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ELEMENTARY
PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION,
TRANSLATED FROBI THE LATIN OF
J. A. ERNESTI,
ACCOMPANIED BY NOTES, WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING EX- TRACTS FROM MORUS, BECK, KEIL, AND HENDERSON.
BY MOSES STUART,
Associate Prof, of Sac. Lit. in Theol. Seminary, Andover.
jFouvtl) 33tiitton
ANDOVER:
PUBLISHED BY ALLEN, MORRILL, AND WAEDWELL, NEW YORK :
DAYTON AND SAXTON.
1842.
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PREFACE
TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
The public, although indulgent in respect to this work, are not prepared to receive another apology for the want of some emendation. The simple truth is, that the intelligence re- specting the exhausted state of the last edition came upon me altogether unexpectedly; and came upon me, also, when so connected with other engagements (if not more important at least more imperious), as to render it absolutely impossible for me to undertake a remodelling of this treatise. All I could do, or have done, was simply to correct the press while a reprint was made.
I might justify myself, perhaps, in the view of the public, were I to state what my engagements are. But I must mere- ly cast myself on their indulgence, not deeming it proper to bring my private pursuits before them, in the preface to this little work.
Some account of the manner in which this book is made up, will be proper for the sake of those who may desire to read it. Such an one I shall now subjoin. ^'
The edition of Ernesti from which I have made the present translation, is that published by Dr. Ammon at Leipsic, in 1809. Of his notes I have made but little use. Some of them are so thoroughly neological, that I could not in con- ( science adopt them. My principal reason however for omit- ' ting his notes, is, that I found a much better commentator on Ernesti, to whom I profess myself to be greatly indebted. I refer to Morus ; whose Hermeneutica is a system of lectures^
IV PREFACE.
on interpretation, of which Ernesti's Institutio is the basis or text-book. The work of Morus I prize so highly, that I have, at the close of almost every section of Ernesti, referred to' the corresponding part in his commentator. The notes which I have added to the work, contain, for the most part, a sum- mary of lohat Morus has said. For the fidelity of this sum- mary, and for the matter of some of the notes, specially of the longer ones, I am responsible. The notes are distin- guished from the text, by being printed in smaller type. Any more distinction was thought unnecessary.
Morus is an author too copious for republication in our country, but may easily be imported. The student cannot fail to read him with great profit. The Latin is uncommonly easy ; and, if I may judge from my own feelings, very pure and classical. I would earnestly recommend it to every stu- dent, to compare Morus with Ernesti, in all the places where reference in the following work is made to him.
The works of Keil, Beck, and Seller, to which reference is made at the head of most of the chapters, are useful ?jianuals of the science of interpretation, and can be procured at a very moderate expense. In point of arrangement, and in the exclusion of matter which does not belong to the proper province of Hermeneutics, they have some advantage over Ernesti. I believe, however, that Ernesti has exhibited the essential part of the science in question more fundamentally, and in a more convincing and instructive way, than either of these authors. Still, as they are more recent, and have been much used by those who study interpretation, I thought it might be acceptable to refer to them.
Other books are occasionally referred to, but not often, with the exception of Morus. It would have been easy to add a multhude of references to books, on every subject, and every ramification of each subject, throughout the work. But I am not persuaded of the utility of this method for beginners.
PREFACE. V
The mind is overwhelmed with the endless task, which the reading of so many writers would occasion. There may be a show of learning in a writer, who makes his references so copious ; but the real profit to the student is comparatively small. A reference to a few of the best books, is of more importance than to accumulate an undistinguished mass, which presents a mere catalogue of what has been published. Beck is not free from this fault ; and even Keil has not made his " select literature " sufficiently select.
To the third division of this work, which treats of translat- ing from one language into another, I have added the greater part of an excellent dissertation of Morus, which comprises this topic. In order to do this, [ have omitted a part of the chapter in Ernesti, pertaining to this subject ; as I thought it far less useful than what is inserted from Morus.
Part fourth contains a summary of the laws of criticism, which are to regulate the judgment of those who form opin- ions about the genuine text of the Scriptures. Exceptions might be made to some of these laws ; but I have not thought them of sufficient importance to be urged here, where every thing is designed to be a mere summary of general maxims. Beck has given a more brief \\ew of the subject of criticism, than I have been able elsewhere to find ; and the biblical student should not be altogether ignorant of it, as cases of controversy may arise about the text, where ignorance of this nature would subject him to serious disadvantages.
Part fifth consists of a chapter from Keil, on the Qualifica- tions of an Interpreter. It is so much more brief and com- prehensive than the corresponding chapter in Ernesti, that 1 could not hesitate to prefer it. A list of some of the best books, on the topics to which the chapter adverts, will be found at the close of the respective sections.
Part sixth contains an extract from the London edition ot this work, which extract exhibits the sentiments of Dr. Hen- 1*
VI PREFACE.
derson, the editor of that edition, respecting the moral quali- fications of young men who enter on studies appropriate to the sacred office. The readers of this httle volume will prize it the more in consequence of its exhibiting the views of one who is justly regarded with great respect and much esteem, by those who have the privilege of any acquaintance with him.
The Index or table of Contents to the present edition, is, after the example of Dr. Henderson, made much fuller and more particular than in the first and second American editions. Indeed it is throughout almost an exact copy of his.
In regard to the translation itself I have only to remark, that I have made what may be called a free translation. I have supplied some links necessary for easy transition, and also for the sake of perspicuity. I have frequently broken up sections, and even sentences, for the same purpose. I have also numbered the sections continuously^ for the sake of easy reference. But I have not, in any case, designedly changed the sentiment of Ernesti. My great object has been, so to present his treatise in English as to make it most perspicuous and useful to the English reader.
At the commencement of each section of the text I have placed a very brief notice of the contents ; which, for con- venience to the reader in finding easily any subject after which he is seeking, has been printed in Italics. These sum- maries belong not to the original work ; 1 am responsible for them.
If the manual shall prove to be intelligible and useful to
the student, who is entering upon the regular study of the
Sacred Records, my wishes and highest expectations will be
gratified.
^ M. STUART.
Andover., Theol. Seminary, Nov. 1841.
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.
OF INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL.
Necessity and utility of interpretation
Difficulties attending it
Definitions ........
Requisites of a good interpreter ....
Means by which difficulties and their causes are detected
Means of removing these difficulties
Exercise and Habits adapted to overcome them
Skill in explanation
Definition of Hermeneutics
Division of the same
Page. 13 13 14 14 15 16 17 17 17 18
PART I. CHAPTER I.
OF THE MEANING OF WORDS.
Every word must have some meaning .... Meaning of words conventional ..... Connection between words and ideas now rendered necessary
by usage
Signification of words multiplied in process of time How to find the meaning in each case ....
Ambiguity of words arises from various causes
Error of those who assign many meanings to a word at the
same time and in the same place Error of those who affirm that the words of Scripture mean all that they poossibly can mean ....
The sense of words, properly considered, is not allegorical Properly speaking, there is no typical sense of words Danger resulting from the spirit of multiplying allegories and types .........
The sense of words depends on the usus loquendi, which is de termined in a variety of ways ....
Grammatical and historical sense .....
Grammatical sense the only true one ....
The principles of interpretation are common to sacred and profane writings .......
Language can be properly interpreted only in a philological way Any method of interpretation not philological, is fallacious The analogy of faith or doctrine as applied to interpretation
VJ 20
20 21 21 21
22
23 23 24
24
25 26 26
27 27
28 28
Vlll
CONTENTS.
29 30 31 31
31
The sense of Scripture not arbitrary
No sentiment of the Scriptures to be hastily deemed unreasonable Interpretation should rather be grammatical than doctrinal
No real contradictions in Scripture
Every interpretation should harmonize with the design of the writer, and with the context . . .
CHAPTER II.
OF THE KINDS OF WORDS AND THEIR VARIOUS USES.
Words proper and tropical ....
Words as first used
Mode of forming tropical words
Tropical words sometimes become proper ones
Usage sometimes effects this change
Tropical words become proper by transfer
used for the sake of variety in expression
used for ornament .....
The frequency of tropes depend much on the genius of the writer
Tropes used from necessity differ from those employed for va- riety or ornament .
Sense of tropical words grammatical
Origin of synonymous words
Definition of emphasis
No word of itself emphatic
Kinds of emphasis .
How emphasis is known .
No ground for dividing emphasis into real and verbal
Tropical words not of course and from their nature emphatic
Words in one language do not always correspond exactly to those in another ........
Antithesis
Mstract and concrete icords.
The use of abstracts for concretes arose from necessity .
Fopular and learned use of words ......
PART II.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION.
CHAPTER I.
Introductory remarks
CHAPTER U.
OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES.
Usus loquendi known by testimony 45
How to obtain direct testimony ...... 45
Definitions of words , . 46
Examples 46
Parallel passages 46
Parallelism is verbal and real 47
Parallel passages to be read continuously and frequently . 49
43
CONTENTS.
IX
The exercise of comparison should be often repeated . . 50
Many parallel passages should be compared . . . .51 Testimony of Scholiasts respecting the usus loquendi , . 52
Glossaries . . , 52
Versions 53
Other similar testimonies 54
Knowledge of the peculiar style and all the circumstances of an
author necessary 54
The nature of composition specially to be regarded . . .55
CHAPTER III.
OTHER MEANS TO ASSIST IN FINDING THE SENSE OF WORDS BESIDES THE USDS L0(^UENOI.
Necessity of indirect testimony 5G
Scope of a writer the first and best means 50
Cautions in judging of the scope n • ^'
Use of the context 59
Various comparisons useful 59
Analogy of languages of use 60
Grammatical analogy 61
Analogy of kindred languages 01
Etymology an uncertain guide i 62
Similar expressions to be compared 62
Foundation of analogy in all languages . . , . 63
Use of this general principle 63
Interpretation by appeal to the nature of things, etc. . . 64
The error of pressing etymologies too far not unfrequent . . 65
CHAPTER IV.
ON FINDlIfC THE USUS LOQUENDI OF THE NEW TESTAMENT,
Knowledge of the New Testament dialect important . . GO
The question stated and limited ^
What it excludes , . 67
The kind of Greek with which the N .Testament is to be compared 68
New Testament Greek not pure 68
Some phrases common to Greek and Hebrew . . .69
Arguments to prove that the New Testament Greek is not pure 69 Objections answered ......... 70
Hebrew-Greek idiom does not necessarily make the style of the
New Testament obscure ....... 71
Language of the New Testament is Hebrew-Greek . . .71
It also comprises Latinisms, etc. 72
Method of finding the usus loquendi of the New Testament not
difficult 72
Rules for finding it 72
Much caution necessary to decide what is classic and what is
Hebrew Greek 73
Sepluagint and Hebrew to be compared . . . . .73
Aquila and Symmachus to be studied 74
When the Hebrew idiom is to be preferred . . . .74 in the doctrines of religion especially . . . .75
% CONTENTS.
in respect to the forms, tenses, and number of words , 75
Other idioms to be consulted in certain cases . . . .75 Direct testimony not alwaj'^s sufficient . . . . .76 New words to be explained by testimony direct and indirect . 77
Greek fathers to be consulted 77
Glossaries 78
Glosses ........... 78
Context . 79
Analogy of faith 79
Difficult idioms to be specially studied 80
Difficult forms in profane writers to be studied . . .81
CHAPTER V.
RULES IN RESPECT TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE.
Duty of an Interpreter in respect to tropical language . . 82 Certain rules respecting tropical diction examined . . .82 How to examine whether language is tropical . . . .83
Certain words not tropical 85
Words tropical where the subject and predicate disagree . . 86 Laws, history, didactic works, seldom admit tropes . . .86 [Jsus loquendi in regard to things which cannot be examined by
our feelings and conceptions ...... 87
Adjuncts useful in determining when words are tropical . . 88
Context to be consulted . .88
Sources of tropical interpretation . . . . . . 88
Caution to be used in judging from etymology . . . .89
Method of determining whether a trope is adequately understood 89 Allecrories, how interpreted ....... 90
Parables 92
CHAPTER VI.
RULES RESPECTING EiMPHASI.S.
Errors respecting emphasis very frequent 93
Ground of these errors 93
Need of rules to direct us in judging of emphasis . . .94
Insufficient rules 94
Kinds of writing where emphasis is rare 94
No word of itself emphatical 95
Emphasis not to be taught by etymology, or recurring to the
original sense of words ....... 95
Prepositions in composition do not always increase the meaning
of a word .......... 95
Whether emphasis is to be deduced from the plural number . 96 Abstract words not emphatic when used for concretes . . 96 Emphasis not to be deduced merely from oriental idioms . . 97 How to discover emphasis in doubtful cases . . . .98
Emphasis must not contradict the usns loquendi . . .99
CONTENTS. XI
CHAPTER VII.
MEANS OF HARMONIZING APPARENT DISCREPANCIES.
If two passages contradict each other, the text of one must be
faulty 100
If both be genuine, conciliation is to be sought where apparent discrepancies exist
Discrepancies, doctrinal and historical ....
Causes of apparent discrepancies in doctrinal passages .
Method of harmonizing them
Origin of apparent historical discrepancies
We should be conversant with the mode of reconciling passages in the best classic authors
Historical facts not to be confounded because of a slight simili tude, nor represented as different on account of some slight discrepancy ......
Doubtful passages to be interpreted by plain ones .
A perfect harmony not to be expected ....
100 100 101 101 103
104
104 106 106
PART m.
ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES.
An interpreter should not only understand the Scriptures, but be able to explain them well, so as to give an exact de- lineation of the original 107
The words of a version ought to correspond as exactly as possi- ble with the original 107
When we cannot translate ad verbum we must translate ad sensum 108 A knowledge of Hebrew as well as Greek necessary to trans- late the New Testament . . . . • .108 Cases where we must adhere to the mode of translating ad verbum 109 In translating, we ought to lean towards our own idiom . 110
Morus on translation 110
PART IV.
GENERAL ROLES OF CRITICISM IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT.
Common laws of lower criticism in general .... 121 Laws of higher criticism for establishing a purer text . • 124 Laws proper to guide our judgment in regard to the true read- ing of the New Testament . . , . . .120
Xll
COxNTENTS.
PART V.
ON THE LITERARY QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER
Knowledge of Biblical Criticism .....
the language in which the books are written
the historical matter of the books
(1) Geography .
(2) Chronology ,
(3) History, civil and political
(4) Manners and customs . doctrinal contents
(1) Jewish opinions .
(2) Christian precepts
(3) Doctrines of heretical sects Grammar, Rhetoric and Philosophy
131 131 132 132 132 133 133 134 134 134 135 135
PART VL
CHAPTER I.
ON THE MORAL
QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER OF SCRIPTURE.
Vital and practical godliness 138
Unreserved submission to the authority of divine revelation . 138 An humble and teachable disposition ..... 139 A decided attachment to the divine truth .... 139 Persevering diligence in the use of proper means . . .139 Incessant and earnest prayer 140
INTRODUCTION.
OF INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL.
[With this introductory chapter, may be compared Keil, Herme- neutica, pp. 1 — 14. Beck, Monogramm. Herm. pp. 1—22. Seller, Hermeneutik, §§ 9 — II.]
§ 1. Necessity and utility of it. The interpretation of the sacred books is the highest and most difficult task of the theo- logian. This may be shown from the nature of the case, from experience, and also from the consent of all enlightened periods. All solid knowledge and judicious defence of divine truth, must originate from a right understanding and accurate interpretation of the Scriptures. The purity of the Christian religion has shone brighter or been obscured, in proportion as the study of sacred interpretation has flourished or de- cayed.
Finally, those have always been reckoned as the most dis- tinguished theologians, who have excelled in this kind of learning. (Compare Morus, Hermeneutica, p. 3. I.)
As Christian doctrine is preserved only in written records, the in- terpretation of these is absolutely essential to a knowledge of it ; and unless we know what Christianity is, we can neither maintain its purity nor defend its principles to the best advantage.
§ 2. Difficulties attending interpretation. The science of interpretation in general is difficult ; because it requires much learning, judgment, and diligence. Not unfrequently a pecu- liar adaptedness of talent, or a more than usual degree of un- derstanding, is requisite to manage an exegetical inquiry with success. But the interpretation of the sacred books is, from various causes (a), still more difficult ; as the general consent 2
14 , INTRODUCTION.
of the learned and the wonderful paucity (h) of good inter- preters fully evince. (Morus, p. 4. 11.)
(a) These causes are, their antiquity ; the peculiar dialect of the Scriptures, which greatly differs from that of the western languages ; the manners, customs, education, style, modes of thinking and ex- pression, situation, government, climate, etc., of the authors, in ma- ny respects so very dissimilar to ours ; the fewness of the books written in the Scriptural dialect ; and the want of commentators and lexicographers to whom the language was vernacular. To these causes may be added, the authority and influence which many erro- neous commentaries of distinguished men have had over the Chris- tian world.
(b) The paucity of good interpreters, who, unbiassed by party sen- timents, have pursued the interpretation of the Scriptures in a sim- ple philological manner, and been consistent throughout in the ap- plication of principles purely exegeticalj is much greater than any one will be disposed to believe, until experience acquired by consult- ing commentaries shall have convinced him.
§ 3. Definitions. The art of interpretation, is the art of teaching what is the meaning of another's language ; or that skill, which enables us to attach to another's language the same meaning that the author himself attached to it. (Mo- rus, p. 6. III.)
It is better to define interpretation as an act than as an art. To in- terpret a passage, is to shew or declare the sense of it, or simply to explain the meaning, i. e. the meaning which the author himself of the passage attached to it. Any other meaning than this can never be called, with propriety, the meaning of the author.
Interpretation, strictly speaking, may be called grammatical, when the meaning of words, phrases, and sentences, is made out from the 7J.SUS loquendi and context; historical, when the meaning is illustra- ted and confirmed by historical arguments, which serve to evince that no other sense can be put upon the passage, whether you regard the nature of the subject, or the genius, manner, and circumstances of the writer.
§ 4. Requisites of a good interpreter. The act of inter- pretation implies two things ; viz., (1) A right perception of the meaning of words. (2) A proper explanation of that meaning. Hence a good interpreter must possess a sound understanding., and be skilful in explanation (a). (Morus^ p, a IV.)
(a) The words of Ernesti are suhtilitas intelligcndl et explicandi, a
INTRODUCTION. 15
phrase which would convey a meaning quite foreign to his intention? if literally translated into English, or at most convey his idea very imperfectly. His meaning is, that the interpreter, who exercises an acute understanding or possesses suhtilitus intelligendi, must demand satisfactory reasons for believing in any particular exegesis, and build his opinion respecting the sense of any passage on such reasons. These reasons must be founded on the usvs loqucndi, the context, the nature of the subject, the design of the writer, etc. An interpreta- tion supported by none of these, cannot be admitted by a sound un- derstanding.
The subtilitas explicandi, which I have translated skilf in explana- tion, consists generally in the accuracy of explanation. To constitute such accuracy in its proper sense, a right use must be made of all the means of interpretation, so as to gain precise and definite views of the author's meaning ; then every thing should be so defined and expres- sed by the interpreter as to exclude all ambiguity and uncertainty ; and lastly, the whole should be exhibited in the proper order which the nature of language and of logic demands^
§ 5. Suhtilitas intelligendi. An acute understanding is exhibited in two ways ; first, in discerning whether we really understand a passage or not, and provided we do not, in dis- covering the difficulties that lie in the way of rightly under- standing it and the grounds of those difficulties ; secondly, in finding out and employing a proper method of investigating the sense of those passages which are difficult. (Morus, p. 10. V.)
§ 6. Means ly which difficulties and their causes are de- tected. A good degree of talent or capacity is requisite for this ; for men of small capacity frequently assent to things which seem to be taught, without any good reasons for so doing, and often believe themselves to understand what they do not understand. To a good degree of talent must be joined a careful habit of distinguishing ideas of things from mere words or sounds (a) ; for we ought always to inquire, with respect to any word, whether we have a distinct percep- tion of the thing or idea which it is meant to designate, and not to regard merely the sound of the word. (Morus, p. 10. VI.)
(a) Specially should this be done where language is employed to de-
16 INTRODUCTION.
signate any thing which is not the object of our senses, but is of an intellectual or metaphysical nature. Habit as well as care will do much in these cases. Translating from onk language into
ANOTHER, IS AN EXCELLENT EXERCISE TO FORM A HABIT OF NICE DIS- TINCTION ; for when we come to express the ideas of an author in an- other language, we often find that we had only an indefinite percep- tion of them. The employment of teaching, also, is well adapted to promote the same purpose ; as is the study of logic, or any science which leads to nice discrimination.
§ 7. Means of removing these difficulties. The first means is, a just and accurate knowledge of languages {a). The next, an acquaintance with the principles of interpreta- tion. Not that no one can interpret at all without a scientific knowledge of these principles ; but because they assist men of moderate talents, and guide them as it were in the right way, so that they are not left to depend on chance rather than rea- son. Besides, they are, in this way, supplied with a common rule forjudging in controverted cases (5). Finally, as in de- tecting difficulties exercise and habit are important, so here they are of so much consequence that all other advantages will be of little use without them. (Morus, p. 12 — 19. Nos. I. II. III.)
(a) An accurate knowledge of grammaticcd principles and of the risus loquendi is here intended ; for what authority can an interpreta- tion have, which violates rules of grammar and the usages of speech ?
(b) Precepts for interpretation, well grounded, clearly understood, and judiciously applied, very much facilitate the task of the interpreter, and render the result of his labors more worthy of confidence. He who acts by well established rules is more certain that he acts riglit, than if he followed his own opinion merely, in all cases of difficult}'' and doubt. And in controversies of an exegetical or doctrinal nature, to what can the appeal be made, in the ultimate resort, but to the prin- ciples of interpretation, i. e. the precepts or rules which it prescribes ? Nor are these principles useful only to men of moderate talents, (as Ernesti would seem to intimate), but to men of the highest talents and best acquisitions. Men may, indeed, learn them by usage in the interpretation of authors, without the scientific study of them : but the latter is the most easy method, and guards most effectually against mistakes.
In addition to these helps for removing difficulties, a knowledge of history, geography, chronology, antiquities, etc., is of high and even of indispensable importance.
INTRODUCTION. I'V
§ 8. Exercises and habits adapted to overcome the difficul- ties of interpretation. First, we should attend the instruc- tions of a good interpreter ; next, we should read those works where exegetical knowledge is displayed in the best manner, and reflect much upon them, for in this way we may be led to the imitation of them ; and lastly, those books which we desire to interpret must be assiduously and constantly perused. (Morus, p. 19. IV.)
In the two first exercises, example serves both to excite and to guide our efforts. The habit of reading, often and assiduously, the book which we desire to interpret, is of more importance than any, or perhaps than all, other means within our power. Every new perusal will suggest to an intelligent and inquisitive mind many ideas, frequently very important ones, which were not before enter- tained. This practice cannot, therefore, be too strongly recommend- ed to the student.
§ 9. Snhtilitas explicandi, i. e. acuteness or skill in expla- nation. This is exhibited by expressing the sense of an au- thor, either in words of the same language which are more perspicuous than his, or by translating into another language, and explaining by argument and illustration (a). In addition to an accurate knowledge of the language which we translate, skill in explaining requires that we should exhibit purity of diction ; still preserving, so far as may be, the features of the original, lest the mode of reasoning should be obscured, which sometimes depends on ihe form of the words. (Morus, p. 20. VIII.)
(a) We explain by argument, when we exhibit reasons drawn from the grammar and idiom of the language, the context, and the design of the writer. We illustrate, when we cast light upon the meaning of an author, which is borrowed from history, chronology, antiquities, etc. Purity and brevity of style should characterize both these modes of explanation.
§ 10. Definition of Hermeneuiics (a). Hermeneutics is the science which teaches to find, in an accurate and judicious manner, the meaning of an author, and appropriately to ex- plain it to others. (Morus, p. 21. IX.)
2*
18 INTRODUCTION.
(a) Modern usage distinguishes between Hermeneutics and Exege- y^ ,-^13. Hermeneutics is the tltcory or science of interpretatjon 5 it com- prises Imd ex hibils the principles and rules of this art. Exegesis is (fthe practical apjjiication of these rules ; the act of carrying them into /"^execution. The etymology of these two words would lead to the con- ^clusion, that both are of the same meaning ; but usage has assigned ^ a different signification to them.
§ 11. Division of Hermeneutics. Hermeneutics, consider- ed as the art of finding the sense of words, (so far as it is an art, and is the proper subject of precepts), consists of two parts, viz. the theoretical and preceptive (a). The first com- prises general principles, in respect to the meaning of words and the various kinds of them. On these principles, the rules of interpretation and the reasons of them are grounded. The second consists of rules, which are to guide us in inves- tigating the sense of an author's words. Both of these parts are essential ; for on the one hand, principles without any \ rules deduced from them would be inadequate to guide our , philological inquiries ; and on the other, rules can neither be \ perspicuous nor well grounded which are not established upon principles. (Morus, p. 22. X.)
(a) Exegesis differs from the preceptive part of Hermeneutics, in- asmuch as it is the act of carrying the precepts into execution, and not the precepts themselves.
§ 12. Division of the work. It may be divided into three parts ; the first contains the principles and precepts of Her- meneutics ; the second has respect to the making of transla- tions and commentaries ; and the third treats of the various kinds of hermeneutical apparatus, and of its proper use in the interpretation of the New Testament.
Of these three parts, the first is translated throughout, and so much
of the second as seemed to be particularly useful. The third part is
essentially comprised in the first, so far as it properly belongs to the
province of Hermeneutics; and therefore may well be dispensed with,
in an elementary treatise like this. So far as the third part contains
-•any thing not substantially comprised in the first, it properly belongs
- to the province of sacred literature, and specially to literarj^ history
^ or introductions (as they are called), which are designed to give the
student a view in detail of the various authors, books, versions, etc.,
of the Scriptures.
MEANING OF WORDS. 19
I. luiITI
PART CHAPTER I
[Compare with this chapter, Keil, §§ 5 — 8. Seller, §§ 41— 4().] OF THE MEANING OF WORDS.
§ 13. Design of this chapter. The design of the follow- ing remarks upon the meaning of words, is to exhibit the ground or principles whence all certainty in the interpretation of language arises. If from the nature and use of language certain principles may be clearly deduced, which will serve as a guide to explain it, then, it is evident, the essential part of the theory of Hermeneutics consists of these principles. (Morus, p.27.I.)
<J 14. Every toord must have some meaning. To every word there ought to be assigned, and in the Scriptures there is unquestionably assigned, some idea or notion. This we call the meaning or sense of the word (a). (Morus, p. 28. II.)
(a) Otherwise words are useless, and have no more signification than the inarticulate sounds of animals.
§ 15. Definitions. The literal sense of words, is the sense which is so connected with them, that it is first in order, and is spontaneously presented to the mind, as soon as the sound of the word is heard {a). The literal sense does not differ, among the older and valuable writers, from the se?ise of the letter ,• although some ignorant persons, in later times, have very erroneously made a distinction. Erasmus and his co- temporaries use both phrases promiscuously. Literal means the same as the Greek to ysygufifiivov, or tlie Latin scriptum : whence the phrases scriptum sequi, and scriptum interpretari.
20 MEANING OF WORDS.
(a) The literal sense is the same as the primitive or original sense ; or, at least, it is equivalent to that sense which has usurped the place of the original one ; e. g. the original sense of the word tragedy has long ceased to be current, and the literal sense of this word, now, is that which has taken the place of the original one.
§ 16. The meaning of words conventional. Words con- sidered simply as sounds have no meaning ; for they are not natural and necessary signs of things,but conventional ones (a). Usage or custom has constituted a connection between words and ideas. (Morus, p. 28. III.)
(a) Interjections or exclamations may, perhaps, be considered as a kind of exception to this remark. Words also which the Greeks call <]vouaTOTcsnon;uira, i. e. words the sounds of which imitate the sense, are also considered by many as an exception. But there is so much of fancy in the construction of these words, and they are so differ- ently formed in different languages, that no solid proof of their being an exception can fairly be made out. Great efforts have been made, in former times, to shew that every syllable and even letter of a word, in the Hebrew language, had a special significancy attached to it. F. M. Helmont published a work entitled Alyhahetum Jfaturale, the object of which was to shew, that every difierent opening of the mouth in order to pronounce different letters, was significant of some idea. To illustrate this, he caused a great number of plates to be engraved, which he inserted in the work ; so that his book, as Morus says, is mira capitum humanorum coUectio, quae admodum distorta ora osten- dat. Caspar Neumann, in his Exodus Linguae Sanctae, followed much the same path, but with more moderation ; and V. E. Loescher, in his De caussis Ling. Heb. exhibits the same principles. E. g. in the word y^nji , t< indicates motion, he says, -i eruption, i: violence. The whole word ynn then, signifies something inwhich motion bursts forth icith violence. The student may smile at this egregious tri- fling ; but the time has been, when the word of God was explained by leading men in the churches, in connection with such wretched puerilities. (Morus, p. 31. IV.)
§ 17. The connection between words and ideas now render- ed necessary ly usage. Such is the fact, whatever may have been the case at first. This does not mean, however, that a word is susceptible of only one meaning ; for usage contra- dicts this. But from this principle we learn, (1) That nei- ther in using or interpreting a word are we at liberty to affix to it an arbitrary sense (a). (2) That the sense of a word cannot be diverse or multifarious, at the same time and in the
MEANING OF WORDS. 21
same passage or expression (b). (Morus, p. 33. V. VI. VII.) (a) The fact that usage has attached any particular meaning to a word, like any other historical fact, is to be proved by adequate tes- timony. This testimony may be drawn from books in which the word is employed, or from daily use in conversation. But the fact of a particular meaning being attached to a word, when once estab- lished, can no more be changed or denied, than any historical event whatever. Of course, an arbitrary sense can never, with propriety, be substituted for a real one.
(6) All men, in their daily conversation and writings, attach but one sense to a word, at the same time and in the same passage ; un- less they design to speak in enigmas. Of course, it would be in op- position to the universal custom of language, if more than one mean- ing should be attached to any word of Scripture in such a case. Yet many have often done this. See § § 21 , 22.
§ 18. Signification oftcords mulliplied in process of time. Although a word can have but one meaning at the same time and in the same place, usage has gradually assigned many meanings to the same word (a), lest words should be indefi- nitely multiplied, and the difficulty of learning a language be- come too great. (Morus, p. 39. VIII.)
