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THE  
EMANCIPATION OF FAITH.

BY THE LATE

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DISEASES OF THE SKIN," OF A "CLINICAL EXAMEN OF  
HYDROPATHY," ETC., ETC., ETC.

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*"Our Father which art in Heaven,  
Hallowed be thy Name!"*

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## OF DIVINE FAITH.



In the beginning was the Word,  
and the Word was God.

ST. JOHN.

CONSCIOUS of having done our utmost to avoid enthusiasm in a matter whose thrilling nature scarcely allows of sedate and mature reflection, and trusting that we shall prove that we have not been carried away by the current of our imagination, we shall begin by attempting to state our conclusions in a few words. A preliminary remark cannot, however, be dispensed with, for it carries with it the whole gist of our undertaking. It is to the effect, that our conclusions, whether right or wrong, are in fixed relation with our knowledge and that they cannot be supposed, when grounded on Tradition either symbolical or mythic, to extend beyond that portion of the human race of which such records are extant. In limiting Revelation to the knowledge of the Existence of God revealed as the Almighty and to be trusted in as such; in finding all in all in that eventful fact, which, cleared from Theology, stands forth as the Word or His Name revealed in the Attributes which constitute that Word; in maintain-

ing that Theology can ground none of her assertions on any other basis than the Trust or Faith which those Attributes have ever inspired, we are fully aware of the clamors such conclusions will excite, not only in the ranks of Philosophy, but still more in those of Theology. Philosophy, already pretty well convinced by the vain attempts of philosophers themselves of the inanity and mutual contradictions of the *à priori* and *à posteriori* proofs of the Existence of God, may indeed be induced to give a fair hearing to the plain statement of the question at issue. Philosophy having merely adopted a negative position is almost disinterested in the admission on rational grounds of the proofs of the Revelation of the Existence of the Almighty under Attributes which alone have ever constituted His Word or Name. Not so Theology ; when the peculiar and distinct character of the knowledge Man has of God is once admitted,—the Nature and the Ways of Him whose Word or Name forms as the Almighty the only ground of Trust or Faith, are also removed by that very fact beyond the grasp of human conception. Theology stands convicted of deceit on the very admission of the Existence of the Supreme Being having been revealed. If we find ourselves obliged to have recourse to desultory preliminaries in order to make ourselves understood when we would say that in the fact of the Revelation of God as the Almighty resides the real ground of Trust in Him as such, and that His Word, or Name, or Attributes, which are the same, constitute His Law, being the call that awakened Man into Life,—if in short the plain and bare statement of that great fact be adduced as the firm ground of Faith, it is because it is met with an exclamation of surprise and by the question of what Revelation we allude to, for if Heathen Theology had, according to Warburton, Revela-



tions in bushels, Christian Theology not only has them by thousands, but even the renewal of the primary Revelation of the Word in Christ is generally presented in a manner that makes a starting point of an Event which, without Unity with the primary Revelation, would leave Christianity at the mercy of Theology. But, the Almighty be praised, such is not the case. A standard exists in the Word of God, in His Attributes, which Theology cannot recuse, and to which it must ever refer, whilst *the Revelation* of Him as the Almighty becomes the ground of Divine Faith so that even Christianity cannot claim another basis. The duty of the man that admits of the Call of God in the Appeal made by the Revelation of His Existence, being evidently that of trusting in Him as in the Almighty, whilst he devotes himself to Him whose Attributes or finite qualities constitute the Law or the Word, and have ever been His Name. Now, this ground can never become that of Faith until Theology shall stand convicted of having practised deceit, either intentionally or unintentionally, since that leaves the matter the same and is indifferent to the thing itself. Theology surrounding the *Rock* on which Divine Faith reposes as a citadel, with thousands of Revelations and Inspirations, Theology not only reduces *the Revelation* to their level, and prevents that great event from being clearly distinguished, but it binds its fate to that of those outskirts or mere human conceptions. Enthusiasm may, it is true, prove a ready excuse for many such errors; and we know that the spirit of religion, when directed on the wrong road, i. e., on the Nature and the Ways of Him whom that religion admits of as only known as revealed by His Word, ever finds expression in devout belief in such wonders as set the most at defiance all the authority of relative

or positive belief. But if His Worship consists in Man's devoting himself to His service, and in following the path pointed out in His Word, and not merely in heartfelt thanksgivings, or what is more common, in selfish requests, then His Attributes become the aim of Man. Is trust in the Almighty at variance with the finite character of those attributes? Does not rather the Absolute nature of Trust in the Almighty constitute a motive for positive or relative Faith in the pursuit of such an aim? Would religious enthusiasm be damped by what is, not an interpretation of fancy, but one that dearly purchased experience has pointed out to many, if not to all? Theology would then become fancy, and the Attributes of God Religion. It is not that the various interpretations given by human Reason to those Attributes would be devoid of strife and discussion. But in adopting rational faith in the Deductive Philosophy as a criterion of the finite attempts of human Reason, with Goodness and Morality extended far and wide by means of Education or Intelligence conferred as a help, such strife and discussion would probably be avoided. Credulity would at least be divested of its noxious character. Fanaticism would assume the garb of ignorance. Fired with his system, the rational believer in God might also imagine that he saw what in reality did not exist, and fancy at the same time that prejudice did not make a part of his intellectual baggage. But error in this path, although much to be lamented, would always prove retrievable however late it might be pointed out, for man alone would be conceived as the authority; whilst error in Theology or Religion, at the present time, is subject to far deeper evil, because Theology speaks in the Name of God respecting His unknown nature, and when the error becomes too glaring to be concealed, Theology is

ever ready to say that in charging her with a fallacy men are attacking God.

As far as human knowledge reaches respecting the human race, and excepting isolated tribes or individuals, the notion or idea of God appears as coexistent therewith. We aim at proving that the original covenant between the Creator and Man, His creature, was Trust or Faith in Him, because He was only known and revealed as the Almighty. Why Human Will went astray we know not; but we own that the conclusions to which our inquiries had led us were strengthened greatly by the passage in Genesis (ch. iv. 26) which is considered to relate to the introduction of false Gods, in the times of Enos, grandson of Adam, and therefore, at all events, refers to an occurrence which took place in the most early period of the traditional history of our race. The passage stands translated thus in the text of our version, "then began men to call upon the name of the Lord," whilst the translation in the margin is, "then began men to call themselves by the Name of the Lord;" and again, "then began men to call the Lord by Name." Now, we own that we were greatly struck with this text, at a time when we were asking ourselves the question whether our conclusions were not altogether erroneous, whether it was absurd to say that all Idolatry, either symbolic or mythic, was nothing else than a false application of the Word or the Name of God so distinctly the same under the various idioms which expressed it. We had already come to the conviction that all Symbols, even the Sun, had received the name of the Supreme Being when Man conceived the idea of taking them as the representatives of the Almighty, and we could not refrain from finding that that view was clearly expressed in the text. The oft-debated

question of Monotheism finds in this fact a ready solution. And we may be permitted to remark that the mysterious terms employed by the Apostle John, in order to express the nature of the Word, far from being at variance with our interpretation, adapt themselves entirely thereto.

This great eventful fact renewed in Christ, only admits of Christianity on the ground of the Unity of that Revelation. And it was, indeed, the assertion of the Unity of Christ with the Father that drew forth from the Jews the cry of "blasphemy," and prompted them to stone Jesus. And yet these mysterious words, the Unity of Christ with God, constitute the very basis of Christianity, *for Christian Faith and Divine Faith are one*. What was blasphemy to the Jew, was Religion to the Christian, and the same continues to obtain to the present day. And it is in that Unity that we foresee the future universal triumph of Christianity.

The great distinction that exists between the various incarnations of Brahma, and of Buddha and Christianity, is involved in that mysterious Unity. The Revelations are One; and the Attributes are the same. The Trinity was no new doctrine, for God, the Law and the Prophets, as uniting in One all religion, find in Christianity an explanation. The incarnations of the various Eastern Worships of ancient times, and more especially of Brahma and of Buddha, not to mention the incarnations of the Grecian Mythology, were beliefs, it is true, of the embodying of the Almighty under a human form. An incarnation, therefore, was the readiest conception of the Union of Christ with God. Theology, that pretends to know all about the Nature and the Ways of the Supreme Being, only made known in a manner quite distinct from all other

knowledge of man, Theology has adopted the notion already pre-existing of incarnation. But Christ, who was no Theologian, but One with the Father, speaks not of Incarnation. And, fully admitting of our own principle of free inquiry, we find in that Unity a tenet that can withstand the strictest scrutiny. In the Identity of Christ with the Father, the primary Revelation is once more renewed. The Almighty thus made known, no individual can claim the worship of Mankind; that Worship is due to Him alone. The flash of Light that streamed across the gloom in the Mosaic dispensation which forbids the bowing of the head to any graven image, and reminds the people of the Unity of the God of their forefathers, of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, that Light is not obscured in the dispensation of Christ. He is One with the Father. All human character disappears, and God alone is worshipped, not in mere lip-sounds, but in the devotion of Man to Him in following His Attributes.

Moses, that great lawgiver, who reminded his nation of the Eternal, of the Most High, of Jehovah, cannot be lowered by the adoption of the crudest tale that ever issued from Egyptian Temples. His appeal to his nation and the rejection of Idolatry stamp his mission with a character that succeeding events will raise higher, for Christianity and its progress prove the difficulties with which in those times such an appeal must have been assailed. Even admitting that troop of unfortunates, of whom Diodorus Siculus speaks as having wandered for a whole generation in the Arabian deserts, living on quails, to have been the Jews, who dared not show themselves to any human being in the horrid state their cruel task-masters had put them by cutting off their noses, lips and ears, and who therefore remained in the desert until death had closed

their eyes, leaving it to their children to propagate their hatred of Idolatry,—we say, even admitting this to be the real tale and account of the flight from Egypt, have not the future destinies of those tribes proved responsive to the primary appeal? Are not hundreds of millions the followers of one of them, of Christ? And is there a Christian at all acquainted with the history of the human race that could walk into Jerusalem without feeling that he was entering upon a spot where had occurred the greatest and most important event *by its results* that is inscribed in the annals of Mankind?

Were Jesus the Christ merely a gifted individual; were he merely one inspired only on the attributes of God by dint of deep contemplation of Him; were he merely considered as an Eastern sage, would that Hebrew thus continue to draw enthralled, not merely the minds or intelligences of the most enlightened parts of the world, but also their hearts? No. It is in the firm belief of the divine nature of the Spirit of Christianity that resides that attraction. Theology may do its worst, it will never succeed in eradicating that belief, which is resumed in saying that *Christian and Divine Faith are One*. The various theological conceptions may in process of time become as different from what they are now, as the actual ones are from those of the middle ages, and of the earliest periods of Christianity; but if the Unity of that religion be maintained with the Almighty, known as the Word “from the beginning,” Christianity will still remain firm on its basis. We care not for the opinions or conceptions of men and their ever-varying forms, nor have the elementary forms of the Mind any thing to do with the matter. Christ as the Word is God, for God was only known by that Word, His Name, or Attributes.

The latter, we cannot too often repeat, constitute his finite expression, as the term Almighty does the Infinite. To say that the Morality of Christianity constitutes its divine essence, is not only taking a partial view of the matter, but also a finite view. Morality is a mere metaphysical conception, representing certain relative *acts* and their results. The followers of Christ include Morality in their acts; but as devoting themselves to Christ as God, to the Word as the Law, the whole range of human activity, intelligence, and learning as well as Goodness, in short, all moral and intellectual action is of their competency.

The Emancipation of Divine Faith, which it is here aimed at establishing, may be likened to the separating of Thought as Subject, from Thought as Object. The motive given by Locke for not insisting, or rather for not entering, upon the study of the primary elements of Thought, was, we have seen, that man is incapable of reasoning upon those elements of all knowledge; Man must be and remain content to point them out. Nor have all the investigations of the German philosophers made the thing clearer. The pure Reason of Kant remains the pure Reason of Reid as a starting point. But the relative Truths or positive conditions, so clearly laid down by Kant, as regards the elementary beliefs themselves, are no Truths, are no *laws* or positive (relative) conditions if we would apply them to the Mind itself. And the same obtains with respect to all the *ultimate* or absolute laws of Nature. All we know of Life is the study of the phenomena termed vital in relation with the chemical and physical, but the most positive certitude on those points do not avail respecting Life itself, of which the conditions or relative phenomena are alone the subjects of investigation.

The Emancipation of Divine Faith does not there-

fore consist in limiting the position to that taken by Luther when he asserted that "what was true in philosophy was not true in Theology." *It is here advanced that all Theology that discusses the Nature and Ways of the Supreme Being only known to Man by THE REVELATION of His Word, constitutes an application of human Thought to a subject that Theology admits to be above the competency of human conception.* Now, as human Thought, Theology, we repeat it, is free to act, for every one is free to think for himself, but such conceptions of the inconceivable, or Theology, can never obtain in the same manner as the Supreme Being whom it aims at explaining. It is as if the finite attributes of the Word or Name of God, which express, and have ever expressed, Power and Wisdom and Goodness, and of which man forms a positive conception, were maintained to obtain in the same relations in the Divine Nature. This is not saying that if God had willed it Right would have been Wrong, and Good Evil. It is merely an admission of ignorance, of incompetency; admission grounded on the nature of the very thing. When Mr. Locke declines entering into any details respecting the elementary acts of the Mind, such as Perception, Memory, Attention, &c., it was because, as he very justly remarked, "because we have nothing to compare them with." Now Theology, in requiring the same belief for her conceptions as for God, is performing the part in relation to the Supreme Being *only known as revealed*, that Locke denies the Mind can act in regard to itself. Theology is obviously far more inconsistent than the philosopher. The latter overtly owns his incompetency whilst he admits the very feeling as natural and human that he declines to explain. But Theology, never abashed, begins by admitting the utter distinc-



tion of the dispensation by which the knowledge of God's Existence is required, and yet she enacts for her decisions a far wider faith. If consistent she would never open her lips on such a subject. Even the Faith or Trust in human conception respecting the finite Attributes which constitute the Word may and must vary, and yet Divine Faith or Trust in those great attributes is not impaired thereby.

The Theologians of Rome, or Oxford, or Geneva, or of the Sorbonne, have certainly a right to enjoy the privilege of free inquiry and private judgment, which was established in spite of Rome. Trust in Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness is at the bottom of all the proceedings or Ways of God, therefore it is incumbent on Man not to allow himself to be mistaken. Credulity and Superstition consist in trusting to finite conceptions as really adequate to express the Being they aim at representing. The human and divine character or nature of Christ, whilst it makes Unity with God or Trust in the Word the basis of the whole edifice, leaves at the same time ample room for millions of human conceptions concerning the same. Therefore, the admission of the human nature of Christ entailing finite conceptions, these can only be admitted as such. This Truism becomes, however, a blasphemy with Theology. To say that the language of Christ was human, and that the laws of human conception must be made use of to conceive it, and that as all conceptions change or vary, these may although Christ or the boon is the same, that truism is the denial of Christ, according to Theologians. The obscure and despised plebeians who propagated Christianity were not God, as Christ was, nor did certain powers with which they appear to have been gifted place them above the conceptual sphere in which they were

moving. Incoherency of language in the relation of wonders is surely far more consistent than discrepancy in the relation of ordinary events, and yet when was an ordinary event related in the same terms by several witnesses? Therefore the existence of such discrepancy in the Gospel is, we believe, a proof of authenticity; a proof indeed that would not exist if such relations were evidently modelled one upon the other. Still the whole dispensation, even the Revelation of the Lord Jesus, cannot bely the primary Revelation. And such we find to be the case: it is a renewal of that fact: a renewal that leaves human nature human nature still. Therefore, the admission of our conceptions being different from the primary conceptions by no means belies the admission of the main fact, or the Advent of Christ in aid to human weakness. The Light was indeed from Heaven, but Man being left free to act, human nature remaining the same, that light cannot be said to have led him astray. Man was left to act according to the impressions he received, and it is obvious that the first impression was that of proclaiming the Advent of Jesus. Now, without something miraculous the minds of the Apostles could not have been moved. That impression, it is true, could on our own admission of Trust in God, have occurred in a different way: it might have been an inward impulsion and not an outward or sensuous one. The belief in Christ would then have been very different from what *the Revelation* of God's Existence by the Word was, taking the Word or Logos, not for Speech, as M. de Bonald pretends it to mean, but for the Name. The point on which Philosophy insists so strenuously, that of the inconsistency, or indeed the absurdity of a Revelation inadequate to its apparent object, that of converting Man, that of regenerating the human race, which point

is indeed of the highest and deepest importance since it involves in its apparent inconsistency the admission of human weakness supported, and not that of human Will cancelled, that point would not have existed had the impression produced consisted in an instinctive impulsion communicated as it might have been indeed by Divine Will. Admitting, therefore, the miracles of Christ only as means of acting sensuously on the Will of his disciples, of disposing their belief in favor of one who adduced other proof than words, is it not remarkable to find that Christ himself does not allude to the miracles themselves in favor of his doctrine, but to *the Spirit in which they were conceived and performed?* Nor is this admission of the truth of the miracles of Christ at variance with our fundamental argument which admits of *the Revelation* of God or of His Word as the only positive mean of overthrowing Credulity and Superstition. Those miracles are indeed linked in and connected with the Divine Nature of the Saviour; they were addressed *directly* to the Apostles and immediate disciples and as his Advent, *indirectly* to us. Of the pristine Revelation we possess merely Testimony; and Testimony is again our means of knowledge of the Revelation of the Word renewed in Christ. In both cases the fundamental point or the Word revealed, is at the same time guaranteed and obscured by the necessary conditions to which that testimony is subjected. Is it the primary Revelation? There it is obvious that from the earliest time, antiquity itself had ceased to comprehend its own symbols or to understand its own Mythology. The Word, the Name, or the Attributes of the Almighty, conferred on natural objects, on natural phenomena and on human conceptions, was lost sight of in the general contest respecting the right conception. Even the ancient symbols and

myths, the productions of the imagination of their ancestors, were forgotten or abandoned by their descendants, whilst their primitive meaning became more and more obscured. Credulity, Superstition and Theology, Mysticism and Asceticism reigned paramount, but the Word was forgotten. Is it the Revelation of the Word renewed in Christ? There the Testimony passing through the same medium, the human conception, was joined with the same necessary accompaniments. The Grace conferred on Man in this renewal of the Revelation, the call on Mankind to devote themselves to the Word of God, the very Advent of Christ and his miracles, all became *a stumbling block*, because the minds of men cannot readily admit of their own incapacity, and dazzled with the Light they first proclaimed and testified the fact, and they afterwards maintained that the primary conceptions of the fact constituted matters of faith also. Thus in Christianity, we find that Symbols and Myths became matters of Faith, and Trust was no longer in the Word, in the Name of the Almighty, but in the human conceptions thereof and in images, wafers, candlesticks, rites, peculiar terms of prayer, which the Churches did not sufficiently distinguish from the Faith or Trust which is alone in God. Now, as Testimony can never be separated from the given, positive conditions inherent in its nature, we therefore join issue with the Reformation in the Protestant view of that testimony inasmuch as we would refer to Christ and not to the Church. But as human testimony is that of the Church or community of Christ, we cannot refer to Christ without the medium with all its necessary errors. Now, we maintain that the fundamental error of all is the attempt to strengthen Christianity as a finite conception or practical, by giving out those conceptions as Revelations; by adducing

miracles which weaken those of Christ as surreptitious Revelations darken the great primary Event and its renewal in Christ. We conceive the Protestant admission of the Miracles of Christ, which limits them entirely to Him as constituting a part in his Divine Nature, not only as the true one, but as containing an irresistible argument against all other miracles whatsoever. And since according to Christ himself, it was the Spirit in which the miracles were performed that gave them their real positive Christian value, whilst the miracles themselves proved His Divine Nature to his disciples, they are therefore and remain above all human explanation as miracles, and we have only to attend to the spirit of them in order to interpret the testimony. The imperfection of this latter being necessary, our only criterion is Reason with Goodness. And thus it is that the miracles of the casting out of devils admit of the ready application of the results of experience to the testimony transmitted. But to that important point we shall refer more fully at a later period. Here, at the very threshold, we would aim at showing that the value of the pristine Revelation is not diminished by human error, any more than it is weakened by another Revelation, provided the renewal be of the same nature, and leaves human nature the same.

Limiting the meaning of the term Revelation to the primary fact of the knowledge of the Existence of God, as the Word, we insist pertinaciously, incessantly, and, we own, in a most monotonous manner, on the very nature of that dispensation rendering it the ground of Trust alone, and no instrument of thought as rational or relative as positive Faith. Reason can, we maintain, point it out as a fact, but Reason can never claim for her conceptions that absolute Faith or

trust which the Revelation confers on the notion of the Almighty. When it is said by us that Reason points out the fact, it is meant thereby, we again repeat, that all tradition, all natural history, and all the nature of human conception prove to Reason, that without such an event the Existence of God would not have been known. God thus becomes an absolute fact not in Nature as known to Reason, but above Nature as admitted by Reason. Revelation therefore can never be adduced by Reason, except as a ground of Trust in God. If Reason acted otherwise, it would be the denial of Revelation. And this is what Theology is always doing. "The taking away of Reason to make way for Revelation is," says Locke, "the putting out the light of both: it is acting as a man who puts out his eyes in order to see the better." And this is indeed the case when men have recourse to Revelation in order to prove a thing of which Reason is conversant. Reason admits of Revelation as the ground of Trust in God in relation to the absolute or ultimate laws of Nature, where Man obtains as a living rational being. In human existence facts exist where Reason sees no Light, such is the existence of Evil both moral and physical; here Trust in Him revealed as the Almighty and in His Attributes, is the seeing where Reason is blind; it is not the putting out of a man's eyes to make him see better. But Theology, we cannot too often repeat it, is ever performing that part; for, with Theology, Revelation, Miracles and Grace (instead of being duly limited to that province where God is all in all, which, instead of cancelling human Will, guarantees its existence, since from thence issued an appeal to the Will of Man) become common-place and do, indeed, appear like the putting out of a man's eyes in order to make him see. When we reason of the Divinity, we

cannot avoid paying attention to the principle of Bacon, who tells us that we must always be careful never to infer conclusions which are unsuited to the measure of the facts, and which therefore, greatly overhanging their basis, have no real strength or solidity.

In the Testimony that supports Christianity in its pristine period, we may, therefore, admit of ignorance, of fanaticism and even of fraud, which we believe also to exist in the present day in Romanism and in other sections of Christianity, without denying that the individuals are Christians, provided Christ be the watchword. The criterion of human endeavors is the Word or God as Christ, and no other Unity exists in Theology.

The link which connects the Old and the New Testament is altogether in the Unity of the Word. But the testimony of the Bible is the human conception of the times respecting the Word revealed. The Book cannot be distinguished from itself as the Word can from the Book. The conceptions of former days may vary or differ from ours respecting Him who is trusted in as unvarying, without Faith being cancelled thereby. Trust in God does not require that a Christian should become a Jew. The Bible cannot be separated from human conception merely because those conceptions are inspired by the feelings which the notion of God gave rise to in the minds of men of former days. It is, we believe, impossible to reflect on the imperfections of human nature, and on that of all language, without admitting that something more certain must be admitted as an object of Trust. But Theology will never submit to have her province thus narrowed. Even Warburton, a staunch theologian, found Theology against him, when he attempted to prove the Divine Mission of Moses, by grounding his arguments on the paucity of the main tenets of that

legislator. This the theologians asserted was utterly subversive of the whole, for with Theology the total system must stand or fall.

As to the Attributes and Qualities assigned to their Gods, by the Heathens, these, according to Warburton, always correspond with the nature and genius of the civil government. If this was gentle, benign, compassionate and forgiving, Goodness and Mercy made up the essence of the Deity; but if severe and inexorable, captious and unequal, the very Gods were Tyrants, and expiations, atonements, lustrations and bloody sacrifices composed the system of religious worship. "This," says the learned Bishop above named, "I have observed to hold universally throughout Antiquity, so that by the rule here delivered, a man might, on being told the genius of any particular government, rightly pronounce on the nature of the Gods." If ever a general propensity may be termed a dictate of Nature it was obviously that of admitting a Revelation of some kind in contradistinction to what is called the Religion of Nature; but asks Warburton what could cause mankind so readily to embrace these offered Revelations, and he adduces the following:

1. Either a consciousness that they wanted a revealed Will for their rule of action;

Or, 2. An old tradition that God was wont to vouchsafe it to their forefathers.

"And there can be no third," adds the Bishop, "for it is either in the nature of man or in a tradition preserved in the whole race. Prince-craft or Priest-craft might indeed offer them for private ends, but nothing short of a common reason could dispose mankind to accept them." Now the common reason to which Warburton alludes is, according to our view, the Word or Name of God, and His Attributes as the



finite conception. Mankind, forgetful of the nature of the knowledge, always aimed at a nearer apprehension of God, or claimed belief thereto. Warburton conceives the very disposition of man to receive such absurd schemes of Religion as Revelations from Heaven as proving more than a thousand arguments that mankind was ignorant even of the very principles of natural religion, and that therefore men were fully conscious of their want of a Revelation. And therefore men so totally at a loss for a rule of life would greedily embrace any direction that came with a sanction from Heaven. This, he reminds us, was not only confined to the ignorant and to the people, but even the wisest, and Socrates especially, owned their want of a superior direction.

Warburton, conceiving Natural Religion to be very distinct from Revealed Religion, admits its two fundamental supports to be 1. The knowledge of Moral Obligation, and 2. The belief in a future state of Rewards and Punishments. The latter they unanimously rejected, he says, but though they all admitted of moral obligation, no two went the same way, and none hit upon the right. "The honor of this discovery was reserved," according to Warburton, "for true Revelation, which teaches us in spite of unwilling hearers that the real ground of moral obligation is the Will of God."

Now, though we are well aware that in the eyes of the orthodox Bishop we would appear as blasphemers and would incur anathema for our opinions, yet we shall remark that his views incline strongly towards the opinions we maintain. Warburton, to the astonishment of all Christianity, aimed at proving the Divinity of Moses's law from the circumstances of the law itself, and that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and

punishments is not to be found in, nor did make part of, the Mosaic dispensation. "Mistaken notions," he says, "of the Jewish and Christian dispensations have made some advocates of Revelation always unwilling to confess the truth here contended for, so that it is not with Atheism and Free-thinking that an adversary is found, but in Orthodoxy. I have often, indeed, asked myself what had I to do to invent *new* arguments for religion when the old ones had outlived so many generations of the race of infidels and free-thinkers. I might then have flourished in the favor of my superiors and the good will of my brethren; advantages I prize above every thing, next the love of Truth. This breaks all my measures, *imperiosa trahit veritas*, and I am once more borne away in the troubled torrent of Antiquity." Warburton then proceeds to show the necessity of being acquainted with the history of ancient Egypt with respect to religion and customs in order to receive therefrom a light, "since Moses was learned in all the Wisdom, and the Jews besotted with all the Idolatries of Egypt. Now in this inquiry into Egyptian manners by an odd chance not uncommon in blind scuffles, the Infidels and we have changed weapons. Our enemies attack us with the Bible to prove the Egyptians very learned and superstitious in the time of Moses, and we defend ourselves with the Chronology of Sir Isaac Newton to prove them very barbarous and very innocent. Infidels, drawing from the written fact that in the Jewish law there were many ordinances respecting the institutions of Egypt a conclusion against the divine inspiration of Moses, the defenders of Revelation, taken by surprise, acted as *unprepared* disputants generally do to support their opinions, i. e., chose rather to deny the *premises* than the *conclusion*; for not knowing to what

their adversary's principles may lead, they think it a point of prudence to cast off all danger, and stop him in his first advance; whereas the skilful disputant well knows that he never has his enemy at more advantage than when he shows him arguing wrong from his own principles."

Taking up this ground, Warburton calls "the Tolands, the Blounts, the Tindals, &c., a race of cold-headed dreamers, in whose composition is found more of that *quality* which subjects men to draw *wrong conclusions*, than of that which tempts them to invent false principles." Still, he by no means consents to be understood as admitting the *premises* of his adversaries in the latitude in which they are delivered, for "the human mind, miserably weak and unstable, and distracted with a great variety of objects, is naturally inclined to repose itself in system, nothing being more uneasy than a state of suspense, or a view too large for our comprehension. Hence we see of every imaginary fact some or other have made an hypothesis, of every hypothesis a castle, within the precincts of which they draw every thing they fancy may contribute to its defence or embellishment. Of this we have adduced an instance in the folly of those who are for drawing all arts, laws and religion from the Hebrews. An extravagance at length come to such a height, that if you would believe certain writers, (Gale, Court, Huet, &c.,) the poor Heathen had neither the Grace to kneel to Prayers, nor the Wit to put their Gods under cover, till the Israelites taught them the way." Warburton here maintains that when we are told that Honor to Parents and the restraint of Theft by Punishment came to the Hebrews from the Egyptians, as also circumcision, the proposition is a fallacy from whatever party it comes, since Cumberlant has proved that they ex-

isted before Abraham. "Why all this strife," asks the learned Bishop, "against the one or the other hypothesis, for assuredly it would no more follow that the Jewish religion was false because they took to circumcision in imitation of other nations or tribes, than that the Egyptian religion was true, if we admit of the hypothesis of Fourmont and others who derive all the Gods of Egypt from Abraham's family." The hypothesis to which Warburton alludes is grounded on the clear and evident ethnological analogies existing between the names of the Gods and Princes of early times. Fourmont, Shuckford, and many others, as in our days Bishop Bovet, a French Divine, have all been carried away by the evidence of Philology, but instead of rising to some primary source, they all turn around either Abraham, or Moses, or Aaron. This the clear-minded Warburton could not brook: He therefore proposed to prove that many of the positive institutions of the Hebrews were enjoined in opposition to the idolatrous customs of the Egyptians, but that some, bearing a conformity to those customs and not liable to be abused to Superstition, were indulged to them in wise compliance with the prejudices that long use had rendered habitual. The learned Bishop considers it to be, however, of great use to religion to trace things to their originals, and for that sole motive asserts the four following propositions, the proofs of which are to be found in his works:

1. That the Egyptian learning celebrated in Scripture, and the Egyptian superstition there condemned, were the very learning and superstition represented by the Greek writers as the honor and opprobrium of that kingdom.

2. That the Jewish people were extremely fond of Egyptian manners, and did frequently fall into Eryp-

tian superstitions, and that many of the laws given to them by the ministry of Moses, were instituted partly in compliance with their prejudices, and partly in opposition to those superstitions. The prejudices were, says Warburton, those that were such *according to their views of things*.

3. That Moses's Egyptian learning, and the laws he instituted in compliance with the people's prejudices or to their view of things, and in opposition to Egyptian superstition, are no reasonable objection to the Divinity of his mission.

4. That those very circumstances are a striking confirmation of the divinity of it.

Warburton considers such an inquiry to be necessary to obtain a true idea or conclusion and judgment of the nature of the Jewish dispensation, as that idea would enable the reader to form a right notion of the force of the arguments with which he supports his proposition, that the doctrine of a future state is not to be found in nor did make part of the Jewish dispensation.

This latter proposition of Warburton constitutes in fact the main argument in favor of his principle of Duty as the consequence of a revealed God issuing commands, and that of *Utility* which constituted and still forms the basis of the doctrine of Natural Religion. Now we maintain, in opposition to Warburton, that *the Revelation* was coeval with Man; but only consisted in the Word or the knowledge of His Existence, and that the Name or Word, which was God, was the attributes of Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness. These Attributes were the Law, the errors of Mankind found an inspired legislator in Moses, but in vain, and the Grace of God vouchsafed a renewal of the primary revelation. The *Duty* therefore existed from

the beginning, and not from Moses alone. The *Utility* that civil society received from the inculcation of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was according to the Bishop the cause of its being maintained even by such as did not believe it. Therefore that great use to civil society of the doctrine caused all mankind, especially the most wise and learned nations of antiquity, to concur in teaching and in believing it.

The Mosaic dispensation or Revelation forms One in the prodigious number of Revelations asserted to have existed, and one fundamentally opposed, says Warburton, to all other institutions of the kind, and that peculiarity appears to him so striking as to warrant its being the true One. Natural religion is considered by this divine to be such as is founded on our relation to the first Cause and deducible from the eternal reason of Things, and this view he adopts from Eusebius (Præp. Evang. lii. c. 6). Now all the pretended, many revelations were, he asserts, but corruptions of religion coming from Princes and Lawgivers, or according to Toland and Tindal from the Priests, which is the same thing. This belief in Revelation, we have already said, Warburton considers as the result either of the nature of Man or of a tradition preserved in the whole race.

1. False revelation, as the result of natural religion, admitted of a future state of rewards and punishments and of moral obligation. Here was *Utility* for society, or the Leviathan of Hobbes in our modern times; whilst with true Revelation, according to Warburton, the real ground of moral obligation is, we have said, *Duty* or obedience to the will of God. Now although we do not join issue with the learned Bishop in dividing natural and revealed religion, since we ad-

mit the first as an attempt of human weakness to follow the primary revelation of the Word, yet we admit most unreservedly the practical value of the distinction. Duty as an obligation requires a Revelation of Will. This we find long before Moses in the Primary One, and in the Attributes. The *Duty* consisted in aiming at following that road; there also was Utility.

2. The general Tradition of God's early revelation of himself to man, as delivered in Scripture, is the one that the Bishop considers as having produced a state of mind which disposed men to so ready and general a reception of the numerous false revelations, since it proceeded from the consciousness of their wants, joined to what he terms "*the prejudices of Tradition.*" If the Deist allows the latter, says Warburton, he gives up the question; if the former, there then exists a strong presumption in favor of Revelation, for if man, from whatsoever cause, be so unavoidably blind and helpless, it is highly rational to think that the good God would lead and enlighten him by an extraordinary Revelation of His Will. Now it is said by Tindal, Toland and others, that this blindness is men's own fault, because instead of improving their reason and following its dictates, which would lead them unto all truth (for Scripture assures them that which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath showed it unto them. Rom. i. 19, 20), go on like beasts, and follow one another as they are led. Yes, answers Warburton, there did exist a *deviation*, and that deviation was from the beginning of the World to the birth of Christ, and was likely to continue so to the end of it. It was a deviation springing from no partial cause of climate, government, or age, but the fatal effect of human weakness in the circumstance of an earthly situation. The deviation existed by the fault

of man, it is true, but such a fault as was seen by sad experience man could never remedy. He therefore flies to Heaven for relief, and would seem to have reason for his confidence.

The rationalist, of those times, retorts, that if our condition be a deviation, it evidently requires redress, but that such to be lasting can never be a revelation of the rule of Right; and that the proof thereof exists clearly in the corrupt state of the Christian world, which seems to require another revelation in order to establish that which the old Revelation failed in doing.

It is an answer, returns Warburton, to say that the Pagan acted ill *upon principle*, whilst the Christian acts unworthily *against principle*. Warburton calls it a false notion to say that God's revelation is represented in Scripture to be a mere republication of the religion of nature. "I shall prove," says the learned Bishop, "that God's Revelation is a very different thing, and from its true nature prove not only the use of Revelation, but likewise the *absolute* use of it to Mankind. I shall likewise show that what our adversaries suppose the only, was but the secondary end of the two revelations, for what was *primary* and peculiar was of such a nature as the utmost perversity of man could not in any degree defeat—of such a nature as manifests there must needs be these, and that to expect more or further would not only be *unreasonable* but *absurd*. But going on with the Deist in his own way. From what hath been said, we see ariseth a strong presumption that God hath indeed communicated His Will to Mankind, in that extraordinary way we call a Revelation.

"Amongst the many arts used by lawgivers and founders of civil Policy for the support and propaga-



tion of religion, they pretended especially to an extraordinary revelation from some God. Thus Amasis and Nnevis in Egypt, whence it gained Greece and Asia (?) claimed theirs from Mercury; Bactria from Zoroaster; the Getes from Zamolxis and Vesta, &c., &c.; all propagating the doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state. In all such pretensions to inspiration their only aim was to establish the opinion of the superintendency of the Gods over human affairs, as well as to beget a veneration to their laws. And one may venture to go further and say that the former was their principal and direct aim, in all their pretensions to inspiration. Now, the advancement of general interests constitutes the legislator, whilst the advancement of their own private interest, the tyrant, for the sovereign merely maintains and executes the law. Was this pretence made to introduce a civil or religious society? if a civil, the effects aimed at must be reception for his policy and laws—if religious, for their perpetuity. I speak not of the third effect or personal interest, because this is the very thing I contend for, such *veneration* and *observance* being only to be procured by the influence of religion which the pretended inspiration introduces. The effects then in question, 1st, their utility for the policy and laws, or 2d, for the perpetuating their observance.”

1. Warburton remarks that, “civil laws are seen by all to be so necessary for the well-being of every individual that one can hardly conceive any need of divine command or assistance to bring men to embrace a scheme for associating, or to establish the right they have for so doing. For as Strabo says, ‘Man was born with this inclination to associate, and it is an appetite common to both Greek and Barbarians, for being by nature a civil animal he lives readily under one com-

mon policy or law.' (Strabo Geogr. lib. 16, c. 2.) And as to the Thracian savages Orpheus is said to have had to deal with, and whom he reduced to society by recommending to them Piety to the Gods by teaching them the ways of superstition." Yet this was not the case, according to the learned Bishop, with most of those with whom these lawgivers had to do. "And therefore if we would assign a cause of these *pretences to Revelation* as extensive as the fact, it must be the cause which we contend for here, it was *made* for the sake of religion alone, for many legislators were called upon by a willing people on the strength of this personal virtue and wisdom, and we find that where Religion was thoroughly settled there no inspiration was pretended to (Dracon, Solon), there it was pretermitted. For if any wanted inspiration it was Dracon's laws, but Ion and Triptolemus had already provided for that.

2. "As to aiming at perpetuating and rendering their institutions immutable, this entered not," says Warburton, "into the intention of the Greek legislations, nor if it had could it be obtained by giving them a divine original. A system of immutable laws might indeed be the wild project of Eastern policy (Medes and Persians), but the Grecian lawgivers were too well acquainted with the nature of mankind, the genius of society and the ceaseless vicissitude of human Things, ever to conceive a project so absurd, so ridiculous a design. Besides, the Egyptian legislation from which they borrowed all their civil Wisdom went upon very different principles. It directed public laws to be occasionally accommodated to the variety of Times, Places and Manners. But had they aimed at perpetuity, the belief of a divine imposition would not have served the purpose. For it never entered the heads of that

ancient people that civil institutions became irrevocable by their issuing from the mouth of a God, or that the divinity of the sanction altered the mutability of their nature. The honor of this discovery is due to certain modern writers who have found out that divine authority reduces all its commands to one and the same species. Here we have employed these false revelations, wicked instruments as they are and wickedly as they have been abused, to terrify true believers, to evidence the high probability of God's having actually given a revelation to Mankind. For if such exists it must have a characteristic mark, and this mark must be our guide. Now the genius of all ancient religions, notwithstanding their pretence to originality, and their actual independence, was so perfectly harmonious as to the Object, Subject, and End of all religious worship, that we must needs conclude them all to be false, or all to be true. Now the primary mark of true Revelation was its asserting to come from the first Cause of all Things, and condemning every other religion for an imposture."

And, "Not *one* of all that numerous rabble of Revelations ever pretended to come from the First Cause, or taught the worship of the One God in their public administrations. Dr. Prideaux, in his excellent history, has indeed told us a very interesting Story of Zoroaster; whom of an early lawgiver of the Bactrians, he hath made a false prophet of the Persians, and the preacher of One God in the public religion; which doctrine however this learned man supposes to be stolen from the Jews. But the truth is that the whole is a pure fable, contradicts all learned antiquity, and is supported only by the ignorant and romantic relations of late Persian writers under the califes, who make Zoroaster contemporary with Darius Hystaspes, and servant to

one of the Jewish prophets, and even say he was Abraham, nay stick not to make him one of the builders of Babel. It may be wondered how such crude imaginations of over-zealous men should ever be thought serviceable to Revelation, when they may be so easily turned against it, *for all falsehood is naturally of the party with infidelity*. I have long indeed looked when some *minute philosopher* would settle in this corrupted place. And, just as I thought, one of these idle, teasing things hath lately given it the infidel taint, having grounded upon this good old man's afternoon dream, *with Hyde* at his elbow, I can't tell what foolery of the Jews receiving in the time of their captivity juster notions of God and His Providence from the followers of Zoroaster." Warburton therefore sides with Eusebius in this controversy, "for, to the Hebrew people alone was reserved the honor of being initiated into the knowledge of God the Creator and of being instructed in the practice of true piety towards Him." This knowledge of the true God or of One God, the Bishop admits was taught in the mysteries of the Heathens to *a few*, whilst with the Hebrew it constituted the general worship. He reminds the reader of the remark of Eusebius that tallies with this view of his, respecting the mystery under which the Heathen concealed or hid the existence of One God. Eusebius, opposing this case of the Jews to the Pagans, where a small select number only was initiated into the knowledge of the Creator, expressly points out the difference. The words of Isaiah when foretelling the conquests of Cyrus are also explained by the Bishop in that sense, when announcing the exaltation of the Persian empire the prophet apostrophizes the God of Israel in this manner: "Verily thou art a God *that hidest thyself*, O God, of Israel the Saviour." This was the *Deus absconditus*.

The Oracles of Apollo, quoted by Eusebius from Porphyry (Præp. Evang. l. ix. c. x.), Warburton interprets in his sense, and says they seem not to have been rightly understood by the ancient writers. The first relates to the Mysteries in which the initiated can alone come to know God. "The way to the knowledge of the Divine Nature is extremely rugged, and of difficult Ascent. The entrance is secured by brazen gates, opening to the adventurer, and the roads to be passed through impossible to be described. These to the vast benefit of mankind *were first* marked out by the Egyptians." The second oracle is as follows: "True Wisdom was the lot only of the Chaldeans and Hebrews, who worship the Governor of the world, the self-existent Deity, with pure and holy rites." Marsham, says Warburton, supposing after Eusebius, that the same thing was spoken of in both the oracles, here exclaims, *Certè nulla est controversia quin ὄτι μοναρχίας, de unius regimine sive de unico Deo, reverens fuerit et rectissima Ebræorum, non item recta Ægyptiorum existimatio*; and again, *verum Apollo parum sibi constans* (Canon chron. p 155, 6 ed.) because in the one oracle the Egyptians are said to be the first, and in the other, the Chaldeans and Hebrews the only people who knew the true God. Now, Warburton asserts that the oracles were on the contrary very consistent as treating of different things, in the first of the knowledge of the true God, and in the second of His public worship. This he considers to be apparent by the different terms in which the oracles are delivered: the Hebrews, whom the oracle, by another name calls Chaldeans, were, he says, well known to be the *only* people who *publicly worshipped* the true God. "But the knowledge of Him being likewise taught, though to a few, all over the Gentile World and

only in the Mysteries, and Mysteries coming, as we have shown, originally from Egypt, the oracle says that *the Egyptians first taught men the knowledge* of the Divine nature. Warburton therefore interprets with great appearance of being in the right the beginning of the first oracle as intimating and describing exactly the state of the initiated and the rites they underwent before coming to the participation of this knowledge, whilst the same oracle speaking of the knowledge that the Hebrews had of God, uses a very different language evidently relating to his public worship as self-existent God (*σεβαζομῆθροι Θεον αγνως*).

The mark on which Warburton particularly insists as distinguishing the Mosaic revelation from all others is the relation Moses established with the First Supreme Being. "There is nothing more amazing in all pagan antiquity than that amidst their endless revelations not one should pretend to come from the First Cause of all things." He says that it was the difficulty of accounting for so extraordinary a circumstance that caused the ancient fathers of the Church to recur so generally to the agency of the Devil. Warburton, in order to obviate all objections, asserts that those who pretended to inspirations from Jupiter never considered him in the sense of the creator of all things, but as the local tutelary God, such as the Jupiter of Creta, or of Libya, or Jupiter Olympian, or Capitolinus at Rome; and that those who pretended to the best system of religion meant thereby not simply the best of all, but the best for their own community. And the Fathers conceived that the admitting of the Evil Spirit as suffering his agents to pretend inspiration from the First Cause might greatly endanger the cause of Idolatry, because the power of God was virtually admitted by that proceeding.

Warburton terms this circumstance the most amazing of all the amazing appearances of Paganism, and it elicits from him the following reflections :

“ 1. The false prophet and politician who formerly cheated in one and the same person found it necessary in his character of prophet to pretend inspiration from the God most revered by the people, and this God was generally one of the dead ancestors or citizens whose services to the community had procured him Divine honors, and who was of course a local tutelary Deity. In his character of politician, he thought it of greatest use to have the national worship paid to the founder of the society or the Father of the Tribe ; for a God who had them in peculiar estimation suited the gross conceptions of the people much better than a common Deity at large. But this practice gave birth to two principles which prevented all pretence of revelation from One God the Creator: 1st, an opinion of their divines that the First Cause did not immediately concern himself with the government of the world, but left it to local tutelary deities, his vicegerents ; 2d, an opinion of legislators that it would be of fatal consequence to society to discover the First Cause of all things to the people.

“ 2. But secondly, that which one would imagine should have brought the One God, the Creator, to the knowledge of the world, namely, its being taught to so many in the mysteries and particularly to all who set up for Revelation and Lawgivers, *was the very thing that kept Him unknown*, because all who were thus taught it, had the knowledge communicated to them under the most religious seal of secrecy.

“ 3. Now, while the First Cause of all things was rejected or unknown, and nothing acknowledged in the public worship but local tutelary deities, each of which

had his own appointment, and little concerned himself with that of another's, no one Religion could accuse the other of Falsehood, because they all stood upon the same foundation. How far this may account, in a natural way, for the matter in question is submitted to the judgment of the learned.

“Here then we rest,” adds the learned Bishop. “An essential difference between the *Jewish* and all *other* Religions is now found. The very mark we wanted to discriminate the true from the false. As for any marks of resemblance in matters circumstantial, this will give us no matter of concern. The shame of this must lie with the Deist, who can in conscience bring it into account, for the equal falsehood of both; seeing, was the Jewish true, as we pretend, and the Pagan false, that very resemblance must still remain. For what is a false religion but a counterfeit of a true? And what is it to counterfeit but to assume the likeness of the thing usurped? An impostor without a single feature of the Truth would be a rarity even among monsters.”

Respecting the non-existence of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishment in the Mosaic dispensation, we have seen that Warburton says after many arguments adduced in favor of that view, “Now mistaken notions of the Jewish and Christian dispensations had made some advocates of Revelation always unwilling to confess the truth here contended for; so that it is not with Atheism and Free-thinking, but in Orthodoxy, that an adversary is found.” This passage we again produce referring for the sequel to the preceding pages. We reproduce it because it is an avowal of much weight, coming from a theologian of the value of Warburton, and not that we aim at making him a cloak for any attempts against the



Church he upheld. We also find in the Mosaic dispensation a peculiar mark, but it is one that tallies with the primary Revelation; it consists in the Unity of the Supreme Being as the Almighty, as the God of their forefathers, of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob. The doctrine of a future state we conceive to be involved in Faith in God, and in the Duty owing to Him revealed by His Attributes or under a Name that was equivalent. Evidently until Christ, the doctrine was not held *generally* by those who admitted the Bible as the standard of Faith. This Warburton maintains, and he mentions as prejudices or unfounded opinions,

1. That several patriarchs and prophets, both before and under the Mosaic dispensation, were certainly favored with the Revelation of man's redemption, in which the doctrine of a future state is so eminently contained; and they think it utterly incredible that these should not have been conveyed to their posterity and people.

2. They could not conceive how a religion could be worthy of God, which did not propose to its followers a future state of Rewards and Punishments.

3. That the truth contended for had been received and abused by the enemies of all true religion and godliness: by the Sadducees of the old Jewish; the Gnostics of the old Christian Church, and Unbelievers in all Churches.

4. Lastly, that men were kept fast within the error into which these *Prejudices* had drawn them, by never rightly distinguishing between a future state as taught by what men call *Natural Religion*, and a future state as taught by Christian Revelation, which is the thread, as we shall see hereafter, to conduct us through all the

errors and perplexities of this region of darkness till we come into the glorious sanctuary of God.

Warburton pursuing his point, admits that the error is not confined to the Christian Church, but that the Jews too maintain it with equal obstinacy, but not with equal *indiscretion*. "The children of the world are in their generation wiser than the children of Light," their fatal adherence to long established Judaism depending altogether upon this single prejudice. For the consequence is inevitable, if Moses taught not a future state, his religion could only be preparatory to one that did. This, therefore, is their great support, and wisely have they enforced and supported it by all the authority and power of the Synagogue.

The Mahometans, the Bishop remarks, who hold the divinity of the Law, use an expedient for saving the honor thereof. They confess the doctrine of a future state is not to be found there, but *though it be not there it ought to be*, for that the Jews in pure spite to them have interpolated their Bible, and struck out all mention of it. Warburton here quotes in favor of the truth of this assertion the following passage from M. d'Herbelot (Word-Taburat): "Les Musulmans disent que c'est l'ancien testament que Dieu révéla à Moïse, écrit en langue hebraïque, livre qui a été altéré et corrompu par les Juifs. C'est là le sentiment des Musulmans qui a été recueilli de plusieurs auteurs Arabes par Hagi Khalfah. Le même auteur dit, que l'on n'y trouve pas aussi aucun endroit où il soit parlé de l'autre vie ni de la résurrection, ni du Paradis ni de l'Enfer, et que cela vient peut-être de ce que les Juifs ont corrompu leurs exemplaires."

From all this Warburton deduces the two following conclusions: 1. "That Moses did *not disbelieve* though he did not teach a future state of rewards and

punishments. 2. That his religion was preparatory to that of Jesus, which taught it."

From my holding, says the Bishop, that Moses did not disbelieve a future state, it follows that all such texts of Scripture as are brought to prove that the ancient Jews believed that the soul survived the body, are nothing to the purpose, but do, on the contrary, greatly support his opinion, since he has himself shown that the early Jews did indeed suppose this truth. As to the passages alleged from Job, Warburton asserts that that Book was written to support Faith or Trust in God, and that he believes it to be from Esdras. The views he presents respecting Faith or Trust in the Almighty tally greatly with those which we maintain to be the primary source of all the conceptions of men relative to God's Existence and Nature, and which conceptions constitute what is termed Theology. Leaving untouched the point relating to the antiquity of the book of Job, as constituting a matter of chronology and of traditional history, and as equally available whether it should appear that that writing existed long before Moses, or only after his time, we would insist on the views of Warburton, which arose on reflecting upon the silence of all such early primary writings with respect to the doctrine of a future state as a ground of Faith in God. We consider the primary Revelation of the Almighty to be the real ground of Trust in Him, because he was only known from the beginning, as the Word. His Name as Supreme Wisdom, and Power, and Goodness, we maintain to have been the source of all conceptions respecting His Nature and Ways. And the doctrine of a future state under certain given forms to have arisen in the minds of men on account of that knowledge. Immortality is linked with the Trust we have in God.

This conception Moses believed in, says Warburton, but did not teach. Christianity teaches it, but in what light? in that of the resurrection of the flesh. Here Theology, under the garb of Orthodoxy, would impose her interpretation. But we maintain the Protestant principle that denies *the letter*, and admits of the *Spirit* of such fundamental texts or principles. Therefore we assert that *Immortality* being the real Truth announced in clearer form, the mode in which it shall occur may be variously stated, and that the Soul appearing with the Flesh, may be conceived as meaning that before his Maker the Soul of Man will appear linked or united with the *doings* of the flesh: the Soul will not appear as a blank sheet of paper, but clothed in the Flesh, not, indeed, as bone, sinew and muscle, but as the human life, the mortal period during which have occurred the things respecting which the Soul is to be judged. We agree with Warburton in conceiving the book of Job to be an attempt to vindicate the Attributes of God, and to obviate all difficulties respecting His Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, by appealing to Faith or to Trust in the Almighty. "The commonest fault," remarks the Bishop, "the ancients were wont to fall into, on seeing good and bad happen indifferently to men, was to call in question the Goodness of God. It is against these doubts that the author of Job has principally provided, and to show that Satan or the Evil Spirit was, like all other superior immaterial Beings, a creature of God, at enmity with him, yet entirely in his power." Here we concur with the Bishop in admitting of the appeal to Faith in the Almighty being the aim of the author; we also believe him to be right in the inferences he draws respecting the times in which the book was written, by insisting on the nature of the conceptions, such as the

Evil Spirit, which points to Persia; but we must not be considered as admitting such conceptions as adequate to the great notion, the great first basis of religion, to Faith in God or Trust in the Almighty. Warburton points to the words of Elihu, as peculiarly obviating all the difficulties and accusations produced by Job and his friends, and as appealing to Divine Faith. Now, we would remind the reader that the very name of Elihu fortifies this opinion of his, it being the Name of God (Ahura, Alla-Hu). Grotius conceives Elihu to represent one of the servants or retainers of Job or of his friends; but is it not more likely, on account of the name, that the unknown author of the Book of Job intended Elihu to represent God as telling Man that He who made Himself known as the Almighty and whose works prove Him to be so, is to be trusted in as Almighty;—this being pristine Faith in God. When Elihu excites Job to attention and accuses him of charging God with Injustice; when reproving that impiety or mistrust, he tells him that man is not heard for want of Faith, we say that this refers to that primary and ultimate link between the Creator and His creature, to that link which is grounded on the nature of the knowledge or Revelation, as well as on the nature of the Being revealed as Supreme or Almighty: the Being whose Attributes constitute His Word or Name, the following of which forms His Worship. But when Elihu tells Job that his sins hinder God's blessing, and when in the same breath he tells him of that God whose Wisdom and Ways are unsearchable, there we find the Theologian that speaks of conceiving that which he tells us to be inconceivable. When, then, Elihu resolves all into Trust in God, we assent, but when instead of conceiving submission to God as inspiring man to action, when instead of

pointing out to the proofs in Nature *which affirm but do not suggest nor render conceivable* Almighty Power, he invites Man to submission to Power Almighty, we there perceive the Oriental fatalist, as well as the Western reasoner. To speak of submission to Power Almighty is at least useless, for the very notion tells us that resistance would prove unavailable. It is Trust or Faith in Him that constitutes submission to the Word. That submission or Duty consists in obeying the Call or Appeal. Human Will summoned to act is told how in the Word or Law, or Name of God. His Attributes are that Name.

We say that the human mind must act towards Theology, as the mind of Warburton did towards Orthodoxy. It must seek for the distinguishing mark. The mark Warburton tells us is the absence, as inadequate, of human conception as regards the future state, but we would make it to be Faith or Trust in God as Almighty. Now, admitting only one point to be true in the Mosaic dispensation as it stands recorded, that point, which the whole history of the Hebrews positively affirms, is that Mankind was in the wrong road, that Polytheism or Idolatry was that road, and the Almighty was Jehovah or Supreme Being. The primary Revelation here becomes a criterion, a standard to judge of that of Moses who tells of God, and issues commands inspired by that Supreme Word.

When we say that Faith in the Almighty or Trust in God ought to inspire Man to act in the sense of the Word of God, or of his Name or Attributes, we would thereby point out the distinction as fundamental between Faith and Works. The actions of Man or his Works, his finite endeavors, even Christian Charity as practical or as Works, cannot therefore be a ground of absolute belief. When trusting in God or inspired

by Faith in the Almighty, Man performs Works in the sense of His Attributes, he proves his Faith, but that Faith or Trust is not grounded on the Works which are merely a consequence. It had been alleged that the 11th chapter to the Hebrews, "By *Faith*, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses performed all the acceptable works to God," &c., plainly shows that a future state of rewards and punishments, or, more properly speaking, the Christian doctrine of life and immortality, was taught by the Law. To this Warburton answers in the following terms: "If so, the 11th chapter directly contradicts all the rest of the Epistle, for the argument of the whole Epistle to the Hebrews is against Jews and judaizing Christians. The point in difference was this: The Gospel taught Justification by Faith. The Judaizers thought it must needs be by Works, one consequence of which was, in their opinion, that the law of Moses was still in force. They had no more conception than our modern Socinians and free-thinkers, that there could be any merit in belief where the Understanding was unavoidably determined by the Evidence. The dispute was not whether Faith in Moses, or Faith in Jesus, made men acceptable to God, but whether Works or the act of believing. Consequently, where the Apostle shows it was Faith, or the act of believing, he must mean Faith in the abstract, and not Faith in Jesus. For the Jews, even that part of them which embraced Jesus as the Messiah, denied it to be any kind of faith whatsoever. On the contrary, had they held justification to be by Faith in Moses and not in Jesus, then it had been the Apostle's business to prove that it was the specific Faith in Jesus. But as the dispute stood, all he had to do was to prove that it was the *act of believing*, and not Works that justified. And this he does with infinite force, by

showing that that which made all the patriarchs, *before the law*, acceptable to God, as all the rulers and prophets *under the law*, was not works but Faith. But what kind of Faith? Doubtless, Faith in God, for he is arguing on their own concessions. They admitted their ancestors to have had that Faith, but not the Faith in Christ, the contending for which had therefore been a kind of begging the question. Thus we see that not only the *pertinency*, but the *whole force* of the argumentation, turns on our understanding Faith in this 11th chapter to mean Faith in the God of our Fathers.

“But the Apostle’s own definition of Faith puts the matter out of dispute. We have said it necessarily required him to speak of the efficacy of Faith in the abstract. Accordingly his definition of Faith is this: ‘It is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.’ Not of faith in the Messiah, but of belief in general, and on good grounds. Indeed very general, not only belief of the future, but of the past. ‘’Tis,’ says the inspired writer, ‘the substance of things hoped for,’ and this he illustrates by Noah’s reliance on God’s promise to save him. ‘’Tis’ again ‘the evidence of Things not seen,’ and this the apostle illustrates by our *belief* that the worlds were framed by the *Word* of God.”

In maintaining that the Word of God means His Attributes, means Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, and that His Name was ever such, we may be supposed by many to be falling into the old Superstition of Names. But we would remind the reader that if we have proved ourselves unsupportably monotonous in repeating our fundamental argument, we have always adhered to the *sense of the Name*. Egyptian superstition, says Warburton, was principally



evinced in Names, and therefore when Moses was inspired to undertake his office he is said to have desired that God should let him know by what name he should be called, when the Hebrews should ask the name of the God of their Fathers.

“This question,” pursues Warburton, “gives us to see a people possessed with the very spirit of Egyptian Idolatry, the religion of names being of great consequence in Egypt. It was one of their essential superstitions—it was one of their native inventions—it was the first that was communicated by them to the Greeks. But this name was not a mere name of distinction, for such names all local deities of nations had before their communication with Egypt, but it was a name of honor. Out of indulgence therefore to this weakness God was pleased to give himself a Name. ‘And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM; and he said, thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.’ (Ex. iii. 14.) Here the indulgence is accompanied by a corrective. The origin of names arising from an idolatrous *Polytheism*, and the name here given implying *Eternity* and *Self-Existence*, directly opposeth that Superstition.”

Here we shall produce a passage from the same writer, a passage to which we shall again recur, and which proves that Warburton himself was far from considering the interpretation given of these ancient texts as satisfactory. “This compliance of God was,” says the learned Bishop, “a new indulgence to the prejudices of this people (the Jews) as is evident from the following words: ‘And God spake unto Moses, and said unto him, I am the Lord, and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the Name of God Almighty, but by my name Jehovah was I not known to them,’ (Exod. vi. 2, 3).” Now, this text is

construed by Warburton as meaning that, As the God of Abraham I before condescended to have a name of distinction, but now, in compliance to another prejudice, I condescend to have a name of honor,—and this interpretation he considers to be the true one of “this very difficult text, about which the commentators have so much perplexed themselves.”

But if we come to consider that *Elohim* is Ahuram or Ahura-mazdao, as Zend, and Iao is merely another term for the same in another idiom, only expressing Time beyond Thought or the Infinite, the Eternal, it may, we believe, be fairly admitted that the difference was *ethnological*, and not merely one of distinction and of honor. Or, if the latter, that they were given by different tribes in ancient time, and not directly by God. We propose entering more fully on this interesting point at a later period. For the present we shall merely state that the name of God was indeed intimately connected in primeval ages not only with religion, but consequently with whatever was respected. The connection that Ethnology points out to have existed in highest antiquity between the first Scyths that peopled Europe and their Eastern ancestors; the conquests in times far anterior to Cyaxares, in times which answer to those unknown ages which, as Justin tells us, men termed the Scythian period, and when the Tartar of those days trampled under his horse's hoof for several thousands of years the primitive tribes;—that connection, those early conquests of the tribes of Upper Asia, of the Scyths or Conquerors may one day explain the universal respect given to the *Name* as to the *Rune*. Syeth, or Sick, or Scythian, or Sethan, was the name of the victor. Sydije or Sydyk, or My Lord is still a name of honor in the East, and is the same as Cid (*conqueror*), the mysterious gothic

term given to the great warrior of Spain in the twelfth century. Sig or Siga was the name of Odin or Wuotan, or Wodin, and in the East as in the West all the Scythian tribes marched to battle invoking the Lord of Hosts, AHURA ; and still among their descendants the loud *Hurra* testifies of forgotten ties which Science now explains.

We merely adduce these views in order to give some force to our opposition to the opinion of Warburton concerning the real interpretation to be given to what is termed the *Religion of Names*. The question was and remains an open one. Science will sooner or later throw light on the subject, in spite of the exclamations of "blasphemy" uttered by Theology. There may have existed in the Nature of the Mosaic reform a necessary want that required a name that expressed that the Almighty had ever existed ; and therefore Moses may have more particularly insisted on that Attribute of Power, and less on Power. Moses told the Hebrews of the Almighty, the God of their Fathers, and giving Him the name of the Eternal, he at once pointed out in the most vivid manner the real conception of the Almighty as revealed in the beginning, in vivid contradistinction with the temporary and varying conception of the universal theology of his time.

The conformity of the Mosaic inspiration with the great criterion or primary Revelation of Him as the Word, of Him only known under finite Attributes, which formed His Name, and who, as Supreme or Almighty, was the ground or foundation of all Trust or Faith, that conformity or harmony we conceive to be a still more distinguishing mark than the mere absence, however remarkable it must be admitted to be, of the doctrine of a future state in that dispensation. The

errors of Judaism testify of human weakness, of human Will, as do the erroneous conceptions of Christianity. This latter dispensation is in fact pure Theism, for to God all things relate, and in Him, as the Father, all Things are concentrated. The criterion which we possess in the Word or the Name of the Almighty, known as the Father or Creator, obviates all doubt respecting Christ as a God distinct from the Father Almighty. With Warburton we would admit of the harmony of the Revelation, but with greater force and on a still broader basis. We would ascend to the fountain head, but Tradition has only handed down to us Names indicative of Him. These primary terms, however various, all meet in representing the Attributes of the ONE, of the Almighty, and we maintain that besides *distinction* and *honor*, which accrued to mortals bearing such names, there exists a religious meaning concealed in them. A deviation is evident, but the starting point is no less clearly pointed out in the terms which constitute the deviation. And that point is the *Oneness*, the Unity of God. Now admitting it even to remain an open question as regards the mode in which man came to know of that Unity, leaving for a moment undecided whether it was an *à priori* or an *à posteriori* conception, or indeed neither, but the *Revelation* of the Word, of the Logos, not as mere speech, but as the Name of God, that indecision does not bear upon the evident *monotheistic* meaning of the Name.

Warburton, in his "Inquiry into the Rise and Order of Idolatry," admits first of the worship of the heavenly bodies, followed by the deification of dead men (ancestors, heroes and kings: lawgivers). But he conceives the notion of the Immortality of the Soul to be older than the Metempsychosis or Transmigration of the Soul. Both of them he considers as human concep-

tions, but the latter as peculiar to Egypt, and points to the early custom of embalming the body in order that the Soul should not leave its *mortal coil* as long as it was preserved, as being a proof thereof. Immortality was the older opinion "that connected with the sepulchral rites, an absurd exception being made for the soul's attendance on the body." He questions the origin of brute worship being, as Lucian says, the result of the Egyptian invention of distinguishing the Constellations and marking each of them with the name of an animal. But says the learned Bishop it was rather the symbolic method of the Egyptians in recording in *improved hieroglyphics* the History of their Kings, heroes, or Gods, that gave birth to brute worship, because *figures* of animals became of *phonetic* value and coming to stand for, or to represent a conception, that conception was worshipped under that symbol, which was often the figure of some animal; this constituted a third kind of idolatry or brute worship, so peculiar to Egypt and its colonies.

"Now," remarks Warburton, "as the method used by all men, of engrafting Hero Worship on Star Worship occasioned *philologists* to mistake the former as symbolic of the latter, so the Egyptian method of supporting a brute worship symbolical of their hero-Gods caused the same writers to believe it to be originally symbolical of Stars, Gods, and even of the First Cause. Thus Vossius falls into two mistakes. 1. That Hero Worship was symbolical of Star Worship. 2. That Brute Worship was symbolical also of Star Worship. The consequence was that the system of Physical Theology, which was one of the last sciences of the Egyptian school, was supposed the first, and the worship which was indeed the first religion of the Egyptian was supposed the last." Herein is contained the

well-known discovery of Warburton, that hieroglyphics were sometimes merely *phonetic*, and were as such to be considered as the source of letter writing (at least in the West).

Shuckford perceiving that on the Bembine table persons are represented in a posture of adoration before figures of birds, beasts, and fishes, had concluded that the table was delineated before the Egyptians worshipped the images of men and women, which idolatry would thus have been the lowest step of their idolatry. To this Warburton answers, "Now admitting that kneeling alone (which posture Shuckford brings no higher than the time of Solomon) is adoration, how does it follow that the table was made before the Egyptians worshipped the images of men and women, since Apis was the symbol of the hero-God Osiris; but can any one believe that Osiris was not worshipped in his own figure before that of an ox?" He therefore concludes that it is far more probable that the table was made at a late period, when brute worship had superseded the worshipping of the images of men and women.

These highly interesting questions we must however forego, and merely arrest the attention of the reader on the admission of Warburton, in conformity with all antiquity, in respect of Osiris. The Bishop alleges against Sir Isaac Newton good and valuable motives for believing that Osiris and Sesostris, although the same names, were not the same persons. "Osiris and Sesostris, it is true, were both Egyptians, whilst the Hercules and Alceus were of different nations. Now the sameness of name is sufficient to account for the *conformity* in the history of Osiris and Sesostris, and this is all that is needful to ascertain their diversity of persons. And I have done more, I have shown

that a sameness of name was in fact the only cause of that *conformity*, and consequently that their persons were really different. . . . Our business is only to show that the sameness of names in the histories of Osiris and Sesostris accounts sufficiently for their supposed conformity. Otherwise we are not wanting in good positive arguments to prove their difference of persons, that Osiris was renowned for great conquests and Sesostris for great civil inventions. We have shown that the Egyptian rulers in order to bring the people more easily into their views of substituting *Hero* to planet worship called the Heroes by the name of a celestial God, and Varro tells us, according to Augustin, that it is of great advantage to Society that heroes should believe themselves the offspring of the Gods, whether indeed so or not. That by this means, the mind confiding in its divine original may rise above humanity, so as more sublimely to project, more daringly to execute, and more happily to establish the grand schemes it labors with for the service of mankind." Warburton continues, "If Sol who first reigned in Egypt (Diod. Sic.) was so called from the luminary of that name, the compliment was turned the other way in the case of Osiris, the luminary being called by the name of the Hero, for the same historian tells us that they called the Sun Osiris, and the Moon Isis, and as Hero Worship was as early as the first introduction of civil policy, therefore the using the name of Osiris to this purpose is demonstrative that Osiris was as early as sober antiquity supposed. Again, Herodotus tells us expressly and of his certain knowledge, that no Gods besides Isis and Osiris were worshipped by *all* the Egyptians in the same invariable manner. This is a plain proof of their being the *common* benefactors of *all* Egypt (in the invention of corn, wine, civil policy, &c.); whilst

the other hero-Gods, as *particular* and *partial*, were worshipped *variously*."

We have produced these passages in order to prove that although Warburton ridicules *the Religion of Names* he, by no means, denies the high value of those of Osiris and Sesostris, that he admits to be the same, though given to various persons. Evidently this admission points to some other cause of the *universal* worship of the *Name*. Now if it be admitted that Osiri or Osri be *Asura* or *Ahura* the mystery would be solved. When therefore we shall allude to Warburton's views respecting Idolatry, as represented to have arisen according to Pluche (Abbé), these opinions of the Bishop as regards the general value given to the terms Osiris and Isis, must not be lost sight of.

Warburton in admitting that natural religion was an invention of statesmen, says that it is not to be inferred that religion is false on account of those inventions. "But I don't know how it is granted on all hands that the invention of religion by politicians inferred its falsehood. 1. Religion not being found out as a Truth by the use of Reason is a high *presumption* of its Truth; whilst, 2d, the admission that it was invented for its utility is a *demonstration* of its Truth; 3d, and the question, as to whether the statesmen themselves did believe it, proves nothing, because the legislators themselves were among the first who fell into the deceit, and Diodorus Siculus himself answers the query he raises as to whether ancient lawgivers did *not* really believe what they taught, saying that evidently they acted under the impulsion that their conceptions were so productive in their opinion of public weal that they must needs be altogether supernatural and divine. But in fact this notion is false and visionary. It is built on false grounds, the legislators



did believe what they taught ; but their conviction was not a measure of its truth, although employing their utmost pains and labor in teaching, propagating and establishing religion. The admission that Idolatry was either the adoration of mortal men or of symbols, is not the admission that the *first* Idolatry and the first religious worship are one and the same thing ; for it is not only *possible* that the worship of the First Cause of all things was prior to any Idol worship, but in *the highest degree* probable, Idol worship having none of the appearances of an original custom and all the circumstances attending a depraved and corrupted institution.

Respecting the period of the rise of Idolatry, the learned Bishop does not, however, agree with Dr. Shuckford, who admits of Idolatry not being practised in Egypt in the days of Abraham ; to this he remarks, “ Now, Shuckford did not reflect on that general principle of intercommunity so essential to Paganism, which made all its followers disposed to receive the God of Abraham as a *true*, though merely *tutelary* deity. Josephus makes Abraham the first who propagated the belief of One God, after the whole race of mankind was sunk into Idolatry. He makes, at the same time, all those with whom Abraham had to do own the Patriarch God, for Josephus well perceived the consistency between the respect paid to Abraham’s God, and their being Idolaters who paid it. He also makes the priest of Pharaoh and Abi-melec himself consider the various evils sent, as punishment sent from God.”

Respecting the popular argument of the innate idea of God having been for ages esteemed the fundamental proof of his Being and Attributes, Warburton says, “ Now, admitting this origin *à priori* to be wrong, and setting up an *à posteriori* origin, the political or

philosophical origin of religion overthrowing that popular argument, it was too hastily concluded that the Truth of religion in general was also overthrown; for prejudice (want of reflection) had established this consequence, *if no innate* idea of God, no God at all. But though the granting of this infidel pretence does not affect the truth of natural religion, yet it doth by accident, and by accident only, affect the truth of Revelation." We shall refer at a later period to these important words of Warburton, as well as to those which follow, for to quote them at present would be to entangle our argument. We own candidly, however, that the force of the words of Warburton which relate to the positive value that would still accrue to religion, even admitting it to be proved that the notion of a God was nothing more than a mere rational conclusion of man, never struck us so strongly, if, indeed, we understood them at all, before we heard M. Auguste Comte expatiate fully on the new religion, which, according to that thinker, is destined by the natural course of things to take the place of Christianity. The words of Warburton then came to our mind, and we would advise those Christians who believe it possible that many generations can pass without any definite conclusion being taken respecting the origin of the notion of a God, and without Christianity being affected thereby either in one sense or the other, we would advise them to meditate on the difference that must exist between the present mild sway of Christianity and the pressure that must necessarily ensue if ever the dogma of Rationalism were raised above that of Revelation. We esteem it self-evident that those who conceive Christianity to admit of the Almighty as originating in human judgment or *à posteriori*, would join instantly the new religion, provided their temporal interests

permitted. But be that as it may, one thing is certain, that nothing is now more common than to hear it maintained by men of real talent in their various scientific callings that the notion of revelation is altogether preposterous, grounding their belief of the existence of God on the arguments produced by Mr. Hume in proof of their opinion of the rational or *à posteriori* origin of the notion of God. In short, they maintain that all religion began naturally with fetishism, and rose gradually to the point at which it now stands. We are ourselves inclined to believe that the hopes entertained by M. Auguste Comte and his followers are far more likely to obtain success than those to which we give utterance. Both our words and hopes are probably doomed to run idle, for as yet we have not met with a single person, even among very religious-minded individuals, who did not believe either that the notion of a God was innate or else acquired *à posteriori*, that is, by reflecting on the course of nature. Such being the real matter of fact, it may perhaps be interesting to inquire whether it be really worth while canvassing the subject, since many millions of good Christians indiscriminately admit either the one doctrine or the other. Bossuet admits that the notion of a God is stamped in the mind of every man. This constitutes, indeed, a doctrine of the Cartesians, excepting Malebranche. The *à posteriori* or rational view which derives the notion of God from the well known phenomena of Cause and Effect, of design and purpose, is not limited now as in Warburton's time to the mere infidel school. Some conceive Christianity to be fortified thereby, not reflecting that the secondary revelation or that of Christ is, in fact, based upon the first. Here, then, are sound Christians with whom the manner in which men came to know of a God bears a very

secondary part. Their faith, or trust in God and in Christ, makes up, indeed, for the want of knowledge respecting the biological facts which prove that both cannot be true, and which prove, indeed, as we believe, that both (the *à priori* and *à posteriori*) are false. The thing, therefore, with these religious minds is quite indifferent; but it may cease to be an indifferent matter, for should their faith slacken—should they attempt to fathom the waters on which they float, they would not only find no bottom, but they would consider the want thereof as an error of religion, whilst it was merely a fallacy of judgment. It was a kind of pious fraud, the final issue of which must always prove detrimental to the cause it was supposed to support. But whilst in their supineness, these blind men imagine that the error is of no import, because their own faith is not disturbed by the notion that their opinion with regard to the manner in which Man really came to know of God may not be true, the enemy is quietly busied in undermining this unguarded post, which, once in their hands, shall deliver up to them, not the outskirts of the fortress, but the citadel itself. The attack is no longer directed at the branches, but at the root. It is the heart of religion that has been left unguarded, and even now, when the pressure is so great, how few will perceive the full extent of the danger.

The term by which the Almighty is designated in the Old Testament finishes with a letter indicating the plural, an M. This word Elohim constitutes a matter of much perplexity among the Jewish rabbins themselves, for the term was never understood in that sense. But Bossuet, followed by a host of divines, considers the word to be of the plural number, and to signify the Trinity. The consequence naturally inferred has been that even the Jews were not, as it was supposed,

monotheists. And again, the Christian revelation caused many Fathers of the Church so far to forget the peculiar nature of the primary revelation, as to maintain and propagate the opinion that all the terms by which ancient nations named their Gods were the names of so many devils. Now, we believe that at the bottom of all these names it will be very easy to point out the name of the Almighty, strangely perverted, it is too true, but yet not the name of the devil.

All these difficulties, however, are of very small account when compared with those entailed by the general misuse of the term *Revelation*. Both Jews and Christians have acted here much in the same manner as the Hindoos and the ancient Egyptians, who deemed almost every science, the origin of which was lost in tradition, to be a *revelation*. Thus Writing with those people was *revealed*. But what was far more ridiculous was that medicine or Physic was also esteemed by the Egyptians and Hindoos to be revealed, and therefore *sacred*, to the extent of a prohibition of all change or alteration in the manner of proceeding. Arts and sciences are said to have been revealed, and that opinion is asserted at the present day by men of high authority, who appear to act upon the principle that stimulated Bossuet, that of contributing thereby to fortify religion. Now the result has been, we believe, that Man has lost sight of the great fact of which Man was apprised by means of that dispensation, which stamped it with an indelible and peculiar mark. The existence of the Almighty is here not considered merely in the light of a special Revelation, but as constituting *the only primary revelation*. The term once confined to that dispensation, and the meaning fully understood, which is that of Supreme Power, and Wis-

dom and Goodness, Faith or Trust in those attributes becomes the covenant between God and Man. The great value and importance of the dispensation are not merely enhanced by its being sole and single, but it is the only primary revelation which appears to admit of rational proof. It is in short *the* Revelation, whilst all other communications constitute *a* revelation which may or may not be, but which cannot be canvassed or indeed admitted as possible in any degree unless *the* Revelation to Man of a God be averred. We prefer using the word Man to that of Mankind, for independent of Holy Writ there exists much probability that the human race sprung from one common stock. But then the actual distinction which exists between the different varieties of men termed *races* is not the less of a positive nature in the eye of Science, although the visionary religionist may fancy that he can at once abrogate and nullify all distinction by appealing to a state of things which he himself admits to have existed many thousand years ago and to have been modified most deeply by the surrounding medium.

The Revelation is then here described as that eventful act by which the Existence of God was communicated to Man, to whom he was made known as the Almighty, His Attributes being Supreme Power, Supreme Wisdom, and Supreme Goodness. Eternity, Infinity, Perfection, as well as all Being and Existence, are included in the word Almighty. We trust that we shall prove this proposition, but we must for the present proceed to clear this eventful act from all those communications which under the same name are subject to more or less of doubt, but which, we repeat it, all demand as a necessary basis the final *con-statement* of God's having been made known to Man as the Al-

mighty by an Act, not only proved to be above human Reason, *but perfectly capable of being distinguished from all those mental faculties*, the scientific knowledge of Man, to which the term Revelation has also been given. This separation is the more requisite, as it is only before a communication of such a peculiar nature as to allow of positive tests that human *Reason* can bend. It is not that the words of our fellow-creatures acquire stronger authority by Revelation. Indeed, far from that, God revealed as the Almighty is alone a matter of Faith or Trust. It is because that event stands alone that reason finds soundings on which her faith can anchor, for that ground is Revelation, and the Almighty, as revealed, is an assurance for Reason of the possibility of things utterly inconceivable, provided they contain existence and relation of some kind ; for relative existence constituting the basis of all rational belief, that belief can never be abandoned. It is, as we have said, the only test the mind possesses in order to consider the existence of the Almighty as possible. Now it is, we believe, perfectly self-evident that the communication which asserts the existence of the Almighty does not at all contradict the basis of human knowledge, that of relative existence.

Revelation, once cleared from all adventitious additions, then stands forth as the most important and portentous event in the history of the human race. The Revelation of the existence of God then only acquires its full value, for it then becomes the sole measure of our Faith in Him who revealed Himself to Man as the Almighty. Rational Faith then becomes not a trust in human knowledge, but one in Almighty Power and Wisdom, and Goodness : it becomes Divine Faith. It is thus that *the* Revelation constitutes in itself an

event of far greater import than any revelation of whatsoever kind, or in number however great: for this is the Revelation *of* God; all others can only be *from* God at the utmost.

Many persons appear to think that it is rendering the matter far more intelligible to term Revelation every conclusion of judgment. It is perhaps in the same sense that all arts and sciences have been esteemed revelations. And this the more so as their origin is generally lost in the clouds of traditional obscurity. Now we maintain that there exists between the relation of God and that of arts and sciences, this most essential distinction, viz., that the latter, almost always beginning in an obscure manner, have then nothing of the nature of a thing revealed and that they are always susceptible of improvement *ad infinitum*, which is not the case with the knowledge of God. This latter revelation indeed appears continually to be on the point of disappearing, and far from extending and covering more and more ground of itself, even the Christian revelation has not rendered it general, nor has it bestowed upon the nature of God's existence any additional light. The Revelation, therefore, remains at the same point as at the beginning; it asserts the existence of the Almighty, and it is still to Trust or Faith in God that Man must have recourse as before, or, if any difference exists, it consists in the certitude, which every century sees increasing, that human knowledge cannot in any manner comprehend the Almighty. Modern Philosophy, it is true, has attempted, as we have shown, to take a most broad and general view of the History of Man and considers it as a constantly increasing and gradually developed Revelation of God, which every century changes in form, whilst the foundation remains the same. These views of Fichte, of Schelling, and



more especially of Hegel, are right as respects Man, but History itself proves them to be wrong in regard to God. It is from the very first that the Supreme Being revealed himself as the Almighty, and succeeding ages, whilst they add to the knowledge and experience of Man, they, far from revealing more of God, merely add conviction, acquired from the first by that peculiar communication, that as He revealed Himself,—the Lord is the Almighty. This view of German Philosophy is very generally admitted by Protestant and Romanist divines, and has become with some a kind of axiom.

Our object then consists in attempting to elucidate and set forth in its true light this eventful communication, by which God, being revealed as the Almighty, His absolute perfections become at once an object of Faith, not because human knowledge, adding science to science and centuries to centuries, can ever see more clearly in the Nature of God, but because, made known as the Almighty, it is in Almighty Power that Man reposes Trust. The attributes revealed in the Almighty become the measure of Faith. Is then divine Faith or trust in the Almighty to be considered as contradictory to human reason? Is it an assertion that “black is white and white is black?” Is human reason thereby degraded to the level of the intellect of every Jewish rabbin or enthusiastic visionary? No. The Revelation of the existence of the Almighty far from lowering human Intelligence, imparts strength to it, and cheers the drooping Mind. Man is thereby told to have Faith in God alone, *for he is Almighty*. But full scope is allowed to Reason, and when worn out and jaded with her wildest career, she finds no issue, the revealed knowledge of the Supreme Being, made known as the Almighty, causes Man to believe in a

possible explanation where he sees no traces of it. God being no creation of the conception of Man, does not partake of his finite nature. This first certitude is nothing metaphysical. The faith Man thus places in Absolute Power, in Supreme Wisdom, and Goodness, proceeds from the fact of its having been communicated. But as the more sober dictates of human judgment often cancel conclusions hastily adopted, and then Reason may be said to be arraigned against Reason, so the very Revelation of the Almighty bespeaks a state of things in which the conclusions of Reason or Science cannot obtain. And why so? Because God was revealed as the Almighty. Therefore faith in God convinces us that our finite views cannot be the same as the views of Him whom we only know as the Infinite. The color of objects, or indeed, diving at once to the bottom,—all human notions either of coexistence or of succession, can only be the conceptions naturally impressed on the mind by experience and reflection; our only motive for giving them up is that in other given conditions they could not be the same. And, as we have seen, all necessary qualities being conditional on the existence of the objects, we might suppose some unknown cause as having produced them, but that would not account for divine faith, which trusts alone in that which was revealed, i. e., in the Almighty. But these necessary qualities, as well as those termed contingent (though in fact all are conditional for Man) are the views that experience and reflection force the mind to take of things. Were the experience different, the views would also differ. Now experience teaching us daily the fallacy of our scientific conceptions, we are justified in hesitating to apply to conditions that evidently must be very different from those we know of, the results of the experience of science. No man of

science can tell whether the sun that evidently causes the peculiar heat of the atmosphere is itself incandescent. No man knows whether Light has any real existence, as air and water, which are composite substances. Therefore as respects human science alone, or rational faith, we have seen that the individual required the support of his fellow-men in order to ground a rational judgment. That conclusion once taken may be considered as subject to error, but it cannot be opposed by Man on the grounds of being opposed to the attributes of God.

