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ELEMENTS

OF TU£

fcRITIGAL PHILOSOPHY

CbNtAlNlNa

A CONCISE ACCOUNT OF ITS ORIGIN AND TENDENCY J A VIEW OF ALL THE WORKS PUBLISHED BT ITS FOUNDER,

PROFESSOR IMMANUEL KANT;

AND A GLOSSART FOR THE EXPLANATION OF TERMS AND PHRASES^

TO WHICH ARE ADDED *.

THREE PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS;

Chiefly tranflated from the German of John Christopher Aceluno }

Ablic Counfellor and Firft Librarian to the Ekiflor of Saxony.

A. F. M. WILLI CH, M. D.

LONDON:

pRiNTiD FOR T. N. LONGMAN, No. 39. Paternoster-Row.

1798*

OBntereb in ©tationerjer !|>afl.

b

To

The Ri^Kt Honourable SIR WILLIAM MILLER of Glenlee, Bart. One of the Senators of the , College of Jufticc }n Scotland ;

T<^

To •

The REV. JAMES FINLAYSON, F. R. S. ?.

Prof, of Logic and Metaphylks in th^ Univerfity of Edinburgh ;

And fhe REV. JAMES MILNE,

ProfeQbr of Moral Philofophy in the Univerfity of Glafgow ; Thefe Elements

are very refpedlfully infcrihcd

Their moft obliged and humble Servai*

Itie AUTHOR and TRANSLATOR.

P R E F A C £l

HE talk of writing prefaces is none of the mof^ grateful ; efpecially when a variety of circumftances con- cur, to impofe it as a duty upon one, who is in a man- ner, partly the author, and partly the franflator of a new work, on a new fubjeft.

It has now become the frequent pradice of certain ttanflators, to iffue their mangled produftions into the world as their own manufacture ; though, upon com- parifon, they do not even deferve the charadler of being accurate tranflations from the German j a language, with which our modern tranflators, in general, are but very imperfedly acquainted.

To obviate a charge of this nature, and to acknow- ledge my obligations to thofe meritorious friends of literature in Germany, from whofe labours I have de- rived very confiderable affiftance in the compofition of this work, I mull mention, in the firfl place, the Rev. Dr. Staeudlin, Professor of Divinity at Goet- TiNGEN. His claflical performance, " On the Spirit and Hi/iory of Scepticifm, in two Volumes, odavo, 1794/' has afforded me the materials of the ' Hi-storical Intro-^ dUction/— In reliance upon a charader of fo much

worth

k PREFACE.

worth and eminence, as that of Dr. Staeudlin, I have not hefitated, pp. 23 and 24, to record, with due praife and refpecl, a work written by Mr. Adam Weishaupt. Without entering upon an inquiry into Mr. Weishaupt*s tnoral chara^er, I can fafely aver; that his literary works have been received, upon the Continent, with almoft uni- verfal approbation. In this aflertion, I am fupported by the Condudors of the firft German Reviews in gene- ral, and particularly by the refpe£lable evidence of Prof. Staeudlin himfelf, as well as by that of the celebrated Prof. Eberhard of Halle; both of whom have ranked Mr. "Weishaupt*s writings ampng the firft philofophical com- pbfitions of Germany. And as he has lately publiflied the third volunie of his work '* On Truth and Motal Perfection; Regensburg, 1796;" as likewife another work entitled^ '* On the fecret Art of Governing; Frankfort on the Main, 1795 ;" I muft leave Mr Weis- haupt to defend his private chara£ler in Britain, as well as he has done it to the fatisfa£tion of his learned friends in Germany.

For the concifenefs of the ' Synopsis,* which con- tains the ftatement and general folution of Five connected Problems, I need niake no apology ; as the terms oc- curring in this part of the ' Elements* are, I hope, fuf- ficietjtly explained in the Glossary. Without this expe- dient, I rtvight have extended the Synopfis alone to a length, far exceeding the whole of the prefent work.

In the ' Chronological Analysis,' perhaps, I have been in fomfe parts too prolix, while others might have

beent

J> R E F A C i. in

been enlarged upon with Advantage. But it is not an eafy mattet to keep within proper bounds, in the difcuf- fion of abftrad metaphyfical fubjeds. Nor dare I flatter myfelf, that I am fufficiently acquainted with the idiom of the Englifli language, to exhibit the moft abftrufe in- quiries of the human mind, in a luminous point of view. In this refped, 1 can offer no better apology than that given by my great mafter, whofe own words I have quoted in page 9. of the Introduction. — Altholigh I had the good fortune to attend Prof. Kant's Ledtures be^ tween the years 1778 and 1781, during my refidence at the Univerfity of Koenigfberg ; and again heard feveral of his Ledures in furamer 1792, when Irevifited my na- tive country ; yet I muft confefs, that my other profef- fional labours have not permitted me to devote, to the ftudy of the Critical Syilem of Philofophy, that portion of time and clofe application, which, in more favourable circumftances, I fhould have been happy to beflow upon this important branch of human knowledge.

Relying, howev^, on the candour and impartiality' of the learned in this country, I truft they will not decide upon a work offo comprehenfive a nature as the prefent, from partial views ; nor do I entertain the lead appre- henfion, that they will be deterred from a thorough exa- mination of it, by any paradoxical pofitions, or eVen appa- rent contradidions, that may occur in the^r/l perufal.^— A nation, which has produced a Bacon, a Newton, a Locke, a Hume, and fo many other profound inquirers, cannot be fuppofed to have a tafle merely for the lighter,

(or

iv PREFACE.

(or what are vulgarly czWed) popular purfults of litera- ture. Valuable and ufeful as thefe are to the commu- nity at large, no man of any penetration will deny, that metaphyfical fpeculations, or inquiries vaxofirji truths, are equally beneficial and honourable j though they mufl ever remain the property of the few, whofe genius leaves the beaten track, and fearches for higher principles than fuch, as are barely deduced from the world of fenfe, or experience. *

To thofe, therefore, who are both able and difpofed to become acquainted with the fpirit of the Critical Syftem, I beg leave to addrefs myfelf in the words of the worthy Professor Will of Altdorf, who gives his pupils the following excellent advice :

I. " Not to prejudge and decry the works of Kant, as being too fubtle and abflrufe, as being couched in unin- telligible terms, as breathing innovation, and produdive of confufion in philofophy :

2, " Not to complain of the want of that plainnefs, which is neceifary to render a book palatable to popular readers ; fmce difficulty of apprehenfion appears to be peculiar to the inquiries, that form the objeft of the * Critique ;*

3, " Not to appeal, according to the prevailing fafliion of the age, to the decifion of the multitude, whenever an abftrad propofition occurs, which cannot, at firft view, be clearly underftood from the fimple operations of Corn- mon Senfe i* for Metaphyfics do not acknowledge the exchifive competency of this tribunal :

4.

PREFACE. V

'4, To abftracl from all other Metaphyfical Syftems, in ftudying the Critical,!, e. not to make any other Syftem the flandard, by which the merits of the prefent are to be tried :

5, To ftudy/r/? the general aim of the work, by fuc- ceflively examining every foluticn, which the Critique of Kant aiFords in regard to the live principal problems (contained in the ' Synopfis') : and laftly,

6, As the inquiries forming the objeQ: of Kant's Cri- tique are merely of a fpeculative nature, to proceed like- wife in the'profecution of them merely upon fpeculative grounds, and to abftain carefully from all partial views of any intereft whatever. For the refult of found fpecu- lation can never be prejudicial to the true interefls of human nature."

With refpe£l: to the Glossary, I mud refer the read- er to the few obfervations premifed at the head of it ; and if I have not fucceeded in rendering the fubje£l it- felf more intelligible, by the definitions given of thofe terms, in the ufe of which Kant differs from his cotem- poraries, I can only plead the good intention, and the patient induftry, with which I collected and arranged the materials.

The ' Three Philological Essays* have been ad- ded to thefe * Elements* by way of Appendix ; in or- der to relieve the reader, in fome degree, from the ar* duous tafk — and fuch it undoubtedly is — of refleding upon fo great a variety of abftraft fubjeQs. And as thefe EfTays are, in a manner, unconnefted with the Philofophy

of

yi PREFACE.

of Kant, they have been at the fame time feparately printed, in a form fomewhat different from the prefent ; in order to accommodate thofe, who might wifti to poE* fefs them as a dilHndl work.

Finally, the flyle and compofitlon of this work, I am fenfible, require more than common apology. Unfortu- nately, however, it is a matter of no fmall difficulty to make good apologies, efpecially in a foreign language, Whatever the execution may be, ibr the anxiety of my wifhes I can confidently appeal to the teftimony of thofe literary friends, who have occafianally lent me their ai4 in correding the grammatical part of both the Elements and the Eflays. They well know my eager and fincere defire of improvement in Englifli compofition ; and if any material errors fhould occur in the courfe of fuch a diverfity of fubjeds as the prefent, I befeech the judicious reader and the candid critic to confider, that I have' ven- tured into a field of inquiry, of which but a fmall pj^rt has hitherto been explored.

The indulgence, which I claim, will not be withheld' ty thofe, who have tried their ftrength in tranflating from a foreign into their own language : and I appre- hend Itil] lefs feverity from the few individuals, who have attempted to write, or to tranflate into, a foreign lan- guage, which they had an opportunity pf acquiring, merely by reading and converfation.

IsovEMBj^R, 1797.

• CONTENfS

CONTENTS.

PAGE

fTiJiorical IntroduBion, containing a JuccinB account efthe origin and tendency of the Critical Philofophy, i

Elementary View of the Philosophy of Kant : J^reparatory Remarks , - - . 24

I. Synopsis,

A. Definition and Dimijion of "Philofophy J - 38

B. Problems and Solutions X Exordium, - 43

Problem Firft, - - - 43

Problem Second, - - - 44

Problem Third, .. - ■ - - 4^

Problem Fourth, - • i» f. 49

Problem Fifth, - - - -51

II. Chronological Analysis : Exordium, ^'i^ I, Refleftions upon the true computation of living

powers; 1746, - - - <^^

II. — XVI. A Lift of fifteen different works, which the author has J)ublifhed between the years 1755 and 1764, - - - 60

XVII. (i) i)^ Mundi fenfihilis at que intelligihilis forma

et principiisi I'j'jo, - - - 62

XVIII. (2) Critique of Pure Reafon ; 1781,' - 64 XIX. (3) Introduftory obfervations with refpeft to

every future Syftem of Metaphyfics Sec. 1784, 80 XX. (4) Refleftions upon the foundation of the powers

and methods &c. 1784, - 83

XXI. (5) Fundamental Principles of the Metaphyfics

of Morals; 1785, - - ibid.

XXII. (6) Metaphyfical Principles of Natural Philo-

fophyj 1786, z 1 - 93

3i:xni.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

XXIII. (7) Fundamental Principles of the Critique of

Tafte; 1787, - - - 99

XXIV. (8) Critique of Praaical Reafon ; 1788, ibid. XXV. (9) Critique of the Judging Faculty ; 1790, 103

XXVI. On a certain difcovery, &c. 1790, - I13

XXVII. (10) Religion confidered within the bounds of

mere Reafon ; 1793, - - 114

XXVIII. Project for a Perpetual Peace ; 1795, 121

XXIX. (ii) Metaphyfical Elements of Jurifprudence ;

1797, - - - 127

XXX. (12) Metaphyfical Elements of Ethics; 1797, 134

A Lift of fourteen Eflays, on various fubjefts, pub-

lifliedby the author, between the years 1777 and 1794* 136

GLOSSARY : from 139, to 183

m»^<

Corrigenda.

p. 16, 1. 11 for direfts, read deferts.

p. 19, 1. 20,, for Propedeutic, read Propaedeutic.

p. 32, 1. 2^, for clofe, read thofe.

p. 83, 1. i^ffor inherent to, read inherent in.

Note : The terms intuition and intuitive have, by inadvert- ency, fometimes been ufed inftead of the words, cqg- nitiqn and cognitive, particularly in No. XVIII. (2) of Kant's works, or between pp. 64. and 80.-— The reader is therefore requefted tp attend to this cir- cumftance, efpeclally in places, where the promif- cuous ufc of thefe terms might occafion feme am- biguity.

Elements

ELEMENTS

OF THE

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, &c.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

j^N Germany, two circumftances in particular have contri- buted to bring about a revolution in philofophy, and to di- minifli the eftimation in which the dogmatical fyjiem of WoLr was formerly held : the ftudy of the writings of the later Englifli and French philofophers ;, and the appearance of a philofophic prince upon the throne of Pruffia.J

The former circumftance made the German philofophers acquainted with many objections that had been ftarted againft the dogmatical fyftem of Metaphjrfics, gave rife to a turn for popularity in philofophical inquiries, and awakened a fpirit of emulation among them. Seleftions were made from various fyftems ; and the learned, now for the firft time, began to con- vey information with elegance and tafte. There arofe a fort oi EcleBicifm, which difcouraged party-fpirit, and recommend- ed philofophical difcretion ; but which was, at the fame time, attended with fome injurious efFedls ; for incoherent fyftems were thus formed, inconfiftent fyftems were mingled together, and philofophy became ftill more wavering and flimfy, and was ftill farther removed from the perfeftion of a fcience.

The hiftory of philofophy was now inveftigated with great- er attention, and more generally ftudied than it had formerly

A been :

a HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

been : With many, the ftudy of philofophy was converted in- to that of its hiftorj ; — a clear proof, how much the turn for dogmatifm had declined, and how little hope was enter- tained of forming a fyftem, at once ftable and fuited to the fpirit of the age.

Frederic the Great collefted a number of foreign philo- fophers round him, who, in a great meafure, merely to pay adulation, and from felfifli views, openly profeffed, like him, infidelity and fcepticifm. This circumftance, from the novelty of the thing, and from the admiration in which the character of Frederic was held, had an almoft magical influence on all the opinions of the age. It would, however, be equal to ingra- titude towards the manes of this furprifing monarch, to o- mit mentioning in this place, that the fyllem of his own prafti- cal philofophy has been held out, both by divines and laymen, as complete and downright Atheifm ; whei eas it is now clear and imiformly admitted by found and unprejudiced inquirers, that it amounted to nothing more than limple Deifm.

Among the philofophers who furrounded Frederic, no one declared hinifelf fo exprefsly, and fo openly, in favour of fcep- ticifm as d'ARGENS, the author of the " Philofophy of good ** fenfe," which is written in a fuperficial manner, with a view of gaining popularity, but which is not even calculated for the Fair Sex and Gentlemen of fafliion, for whofe ufe it was originally defigned ; though it abounds in erudition and abftraft fpeculation. D'Argens there endeavours to fhow the uncertainty of Hiftory, (and this is the befl: part of the work) of Logic, of Phyfics, of Metaphyfics, and of Aftronomy, with- out advancing, in oppofition, any new, or genuine, philofo- fhical principles. It does him, neverthelefs, fome honour that, with regard to the morality of life, he obferves a refpeft- ful filence. His fcepticifm is direfted more againft the ufual

pre.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 3,

pretcafions of the fchools, and the learned in particular, than againft human knowledge in genera).

It is more remarkable, though lefs known, that, in the fame country, a celebrated and profound Divine declared himfelf in favour of an almoft unlimited Pyrrhoni/m, — M.de Beausobre, in his "Pyrrhonifme raifonablc," called it rational, becaufe he allowed certain probabilities, both in kind and in degree, and maintained certain firll principles, which did not admit of doubt. The work is written in a lively fceptical humour, and affords pleafure in the perufal. It contains, indeed, many new and unexpefted remarks ; for it is an alfault upon all fyftems, efpecially upon that of Wolf. " Aristotle," the author fome- where fays, "had numerous followers for many centuries. The ** time of his fall is now come ; and Descartes has given him ** the laft blow. The fame of the French philofopher was of " fhorter duration, becaufe people now poffeffed more un- '* derftanding and leiis pedantry. Leibnitz came ; Wolf ** was his fucceffor : At prefent philofophers are in a fort of ** anarchy ; they wait for a man who is bold enough to build " upon the ruins of former Syftems, new opinions, and confe- ** quently new errors." No where does Beaufobre attack re- ligion and revelation, but rather refpeftfuUy affirms their certainty. The following paffage is worthy of attention : ** Al- ** though it be difficult to prove the exiftence of GoD by the *' light of reafon, yet even this light is fufficient to convince ** us, that the proof of the contrary is impoflible. How can ** we fatisfadorily prove the oppofite, if we have no clear idea ** of the fubjeft which we wifli to call in queftion ? Although " I could bear in my mind no fufficient proof of the exiftence " of God, yet the advantage which attends the belief of this " truth, the impoffibility of comprehending the nature of an " infinite Being, and the reflexion that this truth is both the " jnoft rational and ufeful of all others, would be fufficient to

A z . <* induce

4 [HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION'.

** induce any thinking perfon to give his alTent, nay even tft '* determine me."

But after this we are aftoniflied to find him confidering all morality as uncertain. His chief reafon is, " that the good- *' nefs of actions depends upon their confequences, which man ** cannot forefee, nor accurately afcertain." This argument, maturely confidered, is obvioufly Ihallow, becaufe it proceeds upon falfe ideas of morality : But the following objeftions are of greater importance : " That we are fo little acquainted ** with the motives from which we aft, and in general with ** our palTions, that we know not how far our prejudices, ** and our weaknefs, can juftify our aft ions ; and that the in- ** terference and eollifions of our different duties are inexpli- ** cable to mofl men, nay fome of them inexplicable to all.'* The remark at the end of this work is not lefs ftriking. '* The ** uncertainty of our knowledge fliould not render us diflatis- *' fied ; its advantage, or difadvantage, will not thereby be " much aflfefted. Certainty, with refpeft to usi is not even ** the moll ufeful quality of our knowledge. The difficulty ** of acquiring accurate knowledge, is an admonition of nature, ** which reminds man of his weaknefs, and of the caution he " ought to obfcrve."

The inclination to Scepticifm fliowed itfelf alfo in other parts of Germany, in different writings. It appeared mani- feftly, for inftance, in the ** Phyfical Caufes of Truth," by Lossius, and in the firft edition of Platner's " Philofophical " Aphorifms." In the fyflems of Logic and elementary books alfo, much more regard was paid to it than formerly ; in proof of which I fliall only mention the excellent difcuffions in " Lambert's Organum," and in the elementary publications of Feder.

But no author had, on the one hand, paid more attention to the objeftions of the Sceptics, and the diftinguiftiing charafter-

iftic

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. j

Iftie of the poffible fyftems ; and on the other, inveftigated more profoundly the faculties of the Human Underftanding, and, indeed, of the whole Human Conflitution, than Tetens, in his *' Philofophical Inquiries concerning Human Nature, and the " developement of it," which were publiflied in two volumes, in the year 1777. It is not our bufinefs here to mark mi- nutely the excellencies or defefts of this work; we take notice of it on this account chiefly, becaufe that profound philofopher was the firft among the Germans, who examined fome of the ideas of Hume, with an acutenefs worthy of fuch an opponent ; and he has inveftigated the dodlrines of ohj'Bive truth, and of the objeftive exiftence of things, more deeply and more precifely than had been done before. Againft the explanation given by Hume, of the idea of Caufation, he ob- jefted with juftice, that it did not exhauft the fubjeft ; for we underftand by it not merely a connexion, but alfo a de- pendence of one thing upon another. He remarked that we perceive in ourfelves ideas in a neceffary fucceflion, and that this is properly our notion of a caufe, or connexion : he pointed out inftances, in which the fubjeftive connexion of ideas arifes from a neceffary operation of the underfl anding, and, aftually, has another foundation than the affociation of ideas formed by experience ; — cafes where we explain a compound effedl from compound caufes ; and where the idea of the complex effecSt has never been before affociated with that of the complex caufe, but where the conne£lion is the work of refledion : in fine, he has pointed out the operations of the mind, by which we deduce one truth from another. He maintained, therefore, that the idea of Caufation is ab- Ilrafted from certain affociations of ideas, in which we remark fomething more than mere fucceflion and combination.

Although this explanation is not altogether fatisfaftory, yet it, in a great mcafuxe, holds good againft Hume's idea. Tetens

admits

6 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTIOISr,

admits that fenfations afford the materiab for all ideas j but he contends that their form depends upon the mind, or the power of thinking. After having, in a very profound manner, iUuftrated the origin of our knowledge, from the objedive ex- iftence of things, he next examines the truth of objedive knowledge. According to his acceptation of the terms, our knowledge is called objeftivcly true, in Co far as objeds muft be perceived by every other being, in the fame manner in which we reprefent them to ourfelves ; — a being who has fuch a mind as we have : and in lo far as the relations, which we remark in our external perceptions, correfpond with thofe of every other being, whofe underftanding is fo conftituted, that it thinks of the objeds in queftion, as we do. . The neceffary rules of thought, according to which the mind proceeds, are, with him, not only fuhjeSiive rules of our thinking faculty, but of every reflecting principle ; and the general truths of reafon ar>e not only truths with refpedt to us, but to every reafoning being. We cannot conceive an underftanding which is capable of thinking againft the principle of contradiftion, or in other words, of difputing the admiffibility of that principle : hence this is juftly confidered as an objeftive principle.

Tetenshere contradifts whatLoflius had laid down; and what Defcartes had indeed, pretty diftiu£lly before explained : That truth is only a relation with refped to the being who thinks of it, and that the con tradition is incapable of being an object of thought, only with refpeft to our underftanding. Thus Tetens, with many others, proceeded in reafoning upon fub- jedive neceffary principles. He appealed to the fad, that when we apply theories to real qbjeds, we always fuppofc that the reality is fo conftituted, as the general ideas repre- fent it. But here, argues he, the mind proceeds according to laws which we muft confider as the laws of every reafoning

being j .

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 7

being ; — confequently the truths which are here admitted, or fuppofed, are objedlive truths.

With refpeft to the objefts of fenfe, the knowledge of them, " indeed, is often only an obje6tive appearance ; but the necef- farjjaws of thought lead to this conclufion, that other think- ing beings, in fimilar circumllances, reprefent thefe objefts to themfelves in a fimilar manner ; that thefe objeds, with cer- tain conformations, exift without us, and that certain proper- ties of the impreffions which we experience, are alfo the pro- perties of the obje£ls themfelves. — A Sceptic, however, with- out going out of his way in queft of far-fetched arguments, might eafily find a good deal to objefl againfl this deduftion.

The work of Tetens had not the elFed: of promoting a folid philofophic fpirit, and of bringing about a falutary revolution in the fl;udy of philofophy, wKich might other wife have been expe6ted. But this was not merely the confequence of the circnmftances of the times ; — but alfo of a ftile, not fo much • obfcure, as languid, prolix and afFefted ; as well as of a flaviih dependence upon the Empiiicifm of Locke, which is infufficient for the explanation of the mofl: important problems.

What this work did not accomplifh, another did. — Kant, who by various compofitions upon philofophical fubjefts^ had long ago announced himfelf as an original genius, and an ex- cellent philofopher, publiflied in the year 1781, the " Critique of Pure. Reafon," which promifed a total and beneficial reform in every philofophical department. For a long time, however, after its publication, it had been imaccountably neglefted, or, at leaft, mifunderllood. This was furely not in confequence of the difficulties, with which the flaidy of it, as well as of every metaphyfical fubjeft, is neceflarily attended ; but of a certain indifference to philofophy, and of a rooted tafte for iliallow and popular difcuflions, which Kant directly oppo- fcd. But as foon as the work was more fludied and invefti-

gated

5 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

gated, and had found feveral fuccefsful Commentators, at once a revolution in philofophy commenced. It foon met with numerous admirers and friends, and even its opponents could not with-hold their admiration from this mafterly produftion, Thej faw themfelves^ every where, driven from their llrong holds, and obliged to ere£l new fortifications for the defence of thofe philofophical tenets which they wiihed to maintain. Nay, many of the enemies of this fyllem became its friends ; sm.d the invaluable part of it, which treats of morals, met with an almofl univerfal approbation. All the different branches of Philofophy were examined with greater ardour, and new fources of knowledge, which formerly had fcarcely been conceived, were now expofed to view. The limits of the fcience were more accurately defined, and the laudable refearches after liable and fimple principles, and after a rigid method, gave to philofophical inquiries a certainty, and an in- terefl, which for a long time they had not pofTelTed. Long be- fore this period doubts had arifen, in reflefting minds, con- cerning the fyftems of Leibnitz, Wolf and Locke ; but thefe had never been unfolded with fufficient clearnefs, nor a better fyflem fubllituted in the place of that which was to be re- linquiihed. Here all fyflems were examined with critical acumen, and a folid foundation was laid for a new one. This New Philofophy, in a jQiort time, was attended with an almoft magical influence upon all the Sciences. It found friends and adherents, even among ranks of people who had not devoted themfelves to Science, or leail of all, to Metaphyfics. It excited in Germany, a found, philofophic fpirit of inquiry, of which the prefent age was fcarcely deemed capable. It contains fuch an immenfe flore of new ideas and views that, hitherto, only a fmall part of thefe materials can be confidered as digefled, and even, in a diflant age, new branches of knowledge may fiioot forth from it.

The

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 9

The work itfelf is arranged with alyftematicfpirit, and writ- ten with a noble philofophic impartiality. The ftyle is Ibme- what obfcure *, the conftruftion and arrangement of the pe- riods, in many places, ungraceful, heavy, and over- loaded ; but a reader who has a tolerable underftanding, and an interell for truth, is fufliciently recompenfed by the originality of thought, and by the new und ftriking images in which it abounds- The celebrated author difcovers all the talents requifite to a re- former of philofophy, efpecially in our age : — not merely an admirable acutcnefs, and a rare talent of making himfelf the objeft oiljis refleftion, but alfo a knowledge in«Mathematics and Natural Philofophy, of which he had formerly given proofs : a nice fenfibility of the Beautiful and Sublime ; and in ge- neral^ a cultivated manly tafle, a thorough acquaintance with the different Syfteras of philofophy that prevailed before his time ; and a refinement of feeling, which is truly honourable.

It is not my defign hercy to defcribe minutely the fyflem of this philofopher, which, befides the work already mentioned, is explained in the " Prolegomena to every future Syftem of Metaphyfics," publifhed in 1783 ; in the *' Fundamental Prin- ciples of the Metaphyfics (Theory) of Morals," in 1785 ; in the " Metaphyfical Principles of. Natural Philofophy," in 1786; in the *' Critique on Praftical Reafon," in 1788 ; in the " Critique on Judgment," in 1790 ; and in the " Religion within the limits of Pure Reafon," in 1793: And which Syftem has found in Reinhold, Schulz, Schmid, and others, friends and commentators, — men who themfelves were quali-

B fied

* " I am not very confclous," fays Kant, in his preface to the ad edition of the Critique of Pure Reafon, p. 43 ." that I poffefs the talent of exliibiting an abftratfl philofophical fubjeft in a luminous point of view : I trUfl that the occafional de- fe(5l of ftyle will be further fupplied by the writings of thofe dcfcrving c^aradlen who, -together with a folid judgment, are in the poffeflion of that talent. For, this being the cafe, there is no danger of being refuted, but rather of beinj; mif vnderfotds

xo HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

fird to advance fcience. The following abftraft will be fuffi- cient for our prefent purpofe.

Kant begins with doubting, whether Metaphyfics, in gene- 4 ral, be capable of being ftudicd as a fcience. He remarked that, hitherto, this branch of knowledge could not lay claim to the appellation of a fcience j although it was older than all the others, and befides, bj the intereft it excited, always ' obtruded itfelf upon our attention. Two circumllances led him to difcoveries, which were to bring about a revolution in Metaphyfics, and fecure to them the rank of a fcience ; — the obfervation, by what means Mathematics and Natural Philo- fophy had become fcicnces ; and Hume's inquiries concerning the idea of caufation. We begin with the latter, and fliall make Kant himfelf give the account of it.

** Since the Eflays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather fince ** the origin of Metaphyfics, as far as their hiftory extends, no *' circumftance has occurred, which might have been more *' decifive of the fate of this fcience, than the attack which *' David Hume made upon it. He brought, indeed, no light *' into this department of knowledge, but he ftruck a fpark " which, if it had fallen among combullible materials, and had ** been carefully fanned, ipight have been eafily kindled in- ** to a blaze. Hume proceeded upon a fingle but important ** idea in Metaphyfics, the conne£lion of caufe and effect, and ** the concomitant notions of power and aftion : he challenged *' reafon to anfwer him, what title flie had to imagine, that any *' thing may be fo conftituted as that, if it be given, fomething ** elfe is alfo thereby inferred : for the idea of caufe denotes ** this. He proved beyond contradidlion, that it is impofilble for *' reafon to think of fuch a connection a priori, and out of *' its own ideas ; for it contains neceffity j but it is not pof- ** fible to perceive how, becaufe fomething is, fomething elfe

" mufl

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. it

" muft alfo neceflarilj be ; nor how the idea - of fuch a con- ** nedlion can be introduced a priori." —

" Hence he concluded, that reafon entirely deceives herfelf " with this idea, and that fhe erroneoufl j conliders it as her own ** child, when it is onlj the fpurious offspring of imagination, ** which imagination, impregnated by experience, has brought •• certain ideas under the law ' of affociation, and fubftituted a ** fubjedlive neceffity, thence arifing, that is habit, for an ob- " jedive one derived fiom perception. Hence, again, he con- " eluded that reafon had no title to think of fuch connexions, " even in a general manner ; becaufe then all her general ideas •* would be merely fiftions, and all her pretended notions, *' ftamped a priori, would be nothing elfe than counterfeited *' ordinary leffons of experience : which is juft faying, there is " no fcience of Metaphyfics at all, and there can be none."

" However hafty and unwarrantable Hume's conclufion •* might appear, yet it was founded upon inveftigation, and this ** inveftigation well deferved, that fome of the philofophers of " his time fliould have united to ' folve more happily, if pof- ** fible, the problem in the fenfe in which he delivered it : a " complete reform of thfc fcience might have refulted from *' this folution. But it appears to have been the unavoidable ** deftiny of Metaphyfics, that he fhould not be underftood by *♦ his cotemporaries. For it is a mortifying refleftion, that his " opponents, Reid, Beattie, Oswald, and laftly Priestlet ** himfelf, totally mifunderftood the tendency of his problem. ** Always admitting as granted, what he never had called in " queftion, they fo mifunderftood his aim at improvement, that *< every thing remained in the fame ftate,as if nothing had been ** done. — The queftion was not, whether the idea of caufe be in •* itfelf proper, and indifpenfible to the illuftration of all natural " knowledge ; for this Hume had never doubted ; but whe- 5* ther this idea is »n objeft of thought through reafoning a

B 2 priori ',

1% HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

<• priori ; and whether, in this manner, it poflefs internal evi- " dence, independently of all experience ; confequentlj, whe- " ther it be of fuch «xteafive utility, as is not limited to objects ** of fenfe alone — It was upon this point Hume expefted an ♦* explanation.

" The opponents of this celebrated man, in order fatisfac- •* torily to folve his problem, would have been under the ne- ** ceffity of penetrating more profoundly into the abftradl na- ** ture of reafon, in fo far as it is employed in finre thought ; *' an inquiry to which they were little, if at all, difpofed. — *' Hence they contrived a more convenient method of difplay- •* ing their malignity, without fubjefting themfelves to the *' trouble of making further refearches ; namely, the appeal ** to the common fenfe of mankind. — It is indeed a great gift of ** Heaven, to poflefs a plain and unbiaffed underftanding ; — *' but we mull manifeft it, and eftabliih ourfelves in this pof- *' feffion, by fa£ls, by refleftion, and by reafon, by what we *' do and fay ; not by appealing to it as an oracle, when we ** can produce no rational arguments to.juftify the claim.— . ** When obfervation and fcience are put to the laft fliift, then, ** and not fooner, is it time to appeal to common fenfe. — • *' Tilts is one of the fubtle contrivances of modern times, by *• which the Ihallow prattler affumes a right, boldly to chal- •' lenge a man of profound erudition, and frequently main- <* tains the conteft. As long, however, as there is any roonj ** left for difcovery, we fliall do well to beware of having re- ^* courfe to this laft expedient. And, in truth^ this appeal is ^' nothing elfe than a fubmiffion to the judgment of the mul- ** titude, a reference at which the Philofopher blufhes, but iu *' which the filly witling triumphs and exults. — I ftiould ** think , too, Hume might have laid claim to a found un- f^ derftanding, as well as Beattie ; and befides, to what the ♦? letter certainly did not poffefs, to a critical acquaintance with

« that

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. i^

*< that fpecies of reafoaing, which keeps common fenfe within *' due bounds, and prevents it from lofing itfelf in fpecula- <* tions } or what is more to the prefent purpofe, which hin- *-* ders it from deciding upon any fubjecl, becaufe it knows not ** how to juftify its mode of proceeding upon its own prin- ** ciples ; a reflraint, without which ^an underllanding wiU

♦' not long remain found -The chiflel and the mallet may do

** well enough for Ihaping a piece of timber, but the ra- ** dius-needle, a nicer inftrument, muft be employed. for en- it graving. — In the fame manner, a found and plain under- ** {landing, as well as a fpeculative one, are each of ufe in f* their turn j the former, when we are converfant about *' judgments that are immediately applicable to experience ; *' the latter, when we are about forming general judgments " from mere abllraft ideas, as in Metaphyfics, where the un- " derftanding, termed found or plain, but often erroneoufly fo ** denominated, cannot afford any alliftance.

** I freely own, the fuggeftions of David Hume were, what *' firil, many years ago, roufed me from my dogmatical flum- ** ber, and gave to m^ inquiries quite a diiferent direction in *' the field of fpeculative Philofophy. — I was far from be- ** ing carried away by his conclufions, the fallacy of which " chiefly arofe from his not forming to himfelf an idea of the ** ivhole of his problem ; but merely inveftigating ^ part of it, ** the folution of which was impoffible, without a comprehen- ** five view of the whole. — :When we proceed upon a well <* founded, though not thoroughly digefted thought, we may " expeft, by patient and continued reflexion, to profecute it *' -farther, than the acute genius had done, to whom we are in- ** debted for the firft fpark of this light. — I firft enquired, ** therefore, whether Hume's objeftion might not be a general ** one, and foon found, that the idea of caufe and efFeft is far •* from being the only one, by which the underftanding a

priori

14 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTIOlSr.

*• priori thinks of the connexion of things ; but rather, that *' the fcience of Metaphyfics is altogether founded upon thefe ** connexions. — I endeavoured to afcertain their number, and " as I fucceeded in this attempt, upon ^Jingle principle, I pro- ** ceeded to the deduftion of thofe general ideas which," I was •* now convinced, are not, as Hume apprehended, derived ** from experience, but arife out of the pure underftanding. ** This deduftion, which feemed impoffible to my acute pre- *' deceflbr, and which nobody befides him had ever conceived, " although every one makes ufe of thefe ideas, without alking " himfelf, upon what their objeftive validity is founded ; this ** dedudion was, I.fay, the moft difficult which could have been " undertaken for the behoof of Metaphyfics. And what was ** ftill more embarraffing, Metaphyfics could not here offer me «' the fmallell affiftance, becaufe that dedu£lion ought firft to «* eftablifli the poflibility of a fyftem of Metaphyfics. As I *' had now fucceeded in the explanation of Hume's problem, " not merely in a particular inftance, but with a view of the " whole power of pure reafon, I could advance with fure, " though tedious fleps, to determine completely, and upon '* general principles, the compafs of pure reafon, both what *' is the fphere of its exertion, and what are its limits : which " was all that was required for erefting a fyftem of Meta« ** phyfics upon a proper and folid foundation."

Kant remarked, that Mathematics and Natural Philofophy had properly become fciences by the difcovery, that reafon a priori attributed certain principles to objefts ; and he in- quired, whether we could not alfo fucceed better in Meta- phyfics by taking it for granted, that objeds muft be accommo- dated to the conftitution of our mind, than by the common fuppofition, that all our knowledge muft be regulated accord- ing to external objedls. The following are the elements of his ** Critique of pure reafon," — the firft of Kant's fyftematical

works.,

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 1 5

tvorks, and the moft remarkable for profound reafoning, and the flriking illuftrations, with which it throughout abounds.

" We are in pofleffion of certain notions a priori, which " are abfolutely independent of all experience, although the ** obje£ls of experience correfpond with them ; and which are ** diftinguifhed by neceffitj and ftrift univerfalitj. To thefe " are oppofed empirical notions, or fuch as are only poffible a ** pofteriori, that is, through experience. Befides thefe, wc " have certain notions, with which no objedls of cxpe- ** rience ever correfpond, which rife above the world of ** fenfe, and which we confider as the moft fublime, fuch as *' God, Liberty, Immortality.— -There are analytical and Jyn- *' tbetical judgments a priori; the former are merely illuftra- " tive, and depend upon the principle of contradi6lion ; the " latter are amplijicatory, i. e. they enlarge our knowledge, ** and are eftabliflied upon another (ajQTertoryJ principle. The ** laft are peculiar to the icience of Metaphyfics ; although it " alfo contains analytical judgments. Befides, there are con- " tained in all theoretical fciences of reafoning, purely fyn- " thetical judgments a priori as principles, namely, fuch as ** amplify, or enlarge our knowledge of objcdls, without im-

*' mediate perception Mathematical judgments are altoge-

*• ther fynthetical. The Mathematician may by his pofition ** always give fomething material, or empirical ; but there is ** always fuppofed in it a pure perception a priori, a form of ** the fenfitive faculty, viz. Space and Time. This form firft " renders every adlual appearance of objedls poffible. Thus ** pure Mathematics are poffible, and can be reduced to a fci- *♦ entific form — Natural Philofophy alfo contains fynthetical

** judgments a priori, as its principles By the fenfitive

** faculty we are able to form perceptions : by the under- ** ftanding we form general ideas. By the fenfitive faculty *' we experience impreffions, and objects are given to us : by

the

16 HISTORICAL TNTRODUCTIOlSr.

" the underftanding we bring reprefentations of thefe objccls ** before us ; we think of them. Perceptions and general ** ideas are the elements of all ouj knowledge. Without the " fenfitive faculty, no obje<9: could be given (propofed to) '* us : without the underftanding, none could be thought of *' bj us. Thefe two powers are really diftinft from one ano- ** ther ; but neither of the two, without the other, can pro- ** duce a notion^ (^Erkenntnifs) In order to obtain a diftin^l ** notion of any one thing, we muft prefeiit to our general ideas, ** objefts in perception, and reduce our perceptions to, or con- •* ne£l them with, thefe general ideas. — \s the fenfitive fa- *' culty has its determined forms ; fo has our underftanding, ** likewife, forms a priori. Thefe may be properly termed ** Categories. ; they are pure ideas of the underftanding, which ** relate, a priori, to the objecls of perception in general. The " objecls of experience, therefore, are in no other way pof- ** fible ; they can in no other way be thought of by us ; ** and their multiplied diverfity can only be reduced to *' one aft of judgment, or to one aft of confcioufnefs, by ** means of thefe Categories of fenfe. Hence, the Catego-

** ties have objeftive reality. They are either Catego-

*' ries of I. ^lantity ; as unity, number, totcdity : or 2. of ** Quality ; as reality, negation, limitation : or 3. of Rela- ** tion, as fubftance and accident, caufe and eiFect ; or the re- ** ciprocal operation between agent and fufFerer : or 4. of ** Modality ; as pofllbility and impoffibility, exiftence and *' non exiftence, neceflity and contingency. — The judgm^t is ♦* the capacity of applying the general ideas of the under- ^ ** ftanding to the information of experience.^*) The objefts of " experience are regulated according to thefe ideas ; not, vice

*'. verfa

'' * Hence we obferve in thofewho are deprived of, or deficient in, this important faculty, that they are unable to determine between good and bad, between danger and fafcly, and fo forth.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 17

*"* vcrfa, our ideas according to the objefts. We can attain no ** knowledge of an objed, as a thing in itfelf, but only fo far ** as it is an objeft of our fenfitive perception, or a phenome- •* non ; though we muft be capable of conceiving objefts as ** fubftances, and likewife of admitting their reality ; becaufe *' our internal experience, the confcioufnefs of our own ex- ** iftence, is only poffible on the fuppofition of external expe- ** rience, or by the perception of other things without us. ** As foon as we pretend to confider the objedls of fenfe, as ** things in themfelves, reafon falls into a contradiflion \Cith *' itfelf, into oppofite principles which it cannot unravel, fo ** that as much can be faid for one pofition, as for its oppofite. *• Our kno^vledge, then, is wholly confined to the objects of " experience, without which the pure abflradt ideas of the " u^nderftanding are of no value, and confequently they are ** no longer of ufe, when we abandon the regions of t\\&fe?i/i~ " ble world. Liberty, God, and Immortality are ideas which ** are exalted above all fenfitive faculties \ they are not ob- " jefts of fenfitive knowledge, nor of objeftive certainty, but •' of necejfary thought and belief. Speculative reafon, when it *' confiders any thing, as to what it is in itfelf ^ direfts us here, ** or leads us into conjefture and contradidlion ; but praBical ** reafon, when it confioers that which, fh all hcy by clear ex- V" preflions announces to us truths, than which nothing can *• be more important. It declares us, as moral beings, to be *♦ free agents, who are not fubjeded to the mechanifm of na- '* ture : it holds out to us an ideals moral perfe6lion, which " we ought to attain, but which we can attain only by an « endlefs progreflion, and therefore enjoins us to chefifli a be- *< lief in immortality. By the idea of a mofl: perfeft flate, it ** fatisfies that inftlndive defire of happlnefs, which is a con- " flitucnt part of our fenfitive nature ; and while it holds out « to us the idea of ^.vsxo'iiperfeB harmony, in which liappineTs

C «' and

i8 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

« and virtue muft one day be united j it teaches us to believe *' in the exiftence of that Being, who alone can eflablifh this " harmony."

This imperfe£l account will, at leaft, ferve the purpofe of Ihewing, how this fyftem^ on the one hand, fets limits to the Scepticifm of Hume ; while it refutes and overturns Mate- rialifniy Fatalifm, Atheifm^ as well as Fanaticifm and Infidelity. — Kant does not attack the dogmatical procefs of reafon em- ployed in pure (abftraft) notions, but rather enjoins fo far a more ftridl dogmatifm than formerly prevailed, while he raifes Metaphyfics to the rank and folidity of a fcience : he combats that arrogant dogmatifm, which fets out with its hypothetical notions, without previous enquiries, whether, and how far reafon is intitled, by its peculiar judging powers, either to ad- mit, or to rejedt, thefe notions. *' This critical work of mine," he fays, ** is not written with a view of encouraging prat- " tling fhallownefs, under the arrogant name of popularity, " nor for the purpofe of fupporting fcepticifm which, as well *' as the former, is rather an excrefcence, than an ornament of " the fciences. The Critique is the previous preparation for ** the advancement of a well-founded fyftem of Metaphyfics, ** as a fcience which, neceffarily dogmatical, and in the ftrift- •* eft fenfe fyllematic, muft be formed according to fcientific " rules, not merely adapted to the vulgar." — Upon Scepticifm, its value, its limits, its relation to the Critical Philofophy, Kant, in another part of his inquiry, has made excellent re- marks.— Jacob, another German Philofopher, has fince, in a ipore diredl and comprehenfive manner than Kant himfelf, em- ployed the Critical Philofophy for the confutation of Scep- ticifm in general, and that of Hume in particular.

Not long after Kant's Critique, there appeared a <work, by an ingenious and liberal author, *' upon the dodrine of Spi- noza, in Letters to Mofes MendellTohn, 1785^ which accidental-

l7»

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 19

ly, in many inftances, confirmed the doftrines of the Critique, r The author defined belief to be immediate certainty, which \ required no fupport by arguments, fuperfeded all proofs, as it - refted upon a revelation, and contained the elements of human I knowledge ; he maintained, that reafoh only leads to doubts \ and errors in the moft important objefts of thought, that Spi- \ nozifm is ftill the moft coherent fyftem of reafoning, but it ef- | tablifiies downright atheifm ; and that in general, according | to the expreffion of Paschal, " Reafon expofes the Dogmatiji tojhamdy and nature itfelf refutes the Sceptic ^ — As little how- ever, as his doftrines of belief agree with the principles of Kant, fo much were his opinions, of Scepticifm and Spinozifm, a ftrong corroboration of Kant's afl*ertions ; that fpeculativt \ reafon teaches us nothings with demonftrative certainty, upon . the exiftence of God, and the objedls beyond the world of fenfe. i —Soon after this, in 1787, the worthy fon of a truly philofo- phical father, Joh. Albr. Heinr. Reimarus of Hamburgh^ publiflied a work " upon the foundation of human knowledge, and natural religion," in which he examines the different doc- trines of Jacob and Kant, and which here deferves honourable mention, as it contains many valuable hints, together with happy illuftrations of interefting, though abftrufe, fubjedls. In the mean time Kant's fyftem, or rather his elementary Propedeutic for a fyftem, acquired ftill greater reputation, and gained every where friends notwithftanding feveral accidents of fo ferious a nature, as to threaten its fubverfion. The fyf- tem of Locke, that of Leibnitz, a fpecies of Eclefticifm, and finally the Philofophy of Common Senfe, were alternately op- pofed to it. Some imagined they faw in it a concealed infidelity j others an over credulous religious and moral Myjiicifm ; a third party maintained, that it led to Scepticifm ; and a fourth, that it contained nothing new. All thefe obftacles could not retard the rapid progrefs it was daily making, almoft without exception, in the Protcftant Univerfities of Germany : in ma-

C a nj

ao HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

nj of the Catholic [Schools, too, it obtained decifive vI£loric^ over the fyftems of Ariftotle and Defcartes.

But however much, from conviction, enlightened minds were inclined to befriend this philofophj, yet with a mode- rate acquaintance with the hiftory of Ethics, it was eafy to forefee, that even Kant's Syftem, notwithftanding all the evi- dence and ftrength of its principles, could fcarcely withftand the furious attacks of Pyrrhonifm, or rather the pyrrhonic art, by which, without difcrimination, every thing is called in queftion ; Mathematics and Natural Philofophy itfelf not excepted. Without doubt, many of the opponents of the New Philofophy, long ago rematked this ; but they helitated to make the pyrrhonic experiment with Kantianifm ; becaufe every other poffible fyflem, that could be fubftituted in the room of the Critical, might in like manner be rendered wa- vering and uncertain ; and becaufe fuch a pyrrhonifm, in ge- neral, either leads to no end at all, or it is attended with con- fcquences detrimental to morality and happinefs. — Further, this attack would only have ferved to place the ftrength of the fyftem attacked, in a more ftriking point of view. — But a more moderate fceptlcifm might have been ealily and advan- rageoufly employed againft certain principles of the- Critical Philofophy, if its opponents had been aware of denying, or calling in queftion, fome fafts of confcloufnefs, to which Kant neceffarily appeals. It was not, therefore, a matter of fur- prife that, after repeated attacks in our times, this fpecies of fceptlcifm alfo fliould be employed againft the Critical Philo- fophy.

The author of '* Aenefidemus," or, on the foundation of the *' Elements of Philofophy, publiflied by Prof. Reinhold, in •* Jena ; together wkh a defence of Scepticifm, againft the " pretenfions of the Critical Philofophers, 1792," has en- deavoured tp prove, that the fceptical dbftrines of Hume are

not

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. «i

tiot in the leaft confuted by the Critique of Pure Reafon. The ■work, here mentioned, is written with uncom;non perfpicuity, acutenefs, and refped towards the Father of the Critical Phi- lofophy. The anonymous author directs his objedions againft the chief pillars of Kant's Syftem, the derivation of necelTary fynthetical judgments from the mind, and the reference of thefe to the perception of empirical objects. He allows, that there are neceflary fynthetical judgments in human knowledge, that they form an indifpenfible part in it, and that the neceffity which takes place in the connection of the predicate with the fubjeft, in thefe judgments, can be derived neither from pre- exiftence, from frequent repetition, nor from the conformity of a certain number of fafts. But he maintains, that, in the i* Critique of Pure Reafon," the mind is held out as the real ground of thefe necelTary judgments, that from our being able to think only of the power of rej^refentation (or conception) as the foundation of neceflary fynthetical judgments, a conclufion is drawn, that the mind mitjl aBually he the foundation of thefe. Now, argues he, what Hume called in queflion, is here plain- ly taken for granted ; namely, ifl, that for every thing we per- ceive, there is objectively pre-exifting a real ground, and a really diftindt caufe of it, fo that the pofition of the fuf- ficient ground, in general, depends not only upon the reprefen- tations and their fubjedtive aflbciation, but dlfo upon things in them/elves, and their objective connexion : 2dly, that we are intilled, from the conftitution of a fomething in our conception, to form conje^ures refpefting the conftitution of that Some- thing without us — Kant, continues this Sceptic, has not pro, yed, that our mind alone can be the ground of fynthetical judgments ; for the confcioufnefs of neceffity, which accompa- nies thefe judgments, is not an infallible criterion of their

origin a priori, and from the mind That we cannot now

think of, pr explain fomething otherwife but in a certain man,

ner;

24 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

ner ; this circumftance bj no means proves, that we could not have thought of it in any other way. Another origin of thefe judgments is conceivable, than from the mind ; namely, from the operation of real objefts, and their various modes of af- fe£ting us. It might, therefore, be eafily conceived, that re- prefentations and general ideas, which exift in us a priori, are ftill in another way referable to real obje£ls, than merely by the circumftance, that they exhibit to us the conditions and forms of the objefts. Thefe reprefentations and ideas a priori, might ;aifo relate to the objedlive conftitution of things with- out tis, by means of a pre-eftablifhed harmony between thefe, and the operations of our underftanding ; and agreeably to this harmony, fomething might be reprefented to the mind by aneans of perceptions and general ideas a priori, which fhould not only have objective validity in our underftanding, but alfo correfpond with the conftitutions of things in themfelves, and be the means of reprefenting them. — The Critical Philofophy, he adds, proves the origin of neceflary fynthetical judgmejits from the mind, by making fuch ufe of the principle of caufa- tion, as is contrary to its own principles in the application of the Categories ; whether we underftand by mind a NoU'-

menojiy a thing in itfelf, or a tranfcendental idea To thefe

doubts, feveral of which were formerly propofed by Flatt and Brastberger, the friends of the Critical Philofophy have already anfwered. Whether^the fcepticifm of this author agrees with that of Hume,'" whether it does not contain in fome refpefts more, in others lefs than the laft, I ftiall not venture to determine.

Plattner, that excellent Anthropologifty .who, in a rare in- ftance, to a profound knowledge of medicine, joins extenfive erudition .in philofophy, and peculiar penetration, and who de- ferves to be ranked among the firft philofophers of Germany, has employed rational fcepticifm againft the Kantian Syftem,

ia

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. ' 23

in an elementary treatife, defigned chiefly for academical in- ftruftions, and has even declared himfelf in favour of this mode of thinking in general, with refpe6l to all philofophical fub- jefts. *' Would not a well underftood fcepticifm," fays he among other things, " be the moft natural way ' to a- *' void all metaphyfical controverfy, and at the fame time the " moft rational means for calming all dogmatical and critical ** paffions ? What can be our aim under the titles of Logic, " Metaphyfics, Critic of Reafon ; what elfe can be our objed: " under the general title of Philofophy than, after admitting " the unqueftionable reality of our reprefentations, to Iketch " faithfully the hiftory of them ; and then to prove what •' is true and certain with refpedt to them ; and what in the ** human mind (whether it be the lower, or more exalted part *' of it) carries the conviction of truth and certainty along ** with it ?" — ^This philofopher wiflies the whole. of his work to be confidered merely as xhefuhjeBive conviction of a Sceptic, and defcribes the fceptical mode of thinking more accurately than has been done by any of his predeceflbrs. In oppofition to the Critique of Kant, he has ftarted a number of queftions, fome of which are completely in the fpirit of the old Pyrrhonifts. — Upon thefe doubtful points, likewife, anfwers have already been publilhed by the friends of the Critical Syftem. However conclufive fuch refutations may appear to the party, on whofe' behalf they were attempted, it ftill remains to be willied, though there is now little hope left for this profpeCt, that the aged Father of Rational and Critical Dogmatifm may deign to defend himfelf againft the attacks of Plattner, and thofe of the New Aenelidemus.

With pleafure I proceed, by oppofing to thefe fceptical writings a work written with noble intentions. Although it • deviate in fome refpeds from the principles of Kant, yet it fnpports, [with energy, the truth and certainty of human

knowledge.

44 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

knowledge, and at the fame time places the intereflmg nature of thefe quellions in a^clear point of view. — The treatife, here alluded to, is " On Truth and moral perfection ; by Adam Weisiiaupt, 1793."

All the writings of Sceptics, it is fincerely to be hoped, will never totally deprive man of the belief in objeftive truth ; and the Sceptic himfelf will never be capable of abandoning it com- pletely. For it is of the utmoft importance, that we fhould admit fomething objeftive, for the fake of morality and reli- gion, both of which muft lofe their value, and their exiftence, as foon as they are confidered merely as fomething fubjedlive and relative. Philofophers ought, therefore, rather to juftify the belief in objeftive reality, than reprefent to us, that there is no'other but fubjedlive convidlioa, which they hold out as the higheft ftep of philofophical and confiftent thought — We cannot, indeed, proceed beyond the power of compreheniion,- and all conviction merely refts on our Hate of mind ; but could it be otherwife ?— -It is fufficient that, in our confciouf- nefs, clear traces are. given us of objeftive truth 5 that it is in our power to diltinguifh objedlive and fubjeftive truth from one another ; and that from the whole mode of our thought and a£lion, and from the ideas of duty exalted above all ne- ceility, we muft reafonably zdmit Jhmething objeSively true.

Philofophical Scepticifm, which is not merely pretended, or •affefted, and which does hot flow from an impure fource, has as yet found, and ever will find, but a few genuine fupporters : but when it is taught and extolled in writings, and in public places of inftruCtion, it may, in a great number of individuals, gradually produce a Ihallow mode of fceptical realoning, de- ftroy the fpirit of inquiry, and ultimately promote immora- lity. Perhaps, Philofophy would foon fall into difrepute, and the public fpirit among mankind, as well as the general utility «f the learned; would fufFer extr£mely, were our attention con- * fined

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 25

fined merely to the defcription of the phenomena that occuf in the mind, and to the limited confideration, of what is fub- je6live alone, without placing any value upon what is ob- je£live. — It would be rafli and irrational, to obtrude our maxims, opinions, and conviftions upon others ; though eve- ry one wifiies to cultivate what alone is liable in us, our reafon ; and to try by gentle and fuitable means, to bring to the clear confcioufnefs and convidion of others, what our fair and candid examination teaches us to be uniformly true and good. We wifli not, individually, to confider ourfelves as in- fulated creatures that live, each of us, in our own world of ideas ; but to believe, that we all have a claim upon a certain number of truths, and that it depends upon our own exertions, to get pofleflion of thefe.

In our times, it might be more dangerous than many ima- gine, to reprefent the Scepticifm of Hume as incontrovertible, or incapable of folution ; for the greater number of fuperficial readers might thus be induced to furrender their weak minds to the moll dangerous apathy, to fhun every mental exertion, to fearch for no further difcoveries in the department of philo- fophy, and — ^by gradually returning to the age of barbarifm — to leave every thing in this deplorable fituation, in which they themfelves ultimately fall victims to infidelity, or fanaticifm.

There prevails at prefent, in almoft every civilized country, a very Ihallow and dangerous fcepticifm, extending its influence over the moft important objects. It has affumed a fyftematic form, to which people readily fubfcribe ; becaufe it is more difcreet, and lefs intolerable, than the profejfed mode of think- ing, which characterizes almoft every philofophic fe£t. This fpecies of fcepticifm, in the greater number of individu- als, aflumes the appearance of an indolent and irrefolute difpofition of mind j and in many, that of a wild, fanatical

D ficklenef$

!25 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

ficklenefs ; a ficklenefs, with which one partj, bj way of ir-' taliation, ufuallj reproaches the other.

The caufes of this fingular propenfitj, it is not difficult to trace : an inclination for fenfual indulgence is every where ihanifeft ; the intereft in pure intelleBual truth is univerfally weakened ; the old philofophical and theological fyftems have been fliaken in their foundations, while the new ones have as yet been able to procure but little public r-eputation.

Prof. STiEUDLiN diflinguilhes with accuracy the different fpecies of fcepticifm, and he endeavours to afcertain their true origin. — As a fpecimen of his mafterly method of inquiry, I conclude this IntroduBion^ with a faithful extract from his Treatife " On the Sources and Origin of Scepticifm."

** There is," fays he, " a certain kind of fcepticifm which deferves to be ftiled the^Z>z7o/oj&^/rfl!/, and which arifes near- ly in the following manner. Men of vigorous minds, in whom a lively intereft for every important truth is joined to an uncommon degree of penetration and activity, begin to think, and to inquire for themfelves : fuch men diveft them- felves of their juvenile opinions and prejudices, at a much earlier period of life, than others. Their propenfity to pecu- liar and original ideas exhibits every thing in a fufpicious light, which formerly, either from mere cuftom or authority, had formed a part of their creed. The conftant defire of dif- covering truth ; the ftrong confoioufnefs of their own powers to fearch for it •, the bold profpeft of opening, perhaps, new views in philofophy, continually induce them to inquire into every fource, from which truth may be derived: — thus they, are impelled by a kind of philofopbic enthufiafm."

" That remarkable epoch of human life, in which fome- times the painter, fometimes the poet, as if by infpiration, feels in himfelf the genius of his art ; this epocha has been frequently obferved by men whom nature had defigned for ce- lebrity.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 27

icbrltj. The philofophic genius, not unfrequcntly, difcovers a fimilar period, in which the views he directs to his intellec- tual nature, the manner in which he refle£ls upon the whole created fabric, and the refearches he makes into the writings of the ancient philcfophers, fill his mind with a pleafing anxie- ty, with a lively energy, and lead him to augur his future deftiny : but this exertion of evolving talents not rarely termi- nates infcepticifm. His mind trefpalTes upon regions unknown, and far remote from human conception ; he is firfl indued, and that moft frequently, to Hart queftions which, to men, are al- together UHanfwerable. Unfortunately, tod, he begins with the mofl difficult fubje£ls of inquiry ; for the more eafy pro- politions appear to him beneath his dignity. The latter he treats with contempt ; and grafping principally at the former, he is continually difappointed by the tranfient hopes of difcovering myfteries, which lie concealed behind >an im- penetrable gloom. The unfuccefsful efforts made upon that which is difficult, foon render him fufpicious of what is both eafy, and within his horizon. He wanders from one fyftemto another iii order to find the philofopher's flone ; (or, as it is very forcibly expreffi^d in the original) to folvs ths riddle of the world. He alternately pays homage to the different fyftems, which engage his attention ; fo that at one time the adherents of Locke, at another thofe of Leibnitz, at another thoie of Descartes, and at length thofe of Rousseau are, with him, the reprefentatives of truth. Some- \ times, , he creates fyllems of his own ; but they are as quick- ly deftroyed, as they were erefted."

*' He is, finally, led to invefligate the foundation of all hu- man knowledge and evidence, as well as to inquire into the poffibility of an ohjc6iivc truth. Here, where he was in fearch of a certain refting point, a boifterous ocean of uncer- (.aiatie^, at once, appears in view. In vain he attempts, af-

D-- ter

^S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

ter the moft accurate fcrutiny of his intelleftual powers, t<> difcover the general and neceflarj characters of truth. His fenfations, every where, appear to inform him of things, not in unifon with his reafon ; and upon the moll important concerns, which infpire his heart with hopes and defires, his reafon is filent ; or it torments him with fuch doubts and ap- prehenlions, as are fufficient to blaft his moil fanguine ex- peftations. In vain he endeavours to reconcile that at leall, in which the opinions of all men coincide, with the general characters of truth. With indignation he obferves the con- tradictory opinions of the greatefl philofophers of all ages ; with furprife he fees, how frequently he had already imagin- ed himfelf in the poffeffion of truth ; and how frequently he had alfo been obliged to reje£t it, as illufory. The moll op- pofitc judgments of men, even in common life ; the operation of phyfical caufes ; the influence of the paffions, of authority, and of the moll incidental circumllances, as affecting thefc judgments, — now excite the whole of his ■ attention. The ob- ferraticn, that innumerable muhitudes had from the begin- ning of time lived happy, and found the moll complete con- vidtion in fpeculative fancies and errors ; this obfervation makes him defpair of difcovering certainty in any fubjefl whatever. With a compaffionate fmile he beholds the dog- matill, bold and decifive, proud and felf-fufficient, propofing his opinions, in which he difcovers little more, than proofs of ignorance, or of arrogance and diffimulation. At lall, he forms the refolution of renouncing all difcoveries tending to ellablilh abfolute truth ; of deducing in every inllance no other than doubtful refults ; and of obtruding his judgments as little upon any man, as he would be inclined to adopt them from others. But as he feels in himfelf an irrefillible pro- penfity. Hill to adopt /oz^f things, and to lay down for himfelf

fome rules of conduft, not being able to aft altogether with- out

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. ic^

entjixed principles ; there is no wonder that he beftows his ap- probation upon fome fentiments and judgments ; yet he does this with the conftant rellridion, that thefe are by no means abfolutCf and that they are true only as to himfelfy

" The philofophical fcepticifm, the origin and progrefs of which we have here defcribed, is, however, extremely rare. We meet more frequently, particularly in the prefent age, with other fpecies of it, which arife from very different fources, and which may with more juftice be termed premeditated pyr- rhonifmy or a decided propenfity of the mind to univerfal doubt."

** Scepticifm, alfo, frequently derives its oiigin from in- dolence and ignorance. Some people acquire a fuperficial knowledge of the hiflory of philofophical opinions ; they are perhaps informed, that there has been a fet of men who doubt- ed every thing ; they are fond of claiming the name of philo- fophers, who are not blind followers of others, and who rife above the common fet of men. Inftead of inftitutiag profound inquiries into the nature of the human faculties for acquiring knowledge ; inftead of calmly and patiently comparing the opinions of philofophers ; they raife a hoft of doubts upon every fubjedt, that requires acute refledlion : thus they ftudy the art of contriving endlefs objeftions."

** It is, indeed, much eafter and more convenient to frame objeftions againft every conclufion, than to draw the refult from laborious refearches, and to defend this refult againft the objeftions of others.* — When a fubjeft is only in part under- ftood, doubts muft fpontaneoufly arife, which may confound

the

* Bayle, in his letter to Minuteli.i; " Oeuvret div. IV. p. 537." very ju.ftly remarks : " En vcrite, il ne faut pas trouver etrange, que tant de gf ns " aient donne dans le Pyrrhonifme : car c'eft la chofc du monde la plus commode. " Vous pouvez impunenxcnt dlfputer centre tous venans, ei fans craindreccs " arj^umens ad hominem, qui font quelque-fois tant de peine. Vous craigncz ^ poLit la retorfion ; puifque ne I'outcnant ricn vous abandonnez dc boa coeur a

" tous

50 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

the cleareft propofition. Among this clafs of ignorant an<! fhallow fceptics, we frequently meet with the ftrangeft com- pounds of fcepticifm, credulity and dogmatifm. They are apt to believe the groflelt abfurdities, provided that the ob- jefts be very contiguous tc their light, and require no acute inveftigation : but they entertain doubts concerning the de- Hion/lrative evidence of miathematics, and the reality of moral law."

** Ambition^ a fondnefs for paradoxes and novelty, are,' with many, the principal fprings of fcepticifm. It is feme- thing fo very uncommon to doubt every thing ; it difcovers fo much boldnefs, fuperiority, acutenefs and liberality, fo much art, to combat every opinion that enters into the common creed. On the other hand, it appears fo very modell, when in imitation of Socrates — the fceptical genius pretends to know nothing ; nay, he goes even farther, in confeffing, that he is not quite certain of this I Such is his modefty, produced by a ftill greater impulfe of felf-denial."

Nil fciriquifquis putat, id quoque nefcit

An fciri poffit quo fe nil fcire fatetur. v

LucRET. IV. 471.

^* It is a peculiar fatlsfadtion, to triumph over that pedan- tic dogmatifm, which arifes fometimes from ignorance, fome- times from an abundance of knowings but not of real knowledge. It is a pleafing refleflion, to behold the ardent conteft of opi- nions, and to look on this dangerous and tempeftuous paffage upon the fea of human uncertainties, with a calm, perhaps af- fefted, relignation."

Suave marl magno turbantibus xquora ventis E terra magnum alterius fpecSare laborem, Non quia vexan qiicmquam, eft jucunda voluptas, Sed quibus ipfe malis careas, quia cerncre fuave ell.

*' Wc

• " tous les fophifhies et a tons les raifonnemens de la terre quelque opinion que ce " loit. En un mot vous conteftez et vous daubcz fur toutes chofes tout votrc ' ' liaoul, fans craindre de peine du taiion."

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. ^x

*< We find, in the records of philofophical hillory, many celebrated charadlers who were profeffed fceptics, and who, in that hiftory ftill Ihine as luminaries : though, by the moderns, configned to obfcurity. Is it not honourable, to rank among men of fuch celebrity ? — This atnbitious fcepticifm, certainly, arifes from immoral fources : it is produftive of frequent mifchief, both in the moral charafter of thofe who profefs it, and of thofe who liften to this deception. Its progrefs, in the prefent age, is very confiderable. — As the modern fyftem of toleration is frequently the moll intolerant, this modern fcep- ticifm alfo frequently appears in the highcit degree fanatical and magiflerial. By means of this delufive art, men of a cer^ tain dejcription endeavour to render emery thing doubtful^ which is believed by the generality of mankind ; to deflroy without mercy, all the antiquated forms and fpecies of belief, and to impofe upon us the inventions of their own brain, in the naoft infinuating and decilive tone. Unhappily, they find cafy accefs, through the vices and paffions of man, fo that great moral and political revolutions have been frequently pro- duced, in confequence of metaphyfical fpeculations which, at finr, feemed to have little, orno influence, upon the pradlice of life."

" Avoid thofe — fays the Vicar of Savoy to the youtig man, to whom he delivers his" confeffion of faith — " who, under *' the pretext of expounding nature, fill the heart of men with •* inert dodlrines, and whofe apparent fcepticifm is infinitely ** more decifive and dogmatical, than the pofitive tone of their ** adverfaries. Under the ambitious pretence, that they alone *' are enlightened, veracious and fincere, they imperioufly ** fubjedl us to their deflru£live decifions, v/hiie they afFe£l ** to communicate to us the true principles of things, by* *' means of thofe unintelligible fyftems which are the produc- " tions of their own fancy. Hence, they fubvert, deflroy, and

*' trample

32 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

*« trample under foot, every thing that is venerable to man ** in fociety ; they deprive the affli£led of the lall comfort in *' their calamities ; the rich and powerful of the only bridle ** of their paffions ; they fnatch the flings of confcience from ** the receffes of the heart ; their propitious hopes from the ** virtuous ; and withal, they ftill boaft of having been the ** benefactors of the human race. Never, they fay, is truth " pernicious to man. I believe this, as well as they ; but ** this very circumftance is, in eny opinion, a ftrong proof, ** that their doctrines cannot claim the charadler of truth." ^ Luxury and degeneracy of manners are perfedlly confif- tent, as well with each other, as with a partial illumination and improvement of the mind. If we negledl to unfold the mental faculties ; if the intereft which ties us to the intellec- tual and invilible (not, vifionary) world gradually vanilhes ; then this immoral and ftiallow fcepticifm eafily arifes, and in- fefts even numerous clafles of fociety. It carries along with it the appearance of cultivation and enlargement of mind ; but, at the fame time, it opens an extenfive field to every fel- fifii defire.

Legion is the number of the deluded, who are in fearch of illumination of mind, chiefly by difputing and cavilling upon clofe lubjedls of intelle6lual inquiry,.- which were formerly held to be mod true and worthy of veneration. Thofe for- tunate travellers, whofe objedl, in vifiting the reputed Capitals of Europe,was not amufement alone ; they mull have the clear- efl proofs, how much that fiimfy mode of reafoning now pre- vails, and how certain it is, that it arifes from the fourccs here mentioned. The authors of the moft enlightened nations of Europe agree that, many new philofophical produc- tions, as they are called, are nothing but the offspring of

this crude and unphilofophical fcepticifm.*

Many ,

* Vid. for inflance " Letters of Literature, by Robert Hcfon ; London, 1 785." ^•a ftrang nisdiey of undigelted thoughts.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 33

Manj remarkable events of the prefent age may be Confi- dered as the confequences of a philofophy — without having the leaft claim to that dignified name — which undermines the pillars of every ufefiil inftitution, but rears no fabric ; which leaves man in a ftate of indolence and indifference with rdjpedl to his moft important concerns ; and which converts him in- to a fenfual and felfilh being, that is determined folely by time, accident, and circumftances j and that is tofled, to and fro, on this fea of life, without a rudder or compafs, without a fure rule for his conduft or belief, without any fixed objeft, to which his future profpeds and hopes can be rationally di- rected.

Placed on this ifthmus of a middle ftate, A being darkly wife and rudely great : With too much knowledge for the fceptic fide, With too much weaknefs for the Stoics pride^ He hangs between ; in doubt to a6l, or reft j In doubt to deem himfelf a God or beaft j • In doubt, his mind or body to prefer ; Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err j Alike in ignorance, his reafon fuch. Whether he thinks too little, or too much : Chaos of thought and pafilon, all confus'd. Still by himfelf abusM, or difabus'd ; Created half to rife, and half to fall ; Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all j Sole judge of truth, in endlefs error hurl'd : The glory, jeft, and riddle of the world.

Pope.

E ELEMENTARY

ELEMENTARY VIEW

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

1 8 e c<ix-<eSEa»l^^»»«

Preparatory Remarks,

JjEFORE we enter upon this arduous tafk, it may be of fome importance to premife a few neceirary obfervatlons on the me- thod which has been adopted in the execution of it ; and on the various obitacles which the ftudent of every new Syilem, particularly of Ethics, muft unavoidably encounter.

It appeared to me, at a very early period of my ftudies, that the principal diffenlions, and fubfequent divifions iu philo- fophy, have arifi^n chi^y from the following obvious fources. — Every fyilematic writer on fubjeiSls, which, from their na- ture, do not admit of demonftrative certainty, nor of any fuch proofs as are manifell from oljeBive reality ^ is almoll invo- luntarily led to employ new terms and phrafes, in order to exprefs the different opinions he broaches among his cotem- poraries. It Is of little confequence to himy whether the ideas, which gave rife to thefe opinions, be alfo new. For, though the latter may be already germinating in the feeds fown by his great predeceflbis, or may only have been differently explain- ed, he is equally certain of finding yor^f adherents, who pride themfelves upoa difcovering a new fenfe, or perhaps a new ap- plication pf the fenfe, in which his terms, the definitions of them, or the fcientitic divifions, are now more clearly, or more obfcurely, underllood. This has uniformly h.ppened, I could

almoft

ELEMENTARY VIEW, Sec. 35,

almoft fay, fince the beginning of philofophical fpeculations : hence the ahfolute neceffitj of giving, in every inftance, the clearefl pofllble definitions of words, muft be obvious to every novice in philofophy. But this I confider as a tafk, xh^Jiri6i performance of which, from the very imperfeft ftate of lan- guage, has been (and probably will never ccafe to be) on# of the many human dejiderata. Hence, the immortal Bacon, when the fame, or at leail a limilar idea pervaded his comprehenfive mind, was induced to exprefs himfelf upon this fubjeft, in the following excellent words : " Prceterea ut bene /per ent, Injlau-' rationem nojlram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant^ et animo concipiont j cum reverafit infiniti erroris finis et ter- minus legitimus."

Were it, however, poflible to define «// philofophical terms with that degree of precilion which we, fometimes, obferve in the works of a Bacon, a Newton, and a Kant ; yet we could alfo fuggeft the remark — a remaik which is by no means in favour of human perfeftion — that,even thefe illuftilous cha- radlers, in their own elementary works, not rarely deviate ffom the original, or primary, definitions of terms. Thofe, who are converfant in fpeculative inquiries, will readily, and within proper limits, underftand this aflertion ^ and fuch read- ers as might extend the meaning of it further than I am incli- ned to admit, I only remind of the logical difficulties attending every long demonflration. It would, therefore, be rafli in the extreme to charge thefe eminent charadlers with incongruity of thought, or rcafoning ; as the more minute deviations, in terms, are chiefly owing to the unfettled ftate of language in general ; and as the very term, perfeBiony when fpeaking of human beings provided with human organs, is only rela- tive.

A long and dear-bought experience in teacliing has firft in- duced me to entertain thoughts upon this important theme,

E 2 which

3^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

which may not find manj fupportcrs. Yet I think myfelf juftified in afferting, that the moft, if not all, Syftems of Grammar and Rhetoric, as well as the Di6lionaries of lan- guages, are compiled upon mechanical, wavering and un* tenable principles ; * for they are, more or lefs, liable to the following ferious objeftions :

ift. That the rules contained in Grammars, generally ad- mit of a greater number o£ exceptions, Xh^n oi pojitive deter- minations,

2d. That the inflexions of nouns and verbs are not accom- modated to the etymology of words, but are chiefly taken from analogy ; — a circumftance produftive of endlefs miftakes and confufion in the grammars of modern languages.

3d. That fo far from improving the phrafes and idioms of languages, grammarians feem to labour hard to render them, if poffible, more perplexed and inconfiftent ; f — by daily adopting new idioms in one language, which are borrowed from another ; by ufing words in a figurative fenfe, which cannot be thus employed without impropriety ; by transferring words from the phyjlcal to the moral fenfe, and vice verfa, when there is no other neceffity for this outrage upon good

* Whether the Elementary Grammar of the German Language, which I propofe to puhlifll, together with an Identical DiBionary of the German, Englijb, French and Latin languages, will be liable to the charges which my predeceffors have in- curred, I am not confident enough to aver. The Ihort fpccimen given of the latter at the end of this work) which accompanies the third " Effay, On the merits and demerits of Johnson's Englifti Didlionary, on language in general, &c. by Ade ■ LUNG," will ferve as a tolerable criterion of the execution of the whole.

•|- If it be objedted, that this is no fault of Grammarians, fince language is form- ed and modelled by a whole people, I fliall briefly' anfwer ; that tradition and cuftom alone do not appear to have any fuch tendency, as to make a whole nation fpeak and write jargon, or nonfenfe, for ever ; and confequently, that errors and aiiftake* ought not to be perpetuated in ekmentary books of inftrudion.

KANT'S WORKS. 73

fenfe^ than tlie fancy or caprice of the fpeaker,and fubfequent- I7, that of the writer *.

4th. That inftead of giving a fyntax of fpeech, or fentences arranged in the moft natural order, and ftill conformable to the premifes, as well as to the fubfequent conclufions, they adhere to the oppofite extieme ; by negle£l:ing the general^ and giving Xh^fpecial conftru6lion of the individual parts. — ■ This, indeed, is of itfelf a ufeful piece of labour, if the rules ■were not too jnuch crowded upon the tyro ; but it by no means deferves the name of z fyntax, for its object is merely the in- flexion of nouns and verbs, as preparatory to a Ge?ieral Syn~ tax f .

5th. That no Grammarian, or Lexicographer, excepting perhaps Adelung, has accurately and uniformly diftinguiflied, both the moral and phyftcal fenfe of words — however eaCy this may appear at firfl fight — nor the ohjeBive zxid. fuhjeBive ap- plication of terms and phrafes %•

As

, * This chaKge cannot, in juftice, be levelled at the captivating efFufions of Poetry ; an art which, from its nature, and the frequent good effe<fts it produces in roufing, like mufic, the palGed organs of mortals, deferves more deference, than any of the liberal arts ; as it is likewife underftood to poffefs a much greater la- titude, than all the filler-arts.

f Upon accurate inveftigation, it mufl flrike even the novice in grammar, that there can be only two parts in the nature of fpeech, which being the regulators of all the Data involved in the reft, produce that change of place, or fituation, which we exprefs by the term Syntax : thefe two unqueftionably are the nominative of the Noun, with its corrcfponding FerB.— AW other parts of fpeech arc, in my opinion, liable to the fame modifications, or changes, which characterize a nu- merous progeny, whofe father and mother alone are liable and fixed.

^ The immortal author of the « Critique of Pure Reafon" was, among the Germans, without exception the firft, who perceived the abfolute neceflity of this diflindlion in philofophical inquiries — In juftice to the high rank held by the F.nglifii 5nd French philofophers, however, I muft frankly own, (what I have, in jrart, already declared in the Preface) that I have not been fo happily fituated ss IQ examine, with critical accuracy, their refpeftive iwmendutures. But if I may

rtly

3? ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

As Kant*s Critique of Pure Reafon is the principal ele- mentary work, upon the pillars of which the whole of his Syftem, together with all the works that illuftrate it, muft either Hand, or fall, we fliall firft explain its aim and moral tendency J hy giving Kant's peculiar definition and divifion of philofophy, accompanied with Jive conneBed problems ; and in the next place, it will be ufeful to laj down the particular contents of «//his works. The former we ftiaU exhibit in the Synopfis : * the latter muft be the feeble eflFort of a literal, not elegant, tranflation; and we propofe to comprife them in the fubfequent Chronological Analyjis,

I. Synopsis.

A. Definition and Division of Philosophy.

Pbilofophy is the fyftem of all philofophical, i. e. difcurjive

knowledge derived from bare ideas, or notions This is the

fcholaftic definition ; but, in a cofmological fenfe, it is the fcience concerning the relation of all our knowledge to the cflcntial purpofes of human reafon, (teleologia rationis hu- mange) and the philofopher is not an archited: of reafon, but <» the

rely upon 'the information of that learned and fagacidus pupil, who conde- fcended to tranflate the Synoptical Problems here ftated, with their folutions, as a

fpecimen of his progrefs in the German, Dr Riid, of Glafgow, was the

firft among the Britifh Philol'ophers, who diftinguiflied clearly between the objec~ tive znAfubjeSiive life of the words, which are employed to exprefs the immediate objedls oifenfation zndf erception.

* Originally digefted by Mr John SrtiuLzr, an eminent Divine and Court- Chaplain at Kosnigfberg ; a particular friesd of Kant's who, on that occafion, congratulated him i^on having/«//y entered into the fpirit of the CRiTiqui ; and J)eftowed upon him every mark of approbation.

KANT'S WORKS.

39

the law-glver of it. We cannot, hence, learn philofophy it- felf ; it is philofophizing which ought to be our ftudj.

I. Philofophical Knowledge

a.) is difcurjtvcy as derived from ideas, and oppofed to ma- thematical intuitive knowledge, derived from the con- ftrudlion of ideas, b.) isjto be underftood objeSiively :

I. — as the prototype for judging upon all the attempts

of philolophizing. 2. — as a bare idea of a poffible faience, which is no where given in concreto : for where is it ? who is in the pofleffion of it ? and bj what means maj it be diftinguiflied from others ? c.) confiders particulars only in the general ; while mathe- matical knowledge coniiders general fubjedls in the par- ticular, nay, even in tlie individual. — Thofe who pre- tend, that quality is the objeft of philofophy, quantity the obje£t of mathematics, have erroneoufly adopted the effedt, inftead of the caufe.

2. T\i& fcholajlic definition of philofophy denotes a fyflem of knowledge, which we puifue only with a view of reducing it to fcientific rules, without ?ny other aim, than that of attainingto a logical perfeftion of knowledge. — Thus philo- fophy is merely confidered as one of th6fe arts, which may be applied to certain arbitrary purpofes ; and in this fenfe the philofopher is an architeft of reafon.

3. The cofmological idea of philofophy implies that, which ne- celTarily concerns every individual. — In this view the phi- lofopher is the legiflator oj human reafon.

