such a valuable source of information upon the physical condition of our people.

These records, indeed, constitute a physical census of the men of military age upon a scale which only the urgent necessity of a war for existence among the great nations could have rendered possible. Analysis of them should, therefore, reveal both the nature and distribution of physical disabilities among our manhood, and show to what extent the national health falls below an attainable standard. This information, once harvested and sifted, should indicate unmistakably the directions in which efforts should be made to improve the national health

by preventing what is preventible, and by ameliorating and palliating what is unavoidable.

During the year preceding the signing of the Armistice, viz., 1st November 1917 to 1st November 1918, National Service Medical Boards conducted nearly two and a half million examinations and re-examinations, and the grading determined by these examinations constitutes the basis of all inferences drawn from the records of this work. Now grading—the accurate assessment of such a complex quality as physical fitness—is no easy matter, as those engaged in this work have good cause to know. We must therefore examine such evidence as is available to show how far the grading by the Boards did correctly represent the degree of physical fitness of the men examined. Subject to the necessary safeguards, any man who had been examined and graded by a National Service Medical Board was entitled to appeal against his grading to the Appeal Tribunal, who were empowered to have him re-examined and regraded by a special Board of Assessors if they regarded his appeal as well founded. The returns show that the grading by the National Service Medical Board was altered by the Board of Assessors in less than 0.4 per cent. of these two and a half million examinations.

The fact that the figures of this appeal organisation show only a fractional percentage of difference of opinion upon the grading, is good evidence of its general accuracy. The real and crucial test, however, is clearly that afforded by practice, viz., the extent to which men placed in the several grades did in fact prove capable of doing the work expected of them in the army, and on this essential point there is as yet no statistical evidence available. It may, however, be truly said that in the fourth year of a war which strained the man-power resources of this country to the utmost (at a time when the demand for men was insistent), the general tendency of the Boards was certainly not to grade the men examined too low, for the forces at work upon the minds of all medical men during that initial year ran strongly in favour of rating each recruit examined as highly as the medical conscience would permit. This general tendency is clearly shown upon the grading returns regularly made from all parts of the country throughout the year. The periods during which the demands for men for the army were most urgent, and when the country realised, as it did from time to time, the gravity of the military situation, *e.g.*, during the great German offensive in March 1918, were clearly shown on the

returns by the rise in the number of men placed in the higher grades. Although every effort was made to attain and maintain uniformity of grading, this moral effect of the fluctuating fortunes of war was unquestionably at work in varying degree at various times throughout the period under review.

Whatever criticisms, therefore, may be made of the inferences drawn from the grading statistics, it may be confidently stated that the predominant tendency was certainly towards placing the man about whom there was a doubt in the higher rather than in the lower of two possible grades. The result of this tendency is, that whatever conclusions or estimates of the physical condition of our manhood we may be able to form from the evidence afforded by the facts and figures of grading, we may be confident that the picture of the health of the nation thus presented to our minds is certainly not painted in unduly dark colours. Indeed, the probability is throughout that we shall be under-estimating rather than over-estimating the amount and degree of physical disability and disease.

Out of the 2,425,184 examinations of men of military age in the year under review, 871,769 resulted in the man being placed in Grade I., 546,276 in Grade II., 796,859 in Grade III., and 250,280 in Grade IV. Taking these figures at their face value it would appear that out of every hundred men of military age in Great Britain, on the average thirty-six were perfectly fit and healthy, twenty-three were upon a definitely infirm plane of health and strength, whether from some disability or some failure in development, thirty-one were incapable of undergoing more than a very moderate degree of physical exertion, and could almost (in view of their age) be described with justice as physical wrecks, and ten as chronic invalids with a precarious hold upon life.

Before accepting such an alarming general conclusion, it must be pointed out that the grading figures represent the number of examinations and not of men examined. Thus the same individual who was examined on several occasions figures a corresponding number of times in the total. Unfortunately, this qualification is of little real importance, for the percentage of men re-examined was small, and in only a small proportion of those re-examined was the previous grading altered. If it were possible to eliminate the re-examinations from the grading figures, which would then represent the numbers of individuals examined, it is improbable that there would be any material

alteration in the relation between the numbers shown in the several grades. We may, therefore, regard these numbers as representing with sufficient accuracy the numerical relation between the various grades.

In any inquiry into this great harvest of facts and figures the first question we have to settle is, what is to be counted an average crop? What ratio should the numbers of men in Grades I., II., III., and IV. respectively bear to each other in a community of which the health on the whole is satisfactory? Now there is every reason from past inquiries to suppose that physical fitness, the quality by which men are separated into grades, will be distributed among men exactly as are certain qualities capable of exact measurement, such as stature. Experiment showed that among 1000 Cambridge students who were measured for stature the men of 5 ft. 9 in. formed the largest group. If we add to this group those who were over 5 ft. 9 in. and also those who were not more than 1 in. less, we find the whole group numbers 700. In other words, there were 700 Grade I. (stature) men. The remaining 300 fell into three groups; 200 measuring 5 ft. 7 in. and 5 ft. 6 in. into Grade II., 75 measuring 5 ft. 5 in. and 5 ft. 4 in. into Grade III.; and 25 measuring less than 5 ft. 4 in. into Grade IV.

Thus we should expect that if physical fitness were distributed in the same way as stature, a healthy population would yield 70 per cent. Grade I. men, 20 per cent. Grade II., 7.5 per cent. Grade III., and 2.5 per cent. Grade IV.

Now let us apply this standard to actual returns made by the Boards engaged in examining men, and see to what extent the conclusions reached on theoretical grounds are borne out by actual experience.

It is natural to look for good results among men whose occupation involves physical activity with good general circumstances of life both in their work and homes—conditions which we should expect to find among such broad classes of the population as miners and agriculturists. A return from the western parts of the South Wales coal-fields in the summer of 1918 during a 'comb-out' of miners shows that in this group there were 76 per cent. Grade I., 12 per cent. Grade II., 10 per cent. Grade III., 2 per cent. Grade IV. The subjoined table gives the grading results of the examination of two large groups of miners and agriculturists in Yorkshire during 1918.

	Grade I.	Grade II.	Grade III.	Grade IV.
	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.
Agriculturists -	74.8	13.0	9.4	2.8
„ -	71.9	15.5	8.8	3.8
Miners - -	76.4	9.4	11.4	2.8
„ - -	68.9	15.1	10.5	5.5

It will be observed that these results approximate closely to those which we should expect for theoretical reasons. Mining and agriculture are both industries which were highly protected against recruitment, and the men who were ultimately combed out of them, when the needs of our fighting forces necessitated this step, may therefore be fairly regarded as typical of their class from a physical standpoint.

A standard which expects to find 70 men 'who have attained 'the full normal development of health and strength and are 'capable of enduring physical exertion suitable to their age' among every 100 of the manhood of military age can hardly be regarded as unduly exacting. Yet, as above stated, the examination of 2,425,184 men showed that instead of every 100 men yielding—

70 Grade I., 20 Grade II., 7.5 Grade III., and 2.5 Grade IV. the actual yield was—

36 Grade I., 23 Grade II., 31 Grade III., and 10 Grade IV.

In round numbers our physical census showed a shortage of 825,000 Grade I. men, an excess of 61,000 Grade II. men, and the alarming excess of no less than 575,000 Grade III. men, and 190,000 Grade IV. men.

It is generally accepted by every student of modern civilisation, from whatever standpoint he may be interested, that occupation and health are intimately interdependent. They stand, indeed, in much the same relation to each other as do function and structure in the mind of the biologist. This relation is inevitable, for the occupation of civilised man connotes environment, which, in its turn, represents all the external forces which are brought to bear upon each individual—the climate in which he lives, the character of the air he breathes, the food and drink he consumes, the clothes he wears, the house which he inhabits, the work which he performs, and its relation to his times of sleep and leisure, his companions and the mutual inter-

relations and reactions of these factors upon all the circumstances of his life. The occupation of each individual is a question of the first importance to the doctor, whether he is treating his patient for disease or examining him for insurance or military purposes. Therefore in any collective inquiry into the health of the population, information as to the relation which is found to exist between occupation and physical fitness or unfitness is of the first importance, and must of necessity take a foremost place from the standpoint of all alike, whether statesman or politician, soldier or sailor, doctor or sociologist.

The following figures give the grading percentages in different parts of the Welsh coal-field during the summer of 1918, when the great majority of men coming up for examination were miners:—

#### SOUTH WALES COAL-FIELD

	Grade I.	Grade II.	Grade III.	Grade IV.
	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.
Western district -	76	12	10	2
Central „ -	60	20	14	6
Eastern „ -	48	26	24	2

It will be noticed that the percentage of Grade I. men is highest in the western part, lowest in the eastern, and intermediate in the central portion, or, in other words, falling from west to east. Careful inspection showed that these variations are not due to the adoption of different standards by the examining Boards, and must therefore be attributed to differences in the physique of the men examined. These differences are explained thus:— On the eastern side of the South Wales and Monmouth coal-field there is a continual stream of immigrants, chiefly from the adjacent old industrial centres of England, *e.g.*, Bristol, owing to the better conditions of labour and higher wages prevailing in South Wales. These immigrants are naturally for the most part those who have been employed in other industries, and those who have felt most the pinch of adverse conditions at home, frequently because of physical disabilities, and therefore are fit only for the lower grades. In this district, too, it was found that the gradings were much affected by minor injuries. This factor also may be safely attributed to the



immigrants, for a district which employs, and therefore trains, the unskilled and the unfit has always a high percentage of injuries.

In the western valleys and the eastern portion of Carmarthen the percentage of Grade I. miners reaches a higher point than in any part of Wales. The miners here are usually the sons of farmers, who remain on the land and send their sons to the collieries. Therefore the type of man who becomes a miner is good. He is born and bred on the land in healthy surroundings, totally different to those obtaining during the childhood of most of our industrial population. Further, the conditions of mining are at their best in this anthracite district. The veins are high, there is an absence of the dust found in the steam coal regions, the mines are not so deep, nor is the percentage of minor injuries nearly so high, for not only are these men miners from boyhood—a most important point in reference to injuries—but the veins are not so dangerous as in the steam coal districts. In addition, the housing and other conditions of living are good, and opportunities for open-air recreation are available.

As compared with other industries in Wales, mining, apart from certain disabilities peculiar to the calling of a collier, produced an excellent type of recruit. The younger miner may be regarded as the best class of recruit in this region; hard, well-developed and muscular, he strips well. Though rather undersized and apt to be anæmic, he makes rapid improvement under the favourable conditions of training, feeding, and fresh air provided in the army. The physique of the metal worker, on the other hand, is poor—doubtless because he works in a superheated atmosphere, and has to stand for long hours upon hot surfaces. These men often age prematurely, and many are found to suffer from varicose veins, flat feet, and atheroma.

When the older men came up for examination, the percentage of men in the higher grades fell as the natural result of the disabilities due to increased age, as well as those which gradually develop in the miner as a result of his occupation, viz., effect of old injuries, nystagmus, coal miner's lung, and hernia. Among the older men generally in this region, the percentage of Grade I. men in Cardiff is high, in Newport low. Investigation shows that this is not due to differences in the standards of the Boards concerned, but reflects a well-marked difference in the physique of the two groups of men. This

difference is clearly due to social and economic conditions, for the Newport men were principally casual labourers who had been engaged in hard manual labour, in very adverse circumstances; the Cardiff men were office workers of a moderate degree of prosperity, who had done no manual labour.

The agriculturist here, as elsewhere, provides a good class of recruit, though this generalisation must be qualified by the observation that those engaged on dairy farms and arable land are very liable to bad feet and rheumatism, whereas the shepherds from pastoral farms, generally in mountainous districts, are splendidly developed and usually sound.

Passing to England, the subjoined table, showing the results of the medical examinations of groups of men between eighteen and twenty-five in Yorkshire, indicates unmistakably the direct relation which exists between occupations and physical condition :—

Occupation.	Grade I.	Grade II.	Grade III.	Grade IV.
	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.
Agriculturists -	74.8	13.0	9.4	2.8
" -	71.9	15.5	8.8	3.8
" -	62.0	23.0	11.6	3.4
Miners -	76.4	9.4	11.4	2.8
" -	68.9	15.1	10.5	5.5
Engineers -	60.9	23.9	13.4	1.8
Iron and steel workers -	60.2	25.6	11.2	3.0
Lace workers -	45.0	26.9	22.7	5.4
Woollen trade -	54.6	10.9	24.0	10.5
" -	37.5	31.7	27.0	3.8
Tailors -	33.9	21.4	33.5	11.2

It will be noticed that the miners and agriculturists head the poll and show the best grading results. It can hardly be doubted that the gradual fall in fitness shown in this table is a true criterion of the effects of the various occupations upon the physical welfare of the workers. They correspond to what we know of the conditions of life in the several trades, and their accepted effect upon health, too closely to be explained by the hypothesis that the agriculturist is an agriculturist because he is healthy, and the tailor a tailor because he is unhealthy. This

may be true to a certain very limited extent of certain trades and industries, though even in these cases army training has demonstrated, beyond all doubt, the wonderful improvement in health and physique that can be attained by suitable food, regular hours, fresh air, and physical training, even in the most unpromising human material.

As an illustration of grading returns which revealed bad conditions of health and physique, the following episode may be quoted. In the spring of 1918 the returns from certain Boards in the north-western region showed such wide fluctuations in grading and such a high percentage of Grade III. men in some cases, that a visitor was sent to make special inquiry as to whether these results were in any way due to the adoption of faulty standards by the Boards concerned or reflected truly the physical condition of the men examined. In his report the visitor finds that the reason of these apparently anomalous results lay in the fact that some Boards were examining miners, and others cotton operatives—in other words, that they were examining dissimilar human material. He expresses the opinion that in general the grading by the Boards was correct, and represented faithfully the physical condition of the men examined. The differences, he remarks, are evident in the waiting-room, and become very striking in the examination hall. The colliers, as a class, are well developed and muscular, and strip much better than the cotton operatives. So evident are the

	Grades.		
	I.	II.	III. and IV.
	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.
Combined average gradings of Boards examining mainly colliers in N.-W. region -	70.7	12.5	16.8
Combined average gradings of all men examined in Great Britain in April 1918 - -	55.8	19.8	24.4
Grading of 290 cotton operatives examined by Stockport Board on 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th April 1918 - - -	19.7	22.0	58.3

differences in physique between these two classes of men that one is forced to the conclusion that they represent the effects of their respective occupations and conditions of life, and that in the case of the cotton operatives work in the moist and overheated atmosphere of the mills, when extended over long periods of time, has a profound effect upon their health and physique. For purposes of comparison the table on page 139 is given.

The conclusions of this report carry conviction. One cannot doubt that we have here a remarkable and arresting illustration of the effect of our industrial system upon the health and physique of one class of workers.

Further instances of bad grading results are, unfortunately, only too common, as will be seen in the appended comparison between Leeds and Sheffield for the month of June 1918.

	Grades.			
	I.	II.	III.	IV.
	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.
Leeds - - -	12.4	21.3	58.0	8.3
Sheffield - - -	46.6	21.1	22.7	9.6

The Commissioner of the region draws attention to the factors which he considers mainly contributed towards such a result :—

*In Leeds.* 1. The large number of back-to-back houses.

2. The very large alien population engaged, for the most part, in tailoring at home under very bad sanitary conditions. These help to swell the number of cases of myopia, and diseases of the heart, lungs, and lymphatic glands, which of necessity place them in the lower grades.

3. The large number of women employed in clothing and other factories. This circumstance tends to favour the incidence of rickets in their children, and consequently leads to a low physical standard later in life.

4. The frequency of infantile paralysis, which is responsible for relegating many men to the lower grades.

*In Sheffield.* The industrial population is almost entirely employed in the iron and steel industries—a class of work which, naturally, requires men of good physique. Female labour, on the other hand, is at a minimum. The only women employed are engaged in electro-plating and packing in tolerably good surroundings.

The full returns for the whole country are not yet completed, but the figures which are already available show clearly the principal physical conditions and defects which have reduced the number of fit men to such a deplorable extent, and swollen the ranks of our 'C3 population.' It may be said at once that there is no evidence of racial degeneration upon a large scale. Such degeneration probably requires that many generations should be subjected to deleterious environment in order to make itself apparent. There is, however, ample evidence to show the baneful effect of certain conditions of modern life upon the physique of youths and men of military age, which cannot fail to effect some degree of deterioration of the stock and militate against the health of succeeding generations.

Taking for granted the general accuracy of the observations and figures, and supposing that they represent broadly the frequency and nature of prevalent disabilities among the male population of military age throughout the country, and therefore *mutatis mutandis* among the adult population of both sexes, we are bound to ask to what extent these disabilities are due to preventible disease. Injury and disease are part of the natural lot of mankind. This has always been the case throughout the history of man, and must always be so; but it is equally true that the degree to which a civilised nation is thus crippled must be in large measure dependent upon the conditions it creates for itself. Medical science has advanced by leaps and bounds since the middle of the last century, and continues to make rapid and progressive advances in every department of medicine and surgery. Yet—thanks to the opportunity provided by a physical census forced upon us by a great war—we are confronted by a report showing that little more than one-third of our manhood in the prime of life is of the full normal physical fitness, while nearly half of our men in the prime of life are suffering from serious organic disease—of various kinds and degrees, it is true—but sufficient in all cases to render them unfit for a life of full physical activity.

RECENT MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR  
THEISM

1. **The Theory of Good and Evil.** By Dr. RASHDALL. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1907.
2. **The Idea of God.** By Professor A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1917.
3. **Moral Values and the Idea of God.** By Professor W. R. SORLEY. Cambridge : University Press. 1918.
4. **Theism and Humanism.** By the Rt. Hon. A. J. BALFOUR. Hodder & Stoughton. 1915.
5. **The Moral Argument for Theism.** By the Rev. W. R. MATTHEWS. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. XVIII. 1918.

MORAL arguments for the existence of God first began to assume an important place in modern philosophy with Kant's assertion of the primacy of the practical reason. Like Hume before him, Kant held that Nature, regarded as excluding man, supplied no proof of the existence of a God such as religion demands; but he found in the deliverances of our moral reason what seemed to him a satisfactory ground for belief in a Divine Being. From his day to ours the idea of value, and more especially of moral value, has assumed a dominant position in various philosophical systems. And in recent years the moral status of mankind has been used by several Gifford lecturers and other advocates of theism, both as a touchstone to test the rival theories of the world and of ultimate reality, and also as a foundation-stone for theistic argument. To other kinds of philosophy, it is maintained, human morality is a stumbling-block; for theism, it is the headstone in the corner. Certain arguments independently put forth by these several writers, though differing as to the particular feature of moral experience upon which they respectively lay most stress, share in common a tendency which distinguishes them from the arguments of Kant, and of those who followed in his lines. The emergence of a relatively fresh method of showing the reasonableness and probability of a belief so vital as that in the existence of God, will doubtless be a matter of interest to others than professed philosophers; and it is with that hope that the present article is undertaken.

Its purpose is to touch briefly upon the chief types of reasoning by which it has been sought to ground theistic belief on moral experience, and to discuss more fully the nature of the recent endeavours, already alluded to, as untechnically as the subject will allow.

The main difference between these recent endeavours and most of those which preceded them is this: earlier arguments attempted to infer directly from morality, and from morality alone, to God; whereas the new type of argument, in so far as it is true to its plan, is indirect, and proceeds from other considerations as well as from the facts of moral experience. And connected with this difference is the further fact that the newer kind of reasoning does not profess to achieve coercive demonstration, but rather to establish for the theistic view of the world a much higher degree of probability and of intellectual coherence than can be credited to any of the various rival systems.

Of the 'proofs' of the exclusively moral type, it will be both fitting and respectful to recall, in the first instance, the classic argument of Kant. That philosopher set out from the sense of obligation which is the essence of moral experience. The mere existence of morality, he taught, implies but one pre-supposition or postulate, viz., freedom: 'I ought' involves 'I can.' But if morality be possible without the further postulate of a God, man's realization of his highest good is not. For the highest good, as Kant conceived it, includes happiness (*i.e.*, consonance of the world with the individual's wish and will), as well as perfect virtue; and, moreover, the proportionate adjustment of happiness to personal worth and desert. That adjustment, however, it is beyond the power of either Nature or man to secure. Yet the highest good *must* be realizable, because it *ought* to be realized. There must, therefore, be an endless life before us in which to attain to it, and a Supreme Being, an Intelligence and a Will, to guarantee its attainment. God and immortality are necessary corollaries of the unconditional imperative of duty: such is Kant's argument. A plain man will naturally feel some suspicion of reasoning which seems to extract wealth so stupendous from material so commonplace, though he may find himself, without minute inquiry, unable to lay his finger on its weaknesses. If he inquire more closely, he will perhaps first be led to wonder why Kant, in his conception of the highest good, rounds off his coldly rationalistic

ethic with hedonism, and whether the great philosopher is not arbitrary and inconsequent in doing so. And when he follows on to examine the nature of Kant's categorical imperative, with its absolute and unconditional universality, he may find himself ascending into an atmosphere so rare that he begins to breathe and climb with difficulty. He may be aware that the origin and development of our sense of obligation are matters irrelevant to its validity; but he will be chary of committing himself to a principle entirely abstracted from the actual conditions that may, after all, define the range within which the principle has relevance, and beyond which it may become as meaningless as it is unconditional. He may further be led to doubt whether the word 'ought' possesses one and only one meaning, as Kant assumes, in ethical science, and not rather two, one alone of which involves the 'I can,' on which Kant builds so much: for if a man know that he 'ought' to act in any given situation with such wisdom as he possesses, rather than with such foolishness as he might clothe himself with, he may well doubt whether it is *in the same sense* that he 'ought' in the same situation to act as a far wiser man than he would act in his place. For these, and perhaps other reasons, Kant's argument will not seem convincing to inquisitive common sense. It would, perhaps, be unfair to Kant, the nature of whose God is not necessarily wholly represented by the characteristics with which his argument endows Him, to object further that his conception of God would, if true, be unsatisfying. But that argument, so far as it goes, regards God simply as a means to a human end, a Being invoked to reconcile the two realms of Nature and morality hastily assumed to be disparate, a purveyor of happiness and an administrator of awards, a *Deus ex machina* brought in to make an otherwise unworkable system work; much as the Deity was introduced as a necessary *tertium quid* by Descartes for the purpose of providing that relation which must obtain between our thought and the external world, if we are to have any knowledge of things.

It would not be interesting to follow the course of subsequent speculation along the lines laid down by Kant. But the distinctive characteristic of the moral arguments which have been constructed during the last year or two will be the more apprehensible if we glance beforehand, by way of contrast, at an argument of the Kantian type presented in Dr. Rashdall's recent and important work, 'The Theory of Good and Evil.' This



argument differs in essential respects from that of Kant, but resembles it in attempting to infer directly from the moral consciousness to God. *Absolute* morality—the mere possibility and existence of it—Dr. Rashdall pleads, involves the postulation of God for the following reasons. There is an absolute moral ideal; it exists. And ‘to exist,’ for Dr. Rashdall, means to be ‘in’ some mind. But this ideal is not fully apprehended as to its content by any individual mind, or realized in any individual life; there must, therefore, be a Divine Mind in which its existence is to be located. Our moral experience implies the existence of an absolute moral standard, and its existence in turn implies the existence of God. This reasoning, however, seems to be no more convincing than Kant’s. In the first place, its reliance on the disputable dogma that to exist is to be ‘in’ some mind—*esse est intelligi*—precludes its acceptance by anyone who is not an idealist of the Berkeleyan type, and who sees no reason to doubt that things can exist without entering into the relation of being known, or, at least, that their existence is not necessarily constituted by their being known. Secondly, general principles and laws, whether moral laws or laws of Nature, have validity, not existence; and the argument confounds these two quite distinct things. Thirdly, ideals are, after all, ideas only. Euclid’s lines and triangles are ideals; they do not ‘exist,’ though Euclidean geometry is ‘valid’ of actual things, else there would be no such practice as mensuration. And why should not the moral ideal be in the same case? From idea to existence there is no transition, save by means of the old ontological fallacy. Lastly, the ethical absolute is a ‘practical’ absolute, in which processes of human feeling and conation are carried in imagination to their complete fulfilment; altogether apart from such processes, it is an empty—perhaps even a self-contradictory—abstraction.

We pass to another type of theistic argument based solely on morality, when inference is made from moral experience to its sufficient cause. We are, in fact, then confronted with an application of the cosmological argument to the particular realm of moral phenomena. Thus Alfred Russell Wallace, Mr. Balfour, and others have maintained that inasmuch as natural selection cannot account for the origin of our higher moral sentiments, resort must be had to a supernatural cause. Natural selection, it is true, can only supply an explanation of the origin and persistence of such moral conduct and moral principles as possess

survival-value for individuals or societies between which the struggle for existence obtains. And it is equally true that no help is offered in this connexion by the empty statement that effects may be quite different in Nature from their causes. 'First 'that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual' may, indeed, embody no violation of natural causal sequence; but there is a more definite way of avoiding the necessity of appeal to a Divine cause of our higher moral reason, of which naturalism can avail itself, and one which seems to have escaped the notice of the writers who have recently constructed a new kind of moral argument for theism. It is this: just as an organ, developed in response to the physical environment so as to fulfil a certain function, often proves, when acquired, to be capable of satisfying other ends as well, or of being the starting-point for further developments in quite new directions, so may human mentality, when sufficiently developed to possess utility in the struggle for existence, be able *of itself* and without further evocation from the environment, to develop to higher levels which, from Nature's point of view, are quite superfluous. Once language and social intercourse are attained, the further acquisition of science and art, morality and religion, is rendered possible; though these products of higher culture may possess no survival-value, and may, so far as the securing of 'fitness' is concerned, be works of pure supererogation. The human mind, having attained to a certain degree of complexity in the course of the evolutionary process, may thenceforward, especially when aided by social intercourse, be capable of further spontaneous development to an indefinite degree—development controlled no longer by mechanical selection (or rather, rejection), but by the mind's own interests and intrinsic powers. Mind, whatever be its origin, is mind and not matter, active and not inert; and after having reached intelligence and emotional sensibility such as are biologically useful, may proceed to higher intelligence, disinterested knowledge, appreciation of higher æsthetic and moral values. This would seem a tenable view as to the causation of our higher moral sentiments, and one not necessarily of theistic implication. It may well be that naturalism is a vain deceit; but if once it be admitted that it can account for the origin of morality at its lower levels, there would seem to be no necessity for postulating the existence of God in order to explain the emergence of moral ideals of the highest kinds we know.

One further class of arguments inferring directly from the

moral consciousness to the existence of God, remains to be mentioned: arguments, viz., from human needs and aspirations to their fulfilment, from the value of an object to its existence, or from the value of a doctrine to its truth. This kind of argument has taken many particular forms, but in general principle they are practically one. They owe their plausibility to the somewhat common fallacy of using an ambiguous word first in one, and then in another, of its legitimate but distinct senses. The transition is made rapidly and covertly, and so often escapes detection; it is not logic, but legerdemain. It should be obvious that judgments of value—judgments, that is, which simply predicate value and nothing else—cannot carry us a step beyond themselves, or yield knowledge of the existence of that which, if actual, would possess value. This plain issue has sometimes been confused by remarks to the effect that, after all, our theoretical and our practical reason are inseparable elements or aspects of one and the same personality: as if the disparateness of predications of value and existence were obliterated by the fact that both can proceed from one mind. But putting aside this irrelevance, we can surely see that the desired connexion between worth and truth, between aspiration and fulfilment, can be secured in only one way, viz., by obtaining a major premiss such as 'the world is rational.' Now it is easy to show that the world is rational in the sense that it is—at least, to some extent—intelligible; that it is an order and connexion of things to which the order and connexion of our thought corresponds: the existence of science is proof of such rationality. But, unfortunately, 'rationality' in this sense of 'intelligibility to the analytic mind' is not at all the kind of rationality that our major premiss must assert of the world, if we are to argue from our moral aspirations to their fulfilment. We rather require to know that the world is rational in the sense of 'teleologically ordered.' The mere knowableness of the world, in the scientific sense, implies no guarantee that our moral aspirations are destined to be fulfilled either here or hereafter. So the transition is made to the second meaning of 'rationality,' and our premiss then ceases to be the independently proven truth from which the argument intended to set out, and becomes practically identical with the very assertion that was to be proved—that the world is so perfectly harmonious a whole that no serious error in important human judgments, no frustration of the nobler and more permanent

human hopes, is compatible with it. We must indeed be assured that the universe respects our aspirations before we can argue with certainty to the necessity of the future fulfilment of any of them, and to all that may therein be involved. And that assurance cannot be derived from our moral judgments alone, however valid, or from our moral ideal, however absolute. It could only be justified by knowledge of the existent; by use of the theoretical, as contrasted with the practical reason. And until this assurance is justified on theoretical grounds, it is vain to plead that if such a view as that our aspirations are to be nullified were conceivable, it would 'remain incredible, because 'it outrages the deepest convictions on which our life is built,' or to urge that 'our sense of value is not a matter of selfish 'preference or individual desire,' and the judgment of value 'is as objective in its own sphere as a scientific judgment on 'matters of fact.'\* The 'thinking reed' may indeed face the world, not as a suppliant but as a judge, not 'as one who 'craves a kindness, but as one who claims a right; '† its moral ideals may be objective or valid in their own sphere; but so far as our purely moral knowledge goes, the world may destroy both it and them, however 'intolerable' the thought may be. That there is a moral ideal, and what that ideal is, are matters entirely unaffected by the further question, whether our aspirations and efforts toward the ideal are destined to be realized or frustrated. From what ought to be to what is or what shall be, and from what is to what ought to be, there is no immediate and direct argument. To endeavour to find such a short cut, or to believe that one has been found, is the great mistake of naturalism in the one direction, and of much theistic reasoning in the other; we shall presently see that more recent arguments are wiser in following a more circuitous path.

But before entering upon an examination of these more indirect theistic arguments, it will be well to pursue inquiry into a question which will already have obtruded itself in connexion with the passages just now quoted from Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison. Those passages, taken in isolation, seem to imply the adoption of an attitude towards questions of fact or of philosophical belief determined by subjective bias, interest, or desire. It should be said, in passing, that this culpable

---

\* A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, 'The Idea of God,' etc., p. 41 (1917).

† *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

attitude is by no means characteristic of the book, as a whole, from which the passages are cited: 'philosophy,' its author observes on another page, 'is not an effort to help the good 'cause in a cosmic duel, but an attempt to find out the truth 'about the universe.' Philosophy, indeed, is not entitled to dismiss any theory simply because, from the point of view of human desires and aspirations, it seems incredible or intolerable. Like science, philosophy should be a disinterested, impartial, or ethically neutral study—a study undistorted by our wishes, and not controlled by the tendency to impose human values on the world.

But when we speak of science as 'disinterested,' and say that philosophy should be of like mind with it, it is necessary to observe one or two qualifications. Science is, indeed, aloof from human hopes, fears, and wishes. But in its very disinterestedness it is guided by an interest. It *selects* its data, and selection is always motivated, or directed toward an end. It ignores certain classes of facts, and does so in order that it may the better reduce the rest to order. It ignores values, for instance; and while analysing particular phenomena into their simplest terms and the relations between them, and so in its own way seeking to 'understand' the world, it remains quite indifferent as to whether the world, as a whole, has 'meaning.' That is not its business. But it *is* the business of philosophy, which seeks not to analyse and connect particular phenomena, but to 'understand' the whole by interpreting it or finding its meaning. In this matter science is uninterested rather than disinterested; it neither affirms nor denies, but is indifferent. Similarly, with regard to the existence of God and His relation to the world, science is neither theistic nor atheistic, but atheous—to borrow a useful coinage of Bishop Harvey Goodwin: it 'has no need 'of any such hypothesis,' and would be ruined as science if it had. Philosophy, on the other hand, concerned with the world as a whole, with facts of mind, personality, and morals, as well as with physical phenomena, must take account of every part or aspect, in order adequately to comprehend the totality, or even, perhaps, any one part of it.

To say, then, that science does not inquire into the possible meaning of the universe, is a very different thing from asserting that science finds the universe to be meaningless. The latter assertion is untrue, whether the world actually have meaning or not. And science, in recommending disinterestedness, in the

sense of absence of subjective bias, to philosophy, has no right and no grounds whatever to preclude philosophy from seeking to find a meaning or a purpose in the world. Were it to try to do so, it might well be invited to mind its own business. Nor does it involve any forsaking of ethical neutrality, any departure from a purely objective attitude, to take account of mental and moral facts, or of values, when one seeks to form some comprehensive idea of the world as a whole. The most valuable kind of philosophy will not be that which ignores all consideration of values, but rather that which impartially recognizes and investigates all the different realms and aspects of reality, rendering to each its due when combining them all in a totality. The psychologist can study his own wishes and whims, the ethicist his aspirations and ideals, unbiased by any desire to come to the conclusions which would affect him most pleasantly ; and, similarly, the philosopher can dispassionately discuss the realm of moral values and the bearing of moral principles on the nature of the world. It would scarcely have seemed necessary to draw these distinctions between science and philosophy, disinterestedness and uninterestedness, had it not lately become a matter of observation that distinguished philosophers can fail to perceive them.

Another question arises out of the foregoing discussion, and one that also needs to be disposed of before the worth of the arguments presently to be examined can be estimated. For the gist of these arguments is this: *if* we are to have an interpretation of the world as a whole, then that which theism offers is intellectually the most satisfactory. And the preliminary question will be as to whether interpretation, or assigning a meaning and purpose, is in itself a philosophically justifiable endeavour, and not rather the outcome of man's ineradicable anthropomorphism, his sentimentality and superstitiousness ; an expression merely of 'the cosy feeling that every place is like 'home' ; a thing, like hopes and fears and desires, to be renounced by all who would use only the cold, dry light of the understanding.

Truly, science does not seek to 'interpret' the world. In science, explanation is reduced to description in the simplest and most comprehensive terms ; science describes *how* things happen, and does not raise the question 'why?' But to ask 'why?', to seek the reason of a thing not in its cause but in its end, is not necessarily a vain superfluity, because science, in

pursuing its own departmental interests, refrains from doing so. Nor is it obviously idle to hope that at least a partial answer may be found, so long as all possible attempts have not been proved futile. Philosophy is essentially a pursuit; and it is to be defined in terms of the problems to be solved rather than in terms of the conclusions as to its scope and range to which this or that philosopher, this or that school, has arrived—which would savour of sectarian intolerance. It cannot be rational—in the severer sense of ‘logical’—to assert that the world is irrational—in the sense of ‘meaningless’—so long as any theory of it is open to us that may interpret its meaning. It is quite as baselessly superstitious to affirm that the world is meaningless, or that all search for its meaning is illegitimate, as it would be to assume that it must be meaningful. The only reasonable course, surely, is to inquire whether the world suggests a purpose, and, if so, to seek to find the key to its purpose. There is little to choose between credulity and incredulity when both eschew evidence, and the one may be as sentimental and superstitious a pose as the other. Between the two, however, stands reasoned and reasonable belief; and this, it may be observed—neither more nor less—is what theism claims to be.

‘Reason,’ however, is an ambiguous term, as we have already seen to be the case with ‘rational.’ If by ‘reason’ we mean merely the processes of analysis and re-synthesis, then plainly interpretation is irrational. But analysis is never adequate to the knowledge of a ‘whole,’ such as the world is. Over and above the parts or elements which analysis may reveal, their properties, and the relations which it may find to subsist between them, there remain the specific properties of the whole itself, which is more than the sum of its parts.

Thus, as Professor Sorley well shows, in his volume alluded to on a previous page, the method which (after Merz) he calls ‘synopsis’ is essential for the understanding of such a whole; thus only do we grasp what analysis inevitably loses sight of. Such synopsis, which regards the whole as an *ensemble* or a system, is also ‘reason,’ and has, perhaps, a better title to the name than the exercise of the merely analytic understanding. From synopsis it is but a step to interpretation. And interpretation such as sets out from facts, keeps in touch with them, tests itself, when possible, by reference to them, and unifies them, if it be of the nature of belief rather than of knowledge, is both reasoned and reasonable belief.

We may now proceed to examine the arguments presented in recent theistic literature in which human morality appears as the most important, though not the sole, fact from which inference is made.

The first step is to point out that man belongs to Nature, and is an essential part of Nature, in such a sense that the world cannot be judged, as a whole, without taking him and his moral values into account. It is Professor Pringle-Pattison especially, among the authors to whom we now turn, who elaborates the doctrine that, as he puts it, man is 'organic to the world.' And this truth needs emphasizing the more because many writers, who set out by accepting it in the sense that man and his mentality are the outcome of cosmic evolution, end by insisting that man is but an excrescence upon Nature, an alien in his world, and that the universe is hostile to his ideals, indifferent to his moral status. The cosmic process is regarded not merely as non-moral, but as immoral; if there be any 'Power' behind it, that Power must be diabolically wicked; and the moral process, even if it can make the world somewhat better by resisting and modifying the ruthless course of Nature, is powerless, in the long run, against the cosmic forces. The two processes are entirely antithetical.

If this statement of the relation between man and his world be true, it is, of course, useless to defend theism. But, waiving for the moment the doubtful metaphysics on which such convictions are often expressly based, let us ask whether they are the necessary outcome of an impartial study of the facts of the case. Huxley, in his 'Romanes Lecture,' forcibly presented the alleged antithesis without appealing to naturalistic metaphysics; it will, for that reason, be most suitable at this stage to select his statement of it for examination, as also because he may safely be regarded as among the doughtier champions of the view which is to be questioned. His first point was that the cosmos, with its principles of competition and extermination of the unfit, is 'no school of virtue.' And if that mean merely that it is not to Nature that we are to turn for ethical examples, one is not concerned to dispute the contention. But it overlooks the fact that a cosmos ruled by uniformity and law—and it is to Nature's impartial uniformity that man's troubles are largely due—is a necessary precondition of all intelligent and, therefore, of all moral life; and also the further fact that it is partly through his being 'the plaything of hazard and the prey of



'hardship' that man's moral virtues are developed. Whatever else may be said of it, the world is a theatre of moral life, a place for 'soul-making'; the evolutionary process has value in being instrumental to the emergence and maintenance of morality. In this more important sense, therefore, Nature *is* 'a school of virtue'; and, possibly, this is its *raison d'être*. Huxley's second indictment is that the physical world works upon man solely through his lower nature—his ingrained appetites, etc.—against his higher moral interests; Nature is the cause of his 'original sin,' and, therefore, directly provocative of his immorality. This, again, is true; but, again, Huxley apprehended only one aspect of the inwardness of this fact. For how, without man's bodily impulses, instincts, and appetites, could ethical principles gain purchase on him? Hunger and sex are the bed-rock of morals; and the free self-determination which morality presupposes is impossible without the conflict of moral reason and natural impulse. Morality cannot be made without raw material; and in providing this raw material, Nature is again instrumental to man's possession of the moral status. It requires more than a will working *in vacuo* to constitute the finite soul a moral being; without solicitation to evil, human goodness is impossible. So far, then, we have seen that human morality has its roots in Nature, and that the same cosmic process which is asserted to be anti-moral has, nevertheless, evolved moral beings, and so is itself of instrumental moral value. External fatality is beneficent necessity. But, thirdly, Huxley maintained that the world is indifferent to man's moral ideals and aspirations in that, so far as our scientific knowledge of the physical universe is to be trusted, mankind and his ideals will be extinguished together before the break-up of the solar system. One may grant, for the sake of argument, that science's prophecy concerning the fate of the earth is true; though it should be borne in mind that all scientific prediction is necessarily hypothetical or contingent on certain indemonstrable conditions rather than categorical, that the world is not *known* to be the 'closed system' which science, for the purposes of its own partial description of it, postulates it to be, and that speculations as to the ruin of a fragment of the universe based on partial knowledge of practically an infinitesimal part of that universe, which may possess, for all we know, an indefinite power to make all things new, are altogether too naively anthropomorphic to be considered exhaustive of the possibilities. To speak in this connexion of 'assured results of

'science' is ridiculous. But, be the fate of man's terrestrial home what it may, it is irrelevant, so long as the possibility of a future life lies open; and no one will be hardy enough to maintain that science can deny that possibility.

Taking the actual facts, then, at their face-value, and keeping aloof for the present from metaphysical questions as to how they are ultimately to be construed, there would seem to be no reason for the view that Nature is hostile to man and his ideals, rather than for the supposition that man and his moral status are the goal to which the course of the cosmic process has been directed. We equally advance beyond facts to beliefs, whether we conceive Nature as having 'darkly blundered on 'man's suffering soul,' or as being 'the threshold of spirit.' And the more firmly it is established that man is the child of Nature, the more reason is afforded us for regarding Nature as the mother of such a child. The problem is, are we to explain man in terms of Nature, or to interpret Nature in the light of man? Are we to judge of the tree by its roots, or by its fruits? The former method was followed by naturalism; the latter leads in the direction of theism. And here we pass from facts to philosophies.

Naturalism, in so far as it is to be identified with materialism, is dead. The same Huxley who provided it with the theory that mind is an epiphenomenon, a by-product of material changes having no causal efficiency, admitted in his 'Romanes Lecture,' to which we have before alluded, that moral ideals are operative on the course of Nature. In so far as naturalism is to be identified with the theory that the world (the material part of which can, on certain assumptions, be partly described by purely mechanical concepts) is a mechanism and no more, it is being more and more abandoned as inadequate to account for life, and mind, and progressive evolution. In so far as it identifies a thing with its cause, and translates continuity of development into absorption of differences,\* it commits all along the line what Dr. G. E. Moore has called 'the naturalistic 'fallacy.' Indeed, in order to work at all, it had in its earlier days to resort to hybrid conceptions such as 'ideogenous mole-

---

\* Witness the following quotation from a contribution to a recent number of *Mind*: 'Darwin has put an end to their [*i.e.*, human kind's] assumption that they occupy an exceptional position on our planet.' Man's status, it seems to be implied, is not different from that of the amœba, because there are innumerable stages between the two.

'cules' or besouled atoms, or to endow its matter with 'the 'promise and potency of life.' And, of course, matter which has within it such promise and potency is not matter at all in the sense in which the mechanical theory uses the term: *its* 'matter' possesses only inertia. As Kant saw, hylozoism is the deathblow to science—by which he meant mathematical physics. And if all that characterizes man, *e.g.*, his moral status, be reducible to the lowest terms that science knows, does it not similarly follow that the world from which he has sprung was from the first potentially a moral order? \* The nature of the world is only unfolded in its later stages of development, and no theory on the subject can be adequate which does not take human morality into account. But Nature has produced moral beings, is instrumental to moral life, and is relatively modifiable by operative moral ideals; if she is to be interpreted by her outcome—and we have seen that she cannot otherwise be explained—Nature and man are not at strife, but are organically one.

At this stage the argument which we are following absorbs into itself, as an indispensable constituent, the grounds for the belief that Nature reveals a purpose. The teleological 'proof' has always commanded more respect than others which philosophers have constructed. Hume, the sceptic, and Kant, the parent of the agnosticism to which Huxley stood as godfather, alike admitted its cogency. And advances in biological science have made it still harder to-day to attempt to account for the course of Nature having been what science proclaims it to have been, without resort to the idea of purposive direction. The Gifford Lectures of both Professor Sorley and Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison dwell upon the strength of the teleologist's case, and those of Mr. Balfour show how the theories of a mindless and meaningless world are compelled to rely merely on 'incredible good luck' and innumerable unfounded coincidences, in order to account for the continuity of development from matter to life, from life to mind and its valid thought, and so on. 'If purpose be admitted as necessary 'for the interpretation of organisms, and if organisms are held 'to have arisen out of inorganic material, then there is good

---

\* Not in the sense that morality was 'pre-formed,' but that the environment was such as to evoke morality in the course of its own development and its interaction with minds.

'reason to postulate that the process which led to organic and 'purposive life was itself animated by purpose.'\* Common sense will surely side, on this issue, with the teleologist. To it it will seem as incredible that the world's order, and the progressiveness of its evolution from matter to man's æsthetic and moral consciousness, are the outcome of a 'fortuitous concourse of 'atoms'—especially as the fortuitousness of the concourse can never be proved—as that 'Hamlet' could have been produced by the shuffling and scattering of founts of type.

If it may now be assumed that the world reveals purpose, has a meaning and an end, our moral consciousness suggests what its meaning or purpose is. Nature, as a matter of fact, is instrumental to the realization of moral ideals, and man's reach is more extensive than his grasp. The most reasonable conclusion, then, to which a study of reality, as a whole, points, is that Nature is a school of morality. This is not to make man the measure of the universe; it is only to interpret so much of the universe as we know, and in so far as the purpose of that has, as yet, disclosed itself. And if the conclusion be the most reasonable, it remains to be shown that it leads to theistic belief.

In the first place, it may be observed that the view that in man's moral status we find a key to the interpretation of the universe, or that in what ought to be we discover the ground of what is, enables us to look with equanimity—as philosophers—upon what has been wont to be regarded as the standing and insuperable difficulty for theism. We refer, of course, to the existence of evil, and of so much of it, in a world asserted to embody a Divine purpose; and in doing so we recur once more to the alleged hostility of Nature to man. Many writers, indeed, have argued from the evil of the world to its godlessness. But they have done so always on the assumption that a 'good' world means a pleasurable one, a world of contentment and enjoyableness. The theist recognizes, of course, that our world is not the best conceivable in the sense of 'happiest.' But it is impossible for him to believe that it was meant to be. If it were, it would not and could not be the 'best' in the sense of having the highest worth, which, if theism be true, it must be. The best possible world, a world that is worthy of God and also of man, must rather be a moral order or a theatre of moral

---

\* Sorley, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

life. If moral character and moral progress be the best possible things in any world such as ours, to dispense with them would imply preference of a worse world to a better. And they would be dispensed with if pain were excluded, or if the free moral agent were replaced by an automaton. Before the many current indictments of the world on the ground of its physical and moral evils can be regarded as having force against theism, it will be necessary for those who make them to point to some evils that can be proved to be superfluous to a cosmos in which intelligence is not to be stultified and morality not to be rendered impossible. And no such proofs are forthcoming. It is impossible, indeed, to argue from the world's 'badness' to its godlessness without playing fast and loose with the word 'good,' without using it in the sense of 'hedonically pleasant,' when its only relevant meaning is that of 'instrumental to morality.' On the other hand, the view that the realization of moral values is the *raison d'être* of the world, accounts for the existence within it of physical and moral evil: the former kind of evil is the by-product of a determinate evolutionary cosmos, and the possibility of evil of the latter kind is a *sine qua non* for moral goodness. Evil appears, on this view, to be not so much a means to morality as its necessary precondition. And it may be maintained that no other kind of philosophy accounts so satisfactorily for the presence of evil in a rational world: the *crux* of theism becomes, in recent literature, its glory.

A theory which embraces and explains the facts possesses inherent probability; but before it can be taken as true, it is necessary to show that it is the only sufficient explanation. This is seldom possible in any science; and in philosophy, at least, no more can be done than to demonstrate the superiority of a given theory over its forthcoming rivals. Excluding materialistic naturalism, the shortcomings of which have already been pointed out, there remain two main types of anti-theistic theory, pantheism and pluralism. And, as is urged by Professor Sorley and other recent writers, it is especially when these two systems are confronted with the fact of morality that their inadequacy to interpret the world as a whole becomes most manifest. The theory that the world is ultimately but one being, and that every so-called individual thing is but a mode or something merely adjectival, reduces individuality to illusion. It has no place for human freedom, no use for the idea of a world-purpose, and, indeed, cannot recognize the distinction

between higher and lower values, between good and evil. Everything necessarily has its place within the perfect whole, and no one thing is more or less indispensable than another. Sin is as essential to the world's perfection as virtue, and is not destined to be overcome; for this perfection is static and ever present, not something for future realization. We need not repeat here the criticism to which such a view of the universe has always been exposed; but how there can even be illusion without real individual minds to suffer from it, and why in that case, if evil be illusion, the illusion is not evil, are questions to which common sense would at the outset require an answer, and questions which this kind of philosophy could hardly meet without abandoning its fundamental assumptions. It is more germane to our present purpose to remark that such a world-view explains away, rather than explains, the antithesis which at present obtains between what is and what ought to be.

From the theory that the world is one being, and not a real 'many,' we turn to the opposite view, or rather to such forms of it as are not included in materialistic atomism. The world, it is held, is a multiplicity of spiritual beings, of souls of every degree of mental development, none of which is supreme amongst the rest so as to be their ultimate source or Creator, and to whom can be attributed the idea of a purpose in the world as a whole. Such a theory well accounts, of course, for the 'dysteleological' aspect of the world, for its conflict and evil, as due to the opposed interests of its individual constituents. Its weakness is its relative inability to account for so much order in the world as we actually find. Indeed, the activity, development, and interaction of the world's spiritual denizens presupposes an orderly environment, without which common knowledge and communication are impossible. Pluralists who are inclined to regard the world as composed exclusively of spiritual beings of all ranks, from the highest to the lowest conceivable, have sometimes endeavoured to account for this order in Nature as itself evolved from their behaviour: laws of Nature are settled habits. But, as Professor Pringle-Pattison remarks, habit presupposes, and therefore cannot create, such order. And if matter be, as common sense takes it to be, distinct from mind or spirit, existing independently of finite spirits of any kind, any production of the orderly environment by spiritual beings is out of the question. In any case, there is an order, whether constituted partly by material

exists or by spiritual beings of a type of mentality too low to admit of them being credited with conscious purposes and conspiring aims. It controls the higher minds, and is not their creation; it is discovered, not invented. Therefore, it would seem, individual finite selves cannot be the only ultimate constituents and ground of all reality: there is something which is independent of them, and something which is characterized by order. There are the laws of Nature on the one hand, and the objective and valid principles of moral and other sorts of valuation on the other; and it is only by correspondence with this moral order, as independent of the individual mind as is the natural order, that spiritual beings can progress towards the perfection of which they are capable. They are under the domination of something other than themselves, for which pluralism, in any of its forms, does not seem able to account. If we wish for an explanation of the natural order and of the moral order, and for an interpretation of the antithesis as yet unresolved between what is and what ought to be, we must turn elsewhere than to pluralism. Order points to purpose, and morality implies freedom; and if the world be the progressive realization of the purpose to produce and to create free moral beings, we have an interpretation of the world accounting at once for its order (for pluralism, an accident of luck) and for its evil (for monism, an illusion), both of which (for theism) reveal a meaning.

Such is the gist of the most recent type of theistic argument. It has been spoken of as new, not because—apart from fresh modes of presentation as to detail—none of its constituent links have been fashioned now for the first time, for that is not the case; but rather because in its selection of data, its connexion of them into a systematic whole, and its adjustment of proportionate emphasis, it differs sufficiently from other composite arguments. Further, it uses the facts of moral consciousness as a final link in a chain, rather than in order to extract from them by themselves a reason for belief in ethical theism. Arguments merely from the validity of moral principles, or of a moral ideal here and now unattained, as we have seen, are open to criticism and unconvincing; for from idea to existent, from ideal to realization, from aspiration to fulfilment, there is no direct inference. But that in what ought to be, we are to look for the ground of what is, and that when we look in that direction we find the most reasonable explanation of the universe, as a whole,

that philosophy has as yet offered, are contentions for which there is much to be said. As Dr. Rashdall insists, we must not reject the deliverances of our moral consciousness, merely because they are inconsistent with some metaphysical theory arrived at without taking those deliverances into consideration; nor are we authorized in leaping to the conclusion that the natural and the moral realms are sheerly antagonistic to one another, so long as it is open to us to assign both to the same ultimate ground, and to regard the natural as subservient and instrumental to the moral. Nature has too much order to be construed as the outcome of blind chance; and morality, in suggesting our only clue to what the purpose underlying Nature is, points to the theistic idea as necessary to the rounding off of our knowledge of the world as a whole.

F. R. TENNANT.



## THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF HOMER

1. **Troy : A Study in Homeric Geography.** By Dr. W. LEAF. Macmillan. 1912.
2. **Homer and History.** By Dr. W. LEAF. Macmillan. 1915.
3. **The Rise of the Greek Epic.** By Professor GILBERT MURRAY. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1907.
4. **The World of Homer.** By ANDREW LANG. Longmans, Green. 1910.
5. **Homer and His Age.** By ANDREW LANG. Longmans, Green. 1906.
6. **The Early Age of Greece.** By SIR W. RIDGEWAY. Cambridge : University Press. 1901.
7. **Scripta Minoa.** By SIR ARTHUR EVANS. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1909.

THE Homeric question is perhaps the oldest theme of controversy in the world. For more than two thousand years critics and scholars of all nations have discussed its various aspects with as much vigour and venom as if it were a theological dispute. Homeric heresies have waxed and waned. From the first the orthodox method of criticism has been to separate Homer into as many different fragments as possible. Each new critic has laid Homer on the Procrustean bed of his own theory, and either lopped off all parts that he considered inorganic, or else racked him out to cover the Pisistratean recension and the alleged expurgation by the prudens of fifth-century Athens. In antiquity Homeric separatists, who thought the Iliad and Odyssey the work of different poets, were considered heretics; in more modern times Homeric unitarians were the subject of pity and ridicule; but in later years there has been a reaction, and recent scholarship, guided by the light of archaeology, has led a revival of unitarian views.

In the happy days of antiquity Homeric higher criticism in the modern sense hardly existed, for all revered Homer as Dante revered his master Vergil. The Iliad and the Odyssey were the standard subjects for a liberal education, and were considered to possess the same authority as history. Appeals were continually made to Homer on disputed points, the most famous being that between Athens and Megara about Salamis. There were rationalists who tried to reduce the tale of Troy to a simple historical narrative, and apologists who explained his at times

too familiar treatment of some deities by saying that they were really abstractions, and that, for instance, Aphrodite must be considered as love and not as a goddess. But neither of these schools, nor the school that assigned the Iliad and Odyssey to different authors, ever had any following. Study was then mainly devoted to the interpretation of the poems, the establishment of a sound text, and the accumulation of notes. Many a scholar then gave his best efforts to illustrating Homer from all aspects, literary, geographical, mythological, and archaeological; no one dreamed of dissecting the poems in order to extract an *Ur-Iliad* or Original Iliad from the remains. The ever-revolving circle of human thought is now beginning to bring us back to the point of view thus maintained towards Homer by Aristarchus, the greatest scholar of classical times.

Modern criticism of Homer begins, like so much else that is purely destructive, in Germany, although it is only fair to say that Wolf, from whom it all sprang, owed the original suggestion to an essay by an Englishman, Robert Wood. But Wolf, who was so precocious as to have known some Latin at the age of two, is responsible for the theory which really gave rise to the modern Homeric controversy. Writing in 1795, he referred to a passage in Wood's essay, where it was argued that writing was unknown to Homer, because Josephus held that the Greeks of the time of the Trojan War were ignorant of the art of writing. Wolf accordingly postulates:—

First, that the Greeks of 950 B.C. either did not know writing, or did not use it for literary purposes, and that the Homeric poems were therefore composed without its assistance.

Secondly, that, even after the poems were written down in the age of Pisistratus, they were revised and polished, according to the rules of literary composition.

Thirdly, that the Iliad has, and the Odyssey even more so, an artistic unity which is not due to the original genius of the author, but to the elaborate recension of the later editors.

Fourthly, that the poems which were used as the raw material for the Iliad and Odyssey, were not all by the same poet.

He qualified this last point later by saying that he believed that Homer wrote the bulk of the lays used in the composition of the Iliad and Odyssey, and that he began to weave the web of the two poems, and carried on the work to a certain point. Its completion and the rest of the songs Wolf assigned to the Homeridae, the school or pupils of Homer.

When these theories were first published, they were treated as heresy, just as the separatist idea was regarded by the ancients, and poets like Goethe and Schiller condemned them. The next generation in its effort to be original adopted Wolf's theories *con amore*. Lachmann cut up the Iliad into eighteen lays, while Köchly could only manufacture sixteen out of it. Nitzsch inverted the Wolfian theory, which held that Homer had in the main composed short lays only, by suggesting that Homer was the poet who took the short lays of an earlier period and wove them into the Iliad and Odyssey. Hermann thought that Homer had produced the original sketches for the two poems, and that his successors filled up the design which he had drawn in outline. Since then the whole study of Homer has proceeded in Germany on the lines laid down by Wolf, and as his views were amplified and defended by Hermann, perhaps the most brilliant of all German scholars, they have since been supported by the thunder of all the heaviest artillery that German scholarship could boast. Niese, Bergk, Robert, Cauer, Christ, and Wilamowitz, to name some only of the most prominent, have, though of course with many variations, developed and promoted the idea that Homer must be dismembered before the truth can emerge.

Other scholars of less fame have sought renown, one might say by the very peculiarity of their Homeric theories. Amongst these we might class Fick, who held that the original Achilleid was written in the Aeolic dialect, and later deliberately translated into Ionic and expanded into the Iliad. Gruppe believes that the Trojan War is a mythical reflex of the fierce wars waged by the Hellenic colonists in the Troad, when Euboeans and Boeotians were ranged against Locrians and Thessalians. Bethe, on the other hand, would persuade us that the Trojan War is a reflex (twice blessed word!) of tribal wars between Hellenic tribes in Greece. If Homer says that Hector of Troy fought with Ajax of Salamis, he means, of course, that Hector was a Boeotian and Ajax from Locris. Ingenious fancies of this type leave us marvelling why simple, straightforward Homer adopted such symbolical and perverted methods of expressing himself.

These are samples of modern Teutonic theories about Homer, and one can only regret that some scholars in Great Britain, and even in the United States, that land of practical common sense, should have accepted such doctrines and become almost *Germanis*

*ipsis Germaniores.* Views on Homer such as those just quoted are distinguished by an entire lack of humour, of proportion, and of self-criticism. They argue from the particular to the general, they continually beg the question, they avoid reality, and are constructed by piling hypothesis on hypothesis. Non-supported assertions and pure imaginings cannot replace accurate scholarship and some acquaintance with the laws of probability. Such critics produce their theories, and then adjust the facts and the text of Homer to fit them.

Passing to English critics, that great but severe critic, Bentley, must first be mentioned. He thought that Homer lived about 1050 B.C., and wrote a series of songs and rhapsodies which were not collected till the time of Pisistratus, several centuries later. Grote followed Nitzsch, and regarded Homer as the bard who composed the large epic, but not the short lays which provided the material for it. He regarded the Achilleid as the original poem, and held that the Iliad as we now possess it grew up through the expansions and editing of later poets. Geddes accepted Grote's theory of an original Achilleid, which he thought was a Thessalian poem, and believed that the rest was the work of a later poet, who also wrote the Odyssey and by his splendid and vigorous additions completely transformed the Iliad, but not so entirely that we cannot discern the sutures. Blackie considered that there was a grain of truth in the theory of Wolf, but that it applied only to the raw material of primitive lays used by Homer in his composition, and not to the shapely fragments of finished work collected and arranged by Pisistratus. Jebb adopted the Wolfian point of view, which is also the foundation for the theories of two of our most famous living scholars, Dr. Walter Leaf and Professor Gilbert Murray.

The former in his 'Troy' showed signs of breaking away from the fatal fascination which destructive criticism has for the Homeric scholar, for in that book he proved that the Trojan Catalogue is logical, and agrees with facts. In his latest work, 'Homer and History,' he has again fallen under the Wolfian influence; he adopts Doerpfeld's wonderful theory that Ithaca is not Ithaca; he makes Peleus suzerain of Thessaly; he abolishes Corinth, and in general accepts Benedictus Niese's agnostic views on the Greek Catalogue.

Professor Murray, who is attracted by the extraordinary doctrines of Gruppe and Bethe, makes his own the idea that the Athenians of the fifth century expurgated Homer. That is to

say they removed from his text anything that would be likely to shock people of high morals or refined taste; everything obscene was cut out, and also the all too realistic scenes of bloodshed. Andrew Lang has shown how mistaken this view is. The fifth-century Athenians were far from prudish, to judge both by their art in vase painting, and by the plays of Aristophanes. They had no particular dislike to bloodshed, for they slew the Melians and would have slain the Mytilenaeans as well.

The most original theory yet put forward is that of Samuel Butler, who suggested that Nausicaa was the authoress of the *Odyssey* and lived in Sicily. It was a great disappointment to him, having developed this idea with his usual wit, that it was not readily adopted by Newnham and Girton. On the contrary, Miss Stawell, the principal lady critic, is a Wolfian.

Enough has been said to indicate how the Wolfian cloud still hangs over the study of Homer. It has had a blighting effect on Homeric study which otherwise, thanks to the advance of archaeology, might have made surprising progress.

There is another point of view which arises in this connexion. Early in the nineteenth century the beginning of the study of comparative philology and the fancy that the Aryan or Indo-European race was the chosen race of civilisation, coupled with the knowledge of the later historical invasions of Mediterranean lands by vigorous Aryan tribes from the north, gave rise to the belief that civilisation was brought in the earliest times from the north to the south of Europe. Egypt and Mesopotamia, it was granted, had enjoyed flourishing civilisations of their own; but Greece—Greece was sunk in a slough of barbarism. The Aryans were the people who brought the light of culture into the benighted Hellas of prehistoric days. Thither came the tall, fair, and beautiful Aryans, bringing all the arts of peace and of war, the Olympic Pantheon and all that made life worth living. These godlike Aryans are the Achaeans of Homer, and their great deeds in those spacious days inspired the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. This is the theory put forward in 'Zanoni' by Bulwer Lytton in 1842. Gladstone, on the other hand, who published his book on Homer in 1856, wrote under the influence of Max Müller and the then prevalent belief that the original home of the Aryan race was in Central Asia, and consequently brought Achaeans, Hellenes, and all the early apostles of civilisation in Greece from Persia and the East.

For many years most Homeric scholars believed that Troy

had never had any actual existence ; that it was a purely fanciful city founded solely in the poet's imagination. But in 1822 there was born in Germany a boy, Heinrich Schliemann, who, enthralled by Homer's epics, was bitterly disappointed when told, in accordance with the orthodox view, that Troy was an absolutely mythical city. He remained unconvinced, and at a very early age determined to find and excavate the site of Troy. Reading Homer free from the baleful influence of any theories, he felt that the 'Tale of Troy' was founded on fact, and that there was a Troy to discover. Those indeed who denied the existence of Troy were going against ancient tradition, for Alexander had built a new Ilion on the traditional site of Priam's city. This classical Ilion flourished in the days of the Diadochi, and under the influence of the Aeneas legend was one of the earliest and most faithful allies of Rome in the East. Here Schliemann began to excavate in 1870, and soon showed that beneath the ruins of classical Ilion lay the debris of many another Troy of still earlier times. His discoveries were at first received with scepticism ; doubts were cast on his good faith, and some ingenious critic alleged that he had found the remains of a great incineration necropolis and not of a city. By degrees as his work progressed the world in general accepted the fact that Troy had been found, and that Homer therefore had a basis of solid fact. But it was not till 1893, after Schliemann's death, that the walls of the Sixth City, the Homeric Troy, were revealed in all their massive strength.

