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# ENFORCED PEACE

Proceedings of the First Annual National  
Assemblage of the League to En-  
force Peace, Washington,  
May 26-27, 1916

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With an Introductory Chapter and Appen-  
dices Giving the Proposals of the  
League, Its Officers and  
Committees

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# ENFORCED PEACE

## CHAPTER I

### A REMARKABLE GATHERING

“THE largest and most distinguished gathering of a voluntary character that ever assembled in this city,” so the *Washington Star* asserted, met in the Belasco Theatre in the Nation’s Capital on the morning of May 26, 1916. Its purpose, as announced in the language of the official call, was “To devise and determine upon measures for giving effect to the proposals adopted at the conference held last June in Independence Hall, in Philadelphia, for a League of nations to Enforce Peace.”

The first annual national assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace was notable in many ways. The man who had been the twenty-seventh president of the United States, as president of the League, called the meeting to order and introduced the speakers. Another who had once been the Democratic candidate for the presidency was the vice-president of the League. The list of speakers at the six sessions was exceptional, including, as it did, the president of the Chamber

of Commerce of the United States, the president of the American Federation of Labor, the Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission, the president of Harvard University, a United States Senator, the Secretary of War, and the President of the United States himself.

An interesting feature was the diversity of religious faiths and creeds brought together in a common cause. A Catholic priest, a Congregational minister, and the dean of a Baptist Divinity School delivered addresses, while an Episcopal bishop offered the opening prayer.

In politics, also, the variety of views represented was wide. But the outstanding feature that made this assemblage truly extraordinary was that in it advocates of adequate military preparedness and of non-resistance, with all the shades of opinion between these extremes, sat side by side in the same auditorium and spoke from the same platform in behalf of one plan of action upon which all were agreed. In fact, in the diversity of otherwise irreconcilable views entertained by men who, for once, were working harmoniously together to promote a common purpose, the first annual assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace has seldom been surpassed. The one point upon which these divergent minds came to a common focus was the program of the League to Enforce Peace.

The League to Enforce Peace owes its origin to the wave of horror and indignation that swept



over the world upon the outbreak of the war in Europe. Right thinking men in every land resolved within a week of the beginning of that tragedy that it should never be repeated if they could help it. Given this attitude of mind it was inevitable that some sort of creative action should follow, not to stop nor even to limit nor control the war then raging, for all recognized the futility of any such attempt; but to set in motion the machinery that would provide something to take the place of slaughter in settling some, if not all, future international disputes.

The United States took the lead in this creative action because in this country alone the energies of the people were not wholly engrossed with preparations for national defense. Among political economists, international lawyers, and other leaders of thought the idea gradually took shape that an Alliance or League comprising principal Nations, by agreeing to use their joint economic and military forces, could enforce peace among themselves. So the League to *Enforce* Peace was proposed.

That was something everybody could understand. Every city and town has its police force, every village its marshal, every rural precinct its constable, as the visible embodiment of the majesty of the law, ever ready to enforce respect for the statutes when voluntary observance fails. To compel a whole people to obey the law of nations is but to carry a step farther a practice with which all the world is familiar in its daily life.

This idea is not new, but the manner in which it has been worked out by the League to Enforce Peace is new. Instead of pooling all the various military and naval forces to constitute a grand army of the world under the supreme command of one leader who might be tempted to make embarrassing use of his absolute power, as has been proposed from time to time, the plan of the League to Enforce Peace provides that each nation shall retain its complete autonomy in military affairs as it does in all other matters; but that each shall pledge itself to stand ready to furnish its quota to punish transgressors of the international agreement as the nations combined to suppress the boxer rebellion in China sixteen years ago. Add to this joint use of military force the boycott to coerce an offender and you have the measures by which it is proposed to provide the peace movement with a spinal column.

In due time a call for a national conference at Philadelphia, June 17, 1915, was sent out signed by one hundred and twenty of the foremost men in industry, finance, commerce, transportation, politics, diplomacy, art, education, and the church.

Three hundred men responded to the call for the Philadelphia meeting including the individual members of the special committee on economic results of the war of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. In a preliminary discussion, following a dinner on the evening of June 16, the plan and scope of the proposed "League of Peace"

were pretty fully outlined. The formal conference was held on the anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill in the hall in which the immortal Declaration of Independence was signed, two omens, which, it was hoped, promised well for the proposed emancipation of the human race from the bloody tyranny of war. The proposed name of the organization there formed was enlarged to the "League to Enforce Peace," and W. H. Taft was elected president. ✓

In the addresses delivered at this conference the facts were clearly developed that the League to Enforce Peace did not contemplate any attempt to interfere with the course of the present war in Europe; but that it proposed a constructive program to be ready at hand when hostilities were at an end wherewith the nations might start anew. By providing saner methods of settling international disputes it was hoped that the frequency of wars might be reduced, but the fact was frankly recognized that so long as human nature remains ✓ what it is there are likely to be some wars.

The principles upon which this hope was based were formulated as follows:

"We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

"First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon

the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

“Second: All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing consideration and recommendation.

“Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

“Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the judicial tribunal mentioned in article one.”

Later on the following interpretation of Article Three was authorized by the Executive Committee:

“The signatory powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international judicial tribunal or council of conciliation before issuing an ultimatum or threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another’s territory.”

The immediate task the League to Enforce Peace set itself was to explain its aims and purposes to all the people in order that an enlightened public opinion might be constituted and prepared to sup-

port this government when the time came for it to negotiate with other nations.

The proposals of the League to Enforce Peace attracted a great deal of favorable attention. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, an organization representing a constituency of 350,000 business men, firms, and corporations in every state in the Union, held a referendum on the League's proposals, submitting to each voter, as its by-laws direct, an impartial statement giving the arguments both for and against the proposition. In response to this referendum more than 96 per cent. of the vote approved the proposition that this country should take the initiative in forming a league of nations which should agree to submit justiciable questions arising between any of its members to an international court, and non-justiciable questions to a council of conciliation for decision or recommendation before resorting to war.

The League's program was also indorsed by the National Economic League and by various peace societies, including the World Peace Foundation. It was also very generally approved by leading newspapers and by public men throughout the country. In fact, the propaganda in behalf of the League program was disseminated far more thoroughly and won far greater general approval than any one connected with the movement had dared to hope.

So it happened that the first annual National

assemblage, summoned to meet in Washington May 26 and 27, 1916, "To devise and determine upon measures for giving effect to the proposals adopted at the conference held last June in Independence Hall, in Philadelphia, for a League to Enforce Peace," as already described, elicited a response that astounded and delighted all who had taken an active part in promoting the League and all who believed in saner international relations.

The few active workers immediately identified with the preparations for the Washington conference, while maintaining for purposes of publication an optimism possibly equalled, but certainly never surpassed, by the chairman of a political campaign committee just before election, privately assured each other that if they could only muster an attendance of three hundred the conference might be considered a success.

Two days before the date for the first session more than two thousand delegates, representing every walk in life, and from every state in the Union, not to mention Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, had registered at temporary headquarters at the New Willard Hotel, while others were coming in on every train. The little hall that had seemed ample to meet the modest anticipations of the committee on arrangements was hastily exchanged for the Belasco Theatre, a much larger auditorium. Applications for seats at the closing dinner, at which President Wilson was to be the

principal speaker, were not so easily disposed of, for there was but one available place in which to serve so large a public dinner. The dinner committee simply filled every available seat and was forced to turn the remaining applicants away.

President Taft presided at all sessions, though he was obliged to absent himself from part of the first two. A number of the honorary vice-presidents, other officers and committeemen occupied seats on the stage, while the auditorium was packed with delegates who evidently came to approve all that was good, for applause was spontaneous, frequent, and hearty enough to inspire the most blasé of public speakers.

The program which had been very carefully worked out to cover all phases of the League's proposals, and the subjects assigned to speakers of national prominence best qualified to deal with each, was divided into four general topics; namely, "The platform," "Practicability of the League Program," "American Interests Affected by the League Program," and "Plans for Giving Effect to the League Program." One session was set apart for questions and discussions by delegates, while the addresses at the closing dinner dealt with the broader aspects of the League program.

By common consent the list of addresses at this dinner was conceded to be one of the best ever heard at a public dinner in Washington. President Wilson's address in particular, which was read with profound interest throughout the

world, was a notable utterance. It was the formulation of a new and nobler conception of world statesmanship—a Declaration of Human Rights destined to live in history.

Taken together the papers and addresses presented at the first annual assemblage cover the subject of the League to Enforce Peace program very fully. They will be found, grouped according to general topics, in the succeeding pages.

CHARLES FREDERICK CARTER.







**THOMAS RAEBURN WHITE**  
Member Executive Committee, League to Enforce Peace

## CHAPTER II

### “THE PLATFORM”

THE opening session of the first annual assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace on the morning of May 26, 1916, was devoted to “The Platform.” The first paper on this general topic was presented by Thomas Raeburn White, of Philadelphia, as follows:

#### THE LEAGUE PROGRAM

The present war has demonstrated that existing international institutions are unable to restrain the rush of national ambition bent upon realizing its ends by an appeal to arms. The cause of this failure was not the weakness of international law, but lay in the fact that no machinery existed by which nations could be forced to submit their disputes to international courts or boards of conciliation.

Competent means for peaceable adjustment were at hand, but because there was no power to compel their use the greatest war in history has swept over Europe and has carried desolation and sorrow into every clime. This appalling conflict has concentrated the mind of the world upon the question—what can be done to prevent a like catastrophe from recurring?

The object of this conference is to promote a League of Nations to Enforce Peace—a world organization which will tend to prevent war by forcing its members to try peaceable settlement first.

Our proposals are brief and simple: First, there must be, of course, a contract or agreement between those nations who are willing to join the League; it is intended that this contract or treaty shall relate only to those nations who are parties thereto and such disputes as may arise between them, not comprehending any alliance against outside powers, or any effort to control them.

The disputes which may arise between nations have been roughly divided into two classes—those which are capable of being decided by a court according to known rules of law or equity, called justiciable questions, and those which are not capable of being so decided because there is no law applicable thereto, and which are called non-justiciable questions. The interpretation of a treaty or the ascertainment of a boundary line would be examples of justiciable questions; whether one nation should exclude the citizens of another from its territory or should be permitted to acquire territory in close proximity to another, would be non-justiciable, sometimes called political questions. It is proposed that all justiciable questions shall be submitted to an international court for hearing and judgment and that all other questions shall be submitted to an international council of conciliation for hearing and recommendation, before hostilities shall be commenced by either party to the controversy.

The program does not contemplate that the members of the League shall be bound to accept the decision of the court in the one case, or the recommendation of the council of conciliation in the other; they are left free to go to war if they believe their interests demand that they should do so. The only restraint to be laid upon them is that they shall not commence hostilities until they have stated their case to an impartial body and thus have stated it to the world and have given time for consideration and decision. This is surely not an

unreasonable proposition. If a case is not good enough to bear stating it is not good enough to be supported by force of arms.

In order to assist in the decision of judicial questions it is further proposed that there shall be conferences held at regular intervals so that disputed questions of law between nations may be settled and it may be known in advance what legal principles will be applied by the court which hears the cases.

Finally that the nations may really be restrained from commencing hostilities until their cases have been submitted and examined, it is proposed that all members of the League shall agree that any power which violates this provision of the treaty shall be at once opposed by all the other members, with both their economic and military forces.

What are some of the principal objections which have been urged against these proposals?

It is said that no nation ought to agree to submit all justiciable questions to an international court but should reserve therefrom questions affecting vital interest, honor or independence, which of course means that any question may be reserved at the option of the contracting power, these terms are so inclusive and so elastic.

The principal objection urged to the judicial settlement of international questions of this character is that a nation should not surrender its freedom of action in any important matter. Those who take this view have an exaggerated conception of nationality; they seem to think that their country, like the ancient kings, can do no wrong, and that a claim, unsupportable by law or morals, may properly be enforced, if the nation has the power, and material advantage will result.

This is an unworthy conception of national duty and national honor. It is the duty of a nation, as of an individual, to be just.

It should never attempt to enforce by violence a proposal which it fears to submit to the judgment of a court. If after an unfavorable decision it feels that its best interests demand that it should enforce its claim by war it is left free to do so. But no nation would fear to allow its claim to be examined on the merits unless it knew it to be unsustainable.

There is, however, another objection to the judicial settlement of all international disputes which is more worthy of consideration. This is that there exists at the present time no competent court to which the nations can resort with confidence that their cases will be judicially considered and decided in accordance with the law and the fact.

When a case is now submitted to judicial decision, a special court must be made up for that case, and as the judges are ordinarily selected by the nations concerned they often partake more of the character of advocates than of judges, and the decision is really made by one man, the umpire. It is unsatisfactory for the great questions which come up between sovereign powers to be disposed of by the judgment of one man, whose identity is unknown in advance and who may be inexperienced in judicial work. Men would not so submit their disputes, and it is unreasonable to suppose that nations would be willing to do so.

It is essential to the success of the proposed League to Enforce Peace that a permanent international court shall be established, so that there may be a permanent body of trained jurists, the character of whose work is known in advance, to which nations will be willing to resort with that confidence in the integrity of its decisions which is essential to the success of any judicial body.

The fact that members of the League are not required to submit to the decision of the Court when rendered, but, if they wish, may repudiate it and still

settle their differences by a resort to war, detracts but little from the force of what has been said, for the decision of the court would in most cases be accepted, especially by the United States which on account of its well-known advocacy of judicial settlement would be unlikely to repudiate a decision unless in a clear case of fraud.

The agreement to submit non-justiciable questions to an international council of conciliation is likely to meet with less opposition than the proposal to submit all justiciable questions to a court for the reason that the council of conciliation does not undertake to decide which party is right or what shall be done, but merely makes a recommendation. While for the reasons already indicated some nations, and particularly the United States, would feel bound to conform to the decision of a court, there would not be the same feeling in regard to the recommendation of the Board of Conciliation from the very nature of the case. The questions which would come before this Board would be mostly political in character; there would be no question involving the decision of facts or the application of law. The recommendation would be merely the judgment of the council as to the fair and equitable thing to do under all the circumstances; either nation might, without stultification, under the provisions of the proposed League, state that its interests were so vitally involved that it felt bound to reject the proposed course of procedure; the parties would then be thrown back upon direct negotiation, or, in the last resort, upon the trial of strength.

But there are some general objections to the whole plan which have been advanced by thoughtful men and which deserve a frank and considerate discussion.

It is said that no plan which calls for the legal settlement of questions arising between nations can be suc-

cessful or would be conducive to the advancement of civilization, because it would mean that the *status quo* must be maintained.

In this connection we are told that the great events in the world's history which have marked the progress of civilization have come about not by law but by force; that it would have been impossible for our own nation to have existed had it not been for the use of force; that many wrongs have been committed in the past which as yet are unredressed, and which cannot be redressed by legal means. Peoples once constituting nationalities, and now under the control of alien power, still dream of national greatness; nations which have lost a portion of their territory live in the hope of regaining it, and releasing their people from a foreign yoke.

It must be admitted that the strictly judicial method of settling international controversies would prevent those changes which must inevitably come about with the rise and fall of nations. Advancing civilization, while regardful of the rights of sovereignties, cannot be kept back by a system which would prevent changes in forms of government or the transfer of territory where necessary to the highest development of the world. The physical, moral, and spiritual welfare of human beings may have a higher claim than the national entity which for the moment asserts jurisdiction over them.

The program of the League to Enforce Peace has been framed with consideration for this matter, and when closely analyzed is seen not to stand in the way of proper development of this character. The question whether a colony or a portion of a nation should be entitled to its independence is not a matter for judicial settlement, nor would it come within the comprehension of this scheme, or of any international institution. Such peoples would be as free afterwards as they were before



to assert their independence and maintain it by force of arms, if they could do so.

Moreover, other questions of the character mentioned are non-justiciable and the recommendations of the council of conciliation would not bind, but the nations would be free to use force to realize their aspirations, if they felt the necessity of doing so.

But it may be said that in neither of these particulars does the proposed plan offer any real advance over the existing condition; it does, however, in that the council of conciliation would be competent to consider all such questions when arising between independent states, and in cases where the alternative would be a devastating war, it is by no means impossible that nations would be willing to treat with regard to the question of giving up some of their territory for a proper consideration or granting other concessions under conditions which would make for the best interests of all and the advancement of civilization.

In short, if the *status quo* ever could in the nature of things be changed peaceably it could be under the plan of the League to Enforce Peace.

However, it must be frankly admitted that there are limits to the possibility of adjusting, in a legal way, all questions which may arise so long as there are backward nations, unable or unwilling to maintain law and order within their own boundaries, and to protect the rights of others. These considerations might result in excluding certain of the backward nations from joining a League to Enforce Peace for a time, but that does not interfere with the proposal that the enlightened nations shall now make such a contract, and agree that any questions coming up between them shall at least be stated and passed upon by an international body before hostilities begin.

Another great objection to the plan of the League to Enforce Peace is because it contemplates the use of force

to restrain nations from going to war before they have complied with the stipulations mentioned.

This objection is urged by very conscientious, high-minded people, who believe that all war is wrong, and that it can never be right to do evil. They, therefore, feel bound to oppose the program of the League to Enforce Peace because they think it involves the use of the very thing which civilization is now trying to avoid.

Such views are entitled to great respect but rest perhaps upon a mistaken conception of what the League proposes. It must be admitted that the use of force is necessary in dealing with law breakers, and on principle it seems to make little difference whether these are men or nations. As the evil-doer must be restrained by force in our local communities, so the evil-doer must be restrained by force in the community of nations. The force which is proposed to be used by the League to Enforce Peace, economic and military, is essentially police force; to suppress disorder, not to create it; if not used, more lives would be taken, more damage done, more war inflicted upon the world than if it is used.

That this proposal is not morally wrong is maintained by so eminent an authority as William Penn, a member of the Society of Friends, which holds more strongly than any other religious body that all war is essentially unchristian. In his scheme for an European Diet, William Penn provided that a sovereign assembly consisting of representatives from the various nations should decide disputes between them and he then proceeded thus:

“If any of the Sovereignties that Constitute these Imperial States, shall refuse to submit their Claim or Pretensions to them, or to abide and perform the Judgment thereof, and seek their Remedy by Arms, or delay their Compliance beyond the Time prefixt in their Resolutions, all the other

Sovereignties, United as One Strength, shall compel the Submission and Performance of the Sentence, with Damages to the Suffering Party, and Charges to the Sovereignties that obliged their Submission.”

This is high authority for the precise proposition advanced by the League to Enforce Peace, and one which all of us can safely follow. In so doing, it is a satisfaction to feel that the resort to arms would probably never be necessary. The mere threat of the union of the forces of all the other nations belonging to the League would be enough; if that were not enough the economic pressure which could be put upon a single state would of itself be sufficient to bring her to terms, and the program of the League has been officially interpreted to mean that economic pressure shall first be applied and where it is sufficient military force will not be necessary. Here, again, we have the authority of William Penn, whose wisdom in matters of state has been so often demonstrated. He proceeded:

“To be sure, Europe would quietly obtain the so much desired and needed Peace, to Her harassed Inhabitants; no Sovereignty in Europe having the Power and therefore cannot show the Will to dispute the Conclusion; and, consequently, Peace would be procured, and continued in Europe.”

There are others who oppose the use of force upon a different ground. They say that in the last analysis, the agreement to use force would depend solely upon the will of the nations concerned; that, therefore, it would be no more effective than the agreement by the parties to submit their disputes to the court or to the council of conciliation—they might as well refuse the one as the other. This objection, however, while suggesting that

the plan might not work, is not really an objection to the principle. Of course, the nations might refuse to unite their forces, but with the growing conception that the honor of a nation requires it to keep its treaties, and with the knowledge that the agreement alone would have a deterring effect upon a recalcitrant state, it is believed that the objection is more apparent than real.

It has also been urged that it would be difficult to tell when one nation had begun hostilities, and therefore when the obligation had arisen on the part of the others to oppose their forces against her; also, in some cases, it might be difficult to determine which of the two had first begun hostilities and therefore which was to be opposed and which supported by the other members of the League. These are practical difficulties, but they do not affect the merits of the plan.

Another objection which is often heard is that the League would accomplish nothing if it could come into existence, and that the probabilities are very great that it cannot, because no sufficient number of nations will be willing to adhere to it.

That the League would accomplish much good, if it were formed by a number of first-class powers, there is no doubt. It is true, it does not purport to prohibit war, because the nations are at liberty to go to war if they choose, after a decision of the court or the council has been rendered, but they would not be so likely to do so. On the contrary, it is safe to assume that in a great majority of cases they would not do so. Time is not only the great healer but the great pacifier. Wars frequently spring out of misunderstandings, temporary in character, which disappear on investigation, and it would be of enormous assistance in lessening the tension even when great questions of national policy are involved, if the matters in dispute could be submitted to impartial examination. Thus the misunderstandings would be cleared up, the weakness and the strength of

both sides of the question would be exposed to the world, and the nation whose cause was shown to be unjust would probably find that it would lose more by bringing upon itself the odium of mankind in endeavoring to enforce a cause already determined to be wrong than by submitting to the inconvenience of accepting the decision.

Whether a considerable number of nations would adhere to this plan within the near future no one knows, but we have reason to believe and hope that they will do so. This conflict has shown more clearly than any other that war inflicts terrible damage, not only upon the parties directly involved in it, but upon neutrals, and it is not too much to say that there is a settled determination growing in the minds of thoughtful men, in both neutral and belligerent countries, that at the close of this war some positive steps must be taken to better preserve the peace of the world and that the great powers should be willing to yield such small part of their sovereignty as is involved in adherence to the plan of the League to Enforce Peace.

It is said by some that the program of the League does not go far enough. Of what avail, we are asked, would it be to provide machinery to operate only on members of a League when all other nations not members thereof were still left free to wage war, even on League members, with or without first trying peaceful settlement?

Of course it is true that nations outside of the League would not be controlled by it, but a League is worth while even if it does no more than tend to prevent war between a very few members. But the great advantages to be gained from the freedom of constant menace of attack, and the danger of remaining without when other nations were forming closer relations within would soon compel non-members to seek admission out of consideration for safety, if nothing more.

Everything must have a beginning, and the modest proposals of the League to Enforce Peace seem as far as it is wise to go at this moment. To undertake to deal with non-members would jeopardize the success of the undertaking, for it would place its members in the position of agreeing to engage in wars against other nations who refused to submit their cases to a court or council, when they had not agreed to do so. This would be too serious a risk of a foreign war for some nations, perhaps for the United States, to undertake and it would probably refuse to join a League involving this proposal.

Finally we come to the question whether the United States ought to join such a League.

There are many who assert that we should not, and who prophesy that the people of this country will never agree to it. It is said that the first duty of the United States is to her own citizens; that we ought not to concern ourselves with European affairs; that we should continue to avoid being drawn into this war, and should enter into no treaties or obligations which might involve us in such conflicts in future, and we are of course reminded of Washington's advice that we should avoid entangling alliances. It is also said that to enter into such a League as here proposed would be especially objectionable because the freedom of American action would be restrained at the will of foreign powers.

There is much that appeals to an American in these observations. We like to think of our country as being sufficient unto itself; able with its vast territory and unlimited resources to supply itself indefinitely with all necessary means of sustenance, and to repel foreign invasion, should it be attempted. Would it not be better for us to stand aloof from the nations of the old world and work out our own destiny without entering into leagues or political alliances with them?

These considerations, however, fail to take into ac-

count changing conditions. Our relations with other nations have become so much closer than formerly that our interests can no longer be disassociated from theirs. The distance from one country to another is not measured by miles but by ease of communication, and the means of travel have so improved in the last hundred years that we are nearer to the uttermost quarters of the world than we once were to some of our neighbors. This has led to closer business relations so that while we might perhaps be able to sustain ourselves, in case of need, we are dependent in great degree for our comfort and prosperity upon other nations, and the interruption of normal commercial intercourse brings great loss upon us. It is, therefore, of great importance to us, not merely because of our interest in mankind but because of our interest in ourselves, that world-devastating wars should be prevented.

We have seen in the course of the last few months how dangerous a great war may be to neutrals, and how difficult it is for us to keep from being drawn into it. It would, therefore, be the best self-protection for the United States to lend its aid to some plan by which world peace may be better preserved.

The suggestion that the United States might find itself subject to the dictation and coercion of foreign powers, if it became a member of this League, is without foundation.

Of course the United States would thereby agree that it would not commence hostilities against another member of the League without first submitting its grievance to a court or council of conciliation, and if it violated this provision would find itself opposed by the other members of the League. But it is not thinkable that the United States would adopt such a course of action. We, least of all nations, should refuse to submit our cause to the examination of an impartial body—a method of adjustment of international differences,



which we have practised ourselves and have constantly urged upon the world throughout the whole period of our national existence. When we had submitted our case and a decision had been rendered we should be left free to follow any course we should then deem best.

There is another consideration which shows our joining the League would be to our advantage from military and economic considerations.

If the League to Enforce Peace is adhered to by the principal nations of the world, its immediate effect will be the reduction of armaments for the reason that the nations will no longer have to be "on edge." The commencement of hostilities for a period long enough to examine the question and render a decision, which could scarcely be less than a year, is forbidden. There would, therefore, not be the possibility of sudden descent by one nation upon another without warning. This would mean that there would not have to be that instant readiness to repel attack which some of the nations of Europe have felt it incumbent upon them to maintain.

This would improve the situation of the United States in the possible event of a foreign war because the people of this country will never consent to maintain a great standing army in time of peace, and any consideration which tends to lessen the burden of armaments abroad will place us upon more of an equality with other great powers.

This abatement of the struggle for supremacy in armaments will of itself enormously improve the possibility of peaceful settlements. Nations which are not in instant readiness to fight are much more apt to turn their thoughts to amicable adjustment than those which are only waiting a favorable opportunity to strike the first blow.

But there is another and a far nobler reason why the United States ought to join a League to Enforce Peace.







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**OSCAR S. STRAUS, A.B., LL.D.**

**Member Executive Committee, League to Enforce Peace**

We have been the leader in the cause of peaceful international settlements. We are the greatest neutral nation and in spite of our differences with certain of the belligerents, our disinterestedness and our sense of justice are recognized abroad, and in the opinion of competent statesmen across the water, our coöperation at this great crisis is necessary to the success of this plan, or any plan having the same end in view. If now we should stand aloof from a great undertaking which with our help could be successful and lead the world a step toward the firm establishment of peace we would be recreant to our duty and fail to realize our great destiny.

No one contends that the program of the League to Enforce Peace is perfect; no one believes that it will abolish war instantly, even among its members, but that is no reason for refusing it support. We do not condemn our educational systems because they have not put an end to illiteracy, or our religious or moral institutions because there is still evil in the world; we try to make these institutions better. The question is whether the establishment of the program of the League to Enforce Peace will on the whole *tend* to prevent war, and *tend* to promote harmony and good will among nations. If so, we should give it our support.

There can be no doubt that it will be of value in the great world movement toward a permanent organization among nations, which will some day provide for the suppression of international disorder as promptly as disorder is now suppressed in the best regulated communities.

OSCAR S. STRAUS, A.B., LL.B., LL.D., Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission, former Secretary of Commerce and Labor, former U. S. Ambassador to Turkey, member of the per-

manent court of Arbitration at The Hague, etc., read the following paper:

PREPAREDNESS AGAINST THE REBARBARIZATION OF  
THE WORLD

Lord Haldane, the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, than whom there is no higher authority upon international relationship, in an address before the American Bar Association at Montreal in September, 1913—eleven months before the war began—said:

“The barbarism which once looked to conquest and the waging of successful war as the main object of statesmanship seems as though it were passing away. There have been established rules of international law which already govern the conduct of war itself and are generally observed as binding by all civilized people with the result that the cruelties of war have been lessened. . . . It is this spirit that may develop as time goes on into a full international ‘sittlichkeit.’”

He expressed what was then the prevailing opinion of thoughtful men throughout the world. Alas, we have all experienced a rude awakening and a change of mind. Our hopes and philosophies respecting the progress of civilization and the maintenance of peace have been dashed to the ground, and in the face of the awful and shocking realities we have been compelled to come to the conclusion that more effective agencies than moral securities and aspirations must be provided in the future in order to hold in check the unmoral tendencies, the greed and thirst for conquest which still dominate international relationship. We have learned so long as force sits in the judgment-seat of some nations, force must sit, if not in, certainly behind, the judgment-seat of every other nation unless they can come to an agreement to place a mightier force behind the judgment-seat of a

sufficiently large group of nations that will combine to maintain peace with justice.

