

The ENGLISH *of* MILITARY
COMMUNICATIONS

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The ENGLISH *of* MILITARY
COMMUNICATIONS

By ✓

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FOREWORD

It is important in military matters that a writer shall express definitely the ideas he intends to convey and in such phraseology that there can be no misunderstanding of the language used. Carelessly or improperly phrased instructions have caused many miscarriages of military plans. The attainment of perfection in the use of language is a matter of painstaking study and the gradual refinement of practice. Merely dreaming of what one will do when responsibility is thrust upon him is not the way to prepare for successful achievement. It is the duty of every self respecting officer to be ready to do not only his best but to do what is right.

When one has qualified himself to write or dictate orders and instructions properly he has already learned to interpret those he may receive from others. Accuracy of language demands discipline of mind. Under our system of raising war armies much has had to be entrusted to men without either discipline of mind or of character. This makes it necessary for officers not only to be qualified themselves to prepare and to interpret orders, but to teach the art to others.

Carelessly written instructions are like contoured maps with the base data omitted, leaving one in doubt as to whether he is observing a hill or a depression. A recent instance of such carelessness, coming under my observation, may serve to illustrate this: orders were received at my headquarters to call out certain reservists for actual service and direct them to report at Fort Wayne, Indiana. In the execution of the order individual telegrams were dispatched during the night. As orders had been received previously to turn over for the training of such reservists several permanent posts, including Fort Wayne, near De-

troit, Michigan, telegraphic inquiry was made to find out if a mistake had been made. The reply established that the Post of Fort Wayne, Michigan, and not the City of Fort Wayne, Indiana, was intended.

Modern warfare of nations-in-arms is vastly different from the campaigns and open field fighting of the smaller armies of past wars. Nations no longer entrust the preparation and solution of their military problems to old type of practical soldiers. Military Academies, War Colleges, and General Staff Colleges have become necessary to insure that only trained men shall be entrusted with the preparation of instructions for the employment of the forces.

To combine the study of tactical problems, the preparation of orders and the correct use of language, as contemplated by Major Ganoe, will afford a great advantage to the student of today, and should make the diaries, journals, and war histories of the future finished writings without necessity for editing. These are the true sources of military history, a knowledge of which is essential to the ambitious officer desirous of perfecting himself in his profession.

(signed) WILLIAM HARDING CARTER,
Major General, United States Army.

PREFACE

This course of lessons has for its sole object a demonstration to the military man that rhetoric is a big part of his profession. If he sees this advantage early it is hoped that he will not slight his rich language as so many of us have done to our later regret. Vocational training in English! That is practically what this book is. It is recognizing rhetoric for the first time as a separate study in the field service regulations. Just as we take up topography, engineering, sanitation, and supply as sciences by themselves in order to fit our efficiency into the team work of battle later, so here we apply ourselves to that part of field work which helps us state our ideas in a proper military manner.

The course is in no way tactics, but it forms an excellent primer to tactics. It leads up to and aids in the solution of tactical problems by passing over military ground. Because it is a combination of analysis and synthesis, rhetoric, as we know, is, unlike the exact sciences, purely a secondary subject. Its material, whether of poetry, essay, or fiction, is indiscriminate in its selection of matter so long as the matter is good. The idea in this book is to make both the material and the treatment count—to place the emphasis upon the manner of expressing oneself and to let the student see incidentally the interesting military features as he is passing along. He will be learning what he has never before had the opportunity of taking up separately, and what will lead him more easily into intricate tactical paths afterwards.

Some will criticise the book in that the author is not conforming to the principles which he is enunciating. They will say, "He tells us to boil our communications to the clearest minimum while he himself deals in reiteration and

illumination." Although this objection appears just, it is nevertheless cursory. A closer view will reveal the fact that the *purpose* and *readers* of communications are quite different from the *purpose* and *readers* of a text book. One of the first principles we learn in rhetoric is to suit our treatment and diction to our *purpose* and *readers*. Commanders await with interest and expectancy the words of a field message or order. Students await with skepticism or inertia the chapters of their lessons. Although we rightly can prescribe the severest clearness for something which is bound to be absorbed, we cannot be satisfied with one precise, colorless statement of that which is likely to be ignored. The student must be cudgeled and enticed. As a proof of the correctness of this position, this course has been tried with unexpected success upon the Cadets of the United States Military Academy. The very items which have been repeated and highly colored have proven themselves to the instructors to be the very ones which have more easily driven the points home.

Grateful acknowledgment is made by the author to Lieut. Colonel L. H. Holt, Professor of English and History, who made the book possible; to Captain G. Hoisington, Infantry, for drawing a plate; to Captains J. R. N. Weaver, Infantry, R. H. Lee, Coast Artillery Corps, L. E. Moreton, Coast Artillery Corps, C. C. Benson, Cavalry, and J. H. Grant, 24th Infantry, for their valuable criticism; and to Major A. W. Chilton, Infantry, for the revision of the book in order to make it conform to the practical work passed over—by his disinterested correction the whole becomes more valuable as a text.

W. A. G.

CHAPTER I

OUR APPROACH TO A CRITICAL MATTER

All military language should be of the utmost brevity and clarity. Death and disaster are the direct results of ambiguity. Throughout all history mistaken directions and information have been the ruin of whole campaigns. Careless wording, like careless shooting, is not only ineffective but often suicidal.

The object of these few lessons is to give practice in putting the language of military communication into form. It is hoped that by means of certain technical and rhetorical principles the student may gain proficiency in expressing his thoughts as he intends them and as military efficiency demands them.

Our Field Service Regulations state that "clear and decisive orders are the logical result of definite and sure decisions." But this statement does *not* imply that if a person arrives at a definite and sure decision, he gains clear and decisive phraseology without effort on his part. General Wagner, a pioneer among American military authorities, divides into completely separate operations the act of deciding upon a definite plan of action and that of drafting or framing orders which will carry that decision into effect. One is purely military and has to do with dispositions of forces; the other is mainly rhetorical and has to do with manipulations of language. Many a military man has decided certainly in his own mind what he is going to do in order to carry out his mission, only to be faced immediately with a harder task. He must set that definite

idea in the mind of some one else. "How," he sighs, "shall I put this so as to let my Captains, Smith and Jones, know exactly what I want?" He seats himself on a warm rock under the blazing sun and chews his pencil. What he at first writes down, he finds, is full of loop-holes and is not expressive of what he means. He tries again, crosses out words here and there, adds others, and changes his sentences until the whole is undecipherable. In disgust he tears up the paper and tries again. After fifteen minutes of such effort he holds in his hand a few paragraphs of which he is not proud, but which will have to do. There has been no want, perhaps, of clear tactical reasoning on his part, but rather a distinct lack of ability to drive common English home. His case, we find, is not exceptional. One has only to listen to the discussions of military beginners (or of some, alas, who are not military beginners) to hear this statement confirmed. How often after having given careful or even brilliant estimates of a situation will a man burst out with, "I know what I mean right here, but don't quite know how to say it!" All the way along there has been a decided blank space between decision in the mind and embodiment in language.

Whether slang, profanity, or colloquialisms have cut into our ordinary speech to such an extent as to keep us at a loss for the apt word, or whether we have grown careless or slovenly in our habits of expression, is a matter with which we are not concerned here. We do know that we are continually hampered by our inability to state absolutely our meaning. This lack of skill in composition which besets us, we must overcome in our profession, for the sake of the lives dependent upon our words. Napoleon sitting at his desk scribbling off orders and messages as fast as his nimble fingers can travel, his secretaries standing about him grasping each finished piece from under his pen and

sending it off immediately by courier without revision or correction, is a dazzling picture for the military leader to contemplate. In his writing, a commander capable of carrying out single-handed all the phases and minor items of the mightiest of campaigns could, no doubt, be precise and accurate habitually. He *was* a genius. Yet Napoleon had had long years of practice in putting his will into words; for, we are told, he began to compose orders and to think tactically and strategically at a time of life when most of us have not even chosen our careers. If, then, we can try our hand at transcribing our ideas in as formative a period as possible in our military careers, we, too, may attain a proficiency that will become a second nature with us. At least, we may put behind us a great part of this uninteresting but indispensable work of learning to control our language, before we confront the more serious task of straightening out tactical and strategical difficulties in the presence of the enemy.

Incidentally, while we are on our way in our progress in expression, we may pick up much valuable military information. In our practice with tactical language we must make use of certain facts which have been found by experience appropriate to certain happenings connected with officers' and soldiers' duties. We shall be in constant touch with the workings of patrols, advance guards, outposts, and forces in battle. Like so many reporters we shall be present at maneuvers putting our notes into graphic and specific form.

Now, however, we are going to rivet our attention to the main issue—the mastery of clear and brief military communication. It has been mentioned that such ready skill often prevents loss of battles and human life. It prevents another loss which we have not taken up separately—the loss of time. The officer who sat chewing his

pencil on the warm rock threw away from ten to twelve minutes which might have been used profitably upon the accomplishment of his mission—an amount of time which might have given the very advantage needed to gain a complete victory over the enemy. If he had had a skilful working knowledge of his own Mother Tongue, the delay would not have occurred. His effectiveness was lost for want of power of expression. To illustrate further, consider for a moment an army post going about its routine duties of drill, guard, and police. Into the Adjutant's office walks an individual who announces himself to be Major Smart of the Inspector General's Department. On being introduced to the Colonel, he identifies himself, and gives immediate orders that the Colonel shall have his regiment on the parade ground ready for field service in fifteen minutes. When the troops are formed, the Inspector rides up to the Colonel, hands him a type-written tactical problem, and asks for a solution of it as soon as possible. The Inspector then takes out his watch and observes. If the Colonel consumes more than a reasonable number of minutes in writing his orders, or if he shows a hesitancy in so doing, or if he must seek aid from his Adjutant, it is surprising to note how soon after Major Smart's departure from the post, the Colonel receives a letter from Washington apprising him of his shortcomings, and recommending, for his own good, a speedy remedy. Because of the inroads upon efficiency, the War Department, like any good business firm, cannot brook vacillation or unwarranted loss of time.

