

EDUCATION  
ACCORDING TO SOME  
MODERN MASTERS



CHARLES FRANKLIN THWING

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Education According to Some Modern Masters.

EDUCATION  
ACCORDING TO SOME  
MODERN MASTERS

BY

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## PREFATORY NOTE

**E**DUCATION is in peril of losing its human touch. Important as technical means, methods and conditions are, there is a belief, and a danger, too, that these elements may take to themselves an importance not fundamentally belonging to them. In the desire to emphasize the large human relations, I have made these interpretations of the educational masters who, first and last, are humanists. Being great humanists, they have tried to see education, as they have tried to see other great human forces, in its relations. In my turn, I have simply tried to interpret and properly to relate their utterances.

It is my present hope to make a similar interpretation of the Greek and Latin masters and of the medieval. For, each age indeed should have a voice, moving and quickening for every other age of the race and of the races of man.

C. F. T.

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# EDUCATION ACCORDING TO SOME MODERN MASTERS

## I

### EDUCATION ACCORDING TO EMERSON

**S**CIENCE, knowledge, the scholar, the intellect, as well as education, are the great terms under which Emerson presents his thoughts regarding our central subject. Little does it signify which of the quintette of words is used. For, science and knowledge are the materials of which education makes avail, and by the use of which the intellect creates the scholar. The scholar represents the force in education who, in turn, is himself the product of education. In this personality called the scholar, the intellect is the chief part, guiding, inspiring, by its own might enlarging itself and all that it approaches. Education, in turn, commands science and all knowledge as its tool and content, disciplining the intellect, creating the scholar. Of all the words of the quintette education is the term most germinal, fundamental and comprehensive.

In Emerson's presentation of this great unit

composed of diverse elements, education is not found as an orderly process. It is not seen as an art, much less as a science. Its nature is interpreted with aptness, grandeur and inspiring impressiveness, but is not definitely articulated. Its purposes, and in turn its effects, are indicated with fullness, diversity and weight, not at all with scholarly orderliness. Its methods are outlined and its forces made known, but not in sequence. Its conditions and limitations are drawn up with philosophical comprehensiveness, breadth, depth and height, but the presentation lacks precision.

We may thank God that the educational gospel of Emerson is as it is, and that it is not scholastic. It is life, and life, although lived under recognized principles, is not subject to prescription. Emerson's idea of education calls up picturesque visions of the Concord meadows. His thought wanders on quietly like the Concord River, and its reflection of forest and field, of horizon and zenith, suggests the Concord landscapes.

Emerson's own education gives a prophetic intimation of the variety of his interpretation of the forms and forces of education. The regular course of Harvard College, which he entered in 1817, did not command his attention, and he left, after pur-

suing it for four years, feeling, in the words of James Elliot Cabot, his biographer,

that the college had done little for him. He found there but little nutriment suited to his appetite, and strayed off, though with some misgivings, to other pastures. In one of his journals long afterwards, he speaks of "the instinct which leads the youth who has no faculty for mathematics, and weeps over the impossible Analytical Geometry, to console his defeats with Chaucer and Montaigne, with Plutarch and Plato at night." . . . "The boy at college apologizes for not learning the tutor's tasks, and tries to learn them; but stronger nature gives him Otway and Massinger to read, or betrays him into a stroll to Mount Auburn, in study hours. The poor boy, instead of thanking the gods and slighting the mathematical tutor, ducks before the functionary, and poisons his fine pleasures by a perpetual penance."

In his own way he was industrious; feeling vaguely that, for him, power of expression was more important than philological or scientific training.

Of his college standing Mr. Cabot says:

The rest of the course (except mathematics) he passed through without discredit though without distinction, and came out somewhat above the middle of his class in college rank.

And he adds:

It may be doubted whether under any system he would have been a student of books. It was not in his nature; he

could never, he said in after years, deal with other people's facts and he never made the attempt.<sup>1</sup>

The subject to be educated, according to Emerson, is man, and this man is a youth. Youth in turn is in part a temporary thing, and is only in part to be interpreted in terms of manhood, of interest, of responsiveness, of contagious and absorbing enthusiasms and of immortal hilarity.

Education, according to Emerson, is to be understood, not through formal definition, but through consideration of its purposes and effects, its methods, forces, conditions and values. Without giving a formal definition himself, he adopts the great definition of John Milton. He holds that in all English literature there is no "more noble outline of a wise external education than that which he [Milton] drew up, at the age of thirty-six, in his Letter to Samuel Hartlib."<sup>2</sup>

The college, in giving education, deals at once with truth and personality. It has "to teach you geometry, or the lovely laws of space and figure; chemistry, botany, zoölogy, the streaming of thought into form, and the precipitation of atoms

<sup>1</sup>"A Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson," James Elliot Cabot, Houghton, Mifflin and Co., Vol. I, pp. 56, 57.

<sup>2</sup>"Milton," Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Houghton, Mifflin and Co., Centenary Edition, Vol. XII., p. 256.

which Nature is.”<sup>3</sup> But education is also personal. It is

the happy meeting of the young soul, filled with the desire, with the living teacher who has already made the passage from the centre forth, step by step, along the intellectual roads to the theory and practice of special science. Now if there be genius in the scholar, that is, a delicate sensibility to the laws of the world, and the power to express them again in some new form, he is made to find his own way. He will greet joyfully the wise teacher, but colleges and teachers are no wise essential to him; he will find teachers everywhere.<sup>4</sup>

The lower purpose of education is the object of ridicule by Mr. Emerson. The ground is altogether too common of which he makes fun. It is said that

the people have the power, and if they are not instructed to sympathize with the intelligent, reading, trading and governing class; inspired with a taste for the same competitions and prizes, they will upset the fair pageant of Judicature, and perhaps lay a hand on the sacred muniments of wealth itself, and new distribute the land.<sup>5</sup>

And a still lower purpose may prevail. One will hear every day the maxims of a low prudence. You will hear that the first duty is to get land and money, place and

<sup>3</sup>“The Celebration of Intellect,” Complete Works, etc., *Ibid.*, p. 127.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 128.

<sup>5</sup>“The Conservative,” Complete Works, etc., Vol. I., p. 320.

name. "What is this Truth you seek? what is this Beauty?" men will ask, with derision. If nevertheless God have called any of you to explore truth and beauty, be bold, be firm, be true. When you shall say, "As others do, so will I: I renounce, I am sorry for it, my early visions; I must eat the good of the land and let learning and romantic expectations go, until a more convenient season;"—then dies the man in you; then once more perish the buds of art, and poetry, and science, as they have died already in a thousand thousand men. The hour of that choice is the crisis of your history, and see that you hold yourself fast by the intellect. It is this domineering temper of the sensual world that creates the extreme need of the priests of science; and it is the office and right of the intellect to make and not take its estimate.<sup>6</sup>

No such reasoning has value with this philosopher who is at once transcendental and experimental. The education which a man receives is recreation of the man, or at least a confirmation of the original creation in which he was made.

Humanly speaking, the school, the college, society, make the difference between men. All the fairy tales of Aladdin or the invisible Gyges or the talisman that opens Kings' palaces or the enchanted halls underground or in the sea, are only fictions to indicate the one miracle of intellectual enlargement. When a man stupid becomes a man inspired, when one and the same man passes out of the torpid into the perceiving state, leaves the din of trifles, the stupor of the senses, to enter into the quasi-omniscience of high thought,—up and

<sup>6</sup>"Literary Ethics," Complete Works, etc., *Ibid.*, p. 185.



down, around, all limits disappear. No horizon shuts down. He sees things in their causes, all facts in their connection.<sup>7</sup>

The scholar, as I have intimated, is the force in education and also its fruit. His function is a great and precious one.

The scholar, when he comes, will be known by an energy that will animate all who see him. The labor of ambition and avarice will appear fumbling beside his. In the right hands, literature is not resorted to as a consolation, and by the broken and decayed, but as a decalogue. In this country we are fond of results and of short ways to them; and most in this department. In our experiences, learning is not learned, nor is genius wise. The name of the Scholar is taken in vain. We who should be the channel of that unwearable Power which never sleeps, must give our diligence no holidays. Other men are planting and building, baking and tanning, running and sailing, heaving and carrying, each that he may peacefully execute the fine function by which they all are helped. Shall he play, whilst their eyes follow him from far with reverence, attributing to him the delving in great fields of thought, and conversing with supernatural allies? If he is not kindling his torch or collecting oil, he will fear to go by a workshop; he will not dare to hear the music of a saw or plane; the steam-engine will reprimand, the steam-pipe will hiss at him; he cannot look a blacksmith in the eye; in the field he will be shamed by mowers and reapers. The speculative man, the scholar, is the right hero. He is brave, because he sees the omnipotence of that which inspires him. Is there only one courage and one warfare? I

<sup>7</sup> "Education," Complete Works, etc., Vol. X., p. 126.

cannot manage sword and rifle; can I not therefore be brave? I thought there were as many courages as men. Is an armed man the only hero? Is a man only the breech of a gun or the haft or a bowie-knife? Men of thought fail in fighting down malignity, because they wear other armor than their own. Let them decline henceforward foreign methods and foreign courages. Let them do that which they can do. Let them fight by their strength, not by their weakness. It seems to me that the thoughtful man needs no armor but this—concentration.<sup>8</sup>

The scholar also has a special function in ministering to the joy of life. Emerson says:

I think the peculiar office of scholars in a careful and gloomy generation is to be (as the poets were called in the Middle Ages) Professors of the Joyous Science, detectors and delineators of occult symmetries and unpublished beauties; heralds of civility, nobility, learning and wisdom; affirmers of the one law, yet as those who should affirm it in music and dancing; expressors themselves of that firm and cheerful temper, infinitely removed from sadness, which reigns through the kingdoms of chemistry, vegetation and animal life. Every natural power exhilarates; a true talent delights the possessor first. A celebrated musician was wont to say, that men knew not how much more he delighted himself with his playing than he did others; for if they knew, his hearers would rather demand of him than give him a reward. The scholar is here to fill others with love and courage by confirming their trust in the love and wisdom which are at the heart of all things; to affirm noble sentiments; to hear them

<sup>8</sup>“The Scholar,” *Complete Works, etc., Ibid.*, pp. 273-74.



wherever spoken, out of the deeps of ages, out of the obscurities of barbarous life, and to republish them:—to untune nobody, but to draw all men after the truth, and to keep men spiritual and sweet.<sup>9</sup>

In the broadest way, the scholar, at once the subject and the force of education,

is here to be the beholder of the real; self-centred amidst the superficial; here to revere the dominion of a serene necessity and be its pupil and apprentice by tracing everything home to a cause; here to be sobered, not by the cares of life, as men say, no, but by the depth of his draughts of the cup of immortality.<sup>10</sup>

The scholar is both the thinker and the expositor. He represents true wisdom. He reveals, and he is able to reveal, because he is a learner. Being a thinker and revealer, he is a master. He embodies the Napoleonic command. Bearing the yoke in his youth, enduring toil as a good soldier, he is able through obedience to become a first-rate commander. He unites in himself the two poles of reason and common sense. Lacking reason, his philosophy is utilitarian; lacking common sense, it becomes too vague for life's uses.

Happy is the lot of the scholar in this new world.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 262.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 264.

In an address given at Dartmouth College in the year 1838, Mr. Emerson said:

I have reached the middle age of man; yet I believe I am not less glad or sanguine at the meeting of scholars, than when, a boy, I first saw the graduates of my own College assembled at their anniversary. Neither years nor books have yet availed to extirpate a prejudice then rooted in me, that a scholar is the favorite of Heaven and earth, the excellency of his country, the happiest of men. His duties lead him directly into the holy ground where other men's aspirations only point. His successes are occasions of the purest joy to all men. Eyes is he to the blind; feet is he to the lame. His failures, if he is worthy, are inlets to higher advantages. And because the scholar by every thought he thinks extends his dominion into the general mind of men, he is not one, but many. The few scholars in each country, whose genius I know, seem to me not individuals, but societies; and when events occur of great import, I count over these representatives of opinion, whom they will affect, as if I were counting nations. And even if his results were incommunicable; if they abode in his own spirit; the intellect hath somewhat so sacred in its possessions that the fact of his existence and pursuits would be a happy omen.<sup>11</sup>

Although happy, the scholar in America is not to sit down in listless idleness.

Here you are set down, scholars and idealists, as in a barbarous age; amidst insanity, to calm and guide it; amidst fools and blind, to see the right done; among violent pro-

<sup>11</sup> "Literary Ethics," Complete Works, etc., Vol. I., p. 155.

prietors, to check self-interest, stone-blind and stone-deaf, by considerations of humanity to the workman and to his child; amongst angry politicians swelling with self-esteem, pledged to parties, pledged to clients, you are to make valid the large considerations of equity and good sense; under bad governments to force on them, by your persistence, good laws. Around that immovable persistency of yours, statesmen, legislatures, must revolve, denying you, but not less forced to obey.<sup>12</sup>

In this educational process, all forces, even the whole world itself, educates. The teachers are found in earth, air, sky and sea, as well as in humanity itself.

We have many teachers; we are in this world for culture, to be instructed in realities, in the laws of moral and intelligent nature; and our education is not conducted by toys and luxuries, but by austere and rugged masters, by poverty, solitude, passions, War, Slavery; to know that Paradise is under the shadow of swords; that divine sentiments which are always soliciting us are breathed into us from on high, and are an offset to a Universe of suffering and crime; that self-reliance, the height and perfection of man, is reliance on God.<sup>13</sup> To breathe, to sleep, is wonderful. But never to know the Cause, the Giver, and infer his character and will! Of what import this vacant sky, these puffing elements, these insignificant lives full of selfish loves and quarrels and ennui? Everything is prospective, and man is to live hereafter.

<sup>12</sup> "Progress of Culture," Complete Works, etc., Vol. VIII, p. 230.

<sup>13</sup> "The Fugitive Slave Law," Complete Works, etc., Vol. XI, p. 236.

That the world is for his education is the only sane solution of the enigma.<sup>14</sup>

The force, however, that does really educate is the teacher, the man teaching. The highest character makes the most worthy instructor. Personality is the chief value. The communication of character is more than the communication of formal truth. In many places and under diverse forms does Mr. Emerson inculcate this great principle.

The man may teach by doing, and not otherwise. If he can communicate himself he can teach, but not by words. He teaches who gives, and he learns who receives. There is no teaching until the pupil is brought into the same state or principle in which you are; a transfusion takes place; he is you and you are he; then is a teaching, and by no unfriendly chance or bad company can he ever quite lose the benefit. But your propositions run out of one ear as they ran in at the other. We see it advertised that Mr. Grand will deliver an oration on the Fourth of July, and Mr. Hand before the Mechanics' Association, and we do not go thither, because we know that these gentlemen will not communicate their own character and experience to the company. If we had reason to expect such a confidence we should go through all inconvenience and opposition. The sick would be carried in litters. But a public oration is an escapade, a non-

<sup>14</sup> "Immortality," Complete Works, etc., Vol. VIII., p. 334.

committal, an apology, a gag, and not a communication, not a speech, not a man.<sup>15</sup>

The man who thus teaches is a scholar, and the scholar is to have resources. In his first great oration, Emerson interprets with detail the resources of the American scholar, which consist, he says, of nature, of the past and of action. These resources are primarily resources of the intellect. As he says, in the college address of 1838,

The resources of the scholar are proportioned to his confidence in the attributes of the Intellect. The resources of the scholar are coextensive with nature and truth, yet can never be his unless claimed by him with an equal greatness of mind. He cannot know them until he has beheld with awe the infinitude and impersonality of the intellectual power. When he has seen that it is not his, nor any man's, but that it is the soul which made the world, and that it is all accessible to him, he will know that he, as its minister, may rightfully hold all things subordinate and answerable to it. A divine pilgrim in nature, all things attend his steps. Over him stream the flying constellations; over him streams Time, as they, scarcely divided into months and years. He inhales the year as a vapor: its fragrant midsummer breath, its sparkling January heaven. And so pass into his mind, in bright transfiguration, the grand events of history, to take a new order and scale from him. He is the world; and the epochs and heroes of chronology are pictorial images, in which his thoughts are told. There is no event but sprung

<sup>15</sup> "Spiritual Laws," Complete Works, etc., Vol. II., p. 152.

somewhere from the soul of man; and therefore there is none but the soul of man can interpret.<sup>16</sup>

These resources increase, too, with the growth of the intellect. The scholar's treasures are not to be slight. A larger receptiveness stands for increasing power. Its development is a history of alternating expansions and concentrations. Such growth means the augmentation of the power of the teacher and of education.

But it is ever to be remembered that the teacher is an individual, a person. The teacher is to be his own individual self. Imitation and counterfeit are weaknesses. He says:

I advise teachers to cherish mother-wit. I assume that you will keep the grammar, reading, writing and arithmetic in order; 't is easy and of course you will. But smuggle in a little contraband wit, fancy, imagination, thought. If you have a taste which you have suppressed because it is not shared by those about you, tell them that. Set this law up, whatever becomes of the rules of the school: they must not whisper, much less talk; but if one of the young people says a wise thing, greet it, and let all the children clap their hands. They shall have no book but school-books in the room; but if one has brought in a Plutarch or Shakspeare or Don Quixote or Goldsmith or any other good book, and understands what he reads, put him at once at the head of the class. Nobody shall be disorderly, or leave his desk without permission, but

<sup>16</sup> "Literary Ethics," Complete Works, etc., Vol. I., p. 158.



if a boy runs from his bench, or a girl, because the fire falls, or to check some injury that a little dastard is inflicting behind his desk on some helpless sufferer, take away the medal from the head of the class and give it on the instant to the brave rescuer. If a child happens to show that he knows any fact about astronomy, or plants, or birds, or rocks, or history, that interests him and you, hush all the classes and encourage him to tell it so that all may hear.<sup>17</sup>

But this individuality on the part of the teacher is never to overcome the individuality on the part of the student. To respect that student, his personality, even his idiosyncrasies, is a primary purpose.

Let us wait and see what is this new creation, of what new organ the great Spirit had need when it incarnated this new Will. A new Adam in the garden, he is to name all the beasts in the field, all the gods in the sky. And jealous provision seems to have been made in his constitution that you shall not invade and contaminate him with the worn weeds of your language and opinions. The charm of life is this variety of genius, these contrasts and flavors by which Heaven has modulated the identity of truth, and there is a perpetual hankering to violate this individuality, to warp his ways of thinking and behavior to resemble or reflect your thinking and behavior. A low self-love in the parent desires that his child should repeat his character and fortune; an expectation which the child, if justice is done him, will nobly disappoint. By working on the theory that

<sup>17</sup> "Education," Complete Works, etc., Vol. X., p. 157.

this resemblance exists, we shall do what in us lies to defeat his proper promise and produce the ordinary and mediocre. I suffer whenever I see that common sight of a parent or senior imposing his opinion and way of thinking and being on a young soul to which they are totally unfit. Can not we let people be themselves, and enjoy life in their own way? You are trying to make that man another *you*. One's enough.

Or we sacrifice the genius of the pupil, the unknown possibilities of his nature, to a neat and safe uniformity, as the Turks whitewash the costly mosaics of ancient art which the Greeks left on their temple walls. Rather let us have men whose manhood is only the continuation of their boyhood, natural characters still; such are able and fertile for heroic action; and not that sad spectacle with which we are too familiar, educated eyes in uneducated bodies.<sup>18</sup>

In further interpretation, Mr. Emerson says, in reference to this supreme respect for the student:

It is not for you to choose what he shall know, what he shall do. It is chosen and foreordained, and he only holds the key to his own secret. By your tampering and thwarting and too much governing he may be hindered from his end and kept out of his own. Respect the child. Wait and see the new product of Nature. Nature loves analogies, but not repetitions. Respect the child. Be not too much his parent. Trespass not on his solitude.<sup>19</sup>

In this whole educational process, education is not simply of the inferior by the superior, but of

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 137.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143.



the equal by the equal. Boys educate boys. The education of the playing-fields may be quite as good as that of the classroom.

This unmanliness is so common a result of our half-education,—teaching a youth Latin and metaphysics and history, and neglecting to give him the rough training of a boy,—allowing him to skulk from the games of ball and skates and coasting down the hills on his sled, and whatever else would lead him and keep him on even terms with boys, so that he can meet them as an equal, and lead in his turn,—that I wish his guardians to consider that they are thus preparing him to play a contemptible part when he is full-grown. In England they send the most delicate and protected child from his luxurious home to learn to rough it with boys in the public schools. A few bruises and scratches will do him no harm if he has thereby learned not to be afraid. It is this wise mixture of good drill in Latin grammar with good drill in cricket, boating and wrestling, that is the boast of English education, and of high importance to the matter in hand.<sup>20</sup> . . . You send your child to the schoolmaster, but 't is the schoolboys who educate him. You send him to the Latin class, but much of his tuition comes, on his way to school, from the shop-windows. You like the strict rules and the long terms; and he finds his best leading in a by-way of his own, and refuses any companions but of his own choosing. He hates the grammar and *Gradus*, and loves guns, fishing-rods, horses and boats. Well, the boy is right, and you are not fit to direct his bringing-up if your theory leaves out his gymnastic training. Archery, cricket, gun and fishing-rod, horse and boat, are all educators, liberalizers; and so

<sup>20</sup> "Eloquence," Complete Works, etc., Vol. VIII., p. 128.

are dancing, dress and the street talk; and provided only the boy has resources, and is of a noble and ingenuous strain, these will not serve him less than the books.<sup>21</sup>

But among the forces and causes of education one force and cause demands special recognition. It is religion. Religion, a mighty force itself, is to be intellectual, and, being intellectual, it is primarily concerned with education.

The religion which is to guide and fulfil the present and coming ages, whatever else it be, must be intellectual. The scientific mind must have a faith which is science. "There are two things," said Mahomet, "which I abhor, the learned in his infidelities, and the fool in his devotions." Our times are impatient of both, and specially of the last. Let us have nothing now which is not its own evidence. There is surely enough for the heart and imagination in the religion itself. Let us not be pestered with assertions and half-truths, with emotion and snuffe.<sup>22</sup>

The value of religion as an educator is reflected in the history of Concord itself. In an address given at the opening of the Concord Public Library, Emerson said:

A deep religious sentiment is, in all times, an inspirer of the intellect, and that was not wanting here. The town was

<sup>21</sup> "The Conduct of Life: Culture," Complete Works, etc., Vol. VI., p. 142.

<sup>22</sup> "The Conduct of Life: Worship," Complete Works, etc., *Ibid.*, p. 240.

settled by a pious company of non-conformists from England, and the printed books of their pastor and leader, Rev. Peter Bulkeley, sometime fellow of Saint John's College in Cambridge, England, testify the ardent sentiment which they shared. "There is no people," said he to his little flock of exiles, "but will strive to excel in something. What can we excel in if not in holiness? If we look to number, we are the fewest; if to strength, we are the weakest; if to wealth and riches, we are the poorest of all the people of God through the whole world. We cannot excel, nor so much as equal other people in these things, and if we come short in grace and holiness too, we are the most despicable people under heaven. Strive we therefore herein to excel, and suffer not this crown to be taken away from us."<sup>23</sup>

In respect to the special studies which contribute to education, Mr. Emerson has little to say. Of science, he has a far higher opinion as an educational force than of the ancient classics. These classics had small value to him in his college career, and of the sciences he knew experimentally little or nothing. But he did know them as a philosopher. At considerable length, Mr. Emerson depreciates the value of Latin and Greek as a foundation in the American schools and colleges. He says:

The popular education has been taxed with a want of truth and nature. It was complained that an education to things was not given. We are students of words: we are shut up

<sup>23</sup> Address at the opening of the Concord Free Public Library, Complete Works, etc., Vol. XI., p. 497.

in schools, and colleges, and recitation-rooms, for ten or fifteen years, and come out at last with a bag of wind, a memory of words, and do not know a thing. We cannot use our hands, or our legs, or our eyes, or our arms. We do not know an edible root in the woods, we cannot tell our course by the stars, nor the hour of the day by the sun. It is well if we can swim and skate. We are afraid of a horse, of a cow, of a dog, of a snake, of a spider. The Roman rule was to teach a boy nothing that he could not learn standing. The old English rule was, "All summer in the field, and all winter in the study." And it seems as if a man should learn to plant, or to fish, or to hunt, that he might secure his subsistence at all events, and not be painful to his friends and fellow-men. The lessons of science should be experimental also. The sight of a planet through a telescope is worth all the course on astronomy; the shock of the electric spark in the elbow outvalues all the theories; the taste of the nitrous oxide, the firing of an artificial volcano, are better than volumes of chemistry.

One of the traits of the new spirit is the inquisition it fixed on our scholastic devotion to the dead languages. The ancient languages, with great beauty of structure, contain wonderful remains of genius, which draw, and always will draw, certain like-minded men,—Greek men, and Roman men,—in all countries, to their study; but by a wonderful drowsiness of usage they had exacted the study of *all* men. Once (say two centuries ago), Latin and Greek had a strict relation to all the science and culture there was in Europe, and the Mathematics had a momentary importance at some era of activity in physical science. These things became stereotyped as *education*, as the manner of men is. But the Good Spirit never cared for the colleges, and though all men and

boys were now drilled in Latin, Greek and Mathematics, it had quite left these shells high and dry on the beach, and was now creating and feeding other matters at other ends of the world. But in a hundred high schools and colleges this warfare against common-sense still goes on. Four, or six, or ten years, the pupil is parsing Greek and Latin, and as soon as he leaves the University, as it is ludicrously styled, he shuts those books for the last time. Some thousands of young men are graduated at our colleges in this country every year, and the persons who, at forty years, still read Greek, can all be counted on your hand. I never met with ten. Four or five persons I have seen who read Plato.

But is not this absurd, that the whole liberal talent of this country should be directed in its best years on studies which lead to nothing? What was the consequence? Some intelligent persons said or thought, "Is that Greek and Latin some spell to conjure with, and not words of reason? If the physician, the lawyer, the divine, never use it to come at their ends, I need never learn it to come at mine. Conjuring is gone out of fashion, and I will omit this conjugating, and go straight to affairs." So they jumped the Greek and Latin, and read law, medicine, or sermons, without it. To the astonishment of all, the self-made men took even ground at once with the oldest of the regular graduates, and in a few months the most conservative circles of Boston and New York had quite forgotten who of their gownsmen was college-bred, and who was not.<sup>24</sup>

But in his "English Traits," Mr. Emerson considered and to a degree approved of quite a

<sup>24</sup>"New England Reformers," Complete Works, etc., Vol. III., pp. 257-60.

different interpretation of the ancient classics. He writes:

The effect of this drill is the radical knowledge of Greek and Latin and of mathematics, and the solidity and taste of English criticism. Whatever luck there may be in this or that award, an Eton captain can write Latin longs and shorts, can turn the Court-Guide into hexameters, and it is certain that a Senior Classic can quote correctly from the *Corpus Poetarum* and is critically learned in all the humanities. Greek erudition exists on the Isis and Cam, whether the Maud man or the Brasenose man be properly ranked or not; the atmosphere is loaded with Greek learning; the whole river has reached a certain height, and kills all that growth of weeds which this Castalian water kills. The English nature takes culture kindly. So Milton thought. It refines the Norseman. Access to the Greek mind lifts his standard of taste. He has enough to think of, and, unless of an impulsive nature, is indisposed from writing or speaking, by the fulness of his mind and the new severity of his taste. The great silent crowd of thoroughbred Grecians always known to be around him, the English writer cannot ignore. They prune his orations and point his pen. Hence the style and tone of English journalism. The men have learned accuracy and comprehension, logic, and pace, or speed of working. They have bottom, endurance, wind. When born with good constitutions, they make those eupeptic studying-mills, the cast-iron men, the *dura ilia*, whose powers of performance compare with ours as the steam-hammer with the music-box;—Cokes, Mansfields, Seldens and Bentleys, and when it happens that a superior brain puts a rider on this admirable horse, we obtain those



masters of the world who combine the highest energy in affairs with a supreme culture.<sup>25</sup>

In his interpretation of the great theme, Mr. Emerson alludes again and again, and under divers conditions, to the relationship, or lack of relationship, between intellect and character. He uses character in the narrow sense as standing for moral manhood and also in the comprehensive sense as standing for the whole of manhood, including will, conscience, heart, as well as intellect. He usually, however, uses character in the narrow sense and often makes the relationship between character and intellect one of contrast. In his Journal for 1844, at the age of forty, he says:

Pure intellect is the pure devil when you have got off all the masks of Mephistopheles.<sup>26</sup>

And also, in the year preceding, he says:

The Intellect sees by moral obedience.<sup>27</sup>

In character, even in the narrow sense, he includes not only all the cardinal virtues, but also the cardinal graces. In a striking paragraph repre-

<sup>25</sup> "English Traits," Complete Works, etc., Vol. V., pp. 206-08.

<sup>26</sup> Journal XXXV., Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, edited by Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes. Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1911. Vol. VI., p. 497.

<sup>27</sup> Journal XXXIV., Journals, etc., *Ibid.*, p. 483.

senting both the unity and the diversity in the impression which the soul makes on character, he says:

Character repudiates intellect, yet excites it; and character passes into thought, is published so, and then is ashamed before new flashes of moral worth.<sup>28</sup>

In a large way, he declares:

This is the law of moral and of mental gain. The simple rise as by specific levity not into a particular virtue, but into the region of all the virtues. They are in the spirit which contains them all. The soul requires purity, but purity is not it; requires justice, but justice is not that; requires beneficence, but is somewhat better; so that there is a kind of descent and accommodation felt when we leave speaking of moral nature to urge a virtue which it enjoins. To the well-born child all the virtues are natural, and not painfully acquired. Speak to his heart, and the man becomes suddenly virtuous.

Within the same sentiment is the germ of intellectual growth, which obeys the same law.<sup>29</sup>

In speaking of the relationship between Shakespeare and Swedenborg, he says:

The human mind stands ever in perplexity, demanding intellect, demanding sanctity, impatient equally of each without the other.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> "Character," Complete Works, etc., Vol. III., p. 105.

<sup>29</sup> "The Over-Soul," Complete Works, etc., Vol. II., p. 275.

<sup>30</sup> "Representative Men: Swedenborg," Complete Works, etc., Vol. IV., p. 94.



And yet the intellect and the character, which are so diversely contrasted, are closely knit and intimately related. In speaking on Webster he lays down the principle that "great thoughts come from the heart," and uses the happy phrases "moral sensibility,"<sup>31</sup> "moral perception," "moral sentiment."<sup>32</sup> Passages are these which suggest Pascal's great phrase:

The heart has its reasons that the reason knows not of.

He also declares:

There is an intimate interdependence of intellect and morals. Given the equality of two intellects,—which will form the most reliable judgments, the good, or the bad hearted? "The heart has its arguments, with which the understanding is not acquainted." For the heart is at once aware of the state of health or disease, which is the controlling state, that is, of sanity or of insanity; prior of course to all question of the ingenuity of arguments, the amount of facts, or the elegance of rhetoric. So intimate is this alliance of mind and heart, that talent uniformly sinks with character.<sup>33</sup>

In his "Natural History of Intellect," he further declares:

<sup>31</sup>"The Fugitive Slave Law"—Lecture at New York. Complete Works, etc., Vol. XI., p. 223.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>33</sup>"The Conduct of Life: Worship," Complete Works, etc., Vol. VI., p. 217.

The spiritual power of man is twofold, mind and heart, Intellect and morals; one respecting truth, the other the will. One is the man, the other the woman in spiritual nature. One is power, the other is love. These elements always coexist in every normal individual, but one predominates.<sup>34</sup>

He closes one of his papers in the *Dial* on "The Tragic," with the remark:

The intellect in its purity and the moral sense in its purity are not distinguished from each other, and both ravish us into a region whereunto these passionate clouds of sorrow cannot rise.<sup>35</sup>

The nature of the education which thus unites character and intellect is broad. He declares:

Education should be as broad as man. Whatever elements are in him that should foster and demonstrate. If he be dexterous, his tuition should make it appear; if he be capable of dividing men by the trenchant sword of his thought, education should unsheathe and sharpen it; if he is one to cement society by his all-reconciling affinities, oh! hasten their action! If he is jovial, if he is mercurial, if he is great-hearted, a cunning artificer, a strong commander, a potent ally, ingenious, useful, elegant, witty, prophet, diviner,—society has need of all these. The imagination must be addressed. Why always coast on the surface and never open the interior of Nature, not by science, which is surface still, but by poetry?

<sup>34</sup> "Natural History of Intellect," Complete Works, etc., Vol. XII, p. 60.

<sup>35</sup> Papers from the *Dial*: "The Tragic," Complete Works, etc., *Ibid.*, p. 417.

is not the Vast an element of the mind? Yet what teaching, what book of this day appeals to the Vast?

Our culture has truckled to the times,—to the senses. It is not manworthy. If the vast and the spiritual are omitted, so are the practical and the moral. It does not make us brave or free. We teach boys to be such men as we are. We do not teach them to aspire to be all they can. We do not give them a training as if we believed in their noble nature.<sup>36</sup>

This breadth of education, however, should be made perfectly consistent with two great elements: the element of drill and the element of inspiration. Inspiration without drill is vapid. Drill without inspiration is dull, phlegmatic. Both combined produce the worthy scholar and man.

If he have this twofold goodness,—the drill and the inspiration,—then he has health; then he is a whole, and not a fragment; and the perfection of his endowment will appear in his compositions. Indeed, this twofold merit characterizes ever the productions of great masters. The man of genius should occupy the whole space between God or pure mind and the multitude of uneducated men. He must draw from the infinite Reason, on one side; and he must penetrate into the heart and sense of the crowd, on the other. From one, he must draw his strength; to the other, he must owe his aim. The one yokes him to the real; the other, to the apparent. At one pole is Reason; at the other, Common Sense. If he be defective at either extreme of the scale, his philosophy

<sup>36</sup>“Education,” Complete Works, etc., Vol. X., p. 134.

will seem low and utilitarian, or it will appear too vague and indefinite for the uses of life.<sup>37</sup>

Toil is the essence of drill, and from it no man is to seek excuse. Great scholars, great thinkers, are great laborers. The long and insistent song of the worth of labor for the student, Emerson sings in prose and verse. He says:

No way has been found for making heroism easy, even for the scholar. Labor, iron labor, is for him. The world was created as an audience for him; the atoms of which it is made are opportunities. Read the performance of Bentley, of Gibbon, of Cuvier, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Laplace. "He can toil terribly," said Cecil of Sir Walter Raleigh. These few words sting and bite and lash us when we are frivolous. Let us get out of the way of their blows by making them true of ourselves. There is so much to be done that we ought to begin quickly to bestir ourselves. This day-labor of ours, we confess, has hitherto a certain emblematic air, like the annual ploughing and sowing of the Emperor of China. Let us make it an honest sweat. Let the scholar measure his valor by his power to cope with intellectual giants. Leave others to count votes and calculate stocks.<sup>38</sup>

In this drill and inspiration, the student must seek solitude. Companionship is not for him. His lamp he himself lights. Its rays shine upon his book alone. Emerson always thought of himself as

<sup>37</sup> "Literary Ethics," Complete Works, etc., Vol. I., p. 182.

<sup>38</sup> "Greatness," Complete Works, etc., Vol. VIII., p. 311.

a man apart, as a spectator and auditor, as one not able to join in other men's sports or labors. Out of his own experiences, he writes:

He must embrace solitude as a bride. He must have his glees and his glooms alone. His own estimate must be measure enough, his own praise reward enough for him. And why must the student be solitary and silent? That he may become acquainted with his thoughts. If he pines in a lonely place, hankering for the crowd, for display, he is not in the lonely place; his heart is in the market; he does not see; he does not hear; he does not think. But go cherish your soul; expel companions; set your habits to a life of solitude; then will the faculties rise fair and full within, like forest trees and field flowers; you will have results, which, when you meet your fellow-men, you can communicate, and they will gladly receive. Do not go into solitude only that you may presently come into public. Such solitude denies itself; is public and stale. The public can get public experience, but they wish the scholar to replace to them those private, sincere, divine experiences of which they have been defrauded by dwelling in the street. It is the noble, manlike, just thought, which is the superiority demanded of you, and not crowds but solitude confers this elevation. Not insulation of place, but independence of spirit is essential, and it is only as the garden, the cottage, the forest and the rock, are a sort of mechanical aids to this, that they are of value. Think alone, and all places are friendly and sacred.<sup>39</sup>

The qualities of the education which man thus receives are not hard to deduce. His scholarship

<sup>39</sup> "Literary Ethics," Complete Works, etc., Vol. I., p. 173.

has to represent accuracy. He does not go to the scientists for his justification and confirmation, but rather to the philosophers.

Accuracy is essential to beauty. The very definition of the intellect is Aristotle's: "that by which we know terms or boundaries." Give a boy accurate perceptions. Teach him the difference between the similar and the same. Make him call things by their right names. Pardon in him no blunder. Then he will give you solid satisfaction as long as he lives. It is better to teach the child arithmetic and Latin grammar than rhetoric or moral philosophy, because they require exactitude of performance; it is made certain that the lesson is mastered, and that power of performance is worth more than the knowledge.<sup>40</sup>

In this growing education of the student, it is not to be forgotten that development requires time. Since Emerson himself was a schoolboy, two years have been saved in the ordinary education of the schoolboy, but time still remains an essential condition. It cannot do anything. It is no agent, as Lord Bacon says, but it is a necessary condition for doing. Nature seems to deceive us in making us believe that time is not necessary for growth, but the deception is very bare-faced.

In the year 1841, at the age of thirty-eight, Emerson writes in his journal:

<sup>40</sup> "Education," Complete Works, etc., Vol. X., p. 147.



It seems to me sometimes that we get our education ended a little too quick in this country. As soon as we have learned to read and write and cipher, we are dismissed from school and we set up for ourselves. We are writers and leaders of opinion and we write away without check of any kind, play whatsoever mad prank, indulge whatever spleen, or oddity, or obstinacy, comes into our dear head, and even feed our complacency thereon, and thus fine wits come to nothing, as good horses spoil themselves by running away and straining themselves. I cannot help seeing that Doctor Channing would have been a much greater writer had he found a strict tribunal of writers, a graduated intellectual empire established in the land, and knew that bad logic would not pass, and that the most severe exaction was to be made on all who enter these lists. Now, if a man can write a paragraph for a newspaper, next year he writes what he calls a history, and reckons himself a classic ineoquently, nor will his contemporaries in critical Journal or Review question his claims. It is very easy to reach the degree of culture that prevails around us; very hard to pass it, and Doctor Channing, had he found Wordsworth, Southey, Coleridge and Lamb around him, would as easily have been severe with himself and risen a degree higher as he has stood where he is. I mean, of course, a genuine intellectual tribunal, not a literary junto of Edinburgh wits, or dull conventions of Quarterly or Gentleman's Reviews. Somebody offers to teach me mathematics. I would fain learn. The man is right. I wish that the writers of this country would begin where they now end their culture.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Journal XXXII., Journals of, etc., Vol. VI., p. 105.

In many paragraphs and pages, as I have intimated, the great educationist seeks to interpret the manifold processes of education. Throughout the volumes allusions abound as to the value and to the general results of education. But interpretation still more specific is fitting.

The intellect as standing for education gives freedom. Emerson agrees with Saint Paul and with Jesus Christ in the belief that truth makes free. No hard and fast decree rests upon the educated man.

Intellect annuls Fate. So far as a man thinks, he is free. And though nothing is more disgusting than the crowing about liberty by slaves, as most men are, and the flippant mistaking for freedom of some paper preamble like a Declaration of Independence or the statute right to vote, by those who have never dared to think or to act,—yet it is wholesome to man to look not at Fate, but the other way: the practical view is the other. His sound relation to these facts is to use and command, not to cringe to them.<sup>42</sup>

The trained mind has also imagination.

For we thus enter a new gymnasium, and learn to choose men by their truest marks, taught, with Plato, “to choose those who can, without aid from the eyes or any other sense, proceed to truth and to being.” Foremost among these activities are the summersaults, spells and resurrections wrought

““The Conduct of Life: Fate,” Complete Works, etc., Vol. VI, p. 23.



by the imagination. When this wakes, a man seems to multiply ten times or a thousand times his force. It opens the delicious sense of indeterminate size and inspires an audacious mental habit. We are as elastic as the gas of gunpowder, and a sentence in a book, or a word dropped in conversation, sets free our fancy, and instantly our heads are bathed with galaxies, and our feet tread the floor of the Pit. And this benefit is real because we are entitled to these enlargements, and once having passed the bounds shall never again be quite the miserable pedants we were.<sup>43</sup>

The intellect, moreover, is the consoler of man.

The intellect is a consoler, which delights in detaching or putting an interval between a man and his fortune, and so converts the sufferer into a spectator and his pain into poetry. It yields the joys of conversation, of letters and of science. Hence also the torments of life become tuneful tragedy, solemn and soft with music, and garnished with rich dark pictures.<sup>44</sup>

The intellect represents one element of the essential greatness of humanity. In a noble passage on greatness, he says:

It is easy to draw traits from Napoleon, who was not generous nor just, but was intellectual and knew the law of things. Napoleon commands our respect by his enormous self-trust, the habit of seeing with his own eyes, never the surface,

<sup>43</sup> "Representative Men: Uses of Great Men," Complete Works, etc., Vol. IV., p. 17.

