



THE EGO AND ITS PLACE
IN THE WORLD

CHARLES GRAY SHAW

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THE EGO

AND

ITS PLACE IN THE WORLD



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ITS PLACE IN THE WORLD

BY

CHARLES GRAY SHAW

AUTHOR OF "CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN CULTURE"

"THE PRECINCT OF RELIGION"

"THE VALUE AND DIGNITY OF HUMAN LIFE"

Univ. of
California

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TO
MY WIFE
BELLE CLARKE SHAW

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PREFACE

THE aim of this work is at once personal and professional ; its pages contain the author's retort to the world, as well as his idea of the manner in which that world is to be analysed. The analysis of the world into appearance, activity, and reality may be taken as indicative of the author's desire to come to an understanding with the forms, the forces, and the ends of the world without and within, while the conclusion to each of the three books should stand for an attempt to construe the phenomenal world as the place of joy, the causal world as the place of work, the substantial world as the place of truth. In the elaboration of this threefold world, in which three great human interests are vested, it has been found expedient to interpret phenomenality in the light of æsthetics, causality by means of ethics, substantiality after the manner of religion. In these brisk times of Pragmatism and Realism it is not unheard of for a dialectical discoverer to return from his voyage with the report that at last the poles of being have been found ; the following work must be taken to indicate no more than the writer's "farthest north."

Viewed from the academic standpoint, the following analysis of reality will be found to contain a discussion of the traditional metaphysical problems whose forms, indicated by Parmenides and Aristotle, by Descartes and Kant, have recently been endowed by art and science, ethics and religion, with a new content. The study of these problems has been carried on with the conviction that the time has

come for philosophy to pause in its investigation and analysis, and seek to effect a higher synthesis of that which has been acquired. The various chapters making up the body of the work have served their purpose in a course of lectures in Metaphysics at New York University; the book attempts to put the material in more permanent form.

CHARLES GRAY SHAW.

UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS,
NEW YORK, *September* 1913.

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THE EGO AND ITS PLACE IN THE WORLD

INTRODUCTION

EVERY dialectic springs from some spiritual motive within the thinker, although he may not be sufficiently conscious to conceive or candid enough to express it. Where one organises his hopes, another builds a bulwark against his fears; where one exults in existence, another reveals his dread of reality. Moreover, a metaphysical system is indicative of characteristic interests, for ontology is possessed of the same spiritual life that is wont to express itself more directly in connection with ethical interests. In the present work a double motive is operative; our dialectic has been inspired by the hope of securing a view of the world and a place for the self therein. Thus it proceeds with the desire to remove that dualism of appearance and reality which has so long clouded the mind of philosophy, while it thinks the labour of securing the world an incomplete one unless it include the human self. The hope of reconciling the phenomenal and noumenal rests with the principle of activity, which is introduced as intermediary; upon this principle also the fortunes of the self are largely dependent.

I. THE RESTATEMENT OF REALITY

For a more perfect comprehension of the world, philosophy finds it necessary to extend and enrich its fields in such a manner as to include the causal with the noumenal

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and phenomenal. The introduction of a third and intermediary order of existence has become necessary, not only for the purpose of adjusting the respective claims of appearance and reality, but because there are certain phases of existence which can be understood in none other than an activistic fashion. As a peacemaker the entrance of activity is most welcome, and it cannot fail to appear with what readiness both appearance and reality have prepared themselves for restatement; meanwhile, metaphysics as a whole can only find satisfaction in the acquisition of an extra order of reality, whence the realm of existence becomes threefold in the form of that which appears, that which acts, and that which is. This constitutes the restatement of reality so to be desired by metaphysical thinkers, who are not quite sure of their world, still less sure of the ego's place therein.

Viewed as appearance, activity, and reality, the world of dialectics seems less likely to stand in its own light, less inclined to hinder its own progress, for the principle of causal activity tends to bring it up to the level of the world as such. These three divisions serve to express the nature of reality as here conceived, while they provide for the special treatment of special problems, as the phenomenality of space and the immanence of causality. In the case of the intermediate division, this is of special importance, for the world of activity provides for the discussion of time as something not wholly real and yet not purely phenomenal. Since the world itself is so active, it cannot be perfectly understood by perception and conception alone, but demands the activistic treatment inherent in the will. Given a sharp disjunction of appearance or reality, and the meaning of the world eludes the mind, while special phases of existence, as time, change, causality, and volition, are dialectically disfranchised. With the opening of the activistic realm, these dynamic features of the world within and without are in a position to receive something like sufficient treatment.

In departing from the traditional dualism of appearance

and reality, of *φαινόμενον ὄν*, we are none the less abandoning the habitual division of the study into ontology, cosmology, and psychology. Our conception of reality makes this necessary, for the old arrangement had the bad effect of suggesting that all reality was to be found in the ontological division, while cosmology and psychology were supposed to divide between them the remaining world of appearance. But, one might ask, is there no reality in either the world or the soul? Can the ontological or real be considered in independence of these rich forms of reality, or have we any reality apart from the world and the soul? The present dialectic has no separate department for "being" with subordinate ones for cosmic and psychic realities; it finds reality to consist in something graded, so that there is reality in appearance, still more reality in activity, while its full nature is found in the substantial.

The three realms of being are not outlined in *sepie* by a dialectician, whose sole ambition is to generalise, but they are coloured by human culture, so that the mind views reality by means of deep-seated and fully organised spiritual disciplines. "Every *dianoetic*," said Aristotle, "is practical, poetical, or theoretical—*πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ, ἢ ποιητικὴ, ἢ θεωρητικὴ*." ¹ From the standpoint of the present dialectic, the arrangement would be somewhat different, even where the encyclopædic principle still obtained, for we should have to place the poetical first, the practical second, with the theoretical in the same third and last place. The division of dialectics thus adopted would pay due respect to the æsthetic sense, the ethical motive, and the religious anxiety of the human self. Such a method, which we believe to be the genuine one, is more advantageous than one which relies upon mere physics or mere psychology in its attempt to secure a hold upon the world and the soul. It restores life to ontology, and invests the world of things with appropriate values. Philosophy need not fear to exercise human interest in the world, for the very

¹ *Metaphysics*, v. 1.

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vastness of the problem will purge the mind of all pettiness in its view of the world and the self. The principle of human interest, though it may act as a snare in the smaller sciences of æsthetics and ethics, may be relegated to the all too cool science of the dialectical, where it may work with appropriate intensity. Thus interpreted, metaphysics becomes at once a doctrine of knowledge and a philosophy of life.

With regard to the exact nature of the world, the most difficult and, in a certain sense, the most important point to establish is that which concerns activity. The full reality of substance, the void of appearance—these find a secure place in traditional dialectics; but the half-reality of causality and activity is not so easily apprehended, nor its function so readily appreciated. Hence, the present restatement of reality bases itself upon a threefold view of the world where appearance is supported by activity, whose functions are furthered by reality itself. Appearance does not itself indicate reality; hence we cannot assent to Herbart's realism in its assertion—*Wie viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung auf Sein*.¹ Appearance does indeed point to something beyond and superior to itself, but this something is an activity, whose interior principle of change is in harmony with the instability of the phenomenal order. The activity of the world, which is here accorded full recognition, is accompanied by a principle of selfhood, and it is by means of the active relation of one phase of the world to the other that the ego finds an opportunity to assert itself. Both phenomenalism and absolutism agree in repudiating the ego, but the interposition of activism involves the introduction of this very factor; for of all the phases of being, the activistic one is the most friendly to selfhood. In the world of appearance the forms of nature assume the character of impersonal percepts; in the world of substance they are reduced to concepts; but in the world of activity, where things are known inwardly through the forces that invest them, the threat of sub-

¹ *Metaphysik*, § 307.

sumption is not so pronounced, so that the ego has an opportunity to assert itself as an independent factor among other activities. Nevertheless, activism is demanded by the world itself, and the ego must look to its own self-assertion.

2. THE ACTIVISTIC VIEW

In the present condition of realism, which was anticipated by the *nature* of Rousseau and the *naïve* of Schiller, philosophy has become conscious of the fact that man has come up out of the dynamic order of nature as out of a great deep, so that it is but natural for him, even when established upon the land of intellectual security, to keep feeling the thrill of the throbbing sea behind him, just as his pent-up energies urge him to enter the world of work, so akin to his inner nature. Such a nostalgia for the active order of life affected Goethe's Tasso, who could not pass from the inward *Stille* of culture to the outer *Sturm* of conquest. Given a dynamic world without and a voluntaristic mind within, and the activistic consequence is sure to follow. Within recent years philosophy has witnessed the rise of activism, with the corresponding repudiation of intellectualism in the divergent systems of Eucken and Bergson. Without appealing to voluntarism, Eucken has carried on a criticism of both naturalism and intellectualism on the ground that both alike ignore the claims of an independent spiritual life.¹ Bergson's activism seeks truth and reality along the path of instinct rather than intelligence, although instinct's highest form is found in intuition, or disinterested instinct, capable of reflecting upon itself and expanding indefinitely.² Between the *Vollthat*, or complete spiritual activity, of Eucken and the disinterested instinct of Bergson there is no end of difference, yet in the midst of the obvious contrast between the spiritualistic and the naturalistic there is the common attempt to discard the intellectualistic and adopt the activistic.

¹ *Einheit d. Geisteslebens*, pp. 119-27.

² *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 192.

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From the beginnings of speculation in Europe, up to the rise of the Kantian philosophy, it was assumed that there was a necessary connection between the thoughts of the mind within and the things of the world without, and with the development of dialectics this tendency to connect the rational with the real became more and more pronounced. Ideal and real grew up together, and from its high seat in the understanding rationalism assumed complete control over the stubborn facts of experience, while the ambitions of empiricism were satisfied with servitude, content as was experience to supply the understanding with materials for construction or weapons for defence. The *facta bruta* thus underwent conceptual civilisation; as the concept assembled its marks, the thing organised its qualities; as subject acquired a predicate, substance achieved an attribute. In all this the facts were not as stubborn as one might expect, for they soon submitted to the yoke of the understanding. Here and there were indeed some signs of revolt, as when Plato's august ideas could not quite subordinate such real and ridiculous things as "hair, mud, and dirt,"¹ as when Leibnitz's *vérités de fait* held out against his *vérités de raison*, while the stolid *Ding an sich* refused to bow before the categorical system of the transcendentalist. Yet these touches of irrationalism, sporadic as they were, left no permanent impression upon metaphysics, which continued as it had commenced, and with suitable changes of setting wore the ancient Parmenidean jewel, the unity thought and thing—*νοεῖν εἶναι*.² Nevertheless, the matter was not destined to end with these mild outbursts.

Along with the irrationalistic intrigue, an activistic revolution was fermenting, not within the school of empiricism, whose sluggish methods were alien to all energism, but within the very realm of rationalism. Leibnitz had tried to define substance as an activity, but his system of Pre-established Harmony had at once smothered all spontaneity, all individuality in the monad. Kant had felt the hand of moralistic activism, but so impersonal was his conception

¹ *Parm.*, 130.

² *Ibid.*, 40.

that the latter gained but little when it exchanged the category of causality for the categorical imperative of noumenal freedom. Fichte was more activistic, more egoistic, but the deed-act by which the ego posited itself produced benumbing absolutism which made it impossible for the self to improvise. Schopenhauer was more courageous in his irrationalism, and his elevation of the will to the supreme position on metaphysics looked like a victory for activism over absolutism; but Schopenhauer subsumes the objectified will under the Platonic forms of the intellect,¹ causing the reader to inquire, "Is Schopenhauer also among the intellectualists?" Then activists began to appear on all sides, for both philosophy and poetry were ready to respond to such a ringing call. In their camp were mustered Stendhal, Merimée, Stirner, Ibsen, Wagner, Turgeneff, Nietzsche, Sudermann, Gorky. In such vigorous heat, the snows of the ancient intellectualism seem about to melt.

Such activism is not wanting in the irrationalism of revolt which leaps forth stark and strong in Stirner. Great issues are raised by this activist; none greater than that of truth. "Thinking and its thoughts," says Stirner, "are not sacred to me, and I defend my skin against other things. That may be an unreasonable defence, but if I am in duty bound to reason, then I, like Abraham, must sacrifice my dearest to it."² At war with Hegelianism, Stirner feels justified in emancipating himself by "one irrationalistic kick," and the only question is, how far should irrationalism be allowed to advance? Stirner has disclaimed all logical responsibility, and yet, in spite of the mad manner in which he has laid hold upon truth, he has found in reality the cracks and crags of human interest standing out in sharp contrast to the smooth and shining surface of rationality. The activist strives to show how valuable is reality, how pleasing is truth; and while one would not care to devour the shew-bread in his hunger for knowledge, he feels that that which instructs may likewise nourish. Activity con-

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 25.

² *The Ego and His Own*, tr. Byington, pp. 197-8.

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tains as much truth as appearance; the will is as wise as the feelings, so that if the intellectualist does not wish to be left stranded by the progress of philosophy, he must revise his categories so as to include the activistic as well as the phenomenalistic.

But do the activists themselves realise the possibilities, the implications of their own view of man and the world? According to Bergson, it is activity which breaks through the otherwise inevitable circle spread out like a net by the absolutistic understanding;¹ but the intellectualist may question whether the activist has really cast off his fetters, for he seems still to be suffering from the "chain-madness" felt by the galley-slave long after the manacles have been removed. The iron of thought has entered his soul. For the most part the activist has been half-hearted, for he has carefully avoided the factor most efficient for his emancipation: the ego. Fichte delivers him to the Absolute; Schopenhauer surrenders him to the Will-to-Live; Eucken and Wundt provide no suitable place for him. If indeed the activist would break the chain of conceptualism, let him conjure with the Will-to-Selfhood, for the ego is less likely to submit to rational subordination than were the "hair, mud, and dirt" of Plato's dialectic. One recalls how Plato tried to prove the truth of "participation" by the analogy of the sailors under the sail, as the many under the one.² But our modern egos refuse to remain under the canvas of conceptualism, and in their vigorous revolt they become the hopeful sons of activism. In its self-affirmation, the voice of the ego breaks the silence of the will.

Such a combination of individualism and activism puts our dialectic in a position where we may view the world as an outer whole and an inner unity. Then we are ready to ask, "What is the ego's place in the world? Has the ego a work to do? What is the ego's fate?" Philosophy is not pledged to support mere cosmology or mere psychology, yet it cannot discuss the world apart from the

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 208.

² *Parm.*, 131.

self or the self apart from the world. But in discussing the question of relation between the inner and the outer, its work is not merely the work of the perceptualist, who investigates the speculative activity of the self in its endeavour to understand its world; the self has a work of its own to do, so that activism must account for the motives that lead to such a gigantic enterprise.

3. THE PROBLEM OF THE EGO

With activism assuming responsibility for the world, it now becomes the privilege of dialectics to say a word for the ego. While true philosophy cannot share the irony that Socrates entertained for purely speculative problems, it agrees with him in making the knowledge of self more important than knowledge of the selfless world. Man must himself guard the fortunes of the ego in the world, which seems to have no particular interest in individuality. The first duty of dialectics is an egoistic one, consisting in such a kind and degree of self-affirmation as may be possible for the ego in its cosmic position; for this reason, it must set itself within, and guard itself without, against that amiable but fatal fallacy which looks upon selfhood as an accidental feature in the world-whole. The ego is not an event but a deed, and he who has learned his ontological lesson acts accordingly: he becomes himself. This frank egoism is not irrational, however; it assumes also that the self cannot search its title to the world without becoming dispassionate and disinterested in its attitude, where it asks only the artist's possessorship of the kingdom of time and space. Such is the lesson ever inculcated by art and religion, which endeavour to develop grave, calm views of the world that the subject of them may assume right relations to his environment. Alas, could we mortals only come to some understanding with our world! And yet this is being done by the ego, which as contemplator is beginning to realise somewhat of the august position that he occupies in reality.

Dialectics, therefore, may not rest content after it has found the world, for its functions consist none the less in aligning the ego's position therein. Formerly this art of individualistic study was devoted to the soul, which now stands in scant favour among men of science and speculation, so that if the soul is to resume its place, it must do so by its own efforts and not through favour. Interesting as it may be to observe how idealism has ever subsumed the thinker under one of his own thoughts, as "life," "idea," or "being," it is more useful to remark that the idealist has received his just deserts in the realist's repudiation of the soul. When the rationalist was in possession of the world, as in the days of Scholasticism and Transcendentalism, he refused to call his soul his own, so that now it has become necessary for the egoist to arise and restore the soul to its lost owner: its self. And with the return of the ego, the world of dialectics must abandon its selfless objectivity and suffer the ego to rejoice in its own light. This will produce a problem, but the position and calling of the ego could hardly be demonstrated with effort. If it were not for the ego and his invasion of the world, there would be no metaphysical problem at all; for the ego is the problem itself, whether discussed by proxy, when the place of the self is taken by some impersonal principle, or directly, as in the case of the present dialectic.

The endeavour to be naïve, and thus surrender the self for the sake of viewing things as they are, obliterates all line and destroys all tone in the cosmic picture. "If I stay," said Dante, "who goes; if I go, who stays?" Without the ego there can be no comedy, human or divine; if the ego goes, who stays; if it stays, who goes? Such an assertion is not to be confused with that which is wont to appear in the literature of subjective idealism and its adversary, where the withdrawal of the percipient mind seems to threaten the existence of things over which it has exercised a kind of malicious mental hypnotism. Such a withdrawal is represented in a temporal fashion in the

midst of a real order long since established upon some other than a perceptual basis; so that to say of things, that their *esse* is their *percipi* is to say nothing of their metaphysical basis. The ego is in the world, hence it cannot come and go at will; all problems of being and thinking, therefore, must make their calculations upon the basis of this *actio immanens*. The work of the ego, instead of consisting of the creative and destructive activity of Brahma and Siva, is nothing more or less than that of restoring order in its own kingdom, the realm of appearance, activity, and reality. So great is the temptation to objectify, that the ego must resist the world with all the weapons of its internal warfare, ever lifting its proud head and saying, *Et ego in Arcadia*. Such an egoism is far removed from any system of selfless idealism, with its ambition for gaining a purely perceptual possession of the world. Egoism seeks to secure possession of itself in a world-order where all facts are impersonal, all tendencies outward, all events indifferent. To base the world upon the ego is the subjectivism of the infant mind, but to force an entrance into the various strongholds of the universe is a right due the self, the heir of all reality.

The question of the place of the self in the world is not as foreign to philosophy as some of the foregoing propositions might seem to indicate. Where philosophy has looked upon the phenomenal in such a manner as to include consciousness, where the world of causality has found it expedient to accept or reject the will, where the ontological order in general has adopted some attitude toward the mind, there the cause of the ego has been presented. In the present dialectic, however, the problem with its question of psycho-physical parallelism, the puzzle of the will and the mystery of interaction are both discussed in such a way as to come to a climax in the final of the world as appearance, where the ego finds its place through subjectivity, as also in the view of the world as activity, where the ego asserts itself in freedom. By means of self-consciousness and self-activity, therefore, the ego is able to become itself, if not

also to gain a certain ascendancy over the world ; while in the final view of the problem, where the self finds something irresistible, it thus learns to believe that it has encountered inexorable reality. Our own age has witnessed the rise of egoism in the form of revolt, for the self has been affirmed in a spirit of rebellion against both physical and social solidarity.

The ego must make a place for itself in the world of things and persons, where the usual forces go to establish the general and ordinary rather than the unique and exceptional. In our own day the keenest examples of self-assertion come from Slavonic and Scandinavian quarters, where the rebellion against the established has been most pronounced. There, with Nietzsche and his Polish pride, with Gorky and his anarchy, with Ibsen's indignation and Strindberg's outburst, we find that selfhood is an irreducible element in all masses of solidarity, whether of nature or society. With these tendencies toward the unique, it is the duty of philosophy to settle ; and this it must do if it is to account for genuine humanity in a real world, for self-conscious intelligence is seeking a suitable place in the world-whole, wondering whether after all life has a home for it. This is the doubt that stings, because man cannot for ever rest content in the contemplation of the world in its mere naturalness, or mankind as an impersonal mass.

4. THE METAPHYSICAL MOTIVES

When philosophy pauses to consider the spiritual motives that urge the thinker onward to his goal, it will find that these may be classified in accordance with the division that our dialectic has itself in considering the forms of reality. These leading motives are either æsthetical, ethical, or religious, at any rate they may be associated with these three forms of human culture ; although evolved and evaluated from within they disclose three disparate spiritual conditions. In the æsthetic type of inner life the tone of consciousness is that of *superabundance*, a sense of extra power due to the

fact that the ego is aware of nothing more than a world of sense over which it can easily triumph. With the ethical estimate of reality the feeling of spiritual life is one of *sufficiency*, prompted by the knowledge that the will is able to assert itself in opposition to the inimical forces of nature. The spiritual or religious sense of being indicates a decline from the tone of sufficiency, as this also was a decline from that of superabundance; the *motif* operative here is one of *want*, for the mind becomes conscious of a Beyond, whose inaccessibility creates a feeling of inadequacy on the part of the beholding ego. In each motive the obstacle that reality presents becomes more and more a matter of concern and anxiety.

(1) The æsthetic sense of superabundance creates the phenomenal order as order, and finds no difficulty in appointing the ego the ruler of reality. The confidence expressed by our present-day scientist was originally the prerogative of the seer, who in his own manner had secured possession of reality, and whose song was but the celebration of his conquest. Vedanta is a clear and well-nigh convincing exposition of this victory achieved by the superabundance of the self as rose above the world of outer facts. "The Infinite indeed is below, above, behind, before, right, and left—it is indeed all this." Now follows the explanation of the Infinite as the I: I am below, I am above, I am behind, before, right, and left—I am all this. This characteristic doctrine of Vedanta, which identifies the self with the world, places the devotee in such a position that he becomes "lord and master in all worlds."¹ With Platonism the same idealistic supremacy is attributed to the "friends of the ideas—*εἰδῶν φίλοι*," who ruled over the lower forms of nature as they ruled over the lower classes of men. They were not the slaves but masters of reality, although their world-order was neither the Christian realm of spirit nor the modern kingdom of nature. These make the conquest of the real on the part of the ego a task far more complicated.

¹ *Khândogya Upanishad*, tr. Müller, vii. 25.

In the realm of modern culture, as in the dialectics of antiquity, the close affiliation with nature brings about the experience of excess; indeed the modern form of culture is largely due to an attempt on the part of the genius to escape from the nostalgia aroused by humanity's departure from the immediate order of nature. Among moderns Goethe is the best example of one who has known how to triumph over all self-despection and fear. With Schiller, this reunion with nature, ever sought but never wholly found, was an enterprise more costly, an undertaking more painful. Like Schiller, Nietzsche craved that inward perfection which is supposed to come from communion with Nature and Paganism, with their lack of subjectivity and compunction, and in his desire to the romanticism of need and longing he could postulate nothing but a classic, or as he preferred to style it, Dionysiac pessimism.¹ Among Nietzsche's followers, Sudermann has been the most successful in sustaining the sense of superabundance, so that his eudæmonism seems less strained and more like the outcome of his own nature. Ibsen is more characteristic of the present, which vacillates between the culture of strength and the culture of weakness, the ethics of fullness and the ethics of want, a mixed mood which hardly knows whether it is wiser to resist spiritual life or pursue sense.

(2) The rationalistic sense of sufficiency, in both ethics and metaphysics, creates a staid dialectic wholly different in conception and effect from the extremes of fullness and want, as found in the æsthetic and religious forms of consciousness. These moods, while at opposed poles, have much in common: they participate in the same romantic spirit, and pursue reality with interest and vigour, even where one is inspired by sense, the other by spirit. Such passionate forms of philosophy are unknown in the realm of rationalistic sufficiency, where only the demonstrable is postulated. Here obtains the metaphysical equality of macrocosm and microcosm, the balance of reality and reason. Of this stolid attitude, the Chinese philosophy of

¹ *Fröliche Wissenschaft*, § 370.

immutability, as found in the *Ti King*, is about the oldest example. Aristotle's idea of the Mean, in both his ethics and metaphysics, is significant of this view of sufficiency; being is not wholly ideal, not wholly unreal, life is all sense or all reason. The activism of Aristotle does not run great risks, so that the enclosed Peripatetic philosophy will always remain the model for cautious realism, which expects only a moderate portion of being's benefits. The consciousness that accompanies this style of dialectic is touched with Laodicean toleration, which brings the sense of gratitude the thinker feels when he perceives that he is at least one remove from the lowest order of things. In the life of the average man, where all striving after the remote is unknown, this sense of metaphysical sufficiency produces a moral mediocrity, whose lack of heroism is distressing to contemplate.

The dialectic of self-sufficiency preserves its poise by reacting upon the sensuous, as also by resisting the ideal; its mood is one of dullness, to be explained by the constant devotion to the immediate, and a heavy-browed attitude toward the ideal. Both the moods of excess and want are marked by an abandon to the reigning ideal, but the mood of sufficiency is so cautious as to restrict itself to the exact and useful, the demonstrable and the practical. In the more secular phases of modern thought it appears as a kind of practical scepticism, which rejects the remote and embraces the useful. Montaigne, with his shrewd *Que sais-je?* and cultivated dullness, sought thus to protect himself from the ideal. Stendhal and Flaubert were equally efficient in reacting upon life and the ideal; their mood was marked by *vis inertia* rather than by any positive form of activism. With Anatole France there is a mood of *paisible indifférence*, although his genius will yield to the ideal if it is expressed in an egoistic form. But the dialectic of moderation has no special need of the ego, has no place for him in the vast world without, hence it is only in an impersonal way that such a philosophy may be carried on. So far as conduct is concerned, this rational indifferentism

delivers the ego from both his passions and his ideals, for which reason it forbids greatness of either sense or spirit. And thus, although the dialectic of sufficiency is more advanced than that of superabundance, it is inferior to it as a work of the human spirit.

Thus the important thing is to realise, that, while the two noble conditions of humanity are more fruitful, mental mediocrity is the most common in fact and, strange to say, the one most often praised by moralists as the most meritorious. Without indicating the nature of the extreme moods of power and want, Ernest Hello has not failed to point out the pathos of the intermediate one, whose subject he styles *l'homme mediocre*. The man of mediocrity is one who knows no spiritual struggle, is satisfied with success instead of seeking glory, content with custom instead of asserting independence; knowing nothing of either grandeur or misery, of being or naught, never rising in rapture nor sinking in the abyss, he presents a painful contrast to the superior man with his struggles after the ideal.¹ Hello, whose sense of spiritual want is keen, refrains from expressing his ideal in egoistic terminology, and yet the essence of selfhood is to be found everywhere in this work, where it assumes the form of genius, or superior man.

Metaphysics, with its devotion to the general, has ever been indifferent to the unique, so that the genius has been overlooked in a system that found humanity in the average rather than in the exceptional man. Nevertheless, the claims of idealism, which has been so neglectful of genius, find their most consistent argument and most convincing expression in a view of mankind which is based upon that totality of human life which appears in the exceptional soul. The dialectics of the average man can reveal little more than the advanced animality of the race. It is not to be denied that, in the instinctiveness which seeks food and drink, clothing and shelter, some measure of human life may be found; but it is none the less true that man as man seeks the disinterested satisfactions of art and

¹ *L'Homme*, 3rd ed., i. pp. 65-6.

science, so that philosophy is short-sighted when it considers the mediocre man with his immediate needs, and ignores the exalted mind with its ideal aims. Thus, in the complete denotation of man, it becomes necessary to add to the concept those marks that indicate the pursuit of ultimates, as well as those that involve the search after mere immediacies. So influential has been the notion of metaphysical and moral sufficiency, that dialectics has become sordid in its discussions of the real, for which reason the intellectualistic view of life, as here entertained, will find it expedient to call attention to those extra-economic interests that make up human culture. Certain it is that a dialectic which strives to relate man to the world must not be so ready to capitulate to the instinctive, that it lose sight of the inexorable intellectualism that invests the mind of man.

(3) The view of reality that is inspired by a sense of want finds nothing in either the world of immediacy or activity, hence it postulates a Beyond, as that which alone can convince and satisfy. In Buddhism, the Beyond is nothing objectively real, for where Vedanta found reality in the objective Self, Buddhism recognised no self but the inner and subjective one, whose fate is the naught of Nirvana; nevertheless, Buddhism postulates that hunger for reality which characterises the dialectics of the third order, although as a system it is unable to satisfy this craving. In Christianity the tertiary form of being appears in the character of a desire for spiritual life, which alienates man from the world that produced him and renders him antagonistic toward it. Without pausing to question the ultimate validity and satisfaction of such an extraordinary attitude, the early Christian set up his ideal of a Beyond, and condemned, as enmity toward God, the friendship with the world of immediacy—*ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου*. Plato's love for the ideas could hardly be praised by the apostle, because the ideas were too closely allied with the world of sense. In the religious consciousness the egos that are supposed to participate in the world of spirit are, not the

artistic souls that rejoice in their superabundance, nor yet the ethical minds that are sufficient unto themselves, but the longing ones who hunger and thirst after righteousness—*οἱ πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες*. In contrast with the assurance of the æsthetic ego, that is content to share nature with the other forms of time and space, where its position is that of first among equals, in competition with the active ego, in the world of forces, the longing of the spiritual self is striking in its pathos. The spiritual order may or may not exist, but the reality of the desire for it can never be questioned; this desire is a factor which we must take into account.

He who doubts the validity of such a mood of want will do well to consider how much our human culture is indebted to the dreams of the poor in spirit. Given a sense of superabundance of natural vigour, with the creative will taken up with its recreations in the world of immediacy, or given the mediocrity of the will in its rational reaction upon the dynamic order of things, and there still remains the world of ideal values to be explained. All spiritual life is due, not to excess or sufficiency, but to a sense of dissatisfaction with human experience; hence, where eudæmonism or activism prevails, there can be no sufficient idea of or progress toward a Beyond. Hume was half-right, half-wrong when he called religion a "sick-man's dream";¹ for, with all the dangers of delusion incident upon the longing for something extra and exceptional in experience, it cannot be denied that the dream of the discontented has given history the various forms of romantic dialectics, in which the ideal has been so thoroughly nourished. Through an inordinate sensitivity to an imperceptible grade of existence, through a spontaneity which recoils from the fixed world of fact, the religious consciousness has learned how to transcend the average world of experience.

Springing from the various views of reality, whether as appearance, activity, or substantiality, the three moods become indicative of the ascending forms of the world-order.

¹ *Nat. Hist. of Religion*, sec. xv.

Those who follow the æsthetic, eudæmonistic method, will find nothing more than a world of phenomena, whose varying forms entertain the festive heart. They who pursue the ethical plan of activism will demand something deeper in the form of a world of energies with which the will may busy itself in its reactions. Finally, such as have through superabundance and sufficiency come to a sense of want will be satisfied with nothing less than a self-existent, spiritual order. Like the art of Raphael, reality is possessed of three manners; its forms are found in three worlds—of sense, will, intellect. In all of these it is the same ego that is at work, whether contemplating, creating, or desiring communion with that which is beyond. In the mood of want the self cannot believe that its ideals and values exist *in intellectu solo*, hence it postulates them as real; out of them it builds its world; in their shadow it seeks to live a life of inwardness. The larger history of dialectics bears the record of chosen souls whose strivings have connected them with the particular order of life for which they sought to perfect themselves, whether as artists, workers, or pietists.

Among those who have rejoiced in the mood of superabundance are the Vedists, with their pantheistic impressionism; Plato, with his erotic and dialectic; Scotus Erigena, and his apotheosis of nature; Abelard, the amorous idealist; Giordano Bruno, and his unity with the world of sense; Goethe, prince in the realm of superabundance; Schiller, with his cultivated *naïveté*; Shelley and Byron; Balzac, whose own monomania was the real; Emerson, in his cheerful sense of being; Fechner, the floral idealist; Baudelaire and his diabolism; Nietzsche, and his "will-to-power"; Sudermann, or faunal idealism; Pierre Loti, with his heart-felt naturism.

The dialectical cult of sufficiency enlists the early Tãoists, with their nihilistic dialectics; Socrates, who refused to quit the prison of thought; Aristotle, with his means of mediocrity; Duns Scotus, or *voluntas superior est intellectu*; Bacon, and his culture of utility; Montaigne,

or doubt of the extraordinary; Descartes, or *res cogitans* without content; Leibnitz, whose pre-established harmony quenches spontaneity; Voltaire, and the *jardin* of work; Kant, betrayed by his moralism; Stendhal, or the resultlessness of existence; Herbart, satisfied with the static; Flaubert and Turgenieff; Lotze, or "reality richer than thought"; Wundt, and his psychological voluntarism; Anatole France, or the soul armed against its ideals; Bergson, or belief in instinct.

Those who hunger and thirst for the Inaccessible include Buddhists and Christians; Plotinus, who postulated a "beyond being"; Augustine, with his restless pursuit of Godhead; Anselm, whose Deity was not *in intellectu solo*; Dante, or the longing for paradise; Pascal, or intellectual self-abasement; Geulincx, and his *relinque te ipsum*; Spinoza, or *amor Dei intellectualis*; Fichte, or spiritual self-assertion; Friedrich Schlegel, or *Ironie*; Schleiermacher, and his confession of absolute dependence; Schopenhauer, and the negation of the will-to-live; Wagner, with his *Entsagungsmotiv*; Huysmans, or the road to Damascus; Vielliers de L'Isle Adam, or the rejection of life; Tolstoi, and the silence of spirit; Hauptmann, and his sunken bell of selfhood; Eucken, and absolute culture; Ernest Hello, a child of the Infinite.

5. DIALECTICS AS KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURE

From the foregoing description of the several mental states that preside over the ego's contemplation of the world, it would seem to follow that the preliminary question is not whether knowledge is possible, but whether it is desirable. The self is within a world-order, with which it seeks to become acquainted; hence the problem is not one of the possibility of reason reaching its mental mark, but a complete dialectic which endeavours to find the place that the ego occupies in the world. Thus we must inquire concerning the culture of the world, its most complete form, its intrinsic value. One does not refrain

from the study of morality until he has assured himself that the will is strong enough to assume its ethical duties; why, then, should he avoid metaphysics until he is convinced that the understanding is adapted to the problem of ontology? Reality seems to consist of degrees, as the phenomenal, the causal, the substantial; when, therefore, it is claimed that reality is unknowable, it is assumed that the problem of being consists of the knowledge of a less inclusive reality, of more homogeneous construction. Moreover, the epistemological anxiety displayed by a certain school of philosophy further assumes that reality exists exclusively in itself, apart from those definite determinations that might make the apprehension of it possible. But the conception of reality to which our dialectic is pledged has nothing to do with any thing-in-itself, but involves a richer notion of the real, according to which thinghood is found to consist in qualities and actions. Knowledge, therefore, is something we may have; we accept or reject it according to our view of life; if we believe that all culture is in vain, we seek consolation in practical life, whether of a purely ethical or a more humanistic nature.

The question of the desirability of dialectics is a real one in the life of a creature like man, who cannot always be persuaded that art and science, ethics and religion, are imperative. As human beings, we can exist without these forms of spiritual life, but apart from them we cannot possess the kingdom of reality. Moreover, the inferior phases of being, appearance and activity, conduce to the happy, useful life without yielding a view of ultimate being, so that dialectics is opposed by the utilitarian rather than by the sceptic, who is himself a kind of half-defender of intellectual faith. Where the point of view, as in the present case, is the egoistic one, the question arises, What is philosophy to do with the intellectual powers of the self if it allows realism so to circumscribe the field of thought that the self has no opportunity to exercise its power of contemplation and ideal action? Science will not suffice for the ego, which has interests which lead it far beyond the borders

of the exact and demonstrable. Criticism, especially that of the Kantian type, is of value in disclosing new depths within the self, but it becomes misleading when it assumes the ego's position is without the wall of being, the knowledge of which is so anxiously sought by the mind. And when such criticism seeks to content the self in its intellectual striving, by ascribing to it extra-moral duties, it overlooks the fact that a part of human life consists in exercising the functions of cognition, whence the resort to excessive activity in the practical world is for ever in vain. Still more cogent is this argument in connection with the social substitutes for knowledge that our own age advances. If the knowledge of being were not real knowledge, the attempt to give ethical and social compensation for the loss of it would be wholly without meaning; hence we must conclude that when philosophy decides against knowledge, it is not because it is wanting in ability to discover what it seeks, but because it is lacking in taste for the intellectual. The dialectical question, therefore, is one of culture and intellectual life, rather than of epistemological theory. It is the decadent age, as Stoicism coming after the climax of Greek idealism, Kantianism at the close of the Enlightenment, which despairs of solving its problems in any intellectual way.

Important as the problem of knowledge may be, it is subordinate to the question of culture, which views the inner life of the ego as a whole. The question that confronts us is whether knowledge is worth while, a question concerning the value rather than the validity of human knowledge. Instead of being sceptical, our age is rather credulous; that is, so far as the facts of exterior existence are concerned. The leading example of this is to be found, of course, in science, which has endeavoured to carry on the intellectual work of the ego in the world. But science, instead of establishing the lordship over the soul that was exercised by ancient dialectics and mediæval theology, has merely ruled over a petty principality. And science has suffered itself to become utilitarian, hence it cannot hope to accommodate itself to the free play of consciousness that makes for

the intellectual life of the ego. Of this ego, as an independent principle in the world-whole, science knows nothing, so that he who sees in human culture an inner life, removed from the exterior order of sense, must look elsewhere than to science.

The dialectic of culture shows us how inexorable are the demands of the internal and remote; these must be recognised if the ego is to adjust itself to its proper place in the world. To withdraw from the world and assert the independence of the self is the first problem of all culture; dialectically, it serves to demonstrate the fact that the ego is not a thing among other things in the world, but a form of being which deserves and demands special ontological treatment. Those who cling to intellectualism are not insisting upon a traditional method of reasoning, because of its logical completeness; they are persuaded that the thought-factor, with its inward and disinterested methods, is best calculated to further the interests of spiritual life. It is not to be denied those who adhere to the forms of rationalism have nothing authentic to say concerning the inner life of the self, while others, among whom Eucken is pre-eminent, criticise and cast out intellectualism, while they still uphold the reality of spiritual life. The method of the present dialectic, of considering reason apart from spiritual life, or spiritual life apart from reason, endeavours to conceive and express the characteristic forms of that life by means of the intellect. Given the task of supporting the inner life of the ego, the intellect is thus persuaded to abandon somewhat of its formalism, for its true task consists in realising the self rather than in representing the world. This is not in any sense an overture to irrationalism, but simply a desire to emphasize the living and concrete rather than the abstract and formal; the elements in reason that are most essential in the spiritual life of the ego are those of inness and remoteness. Further, to deliver our dialectic of selfhood from the opprobrium that commonly attaches to rationalism, it may be observed that the inward realisation of the ego that we seek to effect through the furtherance of the intellect is not

to become a fact without a deliberate and characteristic work on the part of the self. The ego, upheld by the intellect, is instructed in the art of becoming itself—*rentre toi-même*—that is its chief dialectical duty.

In addition to the ideal of inwardness that invests the ego and its culture, philosophy points the fact that the nature of the self and its relation to the world are such that there must be involved another element—that of the Remote. Thus, in order to be itself, the ego is called upon to withdraw from the immediacies of perception and interest, so directly connected as these are with the life of instinct. In his ordinary occupations, man neither knows nor wills the real, whose essential nature is somewhat remote from the common processes of cognition and conation. The remoteness that is peculiar to dialectical culture is responsible for the distrust and, indeed, repudiation habitually suffered by human culture; a condition of things most acute in an age like our own, where the principles of immediate certainty and direct application are ever urged upon us by the social and economic forces that have us in hand. All forms of immediacy and instinctiveness conspire to defeat the ego's attempt to secure its independence in the world, whose purpose regarding it the self would fain decipher. Where a dialectic is anxious to find a place for selfhood in nature, it must be prepared to pursue its ideals to the remote, for it is by means of the Beyond that the ego becomes itself.

The adjustment of the ego to the world in the latter's triple aspect of appearance, activity, and substantiality, involves three distinct movements, dependent upon the form of the world and the degree of selfhood under consideration. First in order comes the question concerning the *place* that the self occupies in the world of appearance. Does the ego hold a purely eccentric position, or its seat at the very centre of being? In addition to this problem of the phenomenalist place of the self, our dialectic must advance to the world of activity, where it will be called upon to consider the *work* of the ego in the world of forces;

then it may be possible to determine whether the self has a world-work to perform. Finally, after the struggle to assert real selfhood as something superior to mere appearance and activity, there comes another conquest, in the midst of which the ego learns to consider its *fate* in the world-whole. As the world is given in the forms of appearance, activity, reality, so the ego will be found to assert itself as self-consciousness, self-activity, and selfhood. Apparently the world, while not inviting selfhood, is in no position to forbid it, for it seems to possess some of the imperfections that in the case of humanity seem so distressing. The phenomenal order makes possible the construction of reality, not of mere being whose ontological completeness would provide no place for the self, but out of separate qualities, whose empirical character is in no sense alien to the methods of self-consciousness. The world of activity, dependent as it is upon the principle of time, cannot prevent the entrance of the ego with its self-activity. Within the final and real order of being, the possibilities of illusion and negation are such as to apprise us that here likewise the presence of the ego must be appreciated, for the world-whole could hardly be conceived of apart from selfhood.

The complete world-order, therefore, involving the phenomenal, the causal, the real without, and the self-conscious, the self-active, the self-existent within, has been referred to by the Sankhya philosophy in connection with its Tamas, Rajas, and Satva Gunas; by Plato, with his mental functions of *Θύμος*, *ἐπιθυμία*, *νοῦς*; by St. Paul, whose Deity was One, *ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἐσμέν*; ¹ as also by Eucken, with his *Leben, Schaffen, Geist*. The ego exists, but its being is found in no one phase of consciousness alone, but three which correspond to the threefold order of reality.

¹ Acts xvii. 28.

BOOK I

THE WORLD OF APPEARANCE
THE SELF AS CONSCIOUSNESS



THE PRELIMINARY VIEW OF BEING

THE preliminary order of existence is found in the world of appearance; this does not justify the expression "the world *as* appearance," for that would suggest that phenomenality, instead of constituting a phase of reality, was only a mask assumed by the world, or a curtain that screens the world from the human mind. From the standpoint of the present dialectic, the world of appearance is real to a certain limited extent, while the distinction between reality and appearance is one of degree rather than of quality. It is the same world which here reveals itself to sense, here is seen more thoroughly by the mind; if the senses could think, the world would be to them an intelligible order, where under the present conditions it is only sensible. The advantage of such a phenomeno-real world-view will appear the moment we come to the problem of thinghood, for then, instead of being confronted by two worlds, the phenomenal and the real, metaphysics will be confronted by the single world of reality, the preliminary view of which is to be found as appearance. Reality will thus be found to lie within rather than beyond appearance, while the difference between the two views will consist in the fact that one is the first, the other the final view of that which exists.

The present view of the world of appearance will lead us to the view that, while the real world is in no sense the same as the world of appearance, it is made up of qualities which are found in the phenomenal order. Appearance is only appearance; could one expect more of it? But to regard it as a delusion because it does not assume the importance of the real order of things is to miss the spirit

of existence ; at the same time, the interpretation of appearance as illusion does not do justice to the latter. Illusion and negation are far more serious affairs than the naïve apprehension of the sensuous order can for a moment indicate ; for this reason, our dialectic, when it seeks to come to an understanding with reality, will discuss the problem of illusion more earnestly than any notion of the superficiality of the sensuous world would imply. Appearance does not distort but merely veils reality ; it is translucent even when not perfectly clear ; it gives us to understand that something verily exists, even when it shows us that the more complete nature of the real must be sought further on in connection with causality and substance. To be is not simply to be ; to be is to appear and to act, and while appearance is itself only appearance, it does not fail to suggest that it is not existing and manifesting itself on its own responsibility, but for the sake of something more essential and worthy.

In the course of the discussion of appearance, certain ontological topics will come in for treatment, while others which might be expected to cast in their fortunes with the phenomenal world will be absent from the list. Thus our dialectic can hardly discuss phenomenality without involving spatiality, which constitutes the most essential feature of the sensuous order of existence. On the other hand, one should not expect to find time in the list of topics phenomenalist, even when the temporal and the spatial have habitually appeared together in the ontological programme. The treatment of time is reserved for the intermediate view of existence, where the artistic method of estimating the real will be in force. This separation of space and time will be accompanied by a distinction between two phases of the psycho-physical problem, for where in the world of appearance we seek to account for sensational consciousness in connection with the effect of the outer world on inner life, the complementary discussion of the reaction of that inner life, as the ego seeks to put its will into the world, cannot be taken up until the discussion of the world of activity gives us to understand

just what is expected of causality. In this way the relation of stimulus to sensation offers a problem quite different from the question of the mind's relation to the body, where motive attempts to produce motion.

The human self, whose place in the world is our question, will be found to express its inner nature in the form of consciousness; other things are expected of the ego, but in the world of appearance it is sufficient for it to make its presence felt as an awareness. In this way the analysis of consciousness will only prepare the way for the discussion of the ego as the will to selfhood, and as selfhood indeed. Here, in the preliminary view of existence, we shall begin with appearance as such, and end with consciousness in the self; then we shall be in a position where we may fitly inquire whether the self has any place in the world. In the pursuit of this double interest, we shall consider the world and the self as of equal importance, although we may find it expedient to emphasize the presence and importance of the ego. This is due to the feeling that, as a rule, the world of things is able to take care of itself, while the human self, so prone to neglect its interior existence, so ready to doubt its own being, stands in need of dialectical furtherance. Our dialectic seeks an answer to the question, What is the world? but it is not without interest in the question, Who is man? All that can be accomplished upon the plane of appearance is the identification of the immediate interiority of the self and its position in the world. The spirit in which this inquiry will be conducted will be *æsthetical*. The companion disciplines of ethics and religion will appear and exert their influence when more advanced stages of reality have been reached.

I

REALITY AS FOUND IN APPEARANCE

THE attempt on the part of the self to be itself in the world has the immediate effect of producing three distinct attitudes toward the world of appearance, each one depending upon a distinct ontological mood. When the thinker's mood is one of superabundance, his attitude toward the phenomenal world will be triumphant, whether in pleasure or pain, in comedy or tragedy, in classicism or romanticism. Given the mood of sufficiency, and the thinker's attitude toward the surrounding order of things will be that of an optimistic satisfaction in all that is, and in such a mood there will be no real joyousness, no painful surprise. Where want and spiritual hunger are in the ascendancy, the mind of the thinker can only contemplate the world in the spirit of distrust and disappointment, and while this mood seems to accept the world of sense, it is really looking through this to the world of being. The world of appearance is one and the same, but the estimates set upon it produce three different dialectical tendencies; there is no royal road to reality, so that he who would arrive at being must follow the long lane of appearance. Nevertheless, artist, scientist, and religionist pursue the path each in his own way, according to his own *tempo*.

1. THE ATTITUDE TOWARD APPEARANCE

(1) The æsthetic attitude toward the world of appearance is characterised by a victorious sense of humanity, which has taken the problem of life so lightly that it feels full to overflowing. Whatever the primitive condition

of mankind may have been, it stands out in our modern minds as something naïve and joyous, so that rhapsodists like Rousseau, Schiller, and Nietzsche strive to rehabilitate pure, strong mentality of nature. In this manner nature has become transfigured, and now serves a symbolistic purpose in the poetic mind. This is not to assert that the naturistic man was ever optimistic; nature did not ever smile upon him, his mood was not invariably joyous. But the primitive will was always strong, and its pessimism was a "pessimism of strength." Mythology shows us how man has idealised his fears as well as his hopes, his hatred as well as his love; as Ernest Hello expresses it, "Earth has given names to the stars, and these names are the names of demons."¹ Thus the optimo-pessimism of the primitive mind was due to the feeling that the world was the veritable home of mankind, while man himself was more than equal to the problems that this world presented.

In Aryan thought both Vedism and Hellenism reveal the mind as in command of itself; the prevailing tone is one of superabundance, and the will has not begun to bend in the presence of reality. Hence the organisation of the world was carried on in the spirit of interest as upon the basis of immediacy. Man is as far above optimism as he is above pessimism; the threat of mental mediocrity has not manifested itself, and without the aid of science the mind has secured control of the sensible world. The world of appearance is coloured by human interest, while the ego exists without the extravagant forms of self-assertion which arise when man becomes social and scientific. In this manifold of appearances and interests, the poetic ego easily finds itself and its place; its inner mood makes it more than sufficient to the exigencies of worldly existence.

The quality of dialectic which arises and floats upon the surface of such superabundance of existence is that of impressionism; touching the world at a tangent, living his spiritual life lightly, the primitive man is delivered

¹ *L'Homme*, 3rd ed., i. p. 3.

from both realism and idealism. There prevail in this primitive mood both naturism and humanism, whose special forms are blended in the epic of existence. The exteriority of existence is indeed uppermost, but since the natural world has not yet undergone the petrification of scientific systematisation, there is nothing to forbid the existence and expression of spiritual life. The mind in its superabundance finds none of that resistance to freedom which plagued the philosophy of a later period; the freedom of man is here an inner one, which depends wholly upon his inherent power. The position of the self is that of one element among others, but inasmuch as selfhood is naught save the feeling of self, where the "I will" and the "I think" are still dormant, man finds no fault with his fate. Where the scientific mood of sufficiency was to dispense with the self, where the religious temperament was to retaliate by casting doubt upon the world, the poetic sense of excess of existence was satisfied with the ego as that which is given within, as the very essence of conscious life. Mankind was as near the self as it was near the world; as yet it had not been called upon to take part both as actor and spectator in the dramatic conflict between the inner self and the outer world.

(2) The mood of sufficiency surveys the world in stolid fashion which forbids appreciation and surprise. The scientific consciousness conceives of the breach between reality and appearance, but this it closes so quickly that its presence is hardly noticed, while the pain it should cause is scarcely felt. Inasmuch as scientism refuses to share the naïve mood of art and the spiritual want of religion, it places itself in a mid-position, where the joys of the one and the woes of the other are unknown. Scientism, with its sense of sufficiency in the presence of the phenomenal world, refuses to participate in the æsthetic union of the sensuous and spiritual, while it is equally disinclined to join the religionist in the repudiation of the world; scientism thus refuses to affirm or deny, so that it is this indifferentism which has separated mind from body, under-

standing from experience, thought from thing. The mood of sufficiency is convinced that, while appearance may not be reality, it follows the analogy of that which verily exists, so that by tracing the line in the air one may expect to follow the real order below. The scruple against seeking the real as such does not forbid the scientific consciousness from seeking the real within the phenomenal, whereby there is brought about a union of appearance and reality, which with Herbart amounts to an identification of the two, as *Schein* and *Sein*.

Appearance is not looked upon as mere appearance, or as the appearance of appearance, but as the appearance of reality. Where the creativeness which comes from the æsthetic sense of superabundance and the religious sense of need is wanting, the acquisition of the phenomenal by the scientific mind is often fatal, since it tends to lower to the level of mere happening the very thought-process which elaborated the whole scientific system. The scales of science show a perfect balance between appearance and reality, inner and outer, freedom and law. In this manner science becomes thoroughly secular; to it is lost the rhapsody of reality, the tragedy of spiritual life, the ecstatic sorrows of existence. Illusion and ideal, suffering and striving, contradiction and doubt are all lost sight of in a mood whose tenor is perfectly mediocre. Where "reality is richer than thought," this heavy mantle of sufficiency spreads out until it has covered and weighed down all ideals, all affirmations; henceforth one must wait for the world to speak, if indeed it may be expected to break the silence; meanwhile the essence of existence must be employed on behalf of the practical. Existence becomes economic, the world a scene, not of art but of activity; spiritual profundity is forbidden, lest one find his ego, for it is the ego which both science and society abhor. The veins of the marble that trace their way inward are ignored by the scientism that is content to polish the surface of the stone.

(3) The mood of want urges the ego to uproot itself and seek the beyond. Quite alien to the mood of suf-

ficiency, this sense of need is best expressed by religion, although it is not so unlike the complementary mood of superabundance in expecting something extraordinary in existence. Both extremes of thought are opposed to the metaphysical mediocrity of scientism. To conceive of reality as purely mundane and practical is to drive the stream of the world into a shallow by-water; at the same time, it tempts the thinker to elaborate the real at the expense of the ideal. In the mood of want the thinker is called upon to choose between mysticism and mediocrity, between need and spiritual satisfaction; in this way it becomes impossible for the egoist to abide by the usual conceptions and customs which rule in the world, even where they promise one to provide a smooth place into which his self will snugly fit. The sense of want finds itself in the world as in a strange land; to this feeling of estrangement, this implicit nostalgia, the true pessimism of philosophy is due. The scientific confidence in appearance is a mood which the religionist cannot share, for he has schooled himself to distrust if not to repudiate immediacy, so that he cannot settle down in the world as that which is given. It cannot be denied that this relentless departure from the world of appearance and interest is an unwonted one, but the history of humanity reveals the august fact that the human ego has refused to remain in a temperate world of happy existence, and has pressed on the poles of its being. The romantic, religious search for truth has led to the turning of the coin, from appearance on the one side to reality on the other, from the mundane realm of Cæsar to the spiritual kingdom of Godhead.

The result of this religious rhapsody, so destructive of all finished science, has been to establish being as such. Vedanta set itself against the world of appearance, and subsumed all phenomena under the objective Self; instead of saying, Things are things, it declared, That art thou—*tat tvam asi!* Christianity registered its opposition to the phenomenal world when it instituted its unfavourable contrast between the soul and the world; it delivered all things

to the soul that the soul might repudiate the world-whole—*κερδαίνω τὸν κόσμον ὅλον*.¹ The power of this pessimism is observed when it is suggested the human spirit has the inward power to lay the foundations of another reality, for it is only as a new world is affirmed that the old one is denied. It is quite possible that the religious departure from the world of appearance may lead to pitfalls, while the turning away from the obvious objects of sense may invite illusion; moreover, there will arise, perhaps, the temptation to postulate the naught, for those who have refused to remain in appearance may be forced to affirm the naught as their ground and goal.

It must not be overlooked that our modern philosophy is indebted to religion for the scientific, by whose aid we are able to present the problem of appearance. Tertullian, as he searches for something beyond appearance, finds it expedient to make use of the word *apparentia*; from his time on mediæval thought distinguished appearance and reality in a religious sense, as classic thought had made use of the distinction in an æsthetic manner. In religion, as well as in art and science, the principle of appearance has its peculiar place, although where art idealises and science rationalises, religion symbolises. Art and religion differ from science in that they receive the phenomenal in a fashion by no means implicit; they accept the phenomenal as a promise of reality, but only as a promise. While they have their own respective contents, which are peculiarly æsthetical or pietistic, they know how to make use of the phenomenal concreteness of the sensuous world, and while they are more lofty than science, they do not find it necessary to indulge in the abstractness of scientific formulas. In the perceptible, appreciable content of art and religion, the essence of the phenomenal is justified; for beauty and piety, instead of being creations out of nothing, are but characteristic ways in which the sensuous world is perfected. Where science cannot refrain from changing sense-impressions into principles and laws, whose nature is purely

¹ Mark viii. 36.

mental, art and religion allow the sensuous world to retain much more of its immediacy. From the foregoing we learn that appearance does more than merely appear; it appeals to the mind, and that in more than one manner. Moreover, to the individualistic consciousness, and from the egoistic point of view, there is nothing extraordinary in the fact that dialectics is confronted by a world of appearance; as ego, man is able to peer through the sensuous and secure a glimpse of the reality which inhabits the universe, informing it with his spirit.

2. THE RECEPTION OF THE REAL THROUGH APPEARANCE

But the mind does something more than survey the world about it; the mind attempts to receive the world. With the other products of nature the idea of receiving reality is not to be considered; sufficient is it for plant and animal to exist and settle their accounts with the world objectively. With the human brain this is not a sufficient statement of the case; this brain must make the attempt to comprehend the world as such. Now, cosmic capacity is not something that can be demonstrated by a special form of human culture, unless that definite human discipline, whether art, science, or religion, is able to show that it aims at an explanation of the world as a whole, even where its attention is often arrested by the particular and practical. Both art and religion have had their turns at receiving the world, and making it their own; to-day science prefers this claim.

The reduction of the phenomenal world to order has offered to the scientist temptations which the artist knew how to resist; scientism has thus drawn a circle around the world of experience, and with all the gravity of his agnosticism has closed his eyes to the Beyond. Two things tend to reveal the hollowness of our modern scientism: the assumption of certainty and the willingness to be satisfied with the given. Dogmatism and optimism have thus con-

spired to betray the world of appearance, which has been encased in inflexible forms known as natural laws. Where human thought, as it awakens to the chaos of the phenomenal world, is anxious to reduce it to order, it is unwilling to assume that it has solved the problem in such a manner as to render science authentic and final ; scientific confidence and scientific certainty are not warranted by the actual condition of things in the world of appearance, where there remains much of the old chaos and contradiction, while there is still the feeling that the desired order cannot be demonstrated without appealing to something more fundamental than appearance. The order of things in the world of appearance is not a demonstrated fact but an ideal, the pursuit of which art is no less authoritative than science. Scientism has sought to close all the doors of the world, lest some soul seek to return to the realm of mystery and the ideal. But how impossible is such a negativistic movement, how far beyond the sweep of scientism is the confusion of the natural world !

Scientism has been strangely at ease in existence ; the given has been sufficient for its ambitions. The optimism that was born of the thought that the order of things had at last been discovered, led scientism to promise much more than it was ever destined to fulfil ; hence the positivistic announcement of Comte, promising to do for humanity what theology and philosophy had never been able to do, begat an optimism whose foundation was laid upon the sand. Science has now become a problem, for it is again appreciated that all forms of intellectual life, art, religion, science, and the like, are but so many different expressions of the one culture-life of inner humanity, so that there is no inherent reason why science should have the truth as its own. No longer may we take science for granted ; it has now become scientism, and must defend itself as religion and philosophy have done. The scientific desire to hush up the question concerning ultimate reality, the hasty assumption that science had achieved enough of existence, the optimistic calm of the positivist have passed into history ;

the world as such has broken away from the hold of scientism and now accuses the latter of having deceived it. That Positivism has not kept its promises was a complaint preferred by the symbolists a score of years ago; the æsthetic consciousness was candid enough to confess that science had not satisfied the needs of the self. The sense of freedom within the self creates the desire to witness the emancipation of reality from appearance; this deliverance is something that science has not had the will to bring about. Science has even added to the burden of the real, and has made it more than ever the prisoner of appearance. Spiritual life has been silenced and driven off to the snowy poles of existence.

As we proceed to consider the way that science and art have affected our human life, it cannot fail to appear that scientism has been conservative rather than courageous in meeting the problem of the ego's life in the world. Scientism has shunned this, and has striven to be impersonal, non-committal, spiritually silent. In the first place, scientism has approached the problem of appearance with the naïve thought that the mind loves nothing but order, as if the primitive chaos of the world did not still haunt our meditations. Æsthetics too has often made this classical assumption, whence it has confined itself to the beautiful, as also to pleasure minus interest. But is the secret of the phenomenal world to be found in the orderly, the beautiful, the pleasurable? These serene moods of mind may be desired as the permanent features of the human spirit, but by what right has modern scientism postulated them as certain? Order is something greatly to be desired, could it be deduced, but the world-whole, no longer the appearance-reality of antiquity but that which has an activist, voluntaristic tendency pervading it, refuses to submit to the rationalising, organising efforts of the optimistic intellect. It is with ontological pessimism that we are called upon to deal; and the complacency of scientism is wholly unjustifiable.

Moreover, science, however skilful it may be in account-

ing for special phenomena and immediate relations among them, is not in a position to justify the world as a whole, to give any answer to the wherefore of existence. This is a task which art and religion have not shunned, hence they are far more important as interpreters of the world of immediacy. Our modern scientism, which laid its foundations while the human spirit was stupefied by the rationalism and classicism of the Enlightenment, was destined to run across obstacles when the Romantic deliverance of the mind took place. Why, then, should we look upon our nineteenth century as a positivistic period, when that very age witnessed the rise of Romanticism and pessimism? Now, Romanticism has not failed to observe the fundamental chaos which invests the world, nor has it overlooked the contradictoriness involved in the ideal of striving out of existence toward a Beyond, whether it be as a reality or as the naught. To the romantic consciousness, which is more modern, more advanced than science itself, the world of appearance is not complete, offers no substantial barriers to the strivings of the free human spirit, has no word to forbid the existence and constant elaboration of the ego's inner life. Scientism has looked upon the phenomenal order as though it were innocent of any possibility of the exceptional, the irrational, the pessimistic; in its *naïveté* this same scientism has expected the world to smile for ever. The optimism of the Enlightenment, however, is a spirit which is far removed from the modern mood as we feel it to-day.

Those who have been by nature predisposed to measure the world as artists and religionists, have often felt envious of scientism with its alleged ability to be radical in its treatment of the world; but is this envy necessary? Has not scientism shown that it has no desire to enhance the flux of the manifold as this is thrust upon us in experience? Scientism has assumed that chaotic, Heraclitean flux is something orderly in plan, well behaved in its relation to the human spirit; but this optimism has never been justified. The underlying contradiction of things, the realistic rush onward, the blind striving of the human will, and all

the confusion that voluntarism and pessimism have revealed, are far from being in harmony with the laws deduced by scientism. "Is scientism," asks Nietzsche, "only fear and evasion of pessimism?"¹ It is true that science promises much in the way of peace, but at what a cost! To be scientific one must give up his "soul," and with it the independent existence of the inner life; then, all effort must be impersonal, immediate, utilitarian. Is there not something of illusion in this, and has not science asked payment for relieving us of the pessimism in all existence? We cannot procure peace at the price of the soul.

The way in which art and religion have met the world of appearance is well known, but needs to become better appreciated. Art has produced beauty only after a long struggle with ugliness and contradiction; religion has secured peace through faith only by means of a redemption from the madness of the sensuous world. Both forms of human culture make it plain to us that they observe and fully realise the seriousness of the situation, for where art creates tragedy, by which it reveals the strife of the world with itself, religion never refrains from concealing the pessimism inherent in sin and misery. Science has shown its distaste for the horrible and irregular in its absurd treatment of the problem of genius, as this is carried on by such scientists as Lombroso and Nordau. In its expectation of order and optimism, science is annoyed in finding that the superior souls among the sons of men are not amenable to the usual principles of psycho-physiology; hence science repudiates genius as that which is demented.

In the capacity of the evangel of existence, scientism has indulged in excess of explanation; thus the unreasonable has become the unreal, while the æsthetic and religious formulations of the question of order have seemed untenable because inexact. As far back as the days of Faust, the scientific intellect, anxious to reduce the world to order, was known to employ magic and the Mephistophelian to accomplish its theoretical purpose; the close of the nine-

¹ *The Birth of Tragedy*, tr. Haussmann, p. 3.

teenth century witnessed scientism declaring as "unknowable" anything that could not be reduced to positivistic forms. Has not science shown itself to be somewhat feminine in its adoration of trifles, its refusal to assume metaphysical responsibility, its belief in the conventions of the social order? In its adoration of the pursuit of knowledge, science has given us only a maieutic metaphysics, in which no ontology could be found. At the same time, the scientific reverence for objectivity has resulted in a system of abject selflessness, which has made no provision for the ego, even when the latter was doing all in his power to advance the cause of such science. Moreover, the element of surprise which has ever marked the æsthetic contemplation of the world has had no place in the consciousness of the scientific man, who takes the world as he finds it. But the fact of disorder, that remnant of the original chaos of the world, cannot be set aside by a formula. All genuine thought is anxious to be extricated from the chaotic condition of things, but it is not willing to enjoy this redemption at any hazard; here, science has made promises of happiness and faith which it cannot fulfil.

From such considerations we are led to wonder whether the scientific consciousness has the capacity for existence; if it has not, this conscious capacity must be created. Now art, which is ever creative rather than merely calculating, is adapted to the task of receiving the world of appearance, because it is flexible and without prejudice toward ideals. Scientism has sought to contain the waters of existence in vessels none too deep; it has exerted lordship where it was not itself of royal blood. The superiority of the self, when contrasted with science, is shown in this very question of the reception of reality; for the self as such is able to receive the world, where the scientific consciousness is not. If Plotinus was right in asserting that the eye must be sunlike if it would see the sun, we are safe in assuming that it is because the self is a microcosm that it is able to reflect and to receive the world in its totality.

3. EXPERIENCE AND THE EGO

While experience presents a problem which is usually referred to epistemology, it will not be fruitless to examine the claim which the experience of the ego has when it attempts to receive the world. The appeal that the world of appearance constantly makes to the mind is one which fails in every case except that of the human understanding. There alone do we find a response to the exterior world-order. While we can never overlook or overcome the fact that "our" world is a given world, we must not fail to insist that it is none the less a "world" which we receive. As we saw in the case of the scientific reception of the universe, the question is one of capacity. Idealism, with its faith in the powers of perception and conception, is ever fond of suggesting that the mental act of knowing the world is so influential that, in fact, the mental act has a kind of creative power, so that to be is to be perceived or conceived, all depending upon whether the idealism is Berkeleyian or Platonistic. Empty as this claim seems to be, we will not step aside to betray it, but will content ourselves with the assertion that the reception of the world involves something more than the rationalistic analysis of mind, and even if the receiving aspect of the ego's relation to the world be thus emphasized, the ego consists in something more than faculties of perceiving and thinking; whatever else be said about it, the ego is made up of will, through which, as well as through the understanding, the reception of the world is to be brought about. Hence, if scientism has not the ability to contain reality, rationalism has not the power to create it.

The self cannot emulate the example of Icarus and fly sunward, but the escape from this dialectical danger does not threaten him with another—the entanglement of experience. From experience the self is able to extricate itself; then, and then only, is the self in a position to accept or reject the world. It cannot be denied, even by

the most idealistic, that experience is necessary, yet this fact does not make it supreme; where the servant is necessary, it does not prove that he is master. Experience may be the point of departure without constituting the goal of thought; the mind may accept it temporarily, while it is casting about for a more profound conception of existence. As Herbart said, "We doubt the reality of the given and seek the existent, and our whole hope of finding it depends upon the given."¹ Where thought cannot dispense with the empirically given, nor can it rest content with it. We are thus brought to the realisation that we are not destined to view the world transparently; but in a system which, like the present one, expects to find the ego in a world of things, this realisation is accompanied by no surprise. How could it be otherwise, and with what impossible vision would we contemplate the world about us? The mind receives the given, and by that very act of reception makes its own; the recognition of the given is the first step away from it. Of experience, it may be said that it contains the real, even when it is not itself that real. Our humanistic view-point prepares us for the paradox of experience, and where we have begun to lay emphasis upon the æsthetical as the chief means of apprehending the phenomenal world, we are in a position where we may regard the quasi-sensuous character of the world as something quite after the manner of reality.

Appearance is an appearance of reality; the real cannot exist in itself, but must go forth beyond itself into the realms of activity and appearance. In this way dialectics learns that appearance, which seems to be self-constituted and self-sufficient, is only the result of expressionism on the part of the one real being which inhabits the world-whole. Idealism, whose lack of æsthetic insight has made it unappreciative of the phenomenal world, has not recognised the fact that to be involves the expression of reality in the form of outer appearance, hence idealism has not found it possible to justify appearance. In addition to the

¹ *Metaphysik*, § 198.

need of expression, the real seems to stand in need of being known, so that the phenomenal world is to be regarded as the *ratio cognoscendi* of the substantial order of things. We know that something exists, because something appears; we know that something real exists, because something real appears. Appearance and reality are not upon the same ontological plane, have not the same ontological authority; where philosophy pits one against the other, as it has so often done, the meaning of appearance as the appearance of something not itself, and the idea of reality as that which reveals itself through appearance, are lost to view. Light must cast shadow, shadow surely indicates light; thus reality to be real must appear, while appearance can be no more than the shadow of that which is. For this reason, it is well to avoid the dualism, appearance and reality, and speak of the appearance of reality. Reality cannot expect to exist concealed in the privacy of its being; appearance cannot pretend that it is aught but the manifestation of something other and greater than itself.

In this adjustment of appearance to reality we are assuming that there are grades of being, according to which idea there is some reality in appearance, more in activity, while the superlative grade of existence is found only in substance. At present, where we are following the fortunes of the phenomenal, we are called upon to confess that appearance is more than *apparent*; appearance does appear, but it reveals its degree and kind of reality by thus appearing. The phenomenal thus acquires a dialectical dignity which were impossible were it true that the phenomenal is only an apparent reality. In the character of an appearance of reality, the phenomenal is something more than the ancient τὸ μὴ ὄν, just as it is more truly real than the term appearance would indicate. Sense, which is the counterpart of appearance, is not as inwardly real as volition or cognition; nevertheless, sense has a reality of its own. Of both outer appearance and inner sensation, it may be said that there is a *factum phenomenon* as there is

also a *factum noumenon*. The conjunction of the two in the human mind does not take place after the manner of a conjunction of planet and star, but is inwardly willed by the mind, in which experience is a willed experience, for it is only as the mind actively relates outer impressions to inner ideas that experience is developed.

This active adjustment of the phenomenal to the real explains more fully what was meant by the "reception of the real"; for while the real is given to the ego, it is the ego's experience which receives this real, which otherwise would fail to be recognised. Man's mastery of the phenomenal order is due, not to any superiority of sense, but depends upon his will, which acts as the mediator between reason and sense. Our human experience is not merely what we have felt, but what we have willed; it has its relation to the outer impression, but is not possible without the inner impulse; it is efferent as well as afferent, a deed as well as an impression. Where the world exerts its influence from without, the mind strives from within, so that the relation between the two, instead of resembling the process of photographing upon the receptive mind, suggests the active acquisition of the real through effort. Phenomenality is a necessary phase of our human existence, but it is only a phase; it is the atmosphere in which we breathe and work, but it is a limited atmosphere. Appearance cannot be dismissed as illusory, for illusion is of far different origin; nor can appearance be accepted; hence it must be used. As art finds it impossible to express its ideals through sense as a medium, as religion has not hesitated to clothe itself in the positive, metaphysics should not remain aloof from the phenomenal world, but should seek to reduce this to order. Dialectics can gather the harvest of sense before the frost of abstraction comes to blight it, while the ego can find its place in the world of sense-experience. This is not to say that, in the search for reality, the real is found *as* appearance; the real, however, is found *in* appearance; it is an achievement of the ego, an acquisition by its will.

4. THE REACTION UPON EXPERIENCE

The egoistic interpretation of experience makes it necessary for us to consider the peculiar way in which the ego reacts upon the world which environs it, for the purely scenic, soulless view of the phenomenal order, as this obtains in science, is not the final view of the world of appearance. Dante tells us how he saw in *Inferno* certain sinners who had taken root in the nether world, so that, bearing thorns and breathing their laments, they exclaimed, "Men once were we that now are rooted here";¹ but there is a certain sense in which all mortals are rooted in the world, from which thought alone is able to deliver them. This intellectualising of the life in sense appears in the empirical life of the mind; man alone has experience. In this experience the real is given to the mind; it is not produced by the mind, nor is it found in the world; of it experience is the *ratio cognoscendi*. When the human will reacts upon experience it tills a fertile soil; like the kingdom of Heaven, the real is a treasure hid in a field. As far back as the days of Vedanta it was urged that, "as people may continually walk over golden treasure hidden in the earth without knowing it, so they are ignorant of the true self in Brahman."² The essential factor in the acquisition of the real consists in the idea of reaction upon that which is given; this reaction does not involve the repudiation of the empirical, but is rather a form of activity which brings out of the empirical that which otherwise would lie dormant.

In the reaction of the self upon experience, we observe nothing romantic or cavalier-like; the ego does not indulge in a dialectic which conjures up the world for the sake of conquering it, for the world stands before the ego, defying it to exist in independence. It is thus the ego finds it necessary to uproot itself to exist in its own way, if it is to exist at all. In this reaction upon what is given, the

¹ *Divine Comedy*, tr. Cary, i. 13.

² *Khândogya Upanishad*, viii. 3. 2.

first trace of the real is found. When, therefore, the mind finds it necessary to distinguish between appearance and reality, it discovers that it is further called upon to react upon the outer world in order that it may save itself from mere exteriority. In many ways appearance seems ripe for reality, and readily falls into the basket of the dialectical fruit-gatherer; thus it was with the realism of Herbart, which found in appearance the very counterpart of the world of real relations. But, in many instances, the phenomenal world seems unwilling to give up its secret, as though fearing that to reveal the secret of the gods were to bring down wrath upon its head, so that, if the real is to be revealed, it is by means of activity on the part of the human ego. Accordingly, the various forms of human culture represent so many ways in which the mind has sought to wrest from experience the secret of the reality in and behind it.

In this reactionary operation, experience is the stuff rather than the builder, the servant not the master. In our rationalistic prejudices we are prone to regard the sensuous world about us as a scene to be represented by the perceiving mind, while the mere attitude of the mind is that of activity; perception and performance go hand in hand, so that the reception of the world by the ego is made possible by both impression and volition. Concerning this dual reception of the world, it may be said that, in proportion as the will reacts upon the world, the intellect comprehends that world; and if the motor processes are weak, the sensory ones will be crippled accordingly. Where the will is free, the mind is intelligent; indeed, the intelligible seems to express the nature of both in their perfection. From this point of view of reaction, it begins to appear that experience is something which the human mind fashions out of the raw material of sense.

Experience is not an assemblage of impressions which merely drift together, but an organisation of these according to the purposes of the mind. The empirical reception of the world is made possible by the work of the will, for

experience, instead of being the effect of sensation working from without, is rather a possession of the mind, which seeks to subdue the world. So much will, so much experience; both sensation and intellection are constants, volition is the variable upon whose changes the acquisition of the world depends. The tendency of the mind to will its experience reveals the trans-empirical character of the world in which that mind dwells. Not only is there something beyond experience, however, but there is something behind experience upon the activity of which experience depends. Where dialectics has sought to solve its problems by means of the division of the field into phenomenal and real, it has discovered that a fuller analysis of the world reveals the presence of a tertiary and intermediate factor in the form of activity. Hence, the Platonistic dualism of *φαινόμενον-ὄν* must yield to a division which makes room for the Aristotelian sense of activity, whence the complete statement of the content of the real will involve a system of *φαινόμενον-ἐνέργεια-ὄν*. As the physical view of the problem necessitates the recognition of the dynamic, so the psychological estimate of mind calls upon us to introduce the voluntaristic; in accordance with these changes, dialectics must be prepared to receive the world by means of the peculiar reactions of the mind.

On account of the activistic apprehension of the world, the task of metaphysics consists in something more than relating appearance to reality, sensation to intellection; metaphysics must now seek ideas in actions, for the tendency of the world is not merely to express but also to exert itself. To be is to appear, but it is also to act, while the reception of reality depends upon something more than a form of mental vision which is able to penetrate appearance; in addition to this intellectualistic operation, there must come an activistic apprehension of the energistic world; or, to speak more accurately, the mind which subsumes the manifold of sense under unitary forms of thought must subordinate the manifold of forces within these forms. Where thought has judged the world in the

light of outer impressions, it must also judge it by means of inner activities; for this reason the reception of the world is also a reaction upon it. Where sensations are arranged in a rational order, activities must be directed toward a rational end. Experience is thus made up of a unity of sensation and intellection, of conation and cognition.

That which we call the phenomenal world, far from being anything in nature itself, is a product peculiarly human. Phenomenality is the world-view of a creature which, having his origin in the natural world, learns to break with his habitat and found a humanistic world-order. Apart from the human ego, which is unwilling to accept the exterior world as the real world, there is no phenomenality, for the phenomenal consists of an impression of the world in its totality, an extraordinary idea of which only man is capable. It is the problem of dialectics, not to dismiss appearance as is often done by the religionist in his freedom from ontological responsibility, but to re-organise the sensuous world according to the principles of inner life. It is in this spirit and with this aim that the ego reacts upon the exterior world. Then the world of impressions loses its superficiality and becomes stereoscopic and real. Appearance is a twilight condition of things in which the dying light of sense fuses with the dim light of intellect. From the religious point of view, this repudiation of the exterior world is judged to be wise, aye, necessary, for without it spiritual life cannot come into being; other forms of culture, however, may demur with the idea that, since humanity had its origin in nature, it should not be too free in assuming the possibility of a trans-natural form of existence. Where the rigoristic ethical theory, whose spirit is religious, will counsel man to promote a life other than one of immediacy, eudæmonistic theories hesitate to urge him on beyond the utmost boundaries of the sensible world of feeling. But from either point of view it seems to be admitted that the ego has the world in its hands, to accept or to reject as the desire may be.

From the æsthetic standpoint, it is questioned whether humanity is ever wise in setting up an independent order of being, in opposition to the world, for the reason that man's life is lived in and through the phenomenal. Our modern thought has witnessed movements directed, now against the physical world, now toward it. Among the French, Corneille indulges the idea that man is superior to nature and may find his place in the realm of reason and conscience; Rousseau and the realists, however, insist upon making nature supreme. The naturalistic school seems to forbid interior life, for the sensuous freedom that it allots to the ego does not permit him to pursue a principle of existence other than that which is at work in the winds and rivers. All art seems to feel that one should not run the risk of Prometheus and tell the secrets of spiritual life, for it is in the natural order that human beings seem to have their home. Dialectics, which has nothing authoritative to utter in the midst of such a dispute, may profit by the thought that, as a matter of fact, the actual condition of the human ego is ambiguous, in that the self is neither within the confines of the empirical world, nor wholly detached from these. Upon this circumstance dialectics is built, while it is owing to this that the self must react upon its experience.

II

THE ESSENCE OF THINGHOOD IN ORDER

WHILE reality is different from appearance, it is present in appearance, otherwise appearance would not exist. Dogmatism, which attempts to construct reality out of itself, does not appreciate appearance, so that it is compelled either to ignore it or to regard it as so much illusion. The present dialectic, which hopes to find reality by means of a satisfactory division of the field of human knowledge, has been able to find a certain ontological value in the phenomenal world, although it has not committed itself to appearance or indorsed it. Thus we have learned to regard appearance as symbolical of reality, and while we cannot cease to wonder why the august real should appear to the mind in a sensuous manner, we still realise that this is about as it should be, for the real could hardly appear to the human mind in any other way. The mind has found it possible to accept the phenomenal world, although the act of receiving the sensuous was seen to be so superior that only the human, and not the animal mind was found to be equal to the task. Now arises the question concerning the character of the reality discovered in the phenomenal world. Our dialectic has placed itself in a position where it must adopt a certain point of view, or repudiate what it has asserted about the phenomenal world. Now, the essential question is, whether the real exists in itself or in its qualities as these are made manifest in the world of appearance. Our appreciation of the phenomenal world, an estimate which was influenced by the æsthetical rather than the

scientific, inclines and even obligates us to assert that reality consists in certain qualities rather than in a thing as such.

1. THE FALLACY OF MERE THINGHOOD

While one might expect the mind of man to seek the real among the qualities of thinghood which are manifest in the sensuous world of phenomena, it is a fact that philosophy has usually preferred to look for the real in reality itself. Where primitive Greek philosophy began by the realistic study of being, the real philosophic beginning was made when Parmenides developed his monistic ontology, at the heart of which lay the dogmatic conception of reality as the *ἐστὶν εἶναι*.¹ Plato's classic realism has much the same bent, for the fear of the Heraclitean flux, coupled with the despair at finding truth in the changing phenomena, led Plato to assert that reality is to be found in a trans-phenomenal realm of ideas. In doing this, Plato overlooked the possibilities of the sensuous world, although other forms of Platonism, pre-eminently the doctrine of intuition, reveal the thinker in the attempt to relate the ontological order to the phenomenal one. Among moderns, Spinoza and Kant have struggled most valiantly to uphold the idea of independent, unrelated reality. In Spinoza, substance is defined as that which is *in se et per se concipitur*, so that it becomes unusually difficult for the author of the idea to connect this solitary substance with its all-necessary attributes of thought and extension, which reveal its relation to the inner and outer worlds. Kant reduces the idea of thinghood to absurdity; not only does he reveal the fact that rationalism is not the method of reaching reality, but further indicates that that reality does not consist of a thing in itself. When Kant does realise the ontological possibilities of the phenomenal world, in which reality is immanent, he feels that still he must seek the real in something beyond the phenomenal, while he is unable to make a liberal use of the principle of activity which is for him of

¹ *Fragments*, 43.

a purely moralistic nature. Our own dialectic does not hesitate to seek the real in the midst of the phenomenal, because it knows that the real is destined to avail itself of something more than a purely phenomenalistic form of expression in connection with the principle of activity, while both the phenomenalistic and activistic seem to wait upon the substantialistic for the final justification.

Thinghood, or substance, is doubtless the goal of ontology, but it is not necessarily the starting-point; one cannot ignore the root for the sake of the flower, and this is what dogmatism has long been doing. Since our human world is one of both appearance and reality, to say nothing of the intermediate stage of activity, it is a question whether reality consists in the qualities of the lower or the things of the higher order. Does being consist of attribute or substance? The same question arises in connection with the inner world of consciousness, where we must inquire whether the reality of mind is to be found in the soul or its states. If thought turn away from the qualitative states of inner and outer phenomenality it will lose the rich harvest that nature has prepared for it, and it is only a narrow and dogmatic form of dialectics which affects disdain for the facts of immediate experience. Where a philosophy is at all humanistic, it will not be worried by the thought that the real in the world or the mind is not given directly in the stark form of thinghood, but comes to the mind draped, while it follows a roundabout path to being. If we could say, Now being is, if we could but take hold of reality as such, we should have no troubles in connection with the phenomenalistic order; but such a happy ontological fate is not for man, who must rest content with the impressionism of the phenomenal order, the effects of the real as these are felt by the will.

The necessity of adopting a stuff-like view of reality is obviated by the fact that the perception of reality is quite possible under the auspices of phenomenalism, which presents a view of reality wholly oblivious of the hylical one. It is only in the artificiality of the ontological imagination

that the real assumes the guise of thinghood as such, for the natural apprehension of reality involves something far different. The thing is so embedded in its qualities that the mind is usually able to perceive and use it without discovering wherein its essential nature consists. That with which the mind is confronted is, not the unity of the thing, but the manifold of its qualities, for which reason perception assumes the form of a fusion. Moreover, the dialectical problem of the subjective and objective is not raised by perception itself, for in the perceptual fusion, which yields the object as a fact for the mind, the subjective idea easily fuses with the objective impression to form the complete perception of thing as known. The ego, which itself is made up of elements taken from both sensuous and spiritual worlds, finds no difficulty in combining these contrasted elements when they make the thing perceived. At any rate, no hypothesis of a thing in itself is necessary to account for the thing as perceived, for the mind finds it possible to perceive, and thus fulfil its dialectical obligations upon the lowest plane of existence, by means of very simple devices. The thing does not exhibit itself in sun-clear reality, but shows its nature and character by the way it subordinates and controls its qualities.

Ever since the days of Kant, metaphysics has hesitated to place its faith in thinghood as such, for the critical philosophy showed with excess of conclusiveness that a search for the "thing" is a vain one. The poles of being, remote and all but inaccessible as they are, consist of quality and activity; Kant sought, not the inaccessible, but the impossible, when he attempted to extend his categories on all sides with the hope of laying hold on reality. The self-existent substance seems to abhor attributes, as the thing in itself appears to forbid qualities. If the attempt is made to construct the thing out of quality, a similar difficulty will arise, for the idea of quality in itself is as ontologically fallacious as that of thing in itself. Fortunately, however, the world does not lead us into such pitfalls, and if we but follow the leadings of perception we shall avoid these blind

paths toward being. The world impresses upon us the fact that a thing is made up, not of itself or of a single quality, but of a series of special qualities, in whose order and conduct the real is to be found. Not by isolating the category of substance or by selecting as supreme that of quality can one account for the presence of the real in the world; but by means of an adjustment of the several qualities of the thing to the thing which possesses them, the real may be found.

In this preliminary account of thinghood it is not necessary to cloud the issue by asking whether the thing *has* qualities or merely *is* its qualities, for it is sufficient to decide that thinghood does not consist of something different from the qualities, although the totality of qualities when summed up in the form of thinghood will probably be found to yield something more than a qualitative result. The view that presents the thing as something logically prior to its qualities is at a loss to explain what content the thing had apart from the qualities which it sought to possess; at the same time, this notion has no means of explaining by what means the thing obtained possession of or continues to keep control over its special qualities. The rival principle, which exalts the qualities and thus claims that the thing exists after the qualities have come into being, has no way of accounting for the grouping of those qualities as a preparation for thinghood. Thus it seems evident that the fortunes of the thing are about the same as those of its qualities, and any attempt to separate them in the form of mere thing or sheer quality is destined to lead to dialectical nothingness. In this manner, scholastic realism, which exalted the thing, and modern realism, which has been emphasizing the quality, seem to commit the same fault—that of the real as something in itself.

2. A THING AND ITS QUALITIES

It should occasion no surprise that a thing consists of qualities, for the world in which things are found is, first

of all, a world of appearances. While we do not give up the hope of finding something substantial in the universe, we cannot expect to encounter this at once, when the world in which our thinking is done is one of appearances and activities. Nevertheless, the secret of the thing cannot be kept by the quality, even where that quality seems to suggest nothing beyond itself. The very fact of multiplicity, germane as this is to the phenomenal order, makes necessary the consideration of something more than the particular quality, for why should one quality among many have ontological pre-eminence over the others and thus be looked upon as the thing? The thing is found in all of the qualities taken together, and while it cannot be thought of as existing where they are absent, something more than their presence is necessary to guarantee reality. Phenomena are responsible for something more than appearance; they group themselves in characteristic ways, and carry out a sort of programme. In most instances phenomena pass for realities, and so convincing is their practical substantiality that the majority of people ask for nothing more ontological than that which the world of impressions supplies.

The qualities of things seem ripe for reality, so that very little shaking is sufficient to make them fall into their proper groups. For this reason the Heraclitean despair over the heterogeneous flux of phenomena seems ill-founded, for qualities seem at a loss to know what to do with themselves in their individuality, and readily adapt themselves to the ontological situation, wherein they assume the form of states.

The behaviour of states of things may be illustrated in the instances of things homogeneous and things heterogeneous in their metaphysical constitution. In the case of colour, we have an example of the ready grouping of states to form a thing, so that, instead of speaking of colour in itself or of red as such, we regard colour as that which is made up of a series of states united by a common principle of existence. Colour as a thing is found to consist of a series of states from red to violet; colour in itself does not shine, while the special chromatic state depends upon the general arrangement

of all the possible qualities. The interdependence of the thing and the state appears more directly when a secondary colour is made the object of analysis. Thus, in the case of orange, the existence of the hue might seem to be an affair which concerned orange alone, but the quality of orange is such that it can exist only as it assumes its place in the general scheme, where it stands between red and yellow. In this way the particular quality depends upon the general arrangement of the states of a thing to which it belongs, while its special existence as a state involves the relation which, in the order of being, it sustains to like qualities. Things without states are not to be distinguished from non-entities; states without position and relation are in the same condition of nothingness. With an object whose qualities are heterogeneous the same principle obtains, even when the presentation of it is not so vivid to the imagination. In the case of the apple the quality of redness is related to the state of roundness, while these are likewise connected with sweetness and softness. If all qualities of the apple are eliminated, the apple is itself deduced to naught, yet these several states are nothing apart from the connecting principle of thinghood, which makes the apple what it is.

The qualitative conception of thinghood, which seeks to realise the ontological possibility of states of existence, appears no less strikingly in the case of human consciousness. When we say that the self exists, we mean that there are certain conscious states which unify in such a way as to produce something in excess of their particular significance, if it were possible for them to have significance apart from the unifying principle of the self. When, therefore, we seek to assure ourselves of the soul's reality, we do not advance the notion of a soul in itself, for the ego as ego never comes forth, but contents itself with such self-expressionism as may be found in the furtherance of some special conscious state, as a feeling or an impulse. The stark existence of the self, if indeed it could be proved or made plausible, could have no interest for humanity, which seeks self-expression in something warm and characteristic. A self without states of

consciousness would be no self worth asserting; through it life would pass unnoticed, unappreciated, unchallenged. A thing is known through its states; it does not exist *in se*, nor is it known *per se*. Yet this admission does not serve to enhance the ontological value of the mere state of existence, which is itself dependent upon the unifying principle of thinghood. The mutual dependence of thing and quality thus places our dialectic in a position where we may speak of a thing as the unity of its states, for it is in the unifying principle that reality is found, not in a thing in itself.

If existence were an "in itself," a Spinozistic *in se*, the mind would find it impossible to distinguish one thing from another; if the thing were organic or inorganic, mental or material, the criterion of thing in itself would not enable us to draw a distinction between that which has one set of qualities and that with a series far different. In order to define it is necessary to observe the predicative differences between things, for the mere subject does not place us in a position where we may observe different realities. With a scheme of qualities having something adjectival to modify them, we are enabled to account for the variety of things as this confronts us in our experience. In the Cartesian distinction between mind and body as *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, the essential principle is the predicative one, for by means of the adjectives "conscious" and "extended" we are able to distinguish mind from body in a way that "thing" here and "thing" there would not permit.

Where perception, as the fusion of special qualities, makes plausible the claim that thinghood consists in states of existence, the conceptual synthesis of these perceptual groups furthers the same teaching. The mind seeks to reduce the world of appearances to order, for without this it cannot be at intellectual ease; now the attempt to bring order out of the chaos of *facta bruta* only reveals how necessary to the idea of thinghood is the combination of thing and state. In the reduction of things to order, we have reason to be surprised that material and mental units have not kept up their reputation for viciousness, for the organisation

of matter into "nature," as well as the subsumption of individuals under the concept "society," has been done with surprising ease. Consider how quickly the modern scientific mind reduced all forms of physical activity to the law of conservation of energy; the triumph over stubborn, goat-like activity was so complete as to be suspicious. In the same manner social things thought to group egos under the common head of the state, and so smoothly was this done that one looks in vain for any survival of the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Things and souls have been surprisingly tame, while the conceptualising mind of the dialectician may well be disappointed that the Heraclitean and Hobbist have disappeared from the universe.

While we are thus inclined to be suspicious of the rationalism which hastens to reduce the naturistico-humanistic world to order, we can only recognise the fact that in the unifying tendency, whether in perception or conception, the real is to be found. Ourselves, we refrain from committing ourselves to a definition of reality until we shall have supplemented this phenomenalist conception of the world by an activistic treatment of its inner nature. In the present problem of substance and attribute, thing and quality, we are only anxious to make clear and enforce the idea that, whatever else it may turn out to be, a thing is made up of states in groups. The unity of the thing's qualities, in virtue of which that thing exists, does not shine forth as a *primus inter pares*, or chief quality, as though colour were pre-eminently red, or consciousness primarily volition, but exists as the condition *sine qua non* of the thing's existence. Qualities in their specific differences are mustered in the same line, and clothed with the same uniform. In the case of material things the sensuous qualities possessed by the object, while common to things in general, have a special character, due to the subject which they qualify. This is observed in painting, when such a *valeur* as Fortuny, in perfecting a "Portrait of a Spanish Lady," wielded his brush in such a way as to distinguish a series of four blacks, as he represented velvet, lace, silk, and

jet. The thing thus tends to modify the quality, just as the quality makes the thing.

As a conclusion to this examination of a thing and its qualities, wherein each seems to be nothing apart from the other, we must not fail to observe that, over and above the summation of the qualities whose presence is necessary to substantiate the thing, the thing itself comes forth with the impression of unity. In this way we perceive apple, not redness; man, not bipedality; gold, not yellowness; consciousness, not sensation. The resulting impression, therefore, is not that of a quality by itself or a thing in itself, but of a thing in its qualities. Red is perceived as to colour, sweetness as to taste, hardness as to touch; while the sensational quality seems to have no ontological responsibility, it ends in conveying its special significance to the thing which manifests it as an evidence of its own existence. States are not merely states, but are states of existence; things do not exist in themselves, but in their qualities. The impression of totality is one which does not escape the mind, even when the presence of a significant quality is overlooked; thus most of our perceiving consists in a process of glancing or touching, whereby the salient features of the object are appreciated, whence the object is perceived. Apart from the special states of the thing the latter could not be perceived, and yet the process of perception is strangely inexact, for it recognises the thing as such by means of a state here and there, rather than by a complete analysis of all the states of a thing's existence. This leads us to exalt the thing above its qualities; it depends upon its states as a monument rests upon its pedestal.

3. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY AS ORDER

Thus far we have been content to point out that the escape from the fallacy of mere thinghood is made possible by the treatment of the thing and its qualities; in order to realise the result of this relation, it becomes necessary to consider that which raises the states of existence to thing-

hood. This elevation of the phenomenal states of existence is made possible by the principle of *order*. In the perception of a thing, where the subjective sensation fuses with the free idea, as when the impression of redness joins with the idea of sweetness to form the percept of apple, it might seem as though there were no possibility of reaching objectivity, so that those who sought the thing in its states would be left stranded with subjective idealism. But the actual case of perception, even where the material at hand consists of nothing more substantial than impressions and ideas, shows us that the hope of reality is not misplaced when it is sought in the qualities of the perceptual consciousness. Consciousness does not enjoy the freedom which the subjectivity of impressions and ideas seems to promise, but proceeds only as it follows certain paths. In the restriction of consciousness to a fixed order the presence of the real is made manifest. This view of the real as an order is not essentially different from the idea of the thing as equivalent to its qualities, although here it is to be pointed out that the quality-groups are integrated according to a plan. While we are now convinced that existence is something synthetic, we must be on our guard against viewing the connecting principle as though it were the only factor in the construction of the real; neither the thing, nor the quality, nor the synthetic principle of order taken in its independence is sufficient to account for existence. Thinghood is the synthesis of qualities, the string on which the beads are strung.

While the problem of perception is a methodological one which belongs to logic rather than metaphysics, it may still be pointed out that realism, which claims that the mind may perceive reality as a cat may look at a king, as well as the rationalist, who insists that the mind shall survey something like itself in the form of an idea, are both guilty of ignoring the true nature of the real, which they regard after the manner of the impossible thing in itself, or that which is *in se et per se concipitur*. Perhaps the question of perception, which here is of indirect importance only, would

clear up if, instead of dogmatising about reality as mere thinghood or thoughthood, it were presented in the way that reality is presented; that is, in the form of states arranged in a synthetic order. Now, inasmuch as the mind itself is made up of states of consciousness, it may not be so difficult to show how the synthetic qualities of thinghood may be grouped in the form of units, for this is a method of which the mind is thoroughly familiar.

The primitive view of reality, as here entertained, involves two significant moments, both of which show how thought within and thing without follow the same methods in affirming their respective realities; first, there is the assemblage of qualities in the synthesis which constitutes the thing; second, there is the principle of order which serves to connect one quality with another as so many states of the same thing. From this standpoint, then, a thing is a *kind of combination* and a *mode of conduct*. The states of a thing are actively related to one another, and apart from this dynamic synthesis the thing could not exist. In the heterogeneous synthesis of qualities which go to make up a thing, the principle of order shows itself in the form of a binding principle, under the influence of which the states of the thing cleave to one another with a tenacity which bespeaks their real relation. In the case of "apple," the state of redness, while it is only a sensation, cannot be separated from the state of smoothness, which has the same subjective status as the first-mentioned quality. While the state as state seems flexible and unreal, the principle which makes it necessary for the redness to connect with the smoothness is of an inexorable nature, whence we are led to suspect its reality. While it is easy to conjure up a state of existence simply as a state, it is most difficult, if not impossible, to fabricate the relation which obtains between one state and another, so that the existence of thinghood in the midst of states is not to be wondered at, inasmuch as the connection between the states is so inflexible. For this reason the dogmatic thinker need not fear to lose the peculiar which is expected of reality,

because this is assured by the rigidity of the combination of the several states of the thing.

The conviction that the fixed order of states is none other than the real order is borne out further by the observation that, around the states that are expected to constitute a thing, there is, as it were, an unyielding band which forbids that anything which belongs to the thing should exist outside, while that which does not belong to it be prevented from entering the charmed circle of reality. The entrance of the alien quality produces illusion, and it is against illusion that the work of perception is directed. In this connection it may be well to remind ourselves that, when we speak of reality as a fixed order of states, it does not follow that the human mind has the key to every form of reality which may be conceived of as existing; our contention is that, when the real reveals itself upon the phenomenal plane, it does so, not directly as an "in itself," but indirectly as that which is to be known in the synthetic order of its several states. It is the criterion of reality which we are seeking, and this we believe to have found in the order of sensational qualities. Upon the plane of appearance the work of dialectics consists, not in foisting upon the world some idea of what the real should be, but in rendering intelligible that which is given as a manifold of experience. To perceive is thus to extract something from the world of existence, and that one lesson of thinghood which it is the good fortune of the mind to learn consists in the thought that reality is an order among the maze of impressions with which the mind is constantly confronted. If the Parmenidean principle of permanence had been as zealous in seeking to subdue the Heraclitean elements of flux as Apollonian culture was ready to secure control of the Dionysian, the history of metaphysics might have been a happier one. As it is, we are now brought to the place where we realise the importance and authority of the active states of existence, while we realise that the subjugation of such states is a task which involves something more vigorous than the generalising understanding. Our reality is to be achieved as a victory over

the visible world, and the principle of order, by means of which we seek to reduce the world to intelligibility, is to be looked upon as possessed of a spiritual character far removed from the abstract powers of the rationalising intellect.

4. THE REALISATION OF APPEARANCE

The reduction of phenomena to their common denominator consists in the rational arrangement of them according to the principle of order. From the classic standpoint the treatment of the world consists in the idealisation of the real; on the side of romanticism the work of the intellect is exerted in the opposite direction, and is made up of an attempt to realise the rational. The first method, which seeks to introduce ideality into the world of things, lays emphasis upon the principle of limitation; the second, by proceeding from within outward, excels in the dialectics of the infinite. In the rationalising of the real, we have Plato as the supreme example; in the realising of the rational, the transcendental, ethical philosophy is the type. In the present view of the world-problem, neither method seems to suffice to reduce the manifold of things to a harmonious system. Both traditional views cling to the idea that reality is a thing, while we have learned that such a conception is hopeless. Where, as in the realism of Herbart and Lotze, the qualitative conception of reality has its place, the optimism with which the rationalistic realist expects each thing to fall into its place threatens to remove the system from reality as such, for in the real world the condition of things is far more tumultuous and Schopenhauerian than the rationalist is ready to admit. Philosophy approximates to reasonableness; it gains ascendancy over the given world, not by a thought, but by means of a totalising effort on the part of the human spirit, which has learned how to enlist art, science, ethics, and religion in its service.