Before this, in 1876, not long after his first discoveries at Troy, Schliemann had turned his attention to Mycenae, the home of Agamemnon, the King of Men, where, according to Greek tradition preserved by Pausanias, Agamemnon and others of his house were buried within the walls of the acropolis. This had been despised as a fairy tale, but Schliemann's instinct again guided him aright. Within a grave circle lying immediately inside the Lion Gate were found six tombs. These, now known to all the world as the Shaft Graves of Mycenae, were rich in gold, ivory, amber, silver, copper, and other precious possessions. There the kings and queens of the royal house of Mycenae had been interred with others of their kin with all their trappings, warlike, ceremonial, and domestic. This was the first glimpse of the great prehistoric civilisation of Greece, and proved beyond even the shadow of doubt that the riches, comforts, and luxuries described by Homer were not imaginary,

for a civilisation as wonderful as that pictured in the Iliad and Odyssey had been brought to light. Once again sceptics raised their voices; the treasures of Mycenae could not possibly belong to the prehistoric age of Greece or the times of Homer, because, as all knew, Greece was then in a state of pure barbarism; the golden contents of the Shaft Graves were the plunder of the Gothic invaders who raided Greece early in the Christian era, and buried at Mycenae their chieftains decked with the spoils of the towns they had sacked.

As against this view, Sir Charles Newton was able to show that the civilisation found by Schliemann at Mycenae, and called in consequence Mycenaean, had spread wide over Greek lands. This contention was borne out by other discoveries all over Greece, indicating that there had been a 'Mycenaean Period,' which, as far as a system of dating derived from points of contact with Egypt could show, had preceded the traditional date of Homer and of the Trojan War. The problem of the origin of this Mycenaean civilisation, which appeared so abruptly and in such splendid fulness on the mainland of Greece, immediately arose. Schliemann believed its origin was to be sought in Crete, and wished to excavate the legendary site of the Labyrinth at the ruins of Cnossus, near Candia.

Political circumstances made this impossible during his life, but since his death another archaeologist, no less fortunate, yet with greater science, has demonstrated by his work that Schliemann's instinct was right. Sir Arthur Evans, by his insight and skill, has immensely enlarged our knowledge of the Mycenaean civilisation and of prehistoric Greece. Even before he began his excavations at Cnossus, Evans had proved to all who would not shut their eyes to facts that the art of writing was known to the Mycenaean, and consequently was long anterior to the Trojan War. His excavations, besides revealing the brilliant and steady growth of the Minoan civilisation, as it is now called, which had two climaxes, the first about B.C. 2000 and the second about B.C. 1500, also showed that the art of writing was known even at the first of these two climaxes. More than this, the beginnings of writing can be traced in the pictographic signs of a yet earlier age. In the time immediately preceding the traditional date for the Trojan War a developed cursive script was in use. Finally the Phoenician alphabet, the source of the classical Greek alphabet, has been found in its turn to be derived from the Minoan script. The importance of

these revelations for the study of the Homeric poems cannot be over-estimated.

We know now that the inhabitants of Greece long before 950 B.C., long before the Trojan War, knew and used freely the art of writing. Thus when Homer composed his poems they were, though adapted for recitation, almost certainly reduced to writing. Therefore, the idea that Pisistratus was the first to cause the Homeric poems to be collected, written, and edited, loses its main support. The alleged revision of Homer by Pisistratus is not mentioned by Herodotus or Thucydides, and has no ancient authority earlier than Cicero. The quotations from Homer in ancient authors, and the fragments found among the papyri of Egypt, show that by Alexandrian times (the earliest papyri are of the third century B.C.), and most probably long before, there was a well-established text of both the Iliad and Odyssey. In short, archaeology through its two faithful disciples, Schliemann and Evans, has destroyed not only Wolf's theory, but all the subsequent Homeric criticism which had originally drawn its inspiration from his postulates.

The Achaean Invasion is another theory much favoured by modern critics, who have allowed it to infect all their ideas on Homer. When the treasures of Mycenae were unearthed by Schliemann, they were immediately hailed as the products of Achaean and Aryan culture brought in from the north, all the more since they then appeared to have no ancestry on Greek soil. The latest and most brilliant upholder of the Achaean Invasion is Professor Ridgeway, who in the light of the later historical Celtic invasions of Italy and Greece, would have us accept the Achaeans as Celtic apostles of culture who came down from the north to conquer, rule over, and finally amalgamate with the aboriginal Pelasgians. According to this theory the Pelasgians were the aborigines of Greece, and produced and developed the Minoan civilisation. The Celtic Achaeans adopted the civilisation of those they had subdued, only imposing a few improvements of their own, such as the Skibereen Shield and the safety pin. The Achaeans also imported the Olympic Pantheon, and purified the poor Pelasgian's primitive religious beliefs. Most Germans hold similar views about the Achaeans, making them the original evangelists of *Kultur*.

Professor Ridgeway's theory concerning the shy and elusive Pelasgian does not concern us here. It is enough to say that he is right in holding that the great prehistoric art of Greece



developed on Greek soil, in Crete. But in the main his theory encounters insuperable difficulties, because in prehistoric Greece there was no uniform civilisation such as the Pelasgian theory demands. All recent archæological research, both in Thessaly and the Morea, indicates that not till its latest phase did the Minoan civilisation spread all over Greece as a dominant and unifying force. This occurred in the days when Mycenæ was still in its prime, and not long before the traditional date of the Trojan War. It is with the intrusive Achæan that we have to deal. Here, once again, critics are flying in the face of Greek tradition. The Dorian Invasion must be accepted as an historical fact, because it is constantly referred to in Greek legends and literature. All Greece knew that the Dorians were newcomers, and the tale of how they came is supported by the whole body of Greek tradition. On the other hand, nowhere in Greek poetry, history or mythology is there any mention of an Achæan Invasion. On the contrary, Herodotus states clearly that the Achæans were natives of the Peloponnese, and a similar statement is made by Pausanias. Further, all the researches of Evans, and others who follow in his footsteps, go to show that civilisation in those early days spread from south to north, and not vice versa.

Thus we must abandon the Wolfian theory and all it entails. We must disown any belief in the immigrant Achæan, whether Celtic or Teutonic, as the missionary of a more civilised and purer standard of life, and take a rational and common-sense view of Homer, as in the days of Aristarchus. Homer, writing long after the event, composed an epic that had a dramatic and poetic unity of its own, for he intended his *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to be complete as they stand. Therein lies the perfection of their dramatic and poetical character. As an artistic ending the death of Hector is unrivalled in its force, its restraint and its pathos; the climax is perfect.

The *Odyssey*, which Bentley thought was written for women, the *Iliad* being the men's epic, closes with the victory of right and faith symbolised in the reunion of Odysseus and Penelope. Troy was a real city, and its site and ruins are known. Relics of a civilisation most surprisingly similar to that described by Homer have been found. It dominated Greece exactly in the period preceding the traditional date of the Trojan War.

The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were written down when composed, and the text has not been substantially altered since,

except by the Wolfians in dissecting it in search of the alleged Achilleid. This is supported by the continual quotations from Homer met with in classical authors and by the fragments found in Egyptian papyri. Shakespeare in his historical tragedies worked on material provided by the dramas of previous authors. So we may believe that the genius of Homer designed the composition of his great artistic epics, but wove into them whatever of the earlier lays, ballads, and the like that he thought suitable. The Greek and Trojan catalogues of the heroes and tribes engaged are most probably two instances of this. The earlier lays would have been written by poets, who were closer in point of time to the civilisation, the achievements of which they sang. So Homer, writing long years afterwards, but still under the spell of the golden ages of Cnossus and Mycenae, and all the legends attached thereto, allowed poetic fancy full play and devoted himself to his art, using history much as Sir Walter Scott employed it, for example, in 'Quentin Durward.' The relation of Homer to the siege of Troy is like that of 'Chevy Chase' to the battle of Otterburn. What a 'Chevy Chase' would a Homer have written, if he had had before him all the pre-existing material in the shape of the border ballads! After him would have come other cyclic poets, who would have filled the gaps left by Homer in the tale of the contest between Douglas and Percy. So we can imagine the 'Cypria,' the 'Little Iliad,' and the other cyclic epics to have been written by minor poets to satisfy the inevitable human passion for sequels and complete narratives.

An even better example is the modern Greek epic of Ali Pasha of Yannina, which was written during his lifetime and at his order by his secretary Hajji Sekhret. This describes the career and exploits of Ali, seasoned with a certain amount of flattery and exaggeration. Sekhret almost certainly used as some of his material the klephtic ballads of the time, such as those dealing with the wars of Suli. A careful comparison of the Suli ballads and the Suliot portion of the epic would be very interesting. Further, the Ali Pasha epic is throughout full of epic tags, inorganic lines, and repetitions, common also to the klephtic ballads. Homeric scholars of the Wolfian school would make short work of Sekhret's epic, and soon reduce it from its ten thousand lines to the few hundred of an original Suliad. Just as Sekhret wrote the occurrences of his own lifetime, so some of the lays used by Homer were probably written by bards who were contemporary with the events described. The finished

style of epic found not only in Homer, but also in Hesiod, for whom no Pisistratean recension has ever been suggested, is of itself evidence that the writing of epic lays had been practised for a long time. It is possible even that there were then still in existence some Minoan lays celebrating the glories of Cnossus and Crete of the hundred cities. Homer himself supplies evidence of contemporary lays in Demodocus, who is represented within ten years of the fall of Troy, as reciting in verse the tale of the origin of the Trojan War. Homer wrote his Iliad and Odyssey for recitation by such bards, just as Sekhret wrote his epic to be read to his uncertain tempered master. His poem, too, is divided into episodes, such as the Suliot Wars, the Capture of Preveza, and the destruction of Khormovo, exactly as the various books of the Homeric poems each deal with one more or less self-contained incident. Similarly, in later times, Herodotus read his histories to the assembled Greeks at Olympia. Though writing was known and used freely, yet actual books were scarce, and therefore recitation or reading was obviously the best way to reach the public. For instance, Solon drew up special regulations for the public recitation of Homer at Athens.

He who seeks to interpret Homer must, first of all, be steeped deeply in the Homeric poems themselves, and secondly, should possess a sound knowledge of the prehistoric archaeology of Greece. Even if we appear to be merely at the same point where Aristarchus left off two thousand years ago, yet we have made some small progress, because we are able to prove that the cities and the civilisation of which Homer sang were not fanciful, but real; whereas Aristarchus, though believing it, could not prove that there was an historical basis for the 'Tale of Troy.' The longer we devote ourselves to the actual poems, the more shall we be refreshed, and the more will our faith in our creed be strengthened. Even Wolf admitted that on turning from his Homeric theories to re-read the poems, he felt his arguments vanish from his mind, when once he was immersed in the clear and serenely gliding stream of narrative poetry, for its harmony and consistency penetrated all, and soon asserted themselves with a force he could not resist. Finally, he became angry with himself for the scepticism which had destroyed his belief in Homer. *οἱ Ὀμηρικώτεροι* are not those who would dismember, but those who believe in Homer.

A. J. B. WACE.

## INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION

**A**T a time when the institutions of the Empire are being recast, it seems surprising that little public attention has been directed to the form into which the British Constitution is being moulded.

What is meant by a constitution? A government, however composed, whether it has a king or a president, or one chamber or many, can hardly be said to have a constitution, if by mere lawful legislative action it can destroy its own essential nature. If, for example, the country were placed under the uncontrolled domination of a single chamber, with power to alter or to gerrymander constituencies, and by a simple arbitrary vote to deprive any individual of his suffrage, his property, or his life, we could hardly consider such a country as having a constitution.

Many theories have been advanced respecting the origin of constitutions. In ancient times most governments claimed to have been divinely ordained. Disobedience to the king was held to be disobedience to God. In the seventeenth century High Church divines preached the most absolute doctrines of non-resistance. But doubts arose. For as the Bishop of Exeter pointed out, since most governments have been founded by conquest or revolution they must, when thoroughly settled, be treated as of God. Considerations such as these, coupled with the bad government of James II., ended in the discrediting in England of the theory of a divinely constituted State. About the same period Louis XIV., although he always considered that the whole power of the State resided in his own person, yet doubted whether that power could be exercised by himself without constitutional restraint. Thus when the question arose of a conscription of wealth by means of an imposition of a tenth, proposed by the Controller-General, the king would not consent to it until his confessor, Letellier, by quoting an opinion of the Sorbonne, had convinced him that the individual wealth of every one of his subjects was his property as head of the State. This conviction, says St. Simon (ix. p. 44), restored to him the calm and tranquillity which his doubts had disturbed.

This precedent, drawn from so respectable a source, may perhaps aid in calming the consciences of the few of our legislators who still question the right of our government to confiscate at their pleasure the private property of individuals.

The theory of the divine right of kings has in modern times been replaced by other theories, such as the divine right of the stronger, or again, the divine right of the most numerous in some arbitrarily selected area, but neither of these theories is supported on any firm logical basis.

Another more plausible view is to consider government as the creation of some sort of contract. It is true that historical investigation shows that in most countries constitutions have not been made; they have grown. But they have grown by consent implied, if not expressed.

Thus while we are tempted on a superficial view to treat the social compact of Rousseau as an ingenious fiction, a closer scrutiny shows that there is much truth in it. At first it seems absurd to regard the individuals of a country as bound by a contract made hundreds of years before they were born. This, however, is not Rousseau's view. The social compact outlined by him is a compact made voluntarily between the State and every living member of it. So far is it from being binding against the will of the subject, that Rousseau treats it as liable to be dissolved at any time by the will of either party. But the subject who elects to terminate it forfeits all right to State protection, and cannot complain if he is treated as an outlaw, or even an enemy.\*

It is a defect of Rousseau's 'contrat social' that the voluntary character of the social compact is not sufficiently explained, and also that the nature of the compact is absolutely distorted. It is not true, for instance, that by such a compact a man need 'surrender into common his person and all his powers.' This view of the compact was supported by Robespierre, but is not adopted even by the wildest theorists of to-day. Such a view is, moreover, expressly contradicted in another place by Rousseau himself.†

Moreover, he expressly condemns any attempt on the part of the State to exceed what he calls 'les conventions generales.' Thus, though at first sight his system would seem to involve

---

\* See 'Emile,' Book V. p. 169, vol. xiii. of the edition of 1792.

† 'Contrat Social,' Book I. chapter ix., and Book II., chapter iv.

absolute government, he yet in a dim way recognises the idea of a constitution. On this view the compact of each man with the State would rest on existing laws and conventions and vested interests, which had gradually come into existence, and a foundation would clearly exist for individual freedom within recognised and customary bounds.

Turning to the history of this country, we perceive that in spite of frequent breaches of faith and acts of arbitrary power, the notion of a constitution which no government was morally justified in infringing has always existed. Under the Norman kings statutes were made by the exercise of the king's powers, at first by his sole will, then by the advice of the great Council, from which has descended our House of Lords; and, finally, with the advice not only of this body, but also of a grand committee of representatives of the County Courts, or rather Councils, which has developed into the House of Commons.

But the power of law-making by the king was never recognised as absolute. From time to time appeals were made to a dim group of ancient laws—of laws of Edward the Confessor—which no monarch, with or without the assent of any council, was at liberty to abrogate. The very form of the Magna Carta shows this. Here we have a document of a different character from an Act of Parliament, which might grant liberty one day and take it away the next. It was intended to be not a grant of privileges, but an inviolable written charter of liberty, not to be infringed by the exercise of legislative power. In this it was truly a 'constitution.'

The contention for the rights of individuals to civil and religious liberty was carried on all through the troubled times of the Stuarts. Even those who preached most vehemently the duty of non-resistance, did not deny that the individual possessed certain elementary rights, as regards his person, religion, and property.

The date at which the theory of constitutional limitation to governing power fell into disfavour is difficult to fix. It seems curious that the most explicit abandonment appears to have taken place during the debates over the settlement of the crown upon William and Mary, a period which is usually associated with the foundation of our civil and religious liberty. At that time the form of the coronation oath was settled, and the question arose whether the king should swear to maintain the Protestant religion as then already established by law or as it should be

established by law hereafter. This obviously raised the question whether the king and Parliament could alter all laws and institutions, or only some of them. It ended in the general recognition that, whatever form of words might be employed, the power of the king in his Parliament was unfettered.

From that time forward protection of individuals against arbitrary power has not depended on any view of a constitution, either express or implied, but has depended on a system of checks, counter checks, and legislative delays arranged to make the tyrants disagree among themselves, and to impede all legislation, whether good or bad, and whether in favour of, or in opposition to, individual rights and liberty.

The most important of these checks has been almost completely destroyed by Mr. Asquith, whose Whiggish tendencies might have led one to expect that he would have been in favour of the retention of some last vestige of individual freedom. The reform of the House of Lords was an obvious necessity, but the action of the ministers in threatening to procure the creation of peers, selected on account of their partisanship, was of course quite unconstitutional, and only served to show that no checks upon the arbitrary exercise of power are effective which depend upon the action of men who can be deterred by threats from performing their duty. An opportunity of resettling our constitution, so as to unite power of progress with a fair measure of protection of existing interests, was thus lost, perhaps for ever.

The destruction of all constitutional restraint on the governing authority, which has accompanied the gradual transference of power from the higher to the lower classes, has, of course, the full approval of the working classes. The word liberty is constantly in the mouth of the democracy, but liberty as understood by the populace is only the right of the lower classes to govern the upper. 'Liberty,' said an Irishman, 'is whenever every one does as he pleases, and if he does not, by gorrah we make him.' Manual workers ever have been, and to a large extent ever must be, under orders. The greatest amount of liberty they have hitherto imagined is the right of choosing their tyrants. Individual liberty they seldom understand or desire. The right of a man to work as many hours as he pleases, or to make what contracts he likes, or to express his political views without having his head broken, has rarely appealed to them.

To those who value individual liberty as a means of evolutionary progress, who do not desire to see a forest of birds of various sizes and hues turned into a forest of chattering sparrows, the present fury for destroying all forms of constitutions appears to be fraught with danger.

When the powerful new root thrown off in America from the Anglo-Saxon stem was severed from the parent tree, and became a separate nation, those in charge of the destinies of the new country appear to have been fully alive to the advantages of a written constitution. The declaration of the rights of man in the American Declaration of Independence takes obviously a wider view than the rights of the State, and the American constitution provides guarantees for private rights. For instance, the addenda to Article V. contain a number of provisions for the protection of private persons. Several of the constitutions of separate States go into greater detail. Thus, for example, the constitution of California (sec. 14) provides that private property is not to be taken for public use without just compensation.

Lord Bryce sums up a most interesting examination of the American Constitution by saying:—

‘England has left the so called constitutional laws at the mercy of her legislature, which can abolish any institution of the country or even Parliament itself. America has placed her constitution altogether out of the reach of Congress . . . In England, Parliament is omnipotent; in America, Congress is doubly restricted.’\*

In America, therefore, ‘gerrymandering’ the constitution, that favourite device of pettifogging politicians, is more difficult than in this country, and in the future this will unquestionably improve the political and financial stability of the United States.

It may be argued that a State can in the last resort always violate a paper constitution. This is true, but it is not direct breaches of the constitution that are to be apprehended. Most civilised States would hesitate at direct repudiation of their national debt. But governments would be very apt to do under the guise of ‘taxation’ acts that in substance amount to partial repudiation. In future it is probable that many States will be unable to raise loans except for specified periods, and with a system of pre-arranged commuted taxation.

If she will be wise and moderate, England has a great future

---

\* ‘The American Commonwealth,’ Part i., chap. xxiii.



before her. If she will take the advice of John S. Mill, a civil servant and an earnest well-wisher to the working classes, and avoid the absorption of all the principal ability of the country into the governing body, if she will submit the government to proper and salutary restriction of absolute power, she may have a future no less glorious than her past.

But if she elects to be governed by a single chamber freed from all constitutional restraint, with unlimited power of disfranchising any section of its own electors, with power to prolong its own life indefinitely, with command over the army, and with all industries in the hands of a bureaucracy nominated by itself, an engine of tyranny will have been created, which, once in the hands of an irresponsible proletariat, may end in Bolshevism, or what is far more likely, may, in the hands of a determined bourgeoisie, be enabled to set and keep its heel on the neck of the proletariat.

For in the history of the world, government of the many by the few has been the rule, government by the many has been the exception.

A resolute bourgeoisie smarting from a sense of injustice, if it could once obtain power, even for a short time, could restrict the suffrage, obtain the exclusive possession of war machines, and in a few weeks, perhaps with general applause, convert a democracy into an oligarchy. So that the working classes may even now be sharpening the instrument which is destined to keep them in permanent subjection, and may yet be obliged to seek for an amelioration of their lot by putting power into the hands of a Cæsar. For among all the lessons taught by history none is more clear than this, that the arbitrary use of power, unrestrained by a constitution, leads surely to the corruption of any form of government, and eventually to its downfall.

HENRY CUNYNGHAME.

## THE FUTURE OF OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE

1. *The Oxford University Gazette*, 23rd May 1919.
2. *The Times Educational Supplement*, May and June 1919.
3. *A History of University Reform*. By A. I. TILLYARD. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Son Ltd. 1913.

THE financial needs of the ancient universities are a cause of substantial anxiety at a moment when Oxford and Cambridge are expected to lead the educational renaissance of England. Never rich, they find themselves to-day poor in a new sense. The vast developments of science, due in no small measure to men trained in these universities, make year by year new and costly demands on the very limited financial resources of the universities and the colleges. These demands must be met in full if Oxford and Cambridge are to stand in the van of the new age. Nor do these demands stand alone. In all branches of learning there are educational developments involving fresh outgoings. The cost of living has risen, with the result that university chairs and offices and college offices do not offer a wage commensurate with the reasonable expectations and needs of coming men. Fellowships, scholarships, and exhibitions are almost halved in real value. The income of the universities and colleges has risen very little, and the demands on that income have increased enormously. It is plain beyond argument that new sources of income must be found if the two universities, whose history forms a vital part of the history of England, are to rise to the level of the greatest opportunity that has been offered to them in the seven or eight centuries of their existence.

The possibilities of increasing one source of internal income are not exhausted, but the increase cannot be immediate, and to some extent depends on present expenditure. A great increase is probable in the number of undergraduates, many of whom will be provided with scholarships granted by Local Education Authorities. It is not at all inconceivable that within twenty years there will be 10,000 undergraduates at each university, but such an increase must depend on the provision

of facilities for advanced work. There is no money available for such facilities, and without this provision the internal income from students cannot increase. The external income, for the most part derived from land, may be capable of increase; but such increase cannot be secured at once, and it is very doubtful if the colleges would do any better by selling their land and capitalising the proceeds than by waiting to raise rents. In any event, neither internally nor externally, is any immediate substantial access of income to be found. No doubt large capital sums for university purposes could be raised by the colleges, but this would probably involve legislation, and the policy would be, to say the least, questionable.

There are three other possible sources of income. It is conceivable that such relations could be set up between the universities and the great Local Education Authorities as to permit of substantial subventions for services rendered. Under their general statutory powers it is clear that such subventions could be made. Section 23 of the Education Act, 1918, provides that :

‘With a view to promoting the efficiency of teaching and advanced study, a local education authority for the purposes of Part II. of the Education Act, 1902, may aid teachers and students to carry on any investigation for the advancement of learning or research in or in connection with an educational institution, and with that object may aid educational institutions.’

This section came into force on 8th August 1918. It is to be observed that grants from local authorities, being made in respect of services rendered by the universities or colleges, would not involve interference with the freedom of the educational institution. In fact, at present a certain amount of money from local rates is carried to Oxford and Cambridge in the shape of scholarships, thus reviving a very ancient practice. For special facilities in very advanced work under leading specialists, great cities, such as London and Manchester, might well exercise their powers under Section 23 of the new Education Act, and ‘aid’ the universities. The second possible new source of income is State aid. Of that something will be said directly. The third source is old enough, since from it the universities received their life; it is familiar to all Oxford and Cambridge men who commemorate their benefactors. To tap this source, entirely new borings must be made.

At the moment the tendency of things is in the direction

of State aid. The month of May 1919 brought this question suddenly to the front, so far as the general university public were concerned. A good deal of momentary heat was generated by the apparent suddenness with which the demand for the assistance from the Imperial Treasury came before the universities, but in fact the idea was germinating during the later stages of the war. Mr. Fisher's Education Bill had brought to the mind of all persons interested in the formation of a really national system of education the necessity of organising our higher education. It was plain enough that if the Bill were to become an effective instrument of progress the higher education which it contemplated must be brought into organic relations with all the universities. Such a proposition is indeed self-evident, and it was, and is, equally evident that Oxford and Cambridge must play a leading part in the new co-ordination. It is further evident that all the universities will require a very large increase of income if they are adequately to undertake work on which it is no exaggeration to say that the whole future of the Empire depends. If England is to be efficient, her schools and her universities must be linked to her great industries. Our manufacturers must draw upon the thinking power and technical achievements of our universities, our schools and technical colleges must supply our industries with liberally educated and trained workers. Both schools and industries in the long run are dependent upon the universities. If the latter are starved, the former will be stunted. Hence Mr. Fisher's Act involves a great enlargement of university functions.

This position happened to synchronise with a good deal of restlessness at Cambridge, where there seems to have been throughout the war, though the evidence on the subject only partially has been made public, a movement towards modifying the existing collegiate system. This movement apparently came to nothing, but Cambridge seems to have been more ready than Oxford to welcome the idea of State aid as put forward by Mr. Fisher. As an outcome of the Education Bill, Sir Oliver Lodge in July 1918 invited the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford to join a deputation to the Government for increased State aid to the universities of the country. Eventually the Vice-Chancellor communicated with Mr. Fisher, who said that as the Scottish and Irish universities were joining in the deputation he thought that Oxford and Cambridge

might do the same, and thus provide some idea 'of the likely requirements of higher education.' In the end representatives of both Oxford and Cambridge attended the deputation on the definite understanding that in doing so they were not committing the universities to any new policy. Both these universities informally supplied Mr. Fisher with an account of their financial needs. The authorities at Oxford and Cambridge were apparently and rightly quite willing to receive increased grants on a large scale for separate departments which have long performed and are performing services of direct use to the State. Such increased grants, however large the scale, would involve no change of policy, and would not affect the universities by introducing any element of State control over university life. Considering the great services in many fields given by the universities to the nation and the State during the war, and considering the heavy losses suffered by the universities both in personnel and in suspension of active life, such increased grants would have been merely an act of justice while substantially serving the purposes of the State. As a matter of account, such grants, or indeed capital expenditure in respect of separate departments, might reasonably be credited as part of the German indemnity. But it appears that the Government were not prepared to adopt this policy, but were determined to break down, at a moment of great financial necessity, the age-long independence of the ancient universities.

No doubt it may be said that this is a harsh or a crude way of putting the ultimatum delivered by the Board of Education on 16th April 1919, an ultimatum to the effect that Oxford and Cambridge must receive State aid, if they receive it at all, 'in the form of a single inclusive grant, for the expenditure of which the university, as distinguished from any particular department, will be responsible.' It should be said, to be fair, that the Standing Committee appointed last month to carry this policy into effect is intended to introduce with as little friction as possible the new order of things. The Board of Education argues, and indeed argues weightily, that Oxford and Cambridge ought to come into the national system of education as such, and that to be part of that system is good for the universities as well as for the State. No one would deny this; it is certain that Oxford and Cambridge should give more general services to the country at large than have been given in modern times; it is equally certain that they cannot do this without larger

financial resources. But it does not follow that grants should be made in such a fashion as to involve State control of the universities. It is true that the Board of Education specifically disclaims any intention of interference in university life, declares itself to be unfit to exercise control over the university grade of education, and writes in good faith of giving the individuality of each institution free play and of safeguarding the legitimate interests of university autonomy. The sincerity of Mr. Fisher and the Board in making such declarations is beyond question, but the fact that they should have been considered necessary is in itself almost an overwhelming argument against State help in the proposed form. The form proposed and the declarations together show clearly that the Board recognises the power which it will have acquired if and when the central single grant is accepted. Indeed the grant is to be accompanied by an exercise of this power, for it is made conditional on an inquiry into the financial resources of the universities and colleges. There can be no harm in such inquiry. The universities and colleges have nothing to hide and nothing to fear. They met the inquiry of 1871, the Commissioners reported, with a spirit of marked courtesy and ready assistance. There were no ghosts in the closet then, and most certainly none have crept in since then. The inquiry will answer one useful purpose. It will bring home to the public the poverty of the universities and the colleges, and the splendid use that they have made of that poverty in the past half century.

We are thus reduced to the single and simple issue whether State aid involving State control of the universities, which may very speedily amount to State control of curricula and examinations, is a good thing for national education. The Board itself states frankly that it is unfit to control university education, but as it is, through its examination council, proposing to standardise and control examinations, which will be in practice the first university examination, and may very likely become university scholarship examinations, the next step, the control of university curricula, may not be very far away. It is true that the Board as at present constituted, with a famous Oxford don at its head, is not likely to take the next step. But a Pharaoh may arise who knows not Mr. Fisher and his colleagues, and a militarist or a Labour Government may from their respective points of view think that the time has come to muzzle professors and standardise, with a particular line of policy in view, Honour Schools and

Tripeses. It is no answer to say that this is absurd. The absurd or irrational element is the element that has always to be reckoned with in politics. In fact the German Government generations ago adopted this irrational, but in its subsequent development very logical process, in regard to German schools and universities, with results which will be written large across the pages of history. We are not Germans, and humanly speaking we may anticipate that nothing so absurd and so logical will happen here. But the business of statesmen is to forestall possibilities, and in this case the possibilities are all on the table. In considering this question of State aid, accompanied by State control, we are therefore faced with the simple questions, Is it good for national education, is it good for national life?

The right of State intervention in university affairs is of course undoubted. In the earliest days we find king or Parliament addressing, or legislating in the interest of, Oxford and Cambridge. King Henry III. in 1231, wrote to the respective Vice-Chancellors enjoining them to show hospitality to foreign students and to provide tutors. Even then these universities were centres of learning, 'ubi convenit multitudo studentium.' In 1275 King Edward I. granted special jurisdiction in civil suits to the Chancellor of Oxford, and this was not the earliest instance of such grants. Late in the fourteenth century we find parliamentary legislation beginning. Probably the statute relating to apparel of 1363 was the earliest. For the most part Crown and Parliament only interfered in university affairs in order to grant privileges and to strengthen the hands of the Chancellors in dealing with lawless students and riotous townsmen. Indeed, both authorities deliberately built up the universities as free and self-governing entities. Extraordinary privileges were granted to university men, beginning—and the fact is significant of the poverty from which these seats of learning have always suffered—with the statute of 1388, permitting poor university scholars to beg, if licensed to do so by their Chancellor. We find the begging scholar still afoot in the days of Cromwell.

The Church was not so wise or so considerate as the State. The blow struck by the Church at the university Lollards, the class destined to save Oxford and Cambridge in the darkest days of the fifteenth century, was a deliberate blow at the free right to teach and learn, a deliberate attempt to place the universities in bondage, and fetter freedom of thought. The books that might be used were to be censored by the Church. In the long run the

disability was turned to advantage, but for the greater part of a century this interference with curricula silenced the universities as leaders of national life.

King Henry VIII. was a lover of learning, and deliberately saved the colleges. If we may believe William Harrison, he said, 'I tell you, sirs, that I judge no law in England better bestowed than that which is given to our universities, for by their maintenance our realm shall be well-governed when we be dead and rotten.' When Henry VIII. intervened by statute in 1529 and 1536, he did so for the purpose of strengthening the universities, of purging them of idlers, and of nourishing liberal learning. The king was determined that the new learning should flourish in the land. The preamble to the statute of 1536 shows how truly alive it was. This Act tended to free, not to hamper, the action of the universities. Further Acts of 1548 and 1556 gave new privileges.

It is true that the first legislative Act of Queen Elizabeth brought the universities under the royal supremacy, and introduced a system of official oaths, which became burdensome in later ages. But they were not intended as a burden, and when the queen incorporated by statute the universities in 1571, she speaks of the 'great zeal and care that the Lords and Commons of this present Parliament have for the maintenance of good and godly literature, and the virtuous education of youth within either of the same universities.' The Act was passed 'to the intent that the ancient privileges, liberties, and franchises of either of the said universities heretofore granted, ratified, and confirmed by the Queen's Highness and her most noble progenitors, may be had in greater estimation, and be of greater force and strength, for the better increase of learning and the further suppressing of vice.' With these famous words the great queen refounded the republics of humane learning. In 1589 she cleansed the universities from much internal corruption, and completed her great educational work, which had freed elementary and purified secondary education, and had placed the university grade upon such a footing that the percentage of the male population represented by university students in her later days has never since been approached. This she achieved, and left the universities not only purified and strengthened, but unfettered.

It is not surprising that the universities in the Great Revolution clung to fallen royalty. Perhaps the greatness of Cromwell



was never better exhibited than when he not only refused to persecute these supporters of a lost cause, but deliberately made them part of his educational plan, and bestowed a statutory grant, without conditions, of £2000 a year for the maintenance of the Masterships of the colleges. But Cambridge, at least, was hit hard enough. In a petition to Parliament in the year 1648, the Cambridge cry is a bitter one, 'our members grow thin and 'our revenues short; and the subsistence we have abroad is, for 'the most part, involved in the common miseries.' That, at the moment was inevitable, and though the Restoration restored much to Oxford and Cambridge, yet the conformity legislation so smote all education that the rapid decline into days almost as dark as those of the fifteenth century was inevitable. But that decline was, at any rate, adorned by one great bid for freedom. The struggle between the universities and King James II. was, indeed, worthy of a greater age. James was determined to Romanise these centres of learning. Hitherto they had stood for centuries as independent bodies under the special protection of the Crown, with almost perfect freedom of speech and action. The years 1686 and 1687 saw a definite attack on this freedom. Troops were quartered at Oxford, the Fellows of Magdalen were ejected for refusing to accept a papist as their president, while the Senate of Cambridge were haled to London, and the Vice-Chancellor was deprived by Lord Jeffreys of his Mastership, and the rest were 'bidden go your way and sin no more, lest a worse 'thing happen to you.' But the attack on the freedom of the universities failed; money was subscribed all over England for the ejected fellows, and Oxford emerged triumphant from a contest more fatal to Roman Catholicism in England than the Reformation itself. The echoes of that victory were still reverberating in 1790 when Parliament declared that 'no person 'professing the Roman Catholic religion, shall keep a school in 'either of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge.'

It was about this time that the universities of their own initiative entered into the long process of reform which has restored to them as part of a national system the efficiency that they possessed in the Elizabethan Age. The interesting part of that long process, which has gone on for more than a century, is that it has been for the most part a voluntary process. The legislation of 1854, 1856, and 1877, which created the machinery of internal reform and abolished religious tests, was the result of slow but sound internal movements. Reforms were not

thrust on the universities from without; they were generated from within. When Parliament came upon the scene the universities were already teeming once more with life and learning and were reacting at every turn on national interests of every kind. It may be said with truth that State intervention in the nineteenth century was of the same nature as the intervention of the State of the sixteenth century, intervention prepared for and welcomed by the real leaders of university life. In both cases the intervention created freedom, cleared away the burdens that time and custom had imposed on university life, and restored the universities to their pristine position as republics of humane learning. The State imposed no burdens; it simply removed the dead hand of custom and enabled the universities to turn of their own volition towards new paths and new conquests.

The entire history of State intervention in the affairs of Oxford and Cambridge from the days of King Henry III. to the days of King George V., has been in the definite direction of making these institutions efficient, free, self-supporting, and life-giving institutions. In no epoch has the State determined to impose its will as a determining factor in daily life upon the universities, save in two cases. In the first case the result of an effort to control the examinations and curricula of the universities was the partial suspension of university life for a century, followed by the violent reaction of the Reformation; in the second case the result was, perhaps, hardly less disastrous since the defeat of the Roman Catholics was followed by a Tory reaction that seemed to petrify university life for a century. Direct State interference on a continuing scale in university affairs has rarely been tried, and has never been tried with success. Nor does the experience of England stand alone. The record of the continent, and not of Germany only, shows that the State with its varying political outlook is not fitted to deal with bodies that should be permanently orientated towards the light.

State subventions to seats of learning accompanied by State control have an evil history, and the evil is not likely in the long run to be less virulent when the motives which lie behind the original intervention are high-minded and patriotic. Indeed the evil may be the more dangerous from the fact of its virtuous origin. The brutality of bigots, such as Arundel or James II., produces its own reaction, but a strangle grasp which in its

origin was an act of salvation may well deceive the very elect. It is for this reason that university grants on the terms offered by Mr. Fisher are objectionable. They will place the universities in fetters. These fetters at first will seem light enough in view of the gains that money gives. But when the time comes for one of Mr. Fisher's successors to impose terms on professors, on curricula, on examinations, our descendants may learn to curse the opportunism which threw away the freedom of many centuries.

Is there no alternative? There are, as we have already said, two alternatives. One is to strike a pure business bargain with the great Local Education Authorities under Section 23 of the Education Act, 1918; to say to these authorities: We have something to give your students that they cannot obtain anywhere else in the world, but we need money in order that our professors shall be multiplied and well paid, that our laboratories shall be the best in the world, that our means of undertaking research work shall be unequalled. We can give the liberal education which has been our pride for nearly eight centuries, and give as well the latest teaching in science and technology if you will co-operate with us while leaving us the freedom which is our birthright and our life. We will offer your representatives seats in our Senate and our accounts are open to the world. We come to you frankly in the hope that you will save us from that State standardisation of education, which is as dangerous for you as for us, and is the modern equivalent to the disastrous Roman Catholic attempt to standardise our education in the fifteenth century.

This alternative to State aid coupled with State control has dangers as well as advantages, but it would rapidly bring the universities into the full current of the new education without loss of freedom. The second alternative is a bold appeal for new benefactors who, as a memorial to those university men who have fallen in the war, would place the universities beyond the temptations of opportunism and above the deadening influence of a centralised bureaucracy. There can be no doubt as to the ability of many sons of these ancient universities to come forward and save the seats of learning to which they owe so much. In America, benefactions are poured out on unknown universities with a lavish and even prodigal hand. In America, we see the spirit of the Archbishop of York who, in 1267, wrote to the Masters of Cambridge, 'we

'would gladly serve the university in which we were brought 'up.' It was that spirit which gave life to Oxford and Cambridge. The Report of the Commissioners of 1874 states that 'the properties of the universities have for the most part arisen 'from gifts entrusted to them for specific purposes.' These gifts came when England was a poor struggling land. They were, we are told, 'barely adequate to provide' the maintenance and education for which they were intended. For three centuries the scholars of the university houses included men so poor that they had licences to beg in the vacations and on their foot journeys to their colleges from the remotest confines of the kingdom. Very slowly, means became more adequate, but even in the Elizabethan age the funds were insufficient for new developments. All kinds of methods were devised to increase funds and stimulate benefactors. Special schools, districts, families, linked themselves to special colleges, and members of those colleges, once the recipients of their bounty, gave as freely as lands and wealth allowed.

This process has gone on for centuries and still goes on. At Cambridge the names of 180 benefactors or more are annually commemorated, and we meet with personalities as far apart in time as King Henry III. and King Edward VII., as Hugh de Balsham in the thirteenth century and William Ewart Gladstone in the nineteenth. The founders and benefactors are a noble company of women and men who are eternally alive in the hearts of England :

'And now according to our bounden duty and in obedience to the Statutes of the University, let us thankfully commemorate before Almighty God all our pious Founders and Benefactors by whose noble liberality the glory of God hath been advanced, Christian Religion and good learning propagated, and this our Mother University endowed with special benefits and enlarged with manifold and singular privileges. . . . These are our Founders and principal Benefactors whose names we have thus publicly recited, to the service and glory of God, to the perpetuating of their memory, to the testifying of our own thankfulness. It now remains that we bless and praise Almighty God for them all.'

Many of these benefactors and founders gave, as we have said, their good gifts in days when England was poor. To-day, when wealth abounds in many hands, it would be indeed a commentary on the materialism of the age if there were not found men and women who are anxious to add their names to the immortal roll of benefactors of learning, and so to become

a deathless part of the spiritual force of this nation. To-day England needs, as never before, education in the broadest and most liberal sense. This we shall not gain unless the great traditions of the ancient universities are brought once more, free and unfettered, to the aid of the democracy of England. This we cannot have in the noblest and fullest sense, in that spiritual sense which the Middle Ages attached to all education, unless the rich men and women of England out of their bounteous liberality come forward and place the universities in a position that will enable them to stand as immutable republics of learning with gates open to the New Democracy. Such republics will be the noblest of all memorials of a war which vindicated the principles of liberty and rescued from imminent slavery the democracies of the world.

J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY.

## THE ETHICAL SIDE OF SOCIALISM

ONE of the humours of the controversy that has arisen out of current demands for the nationalisation of industry is the pretence of the Socialists that they have a higher ethical standard than the rest of mankind. This pretence is put forward with so much complacent dogmatism that it tends to be accepted as a reality even by people who in the main are opposed to the Socialist creed. When, for example, any mere individualist points out that certain Socialist proposals are unworkable because of the facts of human nature, writers in the Press—even including such thoughtful writers as the editor of the *Westminster Gazette*—mournfully argue as if the error of the Socialist lay in attributing to poor weak human nature higher possibilities of altruistic endeavour than it is capable of attaining.

If that were the only error there would be at least a conceivable possibility of so modifying socialistic schemes as to allow for this over-estimate of human capacity. The real fault of the Socialist on the ethical side is entirely different. His real fault is this, that while he constantly pretends to believe that the ideal of public service will suffice to move and direct the industrial activities of the world, his actual propaganda among the masses is based on the crudest appeals to personal selfishness and class jealousy. That is to say, the Socialist begins by reversing what for want of a more precise word may be called the religious method of progress. Christianity, like all the great religions of the world, teaches that the kingdom of heaven on earth can only be attained by the individual observance of the primary social virtues embodied in such maxims as: 'Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you'; 'Thou shalt not steal'; 'Thou shalt not covet.' The Socialist teaches that the way to the new earthly heaven, which he promises, lies through class warfare leading to the complete destruction of the existing social order. In order to stimulate the necessary spirit of hatred he emphasises the contrast between rich and poor, thus deliberately holding up the motive of envy as a spiritual ideal. In addition he teaches, regardless of facts, that the differences between rich and poor are solely due to the robbery of the poor by the rich, and that consequently wage-

earners—even including those who themselves might well be called rich—are justified in adopting methods of dealing with their employers, which are in essence theft. Nor is even that the limit of the ethical idealism of the actual Socialist. Resolved at all costs to destroy, if it be possible, what he calls capitalism, he gives his approval even to murderers, if they profess to be acting on behalf of socialism.

These statements will presently be illustrated and justified. The truth that lies behind them should alone give pause to easy-going sentimentalists, who complacently assume that the only obstacle in the way of socialism lies in the weakness of human nature. Average human nature is a mixture of good and bad, and by appealing to the good and penalising the bad it is possible to secure a considerable raising of the average level. But the Socialist is not out to raise human nature; he is out to destroy capitalism, and for that end he encourages or condones conduct which the world has hitherto condemned as criminal.

It may be argued that these Socialist methods of propaganda are only a temporary expedient: that when the glorious day of the social revolution arrives the men who have been taught to lie and to steal and to kill—*ad majorem Marxi gloriam*—will suddenly lay aside their weapons and their hatreds, and will walk through life holding out the hand of brotherly love to all humanity. In any circumstances such a sudden change of heart is improbable. Men who have been stirred to treacherous or cruel action by persistent appeals to the spirit of envy and the passion of hate are not likely suddenly to change their whole moral attitude. But even if such a change of heart were likely to follow the mere hoisting of the Red Flag in place of the Union Jack or the Tricolour, the conditions which the Socialists propose to establish would themselves discourage the very motives which are essential to the success of socialism. Briefly, the interest of the community is advanced when any given individual produces much and consumes little, because there is then more to divide among the rest. Under the system of private ownership many individuals are stimulated so to act by the hope of thus making comfortable provision for their old age or for their children; under the system of public ownership no such stimulus will exist. The State being responsible for the maintenance of all, nobody will have any private stimulus to work strenuously or to consume sparingly; the personal interest of each will be to get the maximum for himself out of the common pool, and to

put the minimum into it. Thus not only do the Socialists carry on their propaganda by an appeal to the lower motives, but the system which they propose to establish provides no stimulus to the encouragement of the higher motives.

As regards the former of these propositions, overwhelming evidence is to be found in the publications of the Socialist party, and in the speeches of men like Mr. Smillie. Take first the appeal to envy. In effect the Socialist reverses the tenth commandment and glorifies covetousness as a mainspring of action. Socialist literature and Socialist speeches are packed with references to high dividends or big fortunes. The examples given are not always justifiable even from the point of view from which they are quoted. A large dividend in one selected year may represent a very poor average return on the capital invested in a speculative business. This, however, is a side issue. The real point is that the prosperity of other people is held up as a mark for envy. The lesson which the Socialist wishes to teach is driven home by arguments such as those which are implied in the following verse taken from the I.L.P. Song-Book. The author is Mr. Bruce Glasier, a well-known Scottish Socialist :—

‘ They live in splendid mansions,  
 And we in hovels vile ;  
 Their lives are spent in pleasure,  
 And ours in cheerless toil ;  
 They jaunt about the world, while we  
 Are pinned down to one spot ;  
 But we’ll turn things upside down, we will !  
 It’s time, lads, is it not ? ’

No doubt this appeal to envy is politically profitable, for the spirit of envy, like most of the baser human instincts, is fairly widespread. But it is impossible to discover any trace of high social idealism in an appeal to individuals to turn things upside down in the hope of bettering themselves. The passions inspired by such an appeal may prepare the way for the revolution which is the Socialist’s goal ; they will inspire men to plunder, to burn, and to slay, but they are impossible as a foundation for a peaceful human society.

Nor do the Socialists shrink from the extreme logic of their own methods of propaganda. That they welcome the prospect of a bloody revolution is clear from the sympathy they express



with the Bolsheviks of Russia.\* Their attitude on this issue has already been responsible for an incalculable mass of human misery. It was because western Socialists looked upon these Russian murderers as comrades that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson between them evolved the proposal to ask the Bolsheviks to send representatives to a conference at Prinkipo. That proposal almost reduced to despair the Russians who were trying to rescue their country from perhaps the most hideous tyranny that any country in the world has ever endured. It has prolonged by many months the duration of Bolshevik rule, and every month means many hundred murders. Nor did this cynical policy even secure the end aimed at—the conciliation of the Labour vote in Great Britain. The additional victims that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson provided for Lenin and Trotsky have died in vain; ‘Labour’ is still unreconciled. It was impossible for the Paris Conference permanently to back the Russian Bolsheviks, and as soon as the Allied Powers began to take steps to support Kolchak and other leaders of the saner elements among the Russian population, the Socialists in the western countries once more showed their teeth. In Great Britain they have threatened to organise a national strike in order to secure the recall of British troops from Russia; in France they have made similar threats; in Italy they have succeeded in forcing the Italian Government to adopt a policy of abstention.

The action taken by the Labour Party in Great Britain on behalf of the Bolsheviks is not due, as is sometimes pretended, merely to a desire to avoid interference in the affairs of other countries; it is due to the widely entertained and openly expressed feeling among English and even more among Scottish Socialists that Russian Bolsheviks are their blood brothers. On this point it is only necessary to examine Socialist publications. A specially interesting example may be quoted from a new publication called *The Red Dawn*, published by ‘The Proletarian School’ in Glasgow. The May issue of this ‘Magazine for Young Workers’ contains an article, called ‘A Lesson from Bolshevism,’ from which the following passages are taken:—

---

\* Mr. Robert Williams, Secretary of the Transport Workers’ Federation, speaking at Southport on 22nd June, said: ‘Bolshevism was only socialism with the courage of its convictions.’ See *Daily Graphic*, 23rd June 1919.

‘The greatest event since the dawn of capitalism is undoubtedly the establishment in Russia of the Bolshevik regime, and like all other events bears a lesson that we unfortunates of a backward country can extract for our benefit and enlightenment. . . . Much as we may admire the splendid work of the Bolsheviks, we must allow—and I am sure the Bolsheviks would admit it also—that they have made quite a few mistakes, a few serious blunders in their task of setting up the machinery of state as they have it to-day. . . . There are existing to-day far too many bodies of the Socialist movement that are only divided by a mere theoretical difference which, if discussed and debated, would be submerged, and the various bodies join as one to face the common enemy. . . . That is a great lesson that is being taught us by the Bolshevik revolution. We must drop our trifling differences and knit our forces together; unity is indeed strength.’

It will be observed that the only defect which these Glasgow Socialists find in ‘the splendid work of the Bolsheviks’ is the lack of unity. That is the lesson they wish to be learnt.

The truth about the proceedings of the Bolsheviks was for many months concealed from the British public. Full reports had indeed reached the Foreign Office very soon after Lenin and Trotsky had established their dictatorship, but these reports were held back while Mr. Lloyd George was making up his mind whether he would support the cause of the Bolsheviks and of the British Labour Party, or the cause of Liberty and Humanity. When he broke with the Labour Party, publication was authorised, and the Foreign Office has issued more than one paper of selections from the reports it has received. The latest of these is ‘A Collection of Reports on Bolshevism in Russia.’ Two extracts may be given. The first is from a report furnished to the Foreign Office by a British chaplain:—

‘For three days before the Austrians inarched into Odessa the Bolsheviks had divers at work from the Imperial yacht ‘Almas’ and the cruiser ‘Sinope,’ dragging the harbour for the weighted bodies of the murdered officers, of whom about 400 had been done to death, the majority after torture with boiling steam, followed by exposure to currents of freezing air. Others were burnt alive, bound to planks which were slowly pushed into the furnaces, a few inches at a time. In this way perished General Chourmakof and many others of my acquaintance. The bodies, now recovered from the water, were destroyed in the ships’ furnaces that no evidence might remain to be brought before the Austro-Germans.’

Another British subject, who left Moscow on 21st January, made the following statement to the Foreign Office on 10th February:—

‘In the school classes all semblance of discipline has been destroyed. The children do exactly as they like, sometimes walking

out in the middle of a lesson. This is especially the case in the lesson before the midday meal, as they are all anxious to get the first places. No punishments, no home work and no marks are allowed. The attendance is abominable, the children coming and going just as they think fit. It is impossible to keep order, and the classes are simply like a bear-garden. If a master does not happen to be popular, the boys turn him out. Sometimes a master may go to a class to give a lesson, only to find the boys holding a committee meeting which must not be disturbed. . . .

'Executions still continue in the prisons, though the ordinary people do not hear about them. Often during the executions a regimental band plays lively tunes.'

The statements above quoted are published on the authority of a government department, and for that reason curiously enough they are treated as unworthy of belief by members of the Socialist party, whose avowed policy it is to bring the whole of our lives under the control of government officials. It is therefore worth while briefly to refer to a very remarkable little book written by Mr. H. V. Keeling, an English workman who went to Russia in January 1914 and only left in January 1919.\* During these five years he earned his living at his own trade as a printer or a jobbing mechanic. He was also for some time employed by the Soviet Government as a photographer. He worked not only in Petrograd and Moscow, but also in the country. Mr. Haywood, who has helped Mr. Keeling in writing his book, describes him as 'the kind of man one loves to think of as a typical 'indomitable, untheoretical English mechanic.' The description is borne out by the text. The book is a plain, somewhat rambling account of personal experiences, with just those reflections thrown in that an honest, level-headed Englishman would make. The fact that stands out most clearly from this narrative is the irreconcilable contrast between Bolshevist practice and democratic ideals. For example, Mr. Keeling describes how the Petrograd Town Council was forcibly dispersed by the Bolsheviks :—

'I was present at the time in the capacity of reporter. This council had been elected by the whole of the inhabitants of Petrograd ; the ballot was secret and the franchise as wide as anything I have heard of in England. The whole procedure of election was modelled on our system. . . . Among the representatives were many men who had suffered under the old regime for the cause of freedom ; among them I remember one venerable, lovable old man who had spent more than thirty years as a political prisoner in Siberia. . . . At this moment it was touch and go. . . . Some one ran outside and brought in

\* 'Bolshevism,' by H. V. Keeling. Hodder & Stoughton.

another crowd who had no scruples at all. They bluntly threatened to shoot all the councillors who did not leave instantly, and evidently meant what they said. The picture of those sad, dignified councillors walking out, making what protest they could, I shall long remember.'

This disregard for constitutional government is typical of the true Socialist, from whatever class in society he comes. In our own country Tory Socialists, like Major Waldorf Astor, do not scruple to suggest in their public speeches that the popularly-elected local authorities of England and Wales must be swept aside if they fail to carry out the orders of some jumped-up minister at Whitehall. Mr. Keeling further describes, from his personal observation, the results of the Bolshevik decision to substitute State distribution of food for private trading. In one word, they are starvation. Incidentally he pours scorn on the pro-Bolsheviks of Great Britain, who have somehow imbibed the belief that the starvation of Russia is due to an Allied blockade! Whoever heard, he asks, contemptuously, of Russia importing food? The starvation of Russia is due to the violation of economic laws by a set of crazy communists, who are giving logical effect to the theories preached by the Socialists of Western Europe.

By way of further illustration of the realities of Bolshevism, it is worth while to quote from an article in the *Times* of 12th June 1919, by M. Sokoloff, who was himself at one time a Bolshevik, but broke away from the party when it severed its relationship with the Social Democrats. The principal purpose of the article is to describe the activities of the Extraordinary Commission, a body which takes the place of the old Police Department. Under the operation of this Commission:—

'There have been re-introduced tortures of the same kind as had been practised in some notorious prisons of the old Russia. Prisoners are fed with pickled herrings to be refused drink afterwards, or they are flogged and beaten by the hour, or they have wooden pins driven under their finger-nails, or, as is the case at the Moscow prison, they are put down on an electric chair. There is, though, a difference between the old times and the new. Under the Tsar's regime people in authority tried to hush up or explain away those proceedings, while Bolshevik Russia has put the question of tortures on the order of the day. The Extraordinary Commission issues a weekly newspaper (*Messenger of the E.C.*), distributed in the capital and in the provinces, where readers will find very interesting discussions on the advisability of tortures, from the communist point of view. . . . The Extraordinary Commission has achieved its object, at least for the time being, far

more thoroughly than its clumsy predecessors of the 'Tsar's epoch. The whole of the country has been so firmly enmeshed in the network of communistic espionage that there is hardly anybody who would dare to express his opinions in public.'

These are the people whom the Socialists of Great Britain hail as 'comrades,' and whose 'splendid work' the *Red Dawn* holds up to the admiration of the young workers of Glasgow.\* Between admiration and imitation the interval is not wide. Happily up to the present the Socialists of Great Britain have not gone to the length of advocating murder and torture, but they openly advocate systematic theft. According to the written statement of the general manager of the United Collieries, Ltd., which was read to the Coal Commission on 14th June, Mr. Duncan Graham, Labour M.P. for the Hamilton Division, addressing a meeting at Larkhall on 1st June, advised his hearers 'not to exert themselves but to do as little as possible, and to see that they got as much money as possible 'for it.' He went on to say that his reason for giving this advice was that 'there was no reason for Labour to be honest 'when the other side was so dishonest.' The excuse involves the admission that the speaker was consciously advocating dishonesty; and except for that purpose it is valueless. Social life would be impossible if every man who thought he was robbed proceeded to rob in return; we should quickly get back to the ethics of wild beasts.

It may be admitted that in certain circumstances a palliative excuse can be found for the policy of ca' canny. When a group of men working on a piece rate have reason to suspect that if they exert themselves to earn good money the rate will be cut against them, they cannot be altogether blamed for going slow. They are not, by so doing, robbing their employer any more than they are robbing themselves; they lose the

---

\* It is interesting to note that the same number of the *Red Dawn* contains, for the benefit of its youthful readers, an article called 'An Unconventional Journey,' in which a Scottish Socialist describes how he and a friend evaded the payment of their fares on a New South Wales railway by hiding themselves in a goods' truck. To satisfy their thirst and hunger they broke open a barrel of beer and a case of cheese. They were caught after they had travelled several hundred miles, and were sentenced to a nominal punishment for riding on the State railways without paying the fare. They escaped punishment for the theft of the beer and cheese, of which the writer boasts, because the police had no way of proving that they were the thieves.

higher wage which they could earn, and he loses the higher return which he might get on his fixed capital; both suffer from the atmosphere of mutual mistrust, for which both sides are blameable in varying proportions. But in the case of the coal miners this palliative excuse does not arise. There is here no question of variable piece rates. Miners' wages at the present time are fixed by authority, and the miner knows that there is no chance of his losing anything by exerting himself more. He also knows that the nation urgently needs coal, and if Socialists in practice had the slightest regard for their professed 'ideal of public service' they would urge the miner to do his utmost within the limits of his strength. They do not do so because the main object of their policy is to produce a social revolution, and they argue that one means to that end is to render the private control of industry impossible by destroying the employer's profits.

All this has been frankly expounded by various groups of Socialists for years past. 'The Miners' Next Step,' published at Tonypany in 1912, advocates as an instrument in the class warfare what is called the 'Irritation Strike.' The men stay nominally at work so as to keep their names on the pay-sheet, but do as little work as possible. The argument is set out as follows:—

'The employer is vulnerable only in one place, his profits! Therefore if the men wish to bring effective pressure to bear, they must use methods which tend to reduce profits. One way of doing this is to decrease production, while continuing at work.'

That is to say, the workman is deliberately to do less work for his wages than was implied in the bargain he made when he agreed to accept those wages. In plain language that is stealing, and there is abundant evidence that this form of stealing is constantly advocated by Socialists in Great Britain. The French Socialists go a step further. With their national love for carrying a proposition to its logical conclusion, they rightly argue that if the end to be attained is the destruction of the employer's profit, it is quite as legitimate to seek that end by active mischief in the workshop as by passive idleness. They have, therefore, elaborated various active forms of sabotage, such as putting sand in machines, packing goods so that they will break in transit, and in the case of railways, blocking the signals or tearing up the rails so as to render traffic altogether impossible. These are the practical workings of what certain

sentimentalists in Parliament and the Press call Socialist 'idealism.'

It is true that all Socialists do not approve the policy of active sabotage or even of passive idleness. For example, Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb, in a pamphlet on 'Syndicalism' published in 1912, strongly criticised the whole policy of ca' canny, declaring that 'the adoption on a large scale of a persistent policy ' of ca' canny, let alone the more unscrupulous French varieties ' of sabotage, means, we are convinced, a serious deterioration of ' moral character in those who consent to take part in it.' That is a sufficiently emphatic verbal condemnation of a mischievous and immoral practice; but the value of such condemnation is discounted by the fact that all the Socialist parties, including the Webbian or Fabian Socialists, are responsible for the economic teaching which in the minds of their wage-earning followers furnishes a moral justification for the policy of ca' canny. All the Socialists, including the Fabians, have taught and continue to teach that the wealth which the 'worker' produces is stolen from him by the capitalist. The proposition is most crudely stated by Karl Marx, who is the original source of the economic fictions upon which modern socialism is based. These fictions are being taught to-day all over the kingdom by various sections of the Socialist Party.

Take, for example, a twopenny pamphlet, published in May 1918 by the Plebs League (Glasgow branch), to celebrate the centenary of the birth of Karl Marx. After giving a biographical account of Marx—in the course of which it is recorded, without comment, that in 1868 the economic position of Marx was bettered by the receipt of legacies on his mother's death—this pamphlet roundly declares that 'there is no real socialism but ' that of Marx.' The Marxian doctrine is then expounded:—

'What then is the measure of value and of exchange value? Karl Marx answers the question by stripping away and putting out of sight the useful qualities of commodities. No standard can be found by which to measure quality, but a standard is needed in order that we may measure the varying value of the different things. When the usefulness and the quality of a commodity is laid aside, there then remains but common property left, and all commodities possess this common property. This common property is that all commodities, no matter how they vary and differ in usefulness and quality, are all the products of human labour-power. They are all the result of expended labour; it is this labour that forms the substance of value. In fact, embodied labour is value.'

It seems almost inconceivable that statements so palpably at variance with everyday facts should be persistently taught by numerous active organisations all over the kingdom, and should be accepted as an inspired gospel by thousands of people. One might have imagined that even in the least thoughtful audience some listener would arise to point out that if the useful qualities are stripped away from a thing it has no value, however much labour may have been put into it. For example, under the intelligent direction of industry organised by the Government officials of the United Kingdom, large numbers of persons were, after the Armistice, employed in making airplanes, for which there was no military demand. As fast as the planes were completed they were sent to Government factories, where more people were employed in breaking them to pieces. According to the Marxian theory the broken fragments of these machines would have more value than the machines themselves in full-going order, because of the labour expended upon the work of destruction. Yet not only is this Marxian doctrine taught from public platforms to popular audiences, but much money is spent by various trade unions in promoting the systematic and reverential study of Marx in Labour colleges. The Glasgow pamphlet continues:—

‘There is no other theory that explains correctly the determination of value except the Marxian one. The Marxian theory of value is very important to the workers, for from that theory flows the theory of surplus value, the crowning point of Marxian economics. . . .

‘Say that the worker receives in wages £2 per week for 48 hours’ labour, and let us suppose that the things he makes realise on the market £8. Then we have a difference of £6 between the value of the worker’s labour-power and the value of the things he has produced. This £6 the kind capitalist pockets as if he had a right to it. From whence comes this £6, this surplus? . . .

‘All the value represented by the £8 was created by the worker, but under the conditions of wage-slavery the worker is forced to give the hours of surplus value to the capitalist. This surplus value appropriated by the capitalist comprises rent, interest, and profit.’

There in brief is the Marxian doctrine—or to use a more appropriate word, the Marxian madness. Before commenting on the essential economic fallacy underlying the whole proposition it is worth while to note the dishonesty involved in the selection of the figures. The difference between the £2 and the £8 is not intended to represent realities, but to create prejudice. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any modern industry in which the payment to labour represents



only one quarter of the selling price of the product. In the railway industry, though the proportion of fixed capital there involved is exceptionally high, labour certainly receives and long has received appreciably more than half the revenue earned. In the year 1913 the total receipts of all the railways of the United Kingdom from railway working were £124,750,000, and the total expenditure on railway working, after deducting rates and taxes, compensation for accidents and 'other' items, was £68,672,000. Practically the whole of this expenditure represents payment for labour in one form or another, so that even on the railways, with their vast fixed capital, labour received in 1913 not 25 per cent. but 55 per cent. of the total proceeds. In the same year the net income of the railway undertakings of the United Kingdom was £52,011,000. This was the outside limit of the sum available for distribution among the representatives of the persons who out of their savings provided the embankments, the bridges, the permanent way, the rolling stock, the stations, the signal boxes, and all the rest of the fixed plant at a cost of £1,144,000,000 in hard cash.\*

In the coal industry the proportion going to labour is greater than in the case of railways, because the fixed capital, though still large, is proportionately less. Here are the figures for a Durham colliery :—†

	July 1914.		December 1918.	
	S.	D.	S.	D.
A. Direct labour cost - -	4	11	15	11 per ton
B. Other expenses for stores, lighting, office, etc. - -	2	6	5	10 "
C. Royalties - - -	0	2	0	3 "
D. Profits, including interest on capital - - -	2	3	3	8 "
Selling price -	9	10	25	8 "

\* The assumption so constantly made by Socialists that all interest on capital is pocketed by a few millionaires has no basis in fact. As a particular example of how widely the ownership of capital is distributed, Sir Hugh Bell, director of the North-Eastern Railway Company, informs me that the number of shareholders in that Company happens to be almost exactly the same as the number of employees.