We must, then, adopt some method or procedure by which we will effectually beat down the causes of this loss of time, battles, and life. After analysing past proficiencies and deficiencies in military communication, we spy out from all the roads to the goal open to us, two which

appear to be shorter than the rest. If we guide ourselves along these we shall come upon our object in the quickest way. Since the first leads into the second, they are given here in order. We should strive: (1) To learn to find quickly expressions which will cover information and decisions that are trying to struggle into language; and (2) To plant that information and decision into the recipient's understanding exactly as it was rooted in our minds.

The first process is that of defining thoughts exactly and briefly.

The second process is that of making those thoughts so unmistakable that the most stupid cannot misunderstand and the most captious cannot misinterpret.

After we have done the first, we should look over our work and be certain that we have done the second.

The first has to do with the kind of situation that faced the man who knew what he "wanted to say but couldn't express himself." Some authorities argue that there is no difference between clear thinking and clear expression. They give no place to the "mute inglorious Milton." They would not concede that the man groping for language had formed a definite plan in his mind, because that plan was not definite enough to be expressed. "If he has not thought in language," they say, "he has not really thought." Their opponents claim that a man thinks in pictures, and that he conceives his ideas as a painter imagines objects. In his mind are the outlines and colors of what he considers. There is truth in both views of the matter. But it is likely from what we know of the training of the military man that his mind works more by visualizing the troops and by conjuring up the scene than by gaining his conceptions through words. His forces are moving along roads, occupying trenches, or surging into conflict. His map is not a plane surface with names upon it, but a

vision of highways, waving corps, and rolling hills. He is looking at these things without mentally describing them. For the purpose of this course, we shall take the view that there are occasions where we deduce certain results, but are unable, because of unfamiliarity with framing good sentences or because of a small vocabulary, to communicate those results or deductions in accordance with common usage.

The second road can be illustrated by comparison with the first. There is a wide difference, although at first there does not appear to be, between merely stating a thing clearly and making it unmistakable. The first is but a negative approach to complete certainty of expression, but the second must be a positive one. The distinction is one more or less of attitude of mind, and although heretofore it has been overlooked as an entity in English text books and military regulations, it assuredly illustrates itself in two types of men who actually exist. The man who is content with merely making himself clear takes the attitude of, "O, well, they will get what I meant because any other interpretation is absurd or incorrect." The man who is not content unless he makes himself unmistakable says, "I won't let any of them have the slightest excuse for any other interpretation; when I get through there will be but *one* interpretation and that will be *mine*." The first one in sending a message to his commanding officer locates himself by putting in his heading, "Irrigation ditch 500 yards east of southeast corner of Catholic Church." He notices another irrigation ditch fifty yards further to the east, but says to himself, "If my commanding officer measures the distance on the map he will know which one I mean." The second man, upon looking about him and discovering the other ditch, does not accept the

chance of letting his commanding officer confuse the two ditches by a possible difference of maps or measuring instruments. He investigates further. By moving a few yards to the top of a hillock he notices that the farther ditch is entirely a dirt construction whereas the one he occupies is a concrete one. He confirms this intelligence by looking at his map which shows the ditches to be as he has made them out. He, therefore, heads his message, "Concrete irrigation ditch 500 yards east of southeast corner of Catholic Church." This is a case where an added word has made the meaning more proof against error. There are similar cases where a word taken away, or the change of a phrase, clause, or sentence, will make the recipient of the communication more sure of the true state of affairs.

To sum up as far as we have gone, we see that our object is to put military communication into proper form; that the failure to make our expression of the utmost brevity and clarity causes loss of efficiency, battles, and life; that a condition of inability to express ourselves exists widely; that by starting as early as we can to practice clear and brief form within the bounds of rhetorical and military rules (which, after all, are nothing more than those of common sense), we shall overcome this deficiency; and that for ourselves we are going to direct our course along two highways, viz.:

(1) To learn to find quickly expressions which will cover information and decisions that are trying to struggle into language; and

(2) To plant that information or decision in the recipient's understanding exactly as it was rooted in our minds.

We have, so far, rehearsed the general attitude we must adopt toward conquering indefinite and lengthy expres-

sion. Because this weakness is so natural to us, we cannot afford to trifle with it if we wish to become a factor in battle. Positive decisions and information must be given in a positive way. Since no other kind of decision or information is countenanced in the military service, we must search for specific means of having our language stand sturdily by itself.

It must not choke our idea or our will, however little. Our decisiveness must reach our farthest superior or subordinate; and *words, phrases, clauses, sentences, and paragraphs* are going to be our only representatives. They alone will stand for us. Every pencil mark on that paper will be a part of the photograph of our intelligence. Our phraseology will be ourselves. We shall be judged by it, and rightly so, at a time when we shall have no chance to offer an amendment, an excuse, or an *I-didn't-mean-quite-that*.

Guide-posts must mark our highways, if we are in earnest about our destination of brevity and clarity. In the specific hints which follow as to what to do and what not to do, there will be no attempt to point the way to literary effects which have entertainment for their sole object. Our effort must be to find a practical and speedy outlet for military information and decision through the most unmistakable channels. But since we must be terse and clear even to entertain, most of the rules of English will apply here. So we must not betray surprise or anguish when we are beset on our way by some old enemies with whom we have wrestled in rhetorics. In meeting them again we shall become the stronger because of the exercise on new and professional ground. The effort to put facts into forceful and compact form now, will create for us such a habit of brevity and clarity that later on we shall have room in our natural language for only such *ideas* and *decisions* as are brief and clear.

WHAT WE MUST NOT DO

AS TO WORDS.

1. Never use a term which depends upon the point of view of the observer, such as *right*, *left*, *in front of*, *behind*, *on this side*, *beyond*, and the like. Any of these directions may be turned askew in nine cases out of ten for the hearer or reader. Use instead *north*, *east*, etc.—the points of the compass—designations which do not change. To give an exact position of a place, state the *number of yards* it lies *south*, *west*, etc., of a certain point on the map or of a well-known object called a *reference point*.

Exceptions.—*Right* and *left* may be used in regard to individuals, banks of a stream, and flanks of troops, because their *rights* and *lefts* do not change. The right of a man is the side on which his right arm is no matter which way he faces; the right bank of a stream is the right as the observer faces down stream; the right flank of a body of troops is the right as the troops face the enemy. (Troops in retreat are supposed to be facing the enemy. The rearguard in reality is doing so.)

2. Do not use qualifying words such as, *sort of*, *kind of*, *very*, *almost*, *quite*, *exceedingly*, *tremendously*, *somewhat*, *rather*, *nearly*, and the like;

For,

(a). They lessen force, because they render uncertain ideas which should be definite; and

(b). They mean different things to different people. Smith's *almost* may achieve; Jones' *almost* may scarcely start.

3. Do not use slang. There is usually a word which will express the meaning more truthfully. "Putting it over" may mean complete victory or a sniper's accurate shot. The phrase is not truthful.

4. Use no abbreviations except A. M., and P. M., and those given in Appendix 9 of our Field Service Regulations.* Noon and midnight should be written out fully.

5. Never use *he, it, this, him, her, their, them, that, those, which, whose*, or the like, without looking at them from every angle to make sure that they refer to a *single word*. If they refer to a whole statement or to two or more possible words, they are used wrongly. The addition of a noun will usually fix the meaning. Suppose you were to receive a message with this sentence in it:

The platoon leader assigned to one squad the wrong objective, and it delayed the firing.

Grammatically, the objective delayed the firing. Logically, either the act of the platoon leader or the squad delayed the firing. You make out by re-reading the whole message that it must have been the mistake of the platoon leader which delayed the firing. But in the meantime you have lost three minutes, and the government has lost that much efficiency.

And this or *which* in place of "*and it*" in the message would have made the sense no clearer. But *and this error*, or *which error*, makes the meaning unmistakable.

6. Never use a participle without inspecting it to see that it does not dangle—that it refers to the subject of the sentence rightly. Example:

"Looking over the crater, the periscope of the enemy was seen to turn."

What this sentence really says is that the periscope was looking over the crater—a very possible happening. But all circumstances connected with the idea, after a series of mental deductions on the part of the reader, reveal that the writer had been looking over the crater at the periscope. The commander who received this information

* See Appendix.

might have been led to believe that the periscope was situated in the crater. At least he was delayed, if not misled.

7. Do not use *and* except where necessary. Usually, when we connect clauses with it, we do not mean *and*, but some more expressive word such as *because*, *whereas*, *when*, etc.

8. Do not use any word which might not mean the same thing to any probable recipients, or might not commonly be understood. For instance, to a southerner *evening* means something different from its significance to a northerner, and to an Englishman *clever* has not the American meaning. Watch the words which have local standards.

AS TO PHRASES AND CLAUSES.

1. Do not allow a phrase or a clause to string out your expression when one word might answer. Boil your communication to the clearest minimum.

(a). We went back to headquarters with all possible speed. We hurried to headquarters.

Here the specific verb *hurried* does away with your phrase *with all possible speed*.

(b). When we were present in the cantonment, the soldiers looked as though they were quite hungry.

Our inspection of the cantonment revealed the soldiers to be hungry.

Here *our inspection* does away with the clause *when we were present*; and *to be hungry* does away with *as though they were quite hungry*.

This error of spreading words is common to ordinary writers and is most tiring and time-wasting to readers.

2. Do not omit words from your phrases and clauses where there is a chance for misunderstanding. Examples:

The detachment commander will be with the main body until 7 a. m. and thereafter the advance guard.

What is really stated is that the advance guard will be with the main body after 7 a. m.—an unintended statement. Make your grammar accord absolutely with your meaning. Add the *with* which belongs before *the advance*, and notice how the sense is brought out. Again,

They order us to go to Brownsville and do impossible things.

In this sentence do they order us to do impossible things, or do they themselves do impossible things?

Add the sign of the infinitive where it belongs before *do*. *And to do impossible things* reads unmistakably.

3. Do not use a participial phrase without first inspecting it to see that it holds but one idea.

Having changed our position, the enemy was confused.

What this sentence really says is that the enemy, when he had changed our position, was confused. This meaning is evidently not intended from the very nature of the statement.

