

ELEMENTS of SCIENCE

MORAL AND RELIGIOUS



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ELEMENTS OF SCIENCE

Moral and Religious.

A TEXT BOOK FOR SCHOOLS AND
GENERAL USE.

BY

S. A. JEWETT, M. A.

Science in the very *idea* of it, has a character of necessity and universality of thought that admits not of one-sided or sectarian views.

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PREFACE.

THIS book is designed to meet a want that has always existed, and is now realized, namely: such treatment and presentation of Moral Philosophy as fits it for public school instruction in morals and religion without sectarian bias.

Recent and earnest discussion in the leading quarterlies and other periodicals is a sure index of the importance of the subject, and of public interest in it.

There is but one way to effect this: It is to point out the true *idea* in morals and in religion, and their relation to each other. In other words, to present the true underlying principles.

In treatises on moral philosophy there is diversity as to the basis of morals. Pleasure, happiness, utility, the fitness of things, law, divine and human, are severally set up. These, indeed, are more or less auxiliary in the formation of moral character, but the underlying principle in morals is to be found in the *disposition to do right*; in the love of the right; in the good will, the will obedient to the right, and existing in the moral nature that demands the exercise of the good will, demands duty.

This accords with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Aristotle, and also with higher authority—that of Jesus - who always refers us to the thoughts and intents of the heart as the source from which are the issues of life.

Without this good-will, there can be no true moral act. With it there must also be intelligence to direct the activities of the good will.

This moral intelligence we have from two sources:

(1) The *self-evident*; as, for instance, it is immediately evident to any man of good common sense that it would be right to obey God.

(2) From the *true idea* in any thought, sentiment, law, institution or moral object.

Man's highest end or chief good is, then, in a true moral nature, having moral truth in its activities.

This principle, then—the true moral nature—acting from self-evident and ideal truth, must run through the warp and woof of all reasoning in constructive moral science.

The idea, the type—universal law—is the philosopher's stone that discloses all truth. When he discovers it he sees its beauty; his soul is enlarged, and is transplanted from a condition of bondage into a realm of liberty. He sees a solvent for all the vexed questions of life, in its religious, moral, educational, social, civil and political aspects, and he rejoices in it.

The Introduction finds distinctive ground in morality and religion, yet an inseparable and intertwining growth of both in the soul, draws a clear line of distinction between natural and revealed religion, yet so that natural religion, together with moral considerations, naturally tend towards and lead up to spiritual tabernacles and to the entrance to Divine revelations.

This affinity in morals and religion marks the place of religion in public school instruction; and this distinction between the natural and the revealed shows a line of demarcation between the work of religious instruction in the schoolroom and in the church.

The intention is to exhibit moral science on a religious-moral ground—not specifically Christian. The phrase "Christian ethics" is sometimes used in a too exclusive sense, as though there were no other ethics of any value; but the teaching of Jesus and the apostles by no means ignores moral truth from other sources. The splendid contributions of ancient philosophy, of the Gentile world, as well as Old Testament law, are all referred to as a part of a grand system of ethics to which Christianity is complementary and is essentially necessary to fulfil the moral law. This recognition of Gentile philosophy was not necessary on the ground that a complete science of morality is not deducible from the Old and New Testaments, but is necessary, and is not to be lost sight of, on the ground that man, however demoralized, is in the image of God, and naturally there flames out from the divinity in him fitful fires of moral truth.

But it is this acknowledgment by Jesus of what is universal in man that proves the roundness and completeness of his own

character. It is with this knowledge of what is in man, and this perfect idea of the moral law, that our Lord says, "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets. I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil."

Jesus then goes on to define the moral law more particularly, and to exhibit its true idea, according to which causeless anger is at the root of murder, and adultery is in the heart; the law of divorce is restricted and the "Love thy neighbor, hate thine enemy" is transformed into "Love thine enemies."

The true idea of charity, or alms-giving in a private way, he distinguishes from the pharisaical and false one of "sounding a trumpet."

In religion, also, he distinguishes the true spirit of prayer from its vain form; and at the same time gives a form of prayer which all men admire as natural and true, and hence it is of universal acceptance.

Paul, too, in the epistle to the Romans, declares that "what men may know of God is manifest in themselves; that the Gentiles, which have not the law, at times do by nature the things contained in the law, and show the work of the law written in their hearts."

This, then, is the attitude of Christian teaching towards morality and religion. It supplies what is lacking in prior views and doctrines; it annuls nothing that is in agreement with the constitution of God or the true nature of man.

This is recognized even by J. S. Mill, who at times indulges in caricature and misrepresentation; but in a mood of right reason he writes thus:

"I believe that the sayings of Christ are all that I can see any evidence of their having been intended to be; that they are irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensive morality requires; that everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought within them."

American institutions should foster individual independence and self-reliance, for these qualities are necessary in the true idea of a citizen of a republic. A man that has no independence of thought and action is poorly equipped for doing his duty to the State: so the young in our land need first to be taught as to the points of agreement in human nature—the necessary and uni-

versal principles that pertain to it; when indoctrinated in what pertains to common interests, a sure foundation has been laid for well balanced thought and feeling.

But the tendency of all sectarian schooling is to bias the child by the presentation of narrow views of duty to God and man. "Just as the twig is bent the tree's inclined," and this childhood bias dwarfs the man. The soul of man naturally inclines to feelings of sympathy. In view of this ideal, the frequent inquiry is: how shall the brotherhood of man be cultivated and promoted; how shall we be able to conform to the Scripture injunction "to look not each one upon his own, but each also upon the things of his neighbor?" Evidently this culture comes neither through secularity nor sectarianism, for secularity fixes the thought and interest upon mere affairs of the world, and sectarian culture in sectarian schools tends directly to erect barriers, to build up division walls, and to separate brethren instead of promoting brotherly love and the sentiment of a common origin and a common destiny for man.

Jewett Mills, Wis.

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THE SYNOPSIS is made somewhat full to give teacher and scholar the clue to the method of bringing out the text in recitation; yet not so full but that observation and remark will be suggested and elicited. They are in aid of obtaining and of retaining distinct views.

THE EXPLANATORY NOTES are to obviate any difficulty the student might encounter in clearly apprehending ideas and forms of expression peculiar to Moral Science, and necessary to a concise and distinct presentation of it. The notes will also suggest to teacher and scholar other related ideas, and thus enliven the recitation and add interest to the study.

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PART FIRST.

DIVISION I. INTRODUCTORY PRINCIPLES.

I. GROUND-PRINCIPLE.—Most people are content with any doctrine or theory of morals and religion, provided, as they say, the practice be good. Doctrine is nothing; theory nothing; practice is all in all.

Yet, in truth, it is the act that follows the thought—not the thought the act. We must think right if we would do right. All great events and fruitful judgments, right or wrong, have first been generated in thought.

Locke's theory of sense-knowledge, or of sensation as the ground of knowledge, gave occasion for David Hume's skeptical philosophy; that is, for Hume's questioning the certainty of any and all knowledge, for this was the logical result of Locke's erroneous theory, though Locke practically was no skeptic.

Immanuel Kant¹ at once saw the necessity for quite a different origin as the ground-principle of knowledge, and in his famous Critique established this ground-principle within the mind—not, like Locke, outside of it.

Just as in the science of intellect we stand in need

¹This word Kant and others thus noted refer to *Explanatory Notes*.

of a ground-principle that insures certitude — such certitude as is assured by the reference of Kant's categories² of thought to a subjective, innate, or *à priori* origin; just so in the science of morals we must look for a *ground-principle* that lies wholly within the constitution of the soul, else we find ourselves at sea upon the great problems of life.

2. CICERO IN DE OFFICIIS.—Cicero¹ in *De Officiis*² notices that in philosophy there are many weighty and useful matters critically and copiously discussed, especially upon questions of duty as traditional, and as taught by the philosophers. For, says Cicero, there is no part of life, neither public nor private, whether you would deal³ with yourself or whether you would transact business with another, from which it is possible to exclude duty.

In the culture of duty there are builded all the virtues of life; in its neglect is all baseness.

But there are some schools⁴ that, when the domain of morals is surveyed, pervert all duty; for whoever so institutes⁵ the chief-good⁶ that he has nothing conjoined with virtue, and measures it by his own profit—not by what is honest—he, if he is consistent with himself, and is not meanwhile bound by the excellency⁷ of nature, can cultivate neither friendship nor justice nor liberality.

Surely in no manner is he able to be truly brave who judges pain to be the greatest evil; nor can he be truly temperate who sets up pleasure as the chief-good. These philosophical systems, then, if they would be consonant with themselves, can say

nothing about duty; nor can any stable principle of duty conjoined to nature be put on record, except by those who say that *honesty* is to be sought on account of itself alone.

Cicero's Division of the Question: "The whole question of duty is twofold: One kind pertains to the Chief-good; the other is placed in Precepts, to which in every relation the course of our lives must be conformed. Examples of the higher kind are of this sort, namely: Can all duties be perfected? Is one duty greater than another? As to the preceptive duties, they indeed pertain somewhat to the chief-good; yet this is less apparent because they seem rather to regard the regulation of ordinary life."

This division by Cicero of the "Question of Duty" into two kinds is of great value. It is the same as that attempted by all ethic writers—a division into Principles and the Practical. It is a generic distinction that marks the limit between what we know in the domain of duty by prudential considerations and wise conclusions drawn from experience and what we know through the moral and religious sensibilities enlightened by the logic of the understanding and the reasoning faculties.

The great search was and is for an underlying principle as the ground of duty, having the character of certitude.⁹

In his enrapt, sublime contemplation of honesty, truth and virtue, Cicero eloquently exclaims: You may see, O son Marcus¹⁰, the very form, and, as it were, the features¹¹ of virtue, which, could they

indeed be looked upon with mortal eyes, would, as Plato says, excite in us wonderful desires for wisdom's ways; for what is more desirable than wisdom! What more excellent; what better for man; what worthier of man! Hence those who seek this are called philosophers. Nor is philosophy any other thing—if you will to define it—than the love and the study of wisdom. To say that there is no science of things chief in interest, while none of those of least moment are destitute of art, and independent of skill and knowledge, is the speech of men lacking in consideration and erring in matters of the highest import.

3. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.—Ancient philosophy comes very near to a true science of morals when it inquires of nature for principles. Plato¹ sought in nature herself the philosophy of right living, and held that the *chief-good* consists in receiving from nature everything requisite for life, to-wit: health, strength and beauty for the body; and as to the excellences of the mind, he noted a natural aptitude in learning, and faculties or disposition suited to the comprehension of virtue, by which a continued advance is made toward virtue. Virtue completed is a perfection of nature as to the mind—and is the chief-good.

This philosophy placed a happy life in virtue alone, yet not the happiest possible unless the good qualities of the body are added to it; namely, those things that should increase and maintain virtue; wealth, power, influence, society, the state, and

whatever else helps or aids in acquiring a habit of virtue.

From this view and exposition of the highest end in morals there arises a certain principle of action in life, and principle of duty, which consists in the preservation of those things which nature prescribes.

In the doctrine of Plato, *three kinds* of good tend to make the chief-good:

1. Living well in obedience to nature.
2. Excellences of the mind, including the disposition.
3. Conditions which unite men in social relations under favoring circumstances. From this third kind Plato elaborated his ideal republic.²

The *educational scheme* of Plato commenced with a course of study having special regard,

1. To the moral training of youth.
2. To the training of their bodies—the due development of the physical powers.

The first, the moral training, consisted largely in music and poetry selected with strict reference to its moral tone. Truth in literature was required by Plato, and truth to man's highest nature was required in the nature and character ascribed to the gods—the heathen divinities worshiped by the Greeks.

Thus Plato's idea of education was something more than a drawing out and development of the child's mental faculties. It meant not only this, but it meant also a purified soul, by excluding whatever was low, vulgar, frivolous in song and poetry, and whatever is unreal, untrue, fictitious and false in

literature and art, and whatever tends to intemperance and excess; and by exercising the vocal, mental and moral faculties in the contemplation, study and use of whatever in music, literature and art was recommended by sound reason and good taste. For further development of the mind in truth and the love of it, Plato prescribed the study of exact science—geometry. The logical use of the reasoning faculty completed the course of the young man destined to take part in the conduct of political affairs, and as a ruler in the service of the state.

Value of this Ideal: Plato's scheme is good and true so far as it goes. It is chiefly defective in its narrow view of the needs of the State, which require not only cultured rulers, but cultured citizens as well.

The morals of the Greeks and of the heathen world at large, in Plato's view, and as all see it, were indexed and strongly determined by the character ascribed to their gods—necessarily endowed like men with the virtues and the vices of men—a mere deification of the good and the gross in man.

Hence the heathen god is no beau-ideal of virtue; and the tendency is to reconcile men to those vices which they see in their gods.

4. THE LEADINGS OF NATURE.—Greek philosophy endeavors to show the way to the source of the chief-good by citing us to the leadings of nature, in the animal and vegetable kingdoms; thus, "every animal loves itself and labors to preserve itself, for this is its first natural impulse. Each animal, ac-

ording to its own peculiar nature, has its own peculiar chief-good—the lion one way or use of life; the lamb another way. Yet there is a generic sense in which the chief-good is common to all, namely, *to live according to nature*.

Hence we can understand that the chief or highest good to man is to live according to the nature of man, when that nature is perfected and in need of nothing.

Now, to apply this principle to self-preservation and a life according to nature, to man's ethic character, we can say that man through his moral nature loves to preserve himself as a moral being.

The Grape-Vine in Allegory¹: This doctrine of man's living according to nature is finely and forcibly presented and illustrated in Cicero's *De Finibus*² by an allegorical representation of the condition and needs of the vine—first in its own vegetable kingdom and native state, as a wild vine with little capacity and power to preserve and develop itself, and as needing the care and aid of an expert vine-dresser to trim its tendrils, and to bring out its latent vigor of growth and capacity for producing its own generous fruit. Now, in lieu of the vine-dresser and his cultivating hand, let us endow the vine itself with hands and with instinctive sense-faculties wherewith to take care of itself. The vine has now taken on and added to its vegetable nature an animal nature; and its province, interest and care will embrace, to a limited extent, not only the culture formerly given to it by the vine-dresser, but also the care of those limbs and sense-faculties, just now added to its original nature.

And if now we add to these sense-faculties, to this vegetable-animal nature, the faculty and gift of reason, the vine has intellect, and has become an intelligent existence, as well as a vegetable-animal; and now the vine is able to take care of itself: to nourish and cultivate its original vegetable nature, with all the knowledge, wisdom and skill of the experienced vine-dresser. And while this must be regarded as its primary and leading duty, yet not less is the vine interested for its own good, and is under obligation to preserve intact and pure, and to protect and cultivate those sense and reasoning faculties, by means of which it is able effectually to maintain its original nature. And the vine, too, will soon discover that though each and every part of itself is essential to itself, yet that, if any part of itself is better than another, its wisdom faculties have the pre-eminence.

This allegory of the vine, it is readily seen, represents the condition and duty of man—himself from the beginning not only a vine-dresser—a cultivator of the vegetable kingdom, but much more—the cultivator also of a nature sensuous, intellectual, moral and religious.

The entire range of known faculties and powers is embraced in his province of culture and duty; and the chief-good, as Cicero views it, consists in giving to each and to every part its due and proper cultivation.

But the *discernment* of this precept as to the chief-good, and of this due and proper culture, has been regarded as beyond the unaided ken of man, and so an appeal for aid is made to the divinity—to the

Pythian Apollo,³ who enjoins us "to know ourselves," namely, to know our own capabilities; and "this must include knowledge of those pursuits of life that are best suited to a virtuous enjoyment of life."

That we are created with desire for this knowledge is evident when we regard the manner of children in their play and work; for inquiry and observation is a part of their nature, and they are influenced by those virtues, the root of which is implanted in their very constitution.

Ancient philosophy, as expounded by Cicero, sought a principle for man that preserves man; a principle for nature that preserves nature; but the true, the right, the honorable, as a principle, is an uncreated element that lies in the constitution of the Creator, and there has its seat and abode; and this element or principle is honored and cherished by the Creator for its own sake. It is the essential element of his being. It preserves the being of God himself, for without it God would not be. We cannot, however, assume that God cherishes and honors this principle of the true and the right merely from the motive of self-preservation; but purely because from the entire holiness of his constitution he loves the true and the right for its own sake—for its own intrinsic beauty and value.

Just so is it in man, as the image of the Creator. Man obeys this principle—if, ethically,⁴ he obeys at all, for itself—and not because the principle is preservative of himself or of nature; for unless the true is obeyed for its own sake, it is not truly obeyed.

The principle or element of the right preserves

nature; it does not reside within it; it dominates nature. The principles or laws of nature in themselves have no influence in making life happy. Contra to this, happiness comes from *obedience* to those principles, in virtue of a distinct element or principle, to-wit: the true, the right, which must rule and dominate in all the relations of the soul to the principles of nature.

It is only when we are controlled by this *moral* element that the principles and laws of nature have influence or are effective in producing happiness.

Knowledge is good or evil, just as it is or is not dominated by virtue.

5. THE LABYRINTH OF THOUGHT.—In the labyrinth of thought, opinion and doctrine in Ancient philosophy¹ what clue is there to lead to truth and knowledge? All follow nature as the guide to wisdom.

The Epicurean² sees pleasure in nature; so pleasure is his chief-good. The Stoic³ follows nature, for his first principle is, that "those things that accord with nature are to be chosen for their own sake." This attitude towards nature they call *kathēkon*, the fit, the becoming, or the duty of maintaining oneself in his natural condition, for man's attraction is to what accords with nature; and by knowledge and reasoning he comes to place the chief-good in what the Stoics call *ōmologia*, agreement; and this is to be sought for its intrinsic worth.

"Duties," says Cicero, "proceed from first princi-

ples of nature; so that it may be fairly said that all duties must be referred to the end of arriving at the principles of nature."

Cicero here overlooks the fact that this is true only if there be no self-evident principles of nature. It is true that duties are referred to principles of nature, but not in the sense of "arriving" at principles, so far as they are intuitive, for in this case *obeying* the principles of nature conveys a more fitting idea of duty.

The Peripatetic follows nature, for his "happy life" is made complete by circumstances consonant with nature. Thus a sound and shapely body contributes to the happy life; and an honorable act free from loss is more to be desired than honor with loss.

The Stoic does not think so: with him virtue is the only possible chief-good. Herein is the happy life, which pain nor poverty can modify. Worldly goods, though desirable, have no value at all as compared with virtue, and hence in Stoic-logic cannot be a factor in the happy life.

It is not alone nature external to man that we are to follow, but man himself is born with adaptations to the virtues, justice, temperance, and all others; also with a love of truth and a desire of knowledge, as is evidenced by the inquiring minds of children, always in pursuit of some new thing. Men, too, are born for companionship, for society and the civil state; hence that branch of morals which the Greek calls *politikos*.

But it is a knowledge of heavenly things that imparts modesty, and it inspires magnanimity to

contemplate the works of God; and justice, when we come to know the power, wisdom and will of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe.

From the foregoing, we see that Ancient philosophy, from following nature to find the "highest good"—the *summum bonorum*—comes naturally upon the trail to man's characteristics, man's soul-nature, as the true path in its discovery. The sentiments, feelings and acts of men show that there is a moral nature—born in them is their instant praise of the noble and the good, as is also their instant condemnation of the mean and the bad.

The great search of Ancient philosophy was for the chief-good, the highest end of man's life; but whatever this be—pleasure, knowledge, virtue, religion, a life according to nature—all agree that the chief-good in its fullness and completion is unattained, if indeed it be attainable. The cause for interminable discussion and unsatisfactory results in Ancient philosophy lies in the fact that the objective chief-good they sought necessarily depends on man's reason, which is liable to error.

The same fault, from the same cause, characterizes the major part of Modern philosophy. But for a science of morality we are in need of a principle that is attainable; that can be characterized as *necessary* and *universal*.⁴

6. KANT: HIS ETHIC GROUND-PRINCIPLE.—Kant calls the law of the moral nature, through which the soul is impressed with the ideas of the right and of duty, the categorical-imperative,¹ mean-

ing thereby a universal law² that gives form to the intuitions³ of the soul about itself, and its relations to other thinking, sensitive existences—such form as determines and makes the man conscious that there must be in these relations a necessary⁴ element—the true and the right.

The method⁵ of the Critical⁶ philosophy gives an *à priori*⁷ character to knowledge. It is also the method of the Practical⁸ philosophy, namely, Kant's Ethical System. As morality relates not to the material, or to objects of sense, but relates to what is rational, sentimental and spiritual—"the true," "the good," "the beautiful" in harmony—all desirable for themselves—separate and apart from aught else, there is for the ethic-principle yet wider ground for predicating an *à priori* character.

In the theory of our understanding,⁹ the cognitive relates to the empirical¹⁰—must have for its object an object of sense. This is the condition of knowledge—a sensuous¹¹ content. But in the moral intuition¹² there is indeed an object, but it is no object of sense. The object is found in the moral relations of the soul. Hence Kant was justified in giving positive certitude¹³ to the ethic ground-principle—to the categorical-imperative—with its character of necessity and universality.¹⁴

The understanding, aided by the moral sense, conjoined with the good-willed soul, intuits the self-evident¹⁵ in the field of morals, and solves such questions as it cannot intuit.

The first intuition is of oneself—one's own character. The second is of the Creator—the Supreme

Ruler of the Universe. His authority is self-evident. When we see him through our intellectual, moral and spiritual vision—to obey him must be right. This is our intuition of duty in its abstract form¹⁶ as universal law—obedience to the Supreme: “I come to do thy will, O God!” Doing antedates knowing: duty is prior to knowledge: as Kant would have it, the intuition of duty is a product of the reason creating the idea of duty; but this creation is not of an abstract form of duty which exists constitutionally, but is of the idea of duty in its reference to an object.

The system of Kant can be briefly summarized: It finds in the constitution of the soul faculties for cognizing nature, and for the discovery of truth. These faculties have a transcendental character; that is, to a degree they create the things and qualities perceived—the phenomena.

There is in nature ground or substratum for a certain form or order; yet nature does not present herself and reveal herself to man's intelligence just as she is in her inner self. The primal elements lie concealed within herself. She appears to us in such form as the mind of man itself imposes upon the unknown content. This form and order exists in the mind—has a prior existence. Nature was made for man, not man for nature—and without this prior existence in the mind, this order of nature would not be seen in nature.

Nor is this a mere correspondence and harmony between mind and matter, for mind *dominates* matter, and compels nature to reveal herself in the forms that mind bestows upon her.

The phenomenal world is the world we perceive and know. The *noumenal* is the realm in nature entirely beyond our cognition.

It will assist us to grasp the constructive, formative or transcendental character of the mind in the cognition of nature, if we reflect that there are laws of nature—for instance, the law of gravity—that subtle, inscrutable force pervading all matter—

so unknown, yet so well known as to its law of action; which is, that the attraction of gravity decreases as the square of the distance increases, exactly in accord with the geometrical properties of the circle, to-wit, areas proportional to the square of the radii; and geometry with its axioms, intuitions, theorems and problems is a science that has its seat, origin and source, not in nature, but in intellect.

If also we reflect that mind must have preceded matter—preceded nature and her laws—the creative mind, in whose image is furnished man's mind; and being thus fashioned, must have analogous creative power.

The soul of man is instructed, not by nature alone, as by a separate individuality, for without formative mind nature would be formless and incapable as a teacher; nor yet by mind alone, for without material to excite the mental powers, the forms of the mind would be empty—destitute of cognition, and without result. This prior existence and pre-eminence of mind over matter, in the constitution of nature, gives an *a priori* cast or character to our cognitions—to the knowledge of the soul in what pertains to the intellect, and in what pertains to moral law.

We are not fettered and crippled by the slow and doubtful instruction of mere sense-perception, as the theory of Locke would have it, as well as the "Data of Ethics" in the Spencer-philosophy, in gathering information and instruction about an independent outer world; nor yet are we to soar in flights of the pure reason—with fancy and enthusiasm unrestrained by our sense-perceptions—into the regions of a pure idealism.

But for understanding nature, and our relations to the Creator of nature, the soul itself has in its inner self a constitutional transcendental endowment to give form and law to what it thus is able to perceive, cognize and know of nature and of the Supreme Source of Nature.

7. THE GOOD; THE GOOD WILL; THE SUMMUM BONUM.—But how do we know that there is such a principle as "the good" and our innate love for it? because we are conscious of it in our inner experiences, and because the existence of this principle is

cognized by the consensus of our intellectual and moral faculties.

We can conceive of the creation of a right constitution by an All-wise Creator, for what is right will live and abide, in virtue of its own inherent nature. We cannot conceive of the creation of anything wrong in principle; for if wrong it would speedily go to decay and ruin, from its own inherent lack of a true constitution, just as an unbalanced fly-wheel would go to pieces by its own rough motion.

The natural existence, then, of the right and good in human nature we are conscious of both by internal experience and by the intuitions of our intelligence, which contradict the possibility of the creation of a moral being destitute of this principle of the right. And in accord with our intuitions is the scripture: "And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good." (Genesis 1: 31.)

Hence we are justified in positing in the moral nature the principle "the good," and the soul's love of it, for we love ourselves, and have right to, so far as we certainly see in ourselves the work of the Creator. And we are justified in positing, in union with the abstract good, an element of abstract duty, as an innate forceful tendency of the soul to obey the Supreme, the Creator, in his office or function as a wise Law-giver and Judge. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" This tendency exists from no motive persuading to virtue through hope of reward or fear of punishment, or even from that grand idea and notion in Ancient philosophy, "that the dignity of human nature requires it;" but the

true ground of right and duty lies deep in the Divine constitution—his holiness and our relations thereto.

It is necessary to make a sharp distinction between the *ground* of morality and the *ultimate end*. The ground-principle is elementary; without it there can be no morals—no chief-good or ultimate end. There must be the “good-will” in unison with the universal law—Kant’s categorical-imperative, as a ground-principle to build on—a starting point.

This we have by the constitution of human nature; but the will being free to act contra to this constitution, our first care and chief-good—not our ultimate end—is to cultivate and preserve the good constitution.

This done, the ultimate end is arrived at—if it be arrived at—as a necessary consequence; for the good-will will act under the best instruction and information it can obtain in its search after a philosophy of life in the concrete, namely, the specific duties of life.

Obedience, then, to the voice of the moral nature demanding the right for its own sake, from love of it, is the “ground of duty.” But Ancient philosophy and most of the Modern overlooking this ground-element have sought to discover the moral principle in the *summum bonum*, the chief-good, the highest end to which man should strive to attain, which effort, being a labor of the reasoning faculties and of our experiences, under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, has always been without certain result; for both reason and experience, being liable to error and slow in a search for truth, can never assure us that

we are on the right track; or that we see clearly the highest, final or ultimate end of our existence, which, indeed, we must clearly see if we would posit in it the ground-principle of our duty and conduct in life.

The search after a ground-principle in the lofty superstructure, and not in the corner-stone of its solid foundation, is what has given birth to so many pseudo-philosophical theories falsely called Moral Science. Whereas, when we realize that the true ground of duty is where Kant puts it—in the “good-will” obedient to law, to the intuitional universal law of duty—his categorical-imperative—then we have a sure start and guide in the path of duty. Not that every concrete duty is seen by intuition; but it is this, that we by intuition do see the true ground-principle of duty—obedience to the “imperative” in the moral nature. But if we posit the ground-principle in the ultimate end, and say, for instance, that this end is “the love of God,” man is destitute of a ground-principle that is universal law, for men do not love God. They ought to, and are so commanded, but the fact is, they do not, except through obedience, self-discipline and contemplation of the Divine attributes. But the love of what is true and right, as an element or principle abstract from the question of a particular content or object, all men constitutionally have; nor will any man deny it; nor will any man deny the duty of obedience to it. This is “universal law,” and is so recognized in the consciousness. This dominates the soul in obedience to the Great source of all truth and right.

8. MORALITY AND RELIGION DISTINCT YET INSEPARABLE.—The distinction between morality and religion has always been known.

Noah Webster's definitions are exact. As to morality, it is this: "The quality of an intention, an act, a sentiment, when tried by the standard of right."

And religion he defines thus: "The recognition of God as an object of worship, love and obedience."

The word religion, as derived from *relegere*, carries the idea of collecting again, or of going over again in feeling, thought, or in speech, our relations to the Infinite One. Also, this derivation of the word religion is the one given by Cicero, an excellent authority, namely, with Cicero, its meaning is: to read, study or contemplate anew and over again. But again others would derive it from *religare*, to bind anew.

Whichever the derivation, it does not appear to affect the doctrine of religion as a constitutional sentiment in human nature. Yet in spite of distinctness in definition, morality and religion are so intertwined, that many people do not clearly apprehend the difference, but speak of morality as a religion; and not a few, with false ideas of religion, imagine that there is virtue in religion without the possession of morality; and others, that morality, when highly cultivated, is all-sufficient without the aid of religion.

Yet, as the elements of both morality and religion are inborn, the reasonable proposition is, that in all true religion there is a pure morality; "by their

fruits ye shall know them"; and that in all perfected morality there is pure religion.

The one cannot be excluded from the other, yet the ground-principle of each has its own distinct origin.

The ground-element of morality is in an inborn appetency, desire and love for "the true and the right," a guiding principle of the soul that tends to right action.

Religion also is an inborn sentiment or natural law in the constitution of man—the ground of the religious nature, under normal conditions, being, in an innate respect, reverence, awe and love for superior beings, and especially for that Supreme Being that exhibits perfection and holiness.

The first, morality, is a pure sentiment of love for a true *principle*; the second, religion, as pure religion, is a sentiment of love for the Supreme Being, as manifesting in his constitution the elements of truth, righteousness and goodness. The one is love for a principle; the other is personal love: and this second kind of love, religion, could have no ground of existence without the first kind—the moral.

There cannot be a morality false in principle, for the essence of morality is in the agreement of the moral forces of the soul which trend towards "the right," with the will, which determines to do right. And this agreement between the will and the other powers or faculties of the moral nature is intuitively known, or consciously known and apprehended. And so it is, that though by the opposition of the will the contra of morality may prevail, this does not

originate in a false moral nature, but in a badly advised or a stubborn and bad will; for there may be false ideas of morality, as when erroneous reasoning blindly leads the way, and with perverted judgment instructs the moral nature; as when persecuting Saul verily thought himself in the path of duty till the Lord stopped him in the way.

There can, however, be a false religion, as when an immoral divinity is worshiped from fear or from custom. Thus the chaste Lucretia adored the unchaste Venus. But this adoration and worship lacked a moral element, and so, like all forms of false religion, tended only to the bad.

Thus it appears that the essence of the religious element—its ground-principle—is in the object as well as in the subject, namely, the object feared and loved is necessary to the existence of fear and love in the subject; and as this object is necessarily external, the religious element cannot be pure *à priori*.

Hence, when the object worshiped with fear, awe, reverence and love is in itself an unworthy object, devoid of a pure moral constitution—this object being, as just recited, a constituent and necessary element in the religious ground-principle—the religion founded upon it must necessarily be false.

The distinction, then, in morality and religion is radical, while yet their close affinity and necessary conjunction is also radical. This, then, is the mark distinguishing true religion from false: the true is objectively moral; the false, objectively vicious.

Hence, there can be no hesitancy as to the proper

attitude of the State or the Government towards religion.

A religion that tends to morality, that coexists and flows onward with it, can safely be tolerated and protected; but a religion that tends to vice is destitute of the moral element, and cannot be protected without danger to the stability of the state itself.

Thus, if the constitution of the United States, by a wide-open policy, debases the quality of citizenship by inviting thereto the Pagan and the Mormon, of vicious moral tendency, then the constitution needs amendment in this regard.

In a true religion there may be many false worshipers, but the state cannot distinguish here the true from the false—as it can between true and false elements in religion—elements, not doctrines.

9. THE SUPERNATURAL IN RELIGION; IN NATURE.—But in religion men see the supernatural, and object to a science of religion, on the ground that we have certain knowledge only of the natural. There is, however, a supernatural in the natural—in the existences and the events of time; and there is also a supernatural as to things external; in other words, a supernatural relating to man's present life, and a supernatural relating to his spiritual life here, and in a future world.

Scientists hold that the laws of nature are fixed, and never transgress their bounds; hence that the intervention of the spiritual in nature is contra to our experience and our reason, and cannot be admitted as fact and science. This view is true; yet not all

the truth. Kant holds to certainty in the laws of nature, but shows that the certain natural effect can be predicated only of a (certain) natural cause; and that the *natural* cause must originate somewhere in a supernatural cause; and that this supernatural may be quite different in kind from the natural; and may have power, and does have power, to institute or to interject another series of natural causes and effects, without at all interfering with the general course of a prior series. This is certainly true as to what now concerns us—cause and effect in its moral aspect.

For instance, in the first and second commandments of the decalogue, God represents himself as the Lord, and as the deliverer of the Israelites from Egyptian bondage; and also as a jealous God, insisting on his own rights—visiting iniquity and showing mercy.

Now, the course of events here referred to by the Lord God is natural and logical, in that the Israelites should desire freedom to worship God, and that the Egyptians should refuse to give it to them, knowing as they must that the concession would end in the freedom of Israel and the loss to themselves of a serving people.

In the natural course of events, the Egyptians, being a powerful people and well armed with many horsemen and chariots of war, the time had not come for the exodus from Egypt.

Moses' strong objections to undertaking the work of deliverance were valid; thus: "And Moses said unto God, Who am I that I should go unto Pharaoh,

and that I should bring forth the children of Israel out of Egypt?" (Exodus 3: 11.)

It was evident to Moses, who well knew the power of Egypt and the weakness of his own people, that their deliverance could not be accomplished.

In a physical sense, and also in a moral sense, there was a course of nature, and a law of nature, that forbade the attempt. Physically the Egyptians were strong; morally the Israelites were weak from the abnormal condition of servitude.

We know that when an organization—the body, for instance—becomes diseased, it sometimes may be cured by a renovating process of nature, and often a diseased limb must be cut off; but in the case of moral disease, we cannot prove that there is ever power in the moral nature to renovate itself, for from the effect of our transgression "the whole head is sick and the heart faint."

This was true as to Moses, till the Lord supernaturally, or by a manifestation of the Divine presence and help, infused into him wisdom and courage.

This is the only reasonable explanation of Moses' subsequent alacrity in going forward in the work of the deliverance of his people.

This chapter in Israel's history, though a noted one, is but a single instance and example of Providential care over the course of nature; and specially over the moral and religious nature, not only in the individual, but including the sympathetic and social, which tend to the formation of family, social, civil, political, national and international relations.

10. THE SUPREME-CAUSE.—As to the physical world, reason tells us that there is a *relation of cause*, and we are free to speculate as to whether the Supreme-cause acted *once for all*' on the content of nature, or whether his action is continued in a line parallel to nature.

As to the religious and moral realm, its very existence argues in like manner a causal relation; and the abnormal condition of its existence—the religious nature being chilled, and the moral nature being perverted by sin and transgression—necessarily calls for a renovating power outside of itself; and thus again we see that it is natural as well as necessary for the supernatural to intervene.

Thus do we find the supernatural in the natural, and in science, physical, intellectual, moral and religious.

And all science—especially these—are of interest to the people individually and collectively, and are proper subjects of study.

And now to briefly discuss the other relation, that of the supernatural in the spiritual. Wide ground for science is not claimed, namely, that which is universal or is self-evident to every man's consciousness. Christianity differs from the religion of nature, as enunciated in the decalogue, in this: that it contemplates and provides for a new or for a supernaturally quickened spiritual nature in man, by the power of the Holy Spirit, and by the gracious offices of a Redeemer.

The supernatural, as first said, working through the good nature bestowed upon us by the Creator—

good though now lapsed and fallen, as every man consciously knows, into an abnormal state—is a necessary factor and co-worker with us; in the attainment of the right, and of a normal happy life; hence the Divine utterance in the decalogue, and this is what man is under obligation to aim at.

But the supernatural, in its reference to and attainment of a higher spiritual state for man now and hereafter, is a different matter, and has interest for the individual affected thereby, singly and in spiritual assemblies.

Herein is the work of the individual and of church organizations, namely, the work of the conversion of the world and of the perfection of the saints by spiritual means.

This work is beyond and outside that of the educational work of the public, as a community or as a state, through and upon the naturally religious and moral nature of man; and the superspiritual work lies entirely within the province of the individual, and that of the spiritual congregations.

This marks a clear line of separation between a science of religion and morals natural and logically supernatural, and the supernaturally spiritual; the former would include the *evidence* of Christianity, the latter regards the applied spiritual truths.

It marks a line of distinction between the duty of the state in the education of the citizen, and individual and ecclesiastic duties in reference to the soul's spiritual welfare.

It is the unity of the moral nature that holds men together, and this unity is manifest when the moral

nature or constitution of man is formulated in the true moral law—the decalogue.

Its first introductory clause, "I am the Lord," gives unity and authority to all that follows; assures men that they have in the two tables a true statement of the requirements of their own nature.

When the Lord speaks, truth is uttered; duty is made known; nor is it possible for us to look for the universal brotherhood of man, on any other basis than this *à priori* scientific basis that exists in the moral constitution of man.

Set up that there is no Lord, or that Baal is God, and we abstract from the moral nature of man the force and the power of its highest, deepest elementary principle—that of obedience to itself; that of a soul without guile in the harmony of the Will with the moral sense, under the power of an active, living conscience, which is surely blunted, hardened, silenced when the Creator of this moral nature—when the Author of man's constitution, unwritten and written—when God himself is lost sight of.

Hence the impossibility of solidarity in a people of diverse and strange gods—like the Jew or Christian and the Pagan.

Hence, too, the necessity in and among a nominally Christian people for cultivation and education in morals and piety, or natural religion—those universals that must underlie Christianity in all its varied forms.

And hence the suicidal policy of an education that would overlook and exclude morals and reli-

gion; and not less suicidal, that policy that would build up sectarian schools on the ruins of public common schools, for the sure tendency of sectarian education is to the disintegration of a people.

And no man can be accounted a wise citizen who, on the one hand, is possessed of the unnatural, irrational, and pernicious notion that morals and religion must be excluded from our public schools; or who, on the other hand, holds to the no less pernicious notion that we should have no public schools, because either irreligion or sectarian opinions would be taught in them; blind to the fact that there is a natural, logical view, and a science of morals and religion in man's nature—best made known in holy writ—that includes only the true, and necessarily excludes what is mere sectarian, and all that is false.

II. THE SUM OF THE ARGUMENT.—The sum of the argument in these introductory or general principles is that Ancient philosophy, and largely Modern, by looking to final ends, can find no certain basis or ground-principle for a science of morals; but when we look to the inner man—to the God-given endowments of the moral nature—love for “the truth and the right”—the “good-will” which Kant makes the central figure in the grouping of the moral consciousness—we find *obedience* to the teaching, to the logic thereof and to the imperative therein, to be a self-evident truth and duty, and *so fit* for a basis of science.

This does not ignore the valuable contributions of empiric philosophy in discovery and experience.

They are efficient aids, auxiliary forces in life's moral progress; they do not lead the way.

DIVISION II. PRINCIPLES: PSYCHIC AND MORAL.

12. THE NATURE OF MAN.—*a.* The nature of man is fourfold: physical,¹ intellectual, moral and religious, and volitional.

The *physical* consists of the corporeal organization; bones, flesh, blood, blood-vessels, vital organs, viscera, muscle, nerve, brain, with all the organs of sense—to-wit: sight, touch, taste, hearing and smelling—that belong to the body, together with the sensibilities to pleasure and to pain that are peculiar to the action of the physical nature.

The *intellectual* nature consists of the faculties of the understanding and of the reason, including, as auxiliaries, memory, imagination,² consciousness.

By the understanding faculties we are endowed with conceptions, to-wit: with the concept of quantity in space, or quantity as one or more, or all of similar things; with the concept of quality as real or as unreal, or as of varying degrees; with the concept of relation, as in the relation of things perceived (phenomena) to substance or some real existence—real, even though unknown; the relation of an effect to a cause; the relation of community, or of reciprocity, as in action and reaction.

The *understanding*³ in connection with the organs of sense perceives objects as they appear; for instance, a tree, a lake, a mountain; has power to

distinguish sounds, as of thunder, of music, of joy, of sorrow; to distinguish odors, as the fragrance of a rose; and so is it, as to the organs of taste and feeling.

By the *reason*, is meant that spirit power of pure thinking which is also called the pure reason—pure at least to a degree; but the reason of man has limits, is finite, and however pure cannot grasp all truth.

The reason⁴ verifies the perceptions of sense and the conceptions of the understanding; counsels in the province⁵ of the sensibilities and sentiments, moral and religious; and with the aid of the understanding devises means to accomplish ends; argues; infers; logically concludes; discovers the idea or type of being, or the elementary principle in any subject or object of thought; thus the great naturalist, Cuvier, having from a single bone reasoned out and discovered the idea, was able to construct the entire skeleton of the extinct animal to which the bone belonged. Reason also speculates⁶ in matters beyond the range of the understanding and so beyond the realm of certitude.

The moral and the religious, though distinct, are so closely allied that we here class them together. Their oneness and their difference have been considered in the introductory principles.

Through the moral sensibilities, in connection with the understanding and the reason, we perceive truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and *just as we act* in view of these moral perceptions we feel moral approbation or moral condemnation.

The Will: The intellect when in exercise de-

depends on the will. It can accomplish nothing without attention, and an act of attention depends on volition. Will power is, then, evidently an essential factor in the constitution of the soul.

This fourfold division—physical, intellectual, moral-religious and volitional—regards the leading activities apparent in man :

(1) His animal life and the play of his muscular powers,

(2) The thoughts that employ his mind,

(3) The feelings that exercise the sensibilities of the soul,

(4) The will power to do what duty demands.

b. But man in his very self, or in his essential nature, is a spirit inhabiting for a time a tenement of clay—the body; and this spirit while in the body, with its adjunct powers of the intellect and the moral feelings, is called the soul—is the soul—the soul as the seat of the susceptibilities, the affections, having the pre-eminence, and so being a name to include the entire man—a name given in the scripturè history of man's creation, thus: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." (Genesis 2:7.)

Scripture passages show a threefold division of man's nature into body, soul and spirit—the body being the seat of the animal nature; the soul, the seat of the nobler affections; and the spirit being the man immortal, whose sphere in this life is lim-

ted by a certain subordination of the body and the soul, and what the exact nature and extent of the relation between spirit, soul and body will be is unknown; however, we read: "There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body" (I Corinthians 18:44); and so we can infer that the spirit has a body adapted to its state of existence in the life to come.

The apostle prays, "that the whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless." (I Thessalonians 5:23.)

See note *b.* relative to Schlegel's view of the soul in the Philosophy of Life.

13. MORAL PHILOSOPHY; ITS LAWS.—Moral philosophy is the study of the moral nature and its laws.

The *moral nature* is that state of the soul's existence bestowed upon it by the Creator, whereby we may know that we are doing right or wrong.

The *first* or primary law of the moral nature is, that we love and seek after the right, and hate and shun the wrong.

The *second* law is, that happiness and joy accompany obedience to the primary law; disquietude and anguish of soul accompany disobedience.

These two laws of the moral nature have the same certainty as other laws made and constituted by the Creator; as for instance, the law of gravity, when a stone tossed into the air falls back again to the ground; or the law of affinity in chemistry, whereby oxygen and hydrogen unite and become water.

In either realm—the moral or the physical—the operation of law may be suspended by opposing forces, or by adverse environment, yet the tendency to action remains.

For instance, the fire in a stove that is tight may be smothered—combustion suspended—by closing the draught; but as soon as the air is again let in, active combustion goes on. So the immoral—the criminal—may long escape the full punishment of misdeeds; but it is sure to overtake him.