† For details see *Newcastle Daily Journal*, 24th February 1919.

It will be noticed that item B necessarily consists mainly of payments for labour, not only in the shape of salaries for the clerks and managers in the office, but also for the labour represented in the cost of the stores, etc. When this is taken into account it may be inferred that labour received about 70 per cent. of the selling price in July 1914, and about 77 per cent. in December 1918.

The dishonest exaggeration involved in the Marxian suggestion that labour only gets 25 per cent. of the selling price is, however, a matter of small importance in comparison with the fundamental economic falsehood contained in the proposition that all the value is created by the worker. It ought to be sufficiently obvious, even to the least reflective mind, that when a labourer ploughs a field part of the value produced is attributable to the plough and to the team, and is therefore morally due to the persons who supply the plough and the team; and that when a mechanic forges a rail by operating the levers of a steam hammer, part of the value produced is due to the hammer which the 'worker' neither invented nor paid for.

Needless to say, these or similar considerations are obvious to the intellectual Socialists. Among themselves they have always laughed at the Marxian doctrine, but they know the immense value it has for purposes of revolutionary propaganda, and therefore, though the Labour movement looks to them for intellectual leadership, they make no effort to prevent the widespread dissemination of propositions which they know to be false.

This is typical of the ethical side of socialism. The Socialist begins by persuading himself that the one thing needed for the betterment of the lot of mankind is a social revolution which shall sweep away what he calls capitalism; he then proceeds to encourage every form of propaganda which is likely to stir the mob to revolution. To that end he deliberately distorts not only economic but historic facts. One of the commonest statements in Socialist leaflets and in Socialist speeches is that all the poverty to be found in the world to-day is due to capitalism. Again and again the suggestion is made that there was some golden age in the past when capital was unknown, and when the working man, unrobbed by the capitalist, was able to enjoy all the fruits of his own labour and to live in peace and contentment. So far as England is concerned the only basis for this delusion is the fact that when a more than

usually disastrous plague—such as the Black Death—had swept over the country, the serfs were able to enjoy a better time than before because the population had been temporarily reduced below the then available means of subsistence. But the broad fact is indisputable that the growth of capital has been accompanied by an immense improvement in the standard of comfort of the whole population. Indeed, the most outstanding economic phenomenon of the present day is the existence, throughout the western world, of an enormous population which is able to enjoy a very comfortable existence with many opportunities for relaxation from work and for the pursuit of pleasure. The existence of this vast well-to-do population would have been impossible but for the manner in which the accumulation of capital has added to the world's power of producing wealth. It is, of course, true that all persons are not equally well-to-do, and that much hard poverty still remains; but these facts do not even begin to justify the constant assertion by the Socialists that the contrast between rich and poor is a modern phenomenon due to capitalism. The parable of Lazarus and Dives must be fairly familiar even to Socialist orators; but there was very little capital in the world when that story was first told.\*

The simple truth is that though the rich have grown richer and more numerous with the aid of capital, the poor have grown richer too. Even the least-skilled manual labourer obtains an appreciable share of the extra wealth created by capitalism. He is better off than his father was, not because he works harder but because his puny efforts are supplemented by an increased volume of capital, which he did not save, and an improved organisation of industry which he did not plan. This truth is apparent to every one who looks around, but the Socialist would spoil his propaganda if he were for a moment to admit it; and therefore he continues to disseminate the Marxian

---

\* The zeal of the Socialists to prove that capitalism is the one and only enemy of mankind sometimes leads to humorous conclusions. For example, the author of 'The Socialism of Karl Marx,' writes:— 'When men lived by hunting and fishing they lived in tribal communism; private property was unknown; they shared food and danger alike; and all stood as equal blood brothers, bound by kinship in one gens or social-unit. With surplus wealth sprang up social classes. . . . Also, prisoners taken in battle were no longer slain and eaten, but kept as slaves to labour for their captors.' So that the curse of capitalism is finally to be traced to the abandonment by our misguided ancestors of the good old custom of eating their prisoners of war.

falsehood that the development of capital means the progressive impoverishment of labour.

A professed idealism based on a wilful misrepresentation of facts does not seem likely to be of much practical use to the world. It is therefore not surprising to find that the Socialist in the actual proposals which he puts forward, ignores the ideals which he professes. On no point are Socialists more eloquent than on the beauty of the ideal of public service. Under socialism the desire to render public service will take the place of the vulgar individualistic pursuit of gain; all labour troubles will spontaneously cease, and every man will give his best service for the common good. That is the tale; what is the reality? *The experience of every country is that men in all classes of life, with hardly an exception, give worse service when employed by the State than when working for a private employer.* The reasons to explain this universal fact are not far to seek. In the first place, the employee of the State has no fear of dismissal if he is idle or inefficient, and very little hope of promotion if he is active and enterprising. Consequently the selfish motives in man which stimulate energy under the capitalistic system cease to operate under the socialistic system. In the second place the unselfish motives, on which the Socialist professes to rely, fail even more completely. Theoretically men ought to be eager to do better work and to be content with lower pay when working for the community than when working for a private employer. In practice they are not. In practice the altruistic instincts in man are not called forth by the appeal of a vague entity like the State to the same extent that they are called forth by human sympathy with an individual employer. Men who would hesitate to cheat a private employer think it no shame to rob the State to the utmost of their opportunities, the reason being that they regard the State as a gigantic impersonal abstraction, with no capacity to feel injuries and endless capacity to meet losses. Again and again during the war men working on Government contracts have gone to their employers and asked for a rise in wages on the openly stated ground that the extra wage would not hurt the employer because he could recover it from the Government. Thus in practice the altruistic spirit of service which exists in varying degrees in all decent men is less to be relied upon under public than under private employment. There is consequently under State management no counterbalancing altruistic force to make good the loss of

those selfish motives which, under private management, stimulate individual energy. Nor is such individual energy only beneficial—as the Socialists habitually pretend—to the private individual; for very few private businesses can achieve success unless they are serving a public need. The law of the market compels the private individual, while pursuing his own gain, to work also for the common good.

If special proof be sought of the complete failure of socialism to call forth the altruistic spirit of service, we have only to note the fact that during the war, when the life of the nation depended on a plentiful supply of coal and on the continuous running of the railways, the miners and the railwaymen repeatedly threatened to strike in order to enforce against the State demands far in excess of anything they had put forward when working for private capitalists. On the plea that the cost of living had risen they extorted for themselves additional payments, which put them in a far better position than large numbers of their fellow-citizens, whose cost of living they were still further increasing by their selfish action. It is significant of the real ethics of socialism that on no occasion have the intellectual leaders of the Socialist Party denounced in the terms it deserved this shameless plunder of the State.

Nor is the position bettered when State socialism has been established for a considerable period so as to permit the alleged higher morality of the Socialists to come into operation. Australia and New Zealand have long possessed State railways and also possess many State mines; but the evidence of Sir Charles Wade and Mr. F. M. B. Fisher before the Coal Commission shows that strikes are frequent among these employees of the State. Yet if State organisation of industry has any merit at all it ought at least to be able to prevent strikes. No theory of public service can possibly justify men who are engaged on work of public necessity in agreeing together to cease work simultaneously, to the grave injury of the community. Even in an individualistic community strikes in such cases ought to be treated as criminal; all the more ought they to be so treated when the strikers have not even the excuse that their action is primarily directed against a 'profiteering' employer. Yet the Socialists are always found on the side of the strikers, even when the strike is against the State.

That this attitude of the Socialists is no mere accident is proved by the Report signed by the six Socialists who sat on the Coal Industry Commission. Mr. Justice Sankey, in recommend-

ing nationalisation of the mines—for the sole purpose, as he explains, of pacifying the miners—is careful to stipulate that the miners, when they become the employees of the State, must forego the right to strike until the question in dispute has been heard by a tribunal which he proposes to set up for the purpose. Apparently if the decision of the tribunal is not satisfactory to the miners they are then to be free to hold the nation to ransom. But the significant fact is that even the temporary safeguard against strikes which Mr. Justice Sankey proposed is rejected by the six Socialists who dominated the Commission over which he formally presided. In their separate Report they bluntly reject this part of his scheme, though he had shown the importance he attached to it by repeating it in three separate clauses. A better illustration of the dishonesty which underlies the Socialist pretence of public service need not be sought. Never once have the six Socialists on the Coal Commission appealed to the miners to serve the nation; on the contrary they have consistently backed the miners in plundering the nation. The lightning strike is an instrument with which any well-organised body of workmen employed on work of national necessity can rob their fellow-citizens for their private advantage, and the Socialists, knowing this, insist that the miners shall retain the power of the lightning strike, even when the mines become the property of the State.

That Socialists should thus cynically flout the public interest, which they profess to regard as their peculiar care, is ultimately due to the fact that the real ethics of socialism are the ethics of war. What the Socialists want is not progress in the world as we know it, but destruction of that world as a prelude to the creation of a new world of their own imagining. In order to win that end they have to seek the support of every force that makes for disorder, and to appeal to every motive that stimulates class hatred. As stated at the beginning of this article, their ethical outlook is the direct reverse of that which has inspired all the great religions of the world. Instead of seeking to attain peace upon earth and goodwill among men, they have chosen for their goal universal warfare, and they deliberately make their appeal to the passions of envy, hatred, and malice.

EDITOR.

---

*No. 470 will be published in October 1919*

261

# The Edinburgh Review

OCTOBER, 1919

No. 470

---

## MUNITIONS AND MR. LLOYD GEORGE

WHEN Mr. Lloyd George established the Munitions Department in 1915 he inherited a great organisation built up by the Master-General of the Ordnance acting under Lord Kitchener's orders. Instead of acknowledging this fact, he allowed and encouraged the public to believe that the action taken before he intervened was inefficient, and that without his intervention the war would have been lost. In what follows I shall give a more just appreciation of the t. I write of what I know, for I spent thirty years in connection with the manufacture and supply of war material, and I have been in touch with all the great ordnance factories in England for years before the war. During the war I was asked by my friend, the Master-General, to assist in expediting supply, and no one had better opportunity of knowing what was done and the difficulty of doing it.

Throughout February 1915 there had been growing dissatisfaction with the treatment of the labour question. 'If Government would speak out and say straightforwardly what they want' was the dominant note. At that time there was no public mention of shortage of ammunition, though then, more than later, there was cause for anxiety.

---

All rights reserved.

In March references to ammunition began to creep into public utterances: 'The expenditure has been on a scale and at a rate which is not only without precedent, but far in excess of any expert forecast.' (Mr. Asquith on 1st March.) On 15th March, Lord Kitchener, speaking in the House of Lords, sounded a serious note of uneasiness: 'We have unfortunately found that the output is not only not equal to our necessities, but does not fulfil our expectations.' On the 18th, Mr. Lloyd George, speaking at the Treasury to the Trade Unions representatives, said: 'You know the position is a serious one. You know it by the speech delivered by Lord Kitchener in the House of Lords. . . . Even in the best prepared country the pressure is beyond anything anyone ever expected.'

On 20th March the *Times* touched the truth very aptly: 'The Government continue to shelter themselves behind Lord Kitchener. . . . No one ever expected him to guide and instruct democracy, that is the business of the party leaders.' On the same date Lord Aberconway foreshadowed a 'Central organisation . . . presided over by the most energetic and open-minded member of the Government.'

On 8th April the *Times* shifted its ground. It was no longer only the question of labour, the organisation of which was the duty of the labour leaders—the blame rested with the War Office:—

'The War Office has sought to do too much. It has applied to this gigantic conflict the principles observed in little wars, and the consequences have been bad. . . . It cannot hope to organise the nation, which its own chief has in many ways curiously failed to understand. It should state its requirements, and leave to others the far more complex task of organising industry.'

Again, on 13th April, the *Times* wrote:—

'The business of producing war material has been badly bungled, and we have no assurance that the position is realised even now, or that the necessary steps have been taken to make good the discredited failure that has already occurred through lack of foresight and an intelligent grasp of the problem.'

By the following day, Mr. Lloyd George having been appointed president of the first industrial organising committee, the tone of the *Times* was more magnanimous: 'So far as we are aware there was no serious breakdown anywhere, and to that extent the Ordnance Department amply deserves the praise (?) it has received.'



On 20th April Mr. Asquith made that speech at Newcastle which has been the subject of recent controversy. On the following day Mr. Lloyd George spoke in the House of Commons:—

‘The great surprise of the war has been the amount of ammunition which we have had to expend. . . . During the fighting in and around Neuve Chapelle almost as much ammunition was expended by our artillery as during the whole two-and-three-quarter years of the Boer War. *The whole of the ammunition has been supplied. There is a reserve at the present moment* (my italics).\* . . . But when we are criticising I think it is fair that the country should know of the prodigious things that have been done. . . . I think the House will realise from what I have said that the problem is being tackled in serious earnest and that great things have been done—I think wonderful things.’

I do not attempt to read the riddle of these contradictory statements. At the beginning the intention may have been to influence the Trade Unions to relax their rules; afterwards there was more than this; it almost looked as if Mr. Lloyd George was hoping for the reversion of the War Office and found it desirable to defend the position. For my purpose it is enough that the War Office had bungled badly, but had done wonderful things; had observed the methods of little wars, but had provided ammunition for a fortnight’s expenditure equal to that of the Boer War plus a reserve; had deserved praise, but had been a discreditable failure.

At the end of May the nine-year-old Liberal Government fell, and Mr. Lloyd George’s opportunity came. The Exchequer in taxation days is not a post that leads to popularity, nor had his handling of it increased his reputation. In this new undertaking a big splash was possible, and with his usual pluck Mr. Lloyd George dived straight in. But the splash was to be his, every ripple of it. From this moment onwards there was no room to give credit to anyone outside the new Ministry.

Within a few days at Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Cardiff, Bristol, he spoke, introducing himself in his new capacity as business manager. Now was the opportunity for some modesty in taking over an inheritance which already had an

---

\* In view of recent disclosures (see *Times*, 19th September 1919) it is remarkable that, subsequent to 31st March 1915, Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Mr. Lloyd George all spoke with confidence of the immediate position.

immense flow of 'goods delivered,' and an immediate prospect of a flood of the same from workshops in England and Scotland, from Canada, from India, from the United States. Some public reference to all this, some explaining of the necessity for the new dispensation, something generous in short to counteract the impression which was abroad would have cost so little and meant so much. But of this there was nothing: 'I will deal as little as possible with the past. I am only concerned with the causes of the shortage in equipment.' (House of Commons, 23rd June.)

It would be charitable to assume that his failure to acknowledge his indebtedness to those who preceded him was accidental, but when opportunities were offered him for such acknowledgment he ignored them. For example, on 1st July Sir H. Dalziel said in the debate on the new Munitions Bill: 'Who is there who would be bold enough to deny to-day that the Ordnance Department as at present constituted has wholly and absolutely forfeited the confidence of the nation; who will deny that it has completely and abjectly broken down? . . . Its management has become a scandal and its blunders innumerable.'

Here was a direct uncompromising accusation—and remembering his own statement not six weeks old—'Great things have been done—I think wonderful things'—one would have expected from Mr. Lloyd George a scathing and indignant repudiation of the charges made against the Ordnance Department. We have instead an implied acceptance of the statement:—

'What is much more important for the moment . . . is that we shall guarantee that any mistakes shall not be repeated. . . . The past is gone and irretrievably lost if the lesson is not learnt. . . . The responsibility must be placed on the right shoulders. This cannot be done now. A time will come when we can safely give the facts, and that will be the time to judge. I would not guarantee, if I was starting where others started nine or ten months ago, that I would not have made the same mistakes.'

The note of modesty in the last sentence is very pleasing, but it inferentially implies a further endorsement of the false charges made by Sir H. Dalziel. It also implies that Mr. Lloyd George was entirely free from responsibility. Yet he had been, since October 1914, a member of a committee specially created to deal with increasing the supply of munitions.

In pursuance of his policy of giving all credit to the new

Ministry at the expense of the War Office, Mr. Lloyd George sought to impress his hearers with a number of details, comparatively trifling in themselves but all tending inferentially to confirm the negligence of the War Office. Thus on 20th December 1915 in the House of Commons he said, 'We sent representatives to America to order new machinery, and, acting in conjunction with Messrs. J. P. Morgan, they have been able to place there the necessary orders.' He failed to add that Messrs. Morgan had been appointed, as far back as January 1915, to co-ordinate prices, make contracts and prevent the rushing up of quotations under strong competition of buyers in England. The appointment was made, I believe, by the War Cabinet at the instance of the War Office. Moreover, representatives of the War Office had been sent to co-operate with Morgan's before Mr. Lloyd George's activity began. If 'millions' were saved by the arrangement, the credit is not his.

And again: 'We organised a system of weekly progress reports to be sent in by every contracting firm throughout the country. . . . Not a bad way of getting contractors to stir up.' Mr. Kellaway refers to this again in June of this year: 'One of Mr. Lloyd George's first acts as Minister of Munitions was to call for weekly progress reports, etc.' Obviously there was much virtue in this system, and it bulked large in the eyes of the Minister. But how about the printed reports of the War Office, which had existed from the beginning, together with forecasts of production for four ensuing weeks? These were regularly submitted to me, followed weekly by a report of 'actuals' as against forecasts. Perhaps these reports were improved upon, but the language used by Mr. Lloyd George clearly implies that he, or his advisers, invented the whole system, and that this simple and necessary measure was neglected by the War Office. Yet there were several of Mr. Lloyd George's young men who might have told him all about it, for they had sent plenty of these reports before ever they rose to eminence in his Ministry.

And again: '*We* set up forty local munition committees . . . *we* had four different co-operative schemes by which we utilised to the full private firms.' In fact, both these systems were inaugurated by Lord Kitchener. The East Coast Armament Committee, a similar organisation on the Clyde, others in process of formation, were all inherited by Mr. Lloyd George, and as for

co-operative schemes, the first was started at Leicester on the 23rd March by myself, under Lord Kitchener's instructions.

Mr. Kellaway, in his speech on 24th June 1919 in the House of Commons, had much to tell about the system of costing, which he claimed to be the first measure of its kind introduced by a Government Department. We were told wonderful things about it; how Sir Somebody This and Sir Anybody That had enabled three hundred millions to be saved. Yet long before the war the cost of every operation on every component of every item of war material was known to a fraction; even more, the earning power of every machine in a well ordered factory was known. The War Office costing system only needed expansion; the suggestion that the Munitions Ministry had evolved an entirely new invention was absolutely without foundation.

Endless illustrations could be given of the skill with which the men, who were employed to boom the new Ministry, practised the art of political advertisement. For example, the country heard from Mr. Kellaway with a thrill of gratitude that the Ministry had reduced the cost of rifles from £4. 1s. to £3. 8s., of Lewis guns from £165 to £62, and so on. Ten millions saved on Lewis guns alone! Prodigious! What is really prodigious is the audacity, or the simplicity, of the speaker. Does Mr. Kellaway really believe that this saving was effected solely by the efficiency of the Ministry of Munitions? It is a matter of everyday experience that if the first cost of a new instrument, say a Lewis gun in its experimental stages at the beginning of the war, was £165, then the last cost of the same gun when made in thousands would automatically be reduced to a fraction of the former figure. If Mr. Kellaway is ignorant of this elementary fact, and if his advisers are equally ignorant, it is easy to understand why 'so sad a mess' was made of the accounts, as Mr. Kellaway himself admits. In all cases initial costs have to bear a number of charges which continuation orders do not, and the War Office, or anybody else with everyday experience, would set a lower standard of price for a continuation order.

A little anecdote in this connexion is worth repeating: 'Now that the war has been won,' said Mr. Kellaway in the House of Commons on 24th June last, 'it was as well that they 'should recall the extent to which this country had been

'dependent on Germany for essential things. We started the 'war on German fuses for our shells, with German sights for our 'guns.' This is a make-your-flesh-creep kind of statement, which would have come better at the time when mysterious motor cars guided Zeppelins about the Norfolk lanes, when poisoned chocolates and packets of assorted disease germs dropped from aeroplanes, and concrete gun platforms were discovered daily. Now it is too late; dope is no longer required to prevent an inquisitive public from knowing what was going on. Its only effect now, the one intended perhaps, is to make men say, 'Think of it! That War Office! How did we win the war?'

Different people may infer different things from this story. I will try to cover them all. We never purchased fuses or 'sights for our guns' in Germany. The same patterns of fuses and sights with which we began the war continued in use throughout the war, and are still in use. There never was a moment's uneasiness during the war regarding their manufacture, except as to quantity. The small 'shaving' of fact that accompanies Mr. Kellaway's story—necessary, of course, to make a plausible reply possible in case of attack—is that fifteen years ago or so an English firm purchased from a German firm certain patent rights in a German system of fuse making, and possibly continued for several years to pay some small royalty. The British Government of the day adopted the principle with certain alterations, and paid a royalty to the English firm, though I am under the impression that the patent rights had lapsed before the war. The fuse or fuses as they stand now are very nearly as English as a Bath bun or a Banbury cake, which may, indeed, themselves have come from Germany in bygone years for anything I know to the contrary.

As to gun sights—by which I suppose Mr. Kellaway means the independent laying system essential to quick-firing ordnance—I believe they originated in France, the birthplace of the principle. Every nation has now its own design, and we have ours. The 'shaving' of truth this time may be in the use of German or Austrian lenses in the telescopes, but I have no knowledge that even this is a fact. Certainly it was not a fact during the war. We might just as well claim that the Germans used English guns during the war, for the Armstrong sliding breech block was the forerunner of the Krupp system.

Nor was Mr. Lloyd George's propaganda confined to public speaking and to newspaper statements. The idea that the stupendous work of supplying the new armies was entirely due to the Ministry of Munitions found its way into less ephemeral utterances. Accidentally or otherwise a most talented authoress undertook the task of enlightening the nation on some phases of 'England's Effort.' Her book is engrossing from end to end, and has been and is being read by thousands. It is semi-official to this extent, that the writer was conducted in her search for information by Government officials. Under the guidance of an official of the Ministry of Munitions she made a tour of the centres of production, and we are told of the effort which sprang into life under the magic wand of Mr. Lloyd George: 'The really marvellous movement which since July (1915) has covered England with new munition factories.' But in the word-painting that follows I recognise places that I have seen born, brought up, and put to useful careers before ever a Ministry of Munitions was thought of. I know the rifle factory referred to; in my time it had only three storeys; now apparently it has a fourth, and *more suo* Mr. Lloyd George claims parentage for the foundation as well. I know the factory where a 'steel pole' introduced at one end of a machine emerged as nine shells at the other. I have congratulated the owners on their first out-turn. I have seen much—if not the greater part—of the acres of buildings where women work on fuses and cartridge making; it was created under War Office orders. *Par parenthèse* I may mention that this class of work always was done by women within my memory.

Mrs. Humphrey Ward, however, was not entirely blind, in spite of the official veil held before her eyes. There nestles in her book a little statement, not too conspicuous, but suggestive: 'Much no doubt had been done earlier, for which the new 'Ministry has perhaps unjustly got the credit.' That is all. It proves Mrs. Ward's good sense and good faith, but two lines in all these pages do not suffice to dissipate the general impression created. I do not think I am wrong in supposing that the official of the Ministry who guided the talented authoress round these wonderful places was immensely satisfied with the success of his manœuvres.

The proceedings that marked the establishment of the

Ministry in England were repeated on very similar lines in Canada. Mr. Lloyd George sent a mission to New York and Ottawa. I was a member of it. What we found in Canada in July 1915 was an immense organisation, employing several hundred firms, each busy in its degree on the manufacture of components, which were brought together, assembled, and shipped to England. It was the very kind of organisation which Mr. Lloyd George himself advocated in England. It had spread its orders, so that a large part of the Dominion took a share.

These Canadians had started on nothing; the vast majority of them had never seen a shell; certainly none of them had made one. Not a penny of Government subsidy to finance their operations had been asked for—very different to the case of the United States or even of England, where large advances on the orders were the rule. The Canadian manufacturers worked for patriotism, and not one of those who entered the business at first could see anything but loss. The results were astonishing. The first orders for 18-pounder shrapnel shells were received in September 1914. One hundred thousand, I think, was the number. Before the end of the year a further large order was given, and afterwards vast numbers were ordered. The first consignment of finished shells was shipped in December 1914, and rapidly increasing numbers followed in succeeding months. By March 1915 the first order had been completed. By June half a million more were finished. A great sum of money had been saved which was returned to England, for the work had been let out at rates considerably below the English contract prices.

Nothing more remarkable or more praiseworthy was done in the line of manufacture during the whole course of the war, and I well remember how welcome the first Canadian consignments were at a time when our resources were severely strained. The Committee which controlled this organisation were single-minded, straightforward men. I have never met men who were more so. In the early days the manufacturers looked askance at this class of work; it was new and unknown. It was not easy to find men to undertake it or to control it. Those who did so deserved every consideration and support. Yet they had to go, in compliance with the views of the Ministry at home, and a new body—very capable no doubt—took their place. As

in England in the like case, they went without any public acknowledgment of their services. The crowning offence took place last November, when Mr. Lloyd George cabled on behalf of the War Cabinet his congratulations to the Chairman of the new body—

‘on the great work of the Imperial Munitions Board *during the last three years*. As the Board was appointed by me when I was Minister of Munitions, it is particularly pleasurable to me to recognise the success, efficiency, and value of its work, and to thank you, and through you, your staff, the Canadian manufacturers, and the great army of workers, who so splendidly assisted you, for the great service rendered.’

Mr. Winston Churchill cabled in similar terms, and confined his thanks to the same period.

However excellent the work of the body appointed by Mr. Lloyd George may have been, the spade work in Canada, the truly difficult work, was done by the first Shell Committee during the eighteen months from the beginning of the war. If the omission of any meed of public thanks to this body was an oversight it was a *bêtise*; if it was intentional, there is no polite word in any language to describe it.

In April 1916 Mr. Kellaway, speaking at Bedford, pronounced this benediction on Mr. Lloyd George’s creation :—

‘We know on the evidence of every careful observer at the front that our armies are abundantly and magnificently equipped. . . . What the German has done after forty-four years of ceaseless organisation, this country has done in less than a quarter as many months (*i.e.*, since the creation of the Ministry). I am confident that history will say that Mr. Lloyd George’s work in connexion with the Ministry of Munitions is the greatest piece of work achieved by one man that this or any other country has ever seen. If ever a man has earned the proud title of being the saviour of his country it is the Minister of Munitions.’

Sir Douglas Haig, in his last dispatch of April 1919, was considerably less enthusiastic :—‘It was not until the midsummer ‘of 1916 that the artillery situation became even approximately ‘adequate to the conduct of major operations. Throughout the ‘Somme battle the expenditure of artillery ammunition had to ‘be watched with the greatest care.’ It is almost a pity to be obliged to discount the accuracy of so ardent an admirer of his own department as Mr. Kellaway.

That the War Office was unfitted to deal with all the problems created by the war I fully admit. When the tentacles of this all-embracing war extended to controlling the sources of



all raw materials, necessitating financial dealings with foreign countries; when the liberty of the subject and the trade of the kingdom became involved, then certainly matters outside the duties or ken of the War Office entered into the question, and the creation of special machinery to deal with these matters became a necessity. In its inception the Ministry of Munitions was limited to 'supply of munitions; it would remain for the fighting department to indicate the nature, the extent, and the urgency of their needs, and distribute the supplies made available.' (Sir John Simon, 8th June 1915.) Even this went too far; but the restrictions laid down were soon swept away. Nature, quantities, and everything else went to the Ministry. Had the new Ministry confined itself to the labour question, and to the commercial problem of securing machinery and raw material, leaving to the Master-General of the Ordnance, to the Admiralty, and to the Air Board the business of manufacture, quantity, and design, I think the fighting forces and the country would have been better served.

The above pages suffice to prove, if any proof were needed, that the authors and the agents of the Ministry of Munitions deliberately set themselves to create the impression that the War Office had been guilty of culpable tardiness, and that the new Ministry had saved the nation. Let us then now see what the War Office actually did.

'Within the limits of their powers the War Office did wonders,' is the very belated acknowledgment of Mr. Kellaway on 24th June last. The tone is gracious and condescending. Had the powers of the War Office been expanded at the proper time and in the proper way the 'wonders' which were certainly done would have continued in still greater degree. We hear nowadays that there was too lavish expenditure on the means of production—that the thing was overdone. I have little sympathy with people who begin to find fault with measures taken for their safety as soon as the danger is over. Without a Commission appointed to examine all the evidence it is futile to discuss the question. Mr. Kellaway himself, however, supplies evidence that such a Commission would be justifiable, for, describing the huge losses incurred during the German offensive in April 1918, he says that the 'workshops' made them good in a fortnight, and he gives figures which seem to indicate a manufacturing capacity of 5000 tons of shells daily; the context

implies that this large quantity is from British workshops alone. There are, however, other figures in the same speech which suggest that Mr. Kellaway was more concerned to sound the Munitions trumpet than to disseminate facts. He says, for example, that on the day the 'British army broke the Hindenburg' line they fired 943,837 shells—a weight of 40,000 tons.' This is a fine resounding kind of figure, but it can scarcely be true, and I notice that Sir Charles Parsons, speaking as President of the British Association a few weeks ago, put the weight of the same number of shells at 18,085 tons, which is much more probable.

The gravamen of Mr. Lloyd George's charge is that the War Office was 'tardy' in developing the nation's resources. Was it?

In the last days of July 1914, when war was in every man's thoughts, the heads of the War Office must have viewed with something like consternation the state of affairs which confronted them, and no one more so than the Master-General of the Ordnance. The Liberal Government, so long in power, had fixed our military basis on the standard of about 120,000 men, sufficient they said for expeditions beyond the sea. This modest force was not too well provided with light artillery; it was almost unprovided with medium artillery, and totally unprovided with heavy artillery.

War came in four days, and the range of the struggle developed so rapidly that five months later the problem was to maintain a million men in the field, and to provide them with equipment which day by day exceeded in quantity and differed in design from that which, in the opinion of every expert of pre-war days, had been thought necessary. The capacity of the country to manufacture munitions had been starved almost to extinction during the years of peace. Many thousands of men had been discharged from Woolwich Arsenal; the great ordnance firms, or such part of them as had been engaged on army work, had turned their swords into ploughshares; for there were no orders except for the Navy. One of the leading men said to me when standing in a great workshop in which every kind of shell-making machine was being hastily erected, brought together from all over England and America: 'This very shop up to two years ago was fitted for making the very shells we are now crying out for. I could get no orders. I

'had to scrap the machinery and turn the buildings over to 'other purposes.' Our pre-war rate of manufacture—so we are officially told—was 55,000 rounds *annually*. Divide that among even half a dozen makers, and each would have, say, thirty rounds a day, a dozen or so of one kind, half a dozen of another, two or three of a third, and so on. This was the state of inanition in which our establishments for the production of ammunition lay in July 1914. The productions of guns, rifles, and vehicles was on a similar scale, hardly any of the first, a few of the others.

There had been loose talk in Government circles about six months being sufficient within which to enlist and train armies. But, so far as I know, the question of munitions was never talked about, either loosely or seriously. Had a moderate number of factories been kept in going order by means of a subsidy, had reserves on a reasonable scale been maintained even at considerable cost for turnover and deterioration, had the Government aided by every means the supply of guns, rifles, and ammunition to foreign Powers, and thus kept the workpeople employed, as the German and Austrian Governments did, then we should have started with something to work on; but none of these things was done.

To those who understand what the manufacture of war material means, the immensity of the task which faced the War Office at the end of July 1914 must be apparent. The layman has little idea of what constitutes a plant for making any given item. For shells there are furnaces, which take time to build, even many days to heat; heavy hydraulic forging machinery with its pumping accessories; steam boilers; great lathes; smaller lathes; shaping and milling tools; complicated chemical apparatus that must be handled carefully and installed with exceeding caution, or life will be endangered. The whole of these were difficult to get, difficult to transport, difficult to erect, difficult to set into going order. Men, men, men were wanted on all sides, and men, experienced in each complex machine, were especially wanted to train others.

Nor was it possible in those early days—when many people talked glibly of the war being over by Christmas—to sit down and carefully calculate the requirements of two or three millions of fighting men engaged in trench warfare in France, in landings at Gallipoli, in desert fighting in Egypt and Palestine,

in advances up the Tigris, in East African forests. There are wisecracks now who claim to have foreseen all these unforeseeable developments, but that always happens. In fact, the great business of creating armies grew gradually—first a hundred thousand men, then another, and another. Neither the Treasury nor the country in the early days of the war would have viewed with favour preparations on the scale that ultimately became necessary. The *Times*, in January 1915, referred to the 'huge 'armies' being raised and equipped, yet the number voted at that time was only 1,186,000 men. Thus the task, immense as its known dimensions made it, was rendered still more perplexing by its constant growth and its unknown future.

This is what faced the War Office. To it fell the duty of setting the great endless business in motion. When Mr. Lloyd George began to intervene in May 1915, the greater part of the work was done; fast or slow the machine was in motion; the further tasks to be accomplished were trivial in comparison with what had already been achieved. Let us give Mr. Lloyd George all the credit and all the praise that even he could desire for expanding the War Office work, and especially for his energy in promoting labour legislation and speaking on behalf of increased effort, both in and out of the House. Yet let us not forget that the War Office expansion of output, great as it was by May 1915, was still in process of further rapid increase. It is more than probable that the arrangements made by the War Office, with the possibilities of expansion which they contained, would have fully met all our requirements. At any rate this is certain, that up to April 1916 the supplies received by our armies in the field were the result of the War Office arrangements, for it was not until that month that the orders placed by the Ministry of Munitions began to materialise. Suppose that in the summer of 1915 a prominent politician had come forward, not to make a reputation for himself, but to assist Lord Kitchener with the difficulties of the labour problem, it is at least possible that even better results than the Ministry obtained would have been more quickly achieved; it is certain that the cost to the nation would have been immensely less.

The placing of orders for the required supply was not in itself a serious difficulty, though even for this the contracts department of the War Office was seriously overworked. These

were not the days of hotels and thousands of clerks, and at that time the Treasury would not have sanctioned such extravagance as later became common, though on quantities of material ordered it wisely placed no limits. Small arms ammunition was ordered by the hundred millions, shells and all their adjuncts in millions, rifles, guns and their equipment in enormous numbers. Every workshop capable of the work in the United Kingdom, in the United States, in Canada, was filled; India was called upon; Japan also helped. Many of the orders were 'continuation orders', which meant *carte blanche* to make as much as possible.

Rifles of divers patterns were obtained from all sorts of places, but these were for training only, and were useless for the fighting line. I remember a certain supposed *cache* of rifles in some South American State which reappeared at intervals like a will-o'-the-wisp. Several officers were sent to find it, but I believe it was never run to earth. Everybody, big or small, who asked for work got it, and the prices given varied with the circumstances. It was a big business, and it was strenuously carried out. The patience and the resourcefulness of the head of the Master-General's contract branch were, to me at all events, a cause of admiration. When Mr. Lloyd George came into possession of all these accumulating orders I doubt greatly, had it not been for the Russian disasters of 1915, if he need have ordered another item.

The essential business was to see that what had been ordered was rapidly supplied. The workshops of Great Britain, for reasons already mentioned, were totally inadequate to meet the demand. Many contracts were accepted and promises made which were beyond the powers of the contractors to fulfil. It would almost appear that each contractor thought of himself alone without remembering that every other firm was expanding, and that in such circumstances the labour market must be soon drained. The contractors worked with desperate energy to meet their engagements. Not one of them but realised how much depended on their efforts. To say they were 'tardy,' if that word connotes in any degree 'dilatatory,' is to say what is untrue.

Buildings were put in hand all over the country. Each of the great ordnance firms had a programme under execution which in peace days would have been remarkable had it been

undertaken as the joint work of several. I have seen streets pulled down to make room for expansion; I have stood in buildings where not many weeks before had been green fields or populated alleys. The work was hampered seriously by the abnormal weather; nothing but the determination of the building contractors to see the work pushed through saved the situation; their men willingly assisted. Often I have seen men digging, building, erecting, in pouring rain, covered by any kind of sacking, or under tarpaulins; wet through all the time, but working cheerfully. I cannot say what total area was covered by new buildings under the War Office orders, or what proportion it bears to the area built afterwards, but I venture to assert that it was a goodly part of the whole, and Mr. Lloyd George stepped into a heritage very different from that which was the property of the War Office when war broke out.

Apart from new workshops already producing and commencing rapidly to overtake their arrears in May 1915, there were many recently complete and about to add their quota. Mr. Lloyd George said himself that the output of November was four and a half times that of September; December nearly eight times, February nearly thirteen times, March nearly twenty times. Beyond this point the record does not continue, but I know that the *great* flow from England, Canada, and the United States commenced in April, and increased rapidly in volume in succeeding months.

The equipment of all these great workshops with machinery was a far greater difficulty in the first six months than afterwards. In the first few weeks of the war thousands of machines were brought over from America, and stocks there were quickly exhausted. American tool makers worked day and night to overtake orders which constantly flowed in from the War Office. The machine tool makers in Great Britain were equally busy. Nevertheless, it very often happened in the early days that shops were erected and waiting for machines; sometimes a whole shopful of machinery was held up for one or two essential articles. This could not be helped; machines of every kind were wanted, and the building of these, most of them of great accuracy, was not light work, capable of being put through in a short time. Still it was done. By March most of the new factories were at work.

And then arose, or at least culminated, the greatest problem

of all—the labour question. It hit us at every turn. The unskilled labourer was not at first so prominent a factor as afterwards when things were going. The initial work required a great proportion of skilled mechanics; but in March we required both, the one to train the other. The War Office was fully alive to the possibilities of training women. Lord Kitchener was urgent in the matter: 'Get women into the factories; get 'thousands of them!' were his words on one occasion to me. There were even then large numbers, but the difficulty at that time in increasing the numbers lay not only in the trade unions, but in the shortage of skilled men to train the women. At Barrow a shop working on shells and employing women only was at work in January by local agreement with the trade union officials. And here I may mention that in very many instances these officials helped the War Office greatly, often stretching their powers to do so. But the difficulties were so great that the impression which I gained all over the country was that they could only be overcome by action on the part of Government. Yet it was strangely difficult to persuade Ministers to do anything. They were afraid to risk their popularity, especially those who had committed themselves to recognition of trade union principles without troubling to consider what those principles involved.

In another direction, too, the War Office was faced with the labour problem. It had to balance the requirements of the Adjutant-General against those of the Master-General of Ordnance. It is a curious fact, which anyone who takes the trouble to look through the newspapers between August 1914 and February 1915 will find for himself, that leading articles, speeches, and letters appeared in profusion about men for the ranks, while no mention is made of the importance of getting men for the machines. I had many meetings with the Adjutant-General during this time. He was always courteous and patient, but his prime necessity was troops. I had proposed a system of issuing badges to ordnance workers; the Master-General had approved and, finally, the King had sanctioned a scheme. But here arose a sea of troubles, for recruiting officers in their zeal constantly captured the badge holders; works managers wrote their lamentations, and the Adjutant-General found it hard to curtail the zeal of his officers, or to give us back the men. Indeed, very frequently, to their credit, the men did not want to come back.

The long hours and continuous seven days' working began to produce the inevitable result, and the men became restless and on edge—'fed-up' we call it. They had no lack of patriotism, but they wanted a strong lead. Mr. G. H. Roberts spoke of their 'spirit of unrestrained willingness to render the 'fullest possible assistance,' and I am sure he spoke truly; but there came no action from the Government. The Master-General deputed me to see Sir George Askwith towards the end of January, and to put our difficulties before him. At his request I made it clear how great was the gap between promised output and actual deliveries. Not half the estimated results were coming in, and the deficiency was, to a large extent, due to lack of labour and bad timekeeping. We discussed, in particular, the trade union rules as regarded employment of unskilled workers and the problem of female labour. Sir George did not let the matter rest, but used his great influence and wide experience for good. At the same time I drew up a general statement which my experience and that of others suggested: the means of widening the field of selection; encouragement to keep better time; more power for employers; prevention of competition for labour in the same market. All were mentioned, and the remedies suggested included legislation to permit the employment of men and women on semi-skilled work; learners, male and female, to be attached to every machine, so as to draft them with some knowledge to new machines; compulsory closing of such private workshops as were not engaged on war work; visits of great personages to encourage the workers; a Press campaign on judicious lines for the same purpose; the mapping out-of the whole country into areas to prevent competition for labour.

I should not like to say that public interest in the labour question commenced as the result of these things, but at all events the ball began to roll very soon afterwards. On 5th February the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, formed a committee to deal with the question of organising labour so as to get the best results from the productive capacity of the nation. On the 9th Mr. Tennant spoke in the House, laying special stress on the necessity for relaxing trade union rules. The *Times* followed with a leading article pressing for a stronger lead from Government. On the 27th Sir George Askwith held a conference with the employers and recorded the opinion:—



'That the production of shells and fuses would be considerably accelerated if there were relaxations of the present practice of trade unions, and urged the suitability of female labour already at work in some shops.'

On 28th February Mr. Lloyd George entered the arena for the first time publicly, and spoke of this as a war of workshops. Ten days later (10th March) Mr. Lloyd George brought in a Bill to amend the Defence Act and to confer power on the Government to control workshops not engaged on war material. Mr. Bonar Law, in supporting the Bill, said that if it had been asked for six months earlier it would have been granted. With submission, I think this is not so. It would have been no more possible to bring in conscription of labour, which is what this Bill did in practice, than to have brought in military universal service in the first days of the war. 'Business as usual' had been the cry from Government circles downwards, and the new Bill was in direct conflict with that popular cry. It required the hard logic of facts to bring the country up to the scratch. If the Government, including Mr. Lloyd George, had brought facts home earlier, instead of spoon-feeding the people with an optimism for which there was little ground, the results would have been obtained sooner. The Order in Council authorising action on the Bill is dated 24th March 1915.

I have dwelt perhaps unduly on this question of labour, but I wished to show that the initiation of labour legislation came from the War Office, and looking back on all that was done I cannot think that the Master-General left any stone unturned to stir the Government into greater activity. If what was done in the latter end of March could have been done earlier the blame for the delay rests with the War Cabinet and not with the War Office.

On the subject of high explosives I intend to say very little, because the issues involved are essentially the same as those dealt with above, though the details differ. This question formed the forefront of Mr. Lloyd George's battle line. It was the main ground of the attack on the War Office. As the *Times* stated—and the *Times* ought to know—the Ministry of Munitions was 'created primarily to supply the deficiency of high explosive shells' (21st December 1915). Yet I venture to doubt whether, at the time of the attack, the real position was fully understood by any of the critics of the War Office. Certainly, from the

statements made in the Press, no one could have gathered that high explosive shells had long constituted the major part of the equipment of all our artillery, excepting only the light field guns (13 and 18-pounder Q.F.). It had been deliberately left out of their equipment after extended trials (which took place long before the war) for reasons which seemed good to the army authorities. The demand for high explosive projectiles for these guns did not, according to my information, arise until October 1914, and then the matter was put in hand at once. The reason for the demand was two-fold: first, that insufficient artillery of the field howitzer type, and of medium and heavy types of guns and howitzers other than field, existed in the country before the war; and secondly, that as a result of trench warfare an entirely new situation had arisen. A high explosive shell on the small scale of the 18-pounder was an exceedingly difficult one to make; difficult not only for technical reasons of fuse and detonation, but also in the purely physical matter of making the shell itself. It had to be of hard steel, and I have seen scores of machines knocked to pieces in its operations. I would even venture to assert that nine-tenths of the machines originally put to work on it broke down and had to be replaced by heavier tools. There was no avoidable delay in getting it made, and the out-turn began to flow in January 1915. As to other high explosive shells of existing patterns, they were pushed along under the same causes of delay which affected the supply of all other forms of ammunition.

Necessarily I have only been able to tell here part of a long and complicated story. I have told what I myself know of the effort of the War Office. Bit by bit further parts of the story will doubtless be told by others. But I venture to assert that the more fully all the facts are known, the more clearly will it be demonstrated that the steps taken by the War Office did, in fact, lead up to the sufficiency of equipment which won the war, and that the loudly proclaimed measures of the Munitions Department were but the natural and necessary expansion due to the progress of events. Further that, with the limitations I have already referred to, the expansion would have been more efficiently carried out had it been left to those who were accustomed to the business and understood the requirements.

R. MAHON.

## ENGLAND AND AMERICA

TO those of us who for many years hoped to see a complete understanding between England and the United States, her entry into the war seemed the realisation of our hopes, and one of the biggest compensations for the great tragedy. In the more than a century and a quarter that had elapsed since America cut the strand with England, the sword had twice been drawn; twice Englishmen and the sons of Englishmen had fought one another on land and sea; and those two wars had left, on the side of America, ineffaceable memories. They were the foundation of American history. They coloured American thought and moulded American policy. They influenced, unconsciously often, but nevertheless with the positive force of conviction, the mental attitude of the American, not only towards England, but towards the rest of the world. In both the wars in which America engaged against England—the one fought to assert a principle, the other to maintain it—America was victorious; both had a profound psychological effect upon the American people. It is doubtful whether in all history a nation has been so rigidly influenced by war. The English character is the heritage of the wars that have seen an island kingdom grow into our mighty Empire; but with us the process has been slow and gradual; we have taken many centuries to pass through the furnace of war, and each generation, tempered and annealed by the fire that was fed by its own blood, transmitted to the next generation the courage, self-confidence, and resiliency that have made the British peoples a conquering race unconquered.

With the Americans there has been no such gradual process. The effect of war was immediate, but the result lasting. Every student of American psychology has noticed the quickness with which the American reaches a decision, the haste he displays to gain his objective, his intolerance of delay and circumlocution. Various reasons have been offered in explanation: climate, a political code that is a social and moral code no less than political; the impetuosity of a young and virile people contending against the forces of nature, and creating their own

cultural system under their own eyes. It might be interesting, but is unnecessary, to examine into causes. Here, it is only requisite to say that the American character, unlike the English, has not developed as a slow growth, has not been hardened or tempered, or modified by wars for national existence or for lust of conquest ; by age-long struggles to gain liberty and overthrow oppression, and then to preserve liberty so heroically bought ; by magnificent adventures that made Englishmen great, and gave to their race the endurance, fortitude and genius to send handfuls of men into the wilderness to build new empires. Although the American springs from an old stock his character was formed at his national birth. It has undergone slight variation since. A character less malleable than the parent stem began with a deep-seated and quite natural prejudice against the English ; that prejudice was strengthened by war, and fed by stupidity, by ignorance and malice. Until the Spanish War, which was a military promenade and not a war, America had engaged no European foe except England. War to the American, the schoolboy, the politician, the historian, was visualised in England ; and England was the concrete representative of the causes that force an unwilling people into war ; for Americans believe with sincerity that they were the victims of English greed and tyranny.

Those of us who had somewhat more than a superficial knowledge of America and her people, hoped that the late war would wipe out the bitter memories of the past, and bring about a friendship so precious that it could not be broken. The hope seemed not unreasonable. We had fought each other, and each had for the other the admiration brave men have for honourable foes. We had fought each other, and now we were to fight as companions in arms, brothers linked in a great cause, willing to give their blood so that the world might live in freedom. In the spiritual contact of war the old prejudices were to be swept away, the old misunderstandings forgotten, as lovers forget their quarrels only to rejoice in their renewed happiness. That was the aspiration ; surely not unwarranted. Yet, I deeply regret to say, the war has not done what we hoped.

Generalities are often misleading and distort the truth, unless a broad statement is limited in its application. Prior to the war, there existed a deep-seated dislike of England and the English

on the part of the great mass of Americans. That dislike to-day is not less intense than it was ; rather, there is every reason to fear, it is more widespread. It is true that the war has brought to our side, as our open and avowed champions, thousands of men and women who were always sentimentally inclined to like England and to admire her traditions, government, and principles, but who, for political, social, and business reasons, felt it the part of wisdom not to allow their admiration to become vocal. These persons are now given the right openly to express what they have long felt.

To offset this we have some 20,000,000 men and women, native-born Germans and American-born children of German parents, Austrians, Hungarians, Turks, Bulgarians, and the Irish, who are all eager to voice their detestation of England. This element is our bitter and implacable enemy. It is an element commanding far-reaching political, social, and financial influence. It is confined to no single class. It is scattered throughout the country, in large cities as well as in villages ; subject to its influence are men in the highest places, leaders of affairs in politics, finance, and trade ; men of learning and the illiterate ; the well-to-do and the poor.

To this we must add the 'native' American, who, through prejudice, environment, association, and the garbled teaching of his history books, was anti-British prior to the outbreak of the war. He is no less anti-British than he was ; in fact, he is now convinced that what was perhaps merely prejudice and an inherited aversion is based on substantial reason.

In dealing with present and future Anglo-American relations we have to consider three factors :—

First, the great mass of Americans not only do not like, but actively dislike England.

Second, 20,000,000 men and women in the United States have an implacable hatred of England.

Third, the American who dislikes England conscientiously believes he is neither prejudiced nor unfair, but has ample justification for his position.

'The great mass of Americans' means not 'Society,' the upper class, or a certain proportion of 'intellectuals,' who are known personally or by reputation to Englishmen, who write and are quoted in the newspapers, and who apparently control

the thought of America. These men are articulate and have the power to reach an audience, but their appeal is made to a class. The great mass is composed of the men and women on the farms, in workshops, factories, and offices, with the strata below, consisting of semi-skilled and unskilled labour, and the strata still lower of the ignorant and the illiterate. These men and women are the backbone of America, as they are of every country; but in America the mass dominates, it does not allow itself to be dominated by an upper and selected class. The mass is uninfluenced by the intellectuals, because it neither knows them, nor hears them, nor reads them. Class antagonism is strong in America, and the 'lower class' resents any attempt at domination or leadership by the 'upper class.' Consequently there are witnessed in America the same phenomena that have been remarked by Frenchmen in their discussion of English politico-sociology, and by Englishmen in their analysis of French politics, namely, that the Government is in the hands, not of the highest intellectually or morally, but of the average mass, mediocre in morals and intellect.

Again, the war has profoundly affected American psychology. The defeat of Germany immensely increased the American's belief in himself. The great mass believes that America won the war. It believes that in April 1917 England and France were defeated and reduced to the last extremity, their man power weakened beyond repair and their financial strength exhausted. In their desperation England and France turned to America. With the cunning and skill which is the heritage of European diplomacy, and of England especially, they inveigled the President into war. America did not go to war willingly; she was forced into it.

The great mass of the American people believes that it was the American army that gave the *coup de grâce* to Germany; that, but for the American army, Germany would have dictated peace in Paris or London; that, but for the American navy, the submarine would have destroyed the last ton of British shipping; that, had it not been for American food carried in American ships, England and France would have starved; that, without the money of America, England would have been bankrupt. These things being a matter of conviction, it is not surprising that the great American mass has a consciousness of

its strength such as it never had before. It was challenged and it won. It did in a few months successfully what every other country after years of endeavour failed to accomplish. The war has made the American believe that he is not only invulnerable but also invincible. He has nothing to fear; the war has proved his physical courage. But more than that, it has proved he has nothing to learn, that his mastery of the art of war is equal, if not superior, to that of those nations of Europe who so long prided themselves upon their military proficiency. And even greater than all, the war has proved that while all Europe is dependent upon the United States, the resources of the United States are so ample that she is independent of Europe.

It is easy to dismiss this national faith with an airy gesture; to say that America exaggerates her importance; that while she assisted in winning the war, that assistance was only possible to her and only of critical value to her allies because for three years England and France and Belgium had poured out their blood and their money with spendthrift profusion, while the manhood of America was untouched and the wealth of the world was at her feet. This answer is easy to make; its partial truth is obvious; yet justice, and the desire to do justice, require a less summary verdict.

The weakness of modern diplomacy is that it moves and has its being in the present but is weighted down with the trappings of the past. When statecraft was the possession of a few men, and when the great public, as we know it to-day, did not exist, the sovereign and a handful of his ministers could carry out in secret any arrangement they saw fit, and then calmly announce the result of their deliberations and intrigues, honest or dishonest. Secrecy is no longer possible because we live in an electric age, an age of electricity both physical and psychical, that makes space merely a spark, and thought leap from mind to mind. Secrecy is now no longer possible, but diplomacy being largely an archaic survival, its professors cling to the methods of the goose quill in a day of the electrically driven printing press; they love mystery when frankness is the cunning of wisdom, and their triumph is the confusion of the public mind.

We should be blind to the claims of justice did we not concede a justification in part at least for the American popular belief. When the United States declared war on Germany on

6th April 1917, it was generally accepted that few if any troops outside of the regular army would be sent to France, that the American naval contingent would be small, that the contribution of America to the common pool would be her money and her resources, her food and her raw materials, her articles of commerce turned to the uses of war; to that extent America was willing to go to the full extent of her capacity. When in the following month the Balfour and Viviani missions came to Washington the American people knew—or perhaps it would be more correct to say they thought they knew, for knowledge is immaterial so long as ignorance may pass current for truth—how much deeper they were to be involved. It is because we live in an electric age that the deliberations of statesmen can never remain a secret even although they may not be officially published. It was not long before Americans learned they were pledged to furnish not only money and food and munitions but men, not a few battalions but armies, millions of men if need be, and that England and France relied on them to make good the waste which it was now beyond their own power to repair.

A people seldom reasons closely, but it has an instinctive faculty of reaching a conclusion. To the American people it seemed, not knowing all the facts but hastily piecing together scattered fragments, that England and France had been so weakened by Germany they were unable to make further formidable resistance and were in danger of irretrievable disaster.

Nor did subsequent events tend to shake the faith thus early acquired. The rapidity with which the American armies grew, the pace at which ship construction was maintained, the subordination of industry and commerce to military purposes, the conversion of man power into military units, the whole readjustment of social life to military ends—these things were proof even to the dullest that the emergency was so great that America alone could avert the catastrophe. When the President sanctioned the abandonment of the predetermined plan to maintain the American Army as a separate organisation and agreed that General Pershing's troops should be merged in the British and French Armies—and it may be properly remarked here that among the great services rendered by Lord Reading during his term as British Ambassador at Washington nothing he did was so important as the part he had in inducing this



decision—when Haig gave a sated world a new wrench to its emotions with the stoical announcement that the British Army was fighting with its back to the wall, and the appeal went up to America for ships and more ships, men and more men, America interpreted it as the last despairing cry of the old world to the new to redress the balance. Americans believed that without America the war was lost ; only America could save it.

The war poured untold wealth into the United States at a cost so trifling that it is negligible. The deaths in the American military and naval forces, in all ranks, both overseas and at home, were approximately 100,000. That is less than one-tenth of one *per cent.* of the population. A hundred thousand deaths in a population of more than 100,000,000 in a country of such great area as that of the United States have scattered the casualties so thinly that not a single community has been plunged into wholesale mourning. In America, unlike Europe or Canada, there is no place where the young and sound man is an exception. The war has not depleted the man power of America.

The war brought no hardships, only inconvenience. It brought neither hunger nor suffering. People put less sugar in their coffee, but there never was a time when they had to deny themselves either sugar or coffee. It forced an economy in the use of coal, but no one went cold. It made living expensive and annoyances were many, but children were not under-nourished and their parents did not starve for the sake of the little ones. Of real sacrifice Americans knew nothing.

Yet it must not be assumed that they were not ready to make sacrifices, or that, had the war continued, they would not have stretched themselves on the cross with the same exalted courage of the other Allied Powers. The Americans have not been given the credit to which they are entitled for their self-denial and acceptance of moral responsibility, and this omission is not because of petty jealousy or deliberate disparagement, but because the world has not known the truth.

America was the one country which passed no law to restrict the consumption of the people's food, which never issued a single ration card, which required no registration and provided no penalties, and yet it stinted itself so that its men in the field might have the best food in unlimited quantities, and it might

share of its plenty with a world in hunger. Americans denied themselves; they gave up their sugar and their butter, their wheat flour and their pork and many other things, so as to create a surplus for export; and they did it voluntarily, and in response to an appeal to their humanity. Mr. Hoover, whose great work the world does not yet fully appreciate, had no such powers as were enjoyed by European Governments and their Food Controllers. He could, and did, exhort and plead, and arouse moral consciousness, and urge the disgrace of America living in luxury when the rest of the world was feeding on scanty husks; but beyond that he could not go. Nor did he have to. The most wasteful and extravagant people in the world, who had never been driven by necessity to practise those small economies in the kitchen that are the tradition of the majority of European women, suddenly became saving almost to the verge of meanness. War bread was as unpalatable in America as elsewhere, yet the people ate it uncomplainingly; the greatest *per capita* consumers of sugar in all its forms, they accepted a voluntary ration because Mr. Hoover placed them on honour; sweets and chocolates, which are as much a part of the American's diet as are jam and marmalade of the Englishman's, were abandoned to release labour and materials; fish was substituted for meat, so that meat could be reserved for the fighting men and the civilian peoples of the other belligerent countries. This devotion to the common cause, this spontaneous acceptance of a moral responsibility, must not be forgotten.

What the war has done for America is vastly to increase her actual and potential wealth and to reverse her international financial and economic position. Before the war America was a debtor nation. To-day Europe and South America are her debtors. Before the war America did a large exporting trade, but in foreign trade she was not a real competitor of either England or Germany; to-day America has invaded the markets which the war has closed to Germany and which England has temporarily abandoned. Before the war American exports were carried in foreign bottoms, largely British; to-day America has a merchant tonnage she hopes will equal, if not exceed, that of England. This knowledge of the financial and commercial advantages the war has brought to America has influenced American psychology.

For nineteen months the interests of England and America were mutual and identical. Past jealousies, differences, and dislikes were forgotten. They ate at a common table, and the obligation of hospitality or charity imposes certain restraints. The table has now been cleared, and the obligation no longer exists.

The Americans are out for foreign trade. Its necessity they now realise as never before, and never before have they appreciated the value of the foreign market. They look forward to controlling a great mercantile marine, and ships must have cargoes. In some countries dollar exchange has displaced sterling. Americans hope that this ousting of the pound can be made permanent. As a result of the war the United States has been able to establish credits in all parts of the world; England, France, Italy, and other nations are heavily indebted to America; alone among nations the United States has vast quantities of raw materials, finished and semi-finished products for export; every other nation is burdened with debt, heavily taxed, its foreign trade dislocated. The next few years will give opportunities to America such as she has never known before.

The official relations between England and America from the American Civil War until 1917—that is, for a little more than half a century—have been, except for brief periods of cordiality, strained and provocative of friction; and the official relations have reflected the non-official relations of the two countries. Between the two peoples, though not between individuals, there has existed more friction than real friendship. To search for the causes of this unhappy state of affairs would be too long a task, nor would any useful purpose be served by raking over the ashes of the past. But for the purpose of this article it is necessary to say that neither side is solely to blame—both must be held responsible.

On our side the trouble comes from a failure to understand the American character, from lack of sympathy and forbearance, from ignorance of American psychology; frequently from the appointment of wrong agents or the employment of wrong methods; from a rigid adherence to practices which, while suitable in other countries and useful, were in America unsuitable and harmful. We have failed, and in a measure have deserved to fail, because we have so frequently swung from untempered

criticism to the extreme of flattery; and the American has resented the one and been cynically irritated by the other.

On the American side the trouble comes from a misunderstanding equally as erroneous of the English character. The English are not liked because they are regarded as arrogant, supercilious, and contemptuous of the American. The policy of England is represented as that of the bully, always trying to take an advantage over weak and small nations, always cunning and dishonest in her diplomacy, always to be feared when she has tried to win by diplomacy what she was unable to secure by force.

That is one reason why the League of Nations has met with so much American opposition. It is looked upon with suspicion because it is supposed to be an English invention, cunningly designed to be to the advantage of England and to the serious disadvantage of America. The Greeks are most feared when bearing gifts.

Nor has the war helped us; on the contrary, it has in some quarters still further strengthened the belief that it is wisdom on the part of America always to be on her guard against England.

It is necessary to speak without reserve. To resort to euphemism would be childish. Our policy of excessive secrecy between 1914 and 1917, and the work of the official propaganda agents appointed to spread the gospel to America—men with neither the training nor the knowledge to qualify them for the task—had most unfortunate effects in America. It made Americans believe that the reports circulated by our enemies were true, that while France was doing the bulk of the fighting, England was doing practically nothing; that while France had given her all to winning the war, England was thinking about trade; that while France had sent her last man to the front, England selfishly held vast armies at home, so that even if France perished England was secure from invasion; that while France made the supreme sacrifice, the English navy was held in safety for the same reason that England withheld her aid from France; the first thought of England being always her own protection. The blockade, the interference with 'neutral' trade, the censorship of mails and cables, the black list, the bunkering regulations, all increased American feeling against England.

The injury done might have been prevented and much of the

feeling could have been removed had other methods been employed, but it is futile to discuss the past, it is only useful if it can be made to give profit to the present. The point to emphasise is that although America has been the ally of England, and American troops have fought side by side with English, the old dislike remains. Americans who have seen both France and England, who have seen England untouched and France devastated; and those Americans who have seen only France, and judge only from what they have seen, believe more firmly than ever that France stood the brunt of the war, that France fought and died in her misery, while England in her security enjoyed her ease.

It is for the interest both of Great Britain and of the United States that they shall not only be friendly but that the sympathy arising out of intimate understanding shall exist between them, that they shall pursue the same ends and have a common policy. Self interest on both sides dictates this, but one would like to ascribe a higher motive. The peace, the security, the well-being, the future progress and civilisation of the world are largely in the keeping of Great Britain and the United States, provided each believes in the sincerity and disinterestedness of the other. On the part of Great Britain it is impossible to hope for this unless we fully understand the American character.

What should level all barriers between the two peoples has too often kept them apart and prevented each being in sympathy with the other. Paradoxical as it may sound, fantastic even as it may seem, the speech of our fathers is an obstacle.

No Englishman goes to a foreign country, no matter how extensive his knowledge of its people, history, and language, without feeling that he still has much to learn, that only with diffidence may he presume to deliver judgment on their mentality or character; and then only after long residence and intimate association. The Englishman going to America for the first time fondly believes that he suffers under no such handicap. Having no strange tongue to master, he assumes that he has nothing to learn; he assumes that as men speak so they are, and that all men who speak the language of England must think as do the people of England. Hence the business man, the casual tourist, the government official or the diplomatist, who in any other country would know his ignorance and be ashamed

to expose it, after a few weeks in America is critic or censor, competent to advise or instruct, to write a book, or to shape the policy of his government. It is more tragic than the blind leading the blind, for there affliction has made all men equal. It is the folly of a man with sound eyes trusting himself to a guide without experience, too vain to confess his ignorance.

Fundamentally, Englishmen and Americans are so much alike, that it may well be believed there is little divergence in the two stocks, and yet psychologically the differences are so great, though not always so immediately obvious, that they are the pitfalls into which the Englishman will stumble, unless he guards his footsteps cautiously. Of the two, the American is the more complex; often he is subtle. I suppose the American would deny this; he thinks of himself as very much on the surface, knowing little of the delight of reticence, and that he cannot be accused of subtlety. Yet, I still adhere to my opinion. But what will not be denied is that an American will treat leniently the mistakes of a foreigner, whether in speech or action, because the American has the Anglo-Saxon tolerant contempt for the foreigner; but an Englishman's mistakes will not be pardoned, because he is expected to know better, and he sins only because he is indifferent or rude with intent. Difference of language shields the foreigner, and forces him to be a more patient and often a more acute observer; community of language induces the Englishman to record superficial judgments, confuses his sense of values and inclines him to criticism, which, being merely a passing impression, irritates the American and creates friction.