Inspirations, Prophecies and Miracles are only possible because God is Almighty. Divine Faith lies at the bottom. The Scriptures teem with such, and they constitute revelations *from* God. Now we possess no criteria of their value, as we do of that of the Revelation *of* God. Revelations from God are said to exist by millions. The Romanists believe themselves all over the world to be blessed by daily revelations of the kind, amounting in number to many thousands in a day. With them statues weep and smile, and blood flows from stones, and the coagulated blood of Saints again liquefies. If the term of Revelation is a term appropriate to such events, it is evident that, judging from what we know, our faith in many revelations of the same nature mentioned in Scripture would be doubtful. And as in a matter of divine Faith grounded on Revelation, the first and most important step was to point out that kind of revelation which embraced all, we have attempted to adduce good reasons why the term should be limited to *the* communication by which the existence of God was made known to Man. Were this admitted, it could not be said of the Holy Scriptures as the German peasantry answered Luther, who invited them to appease all doubt by the lecture of the

Bible: "Bible, Babel!" Now admitting the term Revelation to be applied solely to the knowledge communicated to Man of the Almighty, it would stand forth in bold relief, and would serve to dispel all doubts by inviting to Faith in the Almighty, and it would be not Bible, Babel! but Babel, Bible! the Bible being the only book in which that great event is produced in connection with the actual state of religion. Evidently, the real value of the Bible consists in its containing the Revelation, and yet every one admits that the Bible is not the Revelation. Now would not all error be obviated; would not a clear criterion of the full value of that Holy Book exist, if *the* Revelation of the Almighty being made the mark, we were to look for that mark amongst so many revelations, admitted by some, denied by others? Undoubtedly, *the* Revelation of God is the basis of all; it is that which stamps upon them a sacred characteristic nature. But this by no means precludes the investigation of human judgment which, full of Trust in the Almighty, is not the less convinced of the liability of Man to err. A fixed criterion of Faith as respects the part belonging to God in the Bible, is a desideratum still more necessary for the Christian who depends upon his individual exertion than for those who, like the Romanist, refer all to the priest. Assuredly, such a "consummation" may "devotedly" be wished for. The conflicts between Reason and divine Faith, or between Faith rational and Faith divine, are then reconciled by the rational prostration of Reason or rational faith. But why shall Reason lay prostrate before that which she cannot conceive? Because, before the bar of Reason, rational evidence can be adduced that the Supreme Being, before whose perfections Reason bows, was revealed as the *Almighty*. Here then are two motives. The

mode of communication and the meaning,—the deep portentous sense of the communication. Now should the distinction we solicit of limiting the term *Revelation* to that special communication alone, not be admitted, on the ground that the term had become a kind of common-place and had been given to every impulsive feeling that survenes in the mind of man, still the second motive or the sense, the meaning of the attributes involved in the name revealed, constitutes an evidence the nature of which cannot be lost sight of. The revelation is that *of the Almighty*. This then we repeat to satiety, for we must be understood, this forms the rational motive for believing that the conclusions of Reason may not obtain in matters of which Almighty Wisdom alone can judge. On such grounds then, the prostration of Reason takes place before the Almighty, because His existence is a knowledge that constitutes no part of human knowledge, or if the unwise attempts of Mythology and Theology (all human conceptions of God's supreme attributes) have lowered the value of that deep word Revelation, by causing it to be considered as the most common occurrence possible, if that motive is thus rendered unavailable, let then the prostration of Reason be before the *Almighty* thus made known. On these grounds Reason may admit of Existence and Relation, or of relative existence totally inconceivable, the only limit which reason puts thereto being, that *relative existence* is not denied.

Should all this be likened to teaching the A, B, C to those who know many languages, we admit the objection provided it be also admitted that *the Revelation of God as the Almighty* constitutes the A, B, C of the Bible, and is the alphabet which, if unknown, at once transforms the Book of Books into a heap of puerilities. Without faith in the Almighty has the Creation any

meaning? Without faith in Almighty Power is there any sense in the six periods attributed to the formation of our globe? Does divine Faith bear reference to God, or to the number of years Man has dwelt on earth? Whence proceeds the perpetual struggle between Theology and Science, which is now leading us headlong either into the pit of atheism, or into that of base superstition? Do we then mean to say, it may be asked, that men do not know how to read the Bible, or that Faith is wanting? No, Faith in God abounds, but it is misplaced. Men know how to read the Bible when, esteeming that it contains tidings of our Maker, they proceed to read it with all due gravity and reverence. But a sad confusion too often prevails, and we accuse the teachers of being the cause of that confusion, which has been said to be worse than error. The Bible, and nothing but the Bible! is a sound of freedom and they have made it a sound of thralldom, or indeed a sound of woe; for, conveying to things purely literary, scientific, and entirely of the domain of Reason, the faith that is due to the Almighty only, and persevering in that fallacy, they have caused many to exclaim,—why then did our forefathers unfurl the standard of free inquiry? Why is divine Faith thus continually made a stumbling-block instead of a help? It is thus that despair has been created, and infidelity has been made to teem in the land,—why then not leave Science alone? Why trust to metaphysical reasonings? Why not rather trust in the Almighty because as such He was revealed? The Bible, and nothing but the Bible! means Faith in God alone, and divine Faith or trust in the Almighty is like the cheering Hurra, or that great name to the sound of which our forefathers marched. Free Inquiry left to itself already perceives the natural difficulties with which human reason is surrounded. The progress of

reason or of human knowledge is already hemmed in on all sides, and her march requires to be aided, not impeded. Metaphysical reasoning may safely be left to its own fate, and does not require in order to be overthrown that recourse should be had to the apparent contradictions which may appear therein with the attributes of God. Nor does there accrue any increase in the Faith of Man in the Almighty, when Theology attempts to throw a veil over those positive and physical facts which tell of the misery of mankind, and of the world of woe entailed upon humanity. How few of the Clergy know how to wipe the tear which obscures the sight of that bright star, divine Faith. The general practice is to increase the gloom by expatiating on the wrath of God, and on the iniquities of men, instead of pouring forth Christian consolation by dwelling on the value of trust in the Almighty.

And if leaving on one side the insoluble problems of metaphysical reasonings, of which some account has been given in the first part of this work, we pass to the stern positive mysteries which appear on all sides, when human reason comes to reflect on the doctrine of the Divine government of the universe, and especially on that most mournful and inscrutable mystery the "Origin of Evil," or again, on the too frequent triumphs of vice over virtue, we conceive the issue to be the same. How in such circumstances the believer in the origin of the notion of God, as the result of human conception either *à priori* or *à posteriori*, can *justify* his faith, we know not; but we are certain that Divine Faith or trust in the Almighty, as the result of a peculiar communication, is a firm basis, and is susceptible of rational proof. And it is to the exposition of the motives of this conviction that we now proceed, remarking by the way that it must be clearly understood that

we merely aim at setting forth in their proper light the evidences of *the Revelation* of the Existence of the Almighty. All we attempt to prove is that He was revealed, and was revealed as the Almighty. All that we deduce therefrom is that Divine Faith is Trust in the Almighty, whose supreme Attributes outweigh all contradiction, and *justify* that Faith. Nor is it only in the matters contained in the Old Testament that Divine Faith is the key which opens every hidden place; it is also the positive condition of belief in Christ, or of Christian Faith. Our Lord Jesus places Himself before the bar of Divine Faith when he tells "that none can come to the Son but through the Father." Christianity, as a divine dispensation, as the Unity of God with Christ, and even the essence of the Christian mystery as respects Man and his regeneration, are all matters of which Divine Faith constitutes the basis. That this basis is deeply undermined in the actual state of Science we do not deny; it is indeed perhaps more deeply undermined in public opinion, which seems now so ready to scout at the notion of a God revealed. But let the sterling worth of *the Revelation* be again acknowledged, let it be clearly shown that Religion and Science go hand in hand, the former as a guide when light is wanting, let Faith in the Almighty be the only ground on which Religion stands, and Superstition may be boldly assailed without a fear that in the struggle Science shall inflict on Religion a mortal blow.

The position assumed by Orthodoxy was declared untenable above a century ago by one of the most able theologians of the Anglican Church. Warburton, we have seen, concentrates his attention on the Mosaic dispensation. That revelation of God he conceives as the source of *Duty* or of obedience to the Will of a



Superior, whilst much latitude seems left for what preceded. Warburton maintains that the human means which preserved from Idolatry this small portion of Mankind, was the severity of the civil laws against Idolatry, and that such an institution was necessary to support a separation. "But *penal laws*," he says, "enforced by the magistrate *in matters of opinion*, being manifestly unjust, some way was therefore to be contrived in this case to render such laws equitable, for we are not to suppose that God would ordain any that should violate the rules of natural Justice. How then? By means of a Theocracy. For such laws are only equitable in a Theocracy, therefore was a Theocracy necessary."

Warburton has attempted to admit of Intolerance by linking Theocracy with civil government in the Mosaic dispensation, and the Church as allied to the State in the Christian Revelation carried out, or Christianity. This he conceives as a mean of rendering the enforcement by penal laws in matters of opinion by the civil magistrate a thing no longer unjust. But as he admits of the Nature and Ways of God to constitute those matters of opinion, the issue has ever proved that the ground thus taken up is impracticable; that it is the assuming of an impossibility, and is indeed a contradiction in terms. For Revelation once admitted places the object revealed above all human Reason, although human expressions serve as intermediaries, which therefore necessarily represent inadequately and merely vicariously the revealed Thing for which they stand. As long as the aim of what is termed religious society is to know, otherwise than by Faith or Trust, Him so inadequately represented by finite attributes, so long will the attempt to compel individuals to conceive the inconceivable prove idle. In vain does War-

burton exert all his ingenuity in order to conciliate the difficulty. Neither Theocracy nor the Church can prove of practical value without human action, without civil or civic means, without the common notices of Reason. It is indeed an attempt at conceiving the Supreme Being without His attributes, because these attributes are admitted to be mere inadequate vicarious representatives.

Now let Revelation be placed and left in its superior sphere ; let the Word alone be taken as the representative of God, and the ground on which Religion and religious society shall be placed will be altogether different: it will become a practical one. This is no mere religion of names, but the religion of the Father Almighty, whose Name expressed in attributes points out the way. To admit of Revelation, and also of Theology as adequate are perfect contradictions. The superior claims of Theocracy and the Church with respect to Man and the State have as yet proved themselves altogether worthless, and the efforts of a Warburton, as well as those of Rome, Geneva, Ausbourg, and Oxford, unavailable. But change their ground, let Theocracy or the Church, or the religious society, instead of being an imaginary thing, let it aim at obeying the Word, instead of ringing changes thereon like the Heathen, and then *Duty* would enlighten *Utility*, and Religion become positive.

The religious society with us is not a mystic sect: it is composed of men who believing in a God revealed as the Almighty, and whose Word or Name existed from the beginning of the human race, trust in him, and obey the Word in rational endeavors, *which are religious because they are voluntary*, and which aim at Acts of Intelligence and Goodness. The Word is the Law. The *Duty* of Man commenced at the beginning

and not with Moses. It began then because God was then revealed; for we admit with Warburton that a something more than Utility is required to confirm a Duty. But we see that *Duty* was required from the first, in the very name of God, which constitutes an appeal to human Will, and cannot be deemed the denial of that Will. The Law embraces all Power, all Wisdom, and all Goodness, for the Word comprehends them all. The Law of God therefore comprehends also all the laws or conditions termed scientific, but these latter are made by Reason subservient to the Will of Man.

But as this view may be considered in the light of an attempt at placing all religions on an equal footing, and as involving a preference towards Utility to the prejudice of Duty, it is requisite to expose in Warburton's own words the distinction he establishes between them: but the view here adopted, far from making *Duty* dependent on Utility, *conceives them as one*.

Warburton having established his proposition that all mankind, especially the most wise and learned nations of Antiquity, have concurred in believing and teaching that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was necessary to the well-being of Society, continues thus in his 3d Book, Sect. vi.:

“The ridiculous use men have made of what they did not understand, may perhaps revive the atheistical objection that Religion is only a creature of politics, a state engine invented by the Legislators to draw the knots of civil society the closer, and the rather as we may be supposed to have added much strength to it by showing in this work most fully the extent of that utility, and the legislator's large sphere of agency in applying it.

“The case stood thus: Moses' divine Assistance

was to be proved from his being able to leave out of his religion the doctrine of a future state. This necessitated to show that that doctrine was naturally of the utmost importance to society. But of all the arguments by which it may be proved, the most general satisfactory, if not the strongest, is the conduct of lawgivers with regard thereto. Hence the long detail of circumstances that have been precedingly adduced. And the proving of the Truth of religion in general from its infinite service to human society, is to be considered but as the introduction to the truth of the Mosaic.

“The general utility of Religion once firmly established, we desire no more to establish its truth, for truth and general utility necessarily coincide, i. e., Truth is productive of Utility, and Utility is indicative of Truth. Whenever we find universal utility, we may certainly know it for the product of Truth which it indicates ; and the practice of all legislators showing that this utility results from religion, the consequence is that religion, or the idea of the relation between the creature and the Creator, is true.

“Now, as this unanimous concurrence of lawgivers to support religion hath furnished matter for atheistical and infidel pretence, it must be examined to the bottom.

“Some deny the truth of Religion because it was of no utility, others because too much, but the greater number oppose to its truth the political invention of religion. These critics say that men invented civil laws to be a curb to Evil, from whence justice presided over the human race, Force became a slave to Right, and punishment irremissibly pursued the transgressor. That there was once a time when man lived like a savage without government or laws, the minister and executioner of violence, when there was neither re-

ward annexed to virtue, nor punishment attendant upon vice. When now the laws had restrained an open violation of Right, men set upon contriving some secret mean to injure others. And then it was that some cunning politician, well versed in the knowledge of mankind, counter-plotted this design by the invention of a principle that would hold wicked men in awe, even when about to say or think, or act ill in private. And this was by the bringing in the belief of a God, whom he taught to be immortal, of infinite knowledge, and a nature superlatively excellent. This God, he told them, could hear and see every thing said and done by mortals, and no wickedness could be concealed from him, of whose nature knowledge was the very essence. And to add Terror to this Reverence, the Gods, he said, inhabited above, where swift coruscations of unkindled meteors, accompanied with horrid bursts of thunder, run through the starry vaults of Heaven, the handy work of that wise old architect, Time.

“The account here given of Religion is, that it was a state invention, i. e., that the idea of the relation between the Creator and the creature was formed and contrived by politicians to keep men in awe. From whence the infidel concludes it to be visionary and groundless. But this is: 1, impertinent; 2, false.

“Were it true, as it certainly is not, that Religion was invented by Statesmen, it would not therefore follow that religion was false: a consequence that has, I don't know how, been wrongly taken for granted on all hands. It must be proved by one or other of these mediums. 1. Either because Religion was not framed out as a Truth but by the use of Reason. 2. Because the inventors did not believe it.

“1. The genius of the national religions of the sages of Antiquity taught them to conclude that Utility, and

not Truth, was the end of Religion. This genius was entirely subservient to the State, and they held that every one should adhere to the religion of his country. These sages not rightly distinguishing between particular and general utility, between that which arises from the *illegitimate* administration of civil policy, and the *legitimate*, they universally embraced this other false doctrine, that Utility and Truth do not coincide, as also the consequence or principle, that *it was lawful and expedient to deceive for the public good.*

“Now as to Religion not being found out as a Truth by the use of Reason, we are to consider that the finding out a truth by Reason necessarily implies the exercise of that faculty in proportion to the importance and difficulty of the truth sought for. So that when men do not use their reason, truths of the greatest certitude and use will remain unknown. Nor are we used to reckon it any objection to many obvious and common truths in which religion is not concerned, that divers savage nations in Africa and America remain yet ignorant of them. That superstition was of human origin both parties seem to be agreed, though not all was the invention of statesmen, for one species of Idolatry was in use before the institution of civil society. And if I prove that religion in general was not a political invention, I enervate all the force of the atheists’ argument against Revelation, taken from the invention of Religion.

“Now, the objection against Religion is founded on this pretended fact, that the lawgiver taught the people religion from the most early times. And the infidel, irreligious system is, that man from his first appearance in this world, even to those early times of his coming under the hands of the civil magistrate, differed little from brutes in the use of his rational facul-

ties, and that the improvement of them was gradual and slow, for which the records of Antiquity are appealed to concerning the late invention of the arts of life. Thus, according to their own account, Religion was taught mankind when the generality had not begun to cultivate their natural faculties, and what is very remarkable, *taught by those few that had.*

“Christianity, it is true, gives a different relation to these first men, and also a very different account of the *Origin of Religion.* And let men prevaricate as they will, they must take both or neither. For what only could make the first men so enlightened, as Scripture represents them, was Revelation; and that allowed, all dispute concerning the origin of religion being invented, or found out either by *Reason* or from *Utility*, is at an end. And if it should be said, that supposing religion true, it is of such importance to mankind, that we may well believe God would not suffer us to remain in ignorance. This we allow, but then we are not to prescribe to the Almighty His way of doing it. *It is sufficient to justify His Providence that it is done; whether it be by Revelation, or by the exercise of Reason, or by the accidental imposition of it for oblique ends by the civil magistrate.* And why it might not possibly happen to this truth, as it hath done to many others of great importance, to be first hit upon by chance and mistaken for a mere Utility, and afterwards seen and demonstrated, I would beg leave to demand of these mighty men of Reason.

“2. As to Religion’s being invented only for its Utility. This erroneous argument proceeds from a supposed inconsistency between utility and truth, because such inconsistency existing between private partial utility and truth, the same was supposed to exist between general utility and certain truths. Now, gene-

ral utility and all truth necessarily coincide, truth being but that relation of things whose observance is attended with universal benefit. We may, therefore, as certainly conclude that *general utility* is always founded on truth, as that Truth is always productive of general utility. The concession, then, of the atheist being taken for granted that *religion is productive of public good*, and the very contrary to his inference must follow, viz., that religion is true.

“ And should it be urged that experience makes against this reasoning, for that it was not *religion*, but *superstition*, that for the most part procured this public Utility—and superstition both sides agree to be erroneous—we answer, that superstition was far from procuring any good in the ancient world, since the Good which religion procured us was alloyed with evil in exact proportion to the quantity of superstition found therein. And the less of superstition there was in any national religion the happier, and *ceteris partibus*, we always find that the more there was of it the unhappier was that people. All the advantages which result from the worship of a superior Being are the consequences only of the true principles of Religion, whilst the mischiefs that result from thence, are the consequences only of the false or of superstition, taking the latter word in two senses, either as a thing adventitious, that is apt fatally to mix itself with religion; or as a corrupt species of religion. In the first sense it is of no use, but of infinite mischief and worse than atheism itself. In the second sense of a corrupt religion it is of great service to society by teaching a Providence on which man depends, thus imposing a curb to unruly passions, but likewise does mischief, for by giving wrong notions of the moral attributes of God, it hinders the progress of virtue, or sets up a false



species of it. However in the sense of a corrupt religion it is infinitely preferable to Atheism, although some, with Bayle, maintain that Atheism is *less* hurtful to society than superstition.

“Hence it appears that if religion were a cheat the legislators themselves were among the first that fell into it. On the whole then we see that of all these mediums whereby it is inferred that religion is false because invented by statesmen, the third (relating to the inventors not believing the principle of religion which they taught) proves nothing; whilst the first, which admits of invention, is a high presumption, and the second, or usefulness, is a demonstration of its Truth.

“We have said, that it was we know not how taken for granted on all hands that the invention of *religion by politicians inferred its falsehood*. But reflection persuades me that the too great facility in this concession arose from hence. The popular argument of the innate idea of God, had been for ages esteemed the fundamental proof of His being and attributes. Now the political origin of religion overthrowing that argument, it was too hastily concluded that it overthrew the Truth of *Religion in general*, for prejudice had established the consequence: if no innate ideas of God, no God at all.

“This infidel pretence, though it doth not affect the truth of natural religion (*sua mole stat*), yet it doth by accident and by accident only affect the truth of Revelation, because Holy Scripture has given us a different account of the origin of Divine Worship. It is therefore false and visionary. 1. We shall prove it false by overturning the grounds on which it is built. 2- And show it to be visionary by producing plain matter of fact to the contrary.

“1. If the legislator established Religion it must have been from a conviction of its utility; and how could he gain that conviction but from his having observed the effects of that influence on the actions of men? The Legislator therefore found it, and did not invent it. Atheists contend that natural justice as well as religion was an invention of politicians. Hobbes maintains that Just and Unjust arose from the civil magistrate; *but then he never* supposed that man, before society had not any idea of these things; all he would contend for was that their idea was a false one.

“2. The other and peculiar ground our adversaries go upon is that *the first and original idolatry was the worship of dead men*, and these being chiefs, and lawgivers, and magistrates, shows religion to have been a political institution. This system, taken from Evhemerus, has a face of plausibility, but is a sophism, confounding the first idolatry and the first religious worship as one and the same thing, whilst it is in the *highest degree probable* that the worship of the First Cause of all things was prior to any idol worship.

“Some say Fear first made Gods (*primis in orbe Deos fecit timor*) yet others (Toland) maintain that the first Gods were benefactors adored when dead. If Fear was the origin of religion, Religion undoubtedly existed before civil society. Seneca says Love; Hope and Fear being the great hinges on which all human thoughts and notions turn;—and evidently it was not one alone but both together that opened to early mortals (whose uncultivated Reason had not yet gained the knowledge or whose degenerate manners had now lost the tradition of the true God) the first idea of superior beings. The true and very natural account of the original of Idolatry is that natural phenomena, such as Thunder, Storm, and Lightning were

considered as effects of the anger of God, and that the celestial orbs were in proportion to their use and appearance regarded in the same light, and so it stood in Egypt and Greece in the first ages. A king for his beneficence was called the Sun, and a Queen for her beauty the Moon (the compliment is now in the East more civil than religious). Sol, or the Sun, who reigned first in Egypt was so called from that luminary (Diod. Sic.). And this helps us to understand an odd passage in the fragment of Sanchoniathon, where it is said that Cronus had seven sons by Rhea, the youngest of which was made a God of as soon as born, the meaning being that this youngest son was called after some luminary in the Heavens to which they paid divine honors, which honors by this means, came to be transferred to its namesake. And as this adulation advanced into an established worship they turned the compliment the other way, and now the planet was called after the Hero, in order to better accustom the people to this new adoration. Diodorus having told us that the Sun and Moon were the first Gods of Egypt, adds 'the first of which they call Osiris, and the other Isis.' In Eusebius (Præpar. Evang. 1, c. 9) this is explained, 'it is remarkable that they (the idolaters) imposed on the elements, and on those parts of nature which they esteemed Gods, the names of their Kings. For the natural Gods which they acknowledged were only the Sun, Moon, Planets, Elements and the like, they being for Gods of both classes, the mortal, and the immortal. By this *unheeded* but very natural way of superinducing the one idolatry upon the other, the two species were entirely confounded. How long they continued so, and what obscurity the endeavoring to clear up matters by supposing one idolatry to be only *symbolical* of the other, hath thrown upon this part of Antiquity, may

be more fully seen in Vossius's very learned collection of the Gentile Theology, and this *Hint*, if pursued sufficiently, would open to us a clearer and more certain view of Things."

Warburton admits of the value attached to Names as a positive fact ; as also of the custom of attempting to bestow on given objects or conceptions the same names as indicative of the highest quality. He admits therefore that which we contend for, viz., that certain names were supposed to embody all the qualities they expressed, and constituted the Names of the Heathen Gods as well symbolical as mythic. This name was the name of God, and the fact taken in a traditional sense proves the monotheistic belief of the primary tribes of men. Warburton in recording judgment on the views of Toland respecting "Idolatry and the Reason of Heathenism," although he differs from that writer, calling his opinion "profound nonsense," admits however of the names of kings and heroes being given to the celestial bodies ; now the names of kings and heroes were merely the Names of God, which superstition or self-esteem applied to Chiefs and from them to the tribes or to the nations formed by gatherings thereof. Toland advances that the first idolatry did not proceed, as is commonly supposed, from the beauty, or order, or influence of the Stars. But men observing Books to perish (and this, remarks Warburton, is said of a time *before books existed*) by fire, worms, or rottenness, and iron, brass, and marble not less subject to violent hands, or the injuries of the weather, they imposed on the Stars as the only everlasting monuments, the proper names of their heroes or of something remarkable in their history.

Warburton insists particularly on the doctrine of Transmigration, which inclined the Egyptians to sup-

pose that the departed hero had taken up a new residence, as a chief cause of Idolatry in Egypt, and as the cause of their honoring the present hero with the name of the past. And this reason he says is that given by Tacitus of the great number of Herculeses in Egypt and elsewhere. But then that very name had been at one time, and with the more powerful tribes, the name of God. Warburton, who accounts in this manner for the name of Osiris or Sesostris having been borne by several individuals, against the opinion of Sir Isaac Newton, observes that the latter could not help owning so notorious a fact, and that it was indeed a custom to give one common name to several men. Bacchus (Magnus) was one of the names of Osiris; and therefore a divine name. Warburton explains the saying that Osiris had chosen once more to visit mankind in the son of Semele that died in infancy, and that the oracle advised to name Bacchus, one of the names of that God (Osiris), from an adherence to the customs of their forefathers.

Respecting certain names such as Osiris, Thoyt, and Hermes, on which we may appear in the subsequent pages to lay much stress, Warburton cites Clemens Alexandrinus (*Admon. ad Gentes*, p. 31) to prove his opinion that Sesostris sprung from Osiris, and therefore observes that it was likely that they should give him the name of his great forefather, but Warburton also remarks that they were not, it is true, as were the Thoths and Hermeses, distinguished by the first and second, and therefore posterity frequently confounded them. The learned Bishop does not let fall the opportunity of pointing out another famous instance of this general custom of giving great names to various succeeding personages in the very extensive use of the names of Thoth and Hermes in the most early time.

Our objections against the *à priori* and *à posteriori* systems respecting the source of the idea of a Supreme Being, are merely positive. 1. Reason or rational evidence pointing out that from the highest antiquity God was known as One and as the Almighty, we cannot see the source in Feticism when such symbols bear the name of God (Lar, Lartes, Larth, Lord). 2. Finding no innate idea of God in man, and 3, perceiving that all arts and sciences, although proceeding from the mind in a spontaneous manner, are quite distinct from the idea of a Supreme Being, inasmuch as such ideas acquire positive value and become practical and adapted to use, whilst the idea of the Almighty, instead of accommodating itself to the mind of man, rises the higher in proportion to the increase of human knowledge, for the mind of a Newton is far more lost in wonder when reflecting on the Supreme Being, than is the mind of the most ignorant individual, and yet the Faith of both is the same, God is the Almighty to a Newton as to a boor.

Warburton admitting the opinion of Evhemerus as presented by Whiston to be true, draws therefrom very different conclusions. The great secret of Heathen Idolaters appears, says Mr. Whiston (Folio Table, 2d leaf, 4th dis. 1721, Article, Deluge), to have been this, that all the Gods they popularly worshipped had been natural men. Allowing hero worship to have been the primary source, either as ancestors or chiefs or princes, and that the Greeks borrowed their Gods from the Egyptians, Warburton owns that Sir Isaac Newton is right in saying that "the Phenicians upon their first coming into Greece gave the name of Jao-piter or Jupiter to every king." (Newton, Chr. of Ancient Kings, amended.) To this admission we shall refer later as proving another source than Egypt, and

that the Phenicians did not merely transmit the names of Egyptian heroes in the first ages, when under the name of Pelasgi they occupied the South-West of Europe. The conclusions of the learned Bishop on this knotty point are :

1. That the Greeks received nothing but the names with which they honored their ancient God (and thus Hermes was supplanted by Jao-piter).
2. That, as Herodotus says, this they only did after having consulted the oracle.
3. That hero worship, or the Religion of Names, was unknown to the worship of the natural divinities of the Pelasgians. (But we shall see that this does not hold with what is known respecting Hermes.)
4. That this Religion of Names was an Egyptian Superstition, and *characteristic*. (We say it was characteristic of the first idolatry where Symbols and Myths received the Name of God.)
5. That one cause of the ignorance which, according to Herodotus, the Greeks ever labored under concerning the Original, Nature, and Species of their Gods was that the Names which the Pelasgians had applied to their *natural Divinities*, the Greeks, their successors, took and transferred to their Hero-Gods.

“The Greeks,” continues Warburton, “not only borrowed the *names*, but likewise the *symbols* of the Egyptian Gods, and adapted them to their own; and that this was very natural is shown by the conduct of the Israelites in the desert. But it must be owned that they did soon after indeed adopt Stranger Gods. At first the occasion was rare, and the worship particular and confined. Thus the Athenians, relieved by the Egyptians with corn, in gratitude for that benefit made ISIS the patron goddess of their mysteries. To be explicit concerning these various revolutions in the genius of Paganism, the first Idolatry was planetary, and

the Gods in *common* ; then Hero Worship bringing in local tutelary deities made the Gods *peculiar* ; and when civilization made men understand the absurdity of *mortal Gods*, the Priests in order to hide the descent from Earth of such pretended they had ever been celestial. This brought in again the notion of their General Providence, caused Peculiarity to disappear, and ended in a universal Intercommunity. Full explanation would prove tedious, but one circumstance is most important: The learned Egyptians, as we have observed, were at length taught to hide the deformity of their Idolatry by pretending the whole had a reference to the only God, the various attributes of whom were marked by their various Brute Worship, and the same explanation was given for Hero Worship. Each of their Great Gods was made to signify the First Cause, and thus the several parts of Isis's history became relative to the Divine Nature. Now, Isis being possessed of all the attributes which happened to be severally divided amongst the Grecian goddesses, the Greeks began to think these were originally derived from her. This doctrine became general and established in the time of Apuleius, who makes Isis address herself to him in that well known discourse (see Melan. l. xi.), in which the names of the Mother of Gods, of Minerva, Venus, Proserpine, Ceres, Juno, Bellona, Hecate and Diana are said to be various appellations of Isis."

Space is wanting to give even summarily the motives adduced by Warburton for not adopting the system of the Abbé Pluche, who makes all the civil and religious customs of Antiquity spring from Agriculture, and that the very Gods and Goddesses themselves were a part of this all-bounteous Harvest, and only the letters of an ancient Alphabet, the mere figures which



composed the symbolic directions used by the Egyptian husbandmen, and signified a Plough, Tillage, or Ear of Corn, Erechtheus (Eric. Theos.); as Tarchon was said to have sprung from a furrow, and so did the Phenician Dagon, or Het-khan. Warburton considers the objections against Hero Worship of the Abbé Pluche as intended to obviate the natural comparison of that idolatry of Symbols with the many symbols of the Catholic Church.

We would remind the reader that even thus scanning lightly over this ample field before examining more closely the terms themselves or the names of the primary Deities, we have no other view than that of showing that under all is found concealed the fact, so important for our argument, of the monotheistic notion of the Deity.

As to the "Religion of Names," we do not conceive Religion as resulting from thence; but such names furnish sound evidence of the primary existence of Monotheism.

## MONOTHEISM.

As in the investigation of the important question of Monotheism much stress is laid upon the conformity of the terms used for expressing the Deity by ancient nations, it is requisite to remark, in order to obviate the natural distrust rightly entertained against etymological explanations, that, as we have said already, the only general rule adopted has been that of attending, not to what is named the radicals of the words, but to the similarity of the words in meaning and pronunciation as far as the latter can be traced. The rules adopted in that respect are those which have been fixed by authorities of high standing in those matters, but having already stated the precautions we have taken, and the simple method we have followed, in another part, it would be useless to insist on that point. The reader, must, however, bear also in mind, that esteeming Faith in the Almighty revealed as such to Man, to be the true basis of religion, we shall enter freely into the various questions at issue, since we do not admit Chronology to constitute a ground of faith. Should it be remarked that the question itself is one of Chronology, since denying that the notion of God arose gradually in the mind of men passing through Fetichism and Polytheism before the belief of one God was

attained, it is only by chronological references that the matter can be decided. We answer that if the question has become a matter of chronology and of traditional record respecting, not the dogmas of any kind, but the belief in One God, it is a ground on which we are obliged to tread, and not one of our own choice. Unfortunately for mankind, the ministers of Religion, considering matters of Science as matters of faith, maintain that Faith in the Almighty is involved in a man's belief in respect to the age of the world, as they did before respecting the motion of the earth. And modern philosophy, because certain beliefs appear instinctively and of themselves in the mind, and because rational faith is trust in the conclusion of our reason and therefore faith, modern philosophy has leaned too much towards the bias of giving out Faith as the issue of Science. Now, the confusion of ideas which must at last proceed from this irrational method of explaining the matter, will at last prove highly detrimental to the cause of religion. It is, we believe and we repeat, a kind of pious fraud, that, when given up, always weakens the party that had recourse thereto. The Mosaic account of the formation of the world 6,000 years ago may be very true, but it constitutes no more a matter of faith in God than did the revolutions of the globe. Faith in God reposes upon our conviction that He is the Almighty. Our endeavors tend to prove the fact of His having been thus revealed, but we by no means undertake that of proving, or fixing the age of our globe, or the precise time it has been inhabited by man.

It may be that we entertain a forlorn hope,—that of bettering matters which must take their course. Be that as it may, the question of Monotheism, being a different ground, requires a more general survey. The

discussion is no longer confined to the incoherency of Metaphysics, it is true, but the pit of Tradition is deep, and unfortunately religious men are apt, too apt, to take their fancies for facts, and may therefore be tempted to believe that their real strength is in tradition, and that incredulity on that ground will be readily overthrown. The wisest plan, we believe, is to remain under arms, and stationary, leaving the skirmishers (amongst whom we reckon ourselves) to try their fate. Besides, the great body of Christian teachers will, in so doing, prepare their minds for some final move. They must either join the enemy, i. e., Rome, that strange representative of the Almighty, that *infallible* fallacy; they must either place their Faith in the Pope or in God, and in adopting the Almighty, they must cast away Science and leave it to itself. Here we have only to answer for ourselves in tendering to our fellow-Christians "a reason for our faith." The position we take up is clearly traced. All our efforts are directed to one point. The fact of the Revelation of the Almighty is what we shall aim at proving. But although the method adopted includes physiological proof, we must not be supposed to imagine that in the mental endowments of man we claim, as some modern thinkers, the right of perceiving therein a Revelation of God. If the unity of the human species appears to us to possess proofs of greater value on physiological grounds than those of a plurality of races in the beginning, yet we do not consider that to constitute any proof in favor of our Faith in God, as revealed. Still less shall we attempt to sum up the laws of animated being according to the most approved experience, in order to furnish proof of a deviation from those laws. Very far from that, indeed: it is because we maintain the full value of the physiological proofs, that we maintain

that both the *à priori* and *à posteriori* are erroneous, and that another order of phenomena must be sought in order to account for a fact, of which we shall adduce what we consider to be positive proof. Therefore, it is not merely because human nature when questioned returns no answer respecting the innate belief of God: it is not merely because that belief bears signs which distinguish it from all other primary anticipations of the human intellect; but it is because there exists matter of fact which distinctly proves the thing to be so ever since the highest antiquity, embracing all tradition, traditional as well as legendary. In so doing, we avoid carefully all quotations or reference to Holy Writ, although, having advanced that we do not consider the Jewish accounts contained therein as matters involving Faith in the Almighty, we might have recourse thereunto as a fund of most highly interesting historical records. The sterling value of that sacred volume consisting, according to our view, in its containing the account of the Revelation of God to Man as the Almighty (ELOHIM, JEHOVAH), and the Mosaic inspiration can, we believe, be placed on most positive grounds, provided it be that that point alone constitutes matter of Faith or Trust. Our Faith is in the Lord, for He is the Almighty.

Thus, although we do not consider Tradition as mere prejudice, since, as Bishop Berkeley remarks with great sagacity, a prejudice may be worthy of all credence, for many, very many truths are admitted without inquiry, yet it is not with the traditional facts that we have to do so much as with the evident marks and traces contained therein of the belief or the unbelief in the various mythological forms of the name of the Almighty. We do not say, with M. M. Bonald and de Maistre, that the fact of Man's being endowed with

speech proves that something superior to man must exist. These are fancies of Theologists, which fall before the well-ascertained fact of human beings endowed with speech who are not on that account blessed with the knowledge of God's existence. To say that without language human reason would remain a cipher, is merely saying that human nature consists in possessing such and such conditions. Language, as well as the Hand, is a means. Intelligence, that deepest mystery, constitutes the cause of man's pre-eminence. When, therefore, we are told that speech proves the Revelation of God, and when we have proof that human beings exist endowed with speech who know not of God, it is evident that the fact is not explained by man being able to speak. Now, although we maintain that the knowledge of God was acquired in a peculiar manner, yet beyond terming that great event *the* Revelation of the Almighty, and beyond considering the attribute revealed, as the measure of divine Faith, it meaning Trust in the Almighty; beyond those points, we do not venture, for all the rest is more or less a matter of science (all knowledge proceeding by anticipation or a kind of inspiration, which may, or may not, prove true). At all events, we do not fall in so doing into the meshes of metaphysics, that considers God and metaphysical entities as beings of the same nature, and equally independent of human reason. We say, on the contrary, that the natural existence of metaphysical abstractions prove them to be quite different things from the notion of God, this latter not being natural to man at all.

Our inquiries and investigations in the dark cavern of Tradition do not go one step towards the proving or the disproving of the traditional accounts of Original Sin, of the pride of our forefathers, their sensual-

ity, their vain curiosity in desiring to know of futurity. The fact of Sin existing, and the Revelation once more repeated of God in Christ announcing regeneration, concur in testifying, but not in explaining, events which those traditions trace in characters obscured by time, perhaps veiled in allegory. Respecting Original Sin towards God evidently Man is no judge; he can only tell of Sin in this world, and in the various social relations of mankind. Evidently Sin exists. And surely no one can deny that the Jewish race expected a Messiah. The apparition of that Messiah, it is true, is still expected by that people, but their testimony, although negative, as regards the validity of Christ's mission, is, we esteem, of very great value as respects the fact. This fact, which possesses affirmative as well as negative evidences, all concurring in one point, that of the appearance of Jesus the Christ as One with God, is in its nature perfectly incomprehensible, and requires, in order not to be treated as a dream, some other connection than that of characters traced a thousand years back, and the testimony of men proverbially credulous. Divine Faith or Trust in the Almighty constitutes that connection. As a dispensation of God who revealed to Man His existence, announcing Himself to be the Almighty, it is there and only there that Man finds a ground to anchor in the wild storm of perplexity.

The Deluge is, on the contrary, a tradition evidently of the domain of Science, and Heaven knows what nonsense has been broached by Theology on that score, and how Religion has been betrayed by those whose ignorance appears to have been equal to the boldness of their dogmatical assertions. Here again we find Religion grounding her Faith in the Almighty on Science, and maintaining the truth of explanations which

date three thousand years back. But the commands of God? How were they revealed in this pristine communication which constitutes the Revelation? They were made known in the Attributes of the Almighty. Supreme Power expressed to man that nature was at his command, that he was the master, the prince, the king, the Lord of the Earth. All terms which bear the stamp of the Almighty!! Supreme Wisdom pointed out to knowledge, as the condition of human life, and all the relations which exist between things were given him to learn. Slowly, it is true, rose the temple of human Wisdom, for so dazzled appears Man to have been by this revealed notion of Almighty Wisdom, that every thing that occurred was supposed at first to occur at random, and not under those conditions in which experience shows them to occur, although faith in God answers sufficiently that the whole is a dependence of His Will. Supreme Goodness touched a chord which thrilled harshly to the divine communication. The oldest traditions are tales of blood. The hand of man was often raised against his fellow-man, and the divine attribute was unheeded by the throng. But Faith in God burnt in some bosoms with a livelier flame, and in others it burst forth in accents of reproach and blame towards their fellows who did not only not attend to the divine injunction, but gloried in acts of cruelty, of oppression and of vice. Of such a nature appears to have been the pristine, the primary religion of the earth, that which Newton calls the oldest of all religions, and describes as "a firm belief that One Supreme God made the world by his power, and continually governed it by his providence; a pious fear, love and adoration of Him; a due reverence for parents and aged persons; a fraternal affection for the whole human species, and a com-



passionate tenderness even for the brute creation." The commands of the Almighty thus made known in the Attributes revealed, which formed in the heart of men a corresponding soil more or less propitious according to the Will of that enigma of the Creation, Man; these commands appear to have constituted that primary worship of the Lord termed Mazdeism (which must not be confounded with the religion of Zoroaster), and of which a faint notion may be formed from the fragmentary remnants of prayer in which the Almighty is invoked in humble supplication to cause His Supreme Power and Goodness to triumph over Evil. We could then not only prove that *the* revelation was that of the Almighty, but we might also adduce good testimony in favor of the existence, in most ancient time, of a religion in which a system of devotion as pure as it was sublime, until polluted with symbols, really existed among men. In a matter of such obscurity, however, nothing that tends to cast any light must be neglected. This then would be the religion which preceded all tradition, and followed immediately that eventful fact,—the apparition of man on earth and *the* revelation of the Almighty,—which constitutes at the same time the starting-point and the basis of Divine Faith. Tradition relates, at this period, to two orders of things, the one relative to God, which we maintain to constitute a peculiar communication; the other to man, and is of the domain of Science, if Science can ever attain so high. The revelation of the Almighty is then something distinct from all inference, either intuitive orrational, and is peering from the very beginning of Man's appearance. But the other tradition, which relates to the being of the common parents of men, the designation or the probable position of the spot where Man first appeared, their

names, the first apparition of woman, the origin of languages,—all these traditions, pristine in themselves, but yet secondary as respects Revelation, are all matters of rational and not of Divine Faith, for they relate to Man. We shall not cease repeating that all our attempts have reference to the first, and that we do not entertain the vain hope of saying on the other, or rational tradition, any thing definite and clear.

It is to the East, that Greece and her sages referred whilst acknowledging their want of tradition, and it is in the East that the religion mentioned in the preceding lines appears to have existed. We say appears, because many, whilst they admit the fact, maintain that the religion was pure Pantheism, and that the Al or Almighty, was merely a term in use to signify the Earth, or our Globe. In short that it signified Nature personified, and that in the East as in Egypt, the universe or To Pan, was the centre of the ancient secret religion. This appears to have been the case in Egypt where Osri or Osiris and Isis were both comprehended in the term *To Har* that united the author of nature and his work. Here then there was probably a difference between the belief of the priest and that of the vulgar, the latter attending more to the symbol and the priest to what he deemed the spirit thereof; but in the pristine religion it does not appear that any mystery or secret doctrine existed, for Dualism had not then taken place, as it can be proved to have been later, and more especially in Egypt, where Osri represented the active power, and Isis the passive. But beyond this duality the Egyptians considered God and Nature as making one whole. The existence of this Unity as preceding the symbolic duality cannot be denied. It is the explanation that differs. The Supreme God, under the name *To Har*, according to the Hermaic

writings, included Mind or intellect with  $\Upsilon\lambda\epsilon$ , Matter. And as Berkeley very forcibly remarks, "Now, whether the mind be abstracted from the sensible world and considered by itself, as distinct from and presiding over the created system, or whether the whole universe, including mind together with the mundane body, is conceived to be God, and the creatures to be partial manifestations of the divine essence, there is no atheism in either case, whatever misconceptions there may be: so long as mind or intellect is understood to preside over, govern, and conduct the whole frame of things. Nor if any one, with Aristotle in his metaphysics, should deny that God knows any thing without himself, seeing that God comprehends all things, could this be justly pronounced an atheistical opinion? Nor even was the following notion of the same author to be accounted atheism, to wit, that there are some things beneath the knowledge of God, as too mean, base, and vile; however wrong this notion may be, and unworthy of the divine perception." Thus, according to Bishop Berkeley, the Pantheism of the Egyptians did not constitute Atheism, any more than did the Anthropomorphism of Aristotle; and also a most important point to be remarked is, that whatever may have been the antiquity of Egypt, the religious doctrines were drawn from the writings of Hermes.

The vague doctrines of modern materialism found in Mr. Hume a talented champion, for it was he who drew them from the desultory state in which Bolingbroke, Voltaire, &c., &c., had found and left them, and it was he who fully developed the doctrine of natural religion. He stumbles, it is true, at the threshold, but soon recovers his footing. After advancing that, "the whole frame of nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author," which is the foundation of religion in reason,

he proceeds to say that the origin of religion in human nature is however exposed to some more difficulty, "for some nations have been discovered who entertained no notions of religion, if travellers and historians may be credited." Mr. Hume therefore denies an original instinct or primary impression of nature, and esteems it to be a matter of inference. And yet he admits that this inference may be altogether prevented. Thus it is an "original belief" which is secondary, and it is conditional on some exterior circumstance. After these preliminary words which embody his whole doctrine, Mr. Hume proceeds to dazzle the mind of the reader by enouncing, as the basis of his opinion, a matter of fact obvious to all, it being one of very general experience, requiring strict scrutiny in order not to bestow upon it the weight that Mr. Hume lays claim to in its favor. "It appears to me," says that thinker, "that if we consider the improvement of human society, from rude beginnings to a state of greater perfection, Polytheism or Idolatry was, and necessarily must have been, the first and most ancient religion of mankind. It is a matter of fact incontestable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were polytheists. The doubtful and sceptical principles of a few philosophers, or the theism, and that too not entirely pure, of one or two nations, form no objection worth regarding. Behold then the clear testimony of history. The farther we mount up into antiquity, the more do we find mankind plunged into polytheism. No marks, no symptoms of any more perfect religion. The most ancient records of the human race still present us with that system as the popular and established creed. The north, the south, the east, the west, give their unanimous testimony to the same fact. What can be opposed to so full an evidence? As far as writing or history reaches,

mankind, in ancient times, appear universally to have been polytheists. Shall we assert, that in more ancient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science men entertained the principles of pure theism? That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth; but fell into error as soon as they acquired learning and politeness.

“But in this assertion you not only contradict all appearance of probability, but also our present experience concerning the principles and opinions of barbarous nations. The savage tribes of America and Africa are all idolaters. Not a single exception to this rule. Insomuch that, were a traveller to transport himself into any unknown region; if he found inhabitants cultivated with arts and science, though even upon that supposition there are odds against their being theists, yet could he not safely, till farther inquiry, pronounce any thing on that head; but if he found them ignorant, and barbarous, he might beforehand declare them idolaters; and there scarcely is a probability of his being mistaken.

“It seems certain that, according to the natural progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some grovelling and familiar notion of superior powers, before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature. We may as reasonably suppose, that men inhabited palaces before huts and cottages, or studied geometry before agriculture, as assert that the Deity appeared to them a pure spirit, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent, before he was apprehended to be a powerful, though limited being, with human passions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind rises gradually from inferior to superior. By abstracting from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of perfec-

tion ; and slowly distinguishing the nobler part of its own frame from the grosser, it learns to transfer only the former, much elevated and refined, to its divinity. Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought, but some obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of theism, and make it overleap, at one bound, the vast interval which is interposed between the human and the divine nature. But though I allow, that the order and frame of the universe, when accurately examined, affords such an argument ; yet I can never think that this consideration could have an influence on mankind, when they formed their first rude notions of religion. If men were at first led into the belief of One Superior Being, by reasoning from the frame of nature, they could never possibly leave that belief, in order to embrace polytheism ; but the same principles of reason, which at first produced and diffused over mankind so magnificent an opinion, must be able, with greater facility, to preserve it. The first invention and proof of any doctrine is much more difficult than the supporting and retaining of it.

“ There is a great difference between historical facts and speculative opinions ; nor is the knowledge of the one propagated in the same manner with that of the other. An historical fact, while it passes by oral tradition from eye-witnesses and contemporaries, is disguised in every successive narration, and may at last retain but very small, if any, resemblance of the original truth on which it was founded. The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their supine carelessness ; these principles, if not corrected by books and writing, soon pervert the account of historical events ; where argument or reasoning has little or no place, nor can ever recall the truth which has once es-

caped those narrations. It is thus the fables of Hercules, Theseus, Bacchus, are supposed to have been originally founded in true history corrupted by tradition. But with regard to speculative opinions, the case is far otherwise. If these opinions be founded on arguments so clear and obvious as to carry conviction with the generality of mankind, the same arguments, which at first diffused the opinions, will still preserve them in their original purity. If the arguments be more abstruse, and more remote from vulgar apprehensions, the opinions will always be confined to a few persons, and as soon as men leave the contemplation of the arguments, the opinions will immediately be lost, and be buried in oblivion. Whichever side of this dilemma we take, it must appear impossible that theism could, from reasoning, have been the primary religion of the human race, and have afterwards, by its corruption, given birth to polytheism, and to all the various superstitions of the heathen world. Reason, when obvious, prevents these corruptions; when abstruse, it keeps the principles entirely from the knowledge of the vulgar, who are alone liable to corrupt any principle or opinion.

“ We may conclude, therefore, that in all nations which have embraced polytheism, the first ideas of religion arose, not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind. Accordingly, we find that all idolaters, having separated the provinces of their deities, have recourse to that invisible agent, to whose authority they are immediately subjected and whose province it is to superintend that course of actions in which they are at any time engaged. Juno is invoked at marriages; Lucina at births. Neptune receives the

prayers of seamen ; Mars of warriors. The husbandman cultivates his fields under the protection of Ceres ; and the merchant acknowledges the authority of Mercury. Each natural event is supposed to be governed by some intelligent agent ; and nothing prosperous or adverse can happen in life, which may not be the subject of peculiar prayers or thanksgiving.

“ It must necessarily, indeed, be allowed that in order to carry men’s attention beyond the present course of things, or lead them into any inference concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by some passion which prompts their thought and reflection, some motive which urges their first inquiry. But what passion shall we here have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty consequence ? Not speculative curiosity, surely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for such gross apprehensions ; and would lead men into inquiries concerning the frame of nature, a subject too large and comprehensive for their narrow capacities. No passions, therefore, can be supposed to work upon such barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life ; the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize with a trembling curiosity, the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity.”

It is in these words, which contain all the pith and marrow of his “ Natural History of Religion,” that Mr. Hume sums up the most knotty objections against *the* revelation of God. The effect they have produced, and



which is too clearly visible by the usual tenure of conversation of persons who might be supposed not fully to have comprehended their force, is unlimited. And unfortunately too many religious minds conceived that the first step to be taken was to deny the premises of the argument. It carries indeed an appearance of certitude and self-evidence with it, to appeal to the inward conscience of each reader, as if sentiments inculcated from birth did not possess a conviction in the mind which bears all the appearance of intuition. Now we concur with Mr. Hume in denying the intuitive *à priori* belief in the existence of God. We agree with him that it was not the *à posteriori* deductions of ratiocination concerning the frame of nature that produced the belief in the Almighty. There remains the sensitive or imaginary faculties of men worked upon by their fear, and here we recognize with Mr. Hume the source of Polytheism, and of the greater part of Theology; but we deny, and our proofs will be shown to exist in the very fact which constitutes the matter in question; we deny that the leading principle so strangely distorted by human imagination took its rise therefrom. It would be interverting the order we have adopted for the presentation of our proofs, to bring them forward *instanter*. Mr. Hume's argument must be shown first to be false on the very admission of his own grounds. In considering the ordinary affections and passions of human life as the cause of the first obscure traces of divinity, he has shown much discernment, for therein lies, we strenuously believe, not the source of Monotheism but of Polytheism. It is then a cause that works incessantly, it has worked and continues to work upon a notion not from earth, but from a sphere far different. Was not the light sufficient to guide, but sufficient to lead astray? it may be ask-

ed again. The knowledge imparted to man bears its own answer. The existence of the Almighty was announced, and that communication carries with it the injunction of trust in Him or of Divine Faith. Enlightened by that knowledge and supported by that Faith, the man who trusts in God may readily bear the brunt of sarcasm and the reproach of irrationality for a short period, because he can prove victoriously that Reason is on his side. For if indeed the notion of a God arose, not from an intuitive *à priori* and innate feeling, nor from rational or *à posteriori* deductions, but from passions and ordinary affections "which are common to all men," how then does it happen that, as Mr. Hume so rightly maintains, nations have been found who knew nothing of a divinity? The value of this negative fact, with which Mr. Hume crushes the *à priori* principle, does not cease to exist when that thinker explains the first faint glimmerings of the belief in a God by the passions and feelings common to all men. Mr. Hume may indeed exclaim, that this is making a light from heaven, the light that leads astray. But as that communication, far from announcing an analogy of existence, positively asserts the being of the Almighty as Supreme, it cannot be said with any consistency that the light which shone caused man to deviate from the path pointed out. It certainly does admit of human will, but why the Almighty was pleased to give unto man a will so perverse, is no matter of human knowledge; for as Bacon says, citing a Platonic philosopher, "*Sense discovers natural things, but darkeneth and shutteth up Divine,*" and also, "if any man shall think by view and inquiry into sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, then indeed is he spoiled by vain Philosophy." Nothing then

can be more true than that, notwithstanding the light imparted, Man went astray, but his own passions led him astray, and the origin of Evil, as consistent with the notion of the Almighty, is altogether a matter of Trust in Him who revealed Himself as the Almighty. Nowadays philosophers and theologians think to give weight to their doctrines by terming the instinctive beliefs, such as consciousness, "revelations from on high," but as it has been already remarked, there is much irrationality in darkening things which are very different, by giving them the same name. A revelation common to countless millions becomes a very commonplace matter of fact in nature. We own that all this appears to us very clear and distinct, but as we know that the opinions of the time are against us, so we are convinced that all our endeavors to awaken Antiquity and to remodel Mythology will prove of no avail against men who, in spite of the plain matter of fact written by the hand of Nature in the natural history of man, that men in a state of separation know not of God, and cannot come to know of Him of themselves, yet persevere in maintaining the *à priori* or innate idea of a God. The motive is probably the one given by Warburton, "if no innate idea of God, no God at all," but such a motive (it was not Bishop Warburton's opinion) is a proof of a weak Faith in the Almighty. But this important point of the natural history of man will be fully investigated at a later period.

The doctrine adopted by Mr. Hume proved, however, deficient in historical accuracy, and various searchers in antiquity have attempted to point out the moment when Mankind emerged from Idolatry, and for the first time, according to those authors, believed in One God. The establishment of Monotheism was therefore referred to various times, all agreeing, how-

ever, in one point, that of the Egyptian dogmas having preceded that event. The work which appears to us to have succeeded the best in this unenviable task is that of Professor Röth (*Geschichte unsere abendlandische Glauben*, 1846), who, after a full and ample discussion of Hindoo, Bactrian, Assyrian, Egyptian, Grecian, and Etruscan antiquity, conceives himself authorized to fix the appearance of Monotheism in India, Bactria, and China, at least a thousand years after that belief had been promulgated by the Jewish legislator. The inspiration of Moses he considers as purely Egyptian, denying that before that time any traces can be positively shown of a belief in a personal God, that belief consisting until then in the adoration of cosmologic and heavenly bodies, to which had succeeded the worship of ancestors. These latter were indeed more modern, and ancient nations, it is well known, adored the Earth, Heaven, the Elements, Light, Darkness, Heat, Cold, Wet, Life, Death, taking such phenomena as the expression of the All-pervading Spirit. This ancient religion, as well as Sabeism or the adoration of the heavenly bodies, such as Sun, Moon, Planets and Stars, and which preceded the worship of ancestors, and also symbolic worship, was not so void of the notion of a personal God, for all these objects, as we shall clearly show, received the same name—that of God, variously expressed. It was strange indeed to bow the head before various “images having the likeness of things on the earth, above the earth, and in the waters under the earth,” and it was no less strange to adore, before that time, Stones, Trees, Mountains, Rocks, Springs, &c., not to speak of animals, but although such aberrations are unaccountable, yet they *were* aberrations, for the name given to all such things was that of the Lord. We are taking, it may be said,

the result for the starting point; and so it would appear, if that point varied one jot; but we shall see it does not.

Röth says that all his researches prove that the Egyptian religious speculations precede all those of Bactria, of India, and of Assyria, indeed all others, since they flourished two thousand years before Christ, whilst Zoroaster only appears in Bactria in the sixth century B. C. (512–590), Gaulamo Buddha in India between 548–468 B. C., and Confucius between 550–477 B. C. Röth therefore concludes that these nations—Indian, Bactrian, Chinese—far from being older than the Egyptian, must necessarily be many centuries younger, because otherwise they would not have been ripe and prepared to receive the doctrines of those above-mentioned reformers and legislators; whilst Egypt had given birth so long before that period to Monotheism.

The work of Professor Röth is one of those which deserve much confidence on account of the strict accuracy of all the *data*; and the Grecian mythology is most clearly linked with the Gods of Egypt, a fact to which Herodotus already testified in his days. With his speculations on Egyptian dynasties we have nothing to do, nor can we deliver an opinion respecting those who built the Pyramids, although we believe that we have fallen upon their real destination. Röth considers them to have been built by the Phœnician conquerors of Egypt, and believes the Philistines (Pelister Pelasger) to have been formed by this people when driven out of Egypt. This opinion was also that of Newton. These Phœnicians driven from Egypt founded, according to Röth, all later Grecian mythology. They were also named Crethi-Cretans. But as regards the question we are about investigating, Röth's

views may be summed up in the following manner : Monotheism is a branch which sprung from the main stock of Egyptian religious speculations, which also gave birth to all the Grecian mythology. In Bactria, Assyria, India and China, Monotheism was completely unknown before Zoroaster, Buddha and Confucius, and was a consequence of the previous Egyptian doctrine. Thus according to him the primary revelation would be a dream, for this doctrine, which was one of progress and not of recess, never existed in Bactria before Zoroaster, of whom Plato speaks, naming him Zoroaster the Ormuzdian, which circumstance may account for the purer views of the Deity which distinguish the Greek philosopher.

Matters of fact and chronological data can only be answered by others which lay claim to higher value. Now we do not attempt to contest the date fixed by Röth as the period of Zoroaster's appearance in Bactria, and still less do we deny that the Jewish tribes came from Egypt, that Monotheism did not find in the great Jewish Legislator an energetic and inspired interpreter. But we deny that Monotheism took its rise when proclaimed by Moses, and long after by Zoroaster. We mention Moses, although Röth only talks of Egypt and Zoroaster. The first witness we shall produce in favor of our opinion is M. Röth himself, who expressly tells us that Zoroaster, in introducing his doctrines, *connected* them with the ancient belief of Bactria. (Der alte baktrische Glaubenskreise aber an den Zoroaster seine Speculation anknüpfte und von dem er einen bedeutenden Theil mit seiner Lehre verschmolzt, ist uns noch dunkel.) These ancient tenets, as yet obscurely known, were blended by that legislator with his own. The doctrines here referred to were either those of fire-worship or of belief in

Hor-mudz (the Almighty). But on what grounds do we conceive ourselves to be justified in affirming that Hor-mudz was known long before Zoroaster (always admitting the period of the promulgation of Magism to be the one mentioned by M. Röth, viz., about six hundred years before Christ)? For this we have several motives, but we shall content ourselves with one. We maintain that the worship of Hor-mudz not only precedes the time of Zoroaster, but that of the Egyptian empire, and can be traced in the West 1800 B. C., and this we prove by circumstances which have been overlooked by antiquarians. The great God of the Pelasgian tribes, whose immigration is given by Larcher 1800 B. C., was Her-mez (Hor-mudz). The sacred books on which were founded all the esoteric or secret doctrines of the Egyptian religion were, as it is well known, from Her-mez. He bore also, it is true, the names of Taaut, of Thot, or Thoor, and these names, as likewise those of Pan and Mercury (Melk-urinus), we trust we shall prove to be names of the Almighty. Nor do we have recourse to any artifice of Etymology in this circumstance. The transposition of a letter, when fully proved to be usual, may be fearlessly adopted, according to all authorities. This mysterious name of Hermes or Ermes admits of a ready solution if a *Z* be used instead of an *S*, as final letter, and the substitution of the letter *R* for *L*, and vice versa, we know to have been a very common practice on account of the mixture of tribes speaking languages in which these letters were alternatively wanting. The most correct writing, according to the Zend, would be Ahura-Mazdaô, and on this important point a full explanation will be given in the following pages. Zablonski considers the terms Thoth and Hermes as two different attributions of the God of Science, and the

first, also written Theuth and Thoyth, as measurement, as pillar or column, and also as that which unites all things in One (*congregare; in unum colligere*). He says also that Hermes was called Thouti or Tot, because the first of that name mixed together certain proportions of earth and water and therewith formed Man. These explanations all have reference to the Supreme Being named Hormudz by the ancient Airyans or Iranians. The name was written diversely, but we trust we shall not be taxed with hasty inference if we conclude that a name which bore the very same meaning, which is written in the same manner, and which other circumstances prove to have come to Egypt from Syria, or at least from Asia, has the same origin. In the later translations of the Zendavesta by Eugene Burnouf, words which had not been translated by Anquetil are given by the former as meaning "men of the ancient law," and it can be boldly asserted that what is known of Mazdeism, such as the translations of Neriosingh, &c., have merely reference to Zoroaster, but that doctrines much similar existed in those parts from the highest antiquity.

But as a matter of such vital importance respecting our subject cannot be too positively ascertained, we shall enter into some particularities relating to the well-known word AIRYA and we shall begin by observing that this word, which designates Aria or Ariana, is formed from the term Ahura, the Lord or master, to which was usually added Mazdaô, the Mighty. This term Ahura, M. Grotefend has found written in the cuneiform characters, and it was already pointed out one hundred years ago, as forming the first syllable of the name of the Persian king Artaxerxes. Now although the antiquity of this king is pretty high, yet the reflection is only a stepping stone to other proofs of the higher





antiquity of the name, and consequently that of the term whence it derived. The word Art or Ard, which signifies Lord, was usually written with the article *L* or *the*, and was also used with a *T*, a *Th*, or a *D*. This is then the word Lar, and was a title with the Etruscans 1200 years before Christ, as it is now in Great Britain. It was written Larth, or Lard, the last letter probably not being pronounced, as with some continental nations when pronouncing the word Lord. A female title in Etrusca corresponded to the word Larth. It was written Laritha (Lady). We have not been able to discover any proof which would show of higher antiquity for the etymology of the words Lord and Lady. The fact stands engraven on the stones of which the sarcophagi of the Etruscan nobility were hewn, although it appears in more modern time, towards the final downfall of the Tuscan power, to have become synonymous with plain Mister. However, the ancient meaning of Master and Lord is easily to be perceived, as usual, although that high interpretation ceased to be given. Larith Caius, Lart, and Lars Porsenna are terms which in the dearth that prevails with regard to the Etruscan tongue, cannot be overlooked.

It is however by no means to be inferred that, because a term when become common-place is considered to be of small value, the same word may not have been held in very high esteem in other days. This is proved to have been the case with many names, and most especially with all those in use both in the East and the West as terms of respect and politeness. The name of the Almighty did not escape the usual ordeal. The term of *Hermes*, once the great God of the Pelasgians, fell into discredit when the victorious Helleni, and Graii claimed precedence for that of Jupiter. Now,

Djauspiter, Zeuspiter, Jovis, Djovis were all one name, bearing in their various declensions evident marks of having a common origin, though variously pronounced and transcribed. The first syllable of Her-mez is formed from Ahura, which also formed Allah, Al, El, Asoura, Osiris, &c., &c. Her was also written Er, and Ares. The *Etymolicon magnum* has Ereas, Ermeas, and Ermeias (*Ερεας και Ερμεας και Ερμειας*), and says it signifies the name of the Lord. Muller gives it as an undoubted fact that the words Lars, and Larth, were amongst the Etruscans titles of honor equivalent to *dominus*, and the circumstance of the same term having been used as an appellation for the household Gods favors this view. The frequent occurrence of the word or its varieties, Lart and Larthia, in sepulchral inscriptions (see Tombs and Cemeteries of Etrusca) does not prove, we believe, that the term was used indiscriminately, for only individuals of high rank and their families could furnish the means which were required for many of such sarcophagi on which the name is found. The distinction drawn by the grammarians who consider Lar, Laris, as significant of the deity, and Lars, Lartis, as an Etruscan surname or prænomen, may be correct, but does not weaken, we think, the original meaning, since in modern languages the primary value of the radicals of many surnames is not lost sight of because the names are in common use. Lanzi considers Lars as synonymous with *divus*, but the mark of antiquity of the term is evidently in the radical AR, often written *er, as, az, ase, uz, os, ur, &c.*, according to the idiom, and the *r* often undergoing the usual change, when required by the idiom, of the *r* into *l*, thus making *Al, El, Il, Ul, &c.* The *L*, considered by grammarians as a particle serving as an article noting a particular thing, was replaced, as it is well known, in

other idioms by other letters such as *T*, *Th*, *P*, *Ph*, *B*, *M*, *K*, *Kh*, &c., according to the tribe, and if the *H* was often wanting, that omission proceeded from the first vowel being pronounced less harshly. If we have fixed more especially upon the value given to this first syllable of the word *Her-mèz* it is because there we find positive proof of the word being used in a somewhat familiar sense 1200 years B. C.

The last battle fought by the Etruscans for their liberty occurred 444 years B. C., but we are not authorized to say at that period the term had preserved among them its primitive high signification. However that may be, we have the testimony of Herodotus, testimony so positively confirmed by modern research into the antiquities of Persia, that the term *Art* which commences the name of the well-known Persian king Artaxerxès, had the meaning of *great*. Xerxès, we are told by that historian, means a warrior, and Artaxerxès a great warrior (Herod. lib. 6, ch. 98). Reland, Hyde, Pocock, and indeed all more modern historians of Central Asia, confirm this opinion of Herodotus, who was a contemporary of that king (289 B. C.) The researches of Grotefend, Pettigrew, Rawlinson, Wilson, and other indefatigable inquirers into antiquity, have furnished proof still more positive in deciphering the cuneiform characters used in those times. The word in question which stands thus in those characters

 AR,  TA (Median) proves that a thou-

sand years after its having been in high veneration in Etrusca, where it came from Asia, it still preserved in Central Asia the highest value. We join now the second syllable *Mèz* or *Mès*, of the word *Hermes*, and we find in that syllable the Zend term of *Maz*, *Muzd*, *Mazdaô*, the radical of *Mith*, meaning

mighty, for Mith-ra stands for Mith-Ahura, or Ahura Mazdaô.

The credulity of ancient historians has been rightly censured very severely by modern writers with regard to chronology, that most important point in all such investigations. The obscurity of ancient times is such that events, differing a thousand years in date, appear equally dark and of the same obscure nature. Chronology alone can distinguish them distinctly. M. Röth is then well-founded in remarking that Diodorus Siculus proved himself much less credulous than his contemporaries in asserting that the Pyramids of Egypt did not appear to him to date beyond a thousand years before his time (he flourished towards the beginning of the Christian era). And, moreover, M. Röth proves, by the investigations of modern inquirers, that many historical events, given by former historians as having taken place in Hindostan in remote antiquity, are, comparatively speaking, of modern date. The opinion of one who has greatly contributed to this result, that of Mr. Wilson, may be safely appealed to in the matter in question. Mr. Wilson tells us that whatever doubts may be suggested by much that is given in the religious text books of the Parsees of India as pertaining to the ancient Zend, it is highly probable that their ancestors carried with them the genuine names of places and things, and all such terms, he believes still to be preserved in their extant sacred writings, and to be *bonâ fide* genuine relics of an ancient nomenclature. "We may, therefore, admit," says Mr. Wilson, "that Airya or Airyana are old Persian words, and the names of that region to which the Hindus extended the designation of Arya, which the coins of the Sassanian princes denominated Iran, and which the Greeks in the time of Alexander understood by Ariana." Reserving a

more searching investigation for the following pages, when we trust all doubt on the subject will be removed from the mind of the reader uninformed on those matters, we merely limit our assertion here to the question of whether the comparatively modern date of the writings attributed to Zoroaster constitutes a proof of the superior antiquity of Egypt. Now, respecting that antiquity, we do not pretend to fix any precise period. We merely maintain that, however great or small the number of centuries which may be attributed to the Egyptian religious speculations, these latter carry with them a proof of the priority of the antiquity of Central Asia, by the fact of their being founded on the sacred books of the first Her-mez, which term we shall clearly prove to have been given in the remotest period of Asiatic history to the Almighty. It is, indeed, the very same identical name. But we are also prepared to advance a step farther, for besides the proofs which we can give of the higher antiquity of the belief in the Almighty existing in Upper Asia before the Egyptian religion flourished, it is evident, from the same source, that of the Egyptians themselves, that Phenicia was the starting point of their theology, for Mercurius is a name given by them to Her-mez. Now, this term bears the mark of a Semetic origin, joined with a deviation of that mysterious word Airya or Ahura. Mercurius is evidently the same as Merk-eres, Merc-eres, and Merk is Melk, or Malik; the *R* being replaced by an *L*. These alterations bear the mark of having taken place in Asia Minor and Phenicia, where the great Lady city was termed Melik-Arta. The latter term, it is true, has been considered by Bochart and other etymologists as expressive of city, and so it was; but it did so in giving to the town a meaning of power and mastery which was therein contained.

According to the translation of the Rig-Veda by Mr. Wilson, actual Hinduism is wholly different from that of former time. The religion displayed in that ancient work is a kind of Sabeism, but of a more simple nature than that which existed in Syria and Chaldæa. It is one in which Fire is the principal object of veneration or deification, of which element the firmament, and even the Sun, are considered as mere subordinate manifestations. This work Mr. Wilson esteems to be coeval with the Pentateuch, and as having been written 2,000 years before our era. It is entirely conclusive against the high antiquity attributed to the present idolatry of Hindustan. In the Rig-Veda the various names which since have been given to as many deities, are all names of celestial bodies and elements, but still in them is to be found those distinguishing radicals which, in the Zend, constitute the names or attributes of the Almighty. Our motives for thus insisting on the value of the Zend idiom will be found in the first part of this work, where Ethnography is specially spoken of. Thus in Hindustan the sun represents the Deity, and as such receives many names, which, in later times, were personified. The Sun is Surya, as the glory of heaven, and Poorsh or Pourscha as the first created, and the image of God in the middle of the creation; Agni when rising, Varouna shining, and Djauspiter, Father of Light or Day. As creator, preserver, and destroyer, the Sun received names evidently expressive of those qualities; Brahma, Vishnu and Siva, Isa, Iswara, Rudra, Hara, Sambhu, Mahadeva, Mahaesa, at first were expressions of qualities, and all of them bearing traces of the name of God, became so many deities. Varouna, a name given in later time to the spirit of the waters, was at first, according to Lassen (*Ind. Alterthumerkunde*, t. i. p. 756), the

immensity of the firmament (*Uranus*), and represented unbounded Space, the Infinite. "O Varouna, in thee resides the vast immensity of Heaven and Earth, all the worlds are thine!" But Indra was the king, the deva by excellence, he was the Ait-arya Bramahna. Pourchan or Pouchan is the Sun in relation to the earth, and was addressed in that name in order to obtain good pasturage. Sacrifice was performed to Soma or the Sun when adored, for Som or Hom united all the qualities of the deity, and appears to have been pronounced OUM, and corresponds evidently to the Zend Hom, a term which Sir William Jones considers as signifying the solar fire. That the primary sense of the word was much the same as that which has always been given in the Western World to the terms *Om*, *Am*, *Omne*, meaning All or the Absolute, is evident from the common signification of a corresponding expression, that of OMITA, in Sanscrit, *unmeasurable* (Sir W. Jones). It is pronounced OMRO, according to that writer, and was adopted by the Buddhists in more modern times to express the Almighty.

The whole matter is certainly one of great difficulty, for mythology or personifications of metaphysical creation abound to such an extent in the Hindu religion, that to begin to mention them would be to lengthen, beyond all rational limits, an inquiry which merely relates to the nature of the primary speculations that reigned in Hindustan in high antiquity. Now it is very satisfactory to find that men of such high authority in such a question as Sir W. Jones and Mr. Wilson, should concur in considering the pristine signification of the Vedas to be a mere expression of the powers of Nature. Thus Sir W. Jones ascribes the worship of Fire "to an enthusiastic admiration of Nature's wonderful powers, and it seems, as far as I can understand

the Vedas, to be the principal worship recommended in them." (Sir W. Jones, *On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India.*) Were we less scrupulous, and, were we not apprised by Lassen and E. Burnouf that interpolations exist in many Sanscrit texts, we would refer at once to a passage in the Rig-Veda (Sect. ii. lect. iii. hym. 7, str. 48), in which the names of Indra, Mitra, Varouna, Agni, Yama and Maharisvan, are merely mental conceptions or names given to the Sun or the Isvara, the divine Spirit that shines and circulates in the Heavens. As Indra, he was the king of the Heavens; Mitra, in full force; Agni, when rising; Varouna was the sunshine; Yama indicated the measure of all things or Time, and, as such, life and death and all events were within his realms. This passage, if not interpolated, would go far to prove a question much debated, viz., whether Sabeism took its rise in Bactria, i. e., in the region named Airya, or in Hindustan. Mitra and Agni are evidently Zend or derivations. At all events, the four first terms which here indicate qualifications of the Sun, 2,000 years before Christ, were evidently worshipped as deities in later times, not only in India for the first, but all over the known world for the other three. The worship of Mithra spread far West. Znick (Ignis) was the great Slavonic god (Nick); and Varouna, as Peroun, saw his worship extend over millions of the Scythic race. Here we find them, as it were, at their starting point. It is the source, and may be likened to those springs in certain mountains, which are destined to become mighty rivers, and to flow through wide regions of the earth. Questions which find Eugène Burnouf on one side, and Mr. Wilson on the other, must naturally remain undecided. We own, however, that the motives given by the former great Orientalist, united with what we have



been able to collect in many works on that interesting topic, cause us to favor his views, which are that the conquering tribe which took possession of Northern India, and gradually extended its conquest over all Hindustan, came from Bactria, or rather Airya, from whence they had been driven, or, at least, from whence they issued. One thing is certain, and that circumstance contributes to augment the doubts entertained by those who plead in favor of the Airyans being primitively from Northern India, from the Himalayan mountains: the Brahmins also bore the name of Airyans, and the country they occupied was also named Airya. The Sanscrit tongue also reigned, and the Hindus governed at one time beyond the Indus, so that the solution of the question is a matter of nice discrimination. If the first Brahmins were Sabeans or worshippers of the heavenly bodies, and, as such, were driven from Ariana by the adorers of the Almighty or Ormuzd, this might explain the struggle that existed for so long a period of time between Ormuzd and Airyman, whose worshippers, those of the Sun, were named Airyas. It would also explain the motives of hate which existed between them and the Ormuzdians or Mazdeists, who named devils what the others called Gods (*div*). Burnouf, indeed, is of opinion that before the time of Zoroaster the term was used in Bactria in both a good and a bad light, and that it was not merely in consequence of the change which that legislator brought about in Bactria, from whence he expelled Sabeism, that the Zend term Ahura, signifying the Almighty, was taken by the Brahmins to mean an evil spirit, whilst the Magians gave the name of *div* (god, in Sanscrit) to what they deemed evil beings. Now, as Zoroaster appears to have reminded his countrymen of the pristine religion of Bactria, that goes far

to prove that a purer religion had preceded Sabeism, although it does not indicate that Sabeism had been introduced forcibly in Bactria.

Mr. E. Burnouf considers the Zend term *ars* or *ardh* not to be derived from the Sanscrit radical *ridh*, which means *increase, augmentation*, because all the words in the composition of which that term has been found by him bear not the meaning of increase, but that of Truth or Right. He therefore derives it from the Zend *ērēz*, radical *raz* or *raç*, pronounced *ras*. To this radical is connected the Zend *Erech* (true or truth), and the Sanscrit radical *řidg* (to be straight and also to be right). This opinion of one of the greatest orientalisists of the nineteenth century is not without weight in the solution of the questions which naturally arise respecting the positive value of a term in which the *R* (or *L*) is found united with a vowel variously pronounced, and which itself has often been replaced by *Z* or *S*. It is before this term that the great Herder and the deep Jacob Grimm declare themselves to be lost in amazement and wonder.

AIRYA (Pers. ایری) is a Zend word having the signification of Master, Lord, Dominus (and Herr). The existence of the same term on each side of the Indus is considered by Burnouf as a proof, and a most interesting proof, of the primitive unity of the Iranian and Indian nations. He, however, points out a most important distinction at the same time, consisting in the term being in Airyana the name of the people, of the whole mass; whilst in India it was a special title, one reserved to the Brahmins, and only applicable to the part where they dwelt. And this is admitted by Mr. Wilson, who says that Arya is a Hindu term for excellent, honorable, and that the term Arya-vartha, found in Manu, signifies the country of excellent men.

Thus the name Arya-varṭta given to their primitive seat in Northern India unites the approval of these competent judges. The Brahmīns were named Airyas from Airya, in the same manner as the men of the third class or free workmen were named Vesyes or Vaiçyas, from the word Viç or Vais. But although the words airya and vaisya exist in the Zend (Burnouf), no such division is there to be found: all bear the names of Airyans, or Iranians. It is evident to that distinguished and most regretted philologist, that the Brahmīns differed from the mass of the people where they first resided, because the Zend term Viç or Vais has in fact the meaning of *habitation*, and rather signifies inhabitants, or men residing in dwellings, than man, as a human being, so that the term Vasya would appear to have been given by the Brahmīns to the free inhabitants or dwellers in houses (for the term signifies entrance), whilst they kept their own name—that of the country from whence they came. And Burnouf remarks that in so doing they merely acted according to the usual custom of the Airyans or Iranians, and that Panini (règle iii.) long ago took notice of the high value given to the word Aryan, derived by him from rī. It is thus that all over Asia the terms areta, ereta, art, artu, had the signification of *illustrious, great, honorable, respectable*, whence areta, arethra, ratu (master).

Mr. Wilson, after reminding his readers that Strabo distinguished Ariana from Bactria, and that Herodotus tells us that the ancient Persians were named Artei (areti) and the Medes originally Arii, fixes on Iran or Persia as being the Ariana antiqua. "It is therefore to be inferred that it was known to their (the Greeks) chief authorities, the contemporary writers of Alexander's expedition, and that they derived

it from the natives of the country, amongst whom it was always familiar, being in fact the same as Iran, the proper appellation of Persia. . . . Now whatever doubts may be suggested by much that is given in the religious text-books of the Parsees of India as Zend, it is highly probable that their ancestors carried with them the genuine names of places, persons and things, and that all such terms, still preserved in their extant sacred writings, are genuine relics of their ancient nomenclature. We may therefore admit that Airya or Airyana are old Persian words, and the names of that region *to which the Hindus extended the designation of Arya.*" (Wilson, *Ariana antiqua.*) We here give the words of Mr. Wilson, in which he says most clearly that, in his opinion, the term came from Hindustan; whilst E. Burnouf maintains that the name went to Hindustan from Airya, or Eriene, or Airyana, admitting, however, that the Airyans, who possessed themselves of India where they reigned as masters, also extended their conquests in later times beyond the Indus, more or less West. Thus according to Burnouf, the Zend and various idiom pehlvi, &c., a harsh severe tongue, would have produced in time the deep, learned, grammatical Sanscrit, and when, after centuries of separation, the aryas-Brahmins, speaking the latter language, spread beyond the Indus, they carried with them the Sanscrit as their vernacular dialect. And this would explain the books produced, in which two priests could read at one time—the one (the Zend) reading to the left; the other (Sanskrit) reading to the right. It would also explain the very ancient Sanscrit texts in which the letters or words are not united by a bar or horizontal line.

Major Rennell, in his well-known Memoir of a Map of Hindustan, has the following words, which bear

somewhat on the question: "The term India, by which this country, as far as it was known, is distinguished in the earliest Grecian histories, appears to be derived from Hind, the name given by the ancient Persians, through whom, doubtless, the knowledge both of the country and its name was transmitted to the Greeks. We have the strongest assurances from Mr. Wilkins, that no such words as Hindoo or Hindoostan are to be found in the Sanscrit Dictionary. It appears that the people among whom the Sanscrit language was vernacular, styled their country *Bharata*—a name which is, I believe, quite novel to the ears of the learned in Europe." Here we find a most impartial testimony (for in 1788 it could not be imagined that the origin of the term *arata* would ever become a matter of interest) in favor of Burnouf's views. It was a foreign term, and connected with the existence of the Sanscrit in India as a tongue having its origin elsewhere. Still the opinion of Burnouf has only probabilities in its favor, whilst that of Mr. Wilson can point to Hindu tribes beyond the Indus, since Alexander found Hindus in the Paropamisus, and Pliny notices the common opinion that there once existed four satrapies west of the Indus, and extending even to Aria (Herat) and belonging to India.

Moreover, the traditions of the Hindus concur with those of the Persians in considering the tribes immediately west of India and even those towards the Oxus as their countrymen. Those of the Paropamisian mountains are termed by them Gandharas, of which modern Candahar appears a vestige. The Persian accounts which testify the extension of Iran to the Oxus particularize Caboulistan as occupied by Hindus. The celebrated Persian hero Roustam was surnamed Kabuli from the country of his mother Rudaba, daughter of

the Caboul prince Mihrab. These traditions have been preserved by Firdusi, and even at the end of the seventh century the Mohammedans found idolaters and princes with Indian names in Caboul, and Ibn Haukel, who is supposed to have written in the middle of the tenth century, says expressly that though the castle was occupied by Mohammedans, yet the town was still in possession of the idolaters or Hindus.

Wilson admits then as correct the assertion of Heeren that India comprised the whole of the mountainous country beyond Cashmere, and included Little Bokaria, as also the desert of Cobi, although at present no traces of the occupation exist. From the language of Kaferistan, says Mr. Wilson, we may also infer that the people of that region were of Hindu descent. Jel-labab, and Peshawar in the Paropamisus were Hindu. Thus Wilson considers the Zarangi, and the Ariaspæ or Aryaswa as decidedly Hindu; whilst Burnouf maintains them to have been Zend. But admitting the Hindus to have possessed all the Hindu Kutch, or Paropamisus, which mountainous country extends as far as Herat, Mr. Wilson proves by ruins of cities, still to be pointed out, that this country was formerly thickly populated. In short, if Mr. Burnouf appears to have the advantage in philological questions, such as the derivation of the term *mithra*, which is decidedly the spelling that was constantly adopted and must be Zend, on account of the *th*, so characteristic of the Zend, since the Sanscrit is *Mitra*, the primary use of the word *Ahura* as Zend (asoura, Sansc.) since the *h*, Zend, always is rendered *s* in Sanscrit; whilst when the Sanscrit *s* becomes *h* in Zend, it always takes a *g* (*gh*)—if in these points of antiquity Burnouf triumphs, there always remains the fact that it was the Hindus that evidently pressed upon the West, and not the Iranian tribes on Hindus-

tan. If the Zend be a mere idiom, a falling away of the Sanscrit, it has no claim to be an original authentic tongue; if, on the contrary, the Sanscrit is a development of the primitive Zend, the pristine traditions of the latter country acquire much value.

Evidently, the well known term *Hormuzd* existed before the time of Zoroaster, even placing it as high as 800 years B. C., or even in the days of Semiramis, admitting this queen to have been the wife of the first Ninus; or even still higher, because if we once enter upon fabulous chronology, the result will be always the same, since whatever antiquity people may be disposed to give to the Egyptians, there still remains the stubborn fact of their religious books having been written by Hermez or Tauth or Mercurius; all names evidently to be traced to the Zend, for Hermez was never Hindu. But Jupiter was clearly of Hindu extraction: Djauspiter, Zeuspater, and then the declension Jovis, all Hindu or Sanscrit. If circumstances favor the opinion of a struggle in Upper Asia between Hormuzd and Djauspiter in high antiquity, we possess positive evidence that the same contest was carried on in the West between Hermez the great Pelasgian divinity, and Jupiter, the God of the Helleni or Graii. Nor is it possible with the light which we now possess respecting the positive descent of the Helleni from Hindustan, not only on account of their Jupiter (Djauspiter) but because the grammatical analogy proves their tongue to have proceeded from the Sanscrit, whilst the same conclusion does not hold for its derivation from the Zend,—is it possible with that light to deny that the Sanscrit must have existed before the period of their arrival in Europe? The Pelasgian tribes were in all probability Bactrians, from Balk, and worshipped Hormuz (Hermez), and even admitting the Zend to be a vulgariza-

tion of the Sanscrit, yet as Hormuz was clearly from Airya, and his existence as God preceded all Egyptian worship, it becomes impossible to maintain that Monotheism was a mere branch of Egyptian *superstition*, for speculation means the same thing. Mr. Röth, it is true, may answer that the books said to be composed by Hermez before the creation of man (which proves Hermez not to have been considered as a human being) prove nothing in the question, because all that is known of Egyptian worship consists in grossest idolatry and superstition, until the notion of a Creator awoke; and that this idolatry and superstition were decidedly Egyptian before the Phenicians conquered Egypt, as his theory admits. Now admitting this to free Egypt from that unfortunate connection with Hermez which lays at the bottom of all Egyptian religious speculation, yet neither would Egypt be free from Hindustan on that account, nor would Egypt have any original claim at all to the primary conceptions of her worships, since Osiris and Isis are evidently Indian Osouri, Isa, and Ogga, or Neith, the female deity Ganga (Onga) said to have sprung from the head of Djauspiter. Egyptian superstition had certainly great influence on the furthering of Grecian idolatry, although Jupiter was evidently the result of Hindu speculations. But the same cannot be said of Moses, who so energetically condemns Egyptian superstition, and appeals not to any new principle but to the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob. The terms *Deus Abraham, Deus Isaac, et Deus Jacob* have, it is true, made some religious minded persons suppose (see Fourmont) that these patriarchs were the Gods worshipped by the heathens, but as regards Monotheism the Mosaic dispensation is clear enough. It is clear, indeed, that the only distinct notion that that dispen-



sation affords is that God is the Almighty, and that His ways are perfectly incomprehensible. *But without a primary revelation of God, the inspiration of Moses would have no sense.*

Professor Röth, it is true, speaks only of Zoroaster as teaching the doctrine of Monotheism, the Mosaic dispensation not being positively historical. To this might be opposed the uncertainty that reigns respecting the Bactrian legislator, but in so doing we should appear to avoid discussion. It is not however that we admit with Pezron and other authors that Jupiter reigned over the greater part of Greece, the islands of the Egeian sea, and over a great part of Asia Minor. If a Jupiter reigned in Creta, and about Olympus, and Mount Ida, it constitutes no part of authentic history, and as a God he was evidently worshipped under the name of Zeus, and Theos, Sdeos, &c., but the name Zeus-piter was well known, although it was the Romans who especially gave to the name of Jupiter so much renown. Now the terms Zeus, and Theos, and even the Cretan Sdeos might pass, as they have long passed, for mere varieties of the word Tauth or Toth, but the peculiar character of Djauspiter, Diespiter, &c., stamps on the word an unmistakable mark of Sanscrit origin, even independently of the accumulated mass of proofs relating to the Indo-scythic origin of the various tribes.