<sup>44</sup> Papers from the *Dial*: "The Tragic," Complete Works, etc., Vol. XII., p. 416.

but to the heart of the matter, whether it was a road, a cannon, a character, an officer, or a king,—and by the speed and security of his action in the premises, always new. He has left a library of manuscripts, a multitude of sayings, every one of widest application. He was a man who always fell on his feet. When one of his favorite schemes missed, he had the faculty of taking up his genius, as he said, and of carrying it somewhere else. “Whatever they may tell you, believe that one fights with cannon as with fists; when once the fire is begun, the least want of ammunition renders what you have done already useless.” I find it easy to translate all his technics into all of mine, and his official advices are to me more literary and philosophical than the memoirs of the Academy. His advice to his brother, King Joseph of Spain, was: “I have only one counsel for you,—*Be Master.*” Depth of intellect relieves even the ink of crime with a fringe of light.<sup>45</sup>

The value of the higher education, Mr. Emerson says, is in certain ways imaginary and in others real. One seldom meets a great man who has not gone to college who does not lament what he has missed, and one seldom meets a great man who has been in college who is not inclined to depreciate the worth of what the college was to him. Both ideas are equally true and equally false. The college ought to have made the college man abler, not making him less human; and not going to college, if it has served to bring out the natural forces of the

<sup>45</sup> “Greatness,” Complete Works, etc., Vol. VIII., p. 314.

other man, might also have brought them out in unfitting ways and unto unworthy results. Mr. Emerson says:

We are full of superstitions. Each class fixes its eyes on the advantages it has not; the refined, on rude strength; the democrat, on birth and breeding. One of the benefits of a college education is to show the boy its little avail. I knew a leading man in a leading city, who, having set his heart on an education at the university and missed it, could never quite feel himself the equal of his own brothers who had gone thither. His easy superiority to multitudes of professional men could never quite countervail to him this imaginary defect. Balls, riding, wine-parties and billiards pass to a poor boy for something fine and romantic, which they are not; and a free admission to them on an equal footing, if it were possible, only once or twice, would be worth ten times its cost, by undeeceiving him.<sup>46</sup>

In his essay on "Spiritual Laws," he also writes:

My will never gave the images in my mind the rank they now take. The regular course of studies, the years of academical and professional education have not yielded me better facts than some idle books under the bench at the Latin School. What we do not call education is more precious than that which we call so. We form no guess, at the time of receiving a thought, of its comparative value. And education often wastes its effort in attempts to thwart and balk this natural magnetism, which is sure to select what belongs to it.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> "The Conduct of Life: Culture," Complete Works, etc., Vol. VI., p. 144.

<sup>47</sup> "Spiritual Laws," Complete Works, etc., Vol. II., p. 133.

But, when all is said and done, the argument as to value rests in favor of the college. The college may not do much for the genius; but for the common man its worth is tremendous. Genius is shy, hard to catch, does not easily lend itself to association. The college represents a collection, an assembly, of men each drawn to the other, each in a sense educating the other. The college may not train genius, but it can adorn genius and adorn it with beauty.

This, then, is the theory of Education, the happy meeting of the young soul, filled with the desire, with the living teacher who has already made the passage from the centre forth, step by step, along the intellectual roads to the theory and practice of special science. Now if there be genius in the scholar, that is, a delicate sensibility to the laws of the world, and the power to express them again in some new form, he is made to find his own way. He will greet joyfully the wise teacher, but colleges and teachers are no wise essential to him; he will find teachers everywhere.<sup>48</sup>

In summing up the advantages and disadvantages of the college in Mr. Emerson's judgment, one cannot do better than to quote the concluding passage from *English Traits on the Universities*. It is said:

<sup>48</sup> "The Celebration of Intellect," Complete Works, etc., Vol. XII, p. 128.

Universities are of course hostile to geniuses, which, seeing and using ways of their own, discredit the routine: as churches and monasteries persecute youthful saints. Yet we all send our sons to college, and though he be a genius, the youth must take his chance. The university must be retrospective. The gale that gives direction to the vanes on all its towers blows out of antiquity. Oxford is a library, and the professors must be librarians. And I should as soon think of quarrelling with the janitor for not magnifying his office by hostile sallies into the street, like the Governor of Kertch or Kinburn, as of quarrelling with the professors for not admiring the young neologists who pluck the beards of Euclid and Aristotle, or for not attempting themselves to fill their vacant shelves as original writers.

It is easy to carp at colleges, and the college, if we will wait for it, will have its own turn. Genius exists there also, but will not answer a call of a committee of the House of Commons. It is rare, precarious, eccentric and darkling. England is the land of mixture and surprise, and when you have settled it that the universities are moribund, out comes a poetic influence from the heart of Oxford, to mould the opinions of cities, to build their houses as simply as birds their nests, to give veracity to art and charm mankind, as an appeal to moral order always must. But besides this restorative genius, the best poetry of England of this age, in the old forms, comes from two graduates at Cambridge.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>49</sup> "English Traits, Universities," Complete Works, etc., Vol. V., p. 212.

## II

### EDUCATION ACCORDING TO CARLYLE

CARLYLE was a great spirit. His books are the chief or only exponents of his greatness and spirituality. Like many other great souls he was a bundle of inconsistencies and contradictions. He was at once a pessimist and an optimist; in his tastes a democrat, in his theories an aristocrat; commending silence, but giving us monologues in many volumes; an incarnation of great power, intellectual and emotional, but irritated by the common pains and penalties of life; a Scotchman who most strenuously promoted the doctrine of the real, the great, the good. The strong man, the hero, whether in literature or in history, represented his supreme human idol.

Carlyle's thoughts about education, scattered throughout the eight thousand pages of his twenty volumes, are, however, far more consistent and more free from contradictions, in a realm of thought where consistency and freedom from contradiction are seldom found, than one would be inclined to believe.



The subject of education is man. And who and what is man? He is not, according to Carlyle's interpretation, a worm of the dust, nor is he a butterfly of beautiful existence; rather he is the child of God, a creature born into an infinite universe and destined for an eternal existence. For him the centuries have labored, through him all the past is given to the future, and to him all the future is bound in behalf of its worthy creatures yet to be. No prize is too high for his struggle, and no training is too severe for this child of the gods, this brother of the immortals. For him too, this creature of origin so noble, of destiny so sublime, no education is too enriching. With Platonic mysticism, Carlyle interprets the subject of education.

“To the eye of vulgar Logic,” says he, “what is man? An omnivorous Biped that wears Breeches. To the eye of Pure Reason what is he? A Soul, a Spirit, and divine Apparition. Round his mysterious ME, there lies, under all those wool-rags, a garment of Flesh (or of Senses), contextured in the Loom of Heaven; whereby he is revealed to his like, and dwells with them in UNION and DIVISION; and sees and fashions for himself a Universe, with azure Starry Spaces, and long Thousands of Years. Deep-hidden is he under that strange Garment; amid Sounds and Colors and Forms, as it were, swathed in, and inextricably over-shrouded: yet it is sky-woven, and worthy of a God. Stands he not thereby in the centre of Immensities, in the conflux of Eterni-

ties? He feels; power has been given him to know, to believe; nay does not the spirit of Love, free in its celestial primeval brightness, even here, though but for moments, look through? Well said Saint Chrysostom, with his lips of gold, 'the true SHEKINAH is Man:' where else is the GOD'S-PRESENCE manifested not to our eyes only, but to our hearts, as in our fellow-man?"<sup>1</sup>

Such is Carlyle's perception, according to his autobiography, "Sartor Resartus," of the man who is to be educated. Man is thus made only a little lower than the gods and is crowned with glory and honor.

In man the chief though not the only power to be educated is the intellect. The intellect is the fount and origin of other forces and excellences. It is that part of man which is capable of the highest improvement. At birth it is the weakest faculty in man, weaker than it is in the animal. It grows apace, develops, and becomes united with the will, the ruler of the created world. Man's capabilities, the root of which is intellect, are infinite. Instinct has no like capacity for improvement. It is as perfect at birth as in age. Intellect is intrinsically the noblest part of man's being. Of this man of intellect Carlyle says:

<sup>1</sup>"Sartor Resartus," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. I., p. 50.



. . . A man of Intellect, of real and not sham Intellect, is by the nature of him likewise inevitably a man of nobleness, a man of courage, rectitude, pious strength; who, even *because* he is and has been loyal to the Laws of this Universe, is initiated into *discernment* of the same; to this hour a Missioned of Heaven; whom if men follow, it will be well with them; whom if men do not follow, it will not be well. Human Intellect, if you consider it well, is the exact summary of Human *Worth*; and the essence of all worth-ships and worships is reverence for that same.<sup>2</sup>

The lack of this element of intellect produces grievous evils, and of these are many kinds; perhaps the chief of them being a lack of wisdom. But education acting upon the intellect serves to correct this primary quality and element. It creates wisdom.

Wisdom has been defined by Burke as the application of knowledge to affairs. Solomon also has given many definitions still well worth considering. Of this superb quality and of the man who embodies it Carlyle says:

The wise man; the man with the gift of method, of faithfulness and valor, all of which are of the basis of wisdom; who has insight into what is what, into what will follow out of what, the eye to see and the hand to do; who is *fit* to administer, to direct, and guidingly command: he is the

<sup>2</sup>“Latter-Day Pamphlets,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. II., p. 358.

strong man. His muscles and bones are no stronger than ours; but his soul is stronger, his soul is wiser, clearer,—is better and nobler, for that is, has been and ever will be the root of all clearness worthy of such a name. Beautiful it is, and a gleam from the same eternal pole-star visible amid the destinies of men, that all talent, all intellect is in the first place moral;—what a world were this otherwise! But it is the heart always that sees, before the head *can* see: let us know that; and know therefore that the Good alone is deathless and victorious, that Hope is sure and steadfast, in all phases of this “Place of Hope.”<sup>3</sup>

It was many years after Carlyle wrote the essay on “Chartism” from which this quotation is taken that he was chosen rector of the University of Edinburgh. At the time of his installation he gave the most famous of all his addresses—and his addresses were few, be it said—which teems with advice to the students to whom he spoke. At this time, too, he referred to wisdom.

You are ever to bear in mind that there lies behind that the acquisition of what may be called wisdom;—namely, sound appreciation and just decision as to all the objects that come round you, and the habit of behaving with justice, candor, clear insight and loyal adherence to fact. Great is wisdom; infinite is the value of wisdom. It cannot be exaggerated; it is the highest achievement of man: “Blessed is he that getteth understanding.”<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>“Chartism,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XVI., p. 63.

<sup>4</sup>“Inaugural Address,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, *Ibid.*, p. 404.

The wisdom to which the master refers is wisdom in the sense of Solomon. It refers to excellence both intellectual and moral. It stands for an intellect which sees truth clearly, accurately, largely, comprehensively and in its symmetry. It also refers to a heart of which the emotions are pure and to a will of which the choices are right. It represents the Greek ideal of the true, the good, and the beautiful. The Greek, the Hebrew and the Scotch meet in the interpretation and commendation of the great virtue.

For securing this most excellent thing, two methods at least are specially provided. The first is the university. But in the quest of wisdom it may itself fail. Of such failure there is no lack of conviction in the pages of Carlyle, and especially in "Sartor Resartus." He is indeed free in cursing and heaping ridicule upon the university. He makes the writer of the "Volume on Clothes" say:

"The hungry young . . . looked up to their spiritual Nurses; and, for food, were bidden eat the east-wind. What vain jargon of controversial Metaphysic, Etymology, and mechanical Manipulation falsely named Science, was current there, I indeed learned, better perhaps than the most. Among eleven hundred Christian youths, there will not be wanting some eleven eager to learn. By collision with such, a certain warmth, a certain polish was communicated; by instinct and

happy accident, I took less to rioting (*renommiren*), than to thinking and reading, which latter also I was free to do. Nay from the chaos of that Library, I succeeded in fishing up more books perhaps than had been known to the very keepers thereof. The foundation of a Literary Life was hereby laid: I learned, on my own strength, to read fluently in almost all cultivated languages, on almost all subjects and sciences; farther, as man is ever the prime object to man, already it was my favorite employment to read character in speculation, and from the Writing to construe the Writer. A certain groundplan of Human Nature and Life began to fashion itself in me; wondrous enough, now when I look back on it; for my whole Universe, physical and spiritual, was as yet a Machine! However, such a conscious, recognized groundplan, the truest I had, *was* beginning to be there, and by additional experiments might be corrected and indefinitely extended.”<sup>5</sup>

This bit of autobiography bears on the subjectivity of Carlyle’s interpretation of the university experience of his greatest personal hero, Goethe. Concerning Goethe’s life at Leipzig, he says:

Leipzig University has the honor of matriculating him. The name of his “propitious mother” she may boast of, but not of the reality: alas, in these days, the University of the Universe is the only propitious mother of such; all other propitious mothers are but unpropitious superannuated dry-nurses fallen bedrid, from whom the famished nursling has to *steal* even bread and water, if he will not die; whom for most part he soon takes leave of, giving perhaps (as in Gib-

<sup>5</sup>“Sartor Resartus,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. I., p. 87.

bon's case), for farewell thanks, some rough tweak of the nose; and rushes desperate into the wide world an orphan. The time is advancing, slower or faster, when the bedrid dry-nurse will de cease, and be succeeded by a walking and stirring wet one. Goethe's employments and culture at Leipzig lay in quite other groves than the academic: he listened to the Ciceronian Ernesti with eagerness, but the life-giving word flowed not from his mouth; to the sacerdotal, eclectic-sentimental Gellert (the divinity of all tea-table moral-philosophers of both sexes); witnessed "the pure soul, the genuine will of the noble man," heard "his admonitions, warnings and entreaties, uttered in a somewhat hollow and melancholy tone;" and then the Frenchmen say to it all, "*Laissez le faire; il nous forme des dupes.*" "In logic it seemed to me very strange that I must now take up those spiritual operations which from of old I had executed with the utmost convenience, and tatter them asunder, insulate and as if destroy them, that their right employment might become plain to me. Of the Thing, of the World, of God, I fancied I knew almost about as much as the Doctor himself; and he seemed to me, in more than one place, to hobble dreadfully (*gewaltig zu hupern*)."<sup>6</sup>

This opinion of the worthlessness of universities Carlyle expresses in diverse forms and ways. The university represents, and it necessarily represents, a certain orderliness which was especially repugnant to Carlyle. It represents a certain amount of team-work which did not receive the

<sup>6</sup>"Goethe's Works," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XV., p. 47.



commendation of the great individualist. Still, that in these two diatribes, one directed against Leipzig, and the other, without doubt, referring to Edinburgh, Carlyle did touch on great evils in university administration, is not for one instant to be doubted.

A second and still more important means for securing this great result of wisdom is the book. Throughout his volumes Carlyle refers to the worth of the book. These allusions begin early and continue to the end. In the essay on the Hero as Man of Letters, he says:

Do not Books still accomplish *miracles*, as *Runes* were fabled to do? They persuade men. Not the wretchedest circulating-library novel, which foolish girls thumb and con in remote villages, but will help to regulate the actual practical weddings and households of those foolish girls. So "Celia" felt, so "Clifford" acted: the foolish Theorem of Life, stamped into those young brains, comes out as a solid Practice one day. Consider whether any *Rune* in the wildest imagination of Mythologist ever did such wonders as, on the actual firm Earth, some Books have done! What built St. Paul's Cathedral? Look at the heart of the matter, it was that divine Hebrew Book,—the word partly of the man Moses, an outlaw tending his Midianitish herds, four thousand years ago, in the wilderness of Sinai! It is the strangest of things, yet nothing is truer. With the art of Writing, of which Printing is a simple, an inevitable and comparatively insignificant corollary, the true reign of miracles for man-

kind commenced. It related, with a wondrous new contiguity and perpetual closeness, the Past and Distant with the Present in time and place; all times and all places with this our actual Here and Now. All things were altered for men; all modes of important work of men: teaching, preaching, governing, and all else.<sup>7</sup>

In his inaugural address Carlyle gives to the students sound counsel also in reference to reading:

Well, Gentlemen, whatever you may think of these historical points, the clearest and most imperative duty lies on every one of you to be assiduous in your reading. Learn to be good readers,—which is perhaps a more difficult thing than you imagine. Learn to be discriminative in your reading; to read faithfully, and with your best attention, all kinds of things which you have a real interest in, a real not an imaginary, and which you find to be really fit for what you are engaged in. Of course, at the present time, in a great deal of the reading incumbent on you, you must be guided by the books recommended by your Professors for assistance towards the effect of their prelections. And then, when you leave the University, and go into studies of your own, you will find it very important that you have chosen a field, some province specially suited to you, in which you can study and work. The most unhappy of all men is the man who cannot tell what he is going to do, who has got no work cut out for him in the world, and does not go into it. For work is the

<sup>7</sup>“The Hero as Man of Letters,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. I., p. 383.

grand cure of all the maladies and miseries that ever beset mankind,—honest work, which you intend getting done.

If, in any vacant vague time, you are in a strait as to choice of reading,—a very good indication for you, perhaps the best you could get, is towards some book you have a great curiosity about. You are then in the readiest and best of all possible conditions to improve by that book. It is analogous to what doctors tell us about the physical health and appetites of the patient. You must learn, however, to distinguish between false appetite and true. There is such a thing as a false appetite, which will lead a man into vagaries with regard to diet; will tempt him to eat spiey things, which he should not eat at all, nor would, but that the things are toothsome, and that he is under a momentary baseness of mind. A man ought to examine and find out what he really and truly has an appetite for, what suits his constitution and condition; and that, doctors tell him, is in general the very thing he ought to have. And so with books.<sup>8</sup>

To Carlyle the university is a collection of books. The man who has read well has received a university education, both as a means and as a result.

Of such culture and strength, speech has long been regarded as the chief sign and symbol. In "Latter-Day Pamphlets" and in the "Inaugural Address" Carlyle praises silence. He believes that the world and everybody in it talks too much. To watch the tongue and to watch it unto curbing it is

<sup>8</sup> "Inaugural Address," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XVI., p. 393.



a duty. Wind, wind, wind, seems to be universal; it is to be made to vanish so far as can be. He even advises that tongues be cut out for a whole generation in order that the world may learn wisdom! The reason of all this is that speech is largely vanity and emptiness. On the other hand speech that is filled with wisdom is "noble and even divine." If Carlyle has been most vigilant in denouncing talk that is foolish, he is equally enthusiastic in commending talk that is wise. Even in the Latter-Day Pamphlet "Stump-Orator," he says:

Considered as the last finish of education, or of human culture, worth and acquirement, the art of speech is noble, and even divine; it is like the kindling of a Heaven's light to *show* us what a glorious world exists, and has perfected itself, in a man.<sup>9</sup>

And also in the same essay half-humorously he adds:

Parliament, Church, Law: let the young vivid soul turn whither he will for a career, he finds among variable conditions one condition invariable, and extremely surprising, That the proof of excellence is to be done by the tongue. For heroism that will not speak, but only act, there is no account kept:—The English Nation does not need that silent kind,

<sup>9</sup>"Latter-Day Pamphlets," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. II., p. 426.

then, but only the talking kind? Most astonishing. Of all the organs a man has, there is none held in account, it would appear, but the tongue he uses for talking. Premiership, woolsack, mitre, and quasi-crown: all is attainable if you can talk with due ability. Everywhere your proof-shot is to be a well-fired volley of talk. Contrive to talk well, you will get to Heaven, the modern Heaven of the English.<sup>10</sup>

The result of all education and training is light, light upon all of life's problems and on many of life's mysteries.

Light is the one thing wanted for the world. Put wisdom in the head of the world, the world will fight its battle victoriously, and be the best world man can make it.<sup>11</sup>

In a personal way the result of all this education and training is, for the individual man, *thinking*. The education of man unto wisdom is, as I have already intimated, inseparable from training in morals, and the chief excellence in morals, according to the gospel of Carlyle, is sincerity. Sincerity is the culmination of all the cardinal virtues. It is comprehensive. Insincere speech is the index of insincere action and of all possible evil activities. A nimble tongue utters an octavo volume a day and this volume is in large part designing balder-

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 431.

<sup>11</sup> "Heroes and Hero-Worship," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. I., p. 391.

dash. The insincere man is a bad man, and the bad man an insincere one. The great virtue is honesty, and the great vice which Carlyle constantly damned is hypocrisy.

Education is designed to promote sincerity and honesty:

For no man, and for no body or biggest multitude of men, has Nature favor, if they part company with her facts and her. Excellent stump-orator; eloquent parliamentary dead-dog, making motions, passing bills; reported in the Morning Newspapers, and reputed the "best speaker going?" From the Universe of Fact he has turned himself away; he is gone into partnership with the Universe of Phantasm; finds it profitablest to deal in forged notes, while the foolish shop-keepers will accept them. Nature for such a man, and for Nations that follow such, has her patibulary forks, and prisons of death everlasting:—dost thou doubt it? Unhappy mortal, Nature otherwise were herself a Chaos and no Cosmos. Nature was not made by an Impostor; not she, I think, rife as they are!—In fact, by money or otherwise, to the uttermost fraction of a calculable and incalculable value, we have, each one of us, to settle the exact balance in the above-said Savings-bank, or official register kept by Nature: Creditor by the quantity of veracities we have done, Debtor by the quantity of falsities and errors; there is not, by any conceivable device, the faintest hope of escape from that issue for one of us, nor for all of us.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> "Latter-Day Pamphlets," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. II., p. 449.

The most commanding illustration of the effect of training in sincerity to be found in Carlyle's works is Frederick the Great.

It is an excellent symptom of his intellect, this of gravitating irresistibly towards realities. Better symptom of its quality (whatever *quantity* there be of it), human intellect cannot show for itself. However it may go with Literature, and satisfaction to readers of romantic appetites, this young soul promises to become a successful Worker one day, and to *do* something under the Sun. For work is of an extremely unfictitious nature; and no man can roof his house with clouds and moonshine, so as to turn the rain from him.<sup>13</sup>

The vital place of sincerity as a single virtue is bespoken in Carlyle's praise of work. Diligence and honesty are to him twin sisters; each promotes the welfare of the other. If one great idea be more prominent than another in Carlyle, it is the idea of the worthiness of work. In the essay on "Chartism" he says:

Work is the mission of man in this Earth. A day is ever struggling forward, a day will arrive in some approximate degree, when he who has no work to do, by whatever name he may be named, will not find it good to show himself in our quarter of the Solar System; but may go and look out elsewhere, If there be any *Idle* Planet discoverable?—Let the honest working man rejoice that such law, the first of Nature,

<sup>13</sup> "Frederick the Great," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. V., p. 420.

has been made good on him; and hope that, by and by, all else will be made good. It is the beginning of all.<sup>14</sup>

And also in the essay on "The Nigger Question":

This is the everlasting duty of all men, black or white, who are born into this world. To do competent work, to labor honestly according to the ability given them; for that and for no other purpose was each one of us sent into this world; and woe is to every man who, by friend or by foe, is prevented from fulfilling this the end of his being.<sup>15</sup>

In the essay "Past and Present" Carlyle declares:

All work, even cotton-spinning, is noble; work is alone noble: be that here said and asserted once more. And in like manner, too, all dignity is painful; a life of ease is not for any man, nor for any god. The life of all gods figures itself to us as a Sublime Sadness,—earnestness of Infinite Battle against Infinite Labor.<sup>16</sup>

And also in the same chapter he observes:

The only happiness a brave man ever troubled himself with asking much about was, happiness enough to get his work done. Not "I can't eat!" but "I can't work!" that was the burden of all wise complaining among men. It is, after all, the one unhappiness of a man. That he cannot

<sup>14</sup>"Chartism," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XVI., p. 50.

<sup>15</sup>"The Nigger Question," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, *Ibid.*, p. 299.

<sup>16</sup>"Past and Present," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XII., p. 149.

work; that he cannot get his destiny as a man fulfilled. Behold, the day is passing swiftly over, our life is passing swiftly over; and the night cometh, wherein no man can work.<sup>17</sup>

Further he interprets:

The spoken Word, the written Poem, is said to be an epitome of the man; how much more the done Work. Whatsoever of morality and of intelligence; what of patience, perseverance, faithfulness, of method, insight, ingenuity, energy; in a word, whatsoever of Strength the man had in him will lie written in the Work he does. To work: why, it is to try himself against Nature, and her everlasting unerring Laws; these will tell a true verdict as to the man.<sup>18</sup>

In the chapter in "Past and Present" devoted to labor, Carlyle proclaims again:

For there is a perennial nobleness, and even sacredness, in Work. Were he never so benighted, forgetful of his high calling, there is always hope in a man that actually and earnestly works: in Idleness alone is there perpetual despair. Work, never so mammonish, mean, *is* in communication with Nature; the real desire to get Work done will itself lead one more and more to truth, to Nature's appointments and regulations, which are truth.

The latest Gospel in this world is, Know thy work and do it. "Know thyself:" long enough has that poor "self" of thine tormented thee; thou wilt never get to "know" it, I believe! Think it not thy business, this of knowing thyself; thou art an unknowable individual: know what thou

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.



canst work at; and work at it, like a Hercules! That will be thy better plan.

It has been written, "an endless significance lies in Work;" a man perfects himself by working. Foul jungles are cleared away, fair seedfields rise instead, and stately cities; and withal the man himself first ceases to be a jungle and foul unwholesome desert thereby. Consider how, even in the meanest sorts of Labor, the whole soul of a man is composed into a kind of real harmony, the instant he sets himself to work! Doubt, Desire, Sorrow, Remorse, Indignation, Despair itself, all these like hell-dogs lie beleaguering the soul of the poor day-worker, as of every man; but he bends himself with free valor against his task, and all these are stilled, all these shrink murmuring far off into their caves. The man is now a man. The blessed glow of labor in him, is it not as purifying fire, wherein all poison is burnt up, and of sour smoke itself there is made bright blessed flame!<sup>19</sup>

In the chapter in "Past and Present," already referred to, he further says:

All true work is sacred; in all true Work, were it but true hand-labor, there is something of divineness. Labor, wide as the Earth, has its summit in Heaven. Sweat of the brow; and up from that to sweat of the brain, sweat of the heart; which includes all Kepler calculations, Newton meditations, all Sciences, all spoken Epics, all acted Heroisms, Martyrdoms, —up to that "Agony of bloody sweat," which all men have called divine! O brother, if this is not "worship," then I say, the more pity for worship; for this is the noblest thing yet discovered under God's sky. Who art thou that com-

<sup>19</sup>"Labor," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, *Ibid.*, p. 190.

plainest of thy life of toil? Complain not. Look up, my wearied brother; see thy fellow Workmen there, in God's Eternity; surviving there, they alone surviving; sacred Band of the Immortals, celestial Body-guard of the Empire of Mankind.<sup>20</sup>

Such is the interpretation of work which this great laborer gives. It is an interpretation required in our own age even more fundamentally than in the times in which and of which he wrote. For the college man of to-day is not laborious. Less laborious he is than he was in the days of his fathers. He works no more intensely in the hours in which he does work, and the hours of his labor are fewer. The gospel of indulgence abounds. The by-products of the higher education have taken the place of the direct. The student values less highly the acquiring of mental power and more highly the gaining of culture. The honors of the classroom have become less precious than the honors of the campus. The condition may be painted in colors too dark or too bright; but that a change has occurred is evident. The time has come indeed to put the emphasis in our college courses upon hard work; and a preaching of the gospel of Carlyle is timely.

<sup>20</sup> "Past and Present," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, *Ibid.*, p. 195.



In Carlyle's scheme of education, if it be a scheme at all, religion, as in his scheme of life, fills a large place. Carlyle's religion is not that of the kirk. It has no thirty-nine articles. Rather its articles are only one, or an infinite number. It has a catechism, a long one, so long as to represent infinities and eternities. It has no forms—neither creed nor catechism. Its church is all out-of-doors. Its services are the working of all the powers of nature and of man. Its priest is the eternal and universal force making not for evil nor for vileness nor for damnation, but for righteousness, for sincerity, and for salvation. Its altar is work, and its book of common prayer the desire for truth and for power. Its saints are the world's thinkers and doers, potent through infinite space and eternal time. They are indeed the elect, chosen by the forces of divine movements and tendencies. Carlyle's religion rests in the relation which man bears to ultimate reality. Its scope is as much greater than temporary concerns as eternity is longer than time. It creates nations and individuals.

Carlyle tells the Edinburgh youth that

No nation which did not contemplate this wonderful universe with an awe-stricken and reverential belief that there

was a great unknown, omnipotent, and all-wise and all-just Being, superintending all men in it, and all interests in it,—no nation ever came to very much, nor did any man either, who forgot that. If a man did forget that, he forgot the most important part of his mission in this world.<sup>21</sup>

Carlyle is willing to grant to that form of religion called Presbyterianism a large share in the development of his native country.

Nobody who knows Scotland and Scott can doubt but Presbyterianism too had a vast share in the forming of him. A country where the entire people is, or even once has been, laid hold of, filled to the heart with an infinite religious idea, has “made a step from which it cannot retrograde.” Thought, conscience, the sense that man is denizen of a Universe, creature of an Eternity, has penetrated to the remotest cottage, to the simplest heart. Beautiful and awful, the feeling of a Heavenly Behest, of Duty god-commanded, over-canopies all life. There is an inspiration in such a people; one may say in a more special sense, “the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding.”<sup>22</sup>

There is also a specific element of religion, which our great author commends. It is embodied in the word *reverence*. He follows Goethe in giving a high place in the building of character, to this in-

<sup>21</sup> “Inaugural Address,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XVI., p. 396.

<sup>22</sup> “Essay on Scott,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XV., p. 419.

tellectual and moral virtue. Writing of Goethe's works he says :

To enlighten this principle of reverence for the great, to teach us reverence, and whom we are to revere and admire, should ever be a chief aim of Education (indeed it is herein that instruction properly both begins and ends) ; and in these late ages, perhaps more than ever, so indispensable is now our need of clear reverence, so inexpressibly poor our supply. "Clear reverence!" it was once responded to a seeker of light: "all want it, perhaps thou thyself." What wretched idols, of Leeds cloth, stuffed out with bran of one kind or other, do men either worship, or being tired of worshipping (so expensively without fruit), rend in pieces and kick out of doors, amid loud shouting and erowing, what they call "tremendous cheers," as if the feat were miraculous! In private life, as in public, delusion in this sort does its work; the blind leading the blind, both fall into the ditch.<sup>23</sup>

What method shall be adopted for the teaching of this fundamental and all-embracing subject of religion? What method shall be adopted for incorporating it as a part of education? That is not the question. Rather the question is: What method shall be adopted for teaching it as a basic principle? The problem was given up by Carlyle as one he could not solve. The same confession has been made by the wise and unwise since his day.

<sup>23</sup> "Goethe's Works," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, *Ibid.*, p. 25.

With much negative declamation Carlyle says that others must solve the problem out of their own experience and wisdom. He believes that from the life of the English people, dealing with this question through the centuries, may come forth the proper answer.

“And now how teach religion?” so asks the indignant Ultra-radical, cited above; an Ultra-radical seemingly not of the Benthamite species, with whom, though his dialect is far different, there are sound Churchmen, we hope, who have some fellow-feeling: “How teach religion?” By plying with liturgies, catechisms, credos; droning thirty-nine or other articles incessantly into the infant ear? Friends! In that case, why not apply to Birmingham, and have Machines made, and set up at all street-corners, in highways and by-ways, to repeat and vociferate the same, not ceasing night or day? The genius of Birmingham is adequate to that. Albertus Magnus had a leather man that could articulate; not to speak of Martinus Scriblerus’ Nürnberg man that could reason as well as we know who! Depend upon it, Birmingham can make machines to repeat liturgies and articles; to do whatsoever feat is mechanical. And what were all schoolmasters, nay all priests and churches, compared with this Birmingham Iron Church! Votes of two millions in aid of the Church were then something. You order, at so many pounds a head, so many thousand iron parsons as your grant covers; and fix them by satisfactory masonry in all quarters wheresoever wanted, to preach there independent of the world. In loud thoroughfares, still more in unawakened districts, troubled with argumentative infidelity, you make the windpipes wider,

strengthen the main steam-cylinder; your parson preaches, to the due pitch, while you give him coal; and fears no man or thing. Here *were* a "Church-extension;" to which I, with my last penny, did I believe in it, would subscribe.<sup>24</sup>

Yet, as he intimates, the only way to teach religion is by experience, by acquaintance with the thing itself become incarnate. The method of teaching religion is not through religious persons. Writing of Frederick the Great he says more fully upon this point:

Piety to God, the nobleness that inspires a human soul to struggle Heavenward, cannot be "taught" by the most exquisite catechisms, or the most industrious preachings and drillings. No; alas, no. Only by far other methods,—chiefly by silent continual Example, silently waiting for the favorable mood and moment, and aided then by a kind of miracle, well enough named "the grace of God,"—can that sacred contagion pass from soul into soul. How much beyond whole Libraries of orthodox Theology is, sometimes, the mute action, the unconscious look of a father, of a mother, who *had* in them "Devoutness, pious Nobleness!" In whom the young soul, not unobservant, though not consciously observing, came at length to recognize it; to read it, in this irrefragable manner: a seed planted thenceforth in the centre of his holiest affections forevermore!<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> "Chartism," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XVI., p. 109.

<sup>25</sup> "Frederick the Great," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. V., p. 414.

But in the teaching of religion, it is fair to remark in passing, a distinction is ever to be made between religion as a life and religion as a system of truth.

The measures and methods for securing the consummate and comprehensive result of a man, wise, sincere, laborious and religious, are many and diverse. Interpretations and intimations of these ways are scattered up and down these thousands of pages. Among the first of them all we find the art of teaching itself. Teaching in its highest relationship is of greatest value in making the man. In teaching, the teacher is of primary importance. There are teachers, and there are teachers. In his autobiographic essay Carlyle speaks of teachers who are not indeed teachers.

My teachers were hide-bound Pedants, without knowledge of man's nature, or of boy's; or of aught save their lexicons and quarterly account-books. Innumerable dead Vocables (no dead Language, for they themselves knew no Language) they crammed into us, and called it fostering the growth of mind. How can an inanimate, mechanical Gerund-grinder, the like of whom will, in a subsequent century, be manufactured, at Nürnberg out of wood and leather, foster the growth of anything; much more of Mind, which grows, not like a vegetable (by having its roots littered with etymological compost), but like a spirit, by mysterious con-



tact of Spirit; Thought kindling itself at the fire of living Thought? How shall *he* give kindling, in whose own inward man there is no live coal, but all is burnt out to a dead grammatical cinder? The Hinterschlag Professors knew syntax enough; and of the human soul thus much: that it had a faculty called Memory, and could be acted on through the muscular integument by appliance of birch-rods.<sup>26</sup>

Yet there is another kind of teacher, of which Diderot is the type. In his sketch of the great Frenchman, Carlyle, speaking of Diderot's teaching, says:

To decipher the talent of a young vague Capability, who must one day be a man and a Reality; to take him by the hand, and train him to a spiritual trade, and set him up in it, with tools, shop and good-will, were doing him in most cases an unspeakable service,—on this one proviso, it is true, that the trade be a just and honest one; in which proviso surely there should lie no hindrance to such service, but rather a help.<sup>27</sup>

To secure the noblest results there must be in the teacher at least two qualities beside the quality of intelligence or the element of intellect. The first is a sense of reality. The sense of reality is the reagent of sincerity. This sense the teacher must

<sup>26</sup> "Sartor Resartus," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. I., p. 81.

<sup>27</sup> "Essay on Diderot," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XV., p. 93.

possess. In writing of Frederick and of his education, Carlyle says:

Fritz had one unspeakable advantage, rare among princes and even among peasants in these ruined ages: that of *not* being taught, or in general not, by the kind called "Hypocrites, and even Sincere-Hypocrites,"—fatalest species of the class *Hypocrite*. We perceive he was lessoned, all along, not by enchanted Phantasms of that dangerous sort, breathing mendacity of mind, unconsciously, out of every look; but by real Men, who believed from the heart outwards, and were daily doing what they taught. To which unspeakable advantage we add a second, likewise considerable: That his masters, though rigorous, were not unlovable to him;—that his affections, at least, were kept alive; that whatever of seed (or of chaff and hail, as was likelier) fell on his mind, had *sunshine* to help in dealing with it.<sup>28</sup>

Thus the second attribute which the teacher should possess is affection. He may well be severe, but in his severity there should be the element of love. Light he is to give, but the light should come from the heart quite as much as from the intellect. In that beautiful essay entitled "Death of Goethe," Carlyle says:

Precious is the new light of Knowledge which our Teacher conquers for us; yet small to the new light of Love which also we derive from him: the most important element of

<sup>28</sup>"Frederick the Great," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. V., p. 376.



any man's performance is the Life he has accomplished. Under the intellectual union of man and man, which works by precept, lies a holier union of affection, working by example; the influences of which latter, mystic, deep-reaching, all-embracing, can still less be computed. For Love is ever the beginning of Knowledge, as fire is of light; and works also more in the manner of *fire*.<sup>20</sup>

This method of education through the teacher who is sincere and kind is on the whole to be preferred to the method which is referred to in "Sartor Resartus," the method of "reading up."

Teufelsdröckh affirms, in jest:

"I have heard affirmed (surely in jest)," observes he elsewhere, "by not unphilanthropic persons, that it were a real increase of human happiness, could all young men from the age of nineteen be covered under barrels, or rendered otherwise invisible; and there left to follow their lawful studies and callings, till they emerged, sadder and wiser, at the age of twenty-five. With which suggestion, at least as considered in the light of a practical scheme, I need scarcely say that I nowise coincide. Nevertheless it is plausibly urged that, as young ladies (*Mädchen*) are, to mankind, precisely the most delightful in those years; so young gentlemen (*Bübchen*) do then attain their maximum of detestability. Such gawks (*Gecken*) are they, and foolish peacocks, and yet with such a vulturous hunger for self-indulgence; so obstinate, obstrep-

<sup>20</sup>"Death of Goethe," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XV., p. 13.

erous, vain-glorious; in all senses, so froward and so forward. . . .”<sup>30</sup>

Of the specific studies which youth may pursue Carlyle has little to say. Negatively he spurns the two extremes, science and logic. For these Teufelsdröckh has no use.

“Shall your Science,” exclaims he, “proceed in the small chink-lighted, or even oil-lighted, underground workshop of Logic alone; and man’s mind become an Arithmetical Mill, whereof Memory is the Hopper, and mere Tables of Sines and Tangents, Codification, and Treatises of what you call Political Economy, are the Meal? And what is that Science, which the scientific head alone, were it screwed off, and (like the Doctor’s in the Arabian Tale) set in a basin to keep it alive, could prosecute without shadow of a heart,—but one other of the mechanical and menial handicrafts, for which the Scientific Head (having a Soul in it) is too noble an organ? I mean that Thought without Reverence is barren, perhaps poisonous; at best, dies like cookery with the day that called it forth; does not live, like sowing, in successive tilths and wider-spreading harvests, bringing food and plenteous increase to all Time.”<sup>31</sup>

But for history as a study in the university his enthusiasm is great. No wonder that it is great! He tells the Edinburgh students, in the “Inaugural Address:”

<sup>30</sup> “Sartor Resartus,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. I., p. 98.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

As applicable to all of you, I will say that it is highly expedient to go into History; to inquire into what has passed before you on this Earth, and in the Family of Man.<sup>32</sup>

At greater length too, in a fragment of earlier writing, he says:

History recommends itself as the most profitable of all studies: and truly, for such a being as Man, who is born, and has to learn and work, and then after a measured term of years to depart, leaving descendants and performances, and so, in all ways, to vindicate himself as vital portion of a Mankind, no study could be fitter. History is the Letter of Instructions, which the old generations write and posthumously transmit to the new; nay it may be called, more generally still, the Message, verbal or written, which all Mankind delivers to every man; it is the only *articulate* communication (when the inarticulate and mute, intelligible or not, lie round us and in us, so strangely through every fibre of our being, every step of our activity) which the Past can have with the Present, the Distant with what is Here. All Books, therefore, were they but Song-books or treatises on Mathematics, are in the long-run historical documents—as indeed all Speech itself is: thus we might say, History is not only the fittest study, but the only study, and includes all others whatsoever. The Perfect in History, he who understood, and saw and knew within himself, *all* that the whole Family of Adam had hitherto *been* and hitherto *done*, were perfect in all learning extant or possible; needed not thenceforth to *study* any more; had thenceforth nothing left but to *be* and to *do* something

<sup>32</sup> “Inaugural Address,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lariat, Vol. XVI, p. 394.

himself, that others might make History of it, and learn of *him*.<sup>33</sup>

Into the large field embraced in the course of study of the modern university Carlyle does not enter. He was concerned with the sciences as applied to nations and to men, but with the sciences as a tool of teaching and of forming character he had nothing to do. With government—its methods and its forms—with sociology—its atmospheres and forces—he also was concerned as human forces, but with them as with formal disciplines he had nothing to do and concerning them no statement to make. Of biology, geology or other sciences, of national literatures and languages, he likewise had nothing to say. But of course it is to be remembered that Carlyle does not write as the pedagogue or educational philosopher.