Two qualities are deeply implanted in the American character. The Americans are a generous people, and they have a lofty, almost an exaggerated sense of justice. These two qualities, generosity and the love of justice, help to explain the American dislike of England. The alleged selfishness and injustice of England constitute the history and traditions of America. England's selfishness and injustice brought about the American Revolution; the same selfishness and injustice, pursued from that day to this, have kept England and America apart. It is unnecessary to say that there is no foundation for this American creed. It is not the truth, but whatever is accepted as the truth is the justification men have for their conduct. Americans believe what they have been taught, and believing it to be

the truth, they feel they have abundant cause for their dislike of England.

The admiration and affection shown by Americans for France were the amazement of every foreigner. For France there was a feeling little short of love ; although that affection is less ardent since Americans were brought in close contact with the French people. This was the more surprising, because the great mass of Americans had no understanding and no knowledge of the French character ; the great mass did not know France or the French people, their literature, history, or language ; the French temperament is unlike the American ; the infusion of French blood in the composite American strain is smaller than that of any other race ; French immigration, except that of the French-Canadian to the mill towns of New England, has always been insignificant.

Yet it was France for whom Americans were ready gladly to make sacrifice ; it was the French who seized American imagination, and gave to the war what little measure of popularity it had in America. And the explanation, which has seemed so mysterious, is very simple when read by the light of American character. To Americans, France has always been a knightly figure, because, in the time of American stress, when the believed injustice of England drove America to the sword, it was France, impelled by a love of justice, who generously came to American assistance and rendered America an unforgettable service. Here, again, it is unnecessary to search too narrowly the truth of tradition or too critically to examine motives. All that we need concern ourselves with is that the faith of Americans in the French tradition cannot be shaken ; Americans are still the debtors to France in a debt unredeemed. In one word—sentiment. It is sentiment that has coloured American thought and shaped American policies for more than 125 years.

It must be repeated—and the emphasis is not misplaced—that this is a summary of American characterisation in the mass. It would not apply with the same exactitude to individuals or to special classes—the politicians, for instance ; men engaged in large affairs, thinking only of their own interests ; men and women of great wealth whose only thought is their own luxury. It does, however, describe the great mass, the mass that seldom is able to put into concrete form its vague aspirations, but which,

because of its inability to express itself, clings the more passionately to an abstract idea, and believes implicitly in the things of its inherited faith, whether they be religion, politics, national friendships, or national prejudices.

It is a fact not to be challenged that the past relations between Great Britain and the United States have been unsatisfactory. Are they to-day better—not the official relations between the two Governments, which are always correct and now extremely cordial—but the mass relations on both sides? We all hope so, or hope at least it may become so, especially those of us who for years have used whatever small influence we possess to bring about that desired end; but it would be not only stupid but wrong to blink facts. We on this side of the Atlantic have a convenient trick of ignoring unpleasant truths, and metaphysically deluding ourselves into the belief that if we stubbornly refuse to see a thing, it does not exist. Americans with the best intentions, and with an amiable desire not to hurt our feelings, too often reassure us when, for our own good, they ought to use blunt words.

I have always believed in the salutary effect of criticism based on knowledge, but criticism alone is not sufficient. Having pointed out faults, which is one function of the critic, his other function, even more vital, is to show how they can be corrected. I feel that should be my present duty, but it must be left to a future occasion.

A. MAURICE LOW.



## FRANCE AND THE BRITISH ARMY

1. *Les Silences du Colonel Bramble*. Par ANDRÉ MAUROIS. Paris : Grasset. 1918; English Edition. JOHN LANE. 1919.
2. *Anglais en Guerre. Le Major Pipe et son Père*. Par RENÉ BENJAMIN. Paris : Fayard. 1918.
3. *L'Apogée de l'Effort Militaire Français*. Par le Lieutenant FRANÇOIS MAURY de l'Armée Territoriale. Union des Grandes Associations Françaises. 1919.
4. *Au Front Britannique*. Par S. AULNEAU. Paris : Renaissance du Livre. 1919.
5. *The Square Jaw*. By HENRY RUFFIN and ANDRÉ TUDESQ. Translated from the French. Nelson.

IT is pleasant to enjoy the hospitality of a friend's house when the invitation is given alike for the pleasure of host and of guest. Yet who can lay hand on heart and declare unflinchingly that in his experience—or in hers—this friendliest of all relations has never led to disappointment, heartburnings, acrimonious mutual criticism—in short to the weakening if not the snapping of a friendly bond? Every household and every society has its own ways to which the newcomer cannot conform with perfect adaptation, and so some friction must develop in the sudden closing of intercourse. Was it not Carlyle who said, out of the fulness of his heart, that marriage is a great discipline of character? or was some one inspired to say it by observation of the Carlyles? Human beings never really know each other till they have been shipmates, messmates, or housemates, and the decisive test of friendship and of comradeship—which is not quite the same, but perhaps a better thing—is whether the tie be strengthened or sapped by such enforced intimacy, with the give and take which it involves. Under that test many a friendship has waned into acquaintanceship, many a hopeful acquaintanceship has withered into a nodding when you meet.

Yet if the relation has dangers, it has also its rich chance of gains. Even from what may be called the hospitality of convenience, when the visitor is quartered upon strangers for some public or private end, and not for any purpose of friendship,

friendship may result ; the stray politician in an election campaign may find his temporary shelter turning into a place of welcome which he will seek again and again for the welcome's sake. Still, he will be lucky if in the majority of such cases the doors do not close behind him with a bang of relief ; and, at the very best, with his going, a perceptible grain of sand will have been taken out of the normal running of the household machine. These are the trivialest comparisons to suggest what is in my mind, the relation which arises when one nation becomes the guest of another nation ; yet it is only by some such means that one can convey any of the realities about the war. Perhaps, however, if English people will remember how they felt, and what they said to one another about the Belgian refugees, they may form some idea of the sentiments which France must inevitably have entertained towards the foreigners quartered upon them, of whom by far the largest number were British. Never since the world began was there such a trial of mutual forbearance. Marriage is not comparable, not even marriage to Thomas or to Jane Carlyle.

And as for the two armies which had essentially, and in the end explicitly, to act as one, it is all very well to say that they had a common purpose, that brave men always respect and understand each other, and so forth. Can any soldier recall an action in which each battalion of a brigade was not acutely critical of the battalion on its right or left, or a tour of trenches in which C Company did not complain that A or D got somehow less than its proper share of the unpleasant time ? Under the closest similarity of conditions, of discipline, in the nearest military comradeship, innumerable openings for complaint disclosed themselves ; what was to be expected in the co-operation of two armies so unlike in training, in tradition, in temperament, as the French and our own ? If out of the enforced association, the imposed intimacy of relationship, the French population and the British with whom they came into contact, ended the war with more sense of real friendship than they began it—if the army in blue and the army in khaki have brought out of the conflict a comradeship that it is no idle compliment to name brotherhood in arms—why then a vast deal of credit is due to both sides, and every effort which was made to further this end stands amply justified.

The books which are named at the head of this article are, in more ways than one, proof that the French Government was aware of this need. All of them probably owe their inspiration to the Department of Information which the French (more frank than the British) call simply their Ministry of Propaganda. They are efforts to explain the British to France—especially, one would conjecture, to the France which was remote from the line. In the line and about the line, where contact was most constant and poignant, there was, unless personal observation has deceived me, little need to explain. The more we knew of each other, the better we liked each other, I think; and if that be a true opinion, the recording angel will assuredly make it an important entry in the Book of Judgment and Justice, on the side of honour for hosts and for guests.

Consider what it means. The average division arrived in France after the period of roses and jublations and welcoming had long passed; it consisted of men scarcely one of whom had ever been in a country that was not English-speaking, of men who had no tradition of war and war conditions—who were dismayed and indignant when they found themselves shoved into a cattle truck—and who after what seemed an interminable journey, tired and hungry, had probably to march miles in the heaviest order, through the plashiest mud, and at the end were ushered into the blackness of a barn, beside a manure heap of the amplest dimensions and the most reeking odour. They missed and wanted quantities of things that they were accustomed to, and shyness, as much as ignorance of the language, hampered their asking for them. Their first instinctive attitude towards the people on whom they were billeted was one of distrust and dislike.

Probably also in their first days they gave ground of complaint, and of necessary complaint, to their hosts. What I have to write here can have value only as based on personal experience; and nearly all the cases of trouble that I remember with our people date from the first fortnight—a fruit tree feloniously lopped for firewood, this or that piece of unreflecting mischief done; and punishment had to be a sharp deterrent—which did not tend to ease relations between our men and those who laid the complaint. Yet, very quickly, relations eased themselves—in the first instance, because of the qualities of the people into whose lives we were suddenly flung.

These French civilians knew far more of war than did our new troops. The old among them remembered 1870, the youngest had seen 1914, and all but the last few weeks of 1915: and they belonged to a nation which had never in living memory ceased to be under arms. They were familiar with the comings and goings of troops; they had known their own soldiers always, and these strangers were to them, first and foremost, simply soldiers. It is true, I think, that they made little difference between their soldiers and our own. Frenchmen, indeed, will tell you cynically that the French peasant liked Americans better than colonials, colonials better than English, Englishmen or anybody better than Frenchmen, as occupants of his barn, because in that degree he—or rather she—gained more by them. But cynicism needs to be discounted by experience. In the last resort when one could not get a thing by paying, it could often be procured by an appeal for compassionate assistance. *Mon mari est soldat et je sais ce que c'est que de coucher dans des granges*: that particular phrase which a woman used when I was trying to get straw in the village of Laires expressed the pith of many interviews. Also, if they could prevent it, the French women would have no punishments: *Faut pas être dur pour les hommes, ils ont assez souffert* is another sentence that comes back to me.

On the other hand, our men as they became acclimatised, and got over their shyness, were not slow to feel the good-will which surrounded them and to reciprocate it. The good-will increased as months and years went on. One of the most intelligent men I ever knew in the ranks came to us from another unit, when we were at rest in the country behind Lillers in the early spring of 1916. He was emphatic that the people with whom we had to deal there were infinitely more friendly than those whom he had known when serving a year earlier in the region of Ypres. Yet a year later again, we were among these same Flemings of the Ypres region, and our men liked them even better than the French of Artois. Now and then, of course, a cross and avaricious woman made her disposition felt; but it was rare. Of course also the population was gaining money fast and putting it by; but assuredly we had no occasion to grudge it them. On the whole, the price of eggs and bread in the actual battle-zone was very little, if at all, higher at any

time than in London at the same moment; and those who provided such things helped to make rest camps tolerable, and did so at their own great risk. For instance, hundreds of officers must feel that they owe a personal debt to the nuns in the convent at Lochre who provided meals for us in their refectory and baths in their school, making no doubt a good profit for their Order. Yet Lochre was always liable to shelling, and a day came last year when the poor nuns had scarcely time to save their lives by flight. Of their convent, and of all that little village which in 1917 was so prosperous and happy in its friendly traffic, now scarcely one brick stands on another. First and last the population of the British battle-zone, and those who fought over it, were bound to each other by ties of mutual compassion; and in the end perhaps the soldier had more cause to feel pity for his civilian hosts than even they had ever known for him.

The cleverest of those who write these books of interpretation, M. André Maurois, has an admirable chapter on this subject. He sketches with humour, but with profound appreciation, the character of those Flemish households—the friendly but thrifty young ladies who realised so well that they must gain their *dot* if they were not to be laid on the shelf for life, and who admitted quite frankly that the war was profitable and was not bad fun—that they would miss '*les boys*.' He suggests, too, the surprise which was produced in foreigners accustomed to the music-hall version of a Frenchman by the spectacle of *ces villageois dévots et laborieux*. Irish Catholics were more surprised than anybody else, for it had been inculcated into them that 'Frenchmen were all atheists,' as one of our men said to me; yet here was a population turning out in crowds to Mass, and quite indignant, as I found, at any suggestion that the war had altered their habits in this regard. But, in truth, probably English and Irish were not the only people to be surprised. 'Why did you not tell us about all this before the war?' asks a British officer of the interpreter in M. Maurois' book. 'The fact is,' says the Frenchman, 'we did not know it ourselves.' One of the greatest revelations of the war has been the French peasant—probably the most civilised human being who remains quite unspoilt by civilisation, the very backbone *d'une race forte et droite*, to borrow the fine words which are used by a young

French staff officer to characterise his country, in that admirable summary of France's military achievement, 'L'Apogée de l'effort militaire français.' The peasant stock was, according to Lieutenant Maury, *la plus grande réserve de la France, réserve de forces, de travail, d'épargne, de sagesse.*

The French soldier at his work in the war some of us came to know, but not all. All knew the peasant woman; she was the France that received us, and observation of her filled some with admiration that bordered on dismay. One snowy day in February we were watching through the window of what was, for the time, our company mess, the *patronne* and her satellites active about the yard, busy as bees indoors and outdoors, through that savage weather. 'How do the Frenchwomen 'carry on?'' said a subaltern to me—a courageous boy, good with horses, but otherwise lazy as the day is long. 'What good 'is their life to them at all?' Racial contrasts could scarcely go further than that between a young Irish hunting-man and a French farmer's wife; yet I think the friendliest judgment of all our people—English, Scotch, or Irish—would come from these *patronnes* of little shops and farms in the battle-zone. They seemed to have a kind of maternal feeling for all the 'boys' that they had seen come and go; under the sharpest of their scolding you could detect a maternal tolerance, which revealed itself practically if military authority went to supplement their chastisement of the tongue. In truth, we were of their family, and perhaps they saw the best of us; at all events, what they saw was not bad.

Yet outside the battle-zone there was the great mass of the French population, to whom we were more completely strangers and who naturally and inevitably felt, as the months passed into years, that there were too many strangers in their house—not merely quartered in their house, but to a great extent masters in it. I remember asking some people—educated bourgeois folk in a township outside Lillers—what was meant by the placard *Barrières ouvertes*, or *fermées*, as the case might be. They explained that the roads were opened and closed to ordinary traffic from time to time. By whom? 'By the English, 'of course; they regulate everything now.' There was just an accent of irritation perceptible. But the ladies went on to say, 'After all, English or French, isn't it all

'the same thing at present?' That was a reasoned commentary, made some five miles from where the tide of invasion had been checked by British troops, in a place where every inhabitant had seen the lamentable streams of refugees pouring down the roads before the invader. Further back, perhaps, the commentary would not have been added, or would have been less sincere, the accent of irritation would have been less controlled. It was an unreasonable irritation, doubtless, but it was bound to exist; and M. René Benjamin has satirised it pleasantly in a book not so well known as his 'Gaspard,' but perhaps more of a document. 'Le Major Pipe et son Père' gives, under a veil of irony, considerable insight into the mentality of France in regard to the British army. The Frenchman whom he selects is something approximating as nearly as reality can go to the Frenchman of pre-war British imagination—the little man with a pointed beard who gesticulates and perorates. His Barbet is a third-class Parisian journalist, full to the back teeth of phrases, the ready seed-ground for popular mythology. He, as the British army would say, is 'fed up' with the British army, and navy too, for the navy is allowing ships to be submarined by dozens, and does not care the toss of a penny. Barbet has a shrewd suspicion that the traditional enemy of France is in Calais again, and means to stay there; and so forth. On this gentleman devolves the duty of undertaking a journalistic mission in order to make the French public realise the effort which is being made by their British allies.

No doubt the subject of M. Benjamin's caricature—for his book is throughout in the vein of caricature—was typical only of side-currents in French opinion. The French, being a logical people, reasoned themselves into a sensible view of the presence of strangers in their house; they pushed aside temperamental promptings to impatience and suspicion, and fixed on the clear truth that they had only too good reason to be thankful for the superficial annoyance. Yet a good deal seems to be revealed by a phrase which a young Frenchman used recently in talking over this matter. 'The English,' he said, 'are much 'more popular since we have known the Americans; *ils ont eu beaucoup plus de tact.*' It needed a standard of comparison before France realised how considerate, on the whole, the British soldier guests had been in a difficult relationship. M.

Benjamin takes pains to suggest throughout his book this quality of delicate considerateness. His Major Pipe is presented, no less than Barbet, with a touch of caricature, but it is the caricature of a courageous gentleman.

Yet unquestionably there is a purpose of ironical criticism underlying the account of Barbet's visit to the British army. Openly, ostentatiously, the laugh is turned against the Frenchman; he is almost the clown smacked about the head with a bladder; but underneath that is a mordant comment. The British staff desire to explain to a friendly journalist all the extent of their military effort; and they show him monstrous piles of jam, bully-beef, stores innumerable—*tous les vivres que le vaste appétit britannique peut désirer*, till the Frenchman gets the feeling that he is being shown round the estates of Gargantua. Behind this is the fact that French military opinion held all these preparations to be too elaborate. Their own rationing was simpler and needed a much smaller proportion of men to carry it out. The French were not the only people from whom these criticisms came. We arrived in the end of 1915 to find, as my commanding officer said after his first experience of trenches, multitudes of British soldiers everywhere except in the line. A smart subaltern, who in private life had been a music hall artist, did not stay long with us; he was wanted to organise theatrical entertainments for the troops in rest. Looking back on it, who would deny that the strictly military criticism on our waste of man-power was justified? But if we had been fighting on our own soil, with every household in the land protected only by a line of men, and those men outnumbered by the assailants, there would have been less heard about the quality of the jam; and many things that were provided overseas (at heavy expense of transport) would have been found superfluous. The fact was that a nation unused to the military burden had to be gentled into acceptance of it. Troops, who for two years were all volunteers and whose service in essence never ceased to be voluntary, and behind the troops the civilian population from which they issued, demanded that all things possible should be done to alleviate the existence of men voluntarily facing such hardships and dangers as men had never before been called on to encounter. If the organisation of a French battalion or company was in reality, say in 1917, what it purported to be, if



it conformed to the model which we were then taught to imitate, and which Lieutenant Maury describes, then they were more complex than we in their actual fighting equipment; they relied more on machinery for killing their enemies without being killed themselves. On the other hand, they were much simpler than we in their provision for the comfort and for the health of the men. The Americans, it appears, followed and exceeded our example, so that their battalions were even more encumbered with baggage than were ours. Barbet, the journalist, may be a phrasemonger, but he is permitted to have his moments of insight. 'One feels,' he says, 'that with you all this military 'outfit has not come to stay.' In Great Britain and in America, everything was done as for an exceptional occasion, not to be the normal rule of national life. It is the difference between getting up a picnic and organising a prison dietary.

That is not all. The British army was essentially less homogeneous than the French. M. Benjamin puts with a dexterous dramatic touch the case for some of the most elaborate arrangements. Barbet meets a French manufacturer of canned goods in a camp where there are Indian troops; there is display of the special provisions for feeding them, and the Frenchman is very sceptical as to the necessity of transporting across the seas what could be manufactured, or 'faked,' nearer home. His guide lets him talk, but at last breaks silence. 'Well, you see, 'it's their religion—we can't understand—but we've got to 'respect it.' And when the Frenchman talks of going to India after the war to study all these curiosities for himself. 'You'll 'see nothing,' says the officer. 'It's too big. I've been there 'and I understand very little.'

'You didn't stay long enough?'

'Just so.'

'How long?'

The officer dropped his eyes: 'Twenty-three years.'

That is how M. Benjamin suggests to his readers that what may seem to them nonsensical is based on a lifetime's exceptional experience.

It dramatises, too, what has obviously most impressed Frenchmen in general, the English cultivation of reticence. If Barbet knows a little about anything, he is more eager to air his knowledge than to add to it. When he feels an emotion he

desires to give it full expression. Major Pipe, the personage whom M. Benjamin has chosen to portray as a typical British staff officer (indicating perhaps his intention of caricature by this somewhat fantastic choice of a name), is tongue-tied in French, but not only by his lack of grammar and vocabulary. Emotions or the display of them are alike discouraged in his school; and the manufacturer of canned goods cannot decide after his experiences whether the English are sublime or grotesque. 'A general,' he says, 'dies ripped open with the same coolness as a clown takes a smack on the head.' Major Pipe conducts Barbet through all the valley of the Ancre where the very earth has been murdered, life done to death even in the soil; yet the British officer has eyes for nothing but all the detail of old trenches—nothing to say but that where the Germans were they are not now. His philosophy seeks not emotions, but facts.

'You're sure the Boches will be beaten, aren't you?' says Barbet.  
'They are—for they are the stronger and they don't advance.'

Every derelict German dug-out, every strand of German wire was to Major Pipe a demonstration of ground gained and of German chances waning. I can confirm the touch. What impressed most of us in the first three or four months of 1916 (less than half way through the war) was the cursed immovability of everything, the deadlock maintained at such a constant daily cost of suffering and extermination. Yet our colonel continually impressed on us that every inch of ground gained and held was to the good; and (exactly like Major Pipe) he used to say that he never came into the trenches without a feeling of satisfaction that we were where the Germans had been—the line having advanced about a mile in that portion between Loos and Hulluch.

Neither had he, any more than Major Pipe, any expressions of compassion for the wreckage which had been wrought to gain and to hold that barren waste; rather, he felt himself and all of us hampered by the natural reluctance to shell towns still intact which were in German occupation. He could understand the reluctance but had little sympathy with it. Barbet, in the valley of the Ancre, confounded by the sight of all that desolation where once a landscape painter would have found charming subjects at every turn, says justly enough of the British soldier,

'He can't be touched like us; it's our country.' Yet naturally, but perhaps less justly, he accuses the Briton of lack of imagination. 'The Englishman undergoes experiences, he does not meditate; *il se laisse vivre*—he takes life as it comes.' Barbet does not allow, says M. Benjamin, for the humour by which it is the fashion among Englishmen to cover up their real courage. *Cet humour particulier qui est la coquetterie suprême de l'Anglais pour cacher son vrai courage* is admirably described in these words of M. Benjamin; and he completes the portrait of this cast of character by attributing to it other attractive but rather baffling qualities—*tant de tenue, de gentillesse, tant de charme discret, que trop de Français appellent égoïsme ou insensibilité*. The new army may be allowed to applaud a compliment which really belongs to the old; for the schooled bearing, the finish of manner, and the reticent charm which Frenchmen sometimes take for self-conceit or want of feeling, are marks of the regular officer at his best.

Nothing was ever more English than the traditions of a good mess; and M. Benjamin illustrates his characterisation by a string of anecdotes. Yet, with no disparagement to him, what he seeks to give in them is much better given by another Frenchman's presentment of these same qualities through a dramatic form. What M. Benjamin suggests from intuition M. Maurois has known from intimate comradeship—and has had the extraordinary skill to set down in such fashion that his picture is at once a sincere eulogy and a poignant criticism. 'Les Silences du Colonel Bramble' is a very amusing and brilliant piece of literature; but it is a very wise book as well.

In another of these propagandist works, 'La Mâchoire Carrée,' the authors, MM. Ruffin and Tudesq, dwell on the extent to which the good understanding was fostered by 'two sorts of *agents de liaison*—the French interpreters and the Staff Officers 'of the French Mission to the British Army.' In whichever capacity M. Maurois served, it is certain that nothing but actual experience could have rendered his book possible—and he makes his narrator an interpreter. The French Government utilised many men of literary distinction for this work, but it is not to be supposed that all battalion messes were so fortunate as *les Lennox*—the Scots who harboured M. Aurelle. Nor, on the other hand, were all interpreters so lucky in their associates.

Major Parker, the second in command, O'Grady the doctor, and the Scotch padre, have all a genuine talent for conversation. But the true subject of the book is the man who has no talent at all for conversation—Colonel Bramble himself; and Aurelle is careful not to suggest that the colonel has any special genius for war. He is the type of the good regimental officer, old style, with its limitations as well as its excellences.

All of us had known that type in general society, where it was always popular but curiously detached and sometimes almost astray. The war brought to very many civilians for the first time the revelation of Colonel Bramble and his like in their proper sphere—in the life for which and by which they had been made into what they were. The civilian coming into the domain ruled by representatives of the old army was on strange ground, and often bewildered; as he found his bearings, inevitably his critical faculty worked on what was unfamiliar; and many hundreds of officers, new style, will be grateful to M. Maurois for his interpretation of the older type, after whose example we laboured, as in duty bound, to shape our military conduct. A good deal is here delicately intimated that passed through our minds if not through our lips by way of criticism; but assuredly the qualities that we learned to appreciate at their full value are displayed with a tenderness of insight which would be admirable in any writer, and is simply astonishing in a foreigner.

The book opens with a discussion which sets out what may be called M. Maurois' thesis. Englishmen think of everything, but especially of war, in terms of sport. There has been a boxing competition behind the lines, and the brigadier seizes the occasion to address the men. He impresses on them that they should bring into their service the same principles of conduct as would guide them in the ring.

'We're a queer people' (says Major Parker, the second in command of the Lennox, a personage whom M. Maurois has been obliged to endow with considerable gifts of expression and a taste for controversy). 'To interest a Frenchman in a boxing match, you must tell him that the honour of his nation is at stake; to interest an Englishman in war there is nothing like putting it into his head that war is a boxing match. If you tell us that the Hun is a barbarian, we shall endorse your opinion; but tell us he is no sportsman and you'll raise the British Empire against him.'

On the whole, that is how it was done, and much could be

said to establish this. But Colonel Bramble, who does not care about argument, intervenes with one of his *obiter dicta*. 'It's the 'Hun's fault if war is no longer a gentleman's game.'

Then, having shut down abstract discussion, he asks if the Frenchman enjoyed the boxing show. But Aurelle, by saying that the Highlanders looking on behaved as if they were in church, leads Major Parker to open a new line of criticism by laying it down that the true sportsman's spirit has always a touch of the religious about it. One may concur. Two of the youngest in a long family of cricketers, when hardly old enough to hold a half-sized bat straight, were set to entertain another youngster for the afternoon. He did not secure approbation. 'He seemed 'to think cricket was a game,' one was heard saying to the other. The true spirit already implanted in them taught them that cricket was a part of duty and conduct. Aurelle puts it that English ways of judging men sometimes surprise the foreigner.

'I have heard a man say, "You would think Brown was an idiot; but no such thing—he played for his county."

"Well?" said the Colonel.

"Don't you think, sir, that intelligence——"

"I hate intelligent people . . . Oh, I beg your pardon, messieu."

"That's a very nice compliment, sir," said Aurelle.

"Glad you take it so," growled the Colonel into his moustache.'

Colonel Bramble has merely an instinctive dislike and distrust of what is called brains; but his second in command is prepared to develop the theory which underlies this instinct.

"Don't you think," he says to the Frenchman, "that in your country intelligence is rated above its real value? . . . We don't go to school to learn, but to steep ourselves in the prejudices of our class, without which we should be a public danger and unhappy in ourselves. . . . The greatest service which games have done us is to preserve us from intellectual culture. There isn't time to do everything; golf and tennis bar reading. We're stupid."

"You're putting on side, major," said Aurelle.

"We're stupid," repeated Major Parker, "it's a very great strength to us. When we get into danger we don't perceive it, because we reflect very little; the result is that we keep cool and nearly always come out of it with credit."

"Always," Colonel Bramble corrected him.

'Aurelle, hopping along beside these two giants, understood more clearly than ever that this war would end the right way.'

That is the pith of M. Maurois' thesis. A people so self-

confident as to see sources of strength in what to other eyes look like deficiencies, begets confidence. *Possunt quia posse videntur* : they have the air of winners from the start ; and, as a matter of history, they prove very hard to beat. The view is put here with a touch of exaggeration ; later passages bring it more into line with reality. Yet, how much exaggeration is there ? Years ago a professional soldier who had seen several Indian campaigns explained to me that brains were a disadvantage to an officer ; if a man had brains, he thought about things beforehand, and developed nerves ; and when the pinch came, he could not steady his command. I wonder, now, how far that opinion was prevalent in the old army of whom this exponent was a hardworking example. Other considerations apart, the theory omitted to consider that a man who does not think things out in advance is very apt to lose his head when things begin to happen. A plan implies thinking out ahead ; and certainly, in a good deal that was done during this war, plan was as conspicuously absent as courage was conspicuously present, and courage failed to be a satisfactory substitute for a clearly ordered line of action.

Yet the fact is that the war ended the right way, and Colonel Bramble was justified in an optimism which perhaps proceeded from his intellectual limitations. My own commanding officer, of whom I have spoken, was anything but stupid—and, as a consequence, had chafed more than most against his thirty years' existence as a professional soldier without experience (as it had befallen him) of war. When war came, he was by general admission the most valuable officer in our brigade. He stood out among the others of his class, because with the same training he had more brains to use it—more brains and more individuality. Yet perhaps because he thought, he was the least sanguine among us of a decisive result—though not on military grounds. He believed that the politicians would make an inconclusive peace and that the democracies would force them to it. Here, his thinking led to a wrong conclusion. Like other British soldiers, he was little in touch with the mass of the nation which he served, because of the aloofness and separation from civilian life which are entailed by service in a purely professional army.

When one thinks it over, it appears that Major Parker was in some degree right. The professional soldier of the British army who indulges in abstract thought tends to become

unhappy. Meredith, in fiction, has indicated something of this through his Lord Ormont. In history the career of Sir Charles Napier affords a conspicuous example. But, for a Charles Napier to use, the unthinking British army is wonderful material—just because of its absolute conviction of its own superiority. Every man who came home from the front to his club must have been struck by the transition from an atmosphere of entire confidence, which never troubled to give a reason for its faith, to one of worried uncertainty. This was particularly true if the club happened to be the House of Commons. There was no doubt a thinking department in the British army, but the army as I knew it, simply did not think, was not prone to think, was not encouraged to think, about the war as a whole.

The state of mind was pervasive and infectious; I can testify to its subjugating effect on an elderly civilian, whose trade was, in a manner, thinking. But contact with one French soldier forced me to think, anyhow, about the difference between us. He was a lieutenant, promoted from the ranks, and he was back from forty continuous days (of the first fifty) in the struggle before Verdun. 'There was a time,' he said to me, 'when we used to say *ils passeront*; but now—*ils ne passeront jamais*.' That was very different from any mentality that existed among us—different in the fact that at a given moment a break-through was anticipated, and different in the conclusion, which was really an affirmation, finally reached by the army in all ranks. I question whether the British army as a whole ever envisaged the possibility of a German break-through—and Frenchmen will say that when the break-through happened, Frenchmen had to be called in to plan the means of coping with the situation. Of this however one may be sure, the temperament of the British army rendered it less liable to be dismayed or disheartened by what happened in March 1918 than would have been the case with almost any other troops, because the army as a whole had probably less intellectual realisation of the significance of those occurrences.

A great soldier once said to me that the German discipline and training was the most perfect thing imaginable and produced the ideal instrument of war, but that it had one limitation; it postulated success for its very existence. Troops like ours, loosely held, with hardly any discipline, might go through any

reverse, and come again with their old quality; the more complex, more educated human machine, would be conscious of a breakdown and cease to function, because its training led it to count on certain results.

In all this can be found the reason for prizing troops who have not the habit of thinking, led by officers who almost deliberately think as little as possible, who let their minds lie fallow. Colonel Bramble's notion of recreation is a record on the gramophone, that he has heard a hundred times; he likes a joke only if it is well matured by age, a story if he can prompt the teller at every point in it; he insists on familiar detail. He hates abstract discussion, and above all any conflict of opinion; when an argument becomes heated, he turns on *Destiny Waltz* or the *Bing Boys*.

The Frenchman writing his account of all this to his lady love says that these traits will probably strike her as puerile:

'These admirable men seem in certain ways never to have grown up; they have children's rosy cheeks, children's passion for games, and our dug-out often seems to me like a nursery of heroes. But for all that, they inspire confidence. Their trade as empire-builders has given them an exalted notion of their duty as white men. The colonel and Parker are "sahibs" whom nothing will turn from the line they have chosen. To be steady under fire is not, in their way of thinking, a courageous action, it is simply part and parcel of a gentleman's education.

'And, mind you, a "gentleman," a real gentleman, comes very near to being the most attractive type produced by the evolution of the miserable group of mammals which at this moment is creating some stir on the earth. In a disagreeable world, the English create for themselves an oasis of courtesy and self-possession.'

He goes on to lay it down that it would be foolish to think them less intelligent than the French; their intelligence works on different lines, that is all. It prides itself on a strong common sense and the avoidance of all theories. These generalisations might be regarded as platitudes were it not that M. Maurois abounds in the salt of detailed illustration. He has a pleasant saying that 'conversation is treated like a game by the British; personal allusions are forbidden like hitting below the belt, and anyone who argues with heat is ruled out at once.' But his experience indicates that if you cannot talk sport in some shape or other—games, shooting, fishing, or sailing—you



will be stranded in the conversation of a mess. Listening to a group of soldiers comparing their experiences of sport in many climes, Aurelle 'finally came to see that the world was a great 'park, laid out by a superintendent god for the pleasure of the 'gentlemen of the United Kingdom.' Every gentleman, in short, by the definition of his being must be a sportsman; if he were not a sportsman in practice he would have little in common with his fellows. But in any case he must take life in a sporting way. That conclusion is illustrated by a little scene, in which the battalion mess entertains two company officers just back from leave. One of the two curses the war and says it is disgusting to come away from his jolly little wife and children. The other says, 'No, the war gives us a very good time. When 'you go home you are a hero and an oracle, where formerly you 'were regarded as a selfish young cub.' The mess agree with him, and they try to chaff the homesick warrior out of his melancholy; but it is of no avail; he slips away to get back to his own quarters. 'Silly ass,' says the second in command. Thereupon, a discussion is opened by the Frenchman's protest, and the doctor, who is not a regular soldier, but in peace-time a specialist in lunacy, and, consequently, something of a psychologist, proceeds to lay down the law.

"Aurelle, my friend," he says, "if you want to be popular when you are living among decently brought-up Englishmen, you must make an effort to understand their point of view. They have no tenderness for the melancholy, and they scorn the sentimental. This applies to love as well as to patriotism or religion. If you want the colonel to despise you, pin a flag on your tunic. If you want the padre to abominate you, give him letters of yours with a lot of pious stuff in them to censor. If you want Parker to spew you out of his mouth, shed tears over a photograph.

"They were made to spend their youth in getting their skins toughened. They are no more afraid of a blow of misfortune than of a blow from a fist. They consider exaggeration the worst of vices and chilliness the mark of breeding. When they are very unhappy they put on a mask of humour. When they are very happy they say nothing at all. And at bottom, John Bull is terribly sentimental—which explains all the rest."

"That is all true, Aurelle," says Parker, "but it should not be talked about. The doctor is a damned Irishman, and can't hold his tongue."

These French commentators, it should be noted, invariably

have recourse to an Irishman as a sort of conducting medium to establish intelligence between the two temperamental opposites, the English and the French. They have observed the truth that Irishmen not only are readier at expression than the English, but also that they approach much more nearly to the continental standpoint. Besides, the doctor is a civilian—he stands outside the tradition of the old regular army, of which Colonel Bramble is the example and which Major Parker thus formulates :—

‘We shall never see a regiment like what the Lennox were in 1914. The officer of to-day has seen active service, no doubt, but, after all, in a war all you need is to be fit and to have no more imagination than a fish.

‘It’s in peace-time you should judge a soldier.’

M. Maurois makes the doctor quote at him the legendary saying of a sergeant-major in the Guards: ‘I wish to God this war were over so that we could get back to real manœuvres.’

That is how M. Maurois phrases it; but I think the sergeant would have said ‘real soldiering.’ At all events, the old army stamped its traditional opinion on the new. A real soldier was to be judged by his aptitude for soldiering which had nothing to do with war. When our first drafts came out, and were posted to companies, I interviewed my lot, and asked each if he had ‘done any soldiering’ before, not knowing how the phrase would mislead. Two or three answered ‘Yes’; one hardy-looking fellow said ‘No.’ What had he been doing since he enlisted in 1914? ‘I was in Gallipoli, sir.’ That was not soldiering; and the others who owned to having experience of it had done all the soldiering which counted—which gave them status as real soldiers—before the war.

What is more, the higher commands in the British army—those at least with whom regimental troops came in direct contact—attached extraordinary importance to the qualities by which a soldier is judged in time of peace. Before we went to France, we used to hear that shiny buttons would not be allowed as likely to give away a position. In France, we were told that the troops which would win the war were the troops that kept their buttons bright. A divisional general seemed to pride himself on nothing so much as the way his men saluted. If a brigadier found a subaltern in rest billets practising his men

at sloping arms by numbers, he commended the young man. The French routine seems to have been different. An acquaintance of mine, who had done five years in the Foreign Legion and thirteen in the Irish Guards, was in a position to compare the two services from the point of view of the man in the ranks. Guardsman though he was, and mightily proud of his corps, he thought that all the drilling, all the labour after 'smartness' in rest periods, was a mistake; that it would have been better, like the French, to let the men have all the rest they could get.

M. Maurois makes no detailed criticism, but one may suspect him of thinking that the British army sacrificed a good deal to its cult of appearances and ceremonial. He has one passage of explicit comparison, though the responsibility for the criticism is again saddled upon the Irish doctor.

"I like," he writes, "to see Major Parker's slowly increasing respect for the French army."

"It's curious," he said to me, "you always gather in more prisoners than we, and your losses are less than ours. Why is that?"

"And since I observed a modest silence:

"The reason is," said the doctor, "that the French take this war seriously, whereas we insist on treating it as a game. . . . You know the story of Peter Pan, Aurelle, the little boy who never grew up. The English people are Peter Pan; we have no grown-ups among us. It's charming, but sometimes it's dangerous."

In his description of an attack as seen from divisional headquarters M. Maurois inserts a thumbnail sketch of a French battery in action, and the few lines give skilfully an impression of perfect efficiency, combined with more simplicity of manner than the English traditional pose admits. Yet his picture of the staff-room where a divisional general presides during an attack, among maps and telephones, quietly dealing with the messages that come ticking in, does full justice to a machine, coolly and capably managed. Also, the doctor who has been the mouthpiece of so much criticism is the spokesman employed to say with what enthusiasm the men talked about Colonel Bramble's presence of mind and courage in that same attack.

In the end we find Colonel Bramble turned into a brigadier-general, with Parker for his brigade-major—now adopting, along with the red tabs, the staff point of view, against which, in the good old times, he, like every other regimental officer, had been so eloquent. Probably the same 'grouse' and the same con-

version from it are typical of all armies. Anyhow, the touch proves that M. Maurois really knows his British army; and he knows and loves his Colonel Bramble, who, as brigadier, remains unaltered.

“When do you think the war will be finished, Aurelle?” asks the doctor.

“When we’ve won,” cut in the general.’

That is the salient impression which the British army left on this most acute and sympathetic observer—an impression of absolute confidence. There is no suggestion of an effort of will, but simply an assumption that in the long run things can only go one way, whoever lives to see it or dies to bring it about. That was the trait which compensated for lack of trained and diffused intelligence, and for the greater concentration of effort which was certainly perceptible in the German methods. Now that it is over, one can say that we always had the feeling of fighting against an enemy more skilfully and more scientifically directed than we were; none the less, it is true that this feeling never shook our confidence—as, apparently, when a similar impression at one time spread to the French lines, it did shake French discipline. What is more, we knew that the Germans got more work out of their men than we did; their wire was always better maintained, and so on. In that respect our work was amateurish; it lacked the thoroughness of professional skill. For our professional soldiers told us quite frankly that in this business of actual war up to date they were as much at sea as we. Yet the general attitude of the British army during the first two years was to assume itself superior to the French. We used to be told that they were a temperamental race; that they evacuated trenches when the humour took them, and then, on another impulse, drove the enemy out. The idea of questioning our own tactics—which were at that time to man the line fully when a bombardment began—never entered our heads; regimental officers seldom discussed such matters. All we knew could be summed up in one phrase—to stick it and help the men to stick it.

After two years things changed; Major Parker was not the only man who felt his respect for the French army growing; and we were taught to imitate the tactics which they had in-

vented, and were told that these were French tactics. The British army was ceasing to be like Peter Pan. I knew nothing of its later developments, but it seems worth while to record what a comrade said to me of the last period, after the unity of command had been established under a Frenchman. 'When we were told to attack,' he said, 'we knew it was for a purpose, and we did not mind.'

Nothing is so convincing as success, and Marshal Foch has led us all perhaps even to overvalue the French genius for war. This at least is true, that those of us who saw with our own eyes what France suffered, and how France faced that suffering, will not grudge France her leadership in the final triumph. Yet there is room and need for more mutual knowledge. All France knew the British army; but neither the French army nor the French nation knew the British nation in time of war. Our army knew France, and knew it in the sorest stress a nation was ever put to. But among British soldiers, though they knew well all the region which M. Aulneau has described with so much interesting detail in 'Au Front Britannique,' only a small proportion really knew the army of France. Some English writer who could do the equivalent of what M. Maurois has accomplished, who could interpret to his countrymen the French military spirit and tradition, would, like M. Maurois, do a great deal to bring about an even closer understanding and a deeper mutual respect between the two great allies.

STEPHEN GWYNN.

## SULLY'S 'GRAND DESIGN'

'For the League of Nations is no new idea. It was desired by Elizabeth of England, by Henry IV. of France . . .'—LORD R. CECIL, at the Albert Hall, 13th June 1919.

THE 'Grand Design,' the famous seventeenth-century scheme for world organisation, sometimes attributed to King Henry IV. of France, sometimes to his minister, Sully, has had, not only for political philosophers but also for practical statesmen, an appeal that does not seem to weaken as the ages pass. A hundred years or so after the death of Henry it provided Jean-Jacques Rousseau with material for analytical examination; in June of the present year Lord Robert Cecil invoked its inspiration in expounding before the meeting in the Albert Hall the scheme for a League of Nations recently evolved in Paris. This last appeal alone makes it opportune to examine again the details, the historical importance, still more the very existence of the 'Grand Design.'

The undertaking justifies itself on narrower grounds. A discussion of the subject is not easily accessible in English. The 'Cambridge Modern History' hardly touches on the question. Lord Acton, in his published lectures, condenses into one sentence of dismissal a number of passages and arguments from foreign authors, still marked with his lead pencil, and visible in the Acton books in the University Library at Cambridge. In France, where interest in the reign of Henry IV. has reached such a pitch that a *Revue Henri IV.* appeared for some years under the editorship of Monsieur Albert Chamberland at Reims, a centre of French Renaissance studies, there has been written much to help the English inquirer; while in Germany, before propagandist motives in domestic or external affairs had tainted German scholarship, attention had been successfully directed both to unravelling the diplomatic correspondence between Henry IV. and the minor German potentates, and also to a critical study of Sully's 'Oeconomies Royales,' the memoirs of his years of service under Henry IV. Perhaps it will not be until a modern edition of this book is published that the material

will be to hand for a final judgment on the period and on the subject.

Maximilien de Béthune, Baron, then Marquis, of Rosny, Duke of Sully, was born in 1560, the year in which King Francis II. died and the House of Guise fell from power. At the age of twelve, being a Calvinist, he escaped with great difficulty the massacre of St. Bartholomew; subsequently attached to Henry of Navarre, he took part in the future king's most adventurous expeditions, fighting by his side, and being severely wounded at Arques and Ivry. In 1596 Sully was appointed to the Council and charged, with other counsellors, to carry out a tour through all the royal provinces to verify the accounts of the treasurers and receivers. His career as superintendent of finances began in 1599. In 1609, when Henry wished to embark upon long-meditated projects, the finances of the kingdom had been refurbished, the military machine had been brought to a state of high efficiency, a State debt of a hundred million francs was met, the revenue raised from nine to sixteen millions, and a reserve of twenty-two millions had been piled up.

Of Sully himself it is not difficult to paint a picture. He lived in a time of men of forceful, often eccentrically forceful, character, and amid events which sharpened character, not polished it to sameness. No one more consistently than he could boast a life of service for 'the religion.' Yet his conviction neither withdrew him from the world, like Calvin, to build a holy city; nor, though he had played no meagre military part, did it thrust him into the hurly-burly of contemporary life, like many of those rugged warriors from Gascony, cavaliers of Huguenotism, almost anyone of whom might have deserved the strange but noble epitaph made for one of their number fallen on the field of battle, '*Homme digne des guerres civiles.*' Sully was vain, long-winded, jealous, and not over scrupulous; yet these characteristics were set off by abilities which contributed in a preponderating degree to that vast stock of unique qualities in his public servants upon which Henry IV. drew with such wise selection, that he left the greatness of France laid on secure foundations, and bequeathed a policy which, had that very greatness not intoxicated his successors, might well have averted the suffering that France, and the world with France, has since then been forced to undergo.

Neither his personality, nor his conduct in handling the public moneys, nor his implacability in pursuing his private feuds, were likely to keep Sully immune from attack, or to mollify the attacks when made upon him. His memoirs are full of passages in which he refuses to share with anyone the credit for success ; while even more than the always debateable questions arising from the incidence of taxation, the method of collecting or allocating revenue, his habit of life, and the gorgeous standard of seigneurial state which he kept laid him open to a growing volume of criticism which was not long before it hardened into hatred. Against all attacks arising from such animosity Henry IV. stood as a sure shield, but Sully's authority did not long survive his master's death. He retired to his estates, particularly residing in his château at Villebon. From this retirement, which was broken, it is true, by half a dozen visits to the Court of more importance than has always been realised, he was destined to see the machinery which he had created grow rusty from disuse, and the policy, in the striking out of which he had played the chief part, give way to a chaotic situation which the advisers of the boy monarch seemed powerless to end. Nor, when the strong arm of Richelieu dealt faithfully with anarchy and chaos-mongers, can it be said that this elder statesman's position was the happier. True, he was created Marshal of France by Richelieu, but only to make vacant his post of Master of the Ordnance. Elder statesmen, who find their position insufficiently appraised by king and country, tend to drop into reflections and reminiscences. Not in the rural surroundings of a Machiavelli or a Bismarck did Sully compose his 'Oeconomies Royales.' The story of its composition forms one of the oddest phenomena in the history of authorship.

This age is not likely to be unfamiliar with the idea of the domestic splendour of public men whose life of service to the community has been no less profitable than it has been successful. The dining hall and its equipment at Villebon were magnificent ; the chapel was not less stately because the devotions held in it were simple. Eighty lackeys had been known to be upon the sick list at one time, writes Sully's private physician, and their absence not to be so much as noticed. At any rate, they hung round by dozens in attendance when the duke or his wife left the raised terraces of the château grounds to wander of a summer



afternoon through the lower gardens among the statuary and fountains. Years of devotion to King Henry had not wrought this in Sully that he had the king's easiness of access and that spontaneity of transacting business, of which one often finds shocked mention in the dispatches of the Venetian or the Spanish diplomatic agents at his Court. It was not to be expected, therefore, that the act of autobiography would be either lightly undertaken, or would be carried out without due ceremonial regard for the solemnity of the occasion.

When the manifold activity of the day's administration was at an end, the landowner and the magistrate were laid aside and Sully retired within the closed doors of his library. There, seated upon a chair of state, secretaries read to him those portions of his life which they had prepared that day after a careful sorting of his papers and an elaborate comparison of the records in his strong room. Day by day the manuscript grew, but the publication of it was delayed. In 1638 the first instalment, in two volumes, appeared from his private press at the château, to be followed very shortly by a second edition. The very publication was attended by fresh clouds of mysterious, or rather intentionally mystifying pomposity. The printer was, indeed, sent for from Angers to Villebon, but the volumes open with the assertion, in the course of an elaborate address to 'the wise and judicious readers,' that they were printed at Amsterdam by 'Alethinosgraphe de Clearetimalee and Graphexecon de Pistariste, imprimeurs,' in that city. The second part, consisting of the third and fourth volumes, was published twenty-one years after Sully's death, in 1662, at Paris, under the supervision of Le Laboureur.

It is difficult, without prolonged quotation, to explain to how great an extent a work written in the second person is the despair of modern readers. The form in which it was cast made niceties of composition difficult, though it was a form convenient for covering up the author's traces, and for throwing dust in the eyes of his readers. Mr. Tilley bears witness to two sentences, one of six hundred, the other of nine hundred words in length. Apart from this, however, he must be an intrepid reader whose faculty of apprehension does not boggle at summaries of Sully's virtues in the fawning elaboration of an eternal vocative; while, as a specimen of the process reduced to an absurdity taken from

the more private passages of Sully's life, St. Beuve very aptly quotes the following :—

'De ce pas vous en allastes voir Mademoiselle de Courtenay envers laquelle vous et vos gentils-hommes fistes si bien valoir ce que c'estoit passé, que cette belle et sage fille vous fait en affection, et peu après vous l'espousastes ; l'amour et gentillesse de laquelle vous retint toute l'année 1584 en vostre nouveau mesnage, ou vous commençastes à tesmoigner, comme vous avez desjà bien fait auparavant en toute vostre vie, en la conduite de vostre maison, une oeconomie, un ordre et un mesnage merueilleux.'

Fortunately, however, the secretaries were compelled, at times, to use the direct letters, notes, or memoranda of their master, while Sully himself occasionally deigned to introduce what he himself calls 'un petit conte pour rire au milieu de tant 'de choses sérieuses.' These and several of King Henry's letters relieve the otherwise depressing task of reading through the memoirs, but the best commentary on their strong and weak points is the fact that in 1745 the Abbé de L'Ecluse Des Loges rewrote the whole of the 'Oeconomies Royales,' making a smoothly running story of it all in the first person. This made a pleasant book, which was most inaccurately translated into English in 1756 by one Charlotte Lennox, a pensioner of the Duke of Newcastle, but it must be read under a comprehension of its limitations.

It is in the 'Oeconomies Royales' that the historian is introduced to the conception of the 'Grand Design,' that system of world organisation which Sully attributes to Henry IV., and about which controversy has revolved among historians. It will be well to see first how it is represented in Sully's pages.

Here it is that the investigator of the 'Grand Design' is faced with the first of his difficulties. The papers, letters, and records of diplomatic transactions scattered about in the 'Oeconomies Royales' introduce the idea of the 'Grand Design' again and again, but in such a manner as can only provoke confusion. Sometimes it is treated as a serious matter of negotiation between Henry IV. and other potentates of Europe, Elizabeth, the Landgrave of Hesse, or the Prince of Orange. Sometimes it is treated merely as the subject of King Henry's day dreams. Sometimes it becomes a useful handle in negotiations between Henry and his recalcitrant Protestant subjects, like Lesdiguières,

or the Duke of Bouillon. All sequence in narration and consistency is lacking. Confronted with this difficulty, the adroit editor in the reign of Louis XIV., L'Ecluse, gives an account, embracing, as it were, the chief features of the plan at its high water mark. Modern historians have often been content to take this account at its face value, and round this picture of it public opinion has tended to crystallise. It will serve here as a point to start from.

'Le roi,' writes the pseudo-Sully, 'voulait rendre la France 'éternellement heureux; et comme elle ne peut goûter cette 'parfaite félicité, qu'en un sens toute l'Europe ne la partage avec 'elle, c'était le bien de toute la chrétienté qu'il voulait faire, et 'd'une manière si solide, que rien à l'avenir ne fût capable d'en 'ébranler les fondemens.' The means suggested by the king to bring about so blessed a result, could at first only provoke scepticism in the mind of Sully: 'par la même raison, ce qui 'm'arrêta le plus long temps, la situation générale des affaires 'en Europe, et des nôtres en particulier, paraissant de tout point 'contraire à l'exécution.' More mature reflection, however, convinced him that many of the difficulties could be removed if a persistent policy directed towards that end was followed in finance, as well as in internal and external matters. This persistent policy could only be effective if it were unsuspected, a fact which accounted for the silence of the king to all save Sully in the matter.

The basis of the policy was conceived to consist in the reduction of the European balance of power to an equilibrium. This, it was thought, could be obtained by a grouping, or a re-grouping, of the Powers into six hereditary monarchies, France, Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden, and Lombardy; five elective monarchies, those of the Imperial possessions, the Papacy, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia; four republics, the Venetian, the Italian, the Swiss, and what he terms the Belgic. These fifteen Powers should form a General Council consisting of sixty-six persons, chosen from all proportionately. These sixty-six, re-chosen every third year, should assemble as a Senate to deliberate on any affairs affecting each or all, discuss their joint or several interests, pacify their mutual quarrels, and determine any civil, political, and religious questions touching European nations, whether as regards themselves, or as regards their European neighbours.

This Council might be fixed in its location or ambulatory ; divided into three grand committees, according to geographical convenience, or undivided and indivisible. Its constitution should be easily changed, so as to give it adaptability to circumstance. Two general considerations only should, or might, be written into the charter of its foundation : first, an obligation upon all to combine counsel and forces, if it were necessary, against the Turk ; second, the application by all the members of the Federation of those rules of religious tolerance with regard to Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists, which were coming into force in France.

The simplicity of the scheme, as described by L'Ecluse, will be deceptive to the reader. However simple in itself, in the pages of the 'Oeconomies Royales' the story of its conception is obscure, and there is a lack of consistency in the account of the various steps by which its consummation is alleged to have been pursued. One may quote as an instance of Sully's obscurity in telling how or when the project was first conceived, the description \* of a famous interview given him by the king on 15th February 1593, in which he is consulted as to the desirability of Henry making 'some accommodation' with his opponents in the matter of his religious beliefs. Sully was not altogether opposed to such a step, but poured out, to already convinced ears, a passionate request for the continuance of religious toleration for the Huguenots. Among the other arguments which he urged, or alleges that he urged, on that occasion was the impossibility in any other way of prosecuting Henry's 'high and magnificent designs for the establishment of 'an universal most Christian republic . . . composed of all those 'kings and potentates who profess the name of Christ.' This would undoubtedly be a very pertinent consideration, and one proper for the minister to urge on such an occasion, but it is mystifying to find that, to judge from another passage in the book, three years later the king seems to have forgotten that he ever cherished such a project, or at least that he had ever spoken of it to Sully in a manner which would justify such strong words on Sully's part in 1593. In 1596, one sunny morning,† on the

---

\* Michaud et Poujolot, Vol. XVI., p. 110*b*. This edition of the 'Oeconomies Royales' is quoted in the notes throughout this article.

† Vol. XVI., p. 242.

garden terrace of the Château Gaillon, Henry, warmed by good news from Provence, expanded, and, while waiting for the hunt to start, enthusiastically unfolded to Sully the 'ten desires,' as he named them, 'of his heart.' 'The ninth, my friend,' says Henry, 'is the ability to carry out before I die two specific 'magnificent designs which I have in my mind, without ever 'having communicated them to anyone, about which . . . I 'shall not say anything to you now, never, perhaps, to anyone, 'till I see that by the general establishment of peace throughout 'my kingdom I have the means for the complete execution of 'them.' Was Henry thinking of the 'Grand Design'? If not, why had it so faded from his mind since earlier days as not to be classed among the ten desires of his heart? If it was the 'Grand Design,' how could he have forgotten Sully's knowledge of it from those early days, a point upon which all Sully's utterances lay such stress? We must find reconciliation in inconceivable forgetfulness upon the part of Henry, or we have in other parts of Sully's narrative to be on our guard against habits of inaccuracy, of which this forms a specimen.

Old men, however, as they grow garrulous, will grow forgetful. It would be pedantic to make too much of inconsistencies like these. Unfortunately, Henry's preparation for the actual execution of the 'Grand Design,' as told by Sully, presents not lesser but greater inconsistencies than his witness to its origin. Before passing final judgment, it will be well to see how Sully would have us believe that it came about.

According to a passage in the first part of the 'Oeconomies 'Royales,'\* in 1601, when the king was visiting Calais and Queen Elizabeth happened to be at Dover, the king received a letter from the queen, speaking with vexation of their inability to meet because of certain matters of consequence about which mutual consultation was desirable, but concerning which she dare not put anything on paper. Puzzled by the phrase, the king decided that Sully should make a voyage to England, as if upon a private errand, leaving it to the queen's pleasure to use his coming as a method of communication. Everything turned out as Henry planned. At Dover Sully encountered as by accident Cobham, Raleigh, Devonshire, and Pembroke. He had hardly

---

\* Vol. XVI., p. 364.

settled into his apartments before he was summoned to the queen. At several interviews the whole circle of the diplomatic problems of the day was covered by discussion.

When Sully returned to France, he maintains that an agreement had been put on paper between the French and English monarchs, which, however, he is careful to point out never reached the stage of signature. In effect this agreement provided for:—

1. A loyal and perpetual association, a fraternity and a community of arms and plans in the contemporary European diplomatic matter.
2. A common understanding in matters of religious policy.
3. An agreement upon a joint attempt to invite into such a fraternity, and upon identical terms, the northern, *i.e.*, the Scandinavian Powers.
4. Agreement to approach the North German principalities as to methods for strengthening themselves by federation, as to enlisting their joint or separate co-operation with the present scheme, and as to re-asserting the freedom of the Imperial election.
5. Agreement as to the joint duty of assisting the Netherlands in their struggle with the Hapsburgs.

This, so far as it is possible to gather, is the account which Sully would have his readers believe of the results of his English visit, although the visit is twice described by him\* and the differences in details are not easily reconciled. How far the agreement, thus evolved, might have received subsequent confirmation by the parties concerned in it, or, what is more important for our purpose, how far such political understandings, if they ever existed, would have later been caught up into something in the nature of a 'Grand Design' is a matter of idle speculation, for, as Sully points out, in the year 1603 Elizabeth died, and with the coming of her Scotch successor the diplomatic approaches would have had to be made anew.

According to Sully, the first news of the death of Queen Elizabeth reached him in a letter written by King Henry himself, and dated Nancy, 10th April 1603.† The letter expresses great distress upon the king's part at losing so good an ally, so cordial an enemy of the Hapsburgs, one with whom he was on the verge of concerting great designs 'as none knows better than 'yourself, having been employed in them.' The hopes of obtaining such co-operation from her successor were not good.

\* See also Vol. XVII., p. 327*b*.

† Vol. XVI., p. 426.

Sully must make up his mind to undertake a journey to the English Court to sound the mind of James I., and to turn the situation to the best purpose possible.

Thus it was, according to Sully, that he paid his famous visit to London, about which any history of England bears record. He sailed, armed with all kinds of greetings for the royal family, and with instructions, in part official, in part confidential.\* The official instructions largely enjoined upon Sully the duty of congratulation and inquiry, of sounding the English royal and ministerial opinion as to the situation in the Netherlands, as to a double marriage between the English and French royal children, commercial agreements, and the freedom of the seas. The secret instructions contained more concrete proposals which Sully might or might not find useful with reference to a joint policy of hostility towards the Hapsburgs. In neither is there any mention of the 'Grand Design,' nor is any phrase used from which the contemplation of that project can be inferred, except, perhaps, a clause providing for the equal distribution among all the Powers of any territories taken from the Imperial family, the inference being that no one Power should, by the accretion of such territories, upset the equilibrium of Europe. As, however, in this passage we find mention of the *King* of Sweden, and as Duke Charles did not assume the title of King of Sweden till 1604, which assumption was not recognised by other Powers till 1606, doubts are thrown upon the contemporary character of the provision.

Arrived in London, Sully was handsomely received. His stay there was protracted. He had many interviews with King James, upon whose impressionable mind he appears to have worked with much success. It was not alone the diplomatic dexterity of his visitor which drew King James away from the more cautious counsels of his chief advisers. This same year a priest named Gwynn had been arrested on a voyage to England, and had confessed, with an alacrity which threw doubts upon his sanity, that he was bound for London to murder King James, his consort, and his ministers. The ground was well prepared accordingly for Sully's whispering of dark designs on the part of Spain, of Austria, the Jesuits, and His Holiness.

---

\* Vol. XVI., p. 432 onwards.

Six years afterwards, in a memorandum printed in the 'Oeconomies Royales,' Sully sums up the results of this mission to the English Court.\* The main result was a definite, though secret, agreement, signed at Hampton Court, by which James promised to allow the levy of soldiers in England and Scotland for the defence of Ostend. It was agreed that the French king should pay the expenses of this force, although a third part of the cost was to be deducted from the French debt to Great Britain. Beyond this, progress towards a mutual understanding in the sphere of foreign politics had proved difficult, particularly in the building up of that rearrangement of the European Powers which, according to Sully, occupied so firm a position in the French king's aspirations. True, he asserts that he had discussed these matters with James and with some of the representatives of other European Powers in London, and had won some acceptance for his views, an acceptance the importance of which, to judge from other passages in the 'Oeconomies Royales,' † gradually swelled in his mind till he could be found writing of it as a definite agreement. All the same, on his return he had to run the gauntlet of criticism by his colleagues for lack of concrete achievement on the English mission, while he himself speaks ‡ of the 'froideur, lenteur et timidité' which characterised the temperaments of those foreign statesmen who at the solemn moment had contented themselves with expressions of general approbation concerning not very definite schemes for a geographical reorganisation of Europe, a general toleration for the three religions, freedom of trade on land and sea, compulsory international arbitration, and self-denying ordinances on the part of all the Powers, such as customarily accompany schemes for world organisation. The general impression that Sully desires to give is that, after his mission to the Court of James, the king, perceiving a lack of whole-hearted co-operation on the part of England, turned towards the lands across the Rhine to win from the German princes support for his designs.

So much for Sully's account of the king's efforts between, say, 1593 and 1603 to build up a 'Grand Design' by diplomatic

---

\* Vol. XVII., p. 329.

† *E.g.*, Vol. XVI., p. 491*b*; Vol. XVII., p. 220.

‡ Vol. XVII., p. 320.



methods. It will be well to recapitulate the salient features. According to this account the idea of forming a 'universal most Christian republic' occurred to Henry IV. some time before he won a secure position as the King of France. Mingled as such an idea must be with an anti-Hapsburg policy, notions somewhat similar very naturally occurred about the same time to the Queen of England. Henry having been approached by her, Sully was sent on a mission which was preserved, then and since, as the profoundest of State secrets. With England, however, a shadowy agreement was sketched out, some of the component parts of which were suitable to form the nucleus of the 'Grand Design.' To this agreement the assent of other nations was to be gradually and discreetly wooed. The death of Queen Elizabeth came as a shock to Henry, who, on the very day he heard of it, wrote to Sully suggesting that he should at once fare to England to see if peradventure anything could be saved from the wreckage of the vast Anglo-French projects. Armed with instructions, from which such confidential questions were naturally enough omitted, Sully paid a prolonged visit to England. There, after negotiation with King James and with representatives at London of other foreign Courts, he concluded a practical agreement on the urgent question of the defence of Ostend, but though he received a sympathetic hearing, the more confidential object of his mission had to be postponed to a more favourable moment.

This is an accurate account of the project of the 'Grand Design,' reduced to the baldest statements and drawn from the confused and contradictory narrative of the 'Oeconomies Royales.' Modern research, and indeed a very moderately attentive reading of that work, throw upon even the broadest features of it the very gravest doubt. Of the negotiations with Elizabeth it may be said that her letter to the king suggesting a conference on mysterious matters is probably a forgery; indeed, Sully himself\* in later passages attributes to Henry the initiative in the matter. It is of much bigger significance, of course, that up to the present no reference to Sully's visit to Elizabeth has been found in any English or French State papers or in private documents. It seems almost inconceivable that there should be

---

\* Vol. XVII., p. 327.

no reference to it in, say, the Hatfield papers. None such has been yet published. The suspicion under which the visit rests grows to certainty when not only is it realised that Queen Elizabeth was not in Dover at that time, but that Sully's account of the visit contains other chronological impossibilities.