Modern History may indeed boast of proceeding scientifically, and of analyzing all the various elements which constitute historical events, as does the chemist with any given substance variously composed. But also, or indeed more so in history than in chemical analysis, the gross substance is not the most important, although the most apparent. Taking then an historical fact as the result of many agents, as it is now universally admitted, and as the natural consequences of

previous effects, the first step to be taken before judging is to bring together all the documents respecting the important cause about to be pleaded. The historian, it is true, is not bound to limit his endeavors within the narrow circle of mere recital; and they generally assume the office of *judge*. But as the documents on which their judgment is grounded are such as they have themselves gathered by dint of zeal and careful investigation, and as the natural bias of the mind always tells, they are perhaps rendered incapable of performing the high office of judge with that impartiality which is so requisite to Truth, for they become a party in the cause they plead, and no one is a good judge in his own cause. This will serve to explain our motives for laying before the reader in full the arguments which we consider irrelevant, and also to give a rather lengthened account of the motives on which we found our own opinion. The reader may thus form an opinion of his own. Still as our dogmatism is limited to a very narrow compass, and constitutes a very general conclusion carried out by the general bearing of the facts produced, it may perhaps obtain although the documents be imperfect, and many details are wanting. Therefore when in Western Europe languages evidently identical with Eastern tongues, and when names clearly similar in form and value,—all circumstances accounted for by the plain fact that so the thing stands, can be pointed out, it may rationally be admitted, we believe, that neither language nor names arose at the same time in the West and in the East, but that one preceded the other. Evidently, it requires something more in order to prove the true direction of the current, for that point is not explained by the fact of relationship. Nor have we a right to say that such relationship having been proved to exist

between given languages, we thereby acquire the right of judging by induction that the same law obtains in respect to languages not yet investigated. The chemist may be enabled to pronounce judgment on the nature of a mass by analyzing a very small portion of it; the anatomist may decide of the general form of the skeleton and of the nature of the animal by means of a very small piece of the framework, but it is not so in history. It is now admitted on the faith of good reasons adduced by Vico, Niebuhr, &c., that men do not always act in such a manner, as to authorize it to be laid down as a principle, that a positive result obtained in one circumstance is a sufficient ground to pronounce that on all similar occasions the same result would be obtained. And wherefore that distinction? Because *all* the circumstances in history, which would enable the historian to pronounce judgment, are not in his possession. The documents are not complete. And how can they be so, when they themselves are founded upon or indeed constituted by, the ever fluctuating views of the human mind? Is it the notion of God, the belief in his existence? but men are proved to exist who have not that notion, and all experience tends to demonstrate that we ourselves should not have had it unless it had been communicated to us. Here then the human mind does not furnish us with the same instinctive certitude as it gives us of our own existence and of that of other things: an instinctive feeling grounded in Life, and which ever appears when animated being obtains. But from the huge mass of historical documents which appals by its magnitude, and overwhelms by the impossible conditions which modern history requires, on most rational grounds it is true, in order to range the various facts in due and legitimate connection, does not some one

great fact appear high towering above the disjointed heap of confused materials? Such a fact strikes our view, and it is a *name*. A name indeed, but all names are mere conceptions of things or of ideas. Things exist independently of man, who only names and modifies them to his purposes, and all his conception of things is limited to their qualities made known by experience and to the modifications he invents. Of things then is there one that can be pointed out as clearly distinct from the entangled mass of phenomena? Does any notion exist that man does not possess either through his elementary instinctive faculties, or by the means of his reflections on what sensation causes him to perceive? Yes, there is one, and it is distinguished from all others because, as a thing, the elements thereof can nowhere be pointed out, and which, as a human conception, does not exist. It is a name which carries with it the motive of our trusting in Him of whom it tells; and that name is the name of the Almighty.

It is in the meaning of this name alone that we find universal agreement, and here only is the ground of Divine Faith.

Far from admitting with modern philosophers that in the general page of universal history is to be read the Revelation of the Will of God, we maintain that Revelation to have existed from the very beginning, and we read in the lessons of History a most clear and evident proof of the Freedom of the human Will. A sad boon it may be said; and yet it is one that stands in perfect accord with the finite existence of Man. Science will never pretend to cope with the Almighty. Science never says this, and only this was done by God. These are the words of ignorance, the words of the many. It is ignorance alone that vies with the Almighty, and pretends to know His thoughts. It is in-

deed a sealed letter why such a Will should have been given to man : why ever since his existence on earth human thought has constantly been occupied with that great fact, the revelation of God, and should so strangely have wandered from the right path which was at first pointed out. But He is the Almighty, and we only know of Him as such, and may therefore trust in Him whilst we acknowledge the existence of that deep mystery, Evil. For Idolatry and all Mythology proceed most evidently from human ignorance, from the terrors, the dreams, and the wonderings of the many with respect to the Being whose Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness was revealed to them, but with which revelation they would not remain content. To these wild fancies of the many, may be added the poetical fancies of the few, and the philosophical reflections of some. Thus was created that aberration of the human mind termed Mythology, a thing deemed by deep critics (Bayle) as of no other worth than to amuse children, and in that study esteemed so worthless we are now about to plunge, fully convinced that the conviction of the reader will be ours, and that it will clearly appear that Egypt with all her religious speculations was not, as Professor Röth and the historical school to which he belongs pretend, the primary source of the belief in One God, or in Monotheism.

Evidently we can never hope to penetrate into the thoughts which inspired generations so long extinct. The first condition of that knowledge would be to investigate the origin of ancient Egypt, and that is impossible. All that remains to be done then is to examine whether the basis of that religion bears any positive relation to the religion of any other nation. Now there are two nations of which we find the marks distinctly traced ; the doctrines of Airyana, and those of

India. If the learned have not as yet attended to the fact so well authenticated of the Egyptian religion being founded upon the tenets of Hermès, it is because ancient Egypt being evidently of much higher antiquity than the worship of Hormuzd, and the derivation of the term not having been sufficiently attended to on account of Zoroaster being considered as the inventor of that word, the matter appears never to have fixed the notice of antiquarians. Besides, the subject was principally investigated by divines, who expected to find a ready solution to all difficulties in the Hebrew, but these hopes have been altogether disappointed by the failure of the learned treatises of Bochart, of Jablonski, of Vossius, of Thomassin, of Pezron, as well as of Dodwell, Calmet, Simon, Stillingfleet, Marsham, Fourmont, Tournemine, Prideaux, Shuckford, and even of Warburton. All this ill success proceeded, we believe, from all these authors going no higher than Egypt and Syria, and from their attempting to explain the fragments cited by Eusebius from Porphyry of the sacred history or ancient history of Phenicia by Sanchoniathon. Now, admitting the latter to have been authentic, they evidently relate to events of which a key was wanting, and generally that key was supposed to lie in the sacred history of the Hebrews. Yet still the adaptation of names was a difficult task, and here Etymology and Hebraic roots proved in each author's hands quite different things. At last Warburton in his rough manner told them some home truths which have for ever quenched the fire lighted with Hebraic roots. Warburton treated indeed Etymology most unceremoniously, turning it into ridicule, and quoting an etymologist in despair who declared that "he not only knew where words came from, but where they were going to." Chaldea and Egypt are to Warburton the

hotbeds of Idolatry, and he adopts fully the opinions of Evhemerus, admitted by Newton,—that of the adoration of the dead Kings and Queens; every city setting up the worship of its founder, and spreading that worship by alliances and conquests. Warburton gives as a rule that holds universally through Antiquity, that a man might, on being told the genius of any particular government, rightly pronounce on the nature of the Gods there worshipped. But although both Newton and Warburton admit Egypt to have preceded Greece, as tells Herodotus, in building altars and erecting statues and temples to the Gods, yet they do not omit Chaldea. They unfortunately merely state that Idolatry rose on the borders of the Tigris because cities were built there, but of Upper Asia nothing is said. Warburton admits that “Zoroaster brought the mysteries into Persia; Cadmus and Inachus into Greece; Orphæus into Thrace,” and would thus appear to place Zoroaster before the time of Cadmus, but as these words follow the admission of Diodorus Siculus’ statement (Lib. 1) that the first and original mysteries began in Egypt and were those of Isis and Osiris, it is evident that he considered the doctrine of Hormuzd as commencing with that lawgiver. Now a substantial proof that can be given that Zoroaster alluded to a state of things previously existing, and which had long before been opposed to Hormuzd, is the name of Aryaman, an Indian term for the Sun, a term which contains the very word that constitutes the Zend Ahura or Airya, but which opposed to Hormuzd and with the addition man signifies a god created, in short, Idolatry. For indeed the Zend Airya is without alteration or very little in the word Aryaman; and Aryamazdo, or Ahura mazdaô being the same identical word as Hormuzd or Ormuz (Al-mazdaô, Almighty), the only real

difference between the terms stands thus, God Almighty (Hormuzd); God man (Aryaman or Herman). This same word Aryaman is in the Vedas, and its higher antiquity is admitted by Professor Röth. All this evidently preceded the Egyptian speculations, even admitting that other proofs are required to establish the anteriority of Mazdeism or Monotheism to the worship of natural phenomena and particularly Sabeism, the worship of the heavenly bodies, which appears to have been the starting point in Hindustan and to have been founded on a basis not its own but evidently previous, since the term Airya or Ahura is the name of the Almighty, is the Hor, the Az, the Er, the El, the Al, &c. of many nations, names given also to the Sun, but all springing from that primary one Ahura.

In thus insisting upon the coincidence of the well known fact of the doctrines of the first Hermèz having been the basis of all Egyptian idolatry or the worshipping of things either such as heavenly bodies, or kings and queens, or as symbolical of various conceptions, it is because admitting Hermèz to be the name of the Almighty, as it is, letter for letter and meaning for meaning, we do not deny that Hermèz, Thot, or Mercurius was said to be an individual. That name had then already changed its high signification, since Hermèz was given out as an individual to whom God had imparted the knowledge of the Hermetic Writings before the creation of Man. Still, what we know of the doctrines prove them to be those considered as taught by Mazdeism or that worship which is denied to have preceded Idolatry, taking it as the conceptions of men in general on the nature of God, and worshipping those conceptions under some likeness, instead of worshipping the Almighty in Spirit and in action. No other signs of a pure religion having preceded Egyptian idolatry



exist, it is true, and even these are accompanied with sufficient proofs to warrant the conclusion that the idolatry of India preceded that of Egypt, such as the first architecture or buildings to the Gods, the names of these Osiris or Osri and Isis; Osri being evidently in connection with the Indian pronunciation of Ahura—Asoura; and the term Isis existing in most ancient Indian mythology. Other particularities we shall point out shortly. As to the descent of the Egyptians from the Chinese, or these from Egypt, the latter supposition has not supported investigation in spite of the probabilities pointed out by Kirchner, Freret, and Desguignes; and as for the first it was never thought of, or if thought of on account of the very high antiquity of China it was immediately answered by the irrecusable proofs that it was from India and not from any other country that Egypt derived all her first religious speculations or Sabeian, but it was not from India, it was not from any symbolic or conceptional imagination of man, that was derived the notion of the Almighty so distinctly traced in the term *Hermès*.

It has been a long debated question whether the Egyptian priests, although well aware of the truth, did not keep that Truth for themselves under the term of *aporreta* or secret doctrine, whilst the symbols which constituted Idolatry were only worshipped by the people. The elucidation of that difficult subject, the real nature of the *isoteric* and *exoteric* doctrines of the ancient Egyptian religion, forms a great part of Bishop Warburton's well known work, on which he has expended all the treasures of his deep erudition. Warburton, as we have seen, aimed at proving that the mysteries taught the existence of One God, and that this Truth, thus hidden from the nation at large, constituted on the contrary in the Mosaic dispensation a universal

belief. A remarkable passage of antiquity given by Syncellus, from Africanus, mentions the very early Egyptian King Suphis as being a contemplator of the Gods, and as having written a sacred book (*Perioétés*); whilst Eusebius gives a very different account of the matter, for he expressly says that Suphis was a contemner of the Gods, and that on his repentance he wrote a sacred book. Warburton explains the diversity by admitting that the mysteries were originally Egyptian and that their great secret consisting in the detection of Polytheism, the revelation of the First Cause, and philosophical speculations concerning his essence, the words of Africanus thereby come in as a remarkable piece of History, for we learn from them the first institutor of the mysteries or *Aporreta*. This conclusion the learned Bishop considers as strengthened by the word *Prioples*, *πριοπλης*, being peculiar to the rites, as by the name given to the books that are read before the initiated, they being termed the Sacred Books of Suphis, and he adds, that if Suphis died, as Marsham and Shuckford say, about forty years after Abraham, he must have obtained through that patriarch some knowledge of the true God. And thus as a believer in God he would have been a contemner of the Gods, as were considered all those who believed in one God; for this doctrine being perilous was kept secret and only divulged to those who were initiated in the mysteries.

It is also to be noticed, in addition to this, that Eusebius, after giving the passage of Sanchoniathon which relates of ancient Phenician history, adds thereto the following brief account taken from a work of Porphyry on the Jewish nation, by which we are told that "Thot or Taut, so famous with the Egyptians, had been a Phenician; that he was the first who wrote worthily

of the Gods without vulgar superstition : that the God Syrmubelus and Thuro, who was afterwards named Chusartis, and who was less ancient than Thot by several centuries, had explained the Theology of the latter, which was hidden under allegories and emblems."

Now, whichever conclusion may be adopted on these abstruse matters, and, however high the authority of the Neo-Platonician philosopher Porphyry may be deemed, yet as those accounts are of the third century after Christ, and written by persons engaged in religious controversy, we shall refer to an author of more ancient date, Diodorus Siculus, as to one evidently impartial, and also to Cicero, who is not so decisive, and merely says that Mercurius having fled into Egypt after having killed Argos, introduced laws and sciences into that country, and was named by the Egyptians Thot, that name being the same as that of the first month of the year. *Hunc Ægyptii Thoth appellant: eodemque nomine anni primus mensis apud eos vocatur.* The second Thot of the Egyptians is here a foreigner, bearing in his own country the name of Mercurius (Melecurius), but we are not told why the name was altered. The name may, indeed, have been given him by the ancient Egyptians, because he came among them in the month called Thot. But be that as it may, we find in Champollion (*Description de l'Égypte*. 1. pl. x.) a very remarkable painting, in which the two Thots are represented assisting at the royal presentation to the Gods of an infant Lagides (Ptolomeus), and on which is inscribed Thoth, Supreme Lord, and Thôout, Lord of the sacred writings. It is well known that the Lagides permitted the Egyptians to follow their ancient religion; therefore this painting plainly shows that the ancient Thot bore the title of the Supreme Lord, and that a somewhat similar name was given to another as having in-

roduced writing. The primitive name, at all events, bears the meaning of Almighty God, and although the painting cannot be older than 300 years before Christ, yet it bears far more on the point we aim at establishing, that of the positive value of the Supreme God given to the word *Thoth* by the ancient Egyptians, than does the testimony of Porphyry in the third century after Christ. The time of this second *Thot's* arrival in Egypt would then have been about 2,000 years before Christ, according to Larcher, who places the birth of Argos, brother of Pelasgus, as occurring in times of such fabulous antiquity. Therefore, the first *Thot* or *Mercurius*, in short *Hermès*, is unquestionably of the very highest Egyptian antiquity. As to laying stress on the opinions attributed to *Suphis*, we need not say that we merely give the views of Warburton, who has said all that could be uttered on the matter. But we prefer proving the point by the evident meaning given to the name in the most olden time of Egypt, for as to laying any stress on the opinions of the Egyptian priests, opinion so carefully hidden, or on the secret of the mysteries so variously interpreted, we lay none whatever. Such opinion is a matter of conjecture. The certitude of the existence of the term *Hermèz*, in the very farthest antiquity of Egypt, is sufficient, we believe, to prove that the notion of the Almighty, of One God, did not originate with the Egyptian priests or with an Egyptian king.

What Diodorus Siculus tells us of *Hermès*, (l. 1, xvi.,) evidently refers to the second *Thot* or *Hermès*, whom he considers as having brought into Egypt all arts and sciences, and music as well as writing. His Asiatic descent is proved by the names of *Hermès* and *Mercurius*, evidently high titles, and proceeding from the *Airyaman*, *Ahura mazd*, and subsequent alterations,

whilst the term *Thoth* is more particularly Egyptian, who added that word to many of the names of their kings before the worship of *Osri* effaced all others. The three great names of the Almighty which they rendered by *Thoth*, *Ammon* and *Osiris*, and which had been preceded by that of *Hermèz*, appear to have occasioned much controversy, and each appear at times as triumphant.

Before entering more closely into the investigation of these names, it will be requisite to expose a few more of the general tenets of the Hindus, in order to be able to refer to those names which are of paramount importance, not only for the comprehension of all Eastern mythology, but also for that of the West. Naturally the subject is too vast to allow of our introducing those divinities which are not evidently linked with the various mythologies that have so much occupied antiquity, and scarcely less so the moderns. Naturally we have nothing to do with the endless Theology or nature of the Hindu *Izwara*, supreme God, or with the *Trimourti*, otherwise than to mention the fact that the attributes of *Izwara*, or Supreme Power, Supreme Wisdom, and Supreme Goodness were expressed by terms at first relating to the Sun, called *Aryaman*, and that they were named *Brahma*, *Wishnu* and *Schiva*, evidently personified in remote antiquity, since the Aryas called themselves *Brahmins* from the earliest period. Their evil spirit they term *Mahasura*, a name evidently Sanscrit, and which bears on its brow the very stamp of Idolatry, inasmuch as that word is that of *Mazdura*, bearing an evil interpretation. It may be considered, it is true, as forming the contrary of *Mithra* (*Mazd-ahura*), name so generally given to the Sun. Yet as *Aryaman* was with *Mazdeans* the term for Evil Spirit, it would certainly appear that the

Sabeians gave the name of Mahasura to what they esteemed the contrary of the Being they worshipped under certain symbols. Angels were named Devas and Asuras or Asors, and were first born of Izwara or Brahma, Pradschapati. All the heavenly bodies were Devas. Indra was the first, the glory of the Heavens, the Sun. Then all natural phenomena—Fire, Earth, Water, Air, Wind, &c.; and rivers, with Ganges (Ganga, Ogga, Anga, Onga), as first born; and mountains, with Himalaya, indeed the highest on earth, as the greatest.

The human being Man was named Pa or Father: Pati and Man. All his conceptions are Maia, or Maja (illusion) in this world, for the Atma or Soul is not to be judged of in this life. The atma or the soul of man is named Djuo Atma, ever sedate; that of the body *Prau-Atma*, ever in motion, never at rest. Porsh, Porsch (Porus), Purusha, was the Atma or Spirit of the Universe—the Sovereign Creator; God without sensible form, and altogether distinct from natural mythology. His eyes are the Sun, his heart the Moon, Indra and fire stream from his lips, his breath is the high wind, and the air we breathe is produced from his navel; Heaven issued from his head, the Earth from his feet, and from his ears proceeded the points of space. Thus Pourucha is the Mahadeva, and becomes Brahma, when this unperceived, invisible, self-existing eternal Cause having first created the *waters* gave them the power of motion, which power produced a golden Egg, sparkling with a thousand glittering rays, and in that Egg dwelt for revolving years the Supreme Being Himself meditating upon Himself, until he came forth as Brahma, the great parent of all rational beings.

If we have thus insisted upon this theological no-

tion of the Hindus, it is to show that Pouroucha or Porush was the very highest conception the Brahmins formed of the Supreme Being, whose name naturally was taken by the chiefs, and from thence transmitted to clans, tribes and associations of people forming nations, so that we shall find the name standing for Man. Poor, Por, Pours, Porus, often pronounced Bor, Boor, Bauer, is a name well known in the West. Indeed, the term appears to have been known to the Greeks as synonymous with Man and God, for in an allegory of Plato, that philosopher supposes all the Gods gathered together at a feast to which Porus was also invited. At the end of the repast, given in honor of Venus, the Gods had all fallen asleep, all except Porus, when Poverty, clothed in rags, with humble gait and suppliant aspect, appears at the door. Porus, whose father was Council and whose mother was Abundance, was so smitten with the beauty of the maiden, notwithstanding her paleness, her sadness, and the tears which still moistened her cheeks, all which did not blanch the ruddy lip nor spoil the fair complexion, that Porus at once proposed himself and was at once accepted. And from this union sprung Cupid or Love, for true Love is the son of Poverty, but his father is Porus, and his grand-dame is Abundance. The allegory proves that the term was known in Greece, but like to that of Man, it evidently had passed from the Prince to the people. The various themes of this word, according to the pronunciation of the vowel and of the first consonant, which was often variously expressed either by P, B or V, apply to many nations, and more particularly to the oldest Celtic tribes, in Italy the Bair or Pair, whence Vir.

But the Spirit of Man expressed by Pra or Fra (for the Zend P was pronounced F when followed by

an r) appears to have been a term of very high honor. It was used even in usual phraseology to express force, abundance and action. Fra ahman was the soul of man (prâna), and it had also the meaning of production. Fri was the *Spiritus generationis*, so much honored by the ancient nations. The term Pradjapatis is rendered by Burnouf *generationis*. Fra, Fro, Phra, was a title taken by the 'highest princes of Airyana. The great Fri-dan or Feridoun is one of the oldest heroes of Iriana. We shall find the name signifying in the West the highest qualifications.

We have mentioned Djauspiter or father of Light, and Ganesa must not be forgotten. Sir W. Jones had already insisted upon the similarity of the functions of this Hindu god with those attributed to Janus. Ganesa, as Janus, is represented as having several heads; like Janus, he was the father, the origin of all things. All beginnings were under the care of Ganesa as of Janus. Ganesa was the chief of the Gods of the Hindu and the God of Wisdom. The two choriambic verses of the Latin poet Sulpitius given by Sir W. Jones as proving the identity of the attributes of Janus with those of this Hindu God are the following:

*Jane pater, Jane tuens, dive viceps, biformis.*  
*O cate rerum Sator, O principium Deorum.*

“Father Janus, all beholding Janus, thou divinity with two heads, and with two forms. O! sagacious planter of all things, and leader of deities.” The term Ganesa or Gansa, Sir W. Jones considers as composed of Isa (Asa), the leader or governor, and Gan, a company, a band of Deities, of whom nine companies are enumerated in the Amarcosh. It will be readily perceived that we are here in full Hindu mythology and far removed from what may be positively considered



as the first speculations of the Brahmins, in which natural phenomena, and the conceptions of the mind respecting the high perfections of the Divinity, were not personified. Sir W. Jones insists particularly on this point, but, at the same time, appears to consider the explanation as exonerating the Brahmins from the charge of Idolatry, as if, whether the symbol be a mental conception of nature, or a personification of the Earth, or of an individual, or an allegorical reference to the power, or to the wisdom, or to the goodness of the Supreme Being, the error was not the same, since no distinction ought to be made, because the mind is thereby naturally disengaged from the Almighty and follows the conception of some human being or other. Varuna or Varouna, a term which in the most ancient Hindu mythology designates the Firmament, and which in the most olden time is found as Ouranous, or Uranus among the Phenicians and more Western nations, being also the PEROUN, dwindles down in more modern mythology to the God of water. Ganga, the personification of the great river, is evidently a conception subordinate to the notion of Water as first production of the Almighty. Water is generally represented by the great river, and the great river by a Nymph. The name of this nymph is given to great personages (female) and Tana, Sara, Onga, Ogga become the great female divinity of the Western world as Water, the Oceanus of the Greek, and also the Minerva, and indeed the primary type of all the goddesses. As to Minerva, that goddess is decidedly European, inasmuch as the name, as we shall see, originated with those populations that are not classed by historians. But Ganga does not merely interest us as an Hindu allegory; this name is of high importance as a mean by which we may hope to arrive at some positive con-

clusion respecting the important question of the relative antiquity of India and Egypt. Onga, the goddess of Sais, from thence named Anais, Anaitis, is at least the same female divinity. Now as this goddess was supposed to have sprung from the head of the divinity in all countries where she is found to exist either in Phenicia, in Greece (Thebes), in Egypt or elsewhere, it would be no easy matter to decide the question, if the name of Ganga (which is evidently the source of this unknown Onga, Onka, Oggar) did not allow of fixing upon India as the original country of the myth. Ourga, Dourga, the female War goddess of the Hindus, may safely be considered as the Virga or the Pallas of the primitive Western tribes, but still it might be maintained (for what has not been asserted on these questions?) that the Hindus had taken the name from the Celts, or the Latins, but it would be difficult to pretend that the name of the river Ganges came either from Egypt or from Europe.

Already at the end of the second century (A. D.) Philostratus, a Grecian philosopher, had asserted that Minerva, Jupiter, Bacchus, Apollo and other gods of the Grecian and Latin Mythology, were to be found in India, but little attention was given to his assertions, and scarcely more when Sir W. Jones entered more fully into the subject in the last century. But the progress of philology proving that all European languages that have been carefully analyzed are to be reduced either to the Zend or else to the Sanscrit, and all our knowledge of the ancient Egyptian tongue or the Cophth tending to a like conclusion (so far as the efforts of Klaproth, &c., have any value), it is now quite impossible to point to any other origin of certain names than to Hindustan. The question then remains undecided between Airya and Bharata, which

latter name is found among the nine divisions of the Earth, as the portion of Bharat, whom the Hindus consider as one of the nine sons of the King of the Earth, Kaikyis (Kai-chous?), or else a descendant of the Sun (Rama) or of the Moon (Douchmanta) dynasties. These races bear reference to the wars of the Brahmins with the Pandous or Pandâvas. Gangâ was surnamed Bhagirati from a king of Ayodha Bhagirata, who caused the goddess to come down from Heaven, i. e., who in all probability first personified the river as Goddess, or who caused a statue of the goddess to be made. Gangâ is then decidedly Hindu. But respecting the divisions of the powers of Nature equally represented by the Hindus, and by the Egyptians under *eight* forms, it becomes a more difficult matter to say which *speculation* was taken from the other. That of the Hindus unites in its favor (in its pristine state) much simplicity, indeed a simplicity more Zend than Sanscrit, as if these conceptions of the phenomena of Nature had preceded all mythology. The position of this question, as it exists between India and Egypt, is admirably summed up by Sir W. Jones in the following words, which will ever, we believe, constitute the last limits of our knowledge on the subject. "Many learned Mythologists consider the peaceful Minerva as the Isis of Egypt, from whose temple at Sais a wonderful inscription is quoted by Plutarch, which has a great resemblance to the four Sanscrit verses which constitute the text of the Bhâgavat, 'I am all that hath been, and is, and shall be, and my veil no mortal hath ever removed,' the first verse of the Sanscrit being, 'Even I was even at first, not any other thing; that which exists, unperceived, supreme: afterwards I am that which is, and he who must remain am I.' For my own part," continues Sir W. Jones "I have no doubt that the

Iswara, or God of Nature, and Isa-ni (his consort or power) of the Hindus are the Osiris and Isis of the Egyptians, though a distinct essay would be requisite in order to demonstrate their identity: they mean, I conceive, the *Powers of Nature*, considered as Male and Female; and Isis, like the other goddesses, represents the active power of her lord, whose *eight* forms, under which he becomes visible to men, were thus enumerated by Cálidása near two thousand years ago. ‘*Water* was the first work of the Creator; and *Fire* receives the oblation of clarified butter, as the law ordains; the *Sacrifice* is performed with solemnity; the *two Lights* of heaven distinguish time; the subtil *Ether*, which is the vehicle of sound, pervades the universe; the *Earth* is the natural parent of all increase; and by *Air* all things breathing are animated; may Isa, the *power* propitiously apparent in these eight forms, bless and sustain you.’ The five elements, therefore, as well as the Sun and Moon are considered as Isa, or the Ruler, from which word *ísí* may be regularly formed, though *Isáni* be the usual name of his *active Power*, adored as the Goddess of Nature.” The belief expressed by Sir W. Jones in the passage which follows the one quoted, viz., that future research would prove the whole Egyptian mythology to have been taken from the Hindus, “we shall in time, I am persuaded, discover, by means of the Puranas, all the learning of the Egyptians, without deciphering their hieroglyphics,” we shall see in noticing briefly the general tenets of Egyptian worship (the exoteric).

A far more difficult problem is the real nature of the evident link which unites Airyana and Bharata or Aryavartta (Hindustan). Eugène Burnouf, who maintains almost single the opinion of the primary source of the Hindus being Airyana (Heeren is of the

opposite belief), considers as strongly fortifying the view he takes of the subject, the fact that the Brahmins seem to have borrowed from the Athornés of the Airyanians the word Nâbhanedichtha, in the Zend Nabânazdista. He remarks that this word, given by Colebroke as the name of a son of Manu who had been deprived of his inheritance (*Asiat. Res.*, vol. viii. p. 384), and which Burnouf considers to be the same as the Zend term Nabânazdista (the opposite to the ancient men), has either been taken from the Sanscrit by the Zend, or by the latter from the Sanscrit. Burnouf positively affirms on this subject that nâbha is not at the present time to be explained by the Sanscrit, whilst in Zend it has, so that if our actual knowledge is to be consulted the verdict would be in favor of the Zend, since that idiom furnishes an explanation. In Zend the Nabânazdista indicate the novators or the new men, those who are opposed to the ancestors, called men of the first law. The term in Zend, in Airya, signifies a novator, whilst the Brahmins claim it for a name of one of their clan, of one who had been disinherited by Manu, the founder of the Indian community. Burnouf therefore maintains the word to be originally Zend, and asks if it does not seem probable that the Brahmins finding the word as relating to their immediate ancestors in their traditions, and not knowing the Zend meaning of it, may have taken it for the name of an ancestor, and therefore placed it as such in the Rig-Veda. The term men of the first law may, says the same philologist, refer to the Pischdadians, who might have been the common ancestors of the Airyans of Bactriana, and of the Aryans of India. In Zend the name of the men of the ancient law is Poériodekéschans.

Certainty then there is none as regards the pri-

mary source of the term Airya. Nor is the question limited to the reciprocal assertions of the Hindu and the Iranian people. Heturya or Assyra, Suria or Syria, Airyman or Armenia, are not without very plausible reasons for deciding in favor of their several claims. Arabia bears also the mysterious name, and Touran with the bordering populations on each side of the Oxus (Bactriana, Sogdiana). The town of Balk or Bakhter, one of the oldest towns in Upper Asia, and therefore surnamed Omoul-Beland, or the ancestor or ancient mother of towns, by the Asiatics; this town, the Bactra of the Greeks, the Balkh of the Persians, and Bahika of the Hindus, offers a particularity not unworthy of consideration, which is to be found in the *Ariana Antiqua* of Mr. Wilson. It consists in the name of this town bearing among the surrounding nations a sense which marks it out as having at one time constituted a central point, towards which all eyes were turned, and of this fact Mr. Wilson has, evidently without intention, furnished decisive proof. Thus in canvassing the sources of the name, which Burnouf affirms to mean the North or Northern town, Mr. Wilson remarks that it may be so, but that he is quite certain that the term Bakhter also means East, and that it has likewise the signification of West. The term *Omoul*, by which it is designated, proves at all events the great antiquity of the city.

The word Om is in itself a great mystery among philologists. It is in all the East a sacred term, though variously pronounced, and signifies the Supreme Being. Eugène Burnouf finds much probability in the explanation of the term given by Windischman. The latter, remarking that the Zend pronoun Ava (this), which in Sanscrit has been lost as a pronoun, but has been retained as a preposition, with the signification "from

—down,” as *ava-tar* (trē), to spring from, to descend, with the original meaning, “to alight down at *this* place;” whilst in other terms the remnants are scarcely to be recognized. Windischman therefore admits that the neuter Zend *AOṂ* for *AVUM* supposes a Sanscrit *OM*; and this is found in the well-known name of *BHĪRAMA ŌM*. This is no mere supposition, says Burnouf, for if in Sanscrit the highest denomination of Brahma is the neutral *Tad* (Him, It, as neuter, *Illud*), the neuter *OM*, which signifies the same thing, may very well have been adopted to signify the Supreme Being.

The term *AN*, evidently of very high import in cases almost similar, has been considered as a peculiar manner of pronouncing the mysterious *OM*, and also as equivalent to the cardinal number One. In this latter case the formation of the word would proceed as that of the term *OM* from a pronoun. Now this constitutes a real matter of fact, and it must not be considered in the light of an etymological refinement. The word *êka* (one) has evidently such a derivation, and the defective pronoun in the same tongue, *êna*, is considered as the source of the Greek *oinos*, the Latin *unus* or *unos*, the Gothic *einer*, the English *one*, &c., &c. Nor is this fact confined to the Sanscrit, since the very first authorities in such matters unite in agreeing that among the whole sweep of Indo-European languages the same rule obtains, the number ONE being expressed by pronouns of the 3d person, affording, it is true, a vast multiplicity of expressions for that number, but all agreeing in the general rule. Another rule equally universal in these idioms is relative to the various vowels standing for each other; and thus *AN*, *ON*, *UN*, *EN*, *IN*, may equally represent the same term and bear the same meaning. And the usual extension of signification adapted to the same term holds with this word as

with all others, if indeed not more so. It is therefore a usual expression of the Divinity, and dates as such from the root of the very language, but it also stands for all things superior, elevated, and raised above others so as to be isolated. It is equally a well-authenticated fact that sounds serving as the indefinite article are usually joined to such primitive terms, although these articles are to be distinguished therefrom; thus a B, a P, a T, a Th, a D, equally represent the same thing as does the letter M, so often used for B. Therefore MAN, MON, MEN, as BAN, TAN, THAN, DAN, are the same as MON, &c., when used to express the same thing. Now these words, and very especially the term HAN, or the H strongly aspirated KHAN, DJAN, are terms in constant use for expressing high rank and power, and, at this very day, the expression Khan, variously worded, bears that meaning over the whole wide tract of country in which the Indo-European, Asio-European idioms prevail. It is the Kong, King, Kœnig, Choun, Chan, of actual times as it was four thousand years ago, when the Chons governed in Greece as Ar-chons, and the Kons in Saturnia or Italy as Tar-chons. We have already remarked that these most ancient titles are still borne by the chiefs of the tribes which wander over the steppes of Tartary. But the highest value of the term was derived from its being expressive of the Divinity from the most remote periods of antiquity, and indeed it may be inferred from thence that the high meaning the word expressed was not merely enhanced thereby, but preceded the notion of temporal power. Thus the term TAN, as expressive of country, of land, has the meaning of Extension, of Space, and also, according to Burnouf, that of Creative Power, and such significations evidently refer to the attributes of the Deity. It is therefore no etymological fallacy to admit that the



deepest scrutiny proves that a term significative of Unity, whether as ON or OUM (Him), or as ON, AN, UN (one), appears really to have preceded all mythological conception ; and this conclusion may be considered as holding at least over the whole range of Asio-European idioms or tongues. Now as regards the old Egyptian, we are certainly very defective in positive knowledge, but if the term HERMEZ is admitted to be at the bottom of all Egyptian religious conceptions, that of AMON or AMOUN is no less a positive fact, and as that mystical word finds in the signification of the word in Zend and Sanscrit (more especially in the latter) a ready interpretation, since AMMON would then signify the ONE GOD, it is unquestionable that the worship of Thoth, of Ammon, and of Osiris, all terms perfectly comprehensible in the Asio-European tongues, were the names of the Highest God with the ancient Egyptians, and appear each in their turn to have obtained pre-eminence, though not without much strife and bloodshed. Such an issue is certainly deeply to be deplored, but the man who has trust in Him who revealed His Existence as the Almighty, may safely refer to that Faith in matters conversant of *the Ways of God*. As to the term Pir-omi, it would appear merely to express a superlative, and may be added to the proofs which have already been adduced that the Egyptian religion, if furnishing any proof, furnishes two. The one, that unconsciously they themselves bear witness against their own idolatry ; the other, that *symbols* are to be avoided, not merely when they represent physical phenomena, or signify persons, but also when they constitute mental conceptions relative, as all are, to human views of things ; for Power and Wisdom and Goodness, as attributes of the Almighty, are matters of Faith or Trust,—not as a rational faith,

which proceeds either from intuition or from inference, but a faith founded on the Almighty as revealed, and that revelation as transmitted.

The term *Thot*, *Thoyt*, *Tent*, which has always been considered as equivalent to *Theos*, *Deus*, *Tis*, *Dis*, finds also in *Djus*, or *Dius* (Sanscrit) *Light*, a ready interpretation, and conforms with the Latin *Dies*, the *Day*, as attribute of the Deity, for *Jove* was also the *Ether*, as was *Zeus*. The same word *Thot* appears identical with *daev*, or *div*, but it is evident that two distinct notions reign in this term, the one referring to *Intelligence* and *Goodness*, and the other to *Light* as the great natural phenomenon which is, and renders all things apparent. Now is it not evident that taking knowledge, such as we have it, as a criterion, the clear meaning in *Zend* and *Sanscrit* of the terms *HERMEZ*, *THOYT*, *AMMUN*, *ORISIS* and *ISIS* (to *Fré* we shall refer later), bear strongly towards the conclusion that the *Egyptian* religion was really grounded on a basis *Airyanian*, however high that period may rise as to its beginning, and that *Monotheism* was in reality a starting point and not a conclusion. As to the source of the word *Thoyt*, or *Khot*, from the *Persian* *Khoda* (self-created), it is far from being admitted by the best philological authorities, and would, if admitted, prove nothing more than a metaphysical conception, for self-creation is a matter of *Faith* in *Divine Power*, and not a subject of human knowledge, that can scarcely rise to the height which is requisite to conceive the *Creation*, much less that of conceiving the relations of the *Almighty* towards Himself. The radicals of the word *Dyt* or *Tyt* are according to *Burnouf* the *Zend* *di* or *dhî* analogous to the *Sanscrit* *dhyaî*, which both signify *Thought* and *Intelligence*, and are always given as synonymous with *Buddhi*. In this latter word, it is true, the mean-

ing of All-seeing, of wide awake, is included as in the Thibetan expression SANG GYA MOUNI, but which is also expressive of Intelligence. We have already remarked that the Brahmins give to God the name of Dêva, whilst the Parsees, following the tradition of their ancestors, give the corresponding term Daeva to the evil spirit, but we have not said that Burnouf considers this fact as proving incontestably that long before Zoroaster the Brahmins made use of that word as expressive of the Supreme Being, of the Almighty, and that it was transmitted through the agency of the Sanscrit idiom to the various European tongues where it forms Zeus, Sdeus, Deus, Dews, &c. The Brahmins always maintain that their symbolism is no idolatry because at the bottom God is the foundation. Therefore others must have given to that symbolism its right name, and who could it be but the worshippers of one God, those who considered Aryaman as the type of the Evil Spirit ?

The Zend Erëzata corresponds, according to Burnouf, to the Sanscrit Radjata. Both terms signify an object of high value, and silver (*argentum*). They are said to be derived from the verbal radical rândj (color), but Burnouf derives them from the Zend rih as radical, and the Sanscrit term from the root arh, in that latter idiom, both bearing the same meaning, that of value and of elevation. The same radical exists in the term Heri (master) that with or without the H is so many names of the Deity, in which also the vowel is either *e*, or *a*, or *o*, or *u*, and the final consonant in the Semetic idioms always an *l*. It is, says Burnouf, a contraction of the word AHURA. Another royal title which Sir William Jones considered as signifying King is the word Ke or Kai, because in the name Cyaxare, as in other names reserved to the chief, it is only to be

found. Sir William's conjecture has proved to be right. It belongs to the second dynasty of the ancient Iranian sovereigns, and is considered as a family name, whilst Kaôus is, according to Burnouf, the generic name of King, and stands for Kava-us, or uç, meaning *Magister prudens*, ancient and wise, and says that it may also mean the Sun, as Mr. Wilson supposes; but that meaning Burnouf conceives as indirect, as given because all those Asiatic princes were supposed to be descendants of the Sun.

The Sanscrit and Zend term Pra and Fra, derived from fri, the moving spirit of man, or indeed, according to ancient idolatry (which adopted without hesitation the "common sense doctrine," admitting "the voice of Nature as the voice of God"), the ruling spirit, and constitutes the Spirit worshipped under the form of the "lingam," appears in the Occident under less odious conceptions. This very natural deity (if Nature is to be admitted as law) must have been admitted as such before the term came to constitute the basis of the ordinal number First; Sansc. *Prathama*; Zend *Fra-thema*; Latin *Primus*; Lithuanian *Prima*; Gothic *Frum's*; Greek *Protos*; Old Slavonic *Pervyi*; Old High German *Erister* (Erst from Er). As this is a word, which evidently was in Hindustan the name of a subordinate deity, and although it constitutes the radical of the ordinal number *first*, will be found in the West as a divinity generally worshipped, and as one of the great gods, it being expressive of Fire and deity at the same time, it is requisite to investigate the matter rather closely. We do it the more readily, because we have found nowhere a clearer trace of the positive connection that can thus be demonstrated between the East, Egypt, and the West.

In Egypt *Fre* unites *Kneph*, and in Egypt *Fré* is

*Osiris.* In the West, *Fro* or *Fru* is a high divinity, and *Fra* is the great female goddess. Some notion may be formed of the high antiquity of the use of the word in Europe, when it can be proved that it constitutes the radical of the mysterious name of the female divinity worshipped by the ancient Sabins, and by them transmitted to the Etrusci, the Goddess *Minfra* or *Men-Fra*, the Minerva of the ancient Helleni and of the Romans. The sense of "Men" is dubious, it may mean the Moon, or it may signify Mind or Intelligence; but *Fra* stands unquestionably for Goddess. The confusion created by the various manner in which P, or F, or Ph, was pronounced, it being often pronounced B, may have veiled the real character of the term. In the West, it has nothing odious: it is a name of honor, borne by Kings and Princes; and high born dames aspired to the title of *Frau*. But the name became common, and took the place of weif or weip, as signifying *woman*. As a name, Kings were proud to bear that of *Fro* and of *Frotho*. Thracian Kings seem to have taken the name of the ancient Persian hero *Fridan*, but the word in the Celtic manner was pronounced *Prydan*, and the same name being that of an ancient Cambrian prince renowned in war, the island of Albion is said to have derived its name from that king. We find in Bopp's comparative grammar that the suffix *to* is a Sanscrit abbreviation, and corresponds to the Latin *tu* (*in quartus*), whilst in Zend the termination is *tho*, which explains the corresponding termination in the ordinal numbers of kindred European languages *fifth*, *sixth*. It is singular to find in the first ordinal number the name of a mythological deity; whilst in the cardinal number ONE appears a term, used especially to signify the Supreme Being. In the latter case the conclusion may appear forced which admits that it was the notion

of the Unity of God that presided in the formation of the term ON; why indeed, may it be said, should the notion of a God interfere in the matter? And yet the thing is evident in the formation of the ordinal number First, and stands good in all the kindred languages. But Pri, Fri, Fro, Fru, be it pronounced as one will, is Pyr, is Fire, is Spirit: the formation of the ordinal number "first" stands to Fré in the same relation as Erst does to Er or Her (evidently derived from a term which indicated something of the highest value in all Indo-European tongues). Nor is the similitude limited to one name: the identity of Fre, as Spirit, as Fire, with the well-known term Ar, Art, Tar, Czar, Lar, under which the notion of God was ever concealed; although strangely symbolized, this identity can be proved in many probatory instances. The great Teutonic Divinity Herthus, or Artus, or Herthor, or Ar-Thor, was the name of the Earth, and the female divinity Ertha is Terra and Tella, according to the various pronunciation of the *L* and the *R*. Ar, Or, Ur, are various terms for AHURA. Thor, is The God, or God. Ar-thor, Ar-thur, Herthor, Herthus, is the great god, the earth; and the term at first masculine (Tellus) becomes doubled (duality) male and female. Still, in this symbol (the Earth) it is the notion of God that gives to the word its high bearing. Now the equivalent exists with Fri or Pri, for, in Zend, Prithe-iryān is Earth, is Arthor or Herthus. The terms are very different, but Prit, Brit, or Fritho, of which the primary signification was Fire, become Earth, because, they are the name of the divinity. The tribes that governed all Europe for a time; those of Asiatic origin, that built the first walled cities, or rather citadels in stone, termed after them Towers, or in Latin *Turris*, and which tribes were evidently Pelasgic, and connected with the Phenicians, and the

Tyrrhenians of old, gave to their fortresses, in which an altar was always placed, a name indicating the divinity worshipped therein; thus Arx, Alx, Larissa, Tyr, Prith, Pyrta, Porti, Prytane, Frith, and Afrit, all indicate the fortress and the temple, the Ere or Erinc, as the form was usually circular. Turris or Tower, Greek *Πορτις*, *Portis*, Sanscrit *Prithis*, Zend Afriti, are all names which refer to the worship. Carthage or Karta the Great was also Afrita, the well fortified, and the name of Africa became thus in use among the Romans instead of that of Libya, the former appellation. The gothic Ans or Hans means also fortified, and is also a term for the deity.

Whether the first deviation from faith in the Almighty consisted in the worship of the *symbol* or something physical, some natural phenomenon, or was that of the conception or *Myth*, we do not pretend to determine. The symbol always contains some mythic conception, but Myths can be worshipped without any symbol. Lord Bacon evidently in naming Errors the idols of the mind, points to that fact. But as we only attempt here to judge of things according to Tradition, and not according to laws of mind supposed to have existed many thousand years ago, we are therefore obliged to take Language as a criterion. Now, we know of no idiom more general than the Indo or Asio-European, and especially the Zend and the Sanscrit as primary sources. As symbol, Fire has been worshipped from the earliest times, and from the earliest times the adorers of fire have been called Idolaters. The Parsees say that Zoroaster considered Fire merely as a Symbol, and the Sun as an object representing its Maker, and yet to all practical purposes the Symbol takes the place of the Divinity. Moses and Zoroaster both refer to the Almighty, to Him who was *first* wor-

shipped ; but what a difference between the clear and definite notion of God given by the Hebrew legislator from that of the Bactrian ! The Sun is certainly the glory of its Maker, but the proof that the Symbol took the place of the Supreme Being it represented, is to be found in the impossibility of the Parsee to do without his symbol. So it is with all Symbols. Nor does it fare better with the Myth or the conception, when that conception becomes a mental symbol, and it is maintained that unless that conception or Myth be admitted, there is no Faith or Trust in God. These Myths are of many kinds, but the most common is the Scientific Myth. It exists when men, according to their varied experience, maintain that the relations of phenomena are exactly those they deem them to be. These relations are more or less positive, but usually it is the anticipation, the hypothesis that is given out as the limit, as the boundary fixed by the Almighty. God is then called in as having fixed them so, and it becomes a matter of Faith to believe or not to believe in the conception. It is thus that Scientific beliefs of nations bearing many thousand years of date are deemed matters of Faith in God, and the man who does not believe that our planetary system was framed according to Hebrew Science, becomes an Unbeliever in God !

If Mr. Hume had said that Polytheism, instead of being the first and most ancient religion of mankind, was a natural consequence of worshipping any conception whatsoever, either symbolical as the Sun or a fetish, or mythic as the god of war, of wine, or of love, he would not have confounded Idolatry and Polytheism. The worship of any thing created, as well conceptual as physical, constitutes Idolatry, although no real idol, and only one object, as the Sun, or Fire, may be worshipped. Here Mr. Hume forgets to say, be-



cause he did not know it, that the name of God is at the bottom of all the various terms; and the God revealed, at the bottom of all the conceptions, proves the starting point to have been that revealed Being. Mr. Hume, it is true, maintains that it is impossible that Man, after framing an Almighty God by means of his Reason, should afterwards fall back and split that conception in ten thousand pieces. This he says because it was too evident that knowledge was not the primary cause of the notion of God. But then he denies that Man could have misconceived God had he been revealed. Now, as the misconception began by taking human conception (symbol or myth) as objects of faith instead of the Almighty, the error was gradual; a veil was thrown over the fault. The symbol and the myth, it was maintained, do not cause Man to lose sight of the Almighty; on the contrary, they keep him in the right path, and men were thus carried off to Idolatry many thousand years back, as they are at the present day. If the question be started why men had the Free-will to act wrong, we can only point to the fact that the notion of the Almighty, of God, lies at the bottom of all idolatry, even in that of Fire. The worship of Fire either followed or preceded that of the Sun. In *Aryaman* we find God symbolized in the Sun; the Brahmins deny it to be idolatry; but we know to what it led, and if Fire came to be worshipped as a consequence of the symbolization of God in the Sun, it was evidently the generalizing of the qualities of that one object, the Sun; bestowing on Heat a divine qualification, as the name indeed bore. If the worship of Fire was the symbolization of a pure Spirit, the fact may serve as a proof of the danger of symbols, and also of that of attempting to frame any notion of God, otherwise than as the Almighty. That the term Spirit is

capable of becoming a myth and a symbol, is evident from the fact of man's having attempted to conceive by that term and to symbolize by Fire, the Almighty Intelligence of whom Trust or Faith alone is conversant. Even the conception of pure Spirit becomes perfectly inadequate if a closer apprehension be aimed at. Mr. Hume denies that Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Supreme Goodness, in short, that the idea of a Perfect being could exist before Man had a notion of limited qualities; but the position of the question appears to us to be erroneously stated. The intuitive belief of man in physical, intellectual and moral relation: a general belief carried out continually in positive conceptions, is not contradictory to the notion of Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness, notion always relative to what man cannot but believe. It is however no longer the same when a spirit comes to be conceived. This conception is of another order. It is a conception somewhat mythic inasmuch as man must attempt to *idealize*, to figure God, and of such a conception Light and Fire are means of embodying, as it were, his thoughts. It is the attempt to materialize (if we may be permitted to use the term when Spirit is concerned) that constitutes a levelling of Supreme Perfection to a something conceivable to human intellect. Now the essence of Trust in God is that He is perfectly inconceivable, and that our Faith is not to be measured by our conceptions, but by our Trust in those Perfections. This deviation from Trust in God; this aiming at conceiving that which from the nature of the communication itself is only conceivable as Supreme in Power, in Intelligence and in Goodness (all faculties well known to man in relation to himself, but only by Faith in relation to God), is however a great mystery still, for the eternal question is ever reproduced, why was man thus

created to err? Deny human will, and the whole is not only perfectly unintelligible to Reason, but unintelligible to Faith. Unless man has some will of his own, unless human will exists, no original sin can exist. Admit human will, and the mystery is a matter of Faith in Divine Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness. Deny human will, and Faith has not wherewith to act upon. As to the creation of Man in a state of innocence, evidently it must have been so, but at the same time the seeds of Evil existed, and sprung up. But the creation of Man as perfect cannot be, for the very fact of committing evil is contrary to man's perfection. But in our conception of God revealed as the Almighty, it is Trust in Him, it is Faith alone that is the umpire. The doctrine of Grace is a theological conception, it is a kind of reasoning upon the nature of God. Faith is quite sufficient; for the doctrine of Grace admits of the validity of human reason in matters above her competence, and furthermore is useless, as it cannot do without Faith in God. The upshot of such reasonings has ever been the two extremes farthest from Faith in the Almighty, i. e., Pantheism and Fatalism. Man undoubtedly has a right to reason upon the nature of the Supreme Being made known to him in a manner so peculiar; for indeed the notion of the existence of the Almighty thus revealed is and has ever been a kind of ferment for the human mind. It is impossible that he should not reason upon a subject of such a nature, but as the first measure to be taken in all questions of whatsoever nature they may be, is to begin by precisising the fact about which the investigation is to be pursued, and as the result cannot be any other than either intuitive faith or positive Faith (rational), or else Faith in the Almighty as distinct from the two others, so the matter on that one point (the primary

source of the knowledge of God) can be brought to a ready issue. If intuition, Reason can add nothing; if Reason, it must by its very nature be constantly varying; but if revealed, it is a matter of Trust in the Attributes revealed: those attributes announce Supreme Perfection, and in that we repose our Faith. The Calvinist has as much right to believe his own reasonings on a matter which he owns to be perfectly above all human comprehension; he has as much right to do so, as others have to deny his conclusions, or, as men have not to believe in any thing if they can so form their mind. Free will is a gift of God, and the inconsistency which the human view of Grace attempts to alleviate, can only be done by means of the sacrifice of that high privilege, where Reason finds herself so completely benighted, i. e., the right of acting wrong.

Our purpose being limited here to the results furnished by Tradition aided by Ethnology, we can proceed no farther on this subject without encroaching upon another order of argument. However deep the abyss of Tradition, it cannot prevent one fact from rising above its dark and troubled waters, and that fact is, that with a very great portion of the human race, it is the very name of God that constitutes all symbolism and all myths. The symbol and the myth may be rejected, but the notion of God yet remains unimpaired and a matter of fact, into the nature of the source of which fact we shall proceed to investigate. Among many philological facts having reference to the question at issue is one more which cannot be passed over in silence. It is the use in the Sanscrit and Zend of a superlative preposition, *ut*, in the first and *us* in the second. The *ut* is clearly the same as the *at*, *ait*, *ad*, and *het* of many composed terms to which this particle imparts a notion of superiority. The same may

be said of the particle *ak*, or *ek*, which has the signification of highness, superiority. It is for *eka* (one) and is sometimes written *ag*. Thus *AT-AL* signifies the High or great God: *Ac man*, *Het man*, the high chief.

#### ASSYRIA : PHENICIA.

Before we proceed to investigate more closely the myths of Egyptian idolatry, it may be requisite to say a few words of Assyria, and of Phenicia. In Assyria, as in Egypt, the remark of Damascius, the neo-platonic philosopher, stands good, who says—their religion consisted in dividing that which was united. Sabeism, in Assyria, evidently preceded the worship of Fire, but it appears that the Sun was figured or personified at Babylon by a two-winged human figure, representing the creating and nourishing principles. The figures were male and female, Baal: Baaltis or Mylitta. The leading idea was that of the Brahmins and other idolaters,—the notion of the incarnation or descent of the god represented by the idol. Layard considers one of the figures, the four-horned one, on a basso relievo to represent Belus. Lucian agrees with Diodorus Siculus in admitting that the Assyrians had borrowed the art of the statuary from the Egyptians. The Persians, it is well known, put an end to the idolatry of the Babylonians, and to the immense statues covered with plates of beaten gold weighing in that of Zeus (Djeus) a thousand talents, as also that of Hera. In Phrygia, the great goddess or female divinity was especially worshipped, and Strabo mentions the Goddess Aggdistis as being from time immemorial in veneration. The term variously worded by Casaubon is susceptible of a Teutonic interpretation, if not indeed a Grecian: Hoch-

göttin, Actheia, or Agstheia. The great diversity of the orthography of this word may serve to display the difficulty which is met with in explaining such terms; it is found written Aggidistin, Aggisthei, Angidistin, Acedestis, Agdistin, which latter Casaubon tells us stands for Aicstin (Strabo, Lib. x., Galatia). This circumstance is merely mentioned with respect to the ethnological difficulty, for, as regards our aim, it is sufficient to know that the goddess worshipped was the great goddess, the female divinity, the mother of the gods, that corresponds with the Assyrian Tana and Hera, and appears to have been the same as Astarte (Ast-art-a), and also Mylitta or Melissa, the *s* and the *t* being equally used in Assyria, which latter term in Strabo is replaced in general by the word Aturia. In such instances the difficulty occasioned by such differences is very slight, but when quite different names appear for divinities and persons admitted to be the same, it is only the general meaning that can prove the identity, leaving the discrepancy to be accounted for by the diversity of the idiom. Thus after the Persian conquest of Babylon when names such as Cyrus, Xerxes, Artaxerxes, &c. appear in history; such names, though very different from Sar-dan-phal or Czar-Haddon, Assar-Haddon, have much the same meaning, for in high antiquity *Sar*, *Tar*, *Her* also meant victorious and conqueror. But when the same individual, such as the reputed father of Sardanapalus, is named by Usher, *Phul*; by Africanus, *Acracarnes*; by Eusebius, *Ocracipes*; by Stephanus of Byzantium, *Kyndaraxes*; by Strabo, *Arrien* and *Suidas Anakyndaraxes*, and the same is found in Atheneus, written *Anabaxares*, it is evident that various titles and various idioms are united to express one and the same person. Still the high bearings of the various syllables forming such names

always stand good. The term Sar-dan, besides bearing evident marks of being the same as Tsar-Than, is well known to have meant great chief or great king, and although the Greeks rendered it by Carcinus, or Cancer, or Scorpion, such an interpretation is now no longer admissible. The identical value of the letters *L* and *R*, now well authenticated, explain the identity of *Ar*, *Er*, and *Ur* with *Al*, *El*, and *Ul*. Idolatry, in Assyria, from the earliest times, consisted in the worship of Kings and Queens, who had adopted the names of the heavenly bodies and other natural phenomena, which names themselves were derivations of the name of God. The difficulties of Assyrian history, therefore, do not prevent it from being very evident that the Zeus, the Tana, and Hera mentioned by Diodorus Siculus as having enormous statues erected in their honor, are names which find in ancient language, of which the Zend and Sanscrit are remnants, a ready solution, for they refer to names of the Almighty, but debased by Idolatry. Of this Sir Isaac Newton was perfectly aware when he tells us in his Chronology that the names of the Assyrian kings were those of their gods, such as Bel, or Baal, or Pal, or Phul; Chaddon, Haddon, Ed-don, Adon, Adonis, Melec, Moloch: Atsur, Assur; Atra or Adra-Melec. Sar-Assar-Shar-Assar: Assur-haddon or Esar-hadon. Sar-danapal or Esar-Haddon-Pul. Bel-Adon; Chiniladon or Chan-El-Adon: Nabonassar, or Nabo-Adon-Asur. Nebo-Pul-Assar: Nebo-Chaddon-Assur: Nebuzaradon or Nebo-Assur-Adon: Rab-Saris, or Rab-Assur; Nebo-Shash-Ban: Mardocempad or Mero-dachempad.

We have not here to unravel that Gordian knot of historians, Assyrian antiquity; the number of kings having borne the name of Esar-dan-Pal does not prevent the value of the term being the same whether

only one king bore it or a dozen, although its very general meaning may cause it to be considered in the light of a general name. We have not to discuss the insoluble question as to whether Esar-Haddon, the great conqueror, is also Sar-dan-pal; but we can point out in both names the evident derivation from names, used to express the Deity. All these names, it is true, are comparatively modern when compared to the times of the founders of Nineveh and Babylon, according to Diodorus Siculus, but the same author tells us that Bactria was already an ancient town. The name of the king of Bactres dethroned by Ninus, we are told was Oxy-Arte, and we find in Alexander the Great's time, an Oxyarte king of Bactres, whose daughter Roxane, or Rhoxane, married that conqueror. Now a name higher in antiquity than those of Nineveh and Babylon; a name which is considered to have been a common title of the sovereigns of the country as that of Pharaon was of sovereigns in Egypt, is unquestionably derived from the well-known term AHURA; for the first syllable *Oxy*, may be considered as *Eka*, or *Agga*, having the meaning of superior, or of first, whilst in *Arte* or *Ardā* we find the term used, in later times, by the Persians and by the Etruscans about 1500 years before Christ, as a title of nobility. The ancient Egyptian *ag-nomen*, or surname of Ph-araon, is also considered by all historians as signifying the Lord, and on this point Assyria and Egypt concur in proving the high antiquity of the term from whence such names are derived. Now, whether it was Ninus that built Nineveh, or Assur: whether Babylon was built by Belus or by Semiramide; Belus or Baal, being the god, both these names of *Assur*, and *Bel* are evidently derivations from the Airyanean AHURA or AHULA. The foundation of two large cities such as Nineveh and



Babylon by the same family more readily accounts for their flourishing at the same time, than by supposing them to have been built by different conquerors, and at different periods. But whether Semiramis was the wife of Nabonassar, and this latter the constructor of Nineveh and also named Belus and Ninus, we have not here to determine. At all events if Semiramis placed in the temple of Belus at Babylon statues of which one, that of Jupiter Belus, in erect position is said by Diodorus Siculus to have been forty cubits in height; this circumstance would cause it to be highly probable that the antiquity of Semiramis has been greatly exaggerated, because the art of the statuary does not appear to have been so greatly advanced anywhere as in Egypt, where statues of that description did not exist 1800 years before Christ. The siege of Troy, which occurred according to Larcher 1200 years, and according to Newton 900 years before Christ, is said to have occurred when Teutamos reigned in Assyria, who sent his son Memnon with 10,000 men to the help of Priam. The statue of Zeus, a wooden figure with three eyes, which was considered as having been the household god of Priam, and to have stood behind the altar to which that old king fled from the cruel hand of Pyrrhus, fell to the lot of Stenelaus, son of Capaneus, and was shown at Argos. The famous Palladium or Statue of Minerva, was also in wood. All these statues we are told by Pausanias came from Phenicia, as also the figures of Eracles, Hermès, and of Theseus; and Herodotus, who flourished at a later period, being born 484 years before Christ, expressly mentions the statues in the temples being made of wood (L. 2, 143). If then a queen of Assyria of the name of Semiramis erected statues of the description given by Diodorus Siculus, such a circumstance would be far more prob-

able in the time of Nabonassar, 747 years before Christ, than at any period of higher antiquity. The great goddess of Phrygia was Rheja or Rhea, Cybele or Ké-bel, Tana, Hera, Ceres or Khere, Circe or Herse; it was Artha or Hertha, Terra, Tella; also Persepharta, Persephratta, Persephona, Pherephratta, Proserpine, Ax-ivehersa, the Actheia or Ecthea or Hecate, in short, the conception of a female deity at first worshipped in Asia under those various names, and which we shall find to be the elementary form of all female divinities. The Curetes, or Chaldeans, were as in Babylon with Hera, and Tana, the priests of the great goddess, also named Melicarta.

In Syria, according to Selden, Odachon or Etacon was the god named Dagon. The *D* is evidently an abbreviation and stands for *Tar, Het, Sar* (chief). It is the Tar-chan of primitive tribes, who was said to have arisen from a furrow. Oannes, also named Olo by Selden (*Tradidit is hominem quemdam nomine Ωλω*). Modern ethnology finds in this name the well-known term for chief, that of Ivan, Eban, Evanes, Ibanes, Khan, Jan, &c. Moloch, Meleck, Malek om, Malc-on, are all known to be derivations from Al and El or Ahula. Schaddei and Sadik, or Syddyk, has been already analyzed; they appear to indicate the names given to the ancient Airaynian, or Scythic tribes. Syd appears to be Schid or Syk, or Scyth (Master). Derceto is said by Diodorus Siculus to be the mother of Semiramis, worshipped as Ast-arta. Ogka, Onka, Ogga, the Theban Minerva, is stated by Selden to be the same as Astarte or queen of heaven; also named Siga, by that author. Ogga and Siga or Sigan, he says, are frequently substituted one for the other, and adds, *Reclamare hic prorsus non audio*. He remarks that the fact of the Theban Minerva or

Ogga, also bearing the name of Siga, proves the identity of the three goddesses. He considers Sesak or Sak to be an Assyrian conqueror far more ancient than Cyrus, to whom the term has been supposed by some to refer. Adramelec and Anamelic are esteemed by Selden to be forms of Moloch, since children were sacrificed. Baalgad was the Agathodimon or good spirit, and Men or Meni, Lunus and Luna. As Adon or Thammuz, some ancient chief appears to have been meant whose loss was still remembered and deplored, although the loud wailings of the worshipper and the cries of "ai linu" (what a misfortune) and those of "Jachoch" (he lives again) caused the Greeks to suppose that the god was named Linos and also Bacchus. The mysteries of these ceremonies have been supposed to relate to the Sun, but such astronomical laws scarcely explain the deep feeling which appears to have existed at the first establishment of this anniversary. The period, that of Easter, when the Sun begins to return, may explain the notion expressed of the reappearance of that luminary, but as in fact the Sun never disappears, and as in Syria his rays at that period are still very genial, the fact is certainly not explained by referring it to the knowledge acquired by astronomy, that spring was beginning. Adonis or Thammuz was also named Cyrus or Kiris or Kyris, i. e., Lord, which was also a name of the Sun, but it was that of a chief too. Osiris, although a name of the divinity and borne by the Sun, was also that of Sesostris, also named Ammuz. Moreover, it was in June (Thammuz) that the ceremony took place. The *Dionysiaca* of Nonnus certainly points to the various solstices, as the foundation of the festival of Tammuz or Adonis, considered as the Sun, but Nonnus wrote in the fifth century after Christ, and the Syrian festival is at least as ancient as the

pyramids. Sir W. Jones remarks, that the Ramayan of the Hindu poet Valmic inclines him to think that Rama and Dionysius or Bacchus were one and the same, and that Rama might be the Hindu name of the chief who first established regular government in Upper Asia, and who is described by the Hindus as a representative on earth of the Preserving Power. His great victory was over the satyrs or monkeys, headed by Hanumat, who may well represent wild and savage tribes. A singular coincidence in Egypt and in Syria, with certain Hindu ceremonies, consists in the casting into the sea or the river, in the two above mentioned countries, of the image of the goddess after the procession of Adonis, and the same is mentioned as occurring by Sir W. Jones in the festival of the great Indian goddess Bhavani, a kind of Isis, or Iswara, representing Nature, in which water being the primary element according to the Hindu tenets, the figure is restored to that element as to the primeval fluid. Another resemblance may be pointed out between Vishnou in two of his metamorphoses, in a horse and a peacock, with the above mentioned Syrian gods Anamalech and Adro-Melech, the first of whom was represented by a horse and the second by a peacock. Eusebe Salverte, who remarks this coincidence, supposes that these names signified the Sun as Melek in a particular constellation of the zodiac, that of the twins in this case. Moloch was the Sun in full force, and Beelzebub, the deity implored to preserve the country from locusts. The Hercules *Kornops* of the Thebans was a divinity of the same kind. It is scarcely requisite to remark that although Moloch was also the great deity worshipped at Carthage, yet Baal was likewise an object of deep veneration, as was Melic artha, the great goddess. Bel, Bal or Baal, is a term that enters

into the composition of all great Carthaginian names, as Maharbal, Asdrubal, Annibal. Selden considers Dagon to have been the Carthaginian Neptune: *figurâ et humanâ, et marinâ simul mixtâ*. In short, the division pointed out by Moore (Hindu Pantheon) as established from time immemorial in the Hindu sacred books, of the Earth in two parts, Arya and Mlechch'a, or the countries in which Ahura and Ahulah were worshipped, may be everywhere perceived in Asia to exist no longer separate, but conjoined in every way.

In Syria, not only were the heavenly bodies worshipped, the Sun especially, and also the Moon as Cabar, the great Goddess; not only were various gods, already mentioned, as high and mighty divinities the objects of general superstition, and the practices of the Babylonian Mylitta followed; but animals, or, at least, the dog, to whom Sirius the dog-star was consecrated, was also adored. It is indeed far more probable that this worship, which probably began when wild tribes came into the country, passed from Syria into Egypt, instead of coming from Nubia to the latter country. In Nubia it is too true that that strange worship persisted much later; but the motives which make us believe that the dog worship or that of the Kiun (*κυν*), took birth in Syria are the following. The temple, where the great figure of a dog was in honor, was situated on the river Kalb or the dog river, but a natural phenomenon, which appears to have still existed in the last century (eighteenth), may perhaps throw the light of conjecture on this strange wandering of the human mind, and would, if it proved to be the real cause of the worship, go far in establishing that that worship took its rise in Syria, and not in Egypt or in Nubia, in which latter country, its traces remaining when it had disappeared elsewhere, it was sup-

posed to have originated from that part of the globe. The account here given is gathered from various authors. (See Fourmont, *Histoire des Anciens Peuples*, liv. 2, sect. 3; Paul Lucas's *First Voyage in Syria*, and not the second as Fourmont has it; Mignot, *On the Origin of the Phenicians*, *Mem. des Inscip. et belles lettres*, vol. 47.) Near Byblos, on the road which skirts the sea between Antioch and Aleppo, is the river Lycos or Lucos (Wolf), now called the Dog's river, *Nahr-Kelb*, and also the river of Abraham. The term of Dog's river is derived from the enormous figure of a dog or wolf, which stood in very ancient time on a rock, and was an object of very general worship. Fourmont says the figure stood on a column or pillar of large stones. The statue has fallen or has been precipitated into the river, where Paul Lucas mentions having seen it, and describes it to be in size much bigger than a horse. Anubis was worshipped by the ancient Egyptians under the form of a dog, and the Havims of Canaan adored also a similar figure under the name of Nibhaz, the barker, or howling god. Now the Mussulmans who dwell in the vicinity, say that at times the loud barking, or howling of a dog is still heard at certain periods, and resounds all along the coast, and is sometimes so loud, that, when the wind is favorable, it is heard even in the island of Cyprus, which lies opposite at a distance of above twenty leagues. It is thought to be produced by the wind and waters through some narrow passage on the coast, but is evidently connected with the local superstition which esteemed as a manifestation of the divinity such a boisterous phenomenon, and which must have persisted when men could carve idols of stone, since we have good testimony of the existence of a figure of a dog having really stood there. William of Tyr names

the river the Dog's river (ch. x. sect. 5); it constituted the boundary between the modern kingdom of Jerusalem (that of Baudouin) and the territory of the Count of Tripoli. Unquestionably the local divinity, considered as expressing itself in such loud howlings, was worshipped under the form of a dog or wolf, and very likely dog worship, which existed for a time to a very wide extent among the Hevean or Phenicians, was extended to the islands, and perhaps to Egypt. But as to the identity of Escalape or Ascalape with Esclaf, or Ischmoun, the great soothsayer, known by the Greeks under the name of Æsculapius, and their representing this dog divinity, it is a matter of far greater uncertainty. Vossius, Bockhart, Thomassin, and other great Hebrew scholars, derive the name of Æsculapius from Isch-kaleb, *vir caninus*, because his temple was always guarded by dogs. Fourmont considers the *ez* to mean a goat, because Æsculapius was said to have been suckled by a she goat, and doubts whether the Æsculapius of the Latins, the Asclepios or Escleph of the Egyptians, and the Ascalaphus of the East constitute the same. That writer believes the name to have been given to a brother of the second Hermèz or Elzar Eliezar, because he was from Escalepii or Kaleb, a small town in Phenicia, situated on the mouth of the Dog river. Now with the theory of Fourmont we have nothing to do; we do not believe that Abraham was Sesostris and Osiris, nor that Hermes, or Eliezar with his brother, or rather his countryman, as Fourmont suspects him to have been, were in the service of Abraham. We merely point to the connection that evidently exists between Escleph, the great Egyptian soothsayer, and considered as the type of the Greek and Latin divinity of the same name, and this dog worship. Mr. Marsham is of opinion that

Æsculapius was a king of Memphis, the son of the first Menes and brother to the first Hermèz or Mercury, therefore Menes, one of the kings who reigned simultaneously in Egypt. This Ascleph, Marsham considers to have existed a thousand years before the Grecian Ascalaphe who would have been a son of Phoro-neus. At all events, the Grecian Ascalaphus is one of the fabulous personages whose existence is said to have been connected with Ceres (Herse) and the other Grecian myths. Huet (Præp. pos. 4, art. 6) maintains that Esceleph was Moses, as the great soothsayer and magician, and who besides had been exposed as a child like Esceleph. He was, according to Sanchoniathon the son of Sydyk (the master) and one of the Çabiri, the eighth, and therefore named Esmoun or Heschemouni, the Phenician term for S. Damascius calls him the father of Taaut the second Mercury, but if this author and Sanchoniathon maintain him to be Phenician, Eusebius and Clement of Alexandria hold him to have been an Egyptian. The authors who claim Asclaph or Esceleph as a Hebrew, and of the family of Jacob, point to the fact of the Jews having been often named Egyptians on account of their having dwelt so long in Egypt. Fourmont maintains that Tosorthros, the ancient Egyptian king, and inventor of writing, of mathematical sciences, of medicine, &c., considered as a god, and with whom the books attributed to Hermèz or Taaut stand in evident relation, was no other than Esceleph or Æsculapius. The term Tosorthros he believes to mean *vir* or *dominus caninus*, deriving orthros from the Egyptian or Copth term orthros, dog, and T-os, from os, or az, the well known Egyptian word for Lord, before which stands the article *t*, sometimes given *th*, as also *p* and *ph*. Orthos is indeed a name given by Hesiod to one of the monsters



which that poet mentions as the progeny of Echidna, and the monster Typhon; *Kuon orthos* or the dog Orthos. The caduceus or stick around which a serpent twists itself, and which when killed is recalled to life by another serpent that was said to have appeared with a certain plant in its mouth, does certainly remind one of the serpent of Moses in which the Israelites found salvation, but to suppose that Moses could have been represented by the Egyptians, as the Greeks tell us Esculapius or Escleph to have been, as a friend of the people (*philolaos*) or a Saviour (*Apalexicacos*) or a founder of cities (*Archegète*), does not certainly coincide with what the Egyptians themselves say of Moses. The serpent was an emblem of the divinity among the ancient nations, and as such was ascribed to the individuals in whom in those early times wisdom and knowledge were admitted to predominate above all other human science. If the dog often bears a name evidently the same as that of god, it proceeded very probably from that animal having become a symbol of the deity. As to whether such practices are not constantly a source of idolatry, the affirmative certainly appears to us to be the only answer, but even at the present day millions exist, who seriously maintain that it is the only mean of representing the Divinity to the mind of man. Therefore when we blame the ancients, we should remember how very *natural* the propensity is, to see in a thing and in a name the quality they may happen to stand for or to represent.

## EGYPT.

Having sketched very broadly the various and most predominant Eastern forms under which the Almighty lay, as it were, concealed and strangely disfigured by mythic conceptions, we at last arrive at the point towards which as to a goal all these preliminary remarks tend. However intricate the mazes of Egyptian mythology may be, still a thread may be found in all these dark windings, and the origin of that thread is decidedly *Eastern*, whether Isis and Osiris, or else Hermèz, Taaut, Amoun or Athotes be taken as the starting point. But of that later. We must for the present be contented to examine in a brief manner the general doctrine of the Egyptian Theogony, according to Jablonsky, Creuzer, Guigniaut and Röth.

The Sun (Elios and Elion), said to have been the first divinity of Egypt, received, says Warburton, the name of an Egyptian hero, Osiris or Osri, turning the usual compliment the other way, and naming the luminary after the hero. Warburton, therefore, on the strength of the authority of Herodotus, who expressly says that, to his certain knowledge, no gods, among the various gods of Egypt, were worshipped by all the Egyptians in the same invariable manner as were Osiris and Isis, or the Sun and the Moon; Warburton therefore maintains that this worship was as early as sober antiquity admitted it to be. The Sun, *Elios, Osiris, Soura, Osri* (Surya, Asoura) was Light and elementary Fire, and, as the vivifier or producer, was *Amounra* or *Fre*, the visible expression or sign of *Knef* and *Phtha*. The first spirit Kneph-amoun is united in one figure and one name with Re or Ra (Ri, Pire, Fre, Phra, Phre) as such is Amon-Re (*Amounra*). In the work

of Champollion and on the walls of Thebes, the deity is made known by the ostrich feather on the head, and bears the Phallus. As first spirit, Amoun encompasses the world as a snake, and sets heaven and earth in motion. As spirit of the world, Amoun is Eros, Hor; the produce of Kneph and Neith (Neboun, Neith, Noth) is the second Kneph or the visible spirit, the acting principle, and as such is Pan, Phan, Phanes (the appearing; the emanation), and Hor-seph or Menth as the creating spirit: Pechis or Pachis as the husband of Neith his mother, the primary element or Matter; he is also Hecke or Hicke the master or Lord, and his Lady is Heckte or Hekate.

Phtha is fire in the broadest sense, probably as heat. Phtha and Menth constitute the two halves of the primitive egg, heaven and earth. Anunke is Earth; Pe is the Firmament; Fre or Amoun-re unites all, but is expressed by Eros, the creating, producing principle. Neith as primary matter as mother and wife, or Muth, (Moth) uniting Matter and Spirit. Menth as Spirit produces with Pascht or Space Sate and Athor. Sate is daylight or the atmosphere by day, the East. Athor (Hatys, Atys) is night, is the spirit of the dark regions, the West. The Winter solstice when the Sun begins to return represents Sate, and the Summer solstice Athor or Atys. P-oooh, or without the article Joh or Ooh was the Moon, and the wife of Fre or Fra; Fre-Pooh, as second Athor. Joh is the full moon; Chonfu the half moon. These constitute the Piromi or the eight highest gods of the inner world, Re, Joh; Menth, Phtha; Pe, Anuke; Sate, Athor. Menth and Phtha are Matter and Spirit. Pe and Anunke are upper and lower, active and passive. Re and Joh are male and female. Sate and Athor are day and night. Re and Joh are foremost. Re as Time or Eternity

personified is Sevech, and, as containing all things, is Hor and Tauth. Joh as Joh-Taata is goddess of Wisdom.

Besides these eight expressions of mind or myths, which were the eight great gods or Cabiri, there were twelve others, or lower. 1st. Kneph, as the good spirit, the Baal-god or Agathodemon, Oggan or Okeanos, Oceanus. 2d. Neith, worshipped at Sais, the elementary liquid water Okana, Oceana, Thetis, Astarath, Astera, Demeter, the nurse, the nourishment, the milk of all things. 3d. Sevech or Seb, as Chronus or Time; and 4th, Pascht or Leto, as judge or divider, ordainer. These four represent the Nile. At the head of the eight others stands Thoyt, the founder of religion; Themis, the goddess of justice, &c. These gods appear to be the first that the Egyptians had, before they framed their Theogony.

The gods of the 3d class are Osiris or Bacchus or Dionysius; Arueris or Heracles; Isis or Persphona; Typhon or Hestia. Kneph (spirit) also produced good spirits, and Sev evil ones, as also Anunke (Fate); these were the Apophi, or giants, &c. But it would carry us too far to enter into further particulars. One conclusion, however, cannot be omitted, and that is that Warburton's conjecture, relative to Osiris being the name of a king, has been verified by the latest researches, although, when named *Osiris* son of *Amoun*, he represents the Almighty; this is, in fact, the opinion of Evhemerus, and of Jablonski, the latter admitting the worship of Osiris to be the Apotheosis or deification of the Chief; but it is very probable that the chief already bore that name, one of the East, and long before a name of the sun. As man, Osiris was a god of 3d class, but his name was the name of the Almighty, but he may not have been considered as on

a level with the Sun, which was deemed to be incorporated with the divinity. The history of Osri, Ousri, or Osiri and that of his son, supposed to have been the great Rameses Sesostris, is written on the walls of Thebes. King Ostrei, or Sesostri (Osiri) there is seen in battle where the ranks are broken, and in storming towns. At other times he is shown dragging at once a dozen prisoners by the hair of the head, and offering them in bloody sacrifice to AMOUN-RE, before whom he beheads them with one blow. Probably the authors who maintain that the Egyptians never sacrificed men to their gods, consider such sacrifices as not to be taken into account, because they do not tally with their system.

That the term Osiri was of Eastern extraction is admitted very generally, although the identity of the name with Asouri, the Hindu *Asura*, we believe has not been enough insisted upon. Nor was the *h*, when omitted, replaced at all times by an *s*, for the Nile was termed Jaro, or excellent, and Phiaro, or the most excellent (Jablonski), meaning the "celestial." Jablonski and Guigniaut, it is true, consider the term Phrouron, when given to the Nile, as expressive of "proceeding from heaven," as an "emanation of Osiris." Moreover, we would insist on the primary sense of Osiris or Asura, and on the same word Ahura being unquestionably to be found in Ph-arao, and its having been esteemed to mean *celestial* or *divine* not only by Jablonski, but by every writer, and to be expressive of the divinity, that these kings thought became inherent in their persons by taking the name, for they, in fact, were symbols of the divinity, and caused themselves to be worshipped on that account. The term Ahura of Airyanian extraction is then evident, and is clearly to be pointed out in the well-known Egyptian

names of Osiris and Ph-araos; also the name of Thot forms a component part of the names of Egyptian kings, such as Thot-Moses, and Mispra or Misptra-Tout Moses, &c. Indeed, the evident existence of the well-known high term Az or Os in the word Moses (Mosyche), has led some to suppose that Moses was Osiris, as Sesostris himself was Abraham! (See Bishop Bovet.) The Hebrew term Kara (the Eternal), in which the word Ahura is clearly to be traced, was probably the motive of Jablonski's rendering the Egyptian Maneros by the "son of the Eternal." (Jab. voc. p. 128.) Herodotus had already said the same two thousand years ago, without knowing any thing about etymological derivations (L. 2. 79), when mentioning the dismal ditty sung by the Egyptians, and taken from them by the Greeks, which song termed Linus had been formerly composed on the occasion of the death of Maneros, the son of a great Egyptian monarch; Herodotus adds that this young man being carried off by an untimely death, this funeral song was composed; and as in those early times the Egyptians had no others, it was transmitted carefully. It would, therefore, be time lost to attempt to produce proofs of a fact so well authenticated as that of the identical signification in matters of religion of the terms AL, EL, and UL, with AR, ER, and UR, and all that has been said, and may be said with respect to these in Eastern languages, and to the idioms derived therefrom, is perfectly applicable to these mysterious syllables when they are met with in the names of Egyptian gods and Egyptian kings. Isis, as the female goddess or Nature, was the Moon, was Joh, and, as Minerva or the goddess of knowledge, was Science, and, as such, *Chemia* or *Khermi*, that is the land of Egypt or the Earth by excellence, and analogous to Rhea, Cybele and many

female divinities which have, on that account, received the name of Myrionyme. Maneros, the son of Isis and Osiris, is the Egyptian warrior, is Har, Her, Haroueri, and bears the same names as the son of Fre, that of Horus, Orus, Haroeri, and when the Greeks and Egyptians came to compare their fables, Har became synonymous with Apollo, and Hercules or the Sun in spring. The silent course of that bright luminary was Harpocrat or the god with silent feet (gentle). The Sun had also the character of Siva with the Egyptians, for Phan-re, or Remfa or Typhon the evil principle, and evidently represents the Hindu Aryaman or the Sun considered by the Mazdeans as the principle of Idolatry. The Moon is also an evil spirit as linked with Typhon, and, as such, represents Libya or Africa, where effectively the Moon was in as high honor as the Sun or Aryaman in Hindustan or the East. Her name is Nefte, Nephte or Natfe: she abandons Typhon and joins Horus in defeating the Evil Spirit. With Osiris Nefte has a son; and here we find the dog star Anubis, Anbo, Aneboa, Anebo, also called Hermanubis and Thothnubis, Thot, Thoth, Thoyth, Theut. Anubis is the devoted follower of Isis: the barking Anubis, *latrator Anubis* of Virgile (*Æneid.* 8), and, as the dog star whose rising indicated the expected overflow of the Nile in the solstice of summer (Sirius, Sothis), this god was identified with water, and the vases which contained water bore the same name or Canopus. If Canopus or Anubis was a water god of the Egyptians, and if the vases containing the water of the Nile bore the first name, it was probably connected with the overflowing of that river. Anubis was also the guardian of the celestial gates, probably as representing the Nile over which the boats were ferried. Amoun-Canopus

or Ammon-Knouphis was the fecundant, vivifying power of water (of the Nile).

Osiris-Fre, the Piromi, the Sun as God or master of the thunder, bears a very different character from Osiris as Adys (night: the invisible), or as Amenthi, the sovereign of the lower regions. Fre was Osiris; Fre was Knef and Phtha. Fre and Pooh were the same as Osiris and Isis. Fre is always represented as a child or a youth issuing from a lotus flower, and usually with an aureola around the head: he carries the anse cross as the sceptre of the good spirits. Fre is sometimes represented with a hawk's head, or as a sphinx with a bearded head, and also under the form of a hawk. Fre as Osiris in the later monuments has no longer the hawk's head, but a bull's head or that of an ox. Fre, when representing the Nile or Anubis the guardian God of Egypt, had a dog's head, or a jackall's. Piromi Knef is the creating spirit; Piromi Phtha the vivifying spirit, and Piromi Fre is the joint produce of both, the Cadmile or union, the Generator, the Spirit. Evidently the Fre of the Egyptians and the Fra of the Hindus are the same, and one must be the original. But a more positive and we believe decisive proof is to be found in the principle of Egyptian religion and in Egyptian science, in the well-known existence of Hermèz as first and second.

Leaving aside the dark mazes of Egyptian theogony, even before the Lagides had altered the dogmas, is it not unquestionable that the first and second Hermèz were foreigners, as also Escleph the wise man by excellence, the great soothsayer, also worshipped in Assyria, as the Cynocephale god Nebo, or Nebu, which seems to be the same as An-abu or An-ebu; and is Fre or the Spirit as the conserver. Thus Fre with the dog's head would be the Nile, but Fre with the vulture or



hawk head is the Spirit represented by the Sun, and is the *Nesrok*, the Assyrian god also figured with the vulture's head. Nebo, or Nebu (Anbu), the god with a dog's head, was particularly famous for soothsaying and foretelling, according to St. Jerome, who also says that he was the same as Chamos.

