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THE
EMANCIPATION OF FAITH.

BY THE LATE

HENRY EDWARD SCHEDEL, M. D.,

LAUREATE OF THE HOSPITALS OF PARIS, AUTHOR OF A "TREATISE ON THE
DISEASES OF THE SKIN," OF A "CLINICAL EXAMEN OF
HYDROPATHY," ETC., ETC., ETC.

EDITED BY

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*"Our Father which art in Heaven,
Hallowed be thy Name!"*

VOL. I.



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THIS
POSTHUMOUS WORK
IS
Respectfully Dedicated
TO
EVERY CLEAR INTELLECT, HONEST MIND
AND SINCERE HEART,
BY
THE EDITOR.

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OBITUARY.

[TRANSLATED FROM THE PARIS MEDICAL GAZETTE.]

THE “*Constitutionnel*” of the 9th of August, 1856, contained a short article thus worded :

“A Swiss journal says that on Monday, 28th of July, there was discovered on Mount Pilate the corpse of a stranger, who, it appears, met with his death by falling from a rock. A visiting card found on him bore the name of Henri Schedel. A roll of gold of one thousand francs was in one of his pockets.”

The journals are good for something, it cannot be denied; they collect from all parts news joyful or heart-rending; they register in their impassible columns events which pierce many a heart as with a dagger,—nevertheless, we must thank them for this useful cruelty; for it is better to know than to ignore; certainty is always preferable to doubt; we weep over the memory of the Dead, when we might otherwise have accused the absent one of forgetfulness, perhaps of ingratitude.

Thus, this notice of the “*Constitutionnel*,” carelessly thrown to the public, went direct to the home of a family and of friends. Those who knew that Schedel had recently left for Switzerland, experienced a great shock; they endeavored in their own hearts to cast a doubt on so dire a misfortune; they made inquiries; they wrote to every one they presumed might give information; and, but too soon, the cruel truth appeared in all its naked horror: the corpse found at

the base of the mountain was that of Henry Schedel, of a dear friend, so worthy in every respect of all our sympathies and love.

We do not pretend to impose on the public our sorrows, however bitter they are; a private mourning has not the right to aspire to the honors of a funeral oration. However, there are men whose voluntary obscurity is replete with useful lessons, who deserve that one should bring forth their life to the open light, because theirs was a useful life; men who should not be forgotten whilst scientific knowledge has inherited many fruits of their labor of incontestable value. We sincerely believe that Doctor Henry Schedel was one of those men.

Appointed resident student (*Interne*) in the hospitals in 1824, Schedel, who had hardly completed his twentieth year, soon entered the hospital "St. Louis" in the department of Professor Biett. Here he gave his whole soul to the study of the diseases of the skin; he noted and ranged methodically the clinical lessons of Biett, dividing, with his fellow-student Cazenave, the task of collecting the materials of a work that has long since acquired a distinguished rank in science, and that four successive editions have rendered European.¹ Schedel, by a fortunate concurrence of circumstances, spoke with equal facility the French, the English, and the German languages; he was thoroughly acquainted with the current medical literature of those countries, and, thus, his slightest works acquired the authority of an erudition uncommon among us, and especially among the men of his age.

Intrepid worker, he received the gold medal awarded by the Hospitals in 1827, and his diploma of Doctor in Medicine the 23d of April, 1828. All indicated that our young fellow-student would attain to eminence in a career he so brilliantly entered; but another destiny was in reserve for him. Professor Biett confided to him an important medical post, which, henceforth, absorbed all his care; and, thus, Schedel was lost to the ordinary practice of our art. Free from the daily preoccupations incidental on establishing a practice, he gave

¹ This work is also in general use in all the medical colleges in the United States.

his whole mind to the labors of the closet ; he wrote the greater part of the "*Treatise on the Diseases of the Skin*;" he made himself acquainted with all that was published on the subject, and enriched each edition with new and interesting articles. Nevertheless, we may assert that he grieved over the success of a work, the whole credit of which he was desirous to surrender to Professor Biett, to whom it really belonged; to Biett, who, too modest and too busy, had generously divested himself in favor of his favorite scholar, of deep researches on the subject, of the results acquired in the course of a fortunate practice, and of an instruction then full of renown.

Schedel travelled a great deal ; he successively visited Italy, Germany, and Great Britain, and devoted much of his time to the most celebrated universities of those countries, where he became the friend of the most eminent professors. And each return to Paris was marked by an increase of scientific lore; by some new work ; by new observations, collected with a patient care and a conscientious precision.

But this laborious and quiet life was not to last long. Death gathered around him those between whom he divided his time and his affectionate care ; and, henceforth alone, he entered upon a new career—one full of labor and "ennuis." A prey to deep-seated melancholy, with a bleeding heart, he had recourse to unceasing labor to fill the measure of days which weighed heavily on him.

Some slight attacks of Rheumatism having induced him to make use of lotions and cold water frictions, he resolved to make himself acquainted with the real worth of this mode of treatment. He therefore went to Graefenberg to study Hydropathy at its source, i. e., in the vast establishment founded by Priessnitz.

He told us of the difficulties without number which met him there ; of the obstacles he had to overcome, before he could obtain from that jealous quack-doctor permission to observe the strange clinic where the boldness and sagacity of the inventor turned to account the credulity of the patients,

and instituted one of the fullest experiments that has ever been attempted in favor of an eccentric method. Priessnitz could not bring himself to believe that any man would reside in his wilderness : would pass weeks and months studying the strange mode of treatment to which he subjected his patients, with no other object in view than to note results, and that without an after-thought of profit. In his eyes, every physician was a rival—the founder of a new establishment which would hereafter absorb a part of his practice. But Schedel never gave up easily a course that he had once conceived to be useful. He persevered, therefore, and finally, by presents and kind words, he tamed that covetous and savage nature.

After an absence of more than a year, he returned to Paris, bearing with him materials for a work which appeared in 1843, under the title of “*a Clinical Examen of Hydropathy.*” The introduction, which is written with great care, is certainly one of the best articles that has been published on Hydropathy. This work remains as a scientific document of great value. It is an inquest severe and full of lucidity on a general curative method which occupies, at the present time, an important position in Therapeutics, and is worthy of the attention of the wisest practitioners. We owe to Schedel an acknowledgment for having shown us all the advantages that can be obtained therefrom, and the resources, unhoped for, it contains, which enable the practitioner to struggle with success against morbid injuries that hitherto have been a cause of despair to the most conscientious physicians.

Later, struck with the tendency of the public mind towards organic chemistry, and fully convinced that that science hides within her bosom the key to certain points of Pathology, Schedel started suddenly for Giessen, where he remained a whole year, in the laboratory of the illustrious professor Liebig. Prosecuting, with stubborn enthusiasm, the study of all questions of general hygiene ; the causes which influence the chemical composition of the atmosphere ; the nature of the effluvia which determine the paludal in-

toxication, he soon after visited those countries where fevers are endemical, in order better to ascertain the effect of those miasma; and published in the Paris *Medical Gazette* a very interesting article on the topography of the Isle of Walcheren, and furnished arguments contrary to the thesis of Dr. Boudin; to wit, the absence of pulmonary tubercula where reign intermittent fevers.

But the activity of mind of Schedel was not satisfied; it required a more substantial food; a subject more difficult; an abstract theme, capable of absorbing in incessant and profound meditation the whole mind of a man for whom ordinary pleasures were an "ennui," and relaxation a fatigue. Thus it happened that Schedel read one day in an English newspaper, that a prize was offered for the most satisfactory work on a question of high philosophy. It was nothing less than a research into the origin of Theology, to ascertain to what extent that science concords with the divers systems of ancient and modern philosophy, to establish the basis of this alliance, and to demonstrate how the liberty of conscience of man can still subsist in the midst of the moral circumstances which press upon him.

How came it that Schedel attempted such a subject; how came he to quit the path of medical observation to plunge in the deep gloom of mediæval scholastics, is a fact that surprises those only who were not acquainted with the vigorous grasp of that meditative mind, inured to abstract thought, and with the stubbornness of that intellect whose delight was to struggle with obstacles. Schedel studied Arabic, Persian, Hebrew. He made himself acquainted with the different dialects of India; for he acquired a language, ancient or modern, as it were in play. Born in London, of a German father and of an English mother, he came to France when he was still very young. Thus he had acquired, we might say, without having had the trouble to learn them, three languages, which generally cause much labor to those who undertake to learn them; and these served him as an excellent basis whence to direct his linguistic studies. Thus he was able to read in

the original text nearly all the works which the learned often cite on the faith of translations frequently inexact.

For nearly six years our laborious colleague pursued, without interruption in the long series of his researches, save that necessary for sleep and food, the truth, to the attainment of which he had devoted all his energies. Admitted by him into the secret of this gigantic work, undertaken with as much simplicity as resolution, I have seen Schedel devour all the great works of the most eminent philosophers, analyze, extract, and condense in a few pages, the intrinsic substance, the marrow of those productions that Germany, Great Britain, and France pride themselves upon; and, one fine morning, having completed his book, he signed it, without appearing aware of the immense work he had just accomplished.

What has been the fate of this work? What future is in reserve for it? Shall it ever be published? Shall we be called upon one day to notice a work of high import, exhibiting the vigor of that fruitful mind, the power of the method he adopted, and the soundness of his logical deductions—in fact, all that constitutes *a book worthy of the attention of our age*? Perhaps the day may come when we shall have the grateful task of calling the attention of the medical corps to a work which honors them, and wherein we find reflected the influence of our studies on physical man; and when that time does come, we shall certainly not be found wanting.

Let us now take leave of the bold speculations of our unfortunate colleague. The moment has arrived when a cruel fate closes that life, so full of usefulness; when an accident deprives us for ever of a fellow-traveller, whom thirty years of intimacy have rendered dear to us. Schedel often quitted Paris; he directed his steps always towards Germany, the cradle of his paternal family. He religiously accomplished an annual pilgrimage to Baden-Baden, where sleep the remains of his wife. From thence he would seek some wild solitude in Switzerland, not with the hope of gleaning a respite to his melancholy, for he has said it himself somewhere, “*post equitem sedet atra cura* ;” but to obtain new food for his

active mind, new subjects of meditation, such as elevate and inspire the soul.

In the beginning of July he came to bid me adieu. He left for Baden-Baden, where he remained a few days. Thence he returned to France by Strasburg, wherefrom he wrote to Sir Robert Carswell, physician to H. M. the King of the Belgians, to whom he described the itinerary he intended following through Switzerland, the French Alps, and the Pyrenees. He stopped at Bâle at a friend's, where he received a cordial hospitality. Finally, he arrived at Lucerne, with the project of scaling Mount Pilate, but alone, without a guide, according to his custom. Intrepid walker; indefatigable tourist; careless of the danger; delighting in the most savage scenery; ever seeking some desert where no trace of human feet appeared, where, in sublime isolation, he could brave the tempest or forget the world and dream of the Past he deplored, and of the Future in which he trusted.

It is known that he was met on the mountain by some laborers, who warned him that the road was dangerous, and urged him not to proceed without a guide. Night—a clear moonlight night—had already set in. Schedel, confiding in his muscular strength, in his active dexterity, in Death “*who would not have him,*” as he used to say, smiled, and with a shrug of the shoulders, passed on. The following day, his body, horribly mangled, lay at the base of a perpendicular rock. . . . When the body was removed, his broken repeater struck three. Of the two loaded pocket pistols, which he ever carried on a journey, one had all its internal works broken; and even the ring which he wore was bent out of shape by the violence of that fall. How shall we explain this sad event? a sudden dizziness, a congestion of the brain, or a false step? God only knows. We may presume, however, that in the uncertain light of the moon, he missed the road, and came to a part of the mountain where the ground itself gave way under his feet.

Schedel had the presentiment of a sudden death. In Paris, he carried always about him a paper, upon which were written his name and address, with the words, “Whoever

“ finds my body, and carries it to my residence, without depositing it at the dead house, (Morgue,) shall receive from my servant, who is authorized to that effect, the sum of one hundred francs.”

Those who levied the body on the 28th of July, 1856, brought it to the nearest village—to *Hergiswil*, on the margin of the lake. The British legation was notified of the occurrence by the Swiss authorities. All the legal formalities were gone through. And if a modest stone, bearing the name of

HENRY SCHEDEL,

ever should arrest the wandering eye of a physician of our country, passing by chance through that village cemetery, let him honor that solitary tomb; let him salute with the eye and hand, if not with the heart, the remains of a man who has paid his debt to Science; who has walked through life within the narrow limits of honor and wisdom; who understood friendship in its purest and most tender relations;—of a man, finally, who deserved the respect and sympathies of all honest people (*de tous les honnêtes gens*).

P. MENIÈRE,

*Physician to the Imperial Asylum
of Deaf and Dumb, &c., &c.*

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

AT the time of his death, Doctor Henry Schedel was preparing, at the earnest desire of his friends, who regretted that the conscientious labour of so many years should be lost to the public, an abridgment in French of his MS. "THE EMANCIPATION OF FAITH."

This abridgment was very far from being completed; nay, it was scarcely begun. I therefore resolved to do justice to my brother's memory and fame by publishing the original manuscript, which, I must mention, unhappily has not been revised by the author.

When I undertook this task of love, I hesitated for a long time to believe in my competency to edit a work which the *author alone* could do full justice to; but I reflected that he says somewhere that he wrote for the "uninitiated in philosophic discussions." I trusted therefore to make up for my deficiencies by closer attention and care.

GEORGE SCHEDEL,

NEW YORK, August 16, 1858.

INTRODUCTION.



ON all topics of importance it is required that the expression should prove fully adequate to the subject. But when that importance is paramount, can the expression keep pace with the sentiment which inspires it? Should not "thoughts that breathe" always demand "words that burn?" In short, is plain, simple language, an appropriate interpreter of things and ideas which are placed by their very nature beyond the utmost stretch of all scientific acquirement? To these questions, Pascal furnishes us with a ready answer. "The chief reason," says that distinguished philosopher, "which prevents most men from taking the right road leading to Truth, is an imaginary idea that the knowledge required is above their capacity, on account of certain terms, such as sublime, high, transcendent, elevated, being usually given to that knowledge. Thereby, they are disheartened, and all is lost. Now, I would have it called, common, low, familiar; for I hate and distrust all high-sounding words." This opinion of Pascal we tender as an excuse for attempt-

ing, by plain language, to bring within the reach of all ordinary understandings, even German philosophy. For, if we admit that principles exist "about which no philosopher can tell a plain man any thing which a plain man could not just as well tell a philosopher," it is merely admitting that striving can prove of no avail, if none are stronger; and that darkness hides all things, as well from the learned as from the ignorant. But if the equality produced by darkness does not cancel the testimony of Sight, then no more does that of Credulity either strengthen or lessen the value of Reason, which, judging only of things from the Positive or the Relative, must seek therein its criterion of belief.

Now, to point out as an object of inquiry, the "Evidence that there is a Being, All-powerful, Wise, and Good, by whom every thing exists; and particularly to obviate difficulties regarding the wisdom and goodness of the Deity, and this, in the first place from considerations *independent* of Written Revelation," is to call forth all the energies of Reason, which surely cannot be increased by denying her all capacity of Judgment in a question of that nature. Such a proceeding has been compared by Aristotle and Locke, and, we believe, justly, to the demand of sight from a man known to be blind. Therefore, to require of Reason an *independent* conclusion on such a question, is to admit of it, at least as a trial of strength, and as such she cannot be fairly reproached with it.

And, on the other hand, if such conclusions, thus independently formed, shall tally with the basis of Written Revelation, is it fair to say, with a sneer, that

being told to discover such a connection, *it was of course discovered?* We would appeal from such a verdict to the evident independency of our conclusions, which were completed before the connection that led to the adoption of the Biblical texts we have used was perceived. And, if our conception of Divine Faith finds favor, neither with Philosophy, nor with Theology, we may surely lay claim to an independent opinion. But, however, far from appealing to the independency of that view as a proof of its worth, we distinctly and most expressly insist on the strength imparted to it by that remarkable connection.

Should the mode we have adopted of illustrating our views by beginning with Positive Faith, instead of Divine Faith, appear objectionable, because often alluding to the peculiar manner in which Trust in the Almighty is conceived by us; an allusion which is, in that first part, continually brought forward, without having been already clearly exposed, we here retrieve the error by explaining it. The explanation is, that the tendency of the present day being to admit Credulity or mere elementary belief, as bestowing on knowledge a value which it receives from it, it was thought requisite to begin by elucidating that important question. And if this could only be done by exposing a clear statement of German Philosophy, such a statement required in the first instance a brief exposition of the preceding doctrines, without which that philosophy would be to many as a *terra incognita*, and be utterly inconceivable. With respect to Divine Faith, as conceived in this Essay, and to which concep-

tion we purposely refer in a way which will appear redundant, an evil which is less, we believe, than that of not being clearly understood, we shall here remark that limiting Revelation to that of God, and to the same Revelation of the Word renewed in the Lord Jesus, we find alone in the fact of that Revelation of God as the *Almighty* the positive motive of man's trusting in Him as such. We do not aim at proving the existence of God, but at proving that his existence is only known as revealed, and only revealed as Almighty. The Divine Will is the Revelation of the Word, which is His name, and by which an appeal was made to Man. Thus, the will of man does not conflict with that of God, it only swerves from the faith pointed out in the Attributes of God. Thus, the Nature and Ways of God being a sealed letter for man, no error can exist in that point, provided the Unity and the Attributes of God be left untouched.

Therefore, when Theology says that Error in the order of knowledge is Ignorance, and Error in that of Morality is Vice, whilst Error in Religion is Damnation, the natural question is,—on what ground can the latter error stand? It cannot relate to the Nature and Ways of Him who is only known to be revealed as the Almighty, it must refer to his Name or Attributes. There, then, the error is fatal; but it is committed by Theology, when that Science, instead of aiming at the finite Attributes which represent God in the Word, aims at knowing the Nature and Ways of Him whose *Existence alone is revealed*.

The Word of God is, then, contained in the Bible,

but to say that the Book is the Word of God, is a deplorable error. The Word is God. Our Faith or Trust is in Him as the Almighty revealed, and not as the Almighty conceived. The Lord Jesus is One with the Word, and the Revelations are the same; Divine Faith and Christian Faith being identical. Now, *Faith in God*, taking its birth in the *fact* of His having revealed himself to Man as *The Almighty*, is, by the simple nature of this Revelation, emancipated from all human conception, and thereby placed beyond the errors of Theology, which has made of the Almighty revealed the *Almighty conceived*.

HENRY SCHEDEL.

PARIS, Dec. 25, 1854.

OF POSITIVE FAITH.

Corpus enim per se communis dedicat esse
Sensus : quo nisi prima fides fundata valebit,
Haud erit occultis de rebus quo referentes,
Confirmare animi quidquam ratione queamus.

LUCRETIVS. *De Naturâ Rerum.* Lib. I, v. 123-126.

SECTION I.

It may not appear unworthy of notice to remark, as a prelude to our observations respecting Belief and Faith, that the well-known Roman poet Lucretius, who was born about a century before the Christian era, appeals forcibly in his celebrated poem on the "Nature of Things," to the self-evidence of common sense, for the positive existence of body, as the only sure basis of Faith. The thought embodied in the elegant verses of the Roman philosopher, although a repetition, is not to be considered as a mere echo of the tenets held in the Grecian, or in the more ancient schools of Philosophy. An appeal to principles, self-evident and consequently unsusceptible of demonstration, has ever been the issue of the most free and spontaneous attempts of intelligence to fathom the depths of the mysteries of Thought. The fallacy of considering instinct, or im-

pulsive intuition *alone* as the criterion, whilst the object required was the *universality* of the intuition, we conceive to be the main cause of the discrepancy of many of these investigations. At all events, as early as 500 years B. C., we find the founder of the Eleatic school of Philosophy, Xenophanes, admitting, according to Sextus Empiricus, (Pyrrh. hyp. 1, § 225,) that man possesses a peculiar faculty in Reason to know what is probable, but that it has not been given to man to attain to certitude. It was Aristotle who first insisted upon the *universality* of a belief as a sure test of its validity in his well-known axiom, "What appears to *all*, that we affirm to be, and he who rejects this belief will assuredly advance nothing better worthy of credit," (Eth. Nic. lx. c. 2.) But Aristotle rightly considers such universality as an argument *à posteriori*, as a rational inference, acquired by experience. "The character of universality can only be obtained," remarks Aristotle, (Analyt. post. l. i. c. xiii.,) "by proceeding from the particular to the general, and in this consists the pre-eminence of the *à posteriori* method. . . But how far is such knowledge to be considered certain? By means of what faculty do we apprehend those principles which, although themselves unsusceptible of demonstration, are really the basis of all demonstration; for all animals possess an innate capacity of judging by means of their senses? It is when memory, retaining the various individual perceptions, the intellect forms more general inferences, and the simple unity or one principle deduced then becomes a species or kind. And it is from this gathering together of simple perceptions, and their being retained by memory, that the intellect compares and acquires experience. Thus, by means of the human intellect are derived from the *one* or the single object, the general or the universal, art and

science, or the principles thereof. This faculty is primitive, and proceeds from the nature of the soul. We therefore repeat it : the general proceeds from the particular ; the general notion is formed in the soul ; it is to the understanding that is given in charge to draw it from the mere sensible perception," (Analyt. post. *ibid.* ch. xv.) It would be foreign to our purpose to enter into further details in regard to this "universal," which thus acquired by the means of the Intellect from the "particular" or the contingent, becomes at once an "Absolute and Necessary." But it is well, we believe, to point out at once the fallacy of considering the term of "common sense" as a mere sensible notion or of senses alone : the epithet "common" is in reality the "universal," and that character of generality is the result of rational inference, rising, in the words of Aristotle, "from the particular to the general."

Lucretius therefore in saying, that we are taught by common sense the real existence of body, that without it, primary faith finds no confirmation, for we then possess nothing to refer to, when attempting to unravel the mysteries of nature, points out most clearly the mutual support which sense and intellect afford to each other, and reproduces one of Aristotle's most elementary axioms, "that what is by nature necessarily believed to be, truly is." The same argument is most forcibly insisted on by Tully ; for we avoid the tempting but bottomless pit of Grecian philosophy, and merely insist upon the fact, that before the Christian era and amongst pagan philosophers "belief" and "faith" were considered as positive and inherent qualities of thought. We, however, most earnestly protest, at the same time, against the supposition that our insisting upon the positive value of belief and faith, as having been admitted to be human feelings long before their adoption as mere

religious terms, has been introduced, in order to bestow on these instincts an undue weight. Faith is most assuredly coeval with man, but that faith is rational faith. We protest against any ambiguity being here intended, in our pointing out the positive mental or intellectual value of *rational* faith. And that ambiguity exists, when, after showing that reason cannot be exercised without faith, (as it really is the case in all inference,) that continual dependence on Faith, (positive or rational,) is transferred to a divine object, and thereby held to be of a different nature. The feeling is always the same, but the object being different, it is no longer *rational* faith but *divine* faith. Custom has rendered it usual, indeed, to express our belief in the Almighty and in Christ, by the term Faith; but when we say, as we do here, that faith was pointed out as a primary instinctive feeling, long before the Christian era, we are speaking of faith in Reason, or in the inferences of Reason, and not of faith in God.

Nor must our avoiding to enter into any of the endless discussions of the Grecian schools of philosophy be construed into any feeling of aversion for those great minds which shine with a lustre, the more brilliant from the deep gloom that surrounds them. Grecian philosophy attempted in vain to disentangle the human mind from the meshes of superstition and mythology; but the fruitless endeavors of the most bright and mighty geniuses that the human race ever produced, may serve to point out the utter uselessness of the unaided efforts of human intelligence. They merely cast down one idol in order to make room for another; and so it ever will be when rational faith attempts to raise a divinity of its own creation. The point we insist upon with respect to Grecian philosophy, is the due honor paid to Reason in that fair clime in early ages. We pass over

the unceasing discussions of the schools, because we shall find in the brief summary we are about to expose of modern philosophy, a sufficient display of endless doubt and disputation. Indeed, the progress of human knowledge with respect to history is such, that it would become necessary to relate the interesting disclosures of the translators of Eastern Asiatic philosophy, if we should attempt to indicate the primary sources of philosophical discussion. "The *six* philosophical schools," says Sir William Jones, "whose principles are explained in the Dersana Sâstra, comprise all the metaphysicks of the old Academy, the Stoa, the Lyceum; nor is it possible to read the Vêdanta, or the many fine compositions in illustration of it, without believing that Pythagoras and Plato derived their sublime theories from the same fountain with the sages of India." (3d disc. on the Hindus.) We shall, therefore, limit our investigation to modern philosophy, and merely state as a summary of the Latin schools, the following words of Cicero respecting the certitude acquired by the senses and that which Reason bestows. Cicero pleads against the theory of probability admitted by the new Academy: "What rule is that, which, adopting no positive distinction between Truth and Error, gives us no clear notion either of the one or of the other? If we possess a rule, the true must differ from the false, as good differs from bad; if, on the contrary, no such difference exists, there can be no rule, and he in whose perception, the true and the false are confounded together, has not wherewith to judge of or to characterize Truth. It is in vain, that we pretend to leave all the rest, after having destroyed the guarantee of Judgment: that is acting childishly, (pueriliter;) it is saying to a man that he can see just as well when we have put his eyes out." These words of Tully reminds one of those of Locke,

(Essay on Human Understanding, b. 4, ch. 19, § 4;) when, after comparing Reason to Revelation, or rather after increasing the confusion, by terming Reason, natural revelation, and Revelation, natural reason, enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God; Locke proceeds with the same simile, "so that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much what the same, as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of some invisible star by a telescope." We may observe here, by the way, that our objection to the use of the term "Revelation" as applied to the dictates of Reason, are similar to those we would offer against the use of the term "faith," as meaning two very different things, and yet they are often employed much in the same sense. Reason undoubtedly is of an instinctive, intuitive nature; it proceeds from an unknown source, and may therefore be likened to "Revelation," or the knowledge man possesses of the Almighty. We maintain that "Revelation" can be rationally proved, but we conceive it very essential not to confound the distinction which exists between both, and this is the more essential, that both proceed from an unknown source, altogether raised above the stream of light which floweth therefrom. The Revelation of God is *one*, but the so-called revelations of Reason are myriads of millions.

Cicero continuing in the same chapter (XI. Acad. quæst. lib. ii.) to follow up the inquiry, puts the following questions: "But what is it you mean by probable? If you mean that which appears to be the truth at first sight, and to the first looker on, can any thing be more frivolous? If you require a careful investigation, the difficulty is not thereby eluded. For if you do not admit of any certitude in your perceptions, if

you refuse to them any characteristic mark of truth, you cannot lay confidence in them. And even if this obstacle be done away with, if it be given to the wise to know, how can you rest assured that his conclusions are more probable, approach nearer to truth than those of others? Some criterion of truth is required in order to justify even the pretension to probability. If truth is so hidden and obscure as you pretend, how can you judge of the distance which separates you from it?" And respecting the evidence of the senses, Cicero has the following remarkable words: "The testimony of the senses deserves confidence, if the senses themselves are sound and healthy, and if no obstacle prevents their transmitting faithfully the perceptions. Otherwise of what use would be the notions that we derive from them? what basis would memory possess? what difference would there exist between the learned and the ignorant? Reason would be without dignity and entirely useless. The exercise of the Will supposes a judgment of some kind. If man will act, he must conceive some notion of Truth in order to act accordingly, for the real distinction between inanimate and animated beings consists in action. Now, in the actions of man, what better test of judgment can there be than Virtue. And what is that Wisdom which begins by admitting that no such a thing as wisdom exists." (*Acad. quæst.* II. ch. 7, 8, 9, 12.)

The conclusion of Cicero savors greatly of the Stoa, but is not less worthy of the notice of the Christian, as proving that the doctrines of Christ are not contradictory to those of reason. Cicero, as was Aristotle, is essentially a Rationalist, although admitting the full value of the evidence of the senses when unimpaired. He terms them "*Naturæ judicia: judicia communibus hominum sensibus infixæ;*" but far from considering Reason

as enthralled thereby, he never lets the opportunity escape of protesting against the judgments grounded merely upon the analogies of the notions acquired merely by the senses, and most especially by sight. Thus he has "*abducere mentis aciem a consuetudine oculorum*" to express the raising of the mind above the impressions of the senses: and again, "*magni autem ingenii est revocare mentem a sensibus, et cogitationem a consuetudine abducere,*" (*Tuscul. quæst. 1.*) expresses most forcibly the conviction of that great thinker, how requisite it is to carry in the dictates of Reason an order of notions distinct from the mere impressions produced by the senses. This doctrine we shall find to be also one of the fundamental principles of the Cartesian philosophy, which taught that none of the notions conveyed by sensible perception, which they termed also "common sense and imagination," could be subservient to the knowledge of the mind.

Other philosophers of Greece and Rome imitating, it is true, the traditions, if not the oral lessons, of the schools of Eastern Asia, considered the knowledge of God, either revealed or acquired, as the sole basis of certitude; and the same view we shall find to be taken by Descartes, the founder of modern mental philosophy. This was the doctrine adopted, on other grounds, by the Hindu philosophers, at least fifteen centuries (?) before Christ; for, as we are informed by Sir W. Jones, "The fundamental tenet of the Vedanti school consisted, not in denying the existence of matter, that is, of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure, but in correcting the popular notion of it; and in contending that it has no essence independently of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms; that external appearances and sensations are illusory and would vanish into nothing, if the

divine energy, which alone sustains them, were suspended for a moment." (Sir W. Jones's Works, vol. 1, Prelim. Disc.)

Wherever free inquiry is admitted; either in the schools of India, of Greece, of Rome, or of modern Europe, the jarring element of all discussion, doubt, is an essential principle, and inherent to human nature. If the Divinity be introduced, it is as Neptune appears in the verses of the poet, and the tempest is hushed. In all discussion, where Reason is admitted as umpire, the waters will be found rippling and troubled. To inquire, to examine, to deliberate, is to raise up doubts in order to dispose of them. This the Greeks termed *sceptomai*. Those who refused to admit the conclusions either of the senses, or of Reason, or of invoked divine authority, were termed sceptics. Those who aimed at mere verbal dispute, and attempted by a captious disposition of their phrases to obtain belief, were termed sophists. Both classes still exist. There is no better argument against the first than the one advanced by Pascal: "They believe that they do not believe," and its date is of many thousand years. Sophism is not so readily dealt with, it being a false display of truth. You are free, says the sophist, although you are enslaved, for if you were not free, you could not be enslaved. Sophistry is often involuntary; for counsel taken from the passions being essentially erroneous, is sophistical, displaying error in the garb of truth. Now, as "*passions are the elements of life*," Reason, with the aid of her great supporter, religion, can alone have any chance to answer in the silent workings of Thought the sophistry of passion, sophistry the most to be dreaded, and which no argument in form or syllogism can contend with. Conceiving then Rationalism to be the real characteristic of ancient philosophy, and considering it as an in-

sufficient, because unaided, attempt of the human mind to free mankind from the thralldom of Mythology and Error, we shall at once proceed to a cursory investigation of modern philosophy as a preliminary to what we have to allege respecting positive belief and positive faith.

Modern mental philosophy, as freed from the yoke of the schoolmen, dates from Descartes, who proclaims the doctrine of free inquiry, or of Rationalism. The veracity of thought, the certitude of self-consciousness is victoriously displayed by Descartes; when allowing free and open ingress to the most unbounded scepticism, he finds in certitude of Thought a bar which doubt can never overleap. This certitude, expressed by "I think, therefore I am," (*cogito, ergo sum,*) proceeds from an innate principle which assures man that he exists as a thinking being, and delivers him from all doubt, whilst it certifies at the same time the existence of an object of thought, a something beyond him, or extended, or matter. The same innate principle, or Reason, shows us that we know nothing of things, but by the qualities they possess. All things which possess quality, says Descartes, is a substance and exists, but that substance is alone perfect which exists independent of all others. Thought is therefore the quality which assures us of the existence of a thinking something, a substance or existing being termed the mind; and Extension, taken in its widest sense, constitutes the essential quality of body or matter. But the mind is no less certain of its own imperfectibility than of its own existence; a something perfect then exists, for the idea exists in our mind; and this perfection constitutes the essence of the divine substance which we name God. In Perfection, all quality is found; therefore Descartes ascribes Infinity to God alone, whilst he

only admits the notion of the indefinite to be that which matter and mind can inspire. The doubt, which the certitude of our imperfection leaves in the mind in spite of the certitude of Existence, is at once dispelled by this rational conception of the *perfect* Being. We are then fully assured, for we know we have a Maker, and his perfection proves that He is no deceiver. The Cartesian doctrine is thus complete: Matter,—Mind,—God, constitute the objects of all human Thought. Reason is here the umpire. Reason convinced of her own imperfection finds refuge in that Perfection, of which the “idea is imprinted on the mind as the mark of the Maker.” Causation and design are included in the notion of Perfection. Motion is impressed on created substance by the Perfect Maker, and all things occur according to the form and time allotted. The knowledge of these laws of motion, the knowledge of the relative conditions of the *mechanism* of mind and matter, constitutes all Science, all Knowledge. These conditions exist in virtue of Supreme Will, and not in consequence of their own inherent properties. Supreme Will is ever acting, and thus the Universe may be considered as incessantly renewed. As, however, the Cartesian views of the Deity will find place amongst the observations in which it will be indispensable to enter when treating of Divine Faith, we have not here to discuss that important question. We shall merely remark, by the way, that Descartes is condemned by his own theory, when considering the notion of the Divinity to be grounded on that of Supreme Perfection, and as such so entirely above all human apprehension as to admit of none of the human ideas of Time and Place; all duration and all space as they appear to Man disappearing in Almighty Power, he afterwards introduces the Deity, as acting incessantly, as renewing every moment the Creation willed by Him. (See Hamilton, &c.)

Descartes realizes in his doctrines concerning Matter and Mind what, until him, had been considered as impossible, the complete separation of Mind and Matter. These constitute the two poles, as it were, of his whole system of the Universe, but the separation is so effectual, that in the eye of Reason, it is impossible that they can ever be united. Such a thorough distinction, therefore, was not admitted by subsequent thinkers, who all attempt to fill up the chasm so deeply opened. The essence of Mind being considered as Thought, Mind alone is Spirit, and the Cartesian philosophy must therefore be fully admitted to be *Spiritualism*. As, however, his successor, Leibnitz, recognized in Matter Forces or Powers, where Descartes only perceives mechanical acts, Descartes is often taunted with having inculcated mere mechanism. The fact is, that Leibnitz spiritualized, as it were, Matter, whilst Descartes, consistently with his doctrine, conceived Spirit as only existing with Thought.

We must, however, refrain from entering further into the unbounded field before us, and limit our observations to the point at issue, viz., the Cartesian doctrines respecting self-evident principles and those of common sense. Absolute certitude, we have seen, only exists according to Descartes in Absolute Perfection. The mind assured of relative existence which authorizes it to assert "I think" or "I am," is at the same time convinced by the innate sentiment of its own imperfection that Supreme Perfection *is*. Thence the Cartesian doctrine, that absolute certitude can never be attained unless the mind be centred in supreme Perfection. The primary Faith of man or self-consciousness is a relative feeling. The term itself does not exist in Descartes' works, and by many thinkers, Dr. Hamilton amongst others, this is rather an advan-

tage, as savoring less of Ontology, or imaginary metaphysical entities. His definition is, however, sufficiently accurate to render all that can be conceived of self-consciousness or of consciousness, if the addition of self be considered redundant. We acquire self-knowledge, says Descartes, by means of the notion of self, which represents myself to myself. (*L'idée en moi, qui me represente moi-même à moi-même.*) This constitutes the upshot and issue, as well as the primary faith, of all human certitude. The union between mind and body he conceives to be operated by the agency of common sense. His words are the following: "The mind or spirit (*L'esprit*) does not immediately receive its impressions from all parts of the body; it is in immediate connection with the brain only, or perhaps with one of the smallest parts of that organ, viz., that in which is developed the faculty they term common sense, which faculty, whenever it is disposed in the same manner, always produces on the mind the same impression, however variously disposed the other organs of the body may be, as experience sufficiently testifies, so as to render useless further details; but which is still more evident when certain sensations formerly felt in a limb are still felt, although we are deprived of the limb." Descartes denies that it is the sense of sight that gives us the assurance that the same piece of wax we may see is the same we saw before. The common way of speaking he maintains to be incorrect when it is said, "that we see it is the same piece of wax." The right expression being, that we judge it to be the same piece of wax. A philosopher, (*un homme qui tâche d'élèver sa connaissance au de là du commun,*) Descartes tells us, ought to be ashamed to adduce such kinds of vicious locutions, as proofs of the doubtful nature of things. In this case, Descartes maintains

that it is intelligence that informs him of the nature and qualities of the bit of wax, far better than the senses "or at least than by what is termed common sense, or the faculty of imagining, for this common sense we have, is common with all the brute creation which know of figure and color, whilst human intelligence alone can divest the piece of wax of its outward form and investigate its nature." (2d Meditation.)

Very far from assimilating the sensations acquired by the senses to "certitude," because they are given by Nature, Descartes is quite of the contrary opinion. These natural sensations he terms "the inclination or bent of nature," but it is Reason or "the Light of Nature" that really informs us of the object perceived. The natural bent merely inclines us, he says, to believe it, but it is natural light that makes known the truth. These terms, he remarks, are vastly different. It is natural light that dissipates the gloom which doubt casts around us: to natural light we owe the assurance of our own existence, and we possess no other faculty or power by which we may be enabled to distinguish Truth from Falsehood. The natural bent, on the contrary, is continually inclining us away, sometimes inducing us to act well, sometimes to act ill. Nor indeed are the ideas which we receive from without always similar to the reality existing, and which they represent; for we have two notions of the sun: one which tells us that it is very small, and another that speaks of its immensity; and the latter, acquired by natural light, is by far the truest.

Although the connection between Mind and Matter occurs through the agency of the senses and common sense, "or the imagining faculty," yet according to the Cartesian doctrine no direct causation takes place. All phenomena considered generally as Causes

being merely *occasions* for the occurring of the effect observed. Every thing, even the Will of man, being attributed in fact to the immediate agency of the Deity. Even the rays of light being the mere occasion on which the Deity strikes on our mind the effect termed Vision.

The intimate, immediate connection between sensation and "common sense or the imagination," is one of the main tenets of the Cartesian mental philosophy, as may be clearly shown as well by the words of Descartes as by the full particulars in which one of the chief followers of that doctrine, Malebranche, enters on that point in his well known philosophical work, the "Search for Truth." A full third of that work consists in investigating the notions or ideas of "Imagination" and those which proceed from "natural inclination." Dr. Reid, in examining the opinions of Descartes, cannot reconcile, he tells us, Descartes to himself, (Descartes,) because that writer sometimes places the images of external objects in the brain not only as perceived but as remembered or imagined, and this, adds Reid, has always been held to be the Cartesian doctrine. Yet Descartes, continues Reid, sometimes appears to consider them merely as occasions on which, by the laws of the union of soul and body, ideas are excited in the mind. Descartes, in fact, admitted both, but referring Causation to supreme Power, he did not on that account deny the existence of what he deemed to be the mode or way, in which the phenomena occurred, and did not distinguish less carefully Imagination, or the figuring faculty, so near akin to Fancy, from the more careful and sedate investigation entered into by the Intellect or rational Power. With Descartes, external objects *occasion* the senses to operate; the sensations *occasion* the operation of the

Imagination, and were there no Imagination, he maintains there would be in man, neither Reasoning nor Intellection: not indeed because Reason admits the validity of the operation of the Imagination, but because it constitutes the canvas on which the Mind works.

The criterion of the truth or soundness of our judgment is, according to the Cartesian doctrine, "the clearness and fulness of the conception." Such a test may appear highly objectionable, as inducing us too often to consider our own conceptions as truth because they are clearly conceived. But here the rules of the Cartesian method obviate all error, being of such an absolute character, as to force the Mind to remain in suspense on almost all occasions. These absolute rules, however, which Descartes tells us in his "Method" are the only ones to be depended on in contemplation of Truth, are not to be acted up to in mere ordinary circumstances: and "*indecision being worse than error,*" in the usual course of things we must decide between two probabilities, for that which is the least uncertain. It is the Will, he says, that gives the final verdict, and this highest prerogative of human nature must never consent in important topics without the most evident testimony.

In virtue of the doctrine of occasional causes, and the constant immediate agency of the Deity, it must be readily perceived that in reality, the Cartesian system does not consider as active faculties, any of the qualities of Mind or Matter. All such qualities proceeding indeed from certain motions, or impelling causes, originally impressed on the creation, which are regulated by certain fixed mechanical laws, the secret of which is known only to that Infinite Being, from whence all things proceed. Therefore, although essentially spirit-

ualist, yet Cartesianism was so tainted with the doctrine of Mechanism, as to appear merely a system of mechanics. And this became still more apparent, when Leibnitz, introducing the notion of Powers or Forces in his Philosophy, appeared to have spiritualized matter itself. The two doctrines at the present day, are still conflicting, although neither the Cartesian tenets nor those of Leibnitz pass current. The metaphysical notion which considers as "quiddities, entities, or things," certain unknown somewhats, termed "forces," still reigns paramount in many minds. Science, however, after much oscillation, leans evidently on the side of Descartes, and the full light which the notion of Leibnitz was conceived to have thrown on the nature of Things, is on the wane. Although Cartesianism be altogether exploded as a doctrine, yet the mere statement of the positive relation of things, without reference to certain unknown Powers or Forces, hypothetically admitted, and yet too often conceived as real independent existences, is in accordance with the science of the present day.

As Rationalism is generally considered in the light of a successful effort to cast off the trammels of the Scholastics, who blindly adopted the main tenets of the Peripatetic school, as suggested by its illustrious founder, Aristotle; a rapid comparison of the main doctrines of that philosophy and of the Cartesian, may not be out of place. It is, however, but fair to state, that what we possess of Aristotle is owing to chance, and that more important writings may have existed. The divine mind—the human mind and animal life, constitute the Peripatetic view of being or existence, as substances or essences. These were either self-existent or accidental: self-existence applying to the Deity only; accidental, being the nature of all created substances.

They were either *real*, i. e. existing in nature, or *notional*, as conceived merely in the mind. The notional are only *true*, when the notion corresponds with the real nature of things; they are *false*, when the conception and reality differ. Beings were either active or passive, according as they possess a principle of motion or change, or are merely susceptible of being changed or moved. Aristotle's opinion of motion, as the immediate cause of every thing that occurs in the universe; his *primum mobile*, or the term "First mover" (*πρώτον κινούν*) given to the Deity; his first conviction that movement in a circle was the most excellent of all, remind one not only of the mechanical tenets of Descartes, but seem also to have had some weight in the views he adopted of all substances moving in a vortex, whence his well-known *Vortices*. The moving principle in substances, Aristotle names: Potency, Actuality, or Entelechia, and also *Dunamis* and *Energeia*. This constitutes the essence of things; not as the "Idea" of Plato, which that philosopher considered as something immovable, but as the active Form, (*eidos*,) and which is to be distinguished from Matter, (*ule*.) The soul, he conceives, as the form or *εἶδος* of the body, which is *ὕλη*; but Reason is the form of the soul, *the form of form*, (*εἶδος εἰδούζ*.) Substances, according to their quantity, quality, relation, or modality, constitute so many different sorts, named *categories*, here conceived *à posteriori*. Substance, in whatever form it may have existed, was believed to be external and indestructible. The Deity of Aristotle is not the "Creator," as Descartes conceives him to be, in virtue of the clear notion of perfection, which man is supposed to possess. Aristotle, however, besides the abstract notion of a "Primary Mover," describes the Deity as intelligent, immaterial, and eternal; but in producing motion, the Deity was supposed

to act not voluntarily, but necessarily. The notions of Descartes respecting the Deity, are naturally far more worthy the Being in whom he conceives all perfection to be centred; but in the Cartesian philosophy, God is an *Ens rationis*, a metaphysical Being; and this objection of the Kantian school saps irremediably the foundation which Descartes considered so secure.

It was this tenet of Cartesian philosophy, which conceived the Deity as a notion impressed in the human mind, and acquired by reflecting on the highest possible degree of perfection, that was the cause of the persecution he was threatened with by the Jesuits. To this proof of the existence of the divinity, we shall refer in another part of this work. But with respect to the other doctrines of Descartes, we cannot join his admirers, who proclaim him as having "taught mankind to think." With this reservation, we do not hesitate to place him with Lord Bacon, at the head of that glorious band which raised on high the standard of Reason, and therefore we consider him as deserving of the deepest gratitude of mankind. It was, indeed, no mean endeavor to assert, in the days of Descartes, the rights of free inquiry, too often disputed even in our time. This bold assertion still remains the leading principle of modern philosophy, now that the errors inherent to the Cartesian system have long since caused its downfall. These errors, which proved suicidal, may be summarily reduced to the following: The contradiction, already mentioned, of conceiving the universe as renewed and upheld in every moment of time by Almighty Power, when the rational ideas of perfection did not admit such relative terms to be applied to the actions of God. The positive contradiction involved in considering the grounds of moral obligation to be secure, when the Supreme Perfection on which they re-

posed, was only a rational inference, a suggestion of Reason. It was placing the stream higher than the fount. Therefore, although in practice the Cartesian doctrine of morality tallies with the Christian in considering moral obligation to be grounded on the relation in which man stands to the Infinite Wisdom or Perfection that rules the universe, and his social duties—the government of his passions—his moral capacity, and the perfection of his finite nature are therein represented, as chiefly consisting in a moral resemblance to that Supreme Perfection known by the name of God; yet, as a theory, (and Cartesianism was nothing more,) there was no foundation at all. Reason can never lie prostrate before her own offspring: she may admit or reject the soundness of the proofs adduced, and is indeed in that light the surest foundation of *divine* faith, or trust in the Almighty; but when, instead of accepting, she gives; when, instead of proving, she will suggest, her dictates cannot claim a confidence superior to that of mere rationality, which as yet never has, and we believe cannot ever, found a religion, and is in direct opposition with the leading principle of Christianity: the Almighty, as revealed to man in his first parents; and when lost sight of, again announced, first by Moses, and again by God himself, in Christ. The view we have taken of Reason must not be mistaken. Reason, both rational and inspired or impulsive, we conceive as a means; the only one, indeed, given to man on earth, to carry out the desire of his Maker, mysteriously expressed. But we must reserve this topic, however important, for another part of this work. Here it may suffice to say, that though the believer in natural religion, (not revealed,) even at this day, can adduce no better arguments than those furnished by Descartes in favor of the existence of God, as a sugges-

tion of the human Thought, yet, as decidedly it is not the Christian doctrine, it could never be received as such by Christians. We fully admit the right of the Cartesians, as of all rationalists, to attempt to found a religion of their own, and we eschew all persecution of such rationalists, when, without disturbing the public peace, they attempt to convince others. But it is absolutely inconsistent and irrational to blame the man who believes in the Almighty as revealed, and who sees God in Christ, from expressing the motives of his dissatisfaction. Is it less inconsistent to claim, as merely rational, certain consequences which are purely Christian? This weakness of the starting point of moral virtue, even in pure rationalism, and its utter incompatibility with the Christian doctrine, passed almost unperceived, because a century ago there arose a wild chase after what was termed a *rational* ground for the existence of God, on which it was supposed *Holy Faith* could rest more secure than upon Revelation. This *ignis fatuus* has misled, we believe, and still continues to mislead, many a bright intellect. Still, the main tenet of Descartes remains unshaken, the right of free inquiry, for evidently that right is common to mankind, and cannot be claimed exclusively by any one. It would be indeed a strange inconsistency, even amongst the host of man's inconsistencies, to lay claim at the same time to the right of inquiry, and to that of forbidding all inquiry. Here then, on the threshold, we fully admit the rights of Reason, and if we lay claim to her submission, it is in the name of Reason herself. We merely ask leave to begin by the beginning, as far as human knowledge goes; we point out to Reason a fact superior to all her dictates. It is not in the pointing out of the moral beauty of the Christian doctrine that we ground the testimony we offer to Reason; we

have first to secure the very basis of Christianity; faith in the Almighty, and which is indeed, we believe, the keystone of the whole edifice. Neither does divine Faith, nor Christian Faith, aim at extinguishing "the light of nature." This natural light or Reason, is indeed the sovereign judge of her own incompetence; for without rational Faith, divine Faith finds no resting place. But the submission sought for is a voluntary submission. If Reason requires the absence of restraint, still more so does divine Faith, for its object is the Almighty. If violence and persecusion are Christian doctrines, we stand condemned; but if Christianity, as we are convinced of, aims at the dethroning of force, by means of persuasion and by appealing to the moral conscience, and the rational consciousness of every individual, then we conceive ourselves to be right, in contending that rational Faith may be shown to submit without inconsistency to divine and to Christian Faith, in which the Almighty is One, although expressed to man in Holy Trinity.

The Ethics or doctrine of Morality of Descartes, however pure, possessed no sounder foundation than the Peripatetic or that of Aristotle, with whom the "Highest Good" was empirically deduced from the relative Happiness which was the aim of every sensible being, and which rising gradually in the chain of being pointed clearly out, according to the Peripatetic doctrine, some Supreme Happiness. This was rationally deduced or *à posteriori*. But to begin by the rational conception of the Divinity, and to suppose that such a creation of the Mind of Man could afterwards be pointed out as Supreme Perfection, was attempting to blend divine Faith with rational Faith, not as something independent, but as something dependent thereon. With Aristotle the "Highest Good" was not un-

derstood to be the Almighty. Indeed, the main tenet of that philosopher's moral system was that *virtue* consisted in the careful avoidance of every extreme, in steadily pursuing the middle track, and in moderation. All excess or defect was equally represented to be pernicious or vice. Thus between boldness and timidity, fortitude or courage is the medium, is virtue ; meekness between anger and insensibility or phlegm ; liberality between prodigality and niggardness ; modesty between impudence and bashfulness ; truth between detraction and boasting, &c. The scholastics, therefore, maintained the fight with advantage on this important point. Had the ground indeed been merely practical, the errors of the Cartesians (admitting the soundness of their own doctrine) might have passed unperceived, but when Reason is invoked, the theory must prove consistent ; or if theory is of no consequence, why then maintain unflinchingly the rights of Reason ? The downfall of Rationalism, in the form adopted by Descartes, is not, however, to be attributed to the inconsistency of the basis of divine Faith and of morality virtually contained in the system. It was owing to more glaring errors. To the adoption in physics of hypotheses which did not tally with the mathematical precision invoked by Descartes as the purest test. The accuracy of the issue, when this test was applied to the doctrine of Newton, pointed out clearly that something besides extension existed in Nature. Gravitation was at first positively asserted to be impossible, because it did not tally with the qualities or attributes of matter as admitted by Descartes. And in mental philosophy, or metaphysics, the extremes to which the doctrine was carried by the Egotists, by Malebranche, Spinoza, and Berkeley, entirely estranged the public opinion from Cartesianism. Still the "method" of that great thinker remains unim-

peached, and self-consciousness, termed knowledge of self-identity, or belief in relative existence, is yet the only foundation on which human Reason has found a ground of certitude. Dualism, at all events, constitutes the basis of Cartesianism, and self-consciousness, made known by Thought, assures us at the same instant of self and of something not self. *It is a relative certitude.* Matter and Mind exist in the Cartesian doctrine as separate substances. Matter is known through the senses and the knowledge transmitted by common sense to the mind. Now, however great the errors of Descartes may have been respecting the nature of matter; however great the discrepancy may be between philosophers with regard to the nature of atoms, or the motion thereof, it is impossible to deny that matter and mind, as existing separate substances, have constituted the main tenet of Cartesianism. Now, this firm ground certified to the mind through common sense by the never-ceasing voice of experience, this ground, that of Descartes, was abandoned by his most illustrious followers, and their errors which took their source in the doctrines of Cartesianism recoiled, as it were, with fearful effect on the philosophy from whence they were derived. But, in fact, these errors are not those of Descartes, and the virulent reproaches of Reid addressed to philosophers do not attain that thinker with respect to the nature of certitude, as it is given to man through common sense. A serious objection may, however, be presented here, founded on the fact that Descartes did not consider certitude as complete until the positive notion of a Supreme Perfection was acquired. But this main tenet, it must be remarked, related to *absolute* certitude. Therefore, we believe ourselves fully justified in asserting that Descartes taught that Thought or the mind furnished man with

a relative certitude (and not a relative probability) of relative existence, i. e., of our own and others' existence. Term it Belief, if you please, such Belief is at least a conviction of certitude, unless you repeat with Descartes that man does not possess absolute certitude until he knows of God. When Descartes asserts that the certitude of God's being no deceiver, which certitude is contained in that of the Perfection of the Supreme Being, fully certifies to his Reason that Things really do exist, and that his senses do not mislead him as to the existence of a something beyond himself; that philosopher merely points out to the *absolute* certitude contained in the cause of our Existence. Descartes, it is true, does not admit any conditional thing to be otherwise than conditional, and with him the primary condition or the Absolute is the Will of Supreme Perfection. This reference to Almighty Will as the real basis of Certitude as *absolute*, and as the only measure of Truth as *absolute*, this reference is perfectly consistent when Absolute Perfection is the subject taken in view; but it has always been considered as a failure of Descartes (see Leibnitz, &c.) to have attempted to increase relative certitude by appealing to Absolute Will. Therefore, when he tells us that neither the relations of number nor figure have any certitude in themselves, that if 4 and 4 make 8, that if the three angles of a triangle are equal to two rectangles, it does not depend on the natural relations of Things, but is a mere consequence of Almighty Will, such language, far from increasing human certitude, undermines all evidence. Descartes, it is true, conceives the certitude that God is no "deceiver" as sufficient to cancel all doubt; but evidently if our notions of Supreme Perfection constitute all the certitude we possess, as such notions are merely human and altogether relative, our

ideas of Goodness, of Wisdom, of Power, are far from being strengthened by supposing that if God had willed it otherwise, Good would have been Evil. Leibnitz compares this doctrine of Descartes to that of the same philosopher which asserts that human judgment is an operation of our will, and that if we judge that 2 and 2 make 4, it is a voluntary act. This Leibnitz terms an artifice, which allowed Descartes to maintain with less apparent inconsistency, that it was the Will and not the Wisdom of the Almighty that was the cause of all Truth. This reference to Supreme Will instead of Supreme Wisdom, Leibnitz considers as fatal to all ulterior effort of Descartes to establish the absolute value of human will. In fact, there would not have existed the least inconsistency in a system, the basis of which was Reason, and which bore the proud title of Rationalism, to have considered Infinite Wisdom as a Supreme Arbiter. It is, however, but just to say that Leibnitz did not solve the difficulty, by his supposing a pre-established Harmony to exist from all Eternity. The followers of Descartes, Malebranche and Spinoza, also adopted the views of their chief in regard to the constant exercise of Supreme Will, although the latter finds means to annihilate the very basis on which he founds his system.

Leaving then aside the unattainable notion of *absolute* certitude, we believe ourselves justified in asserting that Rationalism, as founded by Descartes, has bequeathed to posterity, 1. The great doctrine of free inquiry. 2. The certitude of Thought, as certifying through self-consciousness our own existence, and that of something beyond us. By Descartes was traced a ready line and a boundary between Thought and the phenomena of which Thought is conversant. Mind and Matter, or, if modern terms appear clearer, self and

not-self, the subject and the object were perfectly distinguished by him, whilst ancient philosophy had been incapable until then of separating them from each other with such philosophical precision. Besides these principles, which still constitute an integrant part of all philosophy which admits that the writer of these lines is not the reader of them (Bayle), another main tenet of Descartes, that of the distinction between the "Bent of Nature" and the "Light of Nature," must not be forgotten. The latter is evidently what Lord Bacon terms the "Interpretation of Nature," and the first is the "Anticipation of Nature" of that great philosopher; the one is science, the other is hypothesis.

The reign of free inquiry once fairly established by Descartes under the name of Rationalism, and the new method pointing out other means of investigation, the followers of that philosopher carried on a short time to their utmost limits the various doctrines which flowed therefrom. Some, adopting the mind or self as the only basis of certitude, were termed *Egotists*: but the notions or ideas of Reason obtained far greater favor, and Malebranche, Guelinx, Regis, etc., founded the Cartesian *Idealism*, whilst Berkeley maintained that knowledge and existence were convertible terms, considering that doctrine as a proof of the existence of the Supreme Mind, since we are certain that things and qualities exist independent of our own existence. But it was Spinoza that pushed beyond all legitimate inference the notion of independent and absolute substance, which Descartes conceived to be the essence of the Deity. This doctrine was *Pantheism* in the view taken of it by Spinoza, who appeared as the evil genius of Rationalism, since the issue of all his premises founded on the notions of Divine Perfection was the

complete nullifying of the Divinity, as a Being distinct from the works of this creation. Moreover, the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas, although clearly explained by Descartes only to mean the *faculty* of producing notions independently of the ideas of sense, this doctrine was carried to such absurd lengths as to rival with the scholastic tenets of innate axioms which Descartes rejected. This fallacy was pointed out by Locke and Condillac, who founded the modern school of *Sensationalism*, which maintains that nothing is in the Mind but what is obtained by the Senses. Locke, most unfortunately for his future renown, was too confident of his own good intentions and too confiding in the belief that his real meaning could not be mistaken. How, indeed, could a thinker of the intellectual value of Locke suppose that the man who insists upon the existence in man of an innate, intuitive *sagacity*, which weighs, considers, and reflects, could ever be taunted with the reproach of having denied the presence of that *sagacity*, as distinct from the objects on which its faculties were exerted? Sensationalism, or the school of Locke, was a prelude to another view of Rationalism or of free Inquiry. The distinction between Mind and Matter comes not only to be denied; not only are all intellectual notions derived from the sense, but Mind is a mere produce of Matter. This is *Materialism*, and its doctrines will require a most careful and close investigation, because it is on this ground that the broad rupture has taken place which separates at the present day Science and Religion. Science, considering only the fixed relations of things, and drawing her conclusions from thence by the means of innate sagacity or human reason, conceives the design perceived to be the consequence of the relations observed; nor can science abandon her lofty

position so long as sufficient and valid motives be not shown why the constant result of observation and experiment, or, in short, of experience, carefully tested, is to be cast aside, when a more general survey is taken of Things. The sceptical nature of science, distinguished by a desire to see, to feel, to grasp, and requiring, if not tangible, at least practical demonstration, may account for the very common scepticism of scientific men in matters of religious faith. Nor is this scepticism diminished when the weakness of human nature, and the habitual erroneous bent of common opinion, are taken into consideration as tested and verified by the most careful investigations of Tradition and History. We must not, however, anticipate on the remarks we have to offer upon this important point. We have here merely to observe that what is termed *Materialism*, was a natural consequence of perceiving only one side of Locke's system of Sensationalism. To this result Condillac lent a helping hand, and even Hartley, much against his will, we believe, and indeed all those who see in the mechanism of things or their positive relations in time and place the *only* cause of the results now so much insisted upon under the name of the *laws* of science. This school maintains with Priestley that "man does not consist of two principles, so essentially different from one another as matter and spirit, which are always described as having not one common property, by means of which they can affect or act upon each other; the one occupying space, and the other not only not occupying the least imaginable portion of space, but incapable of bearing relation to it; inasmuch that, properly speaking, my mind is no more in my body than it is in the moon," and this school repeats with the same man of science, "that the whole man is of some *uniform composition*, and that the

property of *perception*, as well as the other powers that are termed *mental*, is the result (whether necessary or not) of such an organical structure as that of the brain." The conclusion at which Dr. Priestley arrives is partly peculiar to himself, and the words are the following: "Consequently that the whole man becomes extinct at death, and that we have no hope of surviving the grave, but what is derived from the scheme of revelation." The latter part of this phrase may be considered as peculiar to Dr. Priestley, inasmuch as Materialism by no means assents to Revelation.

In direct opposition to this school stands Leibnitz, whose doctrines may be considered to constitute *Spiritualism*, not because the Cartesian philosophy did not inculcate Spirituality, but because Leibnitz peopled, as we may say, all science and all knowledge with entities known as Forces or Powers, and which immaterial *quiddities* were conceived as acting in all the changes which surviene in the various reigns of nature, in which changes the Cartesians only admitted some peculiar *atomical twist*. Immateriality was the main character of these Powers or Forces, which were made known as peculiar, distinct somethings, termed Monads by Leibnitz, and existing by myriads in the universe. The admission of those Forces or Powers constituted a very striking difference with the frozen unity which was with Spinoza the upshot and issue of the Cartesian doctrine of substance, when that doctrine was pushed to its utmost limits. But of this later. Here we briefly remark that spiritualism was the opposite extreme to materialism, and that both are doctrines of Rationalism, whilst Sensationalism, a branch of the same stem, may be conceived as middle point between two extremes, a position to which it owed perhaps the favor with which it was adopted. Be that as it may, such

discrepancy in philosophical doctrines soon produced the natural effect, that of doubting of the real value of Rationalism as a criterion of certitude, and the modern school of scepticism which arose became scarcely less Pyrrhonian than that of ancient philosophy. It has been said of Bayle and Hume, the two main columns of modern scepticism, that the first maintains that we have not reached truth, and the second that we can never reach it. We believe the latter doctrine to have been held by both. Bayle, it is true, accumulated with an industry and talent which drew forth terms of admiration from his staunchest antagonists, proofs upon proofs that we have not attained certainty, and these instances effectively prove nothing further than individual error, or at least endless discussion. It is in his "Eclaircissement sur les Pyrrhoniens" that Bayle explains the motives which urged him to such deep search, whilst he clearly states his doctrine. After holding forth the belief that in history, careful critical investigation is the only method of attaining approximate truth; and that it is always well to know what has been said for and against, he continues in the following terms: "Nor is this the only or the principal answer I have to give. Nothing is more requisite than Faith, and nothing is of higher importance than to be well acquainted with the value of that theological virtue. Now is there any thing more fit to teach us the value of faith, than to meditate on the attribute which distinguishes it from the other acts of the understanding? Its essence consists in our attachment to the firm persuasion of the revealed truths, and our persevering therein by the sole authority of God as our motive.

"Those who believe in the immortality of the soul on account of philosophical reasons, are indeed orthodoxes; but they do not partake, in so doing, of the faith

to which we allude." This appeal to Faith, uttered by Bayle, is however to be distinguished from the appeal to belief and faith made by Hume. Bayle evidently designates *divine* faith, whilst Hume points out in the human thought, and in the very conviction of the truth of the conclusions of Reason, a peculiar feeling which he terms "belief" and "faith," and which he maintains to exist also in the brute creation. However, we by no means intend to insinuate that either Bayle or Hume considered belief or faith as equivalent to truth; but we maintain, that few thinkers have ever shown themselves more worthy of the title of critic, so difficult to be borne with honor, than these philosophers have done. Opinions may differ respecting the views entertained by Bayle and Hume, in matters above human apprehension, but no uncertainty can reign respecting the value of the scrutiny, to which they submitted all the most intricate folds of the human mind. The dogmatic conclusions of rationalism, never received a more complete refutation than that which is contained in the writings of those authors. With regard to their *scepticism* on religious topics: as we consider the real ground of *divine* faith to be in another object than that of mere *rational* faith, and as, unless that great object, the Supreme Being, is revealed, (as we are convinced, and hope to prove to be the case,) no creation of human thought can lay claim to our homage as God, the religious scepticism of Bayle and Hume, is of more value in our eyes as an admirable proof of the weakness of any religion merely founded by man, than it is hurtful to the God revealed. If the Almighty be revealed then the arrows of scepticism fall harmless before that fact. But if it be maintained that the Almighty is a creation of the human intellect, then the missiles of Bayle and Hume strike with fearful and irresistible

effect. All certitude may indeed be reduced to a belief, to a staid conviction. This conclusion, however, could not be grounded on scepticism as a doctrine, even when it was admitted as the surest method, if not the only one, which could lead to any issue of positive value. Scepticism as a doctrine professes to believe in nothing, not even in the belief of its own tenets. The deep remarks of Bayle and Hume may therefore be highly prized, as means of coming to some positive conclusion; but mere doubt, even when it points to "belief," as the only ultimate issue of human knowledge—requires something of a more positive character; something grounded on universal assent, instead of individual scepticism, in order to constitute a doctrine of "belief" and "faith" merely considered as "*positive*." To attain such a *desideratum*, became now the scope of men given to the study of the springs of human thought, and who could not rest satisfied with a doctrine of uncertainty. Admitting with Hume, *but not as Hume did*, that all human certitude may be termed a belief and a faith, Reid undertook the task, the labor of which must not be underrated, nor overlooked; even be it admitted that the desired aim was not completely attained. This aim was the enumeration and clear demonstration of the elementary primary beliefs of the human mind: those beliefs which evidently did not proceed from the objects we perceive and judge of, but which constitute as elements of thought, sensation, perception, and judgment themselves. This has been termed the theory of common sense; but a more proper term is that of *Psychology*. It aims at acquiring, by careful investigation, the certain elementary principles of thought, and at pointing out the steps which it constantly takes in all parts of human knowledge. Whilst in Scotland a glorious band

of thinkers, with Reid at their head, engaged in the search, the same starting point was adopted in Germany by Kant, whose example was followed by a host of philosophers, and whose investigations, with those of the latter, constitute a brilliant appendix to the study, already so closely discussed, of the human mind. But the German school, although it started as did Reid with the Scotch philosophers and Buffier, from the belief of a primary elementary conviction, deduced notwithstanding very different consequences.

Beginning with common sense, Reid considers it as an umpire, or natural judge of the validity of the most rational, if not the most elaborate, dictates of reason. With Reid, common sense is almost tantamount to certitude; or at least he admits the verdict of common sense as truth. Not so the German school, although it enters more fully and deeper than Reid in the study of human thought. This display, however brilliant it may appear, furnishes no dogmatical consequences of so elementary and simple a nature as those admitted by Reid; but their admission has not been ratified either by the vulgar or the learned. The first knows nothing of them; the latter points them out, it is true, but the *sense* required is not *common* sense. Reducing our inquiry respecting German philosophy to four of the principal leaders, these four doctrines may be termed *Mentalism*, or inquiry into the nature of Pure Reason, (*Kant*;) *Subjectivism*, or the unity of the object perceived, with the mind perceiving, (*Fichte*;) *Naturalism* or *Absolutism*, or the absolute identity of the mind that perceives with the object perceived, (*Schelling*;) and lastly (with us) *Intellectualism*, or the absolute Identity of Existence and Intelligence, of Matter and Mind, (*Hegel*.) From such of our readers who are conversant with German philosophy, we claim

indulgence for thus attempting to define briefly doctrines essentially diffused. However, as we aim at tracing each doctrine in broad and distinct lines, so as to render them evident to the uninitiated in philosophical matters, we have recourse to expressions as trite as possible. It is for thinkers who aim at establishing some system peculiar to themselves, a matter of no less importance than of difficulty, to discover some name for the system, at once appropriate and new. The fact is, that the matter is much the same, and each succeeding writer has to exert his ingenuity in order to express in other terms a subject which scarcely admits of such a broad distinction. Kant, in entitling his inquiry into the elementary beliefs of the mind, the "Criticism of pure Reason," merely gives another name to Rationalism. The store seems almost exhausted, for since the "critical philosophy," no new name has been given. The doctrines take the name of the teacher, whenever that name permits; thus Kantism and Hegelism are terms in use, but Fichte and Schelling are names which do not allow the final addition. We prefer to proper names some term which may point out the leading doctrine.

The difficulty to which we refer, appears to have been found insuperable by M. Victor Cousin, who had recourse to an old term to designate the "Eclectic Philosophy," or Eclectism. This term, which expresses "choice," is another word for "judgment." It was an attempt to cull the choicest flowers of French, English, and German philosophy; which would unite in perfection the choicest odors and colors. But "Eclectism" soon became a byword; and in a short time this doctrine which pompously professed to unite, in one strong inseparable bond, the essences or truths of all philosophy, was considered as a vain and delusory attempt,

altogether irrational, to supersede Rationalism by Eclectism. In fact, Eclectism was either what it always had been,—a doctrine professing merely *to choose*, or else it was meant to signify final judgment or Reason. Now, however great the merit of assembling judiciously the elements of judgment, a well-marked boundary exists between that act of the mind, and the one which proceeds to pronounce the verdict. It is Eclectism, or judicious choice, that brings forward the witnesses, and displays the testimony, but the office of Judge is performed by Reason, sagacity, or understanding. Without the testimony, no judgment: and that testimony, unless it be adequate, would leave the judgment uninformed. It belongs to Reason to question the witnesses which Eclectism produces. Eclectism can therefore lay no claim at constituting a doctrine of all doctrines; for it is merely the rehearsal of the opinions which are considered as the best. Rationalism, therefore, was not superseded by Eclectism, but the very failure of M. Cousin was useful to the great cause of Free Inquiry, by the luminous discussion into which that deep thinker entered, and by the negative result of his conclusions.

If Scepticism be admitted to constitute a branch of Rationalism, this latter may also be considered as embracing in the wide circle of human Thought two other doctrines, although they are grounded still more firmly than Scepticism on the denial of Rationalism. These doctrines, which are Mysticism and Fideism, may be likened to the offspring which deny the parent, and claim to belong to some higher descent; but their fate, like that of all impostors, is to deceive the simple only, and to lose on close investigation all their assumed importance. The fallacy of Mysticism consists in asserting undue confidence in the spontaneous gush of the

human Thought when actuated by strong enthusiastic feelings. The visionary emotions of Thought are maintained to be above Reason; and individual spontaneity above common or universal sense. *Fideism* (pistis, fides) is, in some degree, akin to Mysticism when, instead of being content to remain in the usual course of things as instinctive belief or as rational faith, a *natural, innate parentage* is claimed with Supreme Perfection as an instinct or faith of the soul—a faith distinct from the low, abject faith, termed rational. Such pretensions can only be met by Rationalism—unless Fideism claims to be self-evident as is our consciousness of relative existence. But even then the ground would be that of Rationalism. Faith, as a feeling, exists undoubtedly, and the term has been adopted to express religious belief; but the object of that faith, we trust, we shall prove to be unknown to man, unless revealed. The natural feeling of faith, thus ensconced in the Supreme object of adoration, is lost sight of, and considered to be also of a transcendent nature. The error is harmless, so long as nothing is deduced therefrom, and faith remains on practical ground: but when instead of a natural feeling termed faith, or trust in things as real, and in Reason as true—when instead of that Faith, and a God revealed, it is maintained that divine faith is distinct from rational faith, not because of the object of faith, but on account of its own peculiar nature, which points to God, as the magnet does to the north, then the assumption requires proof, and that faith must be pointed out to us in every human being. The matter, we repeat, is of no consequence on the practical ground of Faith in the Almighty; but those who reason upon that point must prove the existence of such a Faith without a God revealed; this involves the *à priori* belief in the existence of the Almighty, for the *à*

posteriori or rational proof would be an appeal to Rationalism. On slippery ground precaution can alone prevent stumbling. It is therefore requisite, in speaking of Faith, not to fall into the fallacy of confusion. *Fideism* or the philosophical doctrine of Faith is, in fact, neither philosophical nor religious in the sense in which we understand Philosophy and Religion. The first we consider to be grounded on positive belief and rational faith, the second on the primary revelation of the Almighty as Supreme Power, Supreme Wisdom, and Supreme Goodness. The feeling is human, and is of the same nature in itself as rational faith; but the object, instead of being a rational consequence, is of a nature which we are convinced would have been unknown to man, and of which all that has been given to man to know is that He is the Almighty. Natural Religion we maintain to be the imagination of man working upon the notions he has framed to himself of God. We believe that we shall be enabled to prove, most clearly, that man not only does not possess a *natural* or spontaneous knowledge of God, but that in consequence of his nature itself, he is always clouding and darkening that bright revelation with his fanciful or mythic views. This pristine revelation is what the Jewish legislator appeals to, when he reminds the mysterious chosen race of the "God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob." But the Unity of the Almighty is still more apparent in Christianity, for there though Christ was man, yet the *Word* was God. And to enforce, as it were, this unity, to hold up a clear distinction between the human nature of the Messiah and that same Saviour as the Almighty, the existence of the Holy Spirit (a term in which the inadequacy of human language to express the Lord is most conspicuous) is pointed out as the Almighty acting. The Christian

Trinity is the Unity of God. In Christ, as in the Holy Ghost, the Christian sees the Almighty. If such is the real state of things, neither the revelation of Moses, which was a mission against Idolatry; nor the mission of Jesus, in whom neither the Son of God nor the Son of man, nor the Saviour is adored, but the Almighty as the Father, in neither of these missions can any thing be pointed out as inconsistent with the pristine revelation, the Almighty. We must, however, forego entering further on this topic for the present. We only endeavor to point out the mystery as a fact; we attempt no explanation. With us the basis of religious faith is the Almighty as revealed. That point once established, it rises superior to the highest inferences of human Reason, when Reason seems to infer consequences contradictory to the Power, the Wisdom, and the Goodness of the Almighty. In such instances, indeed too common, Faith in the Almighty, as revealed, is the sheet-anchor of the religious mind. Evil exists, and Evil triumphs; but our Faith is in God, who revealed to us His Existence, as the Almighty; and therefore when Reason insinuates that His Power is weak, for Christ is on the cross; that His Wisdom is absurd, for man, His creation, is the child of error; that His Goodness is an infatuation against which the groans of the suffering loudly protest, in all these positions of extreme difficulty, where Reason sees no light, where all is darkness, divine Faith shines through the gloom with a brightness that dispels our fears without informing our Reason.

It by no means follows that, because our conviction of the Truth of Revelation is most deep, we deny to others the right of attempting to ground their religious faith on some peculiar feeling of the Human Mind. All we require is, that such a faculty be pointed out to us, for we have sought it in vain. On this point, as in

regard to the existence of the Almighty, many may believe that it is strengthening religion, to show that the notion of God exists naturally in the mind of man, and thus the search is biassed by the wish of discovering the object they seek to find. We consider this error to be very common, but we admit the right of man to build on error.

Mysticism, or the doctrine of spiritual influence, and *Fideism*, or the doctrine of Faith in God placed in every man as a natural faculty of the soul, we conceive to be the essences of Mythology and of religious error; and, as such, to be the natural bent or inclination of the human mind. This natural bent is the source of all hypothesis, although it be the only road by which we arrive at Truth. This fact on which Descartes insists so strenuously, was no less admitted by our great philosopher, Lord Bacon, whose opinion on a principle of so primary a nature, cannot be passed over in silence. This Essay on positive faith being limited to the outlines of modern philosophy, and to pointing out, in each principal doctrine, the mere elementary principles, it may appear strange that we did not begin by setting forth the tenets of the "father of Experimental Philosophy" respecting the first steps of the human mind towards the acquirement of knowledge either divine or human. But as the chief, if not the only aim of the Baconian philosophy was to constitute science, science practical and useful, a science yielding "fruit;" and as he rather avoids metaphysical doctrines, such as those of the Cartesian school, we preferred postponing the exposition of the views of Lord Bacon until we had given a brief summary of modern philosophy. The Verulamian reformation of philosophy preceded, in fact, the Cartesian; indeed, Descartes approves in several of his letters the method of Bacon,

but the disquisitions of the former on the principle of Thought are not the less original. Bacon aimed at establishing positive science, and to advance the discoveries of Man in nature. The discussions of the Scholastics had produced on his mind a most unfavorable impression. "Away," he tells us, "with a science which brings forth nothing but disputation—a science which is neither a vineyard nor an olive ground, but an intricate wood of briars and thistles, from which those who lose themselves in it bring away many scratches, and no food." (Nov. Org. Lib. 1, Aph. 75). Bacon certainly no more invented Induction than Watt invented Steam; but Bacon, like Watt, taught men to use a power they unheeded. Judgment, inference or induction, as proposed by Lord Bacon, demands facts proved by experiment and observation, and not merely by logical controversy or argument such as the scholastics delighted in, and without which they thought nothing could be done. It is not that Bacon gainsays the value of argument (reasoning; syllogism), he only maintains that man should argue from what he knows. But does it follow that Bacon was ignorant of the usual method of the human mind, that of arguing from supposition or hypothesis? How far this reproach is warranted, we shall see later. Here it is merely stated that Bacon only denied argument grounded on hasty and general induction; he required individual facts, not only *affirmative* but also *negative*; in short, the for and against. "There may exist, and there is, two roads or methods leading to Truth," says Lord Bacon, "the one, starting from our sensations and individual facts, rises at once to the most general principles, and leaning on these principles, as on so many unshakable truths, deduces from thence average axioms, or else refers these axioms to those principles in order to better judge of them, and

the latter method is the one most commonly in use. The other method takes also for its starting point the sensations, and individual facts, but rises slowly and gradually, without omitting a single step, and reaches very late to the most general propositions. This latter is the true one, but no one has yet attempted it." (Nov. Org. Lib. 1, Aph. 19.) And again (Aph. 20.) "Both of these methods starting from our sensations, and individual things, only rest when the most general have been attained, but there exists between them this great difference: The one only skims lightly over experience, and merely touches it flying, as it were; whilst the other proceeds with method, and halts as long as it is necessary. The first seats itself with a single bound in the midst of vague, abstract, and useless theories, whilst the latter rises steadily by degrees to the real and avowed principles of Nature."

The Baconian reformation of argument therefore by no means asserts principles contrary to the Aristotelian method of reasoning or syllogism, which remains, as Aristotle gave it, 2,000 years ago; only Bacon, instead of proceeding from general propositions hypothetically advanced to individual conclusions, advances cautiously from particular, individual facts, carefully investigated by experiment and observation, and thence deduces, not universal conclusions, but average or middle assertions, as those on which science can more surely depend. It was more particularly against the Scholastics, than against Aristotle, that the shafts of the Baconian censure were directed on account of the abuse of one of the forms of argument laid down by Aristotle many centuries ago, into which the school-men had been gradually betrayed, and by which they always reasoned from general propositions to particular ones. Thus, if we suppose the point to be ascertained to consist in

knowing whether the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars gravitate. This question the school-men soon settled by means of the following argument or syllogism in form: All bodies or substances gravitate—now the sun, the moon, and the stars are substances—Therefore, the sun, the moon, and the stars gravitate. The Baconian method arguments contrariwise. It would begin by ascertaining by means of careful observation and experiment, that certain bodies have weight, i. e., gravitate. The first proposition would then be that, according to careful induction, it had been ascertained that such and such bodies gravitated or had weight. From thence would proceed the middle proposition; now, all bodies until yet observed gravitate in whatever part of space they may be situated. Then comes the affirmation; therefore, all bodies gravitate, affirmation only applicable to the heavenly lights when the same inductive method has proved them to possess that peculiar property termed gravitation, the real nature of which would remain as mysterious as ever. Thus we see that the Baconian induction does not consist in a mere childish enumeration of facts leading to hasty conclusions, susceptible of being overturned by the first contradictory instance, nor is it drawn from a limited number of facts, nor from such facts as are of daily occurrence. Sound induction, according to Lord Bacon, chooses from different quarters, and “from *varied* circumstances, including both affirmative and negative facts in the circle of observation and experiment, and beginning by rejecting the negative facts, collects a sufficient number of the affirmative by which it abides.” It is evident from this, that the method of Lord Bacon does not merely conclude that the same event will occur in the same given circumstances, because it is *generally* believed to be so, but it enacts that that point

should become a subject of observation and experiment, *either direct or indirect.*

It is not our task to enter into any discussion respecting the merits or demerits of the inductive method as proposed by Lord Bacon. Those who desire to know more, must have recourse to works such as those of Professor Playfair, or M. Stuart Mill. Modern science certainly differs with respect to method, from the Baconian, being the study of *effects*, and considering as quite illusory the search of the primary cause, whilst it admits the plurality of causes. We have not either to enter into the personal objections made, such as that of perverseness, as having traduced the memory of his predecessors, and of lowering his contemporaries in men's esteem, or that of attempting to undermine all religion and morality. Objections of this kind, which are advanced by the Neo-Roman school headed by *de Maistre*, point out clearly the inveterate hate of that *clique*, against the advancement of learning, and may serve as an antidote against the studied eulogy of those who see in Rome, and in her secular method of instruction, the only true source of knowledge. Without attempting to throw a veil over the fatal fault of Bacon, which justifies the poet who brands him with the appellation of the "meanest of mankind," and without considering him as the only source of "inductive philosophy," or as faultless even in his efforts to bestow on Man a *new organ* for the advancement of learning, we venture to maintain that no thinker ever less deserved the obloquy of religious men, or pointed out more clearly the broad distinction between rational and divine faith. To this we shall refer at a later period. It is with certain philosophical errors respecting the first steps of the human mind towards knowledge, errors which have been reproached to Bacon, that we have here to do.