Men are convinced of the existence of the laws of matter by experience; so by experience are they convinced of the existence of moral law; for men experience in their own feelings the effects of obedience and of disobedience thereto.

Scripture shows this certainty of moral law: "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil; but glory, honor and power to every man that worketh good." (Romans 2:9,10.)

Natural law is in the natural tendency to a certain motion, arrangement, state or order in matter; as in the tendency of bodies to approach each other, or to fall together by force of gravity; or to unite by chemical attraction. And natural moral law is in a tendency to certain emotions and feelings in soul and spirit; as in the soul's natural emotion of love for the true, the right, the good; and of joy in the cognition and attainment of these; and of contra emotions, when the law of the moral nature is violated.

14. MORAL SCIENCE.—Moral science is an exhibit of the principles and the facts of moral law.

The *ground-principle* in moral science lies in our obedience to that moral law, or moral nature, that instinctively loves, tends towards and seeks *the good*. By *the good* is meant whatever is pure, true, right. This instinctive love for *the good* is also properly called an *appetency* for the good.

The good is to be distinguished from *a good*. *The good* pertains to and inheres in the abstract notion of the pure, true and right, that belongs to the moral nature and is grounded in it.

The good is found in whatever harmonizes with the pure moral nature. It is not the thing itself—it is not the veritable real feeling, thought or act that should be, and may be, in harmony with the moral nature; but it is that pure, *right state* of the soul that gives rise to and produces pure feeling, thought and act. *The good*, then, lies in the *character* of the soul as pure, right. *A good* is a right feeling, thought or act, in which the feeling, thought or act itself—separate from *the good*—produces enjoyment either in the subject or the object.

The good relates to what is good in a moral sense. *A good* relates to what is good in an external or material sense. *The good* is abstract; *a good* is concrete.¹ *The good* is in the love of the pure, true, right, *because* it is loveable, and we have an affection for it or a tendency or an appetency towards it. We love the *beautiful* for a similar reason or cause; namely, we have a natural appreciation of the beautiful and admiration for it; hence *the good* belongs to the true and the right in every form of it.

The highest good:² A good cannot be a good in

a moral sense except it be grounded in the right. It is the right in it, or at the ground of it, that makes any state or constitution a moral good; hence the highest good lies in that from which all good proceeds; and as this is what the moral nature seeks after, it follows that man attains to his highest good when his soul is obedient to the voice of his moral nature seeking and demanding the right.

The true is to be distinguished from *truth*. The moral nature has appetency for *the true*. The intellect determines what is true, or what is truth. The truth as to what men owe to each other—as to obligations—is truth about rights; hence rights is the concrete in mutual obligations, and is the product of intellect. Rights impel to action—not necessarily to moral action; it may not be right or duty to insist on rights.

15. MORAL LAW.—Moral law determines the way a man should think, feel and act in accord with his moral nature, and implies that moral thought, feeling and action are necessarily followed by a certain effect.

As natural law is conjoined with the notion of cause and effect, so moral law implies that a man's moral state or act is naturally, and so necessarily, followed by certain effects or consequences; and these sooner or later prove to be either joyous or painful.

The moral nature must have been given to man by the Creator, hence it has a necessary and imperative character.

Wayland's Moral Science makes moral law denote

an order of sequence between the moral quality of acts and their results. This enlarges the idea—as it should be—to include in the effects or results, not merely the effect upon the immediate actor or doer, but the effect upon all who may be morally responsible, for moral law regards moral acts in their reality as facts—not merely the moral quality, as to the individual doer, which is largely in the intent.

When God says “Love me,” he means a pure and true love in very fact and deed. This love accords with man’s moral nature, when the true law of man’s nature is free to manifest itself, or is free to act.

No love of man’s distorted imagination will fulfill this law. Saul imagined he showed love to God by persecuting the Christians. The moral quality of his act as affecting his personal guilt and liability was modified, but was not changed from bad to good, by his honest though mistaken intent. There is a degree of responsibility for doing a bad act even with honest intent. Saul’s act was contra to the law of his moral nature, for that nature uses all the faculties of the soul in its search for the true and the right. Saul did not do this, but allowed himself to be subject to the prejudices of his race, and his one-sided education.

16. WRITTEN MORAL LAWS.—Written moral laws are the authoritative statement of rules to regulate moral conduct; such are the commandments of the decalogue and other Divine precepts, as well as the regulations and laws found in accord therewith, and made and established by wise legislators.

The authority of moral law is either in the Divine utterance of it, or else in its *evidently* being in accord with the law of the moral nature, or both, namely: the wisdom and the Divine utterance of a moral law may both be evident. For instance, the first commandment is: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me."

There is wisdom and there is necessity seen in this commandment when we reflect that the violation of it would contravene the native primary moral law of the soul, to-wit: its tendency to love the true and the right, for by the study of God in his word and work we see that he alone is the true, the right and the good; and to set up another God, or another Good, would be to pervert, even to subvert, man's moral nature.

And, too, there appears to be a necessity for the Divine utterance of this command, because without a display of Divine authority men might never have fully apprehended the wisdom of this first law of the decalogue; and if necessity be in it, then its idea or type is that of a self-evident universal law.

The moral act of obedience to the moral nature implies a will, whose office is to choose and to do the right act.

From the view now given of the moral nature we see its function and the auxiliary faculties and powers.

First, its *innate appetency* for the true, right and good and its *innate cognition* thereof, when there is an *à priori* necessity, or is ground for the self-evident.

Second, the *reasoning faculty*, that inquires into particular cases of right and wrong, and determines why this act or that act is right, when there is not self-evidence.

Third, the *will*, that spontaneously, or of its own accord, chooses and carries into effect or executes the right act or the wrong one.

Fourth, the *conscience*, with its intuitive discernment or immediate knowledge of the disposition of the will to do right or wrong, and with its power to give joy or sorrow to the soul, according as the intents and acts of the soul are good or bad.

Origin of the moral: The moral nature is prior to the discovery and the discernment of relations between one's soul and some other being, and it lies at the very foundation of moral ideas. In accord with this is the tenor of the scripture referring to Gentiles "who do *by nature* the things contained in the law (Romans 2: 12-15.)

The context shows there must be good-will; a conscience bearing witness; and also intelligent action—the thoughts of the soul "accusing" or else "excusing," as to the determinations of the will.

For this intelligent action, Kant gives the expression, "Act always in such manner that the immediate motive of thy will may become a universal law." This—his categorical-imperative—demands that what we will to do shall, in moral aspect, be such as all holy intelligences—God, angels, and men of good-will and of sound mind—would pronounce true and right—right in motive and in act. This is simply Kant's philosophic view and enunciation of

Jesus' sublime precept commonly known as the Golden Rule. A similar sentiment was not unknown to the wise and good in the Pagan world, thus evidencing its universality as constitutional in man.

The "moral," then, has a constitutional origin, and the varied departures from morality are due to an evil imagination, and to an imperfect and wrong education of the intellect and the soul.

17. RELIGION.—The first commandment, in its first clause, "I am the Lord thy God," announces that there is religion, and that the Lord is the object of it. The second clause, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me," presupposes that the religion natural to the soul is liable, on account of the evil imaginations of man's heart, and the influence of evil tendencies and motives—is liable to abuse, perversion, corruption; and that this is the fact; that there is retrogression in religion, as well as a progression, is proved by the history of every people, and by the biography of individuals among the most enlightened, civilized and Christianized.

Natural religion, in its origin, is what religion a man has by "gift of nature;" by the religious constitution given him by the Creator; and this gift is to be cultivated and perfected by the "light of nature" under the guidance of the moral nature, the understanding and the reasoning faculties.

Man sees some objects in the world which he understands in part; others which he knows very little of.

The countless stars in the blue vault of heaven are beyond his knowledge ; the trees that grow up out of the ground he becomes familiar with, and enjoys their fruit and shade ; but how it is that they grow, he knows not. The hidden springs of life—these unknown forces of nature, and the varied objects of the universe incomprehensible in number and extent, fill the mind of man with wonder and awe, and he is necessarily led to ascribe their existence to a Supreme cause, whose existence he contemplates with fear and profound reverence. All things we refer to a cause, because man's mind is so constituted that the idea of cause necessarily arises when we see objects existing or in motion as the fixed stars in their places ; or the sun, moon and planets in their courses. And man contemplates nature with reverence for a like reason ; namely, he is so constituted as to regard with awe and reverence the unknown cause of nature, and is constituted with a disposition to obey the will of the great Author of all.

This natural feeling of reverence for a superior being is further cultivated by the discovery and discernment of power, of wisdom and of goodness in his creations.

Power is seen in the vastness of his works : “ The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork.” (Psalms 19: 1.)

Wisdom is seen in all the forces, arrangements and adaptations of nature.

Goodness is seen, in that the creations are designed to produce happiness and pleasure in sentient beings.

This consciousness of limitation in his powers; this feeling of ignorance and inferiority and dependence in the presence of nature and of the Creator, together with the reverential feeling that naturally accompanies it, is the foundation, the groundwork of natural religion.

So, too, we find that man has a natural love for whatever is true and right, and that is the ground of morality.

These two feelings—*reverence* for the supreme, *love* for the *true*—though distinct as a religious nature, and a moral nature, yet flow on together as a religious moral element in the formation of character, or in the formation of a channel, or habitual course of right feeling and right doing. Religion cannot rise higher than morality, because morality is a necessary element in it, and keeps even step with it; yet religion gives us sublime ideas of morality, because when the religious element is strong, cherished and enlightened, it permeates or leavens morality with a true conception of God, as the Creator, the Giver, Upholder and sure Vindicator of all law and order—the Holy one; yet as the Father of Spirits—the Saviour of his people, and the fountain of good-will and loving care.

By this sign¹ we conquer; we transcend the realm of intemperate desire, of evil surmisings, thoughts and imaginations.

These first principles, then, are the foundation on which we build up a superstructure of character, of proportions grand, harmonious and beautiful, in all the varied relations of man to God and men.

18. FOCAL POINTS IN THE ARGUMENT.—Focal points in the argument for natural religion, or for the existence of the Creator and his moral government:

A. DESIGN 1. As shown in the affinities of certain elements; for instance, the elements of oxygen and hydrogen, that unite to form water.

2. In these affinities being in accord with a law of definite proportions, without which there could be no adaptation to organized existence; as, for instance, in the adaptation of air to the lungs, water to the stomach of animals and to the root of plants.

3. Geology shows that physical forces within the earth have been used to effect results and conditions necessary, after long periods of time, to the existence of its flora and fauna and to mankind; for instance, its primitive gigantic dense flora of no apparent use at the period of its growth, but after the accumulation in thick strata and beds securely covered up in the earth, is of use for the future civilized man. This view of the coal fields is equally applicable to the iron-ore beds and other metals—also to the most useful building rocks, and to the kind of forest trees existing in man's day.

4. Physical nature shows gradual development and progression, and as nature is finite, we logically infer that in time it arrives at its best estate.

5. That this time has now arrived when man, as an intellectual, moral and religious being, has been given dominion over nature to control her forces, so far as he can apply them to his own use and benefit—hence that man must now be the chief object of interest, specially as to his moral and religious nature.

6. As our globe in its imperfect chaotic state was to be valued rather for what it would be than for what it then was, so man is to be valued for what he is capable of rather than for what he now is.

B. The sixth point suggests man as endowed with powers intellectual, moral, religious, capable of indefinite cultivation and improvement. To effect this culture man needs a standard of excellence and a rule of life. He looks in vain to his fellow-man, and the most gifted can see the ideal standard within their own

nature only by a colored light—hence the need of, and the argument for, spiritual aid to give clear vision.

C. Hence the moral law, originally limited to the idea of obedience in one regard¹, was amplified to a canon of written law, which at the outset reveals the moral attributes of God, as the corner-stone of the law; and this revelation of God proves itself to be a true one, because it is such as alone could be predicated of the Author of man's intellectual, moral-religious nature.

There is thus reciprocity in revelation—the revelation of the Creator through himself and his creations, and the revelation of man's moral nature through conscious self and through the revealed perfections of the Creator.

D. But the revelation of the perfect Creator makes evident the low estate of the creature, shows the need and renders probable the use of means to better his condition; namely, since his moral-religious nature is crippled and overruled by his corporeal nature, that there will be imparted to him additional spiritual power. This brings into view the scripture remedial dispensation—the Spirit-power in the Messianic realm and reign.

19. THE CONSCIENCE.—The conscience acts not singly, but is in joint action with other faculties, which together determine *what is right*, when all are in sympathy with the moral nature, which determines *to the right*; and when the right is perceived the conscience approves the soul's action, if it is in accord with this perceived right, and condemns it if it be contra thereto.

Conscience is a faculty, as a moral feeling or sensibility. Of itself it does not discover objective truth and right, but it is instantly sensible to the intent of the will as choosing to act in accord with or contra to the true and right.

The office of the conscience is, in general, to warn the soul against being ruled and overcome by motives that lead the will to wrong action—to actions

contra to the cognitions of the moral nature. These are cognitions of the right, and are either intuitively perceived or else are discovered by aid of the understanding, the reason and experience, when these faculties and means are dominated by the moral sensibilities.

Moral intuition is possible when the object of intuition is conditioned by a law that has necessary existence, or is universal and so becomes self-evident. Thus we have an intuition of its being duty to obey God, because God, as the Creator of all, is necessarily supreme and sovereign.

Some truths—physical, moral—are known by self-evidence, and some are discovered by the use of the understanding faculties acting singly or together. This knowledge the soul takes knowledge of by what are called cognitions of the consciousness—not that the *consciousness* is a separate faculty, or is indeed a cognitive faculty at all, but it is the concurrent knowledge of two, of several or of all the faculties that necessarily accompanies our cognitions.

20. THE OFFICE AND POWER OF THE CONSCIENCE.—The office and power of the conscience is best illustrated by instances of its use. In Wayland's *Moral Science* are several apt quotations from Shakspeare. This one illustrates the monitory power of the conscience.

One of the men about to murder the Duke of Clarence, to his comrade, discourses thus :

“I'll not meddle with it [conscience], 'tis a dangerous thing ; it makes a man a coward ; a man cannot steal but it accuseth

him ; a man cannot swear but it checks him. 'Tis a blushing shame-faced spirit that mutinies in a man's bosom ; it fills one full of obstacles. It made me once restore a purse of gold that by chance I found. It beggars any man that keeps it." (Richard III, Act I.)

In regard to the agonizing struggle that precedes a meditated act of guilt, Mrs. Montague says: "Other poets thought they had sufficiently attended to the moral purpose of the drama by making the Furies pursue the perpetrated crime. Our author [Shakspeare] waives their bloody daggers in the road to guilt, and demonstrates that as soon as a man begins to hearken to ill suggestions, terrors environ and fears distract him. Macbeth's emotions are the struggles of conscience ; his agonies are the agonies of remorse. They are lessons of justice and warnings to innocence. I do not know that any dramatic writer except Shakspeare has set forth the pangs of guilt separate from the fear of punishment." This is the passage:

* * * * * "If but this blow
Might be the be-all and the end-all here,
We'd jump the life to come But in these cases,
We still have judgment here ; that we but teach
Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return
To plague the inventor. This even handed justice
Comunends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice
To our own lips." (Macbeth, Act I.)

The troubled and distracted soul under the influence of conflicting motives, is seen in Brutus' soliloquy about his cogitations and intents relative to Caesar ; thus :

“ Since Cassius first did whet me against Cæsar
 I have not slept.
 Between the acting of a dreadful thing
 And the first motion, all the interim is
 Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream ;
 The *genius* and the *mortal instruments*
 Are then in council : and the state of man,
 Like to a little kingdom, suffers then
 The nature of an insurrection.” (Julius Cæsar, Act II.)

Courage in a good cause, fear in a bad one, is portrayed in these lines :

“ What stronger breastplate than a heart untainted?
 Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just,
 And he but naked, tho’ locked up in steel,
 Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted.”
 (Henry VI, Act 3.)

A like sentiment Solomon utters :

“ The wicked flee when no man pursueth ; but the righteous are bold as a lion.”

And Shakspeare this :

“ Suspicion always haunts the guilty mind,
 The thief doth fear each bush an officer.”

The voice of God : The power and function of the conscience as above noted refers the soul at once, not only to the judgment and condemnation of its own moral nature, but also to that of the supreme judge of all, whose law cannot be evaded.

Hence appropriately the conscience has been characterized as the voice of God in the soul.

21. THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE.—Conscience, the only impulsive faculty or sensibility that *has authority*: We can speak of the conscience as a

faculty. It is the one faculty of the distinctive moral nature; it is the categorical-imperative, just as there are several faculties of the understanding, to-wit: the category of quantity, the category of quality, the category of relation or of cause.

But as the conscience as a faculty is characterized by feeling—not, however, to the exclusion of intelligence—there is a tendency to class it with other sensibilities of the soul; whereas, by its moral nature it is placed in a higher plane, far removed from every other sensibility by the entire diameter of a *type of being*, and it has authority over all other sensibility.

This might be inferred from Kant's cognomen—the "imperative."

Dr. Wayland and other eminent moral scientists make it the *most* authoritative of the sensibilities; but this carries an erroneous idea; for it is the *only* authoritative, the other sensibilities having no moral authority at all.

They have force, power, influence, as motives to action, and these may be good or bad; but good or bad they have no authority. The conscience, aided by intellect, sits in judgment upon each and all. The *artistic* faculties that give rise to our sensibilities for the beautiful and the poetical have a moral tendency, and so are akin to the moral faculty, but they are allies, not rulers; while those sensibilities that manifest themselves—the love of pleasure, of gain, of power—all lower forms of self-love—are neutral or else stand as forces opposed to the moral nature, and can have no voice in the determination of moral conduct.

22. NOTE ON CONSCIENCE.—Our rule must be not to turn aside from the true path of moral science to explore by-ways, to consider and discuss sundry theories; for to do this would extend and crowd and confuse the text, to the detriment of the design of this treatise; but not to leave in doubt students who refer to authorities, a brief explanation of the conscience theory, first as herein stated, second as others see it, will be expedient—for this, as involving the ground of right and of duty, has great significance.

To obtain a clear view of the matter, note—*section 12, b.*—that man is essentially a spirit endowed with a moral-religious nature, with intellect, with sensibilities, with will-power; that in all that pertains to the moral, the moral nature is the central power. The conscience has its seat, its abode, peculiarly in the moral nature, and is a faculty thereof. When the conscience approves the will of good intent, or condemns the bad, and so calls forth joy or self-reproach, its act of approval or the contra proceeds from moral sensibilities—not from the intellect; but when the act itself as moral or the contra is judged, the judgment is obtained by calling in the aid of intellect.

The moral faculty, even when it acts singly, is properly called conscience—*conscientia*—because in its primary act of cognition—the cognition of the will—it appropriates to its own conscious knowledge of itself—of its own proper nature, as loving the truth—the knowledge of the will's intent; and approves or condemns just as there is harmony or discord between itself and the will.

But the conscience may be aided by all its auxiliary powers—by an enlightened intellect, by a good-will, by cultivated sensibilities, æsthetic, moral and religious; that is, by sensibilities trained and habituated to normal action. Under this condition, this normal consensus of the moral faculties, which is called the moral consciousness, the liability to error is reduced to a minimum, though error there may be, for man, in his best estate, is not perfect.

Contra to these views, there is a long line of writers who hold that conscience is not native to the soul, but is the product of force, as in the evolution theory; or of environment, as in the Darwinian; or is the product of associated ideas, of custom, usage, law in the social relations of men; or else is the product of intellect and the sensibilities applied to a consideration of comparative psychology, namely, to the relative place and value of the desires and affections of the soul in their bearing upon the well being of the individual and of mankind.

Among recent writers, this last is the view ably and eloquently argued at great length by President Porter, in his "Elements of Moral Science," with a weight of authority due to one of his distinction. Not to notice it, might be construed as avoiding it.

As to the "*functions of the intellect* in moral activities and experiences," Dr. Porter [sections 39-48], after certain suggestions, to-wit: "That psychology leads to philosophy, prepares the way for moral science, and asks how the intellect acts in ethical processes; but that it cannot answer this ques-

tion without implying that the intellect also evolves certain products known as ethical cognitions or conceptions"—elaborately discusses said functions under the following heads:

"1. Moral distinctions do not originate in the civil law.

"2. Moral relations do not originate with society.

"3. Moral distinctions are not originated by the fiat of the Creator, and therefrom reaches the conclusion that the intellect does not derive moral relations from without the individual man, either in the form of information, or authority, or influence, but that it develops and learns them from within."

"Our next problem," he says, "is to explain the processes by which they are originated within the man himself."

But first Dr. Porter notices and discusses "the several theories which teach that the fundamental ethical concepts and sentiments are original; that all these theories, however antagonistic in other particulars, have this in common—that they find the origin of ethical conceptions and feelings within the individual man, and wholly reject the doctrine that makes them the products of external influences and teachings."

A concise statement of these theories runs thus:

1. *The theory* of the moral sense—a capacity for the moral sentiments.

2. The theory that "finds the original of our moral relations in the pure intellect, or the reason; *i. e.*, in certain ethical categories, which take rank with those that are fundamental to the intellect;

‘the very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation.’ (*Stewart*.) What is true of the sentiment of obligation is true of the other feelings, as of self-approbation or disapprobation. The relation is self-evident to the intellectual judgment or assent, and the sentiments or feelings attend them by an equally necessary but unexplained coherence.”

3. The theory that finds a faculty called the practical reason, which presents to the will an authoritative judgment technically called the *categorical-imperative*. To this the will responds by reverence which impels to action. This theory, as it would seem, is a combination of the two preceding, and is represented by Kant and his ethical followers.

4. [Dr. Porter’s theory.] “We hold that moral relations and feelings require no special faculty or endowment, whether it be called the moral reason, or moral sense, or practical reason; but that they are the necessary products or results of two conspicuous human endowments—the reflective intellect and the voluntary impulses or affections. . . . So soon as the intellect reflects upon the several sensibilities which are subject to the control of the will, as compared with one another, it must find a standard of ideal desirableness or worth for its springs of action.

“According to this theory [continues Dr. Porter] the moral relations, so far as they are rational or intellectual, are not original categories, but are the necessary result of a special application of the category of adaptation or design. It also follows that the sentiments of self-approbation, obligation and merit, are also special applications of the com-

monly recognized human sensibilities, as affected by man's free and personal activity when reviewed by man's conscious or reflective judgment. It follows that the moral nature or the moral faculty are but other names for the human faculties when employed upon a special subject-matter, and in a peculiar manner. The products of this special but natural mode of activity are moral ideas and moral emotions."

On the above brief yet fairly full extracts relative to Dr. Porter's theory of morals, comment must also be brief. His suggestion that psychology cannot inform us how the intellect acts in ethical processes without implying that intellect *evolves* ethical cognitions, suggests that Dr. Porter's theory of the origin of ethical thought and feeling is one of *evolution*, possibly as objectionable as the Spencerian, which he justly condemns; thus [his Elements, section 45]: "The evolutionist's theory of morals presupposes that the conception of perfect moral excellence, as an ideal, is the end or aim to which all social arrangements and influences tend and move; . . . but how did it come into being as a thought, if it were not previously existing as a fact? . . . According to the law of evolution, the absolute morality in both ideal and law is yet to be evolved. What it will be and what it is to be are problematic ideas and truths, concerning which no man can affirm with positiveness who derives his ethical conceptions from the processes of evolution."

Do not these same words of condemnation apply to a theory of morals like Dr. Porter's, that sets up an

ideal standard to be attained to by an intellectual consideration and comparison, in conscious psychology, of the ordinary human affections, desires and motives as good and better, and a choice of the better and higher, prior to and as means for a production, generation or evolution of moral ideas and emotions? Dr. Porter, in section 48, values his own theory because it "develops and learns moral relations from within" and proposes to "explain the processes by which they are originated within the man himself." But what kind of a *within* is it? It is a *within* of ordinary motives impelling the will, which the intellect persuades the will to control in accord with the fitness of each to help attain to the ideal standard. This joint action generates moral emotions: "Ideas of right and wrong are, so to speak, the creations of the individual man." On the contra, *the within* of the second and third theories discussed by Dr. Porter, and which we have cited as above, is a within of an inborn moral nature endowed with "love of the right" and a conscious faculty employed about the instruction and control of the will.

Assuming that Dr. Porter's "special subject-matter" relates to "duty and the right," would it exist for man if man had not a special moral endowment, without which the understanding would not perceive moral relations, more than it would perceive world-objects, as objects of experience, if there were no mental faculties thus to interpret the impressions of sense?

Dr. Porter cites, among others, President James McCosh as an advocate of the second theory above

named; but President McCosh, in his discussion with Dr. Hopkins, says: "We regard God as having a claim upon our love, not because we are necessitated to love him, or because all men love him, but because it is right, and men see it to be so at once." Here, though we see what is right, it does not necessarily follow that we do what is right; the moral emotion does not respond to the intellectual cognition, as it ought to, to make good Dr. Porter's theory as to the origin of the moral; nor does it alter the case even though we question Dr. McCosh's proposition, "that it is self-evident to man that God has a claim on his love." The fact is, "men do not see this at once," nor till after intellectual, moral and religious experiences, which would obtain slowly, were we to wait for the evolution of the moral and religious out of the intellectual, as Dr. Porter has it. Dr. Porter remarks upon the cultivation of the moral nature in an admirable manner, and his theory of morals is one of cultivation, progression, evolution. But the present inquiry is not about the cultivation of moral sensibilities; it is about their origin. According to Dr. Porter, they are the product of reasoning upon a special subject; but according to theories he controverts, they are inherent in man's soul-constitution.

The affection of the mother for the child is natural—inborn—is not the product of reasoning about mutual relations, and this natural affection gives rise to an intuition of duty in ministering to its wants. Reciprocally there is on the part of the child a natural repose of faith in and of dependence upon its parent which gives rise to an intuition of

duty in obedience to the maternal voice. The same repose of faith² and of dependence characterizes the relation of the intelligent creature to the Creator, when this relation is not disturbed and interrupted by conscious transgression.

But these affections and intuitions of duty presuppose the co-existence of a moral nature and moral faculties, without which there could be no intuition of duty. Between the brute and its offspring there exist similar feelings of affection, faith and dependence, yet entirely destitute of any element or idea of duty, because there is in the brute no moral nature, though there is some degree of intelligence.

Now we come to Dr. Porter's direct consideration of the conscience. His "Elements" (section 105) reads: "Conscience should not be used as an appellation for a separate or special moral faculty, for the reason that there is no such faculty. Every step and result of the preceding analysis has gone to show this."

"Neither the intellect, sensibility nor will is known to exercise peculiar functions. The same intellect, so far as it knows itself, acts with respect to moral relations under the same laws and by the same methods of comparison, deduction and inference as when it is concerned with other material.

"Nor can we discover new and peculiar intuitions or categories, whether directly furnished by the intellect, or indirectly derived from the sensibility or moral sense. The only intuition which makes itself conspicuous is the intuition of adaptation which involves design. But this intuition, it need not be

said, is in no sense limited to the moral intellect or moral reason, but is assumed as the postulate of science and philosophy in every form."

Comment on the above: The substance of Dr. Porter's "preceding analysis," which he refers us to, and of his proof of the supremacy and sufficiency of the intellect conjoined with the will in generating moral ideas, is this: that intellect determines or decides between our varied sensibilities, affections, desires, as to which, under the circumstances, best accord with man's highest good. If the will chooses to act in accord with this decision, it is a moral act; if not, it is contra to moral act. This theory ignores the conscience-*faculty* not merely by the *ipse dixit*, "there is no conscience-*faculty*," but it ignores the warning power of conscience, which, knowing the intent of the will, warns it not to put it in execution, if not a right one. If there be a warning power in conscience or in the moral nature—as poets, philosophers and all men have it—let us take notice that intellect, as intellect, does not warn, it can only advise. It is the moral feeling inborn that warns.

As to the statement above cited, that "we discover no new and peculiar intuitions or categories," the very essence of the category is in the nature of the subject. The peculiar subject requires the peculiar category; moral causes—a category of relation with the moral element in it.

There is the difference and peculiarity of a *type of being* between nature as external and our moral nature, and this difference gives peculiarity to the moral intuition and the category; for in a disclosure

of moral relations and moral law, the function of intellect is not solely one of concepts and judgments under the categories of the understanding, whereby through sense-impressions we obtain a knowledge of the material world and its laws involving cause, effect, quantity, quality, degree. Nor is it an intuition like a geometrical axiom; nor is it a logical process of the pure reason, formal and destitute of content—but it is a pure, rationalized moral intuition which intuits the duty of obedience to the moral-religious nature, as loving truth and the right—hence the necessary judgment that this “love of the right” must be “for sake of the right.”

As to the quotation, “The only intuition which makes itself conspicuous,” science, it is true, assumes or postulates that its subject-matter has system, form, design; but what has this to do with intuition? If we could see the system, form, design in science by intuition, the road thereto would be easy—no need of close study. A locomotive or a watch shows its design not by intuition, but by study of its structure and use. In fact we cannot intuit adaptation, design, for these we discover by the use of the understanding through categories of relation; but the understanding does not intuit; it connects intuitions into a synthesis, a unity of perception. *The category* has its own place and function; nor can we speak of it as “derived from the sensibility.”

The category gives form to impressions of sense. Sense-perception is not complete till the impressions of sense are cognized by the understanding faculties, and through the categories of quantity, quality,

relation, are brought into an orderly synthesis, giving such order and unity to the object as makes of it an object of experience.

This does not mean that the condition of the object is one of chaos, which the understanding faculties have to transform into an orderly arrangement. It means that the order in the object is seized upon by the *à priori* conditions or forms of the understanding, and are made its own; for though these *à priori* faculties wait for the excitation of sense-impression, they yet evidently have the priority, for the continued activity of the understanding does not depend on the continued presence of sense-affection; but by power of the imagination it creates objects of its own, which, though like nature, do not in reality exist in nature. This is the substance of Kant's theory of perception, or of a transcendental use of the understanding in the apprehension of the phenomenal object—vastly more satisfactory than the theory of a dead passivity of the understanding in the reception of sense-impression. Even Dr. Stirling, who, at times, “damns Kant with faint praise,” credits him here with having “made a distinguished notch.” But, it may be asked, what have perception-theories to do with the conscience? Much, vitally much, for if our understanding be mere receptivity, like a blank sheet of paper, instead of connecting given intuitions in experience, we might, with Dr. Porter, predicate of it an intuition of design; and as for categories, we would have no use for them; if no categories, then there is no condition, form or faculty to the moral

nature; and as Dr. Porter already has it, "there is no conscience-faculty." What we call conscience is merely "the product of the intellect and the will passing judgment upon the comparative place we should give to our affections, desires, motives, in view of man's highest ends." Conscience indwelling, abiding with love of the right, as the *central* power of the soul's moral nature, is thus extinguished, and along with this extinguishment is necessarily blotted out all innate idea of duty, and for lack of native moral sensibilities, like respect for what is excellent and superior in man, and reverence for God, we have no intuitions of duty—all duty is conditioned upon a study of what constitutes the highest good.

On the contra, the doctrine of this treatise is, that man has within him by nature a love for truth and the right; that this feeling or affection of the soul moves the intellect to formulate the principle that we should do right "for sake of the right," or from love of it—a principle that intellect would be incapable of formulating, except the idea were furnished by its perception of the "moral nature," as loving the right.

This principle at once bears upon the Will, which must be governed by it in all its volitions, if it would be a good will.

23. THE FUNCTION OF THE WILL.—The function of the will is to execute—or not to—the thoughts, the desires and the affections of the soul. These may be with or without a moral element or character.

George has set before him a plum and a pear, to take either. He chooses the plum. Here the will acts, but there is no moral element.

His mother now comes in and says: "George, you must not eat the plum; you may eat the pear."

Now, there enters into George's choice a moral element, which quite overshadows his choice of the fruit.

He ought to obey his mother; ought to put back the plum, and take the pear. He can, however, disobey and eat the plum, in spite of his mother's order.

In his being able to subject his desire for the plum to the duty of obedience, and also in his being able to do what he ought not to do, namely, to disobey his mother, there is involved the idea or notion of liberty, or of the freedom of the will.

The will, if pure and good, will act, in all moral questions, in accord with the soul's moral consciousness; that is, in accord with the view of duty the soul has through the concurrent intelligence of the pure reason, the understanding and the moral faculties—experience inclusive. The *freedom* of the *will* consists in its constitutional ability to obey or to disregard the dictates of the moral consciousness.

That sublime harmony that exists between the liberty of the soul and its subjection to law can be conceived of—is a fact of consciousness, but yet is difficult to express.

We say the will acts naturally, according to the constitution of man's nature, when it harmonizes

with the moral nature ; but yet it is not necessitated so to act, except by moral necessity.

Physical necessities—laws of nature—man cannot by will escape from. He can, though, from moral necessity ; and his will has liberty and ability to go contra to the law of his own moral nature.

In physical law, the effect is positive, and can be estimated and calculated to a dot ; and will not be unheeded, except by a very stupid will.

So in moral law, the effect is sure to follow, but it cannot be certainly estimated and calculated, and will often be unheeded by a proud, haughty, stubborn or depraved will.

When the will acts in accord with and under the guidance of the true and the right, its action is free, voluntary, for the very idea of true freedom' includes that of truth and right.

The true, the right is not by man's constitution foreign to the will, but it is a part of its nature, and his freedom is not abridged, cannot be abridged, by his own proper constitution. It is abridged only by false reasoning, wrong feelings and bad motives.

These are all of the empirical character. The spontaneity and autonomy of the will asserts itself when, acting in virtue of its own true constitutional principles, it sets aside these contra-motives, and resolutely pursues the right.

Volitions do not have a time-relation like events, namely, *effects* from *cause*. Volitions are spontaneous and are not determined. The will is acted upon by a certain determinate train of motives, that have a constant form and effect ; but the yielding or

the resistance of the will is not a part of the train of cause and effect.

Will-action is spontaneity originating in the will itself. It is freedom.

Yet we find it difficult to say the will is free, while it is ruled by a sinful disposition; and this difficulty has given rise, on the one hand, to a philosophy of entire independence of the will, as of a faculty or a *personality* of the soul, that, far from being subject to the strongest motive, has no connection with or relation to motive; and on the other hand has given rise to a philosophy of "denial of freedom," as that of Bain. The idea of freedom and responsibility, coupled with indisposition, he calls a "metaphysical puzzle."

The true doctrine of the will seems to be that the will represents the determinations of the soul—determinations not as to its *judgments*, but as to its *acts*, that the will is influenced and constrained by sundry motives; but is not fettered and bound by them. The indisposition to act in accord with conviction of duty argues moral weakness, not moral inability. It does not, however, abridge the freedom of the will, nor cancel responsibility.

Will Defined: It is very difficult to make a definition to cover every phase of the will; but in accord with the view above given, the will may be defined thus:

The controlling executive power and personality of the soul impelled by sensibility and feeling, yet when well-disposed, obedient to the voice of conscience, to the instructions of the understanding and

to the logic of reason, holding in check under due restraint wayward appetites desires and passions, and so giving moral power and dignity to the man.

On the contra, the will bad or deficient in force and vacillating allows the propensities to run into excess; fails in every duty and makes a wreck of human nature. (Romans 8: 13.)

As *personal*, the will is the centre of the spirit in man, well disposed till enticed and led captive by its own fault in "minding earthly things."²

24. APPETITES; DESIRES; AFFECTIONS. — Appetites: Hunger and thirst are appetites.

These lead to or induce instinctive or else intelligent action in order to satisfy them.

Each appetite is a peculiar sensation within the vital organ that craves food or water.

Desires are

1. Primary, as belonging to the constitution of the soul, thus: The desire of property is a desire of accumulation; of *power*, comes from that of rule, influence, superiority, pre-eminence. We have, too, the desire of knowledge, of esteem and other desires.

The primary desire is abstract, namely: is a feeling or longing for a class of objects abstract from the particular person or thing.

2. Secondary: Secondary desires are concrete, and are the product of other affections.

Love creates a desire for the safety and happiness—or, in general terms, for the good—of the loved object.

Love itself is secondary when it is generated or produced by possession.

From the desire of acquisition we come to love the thing acquired. Having acquired gold, we love gold; having acquired a friend, through love of society, or a fellow-sympathy, or social appetency, we come to love the friend.

From the love of simple qualities perceived or imagined in a person—truth, right, beauty, purity—we love the person.

This is the ground of true love between the young man and the maiden. It becomes “a good” when time and experience prove these virtues real and not imaginary.

Affections: The natural affections are those exercised in social and in family relations—as the *love* of a friend, companion, parent, child, and the love of home and one’s country.

These affections become sentiments when they give rise to thoughts and theories, opinions and feelings¹ as to what is economic, useful, honorable, proper, virtuous and right in relation to them.

25. LOVE; LOVE OF GOD, OF COUNTRY, OF GOLD. —Love, as moral, consists in love of the truth, of the right, of beauty, of purity, of modesty, of harmony; in general, of whatever is clear and simple, not mixed.

These constitute the principle of *the good*.

The quality, *good*, is found in a harmonic fitness, as when God pronounced his work *good*, because it was in agreement or in harmony with constitutional law, and with his design in the creation.

Love may be under the *guidance* of the reason, and only in this sense can it be called rational love. It has within itself no element of thought or reason. Love is not a reasoning of the soul, it is a pure feeling; a pure longing for all that is beautiful, admirable, useful and good, whether in the reality or only in our imaginings.

Love, though innate, exists at first in an elementary inchoate state, which develops in the progressive life with varied tendencies in accord with the kind of object toward which it is directed; among the noblest of these being the love of wisdom, or philosophy, love of country, of home, of friends, and highest of all, the love of things heavenly—the love of God.

Law of Love: Unwritten constitutional law exists by nature in man. Written law is the exposition of law implanted in man's nature. The constitutional law of love is, that love seeks the loveable. But this love under the influence of the moral nature seeks out even the unloveable for their good. This now is love modified by a sense of duty; that is, when love becomes a virtue, it acts under the force of moral sensibility; so that love, instead of having in itself moral law, or instead of being a ground-principle in morals is by the moral law of right and duty seized upon and made use of, as a powerful auxiliary, in aid of virtuous ends.

Our "love of God" is right love when we see God as he is. Here the "law of love" is "to love with all the heart." This is the right expression of the law of our love as to God, because God is assumed to be entirely loveable.

As to man, the law of our love is "to love as we love ourselves." For companionship, the law of love is, to love loveable companions—not bad disposed ones. Here we love for like reason that we love God; yet it would be absurd to apply the same law of love, to-wit, "with all the soul and strength." This law of love rules, and can rule, only when God is the object; but cannot rule as to our love for a companion.

Love of *country* is akin to love of property, but on a higher plane. We hold our country as a peculiar possession, to which is attached the love of home.

The ethic law of this love is in a love that values one's country more than any material possession, but less than a moral possession; or less than the holding fast to the right, or to a good conscience. The pure love of country is not always silent, but is often accompanied with a lofty enthusiasm, which leads to noble action and self-sacrifice. The patriotic men who, July 4, 1776, signed the Declaration of American Independence, in the cause of the country, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, mutually pledged to each other their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor."

In the *love of gold* the ethic law is, not to love gold, as the miser does, for its mere possession, but for the good use it can be put to. When this law does not prevail, this love becomes ignoble, sordid, base.

There is, then, no virtue in the mere act of loving, but only in overcoming obstacles to a pure love.

Love as concrete, namely, as having a natural or a personal object, can be no ground of right, for right itself is ultimate;² yet love imparts to the moral faculties an enthusiasm of the soul in right endeavor. Hence we need not be led astray by the unfounded notion that the abstract principle or ground of right is identical with the highest incentive to the practice of the right.

The principle of right, the abstract notion, the inborn desire, the appetency for the right, and the tendency to it, exists as a distinct moral faculty, or moral emotion, combining intelligence and feeling as to our relations with God and man.

Our intuitive moral judgments and our moral reasonings act through this faculty, which also in its action is authoritative or imperative, not arbitrarily, but because clothed upon with truth and the right. This is the distinct view we must hold of the moral category, the imperative. But on the other hand, moral commandments, the decalogue; the two great commandments, love God; love man; all moral rules and laws are for the purpose of giving the concrete or objective meaning³ and application of this moral principle, as well as for the cultivation and strengthening of it by use and practice. To this end love is enjoined as the purest and strongest motive power to influence the soul for good.

The love of God with the whole heart, with all the love of which man is capable, cannot be attained to and applied to a discrimination and enforcement of the right, through the moral sense, without suitable methods in the study and cognition of God, in

all those loveable qualities in which he reveals himself to the diligent and devout student in nature and in the word.

The emotional nature of man, then, in its love for the truth, and for the maintenance of the right, is not to be identified with his emotional nature as shown in the love contemplated in the first and great commandment, and which goes out toward him who is the embodiment of the truth and the right.

The former love, the first kind of love, the longing of the soul for whatever is true and right without a direct reference to any one object, is the ground-principle in the moral nature.

The latter love, or the second kind of love, is love for an object, in which the qualities and characteristics of truth are seen to exist and dwell, and it has its origin in the first kind of love.

It would be impossible for us to love God if we did not first have within us a *ground-principle* of love for the true and the right:

“I could not love *thee* thus, [*Lucasta*]
Lov'd I not *honor* more.”

Nor would it be possible to love our neighbor without this same ground-principle, which, when possessed as a living active principle, is, as the apostle has it, “the fulfillment of the law.”

26. SELF-LOVE, INSTINCTIVE.—We love ourselves naturally, but not from the moral nature.

Self-love is *sui generis*, arising from itself, not from any other kind of love. It is compatible with

moral love, namely, the "love of the true, the right and the good," but is not grounded in it. It is grounded in instinct.

All animals—man included—have an instinctive dread of bodily harm. Self-love as instinct, relates to the preservation of what we already possess—not at all to the gratification of appetite.

When we eat bread for the sustenance of the body, it is from self-love, or an innate desire of self-preservation; when for sake of the pleasure in it, it is to gratify the appetite.

Self-love can never become selfishness, except by a degeneration and by a passage from the bounds of a good nature to those of a base nature. Nor is self-love cold and calculating. It acts prompt, and by a natural impulse. We do not acquire anything through self-love; we only hold on to what we have. Hence one's self-love may be appealed to, and often is, as a motive to obey and follow the right.

This, however, does not at all argue that "the true and the right" is not to be followed solely for the sake of itself—in accord with the true nature bestowed upon man at his creation. It only argues that self-love or some visible good is a proper incentive to help the soul in its warfare against the hindrances that tend to divert it from a straightforward course in its love of the right.

That self-love is entirely distinct from selfishness is also apparent from the scope of the second great commandment—"love your neighbor as yourself"—which would have no value nor virtue in it, were self-love commensurate with selfishness.

27. LOVE TO THE NEIGHBOR.—This love is grounded in moral love. Were our neighbor entirely loveable, we would love him necessarily, just as we love the true, the right, the good. It is a moral necessity, and so is without the element of virtue.

If, however, our neighbor is not loveable—has characteristics disagreeable and averse to true love—and we yet love him, this love is a virtue, and exists, not in the plane of self-love, but is contra to it.

To love our unloveable neighbor is an abnegation of self. We sacrifice our natural feeling of love for the beautiful, the pure; our sympathy for what is like ourselves—for what we have experienced in our soul's associations; we sacrifice these for the sake of the good, not of ourselves, but of our neighbor.

Good may result to ourselves from this self-sacrifice, but if we do good to our neighbor merely for sake of the good resulting to ourselves, there is no self-sacrifice nor virtue in it. It then becomes a matter of self-love.