4. Among the effcntial purpofes of human reafon^ one is the

final

40 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

final purpofe, and this is the complete deftination of tnaf*. The philofophy which has this purpofe for its object, is cal- led Ethics. Hence the ancienis alwajs underftood by the name philofopher, at the fame time, and principally, the Moralift, the Stoic, or him who can govern himfelf. c. To Philofophi%e y means to exercife, by certain plain expe- riments, the talent which reafon difplays in judging con- formably to its general principles. — According to Kant's Syftem, philofophy is divided into, and confidered as ift. formal (methodiczV) p/jilofophy, which concerns merely the form of the underftanding and reafoning faculties, as well as the general rules of thought, throughout independent of the objefts : hence Logic, Canon for underftanding and reafoning. 2d. material philofophy, fuch as is employed in reflecting upon any one obje61, and again is

A. the pure, or the philofophy of pure reafon, which de- pends upon fundamental principles and notions a priori. This is, ^'

a. Propedeutic, or Critique, which inquires into the fa- culty of reafon with refpeft to all its pure know- ledge a priori j

b. Mctaphyfics in a more extenfive fenfe, the fyflem of pure reafon ; or the coUeftive philofophical know- ledge from pure reafon, in fyftematic connexion, whether real, or imaginary. — This again compre- hends

a.) Metaphyfics of Nature ; Metaphjrfics in a more

limited fenfe, that of the fpeculative ufe of pure reafon, which confines its inquiries to what ac- tually is, or exifts. Its component parts are the following four :

aa. Ontology y the fyflem of all ideas and princi- ples

KANT'S WORKS. 41

pies, which relate to fubje£ls in general, with- out propofmg any obje£ts of perception. hb. Rational Phyfiology y which inveiligates na- ture, i. e. the complexus (compafs) of fub- jefts ; whether thej be exhibited to the fenfes, or to anj other perceptive faculty. It comprepcnds ift. Rational (not empirical) Phyjicsy treating of material obje£ls, and in- cluding every thing that may be known by means of the external fenfes ; — 2d, Ratio?ial Pfychology^ which confiders the fubje6l of the internal fenfe, mind ; and, according to its ■ fundamental notions, the refledling capacity in general, cc. Rational Cofmologyy which employs itfelf with the internal combination of the objefts of ex- perience ; but which proceeds beyond the poffibility of experience ; general hiowledge of the world, by which nature is considered as »n abfolute Univerfum. ddi Rational T^beology, which invefligates the conne£lion fubfifting between Nature and a Supreme Being, b.) Metaphyjics of Morals, ■ or the practical ufe of pure reafon, which attends to the laws, according to which every thing happens in this, and no o- ther, manner ; — pure morals. Ethics. B. The experimental, praBical Philofophy, which is altoge- ther eflablifhed upon experience, and again confifls of three principal divifions, viz.

1. Phyfics, the experimental doftrine of tlie material

world.

2, Pfychologyy the experimental do6lrine of mind.

F 3.

^i ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

3. Jnthropology, the pra£lical doflHne of free-a£ling man, derived from experience, j

Corrolarta,

1 . Material Philofophy is, therefore, divided like Mathematics, - into pure and applied (praftical).

2. There are, originally, only t'uoo principal divifions of phi- lofophy. Logic and Metaphyjics ; or, according to the plan of the ancient Greeks, three j namely. Logic y Phyficsy and Ethics.

B. Problems and Solutions.

, Exordium.

Tlie aim of Kant's Critique is no lefs, than to lead Rcafoii to the true knowledge of itfelf ; to examine the titles, upon which it founds the fuppofed pofTeflion of its m^etaphyfical knowledge, and by means of th'is examination to mark the true limits, beyond which it cannot venture to fpeculate, without wandering into the empty region of pure fancy ; — an attempt, the bare idea of which fufficiently difcovers the philofophic fpirit of its author.

In order to acquire a correal notion of the term Pure. ReafoTiy we muft coiifider it in this point of view. — Every aft of judgment, which is not mingled with any heterogeneous ingredients, is called pure. But particularly every piece of comparative knowledge, which is unmixed with any expe- rience, or fenfation, and which confequently is poffible altoge- ther a priori, defer ves the name oi ahfolutely pure ; v. g. Liberty ^ Qody Lmmortulity Reafon, then, is that faculty, which af- fords to us the principles of comparative knowledge a priori.

Hence

KANT'S WORKS. ^n

Hence pare reafm contains the principles of judging upon any thing abfolutcly a priori. The whole compafs of thofe prin- ciples^ conformably to which all pure judgments a priori can be acquired and carried into effeft, might be called an Orga- non of pure reafon.— The whole Critique of pure reafon, therefore, is eftabliflied upon this principle, (not poJlulatCy nor petitio principii^ but the refult of an appeal to aBs of confcioufnefs) that there is a free Keafon independent of nil eX' perience and fcnfatioti *.

Reafon, as the organ of mind in concrete, muft be confidered, both fubje£tively, and objedively. SuhjeBive reafon is capable of perpetual increafe, by approximation to the ohjeBive ftate ^f it, viz. to the perfect model, (flandard).

Problem FiRst.

To determine the nature of the Senfitive Faculty and its di- ftinBion from Underflanding.

I. The Senfitive Faculty confifts in the capacity of our Soul to receive immediate reprefentations of objects, merely froni being affefled by them in this or that way.

^. The reprefentations, which the Senfitive fdculty affords

to us, are therefore referred to the obje£t which affe£t3 us, i. e.

they are Perceptions.

1^2 3.

• Although M. Selle, one of Kant's opponents, has endeavoured to prove, in an Eflay publiftied in the Berlin Monthly Magazine, for December 1784, " that there are no pure ideas of the reafoning faculty, independent of experience ;" yet I think it neceflary to remind the reader, that all fuch negative proof, as arife from the ful>Je£ii-ve convidion of an individual, fay as little againft the validity, or liability, of a philofophical propofition vrhich altogether depends on the manner of exhi- biting it to the mind, as the failure of converting the Turks and Jews to the Chriilian Religion, can furnilh any argument to the difadvantage of the latter.

44 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

3. All our Perceptions have a twofold^ form, Space and Time, as reprefentations which relate to objefts, and which are thenjfelres Perceptions, pure Perceptions that, a priori, previous to all a£tual fenfation, are difcoveiable originally iti tlie reprefenting capacity of our Soul, and lie already at the foundation of all our actual fenfations, as neceffary conditions of their pollibility.

4. Hence Space and Time are not fomething attached to ob- je6ls themfelves, but mere fubje6live reprefentations in us. The Being in Space and Time, confequently extenfion, impe- netrability, fucceflion, change, motion, &.c. are therefore not qualities which belong to objects w/ themfelves, but reprefen- tations in our minds, which attach barely to the nature of our Senfitive Faculty. In other words, the motion of matter does not produce reprefentations in us, but is itfelf mere reprefen- tation.

5. Hence alfo we know things merely as they appear to us ; that is, we know only the impreffions which they make on our Senfitive Faculty ; but what they may be in themfelves, and for other reafonable Beings, is altogether unknown to us.

Problem Second. To invejligate the whole Jiore of original notions difcoverahle in our Underjlanding\ and which lie at the foundation of all our knowledge ; and at the fame time to authenticate their true de^ fceiit^ by fjjowing that they are not derived from experience^ hut are pure produBlons of the underflanding.

1. The perceptions of objefts contain, indeed, the matter of knowledge, but are in themfelves ^/?W and dead, 3.nd- not knowledge : and our foul is merely paffive in regard to them.

2. If thefe perceptions are to furnilh knowledge, the Under- flanding muft think of them, and this is poffible only through

notions (conceptions), which are the peculiar Form of our

Under-

KANT'S WORKS. 45

Underflanding, in the fame manner, as Space and time ate the Form of our Senfitlve Faculty.

3. Thefe notions are adive reprefentations of our nnder- llanding-faculty ; and as they regard immediately the percep- tions of obje£ls, they refer to the objeds themfelves only me- diately.

4. They lie in our Underflanding, as pure notions a pri- ori, at the foundation of all our knowledge : they are neceffa- ry forms, radical notions, Categories, (Predicaments) of which all our knowledge muft be compounded : and the Table of them follows.

^lantity : Unity, Plurality, Totality. Quality : Reality, Negation, Limitation. Relation : Subftance, Caufe, Reciprocation. Modality : Poflibility, Exiftence, Neceffity.

5. Now to think zTiA. to judge is the fame thing; confe- quently every notion contains a particular form of jndgment concerning objefts There are four principal genera oi Judg- ments : they are derived from the above four poffible funftlons of the Underflanding, each of which contains under it three fpecies^ namely with refpedl to

Quantity y they are univeffal, particular, fingular '\

Quality y affirmative, negative, infinite I %

Relationy - — cathegorical, hypothetical, disjunftive : I Modality y problematical, affertory, apodiftlcal J ?

6. And thus not only the whole power of our underflar.d- ing is fathomed out of its own nature, and therefore per- feftly a priori ; but alfo, at the fame time, the jpure defcent of our notions from the Underflanding ; and their perfe6l inde- pendence on all experience, is proved.

PrPblem Third.

Tojhew in what manner xvc are entitled to afcribe ohjeBive

reality

46 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

reality to thofe notions^ which are merely fomething fuhjeSiivt in us ; or in other words, tojhew how the underjlanding is juf-

' tijied in going, as it were, out of itfelf, and in transferring its notions to things which are external to it, that is, to refer theni to obJeBs.

I . Space and time are, as pure perceptions a priori, merely

fuhjeBive ; but 2.% forms of our Senjitive Faculty, they have a neceflary relation to objeds of fenfe, — -are neccffary Predicates of whatever can be an objeft of fenfation ; and therefore the following fynthetical principles a priori are eftabliflied :

a. Every thing that can be an obje<9; of our exernal fenfesj fo as to be perceived or felt, is in Space ; and all the pre- dicates of fpace, extenfion, divifibility, &c. neceffarily be- long to it.

b. Every thing that can be an objedt of out fenfes in gene- ral, whether external or internal, is in 'Time \ and there- fore, all the predicates of time, fimultaneity, fucceffion, See. alfo of necejjity belong to it.

1. In like manner, all pure notions a priori are, indeed^ fomething merely fuhjeBive in our Underflanding ; but as forms of our Thought (of the Thinking Faculty), they mufl likewife relate to all objedls of our Senfitive Faculty. Hence the following univerfal fynthetical maxim, a priori, is efta- .blifhed.

Every thing which can be an objeft of poflible experi- ence, mull not only be in Space and Time ; but to it alfo mull belong one of each clafs of the pure notions of the un- derftanding.

3. Our notions, therefore, receive relation to objecfls, or ohjeElive reality, only through a third mediating reprefenta- tion a priori, which has fomething in common with the per- ception, as well as with the notion, and by means of which, therefore, the union of the Notion with the Obje6l becomes

pofuble.

KANT'S WORKS. 47

pofTible. This, in reality, is Timey which Kant calls the Schema of Notions * ; for it has fomething common with ill

per-

* The Schemata are indeterminedfenfualizedreprefentationswhicl^k the imagination places under pure notions of the Under/landing j and conformably to the Number of the Categories, they maybe exhibit- ed in the following Table :

1. QiiANTiTY, i. e. Series of time.

Number.

2. Quality, i. e. things contained in time.

Reality^ i. e. exiftence, fenfation in time, time filled. Negation, i. e. non-exiftence, abfence of feeling, va- cuum in time. Limitation, i. c. tranfition from feeling through its va- rious degrees, till it has vanifhed, or vice verfa.

3. Relation, i. c. arrangement in time, relation of feelings to

each other in time. Suhjlantialiiy, i, e. the real, in fo far as it is permanent

in, and with, time^the fubftratum of all

changes : and accidents, i. c. the real io fo

far as it changes. Cafiiality, i. e. fucceflion of different feelings in time,

conformably to a rule. Community^ i. c. fimultancity of feeling, according to

rule.

4. Modality,!, e.the modes, in which an obj eft belongs to

time. Tojfthility, I. -e. the reprefentation of a thing, con- formably to the conditions of any one time ~in general, ABuality, i. e. the reprefentation of a thing, in a de- terminate time. Necejfity, i. e. the reprefentation of a thing at all times. - (Finis)

48 ELEMENTARY VIEW pF '

perceptions, becaufe it is itfelf a perception a priori, and it has fomething common with all notions a priori ; becaufe it is a Form of all Senfations and Reprefentations a priori. The uniting of a pure Notion with aa objeft is, therefore, poffible merely through time as its Schema.

4. Through means of this Schema, according to the Table given in the preceeding note, all fjnthetical axioms may now be exaftly deteirniried a priori, and they are the following : Axiom of ^^antity ^ {ox of perception). " All phenomena in perception are exhibited under the notion of exten- fion." Axiom of^^uality^ (or of the anticipation of obfervation), ** In all phenomena, fenfation, and the reality which correfponds to it in the objeft, have intenjiiie quantum^ or a degree ; that is, evary reality can, through in- finite gradations, become lefs and lefs, till it be = o." Axioms of Relation, (or Analogies of experience).

a. " In all phenomena there is fomething perma-

nent, i. e. Subftance ; and fomething fliifting, or accidents."

b. Every event has a caufe.

c. All fubftances, fo far as they are co-exiflent, fland in reciprocation with each other.

Axioms of Modality, (or Poftulates).

a. That which agrees with the form of experience (according to Perception and Notion) is poffible really, not merely logically.

b. That which is connefted with the matter of expe- rience, i. e, with fenfation, is adlual.

c. That which is conneded with what is a6:ual, a- greeably to the univerfal conditions of experience, is (exills) neceflary.

Problem

KANT'S WORI^. 4f

Problem Fourth.

'To determine by thefe means the true hounds of human reafotiy confequently to explain pojitively^ how far our reafon can reach through mere fpeculation^ where ; on the contrqryy our proper knowledge ceafes, and nothing but faith and hope remain.

1. All the elementary notions, of which our Underftanding is capable, are exaftly thofe which the foregoing Table of them indicates, fo that there are neither more nor lefs of them in number.

%. All thefe elementary notions are applicable merely to fenfible objefts, and hence they ferve only for determining die neceffary predicates of every poffible perception. From this the following confequences refult.

a. We caniiot apply our notions to the mofl perfe£t Being ; confequently we cannot prove that he has cxten- fion, or qualities ; that he is a fubllance, a caufe of other things ; that he is poffible or a<5tual, or neceffary.

b. Even as to the objefts of our fenfitive faculty, all our elementary notions can teach us none of the predicates that belong to them in t;Jiemfelves, that is, to their Effence j but all predicates which, through thefe notions, can be afcribed to them, concern merely their '^perception, and the union of the X'^arieties in it, confequently the -way merely, in which they appear to us. Things in refpe<51: of what they are in them£blves, are no objedls, either of our fenfes or of our underftaading.

c. Hence the three cofmological queftions are mere chi- meras, viz. ' V

Whether the world, in point of fpace, be finite or in- finite ?

Whether it has had a beginning, or has exifled from eternity ?

. G Whether

50 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

Whether the number of parts, of which matter con- fifts, be finite or infinite ?

d. But as the undcrftanding cannot aflert, or prove, any thing of objects that come not under the cognizance of the fenfes, as little can it deny, or refute them, by any argu- ment that has even the appearance of validity. And hence arifes the (fublim?) prefuppofition and belief of a Supreme Being, and of an immortality of the Soul ; becaufe there are certain neceflfary purpofes of human nature, moral laws, which require this prefuppofition.

e. Yet though we have fufllicient JuhjeBi've grounds for prefuppofing and determining certain fuperfenfible objects ; we have not, through fuch grounds, the leafl knowledge, how thefe objedls may be fconftituted in themfelves ; but we try to determine them, only by analogy.

3. All the Synthetical Axioms of our Underftanding, by means of which we are able to judge of objedls, are exaBly thofe which the foregoing Table of them indicates, and we know, therefore, a priori, the whole foundation of all the knowledge of which our Underftanding is capable.

4. But all thefe axioms of cur Underftanding have objective validity, only fo far as the pofiibility of experience depends on them ; and they ferve merely to determine the neceflary con- nexion of fenfible things with each other. It may hence be juftly faid, that our Underftanding, inftead of firft learning its axioms from nature, rather through them, a priori, prefcribes laws to nature ; and that on this account it is the true legijla" ture of nature y fo that, without thefe axioms of our Under- i!anding, all regularity and order among the objefts of fenfe, confequently the pofiibility of experience itfelf, would ceafe. Hence, too, as foon as we wifli to rife with the axioms of our Underitanding to fuperfenfible objects beyond nature, we al- ways make an unjuftifiable ufe of them,

5-

KANT'S WORKS. 51

■ 5. And as oux Underjlanding can neither form a notion of fuperfenfible obje£ls, nor judge of them; as little can our Reafon difcover by inference any fuperfenfible objedt ; confe- quently, no Syllogifm can lead us to new objefts, which lie without the fphere of poffible experience.

6. All notions which our reafon can form of fomething, that is abfolutely unconditiotiate, are therefore mere IdeaSy whofe objedive validity can be proved through no fpecies of Syl- logifm.

7. Hence the Axiom, '* If the conditionate thing be given, the abfolutely unconditionate thing is alfo given," is nothing but a fubje£live logical Maxim of Reafon, i. e. a Maxim which regulates the train of reafoning in the Mind itfelf.

8. As now the whole of fpeculative Cofmology, Pfychology and Theology entirely refts on this Axiom ; thefe three Sciences, as far as concerns their fpeculative parts, are nothing but Syf- tems of fallacies *. Ontology, alfo, completely fails, and muft be changed into a bare Analyfis of the notions of our Underftand- ing. — The whole body of Metaphyfics, then, muft be confined to the Metaphyfics of Nature.

Problem Fifth.

To folnje the riddle y why our Reafon is fo irrejijiibly inclined

to 'Venture with its fpeculations beyond the bounds of pojjible

G 2 knowledge ;

• From what is here faid, the reader may be led to fuppofe, that Kant alto- gether denies the pofliibility of proving the exiftence of a Supreme Being, the im- mortality of the Soul, &c. This fuppofition, however, would be ill-founded ; for Kant diftindlly and repeatedly admits the exiftence of thefe fuperfenfible ob- jccfts ; but maintains, that we arrive at the knowledge of them through a procefs of pradical, not fpeculative, Reafon. This procefs he endeavours to vindicate and illuftratc, by the moll appropriate examples, in his Critique of PraSlical Reafon^ the contents of which the Reader will find in our Chronolooical Anai.tsis.

5^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

knowledge ; arid hence to deteEi the fallacy ^ by which it is in this rcfpeB involuntarily deceived.

1. The ground of this irrefiftible bias lies in the nature of of our Reafon itfelf . Reafon cannot, be fatisfied with the ori- ginal Notions and Axioms of the Underflanding alone ; but through categorical, hypothetical and disjunftive conclufions, it attains to the Idea of a fimple fubftance, of an abfolute Univerfum, of an abfolute exiilent perfcftion in the number of real parts of matter, of an abfolute perfection in the feries of caufes, of an abfolute necelTary Being, and of a Subftance that poflefles all realities.

2. Confequentlj the Idea of the abfolutely unconditionate thing has indeed ^^ri^di fuhjeEiive validity, and is in no man- ner an arbitrary fidlion : Reafon forces it on us neceflarily. But hence it does not follow, that this Idea has alfo objeBive validity. Reafon commits a very concealed, indeed, but un- deniable fophifm, when from mere Notions it forms the fyn- thetical Axiom, *' that, if the conditionatc thing be given, fo mufl be alfo the abfolutely unconditionate."

3. As the Idea of abfolutely unconditionate obje£ls is in- difpenfibly required by our Reafon, it is very natural, that even the acuteft philofopher fhould not only feel in himfelf an unavoidable bias to fuch fallacious conclufions ; but alfo, that it mull be very difficult for him to difencumber himfelf froin them completely, though lie be fortunate enough to difcover the deception.

Scholion*

Thus, tlirough the CRiTi<iUE of Kant, all thefe five pro- blems, concerning the poffibility and the limits of pure rational difcoveries, have been thoroughly folved, but in a way which perhaps no philofopher had fuppofed. According to the refult

oi

KANT'S WORKS. 53

of this Critique y the poffibility of pure latlonal knowledge, fuch as Metaphyfics can furnifh, has been eftabiiihed. Eut that kncJWledge extends no further, than to the world of fenfe, confequentlj only to the univerfal and iieceffary laws of nature. A demonftrably certain Syftem of Metaphyfics is indeed pof- fible, but a very different one from what we have had hither- to, which, as its name indicates, fets out with propofitions for judging dogmatically upon things difcoverable beyond the

region of Phyfics, i. e. without the limits of Nature. If

the principles above delineated be juft, the only po£ille Me- taphyfics, fo far as we are entitled to proceed dogmatically, are the Metaphyfics of Nature — Confequently the Critique of Kant confiders all the Metapnyfical Syftems, which have been hitherto propofed, as falfe ware, and maintains that we have as yet no juft Metaphyfics. His own work is important and profound, and deferves to be carefully examined by thofe who are converfant in fuch fludies. Whatever the refult of this examination may be, philofophy will undoubtedly gaia by it : aud although the Critique of Kant fhould not ftand the. teft of future, perhaps more fuccefsful refearches, it will ne- verthelefs form a remarkable epoch in the hiftory of Meta- phyfical Science.

11. Chronological Analysis.

Exordium,

In venturing upon this eflential part of the Elements, which are defigned to afford a concife, though comprehenfive view of the diverfified labours of Kant, I deem it a duty incumbent upon me to ft ate that, both his fyftematic works *, as well as

thofe

* That thefe may be more cafily diftinguiflicd from Others, I have arranged Uicm by a fccond nunibtr euclofed in ( ).

54

ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

thofe which treat upon general fubjedls of philofoph j, are here fuccejjively fubmitted to the confideration of the reader.

I ir\ufl however remark that, confiftent with the plan and extent of thefe Elements^ the review of fo great a variety of fubjedls cannot abound in Criticifm ; but I hope it w^ill be found the more complete in the analytical part of it, compre- hending emery fubjeft * treated by the illuftrious author, during a period now exceeding half a century.

Though my abilities — the limited compafs of which is bell known to myfelf — were adequate to do the works of Kant that juftice in reviewing them critically, to which they are certainly entitled ; I would ftill hefitate to engage upon an undertaking, obviouily not the moll grateful, and in my rela- tive fituation, as a former pupil to the mofl. renowned Pro- feflbr in Europe, perhaps unbecoming. Hence I ihall content myfelf with the humble province of briefly commenting upon the aim of every individual publication, and then of exhibiting the contents of each through a precife tranflation.

The difficulty of underflanding the peculiar terms and ex- preffions of Kant mull, I have reafon to hope, in great mea- fure vanilh ; if the reader, in every inilance, with patient and diligent application, reforts to the Glojfary.

In order to chara6lerize the early genius of the author, who, in the twenty- fecond year of his age, publilhed an ElTay upon one of the moil abflrufe fubje£ls of inquiry, I ihall con- clude thefe preliminaries with the lingular Motto prefixed to this juvenile production :

Nihil

* Thofe ECays, which have not been feparately printed, andtlic moft of which ■were publilhed in the Monthly Magazine of Berlin, I could not procure from Ger- many ; but I have ftill introduced them in this review, merely for the fake of com- pletensfs, T.pon the authority of Prof. WitL of AltJorf and Prof. Sciimid of Jw«,

KANT's WORKS. S5

Nihil magis praeftandum eft, quam ne pecorum ritu fequa-. Bfiur antecedentium gregem, pergentes, non gua eundum eft, fed qua itur.

Seneca de vita heata ; Cap. I.

I. Gedanken von der wahren Schat%ung der lebcndigen Krafte. — Refledlions upon the true computation of living (moving) powers. Konigfberg, 220 pp. large 8vo. with two plates, 1746,

After having paid handforae and due compliments to his me- ritorious countrymen Leibnitz, Wolf, Herrmann, Bernoulli, BuLLFiNGER, and many other eminent philofophers, the young author examines the different theories and proofs advanced " on the living (inherent) powers of bodies," and endeavours to (hew, that their notions on this intricate fubjeft were far fi;om being cor- * re£l, and that the dilTentions prevailing among them arofe chiefly from having, each of them, confidered the fubjedl in a different point of view. Thus their underftandings were mifled by paying an undue regard, partly to the obftacles overcome by lueigl.t', partly to matter as a£ied upon, or moved, by weight j partly to the prejjure fuffered by elqflic bodies j and finally to the velocities arijing from compound mo- tion.— He attacks Leibnitz moft feverely, while he enters upon a fundamental inquiry infj the origin of his theory concerning the mo- ving powers. It appears obvious to Kant, that Leibnitz bad been led to this theory, by implicitly proceeding on the known rule from which Descartes explains the nature of the lever. Prior to Leibnitz, the world had admitted the fimple propofition of Descartes, " that the mere velocity of bodies, even fuch as are in adlual motion, ferves as a rule for afcertaining their power." But Leibnitz fuddenly roufed the reafoning powers of man, by propofing a new law which, flnce that period, has offered rich materials for difcuflion to the moft learned and acute. Descartes had computed the powers of bodies in motion by mere velocity. But Leibnitz adopted ihtfjuare of velocities in this computation.

Whateve»

5^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

IVJjatever merit may be due, from this Chronological Analysis, to the Recorder of Kant's Collective Works, and from ha- ving engaged in' a tajk — psrhaps the mojl toilfome in life \ — / have flill to lament the impojjibility, or rather the impraBicahility of giving the refpeBive contents of each work at full length ; efpe- cially when I conjider, both the limited fi'ze of thefe Elements, and the almojl boundlefs region oflLkST''sfpeculations.

Nothing, therefore, but the well founded hope, that no reafonable tnan will expeB to firfd in thefe Contents more, or lefs, than I have promifed, — canfupport me in this laborious undertaking.—

Contents,

Chapter First. Of the po-wer of bodies , in general. § l. Every mechanical body pofieires an eff^niial power, a. This power of bodies Leibnitz expreffed by the common name, effeBive poiver. 3. It ought to be called -vis matrix (moving power). 4. On the method of explaining motion from the efFeftive powers in general 5. Of the difficulties arifing from the theory of reciprocal operation of body and mind, if we attribute to the former no other power, than the vis motrix. 6. Of the obftacles thence arifing in the explanation of the manner, in which the mind afrc<3:s the body ; of the method of removing them, if we adopt a common vh aBi'va. 7. There may exift things, the prefence of which cannot be at all de- monftrated. S. It is not improbable, in a ftridl metaphylical fenfe,that there may be more than one world, 9. If bodies, or fubftances, had no power to operate cxter- »a//v, there would be neither extenjlon nor /pace. 10. The triplt dimenfion of fpace is probably derived from the law, according to which the powers of fubftances af- feft each other. 11. Of the condition which renders the exiftence of a plurality of worlds probable. 12. Some Metaphyficians maintain, chat bodies, by means of their (peculiar) powers, incline towards motion in all diredlions 13, 14. Two objec- tions againft this opmion : a.) That the rfioving body does not advance in an equal ratio with the body moved ; b.) That tlie effort towards motion, which fubftances manifeft in all diredlions, muft have a certain degree of intenfity ; for it cannot be infinite, and a finite (limited) exertion, without a certain degree of effort, involves a contradiction. 15. Motion muft be confidered to be of t7.io different kinds. 16. Motion o{ ihefif kind is analogous to dead (inert) prefTure. 17. 18. 19. Mo- tion of the fecond kind prcfuppofes a power, which correfponds with the fquare of velocity.

Chapter Seco,ND, Inquiry into the principles ^ upon ivhich the adherents rfLzm- KiTZ explain the' living poivers. § 20, 21 Buelfinger's advice in fettling dif- ferences between par^jes 22 Leibnitz's and Di:scam e»'s method of computing powers. 23. i''/>y?errorof Leibnitz, in aflerting "ifabody is in adlual motion,

it!

KANT'S WORKS. 57

i?s power is equal to the fquare of its velocity." 24. AAual motion is that, which is not merely at the point of beginning, but during which a certain time has clapfed. This intermediate time, between the begimiing of motion and the mo- ment in which the body moves, properly conftitutes what is called aSiual motion^ 35. Second error of Leibnitz, " that the time confumed during motion is the true and only character of hving power, and that from this alone the difference of com- puting dead and living powers muft refult." a6. ^Further proof againft Leibnitz, from the law of continuity. 27. The time elapfed during motion, confequently the reality of motion, is not the true criterion of computing the Hying power of bodies. a8, 29. iVIathematics cannot prove the reality of living powers. 30. Leibnitz was firft mifled in the computation of living powers, by Defcartes's ex- planation of the lever. 31. Herrmann's affertion, that the powers are in pro- portion to the heights, to which they may rife. 3z. Refutation of this affertion. 33. The followers of Defcartes commit the fame error. 34, ^s. Lichtscheid's doubts upon this head removed. 36. 37. 38. An inftance which proves, that in the computation of power arifing from weight, time muft be neceffarily taken in- to account. 39. Summary of all the proofs derived from the motion of elaftic bodies. 40. The Leibnitzians refute their own conjedlures, through the Syftems of Mechanics which they eftablifh. 41. Herrmann's ftatement, refpeding the repulfion of three elaftic bodies, examined. 4a, 43. The origin of the fallacy .in the reafoning, by which he eftablilhed his concliifion. 44. This condufion was unknown to Mad. de Chastelet. 4^, 46, 47. Jurin's objedlion concerning the reciprocal pulfion of two elaftic and unequalbodies ; — Bernouilli's anfwer to this objeiftion, in comparing it with the preffure fuffered by elaftic bo- dies ; — his ideas on the fubjed; are refuted by his oitin premifes, which con- firm Kant's opinion. 48. Defence of the living powers, fupported by the con- ilant balance of power in the world. 49, 50. Two different ways of explaining this affertion. 51. The fource of Leibnitz's hypothefis relative to the preferva- tion of a uniform power, with propofals for fettling this controverfy, and a con- clufive anfwer to bis affertion. 53. According to the law eftabliftied by Leib- nitz, the power exercifed in the touch, between a fmall and a larger elaftic body, is the fame before as after this contaft. 5$. The fallacy of this obfervation itfelf refutes the theory of the living powers, as maintained by the Leibnitzians. 54. Tliis appears ftill more obvious, by inverting the cafe ; if, namely, a lirgcr elaftic body is brought into contadl with a fmaller one. jj. Calculation affords proofs of the Cartefian law, that " if a larger body touches a fmaller one, there re- mains an equal proportion of power." 56. The power, with which a fmaller bo- dy recoils from a larger one, is called minus. 57. Mad. de Chastelet has very improperly ridiculed this determination, which M. de Mairan firft propofed. 58. The Leibnitzians fhrink from the inquiry into the living powers, by means of the pulfion obferved in untlajlic bodies. 59. The latter is more dccifive in de- termining the living powers, than the refiftance of elaftic bodies. 60, 6j. Ths Leibnitzians give a frivolous anfwer to thefe objetftions, by faying, that " in the repulfion of unelaftic bodies, one half of the power is confumed in the imprefiion

H made

58 ELEMENTARY VIE'W OF

made upon the parts of thefe bodies." 6a. Reply firfl : becaufe this is a mechanf cal, not a mathematical cfFeA of bodies. 63. Reply ftcond : becaufe we have right to call a body unelaftic, tho' it be perfedly hard. 64. Reply third: the im- preffion made upon the parts, offers no argument for afferting, that a part of the power of unelaftic bodies is Ifift; by the refiftance exerted on their fide. 65. ^'t- f\y fourth; the degree ofhardnefs in unelaftic bodies, and the degree of power exerted in the contaA, muft yet be determined by the Leibnitzians. 66. The re- Hftance of unelaftic bodies entirely deftroys'the living powers. 67 — 70. (General proof, that the concuftion of elaftic bodies muft, in every inftance, evince the fal- fity of fuppofing living powers ; — that in the percuflion of elaftic bodies v/e oaght to confider only the Incipient velocity of the hodj percn feJ. 71=77. Examina- tion of the proofs of the living powers derived from compound motion : particu- larly BuEi finger's, which is refuted in feveral ways. 78. The ftraight power irf the diagonal line does not correfpond with the amount of power exerted towards the latei"al parts. 79. In the computation of power by Lkibnit7., the amount of it, in an oblique dircftion, is equal to the diagon:.! power ; but in that by Descar- tes., the former frequently is infinitely greater than the latter. 80=83. A newr cafe towards the refutation of living powers; viz. " that a body moving in- a circle produces the fame effecSl, with refpeft to gravity, as if it reclined upon an obliqtie furface^j- — and that a circular moving body, in every finite nieafure of riOTf, produces the efteffl; of a finite /low^r, even againft the obftacle s of ^;vjt»/*)'. 84. Descartes removes this difficulty by his method of computing power. 85. Another contradi<Sion in this computation by the fquare ; for every one agrees " that the computed power of velocity refulting from the multiplication with it- felf, according to the right angle, muft have infinitely more force, than that which i« fimply exprefi'ed by the, meafure of velocity; and that it has the fonic relation to this, as the furface has to the line." 86. The cafe ftated by Bernooilli, concerning the elajiic ^ower of /our fimilar fprings, is here refuted. 87=90. Mairan's objedion againft the ftafement of Herrmann; the utility of the me- thod adopted by the former ; its tendency to prevent certain palpable miftakes, which haye long remained concealed. 91. Buklfinger's diftinclions, by which he endeavours to elude the objetSlion of Mairan, are fettled by this method. 92,^3. A fingular compound cafe by Leibnitz, which refts upon fallacious reafpning. ■*

•' As Bernouji-li, Htrrsiann and Wolf, the admirers of Leibnitz, have " not, in the ufual m.anner, informed us — that nothing equals this proof- in point of " invention and (apj)arent) ftrength.— I am inclined to think, ' fays Kant,' that " fo great a man as Leieniti could not err, without gaining reputation by the i' very idea, that miflcd hun into'this error." I cannot, upon this occafion, forget " the words of Hector iii Virgil :

Si Pergama dextra

Defend; poffent, ctiani hac defcnfa fuiffent.

Virg. AennJ, 94,9;. The power, which the body A has acquired liy the arrangenoent of »

machine

KANT'S WORKS. 59

«>achine,-is not the effcdl of power produced by the body B. 96. The fame is con- firmed from the law of continuity. 97. The whole extent of the fujjicient tea/on in tlic preceding poQtion. 98. The only difficulty, that ftill preyails in the Leib- nitzian argument, is anfwered. 99. Papin's evafive objeftion is weak and unte- nable, viz. " ^omodo autem fer tranjlationtm totius pvtentia corporis A in corpus B, ■uxia Cartejium, oLtineri pujpt motus perpetuus cuijentijfims dtmonjlrat, atque ita Carte" fianos ad abfurdum reduBos arhitratur. Ego autt-m et ixoiutn perpetuum abfurdum ej^e faleor, tt CI. Fir. demonjlrationem ex fuppofsta tranjlatione ijfe legitimam.'^ And af- ter having, in ihii pojti-ve manner, declared himfelf again ft that important pofition of Descartes, he fcelts for flielter, in difputing the premifes of his adverfary ; and in challenging him, to folve this Gordian knot. The following words difcover his opinion : Scd Hypothefts ipfius pojjihililatem tranjlationis nimirum toiius potentije /■x corf ore A iH corpus B pernego, etc. fA^. Erudit. 1691. page 9 )— IOO=IOI. Leibnitz's reply to Papin is equally inconfiflent, and Ka n r believesthat the former has written thefe words in good earneft : " Cum Florentla effem, dedi amlco mliam adhnc demonjlrationem, pro pojjibiltiate tranjlationis virium dctalium, tjfc. coipon majore ii> minus quiefcens, prorfus ajfinem iis ipfis, quo CI, Papinus ingenuujijfime pro mt juvaadi e}'XOgita-bit,pro qui ''us gratias dcbeo, imo et ago,Jinccritatc ejus digitus. "—l?rooi, that a quadruple body may communicate to a fmgle body four degrees of velocity by means of percuflioh upon a lever ; — how Pa pin ought to have reafoned againfl i-EiBNiTz ; all the arguments for proving the entity of living powers againft the computation of Defcartes have failed ; no hopes are left to to reconcile them. \Q%. The principal arguments of the Leibnitzians refuted 103, 104. WoLr'g argument, and his principal axiom : «' if a body has jsiffed through the fame ip-^Xv.-, it has alfo produced the fame innocuous ejf^d." 105. Another a:ujm of the JVol- fan Scbediafma : " As fpaces (objects of fpace), in the a>ft of uniform, motion, bear a compound relation to the velocities and times ; fo the innocuous eJeSis cor- refpond with the mafl'es, times, and velocities of bodies." Upon thisa.'ciom, Wolb eflabliflies the following erroneous theorem : Aiiiones quiuxs idem ejfeBus prcdw eitur-, flint et celerilaia. lofr. We are not yet in the pofl>;llion of a Syftm of Bynw micks, 107, 108. The argument of MuscSenukoeK examined; 109. Anew cafe for ihe confirmation of the Cartefian method of computing powers, no. The doubts of Leibnitz folvtd by Jurin. in, 112. Mad.de Chaftelet's frivo- lous ol)je<Slion againft Jurin's argument expofed. 113. Richier's objetftions fliare the fame fate. — The author concludes this Chapter withfomc fupplemcntary notes and illuftrations, in which he unfolds the following particulars : (a) Why the undetermined idea of fiiiite time, alfo includes the portion of time inlinitcljf fniall ? (b) Leibnitz's mpthed of computing powers cannot even be admitted mi- der the condition of finite (limited) velocity, (c) Why time muft nccellarily en- ter into the computation of the obltacles occafioned by gravity.

CllAPTIrll 'i'niKD. A -vieit) of a neiv Atcfbod of computing tie living poiv.^ls ; ii- ing ^e iPtly tnti miafure of natural po-uits.-^—^ 1 14. That kw, which has been fooad inapplicable in Mathematics, may neverthclefs apply to Natural Philofophy. iij. piftiUiSliw bfi^ween mathematical itiA natural bodies, and between the la'vvs relative

Hi to

6o ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

to both. ii6. Velocity affords no juft idea of power, 117. There would be no jiowcr, if there were no effort to preferve the Jlatus in fe ; illuftration of the idea oiinUnfion. 1 18. If intenfion be comparable with a point, power refembles a' line, namely that of velocity. 119. If intenfion be finite, i. e. like a line, /"otf^r is comparable With ^fqi'are. no. A body, that manifefts an internal effort to pre- ferve its motion free and conftant, has a power analagous to the fquare of velocity. xti. A body cannot acquire its living power from without. 122. There is an infinite number of intermediate degrees between dead and living power ; — the latter can arife or'y in a finite time, after the beginning of motion. 123. That flate, in which the power of bodies is not yet li-ving (evolved^,, but is in a pro- greflive crifis, Kant terms the i)i-vification. 124, 125. According to a new eftima- ,tion of powers, a body that preferves its velocity, in free motion, in infinitum undi- miniflied, poffeffes living power, i. e. fuch a power as can be edimated by the fquare of velocity. 126. As there are free motions, there are likewife living powers. — Ma- thematics admit no free motions. 127. Aneafier method of applying thefe re- flcdtions to advantage. 128. Bernocilli was not unacquainted with thefe ideas, " fis vii)a,"_ fays he, " i:/l aliquid reaU et fubjlantiale, quod per fefubjijlit, et quantum in fetji, non dtpindit ab alio : — -— — — ^— Vis mortua neii efl aliquid abfolutumet perfedurdns, S<.c. 129*. The living powers are of an accidental nature. '130,131. Experience confirms the ixxcctSivt-vivif cation. 132, 133. Vivification is not ap- plicable to all velocities in general ; — application of this rule to motion, in a re- fifting medium. 134, 135. Whether vivification and free motion, in all the higher degrees of velocity, are poffible /■« infinitum. 136 — 138. The living power may in part vanifh, without having produced any effeft. 139, 140. The phenomena of thofe bodies which overcome gravity, neither manrfeft any living power, nor do they militate againft it. 141. Soft bodies do not operate with their colledive power. 142, 143. Query : whether the effed of bodies, without diftindlion, is proportional to the mafs of their living power. 144, 145. The mafs, ia which a body can produce effedls proportional to its living power, muft be determined ; fmaller maffes, under a certain fize, cannot produce that effect. 146, 147. Fluid bodies operate in proportion to the fquare of velocity. 148 — rji. ■■ The motions of elalUc bodies are inconfiflent with the computation of Leibnitz, but they agree with that of Kant. 152, I53. Mechanical proof of the living powers, by Mus- CHENBRbEK. 154, 155. A fpririg of equal elafticity comniunicates a greater de- gree of power to a larger body than to a fmalier one. 156 — 158. Whence the fquares of velocities of cylinders are in an inverfe ratio to the maffes. I59 — 161. In the effe<S of gravity, time ought te be com.puted ; — ^foft fubftances are of a very different nature. 162. The force of refiftancc of foft matter takes place with finite velocity;

p. Allgemeine Naturgefchichtej oder 'Theorie des Himmels, nach Newtonifcben Grundsdtzen. A general hiflory of na- ture, or theory of the heavens, upon Newtonian principles. 8vo. Koenigjberg. 1 755.

KANT'S WORKS. §t

yil. Principiorum metaphyjicorum nova dilucidatio. 4to. 1 755. iV. Dijfertatio de principiis primis cognitionis humance. 410. Regiomonti' 1755.

V. Monadologia phyjzca. 4to. 1756.

VI. Ge/chicbte der merkwurdigsten Vorfdlle des Krdhehens, welches am Ende des 1755 sten ^ahres einen grojjen 'Theil der.

Erde erfch'iittert hat Hiftorj of the moft remarkable e-

vents produced by the earthquake, which convulfed a great part of the globe, towards the end of the year 1755. 4to. Koenigsbe7-g, 1756.

VJI. Neuer Lehrhe griff der Bewegung und Ruhe^ und der da~ mit verknupften Erfahrungen in der Naturiviffcnfchaft. — New theory of motion and reft, together with an account of the experiments relative to them in Natural Philofophy, 4to. Koenigsherg. 1758.

VIII. Betrachtungen uber den Optimifmus Reflexions upon

Optjmifm. 4to. 1759.

IX. Entwurf und Ankilndigung eines Collegii der phyjljchen G eographie, nehjl einer Unterjuchung : oh die Wejlwinde in vnjern Gegenden darum feucht Jind, weil Jie iiher ein grojfes Mee^Jlreichen ? — A iketch and annunciation of a courfe of lectures on phyfical geography ; together with an inquiry whether the wefterly winds are for this reafon moid in our climate, becaufe they blow over a great fea, 4to. Koenigs- herg. 1739.

X. Eriveis der falfchcn Spit^findigkcit der vier fyllogijlifchen Figuren. — ^"riie fali'e fubtleties of the four fyllogiftical figures proved. 8vo. 1762. ^I. Verjuchy den Be griff der negativen Groffcn in die tVe/f- iveijheit einzufiihren, — An attempt towards introducing the idea of negative magnitudes into philofophy. 1763. ^I. Einzig moglicher Beweisgrund "zu einer Demonjiration

des

6» ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

des Dafeyns Gottes. The only poflible method of proving the exiftence of the Deity. 8vo. Koenigjberg. \']6'^.

XIII. Beobachtungen iiber das Gefiibl des Schbnen und Erhu' bcnen. Obfervations upon the effedl of the Beautiful and Sublime. 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1764. 2d Edit. 1:770.

XIV. Traume eines Geisterfehers, erldut^rt durch Trdume der Metaphyfik. Dreams of a Fanatic, illuftrated by dreams in Metaphyiics. 8vo, 1764.

XV. Abhandlung iib^r die Evident in Metaphyjischen Wijfen' Jchaften ; die bey der Koffiglicben Akademie der Wijfenjchaf-

ten das AcceJJit erhalten haty und mit Mofes Mendelfohri's Preifschrift viugleich erfchienen iji. A Treatife on Evidence in Metaphyfical Sciences, &.C. ^vo. Berlin. 1764.

XVI. AtiTnerkungen %iir Erlduterung der Theorie der VVinde. Remarks ferving to illuflrate the theory of the winds. 4to.

1765-

Of thefe work*, the reader will fcarcely require a detailed ac^ count J for the mod of them, though feveral times reprinted, have become very fcarce. They are indeed, in feme degree, conne6led with the following fyftematic works of the author j but as Pro- feffor Kant has not llriftly adopted that method of deinonftration, which he^/y? propofed in the publication ftated under No. XII. viz. ** The only poflible method of proving the exiftence of the !Peity," I confide^ed it as an unprofitable talk to tranflate the In- dexes belong^g to thefe refpc^live works j though it were in my power to procure them from Germany. For the fame reafon, I prefume, Mr. Nitsch has remarked in his late excellent publica- tion, " A general and introductory view of Prof. Kant's principles concerning man, the world, and the Deity j" that the work above alluded to, No. XII, does not conftitute any part of the Kantean Syftem, as the firft edition of it was publiftied ten years(^ or from the firft Edition of it, eighteen years) before that fyftem was com- pleted.

XVII. (1) De Mundi fenj%ilis at que intelligibilis forma et principiis. Diflertatio pro loco profeffionis Log. et Me-

taph.

KANT'S WORKS. 6^§

tapli. ordinaria; rite fibi ' vindicando ; quam exlgentibus

ftatutis academicis publice tuebitur Immanuel Kant

Regiomonti ; in auditori maximo, horis matutinis et po- meridianis confuetis j Die XX. Aug. MDCCLXX.

Sectio I. De notione mundigeneraUm.-~-M.oment9y in mundi de- finitione attendenda, hsc funt : i Materia (^in scnfu tranfcenden- tali) h. e. partes, quae hie fumuntur effe fubjlantice. 2. Forma quae confiftit in fubHiantiarum coordinatiotie, non fubordinatione. 3. Univerjitas quae eft omnitudo compartium abfoluta.

Sectio II. De fenfibilium atque inteUigibilium dlfcrimine getter a- tim. — Senfualitas eft receplivitas fubjefti, per quam poflibilc eft, ut ftatus ipfius repraefentativus objedi alicujus przfentia certo modo afficiatur. IntclHgentia (rationalitas) eft facultas fubjefti, per quam, quae in fenfus ipfius per qualitaterft fuam, incurrere non pof- funt, fibi repraefentare valet.

Sectio III. Depr'incipiis formce MunJtfenJibilis.—Del^zu?o%.z. 7. Idea Temporis non oritur {t^fupponitur a fenfibus. 2. Idea Tetn- poris eft Jingularis, non generalis : Tempus eriim quodlibet noa cogitatur, nifl tanquam pars unius ejufdem temporis immenfi. 3. Idea itaque temporis eft intuJtus^ et quoniam ante omnem fenfa- tionem concipitur, tanquam conditio refpcftuum in fenfibilibus ob- viorum, eft intuitus, non fenfualis, (edpurus. 4. Tempus t&quan- turn continuum et legum continui in mutationibus univerfi princl- pium. 5. TcmpUi non eji objeBimim aliquid et reale, nee fubftantia, nee accidens, nee reiatio, fed fubje£tiva conditio per naturam men- tis hvtmanae neceffaria, quaelibet fenfibilia, certa lege fibi coordinan- di, et intuitus purus, 6. Tempus eft conceptus veriflimus, et, per omnia pofflbilia fenfuura objefta, in infinitum patens, intuitivae re- prasfentationis conditio. 7. Tempus liAqne t^ principium formale Mundi fenjibilis abfoiute primum. — -De Spatio. A. Conceptus fpatii non abftrahitur a fenfationibus externis. B. Conceptus fpa- tii eft fingularis reprefentatio omnia in fe comprehendens, Ron/ub fe continens notio abftrarfta et communis. C. Conceptus fpatii itaque eft intuitus purus j cum lit conceptus fingularis, fenfationi- bus non coniiatus, fed omnis fenfationis externae forma fundamen- talis. D. Spatium non ejl aliquid objeElivi et realis, nee fubftan- tia, nee accidens, nee reiatio j fed fiAbjedivum et idcale et a ua-

tura

64 ' ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

tura mentis flabili lege proficifccns, veluti fchenia, omnia ommnO

externe fcnfa fibi coordinandi. E. Qaanquam conceptus f^atii^ ut

obje6livI alicujus et realis entis vel afFeftionis, fit imaginarius, ni-

hilo tamcn fecius, refpeBive ad fenjibiha quceciinque^ non folum eft

veri^mus,ic6. etomnis vetitatis in fenfualitate externa fundamentum.

Sectio IV. De principioformce mundi intelligib'dls.

SECtio V» Dc tnslhodo circa fen jitiva et intelleBualia in Meia^

phyficis.

Concerning the lad two Se(rTions, I cannot omit mcntioningj that an abftraft of them could not be rendered intelligible to th? reader, without ftating likewife the illuftrations of the different po- iltions, at full length. Of this detail, the prefent fketch will not admit \ efpecially as the principles, refulting from the difqui- fitions contained in thefe two Seftions,hai'e been already expound- ed in the ^x;^/)ro^/£';«j-, which conftitute the principal part of the prefent Elements j and which, I have reafon to hope, will afford a comprehenlive, though fuccindl, view of Kant's Critique. — No further apology will be required by the learned, that the preceding extraft from the author's Inaugural Di/lertation has been given in his own words, in the original Latin } for, to tranfiate this into Englifh, might be confidered as an infult offered to the literati of this country. — V^ith ref lecEt to the fubfequent works, it muft be remembered, that our objcdl is merely to exhibit the contents of thofe, which could be procured from Germany, during the limited intercourfe with that country, and to define the mofi: difficult and abftrufe terms in tire Glojfury, which concludes this publication.

XVIIL (2) Kr'itik der reinen Vernunft. Critique of Pure Reafon. Svo. Kiga. 1781. Second Edition improved, 17S7. Third Edition 1790. Fourth Edition, 1794. pp. 884, and. xliv pages Preface.

Table of Contents.

Introduction. I. Of the diftinclion between pure and empliicai knowledge. II. We are in the poffeffion of certain intuitions (truths) a priori, and even common fenfe never is without them. III. Philofophy demands a fcience, which may determine the pof- fibility, the principles, and the extent of our intui'aons a /'■/':"•/.

IV-

KANT'S WORKS. 65

IV. Of the diflinftlon between analytical and fynthetical judg- ments. V. In all the theoretical fciences of reafoning we meet with fynthetical judgments a priori, which are contained in them as principles. VI. General problem of Pure Reafon. VII. Plan and divifion of a particular fclence, under the name of a Critique of Pure reafon.

I. Transcendental elementary Doctrine. Part I. Tranfcen-

dental Aefthetic. SeSi. I. Of fpace. II. Of time Part II. Tran-

fcendental Logic. Introd. J)efinitIon of tranfcendental Logic, r. Of Logic in general. 2. Of tranfcendental Logic. 3. Of the divifion of general Logic, into Analyfis and DIale61ic.' 4. Of the divifion of tranfcendental Logic, into tranfcendental Analyfis and Dialedlic.

Division I. Tranfcendental AnalyJis.-—'EooY;, I. Analyfis of no- tions. Chap. I. Of the method of difcovering all purely intellec- tual notions. Se£1. 1. Of the ufe of Logic in general. II. Of the logical funftlon of the intelled, in judgments. III. Of the pure- ly intelleftual notions or Categories. Chap, II. Of the dedu^flion of the purely intelleftual notions. Se6i. I. Of the principles of 4 tranfcendental dcdu61ion in general. II. Tranfcendental deduc* tion of the purely intelle61ual notions. Book. II. Analyfis of principles (tranfcendental doftrine of the judging faculty). — Irf. trod. Of the tranfcendental judging faculty in general. Chap. I. Of the fchema of the pure notions of the int'ellcft. II. Syftem of all the principles of the pure intellect. SeB. I. Of the fupreme prin- ciple of all analytical judgments. II. Of the fupreme principle of all fynthetical judgments. III. Syftematic exhibition of al| fynthetical principles of the pure intelleft. i. Axioms of per- ception. 2. Anticipations of apperception (obfcrvation). 3. Analogies of experience, a.) The principle of continuity of fub- ftance. b.) The principle of fucceflion in time, c.) The princi- ple of coexiflence. — 4. Poftulates of empirical thought in general. Chap. I. Of the ground of diftln^llon between all objefls in gene- ral, into phenomena and noumena. — Of the ambiguity arifing in the ideas of refleftion, by confounding the empirical ufe of the intel- left with thatof the tranfcendental. DiTisiON II. Tranfcendental Diale^ic, l>itrod. I, Of tranfcen-

I dcnta'^

66 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

(qfental illufion. II. Of Pure Reafon being the feat of tranfcen- dental illufion. a.) Of Reafon in general, b.) Of the logical ufe of reafon. c.) Of the pure ufe of reafon. Book I. Of the ■ notions afforded by Pure Reafon. Se6i. I. Of ideas in general. II. Of tranfcenuental ideas. III. Syftem of tranfcendental ideas. Book II. Of the dialeftic conclufions of Pure Reafon. Chflp. I. Of the faife cQncluiions of Pure Reafon, refpefting their form {para- Lgifmi). Of the antinomy of Pure Reafon. Se£i. I. Syftem of the cofmological ideas. II. Antithefis of Pure Reafon. Ill, Of the intereft of reafon in this conteft with itfelf. IV. Of the tranfceo- dental problems of Pure Reafon, in fo far as they muft neceffarily be folvcd. V. Sceptical exhibition of the cofmological queftions, through all four tranfcendental ideas. VI. Tranfccndental Idea- lifm, being the key to the folution of cofmological Diale£lic. VIT. Critical deciiion of the cofmological conteft, into which reafon falls with itfelf. VIII. Regulative principle of Pure Reafon, with rcfpeft to the cofnKilogical ideas. IX. Of the empirical ufe of the regulative principle of reafon, with refpeft to all cofmological ideas. — I. Solution of the cofmological idea refpefting the totali- ty of the compofition of the phenomena of a whole univerfe. 2. Solution of the cpfmological idea refpefting the totality of divifion f»f a given Tyhole in perception. — Concluding remark on the folu- tion of the tranfcendental ideas in Mathematics j and previous remark on the folution of the tranfcendental ideas in Dynamics. 3. Solution of the cofmological ideas refpedling the totality of de- riving the events of the world from their caufes. — On the pof- iibility of caufaliiy by the idea of liberty, as combined with the general law of phyfical neceffity.i — Illuftration of the cofmological idea of a liberty, that is connecled with the general laws of pliyfi- cal neceffity. 4. Solution of the cofmological idea refpe6ling the totality of the dependence of the phenomena, according to the veality of their exiftence in general. Chap. III. The Prototype of Pure Reafon, i. e. an idea of reafon in concreto. Seel. I. Of the prototype in general. II. Of the tranfcendental prototype. III. Of the arguments of fpeculative reafon, to conclude the exiftence of a higheft Being. IV. Of the impofiibility of an ontological proof of th? ejcifteuce of God. V. Of the irnpofllbility of a cof- mological

KANT'S WORKS. 6^

tnological proof of the exiftence of God. VI. Of the impoflibility of a phyfico-theological proof. VII. Critique of all Theology from fpeculative principles of reafon. — -Of the final purpofe of the natural Dialeftic of human reafon.

II. Transcendental DocTrink of Method. CBa/». I. The Dlf- clpline of Pure Reafon. Se^. I. With refpe£l to its dogmatical ufe. IL With refpeft to its polemical ufe. III. With refpe6l to its hypothefes. IV. With refpeft to its pioofs. Cha/>. II. The Canon of Pure Reafon. St'SI. I. Of the ultimate purpofe of the pure ufe of Reafon. II. Of the prototype of the higheft good, as being the fundamental caufe of determining the ultimate purpofe of pure reafon. Ill, On the exprefiionS, *' to be of opinion j to know J and to believe." Cbap. III. Of the Architeflonic of Pure Reafon. Cbn/t. IV. The hiftory of Pure Reafon.

Although we have already given the fubftance of this work in the Prob/emr, which ate exhibited in the foregoing part of ihefe Elements ; yet in a matter of fuch importance as the ptefcnt at- tempt of Kant aftually is, we do not hefitate to infert here ano- ther expofition of his principles^ fo that the reader may acquire a complete analytical view of their origin;

In order to trace the principles of all human knowledge and judgment, froni what fource both may arife, Kant deemed it in- cumbent upon the enquirer, to inftitute an accurate analyiis of the intuitive faculty of man. The chief objedl: of this inquiry was, i, to fcparate the notion we have of the intuitive f acuity ^ from all other notions connefted with it j 2, to lay afide, or to abftraftfroraj the concomitant and accidental characters of it, and to retain in this notion merely thofe charafters^ without which no intuitive faculty can at all be conceived : thus he obtained a general notion of the intuitive faculty of man, i. e. fuch as conQlls of no foreign ingredients. This faculty is the attribute of every man, it is given him in his own perfonal confcioufnefs, and the reality of it cannot be proved otherwife than by an appeal to this confcioufnefs. The exiftence of fuch a fiiculty has never been called in queftioo, it is granted by all parties, and hence it is to be confidered as a fair point, from which the philofopher may begin his inquiries. — To premife a UeHniiion of the intuitive faculty, is by no means ne-

I 3 ceffary j

(58 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

ccffaryj for its reality will be fufficiently proved, If the con- Aituent parts and cnarafters produced of it, be of fuch a nature as can be difcovered in every individual, who has the requifite capa- city and inclination of reflefting upon the fucceffive operations of his mind. Of infinitely greater inoportance we ftiall find the cor»- j'lete analyfis of this faculty ; fince the definition of fomething, the truth of which cannot be difcovered otherwife than by the preceding operation, can be of no pofitive advantage.

Kant ferioufly difcovered, that the intuitive faculty of man is a compound of very diflimllar ingredients j or, in other words, that it confifts ef parts very different in their nature, andeach of which performs funftions peculiar to itfelf j namely the Senfitive Faculty^ and the Under/landing. The former reprcfents the matter of things, fo as it is affe£ted by them ; the latter connefts the variety of thefe materials into a whole. Thefe two operations muft always' j>tecede, if there fliall take place a reprefcntation or intuition of a detcrtained object. Both, therefore, are cffentlal conftituents of the intuitive faculty of m^n, and both muft be aftive, at the fame <ime, in every intmiion.

Leibnitt;, indeed, had likewife remarked the diftlnftion fubfifting between the Senfitive Faculty and the Underftanding j but he en- tirely overlooked the effential difference between their funftions, :ind was of opinion, that both faculties were different from one another only in degree, while he fuppofed the Senfitive Faculty to be only a weaker degree of the Intuitive, which, when opera- ting in a flronger degree, was called the Underftanding : both, ac- cording to him, rcprefented the fame objefts, fave that the Senfitive Faculty exhibited thofe obje£ls in a confufed and obfcure manner, which the Underftandipg precifely and clearly apprehended. Eut this diftin^lioa is altogether falfe and yfithout foundation. The Underftanding, as far as we can explore this faculty, ftill remains, even in its weakeft d-egree, effentially different from the Senfitive Faculty, and the moft pcrfeft functions of the latter can never fup- j..]y the functions of the Underftanding. For, while the fenfes re • ■'cive the matter of the objedls, the Underftanding combines the variety in that matter, and forms a determined reprefcntation of -;i objeft, or an intuition. The former may reci.ive clear or ob- fcure

, KANT'S WORKS. dp

fcure impreffions j the latter may alfo combine In a diftinft or con* fufed manner. Clearncfs and obfcurity, diftinftnefs and confufion, may, therefore, be common to both j nay, what is clearly per- ceived by the fenfes,' may yet be obfcurely apprehended by the Underftanding ; and what the former exhibit in z confufed and ob- fcure manner, may neverthelefs be very clearly coriceived by the latter. The Underftanding may even form a clear notion of things, that never can become obje£ls of fenfe j and vice verfa, the fenfes may perceive things, which the underftanding cannot reprefent, cither clearly or obfcurely j although it is impoflible to have an intuition of any one objcft, unlefs both facuUies are aSively con- cerned in the fame obje(9t. For inftance, to think of God, liberty, virtue, and immortality, cannot yet be called to recagnife or to have an intuition of the objeils, different from their ideas 5 and to perceive fpaccs and times, and fenfible objefls of all kinds, can likevrrfe not be faid to have intuitions of them. For, to acquire the latter, we muft reduce the objedls to ideas, and combine them according to certain laws. The fenfes can do nothing further than perceive, i. e. reprefcnt the given thing immediately ; and tha underftanding only can think of it, i. e. combine the thing per-* ccived, or exhibit the given thing by mediately connedling it into one. The reality of the obje(5l, that is conceived by us in an idea, can be reprefented only by the fenfes, fince the objeft itfelf is ei- ther perceived through the fenfation occafioned by it, or it muft neceffarity be combined with any one perception, according to the laws of pofiible experience.

In the works of the Englifh and French phllofophers, we find this cffential diftinftion between the fenfitive and the intelleSual faculties, and their combination toivards producing one fynthetlcal intuition, fcarcely mentioned. Locke only alludes to the acciden- tal limitations of both faculties ^ but to inquire Into the eiTential difference prevailing between them, does not at all occur to him. It is, however, obvious, that from this negle£l there have arifen many fallacious conclufions, which for a long time, at leaft inlheir confequences, have been hurtful to found philofophy.

This diftin£lion then, between the fenfitive and intelleftual fa- £ulti6s, forms an effential feature in the philofophy of Kant ; it is

. the

70 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

tte bafis, upon which the moft of the fubfequent Inquiries are efla- biifhed. It mud neverthelefs be remembered, that Kant, in dif- tingulfhlng thefe two faculties, does not fpeak of real fubftances, different from one another. His intention merely is, to point out what every refle£\ing mind may ealily obferve within himfelf, if he stte,nds to what precedes an intuition, and how the onderftandlng combines every aft of perception. Now, fince the ground or fource of thefe two faculties obvioufly difcovers two diftinft pow- ers, it is both rational and neceffary, to denote their functions by diftinft names j though their effentially different operations (hould b« formed in one and the fame fubftance. We cannot attend here to an inference, that may be drawn from this identity of origin, againft the difcrimination of powers, that are in themfelves as diftir.ft as the motion of a clock, is from that of the hammer, which flrikes the bell, though by the fame mechanJfm, that moves the pendulum and the hands. In this very contrivance, we may find the moft con- vincing inftance of the aftual difference between the exerclfe of the fenfitive and Intelleflual faculties, if we coniider it both, in an vbjeBive vnA fubjedive view. In the former, we behold no more than a machine that moves, at certain equal diftances, the hands which are attached to it 5 and he, who is unacquainted with the purpofe for which it is defigned, will view it with the aftonlihment and fear of the Swifs peafant, who formerly deftroyed a time-piece dropped by a traveller, becaufe he apprehended mifchief from the noife that accompanied its motion. But, if this untutored fon of nature had been informed of the great utility of that machine, by the conftrufllon of which mankind have contrived to meafure time apparent, his intelleftual faculty might thus have been enlarged, and lie would have acquired \.h.t fuhje6iive view of a watch. With- out having had any previous experience of the defign, with which the motions of a time-piece are arranged in fpaces^ he could now conceive, a priori^ the neceiTary refult of this arrangement, by di- viding the duration of the day into hours, minutes, and fecond* > although experience would a pojieriori confirm this intuitive no- tion, and give it ohjeBive reality. This, indeed, cannot be obtain- ed in any other way than by means of the fenfes j for the quedion, here, is not of the laft and abfulute ground or fubftance of the intuitive faculty, but concerning the intuilive faculty as an appeal

to

KANTs WORICS. 71

to this laft fubftratum, that is determined by its operations. — Thus CopERNicos acquired demonftrativc certainty upon what he, at firft, had conceived only as an hypothcfis j for the central laws of the motions of celeftial bodies at the fame time proved the reality of that invifible power of attraftion, which fupports the fabric of the univerfe, and which Newton never could have difcovered, if the former had not ventured to go beyond the limits of poflible ex- perience, and to fearch for the ground or caufe of the motions ob- ferved, not in the objefls of the celeftial bodies, but in the eyes of the fpcdlator.

Kant, therefore, prevloufly analyfed the Senfitlve Faculty, and endeavoured to difcover the neceffary conditions, without which our Senfitive Faculty cannot perceive any objefls whatever. Af- ter having cautioufly feparated all that, which, in the phenomena exhibited by the fenfes, either Is merely accidental, or is owing to the fun£lion of the intelleft, he difcovered, that /wo conditions only remain, without which, every where, neither our Senfitive Facul- ty, nor Its objects, are conceivable. Thefe conditions are, Space and Time. They have ever been the fturabling block of all me- taphyflcians, and the fpurce of endlefs difpiites. Kant confiders them In fuch a manner as will afford fatisfaftlon to every cool and unbiaffed enquirer after truth, fince none but the moft inveterate Sceptic, or the obftinate Syftematic, can withhold their affcnt. He (hows namely,

I, That both thefe reprefentatlons are the immediate produc- tions of the fenfes, and confequently admit of no further derivar tion. Hence It was a fruitlefs attempt of Lfibnitz, who endea- voured to explain their origin from Intelleftual notions. The Un- derftanding has, Indeed, the power of arranging Space and Time with their modifications, under the Ideas of order, unity, and fo forth, but it cannot derive either of them from thefe Ideas j It can unfold and explain their contents, but it cannot conceive the pof- fibillty of their origin, any further than that they are fomething given us by the Senfitive Faculty Itfclf.

2, They mufl be thought of as the fubftratum of all fenfible ob- jefts, I. e. as the forms of all phenomena. But they are not real Qbje£ts and felf-fubfiftent, as Clarke imagined ; their reality

wholly

»!% ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

vrhoUy depends upon thofe things, which can be obfcrved in them : abftraftly confidered, they are the bare forms of our Senfitive Fa- culty J forms, through ^ich we are enabled to determine, that all real obje£ls of fenfe are conformable to them, or that thefe objefts mull of ueceiTity be given in them.-t-It is by this manner of reprefentation, that we can explain all the predicates of Space and Time, as that of infinity, continuity, uniformity, &c. without incurring thofe difficulties, which have been produftlve of the greateft donfufion in philofophy, and which have involved Mathe- roatlcs and Metaphyfics Into perpetual dliTenflons.

3, Finally, Kant alfo fhows, that fpace and time, being the forms of our Senfitive Faculty, muft confequently be conceived as the forms of thofe objefts only, of which we can attain Intuitions : thus they are merely forms of phenomena, and not the forms of all things in general, that are the objeds of knowledge. Nay, It is even conceivable, that the things exhibited to us in fpace and time, abflraftly confidered, may be viewed or perceived by other thinking beings, under very diflferent forms j although it is not in pur power, either to determine more preclfcly this difference, or %o afcertain the real poffibillty of it, by any arguments favourable to this conje£lure.

From the preceding flatement, the reader will be able to form a general Idea of the manner. In which the univerfal truths of Ma- thematics may be demonftrated upon the principles of the Critical philofopher, and how thefe principles may be employed, to deter- jnlnc thereby the objefts of the world of fenfc. For, fincc fpace and time are apprehended Immediately through the nature of our fenfitive faculty, it is now conceivable j how we can perceive all their relations, compare them with one another through the under- ftanding, and deduce general principles from thefe fources. And ss all the objefts of fenfe neceffarily appear In thefe forms, the ex- planation I5 felf-cvldent, that all the relations apprehended a pri- pri, muft alfo neceffarily be difcovered in all thefe phenomena. It llkewlfe follows from this illuftratlon, that all Mathematics con- fift in ^a fclence, relating only to objefts of fenfe, and admitting of no application whatever, to thofe of an oppofitc nature.

After having fatisf^dlorily proved, that there are neither more

nor

KANTs WORKS. . 73

nor fewer of the neceffary conditions of perception in the SenfitiVe Faculty, than Space and ^ime, Kant proceeds to the inveftiga- tion of the Underftartding, as the fecond principal conflituent of the intuitive Faculty. He remarks, that all the operations of the underftanding may be ultimately reduced to the aSi of judging, and he concludes from this, that the different modifications in a judg- ment, in general, are the principles, according to which the pure notions of the intelleft muft be determined. Upor this ground, he previoufly unfolds all the fimple and pure notions of the intel- left, and exhibits them, in a complete and fyflematic manner, as the ultimate elements of all judgments. — It is well known, how much the fimple notions or firft principles have interefted the Mc- taphyficians of all ages ; it is alfo known, that they never could agree with refpeft to their number ; whether, among the fimple or primary notions, tbere had not be€n included fome of a com- pound nature j whether thofe confidered as original ones were not at the bottom merely derivatives j whether there is no chance of difcovering in future a greater number of fimple notions, or of re- ducing thofe already difcovered to a fmaller number. All thefe doubts and difputes, Kant has now terminated, by difcovering a principle, from uhich it appears evident, that there can be nei- ther more nor fewer than tviehe * originally pure notions of tlie underftanding.

The way, In which Kant difcovers thefe Categories or primary notions, and how he proves their completenefs and validity, can- not be detailed nor abridged in this general retrofpeft of the Cri- tique J but I {hall briefly remark, that the categories exa<^ly com- prife thofe notions, without which the underftanding is unable to conceive any obj efts whatever, i. e. to judge of them. Hence fhey exprefs nothing furthet than the mode or manner, how the Underftanding, by the laws of its conftitutlon, muft neccffarily combine the varities in perception, whenever it attempts to judge upon objefts. But the forms of objefts naturally lie in the under- ftanding, and as fuch they have always been inveftlgated and de-

K termine4

* Sec the Categories, r-45> and compare them with the definitions in the G/o^,. ary.

74 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

tertnined in Logic. Thus the Logicians have long ago taught us, from the nature of the Underftanding, that every judgment muft be determined by its extent and compafs, as well as by its relation to fynthetic unity and confcioufnefs j or that it muft have a certain quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But that, through this procefs alone, the conceivable objefts are determined, that con* fequently the forms of judgment are carried over to the objefts of thought, and can be predicated of them a priori, this neccffary in- ference has been lefs attended to, by former philofophers. For, though they have not failed to make ufe of the notions thus a- rifing, in order to determine the objefts a priori, yet the peculiar fource of thefe notions has hitherto remained undifcovered.

From this fource, Kant derives all our notions a priori, and jnakes them the predicates of general principles, which through- out, become the laws relative to objefts of experience a priori '^ for they do not contain a£lual experience itfelf, but the general con- ditions, that render experience poflible, between the nature of man and things. Thefe laws are fyftematically exhibited in the Cri- tique, agreeably to one principle, fo that the reader is convinced, that there are neither more nor fewer of the general, neccffary, and elementary principles, than are unfolded thi;ough this inquiry. But thefe principles are likewife the axioms of a phyfical fcience, fo far as nature confifts of nothing elfe but the whole complex of experimental objects ', and confequently, from this idea of nature, we not only conceive, very perfeftly, the pofllbility of reducing Phyfics to a fcientific fyftem, but likewife this fyftem itfelf is, in its pure or tranfcendental part, thus actually formed.

Having ftated in the preceding outlines, how our Underftandin|f mjjft reprefent to itfelf given objefts, or how an intuition of them becomes poffible through it, I can now proceed to the particular analyfis of the intelleftual faculty in forming conclufions, which Kaqt denominates theoretical reqfon. This branch of the intellec- tual faculty, by virtue of its conftitution, produces certain notions, to which no objefts whatever correfpond in experience, although they are conne£led with it in fucceiTion, and are both influenced and determined by experience. It is namely, in general, the idea of the unconditional or abfolute^ that is immediately conncfled with

the

KANT'S WORKS. ri

Ihe ttatUre of Rcafori, and through which, according to the differ-- ent form of rational contlufions, the ideas of an abfolute fubjeft or mini/, of an abfolute caufe or liberty, and of an abfolute totality of all that is pofliblc, i. e. the idea oi God, take their refpeftive ori- gin. The further dedu£lion of thefe notions, abftrafled from pure Reafon, muft be ftudied from Kant's Critique^ it forms one of the ttioft eJccellcnt parts of that work. We learn from it, not only to underftand completely^ hoXv all mankind, immediately after the evolution of their mental faculties, attain thefe ideas j but we likewife conceive, how the reprefentations formed concerning the objcfts of thefe ideas^ appear under fo great a variety of afpefts, as fooh as we venture to determine the objefts beyond the nature of the ideas founded upon human reafon : nay» we can even ge- nerally underftand, how varioufly thefe determinations may be mo- dified. We further learn, that thofe, who endeavour to derive every thing concerning religion, from habit, education) and other accidental circumftanccs, judge with the partiality and fallacy of others, who confidcr their incidental opinions as incontrovertible principles, which are deduced frotn the eiTence of tranfcendental objcfts themfelves, or to which they fondly would give the ap- pearance of infallibility, by appealing to the authority of a divine infpiration. We alfo fee, how eafily the accidentai may be con- founded with the necejfary, the fubjeBi'Oe with the ohjeBive, the natural with the artificial'., unlefs we are acquainted with the fources, from which all thefe obje61s flow, not only fo far as their primary origin extends, but alfo with their minuteft difference.-— Without being enraged againft thofe writers, who, from their af- fertions, appear to have formed the artful deiign of depriving maa of every thing, that is valuable and inteielling to him as a rational being, we canwithout difficulty conceive, that it is only a different intereft or motive of our reafon, which incites men to propagate irreligious doftrines j that it is not entirely their immoral will, but rather their too extenfive views, encouraged by the weak- ncfs of thcfr adverfaries, that induce them to expofe the argu- ments employed in favour of the moft interefting principles of re- ligion, while they flatter themfelves with the profpeft of contro- verting all the opinions of their opponents.

K a The

76 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

The Critique of Kant holds^ out the profpeft of a moft conr- plete vidory overjall the enemies of Religion, and I ftiall now ftatc, in what manner the principles of Religion are fecured againft all the attacks of its adveifaries, and how religion is fortified againft ai')itrary and accidental additions. After having (howny that the ground of the idea concerning Mind, Liberty, and the Deity, is to be met with in the nature of Rcafon itfelf, and that every ra- tional being is involuntarily led to the formation of thefe ideas, the author endeavours to prove, and he does this very fatisfa£lo- lily, " that the Intuitive Taculty of man has not the poiuer of appre- hending ohjeBs in a determined manner^ or of pointing out chara&ers of theviy which are derived from immediate perception ?"* He de- xnonltrates, that we can indeed think the objefts of thefe ideas, but that, at no time whatever, we are able to apprehend them theoretically. For, to acquire a theoretical id«a of things, we muft not only predicate of them, that they arc conformable to the laws of our Underftanding, or that they are not fomething con- trary to them, but we mull likewife be enabled to point out de- terminate and real predicates, which are taken from the thing it- felf under apprehenfion. But the real predicates of a thing can- not be conceived in any other manner, than through fenfible per- ception j whether this take place by immediately perceiving the thing itfelf, or mediately through fome other objefl^ which has certain real properties, in common with that to be apprehended. Hence it follows, that we are unqualified to apprehend the real predi#ates^ or the tranfcendental properties of thofe things, which, by their n^ature, neither ii;! part nor in the whole, can ever become objects of fenfible peicleption. We are altogether deficient in a faculty defigned for that purpofe \ hence we are, for inftance, un- able to determine pofitively the nature of mind, according to its internal conftitution. We can Indeed predicate of it^ with cer- tainty, that it is not of itfelf an obje£l of fenfe, confequently, not £( phenomenon j but whatever predicates of reality may, in other' refpe£ts, belong to it •, how its cxiitencc may be conftitutcd, whe- ther it be a firaple fubltance, and different fiom the internal ab- lolute grounds of matter j how the Idea of liberty is evolved j what properties belong to the Deity la a tranfcendental view, atid

the

KANT'S WORKS. H

the like • all thefe problems could be folved only tKrou^ the per- teptlon of fuperfenfible objcfts. And as we are provided with no faculty for the cxercife of fuch a funfllon, we cannot at all deter- mine the real charafters of thefe things-, nay we do not even un- dcrfland the real importance of the term " exifterice;"* when wc apply it to fuperfenfible objefts. I^or, with refpeft to the objeas of fenfe, the expreflion, " foriiethin^ exifts^'' fignifics no more than that it aflFefts our fenfes, by producing a fenfation, as foon as it is placed in proper connexion with them. But the idea of exiftence cannot imply the fame meaning with refpeft to fuperfenfible ob- je£ts J for the term " exiftence" is not to be defined in its bare relation to our Intuitive Faculty, but as an inttrnal property. Yet the impoflibility of giving fuch a definition is obvious, not rnereiy from the failure of all the attempts hitherto made for that pur- pofe, but likewife from theinveftigation of the fourccs, from- which fuch a determination ought to be derived. '

Although we cannot comprehend, through perception, the ob- je£ls of thofe ideas, which, in their nature, lie beyond the world of fenfe j and though we cannot, on that account, obtain any thco*- rttical intuition of them j we can difcover anether fource, frorA »vhich, however, we derive no intuitive knowledge of the objefti themfelves, but a praftical and fubje6li:e knowledge of their re- lations to the nature of man. Though our views of the nature of thefe objects be not thereby enlarged, that knowledge affords us fufficicnt groimds, upon which we may fafely cftablilh rules for our conduft, and convince ouvfelvesof the reality of that ultimate defign, which our Reafon cannot confillently call in queftion.

The chief point of this inquiiy is, to difcover a fufficient ground for the reality of thofe ideas, and to open a fource, from which thfc determinations of their objeds, relative to our pradlical advantage, fliall be derived with fafety and without ambiguity. This fource, then, according to Kant, lies in the nature of our own fubjcft, 1. e. the mind, and is actually that, which we underftand by the term moral fenfe. This alone is a fafe Intuitive ground for deter- mining the reality of the ideas concerning Liberty, God, and Ia>. mortality j and this alone eftabllflies the true relations, in which we can form digrufitd conceptions of the Deity.

Kant

^8 ' ELEMENTARY VltW OF

Kant admits it as a matter of fa£t, that we arc tnoral beings, and confequently this moral fenfc it an eflfential pait of human nature 5 that reafon places the higheft value of man, folely and cxclufively, in his moral feelings J and that it reduces all his power and pro- fperity to thcfe feelings, and values thfe whole of the former ac- tording to effe£ls produced Upon the latter. Aftet having de- monftrated the effential difference fubfifting between the moral and fenfitive nature of man, and having analyzed the different laws, by which both arc governed refpeftivcly j he now proceeds to provc» 3, That the reality of Liberty is neceffarily conne£led with the tnoral nature of man, and that the latter is wholly inconceivable without the former j that confequently our Reafon forces us to ac- knowledge Liberty as a certain, though unaccountable, faft rela- tive to man J becaufcj without doing this, we would be obliged to renounce all claims to Reafon, and to confider it as perfcftly ufe- lefs J 2, That the reality of a being, which cotitains the fufficient ground of a thorough moral order, muft be conceived equally com- bined with the Deity, as it is with the moral nature of man, fo that the immortality of the foul muft be confidered as a neceffary con- ftituent of this moral order. Reafon, however, being the fupreme tribunal, to which man may appeal, perfuades us to receive, not only thefe ideas, but alfo their objefts as founded upon truth j we are therefore juftified in relying upon the juftnefs of our Reafon, provided that we do not prefume to determine with regard to the internal nature and eflence of thefe obje£ts j a determination, which can be made only through the immediate, though impofli- ble, perception of them. Hence we are utterly incapable of af- certainingthe nature of a free fubje6t,as an independent fubftance j the pofitive conftitution of mind, by which immortality be- comes poflTible J and finally, the manner in which the Deity has accomplifhed a moral connexion between man and the world. We only know, that thofe obje£ls, which we conceive, through general ideas, at the caufes of certain cffefts, arc reclaimed by our reafon as the neceffary conditions of our moral deftination j and that ground, on which we muft admit them, or believe their reality, lies in our fubjeft, namely in our moral fenfe, which partly as an intuitive principle, partly as a practical motive, generates

and

KANT'S WORKS. 79

and fupports the belief iiv the fandamental truths of religion. Since, then, the intuitlve'principle refpeding the reality of thefe tranfcendental objcfts, or of religions truths, is perfeAly confident with Reafon, not from the immediate perception of objefts (the reality of which requires no proof), but from a certain qualifica- tion of our own fubjeft, as connefted with the real (late of thefe objefts J a ftate, the exiftcnce of which is far from being imagi- nary only y Kant, confequently, oalls this a JuljeBive ground of convlftion, in contradiftinftion to an objeBive ground, which is derived from the perception of the objefls themfelves.

In reprefenting the Kantian doftrine of morals, every thing de* pcnds upon our being cbnfcious of a moral law, confcious of right and wrong, of good and bad, fo that the intuitive ground of moral principles be rendered independent on all theology j for the, doc- trines of the Deity and Immortality muft be deduced from pure morals j or the latter muft be the intuitive ground of all religion. And this is liUewife the aSual and neceffary refulliof his princi- ples. Morality refts upon its own bafis j and, in the fublime view which Kant prefents of it, all other things relative to man, muft be decided by that ftandard. It is principally in Ethics, we learn, to confider the things of this world as purpofes ) and by colle6live- iy employing them as the means of attaining one ultimate pur- pofc, we introduce unity among them. Thus we difcover their fubordlnate laws, agquirc fyftematic unity, and produce a pcrfeft harmony throughout the whole fphere of the intuitive knowledge of man. Yet, through all the illuftrations afforded by EthicS} we do not learn to comprehend the poflibility of the things them- felves J we only acquire intelligence refpefting the poflibility of our deftination in general. Hence the intuitions, which we de<r rive from morals, do not enlarge our penetration into the nature of the things themfelves, but they render our reafon confiftent with itfelf, and reftore harmony between the moral laws and other intuitions and thoughts ; an operation, which is attended with no theoretical, but certainly with great practical, advantage.

This view of morals, however, if it fhall ferve as the bafis of religion, muft be extremely different from that, which we find ip the " Syjlemt de la ^ature^ in the writings of Helvktids, and fci

8o ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

vera] o'iher reputed philofophers, who fpeak indeed much of Hu- man Nature, but have penetrated lefs into its effence than they themfclves affure us : and though thefe inquiries conftantly appeal to experience, they make ufe of principles very different from thofe, w:hich experience can furnifli. — To dcfcribe, at length, the Moral Syftem of Kant, which affords, at once, folldity and con- fiflency in that of Religion, would require a feparate publication. But we fliall exhibit the outlines of this fyftem in reviewing ano- ther work of Kant's, treatin^r particularly of that fubje£l, which the reader will find mentioned under No. XXI. (5) of this ana- lytical retrofpeft.