It is clearer and more accurate to use a finite form of the verb instead of the participle; as,—

Because we changed our position we confused the enemy.

Or if you can condense with accuracy,

The change in our position confused the enemy.

AS TO SENTENCES.

1. Avoid long involved sentences. Even if they are grammatically well constructed, they are liable to rhetorical error. The following sentence because of its length violates unity:

“The organization of the German army is today well known to American Army officers, and experience has shown that German problems and solutions of a complex character changed in translation to conform to American units are often more troublesome for the student to understand than the original would be, as, on account of the difference in the size of the units, it is often necessary in reading such a translation to go back to the German organization in order to explain a distribution of troops, which, though simple

for a German division, would be an awkward one for a division organized after our own Field Service Regulations."

The first thought given to the reader is that "the organization of the German army is today well known to American Army officers." The last thought of the sentence is that the "explanation of a distribution of troops would be an awkward one for a division organized after our own Field Service Regulations." The path from the first thought to the second is long and winding. In fact the two do not belong in the same sentence as the sense stands.

With a simple change we can make the whole easier to read:

The organization of the German army is today well known to American Army officers. Their experience has shown that German problems and solutions of a complex character changed in translation to conform to American units are often more troublesome for the student to understand than the original would be. On account of the difference in the size of the units, it is often necessary in reading such a translation to go back to the German organization in order to explain a distribution of troops, which, though simple for a German division, would be an awkward one for a division organized after our own Field Service Regulations.

The reader has been allowed to take in a thought at a time instead of three thoughts at once.

In spite of the injunction in our Field Service Regulations that "short sentences are easily understood," such long and involved expressions as the above have abounded among military writers. In war, this continuous motion in a single sentence has marred undertakings; in peace, it has robbed efficiency. It has been an incubus upon general orders, and even communications in the field.

CAUTION.—By short sentences we do not mean choppy sentences—sentences unnecessarily short as,—

The battalion halted for the night. It ate supper. Then the battalion relieved the outpost.

Here the reader has been stopped when he should have been kept going, for there is in reality but one thought in

the three separate sentences. They should be combined into some such form as this,—

After the battalion had halted for the night and had eaten supper, it relieved the outpost.

The proper relation of ideas is here expressed for the reader. He knows that the relief of the outpost is the main consideration, depending in point of time upon the halt and supper. And the whole thought is not too big for him to take in as he reads.

The first error, illustrated by the sentence concerning German organization, is a fault common to older writers. They have allowed themselves to grow into the habit of adding qualifying phrases and clauses to sentences already completed until their additions come to swamp the originals. The second error, illustrated by the sentence concerning the battalion relieving the outpost, is a fault common to young writers. They have not yet formed the habit of relating in their own minds the separate ideas of a complete thought.

The happy mean between these two indefinite extremes is the one we wish to find—the sentence that gives speedy and accurate intelligence.

2. Do not use compound sentences containing *and*, save where they cannot be avoided. Here is a common piece of slovenliness found in such a construction.—

The wagon trains pulled out and the troops ate breakfast.

Any one of the following is more definite.

After the wagon trains pulled out the troops ate breakfast.

The wagon trains pulled out before the troops ate breakfast.

As the wagon trains pulled out the troops ate breakfast.

The writer in the first instance was too lazy or stupid to think out the specific meaning of *and* for the reader.

Remember, also, that the use of *and* to connect clauses leads us into the treacherous “run-on sentences”—the sentence that flits from subject to subject like an old gossip.

"They fell into the trap and so the commanding officer's orders were lost and they remained there twenty days and were finally removed to a prison camp and there winter soon came on and finally they were released and went home in the spring."

The sentence, in addition to having too many ideas in it, has them unrelated.

WHAT WE MUST DO

AS TO WORDS.

1. Every geographical name must be printed in capitals, thus,—

WEST POINT, MARNE RIVER, PARIS.

This rule does not mean that the names must be printed, merely, but that every letter must be capitalized legibly.

If the place be not pronounced as it is spelled, it should appear thus,—**XENIA** (Zě'-nĭ-à), **POUGHKEEPSIE** (Pô-kĭp'-sĭ), **CHIHUAHUA** (Chĕ-wă'-wă).

A road must be designated by enough points to make it unmistakable along the entire course considered; thus:—

BIGLERVILLE—582—CENTER MILLS. (See map, A-8 and 7.) The 582 inserted in this case keeps the course from being confused with the turn-off toward **GUERNSEY**. If the course were intended to lie through **GUERNSEY**, the road would appear thus,—

BIGLERVILLE—GUERNSEY—CENTER MILLS.

2. Use the words of one syllable preferably. You will find that the longer words come to you more readily but are usually more hazy in meaning. You will gain vigor and clearness by the cultivation of Anglo-Saxon.

3. Do not connect two sentences by a comma; for example:—

The phrase does not imply motion, thus it would mean nothing to say that the battery is advancing on the line **Twins-Concrete Ford**.

The error here is not so much one of punctuation as of sentence idea. Somehow, the thought does not run smoothly. We find that two separate thoughts without much relationship have been compressed into a single sentence—into something which should be a complete whole, and go from capital to period without break. Oftentimes, by showing this relationship, we may bring the idea within bounds of a single sentence; for example:—

Since the phrase does not imply motion, it would mean nothing to say that the battery is advancing on the line, etc.

4. Watch the position of your adverbs. When you mean,—

We captured almost all the ammunition,

Do not say,—

We almost captured all the ammunition.

The first means that we captured at least a part of the ammunition; the second means that we were close to success, but failed to capture ammunition.

5. Use the words *head* and *tail* when speaking of a column of troops. The head is the leading element and the tail is the other end, no matter in which direction the column happens to be facing.

6. In the newspaper or book that you are reading, every time you meet a new word make it yours. Look up the meaning in the dictionary until you are sure that you know how to use the word.

At the first opportunity, employ it in your conversation or writing. Sooner or later “dope” and the eternal “damn” will have ceased to fill in endless crevices in your talk and their places will have been taken by incisive words. You will awake to find that you are expressing yourself more easily and plainly. On the other hand, every word you pass over or for which you merely consult the dictionary, is a tool cast aside in your building of an officer.

Every bit of slang or profanity which now crowds out the appropriate word will later rise up and clog your thought at a time when you are making your utmost endeavor to put into clear, forceful English your plan of action or your order.

AS TO PHRASES AND CLAUSES.

Remember to place phrases and clauses nearest the words they modify.

Captain George will divide the tools equally among the battalions *which are fit for felling timber.*

The change of the italicized clause to its proper position next the word *tools*, gives the intended meaning.

AS TO SENTENCES.

1. Use the short complex sentence; such as:—

An attack is expected tomorrow from strong hostile forces whose advanced troops are near FORT MONTGOMERY.

The enemy's infantry disappeared to the south as soon as our advance cavalry came over the hill.

The use of *when, since, because, where, whenever, although, after, till, until, as, so long as, now that, whence, whither, inasmuch as, that, in order that, so that, and lest*, with the finite form of the verb is a good construction to practice.

Notice how compact and explicit is the following:—

Lest the enemy should turn your flank, keep veering to the east.

Try to put this same thought into twelve words by means of a different construction.

2. When you start with one kind of construction, keep it up unless there be some good reason to change it. If you begin with the past tense and third person, have the past tense and third person continue throughout the sentence or sentences.

It is reported that extensive preparations are being made in the vicinity of CAMBRAI and the enemy has stored railroad material there.

It is reported that the enemy has made extensive preparations at Cambrai and has stored railroad material there.

Which sentence reads along with less break?

Again,

It is advisable to advance part of the ammunition columns and that the division should follow at 200 yards.

Better,

It is advisable to advance part of the ammunition columns and to have the division follow at 200 yards.

Now that specific guides have been posted near the grammatical turns of the road, let us look at two general rules covering everything we do.

1. *Write legibly.*—Rain, wear in the pocket, dim and fading lights, and crumpled paper are going to make havoc of your orders and messages in war time. Your commanding officer must be able to make out your script as well as your meaning. Now is the moment to make your handwriting a size or two larger and noticeably plainer.

2. *Inspect the form.* After you have written your ideas legibly, *look at them searchingly to see that they mean only what you intend.*

You cannot be too cold-blooded about this act for two reasons.

In the first place, there is a habit which is strong upon us. We have all been too prone to state a thing haphazardly, and then to exclaim, "You know what I mean!" The person addressed, of course, is not going to acknowledge that he has not the brains to understand; so the jumble is never smoothed out. Thus in nine-tenths of our off-hand moments we have been accustomed to say what we do *not* mean. The habit is so strong that when we find ourselves dealing with matters of life and death, we are still liable to whisper to ourselves, "O, well, he'll get it." The result is that the part of the order, message, or report,

which struck us as having our usual clearness, is a puzzle to the recipient.

In the second place, the impression has grown up in the minds of many that substance, no matter how it is mixed, is all that is necessary. There has come about a certain proud disregard of the *manner* in which a thing is expressed. Too many technical books have failed of their purpose because the writer, although he was an expert in his line, did not know how to present his subject in an attractive form. In the same way explanations have failed upon the drill ground, and lectures have made excellent tacticians appear like school-boys. The very manner of communication has not only spoiled the taste for the subject-matter but has hindered its absorption. His audience has not understood his explanation.

In inspecting your work, take the attitude that the recipient is skeptical of everything you have said.

It is assumed that you wish to fasten in your mind everything in this chapter. The following method is suggested as the best short-cut:

1. Make an outline of the whole chapter, expressing the main idea of each paragraph and sub-paragraph in two or three words.
2. Close your books.
3. With the aid of your outline see whether you can call to your mind everything the paragraph or sub-paragraph means.

CHAPTER II

MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS

The following are the various types of military communication:

FIELD MESSAGES convey verbal or written information by messenger or wire.

REPORTS are written accounts of some enterprise, undertaking, or event, such as a reconnaissance, march, or battle.

WAR DIARIES are daily records of events kept during campaign by each battalion and higher organization. From the entries in these diaries the facts of our military history are obtained.

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION, issued by higher commanders, regulate in a general way movements covering much time and space. Army and Corps commanders may, by visits and conferences, often communicate verbally the substance of letters of instruction.