(a) The question then for an interpreter is simply this : Which one of the significations that a word has, is connected with its use in any particular instance ?
§ 19. How can the meaning in each case he found 7 (1) From the general manner of speaking, i. e. from the common usage. (2) From the proximate words or context. (Morus, p. 41. I. II.)
That is, the usual and obvious meaning is attached to the word, or else one which the context renders necessary. In addition to the aid drawn from these sources, an interpreter may sometimes obtain as- sistance from the scope or design of the writer, or from history, anti- quities, the nature of the subject, etc. (Morus, p. 42. III. IV.)
<5> 20. Ambiguity ofioords arises from various causes. (1) From the fault of writers (a). (2) From neglect in the con- struction and necessary connections of words and sentences ; proper care not having been taken to guard the reader against uncertainty, and to afford him the best means for finding the true sense {b). (3) From the manner in which common
22 MEANING OF WORDS.
usage often forms language ; which, not being guided by phi- losophy.or refined knowledge, is frequently deficient in re- spect to accuracy (c). (Morus, p. 44. X. I — V.)
{a) When they are ignorant of the rules of writing with accuracy and perspicuity, {b) E. g. the answer of the Delphic oracle, /iio te Romanos vincere posse, which may be rendered, with equal probabili- ty, that the Romans would conquer Pyrrhus, or Fyrrhus the Romans, (c) No other proof of this is needed, than what the perusal of a com- position by an illiterate person will afford.
Besides the causes of ambiguity above enumerated, we may reckon ignorance of the usus loquendi. If the interpreter is not acquainted with this, (and in respect to words which are uttw; Xiyo^uru he must of course be ignorant of it in many cases), he is left in doubt, unless the context decides for him. As this is not always the case, there is room here for ambiguity.
§21. Conclusions fromwhat has heen said. From what has already been said, in this chapter, about the use of words, we may discover the ground of all the certainty which attends the interpretation of language {a). For there can be no cer- tainty at all in respect to the interpretation of any passage, unless a kind of necessity compels us to affix a particular sense to a word ; which sense, as I have said before, must be one ; and, unless there are special reasons for a tropical meaning, it must be the literal sense {b). (Morus, p. 47. XL )
(a) If any one should deny that the above principles lead to cer- tainty, when strictly observed, he would deny the possibility of find- ing the meaning of language with certainty, {b) The secondary or figurative sense of words is as often necessary as the literal sense. Many words have even ceased to convey a literal meaning. The ob- vious sense of a word, therefore, in any particular connection, is the necessary one ; and a conviction that the sense in any case is neces- sary, will be in exact proportion to the degree in which it is felt to be obvious. By obvious here, is not meant what is obvious to an illite-. rate or hasty interpreter ; but to one who has learning and good judg- ment, and makes use of all the proper means of interpretation.
§ 22. Error of those who assign many meanings to a word, at the same time and in the same place. Such an opinion is to be rejected ; although the practice is very old, as Augus- tine testifies. Confess. XII. 30, 31. The opinion probably originated from the variety of interpretations given to ambig-.
MEANING OF WORDS. 23
uous passages ; several of which appeared probable, and were recommended by a sentiment of reverence towards the au- thors of them. A principle of this nature, however, must in- troduce very great uncertainty into exegesis ; than which nothing can be more pernicious. (Morus, p. 35. VII.)
§ 23. Error of those who affirm that the words of Scripture mean all that they possibly can mean. This sprung from the Rabbinical schools, and passed from them, in early times, to Christians. The transition is very easy from this error to ev- ery kind of license in the introduction of allegory, prophecy, and mystery, into every part of the Bible ; as the experience of the Jews, the ancient Fathers, the scholastic divines, and the followers of Cocceius, demonstrates.
The Rabbinic maxim is : ' On every point of the Scripture hang suspended mountains of sense.' The Tahnud says; * God so gave the Law to Moses, that a thing can be shewn to be clean and unclean in forty-nine difierent ways.' Most of the fathers, and a multitude of "commentators in later times, were infected with these principles. Little more than a century ago, the celebrated Cocceius of Leyden maintained the sentiment, that all the possible meanings of a word in the Scripture are to be united. By his learning and influence a pow- erful party was raised up, in the protestanl church, in favor of such a principle. The mischiefs resulting from it have not yet ceased to operate.
§ 24. The sense of words properly considered is not alle- gorical. Allegory is rather an accommodation of the sense of words^ or an accommodation of things^ to the illustration of some doctrine. Moderately used, and well adapted, it may be of some profit which is entitled to regard. But when resorted to by the unlearned and those of an uncultivated taste, it commonly degenerates into empty and ridiculous trifling. (Comp. Morus, Dissertt. Tom. I. p. 370, etc.)
It is impossible adequately to describe the excesses and absurdities which have been committed in consequence of the allegorizing spirit. From the time of Origen, who converted into allegory the account of the creation of the world, the creation and fall of man, and multitudes of other simple facts related in the Bible, down to the Jesuit, who makes the account of the creation of the greater light to rule the day to mean the Pope, and the creation of the lesser
24 MEANING OF WORDS.
light and the stars to m6an the subjection of kings and princes to the Pope, there have been multitudes in and out of the Catholic church who have pursued the same path. The most sacred d6ctrines of re- ligion have often been defended and assailed, by arguments of equal validity and of the same nature as the exposition of the Jesuit just mentioned. The spirit which prompts to this may, in some cases, be commendable; but as it is a mere business of fancy, connected with no principles of philology, and supported by no reasons drawn from the nature of language, so it is, for the most part, not only worthless but dangerous. And of what possible use, in the end, can » a principle be, which can prove the most important doctrine, either of Judaism or Christianity, as well from the first verse of the first chapter of Chronicles, as from any part of the Bible ? Or rather, of what use can the Bible be, if it may be interpreted by such principles ?
§ 25. Properly speakings there is no typical sense of words. Types are not words but tilings^ which God has designated as signs of future events. Nor is any special pains necessary for the interpretation of theni. The explanation of them, which the Holy Spirit himself has given, renders them intelli- gible. Beyond his instructions on this subject, we should be very careful never to proceed. As for those who maintain a typical design in all parts of the Scripture, they certainly dis- play very little judgment or consideration ; for they lay open the way for the mere arbitrary introduction of types into ev- ery part of the Bible. The design of the Holy Spirit, in the mention of this or that thing in the Scriptures, can be under- stood only so far as he himself has explained it, or afforded obvious grounds of explanation.
If it be, asked : How far are we to consider the Old Testament as typical? I should answer without any hesitation: Just so much of it is to be regarded as typical, as the New Testament affirms to be so ; and NO MORE. The fact, that any thing or event under the Old Tes- tament dispensation was designed to prefigure something under the ^ew, can be known to us only by revelation ; and, of course, all that ,;'' is not designated by divine authority as typical, can never be made so by any authority less than that which guided the writers of the Scriptures.
§ 26. Danger resulting from the spirit of multiplying al- legories and types. That sentiment, which through impru- . dence or want of knowledge fell from some of the ancient
MEANING OF WORDS. 25
Fathers, and was echoed by many of the Romish doctors, viz. that some passages of Scripture have no literal sense (a), is dangerous beyond description. I presume they meant to affirm this of those passages which they did not understand. Such a sentiment has been recently defended by Wittius on the Proverbs of Solomon ; and Thomas Woolston, taking ad- vantage of this, has converted the narrations of our Saviour's miracles into mere allegories (b.) ^
(a) By literal sense here, Ernest! means a sense not allegorical or mystical ; for to these literal is here opposed, and not to tropical, as it commonly is. There are a multitude of passages in Scripture, which have only a tropical meaning, and which, nevertheless, are neither allegorical nor mystical. '
(b) This shews how dangerous it is, to set the adversaries of reli- gion an example of perverting the interpretation of the Scriptures.
§ 27. The sense of words depends on the usus loquendi. This must be the case, because the sense of words is conven- tional and regulated wholly by usage. Usage then being un- derstood, the sense of words is of course understood.
§ 28. Ustis loquendi determined in a variety of ways. To determine it respect must be had to time (a), religion (b), sect, education, common life (c), and civil affairs (e) ; all of which have influence on an author's language, and character- ^ ize it. For the same word is employed in one sense respect- ing the things of common life ; in another, respecting the things of religion ; in another still in the schools of philoso- phy, and even these are not always agreed in the use of words. (Morus, p. 48. XII— XIII.)
(a) The ancient and modern sense of many words differs, (b) Vic- tim, sacrifice, law, etc., in the Old Testament, are often employed in a sense v/hich differs from that of the same words in the New Testa- ment, (c) Thus to perceive in common life is to feef or experience; in philosophy, to form an idea in the mind ; among the Academic sect, it means to know a thing with certainty, in opposition to mere conjec- ture. So xadaoiauog, ouoz, etc., differ in meaning, when employed by a heathen, a Jew, or a Christian, (e) The technical and peculiar sense of law-language is too well known to need illustration.
To these causes which operate upon the usus loquendi, may be added the style of a writer. We must inquire whether he writes
3
1^ MEANING OF WORDS.
poetry or prose; and whether the writer himself is fervid or cool, turgid or dry, accurate and polished or the reverse. Every writer has his own particular usus loquendi; and most writers, provincial- isms ; and every one is influenced by his own peculiar circumstances. What writers can be more unlike, in respect to style, than Isaiah and Jeremiah, Paul and John ? An interpreter must make himself thor- oughly acquainted with all these various circumstances.
§ 29. Grammatical and historical sense. The observance of all these matters belongs in a special nnanner to gramma- rians, whose business it is to investigate the sense of words. Hence the literal sense is also called the grammatical ; liter- alls and grammaticus having the same meaning. It is also called the historic sense ; because, like other matters of fact, it is supported by historic testimony. (Morus, p. 66. XVII. Comp. § 3, note, supra.)
The grammatical sense is made out by aid of the principles of
frammar, liberally and philosophically (not technically) considered, 'he historical sense is that which is built on the grammatical one, but modified by historical circumstances. Interpreters now speak of the true sense of a passage, by calling it the gramma tico-historical sense; and exegesis, founded on the nature of language, is called grammatico-historical. The object in using this compound name is to shew, that both grammatical and historical considerations are era- ployed in making out the sense of a word or passage.
§ 30. The grammatical sense the only true one. Those who make one sense grammatical and another logical^ do not comprehend the full meaning of grammatical sense. We are not to look, surely, for a sense of words, which varies (in its nature or simply considered as the sense) with every department of learning, or with every diverse object. For if this were the case, words would have as many kinds of senses as objects are muhifarious. (Morus, p. 67. XVIIl.)
In regard to the term grammatical, see the note above. The mean- ing of Ernesti, in this section, is, that the laws of language are the same, in whatever department of writing or speaking it is employed; i. e. the meaning of a writer is to be investigated by the usus loquen- di, etc., and not that logic or philosophy can determine what the sense of words must be, in such a way tliat tlie sense may be called logical, philosophical, etc.
But when he says, as in § 29, that the literal and grammatical sense are the same; and in § 30, that the grammatical sense is the only
MEANING OF WORDS. 27
true one ; he does not mean by literal, that which is opposed to tropi- cal (for the tropical meaning in thousands of cases is the grammatical one), but he means by it, the same as the grammatico-historical sense above described.
§ 31. The principles of interpretation are common to sacred and profane writings. Of course, the Scriptures are to be investigated by the same rules as other books. Those fanat- ics, therefore, are not to be regarded, who, despising literature and the study of the languages, refer every thing merely to the influence of the Spirit. Not that we doubt the influence of the Spirit ; or that men truly pious and desirous of know- ing the truth are assisted by him in their researches, specially in those things that pertain to faith and practice. (Morus, p. 69. XIX.)
if the Scriptures be a revelation to men, then they are to be read and understood by men. If the same laws of language are not ob- served in this revelation as are common to men, Uien they have no guide to the right understanding of the Scriptures ; and an interpre- ter needs inspiration as much as the original writer. It follows, of course,^ that the Scriptures would be no revelation in themselves ; nor of any use, except to those who are inspired. But such a book the Scriptures are not ; and nothing is more evident than that " when God has spoken to men, he has spoken in the language of men, for he ha^ spoken by men, and for men.^'
§ 32. Language can be properly interpreted only in a phi- lological way. Not much unlike these fanatics, and not less hurtful, are those who, from a similar contempt of the langua- ges and from that ignorance of them which breeds contempt, depend in their interpretations rather on things than on words (a). In this way interpretation becomes uncertain ; and truth is made to depend merely on the judgment of men, as soon as we depart from the words, and endeavor to decide upon the sense by the use of means not connected with them. Nor will this mode of exegesis at all avail to convince gainsayers ; for they themselves boast of interpreting in like manner by things^ i. e. either by their own principles and opinions before formed, or by the sentiments of philosophers. Hence arises the abuse of reason, in the interpretation €>f the Scriptures.
■ -^ ^--'- '■■ "' • ;./^ Of xh:-
28 MEANING OF WORDS.
(a) The meaning is, that they decide from that knowledge of things which they suppose themselves already to possess, rather than from the words of the author ; they decide by what they suppose he ought to mean, rather than by what he says.
§ 33. Any method of interpretation not philological isfaU lacious. Moreover, the method of gathering the sense of words from things is altogether deceptive and fallacious ; since things are rather to be known from pointing out the sense of words in a proper way. It is by the words of the Holy Spirit only that we are led to understand what we ought to think respecting things. Said Melancthon very truly : ' The Scripture cannot be understood theologically^ until it is understood grammatically. "^ Luther also avers, that a certain knowledge of the sense of Scripture depends solely on a knowledge of the words.
This section repeats in another form, the idea of the preceding one. In both, Ernesti means to deny the possibility of truly interpreting any book, by other means than those which are philoiogical. &y things, he means the application of our previous views of things to the words of an author, in order to elicit his meaning, — instead of pro- ceeding to our inquiries in the way of grammatico-historical exegesis. Not that our previous knowledge of things can never aid us, — for it often does so; but that this can serve for nothing more than an as- sistant to our philological efforts, as the following section shews.
§ 34. The analogy of faith or doctrine not to guide our in- terpretation. Things, therefore, and the analogy of faith or doctrine (as they call it), assist an interpreter only so far, that when words are ambiguous, either from variety of signification, from structure, or from any other cause, they may lead us to define the signification of them, or to select some one par- ticular meaning. But here we must take good care, that the considerations which we use for explaining should be deduced from the plain, perspicuous, well-understood language of oth- er passages, and that the words which we are endeavouring to explain do not contradict them. For when we investigate the sense in any other way than by a grammatical method, we effect nothing more than to make out a meaning, which in
MEANING OF WORDS. »»
itself perhaps is not absurd, but which lies not in the words, and therefore is not the meaning of the writer. (Morus, p. 253. XVI— XIX.)
Very much has been said both for and against the analogy of faith, as a rule of interpretation. I may safely add, that on this subject, as well as on many others, very much has been said amiss, for want of proper definitions^ What is the analogy of faith ? It is either sim- ply scriptural or sectarian By scriptural analogy 1 mean, that the obvious and incontrovertible sense of clear passages of Scripture af- fords a rule, by which we may reason analogicallij concerning the meaning of obscure passages ; or at least, by which we may shew what obscure passages cannot mean, E. g. God is a spirit, is omnis- cient, supreme, the creator and governor of all things, etc., are truths so plainly and incontrovertibly taught in the Scriptures, that all the passages which would seem to represent him as material, local, lim- ited in his knowledge or power, etc., are to be interpreted agreeably to analogy with the former truths. The same thing holds true of other doctrines taught in the same perspicuous manner. We explain what is doubtful or obscure, by the application to it of what is plain. This rule is not appropriate to the Scriptures only. It is adopted by all good interpreters of profane authors. It is a rule which common sense prescribes ; and is therefore well grounded.
If the question then be asked, whether scriptural analogy of faith is a rule of interpretation; the answer must readily be given in the affirmative.
But the analogy of the faith or creed of any parfy of Christians, taken without abatement, cannot be applied as a rule of exegesis, unless it can be assumed that the whole creed of that party is cer- tainly correct. If a Romanist, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, or a Unita- rian avers, that the Scriptures are to be construed throughout in ac- cordance with the respective Symbols of each ; whom are we to credit." The creed of one party, in some respects, contradicts that of the others, is the Scripture then to have a contradictory exegesis put upon it ? If not, the analogy of party-faith cannot be our rule of interpretation.
In the contest about the analogy of faith being the guide of inter- pretation, both parties have usually been in the right in some re- spects, and in the wrong in others. Comp. Campbell's Gospels, Prelim. Dissert. IV. §§ 13. 14.
5 35. The sense of Scripture not arbitrary. Allowing the above principles to be correct, it is plain that the method of investigating the sense of words in the Scriptures is not more arbitrary than the method used in explaining other books ; but equally regulated by laws deduced from the nature of lan- guage. Those then act very absurdly, who subject the inter- s'
30 MEANING OF WORDS.
pretation of the holy Scriptures to mere human opinion ; for example, to the decision of a Roman pontiff, as if this could determine such a matter. (Comp. § 31. Note.)
§ 36. We must not hastily conclude any sentiment of the Scriptures to he unreasonalle. The meaning, which accord- ing to grammatical principles should be assigned to any word of Scripture, is not to be rejected then on account of reasons derived from things or previously conceived opinions ; for in this way interpretation would become uncertain. In books merely human, if reason and the nature of the subject are re- pugnant to the apparent sense of the words, we conclude there must have been either a fault in the writer, or an error in the copyist. In the Scriptures, if any sentiment does not agree with our opinions, we must call to mind the imbecility of human reason and human faculties ; we must seek for con- ciliation^ and not attempt a correction of the passage without good authority. It is wonderful, that in this matter more rev- erence should be paid to mere human productions, than to the sacred books.
In ancient authors, when any difficulty occurs, we seek for correction or conciliation ; as if they must be rendered ava- fiuQTrjjoi, faultless. But occasion is often taken of carping at the writers of the Scriptures, or of perverting their meaning or the doctrines which they teach.
Nothing can be more appropriate to the present times, than the caution of Ernesti, not to conclude hastily against the reasonable- ness of scriptural sentiment. Many set the Scriptures at variance with reason, because they do not attain to the real meaning of them. Others decide, independently of the Scriptures^ what must be true; and then, whatever is found in the sacred books which thwarts their opinions, they reject as unreasonable. The prudent and pious inter- preter will suspend his judgment in cases of difficulty, and investi- gate with great patience and caution before he decides. Multitudes of passages in sacred writ have been satisfactorily elucidated by crit- ics of this character, which have been given up as unreasonable by those of a different character. The time is coming (I cannot doubt it) when alt the dark places of the Bible will be elucidated, to the satisfaction of intelligent and humble Christians. But how near at
MEANING OF WORDS. 31
hand that blessed day is, I do not pretend to know. " The Lord hasten it in its time !"
§ 37. Interpretation should rather he grammatical than doc- trinal. In comparing reasons for the exegesis of particular passages, greater weight should be attributed to grammatical than doctrinal ones. A thing may be altogether true in doc- trine, which yet is not taught by some particular passage. Books of theology exhibit many doctrinal interpretations, con- sentaneous indeed with Christian principles, but not deduced from the words interpreted ; doctrinally true, but not gram- matically.
It is really matter of regret to find, in most of the old and distin- guished writers on theology, such a multitube of passages adduced ao proof-texts, which, when hermeneutically examined, prove to be in no wise adapted to establish the doctrine in confirmation of which they were cited. It must be acknowledged, that the pleasure of reading many very valuable works of this nature is greatly abated by the study of sacred interpretation, which teaches more correct exegesis. This loss, however, is more than compensated by the deep conviction which springs from the examination of genuine proof passages.
'5> 38. Real contradiction does not exist in the Scriptures. As the books of Scriptures were written by men divinely in- spired, it is evident there can be no real contradiction in them. God is not incapable of seeing what is consistent, and what is contradictory ; nor can he forget, when he speaks, what was said on former occasions. If apparent contradictions then occur, a proper method of conciliation is to be pointed out ; of which, however, I shall say something in another place. (Morus, Vol. II. pp. 1—49.)
§ 39. Every interpretation should harmonize loith the de- sign of the writer, and with the context. For the very reason that these books are inspired, every interpretation ought to agree with the design of the writer, or harmonize with the context. We admit this principle in the interpretation of pro- fane writers ; much more ought we to admit it in respect to
32 KINDS OF WORDS
the Scriptures. Mere men, through negligence or want of knowledge, may insert some things that disagree with their principal design ; but not so the Holy Spirit. Hence the cer- tainty of any exegesis is connected with the design and series of the discourse. Rules of caution, however, are important here, as, in its proper place, will be shewn. (Morus, ut supra.)
CHAPTER II. ^
OF THE KINDS OF WORDS AND THEIR VARIOUS USES.
[With this chapter maybe compared, Keil §43, and §§73 — 84. Beck, pp. 129— 131. Seiler §§41— 64. Lowth on Hebrew poetry, Lect. V-XIL]
§ 40. Design of the following chapter. The former chap- ter treats of the connection between words and ideas, and deduces from that connection several fundamental principles for the interpretation of language. The present chapter is appropriated to the consideration of words as used in a literal or tropical, emphatic or unemphatic sense. It also treats of words as employed in antithesis ; and of abstract words as employed for concrete ones.
All these things belong to the nature of language, as employed to communicate our ideas; and therefore are properly classed, by Er- nesti, among the principles of language, on which the science of Her- meneutics is built. Morus has thrown this chapter into his /^reccj?- tive part, and thus confounded principle with precept. The rules which grow out of the principles here developed are exhibited in Part II, Chapters V. VI.
§41. Importance of the following considerations. It is of great importance, in respect to finding the sense of words, to be acquainted with those distinctions which affect the sense, and alter or augment the meaning.
AND THEIR TARIOUS USES. 33
<5 42. Words proper and tropical. The first important di- vision or distinction of words, in respect to their meaning, is into proper and tropical, i. e. literal and figurative, or (better still) primary and secondary. (Compare Morus, p. 260. II.)
A proper word is a definite name given to a certain thing ; and as such, may be explained by adverting to the proper names of persons. A tropical word is one used oat of its proper, i.e. original sense ; e. g. rosy face, snoicy skin, where rosy and snowy cannot be literally or properly predicated of the skin. The names trope and tropical come from the Greek word T()6.iog, inversio, conversio.
Tropes arise, (1) From similitude ; wliich maybe either real or supposed. E. ff. the vine creeps. This is called metaphor. (2) From conjunction; which is either real or supposed, i. e. believed. Real, where apart of a house is put to signify the xchole; or the container for the thing contained, as to offer the cup, viz. to offer what is con- tained in it, i. e. the wine. Conjunction is supposed, when tlie cause is put for the effect, and vice versd, e. g. blushing for modesty ; the sign for the thing signified; or the subject for the attribute. From conjunction arises that species of trope which is called metonymy.
<J 43. Words first used in their proper sense. Originally,
words were undoubtedly used in their proper sense ; for they
were invented to indicate things, and by these things they
might be easily explained without any ambiguity. A small
number of words sufficed, at an early period ; because there
were, in the age of simplicity, but few objects about which
speech could be employed. (Morus, p. 262. III.)
What Ernesti says, here and in the following section, about the mode of forming tropical language may be true ; but there are no facts to support it. On the contrary, the most rude and barbarous langua- ges abound most of all in words used figuratively. As we can trace no language back to its original, it is clear that the propositions ad- vanced by Ernesti are incapable of direct proof; and analogy, so far as we can go back, is against him. Nothing can be more destitute of proof, than a great part of the speculations of philosophizing gram- marians about the original state of language. One tells us that the lan- guage of barbarians has but few words, and very few varieties in de- clension ; another, that they are filled with 6rouaron£7ioit;uiru ; an- other, that the roots of all words are verbs ; another, that they are nouns ; another, that all the original words are monosyllabic, etc. Some of these things may be true of some languages ; but what can all such speculators say, when they come to know the state of lan- guage, for example, amon^ our Aborigines.' A state which puts at defiance all their theories ; Tor in minutiae of declension some of them surpass the Greek or even the multiform Arabic ; and in most re-
34 KINDS OF WORDS
spects they differ widely from that state, which the above theory would teach us to be the original and necessary one.
§ 44. Mode of forming tropical words. But in process of time, objects being multiplied, there arose a necessity of using words in various senses. Men now began to think and speak concerning those things which had hitherto been neglected ; and of course to form ideas of them in their minds, or to de- scribe them in words. New objects also were invented or discovered, to describe which words became necessary. To serve this necessity, men resorted to two different expedients. Either new words were coined, or old ones were applied to new objects. In those languages that were spoken by a peo- ple ingenious and devoted to science, or in those which by nature or art were flexible and fitted for the coining of new words, new ones were most usually coined. Yet this usage was not without exceptions ; for had new words been coined on every occasion, the number of them would have been rnul- liplied without end. In languages of a character differing from that just mentioned, there was a greater necessity of ap- plying the same word to the designation of several things. Hence it is, that a language, poor as to variety of words either in general or in particular parts of speech, employs the more frequently the same words in different senses. (Mo- rus, p. 262. III.)
§ 45". Tropical ivords sometimes become proper ones. But there are several different points of light in which tropical words are to be viewed. First, the primitive or proper signi- fication, strictly understood, often becomes obsolete, and cea- ses for a long period to be used. In this case, the secondary sense, which originally would have been a tropical one, be- comes the proper one. This applies specially to the names of things. Hence there are many words, which at present never have their original and proper sense, such as etymolo- gy would assign them (a), but only a secondary sense, which
AND THEIB VARIOUS USES. 35
may in such cases be now called the proper sense. (Morus, p. 264. IV.)
(a) E. g. In English, tragedy, comedy, villain, pagan, knave, etc.
§ 46. Usage sometimes converts tropical words into proper ones. Secondly, in like manner, the tropical sense of certain words has become so common, by usage, that it is better un- derstood than the original sense. In this case too we call the SQUSQ proper ; although, strictly and technically speaking, one might insist on its being called tropical. If one should, by his last will, give a library [bibliothecam] to another, we should not call the use o{ bibliotJieca tropical ; although strictly speak- ing it is so, for bibliotheca originally meant the shelves or place where books are deposited. (Morus, ibid.)
§ 47. Tropical names become proper by transfer. So, thirdly, when names are transferred to things destitute of de- signations, they become in respect to these things the same as proper names; as when we predicate luxuriousness of a crop (a) : for although we in fact use the word luxuriousness me- taphorically in respect to the crop, yet in this case the word may be called a. proper one. The same holds true of percep- tion and liberty when predicated of the human mind ; and so of many other things. (Morus, ibid.)
(a) So the Latin, acies, ala, cornu, spoken of an army; and in the same way, foot of a moxintain, head of a river or bed of a river, etc.; all originally proper nouns used in a very different sense, but now, as thus used by transfer, they have become proper.
§ 48. Tropical words used for the sake of variegating the style. Words moreover are frequently used in a tropical manner, without any necessity arising from the occurrence of new objects. For it is not necessity only to which we must attribute the use of tropical words, but suavity and agreeable- ness of style occasion their introduction. To the genius and habits of writers much also is to be attributed ; for,
86 KINDS OF WORDS
§ 49. First, tropes are used for the sake of variety in ex- pression ; so that the same word may not often and always recur. To this species of tropical language belong metony- my, synecdoche, and other smaller tropes. In every thing variety is demanded, and without it taedium quickly follows. ^ No person desirous of writing elegantly and with suavity will fail to discern, that an important part of a good style consists in using variety of language. (Morus, p. 266. 1.)
Examples : heaven is used for God, sleep for death, threshold for house, uncircumcision for Gentiles, etc.
Secondly, tropical words, especially metaphors, are used for ornament. In metaphors, which are the most common species of tropes, there is contained a similitude reduced to the narrow compass of a single word ; and the mind is de- lighted with metaphors, because we are so formed as to be pleased with similitudes and images, particularly with those which are derived from objects that are splendid and agreea- ble. (Morus, p. 267. II.)
§ 50. Tropes used for ornament specially by poets and orators. The more desirous a writer is of ornamenting his discourse, the more frequently does he use tropical language ; as is evident from the style of poets and orators. And it is with the special design that their style may be ornate, that we concede them the liberty of frequently employing tropi- cal language.
(^i 51. The frequency of tropes depends much on the ge- nius of the writer. It should be observed, however, that the genius of a writer, and the subject on which he writes, are intimately connected with this. Those who possess great fervour of imagination and vivid conception, more frequently use tropes, even bold ones, and (as it often seems to others) harsh ones also. This results from the fact, that they easily perceive and frame similitudes, and by their temperament are
AND THEIR VARIOUS USES. 3T
excited to make comparisons. Hence they often content themselves with slight similitudes. But great subjects by their importance naturally excite most men to the use of tropes, and sometimes of splendid ones. (Morus, p. 268. III. IV. Lowth, Lect. V— -XII.)
From the ot^ect of employing tropes, as above described, we may conclude that he abuses them, who interprets tliem etymologically, or seeks any thing more in them except variety and ornament, or urges exactness too far in estimating the limits of meaning in tropical phrases.
§ 52. Tropes used from necessity differ from those employ- ed for variety or ornament. From these principles we may understand, that in all books, but especially in the Scriptures, tropical language used from necessity differs much from that which is used on account of other reasons. In the first case, a thing has a definite name by which it is called ; in the other, the trope is used either for pleasure or ornament. The former is grammatical ; the latter rhetorical. In the first, the reason of the trope lies in analogy of nature ; in the second, it lies in some similitude. And since every thing must have some name either peculiar or common, and considering that a name must belong to any and every thing grammatically, it follows that the iiroper sense of words is not lost in a grammatical trope adopted as their name, but only in a rhetorical. (Morus, p. 270. VII.)
If I rightly understand this, I cannot assent to it. When the He- brew called a man the son of twenty years, in order to designate him as being twenty years old, the Literal or proper Sense of the words surely was not intended.
§ 53. The sense of tropical words ii> grammatical. But as may be easily understood from what has been said, since the meaning of all tropical words as well as proper ones, is deduced from the purpose and design of those who employed them to designate certain things, (as is plain from observa- tion), it appears that this meaning is grammatical or literal, 4
38 NATURE OF EMPHASIS.
and that they are in an error, who (with Jerome) have thought differently. Interpretation is of the same nature^ whether it is applied to words tropical or proper. (Morus, p. 271. VII.)