Now it would require too much space to enter upon details respecting Egyptian theogony, since our aim is to penetrate to roots, and not to wander among the branches. Yet the confusion, we must remark by the way, seems to be caused by the various views in which the same gods were conceived. Nebu or Anbu, Anubis, does not appear to be solely Egyptian as Conserver, but as the guardian god of the country, of Cham or Khemi, that is, of Egypt, Chamos (Comus according to Attwood), is Anubis, is Fre, and unites Cneph, Fta, and Fre. Therefore, when Damascius says Khamephis was the third member of the Egyptian trinity, it seems to mean Fre, as the guardian god, or as Nebu, Anbu, Anubis, or the great river of the country, the Nile. Fre or Re, or Ra, was thus represented under many symbols according to the sense; thus Amoun-ra or Re-Ammon (Remmon) was the Sun, having the full power of the divinity, but Re as Anubis or Khemephis was more local, was the genius of Egypt. The localization extended to families, or rather began in families, where the great Revelation of the existence of the Almighty perhaps commenced the wayward course it took. Still, so great is the influence of his rulers over Man, that idolatry can certainly be traced descending as it were from the highest authority to the lowest member of the community. Household gods, *Teraphim*, *Lares*, are evidently terms of high antiquity, they constituted the Fetishes of the ancients, and were little dolls or wooden puppets, yet in Ter-api we find the Ser-api, in Lares the

term Lar, the AHURA, the AHULA. Such images represented something, and that something is pointed out in the names. The ancient Egyptians termed them Apes, Serapes, Tarapes, and they afterwards received the name of Canopes, Oros, Harpocrate, as Kircher has it *nunc Canopes, nunc Oros, nunc Harpocrates* (Kirch. Œdip. p. 260), but the primitive terms are radically Asiatic, although perfectly Egyptian by time. Fri-apes, Bal-azar, Beel-pheor, were all Syrian and Egyptian.

The high antiquity of Egypt, and of Thebes in particular, is written in characters formed by massive monuments which still defy Time. But admitting that the sacerdotal government preceded that of the chiefs or kings, or admitting them to have been united, yet HERMEZ or THOTH remains the founder. Jablonski considers such terms as indicating the pillars placed in the temples and elsewhere, on which the commands were engraved, and he brings forward good proofs that in Egypt the pillars called Hermes in ancient Greece were named Theuts or Thoyts in Egypt. But this does not signify that pillars of stone were the starting point. This we find in the attribute confessed in the name given to such columns. It clearly indicates a name neither Grecian nor Egyptian, and testifies that long before the eighth or tenth century B. C., or that attributed to Zoroaster, the name of the Almighty (HER-MEZ) was in currency. If the identity of the term with respect to its ethnological derivation has not been sufficiently attended to, yet its high meaning has not escaped notice. M. Guigniaut completely identifies Hermèz with God considered as the Creator, with the primary principle from which all proceeds, and finds an evident resemblance with Brahma. Creuzer compares Hermèz to Buddha, to the Hom. Thus Hermèz

is Supreme Wisdom, all knowledge, for all comes from Hermèz and all returns to Hermèz; he is one with the verb; he is *o logios* and *o logos*. Now what more can be said, except pointing to the identity of a name, that of Hermèz with Hormuz, the meaning of which is completely acknowledged to be that of the "Almighty." The opinion of Jablonski is founded upon what we learn in Jamblicus (*De Myst. Egyp.*), who says that the Egyptian priests gave to all their inventions the name of *Thaut*, and rendered to him all the honor as to the author, because all their knowledge was engraven on the pillars. Jamblicus (*L. viii.*) also says that the number of *Hermeses* or *Theuts*, meaning pillars, were at first only four, but gradually increased until more than 26,525. But all that does not discountenance the view we have taken of this first and decisive step of Egyptian theogony, i. e., that however high the antiquity of Egypt may be proved to have been, it cannot be said that Monotheism proceeded from the Egyptians, since they testify that it was the starting point inasmuch as regards themselves. The point on which we insist here is grounded upon an unquestionable fact, that of the Egyptians' own testimony. Solon is reported to have said that an Egyptian priest had told him that they possessed in their temples proofs of an antiquity of 8,000 years, and could give an account of what had happened to their fathers 1,000 years before. These forefathers were the Atlantides, of whose institutions, laws and most remarkable actions the priest then proceeds to give an account as of events which had occurred 9,000 years before. Admitting such evidence as worthy of notice, it is evident that although the Egyptians denied that Egypt had suffered from a general catastrophe, yet they owned that their forefathers

had perished in some great deluge. Can a few phrases, given, not by Solon, but by Plato, constitute any authority? They certainly cannot be compared to the general testimony which refers all their religious doctrines to Hermèz, and which furnishes a higher authority in proof of all their theogony having been derived from without. And whence could it have proceeded from? Unquestionably from some country where the term Hermèz meant the Almighty. This is Airya, wherever that country may lie or may have lain.

The first Hermèz may have been a foreign prince bearing that high name, or was rather a high priest, whose very name points to Monotheism, although he may have symbolized the Almighty, i. e., have fallen into idolatry, or may have bestowed on his conceptions of God the faith which only ought to be bestowed on the Almighty. From the first Hermèz springs all their religion; from the second proceeds all their learning, i. e., the foundations of writing, the alphabetical or phonetic marks as well as hieroglyphic characters, as well as music, architecture, and especially astronomy. It is also from a foreigner that the Egyptians acquire much knowledge, and this one is called Ascleph, he is the friend of the people, the Saviour of Egypt, the founder of cities; he was Prince of Memphis. The first Hermèz or Taut, or Mercurius (Mercurius), is said by Manethon to have existed before the deluge, and the name which he bears must then relate to things far anterior to the history of Egypt. But, it may be said, the *Trismegistus* was he who caused learning to flourish, and was not the first Hermèz; and so say we, since the name is referred by us to a far higher source. As to the term Trismegist, or three times mighty, it bears an evident relation with the three names so constantly conjoined, and to the three supreme attributes of the

Almighty, Power and Wisdom and Goodness. The Egyptians, it is true, considered their religious books or signs to have been given to them by Hermèz Trismegistus, but that means nothing else than that the source of all religion is the Almighty revealed with the three attributes in intimate connection with the spring of animated being, power or action, wisdom or intelligence, goodness or morality. But these most natural faculties appear to be fruitless unless the revelation of Supreme Power, Supreme Wisdom, and Supreme Goodness, points out a goal; and even then a something is constantly thwarting the right intention.

The Phenician historian Sanchoniathon (Eusebius, Præp. Evang. Lib. Ich. 9) is reported to say, speaking of Thoyt, "Mysor, Μισωρ (Mezd-ahura) had among the number of his successors Taaut, who invented the tracing of the first characters; it is he whom the Egyptians name Thoor; those of Alexandria Thoit, and the Greeks, Hermes." And "Chronos, or Ilus, son of Ouranos, when he arrived at the age of manhood, had recourse to the counsels of Hermèz, the Trismegist, who was his secretary." Here, as usual, the name of the Almighty is given to the *wisest*, but the primitive meaning, which refers to God, is clearly evident, we believe, in the very name. This second Hermèz, or Tat, is evidently the one to whom the painting already mentioned (Desc. de l'Égypte, 1 pl. x z) refers. The Egyptian priest Manetho, who flourished in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, says that it was the Trismegist who translated the hieroglyphic characters traced before the deluge by Thoyth, the first Herméz, on pillars (Stele) in the Seridic land. These characters, Tat or Agatodemon (the good spirit) translated in language or in known characters, and deposited them in the *sanctum sanctorum* of the tem-

ples, where Manetho pretends to have found them. Thoyt, or Hermèz, was said to have written more than 20,000 books, which is supposed to mean that by degrees 20,000 Hermeses, or Thoyts, or pillars with inscriptions, were erected. Josephus, it has been remarked, ascribes to the sons of Seth before the deluge columns or pillars bearing hieroglyphic characters, which still existed in his time in Syria. Josephus, it is true, only speaks of one as still existing in stone, and merely adds that he had been assured that such a column or pillar was yet to be seen in Syria (Lib. I. ch. 2). Pliny (Lib. VII. ch. 56) speaks of pillars on which were engraved Assyrian characters, so that the column mentioned by Josephus, as antediluvian, may have been one of those erected by the great conqueror who first wandered over those countries, by Sesostris, who is said by Herodotus to have raised pillars in the conquered states.

Sanchoniathon, after saying that Ouranous had apotheosized his father Elioun and brought forth Ilus or Chronos, Belyus, Dagon and Atlas, proceeds further on to say, that Taaut imitated the example and made sacred characters or Hieroglyphs of the figures of these four descendants, giving to some four wings (Chronos), to others, two. Afterwards Chronos gives Egypt to Taaut as a kingdom. Esclef or Asclaph the brother of Taaut was told by him to relate all these proceedings, which were also transmitted to posterity by the seven other Cabiri (chiefs) or the Dioscuri (Gods), of whom Æsculapius was the eighth. Our intention not being to proceed any farther in these fables, nor to enter upon the interminable discussion of the value of Sanchoniathon's testimony, we refer at once our readers on that point to Stillingfleet, Dodwell, Cumberland, and other great authorities. Jablonski considers such pillars as

the first statues of the gods, and it is well known that in Assyria, in very early time, Ares as god of war had his column. (Hyde, *de Relig. Persarum.*) Pausanias relates that in Laconia seven pillars were erected in honor of the seven planets (the first Cabiri). Now, it is proved by existing statues that characters were engraved on them, for that of Memnon, drawn by Pocke at Thebes in Egypt, has many such characters on the legs. Jablonski believes that the secrets of the temples, i. e., the theogony, was inscribed on these, and that the different Hermes or Mercuries that came to appear merely signify the differences of the various hieroglyphic characters, the phonetic belonging to the second Thaaut. Whether Hermès was the name of an Egyptian prince, also called Taaut, and sent as governor or Merceres (Mercurius) of Egypt by some Asiatic prince, is a question that cannot be answered. Our object is merely to point out the evidence which the name affords in the question relating to Monotheism, which we are informed most seriously never existed but as an Egyptian speculation; but it may be that such a legislator really existed. At all events, the testimony of the Egyptians themselves must needs be taken into consideration when they say that not only the first rudiments of religion, but of all science, was brought thither from without. It may be that some great Asiatic prince, such as the king who conquered Bactria, sent a viceroy to govern Egypt, or some Egyptian prince may have taken as his counselor a learned stranger; for it is principally in astronomy and geometry that Hermès was famous.

Such strange allegories pass current that one is often at a loss how to account for them. Thus Hermès or Mercurius was said by Plutarch to have won from the moon the 70th part of her light, because the five days

requisite to form the number 365 instead of 360 (the former number of the days of the year), were added by Hermès to the end, without incorporating them in any of the months. Newton considers this addition to have taken place in the ninth century before Christ; and although Jablonski gives it at 1315 B. c., and Freret 2782 years before that period, yet the calculation of Newton must be taken into serious consideration. The age of the world and the historical accounts of human events are all matters of Science, of rational Faith, not of Divine Faith, which is Trust in the Almighty; therefore, whether the time be nine centuries or ninety, it has nothing to do with our faith in God. It has, however, much to do with science, and cautious investigation proves how far men have erred in falsely attributing such high antiquity to events of far later or more modern date. Now, as the books called Hermetic are all forgeries, it has been supposed that no person named Mercurius or Hermès existed, but Mercurius may have been the Lieutenant of a great King, and most unquestionably the great scientific inventions refer to this Hermès and Mercurius, especially the useful ones: those concerning the Nile, the distribution of the waters. The god with the dog's head and a lute in hand whom the Egyptians named Anubis, the Preserver or Guardian, was evidently the Greek Mercurius. Jablonski says this name means *golden*, and Gebelin *period* or *revolution*. Both may be right, for it was a golden period, but the lute seems to point to some invention. Anubis, as guardian, seems also to preside at the opening of the year, since it was the dog star Sirius or Anubis that opened the year. In Egypt, these five days were celebrated at the end of the year, i. e., at the summer solstice in June, and were days of festival. These days were celebrated at Rome



also in the old year, when it began in June, which was, as in Egypt, consecrated to Mercurius. Gibelin says that the Romans were so accustomed to these five days of rejoicing, that they still kept them when the five days were transposed to Spring. The old *Epectæ* or additional days then became Minerval, or the festival of that divinity, and presents were given by scholars to their preceptors as at the beginning of the year. Evidently they were of very ancient date. The first day was relative to Osiris or the Sun, and to Agriculture; and many were the allegories represented. When the year was plentiful a triple phallus announced the joyful event: the Pa-myles was also relative to the rising and perhaps the grinding of corn, and became a God also; the second day was Horus or the Sun before it produces; Typhon was the third, and was a day of sadness, of sacrifice, of fasting; the fourth was that of Isis, and was a great day of rejoicing, and the statue of the goddess was thrown into the river at the end of the procession, no one knows why; the fifth was the day of Nephtys or the victorious (Nicé). The end was attained; the harvest was brought in. It is, however, unknown whether the allegorical names thus given were names of gods, or merely symbolical, for they may, like Pa-myles, become gods and goddesses in time.

What we know of the doctrines of Hermèz has been given us by the Neo-platonicians, who, it is well known, did not scruple to clothe their own conceptions with robes of antiquity. Therefore, all that we contend for is the evidence which presents the name of Hermèz as the starting point of Egyptian worship; that the name of the Almighty, that the notion of the Unity of God preceded and did not succeed to any Egyptian speculation whatsoever.

In the brief summary we have given of German

Philosophy, we have clearly stated our motives for not admitting the conclusions that support the doctrine which considers Revelation to be the "lesson of History;" but respecting the value of history itself we have nothing to allege against it when facts are related and confirmed. But we must remind the reader that in the times of which we are speaking, when the ancient periods of Egyptian, Indian, and Assyrian history come to be discussed, no written records were kept, because neither leather, nor parchment, nor papyrus, nor slips of wood (buchstäben) were invented. Names (Runes) were engraven either as figures or signs on rocks and stones, and no others could have existed. The social state of the North-West of Europe two thousand years ago was much the same as that of the parts South-East two thousand years before Christ, and, at that period of the history of man, signs or names were engraven on stone, and were objects of superstition as were the *Runes* of our forefathers. The Scandinavian *forn-yrda-lag*, or old word law, which was the rule for the primitive scalds or songs, is of a time when such rules were merely transmitted by tradition. It is not our fault if in things which relate to the highest antiquity we are obliged to mention the conditions of knowledge which then existed. Men, it is true, are not obliged to enter into such abstruse discussion in order to believe in God, but the subject, when once it is submitted to investigation, cannot be slightly passed over. If there be any truth in the assertion that every branch of human knowledge ceases to flourish when it is separated from the traditional roots which gave it birth; if it be true that even the most simple literary composition cannot be divested of the links which unite letters with erudition, how much more is it the case when the subject is that of Faith in the Almighty. The Reformation

of the 16th century succeeded in throwing off the yoke of Rome, and the strength of our forefathers wasted in battle was obliged to seek repose, and thus a halting place became necessary. Still even then, a distinct and definite criterion of Faith in God was not found in the mere engraven characters on paper. Has the voice of history revealed to man what he anxiously sought for in the voice of Nature? Must it not at length appear absolutely requisite to speak of Tradition in the only terms in which a language is traced? The intention of our forefathers in casting away Pope and Rome, and in adopting the text of the Holy Scriptures, was grounded upon their knowledge of things. The resting place, to which they resorted with the fond hope of security, and which in fact possesses the real criterion of Divine Faith, has not afforded the shelter demanded, because it was sought for in the wrong place. The Reformers devoutly imagined that in acting as they did they were freeing themselves from the meshes of human knowledge, whilst they were in fact building Divine Faith upon the rotten foundation of a science which dated some thousand years back. The existence of God revealed as the Almighty, and believed in as such, that eventful fact,—the real foundation of Faith because it is above all human endeavors, that fact which the Bible alone distinctly announces—was not sufficiently cleared of, and separated from the conceptions of Man, so that it was in these conceptions and not in God that their Faith was unintentionally placed. The keen sagacity of Rome did not let the error pass without drawing therefrom the advantages which the general freedom of inquiry, introduced by the reformation, allowed her to reap. And, on the other hand, the same fatal error opened a wide breach into which poured unceasingly a host of men astonished to find themselves joining the

enemies of religion, because it was too evident that Divine Faith had been misplaced, and that the Trust, which is due to God alone as the Almighty, had been bestowed on human conceptions, thus become objects of idolatry, since they attracted that Faith which is a homage to Almighty Power. We find, therefore, ever since the 16th century, two streams which, diverging from reformed Christianity, either join the ranks of Rome or of the unbeliever; whilst the man who would be religious without superstition is obliged to foster what he knows to be weeds for fear of tearing up fruitful plants in endeavoring to pluck the former. Investigation is irksome to all the three classes, because the mind is obliged to rise so high as to occasion dizziness, and thus resolutions are adopted on insufficient grounds as regards knowledge, because with the religious mind Faith in God is sufficient, and with the Romanist the spiritual teacher becomes, as it were, alone responsible. But the man of Science has not this advantage, he perceives the falsehood, but unfortunately he does not perceive the truth, which is that Divine Faith is only due to the Almighty, and that if ignorance bestows erroneously on its own conceptions a Trust owing to God alone, Science need only smile in pity at the base idol thus erected in the place of God. Science, it is true, has a right to ask why error should so easily occur on such an important subject, but, as the answer can only refer to the Supreme Cause, which permits ignorance to decide on many points before a more perfect knowledge of the matter is acquired, the question would therefore be answered, as it were, by referring it to Divine Faith or to Trust in God, as must be done for the existence of Evil. But so long as Reason can account for any fact without such a reference, it must be done; otherwise the boon would be thrown away.

We may then assuredly remind our readers who wish to investigate the subject, that in those early times no other records existed but such as were marked on stone, on metal, or on potter's earth, such as the Assyrian rolls, and that even these latter are not only comparatively speaking modern, but that many circumstances tend to prove that warlike tribes having succeeded in subverting powerful and civilized nations, primitive marks may again have succeeded to a more perfect alphabet. It is well known that some time after the Trojan war, the poems of Hesiod were written, according to Pausanias, on plates of lead. Such books would require a strong man to carry them if they were voluminous. Prepared skins, it is true, came into use three centuries before Jesus Christ, and were imported into Pergamus from Upper Asia at that period. The brown Papyrus, made with the rushes of the Nile, and which preceded the use of the finer sort, is certainly more ancient, for it came into use in the time of Psammitichus, or about seven hundred years before Christ. Now in China, according to Duhalde, they used in former ages plates or slips of bamboo on which the rind was left, and these little plates, threaded one after the other, made a volume. Such books being very cumbersome and unfit for use, at length in the year 95 of the Christian Era, under the Tong Han, a great Mandarin named Tsai-hin invented paper. "This Mandarin," says Duhalde, "made use of the bark of different trees, and of old worn-out pieces of silk and hempen cloth, by constant boiling of which matter he brought it to a liquid consistency, and reduced it to a sort of thin paste, of which he made different sorts of paper. He also made some of the knots of silk which they call flaxen paper. The industry of the Chinese soon brought this discovery to perfection, and found

out the secret of polishing the paper, and giving it a lustre." (Duhalde, 2d vol. p. 416.) It may therefore be safely affirmed that a thousand years B. C. no other writings existed but such as were engraven on stone, metal, and brick. The characters on slips or plates of wood of the Chinese, correspond perfectly to the Buchstäben, or slips of wood of the Teutonic tribes, but even in the time of Tacitus, which corresponds almost to the time of the invention of paper in China, such plates of wood were matters of religion and in the hands of the priests.

The investigation of mythology is by no means to be considered as a child's play; nor is it sufficient in that study to follow taste and feeling in preference to *dry reasoning*. Taste and feeling have peopled earth, sea, and heaven with fantastic beings, and have turned away the human mind from Faith or trust in the Almighty, because to such conceptions metaphysical existence was conceded. These fables are in themselves a kind of science of the day; they are expressions of that *anticipation* which the mind constantly puts forth on all subjects, and still more readily on those which are difficult. The antiquarian who passes his time in deciphering ancient inscriptions is not to be considered in the light of a man devoid of religion, as too often is the case. Indeed, such men may be esteemed as forwarding our Trust in the Almighty, when they teach their fellow-creatures how little confidence can be placed in the assertions of Man. In denying the voice of history to be the voice of God, we do not deny the positive value of that great science. It is History, carefully investigated, that puts us into the possession of the past, that tells us of the present, and that points to the future. Erudition is the basis of History, and the facts she relates have passed through the ordeal of Time.

But traditional erudition grows dim and obscure. There the *Rune* or the name is of great importance. History allows us to judge of general facts respecting the human race, and to frame some faint conception of the future destiny of the human race. The part she performs is then no mean one, without attributing to her decisions the prescience of God. History may help us to form an adequate notion of the three views which have been taken of the development of man, that is likened by some to a parabolic curve sweeping out into endless infinity, and ever pursuing an uninterrupted course; whilst others, acknowledging that there exist limits beyond which the human mind cannot stray, deny this boundless flight, and maintain that the march of Intellect follows an intermittent course: that sometimes rising higher and sometimes lowering its course, it may be rather likened to a series of semi-circles of various heights and breadths, but which only attain an *acme* to be followed by a descent. Others again compare it to a winding circuit ever rising, but by degrees almost imperceptible. The voice of history may decide on such matters, for they are the consequences of human action, which neither the Pantheism of Theology nor that of Philosophy can succeed in extirpating.

Guided by History, some judgment may be pronounced on the nature of the sacred writings of the Jews respecting the part that Esdras performed on the return from the Assyrian captivity, before which no written document can be admitted to have existed otherwise than on stone, metal and brick, or tiles, and which were usually committed to memory. All such circumstances are matters of Science and of History; but not of Divine Faith. The attempt to invest History with an authority higher than that of Science, will

meet, we trust, the same fate as that of considering the "voice of Nature as the voice of God." This voice of Nature is the interpretation which man bestows thereon, and the decision of one century may be completely different from that of another, and thus Nature may be gifted by man with many voices, but it is the silent display of Existence which tells of the truth revealed,—that of God by whom all exists.

Whatever mysteries may be revealed in times to come by historical investigation, which, in performing the part allotted to that great Science, is performing a duty to God, and tends to free Divine Faith from the trammels of ignorance, however high those investigations may be carried, they unfortunately can never be expected to reach the birthday of the human race. The revelation of God appears to be coeval with man; and history, or rather tradition, points out that great event by transmitting as the names of the first created things which man worshipped, the identical name of God, of the Almighty. A high interest is then attached to those investigations, and we have seen, admitting the Sun to have been the first great object which took the place of the Creator, that the point to be investigated is the relative value of AHURA or Ahula, and ARYAMAN: the Creator and the Creature. The fact of God being known from the beginning of all tradition as the Almighty corroborates, in our opinion, the view which considers Divine Faith as Trust in the Almighty, not because man began by conceiving such a being to exist by dint of reflection, but because His Existence was at once revealed; i. e., made known or communicated to the first man, and is unknown to any of the descendants of that primitive human being, if he be not informed thereof.

The Airyanian, the Aryan or Brahmin, the Assy-



rian, and the Egyptian tenets, are then those which must be discussed; and in each there may be pointed out an evident deviation from the bright original.

#### ARYANISM OR BRAHMANISM.

The Airyanian religion, or the Zind (Holy), is then that which History has to investigate fully; not so much on account of God being clearly designated as *Ahura-mazdaô* (almighty), in that religion, but because the remnants of that religion offer a clear resemblance with many dogmas of Christianity, which were evidently introduced at a later period. Now, even admitting that religion, arts, and sciences flourished, if they did not take their rise, on the borders of the Oxus, such an event must have been anterior to the highest records of man. Therefore if Bactria was that country, and was conquered and reduced two thousand years B. C. by some great conqueror, the remnants of their religion can surely be supposed to be found in what is called the Zend Avesta. According to Mohsan, quoted by Sir W. Jones, Mahabad, the first monarch of Airya (Iran), which would be lower down than Bactria, was also sovereign of the whole Earth, and divided the people into four orders, the *religious*, the *military*, the *commercial*, and the *servile*, the names of which are, says our author, unquestionably the same in their origin with those now applied to the four primary classes of the Hindus. Sir W. Jones considers Mahabad to be the same as Menu, and adds, "we can hardly doubt, that the first corruption of the purest and oldest religion was the system of Indian Theology, invented by the Brahmins, and prevalent in these countries, where the book of Menu or Mahabad is at this hour the standard of all religious and moral

duties." Now we have seen that Eugène Burnouf fifty years after Jones adopts the very same opinion, grounding that opinion on considerations of great weight, as well ethnographical as rational (mythology, geography, history, tradition). This separation must have occurred at a very early period, but which cannot be stated. If then 2500 years before Christ be adopted as the period, we then all of a sudden come upon Cayumer or Kai-Amour, no longer of the Pischadian or first sovereigns, but the chief of the Kau-nian dynasty in the 8th or 9th century before Christ. The accession of Kai-Amyr, or Cay-umer, seems to have been accompanied by a considerable revolution both in religion and government. The race differed from that of the Mahebadians. Then came Hushang, who completed the national faith, which then resembles the first Hindu superstitions, for the sun, the planets, and fire are highly venerated, if not worshiped. Zoroaster again reformed this faith which was rooted out of Iran or Persia in the 7th century (652) by the Arabians. Now, besides the reform of Zoroaster, we find a continual change in the dogmas occurring during the Parthian and the Persian dynasties, or the Arsacides, and the Sassanides. The first lasted 500 years, but the continual warfare rendered necessary by the Greek, the Roman, and the Scythian incursions, appears to have suspended religious quarrels. These seem to have been very violent under the Persian Sassanides, who reigned 425 years. The Mages, who formed, besides the sacerdotal functions, a rich, powerful and warlike tribe, proved most useful auxiliaries to Ardechyr or Art-axerce, whose rapid conquests appear to have been greatly favored by the fanatical partisans of the Magians. It is well known that these latter constituted the ruling religion, but it is also a

well-authenticated fact that under Hormouz, the Manichean sect attempted to introduce great alterations in Magism, and to introduce many Christian rites, as well as Jewish, and even Hindu. But it was principally the High Priest of the Magians, Masdack, who in 490 attempted to bring about great changes in the national religion. Masdack preached against the vices of the great, and of the high magistrates, and also against the rich and all social superiorities, maintaining that as all riches were from God, they ought to be equally divided amongst men. In short, he acted on the principle of those who deny the positive value of reason, and thus ruin all industry and all emulation with their irrational doctrines. A social revolution was on the point of taking place, when the King, who was of the Masdack party, was deposed, and the latter fled to Hindustan. He, however, returned to Persia, and a kind of religious war was kindled by his presence and predications, until at last Cosroes traitorously caused the chiefs and Masdack to be put to death, and his partisans were obliged to fly for their lives. This schism bore the name of Zendikism, and was strongly proscribed, although not entirely rooted out. This occurred in the year 533 after Christ, and yet we find in the year 630 the partisans of the proscribed modified Magism busily occupied in spreading their doctrines. In 632 a general assembly of the Mobeds (Magian priests) and learned men was convoked, in order to come to some understanding in matters of religion, which were the only pre-occupation of the time, and which divided the nation in various sects, all equally fanatical and intolerant. A kind of covenant was at last agreed to, and great modifications took place in the ancient ritual, which appear to have discontented all parties. Something, however, appears to have per-

sisted, and that is, the alteration effected in the calendar. The new era received the name of the Persian era, or the Era of Isdegerd, and is at this day the one used by the Parsees or fire-worshippers. The date of the new calendar was fixed on the 16th of June, 632. Twenty years later the sword of the Mussulman had put an end to the Persian Monarchy.

Our motive for entering into this short account of the religious schisms of Magism is that of establishing the fact that not only above one hundred years before the conquest great changes had been brought about in the religious doctrines of Zoroaster, by the High Priest himself, but that the matter had been solemnly discussed, and deep alterations had taken place with general consent. Now when a thousand years after the conquest we are told of the ancient religion of Zoroaster, of a religion founded by Kaiamour, the first man, and by Mahabad who flourished long before the first man (the first man probably meant the highest), and when books are produced in Zend, containing many details which are word for word the reproduction of the Christian ritual, are we not entitled to say that we possess proof that alterations had been agreed upon by general consent, and that there exists no proof that Baptism and many other Christian ceremonies were in use two thousand years before Christ in Airyana? This explanation will, we believe, account for the introduction into the Zend text of terms altogether identical with many used by the Christians, and which are found with surprise among doctrines evidently far more ancient than the Christian. Such alterations, however, do not invalidate the only conclusion on which we insist, viz., that the term Ormuzd, Ormuz, Hormouz, Hormisdas, Ahura-mazdaô, precedes that of Aryaman, and is of the very highest antiquity, since

that word is found to precede the Egyptian Theogony. When we are told with an air of mystery that the Lord's prayer exists *verbatim* in the ritual of a religion that preceded that of Hindustan, and when truth and falsehood are so intermingled and blended in the Zend books, if chronology and history be not attended to, that it is made to appear as if Christianity was the work of imposture, the importance of those sciences cannot be overlooked. Nor do we deny the positive worth of History, we merely deny, for we cannot repeat it too often, that the voice of History is the voice of God. But it may be answered: if it is the voice of Truth it is the voice of God; and the response is unanswerable for the Pantheist. It is not so, however, for the man who trusts in Almighty Power, and with whom Faith or Trust in God is the basis of religion and the link that connects God with Man. The fact once clearly established that the Existence of God was revealed, and that that communication made known to Man His Supreme Attributes, there is the ground of Divine Faith; there is a clear and peremptory motive of belief. He leaves the Pantheist, the Theologian, and the Calvinist to reason upon things above their competence, and, enjoying the right of free inquiry, he trusts in the Almighty, and does not believe himself to be part of God, because he cannot account for any thing being distinct from Him who made it. The truth of the actions of Man do not, in our opinion, raise those actions to a level with God's. The belief of Man in rational faith is not inconsistent with Divine Faith. They are distinct, because God, the Maker, is distinct from Man, the created. Nor is this Faith in the Almighty at variance with the consciousness man possesses of his own identity, and is therefore consistent with Fact and Instinct; whilst Pantheism, as well philosophi-

cal as theological, is a denial of Faith and also a denial of Instinct, as well as of Reason.

Sosiosch, the Saviour, born of a Virgin, and who will sit in judgment on the last day. The Resurrection, and the exclamations of those arising again to Life in recognizing each other. Eternal punishment, it is true, is not admitted, but that is a subject which still divides the minds of Christians. In short nothing is more evident than the very identity of many of the doctrines, thus falsely attributed to Zoroaster, with those of the Christian. The Parsees tell us that at the time of the Mohammedan conquest the sacred works written on tablets of lead were thrown into deep wells, and other hiding places in order to conceal them from the enemy. Now should such plates ever come to light, it must not be forgotten that twenty-five years before the Arabian conquest all the books had been changed by mutual consent, and a modified creed adopted. The ancient texts were probably destroyed at the same time, for the triumph of the new doctrines was no sudden emergency: it had been preparing above three generations. And these ancient works, are we to consider them as genuine with regard to the doctrines? We know also that when the Greeks under Alexander conquered Persia, the books of Zoroaster were everywhere destroyed. Moreover, the kings of the Sassanide family, who favored the latter changes, caused all the ancient books they could find to be burned. For as to the works that the Mohammedans destroyed, they were probably those which had been adopted in the general synod, and the same as those which the Parsees carried with them to Hindustan. The books then which are said to contain the doctrines of Zoroaster cannot be faithful copies of the tenets of that legislator, but are nevertheless in accordance with what we know

of the Magian religion as regards the two principles, and deep reverence, if not adoration, of fire. But did Zoroaster really exist? Here the difficulty seems to consist in there having been several of the same name. We might indeed content ourselves with admitting the period pointed out by Professor Röth, from 589 till 512 years before Christ, and with Zoroaster's own admission that he merely aimed at re-establishing the worship of the Supreme Being, of *Hormouz*, or *Ahuramazdaô*, because we possess certain evidence that that very term *Hermèz* was introduced in Egypt and Greece long before that period. The time admitted by Röth as that in which Zoroaster flourished coincides remarkably with that which is said to have been the period of their legislator's existence by a colony of Parsees, probably of the reformed sectarians, who in 598 after Christ fled into China, where they continued their ancient or rather their modified worship. Their documents fix the period of the establishment of the Magian religion in the year 558 B. C. (*Memoires de l'Academie des Inscriptions*, vol. xvi. p. 245.) It is therefore this Zoroaster that is said to have established the actual adoration of One Supreme Being. Already in the time of Plato, and also of Cicero and Pliny, there existed much discrepancy respecting the period of Zoroaster's existence, but that doubt occasioned by resemblance of names never went so far as to deny his having existed, or his having founded the Magian religion. Chronology, we repeat, is a matter of Science, and chronological errors are human errors. Zoroaster, as well as *Hermèz*, are said to have existed before the deluge, the latter as Enoch, and the former as Cham, son of Noah. The period in which he flourished, as fixed by the Parsees dispersed in China and Hindustan, appears identical. It is that admitted by Anquetil

Duperron. Newton and Prideaux agree with Larcher, &c., in fixing the year 521 B. C. to be that of the accession of Darius Hystaspes to the throne of Persia, and as that in which the reform of Zoroaster took place. Larcher, however, says nothing of Zoroaster. His epoch thus settled, all difficulties are not over. He abolished, it is said, idolatry, that is Sabeism, and the worship of Mithra or the Sun. This latter worship was then different from Sabeism. Did he establish the Magian religion? Evidently not, if the Magians had already existed before his time, and we know that they had existed, and that a general massacre of the Magians had taken place. The king Darius appears to have been as ardent as Zoroaster for the propagation of the renovated Magian worship, for Prideaux remarks, after Porphyry, that he ordered before his death, that among other titles to be engraven on his monument that of Archimagus or Chief Magian should not be omitted. And ever since that period the kings of Persia adopted that title with the others, on ascending the throne. There are, we believe, only two issues which can lead us out of the difficulty. The first is pointed out by Pliny, and taken up by the Edinburgh Review (Feb. 1811). It consists in admitting that several Zoroasters had previously existed, and that the name being equivalent to Philosopher or Buddha, was adopted by the associate of Darius Hystaspes, when that prince perceived that he had gone too far in putting to the sword and in trampling under foot the whole sacerdotal caste in order to punish the usurpation of the Magian Smerdis. This Zoroaster would then have been the last. But this explanation by no means accounts for the term Magian having been previously in use. As for the name of Zoroaster, all that is required on this particular point we know, when we are



sure that the strange doctrines called religion, which were abolished by Alexander the Great, and which admit of incest, refer to this man whom the Almighty in His Wisdom, of which Faith alone is the measure, permitted to ensnare so many human beings. The second issue would be to admit that the term Magian referred to what we know already to have existed in the name of Hormouz or Hermèz, which signifies the Almighty, and thus the term Magh or Mighty would mean a priest of the Almighty, whose worship had been corrupted, but whose name remained stamped upon the very men who symbolized, as it was marked upon the symbols themselves. It meant a priest, an elder, and no other name could be given to that class. At all events, not only the term Hermèz existed long before the time of Zoroaster, but the very name of the priests whose dogmas were changed, admit of the same interpretation. The worship that immediately preceded Zoroaster's reform was the Sabian, and also that of Mithra, which consisted in the worship of the Sun under the name of Hormezd, but otherwise pronounced; as if instead of saying Al-mighty we were to say Might-al. The Moghs, Maghs, Mags, or Magii, were then the Brahmins of Iran: the name, which is that of Mazd, or Muz, Mir, Mihr, exists in Mithra, as in Or-muzd.

The sacred fire of the Jews, which came down from Heaven upon their altar of burnt offerings, which they did ever after inextinguishably maintain, till the destruction of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans, and with which fire only all their sacrifices and oblations were made, may have been the original of the Holy fire of Zoroaster, for it was a superstition worthy of the times and very likely to be copied. It may, indeed, be said of Moses, when, inspired by the Almighty, that legislator came to reflect upon the idolatry with which he

was surrounded, and with which as an Egyptian priest he was well acquainted,—it may be said of him, that he spoke to God “as to a friend,” for evidently the work he accomplished was one that proves how closely he adhered to the primary revelation of the Almighty, and with what iron energy he thrust away idolatry, when compared to that of Aaron. But the inspiration of Zoroaster, what did it produce? Fire was worshipped in Asia long before the year 521 B. C. Star worship had been in use for ages, as well as that of the Sun or Mithra, the Hindu Mitra, the Egyptian Osiris, both identical names. Zoroaster caused, it is true, the fire to be maintained with *barked wood* only, and never to be polluted with the breath of man. His prime *invention* appears to have been the Devil and a hierarchy of the angels, so that he may have been the original cause of those mythological expressions passing into the Jewish tongue with the new idiom or Chaldean they adopted, and which we find to constitute the knowledge of the times when Jesus Christ appeared. But to say that because God having spoken by his mouth in Hebrew, all Hebrew notions of the time became matters unalterable and real existences, is just as if men maintained that in two thousand years hence our actual knowledge will pass current. But let the religion of Moses be considered in whatever light it may, the upshot is Christ.

Although the Zend is the language in which the religion of Zoroaster was promulgated, and therefore it may savor very much of antiquity to quote a book which dates from 521 B. C., yet the Zend term to which we refer as proving that long before that legislator the notion of a Supreme Being existed, is grounded on the name of Hermèz or Hormouz existing in monuments of stone in Thracia and Greece. We cannot,

therefore, be accused of using the Zend Avesta of 521 B. C., altered and disfigured until the final expulsion of the Parsees, as a proof that a thousand years at least before that time the Zend word existed. The value of this very ancient term is, it is true, more fully explained by its existence in the Zend Avesta. As to the Hindu Vedas of 2,000 years before Christ, they certainly were not written on paper of any kind, and it remains to be proved that anywhere on earth manuscripts on leather existed at so remote a period. Three religions existed in Asia before the reform of Zoroaster: the Sabian, or that of the heavenly bodies; the worship of Mithra, and the Chaldean or Babylonian; but before we adduce clear proof that in these religions the very names are merely alterations of the name of God, we consider it a duty to give the opinion of Sir Isaac Newton respecting Zoroaster. He quotes Ammianus Marcellinus as saying that Zoroaster, the Bactrian, added much from the mysteries of the Science of the Chaldeans: "*Scientiæ ex Chaldaeorum arcanis Bactrianus addidit Zoroastres.*" This science is considered by Newton to have been Astronomy. He cites also the opinion of Eusebius (*Præp. Evang. l. x. cap. ult.*) as attributing to Zoroaster the following words: "God has the head of a hawk. He is the first, incorruptible, eternal, without beginning, indivisible, different from all others. He is goodness and prudence by excellence, the Father of laws, of equity and justice; His own Master; the only real being, perfect, wise, and sole author of Nature." Such was the ancient God of the Magians, says Newton. They erected no Temples, but worshipped God in keeping perpetually a Fire for sacrifice on an altar in the middle of a round spot of ground surrounded by water. It is but fair to give this testimony in Zoroaster's favor. Still Newton adds

immediately that this pure worship of God was soon abandoned, and Astrology, with all the superstitions of the Egyptians, Phenicians, and Chaldeans, came into use. Evidently the Hawk's head bears reference to the great god of the Assyrians; and as for the purer notion of God, it could not have been inspired to a man who considered incest as meritorious.

#### SABEISM.

To judge of the Sabian worship by what we learn from Fani, a Mohammedan writer, it is evidently that which Hyde has in view when he mentions the religion reformed by Zoroaster to be "the ancient religion of the Persians (*ei est religio peroetusta*), of which the adepts are called Keiomarsii. These admit an Eternal God, whom they name Yezdan, meaning by that term ton Theon (God), and another God the produce of darkness, whom they call Ahriman, which means the devil." Now, this clearly refers to the old worship such as it had been altered by Kaiamour. And therefore Zoroaster could not have taught, in the year 520 B. C., for the first time the existence of God. He explains, says Hyde, the nature of Good and Evil, the manner in which they are produced by a mixture of light and darkness. It appears that Zoroaster, instead of appealing to Faith in God, entered into explanations concerning His nature, and every one is free to go and learn all about it from that source; they will, no doubt, derive much information. The Yezdanians gave the name of Mahabad (the great Lord), from whom Yezdan or Light, and Ahriman or darkness, proceeded. Paradise, the fall of man, the present world; Sisuthros, and the deluge constitute their cosmogony. A struggle for mastery exists between Earth and

Heaven. Power over all things is given to the Stars, and each star rules in his turn ; but on Earth Baal and the Baalim govern, and after having governed, they become stars in Heaven. The Heavenly Powers exert also much influence on earth, and are to be considered as examples. Each planet has its temple, its color, its form and mode of worship. The power of the Stars was supposed to be visible in some stones (magnetic), and sometimes stones falling from Heaven (Bethyls) proved the existence of the heavenly powers. The cabbalistic Hermen, Talesmen, and Abraxas, were signs in stone of the heavenly bodies which they represented, and were kinds of Lares or Fetishes.

Saturn has a temple in black stone. The body of the statue was that of a man with an ox's head and a wild boar's tail. His color was black, and blackamoors were especially devoted to him. Stone was dedicated to him, and the ass. Bad smelling things were offered to him in sacrifice. His worshippers were principally husbandmen and peasants, mechanics and mathematicians.

Jupiter, clay color, a man with an eagle or a vulture's head wearing a crown on which was the head of a cock or of a dragon. To him the emerald and jasper were holy, and also the eagle. Religion, Law, and Justice were his attributes, and the learned resorted to his Temple.

Mars bore the form of a naked warrior, ruddy, with a bloody sword in one hand, and holding by the other a prisoner. Red stones, and the amethyst and sardonyx were holy to Mars, and in his temple congregated warriors, captains, and noblemen.

The Sun was represented as a man with two heads, each wearing a golden crown with seven points and set with rubies ; the figure sat on a horse and had a dragon's tail. The cupola of the temple was gilded

and set with precious stones. The priests wore rich garments with diamonds and rubies, and worked with gold : public honors, eloquence, riches, and birth, were their portion, and they were Princes, Satraps, and Governors.

Venus's temple was of white marble decorated within with crystal ; her statue represented a naked female with a ruddy complexion. The burnt offerings were of saffron and other odoriferous plants : beautiful females performed the offices of priestesses, and musicians, painters, and other professions devoted to the fine arts frequented the temple of their Patroness.

Mercury's statue and temple were of blue stone ; the body and lower extremities were those of a fish ; the head was that of a hog wearing a crown of gold ; the right hand held a feather, and in the left was an inkstand. Mercury united the two sexes, and was therefore named Hermaphrodite (Hermèz and Aphrodite). He was secretary to the Sun, the genius of Trade and Learning ; the god that marked the limits or boundaries, called Marches from his names, as also markets, of which he was the deity. Merchants and traders thronged to his temple which was a kind of Change.

The Moon had a temple in gray stone, and was figured as a man sitting on a white cow, wearing on his head a crown with three points. Incense and salted vegetables were the burnt offerings. Drivers, charioteers, and all steering professions frequented the temple.

The festivals of these seven planets were regulated by the astrologers.

If any confidence can be placed in these traditions handed down by the descendants of the Mohammedan conquerors, we here find the seven Cabiri or great di-

vinities of the Phenicians ; but the main point to which we would draw attention is the personification of the planets and the names given to them, so that we have at the same time the old Stellar Worship on which is grafted a far more modern branch. Hermèz is here a mere talisman, and the Moon, the great female deity of primitive nations, is evidently an afterpiece. The whole bears the stamp of the intermixture of the Greeks and Asiatics after the conquests of Alexander the Great. It is therefore probable that the planetary worship reformed in Persia by Zoroaster and Darius Hystaspes was not exactly the same. This secondary worship may have been abolished, but it cannot be said either that the name of Hermèz did not previously exist, or that Mahabad and Yezdan are not terms which indicate that the notion of a Supreme Being already existed. Sabeism or planetary worship, said to have existed all over the earth at one time in the highest antiquity, and of which Pococke gives sufficient proof, was unquestionably at first of the kind that Mr. Wilson maintains the first worship of the Hindus to have been. If the worship did not take its rise in Arabia, as the Arabs pretend it did, it was at all events established there very early and existed in the time of Mohammed. Pococke mentions seven planets having each their temple and worshippers: 1, *Dzohl* (Saturn); 2, *Dzohara* (Venus); 3, *Moschtara* (Jupiter); 4, *Atharid* (Mercury); 5, *Aldabaran* (Bull's eye); 6, *Sohail* (Canopus); 7, *Alscheera* (Sirius). If these were the leaders of the heavenly host (Tsaba), it would appear by all accounts that also a Supreme Being was admitted, although as usual the symbol hid Him from view. The eight divinities of Arabia given by the same author are, Wodd, Sewak, Nasr, Jagouth, Jaug, Allatt, Alozza, and Manah, besides stones (ærolites) and three

hundred and sixty statues in wood placed round the temple at Mecca.

In times when the science of the day, Astrology, was of much importance,—since by the study of the heavenly bodies men supposed they became acquainted with the will of God, expressed in fixed connection between those bodies and terrestrial events,—in those days, Science was most certainly called upon in order to confirm human trust or Faith in God, and the upshot was, as it always will be, a complete failure. Astrology, Mythology, Theology, may, perhaps, be adequate terms for expressing the deviation of the human mind from *Divine Faith or Trust* in the Almighty *revealed*. Even at the present day the contemplation of the heavenly bodies is peculiarly impressive and awful, when, in the silence of night, the most inexperienced and uninstructed person surveys the broad expanse. But that contemplation is altogether overwhelming for the mind who knows that the worlds on worlds and suns on suns which we perceive, may only represent in Space a white film forming a speck in the vast immensity of systems. Sabeism, that preceded the Egyptian and Persian speculations, was unquestionably, if not the earliest idolatry, at least coeval with the deification of the general conceptions of the human mind, respecting the relations between the great phenomena of nature and the notion of a Supreme Being, of the Almighty, impressed by Revelation on the mind of the first man, either mentally or aurally. Sabeism or Astronomical Theology constitutes an eventful page in the history of the human race; a page in which the first conceptions and the first history of man are to be read, but in which, rising above all, appears the great important fact of the name of the Almighty (not merely



the rational conception) being therein impressed in unmistakable characters. The Sabeism of the East, that of Chaldea, Persia, Scythia, India, Arabia, and Egypt, preceded what we know of the earliest Grecian mythology, which is itself so intimately connected with the worship of the Sun, Moon, Planets and Constellations, all which received or bestowed the names of the chiefs, and thus of the tribes, but which names are nothing more nor less than deviations for the most part from the name or three names of God, the thrice Mighty,—in Power, in Wisdom, in Goodness. These observations are naturally limited to what is known respecting the Slavonic, Celtic and Teutonic races, which form one in fact, if not at the same period, with the Pelagic, and which from the dawn of Tradition, viewed by the light of Ethnology, are so intimately connected with the Chaldean, Phenician, Arabian, and Egyptian nations. Now without Uranography, traced by the accompanying light of chronology, all the deep studies in which the learned are now immersed with respect to the primitive history of man, become utterly inapplicable, for the chiefs, the Cabiri, the Baalim and Elohim, had all their signs in the heavens. When once the human mind shall be emancipated from the yoke of Science; when the Science of the day, no more than the Science of yesterday, or the Science of the morrow, shall be the basis of Faith in the Almighty, then such researches being no longer deemed irreligious or blasphemous,—because it shall have become an unquestionable truth that Divine Faith or Trust in God, is not to be confounded with mere rational faith,—then such studies will resume the place they ought never to have lost. The progress of Astronomy, so intimately linked with Astrology, is marked unmistakably in the various forms of these

primitive theogonies; in the lunar phases, and especially in the great discovery at the time of the course of the sun. Newton says, that all nations at first reckoned their months by the phases of the Moon, and Pridaux gives very interesting accounts of the proceedings of the Hebrews in ascertaining those phases. But when Astrologers caused the course of the sun to be the rule, then 30 days formed a month, because, says Newton, even numbers were more convenient, in order when multiplied by 12, to form the 360 days which were the number of days of the old year before more complicated astronomical observation caused communities or nations to correct the error. Newton, therefore, quoting Proclus, and Geminus (Grecian Chronology), says, that the laws and oracles of the first tribes ordered them to distribute the months according to the phases of the moon, and the year according to the course of the sun, and that the distribution of the sacrifices to the gods thus regulated according to Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter, and to the days and weeks of the month, were considered as peculiarly agreeable to the gods. Thence the necessity to fix the periods, and to name each day, week and month, &c. The 360 deities of the Arabians, like those of the Egyptians, may be likened to the saints of the Romanists, which have no more value now in the eyes of other Christians than the fanciful sanctification of the ancients. Still in Arabia, as in other countries where Sabeism was less primitive, Dionysius, Bacchus, or Maghus, Azour, Osour, Osri, or Osiris as the sun, and under the name of Ourania, or Alitat, Olo Taal, according to Pococke, the Ilithia, or Mylitta, or Alissa, the Moon, were especially the objects of worship. And here the names are evidently the same which we have seen to be the name of the Almighty, and were

adapted to the science of the times. Dio-nyssus was the same as Osri, or Asoura, the Djustiper, the Bel, Baal, Apol, of Babylon and Greece; as Alitta, or Urania was the female deity, or the name of God conceived in the dual form. The Moon thus worshipped as Astarte, Diana, Cybele, Rhea, Eretia, Men-fra (Minerva), Nemesis, Tana, Ana, Anaitis, was also the female deities Juno or Hera, Here, Ceres, Onga, Ganga, and Herse, Hersilia, &c. The original is clearly pointed out in the name. If in some parts the Moon was worshipped in preference to the Sun, it was in those burning climes where, as in Arabia and Africa, all Nature seems to sink beneath the glare of the fiery luminary; whilst man, animals, and plants appeared to salute the silent steps of the mild goddess of the night, diffusing over the parched and sun-burnt fields her silvery light. Even at the presence day when the full moon appears and diffuses her soft radiance over the groves of Africa, her presence is saluted with song and dance, and Europeans who have witnessed such nights under the tropics, all agree in describing such nights as unimaginable by those who have not witnessed them. Still, in Africa, the land of Moonlight worship, the name of Zombi, or Zumbi, reminds of connections long forgotten, in which name the Om, or Oum, evidently refers to one of those mysterious terms of the East, of which another is found to exist at the utmost extremity of that great continent among the Hottentots, who still, like the ancient Airyans, hold the urine of the cow to be holy, for their science as yet can reach no higher.

Astrology and Sabeism can no more be adduced in favor of Zoroaster's having been the first to ground religion on the worship of One Supreme Being, than the worship of Fire in times antecedent prove that men

had no notion of such a Being. Ethnography may or may not be right in tracing to the Sanscrit Agni, the fire-names of God, of Ogmi, Ogmos, Ignis, Knicks, all names of Chiefs and Kings, because such terms represented the divinity; still the symbolic value of Fire (Fra), as representing the Spirit that animates nature, cannot be lost sight of, and it was that symbol which Zoroaster succeeded in restoring. To say, as does Prideaux, "Directly *opposite* to the Sabians were the Magians, another sect who had their original in the same Eastern countries; for they, abominating all images, worshipped God only by fire. They began first in Persia, and there and in India were the only places where this sect was propagated, and there they remain even to this day," is to cause Magism to appear in a far more favorable light than it deserves, for it was nothing else than an attempt at explaining things in Zoroaster's own way, as is evident by his theory of the devil. Does Zoroaster really deserve the praise bestowed on him by many, when, with Prideaux, they consider him as the instigator of the theory of Anschapands, Izeds, or Angels, and of Devs or devils, which thence became a part of the Hebrew tongue, and expressed every action as the result of such beings. To bestow on that legislator such praises is a partial admission of the theory of Professor Röth, who boldly asserts that before him Monotheism did not constitute the basis of any religion, and that assertion is belied by the words given by Röth as those of Zoroaster, who, reminding his followers of the ancient worship, reinstates it with Fire adoration and his theory of angels and devils. And, strange to say, this theory, which was a scientific expression of human fancies until then unknown, for between God and Moses, as between God and Adam, no angel interfered,—this theory found its way in the sa-

ered writings then *written* on skins by Esdras, as they found their way in the Hebrew language with the idiom of the place of captivity. The theory of angels is an indifferent matter as respects man, but not so that of devils. Here the very name of God is turned into devil, and from thence have men been led till the present day to believe in devils as they believe in God. The Apostles, who were men speaking the language of the day, expressed themselves as they ought in the language of the day, for indeed they could not do otherwise, and the authenticity of the sacred writing is guaranteed by that very circumstance. Every word bears the stamp of truth. But all human truths are relative, as are all human languages.

In stating that Zoroaster 550 years before Christ gave the meaning of evil spirits to the *powers* named Devs by the Hindus, we merely point out the fountain head of a doctrine which is still prevalent. For we know that at least a thousand years previous to that event the enemy of Hormouz was Ahriman, i. e., the adoration of the creature instead of the Creator.

The important subject of Sabeism or the worship of the heavenly bodies cannot be dismissed without mentioning the general conclusions at which have arrived MM. Guigniaut and O. Muller. The former maintains that it was only in the Alexandrian schools of Philosophy that occurred between the ideas merely astronomical and the mythological notions of the Greeks, the union or amalgamation which many writers have considered to have taken place at the time of the introduction of mythology in Greece. According to this view, all the ancient fables were revised by the Alexandrian philosophers, and the individuals, and even animals, whose names corresponded with the names of the various constellations, were linked

together, making it appear as if the ancient *data* of the astronomical form were the same as those in which the animal or individual had been placed in the Heavens, and that they also introduced sometimes circumstances which point out clearly that the supposed individuality was a fiction. Thus the Alexandrians gave out that Diana was said to have occasioned the death of Orion by the bite of a Scorpion allegorically, for that the real meaning was that the constellation Orion disappeared when the Scorpion showed itself in the Heavens. By this means they gave to Mythology a more rational appearance. They brought forward no new fables, but merely altered the fables already existing, and gave them a somewhat more specious appearance by their attempting to explain them. And so carefully was this system followed up of explaining all mythical dogmas by astronomical reasons, that many of the learned, and Dupuis in particular, were completely led astray. Mythology was supposed to be nothing more, as regards all metamorphoses therein mentioned, than the natural changes which occur in the heavenly bodies, given out as if they happened to individuals. Their relations were as of adventures: the rising and setting of stars, of planets, and constellations were made to signify the appearance, the birth, or the death of some individual. The myth of Andromeda tied to a rock, and the sea-monster appearing, was the constellation of that name near the Whale. Argus and his eyes were the starry heavens with its thousands of lights peering on the Moon. This reducing, by the Alexandrians, of historical and traditional myths to mere astronomical relations is considered by M. O. Muller as a capital error, and, as such, is powerfully withstood and carefully investigated (*Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie*).

This writer insists upon the fact of the writings of Homer and Hesiod exhibiting very little knowledge of the ancient stellular worship. The Pleiades, the Hyades, Orion, Arctos or the Great Bear (the chariot or Charles' wain), Bootès, and Sirius or the dog star, are the only ones named. These names evidently designate, says M. Muller, the natural phenomena with which the apparition of these constellations was linked. The Pleiades (from *πλεειν* to navigate, or rather to float, to swim) constituted the sailors' constellations, the sons of Atlas who reigned over the broad Atlantic. Hesiod advises never to tempt the seas when the Pleiades are hidden by the waters of the ocean. Later names, such as Sterope, Electra, Alcyon, and Cœleno would be relative to the particular appearances of these stars at sea, and the parts they were supposed to perform in forwarding navigation. *Orion* is considered by Muller to have received its name not from any giant, but from the peculiar brightness of the constellation. Why then the dog, asks Guigniaut, if the constellation did not represent any thing individual? for, if a hunter, the dog comes in naturally enough. Arctos would have received that name, because it meant a car or chariot, and Minerva having invented cars, according to fable, and the animal consecrated to Diana, the same as Minerva at first, the idea of that animal became linked with the constellation in the minds of the first Arcadians. Sirius was a term which pointed out the Heat that reigned when the dog-star appeared, &c., &c.

M. Guigniaut, however, considers M. O. Muller as having treated too lightly the Eastern origin of many of the mythic dogmas of the Greeks or Helleni, of which he believes it to have been unquestionably the source and foundation; such myths being in-

deed materialized by the vulgar on the one hand; whilst, on the other, they were embellished by the poets with all the fictions that imagination could invent. The first, or the personification of the idea, is Symbolism; whilst the Allegory represents the Myth. Thus the symbol is an idea made corporeal, and which by the *eye* of the body reaches the mind; and the Myth an idea expressed verbally, reaching the mind through the *ear*. The Symbol is seeing; the Myth, hearing.

How it came to pass that the primitive religion in Assyria, Chaldea, and Phenicia, bore a more astronomical character than that of Greece, where neither the Titan gods nor ancient gods, according to Hesiod (Earth, Sun, Moon, Stars, Heaven, Rivers, Sea, Water), nor the gods of his time, nor those which had succeeded, such as Jupiter, Mars, Minerva, Juno, Neptune, Apollo, &c., have a positive astronomical character, has been explained by the ignorance of the tribes that renounced the primitive sidereal significations of the symbols or visible signs which were transmitted to them from their Asiatic ancestors. They evidently appear to have begun *a new score* on an ancient basis, although their mythic conceptions unquestionably received names derived for the most part from the East, if indeed their chieftains did not bear those names as titles, for king Jupiter is no positive historical person. But we shall have occasion to return to this when reviewing summarily the Mythology of the West. For the present we must remain in Asia, and pursue the series of proofs, which we believe clearly to point out that the primitive religion—whether the worship of natural phenomena, and associated with the science of astrology as Sabeism, or with Duality or male and female personifications—contains in all its bearings distinct evidences of proceeding from a source where



the three attributes of the Deity constantly appear united. Chronology must be invoked here; not that Chronology which decides upon the very year in which any given event occurred before the time of Nabonassar (747, B. C.), but the data which correspond broadly with the evident primitive religions. If 1800 years before Christ the Airyan or Pelasgic tribes worshipped the heavenly bodies, and natural phenomena, their worship was the same as that of the Persians as described in 456 B. C., by Herodotus, in the following terms: "Here are the customs observed to my knowledge by the Persians. They are not in the habit of erecting either statues, temples, or altars to the gods; on the contrary, they deem it madness to do so; and that view, in my opinion, proceeds from their not believing, as do the Greeks, that the gods have a human form. They sacrifice to Jupiter on the tops of the highest mountains, and give the name of Jupiter to the broad expanse of heaven. They also sacrifice to the Sun, the Moon, Earth, Fire, Water and Winds, and to these divinities alone. But later they borrowed from the Assyrians and Arabians the worship of Urania, or the celestial Venus. To Venus the Assyrians give the name of Mylitta; the Arabians that of Alitta, and the Persians call her Mitra." (Lib. i. cxxxi.) Ethnology has confirmed the opinion advanced on strong probabilities for many years past, that the whole Slavonic, Celtic and Teutonic races, form with the ancient inhabitants of Upper Asia one and the same family, which according to Gœrres and many others, spread from the Caucasus to the Indus and beyond. But then much discrepancy exists as to the distinction between the Airyans or Arameans and the Semites. The same Gœrres considers the Assyrians, Medians, and Persians as speaking the same language—the Zend—

and yet calls it Dschem-Schid and Iran Semite ; Dschem being Sem. Now, admitting a very prevalent opinion, that of a primitive race having existed in Upper Asia, which divided and formed several nations ; and that Bactria and the adjoining countries were the nearest to the common source where the antique language was spoken, this hypothesis accounts for the Zend being that language, but not the Semite tongues. If Armenia was that country or the source, the name is Airyana still. The Medes, it is well known, were Arii, and are called Pahlavi or Pelvi, by the Hindus. The nations or tribes evidently became mingled in the great cities of Niniveh and Babylon, and after various conquests ; but still a broad distinction is to be drawn between the languages at certain periods. Now, what do we know positively respecting the Magians in high antiquity amongst these nations ? Sabeism we know to have been the religion of the Scythian tribes which are said to have resisted so violently the reform of Zoroaster and the Persian king Darius Hystaspes. (520, B. C.) The Medes were more Scythian at that time than the Persians. But Magianism, represented as Persian before and after Zoroaster, was primitively Median, or at least the highest authority, that of Herodotus, tells us so. Cyaxre, or Kai-Assur, the Median king who destroyed the Scythian hordes that plundered Asia after defeating him, and who took Niniveh, was of the Sabian or Magian religion. This was about a century before Darius. Dejoces was the grandsire of Cyaxares, and he reigned 50 years. "Dejoces united in one body all the Median tribes, and governed them only. That nation is constituted by several people, the Busii, the Paretacenians, the Strychates, the Arizantes, the Budians, the *Magians*." (Herod. Lib. I.) Phraortes the son of Dejoces, united the Per-

sian tribes with the Median, but among the Median people the Magii are mentioned. How could the Magii form a tribe? it may be asked; and this question may be answered by the fact that about 1,000 years later the Magians are described as forming in Persia a very powerful tribe, for it was owing to their influence that the Parthians, after reigning 500 years, were subdued by the founder of the Sassanide dynasty. The grand-sire of Cyrus is said to have consulted the Magians or priests respecting his dream, and to have put many to death for advising him to permit Cyrus to leave his court. He began, says Herodotus, when he heard of the revolt of Cyrus, by causing the Magians, interpreters of dreams, to be crucified. The Magians, or the priests of the Sabians, were then not a sect particular to Persia, but were the Druids of Asia. Herodotus expressly says, that whenever the Persians offered sacrifice, they neither erected an altar, nor lighted fire, nor poured libations, nor had sacred music. The victim was cut up and boiled, the pieces were laid on clover or on grass, and when they had been thus placed the Magian who was present, for no sacrifice is permitted without a Magian being there, chants a theogonia or hymn in honor of God. Now it was more than a thousand years before these ceremonies or rites were established,—rites in themselves very simple and adapted to a religion evidently far less complicated than at a later period, that the Pelasgian tribes of that race penetrated into Europe, bringing with them the same worship and considering *Hermès* as the Supreme God. *Hermès*, it is true, was soon worshipped as a mere stone, indeed a post, whilst Jupiter (*Djauspiter*), the god of Light, rose to supremacy. The more sedentary Magians, or those who fled to the mountains, if we admit that the conquest of Balk or Bactria by

Ninus, in spite of an army of four hundred thousand men, was the original cause of the Pelasgian or Zendian (Aryan) immigration into Greece,—these Sabians may not in the time of that separation have been so learned in Astrology, which they may themselves have learned from the Chaldeans or Cardeans, or Curtiens, for it appears that the *r* and *l* were variously and indiscriminately employed. Prof. Röth considers the Curetes to be no others than Chaldean priests who established the worship of Jupiter and that of the great goddess in the island of Crete, and other parts of Greece. At Babylon the temple of Belus was served by Chaldeans. But the more early religion in Europe, at least that of the Pelasgians, was Hermèz and the phenomena of nature. The dual principle, that of Bel and Hera, of Baal and Astarte, of Than and Tana, which is said to have been the worship of Babylon, is unquestionably more akin to Jupiter and Juno, than the Pelasgian.

When Sir W. Jones says that two thousand years ago Calida'sa, the Hindu philosopher, considers the powers of Nature as representing the male and female principle, the eight forms of which he enumerates in the words we have given (p. 175), we are brought to a very few centuries before the Christian era. Guigniaut, whose great work proves the application with which he has attended to this subject, takes the same view, that of duality of all the ancient religions in Asia, in which a god and a goddess were worshipped. All the great gods he considers to be only the forms of one god, in which the force of the male principle (as Sun, Heat, Dryness) and the generative principle were personified; whilst all the great goddesses constitute the various forms of a primitive goddess representing the Moon, the Earth, and the elements, especially *Water*, as the primary plastic element, containing all forms;

in a word the *Isa* of Sir W. Jones. The Sabian worship was evidently anterior in Asia, as a symbolic religion, to the more refined or rational notion of something anthropomorphic, to something similar to man. The first was objective, as the term goes in our times, the second was subjective. The first was symbol, the second was myth. But it is evident that the struggle between the Sabian and the Dual worship under all their forms was not limited to Greece; that struggle was carried on at the same time in Asia. It must, however, be remembered, that this division into symbolic and mythic is merely adopted in order to facilitate our investigation of a difficult and intricate subject, for from the beginning there was no dearth of imagination or of subjective views, which imagined the natural phenomena of nature to be possessed of intelligence not merely human, but more than human, for already the Almighty had been revealed. His existence, announced by attributes perfectly subjective, although He was by that very Revelation shown to be distinct from man and from nature, was supposed to be expressed by every natural phenomenon. The proof of this lies in the very names given to all these phenomena, which constitute the attributes of the Almighty. It was, it is true, a sad dereliction, but that it was such is clearly told in the names given to all these objects, or symbols, as it was later to all the mythological creations, either gods or goddesses. Why should the same name have been given to so many various objects, as we have heretofore seen was the case, if some connection had not existed between them in the minds of those who gave the names. That connection was the revealed Truth, most strangely distorted, it is true, but still it was there. It seems to have required much time before the Sun obtained the mastery over

all other natural phenomena, but at last that point was carried with the Sabians ; but the wild tribes still continued to worship trees and mountains, and groves and fountains. The knowledge acquired by accumulated observation which first told of the precise number of days which form a solar year, had probably much influence in obtaining for the Sun a complete mastery over all other objects of Nature, for then besides the evident utility Science was added. Yet we find among the Persians, Varouna or the broad expanse of heaven worshipped under the name of Jupiter, and from among the many phenomena of nature a certain number were chosen as superior gods. The Isani, or powers of Nature under eight forms, of the Hindus, is much the same, but Mitra was a name not peculiar to the Sun, it was also that of the planet Venus. Evidently this choice was the result of much reasoning on the subject among the Sabian worshippers. Nor did the notion of Duality appear so spontaneously as it is often supposed, because nothing more natural than man and woman, male and female. Why then did not this very natural notion establish itself at once when the subjective or mythic idea became preponderant ? We explain the matter very simply. It was because the notion of One God, of the Almighty revealed as such, being the starting point, and all natural phenomena bearing most erroneously the name of that Supreme Being, when men came to apply it mythologically, or as a myth subjectively, they were at a loss which sex to give to their mythic conception. The Moon or *Luna* was therefore *Lunus*, and the very first rude pillars that represented *Hermès* (the Almighty) and *Phra*, or *Era*, or *Fré* or *Fru*, the spirit (perhaps Fire), were termed *Herm-Aphradite* having both sexes or neither. The first gush of mythology was then of a peculiar nature ; it was not

merely subjective, it was the deviation of a primary monotheistic notion: it was the distortion followed up of the great revelation.

In what manner Hindu Vedas were written 2,000 years before Christ is a problem that is not yet solved. The Bible modestly says that the laws of Moses were engraven on stone, and such must have been the case. Leaving the ante-historical times out of the question, we verily believe, as we have already stated, that the general views of Sir Isaac Newton on Chronology will eventually prove to be true. Even with a period of two thousand years, the history of Asia leaves large gaps which are very imperfectly filled up by personages such as Feridan, of whom we are told that he reigned five hundred years. The fact on which we insist particularly, that of *Hermès* being the name of the great divinity of the Pelasgian immigrants into Europe, points out very clearly that the notion of the Almighty existed 1,800 years before Christ, and that Zoroaster in 520 B. C. (even leaving the Mosaic dispensation out of the question), cannot be considered as having been the first who spoke of or conceived a Supreme Being. Yet there remains such obscurity in Asia that it is very difficult to point out there any corresponding fact excepting the conquest of Balk by Ninus. The Brahmins were evidently in existence at that time, if their Vedas are authentic, and yet almost 1,500 years later, in the time of Alexander the Great, they are not yet the most powerful state beyond the Indus, although that conqueror nearly lost his life in storming, according to Arrian, one of their towns. Their power in India was then established at a far later period, and the priests may have had all requisite time for polishing a tongue that Ethnology proves to have been grounded grammatically before Greece began. But that circumstance does not prove

that the Brahmins governed India at that period, for their political power was on the rise in that country, and not on the wane, when they so energetically opposed an unavailing resistance to the Macedonian conqueror. We have already pointed to these circumstances registered in the historical annals of the human race. The Malli, it is true, are oftener mentioned than the Brahmins in Arrian, and Major Rennell scarcely names the latter, unless in a note in which their determined opposition and their setting fire to their houses and burning themselves and their families sooner than surrender, are stated. Rennell, however, insists upon the country (Hindustan) being at that period divided into many governments, saying that when historians tell us that the Malli, Catheri, and Oxydracæ leagued together for their mutual defence, that proves them to have been separate governments, and that Hindustan was not divided into kingdoms at that period, as ordinary readers suppose, but into tribes. Arrian calls them the independent tribes or nations, because, after the defeat of Porus by Alexander they still continued the contest. Porus commanded several tribes, as also his namesake who fled, but whose territories were seized. The Mysicani were the most powerful of these tribes, but the Brahmins were already noted not only for their valor, but for their philosophy. Brachman and Surman or Sarman, were names given to the worshippers of Brah (Phra), and those of Surya or the Sun. But if, as Sir W. Jones informs us, in such a central point as Agra and surrounding districts, a tongue of very peculiar construction called the idiom of Vraja was spoken when the Mohammedan conquerors possessed the country, and if "five words in six of that tongue were derived from the Sanscrit," it would certainly prove that in the 10th



century after Christ, the Brahmins had extended their power and their idiom from Upper India where Alexander found them to the more central parts. "For we cannot doubt," adds Sir W. Jones, "that the language of the Vedas was used in the great extent of country which has before been delineated, as long as the religion of Brahma has prevailed in it." This country is Airya-vartha, and Bharata, but the latter term is more particularly Hindu. The above-mentioned writer considers the Sanscrit and the Hindi to be as widely different, "*as German from Greek*," but now, such a difference would be esteemed a near resemblance, in the eye of the ethnologist, so that when he tells us that, "the pure Hindi, whether of Tartarian or Chaldean origin, was primeval in Upper India, into which Sanscrit was introduced by conquerors from other kingdoms at a very remote age," we find there introduced the view taken by Heeren, who considers the Brahmins as the conquerors of the Hindus and therefore styling themselves Gods, and their language Deva-nagari or language of the Gods. Many, and we side with them, esteem the term Deva or sacred, holy, as merely indicating the language and characters used in sacred inscriptions, for it is now well ascertained that many characters or alphabets exist even to express Sanscrit. The *Nagari*, from a town of that name where this peculiar character was first used, would then be merely a local term for a mark or sign. Mr. Hodgson, in his very interesting accounts of Nepaul, informs us that the primitive inhabitants are there named *Newars*, and are Buddhists, whilst the mountaineers are of the Brahminical persuasion. At all events, the term *Deva* is Airyan and belongs evidently to the Brahmins, but whatever may have been their religious influence over Hindustan in Alexander's time or a few centuries be-

fore Christ, their political power was very limited at that period, when, according to Rennell, the Prasii were the most powerful of the Indian nations, their territory being almost as large as France in Europe. The long sojourn of the Brahmins in the mountainous parts of Upper Hindustan is proved by the relation of Mr. Hodgson, and the holy town of Deva-prajaga, and that of Mana, are facts sufficient to convince the most incredulous. But even if these facts did not exist, attesting of a protracted stay in those parts, the Grecian conquests in Upper Asia prove a Brahman empire to have been a fable before the great revolutions which followed those conquests. Documents may be produced, and the names of Satya Yug and Dwapar Yug and Kali Yug given thereto, but the Brahman empire could not have existed before the expedition of Alexander, and did not last more than a thousand or twelve hundred years at most. Heeren says that the Bengali contains few words that are not derived from the Sanscrit. Naturally the vernacular idioms would suffer much alteration from rulers that governed India above ten centuries, and that would be quite irrespective of a very ancient connection between the languages. Mr. Wilford has strenuously combated the supposed antiquity of all the things that are told of the Brahmins, and as regards their Hindu Empire we are quite of his opinion, although we do not believe that the sacred islands mentioned in their works were Great Britain. The antiquity of the Brahman tribes is quite another question, but nothing proves them to have governed India before the Grecian Bactrian Empire. The wars and conquests of the Hindu tribes are not to be confounded with the progress of the former.

Major Rennell asserts: "There is no reason to doubt that the Hindu or Brahminical religion was universal

over Hindustan and the Deccan, before the time of Alexander's conquest, if we regard the notices afforded by Herodotus and Arrian. Nor is it more extraordinary that one religion should prevail over India, although composed of distinct governments, than that the Christian should prevail over a larger tract in Europe, or the Mohammedan over a still larger tract in Europe, Asia, and Africa. But although there might be a universality of religion, there were, as the learned well know, many distinct languages; and history, both ancient and modern, gives us the most positive assurances that India was divided into a number of kingdoms or states from the time of Herodotus to that of Achar. Not only Herodotus, Diodorus, Pliny, and Arrian are positive as to this point, but even Abul Fazil, who composed a history of the Hindu provinces, in the reign of Achar in the sixteenth century." We have already given the motives for doubting that this great kingdom or the Prasii and Gangaridæ constituted the Brahman empire which was so flourishing six hundred years after Christ, for, five hundred years before the Christian era Herodotus mentions India as tributary to the kings of Persia, and his description clearly points to Indians very like the Bactrians inhabiting the North, near the towns of Caspatyre and Pactyice, and whom he terms the most warlike; and those residing in the plains who only eat vegetable food, never killing any animals. But all paid tribute to Persia five hundred years before Christ. As to the unity of the religion, Brahmanism, it is true, was a very ancient religion, but it was rather the diversity of that religion than its unity that accounts for its ranging so extensively. Can the Brahmins, at the time of Alexander, be considered as the remnants of a race that once governed Hindustan, or were they the sacer-

dotal tribes, the most learned, who afterwards became the masters? The religious doctrines, usually termed Hindu, are in reality those of the Airyamen, those of the Brahmins, those who dwelt long in Airya-vartha; those, in short, who separated at some unknown period from the great Airyan or Bactrian confederacy on account of their peculiar doctrines, or else because Bactria was conquered and taken possession of by some great conqueror, probably Ninus. At all events, Mr. Buntly insists upon the fact that not till six hundred years before Christ, or in the time of Brahma-Gupta, had the Hindus acquired a scientific knowledge of astronomy. The Hindus, it is true, boasted of six thousand years having elapsed since Bacchus or Dionysius had invaded their country until the reign of Sandracottus, but they evidently referred to some ancient invasion, and there exists great probability that such an occurrence did really take place sixteen hundred years before Alexander appeared.

The religion of the Brahmins was that of the Sun, of Airyaman, and as such was probably the religion of India. The term Brahma may or may not be derived from Bra or Fra, as Fire which represents the Divinity, but nevertheless the mysterious syllable *Ar*, so often given *Al* and *El*, or *Il*, as well as *Er*, is too plainly perceivable to be overlooked. The word meant in all probability Spirit, and in those days, as in our times, men were not wanting who undertook to tell their fellow-men *what Spirit was*, and as the matter was rather difficult, they chose from amongst the elements the most subtle. The religious abstractions of the Brahmins may, and indeed are proved to date from at least two thousand years before Christ, but nothing proves that they had invented *books*, or made marks on *wood*, much less on leather. Stone, brick, and metal were

the materials. The high antiquity of these religious tenets is proved by the first inhabitants of the western world, or at least by the Pelasgians worshipping not only Hermès, but Onga, or Ganga, who sprung from the head of Jupiter, and can be no other than Ganga. But is it not sufficient to be able to adduce proof that the inhabitants of Europe are wanderers from the regions of Upper Asia, and that if they carried with them the idea of the Almighty as Hermès, others also brought the more mythic conceptions of their ancestors. Be it as it may respecting an ancient empire, all we know of the matter is that 500 years before Christ they were merely a religious sect, that in Alexander's day they, the Brahmins, were brave and warlike tribes, and that 600 years after Christ they were masters of all Hindustan.

Although in accordance with modern opinion we adopt the division of ancient religions or polytheism into that of Symbols, and into that of Myths, yet we repeat our remarks respecting the impossibility of applying such a division to any given period. Not only were symbols adopted at the same time, whilst in other places the worship was mythological, but very often they were united. The separation is irrational, and it is probably because writers attempted such distinct separations of things always connected, that we may ascribe the many various systems known by the names of the *historical*, or that of Evhemerus, adopted by Bochart and Newton, which considers ancient mythology merely as historical truth in a poetical dress, and the *allegorical*, that of Bacon, which esteems it to consist solely of moral and metaphysical conceptions; whilst others are of opinion that all the heathen divinities are only different attributes and representations of the Sun or of deceased progenitors, as did

Bryant. Sir William Jones conceives the whole system of religious fables to have arisen from different distinct sources, but that one great spring and fountain of all idolatry was the veneration paid in all parts of the globe to *Fire*, and another, the immoderate respect shown to the memory of powerful or virtuous ancestors, especially the founders of kingdoms, legislators and warriors, who were commonly supposed to be the descendants of the Sun or the Moon.

In the order of proofs on which we insist, we have here to pursue those which relate to the name of the Almighty being constantly given to all those objective or subjective notions which man puts his Faith in, instead of putting it in God alone. These notions, which are either symbolical, mythic, theological or rational, embrace an horizon which we can merely glance at. In the Symbols, as well as in the Myths, the names given are constantly of the nature of one or other of the three divisions we have pointed out. Other names certainly exist in great number, but such is the elasticity of pronunciation and orthography, that names often apparently distinct are, in fact, identical. The well-known terms of *Ar*, *Art*, *Lar*, *Lart*; those of *Thor*, *Tur*, *Czar*, *Sar*, are often united to enforce expression. Thus the earth we have seen named *Ar-Thor*, *Er-tus*, *Ar-tha*, *Er-tha*, and *Eretia* or *Aretia*; and *Tella*, *Tellus*, or *Terra*, to be the same word, whilst *Prithivyan*, *Frothian*, *Frotho*, *Brytho*, *Prydan*, and *Brittan*, though names so very different, are identical, for Fire or Spirit appears to be the primary meaning, and that idea is expressed by the mysterious *yr*, *ur*, *ir*, and *er*, to which the article is added, sounded *P*, *B*, or *F*, or *V*, according to the dialects. It cannot, we believe, be considered in the light of a disparagement towards the great science of modern Ethnology,

if we have only admitted the most simple and less complicated of its rules, for we wish, above all things, to avoid etymologies; but it is clearly evident that the names above cited are mere *literal* or alphabetical alterations, as having at first stood for other notions equally superior. Thus a name, primarily that of Fire as an element, becoming still more important when considered as a god, is given as such to a prince, and is adopted by a nation. The Pyrtans of Greece, the Prytans of Albion, and the Feridans of Persia all bore the same name, which was identical, in fact, with the Tar-chans, Orchons, Archans, and Tearchons of Phenicia, Italy, Greece, Egypt, and Ethiopia. We have seen the high esteem in which that name, which once shone so bright on earth, was held, the name of Syd, Scyth, Sik, Cyd, Syd, Sig, or Sigr, for it was that of the Conqueror, that of Victory, but to others it was a sound of woe. In the name of Sesostris or Syth-ostri, the names of Sith and Osiris appear conjoined, and Sesak is considered as identical with Syth. Whether the term be given as a mark of conquest as that of Getic (jit, conqueror, A-jita, unconquered) or those of Germanicus, Brittanicus, we are ignorant; but the real meaning being that of Mastery, the term Syddyk, or Sydyk was adopted all over the East, and is still received. Is it going too far to remind the reader that the letters *S*, and *C*, and *X*, are often confounded? that Xuthus stands for Sythus, and that the name of Master or Lord being generally expressed by words in which the force was sought to be augmented, and which were therefore doubled, as in Sesostris, where Syth and Ostris form the name, it is very probable that Berosus in that of *Xisuthris* aimed at expressing the chief, the Sesostris, the Lord of Lords, because the name being greatly prized was used long after the event, if, in-

deed, that event was the great deluge; although the terms Syth or Syd, and Ostreis may have been used in Chaldea, for they are among the most primitive.

The worship of the Sun, considered as a more rational mode of adoring the Divinity, exists evidently in Mithra, Mitra, and in Osiris, as in Her-cle, Al-cee, Her-acle. It has long passed for a matter of fact that the "circle of the Lord," which is the meaning of the latter name, positively expressed the course of the Sun, and that the twelve signs of the zodiac were the twelve feats performed by that mythic personage. But the explanations of the Alexandrian school have much less credit than formerly. The circle may mean a crown, or it may mean the Chief of the Camp, of the Arc, or Arx, or Alc. The name is Scythian, and if it meant a wanderer, it would have been perfectly well applied to the Tar-chans or chiefs of the nomade tribes, and more especially to the greatest warrior. The term was Asiatic, although heroes of the same name evidently existed in Egypt and in Greece. But we have seen that in Egypt Tarchon or Star-chon was among the first kings, and Osor or Sar-chan is a name of Hercules. In the West, Er-ric, Eric, and Er-ring are synonymous, and are the same as Her-cle, and Her-akle, but of this later, when speaking of the West. In the wars of Hindustan, preceding all sacred literature and therefore all other of which any record can be extant, there reigned, according to Mitscherlich, at Mahabharet or Malva a king named Her-ghes, whose army was composed of ketris or warriors, and yet who was conquered by the chief or king of the Brahmins. (The wars of the Koros and Pandoos followed at a later period. See Heeren.) Pandea was daughter of the Indian Hercules: the Pandous was the name of the dynasty, as that of Puru, or Pour was that of the Porus family.



The Pandous empire is mentioned by Ptolemeus, according to Heeren; but evidently this empire and the corresponding wars occurred in the second century after Christ. The Bactrian Kan-erkes was one of the Princes that divided the Grecian empire of Bactria, and was a title assumed by all the Indo-Scythic princes whose names assume a Greek form. If then the ancient Her-ghès relates to times 2,000 years before Christ, those wars would have taken place in Upper Asia. The syllable *Her*, *Er*, *Al*, in Her-akle, Er-kle, and Al-cee, prove sufficiently the relation we aim at establishing.

The Sun is Mithra, the all-powerful. The term itself expresses power; but Mithra was also a female deity, also Anaitis, Tana, Tanit, Artha, Eretia, Zara, and Mitra, Athena, Zaretis Artemis. The name of Mithra was not, therefore, exclusively that of the Sun; and if it be admitted that the secret mysteries of Mithra only began when under that name the Egyptian priests introduced into Persia those of Osiris, it would have preceded Darius Hystaspes. It was the great god of Persia, and as Aramazte is the same as Ormuzd or Hormuz, so Mihr appears to form with Ahura, Mithra or Mithras. All these names are said to have been given to the god Belus that represented the king of the same name (Cahan de Cerbied), but we know that kings were in the habit of taking names which expressed some divine attribute. The term constitutes the very name of *Hermèz* or *Armadz* when written with the last syllable first.

The moon-god (*Lunus*, and *Luna*) was certainly worshipped as a female deity under the names of Tana, Dana, Di-ana, Anaitis, Mylitta or Alissa, Elisa or Fra, Afradite Cybele and Magna-mater, Artemis and Belona in various parts of Assyria, and at Babylone as

Hera. This was also Juno. This goddess was also Eretia, or Artha, or Ertha, and Tella. She was Ops or Dives, and Minerva or Min-fra, the goddess of the moon as well as of science. Men, Menus, Mana, Mona, at first indicated the deity represented by the Moon, and was sometimes masculine, sometimes feminine, sometimes both, as Herm-aphrodite. Duality was no primary notion, but was the consequence of applying to symbols and myths the name of God. At first uncertain and hesitatingly respecting the sex, the separation was soon followed up by making so many distinct persons of the various names under which the revealed God was symbolized and mythified. We have seen the natural phenomena receive such names in each of which not only the idea of the divinity is concealed, but in which one of the three names variously combined constantly finds place. The great god Bel, Baal, Belus, or Zeus, or Dzeus, Deus, Theos, and the neutral Theon (divinity), and Zeus, or Dis-piter, Jupiter as well as the goddess, which in Asia were worshipped at first as Sun, Moon, Stars, Planets, Elements, began, it would appear by two, after much hesitation. But these two, as the other mythic creations that followed, had some representative, some symbol in the Heavens. The Constellations being of later date, were the share of the last comers, being themselves less evident to the "*common sense*" of the multitude. These remarks have reference to Asia alone and Egypt. Europe will require a fuller investigation, although the starting point appears to have been the same. Fire in Asia, and Water in Europe, as in Hindustan, are as symbols the distinctive ones. The sign that the element Water was not a primary worship is the name of Ganga, Onga, Onka, Ogghan, Ocean, Ogheana, Oceanus, which accompanied everywhere in Europe that wor-

ship, and which must have arisen among the Brahmins. Still even here the term Ganga alone is *mythic*, the element *Water* is symbolic, and, as a symbol, it would be very difficult to decide whether *Fire* had the preference. Men may live in warm climates without fire, but the use of water is so requisite to his natural wants, and so adapted to the wants of all production in nature, that it may well pass for the primary element more especially worshipped. A third element, Light, was most certainly a very early symbol, as the term Djiv, Div, Ti, Di indicates, and probably each symbol had its followers.