FIELD ORDERS, issued verbally or in writing by commanders of tactical units, regulate the tactical actions of troops, and such strategical actions as are not covered by letters of instruction.

GENERAL ORDERS are written directions having to do with the general administration of a command. They contain the necessary details for carrying out injunctions from higher authority, for keeping up standing instructions, and for publishing results of special and general courts-martial.

ORDERS (when not used as a general term) refer to the instructions communicated to troops by commanders of

divisions and of separate brigades in regard to combat, field, ammunition, supply, sanitary, and engineer trains.

SPECIAL ORDERS cover such matters in regard to individuals as are not necessary to be communicated to the entire command.

OPERATION ORDERS, as we now use the term in reference to trench warfare, are the orders governing a certain enterprise along a given sector of the front. Although they are even more precise than field orders, they contain more details on account of the wide difference between trench and open warfare.

CIRCULARS are printed from time to time by various bureaus and departments of the War Department, and by purchasing officers, for the publication of data pertaining to the business of a bureau or department.

BULLETINS publish, usually in pamphlet form, information for the military service.

Both *circulars* and *bulletins* have the force of orders.

MEMORANDA are published from time to time by commanding officers to embody directions not vital or sweeping enough for general or special orders. *Memoranda* have the force of orders.

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE consists of official letters, returns, rolls, estimates, requisitions, and certain routine reports.

These types of communication have been defined in order to give a general survey of the many kinds of written and oral expression of which military men should become masters. Although the task appears huge, proficiency can be gained by attention to the hints suggested in Chapter I.

In order to apply those suggestions in a practical way, we must now sort out from all of the above types those which should press themselves most upon our attention.

Certainly all these types cannot be equally necessary for our immediate study. Possibly if we classify them from the point of view of the occasion for their use, we may see more clearly how to treat them.

CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO STRESS

MESSAGE	}	Communicated usually in the presence of the enemy under stress.
FIELD ORDERS		
OPERATION ORDERS		

ORDERS—Written often in the presence of the enemy under stress.

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION—Written under stress, but with more or less leisure.

WAR DIARIES—Written under stress, but at any time, during twenty-four hours.

REPORTS—Written during campaign or peace at comparative leisure.

GENERAL ORDERS	}	Written during campaign or peace concerning subjects of a routine nature.
SPECIAL ORDERS		
CIRCULARS		
BULLETINS		
MEMORANDA		
CORRESPONDENCE		
EXPLANATIONS		
LECTURES		

It is evident that we are going to have to write messages, field orders, and operation orders when the enemy is upon us, and when every second is vital. If we must stop in that crisis and putter over the forms and methods of drafting our thoughts, how useless we shall be! When that time comes, one thing alone should occupy our conscious

thought—our military idea. That will be sufficient to keep busy the most brilliant intellect.

In order that we shall have, then, perfect freedom to grapple with tactical, strategical, or logistical difficulties on the field of battle, let us learn the forms and methods of messages, field orders, and operation orders as soon as possible.

In so doing we shall discover two things,—

(1) That messages, field orders, and operation orders have a bearing upon each other in the sequence given, and

(2) That the work of framing them will give us the greatest possible practice in writing all other types of communication.

THE MESSAGE.—The general term *message* may refer to (1) any informal or short communication, (2) any directions or orders too abbreviated to be known as field orders, or (3) any piece of information transmitted in the presence of the enemy.

Number 1 is too broad for treatment here. Moreover, the ready skill in composing anything of its nature should follow easily from what we are about to practice.

Number 2 is to be considered in connection with field orders.

Number 3, then, is the important one for us to take up now. From its definition it is already familiar to us as

THE FIELD MESSAGE

Since it deals entirely with the communication of information, it might be well to inquire from what sources this information is to be derived, in order that we may know something about the kind of material with which we are going to deal. Just as a stenographer acquaints herself with some of the workings of her employer's business in

order to attain the greatest amount of usefulness, so we should now look over the vast amount of territory which the contents of field messages cover in order to gain the maximum efficiency in composing these communications. Accordingly, we find that higher commanders, adjoining troops, inhabitants of the country, newspapers, letters, telegraph files, prisoners, deserters, spies, maps, and reconnaissances, are all sources of valuable military information. It is from these that we shall obtain our data.

Most of all, however, will the fighting man obtain his from reconnaissance—the work of gathering information in the field. From the moment of entering the theatre of operations to that of abandoning it, there is necessary a constant quest of knowledge of the enemy's composition, morale, material, disposition, and activities. No leader can act intelligently without this information, and, since he can not hope to get it in person, he must depend for its acquisition upon certain reconnaissance units, chief of which is the patrol.

Our concern with these reconnaissance units lies in the fact that the information which they gather must be sent to the commander by messages. If no one in the patrol is capable of sending back accurate and timely written information, the reconnaissance has failed, and the patrol might as well have remained in camp. The good field message is the strong link between the reconnoitering party and the main body. The poor field message is a gap which no amount of courageous effort in ferreting out facts from a wary enemy will bridge. The ideal reconnaissance, then, is one which keeps a constant stream of accurate and reliable messages flowing back to the proper recipient.

The main factors which go to make up accuracy and reliability of field messages are keen observation and faithful expression. Both of these faculties can be cultivated,

and indeed are so closely allied that they ought to be considered together. It is quite difficult at times to tell where one leaves off and the other begins. If a man puts in his message, "The enemy was seen over the hill," and another, witnessing the same occurrence, states that "seven hostile infantry men lay down on the military crest of hill 307 at 4-17 p. m.," which one has keenly observed? Which one has faithfully expressed himself? Is it possible that the first man did not see any of the details of the second message? Or did he fail to put them down faithfully? In whatever way we answer these questions, we are brought to the realization that the second man applied both faculties to an equal extent. And, therefore, we are led to the conclusion that from the standpoint of complete expression we must take things quickly, precisely, and accurately, and put them out certainly, specifically, concretely, unmistakably, and faithfully.

The field message is not used by the reconnaissance unit exclusively. An exchange of communications might be necessary between commanders to tell of changing conditions. The enemy has developed an unexpected attack, reinforcements are urgently needed, etc. This message will differ slightly in form from the ordinary field message which will be analysed below, but it will be of the same essential type, and will make the same demands upon brevity and clearness.

FORMS FOR FIELD MESSAGES

The Infantry Drill Regulations state that "the authorized message book should be used and the form therein adhered to." This book, issued by the Signal Corps, contains fifty message blanks with fifty duplicating sheets, so that fifty messages may be sent and a copy of each retained. The front of the blank appears as on next page.

The back of the blank is divided into squares. By means of a ratio between the size of these squares and certain scales for maps, a fairly accurate sketch is possible.

Caution.

Remember that a message may not always go direct from sender to receiver, but may be relayed by several methods of communications—buzzer, helio, or flag. Think how errors may creep in at each change of method, and guard against them by making your message one of telegraphic brevity and unmistakable clearness.


By means of this sketch, the message may often be shortened, for the sender can refer by letter or number

U. S. ARMY FIELD MESSAGE.	No.	Sent by	Time	Rec'd by	Time	Check
	(These spaces for Signal Operators only.)					
Communicated by Buzzer, Phone, Telegraph, Wireless, Lantern, Helio, Flag, Cyclist, Foot Messenger, Mounted Messenger, Motor Car, Flying Machine. Underscore means used.	(Name of sending detachment.)					
	<i>From</i>					
	(Location of sending detachment)					
	<i>At</i>					
<i>Date</i> <i>Hour</i> <i>No.</i>						
<i>To</i>						
.....						
.....						
.....						
<i>Received</i>						

to various points on the sketch, whereas he would otherwise be compelled to describe positions or to go into detail at length. When he does draw a sketch, he should refer to it somewhere on the bottom of the face of the message thus: (See sketch over) or (See sketch reverse side).

The sketch is not usually duplicated.

The reverse side of the message blank appears thus:



The form of address of the regulation envelope for this message appears below. It is probably best explained by an extract from paragraph 36, Field Service Regulations, which reads as follows: "Messages carried by a messenger are usually enclosed in envelopes properly addressed. The

envelope when not marked 'confidential' is left unsealed, so that commanders along the line of march may read the contents. Upon the envelope is written the name of the messenger, his time of departure, and rate of speed. The last is indicated as follows: Ordinary, rapid, or urgent. Ordinary means five miles an hour for a mounted man; rapid, about 7 or 8 miles an hour; and urgent, the highest speed consistent with certainty of arrival at destination. The recipient notes the time of receipt upon the envelope and returns the latter to bearer."

UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD MESSAGE

To..... No.....

(For signal operator only.)

When sent.....No.....

Rate of speed.....

Name of Messenger

When and by whom rec'd

This Envelope Will Be Returned to Bearer

We should certainly be armed with a Field Message Book when the crucial moment for writing a message arrives. But it so happens, especially in open warfare, that that article of equipment may have been left in the saddlebags, or have been borrowed by a friend. At any rate it is not present for duty when we want it. However, we are always able to produce a piece of paper or clothing—something upon which to write—from someone of the party present. It behooves us, then, to learn to compose a message without the aid of a blank. Indeed, this idea is contained in the latter part of the quotation from the Infantry Drill Regulations—"and the form therein adhered to."

We are not compelled to memorize the form of the Field Message Blank. We can, however, analyse it so that it will fix itself in our memory and will be a part of what we must know in regard to the field order. And we can gain a knowledge of this form rather by adhering to the field message blank than by departing from it. Yet we need not know its entire form but simply what contents are necessary and what order they must have.

In the first place the field message may be divided into three parts:

THE HEADING,

THE BODY,

THE ENDING.

THE HEADING should contain:

THE NAME OF SENDING DETACHMENT,

THE LOCATION OF SENDING DETACHMENT (PLACE),

THE DATE,

THE HOUR OF ISSUE,

THE NUMBER OF THE MESSAGE.

For example, the whole heading would appear something like this:

Combat Patrol, 318th Infantry,

Cross Roads 500 yds. south of CLINTON SCHOOL HOUSE.

No. 3.

9 Jan. 18.

9-45 p. m.