Of Sully's later English visit his narrative, as was shown above, begins with a letter to him from the king speaking of the news of Queen Elizabeth's death. It is dated Nancy, 10th April. From Fresne's edition of the 'Lettres missives' it will be observed that on 11th April the king was still without the news. As a matter of fact, he heard it on the way to Fontainebleau after leaving Nancy. The letter is therefore at least doubtful. Its genuineness is not confirmed by the suspiciously admirable way in which it both introduces the 'later' mission of Sully, and, at the same time, hints that his dealings with Elizabeth in 1601 render him the right man for the purpose. While finally—to take no further example of Sully's contradictory and confusing treatment of the 'Grand Design'—how is it to be explained that in another passage we find him writing\* as if it was only in 1607, and in that year for the first time, that the project had seemed feasible?

'Neantmoins voyant que, de temps en temps pendant cette dernière année 1607, et quelquefois assez fréquemment, vostre Majesté renouvelloit telles propositions, me commandant depuis peu plus expressément qu'elle n'avoit point encore fait, de méditer avec plus d'attention sur icelles . . . dont est advenu qu'en examinant toutes circonstances et toutes humeurs et conditions . . . il m'a une fois semblé avoir trouvé des moyens et des fondemens par lesquels plusieurs inconveniens, accidens et difficultez qui m'avoient auparavant effrayé, se pourroient surmonter ou grandement alléger.'

Well may a painstaking, though not highly inspired, German critic of the 'Oeconomies Royales,' reflecting, perhaps, over the labour spent on many a preceding passage, almost pathetically exclaim, 'Von allen Verhandlungen, von allen Bedenken, die vor 'jene Zeit fallen, sagt er sich los.' The whole story of the 'Grand Design' is traceable to one book; after a critical examination of that book any literary jury would pronounce a verdict of not proven.

Nor is it only from the printed edition of the book that

---

\* Vol. XVII., p. 213.

doubts arise. In the Bibliothèque Nationale there exists the original manuscript from which the book was printed.\* It appears that the manuscript was finished in its final form (though many versions were probably drawn up before the final form was reached) in or about the year 1617. That manuscript twenty-five years ago was collated with the printed text by a distinguished scholar. Important differences between the two immediately appear. In the written version there is no mention of the visit to Queen Elizabeth; nor is there throughout the manuscript any use of the words 'république très chrétienne,' the phrase invariably employed in the printed version by Sully in connexion with the 'Grand Design.' Moreover, though some of the letters from London exist in the manuscript, all those are missing which in the printed text purport to give an account of Sully's more confidential conversations with King James or with the other statesmen whose opinion he sought to sound upon his project for world organisation. Often, too, letters from or to Sully will differ considerably in the printed form from the written version, and in almost every case the fact, and in many cases the actual form, of alteration goes to build up a theory of later and tendentious manipulation on the part of the author or his assistant secretaries. These alterations made between the years 1617, when the manuscript was finished, and 1638, when the *editio princeps* was published, are the work of Sully's last twenty years of life, the fruit of his musings in retirement, and of his perception that the destinies of France had passed from his hands for ever. In these added and interpolated passages, made when the reign of Henry IV. had already become history, one finds the elaborated construction of the 'Grand Design,' its amphictyonic council of the fifteen Powers, its senate, its arbitral powers, and the suggested regulations for procedure.

In these features of the 'Grand Design' there is nothing to surprise the historian of the period, though modern popular opinion has either hailed them as a novelty, or argued from the originality of their nature an anachronism indicative of later forgery. The truth is that there is nothing original about them. The seventeenth century in France, the century of Bodin, saw a development of political philosophy and philosophic speculation

---

\* Fonds français, 10305, 10307, 10308, 10309, 10311, 10313.

concerning national and international government, which has been to some extent overshadowed by the work of the French eighteenth-century philosophers, and so forgotten. Beside Bodin's great work we have those provoked by the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, such as the 'Vindiciae contra Tyrannos' of Duplessis Mornay or Languet, or the 'Franco-Gallia' of Hotman. But there were others in these stirring times less well known, forgotten till some historian of European thought stumbles across them in the neglected corner of a library, the work of men who once had a European reputation, like the crazy orientalist, William Postel, expelled from the Society of Jesus for the grandiose nature of his French patriotism, or the benevolent Catholic priest of Paris, Emerich Crucé. Huguenot writers, too, seemed to find a special pleasure in elaborating schemes of government in meticulous detail, Jean de Ferrières, La Noue, and others; so much so that one writer has seen in certain passages in the 'History' of d'Aubigné an instance of close collaboration with the author of the 'Oeconomies Royales.' The provenance of Sully's notions one can hardly hope to trace, but that they were startlingly original it is impossible to argue, in view of the following extract from 'Le Nouveau Cynée,' published by Crucé in 1623\* :—

'Neantmoins pour en prévenir les inconveniens (the impossibility of making at any one moment an enduring peace) il seroit nécessaire de choisir une ville, ou tous les souverains eussent perpetuellement leurs ambassadeurs, afin que les differens qui pourroient survenir fussent viudez par le jugement de toute l'assemblée. Les ambassadeurs de ceux qui seroient interessez exposeroient là les plaintes de leur maistres et les autres députéz en iugeroient sans passion. Et pour autorisez d'avantage le jugement on prendroit advis des grandes Républiques qui auroient aussi en ce mesme endroit leurs agens. . . . Et qui seroit le Prince si temeraire qui osast desdire la compagnie de tous les Monarques du Monde? Les villes de Grece se rapportoient a l'arrest des Amphictyons. . . .

'Ceste compagnie donc iugeroit les debats qui survindroient tant pour la presence (questions of precedence from which Crucé feared trouble) que pour autre chose, maintiendroient les uns et les autres en bonne intelligence, iroit au devant des mescontentemens, et les appaiseroit par la voye de douceur, si faire se pouvait, ou en cas de necessité par la force.'

---

\* See article in *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1919.

The 'Grand Design,' then, as Rousseau discussed it, as Voltaire laughed at it, as Lord Robert Cecil quoted it, was not the conception or ideal of King Henry, but the creation on paper of his wisest minister. Is the forged evidence merely testimony to the insatiable *amour propre* of Sully? To answer this in the affirmative is to take a shallow view of history, which does far short of justice to a man, who, though he showed himself capable of forging evidence for the low end of fastening infamy upon the individuals he hated, was none the less whole-heartedly a lover of France and of the monarch, who for him typified all wisdom and all kingly skill. Nor need it be supposed that the ideals which Sully chose to advocate in his last years were only the creation of a disappointed statesman. They may well in his mind, though not on paper nor elaborated to their final form, have preceded his retirement. The guiding principle of French foreign policy had been antagonism to the Hapsburgs. A wave of anti-Spanish feeling had made it possible for the throne to be secured for the House of Bourbon; Le Satyre Minippée showed no less anti-Spanish feeling than the contemporary literature of England. One understands Henry's success the better, not so much by the study of State papers as in the reading of a play like Beaumont and Fletcher's comedy 'Philaster.' Hatred of Spain moved Burleigh and Henry IV. to watch each other across the English Channel, in earnest anxiety to detect the first sign of weakening in what both regarded as a common cause. On the death of Elizabeth, despite the Treaty of Vervins, Sully's first duty was to incite in her successor an apprehension of the machinations of the Hapsburgs. Towards a struggle with that house all the statecraft, financial or political, of the Government of France was aimed. The vast forces of men and money and munitions, accumulated by Sully's skill when the affair of Cleves Julich disturbed the peace of Europe, can only be accounted for by supposing that Henry felt that the struggle between him and his great European rival was now imminent. Sully saw all this, but he saw also beyond and round it. He visualised, as few of his contemporaries, the greatness of the struggle. It was with him an urgent matter that France should not stand alone. In fighting the Austrians and Spaniards he wished to have upon his side the northern German Powers at least and, if possible, Great Britain and the Scandinavian Powers. Nothing could be more

helpful in the struggle than to have across the Rhine a number of allies to whom France might tender its protection, but whose activities it need not fear. By convincing such States of the disinterested aims of France, there would be at its very gates a northern, for the most part Protestant, Germany, at ease, but impotent to pursue a hostile foreign policy. Thus it behoved French statesmen to form a league in Germany, and to persuade into that league all the primary and secondary Powers in and out of Germany. Towards that league France must adopt an attitude of selfless benevolence. The spoils of war must not be the object of French cupidity; France must bear rather more than her share of war's sacrifice and perils. The diplomatic correspondence between Henry on the one hand, and the Landgrave of Hesse or Christian of Anhalt on the other, shows with what great success Sully had impressed these views upon his master. True, it was not without a struggle. 'Hé, quoi,' the latter is represented as exclaiming on one occasion, 'voudrez vous que je dépendisse quarante millions pour conquestre des terres pour autres sans en retenir pour moi. Ce n'est pas là mon intention, mon aymi.' But he did convince the king, and the policy bore fruit in the great anti-Hapsburg League concluded at Halle in 1610 between the German princes.

Then came the assassination of King Henry. From his château, in retirement, Sully must have watched during the next twenty years the negation of every principle of caution or of preparation before action upon which the policy of the preceding reign had been built. Is it to be wondered that at last he lifted up his voice and spoke, using the most striking form of utterance within his powers to drive home his admonitions and to sound a note of warning? His royal master, like King Arthur, should come again to earth, linked with certain arresting ideas in contemporary thought, and provoke the little men of the succeeding generation to salutary thought such as might still save the State. He is not unique in falsifying history for a purpose, and condemnation without reservation does not do justice to the man.

GEOFFREY BUTLER.

## ULSTER AND SINN FEIN

ONE of the most characteristic features of the Sinn Fein propaganda is the constant repetition of the story that the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland owes its inception to the attitude of the Protestants of Ulster in arming five years ago. The public memory is so short, and the number of people who read Irish history so few, that this story is actually accepted at Radical meetings, in a section of the Press, and even in Parliament itself. One would imagine at times that Ireland was an Arcadia until the Ulster Volunteers were formed, that murder and outrage were unknown, and that the cruelties which are being perpetrated under the ægis of Sinn Fein are things foreign to the Irish character.

It is useless arguing with people who appear to believe that the massacre of 1641, the rebellion of 1798, the Fenian movement in the 'sixties, and the Land League campaign in 1880, were all indirectly due to the machinations of Sir Edward Carson and his Protestant supporters in 1914; but the average person who is amenable to reason will be prepared to weigh the facts and give a just judgment. The first witness I wish to call is Mr. Birrell. He crystallised the Sinn Fein movement in a sentence when he told the Rebellion Commission that it was due to

'The old hatred and distrust of the British connexion, always noticeable in all classes and in all places, varying in degree and finding different ways of expression, but always there as the background of Irish politics and character.'

Sinn Fein is no new Irish movement, but simply Irish disloyalty in a new form.

It is important to bear in mind that those who desire a change in Ireland really aim at complete independence from Great Britain. I have met Englishmen so poorly informed regarding the Irish question as to imagine that the Nationalists only wanted a 'gas and water' Parliament, and they have blamed Ulstermen for standing in the way of what they considered a small concession. The real question at issue is whether the

Union is to be maintained, or whether there is to be separation, with all the dangers it entails not only to the Loyalists in Ireland, but also to Great Britain and the Empire. The history of Ireland proves that there is no *via media*. Ulstermen, when they are blamed for opposing the pretended compromise of Home Rule, are entitled to remind their English critics that the finest and most convincing speeches against Home Rule were made by Mr. Gladstone before he became dependent upon the Parnellite vote. They are also entitled to recall the fact that from 1895 to 1910 the Liberals kept their professed Home Rule faith in a political pigeon hole.

Is it right for politicians to gamble with the future of the United Kingdom and the Empire in order to secure momentary power? Ulster has opposed Home Rule first and foremost on Imperial grounds, because Ulstermen feel that the establishment of a Parliament in Dublin, controlled by people who are disloyal to Great Britain, would place the Empire in grave peril. Ulster is proud of the part she has played in building up the Empire, and Ulstermen dread, and will resist to the death, anything calculated to weaken that great edifice. Ulster is opposed to Sinn Fein as she was opposed to Parnellism, because its success would mean the disintegration of the United Kingdom, and the ultimate destruction of the Empire. Parnellism and Sinn Fein are different labels on the same bottle. The aim of both is the complete independence of Ireland. Parnell started his Land League campaign in 1880, just as De Valera has done, by touring America and rousing the anti-British feeling there. That campaign was arranged and controlled by the Fenian leaders, whose aims were well known to the whole world. The Fenian idea was to establish a republic in Ireland. With full knowledge of these facts, Parnell, addressing a meeting in Cincinnati, used the words:—

‘When we have undermined English misgovernment we have paved the way for Ireland to take her place among the nations of the earth. And let us not forget that this is the ultimate goal at which all we Irishmen aim. None of us, whether we are in America or in Ireland, or wherever we may be, will be satisfied until we have destroyed the last link which keeps Ireland bound to England.’

Numberless speeches to the same effect have been made by



Nationalist leaders. It was not until 1912 that they began to hide their real objects.

It was in 1880 that the cruel boycotting campaign was inaugurated. Bad as the situation is to-day, it was much worse then. Gladstone declared that 'the resources of civilisation were not exhausted,' and he added that Parnell 'stood between the living and the dead, not, like Aaron, to stay the plague, but to spread the plague.' A few days afterwards he said Parnell and his party were 'marching through rapine to the disintegration and dismemberment of the Empire.' In 1881 the outrages numbered 4439—a record which the Sinn Feiners have not yet beaten. The outrages were of the usual Irish kind. Neither age nor sex was spared, and the mutilation of cattle became a nightly occurrence. The situation became so bad in 1882 that the Crimes Prevention Act was passed, with the result that while there were 2597 outrages in the first six months of the year they dropped to 836 in the second half. But the country passed through a trying time until in the firm hand of Mr. A. J. Balfour were placed the reins of government in Dublin. In a short space of time he restored peace to the country, a peace which remained almost unbroken until Mr. Birrell became Chief Secretary. That Ireland was then both peaceful and prosperous Mr. Birrell himself acknowledged publicly, but for political reasons he abdicated his powers in favour of the Irish Nationalist party, who for nine years ruled the country, with results that culminated in the Easter rebellion of 1916.

The Report of the Parnell Commission in 1890 threw a flood of light on the Nationalist movement. It showed that eight members of Parnell's party, whose names will be found in the Report, conspired for the separation of Ireland from Great Britain, and that the whole party had circulated newspapers calculated to incite sedition and crime, that they abstained from denouncing intimidation, and that they compensated persons injured in committing crime. This is the stem from which the Sinn Fein branch has sprung, and it is nourished by the wild men in America who, thirty years ago, provided the funds for carrying on criminal work in Great Britain and Ireland. Why should Englishmen blame Ulstermen for resisting these enemies of the Empire? Make-believe may suit children, but it is folly when

applied to the serious affairs of life. The Sinn Feiners have at least one thing to their credit—they have torn off the mask which Irish Nationalists wore during the passage of the last Home Rule Bill through Parliament. We know now exactly where we stand. The only Home Rule scheme that will satisfy the Sinn Feiners is one which spells separation. Constitution-mongers, like Abbé Sieyès, may draft new schemes for Ireland, but in the end we must get down to bedrock—the Union or Separation. This is the lesson we learn from the written history of the Parnellite movement, and from the unwritten history of Sinn Fein.

With the downfall of Parnell the Nationalist movement in Ireland was broken into fragments, and the ten years of Unionist rule prevented the physical force men from doing any harm. They saw their chance when the Liberals came into office in 1906. The Liberals, it is true, had a sufficient majority to be independent of the Irish vote, and Home Rule was laid on the shelf; but the Nationalist politicians who had backed the Liberal party, were consoled by being allowed to do what they liked in Ireland. They were chiefly concerned in the pastime known as place-hunting. This suited the Sinn Feiners, whose movement was beginning to grow. They posed as pure-souled patriots, they could count on the support of those who held to Parnell's doctrine, and every disgruntled place-hunter readily joined their ranks. As showing that there has been no connexion between the Ulster movement, which began in 1912, and Sinn Fein, it is only necessary to point out that the Sinn Fein organisation was launched in 1904. The foundations were well and truly laid by Arthur Griffith, who urged that Ireland could gain her freedom from Great Britain by following the example of Hungary in its relations with Austria.

'One strong, able, honest man,' he wrote, 'in Ireland in 1867, after the failure of the Fenian insurrection, apprehending the significance of the coronation of Francis Joseph at Pesth, could have rallied and led the country to victory. Ireland did not produce him. Ireland produced Isaac Butt, the apostle of compromise, who by himself and his successors has led the country to the brink of destruction.'

Mr. Griffith's policy fired the imagination of the young bloods, and he soon gathered round him all the writers and poets of local note. Passive resistance was the keynote of his programme. Irish members were to cease attending at West-

minster, and Ireland was to refuse to pay any heed to laws made in London. A General Council was to be formed in Ireland, Irish consular agents were to be appointed, and America was to assist in thwarting the foreign policy of Great Britain. The new party were told that their principal duty was to keep Irishmen out of the British army and the Irish police force. The first public meeting of the Sinn Fein party was held in Dublin, and the policy as outlined by Griffith was adopted. Mr. Edward Martyn, who presided, declared that 'the Irish Nationalist who entered the English army or navy deserved to be flogged.' The anti-enlisting campaign was most successful.

At first the Irish Nationalist party ignored the rival that had appeared in the field. It made the mistake of under-estimating the power of the new force and of over-estimating its own. All the old insurrectionary parties abroad that had supported Parnell soon began to gravitate towards Sinn Fein. For a time the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church was a mystery. The hierarchy observed a studied silence, but to close observers it was a notable sign that the younger priests associated themselves with the Sinn Feiners. There is not a better disciplined force in the world than the Irish priesthood; one word from the bishops then, or now, would have withdrawn the support of the clergy, and without that support the movement would have collapsed. But that word was never spoken, and the Sinn Feiners now feel that they have the approval of their spiritual guides.

The work of organising the Sinn Feiners was naturally slow, but the leaders were greatly facilitated in their work by the supineness of Mr. Birrell. From 1910 onwards the seditious Press was busy. It was evidently heavily subsidised from some source, for its advertising revenue was meagre. The foreign policy of Sinn Fein may be said to have been formulated by Sir Roger Casement. At the beginning Casement circulated his views by means of pamphlets, which were issued privately, and by anonymous articles which appeared in Sinn Fein newspapers. He worked in conjunction with Kuno Meyer, a German who taught Gaelic, but was in reality a German spy. Casement urged Germany that the way to destroy England's control of the seas was to get possession of Ireland, while his Irish friends were assured that a victory for Germany would mean the

freedom of Ireland. Four days after war was declared we find *Sinn Fein*, which was edited by Griffith, declaring that

‘Ireland is not at war with Germany. She has no quarrel with any Continental Power. England is at war with Germany. Germany is nothing to us in herself, but she is not an enemy. Our blood and our miseries are not on her head. But who can forbear admiration of the Germanic people, whom England has ringed about with enemies, standing alone and undaunted against a world in arms?’

As far back as 1911 *Irish Freedom*, another Sinn Fein newspaper, wrote regarding the coming war with Germany:— ‘If, then, Ireland lends her aid to Germany and Germany wins ‘in a war with England, Ireland will become an independent ‘nation.’

Casement was a contributor to *Irish Freedom*, and a month after he reached Berlin, in 1914, *Irish Freedom* wrote that they had an official statement from the German Government that Germany would never invade Ireland with a view to its conquest.

‘Should fortune ever bring the German troops to Ireland’s shores, these troops would land, not as an army of invaders to pillage and destroy, but as forces of a nation inspired by goodwill towards Ireland and her people, for whom Germany desires national prosperity and freedom. In fact, Germany has no quarrel with Ireland and Ireland has no quarrel with Germany. The only enemy of Irish freedom is now, as ever, England.’

A proclamation printed in Berlin, and in somewhat similar terms, was posted up in County Wexford in February 1915. Casement played a large part in developing the militant side of Sinn Fein. A number of the articles which he wrote before the war have been reprinted in America, and they show that he was deep in the secrets of Germany. He knew the war was coming, and all his energies were devoted towards organising Nationalist Ireland, so that she might strike a blow for Germany. In a preface written a few days after the outbreak of hostilities he says:—

‘The war has come sooner than was expected. The rest of the writer’s task must be essayed, not with the author’s pen, but with the rifle of the Irish Volunteer.

‘In this war Ireland has only one enemy. Let every Irish heart, let every Irish hand, let every Irish purse be with Germany. Let Irishmen in America get ready. The day a German sea victory tolls the death-knell of British tyranny at sea it tolls the death-knell of

British rule in Ireland. . . . 'The German guns that sound the sinking of British Dreadnoughts will be the call of Ireland to her scattered sons.'

The average Englishman may not have paid much attention to what was going on, but Ulstermen, who were never free from the Nationalist menace, observed the trend of events, and they were determined when the crisis came—and they knew it would come sooner or later—it should not find them unprepared. Ulstermen armed in the spring of 1914 for the same reason that Englishmen armed a few months later, to preserve the United Kingdom from destruction. As the war progressed Ulster's fears became deeper. She gave freely of her best to fight for the freedom of the Empire, but while her sons were earning glory wherever the Union Jack was unfurled, she witnessed the sad spectacle at home of rebels being given greater licence to plot against the Empire. The Sinn Fein conspiracy was by no means a secret one, and it was easy to carry out, because Mr. Birrell had handed over the reins of government to the United Irish League. To those who blame Ulster for importing arms in 1914 it may be pointed out that as far back as 1906 the Liberal Government, at the dictation of the Nationalist party, repealed the Peace Preservation Act, which prohibited anyone from having or carrying arms without a licence from a resident magistrate. This step was taken against the strong protest of the police authorities in Ireland. No sooner had the Act been repealed than the Nationalists, as they were then called, began to arm, and before a rifle was brought into Ulster the south and west of Ireland were full of arms.

When war was declared Mr. John Redmond called on Irishmen to rally to the support of the Allies. He received the enthusiastic support of a few of his colleagues, including his brother William, who lost his life fighting for the Empire *and* for Ireland; but the bulk of the party remained apathetic. From the very beginning the influence of the Roman Catholic Church was thrown into the scale against recruiting. The hostility of the Vatican to the Allies was thoroughly understood among the Roman Catholic laity. The relations between France and the Vatican influenced most of them to side with Germany. Many excuses have been made for those Irishmen who refused to join the Allies, but

the two determining influences were loyalty to the Vatican and disloyalty to Great Britain. Mr. Redmond's influence became less and less, while that of the Sinn Feiners steadily increased.

In Germany, in America, and in Ireland active preparations were being made for striking a deadly blow at Great Britain. In Ulster the Volunteer Force was already embodied in the British army, but the Sinn Fein Volunteers were steadily arming and drilling, so that when the opportunity came they would be able to strike a blow for Germany. The cowardice of the Government emboldened them, and the reverses which the Allied arms met with in the early days of the war filled the leaders with hope that at last the day was approaching when England would be humbled in the dust. The Government was aware that large sums of money had come into Ireland in the first six months of the war for the purpose of fomenting a rebellion, but the Government did nothing, and the excuse offered to the Rebellion Commission was that the Irish Nationalist party objected to any of the Sinn Fein leaders being deported or interned.

The evidence given before this Commission showed that the Sinn Fein organisation was very complete. They possessed plenty of motor cars and motor cycles, and they had a trained staff for carrying on a private postal service. The secrets of the party were kept in the hands of a few people in Dublin, so that the Government found greater difficulty in obtaining information than was the case in the Fenian conspiracy, when practically every other man was an informer. The Sinn Feiners practised drill, rifle shooting, officers' training schools, and carried out night manœuvres. Their manuals and papers gave instructions how to destroy railways and bridges, and how to attack and surprise sentries. In addition to the arms they were able to smuggle into the country, they stole military rifles, ammunition, and high explosives whenever an opportunity offered. Hand grenades were made in large quantities. Before the Easter rebellion a well-informed police officer reported :—

‘There is undoubted proof that the Sinn Fein Volunteers are working up for a rebellion and revolution if ever they get a good opportunity. Of course, these Sinn Feiners could never expect to face

trained troops successfully, but in the event of a hostile landing in Ireland they would be of enormous assistance to the enemy by destroying bridges and communications, and by affording information to the enemy, as well as paralysing any assistance which the police might give to the military. Their papers have openly advocated holding up the police in each village in case of emergency.'

Mr. Birrell described the threat of a rebellion as 'rubbish,' and refused to pay serious attention to the advice tendered by the police officials. Yet there is overwhelming evidence of the connexion of Sinn Fein with Germany during the war. On 6th November 1914 Herr Zimmerman transmitted through Count Bernstorff, who was then the German Ambassador to America, a dispatch from Casement requesting that, if possible, a messenger, preferably a native-born American, be sent to Ireland with information that everything was ready for a German landing. He was to carry no letters for fear of arrest. Casement also asked that an Irish priest should be sent to Germany, with the assistance of the German Legation in Norway, to work in prison camps amongst Irish soldiers who had been captured in France, and, as a matter of fact, an Irish-American priest reached Berlin in January 1915.

According to a report of Captain Von Papan, which fell into the hands of the British Government, the information which Casement sent to Ireland by way of America produced excellent results.

On 10th February 1916 Count Bernstorff sent to Rotterdam a dispatch signed with the name of Skal, one of his American agents. This dispatch included an extract from a report of John Devoy, the head of the Clan-na-Gael, to the effect that action in Ireland could not be postponed much longer, as he feared the arrest of the leaders. It had been decided, he said, to begin action on Easter Saturday, and he urged that the arms and ammunition which Germany was sending should be at Limerick by that date. Later, Bernstorff fixed Easter Sunday for the rising, and urged the Berlin Government to send the munitions in time. On 4th March Von Jagow reported that the arms would be landed in Tralee Bay, and asked that the necessary arrangements should be made in Ireland through Devoy. On 14th March Bernstorff replied that the Irish agreed, and that full details were being sent to Ireland by messenger.

The next day Bernstorff telegraphed a code to be used between the Germans and the Irish rebels while the arms were in transit. On 26th March Von Jagow replied that the arms would be sent, and that a special code word would be used every night as an introduction to the German Wireless Press service. In a message which he sent to Berlin, Bernstorff assured his Government that there were numerous private wireless receiving stations in Ireland. Urgent messages were sent from America to Berlin on the 18th and 19th April, fixing the delivery of arms for the evening of Easter Sunday, and asking for an air raid on England and a naval attack on the English coast. As a matter of fact, these attacks took place between the 24th and the 26th of April, the time when the Irish rebellion was raging fiercely. The hope of the rebels was to blockade the Irish ports against Great Britain, and establish bases for German submarines. The rebellion broke out a day later than the one fixed by Bernstorff, but that was due to one of those accidents which have so often favoured Great Britain. As the Report of the Royal Commission says :—

‘It is now a matter of common notoriety that the Irish Volunteers have been in communication with the authorities in Germany, and were for a long time known to be supplied with money through Irish-American societies. This was so stated in public by Mr. John McNeill on the 8th November 1914. It was suspected, long before the outbreak, that some of the money came from German sources.’

The Germans kept their promise, and a ship laden with arms and ammunition entered Tralee Bay, but it arrived two days before it was expected. Sinn Fein emissaries had been sent to meet it, but misfortune rather than the police would appear to have dogged their footsteps, so that they were not able to get into touch with Casement who, on coming ashore on Good Friday, was arrested. The ship was captured by a patrol boat, but on its way to Queenstown it was scuttled by its German crew. News was brought to Dublin of the capture of Casement, and Professor McNeill, who signed himself ‘chief ‘of staff’ of the Sinn Fein Volunteers, issued an order cancelling throughout Ireland the arrangements which had been made for the Easter manœuvres. The other Sinn Fein leaders, however, were determined to carry out the original designs, and so the rebellion broke out in Dublin on Easter Monday.



The rebels captured the Post Office and many other vantage points in Dublin, and for a week a frightful guerilla warfare was carried on. When anyone was seen wearing the British uniform he was fired at. In the Dublin metropolitan district 116 soldiers were killed and 367 were wounded. Three policemen were killed and 29 wounded in Dublin, while 310 civilians were killed and 2208 wounded. The bullets used by the Sinn Feiners were large and flat-nosed, so that they inflicted terrible wounds.

The abortive rebellion of Easter 1916 was not confined to Dublin. There were outbreaks in many districts in the south and west, in which a number of policemen lost their lives. It is quite clear, from the evidence given before the Royal Commission, that had it not been for the arrest of Casement and the capture of the German steamer with arms the provinces of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught would have been ablaze. The scheme was carefully arranged, and had it succeeded at least 250,000 soldiers would have been required in Ireland to crush the rebels. The idea appears to have been to start the rebellion in Connaught, and then when the troops were engaged to rise in Munster and Leinster. The outbreak came at a critical period in the war—when we were preparing for the Somme offensive—and even though it was a failure it assisted the Germans materially, and well repaid them for the money they had spent in Ireland.

Stories are still afloat about the brutal way in which the rebellion was suppressed, but they are absolutely devoid of truth. Only fifteen of the rebel leaders were executed, which is small when compared with the number of lives the Sinn Feiners had taken.

Ireland, which had not known responsible government for ten years, speedily regained confidence, and it looked as if the rebellion were going to be regarded as an ugly dream. A number of things occurred which resulted in revivifying the rebel movement. Mr. Asquith, who was then Prime Minister, came to Dublin, visited and shook hands with several Sinn Fein prisoners, men who a few days previously had been engaged in shooting down soldiers, policemen, and unarmed civilians; Mr. Dillon made a speech in Parliament, in which the rebels were represented as heroes; and the Roman Catholic Bishop

of Limerick (Dr. O'Dwyer, who has since died) in a letter, which was widely circulated, wrote:—

‘But Ireland is not dead yet. While her young men are not afraid to die for her in open fight, and when defeated stand proudly with their backs to the wall as targets for English bullets, we need not despair of the old land.’

This Episcopal approval of the rebellion gave the majority of the priests their cue, and so the fires of sedition were strongly fanned. Evidence is available that soon after the rebellion the Sinn Feiners were again appealing to Germany for assistance. On 17th June there was a message from Berlin to Washington saying that Germany was ready to give further help if the Irish would only say what sort of help they wanted. There was a dispatch from Bernstorff to Berlin on 16th June, giving an account of the Irish rebellion, and stating that £1000 had been provided for the defence of Casement. On 25th July he sent a message giving news from Ireland, and explaining that the reorganisation of the rebels was making good progress, and that their lack of money had been remedied by him. On 8th September, in a dispatch to Berlin, he enclosed a memorandum from the ‘Irish Revolution Director in America,’ which contained detailed proposals for another rising. ‘Any rising,’ wrote this gentleman, ‘must be contingent upon the sending by Germany ‘of an expedition with a sufficient military force to cover the ‘landing.’

The German Government was to fix the time of the rising, and as an inducement for undertaking the operation, the advantage of having submarine and Zeppelin bases in the west of Ireland was strongly urged. On 4th December we find Bernstorff writing to Berlin, saying that the Irish leaders in America were pressing for an answer to their September proposal. On the last day of the same year, 1916, Zimmerman informed Bernstorff of the quantities of munitions it was proposed to land in Ireland between 21st and 25th February. He added that it was impossible to send German troops, an announcement which was disappointing to the Irish-American Committee.

A number of the Sinn Fein leaders had been interned after the rebellion, and the Government very foolishly, in response

to Nationalist pressure, agreed to release them a few months later. As soon as they were released they began to revive the old scheme of rebellion at the point where they had left it. Indeed, they seem to have spent their time in gaol, making preparations for the reorganisation of the Sinn Fein Volunteers. A document found on one of the leaders stated :—

‘In order that we may not be hampered in our next effort by any misunderstanding such as occurred on the last occasion, as a result of conflicting orders, volunteers are notified that the only orders they are to obey are those of their own executive. The executive will not issue an order to take the field until they consider that the force is in a position to wage war with the enemy with reasonable hope of success. At the right moment they will give the order to strike, when let it be done relentlessly.’

Incredible though it seems, these revolutionaries were given a practically free hand, and week by week for many months they were allowed to organise every parish, village, and town in the Roman Catholic parts of Ireland. The Sinn Fein rank and file were told that the leaders had ‘got a considerable store of ‘arms,’ which was true, and that they would get more arms before the fateful day, which was also true, because the Germans and the Irish-Americans were steadily engaged in smuggling arms and ammunition into the country.

De Valera, in a speech quoted by Mr. Duke in the House of Commons on 23rd October 1917, declared :—

‘We have arms. Yes, and those arms will be useful when the time comes. Be ready, and you will be more successful than you were the last time. If anybody offers us a helping hand, whether France, America, or Germany, we will take it.’

With very good reason De Valera believed that the Government was afraid of him, and in the course of a series of speeches in Clare he cast off all restraint. He said :—

‘The time for speech-making is now past, and the hour for action has arrived. Each Sinn Fein club should have at least one modern rifle, which all the members should know the mechanism of. Start at once and purchase shotguns and buckshot. That is more effective at close quarters than ball cartridge.’

On another occasion De Valera boasted that ‘by proper ‘organisation of recruiting they could have 500,000 fighting ‘volunteers in Ireland. That will be a big army, but without ‘the opportunity and the means of fighting it could only be used

‘as a menace.’ Their hope, he said, lay in ‘a German invasion of England and the landing of troops and munitions in Ireland. They should be prepared to leave nothing undone towards that end.’

In order that the relations of Sinn Fein towards Germany should be made clear he declared that: ‘So long as Germany is the enemy of England and England the enemy of Ireland, so long will Ireland be the friend of Germany.’

In April 1918, when the situation was critical in France, the British Government obtained accurate information that arrangements had been made with the Sinn Feiners for landing German arms in Ireland, and warned the Irish Command. The German agent landed on 12th April, and was promptly arrested. A statement issued by the Government in May 1918, says:—

‘The new rising depended largely upon the landing of munitions from submarines, and there is evidence to show that it was planned to follow a successful German offensive in the West, and to take place at a time when Great Britain would be presumably stripped of troops. According to documents found on his person, De Valera had worked out in great detail the constitution of his rebel army, and hoped to be able to muster half a million trained men. There is evidence that German munitions were actually shipped on submarines at Cuxhaven at the beginning of May, and that for some time German submarines had been busy off the West Coast of Ireland on other errands than the destruction of Allied shipping.’

Indeed, it is well known that the German submarines were greatly assisted in their murderous work in the Atlantic by the help they received from the Irish rebels. This point was fully appreciated in America, as was the additional fact that the hostility of Sinn Feiners towards American soldiers and sailors was as marked as their hostility towards the British forces.

From the beginning of the war until Germany’s defeat was assured there were continuous negotiations between the Sinn Fein organisation and Germany. Three separate and distinct schemes for risings were arranged. An important feature of every plan was the establishment of submarine bases in Ireland to destroy the Allied shipping. Had there been a Sinn Fein Parliament in Ireland prior to the outbreak of the war, nothing is more certain than that numerous bases for German submarines would have been established, and that the old desire of the Irish Nationalists for the destruction of Great Britain would have

been gratified. The British people do not yet realise how narrowly they escaped disaster.

The Navy League, which is a non-political body, in a pamphlet which it published on the strategic importance of Ireland, wrote :—

‘What Heligoland is to Hamburg, Brunsbuttel, and Sylt, Ireland in hostile hands is to the Mersey, the Clyde, the Severn, and the Seine, with the great industrial centres of those river valleys. . . . Ireland is the Heligoland of the Atlantic. The trade of the world concentrates in the Atlantic. The rebellion of Easter 1916 was a trial trip of the rebellion contemplated by the Irish Sinn Feiners, who have defiled and spat on the British and American flags in Cork, Waterford, Queens-town, and Dublin. The foreign policy of Sinn Fein is to influence American opinion, because Ireland is truly the key of the Atlantic, a fortress that guards the main trade routes of the world.’

While the Sinn Feiners were conspiring with Germany for the destruction of Great Britain and her Allies, what were the much abused and much maligned Ulstermen doing? They were putting forth every ounce of their energy that Germany might be defeated. When the war burst on the world the Ulster Volunteer Force, which had been called into existence to defeat the enemies of the Empire, was strong, well organised, and well equipped. At the call of Sir Edward Carson the force became at once part of the British army. He asked the men to go out and win honour for Ulster and the Empire; and how they responded and how they acquitted themselves is now a matter of history—glorious history, so far as Ulster is concerned. Two months after the Irish Rebellion the Ulster Division earned undying fame on the Somme. Even those newspapers which have been most persistent in misrepresenting Ulstermen could not withhold their meed of praise. During the campaign the Ulster Division won 8 Victoria Crosses, 71 Distinguished Service Orders, 459 Military Crosses, 170 Distinguished Conduct Medals, 1294 Military Medals, 118 Meritorious Service Medals, and 330 foreign decorations. In the words of the King, Ulstermen showed that they knew how to fight and how to die. In the city of Belfast the percentage of voluntary recruits was almost as high as the percentage of recruits in Great Britain where conscription was enforced. The Ulster Division was not the only unit the northern province raised. There were more Ulstermen than Nationalists in the

famous Tenth Division, and Ulster contributed a fair share of the Sixteenth Division, besides sending her three famous regiments of regulars, the Royal Irish Rifles, Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the Inniskilling Fusiliers.

It was not on the field of battle alone that Ulster proved her loyalty to the Empire. In the great shipyards men worked so hard that Belfast turned out ships in less than the time taken in other shipyards. The linen factories produced nearly all the linen that was used by our aeroplanes. Industrial concerns were turned into Government factories for the production of shells and other war munitions. Huge sums of money were raised for charities, for voluntary war hospitals, and for the relief of prisoners. From the day war commenced Ulster had but one aim in view—the defeat of the enemy. Her loyalty to the Empire was unshaken in spite of all the provocation received, for it must not be forgotten that the passing of the Home Rule Bill into law during the war was regarded by Ulster as a gross act of treachery. Ulster asks for no special favour because of her loyalty to Great Britain; all that she asks is to be allowed to retain the privileges which she has enjoyed under the Imperial Parliament. It is not an unreasonable thing to ask, but we are told we must give up those privileges in order to please the rebels who worked for the overthrow of the Empire.

Nor is Ulster deaf to any reasonable demands. It need only be mentioned that after the rebellion, and at the earnest request of the then Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith), Ulstermen agreed to enter a conference with the object of seeing whether a settlement of the Irish question could not be brought about. Ulstermen were told—as it proved, quite wrongly—that unless there was a settlement America would not enter the war. The conference took place, and it was agreed between the Ulster leaders and the Nationalist leaders that there should be a settlement on the basis of the exclusion of six Ulster counties from the provisions of the Home Rule Act; but the Roman Catholic bishops interposed and upset the arrangement. The Irish Convention followed, but it was doomed from the first, as the Sinn Feiners, who represented three-fourths of Nationalist Ireland, would have nothing to do with it. The claims that were made by the Nationalists at the Convention

were such that the Ulster Unionists could not possibly agree to them. They were (1) a sovereign independent Parliament for Ireland, co-equal in power and authority with the Imperial Parliament; (2) complete fiscal autonomy for Ireland, including the power to impose hostile tariffs against Great Britain; (3) the right to raise and maintain a military force in Ireland; (4) repudiation of any liability for the national debt; and (5) the denial of the right of the Imperial Parliament to impose military service in Ireland. As the report of the Ulster Unionist delegates put it:—

‘We regret that instead of proposals being made to remove our objections, the policy pursued by the Nationalists in the Convention strengthened our opinion that Home Rule would intensify existing divisions in Ireland and prove a constant menace to the Empire. Had we thought that the majority of the Convention intended to demand not the subordinate powers contained in previous Home Rule Bills, but what is tantamount to full national independence, we could not have agreed to enter the Convention.’

The echoes of the Convention had scarcely died away when an incident occurred which showed that though some Nationalists are loyal, as they proved on the battlefields of France, the great majority even of the so-called constitutional Nationalists dare not oppose the ideals of Sinn Fein. The great crisis of the war was reached in the spring of 1918. Great Britain had been bled white, but Roman Catholic Ireland refused to give recruits, and so Parliament decided to apply conscription to the country, as it had already been applied in Great Britain. Thereupon the ‘constitutional’ Nationalists and the Sinn Feiners, in spite of their mutual hatred, met together in conference in the Mansion House, under the presidency of the Lord Mayor. They agreed to resist conscription to the death, though it looked at the time as if their action would mean the defeat of the Allies. Before they took action they went to Maynooth, where the Roman Catholic bishops were in session. On 18th April 1918 the bishops issued a manifesto, in which they declared that the application of conscription to Ireland was ‘An oppressive and inhuman law, which the Irish people have a right to resist by all the means that are consonant with the law of God.’

A holy war was preached throughout the country, and Irish Roman Catholics were urged to make any sacrifices rather than

submit to conscription. The Government took fright, and refused to put the Act into operation. This was looked upon as a great victory for Sinn Fein, and undoubtedly gained it many votes at the general election a few months afterwards, when the old Nationalist party was practically wiped out. In Leinster, Munster, and Connaught they only retained one seat. In Ulster the Nationalist seats were apportioned between the Dillonites and the Sinn Feiners, by the order of Cardinal Logue, who feared that any division in the Roman Catholic ranks would be to the advantage of Ulster Protestants.

Since the general election the Sinn Feiners have set up an Irish republic, and for months murders and outrage have been rampant in many districts. Complaints are made about the army of occupation, but without that army Ireland would degenerate into a condition quite as bad as that which prevails in Russia. Can any fair-minded Englishman wonder that the Protestants of Ulster refuse to submit to a system which is built on crime, and which never misses an opportunity of stabbing Great Britain in the back? Those who imagine that Home Rule, in any shape or form, will change the character of Irish rebels, know nothing of the past history of Ireland or the present feelings of the Sinn Feiners.

R. J. LYNN.



## THE FINANCE OF CHINA

1. *The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire.* By HOSEA BALLOU MORSE, A.B., Harvard. Longmans, Green & Co. 1908.
2. *On Chinese Currency.* By Dr. G. VISSERING, with the co-operation of Dr. W. A. ROEST. Printed by G. Kolff & Co., Batavia. 1912.
3. *China.* By E. H. PARKER. John Murray. First Edition, 1901; Second Edition, 1917.

IN order to understand the finance of China, we must first form some idea of the currency in which the revenue is collected, the sources from which the taxes are derived, and the fiscal devices employed for transferring them from the private purse of the taxpayer to the public Exchequer of the Chinese Republic.

The monetary unit in China is the Chinese ounce or tael\* of silver. The weight is not uniform; it varies from one commercial centre to another. The silver also is of varying purity, rated according to a theoretic standard which differs with the locality. It circulates in the form of ingots, or 'shoes,' as they are called, of sycee † of different shapes and sizes, up to fifty or sixty taels in weight. A tael weighs about one and a third ounces troy. The purity of sycee is rated in thousandths of pure silver. Thus the Haikwan or Customs tael in which dues are paid is 992.3 parts of 1000 fine; the Kuping or Government Treasury tael, 987 fine. The Shanghai Tsoaping or 'Tribute' tael (used in commercial transactions) contains  $518\frac{1}{4}$  grains of silver 1000 fine.

The only Chinese coin proper is the cash, ‡ originally  $\frac{1}{1000}$  of a tael of silver. It is about the size of an English halfpenny, but thinner. It is provided with a square hole in the centre, by

---

\* From the Malayan tahlil, Indian tola, a weight equal to 180 grains troy.

† Cantonese *Sai sze*, fine silk, in allusion to the fine threads into which pure silver can be drawn.

‡ Sanskrit *Kārcha*, equal to  $\frac{1}{400}$  of a tola, through the Portuguese *caixa*.

which the cash are strung into rolls of 100, of which 10 rolls go to the *tiao* or string of cash. A full *tiao* is therefore 1000 cash. Paper money in the form of *tiao* notes is commonly met with, but the issue being left to private banks, the circulation is strictly circumscribed as to area. The *tiao* notes of one town are not accepted in another, even a neighbouring town.

It will be seen that the currency of China is lacking in the qualities of portability, uniformity, divisibility, and cognisability which are generally recognised as essential to any system of currency intended to fulfil the double functions of a medium of exchange and a standard of value. The need of a more accurate and convenient circulating medium was increasingly felt as transactions with foreigners multiplied. About the middle of last century the Mexican dollar was introduced, and as an adjunct to the ordinary Chinese currency came into general use, first in exchange between foreigners themselves, and subsequently in financing the crops with which foreigners were chiefly concerned—tea, silk, and cotton.

The advantages to trade of a uniform coin like the Mexican dollar, its convenience and economy, were obvious enough, but the Chinese were not disposed to credit the foreigners with philanthropic motives in introducing it. If there was any profit to be made, the Chinese thought they might as well secure it for themselves. Mints were established at the provincial capitals of Kwangtung, Kiangnan, Hupeh, and Anhui (also at Tientsin) for the coinage of Chinese dollars resembling Mexican in appearance. At first the issues were considerable, but the coins, having only behind them the guarantee of the province in which they were issued, were never freely accepted outside of it. The mints accordingly fell back upon the more lucrative business of striking subsidiary coins\* in 10 and 20 cent pieces of 800 fine, as against 900 for the dollar. A profit of 10 per cent. was more than the mints could resist. Coins were turned out as fast as they could be issued, with the result that the redundancy of the subsidiary coinage, unless sternly checked by the Central Government, is likely to give rise, is indeed already giving rise, to a dislocation of prices which may involve serious social results.

---

\* A recent estimate, quoted by Dr. Vissering, puts the silver subsidiary coins in circulation at 1,500,000,000.

It is said that the Republic is alive to this danger, and that, but for the difficulty of getting rid of vested interests, they would abolish provincial issues altogether, and substitute a national currency for the whole country. Such a coin, bearing the stamp of the Republic, and the effigy of its first President, Yuan Shih-Kai, has already been struck and is in circulation. In appearance it leaves little to be desired, and if only the standard of 416 grs. weight and 900 fine is strictly maintained, the Yuan dollar might well be hailed as the first step in Chinese currency reform.\* The dollar has been adopted by the Chinese Government as the money of account in presenting their annual budget. Railway fares are paid, and the accounts of the companies kept in dollars. Sir Richard Dane, greatly daring, determined from the first to collect his Salt Gabelle in dollars, and he has succeeded beyond all expectation. The gradual substitution of the dollar for the tael as the monetary unit of China seems probable. The advantages which would accrue to China from the adoption of a uniform currency are incalculable, and by his firmness and courage in accelerating the movement, Sir Richard Dane has rendered a service to China of even deeper significance than his reform of the Salt Gabelle.

The native banking system has been developed in accordance with the genius of the people, which is analytic rather than synthetic. Its functions, which upon the whole appear to be adequately performed, are confined to the internal exchanges of the country. It is possible to obtain a credit from a native banker on his various correspondents which will enable a traveller to pay his way from one end of China to the other; but by no possibility, when the journey is ended, can the traveller obtain from a native bank a draft for the balance of his account upon any other country whatsoever. For such accommodation he must have recourse to the foreign banks.†

---

\* A recent analysis of a number of Yuan dollars at a foreign mint shows a deviation from the standard, after allowing for the usual remedy, which does not make an auspicious beginning. The average was 414½ weight, 889½ fineness, as compared with the 416 grains 900 fine of the British dollar and Japanese yen.

† There were ten foreign banks established in China in 1915 with an aggregate capital and reserve of over £32,000,000. The number has been considerably increased since the war.

The official status of the Bank of China (paid-up capital, taels 5,000,000), and the Chiaotung Bank or Bank of Communications (capital, dollars 60,000,000), both Government institutions, may lead to an improvement in the control of currency; it may eventually assist in the regulation of the foreign exchanges, should China ever adopt, as has been proposed, a modified form of the gold standard, such as prevails in India and the Straits Settlements, or the *étalon boiteux* favoured by Dr. Vissering which has been worked with such success in Java. But that day is far off, if only on account of the impracticability of China's acquiring under present conditions the reserve of gold required to make any such scheme workable. In spite of the defection of the surrounding countries, Japan, Java, the Philippines, Siam, the Straits Settlements, and India, China is likely to prove loyal for a long time to come to the silver standard of value with all its concomitant disadvantages of uncertain and fluctuating exchange. Between gold and silver standard countries there can be no parity to which the exchanges are always tending. The only limit set to the variations in value of the silver tael, as expressed in terms of gold, is the price of bar silver, above which, after adding shipping charges, it cannot rise and below which, after deducting shipping charges, it cannot fall. In China, as Dr. Vissering observes, the silver currency is an article of barter, of which neither the weight nor the quality is anywhere fixed.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the evils daily inflicted upon China by an inchoate and irregular currency, the wastefulness, the chicanery, the oppression, the injustice, the loss of happiness, the temper to which it gives rise. One does not know where to turn to find a parallel to such a state of things unless to our own England at the close of the seventeenth century. There is more than one glittering passage in the famous twenty-first chapter of Macaulay's 'History' which recalls the China of to-day. For example:—

'It may well be doubted whether all the misery inflicted on the English nation in a quarter of a century by bad Kings, bad Ministers, bad Parliaments, bad Judges, was equal to the misery caused in a single year by bad crowns and bad shillings. . . . When the great instrument of exchange became thoroughly deranged, all trade, all industry, was smitten as with a palsy. The evil was felt daily and hourly in almost every place and by every class, in the dairy and on the threshing floor, by the anvil and by the loom, on the billows of the ocean and in the

depths of the mine. Nothing could be purchased without a dispute. Over any counter there was wrangling from morning to night. The workman and his employer had a quarrel as regularly as the Saturday came round. On a fair day or a market day, the clamours, the reproaches, the taunts, the curses were incessant; and it was well if no booth was overturned, and no head broken. The simple and the careless were pillaged without mercy by extortioners, whose demands grew even more rapidly than the money shrank!

Allowing for Macaulay's habitual rhetoric, this is no untrue picture of what is going on in China to-day. There is no more vital reform, none more urgent, none more salutary and far-reaching in result, none, but for the vested interests it encounters, so simple to effect as the reform of the currency of China. It would, I believe, do more to establish the peace and prosperity of that country than any other reform whatsoever. An honest and uniform coin once in circulation and generally accepted would go far to reverse Macaulay's glowing periods, and to replace each damnatory adjective by its opposite.

The basis of taxation in China is the claim of the State as lord of the soil to a share in its produce. The rent was fixed by the permanent settlement of 1712,\* upon which to this day, in theory at least, the land tax is assessed for the whole of China. In practice surcharges are added, which on the most moderate estimate treble the cost to the taxpayer without adding to the revenue of the Central Government. The tax is in fact farmed, only the surplus being remitted to Peking after the expenses of provincial administration in the widest sense of that word have been deducted as first charge. Mr. Jamieson, writing in 1905, estimated the total land tax leviable at taels 375,000,000. The reported collection, that is the surplus remitted to Peking, was at that time only taels 26,000,000, while the actual collection, writes Mr. Morse, was almost certainly not less than taels 102,000,000, and the possible collection as estimated by such a high authority as Sir Robert Hart, was taels 400,000,000.†

Likin‡ is a tax on merchandise in transit, which was first introduced in 1852. The tax contravenes the spirit, if not the

\* Cf. the Bengal permanent settlement of 1793, when the demand of the State was fixed and made for ever unalterable by Lord Cornwallis.

† 'The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire.'

‡ Li, a hundredth part; Kin, money—meaning a percentage.

letter, of the Treaty of Nanking of 1842, by which the Treaty Ports were opened to foreign trade. It may be said, however, to have been conditionally condoned by its incorporation in the security for the Anglo-German Loan of 1911, pending its abolition, as provided for in the Mackay Treaty of 1902. It is unfortunate that foreigners should have acquiesced, even temporarily, in a tax which is at once expensive in collection, vexatious in operation, uncertain in incidence, and unfruitful in results. Its yield is now merged with other taxes, but in the budget of 1911 it appeared to contribute taels 44,000,000 to the national exchequer.

It is unnecessary to deal in detail with the remaining miscellaneous taxes which in the same vague and desultory way contribute a reluctant and grudging surplus to the central exchequer of the Republic. These form part of a fiscal system which Mr. E. H. Parker denounces as 'rotten to the core, 'childish and incompetent.' Without going as far as this we may justly say that the taxes it imposes are neither equal, nor certain, nor economical, nor progressively productive, and that it offends against four out of the five canons of taxation originally laid down by Adam Smith, and now generally accepted—in theory—by all civilised nations.

In striking contrast with the fiscal methods of native administration, the results secured by two revenue departments which have been placed under foreign control, the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle, stand out as an object lesson of what may be accomplished even in China by proper accounting. The transfer of the Maritime Customs to foreign control followed as a consequence of the capture of Shanghai by the Taiping rebels in 1853. The native Custom House being closed, the foreign merchants, to their honour be it said, showed no desire to evade their obligations, and deposited with their respective consuls bonds for the duties for which they had become liable. The obvious inconvenience of this plan led to its being superseded later by an agreement with the Chinese authorities for the establishment of a Customs Board, from which the present Maritime Customs service was evolved under Sir Robert Hart, who was appointed Inspector-General in 1861. From 11,000,000 dollars in 1885, the revenue collected for the Central Government increased to 50,000,000 dollars in 1914.

In 1912, the Republic being hard put to it to find the increased

revenue required to meet the revolutionary claims, the Salt Gabelle was placed under the control of Sir Richard Dane. Under his energetic rule and skilful administration the revenue from salt, which in 1905 produced only 17,000,000 dollars, in 1915 contributed 70,000,000 dollars to the exchequer of the Republic.

Until within quite recent years it has never been the practice of the Chinese Government to publish an annual budget statement. Various attempts have been made from time to time by foreigners to supply the deficiency, but the results obtained are admittedly little better than guesswork. In 1901, Sir Robert Hart, than whom none had better opportunities of forming an opinion, estimated the total annual revenue of China at taels 90,400,000, made up as follows:—

SIR ROBERT HART'S ESTIMATE FOR THE YEAR 1901.

Land Tax in silver	-	-	-	-	Tls. 26,500,000
Land Tax in grain	-	-	-	-	3,100,000
Salt Tax	-	-	-	-	13,500,000
Imperial Maritime Customs	-	-	-	-	23,800,000
Likin	-	-	-	-	16,000,000
Native Customs	-	-	-	-	2,700,000
Native Opium	-	-	-	-	2,200,000
Provincial Income	-	-	-	-	2,600,000
					<u>Tls. 90,400,000</u>

Four years later, in 1905, Mr. E. H. Parker arrived at a total of taels 102,924,000. We give his figures as revised by Mr. H. B. Morse, the former head of the statistical department of the Chinese Customs.

MR. E. H. PARKER'S ESTIMATE AS REVISED BY  
MR. H. B. MORSE.

1905.					
Land Tax in Money	-	-	-	-	Tls. 25,887,000
Tribute whether commuted or not	-	-	-	-	7,420,000
Native Customs	-	-	-	-	4,160,000
Salt Gabelle	-	-	-	-	12,600,000
Miscellaneous Taxes, old and new	-	-	-	-	3,856,000
Foreign Customs	-	-	-	-	35,111,000
Likin on general merchandise and native opium	-	-	-	-	13,890,000
					<u>Tls. 102,924,000</u>

It should be noted that all foreign estimates of the budget of China are by the nature of the case limited to the data supplied by the *Peking Gazette*, namely the amounts which actually reach Peking, and take no account of the amounts retained by the provinces. The importance of this proviso will be seen when we come to consider the budgets framed by the Chinese themselves. Mr. Parker's budget of taels 102,924,000, for example, should, if we follow Mr. Morse's estimate of the amounts retained for provincial and local administration, be increased to taels 284,154,000, or dollars 394,658,333, if it is to be taken as a measure of the total revenue of the State. How does this estimate compare with the actual Chinese budget of to-day?

With the advent of the Chinese Republic in 1912,\* the attention of the Government was naturally focussed on finance. An annual budget became a necessity of the new official régime, and no less than six were presented in the course of the first two years. The following are the revised totals for the financial year ending 30th June 1916:—

Ordinary revenue	-	-	-	-	\$426,237,145
Extraordinary revenue	-	-	-	-	45,709,565
Total revenue	-	-	-	-	<u>\$471,946,710</u>
Ordinary expenditure	-	-	-	-	\$285,942,286
Extraordinary expenditure	-	-	-	-	185,577,150
Total expenditure	-	-	-	-	<u>\$471,519,436</u>

Under the Republic the budgets are based upon the total annual collection, and not, as formerly, upon the amounts contributed by the provinces to Peking. But even allowing for the increase from this cause, the discrepancy between former estimates by foreigners of the revenue of China and the figures of the official budgets will not have escaped observation, and requires to be explained. It will not do, after the manner of a recent critic, to dismiss the official figures with the remark that they must be considered as more or less fanciful, as an estimate of what it might be possible to collect rather than of what is

---

\* Yuan Shih-kai, after holding the post provisionally for eighteen months, was elected First President of the Chinese Republic on the 13th October 1913.



actually collected. That would be to fall into the common fallacy in logic of dragging in a far-fetched explanation, when an adequate one may be found nearer at hand. Like all orientals, the Chinese like to make a parade of poverty. There is reason to believe that the provincial contributions as published in the *Peking Gazette*, which, as has already been explained, formed the basis of the foreign estimates, were regularly and deliberately understated. We have also to consider that the Republican Government has exhibited a fiscal activity in excess of their imperial predecessors, which has helped to staunch at least some of the leakage at the source. It is probable, also, that through the agency of the stamp duties sources of revenue have been detected which formerly escaped scot-free. Finally, it is certain that under the Republic there has been a marked advance, both in security and in revenue. The discrepancy in fact seems to be susceptible of a rational explanation, and while we are not prepared to say that the figures will be completely realised, we are not disposed on that account to reject as illusory and untrustworthy the official budget of China.

Of the expenditure side of the account we shall say nothing. It balances with the revenue to within 500,000 dollars; but how far this oriental nicety corresponds with the reality we have no means of judging. But, upon the whole, we are inclined to believe that this early budget may be taken as an honest first attempt to unravel the tangled skein of Chinese finance, the value of which may be expected to increase as time goes on, and as we are enabled to test the figures of each successive budget by those of its forerunners.

At her first entry into the comity of nations, China showed a reluctance to contract a foreign debt, which was of happy augury for her future credit. It would have been well for China if that policy had been maintained. Unfortunately, the ill-starred war with Japan in 1894 brought in its train the payment of an indemnity amounting to £35,000,000 which provided the occasion, as the tangible security which had been created by the foreign-controlled maritime customs provided the means, for recourse to a foreign loan. The appetite grows by what it feeds on, and the foreign loan of 1894 proved to be the first of a long series which culminated in the Reorganisation Loan of 1913 for £25,000,000.

The capital sum of China's foreign debt outstanding on the 31st December 1915 was, in round figures, £170,000,000. This total includes:—

1. The indemnity exacted by the Powers after the anti-foreign outbreak in 1900.
2. Unproductive loans, viz., Chinese Government borrowings for indemnities and administrative purposes by loans publicly issued in foreign markets.
3. Productive loans, viz., loans for railway construction similarly issued.

The total may be roughly stated under these headings as follows:—

Boxer indemnity	-	-	-	£64,000,000
Unproductive loans	-	-	-	67,000,000
Productive	„	-	-	34,000,000
				£165,000,000

In addition to this known 'foreign debt,' the Chinese Government has of recent years raised money abroad by the sale, privately, of treasury bills, estimated as amounting to £15,000,000.

Taking this estimate of £15,000,000, we get a total foreign debt of £180,000,000, of which only the £34,000,000 spent on railways\* produces any return. The remainder, £132,500,000 in all, has produced nothing at all. The country has derived no benefit from it, but much harm. It has served no other end than to confer upon others the power to levy a tribute on the people of China. It wrings from the peasant, who was not consulted in the matter, and would not have consented if he had been, or perhaps even have understood what all the dispute was about, a share of the produce which a reluctant soil yields to his unresting labour.

The general impression left by a survey of the fiscal system of China is that the methods adopted are in the highest degree wasteful, inept, and uncertain. It would be rash however to

---

\* There are 6000 miles of railways open in China, as compared with 35,000 miles in India.

assume that because the people are badly taxed, therefore they are overtaxed. Indeed, a comparison with India, where the general conditions bear the closest available analogy to those of China, points to an opposite conclusion. The figures cited are for the year 1915:—

	INDIA.	CHINA.
Population - - - -	244,000,000	400,000,000
Area in square miles - - -	1,800,000	1,900,000
Taxation, exclusive of Land Tax * £	27,000,000	37,000,000
Burden of taxation per head -	2/2½	1/10¼
National Debt - - - -	£274,000,000	£180,000,000
Burden of debt per head - -	22/6	9/-

The population and taxable area of China are larger than in India. The standard of comfort in the former is higher. The Chinese peasant is better clad, better nourished, and at least as well housed as the Indian ryot. There is more physical energy in China than in India; greater ability to pay. And yet the burden of taxation is lighter, namely, 1s. 10¼d. per head in China, as compared with 2s. 2½d. in India. The burden of debt is also less in China—9s. per head, as compared with 22s. 6d. in India—but here the comparison is vitiated by the excessive proportion in China of unproductive debt. The true test of national debt is not its size but its quality; what it stands for. No less than £262,000,000 of the total Indian debt of £274,000,000 represents investment in Indian railways and irrigation works, conferring the greatest value upon the country, and returning good interest to the bondholder. Of China's £170,000,000 debt, no less a sum than £132,000,000, or nearly 80 per cent., makes no return at all, and stands for nothing except so much money squandered.

There are few public debts which would emerge unscathed from a strict investigation of their origin, and we need not be too censorious in the case of China. What is done is done, and if we deplore the folly which piled up this mass of unproductive debt, there is no need to exaggerate its consequences. It might have been worse. The burden of debt is still light. The revenues hypothecated as security are already more than sufficient to provide for the service—that is, the

---

\* The tax on land is not properly a tax but a rent paid by the occupier to the State as sovereign lord of the soil.

payment of interest and principal—of all existing loans. China is ill-provided with the means of communication, and there is much work to be done in linking up the existing lines of railway on which construction has been temporarily suspended by the European war. For these and other public works loans will be required for which the mineral and other undeveloped resources of the country, if opened up, should furnish ample security. More important than these material things, more important even than their unexhausted taxable capacity, is the security afforded by the character of the Chinese nation. In the first century of the Christian era a Chinaman's word was known to be as good as his bond. It is so to-day. Dynasties may rise and fall, a monarchy may give place to a republic, but we have yet to hear the word repudiation in connexion with China. The greatest asset of China, the surest guarantee for her permanence, is her high standard of political morality.

C. S. ADDIS.

## MUNICIPAL HOUSING

1. *Housing and Town Planning, etc., Act, 1919.*
2. *Report of the Tudor Walters' Committee on questions in connexion with the provision of dwellings for the working classes. Cd. 9191. 1918.*
3. *Report of the London County Council Housing Committee on Housing after the War. 1918.*
4. *Garden First in Land Development. By WILLIAM WEBB. Longmans, Green. 1919.*

THIS question may be examined under three divisions—the state of things existing before the war, the changes due to the war, and present and future policy. It will be seen that a whole conception has been changed under the present convenient fiction, applied to so many regions of national life, that we are meeting a special emergency by transient methods.