<5 54. Origin of synonymous words. From the custom of using tropical language, flow synonymous words. In respect to these, the interpreter must beware lest he seek for diversity of meaning where none really exists ; which not unfrequent- ly happens. Usually, in the same dialect of the same nation and age, proper words are not synonymous ; but when syno- nymes exist (as for example they do in Greek), they originate from different dialects or from different ages. The greatest number of synonymes arises from tropical words, which, for the sake of variety and ornament, express the same idea by various names. (Morus, p. 271. VIII.)
The interpreter should not seek for any definite distinction be- tween synonymes, (1) Where they are introduced for the sake of variety. (2) Where usage conjoins two words; as luck and fortune, peace and quietness, Lung and Lasting, etc. (3) Where they are used for the sake of ornament. (4) Where excited feeling produces a re- petition of the same idea, while different words are employed. (5) Where it is the habit of an author to employ synonymes; e. g. Cicero.
The Hebrew poetry affords the most striking exhibition of syn- onymes, in its synonymous parallelisms. There, from the nature of the composition, the second ai'i/oq or stanza is expected, in general, to exhibit a sense like to the first. An interpreter would mistake the essential part of his office, if he should be solicitious here to ex- iiibit a difference between the sense of words, when the nature of the ^ omposition required them to be regarded as synonymes.
NATURE OF EMPHASIS.
§ 55. Definition of Emphasis. In the use of language cases arise, where the ordinary signification of a word re- ceives, if I may so speak, accession or augmentation. This may be effected in two ways ; the first consists in the use of a word in an honorary or in a degrading sense, e. g. verha svcp7]fxiag et dvcrcprjfilag,^ of which it would be irrelevant to treat here. The second class of words are those, which receive augmentation in their extent or force of meaning. These con«
NATURE OF EMPHASIS. 39
slitute what may with propriety be called emphatic words. Emphasis then may be defined, an accession to the ordinary signification of a word, either as to the extent or the force of its meaning. (Morus, p. 321. II.)
Emphasis comes from iiKpalrtir, which signifies to shew or make conspicuous. It is to language what a nod or a sign is to looks, i.e. it makes more significancy. Examples : when the Jews speak of Moses by the appellation of the Prophet; or the Greeks say, the Orator, the Philosopher, the Poet, meaning Demosthenes, Plato, and Homer ; these respective appellations are emphatic.
§ 56. No word of itself emphatic. It may be easily seen then, that no word of itself is emphatic. Each word has by itself a certain power, and designates a definite idea of a thing either small or great, in which there can be no emphasis. It is not because a word designates anything which is very great or very small, that it is emphatical. Were this the case, then such words as God, the world, the sun, the king, would be always emphatical ; which surely no one will assert. (Mo- rus, p. 322. III.)
If emphasis be an occasional accession of force to a word, then the ordinary meaning of the word, be the signification ever so important, or forcible, of course is not emphatic.
§ 57. Kinds of emphasis. Emphasis is either occasional or constant. We call it occasional, when it is connected with words in some particular place or at a certain time, and from the animated feelings of the speaker, or from the importance of the subject, a word is chosen to express more than its or- dinary import. Constant emphasis is that which usage makes invariably so, by employing a word continually in an emphat- ic rather than in the ordinary sense. Morus, p. 323. IV. )
Constant emphasis, if admitted, would destroy the very definition which Ernesti has given of emphasis. That no word of itself is em- phatic, and that emphasis is an accession to the ordinary force of a word, is what he very rightly teaches us. What then is that empha- sis which is constant?
§ 58. Emphasis, how known. Occasional emphasis must be
4Q NATURE OF EMPHASIS.
known by the context, and from the nature of the discourse, (Morus, p. 324. V.)
I have retained Ernesti's language here In respect to the term oc- casional or temporary as he calls it. But as occasional emphasis is really all which from the nature of the thing can ever exist, I shall not hereafter make any distinction, but speak simply of emphasis.
The nature of the subject and the context are the only means of knowing whether a word is to be regarded as emphatic ; for these must shew that more or less force is to be given to particular terms. As a general rule, we may say that emphasrs is required whenever a frigid, incongruous, or inept sense would be made without it. Thus 1 John iii. 9, He that is horn of God sinneth not ; the writer does not mean to assert tbis^ as employing the word sinneth in the common and usual way ; he means to say, that such an one does not sin in the peculiar sense of which he is speaking, i. e. habitually.
As to constant emphasis (which Morus and his editor have admit- ted), the rule for determining it is said to be the usus loquendi. The rule is good, if the principle be admitted. The examples given to- support this species of emphasis, are such as the names Jehovah ap- plied to God, and Son of man applied to Christ. But these prove no more, than that these appellations, applied in certain circumstances,, have a significant and exalted meaning ; which is also true of very many words, where no real emphasis is to be found. But see and compare Morus, p. 325. VI. Vll.
§ 59. No ground for dividing emphasis into real and ver- bal. Some rhetoricians divide emphasis into real and verbal ; the former of which consists in the greatness and sublimity of things, while the latter consists of loords adapted to express their qualities. But this division is erroneous. To things be- longs sublimity ; to words, emphasis. Nor, as we have above said, does a word designating a great object therefore become emphatic. (Morus, p. 328. VIII.)
§ 60. Tropical words are not of course and from their na- ture emphatic. Those also err, who make every tropical, specially metaphorical, word emphatic. In necessary tropes, or those used for the sake of variety, it is clear there can be no emphasis. Ornamental tropes depend on mere similitude, which serves to render the discourse agreeable. Flagrare cupiditate means no more than vehementer cupere ; and no one gets a different idea from using it. If then there be no
OF ANTITHESIS. 4l
emphasis in the latter expression, there is none in the former. The error arises in this way, that some understand Jiagrare cupiditate to be used instead of cupere ; and thence conclude, that there is an accession of meaning. Hence we learn, that the emphasis of tropical words is to be found in the same way as that of proper words. (Morus, p. 329. IX.)
§ 61. Words in one language do not always correspond exactly to those in another. It may be proper to repeat here a well known, though very important and necessary observa- tion, viz. that every language has words and phrases, to which none in any other language, or at least in that into which we are interpreting, exactly correspond. Of this nature are many words and phrases both in the Greek and Hebrew Testament. The reason of this lies not solely in the difference of objects peculiar to every nation ; such as pertain, for example, to laws, religious rites, manners and customs, etc. ; but also in the variety of minds, which are not all affected in the same manner ; and lastly, in an arbitrary formation of notions, re- specting those things which do not pertain to substance and essence. (Campbell, Diss. 11.)
OF ANTITHESIS.
§ 62. Where antithesis exists^ if the sense of one part can he found the other may be easily known. Finally, as ideas are often contra-distinguished from each other, so the lan- guage corresponds. Therefore, inasmuch as when ideas are repugnant to each other, if you understand the one of course you must understand the other which is the opposite, (for what one asserts the other denies) ; so in antithetic language^ wheth- er the subject or predicate of a sentence, the rule is obvious, that the interpretation of the one part must be directed by that of the other, which is understood either from the ilsus loquen- di, or where this is various, from the context. E. g. when 4*
42 ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE WORDS.
muUi and pauci occur in the same sentence, and it is evident that multi means aZZ, it is of course evident that pauci cannot here have its ordinary sense, but means non omnes, without limiting the idea to feivness of number (a). Of a like kind are adQ$ and nvEv^a, yqa^^a and nvsvfia ; in which the inter- pretation of the one is to be accommodated to that of the other. (Morus, p. 167. XIV. I— 11.)
(a) But if multi means all, does not pauci (the opposite of it) mean noneP In Hebrew, Yz and hb tkh mean all and none; and is not V'z ^h equivalent to no7i ornnes, in such a case ?
ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE WORDS.
§ 63. Abstract words used for concrete. Nor must the in- terpreter neglect the distribution of words into abstract and concrete. All languages, specially ancient ones, often use abstract terms for concrete ones. Generally abstract terms are most frequently employed.
Abstract words are the names of qualities or attributes ; concrete, of things or subjects. E. g. divinity is an abstract word, meaning the quality of divine nature ; but God is a concrete term, meaning the divine agent or being. The former is, by usage, often put for the latter.
§ 64. The use of abstracts for concretes arose from neces- sity. This method of speaking is employed, (1) From we- cessity. Those languages, which have but a few concrete terms, riecessariJy employ abstract ones ; e. g. the Hebrew and its cognate dialects, in which abstracts are often used in the place of concretes. Such usage being once established by necessity, it often extended itself where necessity did not require it.
§ 95. (2) From a desire to render the subject spoken of prominent. When an abstract is put for a subject with its pronoun, or for the subject itself, it directs the mind to that very thing on account of which the predicate is asserted. No one will deny that this mode of expression is energetic.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION. 43
The meaning of Ernesti seems to be, that the abstract noun, when employed instead of a concrete, renders prominent that quality of the subject or agent intended to be designated, and which the writer or speaker would naturally desire to make most prominent.
§ 66. (3) The purpose of ornament is subserved, not only by the prominence given to a thing of which I have just spo- ken, but by a certain elevation and grandeur of style connect- ed with this mode of speaking.
§ 67. Popular and learned use of words. Finally, to some words popular use attributes one meaning, the use of the learned another. Not that words naturally signify one thing in common life, and another in a treatise of science ; but that they are used less skilfully in the one case, and with more skill and accuracy in the other. Interpreters who confound these usages, of course pervert the sense of words.
PART II.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION.
CHAPTER I.
Introductory Remarks.
§ 68. Design of Part 11 Thus far we have been em- ployed in considering the general nature of language, the va- rious kinds of words in use, and also the meaning appropriate to each class. Having taken this general view of the nature and properties of words, we may now proceed to deduce from the principles already established various rules of interpreta- tion, by which the efforts of the interpreter are to be directed. The consideration of these rules, with their various classes
44 RULES OF INTERPRETATION.
and ramifications, will constitute the second part of the pres- ent treatise on Hermeneutics.
§ 69. What are rules of interpretation ? They are di- rections or formulas, which explain and define the mode of rightly investigating, and perspicuously represenUng,the sense of words in any particular author.
§ 70. Origin of these rules. They are deduced from the nature of language as above explained ; and deduced, not by logical subtilties, but by observation and experience.
§ 71. Object of rules. These rules serve not only to assist in finding the sense of words, but also in judging whether any particular sense put upon words be true or false. By them too one may not only be assisted to understand why a par- ticular sense is erroneous, but also why the true one cannot be discovered.
§ 72. Rules of exegesis connected with the usus loquendi. We have seen above, that the sense of words depends on the ■usus loquendi. Proper rules then for finding the sense, or judging of it, ought to have special respect to the tisus loquen- di, and to show how it is applied to every particular case.
<5 73. Usus loquendi general and special. The usus lo- quendi, considered at large, has respect to a language gen- erally ; specially considered, it has respect to some particular writer. To the common usage of words almost every writer adds something thai is peculiar to himself; whence arise the idioms of particular writers. A L^i-C U j. A ,^,,.
§ 74. Order in which the subject toill be pursued. The natural method of treating the usus loquendi will be followed ; so that we shall first consider the method in general of find- ing the usus loquendi in the dead languages ; and then the method of finding it in any particular author, but more special- ly in the writings of the New Testament.
ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 45
CHAPTER II.
OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES.
[Compare Keil, §§ 25— 34. Beck, pp.ylSl— 136. Seller, §8 236—
§ 75/ Vsus loquendi/ is known oy testimony. If the usus loquendi is mere matter of fact, it may be known, in the dead languages, by the testimony of those who lived when these languages were flourishing and in common use, and who well understood them. This testimony is direct or indirect. (Mo- rus, p. 74. II.)
By the itsus loquendi is meant, the sense which usage attaches TO THE WORDS OF ANY LANGUAGE. It is Surprising that any attempts should ever have been made to find the sense of words in a dead lan- guage, by means different in their nature from those which we em- ploy to find the sense of words in a living language. The meaning of a word must always be a simple matter of fact ; and of course it is always to be established by appropriate and adequate testimony. Yet how very different a course has been pursued, I will not say, by many Rabbinic and Cabbalistic commentators merely, nor by monks and zealots for the Romish hierarchy, but, by many Protestants who have had great influence, and who deserve on many accounts the higliest respect. Witness the exegetical principles of Cocceius and his followers ; and read, if the statement just made be doubted, many of the articles in Parkhurst's Heb. Lexicon.
§ 76. How to ohtain direct testimony. Direct testimony may be obtained, first, from the writers to whom the language investigated was vernacular ; either from the same authors whom we interpret, or from their contemporaries. Next, from those who, though foreigners, had learned the language in question {a). Thirdly, from scholiasts, glossographies, and versions made while the language was spoken, and by those who were acquainted with it. But these must be severally treated of.
{a) Thus the writings of Marcus Antoninus a Roman emperor, and
46 ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDl
of Philo and Josephus who were Jews, may be used to illustrate the meaning of Greek words, because, although foreigners, they well un- derstood the Greek language.
§ 77. Testimony of contemporary writers. The most im- portant aid is afforded by writers of the first class ; for their testimony is particularly weighty. This testimony may be drawn from three sources. (1) From the definitions of words. (2) From examples and the nature of the subject. (3) From parallel passages. (Morus, p. 79. V.)
§ 78 (1) Definitions. In regard to these, nothing more is necessary than to take good care that the definition be well understood, and then to consider how much weight the char- acter of the writer who defines may properly give to it.
§ 79. (2) Examples and the nature of the subject. In re- gard to these it may be said, that a good understanding and considerable practice is necessary to enable one to judge well and to make proper distinctions. (Morus, p. 81. VII.)
By examples is meant, that the writer who uses a particular word, although he does not direjtly define it, yet gives in some one or more passages an exanrple. of what it means, by exhibiting its qualities or shewing the operation of it. TJius Paul uses the words oroi/tia tov y.oauov, at first, without an explanation. But we have an example of the meaning of it in Gal. iv. D. Thus nioTic is illustrated by exam- ples in Heb xi. ; and so of many other words.
The nature of tlie subject, in innumerable places, helps to define which meaning of the word the writer attaches to it in any particular passage. E. g. /Jtofc is pardon of sin, divine benevolence, divine aid, temporal blessings, etc. Which of these senses it bears in any par- ticular passage, is to be determined from the nature of the subject.
§ 80. Comparison of parallel passages. Great caution is necesssary here, in order to find the true sense of those passa- ges which are to be compared and judged of, with a view to throw light on some more obscure place. Unless such cau- tion is used, the object cannot be well accomplished. On this account, the principle in question ought to be well under- stood ; especially as all who are skilled in interpretation agree that this principle of exegesis is very broad, and that it applies
GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 47
not only to the Scriptures, but to all other books. (Morus, p. 79. VIII.)
§ S\. Parallelism is verbal and real. (1) Verbal. This occurs when a word is ambiguous and doubtful, because neither the subject nor the context affords matter of illustra- jS tion ; and this same word (a), or its synonyme (b), is repeat- V '^ ed in a similar passage, with those attributes by which it may ""^^ be defined, or with some plain adjunct or intelligible comment (c). (Morus, p. 85. X. XL)
The sense of many words is so plain, that investigation by parallel- ism, i. e. the like use of them in other passages, is unnecessary. But comparison is specially necessary to illustrate words, (I) Which be- long to the Hellenistic or Hebrew-Greek idiom. E. g. tifoSovvTo nuiTtg is often said, when the event to which it relates is some special favour. The language here may be compared with the Hebrew K'l'' and TrtB, or the synonymes Su\iiuaui ana -daufirinat ; by which it ap- pears tliat H^o;iuvrro in such cases means admiration, astonishment. (2) Words should be compared which have a kind of technical reli- gious use. E. g. uvotiIqiov, comp. Rom 16: 25, Colos. 1: 27, Eph. 3: 45. So 71 lOTig, dtxatom'vtu uiTuroia, xanl^ ^linig, etc. (3) Words of unfrequent occurrence. The necessity of this is obvious. (4) Words which are ambiguous ; for words which are so in one place, frequent- ly are, from the connection in which they stand, plain and easy to be understood in another.
(a) E. g. Christ is frequently called astone of stumbling. In 1 Pet. 2: 8, those who stumble are said u.rti^tiv tm Aoyw, to reject or disobey the gospel of Christ. (6) E. g. 2 Cor. 1: 21 . xniaag i^^iUg 6 Gt6c, 1 John 2: 20, /'^icinx is said to be instruction in the truth, (c) Comp. 2 Cor. 4: 10 with verse 11th. Parallelisms appropriately so called are of this nature, the one often serving to explain the other. These are very numerous in the Old Testament, and considerably so in the New. Comp. Matt. 1: 20 with Luke 1: 35.
To the cases already mentioned may be added, (d) Renewed men- tion with explanation. Comp 1 Cor. 7: 1 with verse 26. Also, (e), Renewed mention with antithesis. Comp. x9uiaToc in Rom. iii. iv. and V. with Chap. 6: 23.
§ 82. Real Parallelism. This means that there is a paral- lelism of object or sentiment, although the words are not the same ; or, to describe it in a manner somewhat different, it occurs when the same thing or sentiment is expressed in other words more perspicuous, or with fuller and more numerous words the meaning of which is plain.
n.
k
ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI
Real parallelism may respect a/acf or a doctrine, related or taught in different passages. Examples of the former are abundant in the Gospels, which in very numerous instances relate to the same facts. So in the books of Samuel and Kings compared with the Chroni- cles.
Parallelism of doctrine or sentiment is where the same principles are taught in both passages. To this head of parallelism belong rep- etitions of the same composition ; e. g. Ps. 14 and 53 ; Ps. 96 and 1 Chron. 16 ; Ps. 18 and 2 Sam. 22 ; some of Jude and 2 Epistle of Peter ; with many other such passages. On the faithful, skilful, and diligent comparison of the different parts of Scripture which treat of the same doctrine, depend, in a great measure, all our right con- clusions in regard to the real doctrines of religion ; for in this man- ner, and in this only, are they properly established. Most of the mistakes made about Christian doctrine are made in consequence of partial exegesis, directed not unfrequently by prejudices previously imbibed. The student can never feel too deeply the importance of a thorongh comparison of all those parts of Scripture, ichich pertain to the sa7ne subject.
Besides the verbal and real parallelism considered above, there is another species of parallelism which constitutes one of the principal features of Hebrew poetry. This consists in a correspondence of two parts of a verse with each other, so that words answer to words, and sentiment to sentiment. This runs throughout the book of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Canticles, and most of the Prophets. See Ps. 1. 2. 19. 119. Is. 1: 2 — 5. 40. et passim. This style, so predominant in the language of the Old Testament, has passed into many parts of the New, which strictly speaking are not poetical, but which re- ceive tlieir hue from the influence that Hebrew poetry had produced on the language of the Jewish nation. See Luke 1: 35. 1:46, etc. 11:27; and many parts of the Apocalypse, which is a kind of poem. The attentive and experienced observer will find these characteris- tic idioms of Hebrew poetry, in a greater or less degree, in almost every chapter of the New Testament.
The appropriate method of studying this part of exegesis consists, of course, in attention to Hebrew poetry. How great assistance may be derived from a thorough knowledge of this idiom, no one can scarcely imagine who has not made the experiment. I cannot dv/ell upon it here, except merely to observe, that the student will be in no great danger of overrating the benefit to be derived from a tho- roujrh acquaintance with it ; and that he will find the advantages very perspicuously stated by Schleusner, De Parallelismo Membro- rum egregio interpretationis subsidio.
As Ernesti has failed to consider the appropriate maxims of exe- gesis, in regard to the kind of parallelisms now in question, I will add a few considerations that may be useful. (1) In parallelism of this kind, seek for the principal idea that lies at the ground of both parts of a distich. (2) Be not anxious to avoid the same sense or meaning in both parts, as though it would be tautological and un- worthy of the sacred writers; for sameness of meaning, in innumer- able cases, constitutes the very nature of the idiom or mode of ex-
GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 49
pression. (3) Inquire whether one member of the parallelism is ex- planatory J or whether it is added for the sake of ornament ; or is a repetition or amplification which results from excited feeling, or from mere custom of speech. This inquiry will enable one to know how much exegetical aid may be derived from it. If one member be explanatory or exegetical of the other, it will comprise synonymous or antithetic words ; or one member will be in tropical, and the other in proper language ; or one will enumerate species, which belong to the genus mentioned in the other. Instructive on the above subject ia Morus, pp. 96—107.
But the student must not fail here to read Lowth's Lecturts on Hebrew Poetry, or the preface to Lowth's Commentary on Isaiah. With much profit may be read, on this very interesting and impor- tant branch of a sacred interpreter's knowledge. Herder, Geist der Heb. Poesie, B. I. s. 22, etc., an £nglish translation of which has lately been published by Frof. Marsh of Burlington University, Ver- -mont. De Wette, Ueber die PsaJmen, Einleitung, translated in the Biblical Repository. Meyer, Hermeneutik, B. II.
§ 83. Parallel passages to he read continuously and fre* quently. A good interpreter, therefore, must specially attend to those passages of an author, which resemble each other, when he finds occasion to doubt in respect to the meaning of any one of them. He should read them over continuously, or at short intervals. For in this way, while the passages are fresh in his mind about which he doubts, or with which others are to be compared, he will more easily trace the real resem- blances between them. (Moras, p. 107. XVIII.)
§ 84. Similarity of passages should he real in order to he compared^ and not merely verhal. By this is meant, that the same idea is presented by both, and not merely that the lan- guage of each may be the same. For real likeness between them cannot exist, unless the idea of each be the same ; nor, of course, can the one throw any true light upon the other, except there be a real similarity. But when this point is set- tled, the interpreter must consider which of the two is the most perspicuous and definite, and regulate the exegesis of the more obscure passage by that which is the more perspic- uous. Explanation in this way often becomes very obvious. (Morus, p. 107. XIX.)
5
50 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI
But is there not akindof i;'0rs()ov jiQoreQov in this direction ? Morus las indeed admitted the propriety of the rule ; but still there seems 'to me to be difficulty in it. In order to determine whether two pas- sages may be properly compared (one of which is obscure), you must '^first determine whether there is real similarity between them, i. e. whether they both contain the same idea. But to determine this, yimplies of course a previous knowledge of what the obscure passage ('contains ; otherwise you cannot tell whether the idea \s the same in \both. You have already determined, then, how the obscure passage /^is to be interpreted, and so need not the comparison after which you / are labouring; or else you assume the interpretation, and then build ' your exegesis on that assumption. In either way, the rule would s^eem to amount to little or nothing.
But in some measure to relieve the difficulty, it may be said with truth, you determine what idea is conveyed in each of the passages to be compared, from the context, the design of the writer, or the nature of the case. Having made this determination about each pas- sage, independently of the other, you then bring them together, and the one, being expressed more fully or with more explanatory ad- juncts than the other, confirms the less certain meaning of the other. A comparison of passages, then, where the similarity is real (that of ideas) and not merely verbal, can never be made to any purpose, where the obscurity of either is so great that you can attain no tole- rable degree of satisfaction about the meaning.' It can never be used therefore for any higher degree of evidence, than for the confirma- tion of a sense not improbable in itself, and not contradicted by the context. *
The subject, in such a view of it, becomes fundamental in regard to the validity of testimony to the meaning of words, afforded by what are called parallel passages. The nature and strength of the evidence, and the proper mode of its application, are all illustrated by the above consideriltions. Unless the student forms ideas of this subject which are correct, and grounded upon the principles that will bear examination, he is liable to be carried about " by every wind of doctrine" in Hermeneutics, and to be cast upon the opinion, or con- ceit, or mere confident assertion, of every commentator or lexicogra- pher, who has overrated the authority of passages called parallel in deciding upon some particular word or phrase, or who has no defi- nite views of the exact nature and application of the evidence in question.
<5> 85. The exercise of comparison should he often repeated. To the observance of these principles frequent practice must be added, so that the interpreter may easily discern what pas- sages are similar, and how he may rightly compare them and judge of them. It will be very useful here to consult good interpreters, not only of the Scriptures but of profane authors ;
GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 51
that where they carry these principles into practice, and plain- ly make a right and skilful application of them, we may learn to imitate them by attentively considering the manner in which they attain to the understanding of things that are obscure or ambiguous. By frequently renewing this exercise, we may learn to go in the same path which they have-travelled.
The books of the New Testament present more inducement to re- peat this exercise very frequently, than any other books. For (I) They are of all books the most important. (2) They are not only all of the same idiom in general, but they have reference to the same subject, viz. the development of Christianity. They originated too from cotemporary writers, possessed of views, feelings, and language that were alike. Hence comparison has more force in illustrating the x\. Testament, than in the illustration of either Greek or Latin authors ; many of whom that agree with each" other in all the cir- cumstances just stated, cannot be found. But (3) To all who admit that the same Holy Spirit guided the authors of the New Testament, and that their views of religion in consequence of this must have been harmonious, the inducement to comparison of various parts and passages with each other, in order to obtain a correct view of the whole, must be very great; and the additional force of the evidence arising from comparison, on account of the really harmonious views of the writers, must make this exercise an imperious duty of every theologian.
§ 86. Many parallel passages should he compared. To compare one passage only is often insufficient, whether you are endeavoring to find the usus loquendi by the aid of par- allel passages, or by testimony derived from the nature of the subject and from examples. (Comp. § 77.) Specially is this the case, when we are investigating the sense of words that have a complex or generic meaning made up of various parts. In this case, comparisons should be made from nu- merous passages, until we perceive that what we are seeking is fully and entirely discovered. (Morus, p. 109. XX.)
Suppose the word nlang occurs in a particular passage, where you are doubtful what sense should be applied to it. First you call to mind that niong is a generic word, having several meanings related to each other, but still diverse, as species under the genus. You wish to determine how many species of meaning niang has ; and in order to accomplish this, many passages where it is used must be compared, in order that you may know whether all the species are found. Tljis being doqe, you proceed to compare them with the
52 , OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI
passage under investigation, and see which will fit it. And in this way all generic words must be investigated, before the generic idea can be determined.
/
§ 87. Testimony of Scholiasts respecting the usus loquendi. It was said, § 76, that testimony to linguistic usage might he derived from Scholiasts ; and this testimony is either given by themselves, or it is cited by them from others. It is valuable, in proportion as the time in which they lived approximates to the age of the author whom they interpret (a) ; and also in proportion to their knowledge of the language in which he wrote (h). The latter must be judged of by men of learning and practical skill ; although to judge of it is not a matter of special difficulty. (Morus pp. 113 — 115.)
Scholia means short notes upon any author, either of an exegetical or grammatical nature. On all the distinguished ancient Greek au- thors Scholia have been written, in more recent times ; many vol- umes of which are still extant, upon Homer, Thucydides, Sophocles, Aristophanes, etc. In like manner a multitude of scholia from the ancient Christian Fathers, specially of the Greek Church, have come down to us in their works. Originally they were brief remarks, oc- casionally made in their commentaries and other writings. After- wards these were extracted and brought together, and they now form what is called Catejia Patrum. Many scholia also are found on the margin of manuscripts, or interlined, or placed at the end of a book.
(a) This is too generally expressed ; for surely an ignorant scho- liast of the second century would not be more valuable than Chry- sostom in the fourth. In short, antiquity adds nothing to the value of a scholiast, except as it renders it more probable, ceteris paribus, that he may have a better knowledge of ancient manners, customs, history, etc., than a modern writer would have.
(/>) Almost all that is important in this subject turns on this point. The simple question always is : Is the author interpreted well and skilfully ? not, when or where the commentator lived.
§ 88. Glossaries. In a similar way is the testimony of glossographers to be estimated ; which testimony is by no means to be despised. Its credit depends on its antiquity, and on the learning either of the glossographers themselves, or of others whom they cite.
§ 89. Nature of glossaries. But here we must be cautious not to suppose the Greek glossaries to be like our modern
feE!5rEBALLT tV THE DEAl) LANGUAGES. &^
Lexicons. They explain only particular passages or words ; especially nouns that are in an oblique case, or verbs that are not in the infinitive, nor first person of the present tense. An ignorance of this construction of the glossaries has often been the occasion of ridiculous errors. . /^ ^^ .,,, / / t-cj •^- ;
GLossarium is a book or writing comprehending ylatoaag..^ Amoi^ the Greeks, ylwaaa meant either idiomatic word peculiar t6 a certain dialect only and unknown in others, or obsolete word, or obscure one. Glossary means a book containing explanations of obscure and diffi- cult words. Of course a glossary extends only to a few of the words and phrases of any author. It is not to be used as a lexicon ; for it is only a comment on particular passages. It differs therefore in nothing except mere form from very hx\e^ scholia.
As to the authority of glossaries, it is regulated by the same prin- ciples as that of scholia; mere antiquity of itself adding nothing im- portant to its weight, which is proportioned to the philological know- ledge and accuracy of its author.
The principal ancient glossaries published are those of Hesychius, Suidas, Fhavorinus, Cyrill, Fhotius, and Etymologicon Magnum. Compare, on this note and the two preceding sections, Morus, pp. 115—130.
§ 90. Testimony of versions. The testimony of versions is to be estimated by their antiquity, and by the knowledge of the original which the translator possessed. In order to judge of the latter the version must be compared in many places with the original, in passages where the sense is certain. But here we must well understand the language of the version it- self, lest we should err in judging of it, and rashly suppose the translator has not hit the true sense, (which has often happened to those who have passed sentence on the Sept. version, and on the quotations from the Old Testament that are to be found in the New) ; or lest we should understand the words which are nicely chosen, in a low and vulgar sense. Boyce has shewn that even Erasmus and Beza have erred here. (Morus, p. 130. XXXV.)
Here again antiquity is to be regarded only as conferring more ad- vantage on a translator, in respect to a knowledge of ancient customs, history, etc. In some cases too the translator may have lived before the language which he translates had ceased to be vernacular. But in either of these cases, an ignorant man could not be recommended
5*
54 OF FINDING THE USUSLOQUENDI
as a translator, because he preceded by one, four, or ten centuries, an intelligent, thorough philologist. The credit of any version turns on Mb fidelity and ability. No ancient version, either Sept., Vulgate, Italic, Syriac, Chaldaic, etc., vi'ill bear any comparison in respect to either of these characteristics, with many recent versions made by the finished oriental scholars of the present day.