Sir Edward Grey in a recent interview said: "Unless mankind learns from this war to avoid war, the struggle will have been in vain." This should be our hope and this should be our aim, and in recognition of this truth we are assembled to instruct public opinion, to prepare our people—and through them our government—to take its share, befitting its greatness and its responsibilities to itself and to the world, in the international reconstruction which must follow, unless we and they are willing to suffer the evils and devastations of recurring wars tending to the rebarbarization of the world. Men have learned to check violence within nations and must find some way to suppress or largely reduce violence between nations.

In the days of slow wars an interval separated a state of peace from the state of war. Nations could more readily postpone their preparations for war until the war clouds threatened and could postpone the raising of armies until the time approached for using them; but all this is changed. The present war began after an ultimatum of only a few days, and immediately thereafter the armies of Germany were on the march through Belgium.

At three different periods during the last twenty-eight years I saw at close range at Constantinople the play of the diplomacy of the great European powers. With rare exception, in important vital issues, the diplomacy of the stronger nations won out and that of the weaker nations correspondingly failed.

It is a mistake to believe that armies and navies lie useless when not engaged in war. As a matter of fact armies and navies are the potential forces behind diplomacy when vital interests are at stake and their potentiality is in the background and often the controlling factor in obviating the development of conditions that

lead to war or that project nations into war, even at times against their own will.

Let us not deceive ourselves by failing to see that this war has let loose throughout the world the spirit of conquest, the hunger for territory, and the rivalry for domination on land and sea. Even our efforts to maintain our neutrality instead of making for us friends have made us envied, distrusted, and by some nations hated. But entirely apart from the menace of foreign attack, if we are to be an effective influence, either now or hereafter, in the promotion or maintenance of the peace of the world, the measure of our influence will certainly not be in proportion to our weakness but in proportion to our available strength. It is said by some that to enlarge our naval and military forces will of itself be a provocative of war in that it will prompt the spirit of militarism. This is true where armaments are piled up for the sake of domination or of conquests, but armaments for defense—subordinated as they always must be under our form of government to the civil power—are not the promoters of militarism but a bulwark for the maintenance of the reign of law and of justice and for the security of all those ideals which constitute the elements of enlightened and progressive civilization.

A war such as this could never have engulfed the nations, had their international relationship and foundations been rightfully constructed. For many years past, and especially since the Franco-Prussian War, historians, statesmen, and publicists foresaw and foretold that a condition of armed peace with its ever-increasing burden of competitive armaments would inevitably lead to war unless a reconstruction could be effected by the embattled nations of Europe upon the basis of peace.

Count Benedetti, the French Ambassador at the court of Berlin, at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, in his "Studies in Diplomacy," distinctly stated at

the time that the Triple Alliance of 1879 between Germany and Austria, to which Italy was joined in 1882, would necessarily be a portent of war, or to use his words:

“It is in fact armed peace that the three powers have organized, and can peace under arms be lasting?”

The Marquis of Salisbury, in 1897, made the statement that “The federation of the European nations is the germ of the only possible mutual relation of these States which can protect civilization from the frightful effects of war.”

The German Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag on August 19, 1915, said, “An unassailable Germany would give us a new Europe,” and then adds, “An England able to dictate its will to the world is inconsistent with the peace of the world.”

He was right in his diagnosis when applied to his enemy but wrong when applied to his own country. His statement is itself an additional proof that the dominance of power is not safe in the hands of any one nation, and can only be entrusted for the security of each nation in the hands of the united nations.

It is quite the vogue now to refer with ridicule to the two Hague conferences and to the efforts made to avert the catastrophe toward which Europe was so rapidly drifting. The tendencies were in two diametrically opposite directions which have been graphically described as Utopia and Hell. If the pacifists, who animated and encouraged their governments to participate in the peace conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 and who looked with hopefulness upon the results that would follow, have met with disappointment, certainly they have not fallen farther away from the realization of their ideals than have the militarists in the condition of hopelessness and remoteness of results they aimed speedily to achieve by the war which now engulfs the world. In other words, the failure of the militarists has certainly

been as decisive and infinitely more appalling than has been the failure of the peace advocates in achieving their end.

This world war is a distinct proof that neither pacifism without *might*, nor might—unless dominated by *right*—can be effectual in securing a permanent peace.

As we survey the history of nations we find three distinct methods of world organization which were developed, tried, and found wanting. The first of these was the dominance of nations by great world powers such as Greece under Alexander, whose invincible phalanxes dominated Europe, Asia, and Africa. The disciplined power of Rome which supplanted that of Greece was another example. But as Greece was supplanted by Rome, so Rome in turn was overthrown by the onrush of the northern barbarians.

Following the Napoleonic wars there was developed a second method of keeping the peace—the system of the Balance of Power and of the Concert of Europe under which, instead of one dominant nation, several nations united together in offensive and defensive alliances.

This plan developed in our day in a third arrangement by which it was hoped that peace and order would be maintained among the nations through group alliances; namely, the Triple Alliance on the one side and the Triple Entente on the other. This Dual arrangement dividing Europe into two vast and powerful camps it was hoped would have the effect which is epitomized in the expression that “one sword will keep the other in its scabbard.”

But this war proves that it has had a contrary effect; it has multiplied the swords on both sides, it has developed militarism as never before, and has piled up those crushing armaments that are to-day clashing against one another in the most frightful and bloody war in all history.



These several methods and plans from Alexander the Great to William II each in turn collapsed with increasing frightfulness. They were built upon false foundations; they were built as strongholds for war and not as strongholds for peace. It follows by the light of the logic of history that for the future the world must seek other methods than such as have failed so woefully to maintain righteous peace. It must be a *righteous* peace, for peace to be lasting must be founded on justice and respect for law.

Any future plan to be lasting must take into consideration the two antagonistic schools regarding the application of moral principles to international affairs, and in so doing reconstruct international relationship, not as heretofore exclusively on the basis of war, but dominantly on the basis of peace. This cannot be done by the dominance of a single power. That method has been tried and has failed. It cannot be done by a division of power. That also has proved a failure. It must be done by a unity of power; by placing the might of the united nations as guardians of the rights of each nation, on the same principle as we constitute the joint power of the forty-eight states of our Union as the guardian of the right of each state.

While "righteousness exalteth a nation," the present war gives incontrovertible proof that righteousness will not protect a nation unless all other nations are likewise exalted by righteousness. When that time arrives we shall have reached the millennium which from present indications is sufficiently remote to justify a search for ways and means that will serve the purpose of the world in the intervening time.

It is a fact, which we would deceive ourselves in failing to recognize, that fundamental changes in the progress of mankind have rarely if ever been possible save by war or as a sequel to war. The history of the nations from the Armageddon to the invasion of Belgium teaches

that war will not be banished until the leading and more powerful nations become civilized enough to create an organization that will not only induce but will force resort to other means than war and that will be able to impose necessary and fundamental changes without war.

The greatest curse of war is that it settles international differences by the force of might and not by the arbitration of right, and when so settled it will continue in the future as in the past to breed war. National weakness does not make for peace. On the contrary, as the world is at present constituted, it invites a disregard for fundamental right; it invites aggression and war. Power and preparedness within limitation have a restraining influence and are most helpful in leading controversies to settlement by peaceful negotiations. A nation without power is compelled to submit either to conquest or to humiliating conditions. When vital interests arise between strong and weak nations they are more likely to lead to war than when they arise between two strong nations. We need not look far for examples for this unfortunate condition. The present war in its origin affords a striking instance.

Many plans have been devised but no one in my judgment has laid a better foundation for international peace than the one that has been adopted by the League to Enforce Peace. Herbert Spencer in his "Principles of Sociology" some thirty years ago stated:

"A federation of the highest nations exercising supreme authority—may, by forbidding wars between any of its constituent nations, put an end to the rebarbarization which is continually threatening civilization."

Some such plan was recommended by Sir Edward Grey and proposed by him to Germany as a safeguard against aggression on the part of the Triple Entente, on July 30, 1914. This proposal was embodied in a telegram to the British Ambassador at Berlin. He said:

“If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it as far as I could through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite approachment between the powers than has been possible hitherto.”

Unfortunately this proposal was only put forward at the eleventh hour when misrepresentation, irritation, and suspicion had poisoned the air; all of which emphasizes the necessity that arrangements for peace must be made in advance not only of mobilization but of the irritations which produce war, and that such arrangements must be made with the same precautions and preparedness as the nations have hitherto given to preparations for war.

It is to be hoped that out of the extreme suffering and sacrifices that this war imposes there may arise supreme wisdom among the nations. Either there will be a new day or a darker night; all depends upon how this war will end and what bulwarks the nations will erect against future cataclysms such as we are now witnessing.

In conclusion, let me repeat, America though not a belligerent is equally concerned in the world's peace as are the nations at war. We must take a part in the reconstruction. Norman Angel significantly says, that if we do not mix in the European affairs Europe will mix in our affairs. We owe it to ourselves, to humanity, and to

the world to lend our best efforts and to make our fullest contribution to that reconstruction which must come.

Civilization has been undermined. The temples of the false gods have tumbled into ruin. The most barbaric and colossal war has not put God, but man, on trial. It has put existing international relationship on trial; it has put expediency and the doctrine of might on trial. It has revealed the fact that we cannot have one standard of morals within a nation and a different and lower standard as between nations.

All the machinery that has been devised in the past for the maintenance of peace has been left to volunteer effort. The resort to treaties of arbitration, to the Hague Tribunal, to the Commissions of Inquiry, was voluntary. We must at least put forth as much compelling force for the preservation of peace as has heretofore been put forth for the preparations for war. Let us hope that out of the bloody trenches will arise a new international conscience which will put no geographical limitations upon right and justice.

Instead of a general staff in each nation preparing for war, there should be a general staff of the united nations preparing for peace. Bluntchli was perhaps right in his opinion that the federation of Europe would be easier to bring about than was that of the German Empire. Federation gives cause for hope—hope that out of the agonies and appalling sacrifices of this war may arise a higher sense of international justice and a nobler humanity under the protecting shield of the united powers of the united nations.

EDWARD A. FILENE, President of William Filene's Sons Co., of Boston, Director of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and active in commercial, civic, and political work, evoked the most remarkable demonstration of the con-

ference when, after relating the parable of the Good Samaritan and proposing that this country should play the part of the Good Samaritan to the rest of the world added:

“But it is our first duty to rid the Jericho Road of thieves.”

Mr. Filene's address follows:

THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE AND THE SOUL OF  
THE UNITED STATES

This war will, on the one hand, determine whether or not democracy can survive in Europe, and, on the other hand, it will determine whether or not democracy deserves to survive in America. The effect of this war upon our nation is destined to be just as profound, though more quietly produced, as though we were among the belligerents. While war is hardening Europe through sacrifice, we may let war soften America through prosperity and find ourselves at the end of the war “a peaceful nation unprepared for peace.” I am convinced that the future of American democracy and the very soul of our nation is at stake in the part we play in the present crisis.

This war has emphasized the fact that the United States has become a world power. It has compelled America suddenly to think in terms of world civilization. Carefully sheltered from the recurrent storm and stress of European politics by our geographical location and our traditional policy of isolation, we have, as a nation, grown both powerful and rich, but the war has shaken down about our ears the House of Isolation. We have learned that isolation from world affairs is henceforth impossible, and that coöperation in world affairs is imperative. But we are groping for a program. The

bigness of world demands makes hesitant a nation accustomed to national demands only.

But international problems are fundamentally the same as individual problems, except they are bigger. To find a program for relations between nations, we need but to apply the principles of enlightened relations between men. In fact, I know no better guide for American action in the present crisis than a very old story about the duty one individual owes another. The story is familiar to you.

“A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, who stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead. And by chance there came down a certain priest that way; and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was; and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, and went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, ‘Take care of him: and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee.’ ‘Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbor unto him that fell among the thieves?’ And he said, ‘He that shewed mercy on him.’ Then said Jesus unto him, ‘Go, and do thou likewise.’”

To-day the world is wounded. Civilization has fallen, bruised and beaten by the roadside. There are only a few nations far enough removed from the conflict to be able to go in peace along the highway. Of all these nations, we are the most powerful. The United States may take either of two attitudes in the present crisis. Like the Levite, it may do the selfishly safe thing, pre-

servicing merely its own comfort and safety, or like the Samaritan, it may let the unfortunate situation in which the world now finds itself awaken it to the truth that strength owes a debt to weakness and that order owes a debt to disorder.

We have come to a time when the Good Samaritan is, in theory at least, accepted as an illustration of the minimum social responsibility that any civilized man must accept. The Good Samaritan is the classical example of remedial charity prompted by pity. The millions of dollars we have given to relief funds might indicate that the United States has adequately played the rôle of the Good Samaritan, but I am convinced that were this parable stated to-day, it would not limit the action of the Good Samaritan to dressing the wounds and paying the hotel bill of the victim, but would have him start a practical movement for ridding the Jericho Road of outlaws, instituting adequate police protection, and making the road a safe avenue for travel. In other words, remedial charity is no longer a complete answer to give to suffering. We must add preventive measures.

The parable of the Good Samaritan, therefore, suggests two lines of action for the United States. It suggests relief measures; and we ought to give of our wealth to the point of sacrifice in the relief of the immediate suffering caused by this war. But it suggests also that relief measures are not enough, that it is a fine thing to organize a wrecking crew, but that it is even more valuable to prevent a wreck. Hand in hand, therefore, with our relief measures as a nation, it is our duty to do our share in helping the world put into operation some plan that will make war less probable and will, in the future, to some extent at least, prevent the suffering we are now trying to relieve.

We are met to-day to advocate the establishment of a League of Nations to enforce peace by a common use of



the economic and military power of its members as the one practical preventive program. I wonder if in urging that the United States take vigorous initiative action in behalf of this proposal, we fully realize that by so doing our nation would not only be rendering to a war-shadowed world the service of constructive statesmanship, but would also be exercising in its own behalf the soundest economic, political, and spiritual foresight.

The United States could, in no way, write a better insurance policy for its future material prosperity than by bending every effort toward the establishment of some international plan that would make war less probable, for if, at the end of this war, the nations of Europe are compelled to enter once more an extravagant rivalry in armaments, the whole business competition of the world will become so complicated and destructive that our own material prosperity will hang in the balance.

The United States could, in no way, display keener political foresight. For the time has passed when the United States can be a law unto itself. The United States with its great wealth and power is a responsible citizen in the community of nations. Either it must consciously take its place now as a world power or it will later be dragged reluctantly at the heels of forces and fears which it cannot control. It is better freely and of our own accord to prepare ourselves to answer the call to world responsibility and world duty than to be driven in fear half to prepare ourselves for defense alone.

The United States could, in no way, display greater spiritual foresight than by cooperating with the nations of the world in preventing those recurring floods of war that over night sweep away so many important results of generations of civilized effort.

Even before the war, we were, as a nation, at the crossroads in our spiritual development—using the word spiritual in its broadest sense. In the physical conquest of the continent, we paid the price of an over emphasis



on the material side of life, an inevitable by-product of every pioneer period. But when a nation blazes its last trail and passes its last frontier, unless the spirit of conquest that marked the period of the physical establishment of its cities, its farms, its factories, and its railways can be turned into the spiritual development of its people, it is due for a decline. The very virtues of a nation's youth may become the vices of a nation's maturity.

Our fathers laid the foundations of this republic in the faith that the political and social order that they established would be fundamentally different from that of old-world states, and would act as a spiritual haven among the governments of earth. We have been so busy clearing forests, establishing cities, erecting factories, and building railroads, that we have come near forgetting the spiritual and social responsibility that the tradition of our fathers laid upon us. If we are not to prove recreant to the faith of the men who founded our nation, we must recover the lost thread of our spiritual mission as a people.

This war has given us an opportunity that we would have been compelled to seek in other and smaller fields had not the war confronted us with a great duty. I believe that if we do our share in helping the nations lay the foundations of more lasting world peace, we will find that this war has given us the opportunity for the greatest moral and spiritual adventure of our national life—an adventure in which we shall consciously dedicate the energies of our nation to a compelling ideal, pull ourselves together in a vast, organized, unselfish expression, and reawaken the spiritual impulses that sustained the founders of this republic.

If, at the end of this war, we fail to do our full share toward helping to secure more lasting peace, we shall prove recreant to a great duty and a great opportunity—probably the greatest opportunity that has ever come

or ever will come to us as a people. And with a nation as with an individual, the deliberate avoidance of a great duty inevitably results in a distinct loss of moral and spiritual power, and whenever the spiritual power of a nation is seriously diminished, the material power of the nation is, in time, undermined, just as the Roman Empire, when wealth and luxury relaxed its sterner virtues and tore down its moral fabric, declined in wealth and power and passed from the rank of a first-class nation.

But if so great emphasis upon the spiritual interests involved seems an impractical argument for a business man to make, it is fortunate that in this instance the economic argument coincides with the spiritual argument. For the definite outlook is that, unless law can be substituted for war to the greatest practical extent in the settlement of international disputes, the United States will face, after the conclusion of this war, one of the most serious and extensive business reactions it has ever experienced.

The grounds for predicting this reaction are clear. Europe will come to the end of the war financially depleted, at the one time when she needs money more urgently than ever in her history. The interest bills on war debts and the expense of reëstablishing war-ravaged industries will create a demand for funds so insistent that Europe will be compelled to make an unheard-of onslaught upon markets abroad; for the sale of goods in foreign markets will be the most available and practical method by which Europe can secure the money she needs.

There is every reason to believe that the United States will be the first to suffer from the severe and destructive competition that will result. In this competition, the United States will be forced to reckon with a new efficiency in Europe. The countries that have so efficiently organized their resources for war will, in the

end, so organize their resources for production. In fact, reorganization for this purpose is already under way. The crushing taxation that will aggravate the poverty of Europe will cause the peoples of Europe to share with the governments of Europe their imperative desire for a trade war for the capture of markets, as a means toward rebuilding the industries of Europe, once more putting the nations upon a normal basis, and lessening the necessity for such crushing taxation. So that we may expect the peoples of Europe to carry over into the contest for economic reconstruction much of the spirit of sacrifice they have shown in the contest for military success.

There are indications that by the end of the war, practically all of the nations of Europe will erect high tariff walls which will seriously restrict trading between the nations that are now enemies. Extensive preparations are already under way for splitting Europe into two rival business camps after the war, just as to-day it is split into two rival military camps. These tariff barriers will be another force causing the nations of Europe to bend every effort to capture the trade of the United States and other neutral nations. If the business energy of Europe, spurred by desperate necessity, focusses upon the neutral markets of the world, it is clear that the South American and other neutral markets, where our trade has been none too large in the past, will be an increasingly difficult, if not impossible, field for us. Before the war, I strongly advocated the extension of our trade in South American markets, but the present outlook is that in those markets we will face a competition based upon such urgent necessity for selling and such low wage labor that it will be impossible for us to compete successfully without sacrificing our present standard of living.

If we permit the nations of Europe to flood the market of the United States with goods made by workmen

who, for patriotic reasons, have accepted wages decidedly lower than American wages, it is clear that not only American labor but American capital will seriously suffer. For if the laboring people of Europe have only their time to sell, and if the employer who buys that time must pay such a price for it as will leave him a profit in the markets where he sells his goods, it follows that the buying power of the entire European people will be reduced. Some Americans are suggesting a high protective tariff against foreign goods, but if foreign products are kept from our markets, how can Europe pay for what she will want from us when the war is over?

Then, too, if we attempt to protect American business from the necessity-driven competition of Europe by the use of high tariffs, we will discover that, in many instances, nothing short of a prohibitory tariff will shut out the low wage competition that we fear. But prohibitory tariffs would mean a serious loss of revenue for our government, a loss which we would probably try to make up by an increase in direct taxation. Adding to such a loss of revenue a preparedness program demanding an annual expenditure of \$500,000,000, we will probably face the necessity of raising, largely by direct taxation, something near a billion dollars annually over and above what we are now raising by direct taxation. Throughout history, governments have gone down in an effort to levy direct taxes to the satisfaction of all classes. Whatever may be our individual views on direct taxation, we know that the practical result of any effort to raise so huge a sum by direct taxation will result in serious class strife.

But if Europe should face the necessity of no other expenditures than those of interest bills and the expense of reconstructing her industries, the situation, though extremely difficult, would not be an impossible one. Unless the war continues for so long as to upset all

reasonable calculations, the expense of the war will probably represent no more than a loss of four or five years of the normal production of Europe. For we must remember that Europe will come to the end of the war with an adequate labor supply, because the extensive introduction of women into the ranks of labor, which has taken place and will increasingly take place, will make up the loss of male workers through the destruction of war. But, if at the end of this war, no method but war is left for the settlement of future disputes that are bound to arise between nations, every nation in Europe will be compelled to resort to a rivalry in armaments more extensive and more expensive than ever before. The extent to which any nation of Europe will arm will be determined not by what that nation can reasonably afford, but by the extent to which the other nations of Europe arm. The expense of such a rivalry in armaments added to the interest bills on war debts and the expense of replacing the destruction of war, will create a need for money so continuously urgent that the trade competition, which we have reason to fear, will not only be made more intense and more destructive, but will continue so much farther into the future that no man can reasonably predict the end of the serious business reaction that will come to the United States, in common with the rest of the world.

We display a superficial grasp of modern economic conditions, if we think American prosperity can long exist side by side with European poverty. The agencies of credit, transportation, and exchange have made fluid the wealth of the world. President James A. Farrell, of the United States Steel Corporation, in a recent address to a group of representative business men at New Orleans, recognized this truth in his apt statement that "There can be no stable prosperity at home unless we are able to make liberal sales of American goods abroad."

I am convinced that the United States is due for some business reaction, even though the rivalry in armaments be made unnecessary, but if the expense of rivalry in armaments could be materially decreased, the reaction might be kept within such bounds that we might reasonably meet it. So that the business prosperity of America demands that we do not "pass by on the other side," but that we take a constructively helpful attitude in helping the world make war less probable and peace more lasting.

There is not a right thinking man in America who would not be willing to make sacrifices if he thought thereby he could make more lasting the peace of the world. But the average man is at a loss for a concrete program. If the average American could become convinced as to what is the next practical and possible step forward in the substitution of law for war, there would be no question about his support of the proposal. The best practical thinking of the world, as well as the accumulated experience of history, indicates that the only method by which peace may be made more secure is by substituting law for war among nations just as we have substituted law for war among individuals.

The substitution of law for war among individuals within the nations has meant the establishment of courts with power enough behind them to insure their operation; it has meant the disarmament of the individual and the creation of a police force, as the only body with the legal right to use force in the maintenance of order. There is no reasonable ground to hope that the nations of the world will go that far at this time. We have not gone far enough in international matters yet to expect either the disarmament of nations or the creation of an international army and navy to police the world.

But we have reached the point where we may reasonably hope that the community of nations will, at the end of this war, do what every primitive community sooner

or later does, namely: In a primitive community, before courts and police have been created, when the honor of its women and the property of the town are no longer safe from outlaws, all men, even the most peace loving, unite in forming a Vigilance Committee, in which they agree to combine their force to restrain law-breakers and maintain the peace of the town.

The United States is to-day in the exact position of a man of peace in a frontier community. It is our duty to advocate and to stand ready to join an International Vigilance Committee, in which the nations shall agree to use their combined powers, both economic and military, to compel any nation to submit its grievance for examination to an International Court or Council of Conciliation before declaring war. And this is the program of the League to Enforce Peace—not a proposal to disarm, not a proposal to organize an international government, not a proposal to create an international police, not a proposal to enforce decrees, but simply a proposal that the nations shall join in enforcing a delay in the declaration of a war until an impartial court and the public opinion of the world have had a chance to examine the asserted cause of war. There is little doubt that if every supposed cause of war had to stand examination before the eyes of the whole world, nine out of every ten wars would be prevented.

To the duty of leadership in this movement we are now called; and in urging that the United States now take initiative, we are not sketching an impossible hope. Evidence is daily accumulating that at the end of the war the opportunity to coöperate with the nations of Europe in forming such a League will be definitely ours.

Let me state why we may expect the nations of Europe to be in a receptive mood toward this proposal:

(1) The nations will know that they dare not trust in the permanence of the present alliances for mutual



protection in the future. Practically all of the nations that are now allies have at some time been enemies; practically all that are now enemies have at some time been allies. Wars between the members of an alliance over opposing national interests are apparently inevitable, unless there is provided some method other than war to deal with the differences that are bound to arise.

(2) The nations will know that if they again enter a state of armed peace that the necessary rivalry in armaments will cause such crushing burdens of taxation that sooner or later the masses will rise in protest.

(3) The nations will know that, unless they effect some arrangement that will give greater security against war, social and democratic progress will be a virtual impossibility. As a war machine, an autocratic government is more efficient than a democracy; and if the nations of Europe must stand on the eternal defensive, the masses as well as the statesmen will be sympathetic toward the type of government that affords the best protection from invasion.

But beyond these reasons why Europe *should* be favorable toward the establishment of a League to Enforce Peace, there is evidence that Europe *is* favorable. To Theodore Marburg, as an envoy of the American Branch of the League to Enforce Peace, there has been given by letter and by word of mouth, assurance of the unqualified support of the proposal by such statesmen as Sir Edward Grey, Lord Bryce, Premier Asquith, and others.

Although "the will to coöperate" be strong in Europe the success of the proposal will depend largely upon the initiative of the United States, for the hatreds engendered by the war will make it difficult for any one nation of Europe to give effective leadership to such a proposal. Then, too, this war will have proved America to be the biggest and safest source of those



supplies upon which the success of modern warfare depends—a fact that will lend weight to any international suggestion we may make.

Every counsel of wisdom urges us as a nation to stand upon this platform. It is sound business policy. A peaceful world makes possible a permanently prosperous America. It is sound political policy. It will mean for us a foreign policy under which we shall consciously assume that responsibility in world affairs that duty demands. It will mean for us a domestic policy that will clarify many of our vexed questions. If we unite upon this program, all differences about the degree of preparedness necessary will be easily adjusted; for if we should adopt as our slogan “National Preparedness for International Peace,” every man and woman in America would feel it to be not only a duty but a privilege to prepare themselves to do their share in preserving the peace and order of the world. The fear of militarism would be removed, for if we pledge our arms to the defense of the peace of the world, and agree to submit our disputes to an International Court before declaring war, we thereby protect ourselves against the possibility of our ever waging a war of conquest, and make impossible our *hasty* entrance into any war.

And if there ever should come a time, which is doubtful, when we would be compelled to use our naval and military power for the purpose of forcing another nation to abide by its agreement to submit disputes to an International Court, we would not be “going to war” in the ordinary sense. It has been well said:

“A nation removed from the conflict and taking part in the struggle merely out of a sense of duty to humanity and respect for its pledged word, would be performing an act so different from the ordinary meaning of going to war that one might well look for a different word by which to characterize it. It would, in effect, be *posse comitatus* going out to preserve the peace. It would be

the difference between the bloodthirsty cut-throat and the consecrated policeman, who batters down a door behind which a madman, armed to the teeth, has entrenched himself."

The consecration of a nation's resources and arms to such an endeavor would inevitably produce that spiritual awakening that always accompanies sacrifice for a worthy cause; and would awaken to new vigor those qualities of devotion to duty and to the common good that will go far in helping us solve our problems of labor, of business, of our civic and political life.

Gentlemen, the opportunity that now confronts our nation will put to the test our spiritual capacity as a people. I cannot believe that we will merely give of our wealth to relieve the suffering of war, but leave the highway of the world still infested with outlaws. I know the spirit that animates the men and women of our nation, and I know that the United States will not "pass by on the other side" but will resolutely do its share toward helping the world make war less probable and peace more lasting, that the United States will give its allegiance to the program of the League to Enforce Peace.

THE closing paper on the general subject of "The Platform" was by Hamilton Holt, Litt.D., LL.D., Editor of the *Independent*, as follows:

THE LEAGUE PROGRAM, PREPAREDNESS, AND ULTIMATE  
REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

Except for the extremists in both camps—and they are after all very few—the pacifists and preparationists are not as far apart as they think. Both want peace, both want adequate defense. The pacifists dwell perhaps most on the end to be achieved, the preparationists most on the means to the end.



*Photo by Aimé Dupont, New York*

**HAMILTON HOLT, Litt.D., LL.D.**

**Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee, League to Enforce Peace**



The pacifists, however, have the broader vision. They are internationalists. The preparationists are nationalists. They concern themselves mostly with national security. The only difference between both groups seems to be this: the preparationists say that armaments are our only final protection against annihilation; the pacifists say that armaments lead us directly to war; that if you prepare for a thing you get what you prepare for, and there never would have been this war if some nations had not been prepared. Now if we are candid as we ought to be in approaching a subject of the magnitude of this, we must admit that armaments do protect us when we are in trouble, but on the other hand they do get us right into the trouble. The problem before us is how to solve that paradox: how can we have the full protection that armaments afford and at the same time disarm; for if we cannot do this we must admit that it is a law of nature that war is to consume all the fruits of progress—an admission that humanity can never accept.