Thus he has been said to have, 1st, underrated and misconceived the value of the Mind; 2d, to have been ignorant of the very first principle of all inquiry, that which leads the way in all pursuit of knowledge; 3d, to have waged war against hypothesis, by the very means of an hypothesis. Now as these points bear entirely on those first steps in human knowledge which constitute *belief* and positive faith, the subject, we believe, will be in some measure elucidated by an exposition of Lord Bacon's tenets. The memory of that great, and unfortunate philosopher is, we conceive, quite free from the imputation of such an error of judgment. The opinion of Bacon's great rival, of Descartes, may be here brought forward as the first in time, if not in weight. This opinion is extant in a letter written by Descartes six years after the death of Lord Bacon, and five years before the publication of Descartes' first work. (1637.) In this letter addressed from Holland to his Parisian correspondent Father Mersenne, Descartes expresses himself in the following words: "You wish to learn from me in which manner useful experiments are to be made. On that subject, after all that Verulam has written thereon, I have only to add, that without extending our researches unto the very slightest particularities respecting any matter, our principal care ought to be to form general collections of all the most common things of those which are quite certain, and can be ascertained without expense. Thus for instance, it would be useful to observe, whether all fossil shells are turned into layers having the same direction, and if the same direction persists beyond the line: if the bodies of all animals present three cavities, head, chest, and abdomen, and so on, for all these things apparently indifferent are of use in the search of Truth. As to the more particular researches (experiments) it

is impossible to avoid many superfluous and even erroneous ones if the truth of things be not known beforehand." (*Œuvres compl. de Descartes. Lettres au P. Mersenne.*) These lines of Descartes express the metaphysical tendency of his mind. In saying that experiments are not entered into without some previous knowledge of Truth, he means that they are not made haphazard, but that the mind conducts the process in a peculiar way according to the nature of the experiment. But Descartes only repeats, on this occasion, the very opinion of Bacon, who tells us that the mind judges of experiment in two ways: 1. By a kind of sagacity above all philosophy. 2. By induction or inference. This natural sagacity Bacon proposes to help by the means of a new organ, (*novum organum*,) which facilitates the inquiry by laying before the mind, in all possible ways, the facts inquired into. But Bacon was too great a practical philosopher to admit that beyond that innate, instinctive sagacity, any relative truths could be known without their being attended to, and without the validity of the conditions being attested. According to Lord Bacon, this innate sagacity is the guide to Truth, but does not constitute Truth herself. Bacon, therefore, cannot be considered rightly as having underrated the value of the mind.

An objection of a more serious nature against Lord Bacon as a philosopher, is now prevailing in the schools, not only of France and Germany, but even of England. He stands arraigned for having been ignorant of the natural method of the mind, of the process instinctively adopted to arrive at Truth; i. e., first, by guessing and then verifying. This accusation, which we have heard fall from the lips of men of high and undoubted talent, of MM. Victor Cousin and Auguste Comte, and which is to be found in their respective works; has found in

England not a mere tacit assent, but a full and open avowel. Distrusting our own strength before such powerful antagonists, we ask leave to bring into the field Lord Bacon himself, and we feel confident that the sturdy champion will prove worthy of the task.

For the entire judgment delivered by M. Victor Cousin on this point of the Baconian philosophy, we refer to his "Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, vol. i. p. 100, and seq.," and merely state that this judgment of M. Cousin has been widely circulated by his disciples. M. Auguste Comte, considering the real process of the mind in all inquiry to be a desideratum in philosophy, enters fully and copiously on that subject in his "Cours de Philosophie positive, 2m. vol. pp. 433 to 463." An eminent English philosopher, M. Stuart Mill, concurs in the view adopted by M. Auguste Comte, and quotes the following words of that deep thinker as a clear statement of the position: "Some fact is as yet little understood, or some law is unknown: we frame on the subject an hypothesis as accordant as possible with the whole of the data already possessed, and the science, being thus enabled to move forward freely, always ends by leading to new consequences capable of observation, which either confirm or refute, unequivocally, the first supposition. Neither induction nor deduction would enable us to understand even the simplest phenomena *if we did not commence by anticipating* on the results; by making a provisional supposition, at first essentially conjectural as to some of the very notions which constitute the final object of the inquiry. It is in this way, which has some resemblance to the methods of approximation of mathematicians, that we arrive, by means of hypothesis, at con-

clusions not hypothetical." (A system of Logic by M. J. Stuart Mill, vol. ii. Book 3, ch. xiv. p. 20.)

Mr. Whewell, in his History of the Inductive Sciences, evidently considers the Baconian method which demands facts and not hypotheses as somewhat erroneous, and denies that the cause assigned should be a cause already known, which would be equivalent to saying that we could never become acquainted with any new cause. Speaking of the discoveries of Kepler and Copernicus, Mr. Whewell remarks that "Real discoveries are thus mixed up with baseless assumptions; profound sagacity is combined with fanciful conjecture; *not rarely or in peculiar instances, but commonly and in most cases, probably in all*, if we could read the thoughts of discoverers as we read the books of Kepler. To try wrong guesses is apparently the only way to hit upon right ones." These views of Mr. Whewell elicit the following reflexions from the eminent reviewer of Mr. Whewell's above-mentioned work, as may be seen in the Edinburgh Review for October, 1837: "These views of Mr. Whewell bear a striking similarity to those contained in the following extract from the life of Sir Isaac Newton, and had the author of the History of the Inductive Sciences been aware of this, he would no doubt have referred to them in confirmation of his own observations: 'Nothing, even in mathematical science, can be more certain than that a collection of scientific facts are of themselves incapable of leading to discovery, or to the determination of general laws, unless they contain the predominating fact or relation in which the discovery mainly resides.' In order to give additional support to these views, it would be interesting to ascertain the general character of the process by which a mind of acknowledged power proceeds in the path of successful inquiry.

The history of science does not furnish us with much information on this head, and, if it is to be found at all it must be gleaned from the lives of eminent men. Whatever this process may be in its details, if it has any, there cannot be the slightest doubt that in its generalities at least, *it is the very reverse of the method of induction.*"

Nothing can be more consistent with Truth and with the sound principles of the elements of the process of scientific inquiry, than the value laid by thinkers upon hypothesis, or supposition, as a first step in all such inquiry. The only point here at issue is whether Lord Bacon overlooked this first step, or whether Bacon's very first position has not been overlooked. Does not Lord Verulam lay down as a first truth fully confirmed by experience that on account of the very nature of the human mind which, like a faulty mirror, always reflects false images, man cannot do otherwise than *anticipate*, or guess at Truth? Does he not consider all human inquiry as susceptible of being ranged under two heads, viz., as *Anticipations of Nature*, and as *Interpretations of Nature*. Bacon, it is true, does not say that the method of inquiry should be first to guess and then to verify; but he says man cannot do otherwise. With him it constitutes no method peculiar to any particular road which may be taken or not, but it is the only road the mind can follow. The undoubted tenor of this very first position of the inductive method we conceive to be sufficient to vindicate Lord Bacon from having made the oversight alluded to.

But stronger evidence can be adduced. Does he not, in the "Novum Organum," when exposing the various instances or facts which he deems worthy of becoming the objects of inductive investigation, does

he not constantly produce at the same time the various hypotheses or guesses which have been made as so many anticipations? And the well-known Experimentum crucis, what else is it, than a means of pointing out between two hypotheses or theories, the road that is to be taken? Even when discussing subjects not capable of experimentation, such as that faculty of the Mind termed Memory, the importance of which cannot be overrated, does not Lord Bacon expressly state that without a pre-notion of the thing we seek we can never hope to discover intentionally the object sought after? And in explaining what we are to understand by Rhetoric, does he not commence by saying that he will proceed according to his usual method, that of "beginning by loosening the ground," and after anticipating, by an insufficient definition, he then remarks, "we will now go deeper." The very essence, the pith and marrow of the Baconian method, consists then in the admission that by the very nature of the human mind man always proceeds by anticipating the truth, by guessing, but that this is not true Induction, it is merely an Anticipation of Nature. Now, Bacon proposed by his method of Induction to arrive at the Interpretation of Nature. Nor does this occur immediately. Bacon terms his first harvest an approximation to truth, approximation insufficient, it is true, but yet "far better than confusion."

It is to be attributed, we believe, to the metaphorical language in which it pleased Lord Bacon to express himself, that he has been considered as denying the use of hypothesis in the attainment of knowledge; although well aware how very requisite it was to clothe his thoughts in terms the least susceptible of mistake. "For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I do pro-

pound, I am zealous and affectionate," says Lord Bacon, "to recede as little from Antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and the proficiencie of knowledge."

Whatever opinion may be entertained respecting the perfect analogy which we maintain to exist in the "Anticipation of Nature" of Lord Bacon, and the modern view taken of the use of Hypotheses in scientific Inquiry, this latter view, we believe, to be most undoubtedly true. Indeed, the value of that opinion, we conceive, to be greatly increased by the fact that men of such intellectual eminence as MM. Whewell, Stuart Mill, Cousin, and Comte, are unanimous with respect to the use of hypothesis or supposition as an antecedent to positive knowledge. Yet we again remark, with those thinkers, hypothesis is something optional, whilst with Lord Bacon it is the natural and requisite way.

The two immortal founders of modern philosophy, Bacon of Verulam and Descartes, may then be considered, we believe, as agreeing perfectly on one most important point, although they express themselves somewhat differently. This point consists in the first step taken by the mind towards knowledge. With Bacon it is an anticipation; with Descartes it is an Inclination of Nature. With both, it is the imagination that transmits these anticipations, these inclinations, (or indeed that creates them.) "Sense," says Lord Bacon, "sendeth over to Imagination before Reason have judged. . . . Neither is the Imagination simply and only a messenger, but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small authority in itself besides the duty of the message. . . . And in all persuasions which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief

recommendation unto Reason is from the Imagination." (Of the Proficiency and Adv. of Learning. On the Understanding.)

With Lord Bacon, as with Descartes, Reason is termed Natural Light; but Bacon conceives this natural light somewhat differently, since he says the term is used in two several senses, "the one, that which springeth from Reason, Sense, Induction, Argument, according to the Laws of heaven and earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit, on man by an inward Instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first Estate; in which latter sense only he is participant of some light and discerning, touching the perfection of the moral law: but how? sufficient to check the vice, but not to inform the duty." This constitutes with Lord Verulam the highest office of natural Light or Reason; for Religion, as well moral as mystical, he deems can only be attained by inspiration, and revelation from God. But with this we have not here to deal.

Should it appear problematic to any reader, whether the Anticipation of Nature of Bacon, be really the same thing as Hypothesis or suggestion, i. e., a hasty imaginary induction, the following words of that great thinker will determine at once, we believe, his views respecting doubtful assertion or hypothesis: "The registering of doubts hath two excellent uses; the one, that it saveth Philosophy from errors and falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is not collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but is reserved in doubt: the other, that the entry of doubts is as so many suckers or sponges to draw use of knowledge, insomuch as that which if doubts had not preceded, a man should never have advised, but passed it over without note, is by the suggestion and solicitation of

doubts, made to be attended and applied. But both these commodities do scarcely countervail an inconvenience which will intrude itself if it be not debarred; which is, that when a doubt is once received, men labor rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it, and accordingly bend their wits. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be allowed, which laboreth to make doubtful things certain, and not those which labor to make certain things doubtful. Therefore, these calendars of doubts I commend as excellent things; so that there be this caution used, that when they be thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution, they be from thenceforth omitted, discarded, and not continued to cherish and encourage men in doubting." (Of the Proficiency and Adv. of Learning. Registry of Doubts.)

Even admitting that the hope entertained by Bacon, of fulfilling, as a special mission, the extinction of all hypotheses, to have been itself a mere hypothesis, an Idol of the Tribe, considering as universal what in reality only embraces one side of the question; yet the positive fact that Bacon deemed hypothesis to be the natural road to Truth, is not impaired. It would indeed merely prove, that the difficulty of advancing beyond the Anticipation of Nature was insuperable, and not that the philosophy, before which the schoolmen quailed, was incompetent to point out the first steps which lead to knowledge. The full conviction of Bacon in the weakness of the natural bent of man, may be everywhere perceived in his writings: "Men," he tells us, "which is the root of all Error, have made too untimely a departure, and too remote a recess from particulars." And again, "for it being the nature of the mind of man, to the extreme prejudice of knowledge, to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities,

as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity ; the Mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite." Lord Bacon, here applying the definition of quantity, determined or proportionable to Mathematics, again seizes the opportunity even respecting a science of so positive a nature, to caution against the natural bias of the mind to go astray.

We now consider ourselves fully justified in asserting that the starting point of Modern Philosophy or of Rationalism, is the acknowledgment of the natural bent of the human mind towards Error. The truth of this assertion we deem fully confirmed by the value imparted to hypothesis, as the most natural process of the mind in the search of truth, by the men who stand at the present day in the foremost ranks of those engaged in the study of the human Intellect. It was the doctrine of Bacon and of Descartes ; it is still the doctrine of Rationalism. Let the religious Mind, conscientiously convinced that our knowledge of the existence of the Almighty is acquired *à posteriori*, i. e., by rational means, ponder well on this elementary doctrine of Rationalism : be it not forgotten that their conclusion "far o'erspreads their basis." As for the men who, believing in Revelation, attack Rationalism on the score of pride and self-sufficiency, they ought to bear in mind that such was not the doctrine either of Bacon or Descartes. Free inquiry is of a modest and unassuming nature, because its own doctrines assure it of its own weakness. Toleration is, therefore, the essence of free inquiry in theory and in practice. Nor does toleration exclude personal conviction. The more rational that conviction, the more voluntary the adhesion of Reason. As toleration does not preclude personal conviction, so does Reason admit of submission on ra-

tional grounds, and the submission is in fact a rational one.

Whatever may be deemed the positive value of the Baconian method, we avoid carefully all discussion on that point. The only position we take from that method is the very first step towards knowledge, considered as a truth confirmed by experience. As to inquiries of a more metaphysical character, Lord Bacon, it is well known, eschewed them. Yet it must not be omitted that the metaphysical views of Descartes have taken a far deeper root than the metaphysical tenets advanced by Lord Bacon. The nicety of the divisions adopted by the latter thinker, who defines metaphysics as "the Inquiry of formal and final causes," separating at the same time therefrom Primitive or summary philosophy (*philosophia prima*) as the "receptacle of axioms of a more general and of a higher nature," and therefore worthy of the name of Original or Universal Philosophy, is also found in the separation of Natural Theology from "Metaphysique," which latter, he terms the knowledge of the "simple forms or differences of things." As to the other part or the "inquiry into final causes," Lord Verulam considers it misplaced, if we deem ourselves authorized to deduce "*Intention*," since it is merely the "*consequence*" that can be derived from our investigation. Now, Descartes embraces in "Metaphysics" the whole study of Mind; and whilst he thus simplifies an abstract science, he determines, clearly and distinctly, the "metaphysical form" of the mind, that which constitutes the "essence of each thing" in the words of Lord Bacon. This he finds in Self-consciousness as revealed in Thought, (*L'idée du moi qui me représente moi-même à moi-même*;) and whatever discrepancy may exist amongst thinkers respecting the various elements of Thought, no surer criterion of cer-

titude has yet been pointed out. This feeling, it is true, has been (and may be) termed a belief, but it constitutes assuredly the most positive belief in the human Thought, and still remains the basis of all Philosophy worthy of the name of Rationalism, i. e., which does not in the name of Reason deny the very existence of the only authority it can adduce.

Long before the hypotheses of Descartes respecting Physics, or the theory of motion, had shrunk before the sounder views of Newton; indeed, before the fallacy of judging summarily (against the very precepts of Descartes himself) of the value of a system merely because it does not tally with certain axioms received as infallible truths, before this fallacy had been clearly perceived, Cartesianism was repulsive to general opinion, on account of two of its tenets, in themselves directly opposed to each other. These were the denial of feeling in the brute creation, and the admission that the knowledge of God was a natural innate element of the mind. With respect to innate ideas, Descartes had fully explained his meaning before the work of Locke appeared. By innate ideas, he tells us he means those which neither proceed from without, nor are invented or imagined by ourselves; these latter are ideas, or forms of Thought, which are not born with us, whilst Memory, Will, Judgment, Imagination, Sensation, are forms of Thought neither adventitious (from without) nor of our framing, (by reflexion.)

Unfortunately, however, for Descartes, as later for Leibnitz, the axioms given by him as hypothesis were admitted as truths, and therefore we find the Newtonian system denied by the Cartesians, on account of its being in opposition to the axiom, "that a thing cannot act where it is not," which axiom they deemed to be a philosophical maxim altogether indisputable. Now,

the theory of gravitation asserting that the celestial bodies act reciprocally on each other according to certain fixed conditions or law, which prove that the Sun acts upon the Earth, the Cartesians at once rejected, because the Sun was "so far off." MM. Auguste Comte and Stuart Mill have very rightly insisted on the circumstance, that the great Newton himself was carried away by this very assumption of the Cartesians, since he deemed it inconceivable, "that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon, and affect other matter, *without mutual contact*. . . . That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that a body may act on another, at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of any thing else, by, and through which, their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man, who, in philosophical matters, has a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it." (See Sir Isaac Newton's letters to Dr. Bentley, quoted by Prof. Playfair.) "This passage," says Mr. Stuart Mill, "should be hung up in the cabinet of every man of science, who is ever tempted to pronounce a fact impossible, because it appears to him inconceivable. In our day one would be more inclined, though with equal injustice, to reverse the concluding observation, and consider the seeing any absurdity at all in a thing so simple and natural to be what really marks the absence of a competent faculty of thinking." Be it then as it may respecting the limits of philosophical conception, we most fervently join with Mr. Stuart Mill in repeating: "If a Newton could err thus grossly in the use of such an argument, who else can trust himself with it."

The two Cartesian tenets which grated harshly on

the ear of "common judgment," (Hartley,) were those that maintained that animals were mere mechanical things, and also that the notion of a Supreme Being existed instinctively in the mind of Man. The well-known follower of Descartes, Malebranche, assumed the defence of the first tenet, and really believed that animals did not feel. The second tenet found him incredulous, and he pointed out the words of Descartes, which allow them to be interpreted in the sense of traditional knowledge. Had Malebranche merely insisted on this important point as a matter of fact—had he entered more fully into the proofs which abound in favor of the opinion, that without a "Revelation" the Almighty would never have been known to man, he would have strengthened, with the authority of his talent, that most important circumstance in the history of the human race. But, instead of so doing, we find Malebranche maintaining that it is Revelation alone that can certify to man—not the existence of God, but the existence of any thing beyond him. In short, as Descartes does not consider man to be sure of his own existence, until he is certain that God is no deceiver, so Malebranche asserts that Revelation alone can bestow on man a moral certitude of his own and others' existence.

Amongst the immediate followers of Descartes, it was, as it has been already remarked, the pushing to its utmost limits the doctrine of "substance" that carried Malebranche, Spinoza, and Berkeley, to the lengths which constituted with the first the "vision in God." In Spinoza, a frozen Pantheism in which all distinction, all motion, all Will, all Reason, are denied in the conclusion; and, with Berkeley, that strange, yet natural conclusion that as in man every thing was finite, it is in the Infinite Cause alone that all knowledge and all Existence reside.

Of these three deep thinkers we shall only say a few words of Malebranche. We consider him as having turned from its right channel the stream of divine Faith which flows from the fact of a primary Revelation, and as having lowered its real value by making it the voucher of human existence, or still worse that of Matter or inanimate being.

It cannot be denied that Malebranche is a most persuasive writer, and we would advise those who believe in Materialism, and maintain that Thought is a mere secretion of the brain, to peruse Malebranche. They would there find the "ideal secretion," or "secreted idea," enjoying real existence, although immaterial. The greatest difficulty for the "Materialist" would be to understand how any thing not having weight could have existence. On this point Malebranche would prove of great service, and in favor of the "Secretion," ideas would enjoy an immaterial existence of their own, which the Materialist denies to be possible unless a process of that kind shall have taken place.

It was also upon notions derived from the consideration of the phenomena of Nature, of natural philosophy, that Malebranche supports his views of immaterial, non-sensible existence. He therefore continually reminds the reader that "it is the sensible that leads to the intelligible, the flesh that conducts us to Reason; but the sensible is only a means, it is the intelligible alone that has real existence." A favorite comparison with Malebranche is the action of Heat, wherein we perceive the most positive results produced in a manner altogether unintelligible if judged according to mere sensible views. How, then, it may be asked, does Malebranche reconcile erroneous ideas as existing, with the existence of ideas really true?

This difficulty he solves by considering God as Supreme Truth, in which all true ideas reside ; so that when Truth, or a real idea is perceived, it is seen in God, whilst our errors or false ideas partake of the finite nature of Man. With Malebranche a true idea is the real condition of things ; thus we see that 2 and 2 make 4, and not 5, because we perceive the true relation or condition ; the relation of equality between 2 and 2 as 4, being an eternal, immutable truth. Therefore the “vision in God” only exists when Truth is perceived, and our author conceives God as pronouncing the following expression : “I am the Eternal Truth, because in my being all necessary Truths are inclosed. I am Truth, because nothing is intelligible without me ; not that I cast light on the minds of men as a quality by which they are enlightened, but because I then discover to them my substance, as the Truth or intelligible reason which is nourishment to them ; and because I unite them immediately to myself as to that Reason which makes them rational. It is in that manner that I fill up in men all the capacity they have to receive me.” It is the annihilation of the Finite before the Infinite, that constitutes the essence of the Pantheistical doctrines of Malebranche and Berkeley, not to say of Spinoza, who finds means to annihilate in Pantheism the very essence of Pantheism, which is God ; much in the same way as it is attempted to prove by *reasoning*, that there is not such a thing as Reason.

It is against this annihilation of finite being in Infinite Perfection that Rationalism protests, and in this, we shall see consists one of the great services rendered by Leibnitz to Philosophy, although “his pre-established harmony” is much of the same nature with the notion of the Cartesians that the laws of nature had no action in

themselves, but were mere "occasions" for the occurrence of the event, the real cause being the Will of God. They therefore maintained that the Sun only acts on the earth "in consequence of the natural laws of the communication of motion, but has no inherent virtue or power in itself." We shall find this continual introducing of Almighty Wisdom in finite relations, however unphilosophical it really is, in the more modern doctrines of the German schools; it must not be past over hurriedly. But the introduction by Malebranche of Revelation as constituting the only complete evidence we have of the existence of Matter, was enough to produce a surfeit of all such philosophy. Now, as this work is an attempt to lay down positive foundations to the truth of Revelation, as the only medium by which man could come to know the existence of the Almighty, we must not be supposed to maintain that it is by a "Revelation" that we are assured of our own being or that of others, unless all instinctive impulsive feeling be understood by the term "Revelation."

The adoption in the German philosophical schools of some doctrines identical with those of Bishop Berkeley, renders it necessary for us to define clearly his well-known ideal system. With Berkeley, knowledge and Existence are conceived as equivalent terms, and thus a Thing only exists inasmuch as it is known. Now, as Man is certain that things exist actually unknown to him, that things existed before he came into the world, and as all experience tends to prove that things would continue to exist should Man disappear from the face of the earth, Berkeley therefore concludes in the Existence of an Eternal Mind in which all existence is centred. But Berkeley must be heard himself: "Some men imagine that I run into the en-

thusiasm of Malebranche, though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most general abstract ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and know not the real natures, or the true forms and figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole, there are no principles more fundamentally opposite" (?) "than his and mine. It must be owned that I agree entirely with what the holy scriptures saith, that 'in God we live, and move, and have our being,' but what we see of things in his essence after the manner above set forth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning. It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind. Nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure, what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears. They must, therefore, exist in some other mind, whose will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived, are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, any thing but a mind or spirit? This is indeed inconceivable; and to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense. Now, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should exist in, and be produced by a spirit, since this is no more than I daily experience in myself, insomuch as I perceive numberless ideas, and can by my will form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination, although these are not so strong, vivid,

and permanent as those perceived by my senses, which latter are called *real things*. From all which I conclude, *there is a mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive*. And from the variety, order, and manner of these, I conclude the author of them to be *wise, powerful and good, beyond comprehension.*"

Thus does Berkeley, much in the same manner as Malebranche, annihilate *finite* existence in order to render more apparent *Infinite Perfection*. But when Berkeley insists that "there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind" it is not the mind of man which he has in view, but the Almighty mind. These doctrines of the Infinite or the Absolute were broached by thinkers not only professing Christianity, but who were ministers thereof. It is, therefore, not surprising that their zeal should have carried them too far in attempting to adduce what were considered rational proofs of the existence of God. Malebranche, moreover, having linked the notion of the Deity with Revelation, was, in fact, almost in the circle of orthodoxy.

At about the same period a deep thinker, Spinoza, adduced conclusions widely different in fact from those of Malebranche and Berkeley, from premises quite identical. The starting point of all three is the notion of "substance" as unconditional, and all three following up the *ignis fatuus* of the Absolute, lost sight of relative or positive existence. Not so Descartes. With self-consciousness as his sheet anchor, he outrides the storms of doubt from whatever quarter they assail him. Whilst Malebranche sees all Truth in God; Berkeley sees in Divine Intelligence all Existence, and Spinoza all modes of Existence. With Spinoza, self-consciousness is merely a mode of divine Existence, yet still it is a kind of consciousness; but, as Spinoza admits of

no distinct existence, the value of consciousness is at once lessened, and afterwards denied. This we conceive, with Renouvier, to constitute the weak point of the strong chain of reasonings which form the Pantheistic doctrine. This is, in fact, self contradictory, for either self-consciousness is nothing, or else it is conclusive; but to begin by admitting it as a proof of finite existence, and as an existence to a certain degree distinct from God, although a modality altogether mysterious of the Supreme pervading Power, is acknowledging that something exists in virtue of some mysterious law, in contradistinction to the Deity: it is therefore an error to say "we cannot think of an ant without thinking of God." The great founder of Rationalism remained steadfast in his faith in Dualism, in self and not self, and thus the principle of contradiction, in spite of the mystery contained therein, was never once abandoned by Descartes.

The Cartesian doctrine in the hands of Spinoza, underwent a total change, and this occurred before the promulgation either of the views of Malebranche, or of Berkeley. Spinoza considers Extension as Infinite and not merely as confined to Matter. Extension, substance, *existence*, are unconditional, independent, are absolute, they pervade all space, and are in fact the Deity, of whom all sensible or existing things are merely modes. Indivisibility and Perfection are attributes thereof, the first because self-Existence involves it, and the second because the very nature of God involves all perfection. Self-Existence requires absolute unity, and that Existence would not be unconditional or necessary unless eternal and infinite. When Spinoza concludes that "all is in God and nothing is beyond Him," his demonstration is founded like that of Descartes upon the notions derived from the Perfections

of the Deity. Thus the Cartesian dualism becomes the Spinozian unity. The Thought or Mind of man becomes a mere modality of God, as all in all. Now, Descartes, although he considered God as "the first Mover," and though he did not admit that the mind could augment or diminish a tittle of the motion impressed on the universe, yet he admitted that the Soul could change the direction thereof at will. With Spinoza all personality disappears. God is alone the cause of all modification whatsoever, either material, or intellectual, in man or in nature. In short, it has been rightly remarked that with Spinoza, Nature was not in God, but God was in Nature. Spinozism conceives the will of man as entirely the result of external circumstance, and the difference between Spinoza and Descartes, is here very striking. With Spinoza, all will is merely affirmation or negation, indeed, as it has been remarked, is nothing more than desire. Knowledge, with him, is merely idea or conception, and is only of value when the ideas are clear and distinct; they are then *adequate*, and true, and as such, are modes of God. It may appear, at first sight, that this annihilation of individual consciousness, or personal liberty, of will, of knowledge, that this pantheistical *unity* had in view the furthering of the notion of the Deity; but such is not the case, the same methodical and logical screw which unhinged all human faculties, is now at work with the very attributes of Divinity. These fall off one by one; Motion ceases, Will, divine Will, disappears. The name of God is given to Mathematical Extension immutable, eternally and infinitely thinking without change of Thought, and always expressed by identical modes, appearing in given fixed geometrical relation. In this extended mass, the only difference existing between Things proceeds either from the mere diversity

of the attributes or from that of the affections, but beyond this all is identical, and all is God. The fundamental distinction between Cartesianism and Spinozism consists, in the first being rational and the other merely logical. Reason accepts fact, and after acquiring the certitude thereof, reasons or arguments therefrom. Whilst mere Argument does not hesitate to deny the very principle on which the whole scheme is grounded. But we shall see more of this in the sequel. No argumentation can annihilate finite Existence; but Reason believes in it because *it is*.

The works of Spinoza we conceive to carry with them a deep moral. Although, it is true, the name of God is always used, yet, in fact, the conclusions of Spinoza are quite the same as those of Hobbes, and may serve as a monument to show what will ever be the conclusion, not of Rationalism, but of the notion of God, if unrevealed, and the mere produce of the human Mind. When religiously disposed persons would be tempted to repeat all the obloquy that has been heaped on that great thinker, Spinoza, let them reflect that there exists no better proof of the inanity of the denial that God is only known to Man as the Almighty by Revelation, than the doctrines of Spinoza. For there it is attempted, by a thinker of uncommon depth, to make out all that can be inferred from that doctrine of Descartes which considers God, or the knowledge of God, as a notion inherent to the Mind of Man. For the Deist, who conceives God to be a conception of human thought, the Pantheism of Spinoza is a serious refutation, since it lays down distinctly the conclusions to which Reason must come to, and by which all religion—indeed, all link with the Deity, is annihilated. But the rational Deist may answer; Spinoza was wrong and error constitutes no true doctrine. To this we acquiesce; but

the errors of Spinoza can scarcely be pointed out by one who admits that it was the human mind alone that preceded the notion of God. Once involved in the vortex of Pantheism, the mere rational Deist will ever be carried away by the stream. The usual refutation of Spinoza, is that of Bayle. It is the *argumentum ad absurdum*. Thus Spinoza is taxed with absurdity for identifying all things as modes of God, for evidently Spinoza was well aware that the man who writes, and the person for whom the writing is destined, are two different persons. The strength of this argument consists in the belief that man is a competent judge, but there lies also the weakness. We have seen doctrines held by Newton as utterly inconceivable, which are now believed on all sides. And, moreover, this very argument, *ad absurdum*, we find made use of by the Pantheist Zeno in favor of doctrines somewhat analogous to those of Spinoza, since Zeno treated as absurd and inconceivable the tenets of those who maintained that it was easier to explain every thing by plurality or distinction, than by unity. We have termed Zeno a pantheist, because it is doubtful whether he was or not an atheist; but, at all events, the Eleatic school, of which he was the champion, was decidedly atheistical—a result nothing strange in days of idolatry.

Another contradiction of some importance has been pointed out, amongst others, by the Père Lamy, (see *Athéisme renversé*.) It is relative to the *transcendent perfections* of the Deity, considered by Spinoza as a mere imagination of the human mind, which would be tantamount to the denial of the *absolute* unity of Being. An objection of more weight is that of Fenelon of Cambray, who assails the very foundations of Spinozism, by considering Infinite Perfection as *intensive* and *extensive*—that is, as composed *intensively* of that which is

indivisible, and is as such the very being of the Infinite, and *extensively*, of that which is modified and developed in various degrees. Fenelon, therefore, considers Spinoza's definition of the Deity to be faulty, because the modifiable nature of the Infinite is the only one expressed therein. But, as we have already remarked, the objection which seems to carry most weight is that of beginning by admitting that self-consciousness is a mode, and thus the starting point being Self or the Finite, it is a tacit admission of a something distinct from the Infinite, with which it is afterwards identified, and, as it were, annihilated. All these objections, however, may be made in vain, when it is once admitted that God is an entity of reason, an *Ens rationis*, a creation of the mind. The logical screw of Spinoza, then, bears down all opposition with irresistible force, and none, we believe, can escape the pressure, but such as are convinced that it is by Revelation alone that the existence of the Almighty has been made known to man.

But whilst Spinoza, stretching to the utmost the Cartesian notions of "Substance," conceived God as uniting in Existence all Extension of which Mind and Matter of all kinds are mere modifications, the Baconian philosophy was also the object of an experiment of the same nature but in a different sense. This sense was precisely one contrary to all Idealism; it was Sensationalism, if not Materialism in the fullest extent of the word. Hobbes, the philosopher of Malmsbury, was the man who undertook to carry out the reform begun, or pointed out by Lord Bacon, and who entered the list against all idealism, fully imbued with the doctrine that the names of things are merely nominal or imaginary and nothing real. This deep and acute thinker, whose views have been more popularized by

Locke and Hume, may be cited as a philosopher that scrutinized carefully and sedulously the human mind without finding therein any innate trace of the Almighty. And here the rational Deist, who really believes in the possibility of a true natural religion, that is, a religion from Man alone, as the primary impulsion with a God, the result of mere human thought, here that rational Deist may read an instructive lesson. Spinoza and Hobbes are the two Herculean pillars erected in the 17th century, in order to point out the limits of the human mind. Spinoza admits of the rational creation of the Almighty, and his giant mind creates that adamantine chain destined to remain forever unbroken; that logical chain whose links once around the man who believes in God, leaves him no hope of escaping from unbelief unless his Faith be grounded on Revelation. Hobbes finding no traces of a natural belief in God in the human mind attempts to frame a corresponding philosophy, one of atheism. If the God of Spinoza appears to the believer in natural religion as good as nothing; the atheism of Hobbes, founded on the absence of a natural notion of God in the mind, must induce the rational conviction that Reason is not adequate to the task.

We are well aware of the vituperation with which we shall be assailed by many, on the most conscientious grounds, for not following the usual custom of veiling our face and exclaiming "Racca" at the bare mention of the names of Spinoza and Hobbes. We maintain, notwithstanding, the position we have adopted, and that from motives purely rational, and readily definite. The philosophy of these thinkers we conceive to be perfectly harmless against a religion with Revelation of the Almighty for its basis, and which considers human reason as a means for the furtherance of Al-

mighty Will. But in order that Reason shall acquiesce in Revelation, this revelation must be divested of human views, of human conceptions, so as to be seen in its purity as expressed when Man first appeared, and afterwards by Moses, and lastly by Christ as God.

The tenets of Spinoza and Hobbes are harmless to the man who does not consider the Almighty as the result either of Metaphysical or of Physical knowledge. But for those who conceive God as the result of metaphysical fancies, or as the consequence of causation and design perceived in Physics, those persons may indeed be struck by the arrows of Spinozism and Hobbism, for they stand within range. It may be answered; the doctrines of Hobbes inculcate mere Materialism. They do so, we reply, but we deem them, notwithstanding, as much less dangerous than the doctrines termed Metaphysical and Psychological. These pretend to certitude on ground of a most untenable nature, whilst positive philosophy, the aim if not the issue of Hobbes' disquisitions, admits the full value of sensation, but draws no consequences of a higher nature. Now, this latter doctrine is not opposed to what we shall term the matter-of-fact part of Revelation. We do not consider the Almighty as revealed *by* the sensations of man but as revealed *to* those sensations, taking the term sensation in the light of animated life. Nor must it be supposed that we deem the doctrine of Hobbes as having attained the highest perfection to which positive philosophy may aspire. Indeed, we consider M. Auguste Comte as superior in his notions of positive knowledge, for he does not reject, as does Hobbes, certain notions existing in the present or modern Intellect as mere fancies because they do not or cannot proceed from the mere outward senses.

Hobbes taught that Mind was merely a mode or

quality of Matter. We answer that as the phenomena of Life are never observed on the globe we inhabit but in certain given conditions, all that is required of Science is to know those conditions or laws. As for the Soul or living existence without human properties, no knowledge either physical or metaphysical that does not give one the knowledge of a God as revealed, can inculcate a belief in Existence in another sphere of things. I require a God, not as suggested by Reason but to Reason, before I can conceive what use a soul may be. Epicurus, it is true, gives us both by means of a loose, vague metaphysical kind of reasoning, but such a Deity is as valueless and as inconceivable as the God of Spinoza. What then is gained? surely not a clearer conception. Now, the Revelation tells us of the Almighty, and in that attribute is contained all in all; all Power, all Wisdom, all Goodness. The faith therein is in itself, the natural rational Faith of Man, but, we repeat it again and again, the object is the Deity as the Almighty, and the faith is therefore divine faith.

These remarks are therefore addressed, not so much to the doctrines of Spinoza and Hobbes, as to Metaphysical and Physical knowledge in general. If they appear conjointly with the mention of these great thinkers, it is because we believe that they will be more readily apprehended. The severe and positive character of the doctrines of Hobbes do by no means render them objects of fear. Their fault consists in not being positive enough. Hobbes discards all those maxims and axioms which Bacon considers as the basis of what he terms primary philosophy, or philosophia prima, and which, as we shall see when speaking of Locke, had been kept and adhered to by the first reformers of philosophy. *Ideas of sensation* as the

foundation, and *ideas* of reflection, constitute with Hobbes all that man knows; but of these two those of sensation are more certain. Hobbes, however, fully admits the weakness of human nature, and considers sensation as the only source of knowledge. With him, as with Lord Bacon, it is the certitude of the sensible truths which serve to throw Light into the dark cavern of the Mind of man. Nor does, indeed, experimental induction bestow, according to Hobbes, the same degree of certitude that Lord Bacon conceives it to do. With Hobbes, as with Hume, Experience is more a criterion of *belief* than of *Truth*. This scepticism in the deductions of human reason is met with in Hobbes in instances where the great empirical or rational philosophers, Aristotle and Bacon, saw no need to doubt. Thus the Infinite is admitted to exist as an *à priori* notion both by Aristotle and Verulam, for the first grants the infinite divisibility of Matter as potential though not as fact, whilst the second conceives the infinite divisibility of things to be the result of the nature of the mind ever wandering beyond all limited space, (Nov. org. lib. 1, aph. 48.) Not so Hobbes, who only admits of unity and plurality because that is all that the senses teach.

No philosophy, however, can lay claim to the title of "positive" that leaves out an integrant part of the whole. Now, we may inquire of Hobbes, as of Locke, to which sense do we owe Attention, Will, Memory, Imagination, and Judgment. These are born with man, are innate. Or, as it has been so often remarked, if perception is susceptible of being confounded with sensation, it cannot be the same with conception, that acts, as it were, on the thought given by sense. Not that we conceive any of these superior notions of Thought, such as Judgment and Memory, to constitute

distinct entities, as the unfortunate psychologists have been brought to admit, (for we find them speaking of the soul, Will and the soul, Judgment!!!) The connection of Thoughts can only be solved by the knowledge, not only of what Life consists in, but also of what is Animated Life. In vain the peculiar nature of form and motion, however molecular, may be pointed out; this only constitutes the mode, the means, but does not point out the wherefore of those forms. A deep distinction is here found between Bacon and Hobbes as to the source of the superior principles of the mind. These, under the form of primary axioms, are placed by the first under the charge of divine or religious faith, whilst Hobbes denies their primary existence, and annihilating them, as it were, conceives them as altogether proceeding from experience. The ground adopted by Hobbes is the same as that on which Locke founded his doctrine—that of sensationism, which denies the existence of *innate maxims*. Now, all that we maintain here is, that Descartes, by innate ideas, did not mean innate maxims, but had in view the primary innate forms of Thought—such as Judgment, Memory, &c. This point, however, will be further determined when speaking of Locke.

Before attempting a brief summary of the doctrines of Hobbes, as the precursor of Sensationalism, and of Fatalism, or philosophical necessity, a few words may be requisite, in order to point out in a determinate manner, although briefly, whence proceeds our opinion, that positive philosophy is far less opposed to *divine* faith (trust in God as revealed) than that philosophy termed metaphysical. (We include under the latter term the followers of Descartes, as well as those of Leibnitz.)

We have instanced the distinction between the

views of Hobbes and those of Aristotle and Bacon, in relation to the Infinite. Now, as this notion of human Thought is most nearly related to that of the Almighty, a natural question here arises: If you, it may be said to us, adopt the belief that the Almighty was a revealed notion unknown to man by other means, how can you agree with Hobbes, and admit that the Infinite is a notion altogether derived from sensation, and is not found *à priori* in the human mind? And unless the notion of the Infinite existed before the revelation of the existence of the Almighty, how could that revelation be comprehended by man? To this we answer, that, avoiding all approximation to a time so far beyond all tradition, and merely maintaining to be true that which we can prove by very positive evidence derived from various sources, we will at once exemplify the position by pointing to instances which every one may verify at the present day.

Let some wild American, or African, (say a Caffre, or one of those wild tribes termed Earthmen,) be made acquainted in his language with terms equivalent to Infinite or the Almighty; whilst, at the same time, a European, or any human being endowed with all the instruction that civilization can bestow, be also asked in what consist his notions of such a term, the answer of each would evidently be adapted to their knowledge. The term "Almighty," which is, in fact, the real term to be considered, because we can prove it to have been in existence as equivalent for God, if not the very primary term revealed to Man, this term would be conceived by the "man of nature" to be exemplified by instances of power, of wisdom, of goodness within the narrow circle of his knowledge. Some very strong man would represent Power, some clever *trapper* would constitute Wisdom, and honey or brandy would ex-

hibit Goodness. We shall not attempt to trace the ideas that the endeavor to express the notion of the Almighty would awaken in the Thought of the man of Science, such as Civilization can produce. Let every reader ponder thereon, and answer it himself, after having brought to bear in one focus all his knowledge—all his power of Thought. The difference is in the minds of the individuals, and that difference is to be measured by the extent of their knowledge, but the primary notion is the same—it is Wisdom, and Power, and Goodness Almighty. The term is understood as the Mind receives it. The seed, once sown in the mind of the savage, there takes growth, and Supreme Power, Supreme Wisdom, Supreme Goodness, once inculcated, it is soon perceived that something is more powerful than the strong man, more wise than the skilful trapper, and better than honey that cloy. As to a more definite answer to the question, we believe that if ten thousand Newtons should study for ten thousand years, the response, probably unintelligible to those of the present day, would be still as inadequate as that of the most learned man of actual time.

The view entertained by Hobbes respecting the sensible source of the notion of the Infinite, does not therefore militate against the Revelation of the Almighty: yet still it is not the less requisite to produce good proof that such has really been the case. As for what is termed Materialism and Fatalism, or philosophical necessity being fatal to Religion, they can only be so to a religion not grounded on Revelation of the existence of God. But, with Revelation, how can the belief that every thing takes place according to given laws or conditions, or mechanisms, and that every effect has a motive, how can such a belief prove fatal to Religion? It may, indeed, induce men to believe that

the means they have adopted, in order to carry out the notions of the Almighty, as all Power and Wisdom and Goodness, are inadequate and wanting, although the Almighty has vouchsafed again to reveal His Presence in Christ, and again to point out His attributes as aims, whilst the means to attain them are inculcated. As to Materialism considered as Matter having weight, being the only existing thing, such a proposition, if ever it were serious, could only seriously endanger the opinion of the knowledge of the proposer. Were Gravitation, that unknown mystery of mysteries, the ultimate phenomena, Matter might indeed find a resting place. But phenomena, still more wonderful, are constantly counteracting gravitation, insomuch that the latter phenomena may be likened to an Almighty hand that keeps, within bounds, myriads of mysterious phenomena which would otherwise burst forth in vehement and chaotic disorder. All we require is knowledge. Let us learn, if possible, the true relations of Life with Gravitation, and then we shall have added to our little stock; but Religion, far from being thereby impaired, will be fortified, since the ways of the Almighty will be more distinctly pointed out.

Nor can we refrain, whilst standing before the dark stern figure of Hobbes, from uttering our opinion respecting that "Fatalism" which modern necessarians have rendered so dangerous, because they insist on their views as the only "necessary" ones. We might refer to M. Hume, the most distinguished follower of Hobbes, for an answer to what is termed the doctrine of Causation, or Cause and Effect, and it will be requisite to expose, at a later period, the views of that great thinker. Here we shall merely remind the reader that Hume, far from admitting absolute causation, thought proper to turn into ridicule the "mystical tie," which was ad-

mitted to exist between cause and effect. Now, in fact, this doctrine of Hume is consonant with the opinion of those who maintain Free Will, and teach that the human Will is not linked down to any particular motive. Why then should Religion fear to look Science full in the face? Our intention in thus bringing in juxtaposition Religion and Science, and showing them not to be irreconcilable, must not, however, be mistaken, otherwise we should be guilty of falling into the very same error which the whole purport of this work aims at avoiding.

The domain of Religion and Science is on earth, or in this world the same, but the source is different. The first is given to Man, but under the condition of its being carried out by human Reason. Now, human Reason, the upshot of which is Science or Knowledge, we conceive to be a thing of slow growth: we deny the hasty conclusions of those who term Science every fanciful induction they produce. We do not believe in the formula of the Chymist, merely because it is framed in figures, and puts on the garb of Science. In accepting Reason as a guide, we acknowledge her imperfections, but we know of no better, and we admit of none worthier of greater trust. Truly, it is as if the blind were lead by the halt; but so it is given Man to proceed. Now, between metaphysical science and positive science, we prefer the latter as our guide, because the step, though slow and gradual, is far surer, and yet admits of uncertainty. It feels its way, and its humble gait atones for the insolence of its appellation, that of positive. Metaphysical knows no bounds: its dictates are laws, and its laws are substances. When speaking of the Leibnitzian philosophy, we shall enter more fully on this important point, although we consider it for the present time as labor lost, being well aware of the extreme difficulty of regaining one's foot-

ing when once immersed in the moral morass of metaphysics.

When Hobbes or any school, excludes Mind from the Universe ; when the human intelligence is reduced to a species of material mechanism, it is merely saying, "I think I don't think : " it is merely repeating an old and most ancient adage, that the ways of things pass all human understanding : it is an avowal of ignorance far more *rational* than the metaphysical and dazzling display of *forces* and *powers*. We find, then, more humility in the scepticism of Hume, than in the dogmatism, if the term suits, of Hobbes. In this, our view of positive philosophy, we do not hesitate to repeat with the poet, "Hope humbly then, with trembling pinions soar ;" with us the dogmatism of divine faith is rational, that faith in the Almighty and in Christ *as the Almighty*, being proved rationally. We must not, however, be supposed to bring in continually this dogmatic faith in the way we have seen it done in Catholic countries, (Palermo,) where the barefooted friar begins his lectures on Law, by considering Reason to be out of the question in the matter, and where the power of God invoked as first principle, and continually alluded to, bestows a mystical cast on things purely secular.

We conceive metaphysical philosophy to be the high road to Mysticism, as a branch of philosophy ; for all Mythology, both ancient and modern, is indeed a kind of natural mysticism, and existed long before Boehm and Swedenborg. Nor is the *Fideism* we maintain, a belief in the connate existence of divine Faith, as the common sense of the human soul, and as a natural feeling (inasmuch as divine) of the mind. Faith is a natural feeling we fully allow, but not so *divine* Faith. It may appear strange that the knowledge of God should not be innate or connate,—but

many things are strange. This Revelation of the existence of the Almighty we attempt to prove, not by Scripture, but on positive grounds. Our position is, therefore, open to all the objections that may be advanced against positive science, and still more so against an approximation of the kind we offer. But as we lay no claim to Inspiration; as we call forth strict and severe criticism; as we deliver our views as those of an erring fellow creature, merely prompted and inflamed with the deepest conviction that the Almighty, as such, was revealed to Man. Acting on these grounds, we hope to avoid falling into the fallacy we would avoid; that of Dogmatism in Rationalism. With us, the prostration of Reason before *divine* Faith, is grounded on our conviction of God's being revealed to man as the *Almighty*. Truly, all our endeavors to reach beyond that admirable and mysterious *Name*, have proved ineffectual; but as it is fully adequate to all that can be required, we hope that our conclusions may not be found worthless. It is, indeed, on the value of the attributes involved in this awful word, that divine Faith rests. We believe in the Almighty as *inconceivable*; and our trust or faith in Him is because as *inconceivable*; because as *Power* beyond conception; as *Wisdom* beyond intelligence; as *Goodness* beyond comprehension. These supreme attributes of the Almighty, are all-in-all if the notion be revealed.

Reason, then, or human knowledge, has only to inquire carefully into the nature of the proof, and whether the proofs of Cause and Effect, of intelligence and design, which abound, support or not the fact. This fact, however, is no element of the human mind. The only element that is human, is the feeling termed Faith, or Trust, or rational Assent. Faith in the Deity, is the result of the Revelation of God to our first pa-

rents, as the Almighty. We trust in Him as in the Almighty. We trust in Him, because we do not, cannot comprehend Him. But the very fact which places Revelation of the Almighty as such beyond the sphere of human Reason, obtains authority by the nature of the attributes revealed, for in Almighty Power, in Almighty Wisdom, and Almighty Goodness, all incomprehensibility is comprised. Therefore, however high Reason may soar,—and who can pretend to limit the mind but God,—however sublime her flights, or however contracted her views, the limits, though temporary and ever extending, yet always find an actual, momentary term, beyond which divine Faith in the *Almighty* becomes the natural stay and refuge of Reason.

But this divine Faith is optional, is voluntary. Man may refuse to believe in the Almighty. He may be so allured by the proofs of design and goodness which abound, as only to perceive goodness and wisdom. Evil he denies. The value of the conclusions derived from proofs of design, is turned against Faith in the Almighty. The matter is said to be so clear, so self-evident, that it is impossible not to believe in God, as a rational conclusion. This is natural Theology. What do we want with Revelation? And thus the works of a Paley are brought to bear against himself, against revealed Faith.

We would fain avoid the monotonous repetition of the notion we wish to inculcate, that of the positive existence of the Revelation of God, as the Almighty, and of the real value of divine Faith being contained (the value) in the attribute, Almighty. But we thought it requisite to point out, as briefly as possible, those tenets on which we shall expatiate at length, when speaking of divine faith. Here we maintain that positive faith as a doctrine, and as the offspring of

Reason, does not tie down its votary to any particular philosophy, and that Free Inquiry is always to be represented with open eyes and ears.

In pointing out the divergency of Mr. Hume from those doctrines which deemed Causation as the result of a mystical tie between things, and dependent on the very nature of the things themselves, we are merely stating an important fact; a fact, indeed, the value of which is not yet fully understood, but which can never serve as a support for Faith in the Almighty, that support (we shall persevere in repeating it) being found in the very attribute revealed. Now, Materialism and Atheism, to be at all consistent, ought to require something more positive respecting the very elements of their own doctrines. As for natural Theism, considered as the result of Power, Wisdom, and Goodness displayed, and God as the imaginary creation of the human mind, if men can bend the knee before the mythologic figure thus produced, a "likeness of things which are in the heavens above, or on the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth," they certainly are free to do so. We only claim an equal right, that of believing in God as revealed, and of reposing Faith in Him, because revealed as the Almighty.

We are led to speak of the opinions of Mr. Hume in respect to causation, on account of his adopting, in many points, views very similar to those of Mr. Hobbes. We, therefore, rather anticipate on what we shall have to expose in mentioning the sceptical opinions emitted by the first named of the above-mentioned thinkers. The importance of clearly illustrating the discrepancies which exist in science, or rather in human knowledge, with respect to such an essential point as Causation, or the real relation of Cause and Effect, has engaged us to take a brief and summary view of it. We do so the

more readily, because the point in question bears directly on the Baconian doctrine of Causation, considered as holding equally in all cases. It is scarcely requisite to state, that the question here about to be entered into has no relation with the doctrines of Mr. Hume, respecting miracles, etc., of which mention will be made hereafter.

We have already alluded to the Baconian distinction of the "Anticipation of Nature and the Interpretation of Nature." We have considered the first as the suppositions or hypotheses which Bacon says the mind always has recourse to, and as embracing, therefore, all that has been said by M. Auguste Comte on that subject. We now ask whether the "generalizing propensity" of the human mind which, according to MM. Comte and Stuart Mill, has prompted mankind almost from the beginning of their experience to ascribe events to some cause more or less mysterious, ought not to find place amongst the "anticipations of nature." Should such be the case, Bacon would not be the first who fell into the error he wished others to avoid. Now the capital error in Bacon's view of inductive philosophy is, according to Mr. Stewart, his deeming his principle of inductive elimination applicable in the same sense and in as unqualified a manner to the investigation of the coexistences of phenomena, as to that of their successions. Lord Bacon appears to have thought, that as every event has a cause or invariable antecedent, so every property of an object has an invariable coexistent which he called its Form, on which it was dependent, and we have stated that he deemed one of the chief uses of metaphysics to be the discovery of these Forms. Thus coexistent qualities of objects are Hotness and Coldness, Hardness and Softness, Solidity and Fluidity, and other such con-

spicuous properties, such as Blackness and Whiteness, etc. Coexistent qualities are those which are simultaneous and do not follow in succession, which is the only apparent relation between cause and effect. Things of a kind have coexistent properties which identify them, and to some of which no cause can be assigned because they are *ultimate* properties, not derivative. The weight of an object is an ultimate property, dependent on an unknown phenomenon termed gravitation, and cannot be taken away, as can heat from most gases, and from water. Chemistry divides bodies into elementary substances which are constituted by ultimate coexistent properties, the cause of which is unknown; and the same is the case in Physics, where, although the discovery of more elementary laws tends apparently to diminish the number of the ultimate properties, as would be the case if, as it appears to be, magnetism and electricity are the same, yet still the upshot is in reality the admission simply of a greater number of distinct properties in one object.

On this important point we must be allowed to quote a most competent thinker, Mr. Stuart Mill: "We have seen that in the case of all compounds—of all things, in short, except the elementary substances and primary powers of nature—the presumption is that the properties do really depend upon causes, and it is impossible in any case whatever to be certain that they do not. We therefore should not be safe in claiming for any generalization respecting the coexistence of properties a degree of certainty to which, if the properties should happen to be the result of causes, it would have no claim. A generalization respecting coexistence, or, in other words, respecting the properties of kinds, *may* be an ultimate truth, but it may, also, be merely a derivative one; and since, if it is so, it

is one of those derivative laws which are neither laws of causation nor have been resolved into the laws of causation upon which they depend, it can possess no higher degree of evidence than belongs to an empirical law. This conclusion will be confirmed by the consideration of one great deficiency, which precludes the application to the ultimate uniformities of coexistence of a system of rigorous and scientific induction, such as the uniformities in the succession of phenomena have been found to be susceptible of. The basis of such a system is wanting; there is no general axiom, standing in the same relation to the uniformities of coexistence as the law of causation does to those of succession. The methods of Induction applicable to the ascertainment of causes and effects, are grounded upon the principle that every thing which has a beginning must have some cause or other; that among the circumstances which actually existed at the time of its commencement, there is certainly some one or more, upon which the effect in question is unconditionally consequent, and on the repetition of which it would certainly again recur. But in an inquiry whether some kind (of animal, as crow) universally possesses a certain property (as blackness), there is no room for any assumption analogous to this. We have no previous certainty that the property must have something which constantly coexists with it, must have an invariable coexistent in the same manner as an event must have an invariable antecedent. When we feel pain, we must be in some circumstances under which if exactly repeated we should always feel pain. But when we are conscious of blackness, it does not follow that there is something present of which blackness is a constant accompaniment. There is therefore no room for elimination, no method of induction. We cannot

conclude that the blackness we see in crows must be an invariable property of crows, merely because there is nothing else present of which it can be an invariable property. We therefore inquire into the truth of a proposition like "all crows are black" under the same disadvantage as if, in our inquiries into causation, we were compelled to let in, as one of the possibilities, that the effect may in that particular instance have arisen without any cause at all." (Stuart Mill. *A System of Logic*, 2d vol., p. 126.)

This opinion of one of the worthiest organs of the *positive philosophy* of the 19th century forms a remarkable contrast with the doctrines of philosophical necessity as conceived by the men of the 17th. Mr. Hume, in producing his view of Causation as only known by the constant succession of things in time and place, really introduced a notion very different from the material dogmatism of the school of Hobbes, and yet proceeded from the main tenet of that school free inquiry and Rationalism. Only the necessarians, with their high-priest Priestley at their head, could never be brought to believe that any thing existed that they could not conceive. The inconceivability of the thing, or rather, strange to say, the narrowness of conception of Priestley, prevented him, it is well known, from conceiving that in combustion a something was added which was not "phlogisticon;" and the experiments of Lavoisier found the great natural philosopher incredulous on a point which now constitutes the A B C of chemistry. But, answers the necessarian, if you do not admit of the law of causation as obtaining in every thing, you then admit of chance,—there is no alternative. There is indeed no alternative to the necessarian, whose criterion of Truth is the "conceivability" of a thing. With him whatever is not conceivable is not true. With us

the "inconceivable" *may* be true. Therefore we are not bound to admit of Chance, because the necessarian cannot imagine Causation otherwise than a fixed something occurring in time, place, and circumstance, as antecedent and consequent. All we can infer is, that there exists another order of things, and we should remain, as positive science remains, quite in the dark and merely with the eye fixed on this something so different from the more usual mode of cause and effect, but for the knowledge acquired of the Existence of the Almighty through Revelation. Take away this, it would be utter darkness, yet not Chance, which is a necessarian bugbear. The darkness to us would be utter "inconceivability," but not Chance, which is an attempt at explanation worse than ignorance. The adherent of natural Theology here steps in; why not imagine, instead of darkness, a Being endowed with Power and Wisdom; this gives us a God without difficulty, Chance eliminated, and the absurdities of Revelation exploded? We answer, it is Reason that prevents us from such a conclusion, for it is only the Almighty revealed as such, that can lay claim to homage, because "inconceivability" is not repugnant to the attributes of Almighty Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness. With Faith in the Almighty, revealed as the Almighty, we pass unscathed through the doubts which arise unceasingly from what we perceive in the world, as to the Wisdom, the Power, and the Goodness of God. He has been revealed as the Almighty, and in the sense of that term lies the solution.

When Mr. Hume, denying that we possess any other positive notion of Causation than what is derived entirely from our experience of a uniform sequence of two events, founded upon this an argument against the belief in a First Great Cause, this disbelief must be

considered rather as the absence of the belief in what is termed a state of Nature. This result, i. e., the impossibility to prove, on the ground of Causation, the existence of an intelligent cause of the universe, which Hume conceived as proceeding from his doctrine, has been admitted by many to be exact, and even Reid joins in the admission. We own that we are of the opinion of Dr. Reid, but consider the consequence not to possess the importance Hume attributed to it, because his views of Causation only extended to antecedents and consequents. Now, when experience is appealed to, all phenomena must be taken in view, and evidently Hume omitted coexistences, and absolute empirical laws, or the absolute phenomena of Nature, when he conceived Experience of uniform sequency to be the basis of the belief in Causation. And even had Mr. Hume embraced in one comprehensive grasp the whole range of natural phenomena, and from thence concluded that in a state of nature man knows not of God, that opinion would be precisely the one we maintain on other, and, we believe, more conclusive grounds.

The definition given of Causation by Dr. Priestley differs considerably from that of Hume, although Reid finds therein neither *more nor less*. "A cause," says Priestley, "cannot be defined to be any thing but such previous circumstances as are *constantly followed by a certain effect*, the *constancy* of the result making us to conclude that there must be a *sufficient reason* in the nature of things why it should be produced in those circumstances." In this definition, the terms, previous *circumstances* and sufficient reason, involve much more than mere constant sequency. When the general amazement had subsided that Mr. Hume's proposition had called forth, and when it was perceived that effectively the doctrine was true, it was met in two different

ways. The one consisted in maintaining that our idea of cause and effect, in regard to any two or more individual events, is totally distinct from our intuitive belief or impression, that every event must have an adequate cause. The other course adopted was more philosophical. It consisted simply in attending more fully to the point in question, and the result of this investigation proved satisfactory. It showed that the notion of sequency had been too hastily extended to all idea of causation; that if the idea of cause and effect resulted evidently from observing phenomena existing as antecedents and sequences, yet experience pointed out also coexistences of phenomena which were always present; and, lastly, that other phenomena, termed ultimate or absolute laws of nature, did not at all coincide with the definition of Mr. Hume.

This view of the question has been adopted by Mr. Stuart Mill, and exposed by that deep thinker in the following words: "In all methods of Induction the universality of the law of causation is assumed. But is this assumption warranted? Doubtless, it may be said, most phenomena are connected as effects with some antecedent or cause—that is, are never produced unless some assignable fact has preceded them; but the very circumstance that complicated processes of induction are sometimes necessary, shows that cases exist in which this regular order of succession is not apparent to our first and simplest apprehension. If, then, the processes which bring these cases within the same category with the rest, require that we should assume the universality of the very law which they do not at first sight appear to exemplify, is not this a real *petitio principii*—is it not begging the question? Can we prove a proposition by an argument which takes it

for granted? and if not so proved, on what evidence does it rest?

“For this difficulty, which I have purposely stated in the strongest terms it would admit of, the school of metaphysicians who have long predominated in this country find a ready salvo. They assert that the universality of causation is a truth which we cannot help believing; that the belief in it is an instinct—one of the laws of our believing faculty. As the proof of this, they say, and they have nothing else to say, that everybody *does* believe it, and they number it among the propositions, rather numerous in their catalogue, which may be logically argued against, and perhaps cannot be logically proved, but which are of higher authority than logic, and which even he who denies it in speculation shows, by his habitual practice, that his arguments make no impression upon himself. I have no intention of entering into the merits of this question as a problem of transcendental Metaphysics. But I must renew my protest against adducing, as evidence of the truth of a fact in external nature, any necessity which the mind may be conceived to be under of believing it. It is the business of human intellect to adapt itself to the realities of things, and not to measure those realities by its own capacities of comprehension. The same quality which fits mankind for the offices and purposes of their own little life, the tendency of their belief to follow their experience, incapacitates them for judging of what lies beyond. Not only what man can know, but what he can conceive, depends upon what he has experienced. Whatever forms a part of his experience, forms a part also of all his conceptions, and appears to him universal and necessary, though really, for aught he knows, having no existence beyond certain narrow limits. The habit, however, of philosoph-

ical analysis, of which it is the surest effect to enable the mind to command, instead of being commanded by, the laws of the merely passive part of its own nature, and which, by showing to us that things are not necessarily connected in fact because their ideas are connected in our minds, is able to loosen innumerable associations which reign despotically over the undisciplined mind: this habit is not without power even over those associations which the philosophical school of which I have been speaking, regard as connate and instinctive. I am convinced that any one accustomed to abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the purpose, will, when his imagination has once learned to entertain the notion, find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one, for instance, of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, events may succeed one another at random, without any fixed law; nor can any thing in our experience or in our mental nature constitute a sufficient, or indeed any reason for believing that this is nowhere the case. The grounds, therefore, which warrant us in rejecting such a supposition with respect to any of the phenomena of which we have experience, must be sought elsewhere than in any supposed necessity of our intellectual faculties." (Stuart Mill. On Logic, vol. 2, p. 110.)

In addition to these lines, which breathe so deep a knowledge of human nature, and which ought ever to be present in the mind when we endeavor to unravel the mythological notions of past ages, we shall quote the following, (p. 480:) "Correctly conceived, the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity is simply this: that given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred: that if we knew the person

thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which were acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event. This proposition I take to be a mere interpretation of universal experience, a statement in words of what every one is internally convinced of. No one, who believed that he knew thoroughly the circumstances of any case, and the characters of the different persons concerned, would hesitate to foretell how all of them would act. Whatever degree of doubt he may in fact feel, arises from the uncertainty whether he really knows the circumstances or the character of some one or other of the persons with the degree of accuracy required; but by no means from thinking that if he did not know these things," (this is the principle of sufficient Reason of Leibnitz,) "there could be any uncertainty what the conduct would be. Nor does this full assurance conflict in the smallest degree with what is called our feeling of freedom. We do not feel ourselves the less free, because those to whom we are intimately known are well assured how we shall will to act in a particular case. We often, on the contrary, regard the doubt what our conduct will be, as a mark of ignorance of our character, and sometimes even resent it as an imputation. It has never been admitted by the religious philosophers who advocated the free will doctrine, that we must feel not free because God foreknows our actions. We may be free, and yet another may have reason to be perfectly certain what use we shall make of our freedom. It is not, therefore, the doctrine that our volitions and actions are invariable consequents of our antecedent states of mind, that is either contradicted by our consciousness, or felt to be degrading.

"But the doctrine of Causation," continues Mr.

Stuart Mill, "when considered as obtaining between our volitions and their antecedents, is almost universally conceived as involving more than this. Many do not believe, and very few practically feel, that there is nothing in Causation but invariable, certain and unconditional sequence. There are few, to whom mere constancy of succession appears a sufficiently stringent bond of union for so peculiar a relation as that of Cause and Effect. Even if the Reason repudiates, imagination retains, the feeling of some more intimate connection, of some peculiar tie or mysterious constraint, exercised by the antecedent over the consequent. Now this it is which, considered as applying to the human will, conflicts with our consciousness, and revolts our feelings. We are certain that, in the case of our volitions, there is not this mysterious constraint. We know that we are not compelled, as by a magical spell, to obey any particular motive. We feel, that if we wished to prove that we have the power of resisting the motive, we could do so, (that wish being, it needs scarcely be observed, a *new antecedent*,) and it would be humiliating to our pride, and paralyzing to our desire of excellence, if we thought otherwise. But neither is any such mysterious compulsion now supposed, by the best philosophical authorities, to be exercised by *any* cause over its effect. Those who think that causes draw their effects after them by a mystical tie, are right in believing that the relation between volitions and their antecedents is of another nature. But they should go farther, and admit that this is also true of all other effects and their antecedents. If such a tie is considered to be involved in the word necessity, the doctrine is not true of human actions; but neither is it then true of inanimate objects. It would be more correct to say that matter is *not* bound by necessity than that

mind *is* so. That the free-will philosophers, being mostly of the school which rejects Hume's and Brown's analysis of Cause and Effect, should miss their way for want of the light which that analysis affords, cannot surprise us. The wonder is, that the necessarians, who usually admit that philosophical theory, should in practice equally lose sight of it. The very same misconception of the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity, which prevents the opposite party from recognizing its truth, I believe to exist more or less obscurely in the minds of most necessarians, however in words they may disavow it. I am much mistaken, if they habitually feel that the necessity which they recognize in actions, is but uniformity of order and capability of being predicted. They have a feeling as if there were at bottom a stronger tie between the volitions and their causes; as if, when they asserted that our will is governed by the balance of motives, they meant something more cogent than if they had only said, that whoever knew the motives, and our habitual susceptibilities to them, could predict how we should will to act. They commit, in opposition to their own philosophical system, the very same mistake which their adversaries commit in obedience to theirs; and in consequence do really in some instances (I speak from personal experience) suffer those depressing consequences which their opponents erroneously impute to the doctrine itself."

To these deep and cogent reflections of Mr. Stuart Mill we shall add the lines in which that thinker, with Leibnitz, Whately, and other men of real intellectual value, deprecates, in appropriate terms, the habitual and ordinary use of the word Necessity, in a sense which leaves undetermined two most distinct meanings; one of absolute certainty or unconditional indispensability, the other expressing a mere conditional relation. "The

application of so improper a term to the doctrine of cause and effect, in the matter of human character, seems to me one of the most signal instances in philosophy of the abuse of terms, and its practical consequences one of the most striking examples of the power of language over our associations. The subject will never be generally understood, until that objectionable term is dropped. The free-will doctrine, by keeping in view precisely that portion of the truth which the word Necessity puts out of sight, namely, the power of the mind to co-operate in the formation of its own character, has given to its adherents a practical feeling much nearer to the truth than has generally, I believe, existed in the minds of necessarians. The latter may have had a stronger sense of the importance of what human beings can do to shape the characters of one another; but the free-will doctrine has, I believe, fostered, especially in the younger of its supporters, a much stronger spirit of self-culture. (§ 3, p. 483.) All erroneous associations would be prevented by forbearing to employ, for the expression of the simple fact of causation, so extremely inappropriate a term as Necessity. That word, in its other acceptations, involves much more than mere uniformity of sequence; it implies irresistibility. Applied to the will, it only means that the given cause will be followed by the effect, subject to all possibilities of counteraction by other causes; but in common use, it stands for the operation of those causes exclusively, which are supposed too powerful to be counteracted at all. When we say that all human actions take place of necessity, we only mean that they will certainly happen, *if nothing prevents*. Now, it is apt to be forgotten by people's feelings, even if remembered by their understandings, that human actions are never (except in some cases of mania) ruled by any

one motive with such absolute sway, that there is no room for the influence of any other. The causes, therefore, on which action depends, are never uncontrollable; and any given effect is only necessary, provided that the causes tending to produce it are not controlled. That whatever happens, could have happened otherwise, unless something had taken place which was capable of preventing it, no one surely needs hesitate to admit. But to call this by the name Necessity, is to use the term in a sense so different from its primitive and familiar meaning—from that which it bears in the common occasions of life, as to amount almost to a play upon words. The associations derived from the ordinary use of the term will adhere to it in spite of all we can do, and though the doctrine of Necessity, as stated by most who hold it, is very remote from fatalism, it is probable that most necessarians are fatalists, more or less, in their feelings.

“A fatalist believes, or half believes, (for nobody is a consistent fatalist,) not only that whatever is about to happen will be the infallible result of the causes which produce it, which is the true necessarian doctrine, but moreover that there is no use in struggling against it; that it will happen, however we may strive to prevent it. Now, a necessarian, believing that our actions follow from our characters, and that our characters follow from our organization, our education, and our circumstances, is apt to be, with more or less of consciousness on his part, a fatalist as to his own actions, and to believe that his nature is such, or that his education and circumstances have so moulded his character, that nothing can now prevent him from feeling and acting in a particular way, or, at least, that no effort of his own can hinder it. In the words of the sect which in our own day has so perseveringly inculcated

and so perversely misunderstood this great doctrine, his character is formed *for* him, and not *by* him; therefore, his wishing that it had been formed differently is of no use; he has no power to alter it. But this is a grand error. He has, to a certain extent, a power to alter his character. Its being, in the ultimate resort, formed for him, is not inconsistent with its being, in part, formed by him as one of the intermediate agents. His character is formed by his circumstances, (including among these his particular organization;) but his own desire to mould it in a particular way, is one of those circumstances, and by no means one of the least influential. We cannot, indeed, directly will to be different from what we are. But neither did those who are supposed to have formed our characters directly will that we should be what we are. Their will had no direct power, except over their own actions. They made us what they did make us, by willing, not the end, but the requisite means; and we, when our habits are not too inveterate, can, by similarly willing the requisite means, make ourselves different. If they could place us under the influence of certain circumstances, we, in like manner, can place ourselves under the influence of other circumstances. We are exactly as capable of making our own character, *if we will*, as others are of making it for us.

“Yes, (answers the Owenite,) but these words, ‘if we will,’ surrender the whole point; since the will to alter our own character is given us, not by any efforts of ours, but by circumstances which we cannot help; it comes to us either from external causes, or not at all. Most true: if the Owenite stops here, he is in a position from which nothing can expel him. Our character is formed by us as well as for us; but the wish which induces us to attempt to form it, is formed for

us—and how? not, in general, by our organization, or education, but by our experience; experience of the painful consequences of the character we previously had; or by some strong feeling of admiration or aspiration accidentally aroused. But to think that we have no power of altering our characters, and to think that we shall not use our power unless we have a motive, are very different things, and have a very different effect upon the mind. A person who does not wish to alter his character, cannot be the person who is supposed to feel discouraged or paralyzed by thinking himself unable to do it. The depressing effect of the fatalist doctrine can only be felt where there *is* a wish to do what that doctrine represents as impossible. It is of no consequence what we think forms our character, when we have no desire of our own about forming it; but it is of great consequence that we should not be prevented from forming such a desire by thinking the attainment impracticable, and that if we have the desire, we should know that the work is not so irrevocably done as to be incapable of being altered. And, indeed, if we examine closely, we shall find that this feeling of our being able to modify our own character, *if we wish*, is itself the feeling of moral freedom which we are conscious of. A person feels morally free, who feels that his habits or his temptations are not his masters, but he theirs; who, even in yielding to them, knows that he could resist; that were he, for any reason, desirous of altogether throwing them off, there would not be required for that purpose a stronger desire than he knows himself to be capable of feeling. We must, at least, feel that our wish, if not strong enough to alter our character, is strong enough to conquer our character, when the two are brought into conflict in any particular case of conduct.”

(§ 4.) “There is still one fact which requires to be noticed (in addition to the existence of a power of self-formation) before the doctrine of the causation of human actions can be freed from the confusion and misapprehensions which surround it in many minds. When the will is said to be determined by motives, a motive does not mean always, or solely, the anticipation of a pleasure or of a pain. I shall not here inquire whether it be true that, in the commencement, all our voluntary actions are mere means consciously employed to obtain some pleasure, or avoid some pain. It is, at least, certain that we gradually, through the influence of association, come to desire the means without thinking of the end: the action itself becomes an object of desire, and is performed without reference to any motive beyond itself. But, granting this, the matter does not end here. As we proceed in the formation of habits, and become accustomed to will a particular act or a particular course of conduct because it is pleasurable, we at last continue to will it whether it is pleasurable or not. Although, from some change in us or in our circumstances, we have ceased to find any pleasure as the consequence of it, we still continue to desire the action, and consequently to do it. In this manner it is that habits of hurtful indulgence continue to be practised, although they have ceased to be pleasurable; and in this manner, also, it is that the habit of willing to persevere in a prescribed course does not desert the moral hero, even when the reward, however real, which he doubtless receives from the consciousness of well-doing, is any thing but an equivalent for the sufferings he undergoes, or the wishes he may have to renounce. A habit of willing is commonly called a purpose, and among the causes of our volitions, and of the actions which flow from them, must be reckoned not only

likings and aversions, but also purposes. It is only when our purposes have become independent of the feelings of pain or pleasure from which they originally took their rise, that we are said to have a confirmed character."

Not to quote such admirable passages were to neglect a duty even in a work merely devoted to philosophical disquisitions, but in one in which religion is concerned, and when we have avowed our adhesion to the cause of Rationalism, it became incumbent on us to adduce full proof that positive philosophy, that the Baconian method was not intralled and shackled in the hands of Hobbes. We deprecate the use he made of the system, but we retain the method itself. Hobbes, with Locke, has rendered good service to science in ridding Philosophy of those principles or maxims which, in reality empirical, were considered by Bacon himself as *à priori* axioms, or purely intuitive. Hobbes, with Locke, was of great use in proving the Baconian tenet that "all knowledge is from learning," but both philosophers were blinded by prejudice, and did not perceive that the Will, the Memory, and the Understanding, not to say the very acts of Sensation and Perception, are not learned, and yet are forms of Thought, which certainly can be said of them without fear of falling into metaphysical fancies. But between Hobbes and Locke the palm of consistency rests with the former.

Sensationalism and Causation, as admitted by Hobbes, lead unreservedly to Materialism and Fatalism, and there he rushed, as did Spinoza, on quite opposite grounds. But the Baconian method was neither buried with Hobbes nor thwarted by the errors of Locke. The actual school of positive philosophy, of whose most distinguished organ we have cited the

opinion with regard to Necessity and Free Will, is an offspring, a legitimate descendant of the inductive philosophy, and yet what a complete and comprehensive refutation of ancient and modern necessitarianism is contained in those passages. The "doctrine of the causation of our volitions by motives, and of motives by the desirable objects offered to us, combined with our particular susceptibilities of desire," constitutes a system of free will which leaves entirely out of sight that of which we are unable to judge, and delivers at the same time a faithful analysis of the process itself. The avowed atheism of one of the main columns of positive philosophy of Auguste Comte, does not deter us, any more than that of Hobbes, from considering the inductive method, as carried on in that school, in the light of the most powerful means of intellectual progress that exists, and as the hope of times to come. As for the atheistic doctrines of the school above mentioned, they do not alarm us; but we are somewhat surprised that Lord Brougham should have discovered in the inductive philosophy what Bacon certainly did not allow to be therein, and what neither Hobbes, nor Hume, nor Auguste Comte could at all perceive, the Almighty.

Of the more peculiar doctrines of Hobbes we have little to say, although we know of no writings which demonstrate so clearly the fatal results for society should men ever consider speculative philosophers as practical guides, not to say should they ever take them (and they appear half disposed) as their high-priests, and again attempt to found a religion grounded on "Natural Theology." Even Mahometanism, that blindest of superstitions, has at least a Codex; but whither would men stray when following the *ignis fatuus* of philosophical fancy!

The codex of philosophy is universal judgment, termed also common sense, but erroneously individualized by some philosophers. This general opinion is of slow growth, and greatly varies in its different bearings, according to the society in which it took its birth. For as food requires that a regular succession of processes should be followed before it can be assimilated to the organs of the body, so the dictates of human intelligence cannot obtain, or, in other words, cannot be assimilated in common opinion but by gradual progress more or less of an experimental nature. This is by no means demanding that Science should lower itself, should stoop to the level of common opinion; it is only demanding that the time required should be in staid conformity with the nature of the evidence, and the pains taken to perceive it. A deep truth may long remain unnoticed, and be considered in the light of a philosophical theory; but then it differs from error by the persistence of its brightness: it is only in due course of time that its practical worth becomes known, and then only on the ground of value acquired by some experience can practical men consent to adopt it, or rather try it. The unfinished, or the embryo state, exists in nature, and is by no means a denial of future progress; it is merely a first step. There will ever exist a codex of general or common opinion, not indeed as a fixed standard of Truth, but as the expression of what men deem to be such, and is never peremptory excepting in matters clearly definite. Such a codex exists and is formed as the guide, not of mankind, but of the society (whether tribe, race, or nation) in which it was gradually framed, and the errors which may be contained therein require to be effaced a lapse of time proportionate to the nature of contrary evidence. The natural conclusion of these remarks is the legitimate

right of individual opinion in all matter of Thought, but also the denial of any privilege for any such opinion, should it demand to take the rank without following the successive filiation which can alone assimilate that opinion with general or common judgment.

Philosophical hypotheses, or "Anticipations of Nature," prove so often to be mere fancies, that we believe ourselves justified in comparing them to the brilliant vapors which gleam for a time over the marshes, and from which Truth can only be distinguished by the persistence of the Light. Let then full play be given to human intelligence, but let philosophers also learn to submit to the common rule. Long may the Gaelo-Teutonic race continue to produce such men as Hobbes, and let those who conceive themselves justified in pronouncing anathema on his memory remember that "the way of the Lord passeth all understanding," and that the true sense of divine Faith consists in trusting in Him who was revealed as the Almighty. The man who believes in God revealed as the Almighty can unhesitatingly attempt to sail by the light of reason. He will advance, but will require often to tack. The light of reason, or rational faith, may often be extinguished for a time, but then trust in the Almighty, revealed as such, or divine faith, will prove an unerring guide, for he will believe in Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, although no light of reason be there to point out those attributes to his view, and although the light of reason may seem to show Impotency, and Error, and Evil. But if Faith divine be the result of reason; if God is a rational deduction; if the human mind, that scarcely at the present time can conceive any thing to exist but in time and place, lays claim to trust in a Divinity created

after its own fancies, after its own imagination of things, where is the man that will call that Faith divine? where is the man that can put his trust in it? The weakness of reason has been in all times commonplace, and Mythology sufficiently proves that weakness; all attempts to conceive the Almighty are equally fallacious, but not so all attempts to point out the great fact of Revelation. With divine faith then in the Almighty, revealed as such, no danger can result from the wildest freaks of reason, provided the issue be submitted to the usual and customary trial which can alone render it legitimate.