XIX. (3) Prolegomena zu einer jeden Jiunftigen Metaphyfihy die ah Wiffenfchaft wird auftreten hmnen. Introdudlory pbfervations with refpcft to every future Sjflem of Meta- phyfics, that may deferve the name of a fcjence. 8vo. RigOj

In the preface to this work, the author explains his pirn at con- vincing thofe who employ themfelves in metaphylical inquiries ; that it is indifpenfdbly neceflfary to fufpend their labours for fome time, to confider every thing hitherto done as undone, and above all things to propofe the queilion, " whether there is any profpeft qf eftablifliing every where fuch a fciencc as Metaphyfics ?"

* If it is a fcience already, how does it happen, that it has nof, like other fciences, obtained general and lading reputaJion ? If it is none, how is it permitted continually to boaft of the illufory name of a fcience, and to uphold the human underflanding with hopes equally permanent and unaccompliftied ?— Let us therefore demonflrate, either our knowledge or our ignorance j the nature of this pretended fcience ought to be thoroughly invefligated; for it is impoflible to leave things any longer upon the old foot- irg. It appears almoft ridiculous, while every other fciencc is making incelTFint progrefs, that in this one, which afpires to the charatler of being the oracle of wifdom itfelf, man continually turns round upon the fame fpot, without advancing a fingle flep. 3t is even obferved, that the number of its votaries is much de- ^reafing, and that thofe, who feel themfelves fuihciently able ta

gaia

KA^Ts WORKS. 8Jt

gain credit in other fcicnces, do not choofe to venture their repu- tation in this. On the other hand, it is equally certain, that every tyro, who is ignorant in all other branches of knowledge, here claims the right of pronouncing a df fcifive opinion ; becaiife in this territory there exifts in facl no fettled meafure and weight, by which the rational inquirer can be difcerned from the (hallow prattler;'

' To make plans, is frequently a luxuriant and oftentatious em- ployment of the mind, by which fome people acquire the appear- ance of inventive genius 5 while they demand what they cannot furnifli themfelves, cenfure what they cannot improve, and propofe ■what they themfelves do not know where to difcover it : — though it may be eafily conjeftured, that a little more than a declamation of pious wifhes will be requifite, to foriti a juft plan of " & generill Critique of Reafon." But Pure Reafon is a fphere fo infulaied and fo thoroughly connected with itfclf, that we can approach, no part of it without touching all the reft, and that we can do no good, without having afllgned each part its proper place and influence upon the other. For, fince without Reafon there is nothing that could correft our judgment, the validity and ufe of every part depends upon the relation, in which it Hands towards the others, within the bounds of Reafon itfelf ; as in the ftru^ure of an organized body the purpofe of every member can be deduced only from thfe com- plete idea of the whole. Hence we may fay of fuch a Criii^ue, that no dependence can be placed upon it, unlefs it be entire and complete^ even extending to the minutcil elements of Pure Reafon^ and that we muft be enabled to determine either the whole or nO' thing, that relates to the fphere of this faculty.'

• Although the bare plan of fuch a feience, had it befen pie- mifed to the " Critique of Pure Reafon," might have been unin- telligible, fufpicious, and ufeiefs j it will, on the contrary, become the more advantageous, when it appears in illuftration of that work. For, by this plan, we (hall be enabJ^ to t^ke a view of the whole, to inveftigatc the principal points, upon the folidity of which this fcienc6 is erefted, and to underftand nloie clearly thr principles, which at firft appeared obfcure.'

* 'I'hefc Prolegomena then contain fuch a plan as ought to hv.

I« ftatfii

82 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

flated in an analytical method, fince the preceding work ccceffa- rily required a fynthethical arrangement : in order that this fcience might be exhibited in its individual parts, and as the ftrufture of a very peculiar faculty in the acqulfition of knowledge, which pre- fents itfelf in its natural connexion. Thofe who fliould find this phn as obfcure as the Critique itfelf, muft confider that the ftudy of Metaphyfics is not the bufinefs of all j that there arc many in- genious men, who make confiderable proficiency in fciences, that lie more within the bounds of fenfible perception, and who do not fucceed In inquiries carried on through pure abftraft notions. Such individuals mufl employ their mental faculties upon other ob- jefts. Thofe, however, vfho venture to judge upon Metaphyfics, or even attempt to frame fyftems of their own, muft previoufly fa- tisfy the demands made in this work. Whether this be done by approving of the method, in which I have folved the different problems j or by refuting this folution, upon well eftabliflied prin- ciples, and giving another in its place ; in either cafe they will do juftice to the caufe. For, to rejeft a plan without trying its me- rits, is equally frivolous and illiberal. I confefs I did not expeft to hear philofophers complaining, that my works were deficient in popular, entertaining, and eafy language j when the queftion re- lates to the exiftence of a fource of knowledge, which is highly valuable and indifpenfable to man, but which cannot be demon- flrated, without obferving the ftridleft rules of fcientific deduc- tion. Popularity, indeed, will in its turn attend thefe invefliga- tions, but to aim at it in the beginning, would be a filly and fruit- lefs attempt. — That-very obfcurity, which is fo much decried, and which is frequently ufed as a cloak for the cqnvenlency and mental weaknefs of its adverfarles, is not without relative advan- tacre ;"for all thofe, who obferve a cautious filence In other fciences, enjoy an opportunity of fpeaking and deciding in a magillcrial tone upon metaphyfical fubjedlsj becaufe their ignorance, heie, does not form fo remarkable a contraft, when compared with the knowledge of others, as it does in oppofition to genuine critical principles, of which we may juflly fay with the Roman poet, Ignavum,fucos,l>ecus a prafe/>ibus arcent."*

ViRG.

A-

KANT'S WORKS. 83

As thefe Prolegomena are a concife and perfplcuous abftraft from the preceding Critique, in an analytical method, which the author employs, as it were, to go back again the fame path, upon which he had fynthetically advanced in the Critique •, we could only repeat that deduftion of Kant's principles, which we have al- ready premifed at fufficicnt length.

XX. {^^.')Betrachtungen iiber dasFundament der Krafte und Me- thoden, welche die Vernunft anwenden kann^ daruber zu ur- theilen. Reflexions upon the foundation of the powers and methods, which Reafon is entitled to employ in judging upon their validity. 8vo. Koenigsherg^ \*]^\.

Of this fmall work, I know little more than its title, not having been able to procure a copy of it; and as, from the German Re- views, it appears to be a further deduftion of the principles laid down in the preceding two works, I ftiall Immediately, and at con- llderable length, review the following, which is uniformly confider- ed as the mofl; perfpicuous and valuable produftion of Kant.

XXI. (5) Grundlegung %ur Metaphyjik der Sit fen. Funda- mental principles of the Metaphylicks (Theory) of Morals. 8vo. Riga. 1785. — 2d Edit. 1792, pp. 128 and 14 pp. Preface.

The outlines of Kant's Syftem of Morals, I (hall endeavour to exhibit, as clearly as poffible, in the following analyfis of his prin- ciples.

The defire of happinefs is inherent to human nature : all the in(lin6live propenfities of man are dtrefled to that purpofe. But our reafon ftill reftrains that defire, and confiders only fuch a pof- feffion of happinefs as worthy of our exertions, which is perfedlly confiiient with morality, or rather, which is the reward of moral aflions. Morality and happinefs, therefore, are two different but eiTential determinations originating in human nature j which, when united by the diftates of reafon, render the deftiuation of man per- •feft. This union, however, cannot be better conceived by reafon, than that morality itfelf contains the oaufe, through which the

L 2 hap

84 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

happinefs of man is accompHllied. If we ourfelves are the pur- pofes and not the bare means in tbe hands of nature or any other Being ; it follows, that the neceffary attributes of our conftitution muft likewife be conceived as poflible : there muft exift fuch an arrangement of things, as contributes to realize our moral dedina^ tion. The former part of this deftination, namely morality, de- pends on ourfelves, and on the degree of felf-adivity, with which we praftife the moral hw. This faculty of praftifing what the moral law commands, we prefuppofe in every rational being 5 for oiherWife it would be highly abfurd, to iropofe upon ourfelves a law, obedience to which Reafon could not acknowledge as proclicable. It mufl confequently be in our power, to be morally good, if Reafon commatids us to aft in conformity to the moral law. In whatever fubjeft then Reafon actually exifts, It muft alfo be poflible, that it manifeflitfelf by aftions : whoever has the abi- lity to apprehend what is good as a thing abfolutely neceffary, on its own account, he muft likewife be provided with the facnlty of per- forming it. But it is not phyfically neceffary to do it ; for we nowhere dlfcover ourReafon fubjecl: to this^fpecies of neceflity. Why Rea- fon very frequently does not pra6life what it muft acknowledge to be morally good j why our feufitive nature is not always vanquiili- ed, but frequently prevails in this cgnteft \ thefe problems we are unable to folve j becaufe we do not in any manner comprehend that, which forms the moral nature of man, as an objefl: of percep- tion J and becaufe we can only derive the moral faculty of man from the idea of the poflibility of morality in general. We know only this much with certainty, that we judge upon the moral va- lue of man, merely and entirely, by the degree of moral motive^, which we obferve in his aftions or fentiments. If, therefore, the phyfical energy is properly arranged in a man, fo that the ufe of Reafon, in general, is poflible to him \ we prefuppofe, that the per- formance of morally good a£lions is really entrufted to his will : and if we did not prefuppofe this inclination, we would in faft de- ny all the influence which Reafon exercifes over human aft'airs, and thus be obliged to declare the general laws of morality, af- forded by this faculty, as mere phantoms of the brain. Our moral pcrfcd.ion depends upon our own exertions, and it is from this Smarter, that we may more and more approach our deftination.

"\Vhat

KANTs WORKS. S£

"What, on the other hand, relates to the fecond part of our def- tination, namely to our happinefs ; this depends on the inftitutioa of the things in nature, as well thofe of our own fubjeft as the ex- ternal objefts, and their influence upon us. By means of Reafoa and its inherent liberty, we can indeed make fuch a ufe of the things in nature, as to produce certain degrees or parts of hap- pinefs. But the rules calculated to produce thefe efFe61s, Reafou cannot derive from its own nature a priori, as is the cafe with the moral law j becaufe experience rauft be confulted firft, that we may learn, how the nature of man, and that of individual fubjefts, is conftituted, and In what relation the things are to human happi- nefs. The laws by which happinefs is attained, are founded upon the nature of phenomena : man may apply them to his advantage, but he cannot determine them j he may regulate, in a certain de- gree, the influence of fhe things upon himfclf j but he muft ftill fubrait to their laws. If, then, we were to confult Reafon, and to afk, by what laws happinefs ought to be diftrlbuted in the world > it could give no other anfwer, but that the morul law ought to decide this. Morality fliould always be atteiuled wiih a proportionate fliare of happinefs j whether It of itlclf produced that happinefs as its real caufe (accoiding to phyfical influence), or that a third being allotted to every individual, fuch a portion of happinefs as he deferved through the degree of his moral aiSIvIty : . — here we would admit an ///tW influence, in which a third being had fo regulated the courfe of nature, that her laws were in perfect harmony with the demands of Reafon, relative to ihe happinefs of moral beings.

, But if we confult experience, we by lio means learn, that fuch a moral order really fubfifls in the world j fince we frequently ob- ferve men of bad morals, and of a depraved charafter, apparently happy, while good and virtuous men are afHifled by misfortunes. For, though the confcloufnefs of juft and good adions be accom- panied with agreeable feelings, this alone does ,not conflltute hu- man happinefs 5 fincc the moft excellent man muft be called un- happy. If he is labouring under fuch calamities as are the perma- nent caufe of painful fenfations. The wants of human nature arc very numerous ! Many of them are Independent on our will : the

ftiilurc

85 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

failore in fati&fying urgent neccffities, is unavoidably accompanied •with pain, frequently the raoft acute j nay, even a great number of the voluntary or artiBcial wants are, by degrees and through incidental circumllances, fo intimately interwoven with the well- being of man, that he muft always feel unhappy, when he is de- prived of thofe means, by which he was accuftomed to fatisfy them. Belides, there is a great number of accidents, which ren- der hina who is cxpofed to them always unhappy j and experience does not teach us, that any diftindtlon prevails here between the good and bad. Difeafes, war, famine, and all phyfical evils, op- ptefs the honeft man with equal, and frequently with much great- er, rigour than the difhoneft : the former, as well as the latter, is placed in unhappy fituations, without the means of evading thefc evils. It requires, upon the whole, no proof that in the diftribu- tion of phyfieal goods, though a neceffary part of human happi- nefs, no moral order at all can be difcovered in experience j and that, if the latter alone could decide the queftion, we muft explain all the agreement between happinefs and virtue, entirely by the law of chance. What happens in nature according to phyfieal laws, is equally different from what ought to happen according to the laws of moral order, as the ufual aftions of man diifer from their duties.

Eut although we obferve in this world no fuch moral order, as exhibits happinefs and morality in conftant proportion j our Rea- fon ftill preferves an uncommon propenfity to maintain, that fuch an order muft adlually exift. This, however, is a prefoppofition, which can be juftified, neither by argument nor demonftration, nor through the real expofition of fuch an order j bat which is efta- bliffied merely upon a ground contained in our own mind. This ground refts on the neceffjry internal obligation of being morally good, or on the moral feelings common to all mankind, and acknow- ledged by all good men. The aftual exiftence of a moral order is fb intimately connefled with thcfe feelings, that the confcioufnefs of them continually impels us to prefuppofe this order. And the more cageily we cultivate morality, by difplaying much vigour in the obfervation of its laws ; the more firmly and thoroughly we be- , come convinced, that there muft cxift a complete moral order. ^

The:!

J,

KANTs WORI^. 87

The train of thought, by which Reafon forms and jafilfies this

conclufioD, is nearly the following.

Reafon acknowledges it as indifpenfably necefiTary, that maa ought to aft conformably to moral laws. As long as man enjoys the ufe of Reafon, no fituation or relation In life can be conceived, in v,'hich he is exempted from the obligation of ading as a moral being. To zGt morally right, is therefore the hlgheft objeft, at ■which every man ought to aim : Reafon cannot, upon any condi- tion whatever, reverfe this judgment, without falling into an ob- vious contradiftioD with itfelf. Now, we find, in human nature, at the fame time, a defire of happinefs, which is not always gra- tified. Our nature, however, is fo conflituted, that we mud feel a necefiary defire of happinefs ; and this natural wi(h is a fufHcient ground for exerting ourfelves, to realize it by all the means in our powci". The rules, in confequence of which men attain to real happinefs, are folely and exclnfively learned from experience j while the moral laws are derived a prion irom Reafon : ancf thus it happens, that many rules for procuring happinefs arc contrary to morality ; or that they weaken the force of the moral law. Neverthelefs, Reafon places a much higher value on morality, and commands us to wi(h for no other happinefs, but fuch as is in per- fect harmony with moral feelings. Upon this very occafion we learn, that the happinefs of men is connected with conditions and circumftances, fo various and incidental, that we cannot always at- tain it, by pra<Sifing either the laws cf morality or prudence. For, the moral conduft does not, as far as experience informs us, nectffarily produce happinefs ; fince we obferve no phyfical con- nexion between them ; and fince the afibciation of good fortune with a moral conduft appears to be merely accidental. Even the utmoft prudence of man cannot rear the fabric of felicity, though he fliould aft in defianfce of morality, and endeavour to make happinefs his only and unconditional cbjeft. For the latter de- pends on too many circumftances, over which man has no power of controul, and through which frequently the wifeft plans may be rendered abortive.

The happinefs of a moral being, in a moral order of things, can pvoperly be faid to confift in no other maxim than the following ;

88 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

** every thing that happens, is in fl;rl£l harmony with the geherat laws of morality." Even the good manr can wifli and defiie no- thing fnrther. If he now admit a moral principle or a God, he muft likewijc expect, that every thing Qiall really correfpond with moral purpofes j and confequently, if a man aft virtuoufly, he can expect nothing elfe, in a moral world, but real happinefs. In faft, therefore, man awaits his profperity from good fortune, the dif- penfation of which is entrufted to a wife Providence. This hope is entirely fupported by the belief In God, and it is equally con- llant and fafe as the latter.

Since man poffeffes no p6wcr over all thofe things, which relate to his ultimate deftlnation, no other condition of attaining this re- mains for the virtuous, but to confidcr the whole world fubjeft to a moral order j that Is, to look upon moral beings as abfolute and ultimate purpofes, to which every thing relates, that is real in the world ; or to conflder thefe beings as containing the caufe, on account of which every thing is thus conftltuted, and not other- wife. For, if thefe contain the ground of the conflltutlon of the world, there muft exift a certain order in it, conformably to which the effentlal purpofes of moral beings can be attained. Allowing, therefore, that happinefs is a part of the eSentlal deftlnation of human nature, and that men thcmfelves belong to the clafs of mo- ral beings ; nature Itfelf muft be fo conftltuted, that their happinefs can be effefted by her aid. But the deftlnation of hu- man nature Is not completed by the attainment of that hap- pinefs alone, which confifts in mere enjoyment, but by mora- lity, In union with happinefs, and indeed fo modified, that the lat- ter be in proportion to the former. Morality muft determine the meafure of happinefs allotted tO' every individual, and not <uice ver- fa. If thus we ftiall conceive the attainment of our deftlnation, as a poflible event j we muft admit a thorough moral order as realw ]y fubfifting, though It be not In our power to produce an objeEiive' proof of It. The ground, on vfhich we admit It, lies merely in our own mind, and Indeed in the convlftion, that we are moral be- ings defigned for ultimate purpofes. To conceive thefe beings ih ronncftlon with other things. Is altogether Impoffible, unlefs we grant, that the latter relate to the former, ar.d facilitate the at-

talnmect

KANT'S WORl^. 89

talnment of their deftination. It is, consequently, the reflexion made upon our own moral nature, which induces us to admit the exiftence of a moral order.

Though we cannot difcover this moral order in experience, the truth of it is not thereby in the leaft degree aflPefted, nor can it be difputed from that fource. For experience could no where prove the exiftence of a thorough moral order, although all the phenomena, that we obferve, (hould correfpond with the idea of it. It would ever remain doubtful, whether this correfpondence be general and conttant, unlefs a very different manner of reprefenting it, afforded certainty to the conclufions thus arifing. For, to comprehend the reality of fuch an order a pojleriori, there would be required a complete view of all things and their relations to one another j a view, that is unattainable by beings fo conftituted as we are. And the circumftance of our finding virtue frequently accompanied by- misfortune, is by no means inconliftent with the idea of a moral order. This Idea does not imply the neceflity, that every moral a£lIon fhall be immediately attended with a certain portion of hap- pinefs, or that the latteir be phyfically produced : it involves only this^much, that the lot of man, upon the whole, Is In a certain harmony with his moral character. In this way it is not diiHcult to conceive, that one or feveral periods of his exiftence are parti- cularly defigned for the purpofe of improving his moral nature, and that good and bad fortune may be fo diftrlbuted during thefe pe- riods, that they can be ufed rather as the'means of improvement, than to ferve as the fcale of afcertaining the moral excellence of the individual. Neverthclefs, the regulations in the world may be fo made, that fuch a fhare' of happinefs ariles from them for each moral being, as it has merited b^ its condu6l. We elevate man above the confideration of his being a paflive inftrument in the hands of nature, when we reprefent him as facrificing a part of that happinefs, of which his fenfitive nature is fufceptible ; in order to contribute his fliare, that other rational beings may like- wife attain their deftination j provided that he does not neglefl his own. For, Reafon itfelf muft approve of fuch a regulation. If now, from this point of view, we confider the events and the vi- cifliiudes of human life, which we obferve by experience in the

M world

6o ■ ELEMENTARY VIE W OF

world of fenfe j all the fads thus obtained are perfefkly confiilent with the poflibility gf a moral order. We muft however not at- tempt to make fuch ufe of them, as if they were abfolute proofs j fince they can be ufed only as arguments for difproving the con- trary of a moral order. But if we reprefent the queftion upon this foundation, that moral aftions oughi to produce happinefs con- formably to the laws of nature j then the inftances, by which we prove that virtue and misfortune are in certain cafes accompanied by one another, would not only be irrefutable, but they would likewife prove the nullity of this complete moral order.

In the ^antian philofophy, it is a matter of no importance, and wholly undetermined, how. fuch an order is reo/(y pofFible. The reality, of it, Kant does not attempt to demonftrate from a pre- tended view of its caufes j he rather grants, that thefe are to us altogether inconceivable. He only admits this moral order, on ac- count of the ftrong and conftant demands of Reafon j a faculty, that thinks or judges of moral beings as abfolute and ultimate, to whom every thing eife relates, and who confequently muft deter- mine the order of all other things, -and their relations to the mo- ral beings therafelves.

Thus we prefupjQofe a moral order, while we confidently rely upon our Reafon an|l our moral nature j becaufe the reality of it muft be conceived from its being fo intimately ynitcd with our moral feelings. It is certain, that we are moral agents, confequent- ly ihe conditions muft alfo be certain, without which our moral nature, in the eyes of our own Reafon, would be a nonentity. Ac- cording to Reafon, however, our moral nature cpnfills in this, that man is an abfolute purpofe, to which all other things are fu- bordinate means. Yet morality and happinefs, united to one pur- pofe, compofe the deftination ofraan, fo that the former determines the latter. Without a moral order, this is impoflible. And as, agreeably to Reafon, moral beings rnuft have it in their power to contribute towards the attaimiaent of their deftination ; the reality of a moral order muft likewife be admitted j becaufe it is the only condition-, upon which this inference can be juftified. If we then allow the exiftence of a moral order, we muft ajfo fubmit to thofc conditions, without which It is wholly impoflible. Though we

caunot

KANT'S WORKS. 91

cannot comprehend the real poflibllity of this order, we muft nc- verthelefs grant, that thofe conditions ai"e real, without which fuch an order cannot at all be conceived. But it is inconceiva- ble, if we do not admit, l, that the laws of the world of fcnfe are not the only ones, by which all events are determined : that the world itfelf is fubjefl to ftill higher laws, and upon the whole, re- lates to foraething, which is independent on the world, or exter- nal to it, afid to which the world is merely fubfervient j 2, that there exifts a caufe, through which every thing is determined ac- cording to the laws of a moral order, to which confequently every thing is fubjeft, and upon which every thing in the world depends ; and laftly, 3, that the perfonallty or individual exigence of man continues, in- order that through him the moral order may be ac- compliftied.

It is eafy to perceive, that the firft of thefe poflulates leads to the idea of a fuperfcnfible world, which is independent on the lavfs fubfifting in the world of fenfe, k- e. which is yree. The fecond idesrinvolves the conception of a Deity. For, if we feparate every arbitrary and adventitious matter from the idea of the Deity, and preferve that alone, upon which a reprefentation worthy of fo fa- blime a Being can be eftablifhed j nothing further remains than the thought of a conneftion or relation, by means of which that Being muft be the foundation of a thorough moral order. No other idea, however, but that of an intelligent power could entitle or even induce us to entertain a notion like that of moral order j hence it is conceivable, how in this idea alone wc meet with fome analogy, that ferves to diftinguifh fo fublime^a Being, and, toge- ther with the moft perfe£t will, to attribute to it all thofe proper- ties, through which only fo facrcd a will can be exerted; Laftly j that the third principle before ftatcd, lead* to xht immortality of tBefoul, is now a very rational inference;

The idea of Liberty, or the faculty of determining our adions uninfluenced by fcnfuai motives, and felf aftive, through the con- fcioufnefs of the moral law alone ; this idea is involved in that of morality. We therefore undoubtedly poiTefs that liberty, as we are moral agents •, and the conception of liberty m general has been perfe^ly juftiSed b^ fho'Ving, that the phjfical world is not

M 2 the

9i ELEMENTARY VIEW OF.

the only one, which influences the nature of man j that it is con^ nedled with beings of a very different kind, whofe a£lions are de- termined by very different laws. The idea of a moral order ftands in the fame relation to that of our being moral agents, whofe de- llination is certainly attainable j as the former is connefted with the idea of God and Immortality ; fo that if we a<lmit the truth of the one, the relation of the others mull like wife be granted. Thus we are fufficiently and perfeftly authorized to believe in God and Immortality, as the two effential pillars of all Religion j though the arguments for this belief, are not taken from the per- ception of objecls, but are derived from the more permanent na- ture of our mind.

Upon a Gurfory view of the ftatement here given, it might per- haps appear to feme readers, as if in Knnt's procefs of reafoning, firfl morality is reprefented gs the ground-work of Religion, and afterwards Religion again is called an aid, to fupport the idea of a moral law* But, upon a mature confideratlon of the fubjeft, this appearance will very foon vaniih. For, the ground of difcovcring a morsl law, lies merely and exclufively in our Reafdn, which pre- fents to us this law, as foon as it Is conceived in a praftlcal or ac- tive fenfe ; and which, independent on all Religion, impofcs upon us the obligation of obferving the precepts of morality. But if, with this moral obligation, "we compare nature and her relations to the dcftinatlon of man, Reafon requires, that nature fhould Jikewife agree with the deflination of moral beings ; bccaufe, in the contrary cafe, that value which Reafon places upon its facul- ties and operations, and which is to be computed much higher than Nature itfelf, would not be real, but altogether imaginary. Thus convinced of a moral order, man may certainly make ufe of it, in order to remove thofe difEculties, which prefent themfelves in the pradlice of the moral law. The doubts and uncertainties, ■which may arife againft the reality of a moral order of things, are thereby fuppreffed ; the fenfual appetites, too, are through this ccnviftlun fo modified, and regulated, that they (hall be indulged only with a view of fuch an happinefs as is codfiftent with virtue, while they gradually become familiar with the order, that is ma- nifeft throughout all nature,. BeHdes, this mode of reprefentlng a

fvftem

KANT'S WORKS.

93

iyftcm contains a great number of arguments, from which even the fenfitive facility derives fome confolation, if its purpofes fiiould be occafionally defeated, and its necefTities too much limited ; for there (till remains a ftate, in which this alfo mayl)e fatisfied 5 pro- vided that man perfeveres in obeying the didatfes of morality. Thus Religion certainly contains arguments in favour of morality, and on this very account it is calculated to remove many obftaclt.s, ■which may occur in the pra6lice of the moral law. Religion, therefore, offers no intuitive ground of difcovering moral precepts, though it can be employed as an excellent pfychological aid of (Irengthening the moral faculty of human nature ; fince it over- comes thofe difficulties, which frequently arife from falfe reflec- tions, and which obftruft the due exerclfe of that faculty.

XXII. (6) Mctaphyjifche Anfangsgr-unde der Naturwi/fen- fchaft. Metaphyfical Principles of Natural Philofophy. 8vo. Rigaj 1786. 2d Edit. 1787, pp. 158, and xxiv pages Preface.

This is, without exception, the moll profound of Kant's works j and in order to afford the reader a concife view of the author's aim, I fliall firft give an abftrafl from the elaborate Preface to this publication, and then exhibit the principles of this new fclence, in a clofe tranflation.

* It is of the. gre ate ft importance to the progrefs of the fciences, " fays Kant," to feparate diflimllar principles from one another, tp reduce each fet of them to a particular fyftem, that they may form a fcience of a peculiar kind. Thus we (hall prevent that uncer- tainty in fciences, which arlfes from confounding them, and In con- fcqucnce of which we cannot eafily diftlnguifli the limits, which, in a doubtful cafe, are to be affigned to each of them j nor can .we difco^er the fource of the errors, that may attend the praftical ap- plication of them. On this account, I have deemed It neceffary, to exhibit fyftematically the pure part of Natural Philofophy (^Phyfica generalis), in which metaphyfical and mathematical con- flruflions of Ideas occur promifcuoufly j and, in treating of the former, to fliow at the fame time the principles of that conflruftion,

and

94 . ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

and confequently to prove the poflibillty of a Syftem of Natural Phllolbphy, dedueed from mathematical demonftrations. This di- vifion of fciences, befidc the advantage already ftated, is attended with the particular fatisfaflion, which the unify and harmony of knowledge afford, when we can prevent the limits of the fciences from interferiiig with one another.*

* As a fecond reafon of recommending this procefs, It may be urged, that in every department of Metaphyfics we may hope to attain to abfolute completenefs^ fuch as we cannot expeft in any o- ther fpecies of knowledge j confequently, the completcnefs off the Metaphyfics of material nature may te expe6led,here, with the* lame confidence as in the Metaphyfics of nature In general. For^ in Metaphyfics, the objecl is merely confidered, agreeably to the general laws of thought, while in other fciences It muft be repre- fented according to the difFefent data of perception, whether this be pure or empirical. In Metaphyfics, too, we acquire a deter- mined number of cognitions, which can be completely exhaufted j becaufe, here, the objeft muft be continually compared with all the neceffary laws of thought : while in the other fciences, on account of the infinite variety of perceptions, or objedls of thought, which they prefent to the mind, we never can attain to abfolute coniplete- nefs, but may extend them in Infinitum, as is the cafe with pure Mathematics and experimental Phyfics. I likewife believe, that I have completely ftated th'efe metaphyfical principles of Natural Philofophy, to their utmoft extent j but though I have fucceeded in this attempt, I do not flatter myfelf with having performed any extraordinary talk.'

' To complete, however, a metaphyfical fyftem, whether that of nature in general, or that of the material world, the Table of the Categories * muft ferve as its Schema. For there arc in rea- lity no more nor fewer pure Intelleflual notions concerning the nature of things, than I have ftated In that Table. All the de- terminations relative to the general notion of matter, confequent- ly all that can be conceived of it a priori y that can be exhibited in mathematical conftru£lIon, or that can be propofed as a deter- mined objeft of experience, muft admit of being reduced to the - . . ■ four

' Vid. tJi; Cat.-^^t:) in , p. 4j, aiiii their Sihtmata\ p 47,

KANT'S WORKS. . 9J

four clafles of the Categories, viz. that of Quantity, Quality, Re- lation, and Modality. There remains nothing to be difcovered or added here ; but if imperfeftions (hould occur, with refpeft to perfpicuity and order, the fyftem in this refpeft may be occafional- ly improved.'

* The idea of matter muft, therefore, be examined through all the four mentioned functions of the intellefl (in four Sedions),- in each of which a new determination of that idea occurs. The pri- mary attribute' of fomething, that reprefents an objeft of the ex- ternal fcnfes, muft be motion ; for by that only can thefe fenfes ,be affefted. To this, the Underllanding reduces all other pre- dicates of matter, that relate to.its nature j and thus Natural Phi- lofophy is, throughout, either a pure or applied theory of motion^ The raetaphyfical principles of this fcience muft, confe^ucntly, be, divided into four Sedlions : \x\x\\e.jirjl of which, motion is confi- ^ered as a pure quantum, according to its compofition, without any quality of that which is moveable, and hence n.ay be called Phoronomy ; in \.\\g fecond, motion is inveftigated in its relation Xa the quantity of matter, under the name of an originally moving power, and Is therefore called Dynamics j in the third, matter is examined in reciprocal relation to this quantity, by its peculiar motion, and appears under the title of Mechanics j and in the fourth Sedlion, the motion or reft of matter is determined merely in relation to the mode of reprefenting it, or Modality^ confe- quently as phenomenon of external fcnfes, on vyhich account is i^ palled Phenomenology.'

Contents.

Sect. I. Metaphyjical principles of Vao&.o>iou-i.

Position i. Matter is that which is moveable in fpace. That fpace, which itfelf is moveable, is called the malerialy or likewife, relative fpace \ that, in which all motiorr muft be ultimately con- ceived (and which confcqucBtly in its own nature is abfolutely immoveable"), is called the pure, or likewife, aBfolute fpac:.

Fofit. 2. The motion of a thing is the change of its external re- kilions to given fpace.

90 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

Foftt. 3. Rejl Is the perraatient prefence (^prcefentia perdurab'ilis) in the fame place j permanent however is that which exifts, i. e. continues for a certain time.

Pojit. 4. To conJIruB the idea of compound motion, means to reprefent motion a priori in the perceptive faculty, as far as the former arifes from two or feveral joint motions, in one moveable fpacc.

Theorem. Every motion, as objefl of experience, maybe con-

fidered, either as the motion of a body in a refling fpace, or as

the rcfl of a body and, on the other hand, motion of fpace in

oppofite dire£lion with equal velocity.

Pqfit. 5. The combination of motion is the reprefentation of the motion of 3 point, as being homologous with two or feveral mo- tions of it utiited together.

Sect. II. Metaphysical principles of "DYtiXuics.

Posit. I, Matter is that which is moveable, fo far as It ///j a fpace. Tofil a fpace, is to refift all that is moveable and that makes an effort, by its motion, to penetrate Into a certain fpace. A fpace that is not filled, is a vacuum.

Theorem, 1. Matter fills a fpace, not by Its mere exijlcnce,

but by a particular moving power .

Posit. 2. The power of attraBion is that moving power, by which one matter may be the caufe of the approach of others towards it j or, in other words, by which it reflfts the removal of others from it. — 'Y\it power of repulsion is that, by which one matter may be the caufe of removing others from it j or, in other words, by which it refills the approach of others towards it.

Theorem 2d< Matter fills its fpaces by the repulfive power of

all its parts, I. e. by a peculiar power of extcnfion, that has a

determined degree, beyond which fraaller or greater degrees

may be conceived in infinitum.

Posit 3. Gne matter, in its vaolion, penetrates another, when, by means of comprcffion,it completely removes the fpace of its ex- tenfion.

Theorem 3d. Matter may \y^ comprejfedin'm^aitxiiva, but It ne- ver can he penctraledhy matter, however great its prefling power . -m^y be.

Posif.

KANT^s WORKS* 97

Posit, 4. That impenetrability of matter, which depends upon the refiftance proportionally increafing with the degrees of com- jreffion, Is called relative j as on the contrary that, which refts upon thcfuppo/itioriy that matter, as fuch, Is not liable to any com- prefllon whatever, is here called abfolute Impenetrability.— The filling oifpace with abfolute Impenetrability iftay ,be called matbi- maticaly while that of relative impenettability receives the name of dynamical,

Pqfit. 5. Material fuhfiance i« that in fpace, which is moveable o/itfelf, i. e, feparate from every other thing that exifts without it In fpace. The motion of a part of matter, by which It ceafe."!! to be a part, isfeparation. The feparation of the par^ of matter is the phyjtcal divifion.

Theorem 4th. Matter is divisible in infinitum^ and indeed into parts, each of which Is again matter.

Theorem. 5th. The poflibillty of matter renders a power of at- traftlon neceffary j thw being the fecond effentlal and funda- mental power of it.

Theorem 6th. By the mere power of attraftion, without that of rfcpulfion, we cannot conceive the poflibillty of any matter. Pqfit. 6. Conta£l:, in a phyfical fenfc, Is Immediate aftlon and teaftlon of impenetrability. The aftion of one matter upon ano- ther, without qpntadl, is the aBion at difiance {aBio in difiam'). This a£lion at diftance, which is poflible even without the aid of intervenlent matter. Is called the immediate aBion of matter upon m-aXltr^ through empty fpace.

Theorem 7th. The attraHion ejjential to all matter^ Is the im- mediate aSIon of it upon another matter, through empty fpace.

Pofit. 7th. A moving power, by which matters can Immediately a£l upon one another only In a common furface of contact, Is called Si fuperfic'ial power \ but that, by which one matter can Immedi- ately aft -upon the parts of another, even beyond the furface of contaft, may be called a penetrating power.

Theortm 8th. The original power of attraftion, upon which the poflibillty of matter itfelf, as fuch, muft depend, extends in

N the

^ ELEMENTARY VIEVr OF

the univerfe Immediately from every part oi it to another ad !•- iinitum.

Sect III. Metafihyjjcal pnnc?/)7es of Ms-CHAmcs. Posit. I. Matter is that which is moveable^ fo far as it (as fuch) poireffes moving power.

Posit. 2. The-quaritiiy of matter is the amount of that which ii moveable in a detei'mined fpacfe. This, fo far as all its parts are confidered in their motions as operating (moving) at the fame tirae, is called congeries 5 and we fay, that a matter aQ:s in a con- geries, when all its parts, moved in the fame direftion, exercife their moving power externally, and at the fame time. A congeries eonfifting of a detefmined fhape is called ^'body (in a mechanical fenfe). The magnitude oi motion (mechanically computed) is that which is eflimated both by the quantity of matter moved, and its velocity : \\h.tn phoronomically confideted, it confifts iltterely in the degree of velocity.

Ty&f-or^w ift. The quantity of ^ I^eee 'of matteT, in compa- lifon with any other, can be cftimated only by the quantity of motion in a given velocity.

Theorem 2d. Firji law of Mechanics. In all the changes of cor- poreal nature, the quantity of matter rcrnains, upon ^he wTiole^ without incrcafing or diminifhing.

Theorem 3<1. Second Jaw of 'Mechanics. Evety change of tn^t- tcr has an external caufe. (Every material body remains in its flate ofTeft or motion, in the fatoe direftion, and with the fame velocity, unlcfs it be compelled by fome externalcaafe, to change this ftate.)

Theorem ^'Ca.. Third Mechanical law. In every communicated motion, the aftion and readion always correfpand with one ano- ther.

Shot. IV. Metaphysical principles o/'Pftenomenology. 'Posit. Matter is that which is moveable, as far as in tliat refpe'iS it can be an objeft df'expcrience.

Theorem itt. The motion of matter, in a ftralght line, is,'with refpeft to an empirical fpace, merely -a. pojfble predicate, in con- tradiflinilion to the oppofite motion qf fpace. ■ The very fame

predicate

KANT'S WORKS. 99

predicate Is impojfthle, if we conceive It In no external relatloii 10 xciBk\Xcr/\. t.zi abfoliite motion^ ,

Theorem 2d. The circular- iftotloq of matter, in contradiAino- tlon to the oppofite motioa of fpace, Is a real predicate of it j whereas the oppofite motion of a r^ative fpace, if fubftituted for theirwtionof the body, is no teal motioa qf tHe latter, ^»4 ii confideted as fuch, is a raere^illufion.

Theorem 3d. In, every naoUoix of a body, by which it is ma- ving, with refpeft to another body, an oppoC^te e^ual motioo, <^ the latter is necejfary,

XXIII. (7) Grundlegung zur Critik des Gefchmacks. Funda- mental principles of the Critlq^ue of Tafle. 8vo. ^j^a^ 1787.

Though we have not fuccecded in procuring a copy of this pu- blication, we ftiall find an opportunity of ftating the outlines of Kant's ideas upon this interefting fubjeft, in a fubfequent work, under No. XXY. (9), »*» vvhich heconfiders the vzxiovls judgments refulting from Tajle } the modes, in which they take place in the mind j and their refpeftive peculiarities.

XXIV. (8.) Critik der praBifchen Vermnft. Cntique o£ Pr^flical Reafon. 8vo. /?z^^. 1788. ad Edit. 1792.

If we abftsa^ fsam the empirical part of experience, or if we conceive experience as a general idea, without attending to any variety that may be contained undej; this idea j we then acquire a priori the conditions of it. The empirical or experimental knowledge obtained by experience formed the matter of it j but thofe conditions, without which experience cannot be reduced to the rules of thought, we' have called the form of it. — We muft proceed in a fimllar manner, when we refiedl upon the various operations of our w///. \ will, for inflance, any one objedl, and I immediately become confcious of the idea relating to fome ex- pelled pleafure j an idea, which is connefted with this will. The reprefentation of that pleafure, which the poffeflion of the objeft might afford, is the empirical part of the will, that conftitutes its matter. If we abflra^ from the latter, there is produced the idea

N2 of

100 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

O" a free will, the condition as it were of i every thing that is em- pirical. If, further, we lay afide in thought every thing that re- fers to experience, and ftill fuppofe a will completely determined towards afting \ there remains at laft nothing but the faculty of reafon itfelf, which determines this will to aft. In this manner arifes in us the idea of a PraBical Reafon j a faculty, which direfts the will, independent of any impulfe of the fenfes. The" Critique of Praftical Reafon," therefore, fets out with the defign of in- ycftigating this faculty.

CpjTTtNTS.

Book I. Analysis of pure practical Reason, Sect. I. Of the principles of pure praBical Reafon.

Illujlration. Pradical principles are fuch as contain a general determination of the will, which again has a variety of fubordi- nate pradical rules. They are fubjedive principles or maxims, when the condition is confidered as- applicable only to the will of the fubjeft j but they are objeBive principles or praftical laws, when that condition is acknowledged as objeftive, i. e. applica-, ble to the will of every rational being.

Theorem ift. All praSical principles, which prefuppofe an ohjeB (matter) of the defiring faculty as the caufe of determining the will, are wholly empirical, and cannot furnifti praflical laws.

Theorem 2d. All the pra£lical principles relating to ^material objefts, are, as fuch, without exception, of one and the fame kind, and originate frota the general principle of feli-love or perfonal happinefs.

Theorem 3d. If a rational being (hall conceive its maxims as ^ praftical general laws j it can confider them only as principles, which contain the ground of determining the will,]inot according ^Qthe matter, but merely according to the form.

Fundamental law of pure praBical Reafqn.

" Let fuch be your conduft, that the maxim of your will *' may, in every inftance, be admitted as the principle of a *• general law ) — or in other words :

^ Aft in fuch a manner, as to confider and to employ hvi-

'* manity,

KANT'S WORKS. loi

'■* manity, in your own as well as in every other perfon, al-

" ways as the fiur/to/e, but never as the means of obtaining your

" objea."

Theorem 4th. The autonomy of the will is the only principle of all moral laws, and -of the duties conformable to them : all heteronomy of choice, therefore, not only eftabliflies no obligation "»vhatever, but is likewifc contrary to the principles of it, and to the moral purity of the will. The fole principle of morality confifts in the independence, namely of all matter of the law (i. e. the objeft defired), and at the fame time in the determi- nation of the choice by the pure general legiflative forms, of which a maxim muft be fufceptible. That independence^ how- ever, is liberty in a negative fenfe j whereas XhXs peculiar legifla- tive power of pure, and as fuch practical, Reafon is liberty in 3 pojitive fenfe. Hence the moral law expreffes nothing elfe but the autonomy of pure praftical Reafon, i. e. of liberty, and this itfelf is the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone they can correfpond with the fupreme praftical law. If, there- fore, the matter of volition, which can be nothing elfe but the objeft of a de(ire that is connefted with the law, enters into the condition of its pojjihility j there arifes from it the heteronomy of choice, namely, the dependence on the law of nature, to follow 3ny one impulfe or inclination j and the will does not give itfelf the law, but only the precept for a rational obfervance of patho- logical laws. But the maxim, which in this way never can con- tain the general legiflative form, upon the fame ground efta- blifhes not only no obligation, but is likewife contrary to the principle of 2. pure practical Reafon, confequently alfo to moral fentiment, although the aftion thus arifing (hould be lawful.

Sect II. Of the idea concerning the ohjeB of pure practical Reafon.

Table

Of the Categories of Liberty relative to the cognitions ue toffefs of the Good and Bad.

. 1-

loa ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

X.

Of Quantity.

SubjeElivey In confequence of maxims : {opinions depending upon

the will of the individual 5) OhjeElive, in confequence of principles : {precepts j) yi priori objefllve as well as fubje£live principles of liberty : (laws.)

' 2. .

Of Quality :

practical rales af appetition^ (praceptiva^) pra£lical rules of omiffiony (prohibitive,) practical rules of exceptions, (exceptivce,^

3- Of Relation : To perfonality.

To the condition of the perfon. Reciprocally of one perfon to the condition of another.

ffe.

4- Of Modality ;

Permitted ^nA nonpermitted aAions^ Duty and contrary to duty, perjedi and imperfeB duty.

Sect. III. Of the motives of pure praBical Keafon.

Critical illuflration of the analyfis of pure praflical Reafon.

Book II. Dialectic of pure practical Reason. I. Antinomy of pure pra£lical Reafon. II. Critical folution of this antinomy.

III. Of the principal advantage of pure practical Reafon, in its

connexion with the fpeculative.

IV. On the immortality of the foul, as a poftulate of pure prac-

tical Reafon. V. On the exiftence of a God, as a fin&ilar poftulate. VI. On the poftulates of pure praftical Reafon in general. VII. In what manner an extenfive improvement of pure praiElical

Reafon

itAKT's WORKS. 103

Reafon is conceivable In a particular view, without increa- fihg at the fame time its fpeculative knowledge. VIII. Of fuppofcd truths, being a ncceffary refultof pure Reafon. IX. O'f the cognofcible faculties of man, being wifely proportion- ed to his praftical deftination. Methodical do6lrinc of pure praftical Reafon. \

XXV. (9) Cridk der Uytheilfkraft Critique of the Judging

Faculty. 8vo.Zi^a«, 1790. 2d Edit. Berlin. I793jpp. 482, and lix pp. Preface and Intrcduftion.

The author's principal aim in this work is to inquire,* whether the ^udgingFacultyyVi\i\c\iy in the order of our cognofcible powers, forms an intermediate capacity between the Uhderftandlng and Reafon, has likewife Its own principles aj>rtori •■, whether thefe are confii- tutive or merely regulative j and whether that faculty of judg- ing affords a pridri the rule for the fenfatlons of pleafure and dif- pleafure, which again are the intermediate degrees between the cognofcible and appetitive faculties.'

' A Critique of pure Reafon, I. e. of our capacity of judging con- formably to principles a priori, would be incomplete, if the Judging Faculty, which likewife claims thefe principles, were not treated as a feparate part of that Critique j although, in a fyftem of ^ure philofophy, the principles of judgment muft not be confidered as a feparate part, belonging either to the theoretical or praftlcal de- partment of the fyftem j but, In cafes of emergency, they may be occafionally connefted with either. For, if fuch a fyftem ftiall once be eftabllfticd under the general name of Metaphyfics (a work, the complete attainment of which is by no means impofllble, and which would be of the firft importance to the general ufe of Reafon') 5 the Critique muft have previoufly Inveftigated the ground, on which this ftrufture Is to be ercfted, as well as the fo- lidity of the bafis of this faculty, that deduces its principles inde- pendent on experience : and if any one part of this fabric (hould be found to ftand upon a ftight foundation, the downfal of the whole would be the inevitable confequence.

• But we may eafily perceive from the nature of the Judging Faculty, that the difcOvery of the peculiar principle of it, muft be

attended

104 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

attended with great diiHculties ; for this faculty muft neceffarii/ contain fome fuch principle a priori ; becaufc, in the contrary cafe, it could not be fubjefl: to the moft common critique as a pajrticulat faculty of acquiring knowledge j and becaufe the proper ufe of it is fo neceffary, and fo univerfally admitted, that every body is ac- quainted with its influence. That principle, however, muflr not be derived from notions a priori^ fince thefe are the property of the Underftanding, and the application of them only belcfngs to the Judging Faculty. Hence the latter muft furnifh an idea, through which indeed we obtain no intuition of any objeft, but which' ferves as a rule to that faculty itfelf. This rule, however, is not of an objeEiinie nature, -fo that we could compare the judgment ■with it in concrete j for to do this, there would be required a fe* cond Judging Faculty, in order to enable us to diftinguiflb, whe- ther the cafe applies to the lule or not.

• ' This perplexity on account of a principle (whether a fubjcc- tive or objective one) chiefly manifefts itfelf in thofe judgments, which are called aejlhetical^ which relate to the Beautiful and the Sublime, whether that of nature or art. And yet is the critical inveftigation of a principle of the Judging Faculty, refpefting thofe objefts, the moft important part of the Critique of this power. For, though the aefthetical judgments, of themfelves, contribute nothing to the knowledge we obtain of things, they ne- verthelefs belong exclufively to the cognofcible faculty, and evince the immediate relation of this faculty to the fenfations of pleafurfc and difpleafure, in confequence of fome one principle a priori, without confounding it with that, which may be the caufe of de- termining the appetitive faculty j becaufc this has its principles a priori in notions, which are the produce of Reafon.'

Having preraifed this extrad\ from the author's preface to the work under confideratlon, I ftiall only add the refult of Kant's in- quiry refpe£ting the final purpofes of nature, as exhibited in the Second Book, of this publication ; though, in my opinion, this in- veftigation forms the moft interefting and eflential part of the whole. It is as follows.

In conformity to our Reafon, we are obliged to aiTume a certain connection fubfifting between the final purpofes of nature", in the

fame

KANT'S WORKS. 105

manner as our Underllanding, in confequence of Its conftitution, is impelled to combine things according to their efficient caufes. As foon as we obferve a certain pofitive relation among things to ©ne another j as foon as we can reprcfent to ourfelvcs one thing as poffible only through the idea we poffefs of another j we can re- duce fuch a combination to no other idea than that of final caufes, or of means and purpofes. Although we are not able to perceive and to determine the ground, on which that conneftion rcfts, as a thing independent on our fenfes ; we may ftill conceive it, in a general manner, as the ground of fuch a combination as can be reprefented by us under the idea of connefting final caufes j we may thus think of it under the only fymbol, which can properly dc- ' note the bafis of this affociation, namely that of Reafon. In this way, however, we have no title to refer the modes and aftidtis we obferve in our Reafon, to that being (fubftratum) Itfelf ; but we rouft make ufe of them only as a fymbol, which at leaft expreffes ^milar relations.

We muft, therefore, juflly confider the world, as if every thing were arranged in it by the higheft Underftanding ; and we muft, with the greateft attention, endeavour to difcover in experience ■ thofe traces, that are every where fcattered for the fupport of this couclufion j in order to prepare our minds for the conviftion arifing from a very coniiderable number of individual cafes. In this, we (hall the better fucceed, if, as the ground-work of this in- quiry, we exhibit that fyftematic order, which is already deter- mined by our Reafon a priori^ and in confequence of which deter- mination the moral beings compofe the laft and abfolute purpofe, to which all other things ultimately and^-neceiTarlly refer as the means of the former. But fince we can recognize no other moral being than man, we muft accordingly regulate our inveftigations relative to final purpofes, and particularly attend to v.hat is con- nefted with his nature. PIcre, however, we muft abandon the nption hitherto cnoneoufly maintained by many Theologians, that every thing \iz% a neceffary relation to man. For, as the world of moral beings certainly confifts of more claffes than we are ac- <5uainted with, we may indeed prefuppofe, that men are abfolute purpofes, yet far from being exclufivdy fo j and that nature hai

O ot

io6 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

not been conftituted for the fake of men alone, but that, at the fame time, other moral beings have not been difregarded. We may therefore fafely admit, that nature has been fo formed, that the ef- iential purpofes concerning man can be certainly attained, not- withftanding that the accidental purpofes muft occafionally remain unaccorapliflied, on account of others that are more important and neceffary. For this affertion, which is fupported merely upon the principles of our moral nature, and not by any intuitive knowledge of the world itfelf, experience only furnifhes us with arguments, which this order of the world difplays in individual cafes. But the greateft number of phenomena muft neceflfarily remain inexplicable to us, who are acquainted only with the fmalleft part of the world, and fron^ whom the extenfive territoiy of moral beings is almoft wholly concealed : whereas a complete knowledge of their rela- tions to purpofes would prefuppofe not only a thorough knowledge of the world of fenfe, but likewife that of moral beings. We de- rive from the contemplation of the woild no proofs (ho wing a re- gular order of mora] purpofes, but we invelligate the cafes corre- fponding with that order, fo as to afcertatn it in the individual, and to flrengthen our knowledge upon what we had already pre- fuppofed, in confequence of our moral nature. For, that which affords fome knowledge in a general way, gives but a flight degree of convlftion j while that which animates this convicSlion and ren- ders it applicable to particular cafes, i. e. our fenfation of it, is produced only by individual inftances.

According to thefe principles, we (hall be able to difcover traces of divine wifdom in a great number of phenomena, without neglefting on that account our inquiries into nature, which alone can extend our knowledge of things ; which previoufly unfolds the matter of knowledge j and which points out the relations, where- in divine wifdom is evident. The field of phyfics is immenfe j and by an appeal to the Deity, who has produced nature Itfelf conformably to final caufes, we can fet no limits to that field. For, to obtain a complete view of final caufes, and to apply them to the explanation of phenomena, is entirely out of our power ; we can only mark them as the refults arifing from our intuitive knowledge of nature, with this limitation > tha>, when we obtain a

more

KANTs WORKS. 107

hiore accurate knowledge of the nature of thefe things, we (hall Hkewife difcover a greater variety of final caufes, and fo on in in- finitum.

The contemplation of nature, agreeably to final purpofcs, is therefore fully eftabliflied in the conftitution of our Reifon j al- though we have no intuition of the being that is the bafis of this order. We can conceive this being merely by the idea of Reafon in general, as the only pofliblc way of apprehending it : thus," how- ever, our knowledge of the nature of that being is not increafed j and we only fatisfy a fubjeftive, but fteceffary claim of our Reafon. For fuch an order of things as depends upon a regular fucceflion of final caufes, can be thought of by no other relation but that of a caufality conformably to ideas j a refult, which exadly corre- fponds with the general idea of an efficient Reafon*

Contents.

XntroduBion. — I. Of the divifion of philofophy into theoretical and praftical. II. Of the extent of philofophy in general.

III. Of the Critique of the Judging Faculty, being

the medium of combining the two paits of philofophy into one fyftera.

IV. Of the Judging Faculty being a legiflative power

apriori. V. The principle of formal conformation {Xvoeck- majpgkeit) of nature Is a tranfcendental princi- ple of the Judging Faculty.

VI. Of the connexion between the fenfatlon of

pleafurc and the Idea of the conformation of nature.

VII. On the aellhetical method of reprefenting this conformation.

VHI. On the logical method of exhibiting the fame. IX. On the connexions formed between the le- giflative a61s of the Undcrflanding and Reafon, by means of the Judging Faculty.

O 2 The

108 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

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KANT^s WORKS. loc^

Division I. Critique of the aesthetical Faculty of Judging.

Sect. I. Analysis of the Aesthetical Jcdging Faculty. Book I. Analyjis of the Beautiful. First wodification of the "judgment ofTaJie according to its quality, J I- The judgment of tafte is aefthetical. 2. The approbation cetermined by this judgment is not influenced by any felf-intc- left relative to the objed. 3. The approbation, or the fatisfac- tion we exprefs upon what is agreeable^ is conneAed with fclf- intcreft. 4. The fame is the cafe with regard to what 1% good, 5. Comparifon of the three fpecifically different kinds of fatis- , faflion.

Second modification of the Judgment of Tojle^ namely according to its quantity.

$ 6. That which Is reprefented as an obje<Sl of univerfal approba- tion, Independent on collateral notions, Is called Beautiful. 7. Comparifon of the Beautiful, the Agreeable, and the Good, by -the above ftaled charafter. 8. The univerfality of approba- tion, in a judgment of tafte, is reprefented only in a fubjeftlve fenfe. 9. Inveftigation of the qucftlon : whether in a judgment of tafte the fenfe of pleafure precede the aft of judging upon the objeft, or follow it.

Third modification of the judgments of Tafe, according to their

RELATION to purpofes. \ 10. Of Conformation in general. 11. The judgment of tafte Is; wholly founded upon iht fortn or the nexus finalis of an objeft, (or on the manner of reprefenting that objeft to the mind).

12. The judgment of tafte depends upon principles a priori.

13. 14. This judgment Is not related to any emotion of the mind. 15. It Is equally unconnefted with the idea of perfeftion. 16. That judgment of tafte, by which an objeft is- declared to be beautiful only under a certain condition, cannot be called a

pure judgment, i 7. On the prototype of Beauty. '

Fourth modification of the Judgment ofTa/Ie, according to the

modality of the fatisfaElion in the object.

§ 10. This modality of an aefthetical jndgment is not a neceffary,

but

no ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

but an exeinjilary determination of all individuals, refpc6ling \ judgment, that is confidered as an example of a general rule, tht particulars of which cannot be defined. 19. The fubjedive neceflity, which we attribute to an aefthetical judgment, is con- ditional. 20. The condition of the neceffity, which a judgment of tafte fuppofes, is the idea of a common fcnfe. 21. Whetlier we have grounds, on which we may conclude the reality of a common fenfe. 22. The neceflity of tlie general approbation, which is conceived in an aefthetical judgment, is a fubjeftivc neceflity, which, under the fuppofltion of a common fenfe, is te- prefentcd as objeiflive.

CORROLLARIES FROM THESE FOUR MODIFICATIOl.S.

I. Tojle is the faculty of judging of an objcft, or of reprefen^- ing it by mears of approbation or difapprobation, unconnefted with any felf- inter e/}. The objeft of fuch approbation is cal- led Beautiful.

II. Beautiful IS that which affords unlverfal fatlsfaftion, without reducing it to a certain idea.

III. Beauty is the conformation or nexus finalis of an objeft, fs far as it is obferved in it, ivithout the reprefentation of a pur-

IV. Beautiful is that which is recognized as an objeft of ne- cejfary fatisfadlion, without combining with it a particular idea.

Book II. Analyfis of the Sublime.

§ 23. Tranlition from the judging power of the Beautiful to that of the Sublime. 24. Of the divifion of an inquiry into the fenfation of the Sublime. A. On the mathematical Subfime. 25. Definition of the Sublime : " Sublime, in general, is that which is abfolutely great, which admits of no comparifon, to think, of which only proves a faculty of the mind, which is not fubjeft to any fcale of the fenfes, &c.'* 26. Of the mathema- tical computation of natural obje(5ls, which is requifite to pro- duce the idea of the Sublime. 27. Of the quality of the fatisfa£lion we receive in judging of the Sublime. B. On the dynamical Sublime of nature. 28. NatuHe confidered as might (^botentia). 29. On the modality of the judgment refnedling

the

KANT'S WORKS. iii

the Sublime of nature. — DeduBion of the pure ojlhctkal judg- ments.— 30. The deduction of aefthetical judgments upon the objefts of nature muft not be direfted to what we call fublime in the latter, but to the Beautiful only. 31. On the proper method of this dedu61Ion. 32. Flrjl peculiarity of an aefthetical judgment ; " that it determines its objedt with refpeft to the fatisfafllon found in it, at the fame time claiming the approba- tion of ru^rr)' body, Z3 a it were obJeSiive,''^ 33. ■SVroff^/ peculia- rity : " that it cannot at all be determined by argumental proofs, as if it were vatxtXy fubje&ivey 34. No objedlive principle of tafte can be difcovered. 35. The principle of tafte is the fubjedlivc principle of the judging faculty in general. ^6. How the deduftion of aefthetical judgments muft be carried on. 37. What is properly afferted a priori, in this judgment, concerning the obje£t. 38. Dedu(5lion of aefthetical judgments. 39. How a fenfation can be communicated. 40. Of Tafte, as a fpecies oifetifus communis, 41. Of the empirical intcreft in the Beau- tiful. 42. Of the intelle£lual inteieft. 43. Of art in general. *' /in is diftlnguifaed from Nature, like doing {faccre') from acting or operating in general (^cgcre) 5 and the produclion of the former, i. e. work {opui) is diftinguiftied from the latter as operation ^cffc&us^. — Art, as human ingenuity, is fuilher dif- tinguiftied from Science, like the practical from the theoretical part of geometry ; for to be acquainted with the principles of navigation, for inftance, does not yet form a pra6lical naviga- tor : hence the Sciences imply the knowledge of things, and the Arts teach us the practical application of that knowledge.-— Laftly, j^it is diftinguiftied from handicraft ; the former may be called yrf<r, the latter, mercenary art^ 44. Of the fine arts. 45. By fine art? is underftood any art, fo far as it, at the fame lime, is imitative of nature. 46, 47. The fine arts are the ef- forts of genius. 48. Of the diftinftion fubfifting between ge- nius and tafte. *• To judge of beautiful obje£ts, as fuch, re- quires tajie ; but the art of producing fuch objefts, fuppofes gc- nius.^^ 49. Of the faculties of the mind, which compofe what is called genius, jo. Tafte and genius muft be combined in the produflions of the fine aits. 5 1 . Of the divifion of fine the arts :

Ill ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

*' I.) tlie arts of language, viz. Oratory and Poetry, 2.) tlie arts of fenfible Imitation, which are cither thofe of true or of illufory exhibitions, the former are called Plajllc, the latter Painting : — PIqfiic includes Statuary and ArcbilcBure j paint- ing confifts either in copying beauteous nature, or in beau- ti-'ully arranging her produftions j i. e. in the refpeftive arts of Painting or Pleafure -gardening ; — 3.) the beautiful combination of external fenfations, viz. the arts of Mujic and Dying.'''* 52. Of the combination of the fine arts in one and the fame produftion. 53. Comparifon of the fine arts with one another, with regard to their aefthetical value.

Sect. II. Dialectic of the Aesthf.tical Jcdging Faculty. ^ SS — 57- Repfcfentation and Solution of the Antinomy of Tafte.

58. On the Idealifm of conformation in nature as well as art, being the only principle of the aefthetical faculty of judging.

59, Of Beauty as the fymbol of Morality, 60. Append. Of the methodical do6lrine of Tafte.

Division' II. Critiqtte of the Teleoi^ogical Faculty of Judging.

§ 61. Of the objedive conformation of nature.

Se&. I. Analyjis of the teleologlcal faculty of fudging.

§ 62. Of the objective conformation, which is merely formal, in (liftindion fro^i what is material. 63. Of the relative con- formation of nature, in diftinftion from the internal. 64. Of the peculiar cliarafter of things, as purpofes of nature. 6^. Things, as natural purpofes, are organized beings. 66. Of the principle of judging of the internal conformation of organized beings. 67.- Of the teolological principle of judging of Nature in general, as a fyftem of purpofes. 68. Of the principle of

' Teleology, as an internal principle of Natural Phllofophy.

Seil. II. Diale&ic of the teleologichl,Faculty of fudging.

\ 69. The antinomy of the Judging Faculty. 70, 71. Repre- fentation and folution of this antinomy. 72. Of the various

fvftems

KANTs WORKS. , 113

fyftems refpe£ling the conformation of nature. 73. None of thcfe fyftcms is fatisfa£lory. 74. The caufe of the impoflibility of treating this i^ea,'*' that nature is technically arranged," in a dogmatical manner, lies in our incapacity of explaining the de- ffgn or aim of nature. 75. The idea of an objeftive conforma- tion of nature is a critical principle of Reafon, belonging to the reflex Faculty of Judging. 76. Illuftrating reraarJts. 77. Of the peculiarity of the human underftanding, from which ihc idea of the purpofcs of nature arifes. 78. On the principle of the univcrfal mechanifm of matter, united with the teleologic^l principle in the technical (archite^onjc) arrange^ient of na-* tujre.

Apfendix. Methodical doElrine of the teleolvgtcal Faculty of Judging.

j 79. Whether Teleology ought to be treated as a branch of Phyfics. 80. Of the nccefTity of clafling the principle of me- chanifm under that of teleology, when we attempt to explain a thing as a defign of nature, ^i. On the aflbciation of ^lecha- nifm with the teleplogical principle, accounting for natural pu,r- pofes, as being the produftions of nature, 82. Of the teleolo- gical fyftem in th? external relations of organized beings. 83. Of the laft purpofe (defign) of nature as a tijleological fyftenj, 84. Of the final purpofesof the exjUence of a world, i. e. of thie creation itfelf. 85. Of phyfico-theology. 86. Of ethico-theology. 87. Of the moral proof ofth* exigence of God. 88I The validity of this moral proof is limited. 89. Qf the ufe of the moral argu- ment. 90. Of the manner of admitting things as true, in amoral proof of the exiflence of God. 91. Of the manner ofconfidering tilings as true, by means of a pradical belief,

XXVI. Ueier eine Entdeckung^ nach der alle Critik der retnen Vernunft durch eine dltere entbehrlich gemacht iverden foil. On a certain dlfcoverj, by means of whicK every (new) Critique of pure Reafon is faid to be rendered unneceflary by an earlier one. Svo. Koenigsberg. 179^.

We merely take notice of this publication, here, for the fake of completeu^fs. It can fcatcely be confidered. as forming a dillinub

114 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

part of Kant's fyftematic works j it Is neither mentioned as fuch^ by the numerous German commentators upon the Critical Philo- fophy, nor has Mr Nitsch of London availed himfelf of this (ap- parently polemic) produ£lion, in his late view of the Kantian principles. — For this reafon, we do not hefitate to pafs it over in illence, and to devote a confiderable degree of attention to the following work, on Religion, which is of infinitely greater import- ance.

XXVIL (lo.) Die Religion innerhalh dqn Grm^en derhlojjem Vernunft. Religion confidered withm the bounds of mei& Reafon. Koenigsberg, 1793. ad Edit, enlarged. 1 794, pp. 314, and xxvi pp. Preface.

It cannot be a matter of indifference to a philofopher, to know what relation the prevailing religion of the age bears to the fpe- culative notions of Reafon, that are propagated In the phllofophlc fyftems of his cotemporaries. Although the inquiries of this na- ture be conducted independently of any pofitivc religious creed, we may yet congratulate ourfelves upon the difcovery, when that pofitivc religion, which guides a very confiderable part of man- kind, and which has produced fo many excellent moral effefls, is not found to be altogether inconfiftent wirh the principles, main- tained by the moft profound and eminent phllofophers. We may at the fame time learn, to give a more praftical explanation upon thofe fymbolical points, that have hitherto met with no ofeful ap- plication, and that have occafioned many frultlefs and bloody con< tefts.

No man of candour and impartiality will cenfure the defign of a writer, who employs his philofophic maxims (if they be otherwife well eliabliflied upon a critical baCs), in order to ferve as prliy ciples, for explaining ambiguous doQrines and pofitlve inftitutions. For, if the Deity has immediately intrufted man with fo valuable a gift as religion actually is, it muft have been corrupted by men therafelves, who have delivered it to their poftei;ity, with fuch ad- ditions as are inconfiftent with the principles of Reafon j and the true original fenfe of fuch traditions can be difcoverad only

througl^

ilANT's WORKS. iiS

through the pjroper exercifc of Reafon. Every attempt, there- fore, of reftoring harmony between the pofitive tenets of Religion and thofe of philofophy, muft be confidered as highly beneficial to mankind j becaufe, in this manner only, the defign of that revela- tion can be confidently attained.

Our fatisfaftion, too, muft be the more complete, when we have an opportunity of obferving, that fuch a revelation has not only been preferved in its purity during the courfe of many centuries, but likcwife has been the means of exercifing the rational facul- ties of man, upon the moft profound fubjefts of inquiry. — If we compare the principal tenets of the Chriftian Religion with the principles of the Kantian fyftem, we (hall be agreeably furprjfed to find, that the former are perfeftly confiftent with the latter^ and that this author fatisfies all the claims, which can be made on, philofophy, to eftabliftx a pure religious doftrine. For the refult of Kant's inveftigations, upon this head, is nearly the following :

ill, That Chriftianity is throughout a moral Religion ^ fuch as Rea- fon requires of every religious eftablifhment whatever. It is, among the numerous religions in the world, the only one, which derives Its principles from pure morals, and which reprefents to man' his deftination as attainable only by moral means. It indeed prefuppofes, that he has the power and ability of doing, what the law of philanthropy commands him ; though, at the fame time, Religion apprizes him of that refiftance, which natural inclinations or carnal defires oppofe to the exercife of Reafon. It further appropriates to him, in exprefs terms, the capacity of overcoming^ thefe ditRculties ; and as the human underftanding can arrive at no objeAIve knowledge of fuch a power. Scrip- ture lays the foundation of it in fomething beyond the reach o£ the fenfes, while it gives man the affurance, that the Deity may alfo endow him with faculties, which materiallj differ from thofe of mere fenfitive beings j in order to accompliih, by the power of his will, whatever he judges to be morally right and and falutary. In this manner alone, Reafon can form a com- plete and clear notion, that the moral power is a fuperfenfibU agent, whofe origin or, in the langu^c of Kant, whofc poffibility wc cannot by any means conceive.

Pa 2d

ii6 ELEMENTARY ViEW OF

2d. The tirue deftlhatJon of man is, conformably to the principles of ChriftJanity, not fought for in the fenfible, but in the fupcr- fenfible part of nature. Man muft acquire happinefs by his iho^ ral cofidud, but he ought not to expe<ft the former in this world ; not to derive his hopes of it from his fenfitive, but from his moral nature. For, according to the Chriftian doftrine, his fole bufinefs hefe confifts in prepaiing and making himfelf worthy o£ it, through a purely moral life.

?d. The Chridian Religion throughout prefuppofes a moral go- vernment of the worlds ahd the idea of the moral order of things ferves as its balls : this order, however, can be realized or ac- compliflied only in relation to the whole exiftence of rational beings. Exadly in the fame manner is this propofition deter- mined by our Reafon.

ifth. The Religion of Chrift enjoins us to confider good will to all mankind as the fupreme principle of all our aftions. It enjoins us to unite felf-love, in equal proportion with univerfal benevolence, or rather to make the formir fubfervlent to the purpofes of the latter : and this is precifely the didate of Reafon, and what Kant afferts to be the fiift moral precept. Through this praftical law alone, the Chriflians determine the attributes of the Deity, fince they reprefent him as the luoral creator, prcferver, and

. ruler of the world.

5th. Thus, in the religion of Chrift, morality is laid down as the cogntjfeible ground, on which we eftabllfti our knowledge of the Deity. We can boaft, indeed, of no perceptive cognition of that Being j yet we are not contented with a mere fpeculative notion of him, whofe attribuj^ we can clearly exhibit in the idea of a moral intelligent power* Laftly,

$th. The whole aim of the Chriii^ian Religion is the moral im- provement and perfeftlon of man^ The whole purpofe of Re- liginti, when contemplated by Reafbn, can be no otb'er than to ; render inan morally better, or to improve his moral worth. It . rauft admit of being employed as the means of ftrengthening bis moral faculties, of removing the obftacles that frequently occur in the pra<3:iee of morality, and of fortifying the powers of f'^ Reafon.

s!fe-' Even

KANT'S WORKS. 117

Even the dogmatical part of the Chriftian doftrme Is of fuch i nature as to difplay, in the greater number of inftances, a relative application to morals j and the principal tenets of it, have a ma- nifeft tendency to folve moral difficulties. Thefe appear at fo early a period among men, that attempts to account for them very foon follow. Such explanations, in general, are extremely ludicrous, efpeeially in the infancy of Reafon, when fancy fupplies its place, and before experience has been made our guide. Imagination fearcely liftens to thefuggeftions of Reafon j and, in this fituation, men are eafily pleafed with any plaufible,anfwer, which their ancef- tors have contrived from the rich ftores of mythology. Though their knowledge of objefts is not thereby increafed, yet the hypothefes thus contrived are ufually ingenious, fo that they might aflford fome fatisfaftion, if they were founded upon any thing but fancy.

This infant age of reafoning, if it may be called fo, is attended ■with the advantage, that it does not conceal the difficulties, for which it cannot account. Reafon, being gradually enlightened by philofophy, is eonfclous of this chimerical method of explain* ing things j but as it imagines any other explanation to be inr- poffible J it rather confiders the difficulty itfelf as fiflltious, in or-^ der to fhow, that all attempts at explaining it muft be dlfpenfed- with.

By graidual advances, Reafon difcover* that fuch difficulties really exift, and that all fophiftfcaldifputes upon them 31*6 of no' avail. At the fame time, we find that the former are of fuch a nature, as to admit of no other folutlon than that by prafticat ideas, and thait thcfo idess are expreffed in thofe fanciful explana-' tions of mythology, by the reprefentation oifenfible objefts.

Now, fince every thing conne£led with morals, as well as every conclulion drawn from that fource^ isjuftly denominated by the •pithet * divine j' it is eafy to perceive, how thofe mythological objefts, together with the fiftitious productions of fancy, could be called divine revelations. For there really is a moral text or meaning at the foundation of them, but which can be difclofed only in a more improved ftate of Reafon.

From this deduftion, it becomes perfe^ly evident, in what man- ner wcm«tt with two very differtnt explanations of fuch books, a*

contala

X>t^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

contain the like folations of moral propofitions, under thfe title o£ Revelation. One of thefe explanations namely boafts of ftating! the literal fenfe of the Writ, and is ftyled the grammatical inter- pretation : the other tracer the ideas, that may originally have oc- cafioned thofe fiftions, and confiders the fubjefts of mythology as the fymbols of thofe ideas. And this is juftly called the moral in- terpretation. If now each of the two purfues its own method of inquiry, difputesmay eafily arife among the different interpreters > for they will fiequentiy find oppofite meanings in one and the fanie paffage.

Thefe diflenfions irt the interpretation of Scripture, daily dif- jjlay their baneful effefts, however eafily they might be fettled, i£ the interpreters Were not averfc to enter into 6 proper agreement upon certain points. For, no man will deny, that all Revelation^ refts upon the inward ftate of our mind j that all pofitive Religions are more orlefs perfe£l expreflions of Revelation j and that^ there- fore, the "true interpretation of it can be difcovercd only by our? own fubjedlive Operations. Hence it is, that thofe only, who are well acquainted with the nature of the human miild, can find the true fenfe of Revelations. Reafon is here likewife the fupreme tribunal, from which no further appeal can be made. The doftrines of the original evil, of reconciliation, and many other principles, peculiar to the Chriftian Religion, are founded on a bafis, that ad- mits of very excellent and ufeful refledlions, upon the moial con- flitutiotl of man, and upon the manner in which his deilination has been provided for. Nay, from thefe do6lrines, it is evident, how thofe opinions, which appear to have a common origin in human tiature,have evcir been reprcfented through certain narratives and al- legories J and how the minds of men in all ages reforted to them, as if they had been condadled by an invifible hand, without being uni- formly confcious of their true meaning. And is there any greater fervice, which the philofophic inquirer can render mankind, than to invcSigate thefe traces of Reafon, which, by their facred anti- quity, have fo important an influence on human affairs ; though their origin be, for the mofl part, involved in obfcurity. From this invefligation, the only explanation muft refult, which can contri- bute to th« attainment of that ultimate end, £or which man is ori«

ginally

KANT'S WORKS. c*i*

gliially defigned. If, in this way of explaining fymbols^ we fearch merely for figns of fuch truths, as are previoufly dircovered by our mind, the errors or miftakes cannot be fo detrimental, as if we aija- ed at finding the truth itfelf, by means of thefe fymbols. For, in the former cafe, imagination can merely miflead us to denote a true thing by a falfe fymbol j whereas, in the latter cafe, we are expofed to the danger of confounding a fymbol (to which our fancy is but too fondly attached) with the truth itfelf, and thus of falling into mere chimerical notions. Let us therefore fearch in the re- gions of truth J and, direfting our views to the monuments of anti- quity, inquire, whether among them we can difcovcr no figns correfponding with our moral attainments. Thus we may faci- litate the accefs to the faniluary of truth, in as much as our new method of explaining will afcertain, whether we have fucceeded in exploring the juft charailer of religious truths, and whether the true fcnfe of the refpedive fymbuls has ever been clearly undet- flQod.

■ Contents..

Sect. I. On TjaE coNjoNgrioN qr. league between the bad akj>

■ GOOD principle J OR ON THE RADICAL EVIL IN HUMAN NATURE.

1. Of the original difpofition (inclination) towards the good in human nature.

2. Of the propeofity to. vice,

3. Whether man is naturally vicious.

4. Of the origin of eVjl in huipan nature.

General Remarks. On the manner of reftoring to its vigour thk original dii^o^UQn t(>wards the good.

Sect. II. On the contest between the good principle And the

BAD, FOR THE DOMINION OVER MANKIND.

1. Of the legal claim of the good principle to the dominioa over mankind.

2. Of the legal claim of the bad principle to that dominion, and the conteft between the two principles.

S|scr.

;l2o element AtlY view of

SxCT, IIL On the victory of the good principle over the jja©,

AND THE FODNDATION OF A KINGDOM OF GoD UPON EarTH.

Cbaj>. I. Philofophical exhibition of the viBory of the good principle, - hy the foundation of a kingdom of God upon Egtrth.

J. .Of tlie ethical ftate of nature.

2. Man mufl leave the ethical ftate of nature, in order to be- come a member of an ethical commonwealtb.

3. The idea of an ethical commonwealth is that oi 9. people of God, under ethical laws.

4. The idea 0/ a people of God is (through human regula- tions) no othcrwife to be exhibited in pradice, but by the formation of a Church.

5. The conftitution of every church uniformly begins with fome or other hiftorical belief (revelation) which may be called the church'bclief, and this is molt fuitably founded on a Holy

„ Writ.

0. The pure religious bejief is the fupremc interpreter of church- belief.

7. The gradual tranfition of church-belief, to the exclufive pre- valence of the pure religious belief, indicates the approach . of a kingdom of God.

Chap. n. llijiorlcal exhibition of the gradual foundation of the pre-

dominance of the good principle upon Earth. Sect IV. Of the worship and spurious worship rwDER the domi- nion OF THE good principle, OR OF RELIGION AND PI^IESTHOOD *.

A. Of the divine fervice in Religion in general.

1. The Chriftian Religion confidered as a Natural Religion.

2. The Chriftian Religion confidered as a Learned Religion.

B. Of the fpurious war (hip of God ^ in a fiatutary Religion eflablifhed by men.

\ I. Of the general fubjeftive ground ol religious fancy^

2.

* P/''^"'^""»> Jn German, is not literally ' priefthood,' nor does it fignify « prieft- craft ;' but it exprefl'es the ufurped dominion of the clergy, by which they pre- tend to be in the exdufive pofleffion of the means of difp^hfing abfolution from ^s and diylce grace.

KANT'S WORKS 121

2. The moral principles of Religion, confidcred in oppofi^ion to religious fancy.

3. Of Prieflhood, as being an order of men engaged in the fpurious worfliip of the good principle.

4. Of the guide afforded by confcicnce, in matters of belief.

3CXVIII. "Zum ewigen FriedeUy &c. Projecl for a perpetual peace. A philofophical Eflay. 104 pp. 8vo. Konlgshergy

1795-

Of this original work, which is fo much and juftly admired on the continent, we already poffefs an En^lidi trarflation. And if the appearance of this produ6lion in foreign veriions could efta- blifli anv proof of its merits, I might add, that " Kant's projecl fo^ a perpetual peace" has been likewife traqilated into French, and indeed vvith the fan£llon of the author, who has furniftied the French tfanflator with a wiy Supplement, which contains, " afe- cret article for ^ perpetual peace.'''*

Many of our political readers muft remember, that the idea of a perpetual peace has formerly employed the pen of the good Abbot DE St. Pierre j and that, at a ftjll earlier period, the mofl patriotic King of whom France can boaft, Henry IV, was ferlouf- ]y cng!^ged in modelling this beneficent plan, which he propofed to fubmit to the confidcration of his cotemporary. potentates, if an untimely death had not fruftrated that philanthropic dcfign. — Though pur fage politicians have always confidered plans of this kind as the fanciful produflions of good-natured fanatics, it may on the other h^nd be obferved, tha^ by difputing on the poflibility of a perpetual peace, the neceflity of a perpetual warfare mufl; be admitted as a maxim •, becaufp, without b?ing continually prepa- red for war, the different dates of ^lurope could not long exift to- gether. This maxim, however, is as abominable in theory, as it is praftically deftruclive of every principle of morality. For, if /?// independent dates adopt or continue to pradice fuch a maxim, and if their views be conftantly direfted to the execution of it, ^hcir political exiftence itfelfmuft be extremely precarious. Froni yhis fource, I am inclined to derive the frequent revolutions in the

Q^ political

I2a ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

political world, the frequent returns from a ilate 01 ihtellfi£lual| and moral improvement to their former barbaiifm, and the per- petual animofities (emphatically called, wfl/ara/ enmities) between man and man, which are fo induftrioufly tranfmitted from one ge- neration to another y efpecially in the frontier-provinces of differ- ent nations.— Man is a fighting animal ! is the general outcry of all thofe who are interefted, whether direftly or Indire£lly, in propagating this abfurd and pernicious doftrine. Even admitting, that inan is naturally prone to exercife his phyfical powers j that ■ he has this propenfity in common with the lower animals j that he occafionally manifefts the defire of revenge and conqueft, not un- like the rapacious tyger or the viftorious Uonj and that he cannot cafily overconae thefe natural inclinations, as long as his inhuman feats are niore admired and encouraged than the dignified, though lefs amiring, exertions of his intelledt j — -does it follow from thef<f primitive difpofitions of favage man, that perpetual warAre is a ne- csffary evil in \}at prejent flate of fociety ? I hope for the honour of humanity, that none but the callous financiers of deluded na- tions, or the avaricious contraftors of armies and navies, with their numerous train of cohneftions, will be hardy enough to draw fo falfe a conclufion.