§ 91. Olher similar testimonies. Similar to the helps just mentioned are those writers, who have explained to their readers words and obscure expressions taken from another language. E. g. Cicero explains many Greek words, and Dionysius Halicar. many Latin ones. Of the same class are writers who have inserted translations from another language ; e. g. the Latin poets and historians, from the Greek ; the writers of the New Testament, from the Hebrew of the Old. (Morus, p. 13L XXXVI.)
Passages cited from the Old Testament are frequently explained in the New, either by the connection in which they stand, the lan- guage in which they are expressed (comp. Is. 40: 13 with Rom. 11: 34), or by some adjuncts or direct explanation.
§ 92. Knowledge of the peculiar style and all the circum- stances of an author necessary. The principles of interpreta- tion, thus far, apply to writers of all ages and nations. But in addition to these, there are some principles peculiar and appropriate to certain writers of a particular age, nation, or sect. This peculiar usus loquendi may be known, (1) From the writer's own testimony, either express or implied (a). (2) From the customs and principles of the sect to which he belongs (b), whether philosophical or religious ; and these customs and principles may be known from the testimony of those who belonged to the same sect, or have explained its principles. (3) The interpreter must have a knowledge of the manners and customs of the age to which his author alludes (c) ; and this is to be obtained by consulting those who have given information on these topics (d). (4) The interpreter should have a general knowledge of writers of the same age. (Morus, pp. 132— 14L)
GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 55
(a) If an author have a manner of expression wholly sin generis, then his own writings are the only legitimate source of information in respect to it; and in them testimony may be either direct, where the author himself gives explanations ; or indirect, where the expla- nations are to be drawn from adjuncts or the context, (b) Every re- ligious sect has terms used in a sense peculiar to itself. Of course a writer belonging to this sect may be supposed to use its language; and an explanation of it is to be found as Ernesti directs, (c) Every age has its own peculiar language, customs, and sentiments, in some respect or other. Consequently a knowledge of these peculiarities is necessary, in order to explain language that is predicated upon them. Hence it is plain, (d) That contemporary authors are the most probable source of illustration, next to the writings of an author himself; as they were conversant with the same manners, customs, language, sentiments, etc., as the author.
The question : To what nation did the author belong ? is of great moment, oftentimes, in explaining his metliod of using language. E. g. what can be more diverse, in a great variety of respects, than the Jewish, Roman, and Attic method of writing?
§ 93. The nature of composition to he specially regarded in the interpretation of it. History is one thing, poetry another, oratory another (a). Particular periods have their special characteristics in each of these modes of composition, which frequently arises from a fashion of writing or speaking introduced by some distinguished person. (Morus, p. 141 — 147.)
(a) History therefore is to be inl^erpreted as history, not as allege^ ry or mythic"^ fictionirpoelry is to be construed as possessing its own /"^ peculiar characteristics ; and so of the rest. No one circumstance ^ ^ more displays an interpreter's knowledge and critical acumen, than .-^ a judicious regard to the kind of composition, and the age, cijrcum^
56 SUBSIDIARY MEANS
f CHAPTER III.
OTHER MEANS TO ASSIST IN FINDING THE SENSE OF WORDS BESIDES THE USUS LOQUENDI.
[Compare Keil, pp. 45—80. Beck, pp. 127—142. Seller, § § 250— 256.]
<^ 94. Design of the following chapter. The preceding chapter treated of the method of finding the usus loquendi^ i. e. the meaning which usage has attached to words, by direct testimony. This testimony, it was shewn, might be deduced from three sources ; viz. from the author interpreted, or his contemporaries ; from foreigners who understood his lan- guage ; and from schoHa, glossographies, and versions. With these was united a knowledge of the peculiar style, idiom, country, circumstances, etc., of the author, as also the kind of compositions which are to be interpreted. We come now to treat of indirect testimony, to which we must frequently resort in order to find the meaning of words.
§ 95. Necessity of indirect testimony. The usus loquendi cannot always be found with sufficient certainty, by those means which have been pointed out. Proper evidence re- specting it is sometimes wanting ; sometimes usage is varia- ble or inconstant, even in the same age, or in the same writer ; or there is an ambiguity of language, or of grammatical forms ; or an obscurity covers the subject or thing treated of; or novelty of language occurs ; or a neglect of the ?«ws lo- quendi^ which sometimes happens even in the most careful writers. Other means therefore must be used, by which the true sense can be elicited. (Morus, p. 148. I.)
<J 96. Scope of a writer the first and best means. The most important of these means for discovering the sense of
OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 57
any particular passage, is found in resorting to the general tenor of the discourse. The design or scope of the discourse in general is to be compared with the passage investigated (a). The ground of this rule is, that we ^ught not to suppose a good and judicious writer has said what is inconsistent with his design. Absolute certainty however is not always attain- able in this way ; for it sometimes happens, that several in- terpretations may agree with the scope of the writer. Hence there are cases, in which only a probability in favor of a cer- tain meaning is to be found ; and even cases where not so much as this can be attained. (Morus, p. 149. Ill — V.)
(a) But how is this scope of the writer to be ascertained ? (1) From the express statement of the writer. E. g. John 20: 31. Rom. 3: 28. (2) From the occasion or circumstances which originated the discourse, £• g. the parables of Christ, and many passages in the Epistles. (3) From history, i. e. authentic accounts of facts, that would very naturally give rise to the discourse in question, and would serve to explain it; e. g. the epistle of Jude is directed against teach- ers who lived licentiously. 2 Cor. almost throughout has reference to facts which existed at that time. If none of these things cast suf- ficient light on the scope of the writer, the whole must be perused and re-perused carefully ; by which unexpected light often breaks in.
But some caution in respect to the rule in section 96 is proper. All parts of a discourse have not invariably a strict connection with its general scope. Many things are often said, which are wholly irrelevant to it, and which are mere obiter dicta. These are not to be interpreted by the general scope of the discourse, but agreeably to the subject that is treated of in the place where they occur Recurrence to this principle is very important, in many parts of the New Testa- ment.
§ 97. Caution in regard to the rule above. In regard to this means then of attaining the sense, we must take care not to trust too much to it, nor to rely solely upon it. Nor must we rest satisfied with only some tolerable agreement of the sense given with the general scope of the writer. This the unlearned are very apt to do, for want of skill in the lan- guages ; whence have arisen many idle conjectures. We must insist upon an evident and necessary connection with the scope of the discourse.
5^ ^ SUBSIDIARY MEANS
But how shall we know when it \s evident and necessary P (1) Where a meaning plainly contradicts the tenor of a discourse it ig to be rejected. (2) When it violates the principles of parallelism and the conclusions drawn from them, as to the sense of a passage. [See § § 80 — 86.] (3) Reject a meaning which gives an inept and frigid sense. By a frigid sense is meant one which contributes" neither to argument, nor perspicuity, nor ornament.
A meaning which infringes upon none of these negative precepts, will be found to harmonize with the subject of which the author is treating, unless he has violated all the rules of language and reason- ing.
§ 98. Second caution in regard to the scope of the discourse. Another caution is, that we compare the meaning, as discov- ered by the scope of-the writer, with that which the usu^ lo- quendi affords, and see whether they can be made to agree. In other words, we must see whether the usus loque?idi will tolerate any particular sense given to the passage by the scope of the discourse, specially in respect to words which have various meanings ; or whether there be a repugnance to it. Occasionally, the meaning derived from the scope of the wri- ter will lead to a knowledge of something which may serve to establish its harmony with the usus loquendi.
But to interpret solely from the supposed scope of a writer, without the aid and consent of the usus loquendi, and even in opposition to it, belongs rather to rash conjecture than to in- terpretation by rule. Wherefore this help is not to be used uiiless in cases of ambiguity, or of words which are arta^ As- yofisva, and generally in cases where the best testimony to the meaning of words is either wanting, or insufficient to de- termine the sense (a). (Morus, p. 158. VII. and VIII.)
(rt) The reason why the scope of a discourse is not to be resorted to, except in cases where ambiguity arises, is, that the usus loquendi is the best evidence which can be had of the meaning of a passage, and nothing can be admitted which shall contradict it, where it can be established by adequate testimony. But in case one doubts what meaning the usus Loquendi would assign or at least allow to any word or phrase, secondary or subsidiary means, i. e. the scope of the dis- course may be resorted to, for the sake of obtaining the desired illus- tration.
OF FINDING THE tJSUS LOQUENDI. 59
§ 99. Use of the context in interpretation. Of more lim- ited extent (a), but rather more evident, is the rule to have re- course to the antecedents and consequents of a passage, i. e. the CONTEXT, in order that you may determine its meaning. This is done for two reasons : either that we may choose out of several meanings one which does not disagree with the usus loquendi ; or that the meaning of an uncommon word, not explained by the tisus loquendi, may be discovered. Here however we must guard against proceeding beyond probabili- ty ; and to do this, we must observe the same cautions as have just been given above. (Morus, p. 160. IX.)
(a) In tlie OTigindi], angustius ; by which Ernesti probably meant, of less imjjortance, or confined tcithin narrower limils. But I cannot ac- cede to the propriety of this sentiment ; for the immediate context, either preceding, succeeding, or both together, is a rule for judging of the meaning of words of the very broadest extent. 1 might say that even the evidence of the usus loquendi is, in very many cases, built upon the context. We adopt the opinion that the usus loquendi sanctions this or that particular sense, because the context clearly shews that such a meaning is to be assigned to it, and that no other can be given without rendering the sense frigid and inept. Moreo- ver, the general scope of an author docs not forbid the admission of a great variety of arguments, illustrations, and episodes (if I may be indulged in the use of such a word here), into the intermediate parts of a discourse ; so that one is far more certain of giving a sense that is congruous, by consulting the immediate context, than by merely consulting the general scope of the whole. Both, no doubt, are to be regarded ; but of the two, the former is by far the most important means of assistance.
Indeed I should doubt whether there is any one rule .in the whole science of Hermeneutics, so important, and of so much practical and actual use, as the one in question. Great care, no doubt, is necessa- ry, to decide with certainty what sense the context requires a word to have ; specially when the immediate subject is briefly stated. But this care is as easily practised as any other rule is, which Her- meneutics prescribes in different cases. Violence must not be done to words, by forcibly subjecting them to the context, against etymol- ogy, analogy, the rules of grammar, and the nature of language. But in every thing short of this, all good lexicographers and com- mentators adapt the meaning of words to the context, in cases too numerous to need any specification. Comp. Morus ut supra.
§ 100. Various comparisons useful in order to discover the meaning of words. Of similar utility for finding the sense of
60 SUBSIDIARY MEANS
ambiguous or obscure words is the comparing of subject and attribute ; of nouns and adjectives («) ; of words accompan- ied by other words that qualify them, which may consist of adverbs, or of nouns joined to the word investigated by pre- positions and constituting a kind of adverbial periphrasis {h) j or finally of disjunctives (c). (Morus, p. 163. XI— XIV.)
(a) Qualia sint subjecta talia sint attributa, is tlie old rule of the schools and of philosophy, founded upon the common sense of man- kind. In accordance with this, we understand as tropical language all those expressions which ascrihe hands, feet, eyes, ascent, descent, etc., to God who is a Spirit. The principle in question is of vast ex- tent in construing the figurative language of the Scriptures ; and it also extends to many expressions that are not strictly tropical. Too, much certainty however should not be ascribed to it ; for some cases Occur, where the subject is imperfectly known, and of course we are unable to pronounce with confidence what attributes may be ascribed to it.
(b) E. g. y.at' oxpiv xQioig. Kar' oifiv serves merely the purpose of an adjective qualifying xoioig, and shewing that judgment from external appearance only is meant.
(c) By disjunctives are meant words placed in antithesis. E. g. Jieaven, earth ; spirit, flesh, etc. The rule for finding the sense in such cases is obvious, provided the meaning of either term can be found. For whatever meaning one term has, the other has the opposite ; so that if certainty be acquired as to the one, it is of course acquired as to the other, which is to be construed as a real antithesis. Com- pare § 62.
§ 101. Analogy of languages a means of interpretation. Analogy of languages may also assist in judging of the mean- ing of words. This is of different kinds. The first is analogy of any particular language, (i. e. the same language with that to be interpreted, which analogy was treated of in a former chapter, and shewn to be useful in ascertaining the usus lo- quendi), the principles of which are developed by the precepts of grammarians. It is necessary here only to touch upon this analogy. (Morus, p. 168. XV.)
Analogy means similitude. E. g. from the meaning attached to the forms of words, their position, their connection, etc., in one or rather many cases, we argue to establish a similarity of meaning, where the phenomena are the same, in another. This analogy is the foundation of all the rules of grammar, and of all that is established and intelligible in language.
OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 61
§ 102. Grammatical analogy useful not only in finding the USUS loquendi, hut applicable to some doubtful cases. E. g. when the kind of meaning generally considered is evident, (by comparing other similar words and methods of speaking con- cerning such things appropriate to the language), we may ju^ge of the special force or power of the word by aid of grammatical analogy ; as 1 Pet. 5: 5, where many critics have attached to iyao^^biaaa&ai an emphatic sense, we must compare the other Greek phrases which relate to clothing or investing. And thus we shall see that the prepositions nfgl, u(i(fi, fV, are used in composition without any accession of meaning to the verb thereby ; and consequently that iyaofi- ftuKTacrd^ai is no more than ivdmaa&at, with which it is com- muted in Clemens Rom. Ep. 1. p. 39. A good irxterpreter should be well versed in such comparisons. (Morus, p. 170. XVI.)
vj 103. Analogy of kindred languages. Another analogy is that of kindred languages ; either as descended from one common stock, as Hebrew, Syriac, Chaldee, and Arabic ; or derived the one from the other, as Latin and Greek. The former kind of analogy Schultens has explained, and often had recourse to it in his Origines Ling. Heb., and in his va- rious Commentaries.
Morus, on this section, says, thvit dialects differ only in the mode of declining, in the pronunciations and forms of words, etc. ; and ranks the Syriac, Chaldee, and Arabic, among the dialects of the He- brew ; while he calls the Latin and Greek co^nafe languages. Gen- eral usage however is against him ; for cognate languages of the He- brew, is almost the appropriate name of those which he calls dialects.
§ 104. Use of this analogy. This analogy is of use to the interpreter, not only in assisting him, by the aid of one dia- lect, to restore roots which have perished in another that is the subject of his investigation, and thus opening a way of access to the signification of words ; but still more useful as a
6
62 SUBSIDIARY MEANS
means of illustrating and confirming that sense of words, which ihe scope of the discourse commends.
This is a subject deeply interesting to every student of the original languages of the Bible, especially of the Hebrew. Analogy, mode- rately and judiciously used, is of great worth ; but pushed too far, it degenerates into a violation of all the fundamental rules of interpre- tation. Comp. Morus, p. J 76. XIX — XXII, where several valuable cautions may be found. Better still may be found in the admirable Preface of Gesenius to his Hebrew Lexicon, translated and published in the Biblical Repository. See also Jahn on the study of the origi- nal languages of the Scriptures, pp. 19, 20 and Note G.
<^ 105. Etymology an uncertain guide. The fluctuating use of words which prevails in every language, gives rise to frequent changes in their meaning. There are but few words in any language, which always retain their radical and prima- ry meaning. Great care therefore is necessary in the inter* preter, to guard against rash etymological exegesis ; which is often very fallacious. Etymology often belongs rather to the history of language, than to the illustration of its present meaning ; and rarely does it exhibit any thing more than a specious illustration.
See an admirable illustration of this, in Campb. Dissert. IV. §§ J 5— 2^.
§ 106. Expressions which convey a similar meaning are to he compared^ although in respect to etymology they may differ. That analogy is particularly useful to an interpreter, which leads him not only to compare similar words and phrases, and so cast light from the one upon the other ; but also to compare expressions, which, though dissimilar in respect to etymology^ are employed to designate the same idea. Of this nature are nsTiQaiAsvog vjto ti]v u^aqxlav compared with the Latin addictus alicul, and wg dianvgog compared with amhus* tus, when the Latin words are used tropically. So we must compare the Hebrew C^b^^, "JST: with the Greek ixnodojv. For as the Greeks clearly use iKTtodwv where the Latins say e medio ; so ixnodojv and t2';^^n ]'3.12 are so much alike, that
OF FINDING THE USTTS LOQUENDI. 63
the Greek would almost seem to be made out of the Hebrew phrase. Hence we may see that the sense of D'^.bs^ ']'3.72 is e medio. (Morus, p. 180. XXI.)
5 107. Foundation of analogy in all languages. No one can doubt that men are affected in nearly the same way by objects of sense. Hence those who speak of the same ob- jects, perceived and contemplated in the same manner, al- though they may use language that differs in respect to ety- mology, yet must be supposed to have meant the same thing; and on this account the one may be explained by the other. (Morus, p. 178. XX.)
Men are physically and mentally affected in the same manner, by very many objects; and of course, it may be presumed that they en- tertain and mean to express the same ideas concerning these objects, however various their language may be. Besides, modes of express- ion are oflen communicated from one people to another. Of the use to be made of these facts the following section treats.
^ 108. Use of the above general principle. In general, this principle is of great extent, and of much use to the inter- preter in judging of the meaning of tropical language, and in avoiding fictitious emphasis. Accordingly, we find it resorted to now and then by good interpreters, with great profit. But it needs much and accurate knowledge of many tongues to use it discreetly ; whence it is not to be wondered at that its use is not very common among interpreters. (Morus, p. 181. XXII.)
The following general cautions on the subject of comparing words and languages with each other, may be of some utility. (1) The meaning in each or any language is not to be resolved into the au- thority of lexicons, but that of good writers. (2) Words, phrases, tropes, etc., of any ancient language are to be judged of by the rules of judging among those who spoke that language, and not by those which prevail in modern times, and have originated from different habits and tastes. (3) Guard against drawing conclusions as to the meaning of words, in the same or different languages, from fanciful etymology, similarity or metathesis of letters, etc. (4) When the sense of words can be ascertained in any particular language by the ordinary means, other languages, even kindred ones, should not be fpsorte^ to, e:^cept for the purpose of increasing illustration or con-
64 SUBSIDIARY MEANS
firmation. (5) Take good care that real similitude exists, whenever comparison is made. See Morus, pp. 18*2 — 184.
§ 109. Interpretation by appeal to the nature of things, the common sense, views, and feelings offnen, etc. We must also resort to the nature of things, and the analogy of the sentiment which a writer is inculcating, that we may find the true meaning of his words, and not attribute to them more nor less than he did. Every writer, spontaneously or from edu- cation, feels that his readers must understand what he is say- ing, so that there is no danger of misapprehension. It hap- pens not unfrequently, that on this account he uses language which is not altogether accurate, if it be judged of by the rules of logical precision. Of this nature are catachresisyhy- perhole, hypallage, and those phrases which assert generally what is true of only a part, or of some particular kind. These and other like modes of speech are introduced by vulgar cus- tom into every language, specially into the oriental ones. They abound in poetry and oratory. Nor is there any par- ticular reason that a writer should take special pains to avoid them. It is necessary therefore in these cases, to have re- course, for the sake of interpretation, to the nature of things (a), to innate conceptions, common sense, and the plain ele- ments of knowledge (b). Moreover, we must avoid urging mere verbal criticism too far, or introducing far fetched ety- mologies, or hastily concluding that the expression of the au- thor is faulty. Language is made by prevailing usage ; nor can that be faulty language, which agrees with the usage of those who are well skilled in it. Wherefore grammatical anomalies are not only free from fault when predominant usage sanctions them, but they become a part of the language, so that one who departs from them may be said to write in- accurately.
(a) E. g.the mind is inflamed ; in interpreting which expression we resort to the nature of the mind, to shew that the sense of inflam- ed must be tropical. So when the sun is said to rise, go doion, etc.j
OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI 65
God to ascend, descend, etc ; we resort to the real nature of the ob- jects in question in order to explain the language. So in explaining prophetic language, if the event prophesied has come to pass, we resort to the history of the event, to cast light on the language which predicts it. l
(b) E. g. pluck out thy h,ght eye ; cut off thy right hand. In con- struing this, our views of |he worth of litie and of our members, our views of duty as to the preservation of life and usefulness, and our knowledge of the nature of the Christian religion in general, all con- spire to lead us to reject the literal exposition and to give the words a tropical sense. So when Christ tells his disciples to salute no one by the way, etc.; and in like manner, in innumerable other cases.
As to the various figures of speech mentioned in the section above, can it be doubted whether they occur in the Scripture ? Catachresis is the use of a word so as to attribute to a thing what cannot be real- ly and actually predicted of it. When the heavens then are said to listen; the floods to clap their hands; the hills to skip ; the trees of. the forest to exult ; what is this but catachresis of the boldest kind ? Hyperbole magnifies a thing beyond its real greatness. When the Saviour says : It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God ; which is after- wards explained as simply meaning, How hardly shall they that have riches be saved ; was not his language hyperbole ? Hypallage means a change of appropriate language for unappropriate. E. g. Luke 1: 54, his mouth and his tongue aiiw/^rj. The student, how- ever, must not be content with a meagre note on this great subject. Let him peruse and re-peruse Lowth's Lectures on Hebrew Poetry, where the nature, design, and extent, of figurative language in the Scriptures, is better unfolded than in any other book of whien 1 have any knowledge, Comp. also Glassii. Philol. Sac. ed. Dathii, Vol. H. (Morus, pp. 185-194)
In regard to that usage by which the whole is put for a part and a part for the whole, it is by no means unfrequent in the Scriptures. How often do we meet with nac or nur-rtg, when only a large or con- siderable number is intended. On the other hand, a part is put as the representative of the whole, in very many passages ; e. g. Ps. 8: 7, 8. Rom. 8: 38, 39. Surely in the last example here, the apostle does
not mean to say that the things which he particularizes, are the on- ly things which are unable to separate us from the love of Christ. He means to say that nothing whatever can effect a separation. Jn all such cases, the extent and nature of the subject, and also the scope of the discourse, must determine the latitude in which the words are to be taken.
Especially must common sense, as Ernesti says, be appealed to in the interpretation of parables, allegories, and all kinds of figurative language, proverbial expressions, etc. Every writer adresses him- self to the common sense of his fellow men.
§ 110. The error of pressing etymologies too far not un- frequent. The fault of pressing etymologies too far, is more 6*
66 ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI
general than we should be apt to imagine. For not only they are guilty of this fault, who explain all words by tracing them to their primitive meaning, (which is very common), but those also who always insist too strenuously on the ordinary and grammatical force of a word. Hence arise many false interpretations and fictitious emphases. But of this more hereafter.
CHAPTER IV.
ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI OF THE NEV^ TESTAMENT. [Keil, pp. 4C— 60. Beck, pp. 131—136. Seller, § § 236—257.]
§ 111. What has been said thus far, in this treatise, has respect to the laws of interpretation generally considered. We come now to treat of our subject with reference to the exegesis of the New Testament.
§ 112. Knowledge of the N. Testament dialect important. In the first place, we must inquire concerning the kind of lan- guage or dialect in general which the writers of the N. Tes- tament use ; for a knowledge of this is highly important, in order that we may be able to find the sense of the words and judge of it ; as will speedily be shewn.
§ 1 13. The question to be here investigated. This subject in general is comprised in a single question, viz , Is the N. Testament in its words, phrases, and form of language, pure classic Greek (a) ; or does it partake of the Hebrew idiom ?
The former is defended by Pfochen, Stolberg, E. Schmidt, Blackwall, Georgi, and a few others not very eminent for their knowledge of Greek ; the latter by Erasmus, Luther, Melancthon, Camerarius, Beza, Drusius, Casaubon, Glass, Ga-
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 67
taker, Solanus, Olearius, Vorstius, and many others who were
well skilled in the Greek language ; with whom also Origen
and Chrysostom agree. (Morus, p. 195. II. Vide etiam pp.
217—222.)
(a) We call that a pure style, which has neither barbarisms nor solecisms in it.
<5> 1 14. W/ial is excluded from the present question. That this question may be rightly understood and judged of, we must premise, that the inquiry is not, * Whether some have not mistaken, or do not still mistake, pure Greek expressions for Hebraisms.' We may readily concede this; for error may be and has been committed here, and there lare some modes of speech which are common to all languages. (Mo- rus, p. 204. IV. 1.)
§ 115. The question further limited. Nor is the question, ' Whether the same Greek words and phrases, occurring in the New Testament, may be found in good Greek authors.' This we may often concede. Nor do we inquire, ' Whether some phrase, apparently a Hebraism, may be found in some sublime or tragic poet, e. g. in Eschylus or Sophocles, and used in the same sense ; as ^rjgd for the main land."* For poets, specially these and lyric ones, say many things in an unusual way, which are not to be imitated in common usage. They even intermix foreign expressions, and sometimes use antiquated phrases. Many such things Stanley has noted in Eschylus ; and Zuingle in Pindar, whose preface to this au- thor should be read. The same is the case in Sophocles. (Morus, p. 203—209.)
§ 116. The same subject continued. Nor is it inconsistent with the purity of N. Testament Greek, that certain words are found which designate objects unknown to the Greeks, and are therefore to be understood in a manner different from Greek usage, because they borrrow their meaning from the
68 ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI
Hebrew manner of speaking. Of this kind are nlaxig, find- voia, and other words. (Morus, p. 209. IV.)
§ 117. The question directly stated. The question as to the idiom of the N. Testament, turns on the use of such words and phrases as designate those objects that the Greeks are ac- customed to designate ; and the inquiry here must be, whether such words in the N. Testament are used in the same sense which the Greeks attach to them ; and whether phrases not only have the same syntax as that of classic Greek, but also the same sense as in the Greek authors ; for this is essential to the purity of language. E. g. Sixuioaivr] used for liberality ; svXoyia for plenty ; xoivov for profane. So eUso dlxaiog iv con lov tov Oeov, (HQTov q>dyuv, naQUdir^vuL ivcomov Tivog, etc., have a peculiar sense in the N. Testament. (Morus, pp. 196, 197.)
§ 1 18. With what kind of Greek is the N. Testament to be compared 7 In regard to the writers with whom the N. Tes- tament Greek is to be compared, we must see that they them- selves are pure, i. e. ancient prosaic authors, who have not derived any thing in their style from the Scriptures or the N. Testament; and then historical writers must be compared with historical ; doctrinal with doctrinal ; poetical with poeti- cal (a). (Morus, pp. 208, 209.)
(a) Several hymns in the New Testament, and most of the Apoca- lypse, with occasional quotations from the poetry of the old Testa- ment, are poetical in their nature, though not in their form ; at least they are not in the form of Greek poetry.
<5> 119. New Testament Greek not pure. The question be- ing thus stated and defined, we deny, without hesitation, that the diction of the N. Testament is pure Greek ; and contend that it is modelled after the Hebrew, not only in single words, phrases, and figures of speech, but in the general texture of the language. This can be established by clear examples, more numerous than even those who agree with us in opinion have supposed. For Luke himself, who is usually thought to be
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 69
the most pure in his style, has innumerable Hebraisms. The very beginning of his Gospel, after a short preface of pure Greek (a), immediately goes into the use of the Hebrew idi- om so exactly, that it seems to be translated literally from a Hebrew original.
(fl) The pure Greek of this Preface is very questionable ; as might easily be shewn, if time and circumstances permitted. . • 3 *»-
K / 0 T
^ 120. Some phrases are common to Greek and Hebrew. To prove that Hebrew-Greek is the language of the New Testament, by citing examples here, would be superfluous ; as these may be found in abundance, by consulting the works of Olearius, Vorstius, Leusden, Glass, and others. It may be proper however to remark, that although certain phrases may be found in pure Greek, yet they may also be Hebraisms. For it may happen, that a writer, in translating a Hebrew ex- pression, may adopt words used by a good Greek writer ; which is an. observation sanctioned by the authority of Gata- ker, Hemsterhuis, Raphel, and others. E. g. xuquv /a/^«ty> metum metuerCy which are good Greek and Latin ; but the lat- ler is also of the same tenor as the Hebrew Ths nns.
§ 121. Arguments to support the sentiment expressed in § 119. It is no small argument for the Hebraistic style of the New Testament, that many parts of it can be more easily translated into Hebrew than into any other language ; so Erasmus Schmidius confesses, though a strenuous defender of the classic purity of the New Testament. Nay, many parts of the New Testament can be explained in no other way than by means of the Hebrew. Moreover, in many pas- sages, there would arise an absurd and ridiculous meaning, if they should be interpreted according to a pure Greek idiom ; as appears from the examples produced by Werenfels, and by me in my essay De Difficult, interpr. gramm. N. Test. <5> 12 ; to which many others might easily be added. Theo-
70 ' ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI
logy would have been freed from many errors that have crept in, if Hebraisms had not been interpreted as pure Greek ; as Melancthon in his Commentaries has frequently shewn. (Moras, p. 198. III.)
§ 122. Additional argument. It is another argument in favour of the Hebraisms of the New Testament, that former Greek and Latin interpreters, who have followed the man- ner of classic Greek in their interpretations, have often tor- tured the sense and made it plainly, inept. E. g. in explain- ing avvdiafib) TsXeicTijiog, as Melancthon remarks. The same thing has happened to modern interpreters who are ignorant of the Hebrew idiom ; while to those who are acquainted with it, such passages are very plain. But mistakes on such ground could not be made, if the apostles had written pure Greek. (Morus, p. 199.)
§ 123. Objections answered. We need not be under any apprehension that the dignity of the New Testament will suf- fer, by the admission that Hebraisms may be found in its style. Truth cannot injure religion ; and many reasons moreover may be given, why the Hebrew-Greek style was proper and necessary for the New Testament writers.
(1) The writers of the New Testament could not sponta- neously write Greek well, inasmuch as they were born and educated Hebrews ; nor did they learn Greek in a scholastic way, nor were they accustomed to the reading of Greek au- thors. This is true of Paul as well as the others. For although he was born at Tarsus, where schools of rhetoric and philosophy were established, it does not follow that he attended them ; nor that he was familiar with the Greek poets, because he quotes a single verse from one of them. Greek taste, style, and literature, were plainly foreign to a man who belonged to the most rigid of the sect of the Pharisees, and was brought up at the feet of Gamaliel.