Adopting the main principles of the Baconian method, and rising by gradual steps from particulars to generals, Hobbes passes in review all physical, moral, and social philosophy. But Mr. Hobbes, whilst he refutes the innate maxims of the primary philosophy or *philosophia prima* of Bacon, and denies the *à priori* metaphysical conclusions of Descartes, yet the same man attempts to apply notions afforded by mere physical induction to every order of Thought and to Thought itself; thus indulging in metaphysical fancy with the belief that his grounds were far better assured by the rational or *à posteriori* appearance he so liberally grants them. Power and motion constitute with Hobbes the *ultima ratio*, the first, as well as the final cause of all things. The notion of Causation is nothing more than that of antecedent and consequent, and while he admits that time and place are mere relative terms, yet he bases on them his notion of causation, and really believes it to be applicable to a state of things perfectly inconceivable to man, a state of things of which he admits the possibility by supposing the annihilation of the universe and its subsequent forma-

tion according to the notion furnished by *inductive philosophy*.

This *prima philosophia*, this scientific synthesis, has certainly an appearance of solidity, because meeting therein notions rendered conceivable by analysis, the mind seems to apprehend them. But all this is imaginary, all this is hypothesis, is "anticipation," and anticipation of the worst kind, fancy dressed out in Wisdom's garb. The notion of causation, or succession of phenomena, is considered as perfectly adapted to phenomena where no succession is perceived or perceivable. Logical inductions, as with Hegel in later times, take the place of observation and experiment, and every thing is accounted for in the universe by the narrow ideas furnished by positive knowledge. It is this mixture of truth and error that renders the doctrines of Hobbes so attractive. Emboldened by the firm footing which the inductive philosophy furnishes to Thought or Mind, Hobbes performs with surprising agility intellectual somersets altogether astonishing to the beholder; and yet he finds means always to alight on his feet. The whole secret of the feat lies in the firmness of his premises, and the vigor of his imagination. It is not that Hobbes does not admit that man may imagine a God; for he indeed considers the notion of God to be nothing more than a freak of man's imagination: he only denies that Wisdom and Goodness can enter in the human idea of God. "Power irresistible," he says, "justifies all actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it be found. Less power does not, and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions; and we that, not comprehending his councils, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it."

Now, granting that Natural Theology, or belief in God without Revelation, can be content with a mere

Divinity of Rationalism, the views of Descartes, or even those of Spinoza, are more appropriate to the notion that this system adopts respecting the Deity. Perfection unites all quality, and rejects all evil. And in Pantheism, God is all in all. But a God without Wisdom and Goodness appeared so inconsistent to Hobbes himself, that he could not help saying, that something more than Power must exist as the attribute of Divinity. Now, we maintain that this avowal of Hobbes, this admission that Man did not, could not comprehend the Divinity, breaks up the ground from beneath the feet of those who conceive the human mind as having formed of itself an idea of God, that is, as having supposed a God, from their perceiving works of Wisdom and Goodness. If such was the case, faith in Him would not be requisite, since it would be sufficient to point out all around us perfect wisdom and goodness. Hobbes knew well, that Error and Evil abounded. War and bloodshed he knew to be the savage delight of man, and with him "mutual fear" was the stern bond of society. In saying, could we see the ultimate designs of God, we might see reason to approve and admire them, on account of the wisdom and goodness on which we should perceive them to be founded, Hobbes seems to have anticipated the well-known principle of Leibnitz, that of sufficient Reason, to which we shall refer later. The fact is, that whatever may be the idea of power in man, that of Supreme Goodness and Wisdom is really very foreign to his nature; and yet, unless it be considered as a matter of faith in a Supreme Being, it would appear to exist to no purpose, for where are to be found such models of perfection in mankind?

It is also not a little extraordinary that Hobbes, who would justify the divine conduct, not upon the

principle of the goodness of his ultimate designs in every thing He appoints, but on account of this *power* only, should entirely dismiss that notion of *Power* when he attributes to Causation a mysterious effect which is absolute Fatalism. And it is the more extraordinary, on account of his conceiving all our notions of Causation to be merely that of succession. In *Physic*, where all is reduced to motion and geometry, that motion is not considered by Hobbes as inherent to what he terms primary matter, *materia prima*, because he deems proved by experience that nothing can be moved without an impulsion from without. (*De Corpore*, cap. 8, art. 19.) This notion is very similar to that of the First Mover of Descartes, but it is only Power that he perceives. And even in *Ethics*, with Hobbes, it is Power alone, it is the will of the strongest that decides of Goodness; thus making justice and injustice dependent on the will of power, not merely as underlings, but as susceptible of being reversed at pleasure. Virtue is only virtue when the strongest determines that it shall be so, and right and wrong possess no other standard. Such is the world or society, says Hobbes: it is a monster, a Leviathan.

Hobbes considers the notion of superior beings, as did Epicurus and others, to be the result of fear, and that of unity in God as the result of philosophical considerations, which, rising from cause to cause, at last arrives at a final term or last cause, which is also the first. Religion, with him, is the fear of invisible powers, and thence proceeds all mythology, termed superstition, if not admitted; but named religion, when superior power admits them as existing. The sovereign is sole judge of religious belief, and his will decides respecting the forms of worship to be adopted. The church is the Christian community, represented by a

supreme chief, whose orders fix the times of assembling or disperse the assembly. Hobbes even goes so far as to maintain, that the will of the sovereign may be admitted as a sufficient motive to deny Christ. In short, we would earnestly advise all those who conscientiously believe in natural Theology, and deem Revelation a falsehood, to peruse Hobbes and M. Auguste Comte; they will then acquire some notion of what will become of society if ever it falls into the hands of "natural Theologians." Should, however, the materialist claim these thinkers as pillars of his doctrines, we should willingly assent, for we cannot believe that any rational being can admit of the existence of the Almighty, or imbibe any thing analogous to divine Faith, from the imaginary proofs that may be found in their philosophical tenets.

It is then our fullest conviction that no better negative proof can be adduced than the opinions of Hobbes, when we seek for evidence on all sides respecting the nature of the belief of Mankind in God. Those opinions could only serve, we believe, the materialist; and we therefore consider ourselves authorized to point to them as tending to prove that without Revelation Man would not know of God. Should, however, the natural Theologian deem the notion of Power, so consistently upheld by Hobbes, (barring the Fatalism of Causation,) as entitling that thinker to be classed with those who believe in God as a creation of reason, we again repeat our adhesion, provided the absence of Wisdom and Goodness be maintained, as having root in the mere conclusions of human knowledge. It is, however, but just to remark, that besides the unintentional avowal of Hobbes, alluded to in the preceding pages, which admits of *human ignorance* as a probable motive of Man's not perceiving other positive princi-

ples besides power, and utility derived therefrom, another avowal of the same kind, but in the order of science, can also be pointed out. We give, says Hobbes, the name of future to the past, because we judge of what will be by what has been, and, therefore, the more extended our experience, the better chance we have of foretelling what is going to be; but there can be no certitude on that very account, *because experience cannot furnish us wherewith to attain to universal conclusion.* (De Nat. Hum.) Here we again find Hobbes making an involuntary confession of the real truth of the matter, which is, that human experience cannot possess grounds sufficient to draw conclusions far above human knowledge. This avowal of ignorance, this admission of the *inconceivable*, is all that we contend for, but unfortunately Hobbes had a system in view, and believed he possessed sufficient *data* to build a firm foundation.

Should it be remarked that Hobbes, in admitting no other principle than Power, is, in fact, placing himself on the very ground we maintain to be that of Revelation—that is, the knowledge of God as the Almighty, which term is tantamount to Supreme Power, it might be said that, after all, our ground is no better than that of Hobbes. To this we answer, that Hobbes, although one of the firmest adversaries of the great heathen philosopher, Aristotle, does not, however, hesitate to ground his whole system on the very same notion of that thinker, on the notion of Power. Now, it must be owned that before the Revelation of the Almighty in Christ, the notion of Power was preponderant; and if, without assuming to arraign the ways of God, we merely confine our remarks to the main principle of the Revelation in Christ, it was evidently one of Mercy and “good will unto all men.”

Hobbes acknowledges neither the pristine Revelation nor the Revelation of God in Christ. His conclusions, therefore, were similar to those of Aristotle respecting the notion Man can acquire of God ; but it is not certain that either Aristotle or Hobbes took into consideration *all* the real facts which constituted what they term the *natural means* of Man. The notion of Almighty Power, which appears so natural to civilized man, is not so to man in a state of nature ; and *the absence of all progress in that notion*, proves that it is not one of those which owe their apparition, their rise, and growth, to civilization. The latter, we repeat, make progress, whilst the notion of the Almighty becomes more and more obscure and mythological whenever man attempts to add thereto any of his “anticipations.” Both Aristotle and Hobbes consider the opinions of their fellow-citizens as sufficient *data* to decide upon the matter, but we conceive that the question involved far greater difficulties. Nothing is more common than to meet with men of learning and science, who really believe that they are standing on the firm ground of intuitive or instinctive knowledge, whilst the notions they hold most conscientiously to be such, are in reality inculcated. But this point will be fully elucidated when *Divine Faith* shall be considered in relation to its origin. However, a few words here respecting the views of Aristotle, as the great predecessor of Bacon and all those who cultivate positive science, may not be deemed misplaced when pointing out a marked coincidence between the notion of God according to that philosopher, and that of Thomas Hobbes.

Plato, it is well known, admitted that the human soul possessed virtually, by its very nature, all degrees of knowledge ; that what man learned on earth, was in reality a vague reminiscence of a former state of per-

fection and happiness, which state was become debased by an earthly admixture: therefore learning or knowledge pre-existed in man. We leave untouched the Platonic notions of Ideas, subsisting as divine essences in the Mind of God, and as issuing thence at various periods, according to the will of the Deity, to give form to sensible objects on the contemplation of which human Reason revolves. Aristotle, on the contrary, maintained that the soul possessed no principle of knowledge, that all knowledge was transmitted by the senses, and that Learning or Science was merely the result of experience acquired through the senses, and generalized and amalgamated by the mind. The well-known maxim of Aristotle, that nothing exists in the mind but what has been before in the senses, was the one adopted by Hobbes, Locke, Hume, &c.; and it must be owned there was less danger for practical science in the views of Aristotle than in those of Plato. Even at the present day, when innate *maxims* are totally scouted, we find intuition or instinctive notion deemed tantamount to truth.

The views of Plato, and those of Aristotle, respecting the Divinity, differ most decidedly, insomuch that the latter denies most positively that any human notion excepting Power is applicable to the Deity. "Whatever virtue you can imagine, it will be found," he says, "beneath the Divinity, and inconsistent with our ideas of his nature. Courage he cannot possess, for no danger can threaten him. Friendship? he requires nothing from any one. Temperance? he has no passions, no desires. Goodness? but either his bounties are the result of general laws, or are exceptions to those laws. If the first be the case, they cannot be termed kindnesses, but fixed conditions belonging to a universal state of things, which do not occur especially

for man. But the second admission would be altogether subversive of the Immutability and the Dignity of the Supreme Being." (*Ethic. ad Nicom. x. 8.*) And yet, as it has been very justly remarked, (B. Constant,) Aristotle, at the same time that he denies that any human conception is applicable to God, and insists on the fallacy of giving our views to the Deity, himself commits the very error he reproves in others, for the Existence of the Divinity he deems to be purely speculative or meditative. Now Aristotle here attributes to God the quality, which, in his opinion, contributes the most to human happiness. Aristotle, admitting that meditation possesses in itself, and independent of the results, a real, positive, independent value, (*Ethic. ad Nicom. x. 8.*) forms the Deity according to his own image. And again, when the Stagyrite admits that it is impossible to form any conception of the nature of the meditations of God, he again accounts for it in a manner altogether according to his opinion of human nature, saying that God cannot meditate on his own nature, because even with man it is improper to constitute himself as the object of his own speculations. (*Phys. viii. 15.*) Even the forms of religion are much of the same kind with Aristotle and with Hobbes, for the first considers them merely as political institutions, not as a link between Man and God, but as a means for the better imposing on the people.

This result we consider to be the natural consequence of the doctrines of both those philosophers, and we deem that no other conclusion can be deduced from any doctrine which does not admit that the notion of Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness has been given to man by Revelation as the aim of all his endeavors. This ultimate aim, pointed out by the Almighty from the very beginning as the scope of the

efforts of human reason, has been sought to be attained in the usual manner, by anticipation and by interpretation. Anticipation is yet predominant, as indeed it might be supposed in a matter of such magnitude. Interpretations are few in number, but those which exist have weight. Thus in Christianity for many, many centuries, human anticipations conceived "devils" and "sorcery" to be articles of faith, and they still remain as such amongst the papists, who certainly appear to consider Reason as a nonentity, or else they would not suppose that men would be so blind as to give credit to their assertions in favor of science and learning whilst they will not admit the clearest inductions of Science. But to return to Aristotle: we shall conclude with remarking that the differences between his views of the Almighty and those of Plato have been summed up by saying that with Plato God was a Cause, whilst with Aristotle He was a consequence. It would be easy to point out passages in the Stagyrte which belie this assertion, and we believe it to be nearer to the truth when we assert that Scientific philosophy in general has unfortunately taken a bias, which, after pointing out evident marks of design and purpose, instead of drawing merely that conclusion, goes quite a contrary way, since the issue has been that of maintaining that the Almighty is a kind of metaphysical notion, an *ens rationis*. Unfortunately, many learned divines, thinking to fortify *divine faith* in man, also "anticipated" on Science, and maintained that the notion of God was inherent to human nature, which is not the case, and which, if true, would render the great fact of the Revelation of God as the Almighty a useless event. These "anticipations" of good and learned men soon become also articles of faith, and when Science comes to prove their fallacy, it then seems as if "divine Faith" or trust

in God had been proved to be fallacious, since what was deemed Faith was proved to be a falsehood.

But before proceeding farther, we must remove all ambiguity which may seem to exist in the position we have assumed, since we appear at one time to maintain the adequateness, and at others the inadequacy, of Reason in matter of divine Faith. Now, as of all fallacies, the one we seek most sedulously to avoid is that of confusion, we shall begin by exposing the objections to which our position lies evidently open. Not only, may it be said, has the position you take up, and which you deem so secure, been occupied long since, as well by the mere sceptic, as by those who, considering the avowal of the insufficiency of Reason as equivalent to the abdication of man's natural guide, never fail striking that chord, and insisting thereon, before they proceed to develop the mazes of theological controversy, but, also, as you yourself maintain likewise the theme of the weakness of human reason, you undermine, as it were, your own position. As these objections are of moment, we shall offer an immediate answer.

We are well aware, that a position very similar to ours was adopted several thousand years ago by the partisans of Pagan idolatry and the priests, who refuted all objections against their superstitions, which maintained these latter to be against Reason, and therefore erroneous, by opposing to these rational conclusions the vacillating and uncertain steps of Reason herself. Scepticism, we know, was considered to be of use, in order to gainsay philosophically all dogmatical doctrines. Pyrrhon, although the most sceptic of the sceptical school, was yet high-priest of Minerva, and is said to have acquitted himself of his functions to general satisfaction. We know that in modern time Huet and other divines have considered scepticism al-

most in the light of an argument in favor of religious belief; argumenting from the uncertainty of rational conviction the higher value of Faith. The valuable treatise of Bossuet on "Free Will" argues the probable consistency of Grace and the freedom of human will, on the ground of analogy with what occurs continually in all physical and intellectual relation, in which the uncertainty of our accounting for the facts does not prevent our believing them, and in which truths apparently contradictory are yet equally admitted to be true; thus, our conviction of the unity of body does not prevent our believing in the infinite divisibility of matter, nor the impossibility of reconciling what takes place in motion prevent our believing that the same body, under the same given impulsion, may move very differently, as we know to be the case in the turning of a wheel.

This argument from analogy, showing that many of the objections which are urged against the truths of religion may be brought against circumstances in the economy and course of nature which are known and undoubted facts, has been adopted and fully illustrated by Bishop Butler, and the argument, it is generally allowed, presses forcibly. Still, it is only an analogy of uncertainty, and, indeed, it is only in that light that Butler uses it. "It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. . . . On the contrary, thus much, at least, will be here found, not taken for granted, but proved, that any reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured as he is of his own being, *that it is not, however, so clear a case, that there is nothing in it,*" and "it is certain that no one can, upon princi-

ples of reason, be satisfied of the contrary." The force of this argument, which reminds the unbeliever that the things of which he deems himself so certain are also open to the very same objections which he makes respecting religion, evidently depends at bottom on the insufficiency of rational evidence. Its real force is one of great value, being a moral force, and merely hinting that the order of nature and the order of religion, apparently so distinct, may not be really so different as they are generally supposed to be.

Our argument is not the same. We do not take up our ground on the inadequacy of Reason; we merely admit that in many, very many circumstances, "anticipations" are all that man *can* attain, and all that he *has* attained in many others; but we hold also that "interpretations" also constitute part, although a very small part of the common fund of human Reason. The analogy, we admit, is not indirect; it is not an analogy of incertitude, but is direct, being one of "interpretation," however circumscribed may really be the limits of positive knowledge in the order of Religion. "Anticipations" abound, and few "interpretations" are to be found; but is it not much the same in the order of Nature? We hold that in the order of Religion as in the order of Nature, or, in other words, that in religious truths as in natural truths, the "anticipations" surpass the "interpretations;" that is to say, hypotheses or suppositions surpass in number positive truths, in a direct ratio to the difficulties existing. Therefore, the analogy we allude to must not be considered as judging slightly of the difficulties in the order of religion: that analogy principally consists in the obtaining of Reason in religious truth as well as in natural truth. Thus, we deem rational Faith, or the Faith of Reason, to be adequate to judge of the value of *divine* Faith, or

Faith in the Almighty, considered as to its nature, as to its source, as to the manner in which it appears in the mind of men. Human reason finds the idea of God in the Thoughts of mankind, but as many other ideas or notions are also reflected by human Thought, Reason proceeds to analyze the matter, and attempts to "interpret" this fact, which surpasses all others in the consequences flowing from it. Here "Anticipations" are not wanting, but it would be anticipating on what we have to expose in the second part of this work, where the subject is fully discussed, to say any thing more at the present time.

Unfortunately, we find ourselves in discordancy with divines of high renown, when we maintain on positive, rational ground, that this notion is the result of Revelation; since many divines, with the well-known Bossuet, hold the notion of God to be innate in every human breast. Our perplexity would be great, indeed, did we allow ourselves to be overawed by authority, since the fact of the Revelation of the Almighty, which constitutes for us the basis and the sense or meaning of divine Faith, and which, as a Revelation, is distinct from all other notions in the mind—that fact, so very peculiar, would dwindle down to the level of a prompter of arts and sciences if the opinion of some learned divines were admitted. We reserve all we have to say on this topic for a later period, and merely point out in what manner Reason or Judgment may attempt to solve a question which is the basis of all religion. But the consequences of the conclusion which maintains that all the value of *divine Faith* is contained in the attribute revealed, "the *Almighty*," serve also as a rational test of Christianity with respect to its origin. Christ must be the Almighty; there must be no duality excepting in the human character of the Mediator. Can Christian-

ity stand this rational test? It constitutes, indeed, the basis of Christianity. And, moreover, the unity of God is still more expressively portrayed by the Holy Spirit or Ghost, and all duality is totally dispelled by the unity of the Trinity.

We are fully conscious of the disastrous consequences which follow theological discussions, and merely refer to *divine Faith*, when Christ appears, in order to see whether the new doctrine is consistent with Faith in the Almighty. This we find to be the case, and go no farther, because all is contained in the attributes of the Almighty: no discussion can ensue. The Almighty Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness of God *revealed*, as we trust we shall establish it rationally to have been, constitute the rational grounds of divine Faith when once that Revelation has been rationally established, i. e., as a matter of fact, by proof adduced both affirmative and negative. The prostration of Reason is thus a rational prostration before *divine Faith*; but the same light of Reason which admits of divine Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, not as conclusions of experience, but as the Truth revealed, and therefore trusted, the same light will know also how to deal with human errors, because well-earned experience has taught the wonderful unaccountable bent of mankind to generalize from insufficient grounds, i. e., to anticipate the Truth.

These "anticipations" constitute what in ancient times is termed Mythology, and even in Christianity it cannot be denied but that many "anticipations" bear a mythic form, which Reason alone can dispel. Thus we shall see that for nearly 2,000 years such "anticipations" have been predominant in the Christian community in what is termed Demonology and Sorcery, the true "interpretation" of which has been given by Reason.

But then it may be said "the light that led astray was light from Heaven," how can man avoid error? Reason, we answer, does not deny the existence of error; on the contrary, it is Reason's first principle, but one of experience, that "anticipation" is the road, and the only road to "interpretation." Therefore when the human mind anticipates in the order of Religious truth, it is only acting in the same way as in the order of natural truth. This may seem to be referring to the analogy of mystery, that one on which Bossuet and Butler so strenuously insist, but we repeat our assertion, that we conceive the analogy in another light, in the light of that certitude which Reason casts on all matter of thought. This certitude is evidently a relative one, but man possesses no other, for divine Faith we conceive as the rational trust, on rational grounds, in Almighty power, and wisdom, and goodness. We refer, therefore, to the Almighty, when Reason fails. And, indeed, it is when the gloom is deeper, that the star of *divine* Faith shines brightest. In the order of Nature, Science now admits the inconceivable; Reason is then justified in admitting the same in the order of religious truth; and, moreover, this admission becomes an act of Reason, when rational evidence has been adduced, which leaves no doubt as to the nature of the fact of the Revelation of the Almighty. The certitude of Reason is not impaired either by its being conditional, or by the admission of the inconceivable in the order of Nature, but why? because experience has fully proved it to be the case. And, in a like manner, when rational proof is given of the existence of something far more positive than the inconceivable, of the existence *as fact* of the Revelation of the Almighty as Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness; faith or rational trust in that Being, revealed as the Almighty,

becomes *divine Faith*, and serves to confirm our unshaken confidence in these Almighty attributes, when Reason seems to whisper, but all this is Impotency, and Error, and Evil.

In admitting the certitude of Reason to be merely conditional or relative, and that in the order of Nature, things exist which are now really inconceivable, but which in some thousand years will be fully admitted, we are only saying what is now received as a Truth. As to why Man should only be able to proceed on his way to right interpretation by first passing through anticipation; or, if this appears too metaphorical, as to the reason why man must begin by guessing and then verifying his guesses, no answer can be given, but the fact is not the less certain; and without having recourse to analogy of uncertainty, another analogy, that of certitude, of rational certitude, may also be said to exist in the order of religious truth. Man then also first guesses and then verifies. But trust in the Almighty is grounded on the very nature of the communication, Revelation, and on the rational meaning of the attributes revealed, Power and Wisdom, and Goodness Almighty. Even the scepticism of Mr. Hume did not allow him to deny human certitude, however narrow might be the compass of that certitude, and the following words of that thinker bear so directly on the point at issue that we cannot refrain from citing them: "Nor can there remain any suspicion that philosophical science is uncertain and chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be dis-

tinguished by reflection ; and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject, and a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature ; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain, though more difficult to be comprehended." (An Inq. Concern. the Human Underst., Sec. 1.)

As to the admission of the inconceivable in the order of knowledge, it was already maintained by Mr. Locke, as well in natural as in religious truths. "It is visible," says that thinker, (Extent of Human Knowledge, B. 4,) "that all planets have revolutions about certain remote centres, which I would have any one explain, or make conceivable by the bare essence, or natural powers depending on the essence of matter in general, without something added to that essence, which we cannot conceive, for the moving of matter in a crooked line, or the attraction of matter by matter is all that can be said in the case. You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter at any distance, much less at the distance of millions of miles : you cannot conceive how matter can feel or move itself, or affect an immaterial being or be moved by it."

In pointing out the admission by Locke of the inconceivable in the order of nature, we by no means admit his conclusions. All we pretend to say, all our conclusion is, that the inconceivable is admitted to obtain as the inconceivable ; but as to drawing other consequences therefrom, as to building on the inconceivable, we leave that to those who believe that the Almighty is a creation of the human imagination. We maintain,

and we believe we can adduce rational proof of the fact, that the notion, the knowledge of the Almighty is a fact; in that fact attributes are revealed in which we trust; that Trust constitutes Divine Faith. The belief in the inconceivable may certainly conduce to strengthen this Trust in God, when once rational evidence has been given of the fact of the Revelation, but we do not consider the source of divine faith to be that belief. It has been said, and it may be said, that what we term human certitude is in itself as inconceivable as what we do not know; but if by this term "inconceivable" it be meant that no certitude exists, it is then that the analogy of Bossuet and Butler comes in full play, although it appears to us that both divines conceived that doctrine to bestow on matters of religion somewhat of the *certainty*, and not of the *uncertainty*, which exists in matters of Science.

Lastly, should the certitude we hold to exist in Human Knowledge be stigmatized by the name of Dogmatism by some, or of Expediency by others, it matters not, provided no misapprehension prevail respecting the nature of the connection we maintain to exist between Reason and Religion, and to consist in the rational admission on good evidence of the fact of the Almighty having been revealed as such, i. e., as Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness. These attributes become the aim of human Reason, which, indeed, staggers under the weight, and too often proceeds like one bedimmed, and not like one enlightened. But the fact that the mysterious source of Light, our Sun, cannot be fixed without endangering the sight of the gazer, may be pointed out as an appropriate simile of what happens to Reason. That amongst the "anticipations" of the mind, some may be of a peculiar nature, rising nearer to the great source of divine

Faith, the Almighty, may be admitted on rational grounds, because we perceive in the order of science intuitions or instinctive thoughts, which sometimes reach with one bound to the highest pitch of knowledge, and which afterwards support the strictest scrutiny. Such events are, however, of rare occurrence, and it is far more usual to find that the "anticipations" of the human mind, with respect to religious truths, are far from proving to be real "interpretations."

Trusting that this exposition of our Rationalism will prevent all misconception, we shall now proceed, before speaking of the doctrines of Locke and Hume, to mention, summarily, the philosophical doctrine which superseded that of Descartes. Leibnitz, for the honor was his, may be termed the introducer of spiritualism in Matter, where Descartes only perceives motion, and where he admits of mathematical proportion alone. But in order to render the difference more striking, the comparison must be made between the philosophy of Leibnitz and that of Descartes pushed to its utmost consequences, as it was done by Spinoza, who concludes by representing the Deity as a frozen Unity, which only revolves upon itself in a mode which renders absolute immobility its main attribute.

Leibnitz, on the contrary, sees nothing but active forces or powers, distinct and independent. These he termed Monads or Unities, and conceived them as existing in innumerable myriads in the universe; but as it would be easier to say what they were not than what Leibnitz meant them to be, we must give that great thinker's own words on that matter: "The monads," he says, "are the last elements of all substances, but are not to be considered as material atoms. They are neither physical nor mathematical points, the former being only separate in appearance, and the latter being

mere modifications. The monads now are metaphysical points, are undivisible and uncompounded; they fill the whole universe, each monad remaining necessarily independent of, and distinct from, every other monad, and depending only for existence on God, who is therefore the only self-existing or true monad, i. e., Unity."

These monads Leibnitz conceived as the active force of each individual thing, being that which distinguished it from another: he denies their having the properties of matter, such as extension or weight, but they possessed a kind of vital perception, producing impulsive action. No power except that of God, he conceived to be capable of destroying the individuality of a monad; and, amongst the innumerable myriads of monads which exist in the universe according to his theory, there were not two to be found exactly similar. Each monad is all-powerful in its own sphere of action, and subject only to God. All things in Nature are, according to Leibnitz, an aggregate of Monads. To this Euler answers, that it cannot be if they are nothing material, for then put together as many as you will, you could never constitute any thing corporeal, since a hundred noughts can never form a unity. Be that as it may, Leibnitz considered all that happens in the universe to proceed from the various transformations of the monads or unities, and as arising from a peculiar, inherent power, imparted by God at the Creation.

Many readers may consider it a very useless trouble to enter into details respecting Monads or Unities, in which nobody believes. But should the question be put whether they believed in Powers or Forces, they would undoubtedly answer, without hesitation, most certainly. Therefore, as Forces, Powers, or Monads, are the same thing, those readers would be surprised to

learn that they believe in Monads. It had, perhaps, been better that the latter name had been preserved, because it would then have been evident that a fallacy was concealed therein, whilst the term Power or Force, although expressive of an individual property, bore an appearance of generality, which concealed the individuality of the meaning. All that has been said of powers or forces is applicable to Monads, and *vice versâ*. All the metaphysical ontology which has led men so much astray, is to be found contained in this doctrine. It does, certainly, appear more satisfactory to the mind to be able to attribute to something, that which distinguishes one thing from another, that which is the active agent in all transformation either of things ponderable or of things imponderable, and to this bias or *natural bent* of the Mind, the Leibnitzian doctrine of forces or monads was very attractive. But it is one thing to express by a name a quality of unknown nature, and another to consider the name as any thing else than a relative notion (nominal, not real.) The final result of this doctrine was Ontology, or a second and improved edition of Realism, in which myriads of merely nominal existences, and, in fact, metaphysical as the Monads, were considered as real existences. It is not, therefore, irrelevant to our inquiry into the principles of Rationalism or Modern Philosophy, to enter fully into an investigation of Monadology, which was compared by Leibnitz himself to a revival of the *entelechies* of ancient philosophy and of the occult forces of the Schoolmen.

The seed sown by Leibnitz was watered by Wolf, and a powerful stem grew up on which the main principle of the Cartesian philosophy was grafted—that of self-consciousness or the Ego as the primary element: this became a tree, whose vigorous boughs now cover

Europe, and threaten to stifle all undergrowth. We allude to German philosophy. We do not say that metaphysical "anticipations" did not exist before Leibnitz, but only that through this doctrine a kind of Mythology was created in Science, where it too often still obtains. A doctrine so void of materialism; one of which immaterialism is indeed the very essence, might appear, and did appear at first sight, as one conducing powerfully to the belief of man in God, in immortality, and in the clear distinction between soul and body. Such was the foliage, but the fruits of the tree were of a different kind. The fallacies of the doctrine—fallacies easily pointed out—recoiled on the more sacred tenets they were presumed to support, and the Deity, classed as a Monad, was soon absorbed in the vortex of natural Theology as a mere force of Nature. And all this from what Leibnitz terms an imaginary thing!

We repeat, that it is with monads, as with forces, far easier to say what they are not, than what they are. They are not to be confounded with "atoms" of Democritus and Epicurus. These were identical and material, although utterly impalpable. Their form was the cause of their quality. Now, no two monads are similar or alike. The atoms were considered as infinitely divisible, whilst the monads, being merely metaphysical, immaterial points, were indivisible. In themselves atoms are nothing, whilst Monads constitute all the activity of the universe. Each monad contains also, as it were, reflected in it all that takes place in the universe, barring that the reflection is no passive state, but is a real activity. Each monad thus represents a kind of Divinity, (*parvus in suo genere Deus.*)

Here a natural question arises: How did this doctrine stand in relation to the ideas of Matter, of God,

and of the Soul? With Leibnitz, monads composed the whole universe; every existing thing was an aggregate of them; therefore, there could exist no simple substance, every thing being composed of Monads, in greater or less number, forming thus a complicated machinery in which are found wheels running within wheels: so that what appeared as Matter or Substance was, in reality, an accumulation of Monads, which alone constituted the elements thereof. Did, then, Leibnitz deny the existence of body or matter? He conceived it, as we have just mentioned, because, according to his view of things, Space was a mere conception. But among these monads were various kinds, according to the degree of perfection of these simple powers; and more especially there existed two classes, the indistinct (*confus*) and the distinct or definite. The indistinct were of the simplest nature, (*monade toute nue*;) these are compared to the indistinct thoughts which pass across the mind in slumber. These constitute the inorganic world, and may be likened to what is termed Matter. Monads of higher rank form vegetable life, and Sensation and Intelligence exist in those which represent animated being. Thus some are, as it were, asleep, others are dreaming, whilst others are actively employed. All this is carried on *harmoniously*, for the unity of difference is harmony. All these changes take place according to a pre-established scheme; they are parallel and never confused, and thus when the monads which constitute the body, and the monad which is the soul, come to act, their action is so ordained, that they correspond as do two clocks when pointing to the same hour; each is impelled by a distinct impulsion, and yet the same thing is pointed out.

But what part does the Supreme Monad perform? That of attending to the past, present, and future state

of every single monad, of which myriads of myriads form the universe. This Monad is self-existent; it is the primary substance; it is pure action, (*actus purus*), whilst the effort (*appetitio*) belongs to the monads. But evidently the monads could do without; and so it occurred with those who simply termed natural Forces the powers of nature, instead of Monads. In fact, this system was no less than that of Spinoza—but on quite opposite grounds—a perversion of the religious idea of the Almighty.

It is barely doing justice to Leibnitz to add that in his celebrated work, entitled “Theodicea, or a Dissertation on the Goodness of God, the Liberty of Man, and the Origin of Good and Evil,” his views are far more worthy of a religious mind. Indeed, the views of Leibnitz, which are the same as those of Malebranche, only covered over with a philosophical varnish—these views are generally adopted even at the present day by those who aim at explaining what it is not given to man to explain. Their evil effect seems to us to be that of causing men to lose sight of the deep sense attached to the primary Revelation, that which told Man of the Almighty.

It is trust in the attributes of the Almighty that constitutes divine Faith, and not trust in any rational explanation. When Leibnitz attempts to prove that God had an aim in creating the world, and that that aim was His glory, or when he maintains that the world being created as it is, therefore it is the best of all possible worlds, it is certainly as to that deepest of mysteries, the origin of evil, an easy way to get rid of the difficulty by denying that evil exists. It is at the same time in complete accordance with Christianity and with the most simple experience to admit that Evil prevails on Earth, and no philosophical maxim of

optimism, such as "all is for the best," is of such practical worth as trust or faith in the Almighty, when His having been revealed as such is clearly established on proofs of which rational faith or human judgment is fully competent. This is no blind submission of Reason to Faith; it is the rational belief or Faith in that great event termed Revelation of the Existence of God, rational faith which is the consequence of the certitude acquired that that eventful circumstance in the existence of the human race is a matter of fact. Divine Faith is then the upshot, the highest point of human Reason, which goes no further, which does not aim at understanding the attributes revealed as Supreme, as Almighty, but demands rational evidence of the fact. Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness are thus admitted by Reason, by rational judgment on rational evidence of the fact of their having been revealed. It is then in submission to this eventful fact that human reason admits of Power, of Wisdom, and of Goodness very different from the mere rational finite notions that man possesses of such attributes. Divine Faith thus becomes rational inasmuch as Reason has admitted the grounds thereof, and because in this world Reason is the means accorded to man to carry out the dictates of the Almighty, and thus the link between human reason and the Almighty is trust in Him as the Almighty, as a being perfectly incomprehensible, but in whose attributes Reason trusts because they are not the result of human judgment, but a result acquired in another manner.

The evidence of Reason, according to the ratio of the development of Intelligence, proves, in our view, that the attributes revealed are indeed above human comprehension, although they serve as an unerring guide, strengthened as Divine Faith has been by sub-

sequent Revelation. Thus the great eventful fact of Revelation is supported by Reason, because human intelligence really finds good motives for perceiving something superior when, diving into the nature of things, wonders are heaped on wonders; but if the direction be reversed, if the notion of the Almighty be merely the result of the mind's perceiving Cause and Effect, purpose and design, then it is no more divine Faith: it is rational faith in a Being created by human fancy, and to such a divinity we refuse to bend the knee.

Optimism and Divine Faith, or Trust in the Almighty revealed as such, stand therefore in direct opposition. The first denies the existence of Evil, of moral evil; the other admits the fact, but refers to the Almighty, in whom Reason trusts, for He was revealed, and that revelation told of the Almighty. Let the existence of the Almighty dwindle to a mere psychological or mental intuitive fact, it could not require a faith superior to its source, and even that diminutive faith would be a lie, for the mental or psychological fact would be surreptitiously admitted, no such instinctive belief existing. And, again, let the Existence of the Almighty be considered as the result of human judgment, of human philosophy, the discrepancy between the adherents of that opinion is so enormous as to render quite irrational a notion which claims precedence before all other consequences of human judgment. Men calling themselves philosophers tell us that the unity of God was never taught before Egypt existed; that Monotheism only appeared about a thousand years before Christ, when the most positive proof can be adduced that Monotheism is coeval with all that we know of the first steps of man on earth, *and that quite independent of the Scriptures*, for we do not aim at "*proving Scripture by Holy Writ.*"

Our insistence upon the distinction between the Scheme of Optimism, and the view we have taken of Divine Faith, will not appear, we think, too redundant, when it is called to mind that the whole bent of Pope's well-known "Essay on Man" consists in proving two facts perfectly at variance: the one, that

"'Tis but a part we see, and not the whole;"

and that human knowledge being "limited to time and space," man cannot form an adequate judgment: the other, that therefore absolute submission is due to Providence, both as to our present and future state;

"And spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite,
One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right."

This, the Optimism of Leibnitz, grounded on his great philosophical principle of "sufficient Reason," which admits that if man could see into the nature of things, he would then perceive sufficient reason for their being as they are,—this optimism has acquired deep root in the minds of men on account of its philosophical varnish, which dazzles at first glance. It required, indeed, the rude and unmerciful lash of Voltaire to call forth the real expression with which this poetical effusion of Leibnitz ought to have been received, that of ridicule. Still, in rational Theology, (or natural,) which conceives God as a mere psychological fact, either *à priori* or *à posteriori*, i. e., either as instinct, or else as the result of human judgment,—in both cases the scheme of Optimism may hold rank; but we remind those whose trust is therein, that the ridicule which it involves is atoned for by no superior principle. Now, when the Existence of moral Evil is admitted, and Reason exclaims, "This is absurd, how can we believe in Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, and yet admit that Evil exists?" A ready

and sufficient answer is found in the fact of the Almighty having been revealed as the Almighty, and His attributes, revealed as absolutely superior, then become the stay of Reason. The Leibnitzian Optimism, which is linked with his principles of "pre-established harmony" and "sufficient reason," has, moreover, as it has been already remarked, an obvious tendency to subvert all moral agency and responsibility, and to obliterate all distinctions between vice and virtue. The Christian, trusting in God as the Almighty revealed as such, and seeing Him in Christ, can admit the existence of Evil, and yet repose Faith in Him who made Himself known as superior to human reason; but both the mere rational Deist, and also the rational Atheist, must be embarrassed with the scheme of Optimism as a rational conception. It must be rejected by the first as Fatalism, and by the second as hypothesis.

Reference must be made to this *à priori* principle of Leibnitz of "sufficient reason," (*principium rationis sufficientes*;) in order to account for the assertion of that philosopher, "that, at least in the order of nature, one had the right of denying what is *absolutely* unintelligible and inexplicable," because the limited actual knowledge of man cannot set any limits to what human nature may be brought to conceive. But this important point will be more fully elucidated when speaking of the faith due to miracles. Amongst other *à priori* principles of Leibnitz, is "the law of continuity," by which is expressed that unbroken order which is admitted to pervade the whole system of the universe, so that no change takes place suddenly, but all is accomplished by *infinitely small* degrees. This principle Leibnitz maintains to be an eternal and immutable law of nature, no less applicable to the phenomena of mind than to those of matter. Having thus laid down

what he deems an indisputable foundation, Leibnitz starts from thence to maintain that there cannot be in an intelligent being an entire, and still less, a sudden cessation of thought—that death, therefore, is merely a succession of changes of condition—and that there exists a perfect gradation throughout the universe; so the innumerable classes and order of beings form an unbroken chain, a continuous scale of existences, descending from the Deity to the lowest species of unorganized matter. All these existences are the powers, the forces, the “Monads,” the active in various degrees, the slumbering, and the sleeping. Applying the same principle to the history of human intelligence and all progress of science, Leibnitz asserts that the human mind advances, and has ever advanced—not *per saltum*, not by sudden bounds, but by innumerable *infinitesimal* steps—towards perfection in knowledge, and will continue so to advance till it attain the highest elevation of which created intelligence is capable. This theory he sustains also by another metaphysical *à priori* maxim, which maintains that it is in the nature of things impossible that any body or substance, whether corporeal or spiritual, whether sleeping, slumbering, or acting monads, should be at the same indivisible instant in two different states—that of motion, and that of rest. These views of Leibnitz must be kept in mind when the reader comes to enter into the rather dry and intricate study of German philosophy. However, the innate principles which he admits are, that of contradiction (*principium contradictionis*) and that of sufficient reason. The first appears to be the same as the principle of Descartes—that of self-consciousness or Self made known by negation, to use the more modern term of the Hegelian philosophy, in which Self and not-Self, or affirmation and negation, stand thus as equiva-

lent: Self=not-Self; or again, Intelligence=Matter; or, with Schelling, Object=Subject; or, with Fichte, Subject=Object.

But it is the denial of Evil that particularly characterizes the theological doctrine of Leibnitz, and which has been adopted by very many able divines, as a means of vindicating, as the term goes, the ways of God, as obviating all objections against His Goodness. Evil is considered by Leibnitz either as metaphysical, or as physical, or as moral. Metaphysical evil, such as the finite and imperfect state of things, he deems *necessary*, because it is inseparable from all finite state, and constitutes the very nature of the conditional. This evil lies, therefore, in the nature of things, and is not to be considered as from God directly. Physical Evil, such as Pain, and Sorrow, and Sickness, &c., he admits sometimes to be direct or immediate from God, but either as a means of improvement or as punishment. But moral Evil, he maintains to be in direct contradiction with the very essence of the Deity—that of Goodness, and therefore only *permitted*, but not *willed*. This he explains in various ways. Sometimes, he says, Evil is permitted because it is a condition of virtue, since without Evil, no Freedom, and without Free Will, no Virtue. At other times, he considers moral Evil, in a metaphysical light, as a something similar to cold, which is nothing real, but merely an absence, a negation of heat, and as having indeed a use—that of heightening the beauty of virtue, as shade enhances the radiancy of light. Leibnitz again distinguishes, in evil actions, that which he terms the Power or material impulse which is from God, from the formal act which is from man, and which alone constitutes the Sin, and which is a consequence of man's self-predestination. But such is the pre-established harmony of

things, that it is never disturbed, says Leibnitz, by Evil in any case whatsoever.

These general principles, and, more especially, those of "sufficient reason" and the "law of continuity," appear to us to be those which Bishop Butler had in view in his admirable delineation of the connection of things in the universe, judged of, either from "*the reason of the thing,*" or from "the analogy of nature." We should deem ourselves wanting in our duty did we not cite the following passages of Butler bearing upon this important point, begging, at the same time, our reader to attend to the care with which that deep thinker avoids the admitting of such a connection otherwise than as an hypothetical belief: "The world, and the whole natural government of it, appears to be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts correspond to each other, and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or as any particular model of a civil constitution and government. In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals have various peculiar relations to other individuals of their own species. And whole species are, we find, variously related to other species upon this earth. Nor do we know how much further these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is not any action or natural event which we are acquainted with so single and unconnected as not to have a respect to some other actions and events; so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond the compass of this present world. *There seems, indeed, nothing from whence we can so much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures, actions, and events, throughout the whole of nature, have relations to each other.* But as it is obvious that all events have future unknown consequences; so, if we trace any, as far as

we can go, into what is connected with it, we shall find that if such events were not connected with somewhat further in nature unknown to us, somewhat both past and present, such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor can we give the whole account of any one thing whatever; of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not have been. By this most astonishing connection, these reciprocal correspondences and mutual relations, every thing which we see in the course of nature is actually brought about. And things, seemingly the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be the necessary conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so that any one thing whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other. The natural world, then, and natural government of it, being such an incomprehensible scheme, so incomprehensible, that a man must really, in the literal sense, know nothing at all who is not sensible of his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, and strongly shows the credibility that the moral world and government of it may be so too." (Butler's Analogy. Ch. vii.)

It is, we think, to general principles of the nature of the *à priori* principles of Leibnitz, that the great thinker, whose words we have cited, alludes; and it is not a little remarkable, considering the general adoption in his days of the theological views of Leibnitz in the Protestant world at least,—it is not a little remarkable, we say, to find Butler merely proposing these views in the light of hypotheses, from which indeed conclusions may be drawn perfectly consistent with the moral government of God, as a scheme incomprehensible, but which philosophical maxims are only admitted hypothetically. In this point, we may remark by the

way, consists, we believe, the great strength of Bishop Butler. He takes the hypothesis as an hypothesis, saying; admitting things to stand as you represent them, they are by no means inconsistent with religious truth. Therefore, Butler is never quoted as Paley is by the adherents of natural Theology. Butler says, in the natural course of things you believe steadfastly in matters quite incomprehensible; there then exists an analogy between natural truth and religious truth, placing ourselves in the very same position. But Paley fell, we believe, in the snare concealed, either intentionally or unintentionally, by philosophy. Deeming the argument of demonstrating from Cause and Effect, from design and purpose, as unanswerable, and, what is worse, as the elementary process in the human mind, whilst it constitutes in reality a secondary one in relation to God, whose existence, made known in a peculiar way, is proved, but not suggested, by the evidence of purpose and design, Paley unwillingly lent a hand to the modern scheme of considering the Almighty as a rational consequence of the human judgment. We do not gainsay the value of the argument from design and purpose; we merely remind the reader that it is considered by us as a secondary one.

We have now advanced a first and full step towards the exposition of modern Rationalism, and so firmly connected are the links of human Thought, that we may to many appear guilty of having confined to Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes, and Leibnitz, remarks which ought to have embraced a far wider horizon. We own ourselves liable to the objection, observing, however, that we merely adduce what we deem indispensable, because, in fact, the argument upon which modern unbelief in God reposes is of quite a different nature from that of the 17th and 18th centuries. The struggle is now of a far

more definite character. Modern philosophy strikes at once at the basis of Christianity and of Religion, or connection between God and Man, in asserting, as an historical fact, that the very notion of the Unity of God, that Monotheism did not exist a thousand or two thousand years before Christ. In point of Chronology we here admit of great latitude ; but the main doctrine asserts that in the history of the human race, this notion of the Almighty, of the Supreme Being, is decidedly subsequent to the existence of ancient Egypt, from whence it was ingrafted by philosophers and lawgivers in various parts of Asia. Amongst the many very able works which maintain this doctrine, and which have attempted to bestow upon it a character of positive truth, we shall cite that of Professor R \ddot{o} th, and, indeed, the great philosophical work of M. Auguste Comte. Therefore, our summary of the philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries must needs be abbreviated, and merely confined to the indispensable points without the illustration of which we could not proceed, nor even attempt to delineate a broad sketch of the important doctrines of Locke, Hume, Reid, and others, before giving the less known tenets of German philosophy, curtailed and reduced to Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Although it may seem unimportant, if not irrelevant, to state the opinions of times long passed by, when the actual circumstances are different, yet we hold that modern Rationalism is one, and that we cannot hope to make ourselves fully understood without scanning lightly the whole surface of philosophy since Descartes, or even without referring briefly to tenets of the highest antiquity.

The sources of modern Science are evidently to be traced to Bacon, to Descartes, to Hobbes, to Leibnitz. Without the clear knowledge of the important ad-

ditions made by Descartes to the study of the human Thought, it would be useless to attempt the most summary sketch of German philosophy. The Baconian method, whatever its source, and whatever its faults, constitutes, with the progress inherent to the method, the basis of all science, the hope of all future generations. Social philosophy finds in Hobbes its great modern expounder, who cannot be denied by his successors. And Leibnitz, whose poetical genius spiritualized Matter, would, although apparently forgotten, recognize his own ideas amongst the greater number of modern productions. But our first step would not be firmly supported without entering briefly into some details respecting the views of these great thinkers, as to the value of mathematical knowledge.

In pointing to these eminent men, as to the sources from whence modern science is derived, we again repeat a former observation, viz., that we do not aim thereby at drawing any fixed boundary between the science of the 16th century and that of the 17th. If the "law of continuity" be of doubtful application, when applied to the Universe, it most certainly obtains in all subjects of human Thought, and in Thought itself. And as in mathematical sciences the *law of equality* does not involve a similarity which precludes distinction (Dugald Stewart), so also the law of contiguity in human Thought is by no means to be considered as implying a want of individual worth. The concatenation of Knowledge is a fact now well established, and the addition of a link to that bright chain can only be admitted on the condition *sine quâ non*, of strengthening the union, and that of forming a continuous whole. Therefore when in reference to mathematical science, as to human knowledge in general, we limit to four great chiefs the honor of having unfurled

the standard of modern science, we are by no means to be deemed unmindful of their great predecessors, nor of those who flocked to their standard or followed the path newly trodden. The names of Roger Bacon, of Gutenberg, of Faustus, of Schaeffer, of Strame, or of Lawrentius, are not less immortal because they flourished before the 17th century. And when at that eventful period, the flame of science bursting forth, effectually dissipated the dark cloud of ignorance and superstition which still hung over Europe in spite of the endeavors of the Reformation, if the names of Descartes, of Lord Bacon, of Hobbes and of Leibnitz, deserve to be signalized, yet they by no means throw into obscurity those of Galileo, Kepler, Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Huygens, Isaac Newton, Boyle, Torricelli, Hook, Bernouilli, Pascal, Cassini, Wallis, Halley, Flamsteed, Euler, De l'Hopital, Roemer, Roberval, Barrow, Bradley, etc., etc., etc. Evidently Rationalism existed before Descartes, and Induction was not invented by Lord Bacon. Social philosophy had found deep interpreters before Hobbes, and entelechies or essences were not first introduced in philosophy by Leibnitz. And yet each of these great men has stamped this system with a most characteristic mark, and the deviation from the common track fully entitles them to the highest rank amongst their compeers.

But in mathematical science, Descartes and Leibnitz hold rank with the brightest name of that bright period. The first instituted in *algebra* an improvement which, in the opinion of Playfair, forms a most important epoch in the history of mathematics, namely, the application of the algebraic analysis to define the nature and investigate the properties of curve lines, and consequently to represent the notion of variable quantity. His notation of algebraic quantities, by means

of exponents is more correct, and the development more complete than those of Vieta, respecting the relation between geometry and algebra. His services in geometry were most valuable, having discovered the means of determining the relations and proportions of different species of curve lines, by drawing tangents, and perpendiculars to geometrical curves, and by describing accurately their course of inflection in any given case. In short, if not the discoverer of the "Analysis of Infinites," that glory of modern Science, yet it cannot be denied that Descartes took a most important part by his abstruse mathematical investigations in preparing the way for future mathematicians. These discoveries were made in early youth, and abandoned. Descartes, indeed, expressly tells us in the work which, embodying his boyish researches, determines the grand era in the progress of the modern analysis, that he had completely forgotten for seventeen years even the elementary operations of arithmetic, and he was 42 years old at the time of this publication. The youthful talent of Descartes for mathematics may be judged by the fact that in 1832, Fourier practically demonstrated how a great principle of Descartes, previously unappreciated, affords the best and most rapid method for the analysis of numerical equations. Nor was Leibnitz less remarkable for mathematical attainments, of the real value of which an adequate notion may be formed from the fact that he is considered by many as the first inventor of the *infinitesimal analysis*, and that Professor Playfair, having carefully investigated all the controversy, has been led to admit an independent, though similar, and almost simultaneous discovery by Leibnitz of the principle of the fluxionary calculus, so admirably adapted to all

physical investigation in which the utmost precision is necessary.

Hobbes is less known as a mathematician, and yet his whole philosophical system is based on *geometry*, or on *body* in which motion produces lines, surfaces, and volumes. But Hobbes maintains, as does the modern school of positive philosophy, that the elementary principles of mathematical science, as presented from the time of Euclid down to Wallis, are decidedly fallacious, and that this science is essentially objective, and not subjective. Mathematics, with all these three eminent thinkers, constituted, as it were, the basis of their systems, although in a different light; Descartes considering with Plato the idea of quantity and configuration as bearing the stamp of spirituality, whilst Hobbes, with Aristotle, deemed figure and number to be merely conversant of physical knowledge, or at least as drawing their source from thence alone. The views of Leibnitz are not so clearly defined. As he denies extension, and only admits of metaphysical points in various states, he can scarcely be supposed to adopt a physical source for notions of figure and quantity, and yet as he continually speaks of extension, as he admits of body, the movements of which harmonize completely with those of the spirit, it cannot be said so positively that he deemed mathematics to be a mere subjective science. Space Leibnitz considers as an *ordo coexistendi*, and Duration or Time as an *ordo existendi sed non simul*, definitions to which we shall revert at a later period. However, if we adopt as his opinion the system of Monads, it is evident that Mathematics as well as all Physics are merely metaphysical or subjective ideas. All object indeed disappears, and space itself, being merely an imaginary creation of the mind, cannot admit of any real configuration. In short, the law of

pre-established harmony, admitting mind and body as distinct, unites in unity the apparent duality; whilst, on the other hand, the Monads or Units, created not in Time but in Eternity, invested with mutual reciprocal dependence harmoniously combined with their independence of every thing except God,—the Monads, being ideal matter or body, cannot be said to exist, for nothing is extended. Is it not clearly evident that the attempt to explain the physical system of the world proves as worthless in the hands of Leibnitz as does his solution of the moral difficulties? He denies, it is true, having recourse to divine power in every act, because he admits that every force, power, essence or monad possesses spontaneous activity given by the Creator—activity which may be hemmed in by the activity of other powers in nature, but which still preserves its original elasticity, that shows itself spontaneously whenever the surrounding pressure or activity is less preponderating. This spontaneous activity of the monad or natural power is indeed described by Leibnitz as being of a nature quite inexpressible, and as being susceptible of a varied action at the same moment, a circumstance which he instances by pointing out the state of a circular body in motion, in which the movement of the centre is so different from that of the circumference. Still, as all relative action between the powers of nature, and the very activity of these powers, however spontaneous and varied, were conceived by Leibnitz as being carried on harmoniously and mathematically, i. e., according to strict and absolute rules laid down by the Almighty, this appears to us as clearly admitting mathematical truth neither as subjective, nor as objective, but as *divine*. Thus Leibnitz, although the very antipode of Spinoza, the frozen unity of whom he replaces with myriads of myriads of forces,

or powers, or unities (Monads), yet agrees with him in considering the mathematical method as the only *adequate notion*. (See Leibnitz, *Meditatio de Cognitione Veritate et Ideis*. Act erud. Lips. 1684.) That Leibnitz really conceived mathematical truth to be concentrated in the Divine Mind may, we think, be still more evidently inferred from the naming of God the "Eternal Geometrician," by whom alone is possible the solution of this problem, "The state of a single monad being given, to determine its past, present, and future state throughout the universe."

Although nothing can be more justifiable than to refer truths of such certainty to the Divine Mind, Leibnitz, we think, has thrown much uncertainty on what he terms mathematical truths, by continually reminding his reader of the finite or conditional character of these truths, even when he refers to them as to a fixed standard. From thence, we conceive, proceeds the discrepancy which appears in maintaining that "logic is as susceptible of demonstration as geometry is," (*De l'Entendement humain*, liv. iv. § 9;) and in reproaching Descartes "with having made a vain attempt at certitude by presenting his metaphysical meditations under a mathematical form," this Leibnitz considers as one of the greatest errors of Cartesianism: but why? Because Descartes, considering Extension as the essence of matter, and therefore the very subject matter of geometry, attempts to clothe Mind, or Spirit, or Metaphysics, in a garb which Spirit cannot wear, since, according to Descartes himself, nothing applicable to Extension can be applied to Spirit. In fact, the discrepancy is only apparent, for when Leibnitz considers logic as having the same certitude as mathematics or as geometry, he reasons according to his own assumption of the metaphysical nature of both, whilst Descartes, admit-

ting the existence of matter gifted with certain properties resumed in extension, denies the application to Spirit of the laws of extension." (See Leibnitz. *Sur la notion de substance &c.*) When Leibnitz, referring the criterion of certitude to the clearness and distinctness of the idea, compares such distinct notions with those of the most perfect mathematician respecting the angles of a triangle, he finds means of darkening the comparison, by hinting at the metaphysical nature of mathematics, saying, "The having in the imagination the angles of a triangle does not confer for all that a clear idea. Imagination cannot furnish us with an image common to acute angular and obtuse angular triangles, although the notion of a triangle is common to both; therefore, the notion or idea does not consist of the images, and it is not so easy as one might suppose to understand completely (*à fond*) the angles of a triangle." How far the admission of a mere ideal existence in the notions of geometry contributes to their certitude is rather difficult to say, for if the notion neither proceeds from matter as configured, nor is understood by the mind herself, but requires to be shifted off to the Divine Geometrician, the certitude of Leibnitz would be very similar to that of Spinoza or of Malebranche. The notion of figure and quantity as rational deductions, grounded upon inductions of a peculiar nature, (relative to Time and Space,) is, we believe, the only possible issue to the labyrinth.

However prolix this investigation of the opinions of these great thinkers respecting the nature of mathematics may appear, yet the subject is too important to be hastily dealt with. With the notion of Duration and Quantity is involved that of the Infinite and the Absolute, terms which we shall find constantly used by the modern schools of German Philosophy. Time and

space Leibnitz considers to be eternal truths containing the possible and the existing; but the *Infinite* is contained in the *Absolute*, which is a notion anterior to all composition, and not formed by the addition of parts. Thus he denies that the notions of the *finite* and of the *infinite* are only mental modifications of space and duration; for the *infinite* is the absolute without any modification whatsoever, and the *finite* exists when the Absolute or Infinite becomes modified. The origin of the notion of the Absolute or the Infinite is not, says Leibnitz, the mere superposition or addition of quantity upon quantity, and why? Because the same reason existing always that of adding, we perceive that we might go on so for ever, therefore the consideration of the Infinite proceeds from the very impossibility of supposing an end. This he owns, however, to be rather the *Indefinite* than the *Infinite*. The notion of the Absolute, he maintains to exist in us inwardly as well as that of God; and that these notions of the Absolute constitute the attributes of the Deity, and are no less the source of all intelligence, than God is the principle of all being; thus the idea of absolute space is nothing less than the notion of the immensity of God; but this absolute space is not composed of parts, nothing such exists, it being a notion that implicates contradiction, for these infinite *maxima* and infinitesimal *minima* are of no other use than for geometrical calculations, and for the imaginary roots of algebra. Leibnitz takes the same view of the notion of *Eternity*, which he maintains that we possess, not as the idea of an infinite whole, but as an infinite without end, for it is on account of the impossibility of supposing an end to Time that we have that of Eternity.

We have been especially careful not to weaken the force of the argument of Leibnitz in favor of the con-

nate existence of the notion of the Infinite, of the Absolute. We deem it merely saying the Indefinite proves the Infinite, and the Illimited the Absolute. That the *indefinite* and the *illimited*, as notions extremely varying according to the intelligence of the individual, may contribute to strengthen the Revelation of the Almighty, we do not doubt, and in that light, the views of Leibnitz are of service by their keenness. At a later period we shall refer to the opinion of Leibnitz as it is here exposed.

The views of Lord Bacon respecting mathematics are given by him in a very concise manner. Indefinite quantity he refers to first philosophy, or *philosophia prima*, but quantity determined or proportionable to Metaphysics, as it is one of the "essential forms of things," and as such is the "most abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most proper to metaphysics." Lord Bacon, after remarking that mathematics constituted a metaphysical science, which was the cause why it had been labored and inquired into better than any of the other forms which are more immersed in matter, proceeds in the following terms, as if foreseeing the abuse which might one day be made of this great instrument of Thought, "For it being the nature of the Mind of Man, to the extreme prejudice of knowledge, to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity, the mathematics, of all other knowledge, were the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite." Referring to the pure mathematics, those Sciences "which handle quantity determinate," geometry and arithmetic, "the one handling quantity continued, and the other dissevered," Lord Verulam insists upon the great use of mixed mathematics in the study of natural philosophy, saying, "For many parts of nature can neither be

invented with sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and intervening of the mathematics, of which sort are Perspective, Music, Astronomy, Cosmography, Architecture, Enginery, and divers others. (Advanc. of Learning.) Of these mixed mathematics, Lord Bacon predicts "that there cannot fail to be more of them as Nature grows further disclosed." As for the pure mathematics, he wavers in his opinion of them, saying at one time, that they sharpen the wit if it be too dull, and if wandering, (or bird-witted,) they fix it. Lord Bacon, in placing amongst the axioms of first philosophy, or *philosophia prima*, the higher axioms of Mathematics, compares such axioms to the branches of a tree which meet in a stem, and that stem he terms primary or summary philosophy. Axioms which formed part of this philosophy, he deemed not only of a higher nature, as better founded on experience, but as notions of the mind, and it is the denial of all such notions which distinguishes the modern schools of positive philosophy, from the Baconian, for, as we have seen, Hobbes, as Locke, did, at a later period, consider all such maxims as the result of experience, and with them the mathematical, even the rule *Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se conveniunt*, which Bacon considers as a mathematical axiom so potent in Logic, as to serve to build all syllogisms upon. It was, however, altogether owing to the inductive philosophy of Lord Bacon, that thinkers came readily to admit that the real value of such axioms was their being the result of experience.

SECTION II.

THE 17th century bequeathed to its immediate successor the task of verifying the truth of its conclusions, already denied by Hobbes. These conclusions may be summarily stated by saying that the same doctrine which maintained *relative being* to constitute the upshot and issue of all human investigation, asserted at the same time that absolute existence was irresistibly (necessarily) involved in the very notion of the relative. The *anticipating* propensity of the mind, which had at once drawn these conclusions, was eagerly busied either in defending or in combating them, and both defenders and adversaries followed up the same irrational path. Inductive, or positive philosophy, in the meanwhile, pursued the track pointed out by Bacon, and overshot by Hobbes, who, not contented with pointing out the irrationality of the conclusions adopted in the name of Rationalism, aimed at doing what Bacon did not even attempt, and broached also a system. Criticism, or the careful investigation of the principles laid down in the 17th century, is then the prevailing characteristic of the 18th.

Those who defended the opinion that the unconditioned could be rationally derived from the conditioned, those who maintained that human reason could on its own wings rise higher than the source from which it streamed, are those who still assert under other

forms the conclusions of Descartes and of Leibnitz, respecting the value of metaphysical unconditionality which they uphold. The names of many divines are here to be found—men who conscientiously believed that they were thus forwarding a good cause in joining their voices with those who asserted that the notion of the Almighty was an idea stamped on the mind of man, of which it formed an elementary principle. Others, denying it to be an *à priori* principle, considered that notion as an *à posteriori* argument, and maintained that the evident marks of design and purpose which abound in the universe are sufficient to have suggested and to serve as proofs of the existence of God. Of these some were so carried away by the force of the evidence adduced, that they came to admit first rational argument as proof, and soon as having suggested the notion of God; and it is thus that we find Paley cited as an authority by those who deny Revelation as the real cause of the knowledge of the existence of the Almighty. Religious men are not always aware of the fact that no rational argument can carry conviction higher than the level of human reason, and it is now becoming a general belief that even those spontaneous, intuitive notions called “inspirations,” although independent of the usual course of human conclusions as to the manner in which they appear, are not however to be considered independent of Reason with respect to their consequences. That the “doctrine proves the miracle,” although a principle resorted to by men of tenets most contradictory, is a rule that still obtains. Of these two classes, the supporters of the elementary, intuitive *à priori* principle being a proof, if not indeed the primary source of man’s belief in the existence of a God, were most numerous before Locke’s doctrines became generally known, whilst the *à posteriori* school gained

ground after the publication of his "Essay on the Human Understanding."

But it would be impossible to limit to the 18th century opinions which had many adherents already in the 17th, and which, even in the 19th, still number many warm partisans. Indeed, all schools of philosophy that, since the great period of Descartes, Bacon, Leibnitz, have aimed at any thing like dogmatism, have adopted either the *à priori* principle, or the *à posteriori* one; i. e., they have either considered the belief in the existence of God to be a spontaneous impulse, or else the result of mature reflection. Therefore Sensationalism, as well as Psychology, is of the *à posteriori*, whilst Mysticism and Fideism depend altogether on the *à priori* doctrine. A natural question here introduces itself, to which we shall answer briefly, postponing to a later period a fuller explanation. This question is, whether the present work adopts either the *à priori*, or the *à posteriori* doctrine respecting the source of man's belief in God. To this we reply, unhesitatingly, NEITHER. We attempt to adduce no rational evidence of an existence which we deem so far above human conception; we merely adduce rational evidence of the fact of the Revelation of the Almighty. We have collected a certain amount of evidence respecting this eventful fact, but we go no farther. We agree decidedly in admitting with Materialism, that without Revelation man knows of no God. We conceive the Materialist to be in the right when he maintains that neither human intuition nor human conception can stand forth as adequate to the undertaking; but we deny his conclusions when he maintains that since the notion of God is neither an intuition nor a judgment, it is therefore a fancy. But besides this direct continuation of the 17th century,

merely strengthening or weakening either the *à priori* doctrine or the *à posteriori* one, in pursuing the ancient track, the 18th century produced doctrines of a peculiar nature, each bearing the stamp of Rationalism. We shall confine our remarks to those termed Sensationalism, Scepticism, Materialism, Mysticism, Fideism, Psychology, and German philosophy, as more especially the produce of the 18th century; whilst what may be termed *positive philosophy* is of the 19th. Not that we reckon with the past a most distinguished German philosopher yet living (Schelling), but his opinions we rank with those of the 18th century, because the most prevalent are of that period.

The same explanation accounts for our classing Leibnitz amongst the philosophers of the 17th century, although his critical investigation of Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding" only appeared in print in 1765. This was, however, a posthumous publication, for Leibnitz died in 1716. Born in 1646, this eminent philosopher was so favored by the gifts of nature, as well as by outward circumstances, as to have been a deep scholar at the early age of fifteen, at which period of his life, besides a thorough knowledge of the learned languages and all the modern European idioms, he was deeply versed in all the most intricate mazes of Grecian philosophy, as well as in the dark windings of modern theology; he was at the same time a deep mathematician. But even at that early time of life Leibnitz had already devoted many years to study; for when a child of eight years only, his highest happiness was to creep into the dusty solitude of a vast library, and there pass the day eagerly devouring the contents of the ponderous volumes. His good fortune, as he himself tells us, caused him to hit upon ancient classical authors, of which he at first understood nothing; but the child

felt that there was a difficulty to be overcome, and he persevered. Dawn soon broke on the intellectual darkness, and by degrees all was Light. The early proficiency of the youth is thus accounted for by the earnest, voluntary application of the child. Though it must be admitted that the Leibnitzian metaphysical doctrine of powers and forces prevailed during the 18th century, and still generally obtains, yet the readers, in order to form a clear notion of the effect produced by those doctrines on the intellectual world, must revert to the state of scientific opinion in the 17th, when the severe, chilly, mathematical Cartesian tenets had been followed up by the atomistical doctrines of Gassendi, on the one hand, and the frigid unity of Spinoza on the other. Gassendi was the renewer of the fancies of Democritus and Epicurus on atoms. Spinoza and Malebranche conjured up under peculiar shades the Platonic doctrine of the unity of Mind pervading the Universe, but Rationalism, notwithstanding, tottered on its foundations. Materialism, or Pantheism, appeared to be the dread alternative. Men anxiously inquired, in the secret recess of Thought, if it was to obtain such a result that the yoke of Aristotle and of the schoolmen had been shaken off. At this eventful moment Leibnitz stepped into the arena, introducing, under a form admirably adapted to remove all apprehension of scholastic authority, a stream of life, which, playing about with all the beautiful and harmonious vagrancy of nature, cheered the dull scene, and speaking of Almighty Power, displayed His many ways. We find, therefore, in that admirable poetical effusion of Pope, the "Essay on Man," written in the 18th century, all the popular views remaining of the philosophy of Leibnitz, linked as it were with the more ancient Platonic fancy of the Soul of the World, "Anima Mundi."

The forces, powers, or units which constitute, according to Leibnitz, the Universe, and of which the Almighty is a unity, are beautifully portrayed by the poet, in the following well-known verses, in which the life and activity that reigns in nature are so well expressed :

“ See, thro’ this air, this ocean, and this earth,
 All matter quick, and bursting into birth.
 Above, how high progressive life may go !
 Around, how wide ! how deep extend below !
 Vast chain of being ! which from God began,
 Natures ethereal, human, angel, man,
 Beast, bird, fish, insect, what no eye can see,
 No glass can reach ; from Infinite to thee,
 From thee to nothing.—On superior powers
 Were we to press, inferior might on ours ;
 Or in the full Creation leave a void,
 Where one step broken, the great scale’s destroy’d
 From Nature’s chain whatever link you strike,
 Tenth, or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike.”

The poet, in these verses, finds means to avoid a difficulty which pervades the theory of Monads, in which the sleeping and slumbering forces represent Matter, by considering matter as “quick,” which is, in fact, the same thing, but which allows the poet to speak of “life” as belonging to the higher orders in nature. Now, Leibnitz considers all nature as living, but more or less hemmed in by opposing forces. The poet, also, not being bound to consistency, is enabled to introduce Pantheism under its most attractive form, whilst the philosopher could only point out to staid direction impressed on all things, and which, in despite of himself, caused him to name the Almighty the “Great Geometrician.” The verses of Pope, although now become commonplace, we beg leave to repeat, because we shall have occasion to advert later thereto, and because the poet finds therein a remedy to the apparent autocracy of the “powers or forces” of nature.

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
 Whose body Nature is, and God the soul;
 That changed thro' all, and yet in all the same;
 Great in the earth, as in the ethereal frame;
 Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
 Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,
 Lives thro' all life, extends thro' all extent,
 Spreads undivided, operates unspent;
 Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part,
 As full, as perfect, in a hair as heart;
 As full, as perfect in vile Man that mourns,
 As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns,
 To Him no high, no low, no great, no small;
 He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all."

The scope of the present work will, we hope, excuse us for here anticipating on what we shall have to say at a later period, and, on the occasion of the thought embodied in these lines of Pope—a thought as ancient as all human tradition—to inquire if the main tenet of Christianity, which is to see God in Christ, really constitutes an insuperable objection, when Philosophy is ready to admit a positive identity of the "Supreme Mind" with the lowest existing thing?

But to resume our motives for introducing Leibnitz as being of the 17th century, we shall add, that his System formed an admirable Eclectism, which united in one harmonious chain the most opposing doctrines, since, admitting that the external world, that all man knows of, is only a "series of regular and connected phenomena," he embodies and personifies these phenomena in the forces or powers, of which the state of one part may remain the same, whilst that of another part is changed. Each force, representing the whole universe, or being a mirror of the whole, "sufficient reason," i. e., an intellect of sufficient power, could discover in each natural force the manner in which it is affected by the exterior state of the other forces, which can never annihilate it, but only darken, for a

time, an activity or power which more favorable circumstances will bring at once to light in virtue of the elasticity bestowed thereon when Almighty Will created the Universe. A doctrine which admits of a spontaneity granted to myriads on myriads of forces—spontaneity which constitutes their very essence, could scarcely be adduced as contrary to the existence of the Freedom of the Will in Man. Effectively the virtual existence of Free Will was contained in the very doctrine of Leibnitz, but at the same time all due value is given also to the effect of surrounding circumstances. Therefore, that deep thinker was accustomed to say that Man is free to will any given aim, but the way to reach that aim is independent of his will, and must be duly attended unto.

But it must not be supposed that the 17th century arose as it were from chaos. The connection with times immediately preceding, was too close to be abruptly discarded; and this accounts for the persistence of tenets and principles admitted as intuitive and innate in the human mind, which a more mature investigation has proved to be the inferences of reason or judgment. The grand era of mental emancipation, the 16th century, in which the warning but unheeded voice of Luther preluded to those scenes of slaughter, in which the sinews of our forefathers accomplished the Reformation, written and signed with their blood,—that great era had left untouched in Philosophy many principles deemed intuitive and innate, but which were in fact real intricate acts of judgment. The right of “free inquiry,” and that of “individual judgment in matter of religion,” which appeared at first suicidal, and which in fact entails upon its supporter the duty of proceeding in “Rationalism with all due inquiry, and in Christianity with the meek spirit breathed by God in

Christ, His word,"—that right was at the onset deemed absurd and inadmissible. The wild insurrection of the peasantry, who maintained that Scripture interpreted by them meant that all inequality was to cease on earth, was more hurtful to the cause of Reformation by the utter irrationality of such an assertion at once made in the name of "human Reason," and of Him who says that "His kingdom is not of this world," than the fagot and steel of Pope and Emperor.

The principle of "free inquiry," far from abrogating the laws of human nature, insists most strenuously on the weakness of human nature, but it denies the right of enforcing, in the name of Christ, even those mild and admirable doctrines which it pleased the Almighty to inculcate by way of persuasion. We do not mean to insinuate that physical constraint was never had recourse to by those who aimed at promulgating Christianity, nor that the spirit of imitation did not too often take the place of the spirit of inquiry; but we maintain that the Jew and the Idolater have equally a right, as well as the Christian, to contend that force was the means employed by the divine founder, or that "*to force men to enter*" into His Kingdom points out to any other force but that of Christ, persuasion. But the ways of God are inscrutable, and our belief in Him is grounded on the fact of His being revealed as the Almighty. His power, and wisdom, and goodness, must, therefore, ever remain above all human comprehension, otherwise what deeper slur on His way than to see Christian arrayed against Christian, and the battle-field red with blood shed in the name of Christ, that covenant of the Goodness of the Almighty. What greater proof of the necessity of man's veiling his face before the Almighty, than the firm resolve of thousands, who own in sighing the deep inconsistency of

their determination, to lay down their lives, and to shed their blood with joy for the maintenance of that "right" which entails upon them, we repeat it, the duty of careful investigation and measured judgment in matters they own to be so difficult. Fortunately, the great principles of the right of "free inquiry" and of "individual judgment," allows of a compromise, and permits of being reduced to terms, which fall readily under human comprehension, and which point out a rational solution of the difficulty. This solution consists in the modelling our conduct on that of our adversaries, unless we aim at what has somewhat the appearance of that which is termed the "sinning against the Holy Ghost"—a sin into which man is continually falling, and which consists in his deeming his conduct to be that which Almighty Wisdom would adopt, instead of admitting absolutely and unconditionally the utter incompatibility (admission grounded on the Revelation of the Almighty as such) of human reason acting otherwise than as God has ordained by the laws of human nature. The difficulty, if not solved, is at least brought by this means within the compass of human judgment, leaving no other alternative than active or passive bearing. Let those who deem passive submission, which is a duty to God, to be also a duty towards man, stand forth, but we disavow such conduct, not indeed in the name of God, but in the name of that Judgment which it has pleased Him to breathe into Man.

In alluding, therefore, to the 16th century, as to the great era of the emancipation of the human mind, we do not deny the miseries which that emancipation brought on our forefathers, nor the duty we contract thereby really to "inquire;" nor do we consider ourselves as obeying the voice of God if we follow their example,

and lay down our blood in defence of the principles they have bequeathed to us. The errors of the Reformers, and the horrors of war, were the causes which left unshaken on their pedestals in the field of Philosophy many pillars of scholastic learning. Even the new school, that of Luther and Melanchthon, though full of scorn for the schoolmen, yet admitted many of their principles as elementary truths of the mind. The new school did more ; it laid down also maxims and axioms as elementary facts of the human Thought, which are now readily admitted as results of inference. These principles, admitted, at least tacitly, by Bacon and Descartes, were rooted out by Hobbes, who, unfortunately for himself, in rooting out the weeds, appeared more to aim at making waste, than desirous to erect ; or who, if he did attempt to erect, acted against his own principles, bringing forth conclusions not contained in the premises, and denying evident laws of the human Thought, because they were not to be explained by Sense. Few books set forth in a worse light the overbearing and dogmatic character of irrational or hasty Judgment decked out in the garb of Rationalism, than those of Hobbes. And yet we admit that Hobbes was on the right track, and we know that he maintained with Lord Bacon the constant proneness to error of human "anticipation." Locke fortunately reassumed the search in a spirit which we deem far more rational than that of Hobbes, for his bearing was less dogmatical, and his modesty greater, as it becomes a philosopher.

Locke's opinions are too well known for us to spend much time in stating them. Eulogy and obloquy have, we think, been indiscriminately heaped on him by friends and foes. Tasteless praise we deem to be an unworthy homage to the memory of Locke, but it

cannot be denied, that although error was unavoidable in the bold attempt undertaken by that deep thinker, yet such were his talents that errors embraced by him became riveted, and a century has not sufficed to eradicate the fallacies planted through his medium in many bright minds. In considering Sensationalism as a very one-sided view indeed of the great question "concerning the human understanding," it is that limited view which we reproach to Locke, and not the more usual objection of "loosening the bands of religion." We cannot repeat our assertion too often, that being deeply convinced of the error of those who deem that there exist in the human mind natural psychological proofs of the existence of God, and that therefore the philosopher who denies the existence of such proof is denying that there is a God, we cannot consider the opinions of Locke in the same heinous light that they do. The reprobation they express is perfectly consistent with their knowledge, and may serve to prove the close connection that exists between the understanding and the heart. Now if evident proof were adduced, showing that the knowledge of the Almighty was an event altogether distinct from the natural intuitive, and also the rational faculties of the mind, the error of Locke would dwindle into a mere error of judgment that the difficulties of his undertaking rendered unavoidable. Lord Bacon, we have seen, attempted to point out not only a comprehensive summary of the objects of Reason, or the understanding, but he also aimed at furnishing Mankind with a new organ, with a new method of laying before the understanding or the rational sagacity the various objects of its pursuits; whilst Locke attempted to apply this new invention of Bacon to the elucidation of the Understanding itself as to the manner in which man comes to know.

But unfortunately Locke, instead of beginning where he ended, by exposing the natural, instinctive, inherent faculties of the Understanding, began with his well-known maxim of "no innate principles in the mind," a maxim which he himself belied by admitting the existence of one innate practical principle, "a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery," as if such a feeling of the mind did not constitute one of the most evident results of most early experience. It would be tedious to the reader, to attempt to repeat the many excellent remarks on Locke's philosophy which are to be found in the works of MM. Dugald Stewart, Reid, Victor Cousin, Sir James Mackintosh, Hamilton, &c. &c., and to which we refer. Here we shall merely observe that Locke aimed evidently at throwing down those imaginary self-evident principles which the reformers of the scholastic philosophy had left untouched, but unfortunately he presented his thought in a manner which belied his intention. But it is really scarcely fair to say that Locke, in maintaining the principle of the Academy that "there was nothing in the Mind but what is in the Senses," forgot the "Mind" itself. This keen observation of Leibnitz will forever imprint on the philosophy of Locke a stigma, if not altogether unmerited, at least too severe.