The scope of the second great commandment is in this: We love our neighbor as ourselves, when we love him as we love ourselves perforce of our self-love, and when we, with the same instinctive readiness, minister to him in all things necessary to maintain in him life and its proper possessions. We are to have the same regard for his rights and welfare as for our own. We must not minister to ourselves at his expense, but may minister to him at our expense.

28. THE GROUND OF DUTY.—It is the ground of what ought to be. Anyone can say what a duty is,

can give a dictionary definition similar to Webster's, as a something which we ought to do or not to do; but now what we seek is the ground of this idea of duty.

Some say that the sense of duty is a natural inborn feeling elementary in the soul, and hence as a simple element cannot be further elucidated, or defined as to its essential nature.

This is true of the naked abstract idea of duty, but when we say ground of duty, we mean to inquire what moral element in human nature gives rise to the abstract idea of duty. In Philippians 2:3 we read, "Let each esteem other better than themselves," and it would be difficult to find in words a fitter expression for the ground of duty. It is in a feeling of self-abnegation for sake of all dear to us.

When Lord Nelson at the battle of Trafalgar cries out to his men, "England expects that every man this day will do his duty," there was a reminder and an appeal to that sense of loyalty to their country by which every true Englishman valued his native land, her institutions and his kindred, friends, countrymen, and the government he lived under, more than he did himself—more than his own life even.

It is this feeling of the soul, this affinity for other souls, that underlies the notion of duty—is its ground-principle.

Lord Nelson's men responded to the call manfully, not because of obligation on account of their stipend of forty shillings per month; not because the laws of England protected them in their rights; not because of love for kin or for friend or loved one they had left at home, however strong the feeling. These

considerations might, any or all of them, if called to mind, be proper incentives to duty; but they are not the ground of duty. That lies deeper. It is an inborn feeling of affinity that a man has for whatever is like himself, and which he thus necessarily regards as a part of his own being. It is natural and instinctive as the desire of self-preservation, which leads to prompt action without stopping to inquire into the reasons for it.

There is an affinity or attraction in dead matter called gravity, by which each body of matter, large or small, tends towards all other bodies. We do not know what this force is, except by its effects. We know not the *why* nor the *how*, except that it is a principle in matter, that the Creator has put there of his own will and wisdom.

Just so the principle of duty has been implanted by the Creator in the nature of man, each to act for the good of all others conditioned like himself. This feeling of duty has its source inherent within the soul—is *à priori* in character; and is not to be debased by being grounded in the *à posteriori*—in external conditions and considerations. These have their value: they are motives to duty, but are not the primary law of duty.

The ground of duty is, then, in the attitude of the soul towards kindred souls—in the elementary principle involved when we esteem others—when we gladly become servant to all, like the Master, who “took upon himself the form of a servant” —hence not in any servile sense, but in the sense of a native desire to do good.

The idea of duty involves feeling more than intellect. Nelson's men could not have done their duty had they gone into action with the precision indeed, but yet with the coldness of a morning parade.

In general, the idea of duty antedates and dominates that of the right, as it did with Lord Nelson's men; but not always, for as to the moral precept of Jesus, "Love your enemies," it may be that we must find reasons for it, must argue ourselves into the truth of it, before we see the duty in it.

And so it is as to the commandment, "Love God." If we know that Jehovah says this, we know that it is right and duty to obey; but we *cannot* obey this commandment till our reason and judgment and moral feeling—the entire consciousness—or else the Spirit's power, convinces us that God is a being altogether loveable.

Had this point been well considered, some distinguished writers' on morals would not have mistaken the ultimate end of man for the underlying principle in a science of morals, for to do so starts the seeker after moral truth on his voyage without rudder or compass. He must do his duty by obedience to God, prior to love—before he can love—and exactly this is the philosophy of Jesus: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine." (John 7:17.)

29. GROUND OF RIGHT.—The primary ground is in the Divine constitution. It is in *what is* in the eternal existence—in the "I am."

Some philosophers—Dr. Haven, for instance—

argue that it is in the *nature* of things, and would exist even were there no God ; or that it is eternal and coexistent with the existence of the Creator.

But in this attempt to set up and exhibit a ground of right outside the Divine constitution we abstract the Divine constitution, or the eternal Creator, prior to whom there could be nothing, and without whom nothing exists ; hence we abstract *all*—all ideas, all notions, moral or intellectual. The constitution of God must have preceded all nature, and hence all that is true and right in nature and in her relations. Hence the right and the true must be grounded in the constitution of God, which changes not : “ Thou art the same to-day, yesterday and forever.”

This does not argue a lack of moral freedom in the Divine constitution. We are free when we act in accord with our constitution, yet can act contra to it.

Our conception (idea) of God is of a Being that has power to act contra to his constitution, but who will not, for his will is holy.

The idea of right as having an eternal existence unchangeable is correct ; but it is also a necessary idea that this eternal existence of the right has eternally dwelt in the Divine constitution, and necessarily belongs to it.

It might seem that this question and this distinction is not important, for Dr. Haven admits “ that the will of God must be regarded as the rule of right and the standard of duty to man ; that will itself reposes upon the right and is conformed to it, and

while it is not the source and ground of right, it is nevertheless the source of our knowledge of right—the rule of duty to us.”

But the value of a true doctrine in this regard lies here, namely, that if we set up a ground of right independent of the constitution of God, we have two Gods, a personal one in God the Creator, and an impersonal one in an absolute principle of right, which is not an ideal,¹ but is an eternal principle that should be obeyed, even though in so doing we might disobey God, the Omnipotent, and we thus reopen the question whether our God—the Creator—is altogether the good God, and whether he might not, and at some time may, disregard this impersonal independent principle of the right.

That the ground of right is in the constitution of God is further evident from the necessary conditions of a sufficient reason.²

1. Truth and right are ultimate ideas. They must have their source in the primal elementary fount of existence, else streams of life flowing therefrom will not be permeated with pure life-imparting elements. This primal source can be no other than that eternal uncreate existence from which all created existence originates.

2. We recognize the true ground of right when we see in it the source of the highest incentive to duty.

By reference to section 2, we see that in the standard systems of Greek philosophy, honesty is to be sought *for itself alone*, and not from any advantage to him who cultivates it; and this seeking for itself alone is because of the beauty and excellence of

virtue, if it be possible, as Plato says, to behold this beauty with mortal eyes. They, the ancients, sought this in an ideal perfection of humanity, and this is a legitimate pursuit; but whence this ideal except from the Creator of humanity, who is the reality and completeness of all that is true and right?

A true ground of right leads to a true concept of God, and to that of holiness.

30. THE SECONDARY GROUND OF RIGHT.—The secondary ground of right is in Man's nature as in the Divine image. As we have seen, the idea or the notion of the right is an essential principle of the Divine constitution—must be therein or nowhere.

Hence, if man was created in the Divine image, he of right has this same principle in his own constitution. To act right, then, is to act in accord with the requirements of the moral constitution.

The imperative ground of right is in *authority*—authority emanating direct from God—his acknowledged laws, or else the law of the "still small voice." This law requires truth to nature, hence in morals the true and the right are equivalents. Whatever is true, morally true, is morally right.

We may hardly know the primary ground of right, namely, the constitution of God, or even our own nature. These require much study and reflection, and can never be fully known and apprehended; but there is a certain authority in man's moral nature, called the authority or the voice of the conscience, and a sure authority in God's voice or revealed will,

which is an evident, immediate and imperative ground of right.

31. PRINCIPLE: PRACTICE.—Every science has its own principle, which, however, cannot always be readily applied to particular cases as they occur.

Thus, in keeping accounts, we have the general law or principle that what is received is debit to what is given. This proposition is self-evident, yet its correct application in every transaction that occurs may not be so plain. In the general run of business, it requires experience and practice to determine instantly the proper journal entry, which, in each case, shall be in accord with this principle.

So, in the science of gunnery, the motion of the projectile is in accord with laws which can be formulated. In the art and practice of gunnery, not only the law or the leading principles must be understood, but there must be facility in their application to meet varying circumstances.

Just so is it in morals: a knowledge of principles without a trained and experienced judgment in the use of them, will not enable a man to give a ready and a correct reply to the moral questions with which, in the affairs of a busy life, and under varying circumstances, he is daily confronted; and, on the other hand, without a knowledge of principles, his moral acts will have a mere empiric character, and can never assure of certainty as to the right. This condition gives rise to an uneven, one-sided character, in which fair virtue is disfigured by folly and vice.

Thus, religious zeal for a formal worship, unbalanced by a true principle and spirit of religious liberty, gave rise to contentions and persecutions between Jew and Gentile; between Catholic and Protestant; and in the established church in England and in Germany between Conformists and recusants; and nearer home, to that inconsistency and narrowness of spiritual insight which characterized the Puritans of Massachusetts when they expelled from their midst that man Rodger Williams, who, like Paul, was the personification of soul-liberty, and was the true exponent of that priceless "freedom to worship God," for the sake of which the Puritans themselves and the Pilgrims had braved all dangers and hardships in crossing the tempestuous ocean, landing upon icy, rock-bound coasts, and in effecting settlements in the wilderness of New England.

This principle of conscience-liberty, soul-liberty, religious liberty, cherished by the little band of Mayflower Pilgrims, was, August 1st, 1889, commemorated and emphasized by the dedication at Plymouth of a colossal Faith monument or Pilgrim statue;² and this monument is not local merely, but it is national in character, for it stands for that principle of religious liberty that enters into the laws and the institutions of the American people.

32. PIVOT THOUGHTS IN THE PRINCIPLES.—

1. Some duties are self-evident, and our obedience to these helps us to discover those that are disclosed through moral law certified to by the judgments of our intellectual, moral and religious nature acting in

harmony, and so producing what is called an enlightened consciousness, which, being subject to the imperfection and bias of human nature, gives at best only an incomplete ideal, and so affords ground for a necessary intervention of Divine instruction through laws written or uttered, and through the teaching and power of the Spirit.

2. All considerations as to duty and the ground of duty lead to the underlying idea of right, as that upon which the idea of duty is necessarily imposed; and that this idea of right must have its foundation in the constitution of that Supreme Being who is in himself the archetype of every true idea and existence; whatever is false having been wrought out by the vain imagination and disobedience of the creature.

3. That a just conception of Him—the ground of right—as of the Holy One, who is of “purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity” (Habakkuk 1: 13), is essential to insure in man a just idea of right and duty in all moral relations.

4. That the ground of right, the ground of duty, the function of conscience, the chief-good, the ultimate-good, are all and severally distinct ideas, not to be confused, as sometimes happens, in philosophic investigations.

5. Though the ordinary desires and affections excite intellect and will to action, the moral element in this excitation is furnished solely by the presence of the moral nature acting through its faculties as a moral-sense giving out moral sensations, analogous to sensations from the outer world, finding access to

the intellect and exciting to cognition and thought, a condition not possible were there no outer world nature. So nothing is possible in moral cognition without the inner world of the moral nature. Intellect and will sympathize with the moral nature, but do not originate it.

33. EXPOSITION OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS.—This could be found in the preceding exposition of principles, but it is desirable to show distinctly what is meant by metaphysics of morals, and to give a summary view.

If we look for definitions in the dictionaries we find metaphysics to mean, after or beyond physics, from *meta*, beyond or after, and *phusis*, nature.

It is said that the name metaphysics was given by Aristotle to some of his writings which he could not class with his physics, namely, with his writings upon the science of nature—this term science of nature, in Ancient philosophy, being limited to the determination of the elements and laws of the material universe, including man's physical nature, but not extended to include the intellectual and the moral nature of man—so that *these* subjects of inquiry came under the head or classification by Aristotle of metaphysics, and have since retained that nomenclature, which even though given in the first instance much by accident, is a happy accident, for the word is quite appropriate, as the intellectual and the moral are quite distinct from the material or corporeal in man, as well as from those desires that have their seat in the lower affections of the soul.

After this general explanation of the meaning of metaphysics, let us consider what is meant by the metaphysics of morals. This is best done by taking an example to illustrate.

Achan coveted a wedge of gold, stole it and buried it in the earth in his tent. Now, in this transaction, which faculties of the soul were brought into action?

1. There was the desire to possess, to acquire something. This desire, when directed to a proper object, is a good propensity of the soul. It is to be regulated, not discouraged nor expelled from the soul's constitution. It acts, and should act, when not restrained for cause. The desire, then, for gold, or for aught else, is not chargeable with wrong, if any, in a natural desire.

The second faculty of the soul concerned in this transaction was the will of Achan.

Desire says, I want it; Will says, take it. This determination of the will may have been instantaneous under the pressure of strong desire, and with little opposition on the part of other faculties; or it may have been after deliberation. In either case the will is the executive of the soul's desires and determinations.

The act, even though done on the spur of the moment, must have been briefly debated, as to its propriety, and then approved or condemned. This brings into view those faculties of the soul whose function it is to sit in judgment as to the quality of this act of Achan in taking the gold. The moral sensibility of Achan's soul lifts up its voice and says,

Achan, you should love the right and do what is right. The reasoning faculties of Achan say, this wedge of gold, Achan, is not yours; you know you have no right to it.

Conscience, the consensus of the united voices of the moral faculties, is now aroused; yet desire is strong, the will is bad, and the bad deed is done.

But Achan is seized with fear and remorse and confesses his guilt and meets his fate. Now, the higher faculties that are here introduced into this scene, as actors, are the will, as having an independent action; the moral emotion or sensibility which is constituted to love the right—what is true and right; and the intellect which is able to perceive and state the conditions or circumstances which should determine the will to let or not to let the soul have what it desires. These three, the will in its autonomy, or as having freedom to do as it pleases to do, right or wrong; the moral emotion of the soul as loving the right; the intellect with its idea of the ground of right and of duty, and its intuitive and logical judgments as to what is right, all belong to the higher nature of man, as a spirit, and not to his lower corporeal, physical nature, like those appetites, affections and desires that are intended to minister to the wants of the body; these are physical, but those are spiritual, and so metaphysical.

Hence, the metaphysics of morals is that part of moral science which determines its higher elements and laws. These elements are said to be *à priori* in character, because they are ultimate principles, independent, cannot be referred to anything higher,

though the moral element has the pre-eminence, because the will, though at liberty to do as it pleases, should please to do right in accord with the moral; and, too, the intellect should subordinate its thinking to this dictum of the moral—the ought.

All three, when acting together, rightly make a moral-imperative—a categorical-imperative, so far as relates to the formal law of duty, right for sake of the right, and so far as particular duties are intuitively discerned.

From this it appears that the will is a prime factor or element in the metaphysics of morals; for however wise the moral reason may be, it is destitute of authority without concurrence of the will, which concurrence it will have provided there is a good will. Hence, the attainment of a good will is the highest end of moral instruction and discipline. When this chief-good is reached, is possessed, we readily gain possession of the minor joys of life, such as the pleasures of the imagination, of æsthetic and intellectual pursuits, of society, of friendship, and, in general, those that arise from a faithful discharge of the common duties of life, including the practice of the virtues, and above all those enjoyed in the possession and cultivation of a true religious sentiment and faith; but without the good-will, no other good thing, however good in itself, can have for us any value.

An absolutely good will may not be attainable in this life; but a comparatively good will can be attained to.

Suppose we have this, and that the elements in

the metaphysics of morals are working in harmony, what can they accomplish? This is the *one* question wise men ask. Some philosophers think nothing can be done, for the reason that these elements do not appear to them to have any materials to work upon—any object in sight; and so not perceiving any use for these metaphysical elements, they doubt their very existence. Other philosophers think these elements have a virtue in them able to accomplish all moral good.

The proper view is that these *à priori* elements are essential to the accomplishment of anything at all; that they do accomplish much by direct action, and indirectly all; namely, that what is done by the *à posteriori* or the empirical elements is auxiliary.

In the direct action of the *à priori* elements there are intuitions of duty which do not require experience for their verification; and there is the forceful determination to good acts of an *organization* of faculties designed to point out to the soul of man, and to every intelligent moral creature, the general principle of the morally true and right; and by this *concurrence* of the faculties to give an impulse, impetus, to each faculty that has a part to act in effecting a right conduct of life.

Experience has much to do, and often it requires bitter experiences when the *à priori* faculties are at fault, and do not act well their part; when the will is not good or the intellect is obtuse; when the love of the moral nature, which naturally loves the right, is perverted and deadened by abnormal

causes—by sin and transgression—when “the whole head is sick and the whole heart is faint.”

In such cases, experience, and terrible experiences, providentially come to the aid of the inner man—to scarify and blister the diseased soul into a condition of healthy action.

Here, then, we have the metaphysics and the empiric of the soul; and this is about the sum of it: they are not opposing doctrines and forces; each has its own sphere, and there need be no contention.

The certainty of moral law is known only by the *à priori* elements or sources of moral cognition, the voice of the moral nature in favor of the right, the intuitions of the intellect determining the right, and the power of the conscience to give pleasure or pain give us a logical judgment upon the doctrine of good or ill desert. Whereas, if experience be our only guide, or our primal one, we are left in doubt as to the Divine intention in regard to man's final state. The observation or experience of the psalmist, in Psalms 13, his painful doubt as to God's moral government when he “saw the prosperity of the wicked,” is evidence that the empiric character often misleads.

PART SECOND.

DIVISION I. ETHICS.

34. ETHICS, THE PRACTICAL; ITS SOURCE IN PRINCIPLES.—We have considered the moral and religious nature of man endowed with active faculties, as embodying elements and principles upon which, when rightly exhibited, to base a science of ethics; namely, of moral laws, rules and precepts to guide us in the discharge of duty, and in the maintenance of rights.

The study and exposition of principles implies a philosophy thereof; and ethics, as the enunciation of moral law, implies a knowledge of principles.

Ethics,¹ or Practical Morality, is then derived from principles. The source of ethics can be referred to the source of its principles which lie in the secondary ground of right, namely, in man's moral nature, elucidated by a just idea of the primal ground of right, the constitution of Jehovah,² and enforced by the authoritative ground of right, God's will, as interpreted by revelation thereof direct, and indirectly through the judgments of the enlightened intellectual, moral, religious consciousness.

Ethics is the application of principles in the practice of virtue. Scripture ethics is not merely a didactic statement of what ought to be, but is

also a positive authoritative announcement of what ought not to be.

The first part—the ought to be—consists of universal principles and precepts applicable to all time.

The second part—the ought not—is animadversion and denunciation of the prevailing errors and vices of the times, and served not only for the then present, but, by way of example, it serves for any and all transgressions and immoralities and sins in all times.

The moral law as a formal ethic utterance, in its essential elements and fundamental requirements, is exhibited in the Ten Commandments, and is further summarized in the two great commandments.

In the decalogue and in the summary thereof our relations to God hold the first place, are first considered and enunciated. The first commandment announces the authority that lies at the base of the decalogue, “I am the Lord thy God.”

This authority is self-evident. The sovereignty of the Lord God, the Supreme Ruler, no man can question; and he reminds the unstable people of their special obligation to him in bringing them out of Egypt, the house of bondage, and of the great display therein of his might and power, by way of enforcing their obligation to heed now his authority and commandments, and primarily and specially to give heed to this first commandment, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me.”

The second commandment forbids the worship of the invisible God through the representation of the Godhead by means of idols, or images of any

sort, for in reference to a *true worship* Jesus teaches thus:

“But the hour cometh, and now is, when the worshipers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for the Father seeketh such to worship him.

“God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth.” (John 4: 23, 24.)

Hence it is evident that the true worship of God is the worship of a personal God by the consecrated feelings of his intelligent moral creatures.

This commandment, not to bow down to nor serve other gods, the Lord emphasizes by the declaration that he is a jealous God, “visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me”—“showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.”

Every one from self-examination will see that disobedience tends to alienation and separation between himself and the Lord; and that a cheerful obedience tends to union and love, peace and joy.

35. STRINGENT LAWS AND NECESSITY THEREFOR.—With reference to the Canaanites and other heathen peoples, it is said:

“Thou shalt not bow down to their gods, nor serve them, nor do after their works; but thou shalt utterly overthrow them, and quite break down their images.” (Exodus 23: 24.)

“Thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor with their gods. They shall not dwell in thy land, lest they make thee sin against me; for if thou serve

their gods, it will surely be a snare unto thee." (Exodus 23: 32, 33.)

"Cursed be the man that maketh any graven or molten image, an abomination unto the Lord, the work of the hands of the craftsman, and putteth it in a secret place: and all the people shall answer and say, Amen." (Deuteronomy 27: 15.)

These laws and regulations, and others of like sort, are often objected to by kind-hearted people on account of their severity; but they will be regarded as proof of God's good will when it is considered that no code of laws except a very stringent one would be effective in securing stubborn Israel from affiliation with the idolatrous peoples around them, and so thwarting the intention of God to make *himself* known as the One True God, loving righteousness and hating iniquity.

In the knowledge of which ground-principle in the constitution of the Creator, rests the well-being and the happiness of mankind.

The third commandment, which forbids taking the name of the Lord in vain, is violated when God's name—any of his holy names—are made use of lightly to express vexation with oneself, or imprecation of another.

Specially is his name taken in vain when we make a false statement under the sanctions of his name, swear falsely under oath, or make promises under like sanction.

A more extended notice of this subject will be found under the head "Veracity."

The fourth and fifth are considered under the

heads "Sabbath" and "Filial Duty," and most of the other commandments come under special heads.

This brief view has been given of the first three commandments relating specially to the great Law-giver, because therein is valid testimony and the sufficient reason in confirmation of the logic of our intellectual and moral consciousness in positing the ground of right in the constitution of God. "Love with all the heart, soul and strength." "Be ye holy as I am holy," are the high requirements; and the student in moral science and the lover of moral culture will do well to lay it to heart that these are not idle words, but point to the veritable goal to be reached.

36. THE BEATITUDES.—General View: The Ten Commandments form a summary of Divine requirements and of duty. More specific or particular duties come under moral precepts, sentiments, virtues, or other suitable heads.

The best statement of moral precepts is to be found in the Beatitudes; in the Sermon on the Mount. (Matthew 5.)

The blessedness of the poor in spirit, of those that mourn, of the meek, of those that hunger and thirst after righteousness, of the merciful, of the pure in heart, of the peace maker, of the persecuted for righteousness' sake, are sentiments in accord with man's intellectual and moral constitution, hence are of universal acceptance, and are admired by all.

The *ethic character in the beatitude* is to be found in the reasons given for the blessedness, in the

beneficent results flowing from the exercise, from the activity of these kindly humanizing qualities, these graces of the soul. It is not meant, nor can it be implied, that this exercise and activity are displayed for the sake of the reasons and the results; not at all. The peculiar result that surely follows each of these blessed states is a pure moral result; it tends to the moral perfection of the soul. The action is that of cause and effect in moral relation.

The consideration of the Beatitudes is, then, strictly within the bounds of moral science.

The First Beatitude: "Blessed are the poor in spirit; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."

As to the first beatitude, as it affirms that the poor in spirit possess the kingdom of heaven, which is peculiarly God's kingdom, or a spiritual kingdom, the phrase "poor in spirit" must relate to one's humble opinion of himself—of his own fitness for the kingdom of heaven; for if he had a high opinion of himself, that very circumstance would be a disqualifying one. No man can come before God with the arrogance of a puffed-up spirit, to claim as his own right, or on his own merit, an entrance into the kingdom of heaven. "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven. (Matthew 5:20.)

The Scribes and Pharisees were very particular to observe the letter of the law, to pay tithes of anise and cummin; but they neglected the spirit of the law—justice and mercy.

For the character of the Pharisee, we read:—

“Two men went up into the temple to pray, the one a Pharisee, the other a publican. The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself: ‘God, I thank thee that I am not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican. I fast twice in the week; I give tithes of all that I possess.’ (Luke 18:10-14.) And the publican standing afar off, would not lift up so much as his eyes unto heaven, but smote upon his breast saying: ‘God be merciful to me a sinner.’”

The Pharisee illustrates the self-righteous, proud and haughty in spirit; the publican, the meek.

The Second Beatitude: “Blessed are they that mourn; for they shall be comforted.”

We mourn for loss of property or of friends, but this does not restore them. This mourning may have a soothing effect to mitigate the poignancy of grief; but blessedness is found only in that mourning over our departures from moral rectitude which is accompanied with genuine repentance for our transgressions, which cleanses the soul, and restores it to joy in God's presence. They that thus mourn are comforted and blessed by an assurance of God's returning favor and acceptance; that favor which had been lost to the transgressor. King David's prayer in Psalms 51:10, 12, is: “Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me. Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation.”

The Third Beatitude: “Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth.”

The meek do not lack in courage; on the contrary the meek man is intrepid and brave, yet never pro-

vokes a quarrel; is not on the watch to see if somebody has insulted him; is not over jealous about his rights; is fitted, too, for leadership when meekness is conjoined with a clear conception of duty. Thus Moses led out his people from Egyptian bondage, and of this Moses it is written: "Moses was very meek above all the men which were upon the face of the earth." (Numbers 12: 3.)

The Fourth Beatitude: "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness; for they shall be filled."

Its Definition: Righteousness, as in substance defined by Noah Webster, means: A quality or state of exact rectitude. It comprehends holy principles and affections of the heart, and a conformity of the life to the Divine law.

The true principle of righteousness is, then, to be found in the love of righteousness, thus: "Thy word have I hid in mine heart, that I might not sin against thee." "I will delight myself in thy statutes." (Psalms, 119: 11, 16.)

The righteousness of the Pharisees, however excellent in their own eyes, was formal, precise and superstitious—hence was a false righteousness, of no value, and of no ethic character. Jesus said to them: "I will have mercy and not sacrifice." (Matthew 9: 13.)

This is a form of speech which does not condemn sacrifice, but gives to mercy the preference. "God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation, he that feareth him and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him." (Acts 10: 34, 35.)

All men by nature love righteousness. If any do not, it is because their good nature has been spoiled by not giving heed to its constitutional requirements. This love of righteousness must not be a mere formal, theoretical, sentimental, lukewarm love—such as unfortunately characterizes to a degree all men; the blessing is not for a character of this sort, it is for those that *hunger* and *thirst* after righteousness—a strong figure of speech—for hunger and thirst are very imperative appetites.

It is the duty of man, with divine aid, to educate himself to this high standard of righteousness.

The Fifth Beatitude: “Blessed are the merciful; for they shall obtain mercy.”

“With the merciful thou wilt show thyself merciful.” (II Samuel 22:6.)

The Divine displeasure against those who lack in mercy is thus stated: “For the Lord hath a controversy with the inhabitants of the land, because there is no truth, nor mercy, nor knowledge of God in the land.” (Hosea 4:1.)

“Let anyone who is conversant with the variety of human life reflect upon it, and he will find the man who wants mercy has a taste of no enjoyment of any kind. There is a natural disrelish of everything which is good, in his very nature; and he is born an enemy to the world. He is ever extremely partial to himself in all his actions, and has no sense of iniquity but from the punishment which shall attend it.

“The law of the land is his gospel, and all his cases of conscience are determined by his attorney.”

Balthasar's argument with reference to Shylock's idea of compulsory mercy is unrivaled for force and beauty of thought in depicting the true idea of mercy, thus :

“The quality of mercy is not strain'd,
It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven,
Upon the place beneath; it is twice blest;
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes;
'Tis mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown;
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty,
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
But mercy is above this scepter'd sway,
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings;
It is an attribute to God himself;
And earthly power doth then show likest God's,
When mercy seasons justice.”

Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Sc. 1.

The Sixth Beatitude: “Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God.”

To see God is to dwell in his presence. It is only the pure in heart that have this privilege. “Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life.” (Proverbs 4:23.)

“The man who lives under an habitual sense of the divine presence keeps up a perpetual cheerfulness of temper, and enjoys every moment the satisfaction of thinking himself in company with his dearest and best friend.”

The Seventh Beatitude: “Blessed are the peacemakers; for they shall be called the children of God.”

Peace is the natural condition of man. All desire

the blessings of peace, especially after having experienced the miseries of war. Men rush into battle with a shout, but the return with tidings of an honorable peace is an occasion of great joy. "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace." (Isaiah 52:7.)

A millennium of peace may not soon prevail in the earth, yet the labors of the peacemaker are blessed in restraining the anger of men, and in mitigating the evils of war; and the peacemaker, peace-society, and the peace-congress for settling international disputes are of great utility, and have a divine mission as being in this regard the ministering "children of God."

The Eighth Beatitude: "Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."

It is characteristic of the unrighteous to speak evil of and to annoy and persecute those that follow after righteousness.

The *right attitude* of the soul under persecution is: "Bless them which persecute you; bless and curse not." (Romans 12:14.) "Being persecuted, we suffer it." (I Corinthians 4:12.)

These precepts were contra to those then in vogue, for Jesus says: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy"; but your Father which is in heaven "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." (Matthew 5: 43, 45.)

From these precepts it appears that the ethical relation was not well understood even by the Jews in those days. There are numerous instances to show that ethic ideas are progressive—at times also retrogressive.

Fifty to a hundred years ago the slave trade was justified by many. Now, by civilized and christianized people, it is held to be no better than piracy. In England and the United States there has been, in the last fifty years, a marked change in favor of stricter rules of temperance. Now, this change in the views of men does not argue any change in the ground-principles of the right. This is always the same, and there is in the soul of man always a response to this principle and an affirmation of it—but his intellect and moral perceptions are often clouded, so as not to fully appropriate the true content of what is right.

Our Lord's closing injunction in the Sermon on the Mount is: "Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect."

37. THE VIRTUES.—General View: Virtue is universally praised and honored by men and vice is reproved. Even those who are not virtuous themselves give their testimony in favor of virtue. They acknowledge their duty; but are blind to their own non-performance of it, or else endeavor to excuse it. "They know the better, yet pursue the worse."

We often condemn in others what we are guilty of ourselves. The scripture injunctions are: "Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge."

(II Peter 1: 5.) "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." (Philippians 4: 8.)

We see that vice is punished by law; but that against virtue there is no law.

This proves that virtue is recognized as the natural and proper state of man, and that vice is regarded as an abnormal condition to be discouraged and corrected. St. Paul discloses this idea in his enumeration of Christian virtues. "But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance; against such there is no law." (Galatians 5: 22, 23.)

These virtues are in themselves natural laws, against which there can be no ground for positive law.

With the ancients, prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude were reckoned cardinal virtues.

What a man ought to do and does do in the face of adverse influences, is a virtue; and as in doing right we are beset with temptation not to do right, right acts—morally right—are accounted as virtues.

"We love a virtuous man," says Tully, "though he live in the remotest parts of the earth; though we are altogether out of the reach of his virtue, and can receive from it no manner of benefit; nay, one who died several years ago raises a secret fondness and benevolence for him, in our minds, when we

read his story; nay, what is still more, one who has been the enemy of our country, provided his wars were regulated by justice and humanity. Such is the natural beauty and loveliness of virtue."

"As virtue in general is of an amiable and lovely nature, there are some particular kinds of it which are more so than others, and these are such as dispose us to do good to mankind."

Temperance and abstinence, faith and devotion, are in themselves perhaps as laudable as any other virtues; but those which make a man popular and beloved are justice, charity, munificence, and in short all the good qualities that render us beneficial to each other.

The two great ornaments of virtue which show her in the most advantageous views, and make her altogether lovely, are cheerfulness and good nature. These generally go together, as a man cannot be agreeable to others who is not easy within himself.

They are both very requisite in a virtuous mind to keep out melancholy from the many serious thoughts it is engaged in, and to hinder its natural hatred of vice from souring into severity and censoriousness.

Tully further says: "Virtue and decency are so nearly related that it is difficult to separate them from each other but in our imagination. As the beauty of the body always accompanies the health of it, so certainly is decency the concomitant to virtue.

"As beauty of body with an agreeable carriage pleases the eye, and that pleasure consists in that we observe all the parts with a certain elegance are pro-

portioned to each other, so does decency of behavior which appears in our lives obtain the approbation of all with whom we converse, from the order, consistency and moderation of our words and actions.

“This flows from the reverence we bear towards every good man, and to the world in general, for to be negligent of what anyone thinks of you does not only show you arrogant, but abandoned.” (*The Spectator*, Nos. 104, 243.)

Industry: By industry is meant a steady employment of the hand or mind in the prosecution of any proper or suitable work or design for some good object.

Thus we speak of an industrious mechanic, farmer, merchant, student.

Industry is a virtue when directed to the virtuous end of providing a comfortable living for oneself, or for those dependent on us, the wife, the child, the aged father and mother, or of aiding in some benevolent work, or in the cause of education, and in the promotion of right principles of life among men.

Idleness is the opposite of industry—it is a vice, and its results are contra in character. The idle mechanic, instead of being a generous bread-winner for his house, wastes his irregular earnings at the ale-house, and lets his unhappy wife provide, as best she can, the scant meal for herself and children. The idle farmer, instead of fine wheat, produces weeds.

“I went by the field of the slothful, and by the vineyard of the man void of understanding, and lo,

it was all grown over with thorns, and nettles had covered the face thereof, and the stone wall thereof was broken down." (Proverbs 24: 30, 31.) "The sluggard will not plough by reason of the cold: therefore shall he beg in harvest, and have nothing." (Proverbs 20: 4.) "An idle soul shall suffer hunger." (Proverbs 19: 15.)

Industry tends to independence: idleness, to dependence. "The hand of the diligent shall bear rule; but the slothful shall be under tribute." (Proverbs 12: 24.)

The apostle, in exhorting to the performance of duties, enumerated diligence or industry among Christian virtues. "Not slothful in business; fervent in spirit; serving the Lord." (Romans 12: 11.)

In scripture we have the *ant* as the type of industry. "Go to the ant, thou sluggard, consider her ways and be wise." (Proverbs 6: 6.)

Frugality is a virtue akin to industry, for industry is in vain unless joined with frugality, namely, a moderate use without waste of the means we acquire by industry. Without frugality we save nothing against a time of need.

Poverty does not insure frugality; often the poor are most wasteful and improvident. It is this lack of frugality that keeps them poor. This is, perhaps, the exception rather than the rule; for there are many virtuous poor, frugal and yet straitened in their means.

Uncultivated individuals and uncivilized people, the barbarous and savage races, like the Indians of North America, are most noted for lack of frugality,

using and spending freely and wastefully what they have while it lasts, without regard to the probable wants of the morrow.

Among insects, the ant has been cited; it cannot, however, be said that insects are industrious or frugal from virtuous motives, but that they act merely from an instinctive sense of what is necessary for self-preservation.

But young people should be trained in the virtue of accomplishing much by well-directed effort; and of putting to good use what they acquire.

They should learn to hate idleness and a frivolous employment of time—not, however, to shun such honest sport and recreation as is needful to the maintenance of good spirits and health.

Frugality, it has been said, is the basis of liberality. The frugal man, the man who takes care of the pence, is the man most ready to bestow a pound, with good judgment as to where it is most needed, while the generous man, who is not frugal, is liable to defraud his own household, and at the same time misapply his bounty by the selection of an unworthy object.

George Washington disliked waste, and so is it with the great benefactors of mankind; and so do most persons feel who know the cost of a dollar earned by toil.

The *misér* personifies the abuse of frugality. “Riches give him no plenty; increase, no joy; prosperity, no ease; he has the curse of covetousness—to want the property of his neighbors, while he dare not touch his own; the harpy Avarice drives

him from his own meat ; the sum of his wisdom and his gains will be, by living poor to die rich.

His monument should be lettered thus: "Here lies one who lived unloved, died unlamented ; denied plenty to himself, assistance to his friends, and relief to the poor ; starved his family, oppressed his neighbors, plagued himself to gain what he could not enjoy ; at last, death, more merciful to him than he to himself, released him from care, and his family from want."

Economy is related to frugality, yet has a wider meaning. Frugality is restricted to the use of material. Economy enters into the production of material as well as its use.

The true province of economy is finely discussed by Hannah Moore. Can anyone do better than to quote from what this gifted author has written ?

"Ladies whose natural vanity has been aggravated by a false education, may look down on *economy* as a vulgar attainment, unworthy the attention of a highly cultivated intellect ; but this is the false estimate of a shallow mind. Economy, such as a woman of fortune is called on to practice, is not merely the petty detail of small daily expenses, the shabby curtailments and stinted parsimony of a little mind operating on little concerns ; but it is the exercise of a sound judgment exerted in the comprehensive outline of order, of arrangement, of distribution ; of regulations by which alone well-governed societies, great and small, subsist. She who has the best regulated mind will, other things being equal, have the best regulated family. As, in

the superintendence of the universe, wisdom is seen in its *effects*; and, as in the visible works of Providence, that which goes on with such beautiful regularity is the result not of chance, but of design; so that management which seems the most easy is commonly the consequence of the best concerted plan; and a well concerted plan is seldom the offspring of an ordinary mind. A sound economy is a sound understanding brought into action; it is a calculation realized; it is the doctrine of proportion reduced to practice; it is foreseeing consequences, and guarding against them; it is expecting contingencies, and being prepared for them."

Prudence: "Be prudent," is often the caution of a parent, friend, or other adviser, in reference to something we propose to do, or are about to do; and it means that we shall carefully consider first whether it is best to do it, and, if so, in what way, by what means, the desired end can best be obtained.

Webster defines *prudence*, "Wisdom applied to practice; and *prudent*, "Sagacious in adapting means to ends."

"A prudent man foreseeeth the evil, and hideth himself; but the simple pass on and are punished." (Proverbs 22: 3.) Solomon was "endued with prudence and understanding." (II Chronicles 2: 12.)

A great part of what we call good or ill fortune comes from right or wrong plans of life; so that to be unfortunate in one's affairs means about the same as to be imprudent; hence good fortune presupposes prudence. But this is not all the truth, for as the Scottish bard has it:

“The best laid schemes o’ mice and men
Gang aft agley.”

And so is it evident that many events in our lives result from causes beyond the reach of prudence to provide for. These are accounted accidents from their unforeseen nature; and providences, from the innate idea and sentiment that all events occur in accord with the Divine will. In *The Spectator*, No. 293, is given an instance of the application of this sentiment to a notable event.

On the destruction of the “invincible Armada,” the queen Elizabeth, regarding the favoring storm as indicating that Providence was on her side, caused a medal to be made to represent a fleet beaten by a tempest, with this inscription: “Afflavit Deus, et dissipantur.” God breathed a storm, and they were scattered.

Prudence for Girls [*Maria Edgeworth*]: “In the education of girls, we must teach them much more caution than is necessary to boys; their prudence must be more the result of reasoning than of experiment; they *must* trust to the experience of others; they cannot always have recourse to what *ought to be*; they must adapt themselves to what is; they cannot rectify the material mistakes in their conduct. Timidity, a certain tardiness of decision, and reluctance to act in public situations, are not considered as defects in a woman’s character; her pausing prudence does not, to a man of discernment, denote imbecility, but appears to him the graceful, auspicious characteristic of female virtue. There is

always more probability that women should endanger their own happiness by precipitation than by forbearance. Promptitude of choice is seldom expected from the female sex; they should avail themselves of the leisure that is permitted to them for reflection. 'Begin nothing of which you have not considered the end,' was the advice for which the Eastern sultan paid a purse of gold."

The native prudence Maria Edgeworth treats of does not militate against a certain freedom and decision in thought and act which the increased advantages of education accorded to girls of the present age has made possible and has given to the sex. These new advantages widen the sphere of usefulness and happiness for women, give value to their work and conversation—provided they do not, by the abuse of them, displace native prudence; for feminine freedom and decision, born of a liberal culture in literature and in the science of life, when circled by feminine prudence, is like "apples of gold in pictures of silver."

Self-control, or presence of mind, and a well poised soul is an important virtue.

This means that we should control our hopes, fears, desires and passions, so as not to be taken by surprise, and carried away captive by them under any circumstances that may chance to arise. If danger confronts us, we gain nothing by giving way to fear; we must hold on to our wits to comprehend the situation, and to use such remedies as are practicable.

In case of threatened violence from an enemy, a

robber, or an enraged or vicious animal, collected thoughts and feelings are needful to ward off the attack by prompt, vigorous and effective resistance, if this be the practicable way; if not, by a wise retreat from the impending danger.

Self-control, when anger is provoked, is a virtue. "Be ye angry and sin not; let not the sun go down on your wrath." Anger is a natural passion bestowed on man for a good purpose. Anger is the manifestation of dislike, and it is sometimes necessary to let a foolish or a wicked person know that we dislike his ways.

The viper is angry when trodden on, and his manifestation of anger is doubly useful. It guards the viper from further molestation; and his angry hiss puts the innocent intruder on his guard to get beyond the reach of the poisonous fang. Manifest anger, if properly restrained, may be beneficial to both actor and object.

As to the appetites and propensities, virtue is compatible only with a strict control over them. Self-control cements the foundations of virtue; where this is lacking, vice easily usurps the place of virtue and all is lost.

Purity and Continency: The family is the hearthstone of virtue, and the corner-stone of society, good government, prosperity and happiness.

Impurity is directly antagonistic to this primeval and fundamental institution—hence wise legislators and legislation oppose and restrict.

The high praise bestowed upon the virtue of the Roman matron indicates the tone not only of

Roman sentiment, but the true feeling and sentiment of all men whose moral nature has not been blunted by vice; and hardly any vice demoralizes the entire man more thoroughly than that of impurity. It is antagonistic to all law, physical and moral, and as a bad habit, for whose inlet into and possession of the soul the will of man is entirely responsible, it speedily gains the mastery, tyrannizes over the soul, and destroys all the good in man's nature, except by special and determined effort at reformation. Eras of profligacy have prevailed in all nationalities, even the most civilized; among the formal-religious and the openly irreligious; and too often this dark and low sink of vice and crime is found among the so-called higher classes of society. When the leaders in the social fabric, and the rulers in the political, are themselves corrupt, then indeed the people have good reason to mourn.

Continency is by natural law, in so far as it characterizes the animal creation, and is maintained within its bounds by physical law, save that in man alone in accord with his higher endowment, continency must be regarded and habitually established by reason, by common sense, and by the categorical-imperative of the moral nature; for without continency there can be no health nor happiness in the conjugal relation; nor in the social; nor in life.

Sincerity, Simplicity: Sincerity is honesty of intent and is compatible with all knowledge.

Simplicity is an artlessness and sincerity that is compatible with a lack of wisdom; it characterizes the child.

Scripture furnishes fine illustrations of these traits: "Jesus saw Nathanael coming to him, and saith of him, Behold an Israelite, indeed, in whom is no guile!" (John 1: 47.) A Bible character quite the opposite we have in the patriarch Jacob, noted in his youth for his wiles; while on the other hand, his twin brother—the rude, thoughtless, yet generous, kind-hearted Esau, though defrauded of his birthright, maintains throughout an honest simplicity and sincerity in his relations with all, even with Jacob.

Simplicity and sincerity are qualities that naturally belong to man—how naturally is seen in the speech and acts of little children, which are surely marked by these pleasing and valuable traits of the soul, till corrupted by evil communications. As natural and desirable qualities, all men admire and respect them wherever exhibited; like all the virtues, they have a universal character, in moral relation.

In literature, simplicity of style is regarded as most attractive, and holds attention where ostentatious ornament would tire; for simplicity is compatible with a directness and energy of diction that distinguishes elevated thought, and readily passes over into the sublime—like a great calm resting upon the ground-swell of the boundless ocean.

Consider the lilies, how they grow: they toil not, they spin not; and yet I say unto you, that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. If then God so clothe the grass, which to-

day is in the field, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, how much more will he clothe you.

Here we have great simplicity and beauty, and deep moral and religious sentiment underlying it.

Charity is love in a wide sense; is a primary principle that pervades all the amenities of life; is the common flux that promotes the fusion and easy flow of the graces of the soul.