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 71
(2) Nor was it congruous that the Holy Spirit should in- spire the apostles to write pure Greek. For passing by the consideration, that if they had written classic Greek no critic would now adnnit that they were the authors of the books as- cribed to them, we may say that the apostles themselves would not have understood their own language, unless by ad* ditional inspiration given for this very purpose. Much less would the common people among the Jews have understood it ; for whom these books, for the most part, were primarily written ; and who, through hatred of the Greeks and of Gre- cian eloquence, would not have approved of a classic style, it being so contrary to the diction of the Septuagint, and so diverse from the Hebrew Scriptures.
Finally, as the New Testament is built upon the old, thq same diction ought to be preserved throughout. (Morus, pp. 210-217.)
§ 124. Hebrew- Greek idiom does not necessarily make the style of the New Testament obscure. Nor does the Hebrew idiom of the New Testament injure its perspicuity. Every writer has special reference to his own times, to those for whom he primarily writes ; not to future times, so as to neg- lect his contemporaries. The obscurity which arises from this mode of writing is not a necessary one, but results mere- ly from the change which time makes in languages. It is an obscurity common to all good ancient writers ; for the ground of it lies in the ignorance of later readers, and not in the wri- ters.
§ 125. Language of the New Testament is Hebreio- Greek. Hence the style of the New Testament may justly be named Hebrew-Greek. If any with Scaliger and Drusius choose to call it Hellenistic^ let them not with Heinsius understand by this a peculiar diaZec/; which Salmasius has sufficiently re- futed. Nor would I name it the Alexandrine dialect •, for the
72 ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI
Jews in other places wrote in the same style. The Alexan- drine dialect, concerning which there is extant a little book of one Irenaeus an Alexandrine grammarian, respects merely peculiarities of language appropriate to the Alexandrians ; such for example as existed among the Attics, lonians, etc. Some choose to call it the Macedonian dialect, because many words in the New Testament are peculiar to the Macedo- nians, and the language agrees more with that of Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, etc., than with that of the ancient Greek writers. (Morus, pp. 222—234.)
§ 126. It also comprises Latinisms. Nor is all which is not pure Greek of course to be named Hebraism ; for some words are of Latin derivation, occasioned by intercourse with the Romans ; and others are of the Syriac, Chaldee, or Rab- binic dialect. Vide Olearius de Stylo Nov. Test. Sect, didac. ii. iii. ; et Wetstenium ad N. Test. Acta. 13. 48. (Morus, pp. 235—238.)
Besides Latinisms, as arnxovlaruiQ, xovntoSia, and such phrases as kau^aviiv avu(ior).iov consilium capere, iqyaa'iav Sovrai operam dare, etc., there are Persian words to be found in the New Testament, as ,i/«yot, ayyaoBrhiv', Syriasms, as a^^a, /<«oai' aSa] also Chaldaismsand Rabbinisms. See Marsh's Michaelis on the New Testament idioms.
§ 127. Method of finding the iisus loquendi of the New Testament not difflcuU. These things being settled respect- ing the general nature of the New Testament diction, it will be easy to point out the method of ascertaining the usus lo- quendi, and of drawing aid from it in the interpretation of particular passages so as to assist the interpreter.
§ 128. Rules for finding the usus loquendi. First, the in- terpreter should be well skilled in the Greek and Hebrew idioms ; so that he can distinguish between pure Greek, and that method of writing which is derived from another language. This is necessary in order rightly to interpret either. In re-
tit THE NEtC TESTAMENT. 73
garcl to a good Greek, he must specially consult not only the writers who have used the popular language, but writers of a proximate age, who have imitated the Attic diction, though not studiously. Among these are Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, and Artemidorus ; in which authors are many words common to the New Testament, either not used at all by the Old Greeks, or else used in a different sense. (Morus, p. 23& — 240.)
§ 129. Much taution necessary to decide what is classic and what is Hebrew- Greek ; Sept. and Hebrew to be compared. In all places, therefore, let him carefully examine whether the diction be pure Greek or not; in which there is more difficul- ty than one might be apt to suppose. Where the diction de- parts from pure Greek, let him resort to the Hebrew. To do this properly, he must not only be acquainted with the ge- nius of the Hebrew, as it is developed in the forms and tenses of words, in the construction of them, and in the junction of the members of a sentence, (which however will often be sufficient), but he must also know by what Greek words the Jews were accustomed to express Hebrew things, when they spoke in the then common Greek style, without aiming, like Philo and Josephus, at elegant classic diction. In this way> by a proper comparison with the Hebrew, he may elicit the sense.
Sometimes there is no better method than to translate the Greek directly into the Hebrew ; which oflen-times may be easily done by a tolerable Hebrew scholar, both as it respects single words and also phrases. But at other times, this is difficult on account of the rare occurrence of words, or the obscurity of them, or the dissimilar etymology. The Septua- gint, therefore, must often be consulted ; and the interpreter should be so familiar with it, as readily to know in what way Hebrew expressions are translated into Greek. For as the ■ , 7
74 ON Binding the usxts loquendI
origin of speaking and writing in Greekj concerning sacred things, took its rise from that version, so it is evident, that
THIS VERSION MUST BE THE BASIS OF ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE HEBREW-GREEK.
It will be useful also to be well acquainted with writers on the Hebraisms of the New Testament in general ; such as Vorstius, Leusden, and specially Gataker, the most learned of them all. (Morus, p. 241. ii.)
§ 130. Aquila and Symmachus to he studied. It will be proper, moreover, to study the remains of Aquila's Greek version, which exhibits a similar diction ; as he was not very remote from the age of the apostles, and has some things in his version which may be of special use here. The version of Symmachus should also be read, who, by translating into pure Greek, has made the understanding of Hebrew more easy.
In addition to the Hebrew-Greek mentioned in §§ 128 — 130, the Apocrypha is of special use in the attainment of this idiom. Also the apocryphal books of the New Testament, and several of the apostolic fathers, exhibit a style in many respects partaking of this idiom. Comp. Morus, p. 241—245.
<5> 131. When the Hebrew idiom is to he preferred. It is a sound maxim too, that when the same word or phrase is He- braistic, and also good Greek, and a meaning not at all incon-i gruous may be assigned to it as used according to either idiom, we should prefer that sense which accords with the Hebrew idiom. For it is more probable that Hebrew writers used the latter idiom ; especially if the phrase, understood as classic Greek, should be of the more polished and refined kind. Ac- cordingly I should explain KaTa^oh'jv (jniq^axog, Hebrews 11: 11^ by the Hebrew in Genesis 4: 25, rather than from the Greek idiom. So uno&v^jaxHv iv a^aQilaig^ John 8: 24, by the Greek idiom would mean, you will persevere to the end of life in sinning ; by the Hebrew, you will he condemned on ac- count of your sins. (Morus, p. 246. XI.)
OP THE NEW TESTAMENT. 75
Eig xara^oXijv artinuaTog, in respect to the beginning or foundation of offspring, i. e. in respect to conception ; which neither the Greek nor Hebrew idiom, as to any thing peculiar, would explain. The nature of the case and the general signification of the words offer the requisite explanation.
§ 132. In the doctrines of religion, the Hebrew idiom is to be specially regarded. An interpreter should particularly ob- serve, that when things appropriate to religion, specially to the Christian religion, are spoken of, the idiom should be re- ferred to the Hebrew ; because, in speaking of religious mat- ters, the writers of the New Testament were accustomed to use the phraseology of the Hebrew Scriptures. The interpre- ter will be much assisted here by the analogy of doctrine ; with which he ought to be familiar, lest the words of the New Tes- tament should be drawn to a sense alien from that which the authors desired to express, and different from the essential points of religion. (Morus, p. 246. XII.)
<5> 133. Specially is Hebrew idiom to be regarded in respect to the forms, tenses, and numbers of words. Nor should the maxims here inculcated be applied only to the meaning of words and phrases, but also to the forms and tenses of verbs, and also to the number of both nouns and verbs. In respect to these things, the idiom of the New Testament not unfre- quently departs from classic Greek, and follows the Hebrew. An interpreter who neglects this will fall into great difficul- ties, and commit many surprising and almost.ridiculous mis- takes. (Morus, p. 248.)
^ 134. Other idioms to be consulted in certain cases. When the Hebrew idiom fails us in the explication of a pas- sage or word, we must then have recourse specially to the Syriac, Chaldee, or Rabbinic. All concede that we should have recourse to the Syriac and Chaldee ; but all do not rightly understand the nature of this comparison, as is evi- dent from the attempts of some, who have endeavored to
76 ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENM
cast light upon the Greek of the New Testament by eompar-' ing the Syriac version of it. The right niethod of proceeding is to have recourse to the Syriac, when we find ourselves de- serted by the Hebrew. If we find the idiom to be Syriac, then we can attain to the meaning of the phrase or word, when we have attained to a right understanding of the Syriac which corresponds with it. This may be more easily and certainly attained, provided the Syriac be still a living lan- guage ; which however I find to be doubted (a).
The same may be said of the Chaldee and Rabbinic. Biit he who expects aid different from that which has just been described, will seek and hope for it in vain. He will either labor to no purpose in heaping up what will be useless ; or will abuse, to a bad purpose, a help in exegesis which is by- no means to be despised. At most, he will only be able to determine whether the Syriac interpreter has rightly transla- ted or not. (Morus, p. 249, XIII.)
(a) The Syriac is, beyond all doubt, spoken still among the literary class of the Nestorians ; as the letters of the Rev, Justin Perkins^ missionary at Ooroomiah in Persia fully eyijace.
§ 135. Direct testimony not always sufficient. Thus far we have described the method of discovering the usus lo* quendi in particular passages of the new Testament, by evi- dence which we call direct. But although this evidence is important and goes very far, yet alone it is not always suffi- cient. There are many things in the New Testament which are described in a novel way, because the things themselves are new. Not that a religion absolutely new is taught ; but ancient doctrines are delivered in language more perspicuous, appropriate, and distinctive, the veil of figures and allegories being removed. New words were therefore necessary in or' der to decsrihe new things ; among which words are many that are adapted to designate certain things, on account of some similitude to them. These words, by the way, were not
OP THE NEW TESTAMENT. 77
invented by the apostles, and could not have been ; for such invention is a thing that belongs to minds trained up by litera- r}' discipline, and not to unlettered men. We may conclude, therefore, that terms of such a kind were suggested by the Holy Spirit ; which is an argument in favor of the divine in- spiration of the Scriptures. Of this nature are such words as dttifio>i^s(T&ai, itxQTagog, avaytwav, and others. (Morus, p. 249. XIV.)
§ 136. New words to he explained hy testimony direct and indirect. Such words cannot be explained from the more ancient usus loquendi, but have an interpretation peculiar to themselves ; yet this is not less certain than the other which is gathered from ancient usage. This interpretation depends on the direct testimony of the writers. Hence it must be gathered from the collation of similar passages ; as we have already taught above. (Morus, p. 251.)
§ 137. Greek fathers to he consulted. Nor is the testimony of the ancient Greek fathers of the church by any means to be neglected, which has respect to the meaning of words and phrases ; whether it be the testimony of professed interpre- ters, or of other writers. Respecting a choice of interpreters among the fathers, and the use to be made of them, we shall hereafter treat. I would merely observe here, that in those authors who are not direct interpreters, passages of the New Testament now and then occur in such a connection, or with such adjuncts, that we may clearly perceive what meaning the age attached to them. Such interpretations we find in Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, Hippolytus, Cyril of Jerusalem, and others. The interpreter, in reading such authors, should diligently attend to this. (Morus, p. 251. III.)
. § 138. These may exhihit interpretations of the primitive age of Christianity. In writers of very early times, there 7*
78 ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENUl
may, not improbably, be interpretations that have come down from the apostolic age ; certainly if they are consentaneous with apostolic doctrines, they are not lightly to be rejected. It is one mark that they are worthy of our approbation, if they are of a character appropriate to the apostolic style, formed and moulded after the genius and idiom of the He- brew (a). (Morus, ubi supra.)
(a) But who will venture to decide upon this, except by the use of the common means of interpretation ?
§ 139. Glossaries. The ancient glossaries may be of use here, specially that of Hesychius ; in which is found many things pertaining to certain passages of the New Testament that were deduced from the most ancient interpreters of it, and which are of a character by no means to be despised.
Similar to these are a few of the glossaries of Suidas, and also of Photian ; both of which are to be used with that cau- tion, in respect to any particular word, which requires us well to ascertain whether the word in the glossary really belongs to the passage which we desire to interpret.
In regard to all these things, good judgment is requisite in order to determine what is useful and what is worthless, and to distinguish between them ; which is done much in the way that has been above described. (Morus, p. 252. IV.)
"J 140. Glosses. Even the glosses in some nr^anuscripts which have crept into the text of the New Testament in place of the true reading, may be used to assist the interpreter either to understand the true text, or to find means for illustrating or confirming the true interpretation. Thus for igivvrjaov in John 7: 52, Chrysostom has the reading igmrjaov Homil. 51, and explains it by fxd&s, tovxo ydg iaiiv fQwir^ijov. These glosses may have flowed from the ancient schools instructed by Origen ; although some indeed may have proceeded from the Latin commentaries. (Morus, ubi supra.)
' •' ^'^ r^^^/ Qp ^p£ j^j.^ TESTAMENT. 79
% 141. Context. When all the above mentioned means fail, we must then resort to the context, and to the well known nature of the things themselves. (Morus, p. 252. V.)
<J 142. Analogy of faith. The analogy of Scripture and of Christian doctrine should be always before our eyes, so that the interpretation may be guided by it, i. e. that it may be so far guided by it as that no explanation contrary to it should be adopted ; and in the obscure phrases, where the meaning may be doubtful, the sense may be accommodated to the analogy of Scripture sentiment.
This rule need not be wondered at, as common sense has sanctioned it and applied it to the interpretation of other books ; all of which are to be explained, generally, and in particular passages, agreeably to the analogy of that doctrine which they contain. ^
Analogy of doctrine or faith does not consist in the doctrine which is approved by any particular body of men, as uncan- did or unskilful persons assert ; for then it would be various and inconstant. Grammatical analogy is the rule of speak- ing, or form of speech, constituted by the laws of the language, which is opposed to anomaly or a method of speaking in op- position to usage, or varying from it. In like manner, the analogy of sacred doctrine or faith consists in the summary of religion, and the rules plainly taught in the Scriptures ; whence the Latin church called it regula fidei. To this ana- logy all things are to be referred, so that nothing may be dis- cordant with it. And when this is done, the analogy of faith y is said to be preserved. Nor as to faiih and practice does analogy of Scripture differ from analogy of doctrine. Exam- ples of analogy, and of judgment agreeably to analogy, may be found in Galatians 6 : 15, 16. 1 Corinthians 15: 3 — 11, etc, where the writer calls that analogy la ngojia. In all the de- partments of learning, analogy of such a kind has the force
80 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI
of a rule, both in our judgment and interpretation of a passage. (Morus, p. 253. XVI.)
In a special manner must we betake ourselves to analogy, in those passages which seem to speak what disagrees with that which is plainly taught in other parts of the Scriptures, and with common sense, concerning divine and human things. For it is common to all uninspired writers, although eloquent and thinking and writing with acuteness and subtilly, that when they are not composing a summary of doctrine, or the elements of it, nor treating designedly of any head of doctrine, they exhibit the common views and elements of learning, as taught by usual discipline and instruction. Nor do they al- ways speak of things in such a way as a subtile and scholas-. tic method of discipline would demand ; but often use the more vulgar and popular methods of expression. The same traits of style are found in the works of the sacred writers ; who in all respects desired to speak, and must have spoken in order to be understood, more humano ; the Holy Spirit so guiding them, that they differed as little as possible from the usual method of speaking. It is not therefore to be wondered at, if we find in their expressions some things seemingly harsh, since this is characteristic of the oriental genius and method of expression. (Morus, pp. 255 — 259.)
Respecting the subject of analogy, compare § 34.
§ 143. Difficult idioms to he specially studied. The stu- dent who aspires to the faculty of interpreting, should be fa- miliar and well acquainted with the more difficult forms of speech in the sacred writers, or those forms which differ from the idioms of our own language, and are not adapted to ex- press with simplicity, and logical accuracy, principles of any doctrine. A right understanding of these he must by all means attain ; so that he may not be impeded in his inquiries, or thrown into embarrassment by them. E. g. many things are
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 81
affirmed simply and without any limitation^ which however are to be understood as iiaving only a particular and partial application. Specially is this the case in moral propositions- In like manner, active verbs do not always indicate action or efficacy properly considered ; which Glass in his Philol. Sa- cra, Calovius de persona Christi, p. 527, and Turrelin de In- terp. Sac. Literarum, have already noted, (Morus, p. 256,
I. II.)
§ 144. Difficult forms in profane vrriters to he studied. It will be very useful also to attend to such forms of speech in common books, or classics ; for there is scarcely any form of speech in the sacred books, which is not found in other writings. Nor can there be any doubt that an interpreter will understand the Scriptures with much more facility, if he be familiar and well acquainted with the difficulties and ob- scure forms of speech in other books. Those things which appear to be somewhat hard or clogged in the writings of Paul, will not be wondered at, nor give offence, if one goes from the study of Thucydides to the interpretation of the apos- tle. Nor will such an one be alarmed at faults, which seem hardly to be compatible with the dignity and sanctity of the Scriptures ; nor at transpositions, apparent want of consisten- cy in construction, enallages, and the like things. This has indeed often happened to some good men ; but they were not well skilled in the languages. Such an alarm is rather the result of unlearned superstition than of a judicious reverence for the word of God ; as Melancthon has justly observed in his Dedic. Epist. ad Romanos.
82
HULES IN RESPECT
CHAPTER V.
RULES IN RESPECT TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE. [Keil, pp. 115—128. Beck, pp. 129—136. Seller, §§ 50—78.}
§ 145. Design of this chapter. Having explained the method of finding the sense of the New Testannent by the usus loquendi or other artificial aids, we come now to treat separately of certain things which usually are not enough ex- plained, nor made sufficiently explicit in regard to theory or practice. The first of these respects tropes ; the second^ em- phasis ; the third, apparent contradictions or discrepancies. Of these in their order.
§ 146. Duty of an interpreter in respect to tropical lan- guage. In respect to tropical language the office of the in- terpreter is twofold. First, he must rightly distinguish it from language not tropical, so as not to mistake the one for the other, (as formerly the disciples of Jesus and the Jews mis- took some of the Saviour's discourses (a), and so as not to pervert the proper sense of words by a tropical interpretation. Secondly, he must rightly interpret tropes, and give their true sense. For it often happens that men think they have attain- ed the tropical sense of words, when they understand only the literal one', and they are deluded by an empty shadow, or pervert the trope by an etymological interpretation. To avoid these faults, it is proper to give rules drawn from the nature of tropical diction as learned from use and observation, by which the interpreter may be guided in judging of and in- terpreting figurative language. (Morus, p. 274. IX.)
(a) E. g. John 6: 52. John 4: 11. Matt. 16: 6-12.
^ 147. Certain rules respecting tropical diction examined^
to TROPICAL LANGUAGE. ^ 83
Ih order to judge of diction whether it should be taken in a literal or tropical sense, the vulgar maxim is, not readily to depart from the literal sense. But this maxim is neither strict- ly true, nor perspicuous, nor adapted to use. (Morus, p. 320.)
Not easily (non facile), if you rightly understand the phrase^ means almost never, very rarely. This is erroneous ; for tropes in the sacred writings are very common, so much so that Glass has filled a large volume with them. It is ambig«. uous; for it describes no certain mark or characteristic by which tropical language may be distinguished from that which is to be literally understood ; which is certainly a great fault in a rule.
Danhauer, Tarnoflf, and Calovius, have stated the princi* pie in question with more distinctness, when they aver that the literal meaning is not to be deserted without evident rea* son or necessity. No one will deny that where there is plain and necessary reason for departure from the literal sense, we may admit the tropical. But some apparent repugnance of things or facts is not hastily to lead us to reject the literal sense. The older writers regard the phrase proper sense as of the same meaning with literal or historic sense ; and right* ly teach that we should not depart from the aislomary signi- fication of a word without a weighty and sufficient reason. That we may sometimes depart from it is evident, from the fact that the sacred writers themselves do, beyond all doubt, sometimes depart from it. And indeed, in respect to many words, the tropical sense is the customary or usual one. (Mo"- rus, p. 320.)
<J 148. How to examine whether language is tropical. We may commonly understand, at once, whether a word is to be taken tropically or not, by simply examining the object spoken of, either by the external or internal senses, or by re- newing the perception of the object. To judge of figurative
84 fttJLES IN RESPECT
language, in such cases, is very easy ; and in uninspired writings, it very rarely happens that there is any doubt about it, because the objects spoken of are such as may be exam- ined by our senses, external or internal, and therefore the language may be easily understood («).
In the Scriptures, however, doubts have frequently arisen from the nature of the subjects there treated ; which are such as cannot be subjected to the examination of our senses. E. g. the divine nature (b), divine operations, etc., are subjects beyond the scrutiny of our senses ; and the question, Whether the language that respects such things is to be understood lit- erally or tropically ? has given rise to fierce controversies, which are still continued (c). In these, the parlies have often disputed about tropical diction, in a way which savoured more of metaphysical or dialectical subtility than of truth. (Morus, p. 275. XL)
(a) E. g. Inflamed mind we understand tropically, by repeating the perception of the idea of mind, and taking notice that the litereu meaning of inflamed is incongruous with it. In interpreting the phrase snowy locks, we appeal to the external senses, which deter- mioe that the meaning oi' snowy here must be tropical.
(b) To the language which respects God and his operations, may be added all that respects the invisible things of a future state, i. e. heaven, hell, etc. The controversy whether descriptions of this nature are to be literally or tropically understood, is by no means at an end. One of the things which the human mind learns very slowly, is to detach itself from conceptions that arise from ma- terial objects, and to perceive that in alt the descriptions of a future state, words are of absolute necessity employed which originally have a literal sense, because language affords no other. Eveii the internal operations of our own mind, we are obliged, for the same reason, to describe in language that of necessity must be tropically understood. Almost all men, indeed, now allow that most of the language employed to describe God and liis operations, is necessarily to be understood as tropical. Most men will allow that the language which respects the heavenly world may be so considered; but what regards the day of judgment, or the world of woe, they would strenuously contend, must be literally understood. There is indeed suffi ;ient inconsistency in this, and it betrays no small degree of unacquaintance with the nature and principles of in- terpretation ; but as it is productive of no consequences specially bad, the error is hardly worth combating. The motive no doubt may be good, which leads to the adoption of this error. The apprehension
TO TEOPICAL LANGUAGE. 85
rs, that if you construe the language which respects the day of judg- ment or the world of woe figuratively, you take away the reality of them. Just as if reality dia not, of course, lie at the basis of all fig- urative language, which would be wholly devoid of meaning without it. But how inconsistent too is this objection ! The very person who makes it, admits that the language employed to describe God and his operations, and also to describe the heavenly world, is tropi- cal; that it must of necessity be construed so. But does this des- troy the reality of a God and of his operations, and of the heavenly world ?
(c) Who is ignorant of the innumerable controversies that have arisen about the tropical and literal sense of a multitude of passages in the sacred writings ? Almost all the enthusiasm and extravagance that have been exhibited in respect to religion, have had no better support than gross material conceptions of figurative language ; or, not unfrequently, language that should be j^ropcr/y understood has been tropically construed. There is no end to the mistakes on this ground. Nor are they limited to enthusiasts and fanatics. They develope themselves not unfrequently in the writings of men, grave, pious, excellent, and in other parts of theological science very learn- ed. Indeed it is but a recent thing, that it has come to be consider- ed a science, and a special and essential branch of theological sci- ence— to study the nature of language, and above all, the nature of Ihe oriental biblical languages. Long has this been admitted in respect to the classics, and all works of science in ancient languages. But in regard to the Bible, the most ancient book in the world, and written in a language the idiom of which is exceedingly diverse from our own, it seems to have been very generally taken for granted, that no other study was necessary to discover its meaning than what is devoted to any common English books. At least, a Bible with mar- ginal references, studied by a diligent and careful use of these refer- ences, may surely, as many seem to think, be understood in a satis- factory manner. In very many cases, the first thing has been to study theology ; the second^ to read the bible in order to find proofs of what had already been adopted as matter of belief. This order is now be- ginning to be reversed. The nature of language, of scripture-lan- guage, of figurative language, and of interpretation, is now beginning to be studied as a science ; and the acquisition of this is one of the greatest ends of study, as it is the only proper mode of leading a the- ologian to the knowledge of what the Bible really contains. Here too is a common arbiter of the disputes that exist in the Christian world. The nature of language and of tropical words thoroughly understood, will prostrate, among all intelligent and candid men who really love the truth, a great part of all the diversities of opinion that exist.
§149. Certain words not tropical. Those words are not to be regarded as tropical which have lost their original and proper signification, and are used no longer in any but a sec- ondary sense ; as we have already shewn. 8
8p ^ RtTLES IN RESPECT
^ 150. Words tropical, where the subject and predicate disagree. Beyond all doubt those phrases are tropical, the subject and predicate of which are heterogeneous ; as where corporeal and incorporeal, animate and inanimate, rational and irrational are conjoined {a) ; and also species belonging to a different genus. Things that cannot possibly exist in any particular subject, cannot be logically predicated of it ; for the fundamental rules of logic in respect to this are inhe- rent in the human mind. If then such things appear to be predicated, the phrase must be tropically understood. (Mo- rus, p. 2t8. XIL)
By this rule the language of the New Testament should be interpreted which respects the person of Jesus, to whom di- vine and human qualities are attributed. For the latter are attributed to him as a man ; the former, as a divine person united with the human ; and therefore they may be properly understood.
(a) E. g. the fields smile, the stones cry out, the floods clap their hands, etc.
§ 151. Laws, history, didactic works, seldom admit tropes. As the customary use of language shows the above principle to be correct, so the same use also shows that tropical lan- guage is rarely employed in several cases now to be mention- ed, if you except words which have lost their primary signifi- cation, or such as constitute very easy tropes. Legislators in their statutes ; historians in their narrations of facts, where they aim simply at the declaration of them, (for some narra- tions are designedly ornate and decorated to please the fancy) ; and those who teach any branch of science where the direct object is teaching and not merely occasional allusions ; all these employ tropes very seldom. Flence it follows, that in writings of such a kind tropes are not to be acknowledged, unless it, can be clearly shewn that either by general usage, or by the use of the writer, certain tropical words are appro-
TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE 87
priated to designate particular things. Of this nature are several words of the New Testannent, e. g. those which signi- fy illumination^ regeneration^ etc. (Morus, p. 281. XIV.)
The principle laid down in this section needs more explanation. It is not correct that in the Mosaic law, for example, and in the gos- pels and epistles, there are not a great abundance of tropical words. But still, it is true that these compositions, so far as they are mere precept, mere narration, and mere language of instruction, comprise as few tropes as the nature of the case will admit, and these mostly of the easier and more obvious kind.
The importance of the principle thus defined is very great. Some interpreters, in ancient and modern times, have turned into allegory the whole Jewish ceremonial law. So, formerly and recently, the history of the creation of the world, the fall of man, the flood, the ac- count of the tower of Babel, etc., have been explained either as fiv^uij or as philosophical allegories, i. e. philosophical speculations on these subjects, clothed in the garb of narration. By the same principles of exegesis the gospels are treated as uvSoi, which exhibit an imaginary picture of a perfect character in the person of Jesus. Jn a word, every narration in the Bible of an occurrence which is of a miraculous nature in any respect, is fivSog ; which means, as its abettors say, that some real fact or occurrence lies at the basis of the story, which is told agreeably to the very imperfect conceptions and philosophy of ancient times, or has been augmented and adorned by tradition and fancy.
But that such liberties with the language of Scripture are utterly incompatible with the sober principles of interpretation, is sufficient- ly manifest from the bare statement of them. The object of the in- terpreter is, to find out what the sacred xcriters meant to say. This done, his task is performed. Party philosophy or skepticism cannot guide the interpretation of language. Comp. Morus, pp. 281 — 291.
§ 152. Usus loquendi in regard to things which cannot he examined by our feelings and conceptions. In regard to di- vine things which can be known merely by revelation and cannot be examined by the test of our own feelings or views, we can judge only from the ustis loquendi of the sacred wri- ters, whether their language is to be understood literally or tropically.
This usage can be known only from the comparison of similar passages ; which is done in various ways. (1) When different words are employed in different passages respecting the same thing, it is easy to judge which are tropical. E. g. ihe phrase to he horn of water, John 3: 5, is tropical; for the
88 RULES IN RESPECT.
same thing is literally expressed in Mark 16: 16 {a). (2). When the sanae word is used every where respecting the same thing, it has di proper sense (h). (3) When the same method ofexpression is constantly used respecting divers things, which are similar, or which have some special connection, it is to be understood literally (c). (Morus, p. 291. XV.)
(a) So the iri^a covenant which God made with Abraham, is ex- plained in Gal. 3; 16 as meaning a promise. The latter, as being plain, is to direct us in the interpretation of the other passage, (b) £. g. ctraciraaig rsyooiv, fyj/o£T«i ootua, Lwonoisirat, are constantly used in respect to that which is to take place at the end of the world, and therefore are not tropical.
(c) Which rule requires some abatement. E. g. God gave the Is- raelites bread from heaven, and Christ gives his disciples bread from heaven. The latter is very different from manna. Jn fact, the latter case is plainly an instance of tropical language. The context, then, or nature of the subject treated of, is to be our guide in such cases.
§ 153. Adjuncts useful in determining when words are tropical. We may also form a judgment respecting tropical language, from the adverbs, epithets, or other limitations ex- pressing the manner or nature of things. (Morus, p. 295. XVI.)
This case resolves itself substantially into the principle of the fol- lowing section.
§ 154. Context to he consulted. The context also will fre- quently assist us. For when the whole passage is allegorical, we must acknowledge a trope in particular parts that are con- nected with the whole allegory. E. g. nvgog, in 1 Cor. 3: 13, which relates, to lilAa^and x^tov in the context. In like man- ner the language is to be regarded as tropical, when, although the preceding context is to be literally understood, there is a manifest transition to allegory. (Morus, ubi supra. Comp. also § 99.)
Thus far respecting the means of distinguishing what is tropical.