Location of sending detachment means the *exact spot* upon which sender is located at time of writing.

The date should be given always as above in the sequence, day, month, year. This combination prevents the numerals from being confused. In naming a night both days should be mentioned thus: Night 4/5 Feb. 18.

The time should always have the dash between the hour and minutes.

Messages sent on the same day from the same sending detachment are numbered consecutively. Each day or each mission starts a new series.

If a map referred to is not the one on the reverse side of the message, the sender should designate the name or number of the map used, immediately below the number of the message.

THE BODY of the message contains the following:

TO WHOM SENT,
THE BODY PROPER.

THE BODY PROPER has the following sequence for its information:

1. ENEMY.
2. YOUR OWN TROOPS.
3. TERRAIN.
4. YOUR PLAN.

The body then would appear something like this:

“To Commanding Officer, Advance Guard, 71st Brigade:

Squadron of enemy's cavalry encamped in meadow 600 yards southeast of here. Our officer's patrol, which we met at ZION CHURCH at 8-10 a. m., reported two regiments enemy's infantry intrenched at railroad one mile south of here. Tail of our second battalion at PARKSBURG steel bridge 7-20 a. m. Battalion was marching south. MARTIN'S CREEK unfordable at any point between SMITH'S CORNERS and GREENSBURG. Will move southeast from here along creek bed in order to complete mission.”

On account of lack of space, paragraphing is impossible; but if this sequence is followed the thought is easily gained. If some one of our own troops tells us concerning the enemy, this information should come between 1 and 2, and should be definitely shown to be hearsay and not our own observation.

Of course, all of the parts, 1, 2, 3, and 4, do not always occur. The order is nevertheless followed.

THE ENDING consists of

THE SIGNATURE

which, in turn, consists of the sender's surname and his rank, thus,

FLETCHER,
SGT.

The outline of the whole message construction, then, would be as follows:—

THE HEADING	}	1. Name of sending detachment.	
		2. Location of sending detachment (place).	
		3. The Date.	
		4. The Hour of Issue.	
		5. The Number of the Message.	
THE BODY	{	1. To whom sent.	1. Enemy.
		2. The body proper.	2. Your own troops.
			3. Terrain.
			4. Your plan.
THE ENDING—THE SIGNATURE	}	1. Surname.	
		2. Rank.	

The message we have composed, when assembled, would appear as follows:

Combat Patrol, 318th Infantry.

Cross Roads 500 yds. south of CLINTON SCHOOL HOUSE.

No. 3.

9 Jan. 18.

9-45 a. m.

To Commanding Officer Advance Guard, 71st Brigade:

Squadron of enemy's Cavalry encamped in meadow 600 yards southeast of here. Our officer's patrol, which we met at ZION CHURCH at 8-10 a. m., reported two

regiments enemy's infantry intrenched at railroad one mile south of here. Tail of our second battalion at PARKSBURG steel bridge 7-20 a. m. Battalion was marching south. MARTIN'S CREEK unfordable at any point between SMITH'S CORNERS and GREENSBURG. Will move southeast from here along creek bed in order to complete mission.

FLETCHER,
SGT.

(See sketch reverse side.)

Caution.—Remember that “your own troops” means friendly supporting troops and not the troops of which you are in immediate command.

CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE FIELD MESSAGE

“An intrinsically good tactical exercise,” says Griepenkerl,* “loses by *faulty composition* and careless or illegible handwriting. A rambling mode of expression, a long-winded, elaborate style, is unmilitary. Therefore, test your order to see whether you cannot cross out some superfluous word, or whether you cannot think of some shorter and more suitable mode of expression; *grudge every word.*”

But he goes on to say in another place that clearness takes precedence over brevity; “therefore, rather use a long expression where a shorter one might be misunderstood. *Brevity must never lead to superficiality.*”

Griepenkerl was speaking of orders. Yet our Field Service Regulations state that “most of the rules adopted to secure clearness in orders apply equally to messages.”

In the following problems which are designed for practice in framing field messages, we should adhere not only to Griepenkerl’s advice, but also to the hints, forms, and cautions of Chapters I and II. Remember that each time a faulty form or expression is used, some commanding officer is halted or hindered, retarded or confused. The highest premium should be placed upon correct form and expression.

With the selection of material from the purposely misleading and sometimes ill-stated problems below, you may, however, have difficulty. Certainly all of the long narra-

* Letters on Applied Tactics.

tive, often in soldier jargon, cannot be placed in the message. Some facts must be eliminated as unessential. What you should let your commanding officer know can be determined sometimes only by technical experience. However, Major General Morrison's† caution along this line should be repeated here for your help: "We all recognize the fact that, as a rule, the sooner information reaches headquarters, the more valuable it is. But this applies only to information which really has value. If you are in doubt as to whether or not information would be valuable, give headquarters the benefit of the doubt and send it in." So you see that if you are not quite decided about stating a detail, it is better to give the information than to withhold it. Therefore, exclude only those items which would on the ground of common sense be pointless.

In extracting and writing your messages from the problems given, it will be assumed that you do not know whether or not the recipient is provided with a map similar to your own. It may be taken for granted, however, that he is acquainted with the names which appear on your map.

It may also be assumed that you have drawn a sketch on the reverse side of your message sheet.

In reading your map the signs and abbreviations, explained in Appendix 4, Field Service Regulations, will aid you.

A scale of yards is at the bottom (the south) of your map. By the use of a slip of paper, distances in yards may be measured off from place to place.

Wherever it is stated in these problems that a person writes a message, the student should construct that same message. In so doing:

(1) Assemble your information in proper sequence,

† *Seventy Problems—Infantry Tactics.*

(2) Give it proper and unmistakable expression, and

(3) Inspect it thoroughly in order to be positive that you have given it proper sequence, and proper and unmistakable expression.

Hold yourself strictly accountable for every expression which could be put into better form.

Caution.—The hour in the heading of message is the *time of signature.*

PROBLEMS

1. On January 27, 1926, you are Corporal Peck in charge of a reconnoitering patrol from the advance guard of the third battalion of the 177th regiment of Infantry. You are proceeding along the road east to Hunterstown from 549 (D, 5 and 6). You arrive at the east edge of J. Bell's orchard when you see several men at the zero in 602. With the aid of your field glasses you make out four field pieces and limbers to be turning to the north off the road just opposite to, and south of, the men. The vehicles soon disappear behind the knoll of 602. You can see that the men are wearing the enemy's uniform. After five minutes of observation, the men go out of sight on the far side of the hill, and nothing further happens. After you have written your message at half past four o'clock in the afternoon, you travel under cover of the creek and fields in the general direction of Henderson Meeting House, in the hope of finding out more about the force in the vicinity of 602.

2. On August 27, 1920, you are Sergeant Fenton of a left flank patrol sent out from the second battalion (27th Infantry) which is marching north, as an advance guard to its regiment, toward 546 from Hunterstown. As you come out into the open to the west of the J. Bell farm house, you receive a volley from about twenty rifles from

the woods at the north. Two of your men are killed. With the remainder of your men you retire hastily under cover of the Bell orchard to the stream bed which you follow to the north until half way between the Bell house and the "R" in Beavertdam. There you go through the fields to the west until you get a glimpse of the high ground in the vicinity of 574. You can make out through the corn rows infantrymen deployed and lying down facing you. They extend along the fence for fifty yards on each side of the dirt road. You can see a field piece half way between the ends of the fence and at the edge of the woods. You go back to where you left the stream and write your message. You hand it to one of your men at 20 minutes past two in the afternoon for delivery. You then crawl forward leaving your men under cover in the stream, and remain in observation in the corn-field.

3. You are 1st Sergeant James in charge of a combat patrol from the 38th Infantry which is on outpost duty for the 8th Division at Granite Hill (5, bottom). In passing the house at 5-E the farmer tells you that yesterday at noon he saw about one hundred and fifty saddle-horses in a lot near the cross-roads in Hunterstown. On questioning him further he tells you that there were quite a lot of soldiers about, having a good time, and wearing the enemy's uniform. You keep on your course. When you arrive at the orchard near 603 it is after nightfall. You hear voices and laughing at the northern edge of the orchard just south of the "6" in 603. You sneak up until you can make out four of the enemy's infantrymen sitting about a little fire. You charge with bayonets fixed, kill three and capture one. He is half drunk on apple-jack and talks freely. He says his brigade is in bad shape, has marched four days and nights without stopping, has a big outpost at Woodside School House, and that he him-

self is with a bunch of the advance cavalry in the town. At a quarter of ten at night you hand your message to a member of your patrol for delivery. You then proceed along the road toward 549, looking for more information. You arrive there, having seen nothing of value, the next day at 7 a. m., July 18, 1940.

4. On June 21, 1920, you are a first lieutenant in charge of an officer's patrol from the 80th Cavalry which is operating as Independent Cavalry for the 190th Division. It is six o'clock in the evening when as you are riding along the road from Texas to Biglerville, three of the enemy jump out upon you. In the struggle which ensues the three are overpowered and sabred by your superior force. You search the dead men, but find nothing upon them but ornaments indicating they belong to the 27th Cavalry. You dismount, tie your horses in the orchard near the word Stiner, and proceed with two of your men along the railroad track toward Biglerville. Near 626 you look toward the town to find the space between you and it well dotted with tents. Placing your men well under cover in the woods, you lie down in the culvert at 626. Before taps is blown in the enemy's camp, from conversations which have gone on in your vicinity, you have learned that a regiment of cavalry has been encamped there for two days, that no other force is about, and that the regiment will move out at five the next morning, marching toward Goldenville. You write your message at 9:15 p. m. After it is sent, you take up your position again in the culvert.

5. On the 19th of February, 1940, a visiting patrol in charge of Corporal Eaton sent out from 2d Battalion, which is acting as outpost for the 81st Infantry, is on its way to a picket of friendly troops. Its route lies from Boyd School House, E-8 toward McElheny. As it ap-

proaches the bridge near the 4 in the 480 contour, it hears footsteps of men hurrying into the timber to the east. The suspicions of the patrol being aroused, it looks about and discovers loose earth scattered over the snow at the abutments of the bridge; upon further investigation it finds fuses leading from the center of the pile of fresh earth. The message is finished on the spot at exactly midnight. After the messenger has departed the corporal and one man remain on guard over the mines whose fuses were cut before the messenger left.