When we say this man is charitable, we generally mean that he relieves the needy, or is liberal, so far as his means admit, in the endowment and support of charitable institutions; but if we add, is charitable in his judgments, we mean that he puts a liberal construction on the acts of other people, and condemns not hastily.

Nowhere better than in the Scriptures do we find exhibited the meaning, use and praise of charity. In I Corinthians, chap. 13, occur in substance these sentiments, thus:

Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal.

And though I have the gift of prophecy and all knowledge, and have not charity, I am nothing.

Charity suffereth long and is kind; envieth not; vaunteth not itself; is not puffed up; seeketh not her own; is not easily provoked; thinketh no evil; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things, and never fails.

And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.

38. THE SENTIMENTS.—Patriotism.

“Breathes there the man with soul so dead,
 Who never to himself hath said,
 This is my own, my native land!
 Whose heart hath ne'er within him burn'd,
 As home his footsteps he hath turn'd
 From wandering on a foreign strand?
 If such there breathe, go, mark him well;
 For him no minstrel raptures swell;
 High tho' his titles, proud his name,
 Boundless his wealth as wish can claim,—
 Despite those titles, power and pelf,
 The wretch, concentered all in self,
 Living, shall forfeit fair renown,
 And, doubly dying, shall go down
 To the vile dust, from whence he sprung,
 Unwept, Unhonored, and unsung.”

—*Walter Scott.*

Noted instances of patriotism can be seen in the history of the nations of almost every age of the world. It is, however, better for us to recall those of more recent times, and specially those of our own land; for nowhere do we find a more intelligent and ardent devotion to the then present and to the future weal of one's native land and to the principle of liberty than in the acts individual and collective of the American colonists prior to and during the struggle for independence. Daniel Webster's eloquent words are: “Nowhere can be found higher proofs of a spirit that was ready to hazard all, to pledge all, to sacrifice all, in the cause of the country. Instances were not unfrequent in which small freeholders parted with their last hoof, and the last measure of corn from their granaries, to supply

provision for the troops and hire service for the ranks.

“The voice of Otis and of Adams in Faneuil Hall found its full and true echo in the little councils of the interior towns; and if within the Continental Congress patriotism shows more conspicuously, it did not there exist more truly, nor burn more fervently; it did not render the day more anxious or the night more sleepless; it sent up no more ardent prayer to God for succor, and it put forth in no greater degree the fullness of its effect, and the energy of its whole soul and spirit in the common cause, than it did in the small assemblies of the towns.”

- In the above extract is brought out the important fact that the common people were ready with their offerings on the altar of liberty no less than were their more distinguished compatriots and leaders; the tiller of the soil, no less than the man of wise counsel, brave words and heroic deeds, like James Otis, Samuel and John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry, Lee, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington.

And no less overflowing with pure love of country was the soul of that honest Quaker, Robert Morris, who in time of great need came to his country's aid with “the sinews of war,” in his wealth of gold and of financial ability. The signers of the Declaration of Independence pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor.

Patriotism as a sentiment is inspired by the moral principle of duty to the present and future genera-

tions—hence its ethic character. The patriotic element or character has been denied to brave Leonidas and his band of three hundred Spartans who perished at Thermopylæ, on the ground that they fell in obedience to a sentiment of duty to their laws—to Spartan law—rather than in obedience to a sentiment of patriotism; but this objection is nothing—is short-sighted criticism—for the law was made to voice the sentiment of patriotism. Obedience to the laws was only the immediate ground-principle or corner-stone, of which obedience to the patriotic sentiment was the lower bed-rock.

The Abuse of the Sentiment of Patriotism: “As men, in proportion to their moral advancement, learn to enlarge the circle of their regards; as an exclusive affection for our relatives, our clan, or our country, is a sure mark of an unimproved mind; so is that narrow and unchristian feeling to be condemned which regards with jealousy the progress of foreign nations, and cares for no portion of the human race but that to which itself belongs.

The detestable encouragement so long given to national enmities—the low gratification felt by every people in extolling themselves above their neighbors—should not be forgotten among the causes which have mainly obstructed the improvement of mankind.

Exclusive patriotism should be cast off, together with the exclusive ascendancy of birth, as belonging to the follies and selfishness of our uncultivated nature.”—*Dr. Arnold*.

Friendship is the mutual affection of two souls

that honor, admire, have confidence in and understand each other, so that the one enters into the joys and the sorrows of the other.

True friendship is compatible only with virtue—the love of good qualities. Not every man can be said to have a friend in the proper, the highest and best sense of friendship, and men have friends—held to be such—in various degrees of friendly relations; and so friendship affects not merely the individuals, but society at large.

Among the noted instances of friendship is commonly cited that between Damon and Pythias, David and Jonathan.

In reference to the friendship that existed between Christ and his disciples, the Lord Jesus gives us the best characteristic and definition of friendship, when he says: “Henceforth I call you not servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you.” (John 15: 15.)

* * * * “and many sounds were sweet,
Most ravishing and pleasant to the ear;
But sweeter none than voice of faithful friend,
Sweet always, sweetest heard in loudest storm.
Some I remember and will ne'er forget;
My early friends, friends of my evil day;
Friends in my mirth, friends in my misery too;
Friends given by God in mercy and in love;
My counsellors, my comfortors, and guides.”

—*Pollok.*

The Ethics of Friendship: Duty in friendship is well defined in this given characteristic: “A friend

sticketh closer than a brother." (Proverbs 18: 24.) Be true to your friend in good and in evil report, and give all needed counsel, aid and comfort compatible with the maintenance of a good conscience.

If your friend is fortunate, rejoice with him, without the slightest feeling of envy; if unfortunate, or in the wrong, help him in his difficulty to the extent of your ability—save only a due regard to truth and the right—just as is required of an honest lawyer in behalf of his client.

With those in authority, a false friendship sometimes obtains toward favorites and family relatives. Thus, Queen Elizabeth had her favorites, Essex and Leicester, to the detriment of the public weal.

Washington, in making appointments to offices of public trust, found it necessary—excluding the consideration of family ties—to regard only fitness of character and qualifications for the office, and claims from former merit in the public service.

Honor is defined by Webster thus: "A nice sense of what is right, just and true, with a course of life correspondent thereto."

"Say, what is *honor*? 'Tis the finest sense
Of justice which the human mind can frame
Intent each lurking frailty to disclaim,
And guard the way of life from all offense
Suffered or done." —*Wordsworth*.

"Honor and fame from no condition rise;
Act well your part; there all the honor lies." —*Pope*.

The sentiment of Pope in this couplet, in one view, speaks truly; in another it is incorrect. Admit

that honor is not necessarily affected by condition, yet practically it is. We should by nature have thoughts and feelings just and honorable; but to insure the cultivation, maintenance and habitual presence and use of such feelings, the environment must be favorable; in other words, the element of condition enters.

In the English Parliament the lords act *pro bono publico*, on the honor of gentlemen; with a king, the focal point of honor is in truth and justice; with a soldier, it is in obedience and courage; with the statesman, it is in moral courage—fidelity to one's convictions, while the man of business sees it in honesty and in the prompt discharge of obligations.

Sir Walter Scott, by the reverses of his partners in publishing houses, became responsible for over 100,000 pounds sterling. Of this immense debt he paid 40,000 pounds in two years by means of his literary labors, and all in six years; but the toil and strain cost him his life. This act has wreathed the brow of Sir Walter Scott with greener laurels than all his literary honors.

DIVISION II. DUTY; DUTIES.

39. DUTY THE ELEMENT IN ALL MORAL RELATION.—Duty Defined: Webster defines it thus: "That which a person is bound, by any natural, moral or legal obligation to do, or to refrain from doing; the relation or obliging force of that which is morally right."

Duty Illustrated: The Priest and the Levite, who passed by on the other side, were morally bound to succor the wounded man who on the road to Jericho had fallen among thieves or robbers; but they did not. They possessed neither the native good feelings of humanity, nor a true idea of religion, or of duty to God, though professedly they were religious. It was left to the good Samaritan—good, though ordinarily not on speaking terms with the wounded stranger he had fallen in with by the wayside—to illustrate the true idea of duty in the manifestation of “love for one’s neighbor.”

In behalf of a man by national antipathy and education inimical to himself, he did all acts of kindness necessary to relieve his distress; bound up his wounds, conveyed him to a place of safety; and paid the charges for the care of him until his recovery.

In family, social and neighborly relations, sympathy, love, good will, and kind acts are duties, as well as the works necessary for life and health. That duty is the essential element in these relations is evident enough; and also in other relations—in civil and political affairs, a sense of duty must control all the acts of citizens and officials, else the public weal suffers, at the behest of fancied self-interest, and of party ends.

40. DUTIES TO GOD.—*Obedience*: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; a good understanding have all they that do his commandments.” (Psalm III: 10.)

Prayer: Prayer proceeds from a native desire of the soul for Supreme aid. In times of spiritual and temporal poverty, we call upon God for his favor and blessing. It is the natural outflow of the needy soul, under a great realization of its wants, seeking help from the highest source; and this naturally becomes habitual, as the experiences of the Father's mercies and confidence in him are multiplied and enlarged. Hence the *duty* of prayer.

The Lord Jesus has given us an appropriate form: "Our Father which art in heaven" (Matthew 6: 9-13). He has also emphasized the duty of prayer by his own example—by his frequent, natural and earnest use of this means of communion and communication with the Father. "He went up into a mountain apart to pray." (Matthew 14: 23.) He prayed for his disciples." (John 17.)

Noted Instances of Prayer: Other noted instances are: the prayer of Moses for his people; the prayer of Solomon at the dedication of the temple. Daniel's persistence in his customary prayers three times a day, in face of the decree of King Darius, is a most noted instance of adherence to duty, and of great and good results arising therefrom. (Daniel 6.)

In all ages, the most patriotic, wise, brave and useful men have been men of prayer, and so it always will be.

On the contrary, there are those who inquire: "What is the Almighty that we should serve him, and what profit should we have if we pray unto him?" (Job 21: 15.)

These are they who are lacking in natural sensibilities, and in a good understanding.

Praise: "Let my mouth be filled with thy praise, to give unto them beauty for ashes: the oil of joy for mourning: the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness." (Isaiah 61:3.)

In scripture the duty of praise is everywhere insisted on; he who has no feeling for praise is deficient in the finer sensibilities of our nature.

If a man utter some noble or generous sentiment in accord with human nature, or do some worthy deed, the people praise him: it is natural that they should. Not less so is it, or should it be, when we realize the goodness of the Father.

True worship has been briefly considered under the second commandment. (Section 34.)

When men consider the earth, the heavens, all things therein—the related parts, the harmony—they are convinced that one intelligence made all: that God is One.

The duty of love for God in whom there is constitutionally the true, the right, the good—loving these qualities and hating the contra ones! Without this spiritual view of God it were vain to say that we love God, for if we love him we must love him in his true character, not only as great and good, but as the Lord of all who governs the universe in righteousness.

Our obedience must antedate as well as evidence our love. In obedience fear gives place to love—love is the ultimate and the crowning duty—or rather

it is that state of the soul to which all other duties *done* lead us.

These soul-elements—obedience, fear, reverence, true worship, love—are assisted, purified and intensified by a survey of nature—the heavens, the earth—the sublimest of all phenomena presented to our sense-faculties.

Duties to God, then, as religious and moral, are *first in time and in value*, in the formation of character. And these duties are seen to multiply and to grow broad and deep in proportion as the faculties of the soul are enlarged and cultivated by the study and the appreciation of the natural and the spiritual in God's universe.

To quote a fine passage :

“The reverent mind sees God in all his works. The eternal hills are his strength ; the clouds are his chariot ; the lightnings are his arrows ; the thunder is his voice. . In the impassioned language of sacred poetry, even inanimate nature fears and adores her God.

“He touches the hills and they smoke,
At his going forth, the pillars of heaven
tremble and are astonished.
The deep uttereth his voice
and lifteth up his hands on high.”

Faith is implicit confidence and trust in God—that we should do his will. Scripture examples of faith we have in Abraham, whose faith “ was counted unto him for righteousness:” and in the centurion at Capernaum, of whom Jesus said: “ I have not

found so great faith, no, not in Israel;" also in Hebrews xi are numerous examples, and in many other noted instances, the nature of faith and its excellences are exhibited. This faith is enkindled by hope, is enlightened and enlarged by the reason and intensified by love.

Faith in God arises primarily from a constitutional provision whereby we have confidence in him who has not deceived us. We cannot question the wisdom nor the sincerity of God, and so we intuitively see that he is worthy of faith, and if our will is good we gladly obey him.

To exercise faith in God and to obey him are inseparable acts. If we obey not, we have not faith; if we have not faith, we do not obey.

"Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." (Hebrews 11:1.) That is, we realize that the *visions of hope* have foundations; seen with the eye of faith they become real, and we hope for a happy issue out of all the trials of earth into a joyful state immortal.

Only a living faith¹ arising from the love of divine things can assure us that this is not a vain hope.

Hope is the expectation with varied degrees of confidence of things desired. If these are things heavenly, hope leads to a pure life. "And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as he is pure." (1 John 3:3.)

The Father "hath begotten us again unto a lively hope." (1 Peter 1:3, 4.) The ground of the hope here referred to is "the resurrection of Jesus Christ;"

and the object of the hope is, "an inheritance incorruptible."

In Romans v, the object of hope is "peace with God" and the glory therewith, and the ground of this hope is "justification by faith through our Lord:" also this hope arises from our experience through patience and tribulations.

This hope having origin in the exercises of the soul herein named, including the love of God shed abroad in our hearts, is not a shamefaced hope, but imparts courage and shields us like the armor of an armed man: thus (1 Thessalonians 5:8) "for an helmet, the hope of salvation," and it gives safety as in this other metaphor (Hebrews 6:19), "Which hope we have as an anchor of the soul both sure and steadfast." But "the hypocrite's hope shall perish;" thus it is that both faith and hope are innate states, conditions and faculties of the soul on which, aided by our understanding and the reason, we largely depend in our cognition of the divine attributes.

In its application to men and to worldly affairs, faith has its source more in the *reason*, less in feeling.

"Faith is the inner ear of the Spirit which is open to, catches up and retains the imparted word of a higher revelation. Hope, however, is the eye, whose clear vision discerns even in the remote distance the objects of its profound and ardent longing." (*Schlegel*.)

Hope presupposes the existence of faith and brings us to a thoroughly vivid idea of it—no arbi-

trary and artificial idea, but one real and vital. While faith and hope are primarily of the soul, scripture everywhere recognizes the value of the reason as an element in it.

“Ready always to give a reason of the hope that is in you.” (1 Peter 3:15.) For the matter of the revelation, the object of it, and the philosophy in it, all will accord with man’s nature and with sound reason. But as man’s reason is often at fault logically, and also as in the pursuit of science, we meet with questions the understanding cannot fathom, so it is the part of sound reasoning to expect in true religion to meet with doctrines beyond present comprehension.

The visions, promises and judgments of Isaiah and the other great prophets abound in reasoning; thus in Isaiah 1:18: “Come now and let us reason together, saith the Lord.” “Hast thou not known: hast thou not heard that the everlasting God, the Lord, the creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary? Even the youths shall faint and be weary, but they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength.” (Isaiah 40:28-31.)

The grand thoughts of King David show how largely the intellect contributes to deep spirituality.

“When I survey thy heavens, thy handiwork,
The moon, the stars, thou didst of old ordain,
Man, what is he, that thou for him shouldst care?
The Son of man, that thou shouldst visit him!”

The ethic-character of faith and hope lies in the relation they have to a high plane in morals,

and as being necessary elements in religion, and also in the ordinary transactions and duties of life. Our affections, motives, aspirations and acts are modified—are ennobled or are debased by the quality of our faith and hope.

Duties to man necessarily accompany and run parallel; but are second in time and in eminence.

It is often said that duty done to man is duty to God. True—and it is also true that the man of native kindly disposition—even though not well informed as to his relation and duty to God—will yet love his neighbor; but if his native disposition be selfish, nothing short of a conviction of duty to God will correct it, and yield as fruit, “duty to man.”

Most duties to men are seen from reflection on reciprocal relations, under the impulse of a good will. Time is required for their development and clear cognition. “Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man.” (Ecclesiastes 12:13.)

41. INDIVIDUAL DUTIES.—*Self-preservation* is a natural instinct in animals, man included; but man’s *duty* is to make use of his intelligence.

Health: Without health a man accomplishes little, and he will have little comfort of life. Its preservation, then, is a prime duty. The old saying,

“Early to bed and early to rise,”

is certainly true as to a life of physical toil, in which little can be done without an early start. The lost

hours of the morning cannot be overtaken, and nature has so ordered it that the improvement of these early hours is most conducive to health.

As to whether the like regularity of hours for work and sleep can be maintained in literary and in professional toil is another question. Certainly the environments of professional life do not admit of so even a uniformity in the distribution of time.

Self-examination requires great moral courage. We dislike to enter upon a work likely to involve self-condemnation; we prefer to think well of ourselves. We know that our conduct ought to be such as we can approve, but this can be attained to only by self-examination through the conscience. "Herein do I exercise myself, to have always a conscience void of offence towards God and towards men." (Acts 24: 16.)

It is human to err; it is manly to acknowledge our errors to ourselves and to God; also to men when the nature of the case requires it. "Have courage to review your own conduct; to condemn it where you detect faults; to amend it to the best of your ability; to make good resolutions for future guidance, and to keep them."

The Duty of Labor: There is dignity in labor, when performed with a cheerful mind; and there is *duty* when it is done for our own support, or for that of those dependent on us.

Honest labor, too, promotes health as well as thrift, and is irksome only to those who think more of evanescent pleasures than of solid duty.

Labor was ennobled when the Lord appointed it

for the first man Adam, while he was yet innocent and obedient. "And the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, to dress it, and to keep it." (Genesis 2 : 15.)

The farm and the garden is the field of toil for a large part of mankind—and no more healthful employment can be found. Though the crop be subject to vicissitudes, yet this promise holds good: "While the earth remaineth, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease." (Genesis 8 : 22.)

Labor gives necessary exercise to the several organs of the body, promoting secretions, and the casting off the refuse of material that has been used in the maintenance and growth of the physical organism.

What gives additional value and zest to labor is that law of nature that nothing we need can be produced without it. True, some fruits good for food grow spontaneously, but these are only a small fraction in man's requirements.

The manufacture of suitable clothing and of very many useful articles largely extends the field of labor. Some of these kinds of work are not so promotive of health, and though not to be shunned, they must be supplemented by healthful exercise. As to mental effort, Juvenal points out that for success, "There should be a sound mind in a sound body." This maxim should apply also to the *moral*, for without a sound body, moral courage and power is crippled.

"I cannot too much impress upon your mind that

labor is the condition which God has imposed on us in every station of life—there is nothing worth having that can be had without it, from the bread which the peasant wins with the sweat of his brow, to the sports by which the rich man must get rid of his ennui. The only difference between them is, that the poor man labors to get a dinner to his appetite; the rich man, to get an appetite to his dinner. As for knowledge, it can no more be planted in the human mind without labor than a field of wheat can be produced without the previous use of the plough. There is indeed this great difference, that chance or circumstances may so cause it that another shall reap what the farmer sows; but no man can be deprived, whether by accident or misfortune, of the fruits of his own studies; and the liberal and extended acquisitions of knowledge which he makes are all for his own use. Labor, my dear boy, therefore, and improve the time. In youth our steps are light, and our minds are ductile, and knowledge is easily laid up. But if we neglect our spring, our summer will be useless and contemptible, our harvest will be chaff, and the winter of our old age unrespected and desolate.”—*Walter Scott to his son.*

Work: “There is a perennial nobleness, and even sacredness, in work. Were he never so benighted, forgetful of his high calling, there is always hope in a man that actually and earnestly works; in idleness alone is there perpetual despair. Blessed is he who has found his work; let him ask no other blessedness. He has a work, a life-purpose; he has

found it, and will follow it! How, as a free flowing channel, dug and torn by noble force through the sour mud-swamp of one's existence, like an ever-deepening river there, it runs and flows, draining off the sour festering water gradually from the root of the remotest grass blade, making, instead of pestilential swamp, a green fruitful meadow with its clear flowing stream."—*Carlyle*.

The Ethics of the Vocation: To have a vocation of some sort is held to be necessary. Even princes are taught a trade by which they can earn a livelihood, if need be.

One's vocation is in accord with moral law when that which is produced by the practice of it is for the good of man; and it is contra to moral law when harmful to man's physical or moral constitution. The chief use of tobacco is for chewing and smoking; and of whiskey is for drink. These uses in general are very detrimental. These habits are not only injurious to man, but they are expensive. The manufacture and sale, then, of these articles for the purposes named is labor worse than useless; and to engage in it as a vocation is to follow a calling that tends to degradation of character—to poverty and crime. It would be a vocation destitute of ethic character.

So whatever we do, the morality of it must be measured by its tendency to promote good or evil; and the moral character of the individual doer—whether capitalist or laborer—is measured by the extent of knowledge he has, or ought to have, of the effect he is producing as good or bad.

It becomes, then, the duty of each and all, well to consider the tendency, the moral tendency, of his vocation.

The Ethics of Habit: Were we perfect in morality, we should not need to look to habit as an auxiliary to virtue; but since the most sure-footed are liable to stumble, we need to cultivate a sure habit of erect carriage and firmness in our walk; namely, we need to be habitually on our guard against the seductive influences of vice, and thus we shall with ease resist temptation, because we have accustomed ourselves to do it. It has become a habit with us—a second nature—for us to say no, no, no to the overtures of the tempter.

There is no moral virtue in the habit itself; the moral virtue is in the man who has acquired the habit. The ethic-character, then, in our habits is in the formation and application of good habits as aids to virtue. If we neglect this watchfulness over our walk and conversation, we shall fall into and become accustomed to bad habits. Pope forcibly expresses it thus:

“Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;
Yet, seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.”

—*Essay on Man.*

“Crimes lead to crimes, and link so straight,
What first was *accident*, at last is *fate*,
The unhappy servant sinks into a slave,
And virtue's last sad strugglings cannot save.”

—*Mallet.*

“Watch ye, and pray, lest ye enter into temptation.” (Mark 14 : 38.)

Temperance : “How blest the sparing meal and temperate bowl!” The advantage of temperance as a means of health is that everyone, the poor as well as the rich, can practice it at all times and in all places. It does not oblige us to spend time and money at Saratoga, the Hot Springs, Newport, and other resorts of health and pleasure seekers.

If labor gives necessary exercise to the bodily organs, and tends to cast out the refuse of material used in their growth, temperance tends to a minimum in the accumulation of what nature rejects, and so does not overtax her powers.

Exercise promotes circulation, but temperance gives free course to it, and thus there is force and vigor in it.

Every kind of animal save man is limited by its own nature in its range of food, and so is not liable to suffer from a surfeit; but man's constitution is adapted to very many kinds of food—to fish, flesh and the fruits of the earth; hence he has need to use discretion—to restrain his appetite, and to exercise the virtue of temperance in the use of food as to quality and quantity.

Temperance in eating and drinking and in everything promotes longevity. The intemperate are sure to shorten their days; temperance also promotes thrift, and adds value to every material kind of prosperity. But these are not the only or the chief advantages of temperance.

It affects the moral and religious interests of man;

is a *sine qua non* in the attainment of a character acceptable to the Lord of all. Paul preached temperance as one of the cardinal doctrines. "And as he reasoned of righteousness, *temperance*, and judgment to come, Felix trembled. (Acts 24 : 25.)

The Temper: The ethic-character as regards the temper is in its government from a sense of duty; while a bad temper is a source of unhappiness to the person who has it, it is also a source of great annoyance to all who come in contact with its unfortunate and culpable possessor.

Duty, then, to those related to us—husband or wife, father, mother, child, friend, neighbor—all, requires that if we have the besetting sin of a fault-finding, hasty, peevish or ill-governed temper, we should at once set about to rectify and govern it.

Religion: Man is by nature religious, and is at times sensible that he is subject to and should be in accord with some supreme power known or unknown.

Seeing that he is the possessor of a religious nature, there arises then the question of *duty*: What shall be done with this possession? As the owner of houses, he feels bound to keep them in repair, and to collect the rents—of lands; to cultivate them as best he can, to secure abundant harvests; and, in general, as a business man, to make wise arrangements—to foot up figures correctly, and balance his books. So also he readily sees the need and use of intellectual and moral cultivation for the attainment of a happy life.

But if by nature religious, ought he not to apply

his trained rational and moral nature to the discovery of true religion, so that the entire man—the religious nature as well as the physical, intellectual and moral—shall be duly cultivated and developed?

There can be no question as to this obligation and duty when stated as an abstract proposition. The questioning arises when the method of discovery is considered. But the method, whether short or long, involves necessary and universal principles.

Time—the Ethics of Its Use: There are two views of the use of time, each having its own ethic-character. One relates to *diligence* in its use, the other to the *quality* of our employments. "Seize upon the present moment; trust little to the morrow," is the injunction of Horace, while the "Course of Time" reads:

"Be wise today, 'tis madness to defer:
Next day the fatal precedent will plead;
Thus on, till wisdom is pushed out of life.
Procrastination is the thief of time."

"We all of us complain of the shortness of time," saith Seneca, and yet have much more than we know what to do with. "Our lives," says he, "are spent either in doing nothing at all, or in doing nothing to the purpose, or in doing nothing that we ought to do. We are always complaining our days are few, and acting as though there would be no end of them. Though we seemed grieved at the shortness of life in general, we are wishing every period of it at an end. The minor longs to be at age, then to be a man of business, then to make up an estate, then to

arrive at honors, then to retire. Thus, although the whole life is allowed by everyone to be short, the several divisions of it appear long and tedious.

The Remedy: "The social virtues may give employment to the most industrious temper, and find a man in business more than the most active station in life.

To advise the ignorant, relieve the needy, comfort the afflicted, are duties that fall in our way almost every day of our lives. The *remedy* has reference to *quality*.

The Ethics of Observation: Our duty is to observe those passing events as well as to study those great events that will serve to enlarge our experience in regard to what will be useful to ourselves and others.

This forbids wasting time upon the observation of things unimportant or frivolous; not that all in every station in life are bound to give particular attention to the same things. The range of observation must be measured in part by the work we have marked out for ourselves, our calling, our employment in life.

To the prince proud of his success as a charioteer, and looking for praise: "Expect no praise from me," his sire replied; "the skill that guides the chariot-wheel back in its own self-same track—that skill, if well applied, would rule a State."

The events of the times and the signs of the times should be noticed, that we may be prepared to act intelligently when the time for action occurs.

The Ethics of Taste and Culture: While the study of the fine arts — music, painting, sculpture and poetry — has a humanizing effect and is an important element in man's moral and religious education, one feature of its ethic-character is in the fact that a relish for the study of the fine arts and polite literature is a source of innocent amusement, unbends the mind wearied in the ordinary pursuits of life and professional toil, and counteracts all tendency to coarse and vulgar pleasures.

The many advantages to be derived from cultivation of taste are admirably exhibited by Dr. Hugh Blair in his Lectures on Rhetoric:

Decision of Character: This means a readiness in determining what we will do. Decision and indecision depend upon the energy of the will, and that largely upon the influences brought to bear upon it.

Napoleon I was of quick perception and judgment. This, in conjunction with a willing mind to act in accord therewith, produced instant and habitual decision, decision of character. This he manifested at the beginning of his career, thus: "October 4, 1795, he received the command of the garrison of Paris, and the next day he cleared the streets with grape-shot; pursued the rioters into their hiding places; disbanded the national guard; disarmed the populace, and ended the French Revolution."

The same decision marked his victorious career. His power of combination won the battle before it was fought.

George Washington was not so quick in judgment; but his judgments were in a much higher de-

gree modified and fortified by moral considerations; hence the end of his career was in accord with that of a true man; and will forever shine with a halo of light, while Napoleon's star went down in darkness at midday.

A high moral element must be conjoined to quick intellectual faculties to secure a decision of character fruitful in good works. Great men have not a monopoly of these qualities; they often adorn men and women in the humbler walks of life, and it is the duty of everyone to attain, so far as is practicable, to this valuable kind of decision by cultivating his judgment-faculties and moral perceptions. Decision of character distinguishes any young man who is able to deny all allurements to intemperance or to any other vice.

Discipline: What we do should be well done. This is a primal maxim in mental and also in military discipline. Napoleon I was exacting in military drill and reviews. Not anything unsoldierlike escaped his eye, even to a missing button on a man's coat.

In every department of duty a habit of slovenly work is to be deprecated. It will follow us through life, and in a measure defeat the ends of it.

To do good work we need do one thing at a time, so as to have the mind on it till it is done; otherwise time is lost in passing from one thing to another, and your work will go back on you; for you cannot at once again enter upon it, under the favoring circumstances you left it in.

There are, of course, exceptions to this general

rule ; yet there needs to be a plan of work and duty for efficiency in execution. "Make hay while the sun shines" is an old and wise maxim. We must be on the lookout for the right opportunity to accomplish a desired result.

Hence attention to passing events is necessary to success.

" There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune."

We may be sure that in so far as we fail to discipline ourselves by our wits, we shall be disciplined by misfortune, suffering and punishment.

42. PARENTAL DUTIES.—Parental authority is founded in the loving relation of the father and mother to the child, as the authors of its being—hence cannot in all respects be defined by any certain rule or law. Affection under the guide of care and wisdom makes the rule.

The old Roman law gave to the father the power of life and death over his child ; but there is no law in nature for this unwarranted exercise of power. The function of civil law is rather to limit the abuse of parental authority and government ; for the parent himself, if ill-bred and not under self-restraint, may exceed his right. It is evident he has no right to require his child to do anything morally wrong, nor to constrain its conscience, though the conscience may be instructed.

In general, the parent should exercise a firm rule ; not necessarily a harsh one. A kind manner

makes home for the child pleasant ; and this is a great restraint against the allurements of bad companions on the street. But when loving words and deeds fail, severity must be used—even the rod of correction.

Children, too, have rights as well as parents—the right to credit for truth till forfeited by habitual falsehood. By doubting words and looks, the truthful child may be taught deception. *Patience* is a needful duty hard to exercise about the little trials of the tired and cross child, when the parent also is weary from the real duties of the day ; but patience then may become a virtue.

Scripture best sums up the duties of parent and child: “Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right. And ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath ; but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.” (Ephesians 6: 1.)

A very important parental duty is in guarding the youth against the corrupting influences of bad companions, immoral literature and pictures. The evil ways of bad boys are numerous, and for many a youth the descent into them is easy. There are honorable exceptions ; boys and young men to whom vice is so repulsive that they cannot be induced to follow in her train. But this scripture is true : “ Evil communications corrupt good manners.” And it is also true that when evil thoughts and speech and bad habits have once obtained a foothold, it is not easy to obtain the mastery over them.

A ready perception of right and wrong, and a prompt determination to the right, will not be found

in the youth who allows his conscience to be blunted by evil communications. The avenues of evil must be closed.

Juvenal, a Pagan moralist, gives this advice :

“ Nil dictu foedum visuque hæc limina tangat
Intra quæ puer est.” *Sat. XIV, 44.*

Let nothing shameful to tell and to be seen,
Enter those doors within which a child dwells.

43. SOCIAL DUTIES.—General View: Social duties arise from the relation of man to man and the varied conditions and circumstances under which men live.

In some respects, there is an equality of condition: in the great fundamental principles of right and justice, all stand on an equal footing. “The rich and poor meet together: the Lord is the maker of them all.” (Proverbs 22 : 2.) There is an equality of rights; and there is due a reciprocity of duties; but in the accidental conditions of life there is diversity and contrast,—there is the wise and there is the simple; the learned and the ignorant; the rich and the poor; the strong and the weak; the moral and the immoral.

These diversities in gifts and character are partly from causes too recondite to be seen and known; in part, from what we call the accidents of birth and of life; and in large part they result from the use the individual makes of the faculties and means bestowed upon him by nature.

Whatever the causes, the facts exist, and need

careful consideration ; hence the wide scope there is for the exercise of the better feelings of humanity in social duties.

Friendships, love and care in home relations, in business and civic matters—the affections for these obligations—we have by nature. They are natural affections and are moral in an elementary sense. There is no virtue in conformity to them. There is a great lack of virtue in the neglect of them. Virtue can arise only when the exercise of the natural affections is accompanied with sacrifice or personal danger, as in warding off harm from the defenseless.

Philanthropy, Benevolence: Love to man and good-will are natural affections of the soul ; and if these good qualities have been more or less supplanted by contra dispositions, namely, by misanthropy and malevolence, it is due to sin and transgression, and argues an abnormal state of the soul.

“We are all by nature brethren, placed in the same or in similar circumstances, subject to the same wants and infirmities, endowed with the same faculties, and equally dependent on the great Author of our being ; we cannot be happy but in the society of one another, and from one another we daily receive, or may receive, important services. These considerations recommend the great duty of universal benevolence, which is not more beneficial to others than to ourselves ; for it makes us happy in our own minds, and amiable in the minds of all who know us.”—*Beattie, in Moral Science.*

“And now, Philanthropy! thy rays divine
Dart round the globe, from Zembla to the Line;
O'er each dark prison plays the cheering light
Like Northern lustres o'er the vault of night.
From realm to realm, with cross or crescent crown'd,
Where'er Mankind and Misery are found,
O'er burning sands, deep waves, or wilds of snow,
Thy Howard, journeying, seeks the house of woe.
He treads, inemulous of fame or wealth,
Profuse of toil, and prodigal of health.
Leads stern-eyed Justice to the dark domains,
If not to sever, to relax the chains;—— ——
Gives to her babes the self-devoted wife,
To her fond husband liberty and life.”

—*Thos. Brown.*

Hospitality: Webster defines it, “The reception and entertainment of strangers or guests without reward, or with kind and generous liberality.”

This virtue, sentiment and idea of duty is native to the heart of humanity, and among all people is very generally honored. Exceptions there have been and are, and the frown of disapproval marks the general rule and law.

Atrocious instances have met with severe rebuke and punishment. The refusal of the tribe of Benjamin to deliver up to merited punishment those vile and wicked men who disgraced all Israel by a flagrant violation of the rights and duties of hospitality resulted in forty thousand slain of their men of war—all the tribe but six hundred—a remnant spared that the tribe might not be extinguished.

Among many noteworthy instances of hospitality is that of the poor negro woman, in the heart of Africa, towards that celebrated explorer Mungo Park.

We have a striking instance of the fitness and beauty of the sentiment and duty of hospitality in Queen Dido's word of welcome to Æneas, when, after the Trojan disaster and a tempestuous voyage, he, with his followers, landed upon her shores; thus:

"Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco." Lib. 1, line 630.
Not ignorant of misfortune I learn to succour the unhappy.

And another instance in the friendly greeting "What cheer?" with which Narragansett Indians hailed Roger Williams, as his canoe approached in search of a settlement which he made, and called Providence. "Love ye the stranger; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." (Deuteronomy 10:19.)

44. THE ETHICS OF AMUSEMENT.—That we are constituted for a certain degree of light enjoyment is evident from the fondness of children for play and of youth for sports and games of various kinds. Little boys love to contest with each other in running a race. They delight in flying a kite, especially when grandpa helps them; and the larger ones delight in the bat and ball; and the girls with the boys, great and small, love the croquet ground, lawn-tennis, rowing and skating. These games are exhilarating, healthy, and quicken and invigorate the powers of body, soul and spirit. Yet valuable amusements can be degraded, and are when they are indulged in to excess.

In games there is a desire to excel. This is natural and harmless and gives a zest to the amuse-

ment, when this is a simple desire for the supremacy unaccompanied with thoughts or feelings of triumph over the defeat of contending playmates; but the moment there enters into the soul a pleasure or satisfaction from the chagrin of another, or the moment that the desire of supremacy is carried to the degree of a feeling of triumph on the one side, and of pain on the other side from defeat, then the good morals of the amusement have departed, and there enters a vicious tendency. Amusements, to be moral, must be for the sake of the amusement, and the resulting good. When evil results, then they become immoral. Amusements in themselves innocent when engaged in with moderation, in a temperate manner, may become evil from too long continuance, excess of zeal, or from being conjoined with bad habits, as the use of slang words, coarse jests, or vulgar remarks—even to profane language; and from indulgence in cheat, fraud, white-lies—all which tend to accustom one to bad habits.

There is, too, another point of view that shows an ethic-character. Some persons may engage in amusements who have no difficulty in submitting themselves to the proper restraints of reason and a good conscience, and so to them the amusement is harmless; but more persons have not this self-control, and with them amusement degenerates into vice. Now, what is duty? Doubtless it is the duty of the self-poised, those who can amuse themselves innocently, to forego certain amusements provided thereby they can help their weaker friend or neighbor to recover from a bad habit.

Benevolence and good-will require self-sacrifice. There is the duty of self-denial even as to things harmless. My neighbor has not the decision and self-control necessary to temperance in certain amusements. He must then abstain entirely, and it is my duty to encourage and help him by my own entire abstinence.

This is an ethic aspect in application to *my* use or disuse of certain amusements—precisely the principle and ethic character that applies to temperance in drink. One man knows how to drink pure wine temperately and with useful effect; another and the major part do not. These run into excess, and so the good becomes bad. This is the ethic principle in temperance societies. It is not that there is no good in any of the beverages, but it is that as this good is not essential to my life and well-being, I will forego it, to promote the good of my neighbor. The ethic character is in this limitation.

The *conclusion* must be that amusements may properly be indulged in, so far as they are consistent with the duties of life, are subordinate to the higher principles of life, and that it is the duty of each one to carefully study his duty in this comparative view of it.

DIVISION III. POLITICAL ETHICS.

45. GENERAL VIEW; SPECIAL APPLICATION.—Political ethics have for their subject moral considerations in the conduct of the municipal, state and national affairs of the people, and in general

how the ends of justice as to all the natural rights of the people are to be attained, in the enactment and administration of law. In this view, if it be granted, that an individual has obtained rightful ownership to certain lands or other property, it is a question of political ethics, under what limitations, if any, he should enjoy this right; for instance, to cite Dr. Lieber's examples: "Whether, under certain given circumstances, this general right of property is best secured by unlimited possession or by revertible titles, as was the case in the Mosaic law; whether the general principle demands, under the given circumstances, that the accumulation of property as well as its division should be unlimited; or whether it is wise to prevent division below a certain standard, as is the case in Sweden and some other countries; or prevent accumulation beyond a certain limit, as Solon prescribed. The whole great question of constitutions with respect to everything that is not strictly a principle of natural law—*e. g.*, protection of personal liberty, of freedom from molestation as long as no wrong is done, of a degree of protection extended even to the evildoer, and while we bring him to punishment—belongs to *political ethics*."

Other questions belonging to this subject are—how long ought a senator or a peer to hold office? For six years, as in the United States; for life, as it was in France; or for a hereditary period, as in England; and what the qualifications for the office; and is it ethical, in order to hold on to an order of succession in monarchical governments, to have the throne occupied by a female monarch?

The moral considerations involved in these and like questions are recondite and beyond the limit of this inquiry.

General ethic laws and considerations must guide in the solution of them ; but they cannot be specifically determined except in the light of facts and experience.

Political ethics is applicable to international law, an extensive subject in itself. All that can here be said of it is that international friendships and goodwill are best secured and cemented by a mutual interchange of good offices, in all sincerity and honesty, with a keen perception of what is right and just.

For the attainment of these ends the statesman must be "wise as the serpent, harmless as the dove."

The following extract from Mrs. Barbauld exhibits the ground-principle in political ethics: "We act as a nation, when through the organ of the legislative power which speaks the will of the nation, and by means of the executive power which does the will of the nation, we enact laws, form alliances, make war or peace, dispose of the public money, or do any of those things which belong to us in our collective capacity ; and we are called upon to repent of national sins because we can help them, and because we ought to help them. We are not to imagine we can make government the scapegoat to answer for our follies and our crimes. The blame rests where the power ultimately rests. It were trifling with our consciences to endeavor to separate

the acts of governors sanctioned by the nation from the acts of the nation; for in every transaction the principal is answerable for the conduct of the agents he employs. If the maxim that "the king can do no wrong" throws upon ministers the responsibility because without ministers no wrong can be done, the same reason throws it from them upon the people, without whom ministers could do no wrong.

"The vices of nations may be divided into those which relate to their own internal proceedings and to their relations with other states. With regard to the first, the causes for humiliation are various. Many nations are guilty of the crime of permitting oppressive laws and bad governments to remain among them, by which the poor are crushed, and the lives of the innocent are laid at the mercy of wicked and arbitrary men. This is a national sin of the deepest dye, as it involves in it most others. It is painful to reflect how many atrocious governments there are in the world, and how little even they who enjoy good ones seem to understand their true nature. We are apt to speak of the happiness of living under a mild government as if it were like the happiness of living under an indulgent climate; and when we thank God for it we rank it with the blessings of the air and the soil; whereas we ought to ask God for wisdom and virtue to live under a good government, for a good government is the first of *national duties*. It is indeed a happiness, and one which demands our most grateful thanks, to be born under one which spares us the

trouble and hazard of changing it; but a people born under a good government will probably not die under one, if they conceive of it as an indolent and passive happiness, to be left for its preservation to fortunate conjectures, and the floating and variable chances of incalculable events. Our second duty is to keep it good."

46. LIBERTY; ITS SUBSTANCE.—The substance of liberty or freedom consists in the guarantees which the individual has from the invasion of his rights by a stronger party, whether this party be an individual, the public at large, or the government.

The same truth applies to a nation; hence we speak of national liberty, or independence from foreign interference. Our fathers suffered, fought and bled for this, in the time of the American Revolution, the memorable seven years' struggle in 1776-83.

The following extracts from a distinguished writer bear on this subject: "It is impossible to imagine liberty in its fullness, if the people as a totality, the country, the nation, whatever name may be preferred, or its government, is not independent of foreign interference. The country must have what the Greeks called *autonomy*. This implies that the country must have the right, and of course the power, of establishing that government which it considers best, unexposed to interference from without or pressure from above. No foreigner must dictate: No extra-governmental principle, no divine right, or 'principle of legitimacy' must act in the foundation of the government; no claim superior to

that of the people, that is, superior to national sovereignty, must be allowed. This independence or national self-government further implies that, the civil government of free choice or free acquiescence being established, no influence from without besides that of freely acknowledged justice, fairness and morality must be admitted. There must then be the requisite strength to resist when necessary.

The history of the nineteenth century, but especially that of our own age, is full of instances of interference with the autonomy of nations or states. Italy, Germany, especially Hussia, Spain, Hungary, furnish numerous instances. Cases may occur, indeed, in which foreign interference becomes imperative.

All we can then say is, that the people's liberty, so far, is gone, and must be recovered. No one will maintain that interference with Turkish affairs at the present time is wrong, in those powers who resist Russian influence in that quarter, but no one will say either that Turkey enjoys full autonomy. The very existence of Turkey depends upon foreign sufferance.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that this unstinted autonomy is greatly endangered at home, by interfering with the domestic affairs of foreigners.

"The opinion, therefore, urged by Washington, that we should keep ourselves aloof from foreign politics, is of far greater weight than those believe who take it merely with reference to foreign alliances and ensuing wars."—*Lieber's Civil Liberty*.

Lieber finds that the guaranties of liberty are in institutions; hence that liberty secured to man is "institutional liberty."

Institutions, natural, social and political, the family, the Sabbath, public-school education, Magna Charta, the judiciary and many others, are doubtless all in their several spheres promotive of liberty. But the very substratum, substance, essence of liberty is alone in the inward man; in the law of his soul; in a disposition to a ready obedience to the moral law, as summed up in the two great commandments. Liberty, its substance, its essence, is in the *character of the man*, in his habitual subjection to the limitations imposed by the Creator.