Now, limiting, as it must be done, our investigation within the limits of the Airyo-European race, another term, not only very primitive, but still in use, is that of Pat, Pit, Vat (Pater, Piter, Vater), which were also pronounced Tat, Taat, Baat, Boeth, Tauth, Toth, and Ma, mat, am, tam, or Mater, muther, mooder, in short Mother. The rulers of the family, and the chiefs of the tribes known in highest antiquity as Patr, Vatr, Fadr, Fidr, Pitr, with the term of governor, Ar-chée, Ar-chon, of later date though lost in darkness, constituted the Patri-archs, and these when commanding the warriors were entitled Ascól, Escol, Herkle, Erclé, Archan, &c., &c. The conquerors were Sig, and Scyth, (Sigr, Sidr), and beyond such names there exists no record, for Noah is termed Sydyk (the master) or Suduc, and it is also a name which expresses God. Here one may exclaim with Burnouf, *nomina, numina*, and the names also were invested from the very beginning of all tradition with the notion of the deity as a distinct being, although terms of Power, Wisdom, and Goodness. The men who more especially attended to the forms of expressing Faith in and honor of the Divinity were the first to go astray, and Magian,

Brahmin and Cohen are terms which express the various kinds. Telchins or prophets (Telgam, prophet; Bergmann), Curetes or Kurds or Chaldeans introduced into Europe the Asiatic forms of worship, which being new and far more pompous than the ancient, were eagerly adopted. All these were evidently Asiatic before they were European, and even Sigga was worshipped in Assyria as Sicca Benoth or Venos. The warriors of the Scythic deserts had divided East and West. Without admitting the 1,500 years' dominion of the Scyths over the world before Ninus on the faith of a few lines of Justin, and without restraining it within the short period of the Scythic incursions checked by Khai-axare, it is an unquestionable matter of fact that their tribes did govern for a long period because they found very little opposition. The term Scyt, Syd, Sig, once of such high import, became by degrees to be that of barbarism, although Sidi, Sydyk, Sich, Sesac, appear to be the same. Saad was luck, good fortune, as was Sigga in the West, and with Gad, Mana, Meni, Manah had in the East the meaning of success. We have seen that the old Spanish term Cid, of unknown extraction, means *conqueror* or *victor*, and it may be that the Phenician Sid-on derived her name from some such combination. Sicca was worshipped at Carthage, although Tanit was the more usual name, or Kartha, and Melek-arta, the one being merely an abbreviation. (See Fourmont, Creuzer, and Guigniaut.) The celestial virgin spoken of by St. Augustin, and whose ceremonies were those of the great goddess of Phrygia, Cybele or Rhea, according to that Father, represents perfectly well the high character borne by the primary form of the female deity. This temple was only closed in 399 after Christ. (Capitol. de vita Pertinax. c. 5.) The attributes of Tanit on the old

Carthaginian medals are those of Rhea and Cybele ; she is represented sitting on a lion in full career, one hand launching the thunderbolt and the other holding the lightning, a star is above the head around which is a turreted crown (mural. afrit. arx.). Guigniaut believes that Alissa, Elisa, or Dido was worshipped in Astarte or Tanit, and that her memory, as having founded the city, was linked with that of the great goddess, the *magna mater*, as in Babylon the name of God as well as that of the king were united, as Bel, Belus, or Baal. The goddess of Syria, Urania, and Astarte and Cypris or Cythera, all were forms of Tanit, of Hera, of Juno. Ben-dis was the name of Diana among the Thracians, and at Athens : *Bendidia* was the name of the festival held in her honor, and *Bendideion* the name of her temple. Benos or Venos was gift, was good fortune, was happiness, and if Venus was named Aphrodite, as proceeding from the sea, it is because the latter name, lost by the first Greeks, was carried over the seas by the Phenicians. The three great divinities of Carthage mentioned by Polybius (vii. 9, § 2, 3) : 1, Daimon Karchedoniôn or Tanit-Astarte ; 2, Hercules, and 3, Iolaus or Iulus, are all from Upper Asia, or Scythic, or Assyrian. Hercules is Baal-Khamon, or Bal-Illamon, or Bal-mon (according to an inscription found at Guelma). He was the same as the Malek or Melch-art of Tyr ; he ripened all fruit and spread life around him : he was the Sun personified ; the eternal king ; the Lord of Heaven or Baal-samen, as Tanit was Baalit, or Baalissa the queen. (Movers considers El-issa or Al-issa to mean the mighty God.) Indeed the denominations of Asia spread far into Africa, for in Mauritania we find the Numidian deity Masti-man or Mazdi-man considered by Sallust to be the Sun, and the same as Hercules and Baal-Kha-

mon. (Jug. c. 14.) The third god of Carthage or Iulus or Iolaus is, according to Diodorus Siculus, the Prince who founded a colony in Sardinia, the son of the chief or Hercules, Baal-Khamon and Kartha. In all these denominations the primary radicals are easily perceived. Sardinia itself received its name from Sar-dan, who may have been the same as Iulus or Ilus. Carthage, it is well known, practised horrid rites and human sacrifices, which were prohibited by Xerxes in a special treaty, and again much later by Tiberius, who sentenced all priests to be hung who should offer such inhuman sacrifices to their gods.

Of the three primary terms used to designate the Almighty, which may be considered as the most primitive? We believe the one which signifies Father; and, in fact, it is that term which has ever preserved attached to it a more intimate sense of *intelligence*, of *wisdom*, and of *goodness*. It is, however, a name which, on account of many varied pronunciations, appears often so different, that it is difficult to admit that it is really the same. Certainly Tat, Taut, Taat, and Pat, do not appear identical, no more than Thoth, Teut, Tit; and yet the Titans of old, and the Pattans of the present day, bear names which signify Masters or Fathers, meaning chiefs: the name being taken in both cases from some chief's having that signification. But when the same term comes forward in Boeth and Budh, and in Wod and God, it requires a clear conviction that the letters are merely otherwise pronounced in order to admit of their being the same. It is this name which the Chinese pronounce Fo, the *B* having with them that sound. It is this name which is generally recognized in Odin, or Wodin, or Wuotan, the great god of the Teutonic tribes. Lastly, it is with this name that has ever been connected that of Mer-

curius, for indeed this latter with the term of Hermèz is always found linked with that of Thoyth or Teut. In all languages the name of the day corresponds with these names, and as Mercury or Odin was said to be the god of the Teutons, so Wodin's day corresponds with the Latin *dies Mercurii*. As connected with the name of Buddha, this term means also the genius of the planet Mercury, named Taaut, Hermèz, and Buddha, and has always signified the soul of the world or supreme Intelligence. It is a singular coincidence that the most ancient theogony, according to the ancients, that of Egypt, and at the same time the most grovelling and superstitious, was founded by a person bearing the name of Hermèz or Taaut, which were the terms expressive of the Almighty ; and that that sink of metaphysical theology termed Buddhism, which at present reckons several hundred millions of votaries, should also have been founded by a philosopher in times far more modern, whose name was the same as one of the most ancient Eastern names of God, Buddha, or the All-seeing, the supreme Intelligence. Buddha, the legislator, was the son of a Hindu King, but his name signifies God. (See Klaproth, Hodgson, Remusat.) His name, in fact, that of Sang ngia, pronounced Cha-kia, means *wide awake*. As this religion,—with Christianity, Mohammedanism and Brahminism,—may be said to be one of the four great religions on earth, it cannot be passed over hastily, nor without citing the name of Eugène Burnouf, who has so greatly contributed to clear up many points hitherto totally in the dark. Some writers, such as Langles and Buchanan, consider Buddha to be from Abyssinia, and to have come to Hindustan before Brahminism was established in that country ; but the opinion of Sir W. Jones is now clearly demonstrated, and he is proved to have been

a Hindu. Buddha, pronounced Fo, was a name used in China before they ever heard of the Hindu legislator. It is a name which contributes to connect the ancient nations of the globe ; it means Father, it means Intelligence, it means God. And the Hindus mention in their traditions a Buddha as the ancestor of the warriors named the children of the Moon (Chandravansa), and as the genius of the planet Mercury. They tell of a fifth descendant of this personage, whose father Yahati sent to the East of Hindustan in exile, with this imprecation, "May thy progeny be ignorant of the Vedas." This banished prince Sir W. Jones suspects to be the Chinese Yao, who was the fifth descendant of Fohi, which is the same name as Buddha, and before whom (Yao) all Chinese history is considered as fabulous by the Chinese themselves. The Hindu legislator Buddha lived before the Christian era, and is supposed to have taught his doctrines in those parts, when Zoroaster reformed or altered the ancient Sabian worship in Persia and Upper Asia. Abel Remusat, judging from Japanese documents, and reckoning the years of the twenty-nine Lama patriarchs, makes out Buddha to have existed at 1,000 years before Christ. We would advise the reader to mind the date, but not to give it implicit credit. The lies of the Eastern Pundits appear to pass all conception. At all events, it was only in the first century after Christ that Buddhism was introduced from China. Thus, by some, Buddhism is esteemed more ancient than Brahminism in Hindustan, and effectively if Buddha taught 1,000 years before Christ ; and if the Brahmins, 400 years before that era, were still a kind of sacerdotal philosophers in Upper India where Alexander found them, the Buddhists may be said to be more ancient in Hindustan than the Brahmins, whose antiquity is of



Upper Asia, whose mythology is closely connected, as well as their language, with Europe. The fact is, that the first historian who gives us any account of Hindustan mentions two very distinct races—a northern resembling the Bactrians, very brave; a southern living on vegetable food alone, and of whom the historian Herodotus gives an account (physiological), which was evidently erroneous, but which was in those days considered to be a characteristic of the negro race. The struggle in Hindustan between Buddhism and Brahminism was decided in the time of the birth of Christ, and the Buddhists were driven out of the country, and completely rooted out of India. Now, if the natural course of events be taken into consideration, instead of seeing in Buddha a reformer of a country wholly under the yoke of Brahminism, in which case Buddhism could never have thrived for a thousand years, we would be tempted to consider it as a doctrine already existing in the country, and which successively opposed the progress of Brahminism and the division into castes. The Brahmins at a very early period may have settled in Upper India, and that settlement may have preceded, if it did not occur at the time of the destruction of the Bactrian empire, but the fact of their not being the masters of India neither in the time of Herodotus, who says they paid tribute to Persia, nor in the days of Alexander, when they were still settled in the mountains of North Hindustan, proves that they were not then as they were later, the masters of India. We have seen that Rammohun Roy says that the Brahmins remained two thousand years as philosophers, poor and learned, but that after that time they accepted dignity, and governed India a thousand years until the days of Mahmoud Ghazevid. This account would tally with all we know of the mat-

ter, though it would not agree with all that is fancied. If such was the case, then Buddha would appear as one who attempted and succeeded in introducing into Hindustan a religion somewhat similar, particularly as regards the ten commandments, with the reforms effectuated towards the Mediterranean by Moses. The fact so well authenticated by Mr. Colebrooke of the Djains and Buddhists having formerly admitted, and still admitting the well-known distinction of four castes, proves that this fundamental principle preceded their tenets, thus illustrating forcibly the anterior claim of the Brahmins; but far from proving the political power of the latter, it proves, we believe, only that their religious doctrines were widely propagated. If the Brahmins settled in Northern Hindustan 2,000 years before Christ, and if, as the best authorities (Sir W. Jones, Abel Remusat) advance, Buddha began to teach about a thousand years before the Christian era, the former would have had the start of a thousand years, and have thus precluded to their future political authority. It would then have been their victory over the Buddhists that paved the way to their temporal aggrandizement, which then only permitted them to root out their adversaries. The fact of the admission of castes among the Hindu Buddhists is also highly interesting, since it does away with the great feature of a popular reformer so liberally attributed to Buddha, the legislator. Whether, as it has been supposed, the Arabian gymnosophists were connected with the Indian, it is impossible to decide; but it is certain that those of Hindustan, mentioned by the Greeks in the time of Alexander, and those of whom Strabo speaks, appear to be Buddhists rather than Brahmins. The means resorted to by the latter were probably of the kind which gave to the company of Jesus, in far less time, a

power that was on the point of extending their authority over all Europe. A passage, which we extract from the 2d book of the Hitodesa of Vishnusarnam, as translated by Sir W. Jones, may perhaps clear up the mystery: "Who," asked the king, "will go on this embassy? for an ambassador should be thus qualified: faithful, honest, pure, fortunate, mild, laborious, patient, *a Brahmin*, knowing the hearts of others, and extremely sagacious. Again: noble, true, eloquent, prosperous, affable, exact in delivering his message, with a good memory: An ambassador should have these seven qualities. There are many such ambassadors, *but a Brahmin must be appointed.*" It may, indeed, be a subject of surprise that they should not have succeeded much sooner in obtaining the mastery of Hindustan, but if they found Buddhism in their way, that would account for their slow progress.

In order to preclude all misunderstanding which might arise from our admitting that the terms Buddha, and Odin or Voden or Weda, or the Gothic Vôdaus are identical, we must again remind the reader that this does by no means refer to the individuals which appear to have existed, one in the West, the other in the East—the one a conqueror, Sid, the other a philosopher, but both bearing a name that we consider as the first by which the Causo-Himalayan race named the Almighty, that of Father.

#### BUDDHISM.

The Djainas of Hindustan, who with the Buddhists are termed heretics by the Brahmins, are, it is true, all of one caste, but that proceeds from their all belonging to the caste of Vaisyas according to their own account, or to that of the Kschatrias according to the

Brahmins, and it is into these castes, that they enter when they return into the orthodox Brahminism. But with the Buddhists the distinction of castes is registered in the earliest traditions of their doctrines, in the very history of the disciples who, under the name of patriarchs, spread those tenets over Hindustan, and it is to be found in the translations which have been given of the Buddhist works in the various Eastern languages. It is in the works of MM. Colebrooke, Hodgson, Schmidt, Csoma, Bergmann, Klaproth, Abel Remusat, that those who desire to obtain a sufficient knowledge of these vagaries of the human mind will find them. Here we must be very concise, although the matter cannot be passed over. The *Djainas* or *Arhatas* are also named *Digambaras*, a term signifying *without clothing*, and which evidently reminds of the ancient gymnosophists. *Lantchita-Kesa* is also one of their names from one of their usual practices, that of tearing their hair off, in a spirit of mortification. Their doctrines, on the whole, consist in asserting with respect to the mental faculties of man and that of natural things, the wildest theories which are given out as religious tenets. They know all about the Soul or animated being (*Djiva*), and are no less competent in respect of inanimate nature (*Adjiva* and *Poudgala* or *Matter*). And to these two categories of knowledge they add five others, for the direction and deliverance of the mind: 1. *Asrava* or attention. 2. *Samrava*, or intention. 3. *Nirdjara*, or what effaces sin. 4. *Baddha*, or reasoning, argumentation and inference. 5. *Moksha*, or deliverance, which buoys up and delivers the soul from all corporal links. Eight acts: four pure, four impure. Six substances: spirit, virtue, vice, matter, time and space. Then come reasonings on the transmigration of souls, and explana-

tions all about it, and about atoms, and about what they know with respect to the necessary result of causation on effect, such as maintaining that if intelligence creates any thing, that thing must be intelligent (what is in the cause must be in the effect). But one great doctrine is the influence which the dying thoughts have upon the new transmigration, which is also in the Brahmin Vedas, but which with the Djainas assumes a positive form; since they maintain that when a dying man thinks of a woman he becomes a female, and that in like manner females change their sex. All these doctrines constitute so many articles of Faith not admitted by the opponents, the Brahmins.

The Buddhists are divided into four sects according to the various manner in which they interpret the Sutras, attributed to Buddha, or Sachya-Mouni, or Gautama. All this runs upon the vacuum, the nature of things, the Infinite, human intelligence and sensation, &c. &c. But besides the books of Buddha they have many sacred works written by the patriarchs, and several hundred thousand volumes compose the whole collection written in the various oriental tongues, such as Sanscrit, Thibetan, Chinese, and many dialects. Among these, the sacred book of the Lotus of the excellent law was composed in Tahia (Bactria ?) 1,000 years ago, and brought to China in the 16th century, and translated by Tun-hoang-pou-ssa-tchou-hou-fa-thche (i. e., the Bôdhisattra of Tun-hoang; the defender of the Hindu faith, under the title of Tching fai hoa, or the flower of the true law). The treatises considered as sacred by the Buddhists of Thibet, of Tartary and of China, are merely translations of the Sanscrit texts, and these were discovered by Mr. Hodgson in Nepaul, and he therefore may be considered, as Burnouf expressed himself, as taking from the fountain head. The Thibet, Mon-

golian, and Chinese versions of these Nepaul texts are exact copies of the originals, but copies in which the original meaning does not exist, so that the discovery of Mr. Hodgson has a real literary value. These versions contain, it appears, all the proper names and Indian special religious and philosophical expressions given in the term which renders the literal meaning as much as possible, but which requires that the original names should be known, in order to say what they were. MM. Hodgson and Burnouf agree in saying, that the books of Buddha were written in Hindu or the Fan language, as the Chinese call it, but Lassen disagrees as to the idiom or dialect, which he believes to have been the Pali or Southern dialect of Hindustan; whilst the former are of opinion that the Sutras or doctrinal books of the Buddhists were first written in pure Sanscrit, and that various idioms were afterwards resorted to, in order to spread the doctrine before the great division of Buddhism into the northern school employing Sanscrit, and the southern using Pali, took place. Some notion may be conceived of the difficulties met with by the learned philologists already cited, as well as of those of the question itself, when it comes to be considered, that not only a thorough knowledge of these dialects is necessary, in order to elucidate the matter completely, but that knowledge of the various languages and idioms beyond India is no less requisite, so that Chinese, Thibetian, Japanese, and the Tartar tongues are also required, all the various texts throwing light (or darkness) on each other.

The Buddhists are then to be considered as distinct from the Djainas, and from the Brahmins. These latter term the Buddhists atheists; "as an atheist fallen from the path of rectitude, as a thief, so

is the Buddhist," is one of their favorite expressions. (Heeren.) But this does not clear up the obscurity of the doctrine itself, nor establish with sufficient precision the relative value of the terms, Buddhist or Buddha, Sackya, Gotoma, Kapila, &c.; for all these terms appear to have reference to the same individual said to have lived 1,000 years before Christ. As to the term Buddha, it is well ascertained to be the name of God, who was supposed to have been incarnated ten times (Avatars or Descents), and the ninth Buddha to have been the one named Sackya or Saugkya (1,000 years before Christ), the tenth being his seventh successor, called Phousa, or Maming or Deva-Bodisatoua, by the Chinese and Hindus, and Djangtchoub or Djangtchoubsemspah by the Thibetans, out of which name the Chinese made Phou-sa, considered by some Chinese idolaters as the *goddess* of Porcelain or Chinaware, and given out as such by many missionaries. This Bodhisatoua appears to have been one of the principal reformers or speculators of the Buddhist philosophy, and is said by Abel Remusat to have lived 376 years before Christ. (See Abel Remusat, *Melanges Asiatiques*, vol. 1, p. 113, *et seq.*) Another patriarch, but not a Buddha or incarnation, who was a great philosophical speculator, was Kanadeva or Canade, surnamed Tai-sse or Great Master, being the literal translation of the Sanscrit term Mahagourou. He died about the year 157 before Christ, after teaching his doctrines in the part of Northern India called Kia-pi-lo. The patriarch that left Hindustan for China is said to have been the twenty-eighth, who settled in that country in the year 495 after Christ. Respecting the faith that may be given to such accounts we shall speak elsewhere; for the present we must be content to show proof that the various terms of Sackya, Sancya, Kapila, Gotama,

are merely names of the first of these Buddhas, admitting them really to have existed in the order given by the Japanese, who thus establish facts beyond all usual record, whilst they cannot give accounts of things far more modern. In short, leaving Chronology out of the question, Buddhism and what Mr. Colebrooke terms Hindu philosophy, are one and the same thing.

Gautoma or Gotoma is the name of Goodam taken by the Buddha said to have been in existence 1,000 years before Christ, instead of the princely appellation of Sakya or Chakia, the name of his tribe, and of Ardaschidi, his own personal name. Goodam means, according to Abel Remusat, *a drover of oxen* (*gardeur de bœufs*), and from thence is derived the term Sommonakodom. Thus the names of Buddha and of Sacya, Shakia, Sangkia, would be ancient names, both of high import; but the more personal names are of the philosopher, Ardaschidi; of his father, Souddhodana.

The term Shakia or Chakya is often pronounced Sang-gya or Sankia, and they have been frequently considered as distinct names. Even Abel Remusat in his well-known work on the Samanean Trinity inclines towards the latter opinion on account of the different orthography; but it is now well ascertained that the word is written Sangs-rgyas, and is pronounced Sang-gé in Thibetian, and that this word is the Sanscrit term Chakia, and means Buddha or *extremely awake* or *all-seeing*. Ardaschidi or Shakia, or Sankya or Gotoma was said to have had for immediate predecessor a philosopher named Kia-ye, said to be born at Benares when men lived 20,000 years, and Mahakaya his disciple, who after Chakia's or Ardaschidi's death became the patriarch or chief of the doctrine, and to whom was confided the *secret of the mysteries*, was also named Kia-ye. This latter is consider-



ed to have been the first who received the title of *tsuntche*, in Japanese Souzia, meaning *honorable* or *illustrious*, that being the title borne by the saints of the religion of Buddha. Sir William Jones had already pointed out the very ancient origin of the term Sacya or Chakia, and its relationship with Buddha as the Divinity. "The name of the Arab Idol Wudd," says that great orientalist, "may lead us to suspect that some of the *Hindu* superstitions had found their way into Arabia, and though we have no traces in Arabian History of such a conqueror or legislator as the great Sesac, who is said to have raised pillars in Yemen as well as at the mouth of the Ganges, yet since we know that Sa'cya is a title of Buddha, whom I suppose to be Woden, since Buddha was not a native of India, and since the age of Sesac perfectly agrees with that of Sa'cya, we may form a plausible conjecture, that they were the same person, who travelled eastward from Ethiopia, either as a warrior or as a lawgiver, about a thousand years before Christ, and whose rites we now see extended as far as the country of Nifon, or as the Chinese call it, Japuen, both words signifying the Rising Sun. Sa'cya may be derived from a word meaning *power*, so that this epithet will not determine whether he was a hero or a philosopher; but the title of Buddha or *wise* may induce us to believe that he was rather a benefactor than a destroyer of his species." (Sir W. Jones's fourth discourse.) Subsequent investigation has proved that the only certitude in this matter consists in the names having been taken from some very ancient source; it has also proved that Sir William Jones was right in considering Sa'cya as a name of *power*, and Buddha as meaning *wise*, but it has not borne out the identity of the individuals who are known by that identical name. It is now maintained

that Ardaschidi,, or Buddha or Sakia-mouni, was a native of India, but it is far more certain that the terms of Buddha and Sa'eya were in use before his time, and were carried to the West as Wuota or Wuot-au, and Sig or Sidr, in a spirit very different from that of the mystical misleader of millions. The latter name is linked with the great victories of the Scythian conquerors, and the positive identity of the terms *Sangs-ge*, and *Sa'eya* must not be forgotten when the Italian deity Sancus comes to be taken into consideration.

The grounds on which we found the motives for considering this Ardaschidi or Gotama to be the same as Kapila or Capila are taken from a passage of Abel Remusat (*Obser. sur la doctrine Samanéenne*), in which that learned writer expresses himself to be surprised that M. Deguignes should not have hit upon the exact place of birth of Ardaschidi the Buddha, when he himself (Deguignes) gives, after Ma-touan-lin the Chinese historian, a precise and clear indication of the fact as it stood. Chakia says Ma-touan-lin was born in the kingdom of Kia-weï-weï, or, as Deguignes gives it, Kia-goei-goei. But, observes Abel Remusat, it was the form given to this word which occasioned the error, for the real orthography of the word should be, according to the most classical Chinese authors, Kia-pi-lo or Kia-weï-lo-weï, which pronunciation represents as faithfully as possible the original Sanscrit name Kapila or Capila. We know now, pursues Remusat, in consequence of later investigations, that this name tallies perfectly with the situation of Lucknow in the environs of which town Ardaschide the Buddha was born, for Lucknow as well as the country called Kapila, is situated to the North of the Ganges. The name of Kapila would therefore mean the man of

Kapila, as we say the Londoner, the Oxonian. A successor of Ardaschidi or Gotama is said also to have travelled in the country named Kapila, where he taught his reformed doctrines, and it might be said that the term may refer to him as well as to Buddha, but we believe that the place of birth of the latter being pointed out by the name constitutes a sufficient motive for admitting that it too points to Ardaschidi the Buddha and not to Kanadeva, who merely went to Kia-pi-lo or Kapila.

Evidently the term Capila is not a mere geographical term, for Colebrooke remarks that “the word *capila*, besides its ordinary signification of tawny color, bears likewise that of fire, and upon this ambiguity of sense many legends in the Indian theogonies concerning the saint of the name have been grounded.” (See Colebrooke, on the Philosophy of the Hindus; Trans. of R. Asiat. Soc. vol. 1.) And indeed it would appear that the word becoming the name of the reputed incarnation of Buddha often received the highest signification, as that of Sacya, but with this difference, that the latter term was one that bestowed value, whilst the word Kapila received value by being given to Ardaschidi. The connection of the name with religious doctrines is pointed out by Colebrooke: “It may be questioned whether Capila be not altogether a mythological personage, to whom the true author of the doctrine, whoever he was, thought fit to ascribe it.” When it is once admitted that by the word is meant Ardaschidi, the Sacya mouni or Buddha, no other confusion remains than that of the various doctrines and their chronological relations. It certainly may appear strange to admit that the religion termed Buddhism which reckons 300,000,000 of adherents should thus be summarily considered as *atheistical*, and this sort of

confusion is not lessened by reading in Colebrooke, "The school of Capila is atheistical, as the sects of Jina and Buddha in effect are, acknowledging no creator of the universe, nor supreme ruling providence. The gods of Capila are beings superior to man, but like him subject to change and transmigration." But here again must be taken into consideration the sources from whence Colebrooke derived his information, which were the Brahminical writers, or the Vedantas (the scope and end of the Vedas, which are orthodox), whilst the books of the Buddhists are denominated Saugatas, or Saougatas, confounded, says Abel Remusat, even by the Indian writers, with the Buddhas. This distinction had been stated by Sir William Jones, who expressed at the same time some doubts respecting the atheistical notions attributed to the Buddhists. "If the metaphysics of the Vedantis be wild and erroneous, the pupils of Buddha have run, it is asserted, into an error diametrically opposite; for they are charged with denying the existence of pure spirit, and with believing nothing absolutely and really to exist but *material substance*; a heavy accusation, which ought only to have been made on positive and incontestable proof, especially by the orthodox Brahmins, who, as Buddha dissented from their ancestors in regard to *bloody sacrifices*, which the Veda certainly prescribes, may not unjustly be suspected of low and interested malignity. Though I cannot credit the charge, yet I am unable to prove it entirely false, having only read a few pages of a *Saugata* book, but it begins like other Hind books with the word OM, which we know to be a symbol of the divine attributes: then follows, indeed, a mysterious hymn to the Goddess of Nature, by the name of Arya, but with several other titles, which the Brahmins themselves continually bestow on

their Devi. Now, the Brahmins, who have no idea that any such person exists as Devi, or the *Goddess*, and only mean to express allegorically the *power* of God exerted in creating, preserving and renovating this universe, we cannot with justice infer, that the dissenters admit no deity but *visible nature*." The Brahmin Pandit who attended Sir William Jones, maintained, notwithstanding all this, that the Saugatas were atheists, which assertion the British Orientalist ascribes to the blindness of an intolerant zeal. It is interesting to oppose under such circumstances the foundations of the Vedanta philosophy, that of Vyasa and Jaimini (orthodox), to the Sa'eya or Buddhist.

The tract of Vyasa has in general the appellation of *Vedanta*, and that of his pupil (equally orthodox) Jaimini, is called Purva; their several systems are usually distinguished by the names of the first and second Mimansa, a word which, according to Sir W. Jones, denotes *the operations or conclusions of reason*. Now, if that be the case, in what do the Mimansas, *so emphatically orthodox*, as Colebrooke tells us, differ from the Sanc'hya doctrine or that of Capila? It might be answered to this that the Mimansas contained a refined psychology which goes to a denial of a material world (Colebrooke), whilst in all appearance the doctrine of Capila or the Sanc'hya was more materialist. But if the Sanc'hya, meaning numeral, is analogous from that signification in its doctrines to those of Pythagoras, or if the term signifies, as Mr. Colebrooke also says, reasoning or deliberation—"for this latter interpretation is countenanced by a passage of the Bharata, where it is said of this sect of philosophers, 'they exercise judgment (sanc'hya) and discuss nature and twenty-four principles, and are therefore called Sanc'hya'"—the same Orientalist adding, "the

commentator who has furnished this quotation expounds Sanc'hya as here importing the discovery of soul by means of right discrimination,"—we repeat, if such be the case, both would constitute a spiritual, metaphysical, or psychological doctrine. The Brahmin Vedantas (Vedas), and also the Saugatas or Buddhist books, are written in aphorisms or Sutras, which are distributed in chapters or lectures. The Sutras of Capila himself (Sa'eya, Gotoma, Ardaschidi, Buddha incarnated) are named Sanchya-pravachana; but the commentary called Capila-bhashya is by a mendicant ascetic, Vijnjana-Bhicsu, and in like manner the followers or successors of Capila (Arhaus: patriarchs) have added doctrines of their own, and the same method has probably been carried on for hundreds of years all over the wide extent of Mongolia, Thibet, China and Nepaul, if not in Hindustan, since the expulsion of the Buddhists.

A point on which we insist is the assertion of Colebrooke that according to Gaudapada's commentary only one Capila had existed, who was an incarnation of Vichnu. So that it might safely be inferred that Buddha-Ardaschidi and Capila were certainly one and the same person did we not read in Sir W. Jones that "Capila, not the divine personage, grandson of Brahma, but a sage of his name, who invented the Sanc'hya or *numeral* philosophy, was the oldest head of a sect whose entire work was preserved," and did not that author immediately speak of another philosophical school, that of Gotama, "if indeed not the most ancient of all." All this confusion is cleared up by the evidence which proves Capila and Gotama to have been one with Ardaschidi-Buddha or Sacya, Shakia, Sangsge, the Fo of the Chinese, who gave that ancient name as rendering the term Buddha. Respecting the period

of his existence we may admit it to be true, for the moment, that such a personage lived a thousand years before Christ, and that all his sayings and doings were really transmitted as we are told they were. This personage as Gotama is the more interesting, as "Gotama is the acknowledged author of the *Nya'ya*, furnishing a philosophical arrangement, with strict rules of reasoning, not unaptly compared to the dialectics of the Aristotelian school." (Colebrooke.) It is this doctrine which Sir W. Jones tells us, "according to the well-informed author of the *Dabistan* (Fani), prevailed in the Punjab and several Persian provinces, and was transmitted among other Indian curiosities, by the Grecian philosopher Callisthenes to his uncle Aristotle, as a technical system of logic, which the *Brahmins* had communicated to the inquisitive Greek. And thus on the simple assertion of Mohsani Fani, the groundwork of the famous Aristotelian method would have proceeded from the Hindu Brahmins! To all that has been already said on this much debated subject we shall merely remark that if Gotama be Ardaschidi, and that is still more evident than his being the same as Capila, it is impossible to admit that the Brahmins should have lauded their greatest enemy, the one whose doctrines they had in highest aversion. Indeed, even so late as Strabo's time, it was undecided whether the Brahmins had any writings, for he expressly says that some assure that they had none, whilst others advance that they (the Brachmen) write upon linen stuff, but he at once asserts that they had no written laws. Therefore admitting them to have given to Callisthenes as their own, an invention of their antagonist or Gotama, a thing so very improbable, yet had it occurred, Strabo would not have doubted of their having any written books 400 years after.

The patriarchs or Arhans, the successors of Buddha Sacya or Gotama-Capila, added variously to the doctrines, and among them we find Pantajali and Kanada. Whether the first was the great Arhan, the 11th successor, Maming or Phousa, who added so much to the doctrine as to be considered as an incarnation, and was named by the Hindus *Deva-Bodhisatoua*, we cannot say, though it is probable, but the other, or Kanada, is in all likelihood the 15th, or Kanadeva, born in Southern Hindustan, and who taught in Ka-pi-lo. With the other Mongolian, Thibetian, and Chinese works of the Buddhists, we have nothing to do, beyond merely stating that the Kandjour or Ganddjour is composed in 800 folio volumes, and constitutes a full charge of a camel, and that they are far more voluminous in China. Perhaps after all it may be with those works as with works of religious subjects in Europe, which if collected and considered as the religious books of the Christians, would load a great many camels. A very essential distinction, however, must be made between these works and those bearing the name of Capila, Sacya, Gotama, as being of the founder, or as being attributed to the individual named Ardaschidi, whose other names would not find place in a quarto volume. We merely produce the general impression which the perusal of the accounts given of Buddhism and Hindu Philosophy by MM. Colebrooke, Burnouf, Ward, Wilford, Hodgson, Abel Remusat and Wilson, have left on our mind, and by which was modified on many points that which had been previously induced by the reading of Sir W. Jones's views. It is then in these works, in those of Heeren on Hindustan, in Morrison on China, &c., &c., that an opinion can be got respecting the innumerable views of Buddhism. But as respects practical Buddhism, we must be allowed to quote from Duhalde and



a modern German traveller, Bergmann, who, in order to obtain some insight into the matter, consented to live for some time among the Tartarian votaries of Shakiamouni, the devout adherents of the Great Lama.

In the summary account on which we are about to enter, we must not be considered as maintaining that the doctrines we deliver as those of Buddhism were really professed by Gotama-Ardaschidi a thousand years before Christ. Our credulity does not extend so far. It is evident that many changes have taken place, many alterations been adopted since the doctrine began, at whatever period that may have occurred. The short account given of India by Herodotus, and the notions furnished by the Grecian followers of Alexander the Great, leave no doubt that 400 years before Christ there existed in that country a doctrine that professed great tenderness for animals, that inculcated the transmigration of souls, the contempt of life, ascetic contemplation, and a stoic indifference to pain, which showed itself in many ways which astonished even men accustomed as were the soldiers of the Macedonian conqueror to brave any danger on the field of battle. The opinion of the Greek writers respecting the apathy and utter want of energy in the Hindus, and which is said to be verified in the Bengalese of the present day, forms a striking contrast with the facts which prove the contempt of pain as of life in that same people. The Brahmins, it is true, as well as the Sarmanes or Gymnosophists, were Airyans, and evidently, if not the conquerors of India, of a modified or different race. Ardaschidi, though of swarthy complexion being more Southern, was of the warrior cast. The contemptuous opinion of the Greeks does not then refer to the Northern tribes, to those whom Herodotus mentions as very similar to the Bactrians, but to the more ancient in-

habitants, of whom he gives a strange account, and of whom the relation given by Ctesias would cause one to suppose that they were considered as a different race of men, since some tribes were said to have ears of such dimensions as to enable them to wrap themselves up entirely in them. As to the proposition of Heeren, which accounts for the distinction of the population in castes, by its being the result of conquest, it is not generally adopted, for the division existed in Alexander's time, and Strabo mentions seven castes, and there existed many subdivisions; yet Strabo merely speaks of the religious and intellectual influence of the Brachmans who were counsellors and ministers of all the native princes, but who do not at all appear in the light of masters except in the mountainous districts of the North which they defended so gallantly. Speaking of that most laborious investigator of Indian history, Heeren, we cannot help drawing the attention of the reader to an opinion emitted by that author, who, when speaking of Grecian philosophy, claims for the schools of Greece the glorious privilege of having been the first who ventured to apply the dictates of human reason in the consideration of the mythological accounts transmitted by the priests and poets. But if Buddhism is really a kind of rationalism, at least in part, that which relates to their adversaries (for, as usual, they claim for their own tenets the faith they refuse to those of others), can it be said that in Greece alone Mythology found adversaries? The Buddhists, it is true, required that their metaphysical beliefs should become as much articles of Faith, as the Brahmins did with regard to their Ganesa, their Ganga, Indra, &c., &c. And leaving the dogmas out of the question, and coming to practical religion, the tenderness, pity, and love professed by Buddhism are all in

favor of the brute creation. It is false that they repudiated the division of the population into castes. And yet it is in these tenets that Christianity has been said to have derived its source;—Christianity, where the tenderness, pity, and love required, are all in favor of our fellow-creatures—Christianity the ape of Buddhism!!! And the men who utter that most irrational of all propositions, for it is directly opposite to the matter of fact, those men, in the same breath, reproach Christianity for not laying injunctions of any kind respecting the brute creation on her adherents. We trust we shall be adequate to the proof that Christianity is not Buddhism, but we sincerely believe that many Christians in appearance are in reality Buddhists. Such are those who pay more regard to their cats and dogs than to their fellow-Christians, and again the many who consider Divine Faith or Trust in the Almighty to be the same thing as the mode of expressing our belief, or of worshipping God. The proofs we may allege in favor of our opinion respecting the grand distinction to be drawn between Christianity and Buddhism, must not therefore be considered as tantamount to the admission that in Christianity as it exists there is no Buddhism. If the mode of worship, which is a matter of rational faith, and is as such the expression of the best way we conceive our homage should be paid,—if that mode is esteemed to be a matter of Divine Faith, it is a kind of Buddhism. It is the erecting of an idea, of an idol, a metaphysical one it is true, in the place of Trust in God. The latter can never change; the former will ever vary. The great distinction to be drawn between the laws of God and the laws of Nature, which is, that the first are optional, and leave men free and accountable agents, whilst the latter act in a manner which we term unconditional or necessary,

may be *often* forgotten in Christianity as it is *constantly* in Buddhism. Why such a high privilege as OPTION should be given to a being who, like Man, is constantly misusing it, we do not pretend to know. Analogy may point out the same dispensation as existing throughout the whole series of human knowledge, and of human relations. There the imperfection of things, and their relative bearings, do not discountenance a steady conviction of progress and amelioration. The analogy of uncertainty may therefore be a motive for humility, but as the picture of human condition it cannot be a motive of Divine Faith. But this analogy of the conditional, the finite, the undeterminate, which *oozes forth from every pore* in humanity, this analogy may represent a matter of fact, that of the relative and finite nature of rational Faith. And of this nature is the optional expression of the human mind respecting God, when that expression would convey feelings of honor, of regard, and of love. The argument from analogy which we reject as a motive of Divine Faith, is, we believe, quite irresistible when made the criterion of rational Faith. It does not suppose change and incertitude, it points them out as the very condition of human existence. But the Existence of God being only known as Supreme Perfection, and that knowledge being imparted in a peculiar manner, it is on those attributes so distinct from human uncertainty, it is in that mode so different and peculiar that our Trust in the Almighty reposes, and not on the Analogy of that uncertainty itself. In relation to God, Christianity is grounded on Divine Faith, but in relation to men Christianity becomes a matter subject to the argument from analogy, for it can only be carried out by rational Faith or Reason, i. e., by the intellect of man. But Christianity, as having for its scope and

essence the regeneration of man, for which no other reason can be given than the very basis of Christianity itself or Faith in the Almighty, that dispensation cannot be divested in relation to man from the finite condition of that being. To claim for Christianity an exemption from the lot of the nature of the being charged with carrying out the high injunction—to suppose that Christianity has nothing to do with Reason because its source is distinct, is not only irrational but contrary to plain matter of fact, as we are prepared to show at a later period. But for the present, we must remain content with explaining in full our meaning when we advance that Buddhism, although a very different thing from Christianity, may yet be pointed out in many forms of Christianity which enact that Faith, due to God alone, as due to the conceptions to which men have recourse in order to express either their feelings of devotion, or their rational inferences. But because the modes of practical Christianity are in themselves no matter of Divine Faith, and are subject to change, it is Reason that is adverse to the latter, on account of the very motive alleged, viz., that the change would not render them of a less finite nature, or less *analogous* to the general course of events. Option or human will may resolve or choose, but it cannot claim for itself that which is the basis of all religion or the connection between God and man, i. e., Faith in Him as the Almighty, and which shines the brightest when least unsullied. But because men are only responsible to God for their choice either of Faith or of the mode of worship, they may find in their fellow-creatures claims far more imperious, claims which will enforce obedience, and bend all resistance, scattering far and wide their opponents, who would consider themselves as free to act towards their

fellow-men as towards their God. Christian forbearance and brotherly affection always find a resting-place, but the opposite qualities may expect retribution. In vain the Jew, the Mormon, the Calvinist, the Catholic, and every *expression* of Monotheism and Christianity shall claim infallibility and attempt to render their notions of God and of Christ preponderant, the source is human and cannot stand the test of time, whilst Faith in God, and in Christ, as One with the Father and His Spirit will remain unaltered. It is in the attempt to raise their claims to the standard of Divine Faith that they lower themselves to the level of a religion which is termed the Christianity of the East.

But it may be asked, What has all this to do with the question at issue? why are what we termed the errors of Christianity to be assimilated to Buddhism? Our answer is, that in an investigation which embraces all human nature, the question of Divine Faith must equally be adapted to all races of men. Polytheism and Mythology are matters of the past. The struggle of the day, whether we will or will not, lies between Christianity and those religions which are actually in existence, and, as such, Brahminism, and still less Buddhism, cannot be passed over. The futurity of Christianity is not limited, we believe, to its actual boundaries. The wide extent of Asia and her countless millions will, we trust, one day call on Christ as on the link which connects man with God, and which points out to man the path he is to follow. Reason, and Science her issue, will, we trust, one day, cause the sun of Christianity to enlighten those regions of the East from whence our forefathers brought Polytheism and Idolatry, bearing, it is true, the stamp of a divine, though distorted origin. But neither Buddhism, Brah-

minism, nor Mohammedanism, can be expected to change, so long as Christians claim for the mode of expressing their belief in God through Christ, the same Faith as in the Almighty revealed as Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness. The present form of worship of the Buddhists is due, we are told, to the Romanists, and indeed the plant has thriven, and is become worthy of its original. But whether such be really the case, or whether, what is far more probable, both Romanist and Buddhist worship took its rise from the common errors of human nature, the sad truth is not to be concealed, because in Europe and in our own families we perceive the very same errors which we hope will one day disappear from a country where they seem so much at home. Well may the Buddhist exclaim: Try to amend Christianity before you attend to us.

Buddhism, in the eyes of those modern writers who give the name of Protestantism to ancient idolatry, to polytheism, and to all the religious errors of the human mind, is termed, with respect to Brahminism, the Hindu Protestantism. Such a good opportunity of placing their favorite term was not left to escape. (See Buchez. Ott. &c.) Buddhism, in the eyes of many, is, as we have already stated, the source of Christianity. Because the Brahmins and the Buddhists consider all animated being as sacred, and deem it a sin to kill a fly, whilst they admit of the burning of men and women, Christ, we are told, imitated them. The thing is too absurd, because entirely opposed to matter of fact, to attempt further confutation. There is, however, another point which deserves more attention, especially from the sour spirits who take their fits of devotion for the spirit of God, and consider as peculiarly criminal the harmless effusion of natural gaiety.

Their ascetic humor can scarcely brook the presence of Jesus at a wedding, or the transformation of water into wine. To such devotees of the Buddhist school, the merry song, the joyful dance, and all that gives color and vivacity to life, are deeds of ill. They must learn that such intolerance is a very ancient defect in human nature, ever prone to magnify the faults of others, and to seek for acceptance in the eyes of the Deity by means of the mortification of the flesh. The practice was common long before the Christian era, and that spirit of Buddhism will long remain prevalent. If reason can have no effect with such devotees, we would recommend the method in use among some tribes of North America, who, we are told by Loskiel, have recourse to violent purgatives as a more rational means of purification than the floggings which others inflict upon themselves.

It would be difficult to define in a definite manner in what Buddhism differs from Brahminism, for it is not generally admitted that the former doctrine is atheistical, since it is based upon the incarnations of the Deity or Adi-Buddha. It would appear to consist in the Buddhists refusing to consent to the control of their opponents, and in their placing greater confidence in own arguments than in the mythological divinities whose worship is admitted by the Brahmans, where each sect, it is true, is more especially devoted to the worship of one than of another deity. The worshipper of Brahma despises those who pay homage to Surya or the Sun; but the Buddhist appears only to place Faith in his own metaphysical conceptions—that is, of the Buddhas and Patriarch, or Arhans, now the Great Lama. These metaphysical notions relate to God, to the Spirits, Creation, human nature, general nature, the order of the universe; but the great aim or design of



all these principles is to teach the means by which eternal beatitude may be attained after death, if not before it. (Colebrooke.) True knowledge can alone secure entire and permanent deliverance from evil, and consists in rightly discriminating the means which lead to that end. These means are of various kinds, and their study is of great importance with the Buddhist. They consist in bodily and mental exercises, such as standing on one limb or steadily maintaining prescribed postures, with intensely profound meditation on special topics, accompanied by suppression of breath and restraint of the senses. By such exercises the Buddhist is supposed to acquire the knowledge of every thing past and future, remote or hidden; he divines the thoughts of others, gains the strength of an elephant, the courage of a lion, and the swiftness of the wind; he can fly in the air, float on water, or contemplate at one glance all worlds. The promptest mode of attaining beatitude, through absorbed contemplation, is devotion to God, consisting in repeated mutterings of the great mystical name, the syllable OM, and at the same time meditating its signification. This constitutes efficacious devotion, and the deity, propitiated, confers on the votary the boon desired, thus preparing the soul for liberation.

The power acquired in this manner is one of performing miracles, consisting in the faculty of shrinking the body into form so minute as to find all things pervious thereunto, or of enlarging one's size beyond the height of the loftiest mountain, or, assuming levity, mount along a sunbeam to the solar orb, or to touch the Moon with the tip of the finger, or to sink at will into the earth as in water; in short, it is the faculty of changing the course of nature, the ability to accomplish every thing desired. Still all these are only

means of attaining Supreme happiness ; but, as it may be naturally supposed, such continuous meditation leads to various spontaneous enthusiastic actions, which are accomplished, as it were, in spite of the will of the individual, who sometimes laughs, or cries, or dances like one bewitched, or bellows like a bull, or else the body is violently agitated with tremors and shiverings, or the individual remains as one constantly asleep, though well awake, or else incessant prayers are poured forth without ceasing for a moment, or the individual wanders about sighing vehemently as if ardently intent on the acquirement of some long protracted happiness, or, although in possession of sound mind, he goes about uttering incoherent speeches as if insane. Some condemn voluntarily one or several of their limbs to remain motionless as if palsied. Such acts of superstition may, however, be considered as common to most Asiatic devotees, for among the Mohammedans practices very much akin are observed, but all this with the Buddhist is done with the aim of deliverance or salvation called *Nirvana*, which signifies also extinction or annihilation, being the state of Supreme repose. Are we to consider *Nirvana*, asks Eugène Burnouf, as the state in which man,—having by means of deep meditation broken asunder the links which bound him to the outward world,—enters at once into full possession of his own personality, of his own proper individuality? Or is it a higher state, one in which both the external and internal world disappear, and in which all individuality is absorbed, as it were, in absolute Existence, either that of God or of Nature, that universal existence in which all parts of the universe may be said to exist? Or does the annihilation, the *Nirvana*, relate to existence itself? If the latter, the reproach of the Brahmins would be conceivable when they term the

Buddhists atheists, for it would be the extinction, the disappearing not only of individual Being, but of all Being. In short, by the term Nirvana are we to understand Nothingness? For the Theist, it is the absorption of the individual in God, whilst to the Atheist Nirvana means the disappearance, the annihilation of the individual. And for both the Nirvana may be said to mean repose or deliverance. The Thibetans render the term by one that means *deliverance from sorrow*, or *Mya-ngan-las-hlah-ba*. (Burnouf.)

The priests of the Buddhists are called Lamas, in Thibet; Gelongs or Ghelongs in Tartary; Bonzes in China and Japan; Rahans in Birmah; Talapoins among the Siamese; and Gunnis or Gounnis in the island of Ceylon. It is this actual state of Buddhism which is the real practical side of the question. We have been enabled, by comparing the various authors whose works on Buddhism are generally admitted to be the best, to draw up a brief summary, the upshot of which, although unsatisfactory in a positive sense, is not wanting in weight, inasmuch as it goes far in proving the unsoundness of all positive conclusion on the matter. It is with this most metaphysical of all Eastern religions, which claims at once the right of being considered as the fountain head of Grecian philosophy, that Christianity has to struggle in those wide regions inaccessible to all constraint beyond moral conviction.

According to Hodgson, the same classification of the Buddhist doctrines exists in Ceylon as is found in the wide empire of China, and embraces under the twelve following heads, all the tenets. 1. *Sutras*, or Soudras, aphorisms, maxims, or elementary doctrines. 2. *Geyas*, Hymns, or sacred music. 3. *Vyâkarana*, or narrations, and predictions. 4. *Gâthâ*, moral tales, the tedious and strange bearings of which cannot be

understood by the inhabitants of the West, who do not keep in mind that the doctrine of metempsychosis constitutes the hinge on which all the morality of these tales turns. The moral of a tale of unheard of length and inextricable windings is often nothing more than an attempt to prove by such inventions the happy influence of a farthing given to a bonze, in hundreds of centuries and after hundreds of transmigrations. 5. *Udâna*, of the nature and attributes of Buddha. 6. *Nidâna*, of Cause or Reason. 7. *It-yukta*, the design, aim or conclusion; thus the explanation of a discourse is called the Ityukta. 8. *Jâtaka*, the genealogy of Buddha. 9. The *Vaipulya*, or of the Artha (worldly good), and *Dherma* (or celestial good). 10. *Adbhutadharma*, of miracles, and supernatural events. 11. *Avadâna*, of the fruit of works; metaphors or comparisons according to the Chinese, and, 12. *Upadêca*, instructions or counsels.

The endless discussions called forth by such concentration of theological metaphysics have been divided by Hodgson into four classes, or schools, viz. : 1. The *Svâbhavikas*, who deny the separate existence of God, and consider all nature eternal, though intelligent. With them, intelligent matter is every thing, but it has two modes of action or expression, Pravritti or motion; Nirvritti or repose. We have seen the means required to arrive at the state of Nirvritti, which supreme deliverance is expressed by Nirvana. The abolition of all outward impression is obtained by Tupas, while the other means or pure meditation is termed Dyan. 2. The *Aishvarikas*, who admit an immaterial supreme essence of God, termed Adi-Buddha; but some maintain that the material principle cannot be separated therefrom. 3. The *Kârmikas*, who attach great importance to the moral aim of action, and

4. The *Yatrikas*, who consider the intellectual agency as alone of importance. Of these schools, the first may be termed Materialists or Atheists, and the latter, Theists.

Csomo had already admitted four classes among the schools of Buddhism. 1. *Vaihhachikas*, those who believe all and discuss nothing. 2. *Santrantikas*, those who refer to the authority of the Sutras as a written law. 3. The *Yogatcharas*, or the disciples of Sankara-Atcharya, who united all the Buddhist sects of his day, and whose disciple was Anandi-Giri. 4. The *Madhyamikas*, those who follow the doctrines of Mâdhavatchâryâ, a great Buddhist philosopher and Arhan of the 14th century.

As having reference to the great chronological question or problem, which is still ensconced in spite of all our endeavors in the depths of the primary source of Buddhism, it must be remembered that the Japanese authorities, according to which Abel Remusat considered himself justified in placing the first Buddha in the year 1000 before Christ, gives Mahakaya as the Master of Ananta. This Mahakaya appears to us to be the key of the whole mystery. We are told (see Abel Remusat, *Mél. Asiat.* vol. 1, p. 118), that this immediate successor of Shakya-mouni lived 905 years before Christ, and was the first who received the name of Tsun-che (Chinese), in Japanese, Sonzia, a term having the signification of *illustrious, honorable*, and which is given by the Buddhists to their saints. Mahakaya was also reckoned as the first of the Tsou or ancestors, i. e., of the patriarchs to whom the sacred deposit of the esoteric doctrine was transmitted. Now, the circumstances which are given as those that this individual undertook to better, do not really appear to tally with such as would have existed 1,000 years before

Christ; and moreover he is not talked of as such an ancient personage under the name of Sankara Atcharya. In the days of Sankara, says Abel Remusat (*Œuvres posthumes*, Mél. p. 137), the votaries of Vishnu and of Siva were each divided into six sections, with other subordinate divisions. The list given by Ananda mentions also the worshippers of Brahma as a particular sect, and also that of the votaries of Agni or Fire, of whom the only traces to be found among the Brahmins are the Agnihortas, who carefully keep up the *family fire*, but whose worship is otherwise the same as that of the popular classes. Abel Remusat tells us that Sankara had also to struggle with the worshippers of the Sun, whom he divides into six classes, according to the names they gave themselves, and which were borrowed from the various points of view and periods in which they considered that luminary. 1. The rising-sun, as image of Brahma or the creating power. 2. The mid-day sun or Iswara (Siva ?), being the destructive and regenerating power. 3. The setting-sun, or Vishnu, being the conserving power. Besides these three separate views, the Trimourti, or the union of them all three in the Sun, was also a form of worship, as likewise various speculations according as the Sun was considered as a divine personage either under a physical or a celestial form, or else in a metaphysical view and an intellectual luminary. The worshippers of Ganesa are also included under six heads, and many female divinities also represented the divine Power. "But," continues Abel Remusat, "it is evident that the Hindu worship is now much more gentle than in those days, for now it is a very rare occurrence to meet with the Hindu beggar, quite naked, and besmeared all over with funeral ashes, holding a sword or a pitchfork (trident) in one hand, and in the other

a dead man's skull, in which was contained the intoxicating drink that has deprived him of his senses, and made him ready to commit all sorts of crime; such were the Kâpâlikas, a sect of which mention is often made in the controversial treatises of that period of Indian history which precedes the tenth century of our era."

This assimilation of Sankara, the great reformer, and the master of Ananta with the immediate successors of the first Sankia or Buddha, does not tally, it is true, with what Mr. Wilson says of this same reformer, whom he gives as especially orthodox, since the disciples of Sankara established with his special permission a classification of Hindu worship, which at the present day is considered by the most learned Brahmins as the only regular and orthodox forms of their religion. The objection would be unanswerable if the Brahmin and Buddhist religions were really distinct, but the more one rises to the fountain-head the more they appear to coalesce. The main difference between them consists, according to Eugène Burnouf, in the different mode in which they teach much the same thing. The Brahmin affects mystery; the Buddhist affects to explain every thing. The doctrine of the Brahmins consists of a mysterious teaching to a small number of chosen persons, and with them the studied obscurity of the formulæ is evidently introduced with the express purpose of discouraging all attempts to understand them without the master. Now with the Buddhists the phrases are adapted to a far more numerous auditory, and the words are framed so as to suit all intellects, and besides they are repeated in all manner of ways, so as to meet the lowest degree of intelligence, and to leave it no excuse for not receiving the doctrine. Therefore, says Burnouf, the *Sutras* are to be consider-

ed rather in the light of predications than as maxims, although such do really occur, but they are drowned, as it were, in the flood of words poured forth in predication. Both with Brahmin and Buddhist, notwithstanding the great importance of religion, other doctrines are so interwoven as to make it appear as if they were confounded. Thus the *Sutras* or doctrines, the *Vinayas* or Discipline, and the *Abhidharma* or metaphysical views, all form a compact body of doctrine, variously disposed according to the country; for instance, China, where we find a supplementary addition, or the four Agames. Mr. Hodgson, to whom we are so much indebted for many valuable additions to our imperfect store of knowledge of the wild range of Buddhism, divides the Buddhist religious works into 1, *Puranas*, or ancient books; 2, *Kavya*, or poems; 3, *Vyakarana*, or grammar; 4, *Koças*, or vocabulary; 5, *Tantras*, or on ascetic rites; 6, *Dharani*, or charms and talismans or formulas.

A characteristic feature of Hindu religion, which is most especially stamped on Buddhism, and which is perceivable in what is told of India in the very first historians, relates to that universal benevolence and charity which considered all animated being as invested with a sacred character, and which viewed with horror all bloody sacrifice, and laid down as a main principle of religion the duty of sparing the life of the meanest insect. Therefore, when we are told that such were the precepts of Schakia-moumi, of the first man Buddha, and that such was at once the cause and scope of his mission on earth; the fact seems to be borne out by ancient as well as modern history. The utter irrationality of such doctrines have not prevented them from enduring for several thousands of years, and the sufferings of Bergmann, under the tents of the Mon-



gols, prove them to be still enforced. The Ghelongs or Buddhist priests, with whom that traveller resided, were swarming with vermin, which they carefully took up, when too troublesome, and threw on the ground without hurting them, so that the poor traveller or observer paid dearly for the knowledge he had coveted, that of Tartar customs and manners. It must not, however, be forgotten that however metaphysical and anti-idolatrous Buddhism is made to appear in many circumstances, and especially in respect to what is termed the Brahmin idolatry, yet the Buddhists have no lack of idols either in China, Thibet, Siam, in short wherever the doctrine exists; so that the pure metaphysical Buddhism really seems only to exist in the fancies of the learned. *Galtaicho* is a sacrifice made to the god or Bourkan of Fire, and the founders of Lamaism appear to have fixed a particular day for the ceremony, which evidently bears reference to the old Persian fire-sacrifices. A strange rite is that which ordains in this ceremony that the heart of the animal (a sheep) should be devoured by the highest personages present, each taking a certain number of bites until all disappears. The wording of the abjuration that the Greek clergy cause to be repeated by the Calmuck Tartars who embrace Christianity may be considered as a proof of the fact that Lamaism does not preserve from Idolatry. (The Tartars, it is true, might retort on the Greeks their superstitious genuflections before the paintings and images, if not before the statues of their saints.) "I renounce and say anathema on the doctrines which have been taught me until this day. I renounce and say anathema on the false doctors, and the superstitions of the Bourkans and other divinities who were once human beings, such as Shakia-Mouni, Soukouba, Abidaba, Mansouchari, Maidari,

Erlikhan, Loumkhan, the Tengheri, Dantching, Okin-Tengheri, Daracke, the Dalai-Lama, the Bodko-Lama, and all the other idols (Bourkhans).

“I renounce and abjure the false doctrine of the metempsychosis, and also that of the passage of the soul into other bodies. I renounce that of the creation of the world, and abjure all the lies of the Lamas and their adherents.

“I renounce and abjure all images and statues of the idols; all prayers addressed to the Stars and to the Moon, which are merely bodies created by the true God.”

This proves clearly the fact of idolatry, although we are well aware of the usual answer on such occasions, which is, that it is rendering homage to God, whom such images represent. But the Buddhist Church in Thibet is almost an exact counterpart of the Romanist, and even the Roman Cardinal Wiseman considers it to be copied from what the Buddhist priests had occasion to notice when in the 13th century the Pope's legate performed High Mass all the time he remained with Tchingis-Khan, who afterwards founded a kingdom or independent government in Thibet, which he gave to the Chief of the Buddhist religion. If it can be said that in the time when the patriarchs of Buddhism came to Thibet that country was in immediate connection with Christendom, this can only refer to the time of Nestorius, but the doctrine already existed according to all accounts before, long before the Christian era. The ceremonies have been claimed as Romanist, and we believe the claim to be well founded, for even what is wanting in direct evidence, may be readily accounted for by the common source of so much superstition, viz., the natural bent of the human mind. Those who would judge of the future state of England

and Europe should the Romanists cause their doctrines to become generally admitted there, may learn from the example of Buddhism in Asia what may be expected. It was Abel Remusat that insisted one of the first on this imitation of the Roman Catholic rites by the Buddhists, and the fact of the striking resemblance, if not the similarity of their rites, had been remarked by many missionaries, and is considered by Duhalde to have arisen from the practices of the Nestorian Christians having been adopted in very early times. The similarity, according to this account, would therefore date from a far earlier period than the 13th century. Be it as it may respecting the date, the similarity of the mode of exterior worship with that of the Catholic Church cannot pass unnoticed. A far more ancient peculiarity, that of the ten commandments of the Buddhists, has been esteemed to be a proof of the influence of the Mosaic dispensation in former ages. They are to the following effect: 1. Thou shalt not kill. 2. Thou shalt not steal. 3. Thou shalt not act unchastely. 4. Thou shalt not bear false witness. 5. Thou shalt not lie. 6. Thou shalt not swear. 7. Thou shalt not pronounce unclean words. 8. Thou shalt not be covetous. 9. Thou shalt not wreak vengeance. 10. Thou shalt not worship false divinities. Moreover, the use of spirituous liquids is forbidden.

The Priests are very numerous, and the hierarchy strictly attended to. The Buddhist chiefs are four in number, but the principal appears to be the Dalai Lama at Llassa or Larissa. 2. The Bogdo-Lama or the Band-schan-Bambudschi, who resides at Tischiu or Dschadschi-Lumbu. This Lama was seen as a child by Turner. 3. The Gison Tamba residing at Orga on the borders of Siberia. 4. The Ching-lia-Fo who resides at Pekin. A third of the population are Lamas

or priests, according to Father Huc. Nor may this be much exaggerated, since every fifth boy in a family is devoted from his childhood to the holy orders and is brought up in a convent. Matrimony is strictly forbidden in all the sacerdotal hierarchy, and convents of monks as well as of nuns are to be found in all directions. Huc divides the Lama priests or clergy into three classes.

1. Those who return to their occupations. Thus Bergmann mentions a Calmouk Lama who was very rich, and Duhalde speaks of the silk dresses and sumptuous living of many of the Tartar Lamas.

2. Others are wanderers, and have no fixed place of abode, no dwelling place either in tent, house or cloister, but wander as pilgrims from cloister to cloister, from tent to tent, and are everywhere hospitably received. They walk in unceremoniously, and seat themselves by the fire, drink the tea that is offered them, and relate their travels and other subjects which interest the auditory. A mat in a corner is their bed at night, and the next morning they wander forth to where chance may direct their steps. They thus travel over all the East, over China, Thibet, Turkestan and India, speaking all the idioms and well acquainted with all the tribes. Their step is measured, and the head bent towards the ground; in their hand is a long staff, and on their shoulders a mantle of goat-skin on which the hair has been left.

3. This class is composed of those who are devoted to study and to prayer. They live in cloisters, and from among them are chosen the heads of the church. The cloisters are large buildings or rather villages with Buddha temples around. Some cloisters contain as many as 30,000 Lamas. Each cloister is supported, 1. By the voluntary contributions which

are collected among the tribes, and in the steppes. 2. By presents from rich individuals or from the Emperor and other Princes. 3. Each Lama possesses something or receives money from his family, and many follow various professions, especially those of physicians and astrologers. Some are however very poor, and Duhalde remarks that those who dress in such fine silks are often known to pawn their rich dresses.

The great university of Koum-Boum, where there are 30,000 Lamas, has four Faculties: 1, Metaphysics or Mystic teaching; 2, the Study of the Liturgy and religious rites; 3, that of Natural History, Botany, Pharmacy, Medicine; 4, that of Prayer as a continual occupation, the others only praying at fixed times of the day. This fourth class is divided into thirteen subdivisions, and the students rise or are lowered according to their more or less aptitude or facility for praying. The discipline is severe. Monitors carrying iron rods enforce attention during the hours of study, and are very ready to inflict chastisement on the thoughtless and unmindful. Submission is strictly enjoined. The smallest larceny is very severely punished, and the culprit sometimes is dismissed after having been branded with a red hot iron on the cheeks and forehead. Further accounts of the present state of Buddhism will be found in Mr. Prinsep's well-known work.

We have not been able, as with the religion of the Parsees, to trace out distinctly the doctrines belonging to Buddhism in times previous to Christianity from those which constituted the beliefs of the first Christians. Those doctrines we conceive to have been evidently modified by the latter, but that point admitted, we consider Buddhism not only as worthy of the deepest investigation on account of its actual vitality, but

also because among the multitude of human conceptions which have taken the place of Divine Faith, thus rendering human knowledge a *stumbling-block* for man, this religion appears to be the one in which the attribute of Goodness of the Deity has become as it were spontaneously the criterion of Truth. The lesson is however at once sad and serious. Yes, Buddhism is a religion of Mercy, but with Buddhism Reason finds no place, as we maintain it does with Christianity. We leave the Christian theologian to struggle with the Buddhist in the bottomless pit of Mysticism. On the classical ground of incarnations, human regeneration, by means perfectly independent, if not directly contrary to Reason, and of asceticism having in view the subduing of the flesh, the Christian enthusiast who denies reason will find cause to doubt of victory. Mystical Faith, prayer, meditation, new birth, are as completely Buddhistic as they are Christian. Ten precepts, according to their tenets, lead to sanctity. These *par-amitas*, or means of attaining the other shore, are Charity (Dâna), Observation of Precepts (Shîla), Remorse (Kshânti), Perseverance (Vîrya), Force (Bâla), Prudence (Djâna); but especially Science, meaning Gnostic, or mystic science, &c., &c. In maintaining that Christianity is rational, we mean that as a religion of Mercy it is in Humanity or in reciprocal efforts between man and man that Christian mercy consists, whilst with Buddhism this important and main tenet of practical Christianity is made, if not subordinate, at least to be on a level with the injunction of a positive impossibility, viz., that of not causing any living being to perish. Mercy to brutes is no less a Christian precept for its not constituting the basis of Christianity; but to say that it is against the precepts of divine commandment to destroy life in any way whatsoever,

whilst it is positive that the thing cannot be avoided, is lowering religion below the most simple dictates of knowledge and experience. Mysticism and Asceticism do certainly constitute very natural feelings, and are as it were the expression of the *common sense* of millions; but Christianity is grounded, we believe, on better foundations. It is founded on Faith in the Almighty, and is to be carried out by man according to the path pointed out by God the Almighty, with Whom Christ is One. Faith in God and in Christ, because One with God, is grounded on motives perfectly distinct from mysticism and asceticism. Nor can it be maintained that Mysticism and Asceticism are inherent in Christianity, unless indeed it be likewise maintained that the Brahmins, Buddhists, and Mohammedans are Christians, and that Divine Faith is grounded upon the mere impulsive conceptions of the human mind, which become at once the idols before which men cast themselves prostrate. With us, Buddhism furnishes a convincing proof of the impossibility that the human mind could have righted itself without a dispensation which at once was in perfect unity with the Almighty, and yet left free the human will. Mysticism, Asceticism and Superstition have been and still remain the fruits of free will, but though the grounds of many practices they are not the grounds of Faith in the Almighty. They are conceptions, analogous to many which arise as it were in the course of nature.

The Buddhist Trinity or Triad, the San-pao or San-konei of the Chinese, the Trine Unity of Thibet, the Erdeni of the Mongols, the Seng-Fo-Fa, whatever may be the results of future investigation respecting its introduction into the religion of Buddha, and although apparently the same as the Christian Trinity in name, is not at all the basis of that religion, for the terms are

used as mere formulæ of worship by the votaries of simple local gods and goddesses. Those who are so simple as to believe that the same word entails the same meaning, will find themselves mistaken in this instance as in many others, where the same terms have been supposed to stand for the same thing. Such a state of things is a matter of very common occurrence in circumstances of far less importance, and the difficulty cannot even then be obviated without it being stated that the terms, though identical, do by no means express the same meaning. A striking instance of this kind of thing may be pointed out in a relation given of Nicaragua (Squier), where the author, mentioning the difficulties he encountered in having the prostrate statues and stones raised up from the ground, says that they were in great part caused by the matting of the grass around them; but this, he remarks, would not be understood if the meaning of the word *grass* be considered as identical with that of the same term in North America; the grass he speaks of being as thick as the finger and three or four yards long. Our main object being that of making ourselves understood, we hope the triviality of the comparison will be overlooked. *Buddha*, *Dharma*, and *Sanga*, *Oum*, represent with the Buddhists not merely intelligence, law, and union, but also the law, the priests, and the community or Ecclesia, and are the equivalents of the Mongol terms Bourkhan, Nom, Khoubrak. They have not, as the Christian Trinity, a direct relation with the religion. The unity of the Mediator with God, the Unity of the Son with the Father, which identifies with Christianity the doctrine of the Trinity, does not exist with the Buddhists, who speak of the three precious Beings that govern the ten parts of the universe, and which "turn round unceasingly as the wheel



of the law," and may be likened to the three persons of the Christian Trinity, but they are, as it were, foreign to Buddhism. The term appears to be an adoption, but whether from the Brahmin or from the Christian doctrine, we do not pretend to determine. The usual final term *Oum* is evidently Brahmin, and is linked with the highest antiquity, representing by those mystical letters the AHURA, the Iao, or Supreme Power, Wisdom, and Goodness.

Now, the Christian Trinity without Christ has no meaning. The Unity of Christ with the Father and the Spirit is the Unity of God as He stood revealed from the beginning. But that union is not pointed out in the same manner in the Triad of the Buddhists, who admit of a thousand incarnations in all, of which seven or ten had taken place when Sakia-mouni appeared. To attempt to fix the duration of each period would be to say what each Arhan or Saint thought about the matter; thus some make out the period of Buddha or Sacya to be five hundred years, and each successive period to contain the same number of years, whilst the same are also said to be sometimes 1,000, sometimes 1,400, or 1,500, or 2,500, or 10,000, or 20,000, not forgetting the last period, which is to last 30,000 years. Now, the doctrine of Incarnation, which is so intimately interwoven with what constitutes the basis of Buddhism, is not the same thing in the Christian doctrine as in the Buddhist. It is not that we consider the term *Incarnation*, used by the Evangelist, or God made flesh, to be any thing more than an ineffectual attempt to represent the Unity of God and Christ and the Holy Spirit. But, admitting that term to mean what Polytheism and Buddhism conceived it to mean, still the difference between the Christian view of incarnation and that of Buddhism is widely appar-

ent. The views of the latter religion may be likened with far greater reason to the Egyptian doctrine of Apis, or that of the White Elephant of Siam, where we are told the Deity is made known to be ensconced by certain signs that the priests have cognizance of. The similarity of the terms must not therefore make it be supposed that the Incarnation is of the same kind, no more than the Triad should cause it to be believed the same as the Christian.

The metaphysical doctrine of the Buddhist Triad is connected with the doctrine of Incarnations in the following manner: Adi-Buddha or Supreme Intelligence producing by Thought (Dharma or Pradjna) the multitude (Sanga), this Triad gives birth to five abstractions (Dhyan) which are Intelligences of the first order and bear the name of Buddha. These produce secondary intelligences named *Bhodisatouas* or descendants. Men can never become Buddhas, but they may reach the sphere of the Budisoutras. The creative power or Pradjna, or the voice *that contemplates the century*, reminds one strongly of Fra, or Phra, and is sometimes represented with female characteristics. The Incarnations, moreover, are not limited to the Deity, thus, for instance, in their books we read of a poor woman who, many thousand centuries ago, having furnished a little gold and given a pearl in order to repair some defect in a statue of Buddha Vipasyi, wished to become the wife of the gilder who performed the repairs, and this wish was gratified, and, moreover, she was born anew during ninety-one kalpas or periods of the world (each kalpa is several million of years, in the great kalpas men live 84,000 years), and each time with a golden face: she then appeared on earth as Brahma, and the life of that deity being at last exhausted, she becomes a Brahmane of Mâgadha, and from her family proceed-

ed Maha-kaya the master of Ananda and first disciple of Buddha, and who was also named Kin-se or the Gilded. (Abel Remusat De la Triade Suprême des Buddhistes.) In speaking of the successive incarnations of a thousand Buddhas, we may appear to differ widely from those who only admit of ten Avatars or descents of the Deity in his quality of Preserver, but in reality the incarnations of the Buddhas are beyond all imagination, being in each 75,000 kalpas either 76,000 or 80,000, and some notion may be conceived of the number of years required by the length of the sum in ciphers, it being 44,000 feet long.

The Buddhist clergy are all strictly *tonsured*, and they usually go bareheaded, as the Phenician priests in antiquity: they wear rosaries, and pray with them as do the Papists in Europe. The fast days are numerous and severe. Images made of dough and worked into small figures are almost worshipped. Relics are prized as much as at Rome; and their processions are with the swinging of incense. Bells appear to have been in use from time immemorial, as they were in Egypt and in the temples of Cybele, in Athens. Holy water is also used, but not only is the water of the Ganges sacred with the Buddhists, but also sea water, because Buddha travelled by sea. It is on account of this that the Great Lama is named Dalai-Lama or Sea-Lama. It may appear strange that notwithstanding the evident antiquity of many of the Buddhist doctrines, M. Eugène Burnouf, who has so deeply meditated and studied the subject, should assert that the real date of the death of the personage named Sacya-mouni is not positively known, since instead of a fixed precise time, tradition only furnishes us with a collection of dates which differ one from the other by many centuries. This hesitation of Burnouf must be taken into great

consideration when the *data* are given of the ancient Arhans, and of Sakya-mouni.

The Mercy, the freedom, the Trinity of the Buddhist, take their rise from a very different source than that from whence Christianity arose. But such an assertion requiring proofs, we shall lay before the readers those on which we ground our conclusions. The originating of Buddhism from Brahminism is the first positive fact to which we refer. This origin of the doctrine does not, however, bestow on it a character which may at once distinguish it from the religion of Brahma, because the very freedom of thought asserted accounts for the unstable nature of such metaphysical views. The doctrine of the Metempsychosis constitutes a fundamental tenet of Brahminism, and dates most certainly, as well as that of the transmigration of souls into various animals, far beyond the Christian era. Now in extending Mercy to animals in the irrational way of the Hindus, the notion of slaying one's own parents in killing a brute must not be lost sight of, no more than the right of maintaining a different explanation of things arising from the various and ever varying theological views of the Brahmins themselves. Differences existed then in highest antiquity, but the positive Buddhist doctrines are of a far more modern date. It is the same with the Triad, which is at the bottom, or originally the Brahma, the Dharma, and the Sanga, or God, the law, and the prophets or priests, as may be seen in the very notion of the Thibetian triad given by Father Horace de la Penna (see Abel Remusat and Klaproth), *Sagnchie Khoncihoa—Cihō-Khoncihoa—Kedun-Khoncihoa*, which have the meaning of Buddha or God as Sacya; the law as Cihō, and all the Saints or the Priests in Kedun. There can exist no doubt respecting the existence of some devout per-

sonage to whom the name of Sacya-mouni was given, although it still remains a problem whether he lived a thousand or five hundred years before Christ, or whether indeed he may not be the master of the Arhan or Arhans (patriarchs) who introduced Buddhism into Thibet, China, Siam, Tartary or Mongolia and other places in the first centuries of the Christian era. Thibet, the high seat of Lamaism, certainly dates as such from the 13th century, when the Mongols, under Tchingis Khan, established their power over those parts, but Buddhism, even in Thibet, is of a much earlier date. It is not impossible that the admission made by Wiseman of the Thibetian Buddhist rites having been copied at that period from the Romanist may be exact, but that only accounts for the ceremonies and not for the religion which was much earlier. The privileges of conquest raised the Mongols above all the tribes of Tartary, but they were already Buddhists, whilst the other tribes called Tartars or Tatars, were Mohammedans. The Mongols had not even any written characters beyond the ancient runic and perhaps cuneiform marks until several years after Tchingis Khan, when their present writing was invented by Sagdcha-Bandita, the great Lama of Thibet. It was a syllabic alphabet. (Bergmann, p. 90.) But when did Thibet come to have an alphabet and written characters? Long before the name of Mongol became known to history by the victory of Tchingis Khan. Georgi, Klaproth, Abel Remusat, the Father Horace de la Penna, all agree in admitting that, according to the Thibetian as well as the Mongol traditions, the princes of Thibet anterior to Tchingis were originally from Hindustan, but neither the date nor the circumstances are positive. Some assert that the youngest son of a king in India, a descendant of Sacya (perhaps of the Sacya or warrior

caste), fled to the mountains of Thibet in consequence of his family having perished in a battle against an army of 180,000 barbarian invaders from the desert, and that he settled in Yarlongg. Others say that this prince, named Segher-Sandaliton (sitting on the neck), was a prince who, having been exposed on the Ganges, was brought up by a peasant, and afterwards wandered in the forests and mountains of Thibet, where he was adopted by the *genii* of the country, who, placing a saddle on their necks, made him sit thereupon and carried him in triumph to the temple at Yarlongg, situated in the Snow Mountains. This was 313 years before Christ. Samang-Setsen, the Mongolian historian, mixes up his history with all kinds of Buddhist legends which we omit. The name of the first Thibetian king, according to the Thibetians (Horace de la Penna), is Ngetri, which has the same meaning as the Mongolian Segher Sandaliton. The family reigned 600 years, when the 23d successor, Lhatotori, was born in 348 after Christ; he mounted the throne in 367, and now we hear of Buddhism in Thibet, for Lhatotori was said to have received from heaven the famous formula of the six syllables, Om ma-ni pad-mé hon, that source of all blessing, and the book called Samadok. The king not appreciating sufficiently the blessing, was visited with the wrath of heaven, his children came blind into the world, and famine and sickness destroyed vast numbers of his people and their flocks. At last in 407 five strangers came into the country, and from them the king learnt the cause of all his misfortunes. He therefore embraced Buddhism; and fortune, and plenty, and all happiness smiled on him and on the land. Thus was Buddhism introduced into Thibet, but it was not until the beginning of the 7th century after Christ that the Thibetian king, Srongdsan Gambo, sent into Hindustan

an embassy of sixteen persons with Tongmi Sambhoda. (This is the Samtan Poutra of Fourmont and Georgi, says Abel Remusat, who insists on the error of the latter in placing the introduction of writing into Thibet in the 1st century.) Under this king the power of Thibet rose very high. He was surnamed Tchakravarti, or the king of the Wheel (he who rolls the golden wheel in the four parts of the world, East, West, South and North). The period of this king's reign is certified by the corresponding history of China, for he married a Chinese princess, a daughter of Tait-soung, named Wen-tching, and also a princess of Napaul. This prince died in 698, at the age of 82.

It must not, however, be omitted that the Mongol historian Sanang-Setsen gives the birth of the founder of the religion, Sackya-mouni, as having occurred at a period which corresponds to our twenty-second century before Christ, thus gaining 1,000 years on the Japanese, who are modest enough to place him in the tenth before the Christian era. It was this king that removed the seat of government from Yarloung to Llassa. His third successor married also his son to a Chinese princess, who gave birth to Thisrong Ite Bdsan in 790. And this latter, who mounted the throne at the early age of thirteen, called into Thibet four years after a celebrated Buddhist saint named Sakhora or Sagara, which name M. Schmidt considers as meaning the holy man of Sahora or the Land of Saints, that being the Mongol denomination of Hindustan. This saint prevailed upon the young king to send for Padma Sambhava, who dwelt in Oudiyana, situated on the right bank of the Indus, to the north of the country of the Gandharas. This man taught the young king many Buddhist rites, and initiated him into all their mysteries, with twenty-five companions of the prince.

Eight of these holy personages, who with the king arrived to the highest degree of sanctity and saw the face of as many Buddhas, possessed all kind of power. King Thisrong reigned twenty-four years, and during his reign the eight hundred volumes of the Kangiour were written, and the present hierarchy among the Lama clergy was established. At the same time arose many theological disputes between the Hindu Buddhist Gamalashila, and the Chinese Buddhist named Khochang Mahâ-yâna, who is the same as the Chinese Buddhist named, by Father Horace de la Penna, Achang, and who founded the famous sect of the contemplatives. The doctrine of Mahâ-yâna was that of China, or the great doctrine, whilst that of Kamalashila was the doctrine of Thibet, which the king favored, and which was far more popular. The one is named Tan-min, the other Tse-min. Ta-tching or Mahâ-yâna was vanquished in a great theological discussion, and left the country, and his doctrine, say the Chinese, is only found in Hindustan and at Ceylon. All this took place in the ninth century, and, therefore, when we are told of events which are said to have occurred as many years before the Christian era, one may judge of the faith that is to be put in them. At all events the establishment of the Great Lama by Tchingis Khan in the thirteenth century was only the placing of a High Pontiff over all the Lamas. The Mongols, who only came into possession of written characters twenty years after Tchingis, lost no time in adding to the store of Buddhist works, but the religion of Mongol tribes before Saskya-Pandita was Sabian, being that of Spirits or Larves, Stars or Constellations, especially the constellation termed Charles' Wain or the Ursus Major (the Great Bear), called the *Measure* by the Mongols, who likened the three stars in a straight line to the



handle, and the four others to the body. The protector of Tchingis Khan is, however, said to be Khormousda or *Ormuzd*. The Mongols, however, did not adopt Buddhism until 1247, when Saskya Pandita, who invented their alphabetic writing, operated that conversion. Sanang, it is true, speaks of many Buddhist events as having occurred among those tribes, and in matters relating to Tchingis Khan in 1192, but Abel Remusat considers them to be posterior inventions. Here then are positive dates with regard to the establishment of Buddhism in Thibet, where it certainly did not exist before the Christian era. Another date is 1572, when Altan Khagan, who repaired the fallen fortunes of the Mongols, was driven out of China in 1350, and who, after defeating the Tartars, marched to Thibet, where he made prisoner the reigning princes, and carried off Arik Lama and many Thibetians. This Lama converted Altan Khagan, and taught him to repeat the prayer of the six syllables. The nephew of Altan Khagan, named S'etsen Khoung Taidji, returned to Thibet with Mongol troops, and on his return to the town of Korokorum proposed to his uncle to invite into Mongolia the great Bogdo, or the Sodnam rgyamtso Khoutoaktou (the Dalai Lama), and accordingly a temple was built near the Kœke-noor lake to receive him, and the Mongol writers say he represented in all his glory Shâkya-mouni, and the Khagan: the Lord of the world or Khormousda (*Ormuzd*). The Lama came according to promise, and sent before him Pantcha Mahâkâla, or the five great attributes of God, according to Abel Remusat, who says that Schmidt is mistaken in translating the term the *great blacks*, because here the word *kâla* means *part*, and must be understood the five divinities in one (les facultés de l'être tout puissant, individualisées, et con-

gues dans une existence distincte). The first of these divinities is precisely white, and is called Tchagan Mahâkâla, which, remarks Abel Remusat, cannot mean *black*, for, moreover, the others are of various colors, one being red, another gilded, &c. These forerunners were charged with the care of securing all the evil spirits, the larves, the dragons, &c., that infested Mongolia, and they carried them bound, and presented them to the Lama on his arrival at the frontier town. When Altan Khagan and the Great Lama met, they were very much surprised to find that they were old acquaintances, the Khagan having formerly existed as Koubilai, and as that Prince he had rendered the same honor to the same Pontiff, who was then the nephew of Saskya Pandita, and bore the name of Pagspa; and also the very interpreter was the identical one who on that former occasion had performed the same office. The result of the interview was very important for Buddhism; the Mongol clergy was divided into four classes: the rites of funerals, festivals, and the ecclesiastic hierarchy were fixed: the custom of slaying horses and camels and burying them with the dead was abolished; and it was decreed that they should become the property of the Lamas. An insult made to a high ecclesiastic was considered equivalent to one made to a Khoungtaidge or Prince of the royal blood. The *rabtchimbas* and the *gabtchon* were likened to taidjis, and the giloungs or ghelloungs to the nobles called *tabounang*. Altan Khagan died in 1583, and it was under his successor in 1604 that the celebrated Thibetian work the Ka-gyour (Gandjour) in 222 large folio volumes, was translated into Mongol, but only finished in 1634. Such is the matter of fact respecting the establishment of Buddhism in Thibet and Mongolia, and such is the fact with regard to their

famous three precious, or the Trine Unity or Sanggyas-Tchos-Ge-doun, which did not exist in Thibet before our era, although the equivalent or Buddha, Dharma, and Sanga constituted long before the Hindu Brahmin formula for God, the Law, and the Prophets or clergy.