Man is, furthermore, educated by his associates, his fellow students. The acquisitions and the attitudes of academic life train him into symmetry and efficiency. Writing of Scott, Carlyle says:

No man lives without jostling and being jostled; in all ways he has to *elbow* himself through the world, giving and receiving offence. His life is a battle, in so far as it is an entity at

<sup>33</sup> "Essay on History," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XV., p. 74.

all. The very oyster, we suppose, comes in collision with oysters: undoubtedly enough it does come in collision with Necessity and Difficulty; and helps itself through, not as a perfect ideal oyster, but as an imperfect real one. Some kind of remorse must be known to the oyster: certain hatreds, certain pusillanimities.<sup>34</sup>

Writing of his beloved John Sterling he interprets thus:

But here, as in his former schools, his studies and inquiries, diligently prosecuted I believe, were of the most discursive wide-flowing character; not steadily advancing along beaten roads towards College honors, but pulsing out with impetuous irregularity now on this tract, now on that, towards whatever spiritual Delphi might promise to unfold the mystery of this world, and announce to him what was, in our new day, the authentic message of the gods. His speculations, readings, inferences, glances and conclusions were doubtless sufficiently encyclopedic; his grand tutors the multifarious set of Books he devoured. And perhaps,—as is the singular case in most schools and educational establishments of this unexampled epoch,—it was not the express set of arrangements in this or any extant University that could essentially forward him, but only the implied and silent ones; less in the prescribed “course of study,” which seems to tend no-whither, than—if you will consider it—in the generous (not ungenerous) rebellion against said prescribed course, and the voluntary spirit of endeavor and adventure excited thereby, does help lie for a brave youth in such places. Curious to consider. The fagging, the illicit boating, and the things

<sup>34</sup>“Essay on Scott,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, *Ibid.*, p. 407.

*forbidden* by the school-master,—these, I often notice in my Eton acquaintances, are the things that have done them good; these, and not their inconsiderable or considerable knowledge of the Greek accidence almost at all! What is Greek accidence, compared to Spartan discipline, if it can be had? That latter is a real and grand attainment. Certainly, if rebellion is unfortunately needful, and you can rebel in a generous manner, several things may be acquired in that operation,—rigorous mutual fidelity, reticence, steadfastness, mild stoicism, and other virtues far transcending your Greek accidence. Nor can the unwisest “prescribed course of study” be considered quite useless, if it have incited you to try nobly on all sides for a course of your own. A singular condition of Schools and High-schools, which have come down, in their strange old clothes and “courses of study,” from the monkish ages into this highly unmonkish one;—tragical condition, at which the intelligent observer makes deep pause!<sup>35</sup>

In “Latter-Day Pamphlets” too, writing of the stump-orator, Carlyle says:

Especially where many men work together, the very rubbing against one another will grind and polish off their angularities into roundness, into “politeness” after a sort; and the official man, place him how you may, will never want for schooling, of extremely various kinds. A first-rate school one cannot call this Parliament for him;—I fear to say what rate at present! In so far as it teaches him vigilance, patience,

<sup>35</sup> “John Sterling,” Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. II., p. 34.



courage, toughness of lungs or of soul, and skill in any kind of swimming, it is a good school.<sup>36</sup>

Now the result of all this education through home and school and university, in morals and religion, in honor and honesty, by teacher and fellow-student, is what? What is the purpose realized? What is the achievement, what is the accomplishment through the years and all the chaos of time and labor, of watchfulness and sacrifice, of pain and pleasure? The result is the transformation of chaos into cosmos. As Carlyle says in writing of Frederick and of Frederick's education:

To make of the human soul a Cosmos, so far as possible, that was Friedrich Wilhelm's dumb notion: not to leave the human soul a mere Chaos;—how much less a Singing or eloquently Spouting Chaos, which is ten times worse than a Chaos left *mute*, confessedly chaotic and not cosmic! To develop the man into *doing* something; and withal into doing it as the Universe and the Eternal Laws require,—which is but another name for really doing and not merely seeming to do it:—that was Friedrich Wilhelm's dumb notion: and it was, I can assure you, very far from being a foolish one, though there was no Latin in it, and much of Prussian pipe-clay!<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup> "Latter-Day Pamphlets," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, *Ibid.*, p. 442.

<sup>37</sup> "Frederick the Great," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. V., p. 423.



The result in its brief form is "just vision to discern, with free force to do."<sup>38</sup>

In general and stated at greater length the result is:

A man all lucid, and in equilibrium. His intellect a clear mirror geometrically plane, brilliantly sensitive to all objects and impressions made on it, and imaging all things in their correct proportions; not twisted up into convex or concave, and distorting everything, so that he cannot see the truth of the matter without endless groping and manipulation: healthy, clear and free, and discerning truly all round him.<sup>39</sup>

At the end of his term of service as rector of the University of Edinburgh, Carlyle was asked to deliver a valedictory address. In his acknowledgment of the invitation, which is a benediction, he says:

Bid them, in my name, if they still love me, fight the good fight, and quit themselves like men, in the warfare to which *they* are as if conscript and consecrated, and which lies ahead. Tell them to consult the eternal oracles (not yet inaudible, nor ever to become so, when worthily inquired of); and to disregard, nearly altogether, in comparison, the temporary noises, menacings and deliriums. May

<sup>38</sup> "Corn-Law Rhymes," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, Vol. XVI, p. 126.

<sup>39</sup> "Inaugural Address," Edition de Luxe, Estes & Lauriat, *Ibid.*, p. 416.

they love Wisdom as Wisdom, if she is to yield *her* treasures, must be loved,—piously, valiantly, humbly, beyond life itself or the prizes of life, with all one's heart, and all one's soul:—in that case (I will say again), and not in any other case, it shall be well with them.<sup>40</sup>

Carlyle's note of farewell, a worthy summary of all his teaching, is a bugle note of inspiration to the student and to the world.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 419.

### III

#### EDUCATION ACCORDING TO RUSKIN

**I** LAY down the last of the twenty-six volumes of Ruskin with a heart at once ill at ease and exultant. Ill at ease it is because of the sadnesses of his life, sadnesses born of himself and also of his dissatisfaction with his times; exultant because here is a man who tried, like Sir Henry Lawrence, to do his duty, to see straight and to think clearly, who despised cant and meanness, who in his unflagging courage spoke the thought that was in him and incarnated his own creed. His times were out of joint. He wanted to set them right and they did not care to be set right. He, in later years, spurned some important doctrines of his earlier. Rich for his wants, he made himself poor on his own land. An individualist in his theories of human development, an aristocrat and an autocrat, he was to a large extent in his use of his property a communist. A great interpreter of art, he became a great interpreter of life. Whether his theories of art, of political economy, of social science, of government,

be true or false—and many are certainly false—he believed them to be true and greatly sacrificed for them.

The interpretations which Ruskin gives of education are manifold, diverse, inconsistent, having their origin in a variety of causes and conditions. His remarks refer quite entirely to education as it belongs to England. Down to the passage of the Education Bill of 1870 there was no public education in England. Education was largely a matter either of private instruction or of church support and control. The renaissance in education which began in Prussia under William von Humboldt near the close of the Napoleonic wars still awaits its co-ordinate quickening among the English people. For the English people have never, until recent years, taken any proper interest in this greatest form of human endeavor. In the half-century in which Ruskin worked and wrote that interest was still torpid. This lack of interest arose and still arises from certain great social conditions. The rise of the political democracy has been the cause of the growth of the attention paid to the education of the people. Therefore, in his view, judging by the education with which he was more familiar, most of the attempts made were conceived in unrea-

son and carried out in unwisdom. For many of these endeavors Mr. Ruskin had either scorn or contempt and to others he was indifferent.

It is taken for granted that any education must be good;—that the more of it we get, the better; that bad education only means little education; and that the worst thing we have to fear is getting none. Alas, that is not at all so. Getting no education is by no means the worst thing that can happen to us. One of the pleasantest friends I ever had in my life was a Savoyard guide, who could only read with difficulty, and write, scarcely intelligibly, and by great effort. He knew no language but his own—no science, except as much practical agriculture as served him to till his fields. But he was, without exception, one of the happiest persons, and, on the whole, one of the best, I have ever known. . . .<sup>1</sup>

Positively Mr. Ruskin has sung of the evil of perverted education in the poem on Christ Church, Oxford. Addressing rooms with which he was most familiar, he says:

Ye melancholy chambers! I could shun  
 The darkness of your silence, with such fear,  
 As places where slow murder had been done.  
 How many noble spirits have died here,  
 Withering away in yearnings to aspire,  
 Gnawed by mocked hope—devoured by their own fire!  
 Methinks the grave must feel a colder bed  
 To spirits such as these, than unto common dead.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>“*Fors Clavigera*,” Vol. I., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 42.

<sup>2</sup>“*Poetry of Architecture*,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 192.

With a sarcasm which has a touch of bitterness he refers also to the evils of the contemporary system of education. He says that modern education consists in getting:

A rascal of an architect to order a rascal of a clerk-of-the-works to order a parcel of rascally bricklayers to build you a bestially stupid building in the middle of the town, poisoned with gas, and with an iron floor which will drop you all through it some frosty evening; wherein you will bring a puppet of a cockney lecturer in a dress coat and a white tie, to tell you smugly there's no God, and how many messes he can make of a lump of sugar. Much the better you are for all that, when you get home again, aren't you? <sup>3</sup>

With greater fullness, writing so late as the year 1883, in the ninety-fourth Letter of Fors, he says:

And I do not choose to teach (as usually understood) the three R's; first, because, as I *do* choose to teach the elements of music, astronomy, botany and zoology, not only the mistresses and masters capable of teaching these should not waste their time on the three R's; but the children themselves would have no time to spare, nor should they have. If their fathers and mothers can read and count, *they* are the people to teach reading and numbering, to earliest intelligent infancy. For orphans, or children whose fathers and mothers can't read or count, dame schools in every village (best in the almshouses, where there might be dames enow) are all that is wanted.

<sup>3</sup> "Fors Clavigera," Vol. III., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 416.

Secondly. I do not care that St. George's children, as a rule, should learn either reading or writing, because there are very few people in this world who get any good by either. Broadly and practically, whatever foolish people *read* does *them* harm, and whatever they *write*, does other people harm: (see my notes on Narrs in general, and my own Narr friend in particular, *Fors*, vol. ii., page 400), and nothing can ever prevent this, for a fool attracts folly as decayed meat attracts flies, and distils and assimilates it, no matter out of what book;—he can get as much out of the Bible as any other, though of course he or she usually reads only newspaper or novel.<sup>4</sup>

Again,

Not only do the arts of literature and arithmetic continually hinder children in the *acquisition* of ideas,—but they are apt greatly to confuse and encumber the *memory* of them.<sup>5</sup>

Also,

But, lastly and chiefly, the personal conceit and ambition developed by reading, in minds of selfish activity, lead to the disdain of manual labor, and the desire of all sorts of unattainable things, and fill the streets with discontented and useless persons, seeking some means of living in town society by their wits. I need not enlarge on this head; every reader's experience must avow the extent and increasing plague of this fermenting imbecility, striving to make for itself what it calls a "position in life."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. IV., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 365.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 369.



The simple truth is that education represents a discipline which humanity needs and does not want. The application of education, therefore, should be addressed first to the desires and not to the intellect. We should discipline the passions and direct them. The difficulty of this attempt is great, for

most men's minds are indeed little better than rough heath wilderness, neglected and stubborn, partly barren, partly overgrown with pestilent brakes and venomous wind-sown herbage of evil surmise; that the first thing you have to do for them, and yourself, is eagerly and scornfully to set fire to *this*; burn all the jungle into wholesome ash heaps, and then plow and sow. All the true literary work before you, for life, must begin with obedience to that order, "Break up your fallow ground, and *sow not among thorns.*"<sup>7</sup>

The education which is thus applied to humanity has many characteristics, elements and qualities. Its principle—and the principle determines methods and means and measures—has relation to the great law of heredity, for, as Mr. Ruskin says in the last volume of "Modern Painters:"

The lower orders, and all orders, have to learn that every vicious habit and chronic disease communicates itself by descent; and that by purity of birth the entire system of the human body and soul may be gradually elevated, or by recklessness of birth, degraded; until there shall be as much

<sup>7</sup> "Sesame and Lilies," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 52.

difference between the well-bred and ill-bred human creature (whatever pains be taken with their education) as between a wolf-hound and the vilest mongrel cur. And the knowledge of this great fact ought to regulate the education of our youth, and the entire conduct of the nation.<sup>8</sup>

But under this great law of heredity, a law the value of which has become more evident in the fifty years since Mr. Ruskin wrote these words, there are, at least, three things which the student is to learn. They are:

First. Where he is.

Secondly. Where he is going.

Thirdly. What he had best do under those circumstances.

First. Where he is.—That is to say, what sort of a world he has got into; how large it is; what kind of creatures live in it, and how; what it is made of, and what may be made of it.

Secondly. Where he is going.—That is to say, what chances or reports there are of any other world besides this; what seems to be the nature of that other world; and whether, for information respecting it, he had better consult the Bible, Koran or Council of Trent.

Thirdly. What he had best do under those circumstances.—That is to say, what kind of faculties he possesses; what are the present state and wants of mankind; what is his place in society; and what are the readiest means in his power of attaining happiness and diffusing it. The man who knows these things, and who has had his will so subdued in the learning them, that he is ready to do what he knows he

<sup>8</sup> "Modern Painters," Vol. V., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 332.

ought, I should call educated; and the man who knows them not,—uneducated, though he could talk all the tongues of Babel.

Our present European system of so-called education ignores, or despises, not one, nor the other, but all the three, of these great branches of human knowledge.<sup>9</sup>

In the division of the three fundamental knowledges thus outlined, it is evident that one great purpose, among others, is to give contentment.

The most helpful and sacred work, therefore, which can at present be done for humanity, is to teach people (chiefly by example, as all best teaching must be done) not how “to better themselves,” but how to “satisfy themselves.” It is the curse of every evil nation and evil creature to eat, and *not* be satisfied. The words of blessing are, that they shall eat and be satisfied. And as there is only one kind of water which quenches all thirst, so there is only one kind of bread which satisfies all hunger, the bread of justice or righteousness; which hungering after, men shall always be filled, that being the bread of Heaven; but hungering after the bread, or wages, of unrighteousness, shall not be filled, that being the bread of Sodom.

And, in order to teach men how to be satisfied, it is necessary fully to understand the art and joy of humble life,—this, at present, of all arts or sciences being the one most needing study. Humble life—that is to say, proposing to itself no future exaltation, but only a sweet continuance; not excluding the idea of foresight, but wholly of fore-sorrow,

\*“Stones of Venice,” Vol. III., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 215.

and taking no troublous thought for coming days: so, also, not excluding the idea of providence, or provision, but wholly of accumulation;—the life of domestic affection and domestic peace, full of sensitiveness to all elements of costless and kind pleasure;—therefore, chiefly to the loveliness of the natural world.<sup>10</sup>

But education means also something more definite than contentment.

It means teaching children to be clean, active, honest and useful. All these characters can be taught, and cannot be acquired by sickly and ill-dispositioned children without being taught; but they can be untaught to any extent, by evil habit and example at home. Public schools, in which the aim was to form character faithfully, would return them in due time to their parents, worth more than their “weight in gold.”<sup>11</sup>

Education likewise means occupation.

The employment forms the habits of body and mind, and these are the constitution of the man—the greater part of his moral or persistent nature, whatever effort, under special excitement, he may make to change or overcome them. Employment is the half, and the primal half, of education—it is the warp of it; and the fineness or the endurance of all subsequently woven pattern depends wholly on its straightness and strength. And whatever difficulty there may be in tracing through past history the remoter connections of event

<sup>10</sup> “Modern Painters,” Vol. V., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 411.

<sup>11</sup> “Arrows of the Chace,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 310.

and cause, one chain of sequence is always clear: the formation, namely, of the character of nations by their employments, and the determination of their final fate by their character. . . . For a wholesome human employment is the first and best method of education, mental as well as bodily. A man taught to plough, row or steer well, and a woman taught to cook properly and make dresses neatly, are already educated in many essential moral habits. Labor considered as a discipline has hitherto been thought of only for criminals; but the real and noblest function of labor is to prevent crime, and not to be *Reformatory* but *Formatory*.<sup>12</sup>

Education is, furthermore, mental exercise or cultivation.

May we not, to begin with, accept this great principle—that, as our bodies, to be in health, must be *generally* exercised, so our minds, to be in health, must be *generally* cultivated? You would not call a man healthy who had strong arms but was paralytic in his feet; nor one who could walk well, but had no use of his hands; nor one who could see well, if he could not hear. You would not voluntarily reduce your bodies to any such partially developed state. Much more, then, you would not, if you could help it, reduce your minds to it. Now, your minds are endowed with a vast number of gifts of totally different uses—limbs of mind as it were, which, if you don't exercise, you cripple. One is curiosity; that is a gift, a capacity of pleasure in knowing; which if you destroy, you make yourselves cold and dull. Another is sympathy; the power of sharing in the feelings of living creatures, which if you destroy, you make yourselves hard and

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 318, 322.

cruel. Another of your limbs of mind is admiration; the power of enjoying beauty or ingenuity, which, if you destroy, you make yourselves base and irreverent. Another is wit; or the power of playing with the lights on the many sides of truth; which if you destroy, you make yourselves gloomy, and less useful and cheering to others than you might be. So that in choosing your way of work it should be your aim, as far as possible, to bring out all these faculties, as far as they exist in you; not one merely, nor another, but all of them. And the way to bring them out, is simply to concern yourselves attentively with the subjects of each faculty. To cultivate sympathy you must be among living creatures, and thinking about them; and to cultivate admiration, you must be among beautiful things and looking at them.<sup>13</sup>

But education, continuing the definition, is also accuracy.

The entire difference between education and non-education (as regards the merely intellectual part of it), consists in this accuracy. A well-educated gentleman may not know many languages,—may not be able to speak any but his own,—may have read very few books. But whatever language he knows, he knows precisely; whatever word he pronounces he pronounces rightly; above all, he is learned in the *peerage* of words; knows the words of true descent and ancient blood at a glance, from words of modern canaille; remembers all their ancestry—their intermarriages, distantest relationships, and the extent to which they were admitted, and offices they held, among the national noblesse of words at any time, and in any country. But an uneducated person may know by memory

<sup>13</sup>“Two Paths on Art,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 85.



any number of languages, and talk them all, and yet truly know not a word of any,—not a word even of his own. An ordinarily clever and sensible seaman will be able to make his way ashore at most ports; yet he has only to speak a sentence of any language to be known for an illiterate person: so also the accent, or turn of expression of a single sentence will at once mark a scholar. And this is so strongly felt, so conclusively admitted by educated persons, that a false accent or a mistaken syllable is enough, in the parliament of any civilized nation, to assign to a man a certain degree of inferior standing for ever. And this is right; but it is a pity that the accuracy insisted on is not greater, and required to a serious purpose.<sup>14</sup>

It is to be said further that education represents the highest power.

Believing that all literature and all education are only useful so far as they tend to confirm this calm, beneficent, and *therefore* kingly, power—first, over ourselves, and, through ourselves, over all around us, I am now going to ask you to consider with me farther what special portion or kind of this royal authority, arising out of noble education, may rightly be possessed by women; and how far they also are called to a true queenly power. Not in their households merely, but over all within their sphere. And in what sense, if they rightly understood and exercised this royal or gracious influence, the order and beauty induced by such benignant power would justify us in speaking of the territories over which each of them reigned, as “Queens’ Gardens.”<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> “Sesame and Lilies,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 41.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.



It is to be noted that Mr. Ruskin believes, contrary to the common interpretation, that education should be joy; it should make for gladness, pleasure and happiness.

And in all these phases of education, the main point, you observe, is that it *should* be a beatitude: and that a man should learn “*χαίρειν ὀφθως*”: and this rejoicing is above all things to be in actual sight; you have the truth exactly in the saying of Dante when he is brought before Beatrice, in heaven, that his eyes “satisfied themselves for their ten years’ thirst.”

This, then, I repeat, is the sum of education. All literature, art and science are vain, and worse, if they do not enable you to be glad; and glad justly.

And I feel it distinctly my duty, though with solemn and true deference to the masters of education in this university, to say that I believe our modern methods of teaching, and especially the institution of severe and frequent examination, to be absolutely opposed to this great end; and that the result of competitive labour in youth is infallibly to make men know all they learn wrongly, and hate the habit of learning; so that instead of coming to Oxford to rejoice in their work, men look forward to the years they are to pass under her teaching as a deadly agony, from which they are fain to escape, and sometimes for their life, *must* escape, into any method of sanitary frivolity.<sup>16</sup>

Education, furthermore, means governing.

Educate, or govern, they are one and the same word. Education does not mean teaching people to know what they do

<sup>16</sup> “The Eagle’s Nest,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 402.

not know. It means teaching them to behave as they do not behave. And the true "compulsory education" which the people now ask of you is not catechism, but drill. It is not teaching the youth of England the shapes of letters and the tricks of numbers; and then leaving them to turn their arithmetic to roguery, and their literature to lust. It is, on the contrary, training them into the perfect exercise and kingly continence of their bodies and souls.<sup>17</sup>

The education of gentlemen has been secured largely through two great authors and through what they represent and have formed. They are Homer and Shakespeare. To these two some would add the Bible.

All Greek gentlemen were educated under Homer. All Roman gentlemen, by Greek literature. All Italian, and French, and English gentlemen, by Roman literature, and by its principles. Of the scope of Shakespeare, I will say only, that the intellectual measure of every man since born, in the domains of creative thought, may be assigned to him, according to the degree in which he has been taught by Shakespeare.<sup>18</sup>

The elements of the education of gentlemen and also the elements of all education which the state provides should be:

First.—The body must be made as beautiful and perfect in its youth as it can be, wholly irrespective of ulterior pur-

<sup>17</sup> "Crown of Wild Olive," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 422.

<sup>18</sup> "Sesame and Lilies," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 117.

pose. If you mean afterwards to set the creature to business which will degrade its body and shorten its life, first, I should say, simply,—you had better let such business alone;—but if you must have it done, somehow, yet let the living creature whom you mean to kill, get the full strength of its body first, and taste the joy and bear the beauty of youth. After that, poison it, if you will. Economically, the arrangement is a wiser one, for it will take longer in the killing than if you began with it younger; and you will get an excess of work out of it which will more than pay for its training.

Therefore, first teach—as I said in the preface to *Unto this Last*—“The Laws of Health, and exercises enjoined by them;” and to this end your schools must be in fresh country, and amidst fresh air, and have great extents of land attached to them in permanent estate. Riding, running, all the honest personal exercises of offence and defence, and music, should be the primal heads of this bodily education.

Next to these bodily accomplishments, the two great mental graces should be taught, Reverence and Compassion: not that these are in a literal sense to be “taught,” for they are innate in every well-born human creature, but they have to be developed, exactly as the strength of the body must be, by deliberate and constant exercise. I never understood why Goethe (in the plan of education in *Wilhelm Meister*) says that reverence is not innate, but must be taught from without; it seems to me so fixedly a function of the human spirit, that if men can get nothing else to reverence they will worship a fool, or a stone, or a vegetable. But to teach reverence rightly is to attach it to the right persons and things; first, by setting over your youth masters whom they cannot but love and respect; next, by gathering for them, out of past history, whatever has been most worthy, in human deeds and human pas-

sion; and leading them continually to dwell upon such instances, making this the principal element of emotional excitement to them; and, lastly, by letting them justly feel, as far as may be, the smallness of their own powers and knowledge, as compared with the attainments of others.

Compassion, on the other hand, is to be taught chiefly by making it a point of honour, collaterally with courage, and in the same rank (as indeed the complement and evidence of courage), so that, in the code of unwritten school law, it shall be held as shameful to have done a cruel thing as a cowardly one. All infliction of pain on weaker creatures is to be stigmatized as unmanly crime; and every possible opportunity taken to exercise the youths in offices of some practical help, and to acquaint them with the realities of the distress which, in the joyfulness of entering into life, it is so difficult for those who have not seen home suffering, to conceive.

Reverence, then, and compassion, we are to teach primarily, and with these, as the bond and guardian of them, truth of spirit and word, of thought and sight. Truth, earnest and passionate, sought for like a treasure and kept like a crown.

This teaching of truth as a habit will be the chief work the master has to do; and it will enter into all parts of education. First, you must accustom the children to close accuracy of statement; this both as a principle of honour, and as an accomplishment of language, making them try always who shall speak truest, both as regards the fact he has to relate or express (not concealing or exaggerating), and as regards the precision of the words he expresses it in, thus making truth (which, indeed, it is) the test of perfect language, and giving the intensity of a moral purpose to the study and art of words: then carrying this accuracy into all habits of

thought and observation also, so as always to *think* of things as they truly are and to *see* them as they truly are, as far as in us rests. And it *does* rest much in our power, for all false thoughts and seeings come mainly of our thinking of what we have no business with, and looking for things we want to see, instead of things that ought to be seen.

“Do not talk but of what you know; do not think but of what you have materials to think justly upon; and do not look for things only that you like, when there are others to be seen”—this is the lesson to be taught to our youth, and inbred in them; and that mainly by our own example and continence. Never teach a child anything of which you are not yourself sure; and, above all, if you feel anxious to force anything into its mind in tender years, that the virtue of youth and early association may fasten it there, be sure it is no lie which you thus sanctify. There is always more to be taught of absolute, incontrovertible knowledge, open to its capacity, than any child can learn; there is no need to teach it anything doubtful. Better that it should be ignorant of a thousand truths, than have consecrated in its heart a single lie.

And for this, as well as for many other reasons, the principal subjects of education, after history, ought to be natural science and mathematics; but with respect to these studies, your schools will require to be divided into three groups; one for children who will probably have to live in cities, one for those who will live in the country, and one for those who will live at sea; the schools for these last, of course, being always placed on the coast. And for children whose life is to be in cities, the subjects of study should be, as far as their disposition will allow of it, mathematics and the arts; for children who are to live in the country, natural history of birds,

insects, and plants, together with agriculture taught practically; and for children who are to be seamen, physical geography, astronomy, and the natural history of sea fish and sea birds.<sup>19</sup>

Negatively it is to be said that education is not to be made a means of a livelihood.

So far as you come to Oxford in order to get your living out of her, you are ruining both Oxford and yourselves. There never has been, there never can be, any other law respecting the wisdom that is from above, than this one precept,—“Buy the Truth, and sell it not.” It is to be costly to you—of labour and patience; and you are never to sell it, but to guard, and to give.<sup>20</sup>

The result of education is holiness, faithfulness to duty and kingliness in character and deed.

We once taught them [our youths] to make Latin verses, and called them educated; now we teach them to leap and to row, to hit a ball with a bat, and call them educated. Can they plow, can they sow, can they plant at the right time, or build with a steady hand? Is it the effort of their lives to be chaste, knightly, faithful, holy in thought, lovely in word and deed? Indeed it is, with some, nay with many, and the strength of England is in them, and the hope; but we have to turn their courage from the toil of war to the toil of mercy; and their intellect from dispute of words to discernment of things; and their knighthood from the errantry of adventure to the state and fidelity of a kingly power. And

<sup>19</sup> “Time and Tide,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., pp. 183-186.

<sup>20</sup> “The Art of England,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 352.



then, indeed, shall abide, for them, and for us an incorruptible felicity, and an infallible religion; shall abide for us Faith, no more to be assailed by temptation, no more to be defended by wrath and by fear;—shall abide with us Hope, no more to be quenched by the years that overwhelm, or made ashamed by the shadows that betray; shall abide for us, and with us, the greatest of these; the abiding will, the abiding name, of our Father. For the greatest of these, is Charity.<sup>21</sup>

Such are some of the elements and qualities of education. But more specifically and fully Mr. Ruskin has a good deal to say about the body of education itself. What are the studies which go to make up this great force? Under various forms in several volumes Mr. Ruskin has indicated what he thinks should be the content of education. The elements of this content differ in different statements, “but,” he says in the last volume of “*Modern Painters*,”

I have no doubt that every child in a civilized country should be taught the first principles of natural history, physiology and medicine; also to sing perfectly, so far as it has capacity, and to draw any definite form accurately to any scale.

These things it should be taught by requiring its attendance at school not more than three hours a day, and less if possible (the best part of children’s education being in helping their parents and families). The other elements of its

<sup>21</sup>“*Sesame and Lilies*,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 136.



instruction ought to have respect to the trade by which it is to live.

Modern systems of improvement are too apt to confuse the recreation of the workman with his education. He should be educated for his work before he is allowed to undertake it; and refreshed and relieved while he practises it.<sup>22</sup>

In "Fors," in a letter written in 1871, he says:

Of Arithmetic, Geometry and Chemistry, you can know but little, at the utmost; but that little, well learnt, serves you well. And a little Latin, well learnt, will serve you also, and in a higher way than any of these.<sup>23</sup>

At the other extreme of the educational process he asks the question: What should the average first-class man of Oxford know? He answers the question by saying:

I should require, for a first class, proficiency in two schools; not, of course, in all the subjects of each chosen school, but in a well chosen and combined group of them. Thus, I should call a very good first-class man one who had got some such range of subjects, and such proficiency in each, as this:

English, Greek and Mediæval-Italian Literature.....High.  
 English and French History, and Archæology.....Average.  
 Conic Sections.....Thorough, as far as learnt.  
 Political Economy.....Thorough, as far as learnt.  
 Botany, *or* Chemistry, *or* Physiology.....High.

<sup>22</sup> "Modern Painters," Vol. V., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 413 (note).

<sup>23</sup> "Fors Clavigera," Vol. I., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 16.

Painting .....	Average.
Music .....	Average.
Bodily Exercise .....	High. <sup>24</sup>

For the youth of England Mr. Ruskin believes that acquaintance should be had with at least five cities and with six nations. The five cities are Rome, Athens, Venice, Florence, and London. Not only the English boy, but every European boy should know the history of these five towns. And the six nations are the Roman, the Greek, the Syrian, the Egyptian, and, strange to say, the Tuscan and the Arab.

In the process of education, reading, despite all that has been written to the contrary, plays an important part, and for the content of education the books which are most worth reading are of tremendous consequence. Mr. Ruskin gives a list of such books. What he has to say has wide and vital significance:

I cannot, of course, suggest the choice of your library to you, every several mind needs different books; but there are some books which we all need, and assuredly, if you read Homer, Plato, Æschylus, Herodotus, Dante, Shakespeare, and Spenser, as much as you ought, you will not require wide enlargement of shelves to right and left of them for purposes of perpetual study. Among modern books, avoid generally

<sup>24</sup> "Arrows of the Chace," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 45.

magazine and review literature. Sometimes it may contain a useful abridgement or a wholesome piece of criticism; but the chances are ten to one it will either waste your time or mislead you. If you want to understand any subject whatever, read the best book upon it you can hear of; not a review of the book. If you don't like the first book you try, seek for another; but do not hope ever to understand the subject without pains, by a reviewer's help. Avoid especially that class of literature which has a knowing tone; it is the most poisonous of all. Every good book, or piece of book, is full of admiration and awe; it may contain firm assertion or stern satire, but it never sneers coldly, nor asserts haughtily, and it always leads you to reverence or love something with your whole heart. It is not always easy to distinguish the satire of the venomous race of books from the satire of the noble and pure ones; but in general you may notice that the cold-blooded Crustacean and Batrachian books will sneer at sentiment; and the warm-blooded, human books, at sin. Then, in general, the more you can restrain your serious reading to reflective or lyric poetry, history, and natural history, avoiding fiction and the drama, the healthier your mind will become. Of modern poetry keep to Scott, Wordsworth, Keats, Crabbe, Tennyson, the two Brownings, Lowell, Longfellow, and Coventry Patmore, whose "Angel in the House" is a most finished piece of writing, and the sweetest analysis we possess of quiet modern domestic feeling; while Mrs. Browning's "Aurora Leigh" is, as far as I know, the greatest poem which the century has produced in any language. Cast Coleridge at once aside, as sickly and useless; and Shelley as shallow and verbose; Byron, until your taste is fully formed, and you are able to discern the magnificence in him from the wrong. Never read bad or common poetry, nor write any poetry your-

self; there is, perhaps, rather too much than too little in the world already.

Of reflective prose, read chiefly Bacon, Johnson, and Helps. Carlyle is hardly to be named as a writer for "beginners," because his teaching, though to some of us vitally necessary, may to others be hurtful. If you understand and like him, read him; if he offends you, you are not yet ready for him, and perhaps may never be so; at all events, give him up, as you would sea-bathing if you found it hurt you, till you are stronger. Of fiction, read Sir Charles Grandison, Scott's novels, Miss Edgeworth's, and, if you are a young lady, Madame de Genlis', the French Miss Edgeworth; making these, I mean, your constant companions. Of course you must, or will read other books for amusement, once or twice; but you will find that these have an element of perpetuity in them, existing in nothing else of their kind: while their peculiar quietness and repose of manner will also be of the greatest value in teaching you to feel the same characters in art. Read little at a time, trying to feel interest in little things, and reading not so much for the sake of the story as to get acquainted with the pleasant people into whose company these writers bring you. A common book will often give you much amusement, but it is only a noble book which will give you dear friends. Remember also that it is of less importance to you in your earlier years, that the books you read should be clever, than that they should be right. I do not mean oppressively or repulsively instructive; but that the thoughts they express should be just, and the feelings they excite generous. It is not necessary for you to read the wittiest or the most suggestive books: it is better, in general, to hear what is already known, and may be simply said. Much of the literature of the present day, though good to be read by persons

of ripe age, has a tendency to agitate rather than confirm, and leaves its readers too frequently in a helpless or hopeless indignation, the worst possible state into which the mind of youth can be thrown.<sup>25</sup>

Such are some of the thoughts of Mr. Ruskin regarding the general end and content of education. He lays bare, and interprets, the defects and the possible excellences—the defects being more significant than the excellences—of the system of education known to him. His interpretations are not to be received as philosophic in either thought or expression. He writes with either passion or picturesqueness, or both, but his motives are the purest and his aims the highest. The irregularity of the content of education which he suggests may arise in part from the uniqueness of his own education; for his education was quite unlike that of the English boy of the upper middle class. It is a subject of debate among Eton and Harrow men which school has contributed the larger share to the supremacy of the little island. John Ruskin was not a boy of Eton or of Harrow or even of Rugby. His mother and brothers were his private tutors

<sup>25</sup> “Ethics of the Dust,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., pp. 411–413.

until he went to Oxford in his fifteenth year. He is, therefore, both because of his personal training and also because of the individualistic character of his education, not inclined to lay down full programs of studies. The schedules he does suggest seem to lay emphasis upon special studies without consideration of the relation of these studies to each other. They always emphasize the human in the formal and scholastic, and the utilitarian motive rather than the theoretical aim. No master has placed an emphasis stronger or more constant on the value of religion in education than John Ruskin. The educational form of this great force is largely instruction in the Bible. Ruskin was, like Samuel, trained by his mother in the knowledge of the Holy Scriptures. His style in writing he believes was formed largely on the great scriptural models. In infancy he memorized many parts of the Bible, particularly of the Old Testament, and of its book of Psalms, and these chapters remained a lasting resource. Again and again he refers under diverse forms and at different times to the debt he owed to his mother in her compelling him to learn so many parts of the Bible. In the autobiographic "Praeterita" he says:



I have next with deeper gratitude to chronicle what I owed to my mother for the resolutely consistent lessons which so exercised me in the Scriptures as to make every word of them familiar to my ear in habitual music,—yet in that familiarity revered, as transcending all thought, and ordaining all conduct.

This she effected, not by her own sayings or personal authority; but simply by compelling me to read the book thoroughly, for myself. As soon as I was able to read with fluency, she began a course of Bible work with me, which never ceased till I went to Oxford. She read alternate verses with me, watching, at first, every intonation of my voice, and correcting the false ones, till she made me understand the verse, if within my reach, rightly, and energetically. It might be beyond me altogether; that she did not care about; but she made sure that as soon as I got hold of it at all, I should get hold of it by the right end.

In this way she began with the first verse of Genesis and went straight through, to the last verse of the Apocalypse; hard names, numbers, Levitical law, and all; and began again at Genesis the next day. If a name was hard, the better the exercise in pronunciation,—if a chapter was tiresome, the better lesson in patience,—if loathsome, the better lesson in faith that there was some use in its being so outspoken. After our chapters (from two to three a day, according to their length, the first thing after breakfast, and no interruption from servants allowed,—none from visitors, who either joined in the reading or had to stay upstairs,—and none from any visitings or excursions, except real travelling,) I had to learn a few verses by heart, or repeat, to make sure I had not lost, something of what was already known; and, with the chapters



thus gradually possessed from the first word to the last, I had to learn the whole body of the fine old Scottish paraphrases, which are good, melodious, and forceful verse; and to which, together with the Bible itself, I owe the first cultivation of my ear in sound.

It is strange that all of the pieces of the Bible which my mother thus taught me, that which cost me most to learn, and which was, to my child's mind, chiefly repulsive—the 119th Psalm—has now become of all the most precious to me, in its overflowing and glorious passion of love for the Law of God, in opposition to the abuse of it by modern preachers of what they imagine to be His gospel.

But it is only by deliberate effort that I recall the long morning hours of toil, as regular as sunrise,—toil on both sides equal—by which, year after year, my mother forced me to learn these paraphrases, and chapters, (the eighth of 1st Kings being one—try it, good reader, in a leisure hour!) allowing not so much as a syllable to be missed or misplaced; while every sentence was required to be said over and over again till she was satisfied with the accent of it. I recollect a struggle between us of about three weeks, concerning the accent of the “of” in the lines

“Shall any following spring revive  
The ashes of the urn?”—

I insisting, partly in childish obstinacy, and partly in true instinct for rhythm (being wholly careless on the subject both of urns and their contents), on reciting it with an accented *of*. It was not, I say, till after three weeks' labor, that my mother got the accent lightened on the “of” and laid on the ashes, to her mind. But had it taken three years, she would have done it, having once undertaken to do it. And, assur-

edly, had she not done it,—well, there's no knowing what would have happened; but I am very thankful she *did*.

I have just opened my oldest (in use) Bible,—a small, closely, and very neatly printed volume it is, printed in Edinburgh by Sir D. Hunter Blair and J. Bruce, Printers to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, in 1816. Yellow, now, with age, and flexible, but not unclean, with much use, except that the lower corners of the pages at 8th of 1st Kings, and 32d Deuteronomy, are worn somewhat thin and dark, the learning of these two chapters having cost me much pains. My mother's list of the chapters with which, thus learned, she established my soul in life, has just fallen out of it. I will take what indulgence the incurious reader can give me, for printing the list thus accidentally occurrent:

Exodus, chapters 15th and 20th.

2 Samuel, chapter 1st, from 17th verse to the end.

1 Kings, chapter 8th.

Psalms, chapters 23d, 32d, 90th, 91st, 103d, 112th, 119th, 139th.

Proverbs, chapters 2d, 3d, 8th, 12th.

Isaiah, chapter 58th.

Matthew, chapters 5th, 6th, 7th.

Acts, chapter 26th.

1 Corinthians, chapters 13th, 15th.

James, chapter 4th.

Revelation, chapters 5th, 6th.

And truly, though I have picked up the elements of a little further knowledge—in mathematics, meteorology, and the like, in after life,—and owe not a little to the teaching of many people, this maternal installation of my mind in that prop-

erty of chapters, I count very confidently the most precious, and, on the whole, the one *essential* part of all my education.

And it is perhaps already time to mark what advantage and mischief, by the chances of life up to seven years old, had been irrevocably determined for me.<sup>26</sup>

In addition to the cultural element of a religious education, mention should be made of the moral quality. This moral quality has in it a tremendous significance as standing for efficiency of the highest order. Its value specially emerges in the Greek authors, but it characterizes the great literature of every nation. Mr. Ruskin says :

One farther great, and greatest, sign of the Divinity in this enchanted work of the classic masters, I did not then assert,—for, indeed, I had not then myself discerned it,—namely, that this power of noble composition is never given but with accompanying instinct of moral law; and that so severe, that the apparently too complete and ideal justice which it proclaims has received universally the name of “poetical” justice—the justice conceived only by the men of consummate imaginative power. So that to say of any man that he has power of design, is at once to say of him that he is using it on God’s side; for it can only have been taught him by that Master, and cannot be taught by the use of it against Him. And therefore every great composition in the world, every great piece of painting or literature—without any exception, from the birth of Man to this hour—is an assertion of moral law, as strict, when we examine it,

<sup>26</sup> “*Praetorita*,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 35.

as the *Eumenides* or the *Divina Commedia*; while the total collapse of all power of artistic design in Italy at this day has been signalized and sealed by the production of an epic poem in praise of the Devil, and in declaration that God is a malignant "Larva."<sup>27</sup>

Mr. Ruskin does not decline to touch upon one of the most fundamental and insidious ills which disintegrate education and every other human force. Against it he thunders with tremendous passion. From Venice in the year 1877, he writes:

Hence, if from any place in earth, I ought to be able to send you some words of warning to English youth, for the ruin of this mighty city was all in one word—fornication. Fools who think they can write history will tell you it was "the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope," and the like! Alas it was indeed the covering of every hope she had, in God and his Law.