Magna Charta, "The Great Charter" of liberties, originally granted by King John (A. D. 1215) to the clergy, barons and freemen of England, and confirmed by the subsequent rulers, is justly regarded as the most important part of the British constitution. In the articles relating to taxation is to be found the constitutional principle that no tax shall be levied except by consent of the people taxed, which consent may be expressed by their representatives.

The violation of this principle was one of the items of complaint in our Declaration of Independence, 1776. "The Magna Charta was a writing declaring the people of England exempted from certain oppressions, and entitled to certain privileges, and it contained sixty-three different clauses—only the most vexatious tyranny which kings could exercise over the people could make such clauses

necessary. These for instance: that the goods of every free man shall be disposed of, after his death, according to his will; that if he die without making a will, his children shall succeed to his property; that no officer of the crown shall take horses, carts or wood, without the consent of the owner.

Articles 39 and 40, in Lord Chatham's judgment, and by general consent, are the most important ones, as securing all civil rights belonging to freemen, thus: "Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur. . . ." "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed, nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man justice or right."

47. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.—Religious liberty is freedom to worship according to one's conscience, provided this conscience does not offend against moral principle and right.

In the United States, the government has nothing to do with the maintenance of religion by pecuniary or material aid. This nonrelation between government and religion is commonly called the "Separation of Church and State." This separation is entirely on material or concrete grounds. On moral and on vital grounds there must always be a close relation between the church and the state.

The church as an organization could not securely

exist without the protection of the state, for it would be exposed to the violence of men who know not the fear nor the love of God; and the state, should it neglect its duty to protect its citizens in freedom of worship, would drive pure religion as well as liberty from its borders, and the government would soon degenerate into a misrule of ignorance, bigotry and anarchy, without the semblance of liberty. History proves this; but without the facts of history, the proposition is logical and is necessarily true; because the perfection of religion, its highest idea, is in the freedom of the soul from the rule of wrong desires, and in its ready obedience to the law of right. Thus, the true religious citizen is the ideal freeman, and a true religion tends to liberty. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." (2 Corinthians 3: 17.) "But whoso looketh into the perfect law of liberty, and continueth therein, he being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man shall be blessed in his deed." (James 1: 25.) "So speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty." (James 2: 12.)

These scripture citations show that there is a law of liberty, not a law that restrains liberty, but a law that gives rise to liberty and warrants us in the use and enjoyment of it. -

The law of liberty is in an inward state or law of the soul, wherein is the Spirit of the Lord that manifests itself in a doing of the word, and in good deeds.

The law of liberty as here cited is indeed the law

prescribed for the religious man. It is nevertheless a law entirely in accord with nature as well as with logic and philosophy; and the essential element of liberty is precisely the same in its application to the moral man in all his relations in life, social, civil and institutional. Liberty is not an absolute state of independence that a man has an absolute right to. It is conditioned, and conditioned on a certain law of liberty, that must first exist in the man's soul, and manifest itself by his deeds; and if there be not this evidence of liberty, and of an existing law of liberty, within the man, and of its development into a fitness for the enjoyment of liberty; then that man has no claim to take part or to act in determining the institutions and the limitations of liberty.

48. PERSONAL LIBERTY.—Personal liberty means that a man has a right to the use of his powers and faculties, physical, intellectual, moral and religious, as he pleases, provided that in the use of them he does not stand in the way of the rights of his fellow men.

To illustrate what is personal liberty by examples of what is not; this proviso forbids:

(1) Throwing stones, firing off pistols, exploding India-crackers on the street or frequented highway, or in public or private grounds, and all acts of this kind, even though at the moment you may see no one in range.

(2) It forbids corrupting the young and the ignorant by immoral speech and the circulation of a literature advocating doctrines and practices contrary

to sound morals and to law based upon constitutional morality.

This rule of liberty is entirely compatible with a freedom of speech, and of the press, that does not run into a licentiousness of liberty, which ought never to be tolerated.

(3) It forbids idleness or the disuse of our faculties, since the proper use of them is an important factor in the well-being of the community, which protects the individual in his rights; hence, when a man is habitually idle, and without visible means of support, he is a vagrant and is properly sent to the workhouse, for "Idleness is the mother of vice."

49. RIGHTS: GENERAL VIEW.—The *right* is a moral idea arising from man's moral nature which distinguishes between the right and the wrong.

The lower animals, having no moral nature, have no idea of right or of wrong; but that this idea is universal with mankind is evident from the fact that all men, who for any reason have regard to the respect and good-will of men, predicate their acts—those that affect their fellow-men—on some ground of right.

A stakes out a piece of land in some new territory and claims it, on the ground of a squatter's right, the right of first occupation; but B, as the agent of a railroad corporation, claims the same land in virtue of a prior right through an alleged government grant.

Here are conflicting claims, both set up on the ground and under the idea of a right. A and B both say that they want only what is right. They would not dare to say that they want what is wrong—even

though they might be bad enough in disposition to say it, for a declaration of this sort would at once condemn them and their cause.

So, too, when one nation declares war against another, it is ostensibly on the ground of right. A government and people persuade themselves, and would persuade all men, the world over, that their rights have been violated and must be vindicated. In the American Revolution, England held that she had a right to tax America. On the other hand, America held that taxation without representation was not right. In the recent German-Samoan scrimmage, made famous by subsequent disaster, each party held that it fired on the other in self-defence.

Thus it appears that the question, What is right? is often a question that requires, for its correct solution, an accurate knowledge of the facts involved, and a sound judgment and unprejudiced feelings in the consideration of them.

Hence the need and the function of the judiciary.

These considerations and instances prove that *right*, as a moral idea, is implanted in the soul of man. It is the idea of adherence to what is true, just and conformable to facts. A *right* is something properly claimed or possessed, and is in accord with the laws of man's nature, physical, moral.

Thus any man has a right to the air he breathes, to water and fish from the river or ocean; in general, he has a right to the products of his toil.

A right is the substance of what is, or is possessed by right. Natural rights, then, are the rights a man

has in virtue of the endowments of his nature in its best estate.

Rights and duties are correlative and reciprocal. They are correlative when it is a duty to maintain a right ; reciprocal, when duty results from another's right.

The right deals with the abstract ; there is no question about its existence ; all men are conscious of it.

A right deals with the concrete, and it is often difficult to determine what it is. Some rights called "natural rights" are intuitively seen ; as a man's right, under proper limitations, to air, fire, water, life and liberty. Other rights require wisdom, judgment and experience for their proper determination. Of these are social rights, civil rights, property rights.

A right is quite different from a duty.

A right is something possessed or claimed by me ; or else conceded or granted to another. A duty is nothing possessed or claimed, but is something that ought to be done.

Duty, then, has the pre-eminence. In ethic relation the first inquiry is about duty—What ought I to do ? The second inquiry is about rights that arise in view of duty.

Mutual obligation arises when each man is, by natural law, possessed of like rights with his neighbor.

50. PROPERTY RIGHTS: GENERAL VIEW.—We have seen that every man has a natural right to air, water, fire, the sunlight and heat, in common with

all men so far as bounteous nature affords enough of these necessary elements of existence, as she generally does.

But in some situations even water and fuel fail, and so far as this failure results from lack of foresight or from improvidence, the short-sighted and improvident have not the same rights as those who have exercised care and diligence. There were five wise maidens who put oil into their lamps, and five foolish ones, who failed to provide oil.

Besides air, water, sunlight, there are other things, the right to which must be acquired by some degree of exertion. If you would have a fish, you must catch it; a fire, you must make it, and must see to it that it does no harm, for fire, though a good servant, is a bad master; if a berry, you must pick it; a tree, you must plant it, unless you find one already planted and not claimed.

These things, and numerous others, as well as land for cultivation, become our property by acquisition and occupation, when not already occupied by the prior right of some other person.

In whatever way a man has acquired property, whether by priority of possession, by labor, by gift, by inheritance, he has a right to it. If property has been wrested from another contrary to law, moral or civil, the injured person may recover his rights by the use of such means as civil law and social institutions provide. If there are no remedial laws or institutions, then he should cheerfully abandon his rights, or else rely on his own individual power of redress in the use of means within the restrictions of

man's moral nature; but when property has been obtained by force or by fraud, if there be no rightful individual claimant, the property should revert to the state for the public benefit.

51. ORIGIN OF RIGHT TO PROPERTY.—This is found in the Divine grant given in Genesis 1: 28, 29, “And God said, Replenish the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.

“And God said, “Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed: to you it shall be for meat.”

“And the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, to dress it and to keep it.” (Genesis 2: 15.)

The original title to property comes, then, from the Creator; and according to the terms of it, it consists in personals or movables, such as fish, fowl, herbs bearing seed, and fruit trees, and so much of soil as a man can dress and keep.

These are the general terms or outline of title. Particular instances of title must be determined or decided by the nature or constitution of man; and this determination or decision will be correct just in proportion as the true constitution of man is known and acted upon.

We see that the constitution of man tends to patriarchal relations and government, to tribal relations and government, to national relations and gov-

ernment; and property rights follow these relations and are modified by them. The patriarch Abraham lived a pastoral life—had no landed property, only the *use* of such as he occupied from time to time for temporary residence and the feeding of his flocks and herds.

When his loved wife Sarah died, Abraham desired to possess for a burial-place a field belonging to Ephron, the Hittite, and for four hundred shekels of silver he bought the field, and the cave therein; and all the trees that were in the field were made sure unto Abraham for a possession, in the presence of the children of Heth, before all that went in at the gate of his city. "And the field and the cave that is therein were made sure unto Abraham, for a possession of a burying-place, by the sons of Heth." (Genesis 23 : 20.)

This is the first recorded instance of the purchase of land for a sum of money. The purchase was made by a man accustomed to a wandering life, of an individual belonging to a people of fixed habitations. The people or children of Heth doubtless had by possession and improvement such title to the land where they lived as qualified them to sell parcels of it for money. This is the right a people or nation has to the land they have taken possession of and occupy. It is a permanent right. The land at first belongs to the people collectively—none to individuals; but the collective body of the people, under the form and institution of civil government, for a valuable consideration, gives title to individuals to certain parcels of land; and thus the individual,

the private party, by doing something, or by paying something, for the benefit of the whole people, becomes the owner of a certain tract or certain parcel of land. Also Virgil gives us a brief account of Queen Dido's purchase from the Libyans of the site of Carthage—originally a hide of land—namely, as much land as could be enclosed by a bull's hide.

The received explanation as to this measurement of land is that the hide was cut into narrow strips.

“Mercatique solum, facti de nomine Byrsam,
Taurino quantum possent circumdare tergo.”

—*Æneid*, Bk. I, 367-8.

And they bought ground, from the name of the act, Byrsa,
As much as they were able to encompass with a bullock's hide.

This land-sale occurred six hundred to eight hundred years after the land-purchase by Abraham.

52. LAND-TITLE IN THE UNITED STATES.—The first emigrants from Europe who settled upon the Atlantic coast of North America, bought from time to time of the native Americans, the Indians, their right and title to tracts of country more or less extensive. This Indian right could not be very valuable, as, for the most part, it was only the right of savage men, who lived by hunting and fishing, save some little cultivation of Indian corn, hence the purchase-money or other consideration was small.

The Colonial, the State, and the United States Governments that were successively formed or organized by the immigrant colonists and their descendants thus owned in trust for the entire people

all the lands so purchased of the Indians, and have good right to sell and dispose of them according to the will of the people, as expressed in laws enacted by representatives; namely, men elected by the people to meet in general assembly or congress, to make laws for the government of the people, and for the disposition of public affairs.

Accordingly, by act of Congress, the public lands have been surveyed into townships six miles square, containing thirty-six sections, each a mile square, and each section being subdivided into quarter-sections of one hundred and sixty acres each; and these subdivisions of land have been disposed of in various ways, under sundry legislative acts. Some of the lands have been set apart and given by the United States to the separate States, as a foundation fund for university and public school education, or for educational institutions of a public character. Many alternate sections on the lines of projected railroads have been conditionally granted in aid of railroad building, for the purpose of opening up to settlement a route or locality otherwise almost inaccessible.

Many quarter-sections have been bestowed upon soldiers—one hundred and sixty acres to each soldier—as a bounty for service in the wars of the United States. Many lands have been sold at public sale by auction to the highest bidder, and after a public sale the lands which were not bid off have been on sale, or private entry, at the United States land offices, to anyone who wished to buy at the minimum price, one dollar and twenty-five cents to two dollars

and fifty cents an acre. And also many tracts of land—quarter-sections—for a small consideration—about fifteen dollars—have been sold to the first settler thereon, to encourage settlement as well as to assist the citizen of small means to the possession of a home and homestead and its improvement and culture.

These several ways of disposing of and giving title to the government lands are legitimate; and hence the title the individual obtains is perfect and absolute.

Yet there is danger of unwise, indiscreet legislation and abuse of public trust; and the public lands, in some cases, have been disposed of without due consideration.

There are, however, yet left extensive tracts, and it behooves the present and the rising generation to look sharply to legislative acts relating to them. The United States government does very properly reserve mineral lands, and sells timber lands at a higher valuation than farm lands.

The main object of this sketch of land-tenure in the United States is to show the legitimacy and certainty of title to every man who has come to be a land-owner—to hold a possession founded in man's social, civil and political institutions in accord with human nature—a *title* irreversible except by social and national disintegration, and a backward stride into barbarism. A *possession*, for which he has in some form given "value received," most commonly, has paid money; and money—silver and gold—has cost labor. Thus it is that man's toil and labor

enter into every kind of property, and *stamp* it as *a man's own*.

Yet often the fear of land-monopoly finds expression. There appears to be little danger in the United States that an individual or a corporation will hold on a long time to large tracts of land. Want of money, taxes and other expenses will induce sales. It might, however, be in accord with a sound morality and public policy to limit by law land-acquisitions to a reasonable amount; and to require the equal division of a landed estate among the heirs.

But hostile legislation for the purpose of depriving the individual of his acquired rights, either directly by confiscation, or indirectly by unequal taxation, is robbery, and is in violation of the eighth commandment—"Thou shalt not steal," and of the tenth,—“thou shalt not covet anything that is thy neighbor's.”

53. BLACKSTONE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY.—Some of the comments of Blackstone on the Right to Property will here be appropriate.

“Communion of goods seems not to have been applicable, even in the earliest ages, to aught but the substance of the thing, nor could be extended to the use of it. For by the law of nature and of reason, he who first began to use it, acquired therein a kind of transient property, that lasted so long as he was using it, and no longer; or to speak with greater precision, the right of possession continued for the same time only that the act of possession lasted. Thus the ground was in common, and no part of it was the permanent property of any man in particular; yet whoever was in the occupation of any determinate spot of it, for rest,

for shade, or the like, acquired for the time a sort of ownership, from which it would have been unjust, and contrary to the law of nature, to have driven him by force ; but the instant he quitted the use or occupation of it, another might seize it without injustice. Thus also a vine or other tree might be said to be in common, as all men were equally entitled to its produce ; and yet any private individual might gain the sole property of the fruit, which he had gathered for his own repast ; a doctrine well illustrated by Cicero, who compares the world to a great theatre, which is common to the public, and yet the place which any man has taken is for the time his own.

But when mankind increased in number, craft and ambition, it became necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion, and to appropriate to individuals not the immediate use only, but the very substance of the thing to be used. Otherwise, innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the good order of the world have been continually broken and disturbed, while a variety of persons were striving who should get the first occupation of the same thing, or disputing which of them had actually gained it.

As human life also grew more and more refined, abundance of conveniences were devised to render it more easy, commodious, and agreeable as habitations for shelter and safety, and raiment for warmth and decency. But no man would be at the trouble to provide either, so long as he had only a usufructuary property in them, which was to cease the instant he quitted possession ; if, as soon as he walked out of his tent, or pulled off his garment, the next stranger who came by would have the right to inhabit the one and to wear the other.

In the case of habitations in particular, it was natural to observe, that even the brute creation, to whom everything else was in common, maintained a kind of permanent property in their dwellings, especially for the protection of their young ; that the birds of the air had nests, and the beasts of the fields had caverns, the invasion of which they esteemed a very flagrant injustice, and would sacrifice their lives to preserve them.

Hence, a property was soon established in every man's house and homestall which seem to have been originally mere temporary huts or movable cabins, suited to the design of Providence

for more speedily peopling the earth and suited to the wandering life of their owners before any extensive property in the soil or ground was established.

And there can be no doubt but that movables of every kind became sooner appropriated than the permanent, substantial soil; partly because they were more susceptible of a long occupance, which might be continued for months together without any sensible interruption, and at length by usage ripen into an established right; but principally because few of them could be fit for use, till improved and meliorated by the bodily labor of the occupant; which bodily labor bestowed upon any subject which before lay in common to all men, is universally allowed to give the fairest and most reasonable title to an exclusive property therein.

The article of food was a more immediate call, and, therefore, a more early consideration. Such as were not contented with the spontaneous product of the earth, sought for a more solid refreshment in the flesh of beasts, which they obtained by hunting. But the frequent disappointments incident to that method of provision induced them to gather together such animals as were of a more tame and sequacious nature; and to establish a permanent property in their flocks and herds, in order to sustain themselves in a less precarious manner, partly by the milk of the dams, and partly by the flesh of the young. The support of these, their cattle, made the article of water also a very important point. And, therefore, the book of Genesis (the most venerable monument of antiquity, considered merely with a view to history) will furnish us with frequent instances of the violent contentions concerning wells, the exclusive property of which appears to have been established in the first digger or occupant, even in such places where the ground and herbage remained yet in common.

Thus we find Abraham, who was but a sojourner, asserting his right to a well in the country of Abimelech, and exacting an oath for his security, 'because he had digged that well.' And Isaac, about ninety years afterwards, reclaimed this, his father's property; and after much contention with the Philistines, was suffered to enjoy it in peace.

As the world by degrees grew more populous, it daily became

more difficult to find new spots to inhabit, without encroaching upon former occupants; and by constantly occupying the same individual spot, the fruits of the earth were consumed, and its spontaneous produce destroyed, without any provision for a future supply.

It therefore became necessary to pursue some regular method of providing a constant subsistence; and this necessity produced, or at least promoted and encouraged, the art of agriculture, by a regular connection and consequence; introduced and established the idea of a more permanent property in the soil than had hitherto been received and adopted.

It was clear that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities, without the assistance of tillage; but who would be at the pains of tilling it, if another might watch an opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art and labor? Had not, therefore, a separate property in lands, as in movables, been vested in some individuals, the world must have continued a forest, and men have been mere animals of prey; which, according to some philosophers, is the genuine state of nature. Whereas now (so graciously has Providence interwoven our duty and our happiness together), the result of this very necessity has been the ennobling of the human species, by giving it opportunities of improving its rational faculties, as well as of exerting its natural.

Necessity begat property, and in order to insure that property, recourse was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of inseparable concomitants—states, government, laws, punishments, and the public exercise of religious duties. Thus connected together, it was found that a part only of society was sufficient to provide, by their manual labor, for the necessary subsistence of all; and leisure was given to others to cultivate the human mind, to invent useful arts, and to lay the foundations of science.

The only question remaining is, how this property became actually vested; or what it is that gave a man an exclusive right to retain in a permanent manner that specific land which before belonged generally to everybody, but particularly to nobody.

And as we before observed, that occupancy gave the right to the temporary use of the soil, so it is agreed upon all hands that

occupancy gave also the original right to the permanent property in the substance of the earth itself, which excludes everyone else but the owner from the use of it."

54. CIVIL LIBERTY.—GENERAL VIEW: In general, it carries the idea that the citizen is protected in his civil rights; such rights as he is entitled to by the proper laws and institutions of a land of constitutional freedom. And this protection implies, on his part, a counter-obligation to uphold the laws and institutions of his country.

Civil liberty arises from a due consideration of man's individual, personal rights, and his social relations, his duties, obligations and rights in respect to every other man and also to the community as a whole.

It means protection in natural and institutional rights, such as a right to the unappropriated fruits of the earth, and to the wealth of the seas; and to the products of toil, as well as to freedom from interference in social, civil and political relations—such relations as are in accord with moral and civil law and with civil rights and duties.

In English common law, a man's house is his castle—

"Domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium."

A most sure refuge to everyone is his own house.

None but those of his household can enter unbidden—not even the king—none save an officer of the law empowered by a legal warrant.

As to warrants: The warrant must name the person it is to be served upon. A general warrant

without name inserted is not allowable in English and in American law.

The "Habeas Corpus" writ is an important civil right; trial by a jury of one's peers; the privilege of reasonable bail; proof of guilt to be made by the accusing party, not of innocence by the accused; counsel and protection in public accusation;—these and other guarantees of justice, constitute civil rights.

Freedom of public assembly and discussion, liberty of speech and of the press, and the right of petition, liberty to come and go at will, to determine one's residence and business, are all regarded as primary civil rights; yet these all must have their limitations, especially in time of war and civil strife, when it is sometimes necessary for the public safety to abridge or to suspend these rights.

55. CIVIL DUTIES.—Civil duties include respect for the customs, laws and institutions of our country, and for the officials, civic, legislative, judicial and executive, whose function it is to determine and enforce them; in short, require us to honor, obey and support the government; which duties can be done only by the diligent, moral and patriotic citizen pursuing an honest and useful vocation, and ready to deny himself for the public weal.

Reciprocal rights and duties there are on the part of the State or National Government.

Obvious is the duty of economy in the use of public means; not, however, a penny-wise and pound-foolish economy.

Measures must be instituted for the maintenance

of individual and national rights; for an efficient army and navy, for good harbors, lighthouses, coast defenses, and sundry fortifications. The great arteries of interstate commerce and intercommunication must be kept open, not only by removing or surmounting natural obstacles, but by a prompt setting aside of those of discord and riot.

In short, the state's duty is *to do* what the private citizen can not or should not do; and is *not to do* what individual or private enterprise can and should do, for the contra of this course or policy tends to dwarf the citizen.

To draw correctly this line of distinction between public and private rights and duties requires learning, experience, judgment, moral perception and character, and tests the qualities of the statesman.

56. OBEDIENCE TO LAW.—Man's entire nature, physical and moral, is one of law; and the world in which he lives, as well as the universe around, exists and moves under the reign and guidance of law; included is his social nature, whence arise civil rights and duties. Law is everywhere, and in every part where law is, there must be obedience to it; else the constitution of nature, man inclusive, will come to nought—will quick end in destruction.

There is, then, a physical necessity for obedience to law, for without it nature would not exist; and there is a moral necessity for obedience, for self-preservation is an instinct of all animate nature; and the preservation of whatever has value is a duty, and the discharge of duty is the highest good.

Indeed it was shown at the beginning that obedience is the ground-principle in morals—obedience to the Supreme, as the author of all law—hence, in general, obedience to law; specifically, obedience to the civil law.

The laws and customs of the state and of society, when based on the law of right or good morals, are then to be obeyed with alacrity, because they are right.

When indifferent as to morals, they must be obeyed because disobedience would result in confusion, and a habit of disobedience, in ruin. The law may not be a wise one, may not be a just one, but this does not excuse us from obedience when it is enforced. If the law is wrong, we are at liberty to endeavor to get it amended or repealed.

When, however, civil laws appear to be contra to moral law, the civil law may be obeyed under protest, and an appeal may be made to the courts, or the appeal may be made prior to compliance with the requirements of said law. Thus, in the case of a tax unjustly levied, the taxpayer may appeal to the judiciary for an injunction to restrain official proceedings for the enforcement of collection till the legal status of the tax can be determined.

But if the law be utterly repugnant to the subject's sense of right and conscience, then, rather than do wrong, it is better to receive with meekness the punishment—the penalty attached to the violation of said law.

Man is fallible, and his laws may be fallible—contra to the right. The only sure criterion of duty

is in obedience to God, to the moral law originating in the constitution of the Creator of all.

We must obey the authority delegated by the social compact to our rulers, when we do not thereby disobey the universal law of right, the moral law necessarily and universally true—often called the Higher-law, or the law of the enlightened conscience, thus, when the high priest said to the disciples of Jesus: “Did not we straitly command you, that ye should not teach in this name?” “Peter and the other apostles answered and said, We ought to obey God rather than men.” (Acts 5: 28, 29.) While obedience to civil law is in general imperative, and disobedience, under any circumstances, is to be deprecated, there must be a degree of flexibility—some concession on the part of the state to the right and conscience of the subject, else there is no place for individual self-respect and personal liberty.

Military law is necessarily more strict than civil law, and the death penalty is often attached to disobedience, for on strict obedience important results may depend; and the soldier who deserts his post, and the officer who disregards the orders of his superior is highly culpable.

57. THE DUTY OF INTEREST IN CIVIL AFFAIRS.—“What is everybody’s business is nobody’s” is a common saying, and there is great danger of its being a true one in civil affairs. Each citizen has an interest in the common weal; when that suffers he individually suffers, and each one should cheerfully

contribute of his time and means in proportion to his ability and capability, to promote the general good, by needful and wise public measures and improvements ; by an economic administration of public finance and material ; by the enactment of just and wholesome laws, and a faithful execution of them.

Each citizen should attend to these duties not only on his own account, but on the ground of good-will, a desire to advance the interests of his fellow-citizens, as well as from a sentiment of public spirit and patriotism.

While each one has something to do, has the one talent to improve, there are always a few gifted in wisdom, executive ability, means and capability beyond their fellow-citizens in general. These are called the leading men, or the foremost men of the community or the State—the men providentially entrusted with ten talents, and to whom much is given, of them much is required.

These foremost men should feel, and to the credit of human nature, generally do feel willing to serve for the good of all, in positions of honor rather than of pecuniary profit ; so all should gladly do what they ought and can to sustain the willing leader.

As an illustrious example of this devotion to duty, take that of James Otis, who first manifested his patriotism when, to the sacrifice of private interests, he, at the call of duty, intrepidly argued, with clear logic and electric eloquence, against the "Writs of Assistance," by which old England would enforce her trade laws, collect duties of the

Americans on the goods she sold them—all which acts Otis characterized as “taxation without representation,” and as an expenditure of public money without appropriation by the representatives of the people who paid the money, and hence as unconstitutional acts.

He foresaw the injustice and evil that would come, not from anything already suffered by the colonists, but from the false principle involved, and certain to work mischief.

58. SUFFRAGE—A CONDITIONAL RIGHT.—The right to vote should depend on capability and interest—these to be determined by the intellectual and moral fitness of the voter to understand the question to be voted on, and his relation to it or interest in it.

Thus, if it be a question about the construction or repair of a public road, all persons taxed to make or repair it might have right to vote upon it; so as to district-school educational questions and all questions voted upon. It is the man rightfully interested that has right to vote.

Hence the elective franchise is not a natural right, but a privilege granted by the state in consideration of value received by the state from the individual, and hence *the ethic of it* is in a “quid pro quo,” and the extent of qualification and service on the part of the individual should be carefully determined. The principle demands that there shall be a real interest in the weal of the state.

This interest may be taken for granted where there

is present nativity, or a certain amount of property with respectability. Fitness to vote can only be evidenced by a willing offering of something valuable, and the man who has no moral force, toil or money for the benefit and use of the state, can have no claim to a part and lot in the direction and management of the affairs of the state.

Universal suffrage, with little restriction, has been established by law in the United States. It is questionable whether the restrictions are sufficient to meet the requirements of expediency; and yet more of a true ethic-principle constituent in the elective franchise.

J. S. Mill advocated the right of woman to the ballot, and an educational qualification for all voters. Qualifications and limitations there should be. What qualifications are necessary to save from a too cheap quality of citizenship, let the people and statesmen determine.

59. **LIBERTY OF SPEECH.**—Liberty of speech is another name for the right of free speech. The idea of right is here in the realm of morals, for it is accompanied by present considerations of duty and obligation. Not all rights are in this category. Thus in wandering in the wilderness I have a right to acorns, walnuts or other fruit that in my pathless course may minister to my need. No idea of duty or obligation arises here. My act in appropriating nature's gifts affects only myself. I have right to the fruit, because I want it. No one's right is invaded. But in free speech it is quite otherwise. My

speech may affect the rights of others; hence, it must be so ordered as not to violate another's rights.

This fair side of free speech is kept in view and attained when men are careful to say only things that are true, and in saying them do not contravene other points of the moral law; namely, do not say truths that should not be said, that wrong individuals and profit no one.

Nor would it at all times be right to use the liberty of free speech against a law of the land, even though that law be in fact *contra* to right and to the true interests of the people.

A certain freedom of speech, legitimate in general, would be out of order in a time of invasion by an enemy, when the full aid of every citizen is needed to save his country.

At such a time, to turn aside from the instant duty of the hour, to find fault with the laws and institutions of one's country, is a stab in the back—is treason.

As germane to the subject of free speech, notice Judge Tuley's opinion given in Chicago (January, 1889), in the injunction suit brought by the anarchists against the police, to prevent their interference with anarchist meetings for discussion, peaceable they would say—for plotting mischief, the police say:

The opinion as reported runs thus: "However objectionable some of the objects of the society may be to the court or to the great body of our citizens, the only question is, Are they lawful?"

They have a right to advocate their peculiar views in public assembly; they may discuss any social or economic question, may demand the repeal of old laws, and the substitution of such new ones as may commend themselves to their judgment, whims or caprices. They may criticise the acts of all public officers, from the President of the United States, the judge on the bench, down even to the policeman. They may even advocate a change of our form of government and the substitution of another, but peaceably and by means of the freeman's weapon—the ballot—not by force or by revolution."

As to this opinion, it may be regarded as correct in theory, if the actual facts in the case agree with those enumerated in the opinion; if the objects were lawful. It may be that the written constitution, laws and rules of the anarchist society set out or exhibit only things lawful; but the question arises, do they in fact abide by their own proposals, or are these only a fair form of truth to disguise fraud and evil intent, like the wooden horse the Greeks gave to the Trojans, whereby to honor the Goddess of Wisdom; which gift, noble and pious in outward appearance, yet within teeming with a concealed hostile band of armed men, the simple and deceived Trojans accepting from their wily foes drew into their walled city, to their own destruction?

Thus on pretense of pious regard for the Goddess of Liberty, the wily anarchist, with principles that undermine liberty, with fair words may conceal a treacherous design, and before Judge Tuley's opin-

ion is accepted as sound and final, the public will inquire whether the Haymarket meeting, held ostensibly for peaceable purposes, yet ending in the massacre of policemen with dynamite, as well as the prior and subsequent advocacy of force to effect unlawful and immoral ends, do not justly rule and bar anarchist societies outside the pale of lawful assemblies.

It is well to keep in mind the moral of the old fable about the captive trumpeter who plead that as he himself was unarmed, his captors should spare his life. "Yes," was the sharp reply, "but by sounding your trumpet, you incite our enemies to kill us."

There is a correct theory of free speech predicated on the assumed good intent and moral sanity of the speaker, which admits of a liberal construction to the right of free speech. But after a society or organization of men for whatever object have repeatedly countenanced the advocacy of immoral purposes and unlawful acts, they have lost all claim, as an organization, to be regarded as a lawful assembly, and all claim to the right of free speech, for this sacred right is a right given and guaranteed to the citizen, by the civil government under which he lives, for the protection of its own interests, well-being and life, as well as for that of the individual citizen; and this end cannot be attained when the right and realm of either the state or of the citizen is wrongfully invaded.

Liberty of speech is not a one-sided liberty; there is in it a reciprocal relation, duty and ob-

ligation between the individual citizen and the people.

J. S. Mill on Free Speech: No one will accuse Mr. Mill of illiberality towards liberty; yet even with him liberty has its limitations. We quote this: "No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard.

"Acts of whatever kind which without justifiable cause do harm to others may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require* to be, controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and when needful, by the active interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must thus far be limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people."

60. LEO XIII ON "LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS."—In his Encyclical Letter (1888) Pope Leo XIII writes thus:

"For right is a moral power which it is absurd to suppose that nature has given indifferently to truth and falsehood, to justice and injustice. Men have

a right freely and prudently to propagate throughout the state whatsoever things are true and honorable, so that as many as possible may possess them; but false doctrines, than which no mental plague is greater, and vices which corrupt the heart, should be diligently repressed by public authority, lest they insidiously work the ruin of the state. The excesses of an unbridled intellect, which really end in the oppression of the ignorant multitude, are not less rightly restrained by the authority of the law than are the injuries inflicted by force upon the weak; and even more so, because by far the greater part of the community either absolutely cannot, or can only with great difficulty, avoid their allusions or subtleties, especially such as flatter their own passions.

“If unbridled license of speech and of writing be granted to all, nothing will remain sacred and inviolate; even the highest and truest judgment of nature, the common and noblest heritage of the human race, will not be spared.

“In regard, however, to such matters of opinion as God leaves to man’s free discussion, full liberty of thought and of speech is naturally within the right of everyone, for this liberty never leads men to suppress the truth, but leads often to its discovery and manifestation.”

Sound and admirable, provided “false doctrines” refer to those contra to moral truth, as the general tenor of the article indicates, and not to what may be regarded as true or false by certain individuals, societies or schools of thought.

61. VERACITY.—

“He is detestable
Whose words agree not with his thoughts.”
—*Homer's Iliad*, IX, 312.

Man by nature is inclined to tell the truth, and to believe what is told him; but by the perversion of good faculties and endowments, temptations to conceal and deceive, from a consciousness that the truth would be damaging to our reputation or supposed interest, often tend to counteract this good disposition in man's nature, and to beget falsehood and unbelief.

Moral truth does not necessarily agree with facts, for we may be mistaken as to the fact, and say, “There is a man in the moon,” when there is none except in fancy; or say, that this oar-blade in the water is bent, when it is not, but only so appears, in virtue of the refraction of the rays of light.

But *duty* requires that we inform ourselves as to the fact before we make positive statements in regard to it. This duty is imperative when the fact is not one of mere science or observation or experiment, but is of morals, affecting some person's reputation.

The disregard and violation of this duty can often be noticed in the utterances of public speakers and of newspapers. Willful misstatements and lies are sometimes made. These are so *evidently* wicked as hardly to need remark.

Oftener misstatements are uttered from a habit of zeal without knowledge, and with no predetermination to do harm.

The speaker or writer becomes so accustomed to misrepresentation, like the habitual swearer, to positive affirmation regarding what he has little or no knowledge of, that he acquires the bad habit of believing for the moment that to be true which, to serve his present purpose, he wants to be true.

This bad and wicked habit often results in great injustice and injury to others and destroys one's confidence in the veracity of him who indulges in this vice; and when once the matter comes to be seen in its true light, it reacts on the utterer like the cry of the shepherd boy who three times cried "Wolf, wolf!" when there was no wolf; and so his fourth cry was not regarded when the wolf did in very fact attack and destroy his sleep.

There are many scripture precepts that enforce the virtue of veracity: "Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips from speaking guile." (Psalm 34: 13.) "Lying lips are abomination to the Lord." (Proverbs 12: 22.) "The lip of truth shall be established forever; but a lying tongue is but for a moment." (Proverbs 12: 19.)

In the prayer of Agur we have this petition, "Remove far from me vanity and lies."

Legislation as to the Oath: A common swearer is a common perjurer; too much familiarity with a form of oath tends to a disregard of its sanctity; hence wise legislation will introduce very little affirmation, if any, under affirmation by oath, but will notice the precept, "Let your communications be yea, yea; nay, nay;" that is, a simple affirmation or

denial without equivocation as to what you believe and know.

The limitations of Jesus upon the use of the oath were made in the interest of veracity flowing from its true source in human nature—the *love* of truth; and not of a veracity born of fear or self-interest. The very injunction not to forswear but to perform an oath argues and proves a tendency to a technical estimation of the solemn oath, and to disregard it under pretext of mental reservation or some other subterfuge deemed sufficient to counteract or turn aside its force.

Hence the injunction, and the deeper philosophy, and the true ideal of Jesus, "*Swear not at all,*" for to a man's word that loves truth for its own sake the oath adds nothing; and for him who is a liar by nature, and sees no beauty in truth, the oath has no binding force unless he be also superstitious and cowardly.

But we do not want to educate men in this way; and it is better, in seeking truth for the ends of justice, to endeavor to assure the court of true testimony by inquiry into the character and reputation of the witness, as well as by close examination, than it is to foster a habit of trifling with things sacred. Youth should be educated to say with the boy George Washington, "*I cannot tell a lie.*"

This is what Jesus aimed at; he was enunciating principles and precepts for all time—such *universal* laws as tend to develop the true man.

It is not necessary to say or to assume that Jesus expected his principles to be immediately adopted

in their full extent ; that he would not, like Moses, allow anything for the perversity and hardness of men's hearts ; and so must the court be allowed like latitude of prudence in the search for true testimony. Yet obedience to his precepts requires a constant endeavor to attain to the better way he points out. Herein is duty.

The usual moralistic view of the oath is : That Jesus did not mean to forbid official oaths.

Scripture narrative, indeed, and all history, shows that these oaths were common, as they now are and were spoken of without reprobation ; but this proves nothing as to a true theory or ideal relative to affirmation.

The true ideal still is to so cultivate the moral sentiments and faculties, that a man will speak the truth and do his duty on his honor ; that is, because it is natural, constitutional and habitual for him so to do, and practically impossible for him to do otherwise.

This is the meaning to be given to the affirmation of God, who, in condescension to the custom of men—their need for something formal, and so regarded by them as more binding—swore by himself (“ I have sworn by myself, the word has gone out of my mouth in righteousness and shall not return ”) ; that is, God swore by his own constitutional love for and adherence to truth, which act necessarily could add nothing at all to the certainty of God's truthfulness, except that men, not well instructed in the perfections of Jehovah, and not capable of appreciating them, were more fully assured. But this is

not the perfection and the liberty Jesus was inculcating, nor that men should strive for.

Honesty: It is a trite saying that "honesty is the best policy." This is true as one result of honesty; it turns out to the ultimate advantage of him who practices it; but if practiced for sake of this result, it is not pure honesty; it has no virtue in it; for pure honesty, there must be the love of it.

Cicero makes three general heads on duty: (1) Honest or dishonest, (2) Profitable or unprofitable, (3) How, in case what seems honest is contra to what seems profitable? He arrives at the conclusion that "Honesty and profit are inseparable." -

There are two degrees of honesty: (1) Honesty in intention, (2) in both intention and fact; or, we may say, honesty of purpose conjoined with wisdom in action.

Deceit: To buy or to borrow without intention or reasonable expectation of paying or returning is to obtain goods on false pretenses and is base deceit.

To sell a horse, ox, sheep, house, lands, goods, or anything that has a defect in quality or title concealed from the buyer, yet known to the owner, is of like character.

To buy at prices lower than the real value, or to sell at higher than the real, on information, true or false, privately obtained in advance of public news, for purpose of taking advantage of somebody's ignorance, knowing that the man you deal with will suffer by the transaction, is an act contra to good sound morals.

To deceive an enemy by an appeal to the sympathies of the human soul only to entrap him into your power is a base act. In the siege of Troy, the deceit of the Greek in the wooden-horse affair (*instar Montis equus*) is an instance in point. On the other hand, Virgil rather justifies the proposal of the Trojan youth, Chorcæbus, to his comrades to disguise themselves in the armor of the slain Greeks. This is his note of philosophy ; thus :

Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat !”

—*Æneid*, Lib. II, 390.

Deceit or courage, who in an enemy inquires about it !

This fighting under false colors would ordinarily be unjustifiable and piratical ; but in this case the Trojans had been surprised by the impious fraud of the Greeks, and hence in self-defense they were justified in the use of means otherwise questionable.

The *ethic-principle* on which deceit is to be condemned is that all deceit and lying is *contra* to man’s social nature—hence is unnatural and abominable, and is condemned by all law, human and divine.

In the prosecution of war by hostile nations, some kinds of deceit are regarded as allowable ; other kinds as dishonorable and execrable. As to the first kind, it should be noticed that war itself is an abnormal condition of human nature, and while it lasts it is to be expected that there will be violations of good morals.

Remark : Kant held that deceit is never allowable, and his opinion is not to be lightly esteemed.

This, too, is the opinion of those who say that deceit is not allowable even in self-defense, as when held up by a highwayman, or menaced by a burglar who demands your money or your life. If you deceive him, say these casuists, he will be tempted to take revenge on the next man he meets. The sufficient reply to this is, that the *outlaw*, in virtue of his antagonism to society, has no claim on you for veracity, and that he should not be allowed to have opportunity to meet another man; but that it is the duty of government immediately to track him and hunt him down, and consign him to the penitentiary or the gibbet.

Principles and Practice, Robinson, page 224, has this foot-note:

“ Said one of the older citizens of Lawrence, Kansas, to the writer a few years ago, ‘ I never, in all my life, was in so tight a place as when one of Quantrell’s band in the great raid of 1863, with the muzzle of a cocked pistol close to my head, demanded to know if I was an abolitionist. The raiders were shooting down my neighbors all about me; but the thought flashed through my mind, if I say No! I shall ever afterwards be ashamed to look anyone in the face; so I answered, Yes. An officer in command standing near, for some reason, I never knew what, shouted, “ Don’t shoot him ! ” ’ ”

It is probable this Kansas man did exactly the best thing, but not best for any reason he gives. In fact he did wrong, unless he had some ground of confidence in the moral sagacity of the man, or else of the officer standing by, to see incongruity and cowardice in the shooting of a man so brave for the truth. For sake of a mistaken sentiment, he had

no right to risk his life by "casting pearls before swine."

Experience proves that in very many instances moral considerations avail not with outlaws. The true course for a man in a strait of this sort is to quickly determine as best he can the chances in favor of truth or of deceit. Circumstances, and not solely sentiment, should enter into the decision. Must not this be the reasonable verdict notwithstanding contra authorities of a high order?

Casuistry is the determination of cases of conscience. The conscience is imperfectly developed, specially so in children and in unenlightened grown persons. It is necessary for the parent and the teacher to instruct the child as to the right and wrong in its moral acts. "*This* is right, *that* is wrong—You should do, or should have done, this; or the contra,"—to act towards the child the part of a casuist. In this process of education, the child is gradually fitted to become its own casuist, by a habit of self-examination, and a careful study of the intention in its own thoughts and deeds as pure or impure, wise or unwise.

This should be a leading object in moral and religious education—the attainment of individual knowledge and power to determine the right in one's own acts.

The Jesuits, three hundred years ago, in the zenith of their power, had a monopoly of the office of the casuist. But the times of this ignorance and of swaddling-bands for the conscience has gone by under the enlightenment of moral science and

Christian ethics interpreted by gospel soul-liberty, whereby the divinity within—the enlightened conscience—is each man's own best casuist ; not, however, that any man has attained to perfection, or that anyone is too good for instruction or for reproof ; and, too, confession of faults is good for the soul ; “ Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another.”

For this there are appropriate times and seasons as the moral and spiritual condition of each requires. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind, and so use his liberty as they who must render an account thereof—without asserting independence of the opinions and advice of others, specially of those whose attainments and office fit them to instruct—and, too, without putting one's conscience into the keeping of any man, lest he abuse the trust, by a too easy admittance of such motives as this, “ the end justifies the means ; ” and lest thereby the conscience become weak and corrupt, and self-reliance, individuality and personal liberty be lost, as it was among the Jesuits in their day, where the rules of the order, right or wrong, must be implicitly obeyed ; yet by every proper means—by a scrupulous regard for truth and honesty, by confession to God and men—the conscience must be kept alive and active in its monitorial office, as the inner guardian of the right ; for nothing should be so dreaded, or is so dangerous to the final peace of men, as a seared and dead conscience.

The *Ethic in Casuistry* is, that with an enlightened sensitive conscience, cases of conscience admit

in general of ready solution ; that without this enlightenment and sensibility no rule will have real value.

62. REPUTATION.—“A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches.” This maxim of the wise man is fully endorsed by experience. The true man, whatever his station and calling, values a good name more than any temporary advantage, for reputation once lost is very difficult to recover ; and without it all other possessions are a mockery.