Phenomena show their reality in the resistance which they offer; they are more like the goats than the sheep. Nevertheless, the obstacles which phenomena present are

of value in evincing the essential nature of the world as appearance, and by means of this rigidity of appearances we are able to distinguish between *phenomena realia* and *phenomena imaginaria*. Real phenomena are those which resist, and these are the ones which may be reduced to reality. Here is the place where the romantic attempt to realise the ideal is most thoroughly appreciated. The classic, conceptualistic method, with its expectation of finding phenomena ready for existence, is not sufficient to treat phenomena when these are viewed as the expression, not of themselves alone, but of so many energies in and behind them. Reality must be realised as an ideal if it is to exist for the human mind. In mediæval times the romantic spirit led Scholasticism to postulate as real its favourite notions of God, Church, and salvation, which sprang full-armed from the brain. These notions were not looked upon as though they existed *in intellectu solo*, but had an existence *in re*. Modern romanticism has sought to lay upon things the yoke of the moral ideal; it has crowned reality with beauty, as Saul was made king because of his size. This moralising and æstheticising of the universe in the noble attempt to reduce appearance to reality must be regarded as of authentic nature; the only criticism to be brought against it consists in the optimistic feeling that nature and humanity will be found ready to receive the fetters of virtue and beauty. The conclusion of the Romantic school witnessed the rise of decadence, which may best be understood as the revolt of the world and the self against the sentimentalism of the romantic philosophy. Instead of exalting the fair, decadence brought forward the foul, the base; instead of virtue and beauty sprang up "flowers of evil." The meaning of this Baudelairean revolt may be comprehended by considering that romantic thought had been too hurried in its attempt to reduce things to order; decadence is thus a warning against the hasty assumption that reality has been achieved. When it is fully realised that the world presents a picture of the irrationalistic and im-

moralistic, then the work of dialectics can be done more earnestly, more carefully.

The laborious work of the understanding is made even more serious when the events of human history present themselves for treatment that is accorded the world of nature. In order to claim completeness, metaphysics must read order into the inner world of the human as well as into the outer order of the natural. "The contingent truths of history," said Lessing, "can never be the proof of the eternal truths of reason." In spite of Lessing's scepticism it may be assumed that humanity, as well as nature, is convincing; for in the presence of both the ego and the world the evidence of the real may be found. While the contingent facts of human history may seem to lack solidity, they are not wanting in that Parmenidean sense of persistence which has long since convinced the mind of the existence of the real. Where Lessing despaired of finding eternal truth in the realm of events, Anatole France has recently spoken of "an attempt to arrive at truth by means of a logical sequence of appearances which becomes cumulative evidence."¹ Reality is to be conceived of as a solid made up of superficial planes, and where the isolated event may seem ontologically hopeless, a series of these is able to assume ontological proportions. In this sense the author just cited spoke of one of his characters as possessed of a "frivolity which was rendered august by its persistence."² The real can hide itself in one phenomena, but if there be plurality of these, the inexorable sequence of states and events betrays the presence of something extra-phenomenal. The frivolous facts of human history, if they are capable of persistence, cannot be relegated to the unreal.

In the idealisation of things, the purely human and the purely natural have to be raised above themselves if they are to be made real. In the ordinary observation of things in the world, where the will guides the mind while the animal attends to those things which are of interest,

¹ *The Red Lily*, tr. Stephens, iii. p. 50.

² *Op. cit.*, xv. p. 155.

there can be no sense of reality, either without or within; but, with the development of disinterestedness, as this appears with scientist, artist, and religionist, there arises a consciousness of the phenomenal world and its unity. To this renunciation of interest on the part of the human ego the world responds by presenting the appearance of totality, through which the mind is for ever delivered from its finitude. The fleeting appearances of nature, the contingent and frivolous facts of humanity, become august, because of their wholeness and persistence. Reality, which is something found in the world, is none the less something framed by the mind; it is something which otherwise would be the neglected factor in the world.

5. ACTUALITY AS ACTIVE PRINCIPLE

Where thinghood has been found to consist, not of itself, but of its states, and where these states are further found to follow a principle of order, even when they often revolt against the narrowness of human formulation, the essence of existence cannot be considered complete until the activistic character of reality has received due notice. This energistic factor has been implied by the foregoing treatment of reality as an order of qualities; here, the motor character of the phenomenal must be accorded independent treatment. Both the notion that reality consists of states and the idea that these states of existence constitute an order involve the principle of activity as that which makes them realisable. That which integrates the states of being into things is a causal principle, so that reality is known, not only by the way that it expresses itself, but on account of the way in which it exerts itself. The principle of activity is not to be accused of novelty, for it was in vogue in the days of Heraclitus, just as it reappeared in the ontology of Aristotle, where it was unusually efficient in connection with the idea that being is as much a matter of behaviour as of existence. In mediæval times, Abelard, the conceptualist, and Duns Scotus, the voluntarist, made use

of the term *actualitas*, while the early German metaphysics of Eckhart found room for the modern term *wirklichkeit*. The climax of such activism occurred with Schopenhauer, who contrasts Eckhart's term with the latinised *Realität*.¹

Apart from the notion of the real as the actual, and the actual as the activistic, it would seem to be impossible to explain the coherence of the states that constitute a thing. In the apple, redness does not co-exist with smoothness because of any logical affinity, but because the thing which possesses these special states effects an active connection between them. This is the situation with every combination of heterogeneous fusion of impressions or qualities in the perception of a thing; the states of existence cling to one another for no other reason than that the thing that is in and behind them so orders. This irrationality of thinghood, which was so annoying to Kant as he sought to trap reality in his scheme of categories, reveals the efficiency of the activism in things. The grouping of the heterogeneous qualities of a thing is carried on in a stubborn way which is often the despair of the form-loving understanding. Were it not for this energistic principle, which catches the attention of the mind and challenges the will, consciousness would flow on with suspicious smoothness; it would be a stream without any islands of reality to oppose its progress. In the checking of consciousness by reality we are forced to admit the presence of something objectively real; in this manner, perception is often accompanied by the feeling of pain due to the resistance afforded by reality. But, if this were not the case, it would be impossible for the mind to distinguish the real from the imaginary, the essential from the accidental. As it is, reality is forced upon the mind instead of being merely recognised by it, and out of this stern actuality of things comes the consciousness of the sheer existence of things. In our age, when existence is supposed to be efficient, it is well for us to observe how realistic is the world of things, and how far removed is it from the narrownesses of our humanistic utilitarianism. Things express

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 4.

and exert themselves; if man is willing to conform to their destined course, his path will be strewn with happiness; if he expect the world to exist for his human advantage he will be disappointed, while resistance on his part will have the effect of showing him the difference between the brain of man and the constitution of things as such. Of the two attitudes, both of them aberrations from the path of sober knowledge, that of revolt has the advantage of making the ego aware of its nature and character.

Such a conception of reality ever hovered before the subtle mind of Lotze, and it would have received more straightforward treatment if he had been willing to consider the real in the light of the perception of things. Then, with the states of a thing connecting themselves in synthetic order, he would have had more use for his definition of a thing as the "realised individual law of its behaviour."¹ A view like the present one, which seeks to interpret this realism in the light of the psychology of perception, looks upon existence as a relentless succession of states. In so doing we hope to escape both the dogmatic and sceptical views of the world, and where the one says, The thing possesses its qualities, and the other claims that, The thing is its qualities, we are inclined to believe that the real statement of the case will express the fact that the qualities constitute the thing as something superior to them in their particularity. The thing must do more than exist among its qualities; it must exercise authority over them. The thing thus exists by controlling its states. As for the qualities themselves, they are not forced together by the arbitrary power of the thing, nor do they merely happen together in independence of the thing, but they exist and co-exist at the same time; they are states and they are qualities of the thing.

In the treatment of thinghood as an active principle, we are not likely to run to the extreme of thinking that nothing but this activity exists, for the validity of the energistic principle depends upon the existence of a medium

¹ *Metaphysics*, tr. Bosanquet, § 36.

in which the activity may be displayed. Light without ether, sound without air, force without its proper medium, would give ill accounts of themselves; and while we are ready to grant that activity stands higher than appearance in the scale of existence, we are not in a position where we may affirm that there exist nothing but activities. There exists nothing unless activity bring it into being, but the vehicle does not come empty, but is rather filled with the concrete content of states of existence. Mutual is thus the relation between the quality and the activity which binds it to its appropriate substance; activity apart from quality is as meaningless as quality without activity.

6. THE INNER REALISATION OF EXISTENCE

In the elaboration of reality we have occasion to call upon consciousness to clarify the peculiar nature of existence as an inexorable synthesis of states; now we feel free to inquire whether the ego within the consciousness has any special realisation of things as real. It would seem as though a minimum of free consciousness were the chief requisite for the realisation of existence, just as the creature nearest to nature would possess the most perfect knowledge of it; but in the course of things it appears that the further away that a mind is from the world that produced it, the clearer and more complete is the view of things. It is the bird, not the worm, that contemplates the landscape; it is remote speculation, not immediate consciousness which knows the meaning of existence. To realise the synthetic constitution of things, it is necessary to be all but free from the order of existential states. In this condition of things lies the good fortune of the human ego; produced by the physical order, the ego has had the wisdom to detach itself from the world which was responsible for its being. This emancipation was effected for its own sake in the consciousness of a destiny peculiarly its own, but the result of this was none other than the achievement of a knowledge of the world as a whole.

Since the world is one in which the essential order of things is only partially realised, there is hope for the independent existence of the ego, which finds its place in the chinks and cracks of the none too perfect system. Unfinished as is the world, it cannot prevent the existence of the human self, and with its energies it is fitted to become the home of spiritual striving. Thus the ego strives with and alongside of the world, both of them seeking realisation. That principle of reality which was found to manifest itself in connection with reality in general—the having of states and the exhibition of energy—is come to belong in candid fashion to the self, as if Vedanta were right in asserting that the exterior order is none other than the Self—*tat tvam asi*. Like reality itself, the ego expresses its nature and exerts its inherent forces. And like the realm of existence in which it has its own being, the self, instead of rejoicing in a soul in itself, reveals its character through its states. The ontological criterion which we sought to establish in connection with the world of outer things is seen to be more directly valid here in the inner world of spirits. To have states and to exert active control of qualities are attributes of existence which are clearly displayed by the human self.

Selfhood does not force its way into reality, as though it were *persona non grata*, but assumes its place at the centre of things, whose secret has been revealed to its inner consciousness. No longer do the states of existence sweep on unnoticed and unquestioned, for in the capacity of thought the ego realises the being of things, which cannot exist in the fullest sense of the word until they have aroused the brain of the leading species. Selfhood is itself by the interior organisation of its elements, and as the knowledge of the exterior world becomes clearer, the coherence of interior consciousness assumes a more perfect form. Fortunately for the self, reality consists, not of solid thinghood whose existence would have little for the ego, but in the ability to have states. The possession of soul-states and the ability to control these are indications of existence which

the ego is permitted to experience, so that, at the outset of this examination of the world, we are gratified to observe how the fluid character of existence invites the special form of reality which is to be found in the human ego. The more the ego has states, the more perfectly these are conjoined, the more thoroughly does the ego exist. Under the auspices of the older, solidaric view of existence, it was impossible to express the nature of coming into being, just as it was beyond the power of the dialectician to account for the degrees of being with which experience is constantly confronted. Surely the plant exists more thoroughly than the stone, the animal more than the plant, while the self-conscious, free ego enjoys a grade of existence far more advanced. Where existence consists of an order of states, the difference in degrees of being can easily be accounted for on the ground that the more states a thing has, and the more perfectly these states are interrelated, the more does that thing exist.

The ego, which is able to effect no entrance into the stuff-like system of thinghood as such, is able to do something more than assert itself in the world of things: it has it in its power to render the whole world-order intelligible, because its self-consciousness contains the secret of existence. Idealism has often tried to make some special function of the ego the maxim of all being, so that the existence of things has been found in their being perceived or conceived by the mind. But the egoistic interpretation of the world makes use of the totality of the self, as that which has interrelated states of being, as the clue to existence in general. This is not to give expression to the dubious proposition that that which exists is consciousness, but is rather to suggest that in the unifying consciousness of the ego the peculiarly qualitative, synthetic character of existence is likely to be found.

III

APPEARANCE AND SPATIALITY

I. SPATIALITY AND PHENOMENALITY

FOR the self which discovered the real through appearance and finds thinghood to consist of an order of qualities, the question concerning the nature of space is of peculiar interest. In the traditional treatment of metaphysics, which follows the leadership of Aristotle and Kant, it has been the custom to put space by the side of time, as though the two were upon the same ontological level. The present method of handling the question of existence in the world and self, however, has made this impossible, for the reason that our dialectic has separated appearance, not only from substance, but from activity. With the separate division of activity occupying the intermediate portion of the dialectic, there has been created a vacancy which only time can fill. For this reason it will be necessary to discuss space in independence of time, for as space is phenomenalistic, time is activistic. The treatment of time will be found to open under favourable auspices, while the relegation of one form of sense to appearance, the other to activity, should produce good results.

Our experience, which presents us with the fact of existence, does not fail to convey its significance in the form of something spatial. We perceive things in the world as we observe objects in the landscape, not in the free form of reality, but in the atmosphere of spatiality; things are thus suffused and clouded in their appearance. From the peculiar emphasis which Kant laid upon space, it might seem as though there were something extra-

ordinary about the problem, but the sincere treatment of the world as appearance leads us to see that space is not anything unique, but has about it the features which are found in phenomenality as such. So much phenomenality, so much spatiality; that would seem to be the law of appearance. For this reason we should not be surprised at space, for it is incomprehensible that the world, if it is to be a world of appearance, should appear in any other way. If it be said that space is unique, inasmuch as there is only one space, it may be said in reply that phenomenality is unique, since there is only one world of appearance. All the peculiarities of phenomenality find their counterpart in the attributes of spatiality, so that, having examined the essence of thinghood as an order of states, we now have an opportunity to corroborate this view upon the basis of these states in their spatial character.

It is because of the inherent connection between spatiality and phenomenality that we are gratified in observing how naturally time adapts itself to another phase of the world, the activistic one. Where space and time are placed side by side, as twin forms of phenomenality, the tendency of such a dialectical arrangement is to break up the unity of the phenomenal world. Like space, time demands the privilege of interpreting the world in its own fashion, and the intermediate view of reality will find the world of activity as a system which can best be understood in a temporalistic fashion. Not only the obvious differences between time and space, but the Siamese formation which would be necessary were the two placed upon the plane of phenomenality, forbids that we should consider the phenomenal order as such in any but a spatial character. Kant, who did so much for the intuitions of space and time, reveals the difference between the two when he passes from the formal consideration of their intuitive nature, and proceeds to discuss time in the form of *sento-rational* schematism. This development of the temporal intuition has no parallel in the case of space, which is looked upon as one with the phenomenal world.

The novelty of his discussion of space led Kant to make certain extravagant claims for the extra-ideality of the principle. Thus he expressed his conception of the intuition by speaking of space as nothing but "*nichts nur*"—the form of external representation. What would one expect or desire space to be? Kant really admits that the fortunes of spatiality and phenomenality are the same, for his original motive for idealising space, instead of being the scientifico-mathematical one implied by the *Transcendental Æsthetic*, was a metaphysical one expressed in the *Antinomies*. This is discussed in the *Critical Solution of the Cosmological Conflict*,¹ where Kant adds an "indirect proof" to the "direct" one given in the *Æsthetic*. This "indirect proof" consists in showing that the ideality of space was determined upon the basis of the finitude or the infinitude of space. Upon the ground of the disjunctive syllogism, one might indeed hope to argue that space is either finite or infinite, but the thesis and antithesis of the Antinomies show that, in neither case, do we reach a satisfactory conclusion. But there is a third possibility; if space is neither a finite thing nor an infinite thing, it may be no thing at all. Or as Kant expressed it, "If any one says a substance has either a good odour or a bad odour, there is still a third possibility that it has no odour at all."² Unable to deal with real space as either finite or infinite, Kant decides to idealise it. This is done at the outset of the criticism of human knowledge.

The situation in the dialectics of space, therefore, would seem to be just what one might expect of existence; as a world of appearance, reality can do no other than assume a spatial form, while the spatial can be no other than a form. We are not surprised when we fail to find no objective world existing by itself in independence of the mind, for we are impressed with the notion that our immediate view of the world should yield the impression of a phenomenalist order. To think of the world as an objective system which exists apart from its spatial form,

¹ *Kritik*, pp. 525-35.

² *Ib.*, p. 531.

or to think of space as the independent receptacle of this objective world, is to relinquish altogether the idea of the phenomenality of the world, and it is by means of such phenomenalism that we are able to render the world intelligible. Phenomena are phenomena, nothing more, nothing less ; to think of phenomena as " things " is to put the world in a peculiar light, for it is to indulge once more in the notion that reality is something stuff-like. We have been able to avoid this solidarity by regarding reality as the invisible, imperceptible order among phenomena, and to abandon this notion would be to destroy our hopes of finding anything intelligible in the world.

Since we do not regard the world of appearance as an expression of the complete form of the universe, we do not hesitate to indulge the phenomenalist desire to the full, knowing that there remain two other aspects of the world. In the same manner, the spatial view of the world, which implies so much in the way of subjectivism, does not commit us to any mysterious principle of idealism, for the reason that, in the idealistic, phenomenalist view of space, we have only the superficial aspect of the world, and do not pretend to include the causal conception of things. It must be evident that there is something intra-spatial, for without an indwelling principle of activity it is difficult to conceive how the universe could assume its spatial form. True, there is no thing in itself outside of space, but there is evidently some essential activity within that which assumes the spatial form. The extraordinary character which Kantian space is supposed to reveal is not anything peculiar to space, but is only the one marvel of reality as seen *in toto* by the perceiving mind. When Kant executed his " Copernican " change in the point of view, whereby subjective and objective exchanged places, he did no more than Vedanta accomplished when it drew the perceptible world into the mind, and then declared that in the world one perceived nothing but the features of himself. The primitive idealist was thus called upon to regard the world as the self, the self as the world. This one truth of phenomenality has been

expressed as idealism, as egoism, and as the ideality of space.

In the treatment of the space-problem, it is expedient to proceed according to a plan which has regard to the *origin* of the space-idea in the mind, the *ground* of the intuition in thought, and the *essence* of space as such. Kant was content to base his dialectics of space upon the second of the three forms of treatment, although, in his *Transcendental Dialectic*, he makes use of the ontological method of considering the essential nature of space, and that after the manner of Zeno the Eleatic. In the days of psychological reasoning it is well to observe the method of the mind in obtaining the space-idea, even when we are not inclined to think that the question of origin can take the place of that of ground, or that the solution of the genetic problem is convincing. The relative merits of the three methods of argument would seem to be in the reverse order; first in importance comes the metaphysical argument in favour of the ideality of space; second in value comes the Kantian argument for the intuitive nature of the subject; last of all, the nature of space as it appears in perception. The motive for idealising space is no special one; our dialectic desires only to further the general principle of the phenomenality of the world in opposition to any stuff-like view which might be proposed by uncritical thought.

2. THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE

In our discussion of reality as that which is perceived as an order of states we found that we were dealing with a heterogeneous fusion of impressions and ideas; in the perception of space the same principle of fusion operates, only here the elements to be united are of a homogeneous character. Between the method of apprehending space and the manner of regarding it there is a direct connection. Rationalistic thought, which is never just toward the phenomenal world, finds it impossible to gather material or elaborate methods from the psychological materials which

are forthcoming in connection with the question of space-perception. In the case of Lotze, the disdain for psychological interpretation is most aggravating, for the reason that Lotze's theory of space-perception by means of local signs has been of no mean importance in the elucidation of the perceptualistic problem, and the student of his metaphysics would like to have seen some connection between the results of the descriptive and the postulates of the dialectical in the treatment of spatiality. This desirable relation, however, was one which Lotze refused to set up.¹ Bradley's case is not so flagrant, and yet we can only regret his contention that the question concerning the origin of space is "irrelevant," even when we must admit with him that "nothing can be taken for real because, for psychology, it is original; or, again, as unreal, because it is secondary."²

Nevertheless, the question concerning the origin of the space-idea is suggestive even when it is not convincing, and it is absurd to deny that psychology has any right to express an opinion concerning the ultimate nature of the cosmological principle in question. At the same time, the investigator is perplexed by the observation that the criterion he demands in the one science is just the opposite of that insisted upon in the other. That criterion is immediacy. In the psychological discussion concerning the nature of space, the thinker who insists that space is immediately perceived with all the originality of sensation is quite opposed to the dialectician who regards space as something intuitive. The actual situation is such that he who believes that space is immediately perceived does not believe that it is independently constituted, while he who believes in the *a priori* nature of the spatial cannot accept the thesis that, as a precept, it is original, for he regards it as an inference. This perplexity is made more profound when the thinker who holds space to be nature *a priori* is called, in psychology, an "empirist," while he who regards the spatial as something objectively real is the "nativist." In opposition to

¹ *Metaphysics*, tr. Bosanquet, § 99.

² *Appearance and Reality*, ch. iv.

this, we should expect the believer in idealistic space to be the nativist, or we should certainly wish to call the exponent of real objective space the empirist, but the crossing of the terminology makes this impossible. Intuitionists have become empirists, and empiricists nativists.

But what does seem to be the nature of space-perception, apart from the conclusions we would draw concerning the nature of space as a metaphysical thing? Since perception in general seems to be the result of mental work, and since the perception of reality is a difficult fusion of impressions, we can see no reason why the perception of space should be anything different. There is little or no analogy in the field of perception to justify the assumption that space is perceived smoothly and immediately, without that peculiar toil and tension connected with the acquisition of knowledge in general. Space is not thrust upon us, but is acquired after no little struggle and sorrow. Not all the senses are able to furnish us with the data whence we may draw the deduction of locality, so that the mind is forced to discover the senses which have the attribute of extensity. Then, when these senses of touch and vision have been identified as the space-producing ones, the problem of perceiving extensity has just begun. Space seems to be inferential rather than instinctive, acquired rather than immediate; while the inference of locality is not of syllogistic character, it is of such a nature as to justify the expression "mental space." As will appear more directly in the discussion of space's ground, the peculiar thing about space lies in the fact of its fundamentality; where other impressions seem circumstantial, the spatial situation has about it something inexorable. We do not need to perceive the world as coloured, and in many cases it is wanting in chromatic effect, but we cannot help perceiving the world as spatial, so that the Cartesians were of the opinion that extension was the prime attribute of corporeal existence.

When the nature of tridimensional space is taken into account, it is impossible to overcome the scruple exercised by Berkeley that distance is due to judgment, rather than to

sense. "Distance, being a line directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of the eye—which point remains invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or shorter."¹ Where the question concerns the localisation of the part of the organism affected, the physiological differences in the nature and function of the organs involved supply us with the materials whence we judge of the location. This local colouring of the organism is due to the anatomical peculiarity of the skin at the point of contact, for where one part of the skin is stretched over a bony surface, another has the softer support of the flesh beneath it. Now it is impossible that consciousness should fail to take note of such differences, which are not only of qualitative, but of extensive significance. The peculiar quality of the sensation suggests the special part of the organism affected.

The inferential character of space-perception seems even more plausible when the visual apprehension of distant objects becomes the subject of analysis. Here the principles of perspective are in force, so that a distant object is subjected to certain spatial conditions. These conditions or influences are such as to produce the effect of dwindling in size, blurring in outline, and fading in colour. Thus a tree when surveyed at a distance appears much smaller than when it is nearer, its individual leaves are not clearly observed, while its green hue has assumed the quality of blue. When the landscape artist wishes, therefore, to represent the tree as though at a distance, he makes it comparatively smaller, unusually indistinct, and of bluish rather than greenish hue. Then the mind of the beholder, associating these three characteristics with the thought of distance, immediately relegates it to the background of the canvas, thus producing the illusion of reality.

Perception does not lay hold of its objects *en bloc*, but secures its knowledge of them by means of synthetic judgments, which assemble the several states that go to make up an object; in the case of the spatial world-order, this

¹ *Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision*, § 2.

synthetic arrangement has the effect of building up the solidity of space out of the elements of punctual and superficial space-factors. The general principle of order, which is so necessary to the reality of things, is of especial clearness in the case of space-perception, where the elements to be fused are homogeneous in their tactual and visual character. The order of things is here reduced to the exactness of measurement, whence the science of geometry becomes possible. In the consciousness of space, the manifold of extensions are thus reducible to the one space which exists. From the metaphysical point of view, the inferential notion of space has the value of showing that the mind exercises lordship over the phenomenal world, and having acquired the intuition of space as one of its peculiar possessions, it is in a position where it may determine the position of the ego in the world of appearance. The result of the study of space's origin as a form of perception seems to show that, as something inherent in the mind, space as a consciousness is simply called forth by visual and tactual sensations. The "empiristic" theory, therefore, is at the service of those who believe in the *a priori* character of the spatial.

3. SPACE AS INTUITION

If, as we have sought to show, the origin of spatiality as a consciousness is due to the stimulation of the inherent tendency to spatialise, we are now ready to inquire further into the nature of such internal space. As a form of consciousness, space assumes the character of intuition, which is the hope of the intellectualist, who finds in it the possibility of reducing the physical world to something intelligible. By means of the intuitive the objective may be thoroughly idealised. The term "intuition" cannot fail to suggest the name of Kant, although philosophic usage had fashioned the idea before it was taken up and immortalised by the critical philosophy. As early as Notker¹ the Germans had the term *Anascouunga* (*Anschauung*), while the Latin terminology of Nicolaus Cusanus

¹ 1022.

included *intuitio intellectualis*. In modern philosophy, Spinoza's rationalism had found it expedient to formulate a species of knowledge superior to that which comes from either sense or understanding, and this extra mental product was called *intuitio*. *Præter hæc duo cognitionis generatus, aliud tertium quod scientiam intuitivam vocabimus.*¹ Indeed this tertiary, intuitive form of knowledge was inherent in Platonism, which saw the union of the inductive and the deductive in a form of knowledge which consisted of a "synopsis of scattered particulars in one idea."² Where Plato connects this doctrine of intuition with the erotic Spinoza connects intuition with his famous ideal of intellectual love by saying, *Ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur necessario amor dei intellectualis,*³ while Kant indulges the intuition in a double treatment, one scientific, the other æsthetical. By means of intuition it becomes possible for the self, as a creature of sense, to survey the world as a whole; intuition is thus the friend of the individual ego.

The general nature of intuition, as disclosed by mysticism and æstheticism, is not without its application to the science of geometry, where it experiences the most perfect synthesis of the universal and particular that it is destined to enjoy. Where, in the course of logical method, ideas are formed either inductively or deductively, it happens that there is another kind of knowledge, *cognitio tertii generis*, which is strangely exempt from the more laborious methods of reasoning. In the instance of the spatial, this is of peculiar moment, because neither induction from particulars nor deduction from a general could be of service in securing the idea of space. Whatever be the proper psychology of space, whatever the truest ontology, the logic of the spatial demands the tertiary method of comprehension which is offered by intuition; at the same time, if space be not intuitive, it is difficult to understand why intuition should exist at all.

The reason for such intellectual intuition will appear as

¹ *Ethica*, II. xl., note 2.

³ *Ethica*, V. xxxii. Cor.

² *Phædrus*, 265.

soon as one reflects upon the peculiarity of space, for so unified is it that it is impossible for the mind to distinguish general and particular, conceptual and specific. A line does not differ from space in the way that an oak differs from tree, for the angle has only the conferentia of space without differentia of its own. The wide range of the species and individual, as it is enjoyed by this tree, that animal, and the other metal, is something unknown in the realm of spatiality. Where the tree has root, trunk, and branch, where the animal has respiration, reproduction, locomotion, the sphere has length, breadth, and thickness. But where the tree and the animal have a variety of modifications peculiar to their specific natures, the geometrical figure is confined to the mere generic. Where one figure differs from another, as the sphere from the cube, the specific properties are but immediate modifications of the generic. The logical attempt to ascend from particular to general and to descend from the general to the particular is at once frustrated, because the general and the particular are found to be inseparable.

The application of the Socratic method of induction to the Euclidean problem of space is at once impossible and unnecessary; the mind possesses the spatial as a unified whole, in a way that it does not possess general ideas, so that the water rises to its own level without any assistance. Where the logician groups the particulars to form a general, the geometer does not assemble various spaces to form a space-whole; moreover, the geometer makes no use of the logical methods of abstraction and generalisation, in order to distinguish the essential and non-essential in the object, for this distinction has no place in the spatial. The general idea of animal is formed by assembling horse, cow, lion, tiger, &c., under one class-whole; the idea of tree involves the synthesis of oak, pine, palm, &c., according to the presence of certain marks; but the idea of space is of such a nature that it is not necessary to seek any union of square, circle, cube, &c., and the science of geometry has never thought to imitate the inductive sciences. In

the instance of space, the individual and general are upon the same logical level, so that no elevation of the particular to the general is to be considered.

On the side of deductive reasoning, the aim of the Aristotelian syllogism was to place in the particular that which had been found in the general. Even where this method involved a circular form of proof it has not been in vain, nor has it wanted for appreciation among those who would live in an intelligible world. It will be remembered that Aristotle, in his criticism of Plato's idealism, placed himself on record as an advocate of the particular; given general rules in medicine, "it is always the individual who is to be cured."

Nevertheless, Aristotle used his syllogism with the aim of concentrating in the individual all the essentials of the universal, so that major premise, minor premise, and conclusion assumed the form of an inverted pyramid, according to which the significance of the whole structure was found to bear upon the particular conclusion. As Socrates had taken the individual as his point of departure, and had sought to expand thought to universal proportions, so Aristotle attempts to return from this acquired universal to the original particular. The difference lies in the fact that, where the first individual was of individualistic significance only, the second individual contained the essence of the universal to which it belonged. It is always the individual who is to be cured, but where, as in the instance of the physician, the weight of universal knowledge can be brought to bear upon the special case, the degree of insight is so much clearer and more complete than it would be in the instance of the layman's mere observation that the comparison seems unnecessary.

With regard to intuition, the same desire to find the universal crowded into the particular is manifested when the geometer expects to find the principles of the triangle in this triangle, the principles of the circle in this perceptible figure before him. But, in the case of space, there is no general from which the particular can be deduced, no

universal which can be contained in it; space is genus and species in one. It cannot be derived from "extensity," because extensity is only another name for spatiality, so that the familiar syllogistic arrangement, where the larger truth overshadows the smaller one, is inapplicable. Where "horse" participates in "animal," where "oak" relates to "tree," space would seem to be the outcast child of the concept, for the latter does not supply the spatial with any appropriate genus. Hence, as induction failed to reveal a synthesis of particular "spaces," so here the analysis refuses to yield a spatial deduction, whence we are driven to account for the ground of space in accordance with some *cognitio tertii generis*.

Intuition, as the tertiary form of knowledge, seems to consist of a synthesis of the two extremes produced by the contrast of knowledge from sense without and knowledge from understanding within. Thus, in intuition, we find the necessary and universal of the concept, but where these are usually accompanied by abstraction and generalisation, intuition provides different consorts, in the form of the immediate and particular. The weakness of the conceptual universal lies in its abstractness and generality; the insufficiency of the particular appears in the lack of the necessary and universal; now, the intuition finds it possible to combine the strong points while discarding the weak, hence it presents a combination of the immediate and particular with the necessary and universal.

As we have seen this extraordinary union in the case of mathematics, so we may witness it again in connection with æsthetics. The whole system of gravitation is presented directly to the mind when the column of a temple supports the entablature in the capital, the whole significance of the force is concentrated. Upon the canvas of a landscape painting the full meaning of the world is brought within the narrow compass of immediate contemplation. In the statue the totality of mankind physical is displayed in a perceptible manner, while the drama or the romance has the power to depict the manifold of facts

and influences of human life in a direct, concrete fashion. Where science obtains its victory over the sensible world by summoning the dark powers of abstraction, art achieves a victory no less signal without quitting the field of the perceptible. As the result of this intuitional situation, the beholder is able to bring the powers of his mind to bear upon a particular object without sublimating it in the form of abstraction. The view of the perceptible world is thus exercised in the light of universal, necessary knowledge, and while the senses rest upon the particular star, flower, or other object, the mind is at liberty to intuit these in accordance with principles of universal significance.

This condition of things would be impossible were not space of an intuitive character, were not space a mental rather than a material affair. Since space has been found to consist of a perceptual product of the mind as well as a form of intuition, it is not so difficult for us to render plausible the assumption that space, instead of constituting some phase of the exterior world, exists in the interior world of consciousness. As yet, we have not registered our final view of the world-whole, nor have we even availed ourselves of the dialectical resources contained in the activistic order, so that we have still to consider the world as causal, the world as substantial; but, upon the plane of phenomenality, we are in a position to assert that the exterior world stands in need of nothing spatial to constitute it, so that the spatial, which is so needful to the intuiting mind, may be regarded as something interior, mental, subjective.

4. SPATIALITY AND REALITY

The perception of space from non-spatial impressions and the intuition of space in independence of the usual methods of thought seem to indicate that the subject in question disdains both the physical and the logical. Thus we are brought to the place where we must consider the ontology of space. Both psychological and epistemological

examinations of the spatial indicate that it is in the mind that we must look for the principle of intensity. In doing this we are called upon to tell what matter will lose and what mind will gain by the mental interpretation of the extensive principle. Far from suggesting that space is an illusion, we are anxious to create the impression that, from the point of view of the present dialectic, the reality of space is established when we relegate it to the mental world. The exterior world, instead of being a mere world of forms, is made up of forces in whose modes of behaviour the essential nature of existence is to be found. Nothing is gained when we speak of existence as that which is extended, nor is anything lost when we look upon the world as though it were not extended. There is something extra-mental which is able to produce the appearance of extension, just as there is something there which produces the constant illusion of reality, but to imagine that we have settled accounts with reality merely by attributing the spatial to it is to take the ontological problem with little seriousness. Hence, even if the mind did not need space for the purpose of exerting its sway over the physical world, we should still think it necessary to abandon the Cartesian conception of the corporeal world as *res extensa*. Indeed, before Kant had claimed space as a form of the mind, Leibnitz had rejected extension as an attribute of matter. If space be not ideal it is non-material, for the dynamic methods peculiar to the modern view of the world have long since found it wise to abandon the spatial conception of the physical world-order. That there is a "real" world which assumes the spatial form in our minds, and conducts itself as though it were possessed of spatial properties, no sober thinker will care to deny, while each one will reserve for himself the right to invest that "reality" with such a content as seems most suitable metaphysically; here the point is that the spatial does not solve the problem of the real.

On the other hand, the spatial is in great demand by the mind, which sees in it the possibility of securing a trans-local relation to the world. The human ego, realising the

significance of its spiritual life, is unwilling to remain rooted to the earth, hence it seizes upon the spatial as a means of securing a victory over the visible world. Place space within the mind, and the view of the world becomes spiritual. Among the various impressions which the mind receives, that of space is plainly different from the others; all of them appear as in space; they make up the content of which space is the form; they are in a flux, while space abides. This difference between the manifold content and the unitary form inclines us to the belief that space is so different from that which it envelops that we must relegate it to the mind, in which it serves to objectify the concrete impressions received through the senses.

Certain special considerations incline us further to this view of the internality of space. The mind uses the spatial in such a way as to have space anticipate all impressions, while the result of perception is such as to reveal the presence of the spatial after all the other impressions have been abstracted from the mind. Before perception can begin, the mind must be armed with its distinction of here and there, of external and internal; after the impressions have left, the mind still holds the local idea as a mental residuum. For the perception of objects, the mind has only one demand—the presence of the extensive principle—and this is found so to adhere to the mind that it is looked upon as itself something mental. While it seems impossible to rid ourselves of the notion that space is the external place where things are located, even when the attempt to state the matter in the traditional manner involves stupendous paradoxes, it is still more difficult to rid the critical mind of the notion that the spatial is eminently within. Just as a glance at the celestial universe persuades us that stars “rise” and “set,” while a calm consideration of what really transpires in the world forbids that we should impute motion to these celestial bodies, so the naïve view of the world incites us to objectify the space that can exist upon subjective grounds only.

While it may seem to beg the question, when we speak

of the "objective world" we must remind ourselves that, having abandoned the stuff-like notion of reality, we decided to look upon reality as an order. When, therefore, we speak of there being something extra-mental, we are only admitting, as we are quite ready to do, that this something is a non-spatial affair which has the ability to create an appearance of extensity, just as the spatial objectification often accompanies the display of various forms of natural force, as the flame from the fire, the flash from the lightning. It is to be expected that the order of states in the world of appearance should have the power to produce the spatial appearance, so that while we assert the mentality of space, we are ready to look behind it to the real principle which so orders the states of existence that they cannot help appearing as though they were themselves extended. The mythological mind will see in the separate stars the forms of various objects, so the imagination of man interprets the relation which obtains among states of existence as though it were none other than a principle of grouping according to certain spatial shapes.

Space is all that anyone has reason to expect of it. In its essential nature it is symbolic of the relations that obtain in the objective world; it is as if a substance had its attributes at its side, or as if cause and effect operated by reason of the fact that they were in contact with each other, but these forms of representation are mythological in the real world, where the relation of attribute to substance, of cause to effect, has nothing to do with the spatial view of things, except that it produces it as a mental effect. As the objective world is one whose reality depends, not upon position, but upon the principle of order, that world is independent of the spatial, which is only a special way of representing the real order of existential states; the qualitative view of the real assumes for us a spatial character, but to attempt an explanation of thinghood upon the basis of space-position and space-relation is to attempt the impossible.

5. THE IDEALITY OF SPACE

When we raised the question, Is space real? we found it necessary to make use of the qualitative and relational as criteria of that which really exists. But, as will appear when we have ascended to the next higher view of being, there is another way of measuring that which is real, and this consists in the causal, or activistic, standard. Even where one does not agree with us that the world is three-fold in its phenomenality, activity, and substantiality, he cannot deny that, somewhere in the course of ontology, the real will be challenged to act. To be is to act; it may be more than this, but it is nothing less. When, therefore, we seek to demonstrate the reality of space, we must show that space is capable of action. With spatiality, the possibility of action is precluded by the very nature of the subject; action may assume a quasi-spatial form, and it may be convenient to measure it in terms of position, distance, and the like, as in the movement of the clock's hands over the dial; but this very mode of spatial measurement removes space itself from the sphere of activity. Indeed, to look upon space as that which works reveals the absurdity of the claim that space is objectively real.

Kant found difficulty with space when he sought to decide whether it was finite or infinite. The same question comes forth to trouble the mind when we assume that space is a form or receptacle in which things exist. We have already secured such a criterion of reality that we are not tempted to assert that to exist a thing must exist *in* something; yet, if one cling to this naïve notion, we may point out that the existence of a world of things by way of content, and the extra-existence of a world-space by way of form, implies a dualism in the view of the world-whole; indeed, it yields two worlds instead of the one which exists. In addition to this speculative scruple which one must exercise whenever the reality of space is referred to, there is Zeno's paradox, which so placed the Eleatic Sophist that,

when he sought to put the world of things in space, he found it incumbent upon him to do as much for space itself, and thus place it in something else, whereupon, in order to account for the reality of this third receiver, he found it necessary to improvise a fifth, and so on indefinitely. Kant's first antinomy is a similar *reductio ad ridiculum*, and it is difficult to see how any attempt to express the nature of space in the form of objective thinghood can be any more successful.

The dread of sophistry, whether represented by an ancient Zeno or a modern Kant, persuades the mind to abide by the apparently obvious view that, in spite of objections, contradictions, and the like, space is put there as a vivid fact of perception. One is tempted to think that to exist is to be extended, just as though the real were a *res extensa*. Kant did little or nothing to smooth over the difficulty that so naturally arises in our consciousness, but seemed rather gratified to discover a way in which he might throw dust into the eyes of the less skilled speculator. To make the ideality of space a plausible doctrine, we must keep in mind the fact that reality can be explained much better without the help of space than with it, so that the mind gains rather than loses when it relegates the spatial to the realm of mentality. As a form of the perceiving, intuiting consciousness, the spatial is in a position where it may render the mental view of the world intelligible and consistent; but as an attribute of objective reality, it can produce only confusion and contradiction. Kant suggested that when we look out through the spatial we see nothing; but it would have been possible for him to have asserted that, when the mind makes use of the phenomenology of space, it has it in its power to apprehend the intelligible order of things beyond. He was prevented from asserting this, because he conceived of the real as that which exists in itself; but where one has found the real to be made up of an order of qualities, as a thing in its states, he can avail himself of the spatial intuition as a means of perceiving the intelligible. The order of states, the interrelation of

qualities and the like, being imperceptible, are brought home to the mind in the intimate form of the spatial. The ideality of space, therefore, does not make void the world of real existences; no, it is one of the conditions under which we are able to make the idea of reality plausible.

6. SPATIALITY AND SELFHOOD

The attempt on the part of the ego to secure possession of the world is furthered most mightily by the ideality of space. Were space indeed an objective reality, it is difficult to see how human selfhood could be saved, for the ego would be rooted to the real as a tree to the soil. Through the ideality of the spatial the ego gains access to the world as a whole, while, like the curiosity-merchant in Balzac's *Magic Skin*, it experiences "the joys of beholding all things, of leaning over the parapet of the world to question the other spheres, to hearken to the voice of God." At the beginning of modern thought, Descartes placed thought and extension at opposed poles, and now that extension has been acquired by thought, the thinking mind has achieved the ability of ranging throughout all extensible existence. As Bergson has expressed it, "The more consciousness is intellectualised, the more is matter spatialised."¹ Since we have found that matter suffers nothing from the elimination of the spatial, we are now in a position to appreciate the immense gain that accrues to the mental from the acquisition of this attribute; mind is that which thinks and that which extends the world in space. In this way does the ego begin to secure its rightful place in the world, which at first seemed so inimical to selfhood and the interior life.

The relation of space to selfhood is really taken up by Kant in the Second Antinomy, although the doctrine of spatial ideality found its expression more completely in the First Antinomy, with its problem of the outer limits of the world. Where Kant appears to be discussing the ancient question of Atomism by both affirming and denying, after the

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed, p. 206.

manner of his Antinomies, that "every compound substance consists of simple parts," his real object lies in the direction of soul-atomism, or Monadology, as was shown by his contrast between *monas* and *atomus*.¹ This spiritualistic atomism is further shown to be the true crux of the controversy when Kant discusses the "interest of reason in the conflict of ideas," for he takes pains to inform the reader that the interest centres in the assertion that "the thinking self is of simple and hence indestructible nature."² The question of infinite or finite divisibility, therefore, concerns the self with its supposedly simple nature. If Kant had shown as much zeal in the emancipation of the self as he showed in his defence of freedom, both his logic and ethics would have gained in consistency and power, for the whole system of categories found its centre in the self, as the synthetic unity of apperception, while the categorical imperative, with its "thee" and "thou," would have been more inexorable had it been based upon "I" and "mine."

Kant does not hesitate to consider space something both intellectual and human. It is in this sense that he uses the expression "mental space,"³ while it is in the humanistic spirit that he refers to our human habit of spatialising the world by means of the distinctions of before and behind, right and left, by virtue of which latter distinction the glove that is made for the right hand cannot be used for the left, even though it is the same in shape and size.⁴ Such findings, and they are enriched by illustrations taken from celestial space, in keeping with the larger views of the *Kritik*, have the effect of relating the ego to the world, and that in a manner most efficient for the purposes of an egoistic system. Where we may have looked upon extension as something inferior, the view of space as that which is extended by the mind tends to raise the attribute to a new height. Moreover, it is the means by which the ego obtains its possession of the phenomenal world-order.

Lower forms of life, which share with man the perceptible

¹ *Kritik*, p. 470.

³ *Prolegomena*, tr. Mahaffy and Bernard, p. 41.

² *Ib.*, p. 490.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 39.

apprehension of the sensuous world, are wanting in the space-intuition which enables the ego to view the world as a whole. The animal is wholly within the world, of which it is a part; its knowledge is only a kind of acquaintance with the particular forms of existence which have interest for it. In the instance of the human ego, however, the mind is not wholly within the world, for the self has the power to raise itself above the immediate and place itself in touch with the remote. The mind elaborates a space-science, whereby it secures a view of the world as a unity, so that its knowledge is not merely a chance acquaintance with the several objects of existence, but is concerned with the existence of things in their totality. By means of spatial intuition the ego participates in the world, and where the animal is a part of the world, the ego is equivalent to the world-whole. There is no part of the world to which he belongs exclusively, and there is no part of the world to which he does not belong. The several Socratic sailors under the one sail, the many Leibnitzian monads mirroring the same world reveal the human ego participating in the world which it both inhabits and possesses. The self is present in no one part of the world; it is absent from none; since space is within it, the self tends to render void the common distinctions of "here" and "there."

Where common consciousness may fail to make this manifest, certain exalted forms of mental life compensate for the mediocrity of human existence, when they raise the self above the locality in which, for the time being, it finds itself. These exceptional moments appear in connection with the æsthetic and religious consciousness, in which the mind absorbs its spatial sense and gives expression to that which is wholly intelligible. Of this mood the contemplation of beauty and the communion with the spiritual are abundant evidence. The objective world then appears as a curtain rather than a wall, while the mind casts off local limitations and enjoys existence in its totality. Extreme as such a conception of the ego's life may be, it cannot be denied that all forms of human culture, when they are reduced to a common

dialectical denominator, confess that their one aim is to remove the mind from the immediate that it may enjoy the remote which can come on to consciousness only as mental disinterestedness holds sway.

All culture may thus be expressed by calling it the de-spatialising of the mind, and where no space of such a mental nature as perception, intuition, and ideality have shown it to be, the life of culture would be in vain. In the spatialising of the world and the de-spatialising of the mind, the ego finds opportunity to emancipate itself from the local and utilitarian, and thus it may roam at will in the world whose space-attribute it has in its own possession. The intellectualising of the ego runs parallel to the spatialising of the world, as Bergson has suggested, so that the higher the mind rises in its intellectuality the more perfect its view of the world. Where Vedanta so intellectualises consciousness that it makes the world none other than the Self, a less ambitious and more critical dialectic may substitute for the maxims—That world art thou ; I am Brahman—the more modest thought that the ego is in the world, which it possesses by inherent right.

IV

OUTER WORLD AND INNER LIFE

THE discussion of the world as appearance cannot proceed indefinitely without taking cognisance of the inner character of phenomenality. Moreover, the plan of the present dialectic is such as to involve systematic views of both outer and inner worlds, not as separate topics, but as phases of one and the same universe. Phenomenality, far from forbidding consciousness, really necessitates the function of inner life, for the reason that the world, however else it might be constituted were it a world of things and activities only, could never be considered in a phenomenalist manner were it not for the participation of consciousness. Thus it comes about that the traditional problem of mind and body contributes something new to a dialectic which seeks to locate the ego in the exterior world. As the psycho-physical problem presents itself, it assumes the form of a relation between mind and body; in particular, this relation is one viewed from without inward, inasmuch as it has to do with the conditions under which the stimulus becomes sensation. The discussion of this problem takes, as its point of departure, the dogmatic realism of Descartes, whence it proceeds to the critical idealism of Kant, while it results in an æsthetic view of the inner life as that which has a characteristic content. Thus the present dialectic is not content to reveal the supremacy of the idea of "soul" as something superior to and independent of the purely "psychic" of the parallelistic theory; it insists that the "soul" shall assume an individualistic form and possess a spiritual content.

I. STIMULUS AND SENSATION

When the problem of mind and body is viewed in a critical fashion, it assumes a twofold form; here it is phenomenistic, there it is activistic; here it involves the problem of perception, there the question of volition. Hence it becomes necessary to inquire into the way the self receives impressions from the outer world, just as it must be asked how the will reacts upon these when once they are recorded. In order to discover whether the self has a place in the world, where it may perform the work it seems destined to do, this double question must be discussed, in order that we may be able to determine how *stimulus* becomes *sensation*, how *motive* results in *motion*. The first question is to be taken up here; the second one belongs to the view of the world as activity, where the ego carries on interactivity with the world of causes. Traditional metaphysics, with its habitual tendency toward the static, and with its narrow field of appearance-reality, has prejudiced us against the problem of interaction by discussing the perceptual problem of stimulus-sensation as though it were one with the question of motive-motion, when in truth the first is a phenomenistic, the second an activistic situation. Where at first we are interested in the relation of the inner ego to the outer world, we shall find it expedient to turn to the question of the voluntaristic reaction of that self upon the world.

The problem of perception, with the dualism of stimulus and sensation, has had the effect of stating the whole question, and it is the question of *statement* rather than that of *solution* that engages us here. When Descartes sought the inner life of thought, he found it necessary to draw a distinction between mind and body, as between that which is conscious and that which is extended. As long as the distinction was not drawn, and the two were left to themselves, no problem arose; but with the distinction which the elucidation of the inner life had made necessary, the problem of dualism became paramount. Descartes' statement was made in the

light of the static thought that prevailed throughout the Enlightenment; the revolutionary conception of the world, wherein matter is relegated to a lower stage of existence, found no place in a system which insisted upon placing the mental and the bodily upon the same level. The problem is thus a most trying one, for where we are inclined to arrange the two members in an order, where the material occupies the lower place, the statement of the question presents the two horizontally—mind to one side, matter to the other.

From the Cartesian standpoint of the inner life, the statement of the psycho-physical problem is faulty from another point of view. If we take consciousness as the criterion of existence, then we are confronted, not by a dualism of things mental here and things bodily there, but with a single series of things mental, known to us through consciousness. When the Cartesian consciousness is analysed it fails to present the realistic dualism which Descartes involved in his statement, for the actual situation is that of a mental monism. One may insist that the full statement of the question necessitates both psychical and physical, but the logical point of view assumed by Descartes admits of a single series only, the psychic one. It is for this reason that we find it necessary to qualify the naïve statement of Descartes by the critical idealism of Kant, which serves the interests of this problem just as it has been found to act as an antidote in the case of others.

The original statement of the problem as one of stimulus and sensation involved interpretations of mind and matter which in themselves are untenable, so that where the statement of the factors changes, the problem itself is found to assume a different character. To describe mind as that which thinks is to ignore the activistic phase of mind, which is none the less that which wills. Descartes, who could ascribe no content to inner consciousness, was equally unable to account for its complete form as something both reflective and reactionary. Thus the extreme rationalism of the Cartesian psychology prevented the

thinker of that period from comprehending the naturalness of the mind's relation to the body. In the same way, the material was defined in an impossible manner when it was declared that the essence of matter consists in extension. In the first place, extension was soon discovered to give but an imperfect account of the functions of matter, so that as early as Leibnitz it became necessary to attribute to the material the element of force. On the other hand, the attribute of extension, which had been found so inadequate to the demands of the material, became a mark of the mental when Kant revealed the idealistic character of space. These two tendencies—the energising of the material world and the idealising of space—had the effect of placing the dualism of Descartes in a different light. Descartes made it easy for philosophy to slip into the parallelistic interpretation of the problem, and himself went so far as to conclude in favour of automatism. In the midst of his automatism, however, Descartes clung to his rationalism, and thus made the mind supreme in its inner consciousness, while man was described as a conscious automaton. Parallelism reverses the situation, for the principles of psycho-physics tend to place the material alone as the standard, while the mental is supposed to accompany the latter. As a result the calculated effect of the Cartesian philosophy, or the idea of an independent inner life, is destroyed; and thus it becomes necessary to review the whole situation from the standpoint of the self in the outer world.

2. PARALLELISM AND PHENOMENALITY

As the problem of interaction will be found to demand a critical conception of causality, so the problem of parallelism is no less in need of a critical view of substance. In the midst of the restatement of the psycho-physical problem, it must be remembered that the question concerns the phenomenal rather than the real world. The present view of the world as appearance, therefore, has the advantage of

placing the problem in the proper light; the question thus receives a Kantian, where previously it had enjoyed a Cartesian, statement. After his *Transcendental Æsthetic* had shown that bodies are not things but phenomena, Kant applied his doctrine to the special problem of mento-bodily dualism. The dualism of Descartes had been that of mind and body; the dualism of Kant was that of understanding and sensibility. For this reason, Kant cannot regard the dualism of thinking things and extended things as a real dualism, for the reason that in his mind all "things" are of a phenomenal character. When, therefore, Kant opposes the Cartesian theory of interaction, he raises a critical objection, which makes the relation between mind and body appear, not inexplicable, but unreal. Beneath the dualism of things conscious and things extended, there lies the deeper dualism of sense, in which the material order is given, and understanding, in which thought expresses itself. This presentation of the problem, found as it is in the *Fourth Paralogism* of rational psychology, places the psychophysical situation in a new light. Kant's conception of the problem may not be wholly satisfactory, and one may object to the way his criticism removes, not only the Cartesian dualism, but the original *cogito, ergo sum*; but as a corrective for the crass dualism of the earlier philosophy, it finds a welcome here when we seek to come to an understanding with the problem of inner life and outer world.

But the critical attitude toward the problem of interaction did not fail to receive some recognition in the Cartesian school itself, as one may see in the instance of Malebranche's Occasionalism. With Malebranche the problem of interaction of body with mind, or the causal relation of stimulus to sensation, is a problem of perception. Parallelism and phenomenalism are not far apart in this division of the Occasionalistic school; Geulincx takes up the other half of the problem, so that his problem is of a wholly voluntaristic character. Malebranche may assume that, in a dogmatic way, he is examining the question how the

body affects the mind, but the carrying out of his inquiry finds him working in an idealistic manner, in accordance with which he attempts to answer the question how the mind thinks things. In the spirit of Occasionalism, Malebranche asserts that the vision of the human spirit is not a direct one in which the mind sees things as they are, but an indirect view in which the particular views reality in the light of the universal, and the human perceives through the divine. We see all things in God—*nous voyons toutes choses en dieu*.¹ This view has the advantage of showing that what we call "things" are none the less objects, just as it is of value in demonstrating the fact that the perception of such objects involves a view of the world in its totality.

Our study of phenomenality has had the effect of showing us that the inner mind can enter into relations with the outer world, for this is the essential lesson conveyed by the phenomenal world-order as something received by the mind through experience, just as it is this same world which is found to consist of an order of states. The problem of perception, which belongs to epistemology rather than to metaphysics, is one which cannot be solved as long as philosophy persists in regarding reality as something thing-like or stuff-like in its character; and it is this perverse conception of existence which has spread its wing over the question of interaction. That which the mind perceives is not the *res extensa* of the Cartesians, nor is possessed of a thing-like nature at all. The lowest phase of the real, as this is made manifest upon the plane of appearance, has been found to consist of relation and order, so that we are not called upon to show how it is that the external world in its ontological solidity is able to arouse the perceiving powers of the mind. No such world exists, since reality, as we apprehend it in experience, is composed of qualities whose arrangement assumes responsibility for existence. Now this arrangement or order is something that can make an appeal to the mind, where the solidity or stuff-like character of existence must for ever remain

¹ *Recherche de la Vérité*, III. II. ch. iv.

concealed. Both the outer world and the mind within have the principle of order as something common, and upon this basis of order, which in the outer world is constructive, while in inner consciousness it expresses itself as the *ratio cognoscendi* of existence, affords a ground where these contrasted phases of existence are in community.

The problem of perception, which with Malebranche was both a metaphysical and an epistemological one, places the question of an inner life in the world in a special light, so that it is worth discussing both for its own sake, as a modern problem, as also for the purpose of clarifying the problem of the ego and its position in the world-whole. Realism insists that, as a cat may look at a king, so the mind may contemplate reality as such. Idealism involves more in the way of a *tour de force*, whereby the mind is supposed to perceive something of its own character, as a system of ideas, or the theistic world-whole of Occasionalism. Both schools of epistemology overlook the fact that mind, having come into being within the borders of the world, is not called upon to explain how it comes about that it lays claim to knowledge of some remote and alien realm, for the reason that such a situation is not the real one at all. Realism seems to urge that, with the naked eye, the mind can perceive the far-off world, while idealism insists that it is the mirrored reflection of this in the telescope that is actually seen. Now the real world is not a remote system, but the world in which the ego dwells, the place where it does its world-work, the scene of its destiny. Perception is not so much a cognition of reality as it is an acquaintance with reality; knowledge is the flowering of an indigenous plant, not the mysterious blossoming of an exotic. This point of view, which is neither realism nor rationalism, but intellectualism, is involved in the very problem of the ego and its position in the world, as also in the special question of the relation between external stimuli and interior sensations. When, therefore, the intellectual life of the ego within the world so alters the

conditions of the problem, the original dualism tends to melt away.

3. MONISM AND INTELLECTUALISM

While the application of the principle of phenomenality tends to remove traditional dualism, inasmuch as it provides for a life of the mind within the world, it does not assume the same form as that of monism. Immanence and intellectualism differ in certain important aspects. The most obvious difference between the two appears in the fact that monism looks upon mind and matter as though they were of the same ontological value, and also as though they existed side by side. But the theory of an inner life within the world places the whole question in another light; the plan of the arrangement of the mental and the bodily is thus perpendicular rather than horizontal, whereby the mind is looked upon as a later and more perfect product of the real world. It is difficult to understand how physiological psychology has been able to accept the identity-hypothesis, or to see how it has profited practically by the alleged application of parallelism to the field of experiment. It is more in harmony with experience to consider the material as the underlying basis of the mental, and this naturalistic point of view is far from the situation presented by parallelism. The intellectualistic conception of mind as an inner life cannot accept the monistic theory, because the latter elevates the material to a position it is not supposed to occupy.

The perpendicular arrangement of the mental and bodily was not overlooked by Spinoza, although he did not see fit to emphasize this phase of his monism. That which was wanting was not the subordination of the material to the mental, but the evolutionary conception of the higher as having come from the lower. Spinoza's inquiry concerned itself, not only with the nature, but with the "origin" of mind,¹ and the whole plan of his work,

¹ *Ethica*, part. ii.

beginning with nature, advancing to mind and body, and culminating in a rational and ethical view of human life, involves the idea of a transition from the lower and inferior to the superior and higher. The movement which should carry forward the lower to the higher is wanting, but the recognition of the mind's supremacy is not. Spinoza's view opposes itself to the voluntaristic phase of the problem, as this had been taken up by Geulincx, and like a determinist he appeals to the facts of automatism, somnambulism and the like to support his view. - But, in this very subjugation of the self to the principle of natural law, Spinoza does not fail to keep the mind supreme, for his famous parallelistic text, *ordo et connexio rerum idem est atque ordo et connexio idearum*, while the direct application of this to the psycho-physical problem carries out this same thought that it is the mind with its ideas and states which sets the standard for the order and states of things; thus he says, "The order of states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity *in the mind*." ¹ The arrangement of the two members of the series, therefore, is not the horizontal one of the identity-hypothesis, but a vertical one, according to which the principles of intellectualism are properly presented.

In contrast with this mental form of the monistic doctrine, modern psychology has seen fit to lay emphasis upon the materialistic side of the parallelism. Matter is thus of exaggerated importance in the problem of stimulus sensation, while it lays the doctrine open to two grave objections. First, there is the logical objection, whereby we refuse to identify matter and mind; in the present dialectic, where so much stress is laid upon quality as the exponent of thinghood, it becomes unusually difficult to look upon the material and mental as identical, for the reason that their respective states are so unlike. In addition to this formal objection, there is a second scruple which acts to make the parallelistic hypothesis seem less and less

¹ *Ethica*, part iii., prop. ii., note.

plausible ; this is of empirical character ; it acts as a barrier to the movement that would formulate the psycho-physical parallel in the human mind by asserting that this parallelism is carried on throughout the whole of the natural order. Experience accepts the presence of the mental and the material in the case of man, as also in the instance of animal life in general ; but the theory of parallelism demands that we shall continue this parallelism in proportionate fashion throughout all nature. Mind in man is a fact ; mind in nature is an hypothesis which has little empirical evidence to support it. For this reason we hesitate to accept the theory of sub-human and sub-animal forms of mentality of which Fechner discourses so eloquently in the pages of *Nanna*, while we see no practical gain accruing when, to complete the proportionality in the opposite direction beyond man, Fechner postulates the existence of the supra-human mind, spoken of in his *Zend Avesta*. Experience, whose edge is sharpened by the logic of the concept, must protest against this unwarranted extension of the mental and material, for as the principles of mind seem incapable of obtaining in the realms of plant and mineral, so the principles of matter are equally powerless to advance beyond the borders of the human mind into the realm of the spiritual.

But, like Spinoza, Fechner expresses his monistic doctrine in such a way as to exalt the principles of intellectualism ; this comes about when he insists that experience teaches us but one fact—that of consciousness. In his mind, that which has no consciousness has no existence ; by means of such a doctrine he attempts to establish the truth of “solidarity” in the universe. The result of such a view is to accredit the idea of the world-whole that we are endeavouring to establish : that of an inner, conscious life in the world as such. Whether we are ready to admit that this consciousness streams forth indefinitely into the external world is not the question, for we are anxious only to show how the world as it is constituted makes the presence of spiritual life possible. Fechner’s monism,

however, gives us only a hint of this interior life, for what he calls "consciousness" we would describe more minutely as an interior existence which has its centre in the self, while its content, far from being purely psychological and colourless, has about it somewhat æsthetical and characteristic. Nevertheless, when one seeks to demonstrate the possibility of a spiritual life in the world, whereby human culture finds its foundation, he cannot reasonably overlook the situation presented by the modern problem of mento-bodily interaction. The prime difference between the two problems consists in this: where the rationalist seeks to demonstrate the existence of the soul as a thing, the intellectualist is anxious to evince the reality of an inner life, which has content and character. The problem of psycho-physical interrelation is quite different from that of knowledge, even where the former may involve something of the perceptual in epistemology; for the problem of knowledge relates the self to the world in a formal fashion only, while its concern is for the adoption of the proper method. The problem before us, however, has to do with the constructive ideas of outer world and inner life, so that it is more nearly akin to the question concerning the ego's position in the world.

The traditional theories of mind and body treat both factors in the dualism as though they were solid things, or things in themselves. Where, as in the school of Descartes, one looks upon the two members of the question as "things," *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, he cannot content himself with the criticism that the adjectives in question are inadequate to express the nature of the subjects, mind and body, but must carry his opposition further, and thus insist that the substantives also, where it is here "thing" and there "thing," are equally at fault. A critical notion of substance cannot endure such an uncritical statement of the "substance" contained in both mind and body. Moreover, the whole question is pitched in the field of phenomenality, so that its solution cannot give us anything more than a preliminary statement of the larger question concerning

the relation of the self to the world. Even the dogmatic definitions of Descartes confessed to the fact that the question had to do with the world of appearance, for the Cartesian conception of matter is phenomenalistic, while the parallel notion of mind involves nothing more than immediate consciousness. The situation, as it presents itself, involves two forms of appearance, not two kinds of reality; at the same time, these two phases of phenomenality are related in the form of an inner order circumscribed by the order of exteriority.

4. CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE

From the phenomenalistic standpoint, it appears that both dualism and monism are false. Where mind and matter are viewed in the light of appearance, it becomes evident that their reality consists in the active principle of order; the psycho-physical problem overlooks this feature in the analysis of reality; or, what is really the case, it does not analyse reality at all. There are no two separate substances called mind and body, nor is there a single substance called neither one nor the other; such substances do not exist, whether dualistically or monistically, but they represent an impossible conception of analysed reality. If the dualist were once successful in demonstrating the interaction of the separate "mind" and "body," he would not have explained the relation of the self to the world, because his theory could reveal nothing more than the mechanical interaction of two things without character or content. The monist, who aspires to reduce these two to one substance, would be hardly more successful, although his theory has the advantage of relegating the mental and bodily to something akin to the phenomenal world, for the reason that the monist regards these as attributes or phases of the one substance. But even then it would be necessary to observe that this remaining substance had no reality, since the nature of realness, instead of being found in something ontologically solid, consists in a fine

principle of order as this obtains among the qualitative states of a thing.

The formal character of the psycho-physical problem is due to the fact that metaphysics has been exerting itself in behalf of the abstract sciences of logic and ethics. This tendency, to be observed in the epistemology of Malebranche and the ethics of Geulincx, reveals itself more pointedly in the rationalistic system of Spinoza. As long as these formal sciences are allowed to set the ontological standard, just so long will metaphysics be forced to proceed without content and life, for these sciences are not supposed to supply humanity with anything more than norms and critical methods; life as such must come from some independent source. But the life of the self, as that life is lived, is not an abstraction, nor does it depend upon the concepts of logic and ethics. In the present problem of interaction it has been logic which has determined the discussion, and the question has appeared impossible of solution, because it has expected the mind as abstract to perceive the world as something concrete. "Thought" in all its formal character has been expected to obtain a victory over "thing" in all its resisting solidity; pure form has been contrasted with mere content, as if the perceiving process could carry on its operations under such circumstances.

When the actual situation comes under scrutiny it appears that, in the ego's life in the world, the relation of inner to outer obtains and operates in a warm and natural manner, in independence of formal machinery of thinking. This condition of things reveals itself in the æsthetic consciousness, where the inner life of the ego finds it possible to co-exist and carry on commerce with the exterior world. Since humanity has come up out of nature, since its life is ever lived under the auspices of the natural, it is strange that the problem of the mind's relation to the exterior world should have arisen at all. To conceive of a dualism in which the mind exists apart from matter is far more difficult than to conceive of that mind in natural interaction with the world about it. If, therefore, philosophy has

followed the æsthetical rather than the logical, the unhappiness of the dualistic problem would have been avoided by the modern as it was previously avoided by the ancient. Humanity could not hope to exist in an abstract realm of pure thought, hence the existence and expression of an inner intellectual life in the world-whole is that which is to be expected in philosophy. But the mento-bodily presentation of the problem is unnatural and impossible.

The æsthetic presentation of the present problem, while it is in keeping with the conditions of the world as appearance, has the further advantage of accounting for the spontaneity of the ego, which is not quite contained within the world which surrounds it. When, therefore, the human spirit affirms itself by means of its characteristic work, it effects the interaction of mind and body, and that in a logical and natural fashion. The creative work of the mind cannot be conceived of as going on in the void of mere mentality, hence the presence of the sensuous is welcomed by the self. The advantages of the æsthetic method of relating the mind to the world appear again in connection with the mind's attempt to banish the material world. Where the rationalistic view of the mind is blind to the existence of the exterior world, the æsthetic view attempts no such impossible task as that of ridding the world of itself. For, although the æsthetic consciousness is no more ready to take the world for granted, it is prepared to accept the world as something not wholly alien to its own inner nature. It accepts the world in symbolic fashion as that which contains the secret of existence.

The æsthetico-intellectualistic view of the problem of mind and matter removes the dualism and reforms the monism that have long agitated the dialectic mind. The traditional view of the problem failed to observe that the mind which attempts to perceive matter is itself within the world, so that, instead of representing the relation between mental and physical as a couple of concentric circles, it made its graphic representation assume the form of parallel lines. No such parallelism exists, for mind and matter do

not exist and exhibit their functions side by side ; the actual situation consists of the inner life of the self representing the exterior world, upon which it reacts also. One cannot reasonably call himself a dualist, even when he recognises the intrinsic difference between mind and matter ; nor can he style himself a monist, even when he has repudiated dualism and has adopted a more compact system of reality. The character of the present point of view is thus to be described in such a way as to indicate the peculiar position of the self within the world, while it does not fail to take into account the naturalness and immediacy of the ego's intellectual life. Nothing practical is accomplished when one attempts to explain the essence and activity of human life in the world as long as he persists in asserting that the mental and the bodily are as two parallel lines ; but where the mental is placed within the physical, where it asserts its inner life, the universal striving of the self becomes intelligible.

Where consciousness is possessed of a cultural content rather than merely formal thought, it cannot feel indebted to dualism for the sharp separation of the self from the world, nor can it confess any real obligation to abide by the results of rationalism, which are confined to the formal. Reality certainly does manifest itself in both an outer and inner manner, and the present dialectic is not slow in acknowledging this ; but such an arrangement is by no means the same as the sundering of the world-whole into the hemispheres of thought and extension, of mind and body. The sharp sundering of mind from matter, as it made its appearance in mediæval life and is expressed dialectically in the modern Enlightenment, has not had the effect of evincing the principles of inner life in its individuality, for this has been brought about by means of a system of æsthetic thought in which the dualism of mind and body had no recognised place. The æsthetic deduction of inner life has paid no heed to the problem of psycho-physical perception, but has established the ego's relation to the world by means of an intuitive method of intellection. When we

might expect the relentless rationalism of the Enlightenment, which isolated human reason in a way that it had never been isolated before, to express the essence and character of the human self in its inward independence, the fact is that it was the Romantic school of æsthetics which brought the self to the light, and upon the basis of æsthetic values, rather than upon the premises of reason, does the claim to such individuality rest.

However independent the self may feel itself to be, its emancipation has come about by means of a movement which has not seen fit to signalise an abrupt departure from nature. The prevailing tendency on the part of the æsthetic individualist has been to seek an interpretation of nature which should be expressed in the forms of spiritual life; hence the symbolism of contemporary culture. Rationalistic dualism does nothing more than align the limits of the physical and the psychical; both the world without and the self within are left to themselves. The Romantic theory of life, however, has not been willing to leave the matter in this incomplete fashion, but has gone on to define mind in a more special manner, as that which is interior, intellectual, and egoistic, while it has interpreted matter in the form of exteriority. In this way, while Romanticism has not sought to create any dualism, it has succeeded in establishing the real independence of the self; rationalism, with all its apparent interest in the mind, has not had the good fortune to free the inner life from the toils of the external world, which has domineered over the self as though no dualism had been developed. Accordingly, it would seem as though the æsthetic deduction of the self, while it reveals no sharp antipathy to the exterior world, is the method by which the ego comes to its own in independence of that world. Rationalism has none of that spiritual sincerity which has marked the consciousness of the Romantic movement.

Those who have followed the fortunes of the rationalistic movement in modern times feel that dualism has not kept its word with the self, which it assumed to deliver from

the tyranny of the objective order. From monism, with its confessed adherence to the impersonal and solid, little or nothing was to be expected, while the whole mento-bodily movement, which has secured a place in modern metaphysics, has not been equal to the task of expressing the ego's essential relation to the world. The present dialectic, having departed from the solidarity of the rationalistic conception of thinghood, can do no other than express and discuss the problem of mind and matter in a manner which shall correspond to this general change in point of view, for the solid "mind" of the Enlightenment is something whose ontological character will not bear scrutiny. Mind as an inner life, whose relation to the world is something æsthetical and intellectual, is far removed in idea from the traditional notion.

5. SELFHOOD AND SOUL-STUFF

The difference between "mind" and the interior life of the self appears even more strikingly when the idea of soul-stuff is compared with that of selfhood. From the beginning, modern thought has seen fit to regard mind in such a democratic fashion as to postulate the ontological equality of all human beings, while its latest developments, made under the auspices of the evolutionary hypothesis, revealed the tendency to lower the level to such a degree that the lower forms of animal life should become participants in the realm of spiritual life. The idea of mind as *res cogitans*, or the more advanced conception of soul-stuff, is foreign to the mind of inner experience, while it is impotent to account for the operations of the ego in the world. Where the ideal of selfhood is allowed to exercise its influence, and we no longer view the mind as something added to the body for the sake of perfecting its movements, the infelicities and contradictions of the soul-stuff theory are avoided. Even the traditional notion of the "soul," while it upholds something more consistent and respectable than the scientific principle of mind as such, does not account for the interior

manifold, with its nuances, its mysteries, or its spontaneous strivings; and these are the things that are of interest to us in the contemplation of humanity as an internal system.

When, therefore, mind is looked upon, not in the gross, but as something highly specialised, the total inadequacy of the psychic view of the question becomes apparent. Mind as the accompaniment of matter, the psychic as the reflection of the physical, the will as the imitator of natural force—these are conceptions of the inner life which are intolerable to one who has learned to appreciate the genius of humanity. The psycho-physical presentation of the problem of mind commits the error of regarding the mind as something given in nature, so that the problem of adjusting the mental to the corporeal consists in nothing more than the relating of one form of exterior existence to another, as heat to motion. But the nature of mind, as that nature reveals itself in the case of the ego, is such as to demand a movement from within; for the mind is not constituted by some sort of stuff, but consists of an affirmation which has its source within. In this act of self-affirmation we perceive the chief difference between mind as made up of soul-stuff and mind as constituted by an inner act of self-assertion. The psychical theory, if it could explain the mind at all, could do no more than account for those automatic forms of activity which suggest a condition of perpetual somnambulism; for the elucidation of the intrinsic activity of the mind, that activity which has created human culture, it is necessary to have recourse to the idea of self-affirmation.

The ideal of life as something interior removes the human soul from the field of conflict that made the problems of the Enlightenment so paradoxical, so perplexing. The exteriorising activity of current dialectics presents this difficulty in another light, and while our own age is not innocent of impossible ideals and contradictory notions, it has been able to transcend both the dualism and monism of the earlier period. To-day our naturalistic and social interests seem to forbid the assertion of interior existence, and one might well believe that, in the dispensation of

nature and the organisation of society, there had been made no provision for the self, so thoroughly do all activities assume the exteriorising form. We are in a condition where we "build," but "do not enter in"; we are so interested in the not-self of nature and society that we lose interest in the individual. But selfhood is not supposed to come from without as an event, nor are egos to come into being as a species in the animal order or as citizens of some new empire; egos are to exist inwardly, individually, by means of a spiritual act of affirmation.

The affirmation of the interior self, by means of which it comes into being as something distinct from the exterior world, is not to be confused with the ideas of instinctive activity which guide us in estimating the life-force of the animal, for the activity of the ego is an affair of its own producing. At the same time, the inward act of self-assertion is not the same as that functioning of the will which goes to make up the activity of the exterior social world-order. Both of these views, the natural and the social, suggest too much of the laborious, while the spiritual assertions of the self, as these appear in human culture, are light and fine, even where they are necessarily intense. Moreover, these standards of exteriorising work fail to observe that the existence of the self is found in the enjoyment of its own inner reality. Eudæmonism has so often been criticised for its ethical shortcomings that it is a source of satisfaction to observe how the ideal of happiness is of some value in evincing the existence of the interior life of the human self. Both Geulincx and Spinoza, who were so important in shaping the fortunes of the psycho-physical problem, were inclined to introduce and further an ethical system which was not innocent of rigorism, so that there was no opportunity for them to seek a demonstration of interior existence by means of a eudæmonistic method.

But the enjoyment of existence is an argument for the independent reality of the ego, whose forces and ideals are not to be exteriorised, but are of such a nature as to exist within the confines of the self. Under the auspices of our

modern industrialism, where the inner life is forced to follow the parallel of the natural and social order, the enjoyment of existence tends to fade from our view. In the pursuit of this idea, Eucken has been led to praise certain tenets of "Æsthetic Individualism," even when such a life-ideal is not closely akin to his own; thus he says, "From this point of view it may be regarded as the most important of all tasks again to become master of work, and to preserve a life inwardly conscious of itself, in contrast with the tendency of work to occupy itself solely with externals; to realise a true present in contrast with the restless hurry further and further: a quietness and depth of soul in contrast with work's noise and agitation."¹ Only by the assumption of the selfhood of the ego is such inward stillness to be attained, and this inwardness is something that psycho-physical parallelism does not allow.

6. THE INNER ENJOYMENT OF EXISTENCE

The eudæmonistic test of reality is such as to evince the independent existence of the human self. As the foregoing treatment of the self has indicated, the enjoyment of existence is to be understood in an ontological, rather than an ethical, manner. By its very nature the human self is a subject which expresses judgments of value, whose essence is found in desire. The world is thus viewed, not in the abstract altogether, but from the concrete standpoint of that whose worth can satisfy the self; in this sense, Protagoras was not far from the truth when he declared that man was the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are not. The possibility of such an egoistic estimate of the world is found in the peculiar criteria of truth and reality which are lodged in the human spirit. Where a formal epistemology will argue that truth consists in the correspondence of the inner idea with the outer object, as was the habit with the Platonists, where such a philosophy as Kant's points out

¹ *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, tr. Widgery, p. 62.

that truth is found in the coherence of idea with idea, in the form of a synthetic judgment, the human mind has ever found it expedient to add certain practical tests of truth, whose inner nature is humanistic.

It is quite surprising, if not shocking, to discover that the eudæmonism of the nineteenth century has somehow found it possible to find and follow a trans-rational standard of truth, and in some instances we must dissent from the extremes to which such thought has gone. In Stirner's emancipation from the absolutism of the Hegelian dialectic we have an example of how the inner ego may fortify itself against the truth of the outer world.¹ Such eudæmonism becomes exceedingly utilitarian, for Stirner is found asserting that "his head finds nourishment in truths, as his body finds nourishment in potatoes."² As with all other things in the world, so with truth; it belongs to the ego to enjoy according to his pleasure; such is the irrationalistic conclusion of this early egoist. Such a view, which banishes all form from the true, is as far from being convincing as the rationalistic method, which will admit the presence of no truth-content; both rationalism and irrationalism are equally untenable. Between these extremes there is a more temperate view, which asserts that truth, as it relates to the ego's relation to the outer world, is possessed of both form and content, of Florentine drawing and Venetian colouring. The essence of truth is something that the human spirit can enjoy.

Since man is by nature a *valeur*, he cannot be persuaded that truth is alien to his inner human nature; true, he does not desire to devour the shew-bread in his hunger for knowledge, yet he feels that there is some meaning to the motto *in vino veritas*. In the wine of genuine enjoyment the essence of truth can be perceived; for that which instructs can also nourish the spirit. Eudæmonism relates our inner life to the outer world by showing us how, instead of the smooth and shining surface of mere rationality, the

¹ *The Ego and His Own*, tr. Byington, pp. 197-8.

² *Ib.*, p. 478.

world presents crags and edges of human interest, so that man in his humanity may be a partaker of the reality of the world-whole. Truth may not be expected to please us, nor does it need to clothe itself in gay garments; nevertheless, that which appeals to reason as a finality cannot fail to arouse interest, so that where the self finds genuine satisfaction we may be assured that the true has been found. The parallelistic theory of the self and the world does not admit of any such interpretation, since it considers the self as mere mind, whose nature and behaviour are identical with the form and course of the outer world. But the view that is guiding us through the world of things finds it expedient to allow the ego more freedom, while it is content to see the self adjust itself to the world in such a way as may seem most fitting, even when it is necessary to depart from the traditions of the psycho-physical.

The inner existence of the self is not supposed to find us cold, but beings with a warmth of enthusiasm. The eudæmonist, whether as ancient Epicurean or modern Romanticist, has always insisted that the real should thrill and inspire. In this way human culture has gone hand in hand with human happiness, and while one may not be willing to admit that existence is constituted for the sake of imparting enjoyment, he cannot well deny that the conscious participation in the reality of things yields a form of happiness which is supreme in its art. When thus conceived, the world is to be viewed in a manner at once philosophical and poetical; then its existence and the enjoyment which comes from the sense of this can be appreciated. The rationalism that makes the self to consist of a mere "thinking thing" cannot serve to express the inner significance of the soul; but when this view receives something in the way of an æsthetic content, it reveals the world as that which both convinces and pleases us. Surely we cannot think of the perception of truth as something so academic as to afford no internal satisfaction! We are told that the knowledge of the truth has the power to make us free, that man is happy when he thinks correctly, and that it is by means of love, whether erotic or sympa-

thistic, that the mind comes to the knowledge of reality; such eudæmonistic utterances are only corroborations of the general theme before us—that the perception of existence in the outer world produces enjoyment in the self.

Inasmuch as the present dialectic does not hope to come abreast of reality in its fulness by perfecting the analysis of the phenomenal order, it is not dismayed at the thought that eudæmonism is more suggestive and stimulating than it is convincing; there remain still other aspects of the world, as also other phases of selfhood, and all that is here attempted is to show that, upon the lowest plane of things, the inner self is of such a nature as to carry on commerce with the exterior world, in the existence of which it finds happiness. If the self is able to affirm its spiritual nature as a consciousness in which enjoyment is the supreme ideal, it is not impossible that a superior view of the world, in which activity plays the leading part, will find the self expressing its interior content in a more sufficient fashion as the will to selfhood, while its relation to the world will then assume the character of an interactivity. Furthermore, the self is expected to express an equally characteristic attitude toward that which the third and final view of reality will present as substance. Here it has been sufficient to show that, failing a satisfactory solution of the rationalistic problem of psycho-physical parallelism, it has still been possible to represent the self in the form of an interior life in the world of appearance.

V

THE SELF AS CONSCIOUSNESS

HAVING seen how consciousness draws in the air a line parallel to the course of the world, we are in a position where we may fitly observe the interior work of this consciousness in the elaboration of selfhood. By means of its principle of individuation, nature shows her willingness to permit the entrance of selfhood into the plan of the whole, but she further suggests that, if the self is to come into being, it must do so on its own initiative and according to its own method. Nevertheless, the self as consciousness seems to continue the work of the world which appears to be aiming at intelligibility and self-comprehension, for the unconscious struggle on the part of the natural order is but a groping after that which the conscious self sees clearly as an object of interest. At the same time, we cannot hide from our eyes the fact that nature only prepares the way for a sense of selfhood, which later in its development assumes an inimical attitude to that which has produced it; in all this nature seems to be so interested in the epic plan of the type that she tends to ignore, if not to oppose, the individual. Human work in the world, however, has no more ostensible aim than the elaboration of selfhood; civilisation is but the foundation for the ivory tower of culture. For this reason we are called upon to observe the conscious assertion of self in both nature and culture.

I. THE INNESS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In the world of appearance the climax of phenomenality comes when the whole world suddenly assumes an internal

character. The world alone, if it could possibly be conceived of as such, were no problem; likewise, the self alone, if we could think of it as existing in independence of the world, could present no special difficulty; but the self *in* the world provokes a contrast and arouses a sense of competition which immediately entangle us in the snares of realism and idealism. Our dialectic set out with the aim of investigating reality from the standpoint of the self, so that it can only rejoice at the turn things have taken; the entrance of the self is a most opportune one, the questions its presence arouses throw a clear light upon the problem of reality as a whole. The contrast between mind and body had the effect of showing how an inner series of states can run parallel to an outer one, but the independence of the inner life, as thus established, is only a relative one, the working of a wheel within wheels. Does the ego, instead of merely preserving its being in the midst of attacks from without, really assert itself from within as that which is entitled to independent existence? Does it testify to its own reality, or is its intellectual function purely representative in its mental imitation of nature? Consciousness goes on in the ego, but is it a consciousness of the ego? This is the first point to be settled, and like Kant we shall content ourselves with the "I think," although there was one place in Kant's examination of the soul where he allowed the "I think" to include the "I am."¹ Since we are but preparing the way for the further treatment of the ego in the form of will and intellect, we can afford to allow something to scepticism while we are upon the plane of sense. Upon this lowest plane the demands of selfhood cannot be met; nevertheless, we shall be able to convince ourselves of the reality of soul-states as these appear in the æsthetic consciousness; ethical and religious forms of consciousness will appear in due time upon the higher planes of existence. Inner life, therefore, is not merely a rival to the exterior world, but a life of states of soul.

The inness of consciousness makes it possible for the

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr Müller, 2nd ed., p. 327.

self to have states ; without these human life is all an In-vain. From will to action the path is direct, and were life purely activistic, were its ideal that of work, there would be no need of the introduction of consciousness. But this immediacy, with its instinctive response to the exterior circumstance, would forbid the participation of the ego in a world-order which seems to be peculiarly its own. The world is not so opaquely realistic as to warrant the assumption that the mind is so impressionistic as to dispense with states of its own, and upon the reality of these states the validity of consciousness seems to depend. Where the view of the world is objective in its physical and social significance, the states of selfhood are not appreciated ; but without this individualistic interiority the work of man in the world is carried on in a purely subterranean manner, without a glimmer of light as to its meaning. The physical and social, with their self-styled authority, may account for the energy exerted by nature and humanity respectively, but the entrance into the world is forbidden them. The hope of human participation in the world is apparently dependent upon the self with its ability to detach itself from the immediate order and enter into states of its own. These are representative, and thus have a bearing upon the world ; but they are not wanting in the independence that comes from their origin within the self. Upon the basis of sense, all that can reasonably be accomplished is the principle that the states of consciousness, instead of constituting the attribute of something other than the self, belong to the self in its inwardness. Just as selfhood demands these states by way of content, so they stand in need of the self to give them form. Apart from the idea of the self existing in and exerting sway over its own states, it is impossible to demonstrate the truth of the ego's place in the world, where also it works and has its being ; but where these states of selfhood manifest their independence, it is only logical to conclude that the self exists in the world.

The conscious state is within the self, for it cannot be conceived as allying itself with the exterior world, yet it is

not the self as such. The ego lends itself to the temporary state, perceives with it, feels with it, acts with it; yet the position and attitude of the ego have something magisterial about them. The particular form of selfhood in sense consists in taking notice of the soul-states, which otherwise would dominate the self and render its condition one of somnambulism. Through the function of attention, the ego is able to come into possession of its own conscious states, which otherwise were events as simple and naturistic as the falling of raindrops and the rising of sparks. Attention has something original about it, and thus the states of the ego are created in its own image. From the naturistic point of view, the state of inner consciousness as something which merely takes place is sufficient as an idea to account for what goes on in the soul; but the humanistic conception of mind in its totality involves the further notion that the self is creative of ideals and principles, and if the ego did not create its own states, it could not create these elements of art and ethics. At this point in our work we are not quite ready to speak of the work of the self in the world, yet we must not conceive of the self in such a fashion as to forbid the idea of such work when the time for examining it arrives.

The sort of selfhood which arises upon the basis of sense is not of such grade as to account for spiritual life within the soul, but it is necessary as a preliminary. To be one's inner self demands something more than the self-love of Hobbes' ego. When the ego attempts to assert itself, it is quite natural that it should seek the means nearest at hand, so that sense is adopted as the most available manner of putting an edge upon the dull consciousness of self. In the anti-social literature of the nineteenth century, the attempt to affirm self by means of the sensuous state of consciousness revealed itself in the introductory works on egoism which came from the impassible soul of Stendhal, whose Julien Sorel, in *Red and Black*, and whose Duchess Gina, in *The Chartreuse of Parma*, use sense to signalise their emancipation from the objective social order. At a later date Flaubert

attempted somewhat the same task of freeing the ego from the ennui of social life, but his Madame Bovary, with the bovaryism of her unscrupulous life, seems incapable of supporting a theory of life. A more systematic attempt to base selfhood upon sense was made by Ibsen in *Peer Gynt*, from whose brain there sprang the natural child of the "Gyntisch I." The dialectical principle at work in these poetical creations is that which we have under present consideration; that is, the consciousness of self in the simplest form of sensation; however anti-social such consciousness may be, it is vain to ignore its existence, while the dialectical consideration of its nature is of no little value in determining the ultimate nature of the self.

2. CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOUL-STATES

The inness of consciousness has the effect of establishing states of soul as independent elements of reality; to have such soul-states is to exist inwardly, not to have them is to escape such existence altogether. Where rational psychology has brought inner life to the light, as in the *scio* of Augustine's *Soliloquies* and the *cogito* of Descartes' *Meditations*, it has not shown the ability to invest the form of interior existence with a spiritual content; for this reason the work of such psychology came to an untimely end. States of soul are the primary requisite of the self in its interior existence; the mere "I think" is insufficient to render plausible the extravagant claims of idealism. The craving for content is one which metaphysics ought to satisfy, and in expressing this modern demand for something more than form, the spirit of the age has shown us that it is, not merely the practical, positivistic, and social which satisfies, but none the less the inwardly spiritual, whose needs are recognised in superb fashion by such a work as Eucken's *Der Kampf um einen Geistigen Lebensinhalt*.

Where rational psychology has been content with mere form, empirical psychology has been running to the extreme of mere conscious content, the state as such, apart from its

significance in human life. Consciousness has thus come to be a field of intensities and qualities. But in the dependence of the self upon stimuli, we are not confronted by the supremacy of the outer over the inner, as the very behaviour of the aroused sensations attests. Where the physical fact is that red is red and sweet is sweet, the psychical fact is that red is more red when contrasted with green, less red when compared with orange, just as the sensation of sweetness varies in intensity in accordance with the prevailing states of consciousness. The inner totality of consciousness thus shows how self-contained is the ego, for we do not simply receive sensations from without, but react upon them from within, and while the physiological fact of the stimulus is undeniable, the psychological is none the less so, and while the self exists by courtesy of nature, its being as individualistic is evoked from within. Furthermore, so internal is the work of sensation that tone may reciprocate with colour in the production of qualities, so that the ear may hear better when the eye is looking upon some agreeable colour, a fact which is not without its bearing upon Wagner's theory of the synthesis of the arts in the "music of the future."¹ It thus appears that, while states of soul cannot come into being without stimuli, these states are quite independent; they express themselves in an inward fashion, in the light of the unity of consciousness.

The inwardness of the soul-state is at the same time the independence of the inner life, which is constituted as a free city or sovereign state in a larger government. The evidence of this inner republic is found in human culture, or the independent work of the self. The connection between the naturistic and humanistic, which has not escaped the notice of scientific psychology,² is necessarily slender, so that one would hardly like to associate the art of Wagner with the science of Wundt; but the abstract treatment of mind for the sake of explanatory science has no real reason for forbidding the internal state as a soul-state indeed. The

¹ Cf. Nordau, *Degeneration*, tr. into English, p. 175.

² Cf. Stratton, *Experimental Psychology and Culture*, ch. xv.

place where the inviolable inner has expressed itself appears in æsthetics, which has emphasized the independence of the self by emphasizing the independence of art. The difference between the introspective method as employed by scientific and æsthetic forms of psychology consists in the fact that where the former looks upon the conscious state as a state in isolation, the latter regards it as an expression of the totality of consciousness. It is thus in an æsthetic sense alone that consciousness in the lower sense has led to the consciousness of the self. Owing to the influence of science, an influence which has been exaggerated to the most extreme limit, philosophy has formed the habit of thinking that it is only in the spirit of abstract exactness that truth is to be courted and won. At the same time, science has been so devoted to exteriority that it has placed all humanity upon the social basis. Now humanity is just as thoroughly internal as external, just as much individual as social. Any attempt to rob consciousness of its inherent interiority and individuality is one which genuine dialectics must meet with armed opposition. For this reason dialectics cannot exercise the faith in science that science seems to demand, and the sceptical attitude of the Symbolists is one which dialectics cannot wholly blame. Where science seeks to efface states of the soul as such it can only be repudiated.

The entrance into the ego was brought about by Romanticism at the moment when the poet sought an entrance into art. When Lessing relegated all art to the realm of beauty, when Kant raised it above morality and metaphysics, when Schlegel found it in the self, the way was prepared for the Romanticism of Gautier to unite the individualistic and æsthetical in a way that had not been known before. With his dictum, *l'art pour l'art*, he secured that separation of beauty from the physical and social which these other movements had prophesied; with his definition of the self, as *l'on pour qui le monde extérieure existe*, he made the doctrine, Art for art's sake, read like a palimpsest under whose obviously æsthetical meaning lay the less legible ethical one. In the moment of the emancipation of art came the emanci-

pation of the artist, and where beauty was delivered from the snare set by the world, the beautiful soul was enabled to escape. The Decadents applied this double doctrine to the art of poetising, and thus we find in them an irrationalistic attitude toward the metaphysical, and a sense of impassibility toward the social. Under the inspiration of this ideal, Baudelaire felt called upon to place poetry upon the base of sound rather than mind, while he saw no reason why he should submit to the common dictates of the ethico-social order. As the emphasis laid upon form placed poetry upon a purely æsthetical basis, so the insistence upon the impassible had the effect of limiting beauty to the mood of the poet, who became an egoist the moment he became an æsthete. By such means the modern sought to deliver himself from the Philistinism of science and society. "Poetry," said Baudelaire, "cannot under pain of death or degradation assimilate itself to science or morals."

Thus it has been, not science, but art that has emancipated the inner life. While science was simply Copernican in its treatment of things physical, it was Ptolemaic and traditional in its attitude toward the ethical problem. What distinguishes the morals of Darwinism from that of the Church? What has science done but imitate the ideals that for two thousand years have held Europe in their power? Surprised as we are when we observe that proud, self-sufficient science has had to submit to the yoke of social ethics, our astonishment is even greater when we note how art has been the medium through which the ethics of individualism has been established. Art and artist, culture and individualism were to be emancipated in no other way, and the only pity is that, in his vigour, the egoistic artist has thought it necessary to involve the ego in irrationalism and immoralism. The future will find it possible and expedient to gather to its breast the flowers of this romantic movement, without returning to their bitter root. These flowers are the states of soul which mean so little to science.

3. THE SELF AS ANTI-SOCIAL

With the enthusiasm which followed upon the discovery of "social evolution," the plea of the ego for selfhood in the world could not be heard, and just as applied science in the grim form of industrialism has enslaved the individual, so the applied sociology of this science has thrown dust in the eyes, with the result of hiding selfhood from the consciousness of the ego. His life is supposed to be typical, his work serviceable, his ideals regular. The problem of metaphysics has thus become complicated, because science has combined the forces of physical and social to make war upon the citadel of the self. Idealism is weak because it has lost the sense of inwardness; it contends for spiritual life without first contending for the self that that inner life has evoked. Not only individualism but intellectualism also is condemned by solidarity, whose sole aim is the increase of efficiency.

The attempt to establish the reality of the ego without resorting to egoism has kept the idealist in a position where he could never come to the logical conclusions of his spiritualistic philosophy. The idealist hesitated to withdraw within himself because his ego seemed so empty, so helpless. With its sole work that of representing the external world in perception, subjectivity could not remain contented with itself, so that the ego was ignored the moment that it had reduced the world of phenomena to so many ideas of the percipient mind. The dread was the dread of solipsism, that life-loneliness felt by the rare thinker who decided to proceed alone in a worldless fashion. Not every idealist is prepared to endure the nostalgia of this departure and estrangement from the world of realistic experiences. The æsthetic consciousness, however, has continued the solipsistic strain unremittingly. Not only has decadent art raised the self above nature, but it has drawn the world into itself in the form of symbolism, which is the most systematic form of subjectivity in the history of humanity.

Where idealism accounts for the mere form of the world, symbolism carries with it the justification of its colour and content, which are so many states of the soul. Those who disparage egoism overlook the problem whose importance is constantly before us in the present dialectic; they are willing to let the natural and social have their full sway, in spite of the fact that the ego is in the world. Those who believe in selfhood are not necessarily pledged to an æsthetic theory which, as in the case of symbolism, carries the idea of the ego to the extreme; but they are willing to accept as of relative importance the idea that the human self is everywhere of importance. The landscape as such is not a state of the soul, nor is the world-whole at the bottom of the ego's heart; nevertheless, the ultimate meaning of the world, with its landscapes, its universal forms, is such as to render necessary the participation of the self.

Subjective idealism in its abstract form has shown its inability to account for the phenomenal order, while it has not succeeded in concealing its insincerity with regard to the ego. With the fear of solipsism before it, subjective idealism has repudiated both the self and the world, so that the result of its dialectical labour has been to cast doubt upon the reality of the world, without creating a belief in the self. Symbolism has been more moderate in its treatment of the world, whose obvious existence it could not set aside by any mere *cogito*, while it has been more zealous in upholding the claims of the self in the latter's affirmation of independent interest. There was no particular reason why the "self" of subjective idealism should be allowed to possess independent existence, for with nothing in it by way of content, the self had no value, no vocation. With the symbolist self the case is somewhat different; the self of symbolism is conceived in a beautiful moment, while its own nature is æsthetic. Where the light of beauty falls upon it, there is some reason for its existence in the world. At the same time, the idealistic principle in the æsthetic consciousness of symbolism was not expressed in the threatening manner of abstract idealism, which had at hand no argu-

ment but that of necessity, in the light of which it asserted that the presence of perception was necessary to the existence of the phenomenal order. Having delivered itself of this sophistry, the traditional idealist was content to take the world in just the same way that it had appeared to him originally. The æsthetic idealist, however, persists in his individualism, for his attitude is characteristic rather than academic; yet the world does not appear to him as something from which he is really estranged; to him the most important thing about the world, after it has been subjected to idealistic treatment, is that it is now his own. The same is true of the social order, which is commonly conceived after the analogy of the physical system; the ego is supreme in both realms.

When the problem of the ego is surveyed in the light of not anti-naturalism alone, but that of anti-socialism as well, the plan of evolution is commonly perverted in such a way as to make the place of self in society appear different from that which it occupies in nature, where it is the latest, rarest fruit. Instead of accepting this natural order as though it were the same in the social world, the moralist has insisted that man began his moral career under the auspices of egoism, and since the passing of those primitive times he has been engaged in cultivating his slowly appearing social sentiments. Even Nietzsche fell into this error of Hobbes, for his superman of the future was identified with the "blond beast" of the past. But both creatures are of a nature equally mythical, and whatever the future may unfold in the way of egoism, it is certain that the self did not make its appearance at the beginning, when the herding instinct had a firm hold upon the human mind. It is poor anthropology which seeks to account for social ideals as the triumph over earlier egoistic ones, for the ego is a late development in the history of humanity. An instinctively natural and social tendency has worked in man to identify him with the surrounding world; estrangement from this environment has come about by means of culture, with its awakening of self-consciousness. In this way, all culture is a *culte de moi*.

The subordination of the individual is not the destined line of progress in the exterior world, for both nature and society seem to be interested in the emancipation and full development of the self-conscious, self-active ego. Our dialectic is thus pledged to place the ego at the apex of the world. At the same time, it does not disdain to give aid to egoism, which makes its way into the world through doubt and obstacle. Most of the intellectual forces of science and society work to prevent the recognition of the truth in question, the consciousness of the ego.