§ 155. Sources of tropical interpretation. In regard to
TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE. 89
interpreting tropical language, we may observe that there are two sources of aid. The one is the subject itself; the other, the usiis loquendi. The interpretation by the aid of the sub- ject is easy, when the nature of it affords an obvious simili- tude ; e. g. (po}Tiafji,6g is easily understood as used tropically.
In regard to the usus loquendi, the general usage of the Hebrew tongue in respect to tropical words must be first un- derstood, as in words corresponding to ^to^, -d^avaxov, Tifitj, do^T], etc. ; then Greek usage in general. Passages must also be compared in which the same thing is expressed by a prop- er word, or in which such proper word is employed in the context so that the sense is obvious. Here too we may use the comparison of words that are conjoined and similar ; ex- amples of which will hereafter be produced.
§ 156. Caution to be used in judging from etymology. We must be very cautious, however, not to judge of tropes from mere etymology ; as this is very fallacious. E. g. oQ&oTo^slv, in 2 Tim. 2: 15, some have interpreted as imply- ing a distinction between the law and the gospel ; which is mere trifling, For Xoyog aXrj&Elag in the context means the gospel; the law is not the subject of discourse here. Analo- gy of the language might have taught them, that hq^oTonitv here means to possess right views of the gospel and correct- ly to communicate these to others. So the ancients understood it, and Gerhard among the moderns ; Igd^oTOfila, being an- ciently commuted with og&odo^la, and xaLvoxofiuv being used to signify entertaining and disseminating novel opinions re- specting religion. (Morus, p. 298, XIX.)
^ 157. Method of determining whether a trope is adequate- ly understood. It is one proof that you understand tropical language, if you can substitute proper words for tropical ones. Not that a person who can do this always rightly understands the words ; but if he cannot do it, he certainly does not un- 8*
90 ALLEGORIES.
derstand them. The sacred writers themselves sometimes subjoined proper words to tropical ones, e. g. Col. 2: 7. The best Greek and Latin writers frequently do the same thing.
It is useful also to make the experiment, whether, when the image presented by the tropical expression is removed from the mind, any idea still remains in it different from the image itself which can be expressed by a proper word. This experiment is specially to be made when words designating sensible objects are transferred to the expression of intellec- tual ones, e. g. -d^dvaiog, 'Ccoi], dLad^ri>i% etc ; in respect to which it is easy to be deceived. (Morus, p. 300. XX.)
The context, the nature of the subject, and parallel passages are the most effectual means of ascertaining this.
OF ALLEGORIES.
[Compare Keil, pp. 115—120. Beck, p. 129. II. Seiler, §§41— 78. Much more satisfactory will be Morns, Dissert, de causis Mle- goricB ezplicandiSj in his Dissert. Theol. PkiloL. Vol. 1. pp. 370 — 393.]
§ 158. Allegories how interpreted. As allegories frequent- ly occur in the sacred books, which abound in tropical diction, it seems proper to say something here of the method of inter- preting them. First of all, the general design of the allegory is to be ascertained ; which is easily done when it is connect- ed with a context explanatory of its design. For the most part, however, it is expressly declared. (Morus, p. 301. XXL)
^ Allt^yoyQia is derived from aXXo ayayfiiLxai, i. e. a different thing is said from that which is meant. It differs from metaphor, in that it is not confined to a word but extends to a whole thought, or it may be several thoughts. Allegory may be expressed moreover by pictures, Ezech. 4: 1 ; by actions Ezech. ill. IV, V. Luke 22: 3(5; or by any significant thing.
One most important principle in explaining allegories is omitted by Ernesti. 1 refer to the rule, that comparison is not to he extended to all the circumstances of the allegory. Thus in the parable of the good Samaritan, the point to be illustrated is the extent of the duty of benefi- cence. Most of the circumstances in the parable go to make up merely the verisimilitude of the narration, so that it may give pleasure to hira who hears or reads it. But how differently does the whole appear,
ALLEGORIES. 91
wh^n it comes to be interpreted by an allegorizer of the mystic school r The man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho is Adam wandering in the wilderness of this world ; the thieves who robbed and wounded him are evil spirits ; the priest who passed by on the one side without relieving him is the Levitical law ; the Levite is good works ; the good Samaritan is Christ ; the oil and wine are grace, etc. What may not a parable be made to mean, if imagination is to supply the place of reasoning and philology ? And what riddle or oracle of Delphos could be more equivocal, or of more multifarious significancy, than the Bible, if such exegesis be admissible ? It is a miserable excuse which interpreters make for themselves, that they render the Scriptures more edifying and significant by interpreting them in this manner. And are the Scriptures then to be made more significant than God has made them ; or to be mended by the skill of the interpreter, so as to become more edifying than the Holy Spirit has made them ? If there be a semblance of piety in such interpre- tations, a semblance is all. Real piety and humility appear to the best advantage in receiving the Scriptures as they are, and expound- ing them as simply and skilfully as the rules of language will render practible, rather than by attempting to amend and improve the reve- lation which God has made.
§ 159. This being done, the primary word is to be sought for, and the force of it expressed by a proper word. Other tropical words are then to be explained agreeably to this (a). In this way the explanation of particular things will be ren- dered more easy, and we may avoid errors. The design of the exhortation in the form of allegory, found in 1 Corinthians 5: 6, is, that the Corinthians should bfe purified from vitious inclinations and the faults springing from them. Zvfirj, there- fore, here means vice ; a^vfjiogf free from vice, viz. the being a true Christian. "EoQTa^uv, consequently, is not to celebrate a feast, according to its proper signification, for a tropical meaning is required. It means to serve God, to worship God, to be a Christian, to he free from former vices and worship him in purity.
It is altogether incongruous to understand one part literally and another tropically, in the same allegory (b) ; as those do who take nvgog in 1 Corinthians 3: 15 literally, when all the context is to be understood tropically. Indeed the ex- pression w? dia nvgog makes it plain, that the word is to be figuratively understood. (Morus, p. 309. XXV.)
92 ALLEGORIES.
(a) The meaning of the author is, tliat the word which designates the leading design of the allegory being explained, the remainder is to be interpreted in conformity with it.
(b) This rule is of great importance and of wide extent. I wish I could add, that it is not every day transgressed by multitudes who expound the Scriptures.
To the brief precepts here given by Ernesti, may be added from Morus, (1) That we must sometimes resort to history, in order fully to explain allegory. E. g. the kingdom of God is likened to leaven, which gradually ferments the whole mass into which it is put; and to a grain of mustard seed, which gradually springs up and becomes a large plant. History shows that the Church has arisen from small beginnings, and is extending itself through the earth. (2) The na- ture of the subject will frequently direct the interpretation of the al- legory. E, g. Ye are the salt of the earth, etc.. Matt. 5: 13. The subject is, the instructions to be given by the disciples. The leading word (salt) in the allegory means instruction ; and the sentiment of the passage is : Ye are the teachers by whom others are to be pre- served from corruption, i. e. destruction. See Morus, pp. 311 — 313.
§ 160. Parables. Not unlike to the method of interpret- ing allegories is that of explaining parables, which often con- tain allegory. We must guard here against urging too far the meaning of all parts of a parabolical narration, and refer the particular parts to the general design, so that all may be accommodated to it. It is a very common fault of interpre- ters to urge the explanation too far ; but it is a very great fault. Therefore in Luke 15: 11, etc., we are not to seek for a doctrinal meaning in o-roA?;, fioa/og, daxTvXiog, etc. Such circumstances are commonly added to complete iheform of the narration, and to make it a more finished picture of what might be supposed to have happened ; as is commonly done in stories, fables, and other things of like nature. (Morus, pp. 314—320.)
Parable, in Greek usage, means any comparison introduced into a discourse. It may be called an example taken from things real or fic- titious, and designed for special and graphical illustration. The means of explaining it are the context, the subject, the occasion, etc., as in allegory. The caution suggested by Ernesti against inter- preting all the minute circumstances of a parable so as to give them a mystic significancy, is very important.
It should be added here, that allegory differs from parable only in the style and mode of expression. Take an allegory and express it in the historic style, and you convert in into a parable. Hence the
KULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 93
same rules of exegesis apply to both. Comp. Beck, p. 134. Keil, §§ 78—81. Seller, 71—78 and § 183. But specially worthy of thorough study is Storr's Comment, de Parabolis Christi, Opuscula. Vol. 1, p. 89. See Lowth's Lectures on Allegory and Parables, Lect. X — xii. .
CHAPTER VI.
RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. [Keil, § 42. Beck, p. 130. 111. Seiler, § § 65—70.]
§ 161. Errors respecting emphasis very frequent. In no part of an interpreter's business are errors more frequently committed, than in judging of emphasis. The reason of this is, that many are too prone lo find emphasis every where ; for they suppose that, by so doing, they exhibit the sacred writers as speaking in a manner more worthy of themselves and of the divine origin of the Scriptures. However, noth. ing can have dignity attached to it which has not truth for its basis.
§ 162. Ground of these errors. The ground of this is, want of skill in the knowledge of the original Scripture lan- guages ; for many who interpret, are obliged in general to depend merely on the definitions of Lexicons, and are igno- rant of the analogy of languages, because they have not been sufficiently accustomed to these studies. It is common for men of this sort to push etymologies, especially tropical ones, to an excessive length ; from which very little that is useful can be extracted. Yet from these, they form notions which never entered the minds of the sacred writers. They form moreover rules respecting emphasis, independently either of any reason drawn from the nature of things and of language, or of the usus loquendi.
94 RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS.
Mistakes such as these may be very easily committed with respect to the Hebrew language, in regard to those forms of speech in the New Testament which are deduced from the Hebrew ; because this idiom is so unlike the occidental lan- guages of modern Europe.
§ 163. Need of rules to direct us in judging of emphasis. On this account there is more need of well grounded precepts, drawn from the nature of human language and of things, that we may judge correctly of emphasis ; so that we may neith- er pass by those which are real, nor follow after those which are imaginary. Erasmus (on 1 Cor. 7: 1) thinks this may be endured in hortatory and consolatory preaching ; but for myself, I had rather every thing should have a solid founda- tion, as there is no need of any thing fictitious. In serious argument, fictitious emphases is intolerable. Indeed it is noth- ing less than to sport with that which is sacred.
§ 164. Insufficient rules. The vulgar rule, which bids us beware of making fictitious emphasis or of neglecting real ones, although good sense, is in fact no rule ; as it does not serve at all to direct the mind in judging where emphasis really exists. No one believes himself to wdke fictitious em- phasis. There are some other maxims concerning empha- sis, which are not formed with good judgment, nor worthy of refutation here.
§ 165. Kinds of writing where emphasis is rare. To proceed with precepts. First, it is clear, that in regard to subjects which are to be explained with great nicety ; in perspicuously exhibiting the precepts that respect any branch of the sciences ; laws ; in simple narrations of facts, etc. ; emphasis can scarcely find place. For emphasis is, in a certain sense, tropical or figurative ; and this kind of language does not belong to writings of the classes just named, as I have already shewn % 151, and as all concede. (Morus, p, 330. XL)
RULES RESPECTING EMfHAStS. 99
That is, simple narration, simple instruction, simple legislation, for the most part is destitute of emphasis, except such as is of the lower and more usual kind. But in the Pentateuch, Gospels, and Epistles^ for example, which are specimens of the different kinds of composi- tion in question, are intermixed many passages which contain words that are peculiarly emphatic.
§ 166. No word of itself is emphaticah Secondly, we must guard against finding emphasis in any word of itself, whether used properly or tropically ; because, as has been already shewn, no word used either figuratively or literally has of itself an emphasis. Emphasis implies an accession of meaning to the ordinary signifcaiion of a word.
§ 167. Emphasis not to he taught hy etymology or recut- ring to the original sense of words. Thirdly, emphasis should not be deduced from the etymology of a word, (which often misleads as to the proper sense of it) ; nor in tropical expressions should we recur to the proper sense of the words to deduce emphasis from it ; as has sometimes been done in respect to the word Igiwav. Tropically used, this word does not signify to seek with great exertion and diligence ; for the Holy Spirit is said igivvuv la ^u&t] ttJ? ^iOTrjiog, to whom this emphatic meaning surely will not apply. The ancient inter- preters used iosvvuv in the same sense as yivcaaxsiv. In both of the above points errorsare very frequent. (Morus, p. 331. XII.)
^ 168. Prepositions in composition do not always make any accession of meaning to a word. In Greek words, more- over, we are to take special care not to make any accession of signification to the word, simply because it is compounded with a preposition. E. g. avd, ano, ngo, avv, ix, nigl, com- pounded as in ttvaaTaVQOvv, avavri&Hv, avft^agrvQEtv, nqoyivtaa- xHv, etc. Many are accustomed to build arguments on such imaginary emphasis, and oftentimes very incongruously; while use and observation teach us, that these prepositions do
96 RtTLES RESPECTING EMPHASIS.
not always change the meaning of simple words ; nay, they
very commonly are redundant, as in Polybius. The custom
of the language, in such cases, must be well studied. (Morus,
p.331. XIIL)
While there is some truth in this statement, viz., it is a fact that many have sought too much emphasis in CGim.pound words, yet that prepositions, etc., in union with verbs or other words serve always to modify their meaning in some respect or other, Tittmann has most fully and satisfactorily shewn in an Essay translated and printed in the Bibl. Repository, Vol I. p. 168 seq.
^ 169. Emphasis not to he deduced merely from the plural number. We must be cautious also that we do not deduce emphasis merely from the use of the plural number, supposing that where the plural is put instead of the singular it necessa- rily denotes emphasis. This is not correct either in regard to Hebrew {a) or Greek. With good reason Melancthon blames Origen for making a distinction between ovgavov and ovgavovg. A similar mistake Origen also made in regard to oixTiQ}iotg, in Romans 12: 1 ; which many have incautiously imitated, as Bengel has the former error. (Morus. p. 332. XIV.)
(a) If all that is meant here be simply that some nouns have only a plural form, that others are used both in the singular and plural with the same meaning, and that in neither of these cases is empha- sis to be found, this may readily be conceded. But Ernesti, and his commentators Morus and Eichstaedt, have stated the assertion in the absolute form, that the plural has no emphasis even in the Hebrew language. 1 have softened this assertion in the translation ; and I add here, that it is so far from being correct, that the pluralis excellentiae (e. g. in d^V^'3 , Q'^ri'^S , 5^3 "IS , etc.) is formed on the very basis that the plural is intensive in such cases. This principle extends to many cases of the Hebrew ; e. g. their inward part is, j-n'^n depravi- ties, i. e. very depraved. It is a principle, however, which no gram- marian has yet sufficiently defined and established.
§ 170. Abstract words not of course emphatic when used for concrete ones. In like manner, we must beware of at- taching emphasis to an abstract word which stands merely for a concrete one. Some learned men have done this ; and ev-
/
k..^X^/l...
RTTLES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 97
en Glass himself admits that it may properly be done, as do many others who have followed his example. But they have neither given any good reason for this, nor shewn the origin or cause of the pretended emphasis ; so that it seems to be rather a thing which they wish, than one which they can in- telligibly teach. The true ground of using abstract words in the room of concrete ones, is ehher from necessity or for the sake of perspicuity, not on account of emphasis. In the sa- cred books the necessity of it springs from the Hebrew dialect, which often employs abstract words in this manner because it has only a few concrete ones. The mistake of the interpre- ters in question arises from the infrequency of the practice in the Latin, and in their own vernacular tongue. But dissimi- larity of idiom does not constitute, as a matter of course, any real emphasis. The ground above taken is quite clear also from another circumstance, viz., that in the same forms of expression abstracts and concretes are commuted for each other. Comp. Col. 1: 13 and Matt. 3: 17. Also Eph. 5: 8 and 4: 18, etc. (Morus, p. 332. XV.)
<5> 171. Emphasis must not he deduced merely from oriental idioms. In the sacred books, and specially in the Hebraisms of the New Testament, we must take care not to seek for and recognize emphasis merely in the idiom which is so very dis- similar to ours. Many persons, though acquainted with the Hebrew have often made this mistake. But nothing is more fallacious. In the oriental languages many things appear hyperbolical, (if you translate them literally, i. e. merely by the aid of common lexicons and etymology), which are not in reality hyperbolical. E. g. in Lamentations it is said : My trouble is great as the sea ; yet this is simply equivalent to the Latin expression : Mala mea sunt maxima, (Morus, p. 335. XVI.)
It is true that such is the real meaning of the Hebrew expression; but this does not determine the question, whether the method of ex-
9
99 RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS*
pressing this seutiment is not hyperbolical. Most plainly it is so ; aa really so as when our Saviour says, that " it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God," and yet only meanSj as another passage clearly shews, that ' it is very difficult for a rich man to be saved, or impossi- ble for those who trust in riches (artd continue to do so), to be sa- ved.'
<5> 172. How to discover emphasis in doubtful cases. If there be no adequate testimony to shew that any word has a constant emphasis, we must consult usage. And here we should first inquire, whether in all the passages where the word is found, emphasis would be congruous. Next, whether in the same passage, or a similar one, another word may be substituted in the room of this, which other contains a special designation of intensity. If neither of these be the case, but the word in question may be commuted for others which are plainly unemphatic ; or in some of the passages where the word occurs, a special designation of intensity is made by adding some other word for this purpose ; then there is no emphasis to be recognized in the word in question. E. g. some have attached emphasis to anoy.aQadoxlag in Romans 8: 19; but in Phil. 1: 20 it would be incongruous. There it is used as a synonyme with iluldc (a), and in fact commuted with it in verse 22 ; so also by the LXX. Nor is emphasis always attached to such phrases as xagav xalgsiv (b) ; for such phrases are often used when another word is added to indicate intensity, e. g. Matt. 2: 10. This would be useless if they indicated intensity of themselves.
(a) Not at all. ^ yJnor.uoadoy.ia there means earnest desire or ex* pectation. It characterizes the attitude of a man standing with his head bent forward by reason of his earnest wish or expectancy in re- spect to any particular thing. ^E?.7iiQ is another characteristic, ad- ded to shew that this earnest waiting or expectancy was rendered more interesting by reason of hope.
(b) But in Hebrew, it is admitted by the best oriental scholars, not only that such forms as Vt^'i'S h'H'^^ admit of emphasis, but that the prevailing usus loquendi expresses it in this way. The imitation of this in Hebrew Greek may consequently be emphatic although it is not always and necessarily so.
RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 99
§ 173. Further rules to discover emphasis. The usual or temporary emphasis, arising from the affection of the speaker 6r some other cause, may be recognized without difficuhy by the following mark, viz., if the ordinary signification of the word is far below the manifest intensity of the affection which the speaker or writer feels, or is incompetent to describe the greatness of the object. If emphasis be not admitted in such cases, the discourse would he frigid; which fault is certainly very foreign from the style of the sacred writers.
^ 174. Continued. Another rule for finding whether a word or phrase is emphatic, is this. If the usual force of the word or phrase would give a frigid meaning, when, on the other hand, an apt one would arise if some intensity were giv- en to the word, there is a plain necessity of emphasis; which is the best guide for finding it. So in 1 Cor. 4: 3, 4, avaxgi- VHv is constantly emphatic, for it means either to he tried hy the judgment of another^ or to take to one's self the right of trying and judging, or to have the right of judging, or to be ahle rightly to judge. But if you translate it simply to judge, a frigid sense would be given to it not at all adapted to the context. In like manner nhxiv in Col. 1: 4 is used, as the context shows, to denote the constancy, greatness, or fruitful- ness of faith. For Paul was not necessitated to know, by re- port, that the church at Colosse had simply Christian faith, since he had founded that church. So in Rom. 1: 8, that faith must have been special which was celebrated throughout the world. Also in Matt. 4: 2 iniivaas must imply intensity, as we may gather from the circumstances of the case.
§ 175. Emphasis must not contradict the usus loquendi. In judging of emphasis the usus loquendi is not to be neglect- ed. It must be so far consulted, as to see that the emphasis implies nothing repugnant to it
100 MEANS OF HARMONIZING
CHAPTER VII.
MEANS OF HARMONIZING APPARENT DISCREPANCIES.
[Keil, § 102. Beck, pp. 192—194.]
§ 176. If two passages contradict each other, the text of one must he faulty. If it could be plainly shown, that two passa- ges of Scripture are so repugnant to each other that no method of conciliation is practicable, it then necessarily follows, that one of the readings in the usual copies must be faulty. Con- sequently an emendation of the text must be sought. Of this iiature perhaps is the passage in John 19: 14, compared with Matt. 27: 45 and Mark 15: 25. Also, as many think, Luke 3: 36, compared with Genesis 10: 24 ; though this is not clear, in my view. Some add Matt. 27: 9, compared with Zechariah 11: 12, 13. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 3. I.)
§ 177. If the text of both be genuine, then conciliation is to he sought where apparent discrepancies exist. If the text of both passages plainly appears to be genuine, so that it can- not fairly be questioned, then it must be understood that there is a mere appearance of inconsistency ; which should be re- moved, and the passage conciliated by a proper interpreta- tion. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 7. II.)
<J 178. Discrepancies doctrinal and historic. The appear- ance of inconsistency sometimes occurs in passages of a doc- trinal, and sometimes of a historical kind. The writers of the N. Testament sometimes appear to be at variance with them- selves (a) ; sometimes with each other (h) ; and occasionally with the writers of the Old Testament (c). Many writers have laboured to harmonize these apparent discrepancies ; some devoting themselves to the consideration of a particula.r
APPARENT DISCREPANCIES. 101
class of them, and others treating of the whole. A catalogue
of these writers may be found in Le Long, PfafF, Fabricius,
and others. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 8»)
(a) E. g. 1 Cor. 8: 1 comp. verse 7. (b) E. g. Paul asserts that a man is justified by faith and not by works; James, that he is justi- fied not by fiiith only, but also by works, (c) E. g. in many passa- ges cited from the Old Testament by tlie writers of the New Testa- ment.
§ 179. Causes of apparent discrepancy in doctrinal pas- sages. In doctrinal passages, an apparent contradiction that is to be removed arises, for the most part, either from the style of the authors which is rather of the popular kind than that of nice refinement, or from the genius of the oriental languages which differs so widely from that of the western ones. An apparent contradiction in respect to doctrines plainly taught, (which has often been objected to our religion by impious and profane men, e. g. Julian in Cyril's works, who says that it is expressly taught there is but one God, and yet Matt, xxviii. ascribes Divinity to three), is to be removed by theologians in the way of explaining things rather than words merely ; and so it comes not directly within the pro- vince of the interpreter. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 9.)
<^ 180. Method of harmonizing apparent doctrinal discre- pancies. The method of harmonizing doctrinal passages may be regulated by the following maxims. An obscure passage, i. e. one in which is something ambiguous or unusual, should be explained in accordance with what is plain and without any ambiguity (a). Again, a passage in which a doctrine is merely touched or adverted to, is to be explained by other passages which present plain and direct exhibitions of it (b).
We must however be careful to harmonize apparent discre- pancies, if it can be done, by recourse to the usus loquendi; so that all occasion of doubt or cavilling may be removed. For it is very desirable that the u^us loquendi should justify
^^-
102 MEANS OF HAKMONIZING
that sense which we put on any doubtful passage, from hav- ing compared it with passages that are plain and clear. (Mo- rus, Vol. II. p. 9 and 10.)
(a) E. g. we explain all anthropopathic expressions in regard to God, by the plain truth that his nature is spiritual.
(0) E. g, the subject of justification in Rom. iii, is designedly treated at large; of the resurrection, in 1 Cor. xv Such passages are called classic (loci classici), and by them other expressions which simply occur obiter are to be explained.
§ 181. Continued. It is very important to remember, that many things of a doctrinal nature are simply and abso- lutely declared, agreeably to common usage in all languages, which still have only a relative sense. This may be account- ed for from the fact, that there are parts of religion which are commonly known and understood ; therefore such parts do not need accurate limitations. E. g. that we are saved by faith is one of the elementary principles of the Christian reli- gion. The sacred writers therefore do not, on every men- tion of any duty, remind us of this principle; as they expect us to keep it in memory. When they say then that alms- giving is acceptable to God, they expect to be understood as meaning if it be accompanied by faith. In this way apparent discrepancies may be reconciled ; and the reconciliation be- comes the more probable, as the reason for it can be given. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 11.)
Apparent discrepancies arising from oriental style or manner of expression (§ 179) are pretty numerous. E. g. pluck out the eye that offends thee ; it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, etc.; to follow Christ, one must hate parents, etc., Luke 14: 20. The context, passages similar as to subject, the nature of the style, the subject itself, etc., are the means of finding the true sense of such places ; and then the hartnony of them with other passages is obvious. (Morus, Vol. II. pp. 11 — 14.)
Apparent discrepancies between various writers, or between dif- ferent parts of the same author, not unfrequenlly occur. E, g. Rom. III. and James ii. in respect to justification. The mode of concilia- tion is simply to obtain a complete view of the meaning of each writer. It will then be seen, for example in this case, that Paul is arguing against those who would establish meritorious justification ; James, against Antinomian views of the gospel. Works, in Paul's epistle,
APPARENT DISCREPANCIS. 103
means complete obedience to the law ; in James, it means such obedience as must be the necessary consequence of Christian faith. The object of both apostles being- fully understood, all discrepancy vanir^hes. In like manner, the advice of Paul in 1 Cor. vii. respecting matrimo- ny, is only pro tempore, and dictated merely by the present exigen- cies of the times ; for the apostle, in many other places of his writings, has expressed a different sentiment, (Morus, pp. 14 — 17.)
Similar to the apparent discrepancy just mentioned, is the case where different predicates are apparently asserted of the same subject. E. g. Rom. 'S: 20, it is said that a man cannot be justified by works j but in 2: 13, it is stated that the Tcoir^at, doers, of the law shall be justified. Here one verse states the rule of ^co-a/ justification ; the other asserts that no man can claim it on the ground of that rule. Again, where we are said to he justified by faith, the meaning is, that we receive pardon on the ground of gratuity ; but justification, as ap- plied to the doers, of the law, means reward on the ground of merit or perfect obedience. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 17. VI.)
Discrepancies seem to exist, at times, between the writers of the Old Testament and the New, merely from the different manner in which tliey express themselves on the same subjects ; when this is rather to be attributed to different degrees of light which the writers had, and to the differences in the eras, manners, habits, etc., of each. E. g, the subject of war ; of loving enemies ; of benevolence to the Gentiles; of God's equal and paternal regard to them; of gratuitous justification, etc. A representation less perfect, in the Old Testa- ment, need not be understood as contradicting one more perfect in the New. (Morus, Vol. II. p 18. Vll.)
Finally, in every case of apparent doctrinal discrepancy, the rule to guide the interpreter is simple, viz., find the true meaning of each writer; take every thing into view, which the principles of interpret- ing language requires, viz., the subject, scope, context, design, age, habits, style, object, etc., of the author; and when the meaning is found of each writer, the passages may be brought together without fear of any real discrepancy.
^ 182. Origin of apparent historical discrepancies. Ap- parent discrepancies of a historical nature originate from a difference of design and manner in narrating the same thing ; as often happens in the Gospels. For a diversity of design varies the choice of circumstances. Many circumstances dif- fer, after all, in nothing important as to designating the ideas which the authors in common mean to designate ; and often- times they may be either commuted for each other, or omit- ted. It is of no importance, sometimes, whether a thing be asserted in a generic or specific form. Hence, appearances of discrepancy have frequently arisen. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 22. IX.)
104 MEANS OF HARMONIZING
§ 183. Continued. But far more frequently an appear- ance of discrepancy arises from the mere manner of expres- sion ; which seems, at first view, to imply a difference in the things described, while it is merely a difference in the mode of describing them. It is very evident that the best and most careful writers do not always exhibit the same precise and accurate method in respect to the names of things, persons, or places (a) ; in regard to numbers {b) ; dates (c) ; years, etc. Nor are they usually blamed for this, nor ought they to be. Hence, where several names of the same object exist, they sometimes exhibit one, and sometimes another. In regard to the manner of expressing time, places, and numbers, some- times they use the more vulgar and indistinct method, and sometimes the more nice and accurate one. In designating time they vary. They sometimes put genus for species, and vice versa. Examples of such a nature occur in common histories, and also in the Gospels.
(a) E. tr. Matt. 17: 14, comp. Luke 9: 38. Gadarene and Gerga- sene, Matt. 8: 28, comp. with Mark 5: 2. Matt. 5: I , comp. Luke 6: 17. (b) Matt. 27: 44, comp. Luke 23: 39. Matt. 8: 5—9, comp. Luke 7: 1—10. Matt. 8: 28, comp. Mark 5: 2. Acts 7: 14, comp. Gen. 46: 27. Acts 7: 6, comp. Gal. 3: 17. (c) Luke 2: 2, comp. with the history of the Syrian Proconsuls.
§ 184. We should he conversant ivith conciliations of 2)as- sages in the best classic authors. With these usages in writing history we ought to be well acquainted, either by our own study of the classics, or from the remarks of skilful interpret- ers, e. g. Perizonius in Animadverss. hist. et. al. lib., Duker on Livy, Wesseling on Herodotus and Diodorus. An ac- quaintance with these will enable us promptly to obtain aid from them, when it is needed for harmonizing passages which seem to disagree ; for it is plain that the difficulty of harmo- nizing passages arises, for the most part, from want of skill in this exercise. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 28. XIII.)
§ 185. Historical facts not to be confounded because of a
APPARENT DISCREPANCIES. 105
slight similitude^ nor to he represented as different on account of some slight discrepancy. In historic discrepancies we must guard against confounding things which really differ, merely because they have some similitude ; or deducing discrepan- cies thence, as has often happened, in the interpretation of profane authors. On the other hand, we must not rashly multiply facts because there are some slight discrepancies in the narration of them. The reading of history, and of good commentaries upon different authors, is very important to as- sist one here.
On the subject of harmonizing the narrations contained in the Gospels, it is difficult to say any thing here which will give even a faint representation of the efforts that, have been made. Several hundred karmonieis have been published. Some have chosen one Gospel as exhibiting the regular order of time, and made the rest to conform to it ; others iiave rejected the supposition of perfect chro- nological order in any. Some have made the number of facts related as small as possible, and forced the language to a harmony ; others have multiplied the number of facts, so that every narration compris- ing a single circumstance of discrepancy from others, has been sup- posed to contain a history of a similar jjut ttill of a separate fact. Some have supposed the public ministry of Christ to have continued for three years; others Jbr more than seven.