For indeed, my dear friend, I doubt if you can fight this evil by mere heroism and common-sense. Not many men are heroes; not many are rich in common-sense. They will train for a boat-race; will they for the race of life? For the applause of the pretty girls in blue on the banks; yes. But to win the soul and body of a noble woman for their own forever, will they? Not as things are going, I think, though how or where they are to go or end is to me at present inconceivable.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> "Fors Clavigera," Vol. IV., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 176.

<sup>28</sup> "Arrows of the Chace," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 330.

Further he says :

All that you have advised and exposed is wisely said and bravely told ; but no advice, no exposure, will be of use, until the right relation exists again between the father and the mother and their son. To deserve his confidence, to keep it as the chief treasure committed in trust to them by God : to be the father his strength, the mother his sanctification, and both his chosen refuge, through all weakness, evil, danger, and amazement of his young life. My friend, while you still teach in Oxford the "philosophy," forsooth, of that poor cretinous wretch, Stuart Mill, and are endeavouring to open other "careers" to English women than that of the Wife and the Mother, you won't make your men chaste by recommending them to leave off tea.<sup>29</sup>

I could say ever so much more, of course, if there were only time, or if it would be of any use—about the misapplication of the imagination. But really, the essential thing is the founding of real schools of instruction for both boys and girls—first, in domestic medicine and all that it means ; and secondly, in the plain moral law of all humanity : "Thou shalt not commit adultery," with all that *it* means.<sup>30</sup>

Although the moral and religious elements are of supreme consequence, yet there are other special elements and forces which are preeminent. Fifty years ago Mr. Ruskin distinguished the sense and half-sense of so-called practical education. In this interpretation he also has much to say respecting

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 333.

manual training and trade schools. What he wrote fifty years ago is apt for the present time.

In order that men may be able to support themselves when they are grown, their strength must be properly developed while they are young; and the state should always see to this—not allowing their health to be broken by too early labour, nor their powers to be wasted for want of knowledge. Some questions connected with this matter are noticed farther on under the head of “*trial schools:*” one point I must notice here, that I believe all youths of whatever rank, ought to learn some manual trade thoroughly; for it is quite wonderful how much a man’s views of life are cleared by the attainment of the capacity of doing any one thing well with his hands and arms. For a long time, what right life there was in the upper classes of Europe depended in no small degree on the necessity which each man was under of being able to fence; at this day, the most useful things which boys learn at public schools, are, I believe, riding, rowing, and cricketing. But it would be far better that members of Parliament should be able to plough straight, and make a horseshoe, than only to feather oars neatly or point their toes prettily in stirrups. Then, in literary and scientific teaching, the great point of economy is to give the discipline of it through knowledge which will immediately bear on practical life. Our literary work has long been economically useless to us because too much concerned with dead languages; and our scientific work will yet, for some time, be a good deal lost, because scientific men are too fond or too vain of their systems, and waste the student’s time in endeavouring to give him large views, and make him perceive interesting connections of facts; when there is not one student, no, nor one man, in a thousand, who



can feel the beauty of a system, or even take it clearly into his head; but nearly all men can understand, and most will be interested in, the facts which bear on daily life. Botanists have discovered some wonderful connection between nettles and figs, which a cow-boy who will never see a ripe fig in his life need not be at all troubled about; but it will be interesting to him to know what effect nettles have on hay, and what taste they will give to porridge; and it will give him nearly a new life if he can be got but once, in a spring-time, to look well at the beautiful circle of the white nettle blossom, and work out with his school-master the curves of its petals, and the way it is set on its central mast. So, the principle of chemical equivalents, beautiful as it is, matters far less to a peasant boy, and even to most sons of gentlemen, than their knowing how to find whether the water is wholesome in the back-kitchen cistern, or whether the seven-acre field wants sand or chalk.

Having, then, directed the studies of our youth so as to make them practically serviceable men at the time of their entrance into life, that entrance should always be ready for them in cases where their private circumstances present no opening. There ought to be government establishments for every trade, in which all youths who desired it should be received as apprentices on their leaving school; and men thrown out of work received at all times. At these government manufactories the discipline should be strict, and the wages steady, not varying at all in proportion to the demand for the article, but only in proportion to the price of food; the commodities produced being laid up in store to meet sudden demands, and sudden fluctuations in prices prevented:—that gradual and necessary fluctuation only being allowed which is properly consequent on larger or more limited supply



of raw material and other natural causes. When there was a visible tendency to produce a glut of any commodity, that tendency should be checked by directing the youth at the government schools into other trades; and the yearly surplus of commodities should be the principal means of government provision for the poor.<sup>31</sup>

The principles thus laid down are indeed timely for the present conditions in America and in the whole world.

Upon another side also of current problems our author has light to shed, to wit, vocational guidance:

It is difficult to analyse the characters of mind which cause youths to mistake their vocation, and to endeavour to become artists, when they have no true artist's gift. But the fact is, that multitudes of young men do this, and that by far the greater number of living artists are men who have mistaken their vocation. The peculiar circumstances of modern life, which exhibit art in almost every form to the sight of the youths in our great cities, have a natural tendency to fill their imaginations with borrowed ideas, and their minds with imperfect science; the mere dislike of mechanical employments, either felt to be irksome, or believed to be degrading, urges numbers of young men to become painters, in the same temper in which they would enlist or go to sea; others, the sons of engravers or artists, taught the business of the art by their parents, and having no gift for it themselves, follow it as a means of livelihood, in an ignoble patience; or, if ambi-

<sup>31</sup> "A Joy Forever," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 224.

tious, seek to attract regard, or distance rivalry, by fantastic, meretricious, or unprecedented applications of their mechanical skill; while finally, many men earnest in feeling, and conscientious in principle, mistake their desire to be useful for a love of art, and their quickness of emotion for its capacity, and pass their lives in painting moral and instructive pictures, which might almost justify us in thinking nobody could be a painter but a rogue. On the other hand, I believe that much of the best artistical intellect is daily lost in other avocations. Generally, the temper which would make an admirable artist is humble and observant, capable of taking much interest in little things, and of entertaining itself pleasantly in the dullest circumstances. Suppose, added to these characters, a steady conscientiousness which seeks to do its duty wherever it may be placed, and the power, denied to few artistical minds, of ingenious invention in almost any practical department of human skill, and it can hardly be doubted that the very humility and conscientiousness which would have perfected the painter, have in many instances prevented his becoming one; and that in the quiet life of our steady craftsmen—sagacious manufacturers, and uncomplaining clerks—there may frequently be concealed more genius than ever is raised to the direction of our public works, or to be the mark of our public praises.<sup>32</sup>

Yet in all such vocational guidance, in training for trades, and in all types of manual education, it is to be remembered that these arts are expression of the mind. Manual training is really cerebral

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229.

training. With the cerebral training is to be united also ethical training.

. . . The manual arts are as accurate exponents of ethical state, as other modes of expression; first, with absolute precision, of that of the workman, and then with precision, disguised by many distorting influences, of that of the nation to which he belongs.<sup>33</sup>

For all these manual endeavors it is not to be forgotten that the higher academic ideals have value. Mr. Ruskin says:

To which good end, it will indeed contribute that we add some practice of the lower arts to our scheme of University education; but the thing which is vitally necessary is, that we should extend the spirit of University education to the practice of the lower arts.<sup>34</sup>

Indeed art and scholarship are never to be separated.

What art may do for scholarship, I have no right to conjecture; but what scholarship may do for art, I may in all modesty tell you. Hitherto, great artists, though always gentlemen, have yet been too exclusively craftsmen. Art has been less thoughtful than we suppose; it has taught much, but much, also, falsely. Many of the greatest pictures are enigmas; others, beautiful toys; others, harmful and corrupting toys. In the loveliest there is something weak; in the great-

<sup>33</sup> "Lectures on Art," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 242.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199.

est there is something guilty. And this, gentlemen, if you will, is the new thing that may come to pass,—that the scholars of England may resolve to teach also with the silent power of the arts; and that some among you may so learn and use them, that pictures may be painted which shall not be enigmas any more, but open teachings of what can no otherwise be so well shown; which shall not be fevered or broken visions any more, but shall be filled with the indwelling light of self-possessed imagination; which shall not be stained or enfeebled any more by evil passion, but glorious with the strength and chastity of noble human love; and which shall no more degrade or disguise the work of God in heaven, but testify of Him as here dwelling with men, and walking with them, not angry, in the garden of the earth.<sup>35</sup>

In Mr. Ruskin's conception of education the training of the workingman plays a significant part. The lastingness of his relation to the popular movement to this end is embodied at the present time in what is known as Ruskin College at Oxford, an independent foundation, and one which seeks to carry out his purposes by his methods.

At this point emerges the opinion of the author of *Queens' Gardens* on the education of women. His conception of what the education of women should be arises from his conception of woman's nature itself. Of this nature in contrast with the nature of man, he says:

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 320.

The man's power is active, progressive, defensive. He is eminently the doer, the creator, the discoverer, the defender. His intellect is for speculation and invention; his energy for adventure, for war, and for conquest, wherever war is just, wherever conquest necessary. But the woman's power is for rule, not for battle,—and her intellect is not for invention or creation, but for sweet ordering, arrangement and decision. She sees the qualities of things, their claims and their places. Her great function is Praise; she enters into no contest, but infallibly judges the crown of contest. By her office, and place, she is protected from all danger and temptation. The man, in his rough work in open world, must encounter all peril and trial:—to him, therefore, the failure, the offence, the inevitable error: often he must be wounded, or subdued, often misled, and *always* hardened. But he guards the woman from all this; within his house, as ruled by her, unless she herself has sought it, need enter no danger, no temptation, no cause of error or offence. This is the true nature of home—it is the place of Peace; the shelter, not only from all injury, but from all terror, doubt, and division. In so far as it is not this, it is not home: so far as the anxieties of the outer life penetrate into it, and the inconsistently-minded, unknown, unloved, or hostile society of the outer world is allowed by either husband or wife to cross the threshold, it ceases to be home; it is then only a part of that outer world which you have roofed over, and lighted fire in. But so far as it is a sacred place, a vestal temple, a temple of the hearth watched over by Household Gods, before whose faces none may come but those whom they can receive with love,—so far as it is this, and roof and fire are types only of a nobler shade and light,—shade as of the rock in a weary land, and light as of the Pharos

in the stormy sea;—so far it vindicates the name, and fulfils the praise, of home.

And wherever a true wife comes, this home is always round her. The stars only may be over her head; the glow-worm in the night-cold grass may be the only fire at her foot: but home is yet wherever she is; and for a noble woman it stretches far round her, better than ceiled with cedar, or painted with vermilion, shedding its quiet light far, for those who else were homeless.

This, then, I believe to be,—will you not admit it to be,—the woman's true place and power? But do not you see that to fulfil this, she must—as far as one can use such terms of a human creature—be incapable of error? So far as she rules, all must be right, or nothing is. She must be enduringly, incorruptibly good; instinctively, infallibly wise—wise, not for self-development, but for self-renunciation: wise, not that she may set herself above her husband, but that she may never fail from his side: wise, not with the narrowness of insolent and loveless pride, but with the passionate gentleness of an infinitely variable, because infinitely applicable, modesty of service—the true changefulness of woman. In that great sense—“*La donna e mobile,*” not “*Qual piùm' al vento;*” no, nor yet “*Variable as the shade, by the light quivering aspen made;*” but variable as the *light*, manifold in fair and serene division, that it may take the color of all that it falls upon, and exalt it.<sup>36</sup>

Upon this interpretation of woman's nature he bases his conception of woman's education and of this he says at length:

<sup>36</sup> “*Sesame and Lilies,*” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 86.



The first of our duties to her—no thoughtful persons now doubt this,—is to secure for her such physical training and exercises as may confirm her health, and perfect her beauty, the highest refinement of that beauty being unattainable without splendor of activity and of delicate strength. To perfect her beauty, I say, and increase its power; it cannot be too powerful, nor shed its sacred light too far: only remember that all physical freedom is vain to produce beauty without a corresponding freedom of heart. . . .

“*Vital feelings of delight,*” observe. There are deadly feelings of delight; but the natural ones are vital, necessary to very life.

And they must be feelings of delight, if they are to be vital. Do not think you can make a girl lovely, if you do not make her happy. There is not one restraint you put on a good girl’s nature—there is not one check you give to her instincts of affection or of effort—which will not be indelibly written on her features, with a hardness which is all the more painful because it takes away the brightness from the eyes of innocence, and the charm from the brow of virtue.

This for the means: now note the end. Take from the same poet, in two lines, a perfect description of womanly beauty—

“A countenance in which did meet  
Sweet records, promises as sweet.”

The perfect loveliness of a woman’s countenance can only consist in that majestic peace, which is founded in the memory of happy and useful years,—full of sweet records; and from the joining of this with that yet more majestic childishness, which is still full of change and promise;—opening always—modest at once, and bright, with hope of better things



to be won, and to be bestowed. There is no old age where there is still that promise—it is eternal youth.

Thus, then, you have first to mould her physical frame, and then, as the strength she gains will permit you, to fill and temper her mind with all knowledge and thoughts which tend to confirm its natural instincts of justice, and refine its natural tact of love.

All such knowledge should be given her as may enable her to understand, and even to aid, the work of men: and yet it should be given, not as knowledge,—not as if it were, or could be, for her an object to know; but only to feel, and to judge. It is of no moment, as a matter of pride or perfectness in herself, whether she knows many languages or one; but it is of the utmost, that she should be able to show kindness to a stranger, and to understand the sweetness of a stranger's tongue. It is of no moment to her own worth or dignity that she should be acquainted with this science or that; but it is of the highest that she should be trained in habits of accurate thought; that she should understand the meaning, the inevitableness, and the loveliness of natural laws, and follow at least some one path of scientific attainment, as far as to the threshold of that bitter Valley of Humiliation, into which only the wisest and bravest of men can descend, owning themselves forever children, gathering pebbles on a boundless shore. It is of little consequence how many positions of cities she knows, or how many dates of events, or how many names of celebrated persons—it is not the object of education to turn a woman into a dictionary; but it is deeply necessary that she should be taught to enter with her whole personality into the history she reads; to picture the passages of it vitally in her own bright imagination; to apprehend, with her fine instincts, the pathetic circumstances and dra-

matic relations, which the historian too often only eclipses by his reasoning, and disconnects by his arrangement: it is for her to trace the hidden equities of divine reward, and catch sight, through the darkness, of the fateful threads of woven fire that connect error with its retribution. But, chiefly of all, she is to be taught to extend the limits of her sympathy with respect to that history which is being for her determined, as the moments pass in which she draws her peaceful breath: and to the contemporary calamity which, were it but rightly mourned by her, would recur no more hereafter. She is to exercise herself in imagining what would be the effects upon her mind and conduct, if she were daily brought into the presence of the suffering which is not the less real because shut from her sight. She is to be taught somewhat to understand the nothingness of the proportion which that little world in which she lives and loves, bears to the world in which God lives and loves;—and solemnly she is to be taught to strive that her thoughts of piety may not be feeble in proportion to the number they embrace, nor her prayer more languid than it is for the momentary relief from pain of her husband or her child, when it is uttered for the multitudes of those who have none to love them,—and is, “for all who are desolate and oppressed.”<sup>37</sup>

In the diversity of interpretation of things educational, Mr. Ruskin does write of the value of certain special studies. Among them he is inclined to give a high place to logic. In his great early work he refers in more than one place to this subject.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

Next to imagination, the power of perceiving logical relation is one of the rarest among men; certainly, of those with whom I have conversed, I have found always ten who had deep feeling, quick wit, or extended knowledge, for one who could set down a syllogism without a flaw; and for ten who could set down a syllogism, only one who could *entirely* understand that a square has four sides.<sup>38</sup>

But, as I have already intimated, Mr. Ruskin has a lower opinion of the value of the sciences in education than he has of logic and of literature. No love is lost between him and the scientist. In the year 1884, he writes:

The scientists slink out of my way now, as if I was a mad dog, for I let them have it hot and heavy whenever I've a chance at them.<sup>39</sup>

For Darwin in his "Descent of Man" he has small use. He seeks to controvert Darwin's methods and to oppose some of his conclusions. Mr. Ruskin's interpretations in science are to be received as of slight worth. But he does believe in the value of local natural history as a means of training students. He says:

Thus, in our simplest codes of school instruction, I hope some day to see local natural history assume a principal place,

<sup>38</sup> "Modern Painters," Vol. III., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 13.

<sup>39</sup> "Hortus Inclusus," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 60.

so that our peasant children may be taught the nature and uses of the herbs that grow in their meadows, and may take interest in observing and cherishing, rather than in hunting or killing, the harmless animals of their country. Supposing it determined that this local natural history should be taught, drawing ought to be used to fix the attention, and test, while it aided, the memory. "Draw such and such a flower in outline, with its bell towards you. Draw it with its side towards you. Paint the spots upon it. Draw a duck's head—her foot. Now a robin's,—a thrush's,—now the spots upon the thrush's breast." These are the kind of tasks which it seems to me should be set to the young peasant student.<sup>40</sup>

It is also good to be able to say that the teaching of English our author regards as a mighty force in education. It is a happy condition that one whose books have become standard texts as examples of good English and as means for the teaching of English should include, in the content of education, composition in English, and in other languages. A school of literature he would found which should be occupied largely with human emotion and history. The human emotion should normally be found in literature. Mr. Ruskin says:

There are attractive qualities in Burns, and attractive qualities in Dickens, which neither of those writers would have possessed if the one had been educated, and the other had been studying higher nature than that of cockney London; but

<sup>40</sup>"A Joy Forever," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 252.

those attractive qualities are not such as we should seek in a school of literature. If we want to teach young men a good manner of writing, we should teach it from Shakespeare,—not from Burns; from Walter Scott,—and not from Dickens.<sup>41</sup>

The value of drawing is constantly referred to under divers forms, and with great emphasis, in all of Mr. Ruskin's works. I might refer to many pages, but I content myself with the simple declaration.

This tremendous force called education is one devoted to the enlargement and enrichment of every faculty both of the race and of the individuals composing the race. It is not a force flung into the air, or hidden in the depths of the sea or of the land. It has a human application, yet it has a relationship to the natural elements and the environments which help to make man what he is. This value of environment is illustrated in a personal letter written in 1871, published as Letter Ten in the first volume of "Fors."

It happened also, which was the real cause of the bias of my after life, that my father had a rare love of pictures. I use the word "rare" advisedly, having never met with another instance of so innate a faculty for the discernment of true art, up to the point possible without actual practice.

— "Two Paths on Art," Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 44.

Accordingly, wherever there was a gallery to be seen, we stopped at the nearest town for the night; and in reverentest manner I thus saw nearly all the noblemen's houses in England; not indeed myself at that age caring for the pictures, but much for castles and ruins, feeling more and more, as I grew older, the healthy delight of uncovetous admiration, and perceiving, as soon as I could perceive any political truth at all, that it was probably much happier to live in a small house, and have Warwick Castle to be astonished at, than to live in Warwick Castle, and have nothing to be astonished at; but that, at all events, it would not make Brunswick Square in the least more pleasantly habitable, to pull Warwick Castle down. And, at this day, though I have kind invitations enough to visit America, I could not, even for a couple of months, live in a country so miserable as to possess no castles.<sup>42</sup>

But aside from environment and natural elements, education is above all else a process to be applied, as I have said, to the race and to individuals.

Observe: I do not say, nor do I believe, that the lower classes ought not to be better educated, in millions of ways, than they are. I believe *every man in a Christian kingdom ought to be equally well educated*. But I would have it education to purpose; stern, practical, irresistible, in moral habits, in bodily strength and beauty, in all faculties of mind capable of being developed under the circumstances of the individual,

“‘Fors Clavigera,’” Vol. I., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 132.



and especially in the technical knowledge of his own business; but yet, infinitely various in its effort, directed to make one youth humble, and another confident; to tranquillize this mind, to put some spark of ambition into that; now to urge, and now to restrain: and in the doing of all this, considering knowledge as one only out of myriads of means in its hands, or myriads of gifts at its disposal; and giving it or withholding it as a good husbandman waters his garden, giving the full shower only to the thirsty plants and at times when they are thirsty, whereas at present we pour it upon the heads of our youth as the snow falls on the Alps, on one and another alike, till they can bear no more, and then take honor to ourselves because here and there a river descends from their crests into the valleys, not observing that we have made the loaded hills themselves barren for ever.

Finally: I hold it for indisputable, that the first duty of a state is to see that every child born therein shall be well housed, clothed, fed, and educated, till it attain years of discretion.<sup>43</sup>

It is through this education of the individual that he is strengthened in right choices, enlarged in intellect, made purer in heart and more divine in his entire character. His capacity and final effectiveness are determined at birth; yet education transmutes possibilities into actualities. This modern truth Mr. Ruskin expresses in "Modern Painters" in saying:

<sup>43</sup> "Stones of Venice," Vol. III., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 222.



I know well the common censure by which objections to such futilities of so-called education are met, by the men who have been ruined by them,—the common plea that anything does to “exercise the mind upon.” It is an utterly false one. The human soul, in youth, is *not* a machine of which you can polish the cogs with any kelp or brick-dust near at hand; and, having got it into working order, and good, empty, and oiled serviceableness, start your immortal locomotive at twenty-five years old or thirty, express from the Strait Gate, on the Narrow Road. The whole period of youth is one essentially of formation, edification, instruction, I use the words with their weight in them; in taking of stores, establishment in vital habits, hopes, and faiths. There is not an hour of it but is trembling with destinies,—not a moment of which, once past, the appointed work can ever be done again, or the neglected blow struck on the cold iron. Take your vase of Venice glass out of the furnace, and strew chaff over it in its transparent heat, and recover *that* to its clearness and rubied glory when the north wind has blown upon it; but do not think to strew chaff over the child fresh from God’s presence, and to bring the heavenly colors back to him—at least in this world.<sup>44</sup>

The race does indeed need education as he has well said in “Stones of Venice:”

It seems to me, then, that the whole human race, so far as their own reason can be trusted, may at present be regarded as just emergent from childhood; and beginning for the first time to feel their strength, to stretch their limbs,

““Modern Painters,” Vol. IV., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 497.

and explore the creation around them. If we consider that, till within the last fifty years, the nature of the ground we tread on, of the air we breathe, and of the light by which we see, were not so much as conjecturally conceived by us; that the duration of the globe, and the races of animal life by which it was inhabited, are just beginning to be apprehended; and that the scope of the magnificent science which has revealed them, is as yet so little received by the public mind, that presumption and ignorance are still permitted to raise their voices against it unrebuked; that perfect veracity in the representation of general nature by art has never been attempted until the present day, and has in the present day been resisted with all the energy of the popular voice; that the simplest problems of social science are yet so little understood, as that doctrines of liberty and equality can be openly preached, and so successfully as to affect the whole body of the civilized world with apparently incurable disease; that the first principles of commerce were acknowledged by the English Parliament only a few months ago, in its free trade measures, and are still so little understood by the million, that no nation dares abolish its custom-houses; that the simplest principles of policy are still not so much as stated, far less received, and that civilized nations persist in the belief that the subtlety and dishonesty which they know to be ruinous in dealings between man and man, are serviceable in dealings between multitude and multitude; finally, that the scope of the Christian religion, which we have been taught for two thousand years, is still so little conceived by us, that we suppose the laws of charity and of self-sacrifice bear upon individuals in all their social relations, and yet do not bear upon nations in any of their political relations;—when, I say, we thus review the depth of simplicity in which the human

race are still plunged with respect to all that it most profoundly concerns them to know, and which might, by them, with most ease have been ascertained, we can hardly determine how far back on the narrow path of human progress we ought to place the generation to which we belong, how far the swaddling clothes are unwound from us, and childish things beginning to be put away.<sup>45</sup>

Much that has been said of education according to John Ruskin receives either illustration or emphasis in the account he himself gives of his own education, in his autobiographic "Practerita." From this interpretation I select a few of the more pregnant paragraphs:

And for best and truest beginning of all blessings, I had been taught the perfect meaning of Peace, in thought, act, and word. . . .

Next to this quite priceless gift of Peace, I had received the perfect understanding of the natures of Obedience and Faith. I obeyed word, or lifted finger, of father or mother, simply as a ship her helm; not only without idea of resistance, but receiving the direction as a part of my own life and force, a helpful law, as necessary to me in every moral action as the law of gravity in leaping. And my practice in Faith was soon complete: nothing was ever promised me that was not given; nothing ever threatened me that was not inflicted, and nothing ever told me that was not true.

Peace, obedience, faith; these three for chief good; next to

<sup>45</sup> "Stones of Venice," Vol. III., Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., p. 167.

these, the habit of fixed attention with both eyes and mind—on which I will not further enlarge at this moment, this being the main practical faculty of my life, causing Mazzini to say of me, in conversation authentically reported, a year or two before his death, that I had “the most analytic mind in Europe.” An opinion in which, so far as I am acquainted with Europe, I am myself entirely disposed to concur.

Lastly, an extreme perfection in palate and all other bodily senses, given by the utter prohibition of cake, wine, comfits, or, except in carefullest restriction, fruit; and by fine preparation of what food was given me. Such I esteem the main blessings of my childhood;—next, let me count the equally dominant calamities.

First, that I had nothing to love.

My parents were—in a sort—visible powers of nature to me, no more loved than the sun and the moon: only I should have been annoyed and puzzled if either of them had gone out; (how much, now, when both are darkened!)—still less did I love God; not that I had any quarrel with Him, or fear of Him; but simply found what people told me was His service, disagreeable; and what people told me was His book, not entertaining. I had no companions to quarrel with, neither; nobody to assist, and nobody to thank. Not a servant was ever allowed to do anything for me, but what it was their duty to do; and why should I have been grateful to the cook for cooking, or the gardener for gardening,—when the one dared not give me a baked potato without asking leave, and the other would not let my ants’ nests alone, because they made the walks untidy? The evil consequence of all this was not, however, what might perhaps have been expected, that I grew up selfish or unaffectionate; but that, when affection did come, it came with violence utterly rampant and unmanage-

able, at least by me, who never before had anything to manage.

For (second of chief calamities) I had nothing to endure. Danger or pain of any kind I knew not: my strength was never exercised, my patience never tried, and my courage never fortified. Not that I was ever afraid of anything,—either ghosts, thunder, or beasts; and one of the nearest approaches to insubordination which I was ever tempted into as a child, was in passionate effort to get leave to play with the lion's cubs in Wombwell's menagerie.

Thirdly. I was taught no precision nor etiquette of manners; it was enough if, in the little society we saw, I remained unobtrusive, and replied to a question without shyness: but the shyness came later, and increased as I grew conscious of the rudeness arising from the want of social discipline, and found it impossible to acquire, in advanced life, dexterity in any bodily exercise, skill in any pleasing accomplishment, or ease and tact in ordinary behavior.

Lastly, and chief of evils. My judgment of right and wrong, and powers of independent action, were left entirely undeveloped; because the bridle and blinkers were never taken off me. Children should have their times of being off duty, like soldiers; and when once the obedience, if required, is certain, the little creature should be very early put for periods of practice in complete command of itself; set on the barebacked horse of its own will, and left to break it by its own strength. But the ceaseless authority exercised over my youth left me, when cast out at last into the world, unable for some time to do more than drift with its vortices.

My present verdict, therefore, on the general tenor of my education at that time, must be, that it was at once too formal and too luxurious; leaving my character, at the most impor-

tant moment for its construction, cramped indeed, but not disciplined; and only by protection innocent, instead of by practice virtuous. My mother saw this herself, and but too clearly, in later years; and whenever I did anything wrong, stupid, or hard-hearted,—(and I have done many things that were all three,)—always said, “It is because you were too much indulged.”<sup>46</sup>

### The comprehensive conclusion is:

Thus, in perfect health of life and fire of heart, not wanting to be anything but the boy I was, not wanting to have anything more than I had; knowing of sorrow only just so much as to make life serious to me, not enough to slacken in the least its sinews; and with so much of science mixed with feeling as to make the sight of the Alps not only the revelation of the beauty of the earth, but the opening of the first page of its volume,—I went down that evening from the garden-terrace of Schaffhausen with my destiny fixed in all of it that was to be sacred and useful. To that terrace, and the shore of the Lake of Geneva, my heart and faith return to this day, in every impulse that is yet nobly alive in them, and every thought that has in it help or peace.<sup>47</sup>

A similar experience, and likewise far-reaching, one recalls as occurring in the life of Charles Kingsley. Of Mr. Ruskin’s life at Oxford, broken into by his sickness, it is superfluous now to write. This life apparently had little influence over his career.

<sup>46</sup> “*Praeterita*,” Cabinet Edition, Dana Estes & Co., pp. 38–40.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.



He finally took a "complimentary double fourth." His development was slow, but he finally came to his large self.

I have no space in this story to describe the advantages I never used; nor does my own failure give me right to blame, even were there any use in blaming, a system now passed away. Oxford taught me as much Greek and Latin as she could; and though I think she might also have told me that fritillaries grew in Ifley meadow, it was better that she left me to find them for myself, than that she should have told me, as nowadays she would, that the painting on them was only to amuse the midges. For the rest, the whole time I was there, my mind was simply in the state of a squash before 'tis a peascod,—and remained so yet a year or two afterward, I grieve to say;—so that for any account of my real life, the gossip hitherto given to its eodling or cocoon condition has brought us but a little way. I must get on to the days of opening sight, and effective labor; and to the scenes of nobler education which all men, who keep their hearts open, receive in the End of Days.<sup>48</sup>

As one reviews all that Mr. Ruskin wrote through a half-century, and under diverse conditions, on education, the question emerges: What was the worthiest contribution which he made to the great cause, and what, if any, was the defect or weakness in his offering? The answer is not far to seek. Mr. Ruskin's chief contribution lies in the

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 210.

emphasis he placed on, and in the analyses he made of, the moral element in character and training.

By the moral element one does not mean merely the ethical virtues, either major or minor, although they are included. One does have in mind those parts of character which are primarily spiritual or non-intellectual. Perhaps no better single illustration or example could be found than that which is furnished by the Beatitudes of Christ. The love for, and the making of peace, mercy, purity of heart, meekness, are the supreme qualities which he holds most dear. Obedience, faith, gentleness, charity, are words which drop from his pen like dew from the summer skies. To him, cruelty and idleness are abominable. Like St. John, he is an apostle of and to the heart. His seven lamps of architecture are the lights which illumine every human path. The stones of the city which he most adores are laid with the fair colors of goodness and tenderness and love.

Of such interpretation and of such emphasis there is abundant need. In an age which delights to call itself dynamic, and whose emblem is either an electric bulb or a gas-engine, placed in an automobile, it is good to find accent put on qualities which are neither splendid nor meretricious nor

crass. It is indeed good to find the Divine Spirit not in the whirlwind or the thunder, but in the still, small voice.

This emphasis on the moral side also points out the defect of his theory, as a shadow follows the light. The defect lies in the lack of proper attention to the strictly intellectual side of education. Although the intellect is a less important tool in human progress than is supposed by most men, it does have its great and unique place. Ruskin's own desultory and broken course of education unconsciously affects his theories. The scientific type of mind he contemns. Of the masters in philosophy, as Kant, he has slight knowledge. For the clear light of truth without shadow or turning, free from prejudice and devoid of passion, his mind has slight affinity. He interprets quite as much with the heart as with the brain. To think (although he declares he wishes to be known as a thinker), to reason, to judge, to weigh evidence, he lacked a worthy and adequate power, even with all his unique and tremendously great gifts.

For two of his own great contemporaries, John Stuart Mill and Charles Darwin, he has either derision or sarcasm. Next to Turner, the most outstanding object of his admiration is Thomas Car-

lyle. He prefers the pre-Raphaelites to Raphael, and Burne-Jones to Michael Angelo. His judgment of personalities interprets his own personality, and helps to determine the worth of his interpretation of education.

## IV

### EDUCATION ACCORDING TO JOHN STUART MILL

THE men who were the leaders of thought and action in England between the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 and the passage of the Education Bill of 1870, were the ablest of all who have lived since the great company of those who flourished in the reign of Henry VIII. and of Elizabeth. This large circle includes Peel, Palmerston, Cobden, Brougham, Disraeli, Gladstone, Macaulay, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Brown- ing, Tennyson, Darwin, Huxley and Spencer. In this group, John Stuart Mill has a unique place. Whether that place is large or small—and most would agree in thinking it is large—it is certainly a place unique in its breadth and intensity of influence. Herbert Spencer said of Mill that “during a considerable period his had been the one conspicuous figure in the higher regions of thought. So great, indeed, was his influence that during the interval between, say 1840 and 1860, few

dared to call his views in question.”<sup>1</sup> To the three great provinces of economics, inductive logic and of political science, he made rich contributions.

Yet in a smaller circle, and not unworthy, Mill fills a place also central and commanding. This circle was likewise impressive. It included Carlyle, Ruskin, Bentham, George Grote, his early friend for whom he pronounced a “well-done” in his review of Aristotle, the Austins, Ricardo, Maurice, the thinker, John Sterling, the poet, and his own father. Mill was the worthy son of his father, for, as Bain says in the biography of the father, that

His Intellectual powers were of a high order is attested by the work that he achieved. That his special characteristics were such as we denominate by the terms scientific and logical, is also apparent. His training in science was not even the highest that the time could have permitted; he had, nevertheless, imbibed the scientific methods to a degree beyond most of the professed votaries of science. In other words, he had thoroughly mastered Evidence, and all the processes subservient thereto. His training was aided by the old logicians, and by the best models of clear reasoning that the philosophical literature of the past could afford.<sup>2</sup>

The exceptional place which Mill held in this group, small in numbers, but great in weight, is

<sup>1</sup> Herbert Spencer's *Autobiography*, Vol. II., p. 289.

<sup>2</sup> Bain's "James Mill," p. 420.



intimated by the interpretation made by one of the younger members, the only one still surviving. In writing of the death of Mill, John Morley says:

Even those whom Mr. Mill honoured with his friendship, and who must always bear to his memory the affectionate veneration of sons, may yet feel their pain at the thought that they will see him no more, raised into a higher mood as they meditate on the loftiness of his task and the steadfastness and success with which he achieved it. If it is grievous to think that such richness of culture, such full maturity of wisdom, such passion for truth and justice, are now by a single stroke extinguished, at least we may find some not unworthy solace in the thought of the splendid purpose that they have served in keeping alive, and surrounding with new attractions, the difficult tradition of patient and accurate thinking in union with unselfish and magnanimous living.<sup>3</sup>

Morley also says that with his reputation will stand or fall the intellectual repute of a whole generation of his countrymen. The most eminent of those who are now so fast becoming the front line, as death mows down the veterans, bear traces of his influence, whether they are avowed disciples or avowed opponents. For a score of years no one at all open to serious intellectual impressions left Oxford without being touched by the influence of Mr. Mill's teaching. Yet it would be too much to say that in that temple where they are ever

<sup>3</sup> John Morley's "Critical Miscellanies," Vol. III., p. 38.

burnishing new idols, his throne is still unshaken. The professorial chairs there and elsewhere are more and more being filled with men whose minds have been trained in his principles. The universities only typify his influence on the less learned part of the world. The better sort of journalists educated themselves on his books, and even the baser sort acquired a habit of quoting from them. He is the only writer in the world whose treatises on highly abstract subjects have been printed during his lifetime in editions for the people, and sold at the price of railway novels.<sup>4</sup>

Of him, directly upon his death, Carlyle said to Charles Eliot Norton:

I never knew a finer, tenderer, more sensitive or modest soul among the sons of men.<sup>5</sup>

Such were some of the circumstances attending the life of John Stuart Mill. Such also were certain of the personalities whom he influenced and who influenced him. And such are something of the intimations of the worth of his rich service to humanity.

His own education was unique. His father was his teacher. Never was a father more richly blessed in a son of his intellectual, as well as of his physical, loins. His own education he has described in many pages which should be quoted at length.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>5</sup> "Letters of Charles Eliot Norton," Vol. I., p. 495.

I have no remembrance of the time when I began to learn Greek, I have been told that it was when I was three years old. My earliest recollection on the subject, is that of committing to memory what my father termed vocables, being lists of common Greek words, with their signification in English, which he wrote out for me on cards. Of grammar, until some years later, I learnt no more than the inflexions of the nouns and verbs, but, after a course of vocables, proceeded at once to translation; and I faintly remember going through Æsop's Fables, the first Greek book which I read. The Anabasis, which I remember better, was the second. I learnt no Latin until my eighth year. At that time I had read, under my father's tuition, a number of Greek prose authors, among whom I remember the whole of Herodotus, and of Xenophon's *Cyropædia* and *Memorials of Socrates*; some of the lives of the philosophers by Diogenes Laertius; part of Lucian, and *Isocrates ad Demonicum* and *Ad Nicoclem*. I also read, in 1813, the first six dialogues (in the common arrangement) of Plato, from the *Euthyphron* to the *Theoctetus* inclusive: which last dialogue, I venture to think, would have been better omitted, as it was totally impossible I should understand it. But my father, in all his teaching, demanded of me not only the utmost that I could do, but much that I could by no possibility have done. What he was himself willing to undergo for the sake of my instruction, may be judged from the fact, that I went through the whole process of preparing my Greek lessons in the same room and at the same table at which he was writing: and as in those days Greek and English lexicons were not, and I could make no more use of a Greek and Latin lexicon than could be made without having yet begun to learn Latin, I was forced to have recourse to him for the meaning of every word which I did not know.

This incessant interruption, he, one of the most impatient of men, submitted to, and wrote under that interruption several volumes of his History and all else that he had to write during those years.

The only thing besides Greek, that I learnt as a lesson in this part of my childhood, was arithmetic: this also my father taught me: it was the task of the evenings, and I well remember its disagreeableness. But the lessons were only a part of the daily instruction I received. Much of it consisted in the books I read by myself, and my father's discourses to me, chiefly during our walks. From 1810 to the end of 1813 we were living in Newington Green, then an almost rustic neighbourhood. My father's health required considerable and constant exercise, and he walked habitually before breakfast, generally in the green lanes towards Hornsey. In these walks I always accompanied him, and with my earliest recollections of green fields and wild flowers, is mingled that of the account I gave him daily of what I had read the day before. To the best of my remembrance, this was a voluntary rather than a prescribed exercise. I made notes on slips of paper while reading, and from these in the morning walks, I told the story to him; for the books were chiefly histories, of which I read in this manner a great number: Robertson's histories, Hume, Gibbon; but my greatest delight, then and for long afterwards, was Watson's Philip the Second and Third. The heroic defence of the Knights of Malta against the Turks, and of the revolted Provinces of the Netherlands against Spain, excited in me an intense and lasting interest. Next to Watson, my favourite historical reading was Hooke's History of Rome. Of Greece I had seen at that time no regular history, except school abridgments and the last two or three volumes of a translation of Rollin's Ancient History,

beginning with Philip of Macedon. But I read with great delight Langhorne's translation of Plutarch. In English history, beyond the time at which Hume leaves off, I remember reading Burnet's History of his Own Time, though I cared little for anything in it except the wars and battles; and the historical part of the "Annual Register," from the beginning to about 1788, where the volumes my father borrowed for me from Mr. Bentham left off. I felt a lively interest in Frederic of Prussia during his difficulties, and in Paoli, the Corsican patriot; but when I came to the American war, I took my part, like a child as I was (until set right by my father) on the wrong side, because it was called the English side. In these frequent talks about the books I read, he used, as opportunity offered, to give me explanations and ideas respecting civilization, government, morality, mental cultivation, which he required me afterwards to restate to him in my own words. He also made me read, and give him a verbal account of, many books which would not have interested me sufficiently to induce me to read them of myself: among others, Millar's Historical View of the English Government, a book of great merit for its time, and which he highly valued; Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, McCrie's Life of John Knox, and even Sewell and Ritty's Histories of the Quakers. He was fond of putting into my hands books which exhibited men of energy and resource in unusual circumstances, struggling against difficulties and overcoming them: of such works I remember Beaver's African Memoranda, and Collin's Account of the First Settlement of New South Wales. Two books which I never wearied of reading were Anson's Voyages, so delightful to most young persons, and a collection (Hawkesworth's, I believe) of Voyages round the World, in four volumes, beginning with Drake



and ending with Cook and Bougainville. Of children's books, any more than of playthings, I had scarcely any, except an occasional gift from a relation or acquaintance: among those I had, Robinson Crusoe was preeminent, and continued to delight me through all my boyhood. It was no part, however, of my father's system to exclude books of amusement, though he allowed them very sparingly. Of such books he possessed at that time next to none, but he borrowed several for me; those which I remember are the Arabian Nights, Cazotte's Arabian Tales, Don Quixote, Miss Edgeworth's Popular Tales, and a book of some reputation in its day, Brooke's Fool of Quality.