When Locke undertook his great task, philosophy was rendered altogether impracticable by the presence of many old scholastic weeds which had taken deep root in all directions. That state of things must not be lost sight of in judging of Locke. Some idea of the difficulties he had to surmount, and which proceeded from men's minds being prejudiced, may be formed from the fact that the prejudices he had to encounter were formally authorized by the great philosopher of the Reformation, by Melanchthon. Locke, in-

deed, appears to have had in view some of the very maxims admitted by Melanchthon as intuitive truths. The latter philosopher, when speaking of the origin of human knowledge, (*De Animâ*, p. 207,) resolves the difficulty, not by appealing to the innate faculties of Thought, to sensation, perception, attention, memory, discernment, &c., but by referring to certain principles placed by Nature herself in the mind of Man. If Melanchthon had merely pointed to certain elementary forms of Thought, and considered those forms to constitute the mental foundations of morality, of logic, of geometry, of physics, &c., the matter would have stood somewhat in the same position in which it now stands, but that was not the case. Thus the new school promulgated as elementary moral principles axioms and maxims which are still and ever will remain, as to their source, open to discussion and inquiry; and as an innate principle of physics, Melanchthon cites the very maxim against which Locke directs the first fire of the formidable battery of his first book: "*whatsoever is, is,*" and "*all either is or is not,*" and "*nature is partly animated and partly inanimated,*" and "*the effect is never superior to the cause,*" and "*all body is contained under certain forms,*" and "*a body cannot constitute several bodies, nor can it be in several places at one time;*" and "*the whole is equal to all the parts taken together.*" Other axioms far more intricate were given in *Ethics* as innate principles of morality, for instance the following: "The moral law is the eternal and immutable Wisdom of God," and "*God himself is the principle of all justice as manifested in the creation; and renewed at different periods by the divine voice of God in order to make known to man who and what God is.*"

In every branch of knowledge the same opinion reigned. It is to be found in Agrippa, (*De Vanitate*

Scientiarum,) as well as in the mystic writings of Fludd and Paracelsus. Even Van Helmont expressly reproduces the Platonic long discarded notions, saying, "All knowledge acquired through demonstration, pre-existed already within ourselves: our reasonings only render it more distinct. The mind, in stirring the ashes, lights up the not yet quite extinguished spark." (Helmonti opus. Ortus Med.) This was reproducing the Platonic doctrine which admits that "whoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeks for in a general notion, else how shall he know it when he hath found it?" Now, without denying that in such propositions is involved that most arduous of all questions, "what is it that makes experience possible?" yet the difficulty is not to be overcome by admitting of general maxims as independent of experience. If Lord Bacon deems "anticipation," or hypothesis, to be the constant road to Truth, he is far from considering the instinctive, intuitive character of that natural bent of the mind to constitute any guarantee of the truth of the "anticipation." It may be true, but it must be tested, and the new organ (*novum organum*) is the mean proposed to effectuate the search.

The whole first book of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, and several chapters of the 4th book, may therefore be likened to a battery of heavy guns, which, after having overthrown an enemy's position, still continues to pour forth destruction when nothing is left to oppose it. That Locke himself was perfectly sensible of such being the real state of things, is evident from his words, which explain the omitting of that first book altogether, in the abridgment of the Essay which he published in Leclerc's Review. But it is strange to say, that this omission, which Locke explains on the ground that the book having been writ-

ten merely in order to do away with the prejudices of some philosophers, he omits it as that point was gained, has been represented as a concession to prejudices "against the more important contents of his work." The words of Locke stand thus: "*J'ai tâché d'abord de prouver que notre esprit est au commencement ce qu'on appelle une tabula rasa; c'est-à-dire sans idées et sans connaissances. Mais comme ce n'a été que pour détruire les préjugés de quelques philosophes, j'ai cru que dans ce petit abrégé de mes principes, je devais passer toutes les disputes préliminaires qui composent le livre premier.*" (Biblioth. Univ. Jan. 1688.) The prejudices Locke aimed at overthrowing, were evidently, we believe, those which still darkened the field of philosophy, and he omitted having recourse to his destructive weapons in the abridgment, because the desired result had been obtained. Books require to be read with all due reference to the circumstances in which they were written; but as it is an impossibility that readers should, 150 years later, clearly understand the difficulties with which the author was surrounded, it behooveth the latter not to leave any doubt remaining of his intentions. Now, Locke did far more; he omitted the book altogether, not because it gave offence, but because it had done its work. That many of Locke's expressions are most vague and unsatisfactory, we do not deny, but it is the same still in mental philosophy; but to suppose it possible, that Locke could with one bound clear the insuperable difficulties of the analysis of Thought, without having recourse to "anticipation," or hypothesis, is to forget the most elementary law which governs our steps to knowledge. Locke compares, it is true, the mind to "an empty cabinet," and with him an idea is the "object of thinking," whilst the Cartesian considered the idea or notion, "as

a mode of Thought;” but in spite of the unfortunate expressions of “empty cabinet,” “white paper,” “simple ideas,” etc., as well as the confusion proceeding from using the term “Understanding,” sometimes as synonymous of the mind, sometimes merely as knowledge, sometimes as intuitive sagacity which “knows of the agreement or disagreement between two ideas,” yet Locke never denies that “intuitive ideas” enter spontaneously into the “empty cabinet.” From *without*, no notion can enter the “cabinet” but through the senses, but within it is no longer an “empty cabinet,” it is the “active power of Thought, intent upon its own actions,” and possessing a spontaneous faculty termed “Volition.” Now, when the mind, no longer an “empty cabinet,” but the “power of thinking,” (understanding,) and the power of willing, (volition,) comes to reflect or think *on its own actions*, these then become *objects of Thought*, although, in fact, actions of the mind; and these Locke terms Remembrance, Discerning, Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, etc. These inward acts of the mind, Locke never considers as coming from *without*. They become, it is true, “objects of Thought,” when the mind reflects on them, and therefore consistent with his definition of an idea; Locke names them “objects of Thought,” but with him they are completely distinct from *Sensation*. Positive philosophy would, perhaps, go farther than Locke did on this point, and would not discard *Sensation* in the production of Attention, Memory, Discernment, Judgment, Knowledge, Faith, etc., (we mean *Sensation* as tantamount to Sensibility.) Now, Locke most carefully states these acts of the mind to be independent of the senses, and to constitute “its own actions.” We do not contend in favor of the happiness of Locke’s expressions, such as that of the term “passive,” used to designate Percep-

tion, or "the power of Thought," especially when he tells us that "Perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge in our minds." But this is probably used as he uses the term "passive power," meaning, that in mind apparent passivity is in fact action, as in Volition forbearing is as much a voluntary act as voluntary action itself. But what we unreservedly commend in Locke, is the care he takes to warn his readers against metaphysical fancy; and we think that even at the present time, the following words of Locke are most appropriate: "The ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts, by being supposed to stand for some real beings in the soul that performed those actions of understanding and Volition; . . . yet I suspect that this way of speaking of faculties, has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty, in questions relating to them." And yet above a century after Locke, we find advocates of the psychological school, speaking of "the soul Reason," and "the soul Volition," in consequence of that obscurity which Locke aimed at dissipating. If Locke gives the name of "simple ideas" to the notions of Pleasure and Pain, of Power, Existence, and Unity; yet he does confound them with the "acts of the mind," since he names them, not as these latter "simple ideas of Reflection," but "simple ideas of both Sensation and Reflection." It is with these that he classes the notion of succession.

Sensationalism, even as presented by Locke, is, then, no denial of Thought; it is merely an attempt to analyze the manner in which the mind arrives at the knowledge of Things. All knowledge, says Bacon, is from Learning, and Locke aims at pointing out how Knowledge enters the mind. He finds in his path intruders (maxims) which lay claim to inherent, intuitive authority, as independent of experience, and he thrusts them away. With him all knowledge is relative, and so it remains to the present day. The degrees of our knowledge are, he says, intuition and demonstration, but with him "intuition" is whatever is in the mind. "There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge; and here, I think, we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting. (Book 4, Ch. 4, § 14.) And again, "Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive without reasoning. Some of the ideas in the mind may be compared to each other, and the mind perceives that they agree or disagree as clearly as that it has them. Thus the Mind perceives that an arc of a circle is less than the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle; and this, therefore, I call intuitive knowledge, which is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any, this being the highest of all human certainty." (Book 4.) And again, "Even in demonstrative knowledge each step reason makes must have an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof; for if it were not so, that yet would need a proof, since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced. *If it be perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge; if it cannot be perceived by itself, there is*

need of some intervening idea as a common measure of the relation. By which it is plain that every step in reasoning that produces knowledge has intuitive certainty." (Book 4, Ch. 2, § 7.) And again, "The necessity of this intuitive knowledge, in each step of scientific or demonstrative reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, that all reasoning was from "*ex præcognitis et præconcessis*, (foreknown and already admitted,) which mistake caused axioms and maxims to be supposed to be the foundations of all our knowledge and reasonings," (id. § 8,) &c. &c.

Intuitive knowledge is, then, according to Locke, that which causes us to know of exterior things; it is that which perceives the agreement of ideas; it is that which constitutes judgment; and yet we find Locke saying, "Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together. Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other ideas." And yet "every step is intuitive." Evidently it is the act of Rationality, that high privilege of man, that Locke has continually in view; and although he strenuously asserts the rights of *Sensation*, he does not, in spite of the difficulty of his task, ever give up Reason or the rights of Thought. "Of thinking," he says, "body (matter) affords us no idea at all, it is only from reflection that we have that. (Book 2, Ch. 21, § 4.) It is because the doctrines of Locke are still regarded by many as a "standard authority," that we join our voice with those who do not palliate his errors. We have shown that he had not merely to encounter the Cartesian and Leibnitzian doctrines, but many fallacies that had passed current with all his predecessors, excepting Hobbes.

But, in attempting to give some proof that Locke was very far from considering the active, intuitive, innate acts of the Mind, as obtained by external objects, or through the senses, in which manner all we know of the material world is obtained, yet we maintain that he never admitted that the analogies drawn from the material world were a sufficient criterion to judge of the intellectual phenomena. He maintains that man possesses no other means, but not that they are sufficient. Those who believe in "Natural Religion" as the result of certain innate principles existing in the mind of every human being, felt naturally great alarm when Locke plainly told them that no such principles exist; that *relative knowledge* is all that it is given to Man to know, without a special act. Our words, we know, will prove useless in a cause where far better argument has failed; but we repeat them again, and maintain that moral consequences of a far more dangerous kind are involved in the irrational attempt at proving, by fanciful innate principles of the mind, the existence of God, than in owning the honest truth, and in seeking assiduously in History, traditional, scriptural, natural, geographical, geological, ethnological, and biological, the proofs of the Revelation of the Almighty. To maintain that Man, whose knowledge is merely *relative*, and who only knows of relative existence, possesses *of himself* a knowledge of *absolute* existence, is, we apprehend, not merely the denial of Revelation, but the denial of Reason. Is it a denial of the innate, intuitive acts of Thought, to say that when the Mind reflects upon these acts, it distinguishes them, naming one Memory, another Attention, &c.? This abstraction, thus acquired by Reflection, does by no means nullify the existence of the intellectual phenomena, whilst it distinguishes them effectually from those of Sensation.

But as knowledge of exterior things acquired by Sensation is afterwards worked upon by Reflection, as all the intellectual phenomena come into play in relation with these ideas from sensation, and indeed as Man has no other use for those phenomena, save employing them either on rational or on sensible conceptions, it is only by their activity that they are known. To maintain, as did the Bishop of Worcester, that "*the mind possesses an idea of substance not proceeding from either sensation or reflection,*" was maintaining that man possessed naturally the notion of the Absolute, which he does not possess, for even Revelation, which tells him of the Almighty, is the express denial of man's capability of going higher than the relative. To the objection of Dr. Philpot, Locke answered quaintly that all he (Locke) knew of a cherry was through sensation and reflection; the first pointing out qualities, on which reflection perceived, thought, reasoned, knew, &c., but that sensation alone gave him the notion of something termed substance in the cherry, it being a support or substratum to the modes or accidents termed qualities. Dr. Philpot, in this long discussion, seems, we believe, to have had in view the intuitive knowledge of Existence or Being, which is inseparable from consciousness, and which, being inseparable from animated life, is therefore a quality thereof. This quality is Thought, of which the substance, according to the Cartesian doctrine, was Spirit, but which Descartes and his followers denied to exist in brutes. Now Locke, not caring for system, advances "that brutes have memory—that brutes ponder over things to a certain degree," and common judgment is in his favor. The Cartesian doctrine of Spirit thus fell asunder when it was attempted to ground, on such sophistical arguments, the positive existence of a spiritual substance; but if Men only

lay trust in what they can conceive or explain, it would, we conceive, be a denial of Reason, and not a rational conclusion. But this error of Descartes—error proved by constant experience, has not prevented men from doing justice to the soundness of his principle of self-consciousness as the basis of all certitude of relative knowledge.

Locke, at all events, succeeded in his undertaking; for by his vigorous hand the doctrine of reminiscences, of innate ideas, and of maxims coeval with the existence of the mind, was fairly prostrated. The rights of sensation, or of the senses were restored, and Rationalism progressed. It would be anticipating on what we have to say in another part, to enter here into any detail respecting the opinions of Locke on the notions of Power, of the Infinite, and of the respective rights of Reason and Faith. We shall merely state that we fully acquiesce in his views respecting the very relative notions that Man can acquire on those important points by the only means given him by nature, viz., Reason, aided by Sensation and Reflection. The work of Locke is a monument of times gone by, and requires to be read *cum grano salis*. But be it as it may respecting his errors, he has rendered sound religion good service by an early but unheeded warning of the rocks on which she was about to strike in attempting to sail on waters not sufficiently deep. A continued attention to what were termed rational and psychological proofs of the existence of God soon led men to suppose that the notion of God was a conception of the mind; and, strange to say, rational evidence of God's existence was adduced by creatures who could give no rational evidence of the principal phenomena with which they were surrounded.

Even when the system of Locke was carried far

beyond the limits traced by that great thinker, even when enhancing his remarks respecting the evident connection between the Intellect and the Body, a school arose that inculcated gross Materialism;—what has been the positive issue of all such systems? The result has been the same as in all physical research, in which relation of number and form corresponds to given motions, but by no means explains these motions. It has been the same as in all chemical affinity, in which the number and form of the molecular elements must be taken into consideration, and are indeed the only real basis of observation; and yet what explanation do they bestow respecting the quality of the substance? none. If the chemist alone were to be attended to, he would say that iron and arsenic were perfectly similar in their effects, and so on respecting many substances where the form and molecular quantities are the same. But when vital properties appear, when the four mysterious elementary substances, carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and azote, begin to come into play, especially in animated nature, the puzzle becomes more and more intricate, according to the greater appearance of simplification. The more nitrogen, the more animal life appears enhanced; and yet, what relation has been discovered between sensation and nitrogen? In such circumstances the metaphysician attempts to enter into explanations and gives you words. The materialist, who ought merely to own his ignorance, refuses to believe the metaphysician, but still gives his opinion, the futility of which finds ample testimony in the pages of Lucretius, and modern Collinses. The positive philosopher lets Voltaire, Rousseau, D'Alembert, Diderot, Bolingbroke, and modern consorts scribble; he thinks, and goes quietly to work marking down, according to given rules, which may be undoubtedly ameliorated, the real

relation between phenomena, and whilst he is thus occupied, the philologist brings to the heap the honey he has gathered in his close investigation of idioms and long lost characters. The geologist adds his deep observations on the nature of soils, and the direction of strata, and the sloping of mountains; and the great work progresses, slowly indeed, but still it moves. In short, all we have here to say of Materialism as a system can be summed up in a few words, for we intend to devote a few pages on the subject at a later period. Materialism, that merely points out the evident connection that exists between the organs and the play thereof; that, seeing the faculties weaken as the organs grow more feeble, then conceives the problem to be solved, richly deserves its name, for there is in such a judgment so great an absence of reflection, such a proof of ignorance, that we are certain that the time will come when no one will repeat such stuff. All is relation, and life is not known to man under absolute terms. Life, which can be defined, according to the most able biologists, a continual composition and decomposition, is only known to us under that law or relation. Why life in the vegetable world flourishes by absorbing carbon especially, whilst animal life progresses by means of combustion or an absorption of oxygen, is a question much easier put than answered. And yet Materialism must begin by answering that question in the lowest degrees of life, or rather, Materialism must first accomplish a feat far easier in appearance, and yet which will require perhaps centuries to accomplish—we mean, explain the connection that exists between the form and the qualities of unorganized matter. If Materialism really desires to effectuate something, it must go to work the right way, and Mankind will be benefited by the slightest advance which

shall be made in a forward direction. Sensationalism, as well as Materialism, must acknowledge a relative value in Ratiocination, as they aim also at establishing rational proof. Now we require nothing more than the admission of the relative value of Intelligence, and we own that we possess no notion of Life, either merely organic or animated, without the phenomenon being accompanied with certain fixed laws or relations. But a higher order of things unknown to Reason is presented thereunto by a special act, which is Revelation, and Reason, after due investigation, then admits of divine Faith or trust in the Almighty. The scene now changes; all positive philosophy serves as proof where it could not be admitted as a suggestion, and the real nature of human existence, which is decidedly *relative*, is no obstacle to the belief of another state of things entirely distinct, and only admitting of a relative existence of another kind. When the Sensationalist exclaims with Locke that “real existence is unknown to us as self-evident,” we readily admit the statement; for, according to Locke, “God is, is of real existence;” but if he repeats, with that thinker, “that the existence of a God every man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from his own existence,” such a proposition we deny, and are therefore more Sensationalist than Locke, because we can adduce good proof that the belief in God did not originate in man by means of considerations drawn from his “own existence.” And when the Materialist inquires if we can conceive Life without the conditions that Reason points out as constantly accompanying that phenomenon, we readily concur in the opinion, that Reason, by means of metaphysical conclusions, can by no means give us the certitude acquired by the proof of the Revelation of God as the Almighty. *Sensationalism*, then, considered as

the assertion of the rights of the Senses in human knowledge, and *Materialism*, considered as maintaining a fixed relation to exist between the physical and intellectual faculties, we deem to be unassailable, provided they go no farther, provided they do not attempt the same metaphysical flight that they will not hear of in others.

Therefore, although we allow the inadequacy of Locke to the greatness of the task he attempted, yet we admire his courage; we aver a progress to have been effected, and we maintain it not only to be consistent with Religion, but to constitute an essential step in the advance of Reason towards one of her most important aims, if not indeed the most important of all—that of constituting the ultimate basis of human endeavor towards attaining those Supreme heights pointed out to man by the pristine Revelation of the Almighty, and by His Revelation in Christ. Deprived of Reason, pristine Revelation becomes the wild flight of human conception termed symbolic religion and Mythology; deprived of Reason, the Mosaic inspiration is fettered in the law, and circumcision and sacrifice are deemed tantamount to Faith in the Almighty; deprived of Reason, the Word of God revealed in Christ, not as Man, but God,—Christianity lights the fagot, and ties her opponent to the stake, not merely as an opponent in doctrine, but as one possessed of devils, as one that practises the evil art, and the only motive alleged is the old irrational adage of the Asiatic and the Hebrew, *mactoub*, it is written. How came it that Warburton, who saw so well that written phonetic characters were primary graven images,—how came not Warburton to perceive that the *letter* was also a means of going astray, and one that, without *Reason* as a stay, might lead to the most disastrous conse-

quences? “What!” exclaim both atheist and religious fanatic; “what! you would admit of primary Revelation, of subsequent inspiration, and of a renewed Revelation of the Almighty in Christ, and yet you pretend to uphold the rights of Reason, without perceiving that by the very admission of such principles you completely nullify all the dictates of Reason on the one hand, and, on the other, indirectly accuse God, whom you maintain to be Almighty, of bestowing on Man, whom he created, a broken, rotten reed, instead of the sound staff his earthly journey requires?” “Point out,” we suppose them to say, “point out at least a rational ground, you the defender of Reason, on which you can rest at the same time such contradictory assertions as the denial of Reason and the assertion of her Rights, and this we summon you to do without entering into the metaphysical, commonplace considerations of human ignorance and weakness, considerations which you aver you scout and deride.” To such a forcible appeal we return a ready answer, in pointing out, first, to the *rational* evidence of the great event of Revelation, and, secondly, to the sense of the divine communication. Rational evidence, we own, can never rise above the level of human Reason, of which the highest point is, we think, intuitive belief in relative Existence, and in rational conclusions admitted on trust, or faith, neither of which constitute indeed a ground firm enough to allow the Mind or the intellectual phenomena to out-leap their limits. But the dogmatism of Reason, although totally inadequate for such an attempt, is perfectly adequate to the task of confirming or of denying, on evidence produced, the eventful fact of the Revelation of the Almighty. All that reason, or the universal accumulated experience of Mankind, can lay claim to, is merely the right of admitting or of denying that

Revelation. Is that Revelation confirmed, the mystery is solved by an appeal to the evident, incontestable meaning thereof. It announces to Man Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, for such are the corresponding feelings that the name of God Almighty awakens and enlightens. Now, it is with the Revelation alone that Reason has to deal, as with a fact. Is that fact established on rational evidence, Reason finds in the attributes of the Being revealed as the Almighty an answer to all the natural doubts that the sense of her own weakness gives rise to. Reason may then boldly exclaim: "These ways are not my ways; they are the ways of the Almighty. He has revealed himself as such, and in Him, as such, shall I confide." Divine Faith, or trust in the Almighty, thus becomes a natural consequence of the verdict Reason pronounces respecting Revelation, and is not the result of metaphysical reasonings on the nature of the Infinite and of the Absolute, in which Reason is made to outstep her limits, and comes at last to believe that the notion of the Almighty is a mere rational conception. Should the atheist rejoin, that we are opening an entrance to superstition and fanaticism, since Revelation once believed in and Inspiration admitted, Reason finds all her assertions continually gainsaid by a constant reference to evidences which she owns to be superior to her dictates, and before which she has no other alternative but submission and prostration. This observation might indeed prove a ground for hesitation if the sublimity of the aim pointed out to Man in the attributes of the Almighty did not effectually prevent them from ever being totally lost sight of. In them Reason finds a criterion when assailed by the wild clamors of superstition and fanaticism, and in them she possesses a test whereby to judge of inspiration and of

miracle. The knowledge of the Almighty, or divine Faith, does not do away with rational evidences of human weakness and errors.

Locke, in attempting to ascertain in a more definite manner than his predecessors the process followed spontaneously by the human mind for many thousand years in the attainment of knowledge, did not deny the truth of the propositions or maxims accumulated, but merely their pristine existence in the Mind. This Descartes had in a manner done before him when, attempting to doubt of every thing, he still found something that resisted all his endeavors to treat it as a mere conception—this was consciousness, or the intuitive belief in relative existence, in the existence of Self and not-Self. Nor did Locke deny that in some minds the gradual steps of Reason appeared to make way for a more rapid display of knowledge, as now in the transmission of intelligence we see electricity leave far behind the swiftest courier; he merely maintained that even then the conclusions were to be justified by Reason, according to a slower process. On the same grounds he proposed testing the certainty of general propositions *in toto*. He denied, it is true, that Man could easily acquire such certain knowledge of substances, of which “our knowledge of their qualities and properties goes,” he justly observes, “very seldom farther than our senses reach and inform us. Possibly inquisitive, observing men may, by strength of judgment, penetrate farther, and on probabilities taken from every observation, and hints well laid together, often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to them; but this is but guessing still; it amounts only to opinion, and has not that certainty which is requisite to knowledge . . . general certainty is never to be found but in our ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in

experiment, or observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge." These words of Locke, contained in the 4th book, have reference to the great and paramount difficulty of penetrating into the real nature of things, and it is in the same sense that Locke tells us that Reason fails when our ideas fail, since it neither does nor can extend itself farther than they do. This difficulty explains why Locke insists so little on the operations of the Mind respecting its own actions, in which, if our notions do not fail altogether, yet they are "obscure and imperfect," and "puzzle," he says, "our Reason. For, not having any perfect idea of the least extension of matter, nor of infinity, we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter, but having perfect, clear, and distinct ideas of number, our reason meets with none of those inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them. Thus, we, having but imperfect ideas of the *operations of our minds*, and of the beginning of motion or thought, how the mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet of the operation of God, run into great difficulties about free created agents, which Reason cannot well extricate itself out of it." And when the difficulty is referred to "wrong principles, and to the use of doubtful terms," all the rights of Reflection are adequately stated, and the cause of Mr. Locke's silence sufficiently explained. But it is especially "for want of intermediate ideas that reason is often at a stand." Here, barring the use of the term reason for reasoning, which has been so justly pointed out by Dugald Stewart, Cousin, Hamilton, &c., &c., Locke means "those intervening ideas which serve to show the agreement or disagreement of any other."

This he terms Sagacity, and remarks that in this “some men’s faculties far outgo others.” The first step consists in this comparison; the second is a judgment relating thereto; and then comes the advancing, the progressive process, which, finding a basis already confirmed, advances a step in affirming something different, but reposing partly on the preceding proposition, which then serves as a criterion of agreement or disagreement, and by which the advancing step was *suggested*. (Brown.) Whatever name may be applied to this most important step in *ratiocination*, Science can undoubtedly contribute to strengthen it, and it is here that the judicious reflections of a Stuart Mill, of a Whately, of a Whewell, &c., will prove of service, and further the advancement of learning, for the connection of ideas is far from being of the simple nature that we have just alluded to. Locke is very short on this most essential point. “But it is chiefly,” he tells us, “by the finding out those ideas that show the connection of distant ones, that our stock of knowledge is increased, and that useful arts and sciences are advanced.” He owns his ignorance on this subject, and leaving to others the care of advancing its study, he merely expresses great doubts as to the value of logic or the scholastic rules of arguing (syllogism) for its advancement. Syllogism or logic he quaintly compares to iron of which, instead of making instruments to till the ground, men make implements of warfare. The reflections of Mr. Locke, which follow, upon the important subject of logic or argumentation in form, consist mainly in the assertion that syllogism or argument has been fallaciously represented to be only right and conclusive when it contains at least one general proposition. “As if,” says Locke, “we could not reason and have knowledge about particulars; whereas, in truth, the

matter rightly considered, the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars. Every man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind, which are truly, every one of them, particular existences, and our knowledge and our reason about other things, is only as they correspond with those of our particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular ideas is the whole and utmost of all our knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in this, that the particular ideas, about which it is, are such, as more than the particular thing can correspond with, and be represented by." But the difficulty, we apprehend, is far from being solved by this latter remark of Locke. The true solution we conceive to be contained in the important and highly practical remark of Leibnitz, respecting the impossibility of expressing particular ideas, and even of naming individual things, otherwise than in general terms, i. e., by names which stand for other things. Now as all reasoning, even on the most particular subject, is carried on in words, at least when we attempt to pass our thoughts into the mind of others, the natural consequence is, that the idea which in the mind was particular becomes enveloped in general terms when it is expressed. No syllogism can, therefore, be without a general term, if the opinion of Leibnitz be true, as we believe it is. But it would carry us far beyond the limits of this work to pursue this subject, and we must refer the reader to the works of the above-mentioned authors, to whom we adjoin Hegel, in order to acquire the full particulars relating to the use and value of ratiocination or logic in the inductive and deductive sciences. The divergency that exists in the opinions of these authors, respecting the manner in

which the Mind carries on its operations in reasoning, has the practical advantage of clearly establishing the actual position of the question.

One most important point in Sensationalism, as represented by Locke, consists in the distinction laid down by that thinker between the operations of the mind on its own acts, and the operations of the mind on ideas of sensation and reflection. Locke, it is true, gives the name of "simple ideas" to both, but evidently if we take Thought to be the operation of mind, Locke admits the three kinds of notions admitted by Descartes: 1st, acts of Mind termed Memory, Attention, Judgment, &c., &c.; 2d, Thoughts or ideas of sensation; 3d, and Thoughts obtained by reflecting on our own ideas. These three are, however, only two in fact. 1st, Thoughts from within, and 2d, Thoughts from without. The states of Mind dependent on Mind alone and having no sort of resemblance with any thing beyond us, which constitute the first kind, are the innate ideas of Descartes, the elementary beliefs of Dugald Stewart, the primary beliefs of Reid, and constitute in part, if not altogether, the elementary forms of Thought or the *à priori* categories of Kant, as we shall see at a later period. These acts of Mind, these intellectual phenomena considered by the Mind "as objects," are then admitted by Locke to be pure acts of Intellect. It must not, therefore, be supposed that German philosophy, as it is termed, is any thing contrary to the metaphysical views of Locke: it is merely an attempt to elucidate those operations of the mind, which, as essential acts of the mind, (memory, imagination, attention, contemplation, judgment, knowledge, understanding, &c.,) exist as Thought of a peculiar nature, the obscurity of which is such as to preclude all reasoning. It is in order to obviate difficulties which may

arise in the minds of readers not accustomed to what is termed metaphysical inquiry, that we insist upon these particularities, for we are well aware that they will appear trivial to the erudite. This we do the more readily, because under the term "internal states of the Mind" they are apt to be confounded with the workings of Thought on notions that arise spontaneously, or of themselves, in the Mind.

Before we proceed to discuss briefly the opinions of MM. Hume and Reid, as a preface to what we have to say respecting those of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, there remains an objection of great weight that has been raised against Sensationalism and Materialism, on the grounds of subverting morality and religion, because these doctrines deny that absolute knowledge is given to Man by his own means. Now, as we maintain the compatibility of religion and science, on the ground of a source and nature distinct though coalescing, the one being an aim, the other the means of attaining it, every being considered as an intellectual agent, and every act the result of intelligence and will, it is requisite for us to explain ourselves in a clear and definite manner. For it is undeniable, that under the banners of free inquiry men have risen who have asserted that what was inconceivable was impossible, and who therefore deny, on such grounds, that Life can exist otherwise than we perceive it in our planet. The question must be stated in clear, definite terms. It would be idle, after so many centuries of useless dispute, to repeat what has been perpetually urged respecting the connection between the intellectual phenomena and the organs or body. The matter must be brought to close issue. Can we conceive Life as existing without the relations of composition and decomposition? Can we conceive animated Life

to exist without the inhalation of oxygen? Now as both states are perfectly inconceivable, the atheistic materialist triumphs, and the man who believes that a mathematical point can be possessed of properties the most opposite, denies that of which he is ignorant, on no better grounds than those on which he admits such a point to be endowed with such contradictory properties. As to the deistical materialist, who, resting his argument on the evidence of cause and effect, maintains that the notion of God was suggested thereby, we know not how, after taking up his ground on that belief termed natural theology, he can admit that the same value can be given to the notion of cause and effect, to the evidence of design, there where he only perceives the inconceivable. We believe the position of both to be far more irrational than that of one who, seeing good evidence for the existence of the Revelation of the Almighty, grounds his hopes on *divine faith*, fully admitting the inadequacy of human Reason beyond her limits. When once the clear evidence of that Revelation has shed its full light on our mind, Immortality is believed in on grounds almost rational, through faith, through trust in Him who announced Himself as Almighty. The believer in God revealed fearlessly admits the full value of the relations on which Life appears dependent in this world, but to him the inconceivable is not the impossible, for he knows of the Almighty revealed. Can the natural deist thus raise hopes on the wings of faith? Can his belief in a final or first cause perceived through the dim medium of cause and effect, and on the evidence of design,—can that belief attain to the conviction of divine Faith, of trust in the Almighty known through Revelation?

But the inconsistency of the religious man is still

more glaring when fully aware of the fallacy of Reason as well as of her weakness, when denying even that Reason can constitute the means appointed to fulfil on earth, as an instrument, the Almighty Will, he seeks to build on a rational motive a Faith that has no meaning if not grounded on a Being whose attributes (although of a nature that man comprehends in his dim notions of Power, and of Wisdom, and of Goodness) are announced as Supreme, and therefore beyond Reason. The materialist may deny perceiving any thing beyond the relations of matter, without which no living thing is known to exist on earth. This error proceeds, as already stated, from advancing a belief when all that he can infer is that he knows nothing about the matter; but when a Fénelon grounds the Infinite on the Finite, when a Clarke attempts to lay down a rational *à priori* argument for the existence of an immense and eternal Being, because Space and Time, he thinks, are only abstract or partial conceptions of an immensity and eternity which force themselves on our belief, and which, not being substances, must therefore, he says, be the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense and eternal, the inconsistency is the more dangerous.

It is in the field of metaphysical speculation, so subject to misconception and so open to error, that those who attempt to adduce what is termed rational proof of the existence of the Soul detached from the body, and of Spirits superior to humanity, give full career to their imagination. Even at the present day the Cartesian metaphysical definition of Mind, as the attribute of Spirit, goes a great way with many as proving the separate existence of the Soul. Malebranche, turning to account the discoveries of his time on the weight of the atmosphere and on the phenomenon of

Light, seeks to give some notion of another kind of Being in a manner independent of the laws of matter. And as new discoveries have been made, the various phenomena of Nature termed natural Powers have been usually pointed out as means of comparison. Now we are far from denying that the wonders of Nature do not prove design, or that certain peculiar characteristics of those substances that touch the borders where Gravitation ceases to obtain, are no proof that the energy of a substance, as we know of them, seems to increase in proportion as it is less subject to the law of gravity. We merely contend that these proofs are of no avail unless the Almighty be conceived as revealed in a peculiar manner, in a way quite distinct from what is termed the revelation of Reason. Otherwise, it is in vain, we believe, without such a basis, to expect any thing at all satisfactory to be adduced therefrom. But the evidence of the Revelation of the Almighty once ascertained, the phenomena of nature then become witnesses, and testify a truth which they could never have revealed. It is in this sense that we would point out the remarkable fact contained in those four substances wherein Life resides, and which have never yet been obtained in a solid form. This fact may, it is true, be doubted in regard to carbon, but it is authentic as to oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen. If carbon really exists in a state of purity as the diamond, at least art has never yet obtained it in that form. And even the diamond is no longer considered to be solely formed of carbon. These substances which stand on the last verge of the ponderable, and which separate can never be obtained in the solid state, are, if not the most wonderful of all known phenomena, at least the most wonderful of all pure substances subject to Gravitation, whilst at the same time their

weight counts the lowest in the scale, Carbon being excepted. We say nothing of those important phenomena termed Heat or Caloric, Light, Electricity, and still less of Gravitation, because all that is known of them is their effects; so that nothing more can be said about them save that we considered them the result of a peculiar impulsion; and therefore they have been likened to motion variously accelerated, because nothing else could give any notion of them. All such phenomena are therefore capable of being reduced to the idea of impulsion of power. "Is not that sufficient," exclaims the natural theologian, "Causation, design and purpose, power, what want we more?" We want a something unconditional, and you, the natural theologian, have only the conditional to propose. We want an Absolute grounded on a basis other than the unlimited, formed by the fanciful addition of the limited, and resulting from the impossibility Man finds to conceive a limit thereto. We want an Infinite in whom we can repose our trust, and not an Indefinite formed by fruitless additions of the finite. Is it not very unaccountable that religious men should seek for rational proofs in an order of things where all footing ceases for Reason to *reason* from. This fallacy, we believe, we shall render clearly evident when in the following pages we shall expose the sceptical views of Hume respecting causation, and those of modern positive philosophy. We shall see that both sceptic and positive philosopher are quite at a loss when they attempt to reason theoretically of things, of causation in particular, in an order of things where the same relations are not actual. They deny causation in that sphere, because no rational notion of power, no notion, distinct from action, can exist in the mind; so that in Theory, causation disappears, and there only remains an antecedent

and a consequence. "Without practical belief in causation, no social life," exclaims the sceptic Hume; "I trust to my own feelings, and not to reasoning in the clouds." And so says the positive philosopher, for the denial of causation is the denial of Science; Causation, without agent and patient, cannot be conceived as causation; we only perceive in theory antecedence and succession; the power, the agency, which is the act itself, is reduced to the mere mechanism of succession. Nor has it been better explained by admitting that the notion of causation was an independent, primary, intuitive feeling of the mind, for causation is the very life and soul of experience and of experiment. Causation, as power, "belongs only to agents," to use the words of Locke, who, clearly perceiving that all power related to action, reduced at once the question to the only two notions Man possesses of action, viz., Thought and Motion, of the principles of which (the beginnings) we have no idea either from Thought or Body, since our ideas reach not the "production of action, but merely the continuation." Indeed, no illation or inference whatsoever can exist without a concatenation of reasonings having clear reference to each other, a concatenation that in argument accounts for the conclusion, as in physical experiment the link of causation unites the effect with something that produced it; although in theory all that can be said of the matter is, that experience has taught us that such and such an antecedent was constantly followed by such and such an effect. Causation thus loses that which makes it, when it is considered in the abstract, and yet it is to a notion that does not exist when separated from experience, that metaphysical divines, and natural theologians equally metaphysical, point as a ground of Faith in the Almighty. As to the notion of Causation being an intuitive idea, or, as Locke terms

that of power, a simple idea, we can only say that if by the term "intuitive idea" be meant a "practical idea," then is the notion of causation intuitive. When will men come to perceive that it is the metaphysical or abstract notion of Causation that renders it null and void? Now the religious mind, assured by rational evidence of the truth of Revelation, does not attempt to separate from the act that which makes it what it is, and admitting, as a law or a fixed relation, what remains always open to proof and trial, he does not attempt to grasp at a shadow. Nor is the moral of the mystery lost on his mind because he is careful in his inquiries respecting it. Cautious investigation is the essence of free inquiry, for the power of God *revealed* as the Almighty never shines more resplendent than when the eye of Reason is surrounded by darkness. It is then, indeed, that the mystery of the Revelation becomes a ray of light, for was not God revealed as the Almighty.

But as the readers to whom this work is addressed may not be sufficiently acquainted with what are termed the ultimate laws of biology, and as many may be imbued with the principles of the school of Diderot, D'Alembert, Collins, De la Mettraye, Paine, Gibbon, Bolingbroke, &c., whilst others remain conscientiously attached to the opposite school, that believes in the value of philosophical demonstrations, either *à priori* or *à posteriori*, of the existence of God; we deem it our duty to add a few cursory observations on a subject already filling hundreds and thousands of volumes. It is, in fact, always the same subject—that of the connection between Matter and Spirit. The fallacies we conceive to be the same as those already related. It is the metaphysician whom we consider as the primary source of error. It is the metaphysician, who, main-

taining the existence of a vital power as a fact grounded on scientific investigation, opened an arena of discussion in which he was followed by the materialist. Both we consider as having carried on the fight blindfolded—the metaphysician always separating the essences from the things, and independent of the particles which were merely impelled by them. Thus we find Clarke proving the existence of Thought as a something distinct from Matter, on the ground that if it depended on the particles of matter, there would exist in the body as many thoughts as there were particles; which would be absurd. Collins, on the other hand, maintained that the totality was an aggregate of a multitude of minute qualities, each contributing thereto without constituting the sum total, as a globe is formed of particles that are not all round, and that, taken separately, do not form a globe, and the same with a Rose. Clarke then cries, “Victory!” because Collins owns that the aggregate or totality may differ in quality from the ultimate particles, therefore admitting an unknown quality to be the result of known qualities, thereby affirming the proposition of Clarke, viz., that Thought was distinct from Matter. We have attempted to resume, in the shortest space possible, the burden and issue of this well-known controversy, merely adding thereto, that such verbal controversy proved nothing beyond the ignorance of both adversaries respecting the real conditions or laws of Thought, considered as a phenomenon. It was only a display in which each champion flourished his arms without quitting his ground or moving a step. But, had Collins discovered the yet unknown conditions of organic life; had he, rising on that basis, proceeded to display those of animal organization, such as science may possibly acquire in some thousand years, he could then have

proved,—what? Nothing more than that under given forms and quantities, and certain relations with the surrounding medium, the substances termed carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen, in themselves all unknown mysteries, display another mystery, that of Thought. Clarke would then have been summoned to prove that such was not the case, and unless he proved that Thought existed under other known conditions, Collins would have been considered as having proved not what Thought was, but under what conditions Thought appears. In a word, he would have proved merely *how* Thought was there, but neither *why* it was there, nor in what it consisted. All reasonings on the subject conducted otherwise, are of no more value than those of Lucretius; they are perfect rhapsodies. But the man who would discover under what given conditions that mysterious principle, termed nitrogen, (the basis of all nourishment, and yet termed azote,) becomes from a mere lifeless substance a living principle or basis of life, would go a great way towards the solution of the problem human reason must one day solve, that of feeding the countless millions which will one day cover the surface of the earth, even where now the foot of man has never been impressed.

We fully admit that the vital principle cannot exist without sensibility. We admit, also, that sensibility in man is only known to exist under certain given conditions, and that without a brain we know of no human being. But as, on the other hand, we know that Life can exist without sensibility, and that sensibility and inference can exist without a brain or even any traces of a nervous system, we conceive ourselves justified in maintaining that even as Science stands, it cannot be said that Life, Sensibility, and Thought, are phenomena inherent to given forms of carbon, oxygen,

hydrogen, and nitrogen. If the nature of the human brain was the sole cause of the rational faculties of Man, how does it come to pass that we perceive in the instinctive acts of the lowest living creature proofs of design that are marvellous? And here, without going the lengths of the natural theologian (Lord Brougham) in considering such instances as suggestive of the Almighty, we deem them as proving that all the relations between the nervous system and intelligence observed in the higher orders of animated nature, are not sufficient to lay down such conditions as laws or fixed organic relations, without which intelligence cannot appear in animated beings. Either the instinct of the bee and of the ant is dependent or independent of the form of the nervous system. Now, we admit of the dependence, and we perceive, with surprise, that acts of intelligence are performed instinctively, in virtue of that dependence, that man cannot readily attain. Evidently, the low degree of the form is not in staid relation (we mean according to science) with the act or quality exhibited. If the anatomist could say, "Oh, they are animalcules in size and shape, but as to the nervous system, they are giants;" there would at least exist a staid relation between the nervous system and intelligent acts, showing deep design; but such is not the case: instincts proving deep design exist in beings that live without any nervous system at all; but life and sensibility are there, and the secret lies therein. When, therefore, the materialist repeats with Cabanis, that "the brain secretes Thought," it is, in fact, an avowal of ignorance; for, on the one hand, organs never secrete what is not to be found in the blood, or other fluids, (Secretion is not a new formation, it is a separation;) and, on the other, evident signs of Thought can be pointed out in living beings where no brain exists.

We must not, however, be considered as holding the doctrine of the independence of matter and mind. We merely remark, that organized life yet contains many deep mysteries that the form of the organs (meaning the molecular form) does not explain, and which appear connected with something of a higher order. But this once admitted, and deeming such an admission as incapable of suggesting the notion of the Almighty, but merely as a proof of that fact previously made known, we fully allow all rightful stress to be laid on the positive connection existing between the mind and the body. Evidently, the structure of the child, of the adult, of the female, and of the man, stand in joint relation with the peculiar characteristics of the mind. The physical state of the body exerts an undoubted influence on the mind, and the latter on the physical state of the body; and the effects of climate, of habits, and of regimen, are never to be overlooked. The brain had been considered as the seat of Intelligence many centuries before Cabanis announced that "Intelligence was a secretion of the brain," instead of merely admitting an unknown relation to exist between the organ and the Intellect. That the brain acts when we think, is surely a matter of fact; but whence thought proceeds is only known to Him who revealed His existence to man as the Almighty.

But it is when Materialism goes hand in hand with Metaphysics, that the strangest eccentricities are produced. It is thus that a well-known Italian physiologist, Buffalini, admitting, with Rolando, that attraction or gravitation, chemical affinity, electrical and magnetic affinities, heat or caloric, light, and such general phenomena in Nature, constitute so many powers from which vital power has never been separated, maintains that Life is therefore a mere quality of Matter, being

a mysterious combination of all the powers. He therefore considers himself justified, on such metaphysical grounds, in reducing vital power to a lower rank—to a mere peculiar organic disposition of Matter, whilst excitability or irritability would be a secondary result proceeding from Life. The following answer to this opinion of Buffalini, who considers life as a mere subservient phenomenon, has been made by a well-known physiologist: “The opinion of Buffalini respecting the vital powers may be variously combated. But, first of all, I shall merely ask, if, in natural history, facts are to be denied, because they cannot be explained? Buffalini cannot conceive how a single power such as Life can produce effects so various as sensation in the nerves, intelligence in the brain, contraction in the muscle; and, forsooth, because he don’t understand how it can take place, he thinks fit to deny the existence of any such power. But does Buffalini, who is so very difficult respecting the existence of a vital power, does he understand the part that either gravitation, or chemical affinity, or caloric, perform in the production, not of man, but of the smallest particle of unorganized matter? In natural history, things are to be explained when they can; but, in the meanwhile, we must admit that to exist which is clearly demonstrated, that is, in conformity with the senses and common judgment of a certain number of well organized men, enjoying good health and sound minds, and the facts thus attested are then admitted as matters of fact in scientific affairs. The objection of Buffalini against the existence of peculiar properties termed vital, are therefore groundless. As to considering them as mere mysterious combinations of attraction, affinity, electricity, heat, &c., has he any greater reason for naming these latter phenomena *primitive forces*, than others

have to consider Life as such? And, even admitting what he terms *mysterious combination* to be the real condition of Life, he certainly does not conceive it, since he calls it *mysterious*. Now, if Buffalini refuses to admit that which he cannot conceive, and if he cannot conceive how the physical powers above mentioned, decked out by him with the title of 'primitive forces,' can produce an animal, rather than a vegetable or a mineral, what right has he to consider them as the *primum mobile* or the primitive force in the formation of organized bodies? There must exist a *sufficient reason* why attraction, affinity, electricity, heat, &c.—in short, all such forces known, or yet to be known, produce sometimes an animal, sometimes a plant, and sometimes a stone, and why at times the one is produced sooner than the other. Something, therefore, exists beyond these forces, and a something that directs them. How, then, are they to be deemed more especially 'primitive forces?' In what is the production of a flint, or of any metal, or of any chemical metamorphosis, more primitive than that of an organized being? The so-named 'primitive forces' act evidently in the production of all bodies in nature, but they act in subserviency to some unknown influence, and the same unknown influence that watches over the myriads of reciprocal relations existing between the myriads of beings that people the universe, must be such as to be competent to the task of establishing the totality of such relations. It is that influence which constitutes the prime Cause, and not the primary forces of Buffalini; these are, in fact, secondary. The privilege with which he endows them is a mere supposition of his own imagination, and any one can frame such at will. What could prevent any thinker from considering, if he pleased, every kind, every class, every species, every

organized being, possessing individuality, as a peculiar cause which renders it what it is, forcing the general affinities to obey subservient, and rendering *suo proprio motû* that individual distinct from all others. In this manner any one might frame a hierarchy of unorganized and organized beings at will and pleasure. What better right has Buffalini, who admits that even on the supposition that his explanation is just, the composition of organic bodies still remains a 'mysterious combination,'—what right can he adduce for considering attraction and physical affinities as the primary or elementary principles of organization? Admitting, even, that by careful analysis the materials of all organic bodies, of all plants, and of all animals, could be reduced to the very same materials as those of inorganic bodies, what would that prove respecting the primary cause of the one or of the other? Even supposing the analysis to be perfect, (and that I cannot possibly grant,) it would merely prove that organized, as well as inorganic bodies, are composed of the same materials; but it would, by no means, prove that these materials are the primary either of the one or of the other.

“If the affinities of matter in general are the cause of the production of inorganic bodies, and if the same physical affinities produce all organized beings also, where, then, is to be found the cause of that positive difference so clearly existing between these beings in Nature? where are we to seek for the causes which determine the peculiar characteristic of each being? Such a question is absolutely unanswerable. It is, therefore, quite useless to look for the peculiar laws of each being beyond the conditions inherent to the being itself. And it is also lost time to seek for the *primum mobile* of the indi-

vidual acts of the various beings in common general phenomena, since in order to find this spring of action, we must always ascend to some final cause. Therefore, all we have to do, is to study the various phenomena evolved and displayed by the organized body, to compare them in order to discover the most general fact amongst them, the phenomenon to which the others are most closely linked, but always taking care not to go beyond that being, but to remain in it. As to the question whether irritability constitutes the most general phenomenon amongst the various phenomena of life, I do not pretend to determine; but it must be allowed that such is the opinion generally admitted, and that it constitutes amongst them the most general fact. To distort it, as did Brown, or to reject it with Buffalini, would be acting against the interest of sound physiology." (*Broussais, Examen des doctrines phys.* vol. 2, p. 481 *et seq.*)

We have purposely quoted an authority whose well-known materialistic opinion cannot render him suspicious in the eyes of the many Buffalini of Great Britain that deny plain evidence on the ground of their not conceiving it. They are right to demand good evidence, but are they right in rejecting it if produced because they cannot conceive it? We believe that Broussais carried out his principle to greater lengths than Reason warranted, even in the peculiar application of his doctrine to the cure of disease, since he absolutely rejected all appeal to any thing in the human economy beyond the mere organ. This was a serious error, it is universally admitted, and is scarcely to be conciliated with the high encomium that M. Auguste Comte bestows on Broussais. Even admitting that the organs are to be attended to before the general system, yet it is allowed on all sides that no mistake must be

committed, and that the organ diseased must be pointed out. Now Broussais appears to have failed in this respect, bestowing undue attention on an organ, the stomach, because that organ showed the greatest appearance of disease, whilst in reality others were the seat of disorder. Be it as it may on that score, it is not surprising that a physician should attend particularly to the phenomenon of irritability in organized bodies, and more especially in the human frame. This form of motion was to Broussais of paramount importance, whilst a mind more devoted to natural history, such as that of a Blainville, attends to phenomena on which the existence of the organized being depends. Haller and Broussais had Man in view; Blainville, the organized being alone. Haller, therefore, points out more particularly to irritability; Blainville, to the acts of composition and decomposition. Again, although the vital phenomena are of a most peculiar kind, and appear, as such, to constitute a continual struggle with the forces termed physical and chemical, yet as organized bodies contain physical substances, and as chemical phenomena are carried on side by side with the vital, the matter cannot be dismissed in such a summary way. We have witnessed Liebig marvelling over a leaf, in which, although elementary particles appear in closest contact, yet no molecular affinity or chemical action takes place, because in that leaf life resided, and evidently counteracted or effectually prevented what would otherwise have occurred. Still, as in organized bodies the constituent parts are not disposed at hazard, although they do not present the same constant regularity that we find in mechanical or physical phenomena, it is, therefore, well known that physical laws are not applicable in many circumstances that are brought to pass under the influence either of chemical

affinity, or of vital property. A very slight knowledge of chemistry is required to know that, when a chemical effect has taken place, the properties of the substance become quite different from those of the elementary parts thereof. Thus the elements of water are oxygen and hydrogen, which are very different from the fluid that the chemical affinity has caused to appear. Nor can the properties of the new body be measured by calculating the chemical forces already known of the elementary parts; no more, indeed, than the physiologist can judge of the vital properties of a muscle by the known properties of the carbon, the oxygen, the hydrogen, and the nitrogen that the analysis of the muscle shows to be in it. But yet the ingenuity of that deep thinker and great chemist, Liebig, has hit upon a means of throwing some light on this difficult subject. But it must not be supposed that it is brought about by any metaphysical notion. Far from being so, the attempt is grounded on the well-known relations that exist in chemistry between bodies termed isomorphic or taking the same form. Here the physical form and the chemical properties are in constant relation (although not the action of the substance on the human frame.) In some of these isomorphic combinations the relations that exist between the chemical properties and the physical are constant, so that confidence can be had in the result. Now, whenever such fixed and constant results can be pointed out in any of the many changes that occur in organized bodies, this gives a means of foretelling what will come to pass in other phenomena where the same constancy is remarked in that one point. Thus the quantity of heat required to make water boil under the usual weight of the atmosphere is a means of judging of that weight, since when less heat is required it is a proof that the atmospheric

pressure is less. Now the constant relation that exists between the usual weight of the atmosphere and the boiling point of various liquids, has been found by Liebig to take place in regular proportions, which indicate clearly the molecular state of the liquid heated. This constant relation is, then, a means of judging of the more intimate constitution of these fluids, since if No. 2 requires a third more heat than No. 1, and No. 3 four times the quantity of that heat, always keeping the same proportions, we can, by inference, judge of the molecular state of other fluids having different properties, but which present the same proportions in the differences of the heat required to attain the boiling point. This fact respecting the inferences that can be drawn as to the molecular structure of fluids by means of the proportional quantity of heat employed, has been applied with equal success to metals, and it has been found that a constant relation exists between the heat required to smelt a metal and the weight thereof. It is by means of this kind that we can hope to penetrate into many mysteries of organized being, and that some light may one day dawn on the positive relations that exist between the physical, the chemical, and the vital phenomena. All this may appear mechanical, but for the moment we decline proceeding.

Modern *Scepticism* must now engage our attention. Nothing, we believe, is more worthy of attention than the strange contrast that mankind presents to the observer, in the readiness with which all opinion somewhat new is opposed by "wholesome prejudice," and in the impatience with which men support the slightest opposition, not only to their speculations grounded on broad, rational bases, but even to their most indifferent opinions. Tenacity of opinion, and scepticism, are branches of the same stock. Belief is a necessity, a

want of the human mind, and when a belief has taken root, mankind does not patiently submit even to its value being contested, much less to allowing it to be drawn out. The scepticism of others is intolerable, and yet doubt constitutes a feeling so akin to belief, that it may be said to be not merely a partial acquiescence, (since it is not a denial,) but in reality a belief in some opposite doctrine. This peculiar nature of Doubt, we find beautifully described by Lord Bacon, in his work entitled, "The Characters of a believing Christian in Paradoxes and seeming Contradictions," and especially in the following passage: "The Christian is sometimes so troubled, that he thinks nothing to be true in religion, yet if he did think so, he could not be at all troubled." This passage, which has incurred such violent reprehension from the pen of M. de Maistre, who did not understand it, since he translates it in a manner which gives to the last phrase another meaning; for it would run thus: "Yet if he thinks so, it does not trouble him," (*Le chretien est parfois si troublé qu'il pense qu'il n'y a rien de vrai dans la religion, cependant s'il a cette pensée il n'en est point troublé.*—*Trans. of M. de Maistre*;)—this passage, far from maintaining that "doubt" does not occasion any trouble to the Christian, has quite the opposite meaning. Indeed, it positively points to that trouble, which, says Lord Bacon, would not be the case if the Christian really disbelieved. It is on the faith of this erroneous interpretation of Lord Bacon's phrase, that M. de Maistre indulges in violent abuse against that thinker, and against all the Reformation. Doubt or Scepticism, in short, is not Disbelief; it is Distrust. Even total scepticism is not disbelief, for disbelief cannot be general. Distrust, or doubt, is one of those feelings which arise naturally in the mind, on account of people's im-

patience, when opinions different from their own come to cross them. And experience proving how common is Error, doubt thus becomes, in all circumstances of life, a means of safety.

In ancient time, as in modern, the uncertainty of knowledge engendered schools of scepticism, of which the most noted for the exaggeration of its doctrines was that of Pyrrhon, who considered every thing as uncertain, and therefore maintained a profession of indifference. This indifference, which he carried on many occasions to very great lengths, though generally at others' expense, (as was the case when he left his master Anaxagoras to flounder in a ditch,) often gave rise to ridiculous circumstances, that greatly amused the citizens of Elide. Mr. Hume remarks, however, that the natural disposition of man to act up to the feelings of nature is so great, that Pyrrhon, one day, so far forgot his own doctrines, as to pursue, cane in hand and in violent anger, on the market-place, his cook, who had allowed some viands to burn. Scepticism, as a doctrine of indifference, is the lie given, not to dogmatism, but to the most natural feelings of human nature; and although it is merely distrust, yet when it denies the distinction of good and evil, it cannot be too severely reprobated, or its fallacy too clearly pointed out. It is a canker equally fatal to friend and foe. Indeed, distrust has been considered by many practical philosophers, as far more painful a feeling, and of a character far more debasing, when adopted as a general doctrine, than credulity. Scepticism or distrust is, then, a sentiment not only natural in a certain measure to man, but it is one that the commerce of the world tends to increase. It should not, therefore, be a cause of surprise, to find in Rationalism a school of *Scepticism*, constituted in direct opposition to any thing

like Dogmatism. And in spite of the impatience that scepticism may occasion, we own that modern scepticism has had the great advantage, if not of founding a doctrine, at least of clearly setting forth the real foundations and positive value of each. The two modern Sceptics, whose labors have earned them dearly paid fame and honor, are Bayle and Hume. The first left no stone unturned, that could avail in pointing out the weak sides of every doctrine in all the branches of human knowledge. And this spirit of scepticism was carried on with such wit and learning as to elicit expressions of admiration even from Warburton, his worthy antagonist. Bayle proves that nothing certain had been the issue of all intellectual efforts, but it would be a weary and ungrateful task to collect from his voluminous writings any positive doctrine. Besides, as he himself did not attempt to do so, but merely remained content to wither all certitude on every subject on which he fixed his penetrating glance, such a summary would bear a mere negative character. Not so Hume. His doctrine of Scepticism is clear and definite, and the difference between the two sceptics has been stated by Sir James Mackintosh to be, that Bayle aimed at proving that nothing certain had been attained, whilst the doctrine of Hume was, that we never can reach any thing certain. We have already stated our motives for maintaining that, respecting the basis of Religion, both thinkers were of opinion that human reason was insufficient to the task. However, as the doctrines of Mr. Hume constitute a starting-point, and as Rationalism here takes a turn, where it is important that the reader, if uninitiated in the philosophical wranglings of modern times, should not lose sight of the connecting link, we shall attempt to illustrate

clearly the position of Mr. Hume in relation to his predecessors, and to his immediate successors.

In what, then, consists this relation with respect to that firm principle of certainty on which Descartes rested the whole edifice of human knowledge,—we mean Self-consciousness? In what manner does Scepticism deal with that first principle? How does the *cogito, ergo sum*, fare with Mr. Hume? He admits the first proposition, *I think*, but denies the consequence, “therefore I exist” (I am.) According to Hume, all that follows is, that we *believe* it to be so, because we are conscious of it. It is as if he replaced the “*ergo sum*” by an *ergo credo*. And, in order to prove that this is no imaginary conclusion of our own, we beg leave to quote the following passage of Dr. Reid: “Mr. Hume hath adopted Bishop Berkeley’s arguments against the existence of Matter, and thinks them unanswerable. We may observe, that Mr. Hume, though in general he declares in favor of universal scepticism, and therefore may seem to have no first principles at all, yet, with Descartes, he always acknowledges the reality of those thoughts and operations of mind of which we are conscious. So that he yields the antecedent of Descartes’s enthymeme, ‘*cogito,*’ but denies the conclusion, ‘*ergo sum;*’ the mind being, according to Mr. Hume, ‘nothing but that train of impressions and ideas of which we are conscious.’” It is this opinion of Hume that we have summed up by saying that, according to that thinker, the well-known proposition of Descartes ought to stand thus—I think, therefore I *believe*. Mr. Hume, in fact, reduces all the certainty of human knowledge to mere feeling. All knowledge with him is merely a feeling of “belief.” Morality is a mere feeling, and Power or Causation a mere feeling of succession. But it is upon the *sceptic* belief of Mr. Hume that we shall

principally insist, because that doctrine of his has been most strangely warped into forms that Mr. Hume evidently never intended it should bear, since, strange to say, Mr. Hume has almost been represented as a *pious* believer on account of this sceptic admission of "belief" as a feeling of the human intellect, or rather of all animated nature. Now, what has the mere feeling of "belief," to which Mr. Hume alludes, to do with divine faith? It is merely the similarity of the sensation or feeling in the human mind, that bears a name which has been used more especially in things relating to relation; it is, we say, that similarity that caused, we apprehend, this strange mistake. The only inference to be drawn from Mr. Hume's theory of belief, even admitting that he deemed the existence of such a feeling of belief to be tantamount to the admission of the truth of the belief, would be, that one of the most consistent sceptics in modern time has admitted that the feeling of "belief" was of high import in all matter of knowledge; that this feeling was to be taken into special consideration amongst the various operations of the mind. Nothing more. And yet quite another meaning is given to his words. Reason and Faith are said to be coeval with the nature of man, and as designed to dwell together in his heart. Yes, the feeling, the natural feeling of belief in others, or Faith, is coeval with Reason; but not *divine Faith*, not Faith in the Almighty. *That* faith we got by Revelation. Therefore, when we hear it said that it is impossible to exercise reason without exercising faith, we grant the proposition; but when philosophers admit that *faith* is a first principle, a something that assures us of a thing, because we know it to be true, and trust in that inward conviction, they mean thereby an act of the mind, and nothing more. Thus, when we read that

“the belief of the truth of Newton’s system of the world, when received as the generality of men receive it,—without being able to follow the steps by which the great geometer proves his conclusions,—may be represented rather as an act of Faith than an act of Reason; as much so as in the belief in the truth of Christianity, founded on its historic and other evidences,” (Reason and Faith; their claims and conflicts. Edin. Review, Oct. 1849,) we deny the proposition, if it be meant that there does not exist a something peculiar, to which human Faith may be reconciled, which peculiar something, then, bestows on human Faith a particular character, rendering it *divine faith*. In Christianity, we have divine faith or belief in God as a basis, and this is expressed by the term *Faith*, meaning divine faith,—and we have human testimony, in which we place also Faith; but this latter Faith, or Christian Faith, is of a more rational character than the first or faith in God, which is the basis, we apprehend, of Christianity, for in Christ we see God. Now, it is true that Scepticism tells us that, boast of reason as you may, all that you think on those points is matter of opinion or is matter of faith; but this we maintain to have reference to a feeling purely human.

In the present work we shall therefore attend more especially to that doctrine of Mr. Hume in which “custom” or “habit” is considered as causing certain feelings, termed by that thinker “beliefs,” which constitute, in his opinion, the upshot of all we know of the matter. But it must not be forgotten that Mr. Hume still plays the part of a sceptic, even when he tells us of “belief” as being forced on the mind by nature. Therefore, when Reid and Kant attempt to assail Mr. Hume’s position, by appealing either to the innate beliefs of “common sense” or to the “elementary forms

of pure reason," the similitude is merely apparent, for they appeal to these beliefs as to criterions, or marks of "Truth," whilst Mr. Hume does not consider "belief" to impress on any feeling the stamp of Truth. The suspicion entertained by Mr. Hume with regard to the principles of philosophers upon all subjects, and his "greater inclination to dispute than to assent to their conclusions," although, as he tells us, of long standing, did not find vent in idle declamation. He plunged at once into the deepest waters of philosophy, in deeming it a subject worthy of curiosity "to inquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory." That Mr. Hume did not exaggerate the importance of this inquiry, is very evident from the impression his views occasioned in the philosophical world, and the curiosity they excited. This curiosity he deemed to be useful to the cause of science, "by destroying that implicit Faith which is the bane of all reasoning and free inquiry." The nature of the evidence which assures us of matter of fact and of real existence, is, according to Mr. Hume, that of the relation of cause and effect; which relation, he maintains, cannot be attained in any instance by reasonings *à priori*, but arise entirely from experience, which points out that such and such peculiar objects are constantly conjoined; for "no object," says that eminent thinker, "ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the sense, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact. The same truth obtains with regard to events which have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to

the whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of objects without any secret structure of parts.

“We are apt to imagine, that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason without experience. We fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certitude concerning it. Such is the influence of *custom*, that where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree. Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect which will result from it, without consulting past observation, after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. In a word, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not therefore be discovered in the cause, and the first conception of it *à priori*, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary, since there are always many other effects which to reason must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and ex-

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perience. No philosopher, who is rational and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any rational operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power which produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles productive of natural phenomena to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery, nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and inquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse,—these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall always discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if by accurate inquiry and reasoning we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer; as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us, at every turn, in spite of our endeavors to elude or avoid it. Nor is geometry, when taken in to the assistance of natural philosophy, ever able to remedy this defect, or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the supposition, that certain laws are established by nature in her operations; and abstract reasonings are employed,

either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws, or to determine their influence in particular instances, where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity. Thus it is a law of motion, discovered by experience, that the momentum, or force of any body in motion, is in the compound ratio or proportion of its solid contents and its velocity; and consequently, that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle, or raise the greatest weight, if by any contrivance or machinery we can increase the velocity of that force, so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist. Geometry assists us in the application of this law, by giving us the just dimensions of all the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine; but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience; and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it.

“When we reason *à priori*, and consider any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object, such as its effect; much less show us the inseparable and inviolable connection between them. A man must be very sagacious who could discover by reasoning, that crystal is the effect of heat, and ice of cold, without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities. Thus each solution in philosophy still gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther inquiries. When it is asked, *What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact?* the proper answer seems to be, That they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, *What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?* this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult

solution and explication, to which question I shall only pretend to give here a negative answer. I say, then, that even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from experience are *not* founded on reasoning or any process of the understanding. Nature only affords us the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects, but conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of these objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the color, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of the human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others,—of this we cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects similar to those which we have experienced will follow from them. If a body of like color and consistence with that bread which we have formerly eaten, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee with certainty like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature. As to past *Experience*, it can be allowed to give *direct* and

certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time which fell under its cognizance. But why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which, for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread which I formerly ate nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers. But does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with the like secret powers? The consequence seems no-wise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same. *I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee that other objects which are in appearance similar, will be attended with similar effects.* I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connection between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is I confess passes my comprehension . . . Should it be said that from a number of uniform experiments we *infer* a connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different terms. The question still occurs, On what process of argument is this *inference*

founded? where is the medium, the interposing ideas which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the sensible qualities of bread appear not of themselves to have any connection with the secret powers of nourishment and support; for, otherwise, we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities, without the aid of experience, contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact.

“Here, then, is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience? It shows us only a number of uniform effects resulting from certain objects, and teaches us that those particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces. Any new object endowed with similar sensible qualities being produced, we expect similar powers and forces, and look for a like effect. From a body of like color and consistence with bread, we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or progress of the mind which wants to be explained. When a man says, *I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities, conjoined with such secret powers,* and when he says, *Similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers,* he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions, in any respect, the same. You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other, but you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative. Of what nature is it, then? To say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of

nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that for the future it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with respect to some objects: why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument, secures you against this supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied on the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference."

In this manner does Mr. Hume present those objections and difficulties which have ever since so deeply occupied the schools of philosophy. And without claiming for that thinker an exclusive right to the views he so ably exposes, we cannot withhold our tribute of deep admiration at the clear and distinct manner in which he executed so arduous a task. The question proposed by Hume still continues to attract the fixed and ardent gaze of philosophy: *What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?* and this question will long continue to occupy the human mind. But to pursue our investigation of Mr. Hume's senti-

ments, we must follow up his argumentation, and present the *sceptical solution* he proposes.

“I must confess,” exclaims Mr. Hume, after expressing the small hopes he entertained of obtaining a solution to the difficulty, “I must confess, that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance, who concludes because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that, therefore, it does not really exist. I must also confess, that though all the learned for several ages should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still perhaps be rash to conclude positively, that the subject must therefore pass all human comprehension. Even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the present subject, there are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake.

“It is certain, that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay, infants—nay, even brute beasts, improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle, but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument, nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your inquiry, since you confess that it

is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment ; or if, after reflection, you produce an intricate or profound argument, you in a manner give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are to appearance similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar, since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle."

"SCEPTICAL SOLUTION OF THESE DOUBTS."

In the section bearing the above title, which therefore clearly tells us that the solution is "sceptical" and open to all doubt, Mr. Hume, notwithstanding that prefatory notice, expresses himself in a manner that has caused him to be considered by many, and by Dr. Brown in particular, as renouncing Scepticism in favor of "common sense," or an "instinctive belief." But it is not merely with a view to point out with the greatest precision the real opinion of Mr. Hume, that we pursue our quotations ; it is because the bent of philosophical research having been ever since in that direction, and the doctrine of "elementary beliefs" having ever since reigned paramount in the schools, it is necessary before proceeding farther, that the starting-point should be clearly elucidated. "We need not fear," says Mr. Hume, "that the sceptical philosophy, while it endeavors to limit our inquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action

as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude, that in all reasoning there is a step taken by the mind, which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding, there is no danger that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority, and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same. What that principle is may well be worth the pains of inquiry.

“Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world, he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers by which all natural operations are performed never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event in one instance precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, and the other the effect. The conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other; in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of any thing beyond what was immediately present to his memory or senses. Suppose, again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived so long in the world as to have observed similar objects or

events to be constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of the experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other; nor is it by any process of reasoning he is engaged to draw this inference, but still he finds himself determined to draw it, and though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion. This principle is *Custom or Habit*. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our investigations no farther, nor pretend to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from experience. And it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we assert that, after the constant conjunction of two objects,—heat and flame, for instance, weight and solidity,—we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty, why we draw from a thousand instances an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance that is in no respect different from them. Reason is incapable of such variation. The conclusions which it draws from considering one circle, are the same which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the uni-

verse. All inferences from experience are then effects of custom, not of reasoning.

“Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation. In a word, if we proceed not upon some fact present to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any real existence. If I ask why you believe any particular matter of fact which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner *in infinitum*, you must at last terminate in some fact which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.

“What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object; or, in other words, having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, flame

and heat, snow and cold, have always been conjoined together ; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to *believe* that such a quality does exist and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits ; or hatred when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent. In most questions we can never make a single step farther ; and in all questions we must terminate here at last, after our most restless and curious inquiries. But still our curiosity will be pardonable, perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to still farther researches, and make us examine more accurately the nature of this *belief*, and of the *customary conjunction* whence it is derived. The imagination of man ever free, yet cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, but it possesses unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas in all the varieties of fiction and vision. It can feign a train of events with all the appearance of reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint them out to itself with every circumstance that belongs to any historical fact which it believes with the greatest certainty. Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a fiction and belief ? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea which is annexed to such a conception as commands our assent, and which is wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could volun-

tarily annex this particular idea to any fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases, contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse ; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed. The difference, therefore, between *fiction* and *belief* lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be demanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments, and must rise from the particular situation in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object which is usually conjoined to it ; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief. Were we to attempt a definition of this sentiment we should perhaps find it a very difficult, if not an impossible task ; in the same manner as if we should endeavor to define the feeling of cold, or passion of anger, to a creature who never had any experience of these sentiments. Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling, and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term, because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it. . . . As it is impossible that the faculty of the imagination can ever of itself, reach belief, it is evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the *manner* of their conception, and in their *feeling* to the mind. I confess that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. Its true and proper name is immediately un-

derstood in common life. And in philosophy we can go no farther than assert, that *belief* is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination, enforces them in the mind, and renders them the governing principle of our actions. The sentiment of belief is, then, nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and this *manner* of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses: I believe that it will not be difficult, upon these suppositions, to find other operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these phenomena to principles still more general. Nature has established connections among particular ideas, and one idea no sooner occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of connection or association we have reduced to three, namely, *Resemblance*, *Contiguity*, and *Causation*, which are the only bonds that unite our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of reflection or discourse which, in a greater or less degree, takes place among all mankind. Now here arises a question, on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend. Does it happen in all these relations, that when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a stronger and steadier conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain? This seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original (resemblance). The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an inquiry or discourse

concerning the others (contiguity); and if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it (cause and effect). Contrast or Contrariety is also a connection among ideas, but may perhaps be considered as a mixture of *Causation* and *Resemblance*. Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the other; i. e., the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence.

“In such phenomena, the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed, without which the relation could have no effect. The influence of the picture of a friend supposes, that we believe our friend to have once existed. Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unless we *believe* that it really exists. Now, I assert that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the transition of thought and vivacity here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of thought, from the cause to the effect, proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And it at first begins from an object present to the senses. When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of pain and wound strike me more strongly, than when a glass of wine is presented to me, even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception, except only a present object, and a customary transition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact

and existence; and it is a satisfaction to find some analogies by which it may be explained. The transition from a present object does, in all cases, give strength and solidity to the related idea. Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas. Custom is that principle by which this correspondence has been effected, so necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object instantly excited the idea of those objects commonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses, and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers either to the producing of good or avoiding of evil. I shall add, that as this operation of the mind by which we infer like effects from like causes, and *vice versâ*, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations, appears not in any degree during the first years of infancy, and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the labored deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves by which they are actuated, so she has implanted in us an instinct which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she

has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends."

This latter paraphrase of Mr. Hume we beg our readers who are not initiated in the mysteries of German philosophy, to bear in mind. The latter philosophy we shall see aiming at illustrating and fully showing forth those instinctive forms of the mind which Mr. Hume seems here to have had in view. We shall now continue to develop the views of that thinker with regard to "belief," considered as an instinctive feeling of the mind, and naturally directed in particular directions. We must remind the reader that the bent of all these efforts of Mr. Hume to fully establish an authority based on the natural beliefs, is, in fact, no other than to use it as a battering ram against the decisions of Reason. The dogmatism of the sceptic is merely assumed in order to oppose the dogmatism of natural belief to that of rational belief, and thus overthrow the whole fabric. But although he has succeeded in establishing the positive value of "belief" as a feeling of the mind, and the natural tendency of Thought to believe according to experience on all occasions, insomuch as the mind only believes what it conceives, yet we shall see that rational induction and deduction remain unshaken. This he admits in the following words: "Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact, it must be acknowledged that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. Reasoning according to experience, one who in our climate should expect better weather in June than in December, would reason justly, but it is certain he may happen in the event to find himself mistaken. However, in such a case, he

would have no cause to complain of experience, because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty by that contrariety of events which we may learn from *a diligent observation*. A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases he proceeds with more caution, and even when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence may not exceed what we properly call *probability*. All probability supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments with only one that is contradictory reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future in all our inferences, where the past has been regular and uniform we expect the event with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition. But where different effects have been found to follow from causes which are to appearance exactly similar, all these various effects must concur to the mind in transferring the past to the future, and in determining the probability of the event. And it seems evident that when we transfer the past to the future, in order to determine the effect which will result from any cause, we transfer all the different events in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past, and conceive one to have existed a hundred times, for instance, another ten times, and another once. As a greater number of

views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget that sentiment which we call *belief*, and give its object the preference above the contrary event, which is not supported by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future."

Extending his views concerning belief to the actions of the brute creation, Mr. Hume considers the phenomena exhibited by animals as strongly corroborative of his theory. "It seems evident that animals, as well as men, learn many things from experience, and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned by long observation to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease and pleasure. A horse that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles, nor are the conjectures which he forms on this occasion founded in any thing but his observation and experience.

"This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of action, the most contrary to their natural

instincts and propensities. Is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience which makes him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?

“In all these cases we may observe, that the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects.

“Again, it is impossible that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he concludes that like events must follow like objects, and that the course of nature will be always regular in its operations. For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings; since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning; neither are children; neither are the generality of mankind in their ordinary actions and conclusions; neither are philosophers themselves, who in all the active parts of life, are in the main the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. Nature must have provided some other principle, of more ready and more general use and application, nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life as that of inferring effects from causes be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning

and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to man, it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted without any exception or reserve. It is custom alone which engages animals, from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one to conceive the other, in that particular manner which we term *belief*. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive beings which fall under our notice and observation.

“But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it which they derive from the original hand of nature, which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions, and in which they improve little or nothing by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate *Instincts*, and are so apt to admire, as something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our wonder will perhaps cease or diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning itself which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves, and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparison of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches man to avoid the fire; as much as that which teaches a bird, with such exact-

ness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery.”

Should these quotations from Mr. Hume appear prolix, we must again remark, that we write for the uninitiated in the discussions that have arisen with regard to mental physiology. Now, it is perfectly optional not to enter upon such a matter, but the subject of modern philosophy once broached, the plain, positive connection of the doctrines which lead the one to the other, must be clearly stated, so that the mark may be distinctly perceived, by which the tenets of the Scotch and German schools of philosophy unite with those of Mr. Hume and his predecessors. That Mr. Hume may have gathered widely we do not gainsay, it was not only a right, it was a duty. He was evidently led to adopt the views he pleaded, from deep and profound contemplation, united with much reading. His classification of ideas according to Resemblance, Contiguity, Causation, and Contrariety, being, therefore, taken from the great book in which Aristotle studied, the book of Nature, it is not surprising that it should bear a close resemblance to that of the Stagyrte mentioned by Dr. Beattie, Mr. Dugald Stewart, and Thomas Brown. The passage quoted from Aristotle is explanatory of the process by which, in voluntary reminiscence, we endeavor to discover the idea of which we are in search. We are said *to hunt for* it among other ideas, *either of objects existing at present, or at some former time; and from their resemblance, contrariety, and contiguity.*

The coincidence of this arrangement with that of Mr. Hume, bestows on the opinion of the latter a real value, that of arising, as it were, from the nature of things, since there is no reason to suppose the modern philosopher to have been at all acquainted with a classification that had at so great a distance of time pre-

ceded his own. But we believe that it is not the same with regard to the doctrine of "belief," as stated by Mr. Hume. Here the coincidence of the views of Hume with those of Bishop Butler on the same point is remarkable, and as the "Analogy" of the divine only anticipated a few years the disquisitions of the sceptic, it is probable that Mr. Hume aimed at striking a blow at a doctrine obnoxious to him by admitting the belief in order the more certainly to educe scepticism therefrom. The words of Butler are to the following effect: "When we determine a thing to be probably true, when we suppose that an event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some other event which we have observed has come to pass. And this observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction that such an event has or will come to pass, according as the observation is, that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of time or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the belief, that a child if it live twenty years will grow up to the stature and strength of a man; that food will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a certain number of days, be its certain destruction. So, likewise, the rule and measure of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits, our expectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances, and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles,—all these rely upon our having observed the like, either with respect to ourselves or to others;" and again, "As in the scheme of the natural world no ends appear to be accomplished without means, so we find that means very undesirable often conduce to bring about ends in such a measure

desirable as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. And in cases where such means are conducive to such ends, it is not reason, but experience which shows us that they are thus conducive." Probably in both sceptic and divine there may be traced an evident connection between their views of belief occasioned by experience and thence transferred to other matters which do not at first sight appear connected with the Leibnitzian doctrines of "pre-established harmony," and that of "sufficient reason."

Nothing, therefore, can be reproached to the matters of fact presented by Mr. Hume, since they constituted not only natural truths, but such as were admitted as orthodox. And yet upon this basis he finds means to undermine the value of all rational conclusions. This he effectuates by opposing one to the other our natural beliefs and our rational ones. When he admits "belief" to constitute a more *forcible* degree of feeling than fiction, when he insists upon the many minute circumstances which are required in order that "belief should be established in the mind, since," says Hume, "we believe, because we cannot do otherwise," this is to be considered only as a "sceptical solution" of the difficulty. And yet the earnestness of his expressions has sometimes induced Reid to quote them as bestowing real value on his (Reid's) doctrine of "common sense," as opposed to the ideas of philosophers. "Mr. Hume," says Reid, "saw very clearly the consequences of the ideal theory of Bishop Berkeley, and adopted them in his speculative moments, but he *candidly* acknowledges, that in the common business of life he found himself under the necessity of believing with the vulgar." (Reid. Essay VI. chap. 3.) And Dr. Reid was well aware of the purport of Hume's disquisitions, and as we shall show at a later period, even abstained

from admitting with Hume that belief was merely sensitive. But the clear, good sense of Dr. Reid did mistake the real fallacy, which we conceive to be that of Hume, although Reid did not follow up the insight that his perspicacity afforded him. "Mr. Hume's system," says Reid, "in particular, confounds all distinction between the operations of the mind and their objects. When he speaks of the ideas of memory, the ideas of imagination, and the ideas of sense, it is often impossible, from the tenor of his discourse, to know whether by those ideas he means the operations of the mind, or the objects about which they are employed. And indeed, according to his system, there is no distinction between the one and the other." (Reid. Essay I. chap. 1.) It is in the sense of this observation of Reid, that are grounded all the objections we shall make against the whole tenor of the doctrines of Mr. Hume, not only with respect to the point here at issue, that of the positive value of our "beliefs," but also against his doctrines of "causation" and of "liberty and necessity." Mr. Hume, either purposely or erroneously, we believe, confounds the unconditional, absolute laws of animated being, with the conditional phenomena that proceed from it. He unites here, under the head of beliefs proceeding from experience or custom, i. e., beliefs of inference, the natural impulsive beliefs, which constitute the intellectual phenomena, termed, by Locke, the acts of the mind, which Perception recognizes as distinct and simple ideas, when it considers them as objects, but of which Locke says we can form no notion. The fallacy of confusion, in which Mr. Hume revels so luxuriantly, renders it a tedious task to unravel the knot so artfully knit. The phenomena of animated being, as well in man as in brutes, are accompanied with certain impulsive acts, which are only

to be accounted for by what is termed "animality" or "irritability." The error of the Cartesians, in denying that brutes can feel, or think, or infer, was one of the main causes of the general distrust, in which a doctrine so much at variance with the most simple observation was held. The spontaneous beliefs, or instincts, or impulsive acts of animated beings, must, therefore, be classed with the unconditional, absolute laws of animal life; and to increase the difficulty, it is the same with that peculiar impulse or instinct, or intellectual phenomenon, termed inference or judgment, which, however, requires that a relation of some kind should exist, in order to shoot forth. Now, Mr. Hume confounds the impulsive belief with the belief from inference or judgment. It is precisely at the point where the greatest discrimination becomes requisite, that he mixes up the whole in one misshapen mass of "beliefs from experience," which can never err, since they are from nature, and yet with which Reason is often at variance, and so forth. Mr. Hume, after clearly pointing out the analogy that exists between human inference and animal inference, takes great care, even in these conditional acts, not to illustrate the evident distinctions that exist; they are, he says, the result of a peculiar instinct, that appears spontaneously in brute and in man, and so he insinuates that their nature must be "similar." In short, he levels indiscriminately with the ground all distinction, not only between the beliefs which, as conditional, or dependent alone on the mystery of animal life, belong to the absolute laws of animated being, and the conditional beliefs which are the objects of the intellectual phenomena, but he also confounds all distinction between the inference of the brute creation and that of man. With him, all is made known by experience, and this is sufficient. He owns that *insuf-*

ficient observation may sometimes make us believe wrong, but then he answers flippantly, It is still a matter of experience: had the experience been sufficient, the belief would have tallied with the experience. And yet this gross sophistry has so long passed current.