Under the Housing Act passed by Lord Salisbury's Government in 1890, Local Authorities first received full power to clear and reconstruct insanitary areas, and also to acquire land for the purpose of building new houses for families of the never exactly defined 'Working Class.' Previous legislation, such as the Torrens and the Cross Acts, was in the same direction, but far more limited in scope. The Act of 1890 was based upon the Report of Sir Charles Dilke's Royal Commission of 1884, and it is the real foundation of subsequent legislation. Under these laws Local Authorities were invested with three main functions. They were enabled to purchase insanitary areas by compulsory process if necessary, to demolish houses, reconstruct streets, and build new dwellings on the sites for those displaced, or for others. Secondly, they received powers—the stringency of which has been continually increased—to enforce upon owners or leaseholders the duty of keeping houses in decent repair, and, in case of default, they could close or demolish individual houses. Thirdly, they received power to acquire land for new building, and to develop building estates, always for the working classes only.

The Local Authorities for these purposes were the City and Borough Councils, the Urban District and Rural District

Councils; in London the County Council and the Metropolitan Councils.

In practice the powers most extensively used have been those of enforcing repair of individual houses; but they have been used with very different strenuousness by different authorities, and if the work is measured by the immense number of old, decayed, and inadequate houses still existing in the kingdom, that which has been done does not amount to very much. The fault is due partly to the slackness of the Local Authorities, especially Rural District Councils, partly to legal and other difficulties and expenses in the enforcement, and often, especially in rural districts, to the absence of better houses to which people can remove. In consequence, however, of what has been done and of better drainage and so forth, the worst slums now are probably better than the horrible places of mid-Victorian days; but the complete clearance and reconstruction under authorised schemes of urban slum areas has not been at all widely practised. The chief reason for this has, so far, been the prohibitive cost of buying up such areas, under the existing system of valuation and arbitration. The Local Government Board could legally order Local Authorities to make such schemes, but had no practical means of enforcing its orders; and, in fact, the Board made very little use of its power.

In respect of acquiring new land and developing building estates, Local Authorities have had perfect freedom. They were until 1919 under no obligation to do anything and, in fact, have done very little in this way. It could not be alleged that such action was indispensable, so long as private enterprise was supplying new houses for the working classes as fast as they were required, and sometimes even faster. Indeed, the only valid reasons that could be then alleged to justify Local Authorities in taking a hand in this game were:—

1. That they should endeavour, by example, to raise the standard level of lay-out and building; and
2. That there were advantages in municipal ownership and management.

The latter argument will be examined later. The greatest and wealthiest Local Authority, the London County Council, previously to the present year had only acquired three suburban

building estates. None of these, according to present ideas, was very large, and none of them was anything like completed when all building was arrested by the war. The London County Council and other Local Authorities regarded indulgence in this part of their functions as a kind of municipal luxury, obviously to be postponed till educational and other necessities had been satisfied. But now intervened an extraordinary situation.

From the days when the first inhabitants constructed their clay or wood wigwams, right down to the present century, almost every building in these islands had been built by private enterprise. Ascend the tower of Westminster Cathedral and look as far as eye can see over the immense panorama of brick and stone. Except for Government buildings, and for churches and schools and hospitals and so forth, the whole of this vast sum of human labour is due to the motive of profit or use, inspiring the wills of men through the centuries. The habitations were as much due to private enterprise as were the inhabitants. But during the last ten years private enterprise fell sick and, so far as relates to the great mass of dwelling houses, is now dead, although it may rise again. In this sphere the motive of profit had ceased to work. What caused this strange phenomenon?

In the first five years of the present century there was, as records show, rather over-building than under-building of small houses, and many of them could not find tenants. Then came the land taxes of Mr. Lloyd George's 1909 Budget. The increment value duty dealt a deadly blow at the system under which speculators bought land, or took long leases of it for the purpose of building and selling at improved value. On this point the Tudor Walters' Committee thus sums up the evidence:—

'There was a consensus of opinion amongst the builders and land developers that the land duties in the Finance Act, 1910, had seriously retarded the carrying on of their business. The evidence given was that those duties had arrested the development of building estates, led to the diminution, or withdrawal, of financial facilities, and retarded investment in house property. The taxation of builders' profits, as decided by the Lumsden Judgment, was considered by the builders to be an injustice, and, in their opinion, had seriously prejudiced the trade of house-building.'

Such are the unforeseen results of rash democratic legislation. Another coinciding cause was the gradual rise in wages of labour and cost of material during the first years of the century. The

result, in the years 1910-14, was a marked decline in the building of houses. In the years 1904-5, 99,905 new houses under £20 annual value were built in England and Wales; in 1912-13, only 45,632.

Between 1910 and the outbreak of war the number of new roofs provided within the county of London was less than the number in the same period demolished, and in the suburban districts the pace of new building was very much diminished. The same decline took place all over the country, and complaints were already heard that the housing was not sufficient for the increasing population. The necessary margin of vacant houses was disappearing, and it became often difficult for men changing scene of employment to find roofs to cover themselves and their families. Then came the war. New building came to an end altogether, except where the Government rushed up huts or cottages, regardless of questions of cost or rent, to house its employees.

Since August 1914 domestic building on the economic basis, that is by the expenditure of capital with expectation of recoupment and profit, has never been resumed. On the other hand, the expansion of population, though slower than before, has still gone on. A host of Englishmen died, it is true, in the war, but those who were married left families to be housed at home. Then, again, the normal relief to population given by emigration has been suspended for the last five years. The result is an intensification of overcrowding, and of the difficulties that flow from it. Consequently, Local Authorities dare not enforce laws against overcrowding. They dare not close the most decayed and insanitary dwellings, because there are no houses to which the dispossessed can go. These uncomfortable conditions add no doubt to our formidable sum of discontents. Good homes make a contented population, or assist to make one; but crowded and unhealthy homes drive men and women into the streets and tend to make revolutions. These facts have created a new political point of view with regard to the provision of houses upon a non-economic basis by public authorities. Hence the Housing Act of 1919.

That Act is a revolution in principle, yet it passed through both Houses of Parliament without material opposition. Many men must have felt the dangers contained in the new departure,



but not have thought it worth while to utter their thoughts, while necessity appeared to drive to a foregone conclusion. All that sound economists can say about many things just now is what Shakespeare makes the cold Octavius Caesar say to his sister to console her when his public policy has ruined her private happiness:—

‘Be you not troubled with the time, which drives  
O’er your content these strong necessities;  
But let determin’d things to destiny  
Hold unbewail’d their way.’

Briefly stated the principle of the new Housing Act is as follows:—It is made the duty of Local Authorities to submit to the Ministry of Health—one rather regrets, by the way, the vanished broader and more English-sounding title of ‘Local Government Board’—schemes for the acquisition of land and for building new houses for the working classes. If a Local Authority fails to produce a scheme—a scheme which the Ministry thinks adequate—or to carry out an approved scheme with due diligence, the Ministry can transfer the duty to the County Council of the area or, in the last resort, can carry out the work directly, and levy a rate on the defaulting Local Authority. It is assumed, not at all rashly, that there will be a considerable deficit in the housing budget of every Local Authority. In so far as rents derived from the new working class dwellings fail to meet the debt charges upon the capital sunk in development and other housing expenditure, the gap is to be filled in by the produce of a penny rate in each case, so far as it will go, and after that by a grant from the State.

As the present cost of building the smallest house is something like £600 to £800, apart from the cost of site and making roads, etc., the gap is likely to be large, and in every locality by far the greatest part of the annual deficit will fall upon the individual citizen in his character of national taxpayer, and not upon him in his character of local ratepayer. But hence arises a peril of extravagance. The men who compose a Local Authority always see vividly the local rate which they administer, and they are inclined to think of State aid as money poured forth from quite a distinct fountain. Hence the danger. The temptation is to say, ‘We shall incur a penny rate, neither more nor less; all the rest of the deficit will be met by the State.’ Where,

then, is the motive for economy? To check this tendency a great deal of close supervision by State officials will be necessary, and that leads to increased official expenditure, and to the further destruction of local freedom of action.

Lord Downham, himself lately President of the Local Government Board, said in a speech :—

‘For many years I have been an ardent advocate of Local Government. I believe that nobody has the right to spend the ratepayers’ money except those elected by the ratepayers to spend it. Now I see a vision of England being parcelled out into new areas, and over those areas Housing Commissioners, Electricity Commissioners, Traffic Commissioners, Health Commissioners being nominated by the Government. They will be high salaried, expensive gentlemen, with expensive premises and expensive staffs. What are they there for? If the areas are so small that you cannot conduct operations within them, then really these areas should be united with each other. But, don’t put down upon every such area another set of permanent officials. If your elected authorities have not got adequate staffs to carry out housing, health, electricity, or all these other things, then tell them they must strengthen their staffs in order to do that. But don’t let us have two staffs of officials, each trying to deal in the same area with the same subject. That would lead to nothing but a weakening of the responsibility both of the local elected authority and the Government, and to a great deal of extravagance, friction, and delay, because at every point the Local Authority’s staff would have to consult the staff of the Government.’

The authors of the new Housing Act contemplate, it is true, the advent of an ideal date when rents, by being gradually raised, will approach more nearly to the economic rent ; that is, will more nearly meet the debt charges and other annual expenditure. This is a principle which only needs a pen and a little ink when inserted in a draft Bill or departmental regulations. But in stern practice, will Local Authorities be able to increase the rents? A vast number of householders will, in future, be their tenants, and will also be their electors, and the working classes have recently been taught the principle of fixity of rents and also the application of strike methods to some novel purposes. It will be certainly by no means easy to reintroduce economic rent or anything approaching thereto. Higher rents could no doubt be obtained if Local Authorities were allowed to assume a generous though quite rational interpretation of the words ‘Working Class,’ and could let the new suburban houses not only to the best paid families of the manual labour class, but

to those of the clerical or lower professional class. There will be a great demand for new houses from these classes, and some demand from families who have hitherto lived in villas of a larger size, and will now be too poor to do so, and even from a ruined aristocracy, the *nouveaux pauvres*.

On the other hand, the very poorest classes are unable to pay even a far from economic rent ; they find it necessary to live close to factories and workshops, docks and markets ; and by habit they like crowded central regions, full of life. Nor are they willing or able to travel to and from the suburbs even at 'workmen's fares.' The London County Council never yet have been able to let to the very poorest class the new houses on their existing estates, where rents have hitherto been fixed on an economic or self-supporting basis. The argument has been that the better paid workmen migrated to these estates from interior and overcrowded districts, and thus left vacant many old houses which might be obtained by the poorer class at less than the former rents. In this way it was argued there was a relief of pressure all round, and every one could get a house rather better and larger than his former house. There is a good deal of truth in this argument, although sometimes it is used for more than it is worth.

Even where Local Authorities have bought up and cleared slums, and have built upon the very same sites tenement buildings intended to rehouse the displaced population, or, at least, people of the same wage-level, it has been usually found impossible to achieve this result. To be self-supporting, new dwellings must be let at rents a little beyond those which the ex-slum people can, or will pay. Consequently, these dwellings are occupied by slightly better off families, and the old population goes where it can and overcrowds other streets and alleys.

When insanitary areas are cleared in the heart of great cities, especially in London, the ideal policy would be to convert most of these sites into gardens and open spaces, thus increasing not only beauty but free air, and diminishing the number of those who breathe and rebreathe it. But it is usually impossible to carry out this policy because of the difficulty of finding housing for the displaced close enough to their work. Therefore one is compelled to sacrifice gardens and open spaces in favour of several storied tenement buildings. Some years ago the London

County Council began to clear some fifteen acres in Southwark, some of the worst slums in London. Their scheme included the lay-out of five acres as public garden and recreation ground, and the rehousing on the rest of the cleared area of a population equal to half that displaced. Before the war they could make such a scheme, because there was sufficient vacant accommodation within easy reach to take in the other half of the dispossessed. They could not have made the scheme now, because the margin of vacant accommodation has disappeared.

Municipal reformers, it should be noted, do not at first, at any rate, earn much gratitude from the inhabitants when they remove tiny unsanitary and decayed one or two storied cottages and replace them by four or five storied tenement buildings. Far more popular would they be if they could build a good cottage on the spot for every decayed cottage which they removed. This could be done in the country but not in the fully occupied centres of great cities. Here, as a rule, there is only the cleared site to build upon, and a decent new cottage requires the sites previously occupied by two or three of its slum predecessors. Streets and alleys must also be widened, and more space is lost in this way. Except by building four or five storied tenements it is impossible to rehouse upon an ex-slum area anything like the previous population.

In most continental cities the average height of houses has always been greater than in England. This is probably due to the greater necessity, down almost to modern times, of living within the defence walls of towns. Hence foreign populations were accustomed to the plan of several families sharing the same house, and were prepared for the modern necessity of high tenement buildings as cities expanded in the railway era. But in happy England, free from invasion and long civil turmoil, individualism flourished amazingly, and with it the small separate dwelling. Rampartless cities straggled out into the country, covering miles of land with two storied houses. What is the average height of all houses in the county of London? Not more than three stories, probably a fraction less.

A necessary result of this is that distances, both within the cities and from the centres of the cities, to the rural surroundings, have been lengthened. Then arise new necessities of transport. Horse omnibuses and tramways, petrol omnibuses and electric

tramways, steam and next electric railways, are successively invented, and with each new development of transport comes a new development of building on the old lines. Leagues of two storied workmen's dwellings advance, and at the close of each development of transport the centres of the cities are in point of time as remote as ever from the healthy rural surroundings. All means of transport are crowded and overcrowded and there is much waste of time and vigour and money in travelling. It is bad economy also that the working members of families—fathers and boys and girls—should have their mid-day meal perforce away from home, and bad often for health.

What has happened is this. Factories, workshops, breweries, docks, warehouses, and other places of work and business were established round the old city of London in what were once suburban areas, where sites could be obtained at moderate prices. The commercial part of the town extended, and the old population was displaced and driven outwards, or was overcrowded in a diminished habitable part of the central regions. Ideally a large number of the factories, workshops, etc., should have moved outward also, but this did not take place to any great extent. The same thing has happened in other large cities, but the malady is greatest in London, because the region covered by houses is greatest.

Local Authorities have until now had no power to meet these difficulties. They had power, under the Housing Acts, to acquire land and build thereon new houses for working class families. But a Municipal Authority had no power, unless it obtained a special Act of Parliament, to lay out a 'garden city' like that at Letchworth, to build houses for different social classes, or to sell or lease land for places of work or recreation. So jealous was Parliament that, absurdly enough, a body like the London County Council, elected as representative of a population of four and a half millions, did not possess in this respect the powers of any private landowner or commercial company. These restrictions have at last been largely removed by the Act of 1919.

A Local Authority will now be able to lease, or sell, any part of the land acquired for any purposes relating to the development of the land as a building estate. By an amendment proposed by the House of Lords and accepted by the

County Council began to clear some fifteen acres in Southwark, some of the worst slums in London. Their scheme included the lay-out of five acres as public garden and recreation ground, and the rehousing on the rest of the cleared area of a population equal to half that displaced. Before the war they could make such a scheme, because there was sufficient vacant accommodation within easy reach to take in the other half of the dispossessed. They could not have made the scheme now, because the margin of vacant accommodation has disappeared.

Municipal reformers, it should be noted, do not at first, at any rate, earn much gratitude from the inhabitants when they remove tiny unsanitary and decayed one or two storied cottages and replace them by four or five storied tenement buildings. Far more popular would they be if they could build a good cottage on the spot for every decayed cottage which they removed. This could be done in the country but not in the fully occupied centres of great cities. Here, as a rule, there is only the cleared site to build upon, and a decent new cottage requires the sites previously occupied by two or three of its slum predecessors. Streets and alleys must also be widened, and more space is lost in this way. Except by building four or five storied tenements it is impossible to rehouse upon an ex-slum area anything like the previous population.

In most continental cities the average height of houses has always been greater than in England. This is probably due to the greater necessity, down almost to modern times, of living within the defence walls of towns. Hence foreign populations were accustomed to the plan of several families sharing the same house, and were prepared for the modern necessity of high tenement buildings as cities expanded in the railway era. But in happy England, free from invasion and long civil turmoil, individualism flourished amazingly, and with it the small separate dwelling. Rampartless cities straggled out into the country, covering miles of land with two storied houses. What is the average height of all houses in the county of London? Not more than three stories, probably a fraction less.

A necessary result of this is that distances, both within the cities and from the centres of the cities, to the rural surroundings, have been lengthened. Then arise new necessities of transport. Horse omnibuses and tramways, petrol omnibuses and electric

tramways, steam and next electric railways, are successively invented, and with each new development of transport comes a new development of building on the old lines. Leagues of two storied workmen's dwellings advance, and at the close of each development of transport the centres of the cities are in point of time as remote as ever from the healthy rural surroundings. All means of transport are crowded and overcrowded and there is much waste of time and vigour and money in travelling. It is bad economy also that the working members of families—fathers and boys and girls—should have their mid-day meal perforce away from home, and bad often for health.

What has happened is this. Factories, workshops, breweries, docks, warehouses, and other places of work and business were established round the old city of London in what were once suburban areas, where sites could be obtained at moderate prices. The commercial part of the town extended, and the old population was displaced and driven outwards, or was overcrowded in a diminished habitable part of the central regions. Ideally a large number of the factories, workshops, etc., should have moved outward also, but this did not take place to any great extent. The same thing has happened in other large cities, but the malady is greatest in London, because the region covered by houses is greatest.

Local Authorities have until now had no power to meet these difficulties. They had power, under the Housing Acts, to acquire land and build thereon new houses for working class families. But a Municipal Authority had no power, unless it obtained a special Act of Parliament, to lay out a 'garden city' like that at Letchworth, to build houses for different social classes, or to sell or lease land for places of work or recreation. So jealous was Parliament that, absurdly enough, a body like the London County Council, elected as representative of a population of four and a half millions, did not possess in this respect the powers of any private landowner or commercial company. These restrictions have at last been largely removed by the Act of 1919.

A Local Authority will now be able to lease, or sell, any part of the land acquired for any purposes relating to the development of the land as a building estate. By an amendment proposed by the House of Lords and accepted by the

Government, these purposes are made expressly to include factories and workshops, places of recreation and churches. Thus a Local Authority, in scheming a new suburb, will be able to reserve land to be offered at such moderate prices or rents as will induce private enterprise to establish new centres of employment, shops and stores, theatres or picture palaces, and, it is to be hoped, restaurants, not confined to the sale of tea and lemonade, on the model of those of the Trust House Company.

A well considered policy of this kind would have various good effects. It would supply occupation near their homes to part of the population, especially, if the occupations are judiciously selected, to the women and young persons. It might induce the owners of factories to migrate further and relieve the pressure in central urban regions. It would increase the attractive amenities of the new suburbs. It might, in the long run, enable the whole venture to become self-supporting, since the rental of places of business and recreation would increase, and thus the burden upon the taxpayer might in time be lightened. Fifty years hence, when the original debt charge had been largely paid off, Local Authorities might even be drawing a handsome revenue in relief of rates from their building estates commenced in the year 1919. This is not indeed much consolation to the living tax-payer but he must try to console himself with the philosophical reflection that, although as an individual he is mortal, yet as a concept he is immortal.

The main danger, as already noted, attached to municipal ownership of land is that the tenant is an elector of the men and women who, as a whole, compose his landlord, and that the section of electors, in future a large section, who are municipal tenants may bring their weight to bear upon reduction of the rents or their maintenance at an inadequate level. This would throw an unfair burden of deficit upon the already over-loaded tax-payers at large, including all those of all classes who derive no direct benefit from the new houses. The danger will be considerable where the new houses are occupied by men of a special and strongly organised trade, such as miners. Elsewhere we can, perhaps doubtfully, expect that the good sense of the community will support Local Authorities in obtaining fair rents. The chief advantage of municipal ownership, on the other hand, is that it secures permanence of good estate manage-



ment. Small house property in private hands continually degenerates. Such property in towns usually passes sooner or later into the hands of numerous miserable little owners who have neither the means nor the will to keep houses in decent repair, and aspire only to draw as much rent as they can during their brief individual lives. Very often groups of houses are sub-let for long terms of years, and by these tenants sub-let again, and then no one has any strong interest in their condition, except the motive of fear of fine and exposure inspired by occasional threats, or steps taken by the sanitary authority. A municipal landowner, on the contrary, is a permanent and immediate landlord with ample means, a scientifically constructed repair and renewal fund, and a reputation to guard; he is stimulated by public opinion, expressed both in council and in criticism by the local newspapers. This should be a true insurance against the degeneration into insanitary decay which has taken place, and is still taking place, in the poorer quarters of our cities, and towns, and villages.

In passing, it may be noticed that municipal land ownership is much more developed abroad than in this country, and especially so in Germany. Before the war the city of Berlin was in possession of some 80,000 acres outside the boundaries, available for any municipal purpose. German cities have not only in this, but in other matters, immensely more freedom and self-determination than English, and if Germany rises again it will be through the excellence of her municipal institutions. We are now beginning to follow German methods in the matter of town planning, but our cities, unlike those of Germany, are supposed to need at every step the impulse and intervention of a central State administration. Germany indeed has hitherto been, far more than England, or France, or America, the true home of municipal freedom.

So far as the planning of building schemes is concerned, many useful suggestions are to be found in the Report of the Local Government Board Committee of which Sir Tudor Walters was chairman. It deals with 'questions of building construction in connexion with the provision of dwellings for the working classes in England, Wales, and Scotland,' and discusses 'methods of securing economy and dispatch in the provision of such dwellings.' It is a really excellent text-book of advice to

Local Authorities as to the choice of sites, the lay-out and development of the land chosen, the construction of houses of various types, material, methods of contract.

The choice of land is, of course, a matter of the greatest importance. Our main object is to bring the residence of labour as near as possible to the existing centres of employment, with some regard to the varying cost of the land, and consistently with salubrity of situation, and the nature of the soil. Vicinity to employment depends upon transport as much as on distance. A site four miles from an industrial centre may be practically nearer than one of two miles, if the former has a railway line and the latter none. On the other hand, it may be good policy to acquire land not yet on lines of easy communication, because the land will be less costly, and one may expect with confidence that means of transport will be developed in one way or another to meet the demand of the occupants of the houses. The authority might, for instance, while the estate was in process of development, and the population yet small, begin by running some motor road-cars or lorries of its own, and afterwards might lay a tramway line which should certainly be a source of municipal revenue.

The Committee also lay stress upon the character of the soil as an element in the choice. A clay sub-soil expands in winter and contracts in summer, so that houses built upon it need stronger and more costly foundations. Rock makes a good foundation, but involves much cost in cutting drainage. The best soil for building purposes is deep gravel. In this respect, however, there is often little freedom of choice. Elevations of sites are also important. Best of all, with regard to cost of lay-out and building, is a site fairly level, but with fall enough to allow drainage to be carried off by force of gravitation, without pumping.

The next important matter is the lay-out of the building estate. The present opinion of the Ministry of Health is in favour of not more than twelve houses to the acre, but this rule must be variable according to the cost of land and other circumstances. Visitors to some existing suburban estates will see that houses are by no means crowded at twenty to the acre. No doubt, however, when land can be acquired at moderate cost, the smaller allowance is better. Local Authorities will do well

to acquire far more land than they actually need for the workmen's dwellings, with a view to leasing much of it for incidental purposes. It is a good thing to have plenty of elbow-room.

The Committee point out that much cost can be saved by making the side roadways of an estate not too wide. A width of sixteen feet carriage-way allows two vehicles to pass moving quickly, or a width of thirteen feet if they move slowly. The latter width would be enough for many side roads in cottage estates, and much expense in maintenance would be saved. There should, of course, in all cases be ample widths of grass margins and side walks, or front gardens between houses and carriage-way. In our climate, especially in the North of Scotland, houses should lie so as to receive as much as possible of the scanty, and often intercepted, supply of sunlight. If houses face south, their northward sides receive hardly a ray of sun through the year—at most, a very oblique ray. Roads should therefore be laid out as much as possible from south to north, and not from east to west; the best line is from S.W. to N.E.

Modern estate-artists recognise the truth that, for some mysterious reason, men prefer the curving lines of nature to the straight line due to human intellect and will. This is why our ancient provincial cities are so unintentionally pleasing. They were built along roads and lanes that had themselves grown through centuries by a natural process, and wind and curve and vary in width in the most delightfully historical manner. Roads like Victoria Street, S.W., or Portland Place, or Gower Street, are wearisome, because they are the result of, and correspond with, the mathematical intellect. The mind of man will not accept with pleasure long straight avenues of unvarying width.

The authors of modern garden cities are not, like our rude forefathers, led by nature and circumstances, but they artistically imitate the processes of nature. The result is a little self-conscious, or affected, or fancy dress, but is next best to the real thing. 'See how quaint, and pretty, and old-world I am,' the garden suburb seems to say, and so the dear thing really is. Perhaps this tide of architecture has carried us too far, and it is more costly than the rectilinear, and so perhaps less fitted for these days of poverty. Some philosopher like the late Mr. March Phillips should investigate the occult reasons why Englishmen in the reign of Victoria liked to build in the style of Eaton

have become unfit for habitation. The second of these objects is no doubt highly desirable on grounds of national health and morals. But as regards the first, it is very uncertain whether there will be any natural increase of population in the future at all corresponding with that in the last hundred years of unprecedented progress. On this point, so far as London is concerned, some interesting observations are contained in the published Report of the London County Council Housing Committee, dated 9th October 1918:—

‘If we were asked what additional accommodation should be provided within the next five, or ten, or fifteen years to meet the demand, we should not be able to give any answer in figures which would be of real value. . . . It is probable that the cessation of the war will cause an appreciable reduction in the population of areas like Woolwich, where the large number of houses built by the Government for munition workers will, in that event, become available for other persons. Many other war-workers in different lines who have been drawn into London since 1914 will probably leave it. It also remains to be proved what portion of pre-war Londoners who have been enrolled in the army, and survive the war, will, after it, continue to live in London. In this connexion the existing schemes for settling ex-soldiers on land in this country, and in overseas Dominions, should be considered.

‘Since 1914 the question is also affected by the reduction in the natural increase of the population, *i.e.*, the excess of births over deaths. This increase was, in London, about 45,000 annually, just before the war, but it had fallen last year to 18,000, *excluding* the unknown number killed in action. The effect of the war in decreasing the birth-rate and increasing the deaths will probably continue to depress the rate of natural increase for a time even after the cessation of hostilities. It is also possible, indeed probable, that one effect of the war will be to reduce the already declining excess of birth-rate over death-rate to zero, or even to a minus quantity for many years to come, both by reason of the reduction in the number of men who can marry and have children, and still more by reason of the increased cost of living which will tend to prevent or delay marriages.

‘There may be some arrest upon the immigration of aliens who have contributed much, until recent years, to swell the London population.

‘To some extent the poorer part of the population of London is brought and kept there by the presence of the wealthiest, because population follows money and means of subsistence. This accounts for many small miscellaneous industries in the centre of wealth and pleasure. Will there, after the war, be the same number of wealthy residents? The same doubt makes it impossible to predict whether a considerable number of upper class houses will not become available to house part of the working class population, as has already happened in certain districts.

‘Will the vastly increased burden of Imperial taxation added to the certain additions to rates tend to make factories remove from London to less costly places in the provinces?’

‘These considerations are a reason for moving very cautiously in the case of London, and for not committing the Council to large undertakings in the line of building houses *in addition* to the existing accommodation on the hypothesis that there will be an increase in the existing population in the future, or at least an increase at all equivalent to the increase in the past, when the wealth and prosperity of this country and of London were so rapidly advancing.’

The London County Council, since the date of this Report, have put forward a scheme for building, within the near future, nearly 30,000 new houses in the suburbs, besides building upon the sites of a number of slums to be cleared in the central regions. They base this programme mainly upon the necessity of relieving the vast existing overcrowding in London, not upon future natural increase of the population. It may, of course, fairly be asked whether the same causes which seem likely to check the increase in the population of London may not produce an actual decrease sufficiently rapid to render unnecessary any extensive housing schemes. No positive reply can yet be made, and in the meantime the London County Council, like other Local Authorities, has been placed by Parliament under an obligation to build houses to be let at a loss—a policy which may itself, by adding to the financial burdens of London taxpayers, actually diminish the population requiring to be housed in London. A great pope of old wrote with regard to ecclesiastical discipline:—‘It is clear that what has been established to meet the necessity of the present time did not exist before. Legitimate order is one thing; another is the actual practice (*usurpatio*) to which we are driven by the circumstances of the present time.’

BERNARD HOLLAND.

## THE DRINK PROBLEM

1. **The Control of the Drink Trade in Britain.** By HENRY CARTER, with a preface by Lord D'Abernon. Second Edition. Longmans, Green & Co. 1919.
2. **Alcohol: Its Action on the Human Organism.** H.M. Stationery Office. 1918.

ONE of the most distinctive features of democratic government is the large infusion of sentiment or passion which colours the main topics of the day. When a controversial subject arrives in the arena of politics it is usually buoyed up by a powerful wave of feeling, by means of which it is driven through all opposition. Valuable as enthusiasm may be where action is to be taken, it is destructive of calm judgment, and the truth upon any subject is far more readily determined in the study and in the laboratory than on the platform.

Political history for many years past has shown how deeply the question of drink control is cumbered with passion. On all sides it is recognized as a subject dangerous to politicians—dangerous even to Governments. And it is natural enough that this should be the case. On the one side we have all the frightful evils of alcoholic excess; the degradation, the inefficiency, the poverty, the vice, which are borne along the stream of alcohol. For many persons no more needs to be said. The world is full of soft-hearted and sentimental persons, for whom the mere outward aspect of an evil suffices to justify *any* measures for its repression. On the other side, repression interferes with the personal habits of a very large number of the general public. They resent this interference; and thus on either side a powerful wave of feeling is generated, which gives rise to fierce political controversy. The worst elements of bigotry and partisanship are enlisted in the fray, and the prospect of reaching any *sober* conclusion recedes indefinitely into the distance.

Such was the position of the drink problem before the war. But a year had not passed by before it was altogether changed.

A military organization of the country brought with it, as it always does, a profound modification in methods of government. Matters affecting the well-being of the community were removed bodily from the immediate sway of democratic control. A hidden bureaucracy grew up which issued its fiat to the world; public interest was so deeply concentrated on the war that other things faded into insignificance. The people accepted without demur revolutionary changes in their habits, believing that the bureaucracy behind the scenes was acting in their best interests, and confident in the suppression of political motives. Very early in the war it became apparent that alcoholic excess was causing a serious loss of national efficiency, and in May 1915 Parliament passed an Act setting up the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) with extensive powers to deal with the situation. Lord D'Abernon was appointed chairman; and henceforward all questions of liquor control were removed from the arena of political strife. The mandates of an oligarchy superseded the normal course of democratic government.

The impartial observer is bound to recognize that the new oligarchy carried out their difficult duties with a signal and unexpected success. They did reduce drunkenness, and thereby increase efficiency to a very remarkable extent; and they did so with the minimum of interference with the habits of the people. They worked in an atmosphere of calm, unknown to those who are obliged at every step to defer to popular opinion. With all the facts before them, they were able to reach their decisions, free from prejudice and according to the best of their ability, in what they conceived to be the public interest. They succeeded; and their success raises an interesting speculation as to the true supremacy of democratic procedure. However this may be, it is certain that the methods of bureaucracy cannot be maintained as a normal institution. A new method of control will be adopted, and the moment is opportune for considering the extent and direction which that control should take. For an atmosphere of relative calm still exists; but it is not likely to last long. In the United States the drink problem is the centre of intense political passion, which has issued in action correspondingly extreme; and it is certain that a teetotal campaign on political lines will shortly be attempted in this country.

The prohibitionist point of view is simple. The evils caused

by excessive consumption of alcohol are obvious to every one; on the other hand, a widespread doubt exists as to whether any real benefit accrues from alcohol, and by few is it regarded as a necessity. Prohibitionists therefore think it obvious that the disadvantages greatly exceed any possible advantages, and they forthwith apply the shallow political maxim that direct and forcible repression by the State is the correct way of dealing with any recognized social evil.

Yet the problem is not so simple as they imagine. A widespread social habit cannot be isolated and dealt with independently; it ramifies into social life, and interference involves a number of remote and indirect effects, which may sum up to consequences far greater than the near and direct effects. A community is not like a bicycle, in which a breakdown in one part can be mended without any effect upon other parts. Society is a closely integrated whole, in which any action directed to a single point is sure to send reverberating waves throughout the whole structure, and to bring many unforeseen consequences. Nor is it at all so obvious that alcohol *is* an unmitigated evil. Even if we were to admit that its *immediate* and *visible* effects are bad, we are still far from any proof that it may not fill an important function in the life of the community. It is to these larger aspects of the problem that attention requires to be specially directed. We shall deal first with the action of alcohol itself, and afterwards with the functions of the State with reference to the matter.

All civilized peoples have displayed a craving for narcotics of one kind or another. Wine enters largely into ancient classical literature, and we may infer was an important element in the social habits of the greatest civilizations known upon the earth. Many are the causes which have been alleged for the fall of the Roman Empire. It has been variously attributed by different writers to wealth, to luxury, to sexual promiscuity, to the suppression of Paganism by Constantine, to depopulation, to a dwindling rainfall in Central Asia, etc., etc.—but never to alcoholic excess. A narcotic craving has accompanied all high civilizations; nor is there a fragment of evidence that in the long run it leads to the smallest social degeneration.

Now physiology, notwithstanding the brilliant advances of recent times, is far indeed from claiming any complete know-



ledge as to how the body works. Our food intake may be measured in calories and vitamins, but the healthy human instinct remains a far better guide to nutrition than any scientific theory of requirements in calories and vitamins. It may not always be so, when physiology has acquired a still wider range of knowledge than at present, but it is so now. And thus, in the imperfect state of our present knowledge, it is highly unwise to dismiss a general social craving as being wrong and unhealthy, merely because its *immediate* and *visible* effects are *sometimes* bad. We know indeed that alcohol is not a natural ingredient in the food of the lower animals, or of savage races of men. But all civilization is an artificial state. We live in an environment far removed from that of wild nature. We protect ourselves from the crude hardships of a natural life, we cook our food, we wear clothes, we live in houses, we lay up store for the future, and are entirely unable to realize that hand-to-mouth existence, which is the lot of all animals and of all uncivilized men. The human organism is no longer called upon to withstand the intense vicissitudes and unceasing dangers which beset a life of nature. Those terrible burdens have been removed from us, while yet our bodies, through ages of evolution, were fashioned to withstand them. It seems natural that new organic cravings may result; it seems reasonable to believe that such cravings may represent a genuine organic demand, which it would be highly unwise to tamper with. We do not say that it *is* so; we only say that *it may be so*. The mere fact of a great social craving is a significant circumstance; we want to know all about the origin of it, and the physiological causes of it, before we brush it aside as of no account. The social reformer in a hurry does not think of these things; he is obsessed by the distress which he has occasionally noticed to ensue from alcohol. He forgets that the craving may be a true physiological indication. He harps on the refrain, 'Back to Nature'—advice which, if candidly followed, would in a few years lead through the most terrible distress to the extermination of all now living in these islands.

At all events, no one questions that, for some reason as yet unknown, a craving for narcotics does exist, which at the present time is met chiefly by alcohol and nicotine, but to a minor degree also by other drugs such as opium and cocaine. Prohibition of

alcohol abolishes the means by which this craving is now most commonly satisfied. But there is no sort of evidence that abolition on the large scale of the means of gratifying the craving will result in the disappearance of the craving itself. The prohibitionist doctrine is a treatment of symptoms, and not a cure of the disease, even if it is a disease. In the highly probable assumption that the narcotic demands of civilized humanity will not be laid to rest merely by prohibiting alcohol, we have to inquire how these demands are likely to express themselves if their normal means of alleviation are removed. The presence in society of a large, unsatisfied emotion is extremely dangerous; we know not where it may turn—it has even been said that the Russian Revolution was due to the suppression of vodka; physiological sequences are deeper and far more obscure than political sequences. There would probably be generated a strenuous demand for opium, cocaine, and other drugs of a far more evil character than alcohol. This, no doubt, could be dealt with by legal prohibition in the same way; but the diversion of a powerful craving from its normal channel is in any case a dangerous proceeding, for it may well pursue a far more deleterious course, and one which cannot be dealt with by the simple process of making laws.

In short, it is necessary to know far more about this narcotic craving before too drastic measures are taken for suppressing its natural mode of expression. We know that drunkenness is compatible with the highest civilization. No instance of national degeneracy has been brought forward in condemnation of it. On the other hand, we are at present quite in the dark as to the effect of compulsory interference with so deep-rooted a social habit. This argument is perhaps not likely to carry much weight with social reformers. They see the acknowledged evils of drunkenness; they know, or think they know, the objections to the present system, and they are prepared to get rid of a known evil at the risk of incurring a doubtful and unknown evil. It will therefore be desirable to indicate in a concrete example how alcohol may possibly meet a true and legitimate human requirement.

During the last few years various men of science have laid stress on the damaging effect of *monotony*, and the benefits to be derived from change as change. Especially in regard to ventila-

tion has this doctrine been preached in England by Dr. Leonard Hill. Earlier ideas on the warming and ventilation of houses were based on the assumption that the optimum temperature for health should first be discovered, and then that efforts should be directed towards a steady maintenance of this optimum temperature. The ventilation of the House of Commons was carried out on this principle, a current of warm air of uniform optimum temperature being delivered into the chamber. Results, however, by no means bore out the anticipation; and the reason, subsequently discovered, is that uniformity in itself is deleterious, that variation is essential to well-being, and that irregular oscillation of temperature is a necessity of good ventilation.

More recently observations have been carried out in America as to the relation of climate to health and to state of civilization; and the conclusion has been reached that a direct relation subsists between these and variability of climate. A close analysis of statistics appears to indicate that the rate of mortality is reduced in months where the weather is stormy and changeable; whereas, in corresponding months of different years when the weather remained uniform the mortality is somewhat higher. Moreover, it is generally the case that among modern civilizations the most advanced are those existing in climates where variation is widest and most frequent. We in England shall be well disposed to accept this doctrine, for these American writers affirm that the weather conditions in England are more variable than in any other civilized country; and they find no other fault with our climate, except that variations in the direction of cold are not sufficiently extreme.

In all spheres the benefits of change, *as change*, are rapidly gaining recognition. The advantage of a holiday is not so much due to a cessation of work as to the total change of environment; and the benefit of it is felt just as much by those who do not work at all, but leave their comfortable homes for poor lodgings and indifferent food in a new locality with new surroundings, and where the sights and sounds are different from those usually experienced.

Among the evils which humanity has to avoid, therefore, is that of monotony. Here we may see some connexion with the alteration of men's habits in consequence of civilization.

Civilization permits, and very often enforces, a life of complete regularity, the same task being repeated from day to day with scarcely the smallest variation of time or scenery. The habits of the savage are in comparison irregular. His meals are at varied intervals; there are periods of famine; vicissitudes of temperature affect him more profoundly. He is under constant stress, by reason of his conflict with external nature. It is the physical monotony, the regularity, the absence of excitement, that oppresses large sections of all civilized communities.

Now what other agent is there so capable of giving physical and mental variety as alcohol? Mentally it furnishes for a brief period a new attitude of mind; it induces gaiety, and a *change* of disposition. True, that change is commonly towards reduced efficiency. Perception and judgment are less acute under the influence of alcohol, even in moderate doses. But it is not for the advantage of an individual to maintain high tension all day long. When his day's work is done, relaxation is beneficial, and it is readily comprehensible that a moderate dose of alcohol may be of assistance by introducing variation into his mental outlook, and ridding him of the kind of thoughts which occupy his mind monotonously during the working hours of the day.

Physically, a similar advantage may be suspected. The normal course of metabolism is altered; for alcohol is a drug as well as a food. The blood flows differently through the capillaries; many small physical effects are brought about. They are generally perhaps a departure from the optimum, but at all events they tend to break the monotony of metabolism, to set up temporary minor changes in the constitution, and give a general shake-up to the system. May we not see here a possible explanation of the widespread demand for alcohol? And, when we remember the obscure association between state of civilization and variability of environment, shall we not be wise to hesitate before embarking upon a policy which for large sections of the people would cut away their only chance of escape from unwholesome monotony?

It is true that drunkenness is a vice, and on all grounds extremely deplorable. Alcohol, like all other drugs, when taken in excess, becomes a poison. When taken in such quantities as to poison the system, it brings about many evils of the most

severe character. That furnishes an overwhelming argument against excess, but none whatever against the consumption of alcohol in moderation. Walking is a wholesome exercise ; but to walk fifty miles a day would for most people bring all kinds of physical penalties. It is quite a small proportion of drinkers who drink to excess. Those who do so are the victims of a neurasthenic weakness, which would probably express itself in any case by lowered efficiency. Those who have this tendency are from the start the least valuable members of the community. And there can be no wisdom in a policy which deprives the mass of the people of their only chance of mental relief from a life of weary drudgery and strain, merely to protect a few from the more obvious consequences of their own instability. To penalize all mankind in the interests of drunkards may possibly be sound politics, but it is certainly very bad biology.

It is to be understood that the foregoing line of argument is merely a suggestion as to the possible cause of the demand for alcohol. It is put forward, not in any respect as a reason for consuming alcohol, but to indicate the probability that the unforeseen consequences of compulsory prohibition might greatly outweigh those more obvious consequences that are anticipated. The argument is designed, not to frustrate the progress of reform, but to insist that adequate knowledge is necessary before drastic action is undertaken. Society is a very delicately adjusted organism ; strong action upon it may have very strange effects, and reformers would do well to pause and collect all possible knowledge before rushing into a hasty policy of universal compulsion. Civilization is abnormal and artificial in respect of the fact that it implies a life protected from the greater vicissitudes, as plants are protected in a greenhouse. But the body was never evolved to be altogether immune from physical injury ; and indeed there are circumstances in which physical injury is purposely inflicted by doctors for curing diseased conditions. In the mode of treatment called counter-irritation, a blister is raised on the surface in order to relieve a more deep-seated pain. Moreover, during the war it was noted that the severe mental disease called 'shell-shock' scarcely ever affected men who had been physically wounded. A body-wound appeared to confer a large degree of immunity from shell-shock, by strengthening the resisting powers of the mind. The cheerful-

ness often noticed in wounded soldiers was very likely due in part to the same psychological principle. Long before the war, it had been noted that in railway accidents, passengers who happened to be drunk did not suffer from 'shock,' which laid low their sober fellow-travellers. All we here wish to do is to emphasize the fact that human physiology is at present very imperfectly understood; that the social effects of alcohol are probably for the most part still obscure, and slow in making their appearance; hence, that it is unwise to legislate as though the sole effects were those which are visible and immediate in their occurrence.

The probability that there are other effects, deeper and more obscure in character, is increased by some indications of definite evidence, which may be gleaned from the two admirable works whose titles are placed at the head of this article. Both are written with a spirit of impartiality and genuine feeling for truth. Mr. Henry Carter, himself a member of the Liquor Control Board, describes the methods adopted by the Board for the restriction of the liquor traffic. He conclusively establishes this fact: that it *is* possible to reduce drunkenness, at all events temporarily, by the imposition of certain restrictions. Whereas Mr. Carter deals entirely with the administrative aspects of the problem, the other work noticed, 'Alcohol: Its Action on the 'Human Organism,' is purely scientific in character. It is a statement drawn up by a committee of distinguished men of science, summing up the present state of knowledge as regards the physiological effects of alcohol. We are informed, for instance, that 'the part which alcoholic excess plays in the 'causation of the ordinary forms of mental disease is of secondary importance: it has been shown that when the two facts are 'associated, intemperance is more usually a symptom of insanity 'than its cause.' This would appear to suggest that the evil cannot be eradicated by measures aimed at its external symptoms. The real evil to be contended with is not so much drunkenness as the underlying weakness which leads to excess; nor can any measures be considered satisfactory which merely repress the outward expression of a nervous weakness, thereby thrusting the true evil underground into possibly far more dangerous channels. That excess is due to a natural nervous instability is further borne out by the fact, which Mr. Carter notes:—'The demand for

'drink springs not infrequently from the lack of food.' 'The well-fed man is not, as a rule, the chronic drunkard or "tippler".' All mental instability is increased by inadequate nutrition.

Given the fact of mental instability, alcohol appears to furnish a *relatively* innocuous mode of expression. According to the Scientific Committee, 'alcohol has no very strong habit-forming 'influence,' and if it does happen to be true that the public demand for narcotics is founded on a true physiological need, it is obviously fortunate that the most popular of all narcotics should, in the main, be one which does not establish an organic habit. The Scientific Committee further 'recognize that the 'agreeable effects which the majority of people experience from 'the use of alcoholic beverages, can be produced by doses of 'alcohol—moderate in quantity, and taken in adequate dilution 'and at sufficient intervals—which will not, in normally constituted persons, be attended with appreciable risk to physical 'or mental health.'

Evidence is also forthcoming that alcohol does tend to give relief from that physical and mental monotony which we have noted to be specially injurious. The seventh memorandum of the Health of Munition Workers' Committee draws attention to the condition of 'staleness' often affecting the workers in munition factories. 'By experienced managers and medical 'officers, this condition of staleness is attributed, almost wholly, 'to persistent long hours and the deprivation of weekly rest. It 'has grave accompaniments, which paradoxically appear not only 'in a state of lethargy and indifference, but also in a craving for 'change and excitement. *No doubt the restlessness of the condition must often predispose also to indulgence in the alleviations 'given by alcohol.*' There is, in fact, no other method by which the change and excitement which they need can be so easily met. The evil arose from the fact that the legitimate demand was too often exceeded. The correct treatment is not in the suppression of alcohol—far from it—but in the suppression of excess. Now is it not true in all spheres of life that excess and severe restriction go hand in hand? It is not merely that forbidden fruits taste sweetest. Educationists all agree that children most sharply controlled are those most liable to excess, when the control is removed. Action and reaction are equal

and opposite. Those upon whom control has been most forcibly impressed are the least able to control themselves.

‘The blood of youth burns not with such excess,  
As gravity’s revolt to wantonness.’

If what we desire is moderation in drinking, one thing is certain: that in the long run forcible and repressive restriction can never achieve it, but is likely to lead to a state of affairs in which widespread abstinence goes side by side with violent excess. Nor is it certain that abstinence achieved by such measures is at all advantageous. Mr. Carter himself refers to the ‘tendency to find in alcoholic indulgence an escape from weariness and care, *or an outlet for the common mood of unrest.*’ When we are informed that much loss of work is due to alcoholic excess, we may reply that much loss of work is also due to labour discontent; nor is there, as yet, any present reason to suppose that this discontent would be alleviated by the repression of one of the natural means of relief.

The conclusion at which we arrive, therefore, is this. Alcoholic excess is plainly injurious; it is associated with disease, poverty, and crime. On the other hand there is no evidence that alcohol in moderation and occasionally is in the least injurious. Moreover, it meets a wide public demand, which there is no ground for dismissing as a mere aberration. We have seen that the demand itself is very probably an indication of a true physiological need, with which it would be highly dangerous to meddle. The further question naturally arises as to whether there is any danger of national degeneration in consequence of alcohol. We noted that no race of ancient or modern times has ever been recorded as becoming degenerate on this account, notwithstanding strong inclinations to the consumption of alcohol. We may now go further, and note the reason for this fact, which has been suggested by Sir Archdall Reid in his works, ‘The Principles of Heredity’ and ‘The Laws of Heredity.’ He points out, and supports his contention by abundant evidence, that alcohol and all other drugs, and also infectious diseases, never cause degeneration, though in the latter cases they may cause extinction. If any race is exposed to a new infectious disease through a number of generations, that race will, if not totally exterminated at the start, acquire a relative immunity to the disease. The



suggested reason is that individuals who have little resistance to the disease tend to be killed out by it, so that in course of time the race is perpetuated from those who are tolerant of it. The same truth holds with regard to drugs, such as alcohol and opium. We all know the deadly effects of opium among peoples not accustomed to it. In Eastern races, on the other hand, where opium has been in use for many generations, none of the evil consequences are observed which attend its consumption by a novice.

So it is with alcohol. Those countries of Southern Europe where alcohol has long been in general use among the people, and where there are no restrictions, are the most sober of all nations. Those countries where alcohol has not thus been a normal part of the national diet, but has been comparatively recently adopted, are the most prone to excess. Even among ourselves, immunity appears to have developed most among the classes which have used alcohol the longest. There is in these times little tendency to excess among the upper classes, whose ancestors had regular access to the drug, and according to tradition considerably abused it. Excess is more rife among the poorer classes, who have no hereditary immunity, but come to it as novices. And it appears that tolerance is already becoming manifested among them. The annual death-rate from alcoholism in England and Wales was 71 per million living in 1891, and 52 in 1913. The death-rate from cirrhosis of the liver was 125 in 1891, and 97 in 1913. The Boer War caused a rise in both rates; but since 1900 there has on the whole been a steady decline, though during the two or three years preceding the late war it is true that the decline was not maintained. In short, it appears that the vice of drunkenness is slowly in course of diminution; as might be expected, the disposition to excess gradually decreases as society becomes more and more habituated to the drug. Since there is no question whatever of national degeneration being caused by alcohol, it seems far more reasonable and far safer to allow natural processes to work themselves out, than to embark upon a policy of artificial prohibition, which suspends the normal tendency to toleration, while gravely interfering with the habits of the people.

One argument, often used, remains to be noted. Insurance statistics indicate that the expectation of life among total

abstainers is somewhat higher than among non-abstainers ; and it is inferred that teetotalism tends to prolongation of life. The inference is unjustified. For included among the non-abstainers are the habitual drunkards, whose years are naturally shortened by their mode of life. They are a dead-weight, reducing the average expectation of life for any group in which they are included, and the comparison is thus vitiated. There are indeed no statistics at all bearing upon the average duration of life among teetotalers as compared with those who consume alcohol in moderation. Even supposing that teetotalers do live longer than non-abstainers—a supposition which cannot be admitted except for the sake of argument—it would not follow that compulsory enforcement of teetotalism on those not naturally inclined to it, would equally lengthen their lives. On the contrary, it might shorten them. The whole question is very complex, and still larger questions open out from it, which we cannot hope to solve for a long time to come. Is the duration of life, for instance, proportioned to the richness and fullness of life? Is quantity a true index of quality? And if not, is it not worth while to live the fullest possible life, even if its duration is a few months shorter than a duller and more empty life?

It is not the object of this article to defend the consumption of alcohol, or to express any opinion as between total abstention and moderate or occasional indulgence. Probably many people would be best suited by one course, and many by the other. The object is merely this: to deprecate drastic *compulsory* action, on the ground that scientific knowledge is not sufficiently advanced to say whether the effects would be good or bad. Prudence strongly suggests the unwisdom of any vigorous State action. Moreover, the United States having now plunged into the experiment of total prohibition, we have before us a unique opportunity of observing the results of that experiment, and thus acquiring the necessary information for adopting a wise and safe policy.

No suggestions are made therefore as to what course ought actually to be taken. My only endeavour is to set forth a few deep principles, which have been overlooked in the shallow controversies of political life. The whole problem is merged in the larger question as to the rights of the State to interfere

with the individual. A multiplicity of laws and regulations invariably produces a low standard of regard for law; evasion becomes respectable, and the arm of the law is weakened by attempting too much. Moreover, law in a democratic community is merely an expression of the opinion of the majority; and how do we know that the opinion of the majority is right? Where it can be tested against fact, as in the history of science and philosophy, the opinion of the majority on controversial matters has far more often than not turned out to be wrong. Let the majority guide their lives as they think fit; but let them not force their mode of life indiscriminately on all men; for among the minority there will be some wiser than they. The great new ideas, upon which civilization has slowly grown up, have nearly always originated in the minds of a few men of unusual genius, and have gradually won by reason of their true merit against the unpopularity which at first beset them. If minorities are to be invariably dominated by the opinion of majorities, all hope of progress is at an end.

Furthermore, anarchy and over-government go hand in hand. The excessive governmental interferences involved by the war—most of them necessary no doubt as measures of war—have already led by reaction to a far more anarchical state of Europe than when the hand of government was lighter; and the condition of anarchy is greatest where the weight of government was heaviest. Improvement cannot be otherwise than slow; it is certain also that improvement can only be achieved by a gradual but determined relaxation and ultimate abolition of arbitrary restrictions upon the liberty of the individual. Only in the pure air of freedom can the deadly virus of Bolshevism and social unrest be destroyed.

HUGH ELLIOT.

## THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

1. **The English Public Schools : A Symposium.** Edited by J. HOWARD WHITEHOUSE. Grant Richards. 1919.
2. **The Education of a Philanderer.** By S. P. B. MAIS. Grant Richards. 1919.
3. **Loose Ends.** By ARNOLD LUNN. Hutchinson. 1919.
4. **The Loom of Youth.** By ALEC WAUGH. Grant Richards. 1917.
5. **The Harrovians.** By ARNOLD LUNN. Methuen. 1913.
6. **Sinister Street, Part I.** By COMPTON MACKENZIE. Secker. 1913.
7. **Mr. Perrin and Mr. Traill.** By HUGH WALPOLE. Mills & Boon. 1911.

IT is not a little remarkable that during the present century, excluding three of the novels given above, some sixteen novels dealing wholly or in large part with public school life have appeared in this country. A fuller bibliography is given in the book which heads the list. The public school novel has become a literary fashion. As a literary manifestation it cannot be called important, and it is by no means the aim of this article to estimate the literary value of its phenomena. What the present popularity of this *genre* does more than anything show is the increasing importance of the novel as a medium for propaganda. The reprint, under the editorship of Mr. Whitehouse, of a correspondence which raged round the most discussed of these novels two years ago in the *Nation* shows that the public interest is well kept up. The article which started this discussion must seem to the unimpassioned observer rather crude in its assertions, on the evidence of a book which, as other writers pointed out, can hardly be taken to damn a whole system without further inquiry. Nevertheless, the discussion elicited some interesting points of view, and its conclusions, as quite moderately summed up by the author of the original article and by Mr. Whitehouse, are worthy of serious consideration.

The strong and searching ray of criticism that is now being thrown upon the public boarding schools of England cannot be without result. It must influence, not only the public at large,

but the authorities of the schools, the associations of masters and the parents. Everything about these schools, except their influence on character, is being called in question. Some would sweep away boarding schools altogether, some protest against their exclusiveness ; some find the curriculum infuriating, others the worship of athletics ; others, again, are exercised about their morality and their teaching of religion. Various people blame various sections of the community for the shortcomings which they observe : the parents, the capitalists, the upper classes, the universities, the Church, the masters, and public opinion all come in for castigation at one hand or another. One young master, writing to the *Nation*, found this *mêlée* of points of view disheartening. He said :—

‘ Your indictment of the public schools, and the long correspondence last week, leaves me very much depressed. It is all so dreadfully stale and old. A. says the public schools are indefensible and ought to go ; well, they won’t go, in our time, at any rate. B. remonstrates apologetically that they aren’t quite so bad as all that. C. says they can’t be reformed till everything else has been reformed first. D. blames “Society.” E., the State. F., the classics, and so on. So it goes on. It might all have been written in 1898 or 1878. Can we get no further than that ?’

The point, surely, is that it was not all written, or at least so frequently repeated, in 1898 or 1878, though exponents of all these views might then have been found. Now is the time when the smouldering fire has burst into vivid flame, and the people at large stand round eagerly discussing means for adding fresh combustibles or for applying an effective extinguisher. The pioneers must be content to go all over the old ground again for the sake of the laggards, for it is the weight of the laggards’ opinion that will lead to action, conscious or unconscious. The questions involved are extremely important and not easy to determine ; but they will only be determined satisfactorily if individuals will strive to make up their minds for themselves according to their own lights and their own experience, not by adopting opinions at second hand. For grown men, at all events, it is impossible to start with an entirely open mind : either they are public school men or they are not. Those who are have four or five years of definite experience which they cannot forget ; those who are not must form their ideas without the benefit of the experience. To which

body the writer of this article belongs will be sufficiently obvious, but his plea is that those who have had the experience will be honest with themselves, neither stifling their criticisms under their affections and their social prejudices nor, in their remembrance of abuses and shortcomings, applying without reservation the well-written criticism by other boys of other schools to their own. If they review their own school days in the general light of modern criticism, and base their opinion on the result, they will not be at the mercy of mere discontent and ignorance, which is no more absent from this than from any other public discussion of importance.

There are two classes of question in the discussion raging round the public schools : first, the fundamental questions which involve the whole existence of the public schools as institutions or parts of the educational system ; and, secondly, what may be called the internal questions, which, assuming the existence of these schools, range all over their activities with a view to their improvement. Both types of question, when the particular thing to be reformed has been made sufficiently clear, lead to the further question how the reform is to be carried out, by what measures, and applied at what point.

It may be taken that there are parents, themselves public school men, who, in determining that a public school is the best place for their sons, are not swayed by tradition nor prompted by mere worldly motives and snobbery, nor imbued with a foolish, breezy optimism, nor blind to all possibilities of improvement, but who make up their minds after serious debate and survey of all alternatives. Such parents have answered, in coming to this conclusion, one of the fundamental questions, the other side to which was thus expressed by Sir Sydney Olivier in the *Nation* :—

‘ No parent should be allowed to send his boy to school in a boarding house without special excuse, any more than to send him into a private lunatic asylum.’

Other fundamental questions are more vital than this to the continued existence of the public schools, but it is worth while to examine for a moment this very dogmatic assertion. It leaves out of account one of what seem to be the undisputed advantages of public school education, the advantage of living in an orderly and disciplined community for a greater part of

the years of later boyhood. There will always be exceptional beings to whom this life is not appropriate, but for the majority of boys it is both beneficial and enjoyable. It might even be said that the majority of boys demand it. Moreover, even the holders of opposite views agree that it is an infinitely better system for boys from inadequate homes than the day school. In my opinion, the definition of an inadequate home would be a very wide one, and likely to remain so even after all possible advances in the way of greater social unity and equality. The Montessori system is based on the belief that the home, which is organised for the convenience of its adult inhabitants, cannot give the requisite attention and liberty to children, who are slow in action, capricious, and inexperienced; home life to young children, in this view, is both too protective and too restrictive. For different reasons there is a case to be made out for holding that, as a rule, the home is not properly organised for the advantage, out of school hours, of growing boys between the ages of thirteen and nineteen. All parents are, naturally, only too anxious to prepare their children for life in the world, to enlighten them in their difficulties, and aid the opening of their minds, but it remains sadly true that most of them find their incapability of fulfilling this natural function only too soon.

There is something antipathetic to the young in learning from those they love; they would rather be controlled and taught by those for whom they have no primary affection. Besides, it must be confessed that parents have other shortcomings, all the shortcomings of varied human nature, which are perfectly patent to the uncanny acuteness of children. The father and mother whose influence during the critical years of boyhood would be nothing but good are extremely rare. Parents, for one thing, can so seldom hit the mean between taking too much interest and taking too little. Indifference means either undue indulgence or undue restriction; too great interest leads to jealousy of other influences, to hampering independence, to surrounding a boy with a close atmosphere of emotion from which he would give anything to get away. Boys like to be treated calmly, to be rewarded calmly, and to be punished calmly; they are unemotional creatures, whom school suits well in this respect. Any boy will say as much to one in whom he has confidence. The continued society of ideal parents

may be ideal for a boy, but where the parents fall short of the ideal, it is questionable whether their continued society is a good thing. Too few parents make effective use of their opportunities in the holidays for the question to be resolved unhesitatingly in their favour. And where they fail they may be sure that they will so far be judged by their children with all the cruelty of innocence and ignorance. Also, the boarding school is organised purely for the advantage of the boys; in the house the advantage of the parents must be competitive, even where it is not paramount.

To hold that other disadvantages of the public school system outweigh any advantage of a communal, disciplined life is, of course, perfectly reasonable; but to assert that the home is the best and the normal place for a boy to live till he goes to a university or to take his place in the world is contrary to too many common facts of observation to be convincing. Our public schools may be the creation of an accident, but that does not prove that a perfect system in a perfect community will not find the advantage of taking boys from their parents at the public school age. Those who appeal to the example of France and Germany do not convince me. The German novel by Hermann Hesse, 'Unterm Rad,' is a serious indictment of the German system, and the typical figure of the *Lycéen*, which appears in French writers, when compared with that of the English public schoolboy, is not a very overwhelming testimony in favour of home life during schooldays. In America, too, where there is a complete national system of secondary education, place has also been found for a good many boarding schools, as may be seen from the advertisement pages of the leading American magazines. The fact is that the comparative merits of the boarding school and the day school, plus perpetual home life, cannot be arbitrarily decided; it depends mainly upon the individuals concerned, as society is at present constituted.

Not much time need be wasted over another fundamental assertion which is seldom put forward without considerable reservation, that the type of man turned out by the public schools is, in itself, a wrong or a bad one. The complaint that it has too strong a mark of class will be considered later, but sweeping accusations of invariable stupidity, want of adaptability and originality, muscles over-developed at the expense of brains,



conservatism, dogmatism, and general uselessness except in certain specialised functions reserved for the class, can only be accepted with considerable reservation, for they go contrary to the facts of many men's experience. Quite apart from the generally conceded virtues of high spirit, manliness, incorruptibility, easy manners, courage, and *esprit de corps*, there are others which can be produced as well from public schools as from any different form of education. I have seen brilliant talents fostered and improved, and an undecided talent find its particular bent in these homes of supposed routine and stupidity. The variety of ways in which the supposedly uniform type of the public school blossoms out in later life must, I am convinced, strike many men as surprising. No doubt, as Sir Sydney Olivier points out, the schools do not primarily aim at fostering commercial capabilities or artistic talents, but even these do emerge in spite of their want of encouragement in early days.

The admiration which other nations have for the English public school type is surely not to be lightly dismissed, when the amount of criticism provoked in other countries by the Englishman is remembered. Their code of honour, for one thing, is no mean ethical standard; their easy assumption of responsibility, without falling a prey to its temptations, is of considerable value to the community; and they have a real capacity for leadership, a virtue to be prized wherever it is found. It is one thing to condemn militarism, and another to condemn the military virtues. Those who have served actively in the war cannot condemn them, however strongly they may feel the evil of war. The power of inspiring others to arduous tasks, with the self-sacrifice and devotion which attends the exercise of this power, is a fine and noble thing in itself, precious and admirable in peace as well as on the battlefield. From no spring does this power so strongly flow as from the public schools. The imagination of the public school man may often fail to tell him in what direction this power might best be used, but it is there, and the whole world knows it.

Now comes the last, and perhaps the only really fundamental question. It is said, with truth, that the general influence of our public schools has been a dividing factor in our social system, that they are only open to a certain class on account of their expense, and that they perpetuate a class distinction, which in

the future development of the State will become impossible. An ideal system of education would not follow lines of class divisions any more than an ideal franchise or an ideal administration would do so. This crucial point was raised again in a recent letter to the *Times* by the late Headmaster of Bradfield, which however provoked no answer at the time. He put the case as follows :—

‘The serious problem which confronts our legislators is how to graft the education of the children of the people on to the trunk of our semi-monastic boarding institutions. Hitherto, our (so-called) public schools have sent into the world a splendid breed of young men full of *camaraderie* and *esprit de corps*, who, however, emerge with an entire ignorance of, and therefore want of sympathy with, the classes beyond them. . . . The trouble is this. These schools at present stand outside any system of national education as formulated in Mr. Fisher’s great measure. The Government, however, are credited with an attempt to entice them into the net by holding out the prospect of increased stipends and pensions to teachers, as the price of submission and subordination to the great Whole. Moreover, the voice of Labour is beginning to be heard, insisting that at present these schools form the nursery of an exclusive class, and that the sons of the people have a right to share in the same educational opportunities in the same centres of learning as are enjoyed by the children of the rich and noble. They maintain that there must no longer be education by watertight compartments.’