In my eighth year I commenced learning Latin, in conjunction with a younger sister, to whom I taught it as I went on, and who afterwards repeated the lessons to my father: and from this time, other sisters and brothers being successively added as pupils, a considerable part of my day's work consisted of this preparatory teaching. It was a part which I greatly disliked; the more so as I was held responsible for the lessons of my pupils, in almost as full a sense as for my own: I, however, derived from this discipline the great advantage, of learning more thoroughly and retaining more lastingly the things which I was set to teach: perhaps, too, the practice it afforded in explaining difficulties to others, may even at that age have been useful. In other respects, the experience of my boyhood is not favourable to the plan of teaching children by means of one another. The teaching, I am sure, is very inefficient as teaching, and I well know that the relation between teacher and taught is not a good moral discipline to either. I went in this manner through the Latin grammar, and a considerable part of Cornelius Nepos



and Cæsar's Commentaries, but afterwards added to the superintendence of these lessons, much longer ones of my own.

In the same year in which I began Latin, I made my first commencement in the Greek poets with the Iliad. After I had made some progress in this, my father put Pope's translation into my hands. It was the first English verse I had cared to read, and it became one of the books in which for many years I most delighted: I think I must have read it from twenty to thirty times through. I should not have thought it worth while to mention a taste apparently so natural to boyhood, if I had not, as I think, observed that the keen enjoyment of this brilliant specimen of narrative and versification is not so universal with boys, as I should have expected both *à priori* and from my individual experience. Soon after this time I commenced Euclid, and somewhat later, Algebra, still under my father's tuition.

From my eighth to my twelfth year, the Latin books which I remember reading were, the Bueolies of Virgil, and the first six books of the Æneid; all Horace, except the Epodes; the Fables of Phædrus; the first five books of Livy (to which from my love of the subject I voluntarily added, in my hours of leisure, the remainder of the first decade); all Sallust; a considerable part of Ovid's Metamorphoses; some plays of Terence; two or three books of Lucretius; several of the Orations of Cicero, and of his writings on oratory; also his letters to Atticus, my father taking the trouble to translate to me from the French the historical explanations in Mingault's notes. In Greek I read the Iliad and Odyssey through; one or two plays of Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, though by these I profited little; all Thucydides; the Hellenics of Xenophon; a great part of Demosthenes, Æschines, and Lysias; Theocritus; Anacreon; part of the Anthology; a

little of Dionysius; several books of Polybius; and lastly Aristotle's Rhetoric, which, as the first expressly scientific treatise on any moral or psychological subject which I had read, and containing many of the best observations of the ancients on human nature and life, my father made me study with peculiar care, and throw the matter of it into synoptic tables. During the same years I learnt elementary geometry and algebra thoroughly, the differential calculus, and other portions of the higher mathematics far from thoroughly: for my father, not having kept up this part of his early acquired knowledge, could not spare time to qualify himself for removing my difficulties, and left me to deal with them, with little other aid than that of books: while I was continually incurring his displeasure by my inability to solve difficult problems for which he did not see that I had not the necessary previous knowledge.<sup>6</sup>

Such were the beginnings of the education of one of the ablest intellects. The experience is quite as pregnant in lessons concerning the worth of individuality of teaching as concerning the native ability and moral earnestness of the student. Given such teachers as James Mill, such students as John Stuart Mill would more frequently be made. Happy such students; happy such teachers!

Regarding certain elements of his educative process Mr. Mill also expressed his valuation.

<sup>6</sup> Autobiography, pp. 5 ff.

In the autobiography he says:

My own consciousness and experience ultimately led me to appreciate quite as highly as he did, the value of an early practical familiarity with the school logic. I know of nothing, in my education, to which I think myself more indebted for whatever capacity of thinking I have attained. The first intellectual operation in which I arrived at any proficiency, was dissecting a bad argument, and finding in what part the fallacy lay: and though whatever capacity of this sort I attained, was due to the fact that it was an intellectual exercise in which I was most perseveringly drilled by my father, yet it is also true that the school logic, and the mental habits acquired in studying it, were among the principal instruments of this drilling. I am persuaded that nothing, in modern education, tends so much, when properly used, to form exact thinkers, who attach a precise meaning to words and propositions, and are not imposed on by vague, loose, or ambiguous terms. The boasted influence of mathematical studies is nothing to it; for in mathematical processes, none of the real difficulties of correct ratiocination occur. It is also a study peculiarly adapted to an early stage in the education of philosophical students, since it does not presuppose the slow process of acquiring, by experience and reflection, valuable thoughts of their own. They may become capable of disentangling the intricacies of confused and self-contradictory thought, before their own thinking faculties are much advanced; a power which, for want of such discipline, many otherwise able men altogether lack; and when they have to answer opponents, only endeavour, by such arguments as they can command, to support the opposite conclusion, scarcely even attempting to confute the reasonings of their

antagonists; and, therefore, at the utmost, leaving the question, as far as it depends on argument, a balanced one.<sup>7</sup>

But in a more formal way he also remarks:

We are far from asserting that the dialectic contests of the Greeks, or the public disputations of the Middle Ages which succeeded to them, had never any but a beneficial effect; that they had not their snares and their temptations, and that the good they effected might not be still better attained by other means. But the fact remains that no such means have been provided, and that the old training has disappeared, even from the Universities, without having been replaced by any other. There is no reason why a practice so useful for the pursuit of truth should not be employed when the attainment of truth is the sole object. We have known this most effectually done by a set of young students of philosophy, assembling on certain days to read regularly through some standard book on psychology, logic, or political economy; suspending the reading whenever any one had a difficulty to propound or an idea to start, and carrying on the discussion from day to day, if necessary for weeks, until the point raised had been searched to its inmost depths, and no difficulty or obscurity capable of removal by discussion remained. The intellectual training given by these debates, and especially the habit they gave of leaving no dark corners unexplored—of searching out all the *ἀνορίαι*, and never passing over any unsolved difficulty—has been felt, by those who took part, to have been invaluable to them as a mental discipline. There would be nothing impracticable in making exercises of this kind a standing element of the course of instruction in the higher branches of knowledge; if the teachers had any per-

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

ception of the want which such discussions would supply, or thought it any part of their business to form thinkers, instead of "principling" their pupils (as Locke expresses it) with ready-made knowledge. But the saying of James Mill, in his essay on Education, is as true now as when it was written—that even the theory of education is far behind the progress of knowledge, and the practice lamentably behind even the theory.<sup>8</sup>

The worth of writing as a part of education Mill learned at an early age. He learned, of course, too, that its worth lay quite entirely in the activity of the intellect devoted to the writing.

In the summer of 1822 I wrote my first argumentative essay. I remember very little about it, except that it was an attack on what I regarded as the aristocratic prejudice, that the rich were, or were likely to be, superior in moral qualities to the poor. My performance was entirely argumentative, without any of the declamation which the subject would admit of, and might be expected to suggest to a young writer. In that department however I was, and remained, very inapt. Dry argument was the only thing I could manage, or willingly attempted; though passively I was very susceptible to the effect of all composition, whether in the form of poetry or oratory, which appealed to the feelings on any basis of reason. My father, who knew nothing of this essay until it was finished, was well satisfied, and as I learnt from others, even pleased with it; but, perhaps from a desire to promote the exercise of other mental faculties than the purely logical, he advised me to make my next exercise in composi-

<sup>8</sup> "Dissertations and Discussions," Vol. V., p. 212.

tion one of the oratorical kind: on which suggestion, availing myself of my familiarity with Greek history and ideas and with the Athenian orators, I wrote two speeches, one an accusation, the other a defence of Pericles, on a supposed impeachment for not marching out to fight the Lacedemonians on their invasion of Attica. After this I continued to write papers on subjects often very much beyond my capacity, but with great benefit both from the exercise itself, and from the discussions which it led to with my father.<sup>9</sup>

Mill also at an early age had been accustomed, under his father's criticism, to make abstracts, which he believes to be of much value in compelling exactness in thinking and in expression.

Mill in several ways and under many forms indicates his assent to the theory which makes education consist in training rather than in the accumulation of knowledge. His conception is that the engine, and not the storehouse, is the proper educational symbol.

Most boys or youths who have had much knowledge drilled into them, have their mental capacities not strengthened, but overlaid by it. They are crammed with mere facts, and with the opinions or phrases of other people, and these are accepted as a substitute for the power to form opinions of their own: and thus the sons of eminent fathers, who have spared no pains in their education, so often grow up mere parroters of what they have learnt, incapable of using their minds except

<sup>9</sup> Autobiography, p. 71.



in the furrows traced for them. Mine, however, was not an education of eram. My father never permitted anything which I learnt to degenerate into a mere exercise of memory. He strove to make the understanding not only go along with every step of the teaching, but, if possible, precede it. Anything which could be found out by thinking I never was told, until I had exhausted my efforts to find it out for myself. As far as I can trust my remembrance, I acquitted myself very lamely in this department; my recollection of such matters is almost wholly of failures, hardly ever of success. It is true the failures were often in things in which success in so early a stage of my progress, was almost impossible. I remember at some time in my thirteenth year, on my happening to use the word idea, he asked me what an idea was; and expressed some displeasure at my ineffectual efforts to define the word: I recollect also his indignation at my using the common expression that something was true in theory but required correction in practice; and how, after making me vainly strive to define the word theory, he explained its meaning, and showed the fallacy of the vulgar form of speech which I had used; leaving me fully persuaded that in being unable to give a correct definition of Theory, and in speaking of it as something which might be at variance with practice, I had shown unparalleled ignorance. In this he seems, and perhaps was, very unreasonable; but I think only in being angry at my failure. A pupil from whom nothing is ever demanded which he cannot do, never does all he can.<sup>10</sup>

Mill is a critic as well as an interpreter of his own education. He is free to point out its weaknesses as well as its elements of strength.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

The deficiencies in my education were principally in the things which boys learn from being turned out to shift for themselves, and from being brought together in large numbers. From temperance and much walking, I grew up healthy and hardy, though not muscular; but I could do no feats of skill or physical strength, and knew none of the ordinary bodily exercises. It was not that play, or time for it, was refused me. Though no holidays were allowed, lest the habit of work should be broken, and a taste for idleness acquired, I had ample leisure in every day to amuse myself; but as I had no boy companions, and the animal need of physical activity was satisfied by walking, my amusements, which were mostly solitary, were in general, of a quiet, if not a bookish turn, and gave little stimulus to any other kind even of mental activity than that which was already called forth by my studies: I consequently remained long, and in a less degree have always remained, inexpert in anything requiring manual dexterity; my mind, as well as my hands, did its work very lamely when it was applied, or ought to have been applied, to the practical details which, as they are the chief interest of life to the majority of men, are also the things in which whatever mental capacity they have, chiefly shows itself: I was constantly meriting reproof by inattention, inobservance, and general slackness of mind in matters of daily life. My father was the extreme opposite in these particulars: his senses and mental faculties were always on the alert; he carried decision and energy of character in his whole manner and into every action of life: and this, as much as his talents, contributed to the strong impression which he always made upon those with whom he came into personal contact. But the children of energetic parents, frequently grow up un-

energetic, because they lean on their parents, and the parents are energetic for them. The education which my father gave me, was in itself much more fitted for training me to *know* than to *do*. Not that he was unaware of my deficiencies; both as a boy and as a youth I was incessantly smarting under his severe admonitions on the subject. There was anything but insensibility or tolerance on his part towards such shortcomings: but, while he saved me from the demoralizing effects of school life, he made no effort to provide me with any sufficient substitute for its practicalizing influences.<sup>11</sup>

The conception which one who suffered such an education holds in respect to the normal elements, methods, forces and results of education, cannot be other than interesting. From education of any type, most men, even if capable of receiving such a type of it, would finally and absolutely have revolted. Mill, on the contrary, not only rejoiced in this type, but also, indirectly at least, and in some respects, directly, has proved the type to be a minister of the great science and art of intellectual culture. Toleration was indeed a mark of his character. His interpretations of education are of the severe type of which his own training furnishes the most illustrious example. His generalizations are, therefore, of precious worth and impressiveness.

In a letter written in the year 1852, he says:

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

What the poor as well as the rich require is not to be indoctrinated, is not to be taught other people's opinions, but to be induced and enabled to think for themselves. It is not physical science that will do this, even if they could learn it much more thoroughly than they are able to do. After reading, writing, and arithmetic (the last a most important discipline in habits of accuracy and precision, in which they are extremely deficient), the desirable thing for them seems to be the most miscellaneous information, and the most varied exercise of their faculties. They cannot read too much. Quantity is of more importance than quality, especially all reading which relates to human life and the ways of mankind; geography, voyages and travels, manners and customs, and romances, which must tend to awaken their imagination and give them some of the meaning of self-devotion and heroism, in short, to unbrutalise them. By such reading they would become, to a certain extent, cultivated beings, which they would not become by following out, even to the greatest length, physical science. As for education in the best sense of the term, I fear they have a long time to wait for it. The higher and middle classes cannot educate the working classes unless they are first educated themselves. The miserable pretence of education, which those classes now receive, does not form minds fit to undertake the guidance of other minds, or to exercise a beneficent influence over them by personal contact. Still, any person who sincerely desires whatever is for the good of all, however it may affect himself or his own class, and who regards the great social questions as matters of reason and discussion and not as settled long ago, may, I believe, do a certain amount of good by merely saying to the working classes whatever he sincerely thinks on the subjects on which they are interested. Free discussion with them as

equals, in speech and in writing, seems the best instruction that can be given them, specially on social subjects.<sup>12</sup>

In the great St. Andrews address, one of the weightiest educational addresses ever made, he also says:

What professional men should carry away with them from a University, is not professional knowledge, but that which should direct the use of their professional knowledge, and bring the light of general culture to illuminate the technicalities of a special pursuit. Men may be competent lawyers without general education, but it depends on general education to make them philosophic lawyers—who demand, and are capable of apprehending, principles, instead of merely cramming their memory with details. And so of all other useful pursuits, mechanical included. Education makes a man a more intelligent shoemaker, if that be his occupation, but not by teaching him how to make shoes; it does so by the mental exercise it gives, and the habits it impresses.

This, then, is what a mathematician would call the higher limit of University education: its province ends where education, ceasing to be general, branches off into departments adapted to the individual's destination in life. The lower limit is more difficult to define. A University is not concerned with elementary instruction: the pupil is supposed to have acquired that before coming here. But where does elementary instruction end, and the higher studies begin? Some have given a very wide extension to the idea of elementary instruction. According to them, it is not the office of a University to give instruction in single branches of knowl-

<sup>12</sup>“Letters,” Vol. I., p. 165.

edge from the commencement. What the pupil should be taught here (they think), is to methodise his knowledge: to look at every separate part of it in its relation to the other parts, and to the whole; combining the partial glimpses which he has obtained of the field of human knowledge at different points, into a general map, if I may so speak, of the entire region; observing how all knowledge is connected, how we ascend to one branch by means of another, how the higher modifies the lower, and the lower helps us to understand the higher; how every existing reality is a compound of many properties, of which each science or distinct mode of study reveals but a small part, but the whole of which must be included to enable us to know it truly as a fact in Nature, and not as a mere abstraction.<sup>13</sup>

It is well, moreover, to use different types of education. These types should be as different as are the types of mind which are to be educated, and as are the forms of human service to which these same minds are ultimately to devote themselves. In the essay on "Liberty" is found an application of one of its great principles to the subject of education.

All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the

<sup>13</sup> Rectorial Addresses, University of St. Andrews, p. 21.



predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the task; then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of joint-stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of industry does not exist in the country. But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government auspices, the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to those unable to defray the expense.<sup>14</sup>

In the same impressive essay it is also discriminated:

As much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human de-

<sup>14</sup>“On Liberty,” Ticknor & Fields, 1863, p. 205.

velopment. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. In proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to posterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as Individuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be called, and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men.<sup>15</sup>

Beginning with such a teacher as his father was, Mill is inclined to emphasize the extreme worth of the teacher and of proper methods of teaching. A very modern note is struck, and in a most vital and impressive way. For, in writing to Huxley in the year of 1865, he says:

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

When I said that our educational system needs other modifications still more than it needs the due introduction of modern languages and physical science, what I had strongly in view was improvements in the mode of teaching. It is disgraceful to human nature and society that the whole of boyhood should be spent in pretending to learn certain things without learning them. With proper methods and good teachers boys might really learn Greek and Latin instead of making believe to learn them, and might have ample time besides for science, and for as much of modern languages as there is any use in teaching to them while at school. And if science were taught as badly as Greek and Latin are taught, it would not do their minds more good.<sup>19</sup>

Of course it is most evident that the education with which Mill is largely concerned is preeminently intellectual. The author of the "Logic" leads in the belief of the discipline of the intellect. To him reasoning represents the process and the end of education. In various places and under diverse forms he indicates his fundamental conceptions.

In the "Logic" he affirms that:

The only complete safeguard against reasoning ill, is the habit of reasoning well; familiarity with the principles of correct reasoning, and practice in applying those principles. It is, however, not unimportant to consider what are the most common modes of bad reasoning; by what appearances

<sup>19</sup> "Letters," Vol. II., p. 43.

the mind is most likely to be seduced from the observance of true principles of induction; what, in short, are the most common and most dangerous varieties of Apparent Evidence, whereby persons are misled into opinions for which there does not exist evidence really conclusive.<sup>17</sup>

Logic in even a narrow sense as a part of education holds a high place in the thought of John Stuart Mill:

Logic is, what it was so expressively called by the schoolmen and by Bacon, *ars artium*; the science of science itself. All science consists of data and conclusions from those data, of proofs and what they prove: now logic points out what relations must subsist between data and whatever can be concluded from them, between proof and every thing which it can prove. If there be any such indispensable relations, and if these can be precisely determined, every particular branch of science, as well as every individual in the guidance of his conduct, is bound to conform to those relations, under the penalty of making false inferences—of drawing conclusions which are not grounded in the realities of things. Whatever has at any time been concluded justly, whatever knowledge has been acquired otherwise than by immediate intuition, depended on the observance of the laws which it is the province of logic to investigate. If the conclusions are just, and the knowledge real, those laws, whether known or not, have been observed.

We need not, therefore, seek any further for a solution of the question, so often agitated, respecting the utility of logic. If a science of logic exists, or is capable of existing, it must

"“A System of Logic,” p. 513.

be useful. If there be rules to which every mind consciously or unconsciously conforms in every instance in which it infers rightly, there seems little necessity for discussing whether a person is more likely to observe those rules, when he knows the rules, than when he is unacquainted with them.<sup>18</sup>

Logic, therefore, represents a most important part in the educational program. It lays down laws for the discovery of truth and it makes known the conditions which must attend the search. If it is too broad, ratiocination helps in right reasoning from premises, and induction aids in drawing proper conclusions from observation. Logic in both these relations helps us to exactness. It blows away, like the wind, vague and hazy thinking. It promotes clearness. It induces clearness of thinking by orderly thinking.

Of a form of logic as seen in Plato, Mr. Mill has hearty appreciation. He says:

The Socratic method, of which the Platonic dialogues are the chief example, is unsurpassed as a discipline for correcting the errors, and clearing up the confusions incident to the *intellectus sibi permissus*, the understanding which has made up all its bundles of associations under the guidance of popular phraseology. The close, searching *elenchus* by which the man of vague generalities is constrained either to express his meaning to himself in definite terms, or to confess that

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

he does not know what he is talking about; the perpetual testing of all general statements by particular instances; the siege in form which is laid to the meaning of large abstract terms, by fixing upon some still larger class-name which includes that and more, and dividing down to the thing sought—marking out its limits and definition by a series of accurately drawn distinctions between it and each of the cognate objects which are successively parted off from it—all this, as an education for precise thinking, is inestimable, and all this, even at that age, took such hold of me that it became part of my own mind.<sup>19</sup>

In this intellectual training, several subjects besides logic are included which have a specific value. The St. Andrews address interprets these subjects with the most satisfactory fullness. Of this address, Henry Fawcett said:

The mathematician said that he had never seen the advantages to be derived from the study of Mathematics so absolutely and so forcibly described.<sup>20</sup>

The same remark was also made by a classicist about the classics, and, by a physiologist, about natural science. In his interpretation of the ancient classics, as set forth in the unique St. Andrews speech, Mill believes it is necessary to know the Greek and Latin languages and literatures, if one

<sup>19</sup> Autobiography, p. 21.

<sup>20</sup> John Stuart Mill: Twelve Sketches by Herbert Spenser, Henry Fawcett, Frederic Harrison and other distinguished authors, p. 80.



is to think in Greek or in Latin. It is also necessary to know the language and its writings, if one is to know ancient history. Secondary or easy impressions and interpretations are incorrect. In knowing an ancient language one lays in a stock of thought and observation and becomes familiar with the principal literary compositions which the human mind has produced. Moreover, one receives the most valuable discipline of the intellect. The structure of these languages, at once so regular and so complex, leads to this result. The grammar of the Greek language illustrates this method and effect. Grammar is logic, analysis, synthesis and relationship. It demands discriminations, precise and accurate. It obliges thinking.

The ancient classics, moreover, are the accumulated treasures of wisdom. The experiences of human nature and conduct are in them gathered together. These results in speech and history, in dialogue, essay, poetry and philosophy are the stores of the best ancient civilization. The end of education is here set forth. The truths of metaphysics are here explained. The methods of the search for truth are here interpreted, illustrated, and applied.

The form, too, as well as the content of these

examples of ancient thought, approaches the highest perfection. The literature of Greece is the noblest. It has no rival. The ancients were neither hurried nor self-conscious as are the moderns. Their style represents good sense, without trickery or deceit. They use words with meanings, with clearness and fitness. They were not discursive, but intrinsic and essential. They chose right words for right thought and put them in the right places. They have neither too much nor too little. Their literature finds a type in their sculptures. They are not prolix. They are condensed and brief because they took pains. The acquaintance of the moderns with these ancient masterpieces would make the moderns more masterful.

But the argument for the study of the sciences is hardly less weighty. The sciences give information. They tell us of the world in which we live, and they tell us of ourselves. Truth, the search for which is the most important employment of man, is made known by observation and reasoning. Methods for research and for the discovery of truth have been carried to their highest point of usefulness in the sciences. If ancient literature is an illustration of the art of expression, the modern sciences are the finished illustration of the art of

thinking. Mathematics stands for reasoning, physical science for observation. Models, rules and principles for weighing evidence, which is the essence of thinking, are most effectively proved in the sciences. The mathematical sciences, pure and complete, help one to understand and to express the premises of reasoning and also to keep in mind the proper process arising from these premises. The physical sciences, which are not mathematical, like chemistry, teach methods of rounding-out truth by observation and experiment. Reasoning by induction and reasoning by deduction are likewise taught by these studies. In his examination of Hamilton, Mill speaks particularly of mathematics as habituating the student to precision. It demands observation, and exactness in observation. It teaches the value of quantities. It also expresses the necessity of progressive reasoning. It requires sure footing before and as each step is taken.

Neither is physiology nor psychology to be omitted. The knowledge of one's body, of one's mind, is evidently of much value. To understand one's self is a natural wish. It also is a means of preventing disaster and disease of all sorts, and of promoting health. The moral conditions of life have close relations with the physiological and the

psychological facts. Man's own nature in both higher and lower relations is most deserving of study. Moreover, metaphysical controversies are among the powerful forces for giving intellectual discipline. Metaphysical reading and thinking are profitable for all students.

The author of the classical political economy advises, furthermore, the study of this subject as a guidance for life and for the interpretation of laws, institutions and affairs human. The study of ethics, of politics, of history, moreover, aids in the humanizing of the student, equipping him for his duty as a student and as a future citizen. Jurisprudence and international law, likewise, represent those principles which underlie the conduct of individuals and of nations, and embody those methods by which individuals and nations may and should live together and do prosper.

But education, whatever its content, fails to become a proper disciplinary force, unless it be put into practise. Truth is to lead to duty. Intellect is to train conscience, and conscience to direct and incite the will.

Besides intellectual and moral education, esthetics is not to suffer neglect. In England, two causes have contributed to the elimination of the science

of the beautiful from the educational process,—money-making and puritanism. But poetry, painting, sculpture and the other fine arts, are never to be interpreted as qualities. They embody the truth of that early saying of Goethe, that “the beautiful is greater than the good, for it includes the good.” The beautiful is the good made practical. The examples of the beautiful give quickening, appreciation and self-culture. They stir feeling, enlarge thought, and ennoble life unto the highest.

Yet these severer studies do not alone constitute the elements of the educational process. Of the value of poetry in this program Mill writes with deep sympathy. In particular does he write of the great ministry of Wordsworth to both his mind and heart:

In the first place, these poems addressed themselves powerfully to one of the strongest of my pleasurable susceptibilities, the love of rural objects and natural scenery; to which I had been indebted not only for much of the pleasure of my life, but quite recently for relief from one of my longest relapses into depression. In this power of rural beauty over me, there was a foundation laid for taking pleasure in Wordsworth's poetry; the more so, as his scenery lies mostly among mountains, which, owing to my early Pyrenean excursion, were my ideal of natural beauty. But Wordsworth would never have had any great effect on me, if he had merely

placed before me beautiful pictures of natural scenery. Scott does this still better than Wordsworth, and a very second-rate landscape does it more effectually than any poet. What made Wordsworth's poems a medicine for my state of mind, was that they expressed, not mere outward beauty, but states of feeling, and of thought coloured by feeling, under the excitement of beauty. They seemed to be the very culture of the feelings, which I was in quest of. In them I seemed to draw from a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be shared in by all human beings; which had no connexion with struggle or imperfection, but would be made richer by every improvement in the physical or social condition of mankind. From them I seemed to learn what would be the perennial sources of happiness, when all the greater evils of life shall have been removed. And I felt myself at once better and happier as I came under their influence.<sup>21</sup>

But the education of the intellect and of the imagination does not complete the whole of education, for man is more than intellectual. Man has feelings and a heart. He is a social being, and, as a social being, faculties other than intellectual have their place. Man is also a doer and an executive. He is a moral being and a religious soul. He has a will. He, also, is endowed with the capacity for seeing the beautiful and sublime. He is an esthetic being. Education is comprehensive of the whole

<sup>21</sup> Autobiography, p. 147.



nature of the individual and of all the relations which the individual embodies.

The intellect, moreover, is not cultured by itself alone, either as a condition or as a force. It receives enrichment from the feelings. As Mill says in the *Autobiography*:

I had now learnt by experience that the passive susceptibilities needed to be cultivated as well as the active capacities, and required to be nourished and enriched as well as guided. I did not, for an instant, lose sight of, or undervalue, that part of the truth which I had seen before; I never turned recreant to intellectual culture, or ceased to consider the power and practice of analysis as an essential condition both of individual and of social improvement. But I thought that it had consequences which required to be corrected, by joining other kinds of cultivation with it. The maintenance of a due balance among the faculties, now seemed to me of primary importance. The cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed. And my thoughts and inclinations turned in an increasing degree towards whatever seemed capable of being instrumental to that object.

I now began to find meaning in the things which I had read or heard about the importance of poetry and art as instruments of human culture. But it was some time longer before I began to know this by personal experience. The only one of the imaginative arts in which I had from childhood taken great pleasure, was music; the best effect of which (and in this it surpasses perhaps every other art) consists in exciting enthusiasm; in winding up to a high

pitch those feelings of an elevated kind which are already in the character, but to which this excitement gives a glow and a fervour, which, though transitory at its utmost height, is precious for sustaining them at other times.<sup>22</sup>

It is furthermore to be remembered that the intellect and every part of one's being are cultivated by human association. In education the social relations of man have not received sufficient emphasis. The value of great men, men of great manners and noble qualities, in this general cultivation, is of the highest consequence.

Great men, and great actions, are seldom wasted; they send forth a thousand unseen influences, more effective than those which are seen; and though nine out of every ten things done, with a good purpose, by those who are in advance of their age, produce no material effect, the tenth thing produces effects twenty times as great as any one would have dreamed of predicting from it. Even the men who for want of sufficiently favorable circumstances left no impress at all upon their own age, have often been of the greatest value to posterity. Who could appear to have lived more entirely in vain than some of the early heretics? They were burned or massacred, their writings extirpated, their memory anathematized, and their very names and existence left for seven or eight centuries in the obscurity of musty manuscripts—their history to be gathered, perhaps, only from the sentences by which they were condemned. Yet the memory of these men—men who resisted certain pretensions or

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143.

certain dogmas of the Church in the very age in which the unanimous assent of Christendom was afterward claimed as having been given to them, and asserted as the ground of their authority—broke the chain of tradition, established a series of precedents for resistance, inspired later Reformers with the courage, and armed them with the weapons, which they needed when mankind were better prepared to follow their impulse.<sup>23</sup>

In this relationship, too, of social education, Mr. Mill believes in the value of the fellowship of equals. This value is reinforced by his own experience. He says:

It was in the winter of 1822-3 that I formed the plan of a little society, to be composed of young men agreeing in fundamental principles—acknowledging Utility as their standard in ethics and politics, and a certain number of the principal corollaries drawn from it in the philosophy I had accepted—and meeting once a fortnight to read essays and discuss questions conformably to the premises thus agreed on.<sup>24</sup>

But association with one's superiors or with one's equals is not the only method of gaining cultivation. Cultivation is also to be gained from executive work. The will and its expression react upon the intellectual faculties. If efficiency springs from these faculties, it tends in turn those same faculties to develop and to expand.

<sup>23</sup> "A System of Logic," p. 650.

<sup>24</sup> Autobiography, p. 79.

In the Autobiography it is said:

I am disposed to agree with what has been surmised by others, that the opportunity which my official position gave me of learning by personal observation the necessary conditions of the practical conduct of public affairs, has been of considerable value to me as a theoretical reformer of the opinions and institutions of my time. Not, indeed, that public business transacted on paper, to take effect on the other side of the globe, was of itself calculated to give much practical knowledge of life. But the occupation accustomed me to see and hear the difficulties of every course, and the means of obviating them, stated and discussed deliberately with a view to execution; it gave me opportunities of perceiving when public measures, and other political facts, did not produce the effects which had been expected of them, and from what causes; above all, it was valuable to me by making me, in this portion of my activity, merely one wheel in a machine, the whole of which had to work together. As a speculative writer, I should have had no one to consult but myself, and should have encountered in my speculations none of the obstacles which would have started up whenever they came to be applied to practice. But as a Secretary conducting political correspondence, I could not issue an order or express an opinion, without satisfying various persons very unlike myself, that the thing was fit to be done. I was thus in a good position for finding out by practice the mode of putting a thought which gives it easiest admittance into minds not prepared for it by habit; while I became practically conversant with the difficulties of moving bodies of men, the necessities of compromise, the art of sacrificing the non-essential to preserve the essential. I learnt how to ob-

tain the best I could, when I could not obtain everything; instead of being indignant or dispirited because I could not have entirely my own way, to be pleased and encouraged when I could have the smallest part of it; and when even that could not be, to bear with complete equanimity the being overruled altogether. I have found, through life, these acquisitions to be of the greatest possible importance for personal happiness, and they are also a very necessary condition for enabling any one, either as theorist or as practical man, to effect the greatest amount of good compatible with his opportunities.<sup>25</sup>

In one of the great essays it is also said :

It is by action that the faculties are called forth, more than by words; more, at least, than by words unaccompanied by action. We want schools in which the children of the poor should learn to use, not only their hands, but their minds for the guidance of their hands; in which they should be trained to the actual adaptation of means to ends; should become familiar with the accomplishment of the same object by various processes, and be made to apprehend with their intellects in what consists the difference between the right way of performing industrial operations and the wrong. Meanwhile, they would acquire, not only manual dexterity, but habits of order and regularity, of the utmost use in after-life, and which have more to do with the formation of character than many persons are aware of. Such things would do much more than is usually believed towards converting these neglected creatures into rational beings,—beings capable of foresight, accessible to reasons and motives ad-

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 84–86.

dressed to their understanding, and therefore not governed by the utterly senseless modes of feeling and action which so much astonish educated and observing persons when brought into contact with them.

But when education, in this its narrow sense, has done its best, and even to enable it to do its best, an education of another sort is required, such as schools cannot give. What is taught to a child at school will be of little effect, if the circumstances which surround the grown man or woman contradict the lesson. We may cultivate his understanding; but what if he cannot employ it without becoming discontented with his position, and disaffected to the whole order of things in which he is cast? Society educates the poor, for good or for ill, by its conduct to them, even more than by direct teaching. A sense of this truth is the most valuable feature in the new philanthropic agitation; and the recognition of it is important, whatever mistakes may be at first made in practically applying it.<sup>26</sup>

Regarding the necessity, moreover, of moral education, and, indeed, of religious, Mill is not silent. He says, at length:

My father's moral convictions, wholly dissevered from religion, were very much of the character of those of the Greek philosophers; and were delivered with the force and decision which characterized all that came from him. Even at the very early age at which I read with him the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, I imbibed from that work and from his comments a deep respect for the character of Socrates; who stood in my mind as a model of ideal excellence: and I well remem-

<sup>26</sup>“*Dissertations and Discussions*,” Vol. II., p. 282.



ber how my father at that time impressed upon me the lesson of the "Choice of Hercules." At a somewhat later period the lofty moral standard exhibited in the writings of Plato operated upon me with great force. My father's moral inculcations were at all times mainly those of the "Soeratici viri;" justice, temperance (to which he gave a very extended application), veracity, perseverance, readiness to encounter pain and especially labour; regard for the public good; estimation of persons according to their merits, and of things according to their intrinsic usefulness; a life of exertion in contradiction to one of self-indulgent ease and sloth. These and other moralities he conveyed in brief sentences, uttered as occasion arose, of grave exhortation, or stern reprobation and contempt.

But though direct moral teaching does much, indirect does more; and the effect my father produced on my character, did not depend solely on what he said or did with that direct object, but also, and still more, on what manner of man he was.<sup>27</sup>

In a letter, too, written in 1849, to W. J. Fox, he says:

I would omit the words *including moral instruction*. What the sort of people who will have the management of any such schools mean by moral instruction, is much the same thing as what they mean by religious instruction, only lowered to the world's practice. It means cramming the children *directly* with all the common *professions* about what is right and wrong, and about the worth of different objects in life, and filling them indirectly with the spirit of all the

<sup>27</sup> Autobiography, pp. 46-47.

notions on such matters which vulgar-minded people are in the habit of acting on without consciously professing. I know it is impossible to prevent much of this from being done—but the less of it there is the better, and I would not set people upon doing more of it than they might otherwise do, by insisting expressly on *moral* instruction.

If it were possible to provide for giving *real* moral instruction it would be worth more than all else that schools can do. But no programme of moral instruction, which would be really good, would have a chance of being assented to or followed by the manager of a general scheme of public instruction in the present state of people's minds.<sup>28</sup>

Mr. Mill holds definite ideas in respect to the value of religion, whether that religion be Christian or Buddhistic. In his essay on the Utility of Religion, he contrasts the power of education with the power of religion. The contrast relates to one people, and to one people only. With a generality of statement, which he seldom allows himself, he says:

The power of education is almost boundless: there is not one natural inclination which it is not strong enough to coerce, and, if needful, to destroy by disuse. In the greatest recorded victory which education has ever achieved over a whole host of natural inclinations in an entire people—the maintenance through centuries of the institutions of Lycurgus,—it was very little, if even at all, indebted to religion: for the Gods of the Spartans were the same as

<sup>28</sup> "Letters," Vol. I., p. 150.

those of other Greek states; and though, no doubt, every state of Greece believed that its particular polity had at its first establishment, some sort of divine sanction (mostly that of the Delphian oracle), there was seldom any difficulty in obtaining the same or an equally powerful sanction for a change. . . . The case of Greece is, I believe, the only one in which any teaching, other than religious, has had the unspeakable advantage of forming the basis of education: and though much may be said against the quality of some part of the teaching, very little can be said against its effectiveness. The most memorable example of the power of education over conduct, is afforded (as I have just remarked) by this exceptional case; constituting a strong presumption that in other cases, early religious teaching has owed its power over mankind rather to its being early than to its being religious.<sup>29</sup>

In estimating the worth of education of all types and content, happiness is to be selected as a standard. The principle is the old utilitarian one, largely interpreted, that that education is of the most worth which gives the greatest happiness to the greatest number of persons.

In the "Logic" it is said:

I do not mean to assert that the promotion of happiness should be itself the end of all actions, or even all rules of action. It is the justification, and ought to be the controller, of all ends, but it is not itself the sole end. There are many virtuous actions, and even virtuous modes of action (though

<sup>29</sup> "Three Essays on Religion," pp. 82-83.

the cases are, I think, less frequent than is often supposed), by which happiness in the particular instance is sacrificed, more pain being produced than pleasure. But the conduct of which this can be truly asserted, admits of justification only because it can be shown that, on the whole, more happiness will exist in the world, if feelings are cultivated which will make people, in certain cases, regardless of happiness. I fully admit that this is true; that the cultivation of an ideal nobleness of will and conduct should be to individual human beings an end, to which the specific pursuit either of their own happiness or of that of others (except so far as included in that idea) should, in any case of conflict, give way. But I hold that the very question, what constitutes this elevation of character, is itself to be decided by a reference to happiness as the standard. The character itself should be, to the individual, a paramount end, simply because the existence of this ideal nobleness of character, or of a near approach to it, in any abundance, would go farther than all things else toward making human life happy, both in the comparatively humble sense of pleasure and freedom from pain, and in the higher meaning, of rendering life, not what it now is almost universally, puerile and insignificant, but such as human beings with highly developed faculties can care to have.<sup>30</sup>

It is furthermore to be remembered that education is designed to breed and to train great men. If the large plateau of general culture needs lifting, the need is great of the raising of the Himalaya peaks of thought and of power.

<sup>30</sup> "A System of Logic," p. 658.

In the essay on "Liberty" it is interpreted :

In sober truth, whatever homage may be professed, or even paid, to real or supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. In ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself; and if he had either great talents or a high social position, he was a considerable power. At present individuals are lost in the crowd. In politics it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses. This is as true in the moral and social relations of private life as in public transactions. Those whose opinions go by the name of public opinion, are not always the same sort of public: in America, they are the whole white population; in England, chiefly the middle class. But they are always a mass, that is to say, collective mediocrity. And what is a still greater novelty, the mass do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible leaders, or from books. Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers. I am not complaining of all this. I do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the government of mediocrity from being mediocre government. No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, quali-

ties, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few. The initiation of all wise or noble things, comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual. The honor and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open. I am not countenancing the sort of "hero-worship" which applauds the strong man of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself. All he can claim is, freedom to point out the way. The power of compelling others into it, is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but corrupting to the strong man himself. It does seem, however, that when the opinions of masses of merely average men are everywhere become or becoming the dominant power, the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be, the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought. It is in these circumstances most especially, that exceptional individuals, instead of being deterred, should be encouraged in acting differently from the masses. In other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unless they acted not only differently, but better. In this age the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity has always abounded when and where



strength of character has abounded; and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigor, and moral courage which it contained. That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time.<sup>31</sup>

In one of the early essays, less great than the "Liberty," the same ground is taken:

If we were asked for what end, above all others, endowed universities exist, or ought to exist, we should answer, "To keep alive philosophy." This, too, is the ground on which, of late years, our own national endowments have chiefly been defended. To educate common minds for the common business of life, a public provision may be useful, but is not indispensable; nor are there wanting arguments, not conclusive, yet of considerable strength to show that it is undesirable. Whatever individual competition does at all, it commonly does best. All things in which the public are adequate judges of excellence are best supplied where the stimulus of individual interest is the most active; and that is where pay is in proportion to exertion: not where pay is made sure in the first instance, and the only security for exertion is the superintendence of government; far less where, as in the English universities, even that security has been successfully excluded. But there is an education of which it cannot be pretended that the public are competent judges,—the education by which great minds are formed. To rear up minds with aspirations and faculties above the herd, capable of leading on their countrymen to greater achievements in virtue, intelligence, and social well-being,—to do

<sup>31</sup> "On Liberty," p. 127.

this, and likewise so to educate the leisured classes of the community generally, that they may participate as far as possible in the qualities of these superior spirits, and be prepared to appreciate them and follow in their steps,—these are purposes requiring institutions of education placed above dependence on the immediate pleasure of that very multitude whom they are designed to elevate. These are the ends for which endowed universities are desirable; they are those which all endowed universities profess to aim at: and great is their disgrace, if, having undertaken this task, and claiming credit for fulfilling it, they leave it unfulfilled.<sup>32</sup>

In one of his later letters in a more informal way Mr. Mill indicates and applies the same belief:

Experience shows that academies, whether of literature or science, generally prefer inoffensive mediocrities to men of original genius. Cuvier was no ordinary man, but neither Geoffrey St. Hilaire nor Darwin would have had a chance of obtaining his vote for a professorship.<sup>33</sup>

This need of the training of great men is of all parts of the world most urgent in the United States.

Writing to James M. Barnard, of Boston, in the year of 1869, Mill says:

The great desideratum in America—and though not quite in an equal degree, I may say in England too—is the improvement of the higher education. America surpasses all

<sup>32</sup> “Dissertations and Discussions,” Vol. I., p. 121.