"Whe^ we confider thofe, who dirc^ the affairsf of nations, in a. moral as well as legiflative caj)acity, it is rather furprifing, that thfe important plan of a perpetual peace has never been duly weigh- ed : while many fubje6ls of lefs confequence, and comparatively trifling jnatters, daily occupy their attention. Nobody will deny, that the ideas of right and wrong, of juft and unjuft, are equally applicable to a plurality of Hates, as to different individuals o£ one or feveral countries^ The only obllacle to the juft applica- tion of thefe ideas mull, therefore, lie in the diverfity of opinions, arifing among thofe corrw/*/^// fervants of the ftate, to whom the management of external affairs is intruffed. Why, therefore, do the rulers of nations not agree upon a general federation of ftates ? — ^Why do they not, like every other reafonable being, fubmit to arbitration, by chooCng the arbiters from the bofom of difinterefted ftates J in order to fettle fuch differences as their own minifters cannot determine? This would be the only rational and proper

method ^

KANT'S WORltS 123

ttctlibd } a methodj which is daily pradifed In private life, bf thofc very men, whd feiem to oppofe its introduftion in diplonaatic tranfaftions. Nay, if the arm of violence and rapacity Were per- mitted to decide the quarrels of individuals, all civil inftitutions and focial compafts would fodn be diffolved. And does not the fame reafonitig apply to every government, whether mdnarchical; ariftrocratic, or democratic ? — have we not fufficient teftimonies upon hiftorical record, that dilTolutioh and anjiihilation have hi- therto been their ultimate fate ?

Induced by fuch confiderations, the venerable Kant, after ha- ving obferved the political changes of Europe, for upwards of half a century, fteps forward with a plan drawn up in a diplomatic form. His noble defign of flopping the prodigal efFulion of human blood, and his aim at convincing the governors of nations, that the praftlcability of this plan merely depends upon the exertions of their moral will, are equally confpicuous. The great modern improvements in Ethics throughout focicty, particularly in the highei ranks j the view of the innumerable fufferings and exter- minations accompanying the prefent ftate of warfare in Europe ; and finally the convi£lion, that his " Proje£l" is truly pra£licable and morally unexceptionable j thefe were fufficient motives to roufe the " hoary philofopher of the North," and to animate him with new vigour for this grand and benevolent attempt.

The author exhibits the Preliminary znd J)ejm'tive Articles for a perpetual peace, in two Sedlions, which he accompanies with , proper illuftrations. The preliminary articles are as follows ; 1. ** No treaty of peace ftiall be confidered as valid, that has been

coitduded with a fecret referve of matters for a future war. a. " No independent ftate {hall ever be permitted to be transferred to the dominion of another ftate, whether by inheritance, ex- change, purchafe, or donation.

3. " Standing armies (miles perpetuus) ftiall in time be entirely difcharged.

4. " No national or ftate debts ftiall be contrafted, that relate to the external or foreign affjiirs of the ftate.

5. " No ftate (hall, by force of arms, interfere with either the con- ftitotion or government of other ftates,

Qji 6»

124 ELEMENTARY" VIEW OF

6. '* No flate, at war with another, ftiall make ufe of ftich hofEi- litjes, as muft deftroy their reciprocal confidence in a future peace i for inllarxe, the employing of affafljns, poifoners, the violation of cartels, the inftigation of tteafonable praftices, re- bellion in the inimical flate, &c."

The conclufion of a definiiive peace prcfi.ippofes It as a poftulate : *' that all men, who are able to produce reciprocal effefts upon each other, muft neceffarily be fubjedt to fome civil inftitutiohs.'* AH civil inftitutioits, however, as far as regards the />i?r/o/7j fub- mltting to them', may be reduced to three clafTes: i.)thofe con- cerning the right of the citizen in the ftate ; 2.) thofe relative to the right of natioiis ; and 3.) thofe afcertalning. the rights of the citizen of the world (cofmopolite'). Conformably to this intro- du<ftIon, the author propofes three Dejirntive Artiries.

I. The civil conjlitution of every Jlate ought to he republican. — By a republlcaa conftitution is here underftood fuch a one, as is founded upon the principles of liberty^ dependence^ and equality. By means of that liberty^ acquired by the conttitutional law, all the members of a Hate muft be entitled to the privilege of obeying no other external or bye-laws than thofe, to which they have given their confent. By virtue of their legal ^/^/)fW- tv/c^, all mem be IS of a fociety are fubjeft to only one cdmmon legiflation. And by their legal equality^ among men as citizens of the ftate, there muft fubfift fuch a relation, that none of them can lawfully oblige the other, without fubjefting himfelf to the law, by which the other p^rty may reciprocally compel him in u fimilar Inftance. This, therefore, is the only constitution, which forms the bafis of every other in civil fociety j and it is SHb the only one, that can lead to a perpetual peace. For, in a government, \Vhere the confent of the citizens of the state is required for declaring war, they will be very cautious in giving their approbation to ihofe horrid meafiires. In confequence of which they themfclvcs muft bear all the calainities of a bloody conteft.

In order to prevent any mifconftrudlon of tsrms, Kant dlf- tinguiflies a republican from a democratic conflltuiion, by dlf- crircinating beuveen the Jhrmi cf government {imperii )j and thofe

of

KANPs WORKS. iz^

of adminijlratlon [reghnlnis) j the former of which are deter- mined by the diftindion oiperfoTn^ who hold thefupremc power of the ftate, but the latter, by the mode of governing the people by a fupremc head, whoever this may be. The forms of go- vernment, or thofc of the former kind, are, autocrofy or tiie power of the prince, arijiocracy or the power of the nobles, and democracy or the power of the people : thofe of the latter kind, namely the forms of adminiftration, are republicanifm and defpa- tifm. The former of thefe again confifts, according to the eflen- tial charaflers above defcribed, in the feparat'ion of the execu- tive power from the legiflative j the latter, namely defpotilin, is the arbitrary cxcctition of the laws, which the fove reign him- felf has enabled j fo that his private will becomes the public law of the nation. — Concerning democracy then, Kant affirms, that it necejjarily leads to defjiotifth j becaufe it eftabliflies a legiflative and executive power, by which all have a (hare ia forming refolutions relative to one^ and even agalnft this one, who confequently would not agree with them, fo that all are faid to partake of the Iqgiflation, when in faft they do not fo ; which is in contradiftion to the general will itfelf and to liberty. II. *Ihe rights of nations ought to bt founded upon a federation of iu' dependent /fates. — The author's ideas in this article are expreffed with equal boldnefs, energy, and truth. The refult of them is this : In the relative condition of ftates to one another, there can be rationally no other method of extricating themfelves from the lawlefs condition, that engenders continual wars, than to imitate individual man in the rcfignation of his wild (uncon- ftiained) liberty j to accomodate themfelves to public com- pulfory lavvs j ind thus to form a Jate of n5//o«j-, gradually in- creafing, and at length comprehending all the nations of the earth. Since, however, according to their notions of the right of nations, they are averfe to fubmit like individuals to the laws of corapulfion j and fince they rejeft in hypothesi what is juft in thesif let them at leafl adopt the negative fubftitute of a fe- deration (congrefs) for the prevention of war, inflcad of the pofuvjt cftablifhmcnt of an univsrfal republic. Such a congrefs may at Icaftfavcus from total ryin, by checking that hof-

tile

i%6 ELEIVIENTARY VIEW OF

tile difpofition of man, "which (huns the operation of the law ; it may gradually fpread its beneficent influence to diftant nations ; though it will neverthelefs be in conftant danger of being inter- rupted, by the capricious oppofition of a lawlefs monarch.

III. The cofmopolitical right Jhall be limited to conditions ofuniverfal bofpitality. — Tie cofrtiopblitical right is that of a ftranger, by •which he is intitled tO a friendly reception at his arrival upon foreign ground. It is not ftriAly the light of hofpitality, but that of vifiting one another, which belongs to all men, in offer- ing their company, by virtue of their common inhabitation of the furface of the earth. The iiihofpitality of fea-coafts, for inftance that of .Barbary, and the inhofpitable condu6l of cul- tivated and chiefly of comniercial nations of our tjuartcr of the globej who change their vijits into conque/Is, is donfcquently againft the law of nature. As, liowever, the means of commu- nication among the nations of the eatth are fo much improved, that the violation of a right on one fpot of the globe is now felt in all countries j it hence follows, that the idea of a cofmopoli- tical law is not a whimfical or extravagant reprefentation of a right, but 9 negeffary fupplement to a code, that remains to be written, and that relates to the rights of ftates and nations, as ■well as to the rights of man in general. Under this condition only, we may flatter ourfelves witli the hopes of a continual, though gradual, approximation to a perpetual peace. ,

In the further illuftrations annexed to thefe articles, the author maintains, that both morals and politics, fo far from being in oppofition to this plan, rather tend to confirm and to render it univerfal j " for, ' fays he,' the guarantee of this compa£l is the grand and ingenious artift, nature herfelf, who by her mechanical courfe evidently manifefts her purpofed aiin of reftoring harmony among men, even againft their will, and in the very bofom of their contentions. The provifional difpofi- tions made by nature for this purpofe,fire the following: i) that (he has provided for the fubfiftcnce of man in all climates j ^) that (he has difpcrfed them, through wars, in every dircdlion, even to the moft inhofpitable countries, in order to people thcai ) and 3) that (lie has thus compelled thero to enter into re-

' I ciprocSil

KANT^s WORKS. t%j

^iprocal engagements, which are more <yt lefs cftablifhcd Ijy law."

The many valuable hints and philofophical reflcftions, con- tained in this little work, it is impoflible to abridgie. And *S> we poffefs an English tranflation of It, I muft refer the curiousj reader to the book itfelf j at the fame time affuring him, that he will find the qrts of courts and the juggles of ftatefemen cx- pofcd, in a manner altogether original.

XXIX. (ii-) Ntetaphyjijche Atifangsgrunde der Rechtslehfe. Metaphjfical Eleme:its of Jurifprudence. 8vo. Konigsherg^ 1797. xii pp. Preface ; Lll. pp. Introduction j and "i-^S pp. Text.

This work affords another proof of the very cxtenfive applica- tion, of which the Kantian philofophy is fufceptible. Having In his former publications eftabliflied, on a critical bafis (that of «» pure and practical Reafon), the principles of Phyfics, of Tafte, of Morality, and of rational Religion, the author proceeds in the prefent, to deduce from the fame fource the elements of Jurifpru- dence J and not only lays down the private rights of individuals^ but unfolds alfo the principles, which ought to determine the in- ternal arrangements of Civil Society, and regulate the intercourfe of nations.

The mode. In which Prof. Kant treats tbe fubjeft, will -ap- pear from the following obfervation : " A Syftem of Jurifprudence, the firft part of the Science of Morals, derived from Reafon, and which might be termed the Metaphyfics of Law, Is ftill a defide- ratum in philofophy. But as the idea of law, though pure, has a relation to praftice ; i. e. is applicable to the cafes occurring in ex- perience, a metaphyfical fyftem of it, in Its divifion, muft alfo have a reference to the empirical variety of thofe cafei, in order to make the divifion complete, which is an iodifpenfable requifite in the formation of a Syftem of Reafon. Completenefs of divifion, however, in what is empirical, is impoflible •, and where it is at- tempted, or at leafl an approximation to It, fuch ideas cannot be confidercd as integral parts in a Syftem, but merely as exasiples.

The.

xa^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

The only proper appellation, therefore, for the firfl part of the Metaphyfics'of Morals, Is ' Mctaphyfical Elements of Juriffrudenee -j jbecaufc, with refpecl to the application to thefe cafes, there can only be an approxinjation to a Syftcm, not a Syftem itfclf."

Having, in a general introduftion developed the principles of the Moral Science, and having fhown the nyceflity of a Metaphy- seal Syftem of Morals, i.-e. of ^ praftlcal phllofophy derived from ideas a priori merely, and which has not nature, but the freedom cf the human will, for its objeft j the author makes the following dlftin^ion between Juftice and the other virtues, between Ethics aad Jurifprudence. — " All leglflation, ho/.ever it may agree with refpeS^to the afllons, being in every cnfe external, may yet be dlf- tinguifli6d with regard to the motives. That legiflation, which conftitutes an aflion a duty, and at the fame time makes this duty the motive, is Ethical. But th?t, which does not include in the rule the Idea 9f duty, which on the contrary admits another mo- tive than this idea, is Juridical. With refpefl to the latter, it is eafy to perceive, that this motive, different from the idea of duty, muft be derived. from the pathological grounds, by which the will is determined, viz. inclination and dlflnclination, and among thefe from thofe of the latter kind ; becaufe it is a legiflation which is compulfory, and doies not Influence the condu6l by the allurements of reward. — The mere conformity of an aSion to the rule, with- out regard to the motive, is called Its legality \ but that, in whlcji the idea of duty, arlfing from the rule, Is at the fame time the mo-' live of the aftion, is its morality. The duties, according to a ju- ridical leglflatlof!, can only be external, becaufe this legiflation does not re<juire, that the idea of duty, which is internal, fliould^e in Itfelf the principle, by which the will of the agent Is deter- mined J and as a proper motive for the rule Is neverthelefs necef- fary, it can only be externally conne(Sled with that rule. Ethical legiflation, on the other hand, makes our internal afllons alfo du- ties, not as It were excluding the external, but propeeding on what is duty in general. And as Ethical legiflation includes in its rule the internal motive of aftlon, the idea of duty, which deter- mination can by no means be introduced into an external legifla- tion J fo this Ethical legiflation cannot be external, not even that

of

KANT'S WORK. 129

of a Divine wlUj although indeed it aflumes for motives, aj- ^/?///g- duties, thofe duties which depend upon another, namely an exter- nal leglflatioB. It is not a duty of virtue to keep one^s promlfe, but an obligation of juftice, of Uw, to the performance of which one may be compelled. Yet to do this, where no compulfion is to be apprehended, is a virtuous aftion, a proof of virtue, . Jurif- prudence and Ethics then arc diftinguifhed, not fo much by the different duties they enjoin, as by the diifercnce of the legiflation, which connefis with the rule the on£ or thp other motive."

Next follows a particular * InlroduBion to "jurifprudence^ In jvhich the following fubjedls are difcuflfed.

Sect. I. \ A. Of Jurifprudence. B. ,0f jfuJice.^The idea of ■what is juft or right, fo far as it refers to a correfponding obligation, includes firft, the merely external and praftical relation of one pcr- fon to another, in fo far as their a<Elions, as fafts, can have medi- ately or immediately an Influence on each other. But fecondly, it does not imply the relation of the will of one individual to the vjt/h or mere nvayit of another, as in the a(E):Ions of charity or in- fenfibility, but merely to the wt// of that other. Thirdly, In this reciprocal relation of wills, the matter of the will, I. e. the end, which every body has in view with the objeft, which he wills, does not come under confideratioa. For inftance, the queftion Is not, whether one gains or lofes by the commodities, which he purchafe4 from me for the exerclfe of his trade, but merely according to the form In the relation of each will, fo far only as it Is coafidered as free, whether the aAion oi the one be confiftent with the freedom of the other, according to a general law. — C. General principles ofjujlice. — Every a£lion Is juft or right, according to the maxim of which the freedom of will of one individual is compatible with the freedom of another, agreeably to a general law. D. Jujlice or law, neceflfarily prefuppofes compulfion or force.— E. iV/'/H juftlce or law, may alio be reprefented as the pofliblllty of a reciprocally exerted force, confiftent with the freedom of every man, and with general rules or laws.

Sect. II. i. Of Equity. l.Of the lawqf necejjity. Sect. III. Division of Jurisprudence. — h. General divijion of the duties of juflice.'^t. General divifton of laivs and rights, i.) Law, as

k a

I3« ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

a fyftematic do£liine is divided into the Law of Nature, whicli de^ pcnds entirely on principles a priori^ and pofitive or ftatutary law, wliich proceeds from the will of a legiflator. 2.) Of rights, as the moral power of laying others under an obligation, the chief divifion is into the original and acquired'., the former of which eve- ry man inherits by nature, independent of any legal aft j the lat- ter cannot be attained without fuch an aft. — The only original right, that is born with man, is freedom or independence on any other arbitrary will,, fo far as it is confiftent with the liberty of every individual, according to a general law.

Further Contents of the wori.

Part L Ov the private right of property in general. Chap. I. Of the mode of pojfejjing fomething external as property, \ 1. My pro^ierty is that, with which I am fo connefted, that the ufe, which another might make of it agaiiift ray will, would injure me. The fubjeftive condition of the pofllbility of ufe, in general, is pojfejjion. §. 2, — 3. Juridical populate of praftical reafon. It is pofllble to have every external objeft of my will as my property j i. e. the maxim is contrary to juftlce, according to vphich, if it were a law, an external objeft of the will behoved to be in itfelf without an owner (res nullius). § 4. Expofition of ihe idea of external property. Of the external objefts of my will there can be only three : i.) a corporeal thing without me ; 2.) the will of another to a determined aft (praeftatio) j 3. the fitua- tion of another in relation to me, according to the Categories of Subftance, Caufality, and Community between me and external objefts, agreeable to the laws of freedom. § 5. Definition of thq idea of external property. External property is that without me, to hinder me from ufing which, as I chufe, would be unjuft, or an injury. \ 6. Deduftion of the idea of the mere legal or civil poffeflion of an external objeft. \ 7, Application of the principle of the pofllbility of external property to the objefts of experience. ^ 8. To have fomething external as property, is only poflible in a juridical Hate, under a public legiilative power, i. e. in civil fo- ciety. § 9. In the ftate of nature, nothing but a mtxtly provifional^ thovs^h real exter.r.alj property can take place.

Chap.

feANT's WORKS. 43*

dHAP. II. Of the mode of acquiring external property * \ 10. General principles of external acquifition. — I afcquJre fomething originally, when I caufe that to become mine, which formerly was the property of no other perfon. — Divifion of the acquifition of external property : i.) according to the matter (the tobjefl) I acquire either a corporeal thing (fubftance), or the per- formance of dndther perfon (caufality), or this other perfon, i. e. bis or her (late, fo far as I obtain a right to rule over that perfon j 2.) according tcf the forth or modfe of acquifition, I have either a i'eal right, or zperfonal right, or both real and perfonal right to the poffefllon, hot the ufe, of another perfon br things

Se£l. 1. Of real rights. § II. A real right is the ri^ht to the ptivate life of a thing. In the cOmmoti porfeflion of which (whether original or acquired) I am with all others. § 12. The firft acqui- fition of a thing can be no other than that of the foil. § 13. Every part of the foil may be originally acquired, and the ground of thd pofllbility of this acquifition is, that the foil in general was orI« ginally common. $ 14. The legal a£l of this acquifition is eccu- pancy. § 15. It is in civil fociety alone, that any peremptory ac- quifition can be made : in a ftate of nature it can only be provi- fional. § 16. Explanation of the idea of an original acquifition of the foil. § 17. Dcduftion of this idcPi

Secf. II. Of perfonal rightf. § 18. A perfonal right is the pof- felTion of the will of another, as the power of determining that will through mine to a certain a6lion, according to the laws offreedom. — Of the transference of will by contraft. § 19. Of the confti- tuents of a contract. § 20. Of the caufality of the will of another^ tvhicb is acquired. § 21. In a contraft, a thing is not acquired by the acceptance of the promife, but by the delivery of what has been promifed.

SeB.Wl. Of real— 'perfonal right. § 22.This right is that of the poffeflion of an external objeft as a things and of the ufe of it as « perfon. § 23, Of the right of the Family-Society. § 24, — 27. Title firfl: of the right of marriage. §28 — 29. li\\\t fecond \ of the rights of parentage. § 30. Title third', of the rights of a Maflcr of a Family. §31, 32. Dogmatical divifion of all the rightt

R 2 aci^^uirabid

132 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

acquirable by contra£?s. I. Of Money. II. Of literary property. Se£i. IV. Of ibe ideal acquifition of an external ohjeB of the wilL I. § ^^. Of prefcription, or the mode of acquiring property by length of poffeflion. II. § 34. Of acquifition by Inheritance. III. § SSt^6^ OfpoftbUmous reputation.

Chap, III. 0/* the fubjeSlively conditioned acquifition^ by the fentence

of a Public Court of Juflice.

A. § 37. Of the eontraft of Donafion. B. § 38. Of the con- traft of Loan (commodatum). C. § 39. Of the re-acquifition or reclainaing of property loH ("vindlcatio). D. S 40. Of the acqui- fition of fecurity by oath (cautio juratotia). § 41, 42^. Tranfition from property in a ftate of nature, to that in a juridical date, or civil fociety in general.

Part II. Of Public Law.

.Se£i. I. § 43, 44. Of the Conflitutional Law of a State. § 45 — 47. Of a State as a coUedtlon of men. — Of the powers in a State, Le- giflative, iExecutive, and Judicial. " The only rational plan of government is that, in which the combined will of the people de- termines the law.'' § 48, 49. Of co-ordinate and fubordlnatc powers. — General Remarks. — A. Of the fupreme power j of the focial compaft, and the duty of obedience. Of redrefs of grie- vances. Offedition and rebellion. — According to the principles eftablilhed by Kant, *' A change in the Conftitution of a State, " which its faults may fometimes render neceffary, can only" in *' juflice be accomplifhed by the Sovereign, by means oireform-^ " not by the people, by means of a revolution j and if it take place, *' it can only afiFeft the executive, not the legiflative power. At ** the fame time, if a revolution has once been brought about, and ** a new conftitution eftablifhed, the inju^ice of this- revolution in *' its beginning and accomplifhraent, does not free the fubjefts ***"from the obligation to accommodate themfelves, as good citf- ** zensj.to the new order of things." B. Of the rights of the fo- vereign power to the territory of the State. Of the rights of taxation. Of Fin! nee and Police. C. 0/ the maintenance of the poor J of Foundling Hofpitals j of a religious eftablifhment. D. Of

tire

KANT^s WOl^KS 13 j

the diftnbiition of offices j of rank in tKe State ; of Nobility. E. Of criminal law, and a penal code j of the right of puniftiing and pardosing. § 50. Of the relation of a citizen to his native and other countries, in point of right and 'obligation. §51. Of the different forms of government. § 52. Of the attainment of that rational form, which the fpirit of an original compaft requires, tvhich makes JreeJom alone ihe principle, i. e. the bafis, and con- dition of all yorc^. — Of the reprefentativc Syftem.

Se^. II. Of the law of Nations^ or tnternational law. § 55, 54, Nations, in their external relation to each other, are in a ftate of nature, not unlike lawlefs favages, among whom the right of the ftrongeft is eftabliihed j confequently, a confederacy of Hates be- comes neceffary, in order to prote£l one another againft external at- tacks, conformably to the idea of an otiginal focial compafl. § $^ — 58. Of the right of making war, both with regard jto the fubjeds of a State, and foreign nations. § 59, 60. Of the right of peace. § 61. Of the injurtice of a ftatc of warfare. " There fhall be no war, is the irrefiftible veto of morally-pra£lIcal Reafon,"— Of the mode of bringing nations, like individuals, &om a ilate of nature to a Juridical ilate. — Of the eftablifliment and maintenance of a perpetual peace, by means of a permanent Congrefs of States,

Sec7. III. Cf Cofmopolit'tcal law, or the rights of the citizen of the world. § (ji. Of the right of mutual intcrcoaife and commerce, as belonging to all mankind.

Concluftoii*

This uftjion of the whole human race, under certain Umverfal laws, it may be faid, is not the partial, but the total and complete attainment of the grand aim, the final purpofe of Jurifprudence within the boundaries of mere Reafon. For, that the prototype of a juridical federation of men, according to public laws in general, muft be derived from Reafon fl/r/or», is now obvious ; fince all the j^xamples, taken from experience, can indeed ferve the purpofe of tUuflrating, but not of eftablilhing, the neceflity of a metaphyfical decifion of this important queftion. Thofe very men, who fmile at the novelty of this inrjuiry, incautioufly betray therafelvcs, when

they

134 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

they admit, and even make ufe of the common-place affeition^ *' that that is the beft conftitution, in which the laws govern, not tneni" And what, ' fays the author,' can be more fublimc thaa this idea, which is evidently applicable to praftlce, and capable or being realized in experience, and which alone — provided it is not attempted to be brought about by means of revolutions, or the forcible overthrow of all erroneous cftablifhraents (for that would be the annihilation of all law and juftice), but by gradual reform, according to fixed principles — leads by continual approximation to the fupreme political good, a perpetual peace.

XXX. (i2.) Metaphyjifche Anfangsgrunde der Tugendlehre, Metaphjfical Elements of Ethics . 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1797'

With this publication F'rof. Kant will probably conclude \ui fyftematic labours in the field of the Critical Philofophy. Though, on account of its very recent appearance, I have not yet obtained a copy of this work, among the; books lately received from Ger- many J I can in fome degree fatisfy the curiofity {of the reader, by flating the objeft of it, as. abftrafted from the general Introduc- tion, which is premifed to the preceding " Elements of Jurif- prudence-"

* Moral laws can only be fo far valid as rules, if they can be eftabliftied a priori^ fo that the neceffity of them becomes evident. For the conceptions and judgments, relative to our aftions and o* mifiions, have no moral application at all, if they contain nothing further than what is learned from experience. And if we fhould even be mifled to affume any data, from the latter fource, as moral principles, we cannot avoid falling Into the groffert and moft de- ftru£llve errors.

' If the doftrine of morals had no other aim than that of per- fonal happinefs, it would be abfurd to fearch for principles apriori^ in order to eftablifti fuch a doftrine. For, however plaufible it may appear, that Reafon can perceive previous to experience, by what means man may arrive at the permanent enjoyment of the true pleafures of life, yet every propofition of this kind, a priori^ j« either tautological, or it refts upon groundlefshypothcfes. Ex- pedience!

KANT'S WORKS. 135

penence alone can Inform us of what is attended with pleafure. The natural Inftinft for nourifliment, the fexual Impulfe, reft, mo- tion, and](afler developing the difpofitions of nature) the ftruggles for honour, the enlargement of our knowledge, and the like, caa iptimate to every individual in particular, how he may ejlimate his pleafures, and at the fame time inform him of- the means, by which he is to attain \}i\txa.. All plaufible reafoning a priori iSy here, in reality nothing elfe but experience, which, by indu6lion, has received a general charader. This generality, far from being univerfal, is fo very limited, that an indefinite number of excep- tions muft be granted to every individual, in order to adopt that choice in the mode of life, to his particular inclination, and to his fufceptibility of pleafures j — fo that, in the end, he can profit and ^row wifer only from his own detriment, or that of others.

* The doflrines of morality, however, have a very different prigin. They are imperative to every individual, without regard- ing his inclinations j for this rcafon merely, becaufe he is a free fubjeft, and is capable of reafoning praftically. Inftruftion, in the laws of morality, is not derived from reflc61ion upon ourfelves and our animal nature, nor from the obfervation of the courfe of the world, namely from events and a£lions j but Reafon itfelf commands us, how to a£l, though we ftiould find no i^nalogy or example in experience, corrcfponding wilh the prefent cafe. Reafon, further, in this injundlion, does not attend to the ad- vantage or difadvantage, which may accompany our a£lions j for experience alone could give us any information upon this point. "We are iqdeed entitled to purfue our advantage in every poflibl^ manner, provided that we aft confiftently with both Reafon an4 prudence j for the former enjoins, while the latter only advifes |hat, upon the whole, we fhall derive greater advantages, if wc follow, than if we tranfgrefs the diftates of Reafon.*

J36 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF

'X be following EJfays, written by Prof, Kant, were puhlifhed in different periodical works of Germany^ in the chronological order here fated.

I. Von den verfchiedenen Ra^en der Menfchen> Of the dif- ferent races of man. Publilhed in Engel's Philofopher of the world: firft Edit. 8yo. Leipzig, I777> from p»^ 25 to p. 164.

3. Briefwechfel zwifchen Kant und dem i}erJlorhenen Lam-* hert. Correfpondence between Kant and the late Lambert., — Publlfhed in Bernouilli*s Literary Correfpondence hetvoeen learned Germans. Vol^L from p. 333 to 368. — 1781.

3. Idee %u einer allgemeinen Gefchichte in welthurgerlicher Ahficht. — ^Plan of a general hiftorj in a cofmopolitical view. Publiflied in the Berlin Monthly Magazine ^ for November, 1784'

4. Beantwortung der Frage : ivas ifl Aufkldrung f — Reply to the queflion, what is underflood by illumination (of mind), Ihid. for December, 1784,

5. Ueher die Vuliane im Monde. ^^On the Volcanos in the moon. Ihid. for March, 178 5, ,

6. Von der Unrechtm'dJJigkeit des Biichernachdrucks . — On the injuftice of printing fpurious editions of books.— -/^z^/. for May, 1785.

KANTs WORICS 137

7. Bejiimmung des Begriffs einer Menfchenrace. — Definition of the idea connefted with the cxpreffion " a race Qf men."— Ibid, for November, 1785-

8. MuthmafsJicher Anfang der Menfchengefchichte — On the probable Origin of Human Hiftory. Ihid. for January, 1786.

This Effay the author himfelf confiders as the moft fuccefs- ful of his populVt produftions, or minor works. And though I have not been able to procure a copy of that number, in which it appeared in the Berlin Monthly Magazine, without ordering the whole fet for tbeyear 1786, I can give the following charafler of this treatife, upon the authority of Prof. Will of Alidorf^ as ex- trafted from his " LeBur.es on the Kantian Philofophy^ 8vo. 200 pages J 1788," in which he fays, p.. 32 :— * This mafterly perfor-

* mance contains a philofophical explanation, which certainly. is bet-

* ter founded than upon niere conjefture (as the title modeftly cx-

* preffes). Though it apparently deviates from the Mofaic nar- ^ rative, it neverthelefs forms an ufeful addition to the Bible, an(i ^ affords illuftrations of its hiilorical truth/

9. Was heifst : Jich im Denien orkntiren ? — What ifi under- ftood by the expreffion, " to familiarize onefelf in thinking j"

j. e. to trace the ideas of our own mind to their fource. Ibid,

for Oftober, 1786.

10. Ahhandlung van dem Gebrauche teleologifcher I^rincipien in der Philofophie. — A Treatife concerning the application of teleological principles in philofophy. — Publifhed in the Ger- man Mercury f for January and February, 1788.

XI.

?38

1 1 . Ueher das Mifslingen aller philofophifchen Verfuche in der Theodicee. --^On the failure of all philofophical attempts made

in the Theodicea (by Leibnit^).— .J?^/-//» Monthly Magazine for September, 1 791.

1 2 . Ueher das radikah B'dfe in der menfchlichen Natur-^On the radical evil in human nature — Ibid, for April, i792.

13. Ueher den Qemein/pruch : Das mag in dif Theorie rich^ tig fey n, taugt aher nicht Jur die Praxis. '^-On the common- place aflertion, " that may be true in theory, but is not ap- plicable to praftice." Ihid. for September, 1793.

14. Etwas iiher den Einflufs des Mondes auf die Witterung, Some Remarks relative to the influence of the Moon on the. Weather. Ibid, for May 1794.

GLOSSARY

»39

GLOSSARY.

Tbofe termsy which explain them/elves from the context of the Elements ^ are here omitted.

Such phrafeSf as have only one definition attached to them^ mufi he underjiood in a general fenfe.

If any words occur in thefe definitions, which appear oh- fcure or paradoxical, or do not ftifficiently explain the meaning of the term under confideration, the reader is requefied to have recourfe to the further explanations offuch words, in the alpha- betical order of this Gloffary.

^To render this nomenclature fuhfervient id the purpofe of obtaining a more general view of Kant'* s Philofophy, than could he given in the preceding Elements, I have added explanations of many terms, which, though not occurring in this concife account^ are ufed by the author in a peculiar fenfe.

Aesthetic commonly fignifies the Critique of Tafte, but with Kant, the fcience containing the rules of fenfation, in contradiilinc- tion to Logic, or the doftrine of the Underftanding.

To AFFECt

means, to mike immediate imprelfions dn the S^nfitive Facili- ty, i. e. to occafion reprefentations and defires.

Affirmative, See Judgments. Agreeable, (jucundum) angenehm, is an objeft of the Senfitive Faculty, fo far as it influences tbfe will ; or what pleafjps the fenfes in relation to feelings ; or

Si ^ wha

140 GLOSSARY.

what affords us- pleafure. The agreeable is nat fonaething at" folutely goody i. e. good in the eftimation of every rational being ; becaufe it does not immediately depend on Reafon it- felf, but on the relative ftate of the mind, fenfitive inclina- tions, and the like. The good^ on the contrary, is an objeft of pure Reafon, fomething that is conformEable fd the fubjeft of all rational beings.

Analysis — Zergllederungy i) of an ideuy is the reduftion of it to thofe charaders, of which it is compounded, in order to render the cognition of it clearer, though we cannot by this procefs make it more complete : hence it does not furnifli us with additional knowledge, but merely arranges what we already poflefs. a) confidcred in a. general J'^ufe i Analyfis is the fcience, treat- . ing of the form of real knowledge, and of the rules, by which we can exanaine that knowledge. It is a part of ge- neral Logic f and the negative criterion of truth ; in this fenfe it is oppofed to Diale6iic.

3) Tranfcendental Ajialyjis is the decompofitlon of the pure intelleftual faculty into the elements, through which all the operations of thought are carried on.

4) oi pure pr'aBical Reafon^ i. e. of the pure praftical faculty of Reafon, or of the pure will, into its elements.

•Analytical, See Judgments, Anthropology fignifies in general the experimental doftrine of the nature of man ; and is divided, by Kant, into

1) theoretical or empirical doftrine of mind, which is a branch of N atural Philofophy ;

2) praBicaly applied, and empirical Philofophy of Morals j , Ethics — the confideration of the moral law in relation to the human will, its inclinations, motives, and to the cb-

"ilacles in praftifing that law.

Anthro-

GLOSSARY, .141

* Anthropomorphismus is the art of attributing properties, obferved irt the world o£ fenfe, to a being remote from that world ; or the fenfualiza- tion of an idea of Reafon : for inftance, if we think of the Deity by human predicates.

Anticipation

of experiefice, is a cognition of objeds liable to obfefVation a priori, previous to the obfervation itfelf, i. e. according to the pure ,form of perception, in confequence of which all phe- nomena are in Space and Time.

AiffTiNOMY OF Reason

1 . in general ; a contradidion between two laws ;

2. in particular,

a} oi pure Jpeculative Keafottf is the contradidlion in the re- fults of it,, in the application of its fubjeftive idea rela- tive to the unconditional thing, as well as in the applica- tion of its law, to the world of fenfe ; a law, by which we form conclufions from the given (perceived) condi- tional thing, to what is unconditional.

b} oi pure praQical Reafon y which occurs in the inquiry into the higheft gdod j where, on the one hand, pratftical Reafon prefuppofes a neceflary combination between vir- tue and happinefs ; but, on the other hand, there is no poffibility of perceiving this combination analytically or fynthetically, neither a priori nor a ^o^morr.— This an- tinomy is folved by ihowing the real cotineftion between our good conduft and wellbeing ; though this conneftion be concealed in the world of fenfe, yet it is really ex* ifting throughout the whole of it, and founded on the Xuperfenfible exiftence of ourfelves, in connexion with o- thgr things.

Apodicticax,

.I4i GLOSSARY.

Apodictical or abfolute, and attended with the confciottfnefs of neceffity;

A POSTEEIORI,

i. e. through fenfation, experience — The diftinftion between cur knowledge obtained a pofierioriy may be rendered more clear by its oppofite, a priori. This difliriftion, in the philo- fophy of Kant, does not relate to th&feries oftimcy in which, but to the fource^ from which we receive knowledge or cog- nitions. Every reprefentation or cognition is a pofieriori^ that is not founded merely on the original faculty of the mind^ but in fome one or other modification, which that faculty has received. Such reprefentations or cognitions are therefore called empirical.

A PRlClRi

originally does not fignify, with Kant, a cognition or repre-i fentation which, in order of time, precedes experience ; of which we could become confcious independent of all fenfations j and which, at the fame time with the reprefenting faculty^ could be prefent in our mind as a real reprefentation. Such are the " innate notions or ideas," which Kant exprefsly re* jeiEls throughout his works. But by the term ** a prior i^^ he underitands thofe reprefentations, which we acquire through the exertions of our own mind, or the thinking fubjedl ; and not through obfervation and fenfation (a pojleriori) ; not through given obje£ls and from them, hutfrom our faculty of cognition ; though this latter mull be rendered aftive by means of f«nfible impreiEons ; and though the origin or pro- dudlion of fuch a reprefentation caa in this manner only be accomplilhed. Further, all that is a priori^ which lies in the 6riginal conformation of the thinking fubjefl,- and is not founded on the operation of objefts, which confequently is not firft introduced intQ the mind^ but is evolved from it, by

iis

GLOSSARY. 143

its peculiar faculties. All thcfe reprefentations neverthelefs prefuppofe experience, i. e. materials of application, if we are to become confcious of them, and refer them to objects. With- out experience, thej are non-entities. They do not precede experience as real reprefentations, but as the conditions, that render experience itfelf poffible. All objedive reality of thepi is founded merely on experience.

Apperception

or confcioufnefs, or the faculty of becoming confcious, fig«.

nifies

i) in general,the faipe as reprefentation, or the faculty of re-

prefenting ; a) in particular, the reprefentation as diftinft from the fub- jtd: that reprefents, and from the objeft that isi reprefented. 3) filf -confcioufnefs^ for which we have two faculties,

a — the empirical^ the internal fenfe, i. e, the confcioufnefs of our ftate at any time, of our obfervations. This is as fubjeft to change, as the obfervations themfelves ; con- fidered in itfelf, it is not confined to any one place, and does not relate to ^he identity of the fubjeft. b~the tranfcendentaly pure, original, i. e. the confcioufnefs of the identity of ourfelves, with all the variety of empi- rical confcioufnefs.. It is that felf-conlcioufnefs, which generates the bare idea « /," or <* / tbink^^ as being the fimple correlate of all other ideas, and the condition 0^ their unity and neceflary connection.

There occurs a remark in Kant's Critique of pure Reafon, which is very humiliating in the tranfcendental doftrine of niind. He fays upon this occafion : " Though " confcioufnefs has no extenfiv^ magnitude, and there- *• fore is not divifible, it certainly has intenfive magni- *' tude, and we may well conceive a ceffation of it, by a f* remijfion of power. — For there is a certain degree pf

*f con-

144 GLOSSARY.

** confcloufnefs even in obfcure reprefentations, fave that " It does not always fuffice to diftinguifh one idea from f' another, i. e. to make it clear and evident."

Appetitive Faculty, or Faculty of Desiring, ^Begehrungsvermogefi) in the moll general fenfe, is the power inherent in a living being, to become through his reprefentations the real caufe of obtaining the objefts correfponding with them ; although the phyfical powers fliould not be adequate to the real produdion of the obje£l delired : v, g. to wifh for the great prize in the lottery, and the like.

Apprehension

is an aft of the mind, bj which the variety of individual per- ceptions is coUefted, combined with one another, and images ?re produced. We may diflinguifli,

1 . the fur^ fynthejis of apprchcnjion, which compounds the va- riety of perceptions a priori, of Space and Time, and produ- ces pure Images, fuch as reprefentations of numbers, geo- metrical figures, '&c. 3. empirical apprehfnjtotii which combines the pure percep- tions together with their matter, i, e. with fenfible impref- fions, and produces the images of phenomena ; v. g. wheq I obferve a houfe, the freezing of water, &p.

Approbation, See Satisfaction.

Architectonic

is the art of conftrufting Syftems. The Architeftonic of pare

Reafon is, therefore, the plan for a Syftem of pure philofo-

AKT,(KunJi) 1, in the moft extenfive fenfe, is arbitrary produftipn, in con- fequence of preceding reprefentations j

2.

G L O S S A R Yi 145

2, in a more Umited fenfe, is produftion through Liberty, i. e.

through a free will, which adopts Reafon as the ground o^

its adions.

Articulatjon is the flrufture of the menabers of a fcienee, or the fyftematic unity of it.

Assertory, See Imperative arid Judgments. Attribute or property y is a charafter belonging to the exiftence of a thing conceived, as to its internal poffibility ; which charadVer can be derived from things, or beings, as the neceflary, i; e. fuf- ficiently ellabliflied confequence of them.

AUTONOMt,

a peculiar legiflation of the willj is that conftitution of a ra-^ tional will, by which it is a law to itfelf, by which it deter- mines itfelf, uninfluenced by inclinations. It is the indepen- dence of the will on all matter of it, i. e. on fenlitive defires and their objects ; the dependence on a rational will, merely on it- felf, i. e. upon the form of Reafon. This is a practically ne- ceflary idea, in order to comprehend in this manner the pofl[i- bility of aft unconditional Imperative, and a goodnefs (mora- lity) of adions independent on externjll intereft.

Axiom is a fynthetical principle a priori, which contains immedia^ or intuitive certainty ; i. e. derived from objefts of pure per- ception, and which does not admit of proof, and of the truth of which, we can point out no more accurate charadler, than what it itfelf exprcfles.

Bad— 5o/^j is that which, according to a rational principle, is a neceflary bbjed of deteftation, in dift^indbion from the difagreeable^ i. Ct Ifvhat occafion* an immediate fenfation of pain.

T BEAUi

446 GLOSSARY.

Beautiful — ScBon is that, which excites pleafure and claims our approbation^ without fatisfying any wants : which pleafes us by the har- monious employment of our reprefetiting faculty, unconneft^ with animal defires ; and which we are fond of communicat- ing to others ; for inllance, a witty idea, an acute or bold re- fleftion, a ftrong pifture, and the like.

Beauty— — Schbnheit h the regular conformation of an objeft, fo far as we obfervc this in it, without reprefenting to ourfelves any delign or pur- pofe ; th6 Regular fubjeBive conformation of an objed of na* ture or art ; the expreffion of aefthetical ideas.

BeIng --We/en, Ding fignifies i) a conception with its conftituent parts ; logically^ zJuhJeSium quod. The term ' being' is diftinguiflied from the word ' nature ;' in as much as the former is the internal prin- ciple of all thofe determinations, which relate to the pbj/ihiltt^ of a thing ; and the latter, nature, is the internal piinciple of all the determinations, relating to the exijlence of- a thing : — • 2) a real being, fubjeBum quo, the nature of a thing.

Belief — Glauhe

1, fignifies the aB of taking fomething for true, on account of fuiBcient fubje£live, without any objeftive, reafons for do- lt ingfo; or, in other words, to conceive things as iubjedls of

cognition, or to admit their poffible exillence ; becaufe Rea- fon enjoins it. Thefe fubje£tive grounds are a certain in- ' tereft, certain purpofes ; —

2, the hahit, the moral way of thinking, by which Reafon con- fiders as true, what is inacccffible to our theoretical cog- nition of things ; —

3, in particular, j^^f J facrcL\ the adoption cf religious prin* ciples.

Canon",

GLOSSARY. 147

Canojt, in general, means * a feience treating of the proper ufe of our faculty of cognition:' it is therefore oppofed to * Difcipline* which is a guide, direfting us to prevent the improper ufe of that faculty.

Categorical, See Judgments. Categories I, in general, are original notions or intelleftual conceptions, which correfpond with the fimple form of a judgment ; lo- gical funftions applied to objefts in general ; — a, in particular, and according to their twofold ufe, they are,

a) Categories of theoretical ReaforHy or of Nature j fo far namely, as they are referred to the variety of fenfible perceptions, in older to give it unity of iapperception in a judgment of experience, or a cognition of nature ; hence they^ are conceptions of unity in this cognition ;

b) Categories of praElical Reafon \ fCi far as the fame func- tions of the Underftanding are referred to the variety of defires, in order to obtain for it unity in the rational idea, of morality.

Causality — Causation,

dependencCj caufal connexion, fignifies

jy logically y the funilion of the Underftanding in a hypothetic tical judgment j the reprefentation concerning the logical relation of caufe and eflfeft to one another ;

3, as the pure category correfpdnding with this funflion, it ex- prefles the notion of a real relation of different objecls to one another ; the neceffary determination of the exiftence oC a fomething through fomething of a different kind, whe- ther this be homogeneous or not j~a fpecles of fynthefis, Ta in

148 , G«L O S S A R Y.

in which;, according to, and by means of, fomething A (caufe) we neceflarily admit fomething very different, B, (effeft), and this in confequence of an abfolutely general rule, fo that we can conclude the exiftence of A, from the exiftence of B.

Certainty — Gcivifsheit is the confcioufnefs arifing from fulTicient objective reafons, which are valid with rcfped to every body.

Change — VerHnderung, accidens, is the fucceffion of different Hates, tranfition of a thing from one flate to another ; the co- exiftence of what is Handing and fteady in time, with that which changes ; the connedtion of oppofite predicates in one and the fame obje6l, but at different times, v. g. motion, i. e. a being and not-being of the fame, things in the fame plape, but a|: different periods of time.

CoGNiTioiJ, — Erkenntnifs y in general, is a whole of connefted reprefentations in one aft of confcioufnefs ; or the determinate reference of given repre- fentations to one objedt. — Every cognition has i) matter, fub- ilance, i. e. fomething obje£live, which arifes from the ob- jefts reprefented ; the variety of given perceptions, objefts ; 'i)fortn, i. e. a determinate way or mode, in which the given matter is received, modified, and comb ncd by the reprefent- ing facility ; that,, which relates to the operation of mind in our cognitions ; that, which depends upon the conftitution of the thinking fubjedl, or of the Underftanding and Reafon.

Common Sense — Gememfinn

is the faculty of determining what pleafes or difpleafes, not

through conceptions, but merely through feelings ; yet this

determination has general validity.

Tq

GLOSSARY. 14^

To Conceive — Begreifen

Jo a fundion of Reafon, as " to underjland^'' i. e. to think of an obje<3:, is an aft of the Underftanding.

Conception — Begriffy

1, in the moft extenfive fenfe ; is everj produ<Elion of the ac- tive reprefenting faculty, by which variety, or the multifari-. Qus, is cpnnefted into unity :

2, in a more deterpiined fenfe •, is a general reprefentation ab- flra6ted from a variety of intuitions, and is oppofed to a fingle reprefentation or intuition. A conception of this kind i? called by K^nt, * difcurjive ;' becaufe it does not immediately refer to the objeft, but only by the reprefentation of a charafter, which may be common to an infinite variety of things, the re- prefentation of which is contained under (not, in^ a difcurjboe conception.

In CONCRETO,

J. e, in real nature, in real objefts of experience. Here, many things may be differently conflituted, from what they are *' in obJlraBoy'' i. e, when we refleft merely upon the pure idea of a thing, without attending to what mjiy yet lie in the fenfible perception of an objedl.

Condition — Bed'mgungy the requifite, the ground, that which muft be prefuppofed, in order to underftand or tp comprehend fome other datum, or

given thing Whatever prefuppofes a condition, is called

conditionate or conditional.

InpraQical philofophy, we muH diflinguifh J, that, which is prqSiically conditionate, which Is determined through natural inclinations and neceflitics ; for inftance, the imperatives of happinefs are valid only under the condition,

that

t$» GLOSSARY,

that a perfon feels an inclination for fomcthing, an impulfe to- wards fomething, a necejQity of a certain kind } and not other- wife:

a, that, which is pra&ically unconditionatey which depends merely on Reafon itfelf, i. e. on the moral law, for inftanc© a pure, dilinterefted integrity, fidelity, and general utility*

Conformation — Zweckmcifsigleit,

i. t./ormoy Jive nexus Jinalisy is that conlTitution of an obje<Si (or even of a ftate of mind, or of an aft ion), which can be conceived, or thought of by us, as poflible only through ^ caufality according to conceptions, that is, through a Will,

Conscience — Genvijfeny

means i) the moral fenfe, relative to our own aflions ; l) the felf-determining moral faculty of judging ; that un- conditionate confcioufnefs of duty, by which we can deter- mine Tyithin ourfelves, whether an a^lion, we are about ta perform, be juft or otherwife.

Consciousness — — Bewufiseyn ; See Apperceftion,

Constitution w State — ^Statttsverfajfung ;

the moft perfeft is that, in which the liberty of every indi- vidual is thoroughly confiftent with the freedom of all mem- |»ers of focicty.

CoNSTIfUTlVE

principles are thofe, which refer to an objeft, fo as to deter- mine fomething relative to it, i. e. to the reprefentation of it ; namely either the intuition of an objeft, v. g, the mathema- tical prii^ciples ; or the experirnental conception of it, v. g. the dynamical principles of the Underftanding.

Regulative principles, on the contrary, are thbfe, which

do

GLOSSARY. i5t

do not determine the objefts themfelves, but which aiFord us rules, i. e. determinations of the Underftanding, to fearch for the objefts In quell ion.

To Construct an idea, means to determine an individual objeft, i. e. the per- ception itfelf of that objeft, which is perfeftlj conformable to the general idea.

An objeft requires perception ; an empirical perception^, however, We cannot fpontaueouily produce ; for the pure per- ception only is poffible a prion. In this, namely Space and Time, we can form certain determinations, and combine them in the pure reprefenting faculty, for inftance an equilateral triangle. In a fimilar manner, we can conftrud the intenfiyc magnitude of the fenfations of the folar light, i. e. we can com- pound them of about 200,000 times the quantity of the light of the moon, and predicate them in a determined manner a priori ; — of two given members of a proportion, we are able to conftruft a third, fuch as 1 : 4 : S, &c.

Conjlru&iony in a general fenfCf fignifies every exhibition of . a general idea, by means of the felf-a£live produdiou ot a perception, that correfponds with the idea. "

CoTHTAct-^^Beriibrung, I, in a mathematical fenfe, is the common boundary of two Spaces, which is neither within the one nor the other, v. g. two interfefting lines do not touch one another, becaufe their common point belongs to each of them :

If in a phyjical fenfe, is the reciprocal effeft of the repelling powers in the common boundary of two fpaces ; the im*< mediate adlion and reaftion of impenetrability. It is diftin*- guifhed from the a£tion at diftance, i. e. from the effect of one matter upon the other, without the mediation of other inter- ▼enieiiit matters through the empty fp:^, ▼. g. in the effen-

■ t.ial

15* GLOSSARY.

tial attraftlon. — The beginning of contafl: in the approach of one matter to another, is called * percuffion' (^Sto/s) ; the con- tinuation of it, ' prelTure* (Druck^.

C ONTINUANCE, or V EKM AHEiiCY— Beharrlichieit, is exiftence at all times, without origin and evanefcence. If, in this manner, we reprefent to ourfelves the exiftence of phe- nomena, we clafs them iinder the pure intellectual conception, or Category of Subftance.

Con Ti NUiT Y— 5'/«V/^i«V; refers to that magnitude, no part of which is the abfolutel;^ fmalleft and moft fimple, and in the folutioh of which we ne- ver can arrive at determined laft unities ; for inftance. Space and Time, together with ihe phenomena that exift in them.

Contradiction — Widerfpruch ;

the principle of contradiction, i. e. *' no one thing admits of being reprefented bj contradictory predicates," is the nega- tive criterion of all abftraft truth, and the fource of all our analytical, but not of fynthetlcal, cognitions.

Conviction: See Proofs; Cosmology ; the tranfccndentaly rational cofmology ; is elt^ier the Science Embracing the whole of the pheiiomena in nature, of the me- taphyseal philofophy of the fuperfenfible properties of all ob- jeCts exifting.

COSMO-THEOLOGT

is the cognition of a primitive Being, from the exiftence ci a Tvorld in general, and its accidental ity, as oppofed tofubflance^

Criticism^ with Kant, fignifies a critical mode of proceeding y^doubts of •delay) i. e. the ma*^m^ of general diftruft with fefpeCt to aH

fynthetlcal

GLOSSARY. 153

fynthetlcal j udgments a priori^ until we have acquired a view of the univerfal ground of tbeir poflibility, in the effentlalcon* ditions of our faculties of cognition.

Critique of Pure Reason, or tranfcendental Critique, is the Science of the pure facility ©f Reafon ; the inquiry into thofe particulars, which Reafon is able to know and to perform, from its own fources, and independent of experience •,—'vid. the more ample definition, pp. 42 and 43. ^

CutTUR£^ in ^pojitive fenfe, is ufed by Kant^ to exprefs the promptnefs we acquire in obeying rules ; to which he oppofes the term * Difciplinis^ in a negative fenfe^ which weakens and deftroys that readinefs, and makes xis fufpend our judgment. Tha whole Critique is a Difcipline, as to the contents of pure ra- tional cognition ; but as to its infithod, only a particular part of the Critique is Difcipline*

Daemonology is the doftrine of higher, but in other refpeds finite, beings refembling man ; in oppofitlon to "Tlocologyy the doftrine o£ the highefl and infinite Being, f hyfical Teleology leads us to the former ; moral Teleology to the latter.

Deception — Betriig, Tauschungf Is that lilufion of the Jen/es, "When x^e confider foraething, which is obtained by conclufions, as the immediate obferva- tion itfelf. This is no error of the fenfes, but of the Judging Faculty or the Undei (landing.-^ — There is not only a deception of the external fenfe y v. g. the optical, but alfo, an illnfion of the" internal fenfe f v. g. when the fanatic believes to feel fu- pernatural influence, or when we crfnfound the fenfation, which necefTarily accompanies a moral aftion or detei mination of the will, with the caufe of the adlion itfelf,

U DZDUCTIOfJ'

154 GLOSSARY.

Deduction, in general, is the proof of a legal claim, a right j but, in par- ticular, Kant underftands bj it the eftablilhment of a re- prefentation ; the proof of the right we have to make ufe of it ; the proof, that a reprefentation has fenfe, meaning, rea- lity, objeftive validity, that it is not vague or empty, but re- lates to objedls. '

■ Demonstrable, in Logic, are called thofe pofitions, which admit of irtimediate proof J in oppofition to indemoihjirable pofitions, that admit of no proof ;— in a critical fenfe, fuch cbnceptions or judgments are dcmonflrable, as can be exhibited in perception, whether pure or empirical ; in oppofition to the indcmonfixabh, which cannot be thus exhibited.

Determination — Bejlimmungy l) as oppofed to fubllance ; accidens, a logical predicate of a fubjeft : 2) a real predicate J which amplifies the conception > XXi^ determination of a thing : v. g. hard, elaflic, &c. and n^t mere exillence. — ^The determinations of a thing are, according, to the fource of cognition, empirical^ when they ate derived from experience ; tranfcendentalf when they arife from the re- prefenting fubj eft «/>riorr."

Determinism is the principle of determining the will from JuiHcient inter- nal (fubjeftive) reafons. To combine this principle with that of freedom, i. e, abfolute fpontaneity, occafions no dif- ficulty.

Dialectic is ufed by Kant in the following fignifications r 1) logical, foTmz\ 'f that Logic, which treats of the fources of error and illufion, and the mode of deteftin^ them :

GLOSSARY. 155

2) tranfcendeatali material Dialeftlc ; the exhibition and judgment of that illufion, which arifes from the fubjeftive conftitution of Reafon itfelf a priori.

Discipline — Zucht, See Culture.

Disjunctive •, See Judgments.

To Dispute

upon any thing, means to decide it by proofs, i. e. from ob- jeftive conceptions, on which the judgment is founded — ^To conteji (ftreiten) any thing, fignifies to claim the confent of others to our judgment ; though we cannot always produce objeftive reafons, and frequently have only fubjeftive grounds to go upon, i. e. aefthetical grounds, feelings.

Distance: See Contact.

Divines — Geijiliche

are teachers of the pure moral Religion ; as being oppofed to * priejisyi. e. the confecrated minifters oi pious cuftoms and ce- remonies.

Dogma,

or a dogmatical judgment, is a direft fynthetical decifion from conceptions, and is diftinguiflied

1, from analytical judgments, which properly teach nothing ;

2, from experimental pofitions, which have no apodidic or demonftrative certainty ;

3, from mathematical principles, i. e. from fynthetical judg- ments arifing from the conftruftion of ideas ; and

4, from principles, i. e. indlre£t fynthetico-apodidic judg- ments, fuch as the principle of the * fufficient reafon.'' Spe- culative pure Reafon contains no dogmas ; for its ideas have no conftitutive, objedive reality ; hence it aflraits of oo dogmatical method. <

U a Dog-

%S^ GLOSSARY.

Dogmatism

or the dogmatical procefs of pure Reafon, is the prejudice of maintaining and deciding metaphylical propolitions according to cuftomary pi-inciples, and of determining uppn the exift- cnce or non-exiflence of fuperfenfible obje£ls and their pro- perties, without having previoufly deduced the poffibility of them from the faculties of Reafon : it is therefore, Metaphyfics without a previous Critique. — Dogmatifm paves the way for Scepticifm ; this compels us to have repourfe to a Critique ; and this lallly couducls us to a folid fyftpm of fcience,

Duty — Pfiicht^ is the obedience of a law f lom a true regard for it ; the ob- jeftive neceffity of an aftion for the fake of the law, fo far as this ohliget the will, i. e. morally compels it ; though it may have fome other fubjeftive defires.

Dynamical i) in general, is faid of things, fo far as we do not attend to their quantity in perception, but to the ground or caufe of their exiftence. Hence Kant calls, 2) in particular, ^ifynthefis dynamical, where the things combine4 neceffarily belong to ' one another, but mull not neceffarily be of a homogenous na- ture, becaufe they do not, (as in the mathematical fynthefis) conftitute together One magnitude, quantum. The fyntliefis of caufe and effeft, for inftance, is dynamical.

Effect : See Causality. Empirical ; See A posteriori. Epigenesis of pure Reason has been called the Kantian explanation concerning the coin- cidence of the pure intelle£lual conceptions (Categories) with the obje6h of experience ; according to which explanation,

by

GLOSSARY. 157

1>y thefe pure notions or conceptions, being the forms of thought, experience itfelf and its objeds, as fuch, become pof- ilble,

Vid. the fourth Probleni, p, 49 & feq.

Ethico-theologt is that fpecies ot Theology, which is derived from pure moral arguments, and admits no fjmbolical reprefentations.

Experience — Erfahrung is, with Kant, an objective, i. e. univerfally valid and neceflary fynthotical cognition of given objedls (phenomena) ; or, the reprcfentation of obfervations in a neceflarily determined con- nexion ; cognition through combined obfervation ; the con- pedlion of fenfible reprefentations according to certain laws.

Extension — Ausdehnungy

in the moft comprehenfive fenfe, is the reprcfentation of a whole, by means of its continued parts. If thefe are fimul- taneous or coexiftent, it is Space : if they follow one another in fucceffion, it is lime. According to this ufe of the word ? extenlion,* every magnitude is called extenjiv^^ which is re- prefented by the fucceffive connexion of parts of time and fpace, when the reprcfentation of the whole becomes poflible only by the reprcfentation of the parts. In this fenfe exten- fion ig ufed in Mathematics, and hence the mathejts extenforum.

Extensive power is, according to Kant, original elafticity or the power of an extended thing by means of the repulfion of all its parts. — It fo far differs from what is commonly called elajlicityy as this is the power of a matter,' to refume its form or magnitude (Changed by another moving power, upon the remiffion of the latter.

Fancy

153 GLOSSARY.

TAiicr—Wahn is that deception, in which we confider the mere reprefcnta- tion of a thing as equivalent to the thing itfelf. Religious, fancy manifefts itfelf in^this, when man confiders the flatutory belief and ceremonies as the fubftance of religion, and as the fupreme condition, upon which he may obtain the approba- tion of the Deity.

Fatalism

is that fjftem, in which the connedion of purpofes in the ■world is confidered as accidental ; and in which this connec« tion is yet derived from a Supreme Being, not indeed from his rational nature, but from the neceflary conflitution of this Being, and the unity of the world thence arifing. Such^ for inllance, is the fyftem of Spinoza.

Final purpose — Endzweck is, that, which requires no other purpofe as the condition of its poffibility ; which contains in itfelf the determining caufe, the. neceflary and fufficient condition of all other purpofes.

Form is the determined mode of thinking fomething, of the manner of its exiftence ; it is oppofed to matter, i. e. that which is given and determinable.

Function is the office, the aftlvity, the form of an higher faculty of <• cognition : i) of the XJnderJiancUng — to think and to judge ; 3) of Reafon — ^to conclude.

FunSiion is oppofed to affe£lion^ as this implies a change, to which our Senlitive Faculty is fubjeft.

Genius — ingenium is the talent, the gift ofiiature, or the native difpofition of the

mind, from which nature prefcribes the rule to art.

To

GLOSSARY. 159

To Give — Geben an obje£l. Is to p3rceive it, to obferve it ; to refer the concep- tion of it to real or poflible experience. That an cbjeft be given, is a neceflary condition for receiving a cognition of it, but not fo, for thinking of it only.

Good — CuteSf is that, of which reafon approves, and v^hich It confiders as pra£tically neceffarj ; that, which according to a rational principle is a neceffary objedt of the faculty of defiring ; which has fome- value. It is oppofed to the ^j^r^^aiZ?, which fatis- fies the inclinations of the fenfes, or which affords us pleafure.

Gravitation

is called the effefl of unlverfal attraction, which every part of matter immediately exerts on all other parts, and at all dis- tances Kant dillingulflies gravitation hova gravity ^ i. e. the

effort of matter to move itfelf in the direftioa of the fuperior gravitation.

Groukd of determination — Bejlimmungsgrund.

The grounds or caufes of determining our aftions, are called formal (laws), fo far as they afcertain the way and manner, in which we view an objeft ; material (maxims), fo far as they determiire the objefts, to which an aflion is direfted , fuhjeBive (laws), fo far as they depend upon pure rational con- ceptions ; obje^ive (motives j, fo far as they affeft the Senfi- tive Faculty ; pra&ical, fo far as the laft ground, which de- terftiines the will is an idea from pure Reafon ; ae/lheti- caly when the laft grounds of volition are met with in certain feelings of fenfe. The pure moral law is the formal ground of determining moral aftions ; hence the good and bad, i. e. the objefts of moral defire and averfion, depend upon this law : it is, therefore, likevvlfe the material ground of determina- tion.

i6o GLOSSARY.

tioa, and Is objeftlve, aS being the form of pradical Reafori fe If. The moral fenfe is the fubjeftive ground of the fame a6lion ; but, as this fenfe or feeling itfelf is again produced hy Reafon, it cannot be aefthetical.

Happiness — Glucifeligkeit

fignlfies, with Kant, the whole profperity of a finite, rational being ; the confcioufnefs of the agreeable fituation, which un* interruptedlv accompanies the whole exiftence of fuch a being. —It arifes from the fatisfaftion of all inclinations, from the attainment of all ends, which the Senfitive Faculty propofes, and is therefore a prototype of the imagination.

Heteroxomy,

or a foireign legiflation, is that, in which not the wIU itfelf, but fomething elfe determines us to a6l in a certain manner ; when not the adion itfelf, but merely its objeft, its efFe^, interefts us ; when, befide the idea of the action, another ex- traneous allurement or compulfion, i. e. hope or fear mult concur, in order to produce the action.

Highest Good — H'dchjies Gut

is the whole unconditionate objeft of pure pra£lical Reafon, and confifts i) in virtue as the conftltuent of being happy j t)\& fiipreme good ; 2) in happinefs itfelf, fo far as it is con- nefted with that worth ; XhtperfeB good.

Hypothesis

is an explanation of fomething that is real, by fomething elfe, the reality of which is not demonftr able or, at leaft, is not de-^ inonft rated.

Hypothetical r See Judgments.

Idea.

'ifhis expT^sflion Kant employs more deterdiinately (bor- rowed

GLOSSARY. i6i

rowed from Plato), than is commonly ufed in modern lan- guages. According to Kant, it fignifies aneceflary conception of Reafon, the objedl of which cannot b« perceived by the fenfes, nor acquired by experience.

Idealism is called that fyftem of philofophy, in which the external reali- ty of certain intuitive reprefentations is difputed or doubted, and fpace as well as external objefts are afferted to be mere fancies.^Such is the fyftem of the celebrated bifliop Berkley.

Illusion — Tduf(;hungy Schein,

is a falfe judgment, in which we attribute a predicate to an objedl in itfelf, which predicate belongs to it merely in rela- tion to the fubje£l.

Imagination — Einhlldungskraft is the facility of reprefentlng an obie^tj in perception, though it fliould pot be prefent.

Immanent

is ufed by Kant in oppofition to tranfcendsntal : the former, term is applied to conceptions or principles, v^hich are valid in nature, and are ufed concerning objefts of experience, phe- nomena ; though the principles themfelves are not derived from experience : v. g. the application of the principle of . caufality is immaftent, when it is applied to the relation fub- filling among the plienomena of nature as fuch : it would be tranfcendenty when we go with this principle beyond expe- rience, and endeavour to prove from it the* exiftence of the Deity.

Immortality — Unsterbllchkeity of the foul, cannot be proved from fpeculative reafons, nor from its felf- fubfiftence, fimplicity, and fo forth ;' hence it is.

1(52 G L O S S A R Y.

not properljr an objeft of knowledge, but it may yet be con- cluded by analogy, partly from the difproportion of the great talents of man to the confined duration of his prefent life ; and partly for the fake of giving energy to the necelTary laws of morality : in this manner it may be defended againft all thq fpeculative objeftions of the rude materialifts. ,

IlVrPERATIVE-r-G^io/,

i) in general^ is. an obje£live practical law ; ?) in a more determined fenfe, it is the formula or prefcribed model of that law, by which it is referred to a will, as the ne- ceffary precept of its adliom ; though this will may fubjec- tively have fome other obje£J; of its wiflies, becaufe it is not purely rational, but alfo depends on inclinations, v. g. thofe of the human fpecies.

Impression — Eindruck. ^ Objefts make; impreffions upon us,' fignifies with Kant, that objefts of the external fenfe, external phenomena, afFe6^ the internal fenfe, and are real objefts of thought ; confequently, that they are fufficiently diflinguifhed from the thoughts them- felves, which never can be exhibited in Space* — The modus operandi or the origin of this influence occafioned by fenfible impreffions, cannot be explained by the principles of Kant, nor of any other philofopher.

Inclination — Neigung

fignifies a fenfible impulfe, the dependence of the appetitivq faculty on fenfations ; in oppofition to * interejiy i. e. the de- pendence of that faculty on rational ideas. — The amount of all inclinations \sfelf-love ; the fatisfaftion or gratification of an inclination is pleafure- ; that of all inclinations, is happVnefs^

Indeterminisw is that inert fyftem of philofophy, which imagines freedom to

confifl;

b L O is S A R Y. 163

V^Di^ft In the accldentalky (chance) of adions ; that the will is not at all determined by arguments ; and that a free being is equally liable, to commit good as well as bad adions

Ind,ifferj:nti3ts are called thofe latitudinarians of neutrality, who aflert, that there are indifferent or involuntary actions, which are neither morally good nor bad.

iNpivjiDUAJL : See JuDGMEilTs;

Inducement — Bewegangsgrund, is the obje£live ground of the will, fo far as it, being repre- fented by Reafon, determines the will. — It is diftinguiftied from the * motive,* 'Triebfeder^ which is fometl^ing fubjedlive^ i. e. an inclination^ which impels us to an aftion.

Induction

i$ cognition of the whole or of the genus, by means of the parts obferved or perceived : v. g. if we afcribe to bodies in general, what we have hitherto every where difcovered in them. From indilftion there arifes only a comparative uni- Verfality, or generality of an empirical rvde.

•iNFiNtTE : See Judgments. ItHTmTioa^^—Anfchauungi

1) in the moljt extenfive fenfe, is every reprefentation of va- riety or the multifarious, fo far only, as we confider the va- riety, and liot the unity in the obje£l. In fo far, however, as the reprefentation prefents variety, we may call every repre- fentation a perception, and unfold it further as fuch ; 3) in a more confined and proper fenfe, an intuition is not a bare reprefentation of fight, but every immediate reprefenta- tion of the individual thing, a fingle reprefentation, which

X 2 imme*

i64 GLOSSARY.-

itntnediatelj refers to an objeft, and by which this Is givef^- i. e. perceived.

To Judge — Urtheikn

fignifies to give unity to two reprefcntations, namely to the reprefentation of an obje6l, v. g. of a mkn, and that of a cha- r*a6ter, v. g. man is a rational being.

Judging Faculty — UrtheiUkraft,

is the power of thinking of the particular, as contained under the general or uniVerfal.-^Kant divides this Faculty into i ) the detertnining (fubfuming) power of judging ; this again is a) empirical, b) tranfcendental ; 2) the reflecJling or reflex power . of judging, which is further fubdivided into a) aefthetical, b)

teieological . The meaning of thefe terms may be found ift

their refpe£livl places in the alphabetical order.

Judgments — Urtheilsy

according to the ufual definition of Logicians, are reprefenta- tions of one relation lubfiftingljetween two notions or con- ceptions. This explanation, however, applies only to the ca- tegorical judgments, and does not determine the nature of this relation. For, even by the laws of the reprefenting power, there arifes likewife a relation among our conceptions, which cannot with any propriety be called a judgment. According to Kant, therefore, a judgment in general is the aft of com- prehending a variety or the multifarious, reprefented by an intuition, under objedive unity. And as nothing elfe but in- tuitions can ht reprefented under this unity, they muft ex- hibit either properties of a thing, or efFedts of a thing, or' parts of a whole. Hence the following Judgments will be the refult cf all reprefentations.

1. Judgments OF Quantity, which determine wtiat can ba

comprehended under objeftive unity. The three fpecies of

them are.

Individual f

G L O S S A R Yi 165

j caa be "}>hended

^bidividual or Jlngular^ when one individ- ual thing, J caa be compre-

T> . 7 t, >hended under ob-

rarticular. when many, 1 • ri-

* J* I jeaive unity.

Univerfalt when all, J

* II. Judgments of Qctality, which afcdrtain the manner, in which the aft of comprehending can be carried on. Their fpecies are. Affirmative, i. e. fo as really to unite an intuition with a con- ception ; Negatii/Cy or fo as to exclude fomething from a conception ; Infinite f or fo as to exclude a whole clafs of intuitions, without determining thereby the conception in any degree.

III. Judgments of Relation, or fuch as exprefs the rela- tions fubfifting between things and properties, caufes and efFe£ls, parts and a whole. The fpecies of this clafs are, Categorical, when particular properties or things. Hypothetical, when particular efFefts or caufes, DisjunBive, when particular parts or wholes are compre- hended under objeftive unity.''

IV. Judgments of Modality, are thofe which denote the particular faculties of the mind, by means of which they have been formed ; or determine .that place, where the things judged of, or comprehended under objeftive unity, have their refpedive feat. The fpecies of thefe are,

Frohlematical, when the things exifl in the Underftanding alone, or are mere ideas, of which it is not cer-* tain, whether they really exift without the mind j

yijfertory, when the things comprehended under the objeftive are in reality conceived, and believed to corre- fpond with the conception we have of them ; and

ApffdiBical, or attended with the charafter of neceflity, when the things are fo coilceived, as to carry along with

themr

t66 iG L O S 1^ A k Y.

them the eonvl6:ion, that according to the con- ilitutioa of the Underflandingj they cannot be jotherwife conceived, whether in an affirmative or negative inftance. The three lafl fpecies of Judgments have been redijced by ^ Kant to the clafs of * modality ;' becaufe they add nothing to the contents of a judgment, as is the cafe with thofe of* quan- tity,' * quality,* and * relation.'

The further divifion of Judgments, as to tJieir QrigWf ohJe&Sf Jorm, ufe, &c. cannot be detailed in an elementary treatifej for this would require a feparate work, which Kant has ac- tually publiihed, and of which the reader will find fom6 account, in the preceding elementary view of his works, under No. XXV. (9).

To K.mw^Wifen,

obje£l:ively confideredj is to have apodi^lieal or d^monftrative certainty. This is poffible only in cognitions, the origin of which is a priori.

Knowledge : See Cognition^

Law— G^^a;.

A Law is an obje£iive neceflary rule^ or the teprefentatio n of

a general condition, according to which a variety or what is

multifarious mull be uniformly applicable to all.

LBlGAiiyyi — GefetzmaJJlgkeit, moral reftitude, is predicable of every determination of the will and fubfequent aftion, which agree with the moral law j whether this action arile frtjm the repr^fentation of the law atfdf, or from the kielination refulting from the view of the fuccefs and advantage of the aftion — As to the morality, i. e, rfie propei-ly moral value of the aftion, there is ftill required a virtuous fentiment, or the determination tp a lawful adtlodi through the law independent of any profpe6t of gain or lofs.

LiBKRxy

GLOSSARY. f 6>

Liberty, FRKEDoM^^Frejhett, i? confidered as the attribute of an intelligent being, fo &r as its aftions are not determined bj foreign caufes. Such a can- falitj and its adtion is called free.

Limitation

is a Category of Quality, which is conceived in things, by connefting the predicate of reality with that of negation ; in a fimilat manner as the judgments of quality (i. e. the fpccies of thofe called by Kant, infinite^ have fomething common witl^ the form of both, affirmative and negative,

Man — Menfch

a moral being, fubjedl to moral laws by virtue of bis ratioaal liature : hence it is highly improper to call him a fighting animal, as fome of the modern co-ttrt-philofophers are pleafed to define him — A had man, is he who has adopted deviation from the moral law as a maxim j ugood man, who values the moral law as his fupreme maxim ; — an accoinplijhed man, wha is both inclined and able to communicate his agreeable feelings to others ; — a man of good morals^ whofe anions correfpond with the moral law.

MAT£RIALISiyt

in general, is the afiertion, that th« whole of worldly beings

confift of matter ; — in particular, the ^^c/jo/o^/crt/ mate rialifm,

or the doftrine, that the perfonality of man can fubfifl; only

tinder the condition of his being the fame body j — the cofmo-^

logical, that the esfiftence and prefence of the world can be

owing to other circumftances, than to that of its being in

Space.

Matter,

j) as oppofed toform^is the given, perceived thing in general ; ^hat, which is determinable j the correlate of the determina-

«i(3n:

x68 GLOSSARY.

tibn : 2) in pppofition to mind, i. e. an objed of the internal feufe, matter is that, which is determined bj the form of ex--

teraal perception ; the fubflance of bodies.

♦■

Maxims "

are fubjeftive principles of Reafon, relative to free a£bions ;. whereas. /a:u'j are the neceflary objedtive rules, which applj with equal force to pvcry individual, whether morally difpo- •fed to obey them, or not.

Mechanically

1) in general, is all that, which neceflarily happens in tiqje, according to the law of caufality ; 2) in particular, the effefl, which bodies in naotion produce upon one another by the com- munication of their motion (not by their internal powers,*as in the chemical eiFeOis tf bodies), v. g. mechanical feparation ty the wedge.

Mechanism of Nature 13 the necelTary confequence of events in time, according to the rfatural law of caufality.

Metaphysics

I, as defined by Baumgarten, is the fcience treating of the firft principles of human knowledge ; It has no fixed limits, by which it is feparated from other fciences : 3, with Kant ; the whole fyflem of pure philofophy ; the philofophy of things that are not the objeds of fenfe j or the Science of the hyperphyfical predicates of fenfible objefts.

" Method

I, Theoretically, is the mode of teaching ; the form of a fcience ; that procefs of arranging the variety in our cogni- tions under fyftematic unity, which is guided and determined hy rational principles :

G L O S S A R Yi ' i60

2, praBically, tlie mode and way of eftablifhing genuine moral principles. The methodical doBrine of praBical Reafon is, therefore, that part of the * Critique of Reafon,' which teaches this method from principles.

The tranfcendental doBrine of method is the fcience treating if the form of a metaphjfical 1 jllem»

Mmn—^Seele

lignifies i) the foul as phenomenon, as the objeft of the in- ternal fenfe, with all the internal reflexions : it is thus con- fidered ;a the experimental doftrine of mind ; a) the tranfcen- dental fubjeft of thoughts, which we can reprefent to our* felves merely through the confcioufnefs accompanying all our teprefentations ; 3) in particular, this felf-fame being, as the Vital principle of matter;

Modality : See Judgments. 'M.OIlVE—Triebfeder : See INDUCEMENT.

Mysticism — Schwdrmerey i) that oi fpeculative Reafon^ is Plato's dodrine of intelle^lual perceptions, and the cognofcible reality of thofe pretended in- nate conceptions of things beyond the world of fenfe ; v. g. if we attribute pofitive predicates to the Deity, and ftill difputd their borrowed origin from jihendrJiena : i) that oi praBical Reafon^ is the moral lyftem, which does not derive the material ground of human aftions from the world of fenfe, and which confequently eftablifhes the morality of them upon fuperfenfible perceptions.; v. g. if we admit fuch divine laws, is differ from the effential commands of Reafbui

t^ECESSARY : See Judgments. Necessity — Nothixendiglkeii i) logical f fornaal ; the neceflary connedion of conceptions irl

Y an

170 GLOSSARY.

an apodiftical Judgment ; that neceffity, according to which certain predicates belong to a certain conception : 2) real^ ma-' terial, phyfical neceffitj of exiftence ; the impoffibilitj of non- exiftence : 3) morale praftical neceffitj, which depends upon praftical Reafon.

Negative : See Judgments.

Notion

is a pure intelleftual conception, which arifes from the aS of referring the form of a judgment to an obje^. — An original (not, innate) notion is called a Category.

NouMENON — Ding anjich^ an objeft or thing in itfelf, i. e. without or external to the mind in a tranfcendental fenfe ; a thing exclufive of our repre- fentatlon. It is generally oppofed to the term * ^henomenon^ or the fenfible reprefentation of an objeft.

NuMBER—^Zai'/,

is the reprefentation of unity, from the foeceffive addition of One to One, which is of a fimilar fpeties. By the idea * num- her^'' the Category of ^lantity is fenfualized, and the pure fcheme^of Quantity, or feries of time exhibited.

Oi&jE CT — Gegenjland

of a reprefentation, in general, is the individual thing, to which the variety of given matter in a reprefentation is referred.

Objective

iignifies, in general, every thing which has objeftive reali^^ which relates to an objeft of fenfe and experience.

Obligation — Isbthigung is amoral and praftical determination of a will governed by rational motives ; or the pradical neceflity of volition^ in. a

poffiblc

GLOSSARY. 171

poffible contradidion to natural inclinations. In a facred will, therefore, no obligation takes place.

Ontology i) as it is .pretended ; a fjftematic dodrine of fynthetical cog- nitions a priori of things in general :

2) as it is poffible ; a complete analyfis of the pure Under- ftanding, or tranfcendental philofophy, i. e. the fcience of the moll general conceptions and laws of all rational and moral objefts coUeftively confidered ;— in oppofition to that part of Metaphyfics, which treats of the paitieular objfidb of the in- ternal or external fenfe,

Onto-theoloGT is the cognition of a Supreme Being from bare conceptions,

Orgakon i) in general, is tUe knowledge of thofe rules, by which a fcientific fyilem can be conllruded ;

2) in particular, the Organon of pure Reafon; i. e. an Organon for the purpofes of Metaphyfics. From the complete applica- tion ot the Organon, arifes a fy ftem of pure Reafo.i.

Origin — TJrfprung^ thejirji origin is the derivation of an efFed from its firfl caufe, i. e. that caufe, which is not again the efFed of another caufc of the fame kind.

OKiGimL-LhY—^UrfprUnglichf i'. e. not derived ; for inflance, original adtion : (^See Causa- lity) J an original character, which requires no derivation, no proof.

Paralogism 1^ logical : a falfe conclufion of Reafon, as to its form .• %) tranfcendental : when the ground of the paralogifm de-

y 3* pends

i7a © L O S S A R Y.

pends upon the conftitution of the faculty of cognition itffelf j for inflance, in the tranfcendental doftrine of mind.

Particular : See Judgments.

Pathological

is called, that, which depends upon the paflive part of humaij

nature, upon the fcnfitive facultj. It is oppofed to ^ praBical^^

i, e. that, which depends upon the fiee aftivitjr of Reafon.

People of God is a people, that live, under the government of divine law;s^

Perception

generally fignifies the fame as * intiiitiott ;' but, in particular^ it is ufed by Kant in a more limited fenfe, i. e. a reprefenta* tion accompanied with confcioufnefs or apperception.

Permitted— jEr/att5i

i) is that, which correfponds with a barely poflible praftical precept ; non-permitted^ what militates againft a problema- tical Imperative : 2) that,, which i^ conliftent with a general law of morality, with the autononiy of the wiU ; the contrary is unp^n^itted. In the former fignification, the non-permitted is diftinguifhed from that, which is * contrary to duty^ or what is again ft a real, fubfifting law. In the latter fenfe, thefe terms are equivalent to each other.

Phenomenon : See Nou.menon.

Philosopher — Weltweifer^

\x\. idea^ is he who renders all cognitions fubfervient to the ne- ceffary pwrpofes of human Reafon ; alegiflator of that faculty ; a maftcr in the fcience of wif(ipqjk.

To

GLOSSARY. 137

To Philosophize pieans to exerclfe one*s peculiar talent in the philofophical ufe of Reifon, i. e. in the explanation of that, which is explicable.

Physico-Theology or rather phyfico-teleologlcal theology, is the cognition of the Deity, as being the author of that order and perfe£tion in the aatural world of fenfe, which is every where difcoverable.