I believe the League to Enforce Peace furnishes the common ground on which the pacifists and the preparationists can unite, because the League provides for all sanctions, moral, economic, and physical, to maintain law and order, and furnishes the only scientific formula for the ultimate reduction of armaments.

The great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, said over one hundred years ago that we never could have universal peace until the world was politically organized, and it never would be possible to organize the world politically until the peoples and not the kings ruled. And, he added, we have got to rid our hearts of that feeling of hatred and hostility that so many of us cherish against other races and creeds and peoples and nations.

Now, if this be the true philosophy of peace, and it seems to me to be the most fundamental analysis I have

ever read on the peace movement, then, when this great war is over and the stricken, sobered people attempt to rear a new civilization on the ashes of the old, they have got to do three things.

They have got to extend democracy everywhere, even here in the United States of America.

They have got to instill within themselves a spirit of hospitality and good will to other peoples.

They have got to create the international machinery for doing international business; that is, they have got to organize the world politically.

The extension of democracy will be brought about, if at all, by forces within the nations. James Bryce, in his "American Commonwealth," says that all nations in the world to-day, some slowly, some quickly, but all with unresting footsteps, are coming to adopt the American form of government. At the present moment all nations, with the insignificant exception of Siam, have some form of representative government. Russia has its Duma, Turkey and Persia have their parliaments; and perhaps the real trouble in China to-day is that they have not got popular government fast enough. The extension of democracy will be brought about by forces within the nations going on irrespectively of peace or international movements.

The extension of the spirit of good will and hospitality will likewise be brought about by forces within the nations. Largely, I suppose, this task will devolve upon the schools, colleges, and churches.

But the political organization of the world will not be brought about by forces within the nations. It will rather be achieved by joint action of the governments of the nations, and there, and there only, is the phase of the peace movement where the United States can exert influence outside of its own boundaries.

The League to Enforce Peace primarily finds its activity in this third aspect of the peace movement,

that is, it is the machinery by which reason can enthrone itself in the world.

There are four stages in the evolution of world organization.

First, the creation of the machinery: courts, parliaments, and executives. The first Hague Parliament took us through this stage.

Second, the agreement to use the courts and conferences. There is no such agreement on earth to-day.

Third, the proposal to put force back of the agreement.

Fourth, and last, the proposal to put force back of the decrees of the international courts, councils, and legislatures.

Our League to Enforce Peace jumps over the second stage into the third. We do not think it possible, or practicable, to suggest that the nations go to the fourth stage yet, though they will go eventually.

How then can we organize the world for peace, and the outcome of peace, which is disarmament? Before we can discuss this question intelligently we must apprehend the three-fold function of force in international relations, and this not one in a hundred persons seems to understand.

Internationally speaking, force can be divided into three kinds: international police, aggression, and defense. Aggression and defense sometimes are interchangeable terms and cannot be considered separately, but in the main they represent distinct and even antagonistic ideas. International police force is almost wholly good. It means the enthronement of reason, if necessary, by force. Aggression is almost wholly bad. It means the imposition of your will on some one else, without the right of the other person to say whether your will is just or not. Any lawyer, any jurist, will show you that this is the height of injustice in personal relations.

Defense may be a glorious duty or a necessary evil;

but in either case it is nothing but the neutralization of offense. Therefore the problem of the peace movement is to reduce the force of offense down to that of an international police, because defense will automatically cease when offense ceases.

How can that take place? The London *Spectator*, hitherto considered an intelligent journal, suggested recently one way. It said: "Let a nation disarm all the other nations by force and then disarm itself." Such an idea is too preposterous to discuss. We have in our own constitution a clause forbidding the government to disarm an individual; otherwise we would have no ultimate way of ridding ourselves of tyrants.

Another way would be to call a conference of the nations and all agree to disarm. Such a course is absolutely impossible. There are too many mediæval-minded nations still on earth.

But is there no other way? There is. It may be here and now that there are enough nations—and there have got to be enough who are ready to disarm in advance of the others. How then can they do this with safety to themselves? Let them establish a League to Enforce Peace based on the principle of the United States and the principle of England. Let me explain. When our forefathers established the United States, the State of New York and the State of Virginia each had a separate navy. But by the adoption of our constitution they abolished their separate navies, or their right to say whatever they wanted to say by force in interstate affairs, and in return they were guaranteed home rule and local autonomy by the combined power of all the states. But more than that, the taxes that they paid for protection were less than they had previously paid to the state treasuries for state protection. In other words, by pooling forces, their taxes were less, and they consequently disarmed.

Let the nations in the League to Enforce Peace do



likewise. Let them create a court to settle justiciable questions, a legislature to make rules, and let them disarm, as our forefathers did, i.e., down to the point where they in Congress assembled agreed that the forces of the Union were strong enough to preserve it from enemies within or without. Let them reduce their armaments to the point where the combined armaments are a little larger than those of any one. Let the League to Enforce Peace therefore have courts, parliaments, executives, and disarmament to the safety point on the American plan and be prepared to use force against nations that will not forswear force on the English plan.

I can make this point clearer by an analogy. Suppose instead of talking about forty-six great states we speak of forty-six farmers on the western frontier all engaged in growing grain, and all armed to the teeth. It is perfectly evident that instead of raising grain they would be raising Cain. Suppose there were fifteen to twenty of them who had more sense than the others. They would soon get together to devise ways and means of establishing peace. How would they go about it? Not by making arbitration treaties one with another and leaving their dispute to a third man to decide. They would rather get together and form a *posse comitatus*, a vigilance committee, a league to enforce peace, and they would say, "Woe betide any man who hereafter breaks the peace of this community." And if they were strong enough they would maintain it but if not they would in all probability be "shot up" themselves. But soon some man on the outside of the group would say to himself, "These men are the progressive men of this community; I had better cast my lot with them." And as this man joined the group it could disarm a little and as other men joined the group they would be able to reduce their force a little more and a little more, until finally one or two armed men, policemen, could maintain the peace of the community and the rest would go about unarmed.

Apply this analogy to the nations. Suppose the majority of the great powers joined the League. Suppose the League had a total army of two million. Suppose Russia stays out and has an army of one million. It would be no use for the League to keep up an army of two million for Russia. You could reduce the force of the League to one and a half million, or even one and a quarter million, and still be protected and safe from Russia. But in the meantime, the liberal men in Russia will be seeing that the nations in the League are getting greater protection for themselves for less taxation and finally Russia would apply to join the League. And when Russia came in there would be a pro rata reduction of the armaments of the League down to the size of the next most heavily armed nation and so on down until nearly all the nations were in the League and the armaments were reduced to an international police.

Now that is the theory of a League of nations. It may not be worked out just in that way when this war is over but that is the theory. We are living under the competitive theory of armaments now, and under that theory armaments must continually go up.

The object of the League to Enforce Peace is to substitute for that competitive theory the collective theory of armaments. It seems to be the destiny of the United States to lead in this movement. The United States itself is the greatest League of Peace known to history. The United States is a demonstration that all peoples and races can come here and live in peace together under one form of government.

Every president of the United States has advocated peace through justice. All, from the first great Virginian, George Washington, to the last great Virginian, Woodrow Wilson, has abhorred what another great Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, called "the greatest scourge of mankind." Is it too much to suppose that the man who happens to be President when this war is

over cannot do for the world if he has the courage and vision something similar to what George Washington did for our States after the Revolutionary War was over? Stranger things than that have happened in history. Let us add, then, to the Declaration of Independence a Declaration of Interdependence.

## CHAPTER III

### PRACTICABILITY OF THE LEAGUE PLATFORM

DISCUSSION of the practicability of the program of the League to Enforce Peace, which was the general topic at the second session of the first annual assemblage, was opened by William Howard Taft, B.A., LL.B., LL.D., formerly President of the United States, president of the League to Enforce Peace. Mr. Taft's paper follows:

#### CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS

To me has been assigned the discussion of the constitutional objections to the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. These objections, so far as I understand them, are directed against the first and third planks in our platform. The first plank reads as follows:

“First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issues as to its jurisdiction of the question.”

This looks to an organization of a permanent court by the signatories to the League. It contemplates the opportunity of any member of the League, having a



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President of the League to Enforce Peace



cause of complaint against any other member of the League, to sue such member in this court and bring it into court by proper process. The complainant's pleading will, of course, state its cause of action. The defendant may wish to question the jurisdiction of the court on the ground, for instance, that the cause of action stated by the complainant does not involve a justiciable issue; that it can not be decided on principles of law or equity.

The court, upon this preliminary question, must decide upon its jurisdiction. If it finds the question not to be justiciable, it must dismiss the complaint, but it may properly refer its investigation to the Commission of Conciliation. If it finds that it is justiciable, it must require the defendant nation to answer.

What I have to discuss is whether the President and the Senate, constituting the treaty-making power for this Government, may consent, for and on behalf of the United States, to the settlement of any justiciable issue arising between the United States and any other member of the League by this permanent court; and whether it may leave to that court the power to decide whether the issue raised is a justiciable one. It was argued against a similar provision in the general arbitration treaties with England and France, that such a stipulation constituted a delegation by the President and Senate of the authority reposed in them over the foreign relations of our Government, and therefore that it was *ultra-vires*. Both upon reason and authority this objection is untenable. The United States is a nation, and, from a foreign standpoint, a sovereign nation, without limitation of its sovereignty. It may, therefore, through its treaty-making power, consent to any agreement with other powers relating to subject matter that is usually considered and made the subject of treaties. The well-known language of Mr. Justice Field, in the case of *Geofrey v. Riggs*,

133 U. S. 258, leaves no doubt upon this point. It is as follows:

“That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiations between our Government and the Governments of other nations, is clear. . . . The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited, except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the Government, or of its Departments, and those arising from the nature of the Government itself, and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the Government, or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without its consent. But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.”

✓ Issues that can be settled on principles of law and equity are proper subjects for decision by a judicial tribunal. Such issues have been settled by Boards of Arbitration, agreed to by independent sovereigns since there were governments. The first provision agreed to by the United States for an arbitration of this kind was in the Jay Treaty in 1794; and since that time there have been eighty-four international arbitrations to which an American nation was a party. In forty, or nearly one-half of these, the other party was an European Power, while the arbitrations between American nations were forty-four. To about two-thirds of all of these the United States was a party, the num-



ber of arbitrations between other American powers being fourteen. Of this number, there were ten that related to questions of boundary, which are, of course, questions capable of solution on principles of law and equity.

In such cases, it was never suggested that the Government was delegating any power at all to the tribunal. A submission to a judicial decision is not a delegation of power as to an agent. It is a submission of an issue to a judge. It is a misnomer to call such a submission a delegation, or to determine its validity on principles of delegation of power as that is limited in constitutional law. In the discussion of the general arbitration treaties in the Senate, there was a suggestion that the agreement to submit to a court questions which had not yet arisen described only by definition and classification, with power in the court to take jurisdiction, was more of a delegation of power than the mere submission of an existing question to arbitrators. There is, however, not the slightest difference in principle between the two. If one is a delegation, the other is. If one is invalid, the other is; and if one is not invalid, the other is not.

Nor does the right to determine jurisdiction of the court involve in principle any more of a delegation than the mere voluntary submission of the issue to the court. It only somewhat enlarges the issues to be submitted. The question whether the court has jurisdiction of an issue is dependent on the question of law, involving the construction of the treaty, and such a subject matter is the commonest instance of the class of questions submitted to arbitration or a court. More than this, the Senate has consented from time to time to arbitrations on issues which may arise in the future and defined by language of the treaty of submission.

The last notable instance, and the one which involved a really permanent court is the advice and

consent by our Senate to the Hague International Prize Court Convention in which a permanent international prize court was established, and the United States bound itself to submit all questions arising between it and foreign nations in respect to questions of prize in naval warfare, to this international prize court, and to abide the decision, even though that decision might involve, as it generally would, the reconsideration of an issue already decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. The treaty is not in force because England did not finally approve, but our Senate approved it. The International Prize Court must of necessity pass upon its own jurisdiction, and by agreement between the parties, its decision is to be accepted and to be carried out in good faith. The question as to whether commissioners of arbitration, under the Jay Treaty, had power to determine their own jurisdiction was brought by Rufus King, American Minister in London, to the attention of Lord Grenville, who submitted the question to Lord Chancellor Loughborough. The Lord Chancellor resolved the difficulty by declaring:

“That the doubt respecting the authority of the Commissioners to settle their own jurisdiction was absurd; and that they must necessarily decide upon cases being with, or without, their competency.”

A similar question was raised by the British Government in regard to the power of the Geneva Tribunal to deal with what were known as the “indirect claims,” and her arbitrators decided that they did not have jurisdiction of the indirect claims, and this was acquiesced in by both Governments.

In correspondence with the Chilean Minister over

an arbitration between this country and Chile, Mr. Olney, then Secretary of State, used this language:

“But the question whether any particular claim is a proper one for the consideration and decision of an international commission is necessarily one which the commission itself must determine. The conventions under which such commissions are organized usually describe in general terms the class of cases of which the commission is to take jurisdiction, and whether any particular case presented to it comes within this class the commission must, of course, determine. The decisions of the late commission, both interlocutory and final, are binding upon both Governments, the latter absolutely so, the former unless reversed, after proper proceedings for a rehearing.”

I come now to the other objection. The third plank of the platform is as follows:

“Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.”

It is objected to this clause that it violates the Constitution in that the effect of such a treaty signed by the United States would take away from Congress the power conferred upon it by section eight of article one, to declare war.

I had the pleasure and privilege of hearing Mr. Bryan advance this argument at the Lake Mohonk Conference. He said that we should need an amend-

ment to the Constitution before we could agree to any such provision. He said that in order to carry out the provision we must have a joint council of the powers to determine when the time had arrived for military action and war, and that this would substitute the action of the council for the constitutional discretion of Congress.

I venture to think that this view is wholly without foundation. Although it is not necessary, I am willing to accept the assumption that some kind of a council would be appointed by the powers to make the announcements when the time had come for the use of economic and military forces against the recalcitrant member. Does that take away from Congress the power to declare war? It does not. If the war is a foreign war, it could not be begun under the Constitution until Congress had declared war. The President would not be authorized to direct the Army and the Navy to begin war until Congress had declared it.

What, then, would be the situation if the fact were announced upon which the obligation of the United States to make war arose under this treaty? It would be to make war by Constitutional means, that is, by the preliminary declaration of Congress that war existed. Congress might decline to exercise that power and refuse to declare war. What would be the effect of that? It would merely be a breach of faith on the part of Congress, and so a breach of faith on the part of the United States and we would not go to war. The treaty making power under the Constitution creates the obligation to declare war in certain contingencies. That obligation is to be discharged by Congress under its Constitutional power to declare war. If it fails to do so, and thus comply with the binding obligation created by the treaty making power, then it merely breaks the contract of the Government. It is left to

Congress to carry out that which we in a Constitutional way have agreed to do. Thus to impose in a Constitutional way by treaty an obligation on Congress is not to take away its power to discharge it or to refuse to discharge it.

In 1904 we entered into a treaty with the Republic of Panama, the first article of which is:

“The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama.”

What is the necessary effect of this guaranty? It necessarily means that if any nation attacks Panama and attempts to take territory from her or to subvert her Government, the United States is under treaty obligation to make war to defend Panama. Was it ever supposed that such an obligation took away from Congress the power to declare war? This treaty obligation makes it the duty of the Government to declare war under certain conditions that may arise, creates a contract obligation to the Republic of Panama that it shall do so, and this duty can only be discharged through the action of Congress in declaring war. Does that deprive Congress of its Constitutional power to declare war? It seems to me the question answers itself.

In our relations with Cuba we find in the present treaty:

#### ARTICLE I

“The Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval pur-

poses or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said Island."

#### ARTICLE II

"The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligation with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba."

#### ARTICLE III

"To enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States, lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specific points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States."

It is quite clear from these three articles that the Government of the United States binds itself to maintain the independence of Cuba and to exclude other governments from lodgment in the Island. Now, if any Government attempts to filch territory from Cuba or to subvert the government, it becomes the duty of the United States to make war and defend against such invasion. Does this treaty obligation thus created take away from Congress the power to declare war? It only creates the obligation on the part of the United States to wage war, and in discharging this obligation Congress must act, or the Government must be recreant to its agreement.





GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON, A.B., A.M., Ph.D., L.L.D.  
Professor of International Law at Harvard University; Honorary Vice  
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Thus, by reason and precedent, it would appear clear that this third plank of the platform of the League is not in any way an attempt to take from Congress the power which it has to declare war under the Constitution. The suggestion that in order to carry out such an obligation on the part of the United States, it would be necessary to amend the Constitution, grows out of a confusion of ideas and a failure to analyze the differences between the creation of an obligation of the United States to do a thing and the due, orderly and Constitutional course to be taken by it in doing that which it has agreed to do.

TAKING up another phase of American National policies George Grafton Wilson, A.B., A.M., Ph.D., LL.D., professor of international law at Harvard University and lecturer on international law at the United States Naval War College and author of various works on the subject of international law, presented the following:

#### THE MONROE DOCTRINE

There have been some arguments against the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. One of these arguments most frequently advanced is that the carrying out of the platform of the League would violate the so-called Monroe Doctrine. These words, "the Monroe Doctrine," have been used to designate or to conceal such a variety of ideas and practices that it is necessary to start with some premise as to what the Monroe Doctrine may be.

If the Monroe Doctrine is, as Professor Bingham says, an "obsolete shibboleth," it is clear that the relation of the platform of the League to the content of the Doctrine would be one of historical and speculative in-

terest only. If on the other hand it is, as Mr. Pétin says, the substitution by the United States of an "American law for the general law of nations," the relations of the Monroe Doctrine to the platform of the League would be a fundamental question. If the Monroe Doctrine is an assertion of the "supremacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere" or "supremacy in political leadership," there would also be reason for careful deliberation. A cursory investigation would, however, show that the Monroe Doctrine is not a part of international law.

The statement of the Doctrine has varied. Early discussions in the cabinet before the Doctrine was set forth in Monroe's message seem to have been as lively as some later ones upon the same subject. Jefferson, when consulted upon the advisability of a policy which would not "suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs," comparing the Declaration of Independence with this Doctrine, said: "That (the Declaration) made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening before us." In the early days of the Monroe Doctrine the aim was to avoid further European interference in American affairs. Later, particularly from the days of President Polk, the Doctrine assumed a more positive form. Bismarck is reported to have called the Doctrine a piece of "international impertinence." In 1901 President Roosevelt in his annual message declared: "The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States," and in 1904 that "the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong doing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power."

President Taft intimated in his message in 1909 that "the apprehension which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine may be said to have disappeared already and

neither the Doctrine as it exists nor any other doctrine of American policy should be permitted to operate for the perpetuation of irresponsible government, the escape of just obligations or the insidious allegation of dominating ambitions on the part of the United States."

The construction of the Panama Canal gave rise to new problems. The rumor that foreigners were making purchases of land about Magdalena Bay in Mexico led to pronouncements in the United States Senate, in 1912, that the United States could not view foreign possession of this or any such harbor "without grave concern" and it was admitted that this was a "statement of policy," allied to the Monroe Doctrine of course, but not necessarily dependent upon it or growing out of it.

As in the early days the United States considered it within its rights to assert a policy defensive in its nature but for the preservation of its well being, so in later days the same general policy has taken differing forms. President Wilson early in his administration endeavored to assure the Americas of his desire for the cordial cooperation of the people of the different nations, and a little later he asserted "We are friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions," and in the same message he declared that the United States "must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity." President Roosevelt had in 1901 asserted that the Doctrine referred not merely to European but to "any non-American power." This was recognized abroad, as Sir Edward Grey said in 1911 of the United States: "They had a policy associated with the name of Monroe, the cardinal point of which was that no European or non-American nation should acquire fresh territory on the continent of America."

In December, 1913, Mr. Page, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, announced a late form of policy,

saying: "We have now developed subtler ways than taking their lands. There is the taking of their bonds, for instance. Therefore, the important proposition is that no sort of financial control can without the consent of the United States be obtained over these weaker nations which would in effect control their government."

These and many other views regarding the significance of the Monroe Doctrine show the varying forms in which the United States has stated its opposition to the permanent occupation of territory or acquisition of political control in the American hemisphere by non-American powers. It has seemed necessary to present these differing ideas of the Monroe Doctrine to show that it is not law and to show that as a manifestation of policy it is not set forth in any single formula.

As single nations and as groups of nations have policies which vary in different parts of the world and as the conflict of policies rather than the violation of established law is the frequent cause of international difference it is evident that if the League to Enforce Peace cannot provide any aid in case of conflict of policies its function will be comparatively restricted. The conflict of policy would rarely take form which would make justiciable methods practicable as a means of settlement.

This being the case reference of such matters would be to the Council of Conciliation provided for in the second article of the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. The first article provides for justiciable questions and the second states: "All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation." Here it should be repeated that the League to Enforce Peace does not bind itself to carry out the recommendation which the Council of Conciliation may make but merely binds itself to

see that no power goes to war over such a matter until the question has been submitted.

The conflicts of policy would in most cases be settled by ordinary diplomatic negotiations between the parties concerned. Even the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes ratified by twenty-eight or more of the leading states of the world states that: "In case of serious disagreement or dispute, before an appeal to arms, the signatory powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers." (Art. 2.) The Convention of 1907 deems it "expedient and desirable that one or more powers, strangers to the dispute, should on their own initiative" tender such offices. The United States, however, in signing this Convention made reservation that, "Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign State; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

The United States has, however, also within recent years, particularly since 1913, become a party to a large number of treaties in which "The High Contracting Parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, to the settlement of which previous arbitration treaties or agreements do not apply in their terms or are not applied in fact, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for investigation and report to an international commission," and "they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted." "The report shall be presented in the maxi-

num period of one year, but the High Contracting Parties, by mutual accord may shorten or extend this period." Some of these treaties are to remain effective for five years from the date of ratification and then till twelve months from notice of intention to terminate the treaty. These treaties have still some time to run.

Plainly, therefore, the United States is already bound, possibly in some cases under the Hague Convention, and certainly under these other treaties, of which there are a large number, to submit disputes even involving the Monroe Doctrine to a body which would meet the requirements of the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. These treaties are with France, Great Britain, and Russia as well as with other European states and with South and Central American states. The President in proclaiming these treaties declares that he has "caused the said treaty to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and by the citizens thereof."

A dispute in regard to the Monroe Doctrine or involving its principles whatever they may be would surely be included in the agreement made by the United States to refer disputes "of every nature whatsoever" to an international commission for investigation and report. This principle has had endorsement by leaders in preceding administrations as well as in the action upon these treaties by the present administration and is therefore not to be regarded as embodying partisan policies. The United States is already bound to act as regards the Monroe Doctrine in disputes which may arise with most states in a fashion in exact accord with the second article of the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. The aim of the League is secured when the question which negotiation has been unable to settle is submitted "for hearing, consideration and recommendation" and it makes little difference whether

the body to which it is submitted is called an "international commission" or a "council of conciliation."

If then the United States and thirty or more nations are already bound to the principle of the second article of the League's platform so far as the Monroe Doctrine and other matters are subjects of dispute, there would seem to be no reason for raising the question of practicability of that part of the program at the present time. Its practicability has already been formally declared, and as embodied in treaty provisions is a part of the law of the land.

Any further discussion as to the practicability of the application of the League's program to differences arising in regard to the Monroe Doctrine would involve the question whether treaties already made will be observed when put to the test. Put concretely the question may be, will the United States which has made treaties with certain states agreeing to submit to an international commission disputes "of every nature whatsoever" find it practicable to submit a dispute arising in regard to the Monroe Doctrine to such a commission or will the United States disregard the treaty, and did the United States so intend in making the treaty? It is to be hoped and it must be believed that these treaties were made in good faith and that the parties to the treaties intend to observe their provisions. It has even been announced that the United States proposes to observe in principle toward other nations not parties to such treaties the line of conduct prescribed in these treaties. These treaties are called treaties for the "Advancement of Peace" and declare as their object "to contribute to the development of the spirit of universal peace" or "to serve the cause of general peace." Accordingly the enforcement of these treaties is regarded by these states as at least desirable for the sake of peace.

Under the general practice and law of nations the



violation of a treaty may be a just cause of war. If this be so then it is particularly essential that treaties for "the development of the spirit of universal peace" be kept. It would seem to be a simple proposition that the greater the risk of violation of a treaty the less ready a state will be to violate the treaty. This principle generally prevails though at times states disregard all risks. If there is behind a treaty the compelling force of the fact of a signed agreement and the physical resources of the other signatory only, the fact of the agreement seems often, even in modern times, to have had little weight, and the sole deterrent seems to have been the physical power which might be felt if the agreement was not observed. This has given rise to the maxim often quoted that "a treaty is as strong as the force behind it." There is undoubtedly some truth in the maxim.

The program of the League to Enforce Peace proposes to adopt what is beneficial in the maxim and to put behind treaties a degree of force which weak states might by themselves be unable to command. If under the provision by which the United States and other states have agreed to refer to an international commission all differences there is a reservation as regards matters affecting the Monroe Doctrine this reservation is not expressed or implied.

There has been for many years evidence that treaties needed behind them some sanction. The one sanction which all nations recognize is that of force, whether it be economic, physical or other force. By the state which scrupulously observes its treaty engagements this force is never felt or feared. By the state that is not considerate of its treaty obligations this force is feared and may be felt. The state that proposed to observe its international obligations would seem to have almost a right to demand that it be secured against violation of its rights by a party which has agreed by



treaty to observe them, particularly when the party which observes its international obligations has in reliance upon the promise of the other party refrained from building up a force to inspire fear in that party. All that a State can reasonably demand is that its side of a controversy be heard and considered impartially. The League to Enforce Peace proposes to secure such hearing and consideration for both parties but beyond that does not propose to go even if the subject of the controversy be the Monroe Doctrine.

The question has been repeatedly asked, what would be the position of the United States as a member of the League to Enforce Peace if a non-American Power should through purchase acquire St. Thomas from Denmark or a coaling station in Central America from some American State? Suppose the question is in regard to the purchase of St. Thomas by a non-American State? Denmark maintains that as sovereign she has the right to sell. The non-American State buys. The purchaser attempts to enter into possession. The United States cites President Grant in 1869 to the effect that "These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European Power to another." The United States could not without violating an existing treaty with Denmark go to war with that State without first submitting the matter to an international commission. If the purchaser were France or any of several other European states similar treaties would bind the United States to await the report of the international commission before taking hostile action. In other words the United States is already bound by treaties with Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, France, Great Britain, Spain, Russia, etc., to submit just these questions to the procedure recommended in the League platform.

The answer to those who ask the question as to what the United States would do as a member of

the League in the supposed case of a dispute over the transfer of St. Thomas would be that the United States would keep its treaty agreement and submit the question to the international commission if the purchasing State was among those with which there is a treaty and this would entirely meet the obligations as a member of the League. Consequently in this case there would be no new obligations. If the purchasing State should be one with which the United States has not one of these recent treaties but if the purchasing State be a member of the League, the United States would be under obligation to submit the controversy not to a court of justice or of arbitration, but to a council of conciliation or international commission for hearing, consideration and recommendation for the Monroe Doctrine is not a matter of law, but a matter of policy. The same is to be said in regard to the question in regard to the acquisition of a coaling station. In brief the United States would be obliged so far as members of the League were concerned to do exactly what it is now obliged by treaty agreement to do with most of the states of the world, and as those treaty states would probably be the members of the League the conditions would be changed in no respect except that behind the treaty obligation would be the sanction of the justified use of economic and military force in addition to other sanctions.

Further it may be said if, when in dispute, the Monroe Doctrine as applied by the United States is not a policy upon which the United States is willing to await hearing, consideration and recommendation, then the United States has not acted in good faith in signing these recent treaties, and it may also be said if the American policy as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine will not stand the test of investigation and consideration it is time for the United States to be determining why it should longer give to the Doctrine its support.

As the plan of the League for submission of controversies such as might arise over the Monroe Doctrine has, on the initiative of the United States, already been embodied in treaties with a greater part of the states of the world, such a plan cannot be regarded as impracticable without condemnation of the judgment of those who are in control of the affairs of the world, and this judgment the League to Enforce Peace, having the well being of the world in view, does not criticize and condemn but supports and commends.