Undoubtedly a great and deep mystery lies hidden in those depths of the intellectual phenomena of animated being, termed intuitive or instinctive beliefs, but evidently it can only render the matter more dark than it is if we confound them with the beliefs of inference, on the ground of their being equally mysterious. Now merely as a subject relating to natural history, it behooves the observer to attend to what distinguishes the phenomena, and not to confound them indiscriminately. But Mr. Hume is not content only with treating so difficult a matter with so little ceremony; he goes still farther, and insinuates, or rather proclaims as a matter of fact, that instinctive feeling of all kinds is merely mechanical. And this Mr. Hume considers to be an inquiry into the nature of those mysterious first principles termed "instincts." Here Mr. Hume may be reminded of his own opinion, that to reason from our ignorance is only to increase the obscurity.

We find also in the same passages "experimental reasoning" attributed to the brute creation, and introduced in a manner that might induce the inattentive reader to suppose that there really existed no sound distinction between the human understanding and "the reasoning which we possess in common with beasts." Had Mr. Hume limited his scepticism to the mere metaphysical reasonings of his time, his arguments would certainly bear the test of comparison, but he evidently aims at something higher, he aims at experience and at experimental philosophy in the first

sections of his "Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding." He proceeds, it is true, by hints, and contented with the advantages of position which the Parthian warfare he adopted bestowed, he aims more at effecting happy hits, than at advancing. In section 12, "Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy," it is no longer the "experimental" philosophy that is called in question, but the "ideal" philosophy, that denied any thing external, or at least doubted of its existence. Here Mr. Hume insists very justly on the natural instinct or prepossession which carries men to repose faith in their senses, to believe that the house, the table, or the tree they perceive, really exists; but these primary instincts of nature have nothing to do with the manner in which the external object comes in contact with the brain. Contact is necessary or the condition in some senses, but in vision no one *now* doubts that really external objects do send forth images in all directions, i. e., that the light which strikes them is reflected and may be stamped at will on paper by the process termed photography. The primary instincts of nature, says Mr. Hume, know nothing of these images, and if they exist, "then we are necessitated, by reasoning, to depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses." But Mr. Hume forgets to say that it was owing to the *experiments* of that great philosopher, Berkeley, that we learned that from our very infancy gradual and daily experience corrects the primary instincts of nature, which, though they admit a firm belief in external objects, and are fully competent to the task of establishing the instinctive certitude of relative existence, are by no means competent judges of those relations. Therefore the following well-known passage of Mr. Hume, in which he attempts

to upset all certitude by opposing the evidence of the senses to the dictates of reason, and which were long considered as unanswerable, has now become by the progress of knowledge, a convincing proof that the writer was wanting in that experience of things to which he so loudly appeals. "This," says Mr. Hume, "is a topic in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavor to introduce a universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and inquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments, and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with any external objects."

Another objection consists in the doubts concerning the real nature of the so termed primary qualities of objects, such as figure, extension, weight, and even qualities termed secondary, such as hard, soft, cold, white, black, which were said to have no existence in the objects themselves, but to be merely perceptions of the mind. This doctrine, which indeed constituted the main column of the ideal system, which admitted the mind alone as the cause of all the qualities perceived by the senses, and not the object itself,—this doctrine, which is now replaced by the plain matter of fact, i. e., by the conditions required for the development of the phenomena, was indeed, in the days of Mr.

Hume, a field of constant triumph for the sceptic. Therefore Mr. Hume appeared justified in concluding "that the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense, or to the opinion of external existence, consists in this, that such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial inquirer. The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion as contrary to reason; at least, if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object." Now all these declamations of the sceptic lose their value if metaphysical explanations are given up, if the simple, positive fact, the precise conditions, are pointed out alone. But really "the infinite divisibility of extension"—"a real quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on *in infinitum*," were doctrines well calculated to shock the clear and natural principles of human reason. Such doctrines might well draw down on themselves the animadversion of the sceptic, especially as Mr. Hume, with apparent candor, admits that "the Pyrrhonian cannot expect that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind, or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. Nature is always too strong for principle;" and as, moreover, he clearly exposes the real cure in the following words: "The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism, is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life." Mr. Hume, therefore, adapting, Protean-like, his language

to the various positions of the question, avoids in a manner the grasp of his adversaries, whilst he carries out at the same time his own aim, that of bewildering the contemplative mind with an artful display of the contradiction inherent to the very nature of things. For this reason we must be excused for insisting on giving detached passages, and for viewing from isolated points, Mr. Hume's doctrines, which we include under three heads: 1. The inquiry into the human understanding with which we are now occupied; 2. His doctrine of cause and effect, "of the idea of necessary connection," and "of Liberty and Necessity," to which we shall briefly refer in the following pages; and 3. His natural history of religion, which will become an important subject of consideration in the second part of this work, which treats of divine Faith. The connection existing between the 2d and 3d divisions of the scheme entered upon by Hume with undoubted talent, will necessitate our abbreviating in this section what will be more fully examined in the 2d part of our work. It is on the important subject of the human understanding that Mr. Hume, as we have shown in the preceding pages, so carefully forms one intricate mass of all the principles that a candid inquirer ought to distinguish with the greatest care.

Still it must be owned that the point on which Mr. Hume insists unceasingly, is the real positive value of our primary "beliefs," especially in the instinctive belief that we have in the existence of external objects and in their qualities as something inherent to those objects. On what grounds, it may therefore be asked, is it asserted that Hume admits that Mind alone exists? This assertion is, in fact, only grounded on the general admission by Mr. Hume of the validity of the tenets of the ideal philosophy, an admission which may be *ironi-*

cal; and 2d, on his explanation of the whole matter in referring the certitude of things to mere "belief." Now, as Hume insists on belief being a mere *feeling* that is the result of custom, and as feeling is in fact a mental operation, being a kind of emotion, the opinion of the sceptic may, on those grounds, appear to lean towards the ideal philosophy. We have already given the passage of Mr. Hume, to which Reid refers several times whilst reiterating the quotation, in which the sceptic philosopher, after pointing out our natural beliefs in external objects, continues, "but this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception." Now, is it not evident as the phrase stands, that in thus purposely opposing the qualification of "slightest" to a "universal and primary opinion," Mr. Hume can scarcely be considered as a believer, even for the sake of argument, in that philosophy. He opposes, it is true, the ideal philosophy to the universal beliefs, but in so doing he merely aims, we believe, at indicating the views of the day termed *rational* views, in order to oppose them to the *natural* view. Reid, who tells us (Essay VI. chap. 7,) that "Mr. Hume hath adopted Bishop Berkeley's arguments against the existence of Matter, and thinks them unanswerable," grounds this view of the opinions of Hume on the above cited passage, and the proof that it can be taken from no other part of Mr. Hume's writings, is found in what Reid adds respecting this passage, which, says Reid, "is all I have found in Mr. Hume's writings upon this point." Now, in the said passage, which we have already given in full, the part belonging in reality to Mr. Hume is the scepticism that he causes in the mind of the reader,

by the artful manner in which he disposes the opinions generally admitted, so as to give the greatest possible effect to the contradictions existing between the vulgar and the learned man. When Hume says, "no man who reflects ever doubted that the existences which we consider, when we say *this house*, and *that tree*, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies and representations of other existences which remain uniform and independent," can he be considered as "believing himself to be nothing but a train of ideas and impressions," as Reid says he does? We refrain from entering into any considerations respecting the *images* which reflect visible objects, and which Reid deemed himself authorized to deny, because, in audition, olfaction, and taction, the sensation occurs without any such image. We limit our observations to the main fact, and maintain that the division given by Mr. Hume, and of which Reid says, "in this division, to my great humiliation, I find myself classed with the vulgar," does not contain Hume's opinion on the human understanding, but Hume's endeavors to entangle the mind of the reader in the meshes of Scepticism.

The doctrine of "belief" may more truly be said to be the opinion of the sceptic writer, but of belief as a mere feeling, and as proceeding much more from our sensitive than from our rational nature. We shall see that Reid, although professing the doctrines of "common sense" and of the immediate perception of the object by the mind without any intermediary, did not accept that position of Mr. Hume. Reid admits other grounds of belief besides the evidence of sense, but belief itself, "which nature produces by means of the senses, we call *perception*. The feeling which goes along with the perception, we call sensation." This

distinction, which “requires a degree of attention which is not to be expected in the vulgar, and is even rarely found in philosophers,” is of too minute a kind to find place when one considers what Hume termed a “belief” or a feeling resulting from “experience.” Thus, “we learn,” he says, “the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us how one event constantly follows another, without instructing us in the secret connection which binds them together, and renders them inseparable.” Here we find exposed in a few words all that can be said of the well-known doctrine of Mr. Hume concerning our *belief* in Causation. Experience teaches us that when we will, a result ensues, and in this case, as in all others, all we know of the matter is, that a given phenomenon precedes some other given phenomenon that follows.

In the preceding remarks respecting Mr. Hume’s doctrines concerning the human understanding, it was no difficult matter to point out the confusion caused by confounding ultimate conditions or unconditional laws, such as the phenomena of life, dependent on life alone, and the conditional or relative beliefs which arise when, a certain impulsive mental phenomenon occurring, objects are compared, and judgment ensues. But in the doctrine of Causation, of Power, and Agency, we are standing on metaphysical ground, the vantage of which Mr. Hume knew well how to employ. It is with power as with motion. They are, perhaps, one and the same thing. But be that as it may, motion, it is well known, was denied from the very dawn of sophistry, (not to say philosophy,) because it could not be understood or explained; and thence the well-known proof of motion given by the philosopher, who, being asked what motion was, moved some steps forward. Now, Causation is the very act itself, and cannot be separated so as to

constitute any clear definition. Therefore, when Reid aptly observes, "It is well known that there are many things perfectly understood, and of which we have clear and distinct conceptions, which cannot be logically defined. No man ever attempted to define magnitude, yet there is no word whose meaning is more distinctly or more generally understood. We cannot give a logical definition of thought, of duration, of number, or of motion,"—he expresses a truth universally admitted; but does it ensue that such notions are independent of experience? Even the phenomena of Thought, so impulsive, so instinctive as they are, and which depend on animated life alone for existence, are, nevertheless, made known by experience. It is only by appealing to every man's experience that the universality of consciousness can obtain as a first principle. It is because it is a matter of universal belief that it has acquired the high rank it occupies in the mental phenomena. Much less can the notions of duration, of number, and of motion, be separated from experience. The instinctive, impulsive belief in relative existence, that appears to accompany the very lowest degree of animated life, is not wanting in man, but the nature of the relation is evidently a matter of experience. To this point we shall revert at a later period; we must at present expose the views of Mr. Hume on cause and effect in his own words: "When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or experiment, where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or foretell what will

happen in like cases ; it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular species of events has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call one object Cause ; the other, Effect. We suppose that there is some connection between them ; some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.

“It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connection among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events ; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar ; except only that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connection, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides, you will never find any other origin of that idea. . . . When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connection in our thought, and given rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other’s existence,

a conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity.

“And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present? For, surely, if there be any relation among objects, which it imports us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate utility of all sciences is to teach us how to control and regulate future events by their causes. Our thoughts and inquiries are, therefore, every moment employed about this relation. Yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous, and foreign to it. Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an *object followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second*. Or in other words, where if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary tradition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause, and call it *an object followed*

by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other. But though both these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause, we cannot remedy this inconvenience, or attain any more perfect definition, which may point out that circumstance in the cause which gives it a connection with the effect. We have no idea of this connection, nor even any distinct notion what it is we desire to know, when we endeavor at a conception of it. We say, for instance, that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound. But what do we mean by that affirmation? We either mean that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds, or that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that upon the appearance of one, the mind anticipates the senses, and forms immediately an idea of the other. According to these explications and definitions, the idea of *power* is relative as much as that of *cause*, and both have a reference to an effect, or some other event commonly conjoined with the former. When we consider the *unknown* circumstance of an object by which the degree or quantity of its effect is fixed and determined, we call that its power. And accordingly it is allowed by all philosophers that the effect is the measure of the power. But if they have any idea of power as it is in itself, why could they not measure it in itself? The dispute whether the force of a body in motion be as its velocity or the square of its velocity,—this dispute, I say, needed not to be decided by comparing its effects in equal or unequal times, but by a direct mensuration and comparison.

“As to the frequent use of the words Force, Power, Energy, &c., which everywhere occur in common conversations, as well as in philosophy, that is no proof

that we are acquainted, in any instance, with the connecting principle between cause and effect, or can account ultimately for the production of one thing by another. These words, as commonly used, have very loose meanings annexed to them, and their ideas are very uncertain and confused. No animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment of a *nisus* or endeavor; and every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object that is in motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which we can, *à priori*, draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and to suppose that they have some such feelings whenever they transfer or receive motion. With regard to energies, which are exerted without our annexing to them any idea of communicated motion, we consider only the constant experienced conjunction of the events, and as we *feel* a customary connection between the ideas, we transfer that feeling to the objects; as nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion. Thus, if a cause be defined, *that which produces any thing*, it is easy to observe that producing is synonymous to Causing. In like manner, if a cause be defined *that by which any thing exists*, this is liable to the same objection. For what is meant by these words, *by which?* Had it been said that a cause is that after which any thing constantly exists, we should have understood the terms. For this is, indeed, all we know of the matter. And this constancy forms the very essence of necessity, nor have we any other idea of it."

It fared with this doctrine of Causation and Necessity of Mr. Hume, as with that of "belief" considered as feeling proceeding from experience, and constituting at once the starting-point and issue of the human un-

derstanding. At first all were unanimous in condemning it, but it courted and supported investigation, and, strange to say, it was admitted for a time that the notion of Causation was quite untenable, until Reid took it up, and presented it to the world as an intuitive, instinctive belief. The dismay produced by the bold assertion of Hume, was not diminished by the fact of its having been less forcibly presented by Hobbes. It was a peremptory denial of the reigning doctrine, that of Leibnitz, which admitted myriads of myriads of active causes, which were thus completely exterminated "at one fell swoop." This doctrine of Leibnitz, which replaced the "occult causes" of the schoolmen, not only admits of a mysterious link between the cause and the effect, but is grounded upon the notion of Causality—each monad being an eternal and independent cause in virtue of the creation. This internal force of the monad was thus a law of the thing's own nature. Now, the reducing of such a doctrine to the mere uniformities of succession, as made known by experience, appeared at first, as usually, to be a hot-bed of atheism; whilst, in fact, it was merely reducing the thing to the plain conditions of the phenomena, which certainly constitutes the best way of proceeding, although it is no less certain that unless some hypothesis be acted on—unless some "anticipation" be adopted, human knowledge would never go beyond the surface. It is Reason that revolts at being condemned never to penetrate into the nature of things by the sceptical tenets of Mr. Hume, but neither Religion nor Revelation is thereby impaired. Indeed, Monadology constituted a greater encroachment than the new doctrine of Causation. The *substratum* or *materia prima*, admitted since Plato as the common cause of all the metamorphoses that survene in matter or in the elements

which it constitutes, was, in fact, more derogatory of the Divine Will than the admission that all we know of Causation is the constant succession of the phenomena. As to the question whether the notion of causation is an intuitive belief, or whether there is nothing more in it than antecedence and consequence, all we can say on the subject is, that like Motion it cannot be explained, but must be perceived. Perception is, undoubtedly, a phenomenon dependent on an ultimate law—that of animal life; but to consider the notion of Causation as independent of experience, which is nothing else than causality in act, appears to us quite untenable. But be that as it may, we must at once proceed to state the actual views taken of this doctrine of Mr. Hume at the present day. This we shall do in quoting the words of one whose opinion may be considered as that of the positive school of philosophy, of Mr. Stuart Mill: “The notion of Causation is deemed, by the schools of metaphysics most in vogue at the present moment, to imply a mysterious and most powerful tie, such as cannot, or at least does not, exist between any physical fact and that other physical fact upon which it is invariably consequent, and which is popularly termed its cause; and thence is deduced the supposed necessity of ascending higher into the essences and inherent constitution of things, to find the true cause,—the cause which is not only followed by, but actually *produces*, the effect. No such necessity exists for the purposes of our inquiry. The only notion of a cause which the theory of induction requires, is such a notion as can be gained from experience. The law of causation, which is the main pillar of inductive philosophy, is but the familiar truth, that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it; in-

dependently of all consideration respecting the ultimate mode of production of phenomena, and of every other question regarding the nature of 'Things in themselves.'

"Between the phenomena, then, which exist at any instant, and the phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant, there is an invariable order of succession; and as we said in speaking of the general uniformity of the course of nature, this web is composed of separate fibres; this collective order is made up of particular sequences, obtaining invariably among the separate parts. To certain facts, certain facts always do, and, as we believe, always will succeed. The invariable antecedent is termed the cause; the invariable consequent, the effect. And the universality of the law of causation consists in this, that every consequent is connected in this manner with some particular antecedent. Upon the universality of this truth depends the possibility of reducing the inductive process to rules. The undoubted assurance we have that there is a law to be found, if we only knew how to find it, is the source from which the canons of the Inductive Logic derive their validity. It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and one single antecedent, that this invariable sequence subsists. It is usually between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents; the concurrence of them all being requisite to produce, that is, to be certain of being followed by, the consequent. In such cases, it is very common to single out one only of the antecedents under the denomination of a Cause, calling the others merely Conditions. The real cause is the whole of these antecedents; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others. In practice, that particular condition is usually styled the cause,

whose share in the matter is superficially the most conspicuous, or whose requisiteness to the production of the effect we happen to be insisting upon at the moment. All effects are connected, by the law of causation, with some set of *positive* conditions; negative ones, it is true, being almost always required in addition. In other words, every fact or phenomenon which has a beginning, invariably arises when some certain combination of positive facts exists, provided certain other positive facts do not exist. Since, then, mankind are accustomed with acknowledged propriety, so far as the ordinances of language are concerned, to give the name of cause to almost any one of the conditions of a phenomenon, or any portion of the whole number arbitrarily selected, without excepting even those conditions which are purely negative, and in themselves incapable of causing any thing; it will probably be admitted, without longer discussion, that no one of the conditions has more claim to that title than another, and that the real cause of the phenomenon is the assemblage of all its conditions. The cause, then, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together—the whole of the contingencies of every description, which, being realized, the consequent invariably follows. The negative conditions, however, of any phenomenon, a special enumeration of which would generally be very prolix, may be all summed up under one head, namely, the absence of preventing or counteracting causes. In most cases of causation, a distinction is commonly drawn between something which acts and some other thing which is acted upon, between an agent and a patient. Those who have contended for a radical distinction between agent and patient, have generally conceived the agent as that which causes some state of another object which is called

the patient. But the distinction vanishes on examination, or is found to be simply a sort of logical fiction, for things are never more active than is the production of those phenomena in which they are said to be acted upon. It is not light alone which is the agent in vision, but light coupled with the active properties of the eye and brain, and with those of the visible object. But it is necessary to our using the word cause, that the antecedent not only *has* always been followed by the consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution of things endures, it always *will* be so. Night is not a cause, nor even a condition of day. We may define, therefore, the cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent or the concurrence of antecedents, upon which it is invariably and *unconditionally* consequent. Invariable sequence, therefore, is not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional. The motion of the earth in a given orbit round the sun, is a series of changes which follow one another as antecedents and consequents, and will continue to do so while the sun's attraction and the force with which the earth tends to advance in a direct line through space, continue to coexist in the same quantities as at present. But vary either of the causes, and the unvarying succession of motions would cease to take place. The series of the earth's motions, therefore, though a case of sequence invariable within the limits of human experience, is not a case of causation. It is not unconditional. To distinguish these conditionally uniform sequences from those which are uniform unconditionally; to ascertain whether an apparently invariable antecedent of some consequent is really one of its conditions, or whether, in the absence of that antecedent, the effect would equally have followed from some other portion of the circumstances, which are present whenever it

occurs, is a principal part of the great problem of Induction.

“Does a cause always stand with its effect in the relation of antecedent and consequent? Do we not often say of two simultaneous facts that they are cause and effect—as when we say that fire is the cause of warmth, the sun and moisture the cause of vegetation, and the like? It is certain that a cause does not necessarily perish because its effect has been produced; the two, therefore, do very generally coexist; and there are some appearances, and some common expressions, seeming to imply not only that causes may, but that they must, be contemporaneous with their effects. *Cessante causa, cessat et effectus*, (the cause ceasing, the effect ceases also,) has been a dogma of the schools; the necessity for the continued existence of the cause in order to the continuance of the effect, seems to have been once a general doctrine among philosophers. Mr. Whewell observes that Kepler’s numerous attempts to account for the motion of the heavenly bodies on mechanical principles, were rendered abortive by his always supposing that the force which set those bodies in motion must continue to operate, in order to keep up the motion which it at first produced. Yet there were at all times many familiar instances in open contradiction to this supposed axiom. A *coup de soleil* (a sun stroke) gives a man a brain fever; will the fever go off as soon as he is moved out of the sunshine? A sword is run through his body; must the sword remain in his body in order that he may continue dead? A ploughshare once made, remains a ploughshare, without any continuance of heating and hammering, and even after the man who heated and hammered it has been gathered to his fathers. On the other hand, the pressure which forces up the mercury in an exhausted

tube must be continued in order to sustain it in the tube. This (it may be replied) is because another force is acting without intermission—the force of gravity—which would restore it to its level, unless counterpoised by a force equally constant. But again, a tight bandage causes pain, which pain will sometimes go off as soon as the bandage is removed. The illumination which the sun diffuses over the earth ceases when the sun goes down.

“The solution of these difficulties will be found in a very simple distinction. The conditions which are necessary for the first production of a phenomenon, are occasionally also necessary for its continuance; but more commonly its continuance requires no conditions except negative ones. Most things, once produced, continue as they are, until something changes or destroys them; but some require the permanent presence of the agencies which produced them at first. These may, if we please, be considered as instantaneous phenomena, requiring to be renewed at each instant by the cause by which they were at first generated. Accordingly, the illumination of any given point of space has always been looked upon as an instantaneous fact, which perishes and is perpetually renewed as long as the necessary conditions subsist. If we adopt this language, we are enabled to avoid admitting that the continuance of the cause is ever required to maintain the effect. We may say, it is not required to maintain but to reproduce the effect, or else to counteract some force tending to destroy it. And this may be a convenient phraseology; but it is only a phraseology. The fact remains, that in some cases (though these are a minority) the continuance of the conditions which produced an effect is necessary to the continuance of the effect.

“As to the ulterior question, whether it is strictly necessary that the cause, or assemblage of conditions, should precede, by ever so short an instant, the production of the effect, (a question raised, and argued with much ingenuity by the reviewer of Mr. Whewell, in the Quarterly Review,) we think the question an unimportant one. There certainly are cases in which the effect follows without any interval perceptible to our faculties; and when there is an interval, we cannot tell by how many intermediate links, imperceptible to us, that interval may really be filled up. But even granting that an effect may commence simultaneously with its cause, the view I have taken of causation is in no way practically affected. Whether the cause and its effect be necessarily successive or not, causation is still the law of the succession of phenomena. Every thing which begins to exist must have a cause; what does not begin to exist does not need a cause; what causation has to account for is the origin of phenomena, and all the successions of phenomena must be resolvable into causation. These are the axioms of our doctrine. If these be granted we can afford, though I see no necessity for doing so, to drop the words antecedent and consequent as applied to cause and effect. I have no objection to define a cause, the assemblage of phenomena, which occurring, some other phenomenon invariably commences or has its origin. Whether the effect coincides in point of time with, or immediately follows, the hindmost of its conditions, is immaterial. At all events it does not precede it; and when we are in doubt, between two coexistent phenomena, which is cause and which effect, we rightly deem the question solved if we can ascertain which of them preceded the other.

“There exist in nature a number of Permanent Causes, which have subsisted ever since the human

race has been in existence, and for an indefinite and probably enormous length of time previous. The sun, the earth, and planets, with their various constituents, air, water, and the other distinguishable substances, whether simple or compound, of which nature is made up, are such Permanent Causes. These have existed, and the effects or consequences which they were fitted to produce have taken place (as often as the other conditions of the production met) from the very beginning of our experience. But we can give, scientifically speaking, no account of the origin of the Permanent Causes themselves. Why these particular natural agents existed originally, and no others, or why they are commingled in such and such proportions, and distributed in such and such a manner throughout space, is a question we cannot answer. More than this; we can discover nothing regular in the distribution itself; we can reduce it to no uniformity, to no law. There are no means by which, from the distribution of these causes or agents in one part of space, we could conjecture whether a similar distribution prevails in another. The coexistence, therefore, of Primeval Causes, ranks, to us, among merely casual concurrences, and all those sequences or existences among the effects of several such causes, which, though invariable while those causes coexist, would, if the coexistence terminated, terminate along with it, we do not class as cases of causation or laws of nature; we can only calculate upon finding these sequences or coexistences where we know, by direct evidence, that the natural agents, on the properties of which they ultimately depend, are distributed in the requisite manner. These Permanent Causes are not always objects, they are sometimes events, that is to say, periodical cycles of events, that being the only mode in which events can possess the

property of permanence. Not only, for instance, is the earth itself a permanent cause, or primitive natural agent, but the earth's rotation is so too; it is a cause which has produced, from the earliest period, (by the aid of other necessary conditions,) the succession of day and night, the ebb and flow of the sea, and many other effects, while as we can assign no cause (except conjecturally) for the rotation itself, it is entitled to be ranked as a primeval cause. All phenomena without exception which begin to exist, except the primeval causes, are effects, either immediate or remote, of those primitive facts, or some combination of them.

“Since every thing which occurs in the universe is determined by laws of causation and collocations of the original causes, it follows that the coexistences which are observable among effects, cannot be themselves the subject of any similar set of laws, distinct from laws of causation. Uniformities there are, as well of coexistence as of succession, among the effects; but these must in all cases be a mere result either of the identity or of the coexistence of their causes; if the causes did not coexist, neither could the effects. And these causes being also effects of prior causes, it follows that (except in the case of effects which can be traced immediately or remotely to one and the same cause) the coexistences of phenomena can in no case be universal, unless the coexistences of the primeval causes to which the effects are ultimately traceable, can be reduced to a universal law: but we have seen that they cannot. There are, accordingly, no original and independent—in other words, no unconditional uniformities of coexistence between effects of different causes; if they coexist, it is only because the causes have casually coexisted. The only independent and unconditional coexistences which are sufficiently in-

variable to have any claim to the character of laws, are between different and mutually independent effects of the same cause; in other words, between different properties of the same natural agent.”

However prolix these quotations may appear to the general reader, they are nevertheless scarcely sufficient to form a distinct notion of the present views of science with regard to causation. The most positive result derived from the perusal of these curtailed observations of Mr. Stuart Mill will be, we apprehend, the conviction that in Causation the difficulties are not surmounted by merely repeating with Hume that all we know of cause and effect is antecedence and consequence. It may appear strange that Mr. Stuart Mill should insist, after these reflections, upon the utility of preserving in deductive science a term so radically vicious as that of Causation, since the exposition of the conditions of phenomena constitutes all that can be realized. His motives will be found in the following quotations: “It seems desirable, before concluding, to take notice of an apparent, but not a real opposition between the doctrines which I have laid down respecting causation, and those maintained in a work which I hold to be far the greatest yet produced on the philosophy of the Sciences, M. Comte’s *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. M. Comte asserts as his first principle, that the causes of phenomena are beyond the reach of the human faculties, and that all which is accessible to us is their *laws*, or as he explains the term, their constant relations of succession or of similarity. Accordingly, M. Comte sedulously abstains, in the subsequent part of his work, from the use of the word Cause; an example which I have not followed, for reasons which I will proceed to state. I most fully agree with M. Comte that *ultimate*, or, in the phraseology of meta-

physicians, *efficient* causes, which are conceived as not being phenomena, nor perceptible by the senses at all, are radically inaccessible to the human faculties, and that the 'constant relations of succession or of similarity,' which exist among phenomena themselves, (not forgetting, so far as any constancy can be traced, their relations of coexistence,) are the only subjects of rational investigation. When I speak of causation, I have nothing in view other than those constant relations; but I think the terms causation, and cause and effect, important to be preserved, for the purpose of distinctively designating one class of those relations, namely, the relations of succession, which, so far as we know, are unconditional; as contrasted with those which, like the succession of day and night, depend upon the existence or upon the coexistence of other antecedent facts. This division corresponds to the great division which Mr. Whewell and other writers have made of the field of Science, into the investigation of what they term the Laws of Phenomena, and the investigation of causes—a phraseology, as I conceive, altogether vicious, inasmuch as the ascertainment of causes, such causes as the human faculties *can* ascertain, namely, causes which are themselves phenomena, is therefore merely the ascertainment of other and more universal Laws of Phenomena. And I cannot but look upon the revival, on English soil, of the doctrine, (not only refuted by the school of Locke and Hume, but given up by their great rivals Reid and Stewart,) that *efficient* causes are within the reach of human knowledge, as a remarkable instance of what has been aptly called 'the peculiar zest which the spirit of reaction against modern tendencies gives to ancient absurdities.'

“Yet the distinction between those constant rela-

tions of succession or coexistence which Mr. Whewell terms Laws of Phenomena, and those which he terms, as I do, Laws of Causation, is grounded (however incorrectly expressed) upon a real difference. And it does appear to me that the disinclination of M. Comte to employ the word Cause, has occasionally led him to attach less importance than it deserves to this great distinction, upon which alone, I am convinced, the possibility rests of framing a rigorous Canon of Induction. Nor do I see what is gained by avoiding this particular word, when M. Comte is forced, like other people, to speak continually of the *properties* of things, of *agents* and their *action*, of *forces*, and the like; terms equally liable to perversion, and which are partial and inadequate expressions for what no word that we possess, except Cause, expresses in its full generality. I believe, too, that when the ideas which a word is commonly used to convey are overclouded with mysticism, the obscurity is not likely to be so effectually dispelled by abstaining from its employment, as by bringing out into full clearness the portion of real meaning which exists in the various cases where the term is most familiarly employed, and thereby giving a legitimate satisfaction to that demand of the intellect which has caused the term to remain in use."

In addition to these views of Mr. Stuart Mill on the "Law of Causation," we call the attention of the Student to his valuable summary on the "intermixture of Effects," and his opinion of the position due to the "Deductive Method." (See *A System of Logic*, Vol. I., Book 3d, Ch. x., xi. pp. 520 and seq.) But we must at once remark, that on one important point our views do not coincide with his. This point is respecting the "unconditionalness" of what are termed the "Permanent Causes." On this we shall merely remark, that al-

though our experience is, in fact, our ordinary guide, and though Causation is, we believe, a belief resulting from our experience, yet facts are not wanting which tend to prove that the *unconditional* or *necessary causes* were once very different from what they now appear to be. Let that period be recalled as far back as imagination can stretch, still we know that a time existed when the "constancy" of those causes was in fault.

It now remains to inquire, whether Mr. Hume considered himself authorized to apply the results of our experience to the preceding state of things, or to the rest of the universe. That philosopher maintains, that with reference to a Cause of the Universe, we can conclude nothing, because it is a singular effect. We have no experience that such effects are always conjoined with such a cause; nay, the cause which we assign to this effect is, he remarks, a cause which no man hath seen, nor can see, and, therefore, experience cannot inform us that it has ever been conjoined with any effect. In short, Mr. Hume maintains that since priority and constant conjunction is all that can be conceived in the notion of a cause, *any thing* may be the cause of any thing. This latter phrase of Mr. Hume's, which gave much offence to Dr. Reid, is taken almost *verbatim* from an author whose views are entirely opposed to those of the Sceptic,—we mean, Bishop Butler, who, after pointing out in most forcible language the reciprocal connection of things which extends to the whole course of nature, adds, "and things, seemingly the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be necessary conditions of other things of the greatest importance, so that *any one thing whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other.*" Had Mr. Hume followed up as consistently his own doctrines, which deny that our

experience can be applied to things quite distinct from all human experience, and which led him to deny that philosophy can reason on rational grounds respecting the Deity,—had he followed up this doctrine, he would never have broached his well-known principle of Necessity. This latter he conceives as a belief taught by the experience we have of the constant *conjunction* of similar objects, and the consequent *inference* from one to the other. “These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity which we ascribe to Matter.” This belief, Mr. Hume says, is not sufficient for the philosopher to judge of things of which the philosopher can have no experience, “even logical,” and yet he does not hesitate to frame for himself a doctrine of *necessity* which encompasses the whole range of Nature. Now, we adopt his first principle, which denies that human reason can possibly form any adequate notion of a Supreme Being, but we extend the same principle to the order of things which Mr. Hume surreptitiously, we believe, considered as bound to follow the same order of succession as that which human experience points out. The principle obtains, we would say, in both cases, or in neither. If human experience be denied as an argument to the philosopher, it cannot avail the necessarian. The remarks applicable to Mr. Hume are not applicable to the theory of “Unconditionalness” of Mr. Stuart Mill. This latter thinker, in using that term, to which we would, however, object, uses it as a mere condition of the Deductive Method, having already premised the following conclusions on that point: “The only sense in which necessity can be ascribed to the conclusions of any scientific investigation, is that of necessarily following from some assumption which by the conditions of the inquiry is not to be questioned. In this relation, of course, the deriva-

tive truths of every deductive science must stand to the inductions or assumptions on which the science is founded, and which, whether true or untrue, certain or doubtful in themselves, are always supposed certain for the purposes of the particular science. And, therefore, the conclusions of all deductive sciences were said by the ancients to be necessary propositions." When, therefore, Mr. Stuart Mill deduces from the essence of any thing a "*Proprium*" or peculiar property which is included in the definition, when from those properties by means of the Deductive Method necessary conclusions are admitted, the "unconditionalness" of the first principle is assumed, insomuch as human experience tells of the constant uniformity observed; but that thinker does not, like Mr. Hume, lay claim to any right of misusing the "unconditional or necessary" assumption, whilst he denies the rationality of the proceeding in others. Here we again repeat the words of Mr. Stuart Mill: "Scientifically speaking, we can give no account of the origin of the Permanent Causes themselves. Why these particular natural agents existed originally and no others, or why they are commingled in such and such proportions, and distributed in such and such a manner through Space, is a question we cannot answer. More than this: we can discover nothing regular in the distribution itself—we can reduce it to no uniformity, to no law. . . The coexistence, therefore, of Primeval Causes ranks to us among merely casual occurrences, and all those sequences or coexistences among the effects of several such causes, which though invariable while those causes coexist, would, if the coexistence terminated, terminate along with it."

Here Mr. Stuart Mill simply denies our right of judging of such Ultimate Cause, from our experience of the effects, and Mr. Hume denies Philosophy the

right of concluding any thing respecting the Deity, from notions acquired by human experience; but Mr. Stuart Mill does not apply even to the Primeval Causes the views of human experience; with him the force of the canons or rules of the Deductive Method do not overleap the limits of all experience; he admits of the "inconceivable" even in human science, whilst Mr. Hume, because constant uniformity is the basis of strict science, infers that a law of Necessity obtains everywhere. Should the Necessarian reply that the term "casual occurrence" would appear to imply an admission of Chance, we answer that the man who does not believe in a God can only escape from such an admission by a plain avowal of Man's incompetency to cope with questions above all human experience. Nor has even the rational Deist any refuge beyond the notions acquired by experience, the belief in constant uniformity of succession, which necessary connection he transfers to subjects of another order. Now, we believe, that the question can only be satisfactorily answered by the man who has acquired rational proof of a Revelation of God's existence. The answer of that man is Trust in Him who revealed himself to Man as the Almighty, and whose attributes are trusted, are believed in, not because we perceive them in an adequate manner, but because they were revealed. The rational Deist affirms, or may affirm, it is true, that "Causation" is a notion or rather a truth which we cannot help believing, and this we shall see was the resource of Dr. Reid, who affirms it to be an instinct, one of the laws of our believing faculty: every body does believe it, it is asserted, and it is therefore considered as a proposition which cannot be logically argued against, and which if not capable of being logically proved, is yet of higher authority than logic, since

the man who denies causation in speculation, shows by his habitual practice that he believes in it. Now, as we are of the opinion of those who deem Causation to be like motion, a something proved by experience alone, but of which all we know is in the order of Time, we do not admit it as an instinct but as the result of an instinct. Nor is this instinctive belief in causation admitted by the rational Theist alone, since Reid was a sincere believer in the truth of a God revealed. We apprehend, however, that Reid had not, more than Paley, sufficiently appreciated the misuse that might be made of their doctrines. It is a principle the consequences of which may be very serious, that admits as evidence of the truth of a fact in external nature, any necessity which the human mind may be conceived to be under of believing it. This view, which is that of Mr. Stuart Mill, is supported in the following forcible terms by that able writer. "It is the business of human intellect to adapt itself to the realities of things, and not to measure those realities by its own capacities of comprehension. The same quality which fits mankind for the offices and purposes of their own little life, the tendency of their belief to follow their experience, incapacitates them for judging of what lies beyond. Not only what man can know, but what he can conceive, depends upon what he has experienced. Whatever forms a part of all his experience, forms a part also of all his conceptions, and appears to him universal and necessary, though really, for aught he knows, having no existence beyond certain narrow limits." These words which we have already quoted fully deserve reiteration upon entering, as we are about to do, upon the domains of the Psychological school, where Reid so constantly appeals to the "common sense" of the most illiterate man, as to a

principle of which the philosopher is deemed to be bereft. Now the question is, whether Reid did not give to the term "common sense" a different acceptation than that of "universal opinion" and "common experience," terms used by Hartley and Locke to express the general opinion of Mankind; whether Reid did not bestow an undue value on the *individuality* of the principle, whilst its real value consists in the universality of the belief, of which universality mere individual experience cannot be considered an adequate judge.

Our remarks, therefore, respecting the misuse made by Mr. Hume of the principle of Necessity, do not extend to the "Unconditionalness" of Mr. Stuart Mill, because the latter thinker considers that "Necessity" as one merely relative to our ignorance with regard to the ultimate causes. And moreover, Mr. Stuart Mill does not confine his endeavors to increase as much as lies in his power the difficulties which encompass human knowledge. His efforts tend, like those of Bacon and Descartes, to disperse the clouds with which Truth is veiled. Mr. Hume, in appealing to the natural and instinctive beliefs of Mankind, in a manner which opposed them to the conclusions of Reflection, aimed evidently at upsetting the doctrines of Descartes and Bacon, which admit the natural bent of Man to mistake, and maintain that the very nature of the human mind leads it to hasty anticipation, in short to error. But the clear, silvery voice of Bacon did not merely tell of the idols of the imagination, it also poured forth hopes of brighter days, inviting men to experiment, to eschew hasty deduction, and proclaimed the basis on which by degrees has arisen the present structure of Science. The harsh and husky voice of Hume bespeaks despair, and far from attempting to dissipate the gloom, expatiates insidiously on the contradictions which the con-

flicting evidences of instinctive belief and Reason involve, as it were, or cause naturally to arise in the mind.

On Reid, then, devolved the arduous task to struggle with the difficulties so elaborately heaped by Mr. Hume. He had to unravel the intricate knot of Scepticism formed by the latter writer, not merely with the natural contradictions existing apparently between our instructive and our rational beliefs, to which Hume added all the contradictions of the various schools of Philosophy, but he had also to maintain the real value of practical belief, to which Hume appealed himself as to a feeling which Scepticism could not but feel, and yet to which all real value beyond that of "belief" was denied by that sceptic writer. The difference between the "common sense" doctrine of Reid, and the "practical belief" of Hume, who refers to that belief in causation, when Reason perceives merely a "necessary succession," and who only admits the *reality of external perfection*, because we cannot do otherwise than believe in it,—this difference is a matter of very nice discrimination, so much so indeed, that Dr. Brown considers Reid and Hume as holding the same doctrines in respect to that "belief." Now, the "common sense" doctrine admits of the evidence of Reason, of universal judgment, where Hume only admits of the evidence of mere sensation; of that sensation, the value of which he immediately undermines by opposing thereto the doctrines of Idealism. The struggle between Reid and Hume was therefore on points of nice discrimination, when relative to the *common sense beliefs* of the first, and to the *practical beliefs* of the latter. Reid, nevertheless, must submit to the reproach of ambiguity of language, which might sometimes be taken for duplicity, in appealing to the common belief of the vulgar,

whilst, in reality, he aimed at enlisting something of far more value than the mere individual belief of each simple individual. It is in both an appeal to experience after all, although with both the testimony of reasoning and experience are made to appear subservient to something different. But however irresistible any individual belief may be, it is not the individual himself that can furnish any real criterion of its value from his own individual stock; he must have recourse to others. Neither the sceptic belief of Hume, nor the "common sense" belief of Reid, possess more value than the individual belief of the Eleatic school. Right or wrong, something more general must be pointed out as a criterion, and this, we believe, is in fact the doctrine of Reid. The doctrine of "common sense," which probably led to the more modern one of Emerson, that of "self-trust," which latter would extend far beyond the pale of mere belief in self-identity or consciousness, is not one that allows of the most simple individual being entitled to as much credit about a deep principle, as the deepest scholar. But on that point we shall adduce at a later period the testimony of Reid himself.

Reid's principal objection to Sensationalism is grounded on the existence of "beliefs" in the human mind, which are evidently not results of experience derived from without. But as to the number of such *à priori* beliefs or innate principles, it varies with the supporters of the "common sense" doctrine. Belief itself, Reid considers as an *à priori* tendency of the mind, and points to the natural tendency of children to believe all that is told them, as a proof of the existence of a principle of credulity. Here, as with the Cartesians, Reid appeals to *common sense*. It is the same principle that acts as umpire respecting the points of the metaphysical doctrines which are admitted or rejected.

Besides the admission of natural beliefs, and the criterion of common sense employed in refutation of Cartesianism, Sensationalism and Scepticism, but which still continue a field of discussion, there is one achievement of Reid which fairly levelled to the dust the rival doctrine. This was the confutation by that thinker of the tenets which held *ideas* to be distinct existences, and to which Malebranche had conferred objective being as *images* or *figures* perceived by the mind which creates them. These mental perceptions Reid proved to be merely imaginary, and dependent for the form or picture by which they were represented, on some imagined similitude between some external object and the subject of Thought. He, therefore, represented that ideas were not things that exist, but merely things conceived, having neither place nor time, nor being at all liable to change. It is not generally admitted that Reid had performed with complete success this part of his difficult task, and this general admission must be clearly conceived to bear merely on the intellectual phenomena which represent the subject of Thought in so lively a manner as to produce a kind of visible or tangible perception thereof. But Reid did not only deny the real existence of such ideal images, he also denied that external objects reflected images which were transmitted to the retina, and thus became the intermediaries between the brain and the outward object. Now it is true that ideas or impressions (Hume) which appear in the mind when we see, or hear, or feel, or love, or desire, or will, and also the ideas or notions more or less forcible which arise on reflecting on our past sentiments, are no real existences, although imagination may dress them in pictorial form; but it is also true that in seeing and hearing there exists an intermediary body, and that vision is

performed not directly as Reid maintained, but by the intermediary of an image. We are at a loss to conceive how Reid came to imagine that in denying the existence of such intermediary images or pictures, and in insisting upon the immediate direct perception of the external objects, he conferred more real existence on the latter, than in admitting an intermediary image of a real material prototype. The belief that certain forms or images are actually transmitted through the organs of vision to the mind, involves that of their deriving their origin from some real external existences. But, Reid, it may be said, could not include vision in his rejection of an intermediary image. And yet he does maintain the same doctrine with regard to all the senses, since he tells us, "We have likewise examined with great attention, the various sensations we have by means of the five senses, and are not able to find among them all, one single image of body, or of any of its qualities. From whence then come those images of body and of its qualities into the mind? All I can say is that they come not by the senses." (Inquiry into the Human Mind, of Seeing, Chap. vi. Sect. vi.) Now it has been observed, and we think very justly, that he who is contented with stating that he is conscious of certain sensations and perceptions, by no means assumes the independent existence of matter. The stern question of the sceptic, What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? can only be met by the most accurate and precise investigation of the phenomena; and in such matter of fact which embraces all the relations or conditions of the phenomena under investigation, mere individual opinion alone is no adequate criterion without much subsequent proof, as general and as universal as possible, not merely in regard to the number of the investigators, but also with

respect to the nature of the evidence and to the taking into account of all the conditions. This general scrutiny, carried out according to the rules of Deductive Science, may be considered as furnishing a criterion not to be found either in intuitive instinctive individual belief, or in common sense, when it is to the majority alone that the appeal is made.

The theory of "common sense" is, then, the first which we have to investigate. This is defined to be the "universal irresistible belief of mankind," to which if men dissent, Dr. Reid advises the sending of them to a mad-house! Therefore, although volumes have been written on the subject, we are bound to present a definite characteristic of a faculty, the want of which may expose us to such a disagreeable occurrence. "Common sense" is presented by Reid as a most unambiguous word, as a word "as well understood as the county of York." This definition, which would bestow a kind of physical evidence on "common sense," would render that term a mere equivalent of "consciousness," with which we must always begin in whatever we doubt, and in whatever we prove. This principle, termed by Brown the intuitive instinctive belief in self-identity, is always that peculiar un-named and un-nameable belief in relative existence, or in Self and not-Self, which is alone certain, all the rest being inference, and which ever since Descartes has been admitted by all thinkers under some name or the other, and usually under that of Consciousness. Still, however high the individual testimony of this belief, it is, we believe, its universality which alone bestows upon it that positive value which is admitted to be possessed by every one. And yet that Reid conceived "common sense" to be something more than this faculty or belief in relative existence, or in Self and not-Self, is evident

from the whole tenor of that thinker's writings. This view of Reid is clearly expressed in the following passage: "It is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between reason and common sense. It is, indeed, the first-born of reason, and as they are commonly joined together in speech and in writing, they are inseparable in their nature. We ascribe to reason two offices or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second, to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province and the sole province of common sense; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reason. Perhaps it may be said: why, then, do you give it a particular name, since it is acknowledged to be only a degree of reason? It would be a sufficient answer to this: why do you abolish a name which is to be found in the language of all civilized nations, and has acquired a right by prescription? Such an attempt is equally foolish and ineffectual. Every wise man will be apt to think that a name which is to be found in all languages as far back as we can trace them, is not without some use.

"But there is an obvious reason why this degree of reason should have a name appropriated to it; and that is, that in the greatest part of mankind no other degree of reason is to be found. It is this degree that entitles them to the denomination of reasonable creatures. It is this degree of reason, and this only, that makes a man capable of managing his own affairs, and answerable for his conduct towards others. There is, therefore, the best reason why it should have a name appropriated to it.

"These two degrees of reason differ in other respects, which would be sufficient to entitle them to dis-

tinct names. The first is purely the gift of Heaven. And where Heaven has not given it, no education can supply the want. The second is learned by practice and rules, when the first is not wanting. A man who has common sense may be taught to reason. But if he has not that gift, no teaching will make him able either to judge of first principles or to reason from them." Common sense, then, with Reid, is neither mere Consciousness, i. e., belief in relative existence, nor judgment, and yet it is a clear and certain knowledge of things. And, at all events, in the passages just cited, the word *sense* has evidently the meaning of rational conclusion. Yet, in other parts of his writings, we shall find the term used as an equivalent of the knowledge imparted by the senses. On this point we side with those who consider the whole question to be a matter of philosophical investigation, if not of abstract speculation. The mysteries of the intellectual phenomena are not so readily solved as Dr. Reid appears to have thought; for it is well known by all persons who have studied the various kinds of insanity,—without which study no man is competent to advance a single proposition on the mental phenomena,—that there exists a species of insanity termed *notional*, in which the reasoning and judging faculties remain unimpaired, whilst the fatal error lies in the very first degree, and consists in the mistaking the objects of thought or imagination for real and actual existences. Evidently, in such cases, it is "common sense" that is wanting and not judgment; and it is no less evident that in those cases the error of perception can only be detected, by comparing them with the perceptions of other people, and, in doubtful instances, with the opinions of still more competent judges. Again, it were a truism to say, that if the decision of the practical, universal, irresistible beliefs of

men were always to constitute the real criterion of certitude, the diurnal revolution of the earth must be denied, and it would not be admitted that the inhabitants of the opposite sides of the earth could remain suspended in an inverted position. We would, therefore, prefer, as already stated, the old terms of universal judgment and of common opinion to that of *common sense*, which, in ancient philosophy, was the instinctive feeling of belief in the existence of an external world and of our own existence. The meaning was almost that of self-consciousness, or the belief in the existence of Self and not-Self. If common sense, according to Reid, is the first degree of judgment, one might suppose that that thinker deemed it to be equivalent to simple apprehension, which, he says, "is commonly represented as the first operation of the understanding; and judgment as being a composition or combination of simple apprehensions." But that is not the case; Reid tells Locke, that Nature never presents things either to the senses or to consciousness in a simple state; that they are always complex, and that the human mind, by the means of superior power, analyzes and abstracts every particular attribute of the objects of sense, and forms a distinct conception of it; "so that it is not by the senses immediately, but rather by the powers of analyzing and abstraction that we get the most simple and the most distinct notions, even of the objects of sense." Evidently, Reid here has in view the human Intelligence and not mere *common sense*. And again, after observing, "that one of the fruitless questions agitated among the scholastic philosophers in the dark ages, was, what is the criterion of truth?" the same thinker adds, "As if men could have any other way to distinguish truth from error, but by the right use of that power of judgment which God has given them." Does,

then, Reid admit the Cartesian fundamental criterion of truth, a "clear and distinct perception" expressed in the maxim, that "whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true," to be a matter of common sense? He does not, for considering the Cartesian term "perception" to be equivalent to the more modern one of conception, he merely concludes, that "our power of conceiving a proposition is no criterion of its possibility, or impossibility," and he appeals again to the faculty of judgment given to man, in order to judge as well of the necessity as of the truth of things. Still we consider ourselves justified in maintaining that Reid had more in view common judgment in using the term common sense than consciousness, although in the chapter xx. "of the evidence of sense and of belief in general," that writer appears to point to the common sense or mere individual judgment as to an adequate criterion.

Reid, in that chapter, terms *consciousness* "the immediate conceptions of the operations of our mind joined with a belief of their existence;" whilst he names *perception* the "conception of external objects by our external senses, joined with a belief of their existence." This conception of immediate objects of his senses is as distinct, and the belief is as firm in the most uninstructed peasant as in the greatest philosopher, says Reid; and all is *equally* unaccountable to both. Nor is the conviction and belief of the existence of these external objects known by our senses less unaccountable than their conception. They are believed, because they exist.

"Belief, assent, conviction, are words," remarks Reid, "which I think do not admit of logical definition, because the operation of the mind signified by them is perfectly simple and of its own kind. Nor do they need to be defined, because they are common

words and well understood." This definition is of the same kind as the one given of "common sense," which was said to be no more capable of definition than the county of York. However, be it as it may respecting the analogy which here seems to exist between "belief" and "common sense," the passage in which Reid dwells upon the nature of belief or assent as an intellectual phenomenon is highly interesting, and cannot be passed over in this part of our task, which aims at establishing the full value of positive belief.

"Belief," says Reid, "is always expressed in language by a proposition, wherein something is affirmed or denied. This is the form of speech which in all languages is appropriated to that purpose, and without belief there could be neither affirmation nor denial, nor should we have any form of words to express either. Belief admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance. These things are so evident to every man that reflects, that it would be abusing the reader's patience to dwell upon them. There are many operations of the mind, in which, when we analyze them as far as we are able, we find belief to be an essential ingredient. A man cannot be conscious of his own thoughts without believing that he thinks. He cannot perceive an object of sense, without believing that it exists. He cannot distinctly remember a past event, without believing that it did exist. Belief, therefore, is an ingredient in consciousness, in perception, and in memory. Not only in most of our intellectual operations, but in many of the active principles of the human mind, belief enters as an ingredient. Joy and sorrow, hope and fear, imply a belief of certain qualities in their objects. In every action that is done for an end, there must be a belief of its tendency to

that end. So large a share has belief in our intellectual operations, in our active principles, and in our actions themselves, that as faith in things divine is represented as the main spring in the life of a Christian, so belief in general is the main spring in the life of a man. That men often believe what there is no just ground to believe, and thereby are led into hurtful errors, is too evident to be denied; and on the other hand, that there are just grounds of belief, can as little be doubted by any man who is not a perfect sceptic.

“We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of belief. To believe without evidence, is a weakness which every man is concerned to avoid, and which every man wishes to avoid. Nor is it in a man’s power to believe any thing longer than he thinks he has evidence. What this evidence is, is more easily felt than described. Those who never reflected upon its nature, feel its influence in governing their belief. It is the business of the logician to explain its nature, and to distinguish its various kinds and degrees; but every man of understanding can judge of it, and commonly judges right, when the evidence is fairly laid before him, and his mind is free from prejudice. A man who knows nothing of the theory of vision, may have a good eye, and a man who never speculated about evidence in the abstract, may have a good judgment.

“The common occasions of life lead us to distinguish evidence into different kinds, to which we give names that are well understood; such as the evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, the evidence of consciousness, the evidence of testimony, the evidence of axioms, the evidence of reasoning: all men of common understanding agree, that each of these kinds of evidences, may afford just grounds of belief, and they

agree very generally in the circumstances that strengthen or weaken them." Reid then proceeds to inquire in what these evidences all agree. This he again does not find in the Cartesian maxim, that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, nor does he find a criterion of truth in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas admitted by Locke. "I confess," continues Reid, "that although I have, as I think, a distinct notion of the different kinds of evidence above mentioned, and perhaps of some others, which it is unnecessary here to enumerate, yet I am not able to find any common nature to which they may be all reduced. They seem to me to agree only in this; that they are all fitted by nature to produce belief in the human mind, some of them in the highest degree, which we call certainty; others, in various degrees, according to circumstances. The evidence of sense, when the proper circumstances occur, is good evidence, and a just ground of belief. I shall now compare it with the other kinds of evidences, that we may judge whether it be reducible to any of them, or of a nature peculiar to itself." Reid then proceeds to show:—First, That the evidence of sense seems to be quite different from that of reasoning, since no man seeks a reason for believing what he sees or feels, and if he did, it would be difficult to find one. But though he can give no reason for believing his senses, his belief remains as firm as if it were grounded on demonstration. All reasons furnished by Philosophy for believing our senses, are very insufficient, and will not bear examination. And the supposed invincible reasons against this belief have, on the other hand, never been able either to shake it in the philosophers themselves, or to convince others. The statesman continues to plot, the soldier to fight, and the merchant to export and import without being

in the least moved by the demonstrations that have been offered of the non-existence of those things about which they are so seriously employed. And a man may as soon by reasoning pull the moon out of her orbit, as destroy the belief of the objects of sense." Secondly, Reid remarks that the truths of sense are contingent truths, limited to time and place, and that their evidence, therefore, is not of the self-evident nature, such as that of the self-evident truths that are necessary, or not limited to time and place, but must be true at all times and in all places.

"Thirdly: If the word axiom be put to signify every truth which is known immediately, without being deduced from any antecedent truth, then the existence of the objects of sense may be called an axiom. For my senses give me immediate conviction of what they testify, as my understanding gives me of what is commonly called an axiom. There is, no doubt, an analogy between the evidence of sense, and the evidence of testimony. Hence we find, in all languages, the analogical expressions of the *testimony of sense*, of giving *credit* to our sense, and the like. But there is a real difference between the two, as well as a similitude. In believing upon testimony, we rely upon the authority of a person who testifies; but we have no such authority for believing our senses.

"Shall we say then," continues Reid, "that this belief is the inspiration of the Almighty? I think this may be used in a good sense, for I take it to be the immediate effect of our constitution, which is the work of the Almighty. But if inspiration be understood to imply a persuasion of its coming from God, our belief of the objects of sense is not inspiration; for, a man would believe his senses, though he had no notion of a Deity. He who is persuaded that he is the work-

manship of God, and that it is a part of his constitution to believe his senses, may think that a good reason to confirm his belief; but he had the belief before he could give this or any other reason for it."

Reid therefore maintains, in opposition to Locke, that the evidence of consciousness, and of memory, as well as that of the senses, is grounded on something else than on a perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, and this view of the subject is adopted by all modern philosophers. "When I compare," says Reid, "the different kinds of evidences above mentioned, I confess, after all, that the evidence of reasoning, and of that of some necessary and self-evident truths seems to be the least mysterious, and the most perfectly comprehended; and, therefore, I do not think it strange that philosophers should have attempted to reduce all kinds of evidence to these. When I see a proposition to be self-evident and necessary, and that the subject is plainly included in the predicate, there seems to be nothing more that I can desire, in order to understand why I believe it. And when I see a consequence that necessarily follows from one or more self-evident propositions, I want nothing more with regard to my belief of that consequence. The light of truth so fills my mind in these cases, that I can neither conceive nor desire any thing more satisfactory.

"On the other hand, when I remember distinctly a past event or see an object before my eyes, this commands my belief no less than an axiom. But when as a philosopher, I reflect upon this belief, and want to trace it to its origin, I am not able to reduce it into necessary and self-evident axioms, or conclusions that are necessarily consequent upon them. I seem to want that evidence that I can best comprehend, and which gives perfect satisfaction to an inquisitive mind, and

yet it is ridiculous to doubt, and I find it is not in my power. An attempt to throw off this belief is like an attempt to fly, equally ridiculous and impracticable. To a philosopher who has been accustomed to think that the treasure of his knowledge is the acquisition of that reasoning power of which he boasts, it is no doubt humiliating to find, that his reason can lay no claim to the greater part of it. By his reason he can discover certain abstract and necessary relations of things; but his knowledge of what really exists or did exist, comes by another channel, which is open to those who cannot reason. He is led to it in the dark, and knows not how he came by it." Here we do not find the term *common sense* in use, as constituting the authority of the elementary beliefs of the mind, those beliefs which are originally and unaccountably impressed on the human understanding, and are necessarily implied in most of its acts. These beliefs are termed by Dugald Stewart the "fundamental laws of belief," and we shall find them to constitute an essential part of the baggage of German philosophy. These impulsive innate principles of action general to all men constitute with the more peculiar instincts that render each man what he is, the greater part of the mental faculties. These are known as appetites, passions, affections, interest, reason, etc. "The same principle," says Reid, "is sometimes called by one of these names, sometimes by another, and principles of a very different nature are often called by the same name. There are some principles of action which require no attention, no deliberation, no will, these for distinction's sake we shall call *mechanical*. Another class we may call *animal*, as they seem common to man with other animals. A third class we may call *rational*, being proper to man as a rational creature." We have not to do with the

worth of these divisions of Reid, we merely follow up the views of that thinker respecting the natural beliefs of man. We shall therefore note the following passage in the chapter on Instinct. "If there be any instinctive belief in man, it is probably of the same kind with that which we ascribe to brutes, and may be specifically different from that rational belief which is grounded on evidence; but that there is something in man which we call belief, which is not grounded on evidence, I think must be granted. . . . When we grow up to the use of reason, testimony attended with certain circumstances, or even authority may afford a rational ground of belief; but with children without any regard to circumstances, either of them operates like demonstration. And as they seek no reason, nor can give any reason, for this regard to testimony and to authority, it is the effect of a natural impulse, and may be called instinct. Another instance of belief which appears to be instinctive, is that which children show even in infancy, that an event which they have observed in certain circumstances will happen again in like circumstances. A child of half a year old, who has once burned his finger by putting it in the candle, will not put it there again. Mr. Hume hath shown very clearly, that this belief is not the effect either of reason or experience. He endeavors to account for it by the association of ideas. Though I am not satisfied with his account of this phenomenon, it is sufficient for the present argument, that this belief is not grounded on evidence real or apparent. When a person has observed that nature is governed by fixed laws, he may have some rational ground to expect similar events in similar circumstances; but this cannot be the case of the child. His belief, therefore, is not grounded on evidence. It is the result of his constitution."

When treating of "common sense" in particular, Reid, we have seen, likens that principle to reason. The natural or instinctive beliefs are of an impulsive nature, and are more of the nature of *feeling*, and yet Reid does not admit that belief is a mere sensitive faculty. "But if we should grant to Mr. Hume that our ideas of memory afford no just ground to believe the past existence of things which we remember, it may still be asked how comes it to pass that perception and memory are accompanied with belief, while bare imagination is not. Though this belief cannot be justified upon his system, it ought to be accounted for as a phenomenon of human nature. An opinion or belief, Mr. Hume tells us, may be most accurately defined a lively idea, related to or associated with a present impression. This theory of belief is very fruitful of consequences, which Mr. Hume traces with his usual acuteness, and brings into the service of his system. A great part indeed of his system is built upon it, and it is of itself sufficient to prove what he calls his hypothesis, 'that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our nature.' It is very difficult to examine this account of belief with the same gravity with which it is proposed. . . . I cannot help thinking, that never any thing more absurd was gravely maintained by any philosopher, than this account of the nature of belief. The belief of a proposition is an operation of mind of which every man is conscious, and what it is he understands perfectly, though, on account of its simplicity, he cannot give a logical definition of it. If he compares it with the strength or vivacity of his ideas, or with any modification of ideas, they are so far from appearing to be one and the same, that they have not the least similitude." In short, the notion expressed by Mr. Hume that be-

belief does nothing but vary the manner in which we conceive any object, and can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity, meets in Reid a most decided opponent, since he remarks that Mr. Hume, although fully sensible of the objections to which his theory of belief was liable, still maintained that belief was only a modification of the idea which causes us to apprehend the idea more strongly or to take faster hold of it. "Whatever modification of the idea Mr. Hume makes belief to be," says Reid, "whether its vivacity or some other modification without a name, yet to make perception, memory, and imagination to be different degrees of that modification is chargeable with absurdity." Yet evidently the instinctive beliefs, according to Reid himself, partake more of the sensitive nature of the mind than of the cogitative part.

It is generally admitted, even by the stanch admirers of Reid, that the term *common sense* was badly chosen, as tending to sanction an appeal from the dictates of science to the voice of the multitude, almost always on the side of error. And the term has also, we believe, the effect of attempting to give to the individual a criterion which can only be found in the general or more universal. In such a doubt, and on account of the contradictory tendencies of the word, it had better be dropped; but since its use has now become very prevalent, and since it reposes on the fact that all knowledge, that all science, finds in the intellectual phenomena a starting point, and that men always generalize from the little they know; it were idle to expect that the term can so readily cease to be used. It is with the common sense doctrine, as with Sensationalism, which it however opposes: it has an appearance of clearing away so easily all the difficulties of that most difficult of all questions, the mysteries of the in-

tellectual phenomena. The result has been that *common sense* is now adduced in many instances, and especially in common parlance in favor of Sensationalism itself, whilst Dr. Reid opposes the doctrine of Locke by means of that very principle, when he appeals to common sense in favor of the *à priori*, and instinctive appearance in the mind of many important beliefs, quite independent of sensations derived from without.

We have seen common sense considered by Reid as a degree of judgment: we have seen him appeal to it in the case of intuitive belief, as to a something irrespective of reason, and it is to the same principle that we find him having recourse, in order to struggle with the received opinion of the fallacy of the senses. The upshot and issue of the chapter entitled "of the fallacy of the senses," is in reality that the senses being merely means of judgment, cannot err, but that the error is one of Reason. Now, this conclusion *de facto*, certainly did not warrant the following passage against reason, as of little value when compared to the senses: "Upon the whole, it seems to be a common error of philosophers, to account the senses fallacious; and to this error they have added another, that one use of reason is to detect the fallacies of sense. Perhaps the pride of philosophers may have given occasion to this error. Reason is the faculty wherein they assume a superiority to the unlearned. The informations of sense are common to the philosopher and to the most illiterate; they put all men upon a level, and therefore are apt to be undervalued. We must, however, be beholden to the information of sense for the greatest and most interesting part of our knowledge. The wisdom of nature has made the most useful things most common, and they ought not to be despised on that account.

Nature likewise forces our belief in those informations, and all the attempts of philosophy to weaken it are fruitless and vain." Here, if the question be asked, why all this lowering of reason? no other answer can be given than to an effect, the very opposite of all this spouting against reason, since the whole chapter urges strenuously in favor of the high worth of reason, and of the slight degree of confidence to which the senses are entitled when reason is wanting. "The senses," says Reid, "testify nothing, therefore they cannot give false testimony: they are no judging faculties, therefore no judgment can be imputed to them." Here *common sense* is considered no longer as a degree of reason, but as the mere dictate of sensation, and before the decisions of sense as sensation, Reason is humbled to the lowest pitch, whilst yet it is advanced that reason is every thing as testimony, and the senses nothing. We own the difficulties Reid had to encounter, and do not aim at merely criticizing. We have entered into this investigation as prefatory to that of German philosophy, and in order to facilitate the steps of those who may be uninitiated in the later discussions concerning the mental phenomena. However summary our inquiry into German philosophy may appear, a clear exposition of Reid's main tenets, was a preliminary absolutely required, for Reid constitutes the connecting link between Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Berkeley, Hartley, Locke, Leibnitz, Hume, and the more modern philosophy of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Therefore, we by no means aim at finding Reid in fault, we approve of the general tenor of his doctrine, respecting the real worth of certain impulsive beliefs, and we believe that that real worth may be rendered by some general term, such as common judgment, or universal opinion, in which term the generality, the universality

of the belief is set into full evidence. That such judgment, such opinion, includes the informations of the senses, respecting external existences in time and place is a matter of course. But the word *sense* was ill chosen, and evidently misleads Reid himself, since he sometimes conceives it as judgment, and at others as sensation. Thus, when speaking of the fallacy of the senses, he says they cannot err, for they are common to the learned and to the unlearned, and the greatest and most interesting part of our knowledge is owing to them. In what, then, consists this absolute certitude of common sense? The existence of an external world. But how came we to know of the differences which exist between external objects, and of the qualities of these objects? Here reason steps in. Why therefore, we repeat, the lowering of reason in the same breath that attributes to reason all we know of things, and to the senses nothing? The fallacy was occasioned, we believe, by the adoption of the word *sense*, so easily understood either as a sensorial or as a rational belief, and here we find ourselves in accordance with the general opinion on the subject. It is against Reid's general conclusion, that we enter our protest. It is against the lowering of a faculty that Reid himself tells us constitutes the judge, before whom the evidence of sense is merely given. No stronger language can be held, than that of Reid in favor of Reason in the whole chapter, which concludes with such violent expressions of contempt. From whence proceeded the veil that evidently clouded the sound judgment of Reid? It proceeded, we believe, from his desire to obviate what Hume advances against the constitution of things, when he points to the contradictions that exist between our natural beliefs and those of Reason. Reid, as a divine, seems to have considered it as a duty to vindicate the

Almighty!! And indeed, the fallacy is so general even at the present day, that we probably shall not make ourselves understood.

Reid begins the chapter (xxii.) by saying that if the fallacy of the senses be taken for granted the natural conclusion would be that they were given us by some malignant demon and not by the wise and beneficent Author of Nature, since instead of giving us true information they would seem to have been given us for the purpose of misleading. And he sets out with an ardent desire to uproot what he considers to be a conclusion both impious and erroneous. But evidently the impiety which Reid conceived to be involved in the admission of a natural contradiction between the senses and reason biased his good sense. It was not that his trust in Almighty power was not proof against the sarcasm of the sceptic, it was that he obeyed in spite of himself the reigning opinion, that of Leibnitz, that human knowledge was adequate to the task of vindicating the ways of God. But besides this first question of the apparent injustice of the Great Author of Being in thus bestowing on man a deceitful instrument in the senses, another very important principle of Reid appeared to be in jeopardy by admitting of the fallacy of the senses. Reid, as a protestant divine, conceived the protestant doctrine of transubstantiation to be endangered by that admission; but instead of chiding nominally the philosophers who deem the senses fallacious whilst it is the judgment that errs, he vents his wrath on Reason, on the very faculty which substantiates his own opinion. If we reduce, says Reid, all the notions given by the senses to extension, motion, and figure, it is evident that the errors of false judgments into which men fall arise from mistaking the relative qualities which the senses

point out, for absolute or real qualities. "This cannot justly be called a fallacy of sense, because our senses testify only the change of situation of one body in relation to other bodies, and not its change of situation in absolute space. It is only the relative motion of bodies that we perceive and that we perceive truly. It is the province of Reason and Philosophy, from the relative motions which we perceive to collect the real and absolute motions which produce them." Here we find Reid reasoning according to the prevalent systems of his time, which admitted that the real and the absolute could be fathomed by human intelligence, that the Infinite was really to be produced by the Finite, and which at last have led men to their present situation of believing that the knowledge of God is a suggestion of reason which began with Fetishism and will end no one knows how. The hankering of the divine at explaining all things by referring to the wisdom and goodness of God is also evident in Reid's explaining the want of reason in a child by admitting that reason would do the child more harm than good, since he would be as the man in the dark where every step may lead into a pit. Therefore he says, it is instinct and not reason that leads the child, whilst as the child abandoned to itself would die, and as the rational faculty of the human race begins at the earliest dawn of age, it is impossible not to take into account these circumstances in summing up all the relations in which children are placed, and this without denying the real impulsive energy of the intellectual phenomena, such as memory, etc. Reason is no absolute faculty. Could a human being be shut up until the age of thirty, we verily believe, from relative experience, that that being would prove himself a mere child, although at the age of reason. The instinctive impulse, which Reid so

justly points out, is only an inducement to act in a given way, and the knowledge to which it leads is the result of circumstances quite distinct from that original impulse. The child is in general surrounded with and guarded by the reason of its parents or guardians, but when the stern dictates of want and necessity urge a child to early activity it is surprising how soon their reason is developed, and how readily the lessons of experience are retained. Yet even in these cases the reason stands in direct ratio with the experience, and the native capacity of the child. The trust or faith of the child in the tutor is much akin to that of the brute creation, and if in later years they learn that falsehood generally predominates in the world it is a matter of painful experience. But in advancing this, we by no means maintain that the child left to itself would always act up to some peculiar principle of *veracity* such as Reid considers to exist.

The various deceptions of sight, of hearing, of touch, which so readily impose on the ignorant, are considered by Reid to be false judgments, and not fallacies of the senses. The only deceptions of sense which that thinker admits are those that proceed from some disorder or preternatural state, either of the external organ, or of the nerves and brain. And with Reid the pain some persons feel in their toes after the leg is cut off, constitutes a deception of sense, and thus a case, in which no actual local cause can produce the throe, and in which Descartes perceived an error of imagination or common sense, which error our reason corrects, this case is a fallacy of sense, whilst the broken appearance of a stick placed in water is a fallacy of judgment.

The important services rendered by Reid, and which consisted more in pointing out the errors of his predecessors than in establishing any real positive knowl-

edge of the intellectual phenomena, must not prevent our adverting to the fruitless attempt made by that thinker to produce an internal, infallible and necessary individual certitude, that does not require to be supported by our fellow creatures. The certitude of *common sense*, if that principle be considered as the first step or degree of reason, demands something general, something common to all, for the greater the "self-trust" of the individual, the stronger our suspicion. We have already mentioned, that mere majority is no criterion in our opinion. But if *common sense* be conceived as the contrary of Reason, if it be viewed in the light of mere sensation entirely under the guidance of judgment and as constituting in itself an absolute certitude, such a certitude can be no other than that of *relative existence*. It is then scarcely to be distinguished from consciousness, which, although incapable of error, only owes that high privilege of immunity to the narrow and circumscribed circle in which it revolves. *Common sense* taken in that light, may be considered as the most general principle that exists in organized nature. The brute creation, it is true, do not appear subject to much doubting. But is it before this principle, that Reason, or rather the great principle of human sagacity, of human intelligence, is to bow submissively? And wherefore this base renunciation? In order to satisfy a theological whim; in order "to vindicate the ways of God." And is it really to be supposed that mankind shall not at last come to perceive the utter inanity of such high-sounding phrases? The theologian before he undertakes to reconcile the contradictions of the human mind, would do well to attempt to reconcile those which we meet with at every step in the order of nature, or if the task is above his competency he would do well to undertake

to lessen the contradictions which abound in the fields of chronology, of ancient geography, of Ethnology, of Geology, and of Anthropology. It may be said, that such a restriction is a mere conceit, for the *Theologian* has as great a right to expatiate on the attributes of God and to derive therefrom his conviction, as the *Metaphysician* has to derive the Infinite from the Finite, or the *Sensationalist* to admit nothing in the mind that did not proceed from the senses, or the *Materialist* to maintain that mind is a secretion of the brain, and that the attribute and the subject are one, or the *Sceptic* to doubt of all things except of beliefs. It may also be said in favor of theology, that minds of undoubted capacity, that a Bossuet has admitted the *à priori* proof of the existence of God, and that therefore *if* the existence of God is a truth stamped on the mind of every human being that comes into the world, the theologian stands on natural ground when his starting point is the impossibility that such contradictions can proceed from God. Now we fully acknowledge the right of every human being to express his opinion, and we conceive free inquiry as the birthright of man. But it is not only a right, it is also a duty, and both require to be carried into effect; but when the effect is disastrous, men are apt to suppose that the inquiry was badly conducted. We even go farther and acknowledge the right of man to error, because we are certain that if the principle of free inquiry is maintained error will be at last abandoned. When then the theologians (either Papist, Calvinist, or Lutheran) claim the right to reason or argue in their own way, each laying the hand on Holy Writ; when they deny this and that, because otherwise it would be irreconcilable with the attributes of God, it is to the issue that we refer. And this issue will ever be the same under

whatever name theology may flourish: it will be the scission of science, of human knowledge from religion. Is not such a result well calculated to make us doubt of the real worth of the method adopted? Must we renounce all hope of ever seeing the day when Faith in the Almighty will alone vibrate in the bosom of the Christian when circumstances occur which tend to lower in the eye of Reason, the Power, and the Wisdom, and the Goodness of God? We shall then no longer be told, as was Galileo, that any given relation is impossible because it may appear contrary to the views that men entertain of the ways of God. Geology will then cease to be a stumbling-block to the religious mind that cannot conciliate contradictions which theology, or rather a kind of mythology, conceives as utterly irreconcilable; as if contradictions did not superabound in nature.

Reid, however, rendered real service in pointing out *beliefs* which could not arise from external objects, but beyond that positive fact, we believe Psychology has no other issue. The intrinsic value of the intellectual phenomena was enhanced, but the relation between Intellect and Life remained as dark as ever. The fears expressed by Locke have been realized, the acts of intelligence have been isolated and converted into *entities*. Reason and Will have been considered as distinct souls; every *à priori* notion has been conceived as an *inspiration*, and every matter of fact, the origin of which was lost in tradition, has been termed *a revelation*!! As if in matters where the greatest difficulties abound, these latter would be lessened by an indiscriminate use of the terms. Nor has the philosophy of belief, thus founded by Reid, been better treated by his successors. The sensorial and rational character of belief, as a principle of high impor-

tance among the intellectual phenomena, has been distorted. It has been endeavored to make the natural tendency of the mind to believe, a kind of rational foundation of divine faith independent of the traditional revelation of God. For the moment, however, we have not to do with that question. Here we limit ourselves to the remark that the real and positive value of instinctive and of rational belief must be first clearly established, before we can proceed to investigate the *à priori* and *à posteriori* arguments respecting the existence of God. The real conclusion of Reid's observations seems to us to be the one which constitutes the basis of this first part of our views on Faith in general, namely, that if inference of all kind be lopped away, the senses merely inform us of relative existence, and nothing more. The rest is inference or judgment. But we do not admit, on account of that, of the lowering of rational inference. In order more clearly to establish this point, we will counterbalance the opinion of Reid with regard to the positive value of the instinctive principle of belief or veracity and of rational evidence, with that of Adam Smith on the same subject. "There seems to be in young children," says that philosopher, "an instinctive disposition to believe whatever they are told. Nature seemed to have judged it necessary for their preservation that they should, for some time at least, put implicit confidence in those to whom the care of their childhood, and of the earliest and most necessary parts of their education, is intrusted. Their credulity, accordingly, is excessive, and it requires long and much experience of the falsehood of mankind to reduce them to a reasonable degree of diffidence and distrust. In grown up people the degrees of credulity are, no doubt, very different. The wisest and most experienced are generally the least

credulous. But the man scarce lives who is not more credulous than he ought to be, and who does not, upon many occasions, give credit to tales, which not only turn out to be perfectly false, but which a very moderate degree of reflection and attention might have taught him could not well be true. The natural disposition is always to believe. It is acquired wisdom and experience only that teach incredulity, and they very seldom teach it enough. The wisest and most cautious of us all frequently gives credit to stories which he himself is afterwards both ashamed and astonished that he could possibly think of believing."