Phoronomt h the pure dodlrine of th^ magnitude of motion.

Possibility — M'dgUchkeit

^) the form of a problematical judgment ; the conceivable con-* »e£lion of two conceptions : 2,) the correfponding pure Cate- gory y i. e. the reference of a form of thought in a problema- tical judgment, to perceptions in general, to an obje£l : 3) thq application of this Category to fenfible perceptions ; the a- greement of a conception with the general form of fenfible perceptions of time. — rimpoflibilitj, therefore, fignifics the difagreement, the inconfiflency with this form.

Practical is that, which depends on freedom, on the felf-a£live faculty of defiring ; which relates to that faculty as the ground, cout fequence, gtc. ; for inflance, practical cognition, laws, princi- ples, philofophy.

Pragmatical

^s that, which is defigned for the promotion of general profpe- Tity.

Praying — Betettt is a mere declaration of wilhes towards the Divine 'Berng ; a Being, that ftands in need of no explanation of the internal fentiment of the wiihing perfonv— Praying confidered as the

X74 GLOSSARY.

means of producing efFefts upon God, is fuperllition. In or- der to improve ourfelves, and to enliven our moral fentiment, it is one of the moll falutarjr, but by no means gcnerallj ne- ceflary means.

Precept — Vorjchrift

means a praftical rule, in the moll extenlive fenfe, whether it have an abfolute (lawful) or only a comparative unix'erfality.

Principle — Grutidfotz is every general cognition, from which others may be con» ilflently derived and conceived.

Problematical : See Judgments.

Proofs — Beweife

i) in general, are obje6live grounds of convidlion. To prove fomething, is to deraonftrate it fufficiently from objedive, lo- gical reafons, to convince, or at leail, to prepare the mind for convi6lion, and not merely to perfuade, i. e. to caufe or pro- duce our apptofaation from fubjeftive (aellhetical) grounds of determination : 2) in particular ; proofs are either empirical^ from real experience ; or a priori^ from Reafon and independ- ent of all matter gf experience.

Psychology,

is the doclrine of mind ; the phyfiology of the internal fenfe, ^nd a part of phyfics in general.

Pure — rein : See a priori.

P URPOSE— Ztr^fi , in general, is the conception of an obje£l, fo far as it contains, at the fame time, the ground of the reality of this objed.— * A purpofe is faid to be hypotheticalj vi^hen it prcfents itfelf as

the

GLOSSARY. irS

the means of attaining fome other objea ; categorical, when it exhibits itfelf as final purpofe in the oppofite cafe. — Purpoje of Nature is the exhibition of the idea of a real, objeaive con- formity in nature. A thing exifts as a purpofe of nature, when it is of itfelf both caufe and effea.

The fcience or philofophy of all purpofes is called Teleology,

JSe

FY, J

QUAUTY,

'See Judgments. Quantity,

Reality — WirkUchkeit is real, not merely ideal exigence ; and tliis is conceived i) purcy through that Category, which is founded upon the form of affertory judgments : %) fenfualized ; i. e. the ciicumftance of being in a determined time.

Reason — Vernunft

A) generally implies the whole, fupreme, felf-aaive faculty of cognition, in contradiftinaion to the low, merely paflive, fa- culty of the fenfes j and, in this view, the Underflanding is like wife comprehended under it. Hence the whole faculty of cognitions a priori is called pure Reafon ; which is divided into the faculty of forming conceptions, i. e. the Underfland- ing ; and into the faculty of forming conclufions, i. e. Reafon in a more limited fenfe.

B) in particular : the power of conceiving fomething from ^principles ; of apprehending the particular from the general ;

of reducing the unity of the rules of the Undcrllanding to principles ; of clafling particular conceptions under thofe, which are general ; and finally, of exerting the higheft degree of ac- tivity in the free operating faculty of cognition. — Thus de- fined, Reafon is not only diftinguiQicd from the Senfitive Fa- culty, but likewife from the Underftanding in a more limited fenfe.

Re-

f 7^ GL6SSARY;

Receptivity, the fufceptibility of impreffions ; the power of receiving tf^* prefentations ; of being afFe£led by objedls ; thcpajjive faculty of reprefentation ; fenfibility. Thisj combined with fponta- neity, foims the fubftance of the reprefenting power of man.

i) logical \ the comparifon made between exifling conceptionaT in general : i) tranfcendental refleBionj the mode of compa- ring reprefentations with refpeft to the faculty of cognition, in which they are compared j the a£l of reflecting upon the man- ner, how and by what fubjedlive conditions (Hates of mind) we atrive at certain conceptions and judgments, whether through inclination and cuftom, through the Senfitive Faculty,- the Underllanding, or through Reafon.

Regulative principles : See Ck)NsTiTuTiVB*

Relation : See Judgments. ReIigion

1 ) fuhJeBively c6nfidered, is the reprefentation ot the eftentlal laws of Reafon, as the refult of divine commands and of vir- tue ; tKe coincidence of the will of a finite being with that of a facred and beneficent author of the world, who has both, the will and power of Realizing the mofl exaft proportion be- tween the happinefs and the moral condud of man. All Re- ligion is founded upon morals. The Science of Religion is^ therefore, called Moral Theology :

a) ohjeBively confidered, it is the whole compafs of thofe doc-i- trines, which relate to the fubjeflive Religion.

Representation — Vorjlellung is an internal determination, a modification of the mind. It is converted into a cognition, as foon as it is referred to an obje^?.

GLOSSARY, 177

Rule — Rege! is a conception or a judgment, fo far as the connexion of a variety is fabje6ted to a general coadition.— As to their va- lidity. Rules are either univer/al, which are neceffarilj valid, and admit of no exception , for inftance, the moral law, and all the rules a priori : or they are general, when we frequent- ly obferve them to be advantageous and applicable to the pur- pofes of life : fuch are, for inftance, the rules of prudence.

Sati^f ACT wa—f-Wohlge/allen is the correfponding relation of an objed to the fenfe of feeU J!jg, or to the fubjed itfelf,

ScEPTlCISlVf

of pure Reafon, is the opinion, that we can form no decifion upon the exiflence and non-exiftence of fuperfeufible things and their properties, without pointing out with accuracy the grounds of this irapoflibility, which lie in ^he cognitive facul* ty itfelf.

SCHEVLA

1) is the general determination of a perception according to general ideas ; for inftance, the fenfible reprel'entation of a man, a horfe, a houfe in general. It muft, therefore, not be confounded with a * pifture,' i. e. an example in concreto, V. g. that of an individual or particular man, horfe, houfe, &.c,

2) the tranfcendental fchema of a pure intelleftual not on, is the pure and general fenfualization of fuch a notion q. priori \ the fenfible condition, under which the pure notions of the in-

telleft are ufcd ; i. e. objedls can be clafled under it The

regular fucceflion of variety is apriori the .fchema of cau- fality ; number in general is the fchema of quantity ; where- as an individual number, as that of 5, 15, &c. is merely the pidurc of it.

Leno

1^8 G L O S S A R Y,

Sensation — Empjindting

is feafible reprefentation, impreffion of an adlually piefent ob- jcdl upon the mind, modification of the Senfitive Faculty,

Sense, or Sensitive Faculty — Sinnlichkeity according to Kant, is that faculty of the min(^ which is liable to be modified and affe6ted by things, and thereby to receive imprefiions or feprefentations of things. It is, therefore, nei- ther a bare modification of the Underftanding, as with Leib- nitz, nor a mere a£tivity or excitement of the corporeal organs, the peculiar exiftence of which, if it is to become an objeft of cognition, rather prefuppofes a receptivity in the mind itfelf.

The * pure Senfitive Faculty a priori^ implies the faculty in itfelf; that, which belongs to it as a power of fufceptibility a priori, which is not firft determined by the fenfiblc impref-* fions* but which rather determines the latter themfelves, ac- cording to Space and Time ; it is the fubjeftive condition of all that, which receives by it (namely the Senfitivfc Faculty ^ priori) the character of reality.

Sensibility — Enipfindlarhit

is fometimes, though rarely, ufed in thefe * Elements' inflead of fenfation ; it exprefles ra^er the capacity of receiving fen-^ fible impreffions.

Sensible and Sensitive muft not be confounded with one another, as the former \\ andogous to fenfibility, the latter to fenfation, •

Simultaneity — Zuglekhseyn, is the exiftence of a variety or the multifarious, at one and the fame time.

Space — Raum is the intuitive reprefentation of things bein^ without and u?ar one another, and of extenfxon in general,

SPONr

GLOSSARY; 179

Spontaneity

1) in general, is felf-aftive, unconditionate caufality ;

2) in particular, the fpontaneity of the reprefenting faculty tonfifts in the adivity or operation of the reprefenting fubjeft upon the impreflions received. The reprefenting faculty is called, Underftanding, Reafon in the ihoft extenfive fenfe, fo far only, as it is felf-a6live and apprehends the impreflions re* ceived, conne£ls them into a wholcj and has the power of re- producing them.

SpURidUS woRSHtP — Afterdlenfi < is fuch a fanciful veneration of the Deity, as is contrary to that true fervice, which he himfelf requires ; v. g. by penance, mortification, pilgrimage, &.c.

Subject 1) logical ; that in gieneral, in which certain predicates are in- herent : 2) the tranfcendental fubjeft in particular, the repre- fenting, thinking being in relation to its own thoughts : 3) the real fubje6V, fubflance.

Subjective,

as oppofed to obJeSiivCy lignifies i) that, which belongs to the fubjeft, i. e. all reprefentations : a) that, which in part at leafl is determined by the nature of the fubjeft. This is like- vife the cafe in all our reprefentations : 3) that, which relates to no obje£l correfponding with the reprefentation ; thofe con- ceptions and judgments, that cannot be exhibited in percep- tion, as the Deity, Liberty, Immortality : 4) in a praBical fenfe, fuch practical principles (maxims), which are not imme- diately founded upon Reafon itfelf, but upon the particular conftitution of the ading fubjeft, upon thefenfible impulfe and inclinations of it.

Substance 1) according to the pure Category , a fubjefit in a categorical

' - Z 2 judgment

i8o GLOSSARY.

judgment ; all that, which is not confidered as predicate of fomething elfe : in this fenfe the mind itfelf is called lub- ftance : a) fenfualixed ; fubftance in a phrnomenon, the con- tinuance, perdurability in a perceived object, which exifts at all times ; that, which contains the ground of reality in the accideiis, v. g matter is the fubftance of all external obje£ls, without which no obje£l could be conceived in Space : 3) Suhjiance in itfelf ^ external to the phenomenon ; it is that un- known fomething, by which the diiFerent fenfations are pro- duced, and ueceffarilj cbnnedted with one another in a pheno- inen(^.

StlBSTRATUM.

The fuperfenftble fubjiratum of nature is that objeft, of which we can determine nothing in an affirmative fenfe, fave that it is a being in itfelf, of which we know mcrdy the phe- nomenon.

Stnthesis

1) in general, is the compofitlon or combination of varioiis reprefentations (whether intuitions or conceptions) into one' cognition, which may be conception, judgment, &c. 2) in par-" ticular: a) pure tranfcendental fynthefis a priori, is the a61: of combining the variety of Space and Time into One repre- fcntation of Space and Time. This lies at the foundation of pure Mathematics • — b).f7?//!iVv«/ fyn;hefis, when any expe- rimental varieties^ i. e. fenfations, are connefted into unity, Eachof thefe fpecics confifts 6f three varieties, namely,

i) the fynthefis oi apprehenfloti, when the afFedlions of our in- ternal and external fenfe are apprehended and arranged ;

2) the fjnthefis of reproduSiion when that, which has been colle£led and conneded, is reproduced by the power of ima- ginationy in order that the preceding affeftions may be an-' nexed to thofe immediately fucceeding ; and

3) the fynthefis of recognition^ which forms One Intuition of what has bsea apprehended and coniiedi^.

StsteiiI^

GLOSSARY. i8i

Ststem is a whole, which is connefted bj one principle, and therefore has neceflary unitj. It is oppofed to * aggregate^* i. e. a whole^ which owes its origin to the occafional or accidental addition of one part to another, and confequently has not the charader of neceflary completenefs.

Technic l) in a proper fenfe, means Art. caufality according to ideas^ purpofes : a) in a general fenfe, the technic ofnaturey the cau-^ fality of nature in relation to thofe produftions, which cor- refpond with our conceptions of a purpofe \ in oppofition to * mechanifmy i. e. the determination of caufes according to the laws of motion.

Teleology : See Purpose.

Theology: See Religion.

Theosophy fignifies that theoretical cognition of the divine nature and ex- iftence, which fatisfaftoiily explains the conftitution of th6 world, as well as the moral laws.

Thing in itself : See Noumenon.

Time— ZrtV

is, according to Kant, the original perceptive reprefentation of the poffibilitj of fimultaneity and fucceffion.

Totality — Allheitt

the reprefentation of the whole, (univerfitas^; that funftion of the Underllanding, by which, when it is applied to con- ceptions, a plurality of cognit'ons is comprehended and con- neded into a general one ; when applied to perceptions, To-

tolitj

484 GLOSSARY.

talitj is nothing elfe than plurality confidered in things a9 unitj, and forms a fpecies of a Category, vii. that of Quantity;

Transcendent — UberfchwengUch : See Immanent.

TrANSCENDENTALj in a general fenfe, fignifies a reprefentation (whether percep- tion or conception), a judgment, a fcience a priori, fo far as it ilill refers to objefts, and may be applied to them. For in- ilance, it is a tranfcendental cognition, that Space is a percep- tion a priori, and yet is applicable to fenfible objedls. The tranfcendental is oppofed to the empirical, which latter not only relates to, but likewife arifes from, experience.

'tvJJTU.-^Wahrheii is the igreeifaent or coincidence of oilr tfognition, i) with itfelf, i. e. its own charafters^ and with the general tules of thought : a) with its objefts ; and hence material, pofitive, bhjeBive, real, fytithetical truth, reality. It requires, that the objeft be given ; the principle of contradidion is only a ne- gative criterion of truthi

Unconditional or Unconditionate — Uhhedingt,

that, which is abfolutely and in itfelf, i. e. internally poffiblcj which is exempt from thofe conditions, that circumfcribe a thing in Time and Space. Such is the idea of human Reafon in the moft extenfive fenfe, as it is capable of continual ini- provement, which, although it cannot be realized in experience, is unlimited ; the fpbere of the objedts of cognition being boundlefs. And this circumllance ought not tc deter^ but ra- ther to encourage us in our exertions for the attainment of knowledge, which may be carried on in indeJiniiu/n.—^Cova.- |)ar« this Article with the terra * CowpiTIONAL.*

Under-

' , GLOSSARY. 183

UNDERSTANDING-r:/^rj;fl«^

i) in thei moft extenfive fenfe, is the felf-a£live facultj of cog- nition (^fpontaneitj), or the faculty of producing reprefenta- tions, of uniting the reprefentations given or perceived, of thinking and judging upon objefts :

7t) in particular ; the faculty of forming conceptions and judg- ments of objefts perceived ; the faculty of acquiiing experi- n^ental cognitions, i. e. of forming rules, as oppofed to laws. In this fenf«, the Underftanding is 4iftinguifti'-'d ffom Reafon in a more limited fignificat;on.

The Win.

1) In general, is the arbitrary determination, the caufality of a living being, the power of producing objefts correfponding with conceptions, or at leafl of determining onefelf as to the attainment of them ; an appetitive faculty in general ;

2) in particular, the caufality of Reafon with refpedt o its adions, pradical Reafon and Liberty ; a faculty of afting con- formably to principles, i. e. to the reprefentation of laws— to produce fomething, that correfponds with an idea or purpofe.

Wisdom — Weisheit

ijs the idea of the neceflary unity of all poffible purpofes. It . is therefore i ) theoretically confidered, the cognition of the higheft good: z) pra&ically : an attribute of that will, whlcl|. Realizes the higheft good, or at leaft exerts itfelf for that pur- pofe.

^ I N I S.

THREE

PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS,

CHIEFLY TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

OF

JOHN CHRISTOPHER JDELUNGySco

ESSAYFIRST.

A concife hiftory cf the Englijh Language, 'zs'c.

J HE hiftory of the Englifli Language begins with the An" glo-Sayons ; for, though the old B*'itons, the Anceflors of the modern Weljh, were the firll inhabitants of tliis country, yet, with refpedl to its language, they form no epoch in the hiftory of it ; as__there are but a very fmall number of words, which can be derived, with certainty and juft etymology, from Britifh roots.

It is, indeed, not very probable that the Anglo-Saxons, with their irruption into a new country, Ihould have deftroyed, or expelled, all the former inhabitants of it; and it is more rea- fonable to fuppofe, that befides thofe, who fled to the moun- tains of Wales, there muft ftill have remained behind a very confiderable part of the nation, bat who, according to the bar- barous cuftom prevailing in thofe times, were reduced to a fpecies of ilavery, were obliged to cultivate the fields of their mafters, and were gradually compelled, however unwilling, to adopt the language of their conquerors.

Thus, the ancient tongue of the Britons, was completely eradicated ; if we except a few fingle words, which have ft,ill remained current among country-people. — Similar phenomena have occurred in Germany, and frequently too, in other coun- tries.When the Sclavi and theVandals made themfelves mafters of the Eaftern part of Germany, the/ did not deftroy all thr native Germans ; but they fubjugated and forced them to a- dopt their language. Heiice, in Bohemia, there is fcarcely any trace left of the ancient language of the country. When the Germans, in fucceeding ages, reconquered many of thefe pro- vinces, and united them into a political body, they proceeded in a fimilar manner ; and it is now very difficult to dcte£l any vcftiges of the ancient language of the Vandals, among the country-people of thefe provinces.

The Anglo-Saxons, who began their Irruptions into Britain about the year 450, came from the modern Frifia : hence their language bears a clofcr relation to the Frijian, than to any o- ther. It is, however, to be much regretted, that the latter has

» not

vi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

not been- more accurately inveftigated hitherto by. any philo- logift ; for it certainly might be of great advantage for the il- luflration of the ancient Anglo-Saxon.

The hiflory of the Englifh language, from the lirfl inroads of the Anglo-Saxons, down to the prefent time, comprehends a period of nearly fourteen centuries. As the nati6nj during this long period, has undergone various great changes and commotions, which were necelTarily attended with relative in- fluence upon the language, it becomes therefore neceffary to divide it into ceitain periodical Se6lions, correfponding with thefe changes. I propofe to adopt this method ; although Johnson, my predeceffor, has contented himfelf with giving promifcuous fpecimens of language, as prefixed to his large Dictionary, in chronological order, without however attempt- ing a true hiftorical divifion.

The principal changes, which, pofterior to the Anglo-Sax- ons, aifecled the Englifh language, were, the incurfions of the Danes ; the invafion of the Normans ; and the adoption of French phrafes and terms, together with the improvements and manners of that people. Thefe collectively fuggpft to us four periods, in tracing the hiftory of the Englifh . language : viz. ift, the pure Anglo-Saxon, or the Britiih-Saxon period ; id. the Danijh Saxony ov Danilh Anglo-Saxon ; 3d. the Norr- mannic-SaxoTiy or the Normannic Danifb-Saxon ; and 4th, the Frcjich'Saxon, or the Normannic French-Saxon period, in which laft the language gradually alTumed the form of the modern Englifh,

I. British-Saxon Period.

This period begins with the firft invafion of the Anglo.--, $axons, in the year 450 ; it terminates with the incvirfions of the Danes, about the year 780, and confequently comprehends aa era of 330 years. — It correfgcnds with that period in the hiflory of the German language, which extends from the emi- gration of the Eaflern nations, to the reign of Charlemagne ; and with refpect to the ftate of improvement during this pe- riod, botli languages perfeftly rcfemble one another.

Th& Anglo-Saxons vitre a rude, untutored people, not unlike all the German and Northern nations of that age, whofe prin- cipal improvements related to the art of war. People of this

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. y'd

defcrlptlori do not (land in need of letters, or a -written lan- guage ; and it is very probable, that thej neither had, nor knew, the alphabet. The increafe of population, in a limited territory, compelled them, indeed, eaily to accuftom themfelves to order and a more rigid civil conilitution ; but as they were employed, for a confiderable time, in combating the natives of conquered coimtries, this faint improvement was chiefly, and proximately, deiigned for warlike purfuits._

A more remarkable degree of improvement was manifeft among the Anglo-Saxons about the year 570, when St Au- gustine arrived from Rome, and inftrucled them in the be- neficent principles of thfe Chriftian Religion. Thefe were the more eagerly embraced, as the progrefs of the mind, though hitherto fmall and partial, enabled them to perceive the ne- ceffity of abolifhing that rude and undigelled veneration for their idols, which were calculated only to amufe the fancy of a barbarous and unfettled people.

Together with the Chriftian Religion, the Anglo-Saxons alfo acquired the firft rudiments of the arts and fciences, and a tafte for the literature of ancient Rome, which very rapid- ly fpread among them. This may be eafily accounted for, as it was chiefly promoted by the continual increafe of a numer- ous people, who had eftablilhed themfelves upon a limited ter- ritory. Thus prepared, they likewife adopted the Roman alphabet, which had already been introduced as the current fmall letter in their writings. But as they were accuftomed to 2L found in their language, which was expreffed with a bif- fing tone, fomewhat fimilar to both t and j, and which was foreign to the Romans, who had no charafter for it in their alphabet ; hence the Anglo-Saxon teachers of Religion were obliged to borrow the 0 (theta) from the Greek, which therefore fupplied the place of the modern, Englifli th. The other Anglo-Saxon charafters are perfeftly fipiilar to the Ro- man current letters of thofe times, and particularly of the fixth Century ; and the w of the former is clofely imitated from a, compounded v of the latter.

If full credit be due to Warton, there is no frag- ment extant from this period, but a fmall' metric compofition oi the genuine Caedmon, which is infcrted in Alfred's tranf-

lation of the Ecclefiaftic Hiftory, by Bede * As the only,

a 2 and

* Vol. IV' Chap. 24. (riof Chap. 4. a» quoted by Warton).

VUl

THREE PHILOLOGICAL

and certainly a venerable piece of curiofity left of thefe re- mote ages, it well deferves a place in this period of the Britifli language. It is here offered in two different copies. One of them is tranfcribed from HiCKEs's Grammat. Antrlo-Saxon. p. 187; the other ftill more ancient, is extracted from Wan- ley's Antiq. Litcrat. Septentr. Part II. p. 287 — -I have inet with a third Copy of this fragment in" Whelock's Anglo- Saxoji Bede ; Cambrulge,i6j[^ ; but the text in this differs from both the former, and does not appear to me equally authentic.

H I c K E s.

*' Nu we fceolon hcrigean Heofon rices weard Metodes mihte. And his mod gethanc. Weorc wuldor faeder Suua he wundra gehwaes.

Ece drihten ord pnfteald. He aerefl fcop Eordan bearnura Heofan to rofc Halig fcippend.

Da mlddangeard Moncynnes weard Ece tlrihte aefter teode. Firum fold an. Frea aelmihtig."

Englijh,

" Now we ought to praife the author of the celeftial empire, the might of tlie creator, and his counfeh, the deeds of the father of honour ; how he be- came the author of wonders.

And when the eternal God firfl created heaven as the roof for the children of man, and af- terwards the earth, being an omnipotent guardian of the hu- man race."

W AN L E Y.

" Nu fcylun hergan Hefaen ricaes uard Metudaes maefti End his mod gidanc Verc uuldur fadur Sue he uundrj gihuaes.

Eci d 11(51 in Ora ftelidae. He aerill fcopa Elda barnum Heben til hrofc Halcg fcepen,

Tha middun geard Moncynnaes uard Ecy drySin Aefter tiadae Firum foldu Frca almedlig.

German. ■

•' Nun follen wir prcifen, den Urheber des Himmelrelches, die Macht des Schopfers, and feinen Rath, die Thaten des Vaters der Ehre ; wie er der Urheber der Wunder ward.

Und als der ewige Gott den Menfchenkindern zuerft den Himmel zum Dache, und her- nach als allmuchtiger Hiiter des menfchlichen Gefchleciits die Erdc fchuf.

Although

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNa >

Although Caedmon is faid to have miraculouflj compofed this Song, when dreaming ; it neverthelefs appears tQ be a tranflation from the Latin, which then, and for feveral fuc- ceeding centiiriesy was rendered fo very literally, that even the article was left out, and the whole conftruclion of the La- tin with the participles and ihany other peculiarities were ri- goroufly obferved. It is for this reafon, we ought not to judge x>f the fpirit of a language from the like tranflations ; and the want of rhymes is very probably owing to the fame caufe.

II. Danish Saxon-Period.

(or, IDaniJh Atiglo-Saxon.y

This period begins from the incurlions of the Danes, about the year 780, and continues as far as the invafion of the Nor- mans m 1 066 ; it confequently includes nearly three centuries. Two circumftanccs co-operated here, which produced remar- kable changes in the Old Saxon language ; namely firil, the domeftic improvements of the Anglo-Saxons, both in a phy- sical and moral fenfe, from which the improvement, and con- fequently the change of the language was infeparable ; and fecondly, the mixture of the latter with the Danifh, which being clofely related to the Anglo-Saxon, was more eafily united into one la-iguage.

Many written fragments, from this period, are ftill extant ; and all fuch as are commonly called Anglo-Saxon, properly confift of a mixture of Danilh with the Anglo-Saxon. To this number we may particularly refer two literal tranflations of the four Evangelifts, the writings of King Alfred, and the beautiful poetical paraphrafe of the Firji Book of Mofcs^hy ihejpurious Caedmon.

As a fpecimen of the profe-languageof this period, Johnson gives the ftrll Chapter of St Luke, extracted from one of the tranflations above mentioned ; but as fuch literal tranflations aie by no means calculated to exhibit the fpirit of a language, I have made choice of the Travels of Ohther and Wul'stan, as King Alfred, who died in 901, defcribed them in his Pre- face to the tranflation of Qnosius T have faithfully tranfcri-

bcd it from Sj)e/Tmn*s Fita Aelfredi ; Oxfprd, Fol. ^678 ; with

this

THREE PHILOLOGICAL

this difFerence onlj, that iaftead of giving the (very inaccurate) Latin jjf Spelman, I have fubjoined a German tranflation ; and for the greater convenience of readers, in general, I have likewife exchanged the Anglo-Saxon for the common Latin charafters.

This original piece, on account of the many curious parti- culars it contains, I make no doubt, will pi'ove more accept- able than any of thofe which are bare literal tranflations, and confequently improper to ferve as fpecimens for difplaying the genius of the language.

Ohthaere faede his hlaforde Aelfrede de Kynincge thaet he ealra Northtnanna Northmeft bade J he cwaeth thaet he bude on thaera lande noithweardum with thawaeft fae.he faede theah thaet thaet land fy fwithe north thanon* ao hit is eall wefle bu- ton on feawum ftowum* ftlce maelum wiciath Finnas* on hun- tathe on wintra* and on fumera no fifcothe be thaere fae.

He faede tliaet he aet fumum cyrre woldc fandian hu lange thaet land north rihte laege* oth the hwaether aenig man benortham thaem weftene bu- de : tha for he north rihte be thaem lande* let him ealne weg thaet ivefte lande on thaet fteorbord' and tha wid fae on baec bord thry dagas* tha wes

he

Ohther faid to his Lord, King Alfred, that of all the Normans he refided the farthcft towards the North ; he affirm- ed, that he refided in that conn- try which, in the Noith, borders on the Weftern Ocean. This country extends far to the North, is a complete defert, excepting a few places which are inhabit- ed by the Finns, who live in winter by the chace, but in fum- mer by fifliing.

He related, that he had once wiflied to examine, 'how far this country extended to the North j or whether this defert was in- habited in its northern pajts. For this purpofe he had failed three fucceffive days in a ftraight northern line, having the defert^ country on the ~right, and the open fea on the left hand j thus

he

Ohther fagte zu feinem Herm, dem Koenige Aeltrfd, dafs er unter alien Normannen am weiteften gegen Norden wohne; er fagte, er wohnein dem Lande, welches nordwaerts an die Weftfee ftoefst. Diefes Land erftrecke fich wcit gegen Mitternacht, imd fey voellig wuift, bis auf einige wenige Orte, wo einige Finnett •wohnen,'*welche im Winter von der Jagd, ini Sommer aber von dem Fifchfange leben.

Er fagte, er habe einmal unterfuchen \vollen,wie weit fich diefes Land naeh Norden erflreckte ; ndcr ob noch Menfchen inj Norden diefer Wuifte wohneten. Des%yegen fey er drey Tage lang g«rade nordwaerts gereifet, habe dus wuifte Land 2ur rcchteii, und die ofiene See auf der Uokcn Hand gehabt ; da er dcnn bis dahin

nord-

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG.

xt

he fwa feor north fwa fwa hwael huntan fyrreit farath:- tha for he tha gyt north ryhte* fwa he mihte on thaem othrum thrim dagura gefeglian* tha beah thaet land wer eart rihte* othrhe lio fae in on thaet land* he nyfte hwaether' buton he wyfte thet he ther bad weftan windes oth- the hwon northan* and fegled thanon eaft be lande* fwa fwa he mihte on feowor dagum ge- feglian'thafceolde hebidan ryhte northan windes* forthan thaet land thaer beah futhrihte* oth- thc feo fae in onwaet land* he nyiTe hwaether* tha faegled he thanon futhrihte ^e lande* fwa fwa he mihte pn fif dagum gefe- glian:.

Tha laeg thaer an micel ea up in that land* wa cyrdon he up in on tha ea" for thaem hy ne thorfton forth be thaere ea feglian* for unfrithe* for thaem thaet land waes eall gebun on pthre healfc thaere ea:- Ne met- te he aer nan gebun land* fyth- than he fram his agnum hame. for* ac him waes eaine weg weft land on thaet fteorbord butan fifceran and fugeleran and hun- tan*

he had come to that northern region, to which "the whale-fi(h- ers w'ere accultomed to refort. From thence he had failed, for three days, further North, where he found the country extending due Eaft. But whether the fea continue within the land, he knew not j he only knew this much, that he had ftopped there, waiting for wefterly or northerly- winds. After this he failed four days along the coaft, when he was attain obliged to wait for a northerly wind, as the country extended to the South. Whe- ther the fea continue within this part of the land, he alfo knew not. Then he failed five addi- tional days along the Southern coaft.

Here he met with a great river that extended far up the country, and on the" mouth of which he ftopped, but for fear of the inhabitants, he did not venture to fail up that river ; for the country, on one bank of the river, appeared fully inhabited. He had met with no other inha- bited country than this fince his departure from home : the coun- try on the right always appear-

nordwaerts gekominen fey, wohin die WalUifchjaeger zu gehen pflegten.Von da fey er nochdrey Tage lang weiter nordwaerts gel'egelt,da fich denn dasLand geradc nach Often geftreckt habe. Ob aber innerhalb des Landes Meer fey, wifl'e er nicht ; er wific nur fo viel, dafs er fich dafelbft aufgehalten, und auf den Weft-oder Nord- tvind gewartet habe. Hierauf fey cr vier Tagc lang an dem Lande hiiigcfegelt, " worauf er auf den Nordwind habe warten muiflen, weil fich das Land iiach. Suiden gefkeckt habe. Ob fich die See in diefes Land erftrecke, wilTc cr nicht. Hitrauf fey er fuinf Tage lang laengsder Kuifte fuidwaerts gefegelt.

JDa bufand fich cin grofler Flufs, welcher weit in das Land ging, an deffen Miijndune er fich aufhiclt, fich aber aus Furcht vor den Einwohnern nicht den Flufs hinaiif wagte,- weil das Land aufdcr andern Seite des Flufl'cs ftark bc- wohnt war. Er hatte auch, feitdem er aus feincr Heimath abgereifet war, aufier iiefem kcin bewolmtes Land angetroffcn, fondcrn hatte zur Rcthten jcdcrzeit

■vrujllc*

xu

THREE PHILOLOGICAL

tan" and thaet wacren ealle Fin- nfti* and him waes a Widfac on thact 'uaec bord:.

Tha Beorraas haefdon fwithe well gebun liyra land* ac hi ne dorfton tbacw on cuman:- Ac thara Terfin na land thaes call wefte* butan waer huntan gewi- codon* oththe fifceras.' oththe fugeleras :. Fela fpella lilm fae- don tha Beormas* aegther ge of liyra agcnum lande ge of thaem lande theymbe hy utan waeran* ac he nyfle bwat thaes fothes tv«es* for thaem he hit fylf ne gefeah :• Tha Fionas him thuhte and tha Beormas fpraccon qcah angetueode ;i

Swithod he for thider* to cacan thaes landes fceawunge* for thaens hoifwaelara* for thaem hi habbath fwithe aethele ban on hyra tothum :• Tha tew hy brohion fume thaem cynincge' and hyra hyd bith fwithe god to fciprathum :• Se liwael bith micle laelTa than othre hwalas* ne bith h^ Icngra thonne fyfan

elna

ing a dcfcrt uninhabited, except by a few fiihermen, fowlers and hunters, who were all of Finnic extraflion. But on the left, he always ohferved the open fea. •

Many Biarmians reiided a- mong them j yet he was not in- clined to venture a landing there. But the country of the Terfins was uninhabited, except ' by fome hunters, fiflicrpaen or fowlers who refided there. Tbe Biarmians told him much of their own country, as well as of the neighbouring lands j but how far their narratives were true, he could not afcer- tain, as he had not himfelf {ctn thefe countries. * He believed, however, that the Finks and Biarmians had one common lan- guage.

His principal objeft in tra- velling thither had been, to ob- tain the fe^-horfes, whofe teeth were compofed of a very preci- ous bone, and foiae of which teeth he likewife gave to the King. Their fliins are of ex-. cellent ufe for tackle. This fpecies of whale is much fmallcr than any other, being never ar

bove

•w-niftcs Land gehabt, einige wcnip;e Fifchcr, Vogelfaenger und Jaeger ausgenom- Tiien, wc'.cfie iiisgefammt Fmnen wiiren. Zur L.inken abcr hattc er jcderzeit (ias'ofFenc 7»Ieer.

Es wobtiten viek Blarmter in ihrem Lande ; allein er habe es nicht wagen v'olien, ddfeibft aiizular^.den. Das I.atid der Terfiunen aber fey unbewohnt, auiFer dafs einiije Jaeger, Fifchcr, odtr Vogelfieiiyer dafelbft wohnten. Die Biarmiffr haenen iluu vicics, fo wchl von. ihrem eigenen Lande als von den benachbartcn l.,aendcni rr^aehlet; ailein er wifle nicht v/as daran v»ahr fey, weil er fi& fclbft nicht gefchtn hibe Er glaubte indeffcn, dafs die Fi N n e N und Biarmikr kine \\\\\ cbea tUefclbj Sprache hacttcn.

V.T fey abcr vorii'j'.mlich I'm der Wallroffe wilkn dahin gereifet, welfheeinfehr fchr.tt7.bares Be!n in iliren Zaehnen haetten, von welchen Zaehnen er anch einige icm Koenige g^b. Jlire Felle find fehr gut zu^chifTstauen zu gebrauchen. Dicfo Art Walififclic ill ticit kleincr als anderc Arten, und nicht uiber fieb^n Ehlen

" laiig.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG.

iua

clna lange* ac on his agnum lande iffe bedfta hwael huntuth. tha beth eachta and feowertiges clna lange* and tha maeftan fifiges elna langf * thara he faede thaet he fyxa fum ofsloge fyxtig on twara dagum.

He waes fwithe fpaedlg man on thaem aethum the hoera fpe- da on beoth" that is on wildruai :• He haefde thagyf tha hethone cyning fohte* tamra deora unbe- bohtra fyx hand :• Tha theorhe hatad hranas :• wara waeron fix 'ftaet hranas* Tha beoth fwithe dyre mid.Finnum* fof thaem hy foth tha wildan hranas mid :• He v\aes -mid thaem fyrftura mannum on thaem lande* naefde he theah mathonne twentighry- thera* and twentig fceapa* and twentig fwina* and ;thaet lytle thaet he erede he erede mid horfan :• Ac hyra ar is maeil on thaem gafole the thaFinnashira *vildath* thaet gafol bithon deora lellum* and on fugela fetherum* and hwales bane* and on thaem fciprapura the beoth of hwaeles byde

bove feven ells in length. But good whales were alfo caught in his native country, which meafured upwards of forty-eight yards, and fometiines above fifty yards in length. He affirmed, that he was the fixth among thofe (i. e. in company with five others) who had killed fixty whales in two daysl

He was a very rich man In thofe things which, with them, were efteemed as riches, that is, in cattle. He had, when he came to the King, fix hundred^ unpurchafed, tame deer, which he called rein-deer. Among thtfe were fix highly efteemed. ' by the Finns, as by means of them they tamed the wild rein- deer. He was one of the Chiefs in the land, and yet he was pof- feffed of no more than twenty- oxen, tw^enty (heep, and twenty hogs. The fmall piece of foil, which he cultivated, was tilled by horfes. The principal re- venues (of the Chiefs) confifted .tin the tribute which the *Finns paid them, viz. in fkins of ani- mals, bird-feathers, whale-bone and fliip-ropes, which were ma- nufactured

lang. Es wuirden aber auch in feJnerri Vaterlande gute Wallfifche gefangen, welche uiber acht und vierzig, und zuweilcn iliber funfzig Ehlen lang waeren- Er verficherte, dafs er felb fechfte (d. i. niit noch fuinfen) ihrer in zwey Tagea lechzig erleget haoe.

Er war ein fehr reicher Mann'an folchen Dingen, welche bey ihnen fuir Reichthum gehalten werden, d. i. an Vieh. Er hatte, als er zu dem Koenige kam, fechsliundert ungekaufte zahnie Hirfche, welche er Rennthiere nannte. Darun- ter befanden fich fechs, welche bey den Pinnen fehr hoch gcfchaetzet werden weil fie die wilden Rennthiere damir zahm machen. Er war einer der Vor- nehmften in dem Lande, und hatte dennoch nicht niehr als zwanzig Ochfen.zwan- zig Schafc, und zwanzig Schweine. Den wcnigcn Acker, welchen er bauetc, den bauetc er mit Pferdcn. Jhrc vornehmften Einkuinfte bcftehen in dem Tribute, wdchcn die Finnen ihnen bezahlen, und welcher in ThierfcUen, ia Yogclfedern, in

b Fitchbcin

XIV

THREE PHILOLOGICAL

liyde geworht and of feoles :.

Aeghwilc gylt be his gebyr- dum* fe birdfta fceall gildan fiftyne mearthes fell* and fif hranes' and an beran fel* and tyn ambra fethra' and berenne kyiteloththe yterenne* and twe- gen fciprapas. aegwer fy (yxUg elna laug* other fy of hwaeles byde geworhtc* other of iioles :.

Thaet Eaftland (Wulfstan" faede^ is fwithe mycel' and tbaer bith fwithe manig burh* and on aelcere byrig bith cyninge* and thaer bith fwythe micel hunig and fifcath* and fe cyning and tha ricoftan men drincath myran meocl' and tha unfpethigan and

tha

nufaftured of the fkins of thi whale and fea-dog (feal).

Every one contributed in pro- portion to his abilities. The richeft generally gave fifteen fldns of the marret, five of the reindeer, one bear's fkin, ten- meafures of feathers, together with a coat made of the fkins of bears or otters, and two Ihip's- cables, each of them fixty ells long, one of which mud be ma- nufaftured of whale-lkins, and

the other of the fkins of feals.

* *

This Eaflern country •^•(Wulf- stan related) was very large and contained many cities, each of which had its king. Much ho- ney and many fiflies were likewife found there. The King and the fichert perfons drank horfe-milk, but the poor and the fervants drank

Hfchbein, und in Schifsfeilen beflehet, v^elche letztere aus Wallfifch-und See- haiidsfcUen verfcrtiget werden.

Jcder giebt nach leinem Vermoegen. Der Reiclifle giebt gemeiijiglich fiinf- zehn MarderftUe, fuinf Rennthierc, ein Baerenfell, und zehn Maal's pedern, nebft einem Rocke von Baehren-oder Fifchotterfeilen, und zweyen f-'chifsleilcn, jede»» ll-chzig Ehlen lang, deren eines ausWallfifch — das andere aber aus Seehundsfellen verfertiget feyn mufs.

Diefes Oefiliche Land ferzaehlte Wulfstan) ift fehr grofs, und hat fehr viele Staedte, dcren jede ihren Koenig hat. Aiich giebt es dalelbst viel Honig und Fifche. I>er Koenig 6ad die reichften Perfonen trinken Pferdemilch, die Armen und

Knechte

* , * Here follow Ohther's and Wvlfstau's Ceografiilcal acctunts oi Nor- •yizy, the adjacent countries to the Eaft, and the river Vifula. They are, how- ever, fo inaccurately ftated, and fo little interefting in themfelves, that I thought proper to fave the room for other more curious and attradlive fpecimens. I have felefted a few of that defcript ion from the works of Caxton, Harding, War- Toy, &c. which appeared to me better calculated, to exhibit the true ftate and progrcfs of the Engliih languagCj cfpecially during the fii/raf and yb//r//& periodical divifion^ here adopted.

f Speaking lall of the Fiftula, t\it Ilfng (modern Elbing) the EaJIb'icn Lahc (modern Frifc/j Haff) and tne adjacent country to the Eaft; Wulfstan relates, thefe curious fadls concerning the different provinces, now inhabited by the Eall- anii Weft-Pnifliaus, who gained the vidoric* of Frederic II. W.

ESSAYS, BY AD E LUNG.

XV

tha theowan drincath medo :• Ther bith fvvithe mycel ^ewinn betwconan him* and ne bith thaer naenig ealo gebrowen mid Ef- tum' ac thaer bith medo genoh :• And thaer is mid Eftum theaw thbnne thaer bith man dead" thaet he litii inne unfor- baerned mid his magum and freondum monath* gewhilura twegen' and tha Cyningas and tha othre heah thungene men* fwa micel lengc fvva hi maran fpeda habbath* hwilura healf gear* that hi beoth unforbaerned* and lic^ath bufan eoaithan* on hyra hufum* and ealle tha hwile the thaet lio bith inne* thaer fceal beon gedrync and plega oth thone daeg the hi hine for- baerneth :. Thonne thy ylcan daeg hi hine to thaem ade be- ran wijlath* thonne to daelath hi his feoh thaet thaer to lafe bith aefter them gedrynce and thaem plegan* on fif oththe fyx hwilum on ma* fwa fwa thaes feos andefn bith :• Aleogath hit thonne fore hwaega on anre mile* thoac maeftan daele fram thaem tune* thonne otherne* thonne thaene thriddan* oththe byt eal aled bith on thaere anrq

drank mead. They Ukewife had much wine, but beer was not brewed among the Eaftein in- habitants, inl^ead of which they had plenty of mead.

The Eaftern inhabitants had the (fingular) cuftom of keeping the bodies of their deceafed friends and relationsfor a month, fometimes for two months, ^vith- in theic houfes j but the kings and other men of rank were kept longer within the houfe, iri proportion to their riches. Sometimes they were fuflFered to lie half a year above ground, in their houfe?, without being burnt. As long as the corps remained there, they feafted and played till the appointed day of burning. On this day they re- moved it to the funeral pile ; they divided Jnto five, fix, or m^re parts, according to the nature of the property, the goods of the deceafed, if any remained, after- feafling upon, and playing for them. Then they placed the greateft part of them, at leaft one mile from the village (of the deceafed), then the fecond, and then the thiid. part, until every thing was pla- ced

Knechte aber trinkcn Meth. Es giebt auch vielen Wciii unter ihnen ; abcr Bier wird unter den Oftlaendern nicht gcbriuet ; ,dagegen haben fie Meth genug.

Die Oftlaender haben den (fonderbaren) Gebrauch,dafs wenrt jemand unter ihnen ftirbt, derfelbe in deui Haufe unter den Frcunden und Verwandtcn einen Monath, zuweilen auch zwey,liegen bleibt ; die Koenige aber und andcrc vomehme Maen- ner bleiben dcfto laenger liegen, je reichcr iic find. Zuweilen llegen fie ein halbeg Jahr uiber dcr Erdc in ihren Haeufern unvcrbrannt. So lange die Leiche fo h'egt zechcn und fpiclen fie bis zur Vcrbrennung. An demTage aber, da fie ihn auf den Holzftofs bringen, theilen fie feineGuiter, fo viel nach dem Zechen und Spielen davon iioch uibrig ist,in fuinf, oder fcchs, odef mehr Theile, nachdcm die Guiter bcftliafTch find Dann legen fie den grocistenThcildcrfelben wenigftens eine Meile von dem P©rfe (de» Verftorbciicn,) dann dcii zweytcu, dann den dritlcu Thcil, bis alles inner-

b % haH^

XVI

THREE PHILOLOGICAL

anre mile' and fccall beon fe laefta dael nyhft thaem tune the fe deada man onlith :• Thon- nc fceolon beon gefamnode ealle tha menn the fwyftofte hois hab- bath on thaem lande* for hwaega on fif milum oththe onfyx milum frara thaem feo':- Thonne aer- nath hy ealle toweard them feo* thonne ^cymeth fe man fe thaet Swifte hors hafath to thaem aereflan daele and to thaem mae- flan* and fwa elc aefter othrum* oth hit bith eall genumen" and fe nimth thone laeftan dael. fe nihil thaem tune thaet feoh geaerneth* and thonne rideth aelc his weges raid tha feo* and hyt motan habban call' and for- tby thacr beoth tha Swiftan hors ungefoge dyre :• And thon- ne his geflreon beoth thus eall afpe4ed* thonne byrth man hine uf and forbaerneth mid his waepnum and hraegle* und fwi- thofl ealle his fpeda hy forfpen- dath mid than langan legere thaes deadan mannes inne' and thaes the hy be thaem waegura alecgath* the tha freradon to aernath and nimath :• And thaet is mid Eftum theaw thaet thaer fgeal aelces getheodes man beon

for-

ced within that mile. Tho fti-alleft part was upon this oc- cafion always placed neareil to the village, in which the de- funft had lived. This being done, all the men poffeiTed of the fwifteft horfes, within five or fix miles dillance from the cftate of the deceafed, aflembled and rode with the greateftfpeed to the places, where the goods were depofited ; fo that he who had the fwifteft horfe arrived firft at the beft ftiare of the property, and thus one after another, till the whole was car- ried away. But he who arrived at the lot placed neareft to the village, got the fmalleft (hare. Upon this, each of them rode off with his ftiare and kept it whol- ly— as his property. — For this leafon, too, fvvift hoifes were highly valued among them. Af- ter having thus diftributed all Tiis property, they carried out the deceafed (into the open air), and burnt him, together with his armour and cloaths. The greateft part of the property was fpent in the long keeping of the corps, but whatever was expo- fed on the road, was gained and carried

halb diefcr Meile gelegt ill. Der kleinfte Theii wird dabey allemahl zunaechft an das Dorf gelegt, wo der Verftorbene gewohnet hat. Alsdann verfammeln fich alle Maenner aus dem Lande, welche die I'cimelleftsn Pferde haben, fuinf bis fechs Meilen weit von den Guitern, und rennen fporenftreichs darauf zu ; da denn der, welcher das fchnellefte Pferd hat, zu dem erllen und beften Theil kommt, und fo einer nach dem andern bis alles weggenommen ill. Dcrjenlge bekommt aber den klcinften Theil, der zu dem naechft an dem Dorfe gekgenen Theile gelanget. Alsdann reitet ein jeder mit feinem Theile davon, imd bshaelt ihn ganz — aU leira Eigenthum. — Dies macht uuch, dais die fluichtigen Pferde bey Ilinen uiberaus theuer find. W^enn nun alle Guiter verthcllet find, alsdann tragen (ie den Verftorbenfen hinaus (in die freyc Luft), und verbrermen ihn mit feinen Wafien imd Kleideru. Sein meiftes Vermoegen gehet bey dem langen Aufbehalten des VeTstorbenen flaraxif ; v/as aber an deni Wege ausgefetzet ift, wird von Fremden gewonnen un4

^ weg->

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG.

forbaerncd' and gyf thnr man na ban findeth unforbaerned* hi hit fceolan miclum gebetan :• And thaer is mid Eaftum an maeofti' thaet hi magon cyle gcwyrcan* and thy thaer licgath tha deadan men fwa langc and ne fuliath- that hi wyrcath thone eylc hine on* and thcah man afette tvvegen faetels full ealath oththe waetheres' hy gedoth* that other bith ofer frureir facji hit fy fumraor am winter.

carried off by Grangers. It %v» a prevailing cuftom among the FJlbians, to burn their dead ; and if afterwards a Cngle bone was found unbutnt, fuch an o- miflion was feverely punilhed. The inhabitants of the Eaft Tvei-p alfo acquainted with the art oF producing cold ; hence the corps could lie fo long without under- going putrefaftion, becaufc they introduced cold (fiigorific fub- ftances) into it, And if tw» veffels filled with beer or water were kxpofed, they could make both of them freeze, whether it were in fummer or winter*.

vrcggcnommen. Es ift bey den EJibea der Gebraiich,. dafs jeder Verllorbcnc urer- brai: It wird, und wenn hernach ein einiges Bein unverbrannt, gefundeu v/ird, lb tvird Iblches fcharf geahfldet. Die Oftlaender haben auch die Kraft, dafs fie Kaelte machcn koenncn ; dahcr auch die Ijeichen. fo laiige liegen und nicht faulen, wtul man Kaelte (kaltmachende Koerper) in Ce bringct. Und wenii man zwey GefaefTe voll Bier oder Wafler hinfetzet, fo koenaen fie machcn, dafs beyde frieren, cs fey ini Somnier odor Im Winter. la

* For fuch readers as may be only imperfediy acquainted with the Cermcat language, I beg leave to add the following remarks : i ft. that all Substaurires are written with large initials ; ad, that, according to the German idiom, the prefa* tenfc is ufed, throughout this narrative, instead of the Engliih imperfei-1 ; 3d. tliat though a fcntence in the German frequently begins with tiic wipcrfcil teni'j;, whea introducing the fpcech of another, (v. g. Er fagte^ er habe^ &c. pag. xiii ) yet by the German idiom, the quotation itfelf is exprdlcd in the conjunii!i}i fref<:nt ; — ^

f>eculiarity, which is uniformly obferved by Adeluno hunfclf, wiiofe tranll itioirl lave here fubjoined, with fcarcely any alteration ; 4th, that the preceding Englifi tranflation deviates only from the German^ where the construftion of the for- mer rendered it necefl'ary. Finally ; to prove, that the affinity of the G^won t« the Anglo-Saxon is much stronger than to the modern Englijb, 1 have bcre »uld«3d fomc examples.

German. AngloSaxon. , JEngliJb,

Tagen. (pi. dat. of Tag.)

Gcfegelt. (prct. oifegeln.)

Wuilfte. (impf.couj of •wijfen).

Vogclfanger.

Gegebcn. (participle oigcben)

Ihres (pofs. pron. neut. of Ihr)

Eigenes (part of a pofs. prou.)

Hirfclien. pi. of Hirfcl)

Zuweilen,

lK:K'rf.ihren,

uverbranm (pret. of «;V(5iv<rir<wr«iy }

li,i3tenth<.ii»

Dagum.	Days, (day)
Gefeglian,	Sailed, (to fail)
W'uiste.	He might know.
Fngeieran.	BirdA:atcher.
Gebun.	Given.
Hyra.	Their.
Agenum.	Own.
Hryrethera.	Stags fdcer).
Gewilum.	Sometimes.
Oferferan	To travel (ferry) grrr.
Unforbacmed.	Unburnt (not to barn.)
Mdcstanducle.	Tor tlie mobt jurt.
	vVjhI

XVI J 1

THREE PHILOLOGICAL

In order to give likewife a fpecimen of poetical compofltion, I ftiall fubftitute for the poem furniflied bj Johnson, another original, which I found in Hickes's Gramm. Anglo-Saxon. pag. 178. — -Though the age of it be not afcertained, it certain- Ij belongs to this period, and may be confidered as a concife

Topography of the City of Durham.

Is theos burch breome. Geond Breoten rice.

Steopa gefta tholad.

Stanas ymb utan.

Wundrum gewaexen.

Weor ymb eornath.

En y Lhum ftrong.

And therinne wunath

Fifca feola kinn.

On floda gemong.

And there gewexen.

Wuda feftern mice!.

Wuniath in them wicum

Wilda deor monige.

In deopa dalum.

Deora ungerim.

Is im there byri,

Eac bearnum gecithed

De arfefta eadig Cuthberht.

And

This city is celebrated In the whole empire of the

Britons. The road to it is fleep, It is furrounded wiih rocks, And with curious plants. The Wear flows round it, A river of rapid waves. And there live in it, Fifhes of various kinds Mingling with the floods. And there grow Great forefts j There live in the receffes Wild animals of many forts, In the deep valleys Deer innumerable. There is in this city Alfo well known to men The venerable St Cudberth,

An4

Diefe Stadt ist beruihmt. — In dem ganzen Reiche dei- Britten. — ;DerWeg zu ilir ist jaehe, — Sie ist mit Felfen umgebsp, — Urid fonderbarcn Gewaechsen. — Die Were unfliefst fie, — Ein Flufs von reiffcnden Wellen. — Und darin wohnen, — Filcbc vieler Arten — Die fich mit den Fluthen vermifchen. — Und daselbst wachsen — Grofse .Waelder ; — In den Auen wobnen — Mgincherley wilde Thiere, — In den

tiefen Thaelern — Unzaehlige Rehe, (Tbiere). Es ist in dieser Stadt — ^

Auch den Menschen wohlbekannt — Der ehrwuirdige heil. Cudberth, — Und ' des

And if it be objecSed, that many of thcfe words Ijiiewife bezjr strong marks of affinity to the modem Englifti, I must remind the reader of my aim, whicb i^not to deny this, but to prove, that contrary to the opinion of many Antiquaries, the German very probably is the mother, and not 'njifer language of the AnglorSaxon, Hence the manifest abfurdity, in Didlionaries, of giving references to either, as two different languages, efpecially in words whofe origin cannot be well afcertained

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG.

XIX

And thes claene cynlnges heo- ^ fud.

Ofualdes Engla leo And Aidan bifcop Aedberth and Aedfrid. Aethele geferes Is therinne mid heom Aethelwold bifceop And breoma bocera Beda^ And Boifil abbet. De claene Cuthberht. On gichethe lerde luftum.

And he is lara uuel genom.

Eardlath aeth them eadigC. In in them mynftre. Vnarimeda reliqua -Thaer raonige uundrum guuur-

thath The uurita feggeth Mid then drihtnes uuerdomes bideth.

And the head of the chafte

king. Ofwald, the lion of the Angli, And Aidan, the bifhop, Aedbert at-id Aedfrid The noble affociates. There is in it alfo Aethelwold, the bifliop. And the celebrated writer Bedc And the abbot Boifil, By whom the chafte Cudberth In his youth was gratis inftruc-

ted. Who alfo well received thefe

inftru6tions. There reft with thefe Saints, In the inner part of the rainfter Relicks without number, Which perform many miracles,

As the Chronicles tell us. And (which) await with them the judgment of the Lord,

des keuschen Koeniges Haupt. — Oswald, der Aneeln Loewe, — und der Bischof Aidan, — Aedbert imd Aedfrid, — Die edlei) Gefaehrten. — Es ist darin mit ihnen — Der Bifchof Aethelwold. — Und der beruihmte Schriftsteller Bcda. — Und der Abt Boifil^ — Der den kcufclien Cuthberth — In der Jugend umsonst unterrichtete, — Wekher auch die l.ehre fehr g;ut annalim. — Es ruhen bey diefen Heiligen,— hi dcm Innern dcs Muinsters, — Unzaehlige Reliquien, — Wclche viclc Wunder ■\virken, — W^ie die Schrilteu I'agen — Und (welchc) mit ihaen das Gcricht des Herrn ervvarteu.

Of this period, we muft finally remark, that from the time of Alfkld, the old Anglo Saxon charadlers were gradually ex- changed for the French letters of the Alphabet. There is little doubt, that the nation had already made fuch progrefs in tafte, or intelleftual difcernment, as to become fenfible of the want of fymmetry in the Anglo-Saxon, when compared to the Roman charatlers ; and that they readily gave the pre- ference to the French letters, in which thofe of Rome were fomewhat more faithfully copied.

Ingulf *, as quoted by Spelman in the work above men- tioned,

* Abbot of Croyland. and autlior of the hiffory of that Abbey, was bom in London A. D. 1030— This excellent Chronicler treats from the foundation of that

Abbey,

XT

tHREE PHILOLOGICAL

tloncd, Gspreffes himfelf upon this adoption of foreign dsa- raclers, in the following lines : '* Manus Saxonica ab omni- *« bus Saxonibus et Merciis ufque ad tempofa Regis Aelfrcdl, •* qui per Gallicanos Doftores omnibus chirographis ufitata a •' tempore difti Domini Regis defuetudine viluerat (vilipen- ** derat) ; et manus Gallicana quia magis Icgibilis, et afpedui «* perdeledabilis praeceilebat, frequentius indies apud Anglos •^ omnes complacebat."

Yet this was the cafe only- in a verj gradual progreffion, correfpoading with the improvement and diftulion of tafte ; for long after Alfred's time, the Anglo-^axon chara^lers continued to be ufed, both in public and private writings.

III. NoRMANNic Saxon Period. (Normannic Anglo-Saxojt.^ -

This aera extends from the invafion of the Normans, under William the Conqueror, in the year 1066, to the beginning 6f the thirteenth century, beyond the reign of Henry II. "who died in 11 89 ; and confequently comprehends a feries of about one hundred and fifty years.

The {late of the Erglilli language,, during this period, can- Hot be better defcribed than in the words of the learned and 'p-^rfpicuous Warton, in his " Hijlory ofEngliJJj Poetry ^ from the cloje of the eleventh^ to the commencement of the eighteenth tintiiry ^'* pag. 1. &. feq.

" i he Norman Saxon dialefl formed a language extremely barbarous, irregular, and intraftable ; and confequently promifes no very ftriking fpeclmens in any fpecies of coropofition. Its fub- ft-»nce was the Danifh-Saxon adulterated with French. The Saxort indeed, a language fubfiiling on uniform principles, and polifli- cd by poets and theologifls, however corrupted by the Danes,

had

Jibbej, 664, to the year 109 1 ; he introduces much ot the general hiftory of the kiiigdom, with a variety of curious iinecdotes that are no whei-e cUe to be found.— Ingulf died of ihc gout^ at his Aljhey, A. D. 1109, in the 79th year of his age — — It is a matter of much regret, that men of his found judgment and good lenfe (in if ite of the fuperftitlous abfurdities which flain the annals of that age) did not tl;emielv€& commence writing and cultivating their native language ; inftead of «irudging in monafiic Latin. The certain progrefs of both language, and know- leJge, la the former cafe, is beyond every eakuiation^of the Moderns. W.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxl

had much perfptcuity, ftrength, and harmony * : but the Ffench, imported by the Conqueror and his people, was a confufed jargon of Teutonic, Gaulifli, and vitiated L^tin. In this fludluating ftate of our national fpeech, the French predominated. Even before the conquefl, the Sax'on language began to fall into contempt, and the French, or Frankifh, to be fubftitutcd in its (lead f : a circum- ftance, which at once facilitated and foretold the Norman accef- fion. In the year 652, it was the common praftice of the Anglo- Saxons, to fend their youth to the monafteries of France for edu- cation : and not only the language, but the manners of the French were eftcemed the moll polite accomplidiments. In the reign of Edward the Confeffor, the refort of Normans to the Englifli court was fo frequent, that the affedlation of imitating the Frafikifh cuf- toms became almoft univerfal : and even the lower clafs of people were ambitious of catching the Frankifh idiom %', It was no dif- ficult taflv. for the Norman lords to banifti that language, of which the natives began to be abfurdly afhamed. The new invaders corartianded the laws to be admlniftered in French J. Many char- ters of monafleries were forged in Latin by the Saxon monks, for the prefent fecurity of their poffeffions, in confequence of that a- verfion which the Normans profeffed to the Saxon tongue ||. Even

c chil-

* Becaufc the Danidi was intimately related to the Old Saxon ; hence the lan- guage, which had originated in a mixture of both, neceffarily preferved fomc identity (i e. fimilarity and uniformity of flrud:Ure.) A.

f Probably this was the cafe only among the higher ranks of foclcty ; for France, indeed, at this early period, was already confidered as the School of the Sciences, and the legillatrix of t ifte to the reft of Europe. A.

\ This flrange. bias feems, at prefent, to have fhifted its ground, and to afFcA principally the higher clafl'es of fociety ; — tlie highsjl, or ditStatorial, order itfelf I'inJiviJuallyJ not excepted. Thus our cars are puUicly annoyed with terms and phrafes, which even the Germans, of late years, ftigmatize with the appellation ot neio-franhijh. — The mai^re race of interpreters and tranflators, by profcfTion, alfo contribute their fhare in corrupting the Engliih language with new modelled words and idioms, the meaning of which they thcmfelves (not rarely) miftake and mifapply ; but to what clafs of fociety thefe individuals muft be referred, I (hall, in this place, not attempt to decide. And as I am not defirous of advancing ground- lefs affertions, or of extending them, if they be founded, to every refpeiftive indi- vidual, without exception ; I mull requeft the difpaflionate reader, to turn over a few Numbers of the Monthly, xSxo. Analytical, the Critical, the £>ig I ijh or ^ny other Rcvieiv, in which the lateft tranflations from the French, form the object of criticifni ; and his curiofity will be frequently, and amply, gratified.

W,

§ But there is a precept in Saxon from William the Firft, to the Sheriff of Sommerfctfhire. Hides. Thu. I. P. I. pag. 106. —See alfo PraJ'at. ibid. p. xv.

II The Normans, 'who pratfli fed every fpccious expedient to plunder the nionk«, demanded a light of the written evidences of their lands. The monks well knew, tUat it would huve been ufelefs or impolitic to have produced thcfe evidences, or

(hartcrij

-xxli THREE PHILOLOGICAL

children at fchool were forbidden to read in their native language, and inftiudted in a knowledge of the Norman only. In the mean time, we fliould have fome regard to the general and political ilate of the nation. The natives were fo univcrfally reduced to the loweft condition of negled and indigence, that the Englijh name became a term of reproach : and feveral generations elaplcd, before one-family of Saxon pedigree was. raiCed to any diftinguilhed ho- nours, or could fo much as attain the rank of baronage. Among other inftances of that abfolute and voluntary fubraiffion, with which our Saxon ancellors received a foreign yoke, it appears that they fufFered their hand-writing to fall into difcredit and disufe, which, by degrees became fo difficult and obfolete, that few befide the oldell men could underltand the chara6lers. In the year 1095, Wolstan, bifliop of Worcefter, was depofed by the arbitrary Normans: it was ohjeiied againil him, that he was " a fuperannuated Englijh idiot, who could not /peak French *. It is

true,

charters, in the original Saxon ; as the Normans not only did not underftand^ but ■Would h;ive received with contempt, inftruments written in that language. Tiiere- "fore the monks were compelled to the pious fraud of forging them iu Latin ; and great numbers of thefe forged Latin charters, till lately fuppofed original, are ftill extant. 6'ctr Spelman in Not. ad. Concil. Anglic p. 1^5 ; SriLLiNGFL. Orig. Ecclts. Britann. p. 1 4 Mar sham, Prafat. a J Dugd. And WhARTON Angl. Sacr. YoL 11. ^Ix'IonaJi. Pnefat p. ii. & feq — See alio Ingulfh, p. 513, — Launov and Mabil- LON have treated this fubjcffl with great learnhig and penetration.

■ * J[fatt. Paris. fub ann. — ^as quoted by Warton ; p. 4. When in our

days the converfation turns upon the comparative excellence of languages, I heg leave (o afe : '' are the modern nalers, tutors, or governeflcs (of and from France) aiituated by a tnore difcreet, by a Icl's haughty ipirit, than the Normans were Eight Hundred veaks ago ? — This queftion is eaiily anfwered. For, although it is fortunately not in their power to make us adopt //; a mafi their ncw-fuiigled tongue, by the fame means which have induced its and other na- tions to adopt inflruments, machines and expedients formerly unknown, or un- p.-aSiifed, in the art of war ; yet we are already invaded by luch numbers of a race (however dijhent in degree, ftill of the fame kind) as reniLrs the confequences of our exceflive indulgence every day more alarmir.g. I am led to this reflcclion, at a time, when I ice the legiflaiure itfelf fjriouily employed iu concerting mea- furv s, t:j (.bviaii: thefe imfieiiditig national evils — As a weli-wiiher, and inhabitant, of this country, I hope Providence will g^ide the councils of the nation, upon "a fubjcdc of the utmoll importance, 'f hofc who confider thefe fymptoms of an ap- proaching metamvrpL'Jis-ds. of little importance, plainly manifcft their unacquaintance with the Jiiftory of man and nations. They fecm to forget, that the Anglo- S^xons Jirjf came to Britain with no hoftile intentions ; that they were Invited, only to aiiift the o^JprClTed Britons in repelling their rapacious enemies ; and that revolutions, if excited and aided by foreign allies, were ahvays attended with con- fequences, equally eertain and fatal to the Natives ; however imperfedtly and

gradually they were introduced. To return, from this involuntary digreffion,

tp tl;e fubjeifi: of l.inguage, I {hall conclude this Note with a remark made by a ■veteran in tiie philofophy of grammar : ' 'i iiat the freiub, v\ ith all its eafe and " verfatiiity, is a imnoioi.ous language \ and that thole alone who underftand it, can " difcover the greati ^vantage the Englijh h^v/^ over that lanryuage by their ac, '\-cent, pbiticuurly in tl.c article cf vcrSficatlon." W.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxUI

true, that In fome of tlie monafteries, particnlarlj at Croyland and Tavillocke, founded by Saxon princes, there were regular pre- ceptors in the Saxon language : but this inftitution was fuffered to remain after the conqueft, as a matter only of intereft and ne- ceffity. The religious could not otherwife have underftood their oiiginal charters. William's fucceiTjr, Henry the Firll, gave an inftrument of confirmation to William, Archbifliop of Canterbury, which was written in the Saxon language and letters. Yet this is almoft a Cngle expmple. That monarch's motive was perhaps political : and he feems to have pradlifed this expedient with a view of obliging his queen, who was of Saxon lineage ; or with a defign of flattering his EngliQi fubjefts, and of fecuring his title, already ftreugthened by a Saxon match, in confequence of fo fpe- cious and popular an artifice."

" It was a common and ind-eed a very natural praflice, for the tranfcribers of Saxon books, to change the Saxon orthography for the Norman, and to fubilitute in the place of the original Saxon, Norman words and phrafes. A remarkable inftance of this liberty, which fometimes perplexes and mifleads the critics in Anglo-Saxon literature, appears in a voluminous colleftion of Saxon homilies, preferved in the Bodleian library, and written about the time of Henry the Second. It was with the Saxon charafters, as with the fignature of the crofs in public deeds j which were changed into the Norman mode of feals and fubj'criptions.'

* Among the manufcripts of Digby in the Bodleian library at Oxford, we find a religious or moral Ode, conlifling of one hun- dred and ninety-one ilanzas, which the learned Hickes places juft after the conqueft: but as it contains few Norman terms, I am inclined to think it of rather higher antiquity. The following ftanza is a fpecimen :

* Sende God biforen him mr^n

The while he may to hevene,

For betere is on elmeffe biforen

Thanne ben after fevene." That is, " Let a man fend his good woiks before him to heaven while he can j for one alms-giving before death is of more value than feven afterwards." The verfes perhaps might have been thus written as two ^alexandrines :

' Send God biforen him man the while he may to hevene. For betere is on elmeffe biforen, than ben after fevene.'

' Yet alternate rhyming, applied without regularity, and as rhymes accidentally prcfented thcmfelves, was not uncommon in our early poetry.'

Hickes and Warton have printed a fatirical poem on mo-

c 2 naftic

XXIV THREE PHILOLOGICAL

naftic life, in which the Saxon is remarkably adulterated by the Normannic, and which muft have been written foon after the incurfions of the Normans, or at leaft prior to the reign of flenry II. The poet begins this lingular performance, with defcribing the land of idolence or luxury :

Fur in fee, bi weft Spaynge,

Is a lend ihote Cokaygne :

Ther nis lond under hevenrlche (i).

Of wel of godnis hit iliche.

Thoy paradis bi miri (2) and biigt J

Cokaygn is of fairir light.

What is ther in paradis

But grafs, and flure, and grenerls ?

Thoy ther be joy, and gret dute(3),

Ther nis met, bot frute.

Ther nis halle, bure (4), no bench j

Bot watir manis thurfl to quench, &.c. * In the following lines,' fays Warton, * there is a vein of fatl- ilcal imagination and forae talent at defcription. The luxury of the monks is reprcfented under the idea of a monaftcry conftrufted of various kinds of delicious and coftly viands,'

Ther Is a wel fair abbei.

Of white monkes and of grei,

Ther beth boures and halles :

All of pafteus beth the walles,

Of rieis o£ fiffc, and a rich met,

The likefuUift that man mai et.

Fluren cakes beth the fchingles (5^ alle,

Of church, cloifter, hours ?nd halle.

The pinnes (6) beth fat podinges ,^

Rich met to princes and to kinges.— -•

Ther is a cloyfter fair and ligt,

Brod and lang of fembli figt.

The pilers of that cloifter alle

Beth iturned of criftale,

With harlas and capital

Of grene jafpe and red coral.

In the praer is a tree

Swithe likeful for to fe,

The rote is gingeur and galingale.

The

I The cdeftial empire, Sax. 2 Merry, chearful. «• Although Paradife is chearful and bright, Coiayne is a more beautiful place." 3 Pleafure. 4 Buttery ; or the roem where provifions arc laid up. 5 Shingles, ♦' The tiles, or COTcring oj the howJTe, aic of rich cakes." 6 The pinnacles.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxr

The fiouns betli al fed wale. Trie maces beth the flure, The rind canel of fwete odure : The frute gilofre of gode fraakke, Of.cucubes ther nis no lakke. — Ther beth iiii wiUis (^) in the abbei Of trade and halwey. Of baurae and eke pieraent, Ever emend (8) to rigt rent (9) j Of thai ftrerais al the inolde Stonis pretiufe (10) and golde, Ther is faphir, and uniune, Carbuncle and afliune, Smaragde, lugre, and praffiune, Beril, onyx, topofiune, Amethifte and crifolite, Calcedun and epetite (n). Ther beth birddes mani and fale Throftill, thruifle, and nigtingale, Chalandre, and wodwale, And othir briddes without tale. That ftinteth never bi her migt Miri to fing dai and nigt, ^

'[Nonnulla defunt.'] Yite I do yow mo to witte, The gees iroftid on the fpitte, Fleey to that abbai, god hit wot, '

And gredith (12), gees al bote al bote, &c,

* Our author then makes a pertinent tranfition to a convent of nuns J which he fuppofes to be very commodioufly fituated at no great diftance, and in the fame fortunate region of indolence, eafe »nd affluence.*

An other abbai is ther bi For foth a gret nunnerie ; Up a river of fwet milk Whar is plente grete of lilk. When the fummeris dai is bote, The yung nunnes takith a bote

And

7 Fountains. 8. Running. Sax. 9. Courfe. Sax. 10. The Arabian Philofophy imported into Europe, was full of the dodlrine of precious ftones. 11. Our old poets are never fo happy as when they can get into a catalogue of things or names, ^Warton.) 1%. Crieth, Callo'frane,

xxvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

And doth ham forth in that river Both with oris and with ftere : Whan hi beth fur from the abbei Hi makith him nakid for to plei. And leith dune in to the brimme And doth him fleilich for to fwirame : The yung monkes that hi feeth' Hi doth ham up and forth he fleeth, And comith to the nunnes anon, And euch monk him takith on, And fnellich (13) berith forth har prei To the mochill grei abbei ( 14), And techith the hunnes an oreifun With jamblcus (15) up and dun *.

• This poem was defignedto be fang at public feflivals : a prac- tice which was then very common j and concerning which it may be fufficient to remark at prefent, that a Jocularor, ox Bard ^ was an officer belonging to the court of William the Conqueror.'

* Another Norman-Saxon poem cittd by the fame induftrioBS antiquary (Hick.es), is entitled " The Life of St Margaret.'* The rtrufture of its verlification confiderably differs from that ia the laft mentioned piece, and is like the French Alexandrines, But I am of opinion, that a paufe, or divifion, was intended in the middle of every verfe j and in this refpefl. Its verfiflcation re- fembles alfo that of Albion's England, or Dravton's Polyalbion, ■which was a Ipecies very common about the reign of Queen E!i- fabeth. The rhymes are alfo continued to every fourth line. It appears to have been written about the time of the crufades. It begins thus :

Olde ant " yonge I priet b ou, our foltes for to lete, Thinketh on god thatyefou wite, our funnes to bete. Here I mai tellen ou, wit wordes faire and fwete. The vie '^ of one maiden was hoten '^ Margarete. Hire fader was a patriae, as ic ou tellen may, In Auntioge wif eches*' I in the falfe lay, Deve godes/ ant dombe, he fervid nit and day, So deden mony othere that fingeth welaway. Theodolius was is nome on Criils ne levede he noutt,

He

13. Qnick, quickly. Gallo-Franc. 14. To the great Abbey of Grey Monks. 15 Lafcivious motions. Gambols. Ft. Gambiller.

* HiCKES. TIjefaur. I. Part. I. p. 231. feq. * a And. b I direct. Fr. « I advife you, our, &c. e Life. Fr. d Called &a%on. eChofe a wife. Sax. "He was married in Antioch. / Deaf gods, &c.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxvii

"Be levede on tlie falfe godes, that weren with honden wroutt, Tho that child fculde criftine ben it com well in thoutt, Ebed wen J" it were ibore, to dethit were ibroutt, &c.

* In the fequel, Olibrios, lord of Antioch, who is called' a Sa- racen, falls in love with Margaret : but flie being a chriftian, and a candidate for canonization, rejefts his folicitations, and is thrown into prifon.* »

Meiden Margarete one nitt in prifon lay Ho com biforn Olibrius on that other dai. Meiden Margarete, lef up upon my lay. And Ihu that thou leveft on, thou do him al awey. Lef on me ant be my wife, ful wel the raai fpede. Auntioge and Afie fcaltou han to mede : Ciculauton l> and purpel pall fcaltou have to wede : With all the metes of my lond ful vel I fcal the fede*

* This piece was printed by Hickes, from a manufcript in Trinity-college library at Cambridge. It feems to belong to the manufcript metrical Lives of the Saints, which form a very con- fiderable volume, and A'ere probably tranflated or paraphrafed from Latin or French profe into Englifli rhyme, before the year 1200. We are fure that they were written after the year 1169, as they contain the Life of Saint Thomas of Becket. In the JBodleian library are three manufcript copies of thefe Lives of THE Saints, in each of which the life of St. Margaret occurs j but it is not always cxadtly the fame with this printed by Hickes. And on the whole, the Bodleian Lives feera inferior in point of antiquity*'

Towards the concluiion of this period, true poetry begins to flouriili in England as well as in Germany, fome features of which are already difcoverable in the preceding poems. Yet, withall, the Danifli-Saxon, and probably alfo the Britifh- Saxon bards can claim little more merit than that of making rhymes, and frequently only of writing abrupt fentences in profe. To prove this, I fliall only quote (the two firll flanzas of) a Normannic-Saxon Ballad *, which is full of alliteration, and has a burthen or chorus :

Blow

g In bed. fj Cheddaton. See Obf. Fair. Q_1. 194. (Warton.) * Warton obferves in his " Hiftory of Englilh Poetry," that this is the ^arliejl EngViJh loiis-fong, he could diicover ; that it is among the Harlelan manu- fcripts in the Britilh Mufeum ; and that he \voul3 place it before, or aboutj the y£ar laoo.

xxx'm THREE PHILOLOGICAL

Blow northerne wynd, fent

Thou me my fuetynge ; blow

Northerne wynd, blou, blou, blou.

Ich ot a burde in boure bryht

That fully femly rs on fyht,

Menfkful maiden of myht,

Feire ant fre to fonde.

In all this wurhliche won,

A bnrde of blod and of bon,

Never a zete y nufte l> non,

Luffomore in Londe. B/oiv, &c.

With lokkes c lefliche and longe.

With front ant face fair to fonde ;

With murthes monie mote heo monge

That brid fo breme in boure j

With loffum eie grete and gode,

Weth browen blifstoll undirhode,

He that reft him on the rode

Ihat leflych ]yf honoure. Blond &c. &c. In a truly paftoral vein, a lover * thus addreffes his miftrcfs, ■whom he fuppofes to be the moll beautiful girl, *' Bituenc Lyncolne and Ljndefeye, Northampton and Lounde f."

When the nytenhale finges the wodes waxen grene, Lef, gras, and blofme, fpringes in Avril y wene. And love is to myn harte gon with one fpere fo kene Nyht and day ray blod hit drynkes myn hart deth me tene.

* The following verfes have nearly the fame meafur«, and are not unpleafing to the ear :'

My deth y love, my lyf ich hate for a levcdy lliene, Heo is brith fo daies liht, that is on me wel fene. Al y falewe fo doth the lef in fomir when hit is grene, Zef mi thoht helpeth me noht to whom sdial I mene ? Ich have loved at this yere that y may love na more, Ich have fiked moni fyh, lemon, for thin ore,

. ray love never the ner and thatme rcweth fore j Suete lemon, thenck on me ich have loved thefore, Suete lemon, I prcye the, of love one fpeche. While y ly ve in worlde fo wyde other nill I feche, J.

If

a Yet. b. Knevir not. c Lively, d Sic.

* Probably of the reign of King John.

f Loiidon. J Mas. HarL 225;^. fol. Membran. f. 73. b. — The pieces cited from this manufcript, appear to be oi the hand writing of the reign oi Euw«ii thcfiril, (Warton.)

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxii

If we attempt to trace the progrefs of a language, we fliall always find it connefted with the intelledlual improvement of a people ; for language, in every inftanCe, is the firft objeft, in which national cultivation becomes mauifeft. To deter- mine this, requires the moil accurate knowledge of the gra- dual advances made by a people in manners, arts, and fciences, together with a very intimate acquaintance with the more ancient modes of fpeaking and writing, as well as with the changes produced in them, by thefe refpeftive improvements. In this progrefs, every nation keeps its peculiar path ; a path marked by the colledive number of internal and external cir- cumilances, the particular knowledge of which is indifpenfible to a philological inquirer.

In Germany, the old unpoliflied language of the country was improved through its own refources ; hence the progrefs towards its refinement was necelTarily flow. In France, the language of the natives was formed by a mixture with that of the Romans, yet in fuch a manner, as made the latter pre- vail in that mixture ; hence its improvement was uncommon- ' ly rapid, becaufe the Roman was already a polifhed language. In England, the native language received improvements by a mixture with the French ; yet the former ftill remained the prevailing language : thus it made more rapid progrefs to- wards its refinement than that of the German, but flower

than that of the French Yet we poiVefs no hillory of any

language executed, nor even attempted, in this progrej/ive manner. And as the natives of Britain have hitherto ne-- gle6led to trace the gradual improvements of their language, it can with lefs juft;ice be expeftcd, that / fhould enquire into the path, which they followed. Nor will it be reqirired of ;«£>, to point out minutely the various changes that have taken place in the EngliJh language, and to liate the caufes, or the origin, of thofe changes.

IV. French-Saxon ; or English Period.

This is not only the longefl;, but alfo the mod remarkable period in the literary hillory of England : it begins with the thirteenth Century, and eitends to the prefent time. — The Danifli-Saxon language, in the preceding period, being cor- rupted by the Normannic, now begins to unite with the more

d modern

XXX THREE PHILOLOGICAL

modern French ; to adopt llkewife, in confequence of this pre- cedent, many words from the Litin, and to form bj the affif- tance of botla the prefent EnglilL language.

The Normannic- Saxon language was fufFered to fall into disufe and contempt, during the era, of which we have lafl treated ; the pure Normannic now became the fafhionable language of the court, and of poliflied fociety. This happen- ed with the greater "facility, as the Norman barons and lords ruled over England, and oppreiTed its ancient inhabitants, with unlimited fway. But as foou as the power of the barons, during the thirteenth century, be^an to decline ; as foon as the commofis, or the order of the citizens, acquired more autho- rity and influence ; in fine, as foon as England, with gradual fteps, approached to its prefent conlHtution ; — the popular language,^ hitherto defpifed, reclaimed its due rank ; it was a- gain introduced into the higher circles, and thus its cultiva- tion was the more eafily and the more effeftually accomplifh- ed. Still, however, the vernacular dialefl had been almolt fupprefl'ed, among the higher clafles of the nation, by the language of the haughty Normans ; a circumitance which fuf- ficiently accounts for its ftrange mixture with the French. And as in procefs of time, French manners and improve- ments found a more general reception in Britain, this mixture daily inereai'ed, not only through the reception of new words, but alfo in the terminations of old primitive words; and in the various modes of exhibiting and combining them in phrafes. In this manner, indeed, the ground-work of the language pre- fervcd its Saxon origin ; but its progrefs, its cultivation, its augmentation, and fubfequent refinement, were carried on upon the pf inciple of the French.