TALCOTT WILLIAMS, A.B., A.M., L.H.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Director of the School of Journalism, of Columbia University, delivered an address on "Entangling Alliances," as follows:

ENTANGLING ALLIANCES, NOW, AND IN WASHINGTON'S  
DAY

The United States won independence in large measure through its alliance with France. Since, it has been a country without alliances. Alone of earth's greater powers in the past century and a quarter it has made no alliance in peace or in war. It has shared, now and then, in some "concert of action," as in restoring order in Peking in 1900. More than once, it has joined in a common policy, as in suppressing the slave trade, when its men-of-war acted with those of other countries, in removing crime against humanity. When the independence and integrity of China were threatened in 1902, it timed its protest with that of England so as to have on Russia all the effect of united action. A direct alliance it has avoided and still avoids; but in the absence of any alliance ratified by treaty, it has not hesitated in the past 60 years, in suppressing the slave trade, in protesting against Armenian massacres in

Turkey, in organizing the Congo Free State, in deciding the future of Morocco in the Algeiras Conference—in all using its moral weight and its national forces for a common end so that its action worked the same fruitful result as an alliance. Where other nations in 1907, Russia, France and England, negotiated identical treaties with Japan mutually guaranteeing existing territorial possessions in the Far East, the United States made its pledge of policy to the same end through a note drawn by John Hay. Those who confuse the League to Enforce Peace with “entangling alliances” forget both that the United States has used its military forces on land and at sea to enforce a common policy mutually pledged with other lands and that conditions have radically changed since Washington accepted the French Alliance to secure independence and later pointed out the peril of international entanglement.

Washington’s warning, in his Farewell Address, against “Entangling Alliances,” has influenced the American people as has no other phrase in its annals. It killed the public movement to act on the alliance with France implied in our treaty though through that treaty and its mutual pledges of joint and mutual action our independence was secured. It strengthened the hands of President Adams in breaking with France, and bringing the war at sea, whose trophies are still at Annapolis, and the Watervliet arsenal, forgotten of all Americans.

The phrase “entangling alliances,” and the spirit, so terse, so direct, so exact a definition of the diplomacy of the day, stayed Jefferson from aligning us with France. It brought the purchase of Louisiana outright, as Bonaparte saw was necessary, instead of the temporizing of our envoys at Paris. This precept kept clear our diplomatic policy when a century ago, Latin America rose in revolt. It preserved the Monroe Doctrine, though suggested by England, as a promise

made to ourselves and not as a compact expressed or implied with any other nation whatsoever. It warned us against the many proposals from the Pan-American Congress of John Quincy Adams to the close of the Spanish-American war, thick sown, in its unpublished diplomacy, with intimations of possible common action or understandings among envious friends.

What "entangling alliances" meant, our own day has seen when the one only such alliance in force when Washington spoke, led Portugal to offer to send its quota to the trenches in France under a treaty a century and a half old, though within a few years, England's warships in the Tagus forced from Portugal on twenty-four hours' notice, submission of an ancient colonial right which demanded and deserved arbitration. In the vast European quarrel, Portugal had no interest, past, present or prospective, but an "entangling alliance" left no option.

Of such alliances, the world Washington knew was full. The world we know has eight great powers, whose united action for peace could pacify the world. Six are in Europe, one, Japan, in East Asia, and, one, the United States, looks out, the umpire of a world at war. Washington, when he warned the country his sober and loyal service had created, against "entangling alliances," looked out on an earth divided into many lands, dissident, dissonant, none dominant, none acting alone. All Europe, strong or weak, had to accept alliances which entangled national policy and strangled national freedom because only by this path, could safety be secured by the weak and power by the strong. European diplomatic relations at the close of the eighteenth century were a confusing reticulation of nearly sixty states.

These are no more to-day in all the world. Europe has only a third of this number, and six are dominant. No great power existed a century ago in the sense we understand it. Russia in the decades Washington

knew twice sought a league of neutrals to preserve the safety of her merchant traffic. So perilous a danger to the fleet of England was held the fleet of Denmark that midway between the Battle of the Nile and Trafalgar, it was destroyed by Nelson in a day of unbroken peace between the two flags, without warning, and without any declaration of war, whatsoever. The open and avowed justification was that relations between France and Russia might place the Danish fleet at the disposition of Napoleon.

This result was liable for any State caught in the mesh of alliances all Europe shared. Nor was Europe alone thus divided and subdivided. Asia has to-day only nine independent states, of which three enjoy but the shadow of sovereignty. In British India alone there are 106 native rulers, whose government salute attests the fact that in Washington's day, and for most of the list much later, these rulers held an independent sovereignty. Add the many states of the Central Asian Khanates, of Indo-China and Malaysia, and when Washington delivered his Farewell Address there were at least 150 Asiatic states to be reckoned with. Africa has but two independent states to-day. Washington negotiated with twice this number of African states and savage kingdoms, tribes and Mohammedan Sultanates made the total number of negotiable powers known on the coast of Africa over fifty. Taking islands and in Washington's day, the world had at least 400 civilized, semi-civilized, barbarous and savage states, acting independently, where to-day there are less than sixty. Nearly a third of these are in the American hemisphere where consolidation or recolonization has been prevented through the protection of the United States.

It was in such a world, with as many states in Europe, who in Washington's own day had entered on war, as there are in the world to-day; with sevenfold this number, in all the earth and the seas thereof, ready to make

all manner of mutual agreements for local ends, for common action in war, peace, or in preparation for war, as was true of the demand of the four Barbary states,—that Washington warned a growing nation, weak, peaceful, and isolated that it should not cast in its lot with the wrangling, entangling alliances of Europe, or those trade agreements, which were the early basis of the Anglo-Indian Empire. Alliances between nations, peoples and dynasties; mutual privileges based on religion; great tracts of ocean and sea, like the Spanish Main, the Red Sea and Indian waters, held as a commercial preserve from the days of discovery; Malayian and Polynesian islands, straits, and ports where some hardy naval commander from the days of Magellan to the days of Cook had obtained protection for the trade of his flag at the cost of safety and security for the vessels of other lands;—as was England's avowed policy even in the Mediterranean—these all made a diplomatic labyrinth in whose blind alleys, any state, any tribe, or any colony might find itself dragged to war by compacts to which it had never been a party.

“In order that he might rob a neighbor whom he had promised to defend,” wrote Macaulay of Frederic the Great, “black men fought on the coast of Coromandel and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America.” Louis XIV by a dynastic treaty sought to lower the Pyrenees and bring Spain into perpetual alliance with France; before the final harvest of that treaty was garnered, the Malagasy of Madagascar were stirred to rapine, Hindus fought under Lally and Clive in a quarrel not of their making, and won victories for them infructuous. New England colonists lie buried to this day about one Louisburg and another Lewisburg in Pennsylvania records the high tide of the vain endeavor of France to preserve what had come in the close of a struggle over the fruits of an alliance whose only relic to-day is the presence of the last of the



Bourbons on the throne of Spain. From Charles V to Napoleon, there had been no great war in Western Europe not rooted somewhere in a treaty and no European alliance whose seal was not soon or late, whether broken or kept, the sign of an Apocalyptic destruction in which "fire mingled with blood were cast upon the earth and a third part of the sea became blood."

The alliances which had brought disaster to every European land were known to Washington, whose patient reading of European history is attested by the worn volumes he left at Mt. Vernon. Our own treaty of alliance with France in whose negotiation he had shared, was challenged by Franklin who signed it, when he opened negotiations with England. The Napoleonic wars had proved it a blunder from which only Washington's wisdom and restraint, denounced as cowardice, saved us. The country was rent in twain by partisans of France and of Great Britain. Mobs attacked great processions expressing sympathy with one or the other. Washington holding even the scales of neutrality, denounced by the friends of both parties and suffering much that war might not come, left to his successor the legacy of peace when war was the heritage of other lands bound by leagues innumerable which drew small states and weak through their meshes to aid lands, larger and more powerful, in a world of small and warring states.

In the light and fact of his day, his advice to the American people to beware of entangling alliances showed the penetration of the statesman and the far-sighted patience of a philosopher called to rule the nation he had founded. To-day the hundreds of states he knew and read of in history, atlas and books of travel have been consolidated. Asia is divided between three great empires—Russia, England, and China, and but two of these hold power over the future of the continent. All Africa is parcelled between European powers weak or strong. In Europe and in Latin



America alone are there left, in one a group of small states, thickly settled and, in the other, sovereignties large in territory but far short of their opportunity in power and population.

In Washington's day no nation was great enough and strong enough to command the situation in any part of the world. No great nation could act alone. Napoleon's failure proved this. Earlier, Louis XIV had met a like defeat in a like purpose to secure solitary supremacy. No common action could then be secured on any subject. No common policy existed. No common agreements guaranteed safety to any states. No one power could stretch the shield of its power over two continents as does the United States, under the Monroe Doctrine, over North and South America. No great sphere of influence kept the peace over great areas as England's sphere of influence in Asia does over nearly 2,000,000 square miles. No such step as neutralization for the protection of small states had been proposed. World relations and responsibilities the world did not yet know, recognize or protect even by opinion. The larger powers of Washington's day were weak, too weak to assert their position. The smaller powers were too numerous to be curbed, consolidated or controlled.

Through the century that has passed since Washington's warning was uttered, a continuous evolution has been in progress. Small states have disappeared by the hundred. Large states have grown stronger. International law and diplomacy have created an entire system of new agencies for common action and mutual concord. If neutralization has, for a season, failed in one significant instance, Belgium, it is recognized as a principle and one which will not again be lightly attacked. The "concert" of great powers has again and again prevented war and protected treaties. As the two colonies of Massachusetts Bay united in a Commonwealth and like mergers took place in Connecticut and Rhode

Island; as these three made their joint New England league; and later thirteen colonies united in the Confederation and developed into a Union—so in Europe and in Asia, compact, conquest and consolidation have laid the foundation and brought the possibility of common action not by entangling alliances among a world of many states, but through the united but independent and masterful action of a few great states, strong enough to enforce peace. Two navies, of England and the United States, could already create and enforce the peace of the waters. No single state can to-day meet the military resources of all directed to an end the world approved.

Through all the nineteenth century, the world has gravitated to great empires which hold the world's destinies. Six are in Europe; but why tell their familiar names—Austria-Hungary, England, France, Germany, Italy and Russia; one is in Asia, Japan. United for peace with the eighth of these great powers, the United States, these seven realms could hold a fretful world in awe. Seven of them divided have brought the worst war in history, the worst in origin, in extent and in the evil worked.

Washington, in his Farewell Address, predicted the coming power of the American people, and the wider responsibilities it must some day meet. He, more than any other American, created our indissoluble union of indestructible states led by him through war to constitutional peace, that peace between the oceans which makes even the *pax Romana* but a little thing.

To-day in a world of a few large states, he would if he were living lead the United States to a constructive league between great nations, in order to carry the world from perpetual war to lasting peace by substituting for the entangling alliances of his day the world League to Enforce Peace, possible in our day.





JOHN BATES CLARK. A.B., A.M., Ph.D., LL.D.  
Member Executive Committee, League to Enforce Peace

JOHN BATES CLARK, A.B., A.M., Ph.D., LL.D, Professor of Political Economy, at Columbia University, and Director of the Department of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, presented the following:

#### THE EUROPEAN NATIONS AND THE LEAGUE PROGRAM

The world demands a league of some kind for preserving peace and, for the first time, much of the world expects to get it. It is the purpose of this paper to present an adequate ground for that expectation. There is a natural development toward such a union. Heretofore the effort to create it has seemed like forging a ship by oars and poles against a rapid stream, while at present it is more like steering a ship down such a current. After the war some international unions will exist in any case and, if the demand for peace in states neutral and belligerent is effectively organized, one of the unions may quickly become *a* league of peace and, after an adequate time, it may become *the* league which we hope to see established. If so, the war itself will have carried us, not to the final "federation of the world," but to a half-way station on the road thither.

Forecasts for the coming state of the world are always guesses but there are some points on which we can now guess with confidence, and the most important of them is that the two alliances which are now at war will continue in existence. They were formed by their component states for mutual defense and will still be needed for that purpose. Not one of these countries can afford to expose itself single-handed to attacks of its enemies. France will not leave the shelter of the Entente and brave the entire power of Germany, nor will any state in either combination so isolate itself. It is

futile to demand that states in a firm protective union should dissolve and trust for security to a treaty with present enemies. This single fact of two powerful and lasting alliances already formed takes the effort to create a league of peace completely out of the Utopian realm to which a Philistine world has always consigned it. While it may prevent the immediate formation of an all-embracing union, it creates a condition out of which such a combination may later grow and it fairly well ensures peace in the interim.

Two international unions, each enormously powerful, are now contending with each other and the victorious one will be able, if it will, to ensure the world against another war. These international bodies have no misgivings as to using force. They are now using it without stint in performing their original function of protecting their members, and they will stand ready to use it again for a similar purpose. There is an advantage in making this fact the starting point in planning a future league of nations. It will stand before us two-thirds completed.

┌ If we should assume that nations were quite independent, and should formulate a detailed scheme for uniting them in a new alliance without reference to the unions which exist, we should encounter an army of objectors who would criticise details of the plan and many would reject the plan as a whole because of this. If, on the other hand, we look at one of the alliances as it will exist and find that it will be capable of preserving the peace and vitally interested in doing so, the main question whether there shall or shall not be any league of peace will be settled and we shall have nothing to debate except the question whether, in some secondary particulars, it can be improved by amendment. Its existence and its chief features will not be in question.

This describes the probable situation at the close of

the present war. There are three possible outcomes of it, namely, a draw, a crushing victory by one side, and a moderate victory by one side, leaving the opposing one strong. Most guesses favor the last named alternative. Neither side will probably destroy its adversary and yet one or the other will win. If that shall occur in fact, there will be the brightest outlook for permanent peace that has ever existed. A league that will be able to prevent war and profoundly interested in doing it will be established on the European continent. The alliance which wins the victory will become *ipso facto* a league of peace and it will be capable of becoming, in due time, the nucleus of that greater federation of states of which idealists have long dreamed. Let us assume for illustration, that the Entente has won. It contains four great states, a number of smaller ones and is allied to a great Asiatic power. The leading powers maintain a certain balance and no one of them preponderates over all the others. There is a small danger that in Europe they will trench on each other's territory, though it is possible that they may have their minor dissensions and need the services of mediators or an international court. This is saying that the chief institutions suggested by our own platform would be of great service to the victorious nations and would have a large chance of being adopted. If an opposing alliance still exists, harmony and coherence among the members of the successful league will be of immeasurable importance. The slightest rift in their union would be highly perilous and a positive division might bring down upon them at once a powerful hostile force. The awful tragedy of the second Balkan war is a warning written on the sky in letters of fire against quarrels between members of a victorious union of states, and arbitral institutions should find favor with the members of that union, whichever it is, that shall conquer the opposing one. So much of our platform as would create a court

and a system of arbitration it should welcome and put into practice.

Will it also adopt the third section of our platform—the one which provides for forcibly compelling states to submit quarrels to arbitration and adjudication? What our platform calls for is a relatively modest exercise of force and it encounters far less opposition than would arise if it involved also enforcing the court's decisions. Nevertheless it is the most disputed portion of our platform, and possibly the greatest light that we can gain on this question will come from asking how the alliance which wins the present war will probably regard it.

If only one of these international unions constituted the league of peace, the question of compelling its members to submit their quarrels to a court or an arbitral board would be a complex one and guesses as to the answer would be uncertain; but conceivably it might agree to this measure. With the opposing alliance still in existence, any quarrel between the successful states would be perilous and actual fighting would almost certainly lead to disaster. Whether, on the one hand, two of the allied states were left to fight out a quarrel alone or, on the other hand, all the members were united in defending one of them against the other, the calamity might be about equally irreparable. The war will leave the two alliances in such a position that an open quarrel between states in the victorious one would so paralyze it as to put it at the mercy of its antagonist. This, of itself, affords a highly effective security against quarreling, and whether, in the period immediately following the conclusion of the present war, the successful group of nations will or will not bind themselves to use their collective forces to compel their members to refer their differences to some tribunal before fighting, it is not easy to guess with much confidence. What will happen in a later period is more im-



portant, and I venture to predict that a time will come when the enforcement clause will have a greatly increased chance of adoption.

It is far easier to form a confident opinion as to what would happen if both alliances were at once united in the same league of peace. Here guesses have a broad basis of fact to support them. If the allies in the Entente and the Central powers are together in the new combination, can this general body safely adopt the provision for compelling a resort to tribunals? I venture to say that one strong reason will prevent it from doing this. To bind all these nations immediately after the war to unite in attacking any one of them which should refuse to arbitrate a quarrel might compel the present allies of the recalcitrant state to fight against it in behalf of one of their present enemies. Its comrades in arms would have to desert it and fight for its enemy and their own and, during the period when friendships and enmities are at their height, they are not likely to do so.

Let us say that a quarrel has arisen between England and Germany over African colonies and that England regards these as her sovereign territory and declines to place her claim in the hands of an arbitral court or to call in a board of conciliation. It would be the duty of France to join in attacking England, her present ally, in behalf of Germany, her present enemy; and in any quarrel which could arise between late antagonists, and in which mediation should be refused, some nation or nations would be in this position. France is now bound to defend England against attack by a nation outside of the Entente; England is under a similar obligation toward France, and this mutual bond is far too essential to be waived. It has saved the French State from defeat and dismemberment. Intimate relations have grown up between the countries that are now fighting shoulder to shoulder and

they are very unlikely to tolerate anything which would weaken these ties. Any deliberate planning on their part to make a division in their own ranks result from a quarrel with an outside power is nearly unthinkable. It is a venture, with deference, to express the opinion that, if both the present alliances should come *at once* into a league of peace, the application of force that is proposed in our platform would have to be deferred to a time when the present alignment of friendships and hostilities should have passed far in the background.

The entire question of what would be done if the two present alliances should come at once into a single union is of less importance than it would be if there were a greater probability of their doing this. There is little risk in saying that immediately after the war they will not so unite and that, for the safety and well-being of the world, it will be best that they should not do so. A union so composed could not be trusted. Jealousy, distrust, and a revengeful spirit are poor materials to make a league of peace from. There would be very little coherence in any single body in which both the Teutons and the Western powers were combined. Lack of coherence is the weak point in a league of any kind and would be a fatal point in such a composite body. This would suggest a temple of peace in which sticks of dynamite were inserted between courses of stone. Outside of a league, however, a hostile power may give it the greatest coherence it can possibly have. Nothing can cement a union of states like a great common danger. Inside of the union states full of hostility to the other members of the League would, in all probability, make its working imperfect and its existence precarious.

The critical question then is: does this describe a permanent condition and is there no union making for peace into which all the present enemies can ever come? Very

far from it. There is a type of union with which all of them can come at once. There are things which enemies can do for their mutual benefit, and when they have done them many times, their enmity tends to fade into the background and give place, first, to confidence and good will and positive friendship. Time has its talismans and can cause what begins as a forced and unwelcome toleration of one people by another to convert itself by easy stages into actual fraternity. There is a highway in sight, along which unfriendly nations can walk, if they will, toward and finally to the realm of fraternal union. They *must* make treaties of peace and *can* make treaties of arbitration. In due time they can coöperate in putting life into the institutions at The Hague. France, England, Russia and Italy on the one side, and Germany, Austria, and Turkey on the other, with their several smaller allies, can together create a High Court of Nations. They can develop and codify international law. They must resume their economic activities and can so direct them that causes of friction shall gradually be reduced and common interests shall be magnified. They can hold conferences at intervals and let them become, as decade after decade shall pass, more frequent and influential. In the end, let us profoundly hope, a single, strong and binding league of nations can be created with every institution foreshadowed by the program of our own organization, and others besides, all buttressed by common interests and vitalized by community of feeling. Then may armies and navies shrink to small dimensions and the laboring power they have absorbed may be used to develop the resources of the earth and conquer poverty—of which there will be a vast amount to be conquered. In the midst of the most terrific war of history cosmic forces have steadily tended in the direction of this outcome. The things that are seen are frightful but temporary,

the things that are unseen are eternal. Out of one of the fighting leagues may evolve the federation that, later, will convert dreadnaughts into cargo carriers, huge guns into tools of industry and the fighting instinct of men into healthful rivalry in the activities of peace. The beginning of it all is a victorious league emerging from a war; the end is the banishment of the war demon and the creation of what would to-day seem like a paradise. In the furnace of an awful strife we are fashioning at this moment the beams and girders of a peace temple which will be no mere vision, but a substantial earthly reality, having, however, the form and color of the brightest vision that the imagination of man can paint.





R. G. RHETT

President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States

## CHAPTER IV

### AMERICAN INTERESTS AFFECTED BY THE LEAGUE PROGRAM

ONE of the obvious topics requiring consideration by the first annual assemblage was a consideration of the program of the League to Enforce Peace from the standpoint of various National interests affected. An informative paper showing how the business interests of the country viewed the League's program was presented by R. G. Rhett, of Charleston, S. C., President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Mr. Rhett's paper follows:

#### AMERICAN BUSINESS AND THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

Had any one attempted to tell you the views of the business men of this country on any proposition four years ago, it could only have been his personal opinion, and it would have been impossible to verify its accuracy. There was no practical way in which these views could have been collected and expressed. There were national trade organizations interested in particular lines of business any of which could have ascertained the views of their members. There were local chambers of commerce any of which likewise could have ascertained the opinions of the business men in their respective localities. But it was only in April, 1912, that an

organization was formed for the purpose of ascertaining the collective views of the members of both national trade associations and local chambers of commerce located in every part of the nation. It is true that the Chamber of Commerce of the United States has not enrolled in its membership all such organizations, but it has 750 of them, comprising more than 350,000 business men, firms, and corporations, in which every state in the Union is represented. When they speak with the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution of the Chamber, there can be no doubt that they voice the sentiments of the business men of the country.

It is one of the cardinal principles of the National Chamber that its policies shall come fresh from its membership in response to referenda in which the questions are presented clearly and concisely and supported by the best arguments obtainable pro and con. Neither the President nor the Board of Directors has the power to determine what these policies shall be. It is their duty to see that these questions of policy are properly submitted to the membership in the referenda, and where there is a two-thirds majority vote in favor of any proposition, it is their further duty to carry such proposition into effect.

In November, 1915, the Board of Directors of the National Chamber sent out a referendum on the subject of the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. In response to that referendum more than 96 per cent. of the vote was in favor of the proposition that the United States take the initiative in securing conferences for the purpose of establishing rules for the better protection of life and property at sea; to be followed by successive conferences for the adoption of amendments to meet changed conditions. By practically the same majority the membership voted to approve of the proposition that this country take the initiative in forming



a league of nations, which shall agree to submit justiciable questions arising between any of its members to an international court, and non-justiciable questions to a council of conciliation for their respective decision or recommendation, before resorting to war. With reference to the proposals for enforcing these agreements first by economic pressure and then by military force, the vote of the organization members revealed a majority of 77 per cent. in favor of the former but only 64 per cent. in favor of the latter. This was sixteen votes short of the two-thirds vote required to commit the chamber to its support.

It is interesting to note that on the question of employing military force, the large chambers gave a majority of a little over 63 per cent., the small chambers a little over 65 per cent., and the trade associations about 67 per cent—the average of all organizations, as I have said, being 64 per cent.

It is also interesting to note some of the comments of the chambers in casting their votes. For instance, the Peoria Association of Commerce in voting against either economic pressure or military force, states that in view "of the alleged unpreparedness of the country it desires to protest against the government of the United States entering upon any such propositions as those embodied in recommendations 4 and 5" (Economic pressure and military force).

Again, the Merchants' Association of New York, in declining to vote on the question of military force, states that "had question 5 been submitted so as to cover the proposition of international police power by the exercise of military force without being predicated upon the use of economic pressure the vote of the association would have been cast in its favor." This organization, by the way, casts ten votes, and, in passing, let me say that no chamber has more than ten votes.

Again, the Pittsburg Chamber of Commerce did not

vote either for or against the recommendations concerning economic pressure or military force as in its opinion the problem of creating the necessary means for the enforcement of the decrees of any international tribunal should be left to the deliberation of the proposed international conference.

It therefore may be safely said that the business men of this country are heartily in accord with all the proposals of the League save that providing for the use of military force in the event of the failure of economic pressure. With reference to this the majority of the business men seem to be in favor of it, but the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, under its constitution and by-laws, is not committed to its endorsement or support.

Business ought to be and is peculiarly sympathetic with any effort to substitute coöperation for conflict. Competition under proper restraint is a constructive and beneficent force, but beyond control it becomes commercial warfare. It is now many years since the loss and waste resulting from this kind of warfare turned the thoughts and activities of business men to coöperation. It required sacrifices of individual prerogatives and advantages at times, but the resultant good so outbalanced the bad—the gain so outweighed the loss—that everywhere we find the business men seeking coöperation and avoiding conflict. The changes in methods of travel and communication which have brought business men closer together have likewise brought both the people and the governments of nations into closer contact. The Hague conferences did much to cultivate a spirit of coöperation amongst them, and indeed, marked progress seemed to be making in the direction of universal peace. But the fact that the greatest of wars which the world has ever known is now raging furnishes abundant proof that the time had not yet arrived, in 1914, when the great nations of the world were willing to make the

sacrifices necessary to prevent war by enforcing peace. Is not the time rapidly approaching, and will it not be ripe at the close of the present war, when the spirits of both people and the rulers of all nations have been so chastened—some by suffering, others by the contemplation of that suffering—for the formation of a League which gives promise of securing to the world a hope of permanent peace, with sacrifices which seem infinitesimal in comparison?

For many years it looked as if man had turned his thoughts and energies from the conquest of his fellow-man to the conquest of nature. His genius was harnessing one by one her mighty forces and bending them to his use. Steam, electricity, gas, and many other treasures gathered from her exhaustless storehouse were yielding him power for production, transportation, travel and communication in infinite volume and variety. When his ingenuity began to turn some of these forces into instruments of destruction, the consequences were so appalling, that it looked as if these new weapons of war might prove the most effective instrumentalities for insuring peace. It was a vain hope as the present war has proved; but the horrors of the battle are obscuring its splendors. War is no longer so handsome as it was—to use the President's expression—and we may well hope that the achievements of peace may outshine the deeds of war as now conducted.

Many methods of securing peace have been tried, covering limited areas and limited combinations of nations, and in some instances with marked success; but steam, electricity, and gas have brought all nations so close together that war between any of them seriously affects almost every other.

With the opening of the European War, business in this country for a while was paralyzed; exchanges were closed; values were suspended; bankruptcy stared whole

sections of the nation in the face; distress and suffering was precipitated in almost every section and would probably have continued had not one set of belligerents controlled the seas. Confusion and chaos in business reigned everywhere not only in this country but in the entire world. Great prosperity is now coming to many people in America, in consequence of the peculiarly fortunate conditions in which we have been placed, but upon the cessation of hostilities confusion will again reign and business will require another adjustment.

It is clear that our need is for some method of securing practically universal peace. The general propositions presented by the League to Enforce Peace make for that end and should appeal to every nation. It isn't proposed to bind any nation to abide the decision of a tribunal nor accept the recommendations of a council of conciliation, but it does force all nations in the League to submit their contentions to an investigation and criticism which will naturally be world-wide. It does compel every nation joining it to give the most careful and deliberate consideration to every controversy and especially to the consequences likely to ensue from conflict; and it also enables the people of the countries interested to understand the question and to have some voice in the course which their governments shall pursue.

Agreements unsupported by some means of enforcement amount to little—we have seen how little in the present conflict. Can the great nations agree upon an effective method of enforcement which shall not itself contain dangerous germs of conflict? The proposals of the League present two progressive methods. The National Chamber endorses the first and doubts the second; but out of them can probably be worked practical safeguards if the nations can be induced to approach the problem in a spirit of coöperation by mutual

concession—keeping in mind always the comparison of the gains with the sacrifices.

There is another point of view which appeals strongly to business. Together with a great majority of the people the business man is calling for greater preparation for defense not only in a military way but in an economic way. The vote which has just closed in response to a referendum of the National Chamber on that subject shows just how strongly he feels on this question. Over 99 per cent. of the vote was in favor of the military forces of this country both on sea and land being so increased and the industrial resources so coördinated as to make fully available the military, industrial, and financial strength of the nation. Ninety-nine per cent. of the vote was in favor of the restoration of the Navy to its former position as second in the Atlantic with surplus in the Pacific for the adequate protection of our coast, our possessions, and our trade routes. Furthermore, over 94 per cent. of the vote was in favor of compulsory military training for our youths.