The *motives* for injuring another's reputation are varied ; sometimes from desire to avenge an insult, fancied or real ; sometimes to get the advantage of a rival for popular favor, social or political ; often from mere thoughtlessness and love of talk and notoriety.

These motives are all bad, and the acts they lead to are more or less criminal—the robbery of one's neighbor, so far as such means influence, of his most valuable possession. Fortunately sensible people pay little attention to idle tales, and the slanderer harms chiefly himself in reputation, and lays himself liable to severe punishment, if his victim should think it necessary to resort to the law for redress.

There is, too, a peculiar *meanness* in talking about, perhaps gloating over, the faults of others, when it does no good, when there is no good end in view—especially over faults long ago committed—slips made partly from inexperience and lack of proper moral training, and a wise perception of moral relations—rights, duties and obligations—rather than

from an evil disposition—the love and desire for wrong-doing.

The person maligned for these sins may long since have repented of them, and be standing to-day on a much higher plane of morality, in thought, soul and act, than his would-be traducer.

DIVISION IV. INSTITUTIONS.

63. INSTITUTIONS, AS TO ORIGIN AND CHARACTER.—Their name is legion, from the institutions of nature and those logically derived therefrom, to the minor artificial organizations devised and established by man for various purposes, such as the ancient institution of Free Masons; of Chivalry; or the more modern ones of the Knights of Pythias; the Knights of Labor, or in general labor unions; the board of trade and a hundred others.

Patriarchal, tribal and national forms of government are not instances of the artificial; but rather of institutions either natural or logical.

Chief are the institutions of marriage and of the Sabbath, introduced by Divine appointment at the close of the creation. The discussion of these will be found each under its own head.

Institutions, as to Their Character: Institutions such as the church, the public school, the temperance society, the Order of Free Masons, Odd Fellows, and many other organizations, may have in themselves moral tendencies; but moral obligation and duty are in the individuals that belong to and

support the institution; and each individual member of an institution is morally responsible just in accord with the moral tendency of the institution he helps to maintain.

In general, institutions are moral or immoral just as they are or are not organized on principles of sound morality. Thus marriage and the Sabbath, in their civil aspect, are moral so far as the requirements of the law and custom are in accord with the laws of nature.

Mormon marriage is not moral, because it violates the law of nature. So the church, as an institution, is moral as well as religious, because the design of it is the public worship of the true God, in accord with the first commandment of the moral law, as well as with the inculcation of the entire decalogue and of the moral precepts that abound in the teaching of Jesus. If, however, a church teaches and practices the persecution of those it calls heretics, the individual members of that church are violators of the sixth commandment, "Thou shalt not kill;" and they must be classed and punished as persecutors and murderers, unless they protest and act against the crime, and manifest a readiness to sacrifice themselves, if need be, in the expulsion from their institution of the immoral doctrine, and the immoral utterers of it. Their reward for manly action would surely follow—the blessedness in the eighth beatitude, "Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."

Members of temperance and of benevolent societies

are as individuals morally responsible for the moral tendency of those societies which may be good or bad just in accord with the wisdom or foolishness of their organization and management.

So, if the "board of trade" departs from its proper function as a guardian, conservator and promoter of the business affairs and interests of their city and community, and from legitimate trade, which is designed to be, and which generally is, beneficial to all parties engaged in it, and if it indulges in mere speculative, unreal transactions—its individual members buying and selling fictitious merchandise—wherein one man must lose what another gains—it is mere gambling, a vice and sin that is forbidden by the tenth commandment; which sin each and every member of a board of trade so constituted is guilty of, and for which he is morally responsible.

And so it is as to the responsibility of each citizen in the matter of licensing the saloon, and in compromising with the gambling dens and others of ill repute.

The theatre is an institution for the healthy amusement and improvement of the people, but may be for their corruption; unfortunately the tendency is largely in this latter direction. Theatre-goers and the negligent guardian of morals cannot escape responsibility.

The public school, as an institution being directly intellectual and moral, and indirectly religious and political, can be classified as educational, because the idea of education runs through all its objects; namely, the development of the intellect in a com-

petent knowledge of literature and science, and specially the cultivation of the moral and religious sentiments, and so it does not perform its proper function as an educator of youth when merely the intellect is cultivated; for education consists in drawing out all the good native faculties of the soul; and this is the province of the public school, so far as it is practicable through its instrumentality.

To say, then, that the public school should not and cannot educate in the science of morals, including its relation to religion, is to occupy an untenable and immoral standpoint in the all-important matter of education, and it becomes each citizen to see how far his own responsibility in the matter extends.

64. THE IDEA IN INSTITUTIONS.—The general idea of an institution is well shown in Lieber's "Civil Liberty," and we make quotation thus:

"An institution is a system or body of usages, laws or regulations of extensive and recurring operation, containing within itself an organism by which it effects its own independent action, continuance, and generally its own further development. Its object is to generate, effect, regulate or sanction a succession of acts, transactions or productions of a peculiar kind or class.

"The idea of an institution implies a degree of self-government. Laws act through human agents, and these are, in the case of institutions, their officers or members.

"We are likewise in the habit of calling single laws

or usages (which are laws of spontaneous growth) institutions, if their operation is of vital importance and vast scope, and if their continuance is in a high degree independent of any interfering power.

“Thus we call marriage an institution in consideration of its pervading importance, its extensive operation, the innumerable relations it affects, and the security which its continuance enjoys in the conviction of almost all men, against any attempts at its abolition.

“Indeed we generally mean by the institution of marriage pretty much the institution of the family; that is, the family as a community sanctioned and fortified by the law, by authoritative usages, and by religion—the cluster of laws and usages, social, political and religious, which relate to this well defined community.”

It always forms a prominent element in the idea of an institution, whether the term be taken in the strictest sense or not, that it is a group of laws, usages and operations standing in close relation to one another, and forming an independent whole, with a united and distinguishing character of its own.

“The school,” that is to say, “the whole school system, as well as the modern national army in Prussia, have been called institutions, when it was desired to express the idea that they are establishments of vast importance, and that they enjoy a supposed degree of independent vitality.”

Dr. Thos. Arnold, by “the institution,” understands such officers, orders of men, public bodies, settlements of property, customs or regulations, concern-

ing matters of general usage, as do not owe their existence to any express law or laws; but having originated in various ways, at a period of remote antiquity, are already parts of the national system, at the very beginning of our historical view of it, and are recognized by all actual laws as being themselves a kind of primary condition on which all recorded legislation proceeds.

Dr. Lieber criticizes this view of Arnold's as restricting the meaning of institution to institutions of growth, and as not including those arising from enactments of law. Further, "nor is it accurate to call certain officers, or orders of men, institutions—they are but temporary members of the perpetual institution."

However, the "officers or orders of men" may by Dr. Arnold be regarded as merely representing the principles of the institution; and so by them the institution is personified as to its principles. Hence the second part of the criticism has little force, whilst the first part holds, provided Dr. Arnold really intended to rule out a legal origin for an institution.

65. INSTITUTIONS, NATURAL, LOGICAL, ARTIFICIAL—The *Conjugal Relation, Natural*.—Marriage merging into the family, with its several offices and duties of mutual respect, love and affection; of cares; home amusements; joys; happiness, and domestic bliss, with its industries, frugalities, trials and discipline, is a natural institution, because it necessarily arises from the constitution of human nature.

The *Sabbath* Natural, Logical.—The Sabbath, arising primarily from need of rest after six days of work, is so far a natural institution. The other features of the institution, as of a time for contemplation of the universe, and of one's relations to the Creator and to man, with the ennobling thoughts and feelings of joy and delight, that should and would result under normal conditions, are logical. They arise from a natural procedure of thought and reasoning, from the *idea* of what kind of thoughts, feelings and acts should naturally accompany a season of hallowed rest.

The *State* Natural, Logical, Artificial.—The State is a natural institution as to its leading feature, government. Order is nature's first law, and there must be order among men as a people or nation; and there cannot be, without subordination to law formulated in institutional government, be it autocratic or democratic.

That is, from a natural desire for good society and good government men come together to organize themselves into a state, a government for the people; unless this organization has naturally been effected for them by a general acquiescence in the rule of a leader, be he called chief, king or sovereign.

Thus far the state formation is *natural*.

But now if substitutions are devised, and are carried into effect to secure to the state a firm foundation, and a due regard for right and justice, these substitutions are the logical outcome of the original natural predisposition in humanity to the state organization.

Thus the subordinate and constituent institutions of the state, the legislature, the judiciary, the executive, as branches, are severally in themselves *logical* institutions.

State laws and institutions are *artificial*, when they do not naturally nor logically flow from the proper *idea* of a state.

Thus in England, Spain, Russia, Germany, Austria, and in most civilized lands, there exists a union of church and state. This union means that the power and influence of the religious sentiment centered in a church organization is united and consolidated with the natural and logical constituents of the state so as to become a part of state government, or one of the powers of the realm. Thus in England there arose, perhaps artificially, a division of interests. Some men, comparatively few, became possessors and owners of land. Others were engaged in manufacturing and in mercantile pursuits: hence two classes of citizens, with distinct interests, logically became resolved into two estates of the realm or kingdom; the lords of the lands representing what is justly regarded as the permanent interest, and the manufacturing and mercantile as rather the progressive interest.

Now naturally and logically there is somewhere a third interest or estate, to hold in even balance or equilibrium the entire action of governmental power.

This third estate or power should naturally be sought for and found in the wisdom and influence of the wise and the good. Not long ago the clergy rep-

resented the most of the learning of the people; hence, in the higher dignitaries of the church, in the bishops, archbishops, was vested the third estate; and from their profession and official character as religionists and rulers in the church, it was illogically inferred that the peculiar doctrines of their creed constituted the learning and wisdom that the third estate stands for—was intended to represent.

Thus in lieu of a natural and logical third estate, grounded in literature and science; in the moral and religious sentiments; in the wisdom of mankind, and in the necessary, catholic and universally admitted doctrines and precepts of scripture revelation, we find an artificial third estate set up, the *credo* of whatever sect or branch of the Christian church might, for the time being, chance to be in the ascendancy, or hold the preeminence.

For instance, England's Henry VIII was entitled by the Pope "Defender of the Faith;" then by act of parliament, under pressure of the king's own will, he was styled "Head of the English Church."

Religion had nothing at all to do with this shifting attitude of Henry VIII, in the formal profession of it. It was entirely due to the fancied self-interest, caprice and unholy passion of a man void of spirituality, and whose way of life rendered him incapable of it.

Whatever religious opinions Henry for the time being might think it politic to adopt, these he sought to enforce upon his subjects. Under his reign is well illustrated the *artificial* character of the church as a national institution.

The futile endeavor of the unfortunate Charles I, of England, and of his son, James II, to impose their own religious opinions upon the people and the national character, and the miserable results in the turbulent times of the Commonwealth, affords another conspicuous instance of the folly of attempting to enforce relations that do not exist in nature; that is, to commingle ecclesiastical rule and state government.

Education Natural: Man, by nature, seeks truth, not only from a single desire for knowledge, but also on account of the sympathetic and social feelings natural to man, and his endowment with intellectual faculties, and the gift of speech and song, there is specially in youth, generally in man, a tendency to congregate for discussion for mutual improvement in arts, social, civil and martial.

So far as this is prompted by a natural desire for interchange of thought, and a love of truth, education has a *natural* origin, and educational institutions may properly be called *natural* institutions.

The Public School Natural, Logical: The public school, then, for instruction in what pertains to the formation of enlightened, patriotic and good citizens, is rooted and grounded in the nature of man, and thus there is valid authority for the public school as possessing a highly ethic character, from the moral aspects and relations that necessarily pertain to it, as an institution—as a means for educating the people, for individual and for public ends.

The ground for its existence is not in a mere matter of opinion, but is in man's nature, and the fea-

tures and provisions of the public school institution should be logical, the necessary product of the right use of reason in adapting educational methods and appliances to the proper ends of the public school, in accord with the true idea of it.

66. THE SABBATH.—Every law of the moral code is of the highest value to the well being of man; and the law of the Sabbath, or day of rest, is not to be at all slighted. Yet partly from the perversity of human nature, and partly from some little difficulty in comprehending the scope of the law, and the need of study to discern its right application, men are ready to hold Sabbath-day observance in light esteem, and to interpret its requirements with much latitude.

The experience of man has shown that a periodical cessation of bodily and mental toil is necessary to the maintenance of health, that the physical constitution, when subjected to the strain of regular work, will be impaired, and sooner or later will break down, unless relieved by regular intervals of rest, recreation or change to employments that call into activity other faculties.

In 1832, the English parliament instituted systematic and extensive inquiries, and from the testimony of medical men, and other scientists, as well as of those in industrial pursuits, it was shown that in an economic point of view as to health and good work, a sabbatical day of rest is needed. Indeed, the experience of every man who has noted the results proves it.

More recently, in Germany, the subject has been much discussed—not so much on religious grounds—as on the ground of overwork for the body.

In 1872 the government was petitioned to protect, by enactment of law, workingmen against employers who required them to work on Sunday, and a commission was appointed to inquire into the best mode of effecting such protection—there being no question on the part of either the government or of the people as to the desirability of the Sabbath-day's rest. But the problem was how to obtain it without interfering with industrial pursuits necessary to meet the wants of the needy people; and here it might well be inquired whether it is necessary and right that conditions of life should obtain—such conditions as do prevent a due observance of the Sabbath.

But the authoritative law for a "day of rest" we find in Holy Writ, in the Bible narrative of Creation. Thus, after reciting that in six days "the heavens and the earth were finished and all the host of them," Genesis 2:2, 3, reads: "And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made."

Here we have the institution of the Sabbath, or the day of rest, which day is blessed from the good effects resulting to man on account of its institution; and is hallowed or made holy because the rest gives man an opportunity to contemplate with

proper feelings of admiration and veneration the completed works of God, and his own relation to the great Creator.

God himself, at the close of his six days' work, pronounced his own work *good*, doubtless with a Divine sentient feeling of pure pleasure, admiration and joy over the beauty and grandeur of his own designs.

In reason, then, the Creator should rest after a given series of toil—to look back upon his work and to see that it was good, and to consecrate its completion by a day of rest—of hallowed rest—time restful not only to the body, but to the soul of man, in contemplation of those starry heavens that “declare the glory of God,” and of that last day's work—man, in whose soul-constitution are “the unwritten laws” of God, as if written and graven with his own finger on tablets of imperishable stone.

“ How still the morning of the hallow'd day !
Mute is the voice of rural labor ; hush'd
The ploughboy's whistle and the milkmaid's song.
The scythe lies glittering in the dewy wreath
Of tedded grass, mingled with faded flowers
That yester-morn bloomed waving in the breeze,
Sounds the most faint attract the ear—the hum
Of early bee, the trickling of the dew,
The distant bleating midway up the hill.
Calmness seems throned on yon unmoving cloud.

With dove-like wings, Peace o'er yon village broods,
The dizzying mill-wheel rests ; the anvil's din
Hath ceased ; all, all around is quietness.
Less fearful on this day the limping hare

Stops and looks back, and stops and looks on man,
 Her deadliest foe. The toil-worn horse set free,
 Unheedful of the pasture, roams at large,
 And as his stiff, unwieldy bulk he rolls,
 His iron-armed hoofs gleam in the morning ray.

But chiefly man the day of rest enjoys,
 Hail Sabbath ! thee I hail, the poor man's day !
 On other days the man of toil is doomed
 To eat his joyless bread lonely, the ground
 Both seat and board screened from the winter's cold
 And summer's heat by neighboring hedge or tree ;
 But on this day, embosom'd in his home,
 He shares the frugal meal with those he loves ;
 With those he loves, he shares the heartfelt joy
 Of giving thanks to God—not thanks of form,
 A word and a grimace, but reverently,
 With covered face and upward earnest eye,
 Hail Sabbath ! thee I hail, the poor man's day !”

Grahame's Sabbath Morn.

67. ORIGIN—REASONS FOR A SABBATH-DAY INSTITUTION.—The reasons given for the institution and observance of the Sabbath may be formally stated thus :

God *rested*—We are enjoined to do likewise ;

God *blessed*—The observance of the day is accompanied with blessings to man ;

God sanctified—Set apart from common to sacred use.

In the first ages of man's era, doubtless the Sabbath as thus ordained, as a universal law, was observed by all the peoples of the earth ; and under Divine authority was known and regarded, till men, following their own evil imaginations, began to forget God.

Even the Israelites, the chosen people, had become very lax as to the Sabbath; hence the need of a stringent law to enforce it; hence the first word of the fourth commandment, "Remember"—"Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy"—points to something before known, and which now must not be forgotten.

The formal institution of the Jewish Sabbath was prior to the law of the Sabbath in the fourth commandment. It was upon the occasion of the double supply of manna on the sixth day. "On the sixth day they gathered twice as much bread; two omers for one man. * * * This is that which the Lord hath said: To-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord. * * * To-day is a Sabbath unto the Lord; to-day ye shall not find it in the field. Six days ye shall gather it, but on the seventh day, the Sabbath, in it there shall be none." (Exodus 16:22-26.)

There is no intimation that the manna began to appear on the first day of a week whose seventh day was then kept as the Sabbath; but the double portion of manna on the sixth day of its appearance fixed the next day as the day which now must be strictly observed as the Sabbath. This relative time, the seventh day, instead of an absolute time once for all determined by a sharply defined yet unnatural close of the sixth day of Creation, saves the day from a superstitious observance as to time; and preserves it in its original integrity and virtue as a day of rest, and of sacred duties to be done.

By misinterpretation of the seventh day, as a cer-

tain absolute time, instead of a seventh part of time set apart for peculiar duties, the Sabbath institution had been vitiated. It had become formal rather than useful and practical, as designed originally, and as expressed in the fourth commandment; for as we read, "The Sabbath was made for man."

68. TIME OF REST.—*The time of rest*, as determined by the Creator, is one day in seven; and this being Divine wisdom, no people can assume to make a better distribution of time, as to employments secular and sacred.

In the day of the French revolution, when things sacred were trampled upon, the *tenth* day was substituted as a day of rest instead of the seventh day; but experience soon proved that a tenth part of time was insufficient for the end desired. Nor is the time to be determined by each individual for himself. The law of the Sabbath is a law given to the people at large, to the nation—and must be maintained by the people as a civil institution, as well as a moral one.

The *Sabbath* "made for man" applies not only to man individually, but to man as a community, and hence must enter into the civil code.

Government *national* and *municipal* is under obligation to notice the Sabbath—not only by obedience to its requirements, but by such laws and regulations as will secure a due regard on the part of the people to a proper respect for the Sabbath day.

Among a comparatively homogeneous people there need be no difference in this regard. The

rights of conscience are readily respected when it is understood that no man has a right to a conscience that will without compunction invade the rights of his neighbor.

The essential element of the Sabbath day is the one day's rest after six days of labor.

If the six days of labor be determined by legislation in accord with the known will of the people, the one day of rest will follow in accord with the law of nature as set forth in the Creation.

Or if the one day of rest be determined in accord with the religious views of the people, then the six days of work will naturally follow.

In an exceptional case, it may occur, as in Algiers, that there is a marked observance of more than one day as the Sabbath day.

Thus the French government and French people in Algeria observe Sunday as the Sabbath day.

The Jews observe Saturday, and the Mahomedan Arabs observe Friday as the Sabbath.

Here, properly, the conscience, however unenlightened, is respected; and each people is left free — perforce and under restrictions of due legislation — to observe a Sabbath day, according to its own views as to time.

The particular application of the universal law of rest will vary with varying environments.

As to the Israelites, they were a chosen people set for a light in the world, to maintain, by a ready obedience to moral law, the knowledge and the worship of the one true God amid the darkness of the idolatrous Gentile nations.

And this chosen people was itself a stubborn, stiff-necked race, that could not be kept within the bounds of obedience except by exact and strict laws and with severe penalties for violation thereof.

Hence special Sabbath laws we have—"Six days thou shalt work; but on the seventh day thou shalt rest; in earing time and in harvest time thou shalt rest." (Exodus 34: 21.) "Six days shall work be done; but on the seventh day there shall be to you an holy day, a Sabbath of rest to the Lord. Whosoever doeth work therein shall be put to death." (Exodus 35: 2.) "Ye shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on the Sabbath day." (Exodus 35: 3.)

69. TRUE OBSERVANCE.—But after that a *habit of obedience* and of Sabbath observance had been attained to, through exacting laws, the next step in the education of the people was to change the spirit of this obedience from its compulsory and formal character to a voluntary and a joyful obedience arising from a more enlightened view of the requirements of the Sabbath, and a true appreciation of the blessings the Sabbath institution is capable of conferring upon man, when the moral and religious nature of man has become so enlarged and cultivated as to be able to go alone—to dispense with the leading-strings of positive law and special rules, and to enter into, receive, sustain and enjoy a condition of moral freedom in the interpretation and observance of an institution like the Sabbath, into which enter

varied considerations of physical, intellectual, moral and religious well being.

A chief object in the mission of that illustrious prophet Isaiah was to infuse a spiritual element into the ceremonial, formal and superstitious character of Jewish worship. Hence his sharp rebuke: "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me?" saith the Lord. "Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me; the new moons and Sabbaths, the calling of assemblies; even the solemn meeting."

"Wash ye, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil."
(Isaiah 1: 11.)

To this end, in the matter of Sabbath observance, Isaiah prophecies thus:

"If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day; and call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honorable; and shalt honor him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words:

"Then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord; and I will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy father; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it."
(Isaiah 58: 13, 14.)

70. THE TRUE SABBATH.—Thus the *true Sabbath*, instead of being a time for lugubrious meditation, is an occasion of delight to the soul of man, when the soul is drawn towards proper objects of love.

And in this view of progression towards higher and truer views of moral and religious duties, a more flexible interpretation to the Sabbath-day law became possible in the times and under the ministry of the Lord Jesus, who showed that works of necessity and of mercy might be done on that holy day.

Thus to the blind, sight was given; and to the sick of the palsy he saith: "Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thy house."

The former rigidity of interpretation as to Sabbath-day work was under a reign of law, which, if a man do, he lives; if not, he dies.

The later elasticity of interpretation was under a reign of law indeed, but of law modified by the Spirit's power, which places man in a higher plane of action; one in which the enlightened conscience finds an element of freedom.

We must not, however, for a moment imagine the abrogation of the Sabbath law; Jesus came not to annul but to fulfill."

The law exists, and the element of elasticity infused into it by changed conditions must not be construed into one of unrestricted license.

Every man is bound to observe the law with a very conscientious regard to its duties and requirements.

There are many scripture passages showing obligation to keep the Sabbath day holy. "Blessed is the man that keepeth the Sabbath from polluting it." (Isaiah 56: 2.)

"If ye diligently hearken unto me, saith the Lord,

to bring in no burden through the gates of this city on the Sabbath day; then shall there enter into the gates of this city kings and princes sitting upon the throne of David. But if ye will not hearken unto me to hallow the Sabbath day, and not to bear a burden, even entering in at the gates of Jerusalem on the Sabbath day, then will I kindle a fire in the gates thereof; and it shall devour the palaces of Jerusalem, and it shall not be quenched." (Jeremiah 17: 24-27.)

These solemn warnings are entirely applicable to our degenerate day, which would turn over the institution of the Sabbath day as a day sacred to rest from daily toil, and sacred to heavenly thought and contemplation, into a day for the active and energetic pursuit of business, or of amusement and pleasure.

God rested on the seventh day. The Sabbath is primarily rest from toil. This rest the toiler needs, whether it be rest from bodily or from mental toil.

The labors of the six days of the week are lightened and mitigated by the thought that one day of rest is near at hand. How blithely the wearied traveler journeys over the road as he nears the last day, the last hour, the last milestone that separates from home.

The growing disregard of the day of rest by our business men is doubtless in large part the reason why so many of them break down and die before their time.

"Business, business—it is a dreadful thing!" exclaimed little Miss Winterbotham, as she saw her

papa—always “on the go”—called away from home at an unseasonable hour. And so it is a dreadful thing when pursued in defiance of the Sabbath rest, and of all the warnings and threatenings of Holy Writ, which sooner or later will be executed to the extent and fullness of their language and meaning.

But not solely a day of rest, for it is “the Sabbath of the Lord thy God,” and hence has some special relation to him. The Lord blessed the Sabbath day and *hallowed* it.

This means that while it is a day of rest, it is also a day, a suitable time for spiritual exercises; for thoughts about God, communion with him, prayer and praise; and every man, and all people are more profited by the right use than by the abuse of the Sabbath.

71. SUMMARY AS TO SABBATH-DAY INSTITUTIONS.—On a general survey and review of the Sabbath-day institutions, the conclusion must be that there is one Sabbath—the seventh day set apart at the Creation by constitutional law as a day of rest sanctified to holy use; that the fourth commandment is a reminder of what ought and what ought not to be done, and goes to show that the proper observance of the Sabbath had fallen into neglect.

Hence the positive and particular requirements and the severe penalties for violation, all necessary to drill Israel, the chosen people, into a habit of obedience. True, obedience from higher motives from a pure desire to do right is the kind of obedi-

ence to be aimed at, but it is often necessary to put perverse humanity through a course of rough discipline to educate up to this high plane of duty.

As to *time*, the important point is that it be one day in seven; the seventh after six days of ordinary work.

There is no evidence that the manna began to fall on the first day of a prior series of work-days. Doubtless the original Sabbath day had been lost sight of, and the Creator made use of this necessary interposition to save the people from famine, to again institute a series of days, and to mark the Sabbath day by a double supply of food on the sixth day, and by withholding any supply on the seventh.

This visible and miraculous supply for six days, and the omission of it on the seventh, incidentally introduced again, and emphasized and enforced the Sabbath-day institution. So, too, the immediate disciples of Jesus, confirmed and established in their faith by his resurrection from the grave on the first day of the week, and by the outpouring of the Spirit and the gift of tongues also on the first day, naturally regarded the first day as the day to be observed as holy, sacred to religious uses, and so they had their assemblies for worship on the first day instead of the seventh; and thus they instituted a new week-series.

The completed six days' work of creation marked the income of the sabbatical era; so the double portion of manna on the sixth day marked the same thing.

So, too, the redemptive work of the Lord Jesus—

his advent on a mission of love and mercy, his instructions, his good deeds, his temptations cast aside, his cross and passion, his descent into the grave, were all proved, rounded and completed by his resurrection and the presence of the Spirit as the income of a more glorious Sabbath; warranting, we may say, the disciples in marking the day on which these great events took place as a new sabbatical era—the old having served its purpose. Yet man's wisdom has no sufficient warrant for this change, except on the ground of a Divine oversight and providential care in the Father of all as to the institutions of his children.

Without presuming to scan Divine reasons for these changes, it doubtless is a fact of human nature, as illustrated in the Jew, that the continued observance of one unvaried day tends to superstition and to a formal obedience as to a certain time, rather than to a true holy keeping of it—just as when the *place* of worship is magnified to the damage and loss of a true worship; as Jesus taught thus: “The hour cometh when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. God is a Spirit; and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.” (John 4: 21–24.)

So in like manner, a spiritual observance of the Sabbath is promoted and attained to when the thoughts are drawn away from an absolute time to a sabbatical commemoration of eventful eras—namely, to the Creation, to the providential care of the Father over his chosen people, and to the redemption and spirit-regeneration of man.

72. LEGISLATION SABBATICAL.—Much might be said on what legislation is necessary to discourage Sabbath-day breaking, now so common by institutions and organizations for catering to the lovers of pleasure, by business men in the prosecution of large industries, by railroad corporations, and by the government itself in its postal and other service. Doubtless there is a temperate conservative construction to be put on these matters, and others akin to them, which will be perceived and enforced when the people are so educated as to have a right knowledge and appreciation of the Sabbath day.

An editorial in "Christian Union," May 9th, 1889, indicates a growing sentiment of regard for the Sabbath:

"The New York Central Railroad, which had already reduced its traffic on Sunday to a minimum, has now, by order which went into effect on the first of May, reduced its freight traffic on Sunday about fifty per cent. The difficulties in the way of this movement, and the methods by which they are met, we have already indicated to our readers.

"It is now announced that the Erie Railroad and the Delaware & Hudson Canal Company have adopted the same policy, and will reduce to the minimum the running of all trains and railroad work on Sunday. General Diven showed in our columns last winter that such a reduction of railroad traffic is practicable, and these roads by their action are demonstrating that to this problem, as to the others, the aphorism 'Where there's a will there's a way' applies. It is said that the workmen on the roads are generally glad to get the rest day, although it necessarily involves some diminution in wages.

"The thanks of the religious community are especially due to Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt, whose persistent urgency in this matter has at length borne fruit."

73. THOUGHTS ON THE SABBATH BY BISHOP WHATELY.—Bishop Whately entirely misconstrues the scope of the Jewish Sabbath, and misleads us when he would make it a mere positive law, and thus abstract it from the decalogue. It is no positive law, the seventh day for rest. It is a law of the physical nature, and for religious thought and the exercise of the religious feelings. It is a law of the soul. After six days of toil, bodily rest naturally comes first; it must first be had, else the soul is in no fit condition for spiritual exercise.

The bishop lays stress on the "power of the church" and its "sanction" of the first day of the week as the Sabbath, but from scripture it does not appear that any power of the church was used, but that on the evening of the day of the resurrection the disciples, in view of this momentous event, naturally assembled together, and that Jesus appeared in their midst, thus sanctioning their act of assembling; also that on the next first day of the week a similar meeting took place.

Very pertinent and judicious is the note of Albert Barnes on John 20:26:

"From this it appears that they thus early set apart this day for assembling together, and Jesus countenanced it by appearing twice with them. It was *natural* that the apostles should observe this day, but not probable that they would do it without the sanction of the Lord Jesus. His repeated presence gave such a sanction, and the historical fact is indisputable that from this time this day was observed as the Christian Sabbath.

Hence it further appears that the first-day Sabbath, in lieu of the Jewish seventh-day, far from

being instituted by the "power of the church," instituted itself spontaneously, under the guidance of the providential hand, and with the sanction of the Great Head of the Church—in virtue of a natural logic of a course of supernatural events of the highest interest to man.

74. MARRIAGE.—

“Tell me, on what holy ground
 May Domestic Peace be found?
 Halcyon daughter of the skies,
 Far on fearful wing she flies,
 From the pomp of sceptred state,
 From the rebel's noisy hate;
 In a cottaged vale she dwells,
 Listening to the Sabbath bells!
 Still around her steps are seen
 Spotless Honor's meeker mien,
 Love, the sire of pleasing fears,
 Sorrow smiling through her tears,
 And, conscious of the past employ,
 Memory, bosom-spring of joy!”

—*Coleridge.*

The authority for the marriage institution is “male and female created he them,” and God blessed them and God said unto them, “Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth.” (Genesis 1: 27, 28.)

And the sacredness of marriage is enforced by “What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.” (Matthew 19: 6.)

And the holy love that should exist in wedlock is set forth thus: “Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it: that it should be holy and without blemish.”

“So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself; for no man ever yet hated his own flesh.” (Ephesians 5: 25, 33.) Marriage is honorable in all. (Hebrews 13: 4.) “And both Jesus was called, and his disciples, to the marriage.” (John 2: 2.)

The Conjugal Law: The general equality in numbers between males and females proves that the Creator designed one man for one woman; and that the union of the two must be sacred and inviolable is evidenced from the degradation and miseries, physical and moral, that are sure to accompany its violation. Hence the many scripture precepts in favor of marriage as the natural, lawful and honorable condition of life; and against all acts that are destructive of its beauty and utility and necessity in the continuance, preservation, cultivation and happiness of the human race. Among the blessings of marriage are individual happiness, numerous and well cared for children, peace in society, and good government from the increased interest of citizens under family relation, in the well-being of the state.

Hence to meet the requirements of the conjugal law, it follows that the marriage relation must be *life-long in duration*.

This Jesus taught: “The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?

“And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read that he which made them at the beginning, made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall

cleave to his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh.

“Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.” (Matthew 19: 3, 6.)

Permanent and exclusive union is, then, an essential characteristic of marriage.

75. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MARRIAGE RELATION.—(1) *Compatibility* of temper is generally held to be essential to a happy married life. This word and qualification is, however, misleading, if construed as a similarity of temper, and it is not wise to put unnecessary obstacles in the way of marriage. A *complement* in temper is of higher value and more likely to exist. It is rare that there is a marked degree of compatibility in the temper of the spouses, and unless the temper of each is mild, compatibility is not desirable.

Two persons of high temper cannot so well live together as two of a complementary temper—the one *quick*, the other *calm*. The mild-tempered spouse will not fret on account of a hasty ebullition in the quick-tempered spouse; for valuable qualities oft are conjoined with a temper quick by nature as well as with a calm one, and the opposite characteristics will gradually become *assimilated*, and each be improved thereby.

Herein we find meaning to the scripture idea of *unity, of oneness* in the *esponsals*, whereby *two* become *one flesh*; the most obvious in man, the corporeal, by synecdoche, being taken to represent the

whole man, the body and the soul. This is one of the many instances in which appears the scientific idea in the deeper philosophy of Jesus; and on this is founded the prevailing *legal status of unity*, in the espoused pair.

(2) *Mutual affection and love* is the great requirement, is the ruling element, in the marriage tie that brings and holds together man and wife; and each of the two souls thus united is bound to cherish this ruling element, love. This can be effected only by each valuing the happiness of the other more than his own—for this is of the very nature and essence of true love, so far at least as our limited understanding is able to cognize and to comprehend this subtle, deep-seated, all-pervading, all-powerful principle in human nature—love—with its peculiar electric-like characteristic in conjugal love.

This view is finely presented in *The Spectator*, No. 490.

“Marriage is an institution calculated for a constant scene of delight, as much as our being is capable of. Two persons who have chosen each other out of all the species, with design to be each other’s mutual comfort and entertainment, have in that action bound themselves to be good humored, affable, discreet, forgiving, patient and joyful, with respect to each other’s frailties and perfections, to the end of their lives.

“The wiser of the two (and it always happens one of them is such) will, for her or his own sake, keep things from outrage with the utmost sanctity. When this union is thus preserved, the most indif-

ferent circumstance administers delight ; their condition is an endless source of new gratifications. The married man can say, "If I am unacceptable to all the world beside, there is one whom I entirely love, that will receive me with joy and transport, and think herself obliged to double her kindness and caresses of me from the gloom with which she sees me overcast.

This passion towards each other, when once well fixed, enters into the very constitution, and the kindness flows as easily and silently as the blood in the veins. When this affection is enjoyed in the sublime degree, unskillful eyes see nothing of it ; but when it is subject to be changed, and has an alloy in it that may make it end in distaste, it is apt to break into rage, or overflow into fondness before the rest of the world."

Should it at any time appear that the two made one, are not one at heart, it is their duty to become so, to cultivate and cherish mutual love by a reciprocity of kind offices engaged in with courage and cheerfulness. A happy outcome can hardly fail to follow.

(3) *Congeniality* in sentiments and taste is an important requirement—to secure which there needs be some degree of equality in education, social relations, religious sentiment, and in age ; an old man's tastes do not well consort with those of a young wife.

(4) *Capability for the Common Duties of Life*.—It is the duty of the husband to provide as generously as circumstances allow for the support and comfort of the household, by manual or professional toil, or

else by the care of his estate; and it is the duty of the wife to guide the house, and to make a judicious and economical use of what is provided.

(5) *Authority*: There are times for leadership and decisive action. The superior physical strength of the man, and his wider experience in difficult affairs, naturally give him now the superiority which the gentler consort gladly yields; yet her quicker wits do often well advise.

The voice of the man should be gentle and persuasive, yet, if need be, firm and judicious.

The voice of the wife—gentle and persuasive, yet, if need be, yielding, for open revolt is contra to her nature, and weakens her influence and self-respect.

“For love is made of every fine emotion,
Of generous impulses, and noble thoughts.”

76. PREREQUISITE QUALIFICATIONS—The prerequisites, then, for a happy married life may be gathered from a consideration of the elements, duties and obligations named.

(1) *A Pure Walk and Conversation Before Marriage*: This in the gentler sex is a *sine qua non*, though even here there may be instances of reformation and restoration. These are very exceptional, and native virtue in a woman must be regarded as an essential moral element to her entrance into married life.

And for this very reason, if for no other, purity, virtue in the young man is an essential element; for when he permits unchecked desire to mislead him into seductive arts, he makes of himself a fool, as well as a criminal of very low grade; for nothing can

be more criminal than to assail that virtue which is not only the highest ornament of womanhood, but which is of much greater value to her than is life itself.

Such a young man is not fit for the true conjugal life; and never could find and possess the real joy and happiness that is peculiar to it. He will always feel cheap, and feel, too, the sting of conscience for his past misdeeds—if indeed such an one have a conscience—and if not, he should have no wife.

The restraint here indicated is authoritatively enforced in scripture. “Flee also youthful lusts.” (II Timothy 2: 22.)

“For this is the will of God, even your sanctification. . . . That every one of you should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honor . . . For God hath not called us unto uncleanness, but unto holiness.” (I Thessalonians 4: 3-7.)

(2) *An Education* and bringing up such as shall fit young people for overcoming adversities in life, as well as for the temperate and proper enjoyment of favoring circumstances.

The young man should know how to do something so well that he can make a respectable living at it, and must have a willing mind to do it, if there be need.

The bride, even though brought up in the luxuries of wealth, should yet love industry, and should be skilled in the art and practice of economy in the use of time, in dress, and in culinary and other household affairs.

“For riches oft take to themselves wings.”

(3) *Knowledge of Requirements:* 1. In view of the

requirements in the marriage state, an obvious prerequisite is that the negotiating parties should have a reasonably clear understanding of what will be their duties and rights after marriage.

2. How far there is on each side a good-will and capability to meet duties. To this end there must be entire mutual confidence and sincerity in a review of their own qualifications and disqualifications; no concealment from each other of faults and differences in traits of character and in sentiments.

3. It should be considered and discussed as to how far these faults and differences are obstacles, and as to how easy or difficult it will be to overcome them.

4. It must, too, be taken into account that "love is blind," especially that when in the pursuit of its object, to its enthusiasm, all things seem possible.

5. Hence, if an understanding is arrived at, it is well to have a written memorandum thereof, so that in case of a "family jar," it can be determined wherein is the departure, and thus correct data be readily obtained for the remedy and a new start.

77. DIVORCE.—To the inquiry why Moses allowed the wife to be put away with a writing of divorce-ment, Jesus replies:

"Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery;

and whoso marrieth her which is put away, doth commit adultery. (Matthew 19: 8, 9.)

It is with reference to the true ideal sense of restraint, that of wanton thoughts, that these scripture precepts are given. "Husbands, love your wives;" "the wife see that she reverence her husband;" and others of like import. When these conditions of the marriage relation, if ever they existed, have been lost sight of and have departed, and when ill-treatment and abuse become frequent, or desertion follows, there is evidence of adultery in the affections and thoughts of the soul, and a wise and discriminating judge may find sufficient grounds for *separation* and the separate maintenance of the woman and her children, though not for an absolute divorce.

The limitation of rights in case of separation, the impossibility of contracting another matrimonial alliance without loss of social standing and liability to law, are wholesome restraints tending to inculcate the duty of suffering rather than break the marriage tie tending to aid in preserving a constitution of human nature so essential to civilization and the well-being of mankind.

Jesus enunciates the principle on which divorce is allowable, and leaves it to the logic of man's understanding to make laws and rulings which—if not attaining to the perfect ideal—shall at least gravitate towards and constantly approach it.

78. THE THEOCRACY.—The entire Jewish nationality was a theocratic institution now historical, yet

it will always speak and testify to men. Its one grand purpose was to make known to all the people of the earth the One True God; and to foreshadow and symbolize the more spiritual kingdom of the promised Messiah, by the calling of Abraham out of Chaldea, by the preservation and aggrandizement of Joseph, and of Moses taught "in all the wisdom of the Egyptians," schooled into meekness by forty years of exile, the Lord then appearing to him to commission him as the leader and deliverer of his people from four hundred years of Egyptian bondage, by the sublime revelations of moral law and religious duty at Mount Sinai, by the forty years' discipline of a rebellious people in their wanderings through the wilderness, by triumphs and defeats in entering into the Promised Land, and by the felt presence of Jehovah in the holy tabernacle and in the ark of the covenant, supplemented by the ministry of the prophets illustrious in their impassioned appeals, dire predictions of calamities impending over the disobedient, with promises of prosperity and joy due to obedience to the Divine will, the entire and willing acceptance of the monotheistic idea not being drilled into the cognition and the affections of this chosen people, till their sins were brought home to the entire consciousness by the dreadful experiences of the seventy years of Babylonish captivity, when they took up the plaint,

"By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down,
Yea, we wept when we remembered Zion;
We hanged our harps upon the willows in the midst thereof,
For how shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land!"

From that time on, the Jews have been a faithful witness to the One God, and through the logic of their prophetic utterances verified by history they yet testify to extra-grace and spirit-power under the Messianic economy, over and above that justice and mercy revealed in the tables of the Sinai law.

79. THE STATE, INSTITUTIONAL.—*Its origin, idea, objects :*

Its Origin: Men and most animals are of a social nature. With the brute creation, it is a matter of instinct. They herd or flock together or go in pairs, for sake not only of companionship, but from instinctive feeling that safety lies in it.

Men consort in the family relation, and the social institutions growing out of it, because man was created not in isolation, but in and for society; and men associate in tribal and national relations for sake of the accruing benefits, in maintaining peace and quiet and good order—a prosperity of affairs—and for a ready means of defense against internal discord and foreign foes. Hence outside of family government there is developed a patriarchal government; and beyond this circle are the wider ones of provincial and state governments, each having its own sphere of duty—the several parts being comprised in one whole, as a necessary idea of governmental relation.

Its Idea: The idea of a state as a whole includes the idea of all the institutions and laws that naturally and necessarily belong to the constitution, written or unwritten, of an ideal state.

The existing state constitution can be regarded as an approximation—and always only as an approximation—more or less close to the ideal which we should aim at.

Thus, for instance, if we assume as an ideal that all the employments or business interests of all citizens should be equally and fairly represented by each and all of the legislative delegates; and if we then look at the facts, we see that in England, for instance, the House of Lords is supposed to represent more particularly and specially the interests of the owners of the soil—that is—their own interests; while the House of Commons represents the manufacturing and trading pursuits.

Whereas, by our assumed ideal, there ought to be a largeness of view and a moral element wherein each legislator or delegate should equally regard all interests; but owing to the prejudices and imperfection of human nature, we must be content with the best results attainable—only not neglecting to cultivate those better qualities that tend to the better way.

Its Objects: (1) To afford protection to each and every individual in accord with his natural rights and acquired rights.

(2) Reciprocally, on the ground of said protection, to require of each citizen such service as may be necessary to secure the welfare of the state by an efficient administration of its affairs in peace and in war; also strict honesty in all his dealings with the state.

(3) To bestow on its citizens such education, cul-

ture and franchise as shall qualify them to act the part and perform the duties of good, patriotic and useful citizens, in upholding and perfecting the laws, institutions and government.

80. THE CHURCH AS AN INSTITUTION.—In the United States the church is not an institution that has any legal authority in civil affairs. As to this Daniel Webster thus expounds: “The Constitution of the United States forbids to unite any church with the state, and so create an establishment of religion; yet this does not argue that we have no religion; for religion is presupposed and recognized by all our institutions and by every legal instrument.”

In most civilized and christianized countries, there is a so-called union of Church and State.