Dispute about the sources of the Gospels has been multiplied al- most without bounds, among the German critics. By different wri- ters, each of the first three Evangelists lias been considered as the source of the rest ; while others allow that there are two indepen- dent writers, and the rest are compilers. Many others suppose that original Hel»rew or rather Syro-Chaldaic documents existed in writ- ing, from which the first three evangelists drew in common. Hence their resemblance to each other in respect to diction. But different copies of such documents, they suppose, were used by the Evange- lists, which had been interpolated or augmented. Hence their dis- crepancies. Some assert a perfect harmony betvi'een the Evange- lists even in the minutest circumstances; while other.s maintain dis- crepancies which amount to absolute contradictions. — Where shall the young interpreter go, to find a refuge from such a chaos of doubts and difficulties as are here presented.? If I may venture to express an opinion, which is not the mere result of speculation, I would say : Let him go to the diligent, thorough, repeated study of the gospels, with a candid mind, united to a life of prayer and faith. Let hira carry with him to this study a fundamental knowledge of the nature of language, that he may not be embarrassed with the mere forms of words. I will venture to add, that he will find it necessary to be- lieve with Jerome, that the Scripture consists in the sense of a yassage^
106 MEANS OF HARMONIZING APPARENT DISCREPANCIES.
and not in the words only ; which are the mere costume of the sense. Notions oi verbal inspiration may be and often have been such, as to render the conciliation of the Evangelists a desperate undertaking. That notion v^hich attaches absolute perfection to the /orm q/Zan- ^Mfl^e, as well as the sense which it conveys, makes the reconcil- iation of them impossible. In some cases, two, three, or even the four Evangelists relate the same thing in different words. Now if the form of the words in one is absolutely perfect, what is to be said of the other three, who have adopted different forms ? And if the form of a narration in Luke, with two, three, or more circumstances interwoven is absolutely perfect, what becomes of the narrations in Matthew and Mark, where.one or more of these circumstances are omitted ? -
It is a fact which admits of no doubt, that the sacred writers differ from each other as much in respect to the mode of writing, as profane authors do. The proper question always is : What is the meaning which they design to convey.? What is their principal or special object in conveying it ? These questions being answered, it matters little in what garb this meaning is clad ; or whether more or fewer circumstances accompany it, that are not essential to the main point.
Considerations of this nature will help to remove the apparent discrepancies of the Gospels, as they are now presented to us. And as to speculations about the origin of them, very little terra jirma has yet been won by all the adventures that have been undertaken.
The student may read with some profit, Morus Vol. II. pp. 24 — 49; and many of Newcome's notes, printed at the end of his Harmony, are the result of good sense joined with much critical experience.
§ 186. Doubtful passages to be interpreted by plain ones. In harmonizing passages, it is very important to determine which is to be accommodated to the other. We ought to have some rule here, lest we should wander from our way. The rule is this : If one passage be plain and accurately expressed, so as to admit of no doubt, it cannot admit of any accommo- dation. The doubtful one must be accommodated to the plain one.
^ 187. A perfect Harmony not to be expected. After all, I should admit with PfafT that a perfect Harmony of the Gos- pels can hardly be made by rule. Conjecture must some* times be applied to the rules of harmonizing, and to the use of them in particular cases. But it is well to observe here, that the subject respects merely occasional historical facts, of which one may be ignorant without endangering his salvation*
dN TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES. 107
Nay, better submit to be ignorant here, than to torture one's brain to find out what is not of essential importance.
PART IlL
ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES.
§ 188. An interpreter should understand the Scriptures^ and be able to explain them well. An interpreter should not only possess a thorough understanding of the Scriptures, but also the faculty of interpreting and explaining them well. On this subject it may be proper to say a few things.
The object of interpretation is to give the sense of an author, without addition, diminution, or change. A version ought to be an exact image of the original or archetype, in which image nothing should be drawn ehher greater or less, better or worse, than the original. It should be so composed that it might be acknowledged as another original itself. It follows, that a translator should use those words, and those only, which clearly express all the meaning of the author^ and in the same manner as the author. But this needs illus- tration.
^ 189. The words of the version ought to correspond as exactly as possible to those of the original. First, as the same meaning must be conveyed, those words are to be selected the force of which plainly corresponds to that of the original, and which are not ambiguous, but of a plain and established meaning among those for whom the translation is made. Those words are to be preferred (if such can be found) which correspond altogether with the words of the author, in respect to etymology, tropical use, and construc- tion. But great caution is necessary here, in judging whether
108 ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTtlRES.
the usage of the two languages agrees. Otherwise no version can be made, which can be well understood by those who are ignorant of the original language ; but rather an obscuration of the author ensues, and not unfrequently a perversion of hinfi. For nien will understand the words of a Latin version, according to the Latin usus loquendi, (and so of a German translation) ; when they ought to be understood, if the rule above be violated, according to the Greek or Hebrew idiom. Or perhaps the unlearned reader will not understand them at all, although from the habit of hearing and using the words he may think he understands them. A frequent case indeed among the unlearned ; and I may add, among their teachers also.
§ 190. When one cannot translate ad verbum he must trans- late ad sensum. But if appropriate words as above described cannot be selected, on account of the difference of idiom be- tween the two languages (the original and that of the transla- tor), which often express the same things by words that do not correspond in their etymology or their proper signification, (specially is this the case with the oriental and occidental lan- guages, so that a literal translation of the former would be often unintelligible in the latter), then we must relinquish the design of translating ad verhum, and content ourselves with merely giving the sense of the original plainly designated.
§ 191. A knowledge of Hebrew as well as Greek necessary to translate the New Testament. This can be efTected only by one who has an accurate knowledge of both languages. To accomplish this in respect to the New Testament, a man, besides the knowledge of his vernacular tongue, must have an accurate knowledge of both Greek and Hebrew. This is necessary, not only to understand the original, but to judge of What is peculiar to each language, and to express the sense of the original in a manner adapted to the genius of his own language.
ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES. 109
§ 102. Cases where we must adhere to the mode of trans- lating ad verhum. But various causes operate to prevent a translator from strictly following the rule in § 190. For, 'first, when \heform and manner of the Greek words has such a connection with the things signified and the method of argu- ing, that those things cannot be well understood nor the argu- ment proceed well if a translation ad verhum be not made, then we must sacrifice the idiom of our own language and adhere to that of the Greek. This frequently happens in respect to the epistles of Paul ; e, g. 2 Cor. in. in regard to the words ygdfifiaiog and nvd'fiarog, also do^rjgf add Gal. 3: 16 ; and in respect to allegories, John x.
^ 193, Continued. Antithesis, paronomasia, and the like figures of speech, also require a modification of the rule in § 190. For the grace and beauty of these perish when the language is changed. Paul has many of these figures. But they cannot always be preserved, as another language will not always admit them. E. g. in Matt. 16: 18, nirgog and wfiT^a, the paronomasia can be preserved in Latin but not in English.
"§ 194. Continued. Another class of words which must be literally rendered, are those for which no equivalent ones can be found in the language of the translator, so as fully and unambi-guously to express the idea. E. g. the word ^(a^ ; and others as nlaiig, fisrdvoia, etc,
§ 195. Continued. In very difficult and doubtful passages also a literal translation must be given, because a version ad sensum would be assuming that one definitely understood the real meaning of the passage. This might do in a commen- tary, but not in a translation. With propriety says Castalio on 1 Pet. 4: 6, *' This I do not understand, therefore I trans- late it ad verbum,''^ - ^
10
no MORIJS ON TRANSLAtlOl^.
§ 196. In translating, we ought to lean towards our own vernacular idiom. A good acquaintance with these maxims of translation, specially a practical acquaintance, will enable any one to judge whether a version has preserved the right method in regard to purity of language, or introduced too many of the idioms of the original. As versions however are not made for the learned who can read the original, but for others and specially for the common people, it is better to in- cline to the idiom of our vernacular tongue, (even in cases where you might with some propriety adhere to the original idiom), for the sake of rendering the translation more intelli- gible. It was well said by Jerome to Pammachius, when speaking of the best mode of interpretation: " Let others hunt after syllables and letters ; do you seek for the sense.^^
APPENDIX.
MORUS ON TRANSLATION.
Extract translated from a dissertation of Dr. Morus,]'late Professor of Theology in the University of Leipsick, entitled
DE DISCRIMINE SENSUS ET SIGNIFICATIONIS IN INTERPRETANDOj
and contained in his Dissertationes Theol. et Philol. Vol I. No. 11
[To the above rules of Ernesti, the object of which is to guide the translator in making a version of the original Scriptures into his own vernacular language, 1 have thought it would be acceptable and use- ful to those for whom this little volume of the elements of Herrae- neutics is designed, to subjoin an extract from the dissertation of Morus just mentioned, which appears to be very judicious and in- structive. To the business of teaching Hermeneutics, Morus was peculiarly attached and devoted; and lew men have understood it better, or left behind them more useful precepts on this interesting subject. Equally removed from the recent latitudinarianism of many
MORUS ON TRANSLATION. Ill
Qerman interpreters, and from the mystic and technical method of the older interpreters, he formed and nurtured a school which has produced great and lasting influence upon the science of interpreta- tion ; and the principles of which, for the most part, must commend themselves at once, when well understood, to every intelligent and unbiassed mind.
The dissertation in question commences, with pointing out the im- possibility of translating ad verbum out of one language into another, in every case that may occur. The reason of this is grounded in the diflerent modes in which men of different nations view the same ob- jects, and express themselves in respect to them. The age in which writers live, their different manners, customs, culture, temper, man- ner of life, knowledge, etc., all concur in producing these differences. In consequence of the operation of causes so diverse, there is in one language much of rude antiquity, in another a high or a partial state of cultivation ; in one the connections and transitions are circuitous, in another, short and easy ; in one ellipsis abounds, in another it is unfrequent; one is profuse in allegories and tropes, another dry and jejune in expression ; one abounds with equivocal and indefinite phraseology, another with definite and certain words ; one is fitted for expression in respect to the arts and sciences, another destitute of such means of expression ; one is copious, another furnished with a scanty stock of words.
In consequence of these diversities, and the differences of idiom which spring out of them, it becomes impossible always to translate ad verbum from the one to the other. In such cases, Morus justly contends that the translator, abandoning a literal version, should aim at exactly communicating the sense. E. g. the literal translation of /caxoig £/etv is to have badly ; but what idea could an English reader attach to this translation ? Leaving then the version ad verbum, we must translate it to be sick, which conveys the exact sense of the Greek piirase in an intelligible form. And this instance may serve to illustrate what Morus means by the phrase, difference between the signification and the sense of words. The former is the literal and primary meaning of the words simply considered; the sense is the idea conveyed by the words, in the phrase or in the connection where they stand.
What is said of words may also be applied to phrases and sen- tences, for the same reasons and from the same causes. In all these cases, where the sense cannot be given by a literal translation, we must choose other words which will designate it; and where particu- lar words are wanting in our own language to do this, we must have recourse to circumlocution.
Having discussed these principles of translating, Morus proceeds to descant upon the method of applying them to practice. As this subject is a matter of importance to all who are to expound the word of God in their own vernacular tongue, 1 shall here present it in a translation of the author's words. M. S.]
ft is proper here to point out the duty of the interpreter, in reference to the above principles. In regard to the first case,
112 MORUS ON TRANSLATION.
namely, where we abandon a literal version, and use a word which will convey the sense of the original, I may say, in general, that the word substituted should approximate as nearly as possible in its signification to that of the original word which it represents. On accuracy of this kind depends, in a high degree, the excellence of any version.
But as it rarely suffices to give merely general directions, I will descend to particulars. A version then should exhibit a trope where the original does, whether it be used for the sake of ornament or variety ; an energetic word, where there is one in the original. Let the translator avoid tropes, where the diction of the original is not figurative ; let him avoid technical expressions, where those of common life should be used. E. g. TsXuov should not be rendered perfection, but "probity^ uprightness. Let him not commute genus for spe- cies, nor antecedent for consequent. In respect to words which depend on an excited state of mind, such as reproach- ful terms, and those of complaint, lamentation, and indigna- tion, also proverbs, and proverbial phrases, let him compare these most carefully with the practice of common life ; and what men are wont to say on such occasions let him express in his version, and not rest satisfied with some kind of gene- ral meaning, nor make a version which is cramped by its dic- tion. In general, let him take care to form a right estimate of subjects from the nature of the predicates attached to them ; which is a matter of great importance, where there is a departure from a literal version. It will also afford an anti- dote against negligence and error.
It is sufficient to have given these few hints ; and he who wishes for more accurate knowledge of the laws of transla- ting, must inquire into the grounds or reasons of these laws. The reasons are, the desire to translate closely and not para- phrastically ; a wish to give an exact idea of the thing desig- nated by the original words, so that the reader may under-
MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 113
Stand it ; the necessity of exhibiting the external beauty of the oricfinal diction; and the design of so exhibiting the writer's thoughts in our own language, as to make it appa- rent, that if the writer himself had used our language he would have expressed this proverb, that exclamation, that for- mula of speech, just as the translator has done.
In regard to the second case, viz. where circumlocution is to be employed, one rule may be given to guide the transla- tor. Let him use words, if possible, which do not express entirely an idea that is composed of many parts in the origi- nal, and some of which are not designated exactly in the pas- sage which is translated ; but let him choose terms, which are as exactly equivalent to the original as possible. Where doubt may hang over the expression, he may explain it by notes ; but he should not be blamed for not expressing deji- nilely in translation, what is indefinite in the original ; and while he avoids doing this, he cannot be accused of obtruding his own views upon the author whom he translates.
Thus far in respect to translating ad sensum rather than ad verhim, when single words are to be explained or translated. Let us come now to sentences and propositions ; in regard to which, when they cannot be literally translated without obscu- ring instead of illustrating the sense, we must, in like manner as before described, substitute the meaning of the words in- stead of the words themselves. In merely explaining a pas- sage, which contains the sign of some particular thing, the in- terpreter may substitute the thing signified for the sign of it. E. g. when God is said to come from heaven, an interpreter in merely explaining may say, this means God as performing some illustrious work, or doing any thing in general ; or God as taking cognizance of any thing, or as propitious or unpro- pitiov^,]us\. as the contextjequires. Or when Christ is pre- sented as sitting at the right hand of God, the meaning is, that Christ is participating in divine sovereignty. So when, 10*
114 MORUS ON TRANSLATION.
in the oriental writers, the sun is represented as darkened, the moon as obscured, and the stars as shaken, these are images of distressing times ; and therefore when it is said that these things will happen, the simple meaning is that times of great distress will follow, in which as it were all nature seems to threaten ruin. To this class of passages, however, belong all those in which God as future judge is represented as visible ; the forms of speech being taken from the customs of men. The meaning of such passages is, that Gad will render to every one according to Ms deeds ; as is plainly expressed in Matt. 16: 27.
In the mere explanation of these formulas of language, ev- ery one sees that the sense is to be given ; but our translator has a work of more difficulty. For where the object of enu- merating many signs of the nature described above, is to ren- der the description more vivid and impressive, (as in Matt. 24:29,30,31. Joel 3: 1. Dan. 7:9), everything must be closely translated. The translator would mutilate the diction of the author, if he should abridge the description and give only the general meaning ; for it was not the design of the writer merely to present to the mind the thing summarily and literally declared, but as it were to place it before the eyes in a picture or painting of it. For if the version, by preserving these special traits, is not liable to produce an erroneous im- pression in the reader's mind, but every one who reads will easily understand that the whole is to be considered as a figura- tive expression, (as those things are which are spoken of God av&QMJiona&ag) then there is no good reason why the version should be changed into a paraphrase or explanation. Who would doubt or be at a loss what is meant, if men in a state of suffering and wretchedness should be described as approach- ing the throne of God for the purpose of supplication ? But if a translation, as it stands in our vernacular tongue to be read by the unlearned, necessarily leads to wrong views of the
MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 115
sentiments of the author by being literal ; or communicates a sentiment opposite to his ; or makes no sense ; I see no rea- son why we should fear to substitute the sense instead of the literal signification of the words ; specially when an argument follows which does not depend on the words but on the sense, and which no one can understand who does not attend to ihe sense rather than the words. Of this nature are such expres- sions as making intercession for men ; sitting at the right hand of the king ; Christ who was rich becoming poor that men might be made rich ; Christ being received into the hea- I venSy etc. ; which last phrase clearly means to be mast exalted, to have supreme dominion. Had some critics understood this, they might have spared themselves the trouble of inquir- ing whether Christ contains the heavens, or the heavens him ; nor would they have thought of the majesty of Christ as suf- ' fering degradation by being included in a place ; nor would Beza have written such a note as he has on this subject. The meaning — ihe' meaning only — is to be sought for; and not the mere literal signification of the words.
In other cases, what the sacred writers have applied only to a part or species, interpreters have sometimes applied to the whole or the genus ; and vice versa. Contemplated in the light where they have placed it, the thing appears obscure, or difficult, or as needing to be softened down ; but in the other light, it is plain, easy, and accurately described. What David in a certain place imprecates upon his enemies, (and therefore the enemies of Christ), viz. that their habitation might be desolate and deserted, Peter applies to Judas the be- trayer of Christ, and declares that it happened to him (Acts 1: 20). But if a literal application of it is to be made to David's enemies, it is not to be applied in the same sense in which it is to Judas. How will it be shewn that the habita- tion of Judas became desolate and deserted ? Surely violence must be done to the passage, if any one determines to under-
116 MORUS ON TRANSLATION.
Stand it literally. We may therefore see whether the passage cannot be translated ad sensum. E. g. if in uttering an im- precation against one, we say : ' Let his house become deso- late,' our meaning is, in general, that he may he extirpated, that he may utterly perish. Many imprecations are of such a nature, that the object of them is evil in general by which some one is to be overwhelmed or crushed ; and to the mere form of the words themselves we are not scrupulously to ad- here. For the language of imprecation is of such a nature that it designates, by its vehemence or moderation, the more vehement or moderate affection of the mind, and also the weight or lightness, the abundance or fewness, of the evils which are to be inflicted.
Similar to the imprecations of which I have just been speak- ing, is that of wishing that any one may be extirpated^ or, to express it rhetorically, that his house may he deserted ; which is the image of destruction or extirpation. This expression logically considered means a species of destruction, and in the language of common life it would stand for an exainple of destruction. If now the words above applied to Judas are considered as simply designating the idea, let him perish, and are urged no farther, all this most truly happened to Judas ; and this entirely agrees with the sense put upon the words in Peter's discourse. For, as Peter argues, if Judas has perish- ed, there is need of a successor in his office. But if the pas- sage be literally understood, the conclusion is not valid ; for it would not follow that because the house of Judas is deserted, a successor to his office is needed. We may conclude there- fore that Peter cites one of the many imprecations contained in a long poem, not because this imprecation only is to be re- garded literatim et syllahatim, but merely to show to whom all imprecntions of that nature attach, and to whom they may be referred.
But still further to confirm this exegesis ; does Paul, I
MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 117
would ask, when he cites a part of the imprecations in the same poem, insist upon and urge the literal meaning of them ? (Rom. 11: 9, 10.) Does he apply the tropical language of it to some particular kind of suffering, as poverty for example, or sickness ? Not at all ; but he plainly teaches us that the language of the Psalmist means generally to express the im- precation : Let the enemies of God be wretched !
But still in translating passages of this nature, it is not enough to give the sense in general. We must present the same images as the author does, and of course express his words. If we neglect to do this, our readers may indeed know in general the meaning of the author ; but they will re- main ignorant of what language he employs, and how much force and ornament he exhibits.
I come next to allegory, or where similitudes are employed for the sake of illustration. The use which we should make of allegories in interpretation, is to deduce from them the general sentiment, in which is summarily and properly con- tained that which the writer wishes to illustrate by his simili- tudes. In explaining allegories, it is surely proper to have respect to the design of the author in writing them. But all men, who make use of allegories, expect their readers to re- gard the general sentiment inculcated by them rather than the similitude themselves ; or, which amounts to the same thing, not to dwell upon the language merely but to consider the design of it. For example ; when Christ was asked why he did not enjoin it upon his disciples oftener to fast, according to the usual custom, he answered by allegories, using these three similitudes, viz. that while the bridegroom was present it was not proper for the wedding guests to be sad ; that a new patch should not be sewed upon an old garment ; and that new wine should not be put into old bottles. (Matt. 9: 14 — 18.) In these similitudes is doubtless contained one gen- eral sentiment, which being understood, the force of Jesus'a
118 MORUS ON TRANSLATION.
reply is manifest. That sentiment, as it appears to me, is this ; that no one in common life is wont to do those things, which are incongruous with the time, place, and occasion. For if any one should be sad at a wedding feast, or put new wine into old bottles, or sew a new patch upon an old gar- ment, would he not act foolishly, and be regarded as one des- titute of a sense of propriety ? It is as much as to say, in common life such things are incongruous. Whether there- fore we advert to all these similitudes, or only to one of them, the same meaning is and ought to be deduced from the passage.
The amount of the whole is, that Christ being asked why he permitted his disciples so much indulgence in regard to fasting, replied by making use of similies to shew that no one in common life would do that which is incongruous; and therefore he would not compel his disciples to do that, which neither the time nor the occasion required. For certainly it would have been incongruous for the disciples, while Christ was with them as their guide and teacher, to spend their life in sadness, and to devote themselves to rites of this nature ; especially when Christ was soon to be taken from them, ancl they were to be assailed by many calamities and distresses. Now if Christ, who knew this would be their lot, had forbidden them their present enjoyments, and prematurely loaded them with burdensome rites which were incongruous with their present circumstances and with the indulgence of his affection for them, he would have done that which would be like being sad at a wedding feast, or sewing a new patch upon an old garment, or putting new wine into old bottles, i. e. he would have done an incongruous unseemly thing.
But he, who, overlooking the fact that so many words are employed in the designation of one general sentiment, thinks this mode of explanation does not exhaust the whole meaning of the sirailiesj will, after the manner of many ancient and
MORtTS ON TRANSLATION* ll9
modern expositors, explain every part by itself ; so that the bridegroom is made the husband of the church, the toine is the gospel, the old and the new are Pharisaical and Christian doc- trine, etc. For myself, I am wont to follow the usage of common life in explaining similitudes ; for this is the voice of nature, and can easily be distinguished from the usual method of allegory, fable, and simile. I could wish that the language, opinions, and customs of common life, were more frequently regarded in the interpretation of ancient authors.
If it be true, that whatever pertains to the art of expression is drawn from the observation of nature and common lifej how shall we judge that we have learned^ not the mere opin* ions and speculations of others about language, but the real art of language which agrees with the practice of common life, unless we compare what we have learned with the results of common and every day's experience ? If it be true that any book is simply the language of the author as it were ad* dressed to us, can we persuade ourselves that we have attain- ed the sense of it, if when we read it we construe every thing in a different manner from what we should had we heard it spoken ; if we understand language against all the usages of common life ; if we seek in the very syllables of a writer mountains of sense which no one in the language of common life looks for or suspects ? Can we attain the right sense, if we deny to an author the right of being reasonably construed^ a right not to have his words urged beyond their proper bounds ? This is a thing we always concede in conversation ; and it is, indeed, a fundamental rule of explaining language that is spoken. Shall we suppose an author to have written mere* ly to afford us an occasion of indulging our ingenuity, and while he walks upon the earth shall we mount ourselves upon the clouds ? Only think how many errors, phantasies, and difficulties have been introduced by those, for example, who have commented on the ancient poets, and setting nature at
120 MORUS ON TRANSLATION.
defiance as exhibited in common life, have undertaken to in- terpret from their own fancy ! How much grave wisdom has been obtruded upon Homer against his will, where his words breathed simple nature and common life ! Think with what anxiety of mind many have handled the sacred writings, while they seemed to forget, that although the authors were inspired yet they were men that used human language, and so wrote it that others for whom it was designed could under- stand it in the usual way, that is by the application to it of their knowledge of the idiom in which it was composed. It may happen, indeed, that pursuing this plain beaten path we may seem to be unlearned, because we do not profess to know all which others think they know ; but we shall be more than compensated by the abundant satisfaction of having every thing around us, all that common life comprises, testifying in our favour, and that the meaning of language must be scan- ned by the rules which we have brought to view. Some perhaps may think too, that we do not exhibit much modesty or diffidence in regard to the sacred books, and that we are . too liberal and studious of neology. Still our satisfaction will be very great, if the reasons of our interpretation depend on precepts drawn from common life and usage, which carry along with them a convincing weight of evidence in their favour, and are not repugnant to the nature and genius of all languages. Such incongruous principles Turretine has very ably refuted, in his book de Sac. Script. Interpretatione. I do not mean to say that acuteness or subtilty in philology is to be neglected. By no means ; for without these no doc- trine can be well understood. He who heaps together much, is not therefore a learned man ; but he who arranges, defines, fortifies with arguments. Who would be satisfied with being deprived of all the advantages of subtilty or nice discrimina- tion, which enables us more certainly, briefly, clearly, and orderly, to learn any thing ? But when we have so learned it,
GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM. 121
all is to be brought to the test of common life, so that it may appear what we have learned for ourselves, what for others ; what for the schools, and what for every day's use.
[As related to the general subject of translating , and specially of translating the New Testament, the reader will not fail to compare with the above remarks, Campbell's excellent observations comprised in the Preliminary Dissertations to his Translation, of the Gospels, Diss. 11. Vlli. X.] M^j TA) v<i hiino*f
om'momt&i x'Ml ttoikf-
fH3fjd. .jit^cl^u ->::<-. PART IV.
il' 'I-:/ Ofto Qii
GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT.
eitfinpg p.i; «n* m «i ^.i . >«■;
[Translated from Beckii IVtonogrammata Hermeneutices Librornm Nov. Testamenti, edit. 1803, Lipsiae, Sectio 111. pp. 117, etc.]
§ 1. Criticism is divided into lower and higher, terms not altogether adapted to express a proper division of it ; each of which is again subdivided into grammatico-historical and con- jectural.
^ 2. The authenticity of a book, the genuineness of a pas- sage, and the goodness of a particular reading, are establish- ed by arguments external and internal. The latter kind of arguments is deduced from the nature of things treated of, the sentiments, and the language.
§ 3. Lower or verbal criticism is regulated by the follow- ing general principles ; viz. that reading is preferable, re- specting which it may be probably shewn that it bears the stamp of the author, and from which it may appear that all the varieties of reading have proceeded. Hence all the errors of copyists should be noted ; as they often furnish
11
122 GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM
means of finding out the true reading and the origin of various readings.
§ 4. Common laics of lower criticism ivhich apply to hooks in general whether sacred or profane.
1. That reading is to be regarded as true, which is sup- ported by far the greater number of copies and witnesses.
But still, readings supported by a few books are not en- tirely to be disregarded ; [specially when they harmonize with the usus loquendi of the author.]
2. That reading which the better copies exhibit, unless special reasons prohibit it, is to be prefered to the one which the poorer copies exhibit, although most numerous. What copies are of the better kind, is a question to be discussed in another place, where inquiry is made respecting the genius of the Ni Testament writings. Neither the antiquity nor pro- priety of a reading, solely considered, always proves it to be a true one ; [unless the antiquity should extend back to the autograph, or the propriety should be shewn to be exclusive.]
3. That reading which is more harsh, obscure, difficult, unusual, or delicately chosen, if supported by the authority of a proper witness, is preferable to one which is plain, easy, usual, and common. Difficulty sometimes exists in respect to a whole passage and its connection ; sometimes in regard to the ambiguity of particular words and phrases ; sometimes in respect to the grammatical forms, historical and doctrinal passages, etc. But,
4. That reading which approaches nearest to the popular and familiar method of speaking, if it be supported by exter- nal testimonies, is preferable to one more artificial and subtile.
5. The shorter reading, when supported by testimony of importance, and not incongruous with the style and design of the writer, is preferable to a more verbose one. Still there are cases where the more copious reading is to be preferred.
IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 123
6. That reading which gives the best sense is peculiarly preferable. But to determine this, the nature of the whole passage, the genius of the writer, and not the mere opinions and sentiments of particular interpreters, are to be consulted.
7. The reading which produces a worthless or an incon- gruous sense is to be rejected. Good care however must be taken not to condemn a reading as worthless or incongruous, which a more correct grammatical and historical investiga- tion would prove to be a true reading, or at least a probable one.
8. A reading which agrees with the usus loquendi of the writer, is preferable to that which disagrees with it. It must be remembered in judging here, that the style of an author sometimes varies with increasing age.
9. A reading is to be rejected, in respect to which plain evidence is found that has undergone a designed alteration. Such alteration may have taken place, (1) From doctrinal reasons. (2) From moral and practical reasons. (3) From historical and geographical doubts ; Malt. 8: 28, comp. Mark 5: 1. (4) From the desire of reconciling passages apparently inconsistent with each other. (5) From desire to make the discourse more intensive. Hence may emphatic readings have originated. (6) From the comparison of many manu- scripts the readings of which have been amalgamated. (7) From a comparison of parallel passages.
Corrections of the more celebrated manuscripts have been sometimes detected.
10. Various readings are to be rejected, which spring from the mere negligence of copyists, and from those errors which are very common to all kinds of books. To these belong, (1) The commutation of forms in the Macedonico- Alexan- drine dialect, and also other unusual forms, for those of the common dialect. The Alexandrine and common form, how- ever, have the preference over others in the New Testament ;
124 .,, GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM
and the Alexandrine dialect itself also admitted some Attic forms. (2) The commutation of single letters and syllables, by an error of either the eye or the ear ; the former resulting from obscure and compendious methods of writing, [the latter, from copying after the reading of one who was misunder- stood or who read erroneously]. (3) The commutation of synonymes. (4) From transferring into the text words writ- ten in the margin of copies, and thus uniting both readings, James 5: 2. (5) From the omission of a word or a verse, by an error of the sight. (6) From the transposition of words and passages ; whence it may have happened that some error has crept into most of our books. (7) From words which ended with the Hke sound, or appeared alike ; and from proximate words, one ending and the other begin- ning with the same syllable. (8) From incorrectly unhing or separating words ; which naturally resulted, in some cases, from the ancient method of continuous writing. (9) From an erroneous interpunction and distinction of passages.
11. A reading is to be rejected which plainly betrays a gloss or interpretation. This may be a word, or a whole pas- sage. Sometimes these glosses are united to the true text, and sometimes they have thrust it out. Not all interpreta- tions however are spurious glosses ; [for authors themselves sometimes add them, in order to explain their own language.]