<sup>33</sup> “Letters,” Vol. II., p. 354.

countries in the amount of mental cultivation which she has been able to make universal; but a high average level is not everything. There are wanted, I do not say a class, but a great number of persons of the highest degree of cultivation which the accumulated acquisitions of the human race make it possible to give them. From such persons, in a community that knows no distinction of ranks, civilisation would rain down its influences on the remainder of society, and the higher faculties, having been highly cultivated in the more advanced part of the public, would give forth products and create an atmosphere that would produce a high average of the same faculties in a people so well prepared in point of general intelligence as the people of the United States.<sup>34</sup>

Such is my interpretation of Mill's idea of education. It is an education deep, broad and high,—as broad as human nature, as high as truth, as deep as destiny. Though severe is the type, it is still human. Though Mill might have accepted membership in a narrow sect of educational Pharisaism, his thought of discipline is broad. Though he emphasized the older type of education as seen in the ancient classics, he developed the inductive logic and illustrated its monumental types with multitudes of examples drawn from modern science. Though not an educationist or formal instructor, his influence as an educator was for a score of years commanding. Though he was personally unknown

<sup>34</sup> "Letters," Vol. II., p. 227.

to many of the leaders of his time, though he was not a child of Oxford or of Cambridge, he was the chief force in influencing for a generation their undergraduates. His appreciation of all branches of knowledge was deep, and his sympathy with men of all sorts and conditions was broad without being superficial, and high without visionariness.

## V

### EDUCATION ACCORDING TO GLADSTONE

A MAN'S conception of the value and the nature of education is determined largely by two considerations: The first is his conception of the purpose of life. Mr. Gladstone thought of life as a solemn and serious duty, to be entered upon like the marriage service, reverently, soberly, discreetly, advisedly, and to be pursued with such earnestness and wisdom that the conclusion would be as triumphant as inevitable. It was a great and noble calling he felt life to be; not a mean and grovelling thing that one must shuffle through, but an elevated and lofty destiny.

The second consideration which helps in determining a man's sense of the value and nature of education relates to his personal experience: his own education helps to make up his judgment regarding what all education ought to be. This judgment is applied quite as often negatively as positively. Frequently a man feels that the method of his own education has proved a failure so lament-

able that he counsels every one to follow any other method than that which he himself has suffered. More frequently a man believes that his own kind of education is the best for others. Mr. Gladstone's estimate of the worth of the different types of education is, in no small degree, an exponent of the type of education which he himself received.

In the year 1831, Mr. Gladstone took his double first-class at Oxford as had, twenty-three years before, Sir Robert Peel. The double first-class was, of course, in classics and mathematics. Perhaps no subject in the whole educational curriculum has been more questioned than mathematics as a means of intellectual discipline. Of the value of mathematics in education he had a high opinion, for all minds excepting those which might claim to have the gift of genius. In his little memoir of Arthur Henry Hallam, Mr. Gladstone does speak of the disadvantage of his friend's having gone to the mathematical University of Cambridge. Another of Hallam's "most valued friends," writing of Hallam's mathematical abilities, says "he declined the drudgery of the apprenticeship."<sup>1</sup>

But the ordinary mind, Mr. Gladstone realized,

<sup>1</sup> Remains in Verse and Prose of Arthur Henry Hallam, John Murray, Preface, p. xxx.



could not afford to dispense with the training of mathematics. He felt that for those who found special difficulty in mathematical reasoning, it should be particularly valuable. He believed that few people have what is called a turn for anything. The development of our capacities is made out of elements which before their development could hardly be seen.

One advantage of the training in mathematics lies in accuracy. Mr. Gladstone writes to his eldest son, W. H. Gladstone, in 1857, saying:

When I was at Eton we knew very little indeed, but we knew it accurately. The extension of knowledge is an excellent thing, but the first condition of all is to have it exact. I am under the impression, from our Italian reading, that you are trying to keep this always in mind, and I feel most desirous you should, for it is hard to say what an evil the want of it always proves.<sup>2</sup>

The value which Mr. Gladstone finds in mathematics represents that which he thought belonged to metaphysics. A logical conclusion this, for mathematics is essentially a form of philosophy. He was not primarily a metaphysician or a mathematician. As Mr. Morley says:

<sup>2</sup>“Correspondence on Church and Religion of William Ewart Gladstone,” by D. C. Lathbury, Macmillan Co., 1910, Vol. II., p. 160.

As to the problems of the metaphysician, Mr. Gladstone showed little curiosity. Nor for abstract discussion in its highest shape—for investigation of ultimate propositions—had he any of that power of subtle and ingenious reasoning which was often so extraordinary when he came to deal with the concrete, the historic and the demonstrable.<sup>3</sup>

But he early showed a great regard for Bishop Butler. To his son at Oxford, he writes:

With respect to philosophy, I do not know what may be best according to modern fashions at Oxford, nor do I know what number of books you should take up. But, as far as the value of the books in themselves and for discipline of the mind are concerned, I should recommend you as *three* books Aristotle's "Ethics" and "Politics" and Butler's "Analogy." You should also read and know Butler's Sermons. I should think you ought now to begin the "Analogy," or the "Politics," if not both. I would read little at a time, making sure that you thoroughly understand and *possess* everything as you go along—not that the two are the same, for the "Politics" will call more upon memory, the "Analogy" upon thought.

I cannot say what value I attach to Bishop Butler's works. Viewing him as a guide of life, especially for the intellectual difficulties and temptations of these times, I place him before almost any other author. The *spirit* of wisdom is in every line.<sup>4</sup>

\*"Life of William Ewart Gladstone," by John Morley, Macmillan Co., Vol. I., p. 209.

\*\*\*\*"Correspondence," etc., Vol. II., p. 163.

The great factor in education, however, in the judgment of Gladstone, is found in the classical tradition, and his regard for this tradition was far more fundamental than that he entertained for either mathematics or metaphysics. In the year 1861 Mr. Gladstone writes Lord Littleton:

The *low* utilitarian argument in matter of education, for giving it what is termed a practical direction, is so plausible that I think we may on the whole be thankful that the instincts of the country have resisted what in argument it has been ill able to confute. We still hold by the classical training as the basis of a liberal education; parents dispose of their children in early youth accordingly; but if they were asked why they did so, it is probable they would give lamentably weak or unworthy reasons for it, such for example, as that the public schools and universities open the way to desirable acquaintance and what is termed "good society." . . .

But why after all is the classical training paramount? Is it because we find it established? because it improves memory or taste, or gives precision, or develops the faculty of speech? All these are but partial and fragmentary statements, so many narrow glimpses of a great and comprehensive truth. That truth I take to be that the modern European civilization from the middle age downwards is the compound of two great factors, the Christian religion for the spirit of man, and the Greek, and in a secondary degree the Roman discipline for his mind and intellect. St. Paul is the apostle of the Gentiles, and is in his own person a symbol of this great wedding—the place, for example, of Aristotle and Plato

in Christian education is not arbitrary nor in principle mutable. The materials of what we call classical training were prepared, and we have a right to say were advisedly prepared, in order that it might become not a mere adjunct but (in mathematical phrase) the complement of Christianity in its application to the culture of the human being formed both for this world and for the world to come.

If this principle be true it is broad and high and clear enough, and supplies a key to all questions connected with the relation between the classical training of our youth and all other branches of their secular education. It must of course be kept within its proper place, and duly limited as to things and persons. It can only apply in full to that small proportion of the youth of any country, who are to become in the fullest sense educated men. It involves no extravagant or inconvenient assumptions respecting those who are to be educated for trades and professions in which the necessities of specific training must limit general culture. It leaves open every question turning upon individual aptitudes and inaptitudes and by no means requires that boys without a capacity for imbibing any of the spirit of classical culture are still to be mechanically plied with the instruments of it after their unfitness has become manifest. But it lays down the rule of education for those who have no internal and no external disqualification; and that rule, becoming a fixed and central point in the system, becomes also the point around which all others may be grouped.<sup>5</sup>

The classical training was thought to be of value by Mr. Gladstone not only because of its literary

<sup>5</sup> "Life of," etc., Vol. II., pp. 646-648.

elements but also because of its philosophical import. To his eldest son he writes in 1860, saying:

In my opinion the "Politics" of Aristotle are much more adapted for discipline to the mind of the young, and especially to your mind, than the "Republic" of Plato. The merit of Plato's philosophy is in a quasi-spiritual and highly imaginative element that runs through it; Aristotle's deals in a most sharp, searching, and faithful analysis of the facts of human life and human nature. All the reasons that have bound Aristotle so wonderfully to Oxford should, I think, recommend him to you. Were I to determine your study, I should say, Take for the present some lighter specimen of Plato, and nothing more. . . . The "Politics" will require much from you in thought and energy: I *think* the "Republic" would be lighter as well as less valuable work. . . .<sup>6</sup>

Although Mr. Gladstone gave a higher place to Greek than to Latin in classical education, he did place a high worth upon the writing of Latin. He says, in a note to his son of the year 1853:

The art of writing really good Latin prose is a very difficult one, and possessed by few persons, you can only advance towards it by slow degrees; but it is a most valuable accomplishment, and helps much in making up the character of a scholar and a gentleman by its refining effect upon taste and judgment in expression. It is an admirable preparation for writing good English.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> "Correspondence," etc., Vol. II., p. 164.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

It cannot, however, for one moment be doubted that the great element of education intellectual, in the judgment of Gladstone, is religion. Himself a great believer, "a great Christian," as Lord Salisbury called him after his death, he esteemed the attitude toward religion—and to him the only religion was the Christian—as of primary intellectual significance. In the troublesome period of 1854, when university reform was in the air, he would have been glad to have made Oxford more religious and more theological. Pusey, in his "Collegiate and Professorial Teaching and Discipline," has a passage elevating the doctrine of God to a primary place in his scheme of education:

God alone . . . *is* in Himself, and is the Cause and Up-holder of everything to which He has given being. Every faculty of the mind is some reflection of His; every truth has its being from Him; every law of Nature has the impress of His hand; everything beautiful has caught its light from His eternal beauty; every principle of goodness has its foundation in His attributes. . . . History, without God, is a chaos without design, or end, or aim; political economy, without God, would be a selfish teaching for the acquisition of wealth; physics, without God, would be but a dull inquiry into certain meaningless phenomena; ethics, without God, would be a varying rule, without principle, or substance, or centre, or regulating hand; metaphysics, without God, would make man



his own temporary god, to be resolved, after his brief hour here, into the nothingness out of which he proceeded.<sup>8</sup>

Such is Mr. Gladstone's own conception of the place of religion in education. The theology which he represents is also of a pretty strict type. In the year 1865 he writes:

I would rather see Oxford level with the ground than its religion regulated in the manner which would please Bishop Colenso.<sup>9</sup>

Mr. Gladstone's conception of the place of religion in education is especially expounded in his letters to his children. To his son Harry in the year 1868 he writes:

I am much concerned that my duties here should be so pressing at this moment as to prevent my going down to Eton to-morrow and joining my prayers to your dear mother's that the grace of God may abundantly descend upon you, both in the holy ordinance of Confirmation, and afterwards through all the days of your life. I shall do my best to recollect you from hence; and among other satisfactions I am truly glad that you should be confirmed by the Bishop of Oxford, who far exceeds all the prelates I have ever heard in the wise and devout impressiveness of his administration of that particular rite.

But I look most to what lies within your own breast. It is in the preparation of the heart that the surest promise

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I., p. 211.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220.

as to this and every other ordinance is to be found: in the humility and self-mistrust, in the continual looking up to God, the silent prayer of the soul, for help and strength, in the manful resolution, resting on the hope of His aid, to follow right, conscience, honour, duty, truth, holiness, "through all the changes and chances of this mortal life," and whether others will walk with us or whether they will not.<sup>10</sup>

To his daughter Helen, two years earlier, he writes:

The duty to be done, the progress to be made, the good to be effected, the store to be laid up for the future, from day to day, from hour to hour, make life a solemn thing, and the first of all our duties is that the life of each of us should have a purpose, namely, the fulfilment of the Divine will, by steady exertion aimed at this object, that so far as depends upon us the sum of sin in the world, and in ourselves especially, shall be lessened by the work of our lives, and not increased. Pursue this end, my dearest child, under an ever-living sense of the presence of God with you, and, of your union with Christ, and may you in pursuing it have ever-increasing progress in overcoming evil and infirmity, and in working out the holy will of God.<sup>11</sup>

Four years later upon her coming of age he writes to her to the same intent, saying:

God has been liberal to you in capacity, and I trust you will render it all back to Him in good works done to your fellow-creatures, in the cultivation of your own mind, and in bring-

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II., p. 185.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 191.

ing your whole heart and life into conformity with the blessed Pattern given us.<sup>12</sup>

With rather complete fullness is his conception of the worth of religion in education outlined in certain specific prayers and counsels written for his eldest son. From a multitude of themes I select these brief counsels:

This sense of God's presence will both help and be helped by the practice of prayer by silent ejaculation, or inwardly addressing God in short sentences, though of but two or three words: although so short, their wings may be strong enough to carry upwards many a fervent desire and earnest seeking after God. . . .

Remember that the avoidance of sin, indispensable as it is, is the lower part of our religion: from which we should ever be striving onwards to the higher—namely, the life of Divine love, fed continually by the contemplation of God as He is revealed to us in Christ, nowhere better described in brief than by the Psalmist when he says: "As for me, I will behold Thy presence in righteousness: and when I awake up after Thy likeness I shall be satisfied with it"—words which, like most words of Scripture, open deeper and more satisfying truths the more we humbly ponder them.<sup>13</sup>

Such is the concept of education which the Great Commoner, the first citizen of the world, for his prolonged generation, held. It is an education composed of mathematics and metaphysics in a

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 413.

small degree, of Latin and Greek in a greater measure, and of the counsels and elements of religion in the largest part. If religion is not the formal content, it is more. It is the atmosphere which moves and colors, gives direction and inspires impulse for every other part of the whole educational system.

As to the method in education, too, which the Great Commoner believed in, are found two or three significant notes. The method in education which Mr. Gladstone emphasized, and practised from earliest years to latest, lies simply in the word "work." A tremendous worker himself, he preached work as the condition and way of seeking education. His earliest diaries show the value which he attached to it and his latest statements and lasting practise do not at all contradict them. The diary which he wrote in the year 1830, at the age of twenty-one, is full of evidences of his laboriousness; and a generation later he was counseling his eldest son likewise to be a good worker.

Try and reconcile your mind thoroughly to the idea that this world, if we would be well and do well in it, is a world of work and not of idleness. This idea will, when heartily embraced, become like a part of yourself, and you will feel that you would on no account have it torn from you.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.

Again, he says to his son who has become a student of Christ Church:

If you look at the chief portraits in Hall, you will see with what manner and calibre of men you are associated. Neither is there any reason why you for yourself should not leave behind you a name with which in after-times others may be happy to claim fellowship: only be assured it must be on the same condition as Nature lays down for all except her prodigies, or, in other words, as God ordains for His children in general—the condition, I mean, of steady and hard work. If I may recommend you a mode in which to inaugurate your studentship, I would say *add an hour to your daily minimum of work*. Besides the good it will do you, it is a double acknowledgment—first to God, who has blessed your exertions; and secondly to the poor old College, to which I must be ever grateful, and whose fame I *fondly* hope you in your sphere will do something to restore and to increase.<sup>15</sup>

It may also be said that Mr. Gladstone did not depreciate the value of what is known as cramming. He tells his son that

It is not well to found a course of education on the idea of loading the memory; but *now* is the moment for you to load your memory as heavily as you can without stint—much can be carried for a short distance that cannot be for a long one. It is very convenient at such a time to have the eye able to run over maps and refresh the memory on cardinal or imperfectly known points of geography. Especially at

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162.

this time I should say work up well all the crack passages: those which concentrate much meaning in few words; those which give characteristic and pointed illustration of the characters of the authors, or of their race, country, or institutions. I think you will find the collection of these passages in my little red books pretty good: they were of great service to me, for which I love them, and I shall love them better if they can now do you a good turn.<sup>16</sup>

In this process of education that primarily English institution known as the examination had for him great worth. Of it he says in an address given at Manchester in the year 1862:

It raises to a *maximum* that stimulus which acts insensibly but powerfully upon the minds of students, as it were, from behind; and becomes an auxiliary force augmenting their energies, and helping them, almost without their knowledge, to surmount their difficulties. It is not found in practice, so far as I know, to be open to an objection which is popularly urged against it; this, namely, that it may elicit evil passions among the candidates, because it makes the gain of one the loss of another. I believe that, on the contrary, the pursuit of knowledge is found to carry with it, in this respect, its own preservatives and safeguards. Even in athletic sports, the loser does not resent or grudge the fairly won honours of the winner; and, in the race of minds, those who are behind, having confidence in the perfect fairness of the award, are not so blindly and basely selfish as to cherish resentment against others for being better than themselves. Again, it is a recommendation of purely competitive exami-

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 165.



nations that they bring the matter to the simplest issue; for, in nice cases, it is a much easier and safer task for the examiner to compare the performances of a candidate with those of another candidate, than to compare them with some more abstract standard, existing only in his own mind.<sup>17</sup>

The high worth which Mr. Gladstone placed upon education is indicated in many ways. He called Oxford and Cambridge the "two eyes of the country."<sup>18</sup> His solicitude for them was constant and great. He believed that the connection between the mind of a nation and its education is vital. He loved Oxford as he loved his mother. His farewell message to Oxford, as he drew near his end, voiced his earnest prayers "to the uttermost and to the last" for her.

Two generations after he left the university, Mr. Gladstone interpreted her influence upon him:

Oxford had rather tended to hide from me the great fact that liberty is a great and precious gift of God, and that human excellence cannot grow up in a nation without it. And yet I do not hesitate to say that Oxford had even at this time laid the foundations of my liberalism. School pursuits had revealed little; but in the region of philosophy she had initiated if not inured me to the pursuit of truth as an end of study. The splendid integrity of Aristotle, and still more

<sup>17</sup>"Gleanings of Past Years," by the Right Hon. William Ewart Gladstone, M. P., Charles Scribner's Sons, Vol. I., p. 15.

<sup>18</sup>"Life of," etc., Vol. III., p. 486.

of Butler, conferred upon me an inestimable service. Elsewhere I have not scrupled to speak with severity of myself, but I declare that while in the arms of Oxford, I was possessed through and through with a single-minded and passionate love of truth, with a virgin love of truth, so that, although I might be swathed in clouds of prejudice there was something of an eye within, that might gradually pierce them.<sup>19</sup>

But as Mr. Gladstone looked back upon Oxford in the later years, he traced one great defect in her education.

Perhaps it was my own fault, but I must admit that I did not learn when I was at Oxford that which I have learned since—namely, to set a due value on the imperishable and inestimable principle of British liberty. The temper which too much prevailed in academical circles was that liberty was regarded with jealousy and fear, something which could not wholly be dispensed with, but which was to be continually watched for fear of excesses.<sup>20</sup>

In the year 1860, delivering his inaugural address as rector of Edinburgh, he says:

Let me remind you how one of European fame, who is now your and my academical superior, how the great jurist, orator, philosopher and legislator, who is our Chancellor, how Lord Brougham besought the youth of Glasgow, as I in his words would more feebly, but not less earnestly, pray you, "to believe how incomparably the present season is verily and indeed the most precious of your whole lives,"

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I., p. 84.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

and how "every hour you squander here will," in other days, "rise up against you, and be paid for by years of bitter but unavailing regrets." Let me recall to you the words of another Lord Rector of Glasgow, whose name is cherished in every cottage of his country, and whose strong sagacity, vast range of experience, and energy of will, were not one whit more eminent than the tenderness of his conscience, and his ever wakeful and wearing sense of public duty. Let me remind you how Sir Robert Peel, choosing from his quiver with a congenial forethought that shaft which was most likely to strike home, averred before the same academic audience what may as safely be declared to you, that "there is a presumption, amounting almost to certainty, that if any one of you will determine to be eminent in whatever profession you may choose, and will act with unvarying steadiness in pursuance of that determination, you will, if health and strength be given to you, infallibly succeed." <sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> "Gleanings of Past Years," etc., Vol. VII., pp. 24-25.

## VI

### EDUCATION ACCORDING TO MATTHEW ARNOLD

**M**ATTHEW ARNOLD was a critic of literature: a critic so large and so fine, that his criticism itself has become literature. He was also a poet, and it now seems not improbable that the future will include his name in that trinity of English poets which helped to make illustrious the last half of the nineteenth century. He was too an inspector of English schools, an educationist, and to his work he gave wisdom, strength, vision and pains of all sorts. Both as cause and result of his educational service he wrote much on education, presenting facts as well as analyzing principles and theories. But whether as critic or as poet or as educationist, he was always an interpreter—an interpreter of life. He tried to see life sanely and to see it whole. He was sincere, full of charm, relying upon the power of persuasion to get the results he so eagerly desired. He loved nature, children and animals. He praised as well as condemned. He had humor as well as wit, enjoyed fun and endured

trial without complaint. Laborious, he found recreation in many forms of service. Serene, he delighted in every kind of human interest. Seeking for truth, he lived it, and was loyal to its duties. In him was a sweet reasonableness which, together with his other great qualities, causes his interpretation of education to be of precious worth.

His sum of thoughts about education is no more orderly and logical and consistent than Emerson's. Frederic Harrison says of him in the year 1867:

We seek vainly in Mr. Arnold a system of philosophy with principles coherent, interdependent, subordinate, and derivative.

If "education" were substituted for "philosophy," the remark would be quite as true. And yet it is not difficult from the many volumes of his writings to select certain great and generally consistent interpretations.

These interpretations are concerned, first, with a definition of education; second, with the kind of education needed for different classes in the community; third, with the content of education; fourth, with methods; fifth, with administration; sixth, with the training of teachers; seventh, with the worth or worthlessness of examinations.

The definition of education which Mr. Arnold gives is not dogmatic. It is rather inquisitive, characterizing, descriptive. He says of the compass of education:

The ideal of a general, liberal training, is to carry us to a knowledge of ourselves and the world. We are called to this knowledge by special aptitudes which are born with us; the grand thing in teaching is to have faith that some aptitudes of this kind every one has. This one's special aptitudes are for knowing men—the study of the humanities; that one's special aptitudes are for knowing the world—the study of nature. The circle of knowledge comprehends both, and we should all have some notion, at any rate, of the whole circle of knowledge. The rejection of the humanities by the realists, the rejection of the study of nature by the humanists, are alike ignorant. He whose aptitudes carry him to the study of nature should have some notion of the humanities; he whose aptitudes carry him to the humanities should have some notion of the phenomena and laws of nature.<sup>1</sup>

Into his definition of education Mr. Arnold does not admit any sort of common narrowness or limitation. The type embraces both the moral character and the intellect of the individual. He says:

In modern epochs, the part of a high reason, of ideas, acquires constantly increasing importance in the conduct of the world's affairs. A fine culture is the complement of a

<sup>1</sup>“Higher Schools and Universities in Germany,” p. 175.



high reason, and it is in the conjunction of both with character, with energy, that the ideal for men and nations is placed. It is common to hear remarks on the frequent divorce between culture and character, and to infer from this that culture is a mere varnish, and that character only deserves any serious attention. No error can be more fatal: culture without character is, no doubt, something frivolous, vain, and weak, but character without culture is, on the other hand, something raw, blind, and dangerous: the most interesting, the most truly glorious peoples, are those in which the alliance of the two has been effected most successfully, and its result spread most widely.<sup>2</sup>

The emphasis upon character does not detract from the emphasis on culture. Culture is the need of all. The poor demand it quite as much as the rich, and the rich need it quite as much as the poor. When culture is defined as the acquainting ourselves "with the best which has been thought and said in the world," it becomes plain that it is or should be made a universal possession. For securing it reading is the most effective method.

But, secondly, education is to be adjusted to the needs of persons. The education most profitable for one class of the community may not be profitable for another class. The question most impor-

<sup>2</sup>"The Popular Education of France, with Notices of that of Holland and Switzerland," p. xliii.

tant to Matthew Arnold, as to Herbert Spencer, is the question of relative worth.

Social classes in England are differentiated more highly than in any other country. Each class has its own special weakness or peril:

Far more than by the helplessness of an aristocracy whose day is fast coming to an end, far more than by the rawness of a lower class whose day is only just beginning, we are imperilled by what I call the "Philistinism" of our middle class. On the side of beauty and taste, vulgarity; on the side of morals and feeling, coarseness; on the side of mind and spirit, unintelligence—this is Philistinism.<sup>3</sup>

Now for these different classes the one common advantage to be offered is education, and education adjusted to the need of each class:

It seems to me that, for the class frequenting Eton, the grand aim of education should be to give them those good things which their birth and rearing are least likely to give them, to give them (besides mere book-learning) the notion of a sort of republican fellowship, the practice of a plain life in common, the habit of self-help. To the middle class, the grand aim of education should be to give largeness of soul and personal dignity; to the lower class, feeling, gentleness, humanity.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>"The Study of Celtic Literature," *Intr.*, ix.

<sup>4</sup>"A French Eton," p. 62.

In other words, Mr. Arnold says that education should have the element of proportion. With unusual power and discrimination he writes:

*Da mihi, Domine, scire quod sciendum est*, "Grant that the knowledge I get may be the knowledge which is worth having!"—the spirit of that prayer ought to rule our education. How little it does rule it, every discerning man will acknowledge. Life is short, and our faculties of attention and of recollection are limited; in education we proceed as if our life were endless, and our powers of attention and recollection inexhaustible. We have not time or strength to deal with half of the matters which are thrown upon our minds; they prove a useless load to us. When some one talked to Themistocles of an art of memory, he answered: "Teach me rather to forget!" The sarcasm well criticizes the fatal want of proportion between what we put into our minds and their real needs and powers.<sup>5</sup>

In particular, quoting Plato, he says to American audiences:

"An intelligent man," says Plato, "will prize those studies which result in his soul getting soberness, righteousness, and wisdom, and will less value the others." I cannot consider *that* a bad description of the aim of education, and of the motives which should govern us in the choice of studies, whether we are preparing ourselves for a hereditary seat in the English House of Lords or for the pork trade in Chicago.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Preface to Johnson's "Lives of the Poets."

<sup>6</sup> "Discourses in America," p. 78.

And at the same time, under circumstances which brought America especially near to his vision he goes on to say :

Still I admit that Plato's world was not ours, that his scorn of trade and handicraft is fantastic, that he had no conception of a great industrial community such as that of the United States, and that such a community must and will shape its education to suit its own needs. If the usual education handed down to it from the past does not suit it, it will certainly before long drop this and try another. The usual education in the past has been mainly literary. The question is whether the studies which were long supposed to be the best for all of us are practically the best now; whether others are not better. The tyranny of the past, many think, weighs on us injuriously in the predominance given to letters in education. The question is raised whether, to meet the needs of our modern life, the predominance ought not now to pass from letters to science; and naturally the question is nowhere raised with more energy than here in the United States. The design of abasing what is called "mere literary instruction and education," and of exalting what is called "sound, extensive, and practical scientific knowledge," is, in this intensely modern world of the United States, even more perhaps than in Europe, a very popular design, and makes great and rapid progress.<sup>7</sup>

But education, whether for England or for America, for the obscure or for the conspicuous, for the class of leisure or for the class of labor, is to

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

possess what Pericles calls "a happy and gracious flexibility." "A charming gift" this, and along with it go, Mr. Arnold adds:

Lucidity of thought, clearness and propriety of language, freedom from prejudice and freedom from stiffness, openness of mind, amiability of manners. . . .<sup>8</sup>

In respect to the content of education, one finds in Matthew Arnold what, on the whole, one expects to find—a keen loyalty to the scholastic tradition. His own reading of Latin and Greek was broad and accurate. He knew his Plato and his Aristotle, and among his "unapproachable favorites" were Homer and Sophocles. He was himself a Wykehamist and the son of a Wykehamist. His father was the greatest of head-masters. Three of his brothers had been at his father's school, and three of his sons he sent to Harrow. One therefore expects to find much laudation and commendation of the great classical literatures. From many passages I select the more pregnant.

In a speech made at Eton he says:

What a man seeks through his education is to get to know himself and the world; next, that for this knowledge it is before all things necessary that he acquaint himself with the best which has been thought and said in the world; finally,

<sup>8</sup>"Irish Essays" (A Speech at Eton), p. 187.

that of this *best* the classics of Greece and Rome form a very chief portion, and the portion most entirely satisfactory. With these conclusions lodged safe in one's mind, one is staunch on the side of the humanities.<sup>9</sup>

In speaking of the study of Latin in elementary schools he also says:

It may seem over-sanguine, but I hope to see Latin, also, much more used as a special subject, and even adopted, finally, as part of the regular instruction in the upper classes of all elementary schools. Of course, I mean Latin studied in a very simple way; but I am more and more struck with the stimulating and instructing effect upon a child's mind of possessing a second language, in however limited a degree, as an object of reference and comparison. Latin is the foundation of so much in the written and spoken language of modern Europe, that it is the best language to take as a second language; in our own written and book language, above all, it fills so large a part that we, perhaps, hardly know how much of their reading falls meaningless upon the eye and ear of children in our elementary schools, from their total ignorance of either Latin or a modern language derived from it. For the little of languages that can be taught in our elementary schools, it is far better to go to the root at once; and Latin, besides, is the best of all languages to learn grammar by. But it should by no means be taught as in our classical schools; far less time should be spent on the grammatical framework, and classical literature should be left quite out of view. A second language, and a language coming very largely into the vocabulary of modern nations,

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 184.



is what Latin should stand for to the teacher of an elementary school.<sup>10</sup>

He also remarks and more radically, speaking of the study of Latin as an initiation into the spirit of the ancient world:

The close appropriation of the models, which is necessary for good Latin or Greek composition, not only conduces to accurate and verbal scholarship; it may beget, besides, an intimate sense of those models, which makes us sharers of their spirit and power; and this is of the essence of true *Alterthumswissenschaft*. Herein lies the reason for giving boys more of Latin composition than of Greek, superior though the Greek literature be to the Latin; but the power of the Latin classic is in *character*, that of the Greek is in *beauty*. Now, character is capable of being taught, learnt, and assimilated; beauty hardly; and it is for enabling us to learn and catch some *power* of antiquity, that Greek or Latin composition is most to be valued. Who shall say what share the turning over and over in their mind, and masticating, so to speak, in early life as models for their Latin verse, such things as Virgil's

“Disce, puer, virtutem ex me, verumque laborem”—  
or Horace's

“Fortuna saevo læta negotio”—

has not had in forming the high spirit of the upper class in France and England, the two countries where Latin verse has most ruled the schools, and the two countries which most have had, or have, a high upper class and a high upper class

<sup>10</sup> “Reports on Elementary Schools, 1872,” p. 164.

spirit? All this is no doubt to be considered when we are judging the worth of the old school training.<sup>11</sup>

The value of the classical training is further emphasized by Mr. Arnold's reference to his own experience and observation in Germany:

Dr. Jäger, the director of the united school,—well-placed, therefore, for judging, and, as I have said, an able man,—assured me it was the universal conviction with those competent to form an opinion, that the *Realschulen* were not, at present, successful institutions. He declared that the boys in the corresponding forms of the classical school beat the *Realschule* boys in matters which both do alike, such as history, geography, the mother-tongue, and even French, though to French the *Realschule* boys devote so far more time than their comrades of the classical school. The reason for this, Dr. Jäger affirms, is that the classical training strengthens a boy's mind so much more.

This is what, as I have already said, the chief school authorities everywhere in France and Germany testify: I quote Dr. Jäger's testimony in particular, because of his ability and because of his double experience. In Switzerland you do not hear the same story, but the regnant Swiss conception of secondary instruction is, in general, not a liberal but a commercial one; not culture and training of the mind, but what will be of immediate palpable utility in some practical calling, is there the chief matter; and this cannot be admitted as the true scope of secondary instruction.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> "Higher Schools and Universities in Germany," pp. 168-169.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.

The knowing of Latin and Greek in the sense Mr. Arnold puts upon it is not something slight. It represents thoroughness of training. He says:

When we talk of knowing Greek and Roman antiquity, for instance, which is the knowledge people have called the humanities, I for my part mean a knowledge which is something more than a superficial humanism, mainly decorative. "I call all teaching *scientific*," says Wolf, the critic of Homer, "which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources. For example: a knowledge of classical antiquity is scientific when the remains of classical antiquity are correctly studied in the original languages." There can be no doubt that Wolf is perfectly right; that all learning is scientific which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources, and that a genuine humanism is scientific.

When I speak of knowing Greek and Roman antiquity, therefore, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, I mean more than a knowledge of so much vocabulary, so much grammar, so many portions of authors in the Greek and Latin languages, I mean knowing the Greeks and Romans, and their life and genius, and what they were and did in the world; what we get from them, and what is its value. That, at least, is the ideal; and when we talk of endeavouring to know Greek and Roman antiquity, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, we mean endeavouring so to know them as to satisfy this ideal, however much we may still fall short of it.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> "Discourses in America," pp. 87-89.

But while our author thus commends Latin and Greek, he is not at all blind or dumb to the value of other forms of training. He recognizes that there is a growing disbelief in Latin and Greek and a growing belief in the modern languages and the sciences as disciplines. Asked to give counsel regarding the education of a relative, he says in a paragraph which may be quoted in full:

If it is *perception* you want to cultivate in Florence you had much better take some science (botany is perhaps the best for a girl, and I know Tyndall thinks it the best of all for educational purposes), and choosing a good handbook, go regularly through it with her. Handbooks have long been the great want for teaching the natural sciences, but this want is at last beginning to be supplied, and for botany a textbook based on Henslow's "Lectures," which were excellent, has recently been published by Macmillan. I cannot see that there is much got out of learning the Latin Grammar except the mainly normal discipline of learning something much more exactly than one is made to learn anything else; and the verification of the laws of grammar, in the examples furnished by one's reading, is certainly a far less fruitful stimulus of one's powers of observation and comparison than the verification of the laws of a science like botany in the examples furnished by the world of nature before one's eyes. The sciences have been abominably taught, and by untrained people, but the moment properly trained people begin to teach them properly they fill such a want in education as that which you feel in Florence's better than either gram-

mar or mathematics, which have been forced into the service because they have been hitherto so far better studied and known. Grammar and pure mathematics will fill a much less important part in the education of the young than formerly, though the knowledge of the ancient world will continue to form a most important part in the education of mankind generally. But the way grammar is studied at present is an obstacle to this knowledge rather than a help to it, and I should be glad to see it limited to learning thoroughly the example-forms of words, and very little more—for beginners, I mean. Those who have a taste for philosophical studies may push them further, and with far more intelligible aids than our elementary grammars afterwards. So I should inflict on Florence neither Latin nor English grammar as an elaborate discipline; make her learn her French verbs very thoroughly, and do her French exercises very correctly; but do not go to grammar to cultivate in her the power you miss, but rather to science.<sup>14</sup>

In respect to the content of education Mr. Arnold again and again refers to the worth of the Bible. He believes in the educative value of the English Bible. In "A Bible Reading for Schools," he says:

Only one literature there is, one great literature, for which the people have had a preparation—the literature of the Bible. However far they may be from having a complete preparation for it, they have some; and it is the only great literature for which they have any. Their bringing up, what they have heard and talked of ever since they were born, have given them no sort of conversance with the forms, fash-

<sup>14</sup>"Letters," Vol. I., p. 364.



ions, notions, wordings, allusions, of literature having its source in Greece and Rome; but they have given them a good deal of conversance with the forms, fashions, notions, wordings, allusions, of the Bible. Zion and Babylon are their Athens and Rome, their Ida and Olympus are Tabor and Hermon, Sharon is their Tempe; these and the like Bible names can reach their imagination, kindle trains of thought and remembrance in them. The elements with which the literature of Greece and Rome conjures, have no power on them; the elements with which the literature of the Bible conjures, have. Therefore I have so often insisted, in reports to the Education Department, on the need, if from this point of view only, for the Bible in schools for the people. If poetry, philosophy, and eloquence, if what we call in one word *letters*, are a power, and a beneficent wonder-working power, in education, through the Bible only have the people much chance of getting at poetry, philosophy, and eloquence. Perhaps I may here quote what I have at former times said: "Chords of power are touched by this instruction which no other part of the instruction in a popular school reaches, and chords various, not the single religious chord only. The Bible is for the child in an elementary school almost his only contact with poetry and philosophy. What a course of eloquence and poetry (to call it by that name alone) is the Bible in a school which has and can have but little eloquence and poetry! and how much do our elementary schools lose by not having any such source as part of their school-programme. All who value the Bible may rest assured that thus to know and possess the Bible is the most certain way to extend the power and efficacy of the Bible."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> "A Bible Reading for Schools," pp. x-xi.



To the methods of education, Mr. Arnold gives much heed, and in diverse forms and ways, although not with the fullness and exactness which he devotes to the content of education. He is not a believer in the special value of rules or of methods. He did not himself use rules. A great man, his personality was his chief force. His appreciation of the worth of rules in comparison to personality may be inferred from what he says of the normal school at Haarlem :

The normal school at Haarlem became justly celebrated for its success, due to the capacity and character of its director, M. Prinsen. M. Prinsen was still at its head when M. Cousin visited Holland. He received M. Cousin at Haarlem; and the vigour of the man, and the personal nature of his influence over his pupils, is sufficiently revealed in his reply to M. Cousin's request for a copy of the regulations of his school: "I am the regulations," was M. Prinsen's answer.<sup>16</sup>

The same lesson is taught in his summary of Wolf's great rule for teaching :

Wolf's great rule in all these lessons was that rule which all masters in the art of teaching have followed—to take as little part as possible in the lesson himself; merely to start

<sup>16</sup> "The Popular Education of France, with Notices of that of Holland and Switzerland," p. 206.

it, guide it, and sum it up, and to let quite the main part in it be borne by the learners.<sup>17</sup>

It is in a word Mr. Arnold's belief that the teacher is the school, and that the teacher's own personality will make or impress the wisest methods for securing the highest results.

Although Mr. Arnold does not believe in methods as applied to the school-room, he does believe in an administration of education that shall be orderly, logical, consistent.

It is not from any love of bureaucracy that men like Wilhelm von Humboldt, ardent friends of human dignity and liberty, have had recourse to a department of State in organizing universities; it is because an Education Minister supplies you, for the discharge of certain critical functions, the agent who will perform them in the greatest blaze of daylight and with the keenest sense of responsibility. Convocation made me formerly a professor, and I am very grateful to Convocation; but Convocation is not a fit body to have the appointment of professors. It is far too numerous, and the sense of responsibility does not tell upon it strongly enough. A board is not a fit body to have the appointment of professors; men will connive at a job as members of a board who single-handed would never have perpetrated it. Even the Crown—that is, the Prime Minister—is not the fit power to have the appointment of professors; for the Prime Minister is above all a political functionary, and feels

<sup>17</sup> "Higher Schools and Universities in Germany," p. 73.

political influences overwhelmingly. An Education Minister, directly representing all the interests of learning and intelligence in this great country, a full mark for their criticism and conscious of his responsibility to them, *that* is the power to whom to give the appointment of professors, not for his own sake. but for the sake of public education.<sup>18</sup>

He believes in fact that organization is the method for securing superiority in the teaching staff:

The instruction is better in the foreign popular schools than in ours, because the teachers are better trained, and of the training of teachers I shall have to speak presently. This is the main reason of the superiority, that the teachers are better trained. But that they are better trained comes from a cause which acts for good upon the whole of education abroad, that the instruction as a whole is better organized than with us. Indeed, with us it is not, and cannot at present be organized as a whole at all, for the public administration, which deals with the popular schools, stops at those schools, and takes into its view no others. But there is an article in the constitution of Canton Zurich which well expresses the idea which prevails everywhere abroad of the organization of instruction from top to bottom as one whole: *Die höhern Lehranstalten sollen mit der Volksschule in organische Verbindung gebracht werden*; the higher establishments for teaching shall be brought into organic connexion with the popular school. And men like Wilhelm von Humboldt in Germany and Guizot or Cousin in France have been at the head of the public administration of schools in those

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 222-223.

countries, and have organized popular instruction as a part of one great system, a part in correspondence of some kind with the higher parts, and to be organized with the same seriousness, the same thorough knowledge and large views of education, the same single eye to its requirements, as the higher parts.

We may imagine the like in England if we suppose a man like Sir James Mackintosh at the head of the Education Department having to administer the public school system for intermediate and higher education as well as the popular schools, in continual intercourse with the representatives of that system as well as with representatives of the popular schools, and treating questions respecting popular instruction with a mind apt for all educational questions and conversant with them, aided, moreover, by the intercourse just spoken of. Evidently questions respecting codes and programs would then present themselves under conditions very different from the present conditions. The popular school in our country is at present considered by the minister in charge of it not at all as one stage to be co-ordered with the other stages in a great system of public schools, and to have its course surveyed and fixed from the point of view of a knower and lover of education. Not at all; the popular school is necessarily, for him, not so much an educational problem as a social and political one; as a school dealing with a few elementary matters, simple enough, and the great thing is to make the House of Commons and the public mind satisfied that value is received for the public money spent on teaching these matters. Hence the Code which governs the instruction in our popular schools. And I have always felt that objections made in the pure interest of good instruction and education to the Code had this disadvantage,

that they came before a man, often very able, but who, from his circumstances, would not and could not consider them from the point of a disinterested knower and friend of education at all, but from a point of view quite different.<sup>19</sup>

The contrast between Mr. Arnold's lack of belief in methods in the school-room and his outstanding belief in method as applied to administration—and in an administrative organization, beginning with a minister of education, who is a monarch, and running down through a Prussian system of subordinate officers—is striking and impressive.