Now, what is the fair conclusion of Reid's investigation of the relative value of the evidence of the senses and that of Reason? The same, we believe, as that of Adam Smith. Reason is always a check which serves to remediate—what? Hasty judgment, or very often beliefs grounded on no judgment at all. Now, the bad feature of Reid's doctrine is, we think, that of appearing to confer upon instinctive belief a value which is too often unduly conveyed to the beliefs of hasty judgment, on the ground of their springing forth, as it were, intuitively. Would it not have been more judicious if Reid had said Reason is almost every thing, and Sensation merely a certitude of relative existence, and the elementary beliefs, such as Memory, Judgment, Imagination, &c., all require an exertion of Reason or Sagacity to pass into act. But, then, had Reid acted thus, he would have belied his disproving of the Cartesian doctrine that reduces to Consciousness the certitude of all the principles deemed primary. Consciousness, or the certitude of Thought, as existing, seemed to Reid to constitute a too narrow basis to raise any thing thereon. "Modern Philosophy," says Reid, "of which Descartes may justly be accounted the founder, being

built upon the ruins of the Peripatetic, has a spirit quite opposite, and runs into a contrary extreme. The Peripatetic, not only adopted, as first principles, those which mankind have always rested upon in their most important transactions, but along with them many vulgar prejudices; so that this system was founded upon a wide bottom, but in many parts unsound. The modern system has narrowed the foundation so much, that every superstructure raised upon it appears top-heavy. From the single principle of the existence of our own thoughts, very little, if any thing, can be deduced by just reasoning, especially if we suppose that all our other faculties may be fallacious." Reid was, therefore, of opinion that all consistent reasoning on this system necessarily leads to scepticism, because it tends to admit the existence of mind alone. Buffier is cited by Reid as having been the first who perceived the fallacy of the Cartesian doctrine, even when it was in the meridian of its glory, and as having attempted to lay a broader foundation for human knowledge than the certitude of their own existence, and the existence of those operations of mind of which we are conscious, whilst the existence of other men and other things should be proved by argument. Now, granting that the link with the outward world constitutes a principle as primary as any principle can be, and ought to be esteemed as equal in degree to the certitude of Self, granting, in short, that Self and not-Self form integrant parts of an act of intellect, in which they are united in one, yet it may, we believe, be justly questioned whether that act extends beyond the intuitive certitude bestowed thereby in external relations. It is the knowledge of relative existence that is certified then, but nothing more by the senses, all the remainder is of Reason. Yet still the basis or that from which

Reason is to be distinguished, is of narrow circuit. And the intuitive certitude which exists in that narrow circuit, is as fully possessed by the brute creation as by man. If, indeed, that certitude be not greater, because brutes never hesitate or doubt: reason never causes, at least with them, any thing similar to what it does in man. But between the intuitive certitude of the senses, and the rational evidence of Reason or Judgment, is there no other means of belief? Reid admits such a mean, that of pure judgment or pure reason, and this view we shall find to have been carried out to its utmost limits by Kant. It is with the help of pure judgment that Reid denies the proposition of Hume, which makes belief more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our nature. "This cannot surely mean," remarks Reid, "that belief is not an act of thinking. It is not, therefore, the power of thinking that Mr. Hume calls the cogitative part of our nature. Neither can it be the power of judging, for all belief implies judgment; and to believe a proposition means the same thing as to judge it to be true. It seems, therefore, to be the power of reasoning that he calls the cogitative part of our nature. If this be his meaning, I agree to it in part. The belief of first principles is not an act of the reasoning power, for all reasoning must be grounded upon them. We judge them to be true, and believe them without reasoning. But why this power of judging of first principles should be called the sensitive part of our nature, I do not understand. As our belief of first principles is an act of pure judgment without reasoning, so our belief of the conclusions drawn by reasoning from first principles, may, I think, be called an act of the reasoning faculty. Upon the whole," continues Reid, "I see only two conclusions that can be fairly drawn from the

profound and intricate reasoning of Mr. Hume against reason. The first is, that we are fallible in all our judgments and in all our reasonings. The second, that the truth and fidelity of our faculties can never be proved by reasoning, and therefore our belief of it cannot be founded on reasoning. If the last be what Mr. Hume calls his hypothesis, I subscribe to it, and think it not an hypothesis, but a manifest truth; though I conceive it to be very improperly expressed, by saying that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our nature."

However much Reid may dissent from Mr. Hume on various topics, it is evident, from these words, that he agreed with the sceptic writer in lowering the value of rational evidence. And this depreciation of Reason is grounded by Reid,—not as with Hume, on the distinction of the mere sensitive nature of intuitive belief, and of belief in general, whilst rational belief is deemed to proceed from the cogitative principle of the intellect, a distinction which, either true or not, is clear and definite,—but on the admission of a faculty of very metaphysical and recondite nature termed by the promoter of the doctrine of common sense pure judgment. Now, *common sense*, as we have shown it to be admitted by Reid, is the faculty that assures us of the existence of the external object, but *pure judgment*, or the faculty that gives us our belief of first principles without reasoning, is of a mental or subjective nature, and does not depend on *common sense*. Hume, by the expression *sensitive*, evidently assimilates to sensation and to common sense those elementary beliefs which Reid maintains to be judgment without reasoning, or acts of pure judgment. The distinction is a very nice one, and deeply metaphysical, and moreover it supposes that we are acquainted with some clear distinction

between an inference drawn by one mind in an instant, and the same inference requiring another several days or weeks to accomplish. An intuitive belief, such as we shall find admitted by Kant as the elementary form of Thought, partakes more, we believe, of the sensitive or impulsive nature of the mind, than of the reflective or cogitative. But be it as it may respecting the nature of the intellectual act itself, the very distinction, admitted by Reid, proves that the doctrine of *common sense*, "which assures us of our own and of others existence," does not warrant us to admit of acts of judgment that are not inferences, without entering into those metaphysical vapors in which we shall soon be plunged when investigating what is termed German Philosophy. We esteem, that the most that can be said of them is, as Hume remarked, that they exist as impulsive beliefs, and not as judgments or inferences.

In joining issue with those who blame Reid for using such a term as *common sense*, we by no means suspect the good faith of that philosopher, but evidently he considers the term to bear a more general meaning than mere *sensation*. This must be *pure judgment*, and indeed we shall see that it was also to a *feeling* of the kind that Hume attributed the common sentiment of morality existing amongst men. "The notion of morals," says Mr. Hume, "implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it." This leads him to inquire whether it be reason or sentiment that is conversant with morals: of which inquiry the issue may be stated in his own words, viz. "Twist and turn the matter as much as you will, you can never rest the morality on relation, but must

have recourse to the decisions of sentiment." And Mr. Hume considers himself justified in estimating Morality not as a matter of judgment, but as a matter of Taste. To this view of Hume, Reid opposes the dictates of *common sense*, but of common sense not as a mere testimony of which reason decides, but as a dictate of pure judgment. "I conceive," says Reid, "that the whole force of the reasoning of Mr. Hume amounts to this. When we judge an action to be good or bad, it must have been so in its own nature antecedent to that judgment, otherwise the judgment is erroneous. If, therefore, the action be good in its nature, the judgment of the agent cannot make it bad, nor can his judgment make it good, if in its nature it be bad. For this would be to ascribe to our judgment a strange magical power of transforming the nature of things, and to say, that my judging a thing to be what it is not, makes it really what I erroneously judge it to be. This, I think, is the objection in its full strength;" and in answer to it Reid proposes to cut the metaphysical knot "because it fixes an absurdity upon the clearest and most indisputable principles of morals, and of common sense. For I appeal to any man whether there be any principle of morality, or any principle of common sense more clear than the following, that although a thing be not unclean in itself, yet to him that esteemeth it to be unclean, to him it is unclean. But the metaphysical argument makes this absurd. 'For,' says the metaphysician, 'if the thing was not unclean in itself, you judged wrong in esteeming it to be unclean; and what can be more absurd, than that your esteeming a thing to be what it is not, should make it what you erroneously esteem it to be?'" Reid then proceeds to point out in opposition to Hume, that the goodness of the action refers not to a peculiar feeling, not to the

sensitive part of our nature but to the cogitative part, of which Will constitutes an integral portion. "It is action," says Reid, "that dissipates all the obscurity of abstract theory, and when a man exerts his active power well or ill, *there* is a moral goodness or turpitude which is truly imputable to the man only." Here in the mind of Reid the balance no longer weighs on the side of mere sensation, but reason comes in for her part. And yet that part is small; for standing as it were in equilibrium between intuition and inference, that thinker adopts intuitive inference. The following are his words where common sense is now described as something more than "a mere witness:"

"I find no fault with the name moral sense, although I conceive this name has given occasion to some mistakes concerning the nature of our moral power. The name of *conscience*, however, as it is the most common, seems to me as proper as any that has been given to it. Modern philosophers have conceived of the external senses as having no other office but to give us certain sensations, or simple conceptions, which we could not have without them, and this notion has been applied to the moral sense. But it seems to me to be a mistaken notion in both. By the sense of seeing, I not only have the conception of the different colors, but I perceive one body to be of this color, another of that. In like manner, by my moral sense, I have not only the conceptions of right and wrong in conduct, but I perceive *this* conduct to be right, *that* to be wrong, and *that* indifferent. *All our senses are judging faculties, so also is conscience.*" Here then we find the senses no longer described as the witnesses, they are become judges. And here again Reid seems prompted to judge thus diversely in order to obviate all the apparent contradictions which arise when it is admitted that

right and wrong, the result of rational inference, may be distinct from a natural intuitive feeling of good and bad. Goodness in an action considered abstractly is that, says Reid, which "ought" to be. This has been adopted by Kant, as we shall see, but the great principle of "duty" thus erected as a criterion does more honor to the social philosophy of Reid than to the strength of his arguments against Hume in regard to the important distinction between the sensitive and the cogitative parts of our nature which enter into the composition of moral action. At all events the rational part is preponderant in the notion of duty, and this may account for our finding the author of the common sense theory now considering "the senses to be judging faculties." Is it not that Reid himself perceived that the disparagement of Reason in order to make way for common sense which man is said to possess with the brute is an unqualifiable lowering of human nature? This, which Reid does not take into consideration when attempting to prove that the senses are never fallacious because they never judge but only bear witness,—this position strikes him when Hume terms the moral witness *useful or artificial*, whilst the term of "natural virtues" is applied to the agreeable. Here Reid calls for help on Conscience or the sense of duty, the moral faculty, and remarks that "if the notion of duty be a simple conception of its own kind, and of a different nature from the conceptions of utility and agreeableness, of interest or reputation; if this moral faculty be the prerogative of man, and no vestige of it be found in brute animals; if it be given us by God to regulate all our animal affections and passions; if to be governed by it be the glory of man and the image of God in his soul, and to disregard its dictates be his dishonor and depravity; I say if these things be so, to seek the

foundation of morality in the affections which we have in common with the brutes, is to seek the living with the dead, and to change the glory of man, and the image of God in his soul into the similitude of an ox that eateth grass." This moral faculty, distinct from reason, is then a kind of instinct, and yet Reid insists forcibly on its voluntary character. "A dog has a tender concern for her puppies, so has a man for his children. The natural affection is the same in both, and is amiable in both. But why do we impute moral virtue to the man on account of this concern and not to the dog? The reason surely is that in the man, the natural affection is accompanied with a sense of duty, but in the dog it is not. The same thing may be said of all the kind affections common to us with the brute. They are amiable qualities, but they are not moral virtues." Are then the moral faculties instincts or judgments? They grow up by degrees, says Reid, as our reason does; but he admits with Hume that "in all ingenuous natures the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage." This admission of Hume seems to Reid to tally with what Mr. Hume asserts in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, where we have seen that he pleads strongly in favor of instinct against reason. But is Reid justified in returning to "sense" and "mere instinct" after terming the senses "*judging faculties*," and denying that the moral sense was more of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our nature? The good will and the good intention which alone, as Reid most justly remarks, entitle an action to our gratitude, are more rational than instinctive, and we believe that Reid, as we have already hinted, was himself convinced of this, but then in order to avoid the fallacy of human judgment he

considered the judgment to be intuitive, or an elementary belief.

This summary inquiry will, we apprehend, sufficiently justify our joining issue with those who consider Reid as having unjustifiably attacked Philosophy with a false argument, that of common sense as an individual judgment; whilst it was the Universality of the intuition of which the mere individual was not competent to judge of *by intuition*, that was, and remains, the great point to be decided. Reid admits with Hume of belief, as the only real affirmation in sensation and judgment, but he attempts to infer consequences far less sceptical. He must, however, with Hume, be admitted as having established before Kant the positive existence in the mind not only of Consciousness, as established by the Cartesians, but also of certain elementary beliefs independent of experience although only known thereby, such as Memory, etc.

But the Scotch metaphysicians have been rightly taxed with pusillanimity. They merely pointed out the elementary forms which a close scrutiny or another view of things allowed them to perceive, but it belonged to Kant and to his successors to go beyond the mere fact, and to frame the system that still forms the ultimate limits of Thought, when she refuses to assimilate her ethereal nature with the gross material objects that constitute the phenomenal world. The union between the Scotch and German philosophy has, however, been most ably effected by Mr. Hamilton, and it is to his writings that we must refer the reader who is desirous of investigating more fully the connection between the two schools.

The appeal of Mr. Hume to a peculiar feeling, that of "belief," as the upshot and issue of all experience, and the only ground of certitude, so that we may be

truly said to *believe* far more than to know, seems to have taken metaphysicians by surprise. And yet the doctrine is not only the basis of Cartesianism, since that doctrine is grounded on the certitude of the *belief* of the Self or I, as one that cannot be dispelled, but is, as a belief that remains unshaken, the foundation of the whole doctrine of Descartes. Reid, we have seen, found the basis too narrow, and without admitting "fundamental" or self-evident principles as maxims, admitted them as "*beliefs*" or primary *Truths*. But the meaning given by Hume to the term "belief," was not that of Reid, and Mr. Hamilton insists strongly, and we believe rightly, on that point, showing that the former by no means considered the "belief" as warranting the "truth" of the thing believed in, and merely constituted a positive feeling, proceeding from our sensitive nature and called "belief." When, therefore, it is said that modern philosophy proves the constant and inseparable union of the two principles, Reason and Belief or Faith, since do what he will, no man can advance a step without both; the reader must bear in mind, that this has nothing to do with Divine Faith in the light of an intuitive, unconditional knowledge of God. The reader must remember that before Hume, and in a philosophical sense, Bossuet and Butler insisted strongly on the nature of the mind, which not only in science, but in the daily course of social life, constituted evidences admitted as "*beliefs*" in spite of their unsatisfactory character. When Reid adduces "primary beliefs" as existing "*truths*," he only joins issue with Hume in admitting them to be "*truths*" as matters of fact. Something more is required than a psychological fact to cause it to obtain. For to say that the only ground for a man *believing* a thing to be true, is that he cannot help believing it to be so, would be the ad-

mission of sheer hallucinations as matters of fact, because the man was convinced of their truth in his individual capacity, and without reference to the judgment of others. Therefore, in the very outset, we have insisted on the opinion of Aristotle, respecting the necessity of a belief being *universal*, in order to obtain as such. And much might be said on the same subject, in order to prove more fully the fallacy of those who confound private judgment as individual conviction, with the judgment of the individual grounded on sound inductive and deductive conviction. The doctrine of "common sense" of Buffier and Reid, thus indiscriminately applied as a criterion on account of its merely obtaining in the individual, would be, as it has most justly been remarked, the admission of the Truth of monomaniac convictions. In positive Philosophy, Reason or the human Intelligence will ever find a ground to rely on, not because that ground is conceived as unconditional, but because in Induction and Deduction properly conducted, the mind discovers a standard which serves as a remedy to individual error or mere private judgment; always premising that positive Philosophy takes as *universally* admitted truths, the existence of certain primary faculties of the human mind, as connected with certain conditions of the nervous and general system of human life.

German Philosophy entering boldly into the field of doubtful "beliefs," as exposed by Reid, and calling on all philosophy, both ancient and modern, to furnish a means of solution, must not be conceived as a mere agglomeration of difficulties. The mysticism of expression is a right in schools. It may even be questioned whether our efforts at unravelling that mystery, are not unworthy attempts to introduce to the notice of the general reader, curtailed relations of matters which re-

quire to be attended to in their fullest extent, in order to have justice done to them. At all events, we would signalize as weak and unworthy of philosophers, the reproach addressed so often to German Philosophy, as consisting in more ancient speculations dressed in modern guise, and presented in new forms, merely with some few additions. No writer ever remained more completely himself than Hegel, and yet all his philosophy is grounded on the very views of his immediate predecessors, not forgetting to add thereto the views he adopts from all the great English and French philosophers.

Whilst Reid was attempting to sow in the ground broken by Hume the seeds of a philosophy very different from Scepticism, Jacobi, a German philosopher, sought to plant therein the very doctrine of Divine Faith as a primary, *à priori* instinctive 'belief' of the human Soul. Belief in the Existence of God, or Faith in God, Jacobi conceives to be to the soul what belief in self-consciousness is to the mind. What the Faith of Reason is to the human Intelligence, such he maintains Divine Faith to be to the more ethereal Spirit. Faith would thus stand opposed to Reason, and would admit of other grounds of belief. The knowledge of the Existence of God is the result of this primary evidence, this intuitive impression of the soul. As God, says Jacobi, the Almighty cannot be proved, for man can only prove that which he can conceive; and a God that can be proved, is no God. Natural Theology, he maintains, is grounded on this instinctive belief of the soul: this constitutes *the Revelation*. And as the Mind possesses sensible perception, so the Soul possesses Divine perception or a perception of God. And as rational perception admits of no demonstration, so it is with the spiritual perception of the Existence of God.

This intuitive belief or Faith in God is, with Jacobi, the only answer that can be given to every question respecting God, and it stands in a spiritual light in the same position as the intuitive belief in self-identity or self-existence stands in relation to all rational conception. For in all the latter the only adequate answer that can be given to the inquiry respecting the ultimate grounds of belief, is that we cannot avoid believing, and that such a belief constitutes a feeling of a peculiar nature. The views of Jacobi appear to be the foundation of the philosophy of a theological writer well known in England, Channing. Both admit of the distinction between Reason and Sentiment. Both place feeling or sentiment in juxtaposition. With Jacobi, Channing is ever ready to attend to the Light of the Heart, to Love and Affection in preference to Reason. Where is true Light to be found, asks Jacobi? for both Reason and Feeling maintain contrary opinions. Reason, he answers, has a more objective appearance, but a yawning gulf lies behind the empty forms of the mind, the gulf of nothingness. Feeling casts before her a far dimmer light, but its nature is more subjective, and behind it we find God.

The admission of Jacobi respecting the utter worthlessness of finite or relative conception as the starting point of the knowledge of God's Existence, strikes at the root of his own doctrine, for the considering of Feeling as a belief of the Heart and not of the Mind, does not render that feeling less relative or more unconditional. Jacobi, it is true, conceives it to be far more unconditional than the *elementary beliefs* of the Mind, and as being of a higher order, yet Feeling still retains its *relative* character, nor would even the proof of its arising in another part of the nervous system than the brain, cancel that conditional nature.

K A N T.

Brought up in the dogmatic principles of the Wolffian school of philosophy, Kant derived, as it were, a new light from the perusal of the works of Mr. Hume, which became, for a time, his inseparable companions. The sceptic and empirical tenets of the Scotch philosopher severed him entirely from dogmatic philosophy, and awoke in his mind an ardent desire to erect a philosophical structure in which the human mind should appear reflected as it really is. The results of his investigation were published by Kant under the title of "Criticism of Pure Reason," and he gave the name of "Critical Philosophy" to the tenets he inculcated. These philosophical tenets he professed for nearly fifty years, (from 1747 till 1794,) when ill health, which preceded his death almost ten years, obliged him to relinquish the chair of Philosophy at the University of Königsberg, to which he had imparted European renown.

The main principle of this philosophy is Spiritualism. It asserts, as does all German philosophy, the superiority of Thought over the Object. The high opinion which Kant entertained of the practical importance of the "critical philosophy" may be excused, in some measure, on account of the almost universal

adoption of its tenets by all the leading men of his day. He therefore likens his philosophical views to the great discoveries of Copernicus in Astronomy, by which the sphere of Thought was enlarged, and the face of Science altered. "It was supposed till now," says Kant, "that all human knowledge was founded on the existence of a phenomenal world, but, in fact, the adoption of that opinion has not advanced a step the knowledge of Mind. Let us, therefore, try another method which may cause us to move forwards. Thus, instead of considering external phenomena, or the world without, as the basis of all knowledge, let us consider that knowledge, that principle which knows, as the basis of the phenomenal world. In adopting this new view of things, we obtain the advantage of establishing the prior existence of a something that knows before the appearance of the thing which is to be known. This view of the matter may be likened to the conception of Copernicus, who, perceiving that Astronomy was doomed to remain for ever stationary so long as the stars were supposed with the Heavens to turn round the observer, reversed the general view, and supposed that it was the observer that turned round the Sun, and not the Sun round the observer." In this manner did Kant establish the conception of the pre-existence of the Mind as a first principle of knowledge, as that which knows, and not the existence of a phenomenal world which can only be known under the condition of the prior existence of the principle which knows it.

The leading principle of the philosophy of Kant is the prior existence of the individual mind, of the Self, the *Ego*, or I, of the subject, by the means of which all object is known. The mind thus considered as the mysterious, unknown fount of knowledge, is expressed

by various attributes or faculties which Kant reduces to three, to Cognition, to Sensation and Emotion; admitting, however, that the laws or conditions of Cognition may be considered as directing all three. Thus, Cognition considered as the fount of all Intelligence, of all knowledge, and in its highest degree, Kant terms theoretical or Pure Reason—Understanding; whilst cognition considered as the source of all sensitive feeling, of all action is practical Reason or Intelligence; and Cognition considered again as the principle of all emotion, of all feeling of preference, constitutes the faculty or power of Inference or of Judgment.

These first principles duly established, the Critical Philosophy proceeds to investigate these attributes or faculties of Cognition or Mind, and institutes first, an Inquiry into the conditions or laws of Pure Reason; secondly, into those of practical Reason; and thirdly, into those of Inference or of Judgment.

Pure Reason, Kant terms transcendental: it embraces *Æsthetics*, the utmost limits of Thought, which he considers to be Space and Time, not as forms of inference, but as forms *à priori*. Transcendental, or Pure Reason, also comprehends *à priori* the various forms of Thought which constitute the basis of all Reasoning, and which Aristotle comprehends in the categories. This being premised, we shall pursue rapidly our investigation.

KANT'S INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF PURE REASON.

Sensibility or sensation, and cognition or understanding, constitute, says Kant, the two main pillars of human knowledge; but what are the principles of sensation? from whence is derived, or from whence flow all

our sensitive knowledge? And again, what are the first principles of Intelligence, from whence all reasoning is deducible *à priori*? These Kant terms pure sensibility and pure intelligence, the two main stems of all knowledge, which spring from a root of unknown nature, called the mind. Sensation or Sensibility is the receiving faculty, but understanding is of spontaneous and impulsive nature. She first bestows the faculty of *perceiving*, but the understanding gives us that of *conceiving*. The one is *perception*; the other, *conception* or idea. Thought, without perception of any kind, Kant considers as a mere word; and perceptions without ideas, as nothing. All intellectual action requires both perception and conception. Pure sensibility (*die transcendente Aesthetik*) is that branch of pure Reason which constitutes the source of all sensation and perception, whilst the second branch, or pure intelligence (*die transcendente Analytik*) is the source or the essence of all reasoning or Logic. The study of the first constitutes *Æsthetic* transcendentalism; that of the second *Analytic* transcendentalism. 1. *Pure sensibility* is constituted when considered in its quintessence by the intuitive feelings *à priori* of Space and Time. Space comprehends every object which our senses are capable of knowing from without, and Time includes all feelings which suggestion and imagination can produce in the mind. Even in admitting the abstraction of every object which our outer senses can possibly know, still Space would remain as the general form, the *sensorium* of matter; and also, even after the abstraction of every thing that imagination can invent in Thought, still Time itself would remain as the receptacle of the motion of the succession of Thought itself. It is thus, says Kant, that all sensation, both external and internal, can be resolved into Space and Time,

which he therefore considers as the highest form, as the utmost limits, to which sensation can be reduced by æsthetical analysis. Kant, in order to prove that these forms positively exist as first principles in the human mind, adduces both direct and indirect proofs. 1. The direct proof he finds in all metaphysical discussion, in which the existence of Time and Space are always admitted to exist as *à priori* principles, and are therefore instinctive sensations grounded on sensibility itself, and not on intelligence as a logical demonstration or inference. They are therefore real perceptions, and no conceptions or ideas. Again, all experience is grounded upon the previous intuitive admission or presupposition *à priori* of Space and Time. Thus, says Kant, when we admit as true the existence of any other object besides ourselves, we mentally admit the existence of Space; and thus, whenever we compare two objects one with another, or think of one object after another, Time constitutes mentally a part of the intellectual operation. Space and Time he therefore maintains to be no conceptions of the mind, but real perceptions, which arise *à priori* in Thought. All special Space or place, and all special Time are contained in universal Space and in everlasting Time or eternity. These particular, special ideas, he considers to exist, as it were, under the more general notion of Space and Time, but not as parts thereof.

2. The indirect proof Kant finds in all metaphysical or transcendental notion. Thus it is that certain sciences are in fact grounded upon the previous mental admission or presupposition of Space and Time, and the higher or pure mathematics have no other foundation than the perceptive or merely mental existence of Space and Time independently of all empirical notion

or what is derived from experience. Pure mathematics, he considers as impossible without this presupposition of Space and Time; now, says Kant, mathematical conceptions are both general and necessary, and as such cannot be conclusions of experience or empirical, but are deduced *à priori* from an unknown source from whence they spring forth unconsciously as it were in the mind. The instinctive *à priori* perception of Space and Time being the ground-work of pure mathematics, it follows from thence, says our author, that conceptions may be deduced therefrom, and these conceptions constitute a science, so that he who denies the existence of Space and Time as instinctive intuitive perceptions, denies what flows most evidently therefrom: he denies the existence of mathematics. The invariable and staid connection of these conceptions with the mere perceptive sensations of Space and Time, constitutes what Kant terms the positive result of *Æsthetic Transcendentalism*. But with this positive side is linked a negative view. Perception or immediate knowledge we have seen only to exist, according to Kant, through sensibility, of which Space and Time constitute the general or universal, or highest point, or perceptive acme. But these perceptions of Space and Time are merely mental or subjective forms; they are not objective; they are nothing external, therefore all perceptions partake of this mental or subjective character, and we do not know things as they really are in themselves, but only as they appear to us when perceived through the subjective or mental medium of Space and Time. From thence one of Kant's maxims, that we know not Things in themselves, but only the appearances. Kant's conclusion is not, however, that all things are included in Space and Time: his conclusion is only relative to our knowledge; to us, he says

all things are included therein; to us, the phenomenal world is so ordained that Sensibility such as we possess, knows it in Space and Time, whilst the mental world,—the subjective, or the nominal world, is only known in Time. Kant does by no means infer from thence that the world,—that the phenomena, and noumena, which we know of by means of Sensation or Sensibility, are mere appearances,—things having no real existence;—nor does he maintain that beyond our mental activity there is no such thing as Space and Time. The transcendental æsthetic ideality of Space and Time, as the highest view of perception, by no means prevents, says Kant, the real empirical existence of Space and Time. He considers the existence of the phenomenal world to be as certain as that of our own mental existence: he merely maintains that the phenomenal world, such as it is given to man to know, is only perceived by him in relation to Space and Time; and that independently of those relations, he knows, and can know nothing of them. We are here arrived at an important point in German Philosophy,—the point from which the successors of Kant may be said to have started,—for Kant in the first edition of his Critical Philosophy, following up his investigation as to the nature of things in themselves independently of our views thereof, expresses loosely the opinion, that it may not be impossible that the thinking subject,—the mind or *Ego*,—the I, and the object or thing perceived,—that the subject and object,—the I, and the thing I perceive,—are in themselves, and at the bottom, one and the same substance as Thought. This sort of fanciful view of the matter Kant suppressed in the subsequent editions, and even complained bitterly when Fichte appealed to his (Kant) opinion as corroborating the view which Fichte took of the subject in question. This supposition, however,

of Kant, may be considered as the basis of Fichte's system of Philosophy, which is grounded on the idea that the subject or the *Ego*,—the I or mind,—is only cognizant of itself, and that nothing foreign and distinct therefrom can affect us.

Kant considering it as proved that the upshot, the quintessence of all Sensibility can be resolved into the perception *à priori* of Space and Time, proceeds to inquire into the nature of the primary conceptions of Thought, those forms which exist, he says, *à priori* as first principles in the Intelligence, as he proved the forms of Space and Time to exist in all perception. This inquiry we have said to be termed Analytical Transcendentalism, or rather Transcendental Logic, comprehending two divisions, the one Analytical Transcendentalism and the other Dialectical Transcendentalism, terms which we here take the liberty to render as much as possible in plain English.

1. *Analytical Transcendentalism* aims at acquiring a clear insight into the essential forms or *à priori* conceptions of the understanding. These forms in their essential æsthetical point of view, in which Kant considers them, are, he maintains, no empirical conceptions, no inferences *à posteriori*. As primitive forms they embrace a multitude of empirical conceptions solely founded on experience, but are themselves, he maintains, no results of experience. To these essential necessary forms of Intelligence, Kant gives the same name as Aristotle, he terms them the categories of the Understanding, but points out at once the marked distinction which exists between the view he takes of the categories and that of the Stagyrte. The categories of the latter include Space and Time, which Kant, we have seen, maintains to be perceptive cognitions of the mind, and Aristotle considers as empirical *à posteriori*

conceptions all the forms of his categories; whilst it must always be kept in view that Kant considers them as arising spontaneously in the mind. But in order to frame a table of all the forms of Thought some leading principle is required. This main principle, from which all the principles of the understanding flow, is that of Inference or Judgment; and the various forms of Thought or main conceptions can readily be attained when we investigate the forms and the nature of all kinds of Inference. Thus Kant, in order to come at these primitive forms, first inquires, what are the various kinds of inferences established by ordinary logic? They are four:

| QUANTITY. | QUALITY. | RELATION. | MODALITY. |
|-------------|-----------------------|---------------|--------------|
| general, | affirmative, | categorical, | problematic, |
| several, | negative, | hypothetical, | assestory, |
| particular, | limited or unlimited, | disjunctive, | apodictical. |

From these various judgments or inferences, which have always been admitted as such, Kant deduces the existence of the same number of primary forms of Thought, or rather of Cognition, and calls them the Categories. These categories or *à priori* conceptions, according to Kant, are of a nature which differs from that of mere perception, they are spontaneous and impulsive; whilst the perceptions are more or less passive. From these four relative conditions of things, Kant considers himself authorized to deduce the *à priori* existence in the mind of the 12 *à priori* forms of conception which constitute his categories.

| QUANTITY. | QUALITY. | RELATION. | MODALITY. |
|-------------|-------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Generality, | Reality, | Subsistence & Inherence, | Possibility, Impossibility, |
| Plurality, | Negation, | Causality & Dependence, | Existence, Non-existence, |
| Unity, | Limitation, | Community, | Necessary, Contingent. |

From these 12 categories variously combined, proceed, says Kant, every act of Intelligence. Their ap-

pearance in the mind is spontaneous ; but they would ever remain mere forms without *Perception*. Their production Kant conceives as independent of Sensibility, but not so their positive existence, which obtains only by means of Sensibility and Perception. It is only through Perception, it is only when perceived by Intelligence, that they are, as it were, elevated to empirical existence, i. e., objects of experience. Here the following question naturally arises. How comes it that the objects which constitute the phenomenal world tally so completely with mere *à priori* conceptions, which are said to be in themselves empty forms? This conformity which exists would be readily understood if the nature of the objects conceived, and conception itself were of the same kind. This identity or conformity might indeed in some measure be admitted between external objects and sensibility, since it is by means of the senses that the phenomenal world is perceived. Now we have seen that Kant maintains that the intuitive forms of conception, or *à priori* categorical notions, proceed not from Sensibility or Sensation as perceptions, but from Intelligence, as conceptions, notions, ideas *à priori*. The difficulty therefore appears greater ; some mode of union, some link between the objects of sense, and the pure forms of Intelligence must exist, by means of which these conceptions become positive inferences *à priori*. The nature of this bond of union, of this link, must be adapted to the nature of the two which are to be united : it must partake of the nature of each, of sensibility and the objects of sense, of Intelligence and the *à priori* conceptions which arise therein spontaneously. This link Kant finds in two pure perceptions of *Æsthetical Transcendentalism*, in Space and Time, but more especially in the latter. Space and Time, he remarks, partake of the nature of

mind as perceptions of sensibility, and of matter as conceptions of Intelligence, and therefore it is that he considers the union of mind and matter to obtain in them, as uniting in a peculiar manner both *subjective* and *objective* qualities. Time constitutes most essentially this bond of union, for however æsthetically the categories be considered, they must express either co-existence in Time or succession, and as to the phenomenal or objective world nothing can be thought of therein but in Time.

Time, considered as a pure essence of Thought, constitutes what Kant terms the *transcendental Schema*, and the use which Intelligence makes of this intuitive feeling of Time he calls the *transcendental Schematismus* of pure Reason.

The Schema or mere notion of Time is not however a mere ideal or fanciful intuition, an imaginary notion. An imaginary thing, says Kant, is some more peculiar conception, whilst Time in its transcendental light or *Schema*, constitutes the very actuality, the several successions which occur when the Mind acts in any imagination whatsoever, in forming any notion or idea. Thus Time as Schema, or in its transcendental light, is Time considered in connection with Thought itself, and before Time can be conceived in a sensible or *objective* view.

Transcendental Schematismus is a term given by Kant to the transcendental consideration of Time in relation to each category. Here 1. *Quantity* gives us number, or the succession in Time of one to one, and through which notion alone we can acquire the idea of greatness, by successive addition in the mind of like to like or similar to similar. If we stop at once, we have Unity. We acquire Plurality by adding a second; and Totality by successive additions beyond limit.

This view of Time considered in its very essence (*Schema*) when applied (*schematismus*) to the categories of quality, can alone explain, says Kant, how the successive aspect of the phenomenal world can give us the full conception of greatness.

2. *Quality* to exist as a conception of Intelligence must necessarily require a given Time. That only is real which exists in Time, and thus the pure, essential idea of Reality can be acquired by thinking of any thing that can exist in Time, and we acquire the essential notion of Negation by thinking of Time as empty or containing nought but Time.

3. *Relation*. All relation is essentially grounded on Time. No Relation can be imagined without the conception of some order or the other in Time. Substance is persistency in Time as a Reality; and Causation the regular succession of things in Time. Reaction or reciprocal action is the regular coincidence of the necessary laws of one substance with those of another.

4. *Modality* is included in the very notion of Time, which comprehends *how* and *if*, or the conditions of things in Time. Possibility is the accordance or agreement of any thing imagined with a conditional relation in Time. Reality is the Being of any given object in a given Time. Necessity is the existence of any given thing in all Time.

The various considerations into which Kant enters respecting the *à priori* inferences or judgments which arise synthetically in the mind by means of this connection between Mind and Matter effectuated through the medium of Space and Time, may be reduced to the following: 1. That all phenomenal appearances can only be known to us under the forms of Space and Time, and all axioms of perception, he conceives, as

being founded upon this principle. 2. All phenomenal appearances possess extensive dimension, and every sensation is susceptible to a certain degree of decrease and increase, which constitutes intensive capacity: on this latter principle is founded all anticipation in matter of observation. 3. Substance, which is persistence in Time; and accident, which is change in Time, are continually alternating. The changes which occur constitute the necessary laws of Cause and Effect, and from them proceeds the principle of experimental analogy. 4. The possible is that which coincides with the mental conditions of experience; and the necessary is that which exists as reality under the fixed and positive conditions of experience.

Experience alone, says Kant, gives reality to conception, the metaphysical view is a mere form. They are the alphabet: experience is reading. All conception without an object is only transcendental, and merely fanciful. Thought can only know phenomena, but the mental action, the noumena, is a sealed letter. The cause of so much error in metaphysics proceeds, says Kant, from mistaking noumena for phenomena, and thus believing it possible that Thought can act upon Thought as it does upon the objective or phenomenal world. Besides the categories, which are mere forms, unless they become realized by experience, Kant also admits other primary conceptions which appear to have been expressly ordained to carry the mind beyond the field of empiricism, and cause us to consider the conceptions as really existing, as objective. These notions are termed *Transcendent*, and are to be distinguished from the *Transcendental*, or highest form.

2. *Dialectical Transcendentalism* inquires into the nature of transcendent or metaphysical conceptions. The issue proves, according to Kant, that the appear-

ances of reality, of objective existence, which have been attributed to these notions, are quite false. He admits of a distinction between Reason and Understanding or intelligence. Reason he conceives to be conversant of the unconditional, (*Vernunft*,) whilst Understanding (*Verstand*) is conversant of the conditional, of which the categories constitute the elementary forms. Both proceed together hand in hand. Reason from the unconditional, frames first principles, and Understanding or Intelligence from the conditional, frames axioms. Reason, as conversant of the mental or subjective view of things, is immanent or intrinsic; whilst understanding, having reference to the object, is extrinsic or emanent. But when Reason overshoots the mark, and goes beyond her real limits; when Reason, not content with mere mental, transcendental unity, attempts to elevate a speculative, mental unity to the rank and state of a real object of empirical knowledge, Reason then ceases to be transcendental, and becomes transcendent or Metaphysical. Reason is no longer pure, essential, transcendental, when it attempts to judge of the unconditional by means of the categorical conceptions of the understanding, when it applies empirical notions to transcendental conceptions, to mere elementary forms of Thought which never can constitute real objects of human investigation. Thus the speculative ideas of Reason are realized by means of the axioms of Intelligence, and these latter find in the principles of Reason their highest degree of evidence and confirmation.

The speculative ideas of Reason are of three kinds:

1. *The psychological*, or the notion of the Soul as a thinking substance, (the science of Psychology.)
2. *The cosmological*, or the notion of the world, the Cosmos, as encompassing all phenomena, all appearances, (science of Cosmology.)

3. The theological, or the notion of God, as the first condition of all possibility, (the science of Theology.)

No reader can now find any difficulty in conceiving why Kant considers all metaphysical reasoning as grounded in error; in short, as a paralogism; because it consists in an erroneous application of the conditional to the unconditional. But Kant reserves the term *Paralogism* to designate the false conclusions of Reason in Psychology. The contradictory conclusions which Reason thus obtains in Cosmology, he terms *Antinomies*, and the empty circles in which Reason turns on the ground of Theology, he terms *Idealism*.

1. *The Paralogisms*, or erroneous conclusions of pure Reason constitute, according to our author, what modern science names rational psychology or mental philosophy. Thus the supposed rational proofs of the Soul, as an object endowed with immateriality, and, as a substance, with incorruptibility, and to which Unity and Identity, expressed as Personality, are attributed, and which, as a thinking spaceless being, is considered as endued with Immortality; all the said rational proofs of these conclusions are mere logical consequences derived from the term I think, or *Cogito*. But this proposition, this expression, I think, is merely, remarks Kant, a feeling of consciousness; it is an act of the mind which accompanies and unites every thing we imagine; but it is in itself neither a perception nor a conception. This thought has been erroneously mistaken for some real object; the mind, or the *Ego*, the subject, has been turned into an object or Self, and we have been told that that is the Soul, and all that is attributed to this latter, has been heaped and piled upon the Self or *Ego*. But, in order to be viewed in the light of an object, in order to be consid-

ered as to Quantity, or as to Quality, or as to Relation, or as to Modality,—in a word, in order to apply thereunto the said Categories of Understanding, the *Ego* or I, or the Self must be known empirically, must become an *object* of perception. Rational proof is not mere gratuitous suppositions. The proof said to be given of the immortality of the Soul, merely proves that the thing may be supposed, but not call that a rational proof that Thought can exist as a separate existence beyond the body. Kant denies that rational Psychology or mental philosophy constitutes a doctrine capable of furnishing us with any knowledge in addition to that which we possess; he only admits it to be of value as Discipline, and as a means of acquiring an insight as to the boundaries of speculative Reason. These boundaries alone, says Kant, can prevent our mistaking one thing for another, or hinder us from losing ourselves in the pathless mazes of Spiritualism. As regards Materialism, Kant considers the *à priori*, or intuitive principles of Causation and of Intelligence as a far more positive refutation of that doctrine, than the fanciful views to which the pompous titles of rational psychology and mental philosophy have been given. Psychology, or mental philosophy, considered as a means of acquiring a precise notion of the real limits of speculative reason, thus answers, at the same time, the desponding doubt of the Materialist, and the imaginary rational conclusions of the Spiritualist. This impossibility, this refusal of Reason, says Kant, to answer questions which stretch beyond this life, ought to be taken as a premonitory hint not to lose our time in useless mental speculation, but to turn our thoughts to real practical conceptions.

2. *The Antinomies* of Cosmology constitute the antagonistic views which the Inferences of Reason lead

to in all the different orders of conception. Thus, it has been admitted, that we can acquire no adequate conception of a phenomenal world, without making use of the various primary forms or Categories of Thought.

1st. *Quantity*. It is evident, remarks Kant, that Space and Time are necessarily included in that notion of Quantity: therefore, in a quantitative view, the inference is, that something must certainly exist beyond the totality of Universal Space and Time.

2d. *Quality*. The divisibility of matter not accounting for the peculiar nature of things, the natural Inference would be that something must exist beyond the utmost limits of divisibility.

3d. *Relation*. The innumerable relative phenomena or effects which occur in the universe lead to the inference that they must be accompanied by complete, positive correspondent series of causes.

4th. *Modality*. This conception supposes the absolute dependence of the contingent,—the accidental, or the conditional on the conditions thereof. Now the contingent or conditional is either a necessary consequence of certain given conditions of the things themselves, or else it must be considered as merely phenomenal, as being completely dependent on the appearances.

Here Kant remarks, that when Reason attempts to arrive at some certitude on these various points, she finds herself, as it were, entangled in the mazes of her own inferences; for in all the four conceptions or Categories the contrary propositions to those which have been inferred therefrom may be equally maintained.

1. Thus the proposition, that the universe has a beginning in Time and is bounded in Space, and the contrary that it has no beginning in Time and no boundaries in Space are equally maintainable.

2. The proposition or thesis, that every compound substance in the universe is an aggregate of simple el-

elementary parts, and that beyond such simple component parts nothing else exists, and the antithesis or contrary assertion, that nothing compound can be simple, or composed of such, since nothing simple or elementary exists in the universe, both propositions are equally maintainable.

3. The assertion or thesis, that if according to the laws of Nature we admit Causation, yet that cannot be the only Causation from whence we are to deduce the whole phenomenal world, for Freedom enters also therein as a law of Causation, and the antithesis that by the laws of Cause and Effect every thing being necessary, nothing is free, and that therefore every thing in the universe is a consequence of the laws of Nature, are both tenable.

4. The thesis that there exists a necessary being as cause of the universe,—a something connected with the universe but distinguished therefrom, and the antithesis that since all things are necessary there can exist no necessary being independent of law of necessity and first Cause of the Universe either in this world or beyond it, both assertions have been and are maintainable. And Kant alleges the existence of these dialectic controversies as a proof of their utter inanity, and as pointing out most plainly the necessity of some other scheme.

3. *The Idealism* of pure Reason is the term given by Kant to those conceptions of God, which are considered by many as rational arguments, but which Kant considers as lowering the notion of God, by basing it on mere metaphysical reasoning, that stands thus. The possibility of a Supreme, absolute Being cannot be denied as absolute Reality, and the conception of Existence being included in that of Reality, the necessity of a Real Supreme Existence flows therefrom. But, observes Kant, existence is no real object

which can thus be added to the conception of a thing. Existence is the compound being of a thing with all its properties. A mere conception of a thing only exists as conception, and only can maintain its own peculiar properties as conception, but it by no means acquires thereby objective existence if it does not already exist. The term Being is a mere logical phrase, and it no more bestows real existence on a thing, than the idea of a hundred dollars bestows a hundred dollars cash on him who thinks of them, although the nominal term is the same. In like manner, we may conceive a Being endowed, or rather endowed with Absolute Reality, and that Being may be conceived as possible, but it does not follow that Real Existence proceeds therefrom. Kant considers all such logical proofs as useless trouble, and as lost time, and maintains that mere conceptions no more increase the notions men possess than the adding of several noughts to the ciphers in a book-keeper's ledger increase *de facto* the real fortune of the trader.

The argument or metaphysical ground on which reposes the cosmological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being Kant considers to be equally as weak. This argument, which asserts that if any thing exists there must be a cause of its existence, and that such a Cause is the Necessary Being, so that as we are certain of our Existence, therefore a Necessary Being must absolutely exist as the Cause of our Existence,—this inference Kant shows to be logically erroneous, inasmuch that it deduces the existence of Absolute Existence from that of the contingent; the unconditional from the conditional, the Infinite from the Finite. But even were the argument sound, it would not be sufficient, remarks Kant, to prove any thing beyond the notion of Causation, and could not be alleged as a proof

of the Existence of a Supreme Being, since a further deduction would lead to very different conclusions, for as that only which contains in itself real existence, as an abridgment of all Reality, can be considered as absolutely necessary, or, in other words, as that Being which comprehends in its own essence all reality is alone absolutely necessary, this inference overturns the cosmological proof or that derived from the consideration of the phenomenal world, the existence of which disappears, as it were, in the more general conception of Absolute Being. Kant, therefore, considers the metaphysical or ontological proofs as nothing more than an old trick played off in another way, and made to appear to be firmly grounded on the two main pillars of human knowledge, on Mind and Matter. But a more difficult task remained than that of demonstrating the inanity of metaphysical reasoning; this task Kant undertook to perform in the following manner:

The ground which Kant gives up as untenable when we maintain the positive value of mere conceptions, or when, from human experience, a proof is adduced of the existence of Supreme Being, this ground he reassumes on the argument of the self-evident existence of design or purpose in the whole order of known existences, and on that of a Cause of such design. This proof he terms the physico-theological proof, being grounded upon the conformity of the orders of Nature to some end. Everywhere, he remarks, we perceive design or some purpose which is by itself foreign to the things themselves by which it is brought about. Now, the necessary inference of such a fact is, that there exists some necessary cause thereof, and it is to that necessary cause that Kant gives the name of Absolute Real Being, as possessing essential and necessary existence, and as existing not in Space and Time as all human perception

and conception exist, but as possessing Supreme Intelligence.

This physico-theological proof, or that deduced from the evidence of design and purpose, Kant considers as the most ancient, and as the most clearly intelligible to all understandings. Still he does not view it in the light of a demonstrative proof. It merely infers, from the evident marks of design and purpose which the phenomenal world affords us, the certain existence of a corresponding sufficient cause of such design and purpose. We acquire thereby, it is true, says Kant, the notion of a Supreme Builder, of a Supreme Architect, but it does not furnish us with the conception of a Maker, of a Creator. To advance a step beyond the first notion, it is necessary to have recourse to the cosmological proof, by which is admitted that the cause of our existence necessarily contains all Existence as its very essence, and then, remarks our author, we adjoin to the certitude of a regulator of all phenomena the certitude of a Creator as essence of all existence, of all substance. We thus acquire the knowledge of a Supreme Being, but yet, says Kant, of a Supreme Being, whose perfection corresponds to that of the Creation; and, as we find no positive perfection in the Universe, we cannot consider the certitude of the existence of the phenomenal world united with that of design and purpose, as having furnished us with an adequate idea of Absolute Perfection. This certitude can only be grounded on the metaphysical proof which tells us of the possibility of such a Perfect Being. And thus the physico-theological proof requires in order to be completed that the proof derived from the consideration of the phenomenal world, (cosmological proof,) and also the metaphysical proof derived from

the certitude of a cause of our existence, should be added to it.

Kant, however, does not admit that the Ideal of a Supreme Being acquired and grounded on these close logical deductions is any thing beyond a mere conception of the Mind, a faultless ideal which indeed closes and crowns all human knowledge, but which possesses no objective reality, although the contrary cannot be proved. To consider the Unity thus acquired as a personal unity Kant terms a subreptitious inference, and those who believe that the human mind can really frame any adequate notion of the Almighty ought carefully to peruse the pages of Kant, in order to become fully convinced of the impossibility, on the most rational grounds, that the attributes of the Deity can constitute part of the inferences of men—either essential conceptions, or rational deductions.

Kant now introduces another inquiry relative to the probable design and purpose of the production in the human mind of conceptions of Reason void of all objective signification, for since they are unavoidable and necessary he considers them to have been ordained rightly, and with a view to advantage. That end he deduces from the positive use and value of our belief in God, from the theological idea; but these conceptions are merely regulative and not constitutive principles. These latter form the objective realities of the phenomenal world, says Kant, and it is by their observation alone that we are capable of widening the sphere of our knowledge in the field of real experience. Rational conceptions, he views in the light of mere regulating principles which co-ordain and regulate all our experience, and from whence it proceeds that we can only carry on both experiment and observation in a certain given order. Therefore Kant does not con-

sider these three conceptions, the Psychological, the Cosmological, and the Theological, in the light of a *Novum Organon*, as an organ by means of which Truth can be discovered, but as a Canon or Rule by means of which the mind simplifies experience by systemizing or framing hypothetical unities, or abstractions.

Besides this regulating or governing result or effect, the conceptions of Reason possess also, according to Kant, a practical one, that of impressing on the mind a feeling of Conviction, of Belief or Faith. The mind possesses, as it is well known, a peculiar mental feeling termed conviction or belief, which has in it nothing of the phenomenal world or objective, but is quite mental or subjective, and has no real external existence. Conviction or belief is no logical, but a moral certitude. It reposes entirely, says Kant, on subjective ground, on the very principle on which reposes the belief of self-identity and consciousness. He admits three cardinal principles as forcing themselves forward, and pressing themselves forcibly upon our Reason, and these are 1. The freedom of Will. 2. The immortality of the Soul. 3. The existence of God. Their use, he considers as essentially practical, not indeed to acquire a simple knowledge of things, but as the only principles which can give us moral conviction. Thus, according to Kant, we can say that we are morally certain that there exists a God, though we cannot say, it is morally certain that God exists. (So kann icht nicht einmal sagen, es ist moralisch gewiss dass ein Gott sei, sondern nur, ich bin moralisch gewiss dass ein Gott sei.) His conclusion is that we can no more lose the Belief in our Free Will, in another World, and in God, than we can lose our moral conviction of our own existence. We are now arrived at the second part, and have reached the field of Practical Reason.

OF PRACTICAL REASON.

The problem here to be resolved is precisely the opposite to that which speculative Reason suggested. In the inquiry of the nature of pure or speculative Reason, says Kant, we sought to find how objects were known independent of Will, and we found that there existed certain independent, instinctive *à priori* principles which appear as perceptions, and constitute the very essence of Sensibility, and taking these as our starting point we proceeded to something empirical or practical. The method we shall now follow, he continues, is the reverse: our starting point will be the positive, well established maxims of Morality, and these once clearly exposed we shall ascend from thence to the relationship which exists between practical Reason and Sensibility.

The freedom of the Will, the obligation to Virtue, the immortality of the Soul, and the existence of God, are considered by Kant as mental facts known by inward experience or conviction. Free Will exists as an inward fact in the human mind, and by means of this principle, Reason, which, considered in a pure and speculative light, gives us a mere negative result, becomes positive, practical, empirical. But in what manner is the Will and Sensibility or Sensation connected, for some positive relation must exist between them? This connection Kant finds in the very groundwork, in the very foundations of Will, in Impulse and Inclination; although the same, when considered in a mere speculative light and independently of motive, appear to do away with the freedom of the Will and cause it to seem involuntary. The inquiry, therefore, leads to seek the nature of Impulse and of Inclination, to see whether they be really the foundation of Will, and

this inquiry is followed up by Kant in his *Analysis of Practical Reason*, and in his *Dialectics of Practical Reason*. The first exposes the main moral principles in their connection with the two leading sources of Will, from whence these moral principles proceed, and the second is conversant of the conciliation of the Antinomies which arise from the contradictions between speculative or pure Will and practical or empirical Will.

Analytical inquiry. The most general law or condition of Will, being that it should be determined to action by itself as Will, and not by the external object, Kant, therefore, considers Freedom as a component part of the activity of the Will, and as the Form or pure conception thereof, and names *Autonomy* of Will, or the *Self-rule* of Will, the faculty of self-determination, of self-decision. The free, self-ruling Will, whispers to man a peculiar moral feeling, "thou oughtest," and this moral obligation being in itself an unconditional one so long as no particular obligation is imposed, this moral command is therefore categorical or a mental form. Now, this categorical, this pure form, or pure Will, this *Autonomy*, is not the only component part of practical, of empirical Will, this empty form must be united to something more material, and this material part Kant finds in the Sensations or in the Feelings of desire and aversion which exist in the mind; this principle he terms the *Heteronomy* of Will, or *Contrary-Rule* of Will, as dependent on a principle different from Will, on a principle of a lower order than Will being, more or less, intimately related to the Senses, and therefore causing the Pure Will to act in a kind of dependence upon something foreign to its nature. Categorical or pure Will is absolutely imperative of Duty, but empirical or practical Will is determined by motives of a material nature, by motives

which proceed from the senses, and is therefore of a changeable nature. And since the feelings of Desire and Dislike vary according to the different individuals, some preferring what others dislike, and as all agreement on that head is merely contingent, therefore the determinations of empirical Will vary, and no absolute law can exist. Each individual being very possibly determined to act from some motive quite different from others, the results of practical Will are therefore various as are the rules of action. The various rules of action which thus spring forth, are termed by Kant the maxims of volition, and he blames those moralists who consider such maxims in the light of general principles of morality.

Neither the Autonomy nor the Heteronomy of Will are considered by Kant as active, when viewed in a separate light; they must both act together, and he therefore admits that Will can only become a real active principle by means of the maxims which result from empirical Will. It is the joint connection of these principles which can alone lead to a practical moral principle or maxim. These maxims then become laws of Reason, and we acquire positive first principles of morality, of which the chief one is, according to Kant—To act in such a manner, that the motives which regulate the Will can be adopted at once by all men as an undeniable universal principle; or, in other words, the maxim which regulates, as a generally adopted principle, all our actions, must involve no contradiction. By this formal moral principle, Kant excludes those of clashing and heterogeneous nature.

The inward impulse that moves mankind to act in conformity with this maxim, constitutes, according to Kant, the moral law of Self-respect, or Self-esteem, or Conscience. The sensual appetites of man, he resumes,

in self-love and self-conceit, and these, he says, can never thrive in connection with the principle, never to act but according to an unanswerable and universally adopted maxim, such as the one above mentioned, which reduces self-love to the most narrow compass, and altogether excludes self-conceit. He does not consider Self-esteem or Self-respect as a mere moral feeling, but as a feeling of the mind which is conceived by, and proceeds from, the laws of practical Reason. It is not enough that the feeling which inspires the action should produce content or happiness; it must also produce self-esteem; the action otherwise may be legal, but would not be moral. Self-esteem Kant considers to be of a compound nature, uniting Dislike as a result of our submission to the impulse of Duty, and Pleasure as the result of our following the dictates of Reason. Kant admits that we can never reckon upon the inward inclination of Man towards this feeling of Self-esteem, on account of other feelings continually arising in contradiction. He does not believe that Man possesses an innate love and affection towards the feeling of self-esteem; that love and affection he views as something ideal. His conclusion tends rather to consider Duty only to be such when it is listened to against our inclination, and from thence the kind of ridicule with which these views were received by many, and by Schiller, amongst others, who criticizes them in verses to the following effect:

“ We are not virtuous without Constraint :
Virtue alone is in Restraint.”

“ With Disgust must we do
What Duty points to.”

Dialectic. Pure or speculative Reason, as consid-

ered by Kant, requires, we have seen, to pass from the speculative or unconditional state to the conditional,—requires, in a word, to become a matter of fact, to become practical in order to obtain. And in a like manner, but in an inverse direction, practical Reason requires that to the conditional or practical there should be added an unconditional, a speculative, a higher order of existence. It is therefore not enough that maxims of moral goodness should be laid down, we must also aim at an unconditional Supreme Goodness. But by this latter term Kant does not mean Supreme Virtue alone, but considers it necessary that Happiness should be added thereto, in order that Reason should view it in the light of real Virtue. Here Kant inquires as to the mode in which Happiness and Supreme Goodness are joined, whether that union be analytical or synthetical? The earliest Greek philosophers were of the former opinion. The Stoic considered Happiness as being of accidental import in Virtue; whilst the Epicurean held the opposite view, and maintained, that Virtue was the accident, and Happiness the aim, or principal. The Stoic we know maintained, that to be certain of one's Virtue was Happiness; whilst the Epicurean taught, that to know the road to Happiness was to know the road to Virtue. Now Kant denies that any such connection exists between the two conceptions, for he holds their nature to be very different. The union he considers to be merely apparent, and the relative connection merely casual, the one being cause of the other. For this motive Kant considers it as the highest aim of practical Reason to take into due consideration this relation between Virtue and Happiness. On this knotty point, the following is Kant's reasoning: The proposition that Virtue and Happiness are connected as Cause and Effect, is merely theoretical,

for experience disapproves of it. Experience tells us that neither of them is necessarily the cause of the other, since our efforts to attain to Virtue are no more a necessary cause of Happiness, than our endeavors to be happy produce Virtue. This contradiction constitutes an *Antinomy* which Kant endeavors to conciliate, by pointing out the difference which exists between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world (external and mental). Experience, he says, does most certainly inform us that in the phenomenal world virtue and happiness are not constantly united as cause and effect; but in the intelligible or noumenal world Reason, as *Noumenon*, as a principle of highest order, informs us of and guarantees to us the existence of a state of things quite different. Pure Reason tells us of an order of things above the sensible world, in which the struggle between these feelings will no longer exist, where Virtue and Happiness will always be united, and be adequate terms. In that state, then, will be found Supreme Virtue and Supreme Happiness. The verification of the first involves the immortality of the Soul, and that of the second, the existence of God.

To Supreme Goodness correspond complete Virtue and complete Happiness. Complete virtue, or Sanctity, cannot belong to any being having sensation, or that is moved by the senses, although beings yet under the yoke of Reason and the senses may tend towards that bright ideal in endless progression. This endless progression supposes an everlasting existence, and as Supreme Goodness must be attained, Immortality is thereby clearly to be presumed, and that of the Soul follows thus necessarily.

Happiness, Kant considers to be that state of human nature, or of a rational being, in which every thing occurs according to will and desire. This sup-

poses that all Nature is subservient to Man ; but this, as Kant remarks, we well know is not the case. In the order of Nature, Man does not constitute an actual cause ; and in the moral order of things, Virtue is not necessarily followed by Happiness. It therefore depends on some other order of things, that Man is convinced of the necessary connection between Virtue and Happiness, for his will is insufficient, his experience denies it, and yet he is convinced thereof. This feeling, by which man acquires the certitude of a connection between Supreme Goodness and Supreme Happiness, therefore involves, according to Kant, the existence of a peculiar cause, distinct from Man and from the order of Nature, and which contains within itself the necessity of this connection. Kant finds in this the highest moral certitude which we possess of the existence of a Supreme Being, the common cause of the phenomenal and moral world, a Being to whom our inclinations are all known, an Intelligence by which Happiness is imparted to each according to His Supreme Wisdom. That Being is God, Supreme Reason of all things, whose essence comprehends Almighty Power, Almighty Goodness, and Supreme Happiness.

In this manner, Kant, who considers practical Reason as giving us the notion and the certitude of freedom, conceives that from the same source is derived the conception of Immortality and the idea of God as Supreme Being. We have seen that Kant considers the notion of Freedom to be principally derived from the conviction of the possibility of a moral law. The idea of Immortality, in like manner, he derives from the undeniable possibility of Supreme Virtue, and the idea of God from the continual, unceasing, and necessary yearning of the human mind after Supreme Happiness. And thus Kant considers Practical Reason as

having resolved the three necessary conceptions which were found to be insolvable in the field of Speculative or Pure Reason. Yet still, he does not view these problems of Pure Reason, even when solved by Practical Reason, in the light of theoretical Dogmas, but merely in that of practical necessary presumptions which are involved in every moral action. Practical Reason does not widen the three speculative views of Pure Reason; our knowledge thereof is not increased thereby in the least; we merely become fully assured and certain of the positive existence of these conceptions as objects of empirical knowledge. This conception alone is all that the limited means of human nature can allow us, says Kant, to conceive of the Almighty. He is no theoretical object founded on the categorical divisions which comprehend all human knowledge. He is not subjected to the forms of the human mind. And still, Practical Reason, according to Kant, furnishes the human mind with the certitude of the objective, or empirical reality of this conception, which the mere speculative light of Pure Reason left faint and uncertain. Superior Wisdom, he remarks, appears to have ordained most wisely this to be the ultimate result of the reasoning faculty of man; the veil with which Pure or Speculative Reason shrouds the conception of the Supreme Being, is torn by Practical Reason, and the darkness of doubt, or of hope and fear, is dissipated, whilst we acquire, at the same time, the practical certitude of the value of motives of morality.

In a work, entitled "Religion within the limits of Pure Reason," Kant enters fully into the corresponding relations between Religion and Morality, and maintains that neither Religion can be grounded on Morality alone, nor Morality on Religion. To found Morals

on Religion would, he conceives, be making Hope and Fear the motives of moral action; but he admits that Religion might, to a certain degree, be considered as grounded on Morality. Morality necessarily leads to Religion, because Supreme Goodness or Purity is a necessary conception of Pure Reason, and can only be realized by the necessary existence of an Almighty God. Kant, however, remarks that we must by no means consider the conception of God in the light of a motive of Morality; and he therefore does not admit Religion to be the primary impulse to act virtuously. Religion, he says, is the acknowledgment that we consider all our duties as the commands of God. Religion is revealed, according to Kant, when we have first to learn that something is commanded by God, before we can know in what that command consists; and religion is natural, when we first have to learn that we have duties to perform, before we come to the knowledge that such is the command of God. Kant considers "the Church" as a moral commonwealth, which has in view the accomplishment and fulfilment, as far as possible, of all the injunctions of Morality, or as a moral union of all such persons who oppose evil and forward morality. By Kant, the term "invisible Church" is to be understood as a mere general conception of all such as are united under one moral constitution; whilst the visible Church represents on earth the Kingdom of God, as much as it is given to man to represent it. This Church is placed within the pale of human knowledge and experience, and therefore the signs by which it can be known are within the limits of human perception and of the categories of the human mind. Kant therefore takes up, 1st, the view of *Quantity*, and maintains that the Church must include all men; must be universal; and that, although accidentally and cas-

ually divided in opinion, yet it must repose on principles which necessarily admit of the formation of a united, universal Church, as one and indivisible. 2d. The *Quality*, or qualificative attributes of the visible Church must be Purity, because motives of pure morality are the only ones which can be admitted as inciting men to unite, and therefore all weak superstition and wild fanaticism must be excluded as inconsistent with that purity. 3d. *Relation*. The relative bonds which unite the different members of the Church must be grounded on the principle of Free Will or Freedom. The union must be that of the Heart, and the Church must constitute a free state, neither aristocratical nor democratical, neither fixed hierarchy nor loose individual rule, but one common, general, and lasting. 4th. *The Modality* of the Church demands stability in her constitutional principles, which must remain unchangeable, although the administration of the Church may require to adapt the regulations to the times.

Kant considers belief grounded on Morality and the principles of Reason, as the only basis on which the Universal Church can stand, because this belief alone carries with it conviction to every heart; but here, calling to mind that the weakness of man is so great as to render his convictions always vacillating, Kant conceives it to be quite necessary that something more positive, and less liable to change, should exist; and he finds this in the Scriptures, in which are found the commands of God as handed down by Tradition; from whence he concludes that the Will of God can only be known by the means of Holy Writ. By this, our belief in the Church is itself grounded upon belief in historical tradition and on that of the constitutional statutes of the Church. It is the moral tendencies of these Statutes which alone

give full value to them ; and therefore, admitting this, Kant maintains that the greater the tendency of the Church may be to rest her Statutes upon considerations independent of their moral bearing, the less reasonable and more altered is the Church ; whilst the nearer the approaches of the Church to the belief of Pure Reason, the more near she approaches to the Almighty. This Kant considers to constitute the positive and real distinction between true Faith and spurious Faith, between true Religion and Popery. He conceives the positive empirical value of the Dogma to depend upon its moral tendency, and maintains that without these moral grounds the Apostle Paul himself could scarcely have obtained belief in the Church ; thus, for instance, the doctrine of the Trinity, taken literally, can lead to nothing practical for Man ; it is the moral rules which the Trinity enforces, and not the mystery involved in the number of persons to be honored therein, that are to fix our attention. And in the same manner Kant maintains that the true interpretation of the Bible must repose upon the morality contained therein, and can only be practical by such ; that the mysteries of Revelation must be expounded in a sense agreeable to the universal maxims of religious Reason, Pure Reason being in matters of religion the true and faithful expounder of the Scriptures. The interpretation, he owns, may often appear forced when compared to the wording of the text ; yet he prefers such an interpretation to that of the dry letter whenever this latter would have no moral sense, or might be interpreted in a sense contrary to pure Morality, and maintains that this moral interpretation can always be discovered without going too much against the letter, by having recourse to the natural tendency of human reason towards moral religion.

The maxims with which Kant concludes his attempts at penetrating into the revealed mysteries of the Holy Scriptures, are all couched in terms agreeable to the purest morality, although he considers the historical part of the same as perfectly indifferent in itself. The riper our Reason, says Kant, the more open our moral view and moral sense, and the less necessary will the Statutes of Church-Faith become; and when human reason shall have attained a degree of purity which will enable it to do without the Church, we may then expect the coming of the Kingdom of God, towards which we slowly approach in our advance in unending progress; and that actual realization of the kingdom of God, he considers as the cessation of History, as the end of the World.

We have thought it requisite to add this very brief, and insufficient exposition of Kant's opinions (expressed in a work *ex professo*) on religion, to that of his attempts to conciliate the speculative views of Pure Reason, with those of Practical Reason, as elicited in his "Criticism of Pure Reason;" but the work itself demands a careful perusal. We shall now proceed at once to the third part of Kant's Inquiry into the nature of Pure Reason,—that which treats of Inference.

OF THE NATURE OF INFERENCE, OR JUDGMENT.

Kant considers Inference or Judgment as the intermediary link between Pure Reason or the source of the principle of Intelligence and Practical Reason, the source or mainspring of all Volition. Pure or speculative Reason embraces, as it has been shown, the elementary forms according to which the human mind perceives Things and that independently of the Will. Practical Reason, on the other hand, is the reaction of

the mind guided by Volition and Desire on the phenomenal world, which is thus unfolded as it were at Will, under the condition of its taking place under the given forms or categories, in which all Thought that is empirical must enter. These two primary, or elementary principles of Reason, the speculative and the practical, are separated, as it were, by a deep chasm which is filled up by the power of Inference, according to the views of Kant.

Inference he considers as the faculty which singles from out of the compound any one of the component parts: it is the power of analyzing, and is as such the principle of unity in diversity. This speculative unity comprehends the very important conception of design or end; and as all design, all aim is necessarily found united with desire or with dislike, therefore all Inference as aim or purpose involves the condition of liking or disliking. Design or Purpose Kant considers both in a mental (subjective) and in a phenomenal or empirical (objective) light. Thus the mere imagining, —the mere mental or subjective existence of any thing we can conceive, produces a feeling of Liking or Dislike even before we have any real conception thereof, and this feeling of preference or of Liking Kant views in the light of a corresponding fitness or harmony between the forms imagined in Thought, and the intuitive faculty which produces or frames it as perception. This mental or subjective power of Inference Kant calls the *æsthetical power of Inference*; whilst the objective view requires not a mere speculative, subjective perception of the thing, but a positive conception thereof. Thus the power of perception is all that is required to imagine that any thing—a flower for instance—is beautiful, and we do not want for that any clear conception of the flower; but in order to acquire

a proper and fit notion of the flower, we must have a clear conception of it. This faculty which judges of the phenomenal or objective fitness of Things, Kant terms the Teleological power of Inference, or that of purpose.

Of the Aesthetical Inferring Faculty of the Mind. The analysis of this Faculty includes that of the Beautiful and of the Sublime.

Aesthetical Judgment of the Beautiful. Here, says Kant, we find Taste to be the umpire, therefore the analysis of the Faculty which judges of the Beautiful is in fact the analysis of Taste. 1. In a quantitative point of view, the Beautiful is such as pleases generally. The agreeable is a more personal feeling and varies in each individual, although every body usually supposes that what pleases him, also pleases others; but still this feeling is a mere perception,—it is no conception, and is therefore purely speculative, mental or subjective. All positive inferences or Judgment relative to Taste are therefore individual, for we never judge of a whole class but merely of one or of several, and our conclusions relative to the Beautiful never extend to the whole kind, but only to particular objects.

2d. Quality. The interest in any object which is produced by the beautiful does not depend, according to Kant, on the quality of the object itself. The liking or attachment which the Beautiful creates is disinterested and pure, and therefore must be distinguished from that which is created by the Agreeable, and by the Good. In both of the latter we are interested. The agreeable is connected with a feeling of desire, and also the interest we take in the Good acts as an incitement to further its accomplishment; whilst the pleasurable feeling created by the Beautiful is pure and disinterested; in other respects the Beautiful is all Quality.

3d. Relation. That is Beautiful in which a perfection of relative proportion or of relative fitness is perceived, without any positive conception of use or design.

4th. Modality. In relation to mode or form, the Beautiful, says Kant, pleases and interests us necessarily by its mere perception, without our having a conception thereof. Of all imaginable things, it may be supposed that they may possibly induce pleasure. The thinking, or the merely imagining of the Agreeable, is *really* pleasurable; whilst, on the contrary, the mere thinking of the Beautiful is *necessarily* agreeable. It is by no means an easy task to render Kant's meaning in plain English, and the difficulty is greatly increased when usual terms are applied by that philosopher in a different sense from the ordinary one. Thus we find ourselves obliged to use the term "the mere thinking," in place of the more familiar one of the "mere conception," because Kant distinguishes most particularly perception from conception. Therefore, we do not say that the mere conception of the agreeable is really pleasurable, which would be the more natural expression, but we say "the mere thinking of." And again, we find here a most wire-drawn distinction between *real* and *necessary*, when the latter is considered in an æsthetical or speculative light: necessity having then no real existence, no more than has a general rule which is constantly compared to the several instances which occur, but which general rule itself cannot be an object of empirical knowledge, inasmuch as it is impossible that all the instances could be observed. In short, Taste that judges of the Beautiful is considered by Kant as a mere mental or subjective feeling, and as such is general; and we therefore are pleased or dis-

pleased thereby by mere sensation, and not by conception or positive notion having empirical value.

The Sublime, Kant defines to be that which is great beyond all comparison, that compared to which all other things are small. And yet, remarks our author, we can imagine nothing in Nature but what has something above it. Thus, Absolute Greatness constitutes the Infinite, and the Infinite in the human mind is a mere conception, therefore real absolute greatness is not to be found in Nature, and we give that name to whatever awakens in our mind the notion of the Infinite. The Sublime is all quantity, as the Beautiful is all quality, but yet absolute quantity consists neither in extension (the mathematical Sublime) nor in weight or ponderation (the Sublime in Dynamics). The feeling produced in the mind by any thing approaching to the Sublime, is more a feeling of awe and wonder than of pleasure, and Kant likens it, in some cases, to a momentary suspension of the vital power. Like the Beautiful, the Sublime may be considered in relation to, 1. *Quantity*, which has been already noted as the principal element of the sensation itself. However, it must not be supposed that number to any extent can express the pure mental, subjective feeling of the Sublime; this is only to be judged of by the individual perception. It is on our sense of the Sublime, or the absolute great, that is grounded the feeling which we attempt to express when we would give utterance to some imaginary greatness which surpasses our very imagination. It is not the object that is sublime, says Kant,—it is not the raging sea that is sublime; the Sublimity lies in the perceptive feeling of the individual who judges thereof, and, like the Beautiful, the Sublime is altogether mental or subjective.

2. *Quality.* As regards Quality, the Sublime does not awaken a pure pleasurable feeling or emotion as does the Beautiful; that emotion is always mingled with a certain degree of awe, and being accompanied by a feeling of our own incompetency or weakness, the æsthetical appreciation of the Sublime is not without a degree of displeasure. This latter is mixed up with the pleasurable emotion arising from the consciousness of independent power in our own mind, by means of which we encompass in our imagination things most sublime and elevated. This pleasurable feeling enters greatly in that view of the Sublime which is grounded on self-constraint and on the opposition which the Will often sets up against the desires of the senses. 3. *Relation.* It is the Sublime character of the things of the phenomenal world which gives us a notion of Nature as a power, although we come thereby to a sense of our own superiority as observers. 4. *Modality.* Here, as with the Beautiful, the Sublime is a mode of Thought, but differs from the Beautiful inasmuch as it has more of an individual character, and demands a fuller development of moral notions.

The Dialectical or logical view of *Æsthetical Inference* can only be applied to those *à priori* Inferences which have a claim to be universal or general. The dialectical method of Kant then consists in taking up the very reverse of the inference admitted. Thus it being admitted that the inferences or Judgments of Taste are not grounded upon notions, ideas or conceptions, otherwise they would be subject to discussion, or, in other words, they would have to be proved, the reverse on the Antinomy of this view would run in this wise: All inference in matter of Taste is grounded upon conceptions, otherwise they could never become the subject of discussion, although they are clearly dis-

inct the one from the other. Now this Antinomy or converse position, says Kant, is merely apparent, and the two propositions can be readily conciliated on a closer examination. The propositions, he says, should stand thus: 1. Our judgment in all matter of Taste is not grounded upon positive notions, and is not susceptible of clear demonstration; and the Antithesis should be, our Taste is indeed grounded upon conceptions, but these are undetermined, and consist of metaphysical notions considered as objective or phenomenal. By means of this construction all kinds of opposition, says Kant, disappear, and both are true.

It belongs to the dialectical inquiry into the nature of the Judgment of Taste to examine whether the judgment we bear of the conformity of things lays in the things themselves or in us; whether, for instance, the Beautiful and the Sublime depend merely on our view, or whether they possess an existence independent of us. *Æsthetical Realism* admits that the Supreme Cause in Nature has produced things destined to raise in our imaginations the ideas of the Beautiful and of the Sublime, and organic Nature seems to proclaim this loudly. But on the other hand *æsthetical Idealism* points out evident marks of design and purpose with respect to the Beautiful and the Sublime in things perfectly inorganic and purely mechanical, by which it is most evident that the objects themselves are perfectly unconscious of the feelings they awaken, and that these emotions are only in ourselves. Kant enters fully into the question, and considers Taste and also Religion as dependent on the moral faculty.

The teleological power of Judgment, or that which relates to design and purpose, is now to be considered as it appears in the relative bearings to each other of

the objects of the phenomenal world. The æsthetical, subjective or mental effect of these upon ourselves we have seen are considered by Kant to be the production in us of the emotions of the Beautiful and of the Sublime, which constitute the subjective or æsthetical purpose or design; it is now the more positive or objective purpose of things in nature or the Teleological Inference, as Kant terms it, that will form the object of Inquiry.

Analysis.—This has in view to define the kinds of objective purpose or design. In the preceding paragraph the design or relative fitness of the objects of Nature, as they stand in relation not to each other but merely to the mind of the observer,—in short, the subjective æsthetical fitness of things has been the object of consideration; here we have to consider the mutual relationship in which the phenomena of Nature stand to each other with respect to design or fitness. This mutual relationship Kant terms objective design, and gives it the name of the Faculty of teleological Judgment.

The analysis of Teleological Judgment has in view, we repeat, to determine the nature of objective design, which is of two kinds, the outer or apparent fitness of things and the inner fitness. The exterior fitness of an object is merely relative to some other object. Thus, remarks Kant, the sandy soil of the sea-coast is well adapted for the growth of the fir-tree. The earth in order to bring forth living creatures must possess the requisite fitness, and produce the necessary food, &c. This sort of fitness does not reside in the objects themselves; it is a mere contingent, accidental or relative fitness as regards other objects. Thus, if we come to consider a sandy soil in itself independently of this sort of fitness, we never in that case would consider whether fir-trees may or may not grow there-

in. And again, the Earth possesses in itself other kinds of fitness than the fitness relative to the raising of the food required by the living beings which dwell thereon: and in all such cases the fitness we remark only becomes an object of inference, inasmuch as it relates to something else. Not so the fitness which is inherent in the organic production itself, and that constitutes what Kant terms the inner fitness of things. Thus in all organic production each part stands in due relation to other parts of the same organic production, and as such possesses evident marks of design, and at the same time each part may be considered in itself as an instrument, and as at once serving as a means and as an end. Thus the productive process produces organic beings as a kind; it rears them and brings them forth as individuals, and at the same time every feature of the individual receives its due degree of fitness. Now these various processes of Nature do not proceed, says Kant, from mere mechanical causes, but can only be explained by a peculiar cause having in view fitness and design, and which we have said Kant terms *teleological*.

Dialectics. This treats of the conciliation between the opposing or discordant conclusions which arise between the teleological inferences of design and purpose, and what seems to be the more mechanical law of Nature. Thus the proposition, "all productions of Matter must be judged of as much as possible by the mechanical laws which govern Matter," is met by the following antithesis: "some productions of Matter cannot possibly be accounted for sufficiently by taking into consideration their mere mechanical laws of production; they must also be explained by the evident marks of design and purpose which they exhibit." The contradiction, says Kant, is only apparent, for it is not

positive, but merely mental, subjective, or regulative; design or fitness is no entity, no real thing, admitted by some metaphysicians of the old schools and denied by others; it is a mere regulative or subjective principle which expresses the particular views of fitness which we entertain, which we conceive to exist and to result from the natural phenomena observed: it is our inference which decides as to the design or purpose, but that inference may be erroneous; it may not be shared by our neighbor. The human understanding, remarks Kant, only judges of things discursively, i. e., from parts it judges of the whole: in order to act otherwise it would require to possess an intuitive faculty of judging of the particular from the general, and be thus enabled to judge of all nature at one glance, and the notion of purpose or design would then not be required to form something like an adequate conception of things. This conception of Kant's, the notion of an intuitive relation between the mind and the phenomenal world, by means of which Intuition the *Ego* or Self is mysteriously united with the object, is merely mentioned by him in a cursory way. But Kant saw and avoided the abyss into which Spinoza and others had fallen, and into which Kant's successors were doomed to fall. He well knew that *Abyssus abyssum invocat*. He even struck out of the editions which followed the first the passages which might be construed into an attempt to confound all distinction between the mind and the phenomenal world,—conception which constitutes the basis of the following philosophy.

F I C H T E .

As with the philosophical views of Schelling and of Hegel, those of Fichte must be distinguished according to the period in which they were written and delivered to the public. Thus we have the period of Jena, and that of Berlin.

The primitive system of Fichte, that of Jena, may again be divided into "the theoretical Philosophy" and "the practical Philosophy."

OF FICHTE'S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY, OR
SCHEME OF SYSTEMATICAL SCIENCE.

We have seen that Kant considers "Things in themselves" as things really separate and distinct from the mind that perceives them. Now, this view of Kant is rejected by Fichte, who maintains that the objects perceived, those which constitute the phenomenal world, are merely the peculiar act of the mind itself. With Fichte, the *Ego*, the Self or I, alone exists, and contains within its expansive limits all the phenomenal world, which was before considered generally as limiting the Mind or I, which there found something foreign and distinct. In all experience, in all empiricism, says Fichte, we constantly find two things united and linked together, the

Self or I, (the subject) and some thing or some object. Now, to which of these two must we reduce them? If the Self or I is abstracted, then the phenomenal world or things in themselves alone remain, and thus mental conception has no other value than that of the object, all conception becomes objective; and if we abstract the phenomenal world, the mind, the *Ego* or I alone remains: the first is Dogmatism, the second is Idealism. Both cannot be true; a choice must be made, for a third system appears impossible. Now, to guide our choice, continues Fichte, we shall observe, first, that it is the *Ego*, the Self or I, which is alone positively made known to us by consciousness, whilst the phenomenal world is less certain, is more imaginary, and we are thereby only conscious of having discovered something. Second, Dogmatism, in telling us that our conceptions of a phenomenal world arise from some outward object which possesses real existence, is saying that of which we are not conscious, for we are only conscious of the appearance of the object and not of its existence, as we are of our own. Our idea of the object is therefore one of Intelligence, not an idea of Existence, and can only be considered as a conceptive notion. The mind is never passive, but always active, and in this activity of the mind, Fichte sees the first and absolute condition of all conception, of all knowledge; but this is all that the mind can supply, all it can furnish, it creates no real existence. Existence which possesses absolute Existence can alone produce Existence; the mind only conceives, and conception is no real being. Therefore, Fichte maintains that the various forms of the mind's activity, and the whole system of human intelligence, are all to be considered as dependent on the Self or I, as Intelligence alone, and as nothing more, and that it is the Self or *Ego* which

constitutes the reality of the phenomenal world as a real conception, but not as a real and separate existence. Fichte, following up this view, maintains also that if, with the categories of Kant, we adopt as laws of Intelligence the various laws or conditions which experience furnishes us, we commit, in so doing, a double error, first, because we are not taught thereby why the mind acts thus, nor are we thereby made sure that these laws really constitute essential laws of intelligence; secondly, because we do not thereby acquire the least knowledge of the nature of the phenomenal world. He holds, therefore, that all principles, as well of Intelligence as of the phenomenal world, are to be deduced from the Mind, from the *Ego* or I.