6. You are Corporal Peters sent out with a visiting patrol from Company A, 2d Battalion of your regiment. Your company is Support number 2 of the outpost at the "K" in Oak Ridge, E-8. As you approach Boyd School House, you are not challenged as you expect. You hurry on to where the sentry of the picket should be posted at the cross-roads, only to find him dead of a bayonet thrust. You go to the south side of the school house and there find the remainder of the picket in their blankets in the same condition. You put your hand on one of the men and find that his body is still warm. At fifteen minutes to three, September 30, 1932, you complete your message at the spot where you found most of the picket dead. You then take your remaining man with you and together perform double sentry duty at the cross-roads.

7. On July 4, 1925, you are Sergeant Black in charge of an harassing patrol sent out from the 68th regiment of Infantry which is acting as outpost for the 12th Division. At a quarter to twelve at night, you have just fired two volleys from Boyd School House in the direction of Oak Ridge, and are proceeding toward C. Topper's to do the same there, when, as you cross the railroad one hundred yards south of the "r" in Topper, you stumble upon a wagon wheel imbedded in the earth. Cautious inspection

reveals four howitzers camouflaged. With the aid of known measurements upon your hand you find that the calibre of each is 6 inches. You finish a message at a quarter to one and then proceed as you intended.

8. On the 21st of August, 1919, you are Sergeant Stuart sent out in charge of a contact patrol from the 99th Infantry acting as outpost of the 32d Brigade. After hard work during which you are nearly captured at the cemetery near Henderson Meeting House, you arrive with your patrol, at ten minutes to nine in the evening, at 601 just west of Hunterstown. A regiment of the enemy's infantry has been defeated by your troops during the day and it is your duty to find out what you can about the enemy's whereabouts and intentions. As you look across to the west you see lights in the fields between R. Smith's farm house and J. Bell's. You make your way carefully down the hill to the farm house at D-6. As you lie in the edge of the woods nearest the house you count fifteen rows of tents by the glow from the fires. You see no animals or picket lines. The fires die down shortly and the talking ceases. You take turns on watch with the senior man of your patrol. At a quarter to one while you are on watch, fires begin to spring up at the ends of the company streets. Shortly afterwards a young soldier comes to the nearby farm house to get water. He grumbles loudly that he must get up in the middle of the night and complains that the first sergeant has ordered the company to be in ranks at one fifty. You get your message off at five minutes after one and remain in observation of the camp.

9. (Two messages.) On May 31, 1940, you are Corporal Decker in charge of a reconnoitering patrol from the 71st Regiment of Cavalry acting as Advance Cavalry to the 18th Division. You are proceeding toward Heidlersburg from Friends' Grove School House, and you

arrive at 5-A. When, proceeding to the east, you are half way through the woods, you hear hoof-beats on the road to the north. Having proceeded due east, you now arrive at the edge of the woods. There you see several mounted men of the enemy halted near the road fork 545, but the trees in the ravine make it difficult for you to see them clearly. Near the main cross-roads of the town you see a hundred or more dismounted men holding their horses. After watching them for a few moments you realize that the horses are being watered. At five minutes to five you start to write your message where you are. After sending it off you remain to see what is going to happen further.

At ten minutes past five, the mounted men ride west with an advance guard of about a troop. Your patrol was well concealed so that it was able to time the main body as it trotted past the road fork 578 in column of twos. It took two minutes and a half to pass. The group near 545 that appeared to be a patrol has disappeared. While the larger body was passing road fork 578 you heard firing about a mile to the south by less than a dozen rifles. You begin to send a message at a quarter after five and start to return to your command. (100 cavalrymen in column of twos will trot past a given point in one minute.)

CHAPTER IV

MORE PROBLEMS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE FIELD MESSAGE

1. (Three messages.) On July 18, 1930, you are Corporal Flint in charge of a reconnoitering patrol sent out from the 61st Infantry which is acting as Rear Guard to the 19th Brigade, and which is withdrawing from Goldenville through Table Rock. As you proceed south along the stream which flows past Herman, 500 yds. south of C-7, you stumble upon one of your own regiment seriously wounded and lying at the "V" in Varney, in the open field. He tells you that a regiment of Cavalry of the enemy passed by the nearest farm house going northeast on the dirt road when the sun was overhead. You ask the people of the farm house, who are manifestly in sympathy with the enemy, what they know about the occurrence, but they refuse to answer. On the road are many fresh hoof-marks. You begin to write your message at the Varney farm house at half past three in the afternoon. When you have finished you proceed southwest along the same road and along the creek bed toward the race-track. At the bottom part of the "S" in Stock Farm, you leave your men in the field under cover and go south along the edge of the main road toward Boyd School House. You see several patrols of the enemy but you press on. You have not gone far, however, before you spy a low heavy cloud of dust ahead which seems to be moving toward you. At the Boyd School House Cross Roads it turns west at twenty-five minutes to six. It takes the column, which you now make out to be infantry in column of squads, three minutes and

forty seconds to pass the cross-roads (175 Infantry in column of squads can pass a given point in one minute). Since the patrols of the enemy are becoming rather thick, you decide to make your way back to the "K" in Stock Farm. There you finish writing another message at a quarter after seven. You have scarcely sent it off when there is a noise among the corn-stalks near you. You lie low and have your men, whom you have now collected about you, do the same. A friendly uniform appears through one of the corn-rows; it is just light enough for you to make it out. You give a low whistle and signal at which the wearer of the uniform approaches. He turns out to be Sergeant Black of your regiment who is leading a combat patrol. He tells you that he counted twenty passenger coaches hitched together on the railroad to the southwest. The engine was pointed toward the north and opposite the "r" in C. Topper at four o'clock. The enemy's soldiers were crowding around trying to hurry into the coaches. After the Sergeant leaves you, you try to make your way back to your company. At a quarter to twelve you have arrived under cover of the fields and woods near the road-fork 646 just south of Hamilton when you hear the rumble of wheels close behind you to the south. One of your men counted twelve pieces of light artillery which turned off the road and unlimbered just south of 664. You begin to write another message at the "n" in Hamilton at 5 minutes after twelve.

2. On September 1, 1927, you are a first lieutenant of Infantry in charge of an expeditionary patrol from the 26th Infantry, which is acting as outpost to the 18th Division. The outpost is covering the general sector from Stiner, 1,000 yards north of Texas, to Bender's Church, B-7. The Division is encamped between Biglerville and Guernsey. Your patrol leaves the outermost picket near

Table Rock at three o'clock in the afternoon. Its mission is to capture a strong officer's patrol of the enemy which is supposed to be proceeding north along the railroad from Hamilton. You conceal yourself and your patrol in the shrubbery near the railroad bridge south of Table Rock Station. At five minutes after four you hear footsteps and subdued talking to the south. You allow the first two men to pass you, and when the main body of the patrol is near the bridge you spring out upon them with bayonets. The *mêlée* lasts for about three minutes. Four men finally survive—the leader of their patrol, two of your men, and yourself. Because of the wound of the foreign officer, whom you make out by his insignia to be a staff officer of their 132d Regiment of Engineers and a Captain, you decide that you will be unable to risk bringing in your prisoner at once. You question him as to what he has been doing and he tells you that he has been all day on the road and that his regiment has marched for three days from the south without stopping to pitch camp. He will answer no other questions. You bind and gag him, after you have taken him into the field to the bottom of the "S" in Table Rock Station. There you start to write your message twelve minutes after the end of the fight. After you have sent off the communication you and the one remaining man keep guard over your prisoner.

3. (Six messages.) On October 29, 1945, you are Sergeant Murray sent out in charge of a strong reconnoitering patrol from the 82d Infantry which is acting as Advance Guard to the 34th Brigade. You send a message from Mt. Olivet School House (7-top) that the country is clear of the enemy from there back to Center Mills from which you have come. You finish your message at half past one in the afternoon. At ten minutes after two, from the main cross-roads of Guernsey, you start another mes-

sage in which you let your Commanding Officer know that you have seen nothing of the enemy, and that the roads have been patrolled to a distance of eight hundred yards on each side. You keep on going south along the railroad. As the first two men of your patrol enter the railroad cut five hundred yards south of the main cross-roads of Guernsey, they receive a volley from the top and west side of the embankment. They back out while you with the remainder of your patrol skirt the top of the cut to the west. Three men run to the west into the fields and woods. Your fire does not reach them. You continue to scour the country as far as the stream. At five minutes to three you begin to write a message from the farm house near the southern exit of the cut. You then proceed south along the railroad as before. As you approach Biglerville you try to see through your field glasses any signs of the enemy's men or wagons-which might be in the town. Seeing none, you go carefully and completely around the village back to your starting point. Two of your men then enter the main street from the east. After investigating the first eight or ten houses, they signal you to approach. You then with your patrol go along every street of the town, go into the main stores and houses, but you can find no trace of the enemy. At 20 minutes to five you finish your message at the cross-roads five hundred yards southwest of the "B" in Biglerville. You then take the main Carlisle road and proceed south on it. As you go you inspect all bridges, railroad tracks, streams, and ground in general for eight hundred yards on either side of the road, but find no enemy. At twenty-five minutes to six you begin your message at the Stiner House. Before you now go south, you investigate for eight hundred yards the roads leading to the east and west from the main cross-roads south of Stiner. After your men return you pro-

ceed along the side of the road south toward the stream. As you come up to the bridge, although it is getting dusk you see a sentinel on the bridge, and you collect your men in some bushes near the north abutment. You tell them that when you give the word they are to charge with you across the bridge at a run with bayonets fixed. There is no sentry at the north end of the bridge, and the one at the south end seems to be lazily looking into the field. You give the signal and your patrol leaps out, but in the middle of the bridge your whole party is caught by fire from machine guns located near the wooden fence half way between the word Texas and the bridge. All but two of your men fall. You are hit in the leg, but are dragged back off the bridge to a copse at the edge of the stream. Waiting for further developments, but hearing nothing more of the enemy except laughter at the other end of the bridge, you have your men carry you further eastward along the stream to a place of comparative safety in the woods. You start writing your message twenty yards south of the railroad crossing east of Stiner at seven o'clock. You find that you will be unable to travel for some time. After sending the message, you remain with one man where you are, both of you concealing yourselves as well as possible.