Confiilent with the limits of this Eflay, I cannot enlarge upbn the particular phenomena conne6led with thefe multiplied changes ; I mull, therefore, content myfelf with producing a few fpecimens felected from the befl: writers in every century, during *this long and productive period.

* *

*

In order to fill up a cbafm which both, Johnson and Adelung,

have left in this part of the hlftory of the Englffh language, by not

• entering into the refpeifUve merits of the different writers, during

the middle ages, to whom we Hand fo juttly indebted j — I have here

fele6led a number of paiTages relating to this fubjcd, frcm a work

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxxl

much efteemed at liome, and ftill more abroad, among the lo- vers of Britifli literature. This work, on account of its high— though comparatively fmail — price, is not in the hands of many readers j as it already extends to a confiderable number of vo- lumes,, fince its beginning in 1780. It is the New Annual Re- gister,, to which I allude, and from which I have carefully ex- tradted (and exemplified with a great variety of fpecimens) thofe valuable and truly philological remarks, which the reader will find ftated, at grejiter length, in X.\\t fifth, Jtxlh, and following Vo- lumes of this work, under the head of " yl concife hijlory of the flate of knowledge, literature end tafe in Great Britain.'''' — It there- fore only remains to add, X.\\^t X.\iQ principal part of this hijlory is partly abflraded from the learned difquifitions, partly founded upon the hiftorical fa61s, which we find very perfpicuoufly, though fomewhat tedioufly, ftated in " Wartoh's Hi/lory of Englijh P02- Xry^'' three Volumes, Quarto, London, 1770. & feq.

Having recounted the particular caufes, to which the great- eft alteration and improvement of religious knowledge in England was owing, from the acceffion of Edward I. to the acceffion of Henry IV. ; and having juftly obferved that John WiCKLiFF * iiril opened the underftandings of the regular clergy ; — the philofophic annalift thus • proceeds in illuflrating the fubfsquent eiFefts of thefe changes, with refpedl to the Hate of language and literature in Britain.

, Dlvijiyn Flrji ; from 1272, to 13997.' From Edward I. to Henry IV.

* The literary revolution, v/nich took place in the reigns of Edward III. and Richard II. with no fmall degree of fplendour, was the appearance of poetry in our own tongue. To this period was referved the honour of engaging the Mvfes to fpeak in Englijhy with fuch dignity as to call for general attention and admiration. We mull not, however, imagine that before this time no attempts a-t veriification were made in our native language. The poetical produftions of the age, if

d 2 V fuch

* This acute Divine oppofed the Pope's' fupremacy in 1377, and was forty years after, bifrnt for being a heretic,

t All pjTi'iiges cnclofed within fmgle commas, belong to the Neiv Annual -5,'-

xxxil THREE PHILOLOGICAL

fiich thej may be called, were numerous, and our old libraries abound in them.^ Previoufly to the cera, concierning which we are treating, the Lives of the Saints were written in verfe, and many parts of the Bible were tranflated in the fame manner.'

* A love-fong and fome compofitions of a mifccllaneoas na- ture occur in the reign of King John *. Our early poetical efFufions appeared likewife, not unfrequently, in the form of fatire ; and when this was clothed in allegory, it was fome- times conduced with fuccefs. The objecls, on which it was exerted, were generally the lawyers and the clergy. But the principal efforts of our yet untutored Mufes, were rhyming- chronicles and metrical rouiances.'

Warton, in the fitfl: Volume, p. 43, of his Hiftory, enter- tains us with a ballad, or a fatirical poem, compofed by a bard devoted to th,>- court of Simon of Montfort, Earl of Lei- ceiler, a powerful Baron. It appeared foon after the famous battle' of 1264, which had a very unhappy iflue for the king, and which is defcribed as follows :

I.

Slttelh allc ftille, ant herkenetK to mi : The kynge of Alemai^ne, be mi leaute {^Loyally'). Thritli thoufent pound askede he For to make the pees (peace) in the countre And fo fo he dude more.

Kichard, thah ( though) thou be ever tricchard {treacherous) Triiflhen ihall thou never more.

2. Richard of Alemaigne, whil that he was kying, He fpendc all his trefour opon fwjvyng, Haveth he ncut of Walingford oferlyng (fiipertor) Let hira hab'>e, ase he brew, bale {poifon) to dryng, Maugre Wyndesore, Richard thah thou, 6cc.

3- ' The kyng of Alemaigne wende do ful wel He faifede de mulneifor a cailel,

With

* A monarch of a vinditSive and ufurping temper^ ■whom the Englifli Baron* compelled to confirm the M-'gna Cbarta, in ixij ; — he died at Newark, Ojftob«r 8, xii6,

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxslii

With hare fharpe fwerdes he grounde the flel, He wende that the fayles were mangonel

To help Wyndesore.

Richard thah thou, &c. &c. Sec.

* In the reign of Edward I. *, the character of onr poe- tical compofitions was confiderablj changed. The minilrels either fubliituted fidlitious adventures for hiftorical traditio- nary fadts, or realitj was difguifed by the reprefentations of invention ; and a tafte for ornamental exprclnon gradually prevailed over the rude fimplicity of the native Englifh phra- feology. This change was occafioned, among other caufes, by the introduftioa and increafe of the tales of chivalry. It was in the reign of Edward II. f, when the metrical ro- mances chiefly flourifhed ; and though the poetry of them was, in general, very rude, imperfeft, and feeble, they oc- cafionall 7 exhibited gleams of imagination. One of them, en- titled * Ky.'ig of 'Tarsy has a warmth of defcription in certain paffages, that is not unlike the manner of Chaucer. From ihe produiiions of which we now fpeak, this great poet and. his cotemporaries undoubtedly derived fome advantage ; but it was their acquaintance with Italian literature which ftill more enabled them to produce a literary revolution in their own country. Surprifing effe6ls had been wrought in Italy , by the genius and the writings of Dante (i)andPETRARCii(2). Our Englijh poets were not equally happy in their endeavours to enlighten the underftanding, and to rehne the tafle of the nation. They had greater difficulties to contend with, and were far more unfavourably fituated for obtaining a conqueft over them. Their llyle was rough, and the iiarmony of their poetical numbers was very defective. Neverthelefs we are much indebted to them for affiduoufly applying to the Itudy of their native language, and for contributing, in a confiderable degree, to its enrichment and cultivation. The change ef-

feded

* Bom, June 16,1139; fucceeded to the Crown, November 16, nyz; re- duced Scotland 1299, died July 7, 1307; was buried at Weftminfter, where en May 2. 1774, fome antiquaries examined his tomb, when they fouul his corps unconfumed, though buried 466 years.

f This unfortunate Monarch was born in 1284; wa» the first Prince of IVaLs afcended the throne, 1307 ; was dethroned and murdered in 1327.

(i) Born, 1265; died, 1321. -(2) Fkancis Petrarch, born at .i/vis .,

J 304, died, 1347.

xxxiv THREE PHILOLOGICAL

fe£led by them Is, upon the whole, an important event in the literary hillory of this country.'

* When we look into the accounts of the Britijh writers, which have been given us by Leland (3) and other bio- graphers, and obferve the number of perfons whom thefe biographers have refcued from oblivion, together with the praifes they have beftowed upon them, as excelling in almofl every branch of knowledge, and only defeftive with refpecl to the elegance of their ftyle, we are ready to believe, that the times preceding the Reformation were much more learned than has ufually been imagined. Should v/e allow full -credit to the encomiums, which our hiftorians have fo libeii 7 poured on a number of men whofe works are now either totally loft, or t-otally neglefled, we might hence fee that li- terature is of no avail (or is not duly valued) without tafte ; and that, if fcience be communicated in barbarous language, it will be treated with difregard and contempt by a polite aad cultivated age. But the grcateft part of our ancient monadic authors, notwithllanding the pompous eulogiums we read concerning them, were as defpicable for the matter, as for the exprelTion of their performances. In every view, therefore, they were juftly configned to dull and worms ; and though we pollefs fomething of an antiquarian fpirit, we are not endued with fuch a portion of it, as to be" extremely fpnd of things which are recommended by nothing but their antiquity. Se- veral perfons, however, may deferve a place in a hiftory of the progrefs of knowledge, whofe compofitions are no longer valuable ; and, as learning cannot be purfued, even in the moft difadvantageotis manner, or in the moft unfavourable circumftances, without producing good effefts in certain in- ftanccs, a diligent enquirer will always find fome few names that are worthy of being mentioned with particular cfteem. Where this is the cafe, there is a pleafure in paying the tri- bute due to departed merit ; it is doing honour to our coun- try, to let none be forgotten v.^ho have a lawful title to re- membrance and applaufe.'

* Though general light feemed rather to increafe during the period, of which we are treating ; yet, excepting two or three illuilrious men who appeared towards the conclufion of it,

this

^ John I.f.lakd, a celebrated antiquary, died 155Z ; aged 45 :Vid, his work^ Eor further informatiou.

£SSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxxy

this sera did not produce a fet of writers equal in abilities and 'Charafter to thofe who flourifhed in the preceding.'

'Philological and Polite Literature, till it was revived at the clofe of this sera, was in as low. a Hate as Natural Philo- fophj Though we have feen that fo much poetry was pro- duced in the beginning of the period before us, it is remarka- ble that the names of its writers are, for the moll part, buried in oblivion. We know not to whom we owe far the greater number of metrical romances, and other compofitions which the age afforded. It is probable that they were the produc- duftions jof monks who lived and died, unknown, in their convents. The firft poet whofe name occurs, is Robert of Gloucest^.r, who flourilhed about the year 1280. He was a monk of the abbey of Gloucclter, and compofed a poem of confiderable length, which is a Hiftory of England, in verfe, from Brutus to his own time. At the clofe of Edward the Firll's reign, we meet with another poet named Robert Manning, but more commonly, Robert de Brunne *, who appeals neverthelefs only as atranilator. The work tranflated^or rather paraphrafed by him, was originally written by Robert GRoST£sT,and was entitled Manual de Peche, or the Manual of Sins. Among the authors of metrical romances in the I time

* Becaufe he refided in the monaftery of Brunne, or Bourne, in Lincohijhire inhabited by the monks of the order of St Gilbert- He tranflated many pieces, from the French and Latin, into Eng- lifh verfe J among which " Ihe cajlle of love,\>y bifhop Grosse- Teste," is not the leaft remarkable. It begins with the follow- ing pious lines :

That good thinketh good may do, And God will help him thar to : ■ ,

Ffor nas never good work wrought With oute biginningc of good thougt. Ne never was wrougt non vuel (well, good) thynj. That vuel thouat nas the beginnyng. God ffuder, and fone and holigofte 'J'hat alle thing on corthe fixt and woft That one God art and thrilhhod (trinity) And threo perfones in one hod, Withouten end and biginninge, To whom we ougten over alle thinge, Worshepe him with trewe love, 'J hat kinc worthe king art us above, &c. &c.

xxxvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

time of ^■dward II. Adam Davie (i)is the onlj peifon whofe name has defcended to pofterity. Robert Baston, (2) a poet who attended this monarch in his expedition to Scotland, wrote chiefly in Latin. It was not till the rergn of Edward III. (3) that the geniuffes fpraag up, who produced that poetic revo- lution already mentioned, and which reflect s fo much honour oa themfelves and on their country. Richard Hampoi.e, a

doclor

(i) Of this charafterno accounts appear to be extant refpefting his merits as a b^rd, nor of the time when he flouriflied : at lead I have not been able to dlfcover any in Dr. Kippis' Eiographia Bri- tannica, in the Encyclopedia Britannica, laft edition, and feyeral other works I have purpofely, though vainly, conrulted. — The fame will apply to other authors mentioned in this Ili/Iory, whofc names are not accompanied with any biographical notes.

W.

(2) The greater part of his poems are written in Za//«, of which that " jDf Hacerdotum Luxuriis'''' is not the leafl: curious. — In Eng- lifh he wrote " yi Book of Foems^'' and " A Volume of Tragedies and Comedies. '''' — Being poet laureat and public Orator at Oxford, he accompanied Edward I. in his expedition into Scotland in 1304, to celebrate his vi£lories over the Scots : but Robert Baf- ton unluckily fell into the enemy's liands, and was obliged by tor- ture to change his note and fing the fuccefles of Robert Bruce, who then claimed the crown of Scotland. This talk he reluflant- ly complied with, as he intimates in the two firft lines :

*' In dreery verfe my rhymes I make Bewailing whilft fuch theme I take," &c. Our author's poetry was exprefled in fomewhat barbarous flyle, but not contemptible for the age in which he lived. He died about 1310. Kippis.

(3) Born at Windfor, i^ii ; proclaimed king and crowned at Weftminilcr 1327 ; died in 1377.— ^Hc was undoubtedly one of the greateft princes that ever fwayed the fceptre in England ; whether we refpe<S him as a warrior or lawgiver, a monarch, or a man. He poflefTed the courap'e and romantic fpirit of Alexander ; the penetration, the fortitude, the polifhed manners, of Julius; the munificence, the liberality, the wifdom of Auguftus C.-efar. He was tall, majeftic, of an ele- gant figure, with a piercing eye, and aquiline vifage. He excelled all his cotem- poraries in feats of arms and peifonal addrefs. He was courteous, afFable and eloquent; a conftitutional knight-errant; and his example diffufed the ipirit of chivalry through the whole nation. In imitation of the youthful monarch who delighted in tilts and tournaments, every individual betook himfelf to the exercise cf uniis ; cverj- breaft glowed with emulation, every hcr.rt panted with the thirll

of

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxx.n

doclor in divinity, of the order of St Auguiline, muft not be reckoned in the number of thefe geniuffes. Robert Long - LANDE, who flouriflied about the year 1350, and who was the author of the poem called " The Vifion of Pierce PlowTvariy^ merits a far fuperior diflindlion. This poem contains a feries of diftinft vifions, i^n which the vices of almoft every profcf- fion, particularly of the clergy, and the abfurdities of fupcr- ftition, are ridiculed with much humour and fpirit. The fa- tire is accompanied with a ftrong vein of allegorical invention. The great defeat of Longlande lies in his language. He has adopted the flyle of the Anglo-Saxon poets, and imitated them in their alliterative verfification ; in coufequence of which he is remarkably uncouth, and fometimes obfcure. It is to be lamented, that fo much genius and abilities Ihould be hidden by fa unpleafant and ungracious a mode of compolition. Bad as the model fet by Longlande was, he had a number of imi- tators-'

Longiaad was a cotemporary of Mandeville, and his Vifion before mentioned is one of the beft poems that appeared during this jera. Under the fiftitious idea of vifions, or apparitions, he lafhes m a fatirical ftrain, the vices, of all ranks, and parti- cularly thofe arifing from the abfurdities of fuperftition and the corrupted manners of the clergy. — Inflead of the long paf- ages quoted by Warton, a ihorter one will fuffice here, in which Nature (Kynde) at the command of Confcience and its companions, Age and Death, fends her difeafes from the pla- nets.

Kynde Confcience then heard, and came out of the planetts, And feat forth his farriours Fevers, and Fluxe?,

e Coughes-

of glory ; and when he took the field, there was not a foldier in his army, who did not ferve from fentiment and fight 'for reputation. The love of glory was certain- ly the predominant pa'Jion of.Edward, to the gratification, of which .''e did not fcruple to facrifice the feelings of humanity, the lives of his fuhjeLts, and the in- tcrcft of his country ; and nothing could have induced or enabled his people tq bear the load of taxps, with which they were encumbered in diis reign, but the Jove and admiration of- his pcribn, the fame of his vidlofics, and the excellent laws and regulations which the parliament enaded with his advice and concurrence ; and finally, the firft difUnaion \v;;3 made between lords and commons in 134a, by which the foundation was laid for the prcfent Enghlh conftltution ; a fabric that is believed to be capable of repairing and occafionally reproducing its worm-eaten pil- lars, liowcvsr injuri;d and pr:yed iipon by the tooth of tune.

W ai.d Barclay.

xxxviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

Coughes, and Caidiacles, Crampes and Toth aches,

Reumes and Kadgondes, andraynous Scalles,

Byles and Botches, and burnynge Agues

Frenefes, and foule Evjll, foragers o£ Kynde.

Ther was " Harowe ! and Helpe ! here cometh Kynde !

*' With Death that is dreadful, to unde us all !"

The lord that lyveth after lull tho aloud cried

Age the hoore, he was in the vaw-ward,

And bare the banner before Death : by ryght he is claimed.

Kynde came after, with many kene forts,

As Packes and Peftilences, and much people fl\ent.

So kynde through corruptions kylled full many : '

Death came dryvyng after and all to dufc paflied

Kyngs and Kayfers, knightes and popes.

Many a lovely lady, and lemman of knyghtes,

Swoned and fwelted for forowe and Death's dyntes.

Confcience, of his courtefye to Kynde he befoght

To ceafe and fufire, of fe where they wolde,

Leave pride prively, and be perfite chriilen,

And Kynde ceafed tho, to fee the people amende. ,

At length Good Fortune and Pride difpatch a nuiperous hofl: of enemies led on hy Defire, to make an attack upon Confcience.

And gadered a great hoft, all agayne Confcience :

This Lechery led on, with a laughyng chere.

And with a privye fpeeche, and pnynted wordes,

And armed him in idlenefs and in high bearyng.

He bare a bowe in his hand, and many bloudy arrowes.

Were fethered with faire behcft, and many a falfe truth.

Upon this Confcience is bcfieged bj y^ntichrijl who is aided by the feven great giants (the feven mortal fins), in which ex- pedition Idlenefs forms the order of the attack with an army confifting of upwards of a thoufand well-fed prelates, &c.

* There was a Scotti(h poet in the prefent period, who is entitled to diflinguilhed praifes. The perfon we have in view is John Barbour, (4) Arch-deacon of Aberdeen. His poem

called

(4). Very littie is known of this illuftrious character, one of the earlieft Caledonian bards, except that he feems to have been born about 1326 J that he was Archdeacon of Aberdeen in 1357, in which y«ar he travelled to Oxford, and was appointed by the Bi(hop of Aberdeen, one of the commiflioners for the ranfom of David \\. king of Scotland j and that in 1365 he accompanied

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxxix

called " ^ie Hijlory of Robert Bruce, King of the Scots, allowance being made for the time in which it was written, is eminent for the beauty of its ftyle. Another bard of the fame country wrote a poem on the exploits of Sir. William Wal- lace, which abounds with fine paiTages. Both thefe writers rofe to a flrain of verfification, expreflion, and poetical imagery, greatly fuperior to the age and country in which they lived.*

e a We

fix knights to St Denis "near Paris. In the year 1375, as he him- felf informs us, he wrote h poem of confiderable length, which was firft publiihed, in the original Scottifli verfe, from a MS. dated 1489, with Notes and a Gjoffary j by Mr Pinkerton, in three Vo- lumes i2mo. London, 1790 j .entitled, The Bruce', or the Hiftory of Robfert I. King of Scotland. — Mr P. the prefent editor fays that " taking the total merits of this work together, he prefers it to the early exertions of even the ItaHan mufe, to the melancholy fublimity of Dante, and the amorous quaintnefs of Petrarca. The reader will here find few of the graces of fine poetry, little of the attic drefs of the mufe: but here are life, fpirit, eafe, plain fenfe, piftures of real manners, perpetual incident, and entertainment. The language is remarkably good for the time j and far fuperior, in neatnefs and elegance, even to that of Gawin Douglas, who wrote more than a century after. But when we confider that ouc author is not only the firft poet but the earlieft hiftorian of Scot- land, who has entered into any detail, and from whom any view of the real ftate and manners of the country can be had ; and that the hero, whofe life he paints fo minutely, was a monarch equal to the grentell of modern times ; let the hiftorical and poetical me- rits of his work be weighed together ; and then oppofed to any other early poet of the prefent nations in Europe."

" It is indeed pofterior in time to the earlieft poetry of the moft modern nations ; but it muft be confidered that Scotland hardly had one writer ir\ the thirteenth century, !and this poem was written in the fourteenth."

The following (hort fpecimen of the poem will fufficieritly prove thefe affertions, and we have only to attend to the obfcrvation which the editor has prefixed to his Gloffary y viz. " The chief obftacle in perufing this work arifes from the orthography, which is extremely irregular. To underftand many words, it is only ne- ceffary to pronounce them aloud ; and the meaning which is ob- fcured by the fpelling, will be evident from the found."

A I fredome is a nobill thing ! Eredome mayfe man to haiff liking J (i) *

Fredome

(l) Males man to have joy '

xl THREE PHILOLOGICAL

We are now arrived to Gii;oFFREY Chaucer,(5) who claims the higheft place of diflindlion, on account of his pre-eminent merit, and the more extenfive influence of his example. Into the particulars of his life, which are raiinxtelj difcufl'cd in the

Biographia

Fredome all folace to-man giffis : '

He levys at efe, that frely levys !

A noble hart may baiff nane efe,

Na ellys nocbt that may blra plefe, (2)

Gyfffredome failyhe : for fre liking (3) ^

Is yharnyt our all otbir thing (4)

Na he, that ay h;)fe levyt fie,

May nocht knaw weill the piopyrte,

The angyr, na the wrecbyt dome, (5)

That is cowplyt to foule thyildome.

But gyfF he had aflfayit it,

Than all perquer he fuld it wyt j (6)

And fuld think fredome mar to pryfe,

Than all the gold in varid that is. As a fpecimen of Barbour's rural poetry, the followirifr few lines ^v\U confirm Mr Andrews's opinion, when he fays in his Hi/lory of Great Brilairty conneBed with the Chronology of Europe ; %Lc. ^tOy Londo'i '794» " That Barbour wrote the life arid exploits of Robert Bruce in good rhyme ; and in a ftyle more like our mo- dern Englifti, than the language of Chaucer."

This was in midil of month of May, When birdis fing on ilka fpray, Melland (7) their notes, with feemly foun, For foftnefs of the fweet fcafoyn.' And leavis of the brarichis fp^eeds.

And bloomis bright, befide them, breeds, ,

And fieldis ftra~wed are with flow'rs Well favoring of feir (8) colours.

(^) Geoffrey Chaucer, juftly confidercd as the father of our Tnglifh poets, and the firlt great improver and reformer of our Unguage, was born in the fecond year of Edward III. A. D. 1328. He ftudied firft at Cambridge where he compofc-d his poem called '• l^he Court of Love,'''' in the i8th yearof his age, which carries in it very pregnant proofs of fluU and learning as well as ^ quick-

nefs 1 ' (j) Na ellys nocl'.t ; nor any tbinrr clfc. (.5) fre liking ; y;-^.- ro'ill. (4) yharnyt our J dftt id above, (jj angyr; qucre, c«jjj,i. c. a.-r^iiijhl (6^ pcic^'.icr; reific}- ly. wyt ; i,iiiif. -

(')'5.Icll2ad; ni'mgUng. (8) fcif ; tbilr

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. x\i

Biographia, we fhall not enter. It may be fufficient to faj, that he was converfant with the -court, and engaged in public affairs ; that he was clofely connefted with John of Gaunt, and

majrried

nefs of wit, and great ftrength of genius. He compleated his ftudies in the Univerfity of Oxford, or as fome fay, at Canterbury- College. — Leland informs us, that he was a ready logician, a fmooth rhetorician, a pleafant poet, a grave philofopher, an inge- nious mathematician, and a holy divine. He afteirwards applied himfelf to the ftudy of Law-, In the Middle-Temple j and was made King's page, about the age of thirty, an office then very honourable, as the Englhli court was the molt fplendid in Europe. He married Philippa Rouet, a favourite of the Duke and Duchefs of Gaunt, about the year 1360 -^ was fent by King Edward, as his agent to Genoa, to hire (liips for the King's Navy j and having accompliflied the objeft of this miflion to the fatisfadlion of his mafter, the King granted him, in the 48th year of his reign, a pitcher of wine daily in the port of London, to be delivered by the Butler of England, and very foon after he was made Comptroller of the cuftoms in the port of Loudon. Yet it is doubtful, how long he remained In this lucrative office ; for in the fecond year of King Richard his affairs were in fuch confufion that he was obliged to have recourfe to the King's protedion, in order to fcreen hira from his creditors. — By ^attaching himfelf to Wickllff, ana his followers, he w'as Involved In great calamities, and became equally fufpeded by the King, and dllliked by the people. — In 1382, he was obliged to fly from London Into Hainault, France, and Zeeland, in which banllhment he almoft periflied by the bar- barous Ingratitude of his former friends in England, who inftead of fending him any fupplles, rather hindered every attempt made by others to relieve ^hlm. When almoft perlflilng from want, he privately came over to England, where he was difcovered, feized, thrown Into prifon, and upon difclofing all he knewof the king's enemies, he at laft obtained )ils pardon. Yet he did hot take any meafures to revenge himfelf agalnll his treacherous lilends by the confeffions extorted from him j though with regard to himfelf they brought uppn him an Inexpreffible load of calumnies and flan- ders. — The penfibn of 20 marks per annum, together with the daily pitcher of wine granted him by King -Edward, and forfeited by his dereliftion of the court party, .were confirmed to him in the reign of King Henry, from whom he obtained a licence on the i ith of May 1389 to difpofe ot them to one Scalby. In this unexpeft- ed and terrible reverfe of fortune, he very wifely refolved to quit

that

3dii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

9

married the lifter of the famous Catherine Swynford ; that he was involved in the misfortunes of his friend and mafter ; that he was obliged to flee into Holland, when the Duke was difgrac-

ed ;

xthat bufy fcene of life, in which he had met with fo many troubles, and to feek a more lailing happinefs in retirement. He therefore chofe Woodftock for his retreat j a place which had been the fvveet fcene of fo much fatisfaftion to him in the days of his prof- perity ; and here he employed part of his time in revifing and correcting his writings, totally fecluded from the world, and tafting only thofe calm and folid pleafures which are the refult of a wife man's reflexions on the viciflitudes of human life. He re- iided here in a fquare flone houfe near the park gate, which fllU retains his name •, and it well deferves this honourable token, for, being confecrated in his poems, the whole country round about is become, to Englifliraen, a kind of Claflic ground. The fliort time he lived after the acceflion of Edward IV, was chiefly employed in regulating his private afi^ai,rs which had fuffered by the public dif- orders : for all the public a61:s of the depofed King Richard, in the 2Tft year of his reign, being declared void, Chaucer was forced to quit his retirement, to come up to town to folicithis caufes, and beginning now to bend under the weight of years, this unlucky ac- ceflion of bufinefs, which obliged him to alter his ufual way of living, might very poflibly haften his end, the near approach of which he bore with Roman conftancy, or rather with chriftian pa- tience. For there is ftill extant a kind of Ode that he is faid to have compofed in his laft agonies, which very plainly proves, that his fenfcs were perfeclly found, and the faculties of his mind not in the leaft impaired. He died Oftober 25th 1400, in the full polTeflion of that high reputation which his writings had deferved- ]y acquired, and was buried in Weftminfler Abbey in the great fouth crofs-ifle. — The fonnet or ode above alluded to confifts of three ftanzas only, and as well for the beauty of the piece, as fof the extraordinary occaflon on which it was written, Dr Kippis has dcfervtdly given it a place in his Biograpbia Bruannica,

Gode confaile of Chaucer : - Attempted in modern ErigliJJj. The Po&ts last Advice.

Fly from the croud, and be to virtue true. Content with what thou hafl, tho' it be fmall.

To

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xliii

ed; and that he afterwards returned into England, upon the re- ftoration of his patron to power and favour — His literary cha- racter was trulj illuftrious ; it has been lately, and with great

ability

To hoard brings hate ; nor lofty thoughts purfue, He who climbs high endangers many a fall.

Envy's a (hade that ever waits on fame, And oft the fun that rlfes it will hidej

Trace not in life a vaft cxpenfive fcheme Eut be thy wifhes to thy flate ally'd.

Be mild to others, to thyfelf fevere j

So truth fhall fliield thee, or from hurt or fear.

II. ^

Think not of bending all things to thy will,

Nor vainly hope that fortune Ihall befriend j Inconftant flie, but be thou conflant ftill,

Whate'er betide unto an honeft end. Yet needlefs dangers never madly brave.

Kick not thy naked foot againll: a nailj Or from experience the folution crave,

If wall and pitcher drive, which ftiall prevail; Be in thy caufe, as in thy neighbour's clear. So truth ihall (liield thee, or from hurt or fear.

III.

Whatever happens, happy in thy mind

Be thou, nor at thy lot in life repine. He 'fcapes all ill, whofe bofom is rcfign'd.

Nor way, nor weather will be always fine. Bcfide, thy home's not here, a journey this, A pilgrim thou, then hie thee on thy way. Look up to God, intent on heavenly blifs, ■ Take what the road affords and praifes pay ; Shun brutal luft, and feek thy foul's high fphere 3 So truth ftiall ftiield thee, or from hurt or fear. In order to give likewife fome fpecimen of his original compo- fition, Chaucer's humorous Addrefs to his empty purfe, and his laco- nic advice to his own amanuenjisy well deferve here to be recorded.

Chaucer to his emptie purfe. To you my purfe, and to none othir wight, Complain I, for ye be my ladie dere,

I am

xllv THREE PHILOLOGICAL

ability difplayedby fucli writers as aTYRWHiT and a Wartoi^ : hence it is the lefs neceflary, here, to enlarge upon it. Chau- cer was Ikilled in all the learning of the age, and efpecially in

aftronomy,

I am forie now that ye be fo light, For certis ye now make me hevie cherc j Me were as lefc be laide upon a here, For whiche unto your mercy thus I crie, Be hevy agahie, or els mote I die.

Now vouchfafin this day or it be night . That I of yow the blisful fowne miy here, Or fe your colour lyke the fonne bright, That of yclowneffe ne had nevir pere j Ye be my life, ye be my hert'is llere j Quene of comfort and of gode companye. Be hevy againe, or els mote I die.

Nowe purfe, that art to me my liv'is light, And fayvour, as downe in this vvorlde here, Oute of this towne helpe me by your might, Sithin that yow wol not be my trefoure, For I am (have as nighe as any frere, But I preyin unto your curtefye Be hevy againe, or els mote I die, &c.

Chaucer's wordes unto his own Scrivenere.

Adam Scrivenere, yf ever it the befalle BoECE or Troiles for to write new Under thy longe lockes thou maift have the fcalle, But after my makynge thou write more true. So oft adaye I mote thy werke renew It to correfte and eke to rubbe and fcrape. And al is thorow thy negligence and rape. The following lines are faid to have been anciently upon Chau- cer's tomb-ftone.

Galfridus Chaucer, vates et fama Poesis Matern^e, hac sacra sum tumulatus homo. -About the year 1555, Nicholas Brighman, a gentleman of Ox- ford, erefted a handfbme monument for Chaucer. His pidure was taken*from Occleve's book, together with the folio wing infcription «'hich ftlll- remains :

M. S. ^uifuit Anglorum vates ter maximus olim Ga/fridus Chaucer conditur hoc tumulo :

Amum

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xh

aftronomy, as appears from his AJlrolahe, in which he has collefted whatever was valuable in the works of his predecef- fors who applied to the ftudy of that fcience. He wrote in Engliih profe as well as verfe, being perfnaded that it was the duty of able men to cultivate their native tongue ; an opinion correfponding with the fuccefsful efforts of Petrarch in Italy, whofe example he found worthy of imitation.'

' Chaucer is entitled to eminent praife as a poet. He was endued with an uncommon genius, and Ihone in very different kinds of compofition. His Canterbury -tales are mafter- pieces, which exhibit a wonderful variety of talents ; for they abound with the fublime and the pathetic, with admirable la- tire, genuine humour, and an uncommon knowledge, of life. The llories told by the feveral guefts are^exndlly fuited to their chara6lers, and clearly evince that the author, notwith- ftanding the aid he derived from his acquaintance with Italian literature, was pofleiTed of a noble invention and a fruicful imagination. Whatever were the defeats ofhisftyle, they were entirely the defeiEls of the period in which he flouriihed. At the fame time it has a claim to much higher praife tban it has frequemly received. His verlification has been cenfured as deficient in harmony ; this charge has often proceeded from our unacquaintance with the ftrudure of the lantruage in that age, and with the manner in which it Was pronounced. Chau- cer is ufually characterized as the Father of the Englifh poe-

f try.

^nninn Ji quceras Domini^Ji temj)ora vitce, Ecce notce fubfunt qiice tibi cunBa notunt. 25 OBobris, T400. A. ^rumnarum requies mors.

N. Brigbam bos fecit Mufurum nomine fumfitus . 1536.

In Kngliff) thus : Of En_!7li(h bards who fang the fweeteft ftralns, Old Geoffrey Chaucer now this tomb contains : For if death's date, if reader thou fliould'ft call, Look but beneath and it will tell thee ail. 25th of Oftober, 1400. Death is the repofe of affliftlons. N. Bflghmsn placed thefe in the name of the Mufes at his own expence, ^Sj^'

slvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

try : he was undoubtedly the firfl perfon^in England, to ^vliotn the title of a poet, in its genuine luftre, could be applied with juftice. He not only enriched our native tongue in general, but had the honour of eftablifliing the Englifh heroic verfe, in which fo many beautiful compofitlons have fincc appeared.'

* This illuftrious man was uncommonly free in his leligious fentiraents ; he employed his talents with equal fuccefs in "lalhing the immoralities (jf the priefts, and in covertly attack- ing fome of the do6lrines of the Church of Rome : nor has it been imagined without reafon, that he was a great fa- vourer, if not a d'lrcS. follower of WicklilF.'

* Another poet of this oera, who is entitled to confiderable applaufe, is John Gower (6). He was the intimate friend of Chaucer, and co-operated w-ith him in all his valuable defigns. "With refpeft to religion he was equally liberal in his fentl- ments ; fo natural is the connection between genius and the love of liberty. Though he was much inferior to Cha^iccr in

fpirit,

(6^ Gcwer's chief work in Englilli, is his Confcjjio amantis, or " The lover's confeflion *," itwas finiihed in the year '393. It is divided into eight books, firft printed by Caxton in 1483. He •wrote this poem at the defire of Richard II. who meeting our poet rovir)g on the Thames, near London, invited him into the Royal barge, and after much converfation requefted him to booh fome new thing. On this piece Govver's chara6ler and reputation as a poet, are almolt entirely founded. It is a dialogue between a lover'and his confeffor who is a prieft of Venus, and like the myftagogue in th^ Picture of Cebes, is called Genius.— What Gower wanted in invention, he fupplied from his common-place book, xvhich appears to haye been ftored with an inexhauftible fund of inftruclive maxims, pleafant narrations, and philofophical definitions : hence his objedl to croud all his erudition into this elaborate performance j yet there i? often fome degree of con- trivance and art in his manner of introducing and adapting fub- jefts of a very diftnnt nature, and which are tptaliy foreign to his general defigns. (Kippis). That he was a man of judgment, appears from the tirc.umllance of Chaucer's fubmitting his Troi/us and CreJJida to Gower's ccnfure. — His munificence and piety were great J he largely contributed to rebuild the conventual church of St Mary Overee In Southwark, In Its prcfent elegant form, and to render it a beautiful pattern of the lighter Gothic architeiSture ; at the fame time he founded at his tomb a perpetual chantry, and (died in 1402.

ESSAYS, BY AD E LUNG. xlvli

fpiiit, imagination, and elegance, his language is not dellitute of perfpicuity, and his verfification is frequently harmonious. His erudition was very exteniive, and accompanied with a knowledge of life. He critically ciiltivated his native tongue, that he might reform its irregularities, and eftablifli an Eng- liih ftyle. His poems are diftinguilhcd for their moral merit. In fliort, if Chaucer had not exifted, Gower would alone have been fulftcient to refcue the age, in which he lived, from the imputation of barharifm.'

' In comparing the hiflorians of this age with their prede- ceflbrs, we cannot allow them equal merit in the fame fpecies of compofition. The Compendium of Thomas Wickes, which begins with the Conquelt, and ends at the death of Ed* ward I, is clear and full in its narration of feveral events. The Chronicle that goes under the name of John Brumpton, is copious in its account of the Saxons, and tranfcribes many of their laws at large. Higden, though a plagiary, preferves fome fads which would otherwife have been loft. Matthew OF Westminster (';)concluded his Annalswith the year 1307 ; but his work was continued by other hands, aud particularly b/ Adam de Merimuth, to 1380.'

' This age alfo produced what was then extremely remark- able, an extenfive and illuftrious traveller. Such was Sir John Mandeville, a peifon defcended from an ancient and noble family. He had received his education at the mo- liaftery of St. Albans, and applied himfelf for fome time to the common lludies of the day, and efpecially to phylic ; but at length he was feized with an invincible defire of vifiting Alia and Africa. Having amply provided himfelf for the pur- pofe, he fet out upon his travels in 1332, and was abfentfrom England thirty-four years. When he returned to his native country, he was fcarcely known, as he had long been given up for dead, by his relations and friends. He became acquainted v.'ith many modern languages,- in the courfe of his adventures, and wrote his Travels in Latin, French, and Znglifli. Several

, f ^ falfe

(7) A BenediiS^ine monk and an accom^iliflied fcholar, who wrote this hiftory from the beginning of the world, to the end of the reign of Edward I, ut^der the title of Flores HiJIoriarunt', he died in 1380. ' Encyclop. jBaiT.

xlviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

falfc and fanciful things are to be found in them, as he was extremely credulous, and tells us not only what he faw, but what he heard. In other refpefts, his accounts of the coun- tries, which he vifited, deferve attention ; and, excepting Paulus VENUxas, he was the firfl man who communicated, to the Weiiern Europeans, the knowledge of the remote parts of the world (8).

Divifiofi Second ; from 1399, to 1485.

Frqm Henry IV. to Henry VII.

* The period, in which Chaucer, Gower and Longlande flourilhed, was fucceeded by an age that did not, in any to- lerable degree, fuftain the fame reputation. There was only one poet in the reign of King Henry IV. and he contributed nothing to the improvement of our verfilication and language. His real name was John Walton, though he is called Jo- hmmcs Cnpellanus. He trarflated into Englifli verfe Boethius's " 'Treat ife on the Confolution of Philofophyj a work of genius and merit, which in the middle ages, was adniired above eve- ry other com poll tion.'

* Henry V. though faid to have been fond of reading, de- rives no luflre from his patronage of the fine arts, but from his character as a warrior. Although his coronation was at- tended with harpers, who mult have accompanied their inftru- ments with heroic rhymes, he was no great encourager of the popular minftrelsy, then in a high ftate of perfedlion. When, on h]s entrance into the city of London in triumph, after the battle of Agincourt, children had been placed to ling verfes as he palled, an edift was ifiiied by him, commanding that, for the future, no fongs iliould be recited in praife of the late victory. This humility perhaps was affected ; and, if it was real, does not appear to have been the refult of true wifdom. While his inclinations directed him to purfue his emi- nent military atchievements, he ought to have cherifhed the perfons who were belt able to do juftice to his prowefs. The

little

C'S) His rambling difpofltion did not fuffer tiim fo refl •, for he left his native country a fecond time, and died at Liej^e in the

Nctbcilands in 1372. Encyclop. Brit.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xlix

little regard, however, which Henry paid to the poets, could not prevent them from celebrating his warlike aftions. A- mong other produftions, a minftrel-piece was compofed on the fiege of Harfleur, and the battle of Agincourt. It was a- dapted to the harp, and contained fome fpirited lines ; but the fljle was barbarous, compared with that of Chaucer and Gower. The improvement of our language was attended to only by a few men, who had enjoyed the advantages of a fuperior education, and made compofition their ftudy. As to the minftrels, they were, in general, too illiterate to fearch after the refinements of didtion.'

^ Concerning Occli.ve, though of fome note in the poeti- cal hiftory of this period, nluch cannot be faid in his praife. His principal poem is a tranflation of Egidius on the Govern- ment of Princes. Occleve did not excel in vigour of fancy, and there is no energy in his writings. He had, however, the merit of contributing to the improvement of qur language. His pathetic lines on Chaucer, who was his model, and with whom he had probably formed a connexion in eaily life, re- fle6t honour upon the gratitude and fenfibility of his heart.*

* John Lydgate (9), a monk of the Benedidline abbey of Bury in Suffolk, was the poet whofe reputation ftands the highcft among the Englifli bai-ds of this age. He poffefled the advantage of an education, not inferior to any that the times could afford. After having ftudied at the uuiverfity of Ox- ford, he travelled for improvement into France and Italy. Here he acquired the knowledge, not only of the languages, but of the literature of thefe countries, and paid particular at- tention to the poetry of both nations. Befides obtaining an acquaintance with all the polite learning which was then cul- tivated, he was no inconfiderable proficient in the fa&idnable

philofophy

(9) At what time he retired to the convent of St. Edmund's- Bury. does not appear \ but he was certainly there in 1415. He was h'ving in 1446, aged about d^ ; but in what year he died, is not knoivn. — Lydgate, according to Pits, was an elegant poet, a per- fuafive rhetorician, an expert ma*them!itician, an acute phiiofopher, and a tolerable divine. He was a voluminous writer, and con- fidering the age in which lie lived, an excellent poet. His lan- guage is lefs obfolete, and his verfification much more harmonious, than the language and verlincatiou of Chaucer, who wrote about half a century before hira. Encycl. Bs.it.

1 THREE PHILOLOGIC AL

philofophy and theology of his cotemporaries. The vivacity of his genius, and the vcrl'atility of his talents,' enabled him to write a great number of pogms, extremely diverfified in -their J\ibje6ls, and in the nature of their compofition. His three chief produdions were the <* Fall of Princes, ^^ the " Siege of Thehes^'' and the " DeJlruBion of I'royy — Lydgate alfo im- proved the Englifli tongue ; for his language is uncommon- ly perfpicuous for the times in which he lived, and his verfes frequently excite furprife by their modern caft. He feems to have been ambitious, at leall in the ilrufture and modulation of his ftyle, of rivalling Chaucer ; but undoubtedly he v;as far "inferior to him in the grand requiiites of poetical ex- cellence. His mode of writing is difFufe, and Ije is not diftin- guilhed by animation or pathos. Neverthelefs, he is not def- titute of beauties, and his Deftruftion of Troy, in particular, (difplays much power of defcription, in conjunction with clear 5ind harmonious numbers.'

* If it were compatible vv'ith the nature of our defign to enu- merate names only, other perfons might be added. We might mention Hugh Campedin, Thomas Chester, John Hard- ing (io), who v/rote a Chronicle inVcrfe, and John Norton and George Ripley, whofe poems are didaftic. It is fcarce- lyexpreffing ourfelves with propriety, to fay that thefe men were xnere verfiiiers. While they are totally void of the

noble

(lo) As a fpecimen of this chronicler'? verification, may ferve the fclloving curious lines/ which Spelman has quoted in his " Vita ^elfrediy p. 1 9 1. Append.

" Alfrede king was of this regioun

That brother was to the noble Elthride,

A perfeft Clerk proved in opiriion

As,Clcrks could difcern, and proved.

In knighthood alfo approved and notified

So plenerly, that no man knew his peer

So good a knight he was and fin^ulere.

In batails many in his father's daies

And alfo in his brethren tiD|e all three

He fough.t full ofte, and barfe him wel ahvales,

That for hisdedes and fingularitee ^

He was ccmraended among the emnitce

Within the land and out, aswell v,'as know

His fame among the people hye was blowe."

. E S ,S A Y S, B Y A D E L U N G. li

noble'qaalities which conflltute genuine poetrj, their verri{I:a- tion is unpolifhed and barbarous. Flarding fliould therefore be marked as an antiquary and an hiflorian, and Norton and Ripley as chemical writers. The latter is underflood to have been no mean proficient in the general literature of the times.*

* However deficient the minilrels of this age might be in the excellencies of compofifion, thej were great favourites with the nation atlarge. This is evident frotn the reward which tiiey received for their attendance on particular folemnitics. Superllitious as the body of the people were, they manifeiled greater liberality towards the adminlftrators to their pleafures, than towards the leaders of their devotion. During one fea{l, while twelve priells had only four pence each for finging a dirge, the fame number of minftrels were every one of them rewarded with two faillings and four pence, befides having en- tertainment provided for themfelves and their horfes. At ano- ther feftival two lliillings were given to the priefts, and four to t'le minflri'ls ; and the latter were treated with the moil diilinguilhed marks of attention and refpeft.'

* It is conje^lured that the office of poet laureat originated in this period. An Italian who came into England and profelTcd to be an imitator of tlie great Roman hiflorian, Livy, ailumed tlie name of Titus Livius, and was prote6led by Ilumphrey, Duke of Gloucefter. He wrote, indeed, a judicious Epitome of Thomas de Elham's hiftory, but did not attain cither the ele- vation of fentiment or dignity of (lyle, v/hich fo eminently dif- tinguifhed the model he wiflied to follow. But the emploj^ment of a poet laureat, as held under the kirjg, took it's rife in the ■ reign of Edward IV. and the firft perfon thus appointed was John Kay, of whom no compofition is extant, which can be confidered as afferting his claim to this chara6i?r. The only work that remains of him, is an Engliili tranOation in profe of a Hijlory of the Siege of Rhodes. A crown of laurel was fometJmes conferred, in unlverfities, on' thofc who had diflinguiiheil themfelves by their abilities in Latin compofition, and efpeclally in Latin verfe. Hence the king's laureat might be nothing more than a graduate of this kind, employed in his n:iajefly'3 fervice. The laureats appear originally .to ,have written only in Latin, whiciLcuilom is fuppofed to have con- tinued till the time of the Reiormation.'

* If the difcoveries, profefTedly made fome years ago at Brlf- tol, in 1768, are to be credited, we mull introduce the name of

a poet

lii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

a poet far more excellent than any, whom we have yet n^ention- ed, and who would confer honcyur on this age, iniinitely great- er than that to which hitherto it has eftabliflied its title. Our readers mufl be fenfible that we allude to the poems which Chatterton produced as the works of Thomas RowLtY, a fecular priefl in that city, in the fifteenth century. The full difcuffien of this fubjeft, which affords a very curious literary problem, would be foreign to our defign. We know that Chatterton, when little more than fifteen years of age, brought to his friends certain manufcripts, and a great num- ber of poems, faid to liave been tranfcrib.^ci from manufcripts, all of which were alleged to have been found in ah old cheft in the bdlfrey of St Mary Redcliffe church, and to contain tl^ genuine produflions of this Rowley. We know that thefe poems are, in many refpetls, uncommonly beautiful ; and that there is fomething very extraordinary irt them, if they were the compofitions of a llripling who had no other advan- tages of education than what could be derived from the in- flra6tion of a common charity-fchool. We know that they exhibit fuch marks of knowledge, and are otherwife accom- panied with circumftances of fo furprifing a nature, that it has been deemed not only a matter of ailonilliment, but even of impofEbility, that they fliould be wriUen by Chatterton. We know that the authenticity of them, and the exiftence of Row- ley, have been maintained by fome able and learned men, with no fmall degree of acutenefs and ingenuity. On the other hand, very important arguments and authorities have been urged to prove that they are of modern fabrication. That there ever was fuch a perfon as Rowley, has been called in queilion, j^nd Hill more, that there could be any poet of that name in the fifteenth century, who was capable of producing the works afcribed to him. It is aflced, how he could poflibly have been concealed till within thefe few years, and how he could avoid being celebrated^ in the higheft terms of applauie, by his own cotemporaries, and by every fucceeding age. As to the manufcripts aflerted to have been difcovered by Chat- terton, doubts, which will not admit of an eafy folution, have been railed with regard to the truth of the faiS:. Independent- ly of all thefe conliderations, it is alleged, that the poems, themfelves afford the mofl; decifive internal evidence of their being recent producTiions. This has been argued, with great force of rci^foning, from a variety of concurring circum- ftances.

ESSAYS, BY AD E LUNG. lili

ftances. The ftjle, compofition, fentiments, and meafiire, carry in them the marks of a refinement that was wholly un- known at the period, in which they are profefTedly written. In the abftraftion of ideas, in the ftudied forms of diftion, in the harmony of the verfification, we are conftantly reminded of our lateft poets. The llanza principally ufed was not known in this country till the time of Prior. That fuch a regular piece as the 'Tragedy of Ella fliould come from Rowley, at the period pretended, is abfolutely contrary to every thing of the dramatic kind, which exifted at ihat period. The fa£l feems to have been that Chatterton originally wrote the poems in the prefent Englifli language, and afterwards inserted the old words from gloflaries and didlionaries. It is remarkable that when we perufe Rowley with dean Mills's learned notes, the moment we turn our eyes from the commentary to the text, the modern air of the latter ftrikes us in fo forcible a manner^ that the dean's elaborate arguments lofe all power of convic- tion. It muft be added, that many undeniable proofs have been exhibited of the moft direft imitation of recent poets, even to the adoption of their very words. Thefe and other confiderations have induced a large majority of our ableft an- tiquaries and critics totally to deny the authenticity of the' eompofitions in queftion. Should it, however, be alio wed j that certain ancient manufcripts were difcovered, and that fome of them contained fragments in verfe, written in the age pretended, Rowley, as we now have him, appears in too quef- tionable a fhape to give the fifteenth century the honour of the works publiihed under his name.*

* But while-i-Rowley being rejefted — it will be found that little true poetry flouriflied in England during the prefent pe- riod , if we dired: our view to the northern kingdom of Great Britain, we fhall meet with diftinguifhed excellence in a per- fon of the higheft llation, the fovereign of the country. It is Jamks 1. of Scotland, who introduced a new literary epocha in the nation, over which he reigned. What originally was a great misfortune to this prince, and a flagrant aft of injuftice: towards him, turned out, in one refpeft, eminently to his own fervice, and highly to the advantage of his countiy. When he was only a youth of thirteen, he was treacheroufly taken prifoner by the Englifli, and detained, during the term of eighteen years in a confinement which was often very ftrift and rigid. His education^ however, good rudiments of which

g .he

liv THREE PHILOLOGICAL

he had received in Scotland, was not neglefted, but attended' to with the utmoft care. The perfon appointed to be his go- vernor, was Sir John Pclham, a gentleman of worth and lite- rature, who omitted nothing that could tend to form the mind and manners of his royal charge. James, being blefled with an admirable genius, and enjoying the ableft mafters of the time, made an uncommon proficiency both in bodily exer- cifes and in mental acquirements. To his knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages, the laft of which he is reprc- fented as having written with eafe, he added an acquaintance ivith the philofophy of the age. But the fludies, to which he was more particularly devoted, were thofe of poetry and mufic. Thefe liberal and pleafing arts formed, in his long and clofe captivity, the principal confolation of his folitary hours. When he was reftored to the pofleffion of his thronej froi» which he had been fo unjuftly withheld, his grand object was to enlighten and civilize his countrymen. Many of his exer- tions- to this purpofe were accompanied with fuch a degree of fuccefs, that he may be faid to have given a new turn to the genius of Scotland. His exertions and fuccefs would have been flill greater and more illuftrious, if he had not been cruelly murdered in the forty-fourth year of his age. Va- rious works were written by him, both in profe and verfe, Wioft of which are unfortunately loft : thofe which ftill exift^ are of a poetical nature ; and it is certain that feveral of his compolitions of this kind are now no longer in being. Four of James's pieces, which have happily efcaped the depreda- tions of time, are a " Song pn his Miftrefs ;" " The King's Quair ;" « Peblis to the Play ;" and " Chrifl's Kirk on the Green." The King's Quair is a poem of large extent, being divided into fix cantos. Its theme is the royal author's love to Jane, daughter to the Earl of Sommerfet ; a beautiful lady, <)f whom he became enamoured while a prifoner at the caftle of Windfor, and who was afterwards his queen. The misfor- tunes of his youth, his early and long captivity, the incidents which gave rife to his paffion, its purity, conftancy and happy iflhe, are all difplayed in the mode of allegorical vifion, a- greeably to the reigning tafte of the age. That the merit of the King's Quair is very great, cannot be denied. It is dis- tinguilhed by its invention and faocy, by its genuine fimplici- ty of fentiment, and by the felicity of its poetical defcriptions; Several men of ingenuity and tafte have contended ; that James

is

ESSAYS, BYADELUNG. Iv

is littl-e, if at all, inferior to Chaucer. If the former's ** Court of Venus" be compared to the latter's " Court of Love," the royal author will lofe nothing by the comparifon. The Jane, in particular, of King James, is painted -yvith a beauty and delicacy that are not equalled in Chaucer's Rofial. It is to be lamented, that many of the graces of the King's Quair are concealed, at leaft from common view, in the antiquity of the language.'

* Three other Scottifti poets are named in this period, but they are, on the whole, contemptible, when compared with the monarch of the country. Andrew Winton, a canon re- gular of St Andrev<^^s, and Prior af the monaftery in Loch, leven, and who preceded James I, wrote in verfe a very large Chronicle of Scotland. His work, which is valuable, fo far as it relates to fais own country, and which contains materials not to be met with in Fordun, whom he had never feen, has not yet been publiihed. Its publication would be a defirable acceffion to the hiitory of North Britain *. Holland was the author of a poem entitled *' The Howlat," which appears to have defcribed the poetical employments, and the mufical entertainments of the age. Henry the Minftrel, who, on ac- count of his being blind from his birth, is ufually called the Blind Harry, compofed the " Life of Wallace." It is a romance, like Barbour's Bruce, but not to be ranked with it in point of excellence. At the fame time, it is not deftitute of merit, and there are various things in it, which cannot fail to gratify the curiofity of the antiquary and the critic'

* Caxton f comes before us in the charader of an author, . ' g a as

* It has fince been publiflied at London, in 2 Vols. 8vo,

f William Caxton, a mercer of London, eminent for the books he publifhed, and foi being reputed the &t& who praftifed the art of printing in England. He died at a very advanced age, probably above eighty, in 1494. — Much cannot be faid in his praife as an author ; for his language is rather uncouth ; of which ike following is a fpecimcn, extrafted from his Chronicle :

" King Alfred reigned 30 years, and a good king he had been, and wel coude chaftife his enemies, for he was a good Clerc and let make many bokes. And a boke he made of Englifh of aven- tures of Kings, and of batails that had ben done in the lond : and many other bokes of geftes he let hem write that were of

grete

Ivi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

as well as in that of a printer. He is reckoned among the hiftorians of his age ; but in this relpcft he is entitled to a very fmall degree of applaufe. His chief merit is that of a trans- lator. The books printed by him, were more than fifty in number ; fome of them very large volumes j and many of them were verfions from foreign writers, made by himfel'f.'

* Among the patrons of learning, in this period, the name of Humphrey, Duke of Gloucejier, flands foremoft ; a man of an amiable chara£ler in our civil hiflory. He is celebrated by Occleve as a Angular promoter of literature, and the com- mon patron of the fcholars of the times. Befides him two other names ought to be mentioned, whofe merits were great and eminent. John Tiptoft, Earl of Worcejler^ and An- thony WiDViLi.F, Karl RiverSy were not only protestors and promoters of fcience, but writers themfelves. So emi- nently was the former at the head of literature, and fo mafter- ly an orator, that when, upon a vifit to Rome, he delivered an oration before Pope Pius 11, he drew tears of joy and ad- miration from that celebrated and learned pontiff. The light in which he is now only known to us by his own works, is that of a tranflator. Of his original produ£lions no more than a few letters and fmall pieces are remaining in manufcript. Anthony Widville, greatly to his honour, was the friend of Cnxton, whofe new art he patronized with zeal and liberality. The fecond book printed in England was a work of Earl Rivers's. He alfo employed himfelf principally m tranfla- tions, according to thefafliion of the times, and what was thea the beft mode of conveying inflruftion to the kingdom. Be- fides thefe he wrote feveral ballads againft the feven deadly fins. — Imperfedt as the writings of Tiptoft and Widville may now be deemed, great prajfe is due to them for their zealous endeavours to promote the caufe of learning, and to fpread a- mong their countrymen a regard to mental accomplifhments. The example-; of men fo illuftrious could not fail of producing fome good effefts. It muft ever be lamented that thefe two eminent noblemen met with fo untimely and unhappy an end ; both of them having been beheadec^ when they were little more than forty years of age.'

* Another

grete wifSom and good lerr.ing j thurgh which bokes many a man may liim amende that will hem rcadc."

W.

lESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Jvii

' * Another author deferves to be recorded at the conclufion of this period, not indeed on account of great merit, but for the fake of her fex. This was Juliana Bf.rners, prio- refs of Sopewell Nunnery, near St. Albans. She did not em- ploy herfelf altogether in penning devout meditations and rules of holj living, but being a woman of rank and fpirit, fhe wrote on hawking, hunting and fifhing. That part which relates to hunting is in rhyme. This lady is the fecond, at leaft in point of time, of any of our female writers, and the firft who appeared in print.'

* To the number of hiftorians of this age, whofe works were compofed in Latin, we muft add the name of Robi-kt Fabian, who wrote in Englifh. He was a merchant and alderman of London, and confequently a member of a corpo^ ration which has produced few literary men, and in which many learned characters are not, in the nature of the thing, to be expefted. His fituation* therefore, in life, efpecially confidering the age in which he lived, may be regarded as giving a certain degree of celebrity to his hiftorical charafter. The Chronicle of his compofition is entitled by him the Con- cordance of Sins ;" it is apparently written with fincerity, and its language is intelligible. Befides the more public fadls'which it includes, it contains a variety of particulars relative to the city of London. As Fabian's work is carried down to the twentieth year of the reign of Henry VH. he may in pax't be confidered as belonging to the following period.'

In the manners ; in the political conilitutions ; in the cul- toms ; and confequently alfo in the languages of almoft every European nation, great changes are difcoverable during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Thefe changes cannot be explained otherwife than from the conftant increafe of popu- lation. The order of knighthood, which hitherto had been the only pride of nations, began much to decline ; on the o- ther hand, the lower claffes of the people, till then very much oppreffed, recovered from their abjecl fervitude, and formed a happy middle rank which foon became the feat of inventive genius, of thriving commerce, of the arts, and the fciences. The influence thus occalioned in language, will be eafily re- cognized by him who is acquainted with the exadl relation which languages bear to the whole circuit of ideas, and the de- gree of tafte prevailing in a nation. The queftion, here, relates only to the Englilh language, the progrefs of which, during

the

Hin THREE PHILOLOGICAL

the fourteenth century, particularly towards the end of it , was indeed very remarkable. '1 he liock of words it contain- ed, .had now become too fmall and infufScient to exprefs the acceilion of many new ideas ; and therefore its continual aug- mentation from the French, with which it had already frater- nized in the preceding ages, may be without difficulty uader- ftood.

Divijlon Third -f from 1485 #o 1558: or From Henry VII. to the end of Q^ Mart.

* Of the Englifh poets in the reign of Henry VII, th« writer who beil deferved that name was Stlphhn Hawes : he was patronized by this monarch. One of his principal produftions was entitled the ** Tenaple of GlalTe ;" which xv-as founded upon Chaucer's " Houfe of Fame." Previous to Hawes, for almoft a century, nothing had appeared but Le- gends, Homilies, and Chronicles in verfei His capital per- formance, however, was the " Pajfetyme of Fleufurey In this poem there is an effort of imagination and invention ; and it contains fome ilriking inftances of romantic and allegoric £6lioH. In point of verfification, he improved upon Lydgate, and was fuperior to that poet in genius and fancy. In the harmony of numbers, and clearnefs of expreffion he alfo ex- celled his immediate predecefTors and cotemporaries.'

* Another poet who flourilhed in this reign was Alexander Barclay. His principal work is the ** Zhip ofFooles,''^ It teas chiefly taken from a German original, and from two trans- lations of that original, one iru French and the other in Latin. Barclay made, however, fome additions of his own. — The language of this writer is more cultivated than that of many of his cotemporaries, and he had the honour of contributing fomewhat to the improvement of the phrafeology of his coun- try. Befides other pieces, Barclay was the author of five Eclogues, which were the firfl of the kind in the Englifh tongue. They were formed upon the plan of Petrarch and Mantuan, being of a moral and fatirical nature, and containing but few ftrokes of rural defcription and bucolic imagery.'

* John *Alcock, independently of his charader as a divine and a bifhop, was in many refpedls a man of diflinguifhed a- biiities. And though he wrote upon the Penitential Pfalms in Englifh verfe, we cannot prefume to rank him as a poet.'

< Three

ESSAYS, BY AD E LUNG. Ux

* Three verfifiers in this period, William Walter, Henr? Medwall, and Lawrence Wade, fcaicely deferve any no- tice.— The dramatic entertainments called *' Moralities ^^"^ ap- pear to have been carried to their height about the clofe of tlie prefent reign. A great contriver of them was John Ras- TALL, a learned printer, and brother-in-law to Sir Thomas More. This fort of fpeftacle had hitherto be<in confineiiy either to moral allegory or to religion blended with buffoonery ; but Raftall formed the defign of rendering it the vehicle of fcience and philofophy.'

* To Scotland we ftand indebted for names, in Henry the Seventh's reign, which are unrivalled in England. That coun- try produced writers who adorned the age with a degree of fentiment and fpirit, a command of phrafeology, and a ferti- lity of imagination, not, perhaps, to be found even in Chaucer or Lydgate. Thefe writers exhibited llriking fpecimens of allegorical invention, a mode of compofition which for fome time had been almoft totally extinguiihed in England. Wil- liam Dunbar and Gawin Douglas are the vko principal perfons to whom this high praife is due.'

* Dunbar, the chief of the ancient Scottiih poets, wrote a eonfiderable number of poems, the two longeft of which, and- the moft celebrated are '* The Thiftle and the Rofe," and ** The Golden Terge." The former was occafioned by an evenfwhich ultimately produced the union of the two crowns and kingdoms ; namely the marriage of James IV of Scot- land, with Margaret Tudor, the eldefl daughter of Henry Vn of England. In the latter he endeavours to fhew the gradual and imperceptible influence of love, when too far in- dulged over reafon Dunbar unites in himfelf, and generally

furpaffes, the qualities of the chief Englifh poets ; the moral? and fatire of Langland; Chaucer's humour, poetry and know- ledge of life ; the allegory of Gower ; the defcription of Lyd- gate.'

* Douglas attained to great excellence in claffical learning. This, in conjurftion with the natural vigour of his xnind, en- abled him to fuftain a new chara6ler, that of a poetical tran- flator, not from the old French metrical romances, but from the models of the Auguilan age. In his early youth, iie tranflated Ovid's Art of Love ; but he afterwards raifed his ithoughts to a much nobler and more difficult undertaking, ■ which was a complete tranfiation in heroic verfe, of the iEneid

of

Ix THREEPHILOLOGICAL

of Virgil. The defign, which had long been entertained by him, was accomplilhed in the fpace of lixteen months, and it is executed with equal fpirit and fidelity Dr Johnfon repre- fents Mr Pope's verfion of Homer, as a verj important ob- je£l in the hiftorj of the literature of this country, though it was performed at the time, when learning and tafte were in a high {late of cultivation in England. What, then, are we to think of fuch a work as that of Gawin Douglas's in a period comparatively rude and unpoliflied ? No metrical tranflation of a Claffic had yet appeared in Englifli, unlefs we are difpofed to give that appellation to Boethius. Virgil was hitherto generally known only by Caxton's romance on the fubjeft 'of the jEneid ; concerning which Douglas aflerted, that it no more refemhled Virgil than the devil was like St Aujlin.^

' Henry, Earl of Sinclair^ was the particular friend and patron of Gawin Douglas ; for it was at the Earl's requeft that Douglas undertook the tranflation of the ^Eneid ; though he is eminent not only as a tranflator, but as an original wri- ter. His allegorical poems, " King Hart," and '* Palice of Honour" excel in the fame fpecies of compofition ; — the fe- treral books of his tranflation of Virgil are introduced with metrical prologues, which difplay a moft extraordinary degred of poetical beauty. Milton's L' Allegro, and II Penferofo have been reckoned the earlieft defcriptive poems in Englifli. If that was the cafe, Scotland produced the fineft examples of this delightful fpecies of compofition, nearly a century and a half before.'

* An illufl;rious lady tnuft; be mentioned as an author as well as a patronefs of letters; Margaret, Countefs of Richmond and Derby, the mother of Henry VII. In point of time, flie fucceeds Julia Bergers, being the third female writer in Eng- land. Her works were chiefly tranflations of the devotional kind ; though Ihe, likewife, at the defire of her fon the king, drew up orders with regard to the precedence of great and noble ladies, at public pfoceflions, and efpecially at funerals.'

* At the time when the nobility in general were inx'olved in grofs ignorance, Algernon Percy, the fifth Earl 6f Nor- thumberland diiliiiguiflied himfelf by being the proteftor of genius. SKrLTON was encouraged by him to writ?! an elegy oin the death of his father ; but what particularly ijlarked the Earl's literary tafte and his love for poetry, was a very fplen- did manufcript tranfcribed for his ufe, containing a large col-

jcclion

•ESSAYS, BY ADElUNG. Ixi

leftion of Englifli poems, finely engroffed on vellum and fuperbly illuminated.^

* The prime glorj of the reign of Henry VIII, with refpeft to Polite Literature, was Sir Thomas More. Though, according to Mr Hume, there was no man in this age who had the leaft pietenfion to be ranked among our claffics, he acknowledges that Sir Thomas feems to come near- eft to that charafter : with all his religious weaknefles, he was, indeed, one of the greateft ornaments of his time. " Sir Thomas More," fays Mr Warton, " is reverenced by pofterity as the fcholar who taught that erudition which civilized his country, and as the philofopher who met the horrors of the block with that fortitude which is equally free from oftentation and en- thufiafm : as the man whofe genius overthrew the fabric of falfe learning, and whofe amiable tranquillity of temper tri- umphed over the malice and injuftice of tyranny." His Uto- pia may be regarded as an ethical as well as a political cona- poiition. His hiftory of the reigns of Edward V. and Richard IH, is far from being efteemed among the bell of his produc- tions.—*The hiftorical works of JoHK Rastall, George Lil- ly, and Edward Hall, have little claim to notice ; though Hall is of fome ufe to the antiquary ; by the attention which he pays to the variations of drefs and of fafhion.'

* This period was not unfruitful with regard to poetict writers. John Skelton * exceeded the lieentioufnefs of the times, and was cenfured by his cotemporaries. His charafter- iftic vein of humour is capricious ana extravagant ; his lub- jefts are often ridiculoi^s ; and his matter is fometimes de- bated by his verfificalion. In a fhort ode, which was com- pofed by him, he has exhibited a fpecimen of the ftrufture and phrafeology of a love-fonnet, about the beginning of the fixteenth century. Notwithftanding his fcuirility, he was a claffical fcholar.'

' Moralities ftill continued to hold their rank among the principal entertainments of the times, and they were repre-

h fented

* The editor of the Mufcs Library (E. Cooper) calls Skelton the reftorer of invention in EngliJ}) poetry. Amon^ his numerous performances,*' The Crown of Laurel," is oneofthebeft, and he dlfplays in it confidcrab 6 wit and humour j he died at Well- tainfter Abbey, 1529.

Ixii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

fented by different bodies of men. When more regular playis eame to be compofed, fome of them were a6):ed at the Inns of Court. At thefe feminaries, mafques and interludes were oc- cafionally performed, during feveral fucceeding reigns. The firft inftance of this kind, that is particularly recorded, occurs in 1527, when a comedy written by John Roos, a ferjeant at law, was reprefented in the great hall of the fociety at Gray's Inn.' ^

* Henry Howard *, Earl of Surrey, was a poet of a charac- ter far fuperior to that of Skelton. This accomplifhed noble- man led the way to grej^t improvements in Englifli poetry. Some of his ftanzas approach to the eafe and gallantry of Waller, and exhibit fpecimens of correal verfification,'polifli- ed language, and mufical modulation. It is remarkable, that his tranflation of the fecond and fourth books of Virgil's ^neid is the firft compofition in blank verfc that occurs in the Englifh language.'

* Sir Thomas Wyat's genius was of the nioral and didaftic kind ; and his poems are more diftinguifhed by good fenfe^ fatire and obfervations on life, than by pathos or imagination. He may juftly be efteemed the firft poliihed Englifli fatirift — There was an inviolable friendfliip between Wyat and Surrey, arifing perhaps chiefly from a fimilarity of ftudies. Befides adopting the fame principal fubjeft for their poetry, the paf- fion of love, they were alike anxious to improve their native language, and to attain the elegancies of compofition.'

* Other poets of this period, and of high rank, were SiR Francis Bryant, the friend of Wyat , George Boleyn, Viscount Rochford, brother to Queen Ann Boleyn ; and

Nicholas Lord Vaux, an eminent ftatefman and foldier

In Tottel's colieftion of the poetical writings of this period, is found the firft example, that is known in our language, of the pure and unmixed paftoral. It is an example, likewife,

of

* He was the firft of the Englifh Noblemen, who diftinguifhed himfclf by a fcllowfhip with the mufcs. In purity of language and fweetnefs of found, he far furpaffed his cotemporaries and prede- celTors. (E. Cooper). His imprudence, in adding fome part of the Royal arms to his own, being defcended from the heroic King Edward I, coft him his head 5 though juftified by the Heralds. He was executed January 19, 1547.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixlli

»f extraordinary merit. In eafe of numbers, elgance of rural allufion, and fimplicity of imagery, there is nothing of the kind equal to it in Spencer. The lame coUedlion affords one of the earlieft inftances of the pointed Englifh epigram ; and it is fuppofed that it came fiom the pen of Sir Thomas More. Several poems, which were chiefly the performances of his youth, were written by Sir Thomas in his native tongue.'

* Nicholas Grimoald was the next Englifh poet, after the Eail of Surrey, who wrote in blank verfe ; he gave to this new mode of verfification, additional ftrength, elegance, and modulation. Grimoald wrote, like wife in rhyme ; in which refpeft he is inferior to none of his cotemporaries, for a maf- terly choice of chafte expreilion, and the concife elegancies of didactic verfification. Some of his couplets have the fmart- nefs which marks the modern llyle of fententious poetry.' .

* Andrew Borde, John Bale, Brian Ansley, Andrew Chertsey, Wilfrid Holme, Charles Barnsley, and Ed- ward Haliwji^ll, were poets of a fubordinate clafs in this period, of whom it is fufficient to mention their names.'

John Hetwood, commonly called the Epigrammatifl, is re- prefented by fome as the firll writer of comedies in England. Though moralities and interludes were written and performed Jong before the time of Heywood, it muft be allowed, that he is among the firft of our dramatifts who drove the Bible from the flage, and introduced reprefentations of familiar life and popular manners.'

* The poetry of Scotland during the reign of Henry VHI. was much declining. The writings of Sir David Lindsay were very numerous and extremely popular, on account of ^heir being applied to the purpofes of the Reformation. Another Scots poet of this period was Sir James Inglis.- His principal performance, the " Complaint of Scotland" is well written for the time, and difplays abundance of learning. In one of his compofitions , he mentions a number of poets of his country as then living, that is, about the year 1530. Thefe are, Culrose, Kyd, Stewart, Stewart of Lorn, Gal- BREITH, Kinloch, ancl Ballentyne. Concerning four of ^hefe perfons, nothing is known. Lord Hailes has publifhed fome pieces of the Stewarts ; and Ballentyne, muft mean John Ballenden, the tranflator of Hedor . Boethius's Hiftory of Scotland, in which work he has interfperfed feveral poems, and particularly .^one entitled " Virtue and Vyce," which has

h 2 been

Ixiv THREE PHILOLOGICAL

been reprinted. The author of the article concerning Bal- lenden, in the Biographia Britannica, reprefents his writings as diftinguifhed hy that noble enthufiafm' which is the very foal of poefy.'

* About this time was produced, by an unknown writer, a comedy called Pbilotus, which is extremely valuable for its curious pitSlures of life, manners, drcfs, and other circumllances relative to the age in which it was compofed.'

* Among the number of noble authors in the time of Henry VIII, the names of Lord Morley, and John Bourchier, Lord Berners, IHII deferve honourable mention. The former appears to have been a multifarious writer, in profe and verfe ; he chiefly dillinguifhed himfelf as a tranflator, and certainly was one of fhe moll learned noblemen of that age. The lat- ter alfo tranllated Froiffart's IJhronicle, by the command of the king, befides which he wasf the tranflator of fome French, Italian, and Spaniih novels The only circumftance that en- titles John Lord Lumley to the appellation of an author, is his having tranflated into Engliih, Erafmus's Inftitution of a Chriiliau Prince*.'

* This aera was likewife adorned with fome female authors of high rank. The principal of thefe were, Catherine Parr, the lafl; wife of Henry VI H, and Margaret Rcper, the fa- vourite daughter of Sir Thomas More. The works of the former, which were partly originals and partly tranflations, are entirely of a religious nature : the compofitions of the latter were not confined to the Engliih language ; lor Ihe wrote the Latin with no fmall degree of elegance.'

* Some idea of the literary charadterand tafle of an age may be formed from the nature of its publications. The works iffued by the prefs, were numerous •, and among thefe, contro- verfial treatifes and devotional writings held a principal place. It is furprifing what a number of law books appeared in this period — Magna Charta was fo often reprinted that it may hence be judged, that our anceltors were extremely attentive to, ittd had a high value for that grand fecurity of Engliih liberty.'

* Sir John Cheke can never be mentioned with too much refpeft, as one of thofe who firft introduced genuine litera- ture into this country. In a plan of" innovation, which he had formed with regard to th« orthography of the Englifli language, be "Vva? neither fo happy, nor fo fuccefsful, as he bad been

in

ESS AYS, B Y ADELUNG. Ixv

in reftoring the pronunciation of the Greek and Latin tongues.'

* Sir Thomas Smith alfo dire£led his attention to his na- tive language, which he wss folicitous to refine and to polilh. He publiflied a treatife, the objeft of which was to promote the correft writing of the Engliih tongue, and the true found- ings of the letters and words. If he carried the matter to fome degree of excefs, and propofed alterations that would not be produdive of much advantage, he has only erred in common with other ingenious and learned men.'

* Roger Ascham was an excellent compofer in his own tongue. Sir Thomas More excepted, he was perhaps the fii ft of our fchoiars, who ventured to break the fhackles of J^atinity, bj publiftiing his Toxophilus in Englifh. This he did with a view of giving a pure and corre6l model of Englifli compofition, or rather of fhewing how a fubj eft might be treated witji grace and propriety, in Englifli as well as in Latin. His Vindication of his conduft, in attempting fo great an innovation, difplaj'-s the fonndnefs and ftrength of his un- derftanding. Dr. Johnfon obferves of Roger Afcham, that his philological learning would have gained him honour in any country ; and that among us it may juftly call for that reverence which all nations owe to thofe who firft roufe them from ignorance, and kindle among them the light of literature.*

* The poetical annals of Edward VI. are marked with metrical tranflations of various parts of Scripture. Of thefe the chief is the verfiiication of the Pfalms by Sternhold and Hopkins, a performance which is entitled to no regard from its own merit. Wyat and Surrey had before tranflated fome of the Pfalms into metre ; but Thomas Sternhold was the firft whofe metrical verlion of them was ufed in the church of England. His co-adjutor, John Hopkins, was rather a better poet than himfelf. His other afliftants were, Thomas Norton, and William Wyttingham, afterwards Dean of Durham. The fpiiit of verfifying the Pfalms, and other parts of the Bible, was generally diiFufed at the beginning of the reformation ; and among the reft that employed them- felves in this way, were William Hunis,William Baldwin, Francis Seager, and Matthew Parker, afterwards aich- bilhop of Canterbury. Another contributor to the metrical theology was Robes^.t Crowley, an Oxford Divine ; and another ftill more extraordinary one was Christopher Tye, a Dodor of Mufic at Cambridge. Tye projefted a tranflation

, of

xvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

of the Afls of the Apoftles into familiar metre, of which he completed onlj the fii li fourteen chapters. The Book of Kings had before been verfified bj another hand. Dr. Tye carried his abfurditj fo far as to ft his verfion to mufic ; and his A&s of the Apoftles were fung for a time in the rojal chapel of Edward VI. Even this good kiig himfelf is to be ranked among thj: religious poets of his reign. ^

* Among the anonymous poems of this period, we maj reckon the iirfl drinking ballad of any^ merit, in the Englifli language, which appeared in the yczv 1551. It has a vein of

. eafe and humour, fuperior to what might have been expected Jn thofe times ; and it rnay be confidered as the parent of ma- ny pleafing compolitions, which have highly contributed to convivial cntertairsment. This ballad opens the fecond aft of '•' Ganamer Gurton's Needle," a comedy written and printed in the year juft meurioned, and which was foon .afterwards afted at Chrift's-'Jollege in Cambridge. It is the firll Eng- lifli play which was neither myftery nor morality, and which bandies a comic ftory with fome difpofition of plot, and fome difcrimination of chara6ler. Earlier in the reign of Edward VI, we find a poet of the name of Kelton, who wrote the *' Chronicle of the Brutes," in Englifh verfe.*

* King Edward VI. ftands in the lift of royal authors, and he is juilly entitled to that diftindion. Confideriag the times in which he lived^ and the early period of his death, hia Journal of his own reign, his Remains, and his other compolitions difplay fuch a promife, and indeed fuch a pof- fcfSon of abilities, as add greatly to the regret arifing from liis premature deceafe The Duke of Somerset has obtain- ed a place among the noble writers of the age. His principal title to this honour is founded on one or two religious pieces, which were penned during his troubles. — Edmund Lord Sheffield is faid to have compofed a book of bonnets in the Italian manner. — Henry /Lord Stafford, and Francis Hastings, fecond Earl of Huntingdon, exerted their talents only as tranflators.'

* iThe female authors belonging to this fliort period, are confiderable in number, and eminent for their ftation. The principal of them are. Queen Mary, Lady Jane Grey, Ma- ry Roper, and Lady Elizabeth Fane. Several other ladies of high rank diftinguilhed themfelves as tranflators from, and into, the Greek and Latin languages ; among thefe w^e find

Ladj

ESaAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxn

La<!y Joanna Lumley, and Lady Mary Howard, Dutshefs of Norfolk.' '<■

« Under Qieen Mary, notwithftanding the wretched fitua- tion of the piblic, arifing from the horrid perfecutions which bigotry was carrying into execution, poetry aflumed a higher tone. A pcem was planned, though not fully completed, which fiieds lo common luftre on the dark interval between. Surrey and 1-penser. This poem was entitled " A MirrouT for Magiftrats," and in the compofition of it more writers than one wee concerned. Its primary inventor, however, and moft diflinguifhed contributor, was Thomas Sackville, afterwards lord Buckhuril and Earl of Porfet, and who ia the next reigi w'ill come before us as the author of the firfh genuine Engifh tragedy. The objeft of the ** Mirrour for Magiftrates,'"was to make all the illuftrious but unfortunate chara^lers ir. our hiftory to pafs in review before the poet, who defcends like Dante, into the infernal regions, and is con- duced by So row. A poetical preface called an " Induction," and one Legaid, which is the life of Henry Staftbrd, Duke of Buckingham, were the only parts executed by Sackville. The completion o" the whple was recommended by him to Bald- wyn, before nentioned, and George Ferrers, who carried it into executioi, with the affiftance of Churchyard, Phayer, SkeLTon, Se.gers, and Cavyl. Among thefe finifhers of the '* Mlrroir for Magiftrates," Ferrers was the moil emi- nent in point •f abilities ; but he compoCed ito more than three of the . Legencs, far the greater number of them having been, written by Bsldwyn. As to the poetical merit of the work, it refts almoll entirely with Lord Euckhurst, whofe Induftion and Story of tie Duke of Bucki igham contain many proofs of a vigorous fancy, and many fpleudid palTages.'

* Another poet of this period was Richard Edwards. whofe principjl work was the " Paradife of daintie Devifes." What chiefly aititles him to notice is, that he was one of the earliefl of our dramatic writers, after the reformation of the Britifh ftage — In Thomas Tusskr we meet with, perhaps, the firft exhibiiion of dida£lic poetry in this country. He was the author of a work in rhyme, the title of which was, " Five Hundred points of good Hufbandrie," and which has more iw it of the limpUcity of Hefiod, than of the elegance of Virgil. Indeed, it is b deftitute of poetical ornaments, that its fole value arifes from its being a genuine pidure of agriculture,

the

Ixvili THREEPHILOLOGICAL

the rural arts,' and the domeftic cEconomy and cuftoms of ottr anceftors. — "VA^lliam Forrest brings up the rear of our poets, but with no degree of fplendour. He compofed, in oftave rhyme, a panegyrical hiflory of th6 life of Catherine, the firfl Queen of Henry VIII. His other poens do not de- fer ve a diftin£l fpecification.|

* The only Scotch poet we fliall now take notice of, is Alex- ander Scot, the Anacreon of his time and covntry. If the age in which he liv^d be confidered, his pieces an correft and elegant. He wrote chiefly upon fubjefts of lovf, and ftands at the head of the ancient minor poets of Scotlani.'