And why does he feel so strongly on the subject? Not because he wants this country to become an aggressor, but because he wants insurance against the aggressions of other countries. He wants to remove all temptation from every nation or combination of nations to attack us, by convincing them that it would be a hopeless task.

While he believes in insurance and uses it in every way possible, his instinct is to seek the best security at the least cost. Now, in the first place, extensive military preparedness has not proven an altogether effective and safe insurance. It necessarily cultivates a spirit which is itself a constant menace. It is a necessary form of insurance so long as other nations insist on military preparation, but the proposals of the League would seem to open the way for a limitation upon it and a substitution of what even in its proposed form would seem in-

finitely more effective and less expensive, and what, if once begun, may lead to better and better safeguards.

As to the cost, I wonder how many have the faintest conception of what it amounts to. In this country where we have paid little attention to our army, and in late years have permitted our navy to fall behind, the proportion of our revenues devoted to preparations for defense and to provision for those who have participated in its wars is almost beyond belief. The Massachusetts Commission on the Cost of Living made a report in 1910, showing that  $71\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the national income for the 31 years previous thereto had been expended for these purposes in the following proportions: Army, 20.2 per cent.; Navy, 11.9 per cent.; Pensions, 28.7 per cent.; Interest on debt, 10.7 per cent. It would appear then that only  $28\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of these revenues are devoted to the purposes of the civil administration of national affairs and national development. It is particularly striking that the cost of taking care of those who have participated in war or those immediately dependent upon them is greater than the entire cost of the civil administration of national affairs and of all governmental developments of our country.

Whatever business men can contribute toward the success of the purposes which the League has in mind, I feel sure that they will be willing to contribute cheerfully and generously. Those who have organized the League and have carried it forward to its present splendid position in the public esteem and confidence, deserve the warmest congratulation and the heartiest support from the people of the entire country, and I am confident that they have it in full measure.

THE attitude of business interests toward the League program was further discussed by Harry

A. Wheeler, LL.D., vice-president of the Union Trust Company, of Chicago, former president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and secretary of the Chicago Association of Commerce in the following address:

THE LEAGUE'S SERVICE TO THE WORLD

This has been a remarkable day, and the strength, the force, and the clarity of the able addresses to which we have listened must have impressed you, as they have me, with the fact that the League to Enforce Peace, under the splendid leadership which it possesses, is born to a great world service at a time when the world needs service and sacrifice, as at no other time in its history, to restore its equilibrium.

All that has been in my mind to say upon the subject assigned to me seems insignificant in the face of the weightier considerations here advanced, and I am strengthened in my previously formed opinion that it must be infinitely easier to discuss the political, sentimental, or humanitarian significance of the purposes of the League rather than to discuss the effect of these purposes upon the material prosperity of the nation.

Material prosperity is variously interpreted, and all too often the definition possesses no broader horizon than individual selfishness. There is a predatory prosperity which has its birth in opportunism and sets the rewards of shrewdness and cunning above the general welfare of the state. There is a constructive prosperity which disregards speculative considerations or temporary advantage and pins its faith to stable evolutionary processes. Those whose vision does not extend beyond the selfish gain of to-day would not see in the platform of the League an assurance of material prosperity, but those who recognize the reality of that higher selfishness, which profits most when the whole



body politic is raised to a higher level of civilization, will share with us in the belief that in the platform of the League is embodied principles which make for the healing of national strife.

The world of business is supposed to be coldly material, yet the world of business is for settling its own and international disputes by conciliatory methods.

In September, 1912, when all civilized nations sent their representatives to Boston to participate in the Fifth International Congress of Chambers of Commerce, what sentiment was most frequently uttered and productive of the most enthusiastic applause?

It was the contention by men of business from all lands that international amity should be preserved by the arbitration of international disputes, and by conciliation wherever differences failed to lend themselves to arbitration. The very principles for which this League stands were the principles most vehemently spoken by men of all lands and most generously applauded by all.

We are told that the present war is being fought that commercial opportunity may be unimpaired. That is a libel upon commerce. As a matter of fact, it is not in the name of commerce that such a war as is now proceeding in Europe could possibly be fought, nor for commercial advantage, nor for commercial supremacy. Diplomacy has failed civilization, and desires to find some excuse, no matter how bad, for its failure when put to the crucial test in July, 1914.

Additional evidence of the interest of commerce in the principles of the League to Enforce Peace may be found in the Sixth International Congress of Chambers of Commerce, held in Paris during the early summer of 1914. There, a month before the declaration of war, the commercial interests of fifty or more nations reiterated their good will for each other, and their desire



for encouraging a peaceful means of solving both commercial and political differences.

The League to Enforce Peace has a great responsibility and the time is crucial. This nation of ours likewise has a great responsibility, and its time is crucial. If this conference shall be dissolved without finding a way in which to carry to the farthest corners of our country those principles for which we stand, if we shall go back to our homes without finding ways and means of bringing public sentiment up to a point of agreement with what we know to be the only logical process of settling international differences, there will rest upon us a responsibility which we shall not bear lightly in the years to come, and we shall place our nation in a position where in the days of readjustment it will be infinitely more difficult to treat with other nations.

To my mind the United States stands as a beacon at the crossroads of the world. To what harbor shall we light the nations? To the harbor of fancied exclusiveness where the anguish and strife of a world in readjustment finds no responsive chord? To the harbor of selfishness where material gains, brought in part from the misfortune of others, are used as a barrier against the appeals of those who stretch out hands imploring aid? To the harbor of inordinate ambition where the vision is blinded to all but the goal of our own supremacy? In these harbors the League to Enforce Peace has no place and no anchorage, but if we shall undertake to light the nations to a new civilization, where might shall not be right, where the strong shall find it a privilege to help the weak, and the rich to succor the poor, where national power and national influence and national wealth shall be held as a sacred trust in the interest of humanity, there we shall find the League to Enforce Peace, with its principles broad written over the banner of time, and there this nation

will fulfil its destiny in guiding the way for the nations of the world into a harbor of continued peace and amity.

THE interests of the workingman in any constructive effort to promote peace with justice was discussed by Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor. His address follows:

AMERICAN LABOR AND A CONSTRUCTIVE SETTLEMENT  
OF THE WAR

No class has more to lose and less to gain in war than the workers. No class renders such sacrificial service during war and bears such staggering burdens after war as does labor. In war, labor sees the results of years of struggle for wider justice swept away. In one mad moment the clock of industrial progress may be turned back for a generation. War diverts the mind of peoples from the constructive work of humanizing and democratizing the relations of men. Recognizing this, workingmen the world over have avowed their allegiance to the cause of peace and have sworn undying opposition to the forces that make for war.

Before the present war, the working people of the several countries now in conflict sincerely gave international pledges that they would not fight each other. I confess that I banked strongly upon these pledges, but in an hour of crisis, brought about by forces over which workingmen had little control, their pledges were shattered by the hurried ultimatum of Kaiser and King, of President and Czar. Secret diplomacy and arbitrary autocracy lifted the battle standards, raised the cry that the integrity of the fatherland was at stake, and placed the workingmen of all the nations



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**SAMUEL GOMPERS**  
President, American Federation of Labor



in a position where adherence to their pledges and to the larger interests of humanity would have branded them as traitors. Under the urgency of the situation, with autocracy and militarism resorting to their accustomed stage tricks for arousing patriotic emotions, instinct prevailed over reason and the laboring men of the nations rushed into the paths that had been marked out by the diplomatic and ruling classes.

But when the smoke of this conflict is cleared, with renewed energy, the laboring men of the world will begin to lay anew the foundations for an international peace that will safeguard and minister to the interests of justice, democracy, and larger opportunity for all.

But for even a more immediate reason, America's workers are vitally interested in the kind of settlement that shall come at the end of this war and in its effect upon industrial conditions in the United States. For it is obvious that at the end of this war labor may have to enter into great struggles to get and hold its just dues. These struggles may become more acute in the United States should an industrial reaction ensue after the close of the war.

Organized labor stands, of course, for group action instead of an individual competitive scramble with those in direst need setting the standard. Of course, when there is a scarcity of work and a multitude of workers, collective bargaining faces an added difficulty.

And yet such conditions are the definite outlook, if the settlement of the present war is the ordinary one, a mere diplomatic jockeying on the part of the nations for the best position in the next race for armaments, the kind of settlement that is sure to be made unless labor, agriculture, business, and all classes, can effectively cooperate for a different and better kind of settlement.

Let me state briefly what will cause this reaction, if it comes. If, at the end of this war, nothing but war

is left as a method for settling the future disputes that are bound to arise between nations, every nation, our own included, will be forced into an extravagant competition in armaments as a defensive preparation against the next great conflict that will be but a question of years. The interest bills and the expense of reconstructing demoralized industries will be burden enough to bend the back of Europe for a generation, but if there be added the greatest naval and military appropriations of history, it becomes clear that Europe will face the most desperate need of income she has ever known. To meet this need, Europe must carry over into the economic struggle for the recovery of the markets of the world much of the grim spirit of sacrifice that she has shown in war, and institute the most severe and destructive competition known to industrial and business history. In that competition, our democracy, its institutions, its methods, and its prosperity will be put under a greater strain than it has ever known.

Whether or not this suicidal competition is to be inevitable depends, largely, upon whether or not the mind and heart of the world unite in substituting a higher standard of morality—law for war, in the settlement of future disputes between nations, thereby making less necessary another competitive race for armaments, and thus removing one of the biggest expenditures that will make necessary the destructive race for trade which I have mentioned.

The fear of an industrial and business reaction in America is not born of theory, but is based upon evident proof that the present military war is to be followed by an economic war unparalleled in the intensity and destructiveness of its competition. Definite organization is already under way in practically all of the nations of Europe in preparation for a race for markets that will be the goal of this economic war. This organiza-

tion is being directed not only by the governments of Europe, but also by the private industrial and business interests of Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and other belligerents. It is the declared purpose of the statesmanship and commercial leadership of Europe to convert the present military alliances into future trade alliances. The plans being made for this economic war are animated not only by a desire for retaliation against former enemies but to capture the greatest possible share of the trade of the world, as a means for liquidating war debts, sustaining credit, rebuilding war-damaged industry, and financing such military preparations for the future as conditions may render inevitable.

Every day brings added proof also that the nations of Europe will, at the end of the war, set up formidable tariff barriers that will seriously restrict trade between the nations now at war and force them to compete more keenly in the neutral markets of the world, including the invitingly rich market of the United States. The erection of these tariff barriers will be forced upon the governments of Europe, not only to meet the urgent need of revenue, but also to make each nation as nearly self-sufficient as possible, for this war will have proved and enforced the fact that a nation that can most nearly supply all its needs by its own industries, were it walled in from the world, will be best able to protect itself and conserve its interests in the event of war.

The extraordinary pressure for funds will force exports from Europe upon a bigger scale than ever before. Europe will be more eager to sell and less able to buy than ever in history. If Europe exports at a maximum and imports at a minimum, the outlet for the products of American labor will, of course, be restricted. The poverty of Europe will make her not only a poor customer but also a fierce competitor. Our whole problem of foreign trade will be made

increasingly difficult. The result may be the piling up in America of a great surplus of manufactured goods. Even before the war, we were beginning to feel the pressure of our surplus and the necessity for increased foreign trade. Such a serious limitation upon the exportation of American goods, as any extensive business reaction after the war would involve, would, in a short time, make for scarcity of work and react injuriously upon American labor.

✓ Going back a moment to the proposition with which we started: The prosperity and welfare of American labor are largely dependent upon the prosperity and welfare of the American nation. Granted great prosperity to the nation, with a wide margin of profit to the employers, and granted the proper organization of labor for collective bargaining, there is always the chance, at least, to reach justice and equity; but if the United States suffers a serious business reaction, the American employer may have a less margin on which to deal with the problem of wages, and collective bargaining will face an increasingly difficult problem.

All of which means that American labor has far-reaching interests at stake in doing its share to help bring about such a settlement of the present war as will prevent any abnormal reaction upon the prosperity of the United States, and will give the industrial and business interests of the whole world an opportunity to compete along more nearly normal lines.

But above and beyond the desire of America's workers to secure a settlement that will safeguard the material interests of themselves and the nation is their desire to see a settlement that will render war less probable and peace more permanent in the future; for the interests of the men and women of labor are identified with those of peace. War has never meant to them opportunity for gain or exploitation. It has always meant to them sacrifice and suffering in the actual



fighting of the war and the bearing of heavy burdens after the war. Certainly working people have bought with their flesh and blood the right to a voice in determining the issues of peace and war; and in the general reorganization that will follow the present war, the workers will insist upon having voice and influence. Labor is committed to the principle that peace is the basis of all civilization. ✓

Peace is not a chance by-product of other conditions; it is the fundamental necessity of all government and of all progress—industrial, intellectual, social, and humanitarian. One of the main purposes, therefore, of governments and of all classes within governments must be the maintenance of more permanent international peace.

Since the burdens of war fall more heavily upon the workers than upon any other class, and since war diverts attention from the progress of that social and industrial democracy which holds the hopes of labor in its balance, it follows that labor, more than any other class, is interested in the establishment and maintenance of a more permanent international peace.

Although bearing most of its burdens, labor has had little to say in the declaration and conduct of the wars of the past, but in self-defense and in the interest of civilization, labor must have an increasing voice in the peace of the future.

In any program looking toward the establishment of more permanent peace among nations, labor will insist upon the following principles:

1. It must be a program under which the military forces of the world will be rescued from the dictation of arbitrary autocracy and absolute secret diplomacy and dedicated to the maintenance of a higher standard of morals, founded upon law and justice; a program that will so safeguard the use of military power that it cannot be used by the reactionary forces of privilege in im-

perialistic aggression, or dragged like a red herring across the path of democratic progress.

2. It must be a program elastic enough to admit of those fundamental changes that the growing life of the world makes inevitable. Any international arrangement that does not afford peaceful methods of securing the results that now can be achieved only by successful fighting will make little headway against war. Labor will oppose any federation of nations so organized that the more powerful nations can use the machinery to maintain the *status quo* against the demands for change made in the interest of democracy and larger opportunity for the masses.

3. It must be a program under which the small nation, as well as the large nation, will have a free hand in every just and individual development; a program that will make it impossible for a few strong nations to dictate the policies and development of the world. It must not deny to small and dependent states that final right of revolution that sometimes is the only road to justice and freedom.

4. It must be a program that will give the masses greater influence in those decisions that plunge nations into war; that is to say, a program under which the powers of autocracy and absolute secret diplomacy cannot, over night, rush a nation into war before the citizenship of the nation has a chance to express itself.

5. It must be a program under which the international machinery that is created will afford a medium through which all classes of society can voice their judgment and register their demands. We must not delude ourselves into thinking that the international problem will be solved entirely by the establishment of an international court along traditional lines, presided over by lawyers to pass judgment upon violations of established international law. The fact is that the real causes of modern wars are not so much violations

of established law, as they are conflicts over new problems and new needs that have not yet become a part of international law. So that any adequate international program must include the establishment of a system of stated international conferences in which the representatives of such democratic interests as labor and business can present and discuss, not under any established rules of evidence but in the spirit of impartial examination, those difficulties and differences that threaten to give rise to war. ✓

These principles represent not only the international program for which labor will work in the future, but they represent essentially the program for which labor has been contending through the years. But labor understands that a program so vast, involving as it does the interests of every human group, cannot be established and maintained by one class alone. Labor understands that humanity is one; that the problem of humanity is a common problem, that any international order of things to be permanent must safeguard the interests of all classes. Therefore, labor is profoundly concerned in the creation and adoption of some international program for which all classes, labor, agriculture, and business can work side by side in sincere cooperation for those principles that will best insure the triumph of justice and opportunity for all classes the world over.

In so far as the program of the League to Enforce Peace represents an effort to meet the conditions I have outlined, it demands the interest and careful scrutiny of every man who has the interests of labor at heart.

As I understand it, the essential proposals of the League to Enforce Peace are these:

1. That the nations shall band themselves together in a federation and agree to delay, in every instance, the actual declaration of war until the dispute at issue

has been thoroughly examined by an international tribunal, and the public opinion of the world given a chance to express itself.

2. That there shall be an International Court to consider questions that can be decided upon established law and evidence.

3. That there shall be a Council of Conciliation to consider questions that are not ordinarily regarded as justiciable, such as questions of national honor.

4. That in addition, there shall be at stated intervals international conferences for the progressive amendment of international law.

5. That the nations of the League shall agree to turn their united strength—first in the form of a business and economic boycott, and finally in concerted military action if the boycott is not effective—against any one of their number that wages war without first submitting its dispute for complete examination to one of the International Tribunals created.

The hope of the League's program is, I take it, that by forcing nations to stop and count ten before striking, there will result a cooling off period that will greatly reduce the probability of war, if not prevent most wars. There is no proposal that the decrees of the Court or Council shall be enforced; if, after the decision of the Court, a nation feels that it must fight to gain justice and freedom for its rightful development, the League provides no organized penalties. The program does not propose any tightly organized international government, but suggests that the nations shall cooperate to form a sort of International Vigilance Committee and say: If any one nation starts to "shoot up the world" without first giving legal processes a chance to adjust its difficulty, the other nations shall treat that nation as an outlaw and shall pool their economic and military power in an effort to force it to give law a chance.

It is not for me, by word of mouth, to commit the

laboring men of America to any particular program in international affairs; but I may be permitted to comment upon the way the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace appeal to me as a representative of labor.

The League's program wisely refrains from attempting to stop the present war. Hating war as I do, I am free to confess that if I could stop this war now by a turn of my hand, I would not do it. I hold that something must be determined by this war, and that something is whether the future belongs to autocracy and militarism or to democracy, liberty, and humanity. These are the points at issue and they have not yet been determined.

The League's program also wisely recognizes that we have not yet reached a point where the total disarmament of nations is a practically possible proposal. The labor movement is a militant movement, and the workers understand the necessity for power and its uses. The labor movement has never advocated the abolition of agencies for the enforcement of right and justice, or the abolition of the military arm of government, but it does demand that military forces shall be so organized as to prevent their misuse and abuse as instruments of tyranny against the workers; to render impossible the pernicious results of militarism—the building up of a separate military caste and the subversion of civic life to military government and military standards. If this program can succeed in making our military and naval forces not only our arm of defense, but, in addition, our contribution toward the maintenance of more permanent peace throughout the world, a long step in this direction may have been taken.

The League's program wisely recognizes the danger of creating a league of nations that would undertake to enforce the *decisions* of an International Court, and contents itself with enforcing the *submission* to an International Court of all disputes for examination. Until

power

democracy is more nearly universal, until democracy becomes a social and industrial fact as well as a political catchword, a League with power to enforce decisions would almost certainly become the repressive tool of the reactionary and privileged forces of the world.

The League's program, by suggesting the use of an economic boycott on an international scale as a means of enforcing law and justice, pays a tribute to the increasing importance and power of industrial forces in world affairs. But such a boycott must be left to the voluntary action of the peoples of all nations. What an International Court or League should do is to invite the representatives of all nations involved for a hearing and then declare its findings, holding the nation at fault guilty of such violations as the judgment of the Court or League may determine.

If a nation or nations fail or refuse to be represented, judgment should be taken by default, but in either event the opinion of the Court or League should be declared to the world as to which nation is responsible for the threatening conditions. An official or compulsory boycott must be avoided at all hazards.

Labor will insist that such careful thought and constructive statesmanship be put into the working out of the methods in each country by which such a boycott would be applied, that the workers would be insured against the possibility of being forced to bear more than their just share of the necessary sacrifice involved, and that their freedom of action would not be jeopardized. The wage earners of the United States, who have so often proved their patriotic loyalty in the civic life of the nation, as well as in the nation's wars, stand ready to bear their just share of any economic sacrifice that may be necessary to maintain the peace of the world, but they must insist that it be only their *just* share.

But the final question is not whether, at this stage, we all agree upon every detail of a program. Evidence is

daily accumulating that indicates that some such a league of nations is practically certain to be formed, if not at the end of this war, in the not far distant future. The bitter experience of this war will prove to all nations that the system of small group alliances, armed to the teeth and eternally growling at each other, is a poor way to run the business of the world. It seems practically certain that instinct, as well as reason, will react against this system of armed peace toward some larger federation of the nations. Since such a Court or League as contemplated appears to be the inevitable goal toward which the whole evolution of law and government is tending, the laboring men of this and every other nation will feel it their duty and privilege to lift their voice in counsel at every step of the plans and propaganda, in order to make more certain the triumph of democratic principles and methods in whatever final form such an international institution may take.

CARL VROOMAN, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, who was called on at the last moment by President Taft to take the place of Oliver Wilson, president of the National Grange, discussed the program of the League to Enforce Peace from the standpoint of the American farmer as follows:

AMERICAN AGRICULTURE AND THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE  
PEACE

I come from the great Middle West which, as a friend of mine has said, is "honeycombed with pacifism." The Middle West has more peace sentiment in it—has more pacifists to the square mile, than any other portion of this country, and this is all the more interesting because the Middle West is one of the places where the people have profited most from this war. Farmers of that



section have been feeding the millions of people in Europe who but for them would have gone without bread. Kansas alone last year received \$125,000,000 more on her wheat crop alone than she received on an average during the preceding five years. And yet, receiving as she has this profit from the war, the Middle West is filled as no other part of the nation is, with a militant peace sentiment.

But do not misunderstand me. While the great American wheat belt is coining money as the result of the present European War, the farmers of that fair region labor under no delusions as to what it would mean to them should this country be plunged into the present European vortex of destruction. I suppose there is no class of our citizens that would suffer more if the United States should become involved in war than would our farmers.

We farmers do business on a smaller margin of profit than do any other class of business men. Our profits run all the way from 5 per cent. down to nothing, and then on below zero, until the farmer who is farming for a living becomes merged in the agriculturist who is farming as a pastime. The result is that any considerable increase in taxes hits the farmer harder than any one else because it takes away from him a large proportion of his net profits. If there is any one thing that is always certain to increase the taxes of the country by leaps and bounds, it is war. In many of the European countries to-day one half of the people's incomes is being taken by the government for war uses.

Moreover, with the outbreak of hostilities, credit facilities are always seriously curtailed, and again the farmer is the one who in such a crisis always suffers most. Our banking system has been developed primarily to meet the needs of our urban population.\* After its needs are taken care of, the farmer, if he has gilt-edged

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\*This statement was made before the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act.



security and will pay the price, is allowed to take what is left. In time of war the chances are that there would be practically nothing left for the farmer in the way of credit facilities. Any business man knows that to be deprived of credit facilities means to be financially hamstrung.

And thirdly, and most important of all, in case of war a very large percentage of our armies would necessarily be made up of our farmer boys. And however much the farmer objects to heavy and unnecessary taxes, however much he objects to having his business crippled by having his credit facilities curtailed, still more does he object to war because of the heavy toll of life it exacts from the young manhood of the land. In no crisis in our history have the farmers been slow to present their best and bravest as a bulwark for their country's defense. They always have shown their willingness, when the necessity was imperative, to pour out their treasure and their blood without stint in defense of this great democratic republic, the world's greatest citadel of human liberty. But they are irreconcilably opposed to any war that can be avoided without loss of honor and our national self-respect.

I have spoken in the Middle West a good many times during the past six months. Recently I addressed some eight or ten of the agricultural colleges, speaking in the morning on agriculture and in the afternoon on military education. I have never had more inspiring audiences than those audiences of young men in uniform—young men representing not a military caste, young men not destined for the professional exercise of arms, young men prepared to do the hard work of the world—to exercise the peaceful pursuits of husbandry. And yet along with their education in scientific agriculture, they were gaining a knowledge of the science or art of national self-defense. As a result of this system of military education in our land-grant colleges, while West Point turns

out about 125 graduates each year, officers ready to take the field, the agricultural colleges turn out each year 5,000 men most of whom within six months of intensive military training under actual war conditions could be made into officers capable of leading, with splendid efficiency, our troops against a foreign foe.

Now we farmers always try to reduce things to their lowest common denominator and to their simplest terms. Therefore, if I speak of this great theme in simple terms, you will understand that this is the way that these ideas project themselves to the average farmer.

From time immemorial, civilization has rested upon the broad backs of the agricultural laborers of the world, and yet before their eyes has opened up no vista of opportunities for them, or for their children, save only that of a narrow path, with the horror of unending drudgery on the one side and the hell of starvation on the other. Millet's "Man with the Hoe," celebrated by Edwin Markham's marvelous poem, painted a true picture of agriculture before the advent of what we know as the "science" of agriculture—before man had learned how to focus trained intelligence upon the problems of husbandry and thus to learn how to unlock the hidden resources of nature and bring forth a golden flood of agricultural products greater than man had ever seen before.

In the past, when the farmer was the mat of civilization, he looked around him on every side and through his heavy and hopeless eyes he saw nothing but enemies. The consumer was his enemy, trying to beat down his prices—or he thought he was. The middleman also was his enemy or he thought he was; he saw himself girdled around with a steel band of enemies conspiring to pin him to the earth. He rebelled at this situation and thought that his only hope for an increase of prosperity for himself and for his family lay in war—political and industrial war. But in arriving at this point of

view, he merely accepted the same view of life that had been held for thousands of years by every class in society. This was the conception of life that dominated human thought on this planet until very recently.

But that conception is giving way now to a truer one. For example, the Federal Department of Agriculture is discovering, and helping the farmer to discover, that he is not surrounded by enemies, and that even those who to-day are his enemies are potentially his friends. And while in the past it sometimes has been true, as the farmer has suspected, that the business man regarded him very much as the farmer regarded his sheep—as a creature to be sheared, and sometimes even to be skinned—to-day the business man also is getting a new and truer conception of business. Our more enlightened business men are becoming imbued with a new ideal, and why? Because the white light of science has illumined their pathway, as it has the pathway of the farmer. Both are learning to-day this new lesson, or rather this new application of an old truth, that civilization progresses as fast as, and no faster than, man learns to cooperate with his fellows in the pursuit of their common interests. We have demonstrated recently to the farmers of the country that with the aid of science and by working together instead of at cross purposes, they can increase enormously the productivity of human toil. And not only can they increase their yields per acre, but they can also increase the prices they get for those yields.

The future in this world belongs to those nations which learn soonest and most thoroughly that the best way to enrich themselves is by increasing their productivity; by unlocking the hidden resources of nature; by inducing their citizens to work together for their common advantage instead of wasting their energies fighting about their differences, real or imaginary. Only

thus can man's energy be used at the highest pitch of human efficiency.

Having learned this lesson on our farms and in our factories, why not apply the same great truth to our international problems? Therefore, I think I am safe in saying that a majority of farmers would be willing to present for your respectful consideration the suggestion that the time has come for the formation of an international syndicate of nations to underwrite the peace of the world.

Anything that is properly underwritten, is an assured success. An underwriting syndicate, before it makes a move or risks a dollar, always concentrates enough power behind a venture to put it through. That is, as I understand it, the foundation principle upon which the League to Enforce Peace is working. When the farmer considers the problem of peace and war on an international scale, he asks himself this question, "Where peace exists to-day on our planet, how has it been brought about, and how is it maintained?"

So far as I am aware there is only one known method of maintaining a permanent peace, and that is, first of all, by the creation of a dominant public consciousness in favor of peace. You cannot have peace if a majority of the people are not in favor of peace. But once you have established a public opinion that favors peace—not a unanimous public opinion, for such a thing does not exist on this planet and probably never will—but a dominant public opinion, and that public opinion is able to establish some tribunal to which it can refer disputes, and to back up that tribunal with a police power strong enough to enforce its decrees, then you will be able to establish peace on a sound and permanent basis. And that is the only way that peace has ever been established in any country.

Now is it true that a majority of mankind are in favor of peace? If it is true, if a majority of the power

—the financial power, the intellectual power, the will power of mankind, is for peace, then assuredly we can devise some mechanism through which that power can operate in the interest of peace. But if a majority of the men of this generation were animated by the predatory spirit, then all talk of peace upon the part of this generation would be unavailing.

How about our nation? It is divided into two great classes—two great schools of thought. On one side we see the men who are willing to give to society an equivalent for what they get from society, who are willing to create all the wealth that they utilize and consume on this planet. These are the workers, the creators, the people who know that the best pathway to power is by the way of productive, not predatory, effort. But there are some people still among us—reversions to type—who have the motives and the mental outlook of the cave man—who still believe it is the correct thing to go out into the world to see how much one can acquire, by cunning or strength, of the product of other people's toil. In other words, there are still people among us who are animated by the predatory instincts of the jungle. Fortunately these people are not in a majority in this country. These people are not in a majority in most countries, and that is our only sound basis of hope for the establishment of an enduring peace.