Mr. Arnold recognizes that the teacher is, under a good system of administration, the chief or the only force. In respect to the training of teachers, he says:

They say, why demand so much learning from those who will have to impart so little?—why impose on those who will have to teach the rudiments only of knowledge to the children of the poor, an examination so wide in its range, so searching in its details?

The answer to this involves the whole question as to the training of the teachers of elementary schools. It is sufficient to say, that the plan which these objectors recommend, the plan of employing teachers whose attainments do not rise far above the level of the attainments of their scholars, has already been tried. It has been tried, and it has failed. Its

<sup>19</sup>“Special Report on Elementary Education in Germany, Switzerland, and France, 1886,” p. 15.

fruits were to be seen in the condition of elementary education throughout England, until a very recent period. It is now sufficiently clear, that the teacher to whom you give only a drudge's training, will do only a drudge's work, and will do it in a drudge's spirit: that in order to ensure good instruction even within narrow limits in a school, you must provide it with a master far superior to his scholars, with a master whose own attainments reach beyond the limits within which those of his scholars may be bounded. To form a good teacher for the simplest elementary school, a period of regular training is requisite: *this period must be filled with work. . .*<sup>20</sup>

For that outstanding element in English education, the examination, Mr. Arnold has a just condemnation. Especially does he condemn examinations conducted for men who have been preparing for them by cramming:

Examinations preceded by preparation in a first-rate superior school, with first-rate professors, give you a formed man; examinations preceded by preparation under a crammer give you a crammed man, but not a formed one. I once bore part in the examinations for the Indian Civil Service, and I can truly say that the candidates to whom I gave the highest marks were almost without exception the candidates whom I would not have appointed. They were crammed men, not formed men; the formed men were the public school men, but they were ignorant on the special matter of examination,—English literature. A superior school

<sup>20</sup> "Reports on Elementary Schools, 1855," p. 55.



forms a man at the same time that it gives him special knowledge.<sup>21</sup>

Mr. Arnold says in testing this type of training:

Attention has lately been called to the breakdown, in India, of a number of young men who had won their appointments after severe study and severe examination. No doubt the quantity of mental exertion required for examinations is often excessive, but the strain is much the more severe, because the quality and character of mental exertion required are so often injudicious. The mind is less strained the more it reacts on what it deals with, and has a native play of its own, and is creative. It is more strained the more it has to receive a number of "knowledges" passively, and to store them up to be reproduced in an examination. But to acquire a number of "knowledges," store them, and reproduce them, was what in general those candidates for Indian employment had had to do. By their success in doing this they were tested, and the examination turned on it. In old days examinations mainly turned upon Latin and Greek composition. Composition in the dead languages is now wholly out of favor, and I by no means say that it is a sufficient test for candidates for Indian employment. But I will say that the character and quality of mental exertion required for it is more healthy than the character and quality of exertion required for receiving and storing a number of "knowledges."<sup>22</sup>

In a brief and comprehensive word, it is to be said that Mr. Arnold believes the great benefit of

<sup>21</sup> "A French Eton," p. 412.

<sup>22</sup> "Reports on Elementary Schools, 1882," p. 256.

education lies in the elevation of the mind and feelings. This is "the unspeakable benefit." He believes that the humanizing touch is the greatest and most precious worth. This worth is especially emphasized in the schools of Germany. There he finds "the children human." He says in detail:

They had been brought under teaching of a quality to touch and interest them, and were being formed by it. The fault of the teaching in our popular schools at home is, as I have often said, that it is so little formative; it gives the children the power to read the newspapers, to write a letter, to cast accounts, and gives them a certain number of pieces of knowledge, but it does little to touch their nature for good and to mould them. You hear often people of the richer class in England wishing that they and their children were as well educated as the children of an elementary school; they mean that they wish they wrote as good a hand, worked sums as rapidly and correctly, and had as many facts of geography at command; but they suppose themselves retaining all the while the fuller cultivation of taste and feeling which is their advantage and their children's advantage over the pupils of the elementary school at present, and they forget that it is within the power of the popular school, and should be its aim, to do much for this cultivation, although our schools accomplish for it so very little. The excellent maxim of that true friend of education, the German school-master, John Comenius, "The aim is to train generally all who are born to all which is human," does in some considerable degree govern the proceedings of popular schools in

German countries, and now in France also, but in England hardly at all.<sup>23</sup>

He says comprehensively :

The aim and office of instruction, say many people, is to make a man a good citizen, or a good Christian, or a gentleman; or it is to fit him to get on in the world, or it is to enable him to do his duty in that state of life to which he is called. It is none of these, and the modern spirit more and more discerns it to be none of these. These are at best secondary and indirect aims of instruction; its prime direct aim is to enable a man *to know himself and the world.*<sup>24</sup>

And he adds in conclusion :

As our public instruction gets a clearer view of its own functions, of the relations of the human spirit to knowledge, and of the entire circle of knowledge, it will certainly more learn to awaken in its pupils an interest in that entire circle, and less allow them to remain total strangers to any part of it. Still, the circle is so vast and human faculties are so limited, that it is for the most part through a single aptitude, or group of aptitudes, that each individual will really get his access to intellectual life and vital knowledge; and it is by effectually directing these aptitudes on definite points of the circle, that he will really obtain his comprehension of the whole.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> "Special Report on Elementary Education in Germany, Switzerland, and France, 1886," p. 14.

<sup>24</sup> "Higher Schools and Universities in Germany," p. 154.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157.

As I write the closing paragraph of this chapter, I find hanging before me a picture of Matthew Arnold. It is a strong, calm, serious, solemn face, touched with semi-melancholy. It is as if the effort to see life sanely and to see it whole were too heavy, or as if, having seen life, the inevitable result were depression of soul. Yet the face thus set forth is not quite a true exponent of the man. For Matthew Arnold had much of the Greek's joyousness in life, much of the French lucidity and delicacy of taste, much of the Englishman's solidity and patience. A critic of life, he sought through his criticisms to minister to his nation's well-being. An interpreter of religion, he endeavored to make the Christian faith more rational without causing it to lose its spirit of devotion. A poet, his verses are, though carefully wrought in his own tongue, bathed in the Attic dew. An inspector of schools, he tried to make education of every sort a more efficient instrument of genuine culture and of noble joyousness. If his father was the most outstanding school master of the early years of the Victorian period, he himself was in its later decades an expositor of commanding comprehensiveness, of definite criticism, of charming persuasiveness and of quickening enthusiasms.

## VII

### EDUCATION ACCORDING TO JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

**I**N an inconspicuous private library hang photographs of two great portraits. One shows a man of twenty-five, having a face regular in outline, full and fair, content without self-satisfaction, with eyes direct and alert, with hair, regularly laid, brushed back from a high intellectual forehead, with lips set firmly and yet without any suspicion of obstinacy, with chin strong, yet free from any undue assertiveness, with head resting well poised on a neck straight and strong, and over all a radiant atmosphere of hopefulness, of sunshine, of force, of poise, and of elevation. In the other portrait is seen an old man of four score years, with face thin and worn, the cheeks fallen in, the eyes, sunken back into their sockets, patiently looking out into some indefinite unknown, locks of hair few, irregular, scattered, the chin receding and the chest retreating, and over all a dark, dull atmosphere of depression, dejection and disappointment, "dull, monotonous, unprofitable, hopeless," though the

robe of a cardinal rests on the narrow and thin shoulders and though the ring of a cardinal is on the hand which grasps the crosier which seems rather the crutch of support than a symbol of authority or of power. The one picture recalls the portrait of Titian's "Young Nobleman," yet having an intellectual and moral virility of which the nobleman never dreamed. The other recalls the portrait of Voltaire, the aged, without the intellectual activity, acquisitiveness and alertness, which the great Frenchman possessed.

Between the time of these two portraits—for they each bear the one name of John Henry Newman—lies a life of high distinction, of manifold and diverse achievements, which is still one of the enigmas of biographic interpretation.

Yet, interpretations, moving and keen, have been essayed, and their diversity illustrates the enigmatic quality of this outstanding life and career. To some, Newman is a religious philosopher like Pascal, to others, a mystic like Fénelon. To one, like Lord Morley, he is simply a master of English style and not to be considered as a thinker. To some, like certain German critics, he is an ecclesiastic and theologian, a writer concerned with theory and development in dogma; and to others, like



Dean Stanley, he belongs to the literature of all time. He himself illustrates what his biographer has said:

That the same object may be seen by different onlookers under aspects so various and partial as to make their views, from their inadequacy, appear occasionally even contradictory.<sup>1</sup>

Yet in a still different light lies our task, of interpreting Newman as an educationist. For, in a word, what is education according to John Henry Newman?

The answer to this fundamental question can be made for him by seeking out his interpretation of the human reason, its nature, character, possibilities and limitations.

In one of his great sermons—sermons which have the lyric element as a superlative excellence—he says:

Reason is that faculty of the mind by which knowledge of things external to us, of beings, facts and events, is attained beyond the range of sense. It ascertains for us not natural things only, or immaterial only, or present only, or past, or future; but, even if limited in its power, it is unlimited in its range, viewed as a faculty, though, of course, in individuals it varies in range also. It reaches to the ends of the uni-

<sup>1</sup>“The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman,” by Wilfrid Ward, Vol. I., p. 2.

verse, and to the throne of God beyond them; it brings us knowledge, whether clear or uncertain, still knowledge, in whatever degree of perfection, from every side; but, at the same time, with this characteristic, that it obtains it indirectly, not directly.

Reason does not really perceive any thing; but it is a faculty of proceeding from things that are perceived to things which are not; the existence of which it certifies to us on the hypothesis of something else being known to exist, in other words, being assumed to be true. . . .

Reason is the faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception, or of ascertaining one thing by means of another. In this way it is able, from small beginnings, to create to itself a world of ideas, which do or do not correspond to the things themselves for which they stand, or are true or not, according as it is exercised soundly or otherwise. One fact may suffice for a whole theory; one principle may create and sustain a system; one minute token is a clue to a large discovery. The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then falling back on some received law; next seizing on testimony; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to teach another. It is not too much to say that the stepping by which great

geniuses scale the mountains of truth is as unsafe and precarious to men in general, as the ascent of a skilful mountaineer up a literal crag. It is a way which they alone can take; and its justification lies in their success. And such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason,—not by rule, but by an inward faculty.<sup>2</sup>

In another sermon, he, with great significance, interprets still further:

Philosophy is Reason exercised upon Knowledge; for, from the nature of the case, where the facts are given, as is here supposed, Reason is synonymous with analysis, having no office beyond that of ascertaining the relations existing between them. Reason is the power of proceeding to new ideas by means of given ones.<sup>3</sup>

Yet this faculty of reason is to be used in wisdom, in faith and through the gracious help of God himself. The piety of reason is voiced in this prayer:

O gracious and merciful God, Father of Lights, I humbly pray and beseech Thee, that in all my exercises of Reason, Thy gift, I may use it, as Thou wouldst have me use it, in the obedience of Faith, with a view to Thy Glory, with an aim at Thy Truth, in dutiful submission to Thy Will, for the comfort of Thine elect, for the edification of Holy Jerusalem, Thy Church, and in recollection of Thine own solemn warning: "Every idle word that men shall speak, they shall

<sup>2</sup> "Oxford University Sermons," pp. 206, 256.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 290.

give an account thereof in the day of judgment; for by thy words, thou shalt be justified, and by thy words, thou shalt be condemned." <sup>4</sup>

The reason of man is to be trained and formed; and this training and discipline will manifest themselves in certain unique intellectual methods and conditions.

When the intellect has once been properly trained and formed to have a connected view or grasp of things, it will display its powers with more or less effect according to its particular quality and capacity in the individual. In the case of most men it makes itself felt in the good sense, sobriety of thought, reasonableness, candour, self-command, and steadiness of view, which characterize it. In some it will have developed habits of business, power of influencing others, and sagacity. In others it will elicit the talent of philosophical speculation, and lead the mind forward to eminence in this or that intellectual department. In all it will be a faculty of entering with comparative ease into any subject of thought, and of taking up with aptitude any science or profession. <sup>5</sup>

The first step in intellectual training is to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule and exception, of richness and harmony. This is commonly and excellently done by making him begin with Grammar; nor can too great accuracy, or minuteness and subtlety of teaching be used towards him, as his faculties expand, with this simple purpose. Hence it is that

<sup>4</sup> Ward's, "Life of," etc., Vol. II., pp. 364-365.

<sup>5</sup> "The Idea of a University," Preface, pp. xvii-xviii.

critical scholarship is so important a discipline for him when he is leaving school for the University. A second science is the Mathematics: this should follow Grammar, still with the same object, viz., to give him a conception of development and arrangement from and around a common centre. Hence it is that Chronology and Geography are so necessary for him, when he reads History, which is otherwise little better than a story-book. Hence, too, Metrical Composition, when he reads Poetry; in order to stimulate his powers into action in every practicable way, and to prevent a merely passive reception of images and ideas which in that case are likely to pass out of the mind as soon as they have entered it. Let him once gain this habit of method, of starting from fixed points, of making his ground good as he goes, of distinguishing what he knows from what he does not know, and I conceive he will be gradually initiated into the largest and truest philosophical views, and will feel nothing but impatience and disgust at the random theories and imposing sophistries and dashing paradoxes, which carry away half-formed and superficial intellects.\*

The education thus secured we denominate "liberal" because it sets the reason free, making it at home in every intellectual zone. The man who has such a training

apprehends the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its shades, its great points and its little, as he otherwise cannot apprehend them. Hence it is that his education is called

\* *Ibid.*, pp. xix-xx.

“Liberal.” A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are, freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom.<sup>7</sup>

It is common to speak of “*liberal* knowledge,” of the “*liberal* arts and studies,” and of a “*liberal* education,” as the especial characteristic or property of a University and of a gentleman; what is really meant by the word? Now, first, in its grammatical sense it is opposed to *servile*; and by “servile work” is understood, as our catechisms inform us, bodily labour, mechanical employment, and the like, in which the mind has little or no part. Parallel to such servile works are those arts, if they deserve the name, of which the poet speaks, which owe their origin and their method to hazard, not to skill; as, for instance, the practice and operations of an empiric. As far as this contrast may be considered as a guide into the meaning of the word, liberal education and liberal pursuits are exercises of mind, of reason, of reflection.

But we want something more for its explanation, for there are bodily exercises which are liberal, and mental exercises which are not so. For instance, in ancient times the practitioners in medicine were commonly slaves; yet it was an art as intellectual in its nature, in spite of the pretence, fraud, and quackery with which it might then, as now, be debased, as it was heavenly in its aim. And so in like manner, we contrast a liberal education with a commercial education or a professional; yet no one can deny that commerce and the professions afford scope for the highest and most diversified powers of mind. There is then a great variety of intellectual exercises, which are not technically called “liberal”; on the other hand, I say, there are exercises of the body

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.



which do receive that appellation. Such, for instance, was the palaestra, in ancient times; such the Olympic games, in which strength and dexterity of body as well as of mind gained the prize. In Xenophon we read of the young Persian nobility being taught to ride on horseback and to speak the truth; both being among the accomplishments of a gentleman. War, too, however rough a profession, has ever been accounted liberal, unless in cases when it becomes heroic, which would introduce us to another subject.<sup>8</sup>

The principle of real dignity in Knowledge, its worth, its desirableness, considered irrespectively of its results, is this germ within it of a scientific or a philosophical process. This is how it comes to be an end in itself; this is why it admits of being called Liberal. Not to know the relative disposition of things is the state of slaves or children; to have mapped out the Universe is the boast, or at least the ambition, of Philosophy... .

When, then, we speak of the communication of Knowledge as being Education, we thereby really imply that that Knowledge is a state or condition of mind; and since cultivation of mind is surely worth seeking for its own sake, we are thus brought once more to the conclusion, which the word "Liberal" and the word "Philosophy" have already suggested, that there is a Knowledge, which is desirable, though nothing comes of it, as being of itself a treasure, and a sufficient remuneration of years of labour.<sup>9</sup>

Such an education has tremendous significances for the individual man and for the race :

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 113, 114.

One main portion of intellectual education, of the labours of both school and university, is to remove the original dimness of the mind's eye; to strengthen and perfect its vision; to enable it to look out into the world right forward, steadily and truly; to give the mind clearness, accuracy, precision; to enable it to use words aright, to understand what it says, to conceive justly what it thinks about, to abstract, compare, analyze, divide, define, and reason, correctly. There is a particular science which takes these matters in hand, and it is called logic; but it is not by logic, certainly not by logic alone, that the faculty I speak of is acquired. The infant does not learn to spell and read the hues upon his retina by any scientific rule; nor does the student learn accuracy of thought by any manual or treatise. The instruction given him, of whatever kind, if it be really instruction, is mainly, or at least pre-eminently, this,—a discipline in accuracy of mind.<sup>10</sup>

The reason of man, thus disciplined, is not simply a thinking machine: it is far other than mechanical. It

does manifest itself in a courtesy, propriety, and polish of word and action, which is beautiful in itself, and acceptable to others; but it does much more. It brings the mind into form,—for the mind is like the body. Boys outgrow their shape and their strength; their limbs have to be knit together, and their constitution needs tone. Mistaking animal spirits for vigour, and overconfident in their health, ignorant what they can bear and how to manage themselves, they are immoderate and extravagant; and fall into sharp sicknesses. This is

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 332.

an emblem of their minds; at first they have no principles laid down within them as a foundation for the intellect to build upon; they have no discriminating convictions, and no grasp of consequences.<sup>11</sup>

But perhaps the most comprehensive result of a liberal education lies in the enlargement of the mind of man. In sermon as well as in essay Newman refers to this precious consequence.

However, a very little consideration will make it plain also, that knowledge itself, though a condition of the mind's enlargement, yet, whatever be its range, is not that very thing which enlarges it. Rather the foregoing instances show that this enlargement consists in the comparison of the subjects of knowledge one with another. We feel ourselves to be ranging freely, when we not only learn something, but when we also refer it to what we knew before. It is not the mere addition to our knowledge which is the enlargement, but the change of place, the movement onwards, of that moral centre, to which what we know and what we have been acquiring, the whole mass of our knowledge, as it were, gravitates. And therefore a philosophical cast of thought, or a comprehensive mind, or wisdom in conduct or policy, implies a connected view of the old with the new; an insight into the bearing and influence of each part upon every other; without which there is no whole, and could be no centre. It is the knowledge, not only of things, but of their mutual relations. It is organized, and therefore living knowledge.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, Preface, p. xvi.

<sup>12</sup> "Oxford University Sermons," p. 287.

Narrow minds have no power of throwing themselves into the minds of others. They have stiffened in one position, as limbs of the body subjected to confinement, or as our organs of speech, which after a while cannot learn new tones and inflections. They have already parcelled out to their own satisfaction the whole world of knowledge; they have drawn their lines, and formed their classes, and given to each opinion, argument, principle, and party, its own locality; they profess to know where to find every thing; and they cannot learn any other disposition. They are vexed at new principles of arrangement, and grow giddy amid cross divisions; and, even if they make the effort, cannot master them. They think that any one truth excludes another which is distinct from it, and that every opinion is contrary to their own opinions which is not included in them. They cannot separate words from their own ideas, and ideas from their own associations; and if they attain any new view of a subject, it is but for a moment. They catch it one moment, and let it go the next; and then impute to subtlety in it, or obscurity in its expression, what really arises from their own want of elasticity or vigour. And when they attempt to describe it in their own language, their nearest approximation to it is a mistake; not from any purpose to be unjust, but because they are expressing the ideas of another mind, as it were, in translation.<sup>13</sup>

The enlargement consists, not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 307-308.

a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or, to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought; and without this no enlargement is said to follow. There is no enlargement, unless there be a comparison of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding *then*, when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already. It is not the mere addition to our knowledge that is the illumination; but the locomotion, the movement onwards, of that mental centre, to which both what we know, and what we are learning, the accumulating mass of our acquirements, gravitates.<sup>14</sup>

Knowledge then is the indispensable condition of expansion of mind, and the instrument of attaining to it; this cannot be denied, it is ever to be insisted on; I begin with it as a first principle; however, the very truth of it carries men too far, and confirms to them the notion that it is the whole of the matter. A narrow mind is thought to be that which contains little knowledge; and an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal; and what seems to put the matter beyond dispute is, the fact of the great number of studies which are pursued in a University, by its very profession.<sup>15</sup>

To give this liberal education, set forth thus in noblest and happy phrase and comprehensive and inspiring paragraph, is the primary purpose of a university. Its business is to make the mind a

<sup>14</sup> "The Idea of a University," p. 134.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 129.

freeman of every nation, a happy citizen in every intellectual zone.

This process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture, is called Liberal Education; and though there is no one in whom it is carried as far as is conceivable, or whose intellect would be a pattern of what intellects should be made, yet there is scarcely any one but may gain an idea of what real training is, and at least look towards it, and make its true scope and result, not something else, his standard of excellence; and numbers there are who may submit themselves to it, and secure it to themselves in good measure. And to set forth the right standard, and to train according to it, and to help forward all students towards it according to their various capacities, this I conceive to be the business of a University.<sup>10</sup>

In giving such an education, the university, of course, is to provide a broad and general, not a technical, knowledge. Newman says:

Here are two methods of Education; the end of the one is to be philosophical, of the other to be mechanical; the one rises towards general ideas, the other is exhausted upon what is particular and external. Let me not be thought to deny the necessity, or to decry the benefit, of such attention to what is particular and practical, as belongs to the useful or me-

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.



chanical arts; life could not go on without them; we owe our daily welfare to them; their exercise is the duty of the many, and we owe to the many a debt of gratitude for fulfilling that duty. I only say that Knowledge, in proportion as it tends more and more to be particular, ceases to be Knowledge. It is a question whether Knowledge can in any proper sense be predicated of the brute creation; without pretending to metaphysical exactness of phraseology, which would be unsuitable to an occasion like this, I say, it seems to me improper to call that passive sensation, or perception of things, which brutes seem to possess, by the name of Knowledge. When I speak of Knowledge, I mean something intellectual, something which grasps what it perceives through the senses; something which takes a view of things; which sees more than the senses convey; which reasons upon what it sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an idea. It expresses itself, not in a mere enunciation, but by an enthymeme: it is of the nature of science from the first, and in this consists its dignity.<sup>17</sup>

And so as regards intellectual culture, I am far from denying utility in this large sense as the end of Education, when I lay it down, that the culture of the intellect is a good in itself and its own end; I do not exclude from the idea of intellectual culture what it cannot but be, from the very nature of things; I only deny that we must be able to point out, before we have any right to call it useful, some art, or business, or profession, or trade, or work, as resulting from it, and as its real and complete end. The parallel is exact:—As the body may be sacrificed to some manual or other toil, whether moderate or oppressive, so may the intel-

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 112–113.

lect be devoted to some specific profession; and I do not call *this* the culture of the intellect. Again, as some member or organ of the body may be inordinately used and developed, so may memory, or imagination, or the reasoning faculty; and *this* again is not intellectual culture. On the other hand, as the body may be tended, cherished, and exercised with a simple view to its general health, so may the intellect also be generally exercised in order to its perfect state; and *this is* its cultivation.

Again, as health ought to precede labour of the body, and as a man in health can do what an unhealthy man cannot do, and as of this health the properties are strength, energy, agility, graceful carriage and action, manual dexterity, and endurance of fatigue, so in like manner general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study, and educated men can do what illiterate cannot; and the man who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyze, who has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, will not indeed at once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or a statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or a man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or a chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings I have referred to, or any other for which he has a taste or special talent, with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger. In this sense then, and as yet I have said but a very few words on a large subject, mental culture is emphatically *useful*.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

The task, therefore, of founding and carrying forward a university is among the noblest which can engage the powers of man :

To set on foot and to maintain in life and vigour a real University, is confessedly, as soon as the word "University" is understood, one of those greatest works, great in their difficulty and their importance, on which are deservedly expended the rarest intellects and the most varied endowments. For, first of all, it professes to teach whatever has to be taught in any whatever department of human knowledge, and it embraces in its scope the loftiest subjects of human thought, and the richest fields of human inquiry. Nothing is too vast, nothing too subtle, nothing too distant, nothing too minute, nothing too discursive, nothing too exact, to engage its attention.<sup>19</sup>

This, Gentlemen, is why I say that to erect a University is at once so arduous and beneficial an undertaking, viz., because it is pledged to admit, without fear, without prejudice, without compromise, all comers, if they come in the name of Truth; to adjust views, and experiences, and habits of mind the most independent and dissimilar; and to give full play to thought and erudition in their most original forms, and their most intense expressions, and in their most ample circuit. Thus to draw many things into one, is its special function; and it learns to do it, not by rules reducible to writing. but by sagacity, wisdom, and forbearance, acting upon a profound insight into the subject-matter of knowledge, and by a vigilant repression of aggression or bigotry in any quarter.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 457.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 458.

What an empire is in political history, such is a University in the sphere of philosophy and research. It is, as I have said, the high protecting power of all knowledge and science, of fact and principle, of inquiry and discovery, of experiment and speculation; it maps out the territory of the intellect, and sees that the boundaries of each province are religiously respected, and that there is neither encroachment nor surrender on any side. It acts as umpire between truth and truth, and, taking into account the nature and importance of each, assigns to all their due order of precedence. It maintains no one department of thought exclusively, however ample and noble; and it sacrifices none. It is deferential and loyal, according to their respective weight, to the claims of literature, of physical research, of history, of metaphysics, of theological science. It is impartial towards them all, and promotes each in its own place and for its own object.<sup>21</sup>

The sum of the work of a university on its human side may be said to be that:

Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman. It is well to be a gentleman, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life;—these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge; they are the objects of a University.<sup>22</sup>

In one of the greatest of all passages of literature Newman sums up the purpose and service of a university in his interpretation of a gentleman:

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 459.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

It is almost a definition of a gentleman to say he is one who never inflicts pain. This description is both refined and, as far as it goes, accurate. He is mainly occupied in merely removing the obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those about him; and he concurs with their movements rather than takes the initiative himself. His benefits may be considered as parallel to what are called comforts or conveniences in arrangements of a personal nature: like an easy chair or a good fire, which do their part in dispelling cold and fatigue, though nature provides both means of rest and animal heat without them. The true gentleman in like manner carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast;—all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment; his great concern being to make every one at their ease and at home. He has his eyes on all his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conversation, and never wearisome. He makes light of favours while he does them, and seems to be receiving when he is conferring. He never speaks of himself except when compelled, never defends himself by a mere retort, he has no ears for slander or gossip, is scrupulous in imputing motives to those who interfere with him, and interprets everything for the best. He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments, or insinuates evil which he dare not say out. From a long-sighted prudence, he observes the maxim of the ancient sage, that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our enemy as if he were one

day to be our friend. He has too much good sense to be affronted at insults, he is too well employed to remember injuries, and too indolent to bear malice. He is patient, forbearing, and resigned, on philosophical principles; he submits to pain, because it is inevitable, to bereavement, because it is irreparable, and to death, because it is his destiny. If he engages in controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the blundering discourtesy of better, perhaps, but less educated minds; who, like blunt weapons, tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mistake the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, misconceive their adversary, and leave the question more involved than they find it. He may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too clear-headed to be unjust; he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief as he is decisive. Nowhere shall we find greater candour, consideration, indulgence: he throws himself into the minds of his opponents, he accounts for their mistakes. He knows the weakness of human reason as well as its strength, its province and its limits. If he be an unbeliever, he will be too profound and large-minded to ridicule religion or to act against it; he is too wise to be a dogmatist or fanatic in his infidelity. He respects piety and devotion; he even supports institutions as venerable, beautiful, or useful, to which he does not assent; he honours the ministers of religion, and it contents him to decline its mysteries without assailing or denouncing them. He is a friend of religious toleration, and that, not only because his philosophy has taught him to look on all forms of faith with an impartial eye, but also from the gentleness and effeminacy of feeling, which is the attendant on civilization.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 208–210.



A liberal education, the giving of which is the peculiar and beautiful purpose of a university, represents activity of the intellectual forces of man. With charming irony Newman discourses on securing such an education without money and without the price of toil.

Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing. There is to be nothing individual in it; and this, for sooth, is the wonder of the age. What the steam engine does with matter, the printing press is to do with mind; it is to act mechanically, and the population is to be passively, almost unconsciously enlightened, by the mere multiplication and dissemination of volumes. Whether it be the school boy, or the school girl, or the youth at college, or the mechanic in the town, or the politician in the senate, all have been the victims in one way or other of this most preposterous and pernicious of delusions. Wise men have lifted up their voices in vain; and at length, lest their own institutions should be outshone and should disappear in the folly of the hour, they have been obliged, as far as they could with a good conscience, to humour a spirit which they could not withstand, and make temporizing concessions at which they could not but inwardly smile.<sup>24</sup>

And yet learning is not to be made a mechanical process, but an unconscious growth and vital absorption of forces.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

I protest to you, Gentlemen, that if I had to choose between a so-called University, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a University which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years, and then sent them away as the University of Oxford is said to have done some sixty years since, if I were asked which of these two methods was the better discipline of the intellect,—mind, I do not say which is *morally* the better, for it is plain that compulsory study must be a good and idleness an intolerable mischief,—but if I must determine which of the two courses was the more successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men the more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, men of the world, men whose names would descend to posterity, I have no hesitation in giving the preference to that University which did nothing, over that which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun.<sup>25</sup>

In this educative process, the learned cardinal gives an exalted place to religion. Religion represents the greatest thoughts which influence or instruct the mind and the noblest emotions which fill the heart. To persons who are said to be uneducated religion seems often to give an enlargement of the mind which is nothing less than a liberal

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

education. The new birth of the heart produces an intellectual new birth.

It is often remarked of uneducated persons, who hitherto have lived without seriousness, that on their turning to God, looking into themselves, regulating their hearts, reforming their conduct, and studying the inspired Word, they seem to become, in point of intellect, different beings from what they were before. Before, they took things as they came, and thought no more of one thing than of another. But now every event has a meaning; they form their own estimate of whatever occurs; they recollect times and seasons; and the world, instead of being like the stream which the countryman gazed on, ever in motion and never in progress, is a various and complicated drama, with parts and with an object.<sup>26</sup>

The education which is given by religion, or which is given in the atmosphere of the institutions of religion, is still to be free and liberal. Ward quotes a remark of the cardinal made in his first university sermon in Dublin, to the effect:

Some persons will say that I am thinking of confining, distorting, and stunting the growth of the intellect by ecclesiastical supervision. I have no such thought. Nor have I any thought of a compromise, as if religion must give up something, and science something. I wish the intellect to range with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy an equal freedom; but what I am stipulating for is, that they

<sup>26</sup> "Oxford University Sermons," p. 285.

should be found in one and the same place, and exemplified in the same persons. I want to destroy that diversity of centres which puts everything into confusion by creating a contrariety of influences. I wish the same spots and the same individuals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion. I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual.<sup>27</sup>

Newman believes that the Catholic church should have colleges for its own members. The Dublin experiment, even though it proved to be a failure, testifies to the sincerity of his deep conviction.

As to Oxford and Cambridge, it is quite plain that the Church *ought* to have Schools (Universities) of her own. She can in Ireland—she can't in England, a Protestant country. How are you to prepare young Catholics for taking part in life, in filling stations in a Protestant country as England, without going to the English Universities? Impossible. Either then refuse to let Catholics avail themselves of these privileges, of going into Parliament, of taking their seat in the House of Lords, of becoming Lawyers, Commissioners, etc. etc. *or* let them go *there, where alone* they will be able to put themselves on a par with Protestants. Argument the 1st.

2. They will get more harm in London life than at Oxford or Cambridge. A boy of 19 goes to some London office, with no restraint—he goes at that age to Oxford or Cambridge, and is at least under *some* restraint.

3. Why are you not consistent, and forbid him to go into

<sup>27</sup> Ward's "Life of," etc., Vol. I., p. 395.

the Army? why don't you forbid him to go to such an "Academy" at Woolwich? He may get at Woolwich as much harm in his faith and morals as at the Universities.

4. There are *two* sets at Oxford. What Fr. B. says of the good set being *small*, is bosh. At least I have a right to know better than he. What can he know about my means of knowledge? I was Tutor (in a very rowing College, and was one of those who changed its character). I was Dean of discipline—I was Pro-proctor. The good set was not a small set—tho' it varied in number in different colleges.<sup>28</sup>

Literature, moreover, as well as religion, bears a close relation to the higher education. Of literature, in a characteristic passage, this master of style says:

If a literature be, as I have said, the voice of a particular nation, it requires a territory and a period, as large as that nation's extent and history, to mature in. It is broader and deeper than the capacity of any body of men, however gifted, or any system of teaching, however true. It is the exponent, not of truth, but of nature, which is true only in its elements. It is the result of the mutual action of a hundred simultaneous influences and operations, and the issue of a hundred strange accidents in independent places and times; it is the scanty compensating produce of the wild discipline of the world and of life, so fruitful in failures; and it is the concentration of those rare manifestations of intellectual power which no one can account for. It is made up, in the particular language here under consideration, of human beings as

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II., p. 70.

heterogeneous as Burns and Bunyan, De Foe and Johnson, Goldsmith and Cowper, Law and Fielding, Scott and Byron. The remark has been made that the history of an author is the history of his works; it is far more exact to say that, at least in the case of great writers, the history of their works is the history of their fortunes or their times. Each is, in his turn, the man of his age, the type of a generation, or the interpreter of a crisis. He is made for his day, and his day for him. Hooker would not have been, but for the existence of Catholics and Puritans, the defeat of the former and the rise of the latter; Clarendon would not have been without the Great Rebellion; Hobbes is the prophet of the reaction to scoffing infidelity; and Addison is the child of the Revolution and its attendant changes. If there be any of our classical authors, who might at first sight have been pronounced a University man, with the exception of Johnson, Addison is he; yet even Addison, the son and brother of clergymen, the fellow of an Oxford Society, the resident of a College which still points to the walk which he planted, must be something more, in order to take his place among the Classics of the language, and owed the variety of his matter to his experience of life, and to the call made on his resources by the exigencies of his day. The world he lived in made him and used him. While his writings educated his own generation, they have delineated it for all posterity after him.<sup>29</sup>

In the appreciation of literature, and also as helpful in writing, Newman made some notes in the year 1868. They are perhaps no less useful in

<sup>29</sup> "The Idea of a University," p. 311.



1916 and for general purposes, though they were made primarily on the writing of sermons:

1. A man should be in earnest, by which I mean he should write not for the sake of writing, but to bring out his thoughts.

2. He should never aim at being eloquent.

3. He should keep his idea in view, and should write sentences over and over again till he has expressed his meaning accurately, forcibly, and in few words.

4. He should aim at being understood by his hearers or readers.

5. He should use words which are likely to be understood. Ornament and amplification will come spontaneously in due time, but he should never seek them.

6. He must creep before he can fly, by which I mean that humility which is a great Christian virtue has a place in literary composition.

7. He who is ambitious will never write well, but he who tries to say simply what he feels, what religion demands, what faith teaches, what the Gospel promises, will be eloquent without intending it, and will write better English than if he made a study of English literature.<sup>30</sup>

In this relation it may not be amiss to quote his remark in respect to the hardship he found in his own writing. The remark illustrates the old truth that hard writing makes easy reading.

If I had my way I should give myself up to verse-making; it is nearly the only kind of composition which is not a

<sup>30</sup> Ward's "Life of," etc., Vol. II., p. 335.

trouble to me, but I have never had time. As to my prose volumes, I have scarcely written any one without an external stimulus; their composition has been to me, in point of pain, a mental childbearing, and I have been accustomed to say to myself: "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children."<sup>31</sup>

Thus writes Newman of the nature of the human reason as touched by the liberalizing force of education. His interpretations are among the most moving ever given to the mind of a man to offer to his fellows. Education, he says, further, is a social process. His objections, therefore, to solitary self-education are weighty, and it may be added, timely:

Nay, self-education in any shape, in the most restricted sense, is preferable to a system of teaching which, professing so much, really does so little for the mind. Shut your College gates against the votary of knowledge, throw him back upon the searchings and the efforts of his own mind; he will gain by being spared an entrance into your Babel. Few indeed there are who can dispense with the stimulus and support of instructors, or will do anything at all, if left to themselves. And fewer still (though such great minds are to be found), who will not, from such unassisted attempts, contract a self-reliance and a self-esteem, which are not only moral evils, but serious hindrances to the attainment of truth. And next to none, perhaps, or none, who will not be reminded from time to time of the disadvantage under

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204.

which they lie, by their imperfect grounding, by the breaks, deficiencies, and irregularities of their knowledge, by the eccentricity of opinion and the confusion of principle which they exhibit. They will be too often ignorant of what every one knows and takes for granted, of that multitude of small truths which fall upon the mind like dust, impalpable and ever accumulating; they may be unable to converse, they may argue perversely, they may pride themselves on their worst paradoxes or their grossest truisms, they may be full of their own mode of viewing things, unwilling to be put out of their way, slow to enter into the minds of others;—but, with these and whatever other liabilities upon their heads, they are likely to have more thought, more mind, more philosophy, more true enlargement, than those earnest but ill-used persons, who are forced to load their minds with a score of subjects against an examination, who have too much on their hands to indulge themselves in thinking or investigation, who devour premiss and conclusion together with indiscriminate greediness, who hold whole sciences on faith, and commit demonstrations to memory, and who too often, as might be expected, when their period of education is passed, throw up all they have learned in disgust, having gained nothing really by their anxious labours, except perhaps the habit of application.<sup>32</sup>

In Newman, the ecclesiastic, the scholar, the writer, the educationist, are united apparently contradictory principles and methods of thought. A cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, he yet was for a time a rector of the University of his Church and as rector was obliged to secure for young men

<sup>32</sup> "The Idea of a University," pp. 148-149.

a rational point of view of the fundamental disciplines, of scholarship, and of learning. Noble were the pleas and strong the arguments which this ecclesiastic made for intellectual freedom within academic walls. He sought in practice and in writing to reconcile scientific research with theological development. He wished to create in the same personalities able thinkers and loyal Roman Catholic believers. He sought within the same academic hall to erect the altar of faith and the chemical laboratory. He desired to create and to nurture a religious education which should be liberal and liberalizing to the minds of the students, and also to promote a liberal education which should confirm their belief in the traditions and doctrines of his historic Church. He tried to do what many today would declare cannot be done. But his interpretations of the educational and religious conditions attending his endeavors are full of meaning, and his whole conception of the nature and functions, of the purposes and results, of that educational process is pregnant with lasting lessons to the mind and the conscience of man.

## VIII

### EDUCATION ACCORDING TO GOETHE

GOETHE was the most universal mind of his time—and his time was long and significant—and one of the universal minds of any period. His is a unique place like that belonging to Leonardo da Vinci and Bruno. If one does not feel quite free to apply to him the words which are applied to Socrates in the last paragraph of *Phaedo*, “the wisest, justest and best of all the men whom I have ever known,” one can at least say that his was one of the most human and humanistic lives lived in all the centuries.

The main currents of Goethe’s development were fed by three great springs, the Greek, the Christian, and the modern search for natural truth and law. From the first came his serenity, from the second his joy, and from the third, his rapture in revelation. Natural law he held to be divine law. Pursuing the middle course in life, he was free from the fantastic and eccentric, and he embodied the moderation which lies between original un-

restrained nature, and the artificial restricted life of man. The light of wisdom burned for him throughout his journey. He had a clear eye for the concrete, the actual, the living. Truth and duty rested over him and his great career as a nimbus.

The universality of his relationship emerges in the place of his birth as well as in more personal conditions and forces. Frankfort in the year 1749 and the years following his birth was a mediæval fortress, treasuring the memorials of the Middle Ages, yet being a center of commerce and of industrialism. The ancient and the modern were joined together in peaceful picturesqueness. The ancient storks still looked down from their gables upon the affairs of modern mercantile life.

The home, too, united diverse conditions. It was a German home in its origin, yet the husband and the father had lived in Italy and the house in picture and other memorial bore evidences of his residence in that historic peninsula. It was, moreover, a home of simple competencies standing midway between poverty and wealth. It represented the Aristotelian golden mean in which are gathered up the most enduring results, and the most inspiring forces, of human achievement and personal character.



The age as well as the place was significant. It is not without meaning, that, in the year of Goethe's birth, Rousseau was arguing with the encyclopædists, Gibbon was trying to master the grammar of the people whose history he was to write, Johnson was making his dictionary, and Buffon published the first volume of his natural history.