Divijion Fourth ; from 1558, /o 1625 6r

During the reigns of Q^. Elizabeth and Kiig JameS I.

* In a fcene of great and unavoidable theolqgical difputa- tion, the fcholars of England were obliged to din6l their prin- cipal attention to objeds that were efteemed cf infinite im- portance ; and confequently they had not mudi leifure for refearches into the niceties of languages and Laming. We have no names in Elizabeth's reign, that can be compared with Sir John Cheke, Thomas Smith, and Riger Afcham, •whom, in the preceding Divifion of this Hilbry, we have mentioned as eminent improvers of claffical taft«. Smith and Afcham may in part be confidered as belonging to the reign of Elizabeth ; for Smith's " Treatife on the poper mode of writing the Englifti language," was not pubiftied till the year 1568 ; and " Aicham's Schoolmafler" wis firft printed in 1573.'^

* One circumftance, which contributed to tie increafe of knowledge in general, and to the' improvement of the Englilh language in particular, was the multiplicity of tranflations. This multiplicity conAitutes a llriking feature in the literary charader of the age. On the benefits, which nay be derived from tranflations, it is needlefs tc enlarge. Bdidfis the great ftore of materials, fcientific, literary, and entertaining, which they import into a country, they promote a more accurate ac- quaintance with the language from which they are made, and enrich the tongue into which they are rendered. A much fuperior advantage might have refulted from them, at the time we are treating of, if our. writers had been better judges

of

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixix

of die fubjedl, and if they had not, in particular, moll of them, entertained an opinion, that it was neceflary^or verfions to be ftriftlj literal.'

* The Greek authors, which now appeared in En^lifli trans- lations, were briefly the following. Ten books of Homer's Jliad, from a metrical French verfion of that work ; by Ak- THUH Hall : a complete and regular verfion of Homer, from the original ; by Gugrgk; Chapman : Mufaeus (according to a poetical paffage of Drayton) ; by the fame author : the Jocaila, or the PhsenilTae of Euripides ; by George Gas- coiGNE, and Francis Kinwelmersh : Ariilotle's famous trea- tife on the ten categories; by Barnaby GooGti; feven ora- tions of Demofthenes ; by Thomas Wilson : Heiodian's Hiftory, from a Latin verfion of Angelus Politianus ; by Nicholas Smith : Xenophon's Inftitution of Cyrus, from the original ; by William Hercheh, or as he is called in an- other edition .of the book, Wylliam Barkar : the Table of Ccbes, from a Latin verfion ; by Sir Anthony Poyngz. It is the firft tranflation of Cebes that appeared in the Engliib language — Abraham Fleming, who was a frequent tranfla- tor, among other works, produced in Englifh, Aelian's various Hillory. Something, likewife, of Ifocraies came from the fame hand ; and alfo Synefius's Panegyric on Baldnefs, which had been brought into fallnon by Erafmus's Eucomiuin on Folly. Fleming was of confiderable fervice to the literature of his country, by rendering into Engliih many celebrated books, which had beea written in Latin about the fifteenth century, and at the redoration of learning. — The only remain- ing tranflation from the Greek, of which we are able to give an 'account, is that of the ten books of Heliodorus's Ethiopic Hiflory, by Thomas Underdowne. By the publication of this work, a new field of romance was opened, which is fup- pofed to have fuggefled to £ii- Philip Sidney the fcheme q£ his Arcadia.'

' The tranflations from the Latin poets were more numer^ pus than from the Greek. Seneca's ten tragedies were trans- lated by different poets, at difFeient times, and they were printed together in 1581. The Hyppolitus, the Medea, , the Hercules Oeteus, and the Agamemnon were tranflated by John Studley ; the Odavia, by Thomas Nuce, or NtwcE ; the Oedipus, by Alexander Nevyle, who, in the fixteeath • year of his age, produced the mofl fpirited and elegant verr

i lion

Ixx THREE PHILOLOGICAL

fion in the colledion ; the Hercules Furens, the Thjefles and the Troas of,^ Seneca, hy Jasper HiYWood, fou of John Heywood the Epigrammatift ; and laftl/. the Thebais, by Thomas Newton, the publiiher of the whole.'

* Early in Queen Elizabeth's reign, the firft four books of Ovid's Mctamorphofis were traiiflated by Arthur Goi.ding j and in a ftiort time afterwards, he completed the whole His ilyle is poetical and fpirited ; he excelled many of his cotem- poraries as a trauilator and a poet ; his vcrfions of many modern Latin writers were then of conliderable utility, as being adapted to the condition and opinions of the times. The Fafti of Ovid were rendered into Englifh verfe by an author whofe name does not appear ; and Thomas UvDER- powNE not only gave a tranflation of the Ibis, but illuftrated It with annot;tions.— Christopher Marloe was fo void of principle and decency, as to tranflate the elegies of the fame poet ; the elegant language of v/hich can make no atonement

for their obfcenities Ovid's Remedy of Love met with an

anor.yraous tra;iflator. A verfion of the Heroical Epiftles was publiiljcd by Thomas TuBERViLLE.-^There exifts, it is faid, one of Ovid's Epiftles tranflated by the accorapliihed Earl of Eflex. But if it could be recovered, it is probable that it would only be valued as a curiohty ; fince it is apparent, from a few of his Sonnets, which are preferved in the Afh- molean Mufeum, that he was not endued with a poetic ge- nius— Filially. Ovid's three iirft books of his Triftia were tranflated by Thomas Chukchyard.'

* Great attention was alfo paid to the prince of Latin poets, Virgil, riiomas Phayer, as mentioned in the pi-^ceding Di- vifioD, had tranflated in the reign of Q^Mary, the feven liril books of the ^neid. He afterv/ards tiniflied the eighth and nir-th books, but died foon after he had begun the tenth. This ill perfe£l work, after a fpace of more than twenty years, was completed by Thomas 'i wyne. To the four laft books of Virgil, Twyne added a tranflation of Maphoeus's fupple- meiJtal book. The reafon of Phaser's undertaking this verfion, according to his own account, was to infpire the young nobi- lity, gentry, and ladies of this country with a feni'e of the riches of their native tongue, and to Ihew, that the Englifli language was not, as too many thought, incapable of proprie- ty and elegance. — Robert Stanyhukst. a native of Dublin, alfo tranflated the four firft books of the J&ineid into Englifii

hexameters.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxi

hexameters. He was more unfortunate In the meafure of his verfification than his predeceflbrs, and he was not equal to them in other refpefts. — The Bucolics and Georgics of Virgil were tranflated as literal as poffible, by rendering verfe for verfe, in the regular Alexandrine without ihjme, by A- BR>HAM Fuming ; he afterwaids publifhed feparately the Alexis of Virgil, tranflated into Eaglifli hexameters, verfe for verfe.-^EnMU-'^'D Spknser condefcended to tranflatej though in a vague and paraphraftical manner, the Culex af- cribed to Virgil.'

* Thomas Drant publifhed a tranflation of the two books of Horace's Satires, which was followed bj the Epiftles, and the Art of Poetr j. The tranflator was at firft very paraphraf- tical, but afterwards endeavoured to be fo literal as well nigh to render word for word, and line for line. Timothy Kf.KDALL did not obtain much glory by the fpecimcns which he exhibited of his application to claffical literature. His per- formance cannot ftriftly be called a tranflation of Martial. be« Caufe it includes epigrams from many other writers, modern as well as ancient. Martial^ however^ forms the principal ba- fis of thework.'

* Marloe gave a verfion in blank Verfe of l=he firfl: book of Lucan. His death prevented his carrying on the defiga, which, in the reign of James I, was completed by Georgl- Chap- Man but in a very inferior manner — The Thebais of Statius^ was tranflated by Thomas Nkwton.'

* Befides the tranflacion of the ancient Latin claflic poetSj verfions were not uncommon from fome of the modern poeti- cal writers in the fame language. Among others, Mantuan, who had acquired the rank of a claflic, was tranflated by TUBERviLLE. — Another favourite author, among the Englifli fcholars in this period, was Palingenius, whofe '* Zodiac'* was rendered into Englifli verfe by Ba.N-by Googe ; and the tranflation had the good fortune of the original, to •be ve- ry much admired.'

* The tranflations from the ancient Latin profe writers were not fo numerous as from the poets. Golding, whom we have already mentioned with due refpe6l, enlai.-ged the knowledge of the treafures of antiquity, by his veiiions of Jufl:in's Hiftory, Caefar's Commentaries, and Sen »ca's fine moral treatife on Benefits. Works of lefs confequ ence, ren- dered into Englilh by Golding, were Pompoiiius M.fcln's Geo-

i 2 graph*.

lixii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

j^aphy, and the *' Polyhiflory" of Solinus. — Cicero's Oration for Archias was tranflatecl by Drant — Abraiiam Fleming puLliihed a tranflation of certain feie<Sl epiiUes of Cicero, and afterwards gave a lai-ge coUefticn from the fame author, to which were added letters of Pliny, and of other writers. — Tally's offices were tranflated by Nicholas Grimald, a poet of the age ; and fo adapted was the book to general inftruc- tion, that it was feveral times reprinted. — One of the mofl important tranflations of this period, was that of the four firlt books of Tacitus, and the life of Agricola, by Sir Henry Sa- viLLE. This tranflation was accompanied with notes ; which were deemed of fuch confequence, that they were afterwards rendered into Latm by Gruther, and publilhed at Amfterdam.' ' The books that were chiefly rendered mto Englifli from Italian and French authors, were of the fictitious and narra- tive kind. Among the produdilions of this nature, thofe of Botcace were the moft diftinguiflied favourites ; and the ver- fions made from different parts of his works, were very nu- inerous. Indeed the Italian language now began to be fo fafliionable, that Diftionaries and Grammars of it, written in Englifli, became common publications. The principal peifons tvho figured as tranflatois, were Gi-.ORGt Gascojgne, GlOf- FRY Kent o>r, Thomas Tub^ rville, George \Vh. tstonf^ Sir Jam.-.s Hakrington, and Edward Fairfax. — One of the works tranflated by Gafcoigne, is a comedy of Ariofto's called '* Suppofiti." which was afted at Gray's Inn. This tranflation is in pfofe ; and it is obfervable, that it was the firft comedy in profe which was compofed in our language;

and exhibited upon our 11 age The mofl: valuable of Fenton's

various ptrforqiances, was his verlion of the twenty books of Guicciardin's Hiftory of Italy ; for in this he prefented to his readers not fidion but truth ; and truth, too, of the tirft importance — Sir James Harrington's trar.flation of Ariofto'd Orlando Furiofo, was a great undertaking ; and though it is neither executed with fpirit nor with accuracy, it contributed to enrich our poetry with faew llores for the imagination, both of the romantic and comic fpecies. A wonderful union was prefented to the reader of Gothic machinery and familiar manners. — Edward Fairfax concludes the lift of poetical trans- lator% v^ith no fmall degree of eminence and celebrity. As he lived till the year 1632, he is commonly reckoned amoncj the poets of James ihe Firft's time. The grand work, upon

\ which

A

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Kxiii

which hia reputation wholly depends, the tranflation of Taffo's ** Jerufalem delivered," was performed by him in very early life, and was publifhed in Queen Elizabeth's reign, to whom it was aedicated. It undoubtedly Hands at the head of the poetical vvirfions of that aera. This tranflation is particularly diftinguilhed by the harmony of its verfification, in which refped: lie ranks nearly, if not entirely, upon a level with Spenfer. Waller acknowledged that he had learned his num- bers from Fairfax.'

* In general it may be obferved, that the beft ftoriea of the early and original novelties of Italy, in one form or other, were given in an Englifh drefs. The verfions from French authors were lefs frequent, and for the moft part of lefs importance. With regard to tranflations from the ancient-, \jLr Warton has remarked, thatalmoft all the Greek and Roman claflics appear- ed before the year 1600. 1 he remark we conlider as too general. Were we to enter into an enumeration of them, it would be feen, that many of the fineft claffic writers, both ia proie and verfe, were left untranflated'

* Imperfeft as the multifarious tranflations of this period were, they contributed, amongll other caufes, to excite a fpi- rit of criticifm, and an attention to the laws of compofition. This fpirit, hovveverj had been previoufly difplayed by one of the authors of the age, of whom little notice had been taken, till Mr Warton drew him out of obfcurity. It is Thomas Wil- son *, who in Q^ Mary's reign, (though he flouriflied chiefly

in

* This great improver of the Englifh language was a native of Lincolnftiire, and, in 1541, vvas admitted a fcholar of King's Col- lege, in Cambridge. He became fellow of the College, and whillt he refided at the Univerfity, was tutor to the two celebrated youths, Henry Duke of Suffolk, and Lord Charles Brandon, his brother. In due courfe, he took the degree of Do<3or of Laws, and was afterwards one of the ordinary mafters of requtlts, and mailer of St Catherine's Hofpital near the Tower. Being a man of bufinefs as well as learning, he was at times employed by Queen Elizabeth as ambaflador to Mary Queen of Scots, and into the low countries. At length he rofe to be a fecretary of Hate, and a . privy counfellor. In 1579 he waS appointed Dean of Durham, and died in Ij8i. It i? faid, that Dr Wilfon was endued with an uncommon ilrength of memory, and that this enabled him to aft

I with

isxW THREE PHILOLOGICAL

jn Elizabeths) publilhed an Art of Rhetoric in Englifb. — A technical and elementary manual, in our own tongue, written by Leonard Cox, had indeed appeared many years before ; but Wilfon*s treatife is more liberal and dil'curfive. It has the merit of having illuflrated the arts of eloquence by ex- ample, and of having examined and afcertained the beauties of compofition with the fpeculative (kill and fagaclty of acritic : fo that this work may juftly be confidered as the firil fyftem of criticifm that appeared in our language. The four parts belonging to elocution he ftates to be plainnefs, aptnefs, com- jWiition, and exornation, and has fome excellent obfervations on fimplicity of ftyle. Among other leflbns, this, he fays^ iiould be firfl learned, never to affect any ftrange inkhora terms, but to fpeak as is commonly received ; and he ftrong- iy condemns thofe writers who feek fo far for outlandifli Eng- liib, that they altogether forget their mother tongue. It ap- pears from the work, that to write elegantly in Englifli now began to be falLionable, and to meet with the higheft ap- plaufe.'

* Another compofition of a fimilar nature with Wilfon's Art of Rhetoric, though more confined in its objecl, was PuT- Tenham's " Art of Englilh Poefy." Puttenham had right notions of the true character of a poet, which is, to be pofl'eflf- cd of a creative genius. Accordingly, he commonly ufes the word " Maker" for poet ; and he was the firft author that brought this exprelTion into fafl:iion, the fignificancy of which has been much commended by Sir Philip Sidney and Ben John- fon. ImperfciSt as Puttenham's work is upon the whole, it was the only piece of poetical criticifm of any confequence, that England produced for a long period. Indeed, nothing of im- porta ^ce appeared on tlie fubjed, till Dryden began to write liis prefaces.*

* During Elizabeth's reign, the Englifh language was car- ried by fome writers to a high degree of perfeftion. There have not been wanting perfons who have thought, that our native tongue then rofe to the grcateft excellence which it has ever

attained;

v.ith reraarkable difpatch in his negociatlons. He was the author of vaiious other works befides the two which we had occafion to Jneution, and was one of the moft accompliflied fcholars of his rniic-. New Ann. Reg.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxv

att lined ; and Dr Johnfon, we believe, has cxpreffed the fame opinion. In this opinion, however, we do not ag-ree, though. we are fenfible of the extraordinary merit of a few individnais. Amongft thefe, particular praifes are due to Richard Hookkr, a celebrated divine. He exhibited a fine model of the reafoning llile in his famous " Ecclefiaftical Polity ;" a work that re- fleils high credit on his powers of reafonin^, a:id the extent of his literature. In this admirable produAion he fet a riuble example to his fucceiTors ^ an exainple which was fuccefbfullj followed by a Chillin'Tworth, a Locke, and a Hoadlj — Sir "Walteir RaL' IGH afforded feveral proofs, in this reign, of that dignity of compofition which he afterwards difplayed in his diftory of the World William Perkins, an eminent Di- vine at Cambridge, is faid to haA^e written the bed languags of any of that age or the next, and that many paiTages in his writings arc equal to thofe of the bell authors in modern times.'

* Spme of the ilatefmcn of Elizabeth's reign excelled in the propriety, freedom, and ftrength of their ftyle. This was the cafe with Roblkt DtviEEUx. Earl of EITex ; Robert Dub- ley, Earl of Leicefter ; and Thomas Ratcliffe, Earl of 8uf- fex. Of all the illuilrious charafters of this period, none, witli rerp^;'^ to E iglili cainioricjoa, was equal to the Earl of liLGTex, the Queen's unfortunate favourite. In a variety of inftances he gave ample proofs of his being both a vigorous and an elegant writer. Indeed, public men may be more likely to excel in this refpeft than mere fcholars. The latter, being confined to their clofets, contraft a formality and lliiFnefs of ftyle ;' and this was particularly the cafe, when the learn- ed by profeffion did not fo generally mix with the world, as is cuftomary at prefent. But thofe who are engaged in the grand fcenes of bufinefs, who have their talents called into exercife by frequent and ftriking emergencies, and who follow th^ diftates of tHeir immediate feelings, provided they have had a tolerable education, acquire an eafe and variety of ex- preffion, which the others cannot readily attain.'

* Englifli Poetry alTumed a peculiar importance and cha- rafler in the reign of Elizabeth. This was owing to a variety

of caufcs and circuniftances The age we are treating of has

often been called the golden age of our poetry ; and, if this may not be true in the ftricleft fenfe, it was certainly a very poetical aera, and few periods can be mentioned in our hiftory, wliich fhine in that view with fupenor lultre. The principal

features.

bcxvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

features, that ftri^ce us in the poetry of the times, are the predominancy of fables, fidion, and fancy, and a fondnefs for interefting adventures and pathetic events. This charaderif- tic diflin£lion may be chiefly referred to the following prin- ciples, v/hich were fometimes blended, and fometimes had a £ngle operation. Tlie principles we fpeak of were the revival and vernacular verfions of the dallies ; the vifionary reveries or rehnements of falfe philofophy ; a degree of fuperilition, fufiicient for the purpofes of poetry ; the adoption of the ma- diineries of romance; and the frequency and improvement of allegoric exhibitions in the popular fpedacles.'

* Many circumilances contributed to giVe a defcriptive, a |ji(R;urefque, and figurative call to the poetical language of our ccmtry ; and even the.profe compofitions of Elizabeth's reign took a tinifture from the fame caufes. In the mean while, general knowledge wars widely and rapidly incresriing. Book§ began to be mulriplie.1, and many ufeful and rational topics had been difcufled in our own tongue. Science, at the fame time, had not made fuch great advances as to damp the fpirit of invention' (fi£l ion). On the v/hole, we were now arrived at a period that was eminently propitious to original and true poetry. It- was a period in which genius was rather direfted tlian governed by judgment ; and in which tafle and learning had fo far only difcipliued imagiiiation, as to fuiTer its exceffes to pafs without cenlure or coutroul, for the fake of the beau- ties to which they were allied.'

* At the time when the objeds pointed out by us were cal- culated to have a powerful operation upon the nature andcha- racler of our poetry, a genius of the firft order arofe, who was animated with a fidl portion of the fpirit of the age, and capa- ble of painting it in all its energy. This genius was Spenser, and the production we allude to, his " Faery ^ueene." — It was not to Homer, or Virgil, or even to Tafi'o, that Spenfer looked up for a model ; but to Arioflo : and it was confe- quently his intention to produce a poem v/hich fhould con- fift of allegories, enchantments, and romantic expeditions, con- ducted by knights, giants, magicians, and fiflitious beings. If he was blameable in this refpeCt, the fault is not fo much to be imputed to himfelf, as to the times in which he lived. It was natural for him to follow the mode of compoiition which then was molt admired, and to adopt thofe laws of tafte, which Italian critics had approved : for Italy, not France,

was

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxvii

was in Elizabeth's reign the arbiter of elegance ; and in Italy Arioflo was greatly preferred to Taflb. Whether this opinion Was juft or not, we are not here called upon to determine. It is fufficient for our purpofe to obferve, that it was embraced by Spenfer ; and that upon this principle, the plan of his grand poem, the Fairy Queen, was framed.— In power^ of invention and richnefs of fancy, he has fcarcely ever been ex- ceeded. To the difplay of thefe talents, the fubjefts he was led to, by the faihionable reading of the times, were peculiarly accommodated. There could not be more admirable inftru- ments in the hands of a genuine poet, than the adventures and manners of chivalry, and the fuperflitions and enchantments of the dark. ages. They gave fcope for all the wildnefs and beauty of imagery, and for all the fplendour and majefty of defcription ; circumftances, of which Spenfer has availed him- felf in the higheft degree. As, therefore, his Fairy Queen comes recommended to us by fo many excellencies, it may be thought furprifing, that at prefent it fhould, comparatively^ have only a fmall number of readers. But this may be ac- counted for from feveral caufes. The cuftoms and manners defcribed by Spenfer are vanilhed away, and confequently are little underftood by the bulk of mankind. His allufions, like- wife, are often too abilrufe and learned f6r common apprehen- fion ; and fome degree of obfoletenefs hangs upon his language* Nor is allegorical poetry adapted to the general underflanding. Hence it is that Spenfer, with all his merit, can only be the lafting favourite of the few, who, by reading and true tafte, are fully qualified to appreciate, and to feel, his tranfcendent beauties. By fuch perfons, he will be admired and applaud- ed, fo long as poetry fhall continue to be the obje£t of admira- tion and applaufe. — Various Other poems were written by him, befides the Fairy Queen, amoftg which the " Shep- herd's Calendar," has excited the greateft attention. By the admirers of paftoral poetry it has always been held in high eftimation, and it has no fmill merit of its kind. It has been the fubjeft of imitation to fucceeding writers ; and the fame has been the cafe with regard to his " Aftrophel," or Elegy on the death of Sir Philip Sidney. It is a paftoral ele- gy ; and we know that paftoral elegies have been fabricated in this country, by a long train of verfifiers, till they have be- come inlignificant, and even difgufting. It need not be added, that we except the Lycidas of Milton.'

k 'So

bcxviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

* So ftrongly was the age of Elizabeth devoted to poetry, that poetical publications were more numerous than thofe of any other fpecies of compofition in our language. One eflfed of this tafte in the nation was, that there were two collections of *' Flowers" fele£led from the works of the moft fafhionable poets. The firfl was entitled, ** England's Parnaffus ;" and the other, " Belvidere, or the Garden of the Mufes." The former had the fuperiority, both in point of method and fe- leflion. Thus a cuftom was begun, which in our own time, has been carried to a blameable excels. If fuch compilations are not wholly deftitute of utility, they have the difadvantage of contributing to the number of fuperficial readers, and of pre- venting manj^ authors from being entirely read, the whole of v/hofe produdlions might jullly claira a diligent peru^fal.*

* It will not be expedled, that we Ihould endeavour to recite the names of all the writers of general poetry, that appeared during the reign of Elizabeth. Several of them, though ap- plauded by their cotemporaries, are now found to have been

entitled to no more than a fmall degree of praife George

Gascoigne, in addition to his merit as atranflator and a drama- ttft, may here be mentioned as having been efteemed one of the bell love- poets of his time. He attained alfo fome reputation as a fatirilt. — Gabriel Harvey deferves to be remembered with refpeCl, on account of a copy of verfes written by bim, llgned Hobbinol, and which is prefixed to Spenfer's Fairy Queen. It has even been faid that tliis poem, if he had compofed nothing elie, Vv'ould have rendered him immortal. George TuBERViLLE's compofitions, bcfides his tranflations, were of various kinds j fuch as epitaphs, epigrams, fongs, and fonnets ; and poems defcribing the places and manners of the country of Ruflia, where he reiided for a time, a^ fecretary to Sir Tho- mas Randolph. He was one of thofe who endeavoured to re- fine the Engliih ftyle. — Sir John Harrington deferves little notice as a poet, independently of his tranflation of Ariofto. His Epigrams, however, are not deftitute of wit — If, amidft fo many claims to admiration and applaiife. Sir Walter Raleigh is to be fpoken of as a poet, his title to that ap- pellation belongs to the re'gn of Elizabeth ; for his poetical pieces were entirely the amufenients of bis youth, his attention being foon dire£led to fuperior purfaits.'

* There is fame difficulty in afcertaining the exa61: propor- tion of fame due to Sir Philh* Sidney, as a poet. He was a

paffionate

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxlx

paflionate admirer of the art of poetrj, and his produ£lions in this way were very numerous. It is univerfally allowed, that he was unfortunate in his attempts to introduce the Roman meafures of verfe into our language, thofe meafures not a- greeing with the genius of the Engliih tongue.'

* Joseph Hall, who, in procefs of time became fucceflive- ly Bifhop of Exeter and Norwich, is entitled to particular diftintlioa as a fatiric poet. At the beginning of his cele- brated " Virgidemiarum " he claims the honour of having led die way in this fpecies of compofition ;

■*' I Srfl adventure, follow me who lift,

"" And be the fecond EngHfli fatyrift." This affertion of our poet is not ftridtly true ; for there were various fatirical writings previouily to his appearance. But he was the firll who dillinguiihed himfelf as a legitimate fatirifl, ujDon the clallic model of Juvenal and Perlius, with an intermixture of fome flrokes in the manner of Horace. Suc- ceeding authors have availed themfelves of the pattern (ct them by Hall.'

* Sir Richard Maitland was the principal Scotch ver- nacular poet of tliis period. His productions were various, and are read with pleafure by thofe who are competent maf- ters of the local and obfolete language in which they are written Alexander Arbuthnot, Alexander Mont- gomery, and John Rolland, may be paffed over without farther notice ;.nor is it merit, but rani?:, that induces us to mention James VI. of Scotland. He publiHaed in 1585, " The EfTayes of a Prentife in the divine Arte of Poelie ;" and hi 1591, " His Majefties poetical Exercifes at vacant Houres." King James acted the critic as well as the poet. At the end of the firfl of thefe performances are, ** Rewlis and Cautelis of Scottis Poefie," which, fays Mr Pinkerton, are curious, though itupjd.'

* We clofe the fubjeft of the poetry of this period with fome view of it, as difplayed in the dramatic form. The firft regular tragedy which England produced was early in Eliza- beth's reign ; and this was the Gorboduc of Thomas Sack- viLLE, Lord Buckhurll. It is written in blank verfe, divided into a£ls and fcenes, and cloathed in all the formalities of the legitimate drama. The firft exhibition of it was in the great hall of the Inner Temple, by the ftudents of that Society, as part of the entertainment of a grand Chriftmas ; and in Ja-

jc 2 nuary

Ixxx THREE PHILOLOGICAL *

nuary, 1 561-2, it was again reprefented before the Qdeen at Whitehall. It was not intended for the prefs, but having been furreptitioufly and carelef ly printed, a correct edition was given in 1571. Though this tragedy never was a fa- vourite, even among our anceftors, and has long fallen into ge- neral oblivion, the language of it has great purity and per- fpicuity, and it is entirely free from that tumid phrafeology which afterwards took place aniong our dramatic poets. Eve- ry fcene of the Gorboduc is marked with Sackville's charac- teriftical manner, which confifts in a perfpicuity of ftyle, and a command of numbers, fuperior to the tone of his times.'

* Christopher Marloe, whom we have mentioned as a tranflator, appeared with greater luftre as a dramatic poet. Six tragedies were written by him, and he began a fe- venth, which was completed by another hand. It is remark- able, and indicates the credulous ignorance of the age, that the fubjeft of one of his pieces fhould be the Tragical Hiftory of the Life and Death of Dr. John Fauftus. Marlce's chief fault in defcription is an indulgence of the florid ftjle, and an ac- cumulation of conceits, refulting, however, from a warm and brilliant fancy. It has even been faid of him, that he bore fome refemblance to the incomparable Shakefpeare. The tra- gedy of Dido, left incomplete by Marloe, was finiihed by by Fhomas Nashe, who was likewife the author of a comedy. — Gf.orge Whetstone was a writer upon various fubjefts in profe ; but his poetical compofitions were of too quaint and pedantic a nature, to deferve the attention of pofterity. His comedy, *' Promos and Cafl'andra," no otherwife deferves to be noticed, than as it is faid, that Shakefpeare founded upon it his " Meafure for Meafure." Befides other works, Whet- ilone drew up a life of George Gascoigne, who claims a place among our dramatic poet?, not only as the tranflator of the " Jocalla" of Euripides, and the '* Suppofes" of Ariofto, but as the author of a tragi-comedy, called the Glafs of Go- vernment," and a Mafque, entitled, " The Princely Pleafures of Kcnnelworth Caftle." This Mafque is compofed partly in profe, and partly m rhyme ; and is a relation of the enter- tainment given to Queen Elizabeth at Kennelworth, by Robert

Dudley, Earl of Leicefl;er, in the month of July, 1575

JoAn Lilly wrote a number of comedies, which were a£ted before the Queen, and feem to have been much applauded in their day. He has been highly extolled as a reformer and

purifier

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxxi

purifier of the Englilli language ; but the aiFefted turn of his compolitions, and efpeciaily of his " Euphues," a romance, does not give credit to fuch an encomium. — Another comic writer of this reign was Robert Green. He was a man of great humour and drollery, and by no means deficient in point of wit ; which talents, however, were proftituted by him to the bafe purpofes of vice and obfcenity. It is faid of him,

that he was the fir Ji author %vho wrote for bread George

Peele exercifed his abilities for the Itage in a different form. His " Arraignment of Paris" was a dramatic Paftci'al ; his " Edward the Firfl" an hiftorical play ; and his " King David and Fair Bethfabe," a tragedy. . He wrote, like- wife, another tragedy, called " The Turkiih Mahomet, and Hyren the fair Greek," which has not been pi-iuted. The llory, no doubt, is the fame as that, upon which Dr. Johnfon's *' Irene" is founded. Other poems were written by Peele, and it has been admitted, that he was a good paftoral poet.*

* But all the dramatic authors, we have mentioned, and the luftic they flied Q{i\ the reign of Queen Elizabeth, are ofJittle iignificance,when compared with the glory, which was refiefted upon it by its having produced Shaki speare, that mailer of human nature and hunaan life ; that prodigy of invention and imagination ; that commander of the fublime, the pathetic, and the comic ; that painter of external pailions and external man- ners 9 that miracle of df fcription, moral wifdom, and deep pe- netration ; and that treafure of pure poetry. It was in the latter end of this period, that he wrote forne of his tinefl pieces, and difplayed the'wonderful fources and energies of his mind. We pretend not to give a minute character of Shakefpeare. This it would be impoffible to do with juflice; in many pages. Befides, he chiefly flouriihed in the next reiga of James 1, fur- rounded with his great competitors, but far furpaffing them all."

'Among the mifcellaneous writers of the age, Sir Philip. Sidney deferves the firft place. His " Arcadia" was long high- ly celebrated and greatly admired. What Sir Philip has ob- ferved concerning " Amadis de Gaule," may in fome degree be applied to his own performance. *' Truly," fays he, " I " have known men^ that even with reading Amadis de Gaule, f* which God knows, wanteth much of a perfect poelie, have f* found their hearts moved to the exercife of curtefie, libe- f' ralitie, and efpeciaily coarage." — But there is another pro- duction,

Ixxxii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

du6lion, on account of which Sir Philip deferves to be record- ed with honour as a mifcellaneous writer. This is his '* De- fence of Poefie," which will probably long continue to be read with pleafure, by perfons of true tafte and difcernment. It is an ample and mallerly vindication of the art, and there are many pafi'ages in it, which difplay great power of compofition.*

* Henry Cuff has here fome claim to remembrance, in confequence of his " Treatife on the Diiferences of the Ages of Man's Life." It is a curious and philofophical performance j but the value of it is diminilhed by its partaking too much of that uncouthnefs of language, which was generally prevalent. Cuff was the unfortunate fecretary to the Earl of ElTex, and had in his mafler a fupcrior model of Englifti llyle ; for the former had habituated himfelf to write like a fcholar, while the latter managed his pen with the freedom of a man of the world. — To the names already given, may be added that of Sir Geoffrey Fenton, fecretary of Itate in the kingdom of Ireland. He chiefly figured in the capacity of a tranflator, and his principal works were " Golden Epiilles," gathered from Latin, French, and Italian authors ; and a tranflation of " The Hiftory of the Wars of Italy, by Francis Guicciardini, in twenty Books." — Sir Geoffrey wrote with eafe, and his Jlyle reflefts credit on his judgment and tafte.'

* The mifcellaneous authors of eminent ftation were the following : Lord Buckhurst ; Edward Vere, feventeenth Earl of Oxford; William Poulett, Marquis of Winchef- ter ; Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicefter ; William Cecil, Lord Burleigh ; Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton ; Lord Chancellor Hatton ; and Henry Gary, firft Lord Falk- land. Among the female authors of this period, the il-

luftrious Queen Elizabeth maintains the firft rank ; for fhe was the moil learned woman of the age. Befides her tranfla- tions into Greek and Latin, which are foreign to this hiftori- cal view, Ihe tranfiated Plutarch de Curiofitate, Boethius's Confolation of Philofophy, Salluft's Jugurthine War, and part of Horace's Art of Poetry, into her native language. — By her cotemporaries Pllizabeth has been highly extolled for her poetry ; but this mufl be attributed to the flattery of the age. I'he beautiful, the unfortunate, and the imprudent Mary Qxjeen of Scots makes but a feeble comparifon with her rival Elizabeth ; for llie was far inferior to her in profound eru- dition, and ratjjer excelled in thofe lighter parts of literature,

tl^at

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxxlit

that were fafhionable at the Court, where fhe had been edu- cated. Befides the poems written by her in Latin, French, and Scotch, fhe compofed alfo a •* Confolation of her long Im- prifonment, and royal Advice to her Son." Many of her Letters occur in public libraries, and a^e frequently finding their way to the prefs, in confequence of the minute attention to hillorical information, which is now fo generally prevalent. Mary Sidney, Countefs of Pembroke, and fifter to Sir Philip Sidney, was a very accompliihed lady, and received ample tef- timonies of her merit. The two works, which fhe publifhed, were only tranflations ; one being ** A Difcourfe of L fe and Death ;" and the other, " The Tragedie of Antonie." — But among the women of this period, who were devoted to the fludy of literature, the principal place is due to the four daughters of Sir Anthony Cooke. They were well acquaint- ed with the ancient and modern languages, and tranflated fe- veral works into their own. — Mildred, the eldeft of the four lifters, was, for more than forty-two years, the wife of the il- luftrious ftatefman William Cecil, Lord Burleigh. She tranf- lated a piece of St Chryfoftom's, from the original, into the Englifii language — Anne, the fecond daughter of Sir Anthonjr Cooke, became the wife of the Lord-keeper, Sir Nicholas Bacon, and was the mother of the illuftrious Francis Bacon. She tranflated from the Italian into Englifli, twenty-five Ser- mons written by Barnardine Ochine, a celebrated divine of that age, concerning the predeftination and ele£lion of God. Not long after her marriage. Lady Bacon gratified the curiofity of the public, and contributed much to the inftruction of her countrymen, in religious matters, by tranflating from the La- tin into Englifh, an ** Apology for the Church of England ;" originally written by the learned and eloquent Bifhop Jewel. — Elizabeth, the third daughter of Sir Anthony, was firft mar- ried to Sir Thomas Hobby, and fecondly to John, Lord Kuf- fell, fou and heir to Francis Ruflell, Earl of Bedford. She wrote epitaphs for her fon, daughter, brother, fifter, both huf- bands, and a venerable old friend, in the Greek, Latin, and Englifti tongues. Befides thefe. Lady Ruflel tranflated, from the French into Englifli, a tra(!it, entitled " A way of Recon- ciliation of a good and learned Man, touching the true nature and Subftance of the Body and Blood of Chrift." — Katherine, the fourth daughter in this learned family, though likewi-fe famous for her knowledge in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin

language,

Ixxxiv THREE PlilLOLOGICAL

languages, and for her (kill In poetry, does not appear to have been the author of any diftinft treatife.'

* It muft, however, be remembered, that the literature of the women of that period extended comparatively but to a few perfons, and thofe only of confiderable rank ; the generality of the female fex beifjg in a ftate of .ignorance. I'here was by no means that difFufion of knowledge, that cultivation of mind, that tafte for books, with which we now meet, in al- moft every company of ladies. Neither do we find, that the learned women of the fixteenth century produced fuch works as have continued td be read much by pofterity. The moft important produftion of any of Sir Anthony Cooke's daughters, was Lady Bacon's tranflation of Biftiop Jewel's Apology ; and yet, who but an antiquary will now feek for it, or give himfelf the trouble of perufing it ? Not a fingle poetefs, deferving to be mentioned, arofe in this country till the feventeenth century. The Dutchess of • Newcastle* Mrs Katherine Philips, and Mrs. Behn, appear to have been the firft who could, in any degree, merit that appella- tion. Independently of poetry, the learned women of Eliza- beth's reign have been far exceeded by the ingenious ladies of the prefent age, both in the general and extenfive utility of their writings, and in the elegancies of compofition. There is a remark to be made concerning the difference between the literature of the ladles of the fixteenth century, and that of the females of more recent times. The former entered deeply into the fludy of the ancient languages ; whilft the latter, be- fides acquiring a Ikill in the modern tongues, efpecially the French and the Italian, have paid their principal attention to the cultivation of general knowledge ; though a few of them have been no fmall proficients in the learning of antiquity.'

* Among the numerous Divines of this period, who have a claim to peculiar and extraordinary diftindlion, both as men of letters and as improvers of tlieir native language, we have already mentioned Richard Hooker, to whom we ftiall join the name of Thomas Bilson, fucceflively Bifhop of Worcef- ter and Wincheftcr. This prelate was one of the final cor- rectors of the Englilb tranllation of the Bible, in the reign of J/\Mr s I. For this ofiice he appears to have been particularly qualified, as his fly.'e is, in general, more eafy and harmonious than was common among the ecclefiaftics of his time.'

* Amidft die endlefs theological produdions of the age, ori-

giftal

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxxv

ginal works in Ethics were almoft totallj unknown among us, till at length the pablic received ample gratification from Francis Bacon's Effays, concerning which we need not fay, that they opened a rich treafury of moral obfervation, and that they were worthy of the great and comprehenlive mind, from which they proceeded. The name of Effays was then new to the world, and perhaps had been derived from Mon- taigne. Thus Bacon introduced into England a fpecies of writing, which has fince been largely cultivated, which has produced a vail number of beautiful compofitions, and which conftitutes an elegant part of modern literature.'

The fpecimens of compofition quoted by Dr. Johnfon, in his Hiftory of the Englifli language, extend only to the period, in which X)r Wilfon wrote j a man whofe merits in refining hfs native tongue we have ftated in page Ixxiii &feq. It would, however, have been very ufeful, if Dr. Johnfon had produced further fpecimens, * taken from the writers of the fixteenth and feventeenth centuries, fo that the fubfequent tranfition, from the Saxon-Normannic to the modern Englifti language, might have been exhibited in an uninterrupted view. During a period of two centuries and a half, a living language muft undergo great changes. This is particularly obvious in the German, when we compare the language of the modern Ger- mans with that of Luther and his cotemporaries. I propofe, therefore, to conclude this Effay with a few general remarks.

1. The cultivation of a language altogether depends upon the progrefs, which a nation makes in tafte, and in philofophi- cal acquirements. The latter enrich a language, while the for- mer contribute to give it an agreeable form, and to regulate its inflexion and harmony. Hence the hiftory of a language cannot be properly exhibited, without giving a clofely con- nected view of the refpedtive improvements of the people, that make ufe of this language.

2. As in languages we find no arbitrary but conventional

1 arrange-

* If it were confiftent with the limits allotted to this publication, ■many other fpecimens from later writers might have been inferted. But as the works of the beft authors, during the feventeenth and eighteenth centaries, are pretty generally known, this omiflioa cannot be confidered as material.

W.

Ixxxvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

arrangements in every part of them; hence the changes, which a language from time to time undergoes, mull be de- duced and explained from the particular circumftanceg, in which a nation is placed. In order to fix our attention here eixclufivelj upon the Englifh language, we may obferve, that though the conquefl of England by the Normans, points out the caufe of the fubfequent mixture of the Saxon-Danifli dialeft with the Normannic ; yet as many nations have been conquered by invaders, whofe languages were not introduced into the vanquifhed countries, this mixture cannot be fatis- fadlorily explained, unlefs we have recourfe to a variety of concurrent circumftances. Among thefe, the relative fitua- tion, in which the conquerors were placed towards the conquer- ed, deferves particular attention. As long as the conquerors ruled the natives with defpotic rigour, their language pre- vailed, both at court and in common life ; they compelled the fubjugated Britons to make ufe of the Normannic language, as well in their mutual intercourfe as in all public tranfactions. Thus this language fpread rapidly, even among the lower or- ders of the people. B]ut as the dominion of the proud Norman Barons -did not continue loi-^g enough, to fupprefs completely the language of the country ; and as the lower clafies, under Henry II, again acquired their former importance, the old popular language likewife refumed its former authority. Befides this circumftance, the nation at the fame time advanced in know- ledge, tafle, and improvements of every l^ind, fo that the de- ficiencies and imperfediions of the ancient language were foon difcovered. On this account, the more refined Normjinnic tongue, with which the people were already acquainted, was mingled v/ith the dialedl of the natives : and as England iienceforth continued to improve in knowledge and tafte, by its intercourfe with France, it happened, that the French lan- guage difplayed its influence more and more upon that of the Englifli ; particularly as its kindred dialcfl, the Normannic, had already paved the way for this mixture. Hence, too, we can explain the fmgular phenomenon, that of two names given to the fame objeft, the. one of which is of Saxon-Danifii, and the other of Normannic or French extraftioii, tjie latter fhould be more dignified than the former, or, at lealt, ufed more fre- quently among the higher claiTes of fociety. The words ox^ y'"'fi "^ethcr^ are derived from the DanifliSaxon ; but heef^

vealf

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxxvli

'veal, and mutton * from the Normannlc-French. " Manj other inilances of a fimilar nature occur in modern Englifh.

3. Befides the peculiarities found in every individual na- tion, there are, in many languages of nations intimately con- nected, always fome particulars, in which they all agree : and as this is obfefvable during one and the fame period of time, it mufl be explained from the prevailing fpirit of the age. , lit order to give an example of this kind, we fhall mention the appearance of the foftening letter e, which, fince the fifteenth century, has been prevalent in feveral languages of Europe. The adoption of this letter appears to have arifen in confe- quence of the progreffive refinement of tafte, fo that fpeaker;^ and writers of modern languages felt the neceffity of foftening the harfhnefs of the vernacular tongues, which were overload- ed with confonants. For this purpofe, the infertion or the addition of the vowel e has been the moft ufual and the moft general expedient ; by which, among other languages, the French in particular has been much refined. The fame has been adopted in the German, as the words, Buhe, Knabe, a boy ; Kdfe, cheefe ; etige, narrow ; blode, weak, timid ; Getreide^ corn, and many others, were fince that period written and fpoken with an additional e, inftead of the harder words. Baby Knaby Kasy eng^ blod, Gstreid. — A fimilar method has been praclifed in the Englifh language, as is obvious from the fpe- cimens given in the earlier periods of its' Hiftory. But the limits of propriety, in this refpeft, were foon tranfgreffed in all the modern languages, and this e was frequently annexed, without neceffity, to many words, in which it ferved only to obfcure their ftrufture and inflexion, or at leaft to reader them aukward and heavy. Sudh are, in German, the words, die Gefchwijiere, the brotliers and fillers ; die Biirgermeijlere, the BurgQ-mafters ; oft'Oy frequently ; reiney purely ; die Ableitunge, the derivation ; and in Englilh, the words, ordering^ both e, accoirdynge, fuch^-, anyf, and many others. Hence all the lan- guages, as the people advanced in found tafte and knowledge, have, in latter times, reftrained this addition .within certain and proper limits. ,

* The words here employed in illuftatrion of the remark, do not appear to, have been diltiniSly underltood by Mr. Adelung ; for theyare not ftri£tly fynotiymous, and though they both refer to the objefts expreffed by them, yet always in different ftates of their exirtence, VV.

\ X ESSAY

ESSAY SECOND.

A Ph'tlofophical view of the English Language

Why called Philofophical ?

J.T has now become ufual in language, to call that method of treating a fubjeft philofophical, where we not only defcribe the phenomena as they exift, btit inquire alfo, how they came to be what they are, and why they are fo. And it is merely in this fenfe I make ufe of this expreffion here ; for the term philofophical ftriftly impliesr nothing more than rational. It would lead me too far, were I to ihow the fuperiority of this rational method in languages, over the mechanical mode of teaching, hitherto pra^ifed* It has already been introduced, With fuccefs, in all the other fciences ; language alone is behind in this refpeft : for which reafon grammar muft ftill be contented with the contemptible appellation of a mere art, however fufceptible it may be of a fcientific method. All I intend here is merely an eJJ'peri mental inquiry, in which I propofe to fele£t a few ofi the mor6 renjarkable phenomena occurring in the Engliih language ; fo that the reader mufl by no means expeft to find a grammar, in the common accep- ^tation of that term.

Of the Enf^lifh Language.

"What has been the origin of the Englifli language, and by what means, by what intrinfic and extrinfic changes it has been gradually improving, for upwards of a thoufanfl years pafl, has been Ihewn in the preceding Eilay. — It is fpo- ken in the greateft part cf England, and in the Low-lands of Scotland, while, on the contrary, in the mountainous parts of Scotland, in Ireland, and in the Engliih provinces of Wales and Cornwall, anothei language prevails, which is the offspring of the oldell language of the country, the Britiih, and bears an afliiiity lo that fpoken in the French' province of Britanny.

Of

__.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG Ix/cxlx

Of the Englijh Written Language,

The Englilh, like every other living language, is afgain di- vided into various dialefts, which differ, partly according to the diftricls of the country where they are fpoken, partly ac- cording to the degrees of ctiltivation acquired by thofe who fpeak them. The moil improved of theie dialedls, as ia every other language, is likewife the written language of the nation, and in the ftridleft fenfe termed the Engliili lano-ua'^e. The moft accompliftied part of the nation is here, 'as in many other ftates, the court, and the higher clafles of the innabitants of the Capital : for wealth and tafte are generally the attend- ants of the court, and their natural influence on language is here accordingly moll remarkable. Hence jt is this refined <!iale£l, which all writers of tafte employ, and which, out of the Capital, can be learned only from books. •

Divifion of Grammar.

Grammar is divided into two principal parts, of which the firft and moft important relates to the art of fpeaking with propriety, the fecond to the art of writing corre6lly, or ortho- graphy. As one muft firft fpcak properly, before he can write with acciiracy, (Orthography ought, injuHice, to hold the laft place in every grammar. Yet as no progrefs can be made in fpeaking, without acquiring the elementary part of the mode of writing, it is cuftomary to begin with the ortho- graphy ; particularly in fuch languages as are fpoken dif- ferently from what they are written.

Of the Englifh Written CharuBers.

There is every reafon to believe, that the ancient Britons were as little acquainted with the art of writing, as any of the rude and femi-barbarous nations of thofe times. The Romans, indeecf, as foon as they cftablifhed themfelves in -Britain, likewife introduced their written characters ; but it does not appear, that they were adopted by the natives : and though this had been the cafe, they v/ould have been loft by the fucceeding invalions of the Saxons, who, at their firft ap- pearance in this country, were a more rude and favage people than the ancient Britons As foon as the Saxons were con- verted to Chriftianky, they received the Roman characters

r - ijom

xc THREE PHILOLOGICAL

from their Ifalian and Gallic teachers of religion ; and thefe charadlers had been already transforpied, and adapted to tlic running hand, then in ufe.

Of the Anglo-Saxon Alphabets

As the Saxons had certain founds in their unpolifiied and harfli language^ with which the Romans, as well as the culti- vated Gauls were unacquainted, and which therefore could. not be expreffed by the com-mon written characters of the lat- ter, many of thefe were changed, and fome new ones adopted ; fuch as that which reprefents the hilling thy and which was borrowed from the Greek. 0, theta. This alphabet, termed the Anglo-Saxon, maintained its ground till the invafion oit the Normans, and for a confiderable time after that event.

Of its difufe.

However much the ancient Roman charafters might have been disfigured by the corrupted tafte of the middle ages, they flill retained a certain affinity to their original form : but this affinity was dellroyed by the peculiar Anglo-Saxon letters. — In the Saxon and Saxo-DaniHi periods, the national tafle, notwithftanding the progrefs it had made, was ftill much too rude, to exhibit this corruption, in a fenfible manner. But when the Normans fubjecled England to their power, and began to fpread the higher degrees of im- provement, that prevailed in France ; when the Saxo-Da- fu'fli languTige itfelf was refined by the Norreannic and later French ; this aukward flate ot things became evident, the old Anglo-Saxon charafters were again abandoned, and the Roman alphabet in its pure form, fuch 'as prevailed at that time in France, was confequently adopted, in preference to the former. This change, however^ was now attended with the inconve* nience, that the fimple biffing middle-found, which had for- merly been exprefled by the letter 0, borrowed from the Greek, behoved now to be denoted by the compound ///, ^vhich could exprefs it only in a very imperfecl: manner. But if the improvements in a language be carried on with tafte, of two inconveniences, that one is always preferred, which is t]\e leaft repugnant to the fenfe of beauty and propriety. The old Anglo-Saxon figure difagreed altogetlier with the fym-

metry

ESSAYS, BY AD E LUNG. xci

pietry of the Roman letters ; an^ therefore proved more offen- five to found tafle, than the th^ although it be a compound lign for a fimple found, becaufe it was ftill agreeable to the Roman faihion, at leafl with refpeft to its lliape.

Of angular Written CharaBers.

To trace all the changes, which thefe charaiSers have, from, time to time, undergone in their figure, would be tedio-as, and is not properly an objeft of this inquiry. I ll:iall remark only- one circumflance. In the latter centuries of the middle age, when tafte and induftry began to revive, there arofe a mode of - writing, which is properly denominated the '' Broken writ,'* ' but which, in common life, is generally called the <' Monkiih. writing," becaufe the monks, in particular, ufcd it in their manufcripts. It is alfo frequently termed the *' Gothic cha- rafter," not as if it had been invented and ufed by the Goths^ but in fo far onlj^, as we are accuflomed to call all that tafte Gothic, which delights in angular, pointed, and curled orna- ments. As this handwriting was certainly more beautiful than the long and " waving" current hand, formerly in ufe, it afterv/ards became general over all Europe, and maintained its place till the revival of the fciencesVnd of good tafte, when people returned to the beautiful Roman letters, as they were formed, before the barbarous nations imprinted on them the marks of their corrupted and uncultivated tafte.

Thefe charafters were firft difcontinued in Italy, where the round Roman hand was foon revived, which is therefore term- ed Italian ; and whence it was by degrees introduced into feveral countries of Europe. But as the prevailing degree of tafte was by no means uniform, either in all countries, or a- mong all the clafles of qne and the fame nation, this change happened in different ways, and with various modifications. England, fince the preceding century, has been gradually a- dopting the round Italian letter, in all writings defigned for the higher and middle clafles ; while, on the contrary, in fucli writings as are immediatelj- addrefl'ed to the common people (for inftance, in a^s of parliament, public deeds, &c.) the old angular character, generally called " engrofiing," is ftill ufed ; becaufe they have been long accuftomed to it, and have not 3^et acquired a fufticient degree of tafte *, tp perceive its in- elegance. The

* The author certainly alludes here to the Englifti lawyers only ;

xcii THREE PHILOLOGICAL,

"The Knglijh write differently from what they f peak.

The Eaglifh languat^e confifts of a mixture of the old Saxoa and Daniili, of the Normannic and modern French, and of the Latin. The Italian and Spauifli are often added to this num- ber, but thefe two languages neither have had, nor could have had, fo great an influence on the English, as to form a confti- tuent part of it, although individual words may be derived from them, vsrhich holds alfo with refpecl to many other lan- guages. And as tlie languages before mentioned are fo differ- ent from each other in their external and internal ftrudlure, it is eafy to fee, that this aflociation or combination of words eould not take place without great violence, and the dellruc- tion of a great part of the peculiarities of each of the languages thus combined in the Engiifti. Since, in all languages, a clofe .adherence to etymology .preferves their peculiar form, and has «. tendency to prevent thofe remarkable changes, which the conftant progrefs of civilization, as well as the precipitate al- terations of the people, would otherwife produce ; it is not difficult to perceive, that, by this method of adopting and incor- porating words, the proximate ftru6lure of them, with refp^ft to the ear at leaft,mull in a great variety of inftances be deftroy- ed ; efpecially as this ftrufture, in general, is but very imper- fectly known in fuch words, as are derived from a foreign lan- guage, that forms a component part of the ancient language of the country. The pronunciation, accordingly, in all fuch mixed languages, is exceedingly variable ; becaufe the neareft derivation, of the greater number of words, is unknown to the people, who fpeak them ; and confequently there is no fixed immoveable point, to which the ideas denoted by them, might be attached, and which could guide the tongue and the ear. This deficiency is obvious in .all thofe modern languages, which have been formed by a mixture with the Latin, as the Italian, French, Spanifli, and Portuguefe, the pronunciation of which is expofed to far more confiderable changes than fuch languages, as have remained pure and unmixed, like the Ger- man

as the. continuation cf this barbarous charafter is produ61ive of confiderable fees, while thedifufe of it woi^ld materially .aflfe£l tLeif I.'iterelL

Noteoftbt Cofr.pifftor.

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xiil

man and her northern fifteis. Thofe mixed languages, too, would in a few centuries be deprived of tVieir iiniformity, had not the " latent perception" of neceffity funiifhed thefe nations with a method of preferring, for a long time, the proximate derivation of words, at leaft to the eye, though the ear mav have lofl it.

Explanation of this phenomenon.

The method of preferring the etymology of words, as a- dopted by the nations above alluded to, is no other than this, that people write differently from what they fpeak : a phe- nomenon, which indeed has been hitherto leprefented, by grammarians -and philoiophic linguifts, as the moll palpable abfurdity that can be conceived ; although the agreement of all the weftern nations of Europe, in what they have thus term- ed abfurdity, fliould have convinced them, that there mui^ be fome realv>n for it, and which ought not to be overlook- ed. This reafon then is no other, than to preferve, as long aa itj neceffary, to the eye at leaft, the proximate derivation by means of writing, although the pronunciation has loft it ; to promote thereby that univerfal intelligibility, which is the firft and principal obje£l of language ; and, at the fame time to prevent the fwerving and fluftuating pronunciation, as

long as poffible, from further and ftill greater deviations .

An example or two will ferve to make the matter more evi- dent. The following words, being borronved from the French and Latin languages, legality ^ legion^ organ^ orgies, are now pronounced legallity^ led^hmi, argun, ard%hy%. If they were written in this manner, an Englifliman might, at length, learn to underftand them tolerably well, but he would ftill find a dif- ficulty, when thefe words occurred to him again in their ori- ginal language, to recognize his own in them. The bond of connexion between the Engliih language and its conftituent parts would thus be diflblved, and the reciprocal intelligibili- ty would thereby be rendered abfcure. Further, as the pro- nunciation in all fuch mixed languages, from the caufes above mentioned, is from time to time conliderably changed, many words would foon become altogether obfcure and unintelli- gible, did not the etymological way of writing them, ftill maintain their true form, as long as is pradlicable and neceffary. Befides, the adherence to the neareft derivation, and the pre-. fervation of the original, form of words, by accurate writing.

xciv THREE PHILOLOGICAL

are likewife the means of preventing the extremely fiuduating pronunciation from ftill greater deviations. This is the true realon, why all the weftern Europeans, and confequentlj the Englifli too, write diiFerently from what they fpeak : and as this phenomenon has been produced entirely by " the latent perception of purpofe and means," which is involved in fo miuch obfcurity, that, fo far as I know, their grammarians have not yet been able to account for it ; hence we receive a IcjQTon, not to cenfure the like regulations, if they are univer- fally adopted by one or more nations, until the real foundation of them has been difcovered. The diiFerence of this mode of writing from that of fpeaking, is indeed in itfelf an imperfec- tion ; but in all thofe languages, that are fo thoroughly mixed, it is a real perfeftion ; becaufe it preferves, at leaft to the eye, the immediate derivation, and confequently furniihes us with the ealieft poffible method of underllanding words, while it ferves to prevent any further deviations in the pronuncia- tion.

Of Orthography.

On the preceding doftrine of pronunciation, is alfo founde4 the greateft and moil important part of the Englifh orthogra- phy, or rather, the orthography of the Englifli language is thq reverfed dodtrine of prpnunciation ; Ijecaufe it mull fhew, how. every uttered found is to be written with its proper charac- ters. The lefs important parts of it are, the rules for ufing initial capital letters, the divifion of fyllables, the fpelling of ^^ compound word?, the orthographical iigns, and the like.

OfiheJiruElure of words.

Neither orthography, nor the dodrine of tone, nor any o- ther part of grammar, can difpenfe with the elements pf the JlruBure of words ^ or etymology in the llriftell and moll rigid( fenfe ; however much this has been neglefted in all the Eng- lifli grammars, with which I am acquainted. Hence I pro- pofe here, to make an attempt towards tracing and marking the outlines of this dodrine, which is fo little underfl;oo4 in al^ languages.

Definition of words and fyllables.

Language is compofed of words. A word is the percepti- ble expreffion of an idea, which is pronounced without fuf- pcgding the voice. Words then are the names of particular

- ideas

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG; icv

idtas, and arc confequently as various in their ftrufture, as the ideas themfelves. In general, a word may confift of one or more fyllables, and a fjUable is a perceptible found, which is pronounced with a fingle emiffion from the mouth. Since, therefore, the vowels are fimple founds, which are produced bj the mere opening of the mouth, and diphthongs are double founds, namely two vowels, In which the voice pafles, with- out fufpenflou, from one opening to another, it follows from this, rtiat a word properly contains as many fyllables, as there occur in it vowels or diphthongs. I have ufed the term " pro- perly ;" for the pronunciation, in Englifh, occafions a variety of exceptions, by fuppreffing many vowels, fo that for inftance a word, which in writing confiils of four fyllables, may in pronunciation confift only of three.

Divijion of words f according to their jlruBure. All words, with refpeft to their ftrufture, are of three kinds j they are either radicals^ or derivatives^ or compounds. Con- trafted words might alfo be'added here ; but they belong for the moft part to the language of low life ; for inftance, ^o^r for good father ; gammer^ for good mother ; or if they are at all in general ufe, they are confidered and treated a3 radicals^

DeJinitioT^ of radicals.

Radical words are properly fuch, as exprefs the firft origi- nal idea, of whatever kind, by a firigle enaiffion from the mouth ; and hence they are uniformly monofyllables, becaufe every original idea Is founded on a fingle tranfient and undivided fenfatlon. Thefe radicals may again be divided in- to various fpecies : but in grammar, this divifion is not at- tended with any practical advantage ; for every word that is a monofyllable, if it cannot be proved to be contracted. from two others, is admitted there as a radical. In the following part of this treatife we fliall find, that, in Englifh, the moft of the words borrowed from the French, Latin, and other foreign languages, are treated as radicals, of whatever number of fyl- lables they may confift.

Among the radical words are likewife comprehended thofe, which have adopted the final letter e, for the fake of rendering the harfti monofyllables fo me what fofter, although they ac- quire, by this procefs, an additional fyllable. In all the modern European languages^ particularly in the Englilh, German, and

m 2 French,

xcvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

French, this e has been an ufeful expedient, to foften the harft* nefs of the old languages, and to introduce into them fmooth- nefs and harmonj. Examples of this kind, in Englifh, occur in the words ake^ alcovi^ ale, anife, ape, to appeafe, hahe, bai^ae, to hake. Sec. ; as likewife in the German words y4ffe, an ape y Biihe, Knabe, a boy, and many others. Upon a fuperficial pe- rufal of Englifh works, written during the laft centuries, we ihall find, that this expedient, from an extravagant fondnefs for refinement, has been carried to excels, and thus the ftruc- ture of words rendered obfcure. There is no doubt, that, with increafing cultivation, the Englifh perceived this impro- priety, and therefore rejedled this e, with which, in many cafes, the words had been unnecefTarily loaded : in thofe words, however^ where it was flill preferved in writing, it was fup- ptefTed in the pronunciation, and thus became a mute final e ; heftce the above mentioned words are pronounced dhk, al~ kohvy ably dnnisy cihp, &-c. But whether this alteration has been accomplifhed within proper limits, and whether the lan- guage has not acquired, through this medium, much unnecef- fary harflmefs, I Ihall not attempt to decide. T mufl only ob- ferve, that it is a very erroneous rule, by which, according to the Englifh grammarians, this mute e makes the preceding vowel unifor?nly long, if by the term long we are to under- ft-and extended. Examples of the contrary occur in the words, axe y fickle, badge ^ bottle, and a great many others ; befide the words confiding of three and four fyllables, in which the pre- ceding fyllable is not at all accentuated, and much lefs fhould k be lengthened, as in artifice, concurretice, perceptible, &c.

Of Derivatives-.

The limits of the derived and compound words cannot, in every individual cafe, be accurately afcertained ; although they may be determined with fufhcient precifion, according to the ideas conneded with thcfe words. • In a grammatical fenfe^ XX. derived idea '\% formed by joining an obfcure collateral no- tion to a principal, or radical idea, and by confidering both as one fingle idea : and a derived voordzx\i(:^ from exprefling this obfcure collateral notion, by means of a fyllable, which is no longer ufed as a peculiar word, confequently is as obfcare as the collateral notion itfelf. Such a fyllable is then called a derived fyllable.

The derived f y liable s now are of two kinds ; they are placed

■ either

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xcvn

either before or after the word : in the former cafe they may- be czWed prapojita, while in the latter, we fhall call them poJi~ pojita. Both, however, mull no longer be ufed as pecu- liar words ; for in this cafe the new word is not a derivative, but a compound. The prcepoJitUy as well as the pojlpojita^ are, in Englifh, of two different forts : they originate either from the Saxo-Danilh, or from the Latin and Fiench. The words derived from the lafl two languages are, indeed, considered as radicals, and are not fubjeft to any determined rules ; but with the former, namely the Saxo-Daniih, he ought to be ac- curately acquainted, who is defirous of acquiring z, thorough knowledge of tl^e Englifti language, and of facilitating his ftudy of the tone or accent of words ; a do6lrine, which with- out this previous knowledge, would appear very perpiexed.

The principal prcepojitay from the Saxo-Danilh, are the fyl- lables a, be, for, (in fo far as it reprefents the GermaH ver^ mis, and un ; for inftance, away, aloud, abroad, above, anew, to a- bet, to abide, abode ; before, to begin, beget, befall, befriend ; to mifgive, miflead, milbehave, miftruft, millake ; unaware,

unbelief, undone The chief French-Latin fyllables are the

following ; ac, com, con, em, en, ob, op, pre, re,/e,Jub s.nd Jur.

The principal Saxo-Daniih pojipqjita are thefe : ard, cow- ard ; ed, for forming paffive participles ; as created, opprefled, animated ; el, fynonymous with the German e/, as bowel ; er, not only in fubftantives, where it correlponds with the German er ; adder, anfwer, alder, angler, finger ; but likewife in verbs, to Hammer, to waver ; and in prepofitions, as after ; — the fy liable en, in adjcftives, as leaden, fudden, fallen ; in verbs, to heighten, blacken, redden ; — efs, abbefs, dutchefs, largefs ; — ey, agreeing with the German ey, as abbey, fur- vey ; — ing, for forming the prefent participles, as well as lub- ftantives, in both of which it correfponds with the German ing and ung : feeding, breeding ; — isb, like the German iJcHf, in apifli, foolifh ; — /e, the fame as the German e/, as idle, ancle^ angle^ apple ; — /y, as the German lic/j, particularly for form- ing adverbs, as abfolutely, greatly, accordingly — nejs, for the formation of abftrad ideas, like the German nifs, as goodnefs, franknefs, abllemioufnefs •,^Jhip, not unlike the German yf)?'«//f, as lordlhip, friendfhip — y, correfponding with the Ger- man ig, in adverb?, and ey, in fubftantives, as already, ab- bey. But far more numerous are the terminations form--

cd from the Latin-French fyllables, ance^ antf ate^ ble^ bly,

calf

xcviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

cal^ cle, cyy eer, ier^ en, ence^ ent^ ial^ iaUy ic, ijl^ ive, ion^ Jioriy tion, ment, or^ ous, ple^ tive, ure, y. Sec. ] cannot enter upon the fignification and the pradlical ufe of all thefe derived f)dlables ; fince my purpofe, in this place, is merely direfted to excite the attention of future teachers of the Englifh lan- guage, with refped; lo them. Let nobody, however, imagine, that the inveftigation of thefe particles is a mere illuiion ; for their utility, throughout the whole grammar, is very great, particularly in the fubfequent doftrine of the accent.

All thefe derived fyllables, and efpecially the pojipojitay may again be combined with one another in different ways ; as coward, cowardly, cowardlinefs, or cowardice ; crafty, craftily, craftinefs, or craft ; yet to inveftigate their peculiar ftrufture, would exceed the limits of this EiTay;

Cbmpound words i

If two or more ^7ords, ftill current by themfelves, are com- bined into one, there arifes from this combination a compound word. By means of derivation we conjoin an obfcure colla- teral notion to a radical idea; but in compounding words, we unite two radical ideas, or rather two clear notions, into one. The defign of fuch an union is to determine a word and its meaning, more accurately, by the medium of another ; but frequently alfo to exprefs a metaphorical idea, by means of both. That, vv^hich is determined by another, or the cardinal wordy in Englifh as well as in German, is placed laft : while the determining word, in both languages. Hands foremoft. Thus in the examples, cherry-tree, child-birth, powerful, to undergo, to fubdue, the latter words contain the principal idea, that is more clofely determined by the words Handing fore- moft.

The compound words are as various as there are parts of fpeech, which can be mutually combined. The lubflantivc may in this manner be determined by another fubflantive, as gold-filii ; or by an adjedive, as green-fifli ; or by a parti- ciple, as looking-glafs ; or by a pronoun, as felf-conceit ; or by a verb, as break-faft ; or by an adverb, as fore-noon ; — the adjedive and participle may be joined to a fubflantive, as haud-fuU i to another adjedive, as big-bodied ; — the verb to a fubflantive, as horfe-whip, bind- weed ; particularly by th6 particlesybrf, outy aby ady at, de, /«, ob, Cy ex, &.c. ; — .the adverb to another adverb, as thei'e-fore, whcre-cver, &.c.

it

ESSAYS, BYADELUNG., xciac

It would lead me too far from my obje£l, if I attempted to define the nature of true compounds ; for this can be accom- plifhed only by means of a minute and accurate inveltigation of them, from which the general rules for the cempoundiiig of words inufl refult, and at the fame time the various modi- fications, to which the determining word is liable, might be difcovered and eflabliflied.

Of the tone or accent of words.

The rules for the tone or accentuation of words, in Eng- lifli, are perhaps more variable and intricate than in any/ other language. This v/ant of uniformity is owing, partly to the whole genius and difpofition of the language, partly to the carelefs method and confuted notions of grammarians. — i. On account of the genius and difpofition of the language. The Englifh tongue is a mixture of the Saxon, Danifh, French, and Latin ; it has therefore loft a great fhare of its peculiarity, while each of thefe foreign languages, being thoroughly mix- ed with it, "have likewife" communicated to it a confiderable part of their analogical affinities. Among other parts of gram- tnar, this deviation is obvious in the accentuation of words, which is regulated by different analogies ; hence no general or determined rules can be laid down for it. In the Ger- man language, the tone is the moft regular and fettled part of grammar ; hence it can be reduced to a few plain rules — 2. On account of the confufion prevailing among gramma- rians, who, in Englifli, as well as in German, have always confounded the prqfaic meafure of the accent with that of the metrical, and theretbre conftantly fpeak of Io?ig 2LnAjJjort fyllables ; notions, which do not at all apply to this doctrine, and which occafion great embarrafsment,

I am induced to cenfure, upon this head, not only the grammarians and fchoolmafters of the common fort, but even fuch teachers and writers as claim a fuperior rank, for inftance a Johnson, Sheridan, and feveral others. . The latter has publiffied ** A General Dictionary of the Eng- lifli language, in two Volumes, Quarto, London, 1780 ;" in which he confines himfelf entirely to the accent, and the pronunciation of words; but, with refped to the for- mer, he proceeds in the fame intricate, fluftuating, and unde- terminid manner, as his other brethren of Prifcian's family.

o THREE PHILOLOGICAL

It is therefore my aim in this Eflaj, to propofe a method, by which rational teachers may, in a great meafure, explain this obfcure doctrine concerning the accentuation of words, and thus arrive at fome certainty, at leaft with re fpeft to a con- fiderable number of Englilh words. Previoufly to this in- quiry, however, it will be requifite to premife forne general ideas, and to difmifs altogether, the former notions of lotig •aiSidiJhort fyllables.

General Definitions of the accent.

The accent confifts in a particular elevation of the voice, with which, in polyfyllables, the one fyllable is as it were raifed above the others : thus in emergency y employment^ the fyllables mer and ploy are called accentuated Jyllahles. The reafon of this mode of diftinguilhing one fyllable from ano- ther, is properly contained in the nature of the word and the intention of the fpeaker, who, by this elevation of the voice, points out that fyllable, which exprefles the principal idea, and to which he chiefly dire£ls the attention of the hearer. Hence the two accentuated fyllables, above mentioned, (jon^. tain the principal ideas of the words, in which they occur, and all the other fyllables denote only collateral ideas, or fur-i ther determinations, inflexions, and the like. I have faid, that this, in the nature of the thing, is " properly" the in- tention of the accent ; for this reafon in the German, and pro- bably, too, in all other unmixed languages, we meet with the general rule, that the radical fyllable, in fuch words as confift of a plurality of fyllables, always receives the accent ; fince it contains the principal idea of the word. In the German lan- guage, this rule is fo general, that the few exceptions from it fcarcely deferve any attention. But as the Englilh is a very mixed language, this rule is liable here to a much greater num- ber of exceptions ; efpecially with refpeft to the words bor- rowed from the Latin and French, in which the radical fyllable has become obfcure, fo that it cannot in all in- Aances preferve its due accent. Since I propofe to refume that fubje£t in another part of this EflTay, I ihall here only remark, that thofe words from the Anglo-Saxon, which are ilill current in the Englifli language, follow this rule, and per- haps as uniformly as in the German.

DifiinBion of the accent as to its force.

The tone or accent mufl, be diftinguiftied, both as to its

force

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. ci

force and duration. With refped to the former, it may be divided into the principal and concurrent force of the accent.. There are certain poljfjllables, in which two of the fyllables are marked bj the accent, when one of them, that requires the ftrongeft elevation of the voice, receives the principal force ; while the other, in which the elevation of the voice is weaker, is uttered with a concurrent force. Thus, in the word horfe-courfer, the fyllable hor, as well as the fyllable cour, are both marked by the accent ; yet with this difference, that the former is more llrongly pronounced, and the prijicipcil force is laid upon it ; while in the latter, the elevation of the voice is weaker, and confequently it is denoted only by a con- current force, There is, however, a general rule, which de- ferves to be remarked in this place, and according to which no word can have more t?han one principal accent. But the cafes, in which words, befide the principal one, may have a con- current accent, are the two, following : i, in compound words, where every word retains its accent, yet fo that, in one of the words, this accent becomes the principal or predominant found^ as will clearly appear from the fequel ; 2, in derivatives confift- ing of polyfyllables, which require the principal accent to be laid upon the fourth or fifth fyllable from the end ; in which cafe, unlefs a fyllable be fuppreiTed, one of the derived fylla- bles receives a fecondary or concurrent accent ; becaufe three or four fyllables in fucceffion, without any diftinftion of tone, would oifend the ear. In the word degetieratenefs^ the ac- cent refts upon the fyllable ge ; and though the e in the fyl- lable te be fuppreffed, there would«ftill follow three fyllables in fucceffion, without any elevation of the voice, if the fylla- ble ra were not pronounced with a fecondary accent ; by ■which means this monotony is avoided. The fame occurs in the woxdiSy father Hnefsf delicatenefs, dbfolutely, &-c.

Of the duration of the accent. Whether the accent be principal or fecondary, it is with re- fpeft to its duration, either extended (long) or acute, (fliort). It is extended, when the voice dwells longer upon the vowel, as in the words, fame, fate, father; acute^when it quickly paffes over the vowel and refts upon the confonant, which then ac- quires a double found, as in fan, when, mother, pen. Theie diftinftions between the extended and acute accent, the gram- ij^arians of the Englifh as well as the German and other lan-

cii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

guages, have endeavoured to exprefs by the terms long and foort ; but as thej were under the neceffity of cilllng thofe ijllables, which are pronounced with no accent whatever, upon th© fame plan, either long or fhort, they involved them- felves in perpetual labyrinths, from which there was no efcape. The h& is, that in profodj every accentuated fyllable is like- wife long, whether the accent be extended or acute ; for here

the unaccentuated or neutral fyllablcs alone are Ihort In the

Diftiohary of the Englifti language, which I have publifliedin two volumes, 8vo. Leipzig, 1783 and 1796, I have pointed out the extended or long accent thus (a) and the acute or Ihort accent with this (a) mark : yet as I was mifled at the commencement of the work, by implicitly following Johnfon as my guide in the accent, I began that diftindion only about the middle of the letter A.

Difference between extended and acute fyllablcs. From what has been faid in the preceding fe£lion, it is evi» dent, that in the extended accent; the voice dwells longer upon the vowel ; thus the fucceeding confonant can have only 3 mild and fimple found : as on the contrary, in the acute accent the voice quickly glides over the vowel and refts upon the confonant, which confequently is pronounced with more ener- gy, or like a double confonant. Hence, in German, we find the excellent rule prevailing, by which only a fimple confon- ant is ufed after a long or extended vowel^ but a double con- fonant after a fhort or acute vowel j excepting thofe cafes, where two different confona-' 3 accompany the preceding vowel ; for inilance, ich ham, I came ; Der Kdmm, the comb ; die Muje, the Mufe ; «« mujjen^ to be obliged. This rule indeed is liable to fome exceptions, but it forms neverthelefs one of the mofl adrhirable peculiarities of that language ; a peculiarity, of which the modern innovators wifh to dcfpoil it ; as thefe men are move fond of deflroying than of eredllng. But in the Englifh language, where the pronunciation is perpetually at war v^ith the orthography, that excellent rule cannot be put in praftice, as the exceptions from it are more numerous than the cafes "to which it applies. Thus the words, man, mud , miig, mother, minion, &c. have the fhort or acute ac- cent, though only a fingle confonant follows the vowel , while the words, all, alms, moft, call, fall, falfe, farm, &c. take the ^on<^ or extended accent, notwithf^anding that the vowel is ac- ' / com-

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cili

companied bj two confonants. Even the orthographical diphthongs are not uniformly pronounced as fuch; for they are very frequently uttered fhort or acute, as is obvious in the wrords, dead, head, learn, lead, meadow, &c. Nay, it often •happens, that even double founds, according to orthography at leaft, may occur in fyllables, which receive no accent ; for inftance in the words, chaplain, pldgeon, forfeit. In thefe circumftances, it muft be extremely difficult to l^y down fixed rules, iA what cafes and fituations the accent is acute, and where it muft be extended.

Of the accent of radicals.

All radicals are originally monofyllables, except in the cafes already pointed out, where thb harfli found of the monofy lia- ble has been foftened by the additional vowel e. As every radical word is the fign of an idea, it likewifehas its peculiar determined accent, but which is perceivable only in combination with other words ; for the accent itfelf is nothing elfe than than a relative idea. There are however words, which in the connexion of a fentence receive no accent, but throw it upon the fucceeding word ; and thefe are commonly fuch words as denote circumftances or unimportant modifications ; for in- ftance, the article, feveral of the pronouns, and the particles. In " the finger^ my houfe, on the eaji^^'' the determining words, they my, on the, throw their accent upon the fubftantives that accompany them. All thefe cafes ought to be determined with precifion in an Englilh grammar ; it is fufficient here, to have hinted at them — All the radical words, however, which fig- nify principal ideas, fuch as fubftantives, verbs, adjeftives, &CC. muft necefiarily be accentuated. It is evident from thefe remarks, that the accent, in monofyllables, as well as in po- lyfyllables, wholly depends on the importance of the idea.

Of the accent of derivatives.

With refpea to the accent, the derivatives muft be divided into two great clafles ; namely into.fuch as are derived from the Saxo-Danifti, and into thofe which have been adopted from the French and Latin : both muft, in this refped, be fub- jed to different rules.

The words derived from the Saxo-Danifh, follow that very eafy and precife rule, according to which, in polyfyllables, the principal accent is uniformly placed upon the original

or

civ THREE PHILOLOGICAt

or radical fyllable ; a rule, which in German is liable to fewet .exceptions than any other^ and which I believe to be as gene- ral in Engliih, fince it is fo deeply founded on the natuTC of the thing, and the purpofe of language : for my part, I am acquainted with no words, that can be confidered as exccptions# A few inftances will ferve to illullrate this affertion. The following are derivatives with additional preceding fyllables ; afdryawdy,behmdy beget, begin, besides ; — with fucceeding fyl- lables are, acorn (from the Low Saxon Ecker, in which inftance the fyllable orn correfponds with the German final fyllable er), bdrenefsy heggarlinefsy tdmenefs^ father ^ mother, singer^ hofom, boijlerous, fiidden ; — with both preceding and fucceed- ing fyllables are, ajlodmed, beholden^ behaviour, beginning, be- comingly— Thofe, who pay proper attention to this eafy rule, will find, that one half of the difliculties, in placing the ac- cent on Englifh words, is thereby removed.

The words derived from the French and Latin, in fome in- llances, likewife follow this rule ; to abate, to abandon, abridge, abojninable, abjiemious &c. ; but as the exceptions from it are more numerous than the cafes to which it applies, it cannot be confidered as a general rule ; for in the examples, avenue, bar- ddrity, bombardment, ccmmijfary, continent, continuity, inocu- lation, &.C. the accent is throughout placed upon derived fyl- lables. In addition to this difficulty of diftinguifliing the ac- cent, we may oblerve, that the Englilh words very frequently difplace the accent from the fyllable, which poflefled it in Latin or French. This is the cafe in the words, Eiirope, db- fence, ablative, abrogate, dbfolute, academy, decent, ddage, dd- vocate, ajjignee, balloon, and a great many others. But even here fome general rules may be formed, which would hold good, atleaft with refpedl to fome particular cafes, ihus in derived words, that terminate with the fyllables Jion, tion^ cious and tious, the accent refts upon the next-preceding fyl- lable : this and fimilar rules we find already Hated in the com- mon grammars. — The caufes, from which the placing of the accent in Englifh words is fo precarious, are chiefly the fol- lowing : I . becaufe thefe words had in their original lan- guages, namely in Latin and French, already deviated from- the natural rule above mentioned ; the Latin words, imputdre, imprtidentiaj adeqiidtm, and the French words imputer, marincy marcher, opifii6n,have not preferved their accents upon the ra- dical fyllables ; — -2. beca^ufe in tlie Englifh language theffe ■

words

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cr

words were frequently contraded, fo that a change in the pla- cing of the accent became neceflary ; v. g. to opiney from the Latin opindri, or the French opiner:, although this accidental thange was frequently attended with the advantage of repla- cing the accent upon the radical fyllable of the word ; in this condition we find the verbs, to desire, from the French defirer ; to defpair, from the Latin defperdre j to detejl^ from detejiari.

Of the accent of compound words.

Although every wordy when compounded with another preferves its peculiar accent (book-binder, back-bite) yet as there can be only one principal accent pronoiinced in eacb word, this accent is ufually, " and according to rule," placed upon the determining word, namely that which ftands fore- Baoft ; for inllance, rt/J'^r-OTan, axle-tree ^ hdck-hiie^ hdck-tuard,^ bdne-ful, bdre-feoty hUod-fJ^edy codl-pit. I have faid, " according, to rule ;" for there are indeed many exceptions here, not only with refpe6l to various particles, as in the v/6rds al-rmghty^ another, afch-deacon,nvith-hold,with-out, where-hy, un-ltke, ac- der-tdke, &c. but likewife in the triple compound words, at- to-gether ^afh-voednei-day y what-fo-ever, here-to-jorey for which, inltances, however, many fixed rules might be dxfcovered.

KefleBions upon words as parts effpesch.