This does not mean that there is a union of the Christian religion and of civil law in the determination and administration of public affairs; for this would be contra to the idea and the ground-principle of religion as spiritual, and hence (*sui generis*) as distinct from the kingdoms of the world; and so in this view a union of Church and State is impracticable—even necessarily impossible. But it means that the church, organized as an institution to represent and propagate religion, is surreptitiously, illogically and unnaturally made use of by the people, the state or the sovereignty to assist in the construction and maintenance of government.

Some advantages for the time being may have resulted from such a union. The chief is that the

learning for which the clergy are noted is applied by state authority and support directly to the education of the people in morals and religion, as well as to legislation and the administration of public affairs.

Prior to the art of printing, and in the years of its infancy, books were scarce and too costly for common people, and learning was limited for most part to church functionaries, and naturally the duty of instruction was allotted to the clerical orders in the church; hence the clergy, representing the culture of the people, and performing the important duties of instructing them in morals and religion, and in other branches of education so far as in use, came to be regarded as a constituent of the state—as the leading estate of a kingdom—the other important estates being represented by the landowners and by the mercantile and manufacturing industries of the realm. Hence that union of interests and powers called church and state, which was not primarily a union of the spiritual and the temporal; but the clergy, whose office and duties pertained to spiritualities, necessarily gave much of their time to instruction in those branches of education needed by the people to insure the well-being of the kingdom in temporal things.

Hence the clergy began to claim rights and powers that do not belong to them, for in reality there can be no union of church and state, in and according to the true idea of each—the church (*ecclesia*) being an assembly of persons called out from the world to contemplate, and as a church to occupy

themselves about, questions purely moral and religious.

Theoretically there can be no contradiction between the service of the church and of the state, and in practice there need not be, and should not be. The clergyman, in his office as pastor, priest or prophet, serves the church; as a citizen, and with views of duty enlightened and enlarged by his superior literary acquirements—the scriptures inclusive—he serves the state. The two functions are entirely distinct, yet harmonize, when rightly apprehended. The two kingdoms—the temporal and the spiritual—do not blend nor coalesce; there is no union of elements. They are parallel forces, and should tend in one direction, and, in a truly natural sense, to one end; for each and both the spiritual and the temporal should flow from one fountain—the true and the right.

81. DISADVANTAGES OF A CHURCH AND STATE UNION.—The chief *disadvantages* of a Church and State union are :

(1) That this union inculcates a false idea of religion—its nature and office—exalting the formal and the temporal to the loss of the spiritual.

(2) It invests the church and the clergy with powers, dignities and duties that do not pertain to their primal function and essential character as priest, pastor, teacher in the relations of man to the great Creator, Law-giver and Redeemer.

Thus in England, the church is charged with the duty of instruction at large, and in virtue of

this important function and service, it becomes one of the estates of the realm; namely, one of the powers of the government; the high ecclesiastics, the bishops, archbishops being entitled, *ex-officio*, to seats in Parliament—their bishoprics being endowed at government expense with ample revenues.

(3) It invests the government with powers and duties that do not properly pertain to it. In England the king appoints the bishops to their bishoprics. Henry VIII, by consent of Parliament, assumed the title of "Head of the Church"—a misnomer except in a sense not applicable to the church, but applicable to its clergy in their relation not to the church, but to the state alone; namely, in the sense that the king, in virtue of his office, may have power to appoint or to remove the clergyman, so far as relates to the use of the clergy in state interests, as educators of the people, and as representing in Parliament the educational interests of the realm—thus far the clergy being and constituting one of the estates of the kingdom. In France, "The Estates General" consisted of the nobles, the clergy, the commons—the middle class in towns and the peasantry.

The distinction between service due to the state and service due to the church is clearly made by Jesus when he says:

"Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." (Matthew 22 : 31.)

(4) The church and its dignitaries become puffed

up, and claim more than the people and their rulers at first intended.

Thus in England, extensive properties assigned to and possessed by the lords of the soil and the barons, were bestowed upon the church—that church which was recognized as the national church. But the question arises, what form of Christianity should be national, or should be the established church?

The question gives rise to contentions, tumults, fightings, wars, and finally to cruel persecutions for religious opinions, which the party in power hold to be heretical; all which is entirely at variance with the letter and spirit of pure religion, of “the wisdom that is from above, first pure, then peaceable, gentle and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits.” (James 3 : 17.)

But *tempora mutantur* [times changed] and interests change with them; and by a revulsion of feeling consequent upon its usurpations, and its abuses in doctrine and practice, the church is now stripped of its ill-got wealth, and more too—is deprived of much even that properly belonged to it.

82. PUBLIC EDUCATION, INSTITUTIONAL.—Under the several heads Education as social, ethical, natural and logical, the public function of education has been discussed somewhat, and there is little occasion for its further consideration.

Education begins in the family; the parents have the first right and duty in the education of children in their early years. In ancient times this was gen-

crally the only instruction children received—very meagre—the source being low. Often home education and training is very defective, and of tendency to evil from the ignorance or the moral weakness of parents, as in the case of the high priest Eli, who from indolence and lack of moral courage allowed his sons to fall into evil ways—to the ruin of himself and his house; for we read that—

“When the messenger announced that Israel had fled before the Philistines, and that his two sons Hophni and Phinehas were dead and the ark of God taken, Eli fell from off his seat backward and died, and his daughter in law, Phinehas’ wife, named her infant child Ichabod, saying, The glory is departed from Israel, for the ark of God is taken.” (I Samuel 12.)

And *Ichabod* is written in the history of every people when morality and religion is neglected in the education of its youth.

Warlike states like Rome, Sparta, exercised control over their youth, but for martial purposes. They were educated to the arts of war, not of peace; hence their education was physical—a mere training for strength and agility, and in the use of weapons. But from the need of culture and training to secure qualities serviceable to the state and nation in time of war, there arose the general idea of duty on the part of the state in providing means of education. This is specially true in Christian countries—in several enlightened states of Europe, as well as in the United States of America. Here with us the system of public education takes the place the national

church in England has been wont to occupy in general education.

83. FAMILY; STATE—WHICH?—At times the question has arisen as to the *superiority* in educational interests, Shall the parent or the state determine what the child shall be taught?

This is quite like the question of superiority in the family itself, as between man and wife. Each has its own sphere of duties and rights, and each in its own sphere has the superiority.

In a well informed and well regulated household this question of superiority will never arise; neither side will encroach upon the other. But if the wife, without reason, claims rights that do not belong to her, the man may assert his superiority; on the other hand, if the man, without reason, claims rights, the woman may not be able to assert superiority.

In a moral as well as a legal view, the question of superiority must be subordinate to that of duty.

Under Democratic-Republican institutions, education to a certain extent, and to a large extent, must be in common; that the youth in all stations in life may learn to respect each other, and to mingle together in public on an easy footing of kind regard born of youthful associations and a recognition of common interests and of manly virtues.

The question, then, is one of duty, and can become one of superiority only when duty fails.

In education, what duties do the individual and

the family owe to the state ; and what does the state owe to them ?

It is an ethical question in moral and civic relations.

As individuals and as families, men are in duty bound to realize a culture that best qualifies for citizenship and the service of the state ; and on the other hand, the state, in the interest of the people and of progressive life-giving, life-preserving institutions, is bound to require of the individual and of the family this necessary culture whenever a deficiency occurs—from whatever cause—whether from the general laxity of chronic ignorance and indolence, or from the tendencies of a partial or misleading or vicious home or private education.

84. CAPITAL: LABOR—THE IDEA.—Before we can advisedly enter upon an ethic view of capital and labor in their relation to each other, it is necessary that we have some preliminary consideration and understanding of their economic principles.

(1) *Capital is not Labor*, though in the United States the capitalist largely combines his own labor with his capital, and in general is a hard worker.

Capital derives its meaning from *caput*, the head, and implies that Mind—wisdom and prudence—has been exercised in taking care of the united products of prior capital and labor to secure means for the employment of present and future labor.

Capital in its idea also includes material ; it means the supply of all that is necessary to keep work at work.

The farmer-capitalist provides land, teams, farm machinery, seed, and also food and cash, the wages of his hired help.

The manufacturer provides mills, power, material or raw stock, and suitable machinery for its manufacture, as well as cash wages for the employee.

Capital is like the main-spring of a watch; it sets all the wheels in motion; and when capital is destroyed by fire or flood or riot, there is so much less power for the employment of labor.

(2) *Labor is not Capital.*—It is becoming fashionable to speak of labor as the capital of the laboring man; but labor is not capital—is not entitled to the earnings of capital; it is a misnomer and a misleading notion which a public lecturer or teacher will now and then carelessly give utterance to; it tends to the erroneous notion that the laborer has a right to some of the profits of capital; but he has a right only to fair compensation for good work in aid of capital prosecuting the business, whether there be profit or loss. If we say that labor is capital, and hence that the laborer is entitled to share in the profits, by parity of reasoning we also say that he must share in the loss, when there is one, as is often the case.

It is true that in a continual course of prosperity or of adversity—"good times, hard times"—the wages of labor will advance or decline, as they should; but the present time or season can alone be regarded in determining wages.

There may be, and often is, by agreement, a share of "profit and loss" accorded to the old and

skilled employee. This arrangement proves beneficial. Thereby the employee becomes, in some degree, a partner and a capitalist. He puts his intellect, skill and attention more to the work; takes increased interest.

This is what he gives—the *quid pro quo*—to entitle him to a share in profit and loss, and in a qualified sense to be called a capitalist—not in a full sense—unless he also puts in *material* to work on.

(3) *The wages of Labor* means what wages or pay, in the medium of exchange—gold or silver coin—a man is entitled to in virtue of what he accomplishes or produces by muscular exertion. If the laborer furnishes his own tools; the woodchopper his axe; the stone-mason his hammers; the plasterer his trowels; the farm hand his hoe—these tools are to be regarded as an extension of the man's muscular ability; and so also is his skill and effectiveness in the use of tools and machinery to be counted as an adjunct of manual labor. The *amount* of wages then depends directly on the quantity and quality of the work done, of the fabric produced, and the *value of wages* thus determined in amount depends on its power in purchasing such things as the laborer needs.

(4) *Value of Products*: The capitalist, the producer, is justified in valuing his products only by the quantity and quality of the labor used in their production, as compared with the quantity and quality of the labor employed in producing those goods which he gets in exchange.

Thus, if a farmer in harvest time, on account of a

scarcity of help, pays three dollars per diem wages, he gets no more for his wheat, oats or hay than if he paid but one dollar per day—which is, perhaps, all he can pay without loss, when wheat is less than one dollar per bushel. The extra wages he has paid does not at all raise the market price of wheat. He can adjust the loss only by extra curtailment in family expenses, or in the rate of wages to his regular help. He must rob Peter to pay Paul.

So is it with the lumberman and the manufacturers of wool and of cotton goods; the market value of their products does not depend on the cost of labor, but on the quantity and quality of the labor put into them as compared with that put into what they receive in exchange—supplies, machinery, wool, cotton, cash. This is the underlying principle in estimating the value of goods sold and bought. Of course it is modified by accidents—as a shortage or a superabundance in supply or in demand; but these accidents, for most part, are too dimly foreshadowed to modify labor contracts.

(5) *Value of Labor*: The value of labor to the employer of it depends also upon what he can obtain in exchange for the products of labor, after deducting a fair proportion for his own time and skill in supervision, and for the *use* and *risk* of his capital in aid of production.

The due adjustment of wages is, then, a complicated matter, in which no one is more competent to judge than the employer himself, who in reason can see through his own business better than another.

85. UNION OF CAPITAL; UNION OF LABOR.—Man is of a social nature, and those persons who by similarity of work or business are exercised in like thoughts, feelings and habits, have a natural fondness for each other's company, because between them an interchange of ideas is comparatively easy; and too, the social nature is stimulated by the hope of advantage from a comparison of views, and their practical application in their business or vocation.

The union also tends to develop the better feelings of human nature in this: a selfish nature might argue thus: I know some things about my business that my business-fellows do not know; this gives me an advantage over them. I will hold on to it, by keeping my own counsel and secrets. But good-will and the social sentiments say: Let me impart to my fellows this knowledge, for it accords with the precepts of scripture, as well as with the law of nature, that a man should look not merely upon his own affairs, but upon those of his neighbor in a beneficent, not a meddling sense.

To the credit of business circles in the United States, this is almost the universal rule and practice. If a business man discovers an improvement or better way in his method of manufacture, it is a pleasure to him to make it known to his confrères; and, in fact, this is really his interest, for the moral consideration far outweighs the temporary money profit.

From natural and habitual abilities or defects there will be differences great and positive in men in the conduct of business, as well as accidental cir-

cumstances, that result in success or failure; and these necessary differences should not be increased and aggravated by a disregard of the amenities of life arising from mutual counsel, advice, and even aid when needed, not from lack of industry and fair ability, but from unforeseen causes.

Herein, then, is the underlying *ethic-principle* in the union of capital or of labor. It must be grounded in the natural law of social fraternity, and of *good-will* applied to beneficent purposes.

As an instance of the right kind of labor-union, we cite to that old "Society of Mechanics," organized 1784 in New York city for mutual aid and encouragement and assistance to members and to their widows and orphans in case of need. Since then they have accomplished other useful work, founded a mechanics' bank, a mechanics' school, library, reading room, courses of lectures—all praiseworthy, legitimate and practical objects.

86. THE UNION AS A REGULATOR OF WAGES.—Were men always actuated by enlightened views of their moral relations, there would be no need of any objects in the "union" other than those already named; but offenses will come.

The capitalist and the laborer should agree on fair terms without outside aid or interference, and, if let alone, almost always will. There should be no desire and no effort by either party to unduly reduce or advance wages.

In case, however, of individual disagreements, the "business circle"—the "labor circle" may separately

and mutually determine what is fair; and, if no agreement is thereby arrived at, the two parties must, in a spirit of good-will, agree to disagree, even though it may lead to a rupture of relations and change.

The regulative union must be a union limited to one locality and to one line of business. Under no circumstances would it be right to extend the circle of disagreement to include other lines of business in the same locality, or like lines in other localities. This would be combination and conspiracy on the part of capitalists or of laborers, or of both, to bring about a crisis and disaster in some one line, or in all lines of business, to the distress of the public at large.

If it be said that it would be as wrong for a small and limited union of employers and of employees to assume and maintain contra views as for a larger union, the easy reply is, that the conditions of the same trade differ in different localities, and hence a local question is not a general one, and neither local parties nor outside parties have right to assume that it is; and further, the local dispute, though disagreeable and harmful, cannot result in great harm; and yet is harmful enough to serve as a lesson to all to avoid such disagreement if possible; but, on the other hand, for either capital or labor to enlarge the circle of disagreement manifests a deliberate intention to carry one's point by coercion and force, and has no moral standpoint. It would be an act worthy of public condemnation and stringent legislation, municipal, state and United States.

87. CAPITAL COMBINATION, AS ABNORMAL.—
The combination of capital for the purpose of enhancing profits by means of too low wages, or by high prices for food, fuel, light and fabrics of any sort, are artificial organizations immoral in intent and in tendency, and destructive of individual and public rights. Chiefly is this true of monopolies; specially so of those miscalled trusts. Such organizations should be tolerated only when under subjection to state legislation and the judiciary informed and advised by a competent inquisition.

88. THE LABOR UNION, AS ABNORMAL.—

“Act well your part, there all the honor lies.”

—*Essay on Man.*

A chief objection to organizations of this sort is that they deaden every sentiment like the one Pope gives us in the line here cited.

Naturally men are ambitious to distinguish themselves in competition and in comparison with their fellow men, and this ambition is a very proper and beneficial one, provided it be not conjoined with a feeling of triumph over those whom we excel. The desire to excel in everything laudable is itself also laudable, and without this desire we can have no hope of success in life. But this honest and necessary desire is repressed and trampled upon when men are banded together in a labor union that practically requires the employer to pay the same wages to each man without regard to the difference in the value of the work done in severalty. Thus it is that

the leading principle in the labor union is unnatural, abnormal and harmful to the well being of the social compact; and thus it is that the labor union as a permanent institution cannot last, unless it be put upon a natural basis. When men become educated by study and experience—even dear bought experience—to their true relations, each to the other, “every tub will stand on its own bottom;” that is, in the sense of getting a living—and of “getting on in the world.” Each man should hoe his own row; and if from inability he falls behind so far as to really need help, then help should be cheerfully given from a sentiment of charity—brotherly love—not from a pretense of his being entitled to it as wages. There are few men that would need help if they were not encouraged in idleness and inefficiency by being placed on a par with the skilled and the industrious. Good work is almost always in good demand. The manufacturer, the man of large affairs in whatever business, cannot do without it, and in general will pay well for it.

In labor unions, abnormal, there is a subjection of individual responsibility to the dictum of the few or the many.

The result is arbitrary power and tyranny destructive of a proper self-respect and independence in the individual, and of all elements essential to the education of men in right ideas of freedom and civil liberty; and to the commonwealth, as well as to business prosperity and enterprise, they are as pestiferous as wild oats or Canada thistles in a wheat field.

Anarchy and some secret societies tend to like results, and are of a treasonable character.

A lawful union or combination becomes unlawful when by its acts the rights of others are invaded; it is then a conspiracy. "An officer may throw up his commission when he likes, but if a number of officers combine to throw up their commissions at the same time, it is a punishable act."

Other evils of the labor union in late years are: (1) The employer has no free choice in hiring men, and is oppressed by a "strike," ordered when heavy contracts are in hand; (2) injustice, by ranking the indolent and unskilled with the honest laborer; (3) tyranny and oppression towards apprentices; (4) intimidation and abuse of workmen not in the union; (5) intimidation of capitalists, and so industries are driven to other places and countries, and the very source of their own living is dried up; (6) the violent and criminal in the union fearfully championed; (7) the home and family circle neglected; (8) destructiveness and lawlessness an habitual pastime.

89. THE SUM AND THE MORAL.—The sum and the moral of it is that liberty and free institutions are endangered by overgrown organizations, and that they have no right to exist under conditions hostile to the public good, and so a menace to the peace and dignity of the state.

The ignorant and the evil minded imagine that free institutions are established to favor oppression, lawlessness, anarchy; and for them not only mis-

sionary work is in order, but severe law, if need be, to disabuse them of ideas so contradictory and mischievous. Moral suasion will educate and civilize the well-disposed, but not those whose good-will, weak by nature, has been spoiled by bad training, bad company and bad counsel.

These can be made wise only according to Proverbs 26: 3: "A whip for the horse, a bridle for the ass, and a rod for the fool's back."

If capital and labor cannot walk together in unity, then let us have the health, peace and happiness there is in the poverty of small affairs and economic living, each in the measure of his fitness and ability, and so let there be a due limit set by law to capital and to labor centralization. Two other suggestions and we close.

Suggestion 1. That as unions of either capital or labor have legal existence only perforce of legislation, general or special, and in conformity to what is just and right, there should be a court of appeal for the settlement of all questions between capital and labor—but not to include cases wherein the capital is comparatively small, and the men employed few in number. Let these take care of themselves on the general law of supply and demand. The extent of the limitation is not so important as the fact. The condition might apply to a capital of \$500,000, and to an employment of five hundred men. It is the large corporations or trusts that are abnormal and oppressive, and it is where large numbers of men are employed by one corporation that it becomes a hardship to be thrown out of employment,

whether it be by their own error or by that of the employer.

Suggestion 2. That co-operative work is practicable and successful when engaged in by honest, capable men—and no business succeeds without these qualifications in the management. Let the strike take this form when capitalists refuse justice to the employed.

Let laborers become capitalists by pooling their savings. "Many a little makes a mickle."

If men individually and collectively have not faith for this departure, then let them be content with their wages—such as they can obtain in virtue of good work, and without resort to unjustifiable, arbitrary measures.

90. PUBLIC EDUCATION (*note*).—It has already been indicated that this education should be in the inculcation of true principles of liberty, individual, religious, civil and political, to secure the true qualities of a good citizen, which can be found only in enlightened moral, religious manhood—in a knowledge of those branches of philosophy, science and art that directly tend to educate the people for general usefulness, and in true ideas of liberty and patriotism.

This proposition, as stated in general terms, all admit; but when we come to particulars, there are diverse voices. For instance: Archbishop Ireland read before the National Educational Association convened (July, 1890) at St. Paul, Minn., a paper on "Religious Education in Schools," which contained

many timely truths. Some of his valuable words as reported read thus:

“The State must come forward as an agent of instruction, else ignorance will prevail. Indeed, in the absence of state action, there never was that universal instruction which we have so nearly attained, and which we deem necessary.”

“There is dissatisfaction with the state school as at present organized. The state school, it is said, tends to the elimination of religion from the minds and hearts of the youth of the country. The great mass of the children receive no fireside lessons, and attend no Sunday-school, and the great mass of the children of America are growing up without religion.”

“Do not say that the state school teaches morals, christians demand religion. Morals, without the positive principles of religion, giving to them root and sap, do not exist.”

These, and many similar utterances which our limited space excludes, well indicate the defects in moral and religious education which it is the main object of this volume to remove.

As to the objection of this eminent prelate to religious instruction in the public-school, on the ground that it would not have the stamp of catholicity, and on the ground of conscience scruples—it is not in the province of this book to regard these matters, except to refer the reader to the consideration of the function of the conscience as herein and as generally held—its authority and its limitations from liability to error, through ignorance, perversity and a one-sided education, and that the religious conscience can have no standing in its claim for reverential regard save when it is grounded upon the moral conscience. Otherwise the religious conscience plea is liable to be carried to an abusive

extent. It was against the religious conscience of Robert Morris to fight an enemy, yet he gladly gave to his country the aid of his great ability in providing the sinews of war.

Further, we point to the ground-principle in this volume—to the doctrine of necessary and universal thought in religion—in christianity—in morals and other science, as a “stamp of catholicity” upon the very substance of religion, to wit, conviction of sin, faith in God’s provision for man’s redemption, hope and joy in the appropriation of it, eventuating in good works. Let the scholar study into this substance and possess it, if he will; then can each array truth in such raiment of ritual, church polity and creed, as his own observation and the social and church influence he is in contact with, may approve. Nor will men who are self-satisfied, and see no need of Divine aid to improve their situation, stand in the way of a scientific and logical investigation, and so act the part of the dog in the manger—neither eat hay nor let the ox eat it.

The State of Wisconsin has spent a sum of money in trying to determine the proper way of cutting a seed potato to give the best results. After all experimenting, the official in charge could only say that at times the longitudinal cut, or the transverse, or the clip of the eye-end, or even the potato planted whole would do best; it depended much on the soil and the spell of weather. Of one thing, however, the farmer might be sure: to insure a good crop, the potato-slip with not less than one good,

sound eye must be planted, in good soil and well cultivated.

This is exactly what is requisite in public school education. The moral and religious nature in boys and girls must be planted in generous soil—not in one barren of religious elements, and must be duly cultivated and kept clear of weeds.

State officials, doctors of divinity, doctors of law—for the legal mind from the nature of its employment has enlarged views of religion—would be competent to determine what are the necessary laws of life and growth, when they could say nothing certain about sectarian dogmas, politics and creeds—all which though very valuable in their way as tending by discussion to keep alive essential truths, and as auxiliaries in promoting growth and progress, do in themselves contain but little of the essentials, and unless guardedly stated and rightly explained are apt to mislead the unthinking into the crude idea that religion is a matter of form rather than of substance—a matter of dogmatic statement, and of positive enactment, and not—that it is a constitutional provision in the soul, and a law of the spirit in man in his relation to the Divine law and government—for law and order pervade all the works and acts of God including a Law of Grace whereby “Justice and mercy meet together.”

We must always distinguish widely between the work of the school-room by instruction in the principles of a science of religion, and the work of the church in the practical and effectual application of

those principles to the reclamation of the sinner and his preparation for the life that now is, and is to come. On the other hand, instruction in the substance—the necessary truths of religion—prepares the scholar to receive the aid of the church, or else, as circumstances determine, fits him to go on alone in the attainment of a right life here and of a higher life hereafter.

These two lines of duty: That of the state in moral and religious instruction, and that of the church in reclamation and edification in no way interfere or overlap, and the state's work is not sectarian, nor can be; and is in no manner a union of church and state, nor contra to the constitution of the United States; but rather it is a positive duty of the state to do this work, to secure to all our youth elementary education in all philosophy and science, to widen the sphere of their ideas and feelings and to put their souls in a large place high above the low plane of a strictly secular or sectarian line of thought.

EXPLANATORY NOTES.

SECTION I. Note 1. KANT, IMMANUEL [1724-1804]: A distinguished German philosopher and professor in the University of Königsberg. The leading feature of his philosophy is that the mind itself furnishes a cognitive factor or element that transcends that in sensation, hence the transcendentalism of his philosophy; contra to Locke, John [1632-1704], an English philosopher, of an easy, popular style, who held the source of cognition and knowledge to be in sensation—the mind itself being regarded as a blank, or as white paper, till furnished from without.

Hume, David [Edinburgh, 1711-1776], accepting the philosophy of Locke, deduced therefrom that the *idea* of "cause and effect" is acquired from experience, in seeing one thing or appearance follow another in regular order; hence we could have no idea of a First Cause, because not in the field of sensation, or in the range of our observation.

This legitimate result of Locke's theory makes the feature of Hume's philosophy, and marks it as skeptical, in the sense that it gives no sure origin or ground of knowledge, neither of the world nor of its Creator. But Locke had a faith in the scriptures

that saved him from spiritual skepticism—from the logical tendency of his own philosophy.

Note 2. CATEGORIES: The *à priori* or pure notions of the understanding, to wit: notions as to Quantity, Quality and Relation or Reciprocity. They are functions of the understanding employed in the cognition of objects.

SEC. 2. Note 1. CICERO, MARCUS TULLIUS [b. 106 B.C.], an illustrious Roman orator, philosophical writer and statesman, called "the father of his country" for his defeat of the Catiline conspiracy. As an author he was voluminous and distinguished for beauty and clearness of style and thought.

Note 2. DE OFFICIIS: the title of Cicero's admirable treatise on the Duties of Life.

Note 3. DEAL with yourself—conscientiously examine motives.

Note 4. SCHOOLS: Sects in philosophy; the reference here is to the Epicureans, who see a supreme good in pleasure.

Note 5. INSTITUTES: Determines its location and in what it consists.

Note 6. CHIEF GOOD: The highest end of life.

Note 7. BOUND by the excellency of nature; *i. e.*, native good sense and disposition restrains and counteracts the effect of the false principle of life he has instituted.

Note 8. HONESTY: In Cicero's usage here stands for all the virtues.

Note 9. CHARACTER OF CERTITUDE: Propositions necessarily true have this character; for example, the geometrical axioms—a straight line is the

shortest possible; parallels do not meet; and all theorems logically reasoned therefrom.

So in the domain of morals, there is certitude when the moral quality of an act is immediately perceived or is self-evident, as in feeding the hungry, succoring the distressed, obeying the Creator. Also there are *moral sentiments* that carry within themselves a conviction of truth to nature; for instance, of this kind is the utterance of Chremes in one of Terence's comedies, thus:

"I am a man, and nothing human is foreign to me."

At this sentiment, all the people rose up with a shout of approval, because of its accord with everybody possessed of the right feelings of humanity.

NOTE 10. O SON MARCUS: Cicero is writing *De Officiis* for the benefit of his son, whom he had sent to Athens to study Greek philosophy.

NOTE 11. FORM AND FEATURES OF VIRTUE: This is a very expressive figure of speech, personifying the abstract idea, Virtue. We can judge something of a man's character by his features—the expression of his countenance; but in self-examination and in self-consciousness we have a clear view of our own inner moral features.

SEC. 3. NOTE 1. PLATO: A noted Greek philosopher; his main purpose was to exhibit principles in the art of method in the investigation of truth. His most interesting doctrine is that of *innate ideas*, that is, forms of things in the intellect, as of a circle or other geometrical figure—these evidently are *mental* types, because as perfect forms they are not found

in the reality of nature; and forms of the abstract sentiments and feelings of the soul—as of truth, duty, right, beauty.

Note 2. IDEAL REPUBLIC: The central object of the Platonic philosophy; a body politic or state as near perfection as may be—not so much by means of its riches and material prosperity as in the right education and training of the people in sentiments of patriotism and in all the virtues.

SEC. 4. Note 1. ALLEGORY: The presentation of something real by an imaginary picture of resemblances, as in “the Vine;” also in Bunyan’s *Pilgrim’s Progress* is a fine instance of the allegorical method; also in the eightieth Psalm.

Note 2. DE FINIBUS: Cicero’s treatise on the inquiries of different sects of philosophers into the *chief-good* of man—ills inclusive, for the full title is *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*—the Latin, *finis*; the Greek, *telos*—the end of things good and evil, because as the summum bonum—chief-good—this end itself can be referred to nothing else, but all must be referred to it. In Ancient philosophy, physical pain and evil were in general contrasted with pleasure and “the good.”

The poet Ennius, as Cicero quotes him, modifies this view thus:

“The man who feels no evil does
Enjoy too great a good.”

This sentiment, that pain is not an unmixed evil, is found in a “philosophy of life” regarded as progressive or evolutionary, wherein pain is one of the

necessary forces of nature; and in the deep philosophy of scripture, it is a necessary force of positive value in the development and lasting perfection of the moral nature. See Job; Psalms 119: 71; Romans 8: 17-23; I Peter 1: 6, 7, *et passim*.

Note 3. PYTHIAN APOLLO: A heathen god; son of Jupiter, famous for his oracles. On the site of his temple he slew the Python, a monster serpent—hence the cognomen Pythian.

Note 4. ETHICALLY OBEYS: From moral feelings and considerations, not from constraint.

SEC. 5. Note 1. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY: The reference here is to philosophy as cultivated by the Greeks.

Note 2. EPICUREAN: So called from Epicurus, a noted and popular teacher of philosophy, who lived just after Plato's time. His principle placed the *telos*, *finis*, or the *summum bonum*, in pleasure; yet Epicurus is credited with a simple and frugal habit of life. Cicero finds fault not with the man himself, but with the tendency of his narrow, low view of life to mislead his numerous disciples and followers.

Note 3. STOIC: A sect or school of philosophy founded by Zeno. The name comes from *stoa*, the *porch* where Zeno taught. It was a pictured portico, the most famous in Athens, hence Stoic literally means "the man of the porch." Their doctrines are indicated in the text.

PERIPATETIC—*walking about*: This name comes from the public walk in the Lycæum, which the disciples of this school frequented.

Note 4. NECESSARY AND UNIVERSAL: Necessary, as inborn, constitutional: Universal, as self-evident to the soul of man, and so acceptable to all men.

SEC. 6. Note 1. CATEGORICAL-IMPERATIVE: The self-determination of the moral law, through man's moral and rational nature; hence this moral law is constitutional law—and therefore is imperative, as well as universal.

Note 2. UNIVERSAL LAW: See section 5, note 4; section 6, note 1.

Note 3. INTUITIONS OF THE SOUL: An intuition is an act of immediate cognition and knowledge as contrasted with knowledge gained by reasoning and experience: thus we can have an intuition of the duty of obedience to the laws of God. The Creator must be infinitely superior to the creature, from the very nature of this relation, and should therefore be obeyed; but as to how God is known, or what are his laws, there may be question. This questioning involves reasoning and experience, and so we do not know God and his laws by intuition except when the revelation of God, or the law of God, is self-evident.

Note 4. NECESSARY ELEMENT: Founded in the necessities of the moral nature.

Note 5. METHOD: "A rational progress towards an end."

Note 6. CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY: That of Kant, so called from his "Critique of Pure Reason."

Note 7. À PRIORI CHARACTER: Distinctive marks of a form of thought pre-existent in the mind prior

to experience and without which a rational experience would not be possible: for instance, yesterday resting on a rock by the roadside, it felt cold to me; to-day, it feels warm. Here there are two distinct sensations — empirical observations — and nothing more. But if I account for them by saying it was cloudy yesterday, but to-day the warm sunshine has heated the cold rock, this observation as to the cause of difference in sensation has an *à priori* character. It originates not from the rock nor from the sun, nor from my feelings, but from the intellect — sensation being merely the inciting cause.

Note 8. PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: Critique of "The Practical-Reason." It explains the operations of the soul's intellectual, moral nature within itself. Its application is to the moral and the religious; whereas, "Critique of Pure Reason" regards the relations of the understanding to the outer world.

Note 9. UNDERSTANDING. By the understanding is meant our faculties for acquiring knowledge through our perception of sensations received from the world of matter outside of us. The understanding is here contrasted with the pure reason which deals with pure thought, as in mathematics and logic.

Note 10. EMPIRICAL. "In philosophic language, the term empirical means simply what belongs to or is the product of experience or observation."—*Hamilton*.

Note 11. SENSUOUS CONTENT. When anything is cognized or known through our senses, the object

so known is said to be sensuous as to its matter or content.

Note 12. MORAL INTUITION. Note 3, this section. "Intuitions of the soul."

Note 13. CERTITUDE: Section 2, note 9.

Note 14. CHARACTER OF NECESSITY AND UNIVERSALITY: It is by *necessity* of thought that we say two halves make a whole; a circle is round; a triangle has three sides; an object occupies space; time is represented by motion; God as Creator of all is Supreme; and there is *universality* when the constitutional affections of the soul are touched. See section 2, note 9. These characteristics give rise to the intuitive or self-evident. By some mischance Dr. McCosh finds fault with Kant and Hamilton for making this *character* the test of truth; reverses the order and makes necessity and universality arise from the intuitive or self-evident. See Hopkins' "Law of Love," p. 329, ed. of 1884.

Note 15. SELF-EVIDENT has been sufficiently explicated in the preceding note and in section 2, note 9.

Note 16. ABSTRACT FORM: The general idea of duty is in obedience to our constitutional moral relations.

SEC. 7. Note 1. THE GOOD: "The good," say some noted philosophers, ancient and modern, must have in itself *a* good on the ground of which it is *the* good, and until we discover this *a* good as the chief-good, there can be no moral science. Thus good, well-meaning men, like Saul of Tarsus, have set up some *a* good of their own device and wisdom as

the ground of right action; hence the origin of most religious persecutions.

SEC. 10. Note 1. ONCE FOR ALL: Reference here is to the evolution theory.

SEC. 12. Note 1. PHYSICAL: The relation of the physical to the intellectual, the moral, the volitional, all admit. Its extent, however, is not well defined, and the cause is obscure.

Note 2. IMAGINATION: The office of the imagination is: (1) *Productive*, as when by its aid the manifold of single objects presented through sense-organism, the eye, the ear, the understanding faculties, are fashioned by an act of synthesis into separate and defined objects; as when we determine the varied parts of a landscape—here the hills, there the ravines, the woods, the fields, the winding stream, the vale. This, the productive imagination, is a transcendental function—is in aid of the understanding in arriving at correct judgments upon the impressions of sense. (2) The *reproductive* imagination is in aid of memory in recalling vividly past impressions. (3) Every writer makes use of imagery, but the imagination is peculiarly the faculty of the poet, and also of the artist. (4) Desires may be excited by the imagination beyond due bounds. This is an *abuse* of the faculty. “Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was evil.” (Genesis 6: 5.) “For the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth.” (Genesis 8: 21.) “But became vain in their imaginations.” (Romans 1: 21.) (5) Fear lends wings to the imagination, and that by interaction heightens the fear.

The *Fancy* is the imagination under light restraint, and so is only a peculiar form of it; but yet by the old masters the fancy is used in a generic sense to include the cognitive faculties, imagination, conception.

Milton thus discourses of it:

“ But know that in the soul
Are many lesser faculties that serve
Reason as chief: among these Fancy next
Her office holds. Of all external things
Which the five watchful senses represent,
She forms imaginations, aery shapes.”

—*Paradise Lost*, Book V.

Note 3. THE UNDERSTANDING: In general its office is by means of judgments to unify knowledge received through our perceptive faculties. Thus, if we perceive part of a roof, chimney, door, or window, we judge these parts belong to one object—a house, though the house as a whole may be concealed by shrubbery; trees, woods.

Note 4. THE REASON VERIFIES: Thus in a transit of Venus we see a small dark spot, the size of a bullet, very slowly traverse the disk of the sun. By the concept of cause our understanding informs us that either the said spot is in motion, or else the sun, or both. Reason now comes to the aid of the understanding to correct its judgment and to clear up the illusion. It informs us that Venus, seen as a dot, with a motion imperceptible except as measured by intervals of time, is not in reality on the face of the sun, but is speeding in its orbit around the sun at a distance of sixty-six millions of

miles, and at a rate of about 77,000 miles per hour.

Note 5. COUNSELS IN THE PROVINCE: Advises as to how far we should be influenced by these sensibilities.

Note 6. SPECULATES: Thus we observe the appearance of the aurora borealis, believe in an open polar sea, realize the existence and the useful, beneficent purposes of light; but we cannot certainly determine the nature and the causes of these phenomena—they are beyond the range of our understanding; but in the use of our reasoning faculty we can speculate about their origin and laws, or manner of manifestation. So as to the universe of matter: in one view we say it is finite; in another view, it is infinite. The reason here speculates, but determines nothing. It is because these ideas—the finite, the infinite—have no limits within the range of our understanding; they are beyond its reach.

SEC. 12, *b*.

“The development of the human consciousness, according to the triple principle of its existence, or of its nature as compounded of spirit or mind, soul and animated body, must begin with the soul, and not with the spirit, even though the latter be the most important and supreme. For the soul is the first grade in the progress of development. In actual life, also, it is the beginning and the permanent foundation, as well as the primary root of the collective consciousness. The development of the spirit or mind of man is much later, being first evolved in or out of, by occasion of, or with the co-operation of the soul.”
—*Lec. II. Philosophy of Life.*

The extract sustains the idea of this treatise in positing the ground-principle in the emotional moral nature—not in the ultimate or final end of being.

SEC. 14. Note 1. CONCRETE: That which has material substance.

Note 2. THE HIGHEST GOOD: It is not the petty *a good*, nor a thousand morally good things, that constitute and determine the highest; but practically we find it in the *good-will*, where Kant puts it—in the natural bent of the disposition to love and to seek whatever is pure, true and right; and this longing soul, when enlightened by the Spirit's power, finds its highest end in God, and becomes like him, fruitful and abounding in good works. °

The ground-principle and the ultimate "chief-good" coincide when man has attained to the perfection of his nature. In this state he truly knows "the good," and has the will to lay hold of it. Practically, however, he cannot fully know "the good"—to attain to such knowledge, he must know all that is knowable about nature, humanity and the Creator, and this is always in the future; but man can attain to the *good-will*, and to obedience to it—which is the practical ground-principle—the chief-good. This is within the reach of all, lettered or unlettered.

We have thus in the text and in the notes fully explicated "the good" and the "*a good*," because the distinction in these ideas is not kept well in hand by certain noted moral-science writers, whose systems—whether they will it so or not—surely tend to ground morality in *utility*, rather than in the *beauty of truth*.

SEC. 17. Note 1. SIGN here means the representation we make to ourselves and the evidence we

have of moral power, when we apprehend and appropriate the doctrine of morality and religion conjoined—two elements—one moral force, like as the two elements, oxygen and nitrogen, unite to make the one life-giving element—the air we breathe.

SEC. 18. Note 1. ONE REGARD: The forbidden fruit.

SEC. 22. Note 1. ASSOCIATED IDEAS, ETC.: The reference here is to the associational and materialistic schools of philosophy—Bain, J. S. Mill, Hume, Spencer.

Note 2. REPOSE OF FAITH: See I Timothy 1: 19, 3: 9.

SEC. 23. Note 1. THE IDEA OF TRUE FREEDOM: Kant's idea is that the will is a faculty that determines to action in accord with the conception of law.

This function of the will harmonizes with that indicated in the text. The conception of law—of moral law—is an intellectual act, but becomes the possession of the soul's moral consciousness, which includes the moral, the intellectual and the volitional natures. The will, if a good will, determines to action in accord with this conception as mirrored in the moral consciousness.

Note 2. MINDING EARTHLY THINGS: This is the idea in "For I delight in the law of God, after the inward man; but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. (Romans 7: 22, 23.)

Here the Will as *ego*, personal, though free, is

wrought upon by two diverse influences—the law of the spirit after the inward man, and the law in the outer man—in the body. A true view of the Will's personality and autonomy, yet as under instruction of conscience and intellect, leads to the idea of accountability, and of transgression as sin and guilt.

SEC. 24. The reader will notice that in this section the text itself elucidates the ideas *abstract*, *concrete*.

Note 1. FEELINGS: The beautiful story of Ruth and Naomi is a fine instance of the play of thought and feeling when affections become sentiments.

SEC. 25. Note 2. ULTIMATE: Incapable of further analysis and definition.

Note 3. OBJECTIVE MEANING: When written moral law refers us to a special duty or obligation as its object, and so makes use or application of its principle.

SEC. 28. Note 1. WRITERS: For instance, President Hopkins in his "Law of Love and Love as a Law."

SEC. 29. Note 1. IDEAL: *Not ideal*, because the absolute is self-existent, unconditioned, and not the creature of an idea.

Note 2. SUFFICIENT REASON: To wit, given certain effects, there necessarily exist certain causes of said effects. As in the text, and for another instance: The declaration of one God in the first two commandments is attested to by the criterion of the sufficient reason, for when we study the material universe and behold the numberless marks

of design, we see that these attest to a unity of purpose and will.

SEC. 31. Note 1. PILGRIM STATUE: Said to be the largest statue in the world, from a single block of granite.

NOTES—PART II.

SEC. 34. Note 1. ETHICS comes from the Greek *ēthos* (plural *ēthē*), meaning custom, usage, habit, manners; or that which has become settled rule and law; Latin, *mos, mores* (morals); for example, see I Corinthians 15: 33: "Be not deceived: evil communications corrupt good manners [*ēthē*]." The adjectives are, Greek *ethicos*, ethic; Latin *moralis*, moral.

Note 2. JEHOVAH: The self-evident; the eternal.

SEC. 37. VIRTUE comes from *vir*, man. Thus, what is not virtuous is not manly; and so the essential element is manliness, or duty done in spite of obstacles.

SEC. 40. Note 1. THE RISE OF FAITH: Dante's view of Divine agency in the origin of faith is given in *Paradise, Canto XXIV*.

"———larga pluvia

Spiritus sancti, quae est diffusa

Super veteres et super novas membranas."

The copious rain of the Holy Spirit which has been showered upon the Scriptures both old and new.

THE SYNOPSIS.

PART I.

DIVISION I. INTRODUCTORY PRINCIPLES.

SECTION 1. Any principle for morals good enough, people say, provided the practice be good; but the fact is, a wrong idea tends to a wrong act—Locke's sense-knowledge; Hume's skepticism; Kant's *a priori*; and moral-science requires a ground-principle wholly within the soul's constitution.

SEC. 2. IN DE OFFICIIS, Cicero notices weighty matters critically discussed upon questions of duty.

No part of life, private or public, can exclude duty. In its culture is all virtue; in its neglect is all baseness. Whoso so institutes the chief-good as to estimate it by his own profit, cannot cultivate friendship, justice or liberality.

Honesty is to be sought for itself alone. Cicero's division of the question of duty into what pertains to the chief-good and what to precepts—a generic distinction. His enwrapped vision and eloquent speech; defines philosophy: reason for a science of morals.

SEC. 3. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY, by inquiry of nature, came near a true principle. Plato put the *chief-good* in excellences of body and mind and a disposition for virtue—in virtue alone, yet increased by favoring environment, by wealth, influence, and whatever promotes a *habit* of virtue, giving rise to a principle of duty, namely, the preservation of nature. Plato's ideal republic—his scheme of education—regards (1) moral-training; (2) physical.

The moral required music and poetry of moral tone, truth in literature and truth to nature; hence Plato's *idea*—not a mere

drawing out of the faculties—meant a purified soul. The special means noticed.

The cultivation of the reasoning faculty or logic completed the course; its value and its defects.