But it is still more significant that within the greatest period of his life, in the last decades of the eighteenth, and the first of the nineteenth, century, are united the rise and the fall of Napoleon. In this period are seen finally the close of the middle ages, and the ultimate dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. It was also the period of the rise of the transcendental movement in philosophic interpretation. It was the age of Kant, who, in his provincial university of Koenigsberg, rubbed off the dimness of the vision of philosophy and gave to it a new outlook and inlook, and a consequent new life. It was the age of Fichte, of the Von Humboldts, and of the founding of the University of Berlin, a child of hope, born in a day of despair, that has in many ways for a hundred years, led the profounder thought of humanity. Most materialistic and most spiritual were the forces of the period which Goethe's life covered.

Goethe has himself pictured this life :

The epoch in which we were living might be called an epoch of high requisitions, for every one demanded of himself and of others what no mortal had hitherto accomplished. On chosen spirits who could think and feel, a light had arisen, which enabled them to see that an immediate, original understanding of nature, and a course of action based upon it, was both the best thing a man could desire, and also not difficult to attain. Experience thus once more became the universal watchword, and every one opened his eyes as wide as he could. Physicians, especially, had a most pressing call to labour to this end, and the best opportunity for finding it. Upon them a star shone out of antiquity, which could serve as an example of all that was to be desired. The writings which had come down to us under the name of Hippocrates, furnished a model of the way in which a man should both observe the world and relate what he had seen, without mixing up himself with it. But no one considered that we cannot see like the Greeks, and that we shall never become such poets, sculptors, and physicians as they were. Even granted that we could learn from them, still the results of experience already gone through, were almost beyond number, and besides were not always of the clearest kind; moreover had too often been made to accord with preconceived opinions. All these were to be mastered, discriminated, and sifted. This also, was an immense demand. Then again it was required that each observer, in his personal sphere and labours, should acquaint himself with the true, healthy nature, as if she were now for the first time noticed and attended, and thus only what was genuine and real was to be learned. But as, in general, learning can never exist without the accompaniment

of a universal smattering and a universal pedantry, nor the practice of any profession without empiricism and charlatanry, so there sprung up a violent conflict, the purpose of which was to guard use from abuse, and place the kernel high above the shell in men's estimation. In the execution of this design, it was perceived that the shortest way of getting out of the affair, was to call in the aid of genius, whose magic gifts could settle the strife, and accomplish what was required. Meanwhile, however, the understanding meddled with the matter; all it alleged must be reduced to clear notions, and exhibited in a logical form, that every prejudice might be put aside and all superstition destroyed.<sup>1</sup>

The interpretations which Goethe gives to education are found scattered throughout his numberless works. The autobiography of Wilhelm Meister, however, contains possibly the most pregnant and important parts. But from the reports of the conversations, covering several decades, may be drawn forth sentiments and judgments, often embodied in single sentences, which have large meaning.

These opinions, like Goethe's character, often unite opposing doctrines and antagonistic intimations. They are also, like his own education, frequently without orderliness, filled with sentiments which would not bear logical analyzing, yet which, as by a sudden rift of light, give guidance in ob-

<sup>1</sup> "The Autobiography of Goethe," John Oxenford. Bell's edition, 1903, Vol. II., pp. 54, 55.

curity, and inspiration to indifference, in thinking. A single verse of Faust may have as deep educational significance as a whole paragraph of the scientific work on optics. The by-products of a great mind, working in any field, are often indeed more precious than the direct results of the hard labor of a second-rate intellect.

The principles which through these diverse materials may be found and brought to light, are also more or less contradictory, yet even possibly because of their opposing content, they may often be joined together in a stronger and larger unity.

One of the great principles of Goethe lies in the assurance that education consists rather in the unfolding of the powers with which the mind is originally endowed, than in the engrafting of forces upon the mind, however vital, from without. To him, education is primarily subjective.

To labor for his own moral culture, is the simplest and most practicable thing which man can propose to himself; the impulse is inborn in him; while in social life both reason and love, prompt or rather force him to do so.<sup>2</sup>

Man may seek his higher destination on earth or in heaven, in the present or in the future, he yet remains on this account exposed to an eternal wavering, to an influence from without which ever disturbs him, until he once for all makes a reso-

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74.

lution to declare that that is right, which is suitable to himself.<sup>3</sup>

For he too was a child of nature,—he too had worked his way upwards. What others had been compelled to cast away, he had never possessed; relations of society from which they would have to emancipate themselves, had never fettered him. Thus might he be regarded as one of the purest disciples of that gospel of nature, and in view of his own persevering efforts and his conduct as a man and son, he might well exclaim, “All is good as it comes from the hands of nature!” But the conclusion, “All is corrupted in the hands of man!” was also forced upon him by adverse experience.<sup>4</sup>

Let man, we say, learn to think of himself as being without any enduring external relation; let him seek for consistency not in his surroundings but in himself: there he will find it; cherish and foster it with love; he will form and educate himself so as to be everywhere at home. He who devotes himself to what is most necessary, goes everywhere most surely to his goal. Others, on the contrary, seeking what is higher, more subtle, have, even in the choice of their road, to be more circumspect.<sup>5</sup>

To speak it in a word; the cultivation of my individual self, here as I am, has from my youth upwards been constantly though dimly my wish and my purpose. The same intention I still cherish, but the means of realizing it are now grown somewhat clearer. I have seen more of life than thou believest, and profited more by it also. Give some attention

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I., p. 400.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II., p. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Wilhelm Meister's “Wanderjahre,” Edward Bell. Bell's edition, 1892, p. 366.

then to what I say, though it should not altogether tally with thy own opinions.

Had I been a nobleman, our dispute would soon have been decided; but being a simple burgher, I must take a path of my own; I know not how it is in foreign countries; but in Germany, a universal, and if I may say so, personal cultivation is beyond the reach of any one except a nobleman. A burgher may acquire merit; by excessive efforts he may even educate his mind; but his personal qualities are lost, or worse than lost, let him struggle as he will. Since the nobleman, frequenting the society of the most polished, is compelled to give himself a polished manner; since this manner, neither door nor gate being shut against him, grows at last an unconstrained one; since, in court or camp, his figure, his person, are a part of his possessions, and it may be the most necessary part,—he has reason enough to put some value on them, and to show that he puts some. A certain stately grace in common things, a sort of gay elegance in earnest and important ones, becomes him well; for it shows him to be everywhere in equilibrium. He is a public person, and the more cultivated his movements, the more sonorous his voice, the more staid and measured his whole being is, the more perfect is he. If to high and low, to friends and relations, he continues still the same, then nothing can be said against him, none may wish him otherwise. His coldness must be reckoned clearness of head, his dissimulation prudence. If he can rule himself externally at every moment of his life, no man has aught more to demand of him; and whatever else there may be in him or about him, capacities, talents, wealth, all seem gifts of supererogation.\*

\* Wilhelm Meister's "Lehrjahre," Thomas Carlyle. Centenary edition, Vol. I., pp. 327, 328.



But, in the sum and substance of Goethe's experiencing mind, one easily finds a high place given to what are called the classics. Early did Goethe surrender himself to the ancient masters. He says:

But a leading conviction, which was continually revived within me, was that of the importance of the ancient tongues; since from amidst this literary hurly-burly, thus much continually forced itself upon me, that in them were preserved all the models of oratory, and at the same time everything else of worth that the world has ever possessed. Hebrew, together with biblical studies, had retired into the background, and Greek likewise, since my acquaintance with it did not extend beyond the New Testament. I therefore the more zealously kept to Latin, the master-pieces in which lie nearer to us, and which, besides its splendid original productions, offers us the other wealth of all ages in translations, and the works of the greatest scholars. I consequently read much in this language, with great ease, and was bold enough to believe I understood the authors, because I missed nothing of the literal sense. Indeed I was very indignant when I heard that Grotius had insolently declared "he did not read Terence as boys do." Happy narrow-mindedness of youth!—nay, of men in general, that they can, at every moment of their existence, fancy themselves finished, and inquire after neither the true nor the false, after neither the high nor the deep, but merely after that which is suited to them.

I had thus learned Latin, like German, French and English, merely by practice, without rules, and without conception. Whoever knows the condition of school instruction then,

will not think it strange that I skipped grammar as well as rhetoric; all seemed to me to come together naturally; I retained the words, their forms and inflexions, in my ear and mind, and used the language with ease in writing and in chattering.<sup>7</sup>

He also affirms in particular that the great forces of civilization are found in the Bible, in Plato and in Aristotle.

In the history of the development of knowledge the Bible, Aristotle, and Plato have been the dominant factors; and to these three bases we must always return. Neo-platonists, they say; well, that means coming back to Plato.

Scholasticism, and that Kant is bringing back scholasticism; that is, Aristotle. And of course one returns to the Bible.<sup>8</sup>

Yet, while emphasizing the value of the ancient classics, by parity of earnestness and of reasoning he commends the modern sciences.

For more than a century now the humanities have ceased to influence the minds of those who pursue them, and it is fortunate that Nature has stepped in, drawn the interest to herself, and opened to us from her threshold the road of humanity.

That the humanities do not shape morals! It is by no means necessary that everyone study the humanities, those knowledges—historical antiquarian, belletristic, and artistic—that have come to us out of antiquity and belong to it—

<sup>7</sup>“The Autobiography of Goethe,” etc., Vol. I., p. 200.

<sup>8</sup>“Conversations,” Weimar, 1808, F. V. Biedermann, Vol. I., p. 520.

are by this time so diffused that they need no longer be derived immediately from the ancients, unless one wished to put his whole life-time upon it. Then culture of this sort becomes again one-sided, which has no advantage over any other one-sided culture, indeed, falls below it, because it cannot be nor become productive.<sup>9</sup>

What a world of treasures lies in the sciences, how ever increasingly rich one finds them to be! How much that is wiser, greater, nobler than we, has lived, and we mortals imagine that we alone are wise! A people that possesses a morning paper, a fashionable journal, a free-lance organ (*Freimütigen*) is already quite lost. How much better is the so-often decried reading of novels, which has produced such a tremendously broad, even if not sound, culture.<sup>10</sup>

To Goethe, self-education has many values. Self-discipline may be very real, not only in will, but also in intellect. His beliefs are largely a transcript of his own educational experiences.

Only that I may not have to pursue any thing as a vocation! I will do all that I can playingly, whatever comes to me and as long as the inclination to it lasts. So I played unconsciously in youth; and so I will continue consciously through the rest of my life. *Useful—use*, that is your affair. You want to use me; but I cannot adjust myself to sale and demand. What I can do and understand, that you shall use, as soon as you wish and have need. I will not give myself up as a tool; and every profession is a tool, or, if you wish it expressed more elegantly, an organ.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II., p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>11</sup> "Conversations," Weimar, 1807, etc., Vol. I., p. 472.

It is, therefore, an education, which, in modern phrase, we call broad, in which Goethe believed. It was an education as wide as humanity, as diverse as the qualities of the human mind, as high and as deep as human achievements, and as the forces out of which these achievements are made. The classicist may claim him as a disciple, and the scientist may also declare him to be his apostle. The culture which he embodied and promulgated lay, like the kingdom of Heaven, four square. Although the mind and sentiments of Goethe are fundamentally unlike those of John Stuart Mill, yet the German and the Englishman are united in the belief that the human intellect and character are worthy to receive, and should accept, a training as high as divinity can inspire, as broad as life can embrace, and as deep as destiny can fathom.

Yet although Goethe's conception of education is as broad as man's nature, it is still to be adjusted to man's specific needs. Goethe affirms and argues that education is to be devoted to special ends. These ends are often of a character which proves that they arise from more immediate wants. Goethe would educate man for his place, for his times, for his station in society, and for the fulfilling of his duty to his family, and to the state.

The capabilities that lie in men can be divided into general and special; the general are to be regarded as activities in a state of balanced repose, which are aroused by circumstances, and directed accidentally to this or that end. Man's faculty of imitation is general: he will make or form in imitation of what he sees, even without the slightest inward and outward means to that end. It is always natural, therefore, that he should wish to do what he sees to be done: the most natural thing, however, would be that the son should embrace the occupation of his father. In this case it is all in one, a decided activity in an original direction, with probably an inborn faculty for a special end; then a resultant and gradually progressive exercise and a developed talent, that would have compelled us to proceed upon the beaten path, even if other impulses are developed within us, and a free choice might have led us to an occupation for which nature has given us neither capacity nor perseverance. On the average, therefore, those men are the happiest who find an opportunity of cultivating an inborn, family talent in the domestic circle. We have seen painter-pedigrees of this sort: amongst them there have been feeble talents, it is true, but in the meantime, they have brought to light something useful, and perhaps better than they would have achieved with moderate powers in any other department of their own choice.<sup>12</sup>

"Your universal culture," said he, "and all institutions for that end, are foolishness. The thing is, that a man should understand something quite definitely, do it with an excellence which searee anyone else in the immediate neighbourhood could attain; and in our association particularly this is a self-evident matter. You are just of an age when a man forms any plan with intelligence, judges what lies before him

<sup>12</sup> Wilhelm Meister's "Wanderjahre," etc., pp. 269-270.

with discernment, grapples with it from the right side, and directs his capacities and abilities to the right end.”<sup>13</sup>

But the main thing will be, when shall we find ourselves at the place and spot?<sup>14</sup>

He was, for a time at least, convinced that education ought in every case to be adapted to the inclinations: his present views of it I know not. He maintained that with man the first and last consideration was activity, and that we could not act on anything, without the proper gifts for it, without an instinct impelling us to it. “You admit,” he used to say, “that poets must be born such; you admit this with regard to all professors of the fine arts; because you must admit it, because those workings of human nature cannot very plausibly be aped. But if we consider well, we shall find that every capability, however slight, is born with us: that there is no vague general capability in men. It is our ambiguous dissipating education that makes men uncertain: it awakens wishes, when it should be animating tendencies; instead of forwarding our real capacities, it turns our efforts towards objects which are frequently discordant with the mind that aims at them. I augur better of a child, a youth who is wandering astray on a path of his own, than of many who are walking aright upon paths which are not theirs. If the former, either by themselves, or by the guidance of others, ever finds the right path, that is to say, the path which suits their nature, they will never leave it; while the latter are in danger every moment of shaking off a foreign yoke, and abandoning themselves to unrestricted license.”<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 282.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 383.

<sup>15</sup> Wilhelm Meister's “Lehrjahre,” etc., Vol. II., p. 100.



In this education which is at once broad and special, are to be united what we now call the practical and the theoretical. The deed and the thought are to be joined. The deed without the thought may be illogical, arbitrary, harmful, disastrous. The thought without the deed, is vain and unavailing. Life in thought and for action was his ideal. In the *Travels* is this double activity often commended.

Thinking and Doing, Doing and Thinking, from all time admitted, from all time practised, but not discerned by every one. Like expiration and inhalation, the two must for ever be pulsating backwards and forwards in life; like question and answer, the one cannot exist without the other. Whoever makes for himself a law—which the genius of human understanding secretly whispers into the ear of every newborn child—to test Doing by Thinking, Thinking by Doing, he cannot go astray; and if he does go astray, he will soon find himself on the right way again.<sup>10</sup>

Many-sidedness prepares, in point of fact, only the element in which the one-sided man can work, who just at this time has room enough given him. Yes, now is the time for the one-sided; well for him who comprehends it, and who works for himself and others in this mind. In certain things it is understood thoroughly and at once. Practise till you are an able violinist, and be assured that the director will have pleasure in assigning you a place in the orchestra. Make an instrument of yourself, and wait and see what sort of place humanity will kindly grant you in universal life. Let us break off. Whoso will not believe, let him follow his own

<sup>10</sup> Wilhelm Meister's "Wanderjahre," etc., p. 264.

path: he too will succeed sometimes; but I say it is needful everywhere to serve from the ranks upwards. To limit oneself to a handicraft is the best. For the narrowest heads it is always a craft; for the better ones an art; and the best, when he does one thing, does everything—or, to be less paradoxical, in the one thing, which he does rightly, he beholds the semblance of everything that is rightly done.<sup>17</sup>

All life, all activity, all art must be preceded by handiwork, that can only be acquired in a limited sphere. A correct knowledge and practice give a higher culture than half-knowledge in hundredfold.<sup>18</sup>

From the Useful, through the True, to the Beautiful.<sup>19</sup>

Regarding Goethe's relation to the most fundamental element, religion, the evidence is as diverse as it is in respect to concerns less serious. Contradictions abound. He sympathized with the devout Moravians, and condemned and despised priest and priesthood. At once he commended Voltaire and had a large heart for the pietist. There is reason for calling him a sceptic, and there is evidence that he was a believer in those fundamental concepts regarding ultimate being and destiny, which belong to most thoughtful and reverent souls. To call him a pantheist would be a not unjust interpretation.

But whatever his personal belief may have been,

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 146.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

it is clear that Goethe does believe in the value of religion in education.

The religion which rests on reverence for that which is above us, we call the ethnical one; it is the religion of nations, and the first happy redemption from a base fear; all so-called heathen religions are of this kind, let them have what names they will. The second religion, which is founded on that reverence which we have for what is like ourselves, we call the Philosophie; for the philosopher, who places himself in the middle, must draw downward to himself all that is higher, and upward to himself all that is lower, and only in this central position does he deserve the name of sage. Now, whilst he penetrates his relations to his fellows, and therefore to the whole of humanity, and his relations to all other earthly surroundings, necessary or accidental, in the cosmical sense he only lives in the truth. But we must now speak of the third religion, based on reverence for that which is below us; we call it the Christian one, because this disposition of mind is chiefly revealed in it; it is the last one which humanity could and was bound to attain. Yet what was not demanded for it? not merely to leave earth below, and claim a higher origin, but to recognize as divine even humility and poverty, scorn and contempt, shame and misery, suffering and death; nay, to revere and make lovable even sin and crime, not as hindrances but as furtherances of holiness! Of this there are indeed found traces throughout all time; but a track is not a goal, and this having once been reached, humanity cannot turn backwards; and it may be maintained, that the Christian religion . . . having once been divinely embodied, cannot again be dissolved.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 155, 156.

Two obligations, moreover, we have most strictly taken upon us: to hold in honour every form of the worship of God; for they are all more or less comprised in the Creed; secondly, to allow all forms of government equally to hold good, since they all demand and promote a systematic activity—to employ ourselves in each, wherever and however long it may be, according to its will and pleasure. In conclusion, we hold it a duty to practise good morals, without pedantry and stringency; even as reverence for ourselves demands, which springs from the three reverences which we profess; all of us having the good fortune, some from youth up, to be initiated in this higher universal wisdom.<sup>21</sup>

But below and above religion, Goethe holds to the value of that composite creation and creator which we denominate character.

Character, that is, the complex of the primal human impulses, of self-preservation, self-respect, etc., is that from which the forming of the other spiritual powers departs and upon which also it rests.<sup>22</sup>

All education, like all life, is to be conducted under at least three categories. They are freedom, patience, idealism.

“O needless strictness of morality,” exclaimed he, “while Nature in her own kindly manner trains us to all that we require to be! O strange demands of civil society, which first perplexes and misleads us, then asks of us more than Nature

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 366–367.

<sup>22</sup> “Conversations,” Weimar, 1806, etc., Vol. I., p. 470.

herself! Woe to every sort of culture which destroys the most effectual means of all true culture, and directs us to the end, instead of rendering us happy on the way.”<sup>23</sup>

Persevere in direct observance of the day's duty, and thereby test the purity of your heart, and the safety of your soul. If thus in unoccupied hours you aspire, and find opportunity to elevate yourself, you will so gain a right attitude towards the sublime, to which we must in every way reverently surrender ourselves, regard every occurrence with veneration, and acknowledge therein a higher guidance.<sup>24</sup>

Yes, he has the noble searching and striving for the Better, whereby we of ourselves produce the Good which we suppose we find. How often have I blamed thee, not in silence, for treating this or that person, for acting in this or that case, otherwise than I should have done! and yet in general the issue showed that thou wert right. “When we take people,” thou wouldst say, “merely as they are, we make them worse; when we treat them as if they were what they should be, we improve them as far as they can be improved.”<sup>25</sup>

A great contemporary of Goethe, and an outstanding educationist, was Rousseau. It is easy to draw certain parallels and certain contrasts between the two. Goethe's works are a revelation of the future, those of the sage of Geneva a creed of the eighteenth century. Goethe is not the son of a new culture, like Rousseau, but its creator. In

<sup>23</sup> Wilhelm Meister's “Lehrjahre,” etc., Vol. II., p. 82.

<sup>24</sup> Wilhelm Meister's “Wanderjahre,” etc., p. 403.

<sup>25</sup> Wilhelm Meister's “Lehrjahre,” etc., Vol. II., p. 111.

personality especially they are very diverse. In the one we have feminine sensibility in perception and feeling; in the other the self-conscious precision of a self-sufficient man. In the one are found subjective, in the other objective, thoughts. Rousseau, arrogant, sets himself against the influence of the world about him; Goethe, scientifically trained, uses scientific methods and the greatest objectivity in his examination of life. In the one we have a unique and mighty striving for independence, the yearning for freedom from every fetter; in the other a real respect for the historically established regulations and institutions of state and church. Also in religion are they opposites. To the theism of the Frenchman stands opposed the pantheism of the German. But in the main idea of education, in what Rousseau calls the Return to Nature, they join hands. For Goethe also, nature is the great and eternal teacher, which alone gives us the right measuring rule for mankind. Both see the pettiness of human culture and both value the virtues of simplicity and truth. Social conditions are condemned by Goethe no less than by Rousseau. Both learned to know the conflict of nature and moral law, both stand for the principle of the renunciation of personality at



times, and both fight together for a noble existence, with a worthy culture as the normal condition of all. Both hold the highest view of mankind, each seeks, according to his ability, to bring man back to original nature, and both begin with the child. So one becomes the defender of the rights of children, according as the other reveals them. Both are active in a practical way as educators, and both exchange their educational ideas with women. Both lack the historical point of view. In Rousseau's view "Robinson Crusoe" comprises the most admirable dissertation on the natural education, while Goethe turns to the "Chronicle of Tschudis" for a picture of a worthy type of man. In the same manner each tries to illustrate in a definite individual the idea of education in which they believe. In Wilhelm Meister, as in Emil, poet and philosopher dress their theories in the colors of life. The method in both is fresh and living. In both exists the danger that the example may be taken for the thing itself and the single case confused with the general rule. But let it be remembered that while Goethe planned to write a philosophical compendium for teachers' seminaries, Rousseau declares that the child should be the object of the teacher's most ardent studies; so that,

though his whole method must be interpreted as phantastic and partially false, one can nevertheless always draw useful inferences from his observations.<sup>26</sup>

This interpretation of the educational beliefs of one of the greatest of men I shall close with a general selection—which might be vastly enlarged—from his writings. These selections do represent certain practical axioms. They are pregnant, too, with great meanings.

We retain of our studies, in the end, only that which we apply practically.

There is in our universities, a pursuit of too many things, and of too much that is useless. The individual teachers teach their subjects too extensively, much beyond the needs of their hearers. Formerly chemistry and botany were presented as belonging to pharmacology and they gave the medical student enough to do, but now chemistry and botany have become distinct, limitless sciences, each of which makes claim upon a whole lifetime.

He who is wise, will reject all diverting demands on himself and limit himself to one subject and become proficient in that.

There are some excellent persons who can do nothing off-hand, perfunctorily, but whose natures demand that in every case they penetrate in quiet to deep perception of the subject in hand. Such persons often make us impatient, because

<sup>26</sup> See Adolph Langguth's "Goethe's Pädagogik," p. 312 ff.

one seldom obtains from them what one immediately desires, and yet in this way, the highest things are achieved.

Character does not take the place of knowledge, but supplies it.

Children are the best preceptors because they are all disposed to lend to each other an attentive ear, and because they speak to each other in a language more intelligible than ours.

Avoid dividing your energies. Hold your powers together. Had I been so wise thirty years ago (December 3, 1824), I should have done far different things. What time did I not waste! I cannot think back without vexation to those undertakings in which the world misused us, and which were entirely without result for us.

All depends on your building up a capital for yourself which will never give out. This you will attain in the studies you have begun in the English language and literature. The old languages for the most part, you nursed in youth, therefore seek a basis in the literature of so able a nation as the English. Our own literature is in the largest measure to come from theirs. Our novels, . . . whence do we have them, if not from Goldsmith, Fielding and Shakespeare, and even to-day, where will you find in Germany three heroes in literature who might be placed beside Byron, Moore and Walter Scott? Therefore, ground yourself firmly in English. Hold your powers together, to some excelling purpose, and let all go that has no result for you and is not conformable to you.

As for the Greek, Latin, Italian and Spanish languages, it is possible for us to read the finest works of these countries in such good German translations that we have no grounds except for very special reasons to spend much time on the labori-

ous learning on these languages. It is of the German nature to honor everything foreign in its own kind, and to conform to its peculiarities. It is not to be denied that in general one can do a great deal with a good translation. Frederick the Great knew no Latin, but he read his Cicero in a French translation just as well as we in the original.

The universal development of human powers is desirable and most excellent, but man is not born for it. Each one must form himself as a distinct being, yet seek to attain a conception of what all, together, are.

One ought to beware of setting the frontiers of his cultivation too far.

Fix upon reality and seek to express it. That is what the ancients did.

Even though the world as a whole progresses, youth must always begin again at the beginning, and live through the epochs of culture, as an individual.

Revere something that is above us, for in revering it, we lift ourselves to it, and manifest through our recognition of it, that we bear this higher thing within ourselves and are worthy of being its peers.

I have every respect for the categorical imperative. I know how much good may issue from it. But, we must not go too far with it, or this idea of the freedom of idea will lead to no good.

National literature has no great meaning now (1827). The epoch of world literature has come, and each must labor to hasten this epoch. . . . We must not think it is Chinese literature, or Servian, or Calderon, or the Nibelungen, or rather in our need of some exemplary thing, we must always go back again to the ancient Greeks, in whose works the beauty of man

is represented. All else we must regard as merely historical, and make the good in it, so far as may be, ours.

The truly excellent is distinguished by this, that it belongs to all mankind.

It remains always a heart-lifting sensation to win from the impenetrable a few illumined spaces.

If lithesome youth may legitimately form a wish, it were surely this, to discern in every performance, what is praiseworthy, good, fair, aspiring, in a word, the ideal, and even in what is not difficult, to discern the universal type and exemplar of man.

Mathematicians are foolish people, and so far from possessing even a notion of the main point, that one has to be indulgent to their conceit. . . . I have become more and more conscious of the fact, which I had quietly recognized long ago, that the training given to the mind by mathematicians is extremely one-sided and limited. Voltaire even ventures to say somewhere: "J'ai toujours remarqué que la Géométrie laisse l'esprit ou elle le trouve." Franklin also has a peculiar aversion to mathematicians, and expresses this plainly and clearly in reference to social intercourse, when he speaks of their spirit of littleness and contradiction, as being intolerable.

How did moral feeling come into the world? Through God himself, like every other good.

We ought to study not our contemporaries and fellow aspirants, but great men of the past, whose works have held for centuries an equal worth and an equal estimation. A really highly gifted person will in any case feel the need of this within himself, and just this need of communion with great predecessors is the sign of a higher tendency.

The spirit of the real is the truly ideal.

I am sure that many a dialectically sick spirit, might find in the study of nature, a beneficent feeling.

It were well to think in, as well as to read or write, a foreign language.

That divine illumination whereby the extraordinary comes to be, we shall always find in league with youth and productivity.

For what is genius other than that productive power whereby deeds arise which may be shown before God and nature, and which even therefore have consequences and are permanent?

It is not enough to be gifted; it takes more than that to be sagacious; one must be in great relationships, and have a chance to look at the cards of the playing figures of the time, and himself play with them for gain and loss.

The good world does not know what it costs in time and in pains to learn to read and to profit from one's reading: I have put into it eighty years.

The more one has deepened his own study of any subject whatever, the more he is in a position to teach well its elements.

The secret [with persons] lies not in birth or wealth; but it lies in this, that they have the courage to be what nature has made them. There is about them nothing perverted or warped, there are in them no incompleteness and obliquities; but, however they are, they are always thoroughly complete beings.

Goethe illustrates, in both his character and his writings, the two fundamental elements of education, self-culture and comprehensiveness of learning. He aimed at the enlargement and en-



richment of his own being and also at the possession of universal knowledge. Above most did he succeed in gaining these ends. In his moral relations his culture was selfish, but in the intellectual elements it was ministered unto by the sciences, the literatures and the philosophies of all races and of both worlds, ancient and modern. His mind was a vast reservoir which received streams of influence from many sources, and which, in turn, sent forth streams to make glad the heart of men. His mind was as a great lens which receives the light, which seems to be vitally eager for more light, and which sheds forth that light unto measureless distances. He was among the greatest of the great.

Education indeed is designed to give enlargement and enrichment to the individual and to the race. It recognizes that the center of its service is personality, but, despite the natural and inevitable charge of selfishness, it also seeks to know all that can be known. Its horizon is limited only by its own power of seeing. Under this limitation, however, a sense of over-yonderness rules and inspires. The infinite touches and embraces the finite.

Education, therefore, is as narrow as the individual. Education also is as broad as nature, as humanity and as human appreciation of divinity.

In one relation it stands pre-eminently for power and in the other for sympathy. Through power and sympathy, it fulfills apparently the supreme purposes of life and of all being.

## IX

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

THE preceding chapters are devoted to an interpretation of the gospel of education as set forth by eight human and humanistic masters. Six of the eight belong to a single race and to the Mid-Victorian age. By the influence of this age, because of distance in both space and time, Goethe, the last of the eight, was untouched. But Emerson, the first of the number, was deeply filled by its spirit. The period in which these men lived and wrought was a time of rationalism. It was believed that the intellect of man was the chief tool for carving out a perfect civilization. Truth was to be known. It was to be translated into thought. Thought was to be confirmed into belief, belief was to be transmuted into action, and action was to be solidified into character, both individual and communal. "We needs must love the highest when we see it," sang Tennyson.

Each of these masters, including Emerson and Goethe, sympathetic with and eager to serve his

age, interpreted education as rational in its nature, forces and conditions. Education was, as has been made evident in the preceding chapters, at least rational. Education was also something other and possibly higher than rational. But to them each it was first a rational process.

For to Newman even, the ecclesiastic, the theologian, education had to do with reason, to Mill it spelled reasoning, and to Emerson it meant truth, both as a creative cause, as a process and as a result. Reason gains knowledge, it was held, by immediate perception. It builds up its own world out of the bricks of experience and of observation. In accordance with a plan which has been impressed upon it from the beginning, it creates principles, it accumulates facts, it accentuates relations, it makes inferences, it points out duties. It analyzes, synthesizes, draws inductions and deductions, philosophizes, even geometrizes as says Plato of the Divine Being. The use of reason may be either good or ill, false or true, logical or illogical, but it does use itself. Truth is its food, truth the atmosphere in which it moves, truth the ground on which it stands. Its worthy use is promoted by education, and the more thorough and profound the education, the more complete is the evidence that

its use is worthy. The place given to the reason in the education of these masters was the extension and the elaboration of the doctrine of John Locke and of the light-bearers of the French Revolution.

Yet, although education is intellectual and rational, it is still more essential that it be interpreted and applied as moral. In an age rational, the emphasis is put on a side of education other than rational. To educate the feelings is, in the judgment of Matthew Arnold—a school master and the son of a school master—quite as important as the elevation of the intellect, and the lifting of both is the comprehensive aim and work of the whole educational service. Character, says Goethe, is the sum of the primal human impulses of self-preservation and of self-respect; from it other spiritual powers take their origin, and on it they rest. The intellect enriches the feelings, the feelings quicken the intellect, and both move on, and are moved by, the will. If the heart without the intellect be blind and quite as sure to work destruction as edification, the intellect without the heart is dumb and dead. The affections, declares the virile prophet of Cheyne Row, have the supreme place in teaching, and sincerity and honesty are the lasting worths of education. John Ruskin confesses that one of the

great lacks in his own education was the lack of the element of love. "The intellect sees by moral obedience," declares Emerson. "Pure intellect is the pure devil when you have got off all the marks of Mephistopheles." Real moral instruction in the public schools, says Mill, would do more than all else in attaining the highest aims. Indeed, the testimony of Solomon is still sound, that the moral affections and appreciations lead to, as well as arise from, intellectual valuations, and that the wisdom of the heart is not to be separated from the wisdom of the mind.

In this composite interpretation of education, religion assumes as many types, both formal and informal, as are the races of men. But of any type, whether as a conscious relation to the divine or as simple reverence, it takes its place as among the most potent of all forces. For these educationists, the type is very general. It is devoid of creeds and of articles of specific faith. Its altar is as broad as the earth, its cathedral as wide-reaching as the sky, its incense of worship nothing less than the twilight of the rising or setting sun. Reverence is the one religious virtue and grace of fundamental significance. In education should abide, and from education should come forth, an infallible religion,



a religion which is an unconquerable faith, an unquenchable hope and an abiding charity. To Gladstone religion as a force in education is direct, compact, forcible. "A great Christian," as Lord Salisbury called him after his death, he holds the Christian faith, historically and dogmatically interpreted, to be an essential and necessary part of university education. To his children and to the nation, he declares that he prefers to see Oxford leveled to the ground, rather than see loose notions of the truth and of the inspiration of the Bible prevail. To his family he gives direct counsel respecting nurture in religion and in the church. To Newman, likewise, religion represents one of the most formative of all educative forces. The new birth of the heart produces a new birth of the intellect, and the new direction, under the spiritual quickening of the will, adds stimuli to both intellect and heart. What is called conversion in the Christian church has a value to some personalities equivalent to that of a liberal education as weighed in academic scales. As an exponent and force in the Christian religion, the Bible receives emphatic commendation from Ruskin. Again and again in strongest terms he acknowledges the debt which he owes to it. The English of its King James' version,

as well as the exaltation of its moral precepts and religious truths, cause it to be regarded as one of the most potent of all educative instruments.

Yet the question recurs again and again in these pages, as it is ever recurring in life itself, how can religion be taught? Carlyle specifically considers the question and is content with passing it on to those "whose duty it is," he declares, "to teach religion." "Those entrusted with this duty will find their own way," he says. Of course theology, which is theory, can be taught, but religion, which represents life, cannot be taught any more than life can be taught, though helps for understanding its nature, for apprehending its truths, for appreciating its relationships, for doing its duties, may be taught.

It is also not a little significant that among our masters there is found a general agreement in the belief that education should be fitted into the character and influence of the individual. It should be made personal. The peril is that education will be a mold into which the melted metal of common humanity will be flung and from which the people shall come out bearing identical forms and a similar likeness. Such is the peril, declares Mill, existing especially in public education. The

danger is less menacing in education based more directly on the voluntary principle. Differences in nature begin with birth and are continued and deepened with the unfolding and development of character. These differences are to be respected. That knowledge which is most worth acquiring and having, that training which is most worth securing and using, is to be sought after. Life is short. The stores to be accumulated are immense, the work to be done is hard and great. Our faculties are limited and the results which, it is hoped, they may win are beyond their abilities. The college student who consoles himself with Plato would in trigonometry find only the unrational and the irritating. All education is to have respect unto the student. He is the subject to be educated, not the victim waiting for the pedagogic altar. Yet, though education is ever to be individualistic, it does possess certain great common underlying, over-arching elements. It is to create and to promote lucidity, to nourish the flexibility of the mind, to give freedom from prejudice, to foster the good without the evil of passion, and to give a sense of humanity in every person. At what point in the process individualism becomes narrowness, and breadth and liberality vagueness, is the critical problem—a

problem ever before us, ever seeking and never finding a wholly satisfactory solution.

This educational movement in the individual and the community is carried forward by certain great tools or instruments or forces. They form what are called the studies or the content of studies or, in awkward term, the curriculum. They are supposed to represent what we denominate the truth, and truth is presumed to be, not only the mother of freedom, but also the creator of personal power. Diverse are the credits given to these diverse agencies. Carlyle commends the study of history as the most profitable, being the one "articulate connection" which the past can have with the present. It is a letter of instruction given by the older generations to the new. It is good and profitable to know what the family of man has done. But for those extremes of subjects, the sciences and logic, he has characteristic contempt. Toward Latin and Greek, Carlyle's friend and correspondent, Emerson, has much the same feeling which Carlyle himself has toward chemistry and logic. The ancient classics to him are as dead and as dry as the autumnal leaves. The antagonist of the ancient literatures as a part of the education of the American youth finds in the man of Concord an associate as virile

as he can desire. But the same literatures and languages as given to English youth do discover in Emerson a stout defender. For these studies offered at Eton, at Winchester and at Oxford help to create "those masters of the world who combine the highest energy in affairs with supreme culture." For the same great subjects and forces, masters as diverse as Goethe and Gladstone, as Arnold and Newman, cast their votes as disciplines and as forms of culture. Though knowing Latin better than he knew Greek, Goethe yet held that Plato and Aristotle with the Bible represent the greatest forces in civilization. To Gladstone, the tradition which they represent and embody is most important and significant. It does hold, with the Christian religion, European progress and civilization. To be a part of this civilization is a worthy aim and stands for a first-rate achievement. To be remote from it is to be outside the pale of the greatest and of the best. To Newman the ancient classics are a form of grammar, the knowledge of which stands for the most general and effective of all disciplines. To Matthew Arnold the classics give to us an ancient world, an acquaintance with which aids us in knowing ourselves and our own modern world. Greek inspires



the modern man with an appreciation of beauty, and Latin quickens in him the worth of character. Other studies, such as the modern languages, sciences, metaphysics, do of course have their place, but to most men their place is not so large or so alluring as that belonging to what some are still pleased to call the fundamental linguistic disciplines. Whoever wishes to get the most adequate interpretation of such studies as a means and method of education does not fail to turn to and to linger long among the pages of Mill's St. Andrews Address. The address is a quarry wherein the mathematician will find his argument for the worth of mathematics stated with the utmost cogency, where the classicist will find his plea urged with the greatest convincingness, where the logician will meet with the presentation of the worth of his subject, both induction and deduction, with an eloquence most quickening, where the attorney for modern practical subjects will discover reasons for his quest, of apt value and of fundamental persuasiveness.

In fact, in and beyond all particular studies, it is to be borne in mind that the scholar's functions are at once broad, deep, high. They take on cubical relations. They are conceived with the categories



of freedom, patience and idealism. They are human, as well as humanistic. They cover all life. They are touched with a sense of the infinities and immensities and the eternities. They stand at once for inspiration and for routine. They mean inspiration and also drill. They belong to the still air of delightful leisure and also to the strain of work and the care of toil. Without haste and without rest, the scholar's and the student's service is to be performed, without the current desire of quick returns and with a will that it shall be as effective in securing results as it is of lasting and surpassing significance for humanity. These results, the results of the scholar's and the student's quest, are as manifold and diverse as are the conditions of humanity and as are the forces and elements of material nature. The scholar is to be happy, and happiness, with Mill, is the standard for measuring the value of his achievements. Joy is to clothe him as a garment. At the fountains of rich and tender consolations he drinks when weary and depressed, and inspirations and quickenings are his as he plods along life's long and toilsome way. Contentment is his mood. For, if he is unable to make the numerator of life's fraction large by his positive achievements, he can secure

the same result by making the denominator of the same fraction of his desires small. He has vision and should not lack force, though his reach is more than his grasp. Like Browning's Grammarian, he is patient of time. Though he is eager to be useful to his own age, he knows he does live in the forever. Neither is courage lacking to him if he will but look from his lexicon to the stars. He is the re-creator, adding an eighth day to the pristine week. From the chaos which often surrounds him, he seeks to bring forth a cosmos. If in his service he seeks and finds a livelihood, he does not allow his finding to do away with his life. If he knows the scholar's mood is one of solitude, he is still a good companion and comrade along the way. If he is faithful to his task, a worthy servant of his imperative duty, he remembers that to be is more important than to do. If he is self-respecting, as he ought to be, his soul is full of humility. For he has a sense of relations, and he is never neglectful of either graciousness of character nor of the graces of conduct. If he is a learner, he is also a teacher and he bears in mind the truth that the teacher is more to the student than the subject he professes or the precepts which he conveys. If he seeks to know the truth thoroughly, he also tries to convey it—a harder task—

truthfully. If he recognizes the august categorical imperative for himself, yet he is merciful to the rebellious souls to whom obedience is not life's first commandment. He has clearness of thought without coldness, affection without softness, strength without harshness, a giant's vigor without a giant's cruelty, a sense of beauty without effusiveness, individuality without eccentricity, and a great sympathy without commonplaceness. He is wise without being pedantic, sincere without pride or vanity, comprehensive without neglecting the detail, guided and inspired by high-reaching and deep-lying principle without neglecting the nearest duty, patient without sluggishness or slackness, considerate in both feeling and mind, magnanimous with an instinct for freedom but recognizing the divine and human laws, never allowing courtesy to hide the reality of things, nor the reality of things underlying to be a substitute for courtesy. Social and yet reverent, controlling self and therefore controlling and persuasive of others, an opportunist, yet with an eye and an ear to the universal and the eternal, tolerant toward others, but severe toward himself, having a life and character filled with life's great unities and yet adjusting himself to daily needs and hourly duties, inspired by life's

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ideals, yet taking hold with firm grip of life's present real problems: such is the educated man.

Such, too, are some of the results which the interpretation of these modern prophets gives of the worth of education and of the worth of the educator.

**THE END**

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