As abnormality threatens the ego in nature, so perversity pursues his path in the social order; to be one's self, one must run the risk of the anti-natural and anti-social. Nevertheless, those who rear the natural and social barriers against the affirmation of selfhood on the part of the ego, overlook the fact that life is something progressive, and the conditions of life as yielded by nature and society as they now present themselves are not the conditions in their totality. The world is capable of evolution, and when we inquire concerning the conditions of this evolution, we find that the important thing is deviation from the type; were this impossible, the movement of nature, if it existed at all, would be of a purely rhythmic character which would make progress impossible. Indeed, with classic thought, which exalted the type, the idea of progress was wanting, the only idea of movement being that of a recurrent, circular nature. Evolution seems to depend upon deviation from the established order; progress may be said to depend upon perversion. It was the perverse deviation of the Sophists that made ancient idealism possible; it was such perversion which introduced the Christian revolt, it was nothing but this desire to deviate that caused the Renaissance, and as modern philosophy of religion was ushered in by free-thought, it is possible to assume that the anti-social tendencies which appear in the egoism of the nineteenth century are but the preparation for the new era in ethics and social life. Deviation has thus a distinct place in dialectics, and it is the ego which expresses this change, while it is none the less the ego which exerts

itself to make this departure real. The departure from the established in religion was made possible by the contemptible Deists ; perhaps the progress toward a new view of political life will turn out to have been dependent upon the egoistic revolt of the Parnassians and Decadents, the egoists and nihilists. It seems certain that the self has won its place in metaphysics.

4. SELF-SCEPTICISM

Not only does the ego find opposition from without, on the part of the natural and social, but its enemies are those of its own household. The ego fears to stand alone in the world-whole ; when it is allied with nature and society, its inherent isolation is lost sight of. Where realism has subordinated the self to an empirical concept, like that of the "social organism," rationalism has exercised the same withering influence by elaborating an abstraction like "mankind" or "humanity." If the individual had not been so impressionable, so thoroughly under the sway of a social conscience, these generalisations could have done him little harm ; as it was, they led him to suspect himself ; his inner life, his right to exist, or "take up room in the world." The Russian consciousness of life, as this is represented in the most recent way by Gorky, represents this self-scepticism most pathetically. In *Foma Gordyeeff*, Gorky leads Liubóff to declare her belief in equality, her father insists upon egoism, and says, "Every one has his own soul and his own face ; only those who do not love their souls and do not care for their faces can be planed down to one size."¹ The ethical situation has so worked upon human consciousness that man no longer has the opportunity of living from within, while the "world" that magical science has conjured up before his vision does not afford him a place where he may exist, work, and solve the meaning of life.

The individual's consciousness has been led to believe that egoism is abnormal and vicious, while the ideals of

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Hapgood, ch. x. p. 297.

individualism are of decadent origin. Where the ancient State made the ego a logical impossibility, where the mediæval Church made it a sin, modern Society has been no less opposed to it, even when it felt itself to be "free" and "advanced." Indeed, the art of antiquity and the religion of mediæval life found it possible to enjoy an inner life, which to-day is proscribed as "æsthete" or "mystical." In spite of this the egoistic movement has come into being, as one born out of due time; indeed, the very forces of objectivity seem to have had no more salient effect than that of arousing the ego to an inner sense of its existence in the natural and social world. But, as yet, the movement has not been indigenous; where the æsthete has returned to antiquity for his art, the mystic has sought refuge in the shadows of mediævalism; modern egoism is still to appear.

The present situation is a challenge to inner consciousness, for everything works for activity and exteriority. It is not merely that the exterior world stands out there and offers terrible contrast to the microcosm within the human self, but the exterior world ever calls to the ego to come forth and take up its work in the world. When the ego, conscious of its self and interested in its inner life, refuses to do this, it is immediately struck with a sense of scepticism concerning its own existence, so thoroughly does the inner depend upon the outer. Desire to remain within the self is thus coupled with distrust of the self, as a result of which the ego becomes two-souled. The supreme example of this appears in Goethe's *Tasso*, whose duality of soul was a source of eternal anguish to the hero. By the pursuit of things internal and intellectual, Tasso, who has just completed his *Jerusalem Delivered*, is led to doubt the value of his work of contemplation, especially when he observes how his rival Antonio commands no little attention from the court by virtue of the important, practical mission that he has just fulfilled. Tasso thus learns that inner life is not all there is to human existence, for as the Princess Leonore expresses it, genius is formed in solitude, character

is perfected in the rush of the world—*Es bildet sich ein Talent in der Stille sich ein Character im Strom der Welt.*¹ Meanwhile the hero gives himself up to grief, and learns that, where the active man in his commerce with the external world may have success, the contemplator finds an outlet for his sufferings in a kind of expressionism—*Wenn ist der Mensch in seinem Quall verstummt, gab mir ein Gott zu sagen wie ich leide.*² Such sorrows of genius reveal the pathetic alienation of the ego from the world of facts and deeds.

As this case of Tassoism serves to reveal the consciousness of Goethe in his storm and stress, so the whole of Ibsen's drama reveals somewhat the same spiritual situation in the life of a poet who sought to leave the inner calm of selfhood and come out into the social world with its needs and duties. Why Ibsen abandoned poems of the *Brand*, *Peer Gynt* type for social plays like *Ghosts* and the *Wild Duck* is a biographical point not yet elucidated; the poet himself seems to have regarded such an exodus as an error. In his farewell drama he shows how he passed from romanticism to realism when he leads the sculptor to relate how he came to relegate the central figure of beauty to the background to be surrounded by strange human faces that had swarmed up from the earth to spoil the effect of his life-work. Then he leads the sculptor, Rubek, to add this personal note, whose autobiographical significance cannot be misunderstood: "Let me tell you too how I placed myself in the group. In front beside a fountain sits a man weighed down with guilt who cannot quite free himself from the earth-crust. I call him remorse for a forfeited life. He sits there and dips his fingers in the purling stream to wash them clean, and he is gnawed and tortured by the thought that never, never will he succeed."³ The same phenomenon of genius repudiating itself appears among Russian writers, pre-eminently with Tolstoi, whose later mysticism takes the place of his earlier realism. The

¹ *Op. cit.*, Act i.

² *Ib.*, Act iv.

³ *When We Dead Awaken*, tr. Archer, Act ii.

psychological principle at work in such instances is that of dualistic self-consciousness, or Tassoism as we have called it.

In the struggle for human selfhood it becomes necessary to adjust the claims of inner life to those of outer existence. The philosophical method of perfecting this relation consists in assigning to the ego the function of representation, whereby it becomes a mirror of the universe. As the inner depth of the soul is fathomed, so is the outer extent of the world measured; when the ego finds its self, it does not fail to find the world. On this account, all solipsistic systems make characteristic reference to the world, which they endeavour to establish by means of some inner principle; where we should expect them to rest content with the interior sense of selfhood, they are found invading the external order. Such a dialectical situation is suggestive of the ego's capacity, but it does not involve the principles that go to make up genuine being for self. It is not sufficient for the ego to remember that it is a representation of the outer world; still less is the human self satisfied with the thought that it is typical of the social order surrounding it. Such a method of relating the self to the world makes its adjustment in favour of the world and at the expense of the self. The affairs of the self are such that it cannot abide by this altruistic plan of adjustment, for an aristocratic interpretation seems to be the kind qualified to express the nature of inner life. Hence the real motive for upholding the solipsistic ideal is not theoretical, but practical; it consists in expressing the superiority of the self in the world.

The work of representing the world, which is the only duty of the self in realistic and idealistic systems, is one which involves the preliminary perfection of the self, which cannot express the meaning of the outer order until it has found the self within. Animal intelligence, which enables the creature to set up practical relations with individual objects of the world, is not sufficient to provide for a comprehension of the world in its totality; only in

the conscious self does such a problem arise, and even here it requires a special view of the self to place the problem in the right light. When, therefore, the ego seems to exhaust the possibilities of its inner nature by the representation of the outer world, it appears that the very act of representation involved forces of selfhood which were not at all exhausted by the intellectual process.

Inner consciousness, or genuine *Fürsichsein*, while it involves the fundamental function of world-representation, is not without a content of its own. Where philosophy has introduced the ego, it has not been able to handle it unless the sole work of the self was dedicated to the world; for this reason Descartes does not succeed in investing the self with any positive content, but leaves it in the formal condition of an "I think," while Fichte loses the individualistic heritage of his *Ich* because he interprets its inner activity as that which wills the world. Cognition and conation are certainly generic in the self, and no egoism can dispense with the "I think" or the "I will"; nevertheless, this fundamental relation to the exterior world is but the point of departure for the truly individualistic activity of the inner self. Where the purely logical and practical functions of thinking and willing are attributed to the ego, the inner totality of its existence is lost sight of, so that the work of affirming the self is in vain. In the dialectics of the decadence, so insistent were the anti-natural and anti-social tendencies that the ego seemed to float over the exterior world-order in all the spiritual independence of symbolism; yet genuine individualism considers these extremes as but antidotes for the equally perverse realism which subjugates the self to the world. Self-consciousness makes us aware of the fact that the inner life exists; where the idea of the world is present to the mind, its position is secondary, its function that of contrast.

The self is not merely representative of that which is exterior, but is none the less constructive of the inner order of selfhood. Upon the basis of world-representation

by the ego, we erect science; by means of the inner independence of the self, we are able to develop culture. To doubt culture is to doubt the validity of the inner sense of selfhood; of such scepticism concerning the issues of its spiritual life the history of humanity is not innocent. Where the ancient serenely developed his classicism, where the mediævalist strove after his romanticism, the modern has reacted upon intellectual life, whose fundamental principles he has surveyed in sceptical fashion. With Rousseau, it was the return to nature; with Schiller, the restoration of the naïve. The forward-moving activity of the human spirit, the sense of a future for the species which had come up out of the natural order, the possibility of an interior life as such were all set at naught by the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Our own individualistic age, which has been educated by a new romanticism, is not so steeped in scientific and social ideals that it has no appreciation of the self within the world-whole. The argument in favour of the inner life is that which we have indicated—the argument from culture, or the free development of intellectual life. Without this even the representative work of the self as mind will be in vain, while the stark forms of cognition and conation will have no opportunity to become a living “I think” or “I will.” It is thus that culture, which arouses scepticism of selfhood, tends to allay the same. On the social side, where the withdrawal of the individual is so discountenanced, it will appear that society is not served by its self, but by selected individuals; in society, only egos are efficient.

5. CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE AND CULTURE

Thus far, our discussion of the inner sense of selfhood has taken consciousness for granted, when it is really necessary to analyse the idea of that which constitutes the inner sense. The general conception of the consciousness out of which we aim to construct the sense of selfhood has already

been discussed as an inner totality, or unity of states of souls. The traditions of psychology, however, make it expedient for us to view consciousness as a stream, whose particular currents are the various mental processes. This idea of a "stream" we have expressed above as a "changing continuum"; it must now be inquired as to what such an idea involves. Experience reveals the fact that consciousness is something flowing; its very processes, like perceptual and emotional fusions, make it impossible to consider it in any static manner. At the same time, the essence of consciousness is no less indicative of persistency for that which changes is none the less continuous. Uncritical thinking tends to treat the conscious as that of which we are aware, the unconscious as that which is unnoticed; but the question, under what conditions are we aware of the states of the soul? under what other conditions are we unconscious of them? Our norms of consciousness answer this at once; we are aware of states, or stimuli arouse these states, when there is the continuous change that goes to make up consciousness; without this we are unconscious.

The necessity of change in consciousness appears at once as an indispensable condition of inner experience, for to be conscious of one and the same thing is to be conscious of nothing. Where there is mere fixation in consciousness, that consciousness departs; thus the descent into the unconsciousness of sleep is signalised by the lack of variation in the conscious content. The same condition of undue fixation occurs when one is preoccupied, under which condition he is unaware of the other stimuli which appeal to him from without, as also to the motives that arise within. Consciousness has been reduced to a minimum, and the greater the degree of attention to one thing, the less the amount bestowed upon others, of which we are for the time being unconscious. The unconscious state, therefore, is not a blank, but a condition where one idea dominates to the exclusion of the rest, as also at last to the exclusion of itself.

Not only is the factor of flowing change necessary to the life of consciousness, but there must be continuity also. Consciousness is itself a synthesis, the arrangement of which is the work of the conscious self. To be conscious is to experience the connection between the conscious states, which themselves cannot exist atomically or operate according to mechanical association. Consciousness thus seems to be a flowing on the part of the inner content whose own consistency holds it together. Metaphysical interests have come into conflict over the question concerning the support of the conscious stream. On the one side, the substantialist has asserted that the idea of stream involves also the thought of river-bank and river-bed, over which consciousness flows, while it follows the plan of thought in the same way that a river is true to its banks. Here is the place where the idea of fixation in consciousness appears in a most strategic light, for without the factor of permanence, as prefigured by the idea of river-bank, the stream of consciousness moves on in vain. In contrast with this substantialistic ideal, which grants only local freedom to the stream of consciousness, there is the causalistic view, which attempts to do away with all the extra-conscious factors and thus assert that consciousness conducts its own changes and carries its own ontological burdens. The principle here involved might be presented by the figure of the Gulf Stream or some other ocean current which, instead of being upheld and held in by the alien medium of the land through which the river flows, is held together by its inner consistency and inherent warmth.

The purpose of the present dialectic does not make it expedient for us to carry out an elaborate discussion of these views, whose naturism and dogmatism threaten the character of our conscious spiritual life, so that we will rest content with suggesting that both substantialism and causalism are somewhat superficial in their view of consciousness. The substantialist, with his demand for a conscious substratum, has not freed himself from the error that persists in considering reality, whether in the world without

or consciousness within, as a fixed or quasi-material thing; while causalism, which dispenses with this dogmatic notion, is wanting in the ability to invest the emancipated consciousness with a content. Where one is not able to treat the form of consciousness in a suitable manner, the other is as helpless with the problem of content. Moreover, both views are pledged to the exterior order, for where one regards consciousness to repeat the plan of the world by a faithful imitation of its forms, the other looks to consciousness to complete by action the work of exteriority. Sensation is thus supposed to give a good account of the stimulus; volition is expected to use its freedom with the aim of emulating the example of causality. The idea of improvisation is thus foreign to these ideas of consciousness, both of which are but survivals of the classic æsthetic, both of which are equally innocent of the romantic ideal of a striving beyond that which is given.

From the æsthetic standpoint, which does not consider the conscious as a mere gift on the part of the natural world, but which assumes that our human mental condition is none the less the result of interior activity on the part of the striving self, the content of consciousness is not for a moment accounted for in the routine of traditional metaphysics, which can consider consciousness only as one thing among others in the world. For introducing the æsthetic principle into what has ever been a purely naturistic discussion, we offer no apology, but simply say that consciousness in its content is what it shows itself to be. Thus it is not a matter of imitation on the intellectual side, or of instinctiveness with regard to volition; consciousness reveals itself as something intrinsically human, wherein the data of perception and activity are not mere matters of afferent and efferent nervous processes, but have a significance and value to be appreciated as such by nothing else but the self. With its extraordinary self-confidence, science has pre-empted the field of consciousness with the result of reducing inner events and inner activities to the mediocrity of animal existence; indeed, mediocrity is the supreme ideal

of the scientific mind, whence it becomes impossible to persuade it concerning the excellence of the ego, even the ego which in the case of the genius has produced science itself. The æsthetics of consciousness, however, has not been handicapped by the thought of mediocrity; hence, the æsthetical method is possessed of the freedom necessary for the treatment of consciousness as internal and intrinsic.

The result of the æsthetic handling of the present problem is far different from the staid ideas that dominate the thought of traditional, scientific psychology. This method of treating consciousness has exhausted itself in the attempt to settle the claims of being and becoming; or, consciousness as fixed and consciousness as flowing. As we have suggested, both are necessary for the comprehension of consciousness in its simplest aspects; at the same time, since this consciousness is human, the inner self must be allowed to assume its place as the improviser, without whose work the principles of human culture will for ever remain unknown. The raw material of consciousness is found in the "intellect" and "will" of traditional metaphysics; but the essence of that consciousness which has characterised humanity is constituted of a peculiar sense of spontaneity, from which has sprung the æsthetic ideals and ethical norms of the inner life. Are these to be explained in terms of sensory and motor, in the light of substantialism and causalism, by means of intellectualism and voluntarism?

As the whole plan of the present dialectic makes manifest, the secret of the inner life seems to repose with the self. Adopt that as the starting-point, and the peculiar problems of the inner life become more intelligible, while the claims to a place in the world appear more plausible. But where consciousness is surveyed in a naturistic manner, as something that simply goes on in the world, as the ebb and flow of the tide, the diastole and systole of the heart, the questions we human beings are most anxious to have answered, because they relate to the personal activity of the individual in the world, are ones which are thrown out of court by science, which is pledged to the conventional and

mediocre. Consciousness is the self, and the self is consciousness ; it may not provide a passage from the "I think " to the "I am," as Descartes promised, nor is it likely to leave us stranded with the mere "*Ich denke*" as Kant declared ; but where the ego is taken at its word, where it is looked upon as the originator of the cultural life of humanity, its inner self-consciousness, which is more than an abstract, thinking and willing, is at once the evidence of its internal existence as improvising, interiorising ego. Only such a self has the right to expect a place in the world, only such a self can hope to perform a work there.

VI

THE PLACE OF THE EGO IN THE WORLD OF SENSE

WHEN our world of appearance assumes the form of an order whose nature is spatial, it does not thereby forbid the entrance of consciousness as an inner world-order. Now we are brought to the place where we must inquire into the position that the ego occupies in the phenomenal order. Is it centric or eccentric; is its office a magisterial or a menial one? To these very natural questions, certain others of a similar nature must be added. Is the appearance of the ego the supreme event in the course of the world or a mere incident? Does man stand side by side with the many, or is he related to the All? Such a series of questions serves to express the import of this whole dialectical study, in connection with which we attempt to set the self in the external world, whether that world be one of appearance, activity, or substantiality. So many philosophical systems stand in their own light, that we spare no pains in making clear to ourselves that the ego must not suffer itself to become obscured in the larger investigation of the world. In the latter's triune aspect, the self asserts its independence as *ego sentiens*, *ego faciens*, *ego sapiens*. At this particular point, where the ego has made its entrance in the simple form of consciousness, we must consider the relation that such consciousness bears to the outlying world; this should evince the fact that, with its wealth of inner life, it is superior to the world. Instead of existing in a serene, floral fashion, as though the mere fact of existence were sufficient to content the human spirit, the ego that seeks to express the

intrinsic meaning of spiritual life affirms itself as a member of another order—the order of selfhood. This achievement is not to be realised in a moment or without an effort, so that the ego must overcome its subjectivistic scruples, offset the seeming irrationality of its individualism, and set its face against all forms of objectivism. Then it may rightly be said to “arrive.”

1. THE SOLIPSISTIC SCRUPLE

The system of naïve idealism, in seeking to reduce all reality to consciousness, all *esse* to *percipi*, is dismayed when it discovers that the ego is also in Arcadia, for now its system looks too self-centred. It is true that some members of the school, as the Vedantists and Romanticists, have never thought to shun such an implication, but the majority of these idealists have been as anxious to remove the ego as they were to efface the world of things. The dread was the dread of solipsism. But there are solipsisms and solipsisms, and the history of this particular phase of philosophy will reveal the fact that, in the early Cartesian days of modernity, when the rationalistic spirit was braver, the term “solipsist” was applied positively and approvingly to indicate the position of a thinker who assumed the standpoint of Descartes’ *cogito, ergo sum*. During the eighteenth century, as we see from the case of Baumgarten, the value of the term “Solipsism” was the same as that now possessed by the term, “Egoism.”¹ When the ego on his little planet seeks to project his petty plan of activity, scepticism points to it and asks, “What does it matter to Sirius?” But in the character of solipsist the ego arrays itself against Sirius, and suggests that the star with all its largesse may stand in need of the ego’s power of perception if its brightness is to become a realised fact. Both forms of solipsism, the bad and the good, the self-denying and the self-approving, agree that the ego is of moment in the world; but where the idealist seeks to draw back from this

¹ Erdmann, *Hist. of Philosophy*, § 268, 3.

implication of subjectivism, the egoist believes that the cure for the ill may be found beyond, hence he presses on to a more complete position of selfhood.

The error that attends the system of naïve idealism lies in the assumption that the self has been found when, as a matter of fact, the system is based upon a selfless principle of perception. As a result the self fares well nigh as badly with such idealism as it does with naïve realism; in either case, the *me voici* of the ego is scarcely heard. Accordingly, what is needed is not less but more of egoism; that is, a deepening and intensifying of the egoistic consciousness. To one who has moved about among our modern egoists, it is incredible that dialectics should stand in dread of such a weak adversary as the old-time solipsist. Our age has learned to respect the self, and just as ethics has found it necessary to revise its treatment of the egoistic problem so as to make room for a genuine selfhood, so must metaphysics be as just and as wise in handling the ego of speculation. If it be not solipsism, it is upon something akin to it that the believer in spiritual life must base his hope of attaining to the goal of his philosophy, and unless he desires to dwell in a world of selfless physical and social objectivity, he must allow no sense of self-distrust to thrust him out of the world in which he has a dialectical right to exist; by a consistent course of self-affirmation the egoist must deepen instead of trying to uproot what is so inexorable as the principle of selfness.

The solipsistic despair into which the intellectualist is so often plunged may thus become a hope in the heart of him who is anxious to observe the advancement of spiritual life in the world; selfhood means independence of the inner life which otherwise would seem so out of place in the world of solid nature and society. It is by means of the solipsism that dialectics is enabled to put the self in its proper light, for the reason that the extravagance of this egoism forbids a realistic philosophy from establishing a generalisation of things in the world, whereby the self would appear as one among many. Solipsism warns us that the

ego cannot be thus classified and the inner life is beyond such a subsumption; although solipsism, instead of making some qualitative assertion concerning the ego, contents itself with the rash, quantitative judgment to the effect that the ego is all. It is the qualitative view, however, that is the more important consideration for the intellectualist, who asserts that the self with its states is *toto genere* different from a thing and its qualities. Coming from the very cloister of selfhood, St. Francis of Assisi may find it possible to lose himself temporarily in the natural order that, as a pietist, he has so resolutely abjured, and in his naturistic holiday praise God by his brother the wind and the fire, his sister the moon and the rain—*per frate ventu, per frate focu, per sora luna, per sor aqua*. So likewise may an artist like Pierre Loti pen the features of nature until he comes to survey men and women as though they too were but a part of the great order of wind and sunshine. Yet such forms of contemplation have nothing final about them; they are appreciated because, for the time being, they afford some relief from the stringencies of more serious literary methods, as realism and classicism.

The systematic working of the mind is such as to forbid any dialectical arrangement with which to marshal the forms of selfhood in the line with the phenomena of the outer world, for the act of thought is a totalising one in which the objects of consciousness are grouped around the ego as a centre. In unhappy contrast to this encyclical organisation of consciousness, the purely linear one suggests the impossible. For, if the elements that go to make up experience be represented alphabetically—*a, b, c—m, n, o—x, y, z*—there is no one place exclusively to which the ego may be relegated, whether *a, m, or z*; for even where a philosophy does not see fit to locate the self in the final position of absolute mind, it cannot do aught than regard it as something to be distinguished from the other element of experience as a *primus* among equals. Were not its position exceptional, there would be no problem of knowledge, no philosophy at all, for it is the puzzle involved in

the ego's position in the world that makes speculation a necessity. The ego demands a freedom unknown among the phenomena of nature; indeed our only motive in insisting upon the relative validity of the solipsism is to urge the independence of selfhood in the world-whole. It is of course vain to assert that the ego alone has existence, but the kind of solipsism that is here upheld is one which declares the self to possess a kind of being which is not to be found in the outer world; this qualitative solipsism is thus only another way of indicating the independence of the inner life.

This relative and qualitative solipsism is far removed from the irrational persuasion that one's personal ego is the sole reality, a mental condition of serious ethical and indeed pathological import; we refer to it in order to draw a distinction between the sound and unsound phases of the belief. Among modern egoists, Leonidas Andreiyeff has done much toward analysing and portraying this condition of solipsistic loneliness, an example of which is found in the case of Dr. Kerzhensteff in *Misl*, or *A Thought*, which the translator John Cournas renders as *A Dilemma*. Feigning insanity in order to shield himself from the law, the hero at last arrives at a position wherein he deceives both himself and the judges, and thus cannot settle in his own mind whether he is sane or not; his inner condition had become the solipsistic state. "Exceeding great and terrible is my solitude—behind me, before me, and around me a yawning emptiness. It is the fearfulness of one who lives, feels and thinks, and is incomprehensibly alone; how small I seem, absurdly null, and so weak I expect to be extinguished any moment. It is an ill-boding solitude; in myself I constitute but an infinitesimal part; within myself I am surrounded and suffocated by enemies, morosely silent and mysterious. Whither I go they go with me; I am solitary midst a vast emptiness, and I cannot confide in myself. It is the solitude of madness, and I have no means of knowing who I am, because my lips, my mind, my voice are all given to utter the thoughts of the unknown *they*." ¹

¹ *Op. cit.*, viii. pp. 107-8.

Solipsism has been taken all too lightly by the idealist, who is in no position to appreciate its psychological import. Such an idealism has no real desire to possess the world, nor does it find in the self anything more than a perceptual mechanism which works in an impersonal manner. The average thinker is equally remote from both the world and the self, so that it is absurd to regard naïve idealism as a philosophy which banishes the real world and sets up a dangerous self-existence. The chief problem is to secure possession of the ego as fact and force in the world. We must admit that we are not, and no wonder is it when for centuries the leading moral and metaphysical forces have been anti-egoistic. Idealism has not failed to observe that consciousness is of some moment in the view of the world, but when it came to asserting the consciousness of self as a necessary phase of this, the idealist hesitated to advance, and shirked the ontological responsibility about to be placed upon him. This hesitancy is largely due to the fact that the self has been servant rather than master; it has built up the kingdom of outer existence, in the form of natural science and rational cosmology, without organising the inner realm of selfhood, for which reason it becomes at once difficult and important to seek the establishment of the ego's relation to—that is, its place in—the world as a whole.

Detained thinkers, who cannot be persuaded that the ego also is in the world, will shun such a dialectic, but the *arrivist* will welcome the thought that the self, emancipated from the service of the purely natural and purely social, has a place of its own in the world, so that it need not remain exterior to itself. The social order cannot tolerate the ego, hence any attempt on the part of the soul to be its self is looked upon as solipsistic. Man is not supposed to belong to himself, but to some realm exterior to his inner being, so that the intellectual solitude that produces true selfhood is out of place in a completely exteriorised order like that of the present. Socialism and solipsism are thus at opposed poles; somewhere between them there

must be a place where a reasonable degree of selfhood may be cultivated.

2. SELFHOOD IN SENSE

Having observed the degree of truth that attaches to the solipsistic principle, we are ready to consider the extent to which the phenomenal order provides for the essence and character of the ego. Selfhood, as here conceived, is the selfhood of sense, the simplest and most nearly solipsistic of the three phases of egoism that we shall examine. With a selfhood in sense, the doctrine of egoism makes a beginning, however incomplete such a doctrine may be. Our thought world is primarily a personal one, marked by the possessive "mine." Our spatial distinctions take as their point of departure the body whose sense-organs make space-perception possible. This produces a kind of impressionism, from whose superficialities the thinking ego strives to rid itself. Ideas and acts, instead of having local significance, assume the character of worldhood, without which logical thinking and ethical acting would be impossible. Yet in all this the ego is not blotted out of existence, even when the immediacies of the preliminary impressionism are themselves engulfed in a deeper conception of knowledge. The phenomenal order cannot produce selfhood, nor can it forbid it either, for the affirmation of personal being is significant of a superior realm toward which the self ever strives.

The idea of selfhood in sense is likely to be opposed by the rationalist, who finds in the ego an irrational *quantum* which is not subsumable under the usual categories of its systematic thinking, which seeks to subordinate particulars under the general. Advantageous as it may be to smooth out the rough lines of individuation by such a conceptual basis, the egoist must object that thereby the facts in the case are violated. The constant massing of human souls according to some abstract notion obscures the fact that the interior life of the individual is something as original

as it is generic, while its characteristic movements are marked by improvisation as well as by imitation. A mediævalist like William of Champeaux may subsume all egos under the concept Church, a modern like Leslie Stephen may follow his example and reduce all individuals to the status of cells in the social organism, but the unique ego cannot thus be treated with the methods of abstraction and generalisation that seem to obtain in the merely exterior order. Against such an artificial conceptualism it becomes necessary to assert the original selfhood of sense, and even this lowest type of individuation forbids the traditional forms of classification regnant in rationalistic metaphysics. With the higher types held in reserve, we may assert the rudimentary form of selfhood, even where it involves somewhat of the chaos and contradiction of the subintellectual world. The fuller and more consistent forms of egoism, as found in the will to selfhood and being for self, will complete the argument here begun, aided as it is by the opposition to conceptualism that to-day is so influential.

Along with the insistence upon the particular and not the flat generalisation, there is another tendency which assists him who would advance the claims of selfhood; it is the pluralistic philosophy, which seeks the many as ardently as the ancient sought the one. Upon the pluralistic basis, with all the possibilities in the way of variety, we may more confidently assert that the ego, instead of merely belonging to an order, is unique and qualitative. Where the valuable element in pluralistic realism is really somewhat humanistic, inasmuch its ideals of variety and novelty tend to further the cause of independent egos; but this is a happy implication of the theory which realists like James and Bergson have not been ready to regard. The rationalist would be expected to oppose such a movement as the egoistic one, for the reason that such an array of unique things as humanity presents is not easily subordinated to the solidity of his system, for which reason the egoist finds all the forces of ethical and logical uniformity

drawn up against him. Yet, where the desire to place the self in the world is so strong as to tempt one to avail himself, if need be, of the irrational and Dionysiac, the egoist himself can only recognise that the essential nature of the self-manifold is one and the same, so that one may say of all egos as Stendhal said of women, *O, femmes! vous êtes toujours la même*. The uniqueness of the individual self, therefore, does not prevent the recognition of the generic in humanity, which, though unobserved in the individuating consciousness of the ego, finally makes its presence felt in the subconscious realm, where uniformity is the rule. This fact should calm all fears of solipsism, for it assures us that, ipsesistic as the ego may be upon the surface of his nature, he is ruled by the laws that obtain for all selves. At the same time, an ethical system which counsels the individual to assert himself as ego does thus advise because the general tendency is toward uniformity, so great is the might of the subconscious tendency to produce homogeneity; whence it becomes necessary to urge the ego onward toward distinct selfhood.

The failure to recognise the peculiar place that the ego occupies in the world is as much a social and ethical matter as it is a metaphysical one. Philosophy flees from the self because it does not understand what selfhood denotes, as also because it has long been seeking humanity in the crude mass rather than in the exceptional individual, who reveals the possibilities of the species with a clearness and completeness impossible with the mass. Where the purely social view is in force, it becomes difficult to assert the independence of the realm that our humanity occupies, but with the ego, as thinker and actor, the argument for humanity becomes more cogent. Solipsism, when consciously and deliberately upheld, is only the claim that the world was meant for man, for the self. Where one makes his plea for the spiritual life of humanity upon any other than an individualistic basis, he finds it hard to withstand the force of naturalism, so similar are persons and things; but when the standpoint is that of the individual and his intellect-

ualism, it is not so impossible to believe that the world-whole was meant for superior souls.

To uphold selfhood in sense is to uphold subjectivity, whose philosophical validity has so often been impugned. Those who would sacrifice subjectivity to a system little realise that it is by means of subjectivity that the ego participates in the world of sense. Where, as in the case of the floral, there is mere life in nature; where, as with the animal mind, there is obedience to instinct, there is no participation, so that the lower form of life cannot be said to have a "place" in the world-whole. Indeed the very suggestion that any creature but man should stand out in contrast to the world contains a *reductio ad ridiculum*. To ask, What is the condition upon which participation is possible? is to receive the answer, Subjectivity. There is, therefore, a subjectivity which, in contrast with the noetical objectivity of the world, is sophistical; and there is a subjectivity which so distinguishes the inner ego from the world of sense as assure it an independent position in the intellectual order to which it is akin. Where the ancient cosmos arrayed itself against the ego and, with Aristotle, made man a "political animal," where mediævalism with its belief in the Church raised the *homo totaliter* only to lower the *homo individualiter*, modernism has exalted a kind of naturalistic society with the same result, the degradation of the ego. Subjectivity in its real and noble form has thus become a duty to be followed in spite of paradox. Here one may reflect upon the quixotic maxim with which Anatole France adorns the pages of *The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard*: "Think well about great things, and know that thought is the only reality in this world. Lift up nature to thine own stature, and let the whole universe be for thee no more than the reflection of thine own soul."¹

The point of view of the present dialectic, however, does not place us in a position where we are called upon to dismiss nature in order to make room for the self, even when

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Hearn, p. 136.

idealism has habitually indulged in such a world-dismissal as a necessary feature of its programme. It is our task to read into the world some degree of selfhood, without which philosophy is an In-vain. With idealism here and realism there, one urging the claims of mind, the other devoted to the world, there is a shuttle-like movement between the poles of being, whence it is all the more necessary to determine the exact position which the ego occupies in the universe. While it comes forth from nature, the human ego is derived in no ordinary manner, but with a nature exceptional in its inwardness, with a spontaneity which facilitates the pursuit of extraordinary aim, and with a sensitivity which fits to contemplate the world with suitable feelings it exemplifies its unique being. Any system, whether inclining toward the real or ideal, which ignores the ego renders its own philosophy invalid, because it is through the ego that the thought-principle is employed, and the light is not to be enjoyed without the flame. In both philosophy and poetry, the ego has shown its right to rule in the world of sense, which seeks in vain to submerge it.

3. INDIVIDUALITY AND IRRATIONALITY

To base the ego's claim for independent reality upon something irrational would seem to set that claim at naught ; but by the irrational we mean the subintellectual character of being as it is found in sense and will. The Dionysiac that still lurks in the self thus affords a means of delivering that self from the domination of a fixed conceptualism, which seeks to subordinate it to the impersonal. Against the dark background of such subsumed souls, their individuality lost in the solidarity of their submission, shine forth in clear silhouettes the self-affirming egos that will not be classified. Descartes was on the point of making egoism noble when he submitted to his own rationalism, whose benumbing effects are witnessed in the ethics of Geulincx, with its *despectio sui*. With the "synthetic unity of apperception" as he called it, Kant re-established egoism,

but a critical logic and cautious ethics prevented him from asserting the reality of this former self. Fichte taught an egoism which he himself could not accept, so absolutistic was his dialectic. Goethe knew something of self-assertion, but his individualistic impulses tended ever to receive an objective form, marked by the natural and social. Stendhal arrived by means of a sullen activism, which made the self something efferent. Stirner mingled the irrational with his activism in his violent attempts to find the self. Flaubert's art of Bovaryism, with its contempt for the conventional, was a variation of this egoistic theme. Turgénieff was more nihilistic than egoistic, but some of his negations aided in preparing the way for a sense of selfhood. Ibsen arrived at egoism through indignation; all conventions then became as "ghosts." With Nietzsche the solipsism became a glittering armour in the battle for self-belief. Gorky's thought ranges over barren Russia seeking in vain for the place of selfhood. These all set up revolt as the ideal, while they follow the method of social solipsism as the only way of establishing selfhood in the impersonal world. Imperfect as this may be, it does not fail to suggest that the self is also in the universe, needing only recognition to become a fact.

The foregoing view of selfhood employs the irrational to deliver the ego from conceptual classification; it succeeds by pointing out that the ego is original in its essential character. Thus arises a passive irrationalism, whereby the dangers of absolutism are temporarily avoided. Activistic irrationalism, by making it philosophically possible for the self to improvise in a spontaneous fashion, delivers it from the sway of thinghood. The self must be saved, and if its salvation can be brought about by egoistic revolt, then that shall be the means. This may sound strange to him who, in his regard for "things," is willing to sacrifice the self in order that his system may appear more logical; but he who has learned to think philosophically without resting his lever upon the fulcrum of thinghood is anxious to further only that view of reality which conceives of the world in such a way as to include selfhood. Egoism has

reached the place where the old generalisations are ineffective, for it has found the self in its uniqueness. As the art-teacher in Sudermann's *The Joy of Living* declared, "No one has ever undertaken to make of Michael Angelo, of Alexander Borgia, of Machiavelli anything but an ego, an ego which faces surrounding conditions and the world either as creator or destroyer, relying upon the fullness of his own powers."¹ Why the realist will not espouse the cause of egoism, which is so alien to the rationalistic conceptualism which the realist despises, is difficult to determine; although it may be due to the well-known intellectualism of egoism, which assumes the irrational only in a temporary way, for the sake of combating the foes of the self. Out of this same irrational self may come forth a higher and more comprehensive doctrine of intellectual life as the essential life of the ego.

Such is the nature of the ego that it cannot be subsumed under any impersonal generalisation, even where it cannot rest upon an irrational foundation. The dialectical method that seeks to raise the ego above classifications is urged on by them in behalf of the rich, characteristic content of the inner life. Man is not merely a thing, but a character; not a creature only, but a *valeur*; and it is only because he is so habitually associated with nature that his inner system of intrinsic values is overlooked. It is useless for a realistic system to point to nature and thus seek to locate the ego, for the inner elaboration of humanity at the hand of the self renders this impossible. By means of his inward culture man has turned away from, as also against, the natural order whence he sprang; hence, when naturists like Rousseau and Schiller counsel man to return to nature and rehabilitate the naïve within, they impose an impossible task for a transnatural creature like man. Instead of reposing in nature, the ego creates its own world of spiritual life, wherein obtain criteria of truth and norms of value which are independent of the world of sense. It is the contrast between these inner and outer realms, as well as the independent positing of the

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Seltzer, ch. iii.

former, that creates the impression of solipsism and irrationalism. The ego is in its own world, where it enjoys an independent sense of truth and value; from this superior position the self can be dislodged by no other force than its own will, hence it is to be regretted that realism should seek to undo the work that the inner culture of humanity has long been trying to perfect. This half-heartedness, this fear of egoism must be resisted from within, in order that the mind be restrained in its sacrifice of intellect. When the self really possesses the freedom in, and exercises lordship over, all worlds, it is pathetic to observe how the mind will yield to one of its own notions, as science or experience. Through its consciousness the ego triumphs over the world of sense, even where the path of victory may lead through solipsism and egoism.

While individuality may seem irrational in a conceptual philosophy which is devoted to the class-whole, just as the assertion of selfhood may appear to break the circle described by the concept, there is a sense in which the generic in humanity is expressed by the individual as adequately as by the species. The reason for this peculiar condition is to be found in the fact that, with the individuals that go to make up the class of mankind, the significant feature is the inner one, for man the judging and valuing creature. The mass is too colourless to represent the rich, inner content of spiritual life. The very use of the term "genius" to indicate the favoured, gifted individual suggests that such a superior soul represents the class much better than the class can represent itself. The modern egoist, who does not base his individualistic claims upon the superman alone, tries to assert this inexorable individualism in even the most doubtful case of humanity; thus, in Gorky's *Creatures That Once were Men*, when the merchant Petunikoff, accosts the horrible old man in rags and tatters, and asks "Who are you?" the despised creature answers, "A man."¹ This touch of the generic and essential, so habitual with Gorky, is found again in *The Night Refuge*, when Luka the pilgrim,

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Shirazi, 2nd ed., p. 93.

reviled because he cannot produce a passport as people are supposed to do, solemnly says, "There are people, and there are men."¹

4. THE ASSERTION OF SELFHOOD

When we turn from the solipsistic scruple, as it is felt by the rationalist, to the direct assertion of selfhood, we do so with the conviction that common consciousness fails to sound the depths of the self. Whether or not the ego cognises itself in the way that it cognises the outer world does not concern our dialectic at this point; our duty is to observe that the ego asserts itself as such, and it is this inner affirmation that aids us in discovering the ego's place in the world. The self may not suspect its selfhood, so that it would be amazed to learn just what is involved in its own being. As Fichte expressed it, "*Die meisten Menschen würden sich eher für ein Stück Lava im Monde halten, als für ein Ich.*" As we have been insisting, philosophy, in its fear of solipsism, has rashly assumed that the self exists in a full, conscious fashion, whereas our own age, with its psychological drama, has been privileged to point out that humanity has not asserted the egohood that rightfully belongs to it. Where social and physical science harp upon the massive and extra-egoistic, the dialectics of selfhood finds it necessary to point out that, while man may be able to distinguish the fragment of selfhood he calls his own from a piece of lava in the moon, he usually fails to distinguish his own ego from the forces of the natural order, from the forms of the social one. In independence of Fichte, and in direct opposition to Hegel, Stirner sought to unite the ego with itself. As Feuerbach had reduced the absolutism of Hegel to a humanism, so Stirner advances from this humanism to an egoism. In commenting upon the way in which Feuerbach had interpreted the spiritual in man as his "essence," Stirner says, "Can we put up with this—that 'our essence' is brought into opposition to us—that we are split into an essential and an unessential self? Do

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Hopkins, Act iii.

we not therewith go back into the dreary misery of seeing ourselves banished out of ourselves? What have we gained, then, when for a variation we have transferred into ourselves the divine outside us. *Are we*, that which is in us, as little as that which is outside us? I am as little my heart as I am my sweetheart, this 'other self' of mine."¹

Selfhood, therefore, may not be taken for granted; it is not something which is found in experience, or takes place of itself, as consciousness simply goes on; rather must it be asserted by itself and within itself. Realising this, our dialectic should not be so timid. The ego is capable of a form of selfhood superior to solipsism, which it knows how to absorb. Yet it must not be forgotten that the original solipsist knew nothing about this egoistic dread, nor did he need to resort to the violence of Stirner; the introspective solipsism of Descartes was direct and candid, where the perceptual solipsism of Berkeley was suspicious of itself and insecure. Hence, just as ethical egoism stands in need of a positive rehabilitation, so the dialectical solipsism must assume its proper place in the system of selfhood.

The difference between solipsism and egoism is a difference not of form only, but of original motive; for where the self of the one was never willed by the thinker, the self of the other is an object of supreme importance. The solipsist seeks to establish the world upon a perceptual basis, without being made to suffer for his use of the self; the aim of the egoist is to achieve a victory over the perceptible world, and he is not troubled by the fear that the world might collapse, should he withdraw his perceptual support. The self is not the creator and destroyer, the Brahma and Siva of the universe, and why should it assume an Atlas-like responsibility for the world? Idealists like Berkeley and Kant claim the ego gives both perceptual qualities and conceptual laws to the universe, the kind of idealism that Schopenhauer said stood in need "not of refutation, but of cure."² Egoism, however, is a sound

¹ *The Ego and His Own*, tr. Byington, p. 63.

² *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 19.

philosophy which seeks to care for its own soul in a world-order where the impersonal is all too common. With the ego in its own world, its characteristic nature is set in the proper light. If we are not ready, with Amiel, to style the landscape "a state of the soul," we may exercise such æsthetical scruples as will prevent our placing the ego upon the same level as that of things. The self must have its states, whether they be landscapes or not. Were the motive an ethical or religious one, the contention for self-hood might not be so clear, since these forms of philosophy have often sacrificed the ego to some abstract principle, obedience to which was only a mechanical one. Where the spirit of the philosophy is eudæmonistic, as in this first part of our dialectic, it affords a means of furthering the inward impulse toward self-assertion. The æsthetical thus places the self in a cosmic position, since it provides for a sense of satisfaction which is disinterested; then is overcome the scepticism of the symbolist who complained that the world did not exist for the self—*le monde n'existe pas pour moi*.¹

5. THE INNER WORLD OF SELFHOOD

With the deliverance of the ego from the fixed phenomenal relations, it becomes possible for the mind to elaborate an intimate order of selfhood, wherein the activity of the ego, instead of being purely ideological, becomes real. As long as philosophy adheres to the naturistic method of reasoning, it will find it impossible to invest the inner life with any positive content, and equally inefficient in accounting for its intellectual activity. The free, disinterested work of the mind in its inward culture cannot be explained upon the basis of the immediate percept or the applied purpose of the ideas elaborated. That would constitute a sweeping utilitarianism, wholly foreign to the characteristic behaviour of the intellect, which has learned to detach itself from the percept and exercise its powers for their own sake. As Schlegel said, *Die Individualität ist das*

¹ Melchior de Vogüé, *Jean d'Agrève*, p. 57.

*Ursprüngliche und Ewige im Menschen; die Bildung und Entwicklung dieser Individualität, als höchsten Beruf zu treiben, wäre ein göttlicher Egoismus.*¹ With the Romanticism of Novalis, the ability and willingness to raise the self to the highest pitch of reality and view as a world-order was expressed in the well-known aphorism, *Die Welt wird Traum; der Traum wird Welt.*² In their pure romantic form these maxims are futile, and can never serve as dialectical principles, especially in an age like our own where experience is so influential; nevertheless, the inner essence of such egoism contains a touch of truth where the weight of argument is wanting. It suggests to us that reality is sufficiently rich and resourceful to provide for the self an independent order of being, so that it need not vainly seek to adapt its nature and adjust its strivings to the purely perceptible arrangement of things. The term "world," used so confidently by both realist and rationalist, cannot be applied to the natural order alone without doing violence to dialectics; and since the self has something worldlike about it, philosophy must view it in an epic manner, in accordance with which the inner self is set off in contrast to the outer world. In the case of the ego alone does such a condition obtain, for in its self-assertion it is confronted by the world in a way which is known to no other form of existence.

The inner world of selfhood may be called either the world of ideas or the world of culture; the latter, of modern origin, has about it more of the inner life and the accompanying sense of struggle than was ever felt by the classic philosophy, so that it is a more significant, though perhaps less definite, expression than the Platonic phrase. If there is an order of space, appearance and the like, why may there not also be an order of consciousness, beauty, and happiness? When we view reality at its flood-tide, we find that it includes the human as well as the natural, so that dialectics is able to elaborate an inner world of selfhood, whose data are found in the ideas and acts, in the feelings

¹ *Ideen*, 60.

² *Schriften*, 1815, Bd. I. p. 219.

and strivings of the ego. It is only a clumsy dialectic which persists in handling the things of nature alone, when a more skilful system treats of the things of spirit. No one has seen this more clearly than Eucken, whose activist and idealistic work, *Der Kampf um einen Geistigen Lebensinhalt*, makes an eloquent plea for the supremacy of spiritual life. "*Kein Sinn und kein Character, kein Mark und kein Kraft irgendwelches Geisteslebens ohne eine Erhebung über die Durchschnittslage, keine solche Erhebung ohne eine geistige Selbstthätigkeit, keine Selbstthätigkeit am einzelnen Punkte ohne eine Selbstthätigkeit im Ganzen, ohne einen universalen Lebensprozess, ohne die Eröffnung einer neuen Welt.*"¹ But where Eucken insists upon the personal principle, he does not see his way clear to the expression of this in the form of selfhood, for the reason that, in his antipathy to the *Kleinmenschlich*, he does not care to ally his superior system with a scheme of egoism. In our own case it seems possible to employ egoism, and that profitably, at the stage of our work where we are limited to the phenomenal order, holding in reserve a second and superior phase of selfhood in the form of self-activity, as also a third and intellectualistic one, wherein the ego undergoes complete transformation.

The humanist, who seeks to make man the measure of all things, is in no such secure position as the naturist, who deals with the mechanical and automatic; therefore, when the time comes to organise humanity into a system, the material that serves for the elaboration of this scheme presents no such fitness as is found in atoms and molecules, which are so servile to the laws of nature. The human self, unique, solitary, capricious, seems to frustrate the proposed arrangement. The Platonic Republic, its classes of men assorted according to the cosmic divisions of body, soul, mind, had to contend with no such aroused and organised individualism as confronts the modern thinker. Hobbes was able to subdue the ego, because he endowed him with mere force, due to selfhood in sense, and allotted to him just enough intelligence to allow his submission to

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

the state. Hegel's *Philosophy of Rights*, based as it was upon absolutistic theory of being, has no place for the individual, hence it is perplexed by no egoistic problem. With Spencer the evolutionary system, with its interest in the species rather than the individual, the reconciliation of egoism and altruism is made possible by an appeal to "absolute morality," that is, perfectly evolved morality, in which the individual self is swallowed up without having had an opportunity to assert itself and elaborate its inner life. Historic absolutism, whether in the idealistic form of Plato and Hegel, or the materialistic one of Hobbes and Spencer, removes the ego from the scene before it has had opportunity to demonstrate its right to exist; hence the need of a broader conception of being, according to which the range of reality, instead of being limited to the naturistic, shall include the humanistic also. The modern upholds the ego, because in it is found the hope of an inner world-order; and however perfect in form the impersonal realm may be, the rich content of inward humanity is so highly prized, and its possibilities so thoroughly appreciated, that no fear of individualistic irrationalism will deter the egoist from asserting selfhood as an independent order. Moreover, the world of selfhood is not supposed to present the same formal perfection that invests the objective world, and where consistency of behaviour and ceaseless activity are discoverable, the lack of external conformity need not be taken too seriously. With the ego, selfhood and worldhood are products of one and the same inner activity, the primitive, and in many ways the most perfect form of which is found in the *Tat tvam asi* of Vedanta. The interior affirmation of selfhood is to be accompanied by the exterior adjustment of the ego to the world, whose true place we are seeking.

From this it seems to follow that, if the ego is to have a world-order of its own, it must itself elaborate this by means of its own ideas and forces, as indeed it has long been doing in the culture of humanity. It is not sufficient to sever the self from the outer world and identify the inward order by means of mere consciousness; the inner

world-order must be developed. If this be not done, then the condition of the self is one of solipsism indeed, for the "I" cannot stand solitary in its ipseism. Genuine selfhood, or *Für-sich-sein*, consists of the ego in its world. In his inability to dismiss the objective world, the solipsist has done no more than assert that the ego exists, its independence attested by its inner consciousness. But the present dialectic is anxious to evince something more than this; it seeks to show the superiority of selfhood, a truth which can receive only partial elaboration in this present section, which is devoted to the view of the self as sense.

Kant thought to do something for the human self when he placed it at the centre of his phenomenal world-order and called it the synthetic unity of apperception. It is for speculative philosophy, however, to do more than posit such a punctual egoism, whose range is limited, whose content is all too meagre. To effect such a change of view, enlarge the field of the self, and enrich its content, superior phases of the self must be brought to the light. This can be done only as the severely dialectical makes room for and is absorbed by the cultural, whose claim to consideration rests upon the fact that it considers the mind in the form of a full, fluent intellectual life. In so doing, philosophy will be led to speak of its central principle, not as *a* self, but as *the* self, the complete form of which is to be discovered only as egoism passes on from the consideration of the self of sense to the will to selfhood, whence the path to selfhood as such will be plain. Egoism will thus become a doctrine of no little moment to him who would fain find himself and be himself in a world which has become so scientific and so social as to be inimical to all expression of interior existence.

6. APPEARANCE AND INTUITION

Where the ego takes the world in its hands to receive or reject it, where it constructs experience and then reacts upon it, it shows itself to be both free and intelligent. The free and intelligible character of the self may be

observed in connection with the intellectual function of intuition. Where the formal disciplines of logic and ethics proceed abstractly upon the basis of sheer intellect and will, the more concrete forms of culture, as these appear in art and religion, involve a synthesis of outer sense and inner understanding, of outward-going volition and inward-drawing cognition in the form of intuition. Thus understood, the intuition exercises a more than ordinary sway, for it is as efficient in combining the conative with the cognitive, as in uniting the sensuous with the intellectual. Perhaps the term "intuition" is not sufficiently significant to convey this dual meaning, or to express this double synthesis; but the mind shows itself to be possessed of a function which unites impression and impulse with the intellectualistic. As a result of the expression of such a function, the mind comes into possession of a view of the world in its totality; now the *impression of the whole*, as this obtains in art and religion, is the most significant thing in the mind of a creature which, having its origin in nature, is urging itself onward toward the spiritual world-order.

The intelligible factor in intuition, by whose aid man has been able to secure a view of the whole world, is the more familiar senso-rational one, whose elaboration resembles that of the concept. Nevertheless, between the fixed form of the concept and the freer one of the intuition there is a noteworthy difference. The perfection of the concept is undertaken for the sake of deducing the necessary and universal, in the pursuit of which the mind relinquishes everything that is accidental and particular. This process of conceptualising procures the necessary and universal at the cost of abstraction and generalisation, so that logic is forced to admit that its significance is only formal, while its function is critical rather than creative. While the sensuous has its obvious disadvantages, it rejoices in the possession of the immediate and individual, which are of peculiar interest to man, who cannot accomplish much or enjoy experience under the auspices of the abstract and general. To live and to act, one needs the immediate and

particular. At the same time, the particular, which is merely sense, cannot yield knowledge of anything beyond itself, while the ultimate significance of the object cannot appear unless something more than the particular is involved. But is there not a way of regarding the world according to which the fruits of both concept and percept may be gathered in the same basket.

This attempt to combine the strong parts of both reason and sense, while the weaker ones are allowed to fall away, is found in intuition. By means of intuition the mind is able to perceive the particular in the light of the universal, the immediate in the form of the necessary, for it is the genius of the intuition to unite the necessary and universal with the immediate and individual. Intuition unites sense and reason, without rationalising the one or sensualising the other. If the particular fact as perceived did not really contain the universal, it is difficult to see how the conceptualising mind could subsume it under the head of the class-term; now, intuition is content to recognise this universal in the particular without going on to reduce this to the extreme form of the concept. Its efficiency appears in art, where loyalty to sense forbids that the artist should allow the ideal significance of the object to reduce this to abstraction. Art thus symbolises the general, whereby it wins a victory over the sensuous; architecture intuits or symbolises gravitation, sculpture the life of the spirit in the flesh, painting the idea of the world-whole in the landscape, music the unitary energy of the universe.

With the senso-rational synthesis of intuition, there is found another manner in which volition and intellection are united. All volitions imply ideas, while ideas are propelled by certain forces, so that the unity of the two seems to be quite possible. Both conation and cognition strive toward the same goal in the intelligible; both become free through idea. While we are not so accustomed to that community of mental forms which exists and acts with will and intellect, just as surely as it expresses itself in the parallel case of sensation and thought, we cannot deny that

the conative and cognitive are interdependent in human existence. The determinism which seeks to deprive the will of its voluntaristic rights, as well as the libertarianism which would safeguard these, both depend upon the intellect to furnish them with the material for their respective arguments. The determinist thinks that, by the employment of intellect in the excess, he can render the will void, while the libertarian thinks to emancipate the will by making it "intelligible." Such contentions could not be made were it not for the fact that the will was predisposed to the intellect, in the way that sense is ripe for the understanding.

But the synthesis of the volitional with the intellectual is not to be brought about by the same means as that which united sense and reason, for the contribution offered by the will is not the same as that brought forward by sensation. It is true that, like sensation, the will is allied with the immediate and particular, yet the range of the will is so much greater that we sometimes find it willing the vast and remote, as is the case in ethics. The will contributes activity where the intellect offers awareness; the combination of the two is most advantageous to the will, because the ego needs to know what it wills, although the intellect likewise has its needs, and must act as well as think. Without the intellect the will works in vain, for no object to which it attains can be of value unless the ego is aware of that object. On the other hand, the intellect would remain in a hypothetical condition were it not for the will, which bestows that original power by means of which the subject of the judgment is posited.

Thus, where sense flowers in reason, the will bears its fruit in intellect. In the mind of man, as this mind appears and expresses itself upon the plane of phenomenality, the union of sensation and volition with the intellect could manifest itself in none other than an intuitive manner. Perhaps the more exact statement of the relation which obtains among the three consists in asserting that sensation completes itself in volition, the sensory in the motor, as the organism, having been affected by the external world,

reacts upon this in a manner peculiar to its inner nature; then, the burden of mind having been handed over to the will, the latter completes itself and accomplishes its end only as it acquires intelligence. In this way the will plays the intuitive part of reconciling the extremes of sensation and intellection; for it is the will that vivifies sense and thus raises it above itself, while it is the same will which raises its own head above nature, and by striving after freedom adopts intelligence as the necessary means of emancipation. If this arrangement of mind in the stages of sensation, volition, intellection is not adopted, we are forced to regard the intellect as though it reached out from both right and left toward the realms of sense and will, an order of things quite unnatural. But the difficulty that is encountered when one would unite the sensational with the intellectual is materially obviated by the interpolation of volition as something common to both forms of mental life. In this unity of the three, as it is made possible by the will, we have the true form of intuition. Its inner nature, its range of application, and its relation to the problem of truth belong to another philosophical discipline; here, in metaphysics, we are content to observe how the reception of the world by the ego is made possible by a mental function which, while under the sway of the immediate and the particular, is not wanting in those principles of knowledge which are peculiar, not to the world of appearance, but to the world of activity.

Appearance thus acquires a character superior to that which the natural world as such might impress upon it; intuitive as it is, it assumes a humanistic form; for it is not the animal but man which has a world of phenomenality. Apart from the human ego, there is no problem of appearance; where the intellectualising mind of man enters into the scene, the immediacy and obviousness of nature vanish; all things have become problematical, so that one argues about things under the hypothesis that things exist. In this way appearance seems to rise like a fine mist, whose reality is at once a question for dispute.

Within the phenomenal world, however, there are traces of the substantial, and even while the world seems merely to appear, it has about it such a persistence that one can only believe it to sustain some representative relation to the real order of things. It is thus that our dialectic must advance from the general notion of the reception of the world as phenomenal to that evidence of thinghood which is found in the principle of order.

7. THE WORLD AS PLACE OF ENJOYMENT

The discussion of the question whether the ego has a place in the world may be carried on in a more definite manner when existence is placed upon a eudæmonistic basis. If the self has a place in the world, that place is known by means of the happiness which the self enjoys. In this way the purely metaphysical consideration of the problem assumes a form more ethical and vital, and thus it may be affirmed that the degree of security with which the ego has affirmed its right to a place in the world is measured by the perfection of the enjoyment which the individual feels. In the lower form of eudæmonism, happiness appears as the satisfaction of immediate bodily wants and the enjoyment of sensuous pleasures, but upon this unstable foundation no eudæmonism of human existence can be reared. When viewed in its inwardness and totality, human happiness is connected not with the emotional and private experiences of the self, but with the more complete sense of its possession of the world as a place where the individual may perform world-work and gain world-knowledge. If the world is so conceived as to afford a place, a work, and a comprehension of its nature, then the individual may enjoy that happiness which follows from the feeling of self-existence, self-expression, and self-realisation; where these ambitions of the ego are not fulfilled, it may be concluded that spiritual life is in vain.

Just as eudæmonism bears upon the subject of reality, so it does not fail to concern itself with the criterion of truth. By what means does the ego come to the conscious-

ness that it has found the true reality of the world which encompasses it? Various criteria may be offered, but at this stage of our investigation, where we seek to determine the place which the self occupies in existence, we can assume nothing more than a eudæmonistic standard, and thus conclude that man is happy when he has found the true place which he is destined to occupy in the world. This extension of the hedonic principle is not to be thought unwarranted, since a thorough view of the affectional process justifies us in asserting that feeling conveys something more than enjoyment: it carries with it a totalising sense of the individual's relation to the world. It was in recognition of this truth that the later hedonism was able to amplify its ideal of hedonic calculus to the more comprehensive principles of the hedonic law. The essence of the hedonic law was expressed when it was observed that feeling, instead of confining its influence to the immediate enjoyment of consciousness, had to do with the ultimate welfare of the individual, so that pleasure became the criterion of benefit, pain of injury. If now the pleasurable is the life-helping, pain the life-hindering, is it not possible to extend the hedonic in another direction, and thus elaborate a eudæmonistic law? The hedonic law concerns itself with the conditions of the body, the eudæmonistic law has to do with the welfare of the spiritual life in man.

In accordance with the eudæmonistic law, it may be asserted that happiness comes when the individual is in harmony with existence, while sorrow is the result of disharmony. Man thus finds his place in the world, not by means of some extraordinary form of perception, but through that inward organisation of the self which is capable of producing happiness. It is this sense of outer harmony and inner joy which distinguishes classicism from the dualism and pessimism of modern life. Man knows when he has found his place in the world, not through any special criterion of reality which he perceives in the exterior order, but when his view of the world is accompanied by a sense of satisfaction. True existence is enjoyable, true happiness comes about when the ego finds its place in the world. It

was in the perception of this eudæmonistic truth that the Veda elaborated a view of the world as a dialectic of desire, so that when the *Khandogya Upanishad* had completed its view of the world as the Self, it concluded by describing that world as the joyous city of Brahman. In this city of truth and true desire one finds no abstract world of forms, but a living realm of happiness and fearlessness; it is the "world of friends," the "world of perfumes," the "world of women," the "world of song."¹

The failure to find one's place in the world may be accepted as the cause of our modern Decadence, wherein the joy of life, alienated from the world, seeks its realisation in such inward states of consciousness as may be worthy of an emancipated individual. With the romantic Friedrich Schlegel, this desire for an inward joy expressed itself as a search for the new, the piquant, and striking,² while with the decadent Baudelaire it had passed from the capricious to the morbid; Romanticism sought happiness at the heights of the inner life, Decadence ransacked its depths. Under such troubled skies modern æstheticism with its *l'art pour l'art* underwent its peculiar development. To attempt an explanation of this contrast between the primitive eudæmonism of the Veda and the æstheticism of the Romantic, one must not fail to observe that where in the earlier view the conception of the world had not grown beyond the power of the self to participate in existence, modernity has elaborated a world-view which seems to make it impossible for man to find the place which he believes he should occupy, for it was in a sense of disgust at the social and scientific organisation of existence that the decadent resolved to withdraw from the exterior order.

The modern world oppresses us not because it is too large or too detailed, but because it is conceived in such a manner as to forbid the individual's participation in its existence, whence an aroused inner consciousness finds it necessary to retreat from reality and realise itself in all the inwardness of æstheticism. Such a condition of things,

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Müller, viii. 1-2.

² *Jugend Schriften*, ed. Minor, i. p. 95.


while quite explicable, is not to be thought enduring; hence it has become necessary to find a new view of the world, to elaborate a higher synthesis of the elements of existence. This new view of the world, which at present expresses itself in the form of the anti-scientific and anti-social, is to be developed not merely with the idea of affording a clear explanation of existence, but none the less with the purpose of providing enjoyment for the human ego. If it be said that "worlds" cannot be constructed at will and with the purpose of satisfying human emotion, it may be replied that, since it is the duty of dialectics to explain the totality of that which is given in human experience, the world must be construed with such an extended and enriched content as to make room for the facts of man's inner life; and if the view of the world account for a body's seeking its equilibrium, a plant seeking sunlight, an animal struggling to exist, it must not omit to account for the individual seeking happiness. Only as a dialectic is both naturistic and humanistic may it claim to have assumed the full responsibilities of the ontological problem.

Not only does man seek joy, but his eudæmonistic efforts are such as make it plain that his joy can come only when he has come to an understanding with the world, and has found in it the place where his life achieves its eudæmonistic realisation. To satisfy the spontaneous and illimitable character of his inner life, the individual can rest content with nothing less than participation in the world-whole; science seeks to explain the world, art desires to enjoy it. Man possesses the world both by knowing it and by finding happiness in it, or by an act of the soul which combines both explanation and enjoyment. As Aristotle said, "Happiness then is co-extensive with Contemplative Speculation, and in proportion as people have the act of Contemplation, so far have they also the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of Contemplative Speculation, because it is in itself precious."¹ Whatever else the world may be to man, it is the place of happiness, for enjoyment is an essential criterion of existence.

¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, tr. Chase, x. vii.

BOOK II

THE WORLD OF ACTIVITY
THE SELF AS WILL



THE INTERMEDIATE VIEW OF THE WORLD

THE intermediate view of the world involves an extra division in dialectics; it reveals the world as a world of activity. In making such a division, metaphysics is but responding to a demand for recognition on the part of causality and will; at the same time, the introduction of activity as an intermediary affords independent treatment for certain ontological problems, as change, time, and causality, which could not be perfectly presented upon either a phenomenalistic or noumenalistic basis. As a result of the interpolation of such a division, existence will assume the form of *mundus sensibilis, activus, et intelligibilis*. To be is not simply to appear and to exist; to be is to do, to exert force as well as to express states. Reality as thus conceived has now to exercise sway over both activity and appearance, for as there is no reality without appearance, there is no reality without activity. In the midst of this apology for activity, our dialectic will show how the principle rewards metaphysics for recognising it, for it will afford the means whereby the phenomenal and the noumenal will be reconciled to each other. It must be evident that the real world is at work at some task, for its behaviour cannot be accounted for in terms of that which is and that which appears; in order to explain the work of the world, we have adopted this intermediate division, in which the operations of existence will be discussed.

The activistic view of the world has the additional advantage of rendering plausible the voluntaristic notion of the self. As long as one abides by the traditional

dualism of appearance and reality, he will be torn between the conflicting claims which sensationalism and intellectualism make upon him, but with the interpretation of the soul as that which wills, the nature of the inner life will appear in a new and original manner. Upon the plane of activity, the supreme command will be, not *nosce te ipsum*, but *velle te ipsum*. It is here, in the world of activity, that the reality of the ego receives its most convincing, though not necessarily its most consistent interpretation. Self-knowledge, whether in the form of thought or feeling, has none of the abandon of the will to selfhood as this reveals itself in connection with the activistic view of the world, for which reason we shall do well to cherish the voluntarism that emancipates the self from both the scientific and the social. It is true that the relegation of the world to activity and the self to will may involve the possibility of irrationalism and immoralism, but with the intellectualistic view of the world to follow the present one these dangers will be averted. The synthesis of thing that dialectics ever seeks cannot be achieved until the voluntaristic has had full rein, and it is the higher synthesis of the phenomenal and the activistic that we are seeking.

Having viewed the world as activity and the self as will, our dialectic will then attempt to consummate its intermediate view of the world by inquiring concerning the work that the ego is thought to have in the world. The discussion of the problem of world-work will have the task of both asking the question and answering it; only as one understands the world to be something more than a scene of things where reality appears and exists will he be able to present the problem of human work. But with the view of the world as activity and the self as will, this question can be put in a sincere and complete fashion. The problem is thus one of behaviour; hence we must ask, How do things and egos act? As the place of the self in the world of appearance involved *aesthetic* considerations, the question of the work of the ego in the world of activity will make use of the *ethical* methodology.

I

THE UNITY OF THE REAL AND PHENOMENAL IN ACTIVITY

BOTH the conception of the world as such, and the attitude of the ego toward it make it plain that the conventional division of appearance and reality will not suffice to measure the range of existence or fathom the depth of the self. Moreover, the phenomenal and substantial, which for centuries have sought to settle their quarrel over the interpretation of the world, stand in need of a reconciliation from some third source, if such can be found. Hence both real and formal considerations incline us to review the phenomenal conception of things, with the hope of finding a place for the principle of activity, whose dialectical status seems to be neither purely phenomenal nor wholly real. When this extra stage of being is interpolated between appearance and reality, many of the ancient problems which were always more than ordinarily puzzling because of their paradoxical position will adjust themselves to new relations. In this way the intermediate realm of being will provide a place for change, time, and causality, while it will readjust the ego to the world, wherein it is destined to do its work.

I. THE REAL AS CAUSE OF THE PHENOMENAL

The most obvious function that causality exhibits is in the connection of the phenomenal and the real. Thus it may be said of the three, The real causes the phenomenal. This is the most general truth involved in the activistic reconciliation of appearance and reality, but it does not express all the possibilities contained in the world of activity.

As the phenomenal is ever marked by a dependence upon something else, so the real has been all too absolute and passive; hence metaphysics has stood in need of a principle which should account for appearance and make use of reality. In activity this is found, for activity supplies a basis for appearance in the work of reality, just as it provides the real with a function in causing the phenomenal order.

To consider the real as the cause of the phenomenal tends to clear up certain difficulties which have long irritated the human mind. The phenomenal has about it a peculiar persistence, which forbids the idealistic dismissal of that which merely appears; but, at the same time, the phenomenal cannot stand alone, so that it must be justified in some transphenomenal way. Where Parmenides and Heraclitus had contended, one in favour of being, the other in behalf of becoming, where the school of reconcilers had brought forward certain intermediate notions of immutable elements and organising movements, Plato attempted to solve the problem by relating appearance to the senses and being to the mind. But the dialectical result was only a two-world theory frankly acknowledged by Plato in the *Timæus*.¹ The possibility of determining being in a dynamic manner, and thus inserting activity between appearance and reality, was hinted at in the *Sophist*, where the Eleatic Stranger suggested this very expedient. Said he, "My suggestion would be that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another even for a moment, however trifling the cause and however slight and momentary the effect, has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply power."² But this dynamical determination of being was denied by the "friends of the ideas," and, added the Stranger, "they deny this, and say that the power of doing or suffering is confined to generation, and that neither power has anything to do with being."³ Plato's estimate of Heraclitus seems to have been so connected with the phenomenal and so indif-

¹ l. 27.² *Timæus*, tr. Jowett, l. 247.³ *Ib.*, l. 248.

ferent to the dynamic factor in the "flux," that his ontology made no room for the activistic along with the phenomenal and the real. Aristotle was more successful in handling the activistic principle, but he never freed his thought from formalism, nor did he conceive of the world as a progressive order ever effecting work. Aristotle's distinction between the intellectual and volitional, however, reappearing in the Roman writers, has been of no little influence in distinguishing activity as a separate ontological principle. Where Seneca contrasted *activus* with *contemplativus*,¹ Quintilian compared *activus* with *spectativus*.² This distinction was felt by Augustine, and strikingly expressed by Duns Scotus when, in opposition to the intellectualism of Thomas Aquinas, he upheld the claims of voluntarism, asserting *voluntas superior est intellectu*. Such voluntarism was more of the nature of a revolt than it was a constructive dialectic; nevertheless, it made possible a new view of substance.

As reality must be regarded as cause, appearance must be considered as effect. For the sake of the real, which stands in need of some function, as well as on account of the phenomenal, we are obliged to introduce the activistic notion. Mediæval dialectics, with its intense substantialism, did not fail to ascribe some measure of activity to the Absolute, as when Augustine adopted the idea of the eternal generation of the world, whereby the phenomenal order with its temporal change is relegated to the perpetual activity of the real one. Scotus Erigena places the idea of creation in the midst of his division of nature, in order to relate reality to the perceptible order. Of his four divisions, *creat et non creatur*, *creatur et creat*, *creatur et non creat*, *nec creat nec creatur*, the first relates to the Deity as Creator, the last to the Deity as Absolute; those between, which consist of the ideas that are created but themselves also create, and the things that are created but are not creative, stand for the world, which in order to exist must act and be acted upon.³ This division introduces the activistic,

¹ *Ep.*, 95.

² iii. 5, 11.

³ *De Divisione Naturæ*, i. cap. 1; cf. ii. cap. 2.

while it attributes inactivity to the extremes of existence as these are found in pure spirit and mere sense; but being is in general of the active nature, both in the Hebrew conception of creation and the Greek notion of ideas. In the same way Fichte's dialectic involves an inexorable activism, in which the phenomenal world is not left to itself, but is attributed to the activity of the ego. But the clearest and most comprehensive statement of the activistic reconciliation of appearance and reality came from Herbart, who, however, did not put the principle into very efficient practice. Says he, "*Die Metaphysik hat zwei Pole; sie spricht vom Sein und Schein. Wäre das was erscheint unmittelbar das Reale, so gäbe es keine solche Wissenschaft. Aber was liegt denn zwischen den Polen? Gewiss irgendwo der Causalbegriff; denn wenn das Reale nichts wirkte, woher käme die Erscheinung?*"¹

These are the important questions of activism, which would know whether there is anything between the poles of reality and appearance, just as it would inquire by what means appearance persists in displaying itself to the senses. The significance of the activistic relation between the extremes of existence will become clearer and more convincing when we take up the study of causality, for here we must content ourselves with observing the general effect which the principle of activity has upon the whole dialectical problem. With regard to causality, it will be observed that with some systems the relation is connected with the phenomenal, after the manner of the *causa transiens*, while with others it is relegated to the substantial which involves the *causa immanens*. Such a situation reveals the fact that the causal relation is flexible, since it may be applied to either extreme of being. Causality certainly has its relation to the phenomenal order, the knowledge of which could never be apprehended by the mind, if the leading principle of that order were not of the causal nature. At the same time, causality is dependent upon substance, without which it would result in mere occasionalism. On both sides, therefore, the active principle of

¹ *Metaphysik*, § 193.

causality is demanded, and it is a fact to be regretted that the idealist has not been willing to enrich his dialectic to such a degree as to include the same in his system. But the "friends of the ideas" have not found it possible to make this departure, so that as the Eleatic Stranger despaired of seeing the dynamic principle introduced into the Eleatic idealism of Plato, with its *φαινόμενον-ὄν*, so one may be equally pessimistic about the Eleatic realism of Herbart, with its *Schein-Sein*. Nevertheless, reality is efficient as well as true, so that it must be thought of as achieving something in the way of work, the result of which is found in the world of appearance. It is true that, as Bradley said, "the Absolute has no seasons"; but the sun, which is equally devoid of such terrestrial changes, is the *cause* of the seasons, and in a similar manner the Absolute may be considered the cause of the states of the phenomenal.

The present dialectic proposes to consider together the questions of appearance and reality, of cause and effect, and that for the reason that they belong together. Where antiquity had no real trouble in adjusting the phenomenal to the noumenal, so it was troubled even less by the question of necessary connection; in neither case was it driven to scepticism. In our modern thought the situation has not been so serene, and the scepticism which has been unable to relate the things of sense to those of reason has been equally helpless in adjusting cause to effect. These two problems have been kept apart, although Kant, unable to account for the idea of necessary connection, sought a solution for his problem by relegating causality to the phenomenal order. Before Kant, the rationalist had attempted the problem, only to end in the doubts of occasionalism, just as the empiricist had driven the principles of sense to the extreme of scepticism. Apparently the problem of activity, whether in the special sense of the causal connection between one thing here and another thing there, or on the larger significance of the total work of the world, is not to be solved unless thought connects it with both appearance and substantiality.

2. APPEARANCE AND ACTIVITY

From the foregoing discussion of the influence of activity in the question of appearance-reality, it will appear that appearance involves something more than the representative element which has ever been associated with it. Moreover, the view of the world as appearance, wherein the essence of thinghood was found to consist in order, has brought us to the place where we must inquire concerning the source of the ordering principle. In this way it begins to appear that the phenomenal cannot be viewed as the mere veil of the substantial, but must be looked upon as its effect. "*Denn, wenn das Reale nichts wirkte, woher käme die Erscheinung?*" Light and sound, as physical phenomena, colour and tone, as psychical ones, are not rigid things existing in independence, but are effects produced by matter and mind, and the persistence with which these phenomena appear is not due to the phenomena themselves, but to the sub-phenomenal source that produces them. To this substantial ground they owe the orderly arrangement in which the mind discovers them; to it they are indebted for the constant changes occurring within them; but instead of assuming that things appear and changes take place, we should rather observe that something produces the appearance of things, as it is further responsible for the changes taking place within them. This view of the problem, not in keeping with the classic treatment or the modern method of dialectics, was not unknown to or underestimated by Scholasticism, which was not so favourably disposed to the sensuous as ancient art and modern science have been as to allow the phenomenal undue independence. This sway of the real over the phenomenal was expressed by the distinction of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, whereby the active and passive phases of the world were distinguished and mutually adjusted. The same method of thinking, instead of making the distinction between the *a priori* and *a posteriori* to consist in the rationally inde-

pendent of and the sensuously dependent upon experience as the moderns have done, opposed one form of knowledge to the other as that which comes from causes and that which is observed in effects. In all this activism was a problem by itself, although the mediævalist was too thoroughly involved in his peculiar problems of ecclesiastical theology to appreciate the wealth of his activism. The modern empiricist has taken the phenomenal for granted, and has failed to notice that the world of appearance has come to be as the result of something else working upon it; the rationalist has been guilty of as much haste, only he has pronounced his nay while the empiricist was saying yea; thus the rationalist dismissed the phenomenal as unworthy of his notice.

The explanation of phenomenality is to be found in something beyond itself, not in the substantial as such, but in the substantial as active. Phenomena are not to be accepted or rejected, but are to be explained in the light of their behaviour. Formerly it was the custom to regard the phenomenal space-wise, but with the interpretation of space as something internal rather than external, the nature of appearance was forced to assume a more temporal, active form. With the passing of the Cartesian philosophy, it began to be apparent that the external world must be something more than a *res extensa*, and as early as the Leibnitzian philosophy the perceptible order was interpreted in terms of activity. Indeed, had Kant never thought to render space subjective, the philosophy of Leibnitz would have prevented the progress of the Cartesian notion, inasmuch as Leibnitz showed how, apart from any epistemological considerations, the objective world itself demands some more fundamental and influential principle than that of extension. Appearance itself demands activity whereby it may produce its effects; merely to exist passively is not sufficient to account for the behaviour of the phenomenal order. As the preliminary view of being, as shown in the world of appearance, involved an arrangement of qualities and a succession of states, so it now becomes evident that

even this introductory conception cannot obtain, unless the arrangement and succession are accounted for, and this seems to be impossible without the activistic. Causality and action, instead of concerning the relation between finished things, has as much to do with the interconnection of the special states that make up those things. This is the significance of *actio immanens*, a principle which enters into the smallest detail of being, as well as the larger concerns of the connection between things.

This realistic view of activity is necessary to complement the superficial notion of phenomenality, for that which appears is something which takes place, and this latter cannot be regarded as independent. For its part, activity requires the phenomenal to give it content, and thus redeem it from the abstraction of the law of sufficient reason, which cannot say more than "that which happens has a cause." Now the phenomenal is involved in the "that which," so that causality is placed in a field where it may operate with appropriate effect. As things with their states require actions with their changes, so these active changes are ineffectual without real qualities to give them weight. Where the causal or activistic view of the world is ignored, and the real stands out in contradiction to the phenomenal, there will always be a dispute concerning the superiority of thing and quality, of reason and sense. Our present task is to interpolate the activistic between these opponents, so that they may be shown to participate in the same world, of which they are extreme views. In particular, this task consists in subsuming the phenomenal under the causal, and then in treating the causal to a similar subsumption under the substantial.¹

Both the phenomenalist and the substantialist must make room for the activist; the former, because he cannot explain states of being and their interconnection without involving an organising principle of activity; the latter, because he cannot subordinate the qualities of the thing under the thing itself without invoking the aid of causality.

¹ Cf. *infra*, Bk. III., iv.

This ontological situation is repeated in epistemology, wherein the principle of activity takes its place between the extremes of sense and intellect as a determinant of knowledge. Hence, where the sensationalist and rationalist dispute over the proposition: *nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu*, they must now consider the introduction of a third and intermediary member of the maxim, which will then read as follows: *nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in voluntati et in sensu*. To be means to appear, to act, and to persist; to know means to perceive, to will, and to conceive. The bridge over the chasm between the perceptible and the conceptual is found in the activistic.

3. THE CAUSAL AS PHENOMENAL

The dialectical use to which we are submitting the causal principle makes it necessary for us to show that that principle is adaptable, first to the phenomenal, and then to the substantial; whether causality is sufficiently versatile for this double employment remains to be seen. The likeness between the phenomenal and the causal appears, first of all, in the peculiar lack of continuity observed in each of them. The phenomenal and the causal are made up of things which come into being and then go out of existence; here there is a phenomenon, there it is absent; here there is an action, there it is wanting. At the same time, both the preliminary and intermediate phases of reality betray a certain lack of unity, inasmuch as both of them are involved in the manifold of experience. Whatever may result as the supreme view of causality in theory, the fact obtains that the principle has its transient form of activity, in connection with which it manifests the plurality that is the very life of the phenomenal order. Causality should manifest an immanental character also, but it is none the less an expression of the phenomenal and produced.

As mere states which appear, phenomena are not wholly intelligible, but as activities in operation they secure a more significant place in the mind. Just as perception has its

motor phases, without which it is impossible to account for the behaviour of consciousness, so the perceived order has its rough, active determinants which further facilitate the process of apprehension. The will within apprehends the activity without; and the mind, instead of keeping its attention upon the several states as these occur, observes the activity within and behind them. While we imagine that the world of our experience is a discrete arrangement, which consists of separate phenomena, we are ultimately brought to the place where we behold it in motion as an operation. Within the various phenomena an active principle is manifest, so that the inertia of things is only superficial. Beneath the *natura naturata* works the *natura naturans*, as behind the senses is the will. From the voluntaristic standpoint of Schopenhauer, this treatment of the real as causal manifests a likeness to the Scholastic conception, and Schopenhauer even resembles them in his view of sense as *a posteriori*, where the will is surveyed *a priori*.¹

Activity further accounts for the phenomenal by supplying the temporal in the world of appearance. There is a sense in which the world of appearance is as alien to time as is the substantial order, for the qualities of a thing are as constant as the thing itself. Thus red is always red, sweet always sweet. But by means of the causal notion the relation of condition and consequence is introduced into the phenomenal order, which involves both change and appearance. The problem of philosophy would then seem to consist in introducing change and progress into a world which is more inclined to assume the condition of inertia than philosophy has been ready to observe it. Things are what they are; phenomena appear as they appear, so that the rationalist has little difficulty in surveying the universe *sub specie æternitatis*, or in regarding time as ideal. Yet it is possible to infuse life and action into the order of things and their phenomenal states, but this cannot be done unless one can persuade the friends of the ideas to introduce the dynamic notion of being. So stolid is the world of science and phil-

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 18.

osophy that interpolation of essential activity is by no means a simple task.

In addition to placing the problem of time in a new position as also in a new light, the activist view of the world prepares the way for an altered conception of change. Both of these dialectical principles relate themselves to the phenomenal order, which has ever been reputed to be one where all things are in a flux. Were it not for the causal connection between thing and quality, between reality and appearance, we should be at a loss to express, still less to explain, the nature of change. Standing by itself, change is a contradiction; how can there be a transmutation from being to not being, or from one kind of being to another? The paradox of change persists until the problem is stated in connection with appearance, causality, and substance. The thing, if it be a thing, cannot be conceived of as changing; nor can the qualities any more readily submit to the fatal influence of transmutation. The reason for this consists in the fact that the thing is constituted of its qualities, while the qualities have no existence apart from the thing. Change, therefore, must exercise its sway over something else than the thing and the quality. The nature of change, which will receive independent discussion in due order,¹ is to be interpreted in the light of causality, which controls it. Thing and quality are always what they are, as the rose is rose, and red is red. To conceive of either of these as changing would be to introduce chaos into human thinking. Nevertheless, change does take place, and the only question is as to the subject of the transformation. That which changes is the cause, the condition under which effects are produced. As rose is ever rose, so red is ever red. But from this fact of identity it does not follow that the rose is ever red, for there are conditions, as those of darkness, when it has no colour at all. Thus it appears that the element of change concerns the conditions under which a thing has a quality or fails to have it. Causality changes the relation between thing and quality, while it has no influence over

¹ Cf. *infra*, ii.

either one or the other when each is conceived of as existing by itself.

The hope of phenomenality as a dialectical factor thus reposes in the principle of activity, which controls the phenomena in such a way that they assume their appointed place in the circle of thinghood. There is no phenomenality without causality. Red as a quality depends upon something more than the fixed number of vibrations per second; it depends upon the actual conditions of light under which redness is produced. The phenomenal is the produced condition, the effect of a cause; it cannot stand alone, but demands at each moment of its existence a supporting principle. The natural order supplies this demand by virtue of the principle of energy, which is conceived of as effecting the phenomena; the realm of consciousness provides for this activity in connection with the will. From the activistic standpoint, the phenomenal, whether in the outer physical or the inner psychical form, is at the command of some principle superior to itself; its relation to thinghood depends upon the activity of this ordering principle.

Causality would thus seem to sustain abundant relation to the phenomenal order, so that the present claim for the causal as the mediator between the real and the phenomenal seems to be sustained as far as that claim has been advanced. No phenomenality without causality; in order to uphold this maxim, we must observe that causality has a phenomenal side, even where metaphysics may show that its true nature is something noumenal and immanent. The lower form of *causa transiens* may not be disregarded; hence, instead of dismissing the transient, we relate it directly to the phenomenal world, convinced that in due time it may be shown that, as the quality in appearance is subordinate to the thing in reality, so the transient in causation will find its place in the immanent. There is thus a phenomenal causality as there is also a transient causality, and without this causality the existence of the phenomenal cannot be conceived.

4. THE CAUSAL AS SUBSTANTIAL

Just as causality serves the interests of the phenomenal order by controlling the grouping of qualities into things, so it delivers substance from its ontological imprisonment, and brings it out into the world of living reality. Were it not for the activistic interpretation of things, substance would still be conceived as the *ἐστὶν εἶναι* of Parmenides, the *substantia in se* of Spinoza, or the *Ding an sich* of Kant. The principle of activity assigns a work to reality, which is as impossible as mere phenomenality without it. If, as has been pointed out, the phenomenal is the effect of the real, it follows that the real is the cause of the phenomenal. The phenomenal is not self-existent, nor is the real an existence alone. Now, the substantial side of causality is to be demonstrated in a manner consonant with the phenomenal phase of the principle. In every case of causation, instead of one phenomenal state producing another, after the manner of a mere succession, the causal operation is found to depend upon the existence and influence of something beyond the world of appearance. Here, the causal activity cannot be conceived of as though it connected the real with the real, for reality stands in need of no such activistic furtherance; but the real does need an outlet for its nature, and this is to be found in the lower order of being or in the world of appearance. Causality, in order to be something more than succession, must be conceived of as *causa efficiens*, which efficiency comes from the presence of the real in the causal. For as will become thoroughly apparent when the nature of causality is submitted to direct examination, the causal without the substantial is as helpless as the phenomenal without the causal.

The ontological hierarchy, in which the order of excellence advances from phenomenal to causal, and from causal to substantial, adjusts the causal principle to a position wherein it is half real, half phenomenal; here, we are

interested in observing how it submits to the supremacy of the substantial. Even though we admit that the substantial has need of the causal, we are not also admitting that the causal is the ultimate principle of existence. If there is to be a principle of sufficient reason, with its maxim, Whatever happens has a cause, there must have been in priority to it a law of identity, with its dictum, Whatever is, is. Yet this contrast is presented, not for the sake of arousing conflict in the ontological order, but in behalf of the causal principle, which cannot support or account for itself. In all cases of causality the criterion is the substantial one, whereby we speak of the causal connection as a necessary one, or of the cause as something real. Of itself, the causal is of value in evincing the nature of the substantial, which appeals to the mind as being real in accordance with the way in which it is effective.

The activistic view of the problem of appearance-reality tends to remove the contradiction between the causal and the substantial, as it was previously effective in bringing the substantial nearer to the phenomenal. The ontological fortunes of the causal and substantial are about the same, so that neither can participate in the supreme realm of being without admitting the presence or requiring the assistance of the other. Thus arises a double maxim, the arrangement of which in a philosophy will be determined by the degree of importance which the thinker attaches to the one or the other of the two principles. "There is no substantiality without causality"; "There is no causality without substantiality." The activistic will assert that mere being, as it is nothing without qualities, is even less secure of its ontological position in default of active functions. Hence, just as Socrates affirmed, "No flute-playing without flute-players," a modern thinker may consistently retort, "No flute-players without flute-playing, for it is the playing that makes the player, just as it is the activity that makes the substance in the august art of world-work. The very idea of thinghood as a combination of qualities involves the further idea of activity. Thus the fixed arrangement of

colour-qualities from red to violet, and the inveterate transmutation from one to another, as red to orange, yellow to green, and blue to violet, indicates the presence of something more than the class-term colour; the active relation which obtains among these qualities discloses the presence of an active principle, without which these qualities could not be conceived of as persisting in the peculiar order of colour. This activity is immediately related to the colour as such. Mere causality is insufficient, as both occasionalism and scepticism have shown; mere substance is inadequate, as we have learned from the ideals of *substantia in se* and the *Ding an sich*; hence, when the causal is related to the substantial and the substantial to the causal, both phases of being appear to have gained in content and stability.

A causal view of substance is none the less a substantial view of causality; for this reason the adoption of the activistic idea of being does not set substance at naught, but simply supplies it with a function. So efficient is substance in absorbing and applying the causal that both Herbart in his static thought and Wundt in his voluntarism assert the dependence of substance upon causality; and as Herbart had admitted the truth of the proposition, *Keine Substantialität ohne Causalität*,¹ so Wundt reaffirmed it with vigour.² The causal is not to be dismissed from dialectic, and in the case of the present view of being, which has already found a certain measure of reality in appearance, the claims of causality are unusually powerful. The only question is whether the causal can sustain itself in the primary position. In a secondary place, causality seems secure, and having secured an acknowledgment of its importance to substance, its advocates should rest satisfied. Moreover, the arrangement of things in an order which would ascend from the phenomenal to the substantial, and thence to the causal, could never satisfy our ideal of what the world should be, even where the crowning of causality as supreme might produce a favourable impression here and there.

¹ *Metaphysik*, § 220.

² *System d. Philosophie*, p. 312.

The final view of being will discuss the subordination of the causal to the substantial; here we are content to point out that that substance needs causality as a master needs a servant, as a flute-player needs flute-playing. The Eleatic Stranger was as prejudiced as Socrates, for as the latter had conceived of the activity of flute-playing as nothing in comparison with the flute-player, so the former asserted "being is simply power." Being is active, but is not a mere activity; being possesses power, but does not consist of power alone. Substance is a noun which stands in need of adjective to qualify its nature and verb to relate it to something else; but it is none the less of substantial form. The causal thus stands in need of justification before the bar of the substantial in order to retain its causal efficiency. In the world of actions there is something more than that which happens; there is also that which takes place in a real and efficient manner. The mere happening, if it can be construed in any dialectical fashion, can never be thought of as causal, so that to account for action as such we must have recourse to something within the event directing it towards its goal. From the standpoint of that which happens, the sun rises at dawn and sets at evening, and the geocentric conception of the event is as rational as the heliocentric view; but that which takes place in connection with this phenomenon has a deeper meaning, and the mere appearance of the sun in the east followed by its disappearance in the west stands in need of some more satisfactory determination. The mere action in connection with the phenomenal order is not sufficient to explain that which takes place in the celestial world as a whole with its real work as universe.

When philosophy is prepared to admit that the success of causality depends upon its subordination to the substantial, it will find itself in a position where it may observe the harmonious adjustment of one part of philosophy to another. Through the causal, substance is able to secure its proper hold upon its attributes, the thing secure its qualities. Then all three phases of being combine to pro-

duce a complete conception of reality. As a result, the nature of thinghood may be expressed as follows: a thing does not simply possess its qualities, or substance its attributes; nor does a thing consist of its qualities; a thing is the cause of its qualities, as substance is the cause of its attributes. Causality is thus the hope of both appearance and substantiality, for without it the qualities of the one cannot come under the rule of the other. As for itself, the causal relation obtains upon the basis of the relation of reality to appearance, inasmuch as the real causes the phenomenal. There are no mere appearances, nor are there any mere things; but there are things which exercise an active control over the forms of appearance that make up their qualities.

Causality explains phenomenality, but it cannot explain itself; for this reason we must look to substance for the ground of the necessary connection between things. This will involve the restatement of causality, whose transient and sceptical form is of no value apart from the immanent and intelligible interpretation due the principle. In order to make causality valid, we must raise it to the rank of reality, and in the conception of *causa immanens* this substantiation will take place. As Kant, after having duly limited the causal to the phenomenal order, postulated a noumenal freedom, so we may transcend the lower form of activity with the higher one, and advance to noumenal causality. This will account for real activity in the world rather than mere happening.

5. THE UNITY OF THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL

The activistic view of things is efficient in still another way, where it is as mediatorial with the speculative and practical as it was with the phenomenal and substantial. In this way it is of value also in determining the work of the ego in the world. Being, as an independent principle, is a hopeless metaphysical conception, so that one can be Spinozistic

only to a certain degree. In the same manner, activity, which disdains all ontological support, is of no avail in metaphysics, so that one can accomplish as little with the Fichtean deed-act as with the substance of Spinoza. Yet, in the midst of this dilemma, being and doing, thinking and acting, contemplation and conquest appear to constitute but different phases of the same world-order. In his *contemptus intellecti* Hume made the following cynical inquiry: "What particular privilege has this little agitation of the brain that we call thought that we must make it the model of the whole universe?"¹ In the same way we might inquire, What particular advantage has that little agitation of the brain that we call *will* that we should make it the model of the whole universe? Both intellectualism and voluntarism stand in need of defence, and this is best brought about when the two are considered together. The voluntarism of Scotus, as well as the ethical activism of Kant, was interested in presenting the claims of the will in contrast to those of the intellect, so that it never conceived of the community obtaining between them. But, with the activistic reconciliation of sense and understanding, there is begotten the hope that these later enemies may unite in the common cause of relating the outer world to the inner life, whether that life be peculiar in idea or in act.

Rationalism, which has learned how to respect the phenomenal, has now to school itself in the art of activity, whence its extreme notion of permanent thinghood may accommodate itself to the progressive activity of the world. Philosophy has been learning that the riddle of reality is not to be solved by direct perception, after the manner of realism, or in an idealistic fashion of pure cognition; the will must enter in and take its place between impression and idea, for without action the world will continue to elude us. Thus the reconciliation of theoretical and practical assumes the form of an activistic interpretation of the reality which has long reposed in the care of an intellectualism. Libertarianism, which has conducted the concerns of the will, has really

¹ *Dialogues Concerning Nat. Rel.*, ii.

hindered the interpretation of human action by seeking to separate volition from the outer world. In this exclusiveness, so it was assumed, lay the secret of freedom. But, as we may learn from the work of the ego in the world, the will has aided man in invading nature, as this invasion has been carried on in all art and science. Were not the will worldlike, it could not carry on such a work. The theoretical conception of things, intent upon the idea that the intellect was of universal significance, overlooked the fact that somewhat the same might be true of the will.

The interpretation of life may be conducted in a voluntaristic manner, according to which ideas assume the character of motives which are intelligible, however silent they may be. Literary artists like Stendhal and Merimée show us how necessary it is to apprehend life as it passes, for many of its most vital moods are not to be reproduced in reflection. Apparently the universe is carrying on a vast operation, the nature of which cannot be comprehended by one who is merely a contemplative spectator, but which demands the active participation and furtherance of the human will if it is to be known. Just as music may be expressed in a formal mathematical manner, while its very nature can only be known in the musical performance, so the universe, which doubtless possesses an exact and lawlike character, needs the active operation of the will for its appreciation. The real world is indeed a *natura naturans*, or active order; it is the world militant of the will as well as the world triumphant of the intellect. The absence of activism from ancient classicism and modern rationalism has created the impression that reality must ever be conceived of as at repose; but the view of the world as an order of finished thinghood is not the only one that that world affords, for the intellectual perfection of reality presupposes a primary chaos over which the intelligible has triumphed. Among activists, Turgénieff has been eminent as an opponent of the purely self-contained thought-life of the human Hamlet, just as he has insisted that the problems of life cannot be solved unless the soul be actively equipped for the purpose

of contributing to the actual welfare of the world. Among the Germans, with their belief in the power of reason to solve the problems of life, stands Eucken with his contention that the intellect stands in need of the activity of the spirit in its totality.

Where the world is a purely theoretical one, whether in the perceptible order of science or the imperceptible one of philosophy, there is no opportunity for the ego to perform his work, even where it may seem to possess a place in the universe. The world of activity, however, has less of the perfect and finished about it, so that the self receives more meaning. The world is not exactly Plato's "That which always is becoming and never has any being, or that which always is and has no becoming";¹ it seems rather to consist of an activity which becomes real by virtue of its persistent energy. The "becoming" is to be conceived of, not as upon the lowest plane of being, where the phenomenal is found, but as occupying an intermediate position, where it fills the important office of turning the lower phenomenon into the higher noumenon.

From such a point of view, the practical, which is not without its theoretical suggestiveness as to the intelligibility of things, involves us in the question of human work. To solve this problem, and thus assure ourselves that the ego has a function to perform, we stand in need of an activistic conception of reality. From time to time man seems to be at the point of repudiating his work as something which lacks enchantment and conclusiveness; our own age has expressed this sense of vanity in geniuses like Tolstoi, Huysmans, and Villiers de L'Isle Adam. Ethics has long been probing the will in order to learn whether its ideality is sound, so that the self may exhibit noble aims and proceed with dignified motives; but is it not equally important to inquire whether the ontological character of the will is such as to justify the ego in assuming responsibility for work in the world? In its work the ego has constantly struggled for the sake of discovering the possible meaning of life, so that it has risen

¹ *Timæus*, tr. Jowett, l. 27.

above the activity of the will, which was employed as a means only.

In our own age, when life seems to have been torn from the self, the question of theory and practice assumes a critical character. Man must be on his guard against his will, which in its blindness may lead him astray. To modern eyes no work seems real or valuable unless it arises instinctively, and proceeds to some immediate goal. As a result, all inwardness means mysticism, all culture looks fatal. Nevertheless, life has not wholly passed into the hands of the realists, so that the conduct of the understanding in its purity and disinterestedness may not lead to an In-vain. One reason for expressing such an intellectualistic conviction is found in activism itself, for with the first conscious statement which this theory has ever received comes the thought that activity, instead of being confined to the occasional act of the will in its pursuit of that which life demands, consists rather of a total deed, the ultimate nature of which is internal and intelligible. The floods of activism have thus encroached upon the shores of realism, sweeping away the old landmarks.

The naturalistic and industrial environment of the ego, which has long been a hindrance to selfhood and culture, is no longer able to contain that activity which produced it, so that activity is redeeming itself, and no longer can the scaffolding screen the building. With regard to the ego, it may now be seen that the power which at times leads the self to repudiate its work, as though it were of no consequence in the world, may content itself with the rejection of the half-work which the economic ego has been carrying on. The ego comes into being by contention, by asserting itself in contrast to the world of facts and forces; revolt and repudiation, which are the companions of intellectual doubt and negation, have brought us to the place where we refuse to accept the ideals of the age as eternal verities.