Duhalde, who was in Mongolia at the end of the seventeenth century, was presented to the Head Lama of the Kalkas, named by them Hou Touctou, or Ho Fo (a living Fo or Buddha). "This Lama Prince," says Father Duhalde, "was sitting on a kind of altar in a large tent. Both great and mean pay him the same adoration as they do to *Fo* himself: he returns the salute to no person whatsoever, and suffers himself to be worshipped as a God. All the Tartars of the Kalkas believe he is ignorant of nothing, and absolutely disposes of the favors and powers of Fo. He has been born no less than fourteen times, and will be born again in due season. But he was extremely surprised, when, on occasion of our maps, he saw strangers from the West, who, instead of honoring him, had even the boldness in presence of several Mongol Princes, one of which was his nephew and son-in-law to the Emperor of China, to condemn this foolish Idolatry, expose his ignorance in the questions his curiosity led him to ask concerning Europe, and to threaten him with the terrible judgments of God and eternal torment: yet he heard all with great coolness, and continued to receive the adoration of the Mongol Lords that came with us as if he heard nothing." Would the Roman Pontiff have had as much tolerance? Duhalde says that the Mongol Lamas deny the Hindu doctrine of the transmigration of souls into beasts, and therefore do not hesitate to feed on their flesh. The Chinese Buddhists, however, admit, on the authority of books

of Fo, that he who kills no living things obtains thereby a long life. It is therefore even forbidden to blow out a candle, because by so doing the flame may cause the death of some small moths or gnats that are always flickering around it.

It was in the beginning of the eighteenth century that Father Duhalde, to whom we are indebted for a most interesting work on China and Chinese Tartary, had the above-mentioned interview with the Mongolian Great Lama. The following account of Benjamin Bergmann's reception by the renowned Lama Ombo, in the beginning of the present, the nineteenth century, in the steppes of Tartary, will serve to give some notion of the actual state of Buddhism in those parts, and may encourage the minds who dread the introduction of Reason in Religion, by pointing out to them in the Tartarian deserts a place of refuge when superstition shall have quailed in other climes before the march of Intellect. Ombo was esteemed a saint, having been in Thibet and in various parts of Chinese Mongolia, and being a great traveller, the conversation between him and Bergmann commenced on geographical topics. In answering the Lama's questions, the latter unfortunately mentioned the globular or spheroidal form of the earth in accounting for the natural approximation of countries, which, although very distant in one direction of the compass, are for that very reason extremely near in the opposite direction. But no sooner had the interpreter mentioned that the stranger likened the form of the earth to that of a globular body, than the holy man burst out into loud fits of laughter, exclaiming, "what an absurdity! why, how can people walk with their heads downward?" Bergmann at first attempted to explain, but to no other purpose than that of increasing the boisterous mirth of Ombo. All

he could say only served to make him be looked upon as a prating coxcomb, who had come among them with the fixed intention of telling lies, and of palming them off for truth. Indeed, the Lama at last showed himself so highly offended at this heretical opinion, that Bergmann found no other means of quieting him than to admit that as in Europe many absurdities are believed, it was probable that amongst such was to be reckoned the globular form attributed to the earth. Ombo, however, would not consent to show any of his sacred Buddhist books to such a heretic, although on all other occasions the *ghelloungs* or Buddhist priests had even gone so far as to trust Bergmann with those they possessed. Although the Tartarian Buddhists do eat the flesh of animals, as DuHalde says, yet it would appear, by the account of Bergmann, that ancient scruples are still predominant, since on a fast day they are even forbidden to hunt. On one such day some Russians, who were with the horde, having taken about two dozen young roebucks, the *ghelloungs* bought them at a pretty high price, and set them free; and moreover one of their company, a *ghelloung*, having hunted a goat, was sent to Coventry all that day, and the following. The same traveller tells us that if the Tartar Buddhists do kill animals forming part of their flocks and herds, yet it is generally admitted as a principle that a true votary of Buddha must kill no living thing except beasts and birds of prey. But they abstain from killing serpents and tortoises, and a Kalmuck having one day killed a great spider of the tarantula kind, the eldest son of the chief or Khan of the horde told him, "*that animal will cost thee dear in the other world.*" Even the lice, says Bergmann, which are a constant plague among these people, are never killed by the religious minded: That traveller one day ask-

ing an old Tartar, who was shaking off many of his usual companions, if he would not kill one of them for money, was answered peremptorily in the negative. But for a thousand rubles? No, not for a million. It is the same thing to kill a louse as to kill a man; they have both a soul. It is remarkable enough that a religion so intimately linked with the doctrine of metempsychosis or transmigration of souls, and of which the main principle consists in the belief of the perpetual presence of Buddha or God in the person of the high Pontiff, should be branded as *atheistical*.

Thus, in 407 after Christ, Buddhism penetrated into Thibet, and in 495 the Arhan or great Hindu patriarch Bodhidana, who took the name of Bodhidharma, died in China, where he had introduced the doctrine he had received from his Hindu predecessor Banneyadam or Pan-jo-to-lo. This latter, the 27th patriarch, was the last who died in Hindustan, where he mounted the funeral pile, as did many of his predecessors. On his arrival in Southern India he had been presented by a king of those parts with a pearl of inestimable value, and, on showing it to Bodhidana, then a young man, and on inquiring whether he (Bodhidana) knew of any thing more precious, he received the following answer carefully treasured up by the Buddhists: "*Nothing on earth, but the doctrine far outshines all earthly things.*" These dates given by Abel Remusat may be considered as positive, although we are far from admitting it to be equally as certain that Saecya-mouni lived 1,445 years before this Bodhidana, or Bodhidharma, whose dying words in China were, "I came into this country in order to proclaim the law, and to deliver men from their passions. Each flower has five petals, and they become fruit, and thus my destiny has been accomplished." The Chinese name

Tamo of Bodhidharma has been taken by some missionaries for that of St. Thomas, and the year 65 of Christ is still erroneously given in many works as the period of the introduction of Buddhism into China, from whence it penetrated into Japan and Corea.

We admit that an apparent divergency from the opinion which denies that Buddhism was taught out of Hindustan before the Christian era, may be pointed out in the very authority on which we ground that opinion. Abel Remusat, in giving a translation of the Chinese historian, Ma-touan-lin, says, in speaking of the nation called Small Youci-chi, a branch of the *Great Youchi-chi* (Massagetes), that at a short distance from the capital was a tower or pagoda, consecrated to Buddhism, said by Ma-touan-lin to have been built 842 years before the 8th year of Wou-ting, thus making it to have been erected 292 years before Christ, since the 8th year of Wou-ting corresponds to the 550th after Christ. Abel Remusat remarks on this occasion, that this date is very important for those who seek to determine the precise date of the establishment of Buddhism. The size of the building renders it very remarkable, it having 350 paces in circumference, and 480 feet (80 toises) in height. It was situated 10 lis to the east of the capital. Such a building would tally with what we know of all that is said respecting the number and size of temples and pagodas erected in honor of Buddha in Tothian and Little Bucharia, as early as 500 after Christ, but even for such facts which are corroborated by various authors, Ma-touan-lin alone would scarcely be admitted as an authority, since in his history of Persia he also says that Buddha is worshipped in that country. The account given by Ma-touan-lin respecting the demands of succor made to the Chinese emperor when the Arabian Ma-

hometans invaded the kingdom of Pos-se (Persia) is highly interesting, but when he tells us that in Pos-se (Persia) were at that time many temples dedicated to Fo, and also towers or pagodas many stories high, his error is evident. For the towers and temples of the Persians were dedicated to *Ormuzd*; and although Fo or Buddha have the same meaning, it would be a strange confusion to admit that the worship of Ormuzd was identical with that of Fo. The name of Buddha was probably the same as Toyth or Toth, or Teut, and of the highest antiquity. Tat or Dad was the old Etruscan name for Father or him who nourishes, and is the root of the Sabine word Tatius, and all these terms may be more or less related to that of Buddha or Fo; but, although the etymologist may find some identity as regards the pristine origin of the word, yet it is self-evident that each nation gave very different meanings to the various derivations. Pythagoras is also a name in which the term Buddha or Puth has been pointed out, but the doctrine of the metempsychosis taught by that philosopher many centuries before Christ, after his return from the East, cannot be adduced as a proof that long before the Christian era Buddhism flourished in Upper Asia.

Christianity bears the stamp of its own peculiar origin, as does Buddhism, though in both religions the various circumstances have influenced the language, and the bent of the human minds that carried out the primary doctrines. To say that Christianity has nothing human in it, is to forget the distinction between Christ and those to whom it was given to carry out the Word of God. They were men: they could not claim unity with God, which is the characteristic feature of the Divine Founder. The language spoken by Christ was the Babylonian Chaldaic, that spoken by



the Jews, and, had He spoken another tongue, He would not have been understood by the multitude. Every passion was a devil, and every thing that could not be accounted for was the doing of an angel. Such was the current tongue and expression, and yet the Christian notions are clearly discernible although clothed in a language derived from Babylon. To consider such forms of speech as matters of divine Faith, is conferring on things human that Faith which is due to God alone, as to the Almighty. But Time alone can cure men of the error of taking their conceptions as the measure by which Faith in God is to be judged. Already the scales are beginning to fall from their eyes, and they begin to believe that such expressions as devils and angels have no other value than the opinion of those times.

Although Abel Remusat is of opinion that the Patriarchs or Buddhas, in times preceding the Christian era, were the philosophers of whom Strabo speaks as residing at the courts of the different Indian Princes, yet we cannot agree with him in this respect, for Strabo makes positive mention of the Brachmen or Brahmins. His words are: *Νέαρχος δὲ περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν οὕτω λέγει· τοὺς μὲν Βραχμῖνας πολιτενεῖσθαι, καὶ παρακολουθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι συμβούλους τοὺς δ' ἄλλους σκοπεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν Φύσιν.* ("Nearchus tells us of the Sophists that some Brachmen are given to civil professions, and accompany the kings of whom they are the counsellors: but others devote their time to the contemplation of Nature."—Strab. lib. xv. sec. 66. India. Casaub.) Strabo speaks further on of a class of men much given to arguing and philosophical disputation, and who are opposed to the Brahmins. These antagonists he names the Pramnæ, who considered the Brahmins, on account of their studies in physiol-

ogy and astronomy, as ridiculous and ostentatious. Of these, some dwelt in the mountains, others in the fields, some in towns, and some lived as naked as those who execute gymnastic feats. Those who dwelt in the mountains wore deer skins, and carried about with them knapsacks full of roots, and their profession was the sale of medicines, incantations, and amulets. Those who went naked called themselves Gymnosophists, and were accustomed, as it is well known, to pass the day exposed to the scorching rays of the sun, and this until the 37th year of their age. One of these Pramnæ is said to have burned himself publicly at Athens, giving no other reason than the fear of becoming unhappy. The inscription given by Strabo as having been placed on the tomb where the ashes of this Hindu were buried has the name of Zarmano or Sarmano Xegas. Casaubon says, "*Libri veteres habent Zarmanos Xegan.*" The time of this occurrence is not stated in Strabo, but as he had just mentioned Augustus Cæsar, it is probable that it happened at that period. Now if the term *χηγας* (chegas) was the well known Hindu expression Chakia, this would furnish an instance of the word being in use out of Hindustan at a very early period. At all events, these Pramnæ were far more in the spirit of Buddhism than the Brahmins, whose laws, Strabo says, were very different from all others, but were not written—(*Leges esse non scriptas, alias communes, alias proprias, quæ ab aliorum legibus valde sunt alienæ*). Whether the Pramnæ at that period confided their doctrines to writing, we are not told, but if they considered the learning of the Brahmins as absurd, and as tending to make men proud (*ut stultos et ostentatores*), it is not likely that their mystical and ascetic doctrines were at that time committed to writing. Calenus, the Hindu philoso-

pher who left India with the Macedonian army, is termed a Gymnosophist by Arrian, whilst Strabo calls him a Brachman, for speaking of the Brachmen who led a life of contemplation, the latter author adds *τουτων δειναι και Καλανον* (*ex his Calanum fuisse*). The difference of the period spoken of by Arrian and that, may account for the divergency of the doctrines, since the Brahmins, already more given to science in Alexander's days, are pointed out twenty years after as blamed on that account by the Gymnosophists, or rather the Hindu Pramnæ, of whom the *Gymnatas* were a by class, those who went without clothing.

It is unfortunate that that very acute thinker, Mr. Dugald Stewart, should have gone so far in his critical investigation of the Brahmin doctrines and philosophy as to deny the existence of the Sanscrit as a mother tongue, and should have considered it as an invention of the Brahmins, who copied its grammatical forms from the Greek. We say it is unfortunate, not because the authenticity of the Sanscrit is the least impaired by that opinion, which admits not only the resemblance but the very identity of the Devanagari and the Greek, but because such exaggeration weakens the value of criticism. Because among the Indo-European idioms Greek figures only as one, and thereby loses, as it were, its seat as a primitive mother tongue, it does not ensue that Greece has nothing characteristic, or that Grecian genius is lowered to the level of the Brahmin or the Buddhist. And these remarks find a still readier application with respect to the metaphysical and philosophical speculations which, given as those of Kapila,—who is no other than Sacya,—are made to appear as having taken rise in Hindustan, and as having streamed from the East as did the terms of Hermès and Djauspiter. But such a conclusion is by

no means legitimate. The separation among the tribes which bore the name of Brachmen on account of their doctrines, may have existed before the conquests of Alexander, and yet have taken a different bias after the introduction of Grecian philosophy by means of the Greek Bactrian Empire. Therefore three hundred years after Alexander Strabo terms the antagonists of the Brahmins "*contentiosum genus.*" However interesting such historical investigations are in themselves, and in relation to the various religious conceptions that may thus be traced to their primary source, they are yet altogether irrelevant as regards the main object of this research, viz., whether the primary names of God did not contain clearly and distinctly the *monotheistic* notion. We maintain this to have been the case, although we admit, at the same time, that Science has yet much to perform. But as men begin to understand that ancient history and Geography as well as Geology are no matters of religious Faith, which admits fully and adequately of all positive knowledge, it may be hoped that the investigators,—when no longer restrained by Theology, that maintains such research to be an offence against God,—will strike out boldly in new directions.

The traditional history of the Western tribes would require several volumes to be treated of adequately. But unfortunately our views being at variance with the usual distribution of the current of emigration, we should launch out into a subject altogether distinct from the one we are treating. This divergency relates principally to the adopted rule even admitted by the latest writers (see de Brotonne on the Emigrations of Ancient Peoples and Nations), of supposing Celts, Teutons, and Slavonians to have followed each other in successive apparition, in primary ages, because from the time of

Herodotus such has been the tide of emigration. These authors admit indeed of the Pelasgians and Iberians as having preceded the Celts, Teutons, and Slaves, and as having with the Tuscians preceded all others into Greece and Italy. The connection of the Helleni with the Pelasgians is too well known to admit of a distinction, especially since the lineage is proved *ethnologically* to have been identical between all the Indo-European or Himalaya-Caucasian tribes termed ancient Celts, Teutons, and Slaves. The more ancient worshipped Hermès, or Djaus-piter or Jao-piter, who was the God of the Helleni and Graeci, though Bel or Apol was, as the God of Light, the highest divinity according to the Dorians. (See O. Müller.)

We shall point out rapidly a few matters of fact, which may fortify at least our doubts respecting the truth of the usual accounts given by historians, even admitting that the term Scythian was applied anciently to Celt, Teuton, and Slave, as well as to the Pelasgians, although Pinkerton maintains that the Teutons alone were Pelasgians, or Scythians, thus making the Kimbers or Cambrian Britons Teutons. Our opinion is that no real distinction existed in the primitive ages; for the first tribes that inhabited Italy before all history, the Osci, the Volsci, the Marsi, and other Sabin tribes, appear equally Slavi as Teuton or even Tchoud or Finn. De Brotonne points to the Celts dwelling as it were in the outskirts of the large and wide territories inhabited by their rivals and conquerors, the Teutons. But those outskirts or Celtic territories are not those that appear to contain the descendants of the primary inhabitants of Europe. The Lucumon, or Lokman, or the high chief of the Italian tribes in the most ancient time, is now the name of the mayors of the forgotten tribes of Finland. The chiefs of the Scythian Calmouk

hordes are still the Tarchons and Archins (Tarquin. Archons), and the prophets or magicians of these tribes are still termed Telgcems (Telchines).

Coeval with these Scythian or Slavick tribes appear Iberians, or primitive races, evidently Teuton or speaking idioms connected with the Indo-Zend tongues. Men-fra or Min-vra, the great Goddess, whose name as Minerva is so well known, was the great female deity of the Sabins, and the name was transmitted by them to the Etruscans. (Micale.) Now the fact that the tribes which preceded the latter in Italy employed the term Fra or Frau to designate the female divinity (Min, Men, Mens, Mind), proves them to have been of Teutonic race. The Gauls of Italy appear even in the first days of Rome to have been Teutons, or to have spoken a tongue equally understood by both Celt and Teut. Brennus, the well-known Chief of the Gauls, if pronounced in Cambrian and Teuton mode, is Prinz or Prince; and even in far more modern time the Brenns, or Prins of the Gaelic tribes, as the O'Brians, &c., are evidently the same. The Boii, or Gauls of Upper Italy, are well known to have settled in Germany as the Baiern or Bavarians, and the same tribes had settlements in Gaul, from whence so many followed the second chief Brennus into Greece, and of whom great numbers settled in Asia, where they formed, two centuries before Christ, the territory named Gallatia. There the Tollstoi-Boii (fiercest or bravest) were the chief or predominating tribes, and the same tribes were at one time on the point of conquering all Asia, during the wars that arose between the lieutenants of Alexander the Great, after the death of that Prince.

We had prepared all the necessary documents respecting these highly interesting points of European early history, in the hopes of imparting a local interest

to the dry research of names, but in fact they have appeared to us irrelevant. We must therefore be content with pointing out in the primary terms of Her. mèn, Djauspiter, and Minerva, the evident traces of Eastern origin, and of the monotheistic idea, still to be traced in the very names of the gods that Idolatry worshipped. Fro and Fra (Phro, Phra), as Spirit or Deity, constitute, we have seen, the great link between the East and West.

## OF THE INNATE IDEA OF GOD.

ALL that we have sought to establish in what has been said respecting Monotheism, is merely the traditional fact of the Monotheistic idea being stamped in all the most primary terms which we possess. Still we are willing to abandon that traditional ground as inadequate, and to seek in the very nature of Man the proof which may be found wanting in Tradition and History. It may appear impertinent after all that has been said on the great subject of the philosophical proofs, either arising *à priori* in the mind, or developed *à posteriori* by men of such intellectual capacity as Descartes, Bacon, Leibnitz, Hobbes, &c., &c., not omitting Samuel Clarke and the many hundred others,—it may appear idle to broach the topic again. All former metaphysical notions have been proved worthless by Kant, and the *à posteriori* notions of causation and design substituted therefor. Those who maintain the *à priori* or impulsive appearance in the mind of causation and purpose, would conceive the proof to be one of those proceeding from elementary, primary belief. Still, Causation, and purpose or intelligent design, although



capable of being pointed out as proving such attributes to exist, do not prove the Existence of a Supreme Being as having *suggested* His Existence. The close investigation of Kant does not admit of the innate idea of God. The Almighty appears as a *suggestion*, or a Revelation not to be found in man, but placed therein at the beginning.

Warburton tells us that the popular argument of the innate idea of God, which had been for *ages* esteemed the fundamental proof of his Being and Attributes, coming to be overthrown by the admission of the philosophical *à posteriori* argument, it was hastily concluded that the Truth of Religion was thereby overthrown, for prejudice or want of reflection had established it as a consequence, that if no innate idea of God existed, there could be no God at all. Therefore, philosophically speaking, the issue was the same, for whether *natural religion* were conceived as an *à priori* or *à posteriori* conclusion, still it was the mere result of human conception, for we have seen that all *inferences* or *à posteriori* conclusions have been traced up to certain elementary or impulsive beliefs. The empirical school or Empiricism embraces both orders of conception, and in fact they both deny the Revelation of the Existence of God. But then they both prove inadequate to their task, not because human conceptions being admitted as incompetent by all religious men, and yet obtaining in every religion,—since man must think according to his nature, and such conceptions are continually proved to be mere exaggerated reflections of Man's own intellectual habits,—but because mere rational belief cannot constitute Divine Faith or Trust in God. In undertaking to prove that the knowledge of the Existence of God was *suggested* to man by a peculiar dispensation, but at the same time

planting the standard of Trust in God on that fact, refusing to admit of any human conception as adequate, and considering Faith or Trust in the Almighty alone to be the link, we are exposing ourselves to the kicks both of Philosophy and Theology. We consider even Christian Theology as a field overgrown with rank weeds, which, passing for revelations and inspirations, choke up real Revelation, that of the Existence of God: a Revelation appealed to and pointed out in the Mosaic Inspiration, and renewed by Jesus Christ. We maintain that the Word of God is His Name, and that that Name has ever indicated His Supreme Attributes. The following up of those attributes constitutes man's devoting himself to God. *Duty* we maintain to be involved in the knowledge of the Existence of God by Revelation. That Duty was evidently pointed out more clearly in the commandments of Moses, and the Duty existing from the beginning received thereby an additional light. But that light consisted in the promulgation of the real Essence of God Almighty, not as a new light but as one forgotten, and in the issuing of commands which were the expression, in a clear, definite form, of the Wisdom acquired by mankind during several thousand years. Nothing can be more rational, that is, more consistent with the Word of God, as revealed to Man, than the inspiration of Moses, excepting that of Jesus Christ, for the latter is identical with the first. And the consistency appears in a light still more full and glaring, when we are reminded of the appeals being made in the same manner, i. e., in leaving the human *Will* perfectly *free* to act. Trust in the Almighty can alone answer, without solving, the dark doubts which human nature, so weak and imperfect, inspires by its very existence. But if God is a sugges-

tion of man's conception, then that Trust becomes inadequate to the task.

Modern atheism has attempted to ruin the whole edifice of Christianity, by destroying and cutting away the foundations. Monotheism, admitted to have been a conception of the human mind, and not to have existed more than 1,500 years before Christ, would be the admission of the notion of God being a mere fruit of the Mind. Religion, it is true, would not be overthrown, but Faith or Trust in God would have lost its basis, *the Revelation*. The man who believes in a God revealed may laugh at Theology and Philosophy when they attempt to palm on him any conception of His Nature and Ways as *adequate*. *Duty* and *Faith*, or Trust in God, are involved in His Revelation. But let Religion remain as it is, merely Theology, as an end, instead of being a mean; or let Philosophy take the lead, and cause men to believe that the physical laws of Nature and those of phenomenal and experimental science are alone the *laws of God*, instead of being means subservient to human will, aided by human intelligence, and then all hope of bettering the human condition will be lost. For the direction of Theology is towards Rome and Buddhism; and that of Philosophy towards Atheism or the denial of Divine Faith, whilst it appeals to Trust in her dictates alone. But the thralldom of Philosophy would, we apprehend, prove far more disastrous than that of Theology, admitting even the latter as inculcating implicit Faith in her dictates. For Theology tells of God and of Christ, and acknowledges God, even whilst sinning against His Holy Spirit, i. e., by continually claiming absolute Faith in her dictates, and talking of infallibility, and of her conceptions as being adequate to the knowledge of the

Supreme Being, whom she owns to have been only known by Revelation.

The well-known *à priori* proofs of the Existence of God given by Samuel Clarke, as also those of Paley, admitting the suggestion as capable of proceeding from either argument, cannot be adduced in favor of Revelation, even in the close and limited sphere in which it is admitted of here. The arguments of Paley have indeed been adopted by the partisans of Natural Theology, as furnishing them with sound arguments. As to the argument of Dr. Clarke, the necessary existence of God as deduced from the conditional or finite, it is merely a reproduction of the arguments of Bossuet, deducing the existence of the Perfect from that of the Imperfect; or that of Fenelon, who maintains that the Finite is far more certain of the existence of the Infinite, because the latter is involved in the conception of the former. We must refer the reader to the Kantian philosophy, in order to understand the weakness and inanity of such arguments, which are mere paralogisms, or mere metaphysical conceptions, not grounded on Reason or fact. The propositions of Dr. Clarke may be reduced to the following:

1. Something has existed from all Eternity, because something exists to-day.

2. An independent and immutable Being has existed from all Eternity, because the world being merely an assemblage of things relative and conditional, cannot contain in itself a motive of existence; that motive or reason must therefore exist somewhere else, must be independent, and also immutable.

3. That independent and immutable Being, who has existed from all Eternity, exists by his own self-Will; for He cannot have been produced from noth-

ing, nor from any thing which is external to Him, since He encompasses all things.

But Clarke obviously considered these arguments as weak, since he attempted also to deduce the necessary Existence of God from the notion of Space and Time, or Duration. These notions he conceived to be the qualities or properties, the attributes of a *substratum* which constituted their real foundation, and which was God Himself. This argument, with that of the necessary existence of the Infinite, because the idea of Eternity and of Existence are necessarily connected, was answered by Leibnitz in his usual victorious manner, even before Kant.

Beginning with the notions of Space and Duration, Leibnitz proves them to be inconsistent with the Unity which is at the same time admitted to be absolute in God. Space is divisible, and cannot be conceived as a quality of an indivisible Being. Space admits of a *vacuum*. To say that Space is in God is inconceivable, and to say that God is in Space, whilst the latter is conceived as a property or quality, would be admitting that the subject is in the quality, and not the quality in the subject. Leibnitz proves that as regards Duration or the Succession of things, the same reasoning obtains, for Immutability is altogether incompatible with successive duration, which is continually ceasing to be: Time is composed of moments, and moments are scarcely parts of Time. Besides if Space is a reality, it must be more real than the things it contains: each part of Space would then be immutable and eternal in themselves, so that conceived in that light Space would be coexistent with God, and independent, if indeed it would not be making God dependent on Space. The upshot of the arguments of Leibnitz we have already mentioned: he maintains Space to be the mere

ideal notion of the *order of coexistences*, and Time or Duration that of the *order of successive being*. What Space is to things coexisting, Duration is to things successive. Pure Space is an abstraction; it is the possible placing of things in given relations, and this possibility carried on without end is called the *infinite*. Duration is also a mere relation of succession; only real when real events succeed, and which exists in Thought as possible, and is then merely ideal. Therefore, according to Leibnitz, "The immensity of God is independent of Space, as His Eternity is independent of Time. As regards those two orders of things, those attributes merely signify that whatever shall exist there, God shall be present and coexistent. The immensity and eternity of God are something more eminent than the *duration* (Time) and extension (Space) of His creatures, not only as regards greatness, but also in respect of the nature of the thing." (See *Lettres entre Leibnitz et Clarke*.) These views of Leibnitz have been generally admitted, and especially by Kant. Their arguments upset altogether the position of Clarke, and prove, 1. That the immensity of God is very different from Space; and that Time is one thing, and the Eternity of God another. 2. That Time and Space are no real existences out of, or beyond God. 3. That they are especially no attributes of God. God is immutable, and therefore not in Time: God is One, and therefore not in Space.

These objections against the proofs adduced by Clarke in favor of his *à priori* and *à posteriori* arguments as proving the Existence of God, do not however militate against the value of the arguments produced by that thinker against Collins and Hobbes, respecting the Existence of Free Will in Man, and the inviolability of the moral law. Clarke conceives the

moral law as independent of reward and punishment, and almost as independent of Divine Will. Here he becomes a Necessarian in despite of himself, maintaining that there exists an immutable, absolute law of justice, which constitutes the nature and essence of God, and is not to be conceived as a mere arbitrary decision of His Will. The conformity of the conduct of man to this immutable moral relation of things constitutes, according to Clarke, the Moral Good. *Conscience* is the touchstone of these moral relations of things, but they cannot be defined.

Taken as an elementary belief of the Mind, or as an innate, impulsive *à priori* idea, it is now generally admitted, that the idea of God does not exist in the mind; and it is to the *à posteriori* proof, in some form or other, that most persons rely, without rightly distinguishing between the primary suggestion, and that which proves the suggestion to constitute the real positive relation between God and Man. Now the question is, not whether traces of Almighty Power and Wisdom and Goodness exist or not in the visible creation, but whether, admitting that evidence to be most clearly substantiated, *the primary suggestion* was thus acquired. This oversight on the one hand, with the apparent practical argument on the other, that marks of design and purpose appear to be with Causation, we conceive to be the reason why the views of Paley and the Bridgewater treatises should have produced so much scepticism respecting the Revelation. Add to this the *pious* frauds of Theology, always ready to come forward with *inspiration* and *revelation*, and utterly incapable of distinguishing between Divine Faith or Trust in God, and that mere feeling of belief which exists in Man, and which is as much the source of Super-

stition as of Idolatry, for it is the source of all irrational belief: it is Credulity.

To those who have been dazzled with the accumulation of scientific facts adduced by Lord Brougham in order to prove design and purpose, and who believe that because it can be maintained that effects which bear marks of design have a designing cause, therefore the conception of a Supreme Being was the result of human reflection, we would submit the following observations: 1, tribes and individuals, our fellow-creatures, exist, and have existed, who know nothing of a God; 2, the deaf and dumb know nothing of His Existence until told; and 3, the proof that this ignorance is very different from that of the arts and sciences of civilized life, to which it has been compared, is found in the wide distinction which exists between the workings of the human mind upon the artistic and scientific notions which have arisen at various periods of the existence of the human race, and those workings upon the idea of God.

To those who believe that the admission of the Revelation cancels human Will, and opens wide the door to Theology and Superstition, because it then becomes impossible to control theological assertions, or to find a criterion which may serve as a standard of Truth, we shall remark, that when it is once admitted that the knowledge of the Existence of God by the Revelation, places the Nature and Ways of the Almighty above all possible conception, it at once cuts away all ground from Theology as matter of Faith, beyond His Existence and the Attributes which constitute His Name. This admission at once bursts asunder the fetters of Theology, and frees Mankind from the yoke of Atheism.

1. Although tribes have been pointed out and in-



dividuals designated in savage life as altogether without any notion of a Supreme Being, yet as the means of communication with such are very imperfect, the conclusion cannot be admitted as satisfactory. Pritchard enumerates several instances of tribes in Africa, that had been considered as devoid of all such notion, and yet amongst whom a closer or more adequate investigation brought to light Fetishes, and other symbols of worship, such as that of the Sun and Moon. Still it cannot be passed over in silence that the tribes of Southern Africa known by the name of Earthmen do not know of a Supreme Being, and possess no peculiar mode of worship such as Fetichism. But if the difficulty of communicating with savages may cause some doubt as to the real state of their mind, that objection does not exist with the many Englishmen who can be pointed out, and who are constantly alluded to in the daily Press, as knowing nothing of a God. Such persons constitute, it is true, the dregs or outcasts of society; still they are human beings, and in them the absence of the important knowledge to which we refer, does not prove in favor of its natural existence in the human mind. Here an objection has been raised. It has been said that such beings were too much absorbed in the pressing and harassing work by which their living was insured, to be able to use those faculties by means of which reflection would have taught them, when looking around on Nature, that there existed a God. (We admit of the evidence, but we deny the conclusion.) Men, in the natural state, or savages, do not know of God, on account of their lowered condition, we are told; and here, although they are obviously in conditions most favorable for the grandeurs of Nature to act on the mind, still the innate or instinctive idea does not shoot forth.

2. The deaf and dumb—if we believe not merely writers such as Itard on that subject, but if we would believe what we ourselves have had occasion to observe by attending to that subject—do not naturally possess any intuitive knowledge of God. Already the fact had been attested, but the opinion of the innate idea of God was so grounded in the minds of men that people turned a deaf ear thereto. Here again, however, in admitting of the fact, it has been explained in a sense altogether different, inasmuch as these unfortunate beings were supposed to be naturally deprived of that knowledge as they are of hearing and speech. Again, on the other hand, the Ultra-Catholic school, with De Bonald, admitting of the fact, explain thereby the term so deeply mysterious of the “Word of God.” This they maintain to have been the faculty of speech granted to Man, and which, in order to exist, required to be exerted in the beginning. Therefore, deafness and its constant companion (when primary), muteness, were admitted to have been dispelled by the Word or Speech of God, and thus His Existence made known in or by Speech. At all events, these latter observers admit of the fact, although they explain it in a manner very different from ourselves.

3. The fact of the existence of many human beings in a state of Nature not knowing of God, has also been admitted by some who conceive it to be a proof of the idea of God having arisen in the human mind in the same manner as the arts and sciences. The latter they say do not exist among savages or wild tribes. Arts and sciences, they say, were merely bestowed upon Man in a manner just sufficient to give him a beginning, as was Revelation, but not leaving him or them in the condition of a mere savage, who subsists on such wild fruits and animals as he may chance to meet with.

Therefore, they admit of a superhuman Instructor, not merely as instilling into the mind of our first parents the knowledge of the existence of God, but also as giving rise to the civilized state.

It is very true that we know not of any savage nation or tribe that did invent for themselves, one by one, all the useful arts, and raise themselves to a civilized state without assistance from men already civilized. And as the same may be said of the knowledge of the Existence of God, therefore *the Revelation* of God, or the supernatural knowledge given to man of His Existence, has been likened to that of language, and of arts and sciences. If the reader be a theologian he will never be able to distinguish the difference, and if a philosopher, he may think it is not worth while to do so. Nevertheless we proceed to say that the gradual division of mankind into husbandmen, shepherds, and artificians of various kinds, where the first advance, step by step, was made in all the various arts of civilization, is too general not to have been dependent on the natural organization of man. He spoke, for such was his nature, and the progress of philology or grammatical science in ancient times proves the real nature of that science. And the same obtains in all other arts and sciences, even with the aid and succor of fellow man more civilized or in better conditions, for such progression was in his nature. Not so with Revelation: not so with the knowledge of the Existence of the Almighty. The source of Mind is a mystery; but the source from whence the mind drew the knowledge of God is the mystery of all mysteries; it is the Revelation of the Word. Science, it is true, was merged in Religion at the beginning. We explain without denying the fact on which Auguste Comte insists so strenuously. But it is in the workings of the mind upon these two

orders of ideas, that we perceive the distinction we would point out to the reader. The Art which, theorized, becomes a Science, and as such again gives rise to other Arts more or less useful, arises slowly in accordance with the nature of the human mind. For if the rude arts of primary civilization may be termed the cradles of sciences as practical, these latter are the bases of other arts which spring therefrom. Thus, for instance, Natural Philosophy and Chemistry, those popular sciences, which, carried out in various channels as useful Arts, promise fair to renovate the face of the Earth, to plunge into its bowels, and to penetrate the statistic mysteries of the heavens in ways hitherto unknown and unimagined, were composed a few centuries ago of the rudest elements. In saying that such primary notions of Art arose spontaneously in the mind, we must remind the reader that by that term is meant *positively*, or in due relation to conditions either clearly pointed out, or merely admitted as such, although unknown. Truly the obscurity, the darkness which surrounds the origin of Art and Science, is as deep as that which veils from our gaze the origin of the knowledge of the Existence of God, *the Revelation of His Word*; and Theology has turned to good account that obscurity. Even at the present day it is in this region of darkness that Protestant and Catholic divines join hands, and unite in cancelling human endeavors, human action. Here we find a Whately, and a De Maistre admitting of a Divine Instructor, not merely *as the revealed Word*, leaving Man to grope his way, and thus leaving to *human Will* real worth and value, but as the teacher of Man in the arts of life, as his immediate guide in establishing the relative conditions of the father of a family, of the chief of a tribe, or of the acknowledged

leader of nations. And when states arose, here more than ever a superhuman Instructor is invoked, and human Instinct, human Will, and Reason, all human Experience are cancelled. Logical sophistry is invoked, favored as it is by the darkness, and is brought forward indiscriminately by all theologians, as proving that human experience could be of no avail. The great eventful fact of the Revelation of the Existence of God has been lowered in its nature, and concealed by the spurious offsets of Theology. Results of human experience have been given as *revealed*; as proceeding directly from a divine Instructor; even the simple narrative of the primary Hebrew tribes has been forced in its meaning, or passed over unheeded, and Theologians have gone the lengths of shrouding their ignorance under the name of Philosophy. Bonald, De Maistre and *tutti quanti* term philosophical the admission of divine right in government. They appeal to Revelation in a manner which has rendered that momentous event commonplace. Theology has sinned against the Holy Spirit, for Theology has joined issue with Philosophy in Pantheism, and in denying indirectly Revelation itself, because Revelation without human Will would be in itself an absurdity. The Theologians of the present day are much akin to the old Egyptians, who, admitting of Medicine as a Divine Revelation, forbade all change as blasphemy.

The theological sophistry of bringing forward human conceptions as divine, a fallacy which is still so fatal to religion and which is the foundation, with human credulity, of all Idolatry either *symbolic* or *mythic*, is then grounded on the original obscurity of primary events. But it can never be in the unknown elementary condition of things (a mystery so deep) that man can look in order to perceive a distinction. Gravity

and Life, without the phenomena which qualify these terms, have no meaning as mysteries. Therefore, it is not in the origin but in the consequence that the distinction between Revelation or the notion of God's Existence as the Almighty, and the notions inherent in the frame of the human mind (instinct and inference) is to be seen. This distinction consists in the fact of the notions proceeding from the human mind being susceptible of *Progress*; whilst the revealed notion of God always preserves its sublime immutability, and the Word ever was, is, and will be the same,—the Supreme in Power and Wisdom and Goodness.

This most essential distinction, without which it would prove idle to show, 1, that from the highest antiquity, and according to all tradition, the Name of God had ever pointed Him out as All-powerful and Wise and Good, whilst His Unity was strictly visible even in the strangest metamorphoses to which that Word has been made subservient; 2, that in the nature of man or of the human mind there exists not an innate, instinctive Belief of the Existence of a Supreme Being; nor is that Belief *suggested* by inference (*à posteriori*) to the mind by reflection, although the latter, perceiving evident marks of design and purpose, and observing the subsequent appearance of things in constant succession and positive connection, is most naturally led to believe in Causation likewise, and to admit of those matters of fact as proofs (*à posteriori*) of the Truth of the *revealed suggestion*: this distinction may require further evidence which we would adduce in the following remarks. It is, however, requisite to remind the reader, that by the term instinctive and spontaneous, we mean notions which appear of themselves without inference, as does Memory, Sensation, &c., always admitting of given conditions, as being required. This observation is

elicited by the general use made of the term *spontaneous* by M. Auguste Comte, in his "Philosophie Positive," where it stands in very frequent contradistinction from the positive "deductions" of inference of various kind. We repeat this observation, because the distinction we seek to point out in a clear and definite manner, exists already in the general division adopted by Auguste Comte, of the notions of Mankind or human ideas being proved to have existed, and to exist—1. Theological. 2. Metaphysical. 3. Positive. We admit of the fact which has been alluded to by Bacon, but our conclusions are very different from those of M. Comte, who sees therein a proof of the worthlessness of the first, and deduces therefrom his well known atheistical conclusion, that therefore God does not exist. Now, we see therein merely a proof of the worthlessness of human conceptions respecting the Supreme Being revealed, whose real Nature and Ways (as matters of Trust or Divine Faith) become more and more evident by the progress of human Reason; for men at first (as many do still, especially Theologians) admitted only of theological notions; they maintained that their conceptions were adequate to explain the Supreme Being only known by Revelation; all art and science was revealed, and a matter of Religion. With M. Comte we allow of the progression, but we explain it in favor of the peculiar nature of the mode adopted by the Almighty in order to impart to Man the knowledge of His Existence.

The division under which M. Auguste Comte ranges all the evolutions of human Thought—1. Theological; 2. Metaphysical; 3. Positive—reminds one of that of Lord Bacon, who divides all the contemplations of Man into 1. Divine, or such as penetrate unto God; 2. Human, or such as are reflected upon himself;

3. Natural, or such as are circumscribed to Nature; which he ranges thus: 1. Divine philosophy; 2. Natural philosophy; 3. Human philosophy. All human contemplation, or Thought, being exerted, according to Lord Verulam, either on the Power of God, or the Differences of Nature, or the Use of Man. We shall again refer in the subsequent pages to the views of Bacon on these important points. For the moment we maintain that the notion termed *Theological* by M. Comte does not exist naturally in the mind of Man, nor does it follow the same direction as such notions do which are really natural to the mind. This, it may be said, is the admitting that "the Light which came from Heaven" led Man astray. But we *trust* in Divine Perfection, whilst we are *certain* of Human Imperfection; and as God is only known as Supreme in Power and Wisdom and Goodness; and as these Attributes constitute His Word or Name, whilst human will is ever mistaking Error for Truth, we readily admit of the fact, and trust to God for the wherefore; only in the Word we would see not the Will of God as the physical laws, as modern writers have it, but as a moral appeal to human will.

In what then consists the real value of *theological* ideas? they contain two orders of notion, one relating to the Supreme Being as Existing, the other to the human conception respecting Him. Now the real positive (relative) notion of God's Existence, is that contained in His Word, in His Name, in His Attributes. There is the Law or the aim. Human means may change; the laws of Man respecting Him may change; the Law of God is ever the same. Therefore when it is admitted that theological conceptions undergo alterations, this is not to be applied to the notion which as revealed is the basis of Religion, as it is indeed the start-



ing point of all such theological conceptions. Is then Religion nothing more, it will be asked, than inadequate conceptions respecting God? And if any thing more, where is the criterion to be found which may serve to judge of the matter in question? Here the Revelation of the Word becomes the touchstone, but the Word taken as the Name, as the Attributes which, as Supreme, have ever been that Name.

The distinction to which we refer consists then in what we have termed the Immutability of that notion, of the idea of the Existence of the Almighty, under that fixed meaning of Supreme Power, Wisdom, and Goodness. Religion consists in notions respecting Him, the adequacy of which notions is to be judged of according to what man knows of as certain in Wisdom and Goodness expressed in mutual acts of intercourse between man and man. This is, in fact, the most rational criterion of a religion, and this is the only one to which Reason can apply in cases of doubt. It is indeed because the dispensation of Moses harmonizes with the Word of God, that his divine Mission becomes assured, and not on account of the ritual or Jewish ceremonies of sacrifice and expiation. Are not the ten commandments to this day the basis of social life, as they were before under a form less positive? Is it not their conformity with the finite notions of Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, that insures their *immutable* value? and do they not on that account partake in some measure of the *Immutability* of the Word?

To that Word the law of Progress, and of Change, which constitutes the nature of human conception in general, is not applicable. In arts and sciences as in all human contemplations, some discovery, some change is continually going on. There is ever some theory substituting itself for another, as some machine is adopt-

ed instead of a former. Along the whole line of Thought there is rapid and continual development, and accumulation. This law of Progress may be applied with equal consistency to all religions, and social ideas, but never to the *Revealed Word*. Every political conception, more or less general, comes forth as something more perfect, something more complete, or at least as something far better adapted to actual circumstance. With religion it is the same; the doctrine that is brought forward is always considered as far richer, more complete, and more harmonious with the basis of that religion than the former. Every idea, every notion proceeding from human nature is thus susceptible of progression, of amelioration; the revealed notion of God, *never!* Theologians, it is true, deny all progress, in favor of the absolute idea of God, and our doctrine may appear to savor of the same opinion. But the difference is complete; for we maintain the adequacy of human will as finite, and of human action as the only means of *devotion* to the absolute notion revealed in the Word. We admit of human experience as guiding the actions of man in the fulfilment of the *duties* imposed by the Word as an appeal, and enforced in the Mosaic law, because there the experience of man had proved the adequacy of the commands.

Divine Faith or trust in the Almighty, *because he was revealed as such*, and because all contemplation proves it, is therefore the only link that connects Man with God. Lord Bacon, speaking of the limits of Reason, considers, it is true, the Word of God as something without relation therewith, and in which man *must* believe. "The Reason of man must believe the Word of God, although with reluctance, in like manner as the Will of man obeys the Law of God, although reluctant. How then comes it that Man is said to

have, by the Light and Law of Nature, some notions and conceit of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil, if the light of nature cannot aspire to such perfection? Because the light of nature is raised in two different senses; the one that which springeth from Reason, Sense, Induction, Argument; the other that which is imprinted upon the Spirit of Man by an inward Instinct, according to the law of Conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate, in which latter sense only he is partaking of some light, and discerning touching the perfection of the Moral Law. But how? sufficient to check the vice, but not to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of Religion, as well Moral as Mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration and Revelation from God." Bacon here takes the Word as containing all the Attributes, but he does not consider the *duty* to be sufficiently enforced by Conscience only; and indeed neither the religion of Christ, any more than that of Moses, admits of Conscience alone as informing that *Duty*.

"In Religion," says Lord Verulam, "the use of human Reason is of two sorts; the one, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed—the other in the inferring and deriving of doctrines and directions therefrom. The positive laws of Religion once established, Reason has place as a secondary or relative law. These secondary laws are subject to Reason, the true limits and use of which in spiritual things lies in a proper discrimination so as not to examine the first, but only the second or relative: That which is positive upon Authority and not upon Reason is therefore not to be disputed, but what is most just, not absolutely but relatively, that affordeth a long field of disputation."

Unfortunately for man the words of Bacon are too

true, and as every thing is in fact relative, so are all things objects of discussion. And therefore we are not surprised to have found that in fact the Word of God is placed above all human conception, is absolute, and only known as such. Bacon also denies that Philosophy is the basis of Religion, saying, that “to seek Divinity in Philosophy is to seek the living among the dead, and so to seek Philosophy in Divinity is to seek the dead among the living.” This corresponds with the opinion of Luther, “that what was true in Philosophy was not true in Theology,” which opinion has been adopted herein in respect of Theology and Revelation; it being maintained that Theology is a mere attempt at conceiving the inconceivable, according to the very admission of Theology. We maintain with respect to the Revelation of God’s Existence, what Bacon says respecting Faith as resembling the golden chain of the ancient fable, by which men were not able to draw Jupiter down to Earth, whilst Jupiter was able to draw them up to Heaven. “So we ought not attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of Heaven to our Reason, but contrariwise to raise and advance our Reason to the Divine Truth.” These words may, it is true, be adduced as they have been by Theology in favor of all that over which she throws a cloak or veil, as being the mysteries of God, but we interpret them simply as they stand, and indeed as they have been understood by some who, as De Maistre, reproach Bacon vehemently with them, as meaning that Man has not to occupy himself with the Nature and Ways of God, but to pursue the road that may best elevate his Intelligence a little nearer to the Being known as Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness; in short, as Divine Truth.

We refer purposely to these words of the Father

of modern Experimental Philosophy, and as such of the more modern or Deductive, because that Philosophy is esteemed by theologians and especially by those of the Catholic or Romanist school (see De Maistre and Bonald, &c.,) as a sink of impiety and materialism. *As to Protestant Theology it is merely negative, and when affirmative is altogether Romish.* The distinction between philosophy and the mysteries of God is indeed placed in so elevated a position by Bacon, as to have been considered by some theologians as tantamount to a denial of the direct interference of God in human affairs. The law of conscience, admitted as "sufficient to check the Vice, but not to inform the Duty," supposes some other criterion. This we say was furnished by the revealed knowledge of God, as the Word; and that Word or Name being ever expressive of His Attributes, the link between God and Man is, we cannot too often repeat it, Faith or Trust in the Perfection of those attributes so imperfectly represented to himself by Man. But still the *Duty* became an act of experience, and thus was involved in the knowledge of God, by referring to the source of all Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, those human actions in which these attributes were reflected, and *proved by Experience* to be such. The commands of God as issued by Moses possess therefore, we repeat, a rational ground; they have stood the test of centuries; they preceded as practical the dispensation of Moses. The duty became more positive, it is true, but not less rational, for if the Notion of God preceded the establishment amongst men of such fixed rules, it was as an aim, and those rules once established by experience became sound means of attaining thereunto.

But, it may be objected, Lord Bacon far from placing the idea of God at such a height, has also said that

much philosophy leads to God. His words are the following: "It is an assured Truth, and a conclusion of Experience, that a little or a superficial knowledge of Philosophy may incline the mind of man to Atheism, but a farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind back to Religion; for in the entrance of Philosophy, when the second causes which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of Man, if it dwell and stay there, may induce some oblivion of the highest Cause; but when a man passeth on further, and seeth the dependence of Causes and the works of Providence, then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of Nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair."

Here the philosopher refers to Belief or Trust alone, and remains perfectly consistent with his well known rejection of First Causes (final or ultimate), as being the objects of Philosophy (inductive). In this view Bacon, although reproached by modern philosophy with attending to *causes*, whilst the real aim of man is the knowledge of *effect*, might be defended on the ground of second causes being really such (effects), according to his own explanation.

The Leibnitzian philosophy, we have seen, attempts to explain all difficulties respecting God by the means of broad *à priori* axioms or principles which have found great favor with Theology, for they still constitute the basis thereof. Optimism, or "all for the best," and "Whatever is, is right," is however a sorry substitution, we believe, for Trust in God. It gives to Religion, it is true, a gloss of philosophy, but is, we apprehend, "the seeking the dead among the living." It finds also great favor with those who admit of Natural Religion as arising alone in the mind of men. But too much has been said already on that subject.

The elementary beliefs of modern philosophy so keenly analyzed by Kant, and which as *forms* are transcendental, or matters of pure Reason, only becoming notional by experience, give Cause and purpose (Causation, Intelligence) as the elements of Belief in God. The aptness of the explanation may cause the real fact to be overlooked, and that is, that neither intuition, nor direct impulsive thought, nor inference, the result of experience, appears to be the primary source of the idea of God. Let the reader attend for a moment to that notion, disengaged from the weeds of Theology, and the peculiar nature of the great idea of God, made known as the Word, will arise in all its pristine grandeur. We are perfectly aware of our folly in hoping to eradicate those weeds so baneful to religion, and which, far from upholding that sublime Truth, do their utmost to substitute themselves in its stead. Let them be only drawn aside for a moment, and that moment will suffice to encourage Faith, by a mere casual glimpse at the Truth.

If our attempts to find a clear and definite meaning to the term Faith should cause scruples to arise in religious minds (not Theologians), we would remind them of the constant endeavors of the writers of Scripture to direct the mind towards that point. And even the hyperbolical Eastern expressions of the Old Testament, so characteristic of the times, may be adduced as attempts at increasing in Man a Trust or Faith in God. Enoch, who is said to have "walked with God," is referred to in the Epistle to the Hebrews as an example of Faith, inasmuch as "without Faith, it is impossible to please God;" but as to the *subjects* of his Faith, we are told by Archbishop Whately, that the Apostle himself seems to have had no distinct and par-

ticular knowledge, "except that he must have believed in the Existence and Goodness of God."

The assertion that "*as Science advances, the Deity recedes,*" is then not true, when applied to the knowledge of God, such as rational investigation proves Him to exist. For as Science advances, it is Theology alone that recedes, but the *Word* freed from such rank weeds arises in awful majesty. The knowledge of the Existence of God, His Will and Design manifested therein, are at once declared in *the Revelation*. *There* is the standard of Faith, and *there* the criterion for practical Trust or Religion.

Here it is the investigation of "human imperfection," and not that of *Original Perfection* preceding Original Sin, that has been attended to. It would be puerile to talk of *perfection* in a creature that was acknowledged in the same phrase to have sinned. Theology talks of Death being the result of Sin or imperfection, and modern theologians attempt to prove the fact by reverting to the results of moral or spiritual causes over physical phenomena. Mesmerism and Table-turning are deep Sciences in comparison to such nonsense. Geology points out remnants of animals, we have already said, in the remains of the monsters that preceded the presence of Man on Earth.

It would be irrelevant in an attempt at rational investigation or of matter of fact, to view the Mosaic dispensation otherwise than as having reference to that only criterion we have all along so tediously (for the reader) and strenuously contended for, and which alone we aim at establishing, *the Revelation of God as the Word*. Judaism must, therefore, submit to the criterion, and indeed we find, as Warburton says, in that dispensation a most distinguishing mark. But it is not merely a mark that distinguishes it from all the other



religions of the day or of times known to history, it is a mark which tallies with *the Revelation* of the Existence of God, and all His commandments harmonize most admirably with His Attributes, whilst, as the results of human experience during accumulated centuries, they support the closest rational inquiry. There, then, is the Law of Moses, the Law that the Lord Jesus left untouched.

It was a remarkable event when, towards the middle of the eighteenth century, Warburton levelled at Theology the batteries of his deep erudition, which had proved so serviceable against the philosophy of the day. The chariness of that inspiration, so very different from the many pretended revelations, was particularly insisted upon by him respecting the important doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. That doctrine, so well known to all antiquity, is indeed omitted, not that Moses did not believe in it, but because it formed no part of his dispensation or mission. The discrepancy between our views of Theology and those of Warburton does not require to be pointed out, but the similarity on some fundamental points is evident. This consists in so far, as on both sides it is maintained that Theology commits a deep error in admitting as *Revealed* certain conceptions of man respecting the ways of God. Warburton's views relating to *Duty* as requiring the Will of a superior, we would connect more directly with the primary Revelation, seeing in the Commandments of the Law merely a more positive direction pointed out to man, but a direction already warranted by experience.

With the Mosaic wonders and miracles our investigation has not to do, because the Trust admitted of in the Power and Wisdom and Goodness of God, can by no means be extended to what man relates of Him.

We own candidly that the Jewish miracles do not bear the same relation as regards consistency with the general doctrine, as do the Christian with the doctrine of Christ. Besides, the same miracles are said to have been performed by the Egyptian priests.

Although as a lawgiver and the founder of a future state, Moses constitutes one of the greatest features of ancient history, whilst as the link that unites Christianity with the world of Abraham, he is altogether unrivalled, yet we are far from admitting of his laws having been committed to papyrus, or to slips of wood; we believe them to have been engraven on stone, but the mystery of the graven stones which appear to have formed the first altar of the worship of the Eternal, according to Hebrew tradition, is very far from being cleared up.

Respecting the Jewish ritual we can only say that it has fallen before the words of Jesus, "*I will have mercy, and not sacrifice.*" Christianity, if we may be allowed at this point of our subject to allude thereto, appears to have re-established, though slowly and by degrees, the real character of sacrifice, which had been lost sight of in symbolical burnt offerings and mythic explanations. The *sacrifice* imposed on Man by the *Revelation of the Word*, can be no other than the *sacrifice of the passions and evil dispositions of human nature*. This sacrifice, which is not Asceticism, becomes always obligatory for the man who, believing in God, reposes his Trust in Him, and does not, cannot consider this terrestrial being as the term of his existence in Eternity. How far this Trust is enhanced by the mission of Christ needs no pointing out. And, moreover, an orderly state of things, and all the manifold advantages proceeding from thence, cannot fail to obtain the most unreserved consent of Reason.

Admitting, with Warburton, of the necessity of upholding by coercive measures the doctrine of the Unity of God in the midst of idolatry, we may appear to admit also of the justice of the violent measures to which the law had recourse. But we can only reason on that point with Christian notions, and *these admit of no man acting the part of God*. The part of man can never be performed as active devotion to God, unless Justice and Charity go hand in hand with Intelligence. Whether a scoundrel believes or not in the Unity of the Divinity, it will be, we verily think, of small avail, but as the expression of the Belief of a State, we apprehend that the matter is one of general importance. Now, in a State where "eye for eye and tooth for tooth" was the reigning principle, it may be questioned whether the minds were in sound harmony even from the beginning with the tenor of the Word of God, such as that Word appears to have been revealed, and such as it certainly was *again* in Christ. In admitting of theological coercion on the ground of the Nature of God, as the Hebraic law commanded, we are not guilty of inconsistency in refusing it to obtain in Christianity, in any other way than in ejecting from the rites the man who does not believe in God. But he is not the less bound to conform his conduct to those Commands which Christianity has inherited from Judaism, and which form a crown of Rationalism as they form a guide to duty. Human Will remains unshackled still, for the Laws thus termed the Laws of God, constitute the very essence of human experience as the only social bonds of society.

But, is there nothing wanting? Did the Mosaic mission answer fully to the wants of the moral and intellectual principles of the human mind, to those first principles of Wisdom and Goodness contained in the

Word of God? Fervid devotion and undoubting Faith, expressed in ascetic and mystic guise, may testify of ecstatic delight, and such were certainly the delights of the Jewish believer; but Hope, Joy, and Resignation, Consolation in affliction, Strength to endure, and Courage to persevere in the right road during the dark hours of life, such are the delights of the Christian. For the standard of Faith is higher in Christianity; the criterion is nearer approached; Intelligence is better enlightened in Christianity, for there man is taught not to judge of things by mere appearances; not to believe that he who suffers is abandoned by his God; not to think that the Cross is a sign of reprobation and infamy when the inward man walks with God.

In upholding Judaism as absolutely superior to what is termed Natural Theology, and which includes all Symbolism and Mythology, it is as a stepping-stone to Christianity that we conceive it to have existed, and its existence to have been linked with the knowledge of God, with the *Revelation of His Word*. *There* is the standard; *there* is the criterion, and not the emotional and ecstatic feelings of the believer, however vivid. We have seen that there can exist no doubt respecting the very high antiquity in Hindustan of a religion which invited above all things to Goodness, which spoke of Mercy, which spared cows and other animals, and even flies, and yet—burnt men and women. The religious sentiment which prompts its votary to issue forth with a veil over his or her head, in order not to offend the Deity by the otherwise inevitable destruction of microscopic insects hovering around them, cannot for a moment support the gaze of Reason, whilst the Divine Laws issued by Moses can support the brunt of the strictest investigation. Those

Commands were no attempts "at forestalling the industry of future ages by premature theories and creeds;" it was no metaphysical idolizing of notions as entities. Such commands may court the scrutiny of experience, and far from arresting mental progress constitute the very basis of morality as "*informing the duty.*"

The Mosaic Law comprised undoubtedly numerous ordinances, such as sacrifices, purifying, and other ceremonies, and the worship of the Hebrews has been considered as almost made up of Sacraments. This is the part of Theology. This is what the Lord Jesus denounced by simplifying and reducing the Law and the Prophets to "*love our neighbor as ourselves.*" Here the Commandments are evidently pointed out; for to deprive our fellow-creature of Life is *murder*; to bereave him of his property is *Theft*, and to seduce his consort is *Adultery*. Now, if it has been asserted that "the Law was given by Moses, but that Grace and Truth came by Jesus Christ," (John i. 7,) this must allude to the greater generality of the latter doctrine, in which Man was appealed to in a manner altogether peculiar; in a manner which, leaving him perfectly free to act, yet struck Idolatry a mortal blow. Without these imperative Commands all religious Rites would be perfectly senseless, and it is their complete harmony with all that man can express of Power and Wisdom and Goodness as practical morality, as the link of human society especially, that allows of their being termed the Laws of God.

It is requisite to insist on this point, because the Law of God and the Laws of Science have been confounded, on account of the same term being used to express the relative condition of things as Laws; and as Commands, thus issued and enforced, are really *civil*

laws, although Divine *inasmuch as they really harmonize* with the Word of God (His Name or Attributes), and constitute at the same time the clearest dictates of Reason and Experience. The Commands as Laws of God are as perfectly rational as any law of Science can be, for although as the links of society they preceded Moses, yet his adopting them as Laws of God testifies most obviously of his views respecting the nature of Man's union with God, and may be forcibly insisted upon as a proof of Divine Inspiration. Scientific laws of the day were also adopted by Moses as by other lawgivers, but as such laws were very varying in value according as they were more or less efficacious, they were altered or became obsolete, although fasts were strictly preserved. But the Commandments of God, although well known by experience, were not the less *Divine*, for they were, and remain, far more absolute than the laws of science in respect of society and social intercourse. The regulations respecting Lepers and other persons affected with diseases resembling Leprosy, without forming a part of the Divine Law, were nevertheless considered as dependent on the Levites for execution.

The laws of God, it has been said, are the laws of Science; those have been admitted by some as far more absolute than what in Christianity is termed a Divine Law. We have already had occasion to point out the distinction that separates the Commands or Laws of God from the Laws of Nature and of Science, these latter taken in the sense of the positive or relative condition of things as recognized by Intelligence. In the first, although perfectly agreeable to experience as completely rational, yet man is the master to obey or not. He can rob, and murder, but "he cannot add one inch to his stature;" physical conditions find his

Will totally powerless ; molecular reactions heed him not, and organization follows its laws without his Will being taken into account. The Clergy, whose action is especially destined to stimulate the human Will and to turn the mind to God, can only preach to willing hearers. But never can the pulpit become the chair of the scientific professor. The common weal may be benefited by an appeal to the energy of the auditory in general, if something more definite is expressed than prayers and formularies. Charity sermons are in general rendered very effective by strong and well-directed appeals to the heart. And it is in that sense alone that we should wish to see the Clergy appeal to the Intelligence of their auditory, as well as to their energy, in days of danger and distress. Nor do we deny Prayer ; but if towards God it behooveth Man to humble himself, it is still more on account of the energy we believe it imparts to him that prays. Circumstances too often occur in which all human action is hopeless ; but then the prayer is one of submission, and, *Lord, Thy Will be done!* is the only appropriate one.

The very precise rules of conduct prescribed by the Law to the Hebrews, and in comparison to which the Christian Worship, even theological, must appear lax and remiss, proceeded, it is well known, from the circumstances in which they were placed. Christianity endeavors to regulate men's conduct not only by admitting of the Commandments, but by implanting Christian principles instead of laying down exact rules of outward conduct. In all likelihood, it was the utter uselessness of such rules when become habitual, that caused the Apostles to act thus. And yet the Romanists insist greatly on such outward acts ; and as to the Catholic Clergy itself, its beads and fixed moments of

prayer are altogether the same as those of the Buddhist Clergy.

The fear of God was the spring of Judaism, but the reward or punishment was of this world. This deep distinction between the Mosaic dispensation and the surrounding religions of the Idolaters is considered, we have seen, by Warburton, as a most peculiar mark and as a sign of genuineness. To this we assent, but in pointing to a higher criterion. Christianity, according to theologians, inspires the fear of the Devil; and here if Theology, and not Reason directed, the advantage might appear to be on the side of Judaism. But as it was merely the certitude of Immortality, of which the proof had been given them, that inspired the Apostles with courage after the destruction of all their hopes, so it is Immortality that constitutes the Spring of Christianity. We repeat, however, a preceding remark. The judgment of the soul with the *body*, after the Resurrection, admits of a very rational interpretation, and which is at once simple and distinctive of all Heathenism. The judgment of the *Soul* in the *Flesh* evidently signifies that the Spirit of Man will be judged according to the acts of the body: that the *body* is to be judged, meaning this *Life*. As to the Devil, of whom the Jewish tongue was so prolix in the days of Christ, that phraseology is entirely Chaldean, and can be accounted for by perfectly rational causes. That cause of error well understood, it can no longer be said that the fear of Hell is Christian. We must rise up to the source, to the mission of Moses, to know the purer tongue. Hell is a Persian conception. Reward and Punishment are the real meanings as future. The Fear of God is then no less the spring of Christianity than that of Judaism viewed in its primary or true conditions, in order to be compared



thereto. But in Christianity the very act, the very boon, the very Grace granted therein to human weakness, speaks of Mercy and Divine Goodness, and invites to *Trust*.

The summary of the preceding inquiries may be thus presented. Man, at the period of his first appearance in the world, was made acquainted with the Existence of a Supreme Being, as the Father Almighty, made known by His Word or Name expressing All-powerful, wise and good. These attributes, impressed in a peculiar manner on the mind of Man through the senses, became the road, the line of duty, and disobedience was the contrary path; but this did not merely involve Faith in One as the Almighty Father, it was also required that human intercourse should prevail according to that standard, and in proportion with the succeeding states of society, as Husband, Father, and Chief; or Wife, Mother, and Mistress. Herder, one of the greatest philosophers of the eighteenth century, although a theologian, maintains that the narrative respecting Adam and his disobedience, is merely an allegorical mode of announcing that which should occur to every man, who, born innocent, is tempted by woman, and sins. The temptation, more especially limited to Adam, is defined by St. Augustin, who, with many other theologians, supposes it to have been the height of disobedience in man to have conformed himself to the relation in which the Creator placed him by bestowing on him a companion of another sex.

Even in Scripture no other commands excepting those of multiplying, and ruling the Earth are enjoined beyond the *knowledge of God*, so that if in His Word or Name there did not exist a positive injunction of acting according to what was conceived analogous to

the Word, in short, to Wisdom and Virtue, it would be impossible to say what is meant by men acting right and wrong. If, in maintaining that Man received no other instruction from God than the knowledge of His Existence under given Attributes as the Word, we appear to some to be accusing God of leaving him in too weak a state, we would remind such persons of the positive fact of that being all that is known respecting the first steps of Man in civilization, and that Human *Will* is thus left entirely *free*. We are generally told, it is true, that the most probable conclusion of the case is, that man, when first created, or very shortly afterwards, was advanced by the *Creator himself* to a state above that of a mere savage. This has been alleged to obviate all difficulties, but it creates insuperable ones. That man could not have *made* himself, is always appealed to as a proof of a Divine Creator, but leaving the perfect being out of the question, as many with Schelling suppose Man to have been, as also the opinion of his being a kind of ourang-outang or large baboon, the question always remains the same as to the manner in which he, the first man, came to know of God. An ingenious and learned friend, Sir Robert Carswell, who, maintaining the *à posteriori* conception of God to be the most probable, conceives the *suggestion* as revealed to be beyond all human reach of Thought, and therefore untenable, has forcibly remarked to us that Man, when he first appeared on Earth and had become a Father, must necessarily have known that he had no Father on Earth, and must have sought in Heaven for him. We own the opinion to be very plausible, and we conceive it to have more real value as an *à posteriori* argument than all Teleological ones. It would be primitive, and what is more, it would harmonize with the name which evidently

was, if not the first, one of the first names of God, the Father Almighty. Now, in whatever mode the knowledge of the Existence of God was conveyed to our first parents, undoubtedly their peculiar situation on Earth, so very different from ours that it makes them appear like supernatural beings, since they were neither conceived nor born, must have struck them when they had children, and yet it might not have struck them. But when the *suggestion was given*, the proof was there, and no doubt remained; whilst to admit of a supposition as having been the *primum mobile*, the starting point of the knowledge of the Father Almighty, would not account for the fervor of the Faith in God of the primary race. And still less would it tally with any consecutive or subsequent appeal, with a renewal of the same, even restricting such appeal and such a renewal to the mission of Moses, and the Advent of the Lord Jesus, admitting at the same time as a criterion of such secondary facts a full conformity of nature with the primary, denying all to be such wherein Wisdom and Goodness were not clearly discernible.

We maintain that the knowledge of the Existence of One God can be traced to the highest antiquity, but limiting that knowledge to the primary race, it certainly becomes a matter of much difficulty to speak of the mode in which it was imparted to our first parents. The only rational way of proceeding is, we apprehend, that of tracing a connection, a link between such a knowledge, as it seems to have appeared at first, and as it manifested itself in later times. Now, to admit of the human mind being adequate to the task, at first, precludes altogether the denial of the mind's preserving the same adequacy at a later period. Therefore if that knowledge can be proved to have

been limited to the first races, and to have degenerated in consequence of the human mind endeavoring to reason upon the *notion* of God, whilst at given periods events occur where an appeal is made to some primary fact relating to that notion, events which show themselves independent of the mind of man, the connection cannot relate to a mere conception of our first parents, but to a communication. It may appear very natural to admit that they must have perceived that they themselves had no parents, and thus have been assured of their possessing a Father in Heaven, a Father Almighty, a Creator; but this would not account for the Attributes or the Name of God; and still less, we repeat, would it tally with subsequent conceptions, or with subsequent mysterious appeals to a primary communication or Revelation.

Such a communication is, according to Theology, a matter of commonplace, which leaves human Will without any adequate expression even in error. But let the Revelation be limited to the knowledge of the Word, and that Word be adopted as the standard of Faith, as the criterion of all future appeal, and we shall then possess in the Name of God a proof of the nature of the communication by means of the harmony and concord which evidently exist in all the future appeals.

This view leaves ample space for all opinions relative to the real meaning of the longevity attributed to the first race of Man. Eight or nine centuries may or may not be considered as relating to a race, and not to one man's longevity. We have nothing to do with that. All we aim at proving is, that with respect to religious worship there did not exist for an immense period of time any other rallying point for Religion besides the WORD, or the Divine Attributes

expressed in the Name of Him who was revealed as the Almighty. Theology gets rid of the difficulty by admitting of distinct revelations being made to each patriarch or father (chief) of a tribe, instead of admitting of the existence of a general rule. Even Enoch's Faith is a deep mystery for Theology, because he is said to have walked with God. And this, we have seen, was construed by St. Paul into the sense "of having believed in the Existence and Goodness of God." Moreover, we again appeal to the matter of fact stated in the Bible, of the first introduction of Idolatry as relating to men beginning "to call themselves by the Name of the Lord." (Genesis, ch. iv. 26.)

Unfortunately the Reformation, instead of laying down as a principle that Scripture contained the Word of God, or that the Word of God is in the Bible, followed the track already traced by Theology, both Jewish and Romanist, that of making the Bible itself, and not the Almighty, the Revelation; so that no revelation would have existed before Moses. Warburton has inflicted on Theology a chastisement she so richly deserved, for making Judaism the real starting point of every thing; and that Theology was the result of Protestantism, no less than of Romanism.

We maintain then, that Idolatry and all Polytheism either symbolic or mythic, although it may be said to have arose in accordance with the bent of human nature, was a deviation from true religion, because instead of worshipping the Almighty as he was manifested to Man; instead of following the road pointed out in His Word or Name (All Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness), they symbolized Him, and worshipped the symbol; beginning by comparing Fire to His Spirit, the Sun to His Eye, and adoring the sign. Now, we maintain with many, not only that acts of

Wisdom and Intelligence, of Goodness and Mercy, are the real worship, and that such are realized by following the Divine Commands as Moses taught, and as the Lord Jesus revealed anew to Man, but that we possess in Christianity a real, positive beginning of the true rational religion, which only requires to be freed from Theology and Superstition to flourish afresh. But are then the former conceptions of Man all lies? The answer of the day is that they are merely figurative modes of thought, and either subjective or objective, being inadequate in all to express what God is. Therefore we admit that artificial forms of that kind, and dogmas proceeding therefrom are all true *for a time*. This we admit because we find rational proof of the Revelation of the knowledge of the Existence of the Almighty and of His having been known only as the Word. Science at first was merged in Religion and Religion can never do without Science. It is not that Religion is swallowed up by Science; it is merely a progressive conception that is substituted for a preceding one. The Divine Laws are the tried essences of Knowledge and of Goodness. But the individual application bears an appearance of something foreign, which rational investigation shows to be fallacious. To say that scientific cultivation is the only means of maturing the religious sentiment, is only taking in view the Intelligence; but, as all know, Instruction and Education are two things. But even Education can be dispensed with provided the positive dictates of human Experience, matured by hundreds of centuries and termed the *Laws of God*, be early and sedulously inculcated. These are no mere theories; they are not creeds; they constitute neither entities as Symbols, nor entities as Myths. Progress may be made in the field

of Religion as applied, or rather as finite attempts at application of the Divine Laws.

The grounds of Faith, Hope, and Duty are all to be found *in the Revelation of the Existence of the Father Almighty, made known as the Word*. But the Divine Laws or Commands of Moses are dictates resulting from practical experience of Wisdom and Goodness under thousands of various circumstances. They harmonize with the Word, and in that harmony resides the strength of our argument in favor of the Divine Mission of Moses. Moreover, unless the Word be admitted as an appeal from the beginning there would exist, we repeat, no *duty*, and consequently no positive Religion before Moses. Now we are told that men fell away from God, which can only mean that they followed their own conceptions respecting Him, and not the plain, simple path held forth in that Word.

Here we do not say merely that Faith takes up the problem where knowledge leaves it. The Faith we allude to is no transcendental view superadded to Science by the Spirit of Religion, thus bringing near the distant, making continuous the temporary, and the finite, infinite. Divine Faith, we repeat again and again, is Trust in the Almighty revealed *as such*; so that seeing Evil we yet believe in His Word; and Religion or His Worship can only be true when carried out according to that Word. The distinguishing mark of the Mission of Moses is that which so forcibly attracted the attention of Warburton. It is a rallying point between the primary Revelation of the Word, and the renewal of that Revelation in Christ. The Nature and Ways of the Father Almighty are placed by this very fact above all human conception, leaving alone to Theology His Attributes as her standard and aim.

## OF CHRISTIAN FAITH.



I and my Father are one.

ST. JOHN, x. 30.

CHRISTIANITY involves strict Theism. The unity of the Son and the Father constitutes the connection between *the Revelation*, or communication to Man of God's existence, and His revelation in Christ. Duality is completely precluded by the declaration of the Holy Spirit. The Unity of the Trinity is the real test of the worth of Christianity. Is that Unity congenial with that great and peculiar fact in the history of Mankind on Earth—*the Revelation*? Are the Attributes of Almighty Power and Wisdom and Goodness diminished by the Christian dispensation? Does the long expected Messiah lay claim to any particle of Deity distinct from the Almighty? Does Christianity stand the brunt of these searching questions? It does. And moreover, the manner in which the Unity of the Trinity is asserted, is so very distinct from what we know of the incarnations of the Hindoo divinities, as to support all the investigations so requisite in matters of such difficulty. As to the question whether Christianity does, or does not, inculcate doctrines in conformity with such as existed in some pristine state of



society preceding Sabeism and Mazdeism and the Mosaic dispensation, that question is unanswerable in the present state of human knowledge, for, as we have proved on another occasion, the Zend texts of the Parsees only refer to the reformed religion of Zoroaster, as it existed by mutual consent in the century which preceded the final conquest of Persia by the Arabians.

When we cite among the various proofs of the primary Monotheistic belief of men, the common language of the most polytheistic nations, as well as that of the nations where a form of worship less multifarious existed, we do not adduce that circumstance in order to say that Monotheism was therefore in their thoughts. The visible symbol and the mental myth were equally pernicious from the very earliest period. Natural symbols certainly preceded symbols made by the hands of men, but subjective or mental notions of that Great Being revealed as the Almighty or perhaps the Father, which is God, must have preceded even symbolism, because all these symbols, we have seen, bear names indicative of Power and Wisdom and Goodness, for the term *Al* has the same meaning as *Tat* and *Am*. These remarks naturally do not extend further than our own race, but limited within their natural boundaries they are, we believe, of positive value. The peculiar form of the Jewish dialect at the period of Christ's mission among men is by no means divested of its relative bearings from its having been made the medium of divine communication. The medium, it is true, was of a finite nature, and the Mediator, although distinct by the peculiarities of His birth from Man in general, wore however the human body and was Man. Now although of all monotonous repetitions that of a Truism is the most irksome, we really have no other alternative, especially in a matter

where argument is out of the question. Did men change their nature on the Advent of Christ, or was the finite nature of man adopted? We believe the latter to have been the case, and yet we hesitate in our conclusions, for we perceive on all sides evident signs of a general persuasion that the language used by Jesus was not the language of the form He had assumed. Every one, we own, has the right to admit the contrary. Every one may consider such language and such expressions, as not partaking of a finite nature, but as divine and distinct from human. Devout submission did indeed adopt that course for a time, but the number of its adherents has greatly decreased. Still, to those Christians who persevere in believing that in Christ nothing human existed, we must fain remark that the circle in which such opinions found an echo is growing every generation more and more narrow.

The truth of Christianity is indeed perfectly distinct from the various forms of expression used by men at different periods in order to express their various conceptions. The basis of Christianity is the *revelation of the existence of God*, and the Unity of Christ with God is the criterion of the worth of the doctrine. We have fully stated our reasons for maintaining that the loose manner in which the term *inspiration* was made to stand as tantamount to *Revelation* must ever prove a fertile source of confusion. All our efforts have been limited to those heads, under which we have attempted to adduce to our mind full proof of *the fact*, that Man left to himself knows not of God, and that He is only known as the Almighty. In that revelation is the whole point. *The Revelation* contains the whole pith of Divine Faith, and the Advent of Christ is a boon granted to man's weakness, but it is a boon which did not, which has not nullified

the sad grant of Free Will made to Man by his Maker, and by which he is ever going astray, ever considering his conceptions as matters of Faith. When the *Eman-cipation of Faith* shall be effected, then the Christian will cease to consider *human expressions* as matters of Divine Faith. They certainly must be believed, but *that belief is of the same kind as rational Faith and is conditional*. The mystery of Form is involved in the mystery of the Existence of the thing. "Prove it to me mathematically that God exists," exclaimed an Atheist, "and I will believe." But it is not requisite to array numbers in any given order to prove the fact, for mathematics are in themselves merely the relations of number, and number is conditional on the existence of things. And if it be answered that the higher mathematics are merely mental abstractions, and exist without the existence of things, that answer corroborates the view taken of mathematics, as entirely conditional, unless they have nothing to do with the intellect that brings them forth. The proof of a Maker is then equivalent to a mathematical proof, and that proof exists in the very notion of the Almighty, of the Maker, which does not exist in the human mind, neither as innate nor as a conception of the nature of the arts and sciences, and this point we believe has been fully elucidated.

Nothing is more natural than the tenacity with which men cling to beliefs which, if erroneous, they conceive must draw along with them to the ground their Faith in God. Here lies the great art of Superstition, which endeavors to unite with Divine Faith or Trust in God various human conceptions to which the same value is falsely attributed. But when once it shall be well understood that the grounds of Divine Faith are constituted by the very fact of their being quite distinct

from the speculations of the human mind, then such a union will be impossible, and matters which appear positive truths may turn out to be errors without our Faith in God being weakened thereby. It happens with Christianity, as with the knowledge of God, men immediately ran after some *Will o' the wisp* which they took for the true light, and it grieves them to own that they are finite beings, when they discover the truth. So long as Ignorance held the helm, every conception of apparent value was esteemed as an inspiration, as a gift of God, and to disprove that conception was to disprove God. It would certainly be very desirable if things took that course, and truth appeared spontaneously, and, as it were, of itself. But when the question comes to be one which relates to human nature, and Christ during his stay on earth, for he was Man although a manifestation of the Almighty, we must expect to meet with the forms inherent in human nature. We must expect that the vehicle by means of which men communicate their thoughts should bear the stamp of the times in which Jesus appeared. The Christian Revelation spoke a language natural to the Jews. Evil was expressed by the term in use, that of Devil, and all acts in which God was conceived to be concerned were performed by the agency of angels; even the stirring-up of a pool of water (Bethsaida) was said to be the work of an angel. The vital and essential truth of Christianity is the Unity of Christ with the Almighty. The boon, it may be said, might have been granted in another manner. But we are no judges of the ways of Him only known as the Almighty. Human language, which is the image of the mind, will always be found to be more or less of an imaginary turn. It is this peculiar character which, imprinted on the Gospel, causes it to wear the stamp

of Truth. It is the same with the relation given of the Mosaic dispensation.

The truism which is so irksome, and which is received with a Pshaw! every one knows that; every one is aware that the inconceivable nature of God must be lowered to the level of human weakness if the Deity is manifested in human nature,—that truism wears quite another aspect when it is insisted upon in order to account for a language which in later times appears in the light of a deception. It is here, as in all the paths of knowledge, where it is not sufficient to believe that we are in the right in order to be sure of never obtaining the conviction that we were mistaken. Such fallibility may be very discouraging, but such is human nature. And should it be said that such a proceeding compromises the truth of the Deity, since a deception, or at least an illusion, is practised upon the belief of Man, we should appeal to the Truism of the communication having occurred in human form. The truth of the Revelation is therefore no more impaired, than the truth of the conditional character of humanity or Mankind. We beg pardon for continually recurring to the nature of our knowledge of God. He is only known as the Almighty, and is beyond all analogy except that of Power and Wisdom and Goodness, in which Supreme Attributes we *trust*; but do not presume to fathom them. But the Christian dispensation is only new inasmuch as men are given to understand that the path hitherto taken was the wrong one. The bettering of human nature, the amelioration and regeneration are left to be carried out by the usual way; that of stumbling before we can rise superior. The peculiar state of intelligence of the men among whom Christ appeared required the adaptation of a language by means of which Christianity

could be conveyed to their mind. But because that language was adapted to their peculiar state of intelligence, it neither follows that it was making use of deceit, or that whilst we carefully avoid altering it, we are to consider it otherwise than a means employed in former days to render the communication possible and effective.

The doctrine of Free Inquiry, and the right of private judgment still remains the Palladium of Christianity, for it has become the right of all; and it is in virtue of this doctrine that we are ready to lay down our lives in order to insure to our adversaries the free exercise of their religion. It no longer constitutes a mere Protestant doctrine, for the Romanist resorts nowadays to it, as readily as the Dissenter. And we even find clergymen at variance with the tenets of their own Church having recourse to this sheet anchor of Toleration. The very term Reformation is tantamount to Latitudinarianism, at least it has been proved to be so by experience, although every reformer, every dissenter, every seceder seems to believe that his system has attained perfection, and therefore extols it as the surest resting-place of Faith. The cry of "*the Bible and nothing but the Bible*" was adopted, and since maintained, upon the faith in that fatal error of Luther, that he was scholar enough to expound what no one else had expounded, and that everybody was to believe him. But such an assertion, repeated by Calvin in favor of his own views, was nothing else than asserting what we all deny to Rome, infallibility. That infallibility, it is true, was more personal than the infallibility of Rome, for each pretended by dint of investigation and inquiry to have discovered the opinions of the primitive Christians. Now, even admitting that the views of the primitive Christians could be adopted

in quite another order of things, how is it possible that what is still a matter of discussion in the nineteenth century, should have been deemed a matter of divine Faith in the sixteenth? Reformed Christianity without Latitudinarianism is the sea without water, or mid-day without a sun in the Heavens. The road our forefathers adopted was that of Latitudinarianism, the very monster that they all attempted in vain to exorcise. Investigation, discussion, purification, and simplification were the principles they laid claim to, and each reformer considered himself as acting rationally in giving *his Reform* as the last limits where men could go. For three hundred years the same error has been committed. Tillotson was a latitudinarian, and so was Dr. Burnet, until their stations in the Church silenced the fanatics of their own doctrine. Why not admit at once that the road was ill chosen? Are we bound to persist in a path which is in reality a path of error? for it is one that points to infallibility, and never leads thereto. Let Faith in God be emancipated from Science; let the *ignis fatuus* of Reason be no longer followed as the foundation of Divine Faith, which can only rest on the wide basis of *the Revelation* of the Almighty. There no Latitudinarianism can haunt the path followed by the Christian, but so long as Theology is the measure of Faith, and lays claim to *Infallibility*, that evil Spirit cannot be laid. *The Word of God*, that admits of no latitude beyond its precise limits, is *the Revelation of the Existence of the Almighty*. In that great and awful event all Divine Faith is concentrated, and the Bible is the true expression of that eventful fact. But those expressions require interpretation; and explanation without the requisite latitude is impossible, for no one has the right to impose his exegesis on another. We may believe our own or any

particular interpretation, and maintain our opinion, whilst we tolerate contending views, but the stain of latitudinarianism, in one's own party, can only be avoided by limiting the doctrine to its narrowest expression. In limiting Divine Faith to the Revelation of the Almighty, and Christian Faith to the Unity of Christ in God and His Holy Spirit, all the great difficulties of Christianity are comprised therein, and are at the same time cleared up, for no discussion can ensue. The doctrine of Free Will and the self-agency of man is involved in *the revelation of the Existence of God*, who, as distinct from Man, His creature, does not allow of any human reasoning upon His nature.

Now, as there exists no place for reasoning respecting Him who is revealed as Almighty, and beyond all human notions, the Calvinist and the Jansenist cannot reason on His nature, for we admit that when once engaged in such discussion the issue can be no other than Predestination. But to fix upon such questions as the subject matter of human reason, and then to deny all latitude, or not to admit full latitude, would elicit a laugh, were it not that the blood such discussions have caused to be shed, draws forth a sigh of despair. Let Divine Faith be emancipated from Science, and let it be considered as the only criterion to which men can refer, and the doctrine of the Trinity receives a ready interpretation by the Unity with God which is the very doctrine of Christ, and tallies most accurately with the Existence of the Almighty. The doctrine of the Trinity is not especially a Christian doctrine: it is the *Unity of the Trinity* that is especially Christian. But so long as Theology is upheld as the standard of Faith will Latitudinarianism take place in every sect, for it is basing religion on human conceptions.



*Divine Faith* consists in the admission that God is the Almighty because He was revealed as such ; it is the trusting in Him as the Supreme Being, and *Christian Faith* is the Unity of Christ with the Almighty. The modern school of Rationalists vainly seek to avoid Theology in admitting that God is a human conception. They begin by admitting what Science (not Theology) can prove to be an error, and they admit at the same time the competence of the human mind to erect a Deity. And as on such grounds the right of private judgment must flourish and grow luxuriant, they would have as many Gods as opinions. Some say we will do without a God ; and let them try. They will soon find that the knowledge of God cannot be erased ; that it is the leaven which gives life and vigor to every thought and action. It is a living stream which must flow in its right channel, which cannot be suppressed. Superstition may be suppressed, Faith in God never. Theology is the root of superstition, not Divine Faith. Men who deny God are often superstitious. The man who trusts in God as the Almighty accounts for every thing according to the light afforded him by that Being revealed to his forefathers, and whose knowledge alloyed and debased by symbolism and mythism has been transmitted to him. Clear away the dross, and the pure gold will remain. Or, if symbolism and mythism must remain, as it is probable, do not at least consider them as matters of Divine Faith. They are human conceptions, and as such are latitudinarian. Proclaim the Emancipation of Faith from Science and human conception : you at once place that deepest, highest principle beyond the reach of latitudinarianism : you proclaim the nature of the link which unites God and Man : you proclaim the impossibility of en-

tering into any details respecting Him who was revealed as the Almighty.