The rules concerning the letters and their pronunciation, the ftru6lure of words, and the accent founded upon thjtt flrudture, compofe the firft and etymological part of grammar ; after which follows the fecond divifion, treating of words as parts of fpeech, and their inflexion. Wards are called parts of fpeechy in fo far as they denote different modification^ of ideas in the connexion of a fentence : and in order to underftand a language thoroughly, we mull previoufly acquire clear no- tions of this fubjedt. — Speech is the audible enunciation of our ideas, and thefe are (generally) produced by objefts without us. In fo far as thefe objefts afFeft the leprefenta- tions of the mind, they are of two kinds only ; namely, either felf-fubfillent things, i. e. fuhjiances ; or thofe circumftances and modification^ v/hich occur in fubllances, i. e. the accidental. If our fpeech were conformable to the nature of things, wc ihould have no more than thefe two- parts of fpeech ; but as we cannot comprehend a fubftance with all its relations, at on« view, nor conceive the£e in an uniform manner, various pai'ts

of

cvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

of fpeech mull heceflarilj refult, particularly with refpeS tO the accidental. Belldes, the degree of perfpicuitj in our con- ceptions renders a new diftinftion necefiary ; fince the repre- fentations of the mind are either fo obfcure, that they remain mere fenfations, or aflume the form of clear notions. As, therefore, with refped to the parts of fpeech, every thing de- pends upon the method, in which they are exhibited to Xht mind ; and as this method is by no means uniform in all na- tions, confequently the number and difpofition of the parts of fpeech do not correfpond with each other in all languages. The Englifh, for example, have arranged their ideas and repre- fentations in tjie manner as follows.

I. Abftrufe reprefentations, or vtxtre. fenfations ^ in an abftraft fenfe. The expreffion of thefe affords the interjeSions, or words of fenfation, which denote mere abftradl fenfations. — From the higher branches of etymology we learn, that the interjeilions are the foundation of all language ; becaufe our reprefentations muft be firft abilrufe, and confequently mierfe fenfations, before they can be developed into clear no™ tions.

II. Diftinft teprefentations or ideas, the expreffion of which furnifhes us with words, in the moll concrete and peculiar fenfe — The things, of which we have ideas, are of a two- fold nature ; namely,

I. Stelffubftflent things or fuhflartceSy and every thing that is exhibited to the mind as independent. The fign or ex- preffion of them is t\it fubjlantive.

1. Accidental things f among which We comprife all that can be diftinguiflied in the felf-fublillent thing, and that re- lates to it. In general, this is again of a twofold nature ^ for it is either belonging to the thing itfelf, as red, great, beautiful; or it is. external to it, 3.S noiVy here, away: in' the former cafe, it is called a quality ; in the latter, a «V- cumflance. But according to the manner of exhibiting it, this accidental thing is again divided into different clalTesy which afford an equal number of parts of fpeech. It is con- fide red,

A. Independently, external to the felf-fubfillent thing, and and in immediate connexion with it; and then it is in the aforefaid manner of two kinds ; namely,

I. a quality; hence arilcs the* cpialifying v/ord, or the

adverb

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG cvii

adverb of quality, which can be predicated of the fubflantive, onlj bj means of a verb ;

2. ^circumjiance, which in grammar, is of three different kinds ; viz.

a, an independent circumftance, the adverhium circum- Jiantice, or a word expreffive of a circumftance, in the molt

concrete fenfe ;

b, the relation fulafifting between two felf-fubfiftent things, the prepofition ; and

c, the relation between fentences and their members, the conjunBion.

B. As compriled in the attribute, i. e. fomething accidental refpefting the circumltance of time, number, &:c, predicated of the felf-fubfiftent thing, viz. the verb.

C. As already attributed, or in immediate connexion with the fubflantive. This is either

I. a predicated quality,!, e. a property, the name of which is expreffed by the adjeBive ; or a. a circumftance ; and tlien again

a, of felf-fubfiftence, the article ;

b, of the accidental relation to the perfon, the *ro- nouji ; and laftly

c, of computation, the nuniber.

Farther reJieBions upon words.

From the pretnifes laid (JovC^n, the following parts of fpeech are the neceflary refult :

1 . The fuhjiantive, or the fign of all things,which do not only fabfift of themfelves, but which are likewife conceived as fuch. It is either a proper name, nomen proprium ; or the name of a certain clafs of things, nomen uppellat'wum. As the latter appertains to feveral things of the fame fpecies (for in- ftance, man^^ horfe, houfe^') and thus again fufFers a great dimi- nution of its felf-fubfiftence, certain words became neceflkry, in order to reftore this felf-fubfiftance, in ft^ch fituations as required it. This was accomplilhed

2, by means of the articles ;

3, by numbers, that exprefs the circumftance of computa- tion ; and

4, by the pronouns ; which ferve to denote the immediate relation of the perfon, in connexion with the fubflantive.

5..

«ri{i THREE PHILOLOGICAL

5, The accidental thing, as conneaed with the fubftance it- felf, is confidered, in the German language, in two difFerenf wajs, naraelj of itkli Qer/e), in which cafe it can be pre- dicated of tlie fubftantive, by means of a verb onlj, v. g. tbis houfe IS large ; or in immediate connexion with the fubftantive, as tbe large houje, a great houfe. In the former cafe it is called edverhium qtialitatis or a qualifying word\ but in the lattor, it IS fimplj an adjeBivum or a word of property : this is derived from the former, by means of a peculiar method of infl«£ling ^^ ^7^ grammarians called concretion. In Englifli, however, this diftindion doe^s not prevail j for the adjedives here are nowife different from the adverbs of quality ; hence a peculiar term of art would be requifite' to denote, with preciiion, the idea combined in both cafes : God is almighty y and tbe almighty Cod. — ^To this head alfo belong the participles, which are aot confidered as particular parts of fpeech, but are either ad- jedives or adverbs of quality derived from the verb ; fo that they exprefs, in the fame word, the collateral idea of tinie.

6, The verby a part af fpeech, predicating of the fubftantive that which is accidental, together with different collateral ideas, combined in one and the fame word.

7, The prepofitions ; 8, conjunctions ; and 9, inter jeciions^ ha- ving been confidered in the preceeding fedlion, require no fur- tf^er explanation*

Analyfis of the inflefiions.

That which is accidental may be exprefled in a great va- riety of ways, as belonging to the felf-fubfiftent thing ; whence a number of cafual relations arife, which would render our fpeech extremely prolix, if we had not contrived means of immediately denoting them in the compafs of every word itfelf, through fimple radical founds, i. e. by infiefting the word. The Germans have adopted the following modes of inflexion. I. The diftinftion of plurality in fubftantives, oxxhcforma' iicn of the plural. 1. 'The diftinftion of the relation fublifting between the fubftantive contained in the predicate, and the fubje£t ; the declenfion, 3. The diftindion of the gender in the words determining the fubftantive j the motion. 4. "The change of an adverb of quality into an adjeiftive ; the cowcrf- tiojt. 5. The diftinclion between a higher and the higheil de- gree exprefled in an adverb of tjuality, or adjeftive ; the degrees *ifco7nparifon. And finally, 6, the. diftindion of the different

relations.

E S S A Y S, BY A D E L U N G.

ox

relations, which verbs denote,or the conjugation. — The Eng^ Itjh language is, with refped to the infleaion of words, very fimple, or rather defedlive ; for,- of the fix mpdes of infleaiori above fpecified, three only are known in Englilh ; namely, the formation of the plural, the degrees of comparifon, and the conjugation. As the adjedive here is in no manner different from the adverb of quality, and as the fixbflantives like wife have no peculiar declenfion, there can be exhibited neither cqUt cretien nor motion in their forn^.

I. Further reflediiom on thefubflantive.

I. Divifionof it.

Every part of fpeech muft be feparately confidered in granjr mar ; it muft be divided into its different fpecies, and the iar flexions, to which it is liable, muft there be exhibited. The -fubftantive juftly occupies the firft place, as it is the moft im- portant word in fpeech j in the next place, the words which determine the fubftantive, namely the articles, adje£lives, pro- nouns, and numbers ought to follow ; after thefe the verbs, and finally the adverbs and interje£lions conclude the whole. As it is not my intention to write a grammar in this Effay, I fliall content myfelf with tnaking a few remarks \xpon each part of fpeech.

The fubftantive is the iign of a felf-fubfiftent thing, or a fubftance. This is either really and independently fublifting ; or it is not fubftantially exifting, atid only reprefented as felf-fubfift.ent : the former is called a coKcretum^ the latter an ahJlraBum. The concrete thing is again divided into four claffes ; for it reprefents either the name of an individual, the proper name, nomen proprium; or that of a whole clafs of fimilar in- dividual things, nemen appelJativum ; or that of a multitude of things, in which no individuality is diftinguifhed ; a colleftive name, nomen colleEtivum ; or laftly, that of naatter^j nomem, materiaky fuch as iron, wood, ftone, bread.

%. The gender of fiihfiailii'oes ,

Many languages divide all their fubftantives into certain claffes, borrowed from the phyfical gender of the animal kingdom, fo that e^ their words of determination, i. e. the ar-

6 - ' tides.

ex THREEPHILOLOGICAL

tides, pronouns, adje£tives, and fometlmes alfo the numbers, muft mark the gender peculiar to every fubftantive. The" queftion now arifes, whether this be likewife the cafe in Eng- lifli. If we follow the common ftatement of grammarians, we mull anfwer in the affirmative : but if we refledt upon the nature of the thing, we cannot allow the Englifh fubftantives any fuch gender as thefe words poffefs in the German, Latin, and many other languages. The ftrongeft proof ot this is the abfenc€ of all the genders in the determining words above mentioned. The perfonal pronoun of the third perfon, indeed, appears to prove the contrary.; for he^Jhe^ and it 3 a^e really inflefted according to the three different genders. But there is a great difference between marking the phyfical gender, where this diflinftion becomes iieceffary ; and between claffiag all fubffantives according to the different genders, although they might refer to inanimate things, and to abftract ideas. • All languages praftife the former expedient, though they do not make ufe of the latter claffification ; and this is alfo the cafe in the Englifli language. The Englifti fubftantives, as i'ubftantives, mark no particular gender ; for if they did fo, their determining words likewife ought to .point it out ;^ which however is not confiftent with practice. Hence this apparent deficiency greatly facilitates the acquifition of a language, which does not impofe upon us the talk of ftudying the genders of nouns ; lince it is obvious, that this diilinftion, in our prcfent method of reprefenting objefts to the mind, is not attended with the leaft advantage, that could in any de- gree compenfate this inconvenience.

3. Of the formation of the Plural.

Since the words expreffive of kind, or appellatives, may either relate to one thing of the kind, or to a j:lurality of things, the numbers ferve che purpofe of marking this double diftinftipn. The formation of the plural, which in the Ger- man, Latin, and other languages is very difficult, is remarka- bly eafy in the Englifti ; as it is formed \ij adding the letter s or the fyllable es to the Angular ; and the few exceptions, or deviations from this rule, we find ftated in every grammar.

4. Of the Declenfon.

To decline a noun, is to denote certain relations of a felfr '1 ^ - fubfiftentr

ESSAYS; BY ADELUNG. cxI,

f»ibfiftent thing, bj means of fimple radical founds, which are annexed to the word itfelf: for inilance, Haus, a houfe ; Haufes, of a houfe ; Haufe^ to. a houfe ; H'dufer, houfes ; Hdufern^ to the houfes, &,c. The Engliih language does not admit of thcfe inflexions, and by rejefting them, faves much trouble and inconvenience, which attend the many declenfions, and the exceptions from them prevailing in other languages. In Engliih, therefore, fome prepofitions are ufed, which exprefs the infle6led cafes of other languages : and as two cafes only are marked by the prepofitions, namely the genitive or ablative of the Latin by the particle of, and the dative by to, bpth of them are employed like all other prepofitions, without dif- tindiion of numbers, ot any other circumllance. Yet there is ftill a veilige of a true declenfion remaining , in Engliih, which confiils of what is called the genitivus pojfejjivus (more properly pojlpojitltms)^, which is pointed out by the letter j, and made ufe of,.when the genitive flands before its fubflantive without an article ; v, g. the king's Jpeech, the queen'' s brother ; inftead of " the fpeech of the king, the brother of the queen." — It is not difficult to difcover, that this 'j is a veftige of the German genitive, des Koniges Rede. And as the Engliih fub- ftantives have no variety of gender, this V confequently re- mains unaltered, of whatever gender the word may be in other languages.

II. Of the Article,

The article is a part of fpeech, which ferves to diilinguiih different kinds of abfolutenefs in fubftantives, and is chiefly ufed with appellatives. Thefe mark whole kinds of things of the fame nature ; fuch as horje, houfe, tree • which, from their very extenfive application, lofe a great fhare of their abfolute identity : or, in other words, as they are common to many owners and places, the hearer could never know, which indi- vidual horfe, houfe, or tree is meant, if this circumllance were not determined by the article. / havefcen horfe, has a very oblcure meanings whence the hearer is necefTarily indu- ced to alk, whofe or what fort of a horfe I have feen — The pronouns and numbers, indeed, likewife ferve to determine the bbjefts, but there is yet another determination requifite, to which they are not adapted, namely that of abfolutenefs, ■which is e-^preiTed by the articles.

o 2 In

c:.ii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

In the Englifh grammars, three articles are generally enu- merated ; the indefinite^ which is faid to confift in the prepo- lition ofm the genitive, and-fo in the dative cafe j the definite exprefled bj the word the ; and the article of unity, a or an. But this may be called true pedantry of the fchools, by which we are led from ohe abfurdity to another. For i, who will allow himfelf to confider' the words of and to as ar- ticles, iince they are real ptepofitions, which govern their re- fpeftive cafes: 2. If thefe particles of and to reprefent the definite article, we muft likewife grant, that in the expref- fions " of the king-* and " to the king,** two different articles are ufed before the fubft'antive,. viz. one that is indefinite or imdetermined, and another that is definite or determined, fo that one of them' neceflarily fuperfedes the other : this, how-j ever, is a palpable contradiction. 3. The propofed article of unity is incorredly exprefled in its denomination, becaufe it is liable to be confounded with the number o?z^,-and has ac- tually been confounded- with it, by feveral Englilh gramma- rians— -The definitions and explanations of the articles, which- appear in the ufual French grammars, are equally erroneous. The Englilh language admits only of two articles ; the definite — the, and the indefinite— a;z before a vowel or mutt h, ahd a before a confonant'. The latter, no doubt, has likewife a ten- dency to determine the felf-fubfiftent thing ; but as it does ,this in a much weaker degree than the former, it has received the name of the indefinite or undetermined article. I. The de- finite article points out an individual of a kind or clafs, that is already known and felf-fubfiilent : the emperor, fignifies, ac- cording to the connexion of the fentence, either the prefent reigning emperor, or that emperor, of whom we were fpeak- ing laft ; confequently this article denotes one individually de. terrained perfon, which is fingled out from that clafs of indi- viduals, who are or have been emperors. II. The indefinite- article an or a ferves to mark ; i, an indefinite felf-fubfiftent thing belonging to a whole clafs, without pointing out a par- ticular individual ; v. g. " an enemy is not to be trufted," i. e. " no eneray whoever he be ;" 2, the fpecies or clafs, to which a thing belongs, as an undetermined felf-fubfifting thing, v. g. '* he was killed by a fword," i. e, *' by one of the weapons called fwords."

Without any article may be ufed; i, proper nouns ; be- caufe they are already more accurately det^mined by means

of

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG cxili

6lthe individual, to which they refer, than they could be through the articles ; v. g. Cicero was an excellent orator ; — all Europe is in confujion : excepting, however, when thefe nouns again partake of the nature of appellatives, i. e. -when they may be referred to more than one thing ; for inftance^ tbe elder Plinj/y the little yames. In like manner are the names of rivers and fliips conlidered as appellatives, and con- nefted with the definite article ;■ — 2, if a -determined fingle individual is meant, and the whole kind or clafs is underilood by it, in which cafe the Germans make ufe of the definite article ; v. g. der Menfch ijl verniinftig, " man is rational ;" but in fuch expreffions, the Englifli make ufe of no article:— 3, if an indefinite number of fingle things, out of a whole clafs, is to be expreiTed y or in fuch cafes as require the inde- finite article in the Angular num.ber ; — ^^ I want pens," in the fingular, " I want a pen :" — and 4, if merely the clafs, kind, or/ matter is to be denoted ; as '* building is precious ; or, " it is fine cloth." In_ all thefe inftances, the oblique cafes of the nouns are only marked by the prepofitions of and to in the genitive and dative, and by the fenfe of the aftive verb itfelf irti the accufative, without admitting any article.

III. Of the AdjeCi'ive,

In the German language, that which is found to be change- able in the thing itfelf, is confidered in two different ways,. namely, i, as independent of the fubftantive or, at leafl, not in immediate connection with it, in which cafe it is enunciated by the verb ; v. g. der Mann ijl gut, " the man is good ;" or 2, in immediate conne6lion with the fubftantive, v. g. der ijl ein guter Mann^ " that is a good man," where the German ^ adjective is regularly infledted,, according to the gender of the noun : while in the former cafe, it is ufed adverbially, and remains indeclinable. Hence arife two parts of fpeech, name* iy the adverb of quality, and the adjeSive, or the wo id ex- preffive of the property of the thing, which is derived from the former, by means of the concrete fyllables e for the fe- minine, er for the mafculine, and es for the neuter gender, or with the fimple vowel e for all the thi'ee genders, when the definite article is connected with the noun. And as the Ger-' man fubftantives not only mark different genders, but alfo the ©bli^ue caffis, it- may be eafily inferred, that the adjedives are

liable

'cxiv THREE PHILOLOGICAL

liable to fimilar inflections ; a circumflance, which is attended with confiderable difficulties to foreigners, who apply them- felves to the fpeaking and writing of that language. In Eng- lifh, a much eafier and fhorter method is praftifed, fmce the adverb of quality is, in no refped, different from the adjeftive, and may be combined with the fubftantive, without any in- flexion : thus it remains uniformly in the fame termination, "Whether we fay, *' the prince is powerful," or " the power- ful prince." Hence, too, the adjedives diftinguifli no plural ; and as the Englifli fubftantives mark no gender, and are of themfelves indeclinable, the adje£lives likewife cannot be in- fleded, and are iri this refpeft throughout managed like ad- verbs. "

The only inflexions, of which adjeftives are capable, are the degrees of comparifon, which are formed nearly upon the plan of the German, by adding to the pofitive degree the fyl- lable er, in order to make the comparative ; and the fjllable ejiy to form the fuperlative : but very frequently thefe two degrees are exprefled by prefixing to the fimple adjectives the refpeXive adverbs more and vioji.

IV. Of numerical words »

The words denoting numbers are rarely introduced into Englifli grammars, as particular parts of fpeech, and frequent- ly they are not at all mentioiied : we mull neverthelefs at- tend to feveral peculiarities in the ufe of them. As, with re- fpeX to the idea combined with them, they are remarkably different from all other parts of fpeech, they certainly deferve to be feparately treated. — Numbers denote nothing that is difcoverable in the things themfelves, as is the cafe with the preceding part of fpeech ; bu^ they eftablifh a circumftancCj namely that of numerical computation. Befide this peculia- rity, they are alfo diftinguilhed from the ufual words deno- ting circumftances, by their immediate connexion with the fubftantive, while the former can be predicated of fubftantives, by means of verbs orjy. Grammarians ought to diftinguifK the different fpecies of numerical words, fince they fignify either abfolute number without any collateral idea, viz. thtt radical or cardinal numbers, which may again be divided into definite and indefinite \ or they are connefted with the colla- teral ideas of order or fuccefTion, claflTification, proportion, &c.

All

E S S A Y S, B Y A D E L U N G. cxv.

All thefe words are liable to many peculiar applications, whi^h, ^owever, properly belong to the pjrovince of grapiinar.

V", Of the Pronouns,^

Pronouns are words determining the fubftantives, and de- noting thofe changeable relations, which are indicated in the very ad; of fpeaking, and the principal of which concerns the relative condition of the perfon. They are as various as the relations pointed out by them ; namely,

Xjperfonalf which refer to perfons only. Thefe may be far- ■^ ther I,) definite y which are again divided according to the three perfons, and according as each of them is in the fingular or plural number. The firll and fecond perfons are fufficiently determined by the relation, in which they appear in fpeech ; hence there is no farther neceffity for pointing t)ut their gen-.ler. But the third perfon is, of itfelf, wholly Undetermined ; and fov this reafon its gender is marked in the fingular number, by diflerent words for each of the three ■ Renders. Yet as the Englifli fubftantives, in general, ex- prefs no peculiar gender, the third perfonal pronoun ferves only to denote tl^e phyfical gender of the perfon ; for this reafon all fuch things, as cannot be dillinguiflied by being phyfically of the mafculine or feminine gender, receive the imperfonal pronoun it ; •?,) itidejinite, among which this undetermined fyllable it occupies the firft rank ; a fyllable, which indicates a determined fubjecl in fo undecided a manner, that it does not pofitiyely follow, whether a per- fon or a thing is undcrftood by it : v. g. " it is faid ; it was Mr Pope ; it js I." -»-In like manner is ufed the improper pronoun one, in as far as it correfponds with the German pronoun man oi jemand,, *' fomebody ;" v. g. to lov^e one.

2. Reciprocal 'pvonoxi.nSj which properly /belong to the former clafs, and are only ufed, when the predicate is again referred to the fubjed : " I love myfelf," &c.

3. FoJJeJJlve pronouns ferve to determine the relation of pof- feffion, with refpert to the perfon. They are either con-

jun6live, when immediately combined with their fubftan- tives, *' my houfe, your father ;" or ahfolute, when they are predicated of fubftantives by means of a verb, as likewife in anfwering a queftlon : v. g. *' this houfe is mine ; •^whofe father called ? — yours." The pcflefiive pronoun . . •• ' ' of

cxvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL

of the third perfon is, like the perfonal pronoun, again dif- tinguiftied according to its phyfical gender, fo that his and her are ufed of things, which by the laws of nature are of the mafculine or feminine gender ; and in all other cafes the poffeffive pronoun its, 4. Demonjlrative pronouns, which denote the relation of the place with refpe£t to the fpeaker, fo that the neareft place is exprefled bj the words, this in the fingular or tbefe in the plurd, and the moft remote, by the refpedive words that or thofe. " 5. Determinative pronouns, which afcertain the fubjeft, to which a fentence is referred by means of the fubfequent reci- procal pronoun. To this number belong, partly the perfon- :al pronouns he and Jhe, when they are ufed in a determi- nate fenfe, v. g. ** he that, or who, fights with filver arms ;" partly the pronoun fuch^ in which cafe it is accompanied by the particle at : ** fuch as are loyal, &c." ; partly alfo the " pronoun of identity," the fame, with its further deter- minations, the very fame, the f elf fame ^ and the very. JS. Relative pronouns, which bring back the fentence to a fub- je£l, either previoufly pointed out, or connefted with a de- terminative pronoun ; of which clafs are, who, which, what, and that, *J. Interrogative pronouns ferve to introduce a queflion, for which purpofe we make ufe of the relative pronouns, who, which, and what.

The pronouns, in general, and the perfonal pronouns, in particular, are very irregular in their inflexion. This pecu- liarity is remarkable, net only in the Englifh, but likewife in all the languages hitherto difcovered : for the pronouns may be clafTed among the moft ancient words in fpeech ; their ori- gin muft be traced in the primitive ages, when the language of every nation was yet in its infant ftate.

A number of other pronouns are commonly enumerated in grammars under the name of pronomina indefinita ; but as they exprefs none of the relations denoted by pronouns, they cannot be reduced to any of the clafles before fpecified. Be- fides, many of them are fo pointedly determined, that no ra- tional being will confider them as indefinite ; for inftance, all, whole, each, neither, every, &c. By far the greater part of them rather belong to the clafs of general numbers, viz. all, dmyyfome, both, each, either ^ neither, every, few, mucbj no, none.

Some

ESSAYS, BY ABELUNG. csvii

Some again, as whole, certain, othir, are with more propriety ranked among the adjedlives ; ahd others as ever and never, arc in reality adverbs.

VI. Ojfiheverh,

ThiC verb is, in all languages, the nioil artificial atid the moft difficult part of fpeech ; becaufe men have contrived to point out, in immediate connexion with it, very different and mul- tiplied relations. To denote thefe relations properly, in the various inflections of the verb, is called by grammarians, to conjugate. The verbs are divided into diftereut fpecies, arifing partly from thtiTjignification, partly from their use, and partly alfo from their conjugation.

With refpcft to i\\t\T Jignijication, they attribute fome thing to an objecl, which can either be conceived immediately in it, and in this cafe they are called intranjitive, fometimes too, but not very properly, neuter verbs ; or they imply fomething that takes place externally to it, tranjitive verbs j when two felf-fubfiflent things are required, the one of which is in an aftive, and the other in a paffive ftate. On this account, in many languages, the tranfitive verbs have two different forms ; namely the aBive,- when the fubjeft is in an aclive flate, aud the pajjive, when it is fuffering. The reciprocal verbs are true tranfitives, with this exception only, that the pre4icate is brought back to the fubjeft, by means of a pronoun.

With refpeft to the life, the verbs are e\t\\tx perfonal. When their fubjetSt is determined, or impcrfinal, when it cannot be afcertained, and confequently is fomething unknown. Farther, they are either perfeB, when they can be ufed in all the dif- ferent relations, in which the predicate can be placed towards the fubjeft ; or defeBive, when they are ufed only in fome o^f thefe relatione.

With refpeft to the conjugation, the verbs are called regulaf; when all their relative ftates can be exprefTed conformably to one rule ; or irregular, when they deviate from the eftabliihed rule.

The relations, circumflances, and collateral notions, which mankind have contrived to exprefs by the verb, are very nu- merous. ']lie principal of them are as follows. J. The Jorm of the word, whether a verb is tran/ttivCf or in-

tranjltive ; and in the former cafe, whether it is aBive

Gi p»/Jive,

cxviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL

2. The mood or the manner, in which the predicate is ftatcd concerning the fubje£l. This may be done, a,) in a pofitive manner, implying truth and certainty ; hence the iridicative mood ; b,) in an uncertain and doubtful manner, the conjunc twe ; c,) by way of command, tlie i?nperative ; and d,)

without any reference to the perfon, the infinitive The

participle, which is fometimes confidered as a peculiar mood, deferves no place here ; fince it is properly an adjec- tive derived from the verb, and carrying with it the colla- teral idea of time.

3. The time, in which the predicate belongs to the fubjedl. This ftriftly coniiils of thiee periods only, namely the prefenf, "pafti and future ; but as the two laft are fufceptible of a great variety of farther determinations, not indeed arifing from their own nature, but from the various relations of fpeech, many languages exprefs thefe in the verb itfelf ; and thus the paji time is again divided into three tenfes, the imperfeB, perfeSI, and pluperfeB ; in a fimilar manner the futu?-e\s again refolved into feveral fpecies.

4. The number of the perfous of the fubjeft ; and laftly,

5. The /pedes of the perfon itfelf, whether it is the firft, fe- cond, or third.

To exprefs all thefe circumftances and relations in the verb itfelf, agreeable to the method adopted in every language, is by grammarians called, to conjugate. Under this expreflion, liowever, we underhand only this much, that all the relations^ above dated, ought to be exprefled by means of proper fylla- bles of inflexion, attached to the root of the verb itfelf ; and in this procefs, the Englifh language is remarkably fimple and eafy. It admits only of one form and one gender j for the ///- tranjitive verbs are likewife conjugated in the aSiive form i in this there are only three moods^ the indicative, the impera- tive and the infnitive : in the indicative we make ufe of two tenfes, viz. the prefent, and a fpecies of the pall, the imperfeB ; but in the imperative, and iniinitive, of one tenfe only : in both tenfes of the indicative, there appear tvoo numbers, and iti each of thefe, three perfons, which however can be only im- perfeftly marked by the verb itfelf; a deficiency, which ren- ders the prefixing of the pronouns neceffary.

To denote the remaining relations, the Englifh are obliged to make ufe of circumlocution, or of indirect expreffions fur- nilhed them by certain verbs, tliat generally indicate foroe col-

Jaterai

ESSAYS, BY AbELUNG. cxix

lateral circumflances, and on this account are called auxiliary •words; becaufe thfey ferve to exprefs thofe relations, in the for- mation of whicli the Englifh verbs are deficient. Thefe then confill of the verbs, to be, for the paffive form ; I mayy for the conjunftive ; to have, for the paft ; arid IJhally for the future tenfes 5— although feveral other auxiliary verbs are commonly enumerated. But, as the whole of this periphrajlical conjuga' tion has been formed merely upon the plan of the niore com- plete Latin infledlion of verbs, thofe above fpecified will anfwer the prefent purpofe J fince any other method of conjugating verbs, if carried on by auxiliary words, is in every refpedl pe- riphraftical.

I cannot here enter upon thfe exteiiu-7e application and the ufe of thefe auxiliary words ; and therefore I ftiall only ob- ferve, that the tranjitive verbg^ in the German language, are divided into two clafies, according as the ideas exprelTed by them partake more of the aftive Or paflive meaning. In the former cafe, they are accompanied by the auxiliary verb ha- beriy " to have ;" in the latter, hyfeyn, " to be ;" v. g. er hat gefchlafen, " he has flept 5" but in another inftance, er iji ge- neferif " he is recovered." This diftinftion, however, does not prevail in Englifh, where all tranfitives are inflefted by the auxiliary verb, to have, without attending to their fignifica- tion. — Regular verbs are fuch as preferve the radical fyllable unchanged, and in which the infieftion is carried on, in an uni- form manner, by means of fixed terminating fyilables. Irre^m gular verbs either deviate from th€ eftablilhed fyllable of in- flexion, or they frequently want it altogether ; for inftance, / biirjl ; imperf . / biirjl ; participle, lurjl or burjlen ; or the in- fleftion takes place in the radical fyllable itfelf ; I bleed -, im- perf. / bled ; participle, bled ; or where both deviations Occur in the fame verb; I befeech ; imperf. / bejought \ p&rtic^- feeched cr bef ought. The irregular verbs are, in all languages, the moft ancient and the moft original : in tracing the nature and origin of them, we miift *efort to the higher branches of etymology. In Englifh we find the irregular verbs through- out derived from the Saxo-Danifh, in which language they likewife appear in the irregular form ; as, on the other hand, the verbs formed from the French and Latin uniformly follow the regtlar inflexion.

p 2 VII.

cxx THllEE PHI to LOGIC AL, &c. VII. Of the F articles.

The particles furnifli a fubjeft of inquiry, that would be in- coniirtent with the limits of this Eflay. They are throughout conftdered as adverbs ; fince they denote either a circumftance in general, in which cafe the precife meaning of them refults from thofe parts of fpeech, with which they are immediately conne£led ; or they point out a circumftance of itfelf,. and in- dependent of any other part of fpeech, in which fituation they are called adverbs ; or they relate to particular kinds of circum- flances : thus the prepojitions denote the relation fubfifting be- tween two fubftantives, in which relation they have been placed fey the verb ; as the conjunBions mark the relation between fen-

tences and their members The laft part of fpeech, with which

grammarians conclude their tafk, comprifes the interjeBions. They exprefs the various fenfations or emotions of the mind, fimply as fuch, and may be divided according to the various kinds of thefe emotions. There are however fome words, i. e. expreffions of clear ideas, which are occalionally ufed to de- note mere fenfations ; for inftance, '* O fad ! well a day !'* and for this reafon they canaot^. with Ilrift propriety, be called interjections.

ConcluJiotiM

Since my intention, throughout the whole of this treatife, has been no other, but to iliew ill a curfory mahner, that the Englifh grammar is lefs arbitrary, and more fufceptible of rational treatment, than many philologers imagine, I muft content myfelf, for the prefenf, with this fliort fpecimen.

If teachers and learners ftiould gradually adopt this method of etymological reafoning, it will be eafy to apply it to the fyntax j wliich, independently of this confideration, is much caiier and more concife in Engliflx than in other languages ; becaufe the words, in the former, are deprived of nearly the whole of their inflection. Indeed, by far the moft eJTentiaJ bufinefs in the fyntax confifts, partly of a rational method of Gonftructing thejeries of words, in which the Englifh language much refembles the German ; partly of the proper ufe of the participles, which difplay many peculiarities in the conftruc- tion of that language. .

ESSAY

ESSAY THIRD.

On the relative merits and dements of Johnfoii^ s English Dictionary,

X. HE Englifh are in poffeffion of a very copious Di^ionary of their language, with which the late Dr. Samuel Johnsot has prefented them, and of which the fourth edition appear- ed (London, 1773) with fome additions, in two large Folio Volumes, compriling upwards of thirty Alphabets, or 716 Sheets of letter.prefs *. 1

As the completenefs of this work, together with the criti- cal and philofophic manner, which the author follows, has been frequently the fubjeft of great praife, not only in Eng- land, but alfo in other countries, by recommending it as a mo- del of a ufeful Didionary for any language ; I was induced to think, that an accurate abridgment of this work might of itfelf fuffice, to fupply fo important a defeft in German lite- rature. Nor indeed had I directed my views further, when I refolved upon publifhing an Englifh-German Diftionary, de- figned chiefly for the ufe of my countrymen. But upon a more minute inquiry into the merits of Johnfon's work, I very foon difcovered, that this performance, notwithftandjng the many advantages it poiTeffes, is replete with great imper- fe£lions. — As thefe imperfeftions are of fuch a nature, as to exhibit themfelves more remarkably in an abridgment, tran- flated into German, than they perhaps do appear in the origi- nal ; and as the principal utility, which the Germans expe£t from fuch an undertaking, might thus have been much dimi- niihed, I was obliged to fubmit to a more arduous taik than I was, at firfl, inclined to undertake.

This aflfertion will not be confidered as unjufl, when I fhall point out, individually, the principal requilites to a Didion- ary, and remark upon every point, how far yahnfon has per- formed

* This computation is made from thefirft Edition, Lond. J755»

eixii THREE PHILOLOGICAL,

formed his duty, and wherein / have endeavoured to improve

iipon him.

1. In the number of words.

3, In the vahie and dignity of every word, whether it be quite obfolete or current ; and in the latter cafe, whether it is ufcd in the more elevated, poetical, focial, or vulgar Ryle.

3. In the grammatical nature of the word, to which I alfo re- fer the orthography, the ittark of tfie accent, and the pro- nunciation.

4. In the etymology or derivation.

5. In the decompofition of the principal idea denoted by the word ;^-eithei by means of a definition, or by a fynonymous German word ;— :-and in the analyfis of the different figni- fications.

6. In the ilhtltration of words by exaraipTes ;• and,

*j. In the grammatical combination, or the ufe of every word',

witli refped to the fyntax.

Conformable to this divilion of the fubje£t, liTiall offer fome remarks upon each of thefe particular points.

I. Concerning the number and the pratlical ufe of words I expected to find the work of Johnfon in its greatefl perfec- tion. In a book, confifling of 2864 pages, large folio, and four times reprinted, I hoped to meet with the whole treafure, or at leail with the moil necelTary and current words, ot the Englifh language. But, in this refpefl, my difappoint-i ment Was great ; and thofe^ who have confulted Johnfon's Dictionary with the fame view, will agree with me, that upon this very point he difplays his weakefl: fide. We mufl however do him the jufkice to allow, that with refpe£l to terms of fcience, and written language, his work is very com- |)lete ; but it is defedlive in focial language, in the language of civil life, and in the terms of arts and manufaftures. His defeft in the laft-mentioned branches, the author himfelf ac- knowledges in the preface, and makes this llrange apology for it, •* that he found it impoflible to frequent the work-lhops of mechanics, the mines, magazines, Ihip-yards, &c. in order to inquire into the different terms and phrafes, which are pe- culiar to thefe purfuits." Yet this is a great defideratum to foreigners, and confiderably detradVs from the merit of a work of tl^is nature ; for thefe are the preeife cafes, in which they have moil frequent occafiou for confulting a Dictionary. To

this

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG, cxxm

this head we may refer the names of plants, fifties, birds, an4 infe£ls^ frequently occurring in common life, of which '4 great number are wanting in the work of Johnfon ; though this deficiency might have been moft eafily fupplied, as there certainly is no want of botanical books and publications on Natural Hiilory, in the Englilh language. In order to ihow the extent of this deficiency, in a perticular inllance, I lliall only remark, that in the fingle work containing the laft voyage of Capt. Cook, in two moderate volumes, oflavo, (publilhed 1782) there occur nearly one hundred words, relating partly to navigation, partly to Natural Hiilory^, that cannot be found in Johnfon's or other Dictionaries.

It will be admitted, that a di£lioaary of a language ought to poflefs the greatefl poflible degree of completenei's, parti- cularly with refpeCl to names and technical terms, which are more rarely employed in common language, and the meaning of which cannot be conjeftured from the context. As fuch words frequently become an objedt of refearch, 1 have found myfclf under the difagreeable neceflity of filling up thefe chafms, as far as my time, my plan, and my fources of information would admit. Thus I have increafed the ftock of words, occurring in Johnfon's and other Englifh Diftionaries of diflinguilhec^ merit, with a great number (perhaps feveral thoufands) of words which were wanting ; efpecially fuch as concern the objefts of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, of the Englifli conftitution, and of various other departments. With regard to the laws, manners, and cuftoms of England, I have availed myfelf of the well known work of Entick.

The proper names of countries, places, and perfons, when deviating from the genuine orthography, I have likewife more corre£lly ftated, and added fuch as have been omitted in John- fon's and other dictionaries.

For the improvement of terms in focial language, I am much indebted to Boyer's Engliili and French Dictionary. But as I had, in this refpect, placed more confidence in John- fon than I could juftify after a careful examination of his work ; and as, on this account, I did not bellow the portion of time requifite to a clofe comparifon with other Dictionaries, I readily confefs, that there remains much to be done yet, e^ Specially with the afliflance of the lateft Englifli productions |n the department of Belles Lettres. For, in latter times, the*

Engli^

cxxiv THREE PHILOLOGICAL

Englifh language appears to have undergone the fame changes as the French and German.

II. It is well known, that all the words of a language do ^ not poffefs an equal value or degree of currency : fome of them are entirely obfolete, but ftill occur in writings, which are flu- died in modern times, for inftance, in the tranflation of the Bible, in Shakefpeare, Spencer, Stc. ; others are peculiar to poetical language ; again, others are current only in certain provinces, or ii^ particular fituations of life ; and ftill others arc vulgar, and exploded from the more dignified written ftyle, as well as from the polite circles of converfation. It is one of Johnfon's great merits, that he has carefully attended to this diftin£tion ; I have likewifa marked it, in my Englifh and German Diflionary, with equal attention ; and I have point- ed out the moft neceflary of thefe diftindions, by means of particular figns or charafters.

III. Next to the preceding, I confider the grammatical de- fignation of every word as the moft important part of a good Dictionary : and under this head I place not only the ortho- graphy, the accentuation, and pronunciation, but alfo the claf- iification of a word, to whatever clafs it belongs as a part of fpcech, and finally, its infledion ; whether it be regularly or irregularly declined or conjugated. Upon this point, alfo, Johnfon is in moft inftances very corred ; excepting that he does not always diftinguifli the fubftantive from the adverb, and this again from the adje£live ; an imperfedion which, with the aid of fome general ideas of grammar, I have had no great difiiculty to remedy. — In the fpeUing of words, Johnfon has adopted the method prevalent among aU fenfible people, and configned the orthographic difputes to thofe, who, from want of more important knowledge, have no other means of obtaining reputation. For my part, I faw no reafon for differing from

Johnfon on this head The proper" accentuation is, in the

Englifti language, one of the moft difficult points. The caufes of this difficulty muft be obvix)us from the remarks upon the accent, which I have premifed in the fecond EflUy. The great- er number of Englifli Diftionaries, therefore, have confidered it as necefi!ary, to mark that fyUable, which is accentuated in a word. Neverthelefs, they have committed the common er- ror, that the reader is never certain, whether an accentuated iyllable muft be pronounced with the grave i. e. extended, or fjcute, i. e, ftiort tone of the voice j for inftance, blood and room ,

are

' ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cxxv

are marked with , the fame accent ; though the former be pro- nounced ihort, and the latter long. In this matter I have fol- lowed Johnfon, nearly as far as the middle of the letter A ; but as the true pronunciation is thus very imperfeftly mark- ed ; and as I was fuccefsful enough to difcoyer this common error, I began very early to differ from him and his colleagues ; and, confequently, from the middle of the firil letter, I have endeavoured to diftinguifti carefully the length of an accentu- ated fy liable by a mark drawn from the left towards the right, and the Jhortnefs of it by a mark running from the right towards the left In the remaining part of grammati- cal determinations of words, I have followed Johnfon as my guide, and carefully diftinguiflied the neuter from the a£live form of verbs : though, in a few inftances,- 1 have been in- duced to differ from him, when he had millaken the neutral life of an aftive verb for a neuter verb.

IV. The proximate derivation of a word Is a matter of Im- portance in all languages ; for upon this circumftance depends not only the full idea or intelligibility of words, but likewife their orthography. Johnfon has feniibly perceived this dif- ficulty, and confequently has Ihortly pointed out the immediate derivatives, " in cafes where he was acquainted with them ;'* and I muft add, *' that he has done it in fuch a manner as ap-' pearcd to him the moft proper." For, upon this particular head, his Diftionary is very defe£tive. When an Englifh word is derived from the French or Latin, he does not ealily mii- take its proximate root : in words, that are obvious deriva- tives of familiar Anglo-Saxon terfns, he is equally fuccefsful. But in mofl other cafes, he proves himfelf a Ihallow etymo- logift : and as his own notions of the origin of languages were not very clear, he is frequently led into great efrors. Thus he confiders the words, with whofe origin he is unacquainted, cither as fortuitous and cant wordsy or he derives them fre- quently in the abfurdefl manner from words nearly corief- ponding in found,' while he aims at explaining them in three or four different ways ; for inftance, " to chirps'' derived from, ** to chear up, to make cheerful. Sec." yet this word obviouf- ly comes from the vernacular German, tfchirpen or zirpen^ ** to twitter like birds." This may ferve as a fpecimen of the manner, in which he fearches for the fource of one river in the mouth of another, which is altogether different from the fornjer. Here I have had frequent opportunities of corre£ling

q him;

cxxvi THREE FHILaLOGICAt

him ; particularly as SkiKNEr was his principal hero in etf- iflology, and as Johnfon himfelf was unacquainted with the German and ether languages related to it. ~ But in cafes, where the derivation of a word required laborious refearches^ fuch as would have occupied much rodm to little purpofe, I liave rather pafled it over altogether, becaufe the like words t»re generally confidered as radicals, or as proper names. And {IS the objedl exprefFed by a word of this kind mull be repre- fented by a fefifible exhibition of ; the thing itfelf, the method of rendering it intelligible, by a probable derivation, is but at negative advantage ; though the etymology of it might be ef- tablifhed by a far-fetched analogy with other words.

Upon this occafion, I cannot omit mentioning a ciicum- flance of fome importance tothe philofophic inquirer into the llrufture of languages. There are, in Englilh, as well as in all other languages, a great number of words^, which are pro^ nounced and written perfeftly analogous to one another ; al- though it can be pi-oved, that they are derived from very dif- ferent roots. Such are, for inftance, the German words, Bar^ Bock, Hundi Katze, &c. and the Englifh words, "arm, buxom, cock, &:c." To confider words of the fame found as of com- mon origin, and to treat them as fuch, difcovers a very fuper- ficial knowledge in languages : belides, this method is attend- ed with the fmgular efFe£l of mifleading the ignorant, who" form the ftrangefl combinations of ideas, when they attempt to derive the different fignifications and applications of a word from one common root. Johnfon was aw'^re of this impro- priety, but he has not alwa^-s been fuccefsful enough in ob- viating it. Hence we frequently meet with fuch a number of iignifications crowded upon the fame word, that it is a matter of aii:onill)ment, how they happened to meet under the fame head. For this reafon, I have fcparated the different fignifica- tions of monotonous words by means of numbers, and have endeavoured to fliow the derivation of each, when I was ena- bled to do this in a fatisfaftory manner.

V. To afcertain the principal and peculiar fignification of a word, from which the others, if there be any, muft be de- rived, has been my next employment. This, indeed, is al- ways the moih difficult point in a Didlionary ; a point, which not only prefuppofes correct ideas of the origin of languages, bu^ alfo the molt precife knowledge of every Avord, and of its life from the earlieil peiidds. The whole of this knowledge

muft

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cxxvii

ua-uft be founded upon a fufficient number of works, written bj men who lived in the difFerent ages, in which the language was fpoken. But as we poflefs no fuch numl>er of works i\\ any language, as is jTufficient to make us acquainted with all the words, that are or have' been current in it j it may be cafily conjeftured, that the primitive fignification of every word cannot be pointed out with precilion, Bi^t even in caies where this is poffible, it requires the mod careful" exam inar tion of all the ancient monuments of a language, that are ftQl preferved,, together with much found philofophy, in order to avoid falling into dreams and fancies, and deriving, in an arbi- trary manner, the words from one another. In etymology, as foon as it carried him beyond the proximate derivation of a word, my predeceffor has not been very fuccefsful. For, even in the latter cafe, he relied too much upon the authority of others ; and it evidently appears from his Dictionary, that the . fl:ru£ture of language did not induce him to philofophical in- quiries. On this account, we can form no great expe£lations, and we mull be fatisfied with his claffification of the different meanings of words, fp as they in every jnftance appeared to him mod proper. His want of knowledge in etymology^ however, is attended with this advantage, that it has guarded him againft a thoufand follies, to which the pfeudo-elymolo- gifls, of all languages and climates, are very liable.

As a foreigner, I could not cafily remedy this deficiency in the claffification of words, unlefs it had been my inclination to proceed upon arbitrary principles, which ought not to be in- troduced into the philoipphy of language. Yet I have corT refted another, perhaps more important, error. Johnfon is uncommonly liberal with a variety of fignifications, particu- larly in fuch words as are frequently ufe^i j for in thefe, the fignifications pointed out by hinif are almoil endlefs. Thus he has given feventy different fignifications of the verb, to go j Jixty-nine of the verb, tqjiand ; &.c. and he might, without great difficulty, have produced the double of that number, if he had proceeded upon a fimilar plan. — In thefe verbs, as well as in many hundred other cafes, Johnfon has obvioufly and uniformly confounded the various applications of one and the fame meaning, with the different fignifications themfelves. Hence I found it neceffaiy, to reduce many of his fignifica-- tions to pne general idea, and thus to fave the reader the trouble ofi"earching for the accurate idea of the word in que{r

cxxviu THREE PHILOLOGICAL

tion among a number of fimllar ideas, and of frequently mli's- ing the true meaning of the word altogether. In order to perceive this inconvenience, I requell the reader to compare with one another the VfovAs^ ground j form y and many others of a fimilar tendency.-

It is a very common praftice among the compilers of Dic- tionaries, to point out the fignification of a word, by means of a fy nonymous expreflion ufed in another language. A fmall Ihare of correal philological knowledge muft convince every one of the impropriety and difad vantage of this praftice. There arc no words completely fynonymous in any language ; nor can any two words, from different languages, be confidered as fynony- mous. And although in languages, that bear flrong marks of affinity to one another, there Ihould be two words of common origin, or even radically the fiame, fuch as '* ground'^' with the German Grund ; ** to go," with the German gehen ; they flill deviate in the indire£l fignifications, or, at leaft, in the ap-. plication to individual cafes. The fafeft and mofl rational me- thod, therefore, is to refolve every fignification into other words, or to f^ire a clear and, if poffible, concife definition of it. I am fenfible, that in this manner the idea of a word can- not be exhauftcd, nor is it poffible to point out this idea with all its ihades and fubtle modifications. I further admit, that this developement of the idea is not in all inftances pradlicable ; fince the meaning of a word, in many cafes, is fo obfcure that it cannot be made perfpicuous. Yet, at the fame time, where this expedient is applicable, it affords the moft certain method of exhibiting a competent notion of every word and its figni- fications ; while it ferves to promote a clear aud jufl know- ledge of things in general. This, therefore, is one of the moll important advantages of Johnfon's Di£tionary : for the author poflcffed a very happy talent of difplaying the idea of a word in a concife, intelligible, and pertinent manner. In this refpeft, I have throughout followed him as my guide, except where I was obliged to contradl the fignifications of words, which he had unnecelTarily accumulated, and confequently to fearch for an appropriate and more comprehenfive idea.

Johnfon has not avoided the common error of lexicograph- ers, who have either negledled to ftate the names of plants and animals, or have done it in a very vague and undetermined manner. He commonly difmiffes the names of vegetables with the addition, « a ^lant,''^ Thus he forfakes the reader, where

ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG cxxlx

51 guide is mod anxloufly looked for. I have endeavoured to fupplj this deiiciency, by adding a nuntiber of names from the three kingdoms of nature, together with the fyllematic name of Linnaeus, to every plant, in order to prevent any miftakes. As the Germans, according to the different provinces, make ufe of a variety of names for one and the fame plant, the addition of the Linnaean name v/as indifpenfable. It is now to be hoped, that none of their numerous tranilators from the Englilh, willj in future, be induced to tranflate the word" pine-apple,'* ananas, by the German exprelTions " 'Tanntaapjen, or Fich' /£';za/>/a/,*' ' which fignify the refpeftive produftions of the fir- and pine-trees ; Abies^ and Pinus Lin. ; while the pine-apple is the produce cf the Bromelia Ananas Lin. Such miftakes have been frequently committed in German books on garden- ing ; and, in the imperfett ftate of the Englilh-German Dic- tionaries hitherto publiflied, it was not an eafy matter to avoid them.

VI. In order to fupply the imperfeft definitions of words, the lignification of which cannot be fully coUefted from the notion contained in the definition, it is a neceflary point in a Dictionary, to illuftrate them by examples. From thefe il- luftrations, this additional advantage refults, that the gramma- tical ufe of a word, and its combination with other parts of fpeech, can be rendered moie confpicuous. Johnfon is very liberal with his examples, and not 'unfrequently prod'gal to excefs. The greater number qf them, he has extracted from poetical works, as he had employed much of his time in pub- li/hing the Engliih poets. \ have made it my ftudy, to hold a middle courfe, and to feleft from the rich ftore of Johnfon's examples the moft concife and pertinent, efpecially in fuch cafes as appeared to require an example, to ihow the precife meaning or the grammatical ufe of a word. As, however, his examples and the whole ftock of hisj words principally relate to the language of authors or " written language ;" I have endeavoured to fupply the obvious want of examples for the purpofes of fv>cial life, from the above quoted Engliflj and French Dictionary, by Boyer ; a work, the phrafes and ex- cmplificatio|:is of which are principallv of the latter kind.

VII. Concerning the pra6lical application of words, when in connexion with others, Johnfon has beftowed great atten- tion upon the moft important cafes^ in which every word may pccur. His accuracy in this refped has induced me to adop:

' r hits

bxxx THREE PHILOLOGICAL

tis examples, without attempting to change or improve them. To conclude this account, I fhall add fome remarks, which exclufively concern the publication of my own Diftionary. — It is a common error of the raoft, if not of all. Dictionaries which appear with German explanations, that the authors of them not only pay no attention whatever to the propriety and dignity af the Getman expreffions and phrafes, but likewife that they are very lludious to find the mofl abfurd and vulgar words in the German, and to make ufe of them for the illuf- tration of foreign words ; though the latter fhould not hold out the leafl inducement to this outrage. The injury thus oc- calioned to inexperienced ftudents of languages, who mofl fre- quently fland in n^ed of fuch books, is much greater than is commonly imagined ; becaufe their tafte or intelleftual dif- cernment is thereby for ever depraved. And what mull be tlie ideas of foreign.ers, refpe£ling the German (as they can- not avoid making ufe of fuch books), when they difcover in them the eflence of all that is obfcene and vulgar, inftead of the more polifhed language of authors ? 'What mull an Englith- ^an think of us, when he finds in eur Englilh German Didlio- oaries, ** gormandizer" tranflated Saumagen ; -*' to gorman- dize," e:;i Saumagen Jeyn y *' gangrel," ein groffe lange Strun%e, Similar indecencies occur in every page. A fmall degree of common fenfe would have prevented the infertion of this tralh into our Di«9;Ionaries, while it would have taught the com- pilers, to render the expreflion with becoming dignity. I have exerted myfelf to iliun the like inelegant terms and phrafes, even in thofe cafes where the Englilh word might have afford- ed an opportunity of lifing them ; for I have rather fubmitted to the tafk of circumlocution, than tp the propagation of mean and indecent wojds.

There is another remark to be made, relative to the ortho- graphy of the Englifh. Johnfon ha§ given a feparate analyfis of every compound word, after having firft printed the words in a combined Hate. In order to fave room and trouble, I have thought proper to point out the compound words imme- diately in the order of the alphabet. For thispurpofe 1 have attnoll throughout the whole (for in fome inflances I may have overlooked it) divided fuch words in tUe fpelling, as " hope-

lef«,

ESSAYS, BY ADELlfNG. cxix?

lefs, black-fmith, &c. though thefe words (hoiUd be read and confidered as infeparable *.

The following Extraft fronr a Critical Effay originally pubiifted in the Edin-' burgh Review for 1755, will, it is hoped, be acceptable to the reader ; as the ideas contained in it very nearly coincide with thofe advanced by Mr. Adeluno ; ana »» it is now underftood to be the prodiKftion of the celetwated Dr. Adam Smith.

* A Didionary of the Englilh language, however ufeful, or rather n^ceffary, has never been hitherto attempted with the leaft degree of fuccefs. To explain hard words and terms of art, feems to have been the chief purpofe of all the former eompofitions, which have borne the title of Englifh diftionaries. Mr Johnfon has extended his views much farther, and has made a very full colledlion of all the different meanings of each Englifli word, juftified by examples from authors of good reputation. When we compare this book with other die-* tionaries, the merit of its author appears very extraordinary. Thofe which in modern languages have gained the moft efteem, are that of the French academy, and tliat of the academy Delia Crufca. Both thefe were compofed by a numerous fo- ciety of learned men, and tooK. up a longer time in the com- pofitioii, than the life of a lingle perfon could well have af- forded. The Di<^ionary of the Englifh language is the work of a fingle perfon, and compofed in a period of time very in- confiderable, when compared with the extent of the work. The coUeftion of words appears to be very accurate, and mufl be allowed to be very ample. Mofl words, we belkve, are to be found in the Di6Vionary, that ever were almoft fufpecled to be Engliili ; but we cannot help wilWng, that the author had trufted lefs to the judgment of thofe who may confult him, and had oftener pafled his own cenfure upon thofe words which arc not of approved ufe, though fometimcs to be met

with

* This method of pointing out compounded words is profeiSsdly contrived to favc room and the repetition of words ; yet, at the fame time, it is unavoidably attended with this difad vantage, that it may induce foreigners, to confider a// thofe words, which are printed with a fign of divifion, as feparable compounds. — Mr. Adelung might have eafily obviated this inconvenience, by ufing different marks of feparation for thofe compounds, the parts of which are written fep^ately, as " party-man j" and for thofe, that ate contraded into one word, as ** %itc-ful.'*

cxxxli THREE PHILOLOGICAL

-with in authors of no naean name. — ^Where a work is ad- mitted to be highly ufeful, and the execution of it i.ititled to praife ; the adding, that it might have been more nietul, c aii fcarcely, we hope, be deemed a cenfiire of it. The meiit ct this Difticnary is fo great, that it cannot detract from it, to take notice of fome defefts, the fupplying which, would, in our judgment, add a coniiderable Ihare of merit to that which it already poflefies. Thefe defefts confift chiefly in the plan, tvhich appears to us not to be fufficiently grammatical. The different fignifications of % word are indeed colleded ; but they are feldom digefted into feveral claffes, or langed under the meaning which the word principally expreiTes ; and fuf- ficient care has not been taken to dillinguilh the words appar- ently fynonymous.*

* It can import no refleftion upon Mr. Johnfon's Dictionary, that the fubje£l has been viewed in a different light by others ; and it is; at leaft a matter of curioiity to confider the different views, in which it appears . Any man who is about to com- pofe a diftionary, or rather a grammar of the Englifti lan- guage, muff acknowledge himfelf indebted to Mr. J. for a- bridging at leaft one half of his labour. All thofe who are imder any difficulty, with refpeft to a: particular word of phrafe, are in the fame fituation. The DiSionary prefents them a full colleftion of examples ; from whence indeed they are left to determine ; but by which the determination is rendered eafy. In this country *, the ufefulnefs of it will be' foon felt, as there is no Itandard of correal language in con- verfation. If our recommendation could in any degree incite to the perufal of it, we would earneftly recomrtiend it to all thofe who are defirous to improve and correct their language, frequently to confult the Diftionary. Its merits muft be de- termined by the frequent refort, that is had to it. , This is the moft unerring teft of its value : criticifmtf may be falfe, pri- vate judgments ill-founded ; but if a work of this nature btf tnuch in ufe, it has received the fandion of the public ap-. frobatioB,'

* Scotland,'

t I N I S.

SPECIMEN

IDENTICAL DICTIONARY

German, English, French, and Latin Languages.

Note. All thofe compounded words, which are eqfily explained from

their conjlituent parts, are here purpojely omitted T^he vocables firji

Jlatedy after the Germany exprefs the mofl literal fenfe. — Subjianti'ves, without a number referring to the declenfiony are indeclinable \ the num- bers mark the five German declenfions Further y the ajlerijh (*) points

out thofe fnbjlantivesy which change their firft vowel into a diphthong, when ufed in the plural number ;— a. ^.Jlands for adverbial adjeBive ;— adj /or adjeBive \ — adv. /or adverb ;—conj. /or conjunBion ; — obj. /or objeBivelyy or in a phyfical fenfi ;—i}jih].forftbjeBivelyy or in a mental fenfe ;— s. Lforfubjiantive feminine ; — s. m. for fubjlantive mafculine ;

s. n. for fubjlantive neuter \ — v. a. r./or verb aBive, regular } — ir.

for irregular — v. n. for verb neuter 5 — vulg./or vulgarly, or in low life.

German.

Aal, s. m. i,

Acs *, s. n. 5.

Ab, fyll of compounds.

Ab'diiderlich, a. a.

Ab'dndern, v. a r,

Ab'dnJerung, t. f. 3. Abarheiten, v. a. r.

{fich) recipr,

Aharten, v. n. r. Abartung, S. f. 3. Abbeijfai, V. a. ir.

Abbejltllen , V. a. r. Abbiiden, v. a. r.

Aibildung. 8. f. 3.

English.

eel

carrion, carcafs down, from, off variable, changeable to vary, change, fhift

alteration, variation to work or labour for

to fatigue, or wear

onefelf out by labour

to degenerate

degeneration

to bite off or from

to countermand

to fafliion or portray

formation, pivSlurc

\ Feench.

anguille.

charogne, cadavre

de. du, &c.

variable

varier, changer, cor-

riger alteration, variation , travailler a compte de cequ'ona regud'avance cpuifer I'es forces par

le travail degenerer, forligner degeneration mordre, arracher avec

les dents contremander reprefenter, tirer d'a-

pres nature ■image, portrait.

Latin.

anguilla.

cadaver.

de

varians, mutabilis

mutare, immutarc

mutatio, immutatio aliquid labore compen-

fare laboribus frangi

dcgenerare, depravari degeneratio, depravati* demordere

renunciare, adimere. jeffingere, exprimere ■

Iforraatio, cffiAio

GtHUAlt.

^bhinden,V. a. ir. Abbitu, s. f. (Crg.only)

^iiitfen, V. n. IT.

AbborgeHy V, n. r. Ahbruhen^ V. a. ir.

( to untie or unloofe 'delier, detacher excufe, apology, excufe, apologie

to beg pardon, or to demander pardon

apologize, to borrow. 'emprunter

to break off 'rompre

to pull down iabattre, demolir

to ftopfliort,in fpcakingis'arr^er, paufer

— (Jtcb) recipr. &ir.

Ahhrennen,-<l.'3i.T. • V. n.

Abbrucb ^.4. (fing.only )

to dctraft, leffen. to abftain from.

to burn down, or out to confume by fire

tdeduirc, rabattre Is'abftenir de qq. ch.

reduire en cendre j'confumer par le feu

Abbriiehigf a. a. Abbujfen,v. a. r. Abdanken^ V. a. r.

Ahdankung,^ S. f. 3.

Ahdecken, V. a r.

Abduker, 5 m. 1. vulg. Scbinder. Abdickung, s. f. 3. AbiUngen. v. n. r. Abdringen, V. a. ir. or VxHi^^dt ucksn (fubj.) Abdruck * s. m. a. Abdrucken,\. a. r,

AbdrijcketifV. a. r.(obj.)

Abend., S. m. 2. Abtnibeuer, 8. n. I. "} or Ebentf^er, — C Ahintbmrer, s. m, I. adventurer

to give over burning 'celTer de bruler

ft) difcharge a gun itirer un canon ou un

j fufil detraftion ^rabais

diminution, detriment diminution, detriment lofs, damage perte, domraagc

derogatory derogatoire

to expiate, or atone for expier to fay thanks or grace 'remercier to difcharge jcongedier

j'ifcharge, difmiffal .conge, demiflion refignation, abdication jrefignation, abdication to uncover (the roof) jd^couvrir to ftrip off (the flcin) lecorcher the ikinner lecorcheur

the hangman (in office)' bourreau uncovering, denudation! denuement to dedu\5l in bargaining defelquer

to extort [extorquar

a copy, impreffion Icopie, empreinte to imprint, or to take imprimer,tirer copie

a copy to let down the cock preffer, feparer a force

of a fire-lock the evenmg foir, foirce

adventure

lATJt^/

[but, }'et, however jfuperftition

A lev, conj. — Aherglauhi., S. m. 3 (fmg. only) Abergl'dubifcb, or ") L „. .

Aboglaubig.^.^ jifuperftmotis Aberkeantn, V. 2u r Si.

Abermal, or Abtr-

tnals, adv. Abfrmalig, a a. Aberivitz, s. m. 2.

(Crg. only) Arrrii)itzig, a. a.

— ajv.

jto judge, pafs fentence upon

lonce again, anew

'repeated

idotage, delirium

jdiftradled, infane Idiftradedly, foolifhly

aventure aventuricr

mais, pourtant, or fuperftition

fuperflltieux juger, decretcr

encore, de nouveau

nouveau, autre

folic, delire »

devenu fon comme xin fott

folvere, refolvere. deprecatio. ignofcendi

poftulatio. deprecari, veniam pe-

tere. mutuari.

carpere, decerperc. diruere demolirL abrumpere fermonem. detrahere (de pretio ) abitinere, fefe conti-

nere. urere, comburere. deflagrare, conflagrar©

fiammis. definere ardere. itormcntum vi pulveri»

igniferi mittere. defradum decerptio, deminutio.detrimentuiH jatftura, damnum, derogans. lucre.

gratias agere. dimittere. miilio, dimiflio. abdicatio munerig. detegere (domum). pellem detrahere. pellium detrador. carnifex, tortor. detedio nudatio. deti ahere pi etio.

exprimere, extorqaer*

exemplar, impreflio, • typis exfcribere.

premendo avellerc,

folvere. vefpera.

eventura, portentum;

qui tentat et periclita'

tur fortunam, aft, ad, fed, veid, &* fuperftitio, falfa

religio.

fuperftitiofus. abjudicare.

iterum, rurfus, denuo ^

iteratus.

amentia, delirium.

amens, delirus dtmenter,iuor e deU- rantis.

CONTENTS.

f •■■—

ESSAY FIRST.

A concife hijiory -of the Englijh languAge^ its changes ^ PAGE

and gradual iThpro'OemeHty - - v

I. Britifh-Saxon Period^ - - ' - vi

II. Daniih.Saxon period, - - a^ iX

III. Normannic-Saxon Period j or Normannic Anglo-

Saxon, - - - XX

IV. French-Saxon, or Englifli period, - xxix Divilionfirft : fronx 1272 to 1399 : or from Edward

I. to Henry IV. - - - xxxi

Divifion fecond : from 1399 to 1485; or from

Henry IV. to Henry VII. - * xlviii

Divilion third : from 1485 to 1558; or from Henry

Vll. to the end of Q^Mary. - Iviii

Divifion fourth : from 1558 to 1625 > o^ during the

reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I. - Ixviii Concluding general remarks, * - Ixxxv

ESSAY SECOND.

A philofophical view of the Englijh language t

Why called philofophical ? Ixxxviii. Of the Englifli Lan- guage, Ibid. Of the Englifli written Language^ Ixxxix. Di- vifion of Grammar Ibid, Of the Englifli Written Charafters, /i/i/. Of the Anglo-Sakon Alphabet, xc. Of its difufe, ibid. Of angular written charadters, xci. The Englifli write dif- ferently from what they fpeak, xcii. Explanation of this phe- nomenon, iciii. Of orthography, xciv. Of the ftrufture of words, ibid. Definition of words and fyllables, ibid. Divifion •of words according to their llrufture, xcv. Definition of

radicals

CONTENTS.

radicals, ibid. Of derivatives, xcvi. Compound words, xcviif . Of the tone or accent of words, xcix. General definitions of the accent, c. Diftindion of the accent as to its force, ibid. Of the duration of the accent, ci. DiiFerence between ex- tended and acute fjUables cii. Of the accent of radicals, ciii. Of the accent of derivatives, ibid. Of the accent of compound words, cv. Reflcftions upon words as parts of fpeech, ibid. Further refleftions upon words, cvii. Analjfis of the inflec- tions, cviii. (I.) Further refleftions on the fubflantive. (i.) Divifion of it, cix. (a.) The gender of fubftantives, ibid. (3.) Of the formation of the Plural, ex. (4.) Of the declenfion, ibid. (II.) Of the Article, cxi. (III.) Of the AdjeftJve, cxiii. (IV.) Of numerical words, cxi v. (V.) Of the Pronouns, cxv. (VI.) Of the Verb, cxvii. (VII.) Of the Particles. lzx» Concluiion, ibid.

ESSAY THIRD.

On the rilative merits and demerits of 'jfohnfon's Englijh

Di£iionary, - - - - cxxi

I. Concerning the number of words, - cxxii

II. ■ the value and dignity of words, cxxiv

III, I the grammatical defignation of words, ibid.

IV. ■ the etymology of words, - cxxv V. the principal fignlfication of words, cxxvi

VI. ■ — the illuftration of words by examples, cxxix

VII. ■ I the praftical applicaton of words, ibid.

Extraft from a Critical Effay ; by Dr Adam Smith, cxxxi

INDEX.

N D

X,

Referring to the Names, which occur in thefe Effays *,

Alcock, John, 58.

Alfred, king, 7, 9, 10, 19.

Anfley, Brian, 63.

Arbuthnot, Alexander, 79.

Afcham, Roger. 6j, 68.

Bacon, lady Anne, 83.

— — lord Francis, 85.

Baldwin,' William, 6s, 67.

Bale, John, 63.

Ballenden, John, 63.

Barbour, John, 38.

Barclay, Alexander, 58.

Barnfley, Charles, 63.

Bafton, Robert, 36.

Bede, Vcner. 7.

Behn, Mrs. 84.

Bercher, William, 69.

Berners, Juliana, 57, 6a

Bilson, Thomas, 84.

Boleyn, George, 61.

Borde, Andrew, 63.

Bourchier, John, 64.

Brighman, Nicholas, 44.

Bruce, Robert, 36, 39.

Brumpton, John, 47.

Brunne: V.— Robert de Enmne,35.

Bryant, Sir Francis, 6a.

Buckhurft, Lord, 8».

Caedmon, 7, 9.

Campeden, Hugh, 50.

Cary, Henry, 8a.

Cavyl, 67,

Caxton, William, JSt 60.

Cecil, Mildred, 83,

William, 8a.

Chapman, George, 69, 71, Charlemagne, 6. Chatterton, 5 a. Chaucer, GcofFrcy,40,46^8, Cheke, Sir John, 64, 68. Chertfey, Andrew, 63. Chefler, Thomas, 50.- Churchyard, Thomas, 67, 70. Cook, Catherine, 83. Cox, Leonard, 74. Crowley, Robert, 65. CufiF, Henry, 8a. Culrofc, 63 Davie, Adam, 36. Devercux, Robert, 75.

Doughs, Gawin, 39, 60, Drant, Thomas, 71, 7».

Drayton, a6.

Dudley, Robert, 75, 80, 8a. '•< Dunbar, William, 59. Edward III. 36.

IV. 51.

VI. 65. 66.

Edwards, Richard, 67.

Eiham, Thomas de, 51.

Elizabeth, Queen, 8a.

Entick, ia3.

Fabian, Robert, 57.

Fairfax, Edward, 7a, 75.

Fane, Lady Elizabeth, 66.

Fenton, Sir Geoffrey, 7», 8a.

Ferrers, George, 67.

Fleming Abraham, 69, 71, 7a.

Forreft, William, 68.

Galbreith, 63.

Gafcoigne, George, 69, 7», 78, 8c.

Gaiuit, John of, 41.

Golding, Arthur, 70, 71.

Googe, Bamaby, 69, 71.

Gowcr, John, 46, 47.

Green, Robert, 81. Gray, Lady Jane, 66. Grimoald, Nicholas, 63, 78, Grofteft, Robert, iS- Haliwell, Edward, 6^. Hall, Arthur, 69.

Jofeph, 79.

Hampole, Richard, 36. Harding, John, jo. Harrington, Sir James, 7a, ■ ■ " Sir John, 78 Harvey, Gabriel, 78, Haftings, Francis, 66. ,

Hatton, Lord Chancellor, 8a. Hawes, Stephen, j8. Henry I. a3.

V. 48.

'—— the Minftrel, 55.

Heywood, Jafper, 70,

— -— — John, 63.

Higden, 47.

Holland, 55.

Holme, Wilfrid, 63.

Hooker, Richard, 75, 84

Hopkins, John, 65.

Howard; Henry,EarlofNorthampt. 8a.

■ ■ — — Surrey, 6a, 63.

— — — Lady Mary, 67. Humphrey, Duke of Glouc. 51. 66. Hunis, William, 6j.

Jamec

In order to lave room, and to render the finding out of the Names eafier t« the reader, wc have reduced the Roawu Nw^sr» W thofe ia wTom.** nfc

INDEX.

James of Scotland, 55.

VI. Do. 79.

Inglis, Sir James, 63.

Ingulf, Abbot, 19.

John, King, 32.

Johnfon. Dr. Sam. 6, 9, 60, 65, lar.

Kay, John, 51.

Kelton, 66.

Kendall, Timothy, 71.

Kinloch, 63.

Kinwelmerfh, Francis, 69.

Kyd, 63,

Lcland, 34,41.

Lilly, George, 6j.

John, 80.

Lindfay, Sir David. 63. Livius, Titus, 51. Longlande, Robert, 27' Lumley, Lady Joanna, 67.

Lord John, 64.

Lydgate, John, 49, _j8.

Maitland, Sir Richard, 79.

Mandeville, Sir John, 37, 47.

Manning, Robert, 35.

Margaret, Coimtefs of Richmond, 60.

Marloe, Chriftopher, 70. 80.

Mary, Queen of England, 67.

Scots, 8a.

Matthew of VVeftminfter, 47. Medwall, Henry, 59. Merimuth, Adam de, 47. Montfort, Simon of, 32. Montgomery, Alexander, 79* More, Sir Thomas, 61, 63. Morley, Lord, 64.

Nafhc, Thomas, 80. Nevyle, Alexander, 69. Newcaflle, Dutcheh of, 84. Newce, Thomas, 69. Newton,,Thomas, 70, 71;. Norton, John, 50.

Thomas, 65.

Occleve, 49, 56. Parker, Matthew, 65^ Parr, Catherine, 64. Peele, George, 81. Pelham, Sir John, 54. Percy, Algernon, 60, Perkins, William, 75 Phayer, 67. philips, Catherine, 84. Poulett, William. 82. Poyngz, Sir Anthony, 69' Puttenham, 74. Raleigh, Sir Walter, 75. 78, RaftaD, John, S9, 61.

Ratcliffc, Thomas, 75, Ripley, George, 50. Robert de Brunne, 35.

of Gloucefter, 35.

Rochford, Vifcount, 6a. Rolland, John, 79. Roos, John, '62. Roper, Margaret, 64.

Mary, 66.

Rowley, Thomas, 52. Ruffel, Elizabeth, 83. Sackville, Thomas, 67, 79. Savillc, Sir Henry, 7a. Scot, Alexander, 68. Seager, Francis, 65, 67. Shakefpeare, 81. Sheffield, Lord Edmund, 66. Sheridan, 99. Sidney, Mary, 83.

Sir Philip, 69, 8r

Sinclair, Henry Earl of, 60. Skelton, John, 60, 61, 67. Skinner, 126. Smith, Nicholas, 69.

Sir Thomas, 65, 68.

Sommerfet, Duke of, 66 Spenfer, Edmund, 71, 76 Stafford, Lord Henry, 66 Stanyhurft, Robert, 70 Sternhold, Thomas, 65 Stewart of Lorn, 63 Studley, John, 69 Swynford, Catherine, 42 Tiptoft, John, 56 Tuberville, George. 71, 78

Thomas, 70, jr

Tuffcr, Thomas, 67

Tye, Chriftopher, 65 Twyne, Thomas, 70 Vaux, Lord Nicholas, 62 Vere, Edward. 82 Underdowne, Thomas, 69 Wade, Lawrence, 59 Waller, 73

Walter, William. 59 Walton, John, 48 lVarton,7, 19,23,27,31 Whctftone, George, 72, 80 Wickes, Thomas, 47 W^ickliff, John 31, 41,46 Widville, Anthony, 56 Wilfon, Dr. Thomas, 69, 7a W^inton, Andrew, 55. Wyat, Sir Thomas, 6a Wyttingham, William, 6s

CATALOGUE

CATALOGUE

Of References to the original publications ^ as well as tranfla^ tions made into Englifhy andfome remarkable pajfages.

Addrefs to his empty purfe, by Chau- cer, 43

Aelian's various Hiftory,by Fleming, 69

Agamemnon, by Studley, 69

Agricola's Ltife, by Saville, 7X

Amadis de Gaule, 8 X

Arcadia, by Sidney, 81

Ariofto's Suppofiti, by Gafcoigne, 72, 80

i Works tranflated by Harring- ton, 72, 78

Arittotle, on the Ten Categories, by Googe, 69

Arraignment of Paris, by Peelc, 81

Art of Englift Poelie, by Puttenham,

74 Art of Rhetoric, by Wilfon, 74 Aftrolabe, by Chaucer, 45' Aftrophel, by Spencer, 77 Bard, JVilliatn the Conqueror's, 10 Belvidere, or the Garden of the Mufes,

Boccace, Vifions of, 72 Boethius's Confolation of Philofophy, by Wahon, 48 ■ ' by C^ Elizabeth,

8a Book of Kings, 66

Caefar's Commentaries,by Golding, 71 Canterbury Tables, by Chaucer, 45 Caftle of Love, by Groffe-Tefte, Z5 Cebes, Table of, by Poyngz, 69 Chrift's Kirk on the Green, by King

James, 54 Cicero's Offices, by Grimoald, 72

Oration for Archias, by Drant,

72 ■ Seleft Epidles by Fleming, 27

Complaint of Scotland, by Inglis, 63 Concordance of Sins, by Fabian, 57 ConfcfTio Amantis, by Gower, 46 Confolation of Q^ Mary's, &c 83 Court of Love, by Chaucer, 40, ss

• ■ Venus, by K. James, 55 Pefence of Poelie, by Sidney, 82

Dcmofthenes's Sevcn^Orations, by Wjj^

fon, 69 Deftrutftion of Troy, by Lydgate, 50 Dido, Tragedy of, by Nafhe, 80 Difcourle of Life and Death, by lyT.

Sidney, 83 F-cclefiaftical Polity, by Hooker, 75 Edivard the Firji, by Peele, 81 Egidius, on the Government of Princes,

by Occleve, 49 Ella, Tragedy of, by Rowley, $^ Englijh Name dlfgraced, 22 England's Parnafl'us, 78 Erafmus's Inftitution, by Lumley, 64 Euphues, a Romance, by Lilly, 81 Euripides's Phcenifiae orjoca/ta, by Gaf- coigne and Kinwelmenh. 69, 80 Fairy Queen, by Spenfer, 76 Fall of Princes, by Lydgate, 50 Fauftus's, Dr, Tragical Hi;1ory,by Mar-

loe, 80 Froiffart's Chronicle, by Bourchier, 64 Gammer Gurton's Needle, 66 Glafs of Government, by Gafcoigne,

80 Golden Epiftles, by Fenton,8a — — Tergc, by Dunbar, 59 Gorboduc, by Sackville, 79 Guicciardini's Hiftory of Italy, by Fen- ton, 72, 82 Heliodorus's Hiftory , by Underdowne, 69 Hercules Oeteus, by Studley, 69 Herodian's Hitlory, by Smith, 69 Hiftory of the World, by Raleigh, 75 Homer's Iliad, by Hall, 69 Horace's Art of Poetry, by Q^' Eliza- beth, 8a ~— — Satires, Epiftle* and Art of

Poetry, By Drant, 71 Hufbandrie, five hundred points of

good ; — by Tuffer, 67 Hyppolitus. by Studley, 69 Idiot, an epithet given to a Bijbop, 22 Jewel's Apology for the Church of England, 83

ir«crates

CATALOGUE.

Ifocrates, by Fleming, 69 Tuftin's Hiilory, by Golding, 71 King^ Dayld and Fair Bethfabe, by

Peek 81 King's Quair, by K. James I. 54 Kyng of Tars, 33 Laconic Advice, by Chauetr, 44 Li/e of St. Margaret, 26 JLucan's Firft Book, by MarIoc,7i Jifagna Cbarta often reprintedy 64 Mantiian, tranfl. by Tuberville, 71 Manual de Peche, by R. de Brunnc,35 Maphacus fupplement.book of Virgil, by

Twyne, 70 Martial's Epigrams, by Kendall, 71 Medea, by Studley, 69 Mirrour for Magiftra tes, by Sackvillc,

67 Moralities impronted iy Hawaii, 59, 61] Mufaeus, by Chapman, 69 Ochine's Sermons, by A. Bacon, 83 Odavia, by Newce, 69 Oedipus, by Nevyle, 69 Ovid's Art of Love, by Douglas, 59 — — Elegies, by Marloe, 70 -— — Faiii,70 ■ ■ Heroical Epiflles, by Tuber- ville, 70 ■. Ibis, by Underdowne, 70

■ Metamorphofis, by Golding, 70

■ '■■ Remedy of Love, 70 Tritlia, by Churchyard, 70

Orofius'straanflation, by K. Alfred, lO Palingenius's Zodiac, by Googe, 7 1 , Paradife of dainty dev. by Edvpards, 67 Paffetyme of PIcafure, by Hawes, 58 Peblis to the Play, by K. James I. 54. Philotus, 64

Pliny's Letters, by Fleming, 7a Plutarch de Qiriofitate, by Q^ Eliza- beth, 8a Polyalbion, by Drayton, 26 Pompon. Mela's Geogr. by Golding, 71 Princ. Plcaf. of Kennelw. Caftle, by

Gafcoigne, 80 Promos and Caffandra, by Whetftonc, io

R«jconciliatIon,way of, by E. RufTd,? j Rhodes, HiUory of the Siege of by Kay,

51 Royal advice to her Son, by Q^Mary,

83 Salluft's Jugurth. War, by Q^ Eliza- beth, 82 Schoolmaller, by R. Ascham, 68 Seneca's Hercules Furens,Thyeftes, and

Troas, by Heywood, 7of ' Thebais, by Newton, ibid.

On Benefits, by Golding, 71

— — — Ten Tragedies, 69 Statius's Thebais, by Newton, 71 Shepherd's Calendar, by Spenfer, 77 Ship of Fools, by Barclay, 58 Siege of Thebes, by Lydgate.jo Solinus's Polyhiftory, by Golding, 7a Song of K. Jameson his Miftr. 54 Synefius's Panegyric, by Fleming, 69 Tacitus's Four Firft Books, by Saville, 74 TafTo's Jerufalem deliv. by Fairfiax, 73 Tragedie of Antonio, by M.Sidncy, 83 Thiltle and ELofe, by Dunbai,59 Toxophilus, by R. Afcham, 65 Travels of Ohthcr and Wulfftan, by

King Alfred, 10=17 Treatife on the proper mode of writing the Eng. Lang, by Smith, 65,68 ■ on the difference of the ages of man's life, by Cuff, 82 Tutkifl^Mahomet, a Trag. by Peele, 8t Virgidemiarum, by Hall, 79 Virgil's Aeneid, by Douglas 60 - — — by Howard, 62* ■ — by Phayer & Twyne, 7©

■ — __ by Stanyhurft, 70

■ — Alexis, by Fleming, 71

I Bucolics & Georgics, Do. ibid. Culex, by Spenfer, - Ibid.

Viitue and Vyce, by Ballendcn, 63 Vifion of P. Plowman, by Longlande, 37 Utopia, by Sir Thomas More, 61 Wallace, Sir William's Life Snd exploiti,

by Henry the Minftrel, 39, ss Writer, tbepfifor Bread, 8 1 Xenophon's loftitut. by Bercher, 69.

ESSAY

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