12. Readings deduced from versions or the commentaries of interpreters are to be rejected. In judging of them, how- ever, great prudence and much skill is necessary.
[The maxims thus far are comprised within the province of lower criticism. But higher criticism may be and ought to be employed, in order to assist in forming a judgment of the genuineness of many passages. Here follows, from the same writer, a synopsis of the •principles of higher criticism.]
• § 5. Laws of higher criticism respecting the establishment -of a pure text.
1. The sentiment, declaration, passage, book, or part of a
IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 125
book of any author, which on account of its nature, form, method, subject, or arguments, does not appear to have origi- nated from him, is either spurious, or at least very much to be suspected.
Imitations of authors made with design, or for the sake of practice in writing, or from other reasons, may easily be as- cribed to the authors themselves, though they are supposi- ^ titious.
2. A passage which manifestly disagrees with the nature and connection of the context, and interrupts it, is to be re- garded as spurious.
3. A passage which belongs in another place either in the same words or with little variation, and seems to be more properly and commodiously placed there, may be suspected of having been transferred to the place where it stands with less propriety, and may be removed from thence.
But here great care is requisite lest we judge rashly or form our opinion rather from the taste and style of the present day than from the genius of the author, his design and style, or the subject and argument of the discourse. As an exam- ple, one might appeal to the disputations about the Apocalypse, and to the appendix of John's Gospel in chap. xxi.
4. Passages which are manifestly interpolated, by the com- ments of interpreters or from any other cause, are to be re- jected from the text.
But great caution is necessary here to judge rightly. In general, internal arguments alone are not to be relied on as sufficient evidence.
5. Parts of books which appear incoherent, and yet clearly exhibit the genius and style of the author, may be reduced to better order by separation, and making a different arrange- ment. [Great caution here too is necessary.]
6. If numerous and very diverse readings of a book are found in the best copies, we may conclude, either that the
11*
^iJiS . GENEKAL RULES OF CRITICISM
book has gradually received various accessions, or has been re-published by a later hand, or has been edited a second time by the author and corrected, so as to give occasion for the introduction of such various readings.
§ 6. Laws proper to guide our judgement in respect to the true reading of passages in the New Testament, spurious ad- ditions, the books themselves, or the authors of them, may be deduced from the peculiar nature of the things described, and the style of the books. They may also be deduced from the nature of the sources whence the various readings come, and from the testimony of witnesses. Such are the following :
1. Passages are to be regarded as spurious, at least are to be suspected (if any such there are), which disagree with the nature of the Christian religion, the history of it, or the mode of teaching and deciding appropriate to any sacred writer ; or if they appear trifling, inapt, or jejune, when compared with the force of the doctrine exhibited, or the gravity of the au- thor who exhibits it. Specially are they to be suspected, if historical reasons concur to render them suspicious.
The importance of subjects, the force of precept and nar- rations, and other things of this nature, are to be estimated by the manner, judgment, and usage of those times in which the books were written. In judging of doctrines, special caution is to be used.
We must be watchful against the pious frauds (as they are called) of ancient churches, committed in the interpolation of books, and in giving new forms to passages of them. The special causes of interpolations were tradition, apocryphal writings, the desire of explaining, augmenting, correcting, etc. On the other hand, some passages were eje^cted as spurious, which seemed to be unworthy of the authors of them. E. g. Luke 22: 43, vide Paulus's Commentary, p. 613.
2. In general, the reading which savours of Hebraism
IN EESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 127
or Syro-Chaidaism, is preferable to that which savours of classical Greek. [CcBteris paribus, it is always preferable.]
Some of the writers of the New Testament, however, as Paul and Luke, approach nearer to the Greek style.
The conjecture of some critics, that the books of the New Testament were originally written, for the most part, in Syro-Chaldaic, and afterwards were translated into Greek by an interpreter who has committed many errors, can at most be extended to but very few books. [To none, as I believe.]
3. Since the New Testament was commonly used both in public and private, and certain parts of it were selected for ecclesiastical use, inquiry must be made whether any portion of it has been interpolated, either from the parallel passages of the Old Testament, or from the Church Lectionaries.
4. As many copies, versions, and fathers of the ancient Churches, are found nearly always to have followed the same text, those which belong to the same class are not to be sep- arately numbered, but rather to be regarded as standing in the place of one witness. Still less are we to trust solely to any one copy, however ancient, critical^ or carefully written. Nor is any copy, which may be erroneously written, or recent, or occasionally interpolated, to be rejected as altogether use- less.
5. In respect to any reading, the first inquiry is : To what recension or edition does it belong ?
The age and country of copies and readings are to be ex- amined by careful comparison.
No copy extant is perfectly free from error in all the books, or uniformly follows any one uncorrupted recension. We must judge, therefore, from the consent of many things of the same kind, and from internal evidence, what recension is followed, either generally, or in particular passages. Some copies are thought to follow various recensions in particular parts. A few copies of the most ancient classes of manu-
128 GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM
scripts are extant, but the majority of copies are more mod- ern. If an ancient copy has been propagated through many editions, it may have been exposed to vary from the ancient recension, or have been corrupted by new errors of the copy- ist, more than if a recent copy were directly taken from the ancient one.
6. That reading in which all the recensions of the best copies agree, is the most correct, certainly the most ancient. Slight deviations are unimportant.
7. Readings supported by the authority of the most ancient classes of manuscripts, and of the more credible witnesses, are to be preferred to others. But a regard must be had to the internal goodness of a copy.
8. The Alexandrine class of manuscripts is sometimes pre- ferable to the occidental, and sometimes of less authority. In the conflicting claims of various classes, special regard must be had to historical and internal means which enable us to judge of a reading.
9. Manuscripts are of the highest authority ; but neither the ancient versions, nor the exegetical and other books of the fathers are to be neglected.
10. In collecting and judging of the ancient versions, (1) Regard must be had to those made directly from the Greek. Among these, the Latin, Syriac, and Gothic deserve special mention. (2) We must use a correct text of these Versions. (3) We must inquire whether the translator has rendered literally or ad sefisum ; whether the errors in the version arise from the fault of the translator's copy, or from other causes ; and finally whether the version has been corrected or not. (4) Those versions, which from comparison are found to belong to the same family of manuscripts, are to be regarded as standing in the place of one ancient witness. (5) No reading derived merely from versions, and destitute of other support, can be received ; but the consent of all the
IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 129
ancient versions and fathers in a particular reading, which ^varies from that of manuscripts, renders the latter suspicious. ', 11. In regard to the readings derived from the writers be- longing to the ancient churches, we must see, (1) That they are drawn from a correct and not a corrupt edition of the fathers. (2) We must diligently consider the authors, their descent, age, erudition, subtilty of judging, temerity in emen- dation, the nature of the copies which they used, and the creed of the churches to which they belonged. (3) We must consider in what kind of book or passage of ecclesiastical writers, various readings are found. (4) Inquiry must be made, whether the variations are supported by real and direct testimony of the fathers ; or whether changes were occasion- ed in the text by lapse of memory, or a designed accommo- dation ; or whether merely opinions or conjectures are pro- posed. It seems to be very unjust, to ascribe all the variety found in the ecclesiastical fathers either to error of the mem- ory, or to temerity in accommodation, or a fondness for emendation. (5) The omission of some passage in the com- mentaries of the fathers, does not always show that it was wanting in the copy which the writer had. Silence however concerning an important passage, renders it suspicious.
12. The fragments of heretical writings are not to be over- looked, in the search for various readings; for the supposi- tion is rash, that they generally corrupted the text of all parts of the sacred writings.
13. That interpunction and distinction of verses and chap- ters, which is most consonant with the argument, sentiments, connection of discourse, and usus loquendi^ of the sacred wri- ters, is to be regarded as the best.
§ 7. In the criticism of all ancient books it is well under- stood, that particular readings are not required to be establish- ed by most certain and irrefragable arguments, but only that
130 ON THE QUALIFICATIONS
a probability be shown that they approximate, at least, very near to the original readings ; and the judgment is to be made up, in view of what appears to be most probable. So in re- spect to the New Testament ; no more should be required than can, from the nature of the case, be performed. Every thing on all sides should be considered, before the judgment is made up. And if, in judging of the text of profane au- thors, gravity and modesty are rightly commended ; surely in judging of the sacred books, we ought most scrupulously to abstain from all rashness and levity, as well as from all favoritism and superstition.
PART V. CHAPTER I.
ON THE QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER.
[The following chapter is extracted from Keil's Elemcnta Herme- neutices, translated from the original German into Latin by C. A. (Jr. Emmeriing, and published at Leipsick in 1811. Although it con- tains several things that seem to be a repetition of the ideas advanced in various places by Err.csti, as exhibited in the foregoing pages; yet as the object is to describe the qvalifications of the interpreter him- self in respect to hwwledge, and as it is a very brief and well digested summary, it appears desirable that the student, who aspires to the place of an interpreter, should liave the qualifications of one definitely and separately described, as here, in order that he may direct his special attention to this subject, unembarrassed by other considera- tions.
1 take it for granted here, that the student of the sacred books, who designs to enter upon the duties of the ministry, feels himself attracted to this work by motives of sincere piety and benevolence. It is a bondage worse than Egyptian, to be compelled to the perform- ance of pastoral duties by a mere sense of official obligation. A man of this cast must be very stupid in order that he should not be very miserable. When the blind lead the blind, woe to both ! The last thing that I could commend to a man who is not truly pious, Would be the work of the ministry. But supposing him to possess
OF AN INTERPRETER. 131
sincere piety and good common sense, then the precepts which fol- low may aid him in the acquisition of useful knowledge.]
§ 1. He who desires to understand and interpret the books of the New Testament, must, first qfall, acquire some histor- ic knowledge of the author of each book ; of the state of things existing when it was written ; of the body or collection of the New Testament books ; of the particular history of its ancient versions, editions, and parts in which it was written ; and other things of this nature. To this must be added a know!-' edge of the principles of criticism, in respect to the text of the New Testament.
Books to be read for information on these topics : Marsh's trans- lation of Michaelis's Introduction to the N. Test. ; and various other ^^ Introductions more recently published. ''
<J 2. Of the second kind of knowledge, preparatory to the understanding and interpretation of the N. Testament.
(1) The interpreter must understand the language in which the hooks are written. As the diction is not pure classic Greek, but the Hebrew idiom here and there intermixed with classic Greek, and as vestiges of the Chaldee, Syriac, Eab- binic and Latin languages occur ; it follows, of course, that the interpreter should not only be acquainted with pure Greek, but with its various dialects, specially the Alexandrine. Above all, he ought to be well versed in the Hebrew, Chaldee^ Syriac, Rabbinic, and Latin idioms.
Vorstius de Hebraismis N. Test, cura Fischeri, 1778. Leusden de Dialectis N. Test. edit. Fischeri, 1792. Mattaire de Dialectis Ling. Graecae. Sturtzde DialecitoMacedonica et Alexandrina, 1808. Ffann- kuche Ueber die Palaestinische Landessprache in dem Zeitalter Christi, im Eichhorn^s allgemeine Bibliothek B. viii. s. 365, seq., —translated in the Bib. Repositoryi * V^ <-
■ ,i (2) The interpreter must possess a knowledge of the things Respecting which the hooks treat. These are partly histori- cal, and partly doctrinal. The explanation of them must be sought, primarily, from the books themselves ; and second*
lld^ ON THE QUALIFICATIONS
arily, from those writings of more recent authors, which may be subsidiary to the attainment of this knowledge.
(^ 3. As to the historic matter of these looks. Ii is of great importance to the interpreter to be well versed in sacred geo- graphy, chronology, civil history, and archaeology ; i. e. to understand those things which respect the situation and cli- mate of the countries, where the events referred to happened ; as well as those which serve to define the times when they happened ; and also the history of the nation among whom they took place, and of other nations mentioned in this his- tory, with their condition, manners, and customs.
(1) Geographical knowledge. The geography of Pales- tine and the neighbouring countries should be well understood (a), as also their natural productions {h). To this must be added a knowledge of many countries in Asia, and of some in Europe ; also the Roman empire, as it then existed, di- vided into provinces.
(a) Well's Sacred Geography. Relandi Palaestina. Bachiene' h-istor. und geograph. Beschreibung von Palaestina, Tom. vii. 8vo. 1766. Hamelsfeldt, biblische Geographie, 3 Theile. 1796. Specially Bellerman's biblical Geography, and (later and better still) that of Ro- senmueller. Specially Robinson and Smith's Travels, just published.
{b) Celsii Hierobotanicon, 1745. Bocharti Hierozoicon, edit. Ros- enmueller, 1776. Tom. iii. Supp. to Calmet's Dictionary, Vols, iii — v. Harmer's Observations edited by A. Clarke. Bush's Conipend, Bratt. Vt. 1836.
(2) Chronology. The interpreter should have not only a knowledge of technical chronology, but of the Roman mode of reckoning ad TJrhe condita, and of the Greek Olympiads, (on which subjects he may study authors well deserving of credit) ; but in respect to historical chronology, he should know in what order of time the events related in the Old Tes- menl happened ; when and where the first Roman emperors, the various kings and princes that sprung from the house of Herod the Great, the Roman Consuls at the beginning of the empire of the Caesars, the Jewish high priests (and the num-
OF AN INTERPRETER. 133
ber of them) in our Saviour's time, and the Roman Magis- trates, specially in the provinces of Syria and Judea, succeed- ed each other.
Petavii Opus de Doctrina,Temporum, 1703. Scaliger de Emenda- tione Teinporum, 1629. Usherii Annales Vet. et. N. Test. Franckii Novum Systema Chronol. fundamentalis, 1. Goetting. 1778. A useful compend is Hegewisch's Introduction to historical chronology, re- cently translated from the German by Prof. Marsh of Burlington Uni- versity, and published in this country. A work much used in Ger- many, is Gatterer's Abriss dt?r Chronologie, 1777.
(3) History civil and political. In regard to the history of events among the nations mentioned in the sacred books, and also their forms of government, it is important for the in- terpreter to make himself acquainted, first, with the ancient history of the Jews. In studying this, he is not to confine himself merely to the Old Testament ; he must also consult the traditionary accounts, which were extant in the time of Christ and the apostles (a). Secondly, he must study the his- tory of the Jews under the Herods, and that of these princes. Thirdly, the condition and circumstances of the Jews in Pal- estine, while under the dominion of the Romans ; and also of the Jews living in other countries. Finally, the history of the Roman emperors at that period, and of the Roman prefects over the Asiatic provinces.
(a) Shuckford's Connection. Prideaux's Connection. Krebsius, Decreta Romanorum pro Judaeis e Josepho collecta, 1 vol. 8vo. 1763. Wesselingii Diatribe de Judaeorum Archontibus, 1 vol. 8vo. 1738. Benson's History of the first planting of the Ciiristian religion. Josephi Opera, edit. Havercampii. Jahn, Geschichte der Juden in Archaeologie der Hebraer, Band 1. Jahn's Archaeology, and his his- toryof the Hebrew Commonwealth, have been translated by Professors Upham and Stowe, and repeatedly published at the press in Andover. They are the most useful books that we have on these subjects. <
(4) Manners and customs. In regard to these, (a) A know- ledge of Antiquities in general is necessary. (^) A consider- able knowledge of the Greek and Roman antiquities, (c) A knowledge of the ecclesiastical rites and customs of the primitive churches ; both those which they received from the Hebrews, and others which were introduced by Christians themselves,
12
134 ON THE QUALIFICATIONS
Opera Philonia Alex., et Josephi. Warnekros Entwurf der HeK Alterthuerner, 1 vol. 8vo. Jahn's Archaeology translated by the Rev. Prof, Upham ; a work, which combines brevity with perspicui- ty and good order, and comprizes the substance of preceding publi- cations on this interesting subject.
Of Roman antiquities, Adams's work is a very useful compend ^ and of the Greek, Potter remains not only the best, but almost the only respectable one. Of eccles. antiquities, Bingham's Orig. Ecc. Also Roessler, Bibliothek der Kirchenvaetern ; especially a more re- cent work by Augusti, entitled DenkwUrdigkeiten, etc. Coleman's Abridgment of Augusti.
§ 4. Doctrinal contents of the sacred books. That part of the New Testament, which is directly concerned with faith and practice, will be rightly understood, when the interpreter rightly understands what each particular writer has inculca- ted. As there are many passages which relate to the Jews ; and as the writers of the New Testament and their first read* ers were of Jewish extraction, it will be important,
(1) To know the sentiments of the Jews of that period in regard to religion ; specially of those who used the Hebrew- Greek dialect, and of the three great sects among which the Jews were divided, viz. the Pharisees, Sadducees,and Essenes*
Josephi et Philonis Scripta. An admirable view of Philo's senti- ments has been published by Schreiter, in Analekten der exeget. Theologie, Band i. ii. Fabricii Codex Pseudepigraphus Vet. Test, et Codex Apocryphus Nov. Test. Grabii Spicilegium Sanctt. Patrum, saec. i. ii. iii. 2 vols. 8vo. On the right use of these sources, see Mori Hermeneut. Vol. ii. p. 172., etc. Brettschneider, systemat. Darstellung der Dogmat. und Moral der Apocryph. Schriften des A. Test. 1805. Staeudlin, Theologiae Moralis Ebraeorum ante Christum Historia, 1794. De tribus Judaeorum Sectis, delph. 1703, 4to. comprizing the works of Serrarius, Drusius, and Scaliger, on this subject. See also Jahn, as above.
(2) The precepts of the Christian religion. What was adopted from the Jewish religion, what rejected, and what was added anew to Christianity, must be understood in order to explain the New Testament properly. But knowledge of this nature, that is certain, can be drawn only from the sacred writings themselves.
The Biblical Theology o^ Storr, Reinhard, Doederlein, Zachariae, Leun, Muntinghe, (and for some purposes, of Ammon and Bauer j)
OF AN INTEBPRETER. 135
may be used with profit. But the student is not to be guided by any system, except so far as the author shews it to be built upon a satisfactory interpretation of the word of God. Flatt's edition of Storr, translated into German, and accompanied by the notes of the editor, is a fundamental book in the study of Biblical Theology. It has been translated into English and published, by the lle°v. Dr. Schmucker of Gettysburg Theol. Seminary in Pennsylvania.
(3) The doctrines of heretical sects. It is important to know the opinions of early heretics, because, it is probable, some passages of the New Testament have a special refer- ence to them.
By far the.bestbook is Walch'sEntwurf einer vollstaend. Geschich- te der Ketzereien, etc. 11 vols. 8vo. Vol. i. contains an account of the earliest heresies Tittmanni de vestigiis Gnosticorum in Nov. Test, frustra quaesitis, will well repay the labour of perusal ; but Horn's Biblische Gnosis, and the Essays of Neander, and others, are also to be compared. In the religious and critical Periodicals of Germany, many deeply interesting essays on various heresies and heretics of ancient times, have of late years been published.
§ 5. In enumerating the qualifications of an interpreter, we must not omit a knowledge of grammar, rhetoric, and phi- losophy.
(1) Grammar. Not only a general knowledge of its prin- ciples is necessary, but also a special technical knowledge of both etymology and syntax. The interpreter must be ac- quainted with the various forms of words, and understand how the significations are connected with the forms ; he must understand the manner in which words are connected in a sentence ; the use of the particles ; and also of the grammati- cal figures, as they are called, such as ellipsis and pleonasm.
Vigcrus de idiotismis Ling. Graecae, edit. Hermann, 1812. Hoog- eveen Doctrina partic. Graec. edit. Schutz, 1806. Bos Ellipses Graecae edit. Schaefer, 1808. Weiskii Pleonasmi Graeci, 1807. Hartung, on the Greek Particles.
(2) Rhetoric. A knowledge of this is necessary, not so much to judge of rhetorical figures as to find out the meaning of them, or the sentiment which they are designed to convey.
(3) A knowledge of philosophy. Not that of some partic- ular school or sect merely, but that which pertains to the culti-
136 Henderson's bioral qualifications
vation of the mental powers, and to nice psychological discrim- ination. Such a knowledge is requisite, in order to form clear conceptions in the mind, and accurately to define our ideas ; to discern what is similar in different things, and what is distinct ; to judge of the connection of thought and argument ; and finally, to qualify one perspicuously to represent the opinions of an author to others. Great caution however is necessary here, lest the interpreter intrude upon his author his own par- ticular philosophy.
Ernesti, Opuscula Philol. de vanitate Philosopliantium, etc.
PART VI,
DR. E. HENDERSON,
ON THE MORAL QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER OF THE SCRIPTURES.
[The first edition of this work was reprinted in London, in 1827, under the care of the Rev. E. Henderson, D. D., now Principal of Highbury College in the precincts of London. In general, the Amer- ican edition is simply followed in the English one, tn a few cases, however. Dr. H. has appended some notes of his own. In particu- lar, he has added a whole section to the part, in the Appendix to the American edition, which is taken from Keil, and has respect to the literary Qualifications of an Interpreter. Dr. H. felt, and with good reason, that the German teachers are too apt to neglect the moral qualifications of young candidates for the ministry, when th(\y come to the study of the holy Scriptures. He has therefore added a sec- tion to the chapter from Keil on the subject above mentioned, and printed it near the beginning of the book. I now subjoin his remarks with much pleasure, according, in my own views, throughout with the spirit of them, and in no case differing enough from even the man- ner of expression to deem it of importance to make notes in the way of what might be named correction. The American reader will doubtless be gratified, to have the views of this excellent man and highly respectable and learned scholar placed before him. M. S.]
It has frequently been asserted, that in the interpretation of
OF AN INTERPRETER. 13*^
Scripture, we should proceed in the same manner that we would do in regard to any other book of antiquity. To a certain extent, this position may be regarded as just, and many of the observations contained in the pages of Ernesti are founded on it : but as the Bible contains subjects, which, of all others, are calculated to affect the heart, and it is gene- rally admitted, that in proportion as the heart is interested in any inquiry, a corresponding degree of influence will be ex- erted on the processes of investigation ; it is evident that re- spect must be had to the moral state of the affections, if we would arrive at just and accurate views of divine truth.
The high and exclusive claims of Scripture, too, give them an elevation of character, which commands peculiar atten- tion and respect. Till the mind be satisfied on the subject of these claims, it may be conceded to an inquirer, to class the sacred writings with other works, pretending to a heavenly origin, though, even then, he could not be justified in treating their contents with levity and indifference of mind; but no sooner are their inspiration and paramount authority admitted, than, according to the natural constitution of the human mind, he is constrained to place himself under ihe influence of a principle which will lead him to bow with humble submission to their holy dictates, and to seek in all things to receive and practice whatever is presented to him, as the will of the great Author of revelation.
If he be imbued with the spirit of the Bible, and his affec- tions be in unison with its dictates, nothing will be more nat- ural and easy, than the acquisition of correct ideas respecting its contents : whereas, if his views, feelings, and inclinations ire at variance with its requirements, he will infallibly, though perhaps unwittingly, endeavour to pervert the language in which these requirements are recorded, in order to bring them into accordance with his wishes, or the standard of his pre- conceived opinions.
12*
138 Henderson's moral QUALtFicATioNs
§ 1. The primary moral qualification, therefore, of all who would successfully interpret the Scriptures, is vital and prac- tical godliness — that " godliness," which " is profitable to all things" — "the fear of the Lord," which " is the begin- ning of wisdom." While it is the righteous determination of heaven, that " none of the wicked shall understand ;" we are taught by Him, who is truth itself, that all who conduct their inquiries under the influence of a predisposition to conform to the will of God shall not be left without instruction : ^Edv xt? ■&slri TO -diXr^xa aviov noiuv, yvuaEiat usqI t?]? didaxi^g, John 7:17. "What man is he that feareth the Lord .? him shall he teach in the way that he shall choose," Psalm 25: 12.
§ 2. Unreserved submission to the authority erf divine reve- lation. The language of him who interprets Scripture, should ever be in harmony with that of Samuel : " Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth." All favourite ideas, popular hypothe- ses, hereditary or self-cogitated systems and opinions, must be laid prostrate at the feet of the Bible, which must be " received, not as the word of men, but, as it is in truth, the word of God."^ — "To the law and the testimony," all our de-' cisions must be brought. If they differ from them, " it is be- cause there is no light in them." A divine revelation might naturally be expected to teach truths untaught by reason ; and it is equally natural to expect, that our limited capacities should not be able to comprehend fully the modes, circum- stances, and relations of those truths which reason could not teach, and which are known only by revelation, any more than of many physical and moral truths connected with our world, known without revelation.*
§ 3. An humhle and teachaUe disposition of Mind. As few things are more hostile to the pursuit of truth, in general,
* Storr's Elements of liiblical Theology, Vol. 1. p. 471.
OF AN INTERPRETER. 139
than self-conceit and pride of intellect, so there is no temper more offensive to the great Author of religious truth, than a proud and self-sufficient disposition. " Though the Lord be high, yet hath he respect to the lowly ; but the proud he knoweth afar off. Every one that is proud in heart, is an abomination to the Lord. God resisteih the proud, but giveth grace to the humble. The meek will he guide in judgment, and the meek will he teach his way ;" Pslam 138: 6. Prov. 14: 5- 1 Peter 5: 5. Psalm 25: 9. Hence, both in the gen- eral defence of Christianity, and in the successful interpreta- tion of its essential doctrines, none have more signally distin- guished themselves than they^ who, to a grasp of intellect above their fellows, have united the profoundest reverence and humility in exploring the depths of heavenly wisdom.*
§4.-4 decided aUachment to divine truths springing from a perception of its intrinsic beauty and excellence. That spirit of indifference which some would recommend as favour- able to the discovery of truth, is perfectly incompatible with, all just ideas of the nature and importance of divine revela- tion. The truths it discloses are so transcendently excellent, and bear so directly on our best and dearest interests, that whenever discovered in their native light, they must win the heart, and decide the choice Accordingly, those who derive no saving benefit from the Gospel, are said to receive not the LOVE OF THE TRUTH. 2 Thess. 2: 10. The more the true glory of the revealed system is perceived, the more will the mind be imbued with its spirit, and the influence which this imbuement will exert in leading to full and consistent views of that system, cannot fail to be signally beneficial.
§ 5. Persevering diligence in the use of every proper means for discovering " the mind of the spirit^ While it is of
*Van Mildert's Bampton Lectures, p. 52.
140 Henderson's moral qualifications
prime importance for the interpreter of Scripture to form a just estimate of his natural faculties, and never to attribute supremacy to his own understanding, or the judgment of any- mere man, or body of men, it is obviously his duty to apply those faculties in the use of the various means with which he is furnished for understanding the Scriptures. Subject to those restrictions, which a sense of the supreme authority of the oracles of God, and the natural darkness of the mind can- not but inspire, human reason and science may, without hesi- tation, be allowed their full share in the interpretation of those oracles. Though incompetent in themselves to the discovery of spiritual knowledge, yet, when discovered, they are com- petent to discern, to examine, to compare, to illustrate, and to confirm it by means similar to those which, in every other pursuit, lead most certainly to improvement and perfection.* Not only must the interpreter render himself familiar with the contents of the sacred volume, by a constant and unre- mitted reading ; but he must spare no pains in finding out, and appropriating to his use, all the accessory means by which his acquaintance with it may be facilitated and ad- vanced : endeavouring to make himself master of every sub- ject in any way connected with the work in which he is en- gaged ; and guarding against every temptation to precipita- tion and rashness, in drawing conclusions respecting subjects of such transcendent importance.
§ 6. Incessant and earnest prayer for divine illumination. While it is freely admitted, that no such extraordinary teach- ing, as was enjoyed in the age of inspiration, can warrantably be expected in the present day, it is nevertheless undeniable, that the Scriptures instruct us to believe in the enlightening influences of the Holy Spirit, 1 John 2: 20, 27. This aid consists in a special, internal, and efficient operation of that
* Van Mildert ut sup. p. 126.
OF AN INTERPRETER. I4l
divine agent, and is no less distinct from the prophetic and apostolic impulse, than it is from that mere natural assistance by which we discover common truths, and succeed in our ordinary undertakings. It is granted in answer to prayer, accompanied by the exercise of humble dependence on God, and a due use of all the ordinary means of improvement. " If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not, and it shall be GIVEN HIM." James 1: 5.
All eminent interpreters of Scripture have asserted the necessity and utility of prayer. One of the qualifications which Wickliff considered to be indispensably requisite in him who interprets the word of God, he expresses in the fol- lowing striking terms : — " He should be a man of prayer. He needs the internal instruction of the primary TEACHER."* To the samo effect is the testimony of the great Dr. Owen : — " For a man solemnly to undertake the inter- pretation of any portion of Scripture without invocation of God, to be taught and instructed by his Spirit, is a high prov- ocation of him; rior shall I expect the discovery of truth from any one who thus proudly engages in a work so much above his ability. But this is the sheet anchor of a faith- ful expositor in all difficulties : nor can he without this be satisfied that he hath attained the mind of the Spirit in any divine revelation. When all other helps fail, as they fre- quently do, this will afford him the best relief. The labours of former expositors are of excellent use ; but they are far from having discovered the depths of this vein of wisdom ; nor will the best of our endeavours prescribe limits to our successors : and the reason why the generality go in the same track, except in some excursions of curiosity, is the not giving themselves up to the conduct of the Holy Spirit in the
Milner's Church history, Vol. IV. p. 134.
142 HENDERSON^S MORAL QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.
diligent performance of their duty."* And Ernesli himself, whom none will accuse of fanaticism, scruples not to assert, " that men truly pious, and desirous of knowing the truth, are assisted hy the influence of the Spirit in their researches, specially in those things that pertain to faith and practice." Part I. § 31.
Had the subjects treated of in this chapter not been in a great measure systematically excluded from hermeneutical and exegetical studies, and in many instances regarded as detrimental to the free and successful prosecution of them, foreign theological literature would not have been disgraced as it is with such a mass of puerile, irreverent, and hazardous inter- pretations, such temerity of hypothesis, and such an immense accumulation of philological speculations, marshalled in infi- del array against the fortress of divine truth. To guard the student against the pernicious consequences of attempting to interpret the Bible, except in the spirit of the Bible, the above observations are inserted in this work.
Pneumatology, p. 332. Lond, 1808. &vo
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