But as long as that great event, the Revelation of God, is classed under the same name, *revelation*, with thousands of *inspirations*, which take indeed their source from this primary fount, it will be vain to seek for stability. It is not sufficient to go up to primitive Christianity: it is the very nature of the link between God and Man that must be inquired into. It is the union of Christ with that fountain-head that gives strength and vitality to Christianity. But attempt to explain that Unity; consider the term *incarnation* as an explanation, instead of an attempt at explanation, or a mode of expression, and you launch at once your bark into the stormy waters of discussion, where *latitudinarianism* is an indispensable issue.

When Luther held out to the wild Anabaptists of Germany the *Book*, as an answer to all their questions; when he pointed to the Bible, as to the means of acquiring certitude, he was met, we are told, by the cry of Bible! Babel! which too clearly indicated the real nature of the case, and the inefficacy of the remedy. And yet on this ground has Reformation planted her standard. It is on the very soil of latitudinarianism that rational beings expect to avoid it. It is on this hot-bed of turmoil and dispute that it is attempted to erect the temple of Peace. The infallibility which is denied, and rightly denied, to human conception, as Romanism, is admitted as Judaism, clothed in the garb of Lutheranism or Calvinism.

The assertion on which our forefathers, the reformers, attempted to ground the position they adopted against Rome, assertion which maintained the Bible to be the infallible word of God, and the rule of their faith and obedience, required at least to be expressed

in a manner which did not admit of the everlasting contention which has arisen, and which still arises, respecting interpretation of texts. For, we repeat, not only do the same texts serve to support contrary propositions, but also each party steps forward with texts in great number on any given subject, and they advance them without hesitation as the word of God. Are we not entitled to the privilege of our own great doctrine, the right of private judgment? and if Experience proves, as it did against Rome, that the path our forefathers adopted leads to error, are we bound to continue? Why not reserve the great epithet of the Word of God to *the Revelation of His Existence*, and to the Grace afforded to Man by His Revelation renewed in Christ? In so doing, the *would be* rational considerations of the Lutheran and the Calvinist respecting Grace, by means of which a scheme of Fatalism and Predestination is broached, by means of which men dare arraign and decide of Him whom they only know of as the Almighty, would at once be exploded. All that we require is that an end should be put to such loose interpretations; for when once the point is decided as to what part, and which particular subject, constitutes the Word of God in the Bible, we may then hope that by degrees scraps of Holy Writ will cease to be bandied about as the Word of the Lord by opposing parties. No other change is requisite. It is only an attempt at precision, where it has been too much neglected, on the plea of impossibility. But as such impossibility arises, if not entirely, at least principally, from the general use of allegory and imagination, which are inherent in the human mind, it would be merely acting on rational principles to seek for *infallibility* on some other ground.

Allegorical interpretation, however great its value

when no other is admitted (for then it is unanswerable), loses all worth as an infallible truth, when private or individual judgment becomes authorized. The right of allegory once made universal, the most acute interpreter carries off the palm. No Protestant can question but that many Christian legends of the first centuries were deliberate forgeries, issued for the express purpose of working on the popular mind. Here then it is not the imagination merely that arrayed truth in the garb of fiction, but deceit was considered as a virtue, since men were thus induced to become Christians. This principle of pious fraud is still adduced by the Romanists, in order to justify many acts, which admit (on their own avowal) of no other justification. They are enthralled by the errors of their predecessors, and persevere in error because they dare not own that fraud has been, and is still, practised. The spurious gospels, or accounts of the lives of the Saviour and the Apostles, were of this kind, and appear to have passed off for a time as sacred, for they still continue in Catholic countries to be objects of popular belief, although the task of purging the New Testament was executed by the Roman prelates. The lives of the Saints and Martyrs were all composed in early times in this spirit of fiction, the real aim of which was to awaken religious belief. The various beliefs termed heretical followed the same plan, and are personifications of their feelings and opinions. Miracles were then in great request, and every sect made use of them as unanswerable arguments, until the practice fell into general discredit, because it was perceived to be no real test of the worth of the doctrine.

In the first centuries, the primitive Christians do not appear to have divested themselves entirely of the conceptions of their times, when they embraced Chris-

tianity by believing Jesus the Christ to be the Redeemer, the Mediator. The Essenians and Gnostics entered into the religion destined to regenerate mankind, without renouncing their tendency towards asceticism and mysticism; and it is well known that many of the Jews who became Christians still persisted in the practice of Circumcision on their children, according to the Jewish rites. These were more particularly termed Nazarenes. Such was the appellation of the Christian community of Jerusalem which had taken refuge at Pella, and which bore with them their unabated reverence for the law. That reverence only decayed insensibly, for their final separation from their Jewish ancestors only took place 120 years after Christ, or indeed when they nominated as their bishop Marcus, a Gentile by birth. The Christian Jews or Ebionites, who remained at Pella, persevered in the obstinate rejection of all Greek Scripture, such as the writings of St. Paul, and are supposed to have abided by the original Hebrew Gospel of St. Matthew. All further account has perished, but still, in the mountains of Abyssinia, at the present day there exist evident traces of this primitive Christianity, in which the tenets of Judaism are blended with those of Christianity. These remarks have reference to the opinion now so very general among Protestants, that the only means of obtaining unity would be to embrace the principles of the primitive Christians; for if no better plan can be adopted, such an opinion being a sheer impossibility and altogether visionary, it would be the admission that Christianity is a dead letter, instead of being a living Spirit, that of the Almighty, divulged by Him in Christ, and fully adequate to bear the severest scrutiny of Reason, although the human conceptions thereof may be expressed in terms apparently at variance.

The conceptions of the Jews and Gentiles that embraced Christianity were not, and they could not be identical, although to each the Messiah was Jesus the Christ. These conflicting principles operated from the very beginning, when the Apostles were divided at a time respecting the *elect*. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, since thousands became Christians during the life of Jesus, i. e., believed in Him as the promised Messiah, but it was a belief somewhat different in the Samaritan and the Jew, and still more so in the Greek, and Babylonian, and Egyptian. Nor could the belief of those who had witnessed the miracles of Jesus be less fervent than that of those who were converted by the Apostles. The first Christians spoke of Christ, and glorified God. They made converts although they believed in something very different from what constituted Christianity at a later period. The abolition of idolatry among the Gentiles was linked with a belief in the visible erection of the throne of Christ, whilst the Jews expected to see Him drive the Romans from the Holy Land, for Jerusalem and the Temple were the seat of the Eternal. The Millennium was believed in, until the fatal term had expired, by very sound Christians. To talk of the simple scheme of Christianity before the Gospels were written, is appealing to the verbal teachings of many primary Christians, who were not immediate Apostles. The primitive constitution of the Christian community does not even appear to admit of the later division between the clergy and the laity, for that which Tradition relates respecting the church of Ephesus, where one of the seven deacons, Nicolas, is said to have taught and practised *communism*, is considered as having a character of individuality. The most *simple scheme* was that taught by St. John, the doc-

trine of mutual love and Christian affection, and yet the writer of the Apocalypse cannot be considered as devoid of Mysticism. At all events, the first Christians, those converted by Jesus Christ, scarcely appear to have been baptized, and assuredly the robber who believed in Jesus on the Cross, was admitted without baptism. At that time no previous examination or probation was required. The belief in the union of God and Christ was sufficient to be a Christian, when expressed in the belief that through God in Christ Mankind were to receive salvation or eternal life. This then appears to be the most *simple scheme* of Christianity. Here is primitive Christianity in all its purity.

The sacerdotal establishment, although very primitive and requisite, constitutes a subject of far greater doubt and obscurity. The great schism or heresy of the primitive Christians, arose respecting the Apostolic succession, for the Donatists required a purer faith than that which was generally admitted; they even went so far as to re-baptize the Christians that entered into *their church*. Sacerdotal domination, united with stern enthusiasm, expressed in paroxysms of intense devotion, characterize the Montanists. In both, the claim to higher perfection, the seclusion from the *vulgar herd* of Christians, prove that primitive Christianity found in its clergy much the same men that brought Rome in the sixteenth century to be denied by a great part of the Christian community. The primitive constitution of the Christian churches is only a subject of historical interest to those who do not maintain that Christianity can only be redeemed by a return to those doctrines; but at all events, excepting the Apostles themselves, no other authority was admitted than that of the Elders. And among the Apostles, St. Paul

evidently considers himself invested with the superintendence of all the churches which he had planted. The words of Christ respecting St. Peter may be admitted as a proof of that Apostle having been the Elder or Bishop of Rome, without however deducing from the admission of that event as a fact any peculiar right, beyond the secular advantage of being the Bishop of a City that issued forth her commands to all nations of the Earth. Besides, Rome once conquered by Christianity, that religion soon became predominant. We do not deny the corruptions of Rome in denying that it is possible to return to what is termed primitive Christianity. Those abuses have been admitted by Rome herself, since Rome introduced Reform when too late. The adoption of the opinions of the first Christians would in fact lead, we believe, to many errors. Rome at least would not suffer therefrom. Even the admission that the Bible *was* the Word of God, instead of that of saying that the Book *contains* the Word of God, was tantamount to admitting that the revisions and collations of Scripture executed in the first centuries of the middle ages by the Roman clergy constitute our only basis of Divine Faith. Without the pains and labors of the pious monks of those ages, we would not possess those very Books, the various interpretations of the texts of which have proved so fertile a source of bloodshed. It is not sufficient to reform our Faith, but Trust in God must, we apprehend, be emancipated from all undue trust in human means. The Emancipation of Faith, of Trust in God from all human conception, excepting the great fact of the Revelation of His Existence as the Almighty, can only procure, we believe, the long wished-for result, that of freeing Mankind from the thralldom of Theology.



The Reformation could not, nor did it, bring Unity. The rights of conscience, of free inquiry, and the principles of Toleration which obtained with mental freedom, occasioned rather the increase of doubt, of debate, and theological discussion. These, however, led the way to mutual concession in matters of Theology, and this hoped-for solution occurred in despite of the mutual rancor of the Reformers themselves. The only unshaken principles of union remained: the rights of conscience, of free inquiry, and the Bible as the Word of God, but all parties forget them in the hour of triumph. United by these principles in opposition to Rome, the Lutheran, the Calvinist and the Zwinglian were ever ready to forget them when others had recourse thereto. And it is a fact which requires no proof that all dissent from the theological tenets of these three principal branches of Protestantism, of which the Church of England is a result, has been met with arguments identical with those that Rome addressed to the Reformers. Nor can it be denied that blood has been shed by the latter in endeavoring to put down opinions that arose in consequence of the triumph of their own doctrines. Still the doctrine of the right of free inquiry and that of freedom of conscience, although they have proved to be a fertile source of strife, possess qualities of a redeeming nature, for Toleration arose from the continual appeal made to them on all sides.

Did the other great Protestant principle which admits of the Bible as the Word of God possess the same redeeming feature? If we may judge of the point in question by the theological discussions of the Reformers themselves, independently of the desperate revolts of the Anabaptists grounded upon interpretations of Holy Writ, free discussion on such matters never yet led to

Unity. Texts are daily produced in direct opposition to each other, and in a French work on History (Bucheze), in direct opposition to Scripture, we find hundreds of texts introduced from Holy Writ in order to maintain the author's anti-scriptural opinions. But the revolt of the Anabaptists may be considered in the light of a political and not as a theological event, for the German peasantry everywhere rose upon their feudal masters. Those peasants did not revolt as did the Reformers against Rome when coercion was the only answer they obtained. The Anabaptists had recourse to the sword and attempted to establish coercion. Still we do not deny that the unfortunate doctrine that rendered Holy Writ the only rule of Faith because it *was* the Word of God, and admitted that every one was a competent judge, was the real cause of the revolt.

As this doctrine still continues to be considered as the Palladium of Protestantism we shall devote some lines in order to examine into the truth of that opinion, for the subject is as fresh to-day as it was three hundred years ago. But at the present day experience has pronounced her verdict. And if, in the time of Luther, the open war declared by the Anabaptists to both Catholics and Reformers (who did not admit of their interpretation) acted decidedly against the doctrine of free interpretation, events have since occurred which prove the utter impossibility of maintaining as a doctrine the sweeping assertion that the Scriptures *are* the word of God. Arguing upon this principle "the Gospel," it is said, "was designed for persons of all capacities, and unless all persons of common sense are qualified to understand what the Lord requires of them, we must charge Almighty God with dealing unfairly with his creatures." On the other hand it is

answered that "for the bulk of the people, God hath appointed labor and business of another kind than the duties incumbent on a Christian minister, and as it is necessary that they should support themselves and their families, *their* duty is therefore to *hear*." This latter argument was the very same as that employed by the Romanists against the first Reformers, and especially against the doctrine which considered every man as having a right to judge for himself in matters evidently above his competence. Had it been merely admitted that the Scriptures *contained* the word of God, the object would then have been limited to indicating the points above all discussion. But to admit that every text was from God, was putting on human words the stamp of infallibility. So long as it was supposed that the interpretations of the *teachers* would be received as articles of faith, or until it became self-evident that errors existed, the veneration due to the sacred volume remained unimpaired. The various interpretations of certain mysteries such as that of the Trinity, the Atonement, and Justification, were admitted as sound, in the different communities or churches, but those who did not allow that interpretation of a particular mystery to be the true one were cast out of the church. Nor was this state of things peculiar to the Protestants, whose fundamental doctrines rejected the infallibility they laid claim to; the Catholics were no less busy in metaphysical doctrines and dogmas. In the 18th century, theological interpretation became rather less metaphysical, for Science began to pierce the gloom. It then began to be admitted that there were minglings of human conception, of human error with what was hitherto considered as divine truth. The whole odium of the condemnation of Galileo falls, it is true, on Rome, but we *really know*

that there still exist Reformed Christians who believe that the Sun turns round the Earth because Joshua is said to have stopped that luminary, and because the Jewish Chronicles speak of the Sun having turned his course backwards.

But theological learning, far from diminishing the difficulties of the position, has increased it. Criticism, which embraces within its extended circle, philology, geology, natural history, and many sciences formerly unknown, criticism meets with difficulties altogether irreconcilable with the old Protestant doctrine that the Bible *is* the word of God, for errors are discovered which prove their human origin. The profound researches thus necessitated in all branches of Science in consequence of the principle of attending to the interpretation of the divine Word, have not met with their due reward, the peace of mind of the searcher, because he expected too much. A task which requires the profoundest scholarship, and most various learning, must be buoyed up with hope of success, but the present state of things cannot last, for the actual condition of the intellect of the clergy of all the Protestant communities stands in direct opposition with that unfortunate principle of which we are now striving to point out the utter incompatibility with the actual state of knowledge. But the same experience that taught our forefathers to submit no longer to Rome, will at last point out the necessity of innovating on a principle of such vital importance to Christianity as that of attributing Divine Truth to terms which prove to be errors with respect to Science, though in perfect accordance with the science of the days in which they were written. All this would be avoided by admitting a fixed criterion of Divine Faith, as a thing standing on its own basis. *suâ mole stat.* And this criterion is *the*

*Revelation of the Existence of the Almighty*, which, once proved to be an event altogether peculiar and distinct from all human conception, an event which bears in the very term that characterizes the nature of the Deity revealed, an absolute distinction from the nature of Man, the Existence of God becomes in itself an answer to all objections, whilst it peremptorily prohibits all attempt at piercing into the nature of His attributes, for the very nature of the knowledge of God's Existence carries with it the positive denial of man's comprehending Him. If the upshot of the struggle with Rome, if the issue of the Reformation be merely that of casting men bound hands and feet into the power of Theology and Logic, then indeed have we cause to bewail. And yet the blind doctrine of interpretation of the Bible as the word of God can have no other issue. Of Theology and Logic the basis alone is applicable to the Almighty, and this basis is the nature of man's knowledge of His Existence. Is He, as philosophers now maintain, a mere mental conception? oh! then dreadful will be the thralldom of Mankind; but is He what we believe Him to be, the Almighty, and only known as such by a peculiar dispensation, *the Revelation*, then is all knowledge, all inspiration that attempts to rise to the level of God, "a stumbling-block," and he that pronounces the name of the Almighty, pronounces on himself the sentence of SILENCE.

NOR does this sole and only adequate notion of God contain in itself all the pith and marrow of Theology and Logic, but it asserts, in a most clear and distinct manner, the Freedom of the Will of Man,—the boon of going astray! which finds in the Supremacy of Power and Wisdom and Goodness the revealed attributes of God, and perfectly understood in their

very incomprehensibility, the road pointed out on which men must direct their course with steps uneven and stumbling, but still progressing. The conception of God is not human, it is revealed; and those who bestow that term on matters of less importance are guilty, in our opinion, of darkening the notion men ought to have of the Almighty,—that of awful silence on His Nature. In removing all erroneous and inadequate notions of God, which is only done by denouncing and renouncing all humanizing of the Supreme Being, not because Philosophy or Science indicates that distinction, *but because it exists of itself in the very Revelation*, in so doing we shall “take up the stumbling-block out of the way.”

The great importance of thus penetrating at once to the root of the evil, of which we all feel the direst effect, is most especially paramount at a time when the spirit of Aristotle is awakened, and logic threatens with its screw. Let Divine Faith stand erect and emancipated, whilst the ever-varying waves of human contention break and disperse at her feet.

The only point in which we differ from what is called the orthodox considerations of the Nature of God being that the revealed notion contains in itself all possible, as well as what man terms inconceivable relations of Power and Wisdom and Goodness,—the only logical notion of God, we repeat it, being the *inconceivable* as Powerful and Wise and Good, all attempts at explanation must be totally foregone. The Reformers merely appear to eschew Logic, for both Luther and Calvin, in fact, reasoned on subjects purely *divine*, as if they formed part of the counsels of God. We fully admit that once under the screw, you are necessarily pressed into the strange and incoherent doctrine of the necessary results of Faith and of Grace.

The *De Servo Arbitrio* of Luther is indeed confessed by the most ardent admirers of the great Reformer not to be equal to the opposite thesis, *De Libero Arbitrio* of Erasmus; still the issue of Luther's doctrine or absolute fatalism was received and adopted by crowds of adherents. Nor was the logical inquiry instituted by Calvin less fertile in afflicting results; and to the present day Predestination, according to the Calvinist, is nothing else than the irrational application of *logic* to a subject which only admits of Trust or *Faith*, in strict accordance with the nature of the divine communication. We have fully shown the irrational conclusions of philosophical Pantheism, and shall not quail before theological Pantheism, whether decked out with the name of Luther, or Calvin, or Jansenius. The acknowledgment of the full value of human will and human efforts is a far humbler admission of the Grace of God, than all the attempts of Theology, whether Catholic or Protestant, to deny in every act these gifts of the Almighty, and thus harrow the religious mind with reasonings which plunge it into habitual despair of finding acceptance with God. We sincerely trust that the day will come when the tables will be turned on the men who, with sectarian pride, conceive themselves justified to treat as blasphemy the conscientious efforts of those who consider good works, and acts of wisdom and reason as humble titles to God's favor. If it be true that we cannot be saved without good works, there evidently exists a sense in which we must trust to good works. To maintain that no man can, *by any works*, moral or ceremonial, make atonement for sin, and that works cannot, in any manner or degree, contribute to salvation, is reasoning upon subjects above Reason. The road pointed out by *the Revelation* of God's Existence, is that of Power and Wisdom and

Goodness. Faith or Trust in Him is the link, and when Man went fully astray, God in Christ points out anew the forgotten path, and reconciles the world with Himself. Here lies one of the chief motives of the numerous conversions from the Reformed to the Roman Church. The absolution that Protestant, and especially sectarian ministers present as not to be expected by sincere repentance even from *God* with any degree of certainty, is obtained from *Men* in the Roman Church in a manner, and under a form, that soothes the afflicted mind in a degree which the Rationalists or Calvinists cannot comprehend. Apart from the sophistry of saying to a man, you are saved by faith without good works, but yet you cannot do without the works, for without them Faith does not reckon: there is more danger than is generally supposed in thus introducing logical twists in the relations between God and Man. That minister deeply errs, we believe, who thinks that men do not reason the matter in their own mind, and that *his* reasons are alone admitted. Let the sinner be convinced that his repentance and the atonement have their full effect through Christ, and cease to harrow his mind with doubts which render him either miserable, or a Catholic, or an Atheist. The error of the Evangelical preachers of the present day is the same as that of Luther and Calvin, for fatalism and predestination are the sole issue of their logic. But how can that be remedied? How can the sectarians be disarmed and rendered perfectly incapable of mischief? By a very simple process: that of admitting that the Scripture *contains* the word of God, and not that the Scripture *is* the word of God.

Should some timid minds believe that things had better remain as they are, because the notion that every text is the word of God may prove of avail, by



admitting it to be so, although it may not really be the case; such reasoning we believe to be much akin with that of the Romanists, who contend that pious frauds may be used if the cause of religion is forwarded thereby. But as human views are all liable to error, the question is whether the cause of religion is *really* forwarded by such acts, or whether it be not merely in appearance. Another objection may consist in the remark, that to admit that the Gospel *contains* the Word of God, instead of saying that the Gospel *is* the word of God, would be rendering it impossible to preach the Gospel as the word of God. Perhaps it would be as well to preach as did the Apostles, i. e., of Jesus crucified, and of God thus manifested, as pointing out the road to salvation; but to preach in English, and with the notions of God we have, and not with those of two thousand years ago. Men may be well assured that the day will come when the preacher who talks of devils will be laughed at; and yet, if the New Testament did not speak of them as it does, it would be an impudent forgery. We hear much talk of the mischief done by sectarians, and we know much of it personally, and are convinced that the means proposed would altogether disarm them after one or two generations.

The emancipation of Faith from Science and Philosophy, by declaring that *the Revelation* which granted to men the knowledge of the Almighty constitutes the Alpha and Omega, and that Reason has full scope, would be the carrying out of the Reformation to its natural issue, whilst at the present time hesitation or doubt is extremely prevalent; some turn to Rome, others reason with Calvinistic arguments, and others expound texts. The reproach so often addressed to Protestantism, of being merely a scheme of analysis and demoli-

tion, and incapable of acting upon the principles of Rationalism the Reformers professed, is now vehemently reiterated. Now a full and decisive move can take place, Divine Faith and Christian Faith can be emancipated from the trammels of Science, as well of two thousand years ago as of that of the present day, without Christianity losing one tittle of its rights as mysterious, revealed, and superhuman. In taking such a step, Christians remain perfectly consistent with the Almighty and with human Reason. Free inquiry and no coercion, which are the glorious doctrines of the Reformers, will have proved not to be a dead letter. Only Theology and Logic must submit to their fate, when once the nature of the Supreme Being, revealed as the Almighty, is admitted as fully adequate for Trust or Faith, without the vain prating of men. Then shall Science take her highest flights, without fearing to efface some fanciful proof of God's existence, because what is called His word does not tally with fact. Then will the lies of men cease to be admitted as proofs of the Almighty. Then it shall no longer be said that man and human will do not exist, because that would be admitting that Divine power did not perform every thing. If the human will be of no avail, then the Clergy are totally useless; for the only answer that can be given to those who say preaching ought to be scientific, is the great and essential distinction that exists between the necessary results of science and the voluntary results of the human mind. Chemistry constitutes a very useful and positive science, but the clergyman who should lecture even on some highly interesting point of chemistry, instead of informing men of their duty in a manner that would influence their *Will* to perform it, would, we believe, entirely misconceive the high office with which he is intrusted. Selfishness

and Passion, the two fiends that too often distort the human mind, are not to be laid with lessons on mathematics, or on the physical laws of nature. If past experience allows to judge of the future, it would be altogether hopeless to aim at silencing Theology on that most abstruse of all questions, the nature of God ; and yet the theologians who admit of the *Revelation* of God, are obliged to admit, at the same time, the utter incompatibility of human conception in things relating to Him. Are they not as inconsistent as the philosophers who maintain the same inconceivable nature of the Almighty, and who at the same time admit Him to be a *conception* of the human mind ? An inconceivable conception !

The right of free inquiry and the doctrine of non-coercion, enforced by the Reformers in the sixteenth century, was a new era in religion. Such a doctrine necessarily required a strict discipline, in order not to degenerate into licentiousness. The excesses of the Anabaptists sufficiently justified such a proceeding. But synodic or church discipline was not enough, and a firmer foundation was sought for, in declaring the lines of the inspired writers to be the word of God. Each of the three chief divisions varied in their interpretations of the nature of the relations between God and man, though Pantheism was the final issue. The word of God then became the arena of strife, and to the present day it is on that ground that discussion thrives and prospers. The same soil furnishes sap both to the Puseyist and the Mormon, as also to the many intermediate sects. Would not the supply be cut off by the alteration suggested ; would not the declaration that the Scriptures contain the word of God, and that that Word in the Old Testament is the Revelation of God, and Christ in the New ; would not

such an abridgment tend slowly towards establishing harmony in the lapse of some generations? It would certainly go very far in preventing the continual jarring which necessarily arises, when Judaic views of two thousand years past, varnished over with the solemn title of the words of God, come in formal opposition with positive truths (physical or chemical). We beg pardon for thus joining in juxtaposition the supporters of Dr. Pusey and his friends, all men of the deepest learning and the pride of England, with the enthusiastic adherents of a Joe Smith. But as, however divergent their principles are, the root is the same, since it is the unfortunate doctrine which, instead of saying that the Bible *contains* the word of God, whilst that most essential point is clearly designated, admits the Scriptures *to be* the word of Him who cannot lie.

Dr. Hampden, or any other member of the Church whose opinion must tally with that of his co-associates, utters in a lecture respecting certain phenomena of Nature, doctrines at variance with those of the Jewish learned men of twenty centuries ago. Evidently such a thing would have passed off unnoticed if those Jewish doctrines had not been decked out with the title of the *words* of God. It therefore was incumbent on Dr. Pusey and his friends to signify their disapprobation, and they acted consistently. But let the Church of England (or any other Protestant establishment of the kind) adopt the proposed alteration, and Dr. Pusey, who acted consistently in upholding what we consider a fatal doctrine of the Reformation, would have found no cause for appealing to the truths adopted in the sixteenth century as the adequate expressions of God. In what are such truths required? If *the revelation of the Existence* of the Almighty constitutes, according to

the severest scrutiny, a fact which of itself is the surest evidence of that great truth, whilst it is at the same time, as it were, a divine witness in whose testimony we may securely repose all confidence, in what way can human testimony pretend to strengthen such proof? Indeed they weaken it, for man is a liar, either unwittingly or purposely, in too many things that what he calls truth should be admitted as a proof of the Divine Existence or as a ground of Divine Faith. If in this work there be question of proof, it is one grounded on the absence of all human notion to account for the belief in God. The only witness we have admitted is He who says "I am He that is." But to consider questions of Chronology, Geology, Natural History, Physics, Chemistry, Philology, &c., &c., as matters involving the Divine Testimony, and as truths, the denial of which is the denial of the word of God, is too irrational to last. It would be idle to allege that for three hundred years the doctrine had stood the test of investigation. No false doctrine is consecrated by Time. The decay of Error is but the apparition of Truth, for Error only fades when a brighter light appears. An experience of sixteen hundred years was required before the Pride of Rome was quelled. The three hundred years experience that Reformation has undergone, and the strife and discussions awakened and perpetuated by the doctrine we denounce, are they not sufficient to engage Protestant Christendom to take a step which would deprive at once Sectarianism of its strongest hold, and Atheism of a never-ceasing strain of obloquy which it pours on Christianity as being a direct contradiction of all chronological, astronomical and geological truths?

The canker is permitted to devour the vitals of Christianity. The Mormon Elders root out Christianity with what they term a Revelation. The exam-

ple set them by preceding theologians has borne its fruits. And polygamy, and fraud, and violence, as necessary attendants, appear sanctioned when a Joe Smith tells of a Revelation. Now, the whole face of Reformed Christianity would be changed by the mere fixing of that term to mean the Revelation of God's Existence as the Almighty. Is it the fear of tearing up Christianity by the roots that prevents the extirpation of Error of the kind? But the root of Christianity is Trust in God, in Him only known as Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness Supreme. Christ is One with the Father. What was blasphemy to the Jews, was, and still remains the Religion of the Christian—the link that unites him to God. The Revelation of God was renewed in Christ. Do Protestants believe the Romanists when they are told that Christianity and Reformation are incompatible with each other? They do not, because they believe that the root of Christianity is no mere conception of man, although Christianity itself be constituted by finite means or human efforts, such as their own. And in like manner the emancipation of Divine Faith from all human conception, from all Science as such, would in nowise endanger Christianity. The Unity of Christian and Divine Faith is the only important and vital point. There lies the citadel. The suburbs are not of the same value. And yet at the present day how many Christians consider questions of geology, chronology, astronomy, physics, or of history, or of tradition, as matters of Divine Faith. Christ as One with God raises Christian Faith to the same level as Trust in God. By that Unity Christianity is the way of God, having its root in the Revelation of God's Existence, and consisting in finite attempts at *Acts of Wisdom and Goodness*.

When we admit the mystery of Christ to be tan-

tamount to the mystery of God, it must not be supposed that we are ready to admit any other subject as real and existing merely because it is incomprehensible. We admit in Science of the inconceivable, but we do not believe in it. We admit with modern Science that all that she has to investigate is what is, but that what may be is not of her competence. Christianity, being rooted in Trust in the Almighty, allows of various modes of expression without losing that basis, and indeed without ceasing to constitute the practical regeneration or amelioration of man. The finite or imperfect nature of man is a matter of fact: original sin is a matter of Theology. But Theology, in fact, belies herself when she maintains with the same breath that man was created perfect, and yet sinful. The fact is in favor of Christianity. Theology gives herself the lie. Christianity, in the root is of God, and, as such, a boon to human weakness, yet it leaves the Will as weak, as wayward, as human, as finite as ever. Now, that fact proves human Will to obtain, but as finite, and by that finite mean is Christianity carried out. Did sixteen centuries of error stamp infallibility on Rome? Do three hundred years suffice to make Error a Truth? Protestantism admits of amelioration, and the emancipation of Faith from Science, from all human conception, is the death-blow to Superstition. The prostration of Reason before Faith is the trusting in God, whilst Reason acts according to the Light given by God, although it be admitted that that Light is imperfect and of a finite nature. Trust in God allows full scope to Reason, that only bows to God. No human action or thought can claim from Reason that homage paid to God alone; but the motive thereof lies in the very nature of the communication, which is distinct from all things human, for in

all appearance man was sole on earth. With such a support, the man who trusts in God, not because He is from Man, but was revealed to Man, cannot stand in fear of Science. The Word, the real word of God,—the Almighty,—cannot be injured by any scientific research, nor ought that great fact to be confounded with thousands of topics which, in Scripture (as the Word of God), all claim Faith and exact the prostration of Reason. Now, Reason only lies prostrate before the Almighty, and before Christ because united with the Father, but before every human word, and action, Reason stands upright as a judge.

The scheme of Christianity, the Salvation, the Regeneration of men, is included in the mystery of the Almighty, but all human knowledge, all human effort can only know of the *amelioration* of Mankind. That amelioration is a testimony which cannot be rejected, for eighteen centuries unfold that truth too clearly. We know more of the coming of Christ than those who saw him, for we see the result, and yet understand nothing beyond that positive fact. The prefatory sounds of His advent, "*Peace unto Earth, and good will unto man,*" are still the only conception that is on a level with human reason.

Our first step then respecting Christianity, must be to inquire whether *the* Revelation of the Almighty, which has been proved (we believe by the full reasons alleged) to be the ground of Divine Faith, is consistent with Faith in Christ or the Christian Faith. Does Christianity maintain Unity with God? We have seen that doctrine to be the very basis of that religion, for it was on that account that Christ was crucified. What was blasphemy to the Jew, is salvation to the Christian. We accept, on this point, the testimony of the Jews themselves, who do not deny



that Jesus was crucified, but maintain that He was a blasphemer. This Unity of Christ with the Father we consider to be the master key of all the position. The whole problem of Christianity is involved therein. This point once established, the inference is peremptory. Christianity admits of two orders of facts. The one united to, and of the same kind as Divine Faith; i. e., of an order perfectly distinct from all human conception, and only related to human nature by means of the natural principles of the human mind, which are destined to execute the Desire expressed by Christ; these principles are those of Power, of Wisdom and of Goodness. The other order of facts are the means employed by Christ for the primary step, the starting point of Christianity, and these are the language and conceptions used by the Redeemer. In short, the Unity of Christ with the Father involves the Unity of Christian Faith with Divine Faith. But the evident inference of this union, perfectly incomprehensible, and which in usual language has been termed the "incarnation," is the withdrawal from the sphere of all human conclusions of this first order of fact. It is as with Divine Faith. In vain Theology claims a privilege, for the very belief in an order of things so distinct from the human, annihilates at once all such pretensions. The favor or Grace of the Almighty expressed by Himself in Christ; a Grace which had for effect to call men from the path of error; this Grace constitutes the Unity and must be distinguished from the human means which were destined to carry out Christianity. These human means were the mind, the conceptions of men with all their errors. The road was pointed out to man, but he was left to grope his way.

Naturally, such a proposition, which in itself is not

new, has given rise to violent recriminations. It has been considered as an accusation of fraud against Almighty Wisdom and Goodness. Our answer is simply an appeal to our knowledge of God: His ways are perfectly distinct from those of men. The principal, or indeed the only point, required to be established is, whether the language attributed to Christ did really take place. We are not contented with being answered *Mactoub*, or "it is written." Is it contradictory to Divine Faith, which is the same with Christian Faith? The language attributed to Jesus often alludes to devils, but that language is not of the order of Divine Faith. The Unity of Christ with the Father constitutes Divine Faith. A Unity incomprehensible, but without which Christianity would not be Divine. The assertion of this Unity, which is of such paramount importance according to the view taken in this work of the Christian dispensation, threw the Jews into paroxysms of rage, and yet it is that assertion which will forever constitute the foundation of Christian Faith. But the expression which is now treated as a mere conception of the day, that of *Devils*, was received with every mark of belief; no one indeed doubted it: it was too evident that there must be devils! For how many hundred years did Christians wrangle about sorcerers and magic; and what value is now bestowed on all the reasonings alleged in order to prove that on the lips of Christ such words could not be mere conceptions of men. As if Christ did not speak the language of the day. Deny the Unity of Christ with God, and Christianity is bereft of Divine Faith, and can be of no avail. Admit that Unity, and the religion is a living one; but at the same time the human nature of Christ must be clearly distinguished. That human nature had recourse to human concep-

tions, to human language, in order to express things perfectly distinct from matters of Divine Faith. The dilemma is all-powerful and conclusive in the question at issue. Either you admit Jesus to be One with God or you do not. If you do not, then His crucifixion has no sense, for the hate of the Jews was occasioned by that assertion. That hate is still in every Jewish heart. Such is their belief, and we deem them objects of pity; but the fact cannot be denied. Therefore it must be admitted that Jesus did claim that Unity which is the foundation of Christianity. Now, that point admitted, no other is required; and the language employed by Jesus may be interpreted according to the light acquired since that period without admitting that the discrepancy observed between the languages, in consequence of a more positive knowledge of things, is in the least injurious to the cause of Christianity. For Christian Faith does not depend on the believing in the Devil; it consists in believing that God in Christ bestowed on Man the Grace of showing him the right road to Salvation. That way, that Revelation, as the primary one which told us of God, leaves Man perfectly free to refuse or to accept. We are told, it is true, that Christ in sending the seventy disciples to preach the good tidings or the Gospel, said, "It shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah (which did suffer destruction by fire from heaven) in the day of judgment, than for that city," meaning "the city that refused to receive them." But as Christianity possesses a test in Christ's declaration of Unity with the Father; and as Christian and Divine Faith are One, we find in our Trust in the Power and Wisdom and Goodness of God a sure criterion that points to the truth, which is, that the passage above mentioned is the reverse of all we know of God by Faith, as well

as it is the reverse of the many declarations made by Christ. Were not the Apostles for calling down fire from heaven on a village which had rejected Him; but Jesus expressly told them that he had come "not to destroy but to save men."

To admit of Revelation, and not to speak of the ways of God and Christ otherwise than in faint human language after the little and narrow views of men, is an absurdity far more revolting than the errors of Philosophy. And Theology is perpetually committing this absurdity; or, rather, this direct contradiction to the most natural inference of the admission of Revelation. We, therefore, say that when men shall at last fully comprehend that *the* Revelation leaves Reason perfectly free to act, but places God and Christ above all Philosophy and all Theology, then Divine Faith or Christian Faith shall rise superior to the beliefs of Rome, or Oxford, or the Sorbonne. We have seen that a philosopher of a very sceptical nature, Mr. Hume, demurred in admitting that the usual experience we have of things respecting Cause and Effect authorized mankind to infer that the same results obtain in things concerning which we have no experience. Is it not strange that theologians should be less consistent with respect to Revelation, than the Sceptic with regard to Reason? yet such is the case. Evidently Theology will at last go the lengths of summoning a jury, in order to judge the Almighty for having created such a naughty thing as man. The truth seems to us to be, that Theology having totally lost sight of the peculiar, the individual, the particular nature of *the* Revelation, (because Theology never moves a step without one, and thus has rendered commonplace the thing which consecrates all religion, *the Revelation of God*,) the natural consequence has been,

that as Revelation is continually brought into play by Theology in human affairs, so in Divine matters Anthropomorphism is introduced. But if *the* Revelation is of any avail in answering Philosophy, the time will come when it shall also silence Theology. Men will then trust in Christ, because He is One with the Father, and Reason will be allowed full career respecting the real positive meanings of the terms transmitted by Scripture.

This important point, the Unity of God and Christ, being shown to be consistent, and to leave Reason the fullest scope, we shall now proceed to show that the Revelation of God in Christ is not at all inconsistent with respect to the doctrines of Mercy and the more stern impulses of human nature. For whilst this Unity places Christian Faith above Theology and Philosophy, Christianity with respect to Man bears a peculiar character, being grounded on the feelings of Mercy, of Goodness, of Love, of Affection. Modern philosophers who maintain that if Christianity had been grounded on Charity instead of Faith, its basis would have been far more sound, do not reflect that it would be basing that dispensation, or we shall say that doctrine, on what is contrary to fact. Christ, unless *united* with God, is a dead letter, but that *Unity* involves the same conclusions as those which proceed from the nature of our knowledge of the Almighty. It is by Divine Faith that Christianity is placed beyond the reach of either the philosophical or the theological Necessarian. But that point once settled, Philosophy or Science, i. e., Reason, is paramount and stands erect. But Theology, which cannot rid herself of old traditions, is always mistaking her ground. Impatient of control, Theology is continually wincing; she resists Reason, and is always appealing to Faith. Theology does not even re-

frain from admitting philosophical argument in matter of Divinity, whenever that argument appears in her favor. Instead of holding forth the doctrine of the broad distinction between Positive Faith and Divine Faith, Aristotle is called in to decide, logically, of the value of things to which logic is irrelative. If Luther rejected Aristotle, the principles of that philosopher form no less the basis of the arguments which our Chief adduces to support his scheme of Fatalism termed Justification by Faith. And the same may be said of the logical theology of Calvin termed Predestination. The Philosopher who denies *the* Revelation may be allowed the privilege of carrying into matters very different from those which constitute the ground of experience, the conclusions of experience. For Philosophy will at last perceive that the very doctrine of Mr. Hume concerning Cause and Effect, which makes Experience the only ground of belief, cannot be carried legitimately beyond the pale of experience; and even in the planet we inhabit cannot logically be applied to the order of coexistences which surrounds us. Theology has even taken up the bait held out by Hume for the glutton. Positive belief, pointed out by the Sceptic as the only positive issue of all experience, has been pounced upon by theologians unconscious of the hook, and carried off in triumph. But the man who admits of *the* Revelation does not require the aid of logic to Trust in the Almighty; he only perplexes a clear principle by such an introduction.

Christian Mercy, or Affection, usually rendered by the terms of Love and Affection between fellow-creatures, is the application to man of a principle which never did before the Advent of Christ constitute the practical basis of Religion. The tie which binds the Christian to God is Faith in Christ as God; but the

link which ought to unite Christians is brotherly love and affection. Christianity therefore constitutes a system which,—though distinct from Reason and the usual course of Nature in its source, being One with Divine Faith,—is altogether amenable to Reason *in all practical bearings*. But if, as is the usual practice of theologians, practical Christianity is conceived also to be a matter of Faith, the issue is that which we now have cause so deeply to regret. Every new view for carrying out the religion is at once termed an article of Faith. The Absolute, the Infinite is introduced into the practical bearings of Humanity. Language is no longer a running, varied stream, in which the conditional and relative are reflected. When once Theology, either Catholic or Protestant, has declared its *fiat*, the judgment pronounced becomes an article of Faith, and this article is esteemed as high as Divine Faith or Trust in the Almighty. The hostility of Christianity to every worldly feeling, which is merely the constrained and forced extension of the requisite restraint which is taught by that dispensation to be placed on their thoughts and actions by men, we consider as a morbid disposition. Here we are at once in open dissent with Asceticism. Mysticism is the first of these capital errors, according to the view we have taken, for it is the application in practical Christianity of the Unconditional to the Conditional: it is the considering things which are relative and mutable as being of a different nature. The Unity of Christ with God cannot be mistaken. It is pure Deism. It is the referring to the Almighty the doctrine taught by the Son. But the terms of Unity, Son, Incarnation, Trinity, are terms to be understood, if possible, because they are words. Divine Faith or Trust in God, and Christian Faith or Trust in the Almighty through Christ, are

one, and as such are placed in a sphere above all human conception with respect to the nature of the Being, only known by the attributes of Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness.

The discussion of the means that Reason may engage men to adopt, in the furthering of the boon granted to them by God in Christ, who pointed out the new road to Salvation, is a matter of Reason, but is not therefore a matter of infallibility. The Spirit of God, that is promised to those who attempt to carry out His Will or Power, and Wisdom and Goodness, does not less constitute the Being of the Almighty, because Men are allowed to go their own way in the path pointed out. It is because Christianity will forever remain consistent with that path, with Power and Wisdom and Goodness; it is because every man who trusts in God, and steps forward in his limited capacity,—not as the *lightning*, but as the *snail*, and too often like the *crab*,—and follows the direction pointed out by God in Christ, that we believe Christianity will conquer. We find in a modern doctrine broached by men of deepest learning, the reproach of timidity objected to Christianity. The Christians say (we are told by Auguste Comte) that you are to love your neighbor *as* yourself, but we say you must love him *more* than yourself. Now which scheme is most practical? And yet this new doctrine, which is supposed to reform and replace Christianity under the name of *Alterism* or the Love of the neighbor, is given out as far more *positive*, i. e., practical, than the Christian. But Christianity does not even go the length of Positivism, and yet is, we maintain, far more practical in this important point; the importance of which, indeed, is deemed so great by the man whom we consider as the deepest of all modern thinkers, Auguste Comte (whose name we have



had so often occasion to repeat), as to make it the foundation of his new doctrine. But we maintain that on the ground of Positivism, which is the only one we pretend to discuss, leaving the others to Theology, the Christian is far superior. M. Auguste Comte may adduce as an objection that the Christian principle goes the length of admitting Egotism or Self as the standard by which the neighbor is to be loved, whilst his doctrine eradicates that false feature. But here, again, Christianity seems to us to stand on a far sounder base than Positivism or *Alterism* (Altruism), for it alludes to a real positive feeling, whilst the would-be positive doctrine supposes that the impulsive feeling of self is given up, which is standing on fanciful ground, a rather strange position for a positive philosopher. Creeds are matters of Theology, and are of great use, provided they be considered as belonging to positive Faith, i. e., human. They may indeed turn out to be mere first conceptions, though that character is often far less objectionable than the studied conclusions on the nature of a Being only known by *the* Revelation as the Almighty. Creeds are requisite. Men cannot do without them. All we require is *that they should not be placed on a level with Divine or Christian Faith.* Creeds may differ, not so Faith.

“Shall I ask the brave soldier, who fights by my side  
 In the cause of mankind, if our creeds do agree?  
 Shall I give up the friend I have valued and tried  
 If he kneels not before the same altar with me?  
 From the heretic girl of my soul should I fly  
 To seek somewhere else a more orthodox kiss?  
 No! perish the hearts and the laws that would try  
 Truth, valor, or love by a standard like this.”

These stirring verses of the great poet Thomas Moore embody the whole position relative to Creeds, and are really and *positively* Christian. They reflect the

intentions of Him who said "I will have mercy and not sacrifice," a simple phrase which no Theology can distort under whatsoever guise the monster may appear.

The Christian doctrine of submission to injuries, of affection shown to our enemies, is certainly less practical and especially very jarring to the Scythian spirit of Europeans. The following narrative may however serve to prove that the doctrine is not repulsive to the better feelings of Mankind. It was during the wars that desolated Europe in the latter part of the 18th century that the French and Russian troops met in bloody encounter amongst the cheerful and sublime scenery of Switzerland. A few days previous, the Russians, under Suvarrof, had advanced towards Uri, and occupied the South or Uri side of that deep torrent over which is thrown a bridge called the Devil's bridge. *Requisitions* were put on all the neighboring villages to furnish men. Among these was a young man who, whilst occupied in performing the task allotted to him, was cruelly ill-treated by a Russian officer, who, for some fancied tardiness in carrying things up those steep acclivities, beat him unmercifully with the cane the officers of the Russian service usually carry with them. A few days after, the great battle, in which Suvarrof was worsted, was fought in these wild mountains, and he began the wonderful retreat which is one of his highest titles to admiration. The day after the battle, the young man we have spoken of was proceeding over the field of slaughter when he perceived on the verge of a precipice and sorely wounded, the very officer who had treated him with such inhumanity and whose blows were yet felt at each step. Disengaging the officer from his perilous situation, he placed him on his back and carried him to his cottage. There all requisite attention was paid to

him. His wounds were dressed; he was watched night and day, and treated as one of the family until health was restored. The officer was usually very silent, and appeared not to understand the meaning of all this. At last, one evening the peasant told him that as the Russian army had now escaped from its dangerous position, and as the officer's health permitted, it would be well to join his corps, and that he would put him on his road; and accordingly the next day, seating him in a light mountain chaise, he drove him to where he could find a ready conveyance, and before leaving him placed in his hands a small sum of money sufficient to defray his expenses. The officer, who was in anxious suspense as to the final issue of the adventure, was so struck with the proceeding that he burst into tears, and, seizing the young man's hands, bathed them with those drops of feeling, expressing as much astonishment as gratitude. "I am a Christian," answered the peasant to his look of inquiry, "and believe I have been following the precepts of our Divine Master: at all events I am sure you will never strike me again."

Now, although revenge is certainly a very natural feeling, and has been called a celestial pleasure, yet the conduct held in this case, although very different from what might have been expected, cannot be considered as unnatural. It is, however, perfectly Christian. But what was the creed of the performer? We know not: we are only aware of his Faith, which was in Christ, and surely he will be one day judged according to the doctrines of Him he so nobly interpreted on Earth. His *creed* is a matter of Theology, his FAITH was that of Christianity shown in *acts* of mercy and goodness. Christianity has been said to provide a heart for those in whom Nature had omitted to place

one (De Staël). Theology may be said, on the contrary, to turn the heart to steel, and to freeze up all the sources of feeling. Christianity is a blessing; Theology a curse. How much certain Theologians delight in anathemas is well known. In the *Norwich Mercury* of March, 1852, we read the following account: "When the five o'clock train from Norwich arrived there, the passengers were very much surprised at seeing the Rev. Mr. Moore, the curate of the parish, standing in the passage of the station-house dressed in his canonicals. It was however soon understood that he was waiting there to 'curse' a neighboring magistrate who was expected by the train, and who had given him some presumed offence. When the individual alluded to was giving up his ticket to the station-master, the reverend gentleman thus addressed him: 'I inflict a curse upon this man. I curse you; I curse your wife; I curse your children; I curse all you have: may your children be fatherless and vagabonds, and beg their bread,' &c., &c., and thus he went on until the 'cursed man' drove off." We must not, however, omit to state that the Bishop, when apprised of the circumstance, inflicted severe censure, and that Mr. Moore was lodged in the Castle in default of finding sureties to keep the peace. All religious communities united by a common creed have certainly a right to exclude from the community those who no longer admit of its doctrines; but the practice of "cursing" or anathematizing such individuals in terms similar to those uttered in the above-mentioned account, and which was also a common custom, might assuredly have been dispensed with. Excommunication is a matter of course in cases of dissent, although the separation from any creed whatsoever is not a separation from Christ in the view we adopt of

Christianity, provided the path of Wisdom and Goodness be that which is followed according to the power of the individual. We might even go a step farther, and assert that even Sin that separates men from society does not, if repentance supervene, separate man from Christ. The visible Church, as a symbol, may be objected to, as well as the conceptions (Myths) which men entertain of the Divinity. How far visible signs (symbols) or mental conceptions (myths) of God taught by preaching, are identical with the real nature of the Being they are intended to represent, we may judge of by the only criterion we possess, which is that greatest of all mysteries, *the Revelation*, that tells of the Almighty, and of whom *Incomprehensibility* is the very essence; for His Power, His Wisdom, His Goodness, are not those of man, although Power and Wisdom and Goodness Supreme are the attributes which human nature has the faculty of perceiving in Him, and are the only points of contact which unite the conceptions of men with the Supreme Being revealed. It is impossible not to have a creed or belief in the views one adopts respecting God and Christ and the Holy Spirit. All that is required is, that the creed or belief, which is a conception (myth) or may be represented by some visible sign (symbol), shall not be deemed a matter of Divine Faith as is the Almighty.

The great eventful fact, *the Revelation of the Existence* of the Almighty, which constitutes the foundation of Christianity, is also the only standard by which can be tested the truth of that which is considered as the essence of the divine dispensation of Jesus, i. e., the regeneration or salvation of Man. Men truly perceive that Evil abounds, but the origin of Evil can only be known to Him who was revealed as the Almighty. All that man can tell is that God was worshipped in

many parts of the earth under strange visible symbolic forms, as well as under different mythological conceptions, and that the united forms of Power and Wisdom and Goodness revealed in the beginning were strangely perverted before Jesus the Christ appeared, in whom the doctrine of God was renewed, and by whom human will was again turned towards the road of action, through Wisdom and Goodness.

The Revelation of the Almighty must be confounded with no other thing than the Revelation of Christ, by whom men were turned once more into the right road, that of Wisdom and Goodness to be exhibited in works. Why such a course was adopted is a matter entirely of Divine Faith or of Trust in the Supreme Being revealed. And no other answer can be given at present to any of the mysteries immediately involved in the very existence of Man on earth. They must be referred to the great standard of Divine Faith; but if it be attempted to explain them; if it be tried to form them into a creed, it becomes a human conception, and as such it must not be confounded with Divine Faith. Thus for instance, the Resurrection is a doctrine grounded on Divine and on Christian Faith, and as such relates to a future state. But we absolutely can say nothing respecting the human conception of such an event, and all reflection on the matter can only be rendered by terms which are more or less metaphysical or mythic. The Resurrection of the Saviour proved to His disciples the Power of God, but we are quite ignorant whether our Resurrection in the Flesh bears the same meaning, because so many changes take place during a man's life that, as it has been often remarked, the flesh of an old man has often been replaced. It might indeed be said that the word "flesh" may designate a peculiar state of the soul, which immediately

after Death may be considered as intimately linked and connected with the past life, and is really united with the flesh, so that it may be that nothing we term corporeal is meant by the term in the sense it is generally understood. Thus to be judged in the Flesh may mean, according to the tenor of our corporeal life, and to be judged by Christ may signify, that Christians will be judged according to the doctrine of Christ, the Word of God. But if in Philosophy it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to render in adequate terms the thoughts that relate to human conceptions, it is utterly beyond the power of man to render in the language of man notions of another world which must necessarily be entirely distinct from all ideas of human reason. The mysteries of Christianity, such as Regeneration, the Redemption, the Atonement, the Trinity, the Incarnation, &c., &c., which have caused so much blood to flow, and have called forth millions of different opinions, are after all matters of Theology. They are secondary views. Their foundation is Divine Faith or Trust in God, who is One with Christ. Christian Faith is the Unity of Christ with God. The *path pointed out* constitutes the doctrines of Christ, and is of the same nature as that which was indicated to men from the beginning, but from which they went astray. *Acts of Wisdom and Goodness* with regard to their fellow creatures are evidently the Christian inferences that are to be drawn from the Unity of Christ with Him whose attributes from the beginning were Power and Wisdom and Goodness Supreme. But this highest sphere of Faith is above all contention. All theological conceptions fall within the pale of the rule of Analogy, for they are human conceptions, although relating to things beyond the sphere of human Reason. Not so Divine Faith or Trust in God and Christ; here the distinct

nature of the mode of knowledge places *the* Revelation of the Almighty above all analogy, even that of mystery. It may certainly appear strange at first sight that Divine Faith should thus be invoked in order to assault Theology. But we must remind the reader that God, who is no human conception, and Christ, who is One with God and the Holy Spirit, becomes by His very Existence the only object of Faith or Trust. Theology, either that of a council, or that of an individual, is human language relating to Him in whom we trust. If, as Philosophy maintains it to be the case, God is a mere conception of man, oh, then Theology and the Deity are worthy of each other, and of the quagmire from whence they sprung! Without Divine Faith or Trust in God as the Almighty, Christianity would find no foundation. Modern Philosophy therefore, in proving that human conceptions were all more or less of a *mythic* nature, erroneously supposed that the Existence of God was to be included in the mythic collection. We maintain that Theology alone is affected by the admission of the fanciful nature of all metaphysical conception. Nineteen hundred years of sway are surely enough of tyranny. It is time that Theology shall be answered by the appeal to the very nature of Divine Faith. If God, as Theology admits, is only known by Revelation, how can any human language become a substitute for that Supreme Being? In Christianity the Supreme attributes of God, Power, or action, or works of Wisdom and Goodness, are the real aim, and therefore Christianity may indeed be said to confer a heart on those to whom Nature has refused one. But Theology in claiming for her explanations, for her conceptions of the nature and the relations of the Supreme Being known by Revelation alone and therefore *trusted* in, the same Faith, the same Trust, is evidently *acting*



*unwisely* and against Goodness, for by her means men's hearts become as stones.

Christianity, as a boon, is the new road pointed out to man by God in Christ. The mystery of Christ lies in the Unity of Jesus with the Father. All the mysteries of Christianity are involved in the Ways of God, and their foundation is Trust in the Almighty or Divine Faith. But as the various relations, all dependent on the same great principle, have received different names, and appear as distinct and very dissimilar from what are termed the Ways of God, it is requisite to enter a little closer into this abstruse subject, in order to show how *the* Revelation of the Existence of the Almighty, in pointing out to Man the road of Power and Wisdom and Goodness, involved positive relations, grounded on Faith in God. These relations are those of a boon granted or Grace, of a road pointed out or commands, and of reward and punishment. On these three points turn all the essential parts of religion. We do not speak of Polytheism, but of religion according to the Mosaic dispensation, and the Revelation of God renewed in Christ, both of which boons have one common base—that is, Faith in the Almighty revealed. The Christian mysteries of Redemption and Atonement may be considered as peculiar conceptions relative to the times which appeared in that form on the occasion of the *Way* of God that was instanced in the advent of Christ. We are sorry that this view of the low value of all human conceptions in things relating to the Supreme Being revealed as the Almighty, and manifested in Christ, should lead to the conclusion that all human expression being inadequate to render His ways, can never constitute matters of Divine Faith. Our words, we fear, will be deemed sacrilegious by the Romanist, the Lutheran,

the Calvinist, the Zwinglian, the Anabaptist, as well as by the Methodist, the Evangelist, the Universalist, the Unitarian, &c., &c. Still, trusting as we do to the broad principle of the worthlessness of all human devices, either rational or extravagant, which relate to the Almighty and to Christ in whom He was manifest, we admit the right of men to create such views: yet we refuse to worship them. We consider Theology as totally bereft of the right of appealing to her decisions as to matters of Divine Faith, on whatever subject she may pronounce them.

In the New Testament, as in the Old, all human conception must be taken as an attempt to express that which no human mind can fathom. The terms adopted in order to express the Christian dispensation, in which Christ, as Man, disappears, and where God alone is pointed out by Jesus as the basis of the new *Faith*, or the Christian, it being trust in God through Christ: those terms which express His Ways, such as Mediation, Redemption, Atonement, Sacrifice, and the like, are perfectly adapted to the conceptions of the times in which they were first used. Their sense is evidently a boon granted to Man, by the Will or Grace of God. The expression "blood of the Lamb" is evidently employed in order to assimilate Jesus to a victim, and the theological views which suppose that all expiatory sacrifice of both Pagan and Jew had in view this great sacrifice, are pious considerations which can never constitute matters of Faith, whilst the Unity of Christ is the Unity of Divine and Christian Faith. But that Unity of Christ and God is perfectly impossible of expression, i. e., of any adequate expression. Nor is the mystery of the Way of God in the least explained by the expressions above mentioned. They are peculiarities of expression which tell us nothing more

than what is made known by the fact, which consists in the pointing out to mankind the real road to Him, to Salvation: to Him only known as the Almighty, as Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness. The ends and reasons of the Christian dispensation may be conceived and must have been conceived in some manner or other by the men who were witnesses thereof. The expressions of the times are convincing proofs of the reality of the fact transmitted and testified. But men are not bound to consider the language in which the fact is transmitted and explained as being as satisfactory as the Existence of God, or the mysterious Unity of Christ and God, on account of which unity Jesus cannot be considered as a mere Prophet. And has not the subsequent result proved him to be in reality a Being far superior? Still all the real value of Christianity is concentrated in Him to whom Christ perpetually refers, "to the Father."

The great mystery of the Christian dispensation, which involves the nature of the Godhead, and is therefore of still deeper hue than even the dark facts to which men must refer when the pages of history, the tales of tradition, and the conclusions of scientific investigations have been duly pondered on,—the Trinity,—may be accounted for in various ways. First, it may be referred to the unknown dispensations of Him revealed as the Almighty, and it has been said that nothing can be proved against the truth of that mystery. To this, however, we demur, for He who is revealed as Supreme may appear somewhat divested of that Supremacy when several form His Being. Although many centuries have elapsed since the Advent of Jesus, yet there still remains much to be investigated relating to the doctrine of the treble nature of the Divine Essence according to the human conception of

the Godhead. When once Free inquiry shall not be a vain word ; then, and then only, will men enter fearlessly upon this great question. We say fearlessly, meaning not only the fear of religious blame, but also that of philosophers, who are generally of the opinion of Voltaire, who considered such matters as merely worthy of derision. We trust, however, that when the real nature of Divine Faith comes to be linked with the source from whence it is derived, *the Revelation* of the Almighty, then scrutiny will be permitted without the reproach of unbelief, because the very admission of the Existence of the Almighty places Belief and Trust in Him beyond all human conception. Scrutiny, then, no longer considered as tantamount to irreligion, may perhaps perceive that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, far from being a mystery, is the explanation of a mystery. Indeed, if the three terms : God, the Law, and the Prophets, constituted for many thousand years the great mystery of primitive religions, as well as of the Jewish, an explanation of that mystery would be found in the Christian doctrine of God, Christ, and the Spirit.

Without attempting to enter into any particularities respecting the bloody controversies which have arisen between Christians in the seventh and various centuries, with regard to the nature of the union between God and Christ, and without attaching any value to the remark, we must however observe that, taking the *Law* as something that man was to execute, it becomes a relative object as regards Man, and so was Christ, though united as One with the Father. The Roman Pontiff, or rather the Court of Rome, is extremely jealous of what is termed the orthodox faith respecting the Trinity, which, that Court maintains, is to be believed without demur as to any explanation

whatsoever. Indeed, two sons of that church, Messrs. Lamennais and Chateaubriand, have been deemed heretics principally on account of their admitting that the Trinity might have reference to doctrines of the highest antiquity, and yet their explanations go no further than to admit, as did Bossuet, that by the Holy Trinity was meant Power, Intelligence, and Love.

But in what consists the appeal men are to address to the Almighty revealed once more in Christ? Is it to follow steadfastly the road pointed out by God in His attributes, in Works (Power) of Intelligence (Wisdom) and Mercy (Goodness), which road forms the Worship of God, or does it consist in going to hear Theology preach, to pray, to read?—Why not to fast? why not to scourge oneself? Human depravity, so much insisted upon, is only the material fact of Man's finite being, and which is to be bettered by his own endeavors. The most evident truth of Christianity consists in that high dispensation being a boon granted to erring humanity; but the mystery involved in that great mercy is of the darkest kind, and is not at all done away with by the theological explanation "that God so loved sinners that He gave His only Son, that they who hearkened to Him should be saved." This is only stating in other terms the Advent of Christ. Would it not be more useful to those sinners to insist on inspiring vigor to *Human Will* to perform the duties imposed on men, instead of trampling under foot all such endeavors, by calling it *self-righteousness*? Creeds, Dogmas, Theology are every thing, not symbolic, it is true, as the Romanists have them; but the bent is the same, though expressed merely in words. What real difference exists between a long Protestant sermon on the Passion of our Saviour, and the Roman-

ist practice of representing the same, either in Churches or Cemeteries, by stations and statues, or images, or by persons carrying the Cross, and performing the part so as to draw tears from all the assistants? The idea is the same. It is Church dogma verbally or physically expressed. Action, Intelligence, Mercy, are nothing: Theology knows them not as Worship. Christianity, under the guidance of Theology, is gliding into the pit of Buddhism, if indeed we be not immersed therein already. We repeat again and again that we do not seek to turn the pulpit into a chair of science. Those who go to Church are of a religious mind, or hope to better their spiritual condition. But does theological disquisition attain that end? It does not enter into the actions and temptations of life; it does not encourage men to advance in the path of knowledge, and thus to contribute wisely towards the well-being of those that surround them. How much more practical our Divine Master! Why even for alms-giving, if His advice were followed, if charity were bestowed on the neighbor whose worth may be judged of, and in a wise manner, how much misery would be averted! Men, it is true, would have to judge for themselves, and it is easier to trust in others. Theology in reality has nothing to do with human life. People have come to believe that religion concerns the other world alone. Now, although we fully believe that the Kingdom of God is not of this world, and although we are convinced that Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness are very different things from what we deem them, yet we have the deep conviction that this world has reference to another, and that *acts of Intelligence and Mercy performed on earth are the real Worship of God*, and not Theology. On this path we are walking with God and Christ. With Theology we are dreaming with

men about God and Christ. Theology insists upon our feeling that Christ is our Saviour. Now this is completely Roman; only, as we remarked, the Papists act more forcibly on the feelings. Protestant revivals, it is true, promise to make up for what is wanting. There men, women and children are *exhorted, besought, warned, entreated and terrified*. And all this for what? To believe. But they believe already. No, they do not believe savingly. Now the Romanists have a more precise and distinct manner to determine theological Faith, or believing in dogmas and creeds. The patient is only conceived to believe when a given symbol is adopted, or a peculiar act performed. Thus auricular confession; the taking of the consecrated wafer as the body of Christ, and the acceptance of absolution from the mouth of a fellow-creature, are positive proofs that the sinner is as safe as the Church can make him. Now, as we will not do this, our theologians conceive themselves bound to harrow our minds, instead of soothing. At all this the Catholics chuckle and rub their hands; and well they may, for our Clergy are acting the same part; but performing it in quite the opposite way, which may be compared to the stroking of a cat in the wrong direction. There lies the difference alone, for the intention of both is the same, the acquiescence in the dogma. Now when the result is the same, and the means resorted to so very different, no one need be surprised if Romanist Theology should often beat the Protestant: Theology and Dogma are in both all in all, though each is different in appearance. We would however remind the reader, without fearing to incur the reproach of repetition, that Morality alone is not considered by us as the path of Sanctification, for exemplary conduct, humanity, justice, truth, piety, mercy, temperance, require to be conjoined with rela-

tive acts of intelligence (relative to capacity and position), in order to be said to be the path of Christ. The sacrifice of passions and selfishness stands truly in the foreground, and Trust in Christ as One with the Almighty (for the Spirit of God is the Spirit of Christianity), requires that we should know of Him and the Mediator. The saving Faith is then the *acting* up to the suggestions inspired by the Spirit of Christianity, and not the understanding of the Redemption as a way, or Salvation as an aim, for both are, as well as the nature of God and Christ, mysteries too deep for man.

At the end of the fourth century the creeds of Rome and Constantinople were different in spite of the efforts of the various councils, especially the Nicæan presided over by Constantine, or the edicts of Theodosius. The Pagans, joyous at those appearances of dissolution, were astonished, in periods of calamity so frequent in those disastrous times, at seeing the Christians exercise a common and indiscriminate charity around them. On this point we have the testimony of Julian, who renounced Christianity; who thought to raise up again the fallen statues of the gods, and who may be considered as one of the most dangerous enemies that the new religion had to encounter. Julian reproaches the Pagans with their want of fellow-kindness, and in spite of himself repeats as it were the words of St. John, "Children, love ye each other." It was precisely the authority that a creed was supposed to confer, that encouraged others to put forth their views. The authority sought after was the sanction of the multitude, and here the Arian creed may be said to have been far more popular amongst those who wished to avoid theological cavil. It had ever been remarked that the Gothic and Teutonic character had a strong bias towards Arianism; whilst the Greeks were decidedly



inclined towards Monotheism, Monophysism (one will, one nature), and other absolute doctrines of a pantheistic nature. But creeds were sometimes rooted out. The remedy was that of the Suevi, and of the Romans towards the most determined of their Italian neighbors, the Samnites,—it was general destruction. In modern times the Catholics have attempted the same with the Huguenots; in this way the Albigenes were put down; in this way Lollardism was suppressed; and in this way Reformation would have perished if the great Northern Star, Gustavus Adolphus, had not beaten Tilly and Wallenstein. We believe that the Protestants in general are too confident in their judgments respecting the Ways and the Nature of God, and too narrow-minded as regards His worship and their various rites; but, although distrusting our judgment concerning the Lord, we prefer putting our Faith in Him through Christ without comprehending in the least His scheme, and we would join with hand and heart all Protestant resistance of coercion; never Protestant oppression. But unfortunately Religion is too often the cloak to which men have recourse in order to conceal their real designs. But it should never be forgotten that it is doing such miscreants too much honor to allow them to bear the appearance of martyrs. Here Mysticism and Asceticism furnish no test; Christ and Reason do, and the voice of the Divine Master is in perfect conformity with all Experience. Are the acts incriminated contrary to the good of society; are they contrary to intelligence and mercy? Let them be unhesitatingly suppressed, whilst at the same time all attempts at martyrdom are thwarted by insisting upon the mere secular character of the fault or crime. But are they dogmas; are they the views men entertain of the Nature of God or of Christ,

or of the name to be given of His ways; do they claim the Protestant right of worshipping God according to their conscience? Now, as men have that right, they may express their devotional feelings in any manner that does not bear against sound reason. But the Thug has no right to murder in order to please his goddess; and if the Jews should forget that Christian laws govern the land, and suppose that God ordained the total destruction (man, woman, child, and cattle) of their enemies, even those who believe it was true for Canaan would be the first to deny that the command could be divine, even though the Sun should stand still in his career. Camp meetings and revivals too often demand the vigilant eye of the police. Devotion may be expressed by strong convulsive sobbings or by howls, or by general hysterics; those who prefer dancing to singing may think it more devout to imitate David without any harm: but generally speaking, it would be but rational if the magistrates kept their eyes open on all such practices; and they should never forget to tear off the mask of Religion, which too often is put on for purposes of the basest nature. Excessive mortification of one's *own* flesh proves more the fanatic than the hypocrite, and is therefore, in general, more successful than Mysticism.

Toleration is an act of Power. The true Christian priest in Christian society is the magistrate. He is the whipper in. Theologians bark; but often tear the game. The magistrate must be no theologian. The less stress he lays upon his knowledge of the nature of God; the less logical his views of the Ways of the Lord; the stronger his Faith: the wiser his acts, the more merciful will be his decisions. But if he be a theologian, with or without canonicals, then may the Christian fly to the Turk for protection and mercy. This may be strong

language, but Buddhism must be boldly encountered whether issuing from Rome, or the Sorbonne ; from Oxford or Larissa. Worldly motives may be tempered with Christian restraint without the irrational attempt at eradicating Reason, because it is admitted that the nature of man is finite and imperfect. The pride of learning may be chastened with reminding the wise of the deep mysteries of Nature, the folly of fathoming their depths, and the irrationality of applying to them the measure of human experience, without denying to Man in religious matters the help of the only faculty which places him above the brute, *his Reason*, and without crushing under the weight of Pantheism his Will. Where the Protestant principle exists Hope may yet dawn, although twelve generations have passed away without that star appearing above the horizon. Puseyism and Mormonism ! The Alpha and Omega of our Reformation ! And we talk of Hope ! Asceticism, we own, is not found in the Creeds of either. Monogamy and Polygamy, good livings and worldly interests constitute integrant elements of these doctrinarians. Even should the Puseyites entirely divest themselves of their livings, it would not be to become Apostles. These latter were *poor* men : men of no learning : they were no theologians : their theology, it is true, was that of their times. Our modern Apostles ape them in every thing except in Divine Faith. Why not preach in Greek and Hebrew ? Why reproach the Romanist with his Latin litanies, whilst the explanations given of our own in English are just as unintelligible ? Regeneration and Salvation cannot require the same language as they did two thousand years ago.

The Christian theologians moreover find themselves abandoned by many of the Laity, who, admitting that God is a conception of the human mind, attempt to

found a Theology called natural, which stands in juxtaposition with Christianity, but which denies God as a Revelation, and which pointing to the incoherences of sacerdotal Theology, evidently is ready to step in if called for. We have compared the natural Theology of Lord Brougham with the new religion announced by Auguste Comte. To their opinions we have only one answer, which is : Point me out a human being who believes in a God without it having been told him, and I will admit your opinions and consider the notion of God to have arisen spontaneously in the mind. But that important question has been already disposed of. Nevertheless, it is strange to say that those who maintain that God is no conception of Man have as much to do with Theologians, and with Christian Theologians, as with Philosophers. It is not, however, because the notion of a God stands firmer as a Revelation than as a conception that we have adopted it, but because it is a real matter of fact, inasmuch as from the very first vestiges of all the traditions of our race God is known as the Almighty ; and that notion, very different from that of arts which become sciences, becomes on the contrary more and more intricate the longer human Thought reposes thereon. With all due respect to the memory of a good and worthy man, and with the remark that theological errors, if errors, after all are venial, we own that the attempt of Paley to prove the existence of God from the simple conclusion derived from Cause and Effect has been entirely defeated by Kant. Moreover, far from feeling any longer uneasy after perusing the proofs accumulated by the latter philosopher, we now find cause to rejoice that the system of Paley has been considered a failure, for in fact its success was *à priori* the denial of the Revelation as the primary cause of the knowledge of God : the Supreme Being becoming a

human discovery. We have applied ourselves carefully to the investigation of that, to us, most important point. And when once the most intimate and rational conviction was obtained that the Lord was only known to man by Revelation and as the Almighty, then Light poured down upon us, and we were a renewed man. The errors of Theology, the Unity of Christ with the Father, and the saving Grace of that eventful Revelation then found a ready explanation. Theology as an attempt to conceive the inconceivable must constantly present to various minds very different conceptions. The Christian Trinity was the explanation of the great mystery of the union between God and Man by the Revelation. The Law was His Attributes—Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness. The Will of Man was left free to act, and surely he went astray from the road allotted. Why was Man endowed with that fatal gift, Free Will; and why was that Will so wayward? But the Lord was ever known as the Almighty Father, as the Supreme Spirit; and—all questions, absolutely insoluble to Reason, are to be found therein.

## CATHOLICS.—PROTESTANTS.

To very many we may appear to advert to a most imaginary danger, but as our conviction is of the firmest respecting the strong hold Theology has on the human mind, and as the natural result of a move in a direction contrary to the continual splitting or sectarian division of the numerous sections of Protestantism, has had the effect of producing a deep impression of its danger for religion, that move may not stop at Oxford. Should the theologians of Papism and Protestantism come to an agreement, it would certainly be acting wisely, but that agreement ought to be as general as possible. Such an event may be forwarded by the recent secessions from the Established Church in number and weight sufficient to prove the opportunity of uniting. Moreover, at the present time, the danger lies in the rapid advance of Philosophy. Our indiscriminate charge upon both Theology and Philosophy, in favor of Divine Faith as the umpire, may attract notice in some centuries, but at the present day men will continue to trust to their own conceptions, and, giving them the various names of theological or philosophical—the great primary notion of God will still be abandoned. The common danger may rally the dis-

cordant throng of theologians against the general enemy, and for our part we wish them success, considering the danger to be less, and the harm of a nature more easily supported, because men are accustomed to it. Moreover, with Theology, as we have had already occasion to remark, the Divine Master can always be appealed to; but woe unto those who fall into the hands of Philosophy. We may then expect to see Theology screwed up to a diapason of extreme tightness, and to find Laud renewed if not Pole. So long as the fundamental doctrines of Protestantism remain untouched, there is little danger. But although the two first,—free inquiry and no coercion,—admit of no compromise, yet the position may always be turned by means of the third: the Protestant principle, that admits of the Bible *being*, and not containing the Word of God, this will always furnish a ready handle to those who have courage and wit to lay hold of it, in order to further their plans. The difference between the two Churches, Protestant and Catholic, has been quaintly said to consist “in the latter being infallible, and the former always in the right.” This charge is termed “specious” by Archbishop Whately, who is, unfortunately for us, a theologian. According to his account, Protestant Churches are so many Lambs. It is really irksome to see a good man allow his own feelings to take the place of fact. The fact is, then, that Protestant authority and Protestant interpretation of the Word of God has already committed to the flames some, and to durance vile many, who did not admit of it. It certainly would not be done by Archbishop Whately, but he would not be required for the work. The authority of the Church would be in such a case (if Latitudinarianism were to be excluded) of a very different kind from mere authority in controversy.

The term Catholic is claimed by all sections of Christianity. It is at present most curiously at variance with its original meaning. The Catholics were in primitive Christianity the non-exclusionists, in contradistinction to the Ebionites and the Gnostics. St. Paul was their chief, and all men were admitted. Evidently St. Peter was an exclusionist; he was no Catholic in the primary sense of the term, "all-embracing, universal." That name belongs to Christianity alone. The Papal sectarians are not Catholics in the primary sense, nor are they alone entitled to be called Romish, or Romanists exclusively, for the States of Rome are several, and in Rome are Protestants, although few in number. The real name is Papist, and Popery is in fact the very nature of the doctrine held. But as the term is deemed injurious, it is fit to refrain from using it.

The danger would not be imaginary, should the Christian theologians unite. Scriptural infallibility might be made to serve the same purpose as traditional or Church infallibility, for it would chime in with the prejudices of the multitude. And as nothing would be easier than to gather together an Irish populace, appearances might seem to require in favor of the third principle, in favor of Scripture, a momentary cancelling of the two first. Now "Free inquiry" and "no coercion" are not mere philosophical tenets, they are essentially Christian. They were the binding doctrines which united, three centuries ago, the great Protestant sections against the common enemy. They are above Creeds, which, although admitted to be merely articles of Faith and of Church communion, yet, when held forth by Councils and by Authority as Tests, constitute something of a very positive nature. It may be answered that undoubtedly these tenets are not against Christianity, but that they do not express



sufficiently the nature of that dispensation as a Religion, and that they cannot therefore constitute a part of Christianity. Such an answer would be a necessary consequence of the theological education in which men have been brought up. These principles can never indeed be considered as relating to the Ways or the Nature of the Deity, but they may form a very essential part of His Worship, and therefore of Christianity, which is only seeking our salvation in God, in Him who is only known as Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness. Now doctrines such as these, although they may appear *Truisms*, and bear a semblance of *common-place*, are however the doctrines which seem to us to form the very pith and marrow of that practical Christianity so much spoken of. They cover with a veil the turmoils of Theology, whilst they shield it from the enemies her turbulent temper is forever creating. Essentially defensive, they do not contain a word that can be construed as an offence. The proposition which bears a theological aspect, and which advances that the Bible contains the Word of God, is merely the statement of a matter of fact. They might fearlessly be adopted as the articles of a Test-act, and would not meet an opposing voice. Where is the Protestant that would disavow the glorious principles, in defence of which his forefathers marched to battle, and which have been bequeathed to him as a birth-right? Where is the English Papist who does not daily appeal to these great principles? Where is the philosopher that would not hail the solemn proclamation of the rights of Conscience? Indeed the truth can no longer be hidden: we are merely pleading for the maintenance of what already exists in a somewhat covert guise, and in a form less positive. Here is the Palladium of the State: the safeguard of religious

freedom. Whatever course Theology may take, her steps will be judged according to their agreement with these principles. Should the screw be applied to the present Establishment, should theological tenets again be made the measure of men's capacity for employment in the State, the incompatibility of free inquiry and of the principle of no coercion, and the admission of the Lord being known to Man as Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness, and of Christ being One with Him,—that incompatibility would every day become more and more glaring with those theological tenets. Should the Establishment lean in a more decided manner towards Latitudinarianism, the great Protestant principles which involve all the spirit of Christianity as concerns the mutual relations of men towards each other, and also the very foundation of that religion, *the Revelation* of the Almighty,—these principles alone would prevent the Established Church from becoming a hodge-podge of doctrines entirely inconsistent with each other. In short, these principles would constitute the main articles of Faith. But, what is far more probable, should the Church, sooner or later, without or after attempting to re-establish Theology and the days of Pole and Laud, take the step which has been adopted in Scotland, the State should then uphold the glorious banner towards which, as to the Sun, all sections of Christianity turn invoking; for there is Light, there is Authority, there is Infallibility, there is Mercy, and there is Christ: there would be displayed on Earth He who is Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness. We propose no new theory, but the upholding and careful maintaining of those doctrines which, so long as the present race of sovereigns continue to reign in Great Britain, may be considered as grounded on a rock. We propose principles

altogether practical, for they supported the whole fabric for three centuries. We propose principles to which men could appeal as to an unerring guide, to principles already tried, and in which is found an acquiescence so general as to preclude all dispute and cavilling. In favor of those doctrines implicit assent may be fearlessly invoked, for they are liable to neither misdirection nor excess. Submissive assent is not required. The discordant Theologians will of themselves acknowledge an authority so favorable to all their fancies, for it leaves them to themselves, and only deprives the serpent of its fang. Theology may writhe, and hiss, but would no more instil her poison in the State. She would continue to thrive, but not on human blood. Satan, the offspring of Persian Theology, alone would find cause to repine, for his reign would be drawing near a close. Each separate section could still exalt the worth of its doctrines, and exert itself to extend the sway over more minds than its neighbor. It would be in Great Britain, as in the United States, but with this important difference, that in the former country the great Protestant principles would be upheld by the sovereign, because they constitute his title to the crown. And the day may come when our Transatlantic brethren may find it expedient to have recourse to some such a stay if in time to come Theology, and more especially Popery, should spread over the land her baneful influence. In such an emergency, which may Heaven avert, we would suggest the expediency of inquiring whether there do not remain in Europe descendants of the old man who, in signing the Treaty of Independence, obtained by means of undaunted courage and perseverance, remarked, that as he, the King, had been the last man in England to assent thereto, so he would be the last man in Eng-

land to violate it. In that noble House the great principles of Protestantism are imbibed in earliest years, and such a training more than compensates for the usual personal insignificance of Princes.

The fact is, that whilst the various sections of Christianity generally seek in theological discussion to ground their influence and extend their power, one section is to be found in which deepness of design, an exact knowledge of the real state of things, and temporal power united with theological traditions and long years of sway, constitute an assemblage of conditions which bestow on that section the highest preponderance in all countries where Christianity resides. We speak of Rome, where Church and State form a Unity, that allows the Roman Pontiff to realize on Earth the Kingdom of Christ, and to act on all occasions in a very different manner from the dependent Clergy of the different Christian States. These advantages were rather increased and guaranteed by the Frankish Monarchs than they were founded, for, already one hundred years before Charlemagne, the Bishop or Pope of Rome had found means to separate Italy or the West from Constantinople or the East, and to reign, if not as sovereign, at least as Supreme Chief of the Latin Church. We are forced to illustrate, sufficiently though briefly, the real position of Rome by stating plain matters of fact, in order that the Protestant communities which see in the separation of their communions from the State a pledge of stability, strength and future expansion, may perceive the position in which they would be with respect to Rome if the State did not possess some more powerful means of resistance than their organization, dependent on the different congregations, can possibly furnish. It was only by means of general principles, which left aside all

dogmatic topics and united in one bond of unity the discordant Protestant communities, that Rome was successfully resisted; and at the present day the position is the same, for Rome is ever militant. Rome is faithful to her theological tenets, for she is indeed Theology incarnate. Nothing more advantageous for Rome could happen than the destruction of the Established Church of England, for having only to do with communions and congregations, they would be soon upset in detail, were it not for the existence of the great Protestant doctrines embodied in the Monarchy. Rome foresees with joyful impatience the theological arena about to open in England. As Achilles amidst the Trojan bands, so is Rome amongst the theological hosts of the Reformation. As the burning element increases in strength and intensity by the addition of new fuel, so is Rome when theological intricacies accumulate. But the Spirit of the Reformation "speaks safety to her darling child," and England, secure in the protection afforded by the Crown, may defy Rome, and Theology, and Satan, the foul produce of Theology. Divine Faith may one day hope to soar emancipated from all human conception, either of the Past, of the Present, or of the Future, and mounting directly to the Father Almighty, express our Trust in His Ways in Christ. Many thousand years may be required, however, to baffle Theology, whose troubled waters in the meanwhile will ever threaten to overwhelm the glorious doctrines of the Reformation.

The infallibility of Rome, as a fundamental doctrine, led to that of invariability. The shifts and shirks to which Theology has recourse in order to maintain a species of consistency with this main tenet of Romanism are really curious, and would deserve the admiration of surprise for their fertility were it not for the repulsive, odious

coolness with which truth is sacrificed. The burden of these philosophical iniquities, or denial of the plainest matters of fact, is daily progressing, and the only explanation of the persistence of such a state of things is to be found in the interest of the parties on the one hand, and the incredible superstition of the people on the other. The spirit of Christianity is, however, with them, for they appeal to Christ. Rome has done much to propagate Christianity, although the seed sown by her theologians contained more tares than good grain. As a monument of the Past, the Roman Church may be compared to the Colosseum, which commands respect, but when one reflects on the scenes of blood connected with the majestic ruin, a shudder comes over his frame, and a feeling of repulsion is the never-failing issue of the painful recollection. But to Rome England owes Christianity and Theology, though the Reformers have proved that the plant flourished elsewhere than at Rome. Theology, once acknowledged as an unavoidable evil, would no more be a matter of aversion than are the first views of ignorance. It is because men will have it, that their first conceptions are the only true ones; and, still more, it is because they insist upon your believing their views, that Theology has drawn towards her decrees the Faith which is only due to God and Christ as One with Him, the Almighty. But Man must think and speak of God: it cannot be otherwise; and this necessity of his nature, which is the source of Theology and of Mythology, only finds a stay by referring to the nature of *the Revelation*. There alone is the stronghold of Reason. There alone can she seek for refuge against Theology, against Rome, against the Sorbonne, against Oxford, against Buddhism. But if God be a human conception, oh, then let men bow their heads before Theology! All escape is

precluded. If Mythology has come to be considered as antique, Theology as obsolete and inadequate, modern Philosophy will take its place. But even Rome, Oxford, and the Sorbonne have inhaled the Spirit of Truth, and the Nature and Ways of God even in those high places are invested with the phraseology of the times. But this is only admitting that language may change: it is not sufficient. No language, either ancient or modern; no philosophy, either of the Hindus or of the Greeks, or of the Latins, or of the Germans, can tell of God in terms which represent Him. His Worship alone is given to Man to know of, and the Buddhist only knows of rites, of fasts, and of communions. It is vain to attempt to reform Theology by appealing to a more rational view of the Ways and Nature of the Supreme Being, who is only known to man as the Almighty, and as inconceivable in His Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness. Men must mount to the order of succession of things: they must first become deeply convinced, not of the nature of God, but of the nature of His relation with them. Is God a human conception? then Mythology, Theology, and Philosophy may go hand in hand and struggle for priority. They are of the same *bunch*, and the final result will ever be the same, viz., wrangling and bloodshed. But is God only known as revealed? then His attributes point out not His Nature, but His Way. The man walks with God who worships Him in following the path thus pointed out: and the Unity of Christ with the Father bestows on Christianity the basis of Divine Faith, i. e., Trust in the Almighty. The Spirit of God is in Christianity, not in Theology. In the latter we find human conceptions respecting God. The man who believes in a God revealed, and in the Unity of Christ with Him, laughs at Theology. Show me *Acts* of In-

telligence and Goodness, he exclaims, and I will admit that to be the path of Salvation, and not the explanations of Athanasius or of Arius. Both creeds are of the same value respecting the Nature of God, but Theology finds far greater advantages in adopting the first. But if Rome and Luther admit of the real presence, the Calvinist denies it. True, but the latter Theologian admits of his capability to judge of the matter, and as having a right to maintain that Salvation depends on the believing or not believing of such theological trash. Here is self-righteousness of the blackest hue. If we refer principally to Rome, it is on account of her influence and remaining power. The great Protestant doctrines are as gall and wormwood to her pampered taste; but as to the Theology of the Reformers, the men of Rome are far too deep to be moved at that. It is to them the gale that drives the ship to port in a way which at first may seem quite contrary. The only doctrines before which Rome quails are those to which the affrighted Theologians fled when they implored the Laity. The Theology of Rome soars like the eagle, and dares, like the bird of Jupiter, to face the Sun. Rome, like a bird of prey, sallies from the Vatican, and theological chickens crouch beneath the tutelary wing of the State. And when the air no longer trembles beneath the wing of the royal bird, the dunghill brood poke forth their puny heads, and finding danger past, come out and begin to peck at each other,—the little theological creatures. Some country folks assert that the peck of such birds is venomous. If one may judge of the wounds that Evangelical and reformed Theologians inflict on each other by the impossibility of cure and the protracted pain they occasion, it would appear to be the case. “What got Cudworth for his pains?” asks War-



burton, whose theological flight will outlive Theology as Religion. "In vain had Cudworth endeavored to deserve well of Religion at large and of the Church of England in particular, by fixing the true grounds of morality, by confuting the atheistical arguments of Bayle, and the flagitious principles of Mandeville, by explaining the natures, settling the bounds, and adjusting the distinct rights of Church and State, and by exposing the impious tenet of Religion's being the contrivance of Statesmen. All this went for nothing with the Bigots. He had departed from the old posture of defence. 'His demonstration, *if he could make one of it,*' exclaims the Country Clergyman (2d letter), 'could never make amends for changing that posture of defence and deserting the strongholds.' What would these defenders of Christianity be at?" asks Warburton. "Do they bid you sally out upon the enemy, level his trenches, destroy his works, and turn his own artillery upon himself? By no means. Keep within your *strongholds*, and only prop up the part attacked by his batteries." Warburton, whilst he blames the supineness of the Church, is equally lavish in terms of reproach to the Dissenters, whom he calls "honest madmen."