The morals of the Greek and of all heathen indexed by the character they gave to their gods; hence a reflex tendency to reconcile men to the vices of the gods.

SEC. 4. Greek philosophy as to the *leadings* of nature.

Self-preservation, the first impulse.

This principle applies to the moral nature.

The Grape-vine in Allegory: The discernment of all means for attaining to the *chief-good* is beyond the ken of man, and so there must be an appeal to the Divinity—to Pythian Apollo, who enjoins us “to know ourselves.” What children evidence.

The moral-principle, an uncreated element that has its seat and abode in the constitution of the Creator, as the essential element of his being, that preserves the being of God.

Cicero sought a principle for man that preserves man; for nature, that preserves nature. Why God obeys this principle; why man. This principle *dominates* nature.

What happiness comes from.

SEC. 5. What clue to truth: What Cicero overlooks.

The branch of morals which the Greeks call *politikos*.

What a knowledge of heavenly things imparts.

Ancient philosophy falls upon the trail to man's soul nature.

SEC. 6. Features in Kant's philosophy—“universal law;” the *à priori* character of the moral principle, and of moral intuitions. What they are—the intuition of Duty.

The system of Kant summarized; the transcendental character.

SEC. 7. How we know there is a principle of *the good*.

The creation of anything wrong in principle—not conceivable. The unbalanced fly-wheel illustrates by its disruption.

Scripture proof-text as to the *good*.

Justification in positing “the good” and the love of it as a principle.

The element of abstract duty as of forceful tendency.

The Divine Constitution the true ground of duty.

The *ground* of morality and the *ultimate* end distinguished.

Obedience to the moral nature, the ground of duty.

Why we cannot find it in the "ultimate end"

Examine the "corner stone" before the superstructure.

Why "love of God," though an ultimate end, is not a ground-principle.

SEC. 8. THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT.—Webster's definition; Cicero's derivation, vague views.

The principle of morality and of religion contrasted as love for a principle, and as personal love, the latter dependent upon the former.

A morality false in principle contradictory.

A false religion possible and common.

The moral element is strictly *à priori*.

The religious element cannot be *à priori* pure. Explain.

The distinctive mark of a true and of a false religion.

The proper attitude of the government towards religion.

SEC. 9. THE SUPERNATURAL IN RELIGION.—Men object to a science of religion; certainty, they say, is only in the "natural."

A natural effect comes from a natural cause, but Kant holds that the natural cause must originate in a supernatural cause.

This view illustrated by the history of the exodus from Egypt; specially in the effect upon Moses—the infusion of natural courage—by supernatural cause; the Lord's manifest presence.

SEC. 10. A SUPREME CAUSE reason demands as a condition of nature. The *existence* of a moral and a religious realm also argues the Supreme. By logical method "we look through nature up to nature's God."

Wherein Christianity differs from the religion of nature.

It refers us to the attainment of a higher spiritual state.

This as science and fact is properly observed and noted in a popular education; but the means of attainment lie within the province of individual effort and the church. A science of religion and morals relates to the duties of this life yet *introduces* us to the Spiritual. These distinct offices mark a distinct line between a kingdom of nature and a spiritual kingdom.

The unity of the moral nature lost when the author of it—when God is lost sight of. Sectarianism excluded by science.

SEC. 11. SUM OF THE ARGUMENT.—The ground-principle not in final ends, but in the self-evident duty of *obedience* to the

moral consciousness; in the "good-will"—Kant's central figure, the *fit* basis of moral-science. The empiric not ignored.

DIVISION II. PRINCIPLES: PSYCHIC AND MORAL.

SEC. 12. THE NATURE OF MAN, physical, intellectual, moral, volitional. The physical consists of the bodily organs. The intellectual includes the understanding faculties and the reason. The function of the understanding. The *reason* defined—its offices; illustration from Cuvier's application and use of *the idea*. Reason as speculative.

The *moral* and the *religious* distinct, yet allied. Their oneness and their difference: Moral approbation and the contra. The moral involves the Will.

MAN A SPIRIT; when called a soul. What the soul is the seat of. Origin of the name. The scripture division into body, soul, spirit.

SEC. 13. MORAL PHILOSOPHY.—The study of the moral nature. The moral nature's primary law; its second law. Illustrations: Suspension of law, or its effect; its final certainty; instances given. The tendency in natural law and in moral law.

SEC. 14. MORAL SCIENCE an exhibit of principles and of facts. The *ground-principle* is in obedience—to what? *The good* defined; *appetency* defined. *The good* distinguished from *a good*. "The good" in the *right state* of the soul—in its *character*. The good, *a priori* and abstract. A good, concrete. Illustrated by the love of the *beautiful*. The *highest good*, in obedience to the moral nature. The *true* and *truth*—their distinction—the one a creature of the moral nature; the other of the intellect. Not always right to insist on rights.

SEC. 15. MORAL LAW determines and implies what.—The moral nature necessary and imperative; the why. The idea of moral law; how rightly enlarged. "Love me" in the first commandment means what? When this love accords with the moral nature. Love under abnormal conditions not true love. Why did Saul act contra to the law of his moral nature?

SEC. 16. WRITTEN MORAL LAWS.—Authoritative regulation of moral conduct. The *authority* is in a divine utterance, or in an evident accord with the moral nature, or in both. The wisdom seen in the first commandment; the necessity for its Divine utterance; hence its type as universal law. Obedience to the moral nature implies a will. General view of the moral nature's function: (1) Its innate appetency and cognition; (2) its use or the Reason to determine particular cases; (3) the Will in its spontaneity and autonomy; (4) the Conscience with its intuitions and power for joy and sorrow.

Origin of the moral:—exists prior to the perception of external relations. Scripture illustration as to the moral nature, the conscience and the contention of the reason. Intelligent action; Kant's expression for it; a philosophic statement of Jesus' sublime precept now called the Golden Rule; its origin constitutional.

SEC. 17. RELIGION in the first clause of the first commandment. The second clause assumes that religion is liable to corruption. Retrogression as well as progression proved by history and biography.

Natural religion a gift of nature — to be cultivated and perfected; guided by the moral nature. Environments that lead to a supreme cause. Man constituted through fear and reverence to obey his will. Power, wisdom, goodness in the creation. Scripture illustration. Man conscious of limitations in himself.

These two *reverence* and *love* for the *true* (before noticed), distinct: as religious and as moral unite as a religious-moral element to form character and a habit of right feeling and doing. Religion gives sublimity to morality — leavens it with right conceptions of the Creator. We thus transcend the realm of intemperance in desire, thought, imaginations. First principles, then, are the foundation of a character grand, harmonious, beautiful.

SEC. 18. FOCAL POINTS in the logic of natural religion—

a. Design:

1. In the affinities of elements.
2. In the law of definite proportions.
3. In *the use* of the physical forces.
4. In progression.
5. In man's dominion over nature.

6. In prospective value as to our globe and as to man.
- b.* The sixth point suggests man's endowments and needs.
- c.* The amplified moral law; the reciprocity in revelation.
- d.* Revelation of the Creator brings to view a remedial dispensation.

SEC. 19. THE CONSCIENCE. — Its joint action with other faculties. It does not discover objective truths; is sensible to the intent of the will—its monitorial office.

Moral intuition, when possible; example: The consciousness—its cognitions.

SEC. 20. THE OFFICE AND POWER OF THE CONSCIENCE.—Illustrations from Shakespeare; Mrs. Montagu on Shakespeare's moral purpose and insight; Macbeth's emotions, lessons of justice and warnings; Brutus' soliloquy; his *genius* [conscience] in council with other forces in human nature. Courage in a good cause; fear in a bad one, illustrated.

SEC. 21. THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE; *alone* has authority; can be regarded as a faculty, analogous to the faculties of the understanding; tendency to class it with other sensibilities; it is in a higher plane and *type of being*; hence, the "imperative." Artistic faculties akin to the moral are allies, not rulers. The lower sensibilities, neutral or else opposing forces.

SEC. 22. NOTE ON CONSCIENCE.—Involving the ground of right. Approval or contra; from what—sensibility, intellect! The *faculty*; why properly *conscientia*.

Contra views: product of force; of environment; of association; of intellect and sensibility, as President Porter argues. His argument presented and controverted.

SEC. 23. THE WILL.—*Its function*, to execute or not to, the thoughts, desires and affections of the soul. These may or may not have a moral element. Illustration: George, his plum and pear, and his mother.

The Freedom of the Will: The difference in physical and in moral necessity. The *idea* in true freedom. In what way the freedom of the will is abridged; only by the empirical. The will has spontaneity and autonomy. Volitions have not a time relation, as *effects* from *cause*; but are spontaneous, originating in the will itself. The will as ruled by a sinful disposition. Bain's Metaphysical puzzle.

The True Doctrine of the Will: Its determinations do not prove the judgments, but the acts of the soul. The will is influenced—not bound by motives. Action contra to conviction of duty indicates moral weakness—not moral inability.

The Will Defined: The will *personal*.

SEC. 24. APPETITES; DESIRES; AFFECTIONS.—Appetites—hunger and thirst; instinctive and intelligent action.

Desires are

1. Primary, as the desire of property, power, knowledge.
2. Secondary—difference between the primary and secondary. When love is secondary—examples: Love of gold, etc. From love of the abstract we come to love the concrete.

Affections—paternal, filial. When affections become sentiments.

SEC. 25. LOVE, as of truth, the right, beauty, piety, modesty, harmony. When called *rational* love. Love develops itself in accord with its object.

Law of Love: Seeks the loveable. How is love modified by duty? Love, not a ground-principle in morals.

“*Love of God*”—When, right love. Its law—“To love with all the heart.” The law as to man—“To love as we love ourselves.” Love for a companion—Like in kind, but not in degree, to love for God.

Love of Country—Akin to that of property, but nobler. Its ethic law: Values country more than goods—less than moral possessions; instances of patriotism; the signers of the Declaration of Independence.

Love of Gold—Its ethic law: No virtue in love; but only in surmounting obstacles to a pure love. Concrete love—no ground of right; but is incentive to right endeavor. The “principle of right” combines feeling and intelligence; exists as a moral faculty; gives rise to intuitive judgments and moral reasonings. The moral law applies the moral principle, and by requiring its use strengthens it. “Love to God” required as the great motive power. How it can be attained to. Must not identify the moral ground-principle with “Love God.”

SEC. 26. SELF-LOVE, INSTINCTIVE.—Not from the moral nature; relates to preservation, not to gratification. Self-love, not selfishness; is a motive, a proper incentive.

SEC. 27. LOVE TO THE NEIGHBOR.—Grounded in moral love. When a moral necessity; when a virtue or an abnegation of self. The scope of the second great commandment.

SEC. 28. THE GROUND OF DUTY.—The ground of duty is not in the definition of duty. The sense of duty an inborn feeling. By "ground of duty" is meant what gives rise to the idea of duty. "Let each esteem others better than himself," is a fit expression for the sense of duty. Illustrated by Lord Nelson's battle-cry: "England expects that every man this day will do his duty." The ground-principle in duty, like that in gravity, known only by its effects.

The *why*, the *how*, unknown, except that the Creator so willed it. "Love God": When we do know and when not, the duty in this commandment. Its bearing on the moral ground-principle.

SEC. 29. THE GROUND OF RIGHT.—Primarily is in the Divine constitution, not in the "nature of things," as some would have it. This distinction of importance; further evidence.

SEC. 30 THE SECONDARY GROUND is in man's nature. The imperative ground is in authority divine, either by revelation or by the "voice of conscience," the general consciousness inclusive.

SEC. 31. PRINCIPLES require *practice*.—Illustrated in the science and art of book-keeping and of gunnery. Facility in the application of principle necessary in morals. Moral acts unguided by principles are empiric—give rise to a one-sided character; hence contentions and persecutions. Instances given: Jew, Gentile, Catholic, Protestant, Conformist, Recusant, Inconsistency of the Puritan. What of Roger Williams. The Pilgrim Statue—what it stands for.

SEC. 32. PIVOT THOUGHTS IN THE PRINCIPLES.—1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

SEC. 33. THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS explained and illustrated.

PART II.

DIVISION I. ETHICS.

SEC. 34. ETHICS implies principles; is derived from them; has its source in man's moral nature; how elucidated and enforced by a just idea of the "ground of right." Scripture ethics: What ought to be; what ought not.

The *moral law* is shown in the Ten Commandments; is summarized in the two great commandments.

Our relations to God in these hold the first place; are first enunciated.

The first commandment shows the authority in the decalogue, "I am the Lord thy God." The sovereignty of God self-evident; how enforced.

The second commandment prohibits idolatry. True worship *spiritual*. What is not true worship; what is; love and obedience requisite.

SEC. 35. STRINGENT LAWS; NECESSITY THEREFOR.—Objections thereto: The third commandment; when violated; special instances.

The fourth and fifth commandments are discussed under the heads Sabbath and Filial duty.

Why the first three commandments are entitled to our special consideration.

SEC. 36. THE BEATITUDES.—General view: The decalogue, a summary of duties. The Beatitudes, a statement of moral precepts. They are sentiments of universal acceptance; the reason.

The ethic character in the Beatitude is *in* the reasons and the results—not for the sake of them. The result is purely moral; tends to moral perfection. Cause and effect in moral relation; belongs to moral science.

The *First Beatitude* pronounces a blessing upon "the poor in spirit;" the reason. The meaning of the phrase "poor in spirit."

Scripture requirements for entrance into heaven. The character of the Scribe and Pharisee; of the Publican.

The Second Beatitude: What we mourn; the effect. Wherein the blessedness is found; King David's prayer.

The Third Beatitude: The meek man intrepid and brave; but is not ready to take offense. With clear notions of duty is fitted for a leader, like Moses.

The Fourth Beatitude: Its definition. Its principle is in the "love of righteousness." Scripture proof-texts.

No ethic character in mere formal righteousness. "Mercy better than sacrifice." The blessing is for those that "hunger and thirst after righteousness." A strong figure, indicating a high standard. The duty of man is to attain to it.

The Fifth Beatitude: "The merciful obtain mercy." The Divine displeasure against those who lack in mercy. Shylock's compulsory mercy. "The quality of mercy is not strained."

The Sixth Beatitude: "The pure in heart see God." What it is to see God; the good effect.

The Seventh Beatitude: Peace-makers the children of God. "How beautiful upon the mountains." The peace society, the peace congress may also rank as ministering children of God.

The Eighth Beatitude: "The persecuted for righteousness' sake." The characteristic of the unrighteous. The right attitude of the soul under persecution. Scripture proof-texts. Contra to this was the old rule, "a tooth for a tooth." The ethic relation not well understood in those days. Progress in ethic views argues not change in principle. The highest end or chief-good of man is to discover and appropriate the true content of what is right and good. The closing injunction of the Sermon on the Mount.

SEC. 37. THE VIRTUES.—General View: Virtue universally praised. Vice reprov'd—even by the non-virtuous. They know the better, yet pursue the worse. Scripture injunctions. Proof that virtue is natural to man. St. Paul asserts it in naming Christian virtues. The cardinal virtues of the ancients. Virtue defined. What Tully says about a virtuous man. The loveliest virtues seen in doing good. The laudable virtues; the popular virtues; the ornaments of virtue. Virtue and decency very closely related.

Industry Defined: When a virtue. The vice of idleness; examples. Graphic scripture instances of the effects of idleness. Industry and independence; the type of industry.

Frugality: Akin to industry. Poverty no proof of frugality. What people are not frugal. Youth should be trained in frugality and economy. Frugality as related to liberality. The *miscer* personifies the *abuse* of frugality; his epitaph.

Economy: Related to frugality. Its wider meaning. Hannah Moore on Economy. Economy not a vulgar attainment; not the detail of petty expenses; not parsimony. Economy is in the order, arrangement and distribution of affairs—is in a well connected plan. A sound economy is calculation realized; it is being prepared for contingencies.

Prudence: A common caution; means what. Webster's definition; scripture illustrations. Plans of life, as prudent or as imprudent. Does bad fortune presuppose imprudence? The Scottish bard's fine version of it. Accidents and providences. Kant insists that natural causes and providential are in unison. The Spaniards credited the loss of the "invincible Armada" to the storm—not to British valor. Queen Elizabeth turned this slurring point thus: "Afflavit Deus, et dissipantur."

Prudence for Girls [*Maria Edgeworth*]: Girls need to be taught *caution* more than boys. Must trust to what they are taught—not to experiment. What *ought to be* and what *is not* always conjoined. Material mistakes cannot be rectified. Timidity and pausing prudence characterize female virtue. Advice valued at "a purse of gold." Modern culture and native prudence—a picture of beauty.

Self-control: What it means. Under provocation to anger it is a virtue. Scripture proof-texts; illustrations. Virtue is possible only with control of the appetites and passions. Self-control cements the foundations of virtue.

Purity—Continency: Hearthstone virtues, that stand for prosperity and happiness.

Praise for the Roman matron indicates Roman sentiment, and a universal sentiment for virtue.

Impurity antagonizes all law. As a *habit* it destroys all good. *Eras* of profligacy; the effect from corrupt leaders and rulers.

Continency: A law of nature. In man, the habit of it estab-

lished by reason, by common sense, and by the categorical-imperative of the moral nature.

Sincerity and Simplicity: Sincerity is honesty conjoined with knowledge; simplicity is artlessness; characterizes the child. Fine illustrations in scripture. Nathanael without guile; *contra:* Jacob noted for his wiles. What of Esau?

Simplicity and sincerity are natural qualities, admired by all men; hence as moral, they have a universal character. Simplicity of style holds the attention when ornament tires. From the simple to the sublime in moral sentiment is natural. Scripture illustration: "Consider the lilies."

Charity is love in a wide sense. Further elucidation and illustration. The meaning, use and praise of charity in scripture sentiments as expressed in I Corinthians, ch. 13. *Charity* the greatest of the *virtues*.

SEC. 38. THE SENTIMENTS.—*Patriotism:* "This is my own, my native land!" History affords noted instances. It is best to recall those of our own land. Devotion to the principle of liberty in the struggle for American independence. What Daniel Webster said. The voice of Otis and of Adams in Faneuil Hall. The fire of patriotism in the small assemblies of the towns. Men of wise counsel and heroic deeds; and Robert Morris with the "sinews of war." The ethic character of patriotism. A sentiment inspired by the moral principle of duty. Were Leonidas and his three hundred Spartan-band patriotic? The negative invalid. The abuse of the sentiment of patriotism.

Friendship Defined: True friendship compatible only with virtue. Friendship in various degrees. The friendship of Damon and Pythias; of David and Jonathan. Of that between Christ and his disciples. The characteristic of friendship as given by the Lord Jesus. Pollok's fine lines on Friendship.

The Ethics of Friendship: Duty in friendship aptly defined. "A friend sticketh closer than a brother." How to treat a friend under all circumstances. Misplaced friendship in political affairs. Queen Elizabeth had favorites *contra* to the public weal. Washington regarded only fitness for office.

Honor, defined by Webster, Wordsworth, Pope. How honor is affected by "condition." The point of honor with a king, soldier, statesman, merchant. Sir Walter Scott instanced.

DIVISION II. DUTY; DUTIES.

SEC. 39. *Duty defined*; illustrated by the good Samaritan. The priest and the Levite dead to humanity and religion. *Duty the element* in all moral relation; civil inclusive.

SEC. 40. DUTIES TO GOD.—*Obedience*; scripture texts.

Prayer a Duty: Its source the outflow of the needy soul. The form given by the Lord Jesus; his habit of prayer. Noted instances of prayer; Solomon, Daniel. The men of prayer. To inquire for the *profit* of prayer is contra to good sense.

Praise: Fine scripture passages enforcing it. Argument for it.

Honest endeavor and wisdom requisite for *true worship*. All things declare *God is one*.

Love for God as a Duty: Not possible to see it and feel it, save in view of his true characteristics, as loving, just, holy, hating iniquity. Obedience antedates and proves love the crowning duty. First in time and value are duties to God. Soul elements intensified by science and the sublime in nature. Fine passages descriptive of Jehovah's characteristics.

Faith: Its definition; scripture examples; its origin: faith and obedience inseparable; is the foundation of the visions of hope.

Hope: Defined; leads to a pure life; its grounds, objects, origin, primarily of the soul—has reason in it; gives courage and safety; presupposes faith.

The ethics of faith and hope.

Duties to man run parallel. A kind soul may love his neighbor prior to love to God. A selfish soul can be corrected only by conviction of duty to God. Duties to men are how seen. The whole duty of man: "Fear God and keep his commandments."

SEC. 41. INDIVIDUAL DUTIES. — 1. *Self-preservation*, a natural instinct. Man's *duty* is to use *intelligence*.

2. *Health*, its preservation a duty; why early hours conducive to health.

3. *Self-examination* requires moral courage. Its use; scripture proof-text. To err is human; to admit it is manly—even divinely-human. Make good resolves and keep them.

4. *Labor*: Dignity and duty in it—when. Is irksome to the lover of pleasure. When was labor ennobled; scripture proof-

text. The farm and the garden. The scripture promise as to "seed time and harvest." Labor exercises the bodily organs. Nothing needful produced without it. Juvenal's sound maxim applies to the *moral* as well as to the mental. Walter Scott's advice to his son as to labor. Carlyle on work; its blessedness; transforms the stagnant swamp into a meadow, with clear-flowing stream.

5. *One's Vocation*: The ethic of it. When in accord with moral law; when contra. Consider well the moral tendency of your vocation.

6. *The Ethic of Habit*: The perfect in morality need not the aid of *habit*; but a "habit of virtue" helps to resist temptation. The focal ethic character in our habits; "Watch ye." Pope's "Vice is a monster." Mallet's "Crimes lead to crimes"

7. *Temperance*: "How blest the sparing meal." Temperance is suited to all persons, times and places; is better than Saratoga. The animal limited by its nature; man, by his discretion. Temperance promotes longevity and thrift; is the *sine qua non* of a character acceptable. Paul reasoned of temperance; Felix trembled.

8. *The Temper*: Its ethic character. Duty requires us to govern it. A bad temper and love incompatible.

9. *Religion* is natural to man, hence there is *duty* in it; needs to be kept in repair, like one's house; and taxes paid. *Ought* to discover true religion. Necessary; universal principles lead the way. Obedience to intuitive truth in the commandments. Study nature; search the scriptures. The ethic of religion regards duty to self, to society, to state.

10. *Time*: The ethic of *its use*. Two views; *quality* of work; *diligence*. "Trust little to the morrow."—*Horace*. "Procrastination is the thief of time"—*Young*. "We complain that time is short, yet know not what to do with it."—*Seneca*.

The Remedy: (1) Help the needy; comfort the afflicted; (2) live under an habitual sense of the Divine presence.

11. *Observation*: The ethic of it. Duty is to observe what will be useful. Waste no time on the frivolous. Our range of observation depends largely on our vocation. The king as statesman and the prince as charioteer. Observe the events and signs of the times.

12. *The Ethic of Taste and Culture*: The study of the fine arts and of polite-literature has a humanizing effect. A relish therefor is a source of innocent diversion. The pith of what Dr. Blair says—(1) The powers of taste and imagination were given to embellish the mind; (2) their province is beauty, harmony, grandeur, elegance; (3) they exercise the reason without fatiguing it; (4) they strew flowers in the path of science; (5) the cultivation of taste has a happy effect on the life; (6) employs intervals of time in a way suited to the dignity of man; (7) its ethic character is in its being favorable to many virtues.

13. *Decision of character means* a readiness to determine what to do; depends on the energy of the will. Napoleon I had instant and habitual decision; that is, he had decision of character. In George Washington, decision was fortified by "the moral." Herein is decision of character fruitful of good. In the young man, it marks ability to resist the allurements to vice.

The Ethic of Decision: It contributes to vigor of effort. The contra predicted of Reuben by his father Jacob. "Unstable as water, thou shalt not excel." It intimidates malice disposed to attack.

14. *Discipline*: "Do well what you do" is the primal maxim in mental, military and all discipline. Napoleon I exacting; tolerated nothing unsoldierlike. Do one thing at a time; a plan of work. "Make hay while the sun shines." "There is a tide in the affairs of men." Non-discipline by our wits results in discipline by misfortune.

SEC. 42. PARENTAL DUTIES.—Authority with love. The old Roman law contra to nature. Function of civil law. When the parent will exceed his right. Be firm yet mild. The rights of children. The virtue of patience. Scripture summary of parental and filial duty. The duty of guarding against bad habits. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Juvenal's advice.

SEC. 43. SOCIAL DUTIES.—General view. How social duties arise. Equalities and diversities in rights and duties. The affections natural that pertain to social duties. When they show virtue; when not.

Philanthropy and Benevolence: Why we do or do not possess them. Not happy without them—hence duty. Apos-

trophe to philanthropy. Philanthropy and benevolence outraged by brutal shows.

Hospitality Defined: A sentiment native to the heart of humanity. Atrocious exceptions severely punished. Mungo Park and the hospitable negro woman. Queen Dido's words of welcome to Æneas. The Indian's "What Cheer?" in salutation to Roger Williams.

SEC. 44. THE ETHIC OF AMUSEMENTS.—Children's play and the games of youth prove what. How beneficial. The desire to excel, when innocent. When good morals and amusement part company. Wherein is the ethic character, in limitation, in self-denial. Like principle applies to temperance in drinks. No amusement in what harms somebody. The well-known fable of the boys and the frogs shows the abuse of amusement.

"Love not the world," means that the "love of the world" must be subject to *duty*. The conclusion—Each one to study duty as to amusement.

DIVISION III. POLITICAL ETHICS.

SEC. 45. POLITICAL ETHICS relate to moral questions in the conduct of public affairs. Citations as to land titles and limitations. Protection in rights. Qualifications and term of office. The elective franchise. International law. How best to secure international good will.

Mrs. Barbauld on Political Ethics: The people through its agents enact laws; make war and peace; dispose of public money, and are answerable for these acts; especially for oppressive laws and bad government that crush the poor. Distinction between a mild climate and a mild government. The first a Providential favor; the second a National duty. The indolent lose a good government. Duty is to keep it.

LIBERTY.—*Its substance* consists in guarantees. National liberty is freedom from foreign power. *Autonomy*, the Greeks called it. No foreigner must dictate. Instances of interference. Turkey has not autonomy. Our own autonomy endangered, if we meddle in foreign affairs. Washington's opinion and advice.

Institutions promote liberty; are not the essence of it. The essence of liberty is in a man's *character*.

Magna Charta—by whom granted; its place in the British constitution. The constitutional principle of taxation. Articles of the "Great Charter." "*Nullus liber homo capiatur*" the important one.

SEC. 47. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.—Conscience-worship must be moral—separation of Church and State—on concrete grounds. Relations between Church and State—moral. Reasons therefor.

Religion and the freedom of the soul. Liberty and obedience to the law of right. True religion tends to liberty. Scripture proof-texts. The law of liberty—what is it; what does it. This law is universal—applies to all men. Liberty is conditioned on the law of liberty. Wherein the law of liberty exists. A man destitute of it is not qualified to determine institutions and limitations of liberty.

SEC. 48. PERSONAL LIBERTY.—Must not stand in another's sunshine. Illustrations by what is forbidden. Throwing stones; bad literature; vagrancy; "Idleness the mother of vice."

SEC. 49. RIGHTS.—General view: The *right*, a moral idea from the moral nature. All men predicate their acts on the right. In the light of *the right* is seen *a right*. Examples of conflicting rights. Rights in revolutionary times; in the Samoan-embroglio. The need of the judiciary to determine rights.

A right—Something in accord with man's entire nature. What rights all men have. What constitute natural rights. Rights and duties correlative, reciprocal—the difference. Some rights intuitively seen; other rights require wisdom and judgment. Right and duty different—a right is something claimed; a duty is nothing claimed, but is something that ought to be done. Duty has the pre-eminence over rights. Mutual obligation—wherein is it.

SEC. 50. PROPERTY RIGHTS.—General view: What nature makes common to all—what not. The improvident have not the same rights as the diligent. Personals acquired by work; land, by occupation and labor. Man has a right to property fairly acquired. How I shall recover property wrested from me contra to law. When property reverts to the State.

SEC. 51. ORIGIN OF RIGHT TO PROPERTY.—The Divine grant in Genesis I. Man put into the Garden of Eden to dress it, to keep it. Outline of title given by the Creator. Particular cases of title determined by man's nature. Property rights follow nature's tendencies—examples: Abraham's purchase—the object, the price. The first land purchase on record. The title of Ephron, the grantor. What made it good. Queen Dido's purchase of a "hide of land."

SEC. 52. LAND TITLE IN THE UNITED STATES.—The right and title of the North American Indians. Bought by Colonial and United States Government. Held in trust for the people. Surveyed into townships, sections and quarter-sections. Sold for benefit of and by the will of the people.

Methods of Sale: Railroad grants; bounty lands, and homesteads. All legitimate and title perfect. Mineral lands. Timber and farm lands. Toil and labor stamp property as a man's own. Land monopolies in the United States. The moral and economical aspect. Hostile legislation is robbery. "Covet not."

SEC. 53. BLACKSTONE ON PROPERTY RIGHTS.—Communion of goods applies not to their *use*. The act of possession gives right of possession. This rule applies to lands or to fruits.

Cicero's illustration. Increase acquires title to substance as well as to use. Civilization devises habitation and things convenient. Even the bird and the beast fight for their nest or lair. Movables and dwellings appropriated before land. Property in flocks and herds; in well-water.

Isaac's reclamation of his father's well. Agriculture establishes property in the soil, this distinguishes ennobled humanity from the savage, gives leisure for art and science. Occupancy gave the original right. It excludes all save the owner.

SEC. 54. CIVIL LIBERTY.—General View: It protects the citizen—this imposes a counter obligation. From what civil liberty arises—what it means.

Civil Rights: Some of them named. A man's house his refuge. Warrants. The "habeas corpus." Trial by jury. Liberty of speech. Right of petition. Free locomotion.

SEC. 55. CIVIL DUTIES include and require what. Who can perform them.

Reciprocal Rights and Duties: The State to do what the citizen cannot do. What is required to distinguish between duties, private and public.

SEC. 56. OBEDIENCE TO LAW.—Man and nature under it. Law everywhere. The necessity for obedience—principle. What to do if the law be wrong; if contra to conscience.

SEC. 57. THE DUTY OF INTEREST IN CIVIL AFFAIRS.—Everybody, nobody. What the citizen should do; why. All entrusted with one talent; some with ten. These foremost men serve for honor rather than for profit. James Otis as an example. The "writs of assistance." What he foresaw in the collection of duties without the consent of the Colonists.

SEC. 58. SUFFRAGE.—Not a natural right. On what it should depend. The ethic principle in it. The man without fitness has no claim to suffrage. Universal suffrage in the United States. J. S. Mill's view.

SEC. 59. LIBERTY OF SPEECH is a liberty in the realm of morals; rights of another kind. When the ethic in free speech is attained to. When not right to speak against a wrong. Judge Tuley's opinion in the Anarchist suit. His only question is: "Are the objects of the Anarchist society lawful?" If so, they have a right to discuss what they please. As to this opinion—the premise admitted, the conclusion follows. Shall we judge their objects by their "by-laws," or by their acts. Fair words for liberty; principles that undermine it. The wooden horse and the disguised fraud—"Haymarket" and dynamite. The captive trumpeter that never did any harm. Is there a correct theory of free speech? When the right of free speech is lost. Liberty of speech not one-sided—J. S. Mill on free speech.

SEC. 60. LEO XIII on "Liberty of Speech and the Press" (sound).

SEC. 61. VERACITY.—Homer's sentiment. Truth by nature perverted by temptation. Moral truth and fact contrasted—the "man in the moon." What duty requires; the habitual liar; evil effects; "wolf, wolf!" Scripture precepts.

Legislation as to the Oath: The common swearer. Wise legislation. Limitations of Jesus in the use of the oath—their object; argue what tendency.

Deep philosophy and a true ideal in the injunction "Swear

not at all." Why so. How men should be educated as to truth. "I cannot tell a lie."

Jesus aimed at *universal* laws to develop man. Like Moses, allows something, *pro tempore*, for the hardness of men's hearts. The usual moralist view of the oath.

Honesty: What pure honesty is.

Deceit: Its various forms; when wrong—when right to deceive an enemy; instances cited; the ethic principle; does it apply to highwaymen and burglars?

Casuistry: Its definition; the duty of the parent and the teacher to fit the child for self-casuistry; the Jesuits as casuists; the enlightened conscience the best casuist.

The ethic in casuistry.

SEC. 62. *Reputation*.—The value of a good name. The motives for its injury. Sensible people and idle tales. The *mean-ness* of the traducer.

DIVISION IV. INSTITUTIONS.

SEC. 63. INSTITUTIONS numerous; those of nature; those logically derived, and artificial ones. Chief are those of marriage and the Sabbath of Divine appointment. The character of an institution is in its moral tendency. Duty is in the individual members, who are moral or immoral in accord with the tendency of the institution. Mormonism not moral, because it violates nature. The church moral when it teaches a true religion. Persecutors are criminal.

The Moral Tendency of Societies: The proper function of the Board of Trade—when violated. Responsibility of its membership. The citizen and the saloon. The theatre—in some degree healthy; in large part corrupt. The province of the public school and when it fills its function. The responsibility of the citizen in regard to it.

SEC. 64. INSTITUTIONS, AS TO THE IDEA.—As defined in Leibner's "Civil Liberty." Single laws or usages are called institutions when they have importance and permanency. Why marriage is an institution. A group of laws and usages furnish an elementary idea. What idea makes the "school" an institution

in Germany—the army also. Dr. Arnold's idea of the institution; Leiber's criticism of Arnold not forcible.

SEC. 65. INSTITUTIONS, NATURAL, LOGICAL, ARTIFICIAL.—The conjugal relation natural. The Sabbath natural and logical. The state—when natural, when logical—and is artificial when the proper idea of a state is not in its institutions. Union of church and state an instance of the *artificial*. The meaning of this union. Origin of the estates of the realm in England. Third estate represented by the clergy—illogical inference. The *artificial* third estate. Example in Henry VIII, in Charles I and James II. *Education* natural—wherein. The ethic of the public school; its features as logical defined as in accord with its true *idea*.

SEC. 66. THE SABBATH.—Every law of the moral code of high value, that of the Sabbath inclusive. Men are too prone to lightly esteem it. Experience shows cessation from toil necessary. Inquiries made in 1832 by the English Parliament. In 1872 and later Sunday work discussed in Germany. Should conditions of life obtain that prevent due observance of Sabbath. The authoritative law in the Bible narrative of the Creation. Why blest as a day of rest and made holy. The Divine complacency in a review of his work. "How still the morning of the hallowed day!"

SEC. 67. REASONS FOR A SABBATH-DAY INSTITUTION.—God rested; blessed; sanctified. The Sabbath a universal law—primarily observed by all people. The *occasion* for the *formal* institution of the Jewish sabbath. The double supply of manna on the sixth day—none on the seventh. The seventh day relative—not absolute time. How the Sabbath institution had been vitiated. "The Sabbath was made for man."

SEC. 68. THE TIME OF REST.—The Divine wisdom in this superior to man's. The *tenth* day in the time of the French revolution. Why an individual cannot fix on his own Sabbath day. *Government* under obligation to notice the Sabbath. The essential element of the Sabbath day. The day of rest being determined, six days of labor follow. In Algeria, Sabbath days exceptional as to time. The particular application of the universal law varies with the environment. The mission of Israel to uphold the worship of the true God. Exact and strict laws

necessary for this stiff-necked race ; hence the special Sabbath laws in Exodus 34 : 21, and 35 : 2, 3.

SEC. 69. *A Habit of Obedience Formed:* The spirit of the law was changed from a compulsory, formal character to a voluntary and a joyful one ; from an enlightened view and a truer appreciation of the requirements and the blessings of the Sabbath. The moral and religious nature as able to cast off the leading-strings of positive law and enjoy moral freedom. The prophet Isaiah would infuse a spiritual element into the ceremonial and formal in Jewish worship. "Bring no more vain oblations." (Isaiah 1 : 11.) Characterizes the Sabbath as a delight, holy, honorable ; and in words of beauty and the sublime recites the blessings flowing from its due observance. (Isaiah 58 : 13, 14.)

SEC. 70. TRUE SABBATH OBSERVANCE.—Not lugubrious, but a delight to the soul.

The *Sabbath law* yet more flexible in the ministry of Jesus. His interpretation of it. No abrogation of Sabbath law ; Jesus came "not to annul." Elasticity not to be construed into license. Scripture texts showing obligations. Warnings to our degenerate day. Little Miss Winterbotham's exclamation. The right use—not the abuse of the Sabbath—profits all.

SEC. 71. SUMMARY OF THE SABBATH INSTITUTION.—The Creator, by constitutional law, set apart the seventh day. The fourth commandment reminds of what ought and ought not to be done. The positive and special requirements show that the law had fallen into neglect. Severe penalties necessary to induce a *habit* of obedience. The pure obedience aimed at comes through rough discipline.

As to *Time:* The original Sabbath had been lost sight of. The Creator now institutes a new series of days in accord with the means to save the people from famine. In like manner the resurrection of Jesus, with the attendant events, was ground for a new series—the first day being the Sabbath. Recapitulation of sabbatical eras. Man's wisdom no warrant for change, save by Divine oversight. The continued observance of one day tends to superstition. A time of worship, like a place of worship, becomes unduly magnified. Scripture proof-texts.

SEC. 72. LEGISLATION as to the Sabbath : A conservative

view will be taken when the Sabbath is duly appreciated. What the "Christian Union" of May 9th, 1889, says: Railroads reducing Sunday traffic to a minimum.

SEC. 73. BISHOP WHATELY'S "Thoughts on the Sabbath" misleading. Makes the law of the Sabbath merely positive. It is a law of the body and the soul's nature. Bishop Whately finds warrant in the "power of the church," but the church used no power. Doctor Barnes' very pertinent note on the change of the Sabbath day. The first-day Sabbath instituted itself by the logic of great events.

SEC. 74. MARRIAGE. — Prelude on domestic peace. The authority for the marriage institution. The sacredness of marriage. Its holy love. Scripture proof-texts.

The Conjugal Law: Life-long, permanent and exclusive union.

SEC. 75. REQUIREMENTS IN MARRIAGE.—1. Compatibility.

2. Mutual affection and love; how secured—the nature of true love; a subtle principle. Extract from *Spectator* 490, finely presenting this view.

3. Congeniality in sentiment and taste, feelings and opinions, especially in what pertains to religion and conscience.

4. Capability for the common duties of life; each one's part.

5. Authority; when to be exercised—the voice of the man; the voice of the wife.

SEC. 76. PREREQUISITE QUALIFICATIONS.—1. A pure walk and conversation. Why the virtue of purity is essential to the young man. Scripture injunctions.

2. Education Special: To fit for adversity or prosperity.

3. Knowledge of Requirements: *a.* Of duties and rights; *b.* of capability to meet them with willing mind; *c.* faults to be considered; *d.* "Love is blind;" *e.* well to guard the possible contingency of "a family jar."

SEC. 77. DIVORCE.—The law of it, Matt. 19 : 9. When separation. Duty to suffer rather than to sunder the tie. Jesus gives the principle. Man should make laws to put it into practice as near as he can.

SEC. 78. THE THEOCRACY.—The Jewish nationality a theocratic institution. Its purpose, to make known the one true God.

Historical Sketch of Means Used: Abraham's call. Joseph

under Providential care. Moses taught "in all the wisdom of the Egyptians;" schooled into meekness; divinely commissioned as the leader and deliverer of his people.

The Moral Law: The discipline in the wilderness; the land of promise; the ministry of the prophets; the captivity in Babylon; the Jews, now faithful and dispersed, testify among all nations to the monotheistic idea—"Ye are my witnesses, saith the Lord;" the grandeur of the Jewish economy, as a Divine institution. Christianity evolved from it, enlarges the spiritual idea to a spiritual kingdom; to immortality.

SEC. 79. THE STATE INSTITUTIONAL.—*Its Origin*: In the social nature; for benefits; for defense. These causes develop patriarchal, provincial and state government.

Its Idea: Includes the idea of all the institutions and laws that necessarily belong to an ideal state. The existing state is the approximate idea. England cited; its House of Lords; its Commons; as to the fact; as to the ideal.

Its Objects: 1. Its duty in protection.

2. Its reciprocal right of service.

3. Its duty as to education, culture, franchise.

SEC. 80. THE CHURCH.—*As an Institution*: In the United States, has no authority in civil affairs. Webster expounds the Constitution in this regard. But *religion* is recognized by our institutions. The union of Church and State—what it means. Its advantages in educational interests; hence the clergy a leading estate of the kingdom, and hence they began to claim rights and powers. The service of the Church and of the State entirely distinct, yet harmonize and tend in one direction.

SEC. 81. DISADVANTAGES OF A CHURCH AND STATE UNION.—1. Inculcates a false idea of religion.

2. Invests the Church with dignities and duties not of its primal function.

3. Invests the Government with powers and duties that pertain not to it. "Head of the Church" a misnomer for Henry VIII. "The estates general" in France.

4. The Church and its dignitaries become puffed up. What *is* the national church becomes questionable. Contentions, wars and persecutions follow. Revulsion follows usurpations and abuse.

SEC. 82. PUBLIC EDUCATION.—*Institutional*: Already discussed under the social, ethical, natural, logical. Education begins in the family; if it ends here, is often very defective from ignorance. Tends to evil from moral weakness. Instance the high priest Eli; his lack of moral courage brought ruin on himself and his house; his grandchild named Ichabod—"The glory is departed;" and *Ichabod* is written in the history of every people, when in education, morality and religion are neglected. Warlike states educate youth for martial purposes; hence the general idea of the state's duty in education. Our system of public school education in lieu of the national church in general education.

SEC. 83. FAMILY; STATE.—Which has the superiority; compared to a like question between man and wife. Why common public schools must exist. The question is not of superiority, but is one of duty. What duties in the matter of education do pertain to the individual, the family, the state. When the state must assert authority.

SEC. 84. CAPITAL; LABOR—THE IDEA.—1. Capital (*caput*) implies wisdom, not labor; includes power, machinery, material, and cash to pay wages.

2. *Labor is not capital*, and so has no right to profit and loss as such, though by agreement this may be shared.

3. The wages of labor defined; the *amount*, the *value* of wages.

4. *Value of products*; how estimated, not by the rate of wages or the cost of labor. Illustrations.

5. *Value of labor* to the employer; how to be determined.

SEC. 85. UNION OF CAPITAL; OF LABOR.—Its social aspect; its moral aspect; its ethic principle. Example for a proper labor union.

SEC. 86. THE UNION AS A REGULATOR of wages must be local and special. In a general combination there is conspiracy involving unjustifiable coercion; stringent legislation.

SEC. 87. CAPITAL COMBINATIONS, as abnormal, are artificial and immoral. Should be a subject for legislation and judiciary action.

SEC. 88. THE LABOR UNION, as abnormal, deadens the natural laudable desire to excel; encourages inefficiency; puts the un-

skilled on a par with the skilled; subjects the individual to the dictum of arbitrary power; disqualifies for freedom and civil liberty. Other evils of the labor union—eight of them.

SEC. 89. THE SUM AND THE MORAL OF IT.—Liberty endangered. What the evil-minded imagine; how disabused. Health and happiness in small affairs.

Two suggestions: 1. A court of appeal to settle differences where a half million of capital is used in a business corporation and five hundred men are employed; less matters to be let alone to take care of themselves.

Suggestion 2. To regulate unjust capital, co-operative work, in the long run, is better than "the strike."

SEC. 90. NOTE ON PUBLIC EDUCATION—Relative to ideas in some "papers" read before the National Education Association, at St. Paul, Minn., in July, 1890.

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