II

ACTIVITY AND TIME

THE interpolation of the activistic as a mean between the extremes of appearance and reality has rendered more than one metaphysical problem less paradoxical. This will become apparent in the discussion of Change; this will be the case with the problem of Causality; at present we are interested in observing how the activistic view of things will adjust itself to the question of Time. The position in which we now place time is not the usual one, for it habitually takes its stand by the side of space, the pair dividing between them the responsibilities of the phenomenal order. In this order space certainly belongs, but with time the situation is otherwise. The exigencies of the case demand that we discuss time in a different manner, as also upon a higher plane of being. The very nature of time is such as to distinguish it from space, while its ontological character is such as to relate it to change, causality, and volition. But while we raise time above the rank of appearance, we are not permitted so to indulge our temporalistic feelings to the extreme of allowing us to conclude that the temporal is the real, or that temporal view of things is conclusive. Time has about it a half-reality, it possesses states which are phenomenal, it manifests movements which are activistic, but it cannot be said to participate in the ultimate and substantial form of things. At last the temporalist must relinquish his hold upon being, and allow it to assume its authentic character as something transtemporal.

I. TIME AND SPACE

It is only in a general way that time may be analysed in accordance with the methods so satisfactory with space;

these are cited for the purpose of contrast, rather than with the hope of projecting any possible parallel. Among the various differences between space and time, none is more striking than the fact that, where space has no ontological counterpart to which it may look as to its superior, time reveals an affinity with eternity, so that indeed it is sometimes difficult to convince ourselves that the temporalistic may not perhaps assume the place of the eternalistic view of things, so close is the association, so great is the rivalry between them. With the spatial this is not so, and it is inconceivable the ultimate form of things should be extended, even where one might possibly show that it could be temporal. Hence, we hear nothing of a "spatialist," while the temporalist we have ever with us; nor are we in danger of setting up as our theory of the world such a geocentric notion of things a possible "spatialism" would demand.

In the contrast between time and space there is a sense in which the spatial may be reduced to the temporal, because the mental movement necessary for the representation of the three dimensions of space depends upon the temporal activity of the perceiving mind, which seems thus to elaborate the spatial upon a temporal basis. This is apparently due to the fact that, unlike space, which expresses the form of the outer world alone, time stands for something which happens within the mind as well as the occurrence in the world. The stream of consciousness is measured temporally, as it is not dependent upon anything spatial, for every mental event occurs as an event which, free from the domination of the spatial, is dependent upon the temporal character of being. Where space has three dimensions, time has only one, if indeed its characteristic form may be called a dimension. This characteristic is direction; it presides over the inner and outer worlds, which are subject to the principle of forward movement. The influence of the temporal over the inner mind is something which will need to be investigated in a manner more complete than the particular question of time will here allow; but when our dialectic considers

the problem of the ultimate nature of the mind, whether causal and voluntary or substantial and intellectual, it will stand in need of the truth we are now expressing, namely, that the mind itself, independent of space, is necessarily temporal. The degree to which the temporal may be allowed to tyrannise over the mind, however, is not to be determined here.

The ontological superiority of time, as well as its double aspect of inner and outer, did not escape the notice of Kant, although in the *Transcendental Æsthetic* he puts the two upon the same level, and seeks to establish their ideality by means of the same arguments. It is in the *Schematism* of the categories, where Kant endeavoured to relate the transcendently deduced categories more perfectly to experience, that he raises time to something like its proper position. But in doing this Kant goes so far as to make time lose its marks of direction and real happening and assume the purely mathematical form of relation, according to which the mind may pass to and fro, in one direction as well as another, thus enjoying an independence it is not supposed to possess. Having raised time above the purely phenomenal, Kant could find no place for it except in the real world, where it was forced to assume the non-temporal form of succession without activity. Moreover, Kant was so anxious to demonstrate causality, whose reality he had doubted, that he compromises with himself, and thus relegates the causal to the phenomenal order. The causal and the temporal are not brought together in such a way as to make possible the thought that time may become efficient and produce results. Kant had no world of activity in his dialectic, and while his philosophy of freedom was such as to further the idea of world-work, it ever laboured under the impression that the world was either phenomenal or noumenal. In the *Antinomies*, where Kant attempts a third treatment of time, it is concluded that, instead of a disjunction according to which the world is limited or unlimited in its temporal, as also in its spatial character, there is possible a third view of the question, although this knowledge of the third order is

something which the *Critique* does not afford. The intermediate form of being which accommodates time is none other than the world of activity. In Schopenhauer, who accepted without question the Kantian dictum of the ideality of time, there was room for the activistic view, which would have enjoyed fine treatment in connection with the activism of the will to live, especially at the point where Schopenhauer considered the various grades of being in nature as so many forms of the will in its objectification.¹ Both of these thinkers, who are so important to the voluntarist, reveal an inconsistency in their treatment of the temporal problem.

The nature of time is ambiguous ; the passage to and fro between the temporal and the eternal involves us in an amphiboly. In order to obviate these difficulties, our dialectic has equipped itself with a triple order of reality, in which the position of activity is strategic ; hence we hope to consider the problem of time without serious dialectical disaster. Philosophy is verily in search of the world's ground, not its origin, which, could it be discovered, would have only a limited bearing upon the question of the essential nature of things. For this reason it would seem as though one need not puzzle over the question, Whence came reality ? Among moderns, Lotze has been particularly anxious to show how impossible it is to account for the origin of being, and the mock encounter with this spectre and the verbal victory over it are among the most emphasized things of his ontology.² Inasmuch as Lotze does not assume the reality of time, but follows Kant in idealising it, there was no special reason why he should ponder so seriously over a genetic problem, especially when he had no intention of considering the question of the origin of things. The origin of being cannot be found in time, because time is itself the product of being ; we are not justified in subsuming the whole of being under one of its parts, the genus under the species ; the most that the temporalist can hope to show is that the temporal species is one with the

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, §§ 24-7.

² *Metaphysics*, tr. Bosanquet, § 5.

ontological genus, and this is something which remains to be proved. The supremacy of being cannot be set aside in deference to the claims of one or another particular variety which being itself assumes, and what special authority has time that we should elevate it to the position of supreme reality?

2. TIME AS INTUITION

In spite of the presumption in favour of the eternity of being, the temporal reveals a tendency to invade the otherwise inviolable realm of reality, where it turns the static into the dynamic, the passive into the active. To meet this question, we must analyse the nature of time as such. The logic of space was such as to permit a decisive either-or, according to which both the rational and empirical methods were shown to have no part in the formation of the space-idea; indeed the nature of space was such as to reduce these standard forms of speculation to a neither-nor. In the spatial order there is nothing supra-spatial from which space could be derived deductively, as species from genus; nor is there anything infra-spatial whence it could be elaborated in an inductive manner. With time, however, the case is otherwise; there is possible a synthesis of time in general from the various events that occur in separate moments, for where space was found to be one, time appears to be many. It is true that this synthesis from the usual mental product of either perception or conception, where different things are grouped under one head, as the dissimilar qualities involved in the perceptual fusion of a simple object like an apple, or the various individual things under the one head, as in the concept animal. In the case of the general idea of time, the method of procedure assumes a somewhat different form, and it is not so easy to show that general time is formed from particular times; nevertheless, the passage from the particular to the general is not forbidden to the temporal idea in the way that it was closed to space, which is a whole without the distinction of particular and general.

In a corresponding manner the understanding seems ready to effect the descent from the universal to the particular, while in the problem of space nothing of the sort was possible. This deduction of time from its superior is made possible by the relation of time to eternity.

On the empirical side, the attempt to elaborate a general notion of the temporal from the particular instances of time is suggestive rather than convincing, for it is with difficulty that the particular is separated from the general to such a degree as to afford sea-room for the concept. It is true that every particular exists in the general alone, but in other cases than the temporal one there is an independence of the particular which time is not allowed to enjoy. Red is always red as to colour; maple is maple as to tree; and thus we might say that now was now as to time. But the close connection between the now and the temporal as such makes the attempted generalisation appear inefficient. Plants differ from plants, animals from animals, but do times differ from times in any qualitative manner? We can hardly be said to experience kinds of time, even where we speak of a special or sidereal form of time. The synthetic view of the temporal idea seems to fail for the want of differentiated data, although the attempt to elaborate a temporal concept had about it some suggestion of hope.

The analytical treatment of time appears to be a trifle more plausible, a circumstance due to the fact that the deduction involved is calculated to lay its emphasis upon the general, where the synthetic method was as pronounced in favour of the particular. In this way it becomes possible to show that there is a relation existing between the temporal and the eternal, even where that relation refuses to assume a distinct logical form. The attempt to detach the temporal species from the temporal genus does not meet with the success one expects to have when he seeks to separate the particular palm or pine from the general tree, for the reason that, where the individual tree has differentia which are not possessed by the tree in general, the

particular time may hardly be said to have about it anything that is not contained in the general. Yet, when we view time as containing and effecting the events of human history, it would seem as though there were indeed a temporal quality as well as a mere temporal quantity, so that the summation of various times had about it something of the solidity usually found in the assembling of things according to the concept. The ordinary features of extension and intension, subordination and subsumption, may be wanting, but the essential notion of a synoptic grouping of the many under the one is present.

When we advance from the logical to the metaphysical view of time, we discover that in still a second way does the dialectic of the temporal problem differ from that of the spatial one. When dealing with space, we were called upon to observe that the energistic view of nature made objective space superfluous, inasmuch as reality, instead of demanding space as a place wherein it might exist, sought to occupy the whole field of being itself, and thus relieved our dialectic of the dualism which the view of a world of things in another world of space would necessitate. Added to this was the metaphysical touchstone of activity, which revealed the unreality of space in the latter's inability to exert activity. In the case of time, however, we are confronted with no such problems, for the reason that we have abandoned the traditional method which places space and time upon the same ontological footing, and have raised the temporal from the primary to the intermediate stage of being. Hence, where physical science in its activism may surrender space and still hold to its objective world, it cannot be so cavalier-like with time, which seems to hold the secret of reality.

Our ontological interests are more involved in the temporal than in the spatial, and where there is no serious objection to the subordination of space to reality, except on the part of those who are delightfully naïve, the attempt to remove time from the scene of being, by permitting eternity to absorb it, cannot pass without protest.

Real being cannot be regarded as spatial; to make reality an extended thing is to remain upon the mere surface of thought. But one might perhaps consider being as something temporal, and this is practically what is done in the systems of becoming. In itself, time presents a striking contrast to space, when it reveals its active character as movement in a particular direction. The temporal may not be altogether causal, but it has a decided touch of causality about it, whence it becomes difficult to dismiss it from a system which aspires to give causal activity all possible place. Where space is passive, time is active; and the growing tendency to make reality consist of activity forbids that we should put time upon the lowest plane of reality as appearance. Activity may not be the highest principle of being, but it is at least a mark of reality, and as negative criterion it may be urged to show that whatever aspires to be real must at least be active. Where time meets this test, space is found to fail, so that the temporal is admitted to a higher place in the scheme of things. Thus the present view of reality as something graded permits us to account for the existence of space, if only in a phenomenalist way, while it further permits us to dignify time with a higher degree of being. Now the only question is whether time, having risen from the lowest rank of reality to the intermediate position of the world of activity, can advance to the highest ontological position, where it comes abreast of being in its substantial form. Is the temporal all? Is the world a world of becoming? Having raised time from passivity to activity, may we now exalt it to the rank of permanence? This seems to be impossible; things appear in space, take place in time, but reality is something more than appearance and activity.

Where activism casts out space, because it has none of the marks of reality, it is more lenient with time, which manifests a semi-real character. Nevertheless, it can be shown that time is not indispensable to reality, which will finally reject it, as activity rejected space; time is not as short-lived as space, but while it endures throughout two

stages of dialectical development, it falls short of the demands of the third and final one. To transcend time it is not necessary to place our dialectic in a dilemma, wherein the real in being, so to say, depends upon the unreal in time, and thus force ourselves to say with Bradley, if time is a reality, the "Absolute is a delusion,"¹ nor do we need to point out the contradictions of temporal and eternal, for our object is rather to subsume time under eternity, activity under reality. Time is more real than space; time is just as real as change; but time is not possessed of the reality of eternity and substance.

3. TIME AND HISTORY

As the progress toward the world as reality goes on, the subordination of time to eternity arises as a necessary step. But this act of subsumption must not be allowed to take place without giving time a perfect hearing; indeed, unless we develop the full measure of the temporal, it will be impossible to establish the desired relation between time and eternity. The place where the two meet and the place where they part is found in the principle of *order*. Where a concept relates to its marks, as animality to respiration, reproduction, &c., where a number relates to its parts, as twice two equals four, and where one phenomenon reduces to another, as wood when burned turns to ashes, the principle is that of order, whose nature is expressed in the form of a judgment. In both the mental and the physical relation, as just expressed, it is a matter of indifference whether we pass from subject to predicate or from predicate to subject, provided the appropriate change of detail is observed, for respiration relates to animality, four to twice two, while, if ashes cannot be converted into fire, another physical change, like that of motion into electricity, permits the conversion in a very precise manner. When the temporal relation is now contrasted with the purely logical one, it appears that time involves the idea of *direction*, while

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 206.

the passage from one phase of the temporal to another, instead of representing a mere relation, includes the further thought of an *event*. These two, the inexorable direction and the real event, seem to make time what it is. The task of metaphysics consists in determining the degree to which these two are essential to the world. The universe certainly stands in need of the synthetic arrangement whereby a thing possesses its qualities, a quantity its parts, a physical phenomenon its natural relations; but does this universe make the same demand with regard to time, and does it thus insist that the logici-physical relation shall assume the garb of the temporal?

Temporal direction is unknown in the realms of logic, mathematics, or physical science, where we are confronted by a fixed judgment, equation, or formula. Eliminate the time-element, and these intellectual relations lose none of their validity, which seems to consist of something eternal. This truth appears, as we have already suggested, in the fact of conversion, whereby the judgment, the equation, or the formula is found to read in either direction, *mutatis mutandis*. Logical conversion and physical conservation seem indifferent to that which is so necessary to the temporal as the principle of direction. In the mento-mechanical world it is absurd to look for such a thing as progress, for how could the mind conceive of the subject as acquiring by growth a predicate, or the triangle gradually developing the truths that are found among the various geometrical propositions which are connected with that particular figure? Time involves a definite movement in a certain direction, while these relations seem wholly indifferent to the chronological order or natural evolution. Perhaps time has not the depth which a real principle of the world should possess, perhaps it is wanting in the ontological dignity necessary for a constructive principle of being; certain it is that the world can be a temporal world only as it submits to the temporal principle of movement in a certain direction. It is even a question whether activity itself, in connection with which we are discussing

the temporal notion, can be narrowed down to the particular direction in which the arrow of time points; for to be real signifies an independence of such limitations.

In addition to its definite direction, time requires its subject to take place in the form of an event, as these are involved in the existence of both nature and humanity, both of which have their history. From our human standpoint we are prone to think of time in terms of our planetary life, as though it were made up of sidereal days and sidereal years. Nature observes such times in the form of seasons, and her operations depend upon the planet's position with regard to the sun. In the history of humanity such events take place in accordance with the will of man, which reacts upon the forces of nature and thus elaborates an extra order of events. Taken together, both nature and humanity constitute one grand system of development, which, beginning with the great stellar systems, advancing or, as it were, narrowing down to the production of life upon such a planet as the earth, then taking a new departure in the evolution of conscious life, culminates in a system of human science, which turns upon its creator and endeavours to explain the whole temporal system. It seems impossible to conceive of such a transaction without involving time, and thus it may safely be assumed that nature and her favoured creature, man, demand time as a necessary condition of world-work. Our dialectic is thus inclined to credit the claim that the temporal is real, however limited and qualified that reality may be.

Yet the admission of time into the outer court of reality does not justify the temporalist in assuming that the passage of time is the essential thing in the work carried on by nature and man; time seems rather to be the vehicle in which the activity at work accomplishes its results, and while we may assume that the temporal is somehow necessary, we are by no means ready to consent to the thought that nothing else is required for the work in question. Time means more to the plant than to the mineral, for the plant grows where the mineral remains fixed in its form;

time means more to the man of culture than to the savage, for by means of the temporal the culture-peoples advance in a manner unknown to nature-peoples. Progress is thus something more than time-passage, and the principle of activity greater than that of time. In real being the notion of an event has none of the significance adhering to it in the temporal order, so that one may question whether in reality anything takes place in the world. Whether this be just to the temporal relation or not, it serves to show how easily the temporal may be taken for the eternal, the eternal for the temporal, so that the subordination of time to eternity is not likely to be of great difficulty.

The historical view of time has the good effect of preparing the way for the subsumption of the temporal by the eternal, while it is of advantage to time itself, in that it forbids us to do away with the significance of the temporal through which that history has worked. Although our spiritual life, as it is manifest in both science and religion, is independent of any particular event which may take place in time, and could find no value in a purely detached happening, it stands in need of historical data to substantiate its faith in the reality of its premises. A convincing experiment, a significant event raises the temporal, in which they take place, above the temporal order itself, for they relate themselves to the past as well as the present, while they make the future what otherwise it could not have been. In this way the real happening in time obliterates the common distinctions of past, present, and future. We are thus apprised that the event may not be pinned down to any period, even though it took place then; that the deed performed at a certain place in history is not without significance in an alien and remote one. If time were real in the temporalist sense, we should be unable to account for the fact that an event is of more than temporary meaning, just as we should fail to observe how certain characteristic happenings, as these make up the history of nature and humanity, form a series instead of a string of isolated events. Time thus gathers about it an extra-

temporal significance; the event becomes volatile, ideal. Every past event becomes parabolic—*alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichniss*—inasmuch as it contains, in the form of an event, that which as idea were incomplete. History thus enlarges the circle of mere happening, so that it is by no means so difficult to pass from the temporal to the eternal.

The religious view of history is of aid in transfiguring the temporal, whose eternalistic light cannot be hid under the temporal bushel. As early as Augustine the temporal came in for critical treatment, for this thinker, in considering the idea of creation, finds it expedient to remove from the temporal the obstacles presented by the distinctions of past, present, and future. Augustine thus indulges the idea of eternal generation of the heavens and the earth, rather than their temporal manufacture, and his theory of cosmogony considers creation and preservation as one and the same divine act.¹ In the same manner Erigena so divides nature as to subsume the temporal under the eternal, and the idea of succession involved in the six days of creation gives way to that of simultaneity. Kant's ostensible motive in idealising time appears in his antinomies, wherein he was unable to handle time as an objective reality. So a modern theist like Lotze finds the idea of making a world something repugnant to theism, whence he confines the idea of creation to the timeless, effortless "will to create."² By means of the distinctions implied by these theists, it seems possible to save the idea of activity without bringing with it the temporal and all its limitations, while in the same way the temporal is caught up and exalted by the way it serves the eternal. Time represents eternity in the way that appearance represents reality, and where we are devoted to the idea of being, we are none the less consecrated to the eternal, whose interests are served by the temporal. The ego is forced to apprehend the eternal through the temporal, and through time does its will accomplish its work in the world.

¹ *Civ. Dei*, xii. § 25.

² *Religionsphilosophie*, kap. v. ¹.

4. TIME AND WORLD-WORK

The temporo-eternal character of human work appears in the contrast between the real and formal philosophical sciences. Where art and religion supply the mind with the positive content of beauty and worship, logic and ethics do little more than equip it with the norms of truth and goodness; and where the first group is creative, the second is only critical. To formulate this distinction in terms of time, we may assert that the logico-ethical exists in a frigid zone where temporal change is unknown, while the æsthetico-religious, with its active work and rich fruitage, is found in a torrid region of time. There is of course some sense of evolution in the principles of knowledge and conduct, but one could not expect to find in the "history of truth" and the "history of virtue" the progressive content that confronts one in the history of humanity, wherein periods of art and cults of religion are observed in all their richness. The first pair may move; the second lives.

The positive and progressive characters of art and religion reveal the importance, as also the limitation, of the temporal principle. These forms of human culture have laboured in the galleys of time, but their efforts have not been resultless. Eternalism could never express the peculiar character of the inward affirmation which both the æsthetic and religious reveal, for the spiritual striving inherent in these forms of human culture necessitates the active employment of time. The ego, which must first find its place in the world of sense, and then assert its work in the world of activity, cannot accomplish its destined work in a moment, but requires the exigencies of time to enable it to approximate to its goal. Where a nation like the Hindus is destined to elaborate the religious ideals of pantheistic Vedanta, it cannot intuit these ideals in a moment: both must arrive at them only after spiritual effort. Hence the history of Hinduism, which is almost wholly an internal history, follows a pyramidal course of ascent where the primitive

belief in the thirty-three gods melts and mingles into a monistic conception of a supreme Deity, like Prajapati, only to become more fluid, more internal in the Vedantic notion of the true Brahman in the Self. With the Hebrews, a different national consciousness, asserting different needs, follows the same evolutionary plan, according to which the notion of God as a unity perfected itself only after a struggle against the allurements of polytheism. Where the Hindu consciousness ever eternalised, or refused to consider the temporal as of serious import, the religious consciousness of the Hebrews sought to link the periods of temporal history in such a way as to form a full cycle in which all might participate. Thus did the temporal serve the needs of the eternal in the life of a senso-spiritual creature. Perhaps our dialectic is not possessed of a method which can adapt itself to this implicit unity of time and eternity, but it must not fail to observe the way in which humanity endeavours to eternalise its inner experience.

It is because art and religion are possessed of a positive content that they demand the cumulative agency of the temporal. Art and worship are never content with abstract forms, but demand a fullness of content, which history recognises in the institutions of Brahmanism and Judaism, in the periods of classicism and romanticism. These terms do not represent class-wholes, developed empirically or rationally; they indicate human entities, without which our human history would have no meaning, if indeed it were to have existence. As Brahmanism was evolved out of the poetical elements of the Veda, so classicism arose in opposition to the barbarism of pre-Hellenic life among the Greeks, who perfected their Apollonian ideal of spiritual life only by subduing the Dionysian tendency of their blood. Time served as a gilded chariot to convey the ideal to the scene. Time was the plastic material, which these human geniuses moulded according to their ideal desires. Time with another people was not the same as it was with these superior nations; its invitations to the will were not always heeded. Not only the content but the form as well was

affected by the temporal factor in human culture; as the will elaborated the one, the intellect formulated the other, in a grand system of national history in which outer civilisation and inner culture went hand in hand. Thus it was that ideals arose in a purely temporal manner, even though later they assumed a quasi-eternal form; for as the world of events dwindles, the world of ideals grows and strengthens.

Temporal history, effected by the forces of nature and the will of man, is but a mask for the real history which is only half temporal, and the lyrical character of the "event" assumes the proportions of epic history with its constant touch of eternalism. Historical activity must be introverted if its meaning is to be comprehended. If history is confined to time, it will be impossible for our thought to explain the peculiar sense of an eternal present which seems to brood over all temporal changes, just as it will be difficult to account for the feeling that each age, indeed each ego in his age, participates in time as a whole, so that he is never separated from the rest of humanity. The peculiar unity of human history demands something more than the separate elements of time, arranged in a purely linear fashion, which forbids all unification. It is true that the ego cannot perform work in the world unless its world be somewhat temporal, for if all work is already done, and the self is introduced into a finished universe, there is little or no meaning in our striving or our working. We have still to inquire whether the ego has a work in the world, but at this point, where the question is one concerning the relation of the temporal to the volitional, we may assume that such work is a possibility.

The work of the human will demands both the temporal and the eternal in one; motion, effort, striving and the like may be possible in pure time, but world-work demands some measure of the eternal. One might seek to content himself with the "doing nothing" of Taoism, with the "worklessness" of Vedanta, or the apparent resultlessness of Lionardo's art; but the human will demands an outlet into the world of real, resultful work. Temporalism does not

seem to afford the necessary clutch for such work, so that while time appears to be the activistic requisite, time alone cannot afford the necessary means of human world-work. Time has a tendency to sink to eternity, and while we try to keep it afloat, its existence upon the surface is a limited one. Time itself is temporal; it is hedged about by the eternal. With its ambiguous nature, time has about it the half-reality of all the activities included in the intermediate view of the world.

Through humanity, which also has the semi-reality of the temporal, the extremes of time and eternity are reconciled. As change makes possible the realisation of the several states of a thing as these occur in a definite order, so time serves the same office for humanity, which can attain to the eternal only as it avails itself of the temporal means of stage upon stage, effort after effort. By means of time humanity is able to express the full content of its nature, for these could not be brought forth at once, but must appear upon occasions and after due preparation. For this reason, time, instead of threatening eternity, as Bradley feared, really furthers the ideal interests of eternity by making possible the perfect in the life of a creature itself imperfect. As the single event derives its meaning from history, so history derives its meaning from the trans-temporal, or eternal. Time is not expected to possess the same quantity as eternity, and much of the confusion the discussion of the problem has brought upon its head has been due to this narrow and abstract presentation of the question; time is supposed merely to exhibit somewhat the same quality as eternity; that is, time is expected to exert itself through history that it may realise eternal ideals, eternal values, eternal satisfactions.

The eternal quality of human activity will appear in the solution of problems, in the elaboration of ideals, in the organisation of satisfactions. While the expression of these may not be permanent, they themselves represent overcome standpoints, whence they draw themselves out of the Heraclitean flux. The new is permitted to appear, but its

inception usually calls our attention to the fact that the "new" is an adaptation of the old; it is a capital placed upon an old column. Certain motives and ideals of the human spirit have the ability to detach themselves from the passage of things temporal, whence they enjoy a modified eternalism; when they give place to other ideals and impulses of a nature equally exalted, they do not wholly disappear, but assume a subordinate place in the world of activity. Has not the ancient idea of the "good" enjoyed a trans-temporal existence? Suppose it has had to yield somewhat to the modern ideal of duty, has it really disappeared, or has it not reappeared in a more appropriate form? Has not man ever set up "value" as his ethical standard, even where his values have undergone trans-valuation? A truth may not merely exist in a timeless manner, it "comes to be" what it is; and yet this acquired reality that it enjoys cannot be taken lightly; indeed, the conservatism shows us how insufficient and unworthy truths can persist in spite of progress toward the free and worthy, as though the tendency to eternalise were overdeveloped in the human mind. By means of the temporal, and in spite of the temporal, the human ego works toward timelessness; he acts in order to exist. When thus viewed time presents none other than the general problem of dialectics, which consists in passing from appearance to activity, from activity to reality.

5. TIME AND ETERNITY

While the common philosophy of work may seem to incline the ego toward time rather than eternity, the analysis of activity reveals the human will as endeavouring to eternalise its deeds. Awakened to its position in the world, conscious of its vocation, the ego demands, not time, but eternity as the medium of its work. The insistence upon the temporal has been due to an incomplete and inconsistent conception of human deed-activity. If work is to be more than motion, more than striving, it must detach itself from the temporal, and enter into relations with the eternal. As

Pascal¹ said, "I act; animals run"; thus may human activity be distinguished from organic movement. Perhaps much of our petty activity, our petty morality has been due to the fact that we have not seen how necessary it is to work in a timeless fashion, for the "utilities" and "duties" we have pursued have been threatened by the throttling hand of time, for the reason that they were not real. In this critique of human activity as it is usually apprehended by the modern world, we are not ready to fly to the thin mysticism of the Orient for relief from the teeth of time, for the timelessness of such a system as Vedanta seems to involve as well a kind of "worklessness" which the inherent activism of the occident cannot tolerate. And yet, with the constant temporalism of our practical philosophies, the suggestion that the soul is essentially timeless is a valuable one.

The problem at hand does not consist of dismissing the temporal, and our Western dialectic has never felt that with its wings it might wave away the tempero-sensuous world-order. For us the question is, How shall we pass from the temporal to the eternal, in thought, in activity, in value? How may we transmute the temporal into the eternal, so that what is given to consciousness may become permanent and perfect? For eternity involves a quality as well as quantity, and our volitions and emotions are as deeply concerned as our impersonal ideas. From the contemplation of humanity's history, we learn that the genuine thinker, who comes abreast of his age, centres his efforts upon some issue of apparently temporal and local interest, while in the end this very act of his mind is lifted out of the time-situation and raised to the stars. When Socrates opposed the Sophists, he seemed to narrow his efforts to the extremely local in things Athenian; but the history of philosophy now realises that this neighbourhood work on the part of Socrates gave us the concept, and made logic possible. In our own age, we have witnessed the ethical activities of Ibsen, whose drama is Northern, Norwegian, and "suburban." And yet, with his anxiety

¹ *Pensées*, 70.

to cope with the local situation, *de lokale forholde*, he descends to such a depth that he strikes eternal humanity beneath the Norwegianism of the nineteenth century. Thus it seems that he who realises the possibilities of time will not fail to apprehend the meaning of eternity.

Real work, though performed under the auspices of time, is essentially timeless; that is, it detaches itself from the situation that produced it to enjoy an existence in and for itself. This condition of things, which is indeed peculiar to more than one philosophical problem, assumes a distinct form in connection with the temporalist problem. The problem of time in the human mind represents the ego seeking redemption from the world of change. As the mind transcends the percept and realises itself in the detached idea, so the will desires to act in such a way as to relieve itself of the burden imposed by sensuous incitements; it aspires to perform a deed which shall be timeless, creative. Temporal succession will not suffice to contain its activities or to explain its motives. Time is but the material of eternity, as sensation is the material for thought. Time may be realised or it may simply be allowed to pass, but there is a vast difference between the time that slips by and that which is worked to a definite end. All genuine work, while it has other effects to be noted in connection with ethical thought, eternalises time in a more or less perfect degree, for eternity is not to be understood apart from that which is free and disinterested. When, therefore, human work elaborates the ideal in its detached form, it apprehends the eternal. We have long accustomed ourselves to regarding the apprehension of the Platonic idea as equivalent to securing a hold upon the eternal, but we have not been so ready to look upon the will as enjoying the same privilege. True it is that the Kantian ethics asserted the ability of the will to devote itself to duty in such a manner as to make the duty eternal, as the subject of that duty was then considered immortal; for as the ancient thinker could account for knowledge only as he was provided with an immortal mind contemplating an

eternal idea, so the modern sage was able to justify morality only as an immortal will exerted itself upon an eternal duty. Unfortunately, the routine of the Kantian morale tended to vitiate the force of this eternalistic argument, for the reason that it looked upon ethical conduct as though it were without beauty or value, hence the will was reduced to the most attenuated form of moral striving.

But there is noumenal activity in the same sense as there is noumenal existence, and both real knowledge and real work are of timeless character. Noumenal activity is a demand which the human will may make upon the world with the same sense of security that the intellect insists upon noumenal knowledge. Without this, real activity, intro-activity is impossible; indeed, the manifest condition upon which the improvisations of the human will have been put forth is that of a free deed whose field is the permanent, rather than the passing, world of being. Much of our human melancholy is to be explained in this dialectical fashion, for the reason that the detached ego of genius is placed in a position where it wonders whether it has a work to do in the world. In this way we are able to account for the pessimism of Lionardo da Vinci, the scepticism of Hamlet, the strivings of Faust, and the self-doubt of Skule, Ibsen's "Pretender," who could not live for his own work. When the world of activity has been subjected to complete analysis, we shall be in a position to inquire whether indeed the ego has a work in the world; here it is sufficient to point out that the conditions under which that human work is performed include the present topic, the ability of the ego to transform the temporal into the eternal.

This noumenal or trans-temporal activity appears in the realm of ethical activity, wherein the idea of human work is not so vivid, because it is directed toward the general pursuit of an ideal like that of the good or duty, while the work of the ego includes the creative activity of the genius, as this appears in artistic creation. Even hedonic naturism could not perfect its theory of life upon the basis of Cyrenaic morality, which confined itself to the present-

passing pleasure, for it became apparent that there must be some sort of an ethical judgment, in the form of hedonic calculus or utilitarian law. Finally, the benefits of the naturistic view of life were expressed in the form of a value-judgment, whose temporalism was never as marked as its eternalism. With the rationalistic system of rectitude there was never any question concerning the temporal, for this theory of life grew up *sub specie æternitatis*. Hence the theory of eternalism is as valid in metaphysics only as the theory of rectitude is of value in ethics. Unfortunately, the principle of rectitude is possessed of too little content to make it acceptable in its strict, rationalistic formulation; but when it is observed that a temporal creature, like the human ego, is able to impugn time and live as though eternity had dawned upon it, the moral dignity which gathers about it tends to persuade us of its eternalism. Where our activities seem limited to the routine of common life, the will may flash forth beyond itself with supra-violet rays. All ethical ideals have something trans-temporal about them, for they refuse us the right to live in and for the moment alone, while ethical acts have an air of timelessness about them. The Taoist tolerates only that activity which has its bearing upon the nameless, timeless Tao; the Buddhist weaves all activity into the permanent texture of Nirvana; the Christian raises the pious and merciful deed until it touches the precincts of the eternal kingdom of God. It is the duty of dialectics to recognise these attempts to eternalise impressions and incentives, for the practical life of the ego is a constant demand for the eternal, and the attempt on the part of the ego to will the self and the world forbids that we should temporalise human work.

6. THE EGO AND ETERNITY

In the conflict of the self with the world of sense, which seems to forbid independent, inner consciousness, as well as in its further warfare with the world of activity, which abhors freedom as though it were a vacuum, the essential

meaning of the struggle is prefigured in the contrast between time and eternity. The ego demands permanence where the world is apparently bent on a flux which threatens to obliterate all trace of selfhood from the universe. The salvation of the self seems to lie within itself, and to persist it must never cease to affirm itself as independent ego. Temporalism tends to forbid that the self shall occupy a place, have a work, or enjoy a fate in the world, so that the whole problem of locating and establishing the ego centres itself in the present question concerning the temporal status of spiritual life. Egoism is well equipped for this conflict between the temporal and eternal in humanity, because it possesses the power to exert a timeless activity in the form of self-affirmation, whence it becomes difficult to blot it out. This eternal self-affirmation, this *Wille zum Verewigen*, as Nietzsche called it,¹ has expressed the nature of the time-problem in a manner unknown to the rationalist, and the attempt to lodge the ego in the world, where its place seems so fortuitous, has had the effect of placing the temporal problem in a new light.

That the ego has indeed exerted the effort to eternalise cannot now be doubted, since we have already involved the artistic and ethical activity of the race to fortify this particular point. Wherever impressions are turned into ideas, impulses into principles, consciousness into conduct, it is manifest that some inward influence is at work upon them, whereby they are lifted out of the temporal stream to be eternalised as ideals of truth and virtue. It is by the interweaving of time and eternity that the human ego is able to accomplish its work in the world ; with time alone there would be no result, with eternity alone there would be no work save the work of contemplation. No particular work of the will may itself enjoy eternity, for it is quite true that human ideals are not permanent, but the tendency to idealise, to eternalise, is as inexorable as the flux of time itself.

The egoistic will to eternalise cannot be concealed by the heavy drapery of time ; although our dialectic must not

¹ *Fröliche Wissenschaft*, § 370.

allow rationalism to throw dust in its eyes, and thus hide from it the thought that the ego needs the temporal in the midst of its efforts to eternalise its ideas and impulses. Vedanta proceeds at once to raise the self to the stars, by pronouncing its *Tat tvam asi*, which amounts to identifying the ego with the timeless world. In the same manner, Kant's transcendentalism idealises time, with the result of detaching the thinking self in the form of the eternal synthetic unity of apperception. But the principles of activism, as our dialectic has sought to express them, demand something more than the fleeting data of sense and the fixed form of thinghood ; they demand a temporal order which represents reality, not in the fluid form of phenomena, but as thickening in preparation for the crystallisation of substance. In this semi-real world-order of activity, causality, volition and the like, the ego's work has the effect of transforming the temporal into the eternal.

III

ACTIVITY AND CHANGE

As the activistic view of the world made room for time, whose half-real nature could not be expressed by either appearance or reality alone, so it promises to place the problem of change in an intelligible position. In the history of dialectics the question of change has occasioned dispute more often than it has provoked investigation, and philosophy has been more ready to negate than to define it. This has probably been due to the fact that neither phenomenalism nor substantialism has found it possible to adjust the concept of that which changes to the rest of the world, so that where some have insisted upon the idea, and have then disclaimed further metaphysical responsibility, others have reposed in the real, while they have impugned change as something out of the question. The activistic view, however, appears as neither friend nor foe to change, which must plead its own cause and prove its particular worth in a system which seeks to explain the form and course of the world, as well as the place and work of the ego therein. The success which has been experienced by time suggests what may happen to change, whose peculiar character tends to adapt it to the activistic order. Activity supplies the ground of change, which has usually been regarded as taking place of itself and for reasons of its own. When the ground of change has been fully determined, it will be necessary to inquire concerning the subject of change, for philosophy has spent much of its time in either affirming or denying the change-relation, when it has not taken care to determine just what it is that undergoes change.

I. CHANGE NOT PURELY PHENOMENAL

The treatment of phenomenality as the simplest form of being, which occupies the lowest ontological place and which consists of order, prepares the way for the discussion of change, for apart from the behaviour of the phenomena order depends upon the function of change. But with the relation between change and phenomenality, we are not justified in asserting that change is itself phenomenal; that is, that it is apparent rather than real; this would be unjust to the principle of change, which is supposed to be really efficient, just as it would be destructive to the qualities of thinghood, which are as fixed as thinghood itself. At the outset, then, it seems as though it would be impossible to account for change by asserting that the thing changes, or that the qualities that make up the thing undergo change; the question is too profound and far-reaching for any such simple solution. Change must be interpreted in some third way in which both phenomenal and real are allowed to keep their metaphysical forms, while they participate in the benefits of the change-relation.

Change does not simply "take place," but is something that is caused; hence, the causal, or activist, conception of things tends to make the problem of change more intelligible. After Spinoza had set up a contrast between phenomenal and real in the form of a parallel wherein the order and connection of things was the same as the order and connection of ideas, he introduced also the idea of activity by saying, "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes."¹ Causality and change seem to keep pace with each other, so that where change occurs it does so in accordance with a real reason. To account for change, where dialectic stands in need of phenomenal and real, it can no more easily dispense with the causal; change involves all three, for it is by means of change that phenomenal and real

¹ *Ethica*, Part II. prop. ix.

are related. The Eleatic school resisted all attempts to introduce appearance and change into the system of being, because for them thinghood consisted in a substance without parts or qualities; but with the appearance of the school of "reconcilers," who sought to show how the one could also be the many, as permanence might be conceived of as absorbing change, the question assumed a new form. With Empedocles, for example, all things were made up of four elements, or roots, called fire, air, earth, water, the mixing of which, according to the active principles of love and hate, was supposed to account for "origination" and activity of all things.¹ In the case of Anaxagoras this attempt to reconcile the contrary claims of Parmenides and Heraclitus expressed itself in a similar though more abstract form, as when Anaxagoras urged that the world was made up of infinite number of things, whose grouping was due to mind as the activistic principle.² By means of this intermediate school of thinkers, the fixed "being" of Parmenides and the flowing "fire" of Heraclitus were shown to be mutually dependent.

Change is not purely phenomenal, nor may it be claimed by the Heraclitean school alone; the qualitative conception of being which our dialectic has developed makes the principle of change a necessary one for the realisation of being. If it is not a "coming into being," it is something more than a shifting of the phenomenal scenes, and this half-real, half-phenomenal character of the relation is the question to be investigated. Change cannot be a transmutation from quality to quality, as a bird leaps from bough to bough without changing the status of the tree; it is a relation in which the thing itself participates, as though change were a part of its very being. To view change as a process purely phenomenal is to consider qualities as though they enjoyed such independence that they could move about without disturbing the slumbers of substance. The view of reality which has brought us thus far through the world of phenomenality

¹ *Fragments*, 33, 36, 60.

² *Ib.*, I, 6.

to the world of activity forbids this, for we have been able to elaborate a conception of thinghood only as we constructed it out of its own qualities. The quality is thus something that is ever claimed by the thing, for where the qualities are absent the thing is absent also. Nor is the quality any more able to exist apart from the thing, as though there could be redness without colour, ductility without metal, sensation without consciousness. It was in the recognition of this truth that Spinoza was led to declare that attributes could not be separated from substances, and in such a system as the present one, where the life of the thing is found in its qualities, the attempted separation of the two appears doubly impossible. If change is to take place, it must occur in the presence of both thing and quality, for the reason that the two always exist together. Indeed, the quality of a thing is as little open to change as is the thing itself.

The fact that the qualities of the thing, phenomenal though they may be, are as little susceptible to change as the thing itself, should occasion no surprise to one who conceives of the world-whole as something threefold, whereby there is provided an intermediary between the poles of appearance and reality. Between these opposites change plays back and forth in an essential manner. Change is to be observed in neither the phenomenal quality nor the real thing, but in the causal activity that operates in and among these. Having found somewhat of the real in the phenomenal, or having assured ourselves that, be what it may, the real has no existence apart from the phenomenal, we are in a position where we can appreciate the fixed character of the phenomenal, which cannot undergo change except in a qualified fashion. Tone is always tone; that is, tone is a fixed relation between the ear and the world of sound. In the same manner the tonal quality is no more mutable, for middle C ever consists of a certain number of vibrations per second, and to alter the character of this particular tone, or any other one, would be to make tone itself impossible. In the same way colour is always colour, never tone, for colour bears a

fixed relation to the eye. Likewise the colour-qualities; these are determined in a mathematical manner, according to the number of billions of vibrations per second, so that they cannot be conceived of as undergoing change. Red is ever red as blue is ever blue, and in the very nature of the case they must remain constant or colour cannot exist as such. With man, who passes through the conditions of infancy, childhood, youth, maturity, and old age, the condition of these several human states is a constant one; infancy has its fixed principles, which are applicable to Socrates, St. Paul, or Michael Angelo, so that where change takes place it does not affect the qualities of the thing. That would throw the whole world of appearance into confusion.

2. THE INTERCHANGE OF PHENOMENAL AND REAL

While it may be somewhat disconcerting to discover that change has no effect upon the phenomenal qualities, which have assumed a very rigid character indeed, it may help our thought to observe that these fluid phenomena are not upon exactly that plane of stability where we find substance. This truth we have expressed by the caption, "the interchange of phenomenal and real." In this way it should be shown how the phenomenal qualities of a thing, while exempt from pure change, are yet amenable to the authority of the real. Change does not take place upon the horizontal plane, as though one quality, like red, could move across the scene of things and take the place of another quality, like blue; in the changing relation, the interests and activities of thing that possess the qualities are involved, for the thing really is its qualities. Still less can we conceive of one thing passing over into the existence of another thing, as though tone could become colour, or iron wood. In the higher region of the real, as in the lower realm of the phenomenal, this horizontal transference of substance or of state is ontologically impossible, and he who makes change thus appear is guilty of removing his neighbour's landmarks.

But the idea of "interchange" obviates these difficulties, while it does not fail to serve the interests of both real and phenomenal. Change, when thus conceived, appears as an aid to being, not as something alien and contradictory. The idea of interchange involves undulatory movement, according to which the thing causes its several states to rise and fall, as it projects one into the realm of appearance and submerges another within itself. It is the relative "coming into being" and "passing away" referred to by Empedocles,¹ while its nature is more fully stated by Aristotle when he says, "Now that which undergoes change either from a subject into a subject, or from a subject into a non-subject, or from a non-subject into a subject."² These forms of change contain the idea of the relation here entertained; they involve the ascent into existence on the part of some one quality, and its descent into relative and temporary non-being. The order of change, when represented graphically, is vertical, inasmuch as it consists of the coming up into being and the sinking into non-being. Were the world without change, this treatment of the qualities by the thing that contains them would be impossible.

Thus conceived, change adds to the resources of reality, whose purposes are furthered by a metaphysical relation according to which a full content of qualities can be handled by a single thing. As the phenomenalistic view of reality showed us, a thing consists not of itself, but of a permutation of qualities related to one another through the nature and activity of the thing. In order that the thing may exhibit all these qualities, some of which may be mutually exclusive, some device becomes necessary; this device is change, which acts in a selective manner to perfect the reality contained within it. If an object is to have red as its particular quality, it must absorb the other colours of the spectrum and reflect the red alone. To have all the colours together would be to have none at all, for the reason that they neutralise one another. Red itself neutralises green, as yellow is opposed to blue. But by

¹ *Fragments*, 60.

² *Metaphysics*, Bk. x., ch. xi. 2.

means of change, first one, then the other, may be brought forth into the light. In the case of metal, with its qualities of malleability, ductility, fusibility, solubility, &c., it is evident that these cannot coexist contemporaneously, for to be under the hammer in a malleable form would forbid being in *aqua regia* in a soluble state. So also with human consciousness and its states; where attention goes outward in the exercise of volition, it cannot at the same time turn inward in the cognitive direction of reflection. In each instance, whether colour, metal, or consciousness, the possibility of having qualities as the constituents of thinghood depends upon the principle of change, which acts in a selective fashion to arrange the qualities as so many consistent states of the thing. There is thus a kind of threshold in reality, so that now certain qualities may rise and enjoy existence, while others remain below the *limen* waiting for the causal change to release them.

Where change is thus presented vertically, according to which arrangement a thing's states come into and, as it were, go out of being, the question is no longer one of what the thing changes into, for the virtue of change consists in this interchange of the various qualities that go to make up the existence of the thing. Where this change appears as a growth or becoming, the same principle of selection and arrangement is apparent. The plant cannot exist in the totality of its qualities, but must follow the order of seed, shoot, bud, and blossom. The man, as we have said, must be child, youth, and man, although these states ever belong to it as human being. Whether the example be taken from the organic or the inorganic world, the same principle appears; the thing, in order to have several qualities by way of content, must exercise such control over them that they may appear and realise themselves in a possible fashion, so that change, from being somewhat of an irritant in the dialectic of substance, now appears to be working in the interests of substance, whose attributes or qualities await the action of causal change to exhibit them.

3. CHANGE NOT WHOLLY REAL

Reality forbids change; this seems to be the first and most obvious attitude of ontology toward the principle of transmutation. As phenomenality seems to invite change, substantiality appears to discourage any attempt to introduce the idea into philosophy. But we have found that phenomena deem change impossible, except as that principle is modified to adapt itself to the conditions which things in the world impose, so that we are not surprised to learn that reality is equally inimical to pure change of thinghood. Both Heraclitus and Parmenides postulate something fixed; with one it is becoming, with the other being, and the eternal fire of the one is as changeless as the eternally frigid being of the other. In the same way, the *Yi King*, or *Book of Changes*, develops the notion of immutability, or the certainty of recurrent changes. Here, however, in the question of change and reality, the avenue of approach is somewhat different from that in the case of change and phenomenality. The argument against change is usually urged by the understanding, which finds it impossible to certify its principles of knowledge, unless it be granted a world of fixed things as objects of knowledge; the will, however, finds it desirable to work in a world where change is the rule, for were the world immutable the work of the will were an In-vain.

The activist order must provide a place for change, even though that place be not the highest one. To do this, the idea of change must be subject to certain restrictions, just as the phenomenalist conception of the relation made it necessary to qualify change in the form of a phenomeno-real interchange. The principles of substantialism seem to forbid that we should regard change as real, so that the negative contention against the idea is none the less a positive claim for the reality of permanence. The interest behind the substantialistic theory is the rationalistic one; when, therefore we attempt to justify change as a

dialectical notion, we must not fail to square accounts with this venerable conception of things. Where the Socratic logic, in its opposition to sophistry, had claimed that knowledge is possible only as the mind is in possession of general definitions, that of Plato had advanced to the position that only as these definitions represent realities can the knowledge be genuine.¹ Where the senses rest upon an object, we have perception but not knowledge; for this, it is necessary to assume the knowing relation as one which obtains between a reason which is as immortal as the idea which it beholds is eternal. From this point of view, a world made up of changing phenomena and changing perceptions is not the real world at all; the real world is one in which there is immutability. With the Kantian logic, which impugns these noumena, little progress is made toward the notion of change, although Kant glorifies the second law of thought, where Plato's thought is consecrated to the first—to the law of identity rather than the law of sufficient reason. Kant argues to the effect that, if there is to be knowledge, there must be a necessary connection among our ideas, so that he was as much opposed to the scepticism of Hume as Plato was opposed to the sophistry of Protagoras. In his insistence upon this necessary connection Kant was working in the interests of the law of causality,² which stood out most strikingly in the systematic representation of the synthetic principles of the understanding. This logic makes the principle of change appear more tenable, although more metaphysical reasoning is necessary to render it intelligible.

Change seems to violate the fundamental law of thought, the law of identity. Lotze, who accepts the idea of change as a part of his system of realism, has claimed that the law of identity is just as ready to assert, "Becoming is becoming," even when we have usually considered it as given up to the proposition, "Being is being"; or, Whatever is, is. But it is only upon the most formal grounds that such a contention as Lotze's may be made. Identity unites with

¹ *Timæus*, 51.

² *Kritik*, p. 232.

permanence in a Parmenidean dialectic, which looks upon thinking and being as one. All that one can really derive from the indifference of the law of identity is that it is possible to subsume other principles under it, for the law of sufficient reason is valid only as one has previously laid down the fundamental law of thought. In this manner, as we have already had occasion to observe, the principle of change can be conceived of as persisting only as it is subordinated to the principle of permanence; hence the Chinese system of change, as elaborated in the *Yi King*, and the Heraclitean theory of flux are necessarily subordinate to the principle of substance. Where the Lotzean metaphysics endeavours to place being and becoming upon the same footing by relegating both alike to the law of identity, our dialectic prefers to express the inherent truth of that logic by asserting that becoming is such as to be subsumable to being. For, in the Lotzean notion of becoming,¹ the principle of change is relegated to things rather than to qualities, while the present system is possessed of the notion that neither things nor their qualities undergo change, which plays between them, leaving their essential natures undisturbed.

In seeking to unravel the mystery of change, we are now in a position where we may appreciate the peculiar value of the second law of thought, that of sufficient reason. Where we might be disposed to fear the thought of change, as though it would unhorse our universe, the law of change, or causal law of that which happens, assures us that where changes take place they are ever under the control of a principle, so that one thing cannot turn into another, nor can one thing drive another out of its ontological position. Then the principle of sufficient reason does not attempt to constitute things, but seeks merely to justify their mutual interaction. The law is concerned, not with that which is, but with that which happens, the reason of which happening it attempts to supply. But events do something more than "happen"; they are caused, and they are caused in a reasonable way. Gold does not change into silver, but

¹ *Metaphysics*, tr. Bosanquet, § 43.

into certain states of gold, for the changes which gold undergoes are limited to the field of the substance itself. Moreover, these changes do not "occur"; they are produced. That which causes them works under the auspices of the law in question, *principium rationis sufficientis*. Without the presence of this principle, we should be unable to account for the way in which gold passes from one to another of its predicates, as fusibility, solubility and the like; for gold is not always in these conditions, but demands that where there is fusibility there shall be in operation the proper condition, as the fire; where there is solubility, there shall be *aqua regia*. Change thus limits itself to a definite field, while it further submits itself to a certain principle; in this way it delivers itself from the chaotic and contradictory.

4. THE RESTRICTION OF CHANGE BY REALITY

Reality restricts change; this is the more just way of representing the problem at hand. Since it is a fact of experience that change takes place in the world, even though that change does not affect reality itself, it is the duty of dialectic to place the principle upon a firm ontological basis. The attempt to do this appears in the foregoing proposition—reality restricts change. Change is not merely a matter of appearance which can be despatched by a little criticism, nor is it something that constitutes the essential nature of substance; being somewhere between phenomenal and real it seems to occupy a limited field, and where appearance furnishes it with the material for its operations, reality restricts these to their proper place. This restriction is in no sense a burden which change is called upon to bear; it is rather the means by which change is liberated from the restraint of reality.

In establishing the ontological status of change, dialectics is thus called upon to observe that the metaphysical mutations in question are confined to certain prescribed areas, which are determined by the nature of the thing that is to

undergo change. In particular, change takes place in and among the various qualities of the thing, and not in the thing as such. It is a change within the thing, which has qualities which are able to support the transmutation. The qualities that are to undergo the change are not called in from some alien region but exist already within the thing, and are themselves interrelated. If change should take place in the thing—that is, if the thing were to change—to what should we suppose the change would be? Does the change of colour imply that colour changes to tone? Can a thing go out of its being and then enter into the late being of another thing? If change were to necessitate such a form of transmutation, it were indeed a sad day when it was introduced into the world, and like Homer we might pray that strife might vanish from gods and men. But change, as Heraclitus noted,¹ is necessary to being, which would pass away were change to cease; but change is then to be understood in a temperate fashion, in accordance with which it is restricted to its own field, wherein it operates in a rational manner.

The kind of change that takes place in the world is limited to the species; the freedom of the genus is not granted to it. Therefore, when a colour changes it does not drift away into tone, but undergoes the transmutation from one of its colour-qualities to another. Where red changes it does not attempt to become a tone, but is satisfied with transference into another colour like orange; and as the colour-change goes on along the line of colour-qualities it never passes beyond the borders of violet, but the next change witnesses a return to the original red. Colour thus enjoys change according to the way in which it restricts change. The change in question is not merely one in appearance, nor is it wholly real; nevertheless it has some semblance of reality, as appears from the activity contained within it. Its nature is real, but local; it has about it a certain degree of the real.

To account for the condition of quality when it is not

¹ *Fragments*, 43.

on ontological exhibition, we have made use of the term "absorption." In the instance already cited we may observe the analogy which reality seems to follow when the particular quality, having been on display, resumes its place among the other dormant qualities of the thing. In the light, with its permanent possibilities of colour, an object becomes blue, not only by reflecting that colour in particular, but also by absorbing all the remaining colour-qualities. With metal, the phenomenon of fusibility is exhibited only as the other metallic qualities are absorbed or held in reserve by the substance. In the case of consciousness, the double activity of the thing is more openly revealed, when attention thrusts forward a particular quality like sensation, while it inhibits the others that would war upon this. To have all the possibilities of consciousness above the threshold at one moment would render the function of consciousness impossible, so that absorption is necessary to the life of the thing in question. If change be not a reality, it is one of the most efficient means of promoting reality in things. From this point of view, change does not appear as a favour which reality grants to its qualities, but a necessary means of which it avails itself in its attempt to become a thing. To be, in the full sense of that term, means something more than the formal *ἐστὶν εἶναι* of Parmenides, something more than the *πάντα ῥεῖ* of Heraclitus; it involves the interrelation and interactivity of the many qualities that make up the thing, which makes use of the function of change in order to effect the reality which lies dormant in phenomenal qualities.

But the authority still lies with the real, toward which the attitude of the special qualities is that of servants to master. Indeed, the manner in which a thing rules its qualities is one of that thing's criteria of reality; for to exist is to exercise controlling activity over the qualities that are supposed to make up the thing. Change, which is one remove from reality, is thus under the control of thinghood, for while existence denotes a taking place, it does not fail to indicate existence as such. In the thing are to be found two essential features of change: its limitation and its ground.

It is by means of reality that change is limited or restricted, and the substantial boundaries which the thing sets for its changing qualities are indications of the reality that the thing enjoys. But there must be something more than limitation; there must be a ground for the change. This we endeavour to supply in the same way, by invoking the thing in whose interests the qualities undergo change of position. The thing limits the change while it also justifies it, just as thought makes judgment possible by limiting the predicate to the subject, and by justifying the copula that unites them. In the relation of change to the phenomenal we have sought to justify the principle, while in the adjustment of change to reality we have been just as anxious to limit it to its proper field. By impugning the desire to be limitless and groundless, change takes its place in the world of activity.

5. CHANGE AND ACTIVITY

For the establishment of the principle of change it has been necessary to assume that, where it does not forbid change, reality finds it necessary to restrict it according to certain principles. To complete the plan of the present dialectic, it now becomes necessary to show how the principle of activity controls that of change; since change has been removed from the spheres of both appearance and activity and has been relegated to the realm of activity, it may be well to inquire whether activity is specially adapted to the treatment of the problem. Change is not only to be justified upon the plane of the phenomenal and limited by the real; it is none the less to be caused. The phenomenal supplies the content to be changed; the real sets the limits within which the change may take place; activity brings the change to pass. For, change, as we must ever bear in mind, is not something that takes place; that misconception has had much to do with the unhappy reputation for being chaotic that change has had to live down. Change is a caused change, or it is nothing. This principle may not

come out into clear light until our dialectic has fortified its notion of an independent order of activity by relating the same to the principle of causality, which is to be taken up next in order; but at this time we may assure ourselves of something negative at least, by asserting that change cannot take place by virtue of anything existent in the phenomenal or in the real world, but it can come into being only as it is caused. Instead of having about it the idea of moving to and fro in a free fashion, change suggests that its function is that of work; it exerts itself in behalf of reality.

Reality does not change, but it permits change to take place within its borders. The way in which it becomes possible for change to participate in reality is opened by the principle of active causality. This principle, which lies at the very heart of change, tends to lower substance somewhat, so that it approaches the phenomenal while it raises the phenomenal, which thus tends to approximate to the real. It is possible and just to think of reality as active; indeed the notion of substance, unsatisfactory as it is with the Parmenidean and Spinozistic dialectic, finds a remedy in an activistic view of the world, in accordance with which reality is conceived of as in operation. Whether the work of reality consists in producing something new or confines itself to the given order of being, it seems impossible to conceive of the world as something passive, for the perpetuation of that which now is appears to demand the incessant activity of the substance within it. Activity thus has the merit of reconciling the opposed claims of the extremes of reality, since it removes the haughtiness from the substantial, while it enhances the dignity of the phenomenal.

Activity, however, does more than merely reconcile the opposed poles of the world-whole; activity changes phenomena in such a systematic manner that the substantial may inhabit them with all safety to its ontological dignity. Moreover, activity assigns a function to the real, which would remain in ontological idleness did it not have phenomenal world to work upon. By means of the pliability

and possibility of the phenomenal order, substance is able not only to rule things, but to work upon them, while the same function of active change fits the phenomenal for the world-work that is to be done in and through them. Where the world is rendered dialectically static, it becomes difficult for thought to regard it as the home of true reality, and the glory of the pantheistic view of things departs the moment this view inclines to locate the Deity in some particular thing, on the ground that He is in all things. But the principle of change tends to regard the real as merely touching the particular thing, which itself is in constant, as also consistent, flux. God is in all and in none. Where change enters upon the scene of reality, it permits things to arrange themselves in due ontological order in a hierarchy of being. This seems to constitute the inherent truth of the dialectics of becoming.

As the more complete form of change, becoming is to be understood in the form of a becoming real. The metaphysics of becoming, which went forth from Heraclitus, has usually looked upon becoming as a flowing principle, whose direction was along the horizontal plane. Here the changes involved were esteemed as being of the same ontological grade, and the ostensible reason for urging such a system was the naturistic motive of accounting for the changes in the natural world. Heraclitus, who did indeed teach the philosophical world the value of strife or activity, could not make of his principle anything which might suggest progress; for, with him, activity was but as the flowing stream, in the course of which one day was like another, good and bad were the same, while the various transformations of the fleeting fire were resultless.¹ Apart from any of the interests of spiritual life, nature herself seems to demand a more efficient dialectic, for the evolution of the higher from the lower cannot be accounted for upon the basis of a theory of change in which the transmutation is carried on upon the horizontal plane alone.

Becoming cannot be understood as mere motion, but

¹ *Fragments*, 21 et seq., 57, 120.

demands the notion of ascent or growth; it is not a mere mutation, but a transmutation, wherein the movement is toward a beyond. This leads to the idea that, in becoming, there is a cumulative activity according to which the results of the previous movement are carried onward to increase and enhance the new phase of reality as it comes into being. To deal justly and sufficiently with the principle of becoming, dialectics must not fail to observe that the principle contains the hopes of human history, which advances toward a future without any reason which it itself can give. It then becomes the task of the metaphysics of change to account for the future, to tell us indeed whether there is to be any "future." It seems impossible for the past to go out of existence altogether, even when it can lay no claim to the life of the present, and in the endeavour to account for its fruits we may find ourselves in a position where we shall see something cumulative at work in the principle of becoming. Our thought still has Platonism and the philosophy of the Lyceum; still we have Doric architecture and classic sculpture. If there be no truth in becoming, it is difficult to understand just how the present may appropriate the past or prepare for the future. In the discussion of the time-problem, we were brought to a place where we found it well to postulate the thought of a common participation in a common present, and the discussion of the problem of change only deepens the conviction that becoming must be conceived of as storing up its results in being. If this truth be negated or neglected it becomes too difficult to account for the evolution of the natural order, as also for the history of humanity.

6. THE EGO AND ETERNAL RECURRENCE

As the present treatment of the world of activity approaches the place where it will be called upon to assign to the ego a work in the world, it is not out of place to inquire how the ego is likely to fare in a world where there is no essential change; that is, where the change is so super-

ficial as to lead to no real result in the domain of spiritual life. Granting that the Heraclitean flux knows neither up nor down, that beginning and end are one, and admitting the modern notion that activity involves only an endless recurrence of the same principles, what effect does such a dialectic have upon the ego and its work in the world? Man may not be the measure of all things, but the world cannot be understood unless the inner needs of the self are consulted, for the epic scene stands in need of the lyrical subject. Our problem thus consists in something more than the explanation of change as such; we must be ready to relate the self to the changing order of things.

In itself, consciousness has been found to involve both change and continuity; these forms seem as necessary to it as will and intellect. Only as consciousness persists amid its own changes, only as its nature is refreshed by these changes can there be any inner life. In this manner consciousness takes care of the changes that are worked out within its own domain; but the changes taking place in the outer world are beyond its immediate control. Nevertheless, it is the duty of the ego to insist upon a world where there is something other than perfect rest and perpetual recurrence, for in neither case can the work of the ego be performed. With Nietzsche there was a fatal inconsistency in adopting the principle of eternal recurrence, for what could be more fatal to the exaggerated claims of the superman? From two distinct standpoints Nietzsche's metaphysics of changelessness made war upon his ethics of selfhood. First, the principle of recurrence provided no place for the ego, which would immediately undergo subsumption were the dialectics of eternal recurrence to obtain. Secondly, the superman, as the creature that was to be in the future, was rendered an impossible person, for the reason that there is to be no future in the world of recurrence. When, therefore, the egoist wonders what species of man is to succeed the abject man of sympathy and duty, he is destined to be left to his wonder, for his ontology provides no place for development.

As the issues of spiritual life seem to meet in the self, so the philosophical conception of the future seems to have no other pivots. Were we willing to repose in a Chinese view of the world, wherein change is none other than this dreaded recurrence, or were we to seek consolation in the Hindu notion of transmigration, the doctrine of the eternal recurrence would work no special hardship; but we have cast in our dialectical fortunes with the self to which the doctrine of changelessness in the midst of change is most abhorrent. In Ibsen's ideal of the superior ego, or "right man" as he calls him, egoism and futurism go hand in hand, so that this thinker is in no such paradoxical position as that which besets Nietzsche. The ego, the right man, does not yet exist, but he will appear upon earth; he will come into being as "the man who wills himself." But in order that this consummation may be brought about, man must have a future; he must advance to the "Third Empire," whose inception depends upon the sincere nature of change. This "future" the ego must will, and as the dialectics of time witnesses the self striving to eternalise, so the dialectics of change can afford no better lesson than the effort on the part of the ego to rise above the recurrence peculiar to the phenomenalist order, in order that it may identify itself with the world of becoming. With the animal order something like recurrence does obtain, and with nature-peoples the passage of time may go on without witnessing any essential change within the mind; but with the cultured ego the principle of change affords a means whereby the self may secure a firmer and firmer hold upon the world of reality.

7. THE HERACLITEAN IN HUMANITY

The presence of the activistic in the world of things, however, does not exhaust the possibilities of the energy that everywhere expresses itself, so that we are called upon to observe its presence in the human mind. Undoubtedly there is in humanity that Homeric longing for peace which

Heraclitus so vigorously repudiated ;¹ none the less is there the Heraclitean faith in strife and flux. Man, who is ever aware of his own finitude, is inclined to be suspicious of the synthetic unities which from time to time are proposed for belief. It is not only the expectation that new facts of experience will be discovered, but the general principle of fixation, of completeness, of finality, seems to be alien to the strivings of the human ego. For this reason humanity has felt Heraclitus to have been a benefactor in the gift of his philosophic "fire," which consumes the difference men seek to set up as boundaries between one phase of life and another, whether upward and downward, or good and bad—*ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ταῦτόν*.² Much as we long for the rest that comes when the mind has made its generalisation, secure as we feel in our old concepts, we cannot deny that we are gratified when life makes it necessary for us to repudiate old standards.

The motive at work in this Heraclitean movement is not so much the desire to witness the destruction of ancient ideals, for the departure of these is often the cause of regret in the human heart ; it is rather the feeling that life should not be used up by culture, but should rather burst forth anew as the occasion presents itself. Spiritual life should not be allowed to stagnate, but should rise above and advance beyond itself ; hence anything that can drive the mind forward and release it from its time-honoured ideals is welcome by all those who have at heart the full interests of humanity. Where thought has undergone the petrification of sectarianism and its ideals have been used to build up a school, it is refreshing and encouraging to witness the vigorous influx of new life, even when for the time being dialectics can quite gain the ascendancy over the new impulses. Homeric peace gives way to Heraclitean strife, Apollonian calm to Dionysian madness ; nevertheless, this activistic outbreak cannot represent the outcome of things in the universe, but must be looked upon as a temporary situation. The stream of activity is not wholly

¹ *Fragments*, 43.

² *Ib.*, 57.

heedless of its banks, but is merely rejoicing in a temporary overflow, incident upon some vernal flood.

It cannot be denied that the intellectualist has not always been ready to welcome the tumult inherent in the Heraclitean, but he has felt that, when his idols had been carved out and set up, they should not be so ruthlessly cast down; humanity is conservative, its culture makes it so. At the same time, the Dionysian and Heraclitean in the self make it necessary to repudiate the ideals that in their day appeared as though truly eternal, and the recognition of the activistic and voluntaristic, as it is now being made in this system of dialectics, is urged upon us by the thought that, without the fire, the flux, and the strife of Heraclitus, life will become exhausted, while humanity will sink into somnolence. The world of sense ever demands change as the condition of phenomenality, so that a system which emphasizes one cannot ignore the other; on the other hand, the intellect, which usually adheres to the fixed and substantial, has a certain need of that invigoration which can come from the will alone, as it pours its blood into the feeble veins of the intellect. That is not to assert that the present condition of culture is one in which the intellect suffers from the anæmia of contemplation, for the actual situation is rather one in which the veins are swollen with activism and hedonism of contemporary life. Nevertheless, the voluntarism of our life to-day calls our attention to the fact that the presence of activity is both normal and desirable, and the only pity is that we of the twentieth century have not the will and the wisdom to correct the redundancy of this energism. Life is not omnipotent, nor can the will yield ultimate satisfaction; hence the final view of the world, as the place where the self is found, will strive to correct this error.

Meanwhile let it be remembered that it has been the intellect with its weakness for forms which has brought the voluntaristic and Heraclitean into notice; it has been the intellect pleading for the will rather than the will making claims for itself which has produced the Dionysian. When

Romanticism had exhausted the possibilities of beauty, it turned to the ugly and painful ; the Romanticism of Hugo gave way before the Decadence of Baudelaire, and the strivings of the spirit became a chaos. The dialectical lesson which recent culture inculcates is thus a Heraclitean one, for it consists in showing us that the human mind will exhibit itself at any cost, even the pain of producing the ugly and bad. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that Decadence, with all its affinity for the painful, the unnatural, the anti-social, was still able to uphold the ideal of form, the perfection of which accompanied the perversion of its subject-matter. Thus has the intellect shown its ability to control its own children, even when they are vicious. When, as in the case of the present dialectic, the time comes to state the nature of the mind as that which is primarily intellectualistic, it will appear that the problem will consist in subduing the will, which seems to have broken from the intellect's control.

IV

IMMANENT ACTIVITY

THE world of activity represents a metaphysical view impossible apart from causality as *actio immanens*. Instead of possessing our world as such, and then inquiring whether the causal idea be valid or not, the very possession of the world is an indication that the causal is in full operation. We do not survey it *au distance*, as something we should like to add to our world, but we realise that it lies at the very heart of that world. Having observed how the causal unites the phenomenal and the substantial, we are now placed where we must examine the inherent nature of the reconciling principle. It is a significant fact that philosophy can build up a conception of the world in which the causal idea is the centre ; but it must further be shown that the causal principle is as consistent with itself as it is in harmony with the phenomenal and substantial extremes of existence. Moreover, causality was involved in the idea of change, for without causal influence it is difficult to conceive how change could take place. In the same manner causality was inherent in time, in which condition and consequence are involved in what seem to be the innocent ideas of earlier and later.

In the attempt to reconcile the phenomenal and substantial it was discovered that causality was possessed of a double nature, hence it was able to adapt itself to the fluid character of appearance, as well as to the firmer forms of the noumenal. At this point the dual and inclusive nature of the causal must undergo investigation, in order that we may see wherein the essence of the causal is to be found. But the burdens that causality has been called

upon to bear have given it ontological strength, while they have also laid such hold upon it that it is now no longer a question of whether we possess causality as a necessary idea, but how this indispensable idea is to be understood. In general, causality must be elevated to the rank of substance, and as our dialectic has advanced from that which appears to that which takes place, so it must now proceed to that which is. In particular, the principle of causality must be so adjusted to itself that we shall be able to decide whether it is transient or immanent, phenomenal or noumenal, real or rational, volitional or intellectual.

1. CAUSALITY AS A DOCTRINE

If the ancient with his formalism has the honour of having discovered being, the dynamic spirit of the modern has evolved causality. With antiquity, causality was a fact, but not a doctrine. Aristotle used the principle in his metaphysics, but did not raise the question of its inherent nature and ultimate validity; the beginning of this inquiry traces back to Augustine, who was the first to employ *causalis* as a philosophical term.¹ In this same Augustine we find inception of voluntarism as a theological and psychological doctrine. At a later date Abelard made use of one of Aristotle's four causes, the *causa finalis*, but it was reserved for Averroës to express the tetralogy in complete form.² The distinction between *causa transiens* and *causa immanens* appeared in the second period of Scholasticism, only to receive at a later date the imprint of Spinoza.

While the modern Enlightenment often affected to discuss causality as an independent problem, it was usually devoting itself to certain other questions wherein causality was implicit but not supreme. Among the rationalists, causality was studied in connection with the psycho-physical problem, for Descartes, Geulincx, Spinoza, and Leibnitz considered it in connection with their problem of interactivity. With the empiricists, the idea of necessary connection was

¹ Eucken, *Geschichte d. philos. Terminologie*, p. 55.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 68.

only one among others which came in for examination, so that the adjustment of cause to effect was secondary to the reconciliation of sense and understanding. Locke and Hume introduced the causal into their examination of the understanding, but they were as far from the special treatment of the problem as were the rationalists in their mento-bodily speculations. While metaphysics cannot dispense with the principles developed or the methods organised by these thinkers, it can discuss causality as such, apart from psycho-physical interactivity and empirico-rational methodology. To realise what these two parties have accomplished is to see how much remains to be done in the realm of pure dialectics, for of all modern ideas, no one has submitted to such constant use or suffered from such misunderstanding as that of causality.

Causality as connection was the particular form of the problem in the Enlightenment's endeavour to relate mind to body, understanding to experience. As the problems of both dualism and empiricism were unknown to the ancients, so the question of the causal connection was alien to their dialectical methods. One might look for some suggestion of the causal among those who sought to reconcile the opposed philosophies of Parmenides and Heraclitus, but the breach between being was not wide enough to cause any wonder as to the connection between things; hence it was only when the modern brought about the diremption of being into its mental and material phases, and divided thought into contradictory forms of conduct, that the causal problem was presented. It is true that Aristotle made much of his category of relation, but the question of necessary connection with the doubt as to its validity in theory was foreign to his constructive thinking. In the Enlightenment, the two tendencies with their causal questions remained aloof from each other; so that, with the exception of Leibnitz, no thinker discussed the problems of psycho-physical interaction and empirico-rational epistemology. As a result, it was not until the question was reviewed in connection with psychology that a clear conception of causality was educed.

The causal connection was ever a subject of doubt in the mind of the Enlightenment, which developed a double scepticism. In the rationalism of Descartes, doubt was the beginning of philosophy; with Hume, in his empiricism, it was the conclusion to which all inquiry led. One thinker, moving in the realm of pure thought, effected the separation of mind and body; the sensationalism of the other set experience at variance with understanding. Both thinkers rejected causality as *causa transiens*; in their minds causal connection was a fact, but an unintelligible one. Hume, however, was more sweeping than Descartes in his negation of the causal connection, for as Descartes could find no connection between such unlike things as mind and body, Hume was unable to assign the idea of connection to such like things as two billiard-balls. In this way Hume was more consistent in theory, because the question is not one of definition in connection with which we apply the principle of identity for the purpose of distinguishing mind from body; it is rather a question of sufficient reason, according to which we seek to relate one thing to another, without discussing the private nature of the things thus involved. Among the rationalists, Geulincx was more than Descartes the trenchant sceptic, for he went so far as to establish the paradox that it is as inconceivable for one's own will within the mind to move one finger of the body without, as it is for that will to move the whole earth.

The analogy between dualistic doubt and sensational scepticism is such that, proceeding from opposed poles, they postulate an occasionalism; the occasionalist began as a sceptic, the sceptic ended as an occasionalist, who regarded causality as an event the ultimate nature of which was inscrutable. Both tend to forbid the interpretation of causality in transient fashion, for from their joint testimony it appears that the *causa transiens* has application to the phenomenal world only. In this way it was suggested that genuine causality is neither transient nor phenomenal, but immanent and noumenal. The occasionalist prepared the way for this interpretation when he made his appeal to the Deity, as the

ground of all action and interaction, while scepticism forbade any return to the realm of experience as the field of necessary connection. Kant attempted to save causality by limiting it to the phenomenal, just as he had relegated freedom to the noumenal order. But this procedure of his, of doubtful validity because of its dualism, was only another way of saying that true action takes place in the noumenal realm, in which he places the Deity and the human will. But Kant discovered that freedom could not fill the place assigned it; hence he related it to the causal by defining the work of nature and that of the will as different kinds of causality. In this way there arises a notion of noumenal causality, not unlike the *causa immanens* of Spinoza. The problem of the causal stands in need of a theory which shall unite the immanental with the intelligible, in order that immanence may be saved the blindness peculiar to transience.

2. CAUSALITY AS CONNECTION

Since the modern causal problem was primarily a question of connection it becomes necessary to examine that notion, in order that we may see whether it contains a consistent and sufficient explanation of the causal operation. In carrying on such a discussion, it will further be necessary to examine a number of causal devices which have grown up around the central idea. The causal idea is to be introduced to a world-order where activity and change and the transmutation of the phenomenal and real are the rule. The causal has, therefore, little or nothing in the way of activity to contribute to the given scene of things, where energy and temporal change are everywhere observable. Just as appearance approximates to reality, time approximates to eternity; for the inherent principle of change, instead of involving a mere shifting of scenes, consists of a development wherein the lower ascends to the higher, the less stable to the more permanent, the inferior to the superior. When it is observed that this is brought about

by the active interrelation of the phenomenal and the real, as also by the particular principles of change and time, it will be appreciated that the plan could never be complete without the presence of causality. In this sense causality is what Boethius called *causa sine qua non*. But while the causal is implied by the world of activity in its various aspects, it still deserves independent treatment, calculated to clarify as also to fortify its position in that activistic order. The point to be raised, and the one where the dualist dogmatised while the empiricist doubted, is that of connection.

At the outset we can do nothing else than regard the idea of connection with suspicion, for the reason that it assumes that our world is a disorganised one, wherein connection is to be established only with great difficulty. But this distracted world is hardly the one in which our thought has been moving, so that the question of causality looks less serious than it might were we in an ontological chaos. The phenomenal view of reality conveyed the idea that we could never have apprehended the world at all, were it not for the fact that the perceiving mind discovered in it the presence of order, whose nature was peculiar to the phenomenal and the spatial views of the world as received through experience. The theory of being thus began with the recognition of thinghood in connection with order, and the escape from the snare of thing-in-its-selfhood was made possible by this arrangement of the qualities of the thing. For this reason our dialectic is not so urgently necessitated to allay the fears of the sceptic, who has no such qualitative and activistic ideal of thinghood to guide him. Causality does not supply any alleged principle of connection, because such a principle has no place and plays no part in the world where things consist of ordered actions; intra-causal as the world of things has been found to be, causality in itself is an idea as vain and void as that of substance in itself. Where there is no scepticism concerning the necessary connection, there need be no dogmatism with regard to the solution of the causal problem, and in a world-order where the idea of connection, or order, has already been

employed successfully, the attempt to foist it upon things is decidedly *mal à propos*.

In spite of the obvious connection of things, without which they could not exist, thought has often yielded to the temptation to introduce some causal principle *ab extra* as a kind of causal nexus. This unnecessary and unwise step was taken originally by Leibnitz, who, instead of seeking a connecting principle in cause and effect themselves, attempted to fabricate one in the form of a *vinculum substantiale*.¹ Leibnitz' own view of the world as a unified pluralistic system, and his special theory of pre-established harmony made this artifice unnecessary. At the same time, unless one conceive of the world of activities as a unity, he may be driven to invent such an hypothesis in order to account for the connection between things which he has conceived statically. But this dogmatic introduction of a causal bond as a third principle between cause and effect can hardly deliver itself from scepticism, for the reason that he who questions the connection between cause and effect could doubt also concerning the respective connections with the substantial bond between them. And if the causal can connect the nexus with the cause here and the effect there, why can it not connect the cause with the effect directly? The notion of connection, peculiar as it is to the transient form of causality, seems to defeat itself, or else to render its application unnecessary wherever it is employed. In the world conceived as activity, the need of special connection, whether by substantial bond or otherwise, is one which is not felt.

In company with the notion of causal connection, that of a causal transference of state is commonly found. By this alleged means the active condition of the cause passes over and takes the place of the passive condition of the effect. The attempt to explain causality by means of this idea may be explained in part through the graphic service which the idea of transference renders; and the thinker is thus led to assume that the moving billiard-ball can

¹ *Opera Philosophica*, p. 740.

transfer its state of motion to the other which is at rest, just as fire might impart its own condition of combustion, or water its quality of wetness. But with all the pictorial suggestiveness which the idea of transference possesses, it can have no value outside the world of the perceptible, while in connection with the states of the things which it wishes to transfer it could only bring about chaos. Transference of state is impossible both at the beginning and end of the causal act, because the state of a thing cannot be separated from the thing which possesses it. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the possible condition of the state at the metaphysical moment when it belonged neither to the old object nor to the new one, a condition of ontological independence most noteworthy. When the detached state of the cause finally sought to become the state of the effect, it is just as difficult to conceive how the thing to be affected could appropriate and absorb a metaphysical condition which was not itself an original condition of that thing. As the cause cannot give, the effect cannot receive ; so that it is only in a fictitious manner that we may speak of a thing as bestowing its qualities upon another. The very idea of a thing as no independent scheme of thinghood, but as an order of qualities, forbids that we should seek to wrest a quality from one thing with the idea of attaching it to another.

Where reality was surveyed in the light of thing in its selfhood, apart from all determination of quality and relation according to activity, it was imagined that the perceptible quality was so loosely attached to the thing that it could be completely detached and then be transferred to another thing without losing its ontological equanimity. But, with the qualitative determination of thinghood, a thing could justly protest against the attempt to appropriate its states for the sake of enriching the content of another thing. Fire as fire must burn, light as light shine, sensation be felt. How, then, could the quality of fire, or light, or sensation be detached from the thing to which it belongs and attached to another to which it was foreign? In addition to this scruple against depriving

a thing of the qualities which constitute it, we should hesitate to change a thing from its wonted position beside its fellow and pass it in among qualities to which it was not related. In the case of colour, red is so related to orange as to exercise an effect over it, so that the removal of the one quality, were it conceivable upon other grounds, would cause havoc among those qualities remaining. In thinghood this interconnection among qualities is such as to forbid any suggestion of transference; colour relates to colour in contrasted or complementary fashion, states of consciousness are so bound up together that idea and impulse stand in indissoluble connection. Quality is so connected with quality, state so associated with state, that causal transference of the properties of one thing to the realm of another is an unthinkable hypothesis.

From the side of the effect, the causal gift of another's state would only be disdained by a thing which has states of its own. The causalist has been so interested in the cause that he has not observed its working upon the effect; at the same time, he has mistaken the passivity, or causal inertia of the effect for lack of quality on its part, with the result that it has not been so difficult to imagine that the cause might contribute something in the way of state to the effect. But every object undergoes effect in its own way; so that, from the cause alone, we could not anticipate the nature of the effect, which is as unique as the cause. When fire is applied to wood, it kindles it after the manner of wood; applied to coal, the ignition takes place in a different manner. In the same way the flame vaporises the water which seems to resist its efforts, while it ignites the oil, which appears to aid it in its work. The causalist has reckoned without his host, for the effect is a phase of the activity just as important as is the cause; indeed, the effect is only an implicit cause fully equipped for playing its part in the world of activity. In the causal view of things, for we may not speak of the cause as the exceptional but as the essential in the world, a certain series of qualities in its own changes in a thing accompanies a similar

alteration of qualities in another thing. The peculiar independence of cause and effect, and their loyalty to the general principle of being, will appear more strikingly when the interactivity of mind and body is investigated; for there the inner state of the soul cannot be conceived as departing to become the outer state of the body. Yet, where transference is wanting, causality may still be present.

Two causal devices seem thus to oppose themselves to the two phases of reality which we have been developing. Where reality was viewed upon the lowest plane of things as appearance, it was seen to consist of states; the theory of transient causality assumes that such states are transferable. From the intermediate position of activity, things were regarded as consisting of actions; here again the idea of transiency caused trouble, because it sought to establish a bond of energy between two things, when each was possessed of its own active function. To have things in their reality, their states must remain inviolable, just as their functions in the world of activity must not be subjected to the burden of a causal nexus. In the Kantian category of relation, the three phases of the principle, deduced as they were from the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive forms of judgment, suggest that substance, causality, and community are but different views of the same ontological subject; and while we are not ready to identify the present treatment of the causal problem with the extraordinary notions of Kant, we are in a position to assert substance with its qualities, and activities with their effects enjoy a community which would be impossible were things regarded as without quality or activity.

3. CAUSALITY AS ACTIVITY

The alleged causal connection, which was supposed to fulfil the function of a bridge over which the qualities of one thing might be transferred to another, has been seen to be unnecessary and contradictory. Reality is so active in its nature that it stands in need of no such assistance,

so that it is as an activity rather than as a bond of connection that it must be discussed. Thinghood appears to consist as much of states as of acts, and vice versa; from the view-point achieved in the progress of the present dialectics, it seems to be made up of conditions which strive to express their presence and nature in the most efficient manner possible. Things are thus in unstable equilibrium, if we may thus speak; their condition is not so much a possessing something, but an activity toward that something. Activism does not wait for the thing to be fully formed before it attempts the causal problem, but at the outset, when the first movement toward thinghood begins in the grouping of qualities, the presence of causality is noted and duly credited. The Eleatic of all times is at a loss to understand the causal, which seems to be an interloper in his static system; while the Heraclitean, his philosophic a dynamic one, fails to gather the fruit of his thought, because he does connect the idea of motion as it is given in experience with the deeper principle of an inherent causal activity within things.

Causality is friendly to the principles of movement and change, for they hold out hopes of real activity. But from this it does not follow that change and causality are the same in function, or that they occupy the same dialectical field. As the foregoing discussion of change sought to show, change is real but restricted, so that while the transmutation from one quality of the thing to another quality of the same thing is thinkable, the transformation from one thing to another is not. To assert that all things are in a flux is meaningless, while it is also destructive in the way that it removes all our ontological landmarks. At the same time, we are privileged to declare that each thing in its individuality is the scene of perpetual changes without which the different qualities of the thing could have no opportunity to contribute to the content of the object to which they belonged. Universal flux, with the departure of the quality of one thing for the realm of another, could only destroy the results of change, and defeat

the purpose of causality. But where change restricts itself to the narrower circle of the individual thing, causality sweeps a vaster field. Change relates to the qualities of the thing as such, causality to the things in their complete forms as things; change is adjectival, causality substantival. The effect of causality is not to change one thing into another, but to bring about a change of state in one thing through the change of state in the other. In this way change takes place within a thing; causality between things.

All causal activity is an interactivity; thus viewed the work of causality is vaster and more exalted than it could be were it responsible for the changes that occur within individual things. These changes being left to the minor activities of being, causality concerns itself with the major operations of the universe. In the case of molten metal, for example, the cause of this particular metallic state is to be found in the fire, but the fusibility is an affair of the metal's own; aroused by the fire, it still belongs to the metal as its own condition and not to the fire as its state. Where the metal is soluble, as gold in *aqua regia*, the solubility, while due to the action of the acid, is none the less the property of the gold. Such examples of what goes on in nature serve to show that while one thing may cause a change in another, the state of the former never becomes the state of the latter; thus there is no change from the state of the fire to the province of the metal, but the application of the fire witnesses a change from one metallic condition to another. Fire causes but does not change into fusibility; the acid causes a condition of solubility wholly the metal's own. For while one thing in its changes depends upon the activities of another thing, when these are brought to bear upon it the thing affected suffers the change in its own way.

Causality thus involves the activities of a thing, but not its qualities. The activity in question is an interactivity, whose ultimate nature is not yet in evidence. When each thing is allowed to have its own qualities and to exert its own activities, the question of interactivity will not be so

paradoxical. In the case of psycho-physical interactivity, where the causal situation is most acute, the independence of things in their respective qualities and activities prepares the way for the explanation of their interactivity. If the body with its stimuli were expected to transfer this condition to the mind in order that the latter might have its sensations, the problem would be insoluble ; but the actual situation demands that the stimulus state of the one causes the sensation state of the other. In the same way, where the corresponding activity of the mind upon the body is in question, the motive within may cause motion without, not by becoming a bodily motion, for the motive is as inherent in the mind as is the motion in the body. The vastness of the causal principle, the magisterial way in which it treats individual things with their changing states, and the constancy of its operations incline us toward the intellectualistic view of the principle as a relation, and not so much as an activity. Certainly, the endeavour to account for it in any sufficient manner makes it necessary for us to advance beyond the purely energistic conception of it to a view which involves its intelligibility. This supra-energistic view turns attention away from causality as activity to causality as ground ; that is, from *causa efficiens* to *ratio sufficiens*, without which causality were but a *factum brutum*. The failure to solve the causal problem by means of the idea of connection urges us to attempt a more intellectualistic method, according to which cause and effect are treated as ground and consequence.

4. CAUSA AND RATIO

The futility of seeking the essence of causality in anything like physical contact and mechanical connection suggests that the causal principle may be more friendly to an intellectualistic scheme of relation. In the particular case of the psycho-physical, the peculiar delicacy and aloofness of the causal principle was quite apparent, and this is a condition obtaining in all forms of causality. Disdaining

the help that was supposed to come from the application of a substantial bond, the causal principle seems more inclined to perform its functions when the connection partakes of the slender thread of rational relation. At any rate, the mental *ratio* is as efficient as the material *causa*. The largesse of the causal relation, which forbids that the influence should seek to invade the privacy of existence in such a way as to interfere with the particular qualities of an object, indicates the possibility of causality as a relation. Lotze, who has done much to clear the path to causality from the obstructive idea of connection, has been less efficient in adjusting the *causa efficiens* to the *ratio sufficiens*, so that after all the influence of his dialectic has been cast upon the side of the realistic rather than upon that of the rationalistic view.¹ But the main thing is to recognise the presence of the rational or intellectual element, even where the method of speculation that one employs cannot relate this to the notion of causal connection. An analysis of the *ratio sufficiens* may resolve that principle into such a form that its application to the causal principle at large will be less difficult.

The might of the efficient cause appears to be restricted by something, for events do not simply happen or effects take place; they are controlled by something beyond them. The causal as efficient evidently stands in need of something superior to the activities that result in certain changes in the thing affected. The efficient cause, with all its eagerness to accomplish effects in the world of activity, seems to await the arrival as a reason for the desired operation. We cannot assert that all things are in a flux, or that all activities are resultful, for experience has taught us to observe the conditions under which the effect is produced. In the case of scientific experiment, where the general operation of nature is cast into a particular channel in order that there may be certainty and accuracy, the influence of the rational conditions involved in the causal event are of great moment. Moreover, were we to assume some of the

¹ *Metaphysics*, tr. Bosanquet, § 45.

burdens of epistemology in the midst of these metaphysical difficulties, we might point out how the understanding of man, in its attempt to observe and experimentally to produce an effect from a cause, demands the principle of sufficient reason as the guide and interpreter in the confusion of the world of causes. It cannot be doubted that in some way the human mind has discovered the necessity of erecting the rational in the causal upon the foundation of the real, otherwise the distinction had not been made. Where Aristotle's four causes seem to suggest that the "formal" and "final" are equivalent to *ratio*, while the material and efficient are expressible by *causa*, the German metaphysics of Wolff made the distinction more direct when *ratio* became *Grund*, *causa Ursache*.¹ With such a distinction at hand, dialectic has a causality of double aspect; here it is reason-consequence, there cause and effect. Should it now be objected that the first pair is only preparatory, and that the real relation is so efficient that without it the mere reason for action would be void, it may be retorted that, apart from the reason or causal ground, the efficiency of the cause would be rendered null. The world is redeemed from causal chaos through the instrumentality of the *principium rationis sufficientis*.

In the case of *ratio-consequens*, we have a logical relation not unlike that of subject and predicate, while the realm within which it obtains is that of intellect. With *causa-effectus* there seems to be a connection more real, as its nature is physical rather than mental. The ground of the action is something which the intellect premises in accordance with the nature of the object, whereby we are led to believe that fire will burn, water moisten, the stone fall. The cause is something we perceive in the thing whose behaviour becomes the object of research. One principle indicates a condition which obtains eternally, while the other stands for something which comes into being at a certain time. It might further be said that the rational ground indicates necessity, where the cause stands for

¹ Eucken, *Geschichte d. philos. Terminologie*, p. 134.

actuality. Such statements seem to indicate the superiority of the rational over the real, although they are made with the recognition that without the latter the mere condition of things would be of no avail. But the chief point of interest is found in the idea of intelligibility of causality, according to which things take place according to a plan. At the same time, the principle of *causa* appears to be free from the contradictions of transient causality, as its form inclines it toward the *causa immanens*.

The weakness of causality as a principle of sufficient reason is found in its extreme formalism. Nevertheless, we need not allow this scruple to drive us back to the hylical conception of that which is and that which takes place. Existence has been found to consist of a principle of order in which the stuff-like has no place. Now, the view of causality as a real connection has about it the suggestion of this stuff-like notion, and while we are not content with the view of cause as mere ground, we are anxious to escape the toils of the hylical view. Thinghood cannot consist of content alone, nor can causality give itself up to the unintelligible. In the case of the principle of sufficient reason, we are one remove from the formalism of the principle of identity, while the connection of subject and predicate, thing and quality, cause and effect is a synthetic one, whereby some measure of content is introduced. It is true that as soon as the world is analysed it tends to assume the passive character of rationalism, but the present dialectic has not failed to take note of the activity implied by the very idea of thinghood as a series of qualities in constant motion and change. Far better than the complete disjunction of real and rational is the approximate unity made possible by the activism that supplies the material with more form, the mental with more content. Furthermore, it may be asserted that the real in causality is a relation, for the reason that reality itself, as a combination of phenomenal qualities, is a relation. The synthetic adjustment of thing to quality is a real relation of the order of the connection between cause and effect. Indeed, the idea of connection, which in its material form has

been rejected, is capable of a realistic interpretation, as the deduction of thinghood has already shown. If substance consists of relation, causality must justly be viewed as consisting of the same principle. Where the real is viewed as relation, where the rational is surveyed in its synthetic character, the breach between the two is not as wide as the analysed notions of real and rational in causality seemed to indicate.

5. CONDITION AND CONSEQUENCE

The synthetic activity of causality tends to remove the prejudice that condition and consequence should be alike in nature. We have learned to consider causality as efficient even where it is not marked by contact and connection; now we must prepare to observe the separation of reason and consequence as to their logical categories. The physical separation of cause and effect was the first step, the logical separation of reason and consequence the second. Logical likeness has long been looked upon as a necessary condition of metaphysical interaction, but the interaction has been more influential in suggesting the likeness than the latter has in accounting for the interaction. Logical similarity has thus been established *a posteriori*, and it is reasonable to assume that, had no interaction taken place, the likeness would not have been discovered. In addition to this, it may be pointed out that in some cases contrariety is just as influential as similarity in establishing causal relation, as where the mutually neutralising colours of red and green, yellow and blue are as ready to interact as the allied hues of red and yellow, green and blue. In the same way, similarity is sometimes a hindrance to interaction, for the reason that subjects of the causal relation need a certain amount of contrast to enable them to produce the effect desired. The effect of fire upon water is more significant than the effect it has upon other fire. Unlike poles attract where like poles repel.

With the contempt for conceptual reasoning which science has habitually expressed, it is difficult to understand why it has been so ready to prohibit the supposed change

into another kind that rationalism has set up as an obstacle to certain forms of causality. This *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* is a maxim applicable to change rather than to causality. Change is indeed limited, and at the same time it refuses to permit any metabasis whatsoever, so that there is no opportunity for the qualities of the thing to leave their circle of thinghood and become the states of another thing. The very term "metabasis" indicates that the subject referred to is that of change, to which it applies with far more intensity and consistency than those who use the expression may imagine. But having limited change, we have fulfilled the demands of the law against metabasis, so that we need have no fear of it here. In the larger sense it may be possible to assert that after all there is no dissimilarity in the one universe; but there is sufficient suggestion of pluralism to warrant the assumption that one thing is indeed different from another. But this comparative difference does not forbid the coexistence of unlike things; why should it be a bar to their co-operation? The range of causality is about as great as that of substantiality, so that the supposed law against interaction of dissimilars is a limitation of the work causality is expected to perform.

The demand for homogeneity is a mask for the true ground of causal action. The causal relation is not a perfectly free one, and the restrictions which it imposes constitute the principle of sufficient reason. Likeness between cause and effect is one thing, rationality of the relation between them another. This rationality of relation we are ready to admit, for we have no interest in upholding the blindness of the principle under discussion. Causality must consist of something more than the mere taking place; it must perfect the passage from cause to effect in a rational manner. Where we assert that every effect must have a cause, we are really declaring that in every case of cause and effect there must be a sufficient reason. As all science strives to render intelligible the operations observed in nature, so it is really seeking for the sufficient reason within

the causes at work. The secret of causality would seem to lie in the way in which the causal relation abides by the law of sufficient reason, and is independent of the application of the law of identity to the cause and effect as things.

The analogy which is most serviceable in the question of causality is that of the judgment rather than the concept. Owing to the principle of identity, it is difficult to account for change, which must be restricted to fulfil the law. In the same manner, the law of sufficient reason, which calls upon us to qualify the predicate and justify the copula in the judgment, makes it necessary for us to restrict causality to the proper conditions of the relation. Real connection, were it possible, and formal likeness if it were demonstrable, would never account for the causal as an activity. Both the realistic and rationalistic must be transcended, if we are to give any complete statement of causality. The principle of sufficient reason concerns the causal copula rather than the cause in the subject or the effect in the predicate, if we may thus speak. As a result, this causal principle, which controls that which takes place in action, demands that the effect shall be produced only when the conditions are proper, whence the causal occurs *comme il faut*. If these conditions are not in accord with the law of sufficient reason, perfection in likeness between cause and the desired effect, as well as direct contact, is of no avail. The series of propositions we used in illustrating the limits of change¹ are equally suggestive of the *ratio sufficiens* as the law of causality. Thus it was urged that gold does not always produce the impression of yellow, but only in the light; does not universally become fusible, needing for this quality a definite degree of heat; is not soluble in any liquid except *aqua regia*; has no value in itself, but only in the market of mankind. If in such well-known cases of causality it still be urged that there was connection between cause and effect, just as there was resemblance, we can only assert that the causal action was determined in inde-

¹ Cf. *supra*, iii. § 4.

pendence of these alleged conditions, so that to insist upon them is to commit the fallacy of *non causa pro causa*.

Philosophy may still indulge its scepticism, and thus inquire concerning the reason for the *ratio sufficiens*, however groundless such a scruple may be, but the universe seems to have more faith in the reason of things, for it produces its effects in orthodox fashion, oblivious of the chaos that its creature, man, is so ready to impute to her. Nature does not try all possible causes in order to produce an effect, but proceeds directly to the Boëthian *causa sine qua non*. In a general way we may assert that colour is due to the undulations of ether, as tone is explicable in terms of vibration; but this simple statement overlooks the fact that the undulation in its fineness and rapidity appeals to the eye rather than the ear, which is adapted to the coarser, slower causation of the aerial movement. In such a manner the principle of sufficient reason asserts itself; owing to its presence in the world, causality is prevented from working by mere force of contact between cause and effect or by virtue of the analogy between them. In the special cases of sensation just referred to, the light does not resemble or touch the eye, or the sound exhibit material contact with or metaphysical likeness to the ear; the causal principle is not to be satisfied in such simple ways, for it demands a sufficient reason for its operations.

6. CAUSALITY IMMANENT AND INTELLIGIBLE

As the path to causality has led from real connection to rational relation, we are now in a position where we can appreciate the meaning of the immanent and intelligible in causality. On the side of rationalistic ontology, the failure of *causa transiens* led to the belief in *causa immanens*; while the career of the empirical school was such as to emphasize the importance of the intelligible in causation. These two phases have much in common, even where they are not identical, so that the immanent is not far from the intelligible, nor the intelligible wholly removed from the world.

Immanence of causality involves something more than perpetual presence or invariable connection; its peculiar character in contrast to the causality of transience concerns itself with the universality and necessity which can come from the intellect alone. The advocate of immanence, whether in Scholasticism, the Enlightenment, or the nineteenth century, has usually been content to extend the causal field, or to centralise the source of activity, as if *causa immanens* were nothing but *causa transiens* writ large. But the difference between the two is qualitative, for the immanent form of causality is not to be elaborated apart from the idea of intelligibility. Through the mental as a medium the causal is able to participate in the world as a whole. Thus viewed, the *causa immanens* tends to reconcile the opposition between the causal as activity and the causal as ground; that is, between *causa* and *ratio*.

In addition to this affiliation with the intelligible, the immanent form of causality relates itself to substance, which is to be discussed independently in Book III. The principle of sufficient reason is as non-committal as that of identity; both deliver themselves from responsibility by employing the sweeping "whatever": "whatever is," "whatever happens"—these are their maxims. In this way both the substantial and the causal seem to suffer from fatal lack of content, so that Lotze, who was ever agnostic as to questions of origin, was led to assert, "How it is in general that causal action is produced is as impossible to tell as how being is made."¹ But plausible as this may be, it seems evident that the ultimate nature of being is such as to involve causality, just as the last analysis of causality reveals the presence of the substantial. In this way one may say, "no substantiality without causality"; "no causality without substantiality." Nor are the blind leading the blind, for the substantial acquires some content from the causal, in the same way that the causal receives form and intelligibility from the substantial. To exist, things must act; to act, they must also exist and be present at the action.

¹ *Outlines of Metaphysics*, tr. Ladd, § 48; cf. § 31.

The credit for the reconciliation of the causal and substantial belongs to the intellectualistic principle. Just as the substantial is perfected in the idea of the noumenal, so the causal in its complete form of *causa immanens* approximates to the same intelligible or noumenal character. The immanental is thus the noumenal, a realm which includes both substance and causality. As a result, the distinction between the two kinds of reality and the two kinds of causality may be expressed as follows: Transient action takes place in the phenomenal world; immanent action in the noumenal world. Transient action, which is rejected because it leads to so much contradiction, may yet be said to have about it a certain kind and degree of truth, or that truth and sufficiency which belong to the world of appearance. The particular action does possess the transient form, and is as true and real as the particular percept. In the case of immanent action, which includes and does not contradict the transient, we have something peculiar to the final view of being as substance and intelligibility. The *causa transiens*, so thoroughly questioned by Hume, is ever open to the charge of insufficiency; it represents the actual and perceptible, but not the universal and necessary.

The most obvious characteristic of immanental causality is the permanence which it possesses; as a relation, it knows no temporal limitations peculiar to direction and duration. As soon as one cites a case of causal action, as where fire consumes fuel, water dissolves sugar, or the magnet attracts iron, he recognises the fact that, even when these particular and transient forces are not in actual operation, the conditions upon which they depend are not absent from existence; therefore, one is able to assert that fire always burns, water always dissolves, the magnet always attracts, for the reason that the forces of which these things are capable are also qualities of the things as such. In this sense, *causa immanens* is *causa permanens*. This is the significance of the law of sufficient reason with its all-inclusive "whatever happens has a cause." In this law the

essential thing is the permanent and immanent rather than the generalisation so commonly emphasized.

When the immanent is viewed as the permanent it assumes control over the manifold of activities in the world of activity. As a result, it may be said not *omnium rerum causa immanens*, but *omnium actorum causa immanens*. The well-known dictum of Scholasticism and Spinozism stands in need of the revision which activism is able to supply. To-day the notion of the pluralistic, while it is constantly urged upon us by the detailed study of the world, does not render useless the complementary notion of unity; indeed, the conditions necessary for the establishing of this causal unity are more auspicious than they were in the days of dogmatism, when the content of human knowledge was not as infinitely varied as it is at present. They might have upheld a pluralism, whose range would not have been so great as to occasion much confusion; but with the unlimited variety and rich manifold of experience, the need of a unifying principle of causality is felt most deeply. In our detailed universe, it is hopeless to locate the causal in the specific action, which is too insignificant to express the august character of the supreme activity observed in the world of things. These individual things stand in need of some superior principle of causality, for they are of such comparative insignificance as to defeat any attempt to grant them dialectical independence. With us, the *omnes res* has a meaning which Spinoza never realised; we should be sufficiently order-loving to desire the unification of the manifold with its ever-present peril of the chaos. Were our age given to mystic reflections upon the immanent cause of all things, instead of initiating new thought processes without regard to their consistency and systematic bearing upon knowledge as a whole, we ourselves might recommend a Dionysian revelry in which the contradictory and unorganised should be uppermost; but the age needs no such furtherance of the chaotic, for it is with difficulty that it escapes the irrationalistic implicit in its activism. The immanent in causality is to be welcomed because it is

a means of rendering intelligible a world of facts and forces which thought can barely control.

The thoroughly causal view of the world is opposed, not only by those who have at heart the interests of nature, but by the friends of the human will. These latter may thus have taken offence at the suggestion that the noumenal realm, which Kant reserved for freedom, really belongs to the causal in its immanent form. But the ego, whose interests we are not willing to neglect, is not the loser when he is placed in a world where causality is immanent. A view of causality marked less by the ideas of connection and force, and more by the ideas of rationality and relation, is not at all inimical to the work and welfare of the self with its inner and ideal motives. By means of the principle of immanent causality, the ego is able to participate in the world which exists for him; its freedom is intercausal, dependent as it is upon the intelligible and permanent. The free act of the ego is itself a kind of *actio immanens*; through its employment the self enters into the spirit of the world as a whole where determinism attaches the will to some fragment of it. The intelligible in causality is also self-like; hence the hopefulness of the libertarian situation when the causal is thus understood.

V

INTERACTIVITY OF THE EGO AND THE WORLD

IN seeking to determine the work of the ego in the world, as in endeavouring to explain the ego as self-activity, nothing can be of more importance than the traditional problem of psycho-physical interaction. In order to render this problem less paradoxical, it must be observed that, in a certain way, the question is an overcome standpoint; and where dialectics has learned to be less anxious about causality and more solicitous for selfhood, the form of the discussion will be found to undergo marked changes. The present system, therefore, which exalts both activism and egoism, should find in the problem of interactivity a valuable means of relating not mind to body, but the self-asserting ego to the world of activity, where it is called upon to do its work. With the older thinker, the question was one of mere curiosity, or of narrow ethical concern for the freedom of the will. The major question of world-work did not enter in. With Geulincx, as we shall see, this was not the case, for this thinker saw in the Cartesian puzzle an abyss of spiritual life, which he was unable to fathom, although his strivings are more instructive than any formal solution to the problem could be. As a result, Geulincx must be read anew, if indeed he has been read at all, and those who would understand him must be possessed of advanced ethical notions, which are adapted to a larger view of man's moral life. To determine the place of the ego in the world, we found it necessary to relate the perceiving mind to the world of appearance;¹ here we must be ready to adjust the active

¹ Cf. Bk. I. iv.
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will to the world. Where the first inquiry brought us face to face with the monistic theory, this second one involves that of dualism. Instead of continuing to ask, How does the world affect the mind? we must raise another question, How does the will affect the world? One question involved the problem of stimulus-sensation; the other, the relation of motive-motion. Where phenomenalism, by overcoming a threatening dualism, shows how naturally the mind receives impressions from the world in which it dwells, activism must follow its example and relegate the will to the one world of activity.

1. ACTIVISM AND EGOISM

To carry out the programme of psycho-physical interactivity, more than one departure from the traditions of dualism must be made. These changes are not to be made arbitrarily, as though speculation were weary of the old question, but of necessity as involved in the activistic view of the world and the voluntaristic notion of mind. It is of no value to adopt a critical notion of thinghood and an equally critical view of causality, as we have sought to do, unless the treatment of a special problem like that of interactivity is to participate in the advantages accruing therefrom. The reality of mind, therefore, is to be viewed in no spirit of Cartesian rationalism, but is rather to be considered in accordance with its volitional content, just as the causal relation is here to show anew the advantages of the immanentist theory.

The history of Cartesianism shows that not only did the school fail to account for the obvious fact of interactivity, but it was uncritical in its general views of all ontological questions. Its dogmatism prevented it from observing the implicit phenomenalism in the body's action upon the mind; and this same spirit appeared again to confront the activistic relation of the mind to the body. The want of any activistic philosophy arose at every step of the Cartesian procedure. Descartes' fundamental error consisted in the rationalistic interpretation of the initial formula, *cogito, ergo*

sum; the attempt to conceive of selfhood as something purely intellectualistic was thus doomed to fail. At the other extreme, at the head of the voluntaristic school, Schopenhauer asserted that the essential element of mind was will, whose nature was known *a priori* by the ego.¹ Both thinkers claim to have employed introspection, but where one discovers an idea, the other observes an act. It is true that, in speaking of the modes of mind and body, Descartes does make mention of certain forms of activity—the modes of thought he calls understanding and volition; of matter, extension and motion.² Nevertheless, these touches of activism are lost to account when the modes are subsumed under the static substances, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. These Descartes could not refrain from submitting to an inexorable separation, for he declared that mind and body are totally unlike, opposite, and independent.³ In his *Meditations*, Descartes seems to have departed from the strictness of this dualism, for there he likened the function of the mind in the body to that of the pilot in the vessel,⁴ just as a final view of the problem led him to assert that the soul has a seat in the body, whence it directs the latter's movements. When this seat was identified with the pineal gland, the realism assumed a painful form, while the want of activism was accentuated.

As Occasionalism had its intellectualistic development in Malebranche, it was to witness the organisation of activism in the hands of Geulincx, who separated the will from the body in the same way that Malebranche had screened the world from the senses. For the solution of their problems both appeal to the Deity; one as to the source of knowledge, the other as to the ground of action. In the particular case of Geulincx the problems of activism and egoism receive original treatment, so that they are of extraordinary import in the attempt on the part of our dialectic in adjusting the ego to its place in the world. Geulincx, while apparently engrossed in the speculative question of interaction, is really

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, §§ 2, 23.

³ *Ib.*, i. 14.

² *Principia*, i. 32.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, vi.

interested in the practical one of the ego and its conduct in the world. Thus it will be noted that Geulincx discusses his metaphysical and moral questions under the head of "humility," which in his mind rests upon a foundation partly pagan, partly Christian; hence he says, *Partes Humilitatis sunt duae: Inspectio sui et Despectio sui*.¹ The Apollonian "Know thyself" was connected with the Cartesian "I think, therefore I am." In taking up the latter, he makes certain material changes in its logic by interpreting it in a manner at once activistic and negativistic: *Sequiter cogito, ergo sum et similiter: Non sum, ergo non cogito*.² With this negative principle before him, Geulincx lays down the major premise of his system: *Quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis*.³ Expressed more directly, and with an eye to the Cartesian maxim whence it is descended, Geulincx's motto was *Nescio, ergo non facio*.

The metaphysics of self-despection claims that, since the ego is unconscious of any influence passing from mind to body, in the way that the will is supposed to work, therefore the ego is innocent of exerting any influence upon the body. Upon this dialectical ground the ego should despise itself for its impotence: *Nihil valeo, denotat inspectionem sui, nihil volo denotat despectionem sui*.⁴ Geulincx's psychology is such that it forbids the will to act because it does not know itself; only the clear-cut *cogito* can pass as knowledge, so that the condition of the ego as will is a *nescio*. In sharp contrast to this rationalism, we may cite again the voluntarism of Schopenhauer, which would identify the ego with the *volo*. Schopenhauer affirms that, instead of occupying the superior position, the understanding rejoices in the reflected light of the will, which is known immediately to the self.⁵ It is to be regretted that the long list of those who have neglected Geulincx should have included Schopenhauer, who might have profited liberally from the anti-

¹ *Ethica*, Tr. I., cap. ii. sec. 2, § 2.

² *Ib.*, Ad. Tr. I., cap. ii. sec. 2, § 3.

³ *Ib.*, Ad. Tr. I., cap. ii. sec. 2, § 5.

⁴ *Ib.*, Ad. Tr. I., cap. ii. sec. 2, § 4.

⁵ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 18.

activism of the occasionalist ; Schopenhauer's occasionalism was based upon Malebranche, whose doctrine was in no such position to serve the interests of modern voluntarism. Like Geulincx, Schopenhauer is antagonistic to the will, but where the earlier thinker despises it for its weakness, the later one dreads its strength ; here the attack is both metaphysical and moral, there it is moral alone, although the result is the same *nihil volo* with its ideal of renunciation.

Where Cartesianism prevailed, the question of interaction was ever an unhappy one ; but there was no excuse for the perpetuation of the erroneous views of mind and body, mechanical and static as these were esteemed to be. Leibnitz was able to penetrate beneath the surface of the then current notion of corporeality, for in his "Letter on the question, whether the essence of body consists in Extension,"¹ he introduces an activistic determinant, viewing body as made up also of force. This he emphasizes when he speaks of "the reform of metaphysics and of the notion of Substance," and says, "That this property of acting resides in every substance, that always some sort of action is born of it ; and that, consequently, corporeal substance, no less than spiritual, never ceases to act ; a truth which those who place its essence in mere extension or even in impenetrability, and who have imagined that they conceived of body absolutely at rest, seem not to have sufficiently understood."² The significance of this activism grew upon Leibnitz as he came to relate the mind to the body ; but even though he thus regarded both members of the duality as activities, he was unable to dispense with the mechanical system of pre-established harmony, with its negation of all spontaneity and freedom.

Among the voluntarists, who while holding the secret of interactivity have not contributed to the solution of the problem as such, the activistic view of materiality has not been overlooked. Like Kant, Schopenhauer idealises space, so that, apart from his voluntarism, his notion of matter was free from the Cartesian conception of extension ; more-

¹ *Works*, ed. Duncan, p. 41.

² *Ib.*, p. 70.

over, he so energises matter that all the forms of the physical order, mechanical, electrical, vegetable, chemical, animal, and human, are regarded as so many phases of the will.¹ Indeed, so enthusiastic over his voluntarism was Schopenhauer that he often runs the risk of identifying the will with the body. Bergson, who believes in actions where he cannot believe in things, seems to regard matter as having had its genesis in arrested action, in the same way that a picture may be regarded as the result or the fixation of movement on the part of the artist.² To consider matter as objectified will or arrested activity is to endow it with possibilities of interactivity wholly unknown in the realm of the merely mechanical, and while the dualism is not altogether removed, its strident contrasts are ameliorated in an activism which sees in mind and body somewhat of the same energistic principle. Perhaps the older school insisted upon the dualism, because it was bent upon ridding itself of the notion of "vital force"; with activism, however, the attempt to vitalise matter otherwise mechanical in its nature is swallowed up in a system of volitioning, creating energy which knows naught of inert materiality. Now, this change in point of view cannot fail to bear upon the question of interactivity, which is losing interest for metaphysics at the moment when it is becoming intelligible. Without surrendering to voluntarism, we may observe how lucid it has made some of the dark sayings of dualism.

2. MIND AND BODY AS ACTIVITIES

Not only does the problem of interactivity depend for furtherance upon the activism of the day, but it stands in need of defence against the false view of thing in itselfhood as an ontological norm. The qualitative, attributive standard, which one discovers in the phenomenal order, is of value here where one is tempted to revise the fixed realism of Descartes and place *res* here, *res* there, the dualistic difference between

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 26.

² *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 260.

which consisted in the attributes of *cogitans* and *extensa*. The essential nature of thinghood is such as to forbid such a dualism, for the mind knows nothing of a thing when its qualities are wanting, so that it is confronted by no such problem as perplexed the Enlightenment. Hence, the present treatment of interactivity demands a critical view of thinghood as well as a critical conception of the relation between things.

From the standpoint of traditional rationalism, which could view mind and body in no other way than as fixed entities of alien ontological orders, the apparent interactivity was deemed impossible; for, where mind was an impalpable, spiritual somewhat, body was a solid substance. At the same time, the two were conceived of passively; if not as mirror-like mind and inert body, then in a manner mutually unyielding. But the activist reform in the conception of reality obviates this difficulty, for it sets aside the idea of solidity, and puts in the place of two kinds of "things" two forms and grades of activity. Mind does not simply possess thought as an attribute, but affirms the cognitive as a function. To realise itself as a thinking thing it exercises activity, whose presence is apparent in such forms of cognition as attention and judgment. Only from the external standpoint does the mind seem passive and fixed; its inner experience, however, reveals its own nature to it as a striving reality. In the same way, body does not consist of extension, nor is its physical function merely a space-filling one. It is by virtue of energy that these static effects are produced. Inwardly viewed, both mind and body are activities rather than entities, so that the problem at hand consists of an interactivity of two kinds of energy.

The critical idea of thinghood thus relieves our dialectic of the burdens that weigh down the dogmatic scheme of interaction. The world of appearance instructs us that things are given in their qualities in an order whose sway over them is due to an inherent activity which possesses them. As a result, we are now confronted with a twin series of

actualising qualities, which differ as the inner from the outer. Such a change in point of view does not do away with the necessary distinction between mind and body, but it makes the two differ in species rather than in genus; in this way the crass dualism of thought and extension is removed. With the idealisation of space, body can no longer be thought of as extension; with the activistic interpretation of the ego, mind cannot be confined to thought. Where phenomenalism and activism are ignored by the psycho-physicist, the idea of inactivity must for ever remain a paradox; but when these phases of the world are related to the problem, and it is thus appreciated that the world is an arrangement where all is interplay and interactivity, the question settles down to the position of one among many interesting and hopeful problems of metaphysics.

From the standpoints of activistic phenomenalism, therefore, it should appear that there is nothing exceptional in the present problem. If our world were made up of fleeting phenomena and fixed noumena, and were these two at war with each other, the case could not stand thus; but the world of our human thought is characterised by an order of phenomena which are thus arranged by virtue of an active principle residing within them, from which, by means of immanental causality, the transition from activity to substance follows as smoothly as the change from appearance to activity. In the intermediate world of change, time, and causality, the problem of interactivity finds its proper setting, receives the treatment due it. The particular view of mind which this presentation of interactivity will demand is the voluntaristic one, without which the scheme falls to the ground; when, therefore, the question of interactivity has been reviewed, the idea of the mind as will must be accounted for and justified. Then it should be seen that for its own sake, and not merely for the purpose of escaping the dualistic dilemma, the mind is to be understood as partaking largely of its own volitional process.

Activism serves to bring mind nearer the realm of body, but it makes possible the interrelation between the pair; this

is effected not by removing the contrast between them, which would only defeat the purpose of interactivity, but by making the contrast one of natural opposition, whereby a complementary plan of interplay becomes possible. Leibnitz sought to work out some such scheme upon the general basis of activity lying at the foundation of his system. In the *Nouveaux Essais* he attempts to remove the dualism of Descartes by the introduction of the theory of *petites perceptions*, which stand for subrational forms of mind; by arranging these in an order, Leibnitz endeavours to show how the soul gradually arrives at perceptibility in thought, as also freedom of action. Where this point of view is maintained, the disadvantages of parallelism are obviated, for it will be seen that mind and body, instead of dwelling apart and vexing one another, are in the same world of activity, the relation between them being one of convergence, for the reason that both relate to the common principle of activity. Instead of there being an identity between them, there is rather a contrariety, and their mutual behaviour is suggestive of Schelling's idea of polarity rather than of Spinoza's indiscriminate identity.

The demand for homogeneity as the condition of interactivity is justly made only when it is interpreted as a likeness of behaviour rather than of form. Thus viewed, the question would seem to concern the copula rather than the members of the mento-bodily series; but the two, the interaction and the things interacting, are best understood in an immanent fashion as phases of one and the same active order. Mind and body conceived of as themselves activities will be found ready for the causal yoke when it is laid upon them. In their activist setting the twin forms of energy will be found to express their respective natures, not simply as mind here and body there, but as idea and act. Now these manifestations of the opposed pair are not as dissimilar as might be supposed; for thought is an act, while action serves to express thought. Bergson, who places activity in the superlative degree, while we can make it but comparative, has developed a series of theses which tend to establish the

homogeneity of idea and act, as form and content of mind. "Intelligence and instinct are complementary, and tend to neutralise each other." "All intelligence is instinctive, all instinct is intelligent." "Original psychic activity participated in both at once; both are solutions of one and the same problem."¹ Yet, without making such overtures to naturism as to unite intelligence and instinct, one may see that mind and body, as idea and act, are so understood in conjunction with each other, and as members of the same system of activity. The older views of mind and body as here a mirror, there a fixed field, were disposed of in the phenomenalist question of Outer World and Inner Life; thus the way has been prepared for the intrinsically activist conception, without which interactivity is only a dialectical subterfuge.

3. THE INTERACTIVITY OF MIND AND BODY

The foregoing discussion has sought to show that mind and body, instead of being forms of reality wholly alien, as rationalism insisted, consist rather of opposed forms of activity, which find their place in the intermediate world of activity. When we come to the problem concerning the relation between these activities, we find that activism must be just as ready to revise the conception of causality as it was to reform the idea of substance. The ancient Cartesian puzzle over the impossibility of a causal connection whose reality was found in experience, as well as the Leibnitzian system of pre-established harmony, neither hinders nor helps us when it is seen that causality is native to reality in the form of immanent activity. All forms of being are causally disposed. In the particular case of the mind, the path to interactivity seems to lead through voluntarism, for where, as in the case of Lotze, one adopts a critical view of both causality and substance but does not see fit to regard the mind as will, his way will be perplexed with paradoxes. The activism in the macrocosm that is manifest in the form

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed. pp. 147-63.

of immanental activity reappears in the microcosm as the will to selfhood.

The particular of the relation of mind and body is that of interactivity. To call the relation one of "interaction" is to suggest that mind and body are by nature foreign to each other; hence the relation between them is a forced one. Dualists have appealed to either the sheer fact of interaction, or have resorted to the idea of miracle; the most natural notion of interactivity between two forms of energy has been neglected. Interactivity succeeds in establishing an intelligible causal relation between the two forms of active reality because it proceeds upon the basis of *causa immanens* instead of *causa transiens*; in so doing it avoids the difficulties that usually appear in the form of change and the supposed transference of state. Our discussion of change tried to show how this dialectical operation, instead of indicating the change of one thing into another, involved only the interchange among the several qualities of the same thing. The theory of causality was efficient likewise in removing the idea that causal action implies a transfer of quality from cause to effect. When, therefore, we seek to relate mind to body it is with the double activities that such changes as take place will occur within the respective spheres of the mental and bodily, while the causal action that effects the change will operate immanently, so that we shall not be troubled by the thought of any reality-rending transfer of qualities. Our view of thinghood as an order of qualities would make such an idea work disastrously. Hence, we are exempted from asking how a bodily state can become a mental one, for we have learned that in no case of causal action does such a transfer happen. Nor are we called upon to inquire how mind and body can be related, because our world of things is such that relation is the rule, not the exception, and the relation of one thing to another is included in its very reality as an order of qualities. In other words, we come upon the scene of psycho-physical interactivity knowing nothing about anything existing in itself and apart from its

qualities, just as we are innocent of a causality which starts out with a world of independent things. As each thing exists in its qualities, so all things exist and act in and through one another.

Metaphysics has failed to understand the mind's adaptability to interactivity is to be attributed to a rationalism which has viewed the mind passively, as though it consisted of mere cognition. But intellect and will are not separate, so that the mind with all its powers of reflection still has in it the possibility of action and interaction. Perhaps there are mental states that are so surrendered to activity as to be idea-less, just as we may have experiences which are so contemplative as to be will-less; but the usual condition of consciousness is one wherein cognition and volition are so synthesised that idea and act appear to have proceeded from the same source, and to be moving on toward the same goal. If it were not for the interplay of ideation and volition, it is difficult to see how consciousness would arise. In the instinctive state the connection between the motive and the movement is so direct that the question of interactivity does not arise. But, with the development of intelligence, occurs the separation of the will from the act to be performed, as also the multiplication of the possibilities of action. With this ramification the problem becomes an intense one, bringing with it all the paradoxes of interaction. But the separation of inner motive from outer act is only to be expected, and, as Bergson points out, it is this very distance of the idea from the act that produces consciousness.¹ All such reasoning traces back to Schopenhauer, who found the intelligible element in will as Kant had found it in sense; and what Bergson discusses as the unity of idea and act, Schopenhauer calls "knowledge of the will to live."²

When interactivity is considered in the strictly causal relation, there seems to be nothing in the way of dialectical success, inasmuch as the mind as will is sufficiently sub-

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 157.

² *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 33.

stantial to sustain causal relations with the body, while causality itself is of such a liberal nature as to make possible this relation among others. Causality is in no sense a transmutation, so that we need not wonder how the mental can be changed into the bodily or the bodily into the mental. The stimulus by means of which the outer world sets up causal relations with the inner order is not changed into sensation, nor is the motive by virtue of which the inner world emerges into the world of activity changed into motion. Each reality has its own states, which it keeps in order to maintain itself as such ; so that when Leibnitz spoke of the monads as having no windows through which anything could enter or depart, he was expressing a similar truth. This privacy of thinghood, through which a reality holds fast to its own states in the midst of causal interactivity, is of special import in the present instance, where it dispels the fear that the mental state may pass over into the physical order, or the material condition invade the mind ; both reality as a qualitative arrangement and causality as an Immanent activity make such a circumstance impossible. Causality does not open the windows or break down the doors, for its virtue as metaphysical relation consists in leaving to each thing its thinghood, and in demanding such changes as may take place wholly within the precinct of the individual reality.

As our view of causality made evident to us, the relation involves no idea of a connection, whether between like and like or like and unlike. As a dialectical principle, causality is logical rather than physical, so that the notion of a connecting bond between the causal pair is without force or significance. The idea of connection is brought in by those who start out with the isolated thing in itself, which knows nothing of its own qualities or other things that go to make up the world. Given the idea of the thing in its qualities existing and operating in the world of activity, and the need for a causal bond between things is gone. Then the way is cleared for the psychological presentation of the problem, in the light of which it is seen that, with the organism con-

stituted as it is, stimulus can hardly help producing sensation, just as in the mind as will idea produces act. The relation involved, while it is the causal principle that works so mechanically in the physical order, is a vital one which has the sanction of experience even where its orthodoxy as a dialectical doctrine may be questioned. If there were no other reason for assuming the existence of a world of activity, this single case of the interrelation of mind and body would be sufficient to warrant such an hypothesis.

4. THE WORLD OF ACTIVITY AND THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY

In close connection with the general principle of causality stands the particular physical maxim of the conservation of energy. As causality has usually devoted itself to the physical order, conservation has never been thought of as having any other possible application, whence it has been unusually difficult for metaphysics to declare the causal connection between mind and body as a thing credible. Now we are brought to the place where we may observe how the principle of conservation appears when, instead of occupying its wonted position in the world of thinghood, it is adjusted to the world of activity. Now that our world appears to be more vital than material, more volitional than static, it would seem as though the elder principle of conservation should submit to restatement. As to its doctrinal range, it may be observed that it is subservient to causality, as causality is amenable to activity, and with this quantitative limitation of the principle there should follow certain qualitative changes. The larger view of conservation was indicated over a generation ago by Lotze, but the conservative character of his system, with its lack of both vitalistic and voluntaristic, prevented him from witnessing the victory his idealism might have won. In the case of Bergson, where the activistic receives due recognition, the question of conservation seems to assume an aspect by no means serious. "The law of conservation," says he, "expresses the truth

that *something* is conserved in a constant quantity. But in reality the energies of different natures and the measure of each of them have evidently been chosen in such a way as to justify the conservation of energy."¹ Where the mind was viewed in its purely intellectualistic capacity, the dogmatic theory of conservation was indeed forbidding; but with the entrance of activism the conditions will be found to be materially altered. To appreciate the predicament of dialectics while as yet under the old law, we can do no better than review the history of the problem as it was taken up by the French.

At the beginning Descartes had insisted that the amount of motion in the universe was for ever fixed, and that there was no reason to believe that the Creator should vary the sum.² This general statement was destined to assume a more defensible form when it was declared that it was the amount of energy that was the fixed sum. To overcome the objection that mind and body could not be conceived of as interacting, it was suggested that the desired constant of energy could be conserved, and there would be no interference of the will from without, if one should regard the will as in a state of equilibrium like that of a geometrical cone so perfectly balanced that it could fall in this or that direction by the application of a force practically nothing. — Such was the hypothesis of J. J. Boussinesq.³ With all deference, therefore, to the physical dogma, it was suggested that the will might operate without altering the amount of physical energy in the universe. In a similar manner Ernest Naville suggested that the mind might operate by its very presence without the employment of power: "The occupation of a part of space which manifests itself by figure is a geometrical conception distinct from the dynamic idea of power by which the resistance of a body modifies the motion of another."⁴ Here all semblance of activity was rejected in order that the doctrine

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 263.

² *Principia*, ii. 36.

³ *Revue Scientifique*, 1877, tome 12, p. 986.

⁴ *Revue Philosophique*, 1879, tome 7, p. 280.

of conservation might suffer no harm. According to the account given of him by Delbœuf, Saint-Venant, after distinguishing between potential and kinetic energy, assumed that the force of will necessary to initiate action in the body may be looked upon as indefinitely small, whence it becomes negligible in any physical calculation.¹ Delbœuf, observing that these hypotheses confined themselves to the spatial, himself advanced the hypothesis that the will possesses power over time whereby, while it cannot create force, it can determine the moment when force shall operate, so that the will is free to choose the time of its action.² None of these hypotheses had anything to say in positive defence of the will; they were rather of an apologetic turn, and aimed to defend the law of conservation.

All of the solutions attempted by the French dialecticians of that period were upon the Cartesian plane, inasmuch as the view of mind entertained was the static *res cogitans*, in which the will finds very little place. Where activism prevails and we are in a position to view the mind as will operating in its habitat of activity, the threatened breach in the wall of conservation is discovered to be a false alarm. On the interior side of mind, we are led to protest against a view which seeks to reduce mental activity to zero, or to something infinitesimal, for the mind as will is possessed of force which cannot be set aside just to make a special doctrine look more perfect. The mind of our inner experience, instead of putting forth a feeble volition from time to time, is organised upon volitional principles, whence its interactivity becomes a part of its own active nature. Consciousness itself is a process urged on by its inherent activity, so that the will need not be appended to it as something extra. Geulincx, with his renunciatory *nihil volo*, seems to have realised how native to the soul are its volitions; hence he counsels the ego to relinquish them where the physical order of conservation seems bent upon forbidding them. To make sure, however, that the will does have the oppor-

¹ *Revue Philosophique*, tome 13, pp. 473-4.

² *Ib.*, tome 13, p. 618.

tunity to work in a realm of activity, we must assure ourselves that such a realm exists.

5. THE ONE WORLD OF ACTIVITY

The interpolation of a third and intermediary stage of being between appearance and reality aids us in preventing if not in solving more than one problem in philosophy. It is thus efficient because it furnishes us with a realm of half-reality, wherein such things as change, time, and causality may find their place. This activism furthers our metaphysics in its endeavour to relate mind to body, inasmuch as it tends to reduce both members of the opposed pair to a common denominator. But may the will be regarded as abandoning the petty principality of selfhood for the kingdom of the world? Having served intensively, may it also serve extensively? There is something about the world of activity that forbids our interpreting it in a mechanical fashion, but as yet we are not ready to invest the universe with a world-will. That would yield a voluntaristic monism of serious dialectical moment. And yet, has not Christian metaphysics long been handling some such notion? In the Augustinian conception of creation, according to which the Deity, instead of having created the world in time, eternally wills the world, there is the suggestion of this very notion of a universal will or world-will.

Philosophy has ever been ready to presume the existence of a world-intellect, for intellectualism has always been sufficiently Platonistic to contend that ideas were objective realities; but with the will the case has not stood thus. Perhaps this has been due to the fact that such a cosmic will was too much like the idea of a world soul, with all the hylical implications of the latter. Yet the notion of a world-will connotes nothing more than what is implied by the idea of *actio immanens*; with the theory of interaction carried out upon the basis of *actio transiens*, there is no place for such a constructive principle as that of a world-will; but where the energy in the universe acts inwardly, while it like-

wise enters the mind as motive and spring of action, the conditions of speculation are materially altered. As the world of appearance is made up of the unity of manifold impressions, so the world of activity is so constituted of the unified impulses as to suggest the volitional. It is will that is immanent in the world, and Schopenhauer was not far from the truth when he spoke of the human will as but the self-consciousness will to live.

Our experience with the world reveals the fact that, just as nature appeals to the mind by arousing impressions, so it is equally efficient in soliciting consciousness by means of impulses. Both sensation and impulse furnish the mind with data which it organises into its worlds of appearance and activity. In the case of the latter the path is not so smooth, partly because it is unusual, as also because it is not easy for the ego as will to believe that it has a world-work to perform. Just as at times the mind becomes sceptical, and wonders whether it can know, so there are times when it so despairs of the will as to question the will's power to do. How, then, can one postulate a world-will which co-operates with human volition and furthers the ideals of freedom?

However difficult such a view of the world may be, it is safe to assume that, if we are to have a voluntaristic philosophy, we must do more than treat the mind as will; we must proceed to voluntarise the outer world. Indeed, the fate that befalls the mind is the same as that which is in force in the world, for subjects are at one in their activities, so that to emphasize will here is to accentuate it there. Hence, for the time being, we must indulge the inherent Scotism of the mind, and while we may not care to assume the superiority of the will over the intellect, we may assure ourselves that the will is not to be set aside as a mere item in the world-whole. Libertarianism has created such an ideal of volition that one naturally hesitates to assert that the inner sense of moral choice is one with the force that goes to make up the world; but where the conception of will is not so exclusive, and where its function is creative

instead of being purely selective, there may be a possibility of transferring inward volition to outer activity. The very principle of interactivity, as we have been discussing it, seems to involve the idea of an outer response to the internal impulse of the mind as it wills. We can conceive of the intellect as springing from the intelligible in the world ; why, then, should it be more difficult to regard the will as the child of the world-will? The mechanical view of the world denied the reality of interactivity, but the behaviour of the mind is such as make the acceptance of interactivity imperative, and with this relation in operation the way is opened for the view of the world of activity as a world-will.

The intermediate position of activity has the effect of creating a moderate voluntarism. Geulincx, whose whole philosophy was centred in the principle of interactivity, reduced the will to naught where Schopenhauer made it the all ; between the *nihil volo* of the one and the will to live of the other there is a voluntaristic position fraught with less paradox than attaches to either of these extreme conclusions. Like Geulincx, we feel that the question of interactivity is of extraordinary significance ; but, unlike him, we are inclined to apply it with the aim of relating the ego to the world-will. No system has the right to limit the sphere of the will simply because voluntarism is apt to disturb the serenity of the rationalistic conception of things ; for the demand that psychology is making to-day is for a larger will, with regard to the inner world of thought and the outer world of things. Nor may experience, as it is commonly interpreted, stand in the way of a volitional universe, even though experience has long been accustomed to include under the head of the cosmic the purely mechanical. Experience, however, is to be understood as something non-committal, for its function consists in furnishing the mind with its material, whatever that material may be. When, therefore, the principle of interactivity works itself out on the assumption that mind and body are activities which co-operate in the one world of activity, we must not hesitate to pursue this thought to its conclusion that all such activity,

with its inner and outer forms, is only the indication of a world-will working in a dual capacity.

Voluntarism does not arrive at its goal of universal volition without difficulties which it itself proposes. The will which constitutes the mind is so firmly attached to the individual that the egoistic implication is more dangerous than the solipsism that pursues perception in the world of appearance. In other words, our human volitions seem to lie without the wall of universality, so that the attempt to transfer the private volition to the realm of the abstract-general baffles all conceptualism. Voluntarism has not been successful in escaping irrationalism; it has blocked its own path to the world of thinghood. Sensation, while creating the irrationalistic suspicion, was found ripe for the rationalistic fruit-gatherer; but with impulse prophecy of intellectual arrangement is not so easily fulfilled. To organise impulses as impressions have been organised is the task necessary for him who would view the will as a world-will. When this task is taken up, it appears the will, instead of being wholly alien to the intellect, is rather a rival; both are forms of the mind's reaction upon the world. The will does not seem to be able to carry on its operations apart from the intellect, and the more intelligible it becomes the freer it is. It is evident that, with all its show of independence, the will is beholden to something not itself. When we seek to distinguish among various kinds of volition, we observe that the three grades of automatic, ideo-motor, and free activity are determined, not so much upon the volitional as upon the intellectual basis, inasmuch as the higher form differs from the lower according to the amount of cognition it involves. With the automatic form, the idea is wholly submerged in the act; in the ideo-motor, the act is the end toward which the will unthinkingly applies itself; in volition as such, the act is bounded before and after by ideas. The three, therefore, are arranged intellectually as the unideational, the semi-ideational, and the intelligible. Now, by virtue of its association with the intellect, the will begins to reveal somewhat of that universality which the intellect has

long enjoyed. Not superior or prior to the intellect, the will is not so secondary and inferior that it can lay no claim to worldhood. The mind is *en rapport* with the world, because the mind has something worldlike about it; when, therefore, the will reveals its powers of interactivity, it is presumable that it finds in the world something corresponding to its own nature. We know the world, because of the interactivity of the will with its forces, even where we are accustomed to think of our knowledge as though it came from the relation of the understanding to the forms of the world. Thus from voluntarism in the microcosm we seek to advance to voluntarism in the macrocosm.

6. THE WORLD-WILL

If the world were but a world of forms, the intellect would be the means of securing knowledge of it; but inasmuch as the world is none the less a world of activity, the mind must avail itself of its volitional function, just as it must be prepared to find in the world something of a volitional nature. The doer is likewise the knower, and the knowable world is an active order of things. To contemplate the world from afar is not sufficient for discovering the innermost secret of things, even though it stand out as the ideal of knowledge. Knowledge demands the very handling of the thing to be known, and the active function of the mind, instead of surrendering itself to work, devotes as much of its energy to the problem of discovery. This is the true *cogitatio volitionis*, or will-knowledge, whence the mind emerges from its inner seclusion and finds its place in the world. Hume was led to doubt the validity of the causal idea, because he could not find the impression whence the idea arose; but activism suggests that the causal idea may have its origin in the will, whose inherent intelligence can find no more appropriate field than the activistic one. Kant advanced beyond Hume in the question of causality, for he observed that, as perception secures knowledge of phenomenal causality, volition in the

form of free-will apprehends noumenal causality. But it is by means of the will as the active relation of the ego to the world that such knowledge of causality is obtained; without the active behaviour of the will, the changes that take place in the world, the events that occur in time, the work that the world itself performs would have no meaning to the mind.

The half-real, half-phenomenal character of the world-will is such as to place it in the position of mediator between the inner ego and the outer world. A perfect world of ideas, existing at rest, striving after no beyond, could offer no opportunity for participation on the part of the ego; but a world-will, though inferior to the world of ideas, realises the possibilities in interactivity, and thus promises something in the way of a work for the ego in the world. Schopenhauer had no scruples against assigning to nature the same voluntary functions that the ego experiences within; so that gravitation, magnetism, vegetation, animal instinct and the like were explained upon the basis of volition instead of in terms of abstract "force." In carrying on such a remarkable procedure Schopenhauer does away with all generalisation, and simply "names the genus from the leading species."¹ Bergson is more moderate in his voluntarism, inasmuch as he distinguishes the inorganic from the organic by assigning the former to *l'ordre automatique*, the latter to *l'ordre volu*. At the same time, Bergson refrains from attributing to the purely organic the functions of *l'ordre volontaire*. These qualifications, which assign to the external world the elements of the volitional order, do not yield a perfect voluntarism, but they contain the admission that, in some way and to a certain degree, thought must work out its ideas of activity upon the assumption that the inner will finds something like itself in the external world. Bergson, however, pursues his voluntarism without regard to the fortunes of the ego.²

Through the will the subjective becomes objective, as

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 22.

² *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 252.

in the parallel case of stimulus and sensation the objective becomes subjective. Schopenhauer discussed the objectification of the will, but that without regard to the problem of the ego's interaction with the world; but the method of interactivity has its advantages in revealing the likeness between the inner and outer, and in a dialectic like the present one, where the aim is not merely to consider the world but the ego's place therein, it is almost imperative to show how the external world is of such a volitional nature as to make possible the active participation of the self with its forces. This the world-will makes possible; it mediates between extremes. Were the external world a material order, the ego could have no commerce with it; or were the ego of a purely spiritual character, the desired interactivity would again be frustrated. But the objective world as will is able to rise high enough to meet the subjective ego, whose nature is likewise volitional; and by virtue of its superiority to the object and its inferiority to the subject, the will is in a position to bring about a reconciliation between the opposed pair. The harmony between them is not "pre-established," is directly willed by both the inner and outer orders as the essence of their respective natures.

The position of the world-will between the subject and the object thus aids us in discovering whether the ego has a real work in the world. Metaphysics, which has not as yet learned to treat the will in the same systematic way that it has treated the understanding, has been over-rationalistic because it has conceived of the world-problem as one of forms only. But the world, instead of simply posing for thought, is carrying on a great system of work, the character of which becomes apparent to the ego in its own striving will. Hence, just as the understanding contemplates the form of the world in the character of principles, the will may measure it in terms of causes, and to the traditional way of summing up the meaning of things mentally there must come the estimate of them from the voluntaristic standpoint. Just as the essence of things often seems alien to the nature of the mind, so the work of things may present

a contrast to the strivings of the ego ; but, as our dialectic has no concern about the thing-in-itself, so it need have no anxiety about any supposed activity-in-itself. The work of the world-will seems to be such as to promise participation from the side of the self, as the discussion of the interactionist's question seemed to show. Geulincx despaired of finding a world-work for the self, because he could see no way in which causal connection could be affected. These scruples having been overcome by the aid of an immanent theory of causality and an activistic view of the mind, it seems possible to demonstrate the reality of world-work on the part of the self. To make this more complete, the ego's own nature as will to selfhood must now be advanced for investigation.

VI

THE SELF-ACTIVITY OF THE EGO

THE interactivity of the ego with the world having been relieved of the embarrassments that usually attend it, we are in a position where we may give favourable consideration to the inner nature of the ego as the will to selfhood. Where, in the view of the world of appearance, the contrast between the outer world and inner life made possible the view of the ego as self-consciousness, the present parallel case of the interactivity of mind and body aids us in considering the ego as self-activity. Thus far selfhood has been expressed in terms of sense alone; here, however, we may view it as will, whence its reality will be manifest, not in the way that it appeals to itself, but according to the manner in which it conducts itself in the world. The intro-activity of consciousness whereby the ego strives after self-expression opens a new field to inward investigation, and does not fail to provoke some significant problems. Is the self capable of reacting upon nature in such a way as to make its independence possible? Can the will so realise the possibilities of the inner life as to constitute the ego as the will to selfhood, or must we assume something higher, as the intellect? Whether these two questions may be satisfactorily answered or not, it cannot be denied that the self has set itself in opposition to nature, whether it is destined to succeed or fail in its attempt to posit its inner being. At the same time, there is a tendency to entrust the soul to the will, a *volo* taking the place of the traditional *cogito*.

I. THE REACTION OF THE SELF UPON NATURE

While our position in the world is such that we must regard the world as given, we have found that none the less does the mind exercise the right to receive it in its own

manner. In this way there comes about a reaction upon the world of experience, an impulse which is due to the activistic nature of the self. Whatever the ego be to itself, its active character calls upon it to react upon the exterior world ; this reaction it carries on as if it had a work therein. In order to fit itself for this work, the ego must assert itself as individual with independent existence. At the outset we must content ourselves with the purely negative side of selfhood as something which does not take place in the world, but has an independent source ; then we shall be in a position to survey it positively as a definite form of self-affirmation. In its immediate aspect the ego appears as a revolt against the order that produced it ; with its inner life and its freedom it seems to oppose itself to the realm without which it could hardly be conceived of as existing. While this is not all, it is a significant feature of selfhood.

While we regard the ego as a revolt, we do not fail to give nature credit for producing the means by which this is brought about. Nature produces the brain with its sensory and motor functions just as she expresses her character in the qualities and intensities of consciousness itself. Human ideation and volition may thus be regarded as the climax of natural force in general. Man aids in the attempt to acquire these, but in the larger sense it is nature which works in and through him in the striving for existence. Consciousness is thus of nature, while it is none the less for nature, for as yet it is the species rather than the individual that is in the foreground. Man's percepts, his impulses, his interests are at work nature-wise, so that upon the plane of consciousness it is vain to suggest the idea of detachment. The element of knowledge that enters in, instead of being free and disinterested, is of a practical character, constituting what Schopenhauer called "knowledge of the will to live."

Nevertheless, man is ego as well as creature, so that the sway of nature over him is not unlimited ; the ego revolts, and thereby reveals a dialectical situation which could not be appreciated from any other than the activistic stand-

point. Self-consciousness, with the seeming innocence of its subjectivity, begins to have reference to a transnatural realm of the very essence of the self, and with this introverted activity of the ego the mind acquires mentality as such, and independent of any immediate interest or practical issue. The animal may exhibit the rudiments of this free, internal activity, but they are rudiments only, whose metaphysical is absorbed in the full activity of the self. In the world of activity the inner work of the self constitutes a new departure; it is an activity marked by the idea of creation rather than mere imitation, recognisable in the elaboration and employment of tools to further the work of the will, as by the deduction of signs and words to extend and emancipate the movement of the understanding. This inner activity assumes a strictly human character, for the ego is improvising and originating in such a manner as to create the new. A lingering regard for the natural may make one hesitate to loose man and set him adrift in the sea of spiritual life, and yet it may be pointed out that it is nature herself that is responsible for this detachment of the self from the shores of the perceptible and useful. This has come about through the development of the human brain, which seems bent upon comprehending nature in her totality, as also in transcending her. This condition of things is aptly put in *Man and the Superman*, where Don Juan says: "Life is the force that ever strives to attain greater power of contemplating itself. What made this brain of mine, do you think? Not the need to move my limbs, for the rat with half my brains moves as well as I. Not merely the need to do, but the need to know what I do. Life was driving at brains—at its darling object: an organ by which it can attain not only self-consciousness, but self-understanding. The Life Force says to him, 'I have done a thousand wonderful things unconsciously by merely willing to live; now I want to know myself and my destination, so I have made a special brain, a philosopher's brain, to grasp this knowledge for me.'"¹

¹ *Op. cit.*, Act iii.

The ego is the tiny tube connecting the upper and lower halves of spirit and matter in the hour-glass of the world. Nature does not wholly forbid, spirit does not really invite selfhood ; yet it has its place in the world-whole. Nature aims at the generic, not the individual ; spirit rejoices in the epic with its impersonal largesse ; between these extremes stretches the life of man, in which selfhood is imperative, if only as a means to a superior end. No philosophy can claim to comprehend reality unless it include the ego as one of its categories ; for by means of selfhood the distinction between inner and outer is brought into play, and without these twin principles the world is a confused mass of being. Man as man possesses individuation ; from this as it is given to him the path to selfhood is plain. With this individuation there comes a sense of inwardness, a harmony of *cogito, volo, sum*. To break up the world into these individuating centres may seem disastrous to systematic philosophy, but when the detached ego uses its independence of both natural and social solidarity to advance the interests of reality, the danger of revolt appears imaginary. The ego cannot harm reality ; it can only desire to resist the impersonalising forces of the external world.

Our modern dynamic view of the world, with its evolutionary corollary, calls upon us to recognise a force working out a programme among the manifold forms of matter. With regard to man, we are ready to grant that nature has all but equipped him for the work he is destined to do, but there still remains something to be accounted for in the way of inner activity within the realm of culture. This interior activity manifests itself in the form of an attitude which the ego adopts towards both things and events ; for, rising above the scene of action that produced him, man takes a bird's-eye view of the scene whence he arose. The world-will is contemplated and criticised by a creature which does not always approve of its behaviour. Man as ego begins to assume some of the responsibility for things, just as he is led to wonder whether he has any significant place in the world. The optimistic acceptance of the world is often interrupted

by the revolt of the ego, which cannot receive the fact of existence as equivalent to the right of existence. Thus the ego affirms or denies the force of things within him, and his ethical sense of approval and disapproval, instead of confining itself to private acts, directs its forces toward the world in which the ego finds itself. Thus arise deeds which spurn interest and seek the ideal in either action or idea.

The reaction of the ego upon nature introduces a certain amount of irrationality in dialectic, but it is difficult to see how the self as will can submit to a staid, conceptual system. A realistic writer, who in his impressionism relegates the self to nature, knows nothing of the dialectical compunction which haunts the egoist, whose devotion to the inner life in its independence carries far from the domain of objective thinghood. Where no such world-withdrawal is attempted, the way is clear as the recitation of it is serene. Such is the case with Pierre Loti, whose original characters, breathing the fresh air of the earliest days of creation, seem to have emerged from the very earth about them; of this objective medium they are first-born and favoured ones, and yet they know nothing, seek nothing in the way of a Beyond. Contrast these straightforward souls with the complicated characters of Balzac and Ibsen, and you breathe a feeling of relief. But this is only temporary, for the position of the self is such that thought must gaze into the abyss, convinced that humanity is not so artless, nor its life so exterior and direct. Detached from nature, as is the ego with its will to selfhood, its restlessness contrasts with the fixed natural order as the sea with the land.

Such a view of the ego's detachment from nature warns us that the secret of human existence is to be found only by pressing on toward the Beyond; to indicate a return to nature and the life of immediacy is to entertain the impossible as ideal. Philosophy constantly demands a reactionary movement on the part of the ego, and in our own age, when the forces of objectivity are so assertive, the revolt is all the more necessary. Industrial realism shows us that, as Emerson said, "things are in the saddle, and ride mankind."

During the long estivation of the ego, in which things have flourished luxuriantly, the powers of self-affirmation have dwindled. To emancipate the ego, we must attribute to it a work of its own, for the will teaches us that the self was never meant for the service of the immediate ; the first step in the development of this work consists in the movement under discussion—the reaction of the self against nature. Even with the emphasis that the Greeks placed upon sense, humanity was not lost sight of after Protagoras and Socrates delivered it from the exterior order of things. So likewise with Scholasticism ; the spiritual exercised sovereignty and the internal was clearly seen, even though the ego was none too free. The Enlightenment rescued the modern by means of reason and rights, whence he was able to exert his supremacy over nature. But the age of organic naturalism seems ready to sacrifice the self to a system in which the position of humanity is in no sense strategic. Nevertheless, the very force of our naturalism, by arousing the Dionysian ego within the self, promises an emancipation for spiritual life, this appearing in the revolt of such souls as Nietzsche, Strindberg, and Gorky.

2. THE SELF AS WILL

The reaction of the ego upon nature is made possible by the voluntaristic element in the mind. Both sense and intellect have a way of imitating nature, hence the will is the most likely defender of the originality of the self. But the particular question arising at this point is that of the inner constitution of the soul as will. The voluntaristic view of mind seems to promise material for both defence of the selfhood of the ego and the construction of the mind as such. As a metaphysical conception of mind, voluntarism seems to obviate the necessity of a substratum or support for the soul, and thus creates the impression of a stream flowing on without the support of the river-bed. The activity of consciousness is such as to disdain the assistance thus offered from without, a condition of things in which

the will seems to further the interests of spiritual life. The mythological need of something like soul-stuff has long been met by such a materialistic supply, so that the independent activity of the mind is not easily appreciated. In the will the mind is actualised in such a way that there is no need of any so-called mental substance. The inherent principles of consciousness as a stream now appear in a more intelligible light, for the combination of change and continuity, so paradoxical to the formal intellect, are easily adjusted to the striving will. We need not run to Schopenhauerian extremes, and thus call the will the thing in itself, in order to realise the important part played by volition. The voluntaristic conception of mind seems to follow from the activistic view of reality, as the intermediate nature of being reveals it, as well as from the nature of consciousness itself.

The activistic view of being may be applied to consciousness with the result of showing that the mind is something more than passive sense-consciousness: the progressive and synthetic character of the mind demand that the activistic must come in for recognition. The ideational nature of consciousness, with the active apprehension of the object, is due to the character of the ego as will. The reason why the ego itself is not found among these ideational elements is because it does not consist of any one of them, but is the active expression of their totality. "In its narrowest sense," says Wundt, "the subject is the interconnection of volitional processes which finds expression in the feeling of the ego."¹

So peculiar is the nature of the will that psychology can assign to it no special quality, as colour is attributed to sensation, or pain to feeling. Hence, where we speak of a sensation of colour or tone, or a feeling of pleasure or pain, we cannot continue the introspective programme and add something about the impulse of this or that. So complete within itself is the will that some other than the genitive must be selected from among the cases. Here the dative serves in a more intelligible way, for one may speak of the

¹ *Outlines of Psychology*, tr. Judd, § 15. 12.

will to live, or the will to think. In the instance of the ego the most consistent form of expression is "the will to selfhood." In this way both will and ego are treated in a consistent fashion, the will being directed toward the ego as object, while the self is viewed as an end to be obtained only by striving. But so thorough has been the working of the rationalistic habit, that any departure from the set standard of logical law has been looked upon as irrational. But the irrational, like the unconscious, may indicate the mere privation of the rational or conscious quality; so that in the present case the ego as something irrational simply means the subintellectual form of the self as will. The irrational, instead of suggesting the violation of the rational, stands for a positive quality whose nature is active, for the ego can express itself in acts as well as in ideas. Before voluntarism had obtained its present popularity, Balzac had indicated some of its possibilities as an interpreter of the inner life of the soul. In *Beatrix* (1838), Balzac uses the voluntaristic to delineate the character of Baron du Guenic, whose heraldic motto was "*Fac*": "Thought was rare there; it was visibly an effort; its seat was in the heart rather than the head; its outcome was action rather than idea. . . . His feelings and beliefs were, so to speak, intuitive and saved him all thought."¹

The narrow association between the ego and the will is accompanied by the volitional in consciousness itself. From the standpoint of sense, our mental states seem to occur simply as a succession, no element of action entering in to urge them on toward their goal of intellection. But consciousness conducts itself as an activity whose presence is felt in both the simple and complex mental state. No sensation occurs as a mere event, but is rather a willed condition of consciousness in which the mind reacts upon the stimulus. If attention were only the alert and anticipatory process of voluntary expectation, this activity of the ego could not be understood so readily; but attention is possessed of another form according to which the stimulus arrests it,

¹ *Op. cit.*, Part i.

but here as well the activity of the mind is manifest. Now attention is volition, and the highest kind of volition which involves the intro-activity of the mind. From the volitional side of approach, consciousness would seem to resemble an intermittent spring as much as the smoothly flowing stream, for its general direction is a vertical one, as it rises and then sinks again into the unconscious. Moreover, the recognisable grades in consciousness, alien to pure cognition as they seem to be, are explicable in terms of volition as so many degrees of activity upon which the vividness of the impression depends.

The appropriation of the will by the ego is made more defensible upon the ground we have already discovered in attention. Attention and volition are so similar that we seem justified in speaking of the former as internal volition, or a kind of will to selfhood. The behaviour of the volitional ego appears most strikingly in connection with the question of motive. Where the libertarian sought to show how the will in its freedom expressed itself in a motiveless fashion, as a bolt from the blue, the determinist declared that the will was ever ruled by the strongest motive. Both overlooked the fact that the motives are not fixed facts, but fluid possibilities, while the will, instead of being a will in itself, is one with the ego. The motives reside in the ego, where their condition is an unconscious one as they await the vivifying effects of attention. It is attention which so intensifies these slumbering motives that the so-called strong one becomes weak through inhibition, while the weak one becomes strong through attention. Motives, therefore, are not so many links of equal strength taken from the chain of causality, but so many phases of the will itself. Determinism is not adaptable to the notion of an active ego which wills itself, while its conception of motive as an objective reality ignores the fact that being consists of something more than thinghood, in the form of activity. The will seems to be at work upon its own motives which it has in its control.

With the rise of voluntarism there is witnessed the passing of the mechanical view that raised law to the highest

place; now it is seen that there must be something vitalistic in the world, hence nature is viewed as the will to live or as creative evolution. In the midst of these changes the mind is viewed as no mechanical system of fixed units, but is recognised as an activistic arrangement according to which the self is regarded as will. The self-activity of the ego, like the interactivity of the ego and the world, thus becomes a defensible conception of the soul. Upon this volitional element in the self depends the freedom of the ego in the world of activity; before this can be examined we must observe how the self as will reveals its nature in consciousness.

3. CONATION AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Where both activism and phenomenalism avoid the vicious idea of thinghood as such, they seem to be as critically disposed toward the idea of selfhood as an independent principle. The phenomenistic view of mind accounts for certain facts of inner experience by appealing to self-consciousness as an awareness; the activistic conception of things involves a psychology in which this self-consciousness further reveals itself as the will to selfhood. Accordingly, the soul is esteemed as a system of volitions centred in the ego; whether this be the final view of mind, or only an intermediate notion, need not concern us now, for our present desire is simply to advance beyond the static theory of mind in its impressionism. As the function of memory has served in organising the mind as consciousness, that of memory must now be employed in the development of the reactionary view of inner life.

The usual method of employing activism has been negative, in a radical dialectic which has had no other aim than the destruction of intellectualism; such Scotism, with its maxim, *voluntas superior est intellectu*, has not been so ambitious in the elaboration of an independent theory of the mind as will. Meanwhile it is sufficient to observe that in all probability, if intellectualism had never perfected its view of the outer world as a world of ideas and the

inner life as that which thinks, voluntarism would have no arguments to offer in favour of a view which upholds the superiority of will; by its very mode of discussing the problem of the soul, voluntarism suggests that its own theory is secondary and critical. Hume prepared the way for the radical view of mind when he affirmed that the soul as such was not to be found, but his scepticism concerning causality prevented him from observing the possibilities of the causal conception of mind; nevertheless, his criticism of the Cartesian psychology was of value in pointing out the fact that the ego never appears in stark ontological form, but makes its presence manifest through impressions and volitions. In the same way Kant's Second Antinomy cast doubt upon the reality of the spiritual monad, although Kant himself did not fail to suggest a voluntaristic interpretation, in the form of a moralism, which upheld the primacy of the practical reason. Fichte's *Ich* was the first attempt at a thoroughgoing activism, while it further indicated the possibilities of an egoistic interpretation of the problem of being. In Schopenhauer the advance of the volitional and irrational was carried on at the expense of the egoistic and intellectual, although our own age has learned how to turn voluntarism into the channel of individualism, whence the will to selfhood assumes a consistent psychological character.

In its very behaviour consciousness betrays its volitional nature. Phenomenalism, as it sought the self in sense with the immediacy of self-consciousness, could do no more than establish a representative office, the function of which consisted in revealing the existence of something sense-like within and behind it. The voluntaristic view, however, attempts to construct the real, for which purpose it makes use of the phenomenal as material. Both the phenomenal and substantial views of the mind agree in regarding consciousness as mere appearance; where the former accepts this, the latter repudiates it as an interpretation of the inner life. In this way psychology without a soul and psychology with a soul agree in esteeming mere consciousness as itself

soulless. But the voluntaristic view assumes more metaphysical responsibility for the stream of consciousness within, even where it is not willing to draw from it the inference that it stands for something extra in the way of substance. Voluntarism endeavours to realise the utmost possibility of consciousness, hence it does not fly to the substantial for refuge. That voluntarism, in its treatment of consciousness as a mode of conduct as well as a representative arrangement, is right need not be questioned; the only place where the intellectualist may quarrel with him is where he regards the will as so superior to the intellect that, with the establishing of the voluntaristic view, the case of consciousness is closed. It is true that the volitional as well as the intellectual is indicative of reality, but the modern voluntarist, annoyed at the historical reiteration, The intellect is all, is himself as irritating when he replies, The will is all.

The will is indispensable in the interpretation of reality, but it is not final; it is a necessary phase of selfhood, but yet it does not possess the entire soul. The confidence of the voluntarist is shown by Wundt when he sets up the following contrast between the substantial and the causal in consciousness: "The soul is not simple, but complex; it is conceived, not as persistent, but as in constant change; it consists, not in a being distinct from the inner event, but its being consists in this event itself—*ihre Sein besteht in diesem Geschehen selbst*.¹ In such a platform the sincerity of the plea is injured by the retort which each article implies. The soul, as we know it in inner experience, has its complex content, and one which the doctrine of *res cogitans* grievously overlooked; the soul is likewise capable of change, however difficult it may be for the static substantialist to absorb such a principle; the soul, instead of abdicating in favour of an abstraction, keeps its seat within itself: such are the valuable results of Wundt's psychology. These, likewise, may be appreciated without the negative preliminary which can see nothing true in the older view of the unity, permanence, and substantiality of our inner existence; at

¹ *System d. Philos.*, pp. 308-9.

the same time, one may accept the voluntaristic contribution to the psychology of selfhood, without becoming exterior to himself, after the manner of the activist who seeks relief from interior contemplation by "cultivating the garden." Consciousness is itself conation, but the mere striving for striving's sake, without inner appreciation of the activity expended and without knowledge of the goal sought, is an impossible condition for the human ego.

As an interpreter of interior existence, the will shows its fitness in its simplicity. So flexible is the volitional process that it lends itself to every act of the mind, and that without surrendering its own nature. Where ideas are manifold and coloured, volitions have about them an indefiniteness and abandon which makes it possible for them to participate in any mental state whatsoever. In the desire to find the unity of consciousness the will acts in a most satisfactory manner, in that it frees itself from the manifold of mentality and adheres to the form of mind as such. Where Schopenhauer is able to separate the will from the body and consider its immediate connection with the mind, he tends to establish a voluntarism which is more concerned with the service of will in consciousness than with its alleged superiority to the intellect. In Schopenhauer's mind, the will is *a priori* where the intellect is *a posteriori*, inner where the other is outer;¹ the will is immediate consciousness beyond which we cannot go in returning to the ground of reality. When, therefore, philosophy calls the will free, it recognises its original and groundless nature, which appears directly in self-consciousness.²

From the practical standpoint of work in the world, this voluntaristic contention seems quite justifiable. In human life action is the rule, thought the exception; moreover, work is generic, while thinking seems to have about it more of the individualistic. All animal life is activity, and the primitive functions of the human mind as displayed in the history of the race are of the same voluntaristic nature. Where knowledge makes its appearance,

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 18.

² *Ib.*, § 23.

it is not in the form of disinterested reflection, but partakes of a variation and perfection of the practical operation of the will. So akin are cognition and volition, so similar are act and idea, that the intellectual work of the mind is often masked under the more obvious performance of the will. This implicit intellectualism of the will now appears as one of the strongest arguments for voluntarism, although the intellectualist need have no fears on account of a rival theory which, at a loss to explain the meaning of the will in its workings, must needs resort to the understanding to furnish examples of what activity effects. At the same time, it will appear that the theory of voluntarism is genetic rather than ontological, for the reason that it asserts little more than the fact the will appeared before the intellect, in which latter it is perfected. Had the intellectualist been less conservative and more inclined to see in the mind a series of ideas and acts, instead of ideas alone, the force of voluntarism would to-day be defensive rather than offensive in the philosophy of the interior life.

It is plain from the history of the human mind that the intellect, having awakened from the slumber of sense, is striving to emancipate itself from the toils of the will. In the hands of the will, the intellect is but a tool; its ideas, instead of attaining to freedom, are exploited by the volitional activity of the mind. But the persistent study of the will reveals the fact that the ego is striving onward toward a Beyond, so that the more perfect the will becomes, the nearer to its object that it approaches, the less and less volitional is its character. The intellect is the silence of the will, *le silence authentique* that the restless Huysmans finally found at Chartres. In the midst of his activism, Bergson has not hesitated to confess the apparent finality of the intellect. Relying upon instinct rather than intelligence, Bergson is called upon to observe that the *dénouement* of creative evolution is a condition more contemplative than active, a condition which he describes as self-conscious, disinterested instinct.¹ Now if the will aims at the self-con-

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 192.

scious and disinterested, it aims at the intellectualistic ; only, instead of reposing in this from the outset it has had its little struggle, and has learned how to appreciate the calm, the silence of the contemplative. The intellectualist has never been willing to credit this earlier striving on the part of the mind as volitional, but a consistent theory of human culture finds it possible to presuppose such a Dionysiasm, just as Nietzsche did in his derivation of the Apollonian among the early Greeks.¹ This lesson the intellectualist must learn, and herein consists the possibility of a new intellectualistic view, which will be distinguished from the older one of idealistic pretensions by virtue of the fact that the older doctrine accounted for nothing more than the triumph of the intellect over sense, while the later one is aware of the fact that the intellect must be just as victorious over a second adversary, and one more like itself: the will. Granted, then, that the voluntarist is just in claiming that the will was the first to appear, it is equally reasonable to assume that, implicit as it was in the operations of the will, the intellect was the fundamental basis of the work that the will sought to perform, so that consciousness accepts the intellect *nunc pro tunc*.

4. THE EGO AS WILL TO SELFHOOD

The volitional interpretation of consciousness involves the treatment of the ego as will, and where its internal volition is examined it will appear that the object of the will is the self. Selfhood has usually been regarded either as something impressed upon the mind from without, or discovered by it within; but the activist has learned to accept the truth the self will never come into being unless, like Ibsen's "right man" of the "third empire,"² it come into being as "the man who wills himself." The rationalist has regarded the attempt on the part of the ego to affirm itself either impossible or unnecessary; hence, when Descartes

¹ *Die Geburt d. Tragödie*, § 3.

² *The Emperor Julian*, tr. Archer, Act. iii. sc. 4.

had discovered spiritual life in an egoistic manner, he then set aside the means of discovery as something to be disregarded; as far as it did receive recognition, the Cartesian ego presented no special problems, because it imitated the order of things in the world, while its very principle of personal identity was but a corroboration of the *principium identitatis*. The entrance of the ego as an activity, however, changes the situation, for now the world of fixed forms seems less insurmountable. Activism without egoism is impossible, for when the will is really free it can will nothing but itself. Moreover, to lack selfhood is to lack consciousness, for the instinctive, selfless consciousness is something which merely clings to the soul without; but to will the self is to perfect self-interiority, an introvertive process impossible without the activistic method.

The will, which is habitually relegated to the exterior order, is at its best in its internal volitions, where it furthers the striving of consciousness after selfhood. While dialectics is ever ready to insist that consciousness apart from the self is unthinkable, it is not so ready to acknowledge the self as the leading motive of interior life. The self is thus supposed to serve in the interests of the metaphysical order, in the way that it plays its menial part in the moral one. It is consciousness which furnishes the stuff for selfhood, and any attempt to subordinate the ego to an impersonal process reverses the plan that the world appears to have adopted. As long as consciousness is surveyed in the impersonal form, psycho-physics will be able to entertain its admirers with accounts of the soul-life in plants, but the view of the soul as will to selfhood will ever preclude the attempt to spiritualise nature which knows nothing of a plant-ego. And it is the ego with his speculative and ethical possibilities that is destined to become the glory of philosophy, where that philosophy is so genuine that it consists of a lofty intellectualism, which is not frightened away from its ideals by the report of certain physical necessities or ethical demands. "Mind" and "soul," as these principles have obtained in philosophy, have their value, but they are

so addicted to the generic method of interpretation that it is far better to express the same spiritual content in terms of selfhood.

In order to explain the behaviour of the ego, philosophy turns to the will, which seems to hold the secret of the inward striving of the mind toward independent existence. Such independent being consists in activity, which at times assumes the form of revolt; Stirner directs it against the world of ideas, Nietzsche against the world of values. To exist, the self must strive; as ego it cannot simply take place, nor can its being consist in the natural happening in which Wundt thought to find the soul. Rationalism sometimes attempts this task by distinguishing between self and not-self, but this distinction is but preliminary to the inward struggle to realise the content of separate selfhood; rationalism seeks the solution of a problem which, instead of standing in need of mere dichotomy, makes necessary a perpetual conflict without and within. The self, therefore, neither takes place in nature nor accepts a position assigned it; the self comes into being in response to the will to selfhood.

So often is the impulse toward selfhood associated with the violent in humanity, that we should remind ourselves that all intellectual life proclaims somewhat of the same egoism. Art and science, ethics and religion, depend upon the living distinction between the inner and outer; the first pair involve a free cognition of the world as a whole, while the second make possible the elaboration of the interior in its independence. Taken together, these branches of culture are the result of that inward striving which is necessary to the selfhood of the ego, which avails itself of them as means to an end. The elaboration of the inner order of selfhood, as much Emersonian as it is Nietzschean, is the very life of culture, which, unsupported by nature, depends upon the improvising activity of the inner ego. Perhaps all culture is in vain; but the persistence of humanity in its independent work is an indication that the cultural striving after inwardness and selfhood is as permanent a form of activity as that which operates in the

exterior world. In both its thinking and its working, humanity seems to be seeking the most efficient means of self-affirmation, for which deed-activity nature serves as the field of resistance. To account for the intro-activity of the self, we need something more than nature with its immediacy: we need a Beyond.

Yet the activity of the will is not wholly expended in the revolt against nature and the naturistically conceived social condition; within the self are found forces which are devoted to the elaboration of the ego-order within. The opposition to nature involves only the stark ego, whose inner life would remain without content or world-significance did not the self set about the organisation of its volitions. In the world of appearance, where selfhood assumes the sensuous form, the ego was little more than a means of individuating and introverting sensation and feeling; in the world of activity, however, the self reacts and reorganises the content that ever passes through it. The will that assumes this responsibility is thus enabled to reach the apex of its activities. For what conceivable purpose does the will exist, if it be not for the creation of the free self in the world of activity? Can the conscious volition of the ego be conceived of as having no higher aim than the feeble reinforcement of the world-force, or the vain activity of working for the social not-self? The ego as ego, the ego as free, must be conceived of as willing the spiritual content of its own existence; no other work seems worthy of its free efforts. Were it not for the will to selfhood, would not the human race still be haunting caves or dwelling in trees? If the ego did not demand elaboration from within, would not the human will still be involved in the pursuit of elemental needs? The history of humanity, however, has made it plain that the spirit of man, dissatisfied with the exterior life of immediacy, has willed to exist in an independent manner; so that, until we have proved the truth of the proposition, All culture is an In-vain, we must continue to assume that the will has postulated a sufficient idea in the striving toward intellectual selfhood.

The ethical phase of selfhood reveals the fact that the ego asserts itself with many qualms and only after great efforts. As dialectics has taken the self for granted, ethics has been equally hasty in assuming that the activity of the will was predisposed to the pursuit of the egoistic. Hence the warnings against solipsism and egoism. But the self is very shy of revealing its inner nature, just as it shrinks from a self-affirmation which society, organised upon an objective basis, can only oppose. The modern for egoism, initiated by Stendhal, Stirner, Dostoievsky, and Emerson, has sometimes found it necessary to resort to the irrational and chaotic in order to release the self from its own imprisonment. In the case of Dostoievsky, who was full of that pity which ever hovers above the head of Russian genius, we have an example of the trepidation with which the ego asserts itself; this he has given in connection with one of the morbid moods of Raskolnikow, in *Crime and Punishment*: “‘I ought to have known that,’ he thought with a bitter smile; ‘how did I dare, knowing what I am, anticipating what would happen, how did I dare take an axe and shed blood?’ . . . At moments he would reflect on a thought: ‘No, people of that cast of mind are not constituted like that. The real ruler—the man who dares all—bombards Toulon, massacres in Paris, abandons an army in Egypt, gets rid of half a million of men on his Moscow campaign, and gets off scot-free at Vilna by a pun; when he is dead and gone, people put up statues for him; everything seems allowable in his case. No, men like that are not made of flesh, but rather of bronze.’”¹ To be one’s self and do one’s work in the world demand a belief in selfhood as the fate of mankind, as also the firm conviction that this selfhood is within as consciousness and motive. The exceptional manner in which Dostoievsky introduced the topic, and the unhappy manner in which Stendhal’s immortalists carry out the programme of his activistic egoism, need give us no pause in the inward conflict with fear and self-hatred. Indeed, it is often from such a self-despection

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Wishaw, Part. III. ch. vi.

that the ego delivers itself in its striving after selfhood. Unless the ego is esteemed as a force in the world, the experience of selfhood is impossible, so closely connected are the activistic and egoistic. Where these are wanting, the desire for inner life will defeat itself, after the manner of Geulincx's ethics, with its fundamental maxims, *Inspicere se et Despicere se*.¹ But where the study of interactivity reveals a causal system, in which the ego is found in active relation with the world surrounding it, the scruples of occasionalism, with their destruction of selfhood, are overcome; for the ego can will, and can will its own selfhood.

Where the activistic element in egoism is wanting, the result is weakness and resultlessness; self-knowledge leads but to self-hatred. This half-egoism, with its Hamlet-like introspection, was dreaded by Turgénieff, who so longed for the activistic that he constantly exalted the character of Don Quixote as the man of action. Where Litvinoff in *Smoke* is the type of purely contemplative egoist, Bazaroff in *On the Eve* stands for the quixotic activist. The frank admission of activism as a phase of inner and outer existence does not put us in a position where we must acknowledge such a doubtful proposition as the superiority of the will over the intellect. In such a situation the will would defeat the very purpose for which it strives, and end in a kind of Beylism, as its author Stendhal called it, wherein the self acts in blindness. The anti-activism and anti-egoism of Geulincx tends to arouse such a revolt, and the ego which is conscious of its volitional powers is not ready to relinquish reality upon such unconvincing grounds. It was in this way that Nietzsche, who sought the superman in the pages of Stendhal, did not fail to strike back at Geulincx with his *despectio sui*.²

But the self-activity of the ego can be defended according to a method less violent than the destructive work of Beylism demands. The Dionysian under the control of the Apollonian, the will striving upward toward intelligence, the

¹ *Ethica*, Tract. II., pars. iii. § 9.

² *Genealogy of Morals*, tr. Hausmann, iii. § 18.

quixotic activism of Turgénieff—these are indications of the way in which the will to selfhood may express itself. The supreme element in the self is that of inward spontaneity, so that where rationalism allowed the ego merely to repeat the lesson of outer existence, activism furthers the ideal of selfhood by fostering the tendency to improvise. The ego has the power to extemporise according to its own inner standard, hence its knowledge of the world is something more than the memoriter scheme of Plato's idealism. On the physical and social side of human thinking, the inner work of the self is ever met with reproach and repudiation; this is especially true in an age like our own, with its hatred of the solitaire and its dread of silence. For this reason the believer in the self has sometimes had to meet the outer resistance to his strivings by invoking the fury of a Dionysius or a Zarathustra; but the essential element in selfhood will be found to consist in something more interior, more intelligible.

5. FREEDOM OF THE SELF

Where the ego is interpreted in an activistic fashion, the secret of freedom seems about to be revealed; certainly the activistic method promises a more favourable scheme of consideration than either the libertarian or deterministic forms of rationalism ever offered. By its very nature the ego strives to assert itself, and without this activity the self may hardly be said to exist. Humanity has a profound interest in freedom, for the force by which it has emancipated itself from nature is none other than the free-will. Ethics has assumed responsibility for freedom, with the result that thought has been led to believe that the liberty of the will had no other purpose than the ability to choose in a fine casuistical fashion. But the demand for freedom involves issues which reach farther than the range of selective liberty described by the libertarian. Freedom manifests itself as a constructive principle within the ego, which exerts the will to selfhood only by means of the striving principle within

it. In a world of forces as well as forms, where the ego is actively related to the outer order of being, the question of freedom soon passes on beyond the limits of ethical libertarianism, takes possession of activity as a whole. In some ways this larger view has been entertained by the determinist, who negated freedom of the libertarian sort as he sought to affirm a broader, deeper principle than that of occasional choice.

Genuine freedom, organic as it is to the volitional self in its totality, is adaptable to the active order as a whole. Where mediævalism sought to deliver the inner from the toils of the outer world of sense, modernism has been as zealous in emancipating the mechanical order from spiritual interference. As a result, philosophy is now confronted with a dualism of self and world. But the two stand in need of each other, for as the world needs the ego as interpreter, so the ego in its selfhood demands the worldhood which the outer order must supply. The older parallelism, with its perpetual rivalry between liberty and law, was wanting in an activism which regards the ego as carrying on to a conclusion the work begun by the world. Where the world of activity is the basis of dialectical operation, it is possible to regard the world and the ego as both striving toward the same end; so that, instead of the competitive, inimical parallelism of the older view of freedom and fate, there prevails an arrangement where the lines of activity converge in a supreme principle of value. In the same manner it is possible to regard the work of the free ego as an extra activity thrust forward by the world-force, which itself is incompetent to accomplish the end it has set for itself. Activistic freedom connects the minor activity of the ego with the major activity of the world, so that freedom, instead of defying law, invests it with a new meaning.

The content of freedom, when its position is interpreted activistically, is now found to consist of creation rather than choice. Upon this power to create depends the whole world of culture, with its arts and ideals, its sciences and virtues. These await the dawning of the human will which

evokes them in all their independence. As the activistic nature of the ego, by creating the natural expectation of freedom, forms the argument *a priori*, so the work of the ego in the world affords an *a posteriori* corroboration of the free activity of the ego. If we accept the deterministic view-point, we find ourselves in a position where we cannot account for principle of discovery and the idea of novelty which are involved in the work of the human will. But the creative in the ego demands recognition, and a dialectic which depends in part for its demonstration upon the notion of work can be satisfied with nothing less than full freedom. To postulate an intelligible freedom which transcends phenomenal causality is of value in pointing out that the ultimate element in the self is the intellectual one, but between the extremes of appearance and reality we encounter the realm of activity, in which freedom is discussed in the most favourable light.

Freedom relates to the ego as directly as to the will. Hence, instead of contenting ourselves with the claim, "So much freedom, so much morality," we may descend to a more fundamental level and affirm, "So much freedom, so much selfhood." Where freedom was discussed remotely in a physical sense, it existed only as a premise beyond which the argument could hardly advance; where it rose to the ethical point of view, it became a postulate of no little ideal value; but from the standpoint of selfhood it is now viewed as a constructive principle, as the *sine qua non* of interior life. It is this personal way that freedom acquires a content, and one whose richness was unknown under the auspices of the formal philosophy of freedom. The free ego thus separates itself from the mechanical order only to attach itself to the cultural world of work as this is found in the history of humanity, whence the ego receives reinforcement, while the work becomes intelligible. True freedom, therefore, is not an intelligible freedom standing out in contrast to the order of the phenomenal world, but is rather an activistic freedom operating within the causal order. Such a contention in favour of liberty is made for the sake of

showing that the ego has a work in the world. With Kant, noumenal freedom was demanded in order that the ego might be conceived of as obeying the categorical imperative; but where the ethical life-ideal is not the rigoristic one, the demonstration of such freedom is not so momentous, and a theory of life which aims at evincing the reality of human work must equip itself in a more fundamental manner. The whole moral field, not that of rigorism alone, demands freedom; indeed, the activity of the ego in its totality demands this very principle.

Freedom is thus involved in the very idea of individuation; apart from the ego it can have no meaning. Rationalism, viewing the world of nature and humanity in a solid fashion, had its doubts about freedom because it was never sure of the ego, so that in the greatest of all rationalistic works, the *Ethica* of Spinoza, the individual and the free are subjected to the same negation. But where a philosophy accepts humanity in its independence, and does not persist in seeking the sanction of nature for those ideas and acts which are peculiar to the self, it will be as anxious to conserve freedom and individuation as the rationalist is to rid his system of them. Libertarianism is right in contending for the integrity of the interior condition of the mind, but it has ever weakened its argument by its failure to connect this free, inner condition with the self as such. Determinism is right in insisting the will shall have some connection with the world, instead of acting as a solitaire; but it has erred in assuming that the exteriority is a fixed, mechanical arrangement alien to the free ego. Activistic freedom is connected organically with the inner ego, systematically with outer world of activity. Such was the independent conclusion drawn in the preceding section, with its discussion of the interactivity of the ego and the world.

If, however, selfhood consisted in purely punctual individuation, the significance of freedom would be lost to view. Freedom emancipates the ego from both the world of appearance and the self as mere consciousness, and prepares it for participation in the activistic order. The inward

affirmation of selfhood is a complete deed, wherein conation and cognition unite to complete the act of self-assertion. Felt freedom is also a willed freedom. Here, again, we observe the importance of adding to the rationalistic maxim of Descartes the activistic formula of Geulincx, and where dogmatism tends to repose in the confident *cogito, ergo sum*, voluntarism warns it of the importance of activity to selfhood; hence the *nescio, ergo non facio*.¹ *Cogito* and *facio* must unite, for both idea and act are necessary to the life of the self. With its selfhood established activistically, the ego may take up its work in the world of activity.

¹ Cf. *supra*, v. 1.

VII

THE WORK OF THE EGO IN THE WORLD OF ACTIVITY

As the completion of the preliminary view of selfhood witnessed the ego asserting its position in the world, so the intermediate view of the self as will brings us to a place where we must inquire concerning the work of the ego in the world of activity. As the world of appearance arrayed itself against the ego as *cogito*, threatening the self with a destructive solipsism, so the activistic order now confronts the ego as *facio*, thereby making necessary a doctrine of egoism as the means of saving selfhood. If the percipient ego participates in the phenomenal order, and that in such a way as to preserve its personal identity, it must now be asked whether the active self has an entrance into the world of causes, which does not seem at all friendly to freedom and spontaneity. But the history of humanity reveals the fact that the ego has ever carried on some kind of world-work, either in the free acts of ethics, the creative deeds of art, or the affirmations of religion, whence we have only to inquire upon what basis such activity was exercised. Here the genius of selfhood is put to the test, and if the ego as consciousness had to struggle to escape the smothering effect of sense, the ego as will to selfhood must be even more alert and courageous in affirming itself in opposition to the world of forces. Our dialectic has shown us how the secret of causality is such as to conceal nothing essential from the will in its interactivity with the body, so that we may now proceed to examine the peculiar work of the ego as will in the world; the dreads and doubts that arise will dismiss themselves when the character of the ego's self-assertion becomes apparent.

I. THE DREAD OF EGOISM

The self as inner consciousness seems all too solitary ; the self as activity threatens to lead to caprice, whose ontological value is nothing. There was the danger of solipsism ; here is the dread of egoism. Natural as it was to have scruples against anything solipsistic, even more natural is it to avoid egoism, because the latter is far more real than the belief in one's self alone. Egoism is capable of exerting an influence as an ethical doctrine, as is not the case with ipsestic philosophy. Nevertheless, the path to spiritual life, opening as it may in the exterior order, at length turns inwards, so that he who would solve the problem of his existence, and discover his fate in the world-whole, must not say, "Lo here ! Lo there !" but must arise and assert himself as such. Then will be solved the chief ethical problem—the problem of action as action. When, in Wagner's *Ring*, the world-anxious Wotan counsels the all-wise Erda, who knew the truth of hill and vale, of wind and tide, he is advised to turn to Brunhilde, the wish-maiden, who, as the child of his will, is as wise through deed as Erda is through dream ; the ancient goddess of the earth blames him for banishing the one who could have helped him, and taunts him by saying, *Der die That entzündet zürnt um die That*.¹ So may it be said of him who shuns individualism ; he initiates an act which he fears to carry out to the end, since he has not the courage of his impulses.

Dialectics has begun to dread the ego, and, having kindled the flames of egoism, it shuns the fire, through which the hero must pass if he is to see his salvation. The creative element in spiritual life is to be found in the self and in the self alone. The physical and social, in their modern alliance, are able to affect the ego only on the exterior, by means of imitation ; hence he that would not remain exterior to himself must make selfhood a voluntary act. The difference between the past age of chivalry and

¹ *Siegfried*, Act iii.

the social epoch through which we are passing is expressed by Anatole France as follows: "The men of those days were cuirassed like beetles; their weakness was within them. To-day, on the contrary, our strength is interior, and our armed souls dwell in feeble bodies."¹ Our strength is indeed an interior strength, due to the dialectical principle before us: the will to selfhood; hence our armed souls are called upon to array themselves against the crushing exteriority of the causal world. Where freedom of the will is asserted, the thinker must advance to the selfhood that such freedom predicts and makes possible; but, like Wotan, he will be tempted to take the torch that starts the flame and cast it into the fire.

Man was meant to participate in the real world; there he must find his place, do his work, and achieve his fate. This triple form of world-participation is realisable most thoroughly in the intermediate world of activity, where the self, being neither wholly sensuous, nor fully spiritual, is best viewed as possessed of an activistic nature. By means of activism it becomes possible for the ego, not only to participate in the world, but to possess it in freedom. This interior conquest by the will is the supreme element in human culture; where, through art and science, the intellect invades nature, securing possession of her charms, her power; where also, by virtue of religion and ethics, it triumphs over her, and establishes a world of values in place of a world of things. Such was the work of human history, wherein the ego obtained a victory over exterior realities. "In fact," says Stirner, "ancient history ends with this—that 'I' have struggled until I won my ownership of the world."² Stirner's assertion, that, having overcome the natural order, the ego will further triumph over the spiritual one as well, involves an egoism which is alien to the conception and purpose of the present dialectic; but where we are seeking to establish the supremacy of the self in the worlds of appearance and activity, his Dionysian egoism is indispensable.

¹ *The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard*, tr. Hearn, p. 17.

² *The Ego and His Own*, tr. Byington, I. ii. § 3.

The dread of egoism is the dread of voluntarism ; hence the philosophic trend toward will-lessness and self-relinquishing. In *The Magic Skin*, Balzac portrays this as a monomania, under the sway of which the hero, Raphael, when on the brink of suicide, comes into possession of a charm which fulfilled every desire of its owner. The only drawback to the possession of such a charm consisted in the circumstance that, with the bestowal of each boon, the skin shrank, and when it had dwindled to nothing its owner's life was to be forfeited. In surrendering it to Raphael, the curiosity-merchant included the following bit of advice: "By two instinctive processes man exhausts the springs of life within him. Two verbs cover all the forms which these two causes of death may take—To Will and To have your Will. . . . To Will consumes us, and To have our Will destroys us ; but To Know steeps our feeble organisms in perpetual calm."¹ As the hero gradually learns how fatal is the token in his possession, he endeavours simply to live without reacting upon the incitements of experience to action ; seeks indeed to share the silent moods of nature, and to "blend his life with the life of the crags."² Such a mythological presentation of the will only shows how essential to the self is its volitions ; its very being consists in a perpetual willing of its selfhood.

The self as will enters into the spirit of the universe in a way unknown to the process of perception, which yields only a superficial and shifting world-order, whose systematisation by the understanding results in nothing but a symbolic universe of forms. The activity which unifies the phenomenal with the real, here manifest through the ego, lets us more thoroughly into the secret of that mysterious work which the world for ever performs. The world as it is given to us in our experience is no world of repose, but an ever active order, which we perceive and in which we seek to participate. In his amazement Faust exclaimed, "Where can I grasp thee, thou infinite nature?"³ yet, through the will, world-like as it is, the ego may hope to obtain possession of the

¹ *Op. cit.*, Part. ii.² *Ib.*, ii.³ Part i. 102.

world of activity, there to carry on a world-work. If the universe were purely phenomenal or wholly real, this active participation were impossible, for then the only opportunity offered the ego would consist of the perceptual activity of the senses or the conceptual conduct of the understanding ; but the world is not so thoroughly ontological ; hence, with its changes, its periods of time, its activities, it invites the co-operative efforts of the human will which it has produced, freedom and fate thus combining to carry on the august activity of the world as a whole. The world of activity thus furnishes philosophy with a ready solution of the antinomy of the theoretical and practical, for knowledge observes the real world as a world of work, while the will, instead of functioning in a formal, resultless fashion, acts in a real manner in the performance of a deed which has its office in the universe. When metaphysics presents the picture of a finished world, it seems to obviate the necessity of any ethical striving on the part of the will, whence the ego is constrained to believe that, without work in the world, its life consists of either hedonic ease, or a rigorous *relinquo sui* ; indeed, the lack of genuine activism has been responsible for much of the obscurity in ethics, which could not decide just what the will was supposed to accomplish. On the other hand, the moralistic view of things, by contrasting the ideal with the real, tends to discountenance dialectics, and to confuse philosophy with the thoughtless belief in the "supremacy of the practical reason." Now the thought of the world as an activity indicates a common ground where thinking and doing, the real and ideal, may meet without compromising limitations, just as it apprises the ego that, vast and complete as the world may seem, there is still a work for the will, which can overcome Faust's difficulty and lay hold of the world of causes. Thus to will the self is none the less to will the world.

2. THE SUPREMACY OF SELFHOOD

The emphasis we have had to place upon the will may have worked to obscure the fact that it is the ego which is

the source of the spontaneity. If, therefore, philosophy desires to emancipate the ego from intellectualism, it must not fail to observe that the work of liberation is not complete until the ego is delivered from voluntarism also. The domination of Hegel's absolutistic logic is no worse than the tyranny of Kant's ethics. For this reason we desire to accentuate the supremacy of selfhood in the world of activity. The active reception of the world of experience, as it was observed in the phenomenal order, is now seen to consist of the free work of the ego as it sought to gain possession of its own world. As consciousness does not simply exist or go on, but exerts itself in the form of conduct, so the ego is not merely afferent and imitative, but efferent and spontaneous in its relation to the world. This peculiar character of the will is usually expressed as its freedom, upon which the control of self and the ownership of the world is supposed to rest. To explain, or even to conceive of such freedom in a manner agreeable to both intellect and will, has been a puzzle for two thousand years. The libertarian, in withdrawing the will from the world of causes, could invest it with nothing but an arbitrary character wherein its freedom was supposed to consist. The chief aim seems to have been to create a contrast between freedom and fate. But, suppose that the exterior world is not the fixed, finished system which is dreaded by the libertarian as it is exalted in the mind of the determinist; and suppose further that the freedom in question, instead of involving the will's ability to act, implies as well the ego's power to exist; will not the problem recast itself in a more complete, if not more intelligible manner? It is not our purpose to effect the dialectical withdrawal of the will from the world, but to attempt to adjust the ego to the place where it can accomplish its destined work. Therefore, it is not a situation wherein the active will separates from the static world of things, but a fully energised arrangement, according to which the self-asserting ego acts within and reacts upon the dynamic order about it. In the one world of activity, liberty and law are not at the opposed poles of the static system of reality;

indeed, where dialectics interests itself in the larger problem of selfhood, its place in nature, its supremacy over the world, the importance of freedom as a will-freedom is eclipsed. The world is not as mechanical as the inorganic view of things led us to suppose, and without indulging in romance we may speak of the world as striving toward some remote goal. With the human will the character of this goal, as something possessing value, becomes apparent. As the understanding transforms impressions into ideas, so the will transmutes impulses into volitions; thus does the world interiorise itself.

Freedom, therefore, is a turning inward of the world of activity, whence the resemblance and rivalry between liberty and law. Through the freedom of inner activity the ego's will becomes creative, and while never out of the world, the self is not entangled in its manifold of forces. As the study of the world of appearance revealed the ego's superiority to the unconscious universe, so the development of the world of activity discloses the increased superiority of the self in the form of inner freedom. The purely libertarian argument seeks to show how, as the various impulses arise before the mind, the will selects the one which seems most suitable; but such an arrangement would not evince that inward superiority of the ego which our dialectic seeks to point out in connection with the self-activity of the ego. The traditional view does not include anything in the form of newness, for it assumes that the elements are all given to the will which chooses where it cannot create. The supremacy of the ego, however, demands the creative, without which the self may not be said to have a work in the world. Nature effects her plans according to age-long and invariable methods; the ego in its free individuality transcends this order, and performs a work *sui generis*.

As far as the free acts of the self are subsumable under any category, they are amenable to the one system of activity pervading the world. Determinism, which relinquishes all to law, has no place for the activity that occupies a place and exerts an influence midway between the fixed orders of

phenomena and noumena. If the whole energy of the universe cannot be classified as will, it is no more easily treated as force; and, since Schopenhauer, philosophy is about as ready to refer the will to nature as to reduce volition to mechanical force. The outer activity of the world and the inner activity of the ego are so comparable as urge us to connect rather than to separate them, even where such a method involves the paradoxes of the "world-will" and the "free necessity." In distinction from both libertarianism and determinism, voluntarism views the will in its proper position; that is, in the world of activity. Only in such an energistic order can the will perform its work, as it is only by means of the forces of nature that the human body can execute its movements. And just as freedom is subordinate to activism, so is it also subservient to egoism, since it is the way in which the self shows its supremacy to the outer world.

Both freedom and fate present similar aspects, as they likewise reduce to activity as their common denominator. Seemingly independent of reason, taking place *a priori*, conducting themselves in an arbitrary fashion, both freedom and fate defy explanation. Instead of constituting a passive order of being, the world consists of a vast field of action, where the ego, in its self-affirmation, opposes itself to something not unlike its own nature, the two carrying on a constant interplay. This interactivity of freedom and fate conveys the impression that the world possesses the ego, in the same way that it exercises sway over unintelligent forms of nature, when with these forms there is no such competition. In the case of the ego, the will plays a lyrical part in a drama to which the world contributes the epic situation. Or, to use a less happy analogy, the will at times "plays the part of fate," as did the murderous Madame de Saint-Estève in Balzac's *Cousin Betty*. And as the work of man looks like the work of fate, one may say, as did Flaubert in *Sentimental Education*, "our fate is more like ourselves than we are aware." With the same poetic desire to interweave freedom and fate, Ibsen makes his Julian the Apostate the mere tool of the World-Will, so that the hero is called

upon to will the "free necessity."¹ If Geulincx was justified in declaring *nescio, ergo non facio*, whereby he sought to show how our ignorance of any causal connection between mind and body revealed our inability to effect any causal movement, we feel ready to assert that where there is knowledge of the world of activity as a whole, and where reason has penetrated to the depths of causality as *actio immanens*, there is also the freedom that the ego requires in order to carry on its world-work.

3. THE WORK OF THE SELF

Having found the ego to be fitted for the free possession of the world, our dialectic must now examine into the way the will functions in the peculiar work of the self. The ego is not given in nature, but is asserted freely from within—that is the first thing to appreciate. Egoism has been set aside in both ethics and metaphysics because this lesson has not been learned, the thinker being able to see in the self nothing but the possibilities of self-love and solipsism. From the voluntaristic standpoint these conclusions are impossible, because the self, instead of being identified with a feeling or a percept, is set off in independence by means of its own self-assertion. At the extremes of dialectic, or with the sensuous and the spiritual, the ego tends to lose somewhat of its individuality, which here is submerged in sense, there surrendered to spirit. But, with the will to selfhood, the originality and spontaneity of the self are reinforced by the will.

Since selfhood cannot be taken for granted, but must be made the goal of the will, it were well to consider the more exact nature of the work the ego is called upon to perform in the world of activity. This is an inner one, whose positive features, as they are discernible in ethics and religion, will be the next topic to consider. Here it is necessary to point out in preliminary manner how essential to the self is its own deed-activity. No wonder that psychology cast out the "soul," when it refused to abandon its inner seclusion

¹ *Cæsar's Apostasy*, tr. Archer, Act iii.

and take up its work in the world. But when active selfhood takes the place and assumes the responsibilities of the soul, the exigencies of spiritual life are considered in a manner more forceful and no less worthy. As long as philosophy can resist the temptation to surrender to science and society, both of which are soulless and of nominalistic import, it may be able to recoup its losses when it devotes its attention to the work of the self in the world. Ethical self-assertion is carried on in opposition to other selves, or to the selflike social order, whence its difficulty; but dialectical egoism, as here conceived, involves an antipathy which is confined to the impersonal order of nature. Thus the question, "Shall I be myself as such, or shall I submit?" has a simpler solution in speculation than in practice. He who ponders over such a question will do well to consider the respective advantages of interior and exterior life; then he may be ready to regard the self as the proper object of the will, without which the self can hardly be said to exist.

The positive will to be makes more vivid an impression upon the mind when it is contrasted with its rival, the will not to be. How blind has been philosophy not to have observed that the antique contrast between being and non-being has a modern significance almost terrible to contemplate. From Hobbes to Nietzsche, from Geulincx to Wagner, this contrast, this burning antinomy has been contemplated as a fascination. Where the Dionysiac in man urges him to exist in all the fullness of his earth-life, the calmer Apollonian mood counsels the passivity of contemplation; where Siegfried affirms his being as that which belongs to him, Tristan denies his individual right to continue his existence, and surrenders to a *göttlich ewiges Ur-Vergessen*.¹ Whatever be one's ultimate view of life, he cannot deny the fact that spiritual negation is possible for man, whose existence is so slenderly connected with and meagrely interpreted by nature that the physical fact of self-existence is no necessary ground for self-assertion, which must come from within. This work of self-affirmation thus becomes doubly necessary in the life of

¹ *Tristan und Isolde*, Act iii. sc. 1.

man, who must resist the absorbing influences of both the natural and the spiritual. With the final view of the world before us as will be found in the following book, this problem of self-despection will assume a somewhat different character.

Another effort to rid philosophy of the self consists in relegating it to the phenomenal, where the work of self-hood is set at naught. Schopenhauer goes so far as to regard the ego as an illusion, the dire effects of whose self-individuation are to be offset by negating the will-to-live.¹ The intellectualism of Herbart, while not quite so stringent in its treatment of selfhood, sought to set aside the ego as a contradiction to be removed from dialectics.² But the retreat from reality is as impossible in theory as it is unworthy in ethics; the plan of being, as it is discovered by the self, is progressive, so that the ego is destined to advance from sense to will, from will to intellect. The self cannot be set aside, even where it seems superficial and contradictory. The list of those who have never doubted the self is not long, but it is influential, as we noted in the Introduction.³ Among those who seek to advance the interests of spiritual life apart from the ego stands Eucken, who observes the necessary "elevation of self-affirmation to egoism," which latter he disclaims because he identifies the self with the "individual atom" of the spiritual order.⁴ In the development of his own system of *Personakwelt*, he speaks of personal being as *Weltwesen*; he seems to change his point of view from the egoism of Hobbes to that of Descartes and Fichte, which he regards with approval.⁵ From the standpoint of the present dialectic the ego is regarded as passing through several stages, whereby the self of sense, in all its individuation, yields to the self of will, which, instead of merely existing, asserts itself in connection with a world-work of its own. The true fate of the ego, therefore, consists in re-entering its own as a realm of interior existence.

The categorical imperative of all individualism is, "Be

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 66.

² *Metaphysik*, §§ 309-12.

³ § 3.

⁴ *Einheit d. Geisteslebens*, pp. 177-86.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 357.

thymself"; inasmuch as the ego has departed from its selfhood, this amounts to saying, *Rentre toi-même*. Impersonal science, whether physical or social, can claim the self no longer, for it has learned how to assert itself in opposition to the world of exteriority, where the traditional forces of both speculation and practice have long been acting centrifugally, as they have urged the ego out of himself; but none the less is it possible to induce the self back into its world of interiority, where alone it can perform the work it is destined to do. By assigning to the ego this world-work, the dialectics of selfhood saves the self from the irrationality of Dionysian egoism; at the same time, such a work avoids the paradox of altruism, according to which the self is supposed to live for some form of the not-self. The true egoist, aware of and faithful to his work of selfhood, will be found among neither the sheep of socialism nor the goats of egoism. So vast is selfhood that when one affirms his inner existence he does it with a *largesse* which raises him above minor metaphysical and moral distinctions. Genuine egoism towers above both individuation and solidarity, and the ego that has willed itself is as lofty as the *Moïse* of Alfred de Vigny, *puissant et solitaire*. Such an ego, interiorised and voluntarised as it is, indicates somewhat of the significance of selfhood as our dialectic conceives it; moreover, with its romanticism, which contrasts favourably with the realism of Stendhal and Dostoievsky, it makes the ego seem more attractive, more tenable.

Without a sufficient philosophy of work, all voluntarism falls to the ground. In elaborating such an activistic system, the central position of the ego becomes a determining factor. Shall work spring from necessity or from idea? Shall the worker consult the consequences of his labour, or toil on for the very work's sake? Shall the will depend upon inness and spontaneity, or shall it await the demand of the social order about it? Such questions seem to focus about the ego and non-ego, whence the problem becomes one of selfhood or service. The theory of service is fully organised, fully equipped, so that he who devotes himself to impersonal

humanity will never feel "powerful and solitary." But with the egoist the case does not stand thus; in the midst of exceptional work he begins to appreciate the world-withdrawal that his inner conduct causes him, and thus he falls a victim to self-distrust, a Hamletism, or Tassoism, if we may thus refer to Goethe's drama of genius. As Verlaine said of Poictevin, in his ode to the latter's genius, *Toujours mécontent de son œuvre*, so one may say of the egoistic worker, who is ever dissatisfied with his work. On the other hand, the anonymous worker, bent upon service, loses first his originality, then his selfhood, and in his social automatism he is no longer able to will himself, but must suffer his activities to stream out in an impersonal direction. As our first American egoist remarked, "What is so rare with a man as a deed of his own?" Nevertheless, the egoistic situation is by no means a happy one, as these references to genius will attest; for which reason it becomes necessary to expand the individualistic deed to the proportions of world-work; only when it assumes epic proportions may it stand for the work of the ego in the world.

Nothing is so common as activity, nothing so rare as world-work. Every one who comes to the consciousness of himself as one who has a place and a function in the social order, and who feels none the less that his life is the self where he has a work of his own, must be struck with the way in which both nature and society seem to have conspired against the internal and unique in humanity. That which is immediate and efficient is approved without question, but that which is remote and contemplative becomes the subject of scorn. This condition of things acts not only to discourage and defeat self-activism, but to instil subtle doubt into the brain of the self that works from within, so resultless does such individualistic work appear to be. Individuality is thus lost to view, while egoism, genuine inner egoism, is condemned. Everywhere, the forces that are in operation seem to have no other purpose than the production of an impersonal, sub-human world-order where improvising self-activity is for ever in vain.

4. THE POSITIVE FORM OF SELF-ACTIVISM

The system of self-activism, which leads the ego to react upon nature and retreat to the interior life, instead of constituting a mere ideal to be found here and there in the exceptional personality, is in reality the constructive principle in the spiritual activity of humanity at large. Confined to the genius, it were but a curiosity to be investigated in the form of a special study of the Lombroso type; but as the very theme of human activity as such, it becomes an imperative study, in which the case of genius is but the leading motive. By consulting the history of human work, we may assure ourselves that the world-work of the ego is a reality, its positive results bearing witness to causes that have been operative. This appeal to the result is by no means a relapse into the immediacies of utilitarianism, for the reason that what is willed by the ego is the permanent and remote in the form of the ideal, which nowhere assumes a particular and temporary character, positive though it may be. The evidence of such positive world-work on the part of the ego is to be found in ethics and religion, whose underlying principles, when viewed from within, will be found to consist in characteristic affirmations on the part of the self.

Human ethical activity tends toward a complete deed in whose performance consists the dignity of life. The usual methods of morals do not reveal this, so taken up are they with single principles, as natural desire and rational duty, whose natures seem to be mutually exclusive. The unity of human activity, however, cannot tolerate such internecine conflicts, for the world-work of the ego is a total deed-activity, wherein the self in its unity confronts the world of force as a whole. The reality of such self-activity is shown in the ideal of self-renunciation, under whose influence the ego wills its own non-being as though that were of supreme value. But even in such an extraordinary instance as that of self-despection, the self as self, and not the impersonal order without, is the object of affirmation. Whether the

method be positive or negative, the ego possesses the intelligence and power to will the self or the world, to assert or to negate; this ethical possibility demonstrates its position in the world.

The effect of the ethical argument is to detach the ego from the world, and then re-relate it to the universal order in a way that with its mere existence in the world would be impossible. Without the recognition of the inness and totality of the self, the ethical problem is only half intelligible, for it does not account for the actor or the deed which he performs; moreover, ethics can have only a local significance due to the mere relation of the self to the social order, or to a separate principle of virtue. Criticism is so ready to treat egoism with disapproval, that it is well to bear in mind how the inner essence of morality as something of intrinsic value is expressed by egoism better than by any scheme of social objectivity, inasmuch as the latter tends to secularise and popularise ethics by means of the immediacies of utility. Where self-activism conserves the rich content of the moral life, the contrary scheme tends to debase it; meanwhile, it will become more and more apparent that a doctrine based upon the self has about it an ever-increasing depth unknown in the region of the social. Instead of sustaining relations to society alone, the self is *en rapport* with the world as a whole; the defence of egoism is also a defence of the spiritual order to which the solitary self attaches itself. Without the inner ego, the attempt to organise a dialectics of morality is absurd, for the remoteness of reality is appreciated by the exceptional individual where it is unknown to the mass.

The religious activity of the self is even more convincing as an argument in favour of a unified world-work, just as the description of it is capable of more graphic expression. Where morality wills the world as ideal, religion affirms the spiritual content of the activity in a supreme manner. Religion attempts to express the activity of the ego in its unity, where other forms of culture portray it in part only; the reason for this is to be found in the essence of religion

as the self-affirmation of the soul in opposition to the world. In the religious consciousness of humanity the ideal of world-overcoming is by no means exceptional, whence religion becomes a convincing form of deed-activity, whose sufficiency cannot be gainsaid. So bound up is religion with the sympathistic, so identified is it with the spiritual order to which it belongs, that the egoistic element in it is often lost to view; but when the essence of religion, as attempt to transcend nature, is taken into account, the inward affirmation of spiritual life becomes one with the will to selfhood. In Vedanta with its principle of the Self, in Christianity with its ideal of the soul, in the theology of Augustine and the theism of Descartes with their common centre in the knowing ego, the appeal to selfhood in contrast to sense is candid and direct.

Through the affirmation of selfhood these forms of religion and theology made their way to the spiritual world-order; perhaps at last the self was destined to be submerged in some superior notion, so that egoism was not to be the final form of inner life; but the fact remains that, apart from the ego, these spiritual assertions were not to be made. The form of self-affirmation was an intro-activism, whereby man was urged to negate the immediate, however obvious and interesting it might appear. This assumed the character of a redemption of the individual soul, concerned as was the ego for itself. With Vedanta, the assertion of selfhood was made upon a speculative basis, on the ground that the world of externality was misleading; with Christianity, the appeal was more of an ethical nature, whence the soul was estimated to outvalue the world. From these stand-points, the religious consciousness deduces the following formulæ of world-work, which were so characteristic of the Founder of Christianity: "I have overcome the world"; "All power is given me, both in heaven and earth." From such utterances, as well as from others of a similar but less intense nature in the literature of Taoism and Buddhism, philosophy learns by what extraordinary means the religious ego sets about its task of asserting itself in contrast to the

world. Through such a *göttlicher Egoismus*, as Schlegel called it, the ego asserts itself in a manner unheard of in other forms of human culture. Having gained ascendancy over the world, and with the complete possession of itself, the ego then ponders over the problem, whether it should be itself or relinquish its own selfhood to some larger ideal. Here, when we seek to discover the dialectical conditions of world-work, that reality, instead of being devoted to the fixed forms of appearance and substantiality, is possessed also of an energistic nature in which the ego and its activity find their place.

5. THE WORLD-WORK OF THE EGO

Philosophy has been so taken up with the question of being that it has not had opportunity to discuss the problem of activity, as it bears upon human work ; hence in such a system as the present one, where we seek to locate the ego in the world, the puzzle of the will, as it seeks to perform some characteristic deed in the world, becomes an inquiry of first moment. Ethics is not always able to further the work of humanity in the world of forces, because it has no philosophy of activity, but tends rather to take this for granted. Nevertheless, the question of the ego's activity is not something to be set aside as beyond dispute, nor may it be considered an overcome standpoint ; on the contrary, dialectics must treat it as an independent problem. The purely utilitarian view of morality, as also the rigoristic notion of conduct, is of no avail when the problem of work is discussed ; for, where one theory binds man to the objects of immediate interest, the other is content to frustrate natural impulses, while the leading motive in activity is left untouched. But it is presumable that man has an essential part to play in the drama of reality, just as it is thinkable that human work forms a constructive phase of being. Yet work must be rendered interior and intelligible if it is to assume any dialectical position, and this is the principle that dialectics must itself point out. The religious systems that

have had to do with assisting the self in finding its place in the world have been efficient also in determining the essential nature of human work; where they have been unable to come to any positive conclusion, they have not failed to assert that this work, instead of occupying itself with the ordinary activities of the will, is devoted to such a superior form of striving that it could be regarded in a negative manner only. Thus, while they seem to doubt whether the ego has any real work to perform, they never fail to indicate that, if such work exists, it must consist of the exceptional. Taoism represents this work, if such it may be called, in the form of pure passivity, analogous to the influence of water: "The softest thing in the world dashes against and overcomes the hardest; that which has no substantial existence enters where there is no crevice. I know not what advantage belongs to doing nothing with a purpose."¹ In the Yoga philosophy one encounters a similar ideal of human doing, expressed as it is in the form of "worklessness."² Nor does the New Testament see fit to regard human activity in a fashion much more substantial; for, as Christ counselled His hearers against attempting such impossible things as the increase of one's stature, so St. Paul argues against the works of the law, and teaches that the soul is saved through faith.

In modern philosophy the question of activism is bound up with the problem of egoism, and thought attempts to show that the selfhood and activity are as inseparable as mind and thought. Among the Cartesians, with their problem of psycho-physical interaction, the ideas of Geulincx are most instructive in pointing out how essential it is to relate the ego to its world-work, if indeed such a form of activity exists. As an occasionalist, Geulincx set aside all connection between the mental motive within and the bodily motion without, and for the reason that consciousness of such a relation was wanting. This seems to deprive the ego of all opportunity to carry on any commerce with the world;

¹ *Tao Teh King*, tr. Legge, Part ii. ch. 43.

² *Bhagavad Gita*, tr. Telang, chs. iii.-vi.

and having started with the maxim, *nescio, ergo non facio*,¹ he is led to conclude that the self has no world-work to perform—in *hoc mundo me extra me nihil agere posse*.² Here was laid the basis of his ethics of self-despection and renunciation, for he argued that, since man can do nothing, he should will nothing, but relinquish all to God: *Nihil valeo, nihil volo; totum Deo relinquo*.³ Saturated with this idea of dialectical passivity, Geulincx turns to the ego, whose inability to accomplish any work in the world argues for its self-hatred; among the arrows directed against the ego are: *incuria sui, neglectus sui, contemptus sui*.⁴ Nietzsche, who is so bitterly opposed to the self-despection of Geulincx's ethics, really argues to the same end, since he concludes that, with all the activity of the will-to-power, all is in vain; thus does his Dionysian pessimism lead him to an *Umsonst*. How much more important than the formal questions of psycho-physical interaction and the freedom of the will is this question concerning the world-work of the self! Has man a calling? Does the activity which aims at the remote produce result? Is there any sense in human striving, or is it all a "doing nothing," a "worklessness," a *non facio*, an *Umsonst*?

Our present age finds it difficult to believe and further a form of activity which, instead of responding to the incitements of the Immediate, stretches out toward the Remote. Culture must yield to commerce, the inner organisation of the soul to the external aggrandisement of life. "Are we that which is within us?" Have we as free egos found the work that the self is called upon to do? Have we willed the self and the Beyond, or have we accepted the given and taken all for granted? If the life of man afford no opportunity for the self to do its work, it is indeed in vain. But the study of reality from the egoistic standpoint constantly assures us that man as man has a work to perform, as Aristotle argued; thus conceived, the activity of the human will may be interpreted as world-work. The

¹ Cf. *supra*, v.

² *Ethica*, Tr. I., cap. ii. sec. 2, § 2.

³ *Ethica Annota*, Ad. Tr. I., cap. ii. sec. 2, § 25.

⁴ *Ib.*, sec. 2, § 1.

works of the human will are so distinct from the products of nature that, where the latter may reduce to conceptual classes, the free acts of man, being creative, are independent of such subordination. It was in this spirit of voluntarism that Schopenhauer argued against the intellectualism of Plato, where the latter insisted that, as there were general ideas of plant and animal, so there were general ideas of manufactured articles, like table and bed.¹ The characteristic work of the will does seem to escape the stamp of generalisation, so that, with other evidence, it may be shown that the work of the self in the world is original if not of the superior order sought.

Whether we may draw a conclusion in favour of the universal work in question, we are in a position to assert that the self-activity of the ego is such as to justify a distinction between lower and higher forms of human industry. Man has work and work; the one inferior, the other superior. Here, his activities stream out almost unconsciously, in response to immediate necessity; there, they are sent forth as willed from within as a characteristic deed. The superior work of the ego is individual and creative; it tends to end in idea; the inferior activity is external and sensuous in its materiality. The inner work of the will, recognised by Schopenhauer, was elaborated more artistically and effectively by Wagner, with its theory of music as an expression of the will.² But not only the fine art of music, which Wagner regarded as the supreme form of interior activity, but the whole realm of culture constitutes an inner sphere of activity whose essential character is creative. Only as such a realm is postulated can the activity of the self have any value, any meaning, and where our own age continues to build up the world of externals, the need of constructive culture becomes more and more apparent.

Creative world-work on the part of the ego involves not only the idea of an inwardness, but of a beyond. When we discussed the problem of time, we sought to show how

¹ *Republic*, Bk. x. 596-7.

² *Schriften u. Dichtungen*, Bd. ix. p. 72.

the will-to-eternalise, *der Wille zum Verewigen*, transforms the temporal into the permanent by investing it with a spiritual content of supreme value. In the historical, affirmations of religion and the free creations of an art-epoch will show just what this eternalising really means, just as they indicate the way in which it is accomplished. Toiling in the temporal, humanity is ever plagued by the thought that this is all; the work has about it nothing inwardly intelligible, nothing of an ultimate character. But when we reflect upon the essence of this work, we observe that it does not simply take place, but is willed freely from within by an agency of a spontaneous nature, the ego. In this manner temporal activity, when it is an activity and not a mere happening, has about it something suggestive of real work. The spiritual life in the world, evoking an independent intelligence in the ego, is equally efficient in providing the self with a work worthy of its strivings; if the self has a place, it has a mission also. The ego and its work stand or fall together; and where, as in the case of individual genius or human culture, there appears the manifestation of extraordinary deed-activity, it is presumable that its source is to be found in an independent order of spiritual life. Such work, of value in itself, is none the less a means of evoking the powers of interior life, a condition of things in which egoism is superior to activism. In Turgénieff's romance called *Smoke*, Potugin asserts "that we are indebted to civilisation, not alone for knowledge, art, and law, but for the fact that the very sentiment of beauty and poetry is developed and enters into force under the influence of that same civilisation."¹ This is indeed the idea of work we are now contemplating as the world-work of the self; it assumes an external form and fulfils an external mission, but its influence does not end here; it evokes and elaborates an inner, intellectual order of being more important than the outer one.

The responsibility for real work in the world has usually been borne by the ethical, but with the growth of activism

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Hapgood, xiv. p. 156.

as such, the old appeal to the ethical world-order and the metaphysics of morals will not serve to express the anxiety man feels about his mission. Morality that is based upon maxims, like the categorical imperative and the law of utilitarianism, can hardly be conceived as serving to interpret the work of the self, so that the problem of interior activity must be discussed in an extra-ethical manner. Ordinary activity, as explained by the utilitarian, and moral striving, as the rigorist commends it, are not sufficient to convince us that man has a work which he is doing. As Kuvalda, in Gorky's *Creatures that once were Men*, said, "We all live in the world without sufficient reason."¹ The lack of such a ground for existence appears most painfully when one is anxious to take up some work whose dignity shall be worthy of his strivings, a work which shall be real and resultful.

What can we do—*Was können wir thun?* Kant, who was in the habit of raising the will above the intellect, believed that as the path closed to thought it opened to action. Hence his question concerned the faculties of the understanding rather than the powers of the will. But suppose that willing is dependent upon knowing, so that man cannot take up his work until he has been able to discover and comprehend it, may we not change his question, as indeed we have done, and indulge our doubts practically as he indulged them speculatively? The present dialectic has sought to point out that action like thought is a problem, and one to be solved by a metaphysical method which regards activity as one of the essential elements in reality. When activity has found its place between appearance and substance, the time comes when the independent work of the ego may receive recognition; having willed the self, the ego is ready to take up its world-work. Far from considering this work as something wholly new and without relation to the usual activity of humanity, we have sought to point out that the effort on the part of the self to assert itself in the world, as this is manifest in ethics, in religion, and in culture,

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Shirazi, 2nd ed., p. 17.

is to be understood as an attempt to accomplish work indeed. To look for activity in itself were as unontological as to search for the thing in itself; and just as metaphysics seeks the substantial in the phenomenal, so must it view the activity of the will in such a manner as to evince its reality.

Thus understood, work does not seem threatened with the In-vain of nihilism, but becomes a constructive part of reality. To assure our selves that the ego has some better mission than that of worklessness, we must distinguish between work as an external performance confined to the world of appearance, and work as an interior deed which elaborates an independent order of culture and spiritual life—one is economic, the other ethical. Indeed, the genuine activity of the ego transcends the ethical as the ethical transcends the economic. The self cannot be itself alone; not that it needs other selves of like nature and with the same problem of work before them, but it requires suitable means for the elaboration of the inner life as an activity. Where the threat of nihilism is raised, it is only the ego negating the present activity of man on the ground of an ideal which transcends what has been accomplished. Nihilism urges the abolition of present ideals, even when it can secure no others in their stead. But where the work of the will seems in vain, the worth of the self is called into question, for the very act of repudiating the work done is an affirmation of the ego in its superiority. As Ernest Hello expressed it, *Le grand homme est supérieur à ses actes*.¹ Such superiority raises the ego to the level of world-work, which alone can express its genius.

Finally, after we have set the work of the ego in such dialectical light as to relate it to reality, we must not fail to observe that activity is not the most perfect way of comprehending reality or accounting for the self; we have defended it against nihilism, because it deserved such furtherance as philosophy could render it. The following book, devoted to the final aspect of being as substance, will be able to

¹ *Le Siècle*, x. p. 75.

advance the ego beyond its acts as the activistic treatment of it raised it above its impressions. To study the work of the ego is to realise that it cannot suffice, even when it is considered in its light of the ethical motives: the ego is superior to its acts. The common preference for activity, however, often leads philosophy to "cultivate the garden" when it cannot solve its problems; but where one may seem to build better than he knows, the activistic victory is but a passing triumph in the complete campaign of selfhood. Where *Faust*, as an activistic poem, does not fail to argue for the superiority of the will, its closing chorus warns us that the work of humanity on earth is insufficient in itself, even where it may have satisfied the strivings of the worker; and it is only as heaven stoops to touch the earth that the insufficient becomes a reality, *das Unzulängliche hier wird's Ereigniss*. The chief value of activity is the same as the supreme end of appearance; it enables man to react upon the world and secure knowledge of both inner and outer. With all the advantages of the will, we cannot conclude that the world of activity is the ultimate order of being, or that the egoistic work of the self is the supreme condition of spiritual life. Reality has more than these satisfactions in store for us, while the ego, with its self-consciousness and self-activity, has yet to learn its fate in the world.

6. WORK AND WORTH

Just as individualism makes it plain that the place of the ego in the world is to be determined by postulating a world of enjoyment, so the work of the self may be decided by raising the question of values. And just as the eudæmonistic conception of the metaphysical problem warned us that we must combat the Decadence which would remove the inner self from exterior existence, so the consideration of the value-problem will make it necessary to oppose that pessimism which despairs of finding a work for the self in the world. The purely metaphysical view of the problem

of the will's interaction with the world indicated the possibility of the free initiative on the part of the ego, but it is still to be determined whether this spontaneous form of activity is resultful and worth while. Does the world of forces, even where it affords opportunity for the activistic participation of the will, promise the individual that his work will be of value, or does one will the world in vain? Is the world a world of values? The several systems of activism which have been before us in the discussion of the World as Activity have agreed to question both the possibility and desirability of the ego's attempt to will the world. With Taoism and Geulincx, the contention was that man lacks the metaphysical power to carry on a work in the world; with Yoga and Schopenhauer, it was insisted that such work can never be resultful or valuable. In spite of such scruples it must be insisted that a system of metaphysics cannot be complete or rational unless it explain and justify the attempt on the part of the human will to assert itself and express objectively the meaning of the inner life. Man must be viewed as having a work in the world, the world as the place of worth.

In defence of the idea that the world is the place of values, it may be noted that value is essentially volitional, so that if value is a justifiable category of the human mind it is so because it is the expression of the independent activity which goes forth from the self into the world. Values do not simply exist but are created by the will of man, whether we view the activity of the will in the more immediate sense of the economic or remotely in connection with the ethical. If, therefore, man has a work, it is known to him through the idea of value, while if the will persists in asserting itself as though its activities were genuine, we may conclude that the world of worth exists.

The conception of activity which marks the second and intermediate view of the world has brought us to the place where we are able to assert that with his independent initiative the individual has the power to perform his work in the world, so that the only question is whether man has

faith in himself. The situation which confronts us is quite the contrary of that which obtained in antiquity, where the idea of world-work was neither affirmed nor denied ; indeed, one might almost conclude that man has a work in the world for the simple reason that he has begun to cast doubt upon the question of that work's worth. In the classic intuition of the will in the world, as this is reflected in ancient tragedy, the impossibility of work is made to depend upon the overpowering sense of fate, for however capable and persistent a Prometheus or an Œdipus might be, still stronger was the force of fate. In the modern intuition, as this appears in Ibsen, Wagner, and Hauptmann, it is not that fate is so strong, but that the will is so weak ; hence the doubt cast upon the value of the work which man may attempt. We have learned that man can work, but we are not so convinced that he should work, while the ancient postulated the desirability of action without being able to explain how this was possible in the world. The modern man has investigated the world of force until he has become able to say "I can," but the condition of the ego is such that he cannot say "I will."

The pessimism which has been overclouding modern thought is to be attributed to nothing more fundamental than this inherent sense of will-weakness ; it arose with the metaphysics of Geulincx, and came to its climax in the ethics of Schopenhauer. In the special case of Schopenhauer's pessimism, it must be borne in mind that the summit of the pessimistic view is not attained when the philosopher draws his melancholy picture of the fate of the will in the world, but when he deduces the moral principle that therefore man should not act, but should negate the Will-to-Live. It is in the passivism and Nirvanism that the true pessimism is to be found. The pessimism of Sophocles appears in the fact that the individual cannot act ; that of Wagner is to be attributed to the fact that the individual will not act ; where one artist leads his character to say, "I can do nothing," the other allows him to voice an "I will do nothing." In both cases the cause

of the difficulty is found in the failure to find a pathway out of the inner self to the exterior world; where in one case it is the metaphysical which stands in the way, in the other it is the moral.

Out of this pessimism, which is attributable to failure of the self to find its world-work, has grown the immoralism of modern times. Man can will, but he does not find it worth while to will the world; as a result, man wills the self. At first sight it might appear as though the modern individualist in negating the natural and social order had fallen into complete passivism, which indeed is the case here and there, as in Wagner's *Wotan*, Ibsen's *Rosmer*, and Hauptmann's *Heinrich the Bell-Founder*; but the more characteristic assertions of individualism find expression in an anti-social or immoralistic attitude, as this appears in the self-worship of Baudelaire, and the self-assertion of Wagner's *Siegfried* and Ibsen's *Nora*. There is no want of will on the part of these poets, for they arouse the individual to a supreme pitch of activity; that which is wanting is the motive which would lead the individual to emphasize his will in its attitude toward the world. The Decadent is wanting in work rather than in will; he wills himself when he should will his world, hence the anti-naturalism and anti-socialism of his life-ideal.

The remedy for this perversity of willing is to be found in both the individual and the world. It is not sufficient for the ego to will the self; the ego must also will the world as a world of work, whence the world will assume the form of a world of values. As in the case of the eudæmonism of existence where the ego sought its place, so in the work of the world it may be said that the cure for æstheticism and pessimism is to be found in a larger and more essential conception of the world where this work is to be done. Again our attention is called to the fact that philosophy owes it to the ego to provide man with a higher synthesis of reality. The world has long been viewed as a scene of things in which impersonal forces

exhibit themselves, but it has not always been surveyed as a place where the human ego does work. With the establishment of the world as a world of values, the dangers of Decadence will be offset, while the ego will be able to recognise in the world a place where genuine work is to be done.

BOOK III

THE WORLD OF REALITY
THE SELFHOOD OF THE EGO

THE FINAL VIEW OF REALITY

WITH the qualitative and activistic phases of the world disposed of, our dialectic has now to consider the real as such and for its own sake; having paid tribute to the content and function of the real, we are now privileged to view its form. In thus constituting substance a third principle of the world, we are not committing the error of foisting upon philosophy the conception of substantia as something *eo ipso*, or as a thing in itself, for the real has already been found to exist most eminently in its states and its acts. Had we no faith in the substantial, we should still need to resort to such an idea, without which the order of states and the immanence of causes could not themselves be accounted for. Our dialectic is guilty of no redundancy when it seeks to add the substantial to the phenomenal and the causal, for these affairs of quality and action are but sub-real forms of existence which point to that which is behind and beyond them. Activity is but existence *extraordinarius*, even when it performs all the functions of the real, for which reason it becomes necessary to consider existence as something emancipated from its states and its acts. But the regard that we have already paid to the inferior forms of the real should deliver our dialectic from the dogmatism of the ancient Parmenides and the modern Spinoza.

Where the final view of reality insists upon the substantial as its most superior notion, it is none the less anxious to place the intellectualistic at the same summit. Here, again, we have paved the way for intellectualism by following the paths of the sensational and the volitional; we have allowed sense to interpret the states of existence and have allotted to the will the functions of being. When, therefore, we come to the intellectual, we are not to be

charged with exclusiveness, for we have made ample provision for the other phases of consciousness. As sensation confesses its need of volition, so volition is ready to admit that its chief impulse is toward intelligibility, so that the will completes itself in the intellect. This fact is of no mean importance to the intellect, which takes on new life from the new work which it has to perform, for to exist as intellect it must subsume the data of sense and subordinate the impulses of the will.

Substance and intellect thus constitute the leading topics in the final view of the world, but it is impossible to perfect this view without meeting the problems proposed by sensation and volition as they attempt to define existence. Where one leads to illusion, the other tends to produce negation, so that the path to substance is blocked by these nihilistic conceptions. This fact will serve to account for the emphasis which we have laid upon the illusory and negativistic aspects of dialectics. Where metaphysics has usually assumed that, having found no reality, the mind is at least in a pure and receptive condition; but the history of humanity seems to show that, where the mind does not succeed in discovering that which exists, instead of waiting until the proper ontological time arrives, it proceeds to fashion such a notion as seems most expedient for practical purposes. For this reason the achievement of existence can come about only as thought applies the acid of its criticism to the soiled metal of experience.

The intellectual substantialism of this third view of reality has the effect of evoking a conception of the ego which the lower orders of existence could not enjoy. Hence, where the phenomenistic and activistic views of the world made room for certain phases of interior existence, it remains for the substantialistic view to assure that the self really has a place in the world where it works. Having overcome the fears of solipsism and egoism, we are now placed where we may freely survey the self in its world. Let it not be thought that the ego is an interloper in a world prejudiced in favour of the impersonal; the world

itself gains by the admission of the self into its borders. What is existence? Is it the place where matter is found? Is it that which expresses its being for the sake of some inferior kind of life? From the standpoint of the present dialectic, existence is the place where the self is to be found. Only the human self has caught the true spirit of existence, only the self has the capacity for states and acts as these make up the existing world. The particular determination of the self which forms the climax of these views of the ego consists in, not the self-consciousness or the self-activity, but the selfhood of the ego. Finally it appears that its fate is one with the fate of the world. The sparrow which builds in the amiable tabernacles of God does not really think to have found for herself that place which the self secures in the world-whole; there the self is at home, for there it finds the response which comes to its being as deep calls unto deep. As the ego found its place by means of the *æsthetical* and conceived of its work in the world through the *ethical*, it must now employ *religion* to aid it in discovering its fate.

I

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ILLUSION

WITH the opening of the final seal of the world, where we attempt to view reality as such, we find that appearance and activity are still with us, and while they have had their hearing in their respective worlds, they invade the real order whose fundamental character they screen from the eyes. For this reason it becomes necessary to anticipate the striving after reality, where the mind in its purity seeks the real and true, by examining the pseudo-real forms of thinghood as these are offered by the subordinate realms of being. As appearance will be found to create illusion, activity will be none the less influential in producing negation. The danger of illusion is one which has never been fully appreciated in philosophy, which has assumed that the native attitude of the mind is so Cartesian, so sceptical that reason must do all in its power to allay the inexorable doubt. Such, however, is not the true state of the case, and in an age like our own, where we have learned the sad ethical truth that man must be instructed in individuality, for the reason that he never suspects his own selfhood, so we are advised that man must be taught to doubt, since he is not Cartesian but credulous. When philosophy comes upon the scene it does not find an empty mind which it must fill, but a mental system in full operation; the office of philosophy is that of guiding this system to its rational purpose. If metaphysics were confronted by a barren field which must be tilled and planted, rather than by a virgin forest of tangled growth, its work would be of a purely constructive nature; but where sensation has supplied the mind with a rich harvest of native ideas, where the will has created forms of its own device, the first duty of reason consists in clearing the structure of thought of its scaffolding, while it must likewise

clear the ground of its wild growth. Then the supremacy of the intellect will reappear in our philosophy.

In allowing appearance, as also activity, to express itself before the genuine work of dialectics was done by the intellect itself, we were only paying tribute to the humanistic nature of genuine philosophy. In such a philosophy, which strives to be natural, the situation that presents itself is not that of a sun-clear mind viewing the world from without, but of a rather cloudy intellect that has grown up in nature as a part of the system which now it affects to judge as to reality and unreality. And because the human mind is human indeed, it cannot treat the phenomenal in a purely mathematical manner while it considers the activistic in a merely physical fashion, for both of these subordinate forms of being have long since crept into the blood, whereby we humans are creatures of illusion and negation and may never succeed in finding the real world. A philosopher like Descartes, already convinced of the truth of rationalism, may allow something to the function of doubt, for he verily knows that at any moment he can relieve the whole situation by means of the suppressed major premise, All things are rational. In the same insincere fashion Hume can afford to let go his hold upon causality, for his settled empiricism places him in a position where he can always say, Things are what they are. But those who have no professional scheme of doubt, and who realise that the mind as such is prejudiced in favour of belief, are now called upon to clear the mind of the uncritical notions and blind impulses that have ever beset it. Human life is built upon illusion, so that its foundations must ever be renewed; it is like a cathedral which begins to crumble before it is completed, so that building and repair must go on hand in hand.

I. ILLUSION AND APPEARANCE

In the striving after reality we are beset, not with ignorance, but with illusion; hence we must turn our

dialectical activity in the direction of a perverted rather than an empty notion of being. Our real enemy in this field is not the illusive notion, but the fixed idea, which is all too vivid. In striving after the real we struggle against the unreal, for the flower of human thought has been nourished, not only by the light from above, but by the darkness about its roots. The reason for human illusion is not easily determined, if indeed it is necessary to explain it at all, but the fact remains—we are the victims of false ideas. Perhaps man, in his anxiety to discover the real, has made use of the material that seemed obvious to him because it was nearest at hand; perhaps the human interest clouded the vision, so that the mind which could arrange its earthly affairs by assuming the fixity of the earth and the permanence of species closed its eyes to the truths of the planet's revolution and the species' transmutation. But whether it was the error of sense or the error of volition, the mind has indulged it to the full; so that philosophy is in a position where it must regard illusion as something almost categorical in its nature. Why our modern realism should seek to perpetuate this over-wrought tendency on the part of human imagination, why our pragmatism should aid the will in its constant attempt to foist the life-lie upon us, is to be explained only by assuming that those who uphold and further such uncritical philosophies have never noticed the tendency on the part of the mind to delude itself with the impressions and impulses which its immediate life in the world makes unavoidable.

Our human patient has the dialectical drug-habit. Under the influence of rationalism we were led to believe that it was difficult to find reality, so that our constant dread was one of atheism and agnosticism; but now it appears that the mind of man, instead of waiting to doubt, has gone on to gorge itself with illusions, and instead of working to quarry the proper building-material has hastily erected a wooden edifice which cannot stand the strain of existence. The mind has fabricated where it could find; all its available space is now occupied by buildings of some sort, whence it

becomes necessary to recognise the power of illusion, and to raze the condemned structures it has been erecting for our habitation. Strindberg discerned the illusion in his own life when he made his Autobiography read, "How terrible to search for God and find the Devil; that is what happened to me." This is very like the condition of mankind as such; it has sought God, and instead of coming back empty handed, with a genuine atheism, it has brought in the Devil. Man must be taught to doubt and deny, because his mind is an assenting mind, while his spirit is ever guileless.

The world of appearance, whose forms were made the subject of study in Book I., instead of being a passive order which does not molest the mind, is possessed of a positive influence, as a result of which the mind finds itself anæsthetised. If it were merely a curtain which could be drawn, the situation would not be so serious; but sensation acts as a net which entangles us, and with this snare we must ever struggle to extricate ourselves. How often does man accept appearance as reality, and how ready he is to repose in the immediate world-order! How naturally does the will respond to impulses that are as shallow and resultless as the impressions which accompany them! When metaphysics realises that it is called upon to supply the life of humanity with a goal for its inner activity, with a motive for its work, it will be careful in its selection of principles, for it will see that philosophy is dealing with an illusion-loving creature who knows all too well how to believe, but who has not been shown how he should doubt. From the course of civilisation we observe how easy it is for the phenomenal so to enter the brain as to give history a false scent, while the parallel history of culture reveals the same tendency to approve and pursue ideas that are in themselves without meaning. Human nature is easily betrayed into the hands of some impression, some impulse which has no foundation in the real nature of things, but the mere detection of the error does not prevent the false idea from persisting indefinitely. This strange condition of things is due to the fact that man is credulous, while the world of immediacy, as it

reveals itself in perception and volition, is impressive; thus the mind hardly dares doubt nature, even when it knows that she is setting a snare before its very eyes.

Not only does the human mind find a snare in the phenomenal world, but it has enemies within its own domain. When man has fashioned an intellectual weapon, he has sometimes turned it toward his own breast. Culture may mislead man, who thus becomes the victim of his ideals. In the instance of classicism, which idealised to such a degree that one saw in art nothing but the type in its perfection, there arose an unwarranted optimism which the realistic facts of human existence could permanently tolerate, and the endeavour to find perfection in the world of sense led to one of the august illusions of human history. In mediævalism the human mind was first saved and then lost by its faith, and for another thousand years the mind entertained and contended for an impossible view of the world. The same power of illusion is abroad to-day, for why should it spare modern science when it infected ancient art and mediæval religion? We are deceived, not only by our ignorance of nature, but by our very knowledge of her. As Gorky says, "Science is a divine beverage, but up to the present time it has not got through fermenting, and is unfit for use, like vodka which has not been clarified from fusil oil. Science is not yet ready for man's happiness, and all that living people who use it get out of it is headache."¹ No one cares to speak of science as being "untrue," but we cannot overlook the fact that man has ever been deceived, and in an age which is so thoroughly given up to things external and eudæmonistic as to be off its guard, we are not likely to escape to-day. Our desire to establish an intellectualistic view of the world is thus due very largely to a sense of suspicion aroused by perceiving how thoroughly human affairs are permeated by this spirit of illusion.

2. ILLUSION AND LIFE

Mankind has ever shown its animal-like ability to live in immediacy without reality; indeed the very distrust of

¹ *Foma Gordyeeff*, tr. Hapgood, p. 317.

dialectics, as this is expressed in our own age and our own land, is a mark of this peculiar trait. Only the exclusively philosophical have asserted the absolute necessity for the metaphysical, and where we observe this—as in Vedanta, which can do nothing with life until it is related to the One; with Platonism, which insists that man must have knowledge of reality; with Kantianism, even where it comes to an abrupt moralistic conclusion—we conclude that thinking is the chief concern in the life of a creature which can never wholly overcome its native ophthalmia. Optimistic speculations have tried to convince us that man was in search of the truth which itself was anxious to be known, but the real situation indicates that, where man has other interests than those of truth, the world does not worry because it is not understood. The Sigismonds who brood over the true and the false, and the Hamlets who go mad over being and not-being, are the exception in a truly human world, where the practical concerns of life keep the gaze directed outward. Men are content to live in a vegetable fashion if they feel that they are flourishing, and they will raise no questions about themselves or their world provided they feel that their traditions, whether scientific or religious, are upheld by authority. Give them laws, and they will live without ideals; furnish them with a fresh supply of facts, and they will not seek the totality of the world. The fact that life goes on, however, is not convincing, for man is capable of passing through the world without ever asking, Where am I? while he may work out a kind of life without inquiring, Who am I? It is Stirner's old criticism, "Are we that which is within us?" It is the essence of Nietzsche's lament, "We are strangers to ourselves, we perceivers—we ourselves to ourselves."¹

This very fact of man's blindness to the self gives us a good impression of illusionism. From the inception of modern ethics, the moralist has been imbued with the strange notion that the race began as an egoism and gradually learned to become social; now we are impressed with the

¹ *Genealogy of Morals*, tr. Hausmann, Foreword, 1.

fact that, where from the beginning the social had man in its grasp, the individual is hardly recognised in a social system which looks upon him as an outlaw, in a science which tries to prove he is insane. The world is opposed to self-consciousness and individuality, for its immediate work can best be done by those who do not ask, What is the purpose of all this? Hence, as long as life itself is the standard, the power of illusion will meet with little obstacle. Strindberg, another one of the aroused egoists, saw into this situation when he likened life to sleep and somnambulism: "We lived our lives unconscious as children, full of imaginations, ideals, and illusions, and then we awoke; it was all over. But we awoke with our feet on the pillow, and he who waked us was himself a sleep-walker. When we thought the sun was about to rise, we found ourselves in the bright moonlight amidst ruins as in the good old times. It had only been a little morning slumber with wild dreams, and there was no awakening."¹ The cramped consciousness of Strindberg, with all its pessimism and misanthropy, cannot vitiate all the force of this criticism of our culture, for it is a criticism of the present intellectual life of the race offered at a time when humanity is as a child absorbed with its toys.

The excuse offered for harbouring these illusions has been that these practical ideas were of value in human life, even when they could not commend themselves to the critical intellect, which has had to sacrifice itself for the general good of the whole man. Antiquity carried out a plan of life, however, without this subterfuge, while mediævalism with its narrower intellectualism dispensed with all ethical theory. It has been the modern who has been throwing dust in his eyes, and we who come at the end of the period are required to feel the effect of the operation. Hume, who released Kant from the dungeon of dogmatism, anticipated the famous moralistic demonstration of things transcendental by declaring in favour, not of reason, but custom as the guide of human life. With Kant this illusion assumes the more ethical sense of custom, and having conceived more magnifi-

¹ *The Father*, Act ii. sc. 5.

cently of the intellect that he had thought to destroy, it was necessary for him to advance a more august conception of life to compensate for it. The result was the very kind of illusion that we are now discussing, and much of the chaos that now surrounds us is due to this moralistic blunder on the part of the self-styled critical thinker. Persuaded that the good is better than the true, and so much better that it can take the place of the true, Kant despised knowledge that he might love morality. But the age which followed, finding an irrational duty inexplicable, intolerable, followed the example of Kant by destroying goodness as he had destroyed truth. Hence we are now confronted with both irrationalism and immoralism. This higher pragmatism has acted as an anæsthetic, for when man saw that he could not satisfy his intellectual needs, he began to replace thought with activity with the result of diverting the mind from its central purpose—the problem of the world and man's place in it. When the mind could not find the soul within or God without, it began to act as though it had made these discoveries, and thus arose a fine philosophy of make-believe which seems never to have dreamed of the race's proneness to self-illusion.

The immoralism of the present age reveals to us, as if for the first time, that there can be no talk about what we ought to do until we have done something with the question of what we know. Our illusion is a serious one because it has pervaded the will, which in its innermost nature is not wholly different from the intellect. As a result we have deprived the moral activity of the will of the critical insight which comes from the intellect, and now man knows not what he should will. The age is in a condition not unlike the heroine in *Ghosts*, who saw "all sorts of dead ideas and lifeless old beliefs" walking as ghosts. And these illusions have arisen in connection with the moral nature of man, which has been so anxious to will something that it has willed illusion. The task of ontology is thus a serious one, for it involves the destruction of illusions, as well as an attack upon the illusion-making will, for now we are in a position where we scorn the theoretical and sacrifice the intellectual

upon any practical pretext whatever. As Ernest Hello has said, in his larger psychology of humanity, "The horror of the false, the horror of bad, the burning horror of the lie is perhaps the rarest of sentiments among men."¹ In the midst of this blindness human life runs on, developing prejudices, conjuring up false ideals, and ignoring the sense of truth that occasionally appears; to entertain clear ideas would result in altering our present standards and changing our institutions, and the human will is of a conservative nature.

3. ILLUSION AND ACTIVITY

It sounds strange when one says that mankind cannot endure truth but must work under the auspices of illusion, but something like this represents the actual situation with the race. This unhappy fact makes its presence felt in connection with the human will and its activities; where the motor part of man's nature can often operate without the aid of the ideational, it has been assumed that the latter may be dispensed with altogether. Put into the world to act, we may reduce thought to a minimum; such is the general contention of the activist. But this naïve view of the situation overlooks the fact that the mind will not refrain from the elaboration of ideas when the thinker has ceased to put them forth in a speculative manner; so that, instead of empty forms of thought, we have false views which have been produced by the activity of the will. Thought thus being inevitable, it becomes necessary to decide what shall be the source and character of the ideas produced by the mind. Shall we leave the mind to itself, where it is likely to become a prey to its impulses and interests, or shall we offset the danger of illusion by the exercise of a critical and candid dialectic, which shall not profess to be able to live and work without ideas?

Illusion does not arise in the form of a free creation on the part of the intellect, but has its origin in some form of active interest. In Platonistic language, we may speak of

¹ *L'Homme*, 3rd ed., p. 224.

illusion as something due to the erotic rather than the dialectic in man. Truth may not be perfectly cold, yet we have no right to assume that it has the warmth of human interest, and it is the principle of interest that has led us into the path of illusion. Even where interest is taken in the ethical sense, it is guilty of deluding the mind for some practical purpose. In his essay on *Raymonde de Sabunde*, Montaigne was guilty of this evasion of the intellectual issue of life, when he declared that we must be stupid in order to be wise—*Il nous fault abestir pour nous assaigir*. But would the moralist say, One should be bad in order to be good? If not, what sense is there in insulting the human intellect in order to gain in the moral esteem of mediocrity? This moral high-handedness is shown in the famous verse of Calderon's *Life a Dream*, where Sigismond, who has lost the means of distinguishing truth from dreaming, concludes that the main thing is to do well—*Obrar bien es lo quo importa*.¹ But the human predicament, from which genuine dialectic strives to deliver the ego, is so thorough-going that no simple moralism will suffice, especially where the spirit of illusion is no more likely to spare the ethical than the logical, especially when the ethical has so much interest at stake.

In the present condition of ethical science, which is decidedly unsettled, it is absurd to think of the moralist giving laws to the metaphysician, just as it is impossible to look to the world of values in order to determine the world of forms. Our principles of rectitude and duty, themselves groping about for some genuine sanction, are not able to align the ideal for the intellect. We are in no position to pass from doing to knowing, and where the ethical norm is determined with such difficulty, it is vain to ask it to aid another function of the mind. Many of the metaphysico-moral compounds of the nineteenth century are now being rejected as invalid and spurious, and to make the speculative view of the world depend upon the practical estimate of human life is about as fatal as any philosophical programme can be. The hedonistic system, which was based upon the optimistic assumption of perfect

¹ *Op. cit.*, Act. iii. sc. 4.

happiness for humanity, and the rigoristic plan of perfect virtue for mankind are based upon illusions as to the nature of the self and its place in the world. How, then, can they serve as models for metaphysical thought? Man cannot be perfectly naturised or perfectly rationalised, as these systems demand, so that to follow the lead of the ethical as we know the ethical is to proceed to illusion. As Balzac's Benassis, in the *Country Doctor*, said, "Perhaps perfect happiness is a monster which our species should not tolerate." At any rate, we know that mankind has been living upon some form and degree of illusion, from which a sincere philosophy strives to save it. We have taken working principle for categories, and now we see that these principles are only illusions.

The supreme desire of the present dialectic is to place the ego in the world and assign to it a work; it is of special importance, therefore, that we realise the constant tendency to illusion on the part of the self-anxious individual. There may be something in the way of human attributes that can be carried over into the real world, and it is the duty of metaphysics to discover those phases of humanity which seem to promise this fruitage of substance. The world of sense does not seem to promise much in the way of a real result for the ego that has grown up within its walls, and yet it is possible to conceive of the real world as though it were not unlike the æsthetic aspects of the phenomenal order. Sense is not without its principle of permanence, and the scientific conception of the perceptible order is a convincing sign of this truth. Nor is sense devoid of dignity, as the artistic perfection of it will show, so that he who is anxious to determine his human fate in the world-whole need not be over-anxious about illusion when he recalls how much of his interior life involves principles of phenomenality. Non-egoistic systems, which do not find it necessary to rearrange the inner life in accordance with the principle of culture, do not have the right to indulge the hope that the human world-order in its extreme naturalness may become coincident with the real order of things as they are; but an

individualistic system, which calls upon the ego to reorganise his inner life, thereby places itself in a position where it may lay some claim to reality. In the system of Schopenhauer we have an example of the native calmness of mind due to the scientific perception of things as they are, apart from any human interest; in Schopenhauer's æsthetics, the same sense of stillness appears as something acquired by the mind in its will-less contemplation of the beautiful. Both thinkers are aware of the fact that inner confusion can only lead to blindness as to the meaning of the world; both seek salvation from the intellect.

When we analyse our world of humanity, it assumes a character not unlike a romantic landscape, where the strivings and emotions of the race are added to the forces and qualities of the purely physical order. Then we are led to wonder whether the real world bears witness to the existence of these sentimental phases of our human order. In all probability, in all justice, something of our inner life belongs none the less to the outer order, and we need dread no illusion as long as we attempt to will into things the permanent qualities of our own ego; but any form of instinctiveness which seeks to foist upon the impersonal world the accidental features of mankind is doomed to delusion. Where the morality of the race has been of the minor form, it has looked to the world to reward it for its virtue or to revenge its wrongs; but its attempt to carry inferior moral principles across the border into reality has usually led to naught: the moralist has found that his belief was only in vain. The higher forms of ethics, as these are found in certain religious systems, apprise us of the fact that the real world finds its subject beyond indulgence, beyond revenge, so that he who would find reality as it is expressed in the Tao, in Nirvana, in the kingdom of God, must cleanse his soul of all meanness, all narrowness, and enter a realm where the love of enemies obtains. It is through such a needle's eye that one finds his way into real existence.

Humanity does not fit into existence with any such ease as is experienced by the animal; it must create the place it

is to occupy, the place in which it is to do its work. With mystic thought in general, this work by which one enters the real world consists of something renunciatory; in passing through the eye of the needle, the ego must reduce its nature to a minimum. Vedanta divests man of his personal nature in order to invest him with genuine selfhood in the universal Self. Where Buddhism allows less, Christianity permits more. In modern times Kant has been one of the most earnest seekers after the real, and that not only as a savant, but as the man of living interests. In the midst of the questions that he put to the sphinx of reality, those concerning what one could know and what one should do were not the most significant; Kant was none the less interested in the question, What may we hope? In contrast to Spinoza, whose attitude will be examined by itself in the next section, Kant desired to carry forward a goodly measure of the human, even though his rigoristic ethics had suggested that man should follow duty without any desire for result or reward. Finding so little satisfaction in either knowledge or ethical activity, Kant had reserved the expression of his interests for the final question concerning human hope. According to Spinoza, "The more we endeavour to be guided by reason, the less we depend on hope."¹ But Kant, who had spoiled the ego's chances of becoming an intellectual participant in the reality of the world, reversed this proposition, for he argued to the effect that the less knowledge we have the more hope we express. To what extent was the Kantian hope an illusion? From the standpoint of a theory of knowledge which found nothing in the world of reality, as well as in the light of an ethical theory which did nothing in that world, the hope in question seems to have been for naught, and the Kantian philosophy as expressed by its author fails to lead us out of the world of immediacy into the final form of the real order. Among the Romanticists, Friedrich Schlegel placed the ego in a position where all its efforts led to an *Ironie*, while the activistic realism of Stendhal suggests that all human effort

¹ *Ethica*, IV. xlvii., note.

is in vain. If the self is to be saved from illusion, it is by means of some other kind of philosophy than one which negates the intellect.

4. ILLUSION AND INTEREST

The principle of activity that has so often deluded human thinking has done its work, not in connection with sheer volition, but through desire with its interests. As a result, we are brought to the place where we must consider whether the human mind in its humanity has access to the realm of reality, where perhaps the fond distinctions of feeling are invalid. We are told that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, and it may be that our active humanity will be called upon to renounce its interests, if it is to acquire the real, for reality suggests renunciation. It is evident that some degree of pruning will be necessary, and the mind that has absorbed the sensuous and pursued the practical will have to sever its connection with the interests of the lower orders of reality. The temperamental distinctions which are commonly made by man in his humanity are not subtended by real divisions in the substantial order; by descending from the wish to the thought, the human thinker has thus been led to postulate his illusions. The dialectics of desire is in vain. In our attempt to find a place for the ego in the world, the danger of illusion is exceedingly great; for which reason we have raised the question concerning human illusions in general in order that we might be on our guard against them.

It seems obvious that man in his humanity must suppress some part of his nature if he is to enter the world-whole, and this change involves his interests rather than his ideas. Man must surpass himself if he is to reach reality; in his usual attitude he shows that he has no capacity for existence. The particular place where the strain of the real is felt, and where the weight of renunciation is sure to fall, is found in the question of human happiness. Not only ethics, but dialectics also, has taken up this question of ultimate human

welfare, and in some directions happiness has been employed, not merely as a test of goodness, but as a criterion of truth. Of all who have assumed the rationalistic and rigorous point of view, Spinoza is the prince; having looked into the cool, transparent depths of being, he schooled himself to feel naught, to desire naught, to hope for naught; but to content his spirit by surveying all things *sub specie ratione*. In so doing, he delivered himself from all delusion. Realising that man can never be truly great, he seeks to disillusion us by saying, "He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return."¹ Dwelling in the snows and silence of the midnight sun, Spinoza loved with an *amor intellectualis*, while the supreme act of his will consisted in "acquiescence."² Yet it cannot be denied that this most determined of the rationalists was reserving for himself some measure of satisfaction, for his acquiescence was a joyful one, in the course of which he was led to say, "mirth cannot be excessive."³ To prevent illusion it may be necessary to take such a stand, for the practical interests of life are sure to act as snares for the ego as it seeks its selfhood in the real world. Spinoza sought to cleanse the soul of all save the disinterested intellectualism of the understanding, but in this mental minimum he believed that sufficient joy could be found.

Apart from the intellectualistic attitude the self is in an unhappy position; having placed its desires in feeling and activity, it is brought to the realisation that these emotions of the soul are not real enough to accompany the self when it comes to its supreme position in the world-whole. Happiness has been based upon an illusion, and, as Ibsen says, "Rob the average man of his life-illusion, and you rob him of his happiness at the same stroke."⁴ The way out of the illusion involves an appropriate philosophy of life, for where the end of human existence is made to consist of some form of feeling or some kind of activity, the life-illusion is sure to beset the theory in question; change the life-interest to

¹ *Ethica*, v. xix.

³ *Ib.*, vi. xlii.

² *Ib.* v. xxxviii.

⁴ *The Wild Duck*, Act v.

an intellectual one, in accordance with which the self finds satisfaction in the inner realisation of the meaning of the world, and while the spiritual condition may not be marked by the excessive mirth of Spinozism, it will not be devoid of all satisfaction. But the systems which, like realism and pragmatism, are projected in behalf of an interest all too human, are so many forms of human illusion.

From such considerations it will appear that reality demands a certain degree of renunciation, so that we can understand how Balzac could call human happiness a monster, while Ibsen spoke of happiness as akin to the life-lie. Long ago Plato assumed that "the rulers may be allowed to lie for the good of the state,"¹ and in our own country we have sought to build up a national happiness upon the illusions contained in creed and constitution, so that even to-day, when the seriousness of life is beginning to dawn even here in the West, there are many who still believe in a happiness which need never consider the problem of life in the world. He who studies human institutions with an eye to their ultimate truth will be shocked to discover how thoroughly the will to believe has foisted its fables upon the mind, which cannot be happy in the world of reality. It is quite true that these fictions are not taken as seriously by people as they themselves imagine, and the actual condition of things may be very like pagan polytheism, which, as sceptical Hume said, "seemed to vanish like a cloud whenever one approached to it," while the participants in it were delivered from illusion, because "superstition sat so light and easy upon them."² But this is only a negative form of consolation, in the light of which we strive to persuade ourselves that humanity with its manifold clamouring interests is not really lost in illusion; real happiness can come when the human self detaches itself from the world and seeks to satisfy its central need by a comprehension of the world in its totality.

But this process of spiritualising man in order that he may inherit the kingdom of reality is not to be brought about

¹ *Republic*, 389.

Nat. Hist. of Religion, vii.

by a simple plan of elimination. Where the ego with its interests may seem to spoil the plan of activity, the ultimate nature of being may be such as to be more perfect when the ego takes its place in the system. The present dialectic, therefore, while it realises the danger of human delusion, has proceeded with the assumption that the world can best be understood when it is considered, not in its mere being, but as the home of spiritual life. As a landscape gains in significance when it is viewed as representing the earth in which humanity lives, as a cathedral is more intelligible when we consider it as something constructed for man, whose feet tread its steps as he enters its doors, so reality as a whole can only be the gainer in intelligibility when it is supposed to provide a place for the human ego. Greek philosophy did not lose in validity when Protagoras introduced the principle, Man is the measure of all things, and this same man served Socrates in developing logic. In the same manner, modern philosophy lost nothing when the abstract reason of the Enlightenment gave way to the introverted principle of knowledge which lay at the basis of Kant's *Kritik*; for the effort to know the mind has been the most influential means of acquiring knowledge of the world.

5. ILLUSION AND INDIVIDUALITY

As the result of our examination of the sources of illusion, we are brought to the place where we can survey our central problem in a new light. The endeavour to place the ego in the world, where it may do its work and determine its fate, instead of leading to the dreaded illusion, tends to deliver our thought from it, for the ego as self-conscious thinker is less likely to be deluded than the thinker who effaces himself and lets the world have the centre of the philosophical stage. The objective world, being the world of mediocrity, is more likely to lead to illusion than a world-order which does not eliminate the self. It is the world of realism, the world of pragmatism, that harbours the illusions of men; the intellectual order, on the contrary,

arouses the ego to its position in the world, whence it is able to defend itself from the traditions that grow up with man, in connection with his life of immediacy. Interest and desire work upon society in a way that they do not work upon the individual whose thought has detached him from the solidaric order of men and things; for this reason it is from the social rather than the individualistic quarter that illusions come. In the history of humanity it has been the individual who has delivered the mass from its illusions, so that when a metaphysical system is guided by the individual in man it need fear no danger of delusion. Only the individual in his selfhood is capable of the disinterestedness necessary for the perception of truth; the mass with its immediate wants can see but through a veil.

As it is the individualistic in man that is to deliver philosophy from illusion, so it is none the less the intellectualistic in the individual that is to make the work complete. The pragmatist, who looks upon the truth as something practical and purposive, is so placed that he cannot assume a judicial point of view, for he is guided by the idea of value and practical efficiency. The pre-Copernican astronomy was quite effective, and the speculative change to the more critical view seems to have had no effect upon the life of humanity; the pre-Darwinian biology worked well, and the adoption of a far different view of the organic world has brought no corresponding revolution in the practical affairs of life. But the intellect, which dreads illusion even where it may serve the needs of men and things just as well as the truth serves them, has been the gainer by these scientific changes, and in its blindness to practical interests it has delivered us from false notions. It is for this reason, although it is not the only one, that philosophy must look to intellectualism to deliver man from the illusions of the senses and the will.

If selfhood is a snare, the egoist does not step into it naively; his very nature as individualist puts him on his guard. In the mind of the individualist, the contrast between the outer world and the inner life is a strident one, and the

only reason for his anti-natural and anti-social impulses is that he fears lest he be submerged in the impersonal solidaric order. Since metaphysical thought has usually accepted society rather than the individual as the representative of humanity, it becomes difficult to defend the irregularity of the ego from the charge of inner illusion. In the egoistic movement this danger of illusion has been extreme, and when one examines the dialectics of the decadents he has anxiety for the ego, whose anti-social tendencies have driven him to the very verge of inner unreality. The social has the upper hand in both the ethical and the metaphysical worlds, so that the individual is at a loss to express with consistency that inner sense of real worldhood which lies at the bottom of his heart. The danger with the egos of Decadence is that they have no other dialectics than that of the dream; so it was with the average heroine of Huysmans, or the average heroine of Villiers de L'Isle Adam. These egos really have no world, and their inner lives are not far from the abyss of the naught. On what real basis can one assert himself as ego? Our answer to this has already been expressed in connection with the intellectualistic, which is far from the dream of the decadent; the more complete answer is to be found in the idea of culture.

Where one refrains from the inner life of culture with the fear that it may detach him from the reality of the outer world and imprison him in the seclusion of self, where, after the manner of Goethe's *Torquato Tasso*, he yearns for the outlying world of activity, he indulges the optimistic notion that the social order, whose vastness and plurality suggest the largesse of nature, will give him the reality he desires. But the secret of the world is not usually revealed to him who has made himself one with it, and the person who is a cell in the social organism is even further from the meaning of life than the one who is anti-social and irregular. Hence, with all our fear of individualistic illusion, we are forced to feel that both the highest kind of ethics and the highest kind of dialectics is that which has the ego as its centre and its goal. He who ignores self, and takes his place in the

world, is lost to the ultimate meaning of that world, for the reason that he has now become a part of it, and is to be studied as one studies things in general. Where the social ideal of service predominates over the individualistic ideal of selfhood, the meaning of life is lost among the details of immediate activity. Moreover, there is none of the fear of illusion which ever pursues the isolated individual, and the dullness of mind to the central problem of being is fatal to dialectics.

Individuality leads to illusion where the ego is so detached from the world that it assumes no responsibility for existence in the social order. The history of egoism reveals this in connection with Decadence, whose heroes withdrew from the world to live wholly within; with such characters it is difficult to see how philosophy can escape illusion. The self of decadent dialectics thus possesses very little reality because it assumes no duty in the world-whole, and, like a hero in the romances of Huysmans and Barrés, it is without reality because it is without will. In the present dialectic the fear of illusion has led us to seek the work that the ego is supposed to do in the world, and the intrinsic nature of that work is so distinct from the instinctiveness and immediacy of ordinary toil that the free individualism of the self is not absorbed by the impersonal activity of the objective world. In order to ascribe reality to humanity, the moralist has discussed his problem in close connection with both nature and society. To detach man from the world in which he has his natural origin and his social education is a performance fraught with danger; it tends to place the ego in a position where it has no real existence. Thus we observe that great ethical systems, like those of Plato, Hobbes, and Spencer, seek to conserve the real in humanity by developing a theory of the state as something which is based upon the objective world. Plato passes from physics to ethics, Hobbes from the body-corporeal to the body-politic, while Spencer has made the one law of evolution serve for both nature and humanity. But this kind of human reality is of no special value to him who desires to secure his own position in the

world, so that the egoist cannot find much consolation in a system of life which succeeds only by excluding the individual from its borders. As for the individual, it may be said that his safety from illusion lies in the development of his character as an intellectualist, while his work in life consists in finding his place in the world. The realism that seems to save man from the illusions of his individualism necessitates a *sacrificio dell' intelletto* ; it cures by killing. As a matter of fact, society has the illusions in the character of its traditions, creeds, and the like, while it is the detached individual who has the fear of illusion. The enlightened individual fears self-deception because he sees to what an alarming extent the social order is steeped in the false ; undoubtedly the same illusion has invaded his inner being, but he in his intellectualism is ever on his guard against it. In the present study of reality the problem of illusion is keenly appreciated, because we know that the attempt to relate spiritual life to the exterior world is not without the danger of inner delusion, for the light that is in one may be darkness.

However anxious one might be to assert the selfhood of the ego, he could hardly wish to do so at the cost of being irrationalistic. For this reason he who reviews the history of the egoistic movement is anxious to see the ego of Stirner, which was so influential in the development of the egoistic idea, cleansed of its irrationalism, if indeed this be possible. It was Stirner's opposition to the Hegelianism of Feuerbach that led him to assert the ego by means of the irrationalistic revolt. But was this necessary ? Wagner was not wanting in a clear and forceful conception of the ego in the character of Siegfried, and it was by means of the very humanism of Feuerbach that he was led to this notion. Where Stirner asserted the ego in his solipsistic capacity, Wagner was more anxious to establish the egoistic type, in accordance with which there should arise a race of egos who should share Siegfried's free fearlessness. In this way the ego redeems itself from irrationalism, because it relates itself to a type.

II

REALITY AND NEGATION

WHILE it may seem ridiculous to inquire, Which exists, the real or the naught? it is just as absurd to take reality for granted. In the present dialectic it will be found that, where man's existence in the phenomenal order makes him a prey to illusion, his activity in the causal world inclines him toward nihilism. The will, which affirms and denies, places the self in a position where it asserts reality or negation as its leading category, so that, where we have given prominence to the activistic view of the world without and the self within, we are now called upon to examine the validity and sufficiency of the idea of the naught. In our modern culture the principles of nihilism have usually been advanced by voluntarists. At the inception of the egoistic movement, Stendhal and Stirner both asserted the self at the expense of the objective order, and in each case the general result was some form of negation, whence the striving of the self appeared to be in vain. With Schopenhauer before them, the same seems to have been the case, and having advanced first a phenomenalism, then a voluntarism, Schopenhauer could only counsel the will to negate itself in a world which, with all its majesty of appearance, is but nothing. In Turgénieff, who coined the term "nihilist," activism and nihilism grew up together. More recently Nietzsche has welded the two together in the heat of his Dionysian dialectic, while he has not failed to assert that all existence and all effort end in an *Umsonst*. Two tendencies seem to have conspired to produce the nihilistic repudiation of reality: one was the Hegelianism of the Left School; the other, the philosophy of Schopen-

hauer. Thus both intellectualism and voluntarism have brought us to the abyss of the naught, and we cannot treat the problem as a purely academic one of being and not-being, for the impulse toward negation has invaded the inner life with its ideals.

I. NOSTALGIA FOR THE NAUGHT

Ontological inquiries usually set out with the idea that the human mind has an instinctive desire for the real, toward which also all the impulses of the will are inexorably driven. Our examination of the tendency toward illusion has shown us how unwilling is man to face the real, and how thoroughly bound up in illusion are his best impulses. Human history thus reveals to us the fact that delusions are dear to man, who clings to them more ardently than he cleaves to truth, a melancholy truth to be accounted for in the light of man's origin, as well as by means of his ambiguous position in the world-whole. When we consider that man has come up from the earth, and that he has set before himself the idea of a real goal as the end of his spiritual striving, we can realise how natural it is for him to turn away from this when he observes how far his present condition of inner contradiction removes him from it. This turning back on the part of the human ego is the very root of nihilism. As a result there arises a peculiar aversion for the reality of things, and a decided nostalgia for the naught. Reality is not a fixed thing existing outside of man as an object of perception and activity; it is something which reduces the outer world to order, while it organises the impulses of the inner ego in the form of human culture. Reality is not a pole whose existence one does not doubt, while the discovery of it he cannot achieve; reality is rather a principle not unlike the ethical ideal, and as one sometimes despairs of goodness he may be found doubting truth. The naught clings to man, and when he departs from the world of immediacy it assumes serious proportions.

At this point we will not raise the question whether the

leading category is that of reality or negation, nor will we inquire whether the chief motive of man is that of affirmation or negation; we are content with showing that the naught has some place in our spiritual life, where its influence is of most serious moment. If we were to assume the oriental standpoint, we should then be striving toward the abyss that to the western mind seems so terrible, for with Taoist and Buddhist the naught is far more significant and valuable than the real. The difference between the two points of view appears also in the estimate of phenomenality, for where the eastern mind believes that appearance is but illusion, the western view tends to share the realism of Herbart, which asserts, "If nothing exists, then nothing must appear—*Es ist nämlich klar, dass, wenn Nichts ist, auch Nichts scheinen muss.*"¹ That is, the western mind believes in the integrity of the phenomenal and real, where the oriental consciousness cannot tolerate either.

However obvious the real may seem to us, the naught is not without attractiveness, just as it is not wanting in practical efficiency. We have no right to take the real for granted, especially where that real involves the inner life of the human ego. From the egoistic standpoint the belief in reality rather than negation becomes difficult, because the proof of reality involves something more than the dialectical demonstration of some objective form of thinghood; to assert what is commonly called "the existence of things," the *εἶναι* of Parmenides, makes it necessary for us to show that the self has a place, a work, and a fate in the world. Nihilism arises, not because thought finds it difficult to postulate an objective reality in the form of a world-order, but for the reason that the human ego tries to assert itself in the world about it. However contradictory it may be to say, Nothing exists, it is not impossible to declare that there exists nothing spiritual or individual in the epic universe; and this is just the assertion that is made by nihilism. Realism does not repudiate the ego; realism simply fails to recognise it. Nihilism seems to come from the egoistic

¹ *Metaphysik*, § 199.

quarter itself, where the exponent of individualism, appalled at the difficulty of the task of asserting the presence of spiritual life in the world, throws down his arms and submits to the naught. Unable to return to the immediate, and feeling its inner incapacity for the ultimate, the egoist turns to the naught as the most logical goal of his strivings.

One does not usually strive to assert the existence of the immediate, objective order, which is all too obvious to the self; the chief dialectical effort is directed inward toward the affirmation of the self as such. In the mind of a spiritual egoist like Ernest Hello, the Hegelian assertion that pure being equals nothing is regarded as something satanical: "*L'Orgueil Satan et Hegel poussent le même cri: l'Être et le Néant sont identique.*"¹ From his spirit, Hello is plainly interested in spiritual life within, so that his bitter criticism of Hegel is due to the thought that the negation involved will tell against the ego, which is ever striving to assert its own existence. The same criticism he applies to Goethe, whose Faust seems to him to resemble Buddha, except that, where Buddha merely awaits the naught, Faust deliberately seeks it.² The naught thus appears as a threat directed against the self, which is called upon to surrender an "eternal verity" every now and then, and thus fears that in the end it may be asked to resign its position in the world-whole. As illusion seems to rob us of our world, so negation attacks the self; whence we learn that if the ego is to come into being, it must do so by means of an act of self-affirmation; its place must be created, its work improvised, its fate evoked in a world where the rule of reality takes no account of spiritual life.

A constant tendency toward the naught accompanies the effort on the part of the ego to assert itself, while there is ever the temptation to set up negation as the ideal. The categories of reality and negation may not stand upon the same logical footing, but the impulse that leads the self to the naught is not to be judged in this formal manner.

¹ *L'Homme*, 3rd ed., p. 138.

² *Ib.*, p. 301 *et seq.* Baudelaire, as well as Buddha, was strangely drawn toward the naught. See especially his *Le Goût du Néant, Fleurs du Mal*, lxxxii.

Bergson, whose activism has reason to feel the influence of the naught, has sought to set the latter aside by declaring that negation is secondary to the idea of being; only after an assertion has been made is there any opportunity for the category of negation to come into play.¹ But the threat of negation is more real than this statement of the situation admits, and the voluntarism of Bergson is nearer the idea of negation than its author dreams. From the worlds of appearance and activity the ego may rise to reality, or it may sink to nothingness, and when our current systems of realism and pragmatism are so studious in their avoidance of the final issue in the world of things, we have reason to believe that they are unwilling to face the nihilistic situation. Nihilism consists very largely in the thought that the world has no ultimate value or significance for man; as a world of things it may satisfy the perceptual faculties of the mind, as a world of qualities it will not disappoint the immediate desires of the will; but this simple state of the case does not assure the self that is anxious to find ultimate satisfaction in the world-whole. It is absurd to indulge in such a nihilism as that of Zeno's which asserts that nothing exists, but it is not amiss to suppose, as we have been doing, that nothing spiritual exists, except in the fragmentary fashion peculiar to separate human souls.

When a dialectic withdraws from the world of immediacy, whether it be in the form of appearance or activity, it begins to encounter the possibility of nothingness, and it is not unthinkable that some portion of our spiritual life, as organised by the ethical and religious consciousness, rests upon the sands of the naught. The world avenges itself upon the uncritical idealist, whose hopes project themselves in the form of an ethical world-order or an ideal state. For as the ideal is a repudiation of the real, so the real has its revenge upon the ideal. The nihilistic situation has been expressed by Nietzsche in the following manner: "In all pessimistic religions, the nothing is called God"² This is,

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 301 *et seq.*

² *Genealogy of Morals*, tr. Hausmann, iii. § 17.

of course, one of Nietzsche's splenetic comments upon the ideals of humanity, and is to be accepted in the way that all Nietzscheanisms are received; nevertheless, it puts in a frank way that which we have been suggesting, namely, that humanity has woven the naught in with the real, so that the fabric of its thought and life is not strong. In philosophy proper the act of weaving in nothingness shows itself in the ancient dialectic of Parmenides, which postulated a being which was marked only by existence, and had about it nothing to distinguish it from nothing, as will appear in the complete statement of the ontological situation, "Being is, and non-being is not." Spinoza cannot draw away from it, for he bases his view of life and the world upon the notion of that which exists in itself alone. In the same category of negation one finds the real of Kant, the thing in itself, which is so like nothingness that one fails to see the difference between the two. Hegel was as frank as Nietzsche in his famous comment upon the nothingness of pure being, and in his belief that his own dialectic would provide a means of escape from the abyss of mere being, he was ready to say likewise, "The Absolute is the Naught."¹ Our own dialectic has too much at stake to play into the hands of nihilism, as the activists have been doing, just as it has too little faith in that marvellous synthesis of reality and negation which produced the Hegelian Becoming; for these reasons it lets the activists and idealists go their own way, and fight their own battles with the "Boyg," for it realises that the endeavour to introduce spiritual life into the world places a philosophic in a position where this battle is of special importance.

2. THE NEGATION OF THOUGHT

The work of nihilism in our human culture is thus something more than the Hegelian identification of being with nothing, or the mathematical change of sign with mere quantities. It is a spirit which infects human institutions,

¹ *Logic*, tr. Wallace, § 87.

which are so many forms of objectification which the ideal assumes. The origin of the term "nihilist" indicates the practical seriousness of the idea implied, for when in Turgénieff's *Fathers and Children* the older man seeks to comprehend the new term by referring to the etymology of "nihil," the man from the university explains his meaning by saying, "A nihilist is a man who does not bow before any authority whatever, who does not accept a single principle on faith, with whatever respect that principle may be environed."¹ But the authority in question indicates some product of the human mind and will, so that the repudiation of the outer may involve the turning against the inner ideal. We are led to observe that our ideals are not eternal, and where a moralist like Kant rejects the "I think" of Descartes, he himself comes in for repudiation, when an immoralist like Nietzsche negates the "I will" of the categorical imperative. Our own concern is not for any special system, whether the rationalism at the beginning of the Enlightenment or that at the end of it; we are investigating the question whether the spirit of destruction involves the inner life as well as its characteristics.

The kind of nihilism that confronts us is not purely speculative, nor does it exist in a timeless realm; the spirit of negation bears a practical relation to the culture-consciousness of the present age. What we have called nostalgia for the naught expresses itself in the special form of a longing for a new future, as the theatre for free spirits. The negation in question is thus the negation of present institutions, present ideals, present duties. Ibsen represents this nihilistic spirit in his doctrine of the Third Empire. As St. Paul spoke of the first man as being of the earth, and the second man as of heaven, so, in *Emperor and Galilean*, Julian the Apostate despairs of both earthly paganism and spiritual Christianity, since the "old beauty is no longer beautiful, and the new truth is no longer true."² Meanwhile he looks into the future for the Third Empire, which shall come into being with the appearance of the "right man," who comes

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Hapgood, v.

² *Op. cit.*, Part I. Act ii.

into being as "the man who wills himself."¹ In the later drama of *Rosmersholm* the Third Empire is regarded as something in vain, for the reason that the souls who try to emancipate themselves are doomed to remain for ever within the walls of the "Rosmer view of life," while the fantastic Ulrich Brendel, bereft of his life-ideals, looks out into the darkness, saying, "I am homesick for the mighty Nothingness."² Both the Emperor Julian and Rosmer succumb to the spiritual principles of the Second Empire, and their attempts to reach the future come to naught.

The principle that is involved in the negation of one's culture is the individualistic one; it represents a distinct phase of the problem concerning the ego's relation to the world. This "world" is not a purely physical order, but a system whose several forms are pervaded by the principles of humanity; it is a world of both nature and history, a part of it being given, another part of it created. In Russian nihilism this questioning attitude toward the self, its place and work in the world, is expressed by Gorky: "Why do men really live?" This question, which arises naturally in the progress of the drama *Night Refuge*, leads one to inquire by what right the ego exists and acts in the world, where he assumes to "take up room," as Gorky puts it.³ In his novels and tales Gorky propounds this question in the light of man's work in the world, so that, concerning both toilers and masters, the idea is that "everybody ought without fail to know solidly what he is living for."⁴ In our culture we have come to the place where we can no longer take things for granted, as though the world in its immediacy were sufficient, because it afforded pleasure and furnished an opportunity for work; as though enjoyment and activity were enough for the ego. With other literary masters the condition of things is the cause for lament or rejoicing, according to the genius of the artist. Thus Hauptmann bemoans the inability of man to accomplish anything of value

¹ *Op. cit.*, Part II., Act iii. sc. 4.

² *Op. cit.*, Act iv.

³ *Op. cit.*, tr. Hopkins, Act iv.

⁴ *Foma Gordyeff*, tr. Hapgood, xii. p. 398.

in the world, and represents his condition as that of the Bell Founder, who, his work reduced to complete resultlessness, is led to consider himself the "outcast child of the bright sun."¹ Sudermann seems to feel that one may let the world of ideals depart without any attempt to detain it, while man seeks the realisation of his inner nature in some form of eudæmonistic activity. In default of the Third Empire, Sudermann would return to the First.

With such a condition confronting us, it becomes the duty of dialectics to provide a place for us in the world. Let nature cultivate the garden of floral and faunal existence, since this seems to be her chief concern; man can only insist upon his own being, and say, "We want a place in the sun." From his ethical history we know that man has advanced from the world of sense, with its ideal of happiness, to the world of activity, with its ideal of world-work; now we are anxious to determine whether he can advance from this second empire to the third, with its principle of real participation in the world of substance. Is there a secure place for the self in something beyond the reals of eudæmonism and energism? This involves the present question of the inner life and nihilism; whether we are ready to assert that thinking and being are one, or prefer to avoid such frank intellectualism, we are so placed that we must ask whether culture has the ability to represent and to demonstrate the existence of an inner life of humanity. Our view of reality encounters no unusual problems as long as it is content to consider reality apart from the ego, and even with the burden of speculative egoism upon us, our dialectic is able to account for the self as it asserts itself in the world of sense and carries on its peculiar work in the world of activity. But of what value is a dialectic which accounts for external reality, which in itself has no particular need of existence and does not demonstrate the existence of humanity, which is placed where it can only doubt of its own being? And when the existence of the self as consciousness and will has been brought into clear light, is it not possible to con-

¹ *The Sunken Bell*, tr. Meltzer, Act. v.

tinue this argument, and thus secure for the self a place in the sun? Humanity has tried to do this by asserting the reality of its culture, and it is for a liberal dialectic to justify the premises laid down by this culture, as also to fortify the striving toward an independent order of existence. Present-day culture has been so unwise as to leave this to the art of the Decadence, which has asserted the independence of the ego, and the possibility of withdrawing from the exterior world in a way that has made its art appear anti-natural and anti-social. On the other hand, the regular thinker, who upholds the world and society at all cost, is in danger of working himself out of the system he is so anxious to perfect, and he who views the world as a solid reality of a naturistico-social order is in danger of losing sight of his own being.

The negation of independent intellectual life is akin to the repudiation of the inner self, for the reason that culture constitutes the means by which the self expresses its own nature and expands its peculiar powers. No matter how much external perception, no matter how much social activity there may be, the ego cannot assert itself in its fullness and freedom until it secure an independent, internal culture. Perceiving and acting in the objective world have the effect of reducing the ego to the level of mere thinghood without the intrinsic quality of selfhood. The negation of the inner life is but a relapse into finitude on the part of a spiritual creature who seems to have the power to extend his being toward the infinite. To the inevitable conflict with finitude is all man's sorrow due. As Sahtin, in Gorky's *Night Refuge*, expresses it, "Man bears the cost of all, is therefore free."¹ How empty, how bloodless appear the conventional problems of metaphysics—the one and the many, mind and body, experience and understanding, causality and substance, ideality and reality—when one considers how humanity has struggled to assert itself in opposition to the natural order of objective, solid things! And how serious the undertaking when one attempts to introduce

¹ *Op. cit.*, Act iii.

the living self into the alien, antagonistic world of things! Only such a desire to see the self appreciated can account for the strange sympathy that one must have for the decadents, diabolists, and egoists of recent culture, for they did not allow their logical paradoxes and moral faults to prevent their assertion of man's supremacy to the world of natural society in which he had had his origin. In contrast to the submission to the given order of things in the world, the revolt of the ego appears most meritorious, and where, as in the case of Decadence, this revolt is carried on in an intellectual fashion, the integrity of the movement cannot be questioned. Thus there is nihilism and nihilism; where one form of the doctrine comes out openly and repudiates the established order of things because it provides no place for humanity, the other works in a positive manner and establishes a realistic absolutism, which ignores the selfhood of the ego, and reduces its work in the world to nothing more than something instinctive and immediate.

3. EGOISM AND NIHILISM

In the attempt of the present dialectic to account for the world, and to place the ego in it, the obstacles presented by egoism and nihilism seem almost insurmountable. The negativistic view arises when the world and the self are brought into conflict, for where the world ignores the self, the self seeks to reduce the world to nothing. In its most direct form of application, the principles of philosophical nihilism involve the repudiation of objective standards of truth and goodness, such repudiation being carried on in the name of the inner self. But the natural result of such thinking is the destruction of the ego itself, for it goes down in the ship that it scuttles, is consumed in the conflagration that it itself has started. Our own dialectic working very frankly in behalf of the inner, egoistic life of humanity, seeks to avoid this unhappy consequence by contending for the reality of the world and the ego, rather than for that of the ego alone. Hence solipsism and egoism

have been defended to a limited degree only, and that with the idea that they were merely warnings against the realistic attempt to systematise the world at the expense of humanity.

The reaction of the ego upon the world, as this has been carried on in the history of humanity, may be understood as the attempt on the part of the ego to save itself from absorption by the universe, for the naught is not merely an abyss, but a vortex into which the self ever tends to be drawn. In the Aryan mind, egoism and nihilism go hand in hand. Both Vedanta and Buddhism work in behalf of the Self, and where the one is content to dismiss the world and summon the Self to take its place, the other reduces this absolutistic Self to the proportions of the subjective ego, whence the path to Nirvana is sure and swift. Socrates reasserts the supremacy of the self when he exalts self-knowledge above that of the world, in which he has little or no interest. In Christianity the world-whole is set aside for the sake of the soul, although here the conclusion against the world is reached upon the basis of a value-judgment. Likewise is it with the Christian thought of St. Augustine, which anticipates the *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes with the *scio* of inner knowledge. Descartes himself is even more antipathetic to the external world, in which he believes upon the basis of faith alone. This list of introspectionists is further enriched by the name of Fichte, who is so extreme in his nihilism as to suggest that the exterior world is but the projection of the ego's own nature, a view which Friedrich Schlegel carried to the point of his famous Romantic *Ironie*.

Such a series of egoistic, nihilistic movements are to be explained in the light of the ego's sense of self-preservation, for where the world rears its formidable proportions, the self feels called upon to find some means of reducing this absolute to the naught. In its objectivity the world cannot seem to make room for the inner ego, for the smooth unity of things seems threatened by the irregularity of egoistic existence. It is in the ego, then, that the modern realist should look for the true example of the particular and

positive that he seeks in nature. In contrast to nature, which seems to abhor the dissociated, original fact, the self presents an example of novelty and uniqueness unparalleled in the world, where all is of a piece. Even those who are interested in the self, and desire to see it come to its own in the world, are often anxious about the chaos that it ever tends to produce, but when one seeks to relieve the irrationality of the situation by postulating a selfless world-order, reality seems to have little significance, being a play without spectators, a feast without guests. What the egoistic desires to do in the realm of dialectics is to find the play within the play, the lyric within the epic, the self within the world. The individual soon becomes suspicious of a system which permits of no participation in the world-order that his own thought has elaborated; rather than postulate such an absolute, he prefers to cast in his lot with the naught.

The outlying cosmos resists the attempt of the self to penetrate its surface, and it retaliates upon the ego in terms of solipsism. If the self will exist, it must exist alone; it will not be allowed to breathe the air of reality, but must soon suffocate in selfhood. So impersonal is nature that, even where she has produced the self, she cannot tolerate her own child, as Wagner's Wotan felt that the appearance of his own Siegfried would bring to an end the reign of the gods in Valhalla. On both ethical and dialectical sides of the argument, the opposition to spiritual life, as this is expressed by the self, is so relentless that the ego cannot express itself except in connection with the nihilistic modes of egoism and solipsism. Negation confronts negation, and instead of the passive category of non-being the naught has assumed a dynamic function, according to which it arouses a conflict between the inner and outer forms of reality. When, therefore, a dialectic seeks to account for the presence of the ego in the world, it is alive to the nihilistic situation in our modern culture, and is playing a worthy part in reducing the forces of the world-whole to order. Where the metaphysics of the Enlightenment sought to find the unity that lay beneath the dualistic phases of mind and body, a

unity sought most earnestly by Spinoza and Leibnitz, the dialectics of the present day realises, or should realise, that the task now consists in relating the ego as such to the world in which it makes its strange appearance.

On the part of the ego, which is ever threatened by the naught, the attempt to exist is fraught with a Hamlet-like hesitation. Does one really exist, or is his being only alleged and apparent? Shall one seek to perform his own human work in the world, or shall he allow events to take their own course? Such questions serve to express that natural hunger for reality which the ego is destined to feel, while the doubt implied in them is due to the suspicion that the real order cannot afford nourishment for two species of being. Moreover, the world does not seem to have room for two realms of being, and in the conflict between them the forces of spiritual life are usually worsted. One is thus tempted to long for the defiant irrationalism of a Stirner or the Dionysian madness of Nietzsche; then the cause of individualism would not seem so hopeless. Idealistic systems come and go, but the ego remains as something constant; it may express itself in the modes of classicism, romanticism, or nihilism, but it ever asserts its independence of both realism and idealism. Of these two, realism is often preferred by the egoist, because it offers frank resistance to the ego's impulse toward selfhood, and does not leave the issue in doubt, while the blind way in which the "real" asserts itself encourages the self to follow its example and thus come into being at all costs. Idealism is too often guilty of *neglectus sui*, even when it realises that, apart from the ego as thinker, it could not perfect its system.

Nihilism thus appears to be twofold in its nature; it represents the negation of the ego by the world, and the reaction of the self, which uses the naught in a direct fashion to repudiate the world. However social and natural one may strive to make his metaphysics, he cannot help realising that without the self to appreciate the world the whole system is in vain. The objective order does its best for man when it has satisfied his immediate wants; his ultimate ideals must

come from some other than a physico-social source. Here appears the function of the ego, which consists in supplying humanity with ideals and saves it from self-despair. Man does not live by his illusions, but he is supported by his ideals, and without the self-conscious, critical ego, ideals are impossible. In the culture of the present, fire is fighting fire; for where the spirit of negation urges the world to rid itself of the ego with its suggestion of abnormality, the same idea inspires the self to free its being from the world, which is thus placed in the category of negation. Without the self as such, the inner life of culture seems to be impossible; and without this inner life the existence and activity of the universe can have no intelligible purpose. The inner play upon the larger stage, while it lacks the proportion of the larger drama, is the thing by means of which the vaster movement expresses its own meaning.

4. REALISM AND NIHILISM

Having admitted that the ego is not far from the abyss of nothingness, for which indeed it seems to have a sort of affinity, we are now ready to inquire whether the world in its reality is much better off when the vortex of negation gathers round it. Metaphysical systems have not appreciated the fact that, in many cases, the fundamental principle is nearer the realm of negation than the category of reality. In our own dialectic, which has sought to discover such traces of the real as appear in the phenomenal order, while it carries its investigations over into the world of activity, it is admitted that reality as such has not been found. Before this can be done thought must pass through the fire of negation, as indeed it is now doing. The positivistic reliance upon the world of appearance, as well as the pragmatic attempt to find repose in the causal order, does not deliver one from the fear of the naught, so that reality without, as well as reality within, must meet the naught upon an open field. The dialectic of Parmenides may have been somewhat naïve in asserting that, while being is, non-being is

not; but there is a conflict between the two, so that he who would uphold fundamental reality must be ready to defend it against the internal forces of negation.

The usual statement of thinghood is as empty as the idea of selfhood. The criteria of reality expressed by dialectics from Parmenides to Schopenhauer is hollow in its abstractness. The "being" of Parmenides, the "nature that is beyond being" with Plotinus, the "that which neither is created nor creates" of Erigena, the "substance" of Spinoza and the "thing in itself" of Kant, the "absolute" of Hegel, and the "will to live" with Schopenhauer are examples of the work done by the active category of negation. All attempts to find mere thinghood are so many steps in the direction of nothingness, for to be wanting in qualities and to have no relations is to be nothing at all. The thing in itself is unknowable, because knowledge has to do with that which exists, and the thing in itself is naught. Where one recoils from the principles of substantialism, as these have dominated philosophy, and turns for encouragement to the dynamic view of reality, he is no further from the abyss of negation. Schopenhauer has shown this in his treatment of the will, which he regards as "groundless,"¹ while he concludes his examination of its activities in both nature and humanity by the following dirge of nihilism: "To those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this world of ours so very real, with all its suns and milky ways, is—nothing."

The ego turns the nihilistic argument against the world by making the latter consist in a human order established by the power of thought. If it is "our world," then the negation that infects us cannot fail to invade the world. Where thought rejects standards of the inner life, it follows this up by applying the same principle to the outer world, so that the fortunes of the world and the self appear to be about the same. The realisation of this seems to have made its impression upon Nietzsche, for he used his egoism to contend against the forces of negation whose work in the world did not escape his notice. His pessimism condemned

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 20.

the existing order of things in both the dialectical and ethical world-orders, but he did not come to the place where he could cease from striving, and his pessimism of intellect was accompanied by an optimism of will. Where Tolstoi, Wagner, and even Ibsen seemed to hasten on toward the naught, which had a strange attraction for them, he protested against negation, and postulated a belief in existence.

While it may seem incredible that any sincere system of thought should postulate the naught as its ideal, we cannot deny that this has ever been done by the human mind, which seems to weary of the sun. Just as reality and negation seem to rest upon the same basis, so is it possible for him who has affirmed the existence of things to will their negation. The condition of such a pessimistic Nirvanist is very like that of Wagner's Wotan, who seems to have suffered from metaphysical malaria, for in the excess of his world-sorrow he came to the place where he was ready to will the end of the gods, which grim culmination of a once splendid reality satisfied his wish and gave him no anguish. *Um der Götter Ende gräm't mich die Angst nicht, seit mein Wunsch es will.*¹ Pessimism, which works with nihilism, turns the intellect and the will against the "realities" that an age has long been enjoying; at the same time, it may prepare the way for a positive movement in the form of an optimism which shall affirm new realities and new values. At present dialectics is busy with the destructive movement, the origin of which is to be found in the ego; indeed, Schopenhauer's picture of the ego, ready to annihilate the world that its own private being may persist a moment longer,² reveals the innermost egoism of the nihilistic movement.

From the pessimistic situation, in which the world and self seem to be in mutual antagonism, it begins to appear that both have the same fate in human thought; both encounter the same foe in nihilism. The Nirvanist philosophy, which is so willingly sought by those who are weary of the struggle for reality, reacts upon both cosmism and egoism, and the negationist who believes that no reality can be found

¹ *Siegfried*, Act iii.

² *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 61.

is likely to act accordingly. How far advanced is philosophy beyond the formalism that is content to "demonstrate" the existence of things! Reality as reality has an interest for man in the totality of his being, so that all the issues of life are centred in the dialectical problem. Our pessimism and our optimism are not confined to the value-judgment that estimates the experiences of human life in the light of some eudæmonistic standard, but extend beyond the purely human to the cosmic, whence we are led to conclude for or against the world. Philosophy screens the pessimistic, nihilistic issue from its eyes by an excess of phenomenism and activism, for when the powers of perception and volition are swelled to their full capacity the dangers of cool contemplation are avoided temporarily. The positivist has sought to evade the pessimistic issue by a bland agnosticism which will admit the existence of the Beyond, if it is not called upon to make it an object of real knowledge. Far braver and wiser is it to postulate the Naught, as Nietzsche has done, and then contend with it, as Peer Gynt fought the impalpable Boyg. For the agnostic, like Spencer, believes that in spite of his negations he has some hold upon the real, when there is nothing in his logic to justify such an assumption. A philosophy which seeks to locate spiritual life in the world, and is not content to account for the exterior activities of the social organism, cannot find refuge in the partial negations of positivism or in the partial, half-hearted beliefs of pragmatism; it must meet the naught and settle accounts with it as the dialectics of the decadence has done.

5. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST NEGATION

Whether the naught be the conclusion of dialectics or not, it is a condition through which the ego must pass in its way toward reality. Where dialectics assumes responsibility for the self, it cannot treat negation in the romantic manner of a Hegel, who so merrily gave it the intermediate position in his dialectical movement; on the contrary, a sincere dialectic must be on its guard lest the naught usurp

the highest position and thus destroy the system that plays with it. A certain kind of negation may be necessary, not merely in the form of academic scepticism, but as a means of destroying ideals which have outlived their own validity. At the same time, negation is a tendency peculiar to the human mind, and in our own age it is in a pathological condition, so that philosophy must attempt to heal the soul with truth and reality. Where art and religion have been witnessing the destruction of their ideals, where ethics and dialectics have been forced to bid farewell to formerly fundamental principles, the spiritual condition of humanity is a distressing one, which is masked by the inveterate commercialism of the day. One who will assert the reality of the inner life is expected to "place his affair upon nothing," and the constant affirmation of the self without the corroboration which philosophy should give is disheartening to the individualist, who is thus forced to assume the rôle of an irregular.

This internal nihilism acts in a pathological manner, and thus makes the world appear unreal and untrustworthy to him who suffers from the self-sickness. Ideal and real appear equally in vain, so that the cosmic thinker, who does not care to espouse the cause of egoism, should see that his "world" cannot enjoy unalloyed reality unless some measure of this is attributed to the self as such. But our present interest is so centred in the human self that we will not take up the almost meaningless question of how the world appears when the mind is not perceiving it, for we have the feeling that the world is able to guard its own interests in a way unknown to the less stable ego, whence it becomes expedient for us to reassure the self, which is ever tempted to relinquish the whole problem as something beyond the power of the will to affirm. The self must be taught to strive against its desire to relinquish the world, for too often appears the tendency so forcibly expressed by Gautama Buddha, Geulincx, and Wagner, who come to the place where striving seems useless, and they wait for the end as Wagner's Wotan listened for Brunhilde's song, *Ruhe!*

Ruhe, du Gott! Reality is nothing unless it be both known and willed by the self, and the impulse toward negation appears when the ego, its knowledge of the world having exceeded its power to react upon its ideas, feels that its condition is *nihil volo*, so that to will reality is beyond its inner power.

The particular way in which the inner struggle against the naught appears may be observed in our human culture, as this has affected the senses and the will. Our dialectic, which has sought to relate the ego to the world in such a way as to account for and satisfy our spiritual strivings, has witnessed the affirmation of the self, as this has revealed itself in the world of appearance and the world of activity, where æsthetics and ethics have raised the ego above the mere impression and the immediate impulse. When we come to the summing up of reality, we are now led to question whether this elevation of the self above nature has been a spiritual success, and in the midst of our doubt we are invaded by the spirit of negation. Perhaps all art is in vain, perhaps all ideal activity will lead to naught. The particular way in which this threat of negation appears is recognised quite clearly by the present dialectic, which assumes to conduct the self from the natural order of immediacy to the ultimate realm of reality; for now it appears that the attempted movement in the direction of the ideal is likely to lead to nothing real at all. Man seems destined to remain upon the plane of nature, and the fond ideals that we have been entertaining are found to be void. Both the æsthetical and ethical, which assume to realise man's impressions and impulses respectively, are called upon to bear the brunt of this negativistic attack.

The position of art in dialectics is most instructive, for the reason that art lays hold of the ego when humanity is in its most simple condition of sense, while the perfection that art endeavours to bring about is one which ever has some form of the sensuous about it. The art-impulse is a striving beyond sense by means of sense, an indulgence of the ego's feeling of superabundance. Prosper Mérimée

expressed it by saying, "Art is an exaggeration *à propos*." There can be no doubt of the exaggeration, for art has taken the naïve and immediate only to invest it with ideal significance ; but has this movement away from the natural been accompanied by such a sense of truth as to be *à propos*? It is quite evident that spiritual life as it is manifested by the self stands in need of the consolations that art can administer, but is such an idealistic invigoration which swells the veins with joy a justifiable one? Art becomes dialectical through the inner realisation of reality which it bestows upon the self that is seeking to perfect itself in the realm of sense, as also by means of the feeling of permanent enjoyment that the sense of beauty engenders. These ideals of permanence and perfection are the very ones that seem to constitute a fatal exaggeration of experience which brings on the threat of negation. This is a severe test for the self, which has taught itself to depend upon an ideal which now seems about to vanish, leaving the ego to return to the order whence it sprang. The conflict of art with nihilism involves the redemption of spiritual life from sense, and the ability of the self to affirm itself in opposition to nature. The naught is none other than the natural, for where man expects to rise above the immediate order which produced him, he learns to his surprise that such a fate is very unlikely, for the reason that nature never intended him to play such a transcendental part. In more ways than one has our contemporary culture shown the stress of the naturalistic naught ; this appears in pessimism, which fears that the real cannot be found ; in realism, which tells us that the ideal should not be sought ; as also in Decadence, which pursues selfhood in such a paradoxical way as to spoil its argument.

On the ethical side the same tendency to postulate the naught appears, and here it is none the less important for humanity. As art may seem to be an exaggeration *mal à propos*, so morality does not fail to suggest that it is but a form of vanity, a labour of Sisypheus. In the light of nature, which is blind to the human struggle for inner realisation, in the light of paganism, which was never inclined to

detach and develop the self as such, our strivings and sorrows may seem unnecessary and unworthy. Ethics has often given commands for the sake of giving them, and under the head of autonomy has laid upon the shoulders of man a burden which was not natural. To justify human activity, one must have recourse to something more essential than the conventional notion of duty: in the "work" of Yoga, the "energy" of Aristotle, the "deed-act" of Fichte, and the *Vollthat* of Eucken, the reality of our human striving appears in such a way that the fear of negation tends to pass away. Where the minor forms of activity cannot defend themselves against the attacks of nihilism, these major activities, which involve the self in its totality, take their place in the world as exaggerated but essential forms of activity. Thus it seems that, even where the naught is unfriendly to the excesses of spiritual life which æsthetics and ethics present, it cannot efface these strivings when they are related to the fundamental affirmation of selfhood on the part of the ego. We humans have not placed our affair upon the naught, so that we are not to fall as victims to the spirit of vanity and negation. At the same time, we shall not escape the naught unless we struggle against it; but then our whole spiritual life is practically nothing but this striving against inner negation.

6. THE SPIRIT OF NEGATION

From the foregoing considerations it appears that the naught is not a formal category which stands opposed to reality as minus to plus, for the effect of negation has been felt by the human ego, which has had to struggle to protect its ideals against neutralisation. Where negation calls for a *sacrificio dell' intelletto*, where it acts like acid upon the inner life, where it infects the very veins of our existence with a sense of world-weariness, so that we are ready for the renunciation of reality, it shows itself to be something more than the mere change of sign in the table of categories. Negation is as real as illusion, while it is far more active,

and the so-called "nothing" consists of something katabolic. When, therefore, we seek to determine the more exact status of the naught, so that the ethical conflict with it may be accompanied by a clear conception of its nature, we recognise in it the spirit of negation. Since the naught is possessed of activity, we cannot consider it a naught in itself, which could have no more reality than reality in itself. Those who oppose the idea of negation find it necessary to recognise its power when they themselves come to reject it, for the act of rejection is itself a form of negation, so that the optimistic realist upholds his theory only by the negation of negation.

In the present dialectic, which proceeds toward reality, not formally, but by thrusting the ego into the world to discover what the world may be, the principle of negation is about as real as that of existence, just as Siva the destroyer is as divine as Brahma the creator. The spirit of negation, which stalked up and down the world where Job was working out his destiny, which in the form of Mephistopheles accompanied Faust through the individual and social worlds, is a spirit which torments the ego to doubt the existence of itself in the real world. Having penetrated to the phenomenal order as also to the world of activity, the ego is almost ready to conclude that these forms of being, and the satisfactions which accrue from them, are all that man may expect in the world. The self may thus have consciousness in the world of sense and activity in the world of will, but these are all; such phenomenalism and activism are forms of negation, for they forbid a Beyond.

The conflict which negation carries on is not waged against reality as such, as though one category were warring upon another; it is a conflict of the spirit of negation with the human ego. Therefore, he who is tempted to accept the nihilistic, Nirvanist point of view finds himself in a position where he is about to negate his own inner being; such a form of negation is to be felt in no metaphysical system except one which aims to relate the human self to the world about it. The spirit of negation appears as the *nescio* and *non valeo* of

Geulincx, as the "negation of the will to live" with Schopenhauer, as the "renunciation" of the later Wagnerian opera. Our attention is not called to it, because it does not affect our activities in the outer world but contents itself with invading the innermost realm of the self, where it tends to weaken the force of the ego's self-affirmation. Social nihilism may spring from the same root of bitterness, yet it has not the depth of individual nihilism, which attacks not only the work that man has done in forming his state, but the will which has carried on this work; whence all activity appears to be in vain. The desire to overcome the naught is only the desire to find a real place for the ego in the world; for the affirmation of the self does not consist in a simple positive movement, wherein the will encounters no obstacle; it has to do rather with the overcoming of the negation offered by the impersonal, anti-individual world.

It is thus the self that makes war upon the naught, for the spirit of denial seems to look upon the self as its special prey. Man cannot believe that he has a place in the world, that the forces of the world will permit him to have a work of his own, that the course of the world has any fate in store for him; to contend for these things is to carry on a conflict with the spirit of negation. Man has no real reason for believing in being, for the suggestions of reality which come from the phenomenal and causal worlds contain in themselves nothing of a convincing nature. Man has illusioned himself in his haste to believe something, and having relegated the function of belief to the will instead of the intellect, the ego has found itself in the hands of nihilism. Interest and expediency are not the teachers man should follow in his desire to learn reality, for they elaborate illusions which the critical intellect is bound in honour to destroy, with the result of producing negation. The ego cannot believe in everything, and when it is called upon to do this it responds by believing in nothing. The result of all this is to make necessary a genuine striving after reality, which does not come into being of itself but must be affirmed from within.

III

THE AFFIRMATION OF REALITY

OUR dialectic approaches the subject of reality with more earnestness than impersonal metaphysics experiences, because we have placed the affairs of the ego upon the real, and are more than anxious to behold their realisation. Moreover, the world of reality, as it is discussed in this third and last part of our study, has not revealed itself to us frankly, but has made its appearance shrouded with illusion and accompanied by the spirit of negation. Thus having at heart the interests of the ego, and being confronted by illusion and negation in the outer world, we are placed where we must strive after reality if we desire to make it our own; we do not presume merely to find the real, but believe that we must ourselves affirm it. To refrain from this act of affirmation, to accept the world as given, to take life in the world for granted, and to assume that the self exists as a thing exists, is to miss the spirit of reality altogether; indeed, it is to court illusion and surrender to negation. Our interest is in both the self and the world, and if we seem to emphasize the importance of the egoistic side of the ontological problem, it is only because we feel that in some way the reality of the world is sufficient unto itself, while the human ego has yet to substantiate its claim to being real. At the same time, the ego cannot be itself in and through itself alone; to be itself the ego must have a world in which that self may exist, act, and reach the goal of its inner being. As Friedrich Schlegel expressed it, "Man can be one with himself only as he is one with the world—*Nur wer einig ist mit der Welt kann einig sein mit sich selbst.*"¹

¹ *Ideen*, § 130.

1. THE RATIONALISTIC IN ONTOLOGY

From the beginnings of metaphysics it has been the fashion to speculate in behalf of the world, as though it were in need of reality. Here and there exponents of the ego made their appearance, and warned philosophy that it was the self which stood in need of demonstration, but the systematic presentation of the humanistic world-order has never been taken up by philosophy. It is true that Socrates abjured merely physical speculation and counselled his disciple to turn the rays of his thought inward, toward the inscrutable self; but this Socratic egoism was not carried out with a plan, and from its inception was pledged to the single consideration of the ethical in the ego. The same may be said of Kant, who constructed a metaphysics of nature only to repudiate it in favour of an ethical world-order conjured up by the will; but the humanistic element thus introduced could not carry itself beyond the borders of ethical autonomy. Of all dialecticians, Schopenhauer has come the nearest to a human ontology, and in a system which seems to be a view of the world we find none the less a picture of human life. This system has the special advantage of interpreting the world, not merely from the standpoint of the human understanding, but by means of the will also, while it does not fail to advise us that reality as optimistically considered is ever accompanied by negation and its pessimistic cloud. But the point where the Schopenhauerian system fails to satisfy our dialectical demands is found in the treatment of the ego, which is so closely associated with illusion that we are led to wonder whether it has the power to carry out the negation which Schopenhauer prescribes for it. So unreal is it by nature that it need not strive to attain the naught. For ourselves, we seek a humanistic view of the world which does not call upon us to indulge the pessimism necessary for self-negation.

As special philosophies have seen the possibility of the self, so philosophy in general has sought to introduce certain features and phases of the self into the real world, into which

they have proceeded as spies into the promised land. Two such spies may be found in the ideas of "soul" and "free-will"; for their sake dialectics was urged to find a place in the real world, so that these principles of humanity came to be regarded as noumena. Indeed, with some systems, the noumenal was divided between the world and the soul, and where one contended for the reality of a cosmic principle, he did not fail to argue for a spiritual one at the same time. This was true of Kant, who, in the Second Antinomy of his *Kritik*, seems to be anxious to discover the truth about physical atomism, when in reality his interest is in the soul-atom of the Leibnitzian monadology rather than the body-atom of Epicurus' corpuscular philosophy. In the case of freedom, philosophy has worked for the sake of causality and freedom at the same time, as also with the aid of the same weapons. Thus it was with Kant, who sought to adjust the claims of freedom and determinism by relegating causality to the phenomenal order, while freedom was placed in the noumenal world.

In the midst of such an attempt to transfer our human characteristics to the real order, we are led to wonder how much of our humanity is capable of existing in and worthy of transporting to the realm of reality. If in the world of phenomenality and activity we are not wholly at home, does it follow that in the real order we shall find a more perfect habitat? In order to answer the questions that arise when we seek in idea to transplant the self from the petty principalities of sensation and volition to the kingdom of true being, we are forced to decide in our minds what elements in humanity are so real as to fit them for participation in the substantial order; for in many of our human affairs, in many of our human institutions, we involve principles which are either of temporary significance or are so many forms of illusion. To realise the ontological possibilities of the human ego we must inquire whether man is fitted for reality; if he is not, then the desire to find a place for him is a vain one. Thus far the principle of reality that we have employed has served us in accounting for the principle of order in the

world of sense, just as it has enabled us to look beneath that order to the active principle which expresses itself thereby. In the midst of these researches our dialectic has not found it impossible to satisfy the strivings of the self, as these have expressed themselves as a form of self-consciousness and an impulse toward self-activity. There is now a third possible view of the world, as also a third form of egoism.

If the ego cannot accept the world of sense, will the world of spirit accept the ego? Perhaps our philosophy is flying too near the sun when its wings permit of no such flight. The ego transcended the phenomenal order when it advanced the principle of activity; is it able now to take another step and thus enter the real world? There can be no doubt that the ego is seeking reality; our romanticism has not failed to teach us that. Then, the intellect has entertained the idea of the real, whether that idea is ever to acquire a content or not. What we desire exists in the mind, if not in reality, *in intellectu*, even though *in intellectu solo*. Reality is not unthinkable; the ego is not impossible. At the same time, there is something suggestive in the thought that humanity has not been content with appearance, but has sought something behind it; just as it has not been so absorbed with activity that it has not looked for something beyond it. The desire for the disinterested, for that which is above pleasure and beyond use, is the crack in the empirical wall; through this, perhaps, the ego may be able to pass out into the real.

The kind of reality into which the self hopes to pass is not to be understood as something wholly given, which stands in need of nothing more than recognition by the mind; for, while the mere existence of reality is to be accepted as a statement of the ontological situation, it is none the less true that the real is a goal toward which the self in its totality is ever striving. Where a realistic system seeks to premise a reality which stands in need of nothing contributory from the human mind, as in the expression, "Reality is richer than thought," such a system errs in identifying the self with the

special mental processes of perception and conception, which are of an imitative nature. The self, however, is possessed of an ontological impulse superior to the logical processes mentioned, and it is the inner impulse to exist that may give the ego the clue to the larger ontological activity which the world itself displays, so that the secret of existence, while it may not be solved by the impersonal principles of perceiving and thinking, after the manner of traditional schools of idealism, may occur to the ego in the midst of its attempt at self-affirmation. We have seen how determined is the human ego to avoid illusion and to overcome negation; that same ontological earnestness is none the less observable in the direct attempt to affirm the one reality which invests the outer world and informs the inner self. The secret of the world is not to be found in any one thing, but in the world as a whole; this totalising tendency is understood only by the ego, whose own being follows the same ontological principle. This is far from saying, with Fichte, that the ego posits the world as it posits itself; the principle that our dialectic seeks to express is this: that the ego affirms itself in the same manner that the world asserts its being, for which reason the world is to be understood by the self alone.

In place of this centralising, totalising ontological impulse, idealism has sought to impose upon the world the special forms of cognition that the thinking ego has evolved. Were it possible to prove that human thought has any real effect upon the universe, to which it may seem to impart form and law, it is a question whether this fact could satisfy the ontological aspiration of the ego in its desire to affirm itself as an independent reality. Suppose we are convinced that the act of perceiving an object has a constitutive effect upon the latter, so that, where it rejoices in qualities, it is all because these are bestowed upon by the perceiving mind; will such a claim content the ontological ambitions of the self, when the self has more valuable interests than those of phenomenality? Moreover, we must inquire whether things could be constructed in such a manner when the essence of thinghood, as we have seen, consists, not in the possession

of qualities, but in the arrangement of these in an order ; for the idealist has been content to observe the subjective character of the qualities without investigating the principle that controlled them. At the same time, reality is superior to the purely perceptual, in that reality is an active principle ; when the idealist has explained the outer nature of things as something perceptible, he has said nothing about the inner principle of activity that makes them appear as perceptible qualities. The attempt to account for thinghood on the basis of perception by the mind is as naïve as the expectation of finding reality just as it appears to be without the presence of the mind. Both perceptual idealism, which assumes that the mind makes reality, and naïve realism, which thinks that the mind looks at the world as a cat looks at a king, come to naught because they do not involve the essence of either the world or the self.

In a similar manner the conceptual idealist has looked to the human understanding to dictate laws to the world of things, where the perceptual idealist was content to account for their qualities. In the case of the present problem it is felt that nothing is to be gained by speaking lightly of the mind's power to evolve universals, just as it is hoped that in some sufficient way the ideal character of reality may be evoked and substantiated by our ontology ; nevertheless, we dare not trust to the peculiar magic which absolute idealism employs. The very striving of the self, which seeks reality both for itself and its world, forbids that our dialectic should dismiss the subject with either the *percipio* of the lower idealism or the *cogito* of the higher one. Where the one makes us aware of the mere content of reality, the other never penetrates within the form, where the living content is to be found ; the peculiar struggle for the real, as this is felt by the ego, urges the mind on to something more fundamental. For this reason the attempt to find reality by rationalising it is insufficient from both the ontological and egoistic standpoints ; it does not penetrate within to the very ego, nor does it extend outward to the world of reality. In the midst of this rationalism the logical and ontological

importance of the will is lost to view, and the study of the world from the activist angle has convinced us that the ultimate acquisition of the world cannot come about in the human mind unless the principle of inner affirmation is employed. The striving of the self with nature, as also the elaboration of an inner world of selfhood, is indicative of the way that the reality of the world is to be acquired; the complete analysis of this impulse on the part of the ego will be found to include not merely the logical impulses of perception and conception, but also the æsthetical, ethical, and religious.

2. THE ÆSTHETIC AFFIRMATION OF REALITY

In the treatment of the philosophical sciences, as this is taken up in philosophical encyclopædia and introduction, it is the custom for the special disciplines to borrow from the ontological as their source and sun. In this manner æsthetics, ethics, and religion have assumed that metaphysics was complete in itself, so that it could be used by other sciences less perfect. But now that we are anxious to solve the problem of reality, and cannot rest in the rationalistic statement of the identity of that which is *in intellectu* with that which is *in re*, we would prefer to look upon these more living forms of spiritual life as contributing to the supreme science of reality. These real philosophics cannot fail to be of aid in shedding light upon the nature of dialectics, and if they are privileged to borrow from it, they are not exempt from payment in return. In the instance of æsthetics it is not unthinkable that the special principles which constitute this science and make intelligible its problem will become capable of work in a wider field, that of metaphysics; for the artistic impulse is of such an independent nature that it suggests the freedom of the trans-phenomenal, trans-causal world.

Upon the lowest plane of reality, the ego is found striving toward that perfection of being which cannot come until the realm of sense has been transcended. Art reveals two

tendencies in the self, whereby it redeems itself from the sensuous order ; these are : an excessive sensitivity which could never come from the sense-world, even when it expresses itself through the sensuous, and an artistic spontaneity whose origin is within, not without, in the phenomenal order. With its superabundance of power, art organises a search after the real, in which it expects to find supreme enjoyment ; it triumphs over the world without tyranny. When, therefore, we speak of art as aspiring toward the real, we must bear in mind that Platonic realism, which is destined to remain as the type of æsthetical dialectics, looked upon the idea as both complete in its form and perfect in its character, so that the doctrine of ideas was not rationalistic, but æsthetical and intellectualistic. For this reason it becomes possible for the æsthetic thinker, if not for the artist, to lay hold on the ideal-real, which has its characteristic quality of the perfect as well as its formal nature as universal. All art is an idealising endeavour promoted by the spontaneity of the ego's inner life, its free fancies being furthered by the ontological striving of the human spirit in its fullness.

The realistic quality of art, which delivers it from the charge of being unduly dialectical, is found in the tendency to cling to sense, even when the supreme motive may be a spiritual one. Where philosophy would dismiss nature altogether, art is content to subject it to an idealistic interpretation ; so that where æsthetics derives from sense a universal principle, the latter is still capable of being given in a perceptible form. Where the landscape-painting represents nature as a whole, where sculpture stands for the human form as such, and where the drama depicts the strivings of man in his humanity, the dialectical work is carried on in such a way as to preserve the realistic in its immediacy. Questions of doctrine in art, as to the rights and limits of classicism and romanticism, of realism and impressionism, are metaphysical questions whose solution depends upon the comprehension of reality in its dialectical form. Is it to be supposed that reality is best understood in the raw forms which nature submits to us, and that the

work of the human will, as it endeavours to perfect nature and reduce her phenomena to order, has nothing instructive about it? In art is to be found the degree of reality of which the phenomenal world is capable, and the artistic endeavour is none other than a form of ontological striving, wherein the human spirit seeks the real in its most obvious guise, that of sense. In this manner the eye may see reality, because the eye is reinforced by the mind, while the objective world has the real as a mirror behind it.

When philosophy makes a special examination of the motives that are regnant in the æsthetical world, its hope of finding the fundamental in the midst of the sensuous is not deferred. The supreme element in æsthetic contemplation seems to be that of "disinterestedness," as though the mind as a whole, rather than some special sense, were expressing itself and receiving nourishment from contact with the physical world. Even where one may demur at this over-spiritual doctrine, and assert with Stendhal that beauty is the "promise of happiness," he is still one remove from the sensuous order, for the reason that it is the future promise rather than the present enjoyment that gives æsthetic entertainment to the mind. Hence, with the joy of disinterestedness, or with the pleasure of promise, the sensuous is held aloof from the mind, which is able to find satisfaction in something ideal. The æsthetic mind is certainly anxious to rise above the sensuous, even where the sensuous is the medium through which its aspiration expresses itself, for the quality of satisfaction that the mind would enjoy cannot come from the particular and immediate, but depends upon something universal and remote, which is enjoyed in idea or promise. Through its impulses and impressions, the human mind uses art to find a way out of the sensuous world; only reality can satisfy its inner demands.

3. THE ETHICAL CONQUEST OF REALITY

The various ways in which the ethical problem has been stated do not forbid that we should describe the moral

impulse as a striving after value in the world. The ancient notion of the "good" was closely connected with the idea of substance in which the ontologies of Parmenides and Plato rejoiced, so that upon the basis of classicism the ontological nature of ethics was not difficult to demonstrate. Likewise with the modern ideal of duty, which betrays its affinity for the dynamic, causal metaphysics; the mechanism by which this moral principle was wrought out was of a definitely speculative nature. When, as in the present case, we find it expedient to regard the moral principle as one which is based upon the value-judgment, it is no more difficult to show that the problem of doing involves the problem of being, for one cannot wish to pursue with his will that which he cannot accept with his intellect. Indeed the moral depth into which to-day we are sunk is due, not altogether to viciousness on the part of the will, but has a root in the darkness of our ontological ignorance. The will is incessant in its activities, and where the mind has not been able to supply it with ideas as motives, it has willed past truths, or the naught. Not knowing how to find the real in the midst of its impressions, the ego was equally unable to detect the valuable among these, so that its career has been marked by the nihilistic.

Whether the fundamental ethical principle be one of the good, of duty, or of value, it is evident that the ethical impulse is one which leads the self to advance beyond the given to something more permanent and satisfactory. With a plurality of impressions without, and a variety of impulses within, the self found it necessary to adopt certain principles of conduct whose nature was that of ethical principle or moral ideal. This adoption of types was none other than a metaphysical performance, for it was assumed that the general rather than the particular line of conduct was calculated to bring the will to its realisation. Humanity thus sought "happiness" instead of the particular pleasure, virtue instead of some instinctive act. In all this there was the danger that ethics might become purely normative, as is indeed the case with the science as such; nevertheless, the

formalism of the moral principle cannot hide the real life-issue within the outer setting. Moreover, both the moral ideal and the impulse to pursue it are found to exist and exert their influence in none other than a metaphysical situation.

Our moral ideals, when submitted to that analysis which they themselves demand for their own need, are of an ontological nature. Eudæmonism, which might be expected to provide for the ego's happiness without worrying about the ego's real nature, has been able to postulate a practical ideal only by pursuing a speculative method. Accordingly, when one attempts to account for human happiness, he is forced to abandon the realm of immediate sensation, and decide which of the two phases of man's being is the superior: the substantial-intellectual, or the causal-voluntary. Then the eudæmonist is ready to declare whether happiness comes through contemplation or conquest. Happiness thus turns out to be an inner harmony in which the essential nature of the ego is concerned. What is thus found to be true of the eudæmonistic, which might be expected to realise itself upon a sensuous basis, is all the more true of the ideal of the good.

In the special problems of conscience, rectitude, and duty, the same demand for the dialectical is felt. The peculiar problem of remorse, which could hardly be solved by locking up the human heart in an "intuition," becomes more intelligible, if not wholly explicable, when the moralist considers the position of the ego in the world of humanity, which latter, with its inexorable social sense, establishes such a contrast between the single self and universal humanity that the sting of conscience becomes recognisable as the reaction of the social upon the selfish in man. This metaphysical condition of affairs is none the less apparent in the treatment of rectitude. Where one encases his ideal in the "autonomous," he may delay the ontological inquiry into the ground of ethical judgment, but there comes a time when the ideas of right and wrong escape from their subjectivity and find their place in the world of humanity, where they assume the form of a disinterested regard for the values

that humanity is striving to conserve. The weight of duty is measured in the same scales, for where the rigoristic moralist seeks to throw dust in the eyes by asserting the "imperative" character of obligation, a more reasonable ethics insists upon viewing the principle in its real setting, whence the same truth of the ego in the world comes to view, with the effect of showing that the weight of duty comes from the yoke that humanity lays upon every ego that goes to make up the human world-order.

Just as the problems of ethical judgment seem explicable only in the light of the real world, so the moral motives that have animated humanity refer to the same ontological realm as their source. In his moral striving and suffering, man cannot mask the supreme nature of the task he is attempting; for, instead of being bent upon mere "behaviour," the ego is working for the one reality that inhabits the world. Our conventional systems of conduct, with their legalistic contrivances and temporalistic methods, may make it appear that the moral endeavour of the ego consists in nothing more than the coming abreast of the established moralistic order, but the essential character of this moral striving, as it is revealed in both philosophy and poetry, is recognisable as an attempt on the part of the ego to reach the pole of reality. When we stop to consider what the ethical will has accomplished, we observe that it has had the effect of creating a world of values, in which the ego lives and works: indeed, the problem concerning the work of the ego in the world is an insoluble one, unless we assume that such work is carried on in some such order as that of the world of values. Thus it appears that the mind does not perceive reality as a thing, or think it as a form, but works into it by means of a major movement, which involves the whole ego.

4. REALITY AS AFFIRMED BY RELIGION

Like art, religion proceeds by means of a unitary view of both the soul and the world; this happy condition being

one which the ethical does not always share, for the reason that morality is often looked upon as proceeding from special functions, rather than from the self in its totality. In the midst of this dialectical comparison of the three methods of seeking reality, it must be observed that religion takes its place by the side of art in affirming the real in its fullness, a fact which is due to the sense of superabundance with art, and the feeling of need with religion. Ethics is a more moderate human mood, which expresses itself in conservative manner, so that as man seeks happiness and longs for peace of conscience, his sense of reality is marked by moderation and sufficiency. Religion is more vehement; its ideal is that of "all or naught."

The very conception of religion is metaphysical, for it involves a real relation of the self to the world. When religion has detached the self from the world, it finds it necessary to establish some sort of contrast between the two, as appears in Vedanta, with its substitution of the "Self" for the world, and in Christianity, which weighs soul and world in the balances of value, only to find the world wanting. The contrast thus set up between the inner soul and the outer world, so important in the dramas of *Faust* and *Peer Gynt*, is at once religious and dialectical. At the same time, we discover that it was religion which contributed to human culture the notions of soul, world-whole, and God; philosophy has developed these, has given them a more tenable form, but the living content of these ideas has come to us from the religious affirmations of the soul. Why, then, should we wonder how we can come into possession of the real, when religion has been carrying on its operations in none other than the world of reality? Again, does the staid method of empiricism, which looks for a stark "reality," as well as the formal view of rationalism, appear in unfavourable contrast to the realistic assertion of being which appears in the religious world-order.

When we consult the religious impulse which has been aroused by the metaphysical contrast between the soul and the world, we observe the same ontological tendency that

appeared in art and morality reappears with renewed force, while its character is more definitely outlined. Where art springs upward toward something fair and remote, where morality labours to perfect that which has worth, the egoistic impulse, when expressed by religion, takes the form of the self-affirmation of the soul in contrast to the world. This repudiation of the immediate, this hatred of life in the world, this pessimistic attitude toward nature, contains the essence of religion, which in its turn is only an expression of a profound belief in remote reality. The spirit of pessimism, which in the preceding chapter has been observed to characterise the ego's negation of the world, is not unlike the mood that besets the most advanced forms of religion, except that these indulge in denial because they cannot find satisfaction in the given, while they are usually convinced that there remains in some remote form the reality that the self-affirming soul is postulating. In the case of Buddhism this is not so, for which reason the appeal to this particular religion is of value only in revealing the peculiar trait of world-despair that infects the religious consciousness; hence the renewed assertion of the real in the world is to be sought in a faith less pessimistic.

Remove the ontological from religion and, after the manner of the altruistic, optimistic thinkers of the day, seek to relegate it to the field of social efficiency, and the impossibility of religion will serve to illustrate the necessity of regarding the principle of religious striving as something dialectical. It is because we have assumed that reality is a passive form, into which phenomena and causes are supposed to fit, that we have imagined the religious principle to have nothing ontological about it, or the ontological principle to be equally wanting in religion. Reality, instead of being a dead, inert principle of things, is that which animates all, giving them life and form. Religion exists, not because its idea of God is a faithful imitation of the metaphysical principle of being, but because the living principle of reality at work in the world appears as the impulse which urges the soul to strive and affirm itself. Indeed, if we are ready

to regard reality as an active principle, which exists by positing itself, we are in a position to understand that the essential nature of religion is only the same spirit of affirmation appearing in another form. In his religion man has caught the spirit of reality as nowhere else in his spiritual life, for it is the principle of the real which, instead of inviting him from without, urges him from within. Reality is not unlike Wagner's Wotan, who produced a hero to carry out his work in a freer and more fearless fashion. The human ego is the one element in the whole universe that seems to have understood the motive of reality, for the attempt on the part of the ego, to assert itself is a sign of its reality.

5. REALITY AND HUMANITY

Having observed the three ways in which the ego makes a direct attempt to reach reality, we are ready to inquire whether there exists such a world-order as the human spirit might desire to find. From the beginning, philosophy has devoted itself to nature, for whose sake the world was supposed to have come into being; but is it not possible to regard the world as the place for egos as well as for things? Those who work to evince the reality and character of humanity are constantly led to doubt the ability of its subject to fit itself into a human order, while they are led to look with longing toward the physical world with its stolid indifference to the interests of life, as well as its staid conduct according to natural law. Thus it seems impossible to have a metaphysics of humanity where there is a metaphysics of nature. Nevertheless, there is some suggestion of universality in mankind, and even where the principle of individuation enters to threaten the epic grandeur of reality, the ego may be said to possess the world. What does such possession imply? Idealism in the form of both the perceptual and conceptual is ever ready to advise us that, were it not for the activity of the mind, we should have no world at all; this rationalism is urged to the very limits of solipsism. But the present dialectic is

not disposed to emphasize this rationalistic predicament, not because it lays too much stress upon the ego, but for the reason that it does not evoke any living principles in the human soul. Rationalism, instead of exaggerating the importance of the self, builds up a structure with the aid of the ego, and ends by leaving the latter on the outside. When we seek to relate humanity to reality, our aim is to locate the self in the world it labours so unremittingly to build up, for the world-whole without the self is nothing to us. The world without the ego is as vain as the ego without the world.

When we seek to place the self in the world, as though that world were its own, or the place where the self belonged, we are adopting a method of thought somewhat different from the traditional one, which regards knowledge as having to do with the "outer" world. If such a theory of knowledge would complete the idea which the outwardness of the world implies, and thus account for the inwardness of the self, our dialectic could have no just complaint to offer, because the situation of the ego within the world, the play within the play, is the very one which appeals to us as a perfect statement of the ontological problem. But when knowledge is said to be a knowledge of the outer world, it omits to provide for the ego within that world, while it really uses the term "outer" to indicate the difference between the mind and its object. Has not the mind grown up within the very borders of reality, or are we to imagine that it has come upon the world as an adventurer who seeks to explore some foreign land? Are we to regard the ego as a citizen or a spy? Does the self merely listen at the door of reality, or does it hear what was meant for its ears? So long has rationalism presented the knowing-relation as though the mind began to observe the world from the outside, that when we attempt to investigate the world with the self in its native, internal position, it is as though we are speaking of some purely human order which can hardly be thought to exist. It is to the world that the self owes its origin; it is with the world that perception inter-

plays and the will interacts; and yet we are supposed to believe that the ego begins its life of thinking and acting apart from the world which produced it. Hence, it is urged, we cannot act without some impossible principle of freedom, nor can we think unless we have some special system of ideas. A more sincere view of human knowledge is developed upon the basis of the ego's original location within the world, the knowledge of which is a recognition rather than a discovery. Plato's theory of all knowledge as memory indicates in an impossible way the general truth, that the mind is already in possession of the truth that it is trying to recognise.

From the point of view of the living principle in knowledge of the world, we are in a position where we may survey the world as partaking of the nature of a human order; we may not possess the world, but we have a place in it, and to it we belong. There is no special world of humanity, nor is there a special world of nature; but the one world is of such a nature as to include the humanistic, the salient principles of which extend beyond the limits of mankind to the edges of the world as such. Our present-day metaphysics recognises this fact when it treats the problem of reality from the standpoint of the human intellect and will, whence arise intellectualism and voluntarism. Where once it was the custom to speak of the static principle of being in terms of substantialism, we have learned to apply to the question the principles of intellectualism; while the abstract methods of the causal are enriched by the infusion of the voluntaristic. These departures are only so many ways in which the humanistic has come to be recognised, and while we are more ready to consider the world as intellect than the world as will, both the intellectualistic and the voluntaristic have found their place in dialectics.

When we consider what the term humanity denotes, in order that we may more securely indulge the notion of the humanistic order, we are led to see that it is not man in his natural capacity who is to act as the interpreter of the world; rather is it man in his cultural capacity who is entitled to a

place in the world-whole. Man as man cannot play the part of Atlas, and thus support the world upon his physical being; but man as ego, as intellectualist, is not far from the central position in the universe. The interpretation of humanity in the light of culture must not be allowed to pass without some recognition of what that culture is supposed to indicate. The notion of culture that enables our dialectic to place the self in the world involves something more than the purely intellectualistic, even when the latter constitutes an essential part of the subject; moreover, the ideal of culture is not realised upon a purely æsthetical basis, although the spontaneity of the æsthetical is of no little moment in the elaboration of the cultural. The essential elements in the culture that promotes the ontological in humanity are those of *inwardness*, through which the self comes to its own, and *remoteness*, through which the same self receives a universal significance. The ability of the human self to enter into its own nature, while it extends the meaning of its inner being to the ends of the world, has in it the essential principle of the world as a human-order. It is that unity of the self with its self and with the world to which Friedrich Schlegel referred. If Kant had been careful to recognise this complete unity, he might have escaped the paralogisms of the soul and the antinomies of the world; but, discussing his psychology in one place and his cosmology in another, he could come to no speculative conclusion.

6. THE WORLD AND THE EGO

In the striving of the ego toward reality, the question of knowledge involves the idea of acquaintance with the world in which the ego exists, rather than a discovery of a realm outside it. As a result of this fact, the self in its culture is found trying to realise its inner nature as something within the world. Both realism, with its insistence upon stark reality, and idealism, with its demand that the inner state of the mind shall be accepted as the real, over-

look the character of the ego's striving after the real; indeed, the failure to appreciate the essential nature of the self has been the cause of the misunderstanding of the problem of knowledge. Psychology and ontology have been kept apart, as though the reality of the world were a different kind of reality from that of the soul. Subject and object have been opposed to each other, as though they belonged to different orders of reality. As a result of these dualisms, the world has been looked upon as something which could have no interest in the self, whose real aim was to recognise the universe that had been proceeding *incognito*. The world-like nature of the self has not been appreciated, even when the manifest aim of human culture has been to extend the being of the human self to the remotest circles of the universe. The position of humanity, as the last stage in the natural order and the first division of the spiritual world, should incline us to regard the human self as occupying a strategic position, in the light of which it is able to bring about the unity of the natural and the spiritual, while it itself succeeds in adjusting itself to the world as a whole.

When we attempt to explain our experience with the world by relegating the phenomena of the inner life to one realm and those of the outer world to another, we place our thought in a position where its choice of "subject" or "object" is destined to end in disappointment, for the reason that the thinker is left without either a world or a soul. If we were serious in viewing the world as an "outer" order, and if we were consistent in applying this notion, our thought could suffer no harm; but the actual presentation of the problem is such as to survey the self and the world upon the same plane, as though they were rivals in the realm of reality, whereby each challenged the other, saying, "No object without a subject," or "No subject without an object." Where the spirit of negation attempts to destroy the belief in both the soul and the world, the spirit of realisation would create a faith in the reality of both. But this belief cannot be urged consistently until

we have taken the idea of an "outer" world in its proper meaning, which, instead of being that of an opposite ontological order, is that of an external world, marked by the presence of an inner life. Now the interiority of the self is just as important a truth as that of the exteriority of the world, and where dialectics presents the problem in such a way as to locate the ego in its own world, the egoist can offer no objections.

Where the traditional view prevails, and the world is pitted against the mind, the mind against the world, philosophy is confronted by an antinomy. Suppose one assume the standpoint of the subject, after the manner of the idealist; then he is placed in a position where he must make the world dependent upon thought, in a system where the mind legislates for reality. The world, instead of existing of itself, instead of being a world, is simply a non-ego. It is quite right for the idealist to insist that there is no world which excludes mind, as it is also quite just in him when he refuses to allow anything to domineer over his thought; but it is only a pathological case when the thinker seeks to bound the world by the self. Where one takes the opposite point of view, and thus asserts that the mind is dependent upon the object for its knowledge, he finds it difficult to explain the peculiar adaptability of the subject to the object, for whose principles it seems perfectly well prepared. The subject passes over to the object, as the object comes over into the subject; for, as thought relates to the thing, the thing relates itself to thought. In addition to this community of subject and object, there is the natural desire to apply causality to the relation between the two; thus the idealist insisted that reason determined reality, while the realist insisted that reality determined reason. Thought and things have a peculiar affinity for each other, yet one does not like to assert that either thought makes the thing, or the thing makes the thought. Where the mind is represented as something already within reality, participating in its nature and recognising its meaning, the obvious community of

thought and thing, instead of constituting a contrast, one part of which ever neutralised the other, really constituted a system in which the ego found a very natural place within the real world.

The special forms of culture that we have examined showed us that the ego is gradually adapting itself to the conditions of the world about it ; for æsthetics revealed the ego laying claim to the world of sense, ethics found it taking possession of the world of activity, while religion evinces its ability to make the whole world its own. When we attempt to reduce this characteristic relation of the self to the world to the terms of perception and conception, we see how insufficient is the purely rationalistic statement of the situation. The world does not impress its facts upon the mind, nor does the mind mould the world according to its forms ; but the world is of such a nature as to permit, if not to invite, the full realisation of the inner life of the self through its culture. From the world of sense, the self is able to develop its artistic ideals, through which the perfection of nature is reached ; from the world of activity, ethics extracts the principle of freedom, which it employs to carry out to its completion the world of work ; in the world as a whole, religion finds redemption, which is its supreme notion. When, therefore, the human ego turns to art, to ethics, and to religion, its underlying interest is the ontological one ; the special forms of culture serve to express and exert the central impulse of the self, which is that of existence.

As a result of this living affirmation of reality on the part of the ego, it becomes impossible to regard the self as a thinking thing only, just as it is valueless to consider the world something rejoicing in existence alone ; both the self and the world are characteristic, and if this were not the case it would be impossible to have a metaphysics of art, of ethics, or of religion. Why should we seek to besiege being for an entrance when the doors of reality have stood open from the beginning ? The ego is in the world, even when it is not wholly adjusted to the world's forms or absorbed in

the world's life. All culture, æsthetical, ethical, religious, consists in this attempted adjustment, this desired absorption. It is not the ego as a perceiving mechanism or as concept-forming apparatus, but the ego in the totality of its striving that is destined to reach reality. When, therefore, we speak of the affirmation of reality on the part of the self, we have in mind that total deed which has ever characterised the culture of the human mind.

IV

THE REAL AS SUBSTANCE

HAVING witnessed the struggle for reality and against illusion, and having seen as well with what difficulty dialectic overcomes the tendency toward negation, we are in a position where we can appreciate the nature of reality as something more than appearance and activity. Some there be who are ready to pause on the primary and secondary stages of being, and these will be disposed to discredit the claim of the present dialectic that reality has still a third realm within its complete kingdom; but these are probably they who have had no great struggle to secure their hold upon the real, so that they are satisfied with less than that full reality which is demanded by those who have doubted its existence. There is of course a touch of the pleonastic in the thought of reality as substance, but since appearance and activity are competitors with reality as such, it is perhaps wise to regard the real as the substantial. The foregoing treatment of the problem of being, as found recorded in Book I. and Book II., has indicated that being exists in stages, so that, where phenomena are the primitives of dialectics, substance represents the science in its perfected form; the intermediate position of activity has already received due emphasis.

I. THE ADJECTIVAL, VERBAL, AND SUBSTANTIVAL

There is some measure of reality in appearance, a greater degree of it in activity, but the *ens realissimum* is to be found in a phase of being yet higher. The attempt to determine the nature of this most real of things is now to be made

in connection with the notion of substance. Inasmuch as our dialectic has not slighted phenomenality or been neglectful of activity, it has delivered itself from the charge of dogmatism that usually and justly is brought to bear upon the systems of metaphysics that exalt substance to the highest position. This exaltation of reality in the form of substantialism has not been carried on at the expense of the lesser forms of being, for these have received the same measure of treatment allotted to the final form of things. This advance to the tertiary phase of reality involves no departure from the plan of dialectics begun with the study of appearance and continued with that of activity; it consists rather in the completion of that very plan, and it equips our thought with a full-orbed conception of being, as that which *appears*, that which *acts*, and that which *is*.

The most natural objection to the third view of being will consist of a criticism to the effect that, though it may be true, it is not necessary, for the reason that all the being which exists has already been exhausted in the treatment of the world as appearance and as activity. Yet something more than the desire for completeness now urges us to elaborate the tertiary conception of things; to substantiate the views of being already developed, some extra ideal of things must be entertained. As the phenomenal was found to depend upon the causal, the causal will be found to depend upon the substantial. How, then, can the first two phases of being be maintained without the third and final one? In his desire to escape from the notion of "pure being," Lotze was led to declare that reality was made up of qualities, so that being was regarded in a sense "*adjectival*."¹ In a similar fashion Bergson has repudiated both noun and adjective, which signify things and states, and with voluntaristic enthusiasm surrendered all to the *verb*, with its principle of activity.² With the relative degree of sufficiency which attaches to these forms of expression, it must be added that reality consists not only of adjectival states

¹ *Metaphysics*, tr. Bosanquet, § 311.

² *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 328.

and verbal happenings, but of *substantial* realities also. To be means to appear as a quality, to take place as an event, and to exist as a thing. The striving after reality, the struggle against illusion, and the negation of nihilism must have in them some more essential notion of being than that which appears and acts.

This threefold view of the world without is made more complete when it is accompanied by its psychological counterpart in the world within. There the phenomenal expresses itself in the form of *sense*, the activistic asserts itself as *will*, the real reposes in *intellect*. Just as the phenomenal and real are reconciled by means of activity, so sense and intellect are brought together through the will, which raises the sensational to a higher plane, while it makes it possible for the understanding to cast off some of its rationalism and embrace the interests of the world of experience. Such a treatment of the rational, or noumenal, order cannot fail to influence our conception of both reality and the rationalistic way in which this has been treated in dialectics. Accordingly, we hope to be able to depart from the notion of a thing in itself without abandoning the idea of substance; while we may expect to rid our thought of rationalism without casting out with the bath the child of intellectualism. Just how much life and activity may be attributed to the intellect will appear when we take up the question of the real and ideal. Before this can be done we must sound the depths of reality to see whether it is bottomless, or whether it does not have a substantial foundation.

In working out the problem of substance the ego may find it necessary to descend to an unwonted depth, but this should not seem extraordinary, inasmuch as the ego advanced beyond the limits of appearance and activity in its attempt to find its place and do its work in the world-whole. It seems then as though there must be for the self a Beyond, a Beneath, for in no other realm of reality can it find rest, to no other can it submit. Thus do the interests of spiritual life gather round the idea of substance, for the ego cannot repose in the world of sense, nor can it accept, as its full

fate, the activity accorded to it in the system of world-work. When, therefore, we consult the self, we find that it demands a full reality, beyond the realms of the primary and secondary worlds, whose domain is marked by the empirical. The endeavour to find the third empire of being does not consist in launching forth into the unknown, but consists rather in building upon the subordinate forms of reality already elaborated in connection with the phenomenal and causal; indeed, it is not without regard to the need of finally basing these two worlds upon an ultimate order of substance that that final order is developed. As we have kept insisting, the real turns to the aid of the causal as the causal has turned to aid the phenomenal. Substance has been implicit in both appearance and activity; in the one it has afforded the ground of reality in the principle of order, in the other it has served to justify causal activity by lending its own *actio immanens*. Substance is thus something unifying and creative in the lower realms of being, but it is capable also of independent treatment.

The reason for insisting upon substance as something superior to activity, as activity was found to be superior to appearance, is not an academic desire to introduce substance as such into the ontological order; it arises rather in response to the real desire to find something to satisfy the self in its striving after reality. Without the substantial, thought may be equipped with appearance and activity without being able to assure itself that, where one leads to illusion, the other is bent upon negation. Having struggled against these tendencies, as they confront us upon the threshold of the world of reality, we are now anxious to discover what lies within this superior realm. The mind seeks something satisfying; it cannot rest in impressions, however perfectly they may follow the analogy of substance; it cannot yield to the activistic, even where this supplies a partial and temporary contentment; it demands a genuine form of being as substance. The ego seems to contemplate the world with adequate feelings, while it is anxious to respond to it with appropriate volitions; to do these things, it seems necessary

for it to be in possession of something beyond the worlds of impressionism and activism.

The most natural objection to the idea of substance is found in the thought that this conception implies that the mind has elaborated a finished system of being. Dogmatic substantialism has not always avoided this unfortunate misconception, whence prejudice against the idea of substance has been allowed to deprive our philosophy of the substantial in all forms, when it is in the ancient system of Parmenides and the modern one of Spinoza that the error of substantialistic perfectionism is usually found. The aim of the present dialectic is not to show that the idea of substance represents a closed circle without, but that it reveals something satisfactory within. The self finds the idea of substance sufficient in a world where the phenomenal and real carry us only a part of the way. It is of no import to the self that it possesses a place and has a work in the world, unless at the same time it is shown that this place is real, and the work is not temporal, but eternal; without this substantiation the impressions and impulses of the ego will amount to naught. It is, therefore, the sense of inner sufficiency rather than that of outer perfection that inclines our dialectic to the principle of substance.

2. SUBSTANCE AND APPEARANCE

The preliminary view of reality as found in the World of Appearance afforded our thought certain criteria of being in the form of outer order and inner unity, whence we were led to believe that both nature and humanity had a certain measure of reality about them. So much has thus been attributed to appearance that we are now wondering whether it is indeed possible to elaborate any genuine Beyond. We have referred to how the dialectical hunger expresses a peculiar craving for reality, and might also have observed how this mood of want is responsible for the ethical ideal of intrinsic value and the religious principle of perfect satisfaction; reality is thus supposed to explain what appears and

what happens, just as it is expected to satisfy our feelings and efforts. At this point, when for the last time the principles of appearance and substantiality are called upon to express their relative degrees of sufficiency, we must inquire whether substance contains anything not already found in the phenomenal world-order.

The repudiation of reality on the part of the realist becomes a serious thing when we reflect that the world does not exist to itself and in its own behalf merely, but is supposed to contain spiritual life in the character of the human ego. Deny substance in the world, and the impersonal panorama may go on in about the same way as before; deny substance in the self, and the reception of the world through knowledge, as well as the reaction upon it by the will, is all in vain. Lotze's attempt to substitute quality for reality is instructive to the substantialist, and it grows especially so when it is observed how, in his treatment of the soul-problem, Lotze was quite precipitous in his return to the camp he had quitted in his study of being in general.

In his ontology Lotze turns away from the substantial manner of expressing reality, and dwells upon the inherent possibilities of phenomenalism. In his devotion to the adjectival form of expression he is led to say, "In fact, however, real is an adjectival or predicative conception, a title belonging to that which in some manner . . . behaves as a Thing—changes, that is to say, in a regular order, remains identical with itself in its various states, acts and suffers; for it is this that we have assumed to be the case with Things, supposing that there are Things."¹ In defining his own conception of thinghood Lotze says, "A thing is the realised individual law of its behaviour."² This seems a bit cavalier-like toward thinghood, which is allowed to enjoy only a hypothetical existence. When, however, Lotze was confronted with the problem of thinghood as it reappeared in the Psychology, the last book of the *Metaphysics*, his attitude was by no means so bold. From the ontological standpoint in general, he had been led to declare that "it

¹ *Metaphysics*, tr. Bosanquet, § 31.

² *Ib.*, § 36.

is not by virtue of a substance contained in them that Things are ; they are when they are qualified to produce an appearance of there being a substance in them.”¹ This has the odour of phenomenalism, while it is not wholly free from the thought of illusion. When Lotze seeks to apply this rather empty notion of being to the existence of the soul, he turns toward substantialism, which he approaches via the idea of unity. Thus he says, “We do not believe in the unity of the soul because it appears as unity, but simply because it is able to appear or manifest itself in some way, whatever that may be.”² Somewhat in disregard of this realistic caution, Lotze declares that “every soul is what it shows itself to be, unity whose life is in definite ideas, feelings, efforts.”³ Less subtle is the statement to the effect that “the fact of unity is *eo ipso* at once the fact of the existence of a substance” ;⁴ while with another attempt to state the essential nature of the soul, he slips backward toward his former phenomenalism : “It is not because the soul is substance and unity that it asserts itself as such, but it is substance and unity as soon as, and in so far as, it asserts itself as such.”⁵ At a later point he identifies these two by saying, “The psychical unity of which it (materialism) speaks is simply what we mean by the word substance.”⁶ From such statements as we have extracted from the Lotzean realism it seems fair to conclude that, where Lotze speaks of being in the impersonal sense of the term, he is satisfied with the purely adjectival form of expression, but where the soul’s existence is at stake he makes surreptitious use of substantialism.

The fallacy involved in the idea of pure being without quality or function has been obviated in the present dialectic, which has regarded the real not as an in-itself, but as something which has the colouring of qualities and the mode of activity peculiar to the principle of causality ; nowhere has it sought to deduce the notion of thinghood from any other than phenomenalistic and activistic sources. Being has thus been looked upon as nothing else but a kind of conduct

¹ *Metaphysics*, §§ 37, 243.

⁴ *Ib.*, § 243.

² *Ib.*, § 244.

⁵ *Ib.*, § 246.

³ *Ib.*, § 245.

⁶ *Ib.*, § 250.

on the part of definite qualities. For this reason we feel justified in gathering the fruit of this practical conception of reality in the form of a living idea of substance. Reality, which has its states and exhibits its qualities, is itself something more than states and qualities. Being, which is not without behaviour, is itself something more than behaviour. We are not anxious to regard being as a kind of ontological stuff, a portion of which is contained in each real thing; such a hylozoistic conception was abandoned with the passing of the Milesians and the coming of Parmenides. Nor do we care to look upon being as mere form, whose outline is traced by the understanding. The real stands in need of content, and this comes from the world of sense; the real is no less in need of form, and this must be received from the world of thought; to bring form and content closer together we have sought to develop the activism implicit in each of these opposites. When at the close of this examination of reality we find it necessary to elaborate the idea of substance, without which neither phenomenal nor real could stand, we are in no danger of developing the fallacy of mere thinghood or pure being.

Secure as we are from the snare of mere being as an in-itself, our dialectic is in a position to admit to the fullest extent the validity of the phenomenal order as such. In beginning with the principles of phenomenality we safeguarded our thought from the peculiar predicament of Spinoza's system, which commenced by making substance the all, whence it was difficult to develop and find a place for the inner and outer attributes of thought and extension. But our dialectic did not set out by enclosing the real within itself and then proceed to wonder why it was so shut off from the inner world of nature and the outer world of nature. Its idea of reality was not brought out at the beginning, but was held in reserve while the lesser orders of being were accounted for. In this way we feel that our thought is privileged to indulge the hope that it has made possible the application of the Spinozistic *actio immanens* and *ens immanens* which the Spinozistic system itself did not enjoy,

because of its forbidding notion of substance as an in-itself. We are in a position where we may allow the world to determine the nature of thought, just as we are ready to permit thought to dictate the necessary principles of the world's existence. As the world stands in need of the substantial to give it form, so the substantial stands in need of the world to give it content. Furthermore, the substantial has a function to perform in the world, so that the activistic conception of things is of value in indicating the calling of the substantial in the world. In the problem before us, where we attempt to elaborate the principle of substance as something superior to the phenomenal, it is sufficient to claim that the many are of as much value to the One as the One to the many. Ours is a pluralistic world, the manifold of whose rich content grows upon our experience; but ours is none the less a unified world, wherein the phenomenally many point to the unified One.

3. SUBSTANCE AS THE UNITY OF THINGS

In order to advance dialectics beyond the limits of the phenomenal order, without at the same time departing from the world of experience, the principle of substance must be defined in terms of unity. The real is the One. Being, which cannot exist without states, cannot consist of these states, but consists rather in the unity of them. Such a notion of substance as the unity of the phenomenal states delivers us from a double danger: it enables us to avoid the vicious circle of being as an in-itself; it saves us from the formlessness of states in themselves with no presiding unity among them. Indeed, as it is difficult to distinguish the fallacy of ontologism from the fallacy of phenomenalism, so it is equally difficult to guard against the pitfalls that are laid by these empty notions. We cannot exalt the thing without its quality or the quality without the thing; here we attempt to exalt thinghood, or substance, upon the basis of the qualities that are found in experience. With the ancient *οὐσία* and the mediæval *substantia*, there is the

lingering suspicion of the stuff-like ; in the stead of this our dialectic desires to place the notion of active states of being, the unity of which manifold is supplied by the real itself. While mediæval thought was not ever careful to invest the real with a content, it often introduced the idea of *essentia*, which replaced the solid conception of *substantia* with something more active and transparent ; introduced by Augustine,¹ this notion of being as something free from a petrified substantialism has come down to modern times to serve an age which is ever anxious to have its dialectics so flexible that it may live up to the modern ideal of activity.

Where permanence was the ancient criterion of reality, unity has become the modern ideal ; both are employed to reduce phenomena to order ; both are attempts to rise from the world of appearance to that of being. The use of unity as a criterion of reality places dialectics in a position where it may emphasize the inner and essential nature of being without attempting to determine its limits ; the employment of the permanent had the effect of closing the circle of reality, whose range was so determined that it seemed impossible to introduce new material and new methods as the experience of humanity became richer and more complex. Let it be granted that ours is a growing world-order ; the insistence upon unity as the essential idea in the real does no more than imply that, with all the changes that occur, and with all the corrections that are made, the universe will not be found to depart from the reasonable plan which is now in the possession of human philosophy. Unity as the essence of the real is but an idea assuring us of consistency on the part of the world-activity. Whether the work of the world is finished or not we cannot so easily determine, and thus we are disposed to grant something to the realistic criticism of rationalism, to the effect that rationalism forbids ontological progress ; although we are not as ready to admit that, up to the present hour, the human mind has not succeeded in discovering the principle according to which the work of the world-whole has been

¹ *De Trin.*, v. 9.

carried on. Certainty is not fixedness; and the claim that we possess reality in and through the observed and ever-postulated unity of things is not an extreme pretension of the human mind.

Progress is possible with unity, even if it be forbidden by permanence. Where realism expects to find in the world of experience individual things and new events, it does not prevent our assumption that these are to become part of the authentic system of being, the knowledge of which has long been the chief source of human consolation; nor does this robust realism make it plain to us how else the particular and the novel could be of value to our thought. The oft-recurring Kantian phrase, "the conditions of a possible experience," is of value in indicating that, with the synthetic and progressive in human knowledge of the world, there is the reference to the acquired order of things now known to the mind. Thus there seems to be no reason why the realist as *insurrecto* should seek to vitiate the plan of being that has been established to serve the needs of our intellectual life, even though the rationalist has been too ready to regard his present-passing ideals as eternal dicta of spiritual life. Apparently there is no escape from the plan of the universe, nor is there any real reason why the mind should wish to break through the established order.

If reality were an in-itself, there would be no need for the unity our dialectic is now upholding, but since we are dealing with a world which comes upon us from all quarters, its winds blowing from all points, we are compelled to adopt the notion of unity to save ourselves from contradiction, as also to redeem reality from chaos. The most elaborate, though not necessarily the most consistent, portrayal of this unity of the phenomena of the sensible world appears in the *Upanishads*. Passing from sheer naturalism to sheer spiritualism, the *Khândogya Upanishad* advances the idea of a real unity in the world by asserting that as the juices of plants unite in honey, as rivers mingle in the sea, as salt pervades the ocean, so one element is found in all things. This one element is the Self. "That

which is the subtle essence—in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the self, and thou art it—*tat tvam asi*.”¹ The *Brihadaranyka Upanishad* reiterates this truth, and strives more closely to identify the self with human consciousness. True being, or true Brahman, is not in the sun or moon, in lightning or ether, in wind or fire, in sound or space; but as the web comes from the spider, and as the sparks fly from the fire, so all things come forth from the self, which is the warp and woof of which all things, air and water, sun and stars, are woven.”² Such a unity contains the truth of the phenomenal world-order. To postulate an unsubstantial appearance is to believe in nothing but the single, unrelated phenomenon; when we consider these phenomena in their manifest totality we cannot fail to observe how systematic is the arrangement of them, for they are of such consistency that they cannot stand alone, but demand something in and behind them to arrange them in their destined order. The single thing is single only as our abstractions isolate it; its nature involves it in a habitat, where it enjoys its existence in company with other similar elements of existence. For the sake of phenomenality, then, as much as in behalf of reality, we find it expedient to consider the world of appearance as resting upon the unified world-order of substance. All the while, however, we are called upon to observe that this substance is not something *eo ipso*.

4. SUBSTANCE AND ACTIVITY

Just as the preliminary view of reality, as that which appears, enabled us to escape the snare of mere thinghood, so the activistic conception has been delivering our thought from the misleading notion of a *deus ex machina*. The treatment of causality saves us here as the view of phenomenality delivered us there. While we were contending for genuine causality as *causa immanens* we were borrowing from the treasury of substance, which made it possible for us to look upon causality as something more substantial than the

¹ *Ob. cit.*, vi. 8 *et seq.*

² *Op. cit.*, *ib.*

occasional activity of transience; this debt must now be acknowledged. Since immanent, substantial causality has saved us from the scepticism inherent in transient causality, we are now placed where we must admit that substance, while existing in the interests of activity, is something superior to the latter. Substance rules activity, as activity rules phenomenality; to be means to act, to act signifies to manifest the qualities which belong to a thing. But where we have introduced the substantial for the sake of the causal, we have not admitted that the substantial has no right to its own existence; its place may not be usurped by activity, important as activity may be. The true task of dialectics does not consist in choosing between the two, but has to do rather with the arrangement of them in the form of a hierarchy, wherein activity is inferior as substance is superior. When we exalt substance to the highest position we do not dismiss activity, we merely subordinate it.

We shall never doubt that activity has its place in being; our only question concerns the nature of that place, whether it is supreme or secondary. Thought has given up the idea of elaborating the idea of substance in a merely ontological manner apart from the principle of causality, and now it must guard against the temptation to surrender the substantial to the causal, in response to a present-day tendency toward both the dynamic and the Dionysian. The fortunes of substance and causality are so similar that there should be no rivalry between them. In answer to Socrates' famous question, "Did ever any man believe in flute-playing, and not in flute-players?" we may propose another, the contrary of this: "Did ever any man believe in flute-players, and not in flute-playing?" The dialectic which is fermenting in such word-play may be expressed more formally by observing that as the player is necessary for the playing, so the playing is necessary for the player; or, as substance is necessary to causality, so causality is necessary to substance. Playing makes the player, growing the plant, thinking the mind; without its peculiar function the thing may hardly be said to exist. Reality depends upon activity; the World

Ground needs the world. Thus where the radical Socrates advances from mere activism to substantialism, the conservative Augustine retreats from his pure ontology when he observes that the world, instead of existing apart from God, is to be regarded originating and subsisting in the complete act of eternal generation.¹

Nevertheless, to be means more than to have states and to perform acts, essential as these may be. To be means to suffer; that is, to be affected by the combination of the qualities that go to make up the thing and the activities that express that thing's nature. Such a conception of suffering does not denote passivity, but implies a kind of inner activity even more significant than that which is expressed in outward work. The repose of reality, the silence of spirit are the significant things in ontology, where being is "terrible in action, more terrible when at rest." This eternal passivity is the true *actio immanens*, without which all attempts to explain activity are destined to be in vain. Hence our dialectic makes all possible concession to the empirical and energistic, knowing that it is not likely to sacrifice that superb conception of being as substance, which has enlightened human dialectics from the days of Parmenides.

Where activism is forced to recognise the superiority of the substantialistic view of the world, the latter is not justified in thinking that it is as solitary as it is supreme. Substance stands in need of causality, just as causality stands in need of phenomenality; the form must ever have a content in order to be real. The condition of things presented by the interdependence of substance and activity may be likened to the geological situation upon our planet, where, as the nebular hypothesis suggested, the vast subterranean fires are held in check by the thin crust of the earth, which makes possible the symmetrical form of the planet. The older substantialism conceived of substance as something solid, wherein nothing but being is supposed to exist; it was in this spirit that Parmenides asserted "that being is, and non-being is not." But a more critical view of substance

¹ *De Civ. Dei*, lib. xii. 25.

conceives of this principle as the highest rather than as the only form of being. Such substantialism does not seek to banish activity from the world, for this would be all too fatal; nevertheless it does not submit to the domination of causality, but insists that the interests of the world are best guarded when the order of being is such as to provide a place for the lowest and simplest phase of reality in the form of sensuous phenomenality, upon the basis of which is erected a higher grade of reality in the form of an activistic order, which at last succumbs to the supreme order of being as substance. But in all this, substance must be looked upon as having something elastic about it, for just as it is not possessed of ontological solidity, so its boundary is not fixed in an absolutistic fashion. Certainly our human conception of the world is not final, so that we are not justified in assuming that our dialectic has discovered every category of the mind or explored every field of experience; hence substance must be conceived of in such a way as to provide for new departures in science and philosophy. Yet it seems inconceivable that any discovery within the mind or in connection with the world should bring about such a radical change in the presentation of reality as to change the order of things from appearance, activity, reality to something entirely new. Our dialectic is prepared for the new, it awaits the new with the expectation that it will add to and corroborate the scheme of being which has made the old and established so intelligible and satisfactory for the ego; yet our dialectic does not anticipate the discovery of anything which shall unhinge the doors through which we have been able to enter into being.

Apart from the idea of the new, reality may not fitly be regarded as fixed and solid in its nature, for its various forms are indicative of an indwelling activity. The activistic view of reality is of Gothic nature, for in this style of building the thick, fixed wall gives way to the flying buttress, whose solidity surrenders to the ornamental perforations peculiar to this style of architecture. The older substantialism, with its origin in Parmenides, had about it the unyielding

heaviness of the Doric, where the weight of the entablature fell directly upon the sturdy column. But, with the Gothic, the groined arch within the structure and the flying buttress without have the effect of energising the whole edifice, as also of illuminating it by means of the vast windows which were impossible before the striving-system of the Gothic was introduced. Reality may thus be said to be of Gothic rather than of Greek or Romanesque character, for its very nature is a striving one, and the permanence it enjoys, as it towers above the earth, is an acquired permanence which has come after the downward weight and lateral thrust of the edifice have been overcome. In the midst of the stability of the world of forms there may be observed the stress and strain of the very buttresses of being which resist the destructive thrusts of negation. With activity as the content of things, we are not privileged to indulge the Parmenidean ideal that being is, and non-being is not; we are rather placed in a position where we must say, as it were, "being rules, and activity obeys."

When we attribute restlessness to reality, we add nothing to the ideals of activism; we are merely guilty of indulging the modern spirit, which in our country assumes the distressing form of "American nervousness." The authentic silence of substance puts to shame the clamour of activism, and the ancient sense of permanence transcends the petty plans of modern energism. It was this silence, or *Stille*, which Goethe unwittingly introduced into his *Tasso*, for where the poet seeks to exalt the character that comes from activity in the flux of the world, he cannot prevent our praising as superior the silence which is found in the intellect. When our dialectic proceeds to the next problem, where the competitive claims of will and intellect are put to the test, the ability of the substantial will still further be shown in connection with the free, disinterested consciousness of the mind. Activism is appreciated by philosophy, because it floods the cloisters of reflection with fresh air, while it pours its own blood into the veins of an anæmic intellectualism, and arouses the drowsy Apollonian in the brain to new victories over the Dionysian in the body. But in

all this substantialism shows that it is supreme, even where the *causa formalis* stands in need of the *causa efficiens*.

The activistic is so closely connected with the substantial that it seems impossible for the two to coexist ; the tendency is for one to absorb the other. It is not so easy to confuse reality with appearance, hence the dualism between them is of long standing ; but with activity and substance the case does not stand thus. The activist is not far from the kingdom of reality ; hence he may be tempted to assume that, having risen above the phenomenal, he has no further to go. With the activist the substantialist carries on a friendly suit to determine the respective claims of the theories in question. But however perfect activism may seem to be, the claims of substance as superior are not to be set aside. In some ways the ontological position of activism is not as plausible as that of phenomenalism, for the reason that the idea of that which takes place is not as perceptible as the idea of that which appears, and on account of this difference in vividness the principles of activism have had to wait for a rather tardy recognition on the part of philosophy, which had long learned to discuss being as appearance and reality. Appearance may be inferior to reality, inasmuch as where the latter possesses three dimensions, the former rejoices in but two ; and yet, with this obvious contrast between the solid and the superficial, appearance seems to have enjoyed greater ontological opportunities than have been allotted to activity. The fluid character of activity, which has been of great value to the substantialist, who has learned how to revise his fundamental conceptions of being, has made it difficult for thought to identify activity as an independent principle. Now that this activistic principle has become detached, so that to-day we have an energistic view of both the world and the mind, it is necessary to show that this activity is not to be mistaken for substance.

5. SUBSTANCE AS THE GROUND OF ACTIVITY

Causality cannot explain itself ; the law of sufficient reason cannot give the reason for its own being : this double

truth was forced upon us when we sought to explain the nature of the causal connection of things. That which happens depends for its ground upon that which is. In taking this stand in the substantial, we are not assuming that the real can exist without the active content which empirical and energistic thought is so anxious to supply; we are only upholding the idea that this content counts for nothing ontologically unless it comes under the sway of the substantial. This should appear not only in the present contrast between the causal and substantial, but likewise with the oncoming question of will and intellect, wherein the exaggerated claims of voluntarism will have to submit to the superior rule of intellectualism.

Where activism is admitted to possess a lower degree of reality, there are certain thinkers who seek to raise it to the highest position. Such activistic systems are valid as objections to a purely solid and static dialectic which conceives of substance in an impossible way as something in itself; but they are not of intrinsic value as fundamental principles, and thus they afford poor substitutes for substance. As an example of this desire to pause at the intermediate stage of being, we may cite the voluntaristic system of Wundt, whose activistic theory is expressed in connection with his theory of the soul. Wundt abandons the notion that there is a being distinct from that which takes place in consciousness, and finds the existence of the soul to consist in this happening itself—*ibr Sein besteht in diesem Geschehen selbst*.¹ Having observed that being cannot consist of itself, that the soul cannot be made up of the soul, Wundt comes to the place where he is willing to accept the conscious content as the be-all and end-all of spiritual life. Our own point of view puts us in a position where we admit, with the activist and voluntarist, that the thing and the soul cannot persuade us of their existence unless they exhibit states and carry on some sort of commerce with the world of things and souls; but this free admission does not call upon us to say that the active state,

¹ Cf. *supra*, II. vi. 2.

or that which takes place, is the whole of the affair. In the same manner Bergson has protested against the static notion of thinghood, and has brought himself to the place where he is ready to declare, "Things and states are only the views of becoming as these are taken by our mind. There are no things; there are only actions."¹ Here again we have a dialectic which is valid as a critique of the older notion of thing in its selfhood, but not one which has constructive value. "There are no things; there are only actions"—this dogmatic statement can be accepted only as it declares, "There are no things in themselves; there are only things which have actions." Bergson, it will be observed, is as much opposed to the phenomenal as to the real, for when he repudiates things he does not fail to condemn states as well.² This voluntaristico-activistic movement, as it has developed in our day, only makes us more and more firm in the conviction that being must be apprehended in a threefold manner in order that states of things may be properly appreciated, while the inherent activities of things, as these have been emphasized by Wundt and Bergson, may be assigned to their proper field—that is, upon the intermediate stage of being, whence the final ascent to substance is made. The believer in substance has habitually impugned appearance and ignored activity; our method consists in assigning these to their proper places beneath substance.

The inherent truth of activism is one with the truth of phenomenalism: substance is the unity of states and acts. As the circumference of appearance, so the radii of activity; they are nothing apart from the substantial centre of the circle of being. It is impossible to speak of an act as taking place; our study of change led us to see that events of this kind are directly produced. Hence we are not permitted to affirm that one thing *m* effects another thing *n*, because such a local operation takes no account of the series beginning with *a*, *b*, *c*, and ending with *x*, *y*, *z*. Just as it is impossible to ignore the unity of things, and

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., pp. 269-70.

² Cf. *supra*, 1.

thus deal with the phenomenal in its particularity, so is it equally out of the question to deal with action as action, as if the transient activity between *m* and *n* could go on apart from the substantial unity that invests the world-whole. The real unity that was found to embrace the manifold of phenomenal states reappears as the unity which centralises the manifest actions of the world in the one being of things.

Nature does not fail to supply us with analogies of this unity of all activity; the law of the conservation of energy, for example, informs us that no one movement may be made unless at the same time the particular act avail itself of the world-whole of energy, upon which this act itself does not fail to produce some effect. He who thus would seek the real in the activity of the world must not overlook the fact that this activity is organised according to a unified system, so that the particular act is impossible apart from the general activity. The most acceptable notion of activity is, as it were, sea-like, for the unity of the sea is such that any raising or lowering or elevating of the waters of the deep, as in the phenomenon of tides, is an effect felt throughout the entire watery system. Substance is such an immanental system, into which the whole of reality is crowded; and where the substantial furthers the needs of both the phenomenal and the causal, it is not called upon to abdicate in favour of either or both of them, but is permitted to enjoy its own existence as such.

Being is indeed behaviour, but it is real behaviour, not a shadowy passage from point to point in the world. Being must have its function, but the function must also have being as its ground. The neo-substantial theory of things has done enough for experience and energy, so that it is not expected to keep the principle of substance in complete servitude. As the Orient, with its ideals of tyranny, accustomed itself to regard reality as an inaccessible Beyond-Being, as it was styled by Plotinus,¹ so the modern occident has run to the other extreme of democratic dialectics, in

¹ *Works*, tr. Taylor, xiv.

which the Absolute loses his aristocracy and takes up a humble position in the ranks. We do not wish to consider reality as something independent and self-styled, but we have sufficient knowledge of the bathos of our modern life to see that, as it cannot wholly express the inner nature of the free, human ego, it is still farther removed from the position where it may typify the kingdom of God. A certain touch of aristocracy, such an aristocracy as one finds in the pages of Hello's writings, can only add beauty and consistency to the dialectic of substance. Being cannot remain unrevealed, cannot refrain from some sort of activity; but as the ego is superior to his actions, so the substantial transcends the total activities of the world-whole. In a just view of man's ethical life we do not hastily conclude that man must act in some way or another; we are inclined rather to examine, not only the particular act to see whether it be worthy, but activity as a whole stands in need of justification by the spiritual life of the self. For this reason we are more than usually anxious to deliver substance from the burden and the humiliation of being nothing but an activistic servant of things in general. This alone is a good reason for dissenting from the activistic philosophy that reduces substance to a happening, and thinghood to action.

6. SUBSTANCE AS CREATIVE

The modification of the notion of substance by the critical conception of activity brings our dialectic to the place where we must consider the function of being in the world of experience and energy. This revised notion of substance seems to find its best expression in the idea of the creative. In the case of Christian dialectics there have not been wanting instances of systems which have been able to relate the notion of the ineffable with that of the creative. With Plotinus, for example, while the idea of God involves the "nature that is beyond being," the world is regarded as the result of God's nature, even where it is not assumed to be the direct product of His will. Scotus Erigena makes

use of a similar method, the range of which is great enough to include both the transcendent and the activistic. This appears in his fourfold determination or division of Nature, as *creat et non creatur, creatur et creat, creatur et non creat, nec creat nec creatur*.¹ The last of the four divisions, which regards the Deity as neither created nor creating, seems to indulge the notion of a being in itself, although in the remaining phases of the system there is ample room for the idea of the Deity's world-work. As we have suggested, there is a certain amount of the individualistic and aristocratic which may be attributed to substance, just as this notion of superiority is sometimes applied to the human ego; nevertheless it is not fitting to view substance as without function or duty. Plotinus and Erigena seem anxious to preserve both eastern and western conceptions of the Deity; the same may be affirmed also of Augustine and Bruno. With Augustine there is no delay in dismissing the traditional notion of a creation in time, and the elaboration of a substitute in the form of eternal generation. Hence it seems to follow that the world exists, not because once it was created, but because God ever wills it. With Bruno the idea of transcendence seems to have yielded to that of immanence, for this thinker, to whom the modern world of beauty and scientific truth was being revealed, tends to identify God with the universe. While Bruno considers the substantial as the World-Soul, he agrees with Plotinus, whom he does not fail to mention,² in regarding the Absolute as unknowable. Both thinkers, one looking beyond the other within the world, agree in upholding the notion of the Absolute as superior, even where the Absolute is found to be *en rapport* with the sensible world. Such is likewise the ideal of substance which our dialectic has sought to convey from the beginning; it has relegated substance to the phenomenal world, where it assumes the form of order, as also to the causal universe, where it appears as law; now that it is considered for itself as substance, it may fitly be looked upon as ineffable in its utter superiority. Now, both

¹ *De Divisione Naturæ*, i. 1-7.

² *Della Causa*, ii.

notions, that of immanence and that of transcendence, are included in the supreme idea of the creative.

The demand for the creative as the culmination of the activistic view of the world appears most strikingly in Kant's First Antinomy where the problem of creationism is put to the test of criticism. In the thesis and antithesis, Kant shows that a disjunctive syllogism consisting of two members, which reduce the question to an either-or, is not sufficient in the discussion of the world as either sensible or intelligible. For as the thesis which upholds the idea of the intelligible is found to be at once true and false, so the antithesis which is pledged to the sensible order is no more convincing. The logical demand is for a *tertium quid*; this we have sought to introduce into the world as activity, so that we are not now placed in a predicament where we must choose between the phenomenal and the substantial, for we may say the world is either sensible, or activistic, or intelligible, a contention we made when discussing the activistic reconciliation of appearance and reality.¹ Kant discusses his problem in the light of the theory of limits, which seems to set the old dialectic of appearance-reality at naught, while it results in being equally unfriendly to the *Critique* itself. This comes about when Kant connects the principle of finitude with the intelligible world, while he delivers the sensible order to the infinite. In experience we observe the contrary, for there it is sense which has the limitation, while the intellect goes free. In his comments on the Antinomies,² Kant does not succeed in convincing us that it is the understanding which suffers from want of quantity, while sense proceeds without encountering any barriers. If, as might have been possible with more activism and less sensationalism, he had attributed to the *will* the power to overstep the boundaries set up by the understanding, the plea would have been more plausible; just as it would have been a more consistent development in a philosophy which proclaimed the privacy of the will over the intellect. But Kant is content with showing that the understanding demands a set principle as the basis of its

¹ Cf. *supra*, Bk. II. I.

² See especially secs. iii.-v.

reasonings ; this principle he confuses with the notion of an outer boundary. In our own dialectic, where substance has been found to consist in an inner unity, there is no danger of collision with this rationalistic obstruction.

In exactly the same manner we are called upon to remove from the idea of substance the unnatural prejudice that the intellect cannot work except as it works in a limited field. Humanity needs not to be taught that it is finite, for its finitude constantly acts as the oppressor ; but humanity has yet to learn that, where this limitation is felt by the intellect, it is not experienced by the will, which enjoys the freedom denied the mind as contemplative. Kant was right in assuming that reason has "interests" at stake in the conflict among its ideas, but he was at fault again when he assumed that for this reason the intellect desires to have its ideas confined to a limited field in both the world and the soul.¹ It is true that the intellect demands order as a *sine qua non* of thought, for where there is chaos there can be nothing but contradiction ; but this idea of inner consistency is one thing, that of outer limitation another. In his enthusiasm for the "life-process," Bergson has repeated this idea of Kant's, just as he has accused the intellect of all possible shortcomings, where the will has been treated with surprising indulgence. Speaking of man in his intellectualistic capacity, Bergson says, "We are at our ease only in the finished, the immutable, the dead."² With the process of becoming, with the arrival of new data, the intellect is supposed to be lost and undone. There is some truth in this criticism, and even where we assume the substantialistic position, we are not willing to dispense with the vigorous blood-fusion that comes from the arteries of volition and sensation. And yet we must continue our contention that what the intellect seeks is the principle of unity within, and not rest without ; its ideal of substance does not for a moment forbid the ever-new introduction of the changing and becoming. With the circles that logic loves to draw about its class-wholes,

¹ *Kritik*, p. 490 *et seq.*

² *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 179.

the important thing is the point of departure in the centre, not the limitation by the circumference.

The ideal of active becoming, which appears as the rival of substance, has the advantage of adjusting the finite, growing mind to the vastness of the universe, and we are glad that philosophy shows no disposition to undergo petrification. Yet the truth of becoming contains within it something more than the idea of ceaseless progress forward, for this were as empty an idea as that of substantial immutability. The truth of becoming cannot be expressed unless some measure of the substantial is introduced to give body to the process. We need not assume that all becoming involves the idea of a grand total, by way of dialectical *dénouement*, even where this idea is most plausible; we need only assert that the process of becoming implies the thought of something cumulative, whereby the present possesses the results of the past as well as its own truths and values. The principles of activity, vital force, will, and the like seem to run stark in the ordinary systems of becoming; to make this becoming a genuine becoming, it is necessary to witness it building up results whose nature is substantial. Becoming should not be allowed to run wild, but should be called upon to do work in the world; now it is the theory of substantialism that provides for this world-work for becoming, so that it seems just to subordinate activity under substance, as indeed we have been doing.

This modification of being by becoming, of substance by activity, has nothing extraordinary about it, although it may be difficult for the substantialist to accept and appropriate it. Being uses becoming as means to end, for, as the inherent qualities of the thing change in such permutations as to evince the full nature of that thing, so the process of becoming acts with the effect of realising the inner and inherent nature of substance. This introduces the idea of "beyond being," although in a manner somewhat removed from the mysticism of Plotinus. As the world appeals to man it assumes the form of something not yet complete in effect, however complete it may be in plan. Substance

is the being that is to be, the beyond being ; Plotinus sought it in mysticism, Kant in moralism, Bergson pursues it in voluntarism. There is evidently something of a hyper-real, hyper-rational nature, and there are other paths of approach than those just noted. One may secure a glimpse of this extra-real realm when he assumes the æsthetic point of view, which will be of service in emphasizing the superior and aristocratic character of substance. In the system of becoming, activity does not break through the barriers set by the intellect, for that were a return to chaos and the naught from which dialectics tries to escape ; activity, however, persuades substance to extend the older borders so that being may have sufficient space for the display of its forms and the exercise of its functions.

V

THE REAL AND IDEAL

As the discussion of the real as substance made necessary a contrast between appearance and substance as also between activity and substance, so the present topic, real and ideal, must resume this comparison in the form of a contrast between the phenomenal and noumenal, the volitional and intellectual. Having pledged our dialectic to substantialism, it would seem as though we were in a position where we should have to affirm intellectualism also, but this cannot be done until some critical conception of the latter has been elaborated. As the principle of substance was suffered to lay claim to the highest position in being, without further being allowed to exclude the subordinate forms of appearance and activity, so the ideal may be admitted to the same superior seat, provided it does not call upon dialectics to dismiss sensation and volition. Where the term "metaphysical" suggests the relegation of all reality to physical nature, the companion term, "noumenal," is equally arbitrary in inviting reality to enter the realm of intellect; both ideas are misleading if not monstrous, for reality is neither a physical fact nor a logical concept. When, therefore, our dialectic attempts to connect real and ideal, it is not for the purpose of subsuming nature under a notion, as rationalism attempts to do; nor is it the fear of independent intellection which leads the thinker to cast his golden ideas back into the mine of nature whence they were dug. Our aim is to show that, as the world has real existence in the form of substance, so it has significance, whence we are able to discuss the real as the intelligible.

I. THE REAL AS NOUMENAL

In discussing the real as noumenal, we do not seek to force the phenomeno-causal world of facts and forces into a preconceived rational order of being; nevertheless we have no intention of leaving the lower orders of being to themselves, as if they were the only heirs of reality. Our present purpose, in the introduction of intelligibility into the scheme of things, is to reduce phenomenality to order, and to secure control of the world of activity. In advancing the interests of the intelligible, we are working in behalf of the substantial also, for as there is a definite connection between the phenomenal and the sensational, the activistic and the voluntaristic, so there should be the same affiliation between the real and the intelligible. Apparently there is some relation between thought and thing, reason and reality, but from this fact it does not follow that one must express this relationship as something noumenal, after the manner of the old rationalism.

When dialectics sounds the depths of sensation, volition, and intellect, it observes at the outset that the intellect holds the secret and serves the plan of the self in a way unknown to the other two forms of spiritual life. Sensation does indeed make the self aware of its existence, as also of its position in the world; activity enables the self to react upon its experiences; but the power to improvise, the power to detach the ego from the world, belongs neither to sensation nor volition, but to the intellect alone. If, therefore, the ego is to gain ascendancy over the world, it must be by means of the spontaneity of the free intellect. Knowledge is thus to be understood as a striving after the substantial in the midst of the contradictions inherent in sensation and volition. In the present treatment of the intelligible in the world our dialectic has delivered itself from dogmatism, inasmuch as it has not shunned the inferior forms of being, nor has it asserted the validity of the substantial and intellectual without having paid tribute to the principle of illusion

which clings to us as a part of our life in the world of sense, as well as to the companion principle of negation which follows us from the world of activity. Knowledge is a search for the permanent in the midst of change, as well as an attempt to penetrate and find the transparent in the opaque of sense; to look upon knowledge as a mere affirming or denying things is to overlook the fact that it is a product of the ego, which sends it forth with the hope of finding in the world something akin to its own inner nature. Knowledge thus affords the means by which the self comes into being.

Where the theories of cognition are seeking to determine whether knowledge comes from sense or springs from the understanding, the present treatment of reality as intelligible indulges the idea that knowledge is free, so that it tends to be independent of both the forms of nature and the categories of the understanding. Human reason strives with the world in a manner not provided for in the realms of either an absolutistic matter or an absolutistic mind, and when the outer impression meets the inner form of the mind, the result of the combination is a third somewhat known to the self alone. Knowledge, instead of being purely formal or merely real, possesses a spontaneous and constructive character; for this reason dialectics must seek to rid itself of rationalism, which cannot for a moment serve the interests of a theory of being wherein the idea of reality is far removed from the notion of a thing in itself. Yet intellectualism may be affirmed where absolutism is denied, for while these two have co-existed and co-operated throughout the history of idealism, it does not follow that the traditional connection between them is perpetual. In our discussion of substance we sought to relieve this principle of the restrictions placed upon it by Parmenides and Spinoza; now we are ready for a free treatment of intellectualism.

The intellectualism which we would advance as the best means of adjusting the ego to the world differs from the older rationalism in that it does not attempt to reduce impressions to ideas without first observing the influence of

the will, which acts as a mediator between the two. The will has its own superiority, but this is not a superiority over the intellect. The progress of voluntarism places us in a position where we are ready to admit the power of the will without involving ourselves in the paradoxes of asserting that this power is supreme. Where Duns Scotus confidently affirmed the superiority of the will over the intellect, which Aquinas had been defending, a modern voluntarist like Bergson is content to see the will placed upon the same footing as that of the intellect; hence Bergson speaks of will and intellect as being of equal importance in the world.¹ The intellectualist, who is prepared to admit the importance of the will in both being and thinking, finds it necessary to advance beyond Bergson, as the latter had advanced upon Scotus, and thus declare that the will, instead of being superior or even equal to the intellect, is inferior to it.

It is in connection with the lowest of the three processes that the will does its work of subjugation. Intellect overcomes will as will overcomes sense; one nail drives out another. Hence the complete statement of the case stands as follows: *nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu et in voluntati*. The will is superior to sense as intellect is superior to will, hence the voluntaristic formula of Duns Scotus must be revised to read, *voluntas superior est sensu*. Where the senses furnish the mind with data for knowledge, the work of reducing these to order is carried on by the will, for the mind treats its impressions to a process of action before it submits them to thought. First reaction, then reflection: that is the obvious order of things in the human mind, which settles the questions of existence and work before it proceeds to the disinterested contemplation of the ideas acquired in the course of its experience. When we speak of the intellect as being furnished by the materials coming from impressions and impulses, we should not fail to observe that these data are of sensory origin alone, for the contribution of the will comes in the way of service, in which the will subordinates phenomena and makes possible

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 155.

their interpretation by the intellect. Man is by nature a creature of action, but with him action, in distinction from the movements performed by the lower orders of animal life, has an intellectualistic significance, and in more than one way he may be said to act, not for the sake of the act itself, but for the purpose of acquiring knowledge.

Activity is thus the true schematism by which, as in the *Kritik*, one seeks to connect the material furnished by the senses with the forms presented by the mind. Without the intervention of the third principle of activity it is difficult to see how this is to be done. The threefold form of mental activity was recognised by Vedanta, when it distinguished the knowledge through Satva Guna, which enables one to see things in their unity, from the knowledge by Rajas Guna, which leads us to see things as many different entities, as the knowledge through Rajas Guna was distinguished from the knowledge of the Tamas Guna, by which one saw one particular thing alone.¹ Whether the order of arrangement among the three be in this manner or otherwise, the fact remains that the senses need the will to raise them toward the intellect, while the intellect needs the will to supply it with the data of sense which of itself it is powerless to secure. Therefore it is not in the interests of disorder that thought craves for the will, but it is rather for the sake of the intellect which cannot operate without it that the will is so ardently sought. After dialectics has dogmatised about the one, it is refreshing to be confronted by the many, which stimulates the intellect to its highest activities as it endeavours to reduce the chaos of sense and the contradictions of will to the living order of the intellect. It was for the sake of securing this principle of life that Eucken was led to reject intellectualism; it was in the same spirit that Bergson surrendered to the allurements of the will; it is our purpose to secure the advantages of the living will without relinquishing our hold upon the intellect. To do that were to surrender to the dialectical drudgery of activism.

¹ *Bhagavad Gita*, tr. Telang, ch. xviii.

2. THE REVISION OF RATIONALISM

To survey the real as the noumenal, it was necessary to admit that the intellect does not come to its own immediately, but through the instrumentality first of sense, then volition. This fact makes necessary the revision of rationalism, which has found in thinking and being an immediate unity. But as our historic ideals are not perpetual, so the idealising function is necessarily elastic, whereby it may ever adapt itself to new conditions. The work of the intellect consists in something more than grouping the facts of experiences into so many classes; the intellect is called upon to reduce to order the impulses of the will. As the will must be intellectualised, so the intellect must be voluntarised. The likely effect of this revision seems to involve the repudiation of the Absolute; of the two, the intellectualistic and the absolutistic, the present dialectic prefers the intellectualistic because the intellectualistic is necessary to the dignity of the human ego, which seeks to assert its independence in the world. Absolutism casts us back into fixed conception of being, and it is the intellectualistic that redeems us from it. Hence our present aim is to see how rationalism may be revised in such a way as to eliminate the absolutistic and conserve the intellectualistic; we wish to find the centre of gravity without nailing it fast.

In the present repudiation of rationalism our dialectic is not blind to the fact that this traditional method of thought involves the absolutistic and intellectualistic. Of the two the absolutistic is the one with which dialectics can dispense; the intellectualistic, however, is not to be eliminated. In deciding against the absolutistic, our dialectic bids us bear in mind that rationalism is not the only philosophical system that has indulged in this pernicious method of thinking. Realism, which to-day is so confident of itself, is by no means free from this taint, for its advocate is as implacable as the older rationalist in asserting that there is nothing beyond the realm that this theory outlines as the real. Now this desire

to tie up all the loose ends, to come to a complete conclusion, to consider the philosophical affair as closed is by no means peculiar to the rationalist; the realist has been as innocent of the superior relativism that is to be found in every open-minded dialectic, and the realist is as little open to conviction as his opponent has been. Hence, in the revision of the rationalistic method of measuring reality, we are called upon to observe that absolutism, instead of being a specific shortcoming of the intellectualistic school, is rather a mood which overtakes the thinker of either rationalistic or empirical persuasion. Absolutism is but the spirit that forbids progress, ascent to a higher standpoint, transmutation from one view-point to another, which spirit we have endeavoured to avoid as something alien and inimical to a dialectic which seeks to progress from the preliminary view of the world as appearance to the intermediate view of the world as activity, thence to the view of the world as substantiality. With the substantial-intellectual conception of the world, the spirit of absolutism, which leads the thinker to assume that there is nothing more beyond, is more excusable than it is in the case of the empirical or activistic thinker, who uses absolutism to forbid thought from passing on beyond the realm of sense or action.

In spite of the plausibility of an absolutism which connects itself with the intellectual and substantial, even where it does not leave either the sensational or volitional unmolested, our dialectic is content to emphasize the intellectual quality of the intelligible, for this is the more important of the two principles in question. To abandon the intellectualistic is to quit the field of dialectics at the most interesting point, just as it is to leave the human ego in a peculiar predicament. The manifest aim of life is to reduce the world to order. Sensation with its contradictions, volition with its confusion and lack of proper detachment from the interests of life, produce a condition of things which is all but intolerable, and the effort of the intellect to relieve the chaos of the situation is one which is to be furthered under all circumstances. How great is our

consternation, therefore, when we behold our present-day philosophy throwing dust in the eyes as it repudiates the efforts which the spirit of human culture has been making ! True it is that the intellectualistic attempt to reduce the world to order has not always been conducted in the most consistent manner ; in the capacity of rationalist, the believer in the superiority of the intellect has often been led to dogmatise, but the absolutism in which he has indulged is not the most essential element in his system. The particular fact as it occurs in experience deserves recognition ; the activity of the world and the progress of humanity are so categorical as to be beyond dispute ; and where the dogmatic intellectualist has been unwilling to accommodate his theory to the ideas of the particular and the progressive he has been at fault. But the particular fact and the advancing activity do not exist of themselves, nor are they able to account for themselves ; they are true only by virtue of their participation in an order of being superior to them. When, therefore, a system is aware of the truth that the circles drawn by the intellect are ever destined to give way to yet other and larger circles, it is privileged to enjoy the intellectualistic because it has cleansed itself from the absolutistic. The present dialectic, which recognises the fact that the absolutistic may invade the realistic as well as the rationalistic, is determined to rid itself of this internal foe, and thus present the appearance of a purified intellectualism, whose chief aim is to render intelligible the life of the self in the world.

Viewed as the most characteristic phase of the mind, the intellect makes possible an inward enjoyment and appreciation of the world which were impossible with sensation or volition. It is in the larger and more liberal interpretation of the intellect that the self is delivered from the academic task of reflecting the world and allowed to rejoice in its own interests. On the other hand, absolutism fetters the thinking self, forbids all inner feeling of value, and appoints the mind to a purely scholastic office. Let it not be thought, however, that anything essential and worthy is lost to the

intellect when it thus emerges from its shell of logic. All that is worth conserving is to be found in a free and fluent intellectualism, which strives to exalt the creative rather than the purely analytical.

In its absolutism, rationalism has falsely assumed that reason is solitary in the world ; both sensation and volition were considered as having no dialectical significance. Intellectualism attempts to ascend to reason through the lower stages of sensation and volition, for as the impression conveys us to the volition, so volition leads to thought. The work of intellectualism has been made difficult by the tendency on the part of the thinker to consider man as contemplator only, when experience shows us that his more natural character is that of actor in the world. Various systems of intellectualism have endeavoured to adjust the active to the contemplative, as when Vedanta sought to relate the Sankhya of thought to the Yoga of activity, or Aristotle led up to the energy of contemplation through a recognition of energy as such, or Schopenhauer found the Platonic ideas in the several forms of objectification on the part of the will-to-live; but the intellectualist has usually assumed that, as Geulincx expressed it,¹ the mind is ever the spectator, never actor, in the real scene of things. But this *nihil volo*, which turned intellectualism into absolutism, reacted upon the intellect itself, and thus it began to appear that action and thought were interdependent, so that *cogito* and *volo* could not be separated ; indeed, as Geulincx had said *nescio, ergo non facio*, he made it possible for other intellectualists to say *volo, ergo cogito*. Voluntarism thus redeems our thought from absolutism, but does not deprive us of the intellectualism upon which human enlightenment and culture depend.

The task of the intellectualist, who desires to conserve the results of the mental life of humanity, is somewhat different from the task of the rationalist ; the intellectualist must establish claim to both the phenomenal and the causal, the one by possession, the other by subjugation. In carrying on such work, the principles of the intellect will be viewed

¹ Cf. *infra*, vii.

in a new light; for now, instead of indicating abstract forms into which the data of sense shall fall, the intellectualist must equip his theory with the active principles that are necessary to subdue the Dionysian will. This double duty cannot be performed with the traditional categories of rationalism, which have been framed for the sole purpose of acquiring the empirical; the energistic will now be found to present new problems, as will necessitate new mental forms. Where an activist like Eucken attempts to cope with this question by elaborating the principle of spiritual life,¹ where a voluntarist like Bergson seeks to revise rationalism by means of a new principle of active intuition,² our dialectic finds no need of inventing anything to take the place of intellect where the intellect is regarded as marked by the volitional as well as by the sensational.

With the increase of its dialectical work, in the course of which it must exercise the energy of contemplation, the intellect finds its powers augmented, its dignity enhanced. The victory which the understanding gained over sense, in the rationalism of the Enlightenment, has not the glory which will come when the intellect is finally able to subdue the empirical and energistic forces which now are challenging its supremacy. For the old rationalism easily succumbed to the moralistic voluntarism of Kant, leaving us to assume that the intellect was not sufficiently sure of itself to maintain the supremacy of the speculative, but used its categories to conclude in favour of the categorical imperative of practical reason. But while voluntarism has been growing in importance, intellectualism has not suffered its forms to dwindle. If, therefore, the activist finds in Kant a confession that the intellect, having conquered sense, is itself conquered by the will, the intellectualist may turn to Schopenhauer, with whom the word will means so much more than it did to Kant, and be thrilled by the spectacle of the will submitting to the intellect on the basis of voluntarism itself. For it was Schopenhauer who transcended the simple activism

¹ See e.g. his *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, tr. Widgery, ii.

² *L'Évolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 191 *et seq.*

of Kant when he said, "The will is not only free, but almighty."¹ When the will as thus conceived is overcome by the intellect, the victory of intellectualism is well-nigh complete. With Schopenhauer, who ever preferred the intellectualistic in philosophy, as his deferential attitude toward such systems as Vedanta and Platonism will show, the supremacy of the intellect is ever assumed, so that the author of a philosophy which had a rich voluntaristic content did not deem it necessary to evince the superiority of the intellectual. Nevertheless, the four books of his work raise the intellect to the highest position. The first book represents the world as overcome by reason, even where reason is deprived of the conceptual. Book II. Platonises the will in its objectifications.² The third book seeks to show how the striving of the will-to-live is temporarily overcome by the intellect working through art, while Book IV. discloses the permanent victory of reason in the moral negation of the will-to-live. Indeed, Schopenhauer knew something of the terrors of the will, hence he was more anxious to see the latter brought under the subjugation of the intellect than he was to give it free dialectical rein. With a full appreciation of voluntarism, as this view is developed by such Schopenhauerians as Nietzsche and Strindberg, one is not so favourably impressed with the cavalier-like attitude of Bergson, who seems impressed with the idea that the age needs more of irrational will and less of the intellect.

3. THE COMMUNITY OF WILL AND INTELLECT

Where the older psychology sought to establish the relation of sensation to ideation, psychology now recognises that the will is capable of carrying on a similar commerce with the intellect. Intellectualism is thus placed in a position where it is required to recognise that what is called consciousness is none the less a form of conduct, inasmuch as our mental life is something carried on in an

¹ *World as Will and Idea*, § 53.

² *Ib.*, § 28.

active manner, and not in a purely representative fashion. Aristotle observed the community of will and intellect; hence he said, "It is in one's power to think when one wills"; and, again, "It is in the thinking element that volition arises."¹ From Aristotle's ideal of the work of contemplation there arose the distinction between the two kinds of philosophy—*philosophia contemplativa et activa*, as Seneca expressed it.² With Quintilian, this differentiation found formulation in the contrast between *activus* and *spectativus*.³ The attempt to intellectualise volition is to be pursued in a manner analogous to the treatment of sensation by the understanding. Sensation becomes either ideation or nothing; it has no other fate. But with the will the case stands somewhat differently; volition is not so tractable, and it tends to set up a competitive form of conscious life. Genuine philosophy is not likely to pause with sensationalism, for it can easily discern something beyond. But with voluntarism, it may consider its work done when the theory appears to come abreast of life, especially as the will seems to make room for the ethical. The will would thus seem to resemble the intellect, as also to vie with it in conveying the significance of spiritual life.

The community of volition and intellection is implied by present-day psychology, which approaches the problem from both cognitive and conative points of view; here, there is a tendency to consider the intellect as an activity: there, an attempt to treat attention as a superior form of volition. With the energising of cognition and the rationalising of conation the unity of will and intellect is brought close to us. As Judd has expressed it, "Volition and impulse are merely the active correlates of organised forms of ideational and perceptual experience. . . . Behaviour is a necessary and ever-present physical correlate of experience, and at the same time a product of all those organisations which lie back of experience itself."⁴ In Bergson's system,

¹ *Psychology*, tr. Hammond, pp. 67, 129.

³ Lib. III., 5, 11 (cf. *supra*, Bk. II. i. 1).

² *Ep.*, 95.

⁴ *Psychology*, p. 336.

intellect and will seem to share the honours of our mental life; the attempt to place intelligence and instinct upon an equality, however, has the effect of making the intellect appear inferior; but where, as in the present case, our desire is to establish that community between will and intellect which with sensation and intellection has long been in vogue, we will not insist upon those factors which reveal the superiority of the detached intellect. Bergson's view is expressed as follows: "*Instinct et intelligence représentant donc deux solutions divergentes, également élégant, d'un seul et même problème.*"¹ With this general notion of the community of the cognitive and conative we can only concur, but there is no essential reason why the interchange of the two should involve an equality which, in the case of the sensational and intellective, is not urged. The intellectualist can only admit that the origin of the idea is to be retraced through the volitional to the sensational, but he cannot admit that the earlier stages of the intellectual, however necessary they may have been, are upon the same level as the intellectual which they have produced.

The present endeavour to supply the intellectual with a volitional content is furthered by that phase of the psychology of the will which reveals the community of the will and intellect in the function of attention. Where the older psychology confined voluntary action to purely external forms of efferent expression, the more advanced science of consciousness is now ready to regard the will as capable of internal volition. As a result, will was looked upon as one thing, attention as another; now we believe that the two processes are of the same character, that both are equally volitional.² Through the psychology of attention, therefore, the will finds a place in the intellectual life of man, although there is nothing in the nature of the attentional process to justify the assumption that the will has thereby demonstrated its superiority to the intellect. The history of philosophy recalls how Kant rejected know-

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., p. 155.

Cf. Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, tr. Judd, § 15. 9.

ledge in order that he might receive faith, as one might destroy libraries to make room for the Koran; but one cannot thus scratch out his eyes in the bramble of metaphysics and then scratch them in again in the bush of morality. In egoistic circles, where there are many who welcome the thought that the intellect is inferior to the will, we find one like Stirner who declares himself to be above truth; as Kant transcends truth by means of duty, Stirner surmounts it by force, or by what he calls an "irrationalistic kick." The same voracious spirit appears in Nietzsche and his doctrine of the Dionysian will to power. With the voluntaristic movement, whose rise was doubtless due to the dryness which had come upon the intellectualism exhibited by the Enlightenment, our dialectic cannot fail to sympathise; nevertheless, should the ego devour the shew-bread in his hunger for truth? It is permitted the will to enter the realm of intellect, but this privilege does not justify the voluntarist in placing irrationalism at the summit of his system. The more natural effect of the invasion of the intellect by the will is to repudiate the absolutism of the rationalistic view, while the intellectualistic as such is left undisturbed.

As psychology has revealed the intellect's need of the will, it has not concealed from us the will's need of the intellect. At the summit of voluntarism, therefore, the believer in the superiority of the will finds it difficult to provide an object for the ceaseless striving of the will, so that the will is placed in a position where it must will itself. This predicament is shown by Ibsen in *Cæsar's Apostasy*, where Julian, having learned that the way to freedom comes through willing, calls out to the Voice and asks, "What shall I will?" To which the Voice replies, "What thou must."¹ In the midst of the voluntaristic celebration it becomes evident that the will still stands in need of the intellect, even where the latter has its limitations. It is intelligence that emancipates the human species and makes possible an independent life for humanity, for the will,

¹ *Op. cit.*, Act iii.

vigorous as it may be, is only the caged lion, unable as it is to extricate itself from its environment. This is not unobserved by Bergson, who concludes his extended arraignment of the intellect with the confession that, had not intelligence intervened, the human species would have lived out its life externally in a somnambulistic state wherein it was hypnotised by work.¹ Schopenhauer is even more convinced of the need of the intellectual in volition, for where Bergson looks upon the intellect as something which shoots forth from the will, which is then unable to reabsorb what it has produced, Schopenhauer considers the will in a pitiable condition, whence it is led to seek salvation from the intellect.

4. THE PRESENCE OF INTELLECT IN VOLITION.

The work of the intellect is now seen to consist of a two-fold task ; the subordination of sensations and the subsumption of impulses. Rationalists of the Kantian type, finding it impossible to extend the sway of the intellect over the will, have gone over to voluntarism, when the essential thing to do is to revise the notion of mind so that it shall accommodate the will as well as the senses. The raising of volition to a point not far from the realm of intellect has hardly had the effect of irrationalising the human understanding, even where the rationalistic has been set at naught. Cognition is now seen to consist of processes rather than states, while the mind as such is hardly conceived apart from activity. But the fact that consciousness cannot exist unless it be active does not make it necessary for us to crown the servant that assists the intellect in its work. The deed is necessary to the thought ; man acts in order that he may understand. Indeed, the very desire to act and produce some effect in the world about it impels the ego to arouse a conscious state from which the cognitive cannot be crowded out. If, therefore, the intellectualist will represent the dialectical situation as one in which the intellect, instead of dictating to the world of facts and forces what form they should assume, is merely

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 6th ed., pp. 147-78.

asserting its own right to exist in an intelligible world-order, the problem of real and ideal would assume a far different form from the traditional one. And when the voluntarist realises the preciousness of intelligence in human life, wherein man is under-intellectualised, he will be content to see the will adapt itself to the second place in the world-whole. Rationalism has confined our human work to such a narrow circle that it has been able to tyrannise over the human spirit ; but when the actual situation is surveyed it becomes evident that the world in its mere reality has the upper hand, so that the intellectualist must struggle to exist if he is to enjoy a life of intelligibility.