He concluded by stating that the main problem was how to bring the non-local public boarding schools together with their ancillary institutions, the private-adventure preparatory schools, within the range of a general scheme of national education. He put the problem without suggesting a solution, and it is only to be hoped that he does not suppose a rough and ready one to be possible. It would be possible, of course, though hardly in the present Parliament, to pass legislation which would enable the State to take over all the foundations, and administer them under the Board of Education. It would also be possible so to increase taxation of income that the expenditure of so much upon a boy’s education would become impossible, at least for the class which normally educates itself at these schools. The only result of such hasty measures would be to destroy the public schools and put something different in their place. This may be necessary, or may seem so to a future Government, but it is questionable whether even the ‘voice of Labour’ at present cries

out for this solution. Its cry is rather that the children of parents, whatever their circumstances, should be able to have the advantage of being educated at Eton, Winchester, or one of the other public schools.

The public school man, if he tries to think out the problem honestly, is faced with considerable perplexity. Conscious that he represents a distinct social class with certain privileges and characteristics—though uniformity of wealth is certainly not one of the latter—he feels the flood of public opinion gathering against the maintenance of class distinctions. Even if he believe, as many must, that privileged classes will always arise in any State, to whatever uniformity the most violent revolution may temporarily bring it, he cannot put forward any strong plea for the continuance of his own, since whatever merits he pleads on its behalf are also arguments for its being laid open to all the community, which would presumably wish to attain the same merits by the same process. He sees, at the same time, that Etons and Winchesters are few and the population numerous; that they only exist in certain places, whereas the population is widely scattered; and that, as they are the growths of centuries, it would not be possible to reproduce them exactly in other parts of England.

Moreover if he ask himself the question whether, if he were suddenly reduced to the position of a working-man, he would send his son to Eton or Winchester, even free of charge, he might in many cases hesitate to answer in the affirmative. Eton and Winchester imply a high standard of life: to enjoy that standard at school and to return to a lower one in the holidays, with the prospect of a lower one ever afterwards till he had raised his standard by his own exertions, would be a bad beginning for a boy. A few strong-minded and exceptional boys might benefit by it, but the majority would suffer. And yet, if he claim, as he is certain to do, that there are real advantages in education under the present public school system with all its defects, he cannot wish that they should be restricted to those who have reached a high standard of life, often by no exertion of their own whatsoever. That hasty legislation—of which he has seen so much—or inspection by a Government department, in which he has little faith, will do much to resolve his perplexities he has no belief: the one method can destroy, the other can only improve detail, without enlarging the area of

opportunity. The public schools can only develop parallel to the rest of society which, in England, is a long way from casting off class distinctions. Is it possible to democratise the public schools any further or any quicker than the rest of society is democratised? Not, certainly, by arbitrary methods. That they may have to go is not impossible, for it is easy to conceive in these days a social state in which they could fulfil no useful function, even if they could exist. If, however, they are to stay, they must be encouraged to change from within, rather than be forced roughly into some minister's scheme of national education. Etons and Winchesters cannot be created all over England like board schools; they cannot in the same sense, therefore, become national institutions. If a truly great and effective system of national education is to be built up in England, it had better start on its own legs. When every citizen, whatever his circumstances, without moving from his domicile or sending his children far away, can be sure that they will get the best teaching in the land by the most able and most highly paid teachers in the land, that they will have as fine playing-fields, as open a field at the universities, as high ideals, as healthy a life, as varied a curriculum as any boy in any school; by that time the old public schools will have been improved out of all recognition.

But tradition will be too strong, it may be said. No, tradition is like the walls of Jericho; it collapses at the trumpet sound of an inspired blower. If our national policy of education, through all stages up to the university, is truly inspired, every educational institution will share the inspiration and every parent too. But no good will be done by tinkering at the old institutions before you know how you will constitute the new. Make them living and the old will either live anew or die. The seeds of new and better things are already springing up in the public schools as the result of war. The only chance for them is that these seeds should be allowed to develop steadily, receiving all encouragement from outside. As the young master protested in the *Nation*, a great deal can be done both from within and from without. The duty of those without is clear, as he says; if they bring pressure to bear upon the authorities of the schools in the right direction, more good will be done than by a thousand letters to newspapers. Apathy and reliance upon convention

deserve any fate that they may get ; it is only by fighting against these that the believers in the public schools, be they masters or parents, can hope to see their belief justified.

It may be that, at best, the public schools will improve themselves out of existence, sinking their individuality in a larger and more flourishing system ; but can their individuality be usefully destroyed till the larger and more flourishing system is in full existence? They have done much good and are capable of doing more. To lay the sickle now to their roots would be mere waste. When finer plants have grown up around them, drawing their nourishment from the social soil, these old plants, having done their work, may possibly die off. But, as I hope, a better fate will be theirs. By a kind of cross-fertilisation they will themselves take on a new character, while preserving their sturdy roots. That is perhaps the best we can hope for them in the long run. We should do our utmost, then, to ensure favouring conditions for this development by fixing our minds on devising an ideal secondary system for the whole of the population of the future.

In the course of reflection on this ideal we have to consider the internal questions affecting the public schools ; they are questions involving, not only the great boarding schools, but all the secondary schools in the country, though some of them are more acute in the boarding than the day schools. These questions have been fairly well ventilated of late. We might take the list of them as given in Mr. Whitehouse's summary in the 'English Public Schools,' or from the dialogues in almost any of the public school novels. There is always to be found in them the figure of the ideal and idealistic master, misunderstood and hampered by the old guard, mistrusted by most of his colleagues, and mostly beloved by the boys.

The gospel of Mr. Etherington in Mr. Mais' last novel will do. It is stated as follows :—

'He maintains that the gods of youth are physical perfection and good form, and that they ought to be æsthetic delights and moral excellence. He says that the present system over-emphasises the importance of athletics and undervalues the brain. No boy, in his eyes, ever realises the use of work or cultivates his sense of joy. "Enthusiasm and hard work" is his watchword ; he tries to make his boys take an interest in citizenship, that is to say, he makes them *au fait* with all the perplexing political problems of the day, lectures to them on art (his

wife is a consummate artist), and sculpture, and poetry, and music, and all that sort of thing. He tries to make them realise the God-given beauties of the Cornish country; he can't understand that few boys care for the scenic pleasures of the district in which they are educated. His mistake is too great optimism; he imagines that every boy is a poet at heart . . . he has a wonderful influence over those who submit themselves to his magic spell; he is adored by a few, loved by the great majority, and detested by those who don't understand him, the slackers and the unimaginative.'

A little later on Mr. Etherington is given the chance of letting off steam in a conversation with the hero. He does so in approved style, beginning with religious apathy, the public school sermon, the deadness of the doctrine, and proceeding through the suspicion of schoolmasters for books on education, and the use of a true æsthetic as a preventive for sexual immorality, to the waste of masters' time in marking papers and setting punishments, their want of leisure for reading and self-improvement, the fact that 'an usher is eternally damned by his 'degree,' and the impossibility of attracting the right men to the teaching profession at the present rates of pay.

These two passages, except that they do not specifically mention handicraft and the evils of setting masters to make up for poor pay by the profits of hotel-keeping, cover all the ground. It is impossible to go into all of them here. Everybody who has been at a public school should be aware of them, and should review them in the light of his own experience. Even if he is as hopelessly satisfied as the old athletic gang so tellingly drawn in Mr. Arnold Lunn's 'Loose Ends,' it will do him no harm.

There is first the thing that is taught. It would not be amiss to apply oneself to the difficult task of deciding what is the aim of education. To those who are certain on this question a study of 'The Education of Henry Adams' may be recommended as healthily disconcerting. Henry Adams confesses that to the end of his life he failed to get education from anybody; he does not seem certain that it is even possible to do so; but he states definitely that the right education for a boy is to give him a mastery of his tools. The tools that he himself required were mathematics, French, German, and Spanish. With these at his fingers' ends, we are given to understand, he would have backed himself to master any subject and succeed in

any profession. He says nothing, be it remarked, on the study of English or of science, nothing about æsthetics or handicraft, nothing about morality and religion. His programme must seem barren to the complete reformers of to-day, yet they cannot accuse him of not being an acute thinker, one who spent his whole life pondering the philosophy of education as applied to modern society. However, it may be admitted, if we cannot get any further, that mastery of tools is a very good ideal, if mastery of self be also added.

Do the public schools give mastery of tools, as in a great measure they do give mastery of self? The answer, I fear, must be 'only in exceptional cases.' The exceptional cases are the clever boys who leave school with a very fair mastery of certain subjects, chiefly classics or mathematics. But even in their case something is often wanting: they have not been taught how to work for themselves systematically, and they have shown that waste of time is tolerated even at the best of schools when every moment is of value. Many men (I speak feelingly) do not learn how to work till they go to the university or to some profession in life; it is so easy to get along at school comfortably from day to day, and, if you are able enough, to pass terminal examinations with credit without much permanent benefit to yourself.

Also, inefficient masters waste time: they waste every minute that they are in class. Good teaching, which means getting boys interested in what they are learning, demands special gifts and constant alertness. Yet at every public school there are still old masters, who teach from the same text-books year after year, never revising their lessons or keeping abreast of the times. We all know the man who never turned one single minute of time he spent with his form to profit. His notes and comments were antediluvian, and nobody listened to them. The great aim was to get him talking on some irrelevant subject so that one could go to sleep, and that when one would have been only too grateful to be really kept awake. Those lost hours, irreparably lost, hang heavy on us for the rest of our lives: it is surely more important to get rid of them than to be over-nice in the choice of what is taught. Those of us who are thankful enough for a classical education, which has been of the highest value to us, may freely recognise that it was not suited

for all boys, and may wish that, instead of all the time spent on imitating the Greek and Latin poets, we had been taught some things of which we are ignorant ; yet we must feel more than anything that, if our time had all been as intelligently used as some of it was, we should really have been given a mastery of our tools.

It is needless here to enter into the whole matter of classical teaching. The schools are not entirely free agents in that matter. Change must come and will come, as Mr. R. H. Tawney points out in his letter to the *Nation*, where he asserts that the curriculum of the schools can only be reformed when the universities have been reformed. The coming Royal Commission should settle much in this connexion. Elasticity and freedom of choice are good things, of which there are not yet enough in the public schools, but most important of all is good teaching. Time-tables and the covering of a wide field are all very well, but one or two things thoroughly taught are a hundred times as valuable as twenty taught partially. The mere inclusion of a subject in a curriculum is of very little value in itself. That we and others of our age left school ignorant of really modern history, ignorant of the organisation of the modern State, for all our lectures on the constitution, knowing nothing of local government, of trade unions and the pressing political problems of the day, with no memory of even half an hour in the class-room when any effort was made to make us appreciate art or poetry later than Roman, may be deplored, and it should be remedied in the persons of our sons : but it would be the easiest thing in the world to devote school hours to these subjects, and for nobody to derive the slightest value.

Under an uninspiring master the boy who did not want to learn, or just didn't mind whether he learnt or not—and the majority of boys come into these categories—would let the lines of Milton and Shelley, the development of cinquecentist Italian painting, or of sculpture from Apelles to Rodin, the rise of the trade unions and the European situation which led to the war pass as blissfully into one ear and out of the other as he let the *Odyssey* and the *Æneid*. Many of the present problems can be solved, and the younger masters never tire of saying it, by awaking the conscience, the imagination, and the emotions of the boy. Excessive athleticism, religious or moral indifference,



prurience and nastiness, apathy to the state of society of which they will soon be fully-fledged members, can all be mitigated, if not wholly got rid of, if the boys are inspired to better things. The older boys are really remarkably intelligent, and their power of enthusiasm is unlimited. To what results wise direction can lead has already been shown in the movement towards the learning of 'civics,' and the free application of themselves by boys to the problems of to-day.

This wise direction must come from the masters, and the masters must be the right men, for the improvement of a curriculum is of trifling value beside the power of an inspiring personality. Every man who has taken a first-class degree is not the right man, nor is every good disciplinarian, nor every parson, nor every 'blue,' nor every 'jolly-good sort,' still less every one of the older masters who is comfortably installed in a house, doing his duty, but doing it stodgily. The wrong men ought to go, and the right men be offered sufficient inducement to come. Above all, the goal of a master's ambition should not be to have a successful house. The school authorities could perfectly well take over the economic administration of the boarding houses, putting in a master as commanding officer, as is done in the case of the seventy scholars at Eton. In this, as in any other profession, the prizes should be stages in progress in the profession itself, with fuller responsibility, more authority, more scope and higher payment and pension. The possible reforms to the public schools will not be carried out till the career of a public schoolmaster is placed on a satisfactory basis. At present it is, except in certain cases, a *pis aller*, the easiest thing to do for a poor man who sees no opening for himself in any other profession. It is unsafe to reckon that great teachers and enthusiasts will be born under such conditions: a large proportion will be dull and commonplace, and will contribute to that deadening narrowness and censorious conventionality which are the very obvious faults of the masters' world in the public schools.

The position of a master, especially for a young man, is none too easy. He has to set an example, to pose as a pattern of conduct and deportment before a little world of almost devilishly acute critics, whereas he is a warm-blooded human being, as much a prey to the temptations of the appetite and laziness as

they. He has, also, to hit the happy mean between taking too much interest in the boys and too little: nothing is more futile than the young master who walks about arm in arm with Tom, Dick, and Harry, talks ceaselessly about their doings and knows all the school gossip as well as the boys themselves. \* If the interest is confined to Harry's century and Dick's rather cheeky witticisms, Harry will think of nothing but cricket and Dick will become a bore, as masters' pets usually are. A good master is not an unapproachable pedant, but neither is he just an older playfellow. The gift of leadership which comes so naturally to public school men in other walks of life so often seems to fall out of the hands of those who become masters. It is this gift that is needed above all, and, when it is found, a free scope for it.

Education is so largely a matter of personality that it is almost impossible to discuss the teaching of certain subjects without knowing who is going to teach them: this is a fact too often overlooked by those who want nature study, handicraft, and æsthetics taught at school. Unless the underlying truths and values of these things can really be made to live for a boy, he will be no better educated for having been compelled to spend some hours over them in class. If a boy can be inspired to make a collection of local wild flowers, find out their names and classify them, then he has acquired a new interest in the world, but he will not acquire it by being lectured on the general structure of plants, with blackboards or even magic lantern slides, by anybody who administers knowledge drily. It is the same with handicraft. Unless well and keenly taken up it is not only valueless, but the best excuse for wasting time that could possibly be devised. Let there be workshops by all means and opportunity for a boy keen on carpentering or engineering to put in some time at these things during the 'extra study' time or out of school, but to insist that in this highly specialised society of ours everybody should have an elementary knowledge of how to make something with his hands is surely ludicrous. With art and poetry the case is rather different, provided the teacher has the one necessary quality of enthusiasm. But even here it is a mistake to hope for too much. Few boys have mature tastes: a large majority, for all the enthusiasm in the world, will continue deaf to the poets and blind to the painters.

If some of the seed fall in fertile soil it is enough to be thankful for.

As for the moral value of æsthetic training, one may perhaps be excused for being rather sceptical. It has not this result invariably in adult life, and there are 'artistic' portions of the community, conspicuous enough in London, whose open repudiation of all the accepted canons of sexual morality is founded on an æsthetic philosophy, loose in more senses than one. Benedetto Croce has convincingly pointed out, moreover, that æsthetic and moral judgments have nothing to do with one another. After all, a sense of beauty has through all the ages been as much a minister to the passions as a moderator. Adolescence is a trying time, and there is bound to be trouble for a lot of healthy young animals who pass through this time together. They would however be no more immune from it at home. Sir Sydney Olivier recommends the school-boy passion for a mature female as a precious safeguard. No doubt, as Rousseau said in speaking of Madame du Châtelet, 'Il est certain que les entretiens intéressants et 'sensés d'une femme de mérite sont plus propres à former un 'jeune homme que toute la pédantesque philosophie des livres'; but he also allowed still closer relations with a Madame de Warens to be included in his own scheme of development. It is to be doubted if England is suited to this form of education. Parents would hardly be ready to look for the ideal and elderly Egeria, nor to regard her with anything but suspicion when found.

Good morals may or may not depend upon religious feeling, which is a deeply personal thing; they certainly depend upon inspiration, sympathy, and the right direction of enthusiasm. Those who complain that so much of the moral teaching in public schools is bound up with dry theology and Old Testament history, with formal services wearily or carelessly attended, and sermons which make a boy yawn or groan inwardly with pity for the preacher, know that the experience of every public school man is with them. So much of it did not help at all, and only served to make Sunday tedious. Every Englishman should know the English Bible, but surely undue importance is attached to a knowledge of all that it contains. How ridiculous were some of the 'Sunday questions' that our old headmaster

used to set, and how readily we turned up an old commentary in the school library to find an answer of some sort or another! What possible use can there be in reading the Septuagint in Greek? Yet I remember hours spent over the obscurities of the Song of Deborah in that book. Moreover, the history of the Jews was never intelligently taught, nor was the history of the Christian religion. Sunday at school was a comparatively restful day—and it seems strange that those who cry out against the worship of athletics should wish to allow games on that day too—but it was hardly ever valuable. It is the one point in which the home has the advantage over the boarding school without any question, for there, even if clean collars and Sunday clothes are required in the morning, there is some chance of reasonable costume and occupation for the rest of the day.

But the conventional top-hattedness and 'Sunday Q.'s' of a public school Sunday are in themselves trifling things; it is as a symbol that they are important. They are a symbol, not only of antiquated tradition, but of waste and want of imagination. We, who look gratefully enough back on our school days, will not, indeed, if we look at things rightly, take up an apologetic attitude before the public school novelist. We will assert that the public schools gave, and still give, the best general education in the country to boys between thirteen and nineteen; that they encourage the greatest possible healthiness of body; that they produce normally a character of firmness and decision, and give a power of assuming responsibility without nervousness or arrogance. To the fundamentalists we will say that we admit the charge of privilege, but in doing so we claim the merits which that privilege implies. It was not wholly a wasted privilege, nor is the gratitude and affection with which we look back feigned or unreasonable.

We are not too much concerned at what Society may do in a distant future, for we have faith enough in the good sense of our countrymen; all we recommend is that hasty measures should not be taken which will destroy what is good without replacing it, especially as we are convinced that the mark of the public school tradition will always be clearly stamped on a good system of secondary education in this country. But we admit that this is no longer a time for privileges or traditions to be

taken for granted, and we admit that the old institutions need reforms. Tradition must prove its value or go; waste must be checked, imagination must be allowed to vivify routine. Looking back, we see what we missed. We learnt to live among our own kind, with little moral support but our own characters, which grew in the test; but we did not learn to use our time to the best advantage, and we were not inspired, except by a few rare men, to want more beauty and more knowledge than was given to us in the ordinary run of the system.

Boys are capable of anything in the way of enthusiasm if they are inspired; inspiration and personality will solve the problems of education, if they are sought out and receive fair play. The public schools need spiritualising, without being evangelised by missionaries or proselytised by priests; but that is the state of the whole nation, and if it is not remedied our race is doomed to rapid degeneration. It is unreasonable to expect the public schools to develop virtues ahead of the society to which they belong and of which they are faithful mirrors. The schoolboy is more innocent, purer, less cynical, and has stronger faith than the man; but the man must supply light, guidance, and inspiration—and the man means not only the schoolmaster, but every citizen. Given this, there remains great work for the public schools to do. There need be no fear that they will fail to do it.

ORLO WILLIAMS.

## DEMOCRACY IN ENGLAND

1. **Popular Government.** By Sir H. S. MAINE.
2. **The Limits of Pure Democracy.** By W. H. MALLOCK.
3. **Sane Trade Unionism.** By W. V. OSBORNE. Collins.
4. **Democracy at the Crossways.** By F. J. C. HEARNSHAW, LL.D.  
Macmillan. 1918.

‘**I**S civilisation a failure, or is the Caucasian played out?’ This mocking gibe of Bret Harte dates back fifty years. In making it he had in view the ‘Yellow Peril’ which at one time, especially as emphasised by the theatrical vapourings of the Kaiser, preoccupied us in Europe, as is now patent to every one, to a quite unreasonable extent. The same question, at the present day, forces itself on us with far more serious import. It is not now any threat of foreign intrusion that impends but the fear whether western civilisation, as we now know it, is not in danger of dissolution: whether ‘government of the people by the people for the people’ is not doomed to perish by the insidious working of internal disintegration. A man’s most cruel enemies are those of his own household. For a generation and more it has been a commonplace that parliamentary government was on its trial. That it has proved a failure in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece, to say nothing of Russia and the Balkan States, has been asserted with some show of reason, and though the symptoms in various countries and at different times may not be identical, the cause of the trouble has usually been the same. ‘Log rolling’ has been the method adopted for building up precarious majorities with a view to securing the acceptance by the legislature of measures which most of the members viewed with indifference, if not with suspicion or hostility. Particular interests were substituted for principles, and opportunism, in its most debased form, became the flag under which ministries, while proclaiming that their only motive was a sincere desire to serve their country, were content to keep their craft afloat, steering this way and that, according to the selfish dictates of the groups that lent them their support, pandering to the claims of men whose only bond of

union was a determination to share in the spoils of office, or to secure the votes of their constituents by bribing them with as large a share as possible of the national budgets for the satisfaction of local interests, budgets which thus manipulated swelled with portentous speed. Each deputy, while proclaiming his unalterable devotion to the highest interests of the commonwealth, became an insatiable drain on the national income, *non missura cutem nisi plena cruoris hirudo*. Patriotism threatened to become the last refuge of the rascal.

Here in England we long hoped and believed that the Mother of Parliaments was and would continue immune from the disease which, while envenoming their disputes, threatened the very life of continental legislatures. But, as we are taught, every organism bears in itself the seeds of its own dissolution, and there are grounds for fearing that the truth of this law may be proved on the Thames as on the Seine and the Tiber. It was in 1893 that the little rift within the lute was first manifest. In that year Keir Hardie established the Labour group, a cloud no bigger than a man's hand, which has since then developed into a tempest which threatens, by itself and its indirect consequences, to overwhelm democratic government in red ruin and the breaking up of laws. The programme of that party was seemingly innocent, even laudable. The avowed motive was an earnest desire to better the conditions of life of the wage-earner, but it was, unfortunately, based on the pernicious substitution of class war for class co-operation. It accepted the Marxian postulate that Labour and Capital are, by a law of nature, doomed to irreconcilable hatred, and that, as a necessary corollary, the Labour group in parliamentary life should take no interest in the broad issues of national well-being, should stand aloof from the old political parties, and, at the most, make temporary and log-rolling alliance with one or other with a view to winning some class advantage.

Thus, like the Irish Nationalists, the Labour group took a stand quite outside, and by their fundamental policy hostile to the parliamentary game, as it had always been played at Westminster. They definitely declined to assume any responsibility, though they attempted, sometimes successfully, to dictate policy. They were not themselves part of, nor would they accept or admit any permanent alliance with, His Majesty's Opposition,

the essence of whose function is that, while it criticises keenly as long as it is out of office, it is ready to sit on the Treasury bench when it commands a majority. Under both conditions the Opposition accepts the axiom that His Majesty's government must be carried on.

These new groups are in Parliament but not of it. They barter their votes as opportunity offers, and are prepared to cast them for measures to which at heart they are indifferent, or which they even dislike, in return for backing by a section which is equally uninterested in the proposal—as when the Irish gave their support to the Scottish Crofters Bill, for which they cared nothing, in exchange for aid in obstructing secular education in Ireland, which the Labour party would certainly have backed had English schools been in question. We are reminded of the framing of a proscription list in Rome.

*Octavius*: Your brother, too, must die. Consent you, Lepidus?

*Lepidus*: I do consent.

*Octavius*: Prick him down, Antony.

*Lepidus*: Upon condition Publius shall not live,  
Who is your sister's son, Mark Antony.

What we see at Westminster and in the country is the substitution of a western rough-and-tumble, with its gouging, kicking, and stabbing, for the old-fashioned prize-fight carried on under decent rules, honourably kept. That way lies disintegration. It is not only parliamentary government that is at stake. The issue is far graver than that. The decision is between orderly government of any sort and no government. Russia is an object-lesson, teaching how a nation that seems to be based on solid rock may quickly be swallowed up in bottomless quicksands.

It is generally accepted as axiomatic that, under present conditions, democracy is the sole mould into which the State, whether government or society, can be run. It is also accepted as axiomatic by the greater part—though as to this dissentient voices make themselves heard—that the democratic State can be governed only under a parliamentary and representative system. If this system breaks down, what is to replace it? By what device can orderly life be maintained in a democratic society? The question is one which threatens to pass from the speculations of irresponsible theorists and to become a subject of practical



debate in public life, its answer to be formulated by action, not by words. The vital interests of every man in the community will be concerned, and he should prepare himself betimes to play his part. Are there, it may be asked, any vices inherent in pure democracy which unfit it to provide a form of government suitable for a large national State? Cromwell, the two Napoleons, and Bismarck assumed that there are, and, in turn, cast aside the projects of the Levellers, the French Republicans, and the German Constitutionalists as phantasies that could lead only to disunion and disaster. Even Rousseau admitted that pure democratic government in a large State is impossible.

It is the fashion to wave aside Aristotle's criticism on forms of government, and especially his analysis of democracy, on the ground that the modern State is so fundamentally diverse from any of which he had experience as to make his conclusions entirely inapplicable to the problems of our day. It is urged that all the Greek polities with which he was acquainted were based on slavery; that the States were tiny as compared with the smallest of modern nations, so small that every freeman could take a direct part in the work of government; that he had no opportunity of studying the working of representative government. Though this is not strictly true.\*

We are often told to look to Australia as a political laboratory where the problems of democracy are attacked with a boldness which is not found elsewhere. But how scantily furnished is the Australian laboratory compared to that which Aristotle had at his disposal. He was surrounded by scores of Greek States continually making experiments, which he watched with the closest attention. No brake was put on the rapidity of their evolution by the *vis inertiae* which makes the large modern State move slowly save in times of exceptional stress.

---

\* 'In some democracies,' we read, 'although they do not all share in the appointment of offices, except through representatives elected in turn out of the whole people, as at Matinea, yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at Matinea.' It is indeed strange that this experiment was not worked out even by Rome, rich as its history is in statesmanship, as providing the hint for establishing a system which would solve the, to them, insoluble problem of ruling a widespread State, except by substituting some form of autocracy for the whims of a city mob.

The normal rate of change in Greece was at least as rapid as that of the revolutionary period which shook the framework of England between 1640 and 1688. Thus, the student was almost in the position of the scientist in a physical laboratory. If he could not actually put the elements he wished into his crucible some State, somewhere in Hellas, was ready to accommodate him. It is urged also that Aristotle had a marked dislike for democracy and that his evidence is prejudiced. But if he was a politician he was in far greater degree a scientific inquirer into problems ethical, political, and physical. He loved truth more than he did even his friend and master, Plato, and political prepossessions weighed far more lightly in his scale than did the attainment of accurate statement and logical reasoning. His argument is to a great extent inductive. He collects and analyses a great mass of phenomena, and from a comparison of them he draws his conclusions. Most important of all, he was a keen student of human nature, and, in spite of superficial changes, human nature, the basic passions, the desires and consciences of men, have changed very little in two thousand years. As Antigone said, the great laws that sanction conduct were not born to-day nor yesterday, but are from everlasting, and no man knows whence they were derived. The man in the street is swayed as was Achilles by greed and anger, lust and love, a sense of justice and passion for revenge.

We may thus accept Aristotle's analyses of democracy as in great measure applicable to modern times, and if, on comparison, we find that much of what he predicated of Greece is true of what is actually happening in England we shall be more inclined to accept as applicable to us his forecast of the stages of development which we may not yet have reached.

After stating that 'some people,' including, it would seem, himself, 'say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms, and they praise the Lacedemonian because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the King forming the monarchy, and the Council of Elders the oligarchy, while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors, for the Ephors are selected from the people,'\* he goes on to

---

\* It may be noted how the Ephors, like the House of Commons with us, tended to become the predominant element.

define and criticise democracy. It should be remembered that his views are not based on *a priori* reasoning by deductions from certain abstract concepts, but on the actual facts which he had watched evolving before his eyes, while with us political discussion on which it is sought to base political action is too much left either to 'well-trained lawyers, who assume that a 'juristic answer well drafted can settle every problem of life and 'conduct,' or to amateurs or bureaucrats who, seated in their office armchairs, assume that they can use as the subject matters of their argument the 'democratic man,' who has no more real existence than had the 'economic man' of the older school of political economists. Both these classes, however potent for mischief, may be as completely out of touch with actualities as was 'Alice in Wonderland.'

Democracy, then, is defined by Aristotle as 'the State in 'which the poor and the majority govern. All claim to possess 'political ability, and think they are quite competent to fill most 'offices.' Every man thinks he can drive a gig till he tries. He refers to various forms of democracy in which 'the law is supreme,' and, lastly, describes the 'corrupt form': 'This is that in which 'not the law, but the multitude' have the supreme power, and supersede the law. This is a

'state of affairs brought about by the demagogues, but where the laws are not supreme there demagogues spring up. . . . The people who is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of law, grows into a despot; the flatterer is held in honour, this form of democracy being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The spirit of both is the same. . . . The decrees of the Demos correspond to the Tyrant, and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other. . . . The demagogues make the decrees of the people override the laws, . . . and therefore they grow great, because the people have all things in their hands, and they hold in their hands the votes of the people, who are too ready to listen to them. . . . Such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all, for, where the laws have no control there is no constitution. The law ought to be supreme over all. . . . Where there are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed, after their manner, to distribute the surplus. The poor are always receiving and always wanting more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask.'

The development of our democracy in the past, and the attitude of its leaders and of the rank and file of to-day, bear a sufficiently close resemblance to the phenomena which

Aristotle observed in his time, to give ground for fear that our future too may work itself out on similar lines. History may repeat itself, and we too may welcome or detest a 'Saviour of Society' such as those, who from Dionysius and Cæsar to Cromwell and Napoleon have been allowed or encouraged to curb the truculence of demagogic democracy. One need not be very pessimistic to note tendencies at work, whose outcome will be to convert Lincoln's triumphant definition of democracy into the menacing formula of 'government of the 'people by the boss for the group.' Yet to base any forecast of the future on the assumption that history will repeat itself, while it may be an interesting diversion for the student, is to the statesman a dangerous will-of-the-wisp. The warning of Bismarck is emphatic: 'The longer I live the more incalculable the 'future in politics proves to be.' Even the man of blood and iron had to admit that

'Men are the sport of circumstances when  
The circumstances seem the sport of men,'

and we shall be wise if, while analysing past and present democratic development, we refrain from making any forecast as to its future course. Who, for instance—probably not even himself—can frame any reasonable anticipation of what the attitude of Mr. Lloyd George will be to the problems he may be called upon to handle in the coming months or years? Does Pandora's box contain a demagogue or a statesman?

The most thoroughgoing admirers of democracy admit that its defects are patent and serious. The most menacing to its success is perhaps this: that it fails to choose able leaders. 'Le 'gouvernement des démocraties doit être confié à l'aristocratie intellectuelle,' said Laveleye; and his thesis is worked out at length by Mr. Mallock in 'The Limits of Pure Democracy.' But as a fact the favourite leaders of democracy are those who pander to its appetites by the use of popular catchwords or by appeals to sentimental idealism and by advocating policies highly coloured with an outward show of unselfish service, but involving issues whose ultimate results the demagogues have neither the knowledge, nor the ability, nor the patience to work out. These policies they embrace rather with the fervour of a convert to a new creed, than with the deliberation of

the statesman who formulates his policy after a reasoned balancing of the advantages and disadvantages that may flow from it. This is true of most of the reformers who are 'in the movement' to-day. As Le Bon says, 'Le socialisme est beaucoup plus une croyance religieuse qu'une théorie de raisonnement.' Of the standard-bearers of democracy the mature wisdom of Bacon gives an accurate estimate. 'There is in human nature more of the fool than of the wise. And, therefore, those faculties by which the foolish part of men's minds are taken are most potent. There are mountebanks for the politique body: men that undertake great cures, and perhaps may have been lucky in two or three experiments, but want the grounds of science, and therefore cannot hold out.'

Besides this cardinal fault there is a fatal tendency to confuse the democratic organisation of the State with democratic interference with legislative and executive detail, whether by referendum, detailed mandate, recall, direct action, or other similar devices. All these have this in common, that they substitute for the statesman's forethought impulsive dictation by heterogeneous and evanescent groups, who neither accept responsibility for the results of their orders nor can be restrained by appeals to history or long-sighted views. Mob caprice is as cruel and as dangerous to national well-being as the tyranny of a despot. In addition to this, democracy is ever ready to sacrifice the real interests of the nation to the momentary interests of a well organised class.

These characteristics conduce to the establishment of weak and vacillating governments, under which the truth of Napoleon's dictum may be verified: 'Feebleness in its government is the most frightful calamity that can befall a nation.' In this country it is the feebleness—a feebleness not inconsistent with bureaucratic assumption of autocracy—not its strength, that is the source of danger; and this weakness has been of late years fostered either by the deliberate, purposeful action of more or less factious groups, or has been sometimes the unpremeditated or even the accidental result of their policy. It is anyway manifest that neither Socialists, Syndicalists, nor trade union leaders have been deterred from pursuing their immediate aims by any consideration of what might be the ulterior result of their action on the well-being of the commonwealth. They have embraced in their

arms the twin pillars of justice and discipline on which the temple of good government and orderly life is supported, and threaten to bring down the whole fabric in ruin, purposing to erect on the chaos some new edifice, they know not what.

The whole-hearted votaries of democratic government, even when they admit that its present results are doubtful or bad, and that it is fraught with peril for the future, maintain that not only is there no alternative to it possible, but that it has one supreme merit which counterbalances all its vices—its educative value. The ideal citizen group can only be organised, they tell us, by giving to each individual a share in the government of himself and his fellows, by enabling him to realise that he is an active member of the Great Society, and that on him is laid the sacred duty, on him is conferred the inestimable privilege of walking worthy of that great vocation. So only can he attain to the full life of man. This ideal is a high one, but is not beyond human reach, and the striving after it must be our supreme endeavour, however grave may be the disadvantages or dangers involved in the process. To renounce this high purpose is to acknowledge the failure of the attempt to constitute the democratic State on sure foundations.

It may be suggested that this attitude is illogical. The first object of sane government is to provide conditions under which the majority of the nation may lead a happy and worthy life. It is surely a topsy-turvy argument to urge that this main purpose ought to give place to any subsidiary considerations: that a form of government which fails to accomplish its main function is admirable, or even tolerable, because it aims at an end which is quite different or even incompatible with the object of its being.

'Studies themselves,' said Bacon, 'do give forth directions ' too much at large unless they be bounded by experience.' It is in great measure because our leaders, whether in government or in writing for the Press, have had their being too much in libraries and offices that they have so often failed when put to the test. The three supreme statesmen of the last century, Bismarck, Cavour, and Lincoln, served an apprenticeship by intercourse with men; learnt by experience on the farm or in the workshop that men, far from being the puppets of the ideologue to be moulded on abstract concepts and deductive

sylogisms, are swayed by many motives, and that the conduct of the crowd is determined far more by passion and prejudice than by intelligence.

But let that pass. *A priori* reasoning is but an Egyptian reed. It will be more to the purpose to inquire what has been so far the educative value of citizenship as made manifest in actual life. In 1866 Robert Lowe, in the bitterness of his heart, bade us set about educating our masters. Since 1870, when the Education Department set about the task, it has, by general consent, made a sad botch of it. We have now to wait and see whether the system, as recast after fifty years of failure, will do the work more effectually. Failure or success, however, in this department of education has little or no bearing on the assumed educative value of citizenship. The boy or girl at school does not benefit more or less by his lessons because he will later on have a share, as far as a vote can give it him, in influencing the policy of his country, and determining the kind of teaching by which his own children shall, in due course, be trained.

What we want to know is, how far the moral character of the masses has been affected by 'educative citizenship.' For, clearly, moral, even more than intellectual development, will be influenced by converting a man from what Rousseau called a 'passive' into an 'active' citizen. Does the average man of to-day aim at higher standards of life than he did fifty or thirty years ago? Is he less selfish, more awake to the responsibility of his vote, more inclined to give his support to the statesman with large national views rather than to the propounder of schemes of class advantage, the man who promises to give him 'something for 'nothing'? Is he less or more convinced that he can in a moment solve those social, political, and international problems, which the trained statesman regards as almost beyond his capacity? Does he select his leaders with deliberation and, having done so, follow them through good and evil report? Is he still a votary of the Marxian doctrine of hate? In a word, is he a more useful member of the State, a less prejudiced man?

The leaders who flatter him would answer these queries in the affirmative, agreeing with Gladstone's dictum that the 'classes' are usually wrong and the 'masses' usually right. The real truth is, of course, that both one and the other are swayed by prejudice as much as by reason. During the Civil War the

masses were right, not because their verdict was determined by superior political vision, but because they sympathised with the workmen in the North. The classes, of whom Gladstone was one, were wrong, because they were prejudiced in favour of the 'gentlemen' of the South. When such prepossessions are not the controlling factor, when the verdict is given by the cold light of educated reason, the classes, as being at present, at any rate, the better educated, are more likely to form a just judgment.

A ponderous volume, and not the last pages of an article, would be needed to review the political education of the masses during the past generation. One fact seems clear. It is not the mere right to vote that is the educative force, but a sense of responsibility. It is this that transforms the rowdy fifth form boy into the law-abiding, law-enforcing prefect, who will often relapse into the rowdy undergraduate when that inspiration has ceased. It is that which changed the noisy John Burns of Trafalgar Square into the statesman of Whitehall, a change which incidentally alienated his supporters. Does the average elector realise his responsibility? Does he recognise that the casting of a vote is not a privilege granted him but a duty laid upon him, and that he is bound to use it so as to promote the well-being of the nation as a whole, not for extorting advantages for himself or for a section at the expense of the Great Society? Of course fifty years or a hundred are but a short space in the life of a nation, and we may hope that ultimately the splendid ideal of the Perfect Democracy will be realised, in which the moral and political education of our people will be so exalted that every man will give his vote, uninfluenced by any petty consideration, for the best member of Parliament and the wisest policy; but that is not yet. Meanwhile, without maintaining that the trend of 'advanced opinion' has of late tended uniformly to reduce our institutions to the level of what Aristotle calls the corrupt form of democracy, we cannot close our eyes to certain facts which point to that conclusion. Such are the breakdown of the old trade union discipline, the change in the character and the methods of the unions, the wholesale bribery of the electorate by profusion of doles, by promises of 9d. for 4d., etc., which are 'like water poured into a leaky cask,' the feebleness of the House of Commons, the tyranny of the co-opted oligarchy of the caucus,



the claim to override law by violence, the development of the group system.

All this is common knowledge, *habemus confitentem reum*, and it seems superfluous to collect evidence of what is admitted with sorrow and apprehension by some, arrogantly boasted of by others. One or two instances may be quoted, not as being exceptionally important, but as illustrating the advance made of late years. In 1890 Mr. Mann said: 'Respecting strikes, we are fully aware that they should be avoided when possible, but only entered into after other efforts at a settlement have failed.' He is now a leader of the Syndicalists, who look upon the strike as a no less normal feature of industrial life than an assault on the enemy's position is in war. Like Moltke, they hold that lasting peace is a dream, and not even a pleasant dream.

Another sign of change is the way in which the mass of trade unionists have, by their apathy, allowed the executive mechanism of the unions to be grasped, and diverted from trade purposes to political action by the small group of active Socialists and Syndicalists who direct their policy. How disproportionate their power is to their numbers is shown by the fact that in 1912 the number of avowed Socialists was 31,237 against 1,858,178 trade unionists, yet the Socialists absolutely controlled the executive, appointing directly 3 out of 16 members and indirectly most of the rest. Figures for late years are not available, but it is notorious that an oligarchy, insignificant in numbers, now more than ever dictates the policy of associations that claim to be democratic. How the machine works may be illustrated by a single example. In 1916 the vote of three Lodges of the South Wales Miners' Federation was cast solid against the Military Service Bill. The total membership was 2700. Only 63 members took the trouble to vote—27 for the Bill, 36 against it.

The growing weakness of the Government has curiously coincided with a huge development of bureaucracy. Failing in its main business, it engages in enterprises for which it is unfitted. The first big step towards the abdication of Government of its proper function—the *gran rifiuto*—was made in 1906, when Campbell-Bannerman, by his criminal and humiliating subservience to a group of extremists, passed the Trades Disputes Act. Since then trade unionists have been outlaws—not

as being denied the protection of the law, but in that their tortious acts are not subject to the jurisdiction of the law courts. From that date the progress of direct action and other anti-social, anti-democratic movements has been portentously rapid, and for some time now the country has been living virtually in a state of civil war, if by civil war is meant the attempt by a fraction of the community to impose its will on the majority by means of open violence, or by the threat of it. Instances are but too numerous: the Suffragette Rebellion; the Ulster and Sinn Fein defiance of authority; the trampling under foot of D.O.R.A. by the Clyde strikers, when Mr. Churchill, protesting that he never would consent, consented; the insolent programme of the Triple Alliance, disregarding Mr. Clynes' warning that 'Labour cannot by strikes convert the country or secure its confidence.'

The effect of these incidents is cumulative and menacing. We need not, however, be too much dismayed by Sir H. Maine's prophetic warning, uttered in 1885, that 'if any government should be tempted to neglect, even for a moment, its function of compelling obedience to the law—if a democracy, for example, were to allow a portion of the multitude of which it consists to set at defiance some law which it happens to dislike—it would be guilty of a crime which hardly any other virtue could redeem, and which century after century might fail to repair.' It would be no less a crime to despair of the commonwealth. Rome, indeed, was subverted by a policy that put the destinies of the Republic into the hands of a populace enervated by doles and made selfish by living on the plunder of the provinces, as indeed was Spain; but the virile populations of England, France, and Germany rose to even greater prosperity after the cataclysm of the Thirty Years' War and catastrophic revolutions. It is the imperative duty of every citizen to set his face like flint against a weak policy of drift that hopes to find a remedy for every emergency by waiting upon time, while the ship of state is drifting towards the maelstrom of anarchy. The problem that has to be solved is to reconcile the existence of firm and far-seeing government with that of a democracy, petulant, inexperienced, and immature.

*'Prudens futuri temporis exitum  
Caliginosa nocte tegit Deus.'*

E. STRACHAN MORGAN.

## TAXATION OF CAPITAL AND 'ABILITY TO PAY'

1. Reports of the Select Committees on the Income and Property Tax, 1851-52, 1861, and 1906.
2. Report of the Departmental Committee on Income Tax. Cd. 2575. 1905.
3. Reports from His Majesty's Representatives Abroad respecting Graduated Income Taxes in Foreign States. Cd. 2587 and 7100. 1905 and 1913.
4. Report by W. J. Braithwaite and S. E. Minnis, of the Inland Revenue, on Prussian and other Taxes. 1910.
5. *The Taxation of Capital*. By Sir ALFRED SOWARD, C.B., and W. E. WILLAN. Waterlow & Sons Ltd. 1919.
6. *Taxation in the New State*. By J. A. HOBSON. Methuen. 1919.

**A**SSSENT to a general principle may be well-nigh universal, while at the same time its application to the complex facts of life finds men irreconcilably divided. That men should contribute to the expenses of the State according to their 'ability' is accepted by every one as the essence of fairness, and 'ability to pay' has long been the first principle, indeed the very catchword, of its subject—a subject that now bids fair to be an almost dominant interest in life itself. But what that phrase shall be taken to mean at the practical stage where the relative tax burdens of two individuals must be settled, seems even further from common acceptance to-day than it has been during the past twenty years. A sound, practical application of the phrase has to satisfy three, or perhaps four, separate and distinct tests. If justice is to be done, it is not only necessary to ask the taxpayer the primary question, *How much have you got?* for some resources are more independent of the taxpayer's personal effort than others. Therefore, the taxpayer must be asked a second question, *How did, or how do, you get it?* It may also be necessary to determine whether notice should be taken of differences in the kind or embodiment of wealth, and to put a third question, *What do your resources consist of?* And lastly, it is reasonable to inquire into the unavoidable obligations or first charges imposed by society upon the taxpayer's means, and to ask a

fourth question, *What charges have you to meet out of your resources?*

In this country twenty-five years ago the principle of 'ability' was generally regarded as sufficiently acknowledged, in the taxation of income, by a flat rate of charge, eightpence in the £, equally from an income of £1000 and from £100,000, and the idea of progressive rates did not obtain general acceptance without grave misgivings. The principle of graduation is now not only fully accepted by public sentiment, but has also of late years found strong theoretical support in the development of the economic principle of marginal utility. In passing it must be noticed that one of the most serious defects of indirect taxation is that it lends itself so little to the principle of ability, and—if necessities of life are too heavily taxed—becomes positively repugnant to that principle. For this reason indirect taxes should never be more than a part, and that not a major part, of the general tax system of the country. Graduation or progression is now applied in this country to the taxation both of income and of estates passing by death; the principle is also accepted without question by all advocates of a capital levy and by some income-tax reformers. Therefore, so far as the amount of the taxpayer's means is concerned, this first aspect of 'ability' is equally applicable to the taxation of capital and of income. But when the other aspects of the principle are considered, the advocates of a capital levy contend that taxation by reference to capital rather than to income tends to satisfy the demands of the principle of ability much more fully. That is the issue that it is proposed to consider in the following pages: 'Is capital or income 'the better test of ability to pay in taxation?' It is, of course, necessary to remember that a tax computed *by reference to* capital is not necessarily a tax *on* capital if it is small enough to be paid out of the annual income.

The urgency of the issues involved is illustrated both by the proceedings before the Royal Commission on Income Tax and by the public discussions on the question of a capital levy. The ultimate cause of the present urgency is the grave position of our national finances and the consequent high rate of taxation. Anomalies that were slumbering when rates of taxation were low may come into the field of real injustice when the rates become high. The tests of 'ability to pay,' so much discussed

fifty years ago, are consequently now being re-argued with all the zest of novelty ; history repeats itself.

In the following pages the terms 'income' and 'capital' are used in the conventional sense, from the point of view of the individual recipient, and without any economic refinements. Thus the definition of income as 'the sum of economic goods or 'gains accruing to a person within a given period which are not 'needed to replace capital, and which the person may therefore 'consume without diminishing his wealth' is too exact for the present purpose. Its adoption would make it necessary for the recipient of dividend from a diamond mine, or the landlord of property held on a building lease, to divide his annual 'income' into 'true income' and return of capital.

It is our habit to say that 'ability to pay' is tested by income—the current purchasing power of the taxpayer—and in England we normally measure the income by the year, for the monthly fluctuation of income of a business man or a doctor does not cause him to alter his mode of life or standard of expenditure, which are fairly regulated by the annual average sum he makes or expects. But this is not the case with a working man, whose 'ability' fluctuates from month to month, so that he may be prosperous in the spring and perhaps depressed in the autumn.

In considering 'income by the year' we omit 'long-distance' considerations, and treat equal amounts as having equal ability (apart from discrimination between 'earned' and 'unearned' income). One 'income' is going on in perpetuity ; another is for life ; another man has a business which yields the full income only while he works hard in it ; another has an income which ceases the day he cannot exercise his profession ; another has it for a short term of years ; and yet another has it from a wasting asset like a mine. In treating them as equal in power, there is a rough correspondence with the facts of life, for the recipients rarely make nice actuarial calculations, or introduce differences into their mode of life and scale of expenditure to correspond with the differences in their capital position. But the time has come, we are told, when capital can no longer be ignored in the measurement of ability, and should indeed take the prior place as the better test.

During the first twenty years of Peel's Income Tax there

was a controversy over the alleged injustice of treating all incomes on the same basis. Advocates of a reformed tax wanted to capitalise the income and to charge duty on a percentage of that capital value—in effect an annual capital tax—and call it an income tax. This was an effort to balance up all the considerations involved in the flow and the fund of wealth together. The Committee of 1852 could find no solution, and that of 1861 went against it in the main. Subsequently the agitation waned, and in the ideas generally accepted the capital basis has not necessarily been considered any better test of ability than the other. But three points have since emerged :—

- (1) In the case of the smaller incomes a distinction has been established between those derived from current earnings and those derived from investment.
- (2) A reconsideration of the strongest and most extreme 'wasting asset' case, the terminable annuity, led to a definite decision by the Committee of 1905 in favour of the broad 'annual income' principle without regard to 'long-distance' capital conditions.
- (3) There has been a definite agitation for the recognition of the wasting corpus in mines.

But there had, until recently, been no general revival of feeling in favour of computing 'ability to pay' mathematically by reference to capital possessions instead of incomes.

One recent protagonist of a capital levy puts his case excellently in the following words :—

'As between a tax on the income arising from capital and a tax on the capital itself, the issue is simple enough. The principle of equality of sacrifice is more truly met by the latter than by the former. Indeed, the growing demand for the re-modelling of the income tax is mainly due to the inequalities and anomalies incident to the existing tax. An illustration will make the point clear.

'A has £10,000 in cash, which he keeps at home and lives on. He pays no income tax, and if the sum is exhausted before his death he pays no other tax thereon.

'B has shares which are at the moment paying no dividends, but which are worth £10,000. He pays no income tax; and if, as is possible, "income" takes the form of an appreciation in the value of the shares, he pays nothing on that.

'C has £10,000 on deposit at 2 per cent. His capital is secure, and he pays income tax on £200.

'D has £10,000 in his business, and makes £1000 a year. He pays income tax on the £1000.

'E has £10,000 and purchases an annuity of £700. He pays income tax on the £700, although when the annuity ceases his capital is gone. That is, he pays tax on the real income, and a capital tax amounting in the period to 100 per cent. in addition.

'F has £10,000 and purchases therewith the lease of a mine. It lasts for ten years, and he makes £1000 a year. In ten years he pays income tax on £10,000, but his capital has gone and his real income (*i.e.*, increase in assets) is nil.

'These examples might be multiplied indefinitely. They show that an income tax alone (in its present form) leads to anomalies which cannot be defended. Any attempt to remedy this inequality would seem to involve (1) the assumption of a uniform rate of interest (say 5 per cent.) on the current value of the capital, and (2) the separate treatment of so much of the income as can be regarded as the reward of personal exertion, etc. As regards No. 1, it is immaterial whether the tax is so much in the £ on the assumed interest, or so much in the £ on the corresponding capital. We may, therefore, say that even in normal times, and as regards current national expenditure, what is in effect a tax on capital (*i.e.*, measured by capital) must be introduced to redress the inequalities of the income tax. The point is not without importance when the income tax rate is low. The unqualified income tax becomes quite indefensible when the rate of tax is high.'

Some of the advocates of a capital levy urge that capital is intrinsically a better measure of ability to pay, and they revive the old controversy in a new form. In the *Economic Journal* for September 1918 another writer criticises the statement already given, as assuming the very point to be proved, *viz.*, that capital and not income is the proper basis of income tax, and claims that the advantage of making incomes rather than capital the basis of taxation is that 'income is a fact, whereas capital is 'merely an estimate. Surely it is on every ground preferable 'that the State should take its toll on the actually realised income, 'rather than on an expectation of income that may never be 'realised.' If the State needs a certain annual revenue from the Income Tax, it can base the tax on the actual income (as we now do) or on a 'computed' income (calculated by reference to capital). If there is no income for a year or two there might still be an income tax, under this method, provided the capital source remained intact. But, of course, if the capital value vanished so also would the tax.

The first broad use for which the services of a capital tax are invoked, is to secure a better test of ability than the mere

amount of income can give in dealing with the second question above formulated—‘*How did, or how do, you get it?*’ It is called in aid to enable a distinction to be drawn between ‘earned’ income, or income from personal effort, and ‘unearned’ income, or income from capital without personal effort concurrent with the receipt of the income. In this country the differentiation is mainly effected by two sets of income tax rates (introduced in 1907), and without recourse to a tax on capital. As long ago as 1861 Newmarch urged that incomes of equal amount of these two characters confer different degrees of ability to pay, because out of the income from personal effort provision falls to be made for want of health, old age, precariousness of employment, and calamities which the owner of saved capital need not specially provide for. Thorold Rogers also pointed out the fact that the earner often has little choice where to live, but incurs extra expense in living near his work or travelling to it. Superficially it seems that these factors merge in the fourth question—‘*What charges have you to meet out of your resources?*’ In reality, however, this question relates to the personal circumstances of each taxpayer, whereas if the answer to the second question is ‘from ‘capital without personal effort,’ that answer conveys in itself certain general or impersonal differences in ability.

Two anomalies arise in practice: (1) The pure doctrine is departed from if the recipient of the earned income is rich—the director’s fees of a city magnate, or the £10,000 income of a private business, have no favoured treatment—either because the recipient is wealthy enough not to notice the difference in rate, or because the extra burdens of provision against necessity do not arise in view of his other capital. The second point in practice is the compromise under which the total income, say £1000, from a business which employs £5000 capital, may be regarded as earned if the proprietor works in it, though £500 is strictly interest on capital and £500 personal salary. Practical difficulties, not now so great as they were in 1907, rather than strict logic, account for this anomaly.

Other countries effect the differentiation in various ways and avoid this particular defect, carrying the distinction through more logically. In some Swiss cantons, in Italy, and in Spain, different classes of income are subject to different income tax rates. But in the German States and in Denmark and Norway



and parts of Switzerland, the common method is to combine with a general and uniform tax on income a supplementary (*Ergänzungsteuer*) tax on capital values. Such a tax is generally at a flat rate, but in Denmark it is progressive. Thus the wealthy recipient of 'earned' income is better treated in these countries than in England, for he pays a less amount of tax in all upon such income than he would do if it were derived from capital; but the ordinary recipient of combined income from capital and earnings in business is not so favoured abroad as he is here, for his capital bears a substantial tax. This capital tax does not, however, usually affect what has been called 'enjoyment' income' from furniture, jewellery, etc.

In Saxony, Würtemberg, Austria, and Hungary the supplementary tax on capital is not a single tax but a variety of taxes, according to the kind of property.

A fourth method of differentiation is found in some Swiss cantons, where the income tax is limited to earned incomes and is accompanied by a tax on capital values. In Sweden in recent years a fifth device has appeared, namely, the addition of one-sixtieth of the value of property to the income before applying the income tax.

The British method, though less complete and less obvious, really amounts to the same thing as the continental, and has its basis in the presence or absence of capital as affecting ability to pay. Differentiation between incomes derived from capital and incomes derived from earnings used to be opposed in England on the ground that the purpose was effected by the death duties. It was argued that if one man had £1000 from earnings and another £1000 from land, and if the latter provided for the source to be kept intact by paying out of his income an annual insurance against the death duty, his effective taxation would be greater. But this reasoning is not entirely sound. The insurance payment cannot be regarded as made to ensure that the income is maintained intact during his own life; it is voluntarily paid to provide a similar and undiminished income for some one after the insurer's death. A sufficient reason exists for some differentiation between an income which is 'earned' and one which is being derived from a life interest in property. The death duties cannot effect this distinction, for they affect neither recipient.

A second reason against direct differentiation was given by Gladstone, viz., that the full taxation of gross income from property, especially landed property, without deduction for repairs or depreciation, already effected a measure of such differentiation. But this argument has been cancelled by the allowance for repairs given since 1894, and the differentiation established in 1907 merely restored something like the original difference. This lends some colour to the cynical view that by the time fine adjustments of different classes of income have been made there is very much the same effect as in the original taxation of the crude or gross amounts of income.

But if it is clear in the general sense that to ignore capital considerations altogether is to fail to recognise the lower ability of earnings, it is equally clear that taxation based on capital only (unless there is an artificial capitalisation of wages and salaries) fails altogether. This consideration does not answer the question whether capital has the greater 'ability.' It says no more than that both must be invoked to test comparative ability. If it be further asked which is the more important 'ingredient,' the answer must surely be that taxation by income is the more important, for by it one reaches, to some extent, nearly all kinds of ability, whereas if capital only were taxed, a whole 'class' of 'ability to pay' would be missed altogether.

The third of the questions set out above as necessary tests of ability to pay only arises when the income is derived from capital without personal effort. The advocates of capital taxation suggest that the 'ability to pay' attaching to different kinds of income from capital is very varied, and needs to be properly exposed by basing taxation rather upon capital values than the several amounts of income. In the quotation given above, the arguments used as to the yield of different kinds of capital recall past history. It is unnecessary here to give an account of the long discussions in the 'fifties, when the mathematical discrimination of pure income elements from capital elements in all so-called yields from capital was discussed *ad nauseam*. The evidence before the 1852 Committee can be referred to in this connexion. The discussions were abortive, but the inability to frame a just annual tax based on capital values, despite all the actuaries and mathematicians, gave a quietus to the political discussion for a long time.

A typical quotation, from a draft Report in 1852, sets forth the contentions clearly.

Each person would be taxed in proportion to his ability, which is measured more accurately, and expressed more clearly by the value of the property in his possession than by any other standard. The value of the property of each person is best determined by the sale value of his interest in real and personal estate :—

A has	£1000 per annum in Long Annuities	- -	£	6,875
B „	£1000 „ Consols	- -		33,333
C „	£1000 „ from Land	- -		30,000
D „	£1000 „ for Life	- -		16,667
E „	reversion of rents after D's death	- -		16,666
F „	house returning £1000 a year	- -		16,000

One starts with the apparently simple case of terminable annuities, and then considers the analogous case of life annuities, distinguished only by the introduction of an average of conditions in lieu of a precise condition in the terms of the contract. This leads to the next class—a life interest in regular income. One soon gets away from considering precariousness in the *kind* of income, to deal with the individual's precarious hold on the income, which may, in itself, be a secure dividend from Consols. The position that may be reached by this route may be more clearly seen if the evidence of Newmarch and Mill before the 1861 Committee is studied.

The evidence and draft Reports of the Committee of 1852 showed the bog into which all the complication leads, and how the search for actuarial avoidance of 'taxing capital' lands one into confusion. 'A gentleman has twin daughters, for one of which he purchases an annuity of £1000 a year for £13,000, while to the other he gives a rent-charge for life of £1000 a year on his estate. The annuity and rent-charge are equal in amount and estimated duration, and therefore in value. The rent-charge might, by sale and purchase of an annuity with the proceeds of the sale, be converted into an annuity, and vice versa.'

In 1852 J. S. Mill was strongly in favour of allowing precarious incomes a deduction for all savings, and also for a lower rate on the balance (a lower tax on expenditure). He was against capitalisation, and repeated his objections much more strongly in his evidence in 1861 :—

'The plan of capitalising incomes, and taxing them on their value as capital, I confess, seems to me to be not merely impracticable, but even,

if it were practicable, thoroughly unjust and unequal, and to involve such arithmetical fallacies, that it is to me a matter of astonishment that good arithmeticians should have fallen into them. But what I should lay down as a perfectly unexceptionable and just principle of income tax, if it were capable of being practically realised, would be to exempt all savings—that the portion of an income which was saved and converted into capital, should be untaxed.'

If it is once admitted that a life interest, because it has a lower capital value than a fee simple or perpetual interest, has less 'ability,' many perils are introduced. But this is what the tax on capitalised values really means.

The inevitable loss to the revenue, and the methods of arrangement by which the lowest rate of charge would easily be secured, make it clear that the reversioner must, as a natural corollary, be charged. There seems to be no escape from this. Can there be said to be a real present ability to pay in the *prospects* of a reversion? The tax would get heavier as the time of reversion approaches—for the capital value of the reversion would be increasing—but if the man were to die before the property fell in to him, he would have paid a tax annually for years that ought not to have been collected from him at all, whereas the next successor in title really had a valuable property all along, but was unaware of it during the reversioner's lifetime. Is this not the travesty of 'ability' to pay?

'The only way out is to let the tax accumulate till the 'reversioner receives the first rent,' says the 1852 Report. But is this annual taxation by ability?

The 1905 Committee concluded that the division of a life annuity into principal and interest was a fiction—no doubt convenient for some purposes, but based on actuarial averages which were only true in a minority of cases. As regards terminable annuities, they thought that as existing ones have been contracted for on the existing conditions, if those conditions were unfair, the inequities would be amortised in the terms of the contract; and that an alteration for the future might merely encourage this form of investment. The area represented by this class of income had become small, and terminable annuities purchased as such might well continue to be taxed on their full amount. This was clearly an opportunist judgment, and did not answer any question whether capital or income was a better test of ability.

The whole discussion tempts us to inquire at this stage what is really meant by 'ability'? Does it mean an objective computation of pure income free from capital elements (or having the capital element reduced to a common time basis mathematically) even if the distinctions so made evoke no actual response in our breasts, and have no correspondence to the habits of our lives? If the recipients of equal amounts of these different kinds of income make no difference in their mode of living, and no general difference of social habit is discernible, surely it can fairly be said that ability, so far as they feel it, is equal. If ability is based on the economic principle of marginal sacrifice, or, in other words, on the fact that the 10,000th pound sterling of income has less real utility in the satisfaction of human wants than the 1000th pound, and thus is capable of bearing a higher rate of tax, then it is a subjective psychological test. Differences that we can feel, day by day, in our habits, and not differences that a few can calculate, are those that matter.

If by 'ability' is meant the degree of hardship by ordinary tests of life's habits, the income tax is a better test than the annual tax based on capital values. But if for this same principle one actually asks which method most clearly discerns and separates pure economic interest from all other factors in profit, then the annual tax on capital would be a truer test.

Why does the holder of £10,000 in War Loan get £500, and the holder of £10,000 in business profits get £1000? For the reason that the first receives practically pure economic interest only, while the second receives economic interest, *plus* the allowance which mankind demands for risk-taking, whether the risk be that of absolute loss or merely of fluctuation in income. The capitalisation method practically 'exudes' these elements, and just crystallises out the pure economic interest. The conception of the 'number of years' purchase' confuses the time-principle which is at stake. The pure interest of £500 in War Loan is capitalised at twenty years. The £1000 dividend is not really capitalised at ten years—one finds out how much pure interest it contains and capitalises that, *viz.*, £500 at twenty years, and the £500 earnings of risk, etc., is hardly capitalised at all—sufficient for each year is the evil thereof. The second £500 is an allowance or bonus year by year, in return for consideration of the possibility that the source of income may be given up

altogether. There is no reason why the extra £500, as an income from risk-bearing, should not be taxed in the years when it is received. We test ability within ourselves, not by actuarial calculations, but by the question—How much has been received this year that on our ordinary imitative social habits is spendable?

This question obliterates most of the distinctions to which reference has been made. It does not permit of a charge on the man who is living on the money in his cash box, and has nothing 'coming in.' It would probably lead to the income from investments in short-period wasting assets, like gold mines and the 'fag-end' of leases, being allowed a deduction for the capital wastage element, because many people, but by no means all, would, in fact, make a deduction themselves and not spend the whole receipts annually. But if this human or social principle of ability be accepted, not much would be done in respect of the life interest, dividends from coal mines, income from leasehold property, or ordinary shares in public companies.