How can we coördinate the minds, the will power, the hopes, and the material power of the people on this planet who believe in the productive process, instead of the predatory process, as the only legitimate pathway to power? That is the basic problem before this assembly and before the world to-day. That it is possible of solution no one should doubt who realizes that the masses of every country in the world are in favor, not only of military peace, but also of industrial peace. The masses of every country are believers in

liberty, and believers in justice. The love of liberty and justice is not dependent upon culture spelled with a *C* or a *K*. Therefore, if we can formulate here some plan that will give expression to this slowly but irresistibly growing sentiment of mankind in favor of the productive type instead of the predatory type, then peace as an abiding possession on our planet is assured.

Thus it becomes apparent that our hope of peace is founded on something more solid than "bits of paper," or the understandings and misunderstandings of diplomats, or the kaleidoscopic adjustments and readjustments of secret diplomacy, dictated by the supposed requirements of high finance.

Remember the Scriptures say not that the peace *talkers* but that the peace *makers* shall be called the children of God. We have a good deal of peace talk going on from one end of this country to the other. Some of it has been very useful, and probably all of it has had its uses, but if this organization has any one distinguishing virtue, it seems to me to be that it can be counted on to get results, that it is composed of the genuine "peace makers" of these United States.

NEWTON D. BAKER, B.A., LL.B., Secretary of War, made the following remarks:

#### AMERICAN IDEALS AND THE LEAGUE PROGRAM

Some years ago I went through the mountains of West Virginia in an automobile, along a road projected by George Washington. No other automobile had as yet been through that country, and at what was a post house, originally, on top of a mountain, I saw a splendid-looking American woman standing on the doorstep. Just beyond there was a fork in the road, and I stopped to ask which of these two roads led to Martinsburg. Her reply was:



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**NEWTON D. BAKER, B.A., LL.B.**  
Secretary of War





“I have not the least idea. It is said to be about twelve miles down one of these roads. I was born in this house, I have lived here forty years, I have never been farther away from it than the church you see yonder, and I never expect to be.”

And a thousand times since then I have wondered whether there was some little landmark, some little monument, relatively two miles away, that was circumscribing my vision; whether I was exactly like that good woman who had selected literally two miles as the limit of periphery of her extensive migrations; whether like her I was really tied to some post not much farther away.

I want to talk about American ideals, not as though they were some fixed and unchanging thing, not as though the founders of this government and projectors of our institutions had discovered something impossible for human intelligence to exceed, but as an expanding and growing thing, a cloak that will cover the frame of our activities and that will grow as they grow.

It is always difficult to summarize and abstract the ideals of people. We rarely see people when they are busy about their ideals. If we go out into life we find this man with his plough and that man with his plane, the lawyer with his books and the doctor with his medicines, busy with the ordinary things of life, but not, except in extreme cases, about their ideals; certainly not about the common ideal that we speak of as the ideal of America, and it is only when some great invocation is uttered to all the people that each man forgets his special interest, the farmer turns his hand away from the plough, and the artisan drops his plane, and the lawyer forgets his books, and we touch the thing that can be called the nation's ideal.

It is fortunate that the ideals of America cannot be put into a paragraph or a sentence. You can state almost anything in language if you are willing to make

the necessary disclosures, but the difficulty about sentences and definitions is that they are inelastic. So I think we have no statement of American ideals that can be regarded as a final thing, and yet I believe if you take our history from the Declaration of Independence down to the present time it will be found that America has stood for the opportunity of man in the world as against things, that we have had an attitude that predisposed us toward human freedom and human liberty, that we have desired to establish justice among ourselves, and, treating ourselves as an aggregate, to be just, and to invite justice from others.

American history, for the first century, was a struggle to preserve a kind of individualism which was ideal under the conditions which civilization had then assumed. Thomas Jefferson said a short time before he died, in writing to a friend: "We are a nation of farmers and small merchants, and there is no manufacturing among us." He was thinking of us as individuals aggregated into a nation. Each man was in a sense economically sufficient for himself and his political philosophy, was a corollary of his economic self-sufficiency. Jefferson was filled with the classical ideas that came from an intimate knowledge of the history of Greece, and the territorial subdivisions of the human race were an ever-present thought in his mind. But we have outlived all that. We have come to a time now when no man lives to himself, when the artisan at his bench is dependent upon some producer of raw material in the antipodes. There has come a situation in the world in which, whether we want to or do not want to, whether it is good business or just ordinary idealism, we are obliged to take "a planetary view" of the human race.

And so we come to the question of what is going to happen to the ideals of America, if the League to Enforce Peace is successful in impressing its program.

Let me turn that round: suppose the League to Enforce Peace is not able to impress its program here in America. When this war is over in Europe, the people are going to demand preventive statesmanship. The possibility of a recurrence of this nightmare will no longer be tolerated. The economic forces, the industrial forces, labor and religion, and learning and science and art, already in an intimate and intricate system of exchange and interchange between nations, are going to rise as the voice of the people in favor of some such expression of the popular conscience of the continent of Europe as is desired by the League to Enforce Peace. Now suppose they get up such a League. Suppose that Europe asserts itself and determines to have that sort of regulation of international relations, and we are not in it. What then will be the relation we shall bear to the rest of the world? Their intimacy together, without our partnership in it, may some day become confusing to us. And if we, now in the dominant moral position in the world, decline to join hands with the circle that is quite certainly destined to be formed by the nations of the world for the preservation of peace, they will form the circle, and we shall be on the outside of it.

Clearly, some sacrifices are entailed. As civilization advances some of us see that what once seemed a necessary part of our individualism whether among men as individuals or among nations, comes to the sacrifice, that the advance of civilization is attained by the sacrifice to some extent of individual freedom of action for the common good. The very beginning of private law, by which individuals are restrained from acts of violence and aggression on one another and the peace of society preserved, involves a surrender of some part of the native freedom of the savage or the frontiersman.

And so, when this League to Enforce Peace comes, it may well be that some individualism that was originally a part of what would have been given as a definition

*the true foundation*

✓

of American ideals may have to be surrendered into the keeping of the nations of the earth as trustees of the common good. But out of it there will have arisen more than a compensation for it, a better understanding among nations and peoples of the earth, an understanding that will prevent the recurrence of what we now have.

It is said that analogies, however argumentative, are never conclusive, but let me draw your attention to another thought. The order we have in society now which prevents me from going down into this hall and engaging in a fight with some other man of my size and creating a disturbance of the peace and comfort of this audience, is based upon this thought: It is intolerable that the business or the religion or the thought of any society should be disturbed by any mere individual broils. Philosophers in the law sometimes say that it had its origin in the thought, when every fighting member of the tribe was needed to resist aggression, that the tribe could not allow its members to be fighting one another because it needed its full strength to fight somebody else. And I think that may have been a part of the original initiative of order getting itself established into law. Almost the earliest recognition of the right of society to enforce peace that we have in Anglo-Saxon society is where, when a man fought and slew another, the slayer was fined, and the fine divided, one half going to the relatives of the victim and the other half to the state, whose peace had been offended by that controversy.

And so, in our public indictments now, when a man fights or slays, or does any other sort of crime, it is against the peace and dignity of the state, and the basis of it all is that, adopting the maxim of Kant, that each man must act upon that principle which is fit to become universal law, and applying that to the acts of individuals, we have the principle that if A has a right to be

violent all individuals have an equal right to be violent. Then we say, as a necessary conclusion, that society cannot tolerate individual violence which will interfere with its prosperity, with its dearest and tenderest relations, which will thwart the progress of its soul toward real liberation.

We can take that analogy and apply it to the nations. Now that the peoples of the earth have come to be so intimately dependent upon one another, what was once good humanitarianism has become necessary business consideration and we are able to apply the analogy by saying that a world interrelated as ours now is, with men here depending on men there, with no man and no nation able to stand isolated and alone, it has become intolerable to the human race to have a condition in which unprovoked and aggressive warfare can be brought about by the action of individuals and nations.

Now, I have only one other thought to add to this, and that is: Why should America be specially concerned in this business? For one great reason. As things now seem, we have less to gain and more to give than any other nation in the world. It is because, as I see it, America's ideals, or its ideal, is to be the leader of the human race in giving—in giving to mankind a new lease on life, new codes of liberty, new opportunities for justice. It is because I believe that to be the ideal of America that I think the purpose of this League and its invitation to the rest of the nations of the earth is perfectly consistent with and in fulfilment of our ideals.

logical order  
of international  
order

## CHAPTER V

### PLANS FOR GIVING EFFECT TO THE LEAGUE PROGRAM

THE discussion of plans for giving effect to the program of the League to Enforce Peace was led by Theodore Marburg, A.M., LL.D., publicist and former minister to Belgium, with the following paper:

#### THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE: A REPLY TO CRITICS

In a small flower shop in the humbler quarters of a Southern city a young hospital nurse, still in training, is asking the price of roses, her rounded cheek, itself a rose, half turned to the open door. The daily tasks of the hospital training school are exhausting. But she has managed to embroider a workbag—a wedding present wrought by her own hands—and she seeks to adorn the package with a few buds. Embroideries and carved wood, chiseled marble and wrought metal, music and the painter's art and letters, she is aware, give life a rich setting. To the question she puts there is no reply, only a thoughtful look. Such a voice as is "an excellent thing in woman" repeats it. Then the woman of the shop, quietly:

"I heard you the first time, dear, and I've heard your voice before. You were good, so good, to my Alice at the hospital. How badly she was burned by the overturned lamp! And how patient to the end!"

Then, turning to her boy, she bids him give the lady



**THEODORE MARBURG, A.M., LL.B.**  
Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee, League to Enforce Peace





all the flowers she may need. And she herself pins a white rose on the young nurse's bosom.

Now, the qualities disclosed in this simple incident are not mere ornaments of men. They constitute the very basis and condition of all progress. The philosophy of ruthless suppression and domination is based on the biological principle of the advantage to the individual of fierceness and cunning in the struggle for existence. But this philosophy overlooks a conflicting and more far-reaching biological principle, namely, the superior advantage of group action conditioned on altruism. The buck standing on guard while the herd feeds, the wild goat coming back to the top of the pass to see whether there be a wolf or other enemy following before he moves on with the herd! What have we here but the beginnings of altruism? It is altruism which alone makes group action or coöperation possible, and coöperation has played a greater part in higher evolution than the individual qualities of fierceness and cunning. The dictates of humanity—kindness, consideration, and pity—are therefore equally grounded in philosophy. They are the very foundations of society, which began in the animal world before man and without which human progress would have been utterly impossible.

To apply the principle of coöperation based on altruism to the society of nations, as it has already been applied within the state, is the aim and purpose of the League to Enforce Peace. Its platform lacks details and elaboration; it does not lack definition, nor has there been lack of study and public discussion of its possible workings. We have to overcome the initial difficulty of getting the powers to agree to any plan. Therefore the simplicity of this one. It is felt that if the nations can be induced to subscribe to its fundamental principles the envoys charged with the duty of perfecting the plan will be equal to all questions of detail, program, or organization. The plan contem-

plates "not a league of some states against others, but a union of as many as possible in their common interest."

The central idea of the League is that wars are the result of the condition of international anarchy out of which the world has never yet risen; that they will not cease until justice prevails and that justice cannot triumph until the world organizes for justice.

We find within the modern state certain institutions such as legislature, courts, and executive, which aim to prevent strife among men and to promote the general welfare by promoting legal and social justice and by enlarging opportunity. This system was applied to the states, originally sovereign entities, composing the American Union. Entering the Union involved a certain surrender of sovereignty and independence and a sacrifice of the principle of equality in the unequal representation in the lower house of the Federal Legislature. The interests of the states, economic and other, had often clashed and resort to arms between them had not been unknown. Because of this fact some of them were slow to consent to the plan.

But the workings of the Continental Government, crude as it was, convinced men that in this direction lay progress, in this direction light for the world; and, though with hesitation and misgivings on the part of some, all finally took the step. Once only in a century and a quarter has the peace between them been disturbed. True, the South was forced to abandon the institution of slavery, and lack of protective duties against the cheaper agricultural products of the West caused farms to be abandoned in New York and New England. But individuals moved freely from one section to another. There was no suppression of local aspirations and ideals. On the whole, the welfare of each made for the welfare of all. To-day the benefits of the Union are unquestioned.

We naturally ask ourselves why the same organization which brings justice and peace and orderly progress within the nation may not be applied with equal success between the nations. Far from representing a confusion of ideas, it is the essence of logic. The question is: how far can we attempt to go in the direction of such organization at present? On this question the League to Enforce Peace occupies a middle ground. Because of this fact it faces criticism by two opposing groups. One maintains that we go too far, the other that we do not go far enough.

Men who previous to the present war were opposed to the introduction of the element of force in international institutions have now come to regard it as essential.

The principal declared purpose of the League to Enforce Peace is to make immediate and certain war upon any nation which goes to war without a previous hearing of the dispute. A Council of Conciliation will entertain disputes arising out of a clash of political interests. Incidentally a true international court of justice is to be set up to entertain justiciable questions, and there are to be conferences from time to time to formulate and codify international law. In the measure in which nations are estopped from fighting, the growth of law will be stimulated and resort to international tribunals become more frequent. These latter happy results in their turn will diminish resort to arms.

But it is manifestly not justiciable questions, nor even the nebulous state of international law, which, by and large, brings war. War arises principally out of conflicts of policy. To deal with these successfully is the immediate problem before the world. The demand for a hearing of the dispute once complied with, nations, members of the League, are then free to go to war as under present conditions. That is to

say, the League as such stops short of enforcing the judgment or award. In fact, it is a question whether the Council of Conciliation, unless requested to do so, will proceed to an award at all, though it must be remembered that nations submitting a dispute to any tribunal may, and often will, enter into an agreement beforehand to respect the decision.

The failure to enforce the judgment or award is a source of objection to the League's program on the part of men whose opinion is entitled to respect, among them Charles W. Eliot. Their criticism is that, unless the verdict be enforced, many wars will still take place, and that if a nation may be called upon to defend its position by force of arms after a hearing, armaments must be maintained. Both of these criticisms the League admits to be valid. The check upon war would be much more effective if the nations could be persuaded to accept a plan providing not only for compulsory investigation, but for an award, and finally for a sanction which would insure the execution of the award. But the desirable is not always the realizable. It is felt that although in the interest of world peace they ought to be willing to give and take, as a matter of fact the great Powers would not enter into an agreement to submit all disputes to a tribunal if they were bound to carry out the award. Great Britain, for example, might have the question of Gibraltar or Egypt, or a sphere of influence, brought up; Japan, the question of Korea or her activities in China; the United States, the Monroe Doctrine or the question of oriental immigration. To be something which governments at the present stage of world feeling and enlightenment are likely to adopt the plan must, therefore, omit the feature of executing the award.

Under existing practices, when two nations enter an arbitration they do so voluntarily. The nature of the question to be decided is defined in the pre-

liminary agreement and they know beforehand the worst that can befall them. When at present, therefore, they consent to arbitrate a question they do it in the full expectation of abiding by the result. To go further and enter into general treaties in pairs looking to the settlement of future disputes is still a very different matter from entering into a common treaty with a large group of nations. In the former case each nation knows pretty well the antecedents, policy, and interests of the contracting party. In the latter, that fact is much more complicated. The United States, for example, would be willing to go much farther in a treaty with Great Britain than in a treaty with the Balkan States or Turkey. There still remain in the plan two steps which constitute an advance over existing practice, namely, (a) the obligation of the signatories binding themselves to use the tribunals they may set up; (b) the use of force to compel them to do so, if recalcitrant.

Now why do we base such high hopes on a mere hearing? Because experience, municipal and international, points to its great value in warding off actual strife. In the state of Massachusetts a provision for compulsory investigation of labor disputes in the quasi-public services has long existed. The power to summon witnesses and lay bare the facts of the dispute, without proceeding to a judgment, has prevented labor war in these services. In Canada we witness the successful working of the Dominion law covering similar disputes and properly extended to coal mining, the stoppage of which vitally touches the public interest. In the international field there is the Dogger Bank affair, referred successfully to the International Commission of Inquiry set up by the First Hague Conference.

Such a league as is proposed would necessarily have an executive council or directorate, sitting at the

capital of some small country, and charged, among other duties, with one certain duty of overwhelming importance; namely, that of declaring war in the name of the League on any nation which went to war without a preliminary hearing of the dispute or an earnest attempt to secure one. This is the one sole cause for war by the League.

War on land cannot well be made without invading the territory of the enemy. It will be remembered that at the beginning of the present war France retired her forces a certain number of kilometres within her own borders. If some such rule as this were set up, the locus of the first battle, a geographical fact, could be easily determined, and there would remain no doubt who the offender was. No provocation, whether by threat, either of word or of preparation, nor even an alleged act of injustice, would be accepted as an excuse. There would be no conference of the Powers to deliberate as to what action, if any, should be taken, to raise in the breast of the would-be aggressor the hope that dissension among the Powers might lead to the customary inaction. The Executive Council would be in being, charged with one supreme and certain duty: to make war upon the offender. That duty to declare war in the name of the League is a heavy responsibility, and therefore the fact on which the Executive Council is asked to act should be an easily ascertainable fact. Warlike preparation is not an easily ascertainable fact, nor is that of unjust acts. Both are facts most difficult to ascertain, and therefore are to be neither a ground for the declaration of war by the League nor an excuse for war by the nation offending against the provisions of the League.

The constitutional power of the United States to enter into such a compact already exists. Mr. Taft has pointed to its exercise in connection with the treaties guaranteeing the integrity of Cuba and Panama.

They carry the obligation to use force if necessary. When the contingency contemplated by the treaties arises, Congress, which alone has the power to declare war, would be called upon to fulfill the treaty obligations. The country was justified in taking this risk because the treaties make for the security of Cuba and Panama and so for peace.

Our critics, pointing out that conciliation is a voluntary process, assert that to force conciliation is a contradiction in terms. They set up their own straw man and then proceed to knock him down. The League does not force conciliation. It simply forces a hearing, leaving the parties free to accept or reject the finding. Under the League, nations are prevented from going to war to get what they suppose to be their rights until, by means of a hearing, not only the outside world but—that which is of high importance—their own people have the facts of the dispute spread before them. They are not prevented from indulging in that costly pastime if, after a hearing, they still hold to the opinion that they are being wronged.

Meantime, pending the hearing, each disputant is enjoined by the League, under penalty of war, from continuing the objectionable practice or proceeding with the objectionable project.

The judicial tribunal which the League aims to create will be a true World Court with permanent judges, and the assembly an embryo world parliament to meet periodically. The Court, while set up by the League, will be open to any nation electing to use it. And there is no reason why the Parliament, though convened and prorogued by the League, may not be composed of representatives of all nations, a true development of the Hague Conferences and the Interparliamentary Union. If, now, the League should fail of its main object and melt away, these institutions should remain, a valuable legacy to the world. Far from



running counter to the promising current of arbitration, the project therefore is moving with it.

By far the weightiest argument against the League is the entangling alliance argument. Of this it should be said that when avoidance of such alliances was enjoined by Washington we were a small country highly vulnerable because of our comparative weakness. Who shall say the same of us to-day? A people of one hundred millions, with untold wealth, so placed geographically as to be practically unconquerable by any single power or likely combination of powers! The dominant trait in Washington was his sense of duty. Were he alive to-day would he not recognize the obligation of his country to fulfill a duty to the society of nations instead of taking advantage of its fortunate geographical position to shirk that duty? He saw what coöperation meant for the Colonies. Would his vision be less clear in sensing the great need of our day, the overwhelming importance of international organization to take the place of international anarchy? America may on the surface appear a selfish nation but she has been stirred to her depth by ethical movements in the past and may be counted upon to rouse herself in similar fashion again. An appeal in a high cause involving sacrifice, even hardship and suffering, would go farther to-day than is dreamed of by the high priests of gain and ease and security. Thousands of Americans who have not shut their eyes and ears to the sights and sounds of this awful day are ready for some attempt to destroy the monster, war, and ready to have their country play its part as the mother of men.

A people wedded to justice will not be afraid to assume its share of responsibility in a league of nations in order to lighten the curse of war in the world even though it involves risks. For the principal objection to war is that it is such a wholesale source of injustice, public and private.



We teach our children not to mind so much what is done to them, but to mind very much what is done to others; to be slow to resent little offenses and slights, and even injuries they themselves suffer; but to be ready at all times to act when some one else is being persecuted or injured. We teach them, too, that the only fear any one should have is the fear of doing wrong. Has not the day arrived when these should likewise be substantially the standards of conduct for nations? I say "substantially" because the standards of private conduct are modified for nations by the fact that the nation is a trustee of the interests of its people and of its special form of civilization, including the political principles which it represents.

In most civilized countries, the day is past when a principal obligation of the individual is to insist on his rights. It is the side of duty, rather than rights, which is emphasized to-day; and the new order of international society toward which the nations are moving will do the same.

I fell strongly that the present evil of recurring war is due largely to the selfish motives which have dominated the policies of all nations in the past. The United States probably has been governed by them less than other countries but even its attitude leaves much to be desired. A better day cannot dawn until it is realized that *in general the future interests of a nation will be found to lie in the direction of a present duty to the society of nations.* The fact that Europe permitted the crime of 1870 made possible the crime of 1914. The tragedy we are now witnessing holds within it the seeds of untold future disaster for all of us. And unless the neutral world realizes the significance of it, unless it acts now as if the society of nations were already in existence and assumes its full share of responsibility for the triumph of the right, the seed will bring its harvest.

Has not the time come when this great country should

stand for the right, should strike for the right when necessary, and should help organize the world for right? And how much less frequent the need of striking at all when such absolute and potential power as a league of all the great nations will represent shall be back of the right!

Until we have such organization no country can be really free. Plato has defined the free man as he who has sufficient control over his appetites to be governed by reason in choosing between good and evil. What nation to-day is free to choose between good and evil? How few the nations that would not lay down the burden of armaments if they felt themselves free to do so! Within the state true liberty is secured only by a surrender of license; that is, by self-denial and by a measure of restraint imposed upon each by all. Society implies restraint: self-restraint and restraint from without. In the society of nations there can be no true liberty without surrender, in some measure, of sovereignty and independence. It is the duty of the United States to help in organizing the world for justice because it is only through justice that peace can be secured. A selfish policy which leaves a government apathetic to a universal woe and causes it to act only when its own rights are trespassed upon cannot produce peace. There must be coöperation with other nations in the cause of justice.

Thus much for sacrifice if sacrifice be called for.

But, while ready for it if need be, we cannot admit that the plan of the League to Enforce Peace would actually involve the United States in wars. The League would not be instituted unless it embraced all or nearly all of the great nations. Its military power would thus be overwhelmingly preponderant. Now, what is the dominant demand of the League? A hearing of the dispute before going to war! Could any demand be more reasonable, more just? We are charged with

planning an oligarchy implying oppression. If we sought to enforce the award of a tribunal in disputes involving conflicts of political policy there would really be danger of oppression. To avoid this we should then demand that the League embrace not only all or nearly all the great nations but the smaller progressive nations as well, so that out of their united action substantial justice might emerge. But what injustice, what oppression, can arise from a demand for a hearing which leaves the disputant free to go to war afterward? And is there any nation, however powerful, which would refuse this reasonable demand if faced, as it would be, with the alternative of having to wage war against practically the civilized world?

The French Ambassador at Rome reports San Giuliano's view, July 27, 1914: "Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London and he believes that if any power can determine Berlin in favor of peaceful action it is England." Two days earlier, July 25, Sazonof had asked that England place herself clearly on the side of Russia and France. Such an act on the part of the British Cabinet was not possible, until Belgium was invaded, because it was doubtful whether the people of the British Isles would support the government in a hostile attitude toward the Central Powers. But the opinion is general to-day that if Germany had known with certainty that England would line up against her, she would not have declared war. Under the plan of the League Germany would have known that she would have not only England to reckon with but Italy and the United States and the "ABC" countries of South America, not to mention minor members of the League. Now is it reasonable to suppose that, facing such a possibility, she would have denied Sir Edward Grey's demand for a conference over the dispute?

The only loss a nation could suffer by a hearing would

be that of being deprived of the advantage of superior preparedness. And is not that one of the very advantages we want to take away from nations in the general interest? Nations bent on aggression would go through the form of a hearing and proceed with their designs afterward. There would, therefore, still be wars. But it is inconceivable that the League as such would ever be called upon to wage war under the terms of the compact. It is possible that after a hearing the nations may still regard a threatened war as so unjust or so dangerous to the world at large that they will come together anyway and say: "This may not be." But *that* they may do now.

Objection is made that the League plan calls for cooperation with monarchies. In many constitutional monarchies such as those of Italy, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, etc., the people practically enjoy self-government. France and Switzerland are republics and England is a true democracy despite its monarchical form of government. Drawing our love of liberty originally from England, we have paid back the debt. The example of the successful practice of a broad democracy here encouraged its growth not only in the mother country, but generally throughout the world. Social democracy, which is opportunity to rise in life and is largely the result of economic conditions, is greater in all new countries than in the countries of the old world. It is greater in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States than in England. But when we come to political democracy, which is the opportunity for the will of the people to express itself in law, there is more of *that* in England than in the United States. If one knows what the will of the English people is he can pretty well gauge the action of the English Parliament. Is the same true here? Old age and disability pensions every justice-loving man of the United States would like to see established here. Have

we got them? And if it be the fault of Federal or State constitutions does this alter the fact?

The question has been asked: can the United States afford to become party to a treaty which would justify a league of nations under certain conditions in using force against it?

George Grafton Wilson has pointed out that the Bryan treaties, providing for obligatory inquiry, bind the United States now to a course of action exactly like that laid down in the second article of the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. It will be recalled that these treaties, of which there are many, call for the submission of all disputes whatsoever, not resolvable by diplomacy, to an international commission for investigation and report, and forbid the disputants from declaring war or beginning hostilities "during such investigation or until the report is submitted" provided that the report shall be presented in the maximum period of one year, which period may, however, be shortened or extended by agreement. The League extends the application of this principle to a wide group of nations. But it does not stop there. It goes farther and declares that it will make war upon any nation which breaks the treaty. That is to say, it makes provision for compulsory inquiry instead of obligatory inquiry.

Now in exactly what way are the interests of the United States affected by this further step? The Bryan treaties, now in force, cover disputes "of every nature whatsoever." So does the League compact. Both, therefore, cover matters of vital interest. But both simply call for investigation and report, not for enforcing an award. If the award of the tribunal is not to be enforced how can the legitimate interests of our own or any other country be jeopardized by such treaties? Surely we can afford to submit questions involving even the Monroe Doctrine for investigation before we go to war over them. And this is all the

League demands. No nation will be forced to settle disputes. They may continue them indefinitely if they choose, just as we continued the fisheries dispute with Great Britain for three quarters of a century. The only thing they may not do is to go to war over a dispute before it has been submitted for investigation and report. In other words, unless the United States should, under the League, do what it has already obligated itself under the Bryan treaties not to do, the League would never have occasion to use force against it. A nation which cannot submit any question under the sun for a hearing before going to war over it has a poor case indeed.

Coupled with this consent to a hearing, which necessarily involves delay, there must be some provision for preventing nations from proceeding, under penalty of war, with an objectionable act pending the hearing. For the solution of this problem we turn to the power of injunction which under municipal law is lodged in the courts. The League would undoubtedly exercise a similar power. In other words, the United States would not be estopped from maintaining the Monroe Doctrine after a hearing of the dispute, and it would be protected against violations of it pending the hearing by the power of injunction lodged in the Executive Council of the League or in one of its tribunals.

What we desire is that the Powers should commit themselves now to the principle of obligatory inquiry and a league of nations to enforce it and pledge themselves to set up such an institution after the war.

We have the whole-hearted endorsement of the principle by President Wilson, by Senator Root, by the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, and by a host of eminent Americans. If now we can add to this support of private individuals and officials, a resolution of the Congress of the United States, favoring the





**PHILIP H. GADSDEN**  
Member Executive Committee, League to Enforce Peace



principle, we could then ask Mr. Taft to go abroad as the representative of this unofficial body and endeavor to secure the adherence of foreign Powers. You will recall the fact that the Congress of Vienna did only so much as it was obligated to do by the preliminary Treaty of Paris. And, unless we get the Powers committed now, there is grave danger that when the war is over we will find it difficult to get a hearing. On the other hand, if they do so commit themselves now, the various governments can proceed at once to a study of the project, and the envoys who meet to frame a treaty of peace will come not only with a matured plan, but with positive instructions to reach an agreement if possible.