This system of Idealism, or this renewal of *Egotismus*, Fichte at first passed off as a mere carrying out of the Kantian philosophy, with whose views he maintained it to be identical at the bottom. But, in his subsequent papers, Fichte soon gave up this ground, and pointed out clearly and distinctly the difference which existed not only between himself and Kant, but also between himself and the Cartesian Egotists. Thus, in his "Wissenschafts lehre," whilst admitting that Kant sometimes appears to express himself in a way which might lead one to suppose that the subject and the object are one, yet he owns that Kant asserts again and again that he (Kant) never meant it to be understood that the Thought occasioned in the mind by any object was any thing more than an impression; but still Fichte considered himself justified in following up a path pointed out by so skilful a guide. Kant, however, would never admit, as a necessary consequence of his system, that the Mind, the Self or I, was all in all, that nothing existed beyond the mental subject, and that it was inconsistent with his (Kant's) whole system to admit any thing be-

yond it. Therefore, to avoid as much as was in his power all misinterpretation, Kant omitted purposely in all subsequent editions, the passages which Fichte considered as favorable to the new system proposed by him. It is barely doing justice to the memory of the worthy author of Transcendental Philosophy, to exonerate his system from the blame which is too commonly thrown upon it, as if it was the same as that of Fichte and his successors. The very succinct summary we have given of the Kantian philosophy, renders it doubly incumbent on us to insist on the distinction which is here pointed out.

Kant's denial of his ever having intended to point out the path which was taken by Fichte, and his effacing from his work the passages that had the presumed tendency, whilst it proves his desire not to be considered as an abettor of a kind of Spinozian doctrine, yet does not prove that Fichte was mistaken in advancing that the consequences he drew from those passages were inconsistent. Kant most certainly does distinguish the subject from the object; the mind from the phenomenal world; but then, by admitting that the object is merely known as a state or impression of the mind, he strikes out into a path which Fichte follows up in saying, the mind, or rather mind alone exists; the I or *Ego* is the main principle of every thing, and from Mind alone are all other things to be deduced. But another marked distinction between Kant and Fichte must here be pointed out. The terms subject, I, the *Ego*, Self, have, with Kant, a mere individual meaning, whilst Fichte employs each as a general expression, in the way we use the terms the Soul, the World, which include all mankind. This point now settled, we shall proceed, or rather, begin at once with the main grounds of Fichte's "Doctrines of

Science" (Wissenschafts lehre). His first step consists in inquiring if there does not exist in the human mind some leading principle from which all others may be deduced? for, such a principle, he says, must exist, unless the mind be nothing better than a kind of patchwork. A leading principle, a main-spring of all mental activity therefore must necessarily exist, it must be one from which all others can be readily deduced, and this proof alone is to be considered as sufficient. To a first principle of this sort, which must exist as a prime source, two others may be added in Thought, or in other words, to such a principle we may imagine two others to be adjoined, the one is deduced from the primary principle as the direct opposition thereof, and is conditional in form or apparently, though it is in reality unconditional; the other, or third principle, is deduced from the two first, it is in reality conditional, though in form it be unconditional. The primary, or absolute principle, is the *Ego*, the Self or I; the second principle is the Thing; it is that which stands in direct opposition to the *Ego* or Self, and the third principle is constituted by the result of the *Ego* or I, on the Thing or the *non-Ego*, the not I. We have here the Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis of Fichte, and this view we shall find later to be applied by Hegel to the investigation of the general philosophy of things, and as uniting the synthetical and analytical methods. Thus, any given proposition or synthesis being adopted from that synthesis, a contrary proposition or *antithesis* is deduced by means of analysis or investigation; and another *synthesis* is again sought by analyzing these contradictory propositions or antitheses. These second syntheses are again analyzed in like manner by means of antitheses or contrary propositions, which educe a third synthesis; and this method is pursued until such

antitheses are produced, as are no longer susceptible of clear analysis, but furnish mere approximate conclusions.

Besides this primary principle which, as we have said, Fichte divides into the absolute or unconditional and two others relating thereunto, our author admits also a basis of theoretical knowledge, and a basis of practical science. These three parts constitute the whole Philosophy of Fichte. 1. Principles of universal Doctrinal Science. 2. The basis of Theoretical Knowledge. 3. The basis of Practical Science. Theoretical Knowledge is constituted by the logical following up of the various Antitheses and Syntheses, whilst the basis of Practical Science consists in the union which takes place between the theoretical *Ego* and the *non-Ego*, or in the junction between the mind and the phenomenon observed.

The highest or main principle is constituted, it must be remembered, by the union of three parts, an unconditional Absolute and two conditional relative ones.

(a) The absolute principle expresses that which lies at the bottom of all consciousness, that without which consciousness could not be possible; it expresses Identity, and is represented by Fichte as an algebraical equivalent, $A=A$, since however far we may carry our analysis of consciousness, yet Identity can never be separated. This principle, Fichte considers as the essence of all consciousness. The certitude of Identity is such as renders it the Absolute, the unconditional, being action itself; and it cannot therefore be likened to any other empirical phenomenon. Nothing relating to man can exist without the necessary inference of this absolute principle, Identity. If consciousness exists Identity also exists, and that may be said in the same manner as we say that if A exists so also exists A.

The term $A=A$ is thus in reality conditional, and only unconditional as Form. Now in order to render the term quite unconditional in reality, we have only to put the *Ego* or Self, the I, in the place of A. The formula is then no longer $A=A$, but $I=I$, and then instead of employing the formula $I=I$, we can say at once "I am," whilst we could not say instead of $A=A$, A am. The *Ego* or Self, the I, exists as it were of itself, in virtue of its own value, and requires no other action, it is this activity which alone imparts being to all things. The *Ego* is because it is.

This logical law of the Absolute or Identity is what Fichte considers as the first principle of all Theoretical Science, and this term algebraically expressed $A=A$ as absolutely equivalent, leads us to the other term $I=I$. Still it must by no means be inferred that Fichte requires the first term in order to acquire the second; it is on the contrary the real existence of the term $I=I$ that enables us to frame the first. Not only is the *Ego* or I, as absolute Identity the essence of all consciousness, but also the essence of all Judgment is found in the *Ego*, which unites in itself both the subject and the object. Following up this view Fichte considers this term $A=A$ (meaning that Identity and Consciousness are one) as affording us the category or the primary idea of Reality, which is acquired by reflecting on the mode of action of our own mind, and by which we are convinced of the real existence of things considered metaphysically. Therefore Fichte in like manner deduces each category from the *Ego* or I, as the absolute subject.

(b) The second principle, that which stands in direct opposition to the Absolute and which is therefore conditional in reality although it be unconditional in form or appearance, this second principle is that of

contradiction; a principle which says that one thing is not the other, and is thus a fact proceeding from empirical consciousness and can neither be proved nor deduced otherwise than *à priori*. This term stands thus, A is not $=A$. It is wholly unconditional in form, being quite a matter of fact, as the first principle is itself, from which however Fichte maintains it cannot be logically deduced. But it is, he says, conditional by its nature, since it is always relative to something else, to some other thing; thus in order to say that such and such a thing is not A , the existence of the latter must first be an established fact. The first principle or the Absolute $A=A$ consists in the bare statement of the fact itself, and is entirely independent, and as such is Absolute by the very nature of its form; whilst the second principle appears to exist in relation to the first, of which it is the antithesis or contrary proposition. This antithesis or opposite proposition depends, however, on no other ground than the fact of the existence of the first principle, of which it partakes the absolute nature, being an absolute possibility. As antithesis or contrary proposition a proposition or thesis is necessarily required, for in order to possess a something that is not A we must first possess A itself. And therefore in order to come to the knowledge of what the antithesis or the not A really is, it first requires that we should know what the A is. This latter we know to be constituted by the *Ego*, the self or I as absolute postulate, and it is only in opposition to this postulate that the absolute antithesis or the not I can exist; the essence or the very condition of its existence being opposition. It is therefore empirical consciousness which lays down as fact the existence of the antithesis or the not I , and this second principle or the not I is opposed to the term $I=I$ in

the following formula, The *Ego* or I is not = the not I, (*Ich ist nicht = nicht Ich*), and constitutes what Fichte terms the law of contradiction. Through this second principle Fichte acquires the categorical idea of Negation.

(c) The third principle is dependent on the two first, and may be considered as susceptible of proof, since it is dependent upon two propositions, and as such is evidently conditional or relative; whilst in its essence, as a meaning, it is quite unconditional, being the absolute authoritative sentence or judgment pronounced by Reason. Now, the problem which this third principle has to solve, consists in the conciliation of the contradiction which is found in the two first; for, considered logically, the *Ego*, or Self, or I, seems to disappear through the not I, since the *Ego*, in order to be admitted to exist, requires the existence of a something else, of a not I. And, on the other hand, it is the consciousness, the identity of the *Ego* that alone gives us positive assurance of the reality of the not I. So that, in fact, the *Ego*, the I, never disappears, as is stated in the foregoing phrase, on account of the not I being present. Therefore it seems to be an utter absurdity to say that the *Ego*, or Self, or I, does not disappear in disappearing. How, then, inquires Fichte, is this to be conciliated,—how can the two first principles be righted without incurring the loss of the identity of consciousness? This, Fichte finds in self-consciousness itself. It is, he says, by the means of the identity of consciousness that the *Ego* or I, and the *non-Ego* or not I, are united and moulded together without incurring the loss of their separate distinctive characters. Consciousness marks the boundaries of each, and in the identity of consciousness we find blended without ceasing to exist, both Existence and

non-Existence, reality and negation. Here again, according to Fichte, we find in the Absolute or the identity of Consciousness the x sought for, and by the Absolute are marked and traced the limits of each. It is also here that Fichte finds the idea or category of limitation in the very action of the Absolute, of the Self, the *Ego*, by which things are limited and defined as being the *non-Ego*, or not I. Here, in the very nature of limitation, of distinction or definition, is found the category of quantity, since limitation involves the idea of the partial limitation, of the division of a greater whole, and therefore in it the idea of quantity, as compared to the whole, is necessarily involved. The very act of limitation admits, says Fichte, a possibility of division not only of the not I, but also of the sentient principle of the *Ego* or Self. The formula of limitation he expresses thus, A partly = not A ; and, again, not A partly = A . Here the ground is that of comparison, by which things are compared in reference to any given mark or standard.

These three principles, which constitute the Absolute, are considered by Fichte as including all human knowledge, all philosophy, which he resumes in the following axiom, and to which axiom every thing must be referred as to the ultimate resort; I oppose in Self a divisible not-Self to the divisible I. (Ich setze im Ich dem theilbaren Ich ein theilbares nicht Ich entgegen.) This axiom, the alpha and omega of all philosophy, by which is admitted that the *Ego* or I and the *non-Ego* or not I, are limited the one by the other, includes the following: (1) The *Ego* or I, limits itself by the *non-Ego* or the not I; or, in other words, the *Ego* or I is known to itself. (2) The *Ego* or I, limits the *non-Ego* or the not I, by the *Ego* or I; or, in other words, the *Ego* assumes its true position by its own activity.

Of these latter axioms, the first is considered by Fichte as the basis or ground-work of all Theory, and the second as the basis of all Practical Science.

1. This basis of all Theoretical Knowledge, that issuing from the Self or the *Ego*, lays down its own limits, and becomes known to itself by the *non-Ego*, the not I; this basis constitutes and comprehends an uninterrupted chain of Antitheses, and of Syntheses. Thus the analysis of this very axiom itself furnishes Fichte with several inferior axioms that stand in opposition to each other. And as the *non-Ego*, when considered as a something active, gives the positive assurance of the existence of the *Ego* or Self, so this latter then appears in a passive light, in a light altogether inconsistent with the real nature of the *Ego* or I, from which all activity really proceeds, and is engrossed, and which by its own absolute determines its own positive certitude. Now here we find an evident contradiction, for it is saying that the Self or *Ego* is at once both active and passive; and this contradiction is conciliated by Fichte, by means of the idea of division, since the *Ego* partly determines itself, and is in part determined by the *non-Ego*. Mutual reaction unites them closely, and the state of the one corresponds with that of the other: and thus in the *Ego* the very same number of parts which constitute its reality are found in the *non-Ego* as negation, and vice versa, as many parts as are determined in the *non-Ego* by the *Ego* as reality, precisely the same number is assured in the *Ego* by the *non-Ego* as negation. From this mutual reaction of the Self and not Self, or reflex-action, Fichte deduces the primary idea or category of *Relation*. And in like manner, (by converse propositions or antitheses united in Synthesis,) he deduces the categories of *Causation* and of *Substance*. Thus inasmuch as when

the *Ego* or Self is determined by the *non-Ego*, it becomes passive, whilst the latter acquires activity or reality, we find in this reaction, in which the *Ego* and the *non-Ego* are considered alternatively as active or as passive, as negation or as reality, we find therein, says Fichte, a peculiar sort of Relation, which is expressed by the word *Causation*. That to which Activity is attributed is called a *Cause*; and Effect is that which is considered as passive, and both united constitute action. But this again involves a contradiction; for if the *Ego* or I, in constituting itself in virtue of its own activity, is a Cause as active; on the other hand, we have seen that it is also passive, being determined by the *non-Ego*; and therefore, according to this view of things, it would be at the same time active and passive, reality and negation, cause and effect. How, then, is this difficulty to be surmounted? How is this contradiction, this antithesis, to be alleviated or reconciled? How is the active and passive to be blended in unity? This end is attained, according to Fichte, by the idea of Quantity,—in which idea the *Ego* or Self, is compared by him to a spacious circle, which comprehends all reality as absolute quantity, as absolute Totality. However small the *quantum* of activity may be; however narrow may be the space afforded to it within that circle; still that activity always constitutes Reality, and, as such, is active; but then this separate part is, when compared to the totality of activity, a negation of that whole, and as such is passive; and thus Fichte solves the problem, and in this solution is included the idea of Substance. For inasmuch as the *Ego*, the Self or I, is considered as the circle which comprehends the totality of all reality, it is necessarily *Substance*,—whilst it is merely *Accident* when a partial view is taken of the circle, or of

any determined point. Accident cannot exist without Substance; for any particular or determined reality presupposes Reality or Substance as the basis thereof. Substance includes all change in absolute generality, but without changing its own nature as Substance, and as such is Absolute; whilst Accident is a something relative and determined, always alternating with something else. There exists, then, pursues Fichte, only one primary substance, and that is the Self, the *Ego* or I, containing in itself all possible reality, and all possible accident, all activity and all passivity; and therefore the *Ego* or Self constitutes alone the absolute infinite: the *Ego* alone exists, and all thought, all action, is a limitation thereof; for whenever we say, 'I think, I act,' this already denotes a limitation of our general activity.

This view of Fichte has been aptly and quaintly termed the idealizing of Spinozism. The phenomenal world, the *non-Ego*, which Kant considers as existing, disappears altogether in this system of Fichte, or rather, it does not obtain; it exists only in virtue of the *Ego* or Self: and this may be considered as an admission of the existence of something besides the *Ego*, although dependent thereon. The manner in which Fichte conceives the *Ego* or Self to give rise to the phenomenal world, now remains to be considered.

The relation which exists between the *Ego* and the *non-Ego* may be viewed, according to Fichte, in two different lights, either in that of Causation or in that of Substance.

(1) In setting out from the idea of Causation, we find the operation of the *non-Ego* to be brought about by the Passivity of the *Ego*,—which passivity must have a motive that cannot exist in the *Ego*, since the *Ego* or Self constitutes the very essence of all activ-

ity, of all reality. It therefore, says Fichte, is to be sought for in the *non-Ego*, and this difference between the active and the passive is not only to be expressed by the idea of *quantity*, (in which passivity is considered as diminished activity,) but the passive is opposed to the active in the light of *quality*. And thus, as quality, it is that the *non-Ego* becomes the efficient cause of the passivity of the *Ego*.

(2) If we set out, on the contrary, from the idea of Substance, and not from that of Causation, we find that it is the activity of the *Ego* that creates the state of passivity, for this passivity is here, in point of Quality, a mere lessening of activity.

The first view Fichte considers to be tantamount to Dogmatic Realism, since the cause or real motive is different in quality from the *Ego*. Fichte terms the 2d Dogmatic Idealism, because the real motive or cause is merely ideal, since it proceeds from a mere diminution or lessening of the *quantum* of activity of the *Ego*. Thus, in Realism, the Subject or the *Ego* is educed from the object or the phenomenal world, whilst in Idealism the latter or the object is dependent on the Subject, since Idealism maintains that the reality of the not-Self, of the object or the phenomenal world, proceeds merely from the *Ego* or the Subject. Realism asserts that nothing can proceed from the Self or *Ego* unless an independent existence, a *non-Ego*, a phenomenal world be previously admitted. These contradictory views, which the Kantian philosophy had left as it found them, Fichte attempts to conciliate by means of a new synthesis or general proposition or inference which unites them both. This synthesis or general inference, which is to connect Realism and Idealism, consists in blending together as one and the same both the ideal and the real, and that end Fichte attains by

means of an intermediary system of critical Idealism, based upon the following arguments: The mere operation of the Self or *Ego* not being the only condition of the reality of the *non-Ego*, and the activity or operation of the *non-Ego* not being the only condition of the passivity of the *Ego*, they may both be united in the following manner, if we attend to what occurs in the process of Thought. In scrutinizing attentively this process, we find, remarks Fichte, that the activity of *Ego* coming to exert its power with the help of the *non-Ego*, this activity receives thereby a kind of shock or an impulse by which the activity of the *Ego* is in a manner doubled and made to reflect, as it were, upon itself. This reflex or rebounding impulsion proceeds from the peculiar self-limiting activity of the *Ego*, which does not allow the *Ego* to be acted upon or to act beyond a given point. And thus it is that what we call the phenomenal world or the *non-Ego*, is merely the repeated or manifold repulsions of this peculiar shock proceeding from the expansive activity of the *Ego* being limited by its own energy. Now, these self-exerting powers of the *Ego* or I, which mark so distinctly its existence and absolute reality, are attributed to a something beyond the *Ego*, to a something exterior to Self, and of which we form a notion as if it were a something having real existence in space. This reflex impression corresponds to what Kant terms "things in themselves," but then with Kant "things in themselves," which he considers as constituting the bottom or basis of the phenomenal world and as rendering it what it is, are external—they are independent of the *Ego* or I; whilst in the system of Fichte the reflex impulsion is an internal action entirely dependent on the *Ego*,—with Fichte the object represented is a mere operation of the mind. And thus he

attempts, by the means of this expansive action of the *Ego*, to fill up the chasm which hitherto separated the world of spirit from the world of matter. The various states of the mind thus established between the *Ego* and the *non-Ego*, in virtue of the activity of the first, are, according to our author, Imagination, Sensation, Perception, Feeling or Emotion, Understanding, Judgment, Reason, and in closest union with the mental or subjective expansion of Perception, both Time and Place. Now, from the Theory of Science, we shall pass to Fichte's practical Science.

Of Practical Science. It is the mind, the Self or *Ego* which represents then all things; but this does not occur alone, something else besides the *Ego* is necessary in order that this operation should take place. The act may be explained as it can, yet we cannot imagine that act to occur without presupposing that an impulsion was communicated to the reflex faculty of the *Ego*. Therefore this latter, especially when considered as Mind or Intelligence, is really dependent upon an unknown and altogether inconceivable something,—a not-Self; and it is only through the means of this *non-Ego* that Intelligence can exist, for, says Fichte, a finite being is only finite as intelligence. The nature of the *Ego* is therefore two-fold; the one is that of absolute independent being, the other, as intelligence, is dependent on the outer *non-Ego*. The latter is finite, but the *Ego*, says Fichte, is infinite. The *Ego* or Self must contain independent properties in virtue of which it exists absolutely, and without reference to any kind of not-Self. The condition or law which unites the two natures of the *Ego*, must, observes Fichte, be independent of all external influence. Now the Self as the Absolute, and the Self as Intelligence, stand in direct opposition, and yet their union

alone can constitute the *Ego* or Self. This antithesis or contradiction Fichte attempts to account for by admitting, as did Kant, that the contradictions of logical theory disappear by means of practical Reason. And thus we find, says Fichte, that the limits which the activity of the *Ego* or Self sets to the *non-Ego*, by which the reflex action is occasioned, these limits which exist theoretically disappear when considered practically because in fact the *Ego* is limited by the *non-Ego*. Theoretical Science, says Fichte, having failed in effectuating a mediation, a union between the *Ego* and the *non-Ego*, Reason, Practical Reason, then steps in and pronounces the verdict,—*the union shall be*,—and thus cuts the knot which theory could not untie. Practical Reason accounts for the problem, i. e., the incoherency which exists between the Absolute or Infinite *Ego* and the finite or intelligent *Ego*, which theory attempted in vain to explain. This explanation Fichte admits to be unsatisfactory, since it is not truly adequate, and he considers the activity of the *Ego* to be ever at work and striving to overstep the boundaries or limits which the *non-Ego* fixes. But these efforts,—these unceasing attempts to penetrate beyond the phenomenal world or the *non-Ego* prove idle, because the *Ego*, although absolute, as the means of knowing, is clogged and encumbered with its finite parts, and only perceives Things through the senses. These vain endeavors of the *Ego* to attain the Infinite which is unattainable, Fichte considers as bearing the stamp of Immortality, and in this latter term he blends together all the results of scientific knowledge, for Immortality embraces and exhausts the whole of all finite and rational being. The *Ego* or Absolute, represented by the consciousness of our own identity, endeavors by means of its own activity to acquire the precise deter-

mination, the exact condition or laws of Things represented in the mind, by means of the mind's own action, and all Science, all practical knowledge is constituted by these precise determinations, these conditions or laws, which are the means that the *Ego* or the mind employs in order to widen the boundaries with which the phenomenal world circumscribes it, and places between it and the Infinite. An important point to be remarked in the manner in which Fichte carries out the various consequences of Practical Science consists in his avoiding most carefully to admit any one point not duly tested by experience. And thus we find plurality not admitted as a thing already proved *à priori*, but as a consequence deduced *à posteriori*; and even the fact of man's having a body is considered by him as a deduction of experience.

Fichte's Moral Philosophy. Fichte bases natural right (Naturanrecht), on the notion we possess of our own individual identity, deducing therefrom the notion of Right in the following manner: No finite rational being can believe in his own existence without attributing to himself a free power of acting. Now, it follows necessarily, from this admission of free action, that every rational being believes in the existence of a something besides himself, of a phenomenal world, since it is absolutely impossible to admit of activity without admitting an object to be acted upon. Thus it is that through the medium of free activity we are taught the positive existence of other things, of other beings, and thus we acquire the notion of Plurality, and by it we acquire the belief that the same activity exists in other beings besides ourselves. But such a coexistence of beings, each endowed with free activity, is impossible, unless there exists between them fixed relations of

Right. This relation between man and man, this mutual activity or reaction of free intelligence between rational beings, this mutual curtailing and circumscribing by each man of his own freedom, and the respecting that of others, provided his own freedom be respected, is what Fichte terms the relation of Right, and from that relation he deduces his first axiom of Right, viz., "*Let thine own freedom be limited by thy belief in the freedom of other rational beings with whom thou standest in relation.*" And following up this first principle of Right, Fichte concludes by deducing therefrom and by grounding thereupon the anthropological notion of man as a being endowed with flesh and blood, in short, as a human body.

Fichte comprises under three heads all the views which can be taken of Right. First. The absolute first Right (Urrecht) or that of the individual in mutual relation with others as individuals, which includes all personal or bodily right, and all right of property. Now, when these rights are not respected, means must be had recourse to, in order to enforce them. These means are those of physical force, and involve the right of constraint in order to counterbalance the will of the delinquent. And thus, the law of Nature, i. e., the rightful relations between man and man, entails the existence of regulating rules or laws; and these constitute the second part of Right, or the right of the State, including therein (a) The free agreements between individuals in virtue of which their mutual rights thus agreed upon are guaranteed, and the execution of contracts forced, if necessary. (b) The rules which render obligatory the general will of the community, and cause it to become a law. (c) An acting body or executive power, that of the State which carries out the general will and unites thereto the indi-

vidual will in the abstract. The third head includes the conciliation of these opposing and conflicting rights, those of the individual and those of the State, and this is termed the political. The upshot of Fichte's argument is that every form of government is legal, provided it does not preclude and systematically aim at rendering impossible all amelioration, since the most apparently constitutional forms of government, if they aim at maintaining all things without any change for the better, are thereby to be condemned and to be pronounced decidedly illegal.

Fichte considers the main object of Morality to consist in conciliating the various contending and conflicting views which appear to exist in the *Ego* or Self as Absolute when these opposing rights are compared. He distinguishes Right or Legality from Morality in the following manner: Right or Legality is conversant, he says, with the outward or external world and intimates the necessity of restraint, so as not to encroach upon the rights of others; whilst the moral nature of man is an *inward* act and the restraint imposed is that of an inward voice—the voice of conscience. In Right, the debate lies between the conflicting tendencies to freedom of different individuals. In Morality, the debate lies between two various tendencies existing in one and the same man; the conflict is an inward one altogether.

The moral nature of man or Morality, Fichte conceives to be a compromise between pure desire and natural desire; and this composite desire to constitute the moral principle. Pure Desire is, according to our author, the striving of the Absolute (or the *Ego* as all in all) for absolute independence: it is the longing for freedom for freedom's sake alone, and, as such, is a mere form, and has no determined aim. But experi-

ence teaches us that there also exists another sort of desire—not a mere desire or longing in free and empty space, but a desire for enjoyment of some kind, and this Fichte calls the desire of Nature, and it consists in some empirical fact or other. These two principles being infinitely different, so is their connection or moral principle of indefinite nature, and involves progress without end, or indefinite. The form still remains that of pure desire, and as such appears as a tendency to absolute freedom; but this flight being limited by positive or natural desire, which is a consequence of our circumscribed and limited faculties, absolute independency of desire is never reached, but only approached. And thus the final aim of rational being consisting in Eternity, the *Ego* approaches nearer and nearer *gradatim* to absolute freedom, according to the predominance of pure desire over natural desire. It is, however, only by pure desire that each series of higher intelligence is made known and discovered to the mind. Fichte terms this gradual rising in the scale of moral intelligence “the moral determination of finite rational being,” and lays down the following maxim as a first principle of Morality, “Fulfil each time thy calling!” This absolute principle of morality being, however, limited by natural desire, the higher aspirations are, as it were, curtailed; man otherwise would act for duty’s sake alone, but it is natural desire that too often empowers the desire to act conformably to the dictates of Duty. And therefore Fichte conceives himself justified in considering as having an immoral tendency every natural impulse which is in opposition to the purer absolute principle always aiming at a state of infinite freedom. Even Sympathy, Compassion, and Humanity, he classes with the impulses contrary to purer morality if they are in opposition to pure desire,

for the absolute rational being, says Fichte, can only be such by acting from duty alone, and thus absolute duty and absolute independence become adequate expressions. Act always as thy Conscience dictates, becomes thus the formal condition or positive maxim of morality, and the criterion or test of the rectitude of our conviction of duty consists in a conscious feeling that we are on the road to truth and certitude. This intuitive feeling, exclaims Fichte, never deceives; it is only felt when the empirical, the acting Self or *Ego*, is in clear agreement with the pure and essential nature of the *Ego*; but we must decline entering further into the intricate though highly interesting system into which Fichte, starting from this point, enters concerning Morality and Duty.

The religious tenets of Fichte are to be found in his work entitled "On the grounds of our belief in Divine Providence,"—in which the author maintains the moral order of the world to be of divine nature. But this divine principle inherent in our nature only becomes actual and evident, is only brought into play by acting Right, and this only condition coincides with the belief that a moral end or aim exists in this phenomenal world. Fichte considers the belief in such an order of things in the world to constitute universal and perfect Faith, since in every moral action we perceive God; and he maintains that man can possess no other conception, at least adequate conception, of God. Fichte considers all deductive reasoning and argumentation as far weaker proofs of the certitude of the existence of a particular distinct being than the moral certitude of Divine Providence manifested in acts of Morality. But even admitting the worth and validity of deductive reasoning on such a subject, to what conclusion do we arrive? This Being must be considered

as different from Man and from the World, and yet must act in worldly matters by means of Thought, and therefore possess Personality and Consciousness. Now, asks Fichte, in what do personality and consciousness consist? They are qualities which man finds existing in himself, which he has studied within himself and to which he has applied these terms: they are, in short, finite qualities, and so here is Man attributing to God qualities of his own sphere, making God his equal. Man attempts in vain to create a God, he cannot. All he can do is to give to himself boundless power in imagination. It is still more impossible and more contradictory, asserts Fichte, to attempt to form an idea of God as of a substance that can fall in any way under our conception of things. Now the moral order of things presents us, says our author, with a something which to man is God himself. Fichte, therefore, considers all belief in the Divinity, which contends for more than belief in Divine Providence, as repulsive and unworthy of a rational being. Here, with Fichte as with Kant, religion and morality require that we should grasp at something beyond the phenomenal world. With Kant, the means to reach that something is Faith; with Fichte, it is our moral conduct, it is Morality.

It is but justice to say that in spite of persecution Fichte denies in this work that his theories have any atheistical tendencies. He even maintains that the view he takes of Religion is the true Christian view. His philosophy, he says, aims at attaining Truth and Goodness, and he therefore begins by demonstrating that both absolute Truth and absolute Goodness must exist. With Fichte, the voice of Conscience is the voice of God; and it is this voice which is always whispering to man that duty is to be per-

formed for the sake of duty. Through this natural disposition of man Fichte perceives an opening which leads us to a new sphere of existence and by means of which we can attain, independently of Nature and solely grounded upon ourselves, a higher state of existence. He names Reason the state of absolute self-content, and Bliss the absolute freedom of all constraint and dependence, whilst the road which leads thereto is the fulfilment of our duty, and is unceasingly pointed out by that unwearied monitor Conscience, but true bliss can only exist when the thoughts become holy and purely moral. This gradual rising in the scale of morality, Fichte maintains to be perfectly consistent with an unshaken and firm belief in the existence of a fixed order of things, a belief implanted by nature in the mind of man. Here, says our author, Religion has for its object the reminding mankind of the manner in which that order is best attained, and the encouraging him to persevere in obeying the call of conscience so as to advance with a firmer step towards the purer regions of bliss: it is thus, by the cultivation of the innate feelings of duty that man will come to know God, and already in this world eternal life will be his lot, whilst in the eyes of those around him he may appear to be living in a world merely imaginary.

The philosophical tenets of Fichte underwent much alteration at a later period, and instead of persevering in his views of absolute idealism, in which all is concentrated in the *Ego*, his opinions savored more of the objective pantheism of Schelling, in which Nature is every thing or All, and the *Ego* a part thereof. In the foregoing lines we have seen that Fichte considered the *Ego*, the Self or I, as the absolute, and as including necessarily in its moral part the idea of God.

Now in the new view he took of the matter, he no longer maintained that the Supreme Being was a mere doubtful form of the moral world, but that the Supreme Being constitutes the absolute and only element of Nature. The severity of his moral tenets were tempered with mildness. The absolute is no longer paramount as the philosophical *Ego*, but is displayed in Life and Love, which now take the lead. Expressions strongly savoring of mysticism and mere imagination take the place of the close logical method of his scientific Theory. These latter writings of Fichte incline decidedly to religion, and if not to dogmatical Christianity, at least to that Christianity which the assiduous reading of the Gospel never fails to inculcate. Fichte aimed evidently at conciliating Philosophy with the words of St. John, whose text he considers as the only real and pure source of Christianity. But then the interpretation of the philosopher wears a peculiar character, maintaining that the first verses of the Gospel according to St. John are contrary to the Mosaic revelation, which says that the world was created from nothing, since the testimony of the apostle tends to prove the existence of an eternal revelation co-equal with the Being of God. The incarnation of the Word in the person of our Saviour Jesus Christ he therefore considers as a mere matter of historical fact. Nor does he stop here but proceeds to say that absolute and eternal Truth may become the portion of all who devote themselves entirely and absolutely to a godlike life, by which they are made to join in perfect Unity the Supreme Being, and thus become the receptacle of the Word of God as did our Saviour Jesus, since the tendency of the moral nature of man is to arrive at union with God, the Godhead being the fountain of all Life. This union, says Fichte, can never obtain

so long as man retains in him the stain of Self; for man, as Man, can partake of the nature of the Godhead; but although nothing human can share the divine nature, yet human nature allows the attaining unto the total destruction of Self,—of that which constitutes the negation of divinity; and when this is attained, man sinks into the bosom of his Creator.

SCHELLING.

Although the attempt to illustrate German philosophy by the dry exposition of the main doctrines of a chosen few, may appear very like endeavoring to give the idea of a forest by means of a few trees stripped of their leafy splendor, yet even such an attempt requires that the foregoing doctrine should be clearly understood before we proceed to a subsequent one. Therefore, before entering upon the investigation of the philosophical tenets of Schelling, we present, as a corollary of the doctrines of Fichte, the following translation of a few lines, in which that author has compressed the main tenets of his philosophy :

"Eternal Unity

Lives in my Being, sees in mine own sight.
 Nought is but God, and God is nought but Life.
 Completely raise the veil that here surrounds thee ;
 That veil is thine own Self. What's perishable dies ;
 And thenceforth God alone lives in thine acts.
 Instinctively discern what after Death shall live ;
 For then the veil which shrouds thee here shall fall,
 And Life in God unveiled shall cheer thy sight."

The views of Schelling require to be distinguished according to the different periods in which they were published, and therefore opinions may be said to be those of Schelling, whilst, in fact, having been dis-

owned, they can merely be said to constitute the doctrines of such and such a period.

The starting point of Schelling was the doctrine of Fichte, and we find in his first publication, entitled "On the possibility of a form of Philosophy," a full admission of the necessity of grounding all knowledge upon the consciousness of self-existence. And in another of his first works "On the Self or I," he again maintains that as the ultimate basis of all our knowledge reposes on the *Ego* or Self, it necessarily follows that all true knowledge cannot be any thing but Idealism. Schelling repeats in this work what has been said by Descartes and many preceding philosophers as well as Fichte, that if beyond the sphere of human knowledge there exists a being containing in its own nature the source of all Being, and of all relation or condition, that Being, as occupying the highest point, is alone to be considered as Absolute. The more special doctrine concerning the human mind that Schelling makes known in this work is again that of Fichte, since he admits that whatever Reality the human mind possesses, it is centred, as it were, in a point in which Identity, Reality, Thought and Being, are identically the same. Fichte, indeed, considered this work in the light of a commentary upon his "Theory of Knowledge," although as it has been pointed out, Schelling had already plainly stated his views as to the necessary union of all knowledge in one absolute point as constituting the source or fountain-head of all knowledge. The work in which Schelling more distinctly differs from Fichte and no longer deduces absolutely all things from the Self or I, is to be found in his well-known publication, entitled "On the Soul of the World," although it appears to us that this doctrine of Schelling is, in fact, nothing more nor less than an

ingenious amplification of the ancient doctrine so well illustrated by Pope in the following well-known lines :

“ All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body Nature is, and God the Soul.”

But the genius displayed by Schelling, in introducing into the circle of Philosophy all phenomena, and the scientific arrangement thereof, render *his* philosophy a peculiar one. And moreover, Schelling never attempts to overstep the boundaries of human knowledge, at least in his first period. The philosophy of Pope and of Bolingbroke was that of Leibnitz, and it was in fact a philosophy grounded upon the same basis as that of Lucretius, of Epicurus, of Democritus. It was the taking of tradition for the workings of the Mind ; the supposing that the knowledge of God was a matter of induction, whilst the phenomena are alone the objects of induction. We own that in the eyes of those, who are of opinion that the cause of religion is strengthened when it is said that in taking such and such a view of things, of causation for instance, we find therein a clear and rational demonstration of God, in their eyes Schelling may appear faulty, but to those, and we are of the number, who are convinced that the knowledge of the Almighty God was acquired by a primitive revelation, human thought alone can never be admitted to soar so high, and the result furnished by Philosophy, however close and scrutinizing the inquiry, is clear and satisfactory. But to proceed.

In this work “ On the Soul of the World,” Schelling considers the human mind as uniting in itself the Unlimited and the Limited, the Infinite and the Finite, but not as the *Absolute*, for absolute unlimitedness would render useless and impossible all consciousness,

as well as would absolute limitation. Now the prime origin of all idea of matter proceeding from the very nature of the human mind, Sensation, Perception and Knowledge are therefore only conceivable by the limitation of that force or power which tends towards absolute boundlessness, and that occurs by means of an opposing power, and thus what is limited oversteps, as it were, its own boundaries. The never-ceasing incessant relative unity that is brought about through the constant antagonism of these two forces constitutes the active mind, and the same explanation obtains, according to Schelling, in all the phenomena of Nature. In Nature, matter is constituted by the unity occurring or produced by the antagonism and relative neutralization of the opposing forces of nature, and matter is therefore not primary but consecutive. Matter must be considered as the never ceasing, the incessant production of Attraction and Repulsion ; it is not created in dull passivity as it is usually conceived to be, but is the result of the neutralization of those forces whence it originates. In Nature power is an active something which may be compared to the mind, and the mind is occasioned and produced by the clash of contending forces. So it is with matter in Nature, but the conflict between Mind and Matter takes place in a higher sphere of Identity. Perception is that activity of the mind by which Nature is known, and which considers space as an object external to sense. The absolute in Nature constitutes that highest sphere of Identity, which is independent of the Mind, and with which the relative or finite absolute of the mind harmonizes without creating it, being itself indeed dependent upon it. Schelling insists upon this harmony not being considered as a mere thought, bestowing imaginary existence on the Absolute beyond the mind, but as the in-

tuitive perception of the dependence of the mind upon the absolute. Schelling maintains that the primary and necessary laws of Mind are those of nature expressed and realized in the mind; that Nature alone exists, and fully deserves the name by these her acts. This view of things he considers very distinct from the mere admission of a mere corresponding harmony of the laws of Mind with the laws of Nature. Nature may be considered, he says, as the visible mind, whilst the mind constitutes an invisible nature, and the question as to how Nature exists beyond the mind he conceives to be explained or accounted for by the absolute Identity of our mind in us, with Nature out of us.

The difference here to be pointed out between Descartes and Schelling consists in Descartes' distinguishing the Infinite from the finite or Man. This idea of the Infinite, says that philosopher, is no notion of mine. I did, I could not invent it; it proceeds from an intuition of something beyond us, and he thus preserves the individuality of man. Schelling sacrifices the individuality of man, and makes it a mere dependence of the Absolute. We think of the Absolute, says Schelling, not because it is a something that exists beyond us, but because our mind forms part of it, and cannot be separated therefrom. To these considerations it may be objected that in this first period, Schelling had not yet identified the Mind with Nature as he did later; but the subject being intricate, we prefer to omit than lay a stress on the various shades. It may suffice to say here, that he considers Nature or Matter to proceed from the actual neutralization of the opposing forces, named Attraction and Repulsion, and likens the positive unlimited activity of the mind to the force of Repulsion in Matter, and the negative or limited activity of the mind to that of Attraction. In this view

of Schelling, the deduction of Matter or of Nature from the existence of the Mind as the *Ego*, the Self or I, evidently still predominates. Nature there appears as the counterpart, the reflection of the mind which produces it in order to perceive itself in the antagonistic consciousness of Self. The aim that the mind has in view is to come to the knowledge of that antagonistic force, for then only shall it attain true knowledge of Self or of self-consciousness. But this knowledge can only be attained by the knowledge of Nature, for Nature is beyond the mind; and there we find a succession, a gradation of things which form innumerable stations through which the mind must pass in order to come to the aforesaid knowledge of Self. Nor does this occur in mere æsthetical productions of thought; it occurs in every thing that the mind embraces in its sphere of activity; it occurs in every action upon the lowest production of Nature, in all of which the mind perceives reflected a tendency towards the knowledge of Self. Schelling considers most poetically all organic production as symbolic and every plant as a mazy path to the Soul's perfection, whilst the peculiar properties of each organic formation, those properties which impress on every being its inward identity, every action and reaction or change in matter, as well in form as in purpose, all these various folds or turns in Nature are viewed by him in the light of so many footsteps of the Soul in the path which leads to self-consciousness or the true knowledge of Self. And if the mind is found to possess an innate and never-ceasing tendency to action, and to regulate, to analyze in staid order, this proceeds from the general tendency towards order of the phenomenal world. Schelling therefore considers the whole system of the universe in the light of one gradual and incessant forthcoming of things, which thus

rise by degrees from the very lowest stage and finally attain the highest point. The part of the philosopher consists, according to our author, in gathering together, in uniting in One, the innumerable quantity of powers or forces in which natural philosophy divides the general system of things. It is quite useless, he says, to attempt to illustrate the nature of fire or of electricity by exposing their various effects, for any one who has seen any thing of the kind knows as much about it as the philosopher. The aim of the latter consists in challenging the main principle amongst the multitudinous variety of powers all apparently the result of individual and distinct causes. Schelling indeed admits that the mind possesses in itself a natural tendency to unity in every part of human knowledge, and that an intuitive feeling prevents us from believing that the various appearances of things proceed effectively from individual and distinct principles: that the mind is prompted by a natural bias to perceive as the effects of Nature only those in which the greatest variety of change is linked with the highest simplicity in the laws on which these changes depend, and in which the most unbounded profusion of effect is preceded by the most marked and most striking parsimony as to means. He therefore asserts, that every man, even the man whose thoughts are the most rude and uncultivated, merits consideration and attention when the tendency of their intellectual efforts is directed towards the simplifying of principles, and that these efforts alone deserve our thankful acknowledgment even when success has not crowned them. These considerations of Schelling were especially directed against the tendency of modern natural philosophy towards the opinion of a duality of forces or powers as constituting the governing principles of Nature, not only in the field of Physics, where

repulsion and attraction are considered as the acting principles of Gravitation, but also in Chemical action, where Electricity, divided in the two poles as negative and positive, is similar in that respect to Magnetism distinguished in North and South; and again, in Physiology, where Sensibility and Irritability are still viewed in the light of opposing forces. Against these dualities we find Schelling maintaining the doctrine of the unity of all dualities, the unity of all contending principles, not indeed as an abstract unity, but as a concrete identity, as a harmonious assimilation of all things heterogeneous, and distinct. Schelling in short considers the World as the actual unity of a positive and negative principle. This constitutes what he terms the Soul of the World, or the organizing principle on which the whole system depends, and in which are blended all conflicting and antagonistic forces. This Soul of the World, or Nature, he believes to contain within itself the power of regulating the laws and principles of all action, as Intelligence. And thus it may be said that Schelling admits, in spite of himself, the self-existence of a something in Nature quite distinct from the mind of man: a conclusion wide apart from that of Fichte, with whom all is absorbed in one pure Idealism. This view of Schelling may be considered in the light of an introduction to his later doctrines, although the distinction he lays down in this work, "the Soul of the World," between natural philosophy and mental or transcendental philosophy, differs decidedly from the views adopted by his predecessor.

This second period is to be found in Schelling's works, entitled "First Sketch of a System of Natural Philosophy, 1799," in various leading articles which appeared in the "Zeitschrift für Speculative Physicks, 2 vol. 1800-01," in his "System of transcendental

Idealism 1800," &c. In these works Schelling conceives all knowledge as dependent on the agreement of the Mind or I, or subject with the object. The notion of object virtually involves that of Nature, and the Mind is inferred by the term Subject. The assimilation or union of these opposing principles occupies Schelling, and he conceives, in order to elucidate the matter, two modes of union as possible. Either Nature is the principal, and then the secondary question is relative to Intelligence as to the *quo modo* of its appearance, and this question is to be answered by the definition of Thought as an object of Natural Philosophy; or else the Subject or Thought is the principal, and then the question is, how does the object become known to the mind? And this can only be answered, says Schelling, by Transcendental Philosophy. In short, all Philosophy must either proceed from Nature as Intelligence, or from Intelligence as Nature. And as transcendental philosophy holds all Reality to be subordinate to Ideality, just in like manner does natural philosophy attempt to explain all Ideality from Reality to which it conceives it to be subordinate. Now, both are considered by Schelling as the two poles of one and the same Supreme Intelligence or Wisdom,—poles which necessarily tend mutually towards each other.

To philosophize, is, according to Schelling, to disentangle Nature from the dull mechanism which shrouds and conceals her; for matter he conceives as spirit quenched and extinguished, and thus is Nature the mere apparent producer of Intelligence, for, indeed, whatever Nature accomplishes, must necessarily occur according to given rules of order and purpose. The philosophy of Nature has for its object to demonstrate and point out the forms and laws of intelligence, i. e. of order and of purpose which exist in the phenomenal

world. We know nothing, it is true, says Schelling, but through experience; but this very starting point of all knowledge becomes by its actuality a first principle or *à priori*. Schelling, therefore, considers the Philosophy of Nature as Empiricism or actual experience enlarged in its widest sense, and extended to the unconditional or the unlimited. Nature, he conceives, as an ever-fluctuating state between production and producing, as a continual uninterrupted metamorphosis of form, and this perpetual change indicates, he admits, a duality of principles by which incessant action is maintained, and exhaustion avoided. Thus, on the one hand, we find, remarks Schelling, that the main principle of all actual phenomena in Nature is Duality or Polarity; whilst, on the other hand, the ultimate aim of all Philosophy consists in attempting to attain absolute Unity, that Unity which joins and assimilates all contending principles and which we can only perceive partially in the phenomena of Nature. This latter is the means, the instrument by which are effectuated all things that absolute Wisdom has decided upon. Schelling, therefore, admits that absolute Wisdom may be perceived and made known to us in Nature's works, although the phenomena of Nature only appear to us in due succession and in order of time. Following up the views, Schelling divides in three parts the investigation or Philosophy of Nature. 1. The conditions of organized Nature. 2. Those of unorganized Nature; and 3. The reaction between organic and inorganic Nature.

The views of Schelling as regards organic nature may be reduced to the following summary: Nature, considered in an absolute point of view, he conceives as everlasting, incessant activity, as eternal productivity, which, if allowed to expand without meeting some op-

posing force, would burst forth with inexpressible rapidity into absolute production, thus precluding all possibility of empirical Nature, i. e. of the phenomena we observe to exist. The appearance of the latter he accounts for by admitting that this absolute principle of production is hemmed in, as it were, by an opposing activity also present in Nature, and by means of which finite production obtains. The reciprocal action of these forces brings forth an uninterrupted succession of finite productions. All these various productions are, however, to be considered merely as phenomena, i. e. as appearances produced by the opposing and contending powers, since absolute Productivity tends incessantly to absolute production; and it is by the means of this ever-active and absolute principle that these appearances are each and severally the field of other changes by which this incessant activity is satisfied, and which thus occasions an endless succession of individual productions all subject to change, and all continually changing more or less rapidly. In this everlasting producing of finite production, Nature assumes the appearance of a living antagonism, a continual jarring between two opposing forces, the tendency of the one being to produce, to bring forth—and that of the other, to impede. The effects of this latter principle are also endlessly multifarious, because the primary or absolute tendency of Nature to infinite production has not to contend with a mere impediment, but with endless and continual reactions which we term *the primary* qualities of things. Schelling, therefore, considers each and every organized being as a permanent expression for a time of the never-ceasing conflict going on between the two contending principles,—the destroying principle which hastens to bring forth a new phenomenon, and the impeding or conserving principle which stays for a time

the wild destroyer. It is to this impeding principle that Schelling links all individuality, all self-reproduction, and more especially in organized bodies the distinction of sex. It is this latter distinction which fixes and bestows a permanent expression on the various organized productions of Nature, and which, forcing them to revolve continually in their own peculiar spheres, causes them perpetually to reproduce things of the same kind; for, as it is well known, remarks Schelling, Nature considers first the kind and not the individual, to whom indeed she often appears contrary; when striving with irresistible internal longing to attain to absolute production, all finite being appears as an obstacle in her way. Individual productions Schelling therefore considers in the light of unsuccessful attempts made by Nature towards the full attainment of the Absolute, as impediments laid on the road of the ever-striving, ever-advancing activity of Nature. With Schelling, then, the aim of Nature is the kind, and the individual a means. The kind once made sure, the individual is abandoned as a means no longer wanted, and his apparent destruction worked out.

The dynamic gradation of all organized Nature is divided by Schelling according to the three prime functions of organized bodies. 1. The producing power. 2. Irritability. 3. Sensibility. The producing force appears to act in fullest perfection where Irritability and Sensibility or Sensation are less predominant. On the highest step stand the Organisms in which Sensation or Sensibility outweigh Irritability; whilst those stand lower in proportion to the degree in which Irritability outweighs Sensation. In universal Nature these forces are found most closely interwoven, and form, as it were, one organization, stretching downward from man to the lowest plant.

2. Inorganic Nature forms the opposing feature to the organic. Schelling considers the being and actual existence of inorganic nature as dependent on the Being and Existence of organic Nature, inasmuch as unorganized nature only exists where the forms of organization cease to appear; whilst in organic nature it is the kind which predominates and is alone fixed, the contrary rule obtains in unorganized nature, where the individual thing is alone fixed and determined, and where the individual does not reproduce the kind. Diversity or difference in the material substances undoubtedly exists, but between them we find merely juxtaposition, for inorganic nature is merely a mass bound together by a peculiar outward cause, which is termed Gravitation. Still there exist various degrees in inorganic nature, and Schelling points out as occupying the highest rank different chemical forces, and more especially that of Electricity, which he likens to that of Irritability in organic bodies, whilst Magnetism appears to him in the light of what Sensation or sensibility is to such organized beings—the one and the other constituting in each reign of Nature the highest order of the forces termed natural.

3. Schelling, after thus clearly pointing out the distinction and the real character of each reign of Nature, the organic and the inorganic, considers it to be a just conclusion that both exist in Nature as objective beings or phenomena, and thence infers that a third order of things must exist, in which both organic and inorganic nature are united, for as the existence of inorganic Nature presupposes and involves the being of a higher order of things, that of organic nature, so can the latter only exist under the same condition, that of a world beyond it, and in which both find a motive, a reason. This motive or reason Schelling considers to

be the common soul of Nature, (the Soul of the World,) as the Absolute by which both organic and inorganic beings or universal nature are quickened. This common principle, he conceives as fluctuating between organic and inorganic nature, whilst it maintains the continuity of each, and as constituting in the one kingdom the first, the primary cause of all change, and in the other the final cause of all activity. The proof that such a superior order of things exists he finds in the closest consideration of both kingdoms of Nature, in which the same acting Cause evidently presides, although only perceivable in various degrees. Everywhere there is found a duality of forces which clearly indicate one identical source.

Theoretical or Transcendental Philosophy, as considered by Schelling, undertakes the investigation of the immediate and spontaneous beliefs which arise in the mind, and also submits to proof all knowledge hitherto admitted as undoubted truth, but which theoretical philosophy considers in the light of so many prejudices that require to be confirmed. Schelling, we have seen, considers the whole succession of Things in the phenomenal world as a successive expansion or development of the mind, thus constituting the parallelism of Nature with the mind. Every act of the mind may here be considered in a two-fold view, as *immediate knowledge* when merely actual, and as *acquired knowledge* when that which is believed is investigated, and often comes again to light in quite a different shape and character. Taking this view, Schelling terms all Philosophy a connected history of Consciousness, which first produces immediate knowledge, and then by means of experience serves as record and document. (In this point of view the Transcendental Idealism of Schelling is a precursor to

the Phenomenology of Hegel, in which much the same idea is followed up.) The exposition of this connected state of Things constitutes a succession of intuitions, by which the Self, or the Subject, or I, gradually attains the highest degree of Consciousness. Now neither the Philosophy of Nature (see preceding pages) nor Transcendental Philosophy can accomplish alone a full and perfect exposition of the parallelism of Nature with the Mind; the joint association of both of them is requisite, for the one must be considered as a necessary counterpart of the other. The object of Transcendental Philosophy being on the one hand immediate spontaneous knowledge or understanding, and on the other the investigation of all knowledge by submitting it to experience, we find arising immediately a preconceived opinion or a prejudice. 1st. That there exists a world perfectly distinct and independent of ourselves, and positively disposed in the manner it appears to be; and, 2d, a preconceived opinion that we can act on this objective world by means of the conceptions which we produce by our own Will in our Mind; and this second point of view belongs especially to Practical Philosophy, which seeks to explain the difficulty. Schelling considers these two points of view as involving a palpable and manifest contradiction, the investigation of which constitutes a 3d division. For how, inquires Schelling, can the Mind or Thought possibly possess the mastery over the phenomenal world, if our very conception itself is originally the slave, the utter dependent upon that phenomenal world? This point Schelling considers as the most knotty of all those which Transcendental Philosophy attempts to investigate, and yet as constituting the most important object of that philosophy. The problem required to be answered may be stated

thus: How can the conceptions of the mind be considered at the same time as shooting forth in due obedience to the objective or phenomenal world, and yet the latter be conceived as subservient to the mind? To conceive this, answers Schelling, it must be admitted that the activity which produces, which brings forth the unintelligent object or the phenomenal world is originally identically one and the same as that activity by which is effected all volition or free-will. This third division of Transcendental Philosophy is termed by Schelling "the science of the means and aim of Nature," and attempts to prove the identity of intelligent and unintelligent Activity.

These three divisions of the Transcendental Philosophy of Schelling correspond with the three heads under which Kant reviews all Philosophy, and which he terms "the Critical Philosophy," meaning the investigating Philosophy *par excellence*—(theoretical, practical and artistic.)

1. Theoretical Philosophy starts with Schelling from the culminating point, the highest verge of human Understanding, from Self-consciousness, and attempts to investigate the nature of that phenomenon by means of a close inquiry as regards the manner of its appearance, i. e., by the investigation of Sensation, of Perception and of the Conceptions which unintelligent matter or the phenomenal world calls forth. These conceptions Schelling divides into *outer* and *inner*, including in the latter the conceptions of Space and of Time and also the various categories of Kant, in *Abstractions*, by means of which the Mind is distinguished from the conception which it produces; and thirdly, in volition or absolute abstraction, which constitutes the object of inquiry of practical philosophy.

2. Here in practical philosophy Schelling no longer

considers the Self or I, the Subject, as merely perceptive, or as involuntarily conceiving, but as conceiving with volition, i. e., as realizing the conception. And as from the mere act of self-consciousness a whole order of things is unravelled, so from this second kind of self-consciousness, in which volition comes to act, we find another order of conceptions to be educed. These latter conceptions, being those of volition, constitute particularly the object of practical Philosophy, and Schelling in the exposition of them follows almost exclusively the doctrines of Fichte. The considerations of Schelling relative to general History are, however, more peculiarly his own, and are deserving of particular notice.

History, in its broadest sense, is considered by Schelling as the gradual self-unveiling revelation of Absolute Wisdom, as an ever-continuous proof of the existence of God, and he distinguishes three periods in this historical revelation. The *1st period* is that in which Almighty power only yet appears as Fate, i. e., as a blind unintelligent destroyer, under whose pressure was effectuated the ruin and destruction of all the wonders and all the splendors of the old world, and of the noblest race. The *2d period* of History he conceives to be that in which the hand of Fate is revealed as Nature, and in which the dark gloomy law of destiny appears metamorphosed into the law of Nature, which forces and compels all things to obey her plans, and suffers no volition, no free will. This period Schelling conceives to have begun with the extending power of the Roman republic, and to be still abiding. The *3d period* will be no longer the reign of Fate or of Nature, it will be that of Providence, it will be the reign of God, but when it shall begin yet remains unknown to man. These views of Schelling respecting

History have also been adopted by Hegel, who considers the general result of History to indicate the Will of the Almighty, and to constitute the surest indication of it.

3. *The Philosophy of Art.* We have seen the importance that Kant bestows upon the study of Purpose, or Aim, as observed in Nature. We have seen that Kant conceives Teleology, or the study of purpose, to be the one which points out more particularly than does mere Causation the Existence of the Almighty. Here we find Schelling adducing the notion of Purpose as the link which unites the Subject and the Object, or in other words, the Mind and the phenomenal world. This conception of Schelling, who identifies the subject with the object by the means of Purpose or Intelligence, which exists in Nature although independent of the observer, is deeply obscured by the language in which that author expresses it. In History, this Identity is not considered by Schelling as existing, because History is made up of a series of events which form an endless progression, and by means of which we can merely attain some faint glimmerings of Almighty purpose. But in the Philosophy of Art, Schelling considers the conscious Mind, the Self or I, the Subject, as the point in which this Identity of the Subject and the Object takes place, and this Identity as being that which constitutes the innermost Being of the Self or the Subject. For all really conscious activity being necessarily adapted to some end, i. e., having necessarily some aim in view, the real positive association, the link between the Subject and the Object, between the Mind and the phenomenal world, is to be found in the notions of Purpose plainly perceivable in Nature, although they are there quite independent of the will of the observer otherwise than as being per-

ceived by him. The whole state of Nature may, indeed, says Schelling, be conceived as an assemblage of purposes, and a real harmony may be said to exist between intelligence and not-intelligence, or between the Subject and the Object in the Identity of purpose displayed in mental consciousness on the one hand, and in unconscious phenomenal activity on the other, so that the Mind, the Self or I, the Subject, when surveying the works of Nature may be said to survey its own being in the Identity of Purpose thus displayed. But in order that the mind should perceive herself as object whilst perceiving Nature as a thing beyond her, and thus come to the knowledge of the principle which lays within herself, Schelling admits what he terms an artificial view, or the *Æsthetic teleological view*. Thus as in Nature works although unintelligent themselves are clearly intelligent and full of purpose for the Mind, so in the *æsthetic productions of Art* there exists the deepest intelligence, the clearest purpose in things which are of themselves perfectly unintelligent. Thus, says Schelling, are all contradictions harmonized, all enigmas solved by the self-perception and Identity of Intelligence or Purpose; but the unknown thing, the mysterious feeling of inexpressible content which suddenly harmonizes the Subject and Object, the Mind and the phenomenal world is nothing more nor less in fact than that unknown Absolute, that mysterious inalterable Identity by which all Existence is supported. But to the artistic mind alone, exclaims our author, it is that Nature displays the treasures which lay concealed in her bosom and unseen by vulgar eyes, and the mind once blessed with the sight of Nature unveiled and undisguised is impelled and prompted in despite of himself to attempt achieving her wonderful works. Schelling thus considers Art to be an ever-

lasting Revelation, the only persisting and actually existing Revelation that man possesses, and deems a continual miracle our never-failing belief in the Absolute Reality of that Highest of Intelligences which, never appearing in an objective light, is yet the cause of all phenomena, of all Existence. To Art, he therefore gives the precedency before Philosophy, because by means of Art alone as the highest intellectual purpose can self-consciousness acquire positive objective Reality in intellectual perception. "Art," exclaims our author, "throws open to the gaze of the astonished philosopher deep and holy mysteries, in which is to be found ever burning in eternal and primordial unity the flame which in Nature and in History appears to shine in a separate and distinct manner, which in Life, in Thought and in all practical activity seems to constitute things forever asunder, forever apart, but which Art unites in one all absolute phenomenal objectivity, and therefore," continues Schelling, "it may be understood why Philosophy alone as a mere investigation can never suffice; why it is requisite that the Absolute alone, by means of Nature endowed with Consciousness, should be considered as that which closes the scene of its own activity."

We shall close this 2d period of Schelling's philosophy with a succinct account of his leading article, entitled "Transcendental Idealism," which appeared in "Fichte's method," and in which Schelling carries decidedly the principles laid down by Fichte far beyond the limits or the point of view taken by that philosopher. Thus what Fichte considers as the mysterious limiting of the Subject or of Self, is viewed by Schelling in the light of a necessary Duality which proceeds from the mere simple being of the Subject or Self. And the unity of the Subject and the Object, or of the Mind and the phe-

nominal world, that union which Fichte conceives as only to be accomplished by the gradual and eternal progress of the finite towards the Absolute or the Infinite, is conceived by Schelling to be actually brought about by the means of Art. Moreover the notion of the existence of a Supreme Being, whose existence Fichte considers merely as a moral belief, is viewed by Schelling as an immediate, intuitive æsthetic perception. The ground on which Schelling here treads is no longer that of Subjective Idealism, it is that of Objective Idealism: the universe is not considered any longer by him as a part of the Mind, of the Subject, but the Subject is conceived to be a part of the Object or of the phenomenal world. Schelling here appears to stand on the verge of Spinozism, to maintain the Identity of the Ideal and of the Real,—of Existence and Intelligence. Schelling not only adopts in his third period views almost identical with those of Spinoza, but he also adopts the close mathematical reasonings of that philosopher as better adapted to the matter than the “method” of Fichte.

The works in which a full statement of the doctrines which constitute the third period of Schelling’s philosophy is to be found are the following: “Bruno; or, On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things, 1802”—“A new Periodical for speculative Physics,” which appeared in the years 1802 and 1803—“An Exposition of my System of Philosophy”—also “Ideas on the Philosophy of Nature, 1803,” and “Lectures on the right Method of Academical Studies.”

THE THIRD PERIOD OF SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY
(IDENTITY OF REALISM AND IDEALISM).

Schelling now gives the name of Reason to what he terms Absolute Reason, that in whose eye the mental and the phenomenal world are one and the same, which is tantamount to a total indifference of the subject and the object. But to acquire an adequate conception of this state, a state of mental abstraction is necessary by means of which Reason is no longer perceived in the light of a mental phenomenon, such as mankind conceives it, and which is a something opposed to another something: more is required; for Reason now becomes an absolute Truth, one entirely independent of the subject and the object, or of the mental and phenomenal world which become completely indifferent. This point of view Schelling considers as the true culminating point of Philosophy, in which all relation, all succession, all distinction of things disappear and things are perceived as they really are, or at least as our author would have them to be conceived. The mechanical laws of Space, the fleeting moments of Time are then no longer the standard by which things are compared, *for absolute Reason contains every thing, and beyond it there is nothing.* Any hesitation to admit of this principle proceeds, according to Schelling, from the habits we have acquired of seeing things as they appear to be and not as they really are in absolute Reason, to whose eye all that exists is equal. And since true Reason is absolute and adequate to herself, therefore the highest law of Reason and of all Existence is the Law of Identity, for nothing exists beyond the limits of Absolute Reason.

To the view of this absolute Reason all distinction, all difference ceases to exist as qualitative: it becomes

merely quantitative, i. e., of more or less, for at the bottom they are the same, since one and the same absolute Identity is found in all. To the eye of the Absolute nothing in itself alone is either subject or object, nothing alone constitutes a mental or a physical phenomenon; both are united in all things which only differ in degree, so that sometimes the one, sometimes the other becomes paramount. Thus, whilst the Absolute is formed by the pure Identity of all mental and physical phenomena, nothing exists beyond that Identity but a difference in the degree, or in the quantitative relation of that identical thing. And as the form of the Absolute or Infinite is $A=A$, so that of the Finite is $A=B$ which represents the joint connection of subjective form with various objective forms in different degrees. Nothing, however, is here considered as Finite in self, for pure Identity or the Absolute is alone self-existing. The true form is absolute Identity or Indifference, whilst Difference exists in the form of finite or individual things. In this manner Schelling upholds the opinion broached by various previous philosophers, that could we embrace in one comprehensive glance all universal being, we should then perceive in the whole an equal ponderation of subjective (mental) and objective (physical) phenomena, and should thus be enabled to comprehend pure Identity. But our view never reaches beyond individual things, in which the balance is never rightly adjusted, leaning sometimes on the one side and sometimes on the other, but never exactly equipoised, whence proceeds all individual distinction, whilst all is compensated and identified on the whole, for absolute Totality is considered by Schelling as absolute Identity. To the view of the Absolute there exists therefore no such a thing as individuality, no single separate object by itself, for

nothing exists by itself excepting Totality. If any thing appears to exist beyond Totality, that proceeds, says Schelling, from a mere voluntary abstraction, which, when admitted as real, becomes a too fruitful cause of many errors.

Absolute Identity being absolutely one and the same in every part of the Universe, Schelling therefore likens the Universe to a line, in the centre of which stands $A=A$, whilst at the one end we find $\overset{+}{A}=B$ representing an overplus of mental or subjective activity, and on the other end stands $A=\overset{+}{B}$, which represents an overplus of the objective or physical activity. And thus, while the Identity is absolute in the middle, it is only relative at each extremity, where on the one side Realism figures as physical Nature, and on the other, Idealism as mental or subjective activity. On each side occurs an expansion which constitutes three potencies (the term *potency* having here the meaning of *quantitative*, difference). The first potency of Realism or of Nature is Matter and Gravitation, or the highest preponderance of the objective. Secondly, that of Light, which constitutes the subjective side of Realism and may be considered, says Schelling, as an inner perception of Nature when compared to Gravitation, which figures as an objective or outer one. The third potency of Nature is Organization or Organism, which is the joint production of Light and Gravitation. Schelling maintains that Organism is as much primordial as Matter, and that in fact nothing is unorganized in Nature, for that which appears such is already prepared for organization and contains potentially the future state as does the grain of corn before germination. Schelling therefore terms organization the outward expression of the inner being of every substance, and

conceives the earth to be at once both animal and vegetative. What is called inorganic Schelling conceives to be a mere residuum, and to consist of parts which could not partake of organization. The flower of all earthly organization is, he says, the human brain, whilst the lowest term or the so-called dead matter is a mere sleeping state, which may at any time be called into action according to the laws of absolute Identity.

The Potencies of Idealism or of Thought are, First, the Understanding or that of Reflection; Secondly, Activity, or the Potency of *Subsumption* (Inference); Thirdly, the union of Reflection and *Subsumption*, or the potency of Reason. These three potencies Schelling conceives as containing, 1st, the True; 2d, the Good; and 3d, the Beautiful, accordingly as the inward principle of the substance is dependent on the Form, or the inward principle of the Form proceeds from the Substance, or as the absolute principles of Substance and Form are united and blended into one.

The knowledge (adequate) of Absolute Identity appearing unattainable to Schelling by means of the old methods of Analysis and Synthesis, and even by means of the mathematical, which he came by degrees to give up as utterly inadequate, he at last puts in the stead of the logical forms of human knowledge and even of the metaphysical categories of human reason, simple intellectual perception as the harmony and the equalization of Thought and Existence. This intellectual perception he distinguishes from ordinary perception, inasmuch as in the latter only one individual object is perceived, whilst in intellectual perception it is not merely a given individual object that is perceived as existing, but it is the very notion of universal existence that is identified with our Thought, and thus absolute Thought and absolute Existence are at

once perceived. This intellectual perception constitutes, says Schelling, absolute knowledge, in which alone are blended Thought and Existence, since the human mind cannot separate Thought as absolute from Existence. This absolute knowledge he conceives as intuition; as a something which cannot be taught; and yet Schelling endeavored to frame a peculiar method by means of which this intellectual perception could be more readily acquired, and this method he terms Construction. This method of Construction attempts to prove that in each and every individual object the absolute Totality is expressed, since the Absolute is All, and All is the Absolute. Thus, by the philosophical construction of any given object is meant an attempt to prove how in that given individual object the Absolute is found to be reflected.

Those who may be desirous of a full and complete acquaintance with the views of Schelling respecting the Identity or Indifference of Realism and Idealism, will find this subject completely exposed in his "Lectures on the Method of Academical Study." Here his attempt at an historical construction of Christianity appears to us the most worthy of illustration. The incarnation of the Divinity, which constitutes a main principle of Christianity, Schelling conceives as the incarnation of Eternity. And, considered in this light, the eternal Son of God proceeding from the Being of the Father of all things, is the Finite itself as it exists in the eternal contemplation of God. Christ he conceives to be the culminating point, the utmost apex of human nature rendered apparent, and to have existed as an individual fully conceivable according to the conditions of Time and Place in which he appeared. But since our measures of Time are not applicable to the Eternity of God, it cannot be said that God appear-

ed in the human form at any particular time. This chronological form of Christianity Schelling conceives to be still unfolding itself, but when its full completion shall be is unknown. At the same time he considers the incompleteness of the Revelation contained in the Bible as a great obstacle to the full and free development of Christianity, and even goes so far as to say that the religious bent of the Holy Scriptures is even inferior to that contained in the sacred writings of other Religions. In future time a fuller revelation, he conceives, may be expected, a re-appearance of Christ, or at least a second birth of Christianity shall take place, and then a higher form of Religion shall spring forth, in which Religion, Philosophy and Poetry will be united and blended, and this future event will constitute the full accomplishment of the high destiny of human nature.

This future state of felicity, Schelling considers as a state of recurrence, since he admits that there has existed, at the first appearance of man upon earth or at the creation of man, a golden time, a golden age, not one in which nuggets of gold abounded, as it may have occurred in various periods, but one which was the first state of Man, in which he maintains that Policy, Knowledge, Religion, and Art were in that state of absolute perfection, which shall one day appear again. It cannot be supposed for a moment, says Schelling, that Man could rise from mere Instinct to Consciousness, from companionship with the brute creation to Reason. He maintains that the Historical ages must have been preceded by others of a higher order, which are handed down by old Tradition as ages of Gods and Heroes, and considers Religion and Civilization to be unaccountable, unless it be admitted that they proceed or originate from such a

superior order of things altogether primordial. All Mythology, he conceives to be a dark and clouded narration of times of real grandeur, which Tradition has disfigured in handing it down.

Already in this third period the Mysticism which at last entirely absorbed the writer, becomes more and more strongly marked. This mysticism is as yet combined with his unceasing efforts to lay down a method of absolute knowledge, i. e., a method by means of which he could give full scope to and express in terms capable of being understood, the philosophic Intuition which he considered as identical with the Absolute, but unintelligible when reduced to words. As all mysticism of a higher order is entirely inexpressible in terms suited to the Thought, Schelling's attempt was naturally a failure, and he appears to have given up the search as fruitless, since he at once lets loose the reins to Fancy and Imagination, in a field where such a career is altogether boundless. Not only is the difficulty rendered insuperable, because terms are wanting for many metaphysical thoughts, but it may also be doubted whether these thoughts were really clear to Schelling himself, and this doubt is fully authorized by the change which again supervened in his manner of conceiving the Absolute. This he ceased to view in the light of total and absolute Indifference of Realism and Idealism. This view of the Absolute, which united in Reality or Existence all Things, approached very near to that of Spinoza. This view he now changed for one more similar to that of Bishop Berkeley, admitting Idealism to outweigh Realism, when we attempt to lay down a basis or groundwork for the Absolute. The Ideal is now the first; then the Ideal works, acts, *concretely*, and the third or the Real appears. Matter now appears to Schelling in the light of the negation

of Spirit, and as such, or as a contrary, as a counterpart, he separates the Universe from the Absolute, and by thus distinguishing the one from the other, he effectually discards the opinions of Spinoza, with whose notion of Being or Existence, the Absolute of Schelling, considered as Absolute Totality, was almost identical. This may be termed the fourth period of Schelling's philosophical tenets, that in which they approach those of the Neo-Platonicians. These doctrines of our author are to be found in his "Religion and Philosophy, 1804," in his work entitled "The Doctrine of Fichte," and also in "An Annuary of Medicine," which Schelling undertook with Marcus, and in which many original leading articles of his are published from 1805 to 1808.

In likening these new views of Schelling to those of Berkeley, we do not intend to say that the notions of the latter concerning Idealism and Realism are by any means absurd. We have already expressed the high sense we entertain of that great philosopher, and refer to those opinions in order to recall to our reader's mind, that we consider the popular conception of Berkeley's views as a complete misconception.

SCHELLING'S FOURTH PERIOD.

It has been stated that until now the Absolute and the Universal were considered by Schelling as identical in the point of view of Indifference, i. e., that there was but one absolute Unity in which all was united, and that the immediate manifestations of this Absolute were Nature and History; Nature as exhibiting the various phenomena by which the Absolute is known; History as tracing the various modifications in time gone by. Schelling now pronounces the Absolute and the Uni-

versal to be different; he now maintains the Self-Existence of the world, and, in order to express this thought more forcibly, he admits in the work entitled "Religion and Philosophy," that the world proceeds from a rupture, is a something broken off from the Absolute, admitting no gradual, no fixed transition from the Absolute to the Real, but that the apparition of the Real or of the phenomenal world can only be conceived as a precipitous and sudden rupture or separation from the Absolute. But this Absolute he conceives alone to be Reality, and denies that the finite objective things which stand in opposition direct possess Reality, since they do not contain Self-Existence and cannot therefore be based upon a share of Reality borrowed, as it were, from the Absolute. The phenomenal world or the Universe he therefore considers as Unreal, since only a separation, a rupture from the Absolute, or caused by a withdrawal of the latter. History, whose warning voice Schelling conceives to be a continuous revelation from above,—History alone, he maintains, can conciliate this separation, for the final term and full knowledge of History would constitute a complete revelation from God. Schelling speaks in terms savoring fully of Neo-Platonism, of the descent of the Soul from the intellectual ideal regions to the phenomenal or lower, to the sensible world, and holds, as do the Neo-Platonicians, this descent, this fall of the Soul to be a divine punishment for its Egotism. This idea he follows up in his views respecting the Palingenesis and the wanderings or transmigrations of Souls, which, according as they lay aside more or less in this world of the selfish propensities of human nature and thus approach nearer to the moral purity of the Absolute or the Infinite, either begin anew a life of higher order in better stars—or else, when absorbed in matter, are

precipitated into abodes farther from Infinite Wisdom. Schelling adopts the explanations given by Bruno and the Neo-Platonicians respecting the manner of conceiving the Grecian Mysteries, admitting the deep meaning which these and many philosophers have believed to have existed in these mysteries. He even maintains that the pure ideal nature of Religion can only exist in the form of Mystery. All true experience, says Schelling (*Ann. of Medicine*), is religious, for Philosophy and Religion go hand in hand: the Existence of God is, however, an empirical Truth, the basis of all Truth, the ground-work of all Experience; for though Philosophy is not Religion, yet the Philosophy which fails to unite in holy harmony Religion and Science, is incomplete. But he maintains that there exists something higher than Science, a knowledge which is not to be acquired by Analysis or Abstraction, nor by Synthesis or Deduction, which are incapable of attaining to the Absolute. It is by Contemplation alone that this can be acquired; it is by the vision, by the deep consideration of what is in God; it is in viewing God as he is that the Mind can attain an adequate notion of Eternal Wisdom. Schelling is therefore of opinion that the time will come when Science will cease to be of any avail, a time in which intuitive knowledge will reign, and that as the dying eye in closing upon this phenomenal world opens to the ineffable vision of Supreme Wisdom, so in this world the mind may abstract herself entirely from all worldly things, and by Contemplation arrive at an idea more or less adequate of the Absolute. We find here the modern Philosopher carried away by his feelings, repeating almost word for word the doctrines of the Hindus and of the Ascetics. "Liberation from ill," say the Hindus, according to Mr. H. T. Colebrooke, "is

attained by the soul, acquainted with the truth by means of holy science, divested of passion and meditating on itself; and by the maturity of self-knowledge making its own essence present; relieved from impediments; discerning the previous burden of merit or demerit by devout contemplation. And thus previous acts being annulled, and present body departed, and no future body accruing, there is no future connection with the various sorts of ill. This then is prevention from pain: it is deliverance and beatitude." (See *Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindus*. Trans. R. As. Soc. 1824.)

Schelling from this period devoted himself entirely to the study of the mystical writers, and adopted the tenets of Mysticism, openly avowing his belief therein. "I am not ashamed," he exclaims, "of being called a visionary. I shall even do my utmost to make myself worthy of the name, and shall henceforth devote to the study of such writings a time which, as yet, I thought wasted by such an occupation." He conceives the true spirit of Science to have been abandoned to the unlearned, because Science refuses to go beyond a certain height, and maintains that many a philosopher would willingly give up all his Science for the mental effusions and deep feeling which brighten the pages of many of the despised "visionaries or enthusiasts."

SCHELLING'S FIFTH PERIOD.

Schelling now adopts the style of his favorite author, Jacob Bœhm, in his work entitled "*Philosophical Researches on the existence of Human Freedom*." With Bœhm, he considers contemplative knowledge in the light of immediate intuition. Both make use of a peculiar mixture of abstract and of sensible forms, employing a medley of fantastical descriptions and

logical proofs. The same speculative view of things is taken by both authors. The view of Schelling (at this period) respecting the Deity is almost identically the same as that of Bœhm, one of whose main conceptions was the self-dualism, the double nature of the Absolute. Bœhm, laying down as a first principle that the Deity can only be conceived by man as an incomprehensible Infinite, as a fathomless and inscrutable mystery, Bœhm unites (according to his own expressions) in his own sensible, abstract, finite being this inscrutable mystery. This union of the Infinite with the Finite is conceived as taking place in the very elements, in the very groundwork of Nature, where in the dark resort of feeling the qualities of matter are distinguished from each other, and where from the shock of these qualities with each other a flash of light, as it were, is produced which beams forth as Mind. The Mind or principle of Light thus produced, now ordains and expounds the surrounding forces of Nature, and then from out of the fathomless and inscrutable mystery of the Infinite arises in the bosom of the Finite, by the means of the Light of the Mind, the awful form of God as perceived from afar in the realms of eternal bliss. This fathomless and inscrutable Infinite of Bœhm may be likened to the Absolute as Schelling conceives it in his preceding writings, as the complete identity or indifference of the Real and the Ideal. Bœhm distinguishes the inscrutable Infinite or fathomless deep (Ungrund) from the firm land (Grund) or the phenomenal world as Nature, and from the Deity considered as the Light of Intellect; and much in the same way we find Schelling in this period no longer conceiving the Absolute merely as Unity, but as proceeding to a kind of expansion, from which Expansion the Absolute again becomes One.

The first state is the Absolute as utterly inscrutable, as a something perfectly fathomless: this constitutes Bœhm's Abyss (Ungrund); then as Expansion thereof we have the phenomenal world or Nature (Bœhm's firm land, Grund); and lastly, this Expansion is absorbed once more in Unity or Identity, and again returns to the Absolute. The three moments or positions in which Schelling now conceives the Godhead correspond to these three views of the Absolute: 1. As pure Indifference; as a Thing utterly inconceivable and fathomless, to which no human Thought can approach, and which admits of none of the Contraries that all other conceptions give rise to. 2. From this inscrutable Unity issues Duality, and Existence and Nature are united by Love. The Absolute is no longer indistinct Indifference, but distinct Identity. This Existence is not merely an ideal one, but it is something Real. It is something in God and yet distinct from God, for Nature although utterly dependent on the Deity is yet quite different. Neither Reason nor Will are included in this state of primeval Nature, but Desire alone as an impulse longing for existence. Nature in that state is likened by Schelling to a dark rolling ocean moved by uncertain and varying laws, from the inward shock of which is produced a Light that reflects the Deity. This Light of the World, this conception, is the eternal Word in God which casts a celestial ray in the midst of Darkness, and imparts Intelligence where Desire alone existed. Intelligence and Desire constitute Free Will, which has for its aim and end the ordaining, the regulating of Nature, as yet without positive rule or laws. Nature or the Real, thus enlightened by Intelligence or the Ideal, is brought into Life, and the World is created. The expansion or unfolding of the World has two periods: 1. The

gradual evolution of all natural Things until the appearance of Man. 2. The evolution of Man in History or the gradual development of Mankind. The first is characterized by the appearance of the Light; the second by that of Intelligence, and the whole history of mankind consists in the struggle between these elementary principles. The first Light or the primary principle attempted in vain to bring forth all Things; all the productions of Nature are void without Intelligence. And this, says Schelling, we find exemplified in the first ages of the World, which were chaotic. Even at a much later period the Light of Nature or the primary principle advances but slowly on the road pointed out by Intelligence, and every step is marked by the evolution, the production of some new class of Being. Every Being thus produced in Nature possesses, according to Schelling, two principles, that of Nature, which, as opposed to the other or the divine principle, is dark and obscure, but constitutes the individual. These two principles, which are separated in the lower order of Things, where the divine Principle of Intelligence or Universal Will rules and governs as a power distinct from Nature, are united in Man, but not blended. This only can occur in the Absolute; in Man they exist together, but distinct and separable, whilst in God they are indivisibly united. Schelling conceives this divisibility of the particular and the Universal Will as it exists in Man as a means of accounting for the Existence of Good and Evil: Good being the submission of the particular Will of the individual principle of man to the Universal Will, to the principle of Intelligence, and this constitutes the rightful order of things, whilst the reverse constitutes Evil. And in this possibility of Good or Evil consists the freedom of Man. But, remarks Schel-

ling, empirically Man is not free, since his general, positive state is conditional, and dependent upon the previous fact of Intelligence. Therefore, whenever at any given time man acts, he only acts in concordance with his Nature; and yet, says our author, he acts with freedom, because his freedom, in whatever occurs necessarily, is part of the eternal plan. (Weil er sich selbst von Ewigkeit frei zu dem gemacht hat, was er jetzt nothwendig ist.)