It may be learnt from Seligman that an important tendency in the United States is the movement from property as the basis of taxation to the produce or yield of the property, *i.e.*, to the income derived from the property. The reason why a general property tax has broken down all over the United States is not only because it was a tax on the person without the adequate machinery to assess the person, not only because it was an attempt to tax locally what is no longer local in character, but also because, under modern conditions, property as a whole is not so satisfactory an indication of tax-paying ability as the yield of the property or the income from the property. Seligman says :—

'We see the truth of this statement in our corporation taxes, where the tendency is strong to tax receipts, that is, yield, rather than property. We see it in the agitation over our forest taxes and our mining taxes, where the tax on yield or produce is gradually supplanting the tax on property. We see it in the feeling on the part of our business men that the property invested in the business is not so satisfactory an index of fiscal obligation as the yield or the income. And that, of course, is the main reason why the twentieth century has become the century of income taxes rather than of property taxes. It is this fact more than anything else which explains the gradual break-up of our general property tax.'

Having considered taxation of income and taxation of capital,

in regular annual taxes, it is now necessary to deal with periodical taxation of capital, such as the death duties. Early discussions on these duties related mainly to the question of succession and the graduation of the tax according to the distance of relationship. Soward and Willan have well examined the various principles upon which such graduation is based. The 'privilege' theory assumed that the more remote the relationship, the greater the privileges of succession conferred by the State, and, therefore, the higher the price. But Pierson asked, Which was the greater accident or privilege, to receive a small legacy from an uncle or an aunt, or to inherit a very large estate from a rich father? The faculty theory is based on the idea that with distant relationship the ability of the recipient is all the larger, for his boon is less expected. A son acquires a vested interest in his father's style of life and magnitude of possessions. As Gladstone said, those in direct succession are 'educated' in their expectations, whereas the successions of strangers are accidental and capricious. Pierson (and we must pay all respect to Dutch teaching in matters relating to death duties) wants to divide the duty, and vary one part of it, genuinely, like the income tax, according to the amount of the successor's total resources.

But what we are mainly concerned with is the estate duty itself, graduated according to the size of the estate. This progression has, clearly, no reference to the ability of the successors, for a huge estate might be left to a very large number of poor people, and a small estate might pass to a millionaire.

Modern ideas of graduation put forward by Harcourt in 1894, as applied to the mass of wealth left at death, can be explained on one of two alternative principles: (*a*) impersonal 'ability' and (*b*) personal 'ability.' The first can be sustained only by a special line of reasoning which hardly carries conviction. The second is more easily intelligible. As early as 1889 Goschen said: 'It is the men whose fortunes are considerable who pay 'less in proportion to their aggregate income and property, and 'so equity demands a greater proportional share from the large 'fortune.' If we adopt the fashionable mode of treating the duty as one which can reasonably be regarded as provided for annually out of income by insurance, then, of course, it is but an extension of the income tax, and can be made progressive on the same line of reasoning. But it has really become progressive

by following the line of least resistance, and for reasons other than those relating to ability—such, for example, as public policy in dealing with very large fortunes. The progression in taxation has, probably, no great deterrent effect in the progressive accumulation of capital, not nearly so great in its deferred form as if it actually were dealt with by the taxpayer by way of annual provision. The very deferment of the burden to a time when the taxpayer cannot feel it himself largely relieves the tax from the necessity of being regulated by pure ability.

Any anomaly in the income tax arising from the exemption of non-income producing property, such as furniture, is not even corrected by a graduated death duty charged on capital values, for the latter is levied on both kinds of capital alike, and the original discrimination in the income tax still stands. But in so far as ability to pay tax attaches to such wealth, the estate duty has a slight advantage over income taxation in the answer to the third question, '*Of what do your resources consist?*'

The answer to the second question, as to the origin of the wealth, cannot be so satisfactorily dealt with by estate duty methods, for it is impossible, at the date of death, to make any discrimination. Where both 'earned income' or 'unearned income' have been received, no one can say which has contributed to the sums accumulated for taxation at death. The recognition of true ability is by no means absent from estate duty taxation, but it is not so intimate as with an income tax, and does not disturb one's general feeling that income is, on the whole, a better test of ability.

Whatever other virtues the proposed special and unique levy on capital may possess, this particular pre-eminence can hardly be claimed for it, that it excels as a test of ability. Grant to the full, first of all, the economist's plea that it is to be a composition for future high income taxes. This may work perfectly for a settled and secure source of income, like interest on War Loan, but for every varying or precarious kind of income, whether in the life of the source of income, or the life of the recipient, it is at a hopeless disadvantage.

A valuation of a mine, according to a so-called 'life,' is a mere *mid-point* between the extreme probabilities—an 'average' and not a 'mode'—and the chances of its being the correct life are quite small. There is a 20 to 1 chance against the levy



being a true commutation, for it will be either too much or too little, whereas the income tax will fit the facts, year after year, like a glove.

Similarly in the case of life interests, based upon life tables, the expectation is only correct as an average with wide extremes. Social or average justice is not the same as that individual ability on which alone taxation can rest. Unless provision exists for continually revising valuations on actuarial and other averages in the light of after events, the levy must be very inadequate as a test of ability. The assessment to the levy upon each life interest and upon each reversionary interest, must be tampered with continually, as the expectations upon which they were based fail to materialise, until the levy is practically an annual tax. Even with the adjustments it cannot be as conformable as actual unmodified annual income to the economic test of ability. If the benefits of the war to us are continuous, as we must all agree—for all people in the future are to enjoy the fruits of a 'war that has ended war' and of a 'world safe for democracy'—then people year by year paying for these benefits should do so according to relative ability year by year. With continuous benefits it cannot be right that the share of the burden should be finally settled by the relative prosperity at one fixed moment of time, when the relative prosperity at another moment still within these benefits is so different. In short, ability to pay cannot be commuted when the quantitative tests are being applied.

On the second aspect of ability, that of origin, this form of taxation suffers from the same disability as the estate duty, viz., it cannot discriminate between the wealth saved out of personal earnings and that saved out of 'unearned' income.

On the third aspect of ability, which relates to the kind or embodiment of wealth, it is clear that to the extent to which ability is admitted to be affected by the possession of non-income producing wealth, such as pictures, motors, etc., capital taxation has the advantage. Probably a man with £1000 a year, who possesses a picture worth £20,000, has a slightly greater ability than one with £1000 and no picture, but his extra ability would hardly be regarded as equal to an additional income of £1000 per annum in hard cash.

The fourth aspect of ability, that of personal social obliga-

tion, brought out by the question, What charges have you to meet out of your resources? has not been so far considered. It will be obvious, without elaborate argument, that such differentiae in ability as the possession of a wife, of numbers of children of varying ages, or of dependent relatives, can be dealt with only in a repeated or annual tax. They lend themselves to treatment distinctly better in an annual income tax than in an annual tax based on capital. They cannot be dealt with properly at all in an occasional or unique tax. Suppose that on equal fortunes of £20,000 a levy is made of £5000 on a man who, at the time of the levy, is a bachelor without encumbrances, and of £3000 on a man who has a wife and three children aged sixteen, fourteen, and twelve. The levy is a commutation of their taxation over a period, say, of at least ten years. But in six years' time the bachelor may be a married man with three children, and the married man may be a widower with all his children 'off hand.' There is no satisfactory means of commutating differences in personal ability of this kind.

No reference has been made to a special type of economic capacity to bear taxation called 'ability' by Mr. J. A. Hobson, mainly because the term has not yet any acceptance in that connexion, which serves only to confuse its existing connotation, already sufficiently complex.

The conclusions, therefore, are that:—

- (1) For annual taxation capital is a necessary partner with income to test true ability, but a strictly subordinate and junior partner who is incapable of carrying on business by himself.
- (2) For periodical taxation capital taxation is only indirectly and partially related to individual ability at all.
- (3) For special taxation to reduce war debt, capital is inferior to income as a test of 'ability' to pay.

J. C. STAMP.

*July 1919.*

## MORE ECONOMIC FALLACIES IN INDUSTRY

THE article contributed by the present writer to the April number of this REVIEW on 'Economic Fallacy in Industry,' has brought him into communication with many persons who view, as he does, with deepening apprehension, the growing power of false economic theories. It has been to him a matter of profound satisfaction to find emanating from this correspondence a strong consensus of opinion that an organised and forcible attempt should be made to attack and eradicate these fallacies, by an intensive educational campaign wholly removed from any partisan or political auspices. Some of my correspondents, however, whilst agreeing as to the perniciousness of these fallacies, 'if they really exist,' rather doubt their widespread prevalence. They say that prominent writers and speakers on industrial affairs give no indication of the existence of such theories, but attribute the present 'industrial unrest' wholly to the want of the 'right spirit' in industry. To say that the trouble is due to the want of 'the right spirit' is begging the question. That nebulous phrase, though convenient for superficial critics, explains nothing, leads nowhere. I feel in no way troubled by this criticism.

But to suggest that economic fallacies are not prevalent in industry deserves a reply. My answer is that I have spoken from my own practical experience. The fallacies with which I dealt in the previous article, and with which I am dealing in this, have been met, isolated, and identified by me, not once, nor twice, but continually in the course of over three thousand industrial conferences of every kind. They were not passive predilections. On the contrary, they were found everywhere usurping unchallenged dominion over the industrial mind, reacting injuriously upon the concord and efficiency of industrial life in foundry and in forge, in machine-room and in shipyard. No workshop was free from them.

In the previous article I stated my belief that the clue to the

industrial riddle is to be found in applying to industry the three great integrating forces of contentment, co-operation, and production. No one of them can exist without both the others; all three are essential to industrial happiness and prosperity. The principal fallacies that obstruct production were discussed in the first article; those that eat like a canker at the roots of co-operation are the subject of this article. One reservation, by way of prelude, may avoid misconception. It has been laid as a reproach by some of my labour friends against the previous article, that I was disposed to put a materialistic interpretation upon all the present industrial discontent. The reproach is unjustified. Only with economic fallacy was I concerned; there was no attempt to deal with the idealism of labour. I know its aspirations; with the great majority of them I fully sympathise. That much of the prevailing discontent springs from the thwarting of deeply imbedded and long-held ideals is indisputable; but it is equally certain that the irritation which exists is stirred and fomented by false economic conceptions, and by failure to understand that economic facts themselves, if recognised will aid, if disregarded will hinder, the fulfilment of those very aspirations. The educational corrective is not merely to counter error with truth, but something more. By all means let us extinguish error; it is essential to do so; but at the same time, to borrow Anatole France's pithy words—'Mettez l'étincelle aux esprits.'

The main industrial fallacies associated with the question of production may, with advantage, be recapitulated. They are as follows:—

(1) That there is somewhere or other an undisclosed fund of profits available for the payment of practically unlimited advances in wages, without any increase in present production; (2) that in the improbable case of this fund being insufficient, manufacturers can, without any difficulty, supplement the deficiency by raising the selling price; (3) that the supposed 'vicious circle,' alleged by economists to exist by reason of the reaction of increases of wages upon increased cost of living, is quite illusory; (4) that the restriction of output benefits the status and raises the value of labour; (5) that the introduction of time and labour-saving appliances operates to the detriment of labour; (6) that the true interests of labour are best promoted by keeping up labour costs and resisting anything like simplification of process which tends to reduce the proportion of labour charges to the total cost of production; (7) that workmen, however high their output, are never worth proportionately high earnings.

While these fallacies survive, 'the right spirit' for production is an idle dream. Mr. J. T. Brownlie, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, in urging the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Unions Congress, in his letter of 26th August, to take action to increase production, says: 'The condition precedent in that direction appears 'to me to be the dissemination of accurate and reliable information.'

Not dissimilar are the fallacies which tend to kill co-operation between employer and employed. So far as the readers of this article are concerned, it is hardly necessary to prove the dependence of 'labour' upon 'capital' or of 'capital' upon 'labour.' Their mutual dependency one upon the other will be assumed. It will also be assumed that co-operation towards the end of securing the maximum production reasonably possible under the circumstances, directly operates to advance their joint, as well as their separate interests. How completely that has been overlooked in industry! If one casts a retrospect upon British industry, since the statutory restrictions in 1847 upon the unrestricted employment of the cheap labour of women and children gave the first real impetus to the improvement of mechanical appliances, a striking fact is disclosed. There has been, as time progressed, a steadily improving efficiency in the individual machines and combinations of machines which constitute the mechanical equipment and organisation of a factory. This advance is the work of the human brain. On the other hand, so far as the operation of the machines by manual labour is concerned, after making all necessary allowances for the increased wages resulting from increased productivity—itsself a result of mechanical improvement—it is clear that the progress of industry is being obstructed by some increasing drag. This retarding force can, after very little observation of workshop life, be resolved into two definite components—one, economic fallacy; the other, injustice and want of sympathy, dissociating and dividing employer and employed. When, therefore, it is said that co-operation in industry depends on 'the right spirit' being introduced into industry, what ought to be said, in the writer's view, is that co-operation depends, first, on the extermination of certain economic fallacies that now influence the actions of both masters and men; and secondly, on the establishment of

justice and sympathy as the dominant characteristics of the industrial relationship.

Labour thoroughly well recognises the productive power of the spirit of co-operation. In certain trades the men work in squads, and the members of the squad share in agreed proportions the total price for the squad's collective work. Many shops are paid on the output bonus system or on a 'fellowship' basis. Under such conditions the earnings of the squad or shop, within the limits fixed for normal output, depend on the full co-operation of each member of the squad or shop. Co-operation is then recognised as a democratic duty. It is almost invariably afforded without stint, if not it is exacted. Indeed it goes further than that; many skilled men, paid on output, are assisted by semi-skilled or unskilled 'helpers,' paid a fixed time wage, irrespective of output. Although the increased efforts of the 'helpers' result in increased earnings only for the skilled men, in general, co-operation is usually forthcoming from the 'helpers.' There are, however, some special instances, in particular industries with a history, when co-operation is withheld; for example, there is little co-operation in shipyards between piece-paid platers and their time-paid 'helpers.' The latter 'hang back' in order to secure a share in the output as a condition of co-operation.

There is no difficulty whatsoever in identifying the definite misconceptions to which the workers appeal as a moral justification for their present attitude of antagonism to employers. These false theories all come from what is commonly known as Marxian socialism. To what extent Marx borrowed his ideas from, or stole the thunder of, certain predecessors or contemporaries, is an interesting topic in the history of revolutionary socialism; but it is immaterial so far as this article is concerned. In the workshop the doctrines answer to the name of Marx. That will therefore serve for a label. At every turn they are encountered in industrial establishment and trade union branch and district committee, forming the foundations of belief amongst industrial democracy.

Though it is not possible to crystallise the Marxian doctrines with absolute precision of language into a few lines of print, they may be stated in simple words, with tolerable accuracy, as follows:—

‘Money, which is the final product of the circulation of commodities, is the first form in which capital appears. The capitalist, that is the owner of money, divides his capital into two parts, one part called “constant capital,” which he uses to build factories, instal machines, and purchase raw material; the other part, called “variable capital,” which he employs in buying and making profit out of labour-force, or labour-power. Production is the process of applying this labour-force to raw material, and the exchange or market value of the commodity, which is the product, is created by the labour-force expended by the labourer in working. That value, which solely results from the labour so expended, is measured by the time occupied by the labourer upon the production of the newly-created commodity in question. The labourer is paid by his employer a wage which represents the “exchange value” of his “labour-force.” But the employer has obtained the “use-value” of the labour-force, and disposes of the newly created product in the market at a selling price which, after making allowance for the costs of production before and after the application of labour-force, is higher than the wage paid to the labourer. The excess is “surplus value.” This surplus value in primitive industry is appropriated wholly by the employer, but in industry more highly developed is apportioned out among the different classes of capitalists in the shape of ground rent, interest, manufacturers’ profits, and commercial profit.’

In this doctrine of Marx there are three fundamental propositions, the first that money is the primary form of capital, the second that the value of a commodity is measured by the amount of labour expended upon it, the third that the capitalist buys the use-value of a day’s labour in exchange for its market value, pocketing the surplus value, which is the difference. Under this conception industry to-day is merely a process by which the capitalist constitutes himself the conduit-pipe to the sale-room for the workman’s labour, and as the latter passes through his hands, retains for himself that portion which is represented by ‘surplus value.’

Let me give a few illustrations of how these discordant theories form the articles of belief in numberless workshops. As I write I have beside me a mass of leaflets, pamphlets, and writings which have all come into my possession during my recent industrial work. As representative of by no means extreme opinion some extracts from an edition of ‘The Red Catechism,’ obtained by me in a shipyard in 1916, will give an idea of the prevalence of the doctrines in question:—

Who creates all wealth?	The working class.
Who are the workers?	Men who work for wages and receive only a portion of what they earn, the other part going to keep the idle classes.
Who creates all poverty?	Our capitalistic society.
What is a wage-slave?	A person who works for a wage, and gives all he earns to a capitalist.
What proportion does a wage-slave receive of what he earns?	On the average, about a fourth.
What is an exploiter?	One who employs a man and makes him produce three or four times the amount he receives as wages.
How do capitalists become rich?	By employing labour and exploiting it.
The question of merit does not enter into the reward of capital then?	No. It is only used as a hypocritical subterfuge to hide the robbery of labour.

These are only a few quotations; the list could be amplified enormously. They represent the principles taught in the Socialist Sunday Schools. By the time the child of ten has become the youth of eighteen and nineteen, more stimulating nutriment is administered, and 'red revolution' is preached in language of graphic persuasiveness.

We are, however, for the moment only concerned with economic fallacy in industry. Let us therefore return to the Marxian proposition that money is the first form of capital. It is a discordant and disruptive delusion. Marx declared that all capital was derived from the profits obtained by paying labour less than the value it creates. On this hypothesis the capitalist contributes nothing to the business of production. He is in the position of reaping what he has not sown. He is a bandit who holds up to ransom the whole world of workmen. He lets labourers off with their lives, that is to say, with wages just sufficient for their subsistence and the reproduction of their species, thus securing the maintenance of a supply of labour, on condition that the labourers hand over to him practically the whole value of their labour. As long as such doctrines are taught to the young worker and are accepted by the old, of what good is it to prate about co-operation? It is about as sensible to advocate co-operation between a host and its parasite, between a vampire and its prey, between a highway robber and his victim. Yet



that is the vain task on which so many eminent persons are now wasting their eloquence.

The first essential is boldly and openly to challenge this Marxian doctrine of the parasitic character of capital. There will never be, there cannot be co-operation between capital and labour until labour has learned what capital is and the functions it plays in production. Labour is ready to learn. The writer has found it possible to interest workmen keenly while explaining that capital consists primarily of things that are not money, of goods upon which people subsist while producing other goods, of factories, machinery, and raw material; that capital is a definite factor or agent in production, capable of use, not merely by the conventional employer, but by every man; that it is something which, when used in production, is consumed, so that the user must be possessed of such technical and commercial experience and judgment as will enable him to surmount the risk of loss, and obtain a return sufficient to replace the capital that has been consumed, and to recompense the lender for his thrift and remunerate the user for the services he has rendered and the risk to which he has been subjected. These particular aspects of capital, from their very novelty, I have found to catch the immediate attention of labour, so much so that in some districts the workmen, of their own accord, arranged meetings and invited me specially to discuss with them the character and functions of capital in modern industry, and the extent to which labour was dependent on it.

In any campaign of education realities must be faced. There is no use evading the fact that while capital is essential and of incalculable benefit to humanity, it can, at the same time, like any other human possession, be used so as to cause inconvenience, injustice, distress, degradation, death. In short, the use of capital may be socially beneficent, or it may be maleficent, anti-social. The invariable example which the workman adduces of its anti-social use is 'profiteering' in many of its accustomed forms. It is a great misfortune that there is no precise term in use to describe the particular function of capital as an agent in production. Aristotle distinguished, on arbitrary principles which he enunciated, between the natural beneficial use of wealth, which he calls 'economics,' and the unnatural abuse of wealth, which he calls 'chrematistics.' His principles are out of date;

the terminological distinction which he attempted was sound. What happens in industrial discussion is this: employers, thinking of the beneficent function played by capital in production, emphasise the dependence of labour on capital; labour, thinking of the anti-social uses of capital, and reasoning from the particular to the general, retorts that capital is the cause of all labour's troubles. If both employers and labourers could, by appropriate terms, get down to discussing the same thing, there would be substantial prospect of agreement; on the present mode of discussion there is none. Some documents are in front of me, in which the whole controversy as to the relation between capital and labour turns on the term 'capital' which is used in different connotations by the two sides. When a great dialectician once said 'Mistiness is the mother of wisdom,' he most certainly cannot have been referring to industrial discussions intended to promote co-operation.

The next notion subversive of co-operation is the workman's idea, derived from Marx, that 'the value of a commodity is the amount of abstract human labour embodied in it.' If this be true, as so many workmen now fervently believe, it follows that the employer contributes nothing whatever to the value of the manufactured product; that the only value-producing agency is labour. In truth neither workman nor employer creates value; both unite to perform services or produce things which other circumstances, *e.g.*, demand, cause to be of value, and they do so because of that value. But the material point is that the Marxian doctrine rules out co-operation. Logically, it implies that the only possible remedy for the present lot of the worker consists in the complete demolition of the present organisation of industry. The worker who accepts the Marxian theory of value, with its corollary theory of surplus value, is a weak-kneed individual and a traitor to his brethren if he be cajoled for a moment into co-operating with his employer, or if he hesitates to fight whole-heartedly for the eradication of the employer, root and branch, from the industrial system.

The difficulty I have experienced in tackling this Marxian heresy is the common one which confronts any opponent of a popular doctrine accepted on faith and not on logic. A reasoned explanation of the fallacy is often not understood; a striking refutation is regarded as an extreme instance, to

which no reasonable person would ever suggest that the principle applied. When I have put the classic case of a man who discovers a precious stone, picks it up and finds it is worth, say, £50, and I have suggested that the labour-force exerted by the finder for a few seconds in reaching down and lifting up the stone cannot surely be the sole cause of its value, the answer has at once been made, 'That is a case of raw material, and not a manufactured article.' I have then taken the case of some manufactured article like 'pigs' or 'ingots.' These when made were of a certain value, but they were put into store as against a rising market and became, subsequently, of much greater value. According to Marx, the magnitude of the value of any commodity is determined by the amount of labour socially necessary for its production and embodied in it, under the normal conditions of production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time. This amount of labour, in the case of the 'pigs' and 'ingots,' was the amount expended when they were first made; but since then, without the expenditure of any more labour, their value has greatly increased. This increase in value cannot obviously be attributed to the addition of 'abstract' or any other labour. When I give this case there is usually a halt in the cross-fire of argument and counter-argument, and then some 'intellectual,' unable to controvert the conclusion, will pour out a torrent of Marxian patter. Incensed volubility, devoid of reason, is the final argument behind this popular tenet of belief.

It is surprising how many workmen have learned quite glibly the outlines of the Marxian value and surplus value argument, and can express it by rote in flawless Marxian terminology. Even accepting it, as it has been so truly described, as 'the greatest intellectual mare's nest of the last century,' without any question it is an argument that has got to be seriously considered if it is advanced at any meeting of workmen. No good will come of treating it with flippancy, or pouring ridicule upon it. I made it my practice to take up the argument stage by stage, emphasise what appeared to me to be the flaws, and then finish off with a number of practical workshop illustrations of cases where the argument egregiously fails to hold water. To be convincing, and to drive each point well home, takes a consider-

able amount of time, but it is well worth it. Few persons appreciate the extent to which this Marxian sophistry prevents achievement of the co-operative ideal in industry.

There is just one word of warning necessary. According to Marx, the workman receives from the employer the exchange value of his labour-force or power on handing over to the employer its use value. Marx maintained, and unfortunately in the past there has been much to add force to his contention, that labour in return received a wage no more than equal to 'bare subsistence' or 'bare cost of production of labour-power.' In many cases the past level of wages cannot be defended, and it would be foolish to try to defend it. But this much can be said: wages have risen very considerably since Marx's day, and without any overthrow of the industrial system. Such a result is absolutely in contradiction of his prophecy, and at variance with his doctrine. It strongly suggests the wisdom of constructive evolution as opposed to destructive revolution.

One of the fundamental axioms of the Marxian theory of value is that commodities exchange in the proportion of the amount of labour-force, measured in time of application, that has been expended upon the production of each of them. Hence two manufactured articles, upon which the same number of labour-hours has been expended, ought to exchange one for the other. Not only so, but one labour-hour expended by one man ought to be the equal of a labour-hour expended by any other man. That may be a principle of exchange in primitive society, so far as commodities which are necessary for existence are concerned; it will not and cannot apply to modern society or modern industry. An interesting circumstance is that a workman who will asseverate the Marxian theory that labour is the sole source of value, will scout with scorn the suggestion that equal labour-time creates equal value in exchange. It has been my lot, more than once, to hear this latter notion discussed in assemblages of workmen, when there were present skilled men receiving the district skilled rate, other skilled men in receipt of more than the district rate, and semi-skilled and unskilled men who were paid below the district rate. There was no necessity for me to intervene; the notion was torn to shreds, and discarded with contumely, especially by the skilled men, not on any closely-reasoned argument, but simply on the broad general ground,

'it wasn't common sense.' Then it will be asked: If labour rejects so summarily the Marxian notion that equivalence of labour-force means equality of value in exchange, how can it possibly hold to the Marxian theory that labour is the sole cause of value? Of course logically it cannot, but great sections of labour do, because it seems to them a theory which, in its implications, is fairer than the present state of things. In other words it is by way of revolt against certain of the conditions inherent in the present industrial system.

With some trouble you may convince labour—at any rate that is my experience—that mental power is just as much an agent in production as manual power, and that the marketable character of the product will depend largely on the quality of the mental power, expressed in terms of organising capacity, technical direction, or commercial acumen. You may then point out that what Marx has styled 'surplus value' is partly the remuneration of this mental power, that it provides the wages of the successful business men who manage the concern. But at once it will be objected, 'Have the mental-power men and the owners of capital any right to appropriate the whole of the profits of the concern after paying the manual workers a living wage, or even a wage in substantial excess of the subsistence level?' You are bound to admit they have no such right. What remuneration, then, ought labour to receive? If there were something like equality of bargaining-power between employers and employed, the wages of the workman would approach the full value of his services; in other words, he would obtain a wage approximating to his full marginal worth. But you cannot get such exactly poised industrial equilibrium. Hence certain minimum limits must be laid down on both sides, below which the remuneration to labour ought not to fall, and beneath which the return to capital ought not to sink. Still, in many cases, after compliance with such minima, there will remain surplus profits which to-day are regarded by the employer as his exclusive property. It is clear to me that these surplus profits will have to be shared between employers and employed on some system that will be recognised as just to each. The system will necessarily vary with the industry, and in many cases according to the particular shop, its lay-out, mode of work, type of plant, and so forth. There can be no general and uniform system. What is

essential is that the manual worker should feel that he has a personal interest in the concern, that it is not merely to his material advantage, but that it also satisfies his soul to co-operate with his employer and make the business a success. Whether the system is called profit-sharing or co-partnership, or by any other name, is wholly immaterial. What really matters is its efficacy in enlisting the enthusiasm, stimulating the effort, and openly and obviously emphasising the community of interest of employer and employed. It is not the slightest use attacking Marx unless the industrial sores are to be healed, and those cancers of capitalism cut out for which Marx said (quite wrongly) that there was no cure but acceptance of his doctrine and the enforcement of it to its logical conclusion.

The antagonism that overspreads industry to-day like a noisome blight, the writer has already stated to be due, in his considered judgment, to the power of economic fallacy, and to the fact that injustice and want of sympathy are the normal conditions of the industrial relationship. Co-operation is made repellent to labour by the economic fallacies already mentioned, and, at the same time, their power is enormously reinforced by the atmosphere of injustice and want of sympathy created by employers. The existence of such an atmosphere is largely due also to economic fallacy, to employers holding still to the old 'individualistic' notions of industry, to the idea that a workman is still the animated machine—*ἐμψυχον ὄργανον*—of the Greek philosophers, an 'economic unit' without soul, sensibility, ideals, or aspirations, to the obsession that justice and sympathy are incompatible with discipline and the firm handling of labour. Of course, justice and sympathy can have no place in a creed where labour is merely one of a number of troublesome items of the cost of production. Neither is shown, neither is expected. The traditional employer never recognised that capital, brains, and manual labour filled separate and distinct rôles. He looked upon himself as the all-dominant personality, and labour as his privileged and dependent hireling.

Now domination, or any attempt at it, is quite incompatible with co-operation; in fact, the least semblance of it in industry will speedily kill any nascent spirit of co-operation. Nor does it matter in the slightest on what ground the domination is attempted to be based or assumed to be asserted. It may be on

intellectual superiority, technical experience, organising capacity, social standing. I care not what. It is the poison of all industrial harmony. As soon as it appears there is straightway an end of all co-operation in any democratic organisation, and sectarianism and faction mark the reaction that immediately ensues. Mutual agreement is the essential basis of co-operation, both from the objective and subjective points of view. To secure agreement there must be the spirit to agree, and the existence of that spirit depends almost entirely on the knowledge and belief that matters of industrial controversy will be considered and adjusted on principles of justice and equity. My experience of industry has left me convinced beyond all doubt on one point—there is, deep down in the heart of the British workman, a sense of justice and fair-play. Often it takes time and trouble to develop it, to assist it in freeing itself from the tentacles of ignorance, Marxian sophistry and revolutionary formulas which entangle it, as weeds do a swimmer struggling to gain the surface; but in the end, if it gets a chance, it will assuredly triumph.

The average employer has not yet given it a chance. He does not believe in its existence, nor in its efficacy as a moderating influence. There are no conceivable circumstances, he will tell you, which labour will not unjustly use for its own aggrandisement, if an opportunity coincides with power. That in the past has, unfortunately, been the tradition on the part of employers themselves no less than on the part of labour. So far as it implies either justification or excuse, no distinction whatsoever can be drawn between the two. Propositions and proposals founded on equity and reason can, with confidence, be submitted to the workman's sense of justice. In many instances during the war, I have appealed to this sense of justice with signal success in shop matters of peculiarly acute trade controversy. Amongst them 'victimisation' disputes, always formidable questions, that is to say, cases of dismissal, fine, or degrading, on grounds alleged by the men of the prominence of the 'victim' in furthering the interests of his trade union, or because of alleged breaches of shop unwritten law, invented, it would be said, by some vindictive foreman. When masters and men have failed to adjust the difference—the former taking their stand on 'their right to maintain discipline,' the latter on their duty 'to protect their trade union interests'—I have invariably

found it possible to settle the dispute by getting down to principles of fair-play. If the workman who has been 'dealt with' was a shop steward, and was really using his employer's time for doing his trade union branch work when he might and ought to have been doing his shop work, the men have accepted the position that, after notice, the employer is entitled to take exception to that procedure. On the other hand, if he has only been utilising for union business the many periods of time which occur in the best organised shops when he is 'waiting for work' or 'standing by,' and has done it in such a way as not to interfere with his shop work, then the men claim that he has only done what he was entitled to do. An employer who objects to him doing union business under such circumstances is really out against the union. Most fair-minded people would probably draw the same inference, reserving the question of the right or expediency of a federated employer to adopt that inconsistent attitude. I have selected victimisation disputes as being notoriously the most intractable of all. One occasion occurs to me very vividly. A particular shop in a specially inflammable district was in a turmoil as a result of the dismissal of a shop steward; the management, naturally, supported the foreman, who had power to discharge without reference to higher authority. Discreet inquiries soon satisfied me that the foreman was entirely to blame; he had acted tyrannically, with no sense of responsibility, and in a provocative manner. Still the management were obdurate. 'J'y suis, j'y reste' was its official attitude. To retire from the position they had taken up would be the beginning of a long list of ills, too numerous to recapitulate, but sure to culminate in the bankruptcy court. So, quietly and unofficially, I waylaid the foreman. He was a decent man, suffering, perhaps, from an exaggerated sense of his own importance, somewhat irascible, with nerves quite obviously on edge. He frankly admitted he had lost his temper. I met the men in their own trade union lodge. I put to them my view of the facts: that the foreman had done what I myself or any one of them might have done, 'made a fool of himself,' and by so doing had most unfortunately committed his employers to a definite course of action to which, rightly or wrongly, but perfectly honestly, they felt it their duty to adhere. The men were satisfied that there had been no intentional victimisation. There and then a reconciliation was



effected between the foreman and the men. The latter acquiesced in the man who was dismissed not being reinstated, but taking a job which I found for him elsewhere. This is but one single instance out of many, but enough to point the moral. There would have been a strike involving over 100,000 men had my efforts failed—all arrangements for it were made—simply because one firm would not recognise and make appeal to the sense of justice in their workmen, which is the very bond of co-operation. The appeal, however, must be made at once, and in the shop where the dispute has arisen. Once delay has allowed the contagion to spread beyond the shop, and to infect the district, the dispute becomes a matter of 'principle,' without any reference whatever to what the principle is, and is elevated into an official struggle between 'organised labour' and 'capitalism.'

Employers, as a rule, are keenly conscious of the qualitative efficiency resulting from co-operation, whether 'simple co-operation,' when a number of men combine to perform the same operation in unison—as, for example, in laying on to a rope—or 'complex co-operation,' usually exemplified by 'division of labour,' where a number of different persons, each responsible only for his own particular job, combine to perform the various constituent items of work going to make a completed whole. What employers do not realise—and their actions are the best proof—is the quantitative efficiency resulting from the co-operation which is largely a matter of good brotherly feeling between employer and employed. That it is purely a question of psychology, very little reflection and still less workshop experience will quickly prove. Yet no real effort has, as yet, been made to create the feeling. The antagonism that exists is palpable at any meeting between employers and employed. The employers' ordinary method of negotiation is to 'concede nothing,' however justly the men may be entitled to the demand. The very term, 'concession,' is indicative of their attitude. Their idea is that too ready an acquiescence, even in a demand supported by justice, may stimulate further demands. What an infertile atmosphere in which to generate co-operation!

Whitley Councils for the self-government of industry are the accepted machinery for transmitting the motive power of co-operation into industrial life. The scheme is now well known.

It recommends that in all works there should be set up workshop committees, consisting of representatives of the management and the men; that in each district there should be a joint district council of representatives of the employers and the trade unions concerned in each industry; and that there should be a national joint council for each industry for the entire country. Experience up-to-date proves that while employers will assist in, or associate themselves with, the formation of joint district or national councils which are sufficiently remote from their respective works, few of them will assist at all in the establishment of workshop committees in their own works. Co-operation as a domestic question assumes a very different form from its academic aspect. The value of co-operation in the mind of an average employer, as secured by the harmonising influence of a workshop committee, is entirely outweighed by its disadvantages: 'If once the men get their foot in, they will not stop till they 'get control of the shop'; 'it will be the end of all shop discipline'; 'we shall no longer be masters in our own house'; 'it will simply be a debating club, and we have no time for that'; 'it will lead to all sorts of imaginary grievances being fomented.' Such objections as these were regarded as conclusive, even by employers to whom I was able to quote cases where the establishment of shop committees had resulted in very great benefit to workshop harmony. Here, in fact, the employer was dead set against co-operation in any form. His ideal was 'individualistic control of industry.' The public detriment that results from such an attitude is incalculable; but such an employer—and there are many of the breed—will go down fighting for his alleged rights of autocratic control, with his colours nailed to the mast.

In the works of such an employer, managers, under-managers, and foremen act on the dogma that there is nothing to be got out of the sympathetic handling of labour. 'It's so much cutting air,' more than one has said to me. If the employer of this type honestly believed there is money in sympathetic treatment of labour, he is far too keen a business man not to try it. But to many employers labour is still only a machine which, as long as it runs in any sort of way, is to be left severely alone, when it jerks or sticks it is to be lubricated with smooth words, professions of the employer's anxiety for its welfare, and 'soft

'sawder' of that kind, for which the men, naturally, have the utmost contempt.

Even if labour were a machine, there is no continuous semi-automatic system of lubrication, such as is essential for any intricate modern mechanism. Let me illustrate the point by a few examples. One prominent employer prided himself on being always personally accessible to his men. He had learned something, but he told me 'it was necessary to protect himself,' and he showed me a small telephonic disc, fixed in an inconspicuous position near his table and connected to an adjoining room. On the employer pressing a button, a clerk in that room placed the receiver round his ears and took down the whole of the interview in shorthand—unbeknown, of course, to the workman. Thus the 'frank and free talk of man to man'—a phrase with a definite meaning in industrial parlance—became a formally recorded interview. This may have been right, but if so, it should have been done openly. How can there ever be true co-operation with such a feeling as that between master and man?

In the fourth year of the war I was seriously dismayed at the antagonism between employers and workmen in an important industry engaged on vital war work. Strike was following on the heels of strike; output was ominously low. I called a conference of representative employers to discuss a remedy for 'the unsatisfactory relationship between masters and men.' At the conference strong exception was taken by the employers' spokesman to the suggestion conveyed in the agenda that there was anything whatever in the relationship that invited criticism. He described it as admirable. He stated that he had not met his men since the outbreak of war, some four years before, and that he saw no necessity for doing so. I pointed out to him that he had received from myself his first intimation of two strikes that had occurred in his own works during the preceding month. That, by general consent of his brother employers, was considered beside the question. The meeting, honestly in its own opinion, resolved that the relationship between employers and employed was all that could be expected, and that there was no necessity for any action. How can co-operation be furthered in face of such purblind self-complacency? Stoppage after stoppage steadily increasing friction, dwindling output, were sufficient refutation. Fortunately the armistice supervened, or the Germans would

have taught those eminent employers how ill-founded was their self-satisfaction.

An eminent employer, holding an official appointment under Government during the war, intimated his opinion, unofficially, at an important departmental Labour Conference, that the effective way to treat the workman was to 'grind him,' and he emphasised his meaning by screwing round the top of his thumb upon the table in a sufficiently explanatory gesture. I there and then invited him to minute his opinion to me officially to that effect in writing. He refused.

A very large number of employers have not realised yet that the sympathetic management of labour is a special art, calling for peculiar qualities of temperament and tact. Until that is accepted as sound economics there can never be co-operation. Technical experience is the usual qualification required of a foreman; seldom, if ever, is the least regard paid to his ability to handle men sympathetically so as to get the best out of them. Yet that, much more than technical capacity, contributes to workshop efficiency. There are many persons, wholly unfitted by Nature to have the charge of men, more especially to perform the responsible duty of taking on and discharging them. Their presence in a shop is a chronic source of irritation, and keeps the men's backs perpetually up. Co-operation, under such conditions, cannot exist. An outsider entering the shop can feel the strained relationship almost intuitively. A sort of nervous tension seems to pervade the place. No cheery words are exchanged between men and manager, as the latter passes through the shop. A notice is often found in the office: 'Workmen must wipe their feet before entering.' As a workman said to me: 'No such direction is given to anyone who comes to place an order.' How much better to say to every one, 'Please wipe your feet.' If a workman wants to see some one in authority he is kept hanging about, losing his piece-work earnings, or brusquely told that the manager is engaged, while all the time he sees other persons admitted with welcome to the office. One manager frankly told me that but for his clerk, who artfully got rid of the workmen always wanting to see him, he would never have had any time to 'do his business.' That indicates the attitude of mind. It is not considered any part of the recognised duty of a manager, using the term in its widest meaning, to apply sympathy, understand-

ing, and fact to the treatment of labour. There is no doubt it requires very great time and patience and prolonged study and investigation of numerous circumstances which are on the surface trivial. A manager is loath to devote to work of that kind time and energy which he thinks, and which his employer certainly thinks, can more profitably be spent in technical and commercial activity.

The problem is how to make and sustain such an appeal to the worker that he will be induced to co-operate with the management. A similar problem confronted myself during part of the war period when I was acting for the Government in charge of the labour in some 2000 odd firms, employing something like 700,000 men. The output of munitions had to be secured and maintained at all costs, so when any trouble occurred the Government department to which the firm was responsible intervened if the management and the men failed to come to a settlement. I gathered together a small band of enthusiastic and far-sighted employers and trade unionists, and in conjunction we made a determined and intensive effort to get right down *au fond* and strike the chords in industrial human nature, on whose vibration co-operation is dependent. A number of simple principles were formulated, which later, as experience grew, were modified in detail. These were made the basis of the appeal, not merely in mass meetings, trade-union lodges, and elsewhere among the men, but also exemplified in the ordinary routine practice of my department. At the time when these principles were first put into operation there were close on 200 strikes a week in the 2000 firms. After a twelvemonths' régime the strikes had fallen regularly, month by month, down to something under ten a week. The employers, it is fair to say, denied that the régime had anything to do with the diminution in the number of strikes. One of the most prominent of them described the principles as 'so much pap.' But the trade unions took a view entirely contrary to that of the employers, and I hold many personal letters from some of the prominent unions attributing the whole of the improvement to the sympathetic régime that had been put into operation. It is not intended to suggest that any State department can run labour better than a private employer; the whole point is that enormous improvement in the relationship between employers and em-

ployed can be effected by the adoption of a methodised system of handling labour based on sympathetic principles. To complete the story, it ought to be mentioned that after sixteen months of this régime the Government department in question felt it was in a position to restore to the employers concerned full control over their own labour. Whatever were the causes, the unhappy result ensued that the relationship between masters and men began from that time rapidly to deteriorate, so much so, that in certain districts mass meetings of all trades passed resolutions calling for the re-establishment of the régime.

To sum the matter up, co-operation is a vital essential for the reconstruction of industry. It is the true antidote to revolution. It will only be forthcoming in industry when sound economic conviction operates in an atmosphere and environment of justice and sympathy. As long as economic fallacy permeates the minds of employers and employed, leading them to reject or belittle the material advantages of co-operation, the latter will never emerge as an integrating force in industry. In the present industrial atmosphere and environment co-operation can never flourish. But fallacy will not be replaced by truth, nor ignorance by knowledge, nor justice and sympathy infused into industrial life by Cabinet Ministers rhetorically attempting to exorcise the old 'wrong spirit' or pathetically invoking, in rotund phrases, the advent of the new 'right spirit.' No solution of the industrial problem is likely to present itself spontaneously. It will not be born of platitudes, however distinguished be their origin or however polished be their phraseology. Nothing but a well-directed national crusade affords the slightest prospect of success. The Government's Industrial Programme of 20th August shows little insight. It indicates but small appreciation of the problems, and consequently proceeds upon no policy.

LYNDEN MACASSEY.


*No. 471 will be published in January 1920*

# INDEX

TO

VOLUME 230

July 1919—October 1919





# INDEX

Titles of Articles are printed in heavy type

- Abbas II., Khedive, 64  
Addis, Sir. C. S., **The Finance of China**, 297-308  
**Africa, The Colour Problem in South**, 78-92; instances of injustice to natives, 79; vexatious laws against the natives, 80, 82; conditions in the native locations, 81; maladministration of the law, 85; labour aspect, 87; absence of a native policy, 88-92  
**Agriculture, the Future of British**, 93-109; effects of the war, 93; pasture or arable land, 95 *et seq.*; intensive cultivation, 96; density of population and supply of labour, 100; the unsatisfactory farmer, 101; desire of returned fighting men to settle on the land, 101; cottage holdings, 102; sitting tenants and security of tenure, 106; landowners and their responsibilities, 108  
**Alcohol—The Drink Problem**, 326-39  
Alexander I., Emperor of Russia—ideals at Congress of Vienna, 1, 6  
Ali Pasha of Yannina, 170  
Allotments, 104  
Alsace-Lorraine—campaign of 1914, 32  
**America, England and**, 227-40  
American Meat Trust, 98, 119  
Archæology—discoveries at Mycenæ and Cnossos, 166 *et seq.*  
Aristarchus, 162 *et seq.*  
Aristotle on Government, 361 *et seq.*  
**Armies, Conscript**, 43-59; limitations of universal military service, 43 *et seq.*; feudalism, 47; professional soldiers, 48; mercenaries, 49; formation of standing armies, 51; militias, 51; universal service under French Revolution and in Prussia, 53; loyalty of the professional soldier to the Government, 56; peril of the discontented soldier under universal service, 58  
Army, British—retreat from Mons, 30; General French's instructions, 36; medical examination and grading of recruits during the war, 130 *et seq.*; **France and the British Army**, 241-61  
Askwith, Sir George—and labour supply for munitions, 224  
Austria-Hungary—possible consequences of break-up, 21  
Balfour, Mr. A. J., *Theism and Humanism*, 142, 155; Irish administration, 281  
Benjamin, M. René, *Anglais en Guerre. Le Major Pipe et son Père*, 247  
Bernstorff, Count—and Sinn Fein, 287 *et seq.*  
Béthune, Maximilien de. *See* Sully, Duke of  
Birrell, Mr. A., and Sinn Fein, 279, 283, 287  
Bolsheviks, Socialist sympathy with, 193  
British Army. *See* Army, British  
Brownlie, Mr. J. T., *quoted*, 389  
Butler, Sir Geoffrey, **Sully's 'Grand Design'**, 262-78  
Canada—organisation of munitions production, 215  
Cape Colony—native grievances, 78-92, *passim*  
Capital—poverty not due to, 202; **Taxation of Capital and 'Ability to Pay'**, 371-86; **Economic Fallacies in Industry**, 387-406  
Cambridge University—**The Future of Oxford and Cambridge**, 178-89; question of State aid, 180  
Carson, Sir Edward, 293  
Carter, Mr. Henry, 334  
Casement, Sir Roger, 283  
Castlereagh, Lord—and the peace settlement (1815), 3, 10

- Cattle raising, 93-109, *passim*; feeding stuffs, 99
- China, The Finance of**, 297-308; currency, 297; banking system, 299; taxation, 301; revenue, 303; budgets, 304; foreign debt, 305; India compared, 307; prospects for the future, 307
- Cnossos—Sir Arthur Evans's discoveries, 167
- Coalminers—physical statistics, 136
- Colvin, Sir Auckland, 61
- Competition, trade, 112 *et seq.*
- Conference of Paris (1919), 1 *et seq.*; procedure, 7
- Congress of Vienna (1919), 1 *et seq.*
- Conscript Armies**, 43
- Constitution, Individual Liberty and the**, 173-79
- Co-partnership, 397
- Corn growing, 96
- Cottage holdings, 102
- Cromer, late Lord, *quoted*, 70 *et seq.*
- Cunynghame, Sir Henry—**Individual Liberty and the Constitution**, 172
- Czecho-Slovakia—incorporation of German fringe of Bohemia, 18
- Dairy farming, 99
- Dalziel, Sir Henry—criticism of ordnance department, 210
- Dane, Sir Richard, 299, 303
- Danzig question, 17
- Death duties, 384
- Democracy in England**, 358-70
- De Montmorency, Mr. J. E. G., **The Future of Oxford and Cambridge**, 178-89
- Denmark—agriculture, 100
- De Valera, 291
- Devoy, John, 287
- Downham, Lord—criticism of Housing Act, 314
- Drink Problem, The**, 326-39; inception of the Central Control Board, 327; physiological objections to prohibition, 328; correct treatment, the suppression of excess, 335; incidence of excessive drinking, 337; drastic compulsory action deprecated, 338
- Dufferin, Lord, 61, 65
- Economic Fallacies in Industry, More**, 387-406
- Economic Journal*, *quoted*, 375
- Ecluse, L', 267
- Education—State aid for universities, 178-89, *passim*; position of public schools, 340-57, *passim*
- Egyptian Nationalism**, 60-77; demand for autonomy, 60; chamber of notables, 60; provincial councils, 61; extension of powers of Legislative Assembly and Council, 62; Lord Kitchener's reforms: The new Legislative Assembly, 63, 66; opposition to British influence, 64, 67; Saad Pasha Zaglul's influence, 68; the recent political disturbances, 70; Lord Cromer's criticism of Nationalist aims, 71; the demand for the diminution of British influence in the Civil Service, 71; dangers of premature concessions, 74 *et seq.*
- Elizabeth, Queen—and Sully's 'Grand Design,' 266, 269
- Elliot, Mr. Hugh, **The Drink Problem**, 326-39
- Employers' organisations, 110-29, *passim*
- England and America**, 227
- Estate duties, 383
- Ethical Side of Socialism, The**, 190-206
- Etsch valley, cession of the upper, 18
- Evans, Sir Arthur—discoveries at Cnossos, 167
- Export trade—advantages of combination, 117
- Farming. *See* Agriculture
- Fayle, Mr. C. Ernest, **Trade Combinations**, 110-29
- 'Fencible men,' 45
- Feudalism, 45
- Fisher, Mr. H. L.—and State aid for universities, 180
- Foch, Marshal, 25
- Food production, 95
- France—Louis XIV. and standing armies, 51; militia system, 52; universal service during revolution, 53; United States and, 239; Sully's negotiations with Queen Elizabeth and James I., 278 *et seq.*

- France and the British Army, 241-61  
 French, Field-Marshal Viscount, '1914'  
 reviewed, 22; his instructions on taking  
 command of Expeditionary Force, 36  
 French theory of war, 24 *et seq.*; ma-  
 nœuvre with general reserve, 29  
 Fruit farming, 103
- Game preserves, 109  
 Gentz, *quoted*, 2, 10  
 German colonies—arguments for restora-  
 tion, 19  
 Germany—possible effects of the Peace  
 treaty, 15; the territorial adjustments,  
 17; indemnity, 18; effect of conscrip-  
 tion, 43 *et seq.*  
 German theory of war, 24 *et seq.*; d-  
 trine of envelopment, 28  
 Gibbon, *quoted*, 45  
 God—Recent Moral Arguments for  
 Theism, 142-60  
 Gorst, the late Sir Eldon, 61, 66  
 Government—Individual Liberty and  
 the Constitution, 172; Democracy  
 in England, 358  
 Graham, Mr. Duncan, *quoted*, 197  
 Greece, ancient—The Higher Criticism  
 of Homer, 161-67; Aristotle's theories  
 of Government, 361  
 Griffith, Arthur, 282  
 Gwynn, M.P., Capt. Stephen, France  
 and the British Army, 241-61
- Haig, Sir Douglas—on munition supply,  
*ante* 1916, 216  
 Hannay, Mr. David, Conscript Armies,  
 43  
 Hart, Prof. Bushnell, *quoted*, 13  
 Hart, Sir Robert—estimate of Chinese  
 revenue, 303  
 Health—national statistics, 130 *et seq.*  
 Henry IV., King of France—Sully's  
 'Grand Design,' 262 *et seq.*  
 Holland, Mr. Bernard, Municipal  
 Housing, 309-25  
 'Holy Alliance, The,' 2 *et seq.*  
 Home Rule—Ulster and Sinn Fein,  
 279-96
- Homer, The Higher Criticism of, 161-  
 71; German theories, 162 *et seq.*;  
 English theories, 164; Schliemann's  
 discoveries, 166  
 Hoover, Mr., 234  
 House of Lords—reform, 175  
 Housing, Municipal, 309-25; powers  
 and functions of Local Authorities, 309;  
 effect of land taxes, 311; effects of the  
 war, 312; analysis of Housing Act  
 (1919), 312; local and State aid, 314;  
 tenement dwellings, 315; dangers of  
 municipal ownership, 318; planning  
 of building schemes, 319  
 Huxley, Prof. H., Romanes lecture  
 analysed, 152
- Income tax, 372 *et seq.*  
 India—taxation compared with Chinese,  
 307  
 Individual Liberty and the Constitu-  
 tion, 172-77  
 Industry, More Economic Fallacies  
 in, 387-406  
 Ireland—Ulster and Sinn Fein, 279-  
 96; the separatist movement, 279;  
 boycotting and criminal outrages, 281;  
 origins of Sinn Fein, 281; its organisa-  
 tion, 283; intrigues with Germany,  
 283, 286; Nationalists and the war,  
 285; the rebellion (1916), 286; sub-  
 sequent revolutionary plotting and  
 threats, 291; Ulster's war services,  
 293; Nationalist opposition to con-  
 scription, 295  
 Irish Nationalist party, 281 *et seq.*
- James I., King—Sully's visit to, 271  
 Joffre, Marshal—1914 campaign, 33
- Kant, 142 *et seq.*  
 Keeling, Mr. H. V., 'Bolshevism,' 195  
 Kellaway, Mr.—speeches on munitions  
 organisation, 211, 216  
 Kings, doctrine of divine right of, 172  
 Kitchener, Lord—and the Egyptian  
 assembly, 63, 68; munitions contro-  
 versy, 207-26  
 Kuno, Meyer, 283

## Labour :—

- Capital, co-operation with, 389  
**Economic Fallacies in Industry, More**, 387-406  
 Strikes—the irritation strike, 198 ;  
 strikes by public servants, 205  
 Theft, advocacy of systematic, 197  
 Victimization, 399  
 Labour party—ethics, 190-206 ; programme, 359  
 Land courts, 107  
 Land problems, 93-109, *passim* ; sitting tenant and security of tenure, 106 ; dangers of municipal ownership, 318  
 Land taxes—effect on housing, 311  
 Langlois, Gen., *quoted*, 25  
 Latin America—League of Nations and, 12  
 Leaf, Dr. Walter—Homeric theories, 164  
 League of Nations—proposals considered at Congress of Vienna (1815), 3 ; international friendship and goodwill discussed, 4 ; force of public opinion, 6 ; provisions of Covenant of 28th April examined, 9 ; the principle of intervention, 10 ; admission of dominions, 11 ; position of Monroe doctrine, 12 ; position of Germany, 15 ; American opposition, 236 ; Sully's 'Grand Design,' 262-78.  
 Le Cateau, battle of, 31, 39  
**Liberty and the Constitution, Individual**, 172-77  
 Lloyd George, Mr. D.—**Munitions and Mr. Lloyd George**, 207-26  
 Locre, the Convent at, 245  
 London — housing problems, 309-25, *passim*  
 Louis XIV., King—formation of large standing armies, 51  
 Lovedale Mission Institution, 89  
 Low, A. Maurice, **England and America**, 227-40  
 Lynn, M.P., Mr. R. J., **Ulster and Sinn Fein**, 279-96  
 Macassey, Sir Lynden, **More Economic Fallacies in Industries**, 387-406  
 M'Ilwraith, Sir Malcolm, **Egyptian Nationalism**, 60-77  
*Magazine for Young Workers*, 193  
 Mahon, Major-Gen. R., **Munitions and Mr. Lloyd George**, 207-26  
 Maine, Sir Henry, *quoted*, 370  
 Mais, Mr. S. P. B., *The Education of a Philanderer*, 349  
 Malet, Sir Edward, 61  
 Manufacturing — economies and advantages from combination, 117 ; economic fallacies, 387-406  
 Marne, battle of, 34  
 Marx, Karl—theories criticised, 199, 390  
 Maurice, Maj.-Gen. Sir F., 'Forty Days in 1914' reviewed, 22  
 Maurois, M. André, *Les Silences du Colonel Bramble*, 245, 251  
 Maury, Lieut. François, *L'Apogée de l'Effort Militaire Française*, 249  
 Meat production, 97 *et seq.*  
 Military service, universal—limitations ; necessity for retaining proportion of population for productive work during war, 43 *et seq.*  
 Militias, 51  
 Mill, J. S., *quoted*, 379  
 Milk production, 99  
*Mind, quoted*, 154  
 'Miners' Next Step, The,' 198  
 Monopolies, 119  
 Monroe doctrine—League of Nations and, 12  
 Mons, the retreat from, 30  
 Moore, Dr. G. E., *quoted*, 154  
**Moral Arguments for Theism Recent**, 142-60  
 Morgan, Mr. E. Strachan, **Democracy in England**, 358-70  
 Morse, Mr. H. B., 303  
**Municipal Housing**, 309-25  
**Munitions and Mr. Lloyd George**, 207-26  
 Murray, Prof. Gilbert—Homeric theories, 164  
 Mycenae—Schliemann's discoveries, 166  
 Napoleon Buonaparte—failure due to exhaustion of resources by conscription, 44  
 Natal—native grievances, 78-92, *passim*  
*Nation, The* — controversy over the public schools, 341 *et seq.*  
**Nation, The Physique of the**, 130

- Nationalisation of industry, 124  
 National Service, Ministry of—work of  
 Medical Department, 130 *et seq.*  
 Naturalism, 145 *et seq.*  
 Natural selection and higher moral  
 sentiments, 145  
 Navy League—pamphlet on strategical  
 importance of Ireland, 293  
 Newton, Sir Charles—and the My-  
 cenæan civilisation, 167
- O'Dwyer, Dr. (R. C. Bishop of Limerick),  
 290  
 'Economies Royales,' 262 *et seq.*  
 Olivier, Sir Sidney, *quoted*, 342, 345  
 Ordnance Department—organisation of  
 munitions supplies, 207-26  
 Oxford University—**The Future of  
 Oxford and Cambridge**, 178-89;  
 question of State aid, 180
- Parker, Mr. E. H., *China*, 302 *et seq.*  
 Parliament—the case against a single  
 chamber, 172-77; Parliamentary  
 Government, 358  
 Parnell, C. S., *quoted*, 280  
 Parnell Commission Report, 281  
**Peace Settlements (1815 and 1919),  
 The**, 1-15  
 Phillips, Prof. W. Alison, **The Peace  
 Settlements (1815 and 1919)**, 1-15  
 Philosophy—**Moral Arguments for  
 Theism**, 142-60  
**Physique of the Nation, The**, 130-41  
 Plebs League—pamphlet, 199  
 Population—density of: relation to  
 agriculture, 100; **The Physique of  
 the Nation**, 130-41  
 Poverty—not due to capitalism, 202  
 Press-gang, 53  
 Prices—combinations and, 119; State  
 regulation, 122  
 Pringle-Pattison, Mr. A. Seth, *The  
 Idea of God*, 148, 155  
 Profits—State regulation, 122  
 Profit sharing, 397  
 Prussia—and universal military service,  
 53  
 Public health—**The Physique of the  
 Nation**, 130-41
- Public Schools, The**, 340-57  
 Public service—Socialists and the Ideal  
 of, 204
- Rashdall, Dr., *The Theory of Good and  
 Evil*, 144  
 Reading, Lord, 232  
 'Red Catechism, The,' 391  
*Red Dawn, The*, 193, 197  
 Reid, Sir Archdall, 336  
 Restriction of output, 120, 197  
 Ridgeway, Sir West—Homeric theory,  
 168  
 Rivarol, *quoted*, 55  
 Rousseau's *Contrat Social*, 173  
 Russia—Bolshevik régime, 193
- Saad Pasha Zaglul, 68  
 Saar Valley, temporary occupation of, 17  
 Sabotage, 198  
 Sambre, campaign on the (1914), 29  
 Schliemann, Heinrich—Homeric  
 discoveries, 166  
 Scully, Mr. W. C., **The Colour  
 Problem in South Africa**, 78-92  
 Sekhret, Hadji, 170  
 Selborne, Lord—on native grievances in  
 South Africa, 88  
 Seligman, *quoted*, 382  
 Small Holdings, 93-109, *passim*  
 Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir Horace—battle  
 of Le Cateau, 31; Gen. French's  
 criticisms, 38  
**Socialism, The Ethical Side of**, 190-  
 206; the appeal to envy, 190; sym-  
 pathy with Bolsheviks, 193; advocacy  
 of systematic theft, 197; the 'irrita-  
 tion strike,' 198; sabotage, 198; dis-  
 honesty of Marxian doctrine, 201;  
 the ideal of public service, 204; strikes  
 of State servants, 205  
 Sokoloff, M., 196  
 Sorley, Prof. W. R., 151, 155  
 South Africa. *See* Africa, South  
 Stamp, Mr. J. C., **Taxation of Capital  
 and 'Ability to Pay'**, 371-86  
 State, The—**Individual Liberty and  
 the Constitution**, 176; **Democracy  
 in England**, 358  
 Sully, Duke of—Sully's 'Grand  
 Design,' 262

- Tawney, Mr. R. H., 352
- Taxation of Capital and 'Ability to Pay,' 371-86
- Temperance—The Drink Problem, 326-39
- Tennant, Rev. F. R., Recent Moral Arguments for Theism, 142-60
- Tewfik Pasha, Khedive, 64
- Theism: Recent Moral Arguments for, 142-60
- The Times*—and the munitions controversy, 208-20
- Trade Combinations, 110-29; tendency towards combination, 110 *et seq.*; many forms of association, 114; 'honourable understandings,' 115; associations to regulate trade, 115; the combine, 116; consolidation in a single company, 116; advantages to export trade: economies, and standardisation, 117; co-operative intelligence and research, 118; effect on prices, 119; elimination of speculation, 119; restriction of output, 120; disadvantages, 122; question of State control of industry, 122 *et seq.*; the proposed special tribunal of investigation, 125; the importance of publicity, 126
- Trade Disputes Act, 369
- Trade unions, 120, 368 *et seq.*
- Traill, Mr. H. D., *quoted*, 65 *et seq.*
- Transvaal—native grievances, 78-92, *passim*
- Troy—the Homeric controversy, 161-71
- Trusts, 110-29
- Turgot, 52
- Turkey—break up of, 21
- Ulster and Sinn Fein, 279-96
- United States:—
- Anti-Trust legislation, 122
  - Constitution, 176
  - France, relations with, 239
  - Great Britain, relations with—
    - England and America, 227-40;
    - anti-British feeling still strong, 229; strained relations from civil war until 1917, 235; unfortunate effects of official propaganda, 236;
    - same language a drawback, 238;
    - fundamental differences of British and American characters, 238
  - League of Nations and the Monroe doctrine, 12, 236
  - Meat Trust, 98, 119
  - Property tax, 382
  - Trade campaign, foreign, 235
- Universities—The Future of Oxford and Cambridge, 178-89; question of State aid, 180
- Value—Marxian theories criticised, 394
- Vegetable culture, 96 *et seq.*
- Von Kluck, Gen.—1914 campaign, 31
- Wace, Mr. A. J. B., *The Higher Criticism of Homer*, 161-71
- War—relation between productive work and military service, 43
- War, the Great:—
- British Armies, French views of, 241-61
  - Ireland and, 283 *et seq.*
  - Munitions controversy, 207-26
  - 1914 campaign—Conceptions of War in 1914, 22-42; German plan of envelopment, 28; French plans, 32; battle of the Marne, 34; British Expeditionary Force and Gen. French's instructions, 35
  - Peace Settlement, 1-15
  - United States, effect in, 227 *et seq.*
- War Office—organisation of munitions supply, 207-26
- Ward, Mrs Humphrey—'England's Effort,' 214
- Webb, Mr. William, *Garden First in Land Development*, 322
- Whitehouse, Mr. J. H., *The English Public Schools: A Symposium*, 349
- Williams, Major Orlo, *The Public Schools*, 340-57
- Wilson, President Woodrow—on international friendship and goodwill, 4; champion of new diplomacy, 7; League of Nations and the Monroe doctrine, 13
- Wolf, Herr—Homeric theories, 161-71, *passim*
- Wood, Robert, 162
- Zaghlul, Saad Pasha, 68







TE  
LE

Edin. Review 1919  
230

Author

Title

University of Toronto  
Library

DO NOT  
REMOVE  
THE  
CARD  
FROM  
THIS  
POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket  
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File"  
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU

