Edward B. Walworth.

Theological Seminary.

Auburn.

Cayuga Co.

N. York

ELEMENTARY

PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION,

TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN OF

J. A. ERNESTI,

AND

ACCOMPANIED BY NOTES, WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM MORUS, BECK, KEIL, AND HENDERSON.

BY MOSES STUART,
Associate Prof. of Sac. Lit. in Theol. Seminary, Andover.

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PREFACE

TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

The public, although indulgent in respect to this work, are not prepared to receive another apology for the want of some emendation. The simple truth is, that the intelligence respecting the exhausted state of the last edition came upon me altogether unexpectedly; and came upon me, also, when so connected with other engagements (if not more important at least more imperious), as to render it absolutely impossible for me to undertake a remodelling of this treatise. All I could do, or have done, was simply to correct the press while a reprint was made.

I might justify myself, perhaps, in the view of the public, were I to state what my engagements are. But I must merely cast myself on their indulgence, not deeming it proper to bring my private pursuits before them, in the preface to this little work.

Some account of the manner in which this book is made up, will be proper for the sake of those who may desire to read it. Such an one I shall now subjoin.

The edition of Ernesti from which I have made the present translation, is that published by Dr. Ammon at Leipsic, in 1809. Of his notes I have made but little use. Some of them are so thoroughly *neological*, that I could not in conscience adopt them. My principal reason however for omitting his notes, is, that I found a much better commentator on Ernesti, to whom I profess myself to be greatly indebted. I refer to Morus; whose *Hermeneutica* is a system of lectures

on interpretation, of which Ernesti's *Institutio* is the basis or text-book. The work of Morus I prize so highly, that I have, at the close of almost every section of Ernesti, referred to the corresponding part in his commentator. *The notes which I have added to the work, contain, for the most part, a summary of what Morus has said.* For the fidelity of this summary, and for the matter of some of the notes, specially of the longer ones, I am responsible. The notes are distinguished from the text, by being printed in smaller type. Any more distinction was thought unnecessary.

Morus is an author too copious for republication in our country, but may easily be imported. The student cannot fail to read him with great profit. The Latin is uncommonly easy; and, if I may judge from my own feelings, very pure and classical. I would earnestly recommend it to every student, to compare Morus with Ernesti, in all the places where reference in the following work is made to him.

The works of Keil, Beck, and Seiler, to which reference is made at the head of most of the chapters, are useful *manuals* of the science of interpretation, and can be procured at a very moderate expense. In point of arrangement, and in the exclusion of matter which does not belong to the proper province of Hermeneutics, they have some advantage over Ernesti. I believe, however, that Ernesti has exhibited the essential part of the science in question more fundamentally, and in a more convincing and instructive way, than either of these authors. Still, as they are more recent, and have been much used by those who study interpretation, I thought it might be acceptable to refer to them.

Other books are occasionally referred to, but not often, with the exception of Morus. It would have been easy to add a multitude of references to books, on every subject, and every ramification of each subject, throughout the work. But I am not persuaded of the utility of this method for beginners,

The mind is overwhelmed with the endless task, which the reading of so many writers would occasion. There may be a show of learning in a writer, who makes his references so copious; but the real profit to the student is comparatively small. A reference to a few of the best books, is of more importance than to accumulate an undistinguished mass, which presents a mere catalogue of what has been published. Beck is not free from this fault; and even Keil has not made his "select literature" sufficiently select.

To the *third* division of this work, which treats of translating from one language into another, I have added the greater part of an excellent dissertation of Morus, which comprises this topic. In order to do this, I have omitted a part of the chapter in Ernesti, pertaining to this subject; as I thought it far less useful than what is inserted from Morus.

Part *fourth* contains a summary of the laws of criticism, which are to regulate the judgment of those who form opinions about the genuine text of the Scriptures. Exceptions might be made to some of these laws; but I have not thought them of sufficient importance to be urged here, where every thing is designed to be a mere summary of general maxims. Beck has given a more *brief* view of the subject of criticism, than I have been able elsewhere to find; and the biblical student should not be altogether ignorant of it, as cases of controversy may arise about the text, where ignorance of this nature would subject him to serious disadvantages.

Part *fifth* consists of a chapter from Keil, on the *Qualifications of an Interpreter*. It is so much more brief and comprehensive than the corresponding chapter in Ernesti, that I could not hesitate to prefer it. A list of some of the best books, on the topics to which the chapter adverts, will be found at the close of the respective sections.

Part *sixth* contains an extract from the London edition of this work, which extract exhibits the sentiments of Dr. Hen-

derson, the editor of that edition, respecting the *moral qualifications* of young men who enter on studies appropriate to the sacred office. The readers of this little volume will prize it the more in consequence of its exhibiting the views of one who is justly regarded with great respect and much esteem, by those who have the privilege of any acquaintance with him.

The *Index* or table of *Contents* to the present edition, is, after the example of Dr. Henderson, made much fuller and more particular than in the first and second American editions. Indeed it is throughout almost an exact copy of his.

In regard to the *translation* itself I have only to remark, that I have made what may be called a *free* translation. I have supplied some links necessary for easy transition, and also for the sake of perspicuity. I have frequently broken up sections, and even sentences, for the same purpose. I have also numbered the sections *continuously*, for the sake of easy reference. But I have not, in any case, designedly changed the *sentiment* of Ernesti. My great object has been, so to present his treatise in English as to make it most perspicuous and useful to the English reader.

At the commencement of each section of the text I have placed a very brief notice of the contents; which, for convenience to the reader in finding easily any subject after which he is seeking, has been printed in Italics. *These summaries belong not to the original work; I am responsible for them.*

If the manual shall prove to be intelligible and useful to the student, who is entering upon the regular study of the Sacred Records, my wishes and highest expectations will be gratified.

M. STUART.

Andover, Theol. Seminary, Nov. 1841.

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CHAPTER I.

ON THE MORAL QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER OF SCRIPTURE.

INTRODUCTION.

OF INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL.

[With this introductory chapter, may be compared Keil, Hermeneutica, pp. 1—14. Beck, Monogramm. Herm. pp. 1—22. Seiler, Hermeneutik, §§ 9—11.]

§ 1. *Necessity and utility of it.* The interpretation of the sacred books is the highest and most difficult task of the theologian. This may be shown from the nature of the case, from experience, and also from the consent of all enlightened periods. All solid knowledge and judicious defence of divine truth, must originate from a right understanding and accurate interpretation of the Scriptures. The purity of the Christian religion has shone brighter or been obscured, in proportion as the study of sacred interpretation has flourished or decayed.

Finally, those have always been reckoned as the most distinguished theologians, who have excelled in this kind of learning. (Compare Morus, Hermeneutica, p. 3. I.)

As Christian doctrine is preserved only in *written* records, the interpretation of these is absolutely *essential* to a knowledge of it; and unless we know what Christianity is, we can neither maintain its purity nor defend its principles to the best advantage.

§ 2. *Difficulties attending interpretation.* The science of interpretation in general is difficult; because it requires much learning, judgment, and diligence. Not unfrequently a peculiar adaptedness of talent, or a more than usual degree of understanding, is requisite to manage an exegetical inquiry with success. But the interpretation of the sacred books is, from various causes (*a*), still more difficult; as the general consent

of the learned and the wonderful paucity (*b*) of good interpreters fully evince. (Morus, p. 4. II.)

(*a*) These causes are, their antiquity; the peculiar dialect of the Scriptures, which greatly differs from that of the western languages; the manners, customs, education, style, modes of thinking and expression, situation, government, climate, etc., of the authors, in many respects so very dissimilar to ours; the fewness of the books written in the Scriptural dialect; and the want of commentators and lexicographers to whom the language was *vernacular*. To these causes may be added, the authority and influence which many erroneous commentaries of distinguished men have had over the Christian world.

(*b*) The paucity of *good* interpreters, who, unbiassed by party sentiments, have pursued the interpretation of the Scriptures in a simple philological manner, and been consistent throughout in the application of principles purely exegetical, is much greater than any one will be disposed to believe, until experience acquired by consulting commentaries shall have convinced him.

§ 3. *Definitions.* The art of interpretation, is the art of teaching what is the meaning of another's language; or that skill, which enables us to attach to another's language the same meaning that the author himself attached to it. (Morus, p. 6. III.)

It is better to define interpretation as an *act* than as an *art*. To *interpret* a passage, is *to shew* or *declare the sense of it*, or simply *to explain the meaning*, i. e. the meaning which the author himself of the passage attached to it. Any other meaning than this can never be called, with propriety, the *meaning* of the *author*.

Interpretation, strictly speaking, may be called *grammatical*, when the meaning of words, phrases, and sentences, is made out from the *usus loquendi* and context; *historical*, when the meaning is illustrated and confirmed by historical arguments, which serve to evince that no other sense can be put upon the passage, whether you regard the nature of the subject, or the genius, manner, and circumstances of the writer.

§ 4. *Requisites of a good interpreter.* The act of interpretation implies two things; viz., (1) A right perception of the meaning of words. (2) A proper explanation of that meaning. Hence a good interpreter must possess *a sound understanding*, and be *skilful in explanation* (*a*). (Morus, p. 8. IV.)

(*a*) The words of Ernesti are *subtilitas intelligendi et explicandi*, a

phrase which would convey a meaning quite foreign to his intention, if literally translated into English, or at most convey his idea very imperfectly. His meaning is, that the interpreter, who exercises an acute understanding or possesses *subtilitas intelligendi*, must demand satisfactory reasons for believing in any particular exegesis, and build his opinion respecting the sense of any passage on such reasons. These reasons must be founded on the *usus loquendi*, the context, the nature of the subject, the design of the writer, etc. An interpretation supported by none of these, cannot be admitted by a sound understanding.

The *subtilitas explicandi*, which I have translated *skill in explanation*, consists generally in the *accuracy* of explanation. To constitute such *accuracy* in its proper sense, a right use must be made of all the means of interpretation, so as to gain precise and definite views of the author's meaning; then every thing should be so defined and expressed by the interpreter as to exclude all ambiguity and uncertainty; and lastly, the whole should be exhibited in the proper order which the nature of language and of logic demands.

§ 5. *Subtilitas intelligendi. An acute understanding* is exhibited in two ways; first, in discerning whether we really understand a passage or not, and provided we do not, in discovering the difficulties that lie in the way of rightly understanding it and the grounds of those difficulties; secondly, in finding out and employing a proper method of investigating the sense of those passages which are difficult. (Morus, p. 10. V.)

§ 6. *Means by which difficulties and their causes are* DETECTED. A good degree of talent or capacity is requisite for this; for men of small capacity frequently assent to things which seem to be taught, without any good reasons for so doing, and often believe themselves to understand what they do not understand. To a good degree of talent must be joined a careful habit of distinguishing ideas of *things* from mere *words* or *sounds* (*a*); for we ought always to inquire, with respect to any word, whether we have a distinct perception of the thing or idea which it is meant to designate, and not to regard merely the sound of the word. (Morus, p. 10. VI.)

(*a*) Specially should this be done where language is employed to de-

signate any thing which is not the object of our senses, but is of an intellectual or metaphysical nature. *Habit* as well as *care* will do much in these cases. TRANSLATING FROM ONE LANGUAGE INTO ANOTHER, IS AN EXCELLENT EXERCISE TO FORM A HABIT OF NICE DISTINCTION; for when we come to express the ideas of an author in another language, we often find that we had only an indefinite perception of them. The employment of teaching, also, is well adapted to promote the same purpose; as is the study of logic, or any science which leads to nice discrimination.

§ 7. *Means of* REMOVING *these difficulties.* The first means is, a just and accurate knowledge of languages (*a*). The next, an acquaintance with the principles of interpretation. Not that no one can interpret at all without a *scientific* knowledge of these principles; but because they assist men of moderate talents, and guide them as it were in the right way, so that they are not left to depend on chance rather than reason. Besides, they are, in this way, supplied with a common rule for judging in controverted cases (*b*). Finally, as in *detecting* difficulties exercise and habit are important, so here they are of so much consequence that all other advantages will be of little use without them. (Morus, p. 12—19. Nos. I. II. III.)

(*a*) An accurate knowledge of *grammatical principles* and of the *usus loquendi* is here intended; for what authority can an interpretation have, which violates rules of grammar and the usages of speech?

(*b*) Precepts for interpretation, well grounded, clearly understood, and judiciously applied, very much facilitate the task of the interpreter, and render the result of his labors more worthy of confidence. He who acts by well established rules is more certain that he acts right, than if he followed his own opinion merely, in all cases of difficulty and doubt. And in controversies of an exegetical or doctrinal nature, to what can the appeal be made, in the ultimate resort, but to the *principles* of interpretation, i. e. the precepts or rules which it prescribes? Nor are these principles useful only to men of *moderate* talents, (as Ernesti would seem to intimate), but to men of the highest talents and best acquisitions. Men may, indeed, learn them by usage in the interpretation of authors, without the scientific study of them; but the latter is the most easy method, and guards most effectually against mistakes.

In addition to these helps for removing difficulties, a knowledge of history, geography, chronology, antiquities, etc., is of high and even of indispensable importance.

§ 8. *Exercises and habits adapted to overcome the difficulties of interpretation.* First, we should attend the instructions of a good interpreter; next, we should read those works where exegetical knowledge is displayed in the best manner, and reflect much upon them, for in this way we may be led to the imitation of them; and lastly, those books which we desire to interpret must be assiduously and constantly perused. (Morus, p. 19. IV.)

In the two first exercises, example serves both to excite and to guide our efforts. The habit of reading, often and assiduously, the book which we desire to interpret, is of more importance than any, or perhaps than all, other means within our power. Every new perusal will suggest to an intelligent and inquisitive mind many ideas, frequently very important ones, which were not before entertained. This practice cannot, therefore, be too strongly recommended to the student.

§ 9. *Subtilitas explicandi*, i. e. *acuteness* or *skill in explanation.* This is exhibited by expressing the sense of an author, either in words of the same language which are more perspicuous than his, or by translating into another language, and explaining by argument and illustration (*a*). In addition to an accurate knowledge of the language which we translate, *skill in explaining* requires that we should exhibit purity of diction; still preserving, so far as may be, the features of the original, lest the *mode* of reasoning should be obscured, which sometimes depends on the *form* of the words. (Morus, p. 20. VIII.)

(*a*) We explain by *argument*, when we exhibit reasons drawn from the grammar and idiom of the language, the context, and the design of the writer. We *illustrate*, when we cast light upon the meaning of an author, which is borrowed from history, chronology, antiquities, etc. Purity and brevity of style should characterize both these modes of explanation.

§ 10. *Definition of Hermeneutics* (*a*). Hermeneutics is the science which teaches to find, in an accurate and judicious manner, the meaning of an author, and appropriately to explain it to others. (Morus, p. 21. IX.)

(*a*) Modern usage distinguishes between Hermeneutics and Exegesis. *Hermeneutics* is the *theory* or *science* of interpretation; it comprises and exhibits the principles and rules of this art. *Exegesis* is the *practical application* of these rules; the *act* of carrying them into execution. The etymology of these two words would lead to the conclusion, that both are of the same meaning; but *usage* has assigned a different signification to them.

§ 11. *Division of Hermeneutics.* Hermeneutics, considered as the art of finding the sense of words, (so far as it is an art, and is the proper subject of precepts), consists of two parts, viz. the *theoretical* and *preceptive* (*a*). The first comprises general *principles*, in respect to the meaning of words and the various kinds of them. On these principles, the rules of interpretation and the reasons of them are grounded. The second consists of *rules*, which are to guide us in investigating the sense of an author's words. Both of these parts are essential; for on the one hand, principles without any rules deduced from them would be inadequate to guide our philological inquiries; and on the other, *rules* can neither be perspicuous nor well grounded which are not established upon *principles*. (Morus, p. 22. X.)

(*a*) Exegesis differs from the *preceptive* part of Hermeneutics, inasmuch as it is the *act* of carrying the precepts into execution, and not the precepts themselves.

§ 12. *Division of the work.* It may be divided into three parts; the first contains the principles and precepts of Hermeneutics; the second has respect to the making of translations and commentaries; and the third treats of the various kinds of hermeneutical apparatus, and of its proper use in the interpretation of the New Testament.

Of these three parts, the first is translated throughout, and so much of the second as seemed to be particularly useful. The third part is essentially comprised in the first, so far as it properly belongs to the province of Hermeneutics; and therefore may well be dispensed with, in an elementary treatise like this. So far as the third part contains any thing not substantially comprised in the first, it properly belongs to the province of sacred literature, and specially to literary history or *introductions* (as they are called), which are designed to give the student a view in detail of the various authors, books, versions, etc., of the Scriptures.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

[Compare with this chapter, Keil, §§ 5—8. Seiler, §§ 41—46.]

OF THE MEANING OF WORDS.

§ 13. *Design of this chapter.* The design of the following remarks upon the meaning of words, is to exhibit the ground or principles whence all certainty in the interpretation of language arises. If from the nature and use of language certain principles may be clearly deduced, which will serve as a guide to explain it, then, it is evident, the essential part of the theory of Hermeneutics consists of these principles. (Morus, p. 27. I.)

§ 14. *Every word must have some meaning.* To every word there ought to be assigned, and in the Scriptures there is unquestionably assigned, some idea or notion. This we call the *meaning* or *sense* of the word (*a*). (Morus, p. 28. II.)

(*a*) Otherwise words are useless, and have no more signification than the inarticulate sounds of animals.

§ 15. *Definitions.* The *literal* sense of words, is the sense which is so connected with them, that it is first in order, and is spontaneously presented to the mind, as soon as the sound of the word is heard (*a*). The *literal sense* does not differ, among the older and valuable writers, from the *sense of the letter;* although some ignorant persons, in later times, have very erroneously made a distinction. Erasmus and his contemporaries use both phrases promiscuously. *Literal* means the same as the Greek τὸ γεγραμμένον, or the Latin *scriptum:* whence the phrases *scriptum sequi*, and *scriptum interpretari.*

(*a*) The literal sense is the same as the *primitive* or *original* sense; or, at least, it is equivalent to that sense which has usurped the place of the original one; e. g. the *original* sense of the word *tragedy* has long ceased to be current, and the literal sense of this word, now, is that which has taken the place of the original one.

§ 16. *The meaning of words conventional.* Words considered simply as sounds have no meaning; for they are not natural and necessary signs of things, but conventional ones (*a*). Usage or custom has constituted a connection between words and ideas. (Morus, p. 28. III.)

(*a*) Interjections or exclamations may, perhaps, be considered as a kind of exception to this remark. Words also which the Greeks call ὀνοματοπεποιημένα, i. e. words the sounds of which imitate the sense, are also considered by many as an exception. But there is so much of fancy in the construction of these words, and they are so differently formed in different languages, that no solid proof of their being an exception can fairly be made out. Great efforts have been made, in former times, to shew that every syllable and even letter of a word, in the Hebrew language, had a special significancy attached to it. F. M. Helmont published a work entitled *Alphabetum Naturale*, the object of which was to shew, that every different opening of the mouth in order to pronounce different letters, was significant of some idea. To illustrate this, he caused a great number of plates to be engraved, which he inserted in the work; so that his book, as Morus says, is *mira capitum humanorum collectio, quae admodum distorta ora ostendat.* Caspar Neumann, in his *Exodus Linguae Sanctae*, followed much the same path, but with more moderation; and V. E. Loescher, in his *De caussis Ling. Heb.* exhibits the same principles. E. g. in the word אֶרֶץ, א indicates *motion*, he says, ר *eruption*, ץ *violence*. The whole word אֶרֶץ then, signifies *something in which motion bursts forth with violence*. The student may smile at this egregious trifling; but the time has been, when the word of God was explained by leading men in the churches, in connection with such wretched puerilities. (Morus, p. 31. IV.)

§ 17. *The connection between words and ideas now rendered necessary by usage.* Such is the fact, whatever may have been the case at first. This does not mean, however, that a word is susceptible of only one meaning; for usage contradicts this. But from this principle we learn, (1) That neither in using or interpreting a word are we at liberty to affix to it an arbitrary sense (*a*). (2) That the sense of a word cannot be diverse or multifarious, at the same time and in the

same passage or expression (*b*). (Morus, p. 33. V. VI. VII.)

(*a*) The fact that usage has attached any particular meaning to a word, like any other historical fact, is to be proved by adequate testimony. This testimony may be drawn from books in which the word is employed, or from daily use in conversation. But the fact of a particular meaning being attached to a word, when once established, can no more be changed or denied, than any historical event whatever. Of course, an *arbitrary* sense can never, with propriety, be substituted for a *real* one.

(*b*) All men, in their daily conversation and writings, attach but one sense to a word, at the same time and in the same passage; unless they design to speak in enigmas. Of course, it would be in opposition to the universal custom of language, if more than one meaning should be attached to any word of Scripture in such a case. Yet many have often done this. See §§ 21, 22.

§ 18. *Signification of words multiplied in process of time.* Although a word can have but one meaning at the same time and in the same place, usage has gradually assigned many meanings to the same word (*a*), lest words should be indefinitely multiplied, and the difficulty of learning a language become too great. (Morus, p. 39. VIII.)

(*a*) The question then for an interpreter is simply this: Which *one* of the significations that a word has, is connected with its use in any particular instance?

§ 19. *How can the meaning in each case be found?* (1) From the general manner of speaking, i. e. from the common usage. (2) From the proximate words or context. (Morus, p. 41. I. II.)

That is, the usual and obvious meaning is attached to the word, or else one which the context renders necessary. In addition to the aid drawn from these sources, an interpreter may sometimes obtain assistance from the scope or design of the writer, or from history, antiquities, the nature of the subject, etc. (Morus, p. 42. III. IV.)

§ 20. *Ambiguity of words arises from various causes.* (1) From the fault of writers (*a*). (2) From neglect in the construction and necessary connections of words and sentences; proper care not having been taken to guard the reader against uncertainty, and to afford him the best means for finding the true sense (*b*). (3) From the manner in which common

usage often forms language; which, not being guided by philosophy or refined knowledge, is frequently deficient in respect to *accuracy* (*c*). (Morus, p. 44. X. I—V.)

(*a*) When they are ignorant of the rules of writing with accuracy and perspicuity. (*b*) E. g. the answer of the Delphic oracle, *Aio te Romanos vincere posse*, which may be rendered, with equal probability, that the Romans would conquer Pyrrhus, or Pyrrhus the Romans. (*c*) No other proof of this is needed, than what the perusal of a composition by an illiterate person will afford.

Besides the causes of ambiguity above enumerated, we may reckon *ignorance of the usus loquendi*. If the interpreter is not acquainted with this, (and in respect to words which are ἅπαξ λεγόμενα he must of course be ignorant of it in many cases), he is left in doubt, unless the context decides for him. As this is not always the case, there is room here for ambiguity.

§ 21. *Conclusions from what has been said.* From what has already been said, in this chapter, about the use of words, we may discover the ground of all the certainty which attends the interpretation of language (*a*). For there can be no certainty at all in respect to the interpretation of any passage, unless a kind of necessity compels us to affix a particular sense to a word; which sense, as I have said before, must be *one*; and, unless there are special reasons for a tropical meaning, it must be the *literal* sense (*b*). (Morus, p. 47. XI.)

(*a*) If any one should deny that the above principles lead to certainty, when strictly observed, he would deny the possibility of finding the meaning of language with certainty. (*b*) The secondary or figurative sense of words is as often necessary as the literal sense. Many words have even ceased to convey a literal meaning. The obvious sense of a word, therefore, in any particular connection, is the necessary one; and a conviction that the sense in any case is necessary, will be in exact proportion to the degree in which it is felt to be obvious. By *obvious* here, is not meant what is obvious to an illiterate or hasty interpreter; but to one who has learning and good judgment, and makes use of all the proper means of interpretation.

§ 22. *Error of those who assign many meanings to a word, at the same time and in the same place.* Such an opinion is to be rejected; although the practice is very old, as Augustine testifies, Confess. XII. 30, 31. The opinion probably originated from the variety of interpretations given to ambig-

uous passages; several of which appeared probable, and were recommended by a sentiment of reverence towards the authors of them. A principle of this nature, however, must introduce very great uncertainty into exegesis; than which nothing can be more pernicious. (Morus, p. 35. VII.)

§ 23. *Error of those who affirm that the words of Scripture mean all that they possibly can mean.* This sprung from the Rabbinical schools, and passed from them, in early times, to Christians. The transition is very easy from this error to every kind of license in the introduction of allegory, prophecy, and mystery, into every part of the Bible; as the experience of the Jews, the ancient Fathers, the scholastic divines, and the followers of Cocceius, demonstrates.

The Rabbinic maxim is: 'On every point of the Scripture hang suspended mountains of sense.' The Talmud says: 'God so gave the Law to Moses, that a thing can be shewn to be clean and unclean in forty-nine different ways.' Most of the fathers, and a multitude of commentators in later times, were infected with these principles. Little more than a century ago, the celebrated Cocceius of Leyden maintained the sentiment, that all the possible meanings of a word in the Scripture are to be united. By his learning and influence a powerful party was raised up, in the protestant church, in favor of such a principle. The mischiefs resulting from it have not yet ceased to operate.

§ 24. *The sense of words properly considered is not allegorical.* Allegory is rather an *accommodation of the sense of words*, or an accommodation of *things*, to the illustration of some doctrine. Moderately used, and well adapted, it may be of some profit which is entitled to regard. But when resorted to by the unlearned and those of an uncultivated taste, it commonly degenerates into empty and ridiculous trifling. (Comp. Morus, Dissertt. Tom. I. p. 370, etc.)

It is impossible adequately to describe the excesses and absurdities which have been committed in consequence of the allegorizing spirit. From the time of Origen, who converted into allegory the account of the creation of the world, the creation and fall of man, and multitudes of other simple facts related in the Bible, down to the Jesuit, who makes the account of the creation of the greater light to rule the day to mean the Pope, and the creation of the lesser

light and the stars to mean the subjection of kings and princes to the Pope, there have been multitudes in and out of the Catholic church who have pursued the same path. The most sacred doctrines of religion have often been defended and assailed, by arguments of equal validity and of the same nature as the exposition of the Jesuit just mentioned. The spirit which prompts to this may, in some cases, be commendable; but as it is a mere business of fancy, connected with no principles of philology, and supported by no reasons drawn from the nature of language, so it is, for the most part, not only worthless but dangerous. And of what possible use, in the end, can a principle be, which can prove the most important doctrine, either of Judaism or Christianity, as well from the first verse of the first chapter of Chronicles, as from any part of the Bible? Or rather, of what use can the Bible be, if it may be interpreted by such principles?

§ 25. *Properly speaking, there is no typical sense of words.* Types are not *words* but *things*, which God has designated as signs of future events. Nor is any special pains necessary for the interpretation of them. The explanation of them, which the Holy Spirit himself has given, renders them intelligible. Beyond his instructions on this subject, we should be very careful never to proceed. As for those who maintain a typical design in all parts of the Scripture, they certainly display very little judgment or consideration; for they lay open the way for the mere *arbitrary* introduction of types into every part of the Bible. The design of the Holy Spirit, in the mention of this or that thing in the Scriptures, can be understood only so far as he himself has explained it, or afforded obvious grounds of explanation.

If it be asked: How far are we to consider the Old Testament as *typical?* I should answer without any hesitation: Just so much of it is to be regarded as typical, as the New Testament affirms to be so; and NO MORE. The fact, that any thing or event under the Old Testament dispensation was designed to prefigure something under the New, can be known to us only by revelation; and, of course, all that is not designated by divine authority as typical, can never be made so by any authority less than that which guided the writers of the Scriptures.

§ 26. *Danger resulting from the spirit of multiplying allegories and types.* That sentiment, which through imprudence or want of knowledge fell from some of the ancient

Fathers, and was echoed by many of the Romish doctors, viz. that *some passages of Scripture have no literal sense* (*a*), is dangerous beyond description. I presume they meant to affirm this of those passages which they did not understand. Such a sentiment has been recently defended by Wittius on the Proverbs of Solomon; and Thomas Woolston, taking advantage of this, has converted the narrations of our Saviour's miracles into mere allegories (*b*.)

(*a*) By *literal* sense here, Ernesti means a sense not *allegorical* or *mystical;* for to these *literal* is here opposed, and not to *tropical*, as it commonly is. There are a multitude of passages in Scripture, which have only a tropical meaning, and which, nevertheless, are neither *allegorical* nor *mystical*.

(*b*) This shews how dangerous it is, to set the adversaries of religion an example of perverting the interpretation of the Scriptures.

§ 27. *The sense of words depends on the usus loquendi.* This must be the case, because the sense of words is conventional and regulated wholly by usage. Usage then being understood, the sense of words is of course understood.

§ 28. *Usus loquendi determined in a variety of ways.* To determine it respect must be had to time (*a*), religion (*b*), sect, education, common life (*c*), and civil affairs (*e*); all of which have influence on an author's language, and characterize it. For the same word is employed in one sense respecting the things of common life; in another, respecting the things of religion; in another still in the schools of philosophy, and even these are not always agreed in the use of words. (Morus, p. 48. XII—XIII.)

(*a*) The ancient and modern sense of many words differs. (*b*) *Victim*, *sacrifice*, *law*, etc., in the Old Testament, are often employed in a sense which differs from that of the same words in the New Testament. (*c*) Thus to *perceive* in common life is to *feel* or *experience;* in philosophy, *to form an idea in the mind;* among the Academic sect, it means *to know a thing with certainty*, in opposition to mere conjecture. So καθαριστικός, σάρξ, etc., differ in meaning, when employed by a heathen, a Jew, or a Christian. (*e*) The technical and peculiar sense of law-language is too well known to need illustration.

To these causes which operate upon the *usus loquendi*, may be added the *style* of a writer. We must inquire whether he writes

poetry or *prose;* and whether the writer himself is fervid or cool, turgid or dry, accurate and polished or the reverse. Every writer has his own particular *usus loquendi;* and most writers, provincialisms; and every one is influenced by his own peculiar circumstances. What writers can be more unlike, in respect to style, than Isaiah and Jeremiah, Paul and John? An interpreter must make himself thoroughly acquainted with all these various circumstances.

§ 29. *Grammatical and historical sense.* The observance of all these matters belongs in a special manner to grammarians, whose business it is to investigate the sense of words. Hence the *literal* sense is also called the *grammatical; literalis* and *grammaticus* having the same meaning. It is also called the *historic* sense; because, like other matters of fact, it is supported by historic testimony. (Morus, p. 66. XVII. Comp. § 3, note, supra.)

The grammatical sense is made out by aid of the principles of grammar, liberally and philosophically (not technically) considered. The historical sense is that which is built on the grammatical one, but modified by historical circumstances. Interpreters now speak of the true sense of a passage, by calling it the *grammatico-historical* sense; and exegesis, founded on the nature of language, is called *grammatico-historical*. The object in using this compound name is to shew, that both grammatical and historical considerations are employed in making out the sense of a word or passage.

§ 30. *The grammatical sense the only true one.* Those who make one sense *grammatical* and another *logical*, do not comprehend the full meaning of *grammatical sense.* We are not to look, surely, for a sense of words, which varies (in its nature or simply considered as the sense) with every department of learning, or with every diverse object. For if this were the case, words would have as many kinds of senses as objects are multifarious. (Morus, p. 67. XVIII.)

In regard to the term *grammatical*, see the note above. The meaning of Ernesti, in this section, is, that the laws of language are the same, in whatever department of writing or speaking it is employed; i. e. the meaning of a writer is to be investigated by the *usus loquendi*, etc., and not that logic or philosophy can determine what the sense of words must be, in such a way that the sense may be called *logical*, *philosophical*, etc.

But when he says, as in § 29, that the literal and grammatical sense are the same; and in § 30, that the grammatical sense is the *only*

true one; he does not mean by *literal*, that which is opposed to *tropical* (for the tropical meaning in thousands of cases is the grammatical one), but he means by it, the same as the *grammatico-historical sense* above described.

§ 31. *The principles of interpretation are common to sacred and profane writings.* Of course, the Scriptures are to be investigated by the same rules as other books. Those fanatics, therefore, are not to be regarded, who, despising literature and the study of the languages, refer every thing merely to the influence of the Spirit. Not that we doubt the influence of the Spirit; or that men truly pious and desirous of knowing the truth are assisted by him in their researches, specially in those things that pertain to faith and practice. (Morus, p. 69. XIX.)

If the Scriptures be a *revelation* to men, then they are to be read and understood by men. If the same laws of language are not observed in this *revelation* as are common to men, then they have no guide to the right understanding of the Scriptures; and an *interpreter* needs *inspiration* as much as the original writer. It follows, of course, that the Scriptures would be no *revelation* in themselves; nor of any use, except to those who are inspired. But such a book the Scriptures are NOT; and nothing is more evident than that "*when God has spoken to men, he has spoken in the language of men, for he has spoken by men, and for men.*"

§ 32. *Language can be properly interpreted only in a philological way.* Not much unlike these fanatics, and not less hurtful, are those who, from a similar contempt of the languages and from that ignorance of them which breeds contempt, depend in their interpretations rather on *things* than on words (*a*). In this way interpretation becomes uncertain; and truth is made to depend merely on the judgment of men, as soon as we depart from the words, and endeavor to decide upon the sense by the use of means not connected with them. Nor will this mode of exegesis at all avail to convince gainsayers; for they themselves boast of interpreting in like manner by *things*, i. e. either by their own principles and opinions before formed, or by the sentiments of philosophers. Hence arises the abuse of reason, in the interpretation of the Scriptures.

(*a*) The meaning is, that they decide from that knowledge of things which they suppose themselves already to possess, rather than from the words of the author; they decide by what they suppose he ought to mean, rather than by what he says.

§ 33. *Any method of interpretation not philological is fallacious.* Moreover, the method of gathering the sense of words from *things* is altogether deceptive and fallacious; since things are rather to be known from pointing out the sense of words in a proper way. It is by the *words* of the Holy Spirit only that we are led to understand what we ought to think respecting *things*. Said Melancthon very truly: 'The Scripture cannot be understood *theologically*, until it is understood *grammatically*.' Luther also avers, that a *certain* knowledge of the sense of Scripture depends solely on a knowledge of the words.

This section repeats in another form, the idea of the preceding one. In both, Ernesti means to deny the possibility of truly interpreting any book, by other means than those which are *philological*. By *things*, he means the application of our previous views of things to the words of an author, in order to elicit his meaning,—instead of proceeding to our inquiries in the way of grammatico-historical exegesis. Not that our previous knowledge of things can never aid us,—for it often does so; but that this can serve for nothing more than an assistant to our philological efforts, as the following section shews.

§ 34. *The analogy of faith or doctrine not to guide our interpretation.* *Things*, therefore, and *the analogy of faith* or *doctrine* (as they call it), assist an interpreter only so far, that when words are ambiguous, either from variety of signification, from structure, or from any other cause, they may lead us to define the signification of them, or to select some one particular meaning. But here we must take good care, that the considerations which we use for explaining should be deduced from the plain, perspicuous, well-understood language of other passages, and that the words which we are endeavouring to explain do not contradict them. For when we investigate the sense in any other way than by a grammatical method, we effect nothing more than to make out a meaning, which in

itself perhaps is not absurd, but which lies not in the words, and therefore is not the meaning of the writer. (Morus, p. 253. XVI—XIX.)

Very much has been said both for and against *the analogy of faith*, as a rule of interpretation. I may safely add, that on this subject, as well as on many others, very much has been said amiss, for want of proper definitions. What is *the analogy of faith?* It is either simply *scriptural* or *sectarian* By scriptural analogy I mean, that the obvious and incontrovertible sense of clear passages of Scripture affords a rule, by which we may reason *analogically* concerning the meaning of obscure passages; or at least, by which we may shew what obscure passages cannot mean. E. g. God is a spirit, is omniscient, supreme, the creator and governor of all things, etc., are truths so plainly and incontrovertibly taught in the Scriptures, that all the passages which would seem to represent him as material, local, limited in his knowledge or power, etc., are to be interpreted agreeably to analogy with the former truths. The same thing holds true of other doctrines taught in the same perspicuous manner. We explain what is doubtful or obscure, by the application to it of what is plain. This rule is not appropriate to the Scriptures only. It is adopted by all good interpreters of profane authors. It is a rule which common sense prescribes; and is therefore well grounded.

If the question then be asked, whether *scriptural analogy of faith* is a rule of interpretation; the answer must readily be given in the affirmative.

But the analogy of the faith or creed of any *party* of Christians, taken without abatement, cannot be applied as a rule of exegesis, unless it can be assumed that the whole creed of that party is certainly correct. If a Romanist, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, or a Unitarian avers, that the Scriptures are to be construed throughout in accordance with the respective Symbols of each; whom are we to credit? The creed of one party, in some respects, contradicts that of the others. Is the Scripture then to have a *contradictory* exegesis put upon it? If not, the analogy of party-faith cannot be our rule of interpretation.

In the contest about the *analogy of faith* being the guide of interpretation, both parties have usually been in the right in some respects, and in the wrong in others. Comp. Campbell's Gospels, Prelim. Dissert. IV. §§ 13. 14.

§ 35. *The sense of Scripture not arbitrary.* Allowing the above principles to be correct, it is plain that the method of investigating the sense of words in the Scriptures is not more arbitrary than the method used in explaining other books; but equally regulated by laws deduced from the nature of language. Those then act very absurdly, who subject the inter-

pretation of the holy Scriptures to mere human opinion; for example, to the decision of a Roman pontiff, as if this could determine such a matter. (Comp. § 31. Note.)

§ 36. *We must not hastily conclude any sentiment of the Scriptures to be unreasonable.* The meaning, which according to grammatical principles should be assigned to any word of Scripture, is not to be rejected then on account of reasons derived from things or previously conceived opinions; for in this way interpretation would become uncertain. In books merely human, if reason and the nature of the subject are repugnant to the apparent sense of the words, we conclude there must have been either a fault in the writer, or an error in the copyist. In the Scriptures, if any sentiment does not agree with our opinions, we must call to mind the imbecility of human reason and human faculties; we must seek for *conciliation*, and not attempt a correction of the passage without good authority. It is wonderful, that in this matter more reverence should be paid to mere human productions, than to the sacred books.

In ancient authors, when any difficulty occurs, we seek for correction or conciliation; as if they must be rendered *ἀναμάρτητοι, faultless.* But occasion is often taken of carping at the writers of the Scriptures, or of perverting their meaning or the doctrines which they teach.

Nothing can be more appropriate to the present times, than the caution of Ernesti, not to conclude hastily against the reasonableness of scriptural sentiment. Many set the Scriptures at variance with reason, because they do not attain to the real meaning of them. Others decide, independently of the Scriptures, what must be true; and then, whatever is found in the sacred books which thwarts their opinions, they reject as unreasonable. The prudent and pious interpreter will suspend his judgment in cases of difficulty, and investigate with great patience and caution before he decides. Multitudes of passages in sacred writ have been satisfactorily elucidated by critics of this character, which have been given up as *unreasonable* by those of a different character. The time is coming (I cannot doubt it) when *all* the dark places of the Bible will be elucidated, to the satisfaction of intelligent and humble Christians. But how near at

hand that blessed day is, I do not pretend to know. "The Lord hasten it in its time!"

§ 37. *Interpretation should rather be grammatical than doctrinal.* In comparing reasons for the exegesis of particular passages, greater weight should be attributed to *grammatical* than *doctrinal* ones. A thing may be altogether true in doctrine, which yet is not taught by some particular passage. Books of theology exhibit many doctrinal interpretations, consentaneous indeed with Christian principles, but not deduced from the words interpreted; *doctrinally* true, but not *grammatically.*

It is really matter of regret to find, in most of the old and distinguished writers on theology, such a multitube of passages adduced as proof-texts, which, when hermeneutically examined, prove to be in no wise adapted to establish the doctrine in confirmation of which they were cited. It must be acknowledged, that the pleasure of reading many very valuable works of this nature is greatly abated by the study of sacred interpretation, which teaches more correct exegesis. This loss, however, is more than compensated by the deep conviction which springs from the examination of genuine proof passages.

§ 38. *Real contradiction does not exist in the Scriptures.* As the books of Scriptures were written by men divinely inspired, it is evident there can be no real contradiction in them. God is not incapable of seeing what is consistent, and what is contradictory; nor can he forget, when he speaks, what was said on former occasions. If *apparent* contradictions then occur, a proper method of conciliation is to be pointed out; of which, however, I shall say something in another place. (Morus, Vol. II. pp. 1—49.)

§ 39. *Every interpretation should harmonize with the design of the writer, and with the context.* For the very reason that these books are inspired, every interpretation ought to agree with the design of the writer, or harmonize with the context. We admit this principle in the interpretation of profane writers; much more ought we to admit it in respect to

the Scriptures. Mere men, through negligence or want of knowledge, may insert some things that disagree with their principal design ; but not so the Holy Spirit. Hence the certainty of any exegesis is connected with the design and series of the discourse. Rules of caution, however, are important here, as, in its proper place, will be shewn. (Morus, ut supra.)

CHAPTER II.

OF THE KINDS OF WORDS AND THEIR VARIOUS USES.

[With this chapter may be compared, Keil §43, and §§73—84. Beck, pp. 129—131. Seiler §§41—64. Lowth on Hebrew poetry, Lect. V—XII.]

§ 40. *Design of the following chapter.* The former chapter treats of the connection between words and ideas, and deduces from that connection several fundamental principles for the interpretation of language. The present chapter is appropriated to the consideration of words as used in a literal or tropical, emphatic or unemphatic sense. It also treats of words as employed in antithesis ; and of abstract words as employed for concrete ones.

All these things belong to the *nature* of language, as employed to communicate our ideas ; and therefore are properly classed, by Ernesti, among the principles of language, on which the science of Hermeneutics is built. Morus has thrown this chapter into his *preceptive* part, and thus confounded *principle* with *precept*. The rules which grow out of the principles here developed are exhibited in Part II. Chapters V. VI.

§ 41. *Importance of the following considerations.* It is of great importance, in respect to finding the sense of words, to be acquainted with those distinctions which affect the sense, and alter or augment the meaning.

§ 42. *Words proper and tropical.* The first important division or distinction of words, in respect to their meaning, is into *proper* and *tropical*, i. e. literal and figurative, or (better still) primary and secondary. (Compare Morus, p. 260. II.)

A *proper* word is a definite name given to a certain thing; and as such, may be explained by adverting to the *proper names* of persons. A *tropical* word is one used out of its *proper*, i. e. original sense; e. g. *rosy face, snowy skin*, where *rosy* and *snowy* cannot be literally or properly predicated of the skin. The names *trope* and *tropical* come from the Greek word τρόπος, *inversio, conversio*.

Tropes arise, (1) From *similitude;* which may be either real or supposed. E. g. the vine *creeps*. This is called metaphor. (2) From *conjunction;* which is either real or supposed, i. e. believed. Real, where a *part* of a house is put to signify the *whole;* or the container for the thing contained, as to *offer the cup*, viz. to offer what is contained in it, i. e. the wine. Conjunction is supposed, when the cause is put for the effect, and *vice versâ*, e. g. *blushing* for *modesty;* the sign for the thing signified; or the subject for the attribute. From conjunction arises that species of trope which is called *metonymy*.

§ 43. *Words first used in their proper sense.* Originally, words were undoubtedly used in their *proper* sense; for they were invented to indicate *things*, and by these things they might be easily explained without any ambiguity. A small number of words sufficed, at an early period; because there were, in the age of simplicity, but few objects about which speech could be employed. (Morus, p. 262. III.)

What Ernesti says, here and in the following section, about the *mode* of forming tropical language *may be* true; but there are no facts to support it. On the contrary, the most rude and barbarous languages abound most of all in words used figuratively. As we can trace no language back to its original, it is clear that the propositions advanced by Ernesti are incapable of direct proof; and analogy, so far as we can go back, is against him. Nothing can be more destitute of proof, than a great part of the speculations of philosophizing grammarians about the *original state* of language. One tells us that the language of barbarians has but few words, and very few varieties in declension; another, that they are filled with ὀνοματοποιημένα; another, that the roots of all words are verbs; another, that they are nouns; another, that all the original words are monosyllabic, etc. Some of these things may be true of some languages; but what can all such speculators say, when they come to know the state of language, for example, among our Aborigines? A state which puts at defiance all their theories; for in minutiae of declension some of them surpass the Greek or even the multiform Arabic; and in most re-

spects they differ widely from that state, which the above theory would teach us to be the original and necessary one.

§ 44. *Mode of forming tropical words.* But in process of time, objects being multiplied, there arose a necessity of using words in various senses. Men now began to think and speak concerning those things which had hitherto been neglected; and of course to form ideas of them in their minds, or to describe them in words. New objects also were invented or discovered, to describe which words became necessary. To serve this necessity, men resorted to two different expedients. Either new words were coined, or old ones were applied to new objects. In those languages that were spoken by a people ingenious and devoted to science, or in those which by nature or art were flexible and fitted for the coining of new words, new ones were most usually coined. Yet this usage was not without exceptions; for had new words been coined on every occasion, the number of them would have been multiplied without end. In languages of a character differing from that just mentioned, there was a greater necessity of applying the same word to the designation of several things. Hence it is, that a language, poor as to variety of words either in general or in particular parts of speech, employs the more frequently the same words in different senses. (Morus, p. 262. III.)

§ 45. *Tropical words sometimes become proper ones.* But there are several different points of light in which tropical words are to be viewed. First, the primitive or proper signification, strictly understood, often becomes obsolete, and ceases for a long period to be used. In this case, the secondary sense, which originally would have been a *tropical* one, becomes the *proper* one. This applies specially to the names of things. Hence there are many words, which at present never have their original and proper sense, such as etymology would assign them (*a*), but only a *secondary* sense, which

may in such cases be now called the *proper* sense. (Morus, p. 264. IV.)

(*a*) E. g. In English, *tragedy*, *comedy*, *villain*, *pagan*, *knave*, etc.

§ 46. *Usage sometimes converts tropical words into proper ones.* Secondly, in like manner, the tropical sense of certain words has become so common, by usage, that it is better understood than the original sense. In this case too we call the sense *proper;* although, strictly and technically speaking, one might insist on its being called *tropical.* If one should, by his last will, give *a library* [*bibliothecam*] to another, we should not call the use of *bibliotheca* tropical; although strictly speaking it is so, for bibliotheca originally meant the *shelves* or *place* where books are deposited. (Morus, ibid.)

§ 47. *Tropical names become proper by transfer.* So, thirdly, when names are transferred to things destitute of designations, they become in respect to these things the same as *proper* names; as when we predicate *luxuriousness* of a crop (*a*): for although we in fact use the word *luxuriousness* metaphorically in respect to the crop, yet in this case the word may be called a *proper* one. The same holds true of *perception* and *liberty* when predicated of the human mind; and so of many other things. (Morus, ibid.)

(*a*) So the Latin, *acies*, *ala*, *cornu*, spoken of an army; and in the same way, *foot of a mountain*, *head of a river* or *bed of a river*, etc.; all originally proper nouns used in a very different sense, but now, as thus used by transfer, they have become proper.

§ 48. *Tropical words used for the sake of variegating the style.* Words moreover are frequently used in a tropical manner, without any necessity arising from the occurrence of new objects. For it is not necessity only to which we must attribute the use of tropical words, but suavity and agreeableness of style occasion their introduction. To the genius and habits of writers much also is to be attributed; for,

§ 49. First, *tropes are used for the sake of variety in expression;* so that the same word may not often and always recur. To this species of tropical language belong metonymy, synecdoche, and other smaller tropes. In every thing variety is demanded, and without it taedium quickly follows. No person desirous of writing elegantly and with suavity will fail to discern, that an important part of a good style consists in using variety of language. (Morus, p. 266. 1.)

Examples: *heaven* is used for *God*, *sleep* for *death*, *threshold* for *house*, *uncircumcision* for *Gentiles*, etc.

Secondly, *tropical words, especially metaphors, are used for ornament.* In metaphors, which are the most common species of tropes, there is contained a similitude reduced to the narrow compass of a single word; and the mind is delighted with metaphors, because we are so formed as to be pleased with similitudes and images, particularly with those which are derived from objects that are splendid and agreeable. (Morus, p. 267. II.)

§ 50. *Tropes used for ornament specially by poets and orators.* The more desirous a writer is of ornamenting his discourse, the more frequently does he use tropical language; as is evident from the style of poets and orators. And it is with the special design that their style may be ornate, that we concede them the liberty of frequently employing tropical language.

§ 51. *The frequency of tropes depends much on the genius of the writer.* It should be observed, however, that the genius of a writer, and the subject on which he writes, are intimately connected with this. Those who possess great fervour of imagination and vivid conception, more frequently use tropes, even bold ones, and (as it often seems to others) *harsh* ones also. This results from the fact, that they easily perceive and frame similitudes, and by their temperament are

excited to make comparisons. Hence they often content themselves with slight similitudes. But great subjects by their importance naturally excite most men to the use of tropes, and sometimes of splendid ones. (Morus, p. 268. III. IV. Lowth, Lect. V—XII.)

From the object of employing tropes, as above described, we may conclude that he abuses them, who interprets them etymologically, or seeks any thing more in them except variety and ornament, or urges exactness too far in estimating the limits of meaning in tropical phrases.

§ 52. *Tropes used from necessity differ from those employed for variety or ornament.* From these principles we may understand, that in all books, but especially in the Scriptures, tropical language used from *necessity* differs much from that which is used on account of other reasons. In the first case, a thing has a *definite* name by which it is called; in the other, the trope is used either for pleasure or ornament. The former is grammatical; the latter rhetorical. In the first, the reason of the trope lies in analogy of nature; in the second, it lies in some similitude. And since every thing must have some name either peculiar or common, and considering that a name must belong to any and every thing grammatically, it follows that the *proper* sense of words is not lost in a grammatical trope adopted as their name, but only in a rhetorical. (Morus, p. 270. VII.)

If I rightly understand this, I cannot assent to it. When the Hebrew called a man the *son of twenty years*, in order to designate him as being twenty years old, the *literal* or *proper* sense of the words surely was not intended.

§ 53. *The sense of tropical words is grammatical.* But as may be easily understood from what has been said, since the *meaning* of all tropical words as well as proper ones, is deduced from the purpose and design of those who employed them to designate certain things, (as is plain from observation), it appears that this *meaning* is grammatical or literal,

and that they are in an error, who (with Jerome) have thought differently. Interpretation is of the same *nature*, whether it is applied to words tropical or proper. (Morus, p. 271. VII.)

§ 54. *Origin of synonymous words.* From the custom of using tropical language, flow synonymous words. In respect to these, the interpreter must beware lest he seek for diversity of meaning where none really exists; which not unfrequently happens. Usually, in the same dialect of the same nation and age, proper words are not synonymous; but when synonymes exist (as for example they do in Greek), they originate from different dialects or from different ages. The greatest number of synonymes arises from tropical words, which, for the sake of variety and ornament, express the same idea by various names. (Morus, p. 271. VIII.)

The interpreter should not seek for any definite distinction between synonymes, (1) Where they are introduced for the sake of variety. (2) Where usage conjoins two words; as *luck and fortune*, *peace and quietness*, *long and lasting*, etc. (3) Where they are used for the sake of ornament. (4) Where excited feeling produces a repetition of the same idea, while different words are employed. (5) Where it is the habit of an author to employ synonymes; e. g. Cicero.

The Hebrew poetry affords the most striking exhibition of synonymes, in its synonymous parallelisms. There, from the nature of the composition, the second στίχος or stanza is expected, in general, to exhibit a sense like to the first. An interpreter would mistake the essential part of his office, if he should be solicitious here to exhibit a difference between the sense of words, when the nature of the composition required them to be regarded as synonymes.

NATURE OF EMPHASIS.

§ 55. *Definition of Emphasis.* In the use of language cases arise, where the ordinary signification of a word receives, if I may so speak, *accession* or *augmentation.* This may be effected in two ways; the first consists in the use of a word in an honorary or in a degrading sense, e. g. *verba εὐφημίας et δυσφημίας*, of which it would be irrelevant to treat here. The second class of words are those, which receive augmentation in their *extent* or *force* of meaning. These con-

stitute what may with propriety be called *emphatic* words. Emphasis then may be defined, *an accession to the ordinary signification of a word, either as to the extent or the force of its meaning.* (Morus, p. 321. II.)

Emphasis comes from ἐμφαίνειν, which signifies *to shew* or *make conspicuous.* It is to language what a nod or a sign is to looks, i. e. it makes more significancy. Examples: when the Jews speak of Moses by the appellation of *the Prophet;* or the Greeks say, *the Orator, the Philosopher, the Poet,* meaning Demosthenes, Plato, and Homer; these respective appellations are *emphatic.*

§ 56. *No word of itself emphatic.* It may be easily seen then, that no word of itself is *emphatic.* Each word has by itself a certain power, and designates a definite idea of a thing either small or great, in which there can be no emphasis. It is not because a word designates anything which is very great or very small, that it is emphatical. Were this the case, then such words as *God, the world, the sun, the king,* would be always emphatical; which surely no one will assert. (Morus, p. 322. III.)

If emphasis be an *occasional* accession of force to a word, then the *ordinary* meaning of the word, be the signification ever so important. or forcible, of course is not emphatic.

§ 57. *Kinds of emphasis.* Emphasis is either *occasional* or *constant.* We call it *occasional,* when it is connected with words in some particular place or at a certain time, and from the animated feelings of the speaker, or from the importance of the subject, a word is chosen to express more than its ordinary import. *Constant* emphasis is that which usage makes invariably so, by employing a word continually in an emphatic rather than in the ordinary sense. Morus, p. 323. IV.)

Constant emphasis, if admitted, would destroy the very definition which Ernesti has given of emphasis. That no word of itself is emphatic, and that emphasis is an *accession to the ordinary force* of a word, is what he very rightly teaches us. What then is that emphasis which is *constant?*

§ 58. *Emphasis, how known.* Occasional emphasis must be

known by the context, and from the nature of the discourse. (Morus, p. 324. V.)

I have retained Ernesti's language here in respect to the term *occasional* or *temporary* as he calls it. But as occasional emphasis is really all which from the nature of the thing can ever exist, I shall not hereafter make any distinction, but speak simply of emphasis.

The nature of the subject and the context are the only means of knowing whether a word is to be regarded as emphatic; for these must shew that more or less force is to be given to particular terms. As a general rule, we may say that emphasis is required whenever a frigid, incongruous, or inept sense would be made without it. Thus 1 John iii. 9, *He that is born of God sinneth not*; the writer does not mean to assert this, as employing the word *sinneth* in the common and usual way; he means to say, that such an one does not *sin* in the peculiar sense of which he is speaking, i. e. habitually.

As to *constant* emphasis (which Morus and his editor have admitted), the rule for determining it is said to be the *usus loquendi*. The rule is good, if the principle be admitted. The examples given to support this species of emphasis, are such as the names *Jehovah* applied to God, and *Son of man* applied to Christ. But these prove no more, than that these appellations, applied in certain circumstances, have a significant and exalted meaning; which is also true of very many words, where no real emphasis is to be found. But see and compare Morus, p. 325. VI. VII.

§ 59. *No ground for dividing emphasis into real and verbal.* Some rhetoricians divide emphasis into *real* and *verbal*; the former of which consists in the greatness and sublimity of things, while the latter consists of *words* adapted to express their qualities. But this division is erroneous. To *things* belongs *sublimity*; to *words*, *emphasis*. Nor, as we have above said, does a word designating a great object therefore become emphatic. (Morus, p. 328. VIII.)

§ 60. *Tropical words are not of course and from their nature emphatic.* Those also err, who make every tropical, specially metaphorical, word emphatic. In necessary tropes, or those used for the sake of variety, it is clear there can be no emphasis. Ornamental tropes depend on mere similitude, which serves to render the discourse agreeable. *Flagrare cupiditate* means no more than *vehementer cupere*; and no one gets a different idea from using it. If then there be no

emphasis in the latter expression, there is none in the former. The error arises in this way, that some understand *flagrare cupiditate* to be used instead of *cupere;* and thence conclude, that there is an accession of meaning. Hence we learn, that the emphasis of tropical words is to be found in the same way as that of proper words. (Morus, p. 329. IX.)

§ 61. *Words in one language do not always correspond exactly to those in another.* It may be proper to repeat here a well known, though very important and necessary observation, viz. that every language has words and phrases, to which none in any other language, or at least in that into which we are interpreting, *exactly* correspond. Of this nature are many words and phrases both in the Greek and Hebrew Testament. The reason of this lies not solely in the difference of objects peculiar to every nation; such as pertain, for example, to laws, religious rites, manners and customs, etc.; but also in the variety of minds, which are not all affected in the same manner; and lastly, in an arbitrary formation of notions, respecting those things which do not pertain to substance and essence. (Campbell, Diss. II.)

OF ANTITHESIS.

§ 62. *Where antithesis exists, if the sense of one part can be found the other may be easily known.* Finally, as ideas are often contra-distinguished from each other, so the language corresponds. Therefore, inasmuch as when ideas are repugnant to each other, if you understand the one of course you must understand the other which is the opposite, (for what one asserts the other denies); so in antithetic *language*, whether the subject or predicate of a sentence, the rule is obvious, that the interpretation of the one part must be directed by that of the other, which is understood either from the *usus loquendi*, or where this is various, from the context. E. g. when

multi and *pauci* occur in the same sentence, and it is evident that *multi* means *all*, it is of course evident that *pauci* cannot here have its ordinary sense, but means *non omnes*, without limiting the idea to *fewness* of number (*a*). Of a like kind are σάρξ and πνεῦμα, γράμμα and πνεῦμα; in which the interpretation of the one is to be accommodated to that of the other. (Morus, p. 167. XIV. I—II.)

(*a*) But if *multi* means *all*, does not *pauci* (the opposite of it) mean *none?* In Hebrew, כֹּל and לֹא כֹל mean *all* and *none;* and is not לֹא כֹל equivalent to *non omnes*, in such a case?

ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE WORDS.

§ 63. *Abstract words used for concrete.* Nor must the interpreter neglect the distribution of words into *abstract* and *concrete.* All languages, specially ancient ones, often use abstract terms for concrete ones. Generally abstract terms are most frequently employed.

Abstract words are the names of qualities or attributes; concrete, of things or subjects. E. g. *divinity* is an abstract word, meaning the quality of divine nature; but *God* is a concrete term, meaning the divine agent or being. The former is, by usage, often put for the latter.

§ 64. *The use of abstracts for concretes arose from necessity.* This method of speaking is employed, (1) From *necessity.* Those languages, which have but a few concrete terms, *necessarily* employ abstract ones; e. g. the Hebrew and its cognate dialects, in which abstracts are often used in the place of concretes. Such usage being once established by necessity, it often extended itself where necessity did not require it.

§ 95. (2) From a desire to render the subject spoken of prominent. When an *abstract* is put for a subject with its pronoun, or for the subject itself, it directs the mind to that very thing on account of which the predicate is asserted. No one will deny that this mode of expression is energetic.

The meaning of Ernesti seems to be, that the abstract noun, when employed instead of a concrete, renders prominent that quality of the subject or agent intended to be designated, and which the writer or speaker would naturally desire to make most prominent.

§ 66. (3) The purpose of *ornament* is subserved, not only by the prominence given to a thing of which I have just spoken, but by a certain elevation and grandeur of style connected with this mode of speaking.

§ 67. *Popular and learned use of words.* Finally, to some words popular use attributes one meaning, the use of the learned another. Not that words naturally signify one thing in common life, and another in a treatise of science ; but that they are used less skilfully in the one case, and with more skill and accuracy in the other. Interpreters who confound these usages, of course pervert the sense of words.

PART II.

RULES OF INTERPRETATION.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory Remarks.

§ 68. *Design of Part II.* Thus far we have been employed in considering the general nature of language, the various kinds of words in use, and also the meaning appropriate to each class. Having taken this general view of the nature and properties of words, we may now proceed to deduce from the principles already established various *rules of interpretation*, by which the efforts of the interpreter are to be directed. The consideration of these rules, with their various classes

and ramifications, will constitute the SECOND PART of the present treatise on Hermeneutics.

§ 69. *What are rules of interpretation?* They are directions or formulas, which explain and define the mode of rightly investigating, and perspicuously representing, the sense of words in any particular author.

§ 70. *Origin of these rules.* They are deduced from the nature of language as above explained; and deduced, not by logical subtilties, but by observation and experience.

§ 71. *Object of rules.* These rules serve not only to assist in finding the sense of words, but also in judging whether any particular sense put upon words be true or false. By them too one may not only be assisted to understand why a particular sense is erroneous, but also why the true one cannot be discovered.

§ 72. *Rules of exegesis connected with the usus loquendi.* We have seen above, that the *sense* of words depends on the *usus loquendi.* Proper rules then for finding the sense, or judging of it, ought to have special respect to the *usus loquendi*, and to show how it is applied to every particular case.

§ 73. *Usus loquendi general and special.* The *usus loquendi*, considered at large, has respect to a language generally; specially considered, it has respect to some particular writer. To the common usage of words almost every writer adds something that is peculiar to himself; whence arise the *idioms* of particular writers.

§ 74. *Order in which the subject will be pursued.* The natural method of treating the usus loquendi will be followed; so that we shall first consider the method in general of finding the *usus loquendi* in the dead languages; and then the method of finding it in any particular author, but more specially in the writings of the New Testament.

CHAPTER II.

OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES.

[Compare Keil, §§ 25—34. Beck, pp. 131—136. Seiler, §§ 236—254.]

§ 75. *Usus loquendi is known by testimony.* If the *usus loquendi* is mere matter of fact, it may be known, in the dead languages, by the testimony of those who lived when these languages were flourishing and in common use, and who well understood them. This testimony is *direct* or *indirect*. (Morus, p. 74. II.)

By the *usus loquendi* is meant, THE SENSE WHICH USAGE ATTACHES TO THE WORDS OF ANY LANGUAGE. It is surprising that any attempts should ever have been made to find the sense of words in a dead language, by means different in their nature from those which we employ to find the sense of words in a living language. The meaning of a word must always be a simple matter of fact; and of course it is always to be established by appropriate and adequate testimony. Yet how very different a course has been pursued, I will not say, by many Rabbinic and Cabbalistic commentators merely, nor by monks and zealots for the Romish hierarchy, but, by many Protestants who have had great influence, and who deserve on many accounts the highest respect. Witness the exegetical principles of Cocceius and his followers; and read, if the statement just made be doubted, many of the articles in Parkhurst's Heb. Lexicon.

§ 76. *How to obtain direct testimony.* Direct testimony may be obtained, first, from the writers to whom the language investigated was vernacular; either from the same authors whom we interpret, or from their contemporaries. Next, from those who, though foreigners, had learned the language in question (*a*). Thirdly, from scholiasts, glossographies, and versions made while the language was spoken, and by those who were acquainted with it. But these must be severally treated of.

(*a*) Thus the writings of Marcus Antoninus a Roman emperor, and

of Philo and Josephus who were Jews, may be used to illustrate the meaning of Greek words, because, although foreigners, they well understood the Greek language.

§ 77. *Testimony of contemporary writers.* The most important aid is afforded by writers of the first class; for their testimony is particularly weighty. This testimony may be drawn from three sources. (1) From the definitions of words. (2) From examples and the nature of the subject. (3) From parallel passages. (Morus, p. 79. V.)

§ 78 (1) *Definitions.* In regard to these, nothing more is necessary than to take good care that the definition be well understood, and then to consider how much weight the character of the writer who defines may properly give to it.

§ 79. (2) *Examples and the nature of the subject.* In regard to these it may be said, that a good understanding and considerable practice is necessary to enable one to judge well and to make proper distinctions. (Morus, p. 81. VII.)

By *examples* is meant, that the writer who uses a particular word, although he does not directly define it, yet gives in some one or more passages an *example* of what it means, by exhibiting its qualities or shewing the operation of it. Thus Paul uses the words *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*, at first, without an explanation. But we have an example of the meaning of it in Gal. iv. 9. Thus *πίστις* is illustrated by examples in Heb. xi.; and so of many other words.

The *nature* of the subject, in innumerable places, helps to define which meaning of the word the writer attaches to it in any particular passage. E. g. *χάρις* is *pardon of sin, divine benevolence, divine aid, temporal blessings*, etc. Which of these senses it bears in any particular passage, is to be determined from the nature of the subject.

§ 80. *Comparison of parallel passages.* Great caution is necessary here, in order to find the true sense of those passages which are to be compared and judged of, with a view to throw light on some more obscure place. Unless such caution is used, the object cannot be well accomplished. On this account, the principle in question ought to be *well* understood; especially as all who are skilled in interpretation agree that this principle of exegesis is very broad, and that it applies

not only to the Scriptures, but to all other books. (Morus, p. 79. VIII.)

§ 81. *Parallelism is verbal and real.* (1) Verbal. This occurs when a word is ambiguous and doubtful, because neither the subject nor the context affords matter of illustration; and this same word (*a*), or its synonyme (*b*), is repeated in a similar passage, with those attributes by which it may be defined, or with some plain adjunct or intelligible comment (*c*). (Morus, p. 85. X. XI.)

The sense of many words is so plain, that investigation by parallelism, i. e. the like use of them in other passages, is unnecessary. But comparison is specially necessary to illustrate words, (1) Which belong to the Hellenistic or Hebrew-Greek idiom. E. g. ἐφοβοῦντο πάντες is often said, when the event to which it relates is some special favour. The language here may be compared with the Hebrew יָרֵא and חָגַג, or the synonymes θαυμάσαι and θαμβῆσαι; by which it appears that ἐφοβοῦντο in such cases means *admiration, astonishment.* (2) Words should be compared which have a kind of technical religious use. E. g. μυστήριον, comp. Rom 16: 25, Colos. 1: 27, Eph. 3: 45. So πίστις, δικαιοσύνη, μετάνοια, καινὴ κτίσις, etc. (3) Words of unfrequent occurrence. The necessity of this is obvious. (4) Words which are ambiguous; for words which are so in one place, frequently are, from the connection in which they stand, plain and easy to be understood in another.

(*a*) E. g. Christ is frequently called *a stone of stumbling.* In 1 Pet. 2: 8, those *who stumble* are said ἀπειθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, *to reject or disobey the gospel of Christ.* (*b*) E. g. 2 Cor. 1: 21. χρίσας ἡμᾶς ὁ Θεός. 1 John 2: 20, χρῖσμα is said to be *instruction in the truth.* (*c*) Comp. 2 Cor. 4: 10 with verse 11th. Parallelisms *appropriately* so called are of this nature, the one often serving to explain the other. These are very numerous in the Old Testament, and considerably so in the New. Comp. Matt. 1: 20 with Luke 1: 35.

To the cases already mentioned may be added, (*d*) Renewed mention with explanation. Comp 1 Cor. 7: 1 with verse 26. Also, (*e*), Renewed mention with antithesis. Comp. θάνατος in Rom. iii. iv. and v. with Chap. 6: 23.

§ 82. *Real Parallelism.* This means that there is a parallelism of object or sentiment, although the words are not the same; or, to describe it in a manner somewhat different, it occurs when the same thing or sentiment is expressed in other words more perspicuous, or with fuller and more numerous words the meaning of which is plain.

Real parallelism may respect a *fact* or a *doctrine*, related or taught in different passages. Examples of the former are abundant in the Gospels, which in very numerous instances relate to the same facts. So in the books of Samuel and Kings compared with the Chronicles.

Parallelism of doctrine or sentiment is where the same principles are taught in both passages. To this head of parallelism belong repetitions of the same composition; e. g. Ps. 14 and 53; Ps. 96 and 1 Chron. 16; Ps. 18 and 2 Sam. 22; some of Jude and 2 Epistle of Peter; with many other such passages. On the faithful, skilful, and diligent comparison of the different parts of Scripture which treat of the same doctrine, depend, in a great measure, all our right conclusions in regard to the real doctrines of religion; for in this manner, and in this only, are they properly established. Most of the mistakes made about Christian doctrine are made in consequence of partial exegesis, directed not unfrequently by prejudices previously imbibed. *The student can never feel too deeply the importance of a thorough comparison of all those parts of Scripture, which pertain to the same subject.*

Besides the verbal and real parallelism considered above, there is another species of parallelism which constitutes one of the principal features of Hebrew poetry. This consists in a correspondence of two parts of a verse with each other, so that words answer to words, and sentiment to sentiment. This runs throughout the book of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Canticles, and most of the Prophets. See Ps. 1. 2. 19. 119. Is. 1: 2—5. 40. et passim. This style, so predominant in the language of the Old Testament, has passed into many parts of the New, which strictly speaking are not poetical, but which receive their hue from the influence that Hebrew poetry had produced on the language of the Jewish nation. See Luke 1: 35. 1: 46, etc. 11: 27; and many parts of the Apocalypse, which is a kind of poem. The attentive and experienced observer will find these characteristic idioms of Hebrew poetry, in a greater or less degree, in almost every chapter of the New Testament.

The appropriate method of studying this part of exegesis consists, of course, in attention to Hebrew poetry. How great assistance may be derived from a thorough knowledge of this idiom, no one can scarcely imagine who has not made the experiment. I cannot dwell upon it here, except merely to observe, that the student will be in no great danger of overrating the benefit to be derived from a thorough acquaintance with it; and that he will find the advantages very perspicuously stated by Schleusner, *De Parallelismo Membrorum egregio interpretationis subsidio.*

As Ernesti has failed to consider the appropriate maxims of exegesis, in regard to the kind of parallelisms now in question, I will add a few considerations that may be useful. (1) In parallelism of this kind, seek for the principal idea that lies at the ground of both parts of a distich. (2) Be not anxious to avoid the same sense or meaning in both parts, as though it would be tautological and unworthy of the sacred writers; for sameness of meaning, in innumerable cases, constitutes the very nature of the idiom or mode of ex-

pression. (3) Inquire whether one member of the parallelism is explanatory; or whether it is added for the sake of ornament; or is a repetition or amplification which results from excited feeling, or from mere custom of speech. This inquiry will enable one to know how much exegetical aid may be derived from it. If one member be explanatory or exegetical of the other, it will comprise synonymous or antithetic words; or one member will be in tropical, and the other in proper language; or one will enumerate species, which belong to the genus mentioned in the other. Instructive on the above subject is Morus, pp. 96—107.

But the student must not fail here to read Lowth's *Lectures on Hebrew Poetry*, or the preface to Lowth's *Commentary on Isaiah*. With much profit may be read, on this very interesting and important branch of a sacred interpreter's knowledge, Herder, *Geist der Heb. Poesie*, B. I. s. 22, etc., an English translation of which has lately been published by Prof. Marsh of Burlington University, Vermont. De Wette, *Ueber die Psalmen, Einleitung*, translated in the Biblical Repository. Meyer, *Hermeneutik*, B. II.

§ 83. *Parallel passages to be read continuously and frequently.* A good interpreter, therefore, must specially attend to those passages of an author, which resemble each other, when he finds occasion to doubt in respect to the meaning of any one of them. He should read them over continuously, or at short intervals. For in this way, while the passages are fresh in his mind about which he doubts, or with which others are to be compared, he will more easily trace the real resemblances between them. (Morus, p. 107. XVIII.)

§ 84. *Similarity of passages should be real in order to be compared, and not merely verbal.* By this is meant, that the same *idea* is presented by both, and not merely that the *language* of each may be the same. For *real* likeness between them cannot exist, unless the idea of each be the same; nor, of course, can the one throw any true light upon the other, except there be a real similarity. But when this point is settled, the interpreter must consider which of the two is the most perspicuous and definite, and regulate the exegesis of the more obscure passage by that which is the more perspicuous. Explanation in this way often becomes very obvious. (Morus, p. 107. XIX.)

But is there not a kind of *ὕστερον πρότερον* in this direction? Morus has indeed admitted the propriety of the rule; but still there seems to me to be difficulty in it. In order to determine whether two passages may be properly compared (one of which is *obscure*), you must *first* determine whether there is *real* similarity between them, i. e. whether they both contain the *same* idea. But to determine this, implies of course a previous knowledge of what the obscure passage contains; otherwise you cannot tell whether the *idea* is the *same* in both. You have already determined, then, how the obscure passage is to be interpreted, and so need not the comparison after which you are labouring; or else you *assume* the interpretation, and then build your exegesis on that assumption. In either way, the rule would seem to amount to little or nothing.

But in some measure to relieve the difficulty, it may be said with truth, you determine what idea is conveyed in each of the passages to be compared, from the context, the design of the writer, or the nature of the case. Having made this determination about each passage, independently of the other, you then bring them together, and the one, being expressed more fully or with more explanatory adjuncts than the other, confirms the less certain meaning of the other. A comparison of passages, then, where the similarity is *real* (that of ideas) and not merely *verbal*, can never be made to any purpose, where the obscurity of either is so great that you can attain no tolerable degree of satisfaction about the meaning. It can never be used therefore for any higher degree of evidence, than for the confirmation of a sense not improbable in itself, and not contradicted by the context.

The subject, in such a view of it, becomes fundamental in regard to the *validity* of testimony to the meaning of words, afforded by what are called parallel passages. The nature and strength of the evidence, and the proper mode of its application, are all illustrated by the above considerations. Unless the student forms ideas of this subject which are correct, and grounded upon the principles that will bear examination, he is liable to be carried about "by every wind of doctrine" in Hermeneutics, and to be cast upon the opinion, or conceit, or mere confident assertion, of every commentator or lexicographer, who has overrated the authority of passages called parallel in deciding upon some particular word or phrase, or who has no definite views of the exact nature and application of the evidence in question.

§ 85. *The exercise of comparison should be often repeated.* To the observance of these principles frequent practice must be added, so that the interpreter may *easily* discern what passages are similar, and how he may rightly compare them and judge of them. It will be very useful here to consult good interpreters, not only of the Scriptures but of profane authors;

that where they carry these principles into practice, and plainly make a right and skilful application of them, we may learn to imitate them by attentively considering the manner in which they attain to the understanding of things that are obscure or ambiguous. By *frequently* renewing this exercise, we may learn to go in the same path which they have travelled.

The books of the New Testament present more inducement to repeat this exercise very frequently, than any other books. For (1) They are of all books the most important. (2) They are not only all of the same idiom in general, but they have reference to the same subject, viz. the development of Christianity. They originated too from cotemporary writers, possessed of views, feelings, and language that were alike. Hence comparison has more force in illustrating the N. Testament, than in the illustration of either Greek or Latin authors; many of whom that agree with each other in all the circumstances just stated, cannot be found. But (3) To all who admit that the same Holy Spirit guided the authors of the New Testament, and that their views of religion in consequence of this must have been *harmonious*, the inducement to comparison of various parts and passages with each other, in order to obtain a correct view of the whole, must be *very great;* and the additional force of the evidence arising from comparison, on account of the really harmonious views of the writers, must make this exercise an imperious duty of every theologian.

§ 86. *Many parallel passages should be compared.* To compare one passage only is often insufficient, whether you are endeavoring to find the *usus loquendi* by the aid of parallel passages, or by testimony derived from the nature of the subject and from examples. (Comp. § 77.) Specially is this the case, when we are investigating the sense of words that have a complex or generic meaning made up of various parts. In this case, comparisons should be made from numerous passages, until we perceive that what we are seeking is fully and entirely discovered. (Morus, p. 109. XX.)

Suppose the word πίστις occurs in a particular passage, where you are doubtful what sense should be applied to it. First you call to mind that πίστις is a generic word, having several meanings related to each other, but still diverse, as species under the genus. You wish to determine how many *species* of meaning πίστις has; and in order to accomplish this, *many* passages where it is used must be compared, in order that you may know whether all the species are found. This being done, you proceed to compare them with the

passage under investigation, and see which will fit it. And in this way all generic words must be investigated, before the generic idea can be determined.

§ 87. *Testimony of Scholiasts respecting the usus loquendi.* It was said, § 76, that testimony to linguistic usage might be derived from Scholiasts; and this testimony is either given by themselves, or it is cited by them from others. It is valuable, in proportion as the time in which they lived approximates to the age of the author whom they interpret (*a*); and also in proportion to their knowledge of the language in which he wrote (*b*). The latter must be judged of by men of learning and practical skill; although to judge of it is not a matter of special difficulty. (Morus pp. 113—115.)

Scholia means *short notes* upon any author, either of an exegetical or grammatical nature. On all the distinguished ancient Greek authors *Scholia* have been written, in more recent times; many volumes of which are still extant, upon Homer, Thucydides, Sophocles, Aristophanes, etc. In like manner a multitude of scholia from the ancient Christian Fathers, specially of the Greek Church, have come down to us in their works. Originally they were brief remarks, occasionally made in their commentaries and other writings. Afterwards these were extracted and brought together, and they now form what is called *Catena Patrum*. Many scholia also are found on the margin of manuscripts, or interlined, or placed at the end of a book.

(*a*) This is too generally expressed; for surely an ignorant scholiast of the second century would not be more valuable than Chrysostom in the fourth. In short, antiquity adds nothing to the value of a scholiast, except as it renders it more probable, *ceteris paribus*, that he may have a better knowledge of ancient manners, customs, history, etc., than a modern writer would have.

(*b*) Almost all that is important in this subject turns on this point. The simple question always is: Is the author interpreted well and skilfully? not, when or where the commentator lived.

§ 88. *Glossaries.* In a similar way is the testimony of glossographers to be estimated; which testimony is by no means to be despised. Its credit depends on its antiquity, and on the learning either of the glossographers themselves, or of others whom they cite.

§ 89. *Nature of glossaries.* But here we must be cautious not to suppose the Greek glossaries to be like our modern

Lexicons. They explain only particular passages or words; especially nouns that are in an oblique case, or verbs that are not in the infinitive, nor first person of the present tense. An ignorance of this construction of the glossaries has often been the occasion of ridiculous errors.

Glossarium is a book or writing comprehending γλώσσας. Among the Greeks, γλῶσσα meant either *idiomatic word* peculiar to a certain dialect only and unknown in others, or *obsolete word*, or *obscure one*. *Glossary* means a book containing explanations of obscure and difficult words. Of course a glossary extends only to a few of the words and phrases of any author. It is not to be used as a lexicon; for it is only a comment on particular passages. It differs therefore in nothing except mere form from very brief *scholia*.

As to the authority of glossaries, it is regulated by the same principles as that of scholia; mere antiquity of itself adding nothing important to its weight, which is proportioned to the philological knowledge and accuracy of its author.

The principal ancient glossaries published are those of Hesychius, Suidas, Phavorinus, Cyrill, Photius, and Etymologicon Magnum. Compare, on this note and the two preceding sections, Morus, pp. 115—130.

§ 90. *Testimony of versions.* The testimony of *versions* is to be estimated by their antiquity, and by the knowledge of the original which the translator possessed. In order to judge of the latter the version must be compared in many places with the original, in passages where the sense is certain. But here we must well understand the language of the version itself, lest we should err in judging of it, and rashly suppose the translator has not hit the true sense, (which has often happened to those who have passed sentence on the Sept. version, and on the quotations from the Old Testament that are to be found in the New); or lest we should understand the words which are nicely chosen, in a low and vulgar sense. Boyce has shewn that even Erasmus and Beza have erred here. (Morus, p. 130. XXXV.)

Here again antiquity is to be regarded only as conferring more advantage on a translator, in respect to a knowledge of ancient customs, history, etc. In some cases too the translator may have lived before the language which he translates had ceased to be vernacular. But in either of these cases, an ignorant man could not be recommended

as a translator, because he preceded by one, four, or ten centuries, an intelligent, thorough philologist. The credit of any version turns on its *fidelity* and *ability*. No ancient version, either Sept., Vulgate, Italic, Syriac, Chaldaic, etc., will bear any comparison in respect to either of these characteristics, with many recent versions made by the finished oriental scholars of the present day.

§ 91. *Other similar testimonies.* Similar to the helps just mentioned are those writers, who have explained to their readers words and obscure expressions taken from another language. E. g. Cicero explains many Greek words, and Dionysius Halicar. many Latin ones. Of the same class are writers who have inserted translations from another language; e. g. the Latin poets and historians, from the Greek; the writers of the New Testament, from the Hebrew of the Old. (Morus, p. 131. XXXVI.)

Passages cited from the Old Testament are frequently explained in the New, either by the connection in which they stand, the language in which they are expressed (comp. Is. 40: 13 with Rom. 11: 34), or by some adjuncts or direct explanation.

§ 92. *Knowledge of the peculiar style and all the circumstances of an author necessary.* The principles of interpretation, thus far, apply to writers of all ages and nations. But in addition to these, there are some principles peculiar and appropriate to certain writers of a particular age, nation, or sect. This *peculiar usus loquendi* may be known, (1) From the writer's own testimony, either express or implied (*a*). (2) From the customs and principles of the sect to which he belongs (*b*), whether philosophical or religious; and these customs and principles may be known from the testimony of those who belonged to the same sect, or have explained its principles. (3) The interpreter must have a knowledge of the manners and customs of the age to which his author alludes (*c*); and this is to be obtained by consulting those who have given information on these topics (*d*). (4) The interpreter should have a general knowledge of writers of the same age. (Morus, pp. 132—141.)

(*a*) If an author have a manner of expression wholly *sui generis*, then his own writings are the only legitimate source of information in respect to it; and in them testimony may be either direct, where the author himself gives explanations; or indirect, where the explanations are to be drawn from adjuncts or the context. (*b*) Every religious sect has terms used in a sense peculiar to itself. Of course a writer belonging to this sect may be supposed to use its language; and an explanation of it is to be found as Ernesti directs. (*c*) Every age has its own peculiar language, customs, and sentiments, in some respect or other. Consequently a knowledge of these peculiarities is necessary, in order to explain language that is predicated upon them. Hence it is plain, (*d*) That contemporary authors are the most probable source of illustration, next to the writings of an author himself; as they were conversant with the same manners, customs, language, sentiments, etc., as the author.

The question: To what nation did the author belong? is of great moment, oftentimes, in explaining his method of using language. E. g. what can be more diverse, in a great variety of respects, than the Jewish, Roman, and Attic method of writing?

§ 93. *The nature of composition to be specially regarded in the interpretation of it.* History is one thing, poetry another, oratory another (*a*). Particular periods have their special characteristics in each of these modes of composition, which frequently arises from a fashion of writing or speaking introduced by some distinguished person. (Morus, p. 141—147.)

(*a*) History therefore is to be interpreted as history, not as allegory or mythic fiction; poetry is to be construed as possessing its own peculiar characteristics; and so of the rest. No one circumstance more displays an interpreter's knowledge and critical acumen, than a judicious regard to the kind of composition, and the age, circumstances, and idiom of the author.

CHAPTER III.

OTHER MEANS TO ASSIST IN FINDING THE SENSE OF WORDS BESIDES THE USUS LOQUENDI.

[Compare Keil, pp. 45—80. Beck, pp. 127—142. Seiler, §§ 250—256.]

§ 94. *Design of the following chapter.* The preceding chapter treated of the method of finding the *usus loquendi*, i. e. the meaning which usage has attached to words, by *direct* testimony. This testimony, it was shewn, might be deduced from three sources; viz. from the author interpreted, or his contemporaries; from foreigners who understood his language; and from scholia, glossographies, and versions. With these was united a knowledge of the peculiar style, idiom, country, circumstances, etc., of the author, as also the kind of compositions which are to be interpreted. We come now to treat of *indirect* testimony, to which we must frequently resort in order to find the meaning of words.

§ 95. *Necessity of indirect testimony.* The usus loquendi cannot always be found with sufficient certainty, by those means which have been pointed out. Proper evidence respecting it is sometimes wanting; sometimes usage is variable or inconstant, even in the same age, or in the same writer; or there is an ambiguity of language, or of grammatical forms; or an obscurity covers the subject or thing treated of; or novelty of language occurs; or a neglect of the *usus loquendi*, which sometimes happens even in the most careful writers. Other means therefore must be used, by which the true sense can be elicited. (Morus, p. 148. I.)

§ 96. *Scope of a writer the first and best means.* The most important of these means for discovering the sense of

any particular passage, is found in resorting to the general tenor of the discourse. The *design* or *scope* of the discourse in general is to be compared with the passage investigated (*a*). The ground of this rule is, that we ought not to suppose a good and judicious writer has said what is inconsistent with his design. Absolute certainty however is not always attainable in this way; for it sometimes happens, that several interpretations may agree with the scope of the writer. Hence there are cases, in which only a probability in favor of a certain meaning is to be found; and even cases where not so much as this can be attained. (Morus, p. 149. III—V.)

(*a*) But how is this scope of the writer to be ascertained? (1) From the express statement of the writer. E. g. John 20: 31. Rom. 3: 28. (2) From the occasion or circumstances which originated the discourse. E. g. the parables of Christ, and many passages in the Epistles. (3) From history, i. e. authentic accounts of facts, that would very naturally give rise to the discourse in question, and would serve to explain it; e. g. the epistle of Jude is directed against teachers who lived licentiously. 2 Cor. almost throughout has reference to facts which existed at that time. If none of these things cast sufficient light on the scope of the writer, the whole must be perused and re-perused carefully; by which unexpected light often breaks in.

But some caution in respect to the rule in section 96 is proper. All parts of a discourse have not invariably a strict connection with its general scope. Many things are often said, which are wholly irrelevant to it, and which are mere *obiter dicta*. These are not to be interpreted by the general scope of the discourse, but agreeably to *the subject that is treated of in the place where they occur*. Recurrence to this principle is very important, in many parts of the New Testament.

§ 97. *Caution in regard to the rule above.* In regard to this means then of attaining the sense, we must take care not to trust too much to it, nor to rely *solely* upon it. Nor must we rest satisfied with only some tolerable agreement of the sense given with the general scope of the writer. This the unlearned are very apt to do, for want of skill in the languages; whence have arisen many idle conjectures. We must insist upon an evident and necessary connection with the scope of the discourse.

But how shall we know when it is *evident* and *necessary*? (1) Where a meaning plainly contradicts the tenor of a discourse it is to be rejected. (2) When it violates the principles of parallelism and the conclusions drawn from them, as to the sense of a passage. [See §§ 80—86.] (3) Reject a meaning which gives an inept and frigid sense. By a frigid sense is meant one which contributes neither to argument, nor perspicuity, nor ornament.

A meaning which infringes upon none of these negative precepts, will be found to harmonize with the subject of which the author is treating, unless he has violated all the rules of language and reasoning.

§ 98. *Second caution in regard to the scope of the discourse.* Another caution is, that we compare the meaning, as discovered by the scope of the writer, with that which the *usus loquendi* affords, and see whether they can be made to agree. In other words, we must see whether the *usus loquendi* will tolerate any particular sense given to the passage by the scope of the discourse, specially in respect to words which have various meanings; or whether there be a repugnance to it. Occasionally, the meaning derived from the scope of the writer will lead to a knowledge of something which may serve to establish its harmony with the *usus loquendi.*

But to interpret solely from the supposed scope of a writer, without the aid and consent of the *usus loquendi*, and even in opposition to it, belongs rather to rash conjecture than to interpretation by rule. Wherefore this help is not to be used unless in cases of ambiguity, or of words which are ἅπαξ λεγόμενα, and generally in cases where the best testimony to the meaning of words is either wanting, or insufficient to determine the sense (*a*). (Morus, p. 158. VII. and VIII.)

(*a*) The reason why the *scope* of a discourse is not to be resorted to, except in cases where ambiguity arises, is, that the *usus loquendi* is the *best* evidence which can be had of the meaning of a passage, and nothing can be admitted which shall contradict it, where it can be established by adequate testimony. But in case one doubts what meaning the *usus loquendi* would assign or at least allow to any word or phrase, secondary or subsidiary means, i. e. the scope of the discourse may be resorted to, for the sake of obtaining the desired illustration.

§ 99. *Use of the context in interpretation.* Of more limited extent (*a*), but rather more evident, is the rule to have recourse to the antecedents and consequents of a passage, i. e. the CONTEXT, in order that you may determine its meaning. This is done for two reasons: either that we may choose out of several meanings one which does not disagree with the *usus loquendi;* or that the meaning of an uncommon word, not explained by the *usus loquendi*, may be discovered. Here however we must guard against proceeding beyond probability; and to do this, we must observe the same cautions as have just been given above. (Morus, p. 160. IX.)

(*a*) In the original, *angustius;* by which Ernesti probably meant, of *less importance*, or *confined within narrower limits.* But I cannot accede to the propriety of this sentiment; for the immediate context, either preceding, succeeding, or both together, is a rule for judging of the meaning of words of the very broadest extent. I might say that even the evidence of the *usus loquendi* is, in very many cases, built upon the context. We adopt the opinion that the *usus loquendi* sanctions this or that particular sense, because the *context* clearly shews that such a meaning is to be assigned to it, and that no other can be given without rendering the sense frigid and inept. Moreover, the *general scope* of an author does not forbid the admission of a great variety of arguments, illustrations, and episodes (if I may be indulged in the use of such a word here), into the intermediate parts of a discourse; so that one is far more certain of giving a sense that is congruous, by consulting the *immediate context*, than by merely consulting the general scope of the whole. Both, no doubt, are to be regarded; but of the two, the former is by far the most important means of assistance.

Indeed I should doubt whether there is any one rule in the whole science of Hermeneutics, so important, and of so much practical and actual use, as the one in question. Great care, no doubt, is necessary, to decide with certainty what sense the context requires a word to have; specially when the immediate subject is briefly stated. But this care is as easily practised as any other rule is, which Hermeneutics prescribes in different cases. Violence must not be done to words, by forcibly subjecting them to the context, against etymology, analogy, the rules of grammar, and the nature of language. But in every thing short of this, all good lexicographers and commentators adapt the meaning of words to the context, in cases too numerous to need any specification. Comp. Morus ut supra.

§ 100. *Various comparisons useful in order to discover the meaning of words.* Of similar utility for finding the sense of

ambiguous or obscure words is the comparing of subject and attribute; of nouns and adjectives (*a*); of words accompanied by other words that qualify them, which may consist of adverbs, or of nouns joined to the word investigated by prepositions and constituting a kind of adverbial periphrasis (*b*); or finally of disjunctives (*c*). (Morus, p. 163. XI—XIV.)

(*a*) *Qualia sint subjecta talia sint attributa,* is the old rule of the schools and of philosophy, founded upon the common sense of mankind. In accordance with this, we understand as tropical language all those expressions which ascribe hands, feet, eyes, ascent, descent, etc., to God who is a *Spirit*. The principle in question is of vast extent in construing the figurative language of the Scriptures; and it also extends to many expressions that are not strictly tropical. Too much certainty however should not be ascribed to it; for some cases occur, where the *subject is imperfectly known*, and of course we are unable to pronounce with confidence what *attributes* may be ascribed to it.

(*b*) E. g. κατ' ὄψιν χρίσις. Κατ' ὄψιν serves merely the purpose of an adjective qualifying χρίσις, and shewing that *judgment* from *external appearance only* is meant.

(*c*) By *disjunctives* are meant words placed in antithesis. E. g. *heaven, earth; spirit, flesh,* etc. The rule for finding the sense in such cases is obvious, provided the meaning of either term can be found. For whatever meaning one term has, the other has the opposite; so that if certainty be acquired as to the one, it is of course acquired as to the other, which is to be construed as a *real antithesis*. Compare § 62.

§ 101. *Analogy of languages a means of interpretation.* Analogy of languages may also assist in judging of the meaning of words. This is of different kinds. The first is analogy of any particular language, (i. e. the same language with that to be interpreted, which analogy was treated of in a former chapter, and shewn to be useful in ascertaining the usus loquendi), the principles of which are developed by the precepts of grammarians. It is necessary here only to touch upon this analogy. (Morus, p. 168. XV.)

Analogy means similitude. E. g. from the meaning attached to the forms of words, their position, their connection, etc., in one or rather many cases, we argue to establish a similarity of meaning, where the phenomena are the same, in another. This analogy is the foundation of all the rules of grammar, and of all that is established and intelligible in language.

§ 102. *Grammatical analogy useful not only in finding the usus loquendi, but applicable to some doubtful cases.* E. g. when the kind of meaning generally considered is evident, (by comparing other similar words and methods of speaking concerning such things appropriate to the language), we may judge of the special force or power of the word by aid of grammatical analogy; as 1 Pet. 5: 5, where many critics have attached to ἐγκομβώσασθαι an emphatic sense, we must compare the other Greek phrases which relate to *clothing* or *investing*. And thus we shall see that the prepositions περί, ἀμφί, ἐν, are used in composition without any accession of meaning to the verb thereby; and consequently that ἐγκομβώσασθαι is no more than ἐνδύσασθαι, with which it is commuted in Clemens Rom. Ep. 1. p. 39. A good interpreter should be well versed in such comparisons. (Morus, p. 170. XVI.)

§ 103. *Analogy of kindred languages.* Another *analogy* is that of kindred languages; either as descended from one common stock, as Hebrew, Syriac, Chaldee, and Arabic; or derived the one from the other, as Latin and Greek. The former kind of analogy Schultens has explained, and often had recourse to it in his *Origines Ling. Heb.*, and in his various Commentaries.

Morus, on this section, says, that *dialects* differ only in the mode of declining, in the pronunciations and forms of words, etc.; and ranks the Syriac, Chaldee, and Arabic, among the *dialects* of the Hebrew; while he calls the Latin and Greek *cognate* languages. General usage however is against him; for *cognate languages* of the Hebrew, is almost the appropriate name of those which he calls *dialects*.

§ 104. *Use of this analogy.* This analogy is of use to the interpreter, not only in assisting him, by the aid of one dialect, to restore roots which have perished in another that is the subject of his investigation, and thus opening a way of access to the signification of words; but still more useful as a

means of illustrating and confirming that sense of words, which the scope of the discourse commends.

This is a subject deeply interesting to every student of the original languages of the Bible, especially of the Hebrew. Analogy, moderately and judiciously used, is of great worth; but pushed too far, it degenerates into a violation of all the fundamental rules of interpretation. Comp. Morus, p. 176. XIX—XXII, where several valuable cautions may be found. Better still may be found in the admirable Preface of Gesenius to his Hebrew Lexicon, translated and published in the Biblical Repository. See also Jahn on the study of the original languages of the Scriptures, pp. 19, 20 and Note G.

§ 105. *Etymology an uncertain guide.* The fluctuating use of words which prevails in every language, gives rise to frequent changes in their meaning. There are but few words in any language, which always retain their radical and primary meaning. Great care therefore is necessary in the interpreter, to guard against rash *etymological* exegesis; which is often very fallacious. Etymology often belongs rather to the history of language, than to the illustration of its present meaning; and rarely does it exhibit any thing more than a specious illustration.

See an admirable illustration of this, in Campb. Dissert. IV. §§ 15—29.

§ 106. *Expressions which convey a similar meaning are to be compared, although in respect to etymology they may differ.* That analogy is particularly useful to an interpreter, which leads him not only to compare similar words and phrases, and so cast light from the one upon the other; but also to compare expressions, which, though dissimilar in respect to *etymology*, are employed to designate the *same* idea. Of this nature are πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν compared with the Latin *addictus alicui*, and ὡς διὰ πυρός compared with *ambustus*, when the Latin words are used tropically. So we must compare the Hebrew מִבֵּין רַגְלַיִם with the Greek ἐκποδών. For as the Greeks clearly use ἐκποδών where the Latins say *e medio;* so ἐκποδών and מִבֵּין רַגְלַיִם are so much alike, that

the Greek would almost seem to be made out of the Hebrew phrase. Hence we may see that the sense of מִבֵּן רַגְלַיִם is *e medio*. (Morus, p. 180. XXI.)

§ 107. *Foundation of analogy in all languages.* No one can doubt that men are affected in nearly the same way by objects of sense. Hence those who speak of the same objects, perceived and contemplated in the same manner, although they may use language that differs in respect to etymology, yet must be supposed to have meant the same thing; and on this account the one may be explained by the other. (Morus, p. 178. XX.)

Men are physically and mentally affected in the same manner, by very many objects; and of course, it may be presumed that they entertain and mean to express the same ideas concerning these objects, however various their *language* may be. Besides, *modes* of expression are often communicated from one people to another. Of the use to be made of these facts the following section treats.

§ 108. *Use of the above general principle.* In general, this principle is of great extent, and of much use to the interpreter in judging of the meaning of tropical language, and in avoiding fictitious emphasis. Accordingly, we find it resorted to now and then by good interpreters, with great profit. But it needs much and accurate knowledge of many tongues to use it discreetly; whence it is not to be wondered at that its use is not very common among interpreters. (Morus, p. 181. XXII.)

The following general cautions on the subject of comparing words and languages with each other, may be of some utility. (1) The meaning in each or any language is not to be resolved into the authority of lexicons, but that of good writers. (2) Words, phrases, tropes, etc., of any ancient language are to be judged of by the rules of judging among those who spoke that language, and not by those which prevail in modern times, and have originated from different habits and tastes. (3) Guard against drawing conclusions as to the meaning of words, in the same or different languages, from fanciful etymology, similarity or metathesis of letters, etc. (4) When the sense of words can be ascertained in any particular language by the ordinary means, other languages, even kindred ones, should not be resorted to, except for the purpose of increasing illustration or con-

firmation. (5) Take good care that *real* similitude exists, whenever comparison is made. See Morus, pp. 182—184.

§ 109. *Interpretation by appeal to the nature of things, the common sense, views, and feelings of men, etc.* We must also resort to the nature of things, and the analogy of the sentiment which a writer is inculcating, that we may find the true meaning of his words, and not attribute to them more nor less than he did. Every writer, spontaneously or from education, feels that his readers must understand what he is saying, so that there is no danger of misapprehension. It happens not unfrequently, that on this account he uses language which is not altogether accurate, if it be judged of by the rules of logical precision. Of this nature are *catachresis*, *hyperbole*, *hypallage*, and those phrases which assert generally what is true of only a part, or of some particular kind. These and other like modes of speech are introduced by vulgar custom into every language, specially into the oriental ones. They abound in poetry and oratory. Nor is there any particular reason that a writer should take special pains to avoid them. It is necessary therefore in these cases, to have recourse, for the sake of interpretation, to the nature of things (*a*), to innate conceptions, common sense, and the plain elements of knowledge (*b*). Moreover, we must avoid urging mere *verbal* criticism too far, or introducing far fetched etymologies, or hastily concluding that the expression of the author is faulty. Language is made by prevailing usage; nor can that be faulty language, which agrees with the usage of those who are well skilled in it. Wherefore grammatical anomalies are not only free from fault when predominant usage sanctions them, but they become a part of the language, so that one who departs from them may be said to write inaccurately.

(*a*) E. g. *the mind is inflamed;* in interpreting which expression we resort to the nature of the mind, to shew that the sense of *inflamed* must be tropical. So when the sun is said *to rise, go down,* etc.;

God to *ascend, descend*, etc.; we resort to the real *nature* of the objects in question in order to explain the language. So in explaining prophetic language, if the event prophesied has come to pass, we resort to the history of the event, to cast light on the language which predicts it.

(b) E. g. *pluck out thy right eye; cut off thy right hand.* In construing this, our views of the worth of life and of our members, our views of duty as to the preservation of life and usefulness, and our knowledge of the nature of the Christian religion in general, all conspire to lead us to reject the *literal* exposition and to give the words a tropical sense. So when Christ tells his disciples to *salute no one by the way*, etc.; and in like manner, in innumerable other cases.

As to the various figures of speech mentioned in the section above, can it be doubted whether they occur in the Scripture? *Catachresis* is the use of a word so as to attribute to a thing what cannot be really and actually predicted of it. When the heavens then are said to *listen;* the floods to *clap their hands;* the hills to *skip;* the trees of the forest to *exult;* what is this but catachresis of the boldest kind? *Hyperbole* magnifies a thing beyond its real greatness. When the Saviour says: *It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God;* which is afterwards explained as simply meaning, How hardly shall they that have riches be saved; was not his language *hyperbole?* *Hypallage* means a change of appropriate language for unappropriate. E. g. Luke 1: 54, *his mouth and his tongue* ἀνεῴχθη. The student, however, must not be content with a meagre note on this great subject. Let him peruse and re-peruse Lowth's Lectures on Hebrew Poetry, where the nature, design, and extent, of figurative language in the Scriptures, is better unfolded than in any other book of which I have any knowledge. Comp. also Glassii. Philol. Sac. ed. Dathii, Vol. II. (Morus, pp. 185—194)

In regard to that usage by which the whole is put for a part and a part for the whole, it is by no means unfrequent in the Scriptures. How often do we meet with πᾶς or πάντες, when only a large or considerable number is intended. On the other hand, a part is put as the representative of the whole, in very many passages; e. g. Ps. 8: 7, 8. Rom. 8: 38, 39. Surely in the last example here, the apostle does not mean to say that the things which he particularizes, are the only things which are unable to separate us from the love of Christ. He means to say that *nothing* whatever can effect a separation. In all such cases, the extent and nature of the subject, and also the scope of the discourse, must determine the latitude in which the words are to be taken.

Especially must *common sense*, as Ernesti says, be appealed to in the interpretation of parables, allegories, and all kinds of figurative language, proverbial expressions, etc. Every writer adresses himself to the common sense of his fellow men.

§ 110. *The error of pressing etymologies too far not unfrequent.* The fault of pressing etymologies too far, is more

general than we should be apt to imagine. For not only they are guilty of this fault, who explain *all* words by tracing them to their primitive meaning, (which is very common), but those also who always insist too strenuously on the ordinary and grammatical force of a word. Hence arise many false interpretations and fictitious emphases. But of this more hereafter.

CHAPTER IV.

ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

[Keil, pp. 46—60. Beck, pp. 131—136. Seiler, §§ 236—257.]

§ 111. What has been said thus far, in this treatise, has respect to the laws of interpretation *generally* considered. We come now to treat of our subject with reference to the exegesis of the New Testament.

§ 112. *Knowledge of the N. Testament dialect important.* In the first place, we must inquire concerning the kind of language or dialect in general which the writers of the N. Testament use; for a knowledge of this is highly important, in order that we may be able to find the sense of the words and judge of it; as will speedily be shewn.

§ 113. *The question to be here investigated.* This subject in general is comprised in a single question, viz., Is the N. Testament in its words, phrases, and form of language, *pure classic Greek* (*a*); or does it partake of the Hebrew idiom?

The former is defended by Pfochen, Stolberg, E. Schmidt, Blackwall, Georgi, and a few others not very eminent for their knowledge of Greek; the latter by Erasmus, Luther, Melancthon, Camerarius, Beza, Drusius, Casaubon, Glass, Ga-

taker, Solanus, Olearius, Vorstius, and many others who were well skilled in the Greek language; with whom also Origen and Chrysostom agree. (Morus, p. 195. II. Vide etiam pp. 217—222.)

(*a*) We call that a pure style, which has neither barbarisms nor solecisms in it.

§ 114. *What is excluded from the present question.* That this question may be rightly understood and judged of, we must premise, that the inquiry is not, 'Whether some have not mistaken, or do not still mistake, pure Greek expressions for Hebraisms.' We may readily concede this; for error may be and has been committed here, and there are some modes of speech which are common to all languages. (Morus, p. 204. IV. I.)

§ 115. *The question further limited.* Nor is the question, 'Whether the same Greek *words* and *phrases*, occurring in the New Testament, may be found in good Greek authors.' This we may often concede. Nor do we inquire, 'Whether some phrase, apparently a Hebraism, may be found in some sublime or tragic poet, e. g. in Eschylus or Sophocles, and used in the same sense; as ξηρά for the *main land*.' For poets, specially these and lyric ones, say many things in an unusual way, which are not to be imitated in common usage. They even intermix foreign expressions, and sometimes use antiquated phrases. Many such things Stanley has noted in Eschylus; and Zuingle in Pindar, whose preface to this author should be read. The same is the case in Sophocles. (Morus, p. 203—209.)

§ 116. *The same subject continued.* Nor is it inconsistent with the *purity* of N. Testament Greek, that certain words are found which designate objects unknown to the Greeks, and are therefore to be understood in a manner different from Greek usage, because they borrrow their meaning from the

Hebrew manner of speaking. Of this kind are *πίστις*, *μετάνοια*, and other words. (Morus, p. 209. IV.)

§ 117. *The question directly stated.* The question as to the idiom of the N. Testament, turns on the use of such words and phrases as designate those objects that the Greeks are accustomed to designate; and the inquiry here must be, whether such words in the N. Testament are used in the *same* sense which the Greeks attach to them; and whether phrases not only have the same *syntax* as that of classic Greek, but also the same *sense* as in the Greek authors; for this is essential to the *purity* of language. E. g. *δικαιοσύνη* used for *liberality*; *εὐλογία* for *plenty*; *κοινόν* for *profane*. So also *δίκαιος ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, *ἄρτον φάγειν*, *παραστῆναι ἐνώπιον τινός*, etc., have a peculiar sense in the N. Testament. (Morus, pp. 196, 197.)

§ 118. *With what kind of Greek is the N. Testament to be compared?* In regard to the writers with whom the N. Testament Greek is to be compared, we must see that they themselves are pure, i. e. ancient prosaic authors, who have not derived any thing in their style from the Scriptures or the N. Testament; and then historical writers must be compared with historical; doctrinal with doctrinal; poetical with poetical (*a*). (Morus, pp. 208, 209.)

(*a*) Several hymns in the New Testament, and most of the Apocalypse, with occasional quotations from the poetry of the old Testament, are poetical in their *nature*, though not in their form; at least they are not in the form of Greek poetry.

§ 119. *New Testament Greek not pure.* The question being thus stated and defined, we deny, without hesitation, that the diction of the N. Testament is pure Greek; and contend that it is modelled after the Hebrew, not only in single words, phrases, and figures of speech, but in the general texture of the language. This can be established by clear examples, more numerous than even those who agree with us in opinion have supposed. For Luke himself, who is usually thought to be

the most pure in his style, has innumerable Hebraisms. The very beginning of his Gospel, after a short preface of pure Greek (*a*), immediately goes into the use of the Hebrew idiom so exactly, that it seems to be translated literally from a Hebrew original.

(*a*) The *pure* Greek of this Preface is very questionable; as might easily be shewn, if time and circumstances permitted.

§ 120. *Some phrases are common to Greek and Hebrew.* To prove that Hebrew-Greek is the language of the New Testament, by citing examples here, would be superfluous; as these may be found in abundance, by consulting the works of Olearius, Vorstius, Leusden, Glass, and others. It may be proper however to remark, that although certain phrases may be found in pure Greek, yet they may also be Hebraisms. For it may happen, that a writer, in translating a Hebrew expression, may adopt words used by a good Greek writer; which is an observation sanctioned by the authority of Gataker, Hemsterhuis, Raphel, and others. E. g. *χαρὰν χαίρειν*, *metum metuere*, which are good Greek and Latin; but the latter is also of the same tenor as the Hebrew פָּחַד פָּחַד.

§ 121. *Arguments to support the sentiment expressed in* § 119. It is no small argument for the Hebraistic style of the New Testament, that many parts of it can be more easily translated into Hebrew than into any other language; so Erasmus Schmidius confesses, though a strenuous defender of the classic purity of the New Testament. Nay, many parts of the New Testament can be explained in no other way than by means of the Hebrew. Moreover, in many passages, there would arise an absurd and ridiculous meaning, if they should be interpreted according to a pure Greek idiom; as appears from the examples produced by Werenfels, and by me in my essay *De Difficult. interpr. gramm. N. Test.* § 12; to which many others might easily be added. Theo-

logy would have been freed from many errors that have crept in, if Hebraisms had not been interpreted as pure Greek; as Melancthon in his Commentaries has frequently shewn. (Morus, p. 198. III.)

§ 122. *Additional argument.* It is another argument in favour of the Hebraisms of the New Testament, that former Greek and Latin interpreters, who have followed the manner of classic Greek in their interpretations, have often tortured the sense and made it plainly inept. E. g. in explaining *συνδέσμῳ τελειότητος*, as Melancthon remarks. The same thing has happened to modern interpreters who are ignorant of the Hebrew idiom; while to those who are acquainted with it, such passages are very plain. But mistakes on such ground could not be made, if the apostles had written *pure* Greek. (Morus, p. 199.)

§ 123. *Objections answered.* We need not be under any apprehension that the dignity of the New Testament will suffer, by the admission that Hebraisms may be found in its style. *Truth* cannot injure religion; and many reasons moreover may be given, why the Hebrew-Greek style was proper and necessary for the New Testament writers.

(1) The writers of the New Testament could not spontaneously write Greek well, inasmuch as they were born and educated Hebrews; nor did they learn Greek in a scholastic way, nor were they accustomed to the reading of Greek authors. This is true of Paul as well as the others. For although he was born at Tarsus, where schools of rhetoric and philosophy were established, it does not follow that he attended them; nor that he was familiar with the Greek poets, because he quotes a single verse from one of them. Greek taste, style, and literature, were plainly foreign to a man who belonged to the most rigid of the sect of the Pharisees, and was brought up at the feet of Gamaliel.

(2) Nor was it congruous that the Holy Spirit should inspire the apostles to write pure Greek. For passing by the consideration, that if they had written classic Greek no critic would now admit that they were the authors of the books ascribed to them, we may say that the apostles themselves would not have understood their own language, unless by additional inspiration given for this very purpose. Much less would the common people among the Jews have understood it; for whom these books, for the most part, were primarily written; and who, through hatred of the Greeks and of Grecian eloquence, would not have approved of a classic style, it being so contrary to the diction of the Septuagint, and so diverse from the Hebrew Scriptures.

Finally, as the New Testament is built upon the old, the same diction ought to be preserved throughout. (Morus, pp. 210—217.)

§ 124. *Hebrew-Greek idiom does not necessarily make the style of the New Testament obscure.* Nor does the Hebrew idiom of the New Testament injure its perspicuity. Every writer has special reference to his own times, to those for whom he primarily writes; not to future times, so as to neglect his contemporaries. The obscurity which arises from this mode of writing is not a *necessary* one, but results merely from the change which time makes in languages. It is an obscurity common to all good ancient writers; for the ground of it lies in the ignorance of later readers, and not in the writers.

§ 125. *Language of the New Testament is Hebrew-Greek.* Hence the style of the New Testament may justly be named *Hebrew-Greek.* If any with Scaliger and Drusius choose to call it *Hellenistic*, let them not with Heinsius understand by this a peculiar *dialect;* which Salmasius has sufficiently refuted. Nor would I name it the *Alexandrine* dialect; for the

Jews in other places wrote in the same style. The Alexandrine dialect, concerning which there is extant a little book of one Irenaeus an Alexandrine grammarian, respects merely peculiarities of language appropriate to the Alexandrians; such for example as existed among the Attics, Ionians, etc. Some choose to call it the Macedonian dialect, because many words in the New Testament are peculiar to the Macedonians, and the language agrees more with that of Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, etc., than with that of the ancient Greek writers. (Morus, pp. 222—234.)

§ 126. *It also comprises Latinisms.* Nor is all which is not pure Greek of course to be named *Hebraism;* for some words are of Latin derivation, occasioned by intercourse with the Romans; and others are of the Syriac, Chaldee, or Rabbinic dialect. Vide Olearius de Stylo Nov. Test. Sect. didac. ii. iii.; et Wetstenium ad N. Test. Acta. 13. 48. (Morus, pp. 235—238.)

Besides Latinisms, as σπεκουλάτωρ, κουστωδία, and such phrases as λαμβάνειν συμβούλιον *consilium capere*, ἐργασίαν δοῦναι *operam dare*, etc., there are Persian words to be found in the New Testament, as μάγοι, ἀγγαρεύειν; Syriasms, as ἀββᾶ, μαρὰν ἀθά; also Chaldaisms and Rabbinisms. See Marsh's Michaelis on the New Testament idioms.

§ 127. *Method of finding the usus loquendi of the New Testament not difficult.* These things being settled respecting the general nature of the New Testament diction, it will be easy to point out the method of ascertaining the *usus loquendi*, and of drawing aid from it in the interpretation of particular passages so as to assist the interpreter.

§ 128. *Rules for finding the usus loquendi.* First, the interpreter should be well skilled in the Greek and Hebrew idioms; so that he can distinguish between pure Greek, and that method of writing which is derived from another language. This is necessary in order rightly to interpret either. In re-

gard to a good Greek, he must specially consult not only the writers who have used the popular language, but writers of a proximate age, who have imitated the Attic diction, though not studiously. Among these are Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, and Artemidorus; in which authors are many words common to the New Testament, either not used at all by the Old Greeks, or else used in a different sense. (Morus, p. 238—240.)

§ 129. *Much caution necessary to decide what is classic and what is Hebrew-Greek; Sept. and Hebrew to be compared.* In all places, therefore, let him carefully examine whether the diction be pure Greek or not; in which there is more difficulty than one might be apt to suppose. Where the diction departs from pure Greek, let him resort to the Hebrew. To do this properly, he must not only be acquainted with the genius of the Hebrew, as it is developed in the forms and tenses of words, in the construction of them, and in the junction of the members of a sentence, (which however will often be sufficient), but he must also know by what Greek words the Jews were accustomed to express Hebrew things, when they spoke in the then *common* Greek style, without aiming, like Philo and Josephus, at elegant classic diction. In this way, by a proper comparison with the Hebrew, he may elicit the sense.

Sometimes there is no better method than to translate the Greek directly into the Hebrew; which often-times may be easily done by a tolerable Hebrew scholar, both as it respects single words and also phrases. But at other times, this is difficult on account of the rare occurrence of words, or the obscurity of them, or the dissimilar etymology. The Septuagint, therefore, must often be consulted; and the interpreter should be so familiar with it, as readily to know in what way Hebrew expressions are translated into Greek. For as the

origin of speaking and writing in Greek, concerning sacred things, took its rise from that version, so IT IS EVIDENT, THAT THIS VERSION MUST BE THE BASIS OF ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE HEBREW-GREEK.

It will be useful also to be well acquainted with writers on the Hebraisms of the New Testament in general; such as Vorstius, Leusden, and specially Gataker, the most learned of them all. (Morus, p. 241. ii.)

§ 130. *Aquila and Symmachus to be studied.* It will be proper, moreover, to study the remains of Aquila's Greek version, which exhibits a similar diction; as he was not very remote from the age of the apostles, and has some things in his version which may be of special use here. The version of Symmachus should also be read, who, by translating into pure Greek, has made the understanding of Hebrew more easy.

In addition to the Hebrew-Greek mentioned in §§ 128—130, the Apocrypha is of special use in the attainment of this idiom. Also the apocryphal books of the New Testament, and several of the apostolic fathers, exhibit a style in many respects partaking of this idiom. Comp. Morus, p. 241—245.

§ 131. *When the Hebrew idiom is to be preferred.* It is a sound maxim too, that when the same word or phrase is Hebraistic, and also good Greek, and a meaning not at all incongruous may be assigned to it as used according to either idiom, we should prefer that sense which accords with the Hebrew idiom. For it is more probable that Hebrew writers used the latter idiom; especially if the phrase, understood as classic Greek, should be of the more polished and refined kind. Accordingly I should explain καταβολὴν σπέρματος, Hebrews 11: 11, by the Hebrew in Genesis 4: 25, rather than from the Greek idiom. So ἀποθνήσκειν ἐν ἁμαρτίαις, John 8: 24, by the Greek idiom would mean, *you will persevere to the end of life in sinning;* by the Hebrew, *you will be condemned on account of your sins.* (Morus, p. 246. XI.)

Εἰς καταβολὴν σπέρματος, in respect to the beginning or *foundation of offspring*, i. e. in respect to conception; which neither the Greek nor Hebrew idiom, as to any thing peculiar, would explain. The nature of the case and the general signification of the words offer the requisite explanation.

§ 132. *In the doctrines of religion, the Hebrew idiom is to be specially regarded.* An interpreter should particularly observe, that when things appropriate to religion, specially to the Christian religion, are spoken of, the idiom should be referred to the Hebrew; because, in speaking of religious matters, the writers of the New Testament were accustomed to use the phraseology of the Hebrew Scriptures. The interpreter will be much assisted here by the analogy of doctrine; with which he ought to be familiar, lest the words of the New Testament should be drawn to a sense alien from that which the authors desired to express, and different from the essential points of religion. (Morus, p. 246. XII.)

§ 133. *Specially is Hebrew idiom to be regarded in respect to the forms, tenses, and numbers of words.* Nor should the maxims here inculcated be applied only to the meaning of words and phrases, but also to the forms and tenses of verbs, and also to the *number* of both nouns and verbs. In respect to these things, the idiom of the New Testament not unfrequently departs from classic Greek, and follows the Hebrew. An interpreter who neglects this will fall into great difficulties, and commit many surprising and almost ridiculous mistakes. (Morus, p. 248.)

§ 134. *Other idioms to be consulted in certain cases.* When the Hebrew idiom fails us in the explication of a passage or word, we must then have recourse specially to the Syriac, Chaldee, or Rabbinic. All concede that we should have recourse to the Syriac and Chaldee; but all do not rightly understand the nature of this comparison, as is evident from the attempts of some, who have endeavored to

cast light upon the Greek of the New Testament by comparing the Syriac version of it. The right method of proceeding is to have recourse to the Syriac, when we find ourselves deserted by the Hebrew. If we find the idiom to be Syriac, then we can attain to the meaning of the phrase or word, when we have attained to a right understanding of the Syriac which corresponds with it. This may be more easily and certainly attained, provided the Syriac be still a living language; which however I find to be doubted (*a*).

The same may be said of the Chaldee and Rabbinic. But he who expects aid different from that which has just been described, will seek and hope for it in vain. He will either labor to no purpose in heaping up what will be useless; or will abuse, to a bad purpose, a help in exegesis which is by no means to be despised. At most, he will only be able to determine whether the Syriac interpreter has rightly translated or not. (Morus, p. 249, XIII.)

(*a*) The Syriac is, beyond all doubt, spoken still among the literary class of the Nestorians; as the letters of the Rev. Justin Perkins, missionary at Ooroomiah in Persia fully evince.

§ 135. *Direct testimony not always sufficient.* Thus far we have described the method of discovering the *usus loquendi* in particular passages of the new Testament, by evidence which we call *direct.* But although this evidence is important and goes very far, yet alone it is not always sufficient. There are many things in the New Testament which are described in a novel way, because the things themselves are *new.* Not that a religion absolutely new is taught; but ancient doctrines are delivered in language more perspicuous, appropriate, and distinctive, the veil of figures and allegories being removed. *New words were therefore necessary in order to decsribe new things;* among which words are many that are adapted to designate certain things, on account of some similitude to them. These words, by the way, were not

invented by the apostles, and could not have been; for such invention is a thing that belongs to minds trained up by literary discipline, and not to unlettered men. We may conclude, therefore, that terms of such a kind were suggested by the Holy Spirit; which is an argument in favor of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures. Of this nature are such words as δαιμονίζεσθαι, τάρταρος, ἀναγεννᾶν, and others. (Morus, p. 249. XIV.)

§ 136. *New words to be explained by testimony direct and indirect.* Such words cannot be explained from the more ancient *usus loquendi*, but have an interpretation peculiar to themselves; yet this is not less certain than the other which is gathered from ancient usage. This interpretation depends on the direct testimony of the writers. Hence it must be gathered from the collation of similar passages; as we have already taught above. (Morus, p. 251.)

§ 137. *Greek fathers to be consulted.* Nor is the testimony of the ancient Greek fathers of the church by any means to be neglected, which has respect to the meaning of words and phrases; whether it be the testimony of professed interpreters, or of other writers. Respecting a choice of interpreters among the fathers, and the use to be made of them, we shall hereafter treat. I would merely observe here, that in those authors who are not direct interpreters, passages of the New Testament now and then occur in such a connection, or with such adjuncts, that we may clearly perceive what meaning the age attached to them. Such interpretations we find in Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, Hippolytus, Cyril of Jerusalem, and others. The interpreter, in reading such authors, should diligently attend to this. (Morus, p. 251. III.)

§ 138. *These may exhibit interpretations of the primitive age of Christianity.* In writers of very early times, there

may, not improbably, be interpretations that have come down from the apostolic age; certainly if they are consentaneous with apostolic doctrines, they are not lightly to be rejected. It is one mark that they are worthy of our approbation, if they are of a character appropriate to the apostolic style, formed and moulded after the genius and idiom of the Hebrew (*a*). (Morus, ubi supra.)

(*a*) But who will venture to decide upon this, except by the use of the common means of interpretation?

§ 139. *Glossaries.* The ancient glossaries may be of use here, specially that of Hesychius; in which is found many things pertaining to certain passages of the New Testament that were deduced from the most ancient interpreters of it, and which are of a character by no means to be despised.

Similar to these are a few of the glossaries of Suidas, and also of Photian; both of which are to be used with that caution, in respect to any particular word, which requires us well to ascertain whether the word in the glossary really belongs to the passage which we desire to interpret.

In regard to all these things, good judgment is requisite in order to determine what is useful and what is worthless, and to distinguish between them; which is done much in the way that has been above described. (Morus, p. 252. IV.)

§ 140. *Glosses.* Even the glosses in some manuscripts which have crept into the text of the New Testament in place of the true reading, may be used to assist the interpreter either to understand the true text, or to find means for illustrating or confirming the true interpretation. Thus for ἐρέυνησον in John 7: 52, Chrysostom has the reading ἐρώτησον Homil. 51, and explains it by μάθε, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἐρώτησον. These glosses may have flowed from the ancient schools instructed by Origen; although some indeed may have proceeded from the Latin commentaries. (Morus, ubi supra.)

§ 141. *Context.* When all the above mentioned means fail, we must then resort to the context, and to the well known nature of the things themselves. (Morus, p. 252. V.)

§ 142. *Analogy of faith.* The analogy of Scripture and of Christian doctrine should be always before our eyes, so that the interpretation may be guided by it, i. e. that it may be so far guided by it as that no explanation contrary to it should be adopted; and in the obscure phrases, where the meaning may be doubtful, the sense may be accommodated to the analogy of Scripture sentiment.

This rule need not be wondered at, as common sense has sanctioned it and applied it to the interpretation of other books; all of which are to be explained, generally, and in particular passages, agreeably to the analogy of that doctrine which they contain.

Analogy of doctrine or faith does not consist in the doctrine which is approved by any particular body of men, as uncandid or unskilful persons assert; for then it would be various and inconstant. *Grammatical* analogy is the rule of speaking, or form of speech, constituted by the laws of the language, which is opposed to *anomaly* or a method of speaking in opposition to usage, or varying from it. In like manner, the analogy of sacred doctrine or faith consists in the summary of religion, and the rules plainly taught in the Scriptures; whence the Latin church called it *regula fidei.* To this analogy all things are to be referred, so that nothing may be discordant with it. And when this is done, the analogy of faith is said to be preserved. Nor as to faith and practice does analogy of Scripture differ from analogy of doctrine. Examples of analogy, and of judgment agreeably to analogy, may be found in Galatians 6: 15, 16. 1 Corinthians 15: 3—11, etc., where the writer calls that analogy τὰ πρῶτα. In all the departments of learning, analogy of such a kind has the force

of a rule, both in our judgment and interpretation of a passage. (Morus, p. 253. XVI.)

In a special manner must we betake ourselves to analogy, in those passages which seem to speak what disagrees with that which is plainly taught in other parts of the Scriptures, and with common sense, concerning divine and human things. For it is common to all uninspired writers, although eloquent and thinking and writing with acuteness and subtilty, that when they are not composing a summary of doctrine, or the elements of it, nor treating designedly of any head of doctrine, they exhibit the common views and elements of learning, as taught by usual discipline and instruction. Nor do they always speak of things in such a way as a subtile and scholastic method of discipline would demand; but often use the more vulgar and popular methods of expression. The same traits of style are found in the works of the sacred writers; who in all respects desired to speak, and must have spoken in order to be understood, *more humano;* the Holy Spirit so guiding them, that they differed as little as possible from the usual method of speaking. It is not therefore to be wondered at, if we find in their expressions some things seemingly harsh, since this is characteristic of the oriental genius and method of expression. (Morus, pp. 255—259.)

Respecting the subject of analogy, compare § 34.

§ 143. *Difficult idioms to be specially studied.* The student who aspires to the faculty of interpreting, should be familiar and well acquainted with the more difficult forms of speech in the sacred writers, or those forms which differ from the idioms of our own language, and are not adapted to express with simplicity, and logical accuracy, principles of any doctrine. A right understanding of these he must by all means attain; so that he may not be impeded in his inquiries, or thrown into embarrassment by them. E. g. many things are

affirmed *simply* and *without any limitation*, which however are to be understood as having only a *particular* and *partial application*. Specially is this the case in moral propositions. In like manner, active verbs do not always indicate action or efficacy properly considered; which Glass in his Philol. Sacra, Calovius de persona Christi, p. 527, and Turretin de Interp. Sac. Literarum, have already noted. (Morus, p. 256, I. II.)

§. 144. *Difficult forms in profane writers to be studied.* It will be very useful also to attend to such forms of speech in common books, or classics; for there is scarcely any form of speech in the sacred books, which is not found in other writings. Nor can there be any doubt that an interpreter will understand the Scriptures with much more facility, if he be familiar and well acquainted with the difficulties and obscure forms of speech in other books. Those things which appear to be somewhat hard or clogged in the writings of Paul, will not be wondered at, nor give offence, if one goes from the study of Thucydides to the interpretation of the apostle. Nor will such an one be alarmed at faults, which seem hardly to be compatible with the dignity and sanctity of the Scriptures; nor at transpositions, apparent want of consistency in construction, enallages, and the like things. This has indeed often happened to some good men; but they were not well skilled in the languages. Such an alarm is rather the result of unlearned superstition than of a judicious reverence for the word of God; as Melancthon has justly observed in his Dedic. Epist. ad Romanos.

CHAPTER V.

RULES IN RESPECT TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE.

[Keil, pp. 115—128. Beck, pp. 129—136. Seiler, §§ 50—78.]

§ 145. *Design of this chapter.* Having explained the method of finding the sense of the New Testament by the *usus loquendi* or other artificial aids, we come now to treat separately of certain things which usually are not enough explained, nor made sufficiently explicit in regard to theory or practice. The first of these respects *tropes;* the second, *emphasis;* the third, *apparent contradictions* or *discrepancies.* Of these in their order.

§ 146. *Duty of an interpreter in respect to tropical language.* In respect to tropical language the office of the interpreter is twofold. First, he must rightly distinguish it from language not tropical, so as not to mistake the one for the other, (as formerly the disciples of Jesus and the Jews mistook some of the Saviour's discourses (*a*), and so as not to pervert the *proper* sense of words by a *tropical* interpretation. Secondly, he must rightly interpret tropes, and give their true sense. For it often happens that men think they have attained the *tropical* sense of words, when they understand only the *literal* one; and they are deluded by an empty shadow, or pervert the trope by an etymological interpretation. To avoid these faults, it is proper to give rules drawn from the nature of tropical diction as learned from use and observation, by which the interpreter may be guided in judging of and interpreting figurative language. (Morus, p. 274. IX.)

(*a*) E. g. John 6: 52. John 4: 11. Matt. 16: 6—12.

§ 147. *Certain rules respecting tropical diction examined.*

In order to judge of diction whether it should be taken in a literal or tropical sense, the vulgar maxim is, *not readily to depart from the literal sense.* But this maxim is neither strictly true, nor perspicuous, nor adapted to use. (Morus, p. 320.)

Not easily (non facile), if you rightly understand the phrase, means *almost never*, *very rarely.* This is erroneous; for tropes in the sacred writings are *very common*, so much so that Glass has filled a large volume with them. It is ambiguous; for it describes no certain mark or characteristic by which *tropical* language may be distinguished from that which is to be *literally* understood; which is certainly a great fault in a rule.

Danhauer, Tarnoff, and Calovius, have stated the principle in question with more distinctness, when they aver *that the literal meaning is not to be deserted without evident reason or necessity.* No one will deny that where there is plain and necessary reason for departure from the *literal* sense, we may admit the *tropical.* But some *apparent* repugnance of things or facts is not hastily to lead us to reject the *literal* sense. The older writers regard the phrase *proper sense* as of the same meaning with *literal* or *historic sense;* and rightly teach that *we should not depart from the customary signification of a word without a weighty and sufficient reason.* That we may sometimes depart from it is evident, from the fact that the sacred writers themselves do, beyond all doubt, sometimes depart from it. And indeed, in respect to many words, the tropical sense is the *customary* or *usual* one. (Morus, p. 320.)

§ 148. *How to examine whether language is tropical.* We may commonly understand, at once, whether a word is to be taken tropically or not, by simply examining the object spoken of, either by the external or internal senses, or by renewing the perception of the object. To judge of figurative

language, in such cases, is very easy; and in uninspired writings, it very rarely happens that there is any doubt about it, because the objects spoken of are such as may be examined by our senses, external or internal, and therefore the language may be easily understood (*a*).

In the Scriptures, however, doubts have frequently arisen from the nature of the subjects there treated; which are such as cannot be subjected to the examination of our senses. E. g. the divine nature (*b*), divine operations, etc., are subjects beyond the scrutiny of our senses; and the question, Whether the language that respects such things is to be understood literally or tropically? has given rise to fierce controversies, which are still continued (*c*). In these, the parties have often disputed about tropical diction, in a way which savoured more of metaphysical or dialectical subtility than of truth. (Morus, p. 275. XI.)

(*a*) E. g. *Inflamed mind* we understand tropically, by repeating the perception of the idea of *mind*, and taking notice that the literal meaning of *inflamed* is incongruous with it. In interpreting the phrase *snowy locks*, we appeal to the external senses, which determine that the meaning of *snowy* here must be tropical.

(*b*) To the language which respects God and his operations, may be added all that respects the invisible things of a future state, i. e. heaven, hell, etc. The controversy whether descriptions of this nature are to be literally or tropically understood, is by no means at an end. One of the things which the human mind learns very slowly, is to detach itself from conceptions that arise from material objects, and to perceive that in *all* the descriptions of a future state, words are of absolute necessity employed which originally have a literal sense, because language affords no other. Even the internal operations of our own mind, we are obliged, for the same reason, to describe in language that of necessity must be tropically understood. Almost all men, indeed, now allow that most of the language employed to describe God and his operations, is necessarily to be understood as tropical. Most men will allow that the language which respects the heavenly world may be so considered; but what regards the day of judgment, or the world of woe, they would strenuously contend, must be literally understood. There is indeed sufficient inconsistency in this, and it betrays no small degree of unacquaintance with the nature and principles of interpretation; but as it is productive of no consequences specially bad, the error is hardly worth combating. The motive no doubt may be good, which leads to the adoption of this error. The apprehension

is, that if you construe the language which respects the day of judgment or the world of woe figuratively, you take away the *reality* of them. Just as if reality did not, of course, lie at the basis of all figurative language, which would be wholly devoid of meaning without it. But how inconsistent too is this objection! The very person who makes it, admits that the language employed to describe God and his operations, and also to describe the heavenly world, is *tropical;* that it must of *necessity* be construed so. But does this destroy the *reality* of a God and of his operations, and of the heavenly world?

(c) Who is ignorant of the innumerable controversies that have arisen about the tropical and literal sense of a multitude of passages in the sacred writings? Almost all the enthusiasm and extravagance that have been exhibited in respect to religion, have had no better support than gross material conceptions of figurative language; or, not unfrequently, language that should be *properly* understood has been *tropically* construed. There is no end to the mistakes on this ground. Nor are they limited to enthusiasts and fanatics. They develope themselves not unfrequently in the writings of men, grave, pious, excellent, and in other parts of theological science very learned. Indeed it is but a recent thing, that it has come to be considered a science, and a special and essential branch of theological science—to study the nature of language, and above all, the nature of the oriental biblical languages. Long has this been admitted in respect to the classics, and all works of science in ancient languages. But in regard to the Bible, the most ancient book in the world, and written in a language the idiom of which is exceedingly diverse from our own, it seems to have been very generally taken for granted, that no other study was necessary to discover its meaning than what is devoted to any common English books. At least, a Bible with marginal references, studied by a diligent and careful use of these references, may surely, as many seem to think, be understood in a satisfactory manner. In very many cases, the *first* thing has been to study theology; the *second*, to read the bible in order to find proofs of what had already been adopted as matter of belief. This order is now beginning to be reversed. The nature of language, of scripture-language, of figurative language, and of interpretation, is now beginning to be studied as a science; and the acquisition of this is one of the greatest ends of study, as it is the only proper mode of leading a theologian to the knowledge of what the Bible really contains. Here too is a common arbiter of the disputes that exist in the Christian world. The nature of language and of tropical words thoroughly understood, will prostrate, among all intelligent and candid men who really love the truth, a great part of all the diversities of opinion that exist.

§ 149. *Certain words not tropical.* Those words are not to be regarded as tropical which have lost their *original* and *proper* signification, and are used no longer in any but a secondary sense; as we have already shewn.

§ 150. *Words tropical, where the subject and predicate disagree.* Beyond all doubt those phrases are tropical, the subject and predicate of which are *heterogeneous;* as where corporeal and incorporeal, animate and inanimate, rational and irrational are conjoined (*a*); and also species belonging to a different genus. Things that cannot possibly exist in any particular subject, cannot be logically predicated of it; for the fundamental rules of logic in respect to this are inherent in the human mind. If then such things *appear* to be predicated, the phrase must be tropically understood. (Morus, p. 278. XII.)

By this rule the language of the New Testament should be interpreted which respects the person of Jesus, to whom divine and human qualities are attributed. For the latter are attributed to him as a man; the former, as a divine person united with the human; and therefore they may be *properly* understood.

(*a*) E. g. *the fields smile, the stones cry out, the floods clap their hands*, etc.

§ 151. *Laws, history, didactic works, seldom admit tropes.* As the customary use of language shows the above principle to be correct, so the same use also shows that tropical language is rarely employed in several cases now to be mentioned, if you except words which have lost their primary signification, or such as constitute very easy tropes. Legislators in their statutes; historians in their narrations of facts, where they aim simply at the declaration of them, (for some narrations are designedly ornate and decorated to please the fancy); and those who teach any branch of science where the *direct* object is teaching and not merely occasional allusions; all these employ tropes very seldom. Hence it follows, that in writings of such a kind tropes are not to be acknowledged, unless it can be clearly shewn that either by general usage, or by the use of the writer, certain tropical words are appro-

priated to designate particular things. Of this nature are several words of the New Testament, e. g. those which signify *illumination*, *regeneration*, etc. (Morus, p. 281. XIV.)

The principle laid down in this section needs more explanation. It is not correct that in the Mosaic law, for example, and in the gospels and epistles, there are not a great abundance of tropical words. But still, it is true that these compositions, so far as they are mere precept, mere narration, and mere language of instruction, comprise as few tropes as the nature of the case will admit, and these mostly of the easier and more obvious kind.

The importance of the principle thus defined is very great. Some interpreters, in ancient and modern times, have turned into allegory the whole Jewish ceremonial law. So, formerly and recently, the history of the creation of the world, the fall of man, the flood, the account of the tower of Babel, etc., have been explained either as μῦθοι, or as philosophical allegories, i. e. philosophical speculations on these subjects, clothed in the garb of narration. By the same principles of exegesis the gospels are treated as μῦθοι, which exhibit an imaginary picture of a perfect character in the person of Jesus. In a word, every narration in the Bible of an occurrence which is of a miraculous nature in any respect, is μῦθος; which means, as its abettors say, that some real fact or occurrence lies at the basis of the story, which is told agreeably to the very imperfect conceptions and philosophy of ancient times, or has been augmented and adorned by tradition and fancy.

But that such liberties with the language of Scripture are utterly incompatible with the sober principles of interpretation, is sufficiently manifest from the bare statement of them. The object of the interpreter is, *to find out what the sacred writers meant to say.* This done, his task is performed. Party philosophy or skepticism cannot guide the interpretation of language. Comp. Morus, pp. 281—291.

§ 152. *Usus loquendi in regard to things which cannot be examined by our feelings and conceptions.* In regard to divine things which can be known merely by revelation and cannot be examined by the test of our own feelings or views, we can judge only from the *usus loquendi* of the sacred writers, whether their language is to be understood literally or tropically.

This *usage* can be known only from the comparison of similar passages; which is done in various ways. (1) When different words are employed in different passages respecting the same thing, it is easy to judge which are tropical. E. g. the phrase *to be born of water*, John 3: 5, is *tropical;* for the

same thing is *literally* expressed in Mark 16: 16 (*a*). (2). When the same word is used every where respecting the same thing, it has a *proper* sense (*b*). (3) When the same method of expression is constantly used respecting divers things, which are similar, or which have some special connection, it is to be understood literally (*c*). (Morus, p. 291. XV.)

(*a*) So the בְּרִית *covenant* which God made with Abraham, is explained in Gal. 3: 16 as meaning a *promise*. The latter, as being plain, is to direct us in the interpretation of the other passage. (*b*) E. g. *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα, ζωοποιεῖται*, are *constantly* used in respect to that which is to take place at the end of the world, and therefore are not tropical.

(*c*) Which rule requires some abatement. E. g. God gave the Israelites *bread from heaven*, and Christ gives his disciples *bread from heaven*. The latter is very different from manna. In fact, the latter case is plainly an instance of tropical language. The context, then, or nature of the subject treated of, is to be our guide in such cases.

§ 153. *Adjuncts useful in determining when words are tropical.* We may also form a judgment respecting tropical language, from the adverbs, epithets, or other limitations expressing the manner or nature of things. (Morus, p. 295. XVI.)

This case resolves itself substantially into the principle of the following section.

§ 154. *Context to be consulted.* The context also will frequently assist us. For when the whole passage is allegorical, we must acknowledge a trope in particular parts that are connected with the whole allegory. E. g. *πυρός*, in 1 Cor. 3: 13, which relates, to *ξύλα*, and *χόρτον* in the context. In like manner the language is to be regarded as tropical, when, although the preceding context is to be literally understood, there is a manifest transition to allegory. (Morus, ubi supra. Comp. also § 99.)

Thus far respecting the means of distinguishing what is tropical.

§ 155. *Sources of tropical interpretation.* In regard to

interpreting tropical language, we may observe that there are two sources of aid. The one is the subject itself; the other, the *usus loquendi.* The interpretation by the aid of the subject is easy, when the nature of it affords an obvious similitude; e. g. *φωτισμός* is easily understood as used tropically.

In regard to the *usus loquendi*, the general usage of the Hebrew tongue in respect to tropical words must be first understood, as in words corresponding to *ζωή*, *θάνατον*, *τιμή*, *δόξη*, etc.; then Greek usage in general. Passages must also be compared in which the same thing is expressed by a *proper* word, or in which such *proper* word is employed in the context so that the sense is obvious. Here too we may use the comparison of words that are conjoined and similar; examples of which will hereafter be produced.

§ 156. *Caution to be used in judging from etymology.* We must be very cautious, however, not to judge of tropes from mere etymology; as this is very fallacious. E. g. *ὀρθοτομεῖν*, in 2 Tim. 2: 15, some have interpreted as implying a distinction between the law and the gospel; which is mere trifling, For *λόγος ἀληθείας* in the context means the *gospel;* the law is not the subject of discourse here. Analogy of the language might have taught them, that *ὀρθοτομεῖν* here means to *possess right views* of the gospel and *correctly to communicate these* to others. So the ancients understood it, and Gerhard among the moderns; *ὀρθοτομία*, being anciently commuted with *ὀρθοδοξία*, and *καινοτομεῖν* being used to signify *entertaining and disseminating novel opinions respecting religion.* (Morus, p. 298, XIX.)

§ 157. *Method of determining whether a trope is adequately understood.* It is one proof that you understand tropical language, if you can substitute *proper* words for *tropical* ones. Not that a person who can do this always rightly understands the words; but if he cannot do it, he certainly does *not* un-

derstand them. The sacred writers themselves sometimes subjoined proper words to tropical ones, e. g. Col. 2: 7. The best Greek and Latin writers frequently do the same thing.

It is useful also to make the experiment, whether, when the image presented by the tropical expression is removed from the mind, any idea still remains in it different from the image itself which can be expressed by a proper word. This experiment is specially to be made when words designating sensible objects are transferred to the expression of intellectual ones, e. g. θάνατος, ζωή, διαθήκη, etc; in respect to which it is easy to be deceived. (Morus, p. 300. XX.)

The context, the nature of the subject, and parallel passages are the most effectual means of ascertaining this.

OF ALLEGORIES.

[Compare Keil, pp. 115—120. Beck, p. 129. II. Seiler, §§ 41—78. Much more satisfactory will be Morus, *Dissert. de causis Allegoriæ explicandis*, in his *Dissert. Theol. Philol.* Vol. I. pp. 370—393.]

§ 158. *Allegories how interpreted.* As allegories frequently occur in the sacred books, which abound in tropical diction, it seems proper to say something here of the method of interpreting them. First of all, the general design of the allegory is to be ascertained; which is easily done when it is connected with a context explanatory of its design. For the most part, however, it is expressly declared. (Morus, p. 301. XXI.)

[3] Ἀλληγωρία is derived from ἄλλο ἀγωρεῖται, i. e. *a different thing is said* from that which is meant. It differs from metaphor, in that it is not confined to a word but extends to a whole thought, or it may be several thoughts. Allegory may be expressed moreover by pictures, Ezech. 4: 1; by actions Ezech. III. IV. V. Luke 22: 36; or by any significant thing.

One most important principle in explaining allegories is omitted by Ernesti. I refer to the rule, that *comparison is* NOT *to be extended to all the circumstances of the allegory*. Thus in the parable of the good Samaritan, the point to be illustrated is *the extent of the duty of beneficence*. Most of the circumstances in the parable go to make up merely the verisimilitude of the narration, so that it may give pleasure to him who hears or reads it. But how differently does the whole appear,

when it comes to be interpreted by an allegorizer of the *mystic* school? The man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho is Adam wandering in the wilderness of this world; the thieves who robbed and wounded him are evil spirits; the priest who passed by on the one side without relieving him is the Levitical law; the Levite is good works; the good Samaritan is Christ; the oil and wine are grace, etc. What may not a parable be made to mean, if imagination is to supply the place of reasoning and philology? And what riddle or oracle of Delphos could be more equivocal, or of more multifarious significancy, than the Bible, if such exegesis be admissible? It is a miserable excuse which interpreters make for themselves, that they render the Scriptures more edifying and significant by interpreting them in this manner. And are the Scriptures then to be made more significant than God has made them; or to be mended by the skill of the interpreter, so as to become more edifying than the Holy Spirit has made them? If there be a semblance of piety in such interpretations, a semblance is all. Real piety and humility appear to the best advantage in receiving the Scriptures as they are, and expounding them as simply and skilfully as the rules of language will render practible, rather than by attempting to amend and improve the revelation which God has made.

§ 159. This being done, the primary word is to be sought for, and the force of it expressed by a proper word. Other tropical words are then to be explained agreeably to this (*a*). In this way the explanation of particular things will be rendered more easy, and we may avoid errors. The design of the exhortation in the form of allegory, found in 1 Corinthians 5: 6, is, that the Corinthians should be purified from vitious inclinations and the faults springing from them. *Ζύμη*, therefore, here means *vice; ἄζυμος, free from vice*, viz. the being a true Christian. *Ἑορτάζειν*, consequently, is not *to celebrate a feast*, according to its proper signification, for a *tropical* meaning is required. It means *to serve God, to worship God, to be a Christian, to be free from former vices and worship him in purity.*

It is altogether incongruous to understand one part literally and another tropically, in the same allegory (*b*); as those do who take *πυρός* in 1 Corinthians 3: 15 literally, when all the context is to be understood tropically. Indeed the expression *ὡς διὰ πυρός* makes it plain, that the word is to be figuratively understood. (Morus, p. 309. XXV.)

(*a*) The meaning of the author is, that the word which designates the leading design of the allegory being explained, the remainder is to be interpreted in conformity with it.

(*b*) This rule is of great importance and of wide extent. I wish I could add, that it is not every day transgressed by multitudes who expound the Scriptures.

To the brief precepts here given by Ernesti, may be added from Morus, (1) That we must sometimes resort to history, in order fully to explain allegory. E. g. the kingdom of God is likened to leaven, which gradually ferments the whole mass into which it is put; and to a grain of mustard seed, which gradually springs up and becomes a large plant. History shows that the Church has arisen from small beginnings, and is extending itself through the earth. (2) The nature of the subject will frequently direct the interpretation of the allegory. E. g. *Ye are the salt of the earth*, etc., Matt. 5: 13. The subject is, the instructions to be given by the disciples. The leading word (salt) in the allegory means *instruction;* and the sentiment of the passage is: Ye are the teachers by whom others are to be preserved from corruption, i. e. destruction. See Morus, pp. 311—313.

§ 160. *Parables.* Not unlike to the method of interpreting allegories is that of explaining *parables*, which often contain allegory. We must guard here against urging too far the meaning of all parts of a parabolical narration, and refer the particular parts to the general design, so that all may be accommodated to it. It is a very common fault of interpreters to urge the explanation too far; but it is a very great fault. Therefore in Luke 15: 11, etc., we are not to seek for a doctrinal meaning in στολή, μόσχος, δακτύλιος, etc. Such circumstances are commonly added to complete the *form* of the narration, and to make it a more finished picture of what might be supposed to have happened; as is commonly done in stories, fables, and other things of like nature. (Morus, pp. 314—320.)

Parable, in Greek usage, means *any comparison introduced into a discourse*. It may be called an *example* taken from things real or fictitious, and designed for special and graphical illustration. The means of explaining it are the context, the subject, the occasion, etc., as in allegory. The caution suggested by Ernesti against interpreting all the minute circumstances of a parable so as to give them a mystic significancy, is very important.

It should be added here, that *allegory* differs from *parable* only in the style and mode of expression. Take an allegory and express it in the historic style, and you convert in into a parable. Hence the

same rules of exegesis apply to both. Comp. Beck, p. 134. Keil, §§ 78—81. Seiler, 71—78 and § 183. But specially worthy of thorough study is Storr's *Comment. de Parabolis Christi*, Opuscula. Vol. I. p. 89. See Lowth's Lectures on Allegory and Parables, Lect. x—xii.

CHAPTER VI.

RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS.

[Keil, § 42. Beck, p. 130. III. Seiler, §§ 65—70.]

§ 161. *Errors respecting emphasis very frequent.* In no part of an interpreter's business are errors more frequently committed, than in judging of emphasis. The reason of this is, that many are too prone to find emphasis every where; for they suppose that, by so doing, they exhibit the sacred writers as speaking in a manner more worthy of themselves and of the divine origin of the Scriptures. However, nothing can have dignity attached to it which has not truth for its basis.

§ 162. *Ground of these errors.* The ground of this is, want of skill in the knowledge of the original Scripture languages; for many who interpret, are obliged in general to depend merely on the definitions of Lexicons, and are ignorant of the analogy of languages, because they have not been sufficiently accustomed to these studies. It is common for men of this sort to push etymologies, especially tropical ones, to an excessive length; from which very little that is useful can be extracted. Yet from these, they form notions which never entered the minds of the sacred writers. They form moreover rules respecting emphasis, independently either of any reason drawn from the nature of things and of language, or of the *usus loquendi*.

Mistakes such as these may be very easily committed with respect to the Hebrew language, in regard to those forms of speech in the New Testament which are deduced from the Hebrew; because this idiom is so unlike the occidental languages of modern Europe.

§ 163. *Need of rules to direct us in judging of emphasis.* On this account there is more need of well grounded precepts, drawn from the nature of human language and of things, that we may judge correctly of emphasis; so that we may neither pass by those which are real, nor follow after those which are imaginary. Erasmus (on 1 Cor. 7: 1) thinks this may be endured in hortatory and consolatory preaching; but for myself, I had rather every thing should have a solid foundation, as there is no *need* of any thing *fictitious*. In serious argument, fictitious emphases is intolerable. Indeed it is nothing less than to sport with that which is sacred.

§ 164. *Insufficient rules.* The vulgar rule, which bids us beware of making fictitious emphasis or of neglecting real ones, although good sense, is in fact no rule; as it does not serve at all to direct the mind in judging where emphasis really exists. No one believes himself to make *fictitious* emphasis. There are some other maxims concerning emphasis, which are not formed with good judgment, nor worthy of refutation here.

§ 165. *Kinds of writing where emphasis is rare.* To proceed with precepts. First, it is clear, that in regard to subjects which are to be explained with great nicety; in perspicuously exhibiting the precepts that respect any branch of the sciences; laws; in simple narrations of facts, etc.; emphasis can scarcely find place. For emphasis is, in a certain sense, tropical or figurative; and this kind of language does not belong to writings of the classes just named, as I have already shewn § 151, and as all concede. (Morus, p. 330. XI.)

That is, simple narration, simple instruction, simple legislation, for the most part is destitute of emphasis, except such as is of the lower and more usual kind. But in the Pentateuch, Gospels, and Epistles, for example, which are specimens of the different kinds of composition in question, are intermixed many passages which contain words that are peculiarly emphatic.

§ 166. *No word of itself is emphatical.* Secondly, we must guard against finding emphasis in any word of itself, whether used properly or tropically; because, as has been already shewn, no word used either figuratively or literally has of itself an emphasis. Emphasis implies *an accession of meaning to the ordinary signification of a word.*

§ 167. *Emphasis not to be taught by etymology or recurring to the original sense of words.* Thirdly, emphasis should not be deduced from the etymology of a word, (which often misleads as to the proper sense of it); nor in tropical expressions should we recur to the proper sense of the words to deduce emphasis from it; as has sometimes been done in respect to the word *ἐρευνᾶν*. Tropically used, this word does not signify *to seek with great exertion and diligence;* for the Holy Spirit is said *ἐρευνᾶν τὰ βάθη τῆς θεότητος*, to whom this emphatic meaning surely will not apply. The ancient interpreters used *ἐρευνᾶν* in the same sense as *γινώσκειν*. In both of the above points errors are very frequent. (Morus, p. 331. XII.)

§ 168. *Prepositions in composition do not always make any accession of meaning to a word.* In Greek words, moreover, we are to take special care not to make any accession of signification to the word, simply because it is compounded with a preposition. E. g. *ἀνά, ἀπό, πρό, σύν, ἐκ, περί*, compounded as in *ἀναστανροῦν, ἀνανήθειν, συμμαρτυρεῖν, προγινώσκειν*, etc. Many are accustomed to build arguments on such imaginary emphasis, and oftentimes very incongruously; while use and observation teach us, that these prepositions do

not always change the meaning of simple words; nay, they very commonly are redundant, as in Polybius. The custom of the language, in such cases, must be well studied. (Morus, p. 331. XIII.)

While there is some truth in this statement, viz., it is a fact that many have sought too much emphasis in *compound* words, yet that prepositions, etc., in union with verbs or other words serve always to modify their meaning in some respect or other, Tittmann has most fully and satisfactorily shewn in an Essay translated and printed in the Bibl. Repository, Vol I. p. 168 seq.

§ 169. *Emphasis not to be deduced merely from the plural number.* We must be cautious also that we do not deduce emphasis merely from the use of the plural number, supposing that where the plural is put instead of the singular it necessarily denotes emphasis. This is not correct either in regard to Hebrew (*a*) or Greek. With good reason Melancthon blames Origen for making a distinction between *οὐρανόν* and *οὐρανούς*. A similar mistake Origen also made in regard to *οἰκτιρμοῖς*, in Romans 12: 1; which many have incautiously imitated, as Bengel has the former error. (Morus. p. 332. XIV.)

(*a*) If all that is meant here be simply that some nouns have only a plural form, that others are used both in the singular and plural with the same meaning, and that in neither of these cases is emphasis to be found, this may readily be conceded. But Ernesti, and his commentators Morus and Eichstaedt, have stated the assertion in the absolute form, that the plural has no emphasis even in the Hebrew language. I have softened this assertion in the translation; and I add here, that it is so far from being correct, that the *pluralis excellentiae* (e. g. in בַּעֲלִים , אֱלֹהִים , אֲדֹנִים , etc.) is formed on the very basis that the plural is *intensive* in such cases. This principle extends to many cases of the Hebrew; e. g. *their inward part is*, הַוּוֹת *depravities*, i. e. very depraved. It is a principle, however, which no grammarian has yet sufficiently defined and established.

§ 170. *Abstract words not of course emphatic when used for concrete ones.* In like manner, we must beware of attaching emphasis to an *abstract* word which stands merely for a concrete one. Some learned men have done this; and ev-

en Glass himself admits that it may properly be done, as do many others who have followed his example. But they have neither given any good reason for this, nor shewn the origin or cause of the pretended emphasis; so that it seems to be rather a thing which they wish, than one which they can intelligibly teach. The true ground of using abstract words in the room of concrete ones, is either *from necessity* or *for the sake of perspicuity*, not on account of emphasis. In the sacred books the necessity of it springs from the Hebrew dialect, which often employs abstract words in this manner because it has only a few concrete ones. The mistake of the interpreters in question arises from the infrequency of the practice in the Latin, and in their own vernacular tongue. But dissimilarity of idiom does not constitute, as a matter of course, any real emphasis. The ground above taken is quite clear also from another circumstance, viz., that in the same forms of expression abstracts and concretes are commuted for each other. Comp. Col. 1: 13 and Matt. 3: 17. Also Eph. 5: 8 and 4: 18, etc. (Morus, p. 332. XV.)

§ 171. *Emphasis must not be deduced merely from oriental idioms.* In the sacred books, and specially in the Hebraisms of the New Testament, we must take care not to seek for and recognize emphasis merely in the idiom which is so very dissimilar to ours. Many persons, though acquainted with the Hebrew have often made this mistake. But nothing is more fallacious. In the oriental languages many things *appear* hyperbolical, (if you translate them literally, i. e. merely by the aid of common lexicons and etymology), which are not in reality hyperbolical. E. g. in Lamentations it is said: *My trouble is great as the sea;* yet this is simply equivalent to the Latin expression: *Mala mea sunt maxima.* (Morus, p. 335. XVI.)

It is true that such is the real meaning of the Hebrew expression; but this does not determine the question, whether the method of ex-

pressing this sentiment is not *hyperbolical.* Most plainly it is so; as really so as when our Saviour says, that "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God," and yet only means, as another passage clearly shews, that 'it is *very difficult* for a rich man to be saved, or impossible for those *who trust in riches* (and continue to do so), to be saved.'

§ 172. *How to discover emphasis in doubtful cases.* If there be no adequate testimony to shew that any word has a constant emphasis, we must consult usage. And here we should first inquire, whether in all the passages where the word is found, emphasis would be congruous. Next, whether in the same passage, or a similar one, another word may be substituted in the room of this, which other contains a special designation of *intensity.* If neither of these be the case, but the word in question may be commuted for others which are plainly *unemphatic;* or in some of the passages where the word occurs, a special designation of intensity is made by adding some other word for this purpose; then there is no emphasis to be recognized in the word in question. E. g. some have attached emphasis to *ἀποκαραδοκίας* in Romans 8: 19; but in Phil. 1: 20 it would be incongruous. There it is used as a synonyme with *ἐλπίδι* (*a*), and in fact commuted with it in verse 22; so also by the LXX. Nor is emphasis always attached to such phrases as *χαρὰν χαίρειν* (*b*); for such phrases are often used when another word is added to indicate *intensity*, e. g. Matt. 2: 10. This would be useless if they indicated intensity of themselves.

(*a*) Not at all. *Ἀποκαραδοκία* there means *earnest desire* or *expectation.* It characterizes the attitude of a man standing with his head bent forward by reason of his earnest wish or expectancy in respect to any particular thing. *Ἐλπίς* is another characteristic, added to shew that this earnest waiting or expectancy was rendered more interesting by reason of *hope.*

(*b*) But in Hebrew, it is admitted by the best oriental scholars, not only that such forms as נָשָׂא נָשָׂא admit of emphasis, but that the prevailing *usus loquendi* expresses it in this way. The imitation of this in Hebrew Greek may consequently be emphatic although it is not always and necessarily so.

§ 173. *Further rules to discover emphasis.* The usual or temporary emphasis, arising from the affection of the speaker or some other cause, may be recognized without difficulty by the following mark, viz., if the *ordinary* signification of the word is far below the manifest intensity of the affection which the speaker or writer feels, or is incompetent to describe the greatness of the object. If emphasis be not admitted in such cases, the discourse would be *frigid;* which fault is certainly very foreign from the style of the sacred writers.

§ 174. *Continued.* Another rule for finding whether a word or phrase is emphatic, is this. If the *usual* force of the word or phrase would give a frigid meaning, when, on the other hand, an apt one would arise if some intensity were given to the word, there is a plain necessity of emphasis; which is the best guide for finding it. So in 1 Cor. 4: 3, 4, ἀνακρίνειν is constantly emphatic, for it means either *to be tried by the judgment of another*, or *to take to one's self the right of trying and judging*, or *to have the right of judging*, or *to be able rightly to judge.* But if you translate it simply *to judge*, a frigid sense would be given to it not at all adapted to the context. In like manner πίστιν in Col. 1: 4 is used, as the context shows, to denote *the constancy*, *greatness*, or *fruitfulness of faith.* For Paul was not necessitated to know, by report, that the church at Colosse had simply Christian faith, since he had founded that church. So in Rom. 1: 8, that faith must have been *special* which was celebrated throughout the world. Also in Matt. 4: 2 ἐπείνασε must imply intensity, as we may gather from the circumstances of the case.

§ 175. *Emphasis must not contradict the usus loquendi.* In judging of emphasis the *usus loquendi* is not to be neglected. It must be so far consulted, as to see that the emphasis implies nothing repugnant to it.

CHAPTER VII.

MEANS OF HARMONIZING APPARENT DISCREPANCIES.

[Keil, § 102. Beck, pp. 192—194.]

§ 176. *If two passages contradict each other, the text of one must be faulty.* If it could be plainly shown, that two passages of Scripture are so repugnant to each other that no method of conciliation is practicable, it then necessarily follows, that one of the readings in the usual copies must be faulty. Consequently an emendation of the text must be sought. Of this nature perhaps is the passage in John 19: 14, compared with Matt. 27: 45 and Mark 15: 25. Also, as many think, Luke 3: 36, compared with Genesis 10: 24; though this is not clear, in my view. Some add Matt. 27: 9, compared with Zechariah 11: 12, 13. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 3. I.)

§ 177. *If the text of both be genuine, then conciliation is to be sought where apparent discrepancies exist.* If the text of both passages plainly appears to be genuine, so that it cannot fairly be questioned, then it must be understood that there is a mere *appearance* of inconsistency; which should be removed, and the passage conciliated by a proper interpretation. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 7. II.)

§ 178. *Discrepancies doctrinal and historic.* The appearance of inconsistency sometimes occurs in passages of a doctrinal, and sometimes of a historical kind. The writers of the N. Testament sometimes *appear* to be at variance with themselves (*a*); sometimes with each other (*b*); and occasionally with the writers of the Old Testament (*c*). Many writers have laboured to harmonize these apparent discrepancies; some devoting themselves to the consideration of a particular

class of them, and others treating of the whole. A catalogue of these writers may be found in Le Long, Pfaff, Fabricius, and others. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 8.)

(*a*) E. g. 1 Cor. 8: 1 comp. verse 7. (*b*) E. g. Paul asserts that a man is justified by faith and not by works; James, that he is justified not by faith only, but also by works. (*c*) E. g. in many passages cited from the Old Testament by the writers of the New Testament.

§ 179. *Causes of apparent discrepancy in doctrinal passages.* In doctrinal passages, an apparent contradiction that is to be removed arises, for the most part, either from the style of the authors which is rather of the *popular* kind than that of nice refinement, or from the genius of the oriental languages which differs so widely from that of the western ones. An apparent contradiction in respect to doctrines plainly taught, (which has often been objected to our religion by impious and profane men, e. g. Julian in Cyril's works, who says that it is expressly taught there is but one God, and yet Matt. xxviii. ascribes Divinity to three), is to be removed by theologians in the way of explaining *things* rather than words merely; and so it comes not directly within the province of the interpreter. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 9.)

§ 180. *Method of harmonizing apparent doctrinal discrepancies.* The method of harmonizing doctrinal passages may be regulated by the following maxims. An obscure passage, i. e. one in which is something ambiguous or unusual, should be explained in accordance with what is plain and without any ambiguity (*a*). Again, a passage in which a doctrine is merely touched or adverted to, is to be explained by other passages which present plain and direct exhibitions of it (*b*).

We must however be careful to harmonize apparent discrepancies, if it can be done, by recourse to the *usus loquendi;* so that all occasion of doubt or cavilling may be removed. For it is very desirable that the *usus loquendi* should justify

that sense which we put on any doubtful passage, from having compared it with passages that are plain and clear. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 9 and 10.)

(*a*) E. g. we explain all anthropopathic expressions in regard to God, by the plain truth that his nature is spiritual.

(*b*) E. g. the subject of justification in Rom. III. is designedly treated at large; of the resurrection, in 1 Cor. XV. Such passages are called *classic* (loci classici), and by them other expressions which simply occur *obiter* are to be explained.

§ 181. *Continued.* It is very important to remember, that many things of a doctrinal nature are *simply and absolutely* declared, agreeably to common usage in all languages, which still have only a *relative* sense. This may be accounted for from the fact, that there are parts of religion which are commonly known and understood; therefore such parts do not need accurate limitations. E. g. *that we are saved by faith* is one of the elementary principles of the Christian religion. The sacred writers therefore do not, on every mention of any duty, remind us of this principle; as they expect us to keep it in memory. When they say then that almsgiving is acceptable to God, they expect to be understood as meaning *if it be accompanied by faith.* In this way apparent discrepancies may be reconciled; and the reconciliation becomes the more probable, as the *reason* for it can be given. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 11.)

Apparent discrepancies arising from *oriental* style or manner of expression (§ 179) are pretty numerous. E. g. pluck out the eye that offends thee; it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, etc.; to follow Christ, one must hate parents, etc., Luke 14: 26. The context, passages similar as to subject, the nature of the style, the subject itself, etc., are the means of finding the true sense of such places; and then the harmony of them with other passages is obvious. (Morus, Vol. II. pp. 11—14.)

Apparent discrepancies between various writers, or between different parts of the same author, not unfrequently occur. E. g. Rom. III. and James II. in respect to justification. The mode of conciliation is simply *to obtain a complete view of the meaning of each writer.* It will then be seen, for example in this case, that Paul is arguing against those who would establish *meritorious* justification; James, against *Antinomian* views of the gospel. *Works*, in Paul's epistle,

means *complete obedience to the law;* in James, it means *such obedience as must be the necessary consequence of Christian faith.* The object of both apostles being fully understood, all discrepancy vanishes. In like manner, the advice of Paul in 1 Cor. VII. respecting matrimony, is only *pro tempore*, and dictated merely by the present exigencies of the times; for the apostle, in many other places of his writings, has expressed a different sentiment. (Morus, pp. 14—17.)

Similar to the apparent discrepancy just mentioned, is the case where different predicates are apparently asserted of the same subject. E. g. Rom. 3: 20, it is said that a man cannot be justified by works; but in 2: 13, it is stated that the ποιηταί, *doers*, of the law shall be justified. Here one verse states the rule of *legal* justification; the other asserts that no man can claim it on the ground of that rule. Again, where we are said to be *justified by faith*, the meaning is, that *we receive pardon on the ground of gratuity;* but *justification*, as applied to the *doers*, of the law, means *reward on the ground of merit* or *perfect obedience.* (Morus, Vol. II. p. 17. VI.)

Discrepancies seem to exist, at times, between the writers of the Old Testament and the New, merely from the different manner in which they express themselves on the same subjects; when this is rather to be attributed to different degrees of light which the writers had, and to the differences in the eras, manners, habits, etc., of each. E. g. the subject of war; of loving enemies; of benevolence to the Gentiles; of God's equal and paternal regard to them; of gratuitous justification, etc. A representation less perfect, in the Old Testament, need not be understood as contradicting one more perfect in the New. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 18. VII.)

Finally, in every case of apparent doctrinal discrepancy, the rule to guide the interpreter is simple, viz., find the true meaning of each writer; take every thing into view, which the principles of interpreting language requires, viz., the subject, scope, context, design, age, habits, style, object, etc., of the author; and when the meaning is found of each writer, the passages may be brought together without fear of any real discrepancy.

§ 182. *Origin of apparent historical discrepancies.* Apparent discrepancies of a *historical* nature originate from a difference of design and manner in narrating the same thing; as often happens in the Gospels. For a diversity of design varies the choice of circumstances. Many circumstances differ, after all, in nothing important as to designating the ideas which the authors in common mean to designate; and oftentimes they may be either commuted for each other, or omitted. It is of no importance, sometimes, whether a thing be asserted in a generic or specific form. Hence, appearances of discrepancy have frequently arisen. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 22. IX.)

§ 183. *Continued.* But far more frequently an appearance of discrepancy arises from the mere *manner of expression;* which seems, at first view, to imply a difference in the things described, while it is merely a difference in the mode of describing them. It is very evident that the best and most careful writers do not always exhibit the same precise and accurate method in respect to the names of things, persons, or places (*a*); in regard to numbers (*b*); dates (*c*); years, etc. Nor are they usually blamed for this, nor ought they to be. Hence, where several names of the same object exist, they sometimes exhibit one, and sometimes another. In regard to the manner of expressing time, places, and numbers, sometimes they use the more vulgar and indistinct method, and sometimes the more nice and accurate one. In designating time they vary. They sometimes put genus for species, and *vice versâ*. Examples of such a nature occur in common histories, and also in the Gospels.

(a) E. g. Matt. 17: 14, comp. Luke 9: 38. Gadarene and Gergasene, Matt. 8: 28, comp. with Mark 5: 2. Matt. 5: 1, comp. Luke 6: 17. *(b)* Matt. 27: 44, comp. Luke 23: 39. Matt. 8: 5—9, comp. Luke 7: 1—10. Matt. 8: 28, comp. Mark 5: 2. Acts 7: 14, comp. Gen. 46: 27. Acts 7: 6, comp. Gal. 3: 17. *(c)* Luke 2: 2, comp. with the history of the Syrian Proconsuls.

§ 184. *We should be conversant with conciliations of passages in the best classic authors.* With these usages in writing history we ought to be well acquainted, either by our own study of the classics, or from the remarks of skilful interpreters, e. g. Perizonius in Animadverss. hist. et. al. lib., Duker on Livy, Wesseling on Herodotus and Diodorus. An acquaintance with these will enable us promptly to obtain aid from them, when it is needed for harmonizing passages which seem to disagree; for it is plain that the difficulty of harmonizing passages arises, for the most part, from want of skill in this exercise. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 28. XIII.)

§ 185. *Historical facts not to be confounded because of a*

slight similitude, nor to be represented as different on account of some slight discrepancy. In historic discrepancies we must guard against confounding things which really differ, merely because they have some similitude; or deducing discrepancies thence, as has often happened, in the interpretation of profane authors. On the other hand, we must not rashly multiply facts because there are some slight discrepancies in the narration of them. The reading of history, and of good commentaries upon different authors, is very important to assist one here.

On the subject of harmonizing the narrations contained in the Gospels, it is difficult to say any thing here which will give even a faint representation of the efforts that have been made. Several hundred *harmonies* have been published. Some have chosen one Gospel as exhibiting the regular order of time, and made the rest to conform to it; others have rejected the supposition of perfect chronological order in any. Some have made the number of facts related as small as possible, and forced the language to a harmony; others have multiplied the number of facts, so that every narration comprising a single circumstance of discrepancy from others, has been supposed to contain a history of a similar but still of a separate fact. Some have supposed the public ministry of Christ to have continued for three years; others for more than seven.

Dispute about the sources of the Gospels has been multiplied almost without bounds, among the German critics. By different writers, each of the first three Evangelists has been considered as the source of the rest; while others allow that there are two independent writers, and the rest are compilers. Many others suppose that original Hebrew or rather Syro-Chaldaic documents existed in writing, from which the first three evangelists drew in common. Hence their resemblance to each other in respect to diction. But different copies of such documents, they suppose, were used by the Evangelists, which had been interpolated or augmented. Hence their discrepancies. Some assert a perfect harmony between the Evangelists even in the minutest circumstances; while others maintain discrepancies which amount to absolute contradictions.—Where shall the young interpreter go, to find a refuge from such a chaos of doubts and difficulties as are here presented? If I may venture to express an opinion, which is not the mere result of speculation, I would say: Let him go to the diligent, thorough, repeated study of the gospels, with a candid mind, united to a life of prayer and faith. Let him carry with him to this study a fundamental knowledge of the nature of language, that he may not be embarrassed with the mere forms of words. I will venture to add, that he will find it necessary to believe with Jerome, *that the Scripture consists in the* SENSE *of a passage*,

and not in the words only; which are the mere *costume* of the sense. Notions of *verbal* inspiration may be and often have been such, as to render the conciliation of the Evangelists a desperate undertaking. That notion which attaches absolute perfection to the *form of language,* as well as the sense which it conveys, makes the reconciliation of them impossible. In some cases, two, three, or even the four Evangelists relate the same thing in different words. Now if the *form* of the words in one is absolutely *perfect,* what is to be said of the other three, who have adopted different forms? And if the form of a narration in Luke, with two, three, or more circumstances interwoven is absolutely perfect, what becomes of the narrations in Matthew and Mark, where one or more of these circumstances are omitted?

It is a fact which admits of no doubt, that the sacred writers differ from each other as much in respect to the *mode* of writing, as profane authors do. The proper question always is: What is the *meaning* which they design to convey? What is their principal or special object in conveying it? These questions being answered, it matters little in what garb this *meaning* is clad; or whether more or fewer circumstances accompany it, that are not essential to the main point.

Considerations of this nature will help to remove the apparent discrepancies of the Gospels, as they are now presented to us. And as to speculations about the origin of them, very little *terra firma* has yet been won by all the adventures that have been undertaken.

The student may read with some profit, Morus Vol. II. pp. 24—49; and many of Newcome's notes, printed at the end of his Harmony, are the result of good sense joined with much critical experience.

§ 186. *Doubtful passages to be interpreted by plain ones.* In harmonizing passages, it is very important to determine which is to be accommodated to the other. We ought to have some rule here, lest we should wander from our way. The rule is this: If one passage be plain and accurately expressed, so as to admit of no doubt, it cannot admit of any accommodation. The doubtful one must be accommodated to the plain one.

§ 187. *A perfect Harmony not to be expected.* After all, I should admit with Pfaff that a perfect Harmony of the Gospels can hardly be made by rule. Conjecture must sometimes be applied to the rules of harmonizing, and to the use of them in particular cases. But it is well to observe here, that the subject respects merely occasional historical facts, of which one may be ignorant without endangering his salvation.

Nay, better submit to be ignorant here, than to torture one's brain to find out what is not of essential importance.

PART III.

ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES.

§ 188. *An interpreter should understand the Scriptures, and be able to explain them well.* An interpreter should not only possess a thorough understanding of the Scriptures, but also the faculty of interpreting and explaining them well. On this subject it may be proper to say a few things.

The object of interpretation is to give the sense of an author, without addition, diminution, or change. A *version* ought to be an exact image of the original or archetype, in which image nothing should be drawn either greater or less, better or worse, than the original. It should be so composed that it might be acknowledged as another original itself. It follows, that a translator should use those words, and those only, which clearly express *all the meaning of the author*, and *in the same manner as the author*. But this needs illustration.

§ 189. *The words of the version ought to correspond as exactly as possible to those of the original.* First, as the *same* meaning must be conveyed, those words are to be selected the force of which plainly corresponds to that of the original, and which are not ambiguous, but of a plain and established meaning among those for whom the translation is made. Those words are to be preferred (if such can be found) which correspond altogether with the words of the author, in respect to etymology, tropical use, and construction. But great caution is necessary here, in judging whether

the usage of the two languages agrees. Otherwise no *version* can be made, which can be well understood by those who are ignorant of the original language; but rather an obscuration of the author ensues, and not unfrequently a perversion of him. For men will understand the words of a Latin version, according to the Latin *usus loquendi*, (and so of a German translation); when they ought to be understood, if the rule above be violated, according to the Greek or Hebrew idiom. Or perhaps the unlearned reader will not understand them at all, although from the habit of hearing and using the words he may think he understands them. A frequent case indeed among the unlearned; and I may add, among their teachers also.

§ 190. *When one cannot translate ad verbum he must translate ad sensum.* But if appropriate words as above described cannot be selected, on account of the difference of idiom between the two languages (the original and that of the translator), which often express the same things by words that do not correspond in their etymology or their proper signification, (specially is this the case with the oriental and occidental languages, so that a literal translation of the former would be often unintelligible in the latter), then we must relinquish the design of translating *ad verbum*, and content ourselves with merely giving the *sense* of the original plainly designated.

§ 191. *A knowledge of Hebrew as well as Greek necessary to translate the New Testament.* This can be effected only by one who has an accurate knowledge of both languages. To accomplish this in respect to the New Testament, a man, besides the knowledge of his vernacular tongue, must have an accurate knowledge of both Greek and Hebrew. This is necessary, not only to understand the original, but to judge of what is peculiar to each language, and to express the sense of the original in a manner adapted to the genius of his own language.

§ 192. *Cases where we must adhere to the mode of translating ad verbum.* But various causes operate to prevent a translator from strictly following the rule in § 190. For, first, when the *form* and *manner* of the Greek words has such a connection with the things signified and the method of arguing, that those things cannot be well understood nor the argument proceed well if a translation *ad verbum* be not made, then we must sacrifice the idiom of our own language and adhere to that of the Greek. This frequently happens in respect to the epistles of Paul; e. g. 2 Cor. III. in regard to the words γράμματος and πνεύματος, also δόξης; add Gal. 3: 16; and in respect to allegories, John x.

§ 193. *Continued.* Antithesis, paronomasia, and the like figures of speech, also require a modification of the rule in § 190. For the grace and beauty of these perish when the language is changed. Paul has many of these figures. But they cannot always be preserved, as another language will not always admit them. E. g. in Matt. 16: 18, πέτρος and πέτρα, the paronomasia can be preserved in Latin but not in English.

§ 194. *Continued.* Another class of words which must be literally rendered, are those for which no equivalent ones can be found in the language of the translator, so as fully and unambiguously to express the idea. E. g. the word ζωή; and others as πίστις, μετάνοια, etc.

§ 195. *Continued.* In very difficult and doubtful passages also a literal translation must be given, because a version *ad sensum* would be assuming that one definitely understood the real meaning of the passage. This might do in a commentary, but not in a translation. With propriety says Castalio on 1 Pet. 4: 6, "This I do not understand, therefore I translate it *ad verbum*."

§ 196. *In translating, we ought to lean towards our own vernacular idiom.* A good acquaintance with these maxims of translation, specially a *practical* acquaintance, will enable any one to judge whether a version has preserved the right method in regard to purity of language, or introduced too many of the idioms of the original. As versions however are not made for the learned who can read the original, but for others and specially for the common people, it is better to incline to the idiom of our vernacular tongue, (even in cases where you might with some propriety adhere to the original idiom), for the sake of rendering the translation more intelligible. It was well said by Jerome to Pammachius, when speaking of the best mode of interpretation: "Let others hunt after *syllables* and *letters;* do you seek for the *sense.*"

APPENDIX.

MORUS ON TRANSLATION.

Extract translated from a dissertation of Dr. Morus, late Professor of Theology in the University of Leipsick, entitled DE DISCRIMINE SENSUS ET SIGNIFICATIONIS IN INTERPRETANDO, *and contained in his Dissertationes Theol. et Philol. Vol. I. No. II.*

[To the above rules of Ernesti, the object of which is to guide the translator in making a version of the original Scriptures into his own vernacular language, I have thought it would be acceptable and useful to those for whom this little volume of the elements of Hermeneutics is designed, to subjoin an extract from the dissertation of Morus just mentioned, which appears to be very judicious and instructive. To the business of teaching Hermeneutics, Morus was peculiarly attached and devoted; and few men have understood it better, or left behind them more useful precepts on this interesting subject. Equally removed from the recent latitudinarianism of many

German interpreters, and from the mystic and technical method of the older interpreters, he formed and nurtured a school which has produced great and lasting influence upon the science of interpretation; and the principles of which, for the most part, must commend themselves at once, when well understood, to every intelligent and unbiassed mind.

The dissertation in question commences, with pointing out the impossibility of translating *ad verbum* out of one language into another, in every case that may occur. The reason of this is grounded in the different modes in which men of different nations view the same objects, and express themselves in respect to them. The age in which writers live, their different manners, customs, culture, temper, manner of life, knowledge, etc., all concur in producing these differences. In consequence of the operation of causes so diverse, there is in one language much of rude antiquity, in another a high or a partial state of cultivation; in one the connections and transitions are circuitous, in another, short and easy; in one ellipsis abounds, in another it is unfrequent; one is profuse in allegories and tropes, another dry and jejune in expression; one abounds with equivocal and indefinite phraseology, another with definite and certain words; one is fitted for expression in respect to the arts and sciences, another destitute of such means of expression; one is copious, another furnished with a scanty stock of words.

In consequence of these diversities, and the differences of idiom which spring out of them, it becomes impossible always to translate *ad verbum* from the one to the other. In such cases, Morus justly contends that the translator, abandoning a literal version, should aim at exactly communicating the *sense*. E. g. the literal translation of κακῶς ἔχειν is *to have badly;* but what idea could an English reader attach to this translation? Leaving then the version *ad verbum*, we must translate it *to be sick*, which conveys the exact sense of the Greek phrase in an intelligible form. And this instance may serve to illustrate what Morus means by the phrase, *difference between the signification and the sense of words*. The former is the literal and primary meaning of the words simply considered; the *sense* is the idea conveyed by the words, in the phrase or in the connection where they stand.

What is said of words may also be applied to phrases and sentences, for the same reasons and from the same causes. In all these cases, where the sense cannot be given by a literal translation, we must choose other words which will designate it; and where particular words are wanting in our own language to do this, we must have recourse to circumlocution.

Having discussed these principles of translating, Morus proceeds to descant upon the method of applying them to practice. As this subject is a matter of importance to all who are to expound the word of God in their own vernacular tongue, I shall here present it in a translation of the author's words. M. S.]

It is proper here to point out the duty of the interpreter, in reference to the above principles. In regard to the first case,

namely, where we abandon a literal version, and use a word which will convey the *sense* of the original, I may say, in general, that the word substituted should approximate as nearly as possible in its signification to that of the original word which it represents. On accuracy of this kind depends, in a high degree, the excellence of any version.

But as it rarely suffices to give merely general directions, I will descend to particulars. A version then should exhibit a trope where the original does, whether it be used for the sake of ornament or variety; an energetic word, where there is one in the original. Let the translator avoid tropes, where the diction of the original is not figurative; let him avoid technical expressions, where those of common life should be used. E. g. τέλειον should not be rendered *perfection*, but *probity*, *uprightness*. Let him not commute genus for species, nor antecedent for consequent. In respect to words which depend on an excited state of mind, such as reproachful terms, and those of complaint, lamentation, and indignation, also proverbs, and proverbial phrases, let him compare these most carefully with the practice of common life; and what men are wont to say on such occasions let him express in his version, and not rest satisfied with some kind of general meaning, nor make a version which is cramped by its diction. In general, let him take care to form a right estimate of subjects from the nature of the predicates attached to them; which is a matter of great importance, where there is a departure from a literal version. It will also afford an antidote against negligence and error.

It is sufficient to have given these few hints; and he who wishes for more accurate knowledge of the laws of translating, must inquire into the grounds or reasons of these laws. The reasons are, the desire to translate closely and not paraphrastically; a wish to give an exact idea of the thing designated by the original words, so that the reader may under-

stand it; the necessity of exhibiting the external beauty of the original diction; and the design of so exhibiting the writer's thoughts in our own language, as to make it apparent, that if the writer himself had used our language he would have expressed this proverb, that exclamation, that formula of speech, just as the translator has done.

In regard to the second case, viz. where circumlocution is to be employed, one rule may be given to guide the translator. Let him use words, if possible, which do not express *entirely* an idea that is composed of many parts in the original, and some of which are not designated exactly in the passage which is translated; but let him choose terms, which are as exactly equivalent to the original as possible. Where doubt may hang over the expression, he may explain it by notes; but he should not be blamed for not expressing *definitely* in translation, what is *indefinite* in the original; and while he avoids doing this, he cannot be accused of obtruding his own views upon the author whom he translates.

Thus far in respect to translating *ad sensum* rather than *ad verbum*, when single words are to be explained or translated. Let us come now to sentences and propositions; in regard to which, when they cannot be literally translated without obscuring instead of illustrating the sense, we must, in like manner as before described, substitute the *meaning* of the words instead of the words themselves. In merely *explaining* a passage, which contains the sign of some particular thing, the interpreter may substitute the *thing signified* for the sign of it. E. g. when God is said *to come from heaven*, an interpreter in merely explaining may say, this means *God as performing some illustrious work*, or *doing any thing in general;* or *God as taking cognizance of any thing*, or as *propitious* or *unpropitious*, just as the context requires. Or when Christ is presented as *sitting at the right hand of God*, the meaning is, *that Christ is participating in divine sovereignty.* So when,

in the oriental writers, the sun is represented as darkened, the moon as obscured, and the stars as shaken, these are *images of distressing times;* and therefore when it is said that these things will happen, the simple meaning is that times of great distress will follow, in which as it were all nature seems to threaten ruin. To this class of passages, however, belong all those in which God as future judge is represented as visible; the forms of speech being taken from the customs of men. The meaning of such passages is, that *God will render to every one according to his deeds;* as is plainly expressed in Matt. 16: 27.

In the mere explanation of these formulas of language, every one sees that the *sense* is to be given; but our translator has a work of more difficulty. For where the object of enumerating many signs of the nature described above, is to render the description more vivid and impressive, (as in Matt. 24: 29, 30, 31. Joel 3: 1. Dan. 7: 9), every thing must be closely translated. The translator would mutilate the diction of the author, if he should abridge the description and give only the general meaning; for it was not the design of the writer merely to present to the mind the thing summarily and literally declared, but as it were to place it before the eyes in a picture or painting of it. For if the version, by preserving these special traits, is not liable to produce an erroneous impression in the reader's mind, but every one who reads will easily understand that the whole is to be considered as a figurative expression, (as those things are which are spoken of God ἀνθρωποπάθως) then there is no good reason why the version should be changed into a paraphrase or explanation. Who would doubt or be at a loss what is meant, if men in a state of suffering and wretchedness should be described as approaching the throne of God for the purpose of supplication? But if a translation, as it stands in our vernacular tongue to be read by the unlearned, necessarily leads to wrong views of the

sentiments of the author by being literal; or communicates a sentiment opposite to his; or makes no sense; I see no reason why we should fear to substitute the *sense* instead of the literal signification of the words; specially when an argument follows which does not depend on the words but on the sense, and which no one can understand who does not attend to the sense rather than the words. Of this nature are such expressions as *making intercession for men; sitting at the right hand of the king; Christ who was rich becoming poor that men might be made rich; Christ being received into the heavens*, etc.; which last phrase clearly means to *be most exalted, to have supreme dominion.* Had some critics understood this, they might have spared themselves the trouble of inquiring whether Christ contains the heavens, or the heavens him; nor would they have thought of the majesty of Christ as suffering degradation by being included in a place; nor would Beza have written such a note as he has on this subject. The *meaning*—the *meaning only*—is to be sought for; and not the mere literal signification of the words.

In other cases, what the sacred writers have applied only to a part or species, interpreters have sometimes applied to the whole or the genus; and *vice versâ.* Contemplated in the light where they have placed it, the thing appears obscure, or difficult, or as needing to be softened down; but in the other light, it is plain, easy, and accurately described. What David in a certain place imprecates upon his enemies, (and therefore the enemies of Christ), viz. that *their habitation might be desolate and deserted*, Peter applies to Judas the betrayer of Christ, and declares that it happened to him (Acts 1: 20). But if a literal application of it is to be made to David's enemies, it is not to be applied in the same sense in which it is to Judas. How will it be shewn that the habitation of Judas became desolate and deserted? Surely violence must be done to the passage, if any one determines to under-

stand it literally. We may therefore see whether the passage cannot be translated *ad sensum*. E. g. if in uttering an imprecation against one, we say: 'Let his house become desolate,' our meaning is, in general, *that he may be extirpated, that he may utterly perish.* Many imprecations are of such a nature, that the object of them is evil in general by which some one is to be overwhelmed or crushed; and to the mere form of the words themselves we are not scrupulously to adhere. For the language of imprecation is of such a nature that it designates, by its vehemence or moderation, the more vehement or moderate affection of the mind, and also the weight or lightness, the abundance or fewness, of the evils which are to be inflicted.

Similar to the imprecations of which I have just been speaking, is that of wishing *that any one may be extirpated*, or, to express it rhetorically, that *his house may be deserted;* which is the image of destruction or extirpation. This expression logically considered means a *species* of destruction, and in the language of common life it would stand for an *example* of destruction. If now the words above applied to Judas are considered as simply designating the idea, *let him perish*, and are urged no farther, all this most truly happened to Judas; and this entirely agrees with the sense put upon the words in Peter's discourse. For, as Peter argues, if Judas has perished, there is need of a successor in his office. But if the passage be *literally* understood, the conclusion is not valid; for it would not follow that because the *house* of Judas is deserted, a successor to his office is needed. We may conclude therefore that Peter cites one of the many imprecations contained in a long poem, not because this imprecation only is to be regarded *literatim et syllabatim*, but merely to show to whom all imprecations of that nature attach, and to whom they may be referred.

But still further to confirm this exegesis; does Paul, I

would ask, when he cites a part of the imprecations in the same poem, insist upon and urge the literal meaning of them? (Rom. 11: 9, 10.) Does he apply the tropical language of it to some particular kind of suffering, as poverty for example, or sickness? Not at all; but he plainly teaches us that the language of the Psalmist means generally to express the imprecation: *Let the enemies of God be wretched!*

But still in *translating* passages of this nature, it is not enough to give the sense in general. We must present the same images as the author does, and of course express his words. If we neglect to do this, our readers may indeed know in general the meaning of the author; but they will remain ignorant of what language he employs, and how much force and ornament he exhibits.

I come next to allegory, or where similitudes are employed for the sake of illustration. The use which we should make of allegories in interpretation, is to deduce from them the general sentiment, in which is summarily and properly contained that which the writer wishes to illustrate by his similitudes. In explaining allegories, it is surely proper to have respect to the design of the author in writing them. But all men, who make use of allegories, expect their readers to regard the general sentiment inculcated by them rather than the similitude themselves; or, which amounts to the same thing, not to dwell upon the language merely but to consider the design of it. For example; when Christ was asked why he did not enjoin it upon his disciples oftener to fast, according to the usual custom, he answered by allegories, using these three similitudes, viz. that while the bridegroom was present it was not proper for the wedding guests to be sad; that a new patch should not be sewed upon an old garment; and that new wine should not be put into old bottles. (Matt. 9: 14—18.) In these similitudes is doubtless contained one general sentiment, which being understood, the force of Jesus's

reply is manifest. That sentiment, as it appears to me, is this; *that no one in common life is wont to do those things, which are incongruous with the time, place, and occasion.* For if any one should be sad at a wedding feast, or put new wine into old bottles, or sew a new patch upon an old garment, would he not act foolishly, and be regarded as one destitute of a sense of propriety? It is as much as to say, in common life such things are incongruous. Whether therefore we advert to all these similitudes, or only to one of them, the same meaning is and ought to be deduced from the passage.

The amount of the whole is, that Christ being asked why he permitted his disciples so much indulgence in regard to fasting, replied by making use of similies to shew that *no one in common life would do that which is incongruous;* and therefore he would not compel his disciples to do that, which neither the time nor the occasion required. For certainly it would have been incongruous for the disciples, while Christ was with them as their guide and teacher, to spend their life in sadness, and to devote themselves to rites of this nature; especially when Christ was soon to be taken from them, and they were to be assailed by many calamities and distresses. Now if Christ, who knew this would be their lot, had forbidden them their present enjoyments, and prematurely loaded them with burdensome rites which were incongruous with their present circumstances and with the indulgence of his affection for them, he would have done that which would be like being sad at a wedding feast, or sewing a new patch upon an old garment, or putting new wine into old bottles, i. e. he would have done an incongruous unseemly thing.

But he, who, overlooking the fact that so many words are employed in the designation of one general sentiment, thinks this mode of explanation does not exhaust the whole meaning of the similies, will, after the manner of many ancient and

modern expositors, explain every part by itself; so that the *bridegroom* is made the husband of the church, the *wine* is the gospel, the *old* and the *new* are Pharisaical and Christian doctrine, etc. For myself, I am wont to follow the usage of common life in explaining similitudes; for this is the voice of nature, and can easily be distinguished from the usual method of allegory, fable, and simile. I could wish that the language, opinions, and customs of common life, were more frequently regarded in the interpretation of ancient authors.

If it be true, that whatever pertains to the art of expression is drawn from the observation of nature and common life, how shall we judge that we have learned, not the mere opinions and speculations of others about language, but the real art of language which agrees with the practice of common life, unless we compare what we have learned with the results of common and every day's experience? If it be true that any book is simply the language of the author as it were addressed to us, can we persuade ourselves that we have attained the sense of it, if when we read it we construe every thing in a different manner from what we should had we heard it spoken; if we understand language against all the usages of common life; if we seek in the very *syllables* of a writer *mountains of sense* which no one in the language of common life looks for or suspects? Can we attain the right sense, if we deny to an author the right of being reasonably construed, a right not to have his words urged beyond their proper bounds? This is a thing we always concede in conversation; and it is, indeed, a fundamental rule of explaining language that is spoken. Shall we suppose an author to have written merely to afford us an occasion of indulging our ingenuity, and while he walks upon the earth shall we mount ourselves upon the clouds? Only think how many errors, phantasies, and difficulties have been introduced by those, for example, who have commented on the ancient poets, and setting nature at

defiance as exhibited in common life, have undertaken to interpret from their own fancy! How much grave wisdom has been obtruded upon Homer against his will, where his words breathed simple nature and common life! Think with what anxiety of mind many have handled the sacred writings, while they seemed to forget, that although the authors were inspired yet they were men that used human language, and so wrote it that others for whom it was designed could understand it in the usual way, that is by the application to it of their knowledge of the idiom in which it was composed. It may happen, indeed, that pursuing this plain beaten path we may seem to be unlearned, because we do not profess to know all which others think they know; but we shall be more than compensated by the abundant satisfaction of having every thing around us, all that common life comprises, testifying in our favour, and that the meaning of language must be scanned by the rules which we have brought to view. Some perhaps may think too, that we do not exhibit much modesty or diffidence in regard to the sacred books, and that we are too *liberal* and studious of *neology*. Still our satisfaction will be very great, if the reasons of our interpretation depend on precepts drawn from common life and usage, which carry along with them a convincing weight of evidence in their favour, and are not repugnant to the nature and genius of all languages. Such incongruous principles Turretine has very ably refuted, in his book *de Sac. Script. Interpretatione.* I do not mean to say that acuteness or subtilty in philology is to be neglected. By no means; for without these no doctrine can be well understood. He who heaps together much, is not therefore a learned man; but he who arranges, defines, fortifies with arguments. Who would be satisfied with being deprived of all the advantages of subtilty or nice discrimination, which enables us more certainly, briefly, clearly, and orderly, to learn any thing? But when we have so learned it,

all is to be brought to the test of common life, so that it may appear what we have learned for ourselves, what for others; what for the schools, and what for every day's use.

[As related to the general subject of translating, and specially of translating the New Testament, the reader will not fail to compare with the above remarks, Campbell's excellent observations comprised in the Preliminary Dissertations to his Translation of the Gospels, Diss. II. VIII. X.]

PART IV.

GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT.

[Translated from Beckii Monogrammata Hermeneutices Librorum Nov. Testamenti, edit. 1803, Lipsiae, Sectio III. pp. 117, etc.]

§ 1. Criticism is divided into *lower* and *higher*, terms not altogether adapted to express a proper division of it; each of which is again subdivided into *grammatico-historical* and *conjectural.*

§ 2. The authenticity of a book, the genuineness of a passage, and the goodness of a particular reading, are established by arguments *external* and *internal.* The latter kind of arguments is deduced from the nature of things treated of, the sentiments, and the language.

§ 3. *Lower* or *verbal* criticism is regulated by the following general principles; viz. that reading is preferable, respecting which it may be *probably* shewn that it bears the stamp of the author, and from which it may appear that all the varieties of reading have proceeded. Hence all the errors of copyists should be noted; as they often furnish

means of finding out the true reading and the origin of various readings.

§ 4. *Common laws of lower criticism which apply to books in general whether sacred or profane.*

1. That reading is to be regarded as true, which is supported by far the greater number of copies and witnesses.

But still, readings supported by a few books are not entirely to be disregarded; [specially when they harmonize with the *usus loquendi* of the author.]

2. That reading which the better copies exhibit, unless special reasons prohibit it, is to be prefered to the one which the poorer copies exhibit, although most numerous. What copies are of the better kind, is a question to be discussed in another place, where inquiry is made respecting the genius of the N. Testament writings. Neither the antiquity nor propriety of a reading, solely considered, always proves it to be a true one; [unless the antiquity should extend back to the autograph, or the propriety should be shewn to be exclusive.]

3. That reading which is more harsh, obscure, difficult, unusual, or delicately chosen, if supported by the authority of a proper witness, is preferable to one which is plain, easy, usual, and common. Difficulty sometimes exists in respect to a whole passage and its connection; sometimes in regard to the ambiguity of particular words and phrases; sometimes in respect to the grammatical forms, historical and doctrinal passages, etc. But,

4. That reading which approaches nearest to the popular and familiar method of speaking, if it be supported by external testimonies, is preferable to one more artificial and subtile.

5. The shorter reading, when supported by testimony of importance, and not incongruous with the style and design of the writer, is preferable to a more verbose one. Still there are cases where the more copious reading is to be preferred.

6. That reading which gives the best sense is peculiarly preferable. But to determine this, the nature of the whole passage, the genius of the writer, and not the mere opinions and sentiments of particular interpreters, are to be consulted.

7. The reading which produces a worthless or an incongruous sense is to be rejected. *Good care* however must be taken not to condemn a reading as worthless or incongruous, which a more correct grammatical and historical investigation would prove to be a true reading, or at least a probable one.

8. A reading which agrees with the *usus loquendi* of the writer, is preferable to that which disagrees with it. It must be remembered in judging here, that the style of an author sometimes varies with increasing age.

9. A reading is to be rejected, in respect to which plain evidence is found that has undergone a *designed* alteration. Such alteration may have taken place, (1) From doctrinal reasons. (2) From moral and practical reasons. (3) From historical and geographical doubts; Matt. 8: 28, comp. Mark 5: 1. (4) From the desire of reconciling passages apparently inconsistent with each other. (5) From desire to make the discourse more intensive. Hence may emphatic readings have originated. (6) From the comparison of many manuscripts the readings of which have been amalgamated. (7) From a comparison of parallel passages.

Corrections of the more celebrated manuscripts have been sometimes detected.

10. Various readings are to be *rejected*, which spring from the mere negligence of copyists, and from those errors which are very common to all kinds of books. To these belong, (1) The commutation of forms in the Macedonico-Alexandrine dialect, and also other unusual forms, for those of the common dialect. The Alexandrine and common form, however, have the preference over others in the New Testament;

and the Alexandrine dialect itself also admitted some Attic forms. (2) The commutation of single letters and syllables, by an error of either the eye or the ear; the former resulting from obscure and compendious methods of writing, [the latter, from copying after the reading of one who was misunderstood or who read erroneously]. (3) The commutation of synonymes. (4) From transferring into the text words written in the margin of copies, and thus uniting both readings, James 5: 2. (5) From the omission of a word or a verse, by an error of the sight. (6) From the transposition of words and passages; whence it may have happened that some error has crept into most of our books. (7) From words which ended with the like sound, or appeared alike; and from proximate words, one ending and the other beginning with the same syllable. (8) From incorrectly uniting or separating words; which naturally resulted, in some cases, from the ancient method of *continuous* writing. (9) From an erroneous interpunction and distinction of passages.

11. A reading is to be rejected which plainly betrays a gloss or interpretation. This may be a word, or a whole passage. Sometimes these glosses are united to the true text, and sometimes they have thrust it out. Not all interpretations however are spurious glosses; [for authors themselves sometimes add them, in order to explain their own language.]

12. Readings deduced from versions or the commentaries of interpreters are to be rejected. In judging of them, however, great prudence and much skill is necessary.

[The maxims thus far are comprised within the province of *lower criticism*. But *higher criticism* may be and ought to be employed, in order to assist in forming a judgment of the genuineness of many passages. Here follows, from the same writer, a synopsis of the principles of higher criticism.]

§ 5. *Laws of higher criticism respecting the establishment of a pure text.*

1. The sentiment, declaration, passage, book, or part of a

book of any author, which on account of its nature, form, method, subject, or arguments, does not appear to have originated from him, is either spurious, or at least very much to be suspected.

Imitations of authors made with design, or for the sake of practice in writing, or from other reasons, may easily be ascribed to the authors themselves, though they are supposititious.

2. A passage which manifestly disagrees with the nature and connection of the context, and interrupts it, is to be regarded as spurious.

3. A passage which belongs in another place either in the same words or with little variation, and seems to be more properly and commodiously placed there, may be suspected of having been transferred to the place where it stands with less propriety, and may be removed from thence.

But here great care is requisite lest we judge rashly or form our opinion rather from the taste and style of the present day than from the genius of the author, his design and style, or the subject and argument of the discourse. As an example, one might appeal to the disputations about the Apocalypse, and to the appendix of John's Gospel in chap. XXI.

4. Passages which are *manifestly* interpolated, by the comments of interpreters or from any other cause, are to be rejected from the text.

But great caution is necessary here to judge rightly. In general, *internal arguments alone* are not to be relied on as sufficient evidence.

5. Parts of books which appear incoherent, and yet clearly exhibit the genius and style of the author, may be reduced to better order by separation, and making a different arrangement. [Great caution here too is necessary.]

6. If numerous and very diverse readings of a book are found in the best copies, we may conclude, either that the

book has gradually received various accessions, or has been re-published by a later hand, or has been edited a second time by the author and corrected, so as to give occasion for the introduction of such various readings.

§ 6. Laws proper to guide our judgement in respect to the true reading of passages in the New Testament, spurious additions, the books themselves, or the authors of them, may be deduced from the peculiar nature of the things described, and the style of the books. They may also be deduced from the nature of the sources whence the various readings come, and from the testimony of witnesses. Such are the following:

1. Passages are to be regarded as spurious, at least are to be suspected (if any such there are), which disagree with the nature of the Christian religion, the history of it, or the mode of teaching and deciding appropriate to any sacred writer; or if they appear trifling, inapt, or jejune, when compared with the force of the doctrine exhibited, or the gravity of the author who exhibits it. Specially are they to be suspected, if historical reasons concur to render them suspicious.

The importance of subjects, the force of precept and narrations, and other things of this nature, are to be estimated by the manner, judgment, and usage of those times in which the books were written. In judging of doctrines, special caution is to be used.

We must be watchful against the *pious frauds* (as they are called) of ancient churches, committed in the interpolation of books, and in giving new forms to passages of them. The special causes of interpolations were tradition, apocryphal writings, the desire of explaining, augmenting, correcting, etc. On the other hand, some passages were ejected as spurious, which seemed to be unworthy of the authors of them. E. g. Luke 22: 43, vide Paulus's Commentary, p. 613.

2. In general, the reading which savours of Hebraism

or Syro-Chaldaism, is preferable to that which savours of classical Greek. [*Cæteris paribus*, it is always preferable.]

Some of the writers of the New Testament, however, as Paul and Luke, approach nearer to the Greek style.

The conjecture of some critics, that the books of the New Testament were originally written, for the most part, in Syro-Chaldaic, and afterwards were translated into Greek by an interpreter who has committed many errors, can at most be extended to but very few books. [To none, as I believe.]

3. Since the New Testament was commonly used both in public and private, and certain parts of it were selected for ecclesiastical use, inquiry must be made whether any portion of it has been interpolated, either from the parallel passages of the Old Testament, or from the Church Lectionaries.

4. As many copies, versions, and fathers of the ancient Churches, are found nearly always to have followed the same text, those which belong to the same class are not to be separately numbered, but rather to be regarded as standing in the place of *one witness*. Still less are we to trust solely to any *one* copy, however ancient, critical, or carefully written. Nor is any copy, which may be erroneously written, or recent, or occasionally interpolated, to be rejected as altogether useless.

5. In respect to any reading, the first inquiry is: To what recension or edition does it belong?

The age and country of copies and readings are to be examined by careful comparison.

No copy extant is perfectly free from error in all the books, or uniformly follows any one uncorrupted recension. We must judge, therefore, from the consent of many things of the same kind, and from internal evidence, what recension is followed, either generally, or in particular passages. Some copies are thought to follow various recensions in particular parts. A few copies of the most ancient classes of manu-

scripts are extant, but the majority of copies are more modern. If an ancient copy has been propagated through many editions, it may have been exposed to vary from the ancient recension, or have been corrupted by new errors of the copyist, more than if a recent copy were directly taken from the ancient one.

6. That reading in which all the recensions of the best copies agree, is the most correct, certainly the most ancient. Slight deviations are unimportant.

7. Readings supported by the authority of the most ancient classes of manuscripts, and of the more credible witnesses, are to be preferred to others. But a regard must be had to the internal goodness of a copy.

8. The Alexandrine class of manuscripts is sometimes preferable to the occidental, and sometimes of less authority. In the conflicting claims of various classes, special regard must be had to historical and internal means which enable us to judge of a reading.

9. Manuscripts are of the highest authority; but neither the ancient versions, nor the exegetical and other books of the fathers are to be neglected.

10. In collecting and judging of the ancient versions, (1) Regard must be had to those made directly from the Greek. Among these, the Latin, Syriac, and Gothic deserve special mention. (2) We must use a correct text of these Versions. (3) We must inquire whether the translator has rendered *literally* or *ad sensum;* whether the errors in the version arise from the fault of the translator's copy, or from other causes; and finally whether the version has been corrected or not. (4) Those versions, which from comparison are found to belong to the same family of manuscripts, are to be regarded as standing in the place of one ancient witness. (5) No reading derived merely from versions, and destitute of other support, can be received; but the consent of all the

ancient versions and fathers in a particular reading, which varies from that of manuscripts, renders the latter suspicious.

11. In regard to the readings derived from the writers belonging to the ancient churches, we must see, (1) That they are drawn from a correct and not a corrupt edition of the fathers. (2) We must diligently consider the authors, their descent, age, erudition, subtilty of judging, temerity in emendation, the nature of the copies which they used, and the creed of the churches to which they belonged. (3) We must consider in what kind of book or passage of ecclesiastical writers, various readings are found. (4) Inquiry must be made, whether the variations are supported by real and direct testimony of the fathers; or whether changes were occasioned in the text by lapse of memory, or a designed accommodation; or whether merely opinions or conjectures are proposed. It seems to be very unjust, to ascribe all the variety found in the ecclesiastical fathers either to error of the memory, or to temerity in accommodation, or a fondness for emendation. (5) The omission of some passage in the commentaries of the fathers, does not always show that it was wanting in the copy which the writer had. Silence however concerning an *important* passage, renders it suspicious.

12. The fragments of heretical writings are not to be overlooked, in the search for various readings; for the supposition is rash, that they generally corrupted the text of all parts of the sacred writings.

13. That interpunction and distinction of verses and chapters, which is most consonant with the argument, sentiments, connection of discourse, and *usus loquendi*, of the sacred writers, is to be regarded as the best.

§ 7. In the criticism of all ancient books it is well understood, that particular readings are not required to be established by most certain and irrefragable arguments, but only that

a probability be shown that they approximate, at least, very near to the original readings; and the judgment is to be made up, in view of what appears to be most probable. So in respect to the New Testament; no more should be required than can, from the nature of the case, be performed. Every thing on all sides should be considered, before the judgment is made up. And if, in judging of the text of profane authors, gravity and modesty are rightly commended; surely in judging of the sacred books, we ought most scrupulously to abstain from all rashness and levity, as well as from all favoritism and superstition.

PART V.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER.

[The following chapter is extracted from Keil's *Elementa Hermeneutices*, translated from the original German into Latin by C. A. G. Emmerling, and published at Leipsick in 1811. Although it contains several things that seem to be a repetition of the ideas advanced in various places by Ernesti, as exhibited in the foregoing pages; yet as the object is to describe *the qualifications of the interpreter himself in respect to knowledge*, and as it is a very brief and well digested summary, it appears desirable that the student, who aspires to the place of an interpreter, should have the qualifications of one definitely and separately described, as here, in order that he may direct his special attention to this subject, unembarrassed by other considerations.

I take it for granted here, that the student of the sacred books, who designs to enter upon the duties of the ministry, feels himself attracted to this work by motives of sincere piety and benevolence. It is a bondage worse than Egyptian, to be compelled to the performance of pastoral duties by a mere sense of official obligation. A man of this cast must be very stupid in order that he should not be very miserable. When the blind lead the blind, woe to both! The last thing that I could commend to a man who is not truly pious, would be the work of the ministry. But supposing him to possess

sincere piety and good common sense, then the precepts which follow may aid him in the acquisition of useful knowledge.]

§ 1. He who desires to understand and interpret the books of the New Testament, must, *first of all*, acquire some historic knowledge of the author of each book; of the state of things existing when it was written; of the body or collection of the New Testament books; of the particular history of its ancient versions, editions, and parts in which it was written; and other things of this nature. To this must be added a knowledge of the principles of criticism, in respect to the text of the New Testament.

Books to be read for information on these topics: Marsh's translation of Michaelis's Introduction to the N. Test.; and various other Introductions more recently published.

§ 2. *Of the second kind of knowledge, preparatory to the understanding and interpretation of the N. Testament.*

(1) *The interpreter must understand the language in which the books are written.* As the diction is not pure classic Greek, but the Hebrew idiom here and there intermixed with classic Greek, and as vestiges of the Chaldee, Syriac, Rabbinic and Latin languages occur; it follows, of course, that the interpreter should not only be acquainted with pure Greek, but with its various dialects, specially the Alexandrine. Above all, he ought to be well versed in the Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, Rabbinic, and Latin idioms.

Vorstius de Hebraismis N. Test. cura Fischeri, 1778. Leusden de Dialectis N. Test. edit. Fischeri, 1792. Mattaire de Dialectis Ling. Graecae. Sturtz de Dialecto Macedonica et Alexandrina, 1808. Pfannkuche Ueber die Palaestinische Landessprache in dem Zeitalter Christi, im Eichhorn's allgemeine Bibliothek B. viii. s. 365, seq., —translated in the Bib. Repository.

(2) *The interpreter must possess a knowledge of the* THINGS *respecting which the books treat.* These are partly *historical*, and partly *doctrinal.* The explanation of them must be sought, primarily, from the books themselves; and second-

arily, from those writings of more recent authors, which may be subsidiary to the attainment of this knowledge.

§ 3. *As to the historic matter of these books.* It is of great importance to the interpreter to be well versed in sacred geography, chronology, civil history, and archaeology; i. e. to understand those things which respect the situation and climate of the countries, where the events referred to happened; as well as those which serve to define the times when they happened; and also the history of the nation among whom they took place, and of other nations mentioned in this history, with their condition, manners, and customs.

(1) *Geographical knowledge.* The geography of Palestine and the neighbouring countries should be well understood (*a*), as also their natural productions (*b*). To this must be added a knowledge of many countries in Asia, and of some in Europe; also the Roman empire, as it then existed, divided into provinces.

(*a*) Well's Sacred Geography. Relandi Palaestina. Bachiene histor. und geograph. Beschreibung von Palaestina, Tom. vii. 8vo. 1766. Hamelsfeldt, biblische Geographie, 3 Theile. 1796. Specially Bellerman's biblical Geography, and (later and better still) that of Rosenmueller. Specially Robinson and Smith's Travels, just published.

(*b*) Celsii Hierobotanicon, 1745. Bocharti Hierozoicon, edit. Rosenmueller, 1776. Tom. iii. Supp. to Calmet's Dictionary, Vols. iii—v. Harmer's Observations edited by A. Clarke. Bush's Compend, Bratt. Vt. 1836.

(2) *Chronology.* The interpreter should have not only a knowledge of technical chronology, but of the Roman mode of reckoning *ad Urbe condita*, and of the Greek Olympiads, (on which subjects he may study authors well deserving of credit); but in respect to historical chronology, he should know in what order of time the events related in the Old Testment happened; when and where the first Roman emperors, the various kings and princes that sprung from the house of Herod the Great, the Roman Consuls at the beginning of the empire of the Caesars, the Jewish high priests (and the num-

ber of them) in our Saviour's time, and the Roman Magistrates, specially in the provinces of Syria and Judea, succeeded each other.

Petavii Opus de Doctrina Temporum, 1703. Scaliger de Emendatione Temporum, 1629. Usherii Annales Vet. et. N. Test. Franckii Novum Systema Chronol. fundamentalis, 1. Goetting. 1778. A useful compend is Hegewisch's Introduction to historical chronology, recently translated from the German by Prof. Marsh of Burlington University, and published in this country. A work much used in Germany, is Gatterer's Abriss der Chronologie, 1777.

(3) *History civil and political.* In regard to the history of events among the nations mentioned in the sacred books, and also their forms of government, it is important for the interpreter to make himself acquainted, first, with the ancient history of the Jews. In studying this, he is not to confine himself merely to the Old Testament; he must also consult the traditionary accounts, which were extant in the time of Christ and the apostles (*a*). Secondly, he must study the history of the Jews under the Herods, and that of these princes. Thirdly, the condition and circumstances of the Jews in Palestine, while under the dominion of the Romans; and also of the Jews living in other countries. Finally, the history of the Roman emperors at that period, and of the Roman prefects over the Asiatic provinces.

(*a*) Shuckford's Connection. Prideaux's Connection. Krebsius, Decreta Romanorum pro Judaeis e Josepho collecta, 1 vol. 8vo. 1763. Wesselingii Diatribe de Judaeorum Archontibus, 1 vol. 8vo. 1738. Benson's History of the first planting of the Christian religion. Josephi Opera, edit. Havercampii. Jahn, Geschichte der Juden in Archaeologie der Hebraer, Band 1. Jahn's Archaeology, and his history of the Hebrew Commonwealth, have been translated by Professors Upham and Stowe, and repeatedly published at the press in Andover. They are the most useful books that we have on these subjects.

(4) *Manners and customs.* In regard to these, (*a*) A knowledge of Antiquities in general is necessary. (*b*) A considerable knowledge of the Greek and Roman antiquities. (*c*) A knowledge of the ecclesiastical rites and customs of the primitive churches; both those which they received from the Hebrews, and others which were introduced by Christians themselves.

Opera Philonis Alex., et Josephi. Warnekros Entwurf der Heb. Alterthuemer, 1 vol. 8vo. Jahn's Archaeology translated by the Rev. Prof. Upham; a work, which combines brevity with perspicuity and good order, and comprizes the substance of preceding publications on this interesting subject.

Of Roman antiquities, Adams's work is a very useful compend; and of the Greek, Potter remains not only the best, but almost the only respectable one. Of eccles. antiquities, Bingham's Orig. Ecc. Also Roessler, Bibliothek der Kirchenvaetern; especially a more recent work by Augusti, entitled Denkwürdigkeiten, etc. Coleman's Abridgment of Augusti.

§ 4. *Doctrinal contents of the sacred books.* That part of the New Testament, which is directly concerned with faith and practice, will be rightly understood, when the interpreter rightly understands what each particular writer has inculcated. As there are many passages which relate to the Jews; and as the writers of the New Testament and their first readers were of Jewish extraction, it will be important,

(1) To know the sentiments of the Jews of that period in regard to religion; specially of those who used the Hebrew-Greek dialect, and of the three great sects among which the Jews were divided, viz. the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes.

Josephi et Philonis Scripta. An admirable view of Philo's sentiments has been published by Schreiter, in Analekten der exeget. Theologie, Band i. ii. Fabricii Codex Pseudepigraphus Vet. Test. et Codex Apocryphus Nov. Test. Grabii Spicilegium Sanctt. Patrum, saec. i. ii. iii. 2 vols. 8vo. On the right use of these sources, see Mori Hermeneut. Vol. ii. p. 172., etc. Brettschneider, systemat. Darstellung der Dogmat. und Moral der Apocryph. Schriften des A. Test. 1805. Staeudlin, Theologiae Moralis Ebraeorum ante Christum Historia, 1794. De tribus Judaeorum Sectis, delph. 1703, 4to. comprizing the works of Serrarius, Drusius, and Scaliger, on this subject. See also Jahn, as above.

(2) *The precepts of the Christian religion.* What was adopted from the Jewish religion, what rejected, and what was added anew to Christianity, must be understood in order to explain the New Testament properly. But knowledge of this nature, that is certain, can be drawn only from the sacred writings themselves.

The *Biblical Theology* of Storr, Reinhard, Doederlein, Zachariae, Leun, Muntinghe, (and for some purposes, of Ammon and Bauer,)

may be used with profit. But the student is not to be guided by any system, except so far as the author shews it to be built upon a satisfactory interpretation of the word of God. Flatt's edition of Storr, translated into German, and accompanied by the notes of the editor, is a fundamental book in the study of *Biblical Theology*. It has been translated into English and published, by the Rev. Dr. Schmucker of Gettysburg Theol. Seminary in Pennsylvania.

(3) *The doctrines of heretical sects.* It is important to know the opinions of early heretics, because, it is probable, some passages of the New Testament have a special reference to them.

By far the best book is Walch's Entwurf einer vollstaend. Geschichte der Ketzereien, etc. 11 vols. 8vo. Vol. i. contains an account of the earliest heresies. Tittmanni de vestigiis Gnosticorum in Nov. Test. frustra quaesitis, will well repay the labour of perusal; but Horn's Biblische Gnosis, and the Essays of Neander, and others, are also to be compared. In the religious and critical Periodicals of Germany, many deeply interesting essays on various heresies and heretics of ancient times, have of late years been published.

§ 5. In enumerating the qualifications of an interpreter, we must not omit a knowledge of grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy.

(1) *Grammar.* Not only a general knowledge of its principles is necessary, but also a special technical knowledge of both etymology and syntax. The interpreter must be acquainted with the various forms of words, and understand how the significations are connected with the forms; he must understand the manner in which words are connected in a sentence; the use of the particles; and also of the grammatical figures, as they are called, such as ellipsis and pleonasm.

Vigerus de idiotismis Ling. Graecae, edit. Hermann, 1812. Hoogeveen Doctrina partic. Graec. edit. Schutz, 1806. Bos Ellipses Graecae edit. Schaefer, 1808. Weiskii Pleonasmi Graeci, 1807. Hartung, on the Greek Particles.

(2) *Rhetoric.* A knowledge of this is necessary, not so much to judge of rhetorical figures as to find out the *meaning* of them, or the sentiment which they are designed to convey.

(3) *A knowledge of philosophy.* Not that of some particular school or sect merely, but that which pertains to the culti-

vation of the mental powers, and to nice psychological discrimination. Such a knowledge is requisite, in order to form clear conceptions in the mind, and accurately to define our ideas; to discern what is similar in different things, and what is distinct; to judge of the connection of thought and argument; and finally, to qualify one perspicuously to represent the opinions of an author to others. Great caution however is necessary here, lest the interpreter intrude upon his author his own particular philosophy.

Ernesti, Opuscula Philol. de vanitate Philosophantium, etc.

PART VI.

DR. E. HENDERSON,

ON THE MORAL QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER OF THE SCRIPTURES.

[The first edition of this work was reprinted in London, in 1827, under the care of the Rev. E. Henderson, D. D., now Principal of Highbury College in the precincts of London. In general, the American edition is simply followed in the English one. In a few cases, however, Dr. H. has appended some notes of his own. In particular, he has added a whole section to the part, in the Appendix to the American edition, which is taken from Keil, and has respect to the literary *Qualifications of an Interpreter*. Dr. H. felt, and with good reason, that the German teachers are too apt to neglect the *moral* qualifications of young candidates for the ministry, when they come to the study of the holy Scriptures. He has therefore added a section to the chapter from Keil on the subject above mentioned, and printed it near the beginning of the book. I now subjoin his remarks with much pleasure, according, in my own views, throughout with the spirit of them, and in no case differing enough from even the manner of expression to deem it of importance to make notes in the way of what might be named correction. The American reader will doubtless be gratified, to have the views of this excellent man and highly respectable and learned scholar placed before him. M. S.]

It has frequently been asserted, that in the interpretation of

Scripture, we should proceed in the same manner that we would do in regard to any other book of antiquity. To a certain extent, this position may be regarded as just, and many of the observations contained in the pages of Ernesti are founded on it: but as the Bible contains subjects, which, of all others, are calculated to affect the heart, and it is generally admitted, that in proportion as the heart is interested in any inquiry, a corresponding degree of influence will be exerted on the processes of investigation; it is evident that respect must be had to the moral state of the affections, if we would arrive at just and accurate views of divine truth.

The high and exclusive claims of Scripture, too, give them an elevation of character, which commands peculiar attention and respect. Till the mind be satisfied on the subject of these claims, it may be conceded to an inquirer, to class the sacred writings with other works, pretending to a heavenly origin, though, even then, he could not be justified in treating their contents with levity and indifference of mind; but no sooner are their inspiration and paramount authority admitted, than, according to the natural constitution of the human mind, he is constrained to place himself under the influence of a principle which will lead him to bow with humble submission to their holy dictates, and to seek in all things to receive and practice whatever is presented to him, as the will of the great Author of revelation.

If he be imbued with the spirit of the Bible, and his affections be in unison with its dictates, nothing will be more natural and easy, than the acquisition of correct ideas respecting its contents: whereas, if his views, feelings, and inclinations are at variance with its requirements, he will infallibly, though perhaps unwittingly, endeavour to pervert the language in which these requirements are recorded, in order to bring them into accordance with his wishes, or the standard of his preconceived opinions.

§ 1. The primary moral qualification, therefore, of all who would successfully interpret the Scriptures, is *vital and practical godliness*—that "godliness," which "is profitable to all things"—"the fear of the Lord," which "is the beginning of wisdom." While it is the righteous determination of heaven, that "none of the wicked shall understand;" we are taught by Him, who is truth itself, that all who conduct their inquiries under the influence of a predisposition to conform to the will of God shall not be left without instruction: *Ἐάν τις θέλῃ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν, γνώσεται περὶ τῆς διδαχῆς*, John 7: 17. "What man is he that feareth the Lord? him shall he teach in the way that he shall choose," Psalm 25: 12.

§ 2. *Unreserved submission to the authority of divine revelation.* The language of him who interprets Scripture, should ever be in harmony with that of Samuel: "Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth."* All favourite ideas, popular hypotheses, hereditary or self-cogitated systems and opinions, must be laid prostrate at the feet of the Bible, which must be "received, not as the word of men, but, as it is in truth, the word of God."—"To the law and the testimony," all our decisions must be brought. If they differ from them, "it is because there is no light in them." A divine revelation might naturally be expected to teach truths untaught by reason; and it is equally natural to expect, that our limited capacities should not be able to comprehend fully the modes, circumstances, and relations of those truths which reason could not teach, and which are known only by revelation, any more than of many physical and moral truths connected with our world, known without revelation.*

§ 3. *An humble and teachable disposition of Mind.* As few things are more hostile to the pursuit of truth, in general,

* Storr's Elements of Biblical Theology, Vol. I. p. 471.

than self-conceit and pride of intellect, so there is no temper more offensive to the great Author of religious truth, than a proud and self-sufficient disposition. "Though the Lord be high, yet hath he respect to the lowly; but the proud he knoweth afar off. Every one that is proud in heart, is an abomination to the Lord. God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble. The meek will he guide in judgment, and the meek will he teach his way;" Pslam 138: 6. Prov. 14: 5- 1 Peter 5: 5. Psalm 25: 9. Hence, both in the general defence of Christianity, and in the successful interpretation of its essential doctrines, none have more signally distinguished themselves than they, who, to a grasp of intellect above their fellows, have united the profoundest reverence and humility in exploring the depths of heavenly wisdom.*

§ 4. *A decided attachment to divine truth, springing from a perception of its intrinsic beauty and excellence.* That spirit of indifference which some would recommend as favourable to the discovery of truth, is perfectly incompatible with all just ideas of the nature and importance of divine revelation. The truths it discloses are so transcendently excellent, and bear so directly on our best and dearest interests, that whenever discovered in their native light, they must win the heart, and decide the choice. Accordingly, those who derive no saving benefit from the Gospel, are said to receive not the LOVE OF THE TRUTH. 2 Thess. 2: 10. The more the true glory of the revealed system is perceived, the more will the mind be imbued with its spirit, and the influence which this imbuement will exert in leading to full and consistent views of that system, cannot fail to be signally beneficial.

§ 5. *Persevering diligence in the use of every proper means for discovering "the mind of the spirit."* While it is of

*Van Mildert's Bampton Lectures, p. 52.

prime importance for the interpreter of Scripture to form a just estimate of his natural faculties, and never to attribute supremacy to his own understanding, or the judgment of any mere man, or body of men, it is obviously his duty to apply those faculties in the use of the various means with which he is furnished for understanding the Scriptures. Subject to those restrictions, which a sense of the supreme authority of the oracles of God, and the natural darkness of the mind cannot but inspire, human reason and science may, without hesitation, be allowed their full share in the interpretation of those oracles. Though incompetent in themselves to the discovery of spiritual knowledge, yet, when discovered, they are competent to discern, to examine, to compare, to illustrate, and to confirm it by means similar to those which, in every other pursuit, lead most certainly to improvement and perfection.* Not only must the interpreter render himself familiar with the contents of the sacred volume, by a constant and unremitted reading; but he must spare no pains in finding out, and appropriating to his use, all the accessory means by which his acquaintance with it may be facilitated and advanced: endeavouring to make himself master of every subject in any way connected with the work in which he is engaged; and guarding against every temptation to precipitation and rashness, in drawing conclusions respecting subjects of such transcendent importance.

§ 6. *Incessant and earnest prayer for divine illumination.* While it is freely admitted, that no such extraordinary teaching, as was enjoyed in the age of inspiration, can warrantably be expected in the present day, it is nevertheless undeniable, that the Scriptures instruct us to believe in the enlightening influences of the Holy Spirit, 1 John 2: 20, 27. This aid consists in a special, internal, and efficient operation of that

* Van Mildert ut sup. p. 126.

divine agent, and is no less distinct from the prophetic and apostolic impulse, than it is from that mere natural assistance by which we discover common truths, and succeed in our ordinary undertakings. It is granted in answer to prayer, accompanied by the exercise of humble dependence on God, and a due use of all the ordinary means of improvement. "If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not, AND IT SHALL BE GIVEN HIM." James 1: 5.

All eminent interpreters of Scripture have asserted the necessity and utility of prayer. One of the qualifications which Wickliff considered to be indispensably requisite in him who interprets the word of God, he expresses in the following striking terms:—"He should be A MAN OF PRAYER. HE NEEDS THE INTERNAL INSTRUCTION OF THE PRIMARY TEACHER."* To the same effect is the testimony of the great Dr. Owen:—"For a man solemnly to undertake the interpretation of any portion of Scripture without invocation of God, to be taught and instructed by his Spirit, is a high provocation of him; nor shall I expect the discovery of truth from any one who thus proudly engages in a work so much above his ability. But this is THE SHEET ANCHOR of a faithful expositor in all difficulties: nor can he without this be satisfied that he hath attained the mind of the Spirit in any divine revelation. When all other helps fail, as they frequently do, this will afford him the best relief. The labours of former expositors are of excellent use; but they are far from having discovered the depths of this vein of wisdom; nor will the best of our endeavours prescribe limits to our successors: and the reason why the generality go in the same track, except in some excursions of curiosity, is the not giving themselves up to the conduct of the Holy Spirit in the

* Milner's Church history, Vol. IV. p. 134.

diligent performance of their duty."* And Ernesti himself, whom none will accuse of fanaticism, scruples not to assert, "that men truly pious, and desirous of knowing the truth, are *assisted by the influence of the Spirit* in their researches, specially in those things that pertain to faith and practice." Part I. § 31.

Had the subjects treated of in this chapter not been in a great measure systematically excluded from hermeneutical and exegetical studies, and in many instances regarded as detrimental to the free and successful prosecution of them, foreign theological literature would not have been disgraced as it is with such a mass of puerile, irreverent, and hazardous interpretations, such temerity of hypothesis, and such an immense accumulation of philological speculations, marshalled in infidel array against the fortress of divine truth. To guard the student against the pernicious consequences of attempting to interpret the Bible, except in the spirit of the Bible, the above observations are inserted in this work.

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* Pneumatology, p. 332. Lond. 1808. 8vo.

END.

The Curfew tolls the knell of parting day
The lowing herd wind slowly o'er the lea
The plowman homeward plods his weary way
And leaves the world to darkness & to me