The change of standpoint from the geocentric to the heliocentric in metaphysics does not urge us to abandon the intellectual ; we are called upon to extend its borders. In the larger operations of the universe as in the smaller ones, as these were represented by the older astronomy, it is still possible to find ideas in actions. Intellectualism differs from rationalism, not merely in view of the fact that intellectualism rejects the absolutism of the older theory, but because it aims to introduce the idea of intelligibility. Where rationalism sought to compress a fixed form from without, intellectualism attempts only to evince the implicit intelligibility in what appears and takes place in the world of experience. The intellect is present in the work of the world ; it is none the less present in the activity of the human will. The rationalist has attempted to reduce the work of the will to nothing but idea, while the intellectualist is content to introduce the intellect into the world that seems to enjoy a redundancy of mere activity.

With all its alleged freedom, the will seems unable to carry out its operations apart from the assistance of the intellect. What shall I will? To this question one can only reply, Thou shalt will the idea. The need of an object is thus the reason why the will turns to the intellect, and having admitted that the intellect is ineffectual where it has no infusion of volition, we are not disposed to allow the will to assume perfect independence when its only possible

object is an ideational one. The coolness of the will, to be distinguished as it is from the ardour of desire, is comparable to the calmness of intellection, and by natural affiliation will and intellect cast in their lot together. In the problem of causality, the same dependence of the energistic upon the intellectualistic appeared when our dialectic took up the comparison between *ratio* and *causa*. Here, with the volitional problem, the presence of the ideational in volitional should not fail to be observed. The salvation of the causal principle was brought about by the subsumption of the efficient under the formal, according to which the intellectual assumed control of the activistic. As the causal was a problem which could not solve itself, so the volitional seems to be placed in the same position. If, therefore, the will is to realise itself as a factor in human consciousness, it must have some answer from the ego when the latter inquires, What shall I will? The causal acts for the sake of producing the substantial, for without causality there can be no substantiality. In the same manner, the will is to be conceived of as exerting itself not for itself alone, as though willing were an end in itself; the will exerts itself for the sake of producing intelligence; hence, whether one call himself voluntarist or intellectualist, he may say, *volo ut intelligam*.

Not only does the general nature of volition reveal the will as being perfectly at home in the intellect, but the particular form or grades of the will are not to be distinguished from one another apart from the standard which the intellect sets for them. Thus the grades of volition arrange themselves in a scale marked by certain degrees of ideation. With automatic activity, the intellectual is wholly submerged in the act, which is anticipated by no conscious state, just as it has no such state before it as a goal. Ideo-motor activity reveals more volition, not because it is more intense as a form of activity, but because it involves more of the ideational. Accordingly the second form of volition manifests the presence of the idea as the object of the act, although the act as such is provoked by no preliminary idea. In

the case of volition in its complete form, the act which constitutes the volition is accompanied on both sides by ideas, which stand out as heraldic figures by the side of the escutcheon of volition. In this way the volitional act is aroused by an idea, while it is directed to another idea as its object. The will has come to consciousness; it has realised itself as will by evoking the intelligible within its own nature. In this way Kant was in the habit of speaking of the will's freedom as an "intelligible" freedom. Certain is it that the will cannot free itself; its attribute of force cannot avail for its perfection; the will can become will only as it intellectualises itself. The will thus comes into being as something quite ideational. To ignore this fact is to ignore the plan which the world-whole seems to be setting for its operations—namely, the development of conscious intellectual activity, by virtue of which the ego is led to see what it has been doing.

Such an argument in favour of the intellectualistic in the will does not tend to dismiss the will; on the contrary, the recognition of the ideational in volition furthers the very plan of the will. Like causality, volition is unable to explain itself; the will is efficient but not intelligible. Owing to its flexibility the will is able to assume such a simple form as to be all but identifiable with sensation, while it is none the less efficient in shooting out beyond itself in the form of the ideational. This ability to ascend and transcend itself is by no means the same as the exaggerated voluntarism that proceeds to assert the primacy or supremacy of the will. As sensation seems to be working toward volition, as in the transition from the vegetative form of life to the animal order, so the volitional power of self-propulsion, not content with mere activity, tends to outdo itself and become self-consciousness. The will seems thus to hold the secret of reality, inasmuch as it is the means by which humanity is able to effect the transition from the sensuous to the spiritual. From the empirical standpoint of sense, the self seems to be but a thing among others in the world. But the activistic is introduced, and, with the inherent principle of striving

that is involved, there appears an opportunity for the ego to emancipate itself from the surrounding world of sense. Perhaps it may never be the happy fate of humanity to assure itself of the reality of its ideals, but it has already convinced itself of the impossibility of a life for the self in the world as it is given in experience. Man has broken with nature; the ego has asserted itself; and progress to something superior has begun.

If the world were but a world of forms, the intellect would be the only means necessary to understanding it; but the world is marked by the presence of forces, so that the mind must avail itself of its volitional functions in order to secure the view of the living, acting world-order. The will understands; the doer is none the less the knower. To see with the senses, and to contemplate with the mind, is not sufficient to establish human knowledge; one must also act. The position of the will between sensation and thought enables it to overcome the opposition between these contraries, but the will has a function of its own. The world, instead of posing for human contemplation, is itself carrying on a great work; this work cannot be comprehended by the mind in its static mood, but must be measured in kind, so that the inner activity of the mind is needed to cope with the outer activity of the world. As truth is supposed to make one free, so the free will may lead one to truth. From the voluntarist the intellectualist may thus learn a great lesson, for it is not only the sluggish stream of sensation that contributes to knowledge, but the surging torrent of will is none the less significant for the understanding. But this confession on the part of the intellectualist is not really a victory for the voluntarist, for the intellect is still supreme even when it has extended its sway over a new field, and one so intractable as that of volition. The will realises itself and does its chief work in connection with the intellect, and the more perfect it becomes, the nearer does it approach to the field of knowledge.

5. THE IRRATIONAL

Our dialectic has constantly been bordering upon the irrational, for when it turned from rationalism with its forbidding notion of an absolute, and turned to the voluntaristic with its contempt for limitations, it opened the way for an irrationalistic interpretation of the world. Realists who oppose traditional idealism, and voluntarists who set themselves against intellectualism, are not ever ready to admit that they perhaps have been like Stirner, who freed himself from Hegelianism by one "irrationalistic kick." It is not necessarily true that the repudiation of rationalism involves the peculiar kind of irrationalism that one finds in Stirner, but he who turns away from the accepted methods of idealism must be prepared to answer to the charge of irrationalism. When we abandon the Platonistic notion that the idea is a form impressed upon the sensible world, and begin to speculate with the idea that the sensible, irrational world is itself striving onward toward intelligence, we are in a position where we may have less respect for the dignity of the Idea; but now we have more sympathy with it, because now it is seen to be striving for that emancipation and enlightenment which man himself is seeking. Such striving intellectualism, which interprets the problem of knowledge in the light of the culture-activity of humanity rather than as the steady shining of the abstract understanding, realises the presence of the irrational, in which it observes the obstacle to be overcome. Kant's moralism, Lotze's realism, and the various forms of realism and pragmatism to-day, seem to view the intellect as an absolute monarch who must be overthrown, but the human understanding should not thus flatter itself into believing that the intellect has as yet obtained such supremacy over the world of things; on the contrary, things and forces are on the throne, while the intellect is trying to secure the place occupied by these pretenders. When this more temperate view of the intellect—a view wholly in harmony with the

voluntarism of Schopenhauer—is allowed to express itself, the problem of dialectics is seen to consist of such an ordering of the things of experience as shall further the very plan of reality in thrusting the intellect forward until it is free from the hindrances of sensation and volition. He who realises how far is the mind from its goal will not be likely to hinder the work of human intelligence, nor will he exalt the power of sensation and volition which under ordinary circumstances are too formidable for the mind.

The irrational comes without invitation, while its tendency is to crowd out the intellect. With sensation, the presence of the irrational is not so marked, because of the passivity of the sensational content; with the will, however, the irrational reveals itself in its Dionysian fury, whence the real problem of intellectualism arises. It is no great glory for the intellect to group the data of sense into classes, but the will presents a worthy task, the difficulties of which are becoming more apparent to philosophy, which has been assuming that its sole problem consisted in either affirming or denying the power of the understanding. Now it is appreciated that the mere act of affirmation is not sufficient to establish the intellect in its proper position, while the negation of it is uncalled for in a world where volition is constantly threatening us with irrationalism. We have the irrational in art, in politics, in religion; we are illusion-loving creatures; why, then, should we seek consciously to deny the right of the intellect over us? If irrationalistic voluntarism were in a feeble condition, if we were over-intellectualised, there might be the need of reminding man that, having sprung from the earth, he has no right to imagine that his life is purely an intellectual one; but inasmuch as the race is under-intellectualised, while the intellect itself is in a pitiable condition, we are forced to assert the claims of the contemplative side of our nature, which is all but neglected in the present-day pursuit of things immediate and useful.

To make the will supreme puts our thought in a position where we are unable to account for the principle of order in

the world. It is perfectly true that the work of intellectualising impressions is quite different from that of intellectualising impulses, and the voluntarist may have made his unfortunate overtures to irrationalism for the reason that he was unable to apply the empirico-rational method of thought to the volitio-intellectual problem. But the mind is capable of both forms of activity whereby the world is to be reduced to order. Where the sensational stands in need of a grouping into a class-whole, the volitional demands arrangement in an order; in the one case the analogy is that of the concept, in the other that of the judgment. Cosmic activities are not so given up to the irrational that they refuse to follow certain consistent plans of activity, whence it becomes possible for the intellect to approach the activistic through the principle of relation, without which this activity were in vain. Here the Schopenhauerian dictum, to the effect that the volitional is subsumable under the intellectual, is of no little moment: "Every general, original force of nature is in its inner essence nothing else than the objectification of the will upon a lower stage: we call every such stage an eternal idea in Plato's sense."¹ To leave the will unintellectualised is to let the light within one remain in darkness.

The motive for the voluntarism that has brought us so close to irrationalism is very largely an ethical motive, and that a misguided one. On the metaphysical side, ethical thought depends upon an interpretation of the purpose of human life in the world. When, therefore, one assumes the hedonic point of view, he is evidently persuaded that the end of human existence is to be found in the world of immediacy, the cultivation of which thus becomes supreme. If one assume the rigoristic standpoint, he will carry on his calculations upon the basis that man's true life is a life of will. But over and above these special problems of minor morality, with their particular dialectical implications, there are the fundamental questions of major morality, in the light of which we are led to inquire whether the very life of man consists in the activity of the will or the contemplation of the

¹ *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 26.

intellect. Where the ideal of conquest is uppermost, the voluntaristic view of things will prevail; where, however, one is convinced that the moral activity of the will is not the last thing in human life, he will not be so ready to conclude against the intellect. The relative irrationalism of the will has a place in the life of man, whose intellectualism is constantly in need of blood-fusion with the Dionysian will; but, in all this, the will is the helper, not the ruler; its work is subordinate to the contemplative activity of the intellect. The apparent order of development in the world is from will to intellect, not from intellect to will; only in the intellect may the ego rest its case.

With the recognition of irrationalism as something that, instead of opposing the intellect from without, clings to it as that which previously had a claim upon it, it becomes possible to compare the two according to their relative degrees of superiority. Of the two, which is the more likely to contain the self: the "I think," or the "I will"? Which of the pair gives the ego the better opportunity to display its independent nature? Which provides the greater degree of satisfaction? Prejudice and popular thinking will cast their vote in favour of the will, for the will has its obvious merits, just as it provides immediate benefits. Yet the life of man in its totality provides a view of the resources of both activity and contemplation according to which the contemplative is able to reveal its possibilities. Human life seems to consist of a striving after the "worklessness" of Yoga, or the trans-active "faith" of Christianity; in such spiritual movements the mind seems to be striving with the will for rest. True, it may repose too soon without carrying out the struggle to the end, whence it becomes necessary to revive voluntarism and thus present anew the ancient problem of the world which has so long been the battleground of the active and irrational against the contemplative and intellectual; and this is what the voluntarist of the day feels called upon to do. But the conclusion to the whole matter appears to lie in the intellect with its repose, rather than in the will with its restlessness.

6. THE SELF AND THE INTELLECT

It is the intellect to which the self turns when it seeks redemption from the world. It is therefore useless to speak of activity as offering consolation to the ego, which has itself come up out of the very sea of action and is now anxious to gain a footing upon the land. From time to time the ego manifests a sort of nostalgia for the outlying world of work, and this longing for the throbbing sea behind it is responsible for the various forms of realistic revolt. Hemmed in by the intellectualism of Aquinas' theology, Scotus sought to break down the barriers and let the stream of volition have its sway. In the Enlightenment, both Rousseau and Schiller attempted to escape the fetters of classicism by equipping themselves with the natural. In our own age, the egoist revolt, begun as it was when Stirner opposed the ego to the Hegelian absolute, reveals the root of bitterness in the same soil; having had too much of intellect, we are now anxious to avail ourselves of the possibilities of activism. Eucken may thus be understood as a revolt against the intellectualism of modern philosophy, while the attitude of Bergson involves a certain antipathy to the same spirit in science.

The present study of the world has paid its tribute to activity; it has even treated activity in a constructive fashion by making it one of the main divisions of dialectics. In doing this the present dialectic has admitted that the intellect cannot secure control over the world of appearance unless it makes use of activity as a necessary means; while it has not denied the fact that the ego cannot hope to be itself in the world of things unless it arm itself with voluntarism, whereby it will be enabled to assert its inner being in the form of the will to selfhood. Having done this, our dialectic is in a position where it escapes the meshes of rationalism, and may attempt to reconstruct the intellectualistic principle, without which philosophy can never be genuine or sufficient. The activism of the present is only

the transitional period to a new and more living doctrine of intellectualism.

The sufficiency of intellectualism and the relative sufficiency of voluntarism has not been overlooked by the advocates of the former, and the implicit unity of intellect and will has not prevented them from showing how, in the last resort, the intellect quiets the will and assumes its solitary place in the self. The *Bhagavad Gita* of Vedanta assumes the unity of intellect and will when it looks upon the Sankhya of speculation and the Yoga of action as of the same nature. "One who pursues either well obtains the fruit of both. The seat which the Sankhyas obtain is reached by the Yogas also. He sees truly who sees the Sankhya and Yoga as one."¹ Yet the idealism of Vedanta, which makes these overtures to the Yoga of activism, is secure in the supreme thought of the Upanishads that the ultimate principle in the world-whole is the self which is found by intellectual contemplation. Aristotle was similarly able to adopt the voluntaristic and still preserve the supremacy of the intellect. Having freed himself from the sheer idealism of Plato, he elaborated an energistic theory of things and then placed the world upon it. Upon this basis he constructed his view of human life in the form of an energistic eudæmonism. Nevertheless, when Aristotle sought the highest principle, he found it necessary to relinquish his hold upon the will that had previously served him and cleave to the intellect alone. "The activity of mind appears to be pre-eminent because of its dignity, being contemplative, and to seek no further end beyond itself."²

In our age the establishment of the ego in the intellectual order is not to be brought about so readily. We are so fully aware of the objective world with its immediate interests that we are able to apprehend the self in its inner life. In such a crisis the Hindu method of mere contemplation cannot prove effective in the modern world of conquest, nor can the classicism of Aristotle express the modern sense of striving. Our practical and democratic

¹ *Op. cit.*, tr. Telang, ch. v.

² *Eth. Nicom.*, x. 7. 7.

age is none the less removed from the monastic in mediæval life and the aristocratic in our early modernism. But the inability of the age to imitate the past does not prevent it from originating a new form of intellectualism, which shall accommodate itself to activism, as indeed these other intellectuals have done, and which shall conduct its thought in view of the fact that the world is supposed to provide a place for the self.

Genuine intellectualism sees no danger in making mind an end in itself as a *νοήσις νοήσεως*, and this becomes more than ever important as an ideal when it is observed how incapable are the inferior forms of mind, as they appear in sensation and volition, of providing the ego with a worthy goal for its striving. Reason, when viewed and enjoyed as an intellectual life, will not conduct the ego to a barren summit, but will aid it in threading its way through the world in which it is fated to exist; and when the internal activity of the ego, as this is seen in its intellectual work, is seen to be fraught with all the possibilities of creative culture, the danger of a rationalistic intellectualism falls to the ground. Culture thus delivers the thinking self from the conceptualism that has so long impeded its progress in the world and tainted the truths it has sought to establish. Everything that is of value to the contemplative ego will be found in a system of major intellectualism, based as this is on mental life rather than upon logical forms.

VI

THE SELFHOOD OF THE EGO

THE self that has already expressed itself as consciousness and exerted itself as will has still to evince its true nature as self indeed. As the phenomenal has been transformed into consciousness, the causal into freedom, so the real in the world must be made to yield the selfhood of the ego. The true condition of the ego is such as to forbid that we should consider its inner consciousness as something purely phenomenal, as though it existed as plant and animal exist, while its behaviour is such as to distinguish its activities from the events that simply take place in the world. Non-egoistic dialectics is fond of regarding the self as though it were one among the other facts of the world, while its states and activities are compared with what seem to be analogous effects in the physical world. Those who are more liberal will admit that the ego, while of the same kind as the other elements of nature, occupies the position of first among equals. In the pursuit of such weird notions, the realistic thinker has been aided and abetted by the social and scientific forces of recent culture; while the sincere believer in the self and its independent states of consciousness has been deterred from asserting the supremacy of the self, lest he seem anti-social and anti-scientific. It seems impossible for metaphysics to pursue its course in a purely disinterested manner, for the reason that the interests of life present themselves as motives, while the affairs of humanity demand somewhat the same ontological explanation that is meted out to impersonal things.

Realistic thought in general has been in the habit of viewing the self as a thing, when those who have made the

self an object of special study feel that one must regard it as *the* thing. Even when scientific thinking, which is always anxious to preserve the external appearance of completeness, is willing to accord the self a prominent position among the other phenomena of the world, the egoist is called upon to declare that this is not enough of a concession, because the nature of the self is unique. The common line of defence thrown out by the idealist consists in contending that, were it not for the ego with its states of consciousness, there would be no phenomena at all. Thus it is claimed that the mind leaves nothing untouched by its mentality, because the perceptual powers of consciousness lend quality to the so-called things of our human experience, while the conceptual functions, which involve the categorical groups of these particular qualities, are even more mental in their character. By means of mind, whether finite or infinite, the whole world is transformed into a thought-world, whether Platonistic or Kantian. While the present dialectic looks in an interested way when the idealistic David confronts the realistic Goliath, it refuses to rest content with the "victory" of the slender warrior over the stouter one, for its fundamental principles forbid that it should accept as real such a shadow world, even where the latter is able to create the permanent illusion of reality.

I. THE SELF AS UNIQUE

All that idealism attempts to do is to establish the same world as that presented in experience, only it desires to achieve this result according to its own method. Individualistic intellectualism, realising that the world is quite able to take care of its affairs, centres its attention upon the ego, which seems to stand in need of all that thought can do for it. The "world" of the idealist does not satisfy the egoist who can find in such an order of things none but a spectral self; at the same time, the ideal world is no sufficient explanation of reality, because it omits one of the most striking features of all that is real—activity. Hence both

egoism and activism make it impossible for the present dialectic to accept as a sufficient treatment of the problem of selfhood the formal, rationalistic endeavour of the idealist. Both realist and rationalist repudiate the ego, whose presence seems to them to destroy the smoothness of their respective systems; both fail to note that the self is unique. Where activity has had the good effect of uniting the phenomenal and real poles of being, it has been no less efficient in relating the self to the world, for it was the self as *ego efficiens* which made it possible for us to adjust the individual to the universal order.

Since now we have disdained to accept the assistance that the idealist offers to all those who desire to find a place for the self in the world, because the idealist gives us the world as a picture in whose scenes the self cannot participate, we are now expected to suggest a method by which the selfhood of the ego may be placed upon a sure ontological foundation. This, however, is to be done in no single manner, nor is it to be supposed that it is an undertaking that has been delayed until the question of selfhood was reached; from the beginning we have viewed the world with the eyes of the self, and have never considered it in independence of the ego. For this reason we do not need to elaborate some special method of thinking, with the aim of showing that it is necessary to the existence of the world itself; we have to show rather that the self has its inner worldhood as something unique. Our "proof" of the self's existence, therefore, consists in a renewed statement of the fact that the self has an independent inner life, which it pursues in its unique way. The argument is to be constructive and positive, for nothing real can result from the idealist's method of making the mind indispensable to things—that were but to challenge the realist to think of the world apart from the ego.

The inwardness of the self in its interests and motives forbids that we should seek to include it among other things in the world, for the very moment we attempt to objectify the self as things are objectified, we discover that in its

inner nature it is incapable of being reduced to perception, while it does not relate to its fellow-ego in any causal fashion. Now, the being perceived and the being related are the peculiar marks of reality where things are concerned, but these criteria do not apply to the realm of selfhood. The imperceptibility of the ego led the opponents of Berkeley to assert that his notion of *esse* and *percipi* as one could only act destructively upon the human self, which was unable to pose for the perceptual scrutiny of the other ego. But this very just contention only serves to show how different in nature is the self from the physical world, and if the method of measuring the reality of the latter does not apply to the ego that fact makes against the method rather than the ego which the impressionistic thinker is trying to represent. The inwardness of the self, by means of which it is saved the mortification of being beheld as things are beheld, really constitutes its intrinsic nature; the self is thus seen to be unique, having no analogy but the world itself.

The inner character of the self, which appeared so strikingly the moment the method of objective perception was applied, reappeared in a more forceful manner when Hume applied to it the method of introspection. As Berkeley had found it impossible to represent the ego as an object of external perception, Hume was unable to make it the object of internal perception. The self is neither an object without nor a state within. In his doubt concerning personal identity¹ Hume was not confronted by a subjective void when he looked within himself, but found rather that the mind was filled with a selfless content, so that, in search of the self, he "stumbled upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure." Thus he complained that he could never quite "catch himself at any time without a perception, and never observe anything but a perception." This just scepticism is of value in pointing out that the self, which is no single objective datum, is no

¹ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I. sec. vi.

special subjective fact; if it could be run down like an ordinary conscious state it would not be worthy of selfhood. From both forms of scepticism, therefore, we learn that the selfhood of the ego is to be established in some superior manner, for that which identifies phenomena is not sufficient as a method of identifying the ego.

As in the parallel case of the world, the reality of the ego is made manifest in the way that the self stands out as an independent reality. The self is not called upon to manifest its existence and nature in accordance with any fixed standard, but it is sufficient if it simply puts its nature into being. To express this unique condition, in which the independent self takes its place in the world, we stand in need of some special word, although the Fichtean term "posit" conveys much of the meaning required. One should hope to "catch himself," as Hume so crudely expressed it, especially as the ego in the form of attention is already in introspective operation. The self has the same reason for existence that the world has, whatever that reason may be. Like Faust in his endeavour to give a sufficient rendering of the first line of St. John's Gospel, we find it difficult to select the term that shall express the originality and independence of the self's existence, and we cannot content ourselves with the activism which says, In the beginning was the deed! The ego is known by means of a complete form of self-affirmation, in which thought and action are one and the same; this self-affirmation, therefore, is a conscious act and active thought. Its selfhood and its worldhood are one and the same.

The systematic view of humanity does not make void the supreme idea of self, because the latter is of such vast proportions as to lose nothing by such ideal organisation. The moment we endeavour to organise egos empirically in the form of "society," we encounter resistance on the part of the ego, which cannot breathe in such close atmosphere, so that the world of humanity must be established in some other way. The causal connection among the various members of a series is one which finds no application in the

world of egos, for a system which arranges things according to the general idea of "nature" is far different from that which organises egos into a system of "society." When we contrast the respective conditions of egoism and equality, we observe that the ideal of equality, instead of being the product of the mass through its social consciousness, is an ideal thrust upon it by the ego as man of genius, who reads into the mind of man at large the splendid principles of individualism and aristocracy which have come to his own exalted consciousness. Equality is not a plea passed up from the common world of men, but a decision handed down by those who are able to judge. If, therefore, equality is a tenable notion, it is only because the individualistic thinker has wrought the logic necessary to establish it; mankind in the mass would never entertain such a wild dream of human nobility. Now it is because philosophy has been in the habit of deferring to the social that we find it difficult to regard the world as the home of the self; and where Plato, Hobbes, and Spencer find it possible to base their ethically social systems upon a physical principle, the individualist is not allowed to use such a broad base for the sake of placing the ego at the apex of the pyramid.

Nevertheless, the individualistic treatment of the ontological problem is not impossible. Descartes made his way through the world with the ego as his guide; Leibnitz found it possible to preserve the unity of the world while he viewed it in the light of the monad; Fichte came to knowledge of the Absolute through the self; Romanticism founded a new form of culture upon none other than this same principle of individualism. In the culture of the present, symbolism has had the good effect of emancipating the self from the objectivities of nature and society; the characteristics of this style of poetry often appear absurdly impossible to the positivistic consciousness of the age, but the philosophical situation would be even more preposterous if the subjectivities of symbolism were omitted. The self cannot bear the whole burden of the real world, and it is because dialectics has not seen fit to determine its special,

ontological function that the egoistic movement in æsthetics and ethics has been placed in a paradoxical position. The world without the self is a subject of no interest to the human mind, although the latter has done all in its power to remove the ego from the objective orders set up by science in the natural and social worlds, where there has been no dread like that of solipsism and egoism.

The true function of the ego in the world as real, however, is far superior to these ipsesistic forms of selfhood, which create the impression that the ego is supposed to represent the world in its extensity. On the contrary, it is the office of the ego to reveal the intensity of the real world. The worldhood of the ego was recognised by Socrates, who was so satisfied with the ideals of human conduct that he found it possible to gratify his dialectical ambitions without having recourse to the principles of physical speculation. None the less was the ego acknowledged by Kant, the Second Antinomy of whose *Kritik* lays as much stress upon the single soul as the First Antinomy had laid on the whole world. Both Socrates and Kant are willing to place the affair of the self upon the ethical, while the egoism of the present dialectic finds it necessary to enrich the content of the self by means of material drawn from æsthetical and religious sources. In this way we seek to show how the ego has the spirit, if not the letter, of reality, whose intensive character is expressed by the self alone, for a reality which does not seek to recognise itself through consciousness and to react upon itself by means of the will is not worth the dialectical labour to investigate. Both realism and rationalism have agreed to ignore the ego, and the abstract meanness of their respective systems is due to this fatal omission.

2. THE INTRO-ACTIVITY OF THE SELF

When we attempt to determine the inner character of the self, we are called upon to observe that selfhood as such is due to the interaction of inner and outer forces. From the natural world, which recasts the larger masses of

reality in the form of smaller ones recognised as molecules, atoms, and cells, humanity receives the principle of individuation. This principle, the name of which was given by Avicenna, made a special appeal to the ontological imagination of Leibnitz, who looked upon nature as carrying out the reproduction of the whole in the single part to an indefinite degree ; each single thing thus became a world.¹ With Schopenhauer, the *principium individuationis* was esteemed a snare from which the ego should seek to rid itself because it was illusory.² Current egoism is so anxious to emancipate itself from the social order that it does not take pains to inquire whether the independent existence of the self comes within the range of ontological possibility. Indeed, an egoist like Stirner destroys the self in the very moment that he destroys the Absolute ; while Nietzsche, in his opposition to the soul-atomism of modern thought, negates the metaphysical basis upon which his ethical egoism rests. Among the symbolists, Villiers de L'Isle Adam has attempted to connect individualistic revolt with the introspective ; hence when Elizabeth seeks to free herself from the social order, her real aim is to have opportunity to dream, "to contemplate in the depths of our thought a hidden world only faintly reflected by outside realities."³ Nowhere in this drama or in the more dialectical one, *Axël*, does Villiers supply the reader with a sufficient metaphysics of the self ; nevertheless, his art has the advantage of revealing the connection between the ontology and the æsthetic self, while it warns the egoist that he cannot hope to advance the claims of the self unless he is careful to inquire upon what grounds that self exists.

But the intro-activity of the ego does not work for the dismissal of the world, which were a vain piece of work for the will ; it is exerted with the aim of showing that the ego too is a force in the universe. Where æsthetic realism insists that the life of the self is the result of the *milieu* in which it finds itself, symbolism tends to make the world

¹ *Monadology*, 64.

² *Welt als Wille u. Vors.*, § 61.

³ *The Revolt*, tr. Barclay, sc. 1.

the result of life, as though nature were the imitation of art, as Wilde suggested.¹ The symbolistic absurdity is a match for the realistic notion that the self is the product of natural forces; we learn to combat the idea of the *milieu* when we observe under what difficulties the self comes into being, forced upon the world as a result of the will to selfhood. Egoism does not commit the solipsistic error of supposing that the subjective self is the be-all and end-all of the universe, for it desires to make the ego supreme rather than solitary; when egoism insists upon the inner activity of the self, it looks upon nature as the background of the ego's free, spontaneous activities in the world-whole. The argument for the existence of the self is thus about the same as Plato's contention in favour of the reality of ideas; if we are to explain the spiritual life of humanity, expressed as this is in the form of culture, we must make the proper assumption. This amounts to asserting the independent existence of the ego, without which the existence of culture is inexplicable, as without the existence of ideas the existence of knowledge cannot be explained.

In the attempt to account for the inner activity of the free ego, it may be necessary to indulge the ideal of æsthetic aristocracy, even where it has ever been the custom to regard reality as though it were in the possession of mediocrity. Why dialectics should have assumed the mediocre nature of reality is still to be explained, but the fact remains that it has habitually assumed that the real is the obvious and commonplace. This is probably due to the fact that the real is expected to serve some ethical purpose, the realisation of which is supposed to be apparent and possible to all men, and it is morality which seems to have about it the necessary democracy. It was in this spirit that Schopenhauer concluded the third and æsthetical part of *The World as Will and Idea*, for he assumed that, while art was able to afford for man a pathway out of life, it was only the genius who was the one adapted to the appreciation of this superior method of emancipation, so that for the

¹ *Intentions*, p. 32.

salvation of mankind as such it became necessary to pass from the æsthetical to the ethical; for all can be moralists, while not all can be artists. In spite of this notion, which is so prevalent, it is not impossible to assume that reality is not something so ordinary that all men can lay hold upon it. True dialectics can only assume the contrary, and proceed as though the real were as unique as the individual, as fine as art itself; for it is only democratic prejudice and moralistic restraint which keep us from appreciating what a genius the spirit of reality is possessed of. When the superior nature of the real is once appreciated, it becomes possible to survey the ego in the proper light; no longer will it be necessary to apologise for the self, and ask pardon for the apparent solipsism of its self-assertion, for the nature of reality as such will incline us to view the latter in an individualistic manner. Then the Vedantist "That" will become the "Thou," and the spirit of the world will be understood as the spirit of the self is inwardly known to the ego.

The ills of individuation are self-caused and self-cured; for, by means of the full withdrawal from the world-whole, the ego is placed where it must interpret its individuality in a worldlike manner. Self is now seen to consist in selfhood, wherein the one and the all are harmoniously blended, while the ego begins to recognise in the world something similar to itself; such is the origin of the *Tat tvam asi* of Vedanta. In this manner, individualisation and totalisation are found to consist of one and the same dialectical movement, for our common method of subordinating part to the whole does not apply to such unique things as the self and the world. Selfhood assumes greater extension as it assumes greater intension; the more *intime* is the individual, the more universal is its order of being. Intro-activity is not a mode of work in which the individual insinuates his subjectivity into the objective order of nature, but is a positive and creative force, which enables the ego to be a creator as the world is also a creator. If ontology can use its valuable space to discuss the automatic action of the

spinal cord and the relation of stimulus to sensation, why should it not be willing to consider the possibility of a creative work which, in the person of the genius, the spirit of humanity is carrying on? Individuality is itself a creation due to the freedom of the intro-active ego.

Ontology has exerted itself to extricate the will of the ego from the toils of causality, but it has not been so earnest in seeking to evince the existence of a free world of work in which the creative activity of the self is viewed in constructive manner. Libertarianism can do no more than demonstrate the abstract possibility of freedom as a force which exerts itself here and there, from time to time; intro-activity however, seeks to account for the continuity and systematic coherence of human activity; for, from the inception of human culture, the human spirit has been tracing in the air a line parallel to the course of the natural world. The freedom of humanity is thus something which leads the ego forward beyond nature rather than backward into the meshes of causal law; the proof of one is the same as the proof of the other: it is the perceptible fact of a system of nature below, and a system of humanity above. The possibility of intro-activity has been ignored by traditional ontology, which has penetrated beneath the crust of reality to the subterannean fires of free energy. These free strivings beneath the crust of formal reason are essential to a comprehension of the whole, and without the recognition of intro-activity, the significance of human reality will be superficial indeed.

The intro-activity of selfhood, recognisable in the form of human culture, consists of a complete act of self-affirmation. This affirmatory act on the part of the self consists, not of some life-force whose aim could be no more than the acquisition of the immediate, but of a striving toward the remote and disinterested, far removed from the spirit of mediocrity that so sullenly broods over the world. The superior world of selfhood does not simply exist, but is an effect thrust out by the ego as it seeks to strive beyond itself and achieve a "victory over the invisible." This act

of self-affirmation, with which Fichte has made us familiar, wills the self and the world as one—that is, the self is willed as a world. Having already settled with solipsism¹ and egoism,² we may here pursue the ideal of selfhood without fear of fatal subjectivity; indeed, when the self is viewed in the light of its intellectual significance, the narrowness of ipseism never threatens it. The aim of the intellectual individualist is to surmount the natural order; such a thinker must do what, according to Sainte-Beuve, Alfred de Vigny did—erect an ivory tower.³ With our persistent democratic prejudice, we insist that reality must be conceived of in the spirit of mediocrity by the social consciousness of humanity, while we look with distrust upon the individualism which finds the real in the spirit of superiority, as though the real world were to be seen from the top of a *tour d'ivoire*, the erection of which constitutes the most complete form of intro-activity.

With a peculiar confidence in the ordinary, philosophy has sought the real in the natural and social instead of in the spiritual and individual; as a result, we can assign no reason why the real should exist, so inferior is it. Why should we investigate the plain, obvious phenomena of nature in their outwardness when the secret of reality is more likely to be found in the exceptional and internal? Why should we consider every whim and habit of society, as though the spirit of existence were enamoured of the commonplace? The significance of the structure of things lies in the column rather than the masonry of the wall, in the arch rather than the obvious foundation. Science reduces the differences among races to the colour of the skin or the shape of the skull, but the spirit of investigation must take into account the cultural differences between peoples, as Aryans and Semites, Germans and Slavs. The inner life of humanity, where all the nuances of spirituality are realised in a coloured, characteristic way, stand in need of ontological explanation, and when we look to metaphysics

¹ Cf. *supra*, Bk. I. vi. 2.

² Cf. *supra*, Bk. II. vii. 1.

³ *Portraits Littéraires*, 1862, iii. p. 410.

to explain the ramifications of this intro-activity, we are surprised to discover that the energies of this proud science have been exhausted in attempting to explain the phenomena of matter and motion, of time and space. An adequate theory of reality must account for human strivings in the world of spirit as well as the movements of atoms in the void. The attempts to provide a metaphysics of life have usually resulted in something colourless, as Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals* attests; the rich content of individual life has been allowed to pass unexplained, the course of human volition and emotion unjustified. The peculiar character of intro-activity has been obscured by physical and social considerations, which have made it impossible for humanity to live from within.

3. PERFECTION OF THE SELF THROUGH INTELLECT

In order to gather the fruits of the ego's activity, it is necessary to consider the nature and activity of the self in the light of intellect. In our day, where positivism and pragmatism have conspired to betray the intellect, it is not possible to advance the claims of the intellect with the ease of the older rationalism, but since we have already repudiated this rationalism, we do not feel the deprivation when it is taken away. Rationalism sought to remove contradiction by removing life; intellectualism, which has the individual on its side, attempts the far different task of reducing this chaos to order. These circumstances place the principles of intellectualism in a different light; no longer does the mind seek to secure sway over the realm of impersonal sense, for now it is engaged in subduing the will as this appears in the living form of individual life. As in other phases of our study, egoism and activism have the effect of presenting new problems and new ways of solving them. In the present case, where we are striving to secure a consistent and sufficient notion of selfhood, the subjugation of the will by the intellect lends new meaning to the intel-

lectualist problem, which is seen to proceed from the voluntaristic rather than from the sensational, as was the case with the older rationalism.

Philosophy has ever been optimistic concerning action, where it has often been pessimistically sceptical concerning the will; it has assumed that, with all the uncertainty of speculation, action was something sure. But the rise of voluntarism has brought us to the place where we are called upon to inquire concerning the authenticity of action, for the mind may doubt the deed as well as the thought. Where the human self reacts upon nature and initiates an independent course of activity, it abandons the obvious and instinctive for the uncertainties of the ideal. In this way it may become decadent and mystical, and under the guise of genius may sink into degeneration. In the case of individualism to-day, something not wholly unlike this confronts us. With the elaboration of and emphasis upon the obvious, the solidaric in the physical and social orders has left the ego to choose a course of activity at once bizarre, so that he who believes in the self, and believes the world is to be measured in terms of the self, is forced to seek instruction and nourishment from the dialectics of Decadence. One may seek self-justification in the thought that he may take his goods wherever he finds them, and yet the conditions of individualism are plainly deplorable in their anti-social and anti-natural ideals. If we seek selfhood in sense, we are threatened by sensualism and Wagnerism; if we pursue the self through will, we may fall a prey to Nietzschean negations; if we turn to the intellect, we fear the fallacies of mysticism.

Having examined the subordinate forms of selfhood, as these appear in the phenomenal and activistic orders, we are now anxious to discover what may be found at the poles of the intellect; in what sense is the self a *scio* or a *cogito*? The true egoist should be willing to place his affair upon nothing obvious and evident, so that we are not disconcerted when we find that the only consistent support for the self seems to be found in the intellect. The danger that con-

fronts us here is that of formality and passivity, for the intellect is famous for its *impassibilité*. Our chief source of trust in the intellect lies, not in what philosophy has already said about it, but in what has thus far been neglected. The intellect indeed seems impassible and formal, but its condition may be an acquired passivity, which has come about by the expression of superior forces. This is indeed the inner condition of the self as our dialectic has been considering it, and our claim for intro-activity on the part of the self was but preliminary to the claim we now make for the interior life of the ego.

The inner life as an intellectual one cannot be understood if the ego is regarded as something purely representative, an imitative mirror of the universe. If the world were content to leave the ego to its work, the life of the self were simple indeed; but the individualistic history of humanity shows how thoroughly has the spirit of the world, sensational and activistic, invaded the soul, so that the life of man has ever been a tumultuous one. For this reason the primary work of the intellect, a work destined never to be complete, has consisted in subduing the contradictory forces of the natural order. The will to live carries and sustains the natural world, but when it enters the ego it causes chaos. To still this storm, reduce experience to order, and establish the independence of the inner life, is the work the intellect has long been carrying on, so that it was from the voluntaristic rather than the empirical that the intellect proceeded. Rationalism has expected the world to come to it, and, in its *a priori* fashion, it prepared the moulds into which the plastic world-stuff was supposed to enter and receive shape. But the actual situation reveals the fact that the intellect must exert its superior powers to quell the Dionysian revolt that from the beginning has been going on in the soul. This Apollonian treatment of the problem of knowledge has the effect of showing that the intellect, instead of being the formal, passive faculty of representative thought, is really activistic, a νοῦς ποιητικός, a cultural principle. This fact should place intellectualism in a more acceptable light in

an age which emphasizes the obvious and exaggerates the efficient.

With the absurd emphasis that is commonly laid upon activity, it is well to inquire concerning the exact nature of that which seems so important to our present-day philosophy. What is the real nature of action? As commonly conceived, action is attached to some immediate inclination from which it springs, while it is directed to an end which it endeavours to realise; incentive and motive conspire with result and consequence. To emancipate the deed from its attachments, and thus render it universal and free, it becomes necessary for the ego to intellectualise it. In both ethics and æsthetics this free form of activity is postulated as ideal; ethics aims at the intrinsic, art at the disinterested. The ontological principle at work in these particular forms of ideal activity is one which is supposed to free these forms of action from the usual entanglements of the exterior world. With the æsthete, the abhorrence of action is so great that it seems fatal to the self to indulge in "expressionism." In symbolistic art this has expressed itself in the case of Stephen Mallarmé, whose poetry was prized because it was not written, the silence of the bard being due to the fact that he thought such an exhibitionism unworthy.¹ Ibsen caricatures this same resolute passivism in the person of Ulrich Brendel, who also esteemed his thought too holy to be committed to paper.² In the case of the decadent Oscar Wilde, while the scruple against expression is thoroughly overcome, there is always the expressed desire to remain aloof from the affairs of the actual world of nature and the social order.

Not only is the decadent artist suspicious of action, but from the beginning the religious consciousness of humanity has hoped to keep upon the free, formless sea of inner life, without coming out upon the limited land of practical work. In Taoism this sense of the limitation of activity led to the praise of "doing nothing," which was expressed as follows: "Heaven and earth do nothing and yet there is nothing that

¹ Cf. Nordau, *Degeneration*, English tr., p. 129.

² *Rosmersholm*, Act i.

they do not do. But what man is there that can attain to this inaction?"¹ The Yoga reveals the same scruple against Philistinism, yet it does not express this antipathy to work in the same nihilistic way. The Yoga method of attaining to the ideal of "worklessness" consists of neither inactivity nor mere contemplation, but in a scheme of works, whereby action becomes the cure of action; hence it is said, "Without undertaking works, no man comes to worklessness."² The more complete elucidation of this paradox, which will arouse the Philistines of all lands, appears in connection with Vedanta, which points out that work has no place in true selfhood; thus it is said, "For the man whose delight is in the Self, who is contented with the Self, and is glad of the Self, there is naught for which he should work."³ Nevertheless, Vedanta does not seek to neutralise the activism of Yoga, for it assures the disciple that "he who beholds in work no work, and in no work work, is the man of understanding among mortals."⁴ A similar suspicion of the efficiency of work expresses itself in the Christian doctrine of salvation by faith, wherein the religious consciousness seems to fear the identification of its essence with any form of externalising activity. In this era of efficiency, when men have expected humanity to run on tracks, these idealistic scruples will seem vapid indeed; but those who have faith in the inner life will suffer no self-styled laws of science and society to domineer over them.

When we attempt to subordinate the will to the intellect we are aided by the fact that the ground of action is to be found, not in the act itself, but in something independent of it. Activity may be organised into a world of deeds, comparable to the system of intelligible freedom in Kantianism, for there is an ontology of action as well as of being. We apply the principle of reality to that which we perceive as a manifold of appearance; why should we hesitate to apply it to that which we perform in the same pluralistic

¹ *Writings of Kwang-Sze*, tr. Legge, Book XVIII.

² *Bhagavad Gita*, tr. Telang, ch. iii. 4.

³ *Ib.*, ch. iii. 17.

⁴ *Ib.*, ch. iv. 18.

world-order? Real activity is an idea most difficult to evince, although there have been attempts to express it in a sufficient form. Where the system of intelligible freedom is too nominalistic with Kant, the idea of deed-activity with Fichte has the unfortunate effect of neutralising the intellect. As Spinoza had based his idea of substance upon that which was self-existent and self-conceived, the inverted Spinozism placed its affair upon activity self-centred and pure, and styled by the author "systematic Spinozism."¹ If Fichte's dialectic were a true systematising of Spinozism, if it could have carried away from Spinoza the intellectualism rather than the absolutism of his rationalistic doctrine, we might look upon it as a sufficient presentation of the problem of selfhood. Unfortunately Fichte rehabilitated the undesirable feature of Spinozism, while he left the inner spirit of it to decline, as if one were to clothe himself in mediæval armour, instead of trying to revive the spirit of mediæval chivalry.

When we attempt to catch the spirit of selfhood, we discover that the weight of responsibility for the affirmation of the ego rests with the intellect, not with the will. In both ethics and metaphysics the worth of the self is conserved by its inherent intelligence, rather than by anything that the ego can do. As the foregoing will indicate, it is the function of the intellect not merely to find the unity of the manifold of sense, but also to reduce the chaos of impulse to order. For genuine action, nothing is more necessary than thought, without which the movement of the ego is only something instinctive and immediate. As with the ego of Geulincx, so with the ego everywhere; if it does not know it cannot act—*nescio, ergo non facio*. Our philosophical philistinism has urged action at all costs, thought only as there appears something useful in it. But the human will is wholly incapable of expressing the inner nature of the ego, even where it is freely admitted that the intellect ever stands in need of an infusion of voluntarism. Genuine intellectualism is progressive and creative, and while it exalts

¹ *Science of Knowledge*, tr. Kroeger, p. 97.

contemplation to the supreme place in the self, it does not seek to inculcate passivism, for it needs the impetus of action for its intellectualistic purposes. From the standpoint of such free intellectualism, therefore, the renunciationism of Geulincx is condemned as both unethical and unontological—*Nudus sum hujusce Mundi contemplator; spectator sum in hac scena, non actor.*¹ This quiescent attitude of Geulincx is reflected by Wagner's Wotan, who has so compromised himself on the heights of Valhalla that he comes to the point where he admits to the dwarf, Alberic, that he no longer has a work in the world;—*Zu schauen kam ich, nicht zu schaffen.*² But where one for the sake of the intellect renounces the will, his pessimism is doubled when he is forced to observe how will and intellect go together.

The intellect is a gainer rather than a loser when it is called upon to support the ego, while it is also expected to compete with the will; and an intellectualism which is no longer content to deck itself out with the faded wreaths of a rationalism, which achieved no other victory than that of the understanding over sense, has a future destined to be replete with satisfactions. As far as voluntarism is concerned, it is well to observe that the abandonment of the intellectual indicates a return to the irrational. A free intellectualism does not hesitate to entertain the temporary presence of irrationalism, for it conceives of its task in the world of dialectics to be none other than the redemption of this inner contradiction by means of intelligence; with voluntarism, however, the case is far different, for this theory of the self seems to have no choice between the rationalistic and the irrationalistic, and itself makes headway because it leaves it to intellectualism to introduce intelligibility into the system of being. When the dread of irrationalism has taken hold upon the human mind, when the thinker realises out of what pit of contradiction he has been dug, voluntarism does not have the opportunity to allure and deceive. It is the intellect which is striving with the world for the sake of redeeming the self, and while the will is indispensable

¹ *Ethica*, Tr. I. cap. ii. sec. 2, § 11.

² *Siegfried*, Act ii.

it is in the capacity of servant rather than as master—*cogito, ergo facio*.

In the assertion of the self, will promotes intellect, while intellect perfects will. The union of these two functions of reality is found in the human self. Among the activists, Eucken has found it possible to express the independence of form and the character of content which one desires to find in spiritual life, and that without the aid of either voluntarism or egoism. As far as his system adjusts itself to traditional problems, it is content with a persistent criticism of intellectualism. The nature of Eucken's activism is expressed as a complete or essential deed on the part of the soul—*Vollthat, Wesensthat*.¹ Where Eucken emphasizes the activity of spiritual life, he does not see fit to lay any emphasis upon the two ideas that have been so influential in guiding the present investigations: those of individualism and activism. Our own presentation of the problem of reality is further distinguished from that of Eucken by the adoption of the intellectual as the best means of meeting voluntarism, while we adopt egoism as the indispensable means of securing a hold upon the inner life.

It is by none other than the intellectualistic means that the human self is able to perform world-work, without which it could not lay claim to essential selfhood. Minor ethical systems often dream of a world-work for the individual, but they have no ontological basis upon which to build it up. The utilitarianism of Mill was not far from this idea even when it had none other than an empirical principle upon which to found its ideal motive as that which seeks to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The same was true of Kant's categorical imperative, which sought to transform the free volition of the individual into a universal law. In addition to these ethical attempts to will the world as a whole, philosophy is not wanting in examples from the realms of æsthetics and religion; indeed, both of these forms of human culture have at heart the very idea of affirming the existence of an ideal

¹ *Einheit des Geisteslebens*, p. 433.

order whose content is conceived as having value for the soul. The nature of human world-work is in no sense objective, for its essential meaning is grasped in a moment of intro-activity. When we raised the psycho-physical question, and asked how the mind could affect matter, we saw that it was not the office of mind to go out as will into the physical world; and Geulincx was not far from the truth when he suggested that it were as impossible to move one's little finger as it were to move the whole earth. The work that is performed by the will is not so much a working as it is an asserting; by means of it the ego affirms the world or negates it, as seems the more logical and valuable. Since the act of willing really consists in an inward affirmation rather than an outward labour, for which the powers of the ego were poorly fitted, it is possible to interpret it as a work of world-significance. The moment this is done, however, the will gives way to the intellect, which is better fitted for affirming the world in its totality. Moreover, the activity of the world, being of an immanent nature, the self may exert world-activity by means of something other than force; it does accomplish this world-work by means of an intelligent affirmation of the plan of the world as a whole. If causality were but a *causa transiens*, and if the self were but *ego efficiens*, the situation would be a hopeless one for the self which attempts to realise itself by willing the world; but the ontology of the world has given us a different notion of causality, while the metaphysics of the self has led us to look upon the ego in some other than a voluntaristic manner, so that with a world where causality assumes the character of immanent reason, and where the self is regarded as something intellectual, the possibility of the ego's performing world-work is by no means a vain one.

4. THE SUPREMACY OF SELFHOOD

The work of the self in the world being a world-work, it is not difficult to raise the ego from the idea of efficiency to that of superiority, wherein its true character consists.

Reality is the form of human selfhood and consists in the possession of that which exists rather than the mere striving after it. In this respect, reality, as expressed by the ego, is of aristocratic character, while the conception of reality formulated by realism is necessarily mediocre and unworthy. Only by the calm possession of the real is the self able to entertain and express the notion of its inherent essence and its intrinsic worth. While activity has an acceptable place in the dialectics of the self, that place is not the highest one; and where striving is necessary for the development of the ego's nature, the character of that striving is chiefly negative, consisting of a reaction against the world. Systems which are content with immediacy, as well as those which seek to attain to the real by means of becoming, fall far short of the egoistic ideal, which consists in the royal possession of the real. Realism takes no pride in existence; it elaborates a notion of reality which it must ever hesitate to apply to the self. Nor is the secret of existence to be found in the ideal of efficiency, which tends to confuse the intellect as to the real meaning of things, so that one is tempted to deliver his soul by means of a quietism which says, with Geulincx, *spectator sum in hac scena, non actor*.

With the failure of the representative and reactionary doctrines of selfhood, as these spring from the two inferior views of the world, it becomes necessary to assert the aristocratic and individualistic in the human ego; where this is not done, the purpose of the world is set at naught. It is the fate of sensation to be raised above itself by the will; none the less is it the fate of will to elevate to an unwonted plane through the intellect. Where the intellect has performed such a task as the intellectualising of volition, and where it occupies such an exalted position, its character is seen to be something more than that of intellect in the ordinary sense of the term. The intellect supersedes itself by virtue of the fact that it creates something beyond, or that which is an exaggeration of the mere intellect. As a result, the intellect brings the self into being, while it affords the self an intuition of the world as a whole. The

mind cannot experience the world-whole, nor can it will the universe in its totality; but it can contemplate the world-whole in the moment that it contemplates itself.

It is thus by means of knowledge that the self comes to its own in the world, which it recognises as something akin to it. Modern thought has lost sight of the function of knowledge in the ego, and that partly because it has assumed that independent discussion of the knowledge problem was unnecessary, and partly because it has treated the problem as something introductory to the ontological question. The self lives by knowing, just as it is by means of knowledge that it secures its place in the world. Knowledge is thus a recognition, not of something known in a previous state of existence, as Plato would have it, but of that which now forms the veritable environment of the ego. By means of knowledge the self is redeemed from the world, or that which Villiers de L'Isle Adam styled *Toute cette vieille Extériorité, maligne, compliquée, inflexible*. Where knowledge has assumed the idealistic character, it has usually directed its energies in the direction of reaching a Beyond, in the form of the transphenomenal; but in doing this it has no right to overlook the fact that the self which puts forth the knowledge does not relinquish knowledge at the moment it realises it; for this reason it becomes necessary to regard the exercise of knowledge, not as a mere representation of something exterior, but as the realisation of that which is internal.

The human self endeavours to think the world and will the world, because that self has something worldlike about it. In the attitude and action of the whole self we see what reality can be. The aim of the self is not simply to experience the exterior, or to exhibit the interior, but to affirm itself as real. In its attitude toward the exterior world the self cannot wholly conceal its contempt, the expression of which is not at all out of place to-day, when the usual philosophy of life resembles a hut rather than an ivory tower, when man is looked upon as a servant of the world instead of as its master. Realism, which thinks that

man exists for the world, is no nearer the truth than romanticism, which thinks the world exists for man. Our dialectic will be satisfied with the system of philosophy or poetry which makes the self supreme. Meanwhile it cherishes the belief that the anti-natural and anti-social phases of egoism are only preliminary to a more constructive view of the self in the world and society, which are unable to submerge it. All that the world of things and persons can do for the self is to provide it with a place where it may enjoy its inner existence and exert its peculiar powers. Yet the full fate of the ego in the world is a problem which demands independent treatment through which the ultimate meaning of all human striving and hoping may be properly analysed and thoroughly appreciated.

VII

THE FATE OF THE EGO IN THE WORLD-WHOLE

WHERE the idea of the self as a consciousness led our dialectic to assert that this self has a place in the world of sense, where the principle of the ego as the will to selfhood urged us to affirm the work of the self in the world of activity, the deduction of the reality of selfhood makes it necessary for us to inquire concerning the fate of the self in the world-whole. The ego expresses itself in the form of soul-states; the ego exerts its will in the form of free activity; and the ego in its reality seeks its fate in the world. Where the mood of superabundance assures the ego of such selfhood that the whole world of sense appears symbolic rather than real, where the mood of sufficiency equips the self with a sense of freedom in the activistic order, the mood of want adapts it to its fate in the world as such. At last the self is called upon to express its condition as one of weakness, wherein it expresses desire for pursuit rather than possession of reality, as Brunhilde was *des Wissens bar, doch des Wunches voll*. Yet this very state of emptiness may have about it something of ontological significance, for it may place the self in an attitude where it shall receive an impression of the world unknown to it in its more opulent states or conditions. Reality is not so commonplace that the habitual moods of the self are able to entertain it; existence is so extraordinary that an exceptional state of mind is the one adapted to apprehending it. Therefore, where the æsthetical and ethical have played their respective parts in the inferior orders of existence,

the religious is now made necessary for the apprehension of the world in its totality. In order to appreciate how inexorably the self strives to participate in the world about it, a restatement of the situation upon the lower planes of reality will be of value in adjusting the self to the highest order of things. Having come to its own in selfhood, the ego is in a position where it can appreciate the significance of its efforts in the realms of phenomenality and activity.

I. INTUITIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD

The result of the preliminary view of reality was to establish a temporary location for the self in the world; provisional as this was, it had about it a significance which extended to the most remote view of the world. At the outset of our dialectical inquiry, when we viewed reality as something received intuitively by the mind, the perceptible world seemed to prepare a place for the ego as individual thing, and it was only necessary to show how empirical generalisations, which group stars and planets, plants and animals, are incompetent to assemble individuals under any such abstract heads. Moreover, the inner consciousness of the self with its æsthetic feelings was found to be such as to deliver the ego from science and society, which had conspired against it. Such a resistance to reality on the part of the self is to be explained in the light of that inner feeling of superiority which the ego enjoys as long as it remains in the world of appearance; when, however, we attempt to relate the self to the remote order of reality in its substantial and ideal aspects, the intuitive egoism of the first stage of things will be found insufficient and impotent. The self can triumph over the world of sense and, in its victorious humanity, enjoy the æsthetical, but the conquest of reality as such places the ego in a very different position, wherein it is not so ready to take up arms against the Real, so that the mood of superabundance becomes a mood of want.

The larger history of human thinking has not been wanting in attempts to express the sense of intuitive participation

in the world that the human mind has ever implied by its strivings and emotions. In the midst of the august utterances which eternalise the *Upanishads*, there is heard a humanistic strain due to the immediate participation of the ego in the world of sense, although with the Vedantist the wistful glance into the misty world of desire is at once averted and the gaze turned to the sun of selfhood. He who sees into the depths of reality knows that, not in the manifold of objective things, but in the unity of selfhood is the secret of being to be found, for the subtle essence of all that exists is not a "That" but a "Thou." Such a self is an object of love as well as of contemplation; in it the devotee awakens to the love of persons and castes, worlds and gods; through it he enters the world of persons, the world of perfumes, the world of women, the world of song."¹ Yet this touch of the sensuous is soon engulfed in *amor intellectualis* of the heart of true desire, which is as vast as all space. In Plato's idealism there is somewhat of the same taste for truth, while the Greek thinker expresses his idea by a word, the Erotic; upon this he builds his dialectic as a temple built upon music. It is in the praise of Eros that Plato lets Socrates introduce "intuition," as the "comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea."² As an erotic impulse, Eros consists in a longing to participate in truth and beauty, so that the soul is likened to a dove looking upward and fluttering onward in its attempt to reach the ideal.³ This erotic mania of the *Phaedrus* looks backward and in memory seeks to recall its past experience, while the Dæmon of the Symposium gazes forward seeking to secure the ideal as future blessing. Like Sanskrit and Grecian thinkers, St. John combines his doctrine of love with the ideal of truth; thus he declares, "We know, because we love—οἰδᾶμεν ὅτι ἀγαπῶμεν."⁴ Taken together, these intuitive impulses are but naïve attempts to reach reality upon the plane of sense and feeling; their genuineness we cannot question, while we may wonder whether they are sufficient.

¹ *Khândogya Upanishad*, viii. 2.

³ *Ib.*, 249.

² *Phaedrus*, 265.

⁴ 1 John iii. 14.

This intuitive apprehension of the world finds its best expression among moderns in the æsthetics of Schiller. Inspired by the idea of immediacy, Schiller made his famous distinction between "naïve" and "sentimental" poetry, whence he was led to express his regret that the modern in his subjectivism had been drawn away from nature and the naïve. Where the naïve poet *is* nature, the sentimental poet merely seeks her,¹ so that there arises an ironical situation in which the alienated poet indulges in satire, where the naïve bard uses the idyll to celebrate his unity with nature.² The æsthetic consciousness of Schiller, filled as it was with the most characteristic in modern culture, inclines him to the natural, although he does not fail to indicate an ideal where the natural should be raised to a harmony with the spiritual in a complete, æsthetic unity.³ Just as Schiller despairs of restoring the unity of the self with nature, the more religious thinker may hesitate to identify the self with the higher order, that of spiritual life; but the culture of humanity seems to indicate that the progress of the self is from the natural onward toward the spiritual, so that where the naïve unity of immediacy is broken, the higher unity with spirit may yet be established.

When the world is portrayed in humanistic fashion, the æsthetic consciousness is quickened, although reason runs the risk of delusion. Hence the romantic, eudæmonistic view of the world as a place fitted for human participation can hardly be credited. Like a painting by Delacroix, such a world-view casts upon the canvas the light and colours of our human desires, for as art itself invades nature, romantic art intrudes upon the world the scenic states of the soul. And yet, is the most appropriate picture of the world an airless, colourless landscape, or the semi-romantic landscape of atmospheric and chromatic qualities, further marked by human values? In our native distrust of the self with its interests and ideals, we must remember that reality is not of necessity predisposed to the purely physical;

¹ *Werke*, ed. Hempel, vol. xv. p. 492.

² *Ib.*, p. 495.

³ *Ib.*, pp. 492-3.

sheer naturism is as poor an exponent of the real as sheer humanism; the objective is no better than the subjective. Humanity is entitled to the same claim upon the world that nature seeks to establish. Following the example of the primitive philosophers among the Greeks, and heedless of the fact that such philosophy was restated by Socrates and the Sophists, we have assumed that reality has a penchant for nature rather than humanity, and while speculation has been ready to accept the physical atom, it has not shown the same willingness to approve of the human ego.

In his haste to find reality, the naïve thinker has accepted the world in its immediacy, while in his desire to participate in reality and not be left wholly worldless, he has allowed the sensuous to mesh his mind. But flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of reality, so that the ego which finds himself surrounded by and submerged in the world begins to look about for some pathway out of life. Having demanded that reality shall satisfy the heart at the moment that it appeals to the senses, the naïve egoist has to learn that there are other forms of being, as there are other criteria of truth than those which are found in the immediate world-order of phenomenality. How artless it sounds when the ego declares its belief that reality as such must correspond to his perceptions as well as to his desires! Such an ego is but a measuring worm which uses its own body as the standard; he has the wisdom of the ant, which passes from idea to act without a moment's deliberation. While we are working in behalf of the human self, and think philosophy for ever in vain where it does not account for man and justify his strivings, we are not misled by the Protagorean method of measuring the world-whole by the perceptual powers of the individual, which is equivalent to making the world terminate with the landscape. In search of his fate, man is naturally tempted to assume that it is here in the world of appearance human beings have their home; but the progress of dialectics apprises him that reality is by nature remote, while the conditions of participating in it are somewhat more severe than

those of scientific hedonism. That which exists does not appear, and that which appears does not exist.

The rapid reunion of humanity with the world, desired so anxiously by the realist, is fatal to selfhood. In the natural order man gains a footing, but there he does not find his real place, and when our preliminary study of the world as appearance made it possible for us to find a "place" for the ego, it was not assumed that this was anything more than a temporary location, decided upon for the sake of showing that, wherever thought draws a circle around the world it does so by making the self the centre. But as the view of the world cannot conclude with the phenomenal, so the basis of selfhood must be found in something deeper than sense, and the passive joy in nature, knowing nothing of the happiness that comes through overcoming obstacles and solving problems, cannot be regarded as the absolute condition of the self. Where human happiness is taken as one of the tests of truth, it must be remembered that the satisfactions of sense do not exhaust the eudæmonistic possibilities of the self, which finds it possible to enjoy happiness in the exertion of power, while supreme joy comes only when the self is in a purely contemplative attitude. For this reason the fate of humanity does not seem to rest with sense, because sense does not satisfy the self. Hence it becomes necessary to press on to a higher view of the world, where the form of participation, instead of being the passivity of sense, consists of the activity of will.

2. THE ACTIVISTIC APPREHENSION OF THE WORLD

Just as the eudæmonistic desire to participate in the world led to the naïve intuition of reality, as though the world were a "world of perfumes," so the activistic apprehension of things arises as the thinker strives to carry his aims and endeavours over into the imperceptible world of activity. It is quite true that man must not only perceive the world, but none the less must will the world if he is to make it his own; then the only question is whether the

volition of the ego is of sufficient moment to establish the real relation supposed to exist between the self and the universe. There is a metaphysics of morality which assumes the responsibility for existence is discharged when the ego learns how to enjoy pleasure in the world of appearance, just as there is another moral system which insists that man must be free to will, so that he may react upon the world ; but with the latter, as even more thoroughly with the former, the ego finds that, instead of affirming reality in a complete, abiding manner, it is only willing the world part by part, and that in a fashion which can hardly be called disinterested. Having sought a path from *Schein* to *Sein*, the self is now found attempting to advance from *Sollen* to *Sein*, from that which is willed from interest to that which exists through itself. The invasion of reality by the will with its full armour of interests is one of the most interesting spectacles that the history of humanity has concocted. The human self, with the full assurance of Romanticism, assumes that the ego is the thing for which the exterior world exists, and like a dialectical dauphin it awaits the throne.

To conclude that the activistic apprehension of the world is not complete in itself, or satisfactory to the self that proposes it, our dialectic must measure the meaning of human activity at its highest—that is, where this activity assumes the character of world-work. Our dialectic has sought to account for the work of the ego in the world, but it has not inquired concerning what this work involves. Can man as worker enter the real order ; if so, under what conditions, and by means of what kind of work ? Traditional dialectics has thought to adjust itself to this problem by laying emphasis upon the ethical, which has been looked upon as sufficient to bear the burden of the striving will. But if the ethical is required to pay the cost of human existence, it must be organised in such a way as to make resources sufficient ; for the ethics of rectitude and duty, being of a formal if not negativistic character, is in no position to serve as the exponent of human world-work. For this reason we are unwilling to urge the claim that the

ego has a real fate in the world-whole simply because the ego claims a position in the ethical world-order, and the results of Kantian ethics are in themselves sufficient to show how empty such a claim can be. The moralistic view of the self and its work is of value in warning us that the self cannot hope to will the world in any but a disinterested manner, but it does not show us how the positive work of the ego may still be done when the ethical scruple has been exercised.

Human work makes possible the activistic apprehension of the world only as that work is performed in a disinterested fashion. Only empty hands can grasp reality. The attempt to construct an ideal of disinterested work which should have real significance is nothing new in the history of mankind, even though each age must provide a special solution for the problem. Among the Chinese, the Taoists seem to have been distrustful of activity, although their ideal seems to make work consist of naught and all in one. "The Tao in its regular course does nothing for the sake of doing it, and so there is nothing which it does not do," says the sage.¹ Patanjali, the founder of Yoga, approved of work so far as that work was performed in full freedom from attachment; hence he said, "That extreme non-attachment, giving up even the (tamas, rajas, sattva) qualities themselves, shows the real nature of Purusha"² The attempt to fuse the philosophy of Yoga with the Sankya in one grand whole of Vedanta, as this fusion appears in the *Bhagavad Gita*, brought the Sanskrit mind to the place where it was ready to consider work in a more complete sense, as will appear from the following citation: "A man does not attain freedom from action merely by not engaging in action; nor does he attain perfection by mere renunciation. For nobody ever remains for an instant without performing some action; since the qualities of nature constrain everybody not having freewill in the matter to some action. . . . Do you perform prescribed action, for action is better than inaction."³ Such a scheme of action, while it may have about it something of a

¹ *Tao Teh King*, i. 37.

² *Aphorisms*, i. 16.

³ *Op. cit.*, tr. Telang, ch. iii.

mystical, magical nature, does not fail to indicate the necessity and possibility of a totalising deed as the essential thing in all work. It is a theory of action which seeks to account for worklessness upon the basis of work itself, and if the human ego is to make the world its own, it must align an ideal of action far different from the obvious and particularising forms of willing which have long dominated our view of life.

Since the world is a world of activity as well as a world of appearance and reality, it is necessary to use the will and thus affirm the world if man hopes to make it his own. Yet this practice is not without peril, for it tends to reduce the world to something comparable to the work of man, whence it assumes a mediocre character. The danger of metaphysical mediocrity is by no means an imaginary one, and the tendency to make reality accessible to all minds has prevented dialectics from reaping the rarer fruits of its special field. The social and the practical have been over-influential in the development of our world-ideal, so that the intellect has been cheated out of its birthright. The apprehension of the world through work when contrasted with the intelligible form of acquisition is as talent to genius, mediocrity to superiority; as a result of this democratic method, reality has come to be regarded as commonplace. Our own age, with its positivism and pragmatism, has sought to forbid as mystical or æsthete any attempt to intuit the world-order in the light of a Beyond; nevertheless, there have not been wanting attempts to view the world as something superior, even where these impulses have sometimes been too slender to be convincing.

A century of romanticism has had the effect of showing us the possibility of an aristocratic conception of the world; at its inception the intellectual individual was found apart from the world of action, which he sought to enter, while the latter expression of the romantic doctrine, as this appeared in the Decadence, observed the human ego dismayed at the way the world of practice had submerged, and thus as seeking to extricate itself from the toils of the activistic order. There was a time when the man of genius

sought an entrance into the world from which his culture had estranged him; Faust is not contented with his inner life; De Vigny's *Moses* feels solitary in the midst of his power. But now that man has become so socialised, so industrialised, the individual seeks a pathway out of the world. This desire to be exalted above the world of action appears in such decadents as Huysmans and Wilde, whose views of the actual world of work are absurd in the extreme. Nevertheless, the decadent desire to escape the world and to rise above action is promoted by a sound motive, which is that of securing a consistent view of the world as a whole; now activity with its devotion to the particular and immediate seems to defeat this ambition. Moreover, where the decadent, individualistic view is frank in its absurdities, social thought is not so willing to admit that it postulates an impossible condition for humanity, and the revolt of diabolists and æsthetes is only what might have been expected in an age when the ethical, intellectual, and spiritual forms of life were expected to run by machinery.

By means of activity the ego has ruled itself out of the world; its morality has turned against it, and now man cannot be himself without being egoistic. Action is confusing and absorbing; while we are engaged in it, we lose sight of the self and proceed in automatic fashion. Where the activity is conceived ethically, it exists at the expense of thought; where it assumes a social form, it wars upon the individual. When, therefore, one seeks to apprehend the world by means of the will, he is led to doubt whether the will has the ability to bring the universe to him, and it may be that one can best receive the world by withdrawing from it. If, in fine Aristotelian fashion, we were able to transform our energy into energy of contemplation, the activistic apprehension of the world would not be the problem it is to-day when work seems fatal to a comprehension of the world-whole. Will can make us aware of the content and function of things in particular, and our logic has yet to learn how important is action as a means of knowledge; but will seems unable to grasp the universe in its totality,

while it is lacking in the ability to detach itself from its object. Disinterested willing is by nature impossible, and even where one frees himself from desire he has not cleansed his breast of all interest, so that the world-whole is something beyond his grasp. Our decadent culture, faulty as it is in its logic and ethics, has not failed to show us how difficult it is to grasp the meaning of the world in an age which is voluntaristic and industrial.

Just as action is somewhat disconcerting to him who would grasp the universe, so it is misleading to him in its inner consciousness. When we seek to argue that truth, with all its intellectualistic criteria, is something which satisfies the mind, we hesitate to put our trust in the will, because its activity has the effect of stupefying rather than satisfying the mind. Where the intuitive reunion with the world results in mental blindness due to the excess of sensation and feeling, the activistic apprehension of reality tends to remove the question instead of answering it. Under the influence of activity we forget our anxiety to know the meaning of things, and in our mood of spiritual sufficiency we feel no need of a Beyond. Activism tends to make all spiritual life, whether it be æsthetic or religious, appear exaggerated; for the will has entered into the spirit of immediacy and cannot feel the desire to create anything extra. From such philosophical Philistinism we are now suffering without being aware of our disease. We would not have man exaggerate the meaning of his existence, yet there may be just as much truth in that which his ego creates as in that which it finds immediately before it in the worlds of appearance and activity. Properly conceived, activism should redeem man from his native eudæmonism; but, as a doctrine, activism has reduced all things to the drab and secular, to the practical and social, as if to assert that the world had no room for genius and individuality. Moreover, where activity with the Yoga, with Aristotle, with Goethe, has the ability to grasp the universe, activity in the hands of the present-day thinker is conspicuous for its clumsiness in apprehending the meaning of the world.

3. THE INTELLECTUAL REUNION WITH REALITY

If the intuitive and instinctive forms of apprehending the world seem to fail to give us the real meaning of the ego's relation to the world, we may still turn to the intellect as another possible means of salvation. In examining the nature of the intellect, we are not examining its claim to knowledge, but are questioning its ability to contain and content the human ego. If the intellect can do this, it will be more successful than intuition and volition have been. The question is thus one not of intellect alone, but of intellectual life. Where a voluntarist like Kant would destroy knowledge to make room for activity, the intellectualist may have to destroy activity to make room for thought; such indeed is the meaning of the conflict between the two. But the real state of the case is somewhat different; instead of one spiritual function making war upon another, the world carries on a conquest with all of them, leaving us to wonder which of the three will be able to endure the test. Both sense and activity rejoice in interest, while the intellect alone seems to possess the ability to carry on its operations in the spirit of detachment from the world. But while this disinterestedness on the part of the intellect has its advantages, it seems fatal to the humanity of the ego, which is reduced to mere thought; practical interests and human desires are not destined to inherit the kingdom of being. The plant dies as it flowers, and the self seems called upon to relinquish life at the moment of its own perfection in intellect. Having used thought to kindle the world, is the ego to cast the torch into the flames? When man seeks a place in the sun, does he suffer the fate of Icarus? Idealism seems more threatening than materialism, because the ego can triumph over a view which makes the world so inferior to the self, while it hesitates to affirm its superiority over the intellectual.

Where the self is able to withstand both sensation and volition, it appears to be unable to carry on the same con-

fict with the intellect, for the reason that the intellect is friendly, where the inferior forms of mind are inimical, to interior life. The danger is no longer the danger of opposition, which is healthy and thrilling, but one of absorption, due to the likeness existing between the world and the self. Vedanta found it so, and Buddhism, which laid more emphasis upon the subjective self, developed a more complete ideal of destructive absorption. Perhaps it is wiser and more comfortable for man to indulge in some sort of scepticism which will keep the intellectual world-order at a distance, for the ideal seems fatal to his feelings and activities. Yet there is something about the mystical human spirit which will not allow it to engross itself with immediate impressions and useful activities; the sea of reality allures the human voyageur, the flame attracts the moth. Let the ego play in the world of appearance, let it work at the earth-loom of time and it finds joy; but let it lay aside these simpler tasks for the purpose of finding its place in the sun, and its condition is most pathetic. The ego can draw circles about appearance and activity, but to find the horizon of reality is beyond its power. For this reason man seems fated to suffer from his contact with reality; as the chorus in *Antigone* expresses it, "Nothing that is vast enters into the life of mortals without a curse." This curse of vastness, this threat of the sea of reality, is felt by the self the moment it comes to itself in intellect; having asserted the ego as thinking being, Descartes can only allow the self to be crowded out by the Absolute. The ego cannot contain the real in the way that it contains the phenomenal and causal; under the influence of the ideal it soon becomes "God-intoxicated." The eternal day of the arctic summer burdens him; at last he becomes weary of the sun. Truth is at variance with our human interests, and we are not able to Platonise in such a way as to become the "friends of the ideas"; the dark den seems preferable to the bright day without.

The severity of the real world has not been unnoticed by the human mind, and more than one phase of religion

consists of attempts to discipline the ego for its reunion with the world-whole. In the course of his earth-existence man annexes interests which cannot accompany him into the real order, so that religion has constantly urged him to reduce his existence to essentials, in order that he may suffer no harm from his contact with the real world. In this spirit the ancient Chinese represented the "man of Tao" as one who sought to reduce himself to a kenotic condition, which he accomplished by withdrawing his mind from all externals. Such a theory of conduct was called "returning to the root, as the plant returns from full flowering to its original condition." "This returning to the root," says the sage, "is what we call the state of stillness," while elsewhere he expresses its naïve character by comparing it with the "infant that has not yet smiled."¹ While such a view of the conditions under which man inherits reality may seem too oriental in their passivism, the western world has not refrained from demanding sacrifice on the part of the self that would enter the real world.

Where other thinkers have thought to enter the real world with their interests all intact, Spinoza pursued a relentless rationalism which forbade all feeling save an *amor Dei intellectualis*; nevertheless, the rational appreciation of truth was sufficient to lead Spinoza to a state beyond melancholy and pity, removed from hope and fear, and free from humility and repentance, while it suffered him to declare, "Mirth cannot be excessive."² In the intuitive knowledge of God he found blessedness and repose of spirit, and the highest act of the mind was to him an act of "acquiescence," in the spirit of which he asserted, "He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return."³ Yet man in his humanity is led to wonder whether he can endure the light of the midnight sun and the icy stillness of arctic truth. How costly does truth seem, how fatal to human interests! Less rationalistic and more romantic than the acquiescence of Spinoza is the æsthetic renunciation of Wagner. Having loosed the rein with his Siegfried, fearless

¹ *Táo Teh King*, chs. xii.-xx.

² *Ethica*, iv. 42-54.

³ *Ib.*, v. 19.

and free, Wagner seems to tighten it to the extreme, not only in his Wotan, but more especially in Tristan and Isolde. Where the striving god sought rest, Tristan is even more devoted to Nirvana, while his resignation, instead of being grim and forced, is free and joyful. With a complete transvaluation of dialectical values, the poet seems to indulge in a *Fiat Nox*, in which the soul celebrates its deliverance from light and life. The day is called hateful, while the consciousness that distinguishes one self from another is disclaimed in favour of an impersonal love, while Isolde welcomes absorption in the whirlwind of the All as her highest bliss.¹

It is the self which resists reality, and it is not until one attempts to negate his own being for the sake of the All that he appreciates the power of the egoistic within him. Both Schopenhauer and Wagner affect to find such renunciation joyful, but the true egoist finds it difficult to believe that he is at last called upon to sacrifice the self for which the world seems to exist. Upon the lower stages of reality the phenomenal occupation and activist subjugation of the world are carried out with little difficulty on the part of the self with its inner consciousness and freedom; but the conquest of ultimate reality is a matter far different, especially as the ego cannot command any suitable weapons for its conflict. If the ego is not ready to will its non-being, as the more rigorous dialecticians assume, it must not forget that the ruling mood in the world of reality is not that of superabundance or sufficiency, but that of want. To reality the ego is supposed to submit, unless it is ready to assume the attitude a heaven-storming *θεομάχος*, which continues its warfare to the end. The ego is here instructed by its needs—a situation quite intelligible to philosophy of religion. The “poor in spirit” know something of the Emersonian “sense of want and ignorance by which the soul makes its enormous claim.” The question of want, however, must not be presented in such a way as to reflect upon the dignity of the self, for the self is as great in its mood of want as in its æsthetic mood of superabundance, while the more lofty the

¹ *Op. cit.*, Act. iii. sc. 4.

soul the more profound the sense of need. In our age no one has been more successful than Ernest Hello in portraying in worthy fashion the innermost needs of the superior self, which has more wants than are felt by the non-egoistic man. *Le grand Homme a tous les besoins de l'homme ordinaire et il les sent plus profondément que personne. Puis il a d'autres besoins.*¹ Man is thus exalted not by means of his impressions and actions alone, but also by his wants; when he feels these he is in a superior condition. This view of the dialectical situation tends to place the affair of the self in an altered light, and when we were on the point of relinquishing the self to negation because the self began to feel its implicit sense of need, we were brought to see that the ego may make positive use of its most profound mood. Thus where the intellectual reunion with reality threatened to result fatally to the ego, the latter is able to affirm itself through the superior wants that it exhibits.

4. THE WORLD THE PLACE OF TRUTH

As the place of the ego in the world is made known through happiness, as the work of the self is assured by means of the sense of worth, so the fate of the individual is secured through truth. In the same manner, where Decadence tends to taint the enjoyment of existence, while pessimism seeks to neutralise the work of the self, so the attempt to save one's self by truth encounters a scepticism which is both spiritual and social. It is to be expected that the self should find joy in the world, that the will should have a place for work, so it is natural to believe that the world should be the place of truth. In the elaboration of the individual's selfhood, it was found expedient to emphasize the importance of the intellectual, whence the ego became a *cogito*; now, when we seek the fate of the self in the world, it is natural to turn to the intellect as to that which can assure us of the ego's fate. Other and more general conceptions of human fate have found expression in

¹ *Le Siècle*, x. p. 75.

this final part of our work, but they find their most definite expression in the idea of truth.

When we impose upon intellectualism the extra burden of supporting the fate of the ego, it might seem as though we were making the task of knowledge a more difficult one, yet the contrary is really the case. Intellectualism has long suffered from a lack of metaphysical and moral responsibility, and in its false freedom has been led to content itself with the mere knowledge of ideas; indeed, intellectualism has been more intent upon the question of thought than the problem of knowledge. The result of this, as it worked itself out in the nineteenth century, was to perfect the principle of selfhood in thought, but such selfhood was unable to stand alone, the individual was unable to be himself in himself. When, therefore, we attempt to relate the self to the world, we impose a new task upon the intellect, whence it is able to evoke new powers, expand its sway, and enrich its content. Idealism has stood in its own light; just as the desire for joy led to a decadent æstheticism, just as the wish to perform worthy work ended in pessimism, so the longing to know the world as a world of thought brought idealism to scepticism.

The difficulty with idealism lay in the fact that idealism sought to carry on its search for truth outside of the world in which the mind had its origin, so that knowledge, instead of being an acquaintance with the world, was only a knowledge of the world as of something alien to the mind. Idealism falsely assumed that knowledge might first perfect itself within the mind, and then go forth to discover the world as something extra-mental in its character. Intellectualism, with its desire to discover the fate of the self in the world, makes assumptions far different; instead of considering the intellect as something which has its place without the world, intellectualism insists that the location of the mind is within the world of things, while the mind itself, instead of being a merely mental function, consists of an intellectual life. Thus conceived and thus constituted, the intellect is able to do more than simply reflect the world; the intellect

has the power and the opportunity to achieve something of supreme significance for the self; the intellect is in a position to assure the self of its fate in the world.

The assurance of a world-fate is accomplished, not by the intellect's furnishing the mind with the consciousness of something extraordinary whereby the fact of fate is made manifest, but is brought about by the fact of knowledge itself. Human fate is no miraculous acquisition, but consists in the realisation of the intellectual destiny of the self. To idealism, knowledge is only a knowing; to intellectualism, knowledge is the achieving of fate, which apart from knowledge were without meaning. The ego may find its place by means of the exercise of that superabundance of spiritual life which brings genuine joy; it assures itself of its work in the mood of sufficiency whence springs the sense of worth; but it achieves its fate through the mood of want in which true knowledge arises. Knowing is thus more than a disinterested awareness; it consists in the possession of the world as the ego's own.

In order to possess the world, it becomes necessary to conceive of knowledge as something which establishes a necessary relation between the ego and the exterior order. The endeavour to unite the interior and the outer, so that the ego may determine its fate in the world, involves a theory of knowledge in which both idealism and realism are transcended. Idealism may have the power to show us how real is the self, realism may be able to do as much for the exterior world, but to establish the reality of the self within the world involves a broader and deeper conception of the knowing relation. The essential element in knowledge is thus more cultural than dialectical, for knowledge is expressed and exercised by the self, not for the sake of discovering the world, but with the purpose of realising the self within the world. If realism is right in assuming that, so uninfluential is the knowing-process when thought seeks to explain the nature of that which exists, if perception and conception add nothing to reality as such, it may be pointed out that such realism is guilty of restricting "reality" to

the exterior order, while our examination of the world-whole has shown us that the full reality is both interior and exterior, that it involves both selfhood and worldhood. Furthermore, the realistic intuition of the world not only ignores the existence of the self, but it shuns the responsibility of finding the place in the world where the self is called upon to achieve its destiny, so that the attitude of man toward his own life becomes a sceptical one.

The presence of scepticism in our life and thought should arouse us to the necessity of assuring our minds that the human ego has a vocation in the world. It might seem that the question of doubt were purely academical, but contemporary culture warns us that we are confronted by a social scepticism under whose influence men have been led to despair of their essential existence in the world of humanity. The clearest expression of this social scepticism appears in the socialistic revolt of the nineteenth century, where the populace, awakening to the fact that industry and wealth had been taken out of its hands, began to suspect that at the same time it had been deprived of human life as such. To say that the Proletariat has no property is a serious economic statement, but it is not unaccompanied by the more serious thought that the Proletariat has no world; both wealth and reality have been torn from it. It was in this socially sceptical spirit that Gorky led the locksmith in *Night Refuge* to say, "Where is truth? What is it to me—this truth? Why should we have truth?"¹ Is there any deeper sorrow into which mankind has been plunged than this of scepticism? And is not this scepticism, far from being a purely intellectual matter, a humanistic predicament due to social causes, all of which centre in the idea that humanity has lost its clue to the fate of the self in the world?

For the proper treatment of the problem of social scepticism, nothing would seem more necessary than a philosophic which has the power and the courage to construe the world as the place of truths, the place of ideals, for both truths and ideals have been taken from mankind. It is not

¹ *Op. cit.*, Act iii.

only the atheism of Marx's socialism which reveals this plight of the self, but the whole social situation presents a picture of perplexed individuals who seem to be seeking a place in the earth when in reality they are seeking a place in the sun. As a result, knowledge, which has been looked upon as a luxury, is to be regarded as a necessity, as the one thing needful for human salvation. Man cannot afford to doubt, for it is the effect of scepticism to tear life from him, to rob him of his fate, and leave him without a place in the world. Sense seeks joy in reality, will looks for world-work, intellect demands world-fate. This world-fate, which might seem to depend upon such inferior things as wealth, power, and the like, is now seen to depend upon knowledge, and when the self seeks its fate in the world, it is led to see that the world is the place of truth.

5. REALITY AND SELF-RELINQUISHMENT

Having observed how the mood of want enables the self to meet reality in a secure and worthy fashion, we are now ready to see how the fortunes of the self are so unified with those of the world that the relinquishment of the ego tends to rob reality of its true meaning. Here the conflict is that between the dialectics of optimism and pessimism. Happiness comes when an obstacle has been overcome; there is happiness in the world of sense when the art triumphs over nature, just as there is joy in the activistic order when the will rises above causality; but in the real world the sense of satisfaction is destined to come in some other manner. Upon the plane of the phenomenal man becomes happy, not through the acquisition of pleasure, but by means of his ability to derive value from the world. Man has not been the happy one, but he has become a *valeur*, so that the world of sense can bring no charge against him. This test of inner realisation, distinct as it is from that of the joy of living, has a dialectical significance, for it shows us that the ego has succeeded in finding his place in the world. On the side of activity it need not be asked whether

the self has done its duty in the world, but whether it has conducted itself in a worthy manner, for as the true standard of excellence in the world of sense is that of value, the criterion in the active order is that of dignity. The self has shown its ability to carry on world-work, so that we dare not doubt its inner dignity, nor question its spiritual success in the world. Such considerations, based upon the ideas of value and dignity, incline us to turn away from the pessimistic view, which looks upon spiritual life as having suffered defeat in the world.

The fundamental questions of life now appear in an altered form. No longer do we ask, Has man been happy? Has man done his duty? Has he solved the riddle of the universe? We see that the place of the ego within the world involves other considerations. Those which relate to value and dignity have already been met. On the third stage of reality, the question is not one of mere understanding, for the ideal of pure cognition is as vain as the idea of pure being; in the larger sense, it is the question of intellectual life. Can man live the life of the world as a whole? The question is more a cultural than an epistemological one, it requires the ego to be real and not representative only. To come to an understanding with the universe is far more important than to arrive at a solution of some of its special problems, and where the metaphysical problem consists in adjusting the self to the world, rather than in understanding the salient forms of the world apart from the self, the problem becomes a living one. We are called upon to inquire concerning what the world has in store for us; were our problem purely cosmic, and we had but to learn how the world is constituted and how it conducts itself, the question before us would not be such a serious one; but we are expected to discover how the world intends to treat the human self.

To be one's self and to accept one's fate in the world is the supreme test for man's mental and moral courage; no wonder is it that the mind resorts to sceptical subterfuges to avoid meeting the fundamental question of his existence.

The dialectics of disillusion brings us to the place where we are expected to relinquish life the moment we have idealised it, and where one, reasoning after the manner of the Cartesian dialectic, would expect the "I think" to guarantee the "I am," he is almost persuaded to believe that Geulincx was right when he said, *Nosce te ipsum, et relinque te ipsum*.¹ And yet the fortunes of the world are not so different from those of the ego that the latter can withdraw without marring the plan of the whole system of things, for any diminution of the inner order is sure to be followed by a dwindling of the outer one as well. Examples of this double depreciation are to be found in the dialectical decadence of antiquity, when the sceptre of classicism was departing. In such a melancholy mood, Horace wrote his famous ode beginning, *Nil admirari prope res est una*, while Seneca re-echoes this apathetic sentiment with his *Sine admiratione*,² and Marcus Aurelius resolves not to wonder at anything.³ Such cynicism has the effect of negating the reality of the world as well as that of the self, for it leaves the place of selfhood vacant, its work undone. Such is the condition of culture under the auspices of Russian renunciation, as revealed by Von Vizin, Zhuhovsky, Gogol, and Tolstoi. The attitude of the ego is not necessarily one of self-assertion, and the example of our modern renunciationists is sufficient to show how easy it is for the ego to turn its weapons against itself. But in all this the peculiar power of the self is displayed, for it is only by means of the ego that the ego can be negated; hence the fate of the ego lies in its own hands.

The grand result of the inquiry into the fate of the ego in the world is not the idea that the self should withdraw from the world in any pessimistic fashion, but rather that the self should develop a sense of its inherent worldhood, whereby it becomes worthy of existing as a real being. This can be accomplished upon none other than the intellectualistic basis, for both sense and volition lack the largesse and

¹ *Ethica Annotata*, I. cap. ii. sec. 2, § 11.

² *De Vita Beata*, iii. 3.

³ *Med.* i. 15.

superiority requisite for such an ontological undertaking. This view of the intellectual worldhood of the self tends to cure the malady of renunciation that we find in some significant phases of our modern culture, as these have come up for review. If the condition of the self were the *nescio* spoken of by Geulincx, it were indeed difficult to offset the *relinquo* with which he concluded ; but since our examination of the ego's position in the world leads us to believe that the self has come to an understanding with the world, we are not necessitated to adopt the pessimistic postulate. The life of the self *in intellectu* may not be as perfect or as satisfactory as the self may desire, yet it cannot be doubted that it represents man at his best, just as it provides for him the most perfect degree of happiness he is destined to enjoy. Most of our pessimism is due to dissatisfaction with the life of immediacy, for the self is unable to enjoy life in such a way as to make it appear valuable. In the same manner our nihilism is due to our defeated activism, when we realise that the human will is unable to effect that which we believe to be the real meaning of life. Thus, unable to enjoy or to effect the significance of reality, the non-intellectualistic condition of the self is pathetic to a degree that the practical thinker does not realise.

The intellect has been the most successful of the three in advancing the claims of the self in the world ; true, it has not been without its pessimism, but it has never wholly despaired of apprehending the meaning of the world. The ancient contradiction of things in their promiscuous existence is thus reduced to order by the intellect, which is not less effective in satisfying the anxious self. It is because philosophy has employed intellect in its purely critical and rationalistic sense that it has not found that convincing peace which the intellect as a life can bestow ; by means of the intellect, the ego rises to the peaks where this peace is to be found. By adopting the intellectualistic method, the ego is able to unite with reality in such a way as to assure the achievement of its own destiny, so that by one and the same act of thought the self avoids *contemptus sui* and *nil*

admirari. In place of the renunciation that threatened the self, the latter is able to employ thought to realise itself; this is not accomplished after the manner of Cartesian rationalism, which considers thought in its purely representative character, but in a creative fashion, which assigns a definite and worthy task to the intellect. The sense of want, so far removed from the sense of sufficiency in which philosophical Philistinism rejoices, assumes the character of artistic creativeness recognised in a naïve manner as the mood of superabundance. It provides for a renunciation which does not relinquish reality, but which renounces all else except reality.

6. THE REDEMPTION OF THE SELF THROUGH REALITY

The endeavour to relate the ego to the world, which has been considered both æsthetically and ethically, cannot satisfy itself until it has questioned the world with regard to its fate; to the world-whole in its real-ideal character the self looks for redemption. From the standpoint of need, reality assumes the character of the indispensable, for while the self is more than sufficient to the demands of the sensuous order, while it is equal to the exigencies of the activistic world, it finds that reality as such is something beyond its power to resist. From the ego's final relation to the world we are able to infer concerning the nature of the things; hence we conclude that reality is that which cannot be resisted. With Platonism, reality is that which is necessary to thought; with Anselm, the God who exists *in re* and not *in intellectu solo* is that which the mind must postulate as the most perfect; with Spinoza, substance is not only self-existent but intellectually imperative, inasmuch as it demands "acquiescence" from the mind. In the present dialectic, which finds its centre in the relation of the inner ego to the outer world, the real is that which this ego encounters as the insurmountable, the irresistible. Where another system may consider the real as that which

impresses itself upon the senses, where another may find the real in that which constrains the will in the form of determinism, the present system finds it expedient to measure the meaning of reality by means of the self in its totality.

Reality as the irresistible appeals to the intellect, which can assent to the real with a grace unknown to the will. The inferior forms of reality are met and overcome by the ego, whose value and dignity consist in resisting the power of the world. By means of art, the self penetrates the world of sense and ends its invasion by becoming conqueror. Through the influence of ethics, the self opposes its being to the forces of nature, even to the extremes of negation. But the ego cannot contend against reason in the way that it has opposed sense and will, so that the final attitude of the self toward the world is destined to be different from its earlier ones. From being the ruler it has become the subject, and its problem now consists in finding the most appropriate means of adjusting itself to the inevitable reality. In coming to the conclusion that the self is destined to submit, we are not unaware of the danger of passivism and Nirvanism, nor are we without admiration for that Fichtean, Nietzschean effort toward complete self-assertion; nevertheless, we cannot believe that the ego's native attitude of opposition can be assumed in the face of the final view of reality. Oriental passivism, which has in these recent centuries invaded our blood, Russian renunciation produced by an inherent sense of the resultlessness of all things, as well as by Siberian severity, and German pessimism, which brings the thought nearer home, incline us to surrender the self and let the world take its own course.

The ego cannot wish to combat reality, as if to say, *Je combats l'universelle arraignée*; for nothing can well be more unreal than the attitude of such a mad warrior, the Θεομάχος of the New Testament. At the same time, the self-despection of Geulincx, with its *nihil valeo, nihil volo, despectio sui*, is almost as fatal. Where Spinoza and Wagner postulate a joyous welcome for the world-whole on the part of the ego, the average thinker will experience less

exultation, while he will stand in need of more courage and faith. There can be no doubt that reality demands of us deep disinterestedness, and our earlier, human attempts at self-knowledge and the will to selfhood fall short of the supreme affirmation that we are expected to make when we consent to reality. For this supreme act of assent our culture has long been preparing us; culture has taught us to live lightly, as though the world of things was to be touched at a tangent, while progress in the intellectual life has ever been a movement away from the world of immediacy.

In this detachment of the soul from the world, with the accompanying sense of disinterestedness, we see the fundamental principles of human redemption. The redemption of man from the immediate world is brought about by a superior form of spiritual activity by the ego itself. The ego must be saved, but it must save itself; in redeeming itself, the ego makes use of its most characteristic functions. In Yoga the disciple finds the real of Krishna by means of his most superior powers, "for a man performing action without attachment attains the Supreme."¹ By such means the self escapes the destructive effects of asserting the ego in sense and through will, and when it encounters the Christian maxim, "He that wills his life—ὁς γὰρ ἐὰν θέλῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν—shall lose it," it feels as though the self as disinterested thought had already saved itself. At the same time, this startling text is not without the suggestion that salvation lies in the hands of the self, for it completes its statement by declaring that he who loses his life shall save it—ὁς ἀπολέσει τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῷ σώσει αὐτήν.² To be one's self is to save one's self, for the process of slaying the self is carried on, not for the sake of destroying the inner life, but rather with the idea of realising it.

Through disinterested insight into the nature of reality and the appreciation of its meaning, the ego is able to effect its salvation from the lower orders of being; to look for redemption elsewhere is to court the In-vain. Reality, as our dialectic has investigated it, reveals its nature in both

¹ *Bhagavad Gita*, tr. Telang, Ch. iii.

² Mark viii. 35.

an inner and an outer form ; its existence *in extenso* is the world, its existence *in intenso* is the self. Man knows himself to the degree that he knows the world ; he solves the problem of the world as he solves the problem of the self. Here is the world of sense and there a place for the conscious self ; here the world of activity, there a world-work for the ego ; here, finally, a world of reality by participation in which the self is redeemed. The redemption of the self is due to its recognition of and reunion with reality. The sublime isolation experienced by the self at its highest is akin to the isolation of the world ; both are "powerful and alone." Only this redemptive reunion with the world-whole can appeal to the self as of supreme value, for the eudæmonism of the phenomenal order and the contentedness which comes from the world of work fall far short of the peace the self as self is destined to enjoy.

The self is thus redeemed by its final relation to reality, which possesses an identity of which its own personal self is the prototype ; the "That" is the "Thou." Dialectical systems seldom seek to establish any living connection between the self and its essential thoughts, but in the spirit of realism or rationalism it makes of the world nothing but the satisfaction of certain cognitive functions, whether perceptual or conceptual. Intellectualism, a doctrine which bases itself upon the inner life of the self, looks to the real world to exercise some effect upon the contemplative self, which surveys it with just emotions, and reacts upon it with reasonable volitions. The self thus expects something from the world-whole, whose being is not confined to the category of existence, but extends to the realm of value. The self looks to the world for redemption. Since the world affords man the opportunity to redeem himself, it must be assumed that the world is interested in him, as Plato's disciples were friends of the ideas. One is privileged to question whether the world is sufficiently romantic to regard man as the one for whom it is supposed to exist, but such an objector must remember this idea of a real relation between the self and the world is supposed to obtain only as the one is considered

in the highest degree of its extensivity, while the other is viewed in the moment of its greatest intensity. View the world as appearance, and the ego is lost in the desert ; consider it a system of causality, and the self is submerged in the sea ; but view it as a real world-whole, and the unified ego finds itself at home in being. The world as a substantial order is not at all unlike the self, which loses its hold upon it only when it is viewed in the form of a manifold.

However extraordinary it may seem when we endeavour to relate the self and the world in this living fashion, according to which the world redeems the self, nothing else can be done, when one seeks to pursue philosophy to the end. All exalted philosophies imply nothing else than this reunion of the self with its own world. Did not Plato declare that there must be a real order of ideas if the mind was to think truth ? Did not Kant demand a universal and necessary causal connection among ideas if there was to be knowledge within the mind ? Only the world as a whole can satisfy the self, and to that world-whole it looks for its redemption. To attribute the cosmic to the ego, a philosophy must have found something epic in that ego ; and when it has found in the ego the true self, it need not hesitate to view the self from the standpoint of the world. Reality has something human about it, and, like Gothic architecture, it may be called *enorme et delicate*, and as the strong striving of the Gothic is responsible for the delicacy of its forms, it is possible also to think of the world struggling with the soul's redemption, as indeed the apostle assures us it is groaning with the soul's salvation—*πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις συνστένάζει*. By such means the self becomes a partaker of the real world, whereby it is saved. It finds in reality that which is irresistible and insurmountable, forbidding that it should be overcome, and leaving nothing more to be desired.

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