Speaking of his own case, "Pray what reason," demands Warburton, "has our author to complain? This was the fate of all his betters. It was the fate of Hooker, Hales, Cudworth, Stillingfleet, Taylor. They were called Politiques, Sceptics, Deists, Erastians, Atheists, and what not. Cudworth's case was most particular. Hobbes' steel cap tempted every young Church militant to try his arms. Cudworth, to strip Atheism of all its disguises, penetrated the very darkest recess of Antiquity. Though few readers could follow him, yet the very slowest were able to unravel

his purpose, and yet there wanted not clergymen to say, that under pretence of defending Revelation he wrote in the very manner that an artful Infidel might naturally be supposed to use in writing against it: as having given all the *filthy stuff* he could scrape together out of the sink of Atheism, as a natural introduction to a demonstration of the Truth of Revelation. In a word, that he was an Atheist in his heart, and an Arian in his book. As the advocates of Popery, having joined together the ideas of a God in Heaven and a Vice-God on Earth, assert the denial of the infallibility of the Papal Chair to be a direct tendency to Atheism, so was popular clamor raised against Cudworth. The Zealots (Methodists) inflamed the Bigots (Churchmen), calumny was believed, and the author grew disgusted." And the case was the same with Warburton, and such, we believe, will be the case with every theologian who deems a theological belief a matter of salvation, whilst such belief is merely a human conception of the Deity. If the Lord Jesus was man, if He spoke Chaldaic-Hebrew, if His words, in order to be understood, were necessarily adapted to the conceptions of His disciples, His divine mission was nevertheless accomplished, the saving Grace was bestowed, but without impugning human will; and human will being one with the finite nature of man, he has to learn in order to know. If God deceived man in making him, then was Christ a deceiver. Theology refuses to admit the plain matter of fact that God is only known as revealed, and yet she has nothing to say about Him that can be esteemed equivalent to that fact. But Theology only perceives the weakness of man, and full of self-sufficiency and of self-righteousness she forgets her own condition. The case of Warburton is the case of every theologian. Carried on in spite of his own endeavors, by that unspeak-

able evil called Theology, those who remain steadfast are bigots, whilst those who march boldly forward are zealots. In the eye of Warburton, Whitefield was a "fanatic." And so it has ever been with Theology, because religious error and theological error are one and the same. Now, Religion, if God be revealed, consists in following the doctrines pointed out by His attributes. Acts of Intelligence and Goodness constitute then the true religion: this is duty. For Prayer is a want, a craving of the heart. Theology, especially that of the Calvinist, teaches, fiend-like, that prayer is useless, for predestination stares men in the face. Let the theologians huddle together, the State will be the gainer provided the Protestant doctrines be upheld with a firm hand. And here we would advise men to trust in God, and to put their shoulders energetically to the wheel in case of emergency. Free inquiry, no coercion, and the Bible *containing* the Word of God, are the true principles.

Warburton, as a theologian, could not avoid considering the Church as equivalent to Religion and Christianity. He proves in his admirable work that the working out of Religion and of Christianity is no mere matter of theory effected by men. Only he conceives those men as always right when their theology (Nature and Ways of God) tallies with his own: the others are bigots and zealots. He is very right, we believe, in maintaining it to be the duty of all States to further the spreading of religious principles, but this we understand as meaning the doctrines or attributes of God, not the theological views of such and such sections of Christianity. Here we differ. The civil magistrate may find a ready criterion of Faith by appealing to the authority of the attributes of God, which are, if possible, still more energetically rendered

by the Lord Jesus, who points so particularly to kindred affection. If the civil magistrate seeks for any other criterion he will find none, but then he must consent to give up his own notions respecting the ways and nature of God, and take Him as He is known. If the scene of action were in Turkey, and the civil magistrate a sectary of Mohammed, he would undoubtedly consider his own view as the true one, whilst at Geneva the same functionary would admit no other view than the Calvinistic. Warburton, therefore, was right in saying that some other criterion of the truth or falseness of a religion was requisite, than the opinion of the civil magistrate or of the State. Theology claims this privilege, on the ground that the State is not competent. But here lies the strange and unaccountable error of Christian theologians, who always see Cæsar in the State. And yet Protestants, who admit that the laity are as good members of the Christian community as are the Clergy, repeat the same. Now a Christian State, or a Christian government, being composed of Christians, what better principles on religious subjects can they adopt, as Protestants, than those which united three hundred years ago the various sections of Reformers, and which still continue to preserve their full force and application? Should it be said that it is putting something in the place of Christianity, we answer it is acting under the very Spirit of Christianity. At least, we have diligently sought for a better remedy to the present state of anarchy, but we have found none. The protection of the State would, it is true, become exclusively due to those principles, for no section could claim a superior right, but between themselves equality could scarcely be deemed an injustice. If the Romanists required a more careful scrutiny, the motive will be clearly explained, although

it is no mystery. Would the position of the State be very different from its present one? Do not the theologians speak of the State as Cæsar, and could they do worse? The State might indeed safely promise to put the helm of government into their hands as soon as they were all of one opinion respecting the *nature* and the ways, and the worship of God and of Christ. The State would remain content, in the meanwhile, with the Spirit; for the Spirit is God and Christianity would not thrive the less if no Established Church should exist as a National one, for indeed either that Church must prove that the other sections of Protestantism are not national in a way which it is difficult to conceive, or else the title must one day be given up. Should the latter event occur, the Episcopalian Church would, in all probability, expel the lax members. And as in the United States the said Church flourishes, so it might be expected to do in England. But then in America the Episcopalian Church is far more latitudinarian than her sister of England. We indeed very much doubt whether the Oxford theologians could avoid joining Rome; it would certainly be more consistent that men who aim at founding or restoring an infallible and impeccable Church should be brought to adopt that step, than that they should maintain an equilibrium altogether unnatural. The adhesion would be gradual and occur individually. We are far from undervaluing the practical influence that will ensue when the decisive move of the Established Church shall take place, either in the sense of Romanism or in that of Latitudinarianism. But that being a theological matter, we have nothing to do with it save to prove that, in either case, the maintenance of the doctrines of freedom of conscience, and of the Word of God being in the Bible, constitute a thing of far greater import

for religion and Christianity than all the various alterations adopted by Theology. To this should it be objected that the latter doctrine respecting the Bible is in itself a theological one, we answer that it is the foundation of all, for it involves *the revelation* of the Almighty. There is the real *fundamental of fundamentals*, for it is Divine Faith as the foundation of Christian Faith.

Another important question may be made by the theologian. Whence should proceed the direction of the Education of the country? The partisans of the Establishment contend that the Church, meaning the Episcopal, and the Church alone should possess that direction. The argument adopted by one of the ablest of the advocates of this system, Mr. Gladstone, is at once simple and peremptory. Christianity requires a Christian education. The State has a conscience, and that conscience says that the religion which is true can alone be taught. A Christian State must admit that no education deserves that name which is not founded upon pure and Christian doctrine. This doctrine must form an essential and indispensable part of all school instruction. It is impossible to give this instruction in any general form, comprehending the tenets common to the various sects of professing Christians. Such an attempt at generalized instruction would lead to latitudinarianism, to unbelief, and finally to atheism. Neither would it be justifiable to communicate separate systems of religious knowledge in the same school, according to the various professions of the scholars; that practice would lead to indifference, to confusion, and to scepticism. Still less would it be justifiable to establish separate schools for the different sects, giving to each their separate and distinctive religious instruction. The conscience of the State commands that the

true religion should also be the religion established by law; therefore as no education should be encouraged which is not connected with religion, so no religion should be taught but that which is true; and as that religion which is established according to the conscience of the State is the only true religion, it is inconsistent with principle that the State should encourage, or aid in any way whatsoever, any schools or establishments for education in which the religion of the Established Church is not exclusively taught.

To say that schools built or supported out of the general taxation of the country, that is by the State, must therefore receive a theological instruction of a peculiar nature, "which, however, cannot be common to the various sects of professing Christians," is a strange admission. It is, however, the natural consequence of a theological education, which only sees Christianity in the special views inculcated respecting the nature and ways of God, more particularly in the Christian dispensation. This doctrine of Mr. Gladstone is sound Theology: it is indeed altogether worthy of Rome, the fountain head of those opinions which hold that religious instruction consists principally therein, whilst in fact those views are as it were incidental, and can never claim a higher value than human conceptions on a mystery by its very nature altogether impenetrable. We know that in such schools the parents who are Catholics or Romanists object even to the Scriptures, but they surely would not demur to their children being taught that God is only known to man by Revelation, and that our Trust or Faith in Him is not the result of human investigation, but the consequence of that Revelation by which he was made known as the God Almighty, as Supreme Power and Wisdom and Goodness; that therefore men repose their trust in Him, and that no

investigation can fathom His inconceivability as to His ways and nature, but that His attributes, which find in man a faint analogy, constitute the road in which we may be said to walk with Him: that the Unity of Christ with the Father is the identity of Trust in God through the Law of Christ, or Christian Faith. Assuredly the most bigoted person could never object to his child trusting in God, whilst learning His ways on Earth. Why has the practical spirit of the country escaped the sophistry of Mr. Gladstone? Because every one is convinced that Theology only constitutes a very confined part of Faith, although she pretends to explain every thing. Still we by no means deny the right of parents to superintend the theological beliefs of their children; but we are prepared to deny that they have the right of preventing them from receiving lessons of Intelligence and Goodness, i. e., of learning and of morality; or that the State has not a right to insist upon the main tenet of Christ—that of kindred affection, and of restraint on the baser passions. Now here is real religious instruction: this can be proved in the teeth of Philosophy to constitute “walking with God,” and not the theological history, geology, astronomy, chronology of three or four thousand years back, that theologians with solemn mien hold forth to children as learning from Heaven!

The voluntary system which is proposed, and which appears to meet with general approbation, would constitute a state of things extremely favorable to Rome, unless either the Houses of Parliament or the Sovereign were *especially* charged with the care of upholding the principles of the Reformation: *Free inquiry, Freedom of conscience, The Bible containing the word of God.* We lay stress on the term *especially* because, although tacitly admitted, those principles would more



than ever be required. This may seem contrary to fact, since the establishment being then abolished, no danger may appear to threaten religious liberty. But if the Episcopal Church ceases to be the national Church, that circumstance would prove a positive tendency of theological opinion towards Rome. The scission which is about to occur has been occasioned by the predominance of the Romanist theology over what is termed Latitudinarianism. Such a tendency must one day bring over to Rome all or the greater number of the High Churchmen; the power and influence of the Romanists would be greatly increased in the country, and there would exist good reason for placing in safety the fundamental principles of the Reformation. We naturally claim the right of looking to the safety of the principles we deem the most important. In so doing we believe we would be upholding the doctrines of the majority. The voluntary system would be in fact the renunciation of those principles by each section of Christians, in favor of their non-theological views. The principles are not theological, and even the latter proposition respecting the Bible is *a positive matter of fact*. The State, or the civil magistrate, would then have nothing to do with Theology in taking them under his especial care, and civilization would have nothing to fear.

Another danger that the voluntary system would involve would be the relative weakness of all the sections compared with Rome, especially if with Ireland the Oxford theologians formed one party. As a Church Rome still possesses great riches, although as a State her resources may be contemptible. The theological turmoils that would ensue, should the expected separation take place, would be all to the advantage of Rome, for, it has been often remarked, how very similar the

absolute principles of many sectarians are with those of Rome. There would be much difficulty, no doubt, to hinge the Romanist principles on the Calvinist; but there is no knowing what twist theological opinions may take. Some theologian might yet be found, who, by means of the pantheistical notions of the Calvinist respecting free will, might impinge even upon the more rational views respecting the real presence. At all events, leaving Theology to her fate in whatsoever form she may appear, we would insist upon the necessity of placing our great Protestant doctrines beyond the doubtful contingency of events, and the still more doubtful good-will of the theological sects. We do not blame Rome for acting as she does. Rome conceives she has a duty to perform. Every Church has the same notion, and therefore attempts to extend her doctrines as the only Christian. If every one must be brought to have the same conception of Him who is only known as revealed, why not at once name Him the Almighty as in the beginning? but, wiser than formerly, refrain, if not from judging of His ways and nature, at least from considering such opinions to constitute religious instruction. It is the Spirit of Theology that inspires Rome. Now, Theology evidently was of service when no other views could cope with Mythology. The devil was a theological inspiration, and he certainly has rendered good service. But until the staid notion of a future state, and the certitude that Hell-fire is a weak substitution for what Science foresees in another world as possible,—until such opinions become prevalent, it is a matter of fact, that with theologians, with or without canonicals, to deny the devil is as much as to deny God. The Church of Rome that is said to have represented at some time or the other Truth and Freedom, and that still finds writers who

assert the same,—the Church of Rome always kept in mind that material power was a necessary condition to the possession of moral authority, and her freedom consisted in making free with every thing that was an obstacle to the acquirement of that power. So long as Rome found councils on her side, and could crush kings and nations as *heretical*, that road was the one she adopted. But History furnishes clear and evident proof that Rome does not merely aspire to extirpate heresy, but that she considers temporal power as a necessary means to forward her theological views, because they at one time chimed with religion. Ever since Constantine left Rome for Byzantium, and the capital of the Western Empire was transferred to Milan and Ravenna, the temporal power of the Pope at Rome had become altogether preponderant. To require that Rome should abnegate a doctrine that has proved so useful to her interests, is tantamount to requiring of her to renounce what she conceives to be Christianity. With her the Church alone is Christianity, and the Christian community is not the Church. We believe that every section of Christian worship holds *practically* the same opinion, and we own that we should deeply regret to see what we consider as the foundation of a true Christian society, viz., the main doctrines of Protestants, confided to such a step-mother as Theology. The Faith of a Christian is Faith in God or Trust in the Almighty; Christianity, as an expression of that Faith, admits of various forms, but the scope is ever the same, provided that it be admitted that *infallibility* does not belong thereto, and that Christianity as a finite mean may and must vary. We do not seek for Unity with Channing in Christian love and affection, but in Divine Faith, in Trust in the Attributes which constitute all we know of God. In

these Attributes Goodness and Mercy are included, but as inseparably connected with Reason.

A summary view of the doctrines of the Catholic or High Church, as well as the Papal, party on authority, and that of one of the Latitudinarian doctrines of Christianity, that of Channing, will not be here out of place. We admit with the ultra-Catholic party, that *Force* is not *Authority*, because Force may not be Justice. True Authority however exists; those who exert it admit of its finite nature, and conceive it as a finite attempt at the expression of Power and Wisdom and Goodness. Christianity is an attempt of that kind, according to our conception of that dispensation. Trust in God does not prevent men from placing a finite, mutable, temporary or relative (positive) trust in their own views until a more appropriate view shall occur. But the very admission of the finite character of the human efforts that constitute Christianity, and what is termed Universality or Catholicity, is the denial of any other point of Unity than Trust in God, and the *renewal* of His Revelation in Christ. The very subordination of society to the Attributes of God, does not involve any absolute view of those Attributes: it does not preclude change. The mode adopted to-day may not be the same in five hundred years, but the scope would still remain unchanged. When therefore the Catholics (Romanists) declaim against the spirit of inquiry as leading to separation or to sectarianism, and as being in direct opposition with the spirit of authority, (see De Maistre, De Bonald,) we conceive them to be sinning against the Holy Ghost, against the Spirit of God, of Him who alone constitutes the Supreme, the Infinite, the Absolute. All Theology that does not admit of the Trusting of the Finite in the Infinite, and that enacts for its own tenets,

its own conceptions, the Faith or Trust which is due to God alone,—that Theology, be it Catholic or Protestant, sins against the Spirit of God. Nor does the denial of the absolute nature of finite thought constitute, as the Catholics say it does, the necessity of every man's imagining himself to be his only authority, and therefore as the very annihilation of all authority, rendering all subordination impossible, and society a mere state of anarchy. Neither political authority, nor the authority of knowledge, nor that of morality is impaired by the admission of their finite nature; that admission would indeed rather tend to the adoption of artificial means of rendering them less subject to change than to prompt men to adopt incessantly new ones. This constitutes what is called keeping the mind open to evidence. It is not necessary to admit, with certain thinkers, that all political authority emanates from God himself, and that as such Man is bound to conform his thoughts and demeanor thereto, in order to acquire a fixed and durable standard of authority. We term this the substituting of the Finite for the Infinite, we liken it to the sinning against the Spirit of God, for Divine Faith is Trust in the Almighty and is absolute, but human Faith is finite, and relative. Christian Humility is far more consistent with the *finite* admission of all human notions of Power and Wisdom and Goodness, than with that of their possessing any *absolute*, fixed, and unchangeable expression. The *Instability*, the *Variations* of the Protestants admit less of *Pride* than the pretended *Infallibility* of the Catholics. The dogmatism that aims at admitting of the finite views of the Attributes of God as finite conceptions of the Supreme Being revealed as the Almighty, and denies the existence of immutable laws in finite conceptions, admitting His Will alone as the Absolute,

and Trust in Him as alone obtaining, that dogmatism conceives human action, human knowledge, and human goodness as tallying with the more absolute notion of the same in God, and that is sufficient, if it be admitted that human views can only be of a finite nature. God is no deceiver because the finite attributes which express His Being may in the next world possess a very different aspect.

When we say that Church authority is of a finite nature, we allude to the various conceptions adopted by Christian communities respecting the terms under which the Revelation of God's Existence and His renewal in Christ have been expressed. In maintaining that human Will is not to be conceived as cancelled by that appeal, but as excited to action in a given path, we say that the nature and ways of Him, only known by *the Revelation*, cannot constitute that path, which is to be sought for in some finite conceptions, and that *His Attributes* are those conceptions. With us the Revelation is not the Scriptures, but is contained in the Scriptures. That Revelation is *His Existence, His Word, His Name*. Channing admits of the Creation or Nature as the first Revelation, and as the first school of Reason. Now we would have the term reserved for that peculiar dispensation made to Man in the beginning, and transmitted by him to his children and successors. With us the fundamental notion of religion is the Existence of God. Trust or Faith in Absolute or Almighty Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, is the only adequate expression of Faith in God. This alone is an Absolute notion, but those of the attributes, of right and wrong, of legality and illegality, of duty, are only absolute in respect of God. They constitute the scope or aim of Man, but all such attempts are in themselves finite. We do not conceive with Channing

*the Revelation* as based on Reason, and the latter as denying her own existence in denying the former. Reason is an abstraction, and as such comes of itself spontaneously. Now, we maintain that man knows not spontaneously of God; and that if it be proved that the idea of God is a mere notion or conception of Reason, his existence thereby dwindles down to the rank of an abstraction. But Reason, we say, cannot admit of God otherwise than as He was revealed. His attributes, as absolute, become thereby *an aim*, a scope for all her efforts. The path to follow lies there, and not in Theology. We place *the Revelation* above Reason, but human Will and Reason constitute the finite means of obeying the Call of God. Superstition seeks for favor in Mysticism and Asceticism. Here the Buddhist is on a level with the Christian. But Christianity, as the rational attempt at carrying out the Revelation; as obeying and seeking to reverence God, does not consist of Fasts and Penance, but in Repentance, or better conduct in all the bearings of man to man. To the Christian, the finite nature of Man is a fact above all Reason; he listens to the theological tales of his having been created perfect, and inquires whether Theology can conciliate that supposed *perfection* with what she calls "the fall." The Christian admits of the fact, but leaves the theological view to the theologians. The divinity of Christ is the unity of the Son with the Father, therefore Trust in Christ is Trust in Him who sent him. And if Mercy is more particularly inculcated by the law of Christ, that can only be in relation to the errors of Judaism. Christianity, as a dispensation, is from God, for *the Revelation* is the same. But the human mind, the Will of Man, and finite means, are to carry out that dispensation. Christianity, therefore, precludes Unity as an attempt of human efforts.

That Unity can only exist *in its basis*, which is Trust in God. The Regeneration of Man is not a mere matter of Theology, it is not to be carried out by priest-craft, but by Christian efforts, i. e., finite attempts in the path of God.

The superiority of Christianity over Reason consists in its basis and in its aim, but Reason or the human mind, which includes all human Thought, cannot be separated from what we term Christianity. Pantheistical intolerance is not limited to Philosophy. Rome and Geneva each sin against the Spirit in laying claim to the adequacy of finite thought in relation to the nature of God. But Rome admits of the Church's possessing power, as *infallible*, of altering many points of doctrine. The power that the Catholics grant to the Priest we would not deny to the Christian, but then the criterion cannot be mere human or individual will. Here the attributes of God constitute a firm basis of Faith. With Channing the Universal Church is Virtue and Morality, for purity of mind is independent of the world, and virtue is nothing local; virtue is confined to no given spot. We conceive the Community of God to consist of those who Trust in Him as the Almighty, whilst they actively aim at attending by finite means to the appeal or call made by that *Revelation* to human Will. Morality and virtue are elementary parts of His Worship; and as prayers and rites are expressions of human feeling towards Him, so is virtue an expression of Divine Faith towards man, for there man walks with God, humbly and finitely, as he does in the active carrying out of knowledge and relative Truth. The power of the clergy is far better displayed in exciting the human Will in the path of God, than in denying to human Will all value, and always harping upon the same theological strings. The connection between



human Will and a future life involves the admission of the former possessing direct influence thereon, and Trust in God, as absolute, leaves ample career to all finite conceptions, such as those to which Science opens the doors of Imagination. The Unitarian system, which undertakes to conciliate Religion and Philosophy, not by means of mutual and disdainful tolerance, but by conceiving Christianity as the issue and upshot of Philosophy, and the Revelation as the perfection of Reason, is not the ground we adopt. That system is indeed a worthy attempt at tranquillizing the hearts and minds of many who are distressed and sorely tormented with the doubts and difficulties attendant on the dogmatic points of Christianity. Our aim is the same, but we have been led by matter of fact to seek in Faith or Trust in God that Unity which the deep conviction of Dr. Channing places in the Love of God. But we conceive Channing as acting inconsistently with his own doctrines, when, after considering human Reason as the divine masterpiece, as the great secret of the Creation, the deepest of all mysteries, and after expressing as much wonder at the disdain of the Sceptic as at that with which the devotee regards it, and after saying that if he were required to give up Christianity or to renounce his Reason, he would unhesitatingly concede the former, he nevertheless concludes by giving up Reason for Feeling or Love. No thinker ever pleaded more strenuously than Channing in favor of Reason and in its being inseparable from Christianity. He honors human Reason, not from pride, but from piety. Considering Truth to be the end and aim of the creation of Man, Channing sees in Reason the path that leads thereto. Therefore with him each doctrine that attacks Reason or human Intelligence attacks God and Christianity. For man, as a reasonable

or rational being, is made in the likeness of God; and Christianity, without Reason, no longer finds a basis, for Reason is the only light given to human nature in order to understand what Christianity can mean. Channing conceives Christianity as elevating, exalting, and fortifying Reason, that great gift of God that places Man above the brute. Christianity, according to Channing, very far from being antagonistic to Reason, cannot be distinguished from Reason, which serves her as a guide and a friend. Still, as we have remarked, it is not in Reason that Channing finds the link that may serve to unite the millions who seek after truth, each man with a different step, and all in various ways. Where then does he find that Universal Church, that Catholicity, that common ground open to all, and on which Christians stand united, although differing in theological or dogmatic points of view? Channing does not admit that Unity can exist in the dogmas of Christianity, because it is impossible that all men can have the same apprehension of truth. The adoption of a common symbol may indeed serve to veil over or to conceal differences, but it can never efface them. No confession ever prevented Schism. The human mind, ever restless, cannot admit of limitation. Now, here Channing abandons Reason, because Unity cannot be sought for therein, since her very essence is to seek, and since every man views Truth in a different light. He therefore conceives the principle of union to be placed by God, not in the mind, but in the heart, not in Reason, but in Virtue, and as only to be sought for there. Love constitutes, with Channing, the true and only link between Christians, the only universal Church where Unity is to be found. That principle exists in the words of Christ, which are a summary of all the Law and the Prophets, viz., the Love of God and

of our neighbor. The morality of Christianity and of the Scriptures lies therein, for whoever is penetrated with the love of God and of his neighbor, and makes it the rule of his life, that man fulfils the law, that man is a member of the Universal Church of Christ. We need not say that Channing sees in the Romanists brothers and rivals in the path of Christian love, and many a bright model is pointed out by him in the ranks of the Catholic Church. Slavery finds in him a determined foe, and all attempts at enslaving intelligence are by him treated with unfeigned and deserved contempt. In short, the whole tenor of the writings of Channing may be said to teem with an elevated and affectionate spirit, even when he merely aims at effect. But it is not the voice of a Romanist that we hear, it is the voice of a Reformer, of one whose tongue would be torn out by the roots if Romanism still directed the minds of men, for Channing makes light of Theology, and admits of Salvation beyond the pale of Rome.

Although we are ready to admit that the deep stress laid by Channing on Christian love and affection, on the love of God and of our neighbor, is in perfect unison with the main tenet of practical Christianity which inculcates restraint on Egotism or Selfishness, whilst it teaches that the feelings of others constitute a criterion and an aim; still we cannot admit of the lowering of Reason or of rational experience even in favor of the doctrine of Christian love or Charity; for Christian Charity includes the dictates of the highest Intelligence, the relative value of which bestows on that feeling of brotherly affection a practical worth, without which the best intentions too often prove an evil and not a good. To seek for Unity in Love is, we believe, the admitting of the aim as the starting point. The well-known maxim of Augustin,

“In things certain, Unity; in things doubtful, Divinity; and in all things, Charity,” contains, we think, even after a period of many centuries, the whole pith of Divine or religious Faith. The positive views of Augustin respecting the authority of the Church may have suffered deep alterations in the minds of many Christians on account of the corrupt practices of Rome, and the too evident and glaring error of the doctrine of *Infallibility*; therefore *Unity*, so long admitted as existing in the Faith which men had in the Church, since Faith in God and Faith in the Church were conceived by the Christian community to be identical,—Unity came to be sought for in things which of their very nature admit only of *diversity* or latitude. And yet the same fond hope still continues, like a long cherished illusion, to haunt the minds of most Christians, who conscientiously believe that if the tenets of their Theology,—if their Church were admitted generally, Unity would then flourish. A poet of some celebrity, and an avowed enemy to Christianity in its dogmatic sternness, is said to have often expressed the belief that had Christianity been grounded on Charity, and not on Faith, that Religion would ever remain unshaken. This opinion of Shelley savors somewhat of the views of Channing, and is met by the same objection, viz.: that Faith or Trust or belief, as a practical and positive feeling, cannot be denied without admitting with Hume that in all things it constitutes the main element of Thought, and is the only certitude we possess. We have dwelt earnestly, and we hope successfully, on the fallacy of many modern writers, who, because all rational opinion as well as every irrational one is naturally accompanied by the feeling of belief, or Faith, have maintained that since Reason and Faith always thus go together, Faith (meaning Trust in

God) is a natural feeling and God's Existence is thereby certified. If, indeed, it sufficed to believe in a thing to render the thing certain, the argument would be unanswerable. We have therefore come to the conclusion, that the modern doctrine of conceiving the natural feeling of belief to be altogether the same thing as Divine Faith or Trust in God, is a mere quibble, and an attempt, either voluntary or perhaps unintentional, at equivocation in a matter which less than all others can admit of it. Now, certitude, which alone can command Unity, is indeed of the same nature as belief or Faith or Trust. That feeling as a positive element of Thought cannot be discarded. Our knowledge of the actual world was named, we have shown, by the ancients, Faith or instinctive belief, which assures us of the real existence of the objects we perceive. *The Revelation* of the Existence of the Almighty is indeed adapted to this feeling, but appears only to have been transmitted. The feeling is natural and rational, but the Supreme Being, the Great Object, was revealed to that feeling. Divine Faith or Trust in God we conceive to be the natural basis, or indeed the foundation of all religion, and most especially of Christianity. Trust in God, and Love to our fellow-creatures, and the humble hope that our endeavors shall prove effectual—in short, Faith, Hope, and Charity, or the Christian virtues, go hand in hand, but without Reason, or Knowledge, which must be learned, their practical bearings are, we apprehend, altogether inane. This is not the admission that the laws of Science are alone the laws of God; this is no assimilation of the pulpit—from whence the Will is excited to action in the path of God—to the chair of Science, where the laws of gravitation and of molecules as well as of number or of space are expounded;

and yet the Will considers such laws as subservient to a higher law, to the action of Man. Science directed by human Will can bestow blessings upon thousands. The dire forebodings of a Malthus can only be thwarted by Science, for those dark prophecies are no vain words, but are facts which must be looked at full in the face. Intelligence or the issue thereof, Knowledge, is with Goodness an attribute of the Almighty. The paths of Wisdom are also the paths of God, no less than those of Mercy or of Charity.

But conjointly with Trust or Faith in God, mutual love or Christian affection assumes a positive character when that Trust points to the Attributes of the Almighty as the road to be followed. But unless Christian brotherhood is mutual, and unless Christian affection is inspired by Wisdom, the issue may prove very different from what might be expected. We do not allude to "philosophy and vain deceit," or to presumptuous and absurd speculations, but to the more sedate and certain (although, as finite, ever subject to modification) lessons of experience. We need only point to the deep and constant difficulties which are inherent in the distribution of help or succor to the needful, in order to be understood. Christian Charity, therefore, embraces the whole means of effectuating the end, i. e., the fulfilling of the aim pointed out by Christ.

According to these views, the Church of Christ can never be distinguished from the Christian community that aims at accomplishing the Divine Laws; and, as it is generally understood in Protestant communities, at acting in accordance with the Spirit of Christianity, so that many measures may be perfectly Christian and yet quite temporary. The man who by physical, chemical, or any scientific means, should deliver a city or a community from plague and pestilence would be

acting in conformity with the law of Christ. But to say that the Rites of Christianity are alone binding is a matter that we leave with Theology.

The Church we admit of is the General Universal Christian or Common Church, that acknowledges Christ as One with the Word. As to the terms Universal, or Catholic or General, the term Community is perhaps equally expressive: no distinction of human race being the basis of the doctrine. For the *Christian Community* would signify the *common possession of Christ*. As to the Greek term *Catholic*, (we have seen that Saint Peter was no Catholic,) it is evidently subject to give rise to misconceptions. And as many Protestants appear to have a very erroneous notion of the Roman Catholic Church, we shall attempt to place that Church before them in its real light. We shall thus more clearly elucidate our own position, which, as we maintain also in a measure the doctrine of Intolerance, may be wrongly interpreted or misunderstood.

#### OF ROMANISM.—MIRACLES.

The general surprise occasioned not only in Great Britain, but among the whole body of Reformed Christianity, in perceiving the most learned theologians of the Church of England on the point of merging once more into the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church, proves that the real state of things is far from being generally known; or, if known, not sufficiently attended to. To admit of the right of individual interpretation and not to expect the establishment of innumerable contradictory doctrines, in a word, of Latitudinarianism, was to admit of impossibility. And yet

that has been and is still the case. *Unity* is the general cry, and *Diversity* the Universal issue. The theologians who clearly perceived that *Unity* was impossible on the theological ground adopted by Protestantism, and consciously unwilling to recede from that ground, have found no other means of avoiding that inevitable step than by recurring to the primary conceptions of that Church or section of Christianity in which the primary doctrines admitted by the Councils were carefully preserved. The Reformers have acted in the same manner, but in another direction. They seek in primary doctrine their standard of Belief, but they seek for it, as it were, in the primary conceptions themselves. The clash of opinion, at one time followed even amongst the Reformers by inveterate hostilities, had been gradually silenced. An apathetic torpor had succeeded, because the scandal of contention respecting the Nature and the Ways of God, lowering such sublime Truths, could not be avoided but by having recourse to the adoption of that great Protestant principle,—the right of conscience. But strange to say, instead of admitting that the ground had been ill chosen, and that such matters were above all human conception, since every Christian admits of the Existence of God as *revealed*, they persevered, and they were allowed to pass as matters of indifference. Now can any position be conceived more intolerable for a religious mind than to feel deeply, and yet to be debarred from action, and this in virtue of his own fundamental doctrine. This feeling was indeed partly quieted in consequence of the opinion to which many Protestant divines resorted, and which considered Christianity to be more truly genuine and religious in proportion as it opened wider its arms to embrace and enclose more conflicting doctrines. The fallacy of this method of making a virtue of neces-



sity, this rejection of all strict dogmatism, appeared too glaring to many conscientious minds; but, faithful to the bent of the human mind, they did not admit that since, according to their own tenets, the Almighty was only known by Revelation, it was adopting a ground altogether untenable to dogmatize on His Nature and His Ways. With them particular doctrines do not, as with the Romanist, form a whole each of which particular tenet it is absolutely necessary to admit in order to belong to the Church. The issue, we repeat, was Indifferentism; whilst Rome, maintaining the immutability of her doctrines, and the Infallibility of the Supreme Head, reappeared on the field of Theology well disciplined, perfectly consistent in the path of error she had adopted, and claiming at the same time all the privileges of individual right of conscience against the Reformed communities, whilst all such privileges are in fact in direct opposition to the very spirit of the Church of Rome.

Now, if Theology be indeed the field of Religion, then Latitudinarianism is an evil deeply to be regretted; and we know of no other advice to give than to avoid forming any opinion on the subject, submit to the Church that styles herself the Church of God, and esteem nothing light or unimportant which she communicates. The Catholic, admitting, as an individual that uses his rights of conscience, of the institution of the Holy Mass, and daily attending at what he deems a representation of an adorable sacrifice, receives therefrom a devotion to the Church of his choice which is of a nature far more approaching to Fanaticism than to any other feeling, and which is perpetually fed at short intervals by the freedom which his conscience receives and allows of, from Absolution conferred by Men who carry the Almighty

about on a plate, and who confer the Source of all Existence under the form of a Wafer. But Rome is at least consistent in absurdity. Theology with Rome is altogether sacred ground. With her the Church is God, and the Chief of her choice is the Vicar of God on Earth. And if the germ of dissolution exists in that Church, it is owing to her permitting certain doctrines of science to obtain after having, as with Galileo, openly punished such doctrines as contrary to God.

To what then must men submit who would embrace the tenets of Rome? To the Cardinals, Archbishops, Bishops, &c., who, under the authority of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, teach and govern the Church, without admitting of any other *right* of control, submitting to *Might* alone. These are the *successors* of the Apostles to whom it has been said, "*Ite et docete omnes gentes.*" they, as well as the Apostles, have received the influence of the breath of Christ. All substitution of private judgment to that of those who govern the Church, under any pretext, is acting against the Word of God, and the Holy Church, for it is acting contrary to what has ever existed since the coming of Christ. To act in this manner is, according to Rome, to appeal from an authority instituted by God Himself, to mere individual judgment. Such is Rome, and such will she remain.

But, it may be objected, the Gallican Church is Catholic, and yet acknowledges the temporal power of the Pope. But in fact that Church (see Dupin) only admits of the rights of Papacy in spiritual matters, and even these are limited, and the primacy of the Pope is restricted to the right of acting as guardian of the sacred deposit of Faith, and *in conforming those acts to the canonical rules.* These liberties, maintained by

Bossuet, are considered as schismatic by Rome, and is only supported as *temporary*. We need not speak of Heretical England, where *Union* with Rome is still conceived to be possible by many. Now it is an utter *Impossibility*; Submission is alone possible. The great fundamental doctrine of Rome altogether opposes such a union, for, according to that doctrine, one Church alone can exist. And here we repeat, on a very different ground, it is true, with Rome, *Unus Deus, una fides est*; but our Infallibility is Trust or Faith in the Almighty; our Immutability, Distrust in all human conception respecting Him only known as existing as the Father Almighty, ever One.

Respecting the impossibility of Union between the various Theologians, we shall refer the reader to the whole account of the negotiations between Bossuet and Leibnitz on this point during a certain period of the last century. We shall merely say that, according to Tabaraud, it is the general opinion in France that the Catholics erred in insisting on the *Infallibility of the Pope*, whilst it was the *Infallibility of the Church* that ought to have been particularly upheld, as also the divine primacy of the Holy See. But this would still constitute Schism. Complete Unity is Submission, for all Reformation coming from without constitutes the denial of the Infallibility of the Church, and is at the bottom a system of Incredulity which is necessarily contained in its very principle.

That Theology constitutes a ground altogether untenable for Protestantism, is furthermore made evident by the fact of the Reformed Theologian admitting that a member of the Church of Rome does not, thereby, incur the loss of salvation. This forms a strong argument in the hands of Bossuet; and we own that we could find no satisfactory explanation in

the doctrine of universal Toleration, and unwillingness to admit of any religion to be in the wrong, which is generally adduced to explain why the Protestant should not candidly maintain that Romanism was Damnation. Now let the ground of Theology be given up as the ground of Faith, placing Trust in God merely in the fact of *the Revelation* of His Existence as the Almighty: let it be admitted that all we know of Him is the Word, and that that Name has ever signified the All-Powerful, Wise, and Perfect Being; let these be the *primary Appeal* to His Creature, leaving him full scope for the display of Will, though inspiring Moses, when the time was, with a mission *harmonizing* with the primary revelation, and strengthened with *Commands*, which to this day are perfect models of Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, and which, though as such *Divine*, are nevertheless the brightest gems of Human Society that Experience could have chosen. Let the same ground be taken in *the Revelation* renewed in Christ. Theology will then be a sealed letter, a mystery incomprehensible, and merely consisting in the fact of that bright passage of Christ on Earth; Christ, the man, admitted as human and his language as such, so far as human knowledge unshackled can reach; but the doctrine as *Divine*, a doctrine comprising the Law and the Prophets, in the Love of our Neighbor: a doctrine that, whilst it seals the fate of Idolatry, stamps on the Law a higher and purer Morality without its being less practical.

Respecting the person of Christ, we only admit of the plain matter of fact as we derive it from His bitterest enemies, the Jews. Their explanations, as well as those of the Apostles, point to events perfectly astounding. Our conclusions can only relate to the conviction that such events really took place, although by

their very nature no rational account can be given. To him who believes in God, or even to one who, without believing in a God, is well aware of the fact that man and woman appeared on earth unconceived and unborn, the fact of such an event occurring is not in itself an impossibility. The worst feature in the case is the common practice of those who seek to impose on the credulity of nations or tribes, having often had recourse to such an origin for the hero of their tale. As regards God and matter of fact, nothing more possible, for even those who believe that men and women appeared on Earth by thousands unconceived and unborn at the beginning, cannot surely deny the possibility of a similar occurrence. The doubt then is relating to Man; and if other circumstances did not concur in testifying of the Divine Nature of the Revelation of the Word renewed in Christ, human testimony alone would be insufficient. This event and the miracles of Christ, without the general harmony of things, and especially that of leaving Man to follow his own Will after forcibly striking his imagination, and thus forcibly impressing on his mind that doctrines, thus made known, were worthy of unreserved devotion and adhesion,—those events alone would have no more meaning than meteors in the Heavens, and Auroras Boreales in the North. The fact is that after having found so much told in Eastern and Western Mythology of miracles and wonders, it is impossible not to admit of the well-known maxim that it is the doctrine that proves the miracle, and not the miracle the doctrine. This maxim, which the Jesuits adduced against the miracles cited by Pascal, and which ought to have prevented their having recourse themselves to miracles in too many cases, is the one we have adopted. And the only exception we make to this rule is the sudden con-

version of St. Paul. This was a miracle of Christ, for the writings and acts of St. Paul testify that he did not labor under any hallucination. To admit without demur of Supernaturalism would be denying it; it would be doing as does Theology, that admits of God being known solely by Revelation, and yet insists upon men's admitting of her explanations and conceptions respecting Him. A mere supernatural event without some circumstance connected therewith is of no avail. It is the circumstance that man can interrogate. If that circumstance in the Christian miracles is the foundation not only of doctrines really, though slowly, practical, but also unites in harmony with foregoing events, not merely theological, but rational, and moral, as the Mosaic mission, the circumstance then becomes for the investigator a motive of admitting its possibility on account of Faith in Divine Power. In short, and we repeat it, the miracles proved the doctrine to the Apostles; to us the doctrine proves the miracles; for as without the miracles they would not have believed the doctrine, so without the latter we could not believe the miracles. As to Socinian interpretations, or the Exegesis of a Paulus, all we have to say is, that we do not possess any circumstantial accounts, any positive *data* by which our judgments could be rightly directed in such cases. And, moreover, all Theology, as theoretical, being reduced by the Emancipation of Faith to *Trust* in the Almighty made known in His Word, therefore denies any other logical conclusion besides the Fact of that Appeal or Call on Human Will, by which the *Divine Will* leaves to Man full action and voluntary display of Thought. Nor does Theology, as practical Religion, admit of absolute notions, for being, as Religion, the practical carrying out of the Word, it involves Acts

of Wisdom and Intelligence, of Goodness and Mercy, leaving aside, as Superstition, mere mental Contemplation on the Nature and Ways of Him who is acknowledged by the fundamental principle to be above all human conception, and is to be recognized as such by rational investigation. Now, Religion incorporates as *Divine* certain positive conditions or laws which obtain between man and man and participate of the Divine Nature only so far as God is known in His Word, as All-Powerful, and Wise, and Good. Such we have seen to be the Divine Commands of Moses, which are no less positive (relative) conditions of human society, without which no society can exist, and which, after a lapse of many thousand years, shine forth as the beacons of Humanity, with unfaded lustre and with undiminished value. The Appeal renewed in Christ, far from cancelling these Laws, at once Divine and Human, has been followed by the downfall of Judaism and of Heathenism as predominating Religions; but Symbols and Myths alone were excluded: the Laws of God are the same, and to the Mind of Man it pertains to shape his individual and national conduct according to principles drawn from that source. Now to talk, as Theologians do, of Eternal principles alone as Divine Laws, thus eschewing all human Experience, or to advance, as do certain philosophers (see George Combe), that the physical, chemical, and physiological laws are the laws of God which alone deserve the name of Divine laws, are one-sided views, we believe, of dangerous tendency; but we esteem the latter to be fraught with greater evil than the former, because it does not acknowledge the real positive value of those Laws as the very upshot of human or social Experience, which constitutes at once for such conditions the right to obtain as Laws of

Science (social), and as Laws in full and perfect and staid conformity with the Word. Therefore, it is not merely a desecration of the Divine Laws, and an attempt at weakening their authoritative value as connected with all that man knows of God, when impulsive passions, or the laws of Nature are surreptitiously held forth as the real Divine Laws ; but it is perfectly irrational, for we have seen that those Laws are no less consonant to human nature, purified from dross by experience, than to the notion Man has ever had of God. But it has ever been the fallacy, we believe, of Philosophy not to meet Theology on her own ground, on that of the real positive (relative) conditions of Man's knowledge of the Existence of God. Is that condition, *the Revelation*, Theology, as a *theory*, can only claim the right of pointing to the fact ; whilst, as *practical*, she embraces all human knowledge, all human science, all conditions past, present and future of Thought, and enlists them in the service of God. Now in the road of God the Divine Commands are the essence of human Wisdom ; they are staffs for the wanderer in Eternity on this his earthly residence for a time. In vain does modern social philosophy, or Socialism, attempt to lay down other conditions of a more elementary nature. Such attempts all prove to be nugatory unless based upon those foundations of human society termed the Laws of God. And should it be objected that, according to our own account, they are the results of human Experience, and were known, as Warburton says, long before Moses, our answer is, that in staid conformity with what man knows of the Word of God, i. e., Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, all positive conditions may be said to be Divine Laws, which like those Commands can at once unite the universal consent of Mankind during thousands of years, whilst



they stand forth in perfect consistency with the Word of God.

Such being the position we have assumed in regard to Theology, we therefore do not attempt to undervalue what is called a *Miracle*, by representing such an event as a mere signal exhibition of superior Wisdom or Address. A Miracle we understand in the modern sense of a direct infraction of the Laws of Nature, and as such we are ready to admit Mr. Hume's opinion as the only rational one that can obtain respecting an event of the kind. It is "a transgression of a law of Nature," and we admit that, if the event be investigated, it is only so far a miracle as that no human knowledge can explain it; and such we consider to be the walking on the waters, or the raising of the dead. Here Divine Power can alone be the agency, and Trust in Almighty Power can alone be appealed to; whilst *Distrust* in human Testimony is the only rule with respect to Man. But as Science admits of a beginning to certain conditions of Nature, which are termed fixed laws, such as the origin of our globe; the appearance of life and animated being, &c., it cannot be said even scientifically, that what we term the fixed laws of Nature cannot be infringed. This is allowed by Hume himself in one of his reflections on the extent of human knowledge. "Philosophy," he says, "will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as philosophers consider the imperfection of the faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall or fire burn, can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination which we may form with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, from and to Eternity?" If therefore

it be admitted with Mr. Hume that "no human testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish. And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior," the same weakness which would impugn the value of the testimony must be admitted to diminish the worth of the denial. But if nothing can prove for or against an event taking place against the laws of nature, it is a matter of constant experience that miracles are daily palmed upon the credulous. Trust in God and distrust of Man must be the real principles in the case. Priestcraft and cunning can only be opposed by a firm Faith in God or in Wisdom, Intelligence and Virtue. Theology has altogether overshot the mark, and Faith must be emancipated.

We therefore forbear entering into any attempt at explanation, which after all only comes to that of the Chinese Mandarins, who in their Manifestos declare that the miracles of the Lord Jesus worshipped by the Christians, are easily explained by the *well known* shifting in place of atoms. The validity of the Scriptural miracles has certainly been weakened by the legendary or theological miracles of succeeding ages. The first are to be admitted as means of enforcing the attention of the immediate disciples to the fact of the presence of Christ, and fixing their belief in the value of the unknown doctrine. To them the miracles; to us the doctrine. But the ecclesiastical and all other miracles except those of Christ, real or imaginary, must share the fate that Theology has marked out for her legends.

## STATE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

IN order to complete the review of German philosophy, or rather of the issue of the modern investigations of Mind, it is requisite to give the result of those investigations on the minds of the various Christian communities at large.

Kant, we have seen, admits of a moral rational religion. He seeks the proofs thereof in the positive religious dogmas of Christianity, which Rationalism continued to treat merely as ancient Hebrew conceptions. Kant sees in the Trinity, God in the threefold capacity of a Lawgiver, a Maintainer, and a Judge. By *Original sin* he understands a matter of positive experience, viz., the universality of Evil, and its unavoidable source from Free Will. The Redeemer and the Redemption, he conceives as meaning that the *moral idea* alone, which is planted in the human mind as the Eternal Son of God, is that alone which can render Man an object of Divine Complacency. It is only a new moral birth, or the revival of this idea in us, that can bestow on man a new moral character. By that alone is Man justified before God, by means of the redeeming character which that moral idea imprints upon his whole natural being. With this no-

tion he connects the Person and History of Christ, whose inexpressible moral purity personifies this moral idea, which is then no longer a mere rational faith, but becomes positive, and constitutes as such the Moral Being or the Visible Church, instead of being, as it was before, the Invisible Church. The visible Church, or positive moral being of man, he conceives to be represented by certain religions, which constitute so many various attempts of Mankind to express their relative moral feelings. It was on this *redeeming* value of Morality that Kant insisted especially, as awakening and quickening to a new life; and in Christ it is the moral idea which forms, according to Kant, the real ground of Faith. He conceived all positive religion merely as a mean of expressing *pure* rational Faith, but denied Tradition or History, as well as outward authority, as grounds of Faith. All trust in supernatural Grace, all beliefs in absolute commands from God, appear to him as mere superstition and priestcraft. Respecting the primary sources of Religion, as well as the various dogmatic conceptions, he adopted the opinion that full and unlimited scope was necessary for all scientific research, in order to discover something of real positive value. He proclaimed, however, the human mind as altogether inadequate to affirm any thing contrary to the Existence of God, or the Immortality of the Soul. Natural Religion and Theology he considers as mere metaphysical abstractions, and as possessing in the human mind no sure resting-place, for the absolute and necessary laws of the mind merely serve to guide us in the exploration of the *objective* or sensible universe.

The inward Perception or Consciousness of the Soul, which Jacobi admitted as the real Revelation of God, was even more distinct from Christianity than

the views of Kant, although Jacobi termed his system a system of inward or intuitive Faith. This system, again, gave birth to that of Emotional-Rationalism (Gefühls-Rationalismus) of De Wette and Schleiermacher, which reminds us of the various sections of Christians who admit of inward inspirations of the Spirit as clear Revelations; which is indeed much akin to the Mysticism of Bœhm and of Swedenborg.

In the later productions of Fichte, Idealism consists in the Pantheistic view of the absorption of all things in God. With him Christianity consists in the belief of this divinization of Human Nature in the person of Jesus Christ. But the system of Schelling, which approached nearest to the revealed religion, was that of the Revelation of the Absolute. Schelling even affected to consider those philosophical views as identical with the dogmas of Christianity. The reconciliation of the Finite with the Absolute, by the appearance of the latter as self-conceived in finite existence, he conceives to be the very first notion of Christianity. In the carrying out of this doctrine he perceives the Trinity, for the Son of God is finite Existence itself expressed in the Spirit and rendered fully complete in spiritual religion. But, as a historical fact, he admits of Christ as man, and his mission as requiring a long period in order to be completed; but the real mysteries contained therein will require another revelation.

The views of Hegel and his followers, Strauss, Vatke, Ewald, &c., have absorbed those of the preceding philosophers. Hegel conceives Christianity as uniting the realized Idea of Religion, as absolute or revealed, and as being constituted by the finite apparition of the Infinite. This he grounds on the relationship in which God stands to Man in Christianity, where Humanity deified, and the Deity in Humanity, consti-

tute a Unity in which God and Man are reconciled. In virtue of this Union the corporeal man ceases to exist, whilst the spiritual, being filled and penetrated in Thought and Act with the Idea of God, becomes new born to life everlasting. Here Hegel perceives a full-completed Self-consciousness.

The Trinity, he conceives, to mean God revealed in the World, which, though separated from Him in appearance, is yet contained and united with Him, as also the Spirit of Man.

Original Sin is the acknowledged fact of the obstinacy of the human Will in persevering in its course of Selfishness and Error; this constitutes positive Evil.

Faith in the Redemption and the Redeemer he explains by admitting that Man, by the means of the Divine principle he bears in himself, is capable of, and ordained to, effectuate the Unity of those two principles by obtaining the mastery over his evil dispositions. This he effectuates by rising morally and intellectually higher and higher until he reaches a purer sphere, represented by the Christian Community, by the Christian State acting on Christian principles, and, above all, imbued with Christian Science.

The Unity of Jesus with God he finds in that of the Divine Idea; but he avoids giving any positive opinion respecting the miracles of Christ.

The followers of Hegel maintain that God cannot be conceived as a Being or principle distinct from this World, and represented as containing within itself Intelligence, Love, and Freedom, because they say such views are anthropomorphic and superstitious. The notion of God does not admit, according to them, of any analogy, of any conclusion or determination whatsoever taken from our physical and moral universe. With

them God is no conclusion, no creation of the Mind, which can only be conversant of the relative ; it is, in short, no conclusion *à posteriori*, but it is produced, they maintain, in the human mind by a kind of *à priori* intuition of a peculiar nature ; and in the Supreme Being thus revealed according to them *à priori*, or by intuition, they find the key to all the enigmas of the Universe. Still more, they pretend to discuss His Essence, whilst at the same time they laugh at Psychology, at the doctrine of common sense, and of the universal belief of Mankind.

Strauss undertook in 1835 a critical investigation of the New Testament, where he found the conceptions of the times, but which conclusion caused him, we believe erroneously, to infer that the foundation thereof was false. Even admitting the New Testament to constitute no real history, but only the human conceptions of surprising events expressed in analogous language, it certainly does not follow that Christ only represents Humanity in general, and did not appear as man appealing to men by means, which, though slow, have worked and continue to work their way. Therefore neither the admission of Mythic or subjective views abounding in the Gospel, according to Strauss, nor the still more decisive opinion of Feuerbach, who finds in all Theology mere Anthropomorphism, the issue of which is Worship addressed by Man to conceptions of his own creation,—so that he is somewhat like a man who should take his own image reflected in a mirror for something foreign or really objective,—nor indeed the socialistic conclusions drawn by Ruge from the adoption of such theological *Liberalism*, have to do with the inferences which we draw from the proofs beside Scripture. Such an admission, far from weakening the position adopted here, would, on the contrary,

greatly contribute to strengthen our conclusions relative to the inadequacy of human conception. It would not, however, weaken the positive fact of all such symbols and Mythic conceptions being based upon a Faith in God which Man attempted in vain to express adequately. Admitting of *the Revelation* of the Existence of God as the sole, and that Revelation which inspired Moses to have been renewed in Christ, we are at complete variance with Philosophy, and still more so with Theology. But rational proof of the Divine origin of Christianity is not to be transferred from its natural position, and made use of to prove all subsequent revelations. With us the Revelation is One; with Theology it has been renewed millions of times. But this admits of a deep line of demarcation existing between the Lord Jesus and His disciples. Therefore when we read in Scripture, that Christ rebuked them for requiring that Fire from Heaven should destroy a village that refused to receive Him; whilst we are told that he threatened with the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah the places that should refuse to receive His disciples, the cloven foot of Theology already displays itself too clearly to be mistaken;—and such Theology richly deserves the fate that awaits it.

But Theology, presented under the protection of a Whately, cannot be so readily dismissed. We shall not attempt any *logical* discussion with such an adversary, being well aware of defeat. We shall merely refer to a position taken up by the learned Archbishop, which, if it be accurate, would foretell the inevitable downfall of Christianity. The remark is relative to the interpretations which might be given at later periods to the words transmitted to us as those of the Lord Jesus, but which, after having been for a time interpreted in one sense, come to be rendered in an-



other, when it has appeared, on sufficient grounds, that the primary interpretation, though peremptory in appearance, does not tally with the real nature of things, but is a matter of judgment and discernment. Now, Archbishop Whately says, that to admit that the Saviour should utter in His time words which He well knew would be taken at a later period in a different sense, is blasphemy; because it is attributing a subterfuge to Him who "came into world that He might bear witness of the truth." The necessary conclusion, if that constituted blasphemy, would be that as God was well aware of the desperate struggles which the various interpretations of the words of Christ would occasion, He was, in that dispensation, purposely sowing the seeds of blasphemous explanations. The remark of Dr. Whately was elicited on the occasion of an answer addressed by that Prelate to the advocates of coercive means for extending Christianity. After giving the words of Christ, who enjoins to treat as "heathen men" those who refuse to listen to the Church, the Archbishop proceeds in the following terms:

"The language of the Apostle Paul corresponds with his Master's, 'a man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject.' But no personal violence—no secular penalty whatever, is denounced against heretics and schismatics—'heathen men and publicans.' The whole of the New Testament breathes a spirit of earnestness indeed in the cause of Truth, and zeal against religious error, but of such a zeal as to manifest itself only in vehement and persevering persuasion.

"This, which the advocates of coercion cannot deny, they are driven to explain away, by saying that the Apostles and other early Christians were *unable* to

compel men to a conformity to the true faith; they abstained from the use of secular force, because (I cite the words of Augustine, a favorite authority with the Romanists as well as with many Protestants) ‘that prophecy was not yet fulfilled, Be wise now therefore, O ye kings; be learned, ye that are the judges of the Earth; serve the Lord with fear.’ The rulers of the Earth, he adds, were at that time opposed to the Gospel; and *therefore* it was that the secular arm was not called in against the Church’s enemies.

“But they might be asked in reply—if, indeed, such an argument be worth a reply,—*why* the Apostles had not this power? Surely their Master could have bestowed it;—He unto whom ‘all power was given in Heaven and in Earth,’—He who declared that the Father was ready to send him ‘more than twelve legions of angels’ whose force, as it would have destroyed all idea of resistance, would at once have established his religion without any need of a resort to *actual* persecution. Or if for any hidden reasons the time was not yet come for conferring on his disciples that coercive power which was to be afterwards justifiably employed in his cause, we might expect that He would have given notice to them of the change of system which was to take place. But had he designed any such change, his declaration to Pilate would have been little else than an equivocation worthy of the school of the very Jesuits. Had He declared that ‘His kingdom was not of this world,’ meaning that though such was the case *then*, He meant it to be supported by secular force, or monopoly of civil rights hereafter, and consequently to become a kingdom of this world; and that his servants were not allowed to fight in his cause, with the mental reservation that they were hereafter to do so, He would have fully justified

the suspicion which was probably entertained by many of the heathen magistrates, that the Christians and their Master did, notwithstanding their professions, secretly meditate the establishment of a kingdom supported by secular force; and that though they disavowed this principle and abstained from all violent methods, this was only a mask assumed during the weakness of their infant power, which they would (according to the principle which Augustine avows) throw aside as soon as they should have obtained sufficient strength.

“But the very idea is blasphemous, of attributing such a subterfuge to Him who came into the world that He might bear witness of the truth. The immediate *occasion* indeed of our Lord’s *making this declaration* to Pilate, was his desire to do away with the expectation so strongly prevailing both among Jews and Gentiles, of a temporal Messiah about to establish a triumphant kingdom; but no occasion would have led Him to make the declaration had it not been *true*; and it would not have been *true* had he meant no more than that his kingdom was spiritual, in the sense of its having dominion over the souls of men, and holding out the glories and judgments of the other world; for this was what the infidel Jews expected, and expect to this day. They look for a kingdom both of this world and also of the next; for a Messiah who shall bestow on his followers not only worldly power and splendor, but also the spiritual blessings of a future state besides. They did indeed expect the Messiah to reign over them forever in bodily person; but the main part of their expectation would have been fulfilled, had he merely *founded* a temporal kingdom, and delegated (as the Lord did of old, to the kings) his power to his anointed in whom his Spirit should dwell.

Jesus accordingly, to mark his opposition to this expectation of the Jews, not only *claimed spiritual dominion*, but *renounced temporal*."

According to this opinion, so pre-emptorily stated by Archbishop Whately, whom we conceive to be one of the most liberal-minded theologians of the Anglican Church, it would be blasphemous to admit that Jesus spoke of Devils well knowing that they were not existing beings, and merely employed the expression to designate some evil occurrences, not readily understood by the people. Now, most Christians are convinced that the words of Jesus were indeed *true* as regarded the opinions of the time, the language of that epoch. This conviction has been the work of ages, for in the last century there did still exist in Christendom such a belief, which every Christian was bound to receive as a thing declared in Scripture and therefore proved to be true. But the real truth was, that people conceived the matter to be so; and that was the truth contained in the texts and in the words of the Lord Jesus, who certainly had not the mission to teach grammar, and philosophy. Now, although the words of Dr. Whately have reference to another subject, yet they would find a ready application in many instances where it might also be alleged that the first interpretation being the most natural and the earliest, that which was *then* believed to be the truth, must remain *true* forever after, because it would be *blasphemous* to attribute that kind of subterfuge to Christ.

Too much has been said on the subject of demonology to require our adducing proofs of the sad error in which Christians were led by ignorant theologians, by men who had not Trust enough in God to make use of their own means of evidence. The very words Devil and Saitan are now well known to have been no others

than the name of God conceived as Evil because otherwise worshipped, or else an expression (Sethan) used by the conquerors or masters of all Asia, the Scythians (Syd, Seyth, Sydyk), and which is found in Sesac or Sich, or Sesostris, on account of its high value, but which term was held in execration by the oppressed and enslaved tribes, who used the same words as signifying the extreme of Evil.

Because the Existence of God was taught in a peculiar manner, it may be said that mankind attempted to infer from thence many conclusions merely grounded on imagination. The belief in God involves a Trust in a future life it is certain, but that was not sufficient, and Mankind has ever had recourse to conjecture concerning the destination of the soul when parted from the body. In that there is no harm, but it is otherwise when men give the value of religious dogmas to such crude notions. The Revelation renewed in Christ has expressly told us of the Resurrection in the Flesh, and we do not believe it *blasphemous* to conceive the meaning thereof to be different from the primary one. It has been said that it may mean that the Flesh will be judged, meaning that this mortal life will be that which will be called to account on the apparition of the Soul before the Judge. The Soul will then appear as clothed in Flesh. But be that as it may, one thing is certain, which is that, as Warburton remarks, the doctrine of Spirits was intimately linked with that of the Metempsychosis, and with the worship of beasts and animals. This is all matter of fact, as also the belief of the early Christian Church in cases of demoniacal possession.

It is not unworthy of remark that Rome herself has been obliged to recede in this nefarious war on Reason. But it cannot be forgotten that it was not

Rome alone that declared herself against witches and sorcerers; the Calvinists, our Protestant brethren, were also undoubting believers in magic and witchcraft, although they denied the power of the Romish priest to be from God. That power they supposed he received from the arch-fiend. But where the Romanist used water, the Calvinist used fire; and the unfortunate wretches who fell into the hands of such Christians as the latter, had deep cause to regret the holy sprinklings of the former doctrine. In England and Scotland the Calvinistic predominance was usually announced by a general persecution of sorcerers and witches, which seemed to take place as a matter of course. And as they connected in their theological hate the Pope and the Devil, they therefore conceived it consistent with those feelings to search as eagerly after the Catholic as after the sorcerer and the witch, in order to pursue the latter at least to the expiation of the fagot. But at the present day the Catholic alone has remained faithful to his belief in Satan, in magic, and sorcery. The Calvinists have discovered that Mankind can believe in Christ, and Trust in God without admitting that Evil is occasioned by the arch-fiend. As to the Church of England, if the high education of its members did formerly render them much less superstitious respecting witches and demoniacal possession, we may safely say that it is at the present time an uncommon thing to find one of the members of that Church who does not discourage to the utmost of his power all such prejudices. Yet they surely are Christians. What then becomes of the argument of Archbishop Whately if what Christ *then* left to be believed and asserted, is no longer admitted to be true? This is no theoretical ground; it is a ground that Theology has covered with fire and flames, which, even at the present day, are

ready to burst forth anew unless Reason continues to exercise her sway, and Faith becomes emancipated from all human conception respecting the Nature of God, and only Trusts in Him as in the Almighty. For there yet lurks in the mind of many much superstition, as witnessed by *table-turning*. And yet too often the aspect of misery and distress, instead of awakening commiseration, calls forth that native perverseness of the human mind which has for so many thousand years expressed its feelings in pursuing the wretches hunted down for magic or witchcraft. These remarks will be better corroborated by an instance of the kind which we find in a Kilkenny journal of this year (1853): "On Tuesday evening, between five and six o'clock, a poor young woman named Rebecca Holmes, who recently suffered amputation of one of her legs in the County Infirmary, and since walks with difficulty by the aid of crutches, was proceeding along the coach-road to the Bishop's Palace to deliver some needle-work, by which she gains a livelihood, when she was assailed by about a dozen persons, chiefly girls and boys of about ten to eighteen years of age, who commenced to hoot and shout at her, calling her 'a jumper,' 'a souper,' and 'a devil on crutches,' and at last proceeded to beat her. A ruffian snatched away one of her crutches, and was about to break it in pieces, when a countryman came up and took it from him, and restored it, calling upon the crowd to discontinue such cruel treatment to a poor cripple. However, on being informed that she was only a 'jumper,' her protector soon relinquished his merciful interference, and told them to beat her well. His advice was followed. The poor wretch was thrown down, jumped upon, her crutches broken upon her body, and she was left una-

ble to rise from the ground, when some more compassionate passers-by came to her assistance.”

We have in the above not only a proof that the spirit which has impelled people to torment their fellow-creatures on the imaginary and groundless charge of witchcraft and magic art, is not yet extinct (and too many of the kind might be adduced), but we have also therein a signal instance of the manner in which such accusations have constantly operated on the minds of such as were disposed to come forward and show mercy. It is then evident not only that the belief in witchcraft is only asleep, but that it might be awakened to deeds of blood, in a time when *table-turning* turns the heads of the better educated, and superstition threatens to turn their minds from God, and steel their hearts to Mercy. Now, if Theology persists in maintaining that all former conceptions adopted as Truth in ancient time are true, because to adopt another view would be accusing the founder of Christianity, the Almighty, of having designedly caused men to err by issuing forth terms fraught with error in the popular meaning attached thereto, the fate of such Theology is sealed: it must join Rome and worship Buddha. Christianity will ever rise superior to the highest wave of human knowledge, and, before Science, neither God nor Christ recedes, for they are One or None. The Revelation renewed in Christ, as the expression of Divine Will, which is an *Appeal* made to Mankind, an Appeal that leaves human will entirely free, is then identical with the First. And as God stands revealed in the Word, the same is expressed by His Word in Christ. And if Jesus Christ or the Saviour appeared as man, it is sinning against the Holy Spirit not to admit of his language being susceptible of rational investigation. This admission, far from weakening Divine Faith, leaves the



Word as indicative alone of Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness,—of God. Therein lies the criterion, but the human language of Christ is also to be judged of according to that criterion.

Reformed Christianity, in admitting of free inquiry, renounces neither God nor Christ, his Word renewed. But unless Divine Faith be emancipated, and God trusted as having been revealed as the Almighty, He becomes a mere summary of human knowledge; He is no more the Absolute Intelligence, in which man trusts. This is Rational Christianity which protests against Rome and which fears not Science, because Knowledge or Science and Religion are ever united as the Means. This is saying that rational Religion is that which acts in conformity with its principle without fearing to weaken the principle on which it stands and is supported. And this high position can only be occupied by the Religion in which Faith in God is emancipated from Science,—because the Suggestion did not part from human knowledge or Mind as other notions do,—that Religion therefore perceiving the mysterious landmarks in the Word revealed in the beginning, and inspiring Moses, again shines forth renewed in Christ, at once God, as the Word, and the Son of God, though man: that Religion, we repeat it, remains steadfast in its principle in admitting of human knowledge or science as a means. Reasoning on God only from what is known, and that knowledge admitted to be revealed, the rational Christian trusts in Him with bended brow, but before Him alone. What are termed partial revelations or theological, such as Man a *perfect* being, yet fallible; the divine nature of the Christ alone admitted, which is denying that any interpretation of his words can obtain: all such conceptions may be believed in, but

cannot become matters of Divine Faith. They are conceptions relating to the Ways of Him whose Ways are inconceivable.

The question lies then between *rational* Religion, theological Religion and philosophical Religion. Each in theory may appear fatal to the principle it adopts, but we shall see that in practice it is quite a different thing.

1. *Emancipated Christianity* is rational, not merely because it aims at enlisting in the service of God *all* the resources of human Intelligence both moral and scientific, but because admitting of Revelation as the source of the Knowledge of the Word, and seeing the same in the Word of Christ, it obeys the *Appeal* willed by God, and considers all doctrines and rites as matters of form, which indeed it would be useful to alter now and again in order to prove that the *Spirit* and not the letter constitutes the thing aimed at being performed. Here then no other Supernaturalism is admitted of besides the Revelation of the Existence of the Almighty. Faith is not turned off from this great eventful fact by theological illustrations, because whatever may be the real value of the facts alleged by Theology, she has proved herself worse than credulous; she has proved herself by her cruelty to be unworthy of credit, and must pay the penalty of pious frauds, and of the blood spilled to maintain her doctrinal revelations. The conscientious convictions of the first disciples and followers of Christ allowed of discrepancy, for all united in proclaiming the Advent of the Saviour, the change in the Law of the Synagogue, and the universality of the Appeal; though, strange to say, and we repeat it purposely, Saint Peter would not hear of a Catholic Church. This religion then admits of Revelation as a basis, and never opposes it to Science or knowledge either moral or intellectual, its means. The Word,

which ever signified Supremacy in Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, is followed by directing the minds of men in that path, and therefore by acting on the Will of Man. Science teaches the conditions of things. Religion by the mouth of her ministers stirs up man to action, to will the right road, to apply the blessings of knowledge in the Spirit of Christ. Here the wisdom of ages long gone by is not passed over. The Present does not deny all connection with the Past, saying the latter is nothing. The Divine Laws issued by Moses still remain the highest expression of Biology and Sociology. Here the doctrinal interpretations of Christianity admit of full Toleration; not so the Divine Laws: these the individual must respect, and the State cause them to be respected.

Human nature reprieved through the following of the Word, which tells us that all the Law and the Prophets are involved in the Love of our neighbor, is no mere theoretical doctrine, but must be practised; and it cannot be practised without obeying the dictates of Reason, and here the reprieve admits of unbounded scope, whilst it receives also the widow's mite. But, it may be asked, what has Salvation or Perdition to do with Reason? Our answer is, that admitting of God as being known as All-powerful, and Wise, and Good, Salvation is in the path pointed out and not in believing things relative to his inconceivable nature. The Bible as containing the Word of God is also composed of many statements relative to the notions and conceptions, as well as to the events of the times. But the three great landmarks of Christianity, those which form the rallying points thereof, and as such are distinct from all surrounding circumstances, for they appear, as it were, absolutely, and only connected firmly with themselves,—these landmarks are the Revelation of the

Word, the Inspiration of Moses and the Advent of Christ. But here Action is wanting: rational Christianity is yet in seed.

2. *Theological Religion* is actual Christianity, and Romanism in particular. To the latter all Protestants who would have Theology, as now taught, to be the truth, must fly for help. There they will have wafers, and candlesticks, and councils, and cardinals, and witches, and sorcerers, and holy water, and seven sacraments, and bulls, and letters encyclical, &c., &c., to their hearts' content. But Rome at least has not remained inactive. Rome admits of Christianity being Action: Active Theology, it is true, but here Rome is consistent. But we Protestants, we are not consistent with Reform in fearing Science; in believing that Geology, and Astronomy, and Geography, and Chronology, and Philosophy, &c., &c., all modern sciences, in a word, contain a principle of Perdition, because their conclusions no longer tally with those of former time. The upshot of Protestant faith inculcates the doctrine of indifference, and such must ever remain the state of things so long as Theology shall on both sides constitute the field of battle. Mutual Toleration has become the watchword of Peace, but it is only an outward Peace. Rome alone cannot admit of Toleration, for the march of Christianity is onwards. We admit of her acting in the wrong way, but at least her excuse is that it is the road followed by her predecessors, and as an infallible and immutable Church she is consistent in upholding the Theology of past times as the best expression of Truth, and her dictates as the best path to follow. There can be no real truce with Rome. Reformed Christianity perceives her position, but will not break with Theology. *The Revelation* alone of God's Existence is nothing to Theologians accustomed

to descant on revelations innumerable. To admit of human Will is Pelagian, or Semi-Pelagian. The deep mystery of the various Appeals to that Will of man is lost in the theological denial of its worth and value. Each theological party is altogether pantheistical, but the Catholic is alone consistent, for Free inquiry, and freedom of conscience, and the Bible as containing the Word of God, leave the Protestant no excuse for not placing full Trust in God, whilst he acts up to the principle of individual freedom in carrying out the Word of God not theologically, not in reasoning on the Nature and Ways of Him whom he acknowledges to be only known as the Almighty, but religiously, i. e., in actively applying his Will to the forwarding of Knowledge, and Wisdom, and Morality, by all possible means, attacking openly Theology, although delighting in the simple narratives and beliefs of Times gone by.

3. *Philosophical Religion.* Many persons, even Protestants, disgusted with theological intolerance, and perceiving no issue to the blind reasonings on Election, on the fall of man, on the atonement, on the depravity of human nature, &c., &c., &c., have entered conscientiously into a league to subvert Christianity, as a religion tending to maintain the human mind in fetters, and as the deepest mishap which could occur if persevered in. Instead of perceiving that Theology is indeed composed of the conceptions of former days, which have been outgrown by the march of Intellect, they deny the whole doctrine, and therefore the Existence of God. The theological error of conceiving ancient notions as adequate is their great argument. God is a mere assemblage of human qualities: the notion of this world being a state of trial becomes in their hands ridiculous, because they point to the

theological tenet of the utter worthlessness of human Will. These men do not propose to root out Religion, but to substitute themselves in the place of the Clergy, and to palm off the dictates of Science as the Will of God, which they say is a mere human conception, and therefore nothing according to their own confession. As in all appearance this party will succeed, not because its tenets are understood, but because Theology maintains that to deny her conclusions is to deny God; we shall leave to Time and Experience to prove the utter irrationality of such a religion which would pass for philosophical, and which begins by advocating that no religious doctrines should be taught in the secular schools instituted by the State. Theology is taken at her word; Religion and Theology are thus esteemed as inseparably united, as if other theological views, or rather other views respecting Theology were not perfectly consistent with Religion considered as the Worship of God. To this position we shall soon advert more positively. For the moment we must explain the using of the term Religion when speaking of Philosophy. This we have done because none of the various philosophical schools which would substitute themselves for Religion, admit openly of no Religion. But evidently to admit of the human mind having invented God, and then to speak of Religion, is either an absurdity or a trick. Now the men who advocate the principle are perfectly aware of the consequences; it is therefore no absurdity, but a scheme purposely concocted. Religion, as the efforts of Man to worship God, may admit of various modes of expression. The one which we conceive to be the most consistent with the knowledge man possesses of God is Emancipated Christianity. There, all human knowledge which contains not merely the physical laws of Nature, but all the conditions

of Intelligence, such as psychology and social science, is enlisted in the service of religion. Divine Faith stands apart, as an encourager, but forms no Science, for what is termed Theology is ingulfed in the vast abyss of human endeavors at appreciating the Supreme Being only known by Revelation. No religion, therefore, without a God. No Theology with a Revealed God.

The different philosophical schools which seek to substitute their opinions for Religion, and enslave Man to his own conceptions under a yoke far more insupportable than that of Theology, may be distinguished into those of Germany, France, and England. 1. In Germany the Revelation has been rooted out by Philosophy as well as Theology, but no definite plan exists to be substituted. 2. In France the plan exists; the work is begun, and its atheistical tendency openly avowed. M. Auguste Comte is at the head of the movement, and spares no pains in order to convince his auditory and his readers of the inefficiency of Theology, and of the necessity of Positive Philosophy. Admitting of all the conceptions of the human mind to be constantly expressed under three forms which always appear in fixed succession: 1, the theological; 2, the metaphysical; and 3, the positive, the upshot is that the latter is alone adequate; but when M. Comte proves the inanity of Theology he believes he has proved the inanity of the notion of God. That constitutes, we apprehend, his capital error; for even the admission of his theory, supposing it to be a matter of fact, would not disprove the knowledge of that notion having been suggested by an Act altogether peculiar which we term Revelation, but which Act has been lowered and rendered commonplace by Theology. Having carefully perused the works of

this deep thinker, and having attended his lectures in Paris on the subject in question, we have been able to form a definite judgment on the probable result of the workings of his brain, and remain convinced that no greater tyranny could ever weigh on man than from the adoption of a plan which substitutes, under the title of the positive laws of Society, or as Sociology, the law of the philosopher for the Divine Laws which will ever remain the basis of society, and which are found in the Decalogue. 3. In Great Britain Theology has embittered many minds devoted to God, and they have attempted to establish a theory of Natural Theology which would, in their opinion, operate favorably against clerical Theology. But unfortunately Teleology or the doctrine of design and purpose is substituted for the peculiar mode in which God appears to have been suggested, instead of being proposed as a kind of subsequent proof of the validity of the suggestion. This is the scheme of Lord Brougham, who, we believe, does not sufficiently appreciate the real weakness of Science in general, when he proposes the establishment of a doctrine or Science of final causes, constituted by the evident marks of purpose and design imprinted on the works of Nature. This would constitute a kind of scientific Theology, for that science was formerly nothing else than the enlisting in the cause of God, as religion, what was conceived to be the real purposes and designs of God. These conceptions took root; Theology appeared and bore a fruit which has poisoned the human mind. The third school of philosophy in England, is that which would separate the teaching of Christianity in the secular schools from that of Science. Its advocates consider Nature as a divine institution, and opine that by the teaching of God's natural laws the well-being of man



would be sufficiently regulated. Natural truths (physical laws) are considered as really in themselves a Divine Revelation, which would, when sanctified by religious emotions, become a living faith. All truth conducive to human happiness would be rendered religious. The Will of God would be expressed in his works as revealed thereby, as also His Existence and Attributes according to their manifestation. Forms would be invented to give expression to this religion, and under those forms it would be taught to the people. In a word, Symbols and Myths would again have full play.

Now the enlisting of the laws of Science, as well physiological as social, in the cause of Religion would be a matter of course if Theology was considered merely as conceptions respecting the inconceivable, and Faith was limited to God. The danger consists in the doing what happened with the Roman Church when, after much demur, the philosophy of Aristotle became a principle of religion. Then to doubt of the opinions of a heathen philosopher was to doubt of God. Theology enlisting Philosophy in her service enslaves the latter. God is an object of Trust, being revealed as the Almighty. This Faith would be the basis of Christianity, which would admit of all human knowledge, with all future and possible change, without fearing for her basis; or the Divine Laws inseparably connected thereto.

We plead then for the *Emancipation of Faith*; whilst Theology, feeling the pressure of the times, pleads for the Emancipation of the Church from the State. Now no State can be *felo de se*. But the Toleration of Theological tenets of all kinds does not prevent the State from having "a conscience," a religion. That feeling is obeyed and satisfied by the enforcement of secular education, by the adoption of all

such means as may further the more ready compliance to the Divine Laws of Moses, and to the Divine precepts issued by Christ. In actual circumstances the voluntary separation of Church and State would merely prove to be the separation of Theology. The State composed of Christians could not even enforce secular education without insisting upon the Divine Laws or the Decalogue being taught and expounded, and without insisting on the Christian doctrines of self-restraint by making our neighbors' happiness connected with our own.

The result would be, that by the furthering of knowledge, not merely physical or physiological, but of all knowledge as means of Religious worship, the State would further the extension of Christianity; whilst Theology would either recoil, or gradually sink after some ten or fifteen generations. No further change would be required. Theology would be tolerated on condition of submission to the law of free inquiry, and that of non-coercion. But Intolerance against Ignorance would be at once the Duty of the Christian and of the State.

## CONCLUSION.

As the flutterings of the insect following the rush of the chariot, and stolidly fancying that it contributes to impel the ponderous mass, have been very aptly compared by the fabulist to the vain fancies of those who believe that they bestow impulsion on things that need them not, so they would prove with the man who should imagine that his words can impress on events a direction which already exists. We can, therefore, afford to be sober in our conclusions, and still more so with our advice, for our part consists principally in pointing to what is already taking place.

On all sides Theology feeling the pressure from without, but unwilling to own allegiance in God alone, and in Christ as God, thus emancipating Faith, and leaving human conceptions to stand or to fall, —Theology is everywhere on the point of withdrawing herself within the narrow circles of the special theological doctrines of each individual section, thus isolating herself. Instead of presenting *Supernaturalism* as a secondary thing, and as involved in the unknown Nature and Ways of Him who was made known by Revelation alone, and whose

Nature and Ways are therefore inscrutable,—which manner of proceeding would leave free scope for all expression of distrust arising from the certain knowledge of human weakness, and proneness to invention—instead of making *the Revelation of the Existence of God*, the only certain Supernaturalism, Theology prefers enveloping herself in the conceptions of past ages, making them the signs and standards of Faith. Her retreat is then one of Necessity, not of choice. It is produced by the increasing opposition against the notion that Supernaturalism and ancient subjective views constitute the real ground of Divine Faith or Trust in God. In short, religious minds are perceiving more and more clearly, that Faith in God must be emancipated from all such human conceptions, and not only from such, but from human conception altogether. Now this can only occur on the ground of Revelation, which, placing the Nature and Ways of God above all human Thought, and making Him known under finite Attributes, the very notion of the adequacy of the mind of Man would be in contradiction with the knowledge imparted, that of His Existence; whilst all human conceptions relating to the Almighty would be summoned before the bar of the ideas expressed in those Attributes, of Power or Action, of Wisdom or Knowledge, of Goodness or Mercy.

In acting as she does, Theology is however borne out by the great Protestant principles of free inquiry, and the rights of the individual to judge for himself of the Nature, the Ways, and the Worship of his God. Deriding Philosophy for seeking for the Absolute and the Infinite, in the conditional and the Finite, Theology herself seeks for Unity where Diversity alone can exist, and denounces Latitudinarianism whilst she invokes Reason! We do not say to the Reformed

Churches, embrace Reason as your only guide, and as your standard of Faith, for if we admit that God's Existence is all that man knows of Him,—his Attributes being merely the most adequate of finite ideas to express that Existence,—we cannot admit also those Attributes which embrace all Reason as forming the standards of Divine Faith. They are finite, they are the means to be employed, they may be right or wrong, but they cannot ever be proposed as being entitled to that Trust which is owing to Him who was *suggested* to man as Almighty.

We believe then that the State in eschewing theological and doctrinal tenets, is on the right road, and it cannot appear incongruous to point out how *necessary and useful* it is to the Nation that such a course should have been adopted. Nor do we believe that it would be less useful to Mankind if the same were adopted in all parts, for Mankind would, we believe, become wiser and more happy.

In admitting of the rights of the State to enforce and to propagate Knowledge and Morality in what may be termed an *intolerant* manner; whilst Toleration would be allowed to all opinions respecting God, it is not meant that the State should renounce any of her rights either as a power that tolerates actively, or as a power that also has an opinion respecting God. Now, Christianity cannot be upheld without a basis or doctrine, however narrow it may be drawn. The Unity of Christ and the Father is that basis, and it places the Lord Jesus as the Word beyond all interpretations of the language He made use of, or the conceptions expressed therein. The real question is what we are to understand by the Word; is it the Name of God, or his Attributes? then the expounding of the Word embraces all possible knowledge, all morality,

and all the various means of bettering Man. This is Salvation; this is Regeneration. And, moreover, in adopting this mode of *active* worship,—leaving to Romanism her mode of *active* Supernaturalism,—Protestants, far from lowering Faith, would emancipate that Divine Trust, provided Reason was never brought in for Faith in God. Reason may attempt to set forth, to illustrate His Power and Wisdom and Goodness, by finite conceptions according to those Attributes, but the attempt can never be a matter of Faith. Nor are these human notions, termed Attributes, any thing else than mere connecting links between God and Man: they represent without expressing the Nature of the Almighty.

It will be seen that the full responsibility of human action is thus made to weigh on Man, in virtue of the efficacy of human Will. Therefore, if in the future pursuit of the Idea, or of the study of the human mind, we were required to state the part therein which appears as God's, we should only fix on Trust in the Almighty or Divine Faith, leaving all the rest as the lawful inheritance of the creature to whom the Existence of the Almighty was alone revealed, and Who is so inadequately expressed in his Name.

Might not Orthodoxy, once for all, consent to waive in favor of Divine Faith all the claims of Supernaturalism, for without the former Supernaturalism would not find a resting-place? The religion of the Word would then become the religion of the world, and Mankind repeat in chorus,

OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVEN, HALLOWED BE THY NAME!