PHILIP H. GADSDEN, president of the Charleston, S. C., Consolidated Railway and Lighting Company, delivered the following address:

#### PERFECTING THE ORGANIZATION

In all of the great crises through which the world has come, when men were confronted with the apparent destruction of all which, up to that time, had been held most dear, when in despair they wondered if civilization itself were not at stake, history shows that in every such instance, out of the stress and strain, sorrow and anguish of the moment, there was gradually evolved in the minds and consciences of men in different parts of the world, first, a vague thought or suggestion which gradually grew until it assumed the form of a definite proposition, as an answer to the voice of humanity and as a solution to the problems then confronting the human race.

The next step in the process, we find, has been that this vague and undefined thought or aspiration has been formulated into definite shape and submitted

to the judgment of the world for its criticism and analysis. If it came out of this crucible of public opinion, it definitely established itself as a principle of action, as a guide for the conduct of men, and from that point on its influence upon the human race was dependent upon the effectiveness of the organization which could be created to support it. All great movements which have left their mark upon the history of the world and have become the guiding principle of human conduct have had their origin under similar conditions; have gone through the same orderly development, and their effectiveness and general acceptance throughout the world has been, in every instance, dependent upon the effectiveness and force of the organization which could be built up for their support.

A plan of organization was adopted at a conference called in Philadelphia in June, 1915, which it is my privilege to explain.

The object of the League was expressed to be to establish and maintain peace after the close of the present war, not to end the European conflict. The organization of the League consists of a President, fifty-one or more National Vice-Presidents, a National Chairman, a National Secretary, a National Treasurer, a National Executive Committee of twenty-five to be elected annually by the General Committee, and a General Committee of two hundred and fifty to be appointed annually by the Chairman of the National Executive Committee. The organization was further perfected by the creation of the following National Committees:

Finance Committee.

Committee on Foreign Organization.

Committee on Information.

Committee on Home Organization.

Each committee to consist of twenty-five members. In addition there was created a National Committee,

representing directly the state organizations and composed of one member and one alternate from each state, to be elected annually by the state committees of such states.

The next step in perfecting the organization of the League was to create an organization in every state of the Union and upon the recommendation of the Committee on Home Organization, the state organizations consist of State Chairman, a State Secretary and Treasurer, with the necessary assistants, a State Committee, a State Executive Committee, and standing state committees on Finance, Information, and State Organization. In order to put the League in still closer touch with the people, a plan of county organization has been adopted, similar in every respect to the state organization. The conference at Philadelphia elected an Executive Committee of twenty-five, composed of men representing all sections of this country, who have, during the last twelve months, earnestly and enthusiastically devoted themselves to the work of creating an organization which would bring home to the people of the United States the great principles included in the proposals of the League. A distinguished list of honorary vice-presidents has been elected, of men and women, educators, men prominent in public life, leaders in the commercial and industrial life of the nation, both men and women representing on one hand what has come to be known as the pacifist movement and others who have been and are now taking active part in arousing public sentiment in this country to the necessity of adequate defense of its liberty and institutions. Representing, as many of them do, opposing views on these great questions, they have, one and all, enthusiastically and patriotically accepted service as vice presidents of this organization, convinced that the proposals of the League offer a common meeting ground, and furnish the only practical

plan which has yet been suggested for accomplishing what each and all are striving for, the orderly peace of the world.

What we need at this time is to perfect the organization which we have planned, so that in each state, county, and city of the United States there shall be state, county, and municipal committees composed of enthusiastic men and women, convinced that in working for the advancement of the League, they are engaged in the most important work which they have ever been called upon to perform. To do this work satisfactorily it is necessary that we should become saturated with the principles for which we stand and especially be prepared to combat the arguments advanced against it.

Among the many lessons which this frightful war has taught us, is the realization that the isolation of this country from European questions and European wars and strifes, if it ever really existed, has come to an end. The chief criticism which the members of the League are called upon to meet is, that by becoming a member of a league of nations, such as we propose, the United States will be called upon to abandon the advice of Washington against entering into entangling alliances. Based upon this admonition of Washington, the political policies of this country have been framed upon a theory that the United States of America is sufficient unto itself; that it is not concerned in the interests or policies of other nations; and that it can work out its destiny without regard to the great influences working throughout the civilized world.

Even in the days of Washington these proposals were only measurably true. There never has been a time, it seems to me, in the history of the world when one nation could justly take the position that the problems confronting the human race and which

were being worked out in sorrow and in strife by other nations were no concern of theirs. The extraordinary development in transportation which has come about within comparatively recent years; the improvement which has been produced in the transmission of intelligence throughout the world; the internationalization of capital and economic and industrial forces and of postal facilities, are conclusive evidence of the fact that the great leaders in the field of transportation and transmission of intelligence, the economists, the postal authorities, the masters of industry, have long since come to a realization of the fact that no one nation was sufficient unto itself. The great war which has destroyed so many of our theories and illusions has brought home to us, convincingly, a realization of the fact that we are a member of the great family of nations, and that we can no more relieve ourselves of the responsibilities and duties of that position, than can one of the states of this Union relieve itself of the responsibilities and duties growing out of its membership in the great federation of the United States, or can any man divest himself of the responsibilities for the maintenance and care of the members of his own family.

This, my friends, is the opportunity and privilege which the League to Enforce Peace holds out to us and to every thinking man and woman in the United States to-day. As with everything else in the world, which is really worth the doing, it requires of us personal service and service implies sacrifice. We must enter into this great work with enthusiasm and with zeal. If, as we believe it to be, it is easily the most important and far-reaching subject which can appeal to the human mind, then we must enter upon its prosecution with a high purpose, to give our thoughts, our time, our energies, and our means to arousing the dormant conscience of Americans; to instill in them the doctrine of the brotherhood of man. It is not often that the opportunity comes to the

individual citizen to take an active part in a great world movement, to feel that its success, in a measure, depends upon his individual effort, but it is so in this, and that thought should inspire us to our best efforts. What is needed in this country of ours is a revival of the ideals of the founders of the Republic: a rekindling of the fires of patriotism and broad humanity which burned so brightly in the early days of this country's life.

The extraordinary success which has been ours in commerce and industry has insidiously weaned us away from the things of the spirit, which only are eternal, and threaten to foster in us a selfish commercialism whose poisonous vapors tend to stifle all the generous and natural aspirations of a free people. What is most needed, therefore, in my judgment, for a general acceptance by the people of the United States of the proposals of the League, is to arouse and stimulate the national conscience—to cultivate a broader view of our duties and responsibilities, as a member of the great society of nations, and so as a people, acquire a spiritual vision which will lead us to do our utmost in solving the problem of the ages, and help us and the world to hasten the time when we will measurably, at least, realize that greatest of all benedictions conferred upon the human race: "Peace on Earth, Good Will toward Men."

J. MOTT HALLOWELL, attorney, of Boston, discussed organization plans more exhaustively in the following paper:

#### PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN

A plan of organization is like a problem in mathematics with a human element added. The most effective plan is that one which is planned as a strategist plans a campaign. First, determine exactly the ulti-



J. MOTT HALLOWELL





mate goal which it is sought to reach. Second, estimate the forces which must be marshalled in order to be able to overcome the obstacles which lie between you and the goal. Third, work out the plan for securing these forces and putting them into effective operation.

The ultimate goal of the American Branch of the League to Enforce Peace is to have the United States lead the way in forming a league of nations which will carry out the proposals of the League.

The force which must be marshalled in the United States in order to reach that goal and successfully to maintain the position when reached is the indorsement, with understanding, of a commanding number of the citizens of the United States. The favorable opinion of scholars, statesmen, and even of the President of the United States and a ratifying Senate is not enough.

This is so for two reasons. In the first place, probably any national administration, before attempting to bind the United States to such a radical step, would much prefer to feel that the proposals and their logical consequences were understood and endorsed by those people upon whose backing the administration must depend if the United States, after joining the league of nations, should be called upon to do its part in enforcing the peace. In the second place, because if any administration should so pledge the faith of our country and should afterward be called upon to make good its word, its ability to do so would depend upon the strength of the public opinion endorsing the pledge. Without the endorsement of this public opinion the President of the United States and the ratifying Senate would not have formed a League to Enforce Peace, but would merely have attached the official signature of the United States to one more scrap of paper. Within any republic the strength of this international League to Enforce Peace will vary in proportion to the strength of the public opinion which backs its proposals, because this, in

the last resort, is the force to which the administration in power must appeal in order to provide ways and means to enable it to carry out its part of the international agreement.

The third and present step, therefore, in the plan of organization of the American Branch of the League to Enforce Peace, should be to devise ways and means for having its proposals understood and endorsed by a majority of the citizens of the United States. It might well be that official action before this endorsement is secured might be premature and invite initial defeat. When this popular approval is secured, favorable action by any administration in power will follow almost as an inevitable consequence.

The first essential in a methodical plan for securing the favorable public opinion of a majority of the citizens of the United States is that the active work in building up a public following should be done by state branches, one in each state. If a successful state branch can be established in every state, national success will come rapidly. No national organization for our purpose can conduct a campaign over the entire country. There should be forty-eight campaigns going on at the same time, one in each state, and each conducted by its local state branch.

The plan suggested below for organizing state branches has already been tried for five months in the state of Massachusetts and so far has worked successfully. It may very well be true, however, and probably is, that in different states this plan would have to be modified in order to meet varying local conditions.

The following is submitted as a practicable plan of procedure.

Mr. Hallowell here proceeded to give a minutely detailed account of the steps in organizing the state

of Massachusetts. Experience here taught that a minimum capital of five thousand dollars was required with which to begin organization. It was further found that the Secretary and the Chairman of the State organization had to devote practically all their time to League affairs for the first six months. Mr. Hallowell continued:

The appeal of the League is not to the emotions but to the intellect. In many other appeals for public support an advocate starts either with an appeal to the emotions or with an appeal for a purpose the merit of which is admitted, as for instance raising money to assist the sufferers from a volcanic eruption or a great fire. The proposals of the League, however, are to most people so novel that a condition precedent to obtaining this support is an appeal to their intellect to show that the cause has merit. This will account in many places for its slow growth where less important but more emotional causes obtain rapid success. It will on the other hand, however, give it lasting strength.

The work of the national organization should include work of the nature usually done by a general staff, namely to assist and coöperate with the state branches. It should insist that the monthly reports on progress be filed with it regularly by each state branch. These reports should be carefully studied, and assistance to the state branch either by advice or by other ways should be furnished where needed. In this way the national organization will guide the entire campaign, will know just what progress is being made in each state, just where work is most needed, and where it can be most effectively done. It will also have the requisite data to enable it to know with some degree of intelligence when a majority of the people of this country endorses the proposals of the League. When this time arrives the

next step will be the work of applying the force which will have been created; in other words, causing the United States Government to begin the formation of the league of nations. To make action by any national administration effective it ought to have the backing of a big majority of the states.

METHODS of enlisting the support of public opinion were discussed by Herbert S. Houston, M.A., president of the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World, vice-president of Doubleday, Page & Co., publishers, and chairman of the Committee on Information of the League to Enforce Peace, in the following remarks:

#### PUBLICITY PLANS

I am asked to speak about our publicity plans. I was reminded as I sat there of Burke, standing in the Commons, pointing to the reporters in the gallery, and saying: "There sit the Fourth Estate, and through them I speak to all the millions of English-speaking people." There are two or three thousand people gathered here, but through the newspaper men sitting here at these desks have gone out over the wires messages and cables, information and news, which have been on the first page of every newspaper in the world, and to-morrow morning with President Wilson's address we shall have first-page position in every important newspaper in the United States and the world.

We have undertaken to be not a publicity committee in the ordinary sense of trying to get from newspapers space that they sometimes give but grudgingly, but have gone to newspapers and great periodicals of America and said, "Here is a great international movement of the highest importance to every thinking man in every country in Christendom, and this committee wants to



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**HERBERT S. HOUSTON, M.A.**

Treasurer and Chairman of Committee on Information, League to  
Enforce Peace



coöperate with the newspapers and publishers and give them what they want." That is the policy which your committee has followed from the beginning.

Let me illustrate how that has worked out with the Chambers of Commerce referendum. That referendum was submitted and we followed it up with a plan of localizing our news. Judge Taft prepared a most interesting statement that was sent to the president of every Chamber of Commerce in the country. We sent this statement also from headquarters in New York to every paper; for example, to Richmond, Va., and when Mr. John Stewart Bryan sent a reporter to the Chamber of Commerce he got, as local news, this letter from Judge Taft, supplemented by an interview with the president of the Chamber of Commerce in Richmond. And that happened all over the United States. I could have brought here to-day practically a trainload of clippings. We are having thousands and thousands of columns in the leading newspapers of America, in the leading newspapers and journals of the world.

It is not due to any cleverness on the part of your committee, it is due to the fact that we are coöperating with the newspapers to give them what they want. When we began the question as to the word "publicity" came up. All American newspapers have intense dislike for the very word "publicity." Dr. Lowell, by a real stroke of genius, solved the question. Horace in the *Ars Poetica* says that a man wins immortality who creates a word. Dr. Lowell surely wins that immortality, because he suggested that we call the committee the Committee on *Information*. And that is what we have tried to be, a committee on information.

As a member of the Committee on Information, I want to give some information about a man whose name has not been mentioned yet in this convention, as far as I know, a man who in season and out of season has been doing the work of this organization, from that heated

day in June in Independence Hall, when the League to Enforce Peace was formed.

I refer to that great, silent, modest, tireless secretary of the League to Enforce Peace, William H. Short. In an experience of twenty-five years in organizations, in business, and in the publishing field, I have never seen a man who was such a tremendous dynamo of energy and resistless power. In the publishing business we are always seeing men who are spectacular, who are continually seeking the spotlight. Here is a man who shrinks from putting himself into the spotlight. But it is men of that type, who are willing to sacrifice to the uttermost, who will make this work that we are doing known all over the world.

WILLIAM H. WADHAMS, A.B., LL.B., Judge of the Court of General Sessions of New York, presented the following paper:

#### MOBILIZATION OF OUR FORCES

We propose a Council of Conciliation and a Court of General Sessions of the Peace of the World. How are we going to bring the nations into court? If a man violates the law, he is brought into court by the police. But the police are but a small number of men representing the whole citizenship. So behind the police we must have a public opinion which supports the police. The police are necessary to give instant and organized expression to that public opinion which sustains them.

The real power which brings men into court is the public opinion behind the police. That opinion is based upon the ideals of our country. It is our conception of right between man and man, our conception of the meaning of the right to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness which sustains the police. We have set up standards of individual conduct which hale men





*Photo by Pach Bros.*

**W. H. WADHAMS, A.B., LL.B.**  
Member Executive Committee, League to Enforce Peace



into court when those standards are defied. If nations are to sustain a world court they must set up standards of international conduct which will hale nations into the world court.

What are the means by which we may bring this about? We must first mobilize our forces in America. We must mobilize the great forces that make and direct public opinion. We must go forward with our national and state organizations and thereby spur existing public opinion and bring together those who already have the light. We must organize the torch bearers. When I was helping to take up the collection this morning, one man handed me this card, on which he had written: "To help carry forward the work of the League I subscribe service." If there is to be a conquest of reason and a sweeping away of ignorance and tyranny, we must have the enlistment of service. But we must do more than organize our own numbers, we must make use of all existing agencies.

The principal reason for the failure of the new generation to reach the height to which it should have climbed over the mistakes of the past is the neglect of child culture. The greatest cause of the continuance of war is the neglect of child culture. The most impressionable material in the world is the mind of a child. He who moulds the mind of a child is creating a force that is going to throw out energy even as radium does, a continuing force that is to make the future of the world. When we look into the eyes of a little child we are looking into the eyes of the future. We have more power than the prophets; they merely declare their forecast of the future; but when we shape the mind of a child we mould the future of the world.

If we are to have a new world we must have a new education. We must have a new education in elementary schools. Examine the books which are read in the nursery and which are put into the hands of our little boys

and girls and which mould their first impressions. Will you be astonished to find that slaughter and fighting and war are made to seem good and wise? Then the child goes to school and is unconsciously taught to march where the last generation marched. History must be taught. The story of the race and of the nation must be told; it may be so taught as to be a guide to the future, to illustrate sacrifice for great causes, to inspire valor and patriotism. But many elementary histories glorify victory by arms regardless of its purpose and mark the triumphs of history by the number of dead and exalt the conquerors, those who produced the greatest slaughter, as the heroes of the world, merely because they were successful in war. To so teach a child who has not yet learned the great principles and purposes of government is to corrupt the young mind. It may be that we should postpone the teaching of elementary history until it can be taught to minds already mature enough to understand its meaning.

Again, Latin is an important study as a foundation of language. How important I leave to the pedagogues. Our boys and girls begin their study of Latin by marching through Gaul with Cæsar, following the Roman eagles to victory and conquest. Always marching, fighting, killing as a glorious occupation! Is it necessary to culture that we should take an instrumentality, which while teaching the mind to think, moulds it to a standard that has meant disaster in the past? The mind must be trained in perception, in analysis, in memory, but let us see to it that the means which are used to train the mind do not themselves poison the mind.

Let us summon all the college presidents to help mobilize our forces. The colleges not only exert great influence over their students and the public, but also determine what shall be taught in the secondary schools.

I would prescribe as a requirement for admission to every college an elementary course in world peace. Let us mobilize all the teachers of youth who are going to build for us the generation to come, in whose hands is to be placed the fate of the world. Is it not time to direct our attention to the study of those things which will produce a citizenship with the vision and determination to put into effect and maintain the new order? If we are really in earnest let us teach that an appeal to reason is more noble than an appeal to force, that justice is of greater value than might. If we are really in earnest we must provide a new education that will give us new ideals, a new public conscience that will sustain the court we propose to establish.

We must also call upon the women of America to help us mobilize our forces. The women have great power to help. They have a knowledge of the value of life. They believe in the conservation of men. They believe that the greatest sacrifice is not in death but in life, in service to the world. The women can do much to establish the new standards. They direct the thought of men, for the man's mind is fashioned at his mother's knee, when as a boy he receives those first impressions that stay with him through life, that guide him in all his actions. We should mobilize the women's organizations and clubs and summon to our aid the teachers and the business and professional women.

And we should have the help of organized labor, and we should have the help of organized agriculture, for they gain the least and suffer most by war. We should mobilize business and call on Chambers of Commerce and Merchants Associations, because the peace and prosperity of all nations is essential to the prosperity of each. We should welcome the aid of the peace societies, because we share their vision of universal peace.

Those who believe in preparedness should give us aid for our program takes the curse of militarism from pre-

paredness. We should prepare. But what is adequate preparedness? That is a difficult question to answer. Are we to build navies in competition with the navies of the world? Are we to enlist armies in competition with the armies of the world? Are we to burden ourselves with intolerable taxation after the manner of the old world? Our League presents the only answer, for with the formation of a league of nations to enforce peace, the measure of preparedness—that is of armed force—would be the pro rata share of each country to the united force necessary to the maintenance of peace. Our plan lifts the burden of preparedness and shows the way to disarmament.

There are some things worse than war. Slavery is worse than war; failure to assert righteousness against unrighteousness is worse than war. If we do not have any other means, we will have to resort to force. We are now dependent on force. It is a substitution of other and better means that we propose to provide. Armament is to be used to assure a hearing, and thereby guarantee peace. This plan of ours imposes upon preparedness a peaceful purpose. It is a justification of preparedness.

Our preparedness shall be used only for the purpose of maintaining peace. We propose to the nations of the world a new era of order and justice. We do not propose longer to tolerate aggression; we recognize the family of nations, each with the right to develop in its own sphere, we desire no territory, we desire no spheres of influence, we are ready to submit our demands to a world court and to withhold action until judgment is pronounced. Our preparedness is for the purpose of establishing the rule of reason and to maintain the Court of the World. This is a new patriotism greater than has ever prevailed in the world before.





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**WOODROW WILSON**  
President of the United States



## CHAPTER VI

### BROADER ASPECTS OF THE LEAGUE PROGRAM

THROUGHOUT the sessions of the first annual assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace discussion was maintained on a lofty plane. The climax was reached by President Wilson, who made the closing address at the dinner which ended the conference. President Wilson said:

When the invitation to be here to-night came to me, I was glad to accept it—not because it offered me an opportunity to discuss the program of the League—that you will, I am sure, not expect of me—but because the desire of the whole world now turns eagerly, more and more eagerly, toward the hope of peace, and there is just reason why we should take our part in counsel upon this great theme. It is right that I, as spokesman of our Government, should attempt to give expression to what I believe to be the thought and purpose of the people of the United States in this vital matter.

This great war that broke so suddenly upon the world two years ago, and which has swept within its flame so great a part of the civilized world, has affected us very profoundly, and we are not only at liberty, it is perhaps our duty, to speak very frankly of it and of the great interests of civilization which it affects.

With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood

has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore. But so great a flood, spread far and wide to every quarter of the globe, has of necessity engulfed many a fair province of right that lies very near to us. Our own rights as a Nation, the liberties, the privileges, and the property of our people have been profoundly affected. We are not mere disconnected lookers-on. The longer the war lasts, the more deeply do we become concerned that it should be brought to an end and the world be permitted to resume its normal life and course again. And when it does come to an end we shall be as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence, give promise of days from which the anxiety of uncertainty shall be lifted, bring some assurance that peace and war shall always hereafter be reckoned part of the common interest of mankind. We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.

One observation on the causes of the present war we are at liberty to make, and to make it may throw some light forward upon the future, as well as backward upon the past. It is plain that this war could have come only as it did, suddenly and out of secret counsels, without warning to the world, without discussion, without any of the deliberate movements of counsel with which it would seem natural to approach so stupendous a contest. It is probable that if it had been foreseen just what would happen, just what alliances would be formed, just what forces arrayed against one another, those who brought the great contest on would have been glad to substitute conference for force. If we ourselves had been afforded some opportunity to appraise the belligerents of the attitude which it would be our duty to take, of the policies and practices against which

we would feel bound to use all our moral and economic strength, and in certain circumstances even our physical strength also, our own contribution to the counsel which might have averted the struggle would have been considered worth weighing and regarding.

And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear is, that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established. It is clear that nations must in the future be governed by the same high code of honor that we demand of individuals. V

We must, indeed, in the very same breath with which we avow this conviction, admit that we have ourselves upon occasion in the past been offenders against the law of diplomacy which we thus forecast; but our conviction is not the less clear, but rather the more clear, on that account. If this war has accomplished nothing else for the benefit of the world, it has at least disclosed a great moral necessity and set forward the thinking of the statesmen of the world by a whole age. Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this, that the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set

up against alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind. The nations of the world have become each other's neighbors. It is to their interest that they should understand each other. In order that they may understand each other, it is imperative that they should agree to coöperate in a common cause, and that they should so act that the guiding principles of that common cause shall be even-handed and impartial justice.

This is undoubtedly the thought of America. This is what we ourselves will say when there comes proper occasion to say it. In the dealings of nations with one another arbitrary force must be rejected and we must move forward to the thought of the modern world, the thought of which peace is the very atmosphere. That thought constitutes a chief part of the passionate conviction of America.

We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. Like other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended against that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as our franker historians have been honorable enough to admit; but it has become more and more our rule of life and action. Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.

So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of

America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation.

There is nothing that the United States wants for itself that any other nation has. We are willing, on the contrary, to limit ourselves along with them to a prescribed course of duty and respect for the rights of others which will check any selfish passion of our own, as it will check any aggressive impulse of theirs.

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their Government to move along these lines: First, such a settlement with regard to their own immediate interests as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our interest is only in peace and its future guarantees. Second, an universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world, a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.


But I did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a program. I came only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion shall be summoned not to the

service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common peace. God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and coöperation may be near at hand!

HENRY CABOT LODGE, A.B., LL.B., Ph.D., United States Senator from Massachusetts, and a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign relations, spoke of the

#### GREAT WORK OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

It is well, in understanding any great work, and the work of this League is a very great work indeed, to know precisely where we stand; and I have been glad to learn that the League has laid down as a principle that it is not engaged in attempting to bring the war in Europe to an end, that its work lies beyond that war, for I have a somewhat deep impression that when the peace we all hope for comes, it will not be brought about by expeditions from the United States, nor by mass meetings and resolutions, no matter how admirable such resolutions may be. The United States has led the world in the matter of arbitration. From the day of the Jay Treaty of 1794 and the Pinckney Treaty of 1795 down to 1912, eight-four arbitration treaties had been negotiated by the executive of the United States, eighty-three had been ratified by the Senate, and only one, the treaty of 1897 with England, rejected. I think that is a remarkable record. We have carried the principle of voluntary arbitration to its limit, and it is well to recognize that it has a limit, because when we undertake to put into treaties for voluntary arbitration questions which no nation, when the stress comes, will submit to arbitration, we do not advance the cause of peace, but quite the



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**HENRY CABOT LODGE, A.B., LL.B., Ph.D.**  
United States Senator from Massachusetts





reverse; for we do vast mischief by making treaties which we know in our hearts we are not prepared to carry out when the time comes.

The limit of voluntary arbitration has, I think, been reached. Much has been achieved by it. It has taken out of the range of arms a large mass of questions which once were causes, frequently of war, constantly of reprisals, and by the general consent of civilized mankind has put them before a tribunal and had them there decided. If we have reached the limit of voluntary arbitration what is the next step? I think the next step is that which this League proposes and that is to put force behind international peace. We may not solve it in that way, but if we cannot solve it in that way it can be solved in no other.

You cannot keep order in your cities unless you put force behind the will of the community and behind the peace of the citizens. The peace of your states is maintained by force. It rests upon the militia and the constabulary of the states. The peace of the United States can only be secured and maintained by an ample, thorough national defense. We have not that defense now. I trust that we have entered on the path that will lead us to the upbuilding of our national defense both in the army and in the navy. I hope this not only to make our peace secure, but because we as a nation shall find it very difficult to induce others to put force behind peace if we have not force to put behind our own peace. I know, and no one, I think, can know better than one who has served long in the Senate, which is charged with an important share of the ratification and confirmation of all treaties—no one can, I think, feel more deeply than I do the difficulties which confront us in the work which this League undertakes. But the difficulties cannot be overcome unless we try to overcome them. I believe much can be done. Probably it will be impossible to

stop all wars, but it certainly will be possible to stop some wars and thus diminish their number. The way in which this problem is to be worked out must be left to this League and to those who are giving this great question the study which it deserves. I know the obstacles. I know how quickly we shall be met with the statement that this is a dangerous question which you are putting into your agreement; that no nation can submit to the judgment of other nations, and we must be careful at the beginning not to attempt too much. I know the difficulties which arise when we speak of anything which seems to involve an alliance. But I do not believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace.

It was a year ago that in delivering the Chancellor's address at Union College, I made an argument on this theory: that if we were to promote international peace at the close of the present terrible war, if we were to restore international law as it must be restored, we must find some way in which the united forces of the nations could be put behind the cause of peace and law. I said then that my hearers might think that I was picturing a Utopia, but it is in the search for Utopias that great discoveries have been made. "Not failure, but low aim, is the crime."

This League certainly has the highest of all aims for the benefit of humanity, and because the pathway is sown with difficulties is no reason that we should turn from it. It is the vision of a perhaps impossible perfection which has led humanity across the centuries. If our aspirations are for that which is great and beautiful and good and beneficent to humanity, even when we do not achieve our end, even if the results are little, we can at least remember Arnold's lines:





*Photo by Matzene, Chicago*

SHAILER MATTHEWS, D.D., A.B., A.M., LL.D.  
Dean of Divinity School, Chicago University

“Charge again, then, and be dumb.  
Let the victors, when they come,  
When the forts of folly fall,  
Find your body at the wall.”

SHAILER MATHEWS, D.D., LL.D., Dean of the Divinity School of Chicago University and president of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, discussed

WHAT THE CHURCHES HAVE AT STAKE IN THE SUCCESS  
OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

It is one of the gratifying facts of recent days that Jew, Romanist, and Protestant have united in championing the cause of peace as a great common divisor which runs through all religious organizations. The churches, under whatever name organized, represent in a social form that underlying conviction which we all have that the significance of life is not to be found simply in economic forces, but rather in those spiritual values which tower above all economic, geographic, military, and even social forces. These churches thus involved in a common interest find themselves profoundly concerned in the success of every well-intended effort to bring peace into history. But we are less interested in peace than in the causes which make peace inevitable. If there is anything worse than a war based upon injustice, it is a peace based upon injustice.

The churches have at stake two or three fundamental matters. There is first the great question whether idealism of a spiritual sort can be made practical and administered. Good people do not always have good sense. The attempt to organize this League to Enforce Peace is an attempt to bring good sense into superlative ideals.