The struggle between self-will or particular individual desire and Universal Will constitutes almost all the history of Mankind; as the history of Nature consists principally in the struggle between the primary impulsive fundamental principle of Desire and that of Intelligence. The various periods of human history or of that of the world are said by Schelling to consist of the various degrees through which the Evil principle passes in its struggle with the principle of Good or of Love, and the middle term of History to be Christianity or the point of History in Christ, in which point of Time we perceive the principle of Good or of Love appearing personally in face of the principle of Evil as it is in Man. The interposer, the Mediator was Christ, who aimed at restoring the fitful relation between the Creation and God. Man, says Schelling, being a personal object, demanded a personal Mediator, and found one in the highest point of perfection to which Creation could possibly attain. The final view, the term or end of History, will be the reconciliation of self-will or of individual principle with Good or Love, the Universal Will, and the complete mastery of the latter over Self-will so that the Universal Will or God will be All in All. And then, adds the philosopher, that which was hitherto Indifference will become Identity.

A fuller exposition of Schelling's views respecting

the Deity may be found in Schelling's controversy with Jacobi (1812), in which he strenuously denies having merely pleaded in favor of natural religion by advancing that it is through Nature also that Man acquires the notion of the Divinity. Theism or Theology alone, says Schelling, gives us the notion of God considered as the cause of the World, whilst in Naturalism we come to the Divinity as to the basis or the groundwork of the whole fabric. He therefore maintains that both are necessary, and that the truth consists in the joint assemblage of the two sources of light, for indeed God is at the same time the fundamental principle and the Cause of all things. It is not unworthy of the Divinity, exclaims our author, it is not contradictory to the nature of God to admit of a gradual evolution of things, a slow expansion proceeding from His being, thus constituting a slow but continuous revelation of himself. Therefore all things proceeding from God, all Things, even apparently unfinished and imperfect, may be conceived as complete because they were about to be completed. Things about to come forth must necessarily expand by degrees in order that the due and full completion of Things shall occur to the point and as fully as it is ordained. Nature, says Schelling, has, it is true, the appearance of a something negative when compared with the notion of the Deity, but unless we admit in God the existence of Nature even as a dark and negative principle we can have no real conscience of God, and therefore such an opinion cannot be derogatory of the Divine Essence. For so long as modern Theism only conceives God as possessing merely pure and simple existence, He remains in fact a being without existence, so that until a real Duality or Dualism is acknowledged in God, until not only the affirmative or

expansive principle, but also the negative or restraining one is admitted, until then, Schelling tells us, it is the duty of scientific sincerity to deny the personal existence of the Godhead, since he considers it as impossible to conceive a God without a negative principle as it is to conceive a circle without a central point.

In later times (1830-'40) Schelling published his philosophical views under the title of "Positive Philosophy or Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation." The views are much the same as those already detailed, but are placed in various, and in other lights. We must, however, decline entering into closer inquiry on that subject before having sketched the outlines of the Hegelian philosophy so as to point out at the same time the positive views of German Philosophy in general, or at least in the four masters whose opinions we have attempted to illustrate. All these philosophers, as indeed all theologians who attempt to reason on the Nature of God,—all finish in Pantheism. In order to admit of the existence of a human intelligence as a something distinct from Divine Intelligence man must not reason on God, but Trust in God, and that Trust constitutes, according to the view we adopt, Divine Faith.

Thus we have seen that Kant, denying all metaphysical conclusions, conceives the mind as the centre around which all human thought revolves as does the planetary system round the Sun. We have seen that his conclusions tend to cancel all idealism, all dogmatism, and even empiricism and Pyrrhonism in favor of the empirical laws of the human mind, which, proceeding from an unknown source, knows nothing and can know nothing of itself or of its source, and must follow certain given roads or elementary beliefs in all perception and reasonings, without knowing, however, the

true nature of that which it perceives and of which it reasons. Therefore those primary beliefs, those absolute forms, those absolute and necessary *à priori* laws of the mind merely guide mankind, according to Kant, in the exploration of the sensible world or of the object.

Fichte, we have shown, follows up the notion of Kant respecting the superiority of the Mind over Matter. But we have seen that if at first he only admitted of the Subject or the Mind as all in all, he, at a later period, although still maintaining that the *Ego* or Self constitutes the only positive ground which the mind possesses, yet he deduces from the *Ego* or Self the Existence of a superior, unlimited and absolute principle, a something that serves to limit the Self, and causes it, as it were, to rebound upon itself. That principle is God, who, with Fichte, is a creation of the mind, a psychological phenomenon.

Now, Schelling sees God in the History of Man or of Mankind, of the human race and in that of Nature. He admits of the analogy of the laws of nature and those of mind. With him the mind is not paramount, but is only a link in the vast chain of being. Intelligence penetrates Nature in every pore, but only awakens by degrees, so that the Mind may be considered itself in the light of a superior degree or of a higher step of Nature in the march of Intelligence towards Absolute Wisdom. These degrees, we have seen, are conceived by Schelling to be themselves united in one Supreme degree, which is the Absolute, in which is found and in which resides the harmony of all things. Nature and Mind he considers as united in Intelligence, which is to them as the union of two tendencies, a definite and an indefinite, or of attraction and repulsion, and continually varying to be perpet-

ually *forthcoming*. This identity, this Unity of the Subject and the Object or Nature in Thought was, however, a mere hypothesis, and the issue of these speculations was, that Schelling began to be looked upon as a dreamer. Compared to Fichte, these views of Schelling threw the former into comparative obscurity—such an unbounded horizon was opened to Thought by the identification of Mind to Object. This Identity, this pure Subject-Object or Mind-reflecting Nature, became the principle of all duality, of all plurality, and may be likened to an ever-varying scale, ever inclining on one side or the other according as the *real* or the *un-real* preponderate for a time. This duality is, however, according to our author, merely apparent, for the relative Totality of each is identical, and the balance is always restored or equipoised. Nature and Mind identified and united in Reason or Intelligence (*Vernunft*), was indeed a most poetical view of things in philosophy, but that view when compared to the more positive (relative) conceptions of Hegel, who now appeared upon the stage of philosophical discussion in all the pride of strength, seemed unworthy of the name of Science.

The scientific, logical and close reasoning character of the *à posteriori* philosophy of Hegel routed the light, conjectural *à priori* reasonings opposed by Schelling in the very first encounter. The latter, it is true, aimed far more at proving that what Hegel said had been taken from himself, than at proving him to be in the wrong. Thus, after having long maintained that the Absolute or Reason was the result of the unity of Mind and Nature, we find Schelling at last abandoning that position and admitting that the Absolute was distinct from Reason or Intelligence. The difference between the primary views of Schelling and those of

Hegel respecting the Absolute, was that the former conceived the Absolute as the Identity of the Object and Subject, whilst the latter understood by that term the Identity of the *Subject* and *Substance*, so that the absolute Substance of Hegel united both the views of Fichte respecting the absolute *Subject*, and those of Spinoza on absolute *Substance* or Existence. The issue of the struggle was that Schelling gave up Philosophy for Mysticism. He sought after something higher than Spirit, or Mind, or Absolute Intelligence, and he imagined to have discovered the object of his search in Love, and in the God of all Love.

The logical *à posteriori* method of Hegel stands in formal contrast with the loose *à priori* intuitive admissions of Schelling even when occupying the very same ground, or taking up the same subject. Hegel considers all things as possessing fixed relations of a peculiar nature which constitute the absolute and necessary law thereof. The struggle between the two philosophers arose on a field that will ever prove a ground of strife. The admission of Hegel that the finite Being termed Man can comprehend and embrace Infinity or the Infinite in logical rule, is an attempt as irrational, we believe, as the pains which Schelling took to prove that his *à priori* opinions possessed any real or positive (relative) value. Hegel, it is true, asserted that if we reason at all of the Infinite, it must be done closely ; and that the strictest logical rules are there altogether indispensable.

H E G E L.

Since the perfect identity of Mind and Nature or of Thought and Being constitutes the main principle of Schelling's philosophy, Hegel maintains that if such is really the fact, it ought to be adequately expressed and not in the varying loose manner adopted by his predecessor. Absolute knowledge is therefore conceived by Hegel as requiring absolute expression or identical form, and he aims, not at setting aside the philosophical views of Schelling, but at rendering them practical or available by means of the *absolute* method. This method is very like that of Fichte, so that Hegel may be said to combine in himself both of his predecessors. With Fichte, he admits that all proceeds from the Subject, the Mind or *Ego*, and there lies the basis of his method; but, with Schelling, he admits of the Absolute, but not as intuitive. Schelling, he remarks sarcastically, brought forth the Absolute "as if he shot it out of a gun." Hegel likens that conception, as Schelling presented it, to Night in which all things are equally dark, and compares him to a painter who should only know of two colors, red and green. Hegel avoids the first fault by proceeding with gradual well co-ordinated steps, arriving at last by a long concatenation of reasonings to the point which lies beyond the depth of all human knowledge, and not plunging headlong therein as does Schelling. The sec-

ond error of Schelling is, according to Hegel, that of defining the Absolute as the absence of all finite distinction or difference, instead of viewing it, as he (Hegel) did in the light of a system of difference within itself, or as containing in itself all Existence. He explains this so-called error of Schelling as arising from his considering Truth or the Absolute not as Substance, but as Subject. The third reproach is grounded on Schelling's attempting to base his principle on reasonings founded in Nature and in Mind, and particularly in applying to these objects a ready concerted scheme, such as the antithesis of the *real* and the *ideal*, instead of deducing that principle from the Absolute itself when once particularized. The conjectural tendency of the Philosophy of Schelling, Hegel blames in the following terms: "When natural philosophers attempt to prove that Intelligence is Electricity, or that animal life is Nitrogene, the unexperienced Tyro may listen with unfeigned wonder and respect, but the trick is easily detected, for it is always the same, and its repetition becomes as wearisome and as fastidious as that of any sleight of hand performance which every one is acquainted with. This method of connecting all heavenly and earthly things, all objects in nature and in intelligence upon the mere assertory proposition of an antithesis, likens such a philosophy to a grocer's shop, where all sorts of things are placed on one shelf, or hung up on one peg."

The method, however, adopted by Hegel was, we have said, that of Fichte: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis. By this method we have seen how Fichte attempted to deduce all Existence from the Self or *Ego*; and in a like manner we shall find Hegel deducing the Universe of Intelligence from Thought, causing Thought to harmonize with Existence. But then between Fichte

and Hegel there exists a marked distinction, inasmuch that these idealized deductions possess, according to the first, *subjective*, and according to the latter, *objective* Reality. Thus whilst the practical Idealism, or the phenomenal world, or the Object is conceived by Fichte only in the light of forthcoming, whilst Empiricism as observation alone obtains, Hegel considers Intelligence, Reason, or Conception as uniting both, as forthcoming and as existing at the same time. Thus in Conception (in *Begreifen*), says Hegel, a something is produced, is forthcoming, which exists in itself; for Thought, which is the main aim of Philosophy and which embraces the Universe, whilst it changes it into something comprehensible or intelligible—Thought is self-existent and independent. Thought as Existence is raised up to knowledge by Philosophy, and this great aim is attained when the mind has succeeded in creating or in rendering intelligible the whole phenomenal world by its own workings: this then becomes absolute Knowledge or absolute Idealism, for all things are known.

These philosophical views are to be found in Hegel's "Phenomenology of the Mind," which appeared in 1807, and in which he attempts to detail the phenomena which he conceives to occur in the various periods or stations, or epochs which arise in the gradual formation of human consciousness on the road to philosophical knowledge or absolute Idealism. Phenomenology endeavors to point out how and from what necessary conditions consciousness gradually rises step by step from simple Existence to self-Existence, from mere Being to Knowledge. Consciousness he conceives as expanding inwardly each time the mind perceives her own actual and peculiar state, that state which constitutes every actual moment of perception, and Con-

consciousness thus acquires by every perception of its own Being a higher degree of Expansion.

Hegel in the chapter on sensible certitude, or "the This and the Mine," undertakes to analyze the mode in which the mind or Thought becomes gradually certain of its invariableness by means of the intuitive perception that arises of change occurring in all outward phenomena in every moment of actuality or of the This here, for whilst these are continually changing the mind remains evidently unaltered and the same. All knowledge acquired by the senses or all sensible certitude is instinctive and immediate, and embraces existence as a something distinct from ourselves. Whatever is contained in Time and Space are objects of this knowledge, which includes not only indefinite immensity as a whole, but which also on close inspection of the smallest particle can find therein no limits. Macrocosm and Microcosm, which are embraced in this knowledge, merely are known as *existing*, for that knowledge only expresses that *it is*. In this phenomenal certitude the part of consciousness is merely the certitude of Self, or of the *Ego*, which Self-certitude is expressed by the term "This" as well as any other object. For instinctive Truth or certitude merely announces that the *Ego* or Self *is*, as it does that the thing *is*, and both Truths may be equally well expressed by the term "This." But in this region, as it were of pure existence, that embraces merely as existing both the Self, the *Ego* and the thing or object, both equally expressed by the pronoun "This," there presents itself at the very threshold of certitude a distinction, a difference which is no longer *immediate or intuitive* as is the certitude of Being, but is *mediate or relative*. The very certitude of the distinction lies in the relative consideration of the Self, the *Ego*, and

the thing or object. The certainty of the one is guaranteed by the certitude of the other.

The great and important distinction between the immediate or the instinctive, and the relative, the mediate or comparative is altogether independent of Will, and finds its basis in the very nature of sensible certitude itself, where the Self, the *Ego* or I, that perceives must necessarily be distinct from the object or thing perceived. Therefore without an object neither Knowledge, nor certitude, nor Self or consciousness can exist. Therefore even on the reduction or contraction of pure Knowledge to mere Existence, we find that sentiment, that feeling embracing in its very essence the distinct belief of a distinction between the perceptive Self, and the object perceived to exist or to be. The nature of the Self or *Ego*, and that of the object are here quite out of the question, and pure knowledge is reduced to the simple fact of Existence.

The term or pronoun "This," which serves to express at once both the Self or *Ego* and the Thing or Object, has therefore a double meaning and unites Time and Place: it expresses Time or Actuality or *Now*, and Place or Difference or *Here*. Thus if it be asked, what is it *now* or *actually*? and the answer should be, *Now* it is night; this knowledge, this certitude having been written down, should the question be again repeated at a later period, and the answer to *What is it now?* be *Now* is mid-day; this answer would clash with the written testimony of the former. Hegel therefore maintains that the existence of the actual, of the present represented by the term *Now*, must be distinguished from the objects existing, for otherwise actuality or *Now* would be at once Night and Day. He concludes that the actuality, which is neither one thing nor the other, but which includes both whilst it

denies their identity, constitutes what men term a general expression or a Generality, and that in fact the *general* is the true object of sensible certitude.

Hegel insists upon the preceding analysis in order to show that even whilst our *Meaning* is simple, and is thus limited to mere Existence, our *Expression* is general and relative, and that it is in the nature of language to express inadequately and imperfectly our meaning, since men can never express in words even mere simple sensible existence, as one and simple, although they may aim at expressing it. And as with *Now*, so it is with "This" and with "Here." For the question being, what is *This*, or what is *Here*, and the answer made, Here is a tree, we have only to repeat the same question in another direction to receive quite a different answer. Thus, if turning round, we ask, What is *This*? the answer should be, Here is a house. The *Here* remains unaltered in relation to the *Ego*, but the object is changed; it is no longer a Tree, but a House. *This* and *Now*, therefore, lose their actuality when they are thus instinctively compared with the unchangeable *Ego* or Self, and, instead of being individual expressions, they become general terms denoting *generality*. Generality is also the true object of our sensible certitude, as its Essence is pure existence. Mere Existence does not, however, exist as unconditional, but in consequence of negation and relation, so that even when men aim at expressing Existence as unconditional, they cannot avoid using the term of Existence or Being in a conditional sense, and as an abstraction of the term of mere Generality. So that our *meaning*, which can only be expressed by a general term whilst it consists in thought in a single sensible certitude or knowledge, must needs be content to use such indifferent and empty expressions in regard to

that individual thought. And if we come to compare the Relation in which certitude or Knowledge and the object thereof stood in the beginning towards each other with the relations which are the result of the natural course of things as before mentioned, we find a total change. The object which constituted as the individual thing the Existing, becomes as the *general*, Unexisting in relation to sensible certitude, for the universal or Generality as a mere rational entity passes into a state of non-existence, or is the sole existence. The certitude of sense is therefore not in the object perceived, which is thus susceptible of change and which passes from the individual to the universal, whilst sensible certitude itself remains the same, and does not disappear. That certitude is in the unchangeable Self or *Ego*, which is now substituted for the general terms *Now* and *Here*.

Nor does the Self or *Ego*, when expressed, remain an individual term, for it then becomes also a Generality, since it then expresses no longer one individual particular self, but every self, every individual, in short, Generality. Should Science enact as a requisite condition that the Self or *Ego*, which is educed in Thought immediately and instinctively or *à priori*, should, when expressed, retain the same meaning, i. e., of individuality, Science would have to say what individual, which personality is meant when this general expression is made use of, and this Science can never do. Hegel, in this manner, corroborates the views of Leibnitz on the nature of individual terms, which he maintains are and must be general expressions. But Hegel carries out with logical strictness the conclusions which are his own exclusively. He sees in sensible certitude neither the object nor the Mind, when expressed, but merely general terms. In language there-

fore Universality, and not Individuality of any kind either objective or subjective must be expressed, and in language Universality constitutes the essence or being of all sensible certitude. In order to become individualized, the object of sensible certitude, as well as the subject or Self, must be pointed out. They then cease to be immediate and general, and become conditional and particular. Generality, then, disappears as well as general terms. This pointing out, this denotation, Hegel reduces to a simple motion which, as existing in Time and Place, is continually varying, and to which may be applied all that has been said by Philosophy respecting the fleeting moments in Time, and the change of points in Space. And thus, according to this deep thinker, the first immediate certitude of our sense consists in our acquiring that of the unchangeable nature of the *Ego* or Self. Consciousness is awakened by continual oppositions or mental antitheses, which pass instinctively in Thought without our perceiving them. And thus awakened consciousness gradually unfolds and the expansion proceeds until the mind acquires self-certitude or self-knowledge. Observation then conceives the various objects of the phenomenal world as things endowed with properties and the result is Knowledge or Wisdom, and consciousness attains the rank of self-consciousness, for it comprehends and knows of its own pure being. Things cease to be distinct from the mind that embraces all knowledge in Self.

But the main point on which we would insist, is the view adopted by Hegel respecting the reduction of all sensible certitude to the mere history of its movement or of its experience, and it is in the exactitude of that history alone that he conceives the certitude of sense to consist. Skepticism, taking advantage of this admission, considers this negative result as a proof of

weakness and therefore triumphs, because the constant changing of the object of consciousness renders it a matter of doubt or at least of mere experience. But Hegel attacks the skepticism of both ancient and modern schools by advancing that his system, if it be admitted by the Skeptics, must also be admitted to obtain against themselves, and that therefore the Skeptics do not say what they mean to say when they speak, for they think of express particular objects, whilst in reality they are themselves making use of general terms. Thus when they would tell of any given piece of paper, they cannot express it adequately in actual Time and Place, for language and consciousness prevent it from being identically the same in actuality. This view of Hegel respecting Time and Place is obviously nothing new, for it was one of the old dodges of the Greek sophists when they sought to bewilder the hearer. But on this occasion he only makes use of it against the skeptic himself and upon his own admission.

The preceding account will suffice, we trust, to convey to the reader some faint notion of the manner of philosophizing of this great master. Self-consciousness, once advanced to Self-knowledge or Reason, he conceives as requiring a still fuller expansion, and as having to undergo a series of evolutions before it unites with Absolute Reason as Spirit. This latter continues to pursue its course through the various degrees of cultivation, of intelligence and purity, until it arrives at Religion through moral perception. Religion attains its fullest consummation through Revelation, and only then arrives at absolute knowledge. In this last stage of perfection, Existence and Thought are no longer separated, and then it is no longer Existence that constitutes the object of Thought, but Thought is itself the object

of Thought. Hegel concludes his Phenomenology in the following words: "That bright aim and end of human existence, absolute knowledge or the Spirit which knows of itself as Spirit, pursues the road followed by Spirits, and becomes endowed with qualifications such as Spirits can alone know of or possess, and by means of which the end of Spirit is fulfilled. To *History* it is reserved to transmit and to preserve the accidental forms of Existence, but to *Science* belongs the province of the conceptions of Intelligence. United they form the essence and glory of Absolute Intelligence, to which they alone impart reality, truth, and certitude, and which without them would be as without life."

The philosophical career of Hegel is related by himself in eighteen thick octavo volumes. His doctrines, we have seen, are partly grounded on the philosophy of Fichte and partly on that of Schelling. The knowledge of both, or of the grounds thereof, is therefore indispensable for all those who would investigate the opinions of this deep thinker. Yet we need not say that his school in fact exists no longer *de facto*, although not a quarter of a century has elapsed since his death (1837). In his Philosophy he boldly attempts to carry into the study of Absolute Intelligence the primitive forms of the human mind, and thus transfer to regions of unknown thought the logical strictness with which he accounts for and admits the various phenomena of Intelligence. The "Method of the Absolute," Hegel divides into three parts: 1st. *The Science of Logic*, or the necessary principles of Thought, being the logical expression of the Absolute as utter Indifference. 2d. *The Philosophy of Nature*, being the expansion, the unfolding of the real world or of Nature. 3d. *The Philosophy of Mind*, being the

unfolding of the Intelligence, the science of mind as it appears in Law, Manners, Morals, State, Arts, Sciences, and Religion. The Science of Logic—the Science of Nature—The Science of Mind, which united form *Absolute Intelligence* or the Absolute, constitute the three parts which Hegel introduces continually into his system or method: Thesis—Antithesis—Synthesis. Pure Thought or the Absolute forms the first; the second is Thought in Space and in Time or Nature; in the third, Nature and Mind are united: they form one, and Spirit or Intelligent Thought alone exists.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC.

Logic, says Hegel, aims at considering Truth in itself, unveiled. Logic is the representation of the Supreme Mind in His own Eternal Being before the creation of the world or of any finite creature. He admits that taken in this light Logic may be esteemed to form a realm of shadows, but these are the shadows which constitute pure Existence deprived of and freed from all intermixture of sense, and containing in their web of diamonds the immensity of the Universe. The logic of Hegel then consists in the scientific and philosophical exposition and development *à priori* from the pure ideas of Reason, or of the notions or elementary beliefs, or categories which constitute the very principle of all Thought and all Existence. They form, indeed, according to the main doctrine of German Philosophy, the groundwork of all intellectual knowledge, of all phenomenal reality, and in them are found to coalesce the Ideal and the Real.

We have seen that Kant, following up the views of Hume and Reid, abandoned the road pursued by Aristotle and succeeding philosophers who deduced *à*

posteriori or empirically the Categories or elementary beliefs of the human mind. With Kant, Hegel deduces them *à priori*, but in a manner that differs from the method of Kant, which we have seen in his Transcendental Analysis. Hegel endeavors to select and to distinguish critically the pure ideas of Art, and aims at separating all that is not pure imaginary Thought from that ideal of Absolute Mind. It is the dialectical deductions of one from the other so as to form a close connected system of pure Reason, that most especially constitutes the Logic of Hegel, or characterizes it. He starts from the principle that every idea of Reason is implicitly contained in another and can be dialectically deduced therefrom. Fichte had already maintained that Reason must exist pure, and deduce from out of itself without any proposition whatsoever the whole system of knowledge. Fichte conceived Reason as to be sought for by means of a necessary principle requiring no further proof and from out of which all others must be dialectically deduced. Hegel follows up this idea of Fichte; he first seeks for the simplest, purest idea of Reason, such as that which may be supposed to proceed from the notion of pure Being or of mere Existence. From that idea he proceeds to notions more and more complicated, and thus deduces by successive steps the whole system of Pure Reason. The dialectical lever or logical is the mean employed by Hegel, and is partly borrowed from Plato and partly from Fichte. His idea of negation is taken from Plato. All negation, says Hegel, is position or affirmation. Is an idea denied, the result we obtain is not a nothing, or a pure negation, but a concrete Positive. We acquire from thence a new idea fortified and enhanced by the very negation of the preceding idea. Thus for instance the negation of the single or of the one

involves the idea of the several or of plurality. This manner of using (or mis-using) the notion of negation is one of the favorite logical levers to which Hegel resorts. Every idea when emitted is at once denied, and thus he acquires a new and more energetic affirmation. The method adopted by Fichte, is the advancing a main proposition or *synthesis* by the reduction of which by the method *Analysis*, counter-propositions or *anti-theses* are sought for in the elementary compounds of the given proposition. These counter-propositions are again united by means of a second Synthesis, and in this manner Hegel treats severally of Existence, of Production, of Quality, of Quantity, of Measure, etc.; and this method he has carried on throughout the whole system of human knowledge. The following summary may serve to impress some slight notion of "the Logic of Hegel," which is in three parts. 1. The Doctrine of Existence. 2. The Doctrine of Being. 3. The Doctrine of Idea.

OF EXISTENCE.

The Indefinite (*bestimmtlose*) undeterminate notion of Existence is conceived by Hegel as the necessary basis of all knowledge. Existence in this unmeaning state of emptiness is however tantamount to pure negation or to nought. Here affirmation of Existence and Negation of given notions are at the same time contradictory and yet identical. Contrariety here, instead of destroying, furnishes a basis, for each notion is immediately or intuitively metamorphosed into its contrary. From this perpetual oscillation proceeds Production, or Being, or a Forthcoming (*wesen* or *werden*, in opposition to mere Existence or *seyn*). Thus when from *nought* any thing appears, we say it originates or

begins, as when things on the contrary decay and pass away we conceive them as perishing. *Being* (Wesen) constitutes therefore the simplest mode of this forthcoming (Werden) or production from pure Existence (Seyn). Existence is then no longer pure or simple, but is determinate being, and as such possesses Quality or Reality. Determinate or qualified being excludes from the individual sphere of that being all other. This elementary or fundamental relation of Being to itself which is constituted by a negative act towards others, is what makes the thing what it really is, and constitutes the *quiddity* of that something. The individual, the one, is thus constituted by negation as affirming its existence towards that of other things. The individual being of the one is guaranteed by this negative repulsion of the being of the *many*. And yet the many as such are not distinct individualities, but the many may be said to be one, for in regard to the individual the many are all the same, are all similar. It is in this sense that Hegel advances that the many are One, and the One many, since the many are constituted as such by the one. He then proceeds from Quality to Quantity. The qualitative determination that fixes the one or the individual and is the essence of the thing, cannot however be conceived without the many or Quantity in order to be forthcoming.

Quantity as limitation in extent is equivalent to Quality. When as extension, or volume, or quantity, each one of the many is distinct and separate, they are said to be *discrete* or in a state known in metaphysics as the state of *discretion*. But when the many are no longer distinguishable in extension or volume, they are said to be continuous, and their state to be that of *Continuity*. And yet Discretion and Continuity are one, when the nature of the thing is the same, we cannot

think of one without the other. The notion of the discrete involves that of the continuous. In limited, discrete, or determinate quantity is found the *quantum*, in which exist the single and the several or number. Quantity or *extensive* volume finds its contrast in *intensive* being, and here the Degree in its most simple state is almost akin as quantity to quality. *Measure* unites both quantity and quality: it is a qualitative *quantum*, for it is a quantum on which the quality depends. Thus, for instance, it is in the degree or measure of Heat, or in the temperature of Water that is to be traced the peculiar qualities of the various states of that body, taking as standards the states of Ice, of liquid water, and of Vapor. Here, according to the measure of temperature, or to the *quantum*, we find most remarkable differences to exist in the most striking quality of the thing. Quality or the *quiddity*, and Quantity or the *quantum* (the What? and the How much?) necessarily involve the notion or idea of being for they can only exist in relation to something. And Quality can yet be distinguished from pure Existence of which it is indeed a negation, and thus the being or quiddity of a thing implies negation. Being is Quality: it is Existence qualified or parcelled out as individuality, and therefore all Being admits of a duality in Existence.

OF BEING.

Being considered as Existence reflected can only obtain in relation to itself, inasmuch as it has reference to something else. Hegel terms it reflected Existence, because as Light whenever it meets with an appropriate or reflecting surface, cannot be the object of inquiry without taking into account the peculiar nature

of that surface or intermediary, in a like manner Being or Existence reflected by an intermediary, cannot be studied independently of that which certifies and makes it what it is. Hegel compares immediate, intuitive Existence or Existence purely and simply, to a shell or to a curtain, behind which lie concealed all the mysteries which as Being are one day to appear. But when Being is forthcoming and becomes a real object, Existence then appears in the light of a negation. Existence, once evident in Being, then appears as non-existing as mere existence. Being becomes the Existing. The negation of the Existing is Existence. The one renders the other apparent. Affirmation is reflected in Negation. Here the Negative guarantees the Being of the Positive: the negative and the positive prove and reflect each other.

Being, as reflected Existence, as self-relative by the means of relation to others, which self-relation appears in the quality, in the quiddity or essence of Being, is characterized by Identity, and may be thus expressed, $A=A$. Identity involves the idea of Distinction or of a something that is denied: it is a repulsion from Self. Immediate distinction is Difference only. But essential distinction is the Contrary, or the positive and the negative. Contradiction is the self-opposition of Being. The contraries of Identity and of distinction are united in the notion of Causation, for cause and effect always go together. Being draws from itself the principle of Causation by distinguishing itself from others, and that distinction is an Effect. In Cause and Effect, Being is thus twice asserted. The separation of Cause and Effect is a mere abstraction. Their categorical distinction is merely formal; it is not real. Thought can never embrace the cause or ground with-

out having at the same time some effect in view; this double view constitutes at once Cause and Effect.

Being is fulfilled in phenomenal appearance or Apparition. Without Being nothing apparent exists. Being and Appearance are therefore identical. Phenomenal appearance gives as *positive* the essence or cause, and as *negative* *the form*. All individual Being requires unity of essence and form, and as such constitutes a thing. The relations between the quiddity or essence of a thing and its form are again found in the relation of the thing itself to its qualities. These latter reflect to the thing itself a form, whilst it is the essential side that renders it a thing in itself. Being is Power and Action in negative reference to the thing itself, and yet issuing therefrom as positive or as in relation to others. The relation between a Thing and its Qualities is termed its properties, so that the properties of Being may be considered as a negation of mere Existence. In action and power, as for cause and effect in Causation, one and the same essence is twice expressed. Hegel however prefers the expression of inward and outward to the terms of Power and Action. Inward or inner expressing a something that proceeds from the thing itself, whilst Power expresses a something distinct. Inner and Outer, as Power and Action, are identical, for the one cannot exist without the other. Reality is constituted by the identity of Power and Action in Being.

OF REALITY.

Hegel conceives Reality as the third moment (value, importance) with respect to Existence and Being, and as constituting the full and adequate manifestation of the latter. True Reality is therefore necessary Being

or rational Necessity, in opposition to Possibility and Accident, and it is begging the question to say that all Reality is rational and all rationality real. That is real which contains within itself its own peculiar essence, and that is Substance. Accident is the apparent incidental compared to the necessary or the real. Accidents are not adequate manifestations; they do not stand in the same relation to Substance or Reality as Power to Action; they are only transitory or fortuitous alterations of Substance; they are mere passing phenomena as waves on the surface of the deep waters. They do not proceed from the substance, but rather disappear in the substance. Relations of Substance involve relations of Causation, where Cause and Effect are one and the same thing perceived in various situations. Of Heat we know of no other cause than Heat, and its effects again are Heat. Effect is to be distinguished from mere accidental, fortuitous variation, because it is causation carried out, and is necessary. No effect can exist without Reaction, which is causation of a higher order and contains more Reality than mere causation. All causation and effect are harmonized in Reaction, which unites in One the apparent Duality. This Reaction or Unity of Existence and Being, this inward or realized Necessity, is Conception (Begriff).

OF CONCEPTION.

Conception is rational necessity, and that only is conceived, the true necessity of which is known. Conception is therefore the truly real, the individual Being, for it contains that which ought to be as well as that which is. Subjective conception or mental Thought involves the Universal or Generality, as the conception of Kind; the particular or Particularity

as classification or logical difference; and the singular or Singularity, as the separate, distinct classes. The Conception thus constitutes the Unity of all Plurality. The self-analysis or self-division of Conception is Judgment, where the mental conception appears to exclude itself as a second object which it considers. This duality is clearly expressed in all propositions or mental conceptions, in the difference between the mind or subject and the conception or notion conceived or the predicate. All progression in the various forms of Judgment is marked by the copula and conveyed in the Inference, which is performed by comparing the Conception with itself. The copula unites as conception one conception to a third. When conception thus, by means of another conception, produces a third or a conclusion, the latter acquires an existence of its own, an existence not merely mental or subjective, but it then *exists* or *it is*. It is no longer a Thought dependent on us, but it acquires an objective existence inherent in itself.

OF OBJECTIVITY.

Phenomenal relation or Objectivity is the reality of Conception. This objective conception has three degrees. There is the Physical or the Mechanical, which constitutes the equipollence of objects towards each other. The Chemical or the mutual reciprocal action and reaction of the same, and the Teleological or Final, which comprehends all inherent conformity of purpose.

OF IDEAS.

The idea is the highest logical expression of the Absolute, says Hegel. Life or Vitality constitutes the pure and simple Existence of the Idea. Inherency or self-purpose is that which makes the living being. In

relation to the objective and to the subjective, the Idea constitutes the True and the Good. The True is objective Rationality, as mental or subjective. The Good is mental rationality or subjective considered objectively, or applied to the various relations of the phenomenal world. United, the True and the Good constitute the Absolute, that Idea which concentrates in itself all real Good as existing, and all living realized Truth.

The Idea thus Absolute, thus realized acquires Objectivity, and is present there when it perceives in itself its own image reflected from without. This Actuality of the Idea is Nature. (*Die absolute, erfüllte Idee ist da, indem sie sich selbst als ihren Widerschein aus sich entlässt; dieses ihr Dasein ist die Natur.*)

THE SCIENCE OF NATURE.

Nature is the Idea conceived in the form of other Being, it is the self-created external idea, the mind which has become estranged to itself. (*Die Natur ist die Idee in der Form des Andersseins, die sich selbst äusserliche Idee, der sich entfremdete Geist.*) As the Idea contains in itself all the Unity of Conception, therefore all those who seek to discover the hidden mysteries of Nature must never forget that all we know of the phenomenal world is grounded on the conceptions of the mind, and that in human intelligence alone exist the various relations of all the productions of Nature with each other. Nature possesses neither rule nor understanding. There exist no conceivable regular and connected ideas in Nature. The various limits of being are still defaced by formations of inferior kinds which we know not in which class to place. Natural Philosophy, therefore, finds itself un-

der the necessity of capitulating between the concrete individual isolated forms as they exist and the regulative forms of the speculative mind.

Natural Philosophy recognizes in all things the traces of a Beginning, of a Course to run and of a Purpose or an End. In Natural Philosophy, the *beginning* is the abstract generality of the existence of Nature beyond ourselves or beyond Space and Matter, whilst the *End* is the distinction of the mind or conscious individuality from Nature. The one is the distinction of Nature from Mind, the other the distinction of Mind from Nature. The middle term or course consists of the gradual progression of Nature from the lowest degree to that of self-consciousness or of Man. This constitutes the only part of Nature which it is given to Man to study, and it offers three degrees:—1st. Matter or Mechanics, which is the ideal system of Matter. Matter is the outward general form of Nature or as it was beyond the realm of Nature, whose first step towards self-existence is marked by Gravitation in Natural Philosophy. Gravitation is the Being of Matter, it constitutes the first dawn of Mental Thought or of Subjectivity. In body, Gravitation is the tendency to Unity, to one point of that body. The same tendency, that of uniting the many in one, forms the groundwork of our Universe, of our planetary system. Necessary mathematical laws point out and determine the road of Matter in Space, and the Time required for its accomplishment; and thus is Gravitation a system really and entirely subjective or rational.

2d. Matter in Gravitation does not possess Individuality. Astronomy knows not of planets as bodies, but of their geometrical relationship. Quantity and not Quality is that which Astronomy seeks to deter-

mine. Matter as quality belongs to Physics, that studies body individually and in relation to each other, and here we find all inorganic Nature and its various forms.

3d. Organic Nature. The Chemical process is already placed beyond the province of Physics, for there inorganic Nature loses all its properties, (cohesion, color, gloss, &c.,) and again the vital process is the cessation of the chemical. Still are organized or living bodies ever on the point of becoming subject to the chemical process, but the living thing resists so long as life remains. Life is self-determination or self-purpose.

The Idea as Life offers to consideration three degrees: The Geological, the Vegetable, and the Animal; but it is only in the freedom of Rationality that the Mind accomplishes its self-deliverance from Nature.

THE RATIONAL MIND OR SUBJECTIVE REASON.

In the Mind is reflected the Truth of Nature. In the Mind the distinction between Self and the external world ceases to exist. There the phenomenal world becomes identified with the Self or the *Ego*. The formal or apparent Being of Mind comprehends the possibility of Abstraction from all things, whilst its essential Being is constituted by the power of revealing itself to itself, of making itself known by *conscious* Rationality, embracing as its province the whole universe of things, and erecting therein the stately fabrics of *objective* Rationality. The Mind, however, as well as Nature, requires to go through various degrees of Being before it arrives at complete Rationality or the full knowledge of all things, and thus it becomes gradually more and more independent of Nature. The

Mind, proceeding from Nature, and arising as it were from out her bosom to self-existence, constitutes the natural Spirit or the Soul, and is therefore in all respects an object of anthropology, and its study belongs to the study of Man. As natural Spirit the Mind is subject to the general vicissitudes of all sub-lunary human life, as well with respect to climate, as to season, and even weather. The geological and geographical conditions of the regions where man resides must therefore be taken into account. The national type which proceeds from and bears the stamp of the same causes, such as the mode of living and dwelling, etc., etc., in short all the conditions of Nature capable of affecting the rational and moral character of the Mind, must be taken into consideration, as well as the mere individual circumstance of tribe, cast, family, idiosyncrasy, temperament, character and disposition, etc., etc., without omitting the various changes which the mind undergoes according to age and especially from sex, and even from the state of sleep. This middle term or natural course of Life, placed between pure immediate self-existence and the sleep of Nature is constituted by Sensibility, that dark web that surrounds and holds the mind entangled in its meshes. Feeling is Sensibility or Sensation in a higher degree, for therein exist the first germs of self-existence, and self-feeling in its highest stage stands already on the verge of self-consciousness, for in self-feeling the *Ego* or Self becomes more and more independent. Self-consciousness follows in succession sensation and feeling. All Perception, all Conception, all Thought and Knowledge are to be referred to self-consciousness in which they find a basis. Conscious of its own self-identity the Self, or *Ego*, or I, constitutes the subject of the study of the phenomena (Phenomenology) of consciousness.

The Mind was merely individual as long as it was confounded with Nature, whose yoke is thrown off by Consciousness which then becomes its essence. Consciousness or Self now takes the lead, and stands opposed to all that the individual was once intimately united and confounded with, and all such natural relations as birthplace, nationality, etc., now become things external and distinct. *Consciousness* is, therefore, to be considered not merely as the apparition of the *subject* as distinct, but also as bringing into *creation* the phenomenal *world* or the object; for consciousness in the strictest sense of the term is the Self or I, opposed to outward or phenomenal being. But mere Consciousness is not yet arrived at its acme, it has yet to rise to self-consciousness, and this occurs when the Mind acquires the full assurance of having had to do with itself whilst it believed to have to do with another object. This is acquired by the mean of sensitive consciousness, of observation, experience, and rationality in all their various forms. Rational self-consciousness is the result of the various conflicts that arise from the various and necessary comparisons of the many forms of self-consciousness which occur on the occasion of observing and comparing the objects of the phenomenal world. By means of these various conflicts self-consciousness at last arrives at a middle point, a medium between dominion and servitude, and only becomes rational or general by freeing itself entirely from the yoke of Nature. The Mind then exists as Spirit, when both Subject and Object are harmonized, and the Science of Pneumatology or of the Soul is thenceforth founded.

The Mind is at first theoretical as *Intelligence*: the practical Mind appears as *Will*. The Mind is theoretical, or may be said to theorize, when seizing any

given Object in its grasp, it considers it as *Subject* or *Subjectively* (mentally). It is practical when it frees the subjective or mental relation of things of their apparently mere mental existence and considers them as *Objects* or *objectively*. And thus the Mind as Will or as practical becomes the Truth of Intelligence or mental theory. Perception, Conception, and Thought or Reflection, form the various terms through which Intelligence or the theoretical mind has to pass in order that Will or practical intelligence be developed, and impulse, desire, and inclination joined thereto forms Free Will. Free Will as Existence constitutes the practical mind as objective, and is the basis of Right or Law, and of the State or Society. Mere natural impulse stands corrected by rational Free Will, and mere natural inclinations become moral and legal in social law and morality. Mere animal lust may indeed be pointed out as the basis of the very institutions which constitute the foundations of society, marriage and family. Revenge is no longer an object of repulsion, when the punishment due to crime is performed according to law.

OF THE OBJECTIVE MIND OR FREE WILL.

Personality as individuality only can be adequately expressed by the possession and enjoyment of Rights as an individual. Free Will or practical Intelligence therefore constitutes the Right of *commanding* in the following terms: enjoy thine own individuality and respect that of others; and Personality also has a right of *possessing*, or the investing with the Will a something that becomes our own. But as others exist besides ourselves, this right is necessarily limited thereby, and Will stands arrayed against Will, a con-

flict which can only be harmonized by general Will or voluntary Transaction. This relation of Transaction constitutes the stepping stone that leads to the grounding of the State, but is merely the most elementary, for to define the State as it is so often done, a transaction of all with all, would be lowering it to the level of mere private right and private property. Nothing can be more obvious than that it does not depend on the Will of the individual whether he shall depend or not on the State. The real transaction is merely relative to personal property. Right or Law as general Will here harmonizes the discordance of duality, by blending in One all opposition. But on this ground also strife is found to exist, for many particular Wills are often arrayed against the universal Will. This momentary cessation of Right constitutes Wrong or Criminality, and the negation of Right requires its necessary re-establishment. This is done by means of punishment, which is merely the negation of Wrong, and is not grounded in reality upon the mere fanciful theories of avoiding crime, or on that of threatening, of frightening and ameliorating the individual. These are mistaken notions, according to Hegel, since they forget the nature of punishment, which is a Right, and not a means. To frighten, to threaten, etc., etc., are finite aims or means, and what is more they are uncertain means. Right can only be resorted to in order to support Right. The forwarding and self-manifestation of Right is absolute and self-purposed. This, the essence of punishment, is however distinct from the mode in which it may be carried out, and which may indeed be adopted, so as to insure some of the above-mentioned aims, but the right of punishment is safe. Not to punish a criminal according to the law is depriving him of his Right as part of the community. His

action falls upon himself. Hegel maintains the Right of the community to exercise capital punishment, but carried along by the desire of expressing his contempt for the mawkish sentimentality of his time, he has not perhaps sufficiently insisted on the impossibility of retrieving judicial error, and the too ready recourse that Tyranny has ever had to such a sure but nefarious mode of upholding the right of punishment.

Duty and Virtue are necessarily included in the abstract Right created in the Mind by Free Will, or in Morality, which as that Right is the antithesis of individual and general Will considered subjectively. The free moral decision as subjective is Right of Conscience. In absolute Right the intention or purpose as principle of action does not obtain, but in free moral decision and in virtue of the power of free Will the intention is taken into consideration. Morality is then, according to Hegel, action conformable to motives of duty, and is to be distinguished from mere positive, unreflecting proper behavior. And taken in this light, Hegel conceives Morality from the three following points of view: 1st, of the Resolution, or Determination, by which the act becomes a result of our free Will, and may therefore be imputed to us; 2d, that of the Intention, in which the occurring fact is considered, not according to its result or consequences, but according to its value in relation to ourselves. The resolution was merely mental, but the intention is of a more voluntary nature; 3d, that of the Result, either good or bad, inasmuch as the fact must be judged of, according to its general received value; the Good, being the reconciliation of the individual to general Will and is rational; the Bad, being the attempt to force the general Will to submit to the individual. The attempt to substitute individual despotism as absolute Will constitutes Free

irrational Will. The union of Conscience and abstract Good is Moral Duty. Morality thereby becomes a fact and is an act of Self-consciousness.

Hegel considers Morality to have been first apparent in primitive society, in marriage and family life. In marriage he insists on three points which to him are capital. 1st, Marriage is quite a different thing from Platonic affection and all ascetic notions of the kind; for it reposes on the difference of the sexes, and is in fact a sexual and not a mental relation; 2d, it is also a worldly contract, involving temporal interests; and 3d, it is *Love*. Hegel, we own, appears to lay but small stress on the latter feeling, since he places it in the third rank and as a terminating link of the marriage compact. He considers Love more as a consequence than as a precedent of Marriage, because reciprocal affection that issues from mutual cohabitation, and is the result of mutual endeavors to please, is not only more moral, and more conformable to a married life, but is the only one that lasts, and that can defy all events. The resolution to marry and not the falling in love, he conceives as the best beginning, and mutual endeavors as the best means to induce sincere personal affection. Hegel views the marriage contract in the light of a duty and adopts the opinion that in all cases Divorce should be rendered as difficult as possible; and that philosopher treats also with the deepest moral feeling all that relates to that most important element of society, the Family. Views almost identical are professed in present times by that deep thinker, M. Auguste Comte, who strongly insists upon the spontaneous and self-development of most of his own opinions without any previous lecture whatsoever. Now, admitting that he may not himself be mistaken, the

fact would prove forcibly in favor of the perfect rationality of institutions coeval with the human race.

The family increasing in number, another interest appears, and social community is formed. Mutual wants provoke mutual laws as a means of safety for persons and property. Other communities arise, and policy is introduced. Hegel, on this point at variance with most writers on political economy, distinguishes the civil community from the State. He conceives the former or the community as a whole, in which every elementary part or individual is self purposed, and to whom all others are as means to some end. But the State, he maintains, knows of no independent individuality, the State acknowledges no one whose only aim is his own purpose or his own interest. With the State, therefore, the individual is the means, and the general not the individual interest, is the end or purpose. These remain open questions ever since the times of Plato and of Aristotle. Most writers on political economy conceive the inviolability of Property and of personal Freedom as the aim and purpose of the State, and thus reduce it, according to Hegel, to the mere capacity of a civil community, which, he shows, does not include the common Weal, since State necessity and the Legal State and the most important point between communities, that of War, are excluded and the latter is totally inconceivable with a mere civic or civil State. The Commonwealth or State fulfils its charge or mandate, in short, its duty, in a manner more or less perfect according as its aim is less individual, but as in practice these aims are carried out by individuals, modes have ever been resorted to in order to perform those aims. Constitutions, trial by Jury, and freedom of the Press, found in Hegel a champion in times when and places where such doctrines were esteemed pernicious.

Here Auguste Comte differs deeply from Hegel, inasmuch as the former looks on such means as merely a transitory state of things which is destined to convey Humanity or Mankind to some ideal state very much like that dreamed of by Condorcet.

Respecting the peculiar formation of the civil community, Hegel expresses himself unreservedly in favor of corporations, in which the spirit of the profession is upheld. The sanctity of the marriage vow and the principle of Honor in the Corporation are considered by that thinker as the two main pivots on which the civic community turns, the integrity of which can alone prevent its complete disorganization.

The civic community, however, disappears in the State as the interest of the individual does in that of the Universal or of the Whole. In the State is found the reality of the moral Idea, which it aims at carrying out, as would take place in an individual entirely under the sway of that idea. Hegel likens the various existing States or Nations to individuals with respect to the relations of attraction and repulsion towards each other, and conceives their History, their Rise and Downfall as completing and constituting the competence or fitness, as aim or end, of the History of the World.

Although Hegel speaks loudly in favor of legal institutions for all, of the freedom of the Press, and of trial by Jury, he must not, however, be confounded with more modern *liberal* thinkers. He inclines decidedly in his conception of the State towards the ancient notion which admits of the entire absorption of the Individual, and of the right of *Particularity* by the State. And as he maintains with Plato the full omnipotence of the State, it is obvious that such a doctrine can only be admitted where no doubt re-

mains, which is limiting it very much; but this limitation, as that of all finite means, is the only practical mode of avoiding Despotism. Hegel's aversion to modern liberalism may be compared to that of M. Auguste Comte, if not indeed to that of all competent judges, who deny the competency of mere private or individual judgment—that is, only grounded on the right of contradiction. And still the ideal of a State, according to many very deep thinkers, such as Plato, and Hobbes, and Spinoza, as well as that of Hegel, and Auguste Comte, omitting many for brevity's sake, would, we apprehend, if realized, prove a tyranny such as never yet has weighed on mortals. The more absolute and unbending the principle, the more definite must be its application. Hegel conceiving the State in the light of a rational, moral and substantial Being or Thing, in which the Individual has to live and as a rational existence to which all must obey, may appear at first view in a most unfavorable light. And yet Hegel with Montesquieu opines in favor of a limited monarchy, and more especially to that of Great Britain. He refers to the British Constitution in his often-repeated saying that 'there the sovereign is as the dot on the i.' Hegel not only maintains that an individual, or one person, or a Monarch, is the best form of the executive principle; but he considers hereditary Monarchy as the best practical form of transmission, provided there exist a Parliament or Assembly of State. He does not, however, conceive that body in the light of a limiting power, nor even as a guardian of the rights of the people, but merely as a guarantee and assurance of able administration and the full publicity of that important fact in the life of a State.

OF THE MIND AS ABSOLUTE.

Under this head Hegel ranges Art or the Beautiful and the Sublime. Here the Idea is symbolized, or rendered sensible by the means of various mediums; such as Stone or Marble, Color, Tone, as also by connected Discourse or Oratory, and by writings either Prose or Poetry. Sculpture, Painting, Music, Poetry, and Eloquence here find place.

OF RELIGION.

Hegel conceives Religion to have in view the reconciliation of the Finite with the Infinite, of Man with God. All religions aim at endeavoring to effectuate the union of Man with the Deity. This is visible in the roughest mode—1st, in the Natural Religion of the East, where the powers of Nature, and various natural phenomena are worshipped as God, and before which all other finite objects are as nought. 2d. In the higher form of Spiritual Individuality, in which the Divinity is considered as the Soul of All. Such is Judaism, or the religion of the Most High, of the Infinite conceived as infinitely powerful and wise; 3d, or in Greece, where artistic beauty was considered as the chief attribute of the Divinity; 4th, or in the Religion of the Romans, which was a matter of the State, and conformable to the bent and intelligence of the King-Nation.

But the positive harmony between God and Man in vain sought by various nations, Hegel finds only to exist in the revealed or Christian religion, in which God is personified in Jesus Christ as Man, thus blending both natures in real Unity, and where God is

viewed in the light of the Idea humanized or returning to the primary pristine Nature. In this act of self-privation are found united in One, God as Absolute, God as man or Christ, and God as the Idea or Spirit of God, and this Unity in Trinity Hegel conceives to constitute that deep mystery. The spiritual tenor of revealed religion or of Christianity, is therefore, according to him, the same as that of speculative Philosophy, but with this essential difference, that whilst in Philosophy the Idea is merely a conception of the Mind, it is carried into execution in Christianity, and interwoven with the History of Mankind, in which is to be found the Divine Will or in which is revealed the Will of God.

We shall now take leave of German Philosophy, allowing the reader to follow up, if he pleases, *the Idea* in later times. To the philosophy of Eclecticism professed by M. Victor Cousin we can only afford a slight allusion, in regard to the use, or mis-use rather, which that Thinker has made of the idea of Negation as presented by Hegel. But on that important subject we must refer to what Professor Hamilton has published. The undue value given by Cousin to Negation or not-Self, which he conceives as bestowing *Objectivity* on Nothingness, instead of merely involving *distinction* or difference, is most ably pointed out and illustrated by the above-named powerful writer.

The sixteenth century, which preceded that of Rationalism, that of Descartes and Bacon, was that of the Reformation. This was a century of Action. The yoke of Rome was broken, because Theocracy under pretence of enlisting all human means in the service of God only rendered Mankind subservient to its own purposes.

The seventeenth, that of Rationalism, was a time

of Theory, of Anticipation or Hypothesis; for as such must be esteemed even the systems of Bacon and Descartes.

The eighteenth century was one of Scepticism, and Philosophy advances a doubt as to the Truth of that which Belief alone guarantees, even admitting that Belief alone can render Experience available.

The nineteenth has witnessed the unwearied labors of Philosophy to reconcile human Thought and Religion on the common ground of Belief. It is a century in which Credulity has seen altars raised in her honor instead of being dedicated to Faith.

The philosophy of Belief which is therefore more especially that of the nineteenth century, because the elementary beliefs of Thought have been substituted to that staid belief in Self-identity, in the *Ego* or I, which was the basis of the Cartesian doctrine, may also be termed that of Positivism. Here Intuition and Inference appear struggling for superiority, but Hegel has carried the day. It is now universally allowed by all thinkers that certain conditions are required for given phenomena, which are then said to *appear of themselves* or spontaneously. These latter terms having often been made use of equivocally, it is necessary to fix their meaning at once. And this we do by referring to what has been said on that important subject by Professor Hamilton, by Stuart Mill and others. Auguste Comte uses the term *spontaneously* as synonymous with necessarily. As to the term Necessity, Leibnitz, Whately and Stuart Mill are unanimous in the same opinion respecting the utility of discontinuing the use of a term which, serving to express the conditional and the unconditional, has become unphilosophical.

The order of coexistences, and that of successive existences (Leibnitz), embracing all that constitutes the subject of human knowledge respecting Existence, comprehend or rather themselves form Space and Time. The wonders of Space have been revealed by the microscope and the telescope. Not only does Space appear by artificial means to double, treble, or decuple its capacity, which might be conceived as an optic illusion, making an inch appear to be a foot, but still more, myriads of beings are found to people the artificial increase. This is now quite common-place, and it is the same with Time or Duration, for the electric telegraph has taught the most unlearned that as succession constitutes Time, and is therefore a concern of Motion, so the quicker or more rapid the latter, the sooner is Time elapsed. Rapidity of motion thus causes Space to disappear, and ingenious writers have attempted to make Ubiquity or Omnipresence sensible, by pointing to a fact now so clearly perceived. The Roman Catholics have also drawn from thence a kind of proof based on the ignorance of man respecting motion, in order to conciliate their doctrine of the real presence existing at one time in a thousand places. But the matter being one which requires argumentation on the Nature of Him who is only known as the Almighty, and in whom men trust as such, we conceive such explanations to be theological. The nature of Space and Time is now generally admitted to be altogether *subjective* or mental (see Kant), a proposition which was not agreed to even by the sceptic Bayle, who allows that Space, as mere Extension, is only ideal, but does not admit of the same respecting Time, although Descartes lays it down as an axiom that all we know of Time or Duration proceeds from the succession of Thought. Now, since Space and Time are conceived as mental conceptions, it may

be said by those who admit of that doctrine, that "man does not exist either in Space or Time," and thus an apparent absurdity so often reproached to German Philosophy disappears.

But Matter or Substance is of a more stubborn nature than Space or Time. Substance refuses to be reduced to mere extension, and then idealized; so that mathematical points have been invented. A mathematical point, say an atom of oxygen, if all known phenomena are inherent in matter, would be admitted to possess the most contradictory qualities; such as gravity, molecular reaction, vital power, &c.

Coexistences, which include all elementary substances, remain ever the same, as far as human ingenuity can devise. Oxygen, united with hydrogen, forms a radical termed water, but is unchanged. And so in all the various organic radicals forming bases, such as Amide (N H_2), Ethyle ($\text{C}_4 \text{H}_5$), Methyle ($\text{C}_2 \text{H}_3$), Cetyle ($\text{C}_{32} \text{H}_{33}$), Amyle ($\text{C}_{10} \text{H}_{11}$), and Glyceryle ($\text{C}_6 \text{H}_7$), as also in the deduced radicals, either by decomposition (as *melone* from sulphuret of cyanogen, or acetyle out of ethyle), or by being doubled or tripled (as the radicals of fulminic or cyanuric acid out of cyanogen). It is the same with all the mysterious compounds of Carbon and Oxygen. (Carbonic oxide, $\text{C}_2 \text{O}_2$, and carbonic acid $\text{C}_2 + \text{O}_3$), and oxalic acid, &c., and those not less fatal formed of Carbon and Nitrogen. In all, the elements remain the same, although compounds of the most varied properties are produced in consequence of very slight differences in the formulas or in the aggregate parts.

Successive-existences even in inorganic matter exhibit properties, which the component parts can by no means explain by their known qualities, as Ether and Chloroform show to be the case. But in organic com-

pounds the variety baffles description, for in many cases no appreciable change of substance or of formula, and merely a molecular change of place, appears to occasion the change of quality. These compounds are sometimes excessively complex; thus Albumen contains in its smallest molecule $C_{45} H_{36} N_6 O_{14}$ besides perhaps molecules of sulphur and phosphorus. In these complex compounds decomposition is very rapid, especially in all such as contain Nitrogen, because that substance has, as it is termed, weak affinities, and all its compounds decompose rapidly and many spontaneously or without determined cause.

These changes, such as the fermentation of grape-juice, which takes place spontaneously, on account of the presence of an albuminous compound (containing nitrogen) dissolved in the juice (for the pure solution of sugar does not ferment), are called in this fermentation and in others putrefaction.

The fact thus simply stated, the explanation varies. Berzelius merely states the fact, saying it occurs in a mode termed *catalytical*, which explains nothing and only tells you that decomposition has occurred. Here the ingenious theory of Liebig finds a place, which accounts for the decomposition of the sugar by admitting that when a ferment or exciting body comes into contact with sugar in dissolution, the motion of the particles of the ferment being mechanically communicated to the molecules of the sugar, which are held together in a state of unstable equilibrium, this latter is destroyed and the saccharine molecules assume new forms of combination, here Alcohol, and Carbonic acid.

All such decomposition, as all decay, requires atmospheric air in order to begin. Decay is a slow combustion, and is always dependent on oxygen. But in plants organic tissues are formed from inorganic mat-

ter, always however principally Carbon, hydrogen and some mineral salts. These proceed from the soil, or from the atmosphere under the form of ammonia.

All that is known of the metamorphoses of Substance in vegetables is that the juices of plants containing ammonia and sugar, gum or amidon, these azotized compounds form albumen, fibrine and caseine, or the albuminous compounds so necessary to animated life, and which vegetables alone can produce. The movement of the sap is occasioned by the presence of carbonic acid gas, which, disengaged in consequence of the decomposition of the starch of the roots, passes into the vessels of the plants and impels mechanically the juices upward as would soda-water in a tube.

In all these various metamorphoses substances remain the same ; successive or subsequent existences appear which contain the coexistences, but from some unknown cause altogether inexplicable. The cause of molecular or chemical action and reaction is quite a mystery, and still more so those of life.

Life, or composition and decomposition, presents an inverse direction of such metamorphoses, according as the Life is *vegetable* or *animal*. Vegetable life fixes the carbon and ejects principally oxygen. Animal life inhales oxygen and exhales carbonic acid gas : this gives rise to a slow combustion, which occurs in warm-blooded animals in the arterial blood and lungs, although the latter now appear only to serve to inhale the oxygen and to let the carbonic acid and water escape. In all these metamorphoses, as in those of the mere inorganized substances, nothing more can be known, or is known beyond the positive conditions, and the phenomena which arise under such and such given conditions.

All this A, B, C, of Science is here adduced merely

to point out clearly the real or positive (relative) nature of successive-existences with respect to coexistences. Thus, even in mere unorganized matter there exists a something which cannot be confounded with substance, although no successive-existence is without. Water is formed of two substances of which the given conditions are known, but what it is that forms them into water is a mystery as deep as that of Life. Heat is required, but only to a certain degree. *Affinity* is the name of this mystery. It may be termed spontaneous ;—it is something specific. Its conditions are various, but dissimilarity, contact and heat are the most requisite. But respecting *dissimilarity* there exists much singularity in that point of view, for those substances which cold or absence of Heat cannot condense into solid substances (Oxygen, Hydrogen, Nitrogen), appear to possess in this *common* property something very specific.

Affinity is the unknown link of inorganic molecules, as *Gravity* is that of inorganic mass. Both are only made known to us as relative to coexistences or elementary substances, and are alluded to by Science as the ultimate forces of inorganic nature. They constitute the ultimate cause of the millions of successive-existences which appear and disappear in nature ; they are ever-acting and appear as a something which quickens or rather impels matter. Here, then, even *Motion* may be said to be secondary, and all that Science can tell is the given condition when indeed that can be clearly ascertained. To conceive them as entities is then, according to Positive Science, a fallacy ; as it would be to consider them as the effects of the mysterious substances called Matter. As to reducing the ultimate property of substance or matter to Impenetrability, as Euler did, and attempting to explain mo-

tion thereby, because without it there would exist nothing in Substance on which impulsion could obtain, it cannot be considered as an explanation of the impelling force even if true. But modern Science, in admitting of such Atoms, conceives, or rather proves that each retains in whatsoever change occurs, its own specific weight (relative gravity) and properties (relative affinity), and therefore allows of another reason than the positive (relative) fact of their being found to co-exist. Here, then, modern Science differs from the Epicurean whose *atoms* are all *supposed* to be reduced to some atomistic *materia prima*, to which it is *Form* that bestows *Quality*. And modern Science is fully justified by the later discoveries in animal chemistry (and also in inorganic), where complex compounds exist and evidently act as such. Thus Water, Caseine, Fibrine, &c., pass from without not as Oxygen, Hydrogen, &c., but as definite compounds. If, indeed, the Theory of Substitutions originating in the labors of Laurent, Dumas, Gerhardt, Liebig, &c., and which is founded on the fact that in many instances one of the elements of an organic compound is replaced, first to a small extent, subsequently to a greater degree, and finally, in some cases, altogether by another element, while the general character or type, as it is called, of the component remains unaltered,—if that theory appears at variance with the foregoing observation, we shall remark that the *Form* of the body or substance that replaces another never varies as such, as oxygen, or hydrogen for instance. Thus an atom of primary matter would, according to the School of Empedocles, Leucippus, Democritus, &c., become oxygen or hydrogen by a mere twist or change of form. Therefore if in *inorganic* chemistry, the chemical character of the compound depends principally on the *nature* of the

component elements, whilst in *organic* chemistry the character seems to depend not so much on the nature as on their *arrangement*, or position in the compound, that arrangement is independent of the supposed primary matter, and only acknowledges as a *positive cause* the position taken by the molecules of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon and nitrogen. Every chemical action, or affinity in act, appears now to be a case of substitution, one element replacing another, and Isomorphism is carried to great lengths. But, although Iron and Arsenic crystallize under the same form, yet their nature is very different.

Arrangement or position, then, is not the same as the atomistic forms of the Epicureans. Oxygen, Hydrogen, Carbon and Nitrogen forming the only component elements in organized bodies, the position or arrangement of their molecules in the compound radicals constitutes the *positive condition* of the changes that occur. And these changes form all the multifarious varieties of organized compound radicals. The peculiar relative position or arrangement of the elementary molecules is now considered as the source of the properties of the type of the compound, and not the electro-chemical nature of the element as before. And *Albumen* may be considered as the starting point of all the animal tissues, for the first step in the formation of all organism is a cell or cellular albuminous tissue, where Life is marked or distinguished by the power of composition and decomposition or Endosmose and Exosmose, not to be confounded with mere imbibition proved by Liebig to relate to another order of facts. Thus in a leaf chemical substances having the strongest affinities, are placed in apparent contact, being only separated by a membrane of the most transparent nature. What, then, prevents *Affinity* from taking

place? It is Life or the vital power. And what is it that in the human body separates and divides the phosphates of soda and of potash which exist in the food, so as to place the former alone in the blood, and the latter (phosphate of potash) in the juice of flesh? Merely the thin membranes or cells, which evidently possess a power of selection or of allowing some salts to pass in one direction only, and others in the opposite.

Can Art produce organic compounds? It can, indeed, imitate some of the results of organic life. One organic product can be produced from another. Thus cyanic acid and ammonia, forming cyanate of ammonia, can be transformed into urea, with ease; and from sugar, butyric acid, &c. But this imitation of compounds, as Liebig himself strenuously asserts in his oral lessons, is in nowise to be considered as an imitation of organic tissue. Even the formation of albumen and fibrine, or that of the production of a cell, is altogether beyond human power as yet. There exists, it is true, a celebrated experiment by Ascherson, where, by placing albumen in contact with a fat oil, membranous sacs or cells, containing a liquid, and possessing the power of endosmose and exosmose, appear to be formed. But whether these artificial cells are true cells, such as compose organisms, is another question.

If Affinity and Gravity are terms without a meaning unless substances or matter are connected therewith, although, as it were, the impulsive agents, so it is with *Life*, which, without given conditions, does not appear. Gravity and Affinity may be said to be spontaneous, although they are conditional. But Life is never spontaneous, or at least as yet, even the cell requires certain conditions termed organization, and no vegetable or animated life is known to exist without having been preceded by it. This truth once ad-

mitted, and also another proved by science, viz., that time was when no Life existed on Earth, and the mystery of the apparition of vegetables and animals in this world is limited to that of the *one* or of the *many*. We do not merely allude to the pre-existence of vegetable to animal life. All we know of vegetable life is the positive value of the conditions or medium in which plants are placed. The astonishing variety which results from such conditions must not blind us to the fact that with time and circumstance, i. e., with many thousands of years, with varieties of light, heat, temperature, moisture, air, climate, soil, a greater or less height above the level of the sea, &c. &c., one primitive type of vegetables, one germ, might account for all the endless variety of the vegetable creation; and, as evidenced by the remnants in the coal mines, primary vegetable life was altogether dependent on the condition of the globe, since at that time, probably on account of the Heat of the globe, and the masses of carbonic acid gas which covered the soil, not only plants which are now tropical grew in Great Britain, but plants which are now as low weeds were then of a size beyond the highest oak of our time. Moreover, such a state of things must have been gradual even after the later cataclysms of the globe, so that those who maintain that a single germ of vegetable life might have produced all the endless variety we now remark only render homage to the real value of the positive conditions of things as they are known. To exclaim as a definite objection, But how could a plant which only exists in one spot have come there from where it never has been found, is to forget the nature of acclimation, or the possibility of such plants having been at one time very general, and having disappeared excepting where they are now found. This does not

separate Life from the positive conditions of Life, on the contrary, it points out the wonderful mystery contained in that Cause, at once so unconditional in its nature and so conditional in its expression.

These conditions or the Conditionality of Life must then for a moment arrest our attention. Composition and Decomposition, reduced to their simplest elements, are constituted, we have said, in vegetable life by the inhaling of carbonic acid, the fixing of the carbon, and exhaling of the oxygen (we avoid minor details); whilst in animal life oxygen (duly mixed with nitrogen) is inhaled, and carbonic acid is exhaled. No life is known to exist without these conditions. When, therefore, Thought is said or conceived to exist in connection with Life alone as Soul, some other condition must exist, and unless an Almighty power be admitted to exist, the thing cannot be. With God, the possibility of future existence was not only admitted, but became, as it is well known, the basis of many theological conceptions respecting that future state, which incoherences are wanting in the Mosaic dispensation. Life being only known, or only appearing though never spontaneously, under given conditions, which means that the germs of Life require such conditions to show themselves, is the great secret of the Creator as it is of the Creation. And it can be no wanting of respect towards Him to study Him in the most surprising of his works. It is rather a want thereof to attempt to penetrate such secrets without following even any given order in things where all is order.

In animated Being, Thought and Sensation alone exist; but can it be said that Plants think, or that unorganized matter feels although unable to express it? We have seen that neither composition, division, nor movement, change the nature of the primary substances

in the least, and that they ever remain what they were before. This Hobbes understood perfectly well; but, strange to say, that thinker, not finding in form or figure and motion any explanation for perception and thought, almost admits that matter or substance, as matter alone, is not only capable of motion and figure, but also of sentiment and perception, and only wants, in order to express its sensations, to have organs and memory such as animals possess. This incoherent notion of Hobbes, which Table-rapping may turn to account, is expressed by that philosopher in the following words: "*Scio fuisse philosophos, eosdemque viros doctos, qui corpora omnia sensu predicta esse sustinuerunt: nec video, si natura sensationis in reactione sola collocaretur, quo modo refutari possint. Sed et si ex reactione etiam corporum aliorum, phantasma aliquod nasceretur, illud tamen remoto objecto statim cessaret: nam nisi ad retinendum motum impressum, etiam remoto objecto apta habent organa, ut habent animalia: ita tamen sentiunt, ut nunquam sensisse se recordentur. — Sensioni ergo, quæ vulgo ita appellatur, necessario adheret memoria aliqua,*" etc. (Hobbes, Phil. c. xxv. sect. v.) On this ground of fancy Hobbes would have much company.

Sensation and Thought, even admitting them to exist in the lower animated beings (exhaling carbonic acid), is only expressed mechanically in plants, and in the lower animals by locomotion. Still with animated being there may be said to exist belief, an instinctive belief in Existence, or in relative being. Now even admitting this, it cannot be considered as amounting to Assent. In Man *assent* is voluntary belief (either valid or erroneous), but Credulity or mere belief is only a feeling without any fixed or relative notion, beyond Trust in the veracity of the speaker. Now

we do not deny that even the actions of the *Infusoria* do indicate a kind of belief, if not of voluntary expression. They are perceived to avoid obstacles when swimming in the fluid that contains them; they are seen to turn aside on encountering one another; and the eagerness with which they pursue their prey is an indication of resolve and of belief in relative existence and design. Such belief is, however, merely instinctive. Even those floating masses of gelatinous matter termed *Acelepha*, of which the *Medusa* may serve as a type, are seen floating in the ocean seeking their prey and avoiding all danger that may occur. Evidently the manner in which this jelly spreads its fringed tentacula, its varying motions in the water, the cautious concern with which it avoids all appearance of danger by sinking and again reappearing, all such relative acts prove indeed in those amorphous masses a kind of belief in relative existence and in design, yet such acts are not assent. Can this be compared to the intuitive knowledge on which Mr. Locke insists, saying that "as for our existence we perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. Experience convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every sort of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being, and in this matter come not short of the highest degree of certainty." This instinctive feeling of Belief may indeed be said then to exist with Life; it may perhaps be considered as inherent in the expression of that mystery, and thus to be connected with what is termed the vital flame, and which really does constitute a state of combustion.

But as to confounding rational assent or positive belief with what Mr. Hume says "the reasoning man

possesses in common with the brutes, and which is nothing but a species of instinct or mere mechanical process," we join our voice with those who loudly protest, but without admitting with Reid much the same conclusion, who would constitute mere belief a universal umpire. It is remarkable that Mr. Hume, after appearing to reprove severely the Cartesians for their separating with such nicety animal nature from human nature, should also conclude by advancing an evident fallacy, viz., that they were *quite* the same, and *mechanical*. This is reasoning much in the same manner as Hobbes, who rather than own the deepness of the mystery of Life prefers supposing Thought to exist in stones and metal!

All instinctive Belief as vital supposes a relation, and as such is never without an object, even when not expressed. Therefore, if such is the case rational belief, or assent or conviction, would be Positive Faith, that which admits of a belief grounded on deduction of some kind. So that when Stuart Mill says that for belief one object is not sufficient, because the simplest act of belief supposes two objects, or two names at least, or even ideas, and gives as an instance that the mere expressing of a word gives no belief at all, not even that of the existence of the thing named, this we refer to positive belief and not to intuitive belief. "I may say for instance," observes Mr. Stuart Mill, "'the Sun;' the word has a meaning, and suggests that meaning to the mind of any one who is listening to me. But suppose I ask him whether it is true, whether he believes it? he can give no answer: there is as yet nothing to believe or to disbelieve. Now let me make all possible assertions respecting the Sun, the one which involves the least of reference to any object besides itself, let me say 'the Sun' exists. Here at

once is something which a person can say he believes." Mr. Stuart Mill maintains that the Sun is as one object and Existence another, and that the second cannot be said to be involved in the first conception, because it can be conceived as no longer existing. And the same with a round square, which when said alone calls for neither belief or disbelief, being only disbelieved when it is asserted that a round square exists. But we really think this is going too far, because the bare mention of things calling to mind relative bearings, the term of a "round square" would of itself and alone produce Disbelief.

Be that, however, as it may, instinctive belief may be admitted to constitute an instinctive expression of animated being, but not so Assent. Therefore if to Think is to believe because Thought is always relative of its very nature (Self, not-Self), it is not the same with Assent or Relative Faith, and Dissent. Thought and Perception go then together, and if in the lower classes of animals no peculiar system exists, and if in some, such as the bee, the ant, etc., the act presents higher marks of design than the degree of development of the nervous system can at all explain, it may indeed be admitted that Sensation, Perception and Thought reside in the nervous system, and that in Man the brain is the organ of Thought. We have already answered the remark of Cabanis relative to Thought being a secretion of that organ.

Can Science produce a better brain or can the nervous system in general be raised to its highest standard? This is a question which interests Mankind, and the Phrenologist has a right to provoke inquiry. Now even admitting that the anterior part is that where the intellectual, the central where the moral, and the hinder where the animal faculties are pro-

duced in an unknown way, but still in a mode which bears a relation to the state of those parts, no practical result can be obtained without ascertaining whether the energy of action corresponds to appearances. But respecting the elevations or bumps, the difficulties are still greater, and we well remember Gall's insisting on those drawbacks to his system in 1820, and experience has shown them to be real. The principal one consists in the fact that bumps or organs fully developed may be dull and sluggish, whilst organs having no striking appearance may be very energetic and active. Moreover, to say that the schoolmaster must not only know, but teach the laws of physiology, and bring up children according to the physical expression of the brain, is certainly overrating the capacity of teacher and scholar, and admitting that no attention is paid to the expression of the brains of the scholars. Now in all cases where education is carefully attended to, and those alone can serve as examples, the various intellectual and moral capacities of children are taken into great consideration. And as to passions, to declare a child as bad as a thief or a murderer, because certain parts were prominent, has been shown by competent judges to be a bad way to go to work. Moreover, as the great primary principles of Thought, such as *Perception*, *Memory*, *Conception*, *Reflection*, and *Judgment*, as well as *Attention*, are no peculiar located faculties and yet of the highest order in an intellectual light; and as in a moral, neither *Passion*, *Pleasure* nor *Pain* are any thing local; and again as *Sympathy*, that deepest of the social virtues has no organ but the *heart*, (no bump at least,) and also as *Habit* has nothing to do with Phrenology, we believe that Time and Experience will prove that Science to be more illusory than it is generally supposed at present; for in Education *Habit*

is every thing. Natural faculties do exist, however, but indeed they show themselves most readily. The natural impulse which makes a man calculate in a way like Pascal is indeed an instinctive belief in numbers, which are united in all ways most unaccountably, but yet which the individual himself can explain: it is no guess work. Other impulsive acts are indeed instinctive beliefs, and are to be distinguished from Rational or deductive Belief. And above all, the *Will* which alone can govern sentiments and propensities, is entirely beyond any physical means to which the Phrenologist can have recourse. But lest this should be esteemed a supercilious mode of treating a science which aims at effecting that which we own to be a desideratum,—the bettering of mankind, morally, physically and intellectually, and which if really capable of attaining such an end would become, enlisted in the service of religion (not theological, but according to the Attributes of God,) of inestimable value, we shall add a few more remarks to the preceding. These again relate to the practical part, and to the various chances of error which may proceed from the thickness of the skull and all that might occasion bumps to appear without the brain being really organized as the external appearance would make one believe. Also, even admitting the utility of acting upon one organ in order to repress another by bringing the former into a more complete state of action, all such proceedings would demand moral influence, so that the means to be employed would be the same, as if without a bump, one had merely judged of the action of the faculties from the observation of the ways in which they were expressed.

Respecting what is termed the alliance between Religion and Science (leaving the Nature and Ways of God as matters of Divine Faith, which only knows or

trusts in Him as Almighty) it has already been attempted, but unfortunately Theology has always conceived that her *fiat* bestowed a kind of infallibility. It was thus that Aristotle, at first deemed heretical, was not only adopted as orthodox, but Faith itself was considered to be linked therewith. Now as Science is and ever will be a ground in perpetual motion, it is irrational to lay down any thing absolute beyond the Laws of Science, which may be the means made use of by Religion but which one may attack and reason upon in all ways without endangering Divine Faith, though the Science may be proved to have been an error. No scientific man indeed arrives at old age without perceiving a remarkable disparity between the doctrines of science having currency in his youth and those adopted when his earthly career is drawing near its close. In fact, it is a well known Truth and self-evident, that experience and unwearied investigation are continually bringing to light new systems and perfections before unknown. Those who are initiated in chemistry are well aware of the fact, of all the attempts at forming a perfect chemical language having failed, because those who gave the names erroneously supposed that they knew all that was wanting to name the elementary substances.

The deductive sciences constitute positive beliefs, which possess all the guarantees that can be required; but the elementary beliefs or intuitive, must be carefully distinguished therefrom. But neither theological beliefs, nor metaphysical, nor positive, bear the character which can be assigned to Divine Faith. It is not sufficient to say that in historic investigations, there exist many thousands of facts which no one doubts, though the circumstances alleged are in appearance inexplicable and thus aim at establishing a similarity

between Faith in God and Faith or belief in various narratives told of Tradition and by Theology. It may indeed appear as if the truth of Christianity, not to say that of the Existence of God, is involved in the reality of the facts asserted to have taken place. But here lies the error. The basis of Christianity is Trust in God, and that Trust is in the Almighty. And it is to that important point that we now proceed.

Respecting the conclusions of this first part we have nothing to add that can strengthen the arguments presented already with respect to the worthlessness of mere individual belief only grounded on the intuition of the individual alone. The intuition must be common, must be universal, to obtain as such. And yet this Truism is continually overlooked. Under the name of Common Sense, which can have no other value than its Universality, the mere impulsive or intuitive nature of the feeling is introduced as the standard of worth, and thus mere individual or *sole* belief comes to usurp the place of *common* belief, and Credulity is admitted to obtain merely because it is also a belief. Prodigies, allegories, fables, figurative expression, poetic fiction and metaphor all find a ready believer in him who only consults the individual impulsive feeling of Credulity which lurks in the mind of every man, but which, without the faculty of judgment, would prove no blessing, but a bane and a curse. This is the Faith of the Visionary, of the Swedenborgian, of the Somnambulist, of the Table-rapper, and of the modern Spiritualist; and this is a field which promises to vie with all those sinks of superstition which, under some form or other, have been ever interposed between God and Man.