MESSAGES FROM COMMANDERS

4. On July 22, 1932, you are Colonel Algernon M. Potts, commanding the 48th Infantry which is acting as Advance Guard for the 20th Division. You have at a quarter to one just pushed two battalions of the enemy's infantry toward Woodside School House. Your adjutant counts on the ground over which they have fled forty-eight of their dead and wounded. When you have taken up and

reorganized your line from Plainview through the cross-roads at 666 to, and including, the farm house one mile and a quarter directly east of A. Logan, Lieutenant Shelley, adjutant of the first battalion, reports to you that Major Jones' command has captured twenty-two prisoners. While you are talking, suddenly a heavy fire of artillery comes from somewhere in the vicinity of 603 west of Hunterstown. At the same time a message reaches you from Sergeant Stearns, who has been out with a combat patrol to the south, that a regiment of the enemy's cavalry was between Table Rock and Herman at half-past two, and that a civilian had telephoned that an infantry regiment of the enemy was seen marching west through Hunterstown at twenty minutes to twelve that morning. You have no reinforcements at hand, but send your reserve of one battalion to prolong the right of your line to the bridge at Fidler, B-7. Your artillery seems to be superior to the enemy's and is holding down his fire which is growing heavier. The adjutants of the 2d and 3d battalions report that their commands have lost 12 dead, 17 wounded, and 24 missing during the previous engagement. You feel that you will scarcely be able to hold out more than an hour under the present circumstances, but decide to make strenuous efforts to do more. You start to write your message to the Division Commander at four o'clock in the afternoon.

5. You are Major Mark Montclair in command of the battalion which constituted the reserves in the preceding problem. When you arrive in your designated position at a quarter to five you are immediately charged by two troops of cavalry which you drive off to the south by superior fire. You send in pursuit one company and a machine gun. By the number of loose horses you see galloping about and by the haste with which the troopers

took to their heels, you infer that the casualties must have been large. Your adjutant arrives at this time reporting that sixteen prisoners in sound condition have been taken, that twelve dead and twenty-two wounded of the enemy have been counted, and that your own losses are 3 missing, 4 dead, and 8 wounded. Just before you start to write your message at a quarter to six, word reaches you from A Company which is still pursuing the enemy, that they have captured 18 prisoners and have killed and wounded twelve. You finish your message at five minutes to six, and then go over your lines in order to make them stronger for defense.

6. On June 12, 1925, you are Captain James A. Marion in command of Company I, 203d Infantry. Your company, which constitutes a detached post from your regiment acting as outpost at Granite Hill, is at 601, five hundred yards west of Hunterstown Cross-roads. At twenty-five minutes to five in the morning you are charged by a squadron of cavalry from the J. Bell farm. They strike you from the front, and you are holding them by your fire when a troop hits your right flank riding at a full gallop out of the woods from the direction of the Henderson Meeting House. You are in a very awkward position and are prepared to do or die, when, without warning of any kind, a squadron of your own 29th Cavalry which has been on a raiding expedition in the direction of New Oxford, deploys at a gallop from Hunterstown. The enemy, who is now in turn struck in flank, is in serious straits. He breaks and runs in the direction of Table Rock, the friendly squadron pursuing. You count 45 dead and 62 wounded of the enemy. Of your own troops 12 infantrymen are missing, 3 cavalrymen and 9 infantrymen dead, and 5 cavalrymen and 18 infantrymen wounded. You start to write your message at twenty minutes to

six. You straighten out your former position and send strong connecting and reconnoitering patrols to north and west.

7. On May 13, 1922, you are Major Gerald Pendelton of the 1st Battalion, 43d Infantry. You have been ordered by your regimental commander to establish by a line of your own troops a defensive position facing east from the 4 (exclusive) in 664 east of Hamilton, D-8, to the south-east corner of the orchard (inclusive), five hundred yards northwest of Stock Farm. At five minutes to ten at night you have formed your line as ordered and are beginning to entrench. You are proceeding with your work when a messenger from B Company on the left flank tells you that G Company of the 2d Battalion has arrived at the 4 in 664, and that at ten minutes to ten the right flank of that company was beginning to dig. Seven minutes later another messenger from A Company arrives with similar information concerning Company E, 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry; he states that the left flank of that company at thirteen minutes to ten started to dig twenty yards south of the corner of the orchard. You go over your lines correcting positions here and there and start to send a message at twenty-five minutes to eleven. The order of your interior companies is, left to right, C, D.

CHAPTER V

VERBAL FIELD MESSAGE

OBSERVATION—ATTENTION—EXPOSITION

There are occasions when it becomes proper not to write the field message, but to speak it. If the enemy is strong and active, so that a bearer of information runs grave risk of capture, the message is safer as a verbal one. In the case of the written one, both message and messenger are lost; in the case of the verbal one, only the messenger. Therefore, it is best to entrust the information to the care of the messenger's mind. The facts deposited there should remain in readiness for the first opportunity of delivery.

There are times, too, when no chance is offered to write a message on account of the pressure of the enemy. The attention of a leader may be so occupied with warding off, or moving away from, strong hostile bodies, that work with pencil and paper becomes an impossibility.

The form of the written field message must be abbreviated. The *gist* of the *Heading* and *Ending* must be stated by the messenger upon his arrival at his destination; and the *Body* must be contracted into one or two sentences depending upon the accuracy and intelligence of the messenger. Where officers are messengers the message may be lengthened. For our purpose and practice we must attempt the shorter form.

The usual procedure in sending off a verbal message may be represented by the following dialogue:

Patrol Leader (or Commander): "Swinton, go back at once to the Commanding Officer of our Outpost and say,—

Twelve enemy's cavalry marching north on Carlisle Road at Hamilton 11:45 a. m. Repeat."

Swinton: "I am going back to the Commanding Officer of our Outpost and say,—

Twelve of enemy marching north on Carlisle Road at 11:45 a. m."

P. L.: "No, Swinton, twelve enemy's *cavalry* marching north on Carlisle Road at Hamilton 11:45 a. m. Repeat again."

Swinton: "I am to go back right away and say to Commanding Officer,—

Twelve enemy's cavalry marching north on Carlisle Road at Hamilton 11:45 a. m. Repeat."

P. L.: "Not quite; you are to go back to Commanding Officer of Outpost. Repeat again."

Swinton: "I am to go back and say to Commanding Officer of the Outpost,—

Twelve enemy's cavalry marching north on Carlisle Road at Hamilton at 11:45 a. m."

P. L.: "That's right. It is now 12 o'clock. Notice where we are located. I am going to continue on my mission toward the southwest. Do you understand?"

Swinton: "Yes, sir."

When Swinton arrives at headquarters he ought thus to be able to give to his commanding officer not only the accurate *Body* of the verbal message, but the contents of the *Heading* and *Ending* of a similar written one.

The above conversation is not exaggerated. It is not only what *does* happen, but what *should* happen. It does happen because the average American has rarely developed his powers of attention to things outside of his interest. It should happen because every word in every good message is a vital word. Any omission or substitution is a loss.

PROBLEMS

In each of the following problems try to condense the essential facts, without loss of substance or truth, if possible, into one sentence. The *Body* only will be attempted. In other words, that part of the dialogue which preceded the last speech of the Patrol Leader will be imitated. It is presumed that we are now conversant with the material of the *Heading* and *Ending*. We shall, therefore, dispense with these parts of the message in the verbal exercise.

CAUTION.—*Under no circumstances should there be any writing done in connection with the solution of the problems. A violation of this prohibition will destroy the value of the exercise.*

1. You are alone in your aeroplane scouting north from your Division which is at Granite Hill. While you are flying low in the vicinity of B-A, you notice a moving cloud of dust which produces a dark spot on the road leading south from Guernsey. The haze extends from the lower edge of the "G" in Guernsey indistinctly through the town. You turn off and fly over Center Mills. When you return the head of the dust cloud has reached the first roadfork south of Guernsey and the tail of it is at the lower edge of the "G." You land in twelve minutes at Granite Hill. It is one o'clock in the afternoon. You are so cold that you walk with difficulty. You call a Corporal of the Signal Corps to you and give him a verbal message.

2. You are sitting on the knoll at 624 immediately south of the "Sta." in Granite Hill Station, 5-E. You see about fifteen horsemen cross the railroad tracks and ride up to the cross-roads to the east of you. It is half-past ten in the morning when you see them split up into three parties, one riding southwest, one northeast, and one southeast on the three different roads in your vicinity. As the party on the road running southeast comes opposite

you, they dismount. You can make them out to be cavalymen of the enemy. As they start in your rear to cross the stream and to come toward you, you decide to send a verbal message.

3. You are proceeding from the cross-roads southwest of Plainview (B-5) toward Hershey Mill (B-6). When you approach the mill race you notice a quantity of smoke rising; when you come nearer you see the smouldering ruins of the mill. You go on to the Miller's house and there perceive that the bridge has buckled in the middle and is lying on its side in the water. The Miller tells you that an aeroplane of the enemy went up and down the Conewago at six o'clock the evening before, until it finally landed a bomb upon the bridge. As it was circling to leave, it let another bomb drop upon the mill. You go to the Miller's telephone and send a message.

4. You are lying on the long knoll 566, five hundred yards south of C-6. You are watching at half-past two in the afternoon two infantrymen of the enemy who are walking along the edge of the stream to the west. You have been interested in their movements ever since they crossed the first road to the southwest several moments ago. While you are watching them, you are fired upon by what you estimate to be sixteen rifles from the woods to the south. You hasten north and give to one of your men a verbal message on the way.

5. You are proceeding south along the stream at $7\frac{1}{3}$ -E. At twenty minutes after eight in the morning you approach the more densely wooded section of country near the bridge. You look toward the cross-roads to the west and spy in the field some of the enemy loafing and talking at the letter "8" in 488. You see four stacks of arms and are making further observations, when you hear a rustle of undergrowth in the woods. Eight men rush out upon you.