In the second place, the churches have at stake the great question as to whether moral ideals which are significant in the case of individuals are also significant in the case of nations. They have never been tried. The League to Enforce Peace intends to try them. God be with it in its attempt.

In the third place, the churches have at stake a closely allied question, which is more than a question. It is a fundamental belief of every religious man that an ideal becomes an enthusiasm only when it involves sacrifice. An ideal that costs nothing is only a piece of social bric-à-brac. Idealism for which you are ready to die has a driving power that makes history go forward. And we bring forward at this time, in this League to Enforce Peace, an ideal that dares call upon nations as well as individuals to sacrifice. It is an educational appeal, it is a profoundly spiritual appeal; and when you have spirituality coupled with education, and faith in God coupled with common sense you have a marvellously effective combination.

In this undertaking the church also dares hope that patriotism will become a coöperative rather than a belligerent virtue. There are many people who are ready to die for their country who will not pay taxes to their country. There are many nations who are ready to fight for their rights who are not ready to stand for other nation's rights. The great issue before humanity, as I see it at the present time, is perfectly simple, to be formulated in this simple way: Are you, as a nation, ready to give justice? The League to Enforce Peace intends to socialize rights; we hope to handle nations as possessing not only rights but duties. We hope that by its program it will be shown that spirituality, common sense, and coöperative patriotism may be united into a splendid, devoted effort to give to the other nations the justice which we claim for ourselves.

And, Mr. President, if the churches have something

at stake, in the success of this League, the League has something at stake in the success of the churches. The church is not a parasite on social progress. In the same proportion as the churches realize their supreme function in social evolution, can they contribute influences which will help forward, control, and rectify social progress itself.

I stand for religious people, who are not ashamed of being religious. It is hard to talk of religion without seeming to talk professionally, but in all seriousness religion is a big thing in life. It is more than church-going. A tremendous passion and thirst for justice characterizes our new religious epoch. We have something to give to the nations that will make this League possible, because you cannot make a League to Enforce Peace successful among people who do not want peace. All reforms would be easy if it were not for folks. And the church is engaged in making folks interested in the things for which this League stands. Therefore our relationship is mutual. Religion is hardly religion if it does not tend to express itself creatively. And religion always does express itself creatively at those points where men are stirred by some great social ideal. The man who has a religious message, whatever may be his creed, whatever his theology, has something which the world needs, and which, by God's grace, at the present time it will get. Religion has become international. Religion has ceased to be a matter of merely saving a man's soul from something which may happen some time in the future. Religion wants to look out for dead people, but it has much more interest in live people. This is a splendid opportunity which the church has. It can swing into the great movement for social reform, and social evolution, and social recreation. It can call upon a world of persons who have come out of the universe to trust the Spirit of the Universe whom we may love and whom we may emulate in sacrificial social-mindedness. And thus

the church may help bring in a kingdom of justice and of peace. If that be Utopia, so be it. I would rather prepare for Utopia than for Hell.

PROF. FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, LL.D., Professor of Sociology and the History of Civilization at Columbia University, former president of the American Sociological Society, former president of L'Institut Internationale de Sociologie, and author of various works on sociology, presented the following paper:

HOW SOCIAL PROGRESS DEPENDS ON THE SUCCESS OF THE  
LEAGUE PLATFORM

The European War has not only devastated: it has disillusioned. In the life of every successful man there comes an hour of maximum peril and of supreme test. He has struggled with difficulty and with disappointment; so far he has been safe. Then, perhaps suddenly, achievement and recognition have awakened in him a new and intoxicating sense of power. As before his imagination exaggerated difficulties to be overcome, so now his judgment underestimates the obstacles with which he has yet to contend. The day will come when he will find himself responsible for the performance of obligations that will tax all his strength, call for the perfect play of his intellectual powers, and demand the utmost steadfastness of an unfaltering purpose. Only when he has come safely through this ordeal, and has been tried as by fire, will he know himself as he is, and the world as it is.

As with the individual man so with the nation; so with mankind.

Nations that have slowly grown through centuries of poverty and relative obscurity have suddenly found





FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, A.B., Ph.D., LL.D.  
Professor of Sociology and History of Civilization, Columbia University



themselves important in the world's affairs. Face to face with obligations, in arrogance and overweening confidence they have rushed upon destruction, or, measuring themselves truly and organizing their resources effectively, they have written imperishable lines upon the scroll of history.

In the nineteenth century the whole world of Western civilization awoke to the realization of achievement and to a consciousness of power for which no parallel, or precedent, or dream, had prepared the human mind or the moral forces of character. Through experimental science a new mastery over physical nature had been attained. Material wealth, and the enjoyments which it yields, so grew and multiplied that even trained economists began to speak lightly, as of discredited dogmas, of the laws of diminishing return and population increase.

It was obvious that this new power of man, over the conditions of material life, was the power of intellect. Intellect not only explored and discovered; it organized, directed and applied. To the possibilities of recombination no limit could be assigned. Man could recreate his world. Knowledge no less than comfort could be diffused. The ancient evils of ignorance and of poverty could be banished together.

With abundance possible for all, and enlightenment assured as a universal condition, the strong need no longer remorselessly crowd the weak to the wall in the struggle for existence. The brotherhood of man might supersede warring states. We looked upon the vision of a limitless moral progress.

Unhappily, in making this forecast, we unconsciously built upon an unwarranted assumption, and we forgot one of the most indubitable generalizations from the experience of the race. We assumed a matter-of-course relationship between reason and reasonableness, and we forgot that, although knowledge comes, wisdom lingers.

The assumption has been shattered. The civilized world has not lost its faith that moral progress is possible but it will not again base its hopes upon the untested belief that mankind necessarily becomes better if it becomes richer and more comfortable. It will not again so appallingly underestimate the forces of evil that have yet to be encountered and overcome. Like the strong and forward-looking individual who has suffered defeat but not destruction, it will now resurvey its task, take more careful stock of its energies and its resources, and go forward in the full realization of the magnitude of the work in hand.

This prediction we are able to make because the evidence abounds that our now disillusioned world is not a discouraged world. He is a poor observer who sees in the European War only the most appalling waste of life and treasure that history records. He is not a less poor observer who sees in it only waste made worse by disillusion. It has been, and is, the most tremendous stimulus to self-examination, to resolution, and to determined effort that has ever provoked the moral energies and the intelligence of man to fresh exertion.

The self-examination will be thorough. It was the remorseless Nietzsche who proposed the revaluation of all values. The reappraisal has begun, and already we know that the resulting scale of values will not be what Nietzsche anticipated, and what his disciples, the philosophers of frightfulness, have striven to establish. In the new appraisal the rightfulness of means will rank at least with the desirability of ends. Of all criteria that have from time to time been suggested to discriminate civilization from barbarism, recognition of the moral quality of the means employed to attain desired ends is the most certain. And of all the measures that have been used to determine the extent of moral progress in distinction from material advancement, none is so precise as the amount of behavior which punctiliously re-

gards the procedure by which individuals and governments attempt to attain their purposes. The masses of men have been slow to perceive these truths, always clear to the few. The war has flashed them on a screen upon which the eyes of the world are riveted. The maxim that the end justifies the means, and the philosophy that might makes right, are revealed in all their moral nakedness as the ethics of barbarism.

Monstrous beyond all other discredited ways of attaining ends desired, is aggressive war. To check the resort of nations to this means of aggrandizement, and to work tirelessly to make it ultimately impossible will, from this day forth, be the most serious task, not only of the ethically-minded few, but of millions of common-sensible citizens in every land, brought now to realize that no end consonant with progressive civilization can justify original resort to the devastating and morally disintegrating procedures of savagery.

With the reappraisal of values in their abstract quality as right and wrong, we are reappraising them also as expressions of concrete fact, of practical realities, of working energies. We have arrived at a truer estimate of the tremendous power that inheres in the surviving passions, the traditional prejudices, and the actual convictions of the masses of living men in this democratic age. The peace of the world cannot be established by conventions alone. Statutes and treaties are powerless against lawless might or the avalanche of wrath. If peace is to prevail, peace must abide in the minds and the hearts of men. It must be a mastering desire. We know that this desire has awakened in the multitude. To strengthen it, and to organize it, is the imperatively important work that calls for all the educational resources and the untiring effort of those to whom has been imparted the power to inspire and to direct. Desire must be fortified by thought. The power of reason which has given man command over

material resources, must be directed upon the mighty task of making man himself reasonable. It is not an impossible task. The multitude to-day is beginning to think, and thought will react upon behavior.

One further reappraisal there will be; it has already begun. We shall revalue the means by which we seek to attain ends not only according to their quality as right or wrong, but also according to their effectiveness. In this reappraisal we shall reestimate the dreamer and his dream. Conscious progress begins in dreams. Not until we have seen the vision of better things do we plan and work to make the vision real. But dreams do not come true through dreaming. We live in a universe of material things and forces, and our ideas, our aspirations are effective only as they organize physical energies and set them at work upon the task to be done. We have dreamed of world peace, but we shall not get it by dreaming. We shall get it only by organizing and bringing to bear upon the interests and the forces that make for war, an adequate physical force, backed by adequate material resources.

Herbert Spencer in his autobiography tells us that his great-grandmother Spencer used to admonish her grandson, Herbert's father, to impress upon her granddaughter-in-law, Catharine, the imperative necessity of looking ahead and making provision for the future. Always her parting words to him were: "Tell Kitty to forecast." Forecasting has not been a habit of collective mankind—least of all of democracies. But collective forecasting has now become imperative. In the movement for preparedness in this nation we see the possibility that this prudential virtue may be strengthened. But if war is to cease, there must be forecasting in a larger way than would suffice to prepare one nation only for defense. There must be agreeing action by many nations collectively strong enough to restrain any power that would break the





A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, A.B., LL.B., LL.D., Ph.D.  
President of Harvard University. Chairman of the Executive  
Committee, League to Enforce Peace



peace—as the single state is strong enough to restrain the criminal individual, or the forces of local insurrection. The strength of the restraining group must be more than moral: it must be the strength of physical force. A league to pass resolutions, and to offer advice, will not avail: it must be a league to enforce peace. The preamble and the platform which the League to Enforce Peace, here assembled and represented, has adopted, state the simple, obvious conclusions of experience. In one way only has the area of peace been widened as the centuries have passed. The law-breaker and the war-maker have been restrained by authority armed and employing force. History offers us no suggestion of any other possibility. In a federation of nations desiring peace, and adequately organized to prevent war, rests our hope of the further material and moral progress of mankind.

DR. A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, A.B., LL.B., LL.D., Ph.D., president of Harvard University, chairman of the Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace, spoke as follows:

A PLATFORM UPON WHICH THE WHOLE WORLD CAN  
STAND

The program of the League to Enforce Peace is essentially contained in its title, and indeed the only immediate change made by the meeting at Philadelphia in the preliminary plan that had been proposed, was a change in the title, by inserting the word “enforce.” This change was important because it drew attention to the true significance of the plan; because it alienated those who were really opposed to the principles advocated by the League; and because it attracted many men who saw that these principles were no mere nebulous abstraction, but something con-

crete which it might not be impossible for the nations of the world to approve, adopt, and put into operation. I shall, therefore, dwell not on the program, for it has been discussed fully during the last two days, but on the title of the League.

The title contains three principal words, which can best be taken up in reverse order. The last of these words is Peace, a thing almost all men profess to desire; and after the calamities we have seen casting their dark shadow over Europe during the last two years, it is needless to argue here the value of peace on earth and good will toward men.

The advocates of the League make no claim that it is possible to maintain peace now and forever—to abolish all future wars. Such a condition must for a long time be beyond the skill of man to attain. But they do seek to establish a condition in which no wars shall be undertaken save, such as are, humanly speaking, inevitable; in which a nation shall not resort to war until every other means of averting a conflict has been exhausted—until efforts to obtain justice by judicial methods have failed. Arbitration, or submission to judicial decision, has already been applied, largely to the questions about which governments do not want to go to war, and much has been done thereby to remove the lesser causes of friction, misunderstanding, and ill will among nations. But we believe that it is possible to go farther and agree that no nation shall take up arms against another over any controversy, however much the question may affect its interests or touch its feelings or its honor, until it has brought, or offered to bring, the matter before some international body, charged with the duty of rendering a judgment or suggesting an adjustment.

Nations would hardly be willing to bind themselves to submit to a tribunal all questions and abide by the result. They may not have implicit confidence that

the question will be fairly decided, but they can surely have confidence that it will be fairly heard—that each side will be given a full opportunity to state its case and publish its evidence and its argument; and this every nation ought to be willing to do. Surely governments cannot take the ground that one of their sacred rights is that of going to war without giving any reasons therefor. In the words of the Declaration of Independence, “A decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them.”

In preventing war a public hearing is not less important than a judgment, because it makes for delay before men’s minds are inflamed by war; and thereby gives an opportunity for public opinion in the world to develop, for other nations to intercede, and above all for the people of the countries involved to form and express their views in a way that is wholly impossible after war has once broken out. Governments ought not to be able to drag their people into a terrific struggle, where men must fight and not think, without giving them a chance to consider the cause or the wisdom of the war. No outside country has any right to question the form of government that a nation may prefer; but the world has a right to demand that a people shall not go to war without knowing why and being convinced of the necessity; and yet as the world is organized to-day a government can often refuse to delay, or allow the time for reflection.

The second word in the title of the League to Enforce Peace, is “Enforce,” and the essential idea in the proposal is that these principles shall be enforced. Mr. Root has pointed out that international rights and duties have hitherto been treated like private rights and duties in civil society, as matters affecting only the parties thereto; whereas many international obligations really touch the whole world, and not merely

the nations directly affected, so that their violation, like the corresponding acts of individuals, may be regarded as offenses against a criminal law of which the public at large is the guardian. A breach of the world's peace, like a breach of domestic peace, is an offense against public order which the public ought to have some right to prevent. Nations that go to war break the peace of the world, and the world has at least a right to insist on knowing the reason for the war. It has a right to go farther and demand that peace shall not be broken until an opportunity has been given to ascertain where justice lies; to try mediation and arbitration; and to consider calmly whether or not the matter at issue requires the sacrifice of war.

In saying that the world has a right to insist upon this, we mean that it is justified in compelling nations to go to arbitration and state their case before they take up arms. But in order that the compulsion may be effective, the method of enforcement must be certain, and sufficient for the purpose. In the terrible face of war there is no use in shaking the rattle of an unarmed watchman or in convening councils that talk and will not act. The object is not to consult about the punishment of an offender, but to prepare a deterrent that will prevent the offense. The delinquent who contemplates a breach of the peace, without an offer to state the case before an international tribunal, must know that retribution will be certain, instant, and irresistible. Such a deterrent can be provided only if it is known that the great nations will use forthwith all their powers, moral, economic, and military, to enforce the principle of no war before arbitration. Nothing less will be effective, and such a doom no nation would dare to face.

The remaining word in the title is "League." No single country can enforce a *Pax Romana* on the modern world; to attempt it would be to make itself a Don

Quixote in search of perilous adventures, to suffer defeat and become a laughing stock. It can be undertaken only by a league of nations strong enough and trustworthy enough to overawe any single state or combination of states that might venture to disregard its law of peace and war. Whether such a league can be formed or not, we do not know. The question bristles with difficulties for statesmen and international lawyers, which there is no use in attempting to minimize and which require learning, skill, patience, and good will to solve. But one thing we do know—that such a league is not possible unless our country is willing to join it; nay, more, unless we take a prominent part in its formation.

Washington warned us to avoid entangling alliances with foreign powers, and the advice was good in his day, when we held an isolated position in the world, when wind was the only means of crossing the water, when steam and electricity had not shrunk the earth to its present size. Yet fifteen years after the Farewell Address we were at war with England, and hardly more than ten years later we had announced the bold policy of protecting all the independent states of North and South America from aggression by European Powers. So far as the outside world is concerned, the Monroe Doctrine spread a sort of *Pax Americana* over the two western continents; and we have maintained it for nearly a century, at one time in Mexico in the face of a great and gallant martial nation. To-day we cannot retain the old isolation if we would. We are too populous, too prosperous, too powerful, and the world has become too small, its seas too narrow, its continents too close together. We are faced by the alternatives of standing aloof from the rest of the world if we can, defending ourselves and working out our destiny by the strength of our own arm if we must, a stranger and perchance an Ishmaelite among

the nations; or of taking our part, if we may, in shaping with others the progress of mankind and helping to bring order and peace over the earth as the waters cover the sea.

BENJAMIN IDE WHEELER, A.B., A.M., Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D., L.H.D., President of the University of California, Berkeley, Cal., spoke as follows:

#### ENFORCING THE RECOGNITION OF JUSTICE

If anything can be done to abate the chances of war, it must be done in the general field of the program sketched out for this League. So overwhelming, indeed, is the assent in the marts of opinion, as to stir a distrust that the sketch is a curtain dropped at the line where the troubles begin. In all human affairs we are justified by experience in leveling suspicion against any scheme which offers simplicity and beams upon us with an easy, smiling face. It is also true, however, in all human affairs that to secure coöperation among great masses of humans the first requisite is the provision of a vast and simple sweep of level standing-ground. We must presume that the relative bareness of the scheme before us represents a fair effort to bring together as a basis of organization, the maximum of that in which we can presumably agree and the minimum of that concerning which we are likely to disagree.

Even as it is, our optimism may have led us too far in tempting us to use the word *peace*. The associations which come to us from the hopeless and light-winged use of that word in organization, movements, and orations warn us that what we perhaps meant to say was: *League to Enforce the Recognition of Justice*. It is a delusion and a snare to speak or think of peace as a normal status of human affairs, to which we must seek return.



**BENJAMIN IDE WHEELER**  
A.B., A.M., Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D., L.H.D.  
President of the University of California





It is a delusion to think out our problem in that order—a delusion of the same cast as the old-time argument from “the state of nature.” This argument from the state of nature finds no standing in anthropology nor for that matter in zoölogy. Man is by anthropology and zoölogy a homicidal mammal. He kills and often eats his enemy. The normal status of human affairs involves competition, contention, strife. With that he starts; from that he must seek to advance. Advance comes only by the intrusion of time and wider consideration in the place of impulse and inconsiderate violence. Then the reasonableness begotten of time may strike the balance we call justice. For the recognition of justice we must have the check of time, and for time we must have, so far as we know the mood of human affairs, the check of power. What we need to find is some form of expressible innate power in human society which will induce the recognition of justice.

In seeking such a form of power and the mechanism for its expression we find ourselves engaged in a strange new quest. Rising to face us at every turn stand bristling the barriers of that new nationalism which until to-day we had esteemed as the protecting walls of national liberty and the chief guarantee of human freedom—and namely, as against all arbitrary assignments to alien dominion and government from without. These protecting walls are built out of unity of language, the inheritance of common traditions, the possession of common goods in folklore, poetry, festivals and dance, costume and manners, the memories of great names and deeds, a common attachment to mountain and river, and the romance of places, a high patriotism mingled with prejudice and a vehement chauvinism; and of late years, with accelerating zeal, these walls have been building themselves ever higher through the artificial cultivation by organized effort of national songs and reverence of the flag and through artificial revival of

vanishing tongues, costumes, festivals, traditions coupled with a concurrent antipathy and outrooting zeal toward various forms of foreign usage and production. History as well as poetry have been used to stir the flame upon the altars of national pride.

Lord Bryce discussed this subject in his remarkable address before the University of London on February 22, 1915, and I quote his words: "Men's souls are raised by the recollection of great deeds done by their forefathers. But the study of the past has its dangers when it makes men transfer past claims and past hatreds to the present. . . . The learned men and the literary men, often themselves intoxicated by their own enthusiasm, never put their books to a worse use than when they filled each people with a conceit of its own super-eminent gifts and merits."

The development of this new nationalism is a peculiar product of the nineteenth century having its roots in the American and French Revolutions. The completest type of new nationality is found in the Kingdom of Greece, which bases its right to be in the inheritance of tongue and traditions and glorious memories from the great Greece of antiquity. But on every hand in Europe these nationalities-by-natural-right are forcing their colors through in disregard of the boundaries in the old political map. Poland insists on asserting itself against the triple division. Bohemia persists in the use of its own language for its schools and universities and in the maintenance of every other mark of its own individuality. So the Magyars and the Serbs and the Roumanians and the Bulgars. Norway differentiates itself from Swedes and Danes, even to a shuffling off of the Danish standard of the written language. Italy sets everything at stake in behalf of the *Italia irredenta*. Ireland will not be obliterated.

This new nationalism, shaped in the high sentiments of loyalty and patriotism, has undoubtedly brought with





**FRANK S. STREETER, LL.D.**  
Member Executive Committee, League to Enforce Peace

it into the world a new and uplifting passion, a new object of sacrifice and service, a new type of the religion of the state. But there is reason to fear, and we may not be blind thereto, that it has also brought with it the possibility of certain grave perils, among which are two: a slackened allegiance to the cause of humanity at large, and a magnified sentiment of national pride, involving wounded honor and satisfaction by the oldtime route of the duel.

In seeking the form of power which shall set check upon war, we must utilize that very spirit of nationalism which through unguarded assertion of national claims has involved us in world peril.

If, in the hysterical haste of those last sad days of July, 1914, when speed begat speed in accelerating ratio, some power could have arisen to set brakes by which speed could have automatically begotten delay, there would have been no war at the time. But the time-factor involved the occasion, not the cause of the war. The cause was the earthquake fault running from Central Europe through the Balkans and on, by the southeasterly trade route on the line of the Bagdad railway, toward the Persian Gulf. It ran in Asia parallel to the Suez route of England and across the face of the Russian advance, and in Europe, it ran through the crust of the Balkans weakened by the recent disruptions of the newly emerging nationalities. Another great fault-line runs somewhere, north and south, through the bed of the Pacific Ocean. And there are others: but it is first and foremost in reference to these two, and in terms of these two, that our immediate effort must be shapen. To undertake the automatic and unerring production of peace—all kinds of peace at all times and everywhere—is an inspiration of folly.

FRANK S. STREETER, LL.D., of Concord, N. H.,  
a member of the original National Provisional

Committee calling the Philadelphia Conference, a member of the Committee on Resolutions at that Conference, and a member of the Executive Committee of the League from its organization, told of a variation on the League to Enforce Peace and its results in his state as follows:

#### THE NEW HAMPSHIRE WAY

I come here to make a report of a modified plan of organization which we found it necessary to adopt in New Hampshire. We have there created an organization which combines in its purposes the two ideas of national defense and the proposals of this League to Enforce Peace. I want to read the objects as stated in our constitution.

“First. To advocate and to aid in bringing about the increase of the naval and military strength of the United States so that this nation may always be prepared and able to repel invasions, to protect its territory, its people, and its national honor.

“Second. To advocate and urge that the United States join a league of nations binding the signatories to the definite proposals adopted at Independence Hall, June 17, 1915, by the League to Enforce Peace.”

And here follows in the constitution the four definite proposals of the League. Friends have asked me to explain why in New Hampshire this plan of organization was adopted. Briefly it was this:

Soon after the Independence Hall proposals, in which many of us participated, but before they had taken root in New Hampshire, there was organized a New Hampshire Defense League, and many of our prominent citizens heartily supported it. Being believers in the purposes of that League, many of us did not hesitate to join it, and at the next meeting of the Executive Com-

mittee of this organization in New York the question was submitted whether the same man at the same time could consistently be an active member of both organizations. The Executive Committee said yes, and this conclusion was published the next morning under the authority of the committee. When we came to organize the branch of this League in New Hampshire it was speedily found that the great majority of our citizens desired not only to lend encouragement to the Independence Hall proposals, but also earnestly believed that it was the duty of this Government without delay to provide for reasonable and adequate national defense. In this situation, and because demanded by the public opinion of my state, we created this new organization to promote both purposes. An effective organization was created, and within the last two weeks there have been enrolled somewhere between seven and eight hundred members, and some of our people are very enthusiastic with reference to the interest that is being aroused.

The reason for forming this New Hampshire organization is because our people desire not only to support the principles of this great movement, looking toward the establishment and preservation of international peace, by force if necessary, but also that this nation should put itself in readiness to defend itself. It is their desire by all honorable means to avoid war, but they shrink from the humiliation of our present helplessness. They are not hunting for trouble, but they do not want to be obliged to run if trouble comes. They emphatically reject the doctrine that a deliberate preparation to protect ourselves if war is forced upon us is essentially a preparation for our forcing war on others. They believe that reasonable and adequate preparation to defend ourselves, by force, is the first requisite to enable this country either to lead other nations or to cooperate efficiently with other nations in defending the peace of the world by force. In an international league

created to preserve the peace of the world, by force if necessary—the supreme object for which this great organization was created—a member nation, the United States for illustration, which is known to be powerless to defend its own territory, its own citizens, and its own national honor, would have very little influence or standing.

Therefore, logically, if the United States hopes to take any leadership or exert any substantial influence as a member of a league of nations to enforce peace, its ability to defend itself by force must be recognized by the other members of such a league. Now, to show where we stand, I will read two brief sentences, or paragraphs, from our address to the patriotic citizens of New Hampshire, recently sent out.

“Every New Hampshire citizen who loves his country, loves peace, abhors war, and believes that the United States should take the proper steps to safeguard its honor, dignity, integrity, and the lives of its citizens by reasonable but adequate preparation, is invited to become a member of this organization.

“Every New Hampshire man who desires to prevent the recurrence of war, and who believes that the United States should join with other civilized nations in an effort to prevent further wars, and to take all possible steps for the enforcement of international peace, ought to enroll himself, and thereby give his individual influence, so far as possible, for the support of this vital and fundamental principle.”

This organization was adopted for New Hampshire, because it was there demanded by public opinion. This plan may not be valuable or useful in any other state. Such a course is not suggested. It was put into effect there because our New Hampshire citizens desire to contribute their influence not only to promote the



establishment of international peace but also to provide for our national defense.

Mr. Streeter's brief speech, followed a little later by a question propounded by Miss Mary Winsor, representing the Woman's Peace Party of Pennsylvania, afforded President Taft an opportunity to clear up any doubts that may have lingered in the minds of any one regarding the policy of the League to Enforce Peace. Mr. Taft said:

"We have attempted in this meeting to lay down with all the emphasis possible the fact that what we are here for is to promote four proposals and no more. We are not here to discuss anything else, and because they have seen fit in New Hampshire to invite others to help finance a movement we have nothing to do with it. We wish to emphasize this fact. It is not the intention of the Executive Committee to go into any issue except those that are involved in the four proposals of the League."

DR. NEHEMIAH BOYNTON, A.B., D.D., pastor of Clinton Avenue Congregational Church, Brooklyn, discussed the ideal of the League to Enforce Peace, saying in part:

#### AN IDEAL WITH LIMITATIONS

We, as idealists, are absolutely frank with the world concerning our purposes and attitudes. We desire no one to come into fellowship with us under any impression which may be by any manner of means ill-conceived. We say very frankly that when the court fails, and conciliation fails, with the very greatest regret but with equally great decision, we will resort

to force, in order to secure those larger rights of peace for the world in which we fundamentally believe.

But while we say that, fairly and squarely, we want people to understand that that is only the incidental part of our propaganda: The essential of it is faith—faith in humanity, faith in the soul of the American people, faith in our purposes and in our ability to carry the ideal for which we stand to a favorable, and one day a successful, conclusion.

We are not ashamed to announce to the world, either, that we limit our ideals. We put a limitation upon our effort in order that we may send our ideal on its certain itinerary through the various highways of travel. We believe that a limited ideal is necessary for the common peace. But while we thus limit our ideal, we have the unlimited vision in the morning hour of this splendid propaganda in the interest, of a world peace. The vision is being caught wonderfully by our men of affairs. There are multitudes of thinking people in our country who have been waiting for just such a cause as this to catch the imagination and to inspire the generosity of hundreds of thousands of people in our country who to-day are sharing such notable financial experiences that except something comes to challenge their spirit of self-sacrifice it will be with increasing difficulty that they retain the larger proofs of their manhood.

This thing is going to be pushed with wisdom, with character, with money, with brains, with sacrifice, with the larger patriotism, until the international idea which it represents shall become so generally accepted that the day may dawn not too far distant, please God, when the horrors of war shall be things of the past, and the widening opportunities of peace shall be the provision for the sons and daughters of men.

## APPENDIX A

### PROPOSALS

WE BELIEVE it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

*The following interpretation of Article Three has been authorized by the Executive Committee:*

“The signatory powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their number that

refuses to submit any question which arises to an international judicial tribunal or council of conciliation before issuing an ultimatum or threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory."

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One.

## APPENDIX B

### OFFICERS AND ORGANIZATION

President

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

Vice-President

ALTON B. PARKER

Honorary Vice-Presidents

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