Three of your men are killed. You escape with one man. As soon as you are able, you give him a verbal message, and both of you take different routes back to headquarters.

6. You are reconnoitering south along the railroad track from Biglerville. When you reach the siding at 626, you notice that part of the track exactly opposite "B," both on the siding and main line, is completely blown away. You count ten ties burning at the side of the road. While you are making an inventory of the situation, you are fired upon by a machine gun mounted on a flat car near the next bridge to the south. The car apparently filled with men seems to be approaching. Your patrol scatters to the fields. You give one man a verbal message.

7. You have been sent with two men to find out whether the Conewago is fordable at any point between Table Rock and Fidler, B-7. After some search you find a crossing directly south of the zero in the number 540 which marks the contour of that height. Some time ago you sent a written message to the effect that there was a picket located at the Logan farm-house. You have finished searching thoroughly that part of the stream assigned to you, when a strong party of the enemy is seen approaching your position from A. Logan. You give your remaining man a verbal message. Each takes a separate route.

8. You are in charge of a small reconnoitering patrol going south from Boyd School House. As you approach the marsh (7-4½, bottom) at the west of the road, you see three pieces of artillery stuck in the mud up to their hubs. You find that the guns are 3 in. field pieces. While you are investigating their mechanism in order to confirm your opinion that they belong to hostile troops, about forty men of the enemy with ropes and tackle appear about 400 yards to the south. You hurry away under cover, and find a telephone. You send a verbal message over the wire at twenty minutes to five in the evening.

9. You are delivering a message by motor cycle from Center Mills to Granite Hill Station. You are riding at about thirty miles an hour on a road supposedly clear of the enemy, when you are met by a fusillade from the woods in the vicinity of Henderson Meeting House. As you pass the road-fork, shots follow you and you feel a sharp pain in the calf of your leg. You speed up to pass the cross-roads at Hunterstown, and in two minutes reach Granite Hill Station. At twenty minutes after nine in the morning you dismount from your motor cycle and direct an infantryman standing near you to take a verbal message to headquarters in addition to the written one you hand him.

10. You are Captain Williams in command of Company B, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry. You are acting as a support during the Outpost duty of your battalion. You are at 592, northwest of the Good Intent School House, D-7, and are engaged in driving back a company of infantrymen which is attacking you from the stream to the west. At twenty-five minutes to ten in the morning you are suddenly attacked also by a platoon of infantry from the direction of Herman. The nearest friendly troops are those at battalion headquarters. You are in a serious predicament. You at once send a verbal message by an intelligent sergeant.

We have doubtless demonstrated to our own satisfaction by means of the problems above how difficult it is to frame a message briefly and unmistakably. It might be well to inquire why we have had this trouble. An analysis may not only reveal, but also remedy, the cause of our inability to achieve the desired result.

We find upon investigation that we have permitted certain practical talents to lie unused in our minds. We

have not acquired the habit of observing anything outside of our desire, of listening to anything outside of our interest, and of explaining anything outside of simplicity. Strict observation, attention, and exposition are the ordinary tools of a military man. Let him develop them to the highest degree and he has done no more than is expected of him.

Here, between the study of the field message, which informs commanders, and the field order, which directs troops, it is especially fitting for us to reckon with mental improvement. For it is in this interval between the information's coming to, and the decision's going from, a leader that the fateful question arises, "What is my plan?" His thoughts, before they arrive at a decision, must take in and classify in a certain definite order all obtainable and pertinent facts. He must assemble all his data before he can take the slightest risk as to how his troops are to act. Lives are at stake in the passing minutes; victory is awaiting the decision. In all this stress and excitement the commander must observe and listen as if he were stalking a deer in a thicket. And when his mind is made up he must formulate his decision as if he were sitting before his own peaceful hearth writing a letter. But he must do both in one per cent of the time allowed for stalking deer or writing letters.

To acquire this ability, he must have regarded beforehand the development of these three talents as a necessity. If he has caused himself to be a faithful observer, so that he is capable of taking in many details at once, if he has compelled himself to be a keen listener so that he can absorb every word instantly, if he has made himself into a skilful instructor so that he can express rapidly his exact wishes and knowledge, he will be able, when the crisis comes, to give his entire attention to his plan. Otherwise

he will be hampered. If he has not observed, if he has not listened, he will be able neither to decide nor to state his will forcibly.

The following hints may show us our deficiencies:

1. In regard to the scope and habit of observation,—

(a) Look out of the window, count off to yourself five seconds, turn about and see how much of the view or of its salient features you can describe.

(b) After you have taken your next long walk through the woods or open country, go over in your mind your journey. Pick out points along the course and see whether you know in regard to each: (1) the appearance and number of trees within your view, (2) the rise and fall of the ground within your view, (3) or the direction you next took.

(c) What is the exact color of the hair or eyes, or the shape of the hands of your closest associates?

(d) Have someone place five articles on a plane surface while your back is turned. Look at the objects for ten seconds; then look away and describe fully their appearance and position.

2. In regard to the power and habit of listening,—

(a) Have someone read aloud to you three sentences capable of being understood by a person of ordinary intellect. Try to repeat in your own words every idea given in the reading.

This is not a memory exercise.

(b) The next time you find yourself interrupting someone, check yourself at once, and try to repeat in your own mind the substance of what the speaker has last uttered.

(c) The next time you find yourself a part of an audience to which a sermon or lecture is being delivered, say to yourself, "I am going to get at least for practice's

sake every idea this speaker has to offer." Then note how short a time it is before you miss a phrase.

3. In regard to the power of exposition,—

(a) With your hands behind your back, try to describe in a sentence each one of the following articles:

A barrel, a scabbard, a tea kettle, a potato, a billiard cue, a chrysanthemum, a dumb-bell, your shoes, a fox terrier, a grand piano.

(b) Give the shortest complete description you can of the parts and working of a rifle.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIELD ORDER, THE ESTIMATE, THE DECISION, THE EXPRESSION

“Upon the information of the enemy and of the terrain obtained by reconnaissance, and, as far as time will permit, upon the study of the terrain made by the leader in the field of probable operations, the plan of action is based.” So state our Field Service Regulations.* Decision, then, is built upon the amount of material that the observation and attention of a commander can collect. And it is only *his* observation and attention which count. It is only what he himself has fixed in his own mind which is going to do the troops harm or good. He may receive dozens of excellent messages, or may view the battle-field for twenty miles; yet it is only what he himself appropriates to his own straight thinking, which can influence the outcome. The reports or the visions of others cannot enter into the decision, unless he has transferred those reports or visions to his own calculations. How can he weigh what he has not handled—consider what he has not absorbed? *The decision of a leader issues from the door of his own observation and attention.* The most pertinent facts may be laid at that threshold only to be shut out because he has not increased his capacity to take them in. And no one else can enter there in order to do the work for him unless the intruder becomes virtually, if not actually, the leader.

* Par. 141.

THE ESTIMATE

Let us suppose that the observation and attention have taken in all that they should. These various items lying in a more or less jumbled mass must now be sorted. Information of one class must not be found mixed with that of another class. Each organized body of information must approach the leader's judgment by itself so that: (1) nothing will be overlooked; so that (2) each item will be with its proper set. After they have all passed through his thought, certain ones, of course, may be discarded; but they all must none the less be first reviewed consciously by the leader. This process is called the *estimate of the situation*. In order, therefore, to comply with the full conditions of such an estimate, a fixed classification of all the essentials which should go through the hopper of a leader's judgment has been made. After his information has been obtained and before his decision has been formed, the leader must say to himself:—

1. What is my mission?
2. What are the forces—the enemy's and my own?
3. What conditions are favorable and what unfavorable?
4. What is the enemy doing and what will he probably do?
5. What effect has the terrain upon my mission?
6. What different courses are open to me in order to carry out my mission, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of each?

The method just described is no more than that of collecting, classifying, and weighing data. It is the very process we must follow before we can write a decent theme, article, report, or anything fit to read. An estimate of a situation is nothing more than an outline of observations

made in order to arrive at a proper conclusion. The leader has no time to write down the points. But he nevertheless assembles in his own mind everything which bears on his subject—unity; he classifies all this into groups with a certain orderly arrangement—coherence; and he considers the effect of each item upon his mission and situation—clear thinking.

THE DECISION

As soon as he has finished with this estimate of the situation, there should stand forth as a result of this clear thinking his decision. If he has been in the habit of making his ideas unmistakable in conversation or writing—if he has been accustomed to dealing in good exposition, his plan ought to be clear and simple. For no man can make clear statements without first thinking clear thoughts. If then he has habitually insisted upon his own use of only the clearest phraseology, he ought certainly to arrive at a clear plan whatever may be its tactical value.

THE EXPRESSION

To give this plan expression is the purpose of the field order. Certainly if the decision is clear and simple, the translation into language ought to be easy. Infantry Drill Regulations state: "Ambiguity or vagueness indicates either vacillation or inability to formulate orders." Since vacillation is a matter of character, the discussion of such a trait is outside of this course; but the inability to formulate orders is not. In fact it belongs only in the course of Rhetoric or English. The following terms are found in our Regulations and Text Books: "Clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken in combat";¹ "an order must be definite and the expression

1. Infantry Drill Regs.

of a fixed decision";¹ "field orders are brief";² "field orders must be brief and definite";² "clear and decisive orders are the logical result of definite and sure decisions and are the means of transforming the decision into action";² "Make your order short and make it definite";³ "above all do not give vague orders";³ "be positive and definite";³ "a plan, promising success, may fail if it does not find correct expression in an order."⁴ And so our manuals keep on telling us to use correct English, but failing to tell us how. Putting the clarified decision into the form of an order is the business of Rhetoric. And the process requires the application of every rule for correct English we have learned or are going to learn.

"Often a faulty expression, a word too much or too little, or an omission, may become the source of serious consequences," declares Buddecke. Even in the orders of the greatest commanders, a twist of phrase or a wrong word has given an unintentional meaning, so that troops have from the very construction of the order acted contrary to the will of the chief. Napoleon, in a despatch to Davout before the battles of Auerstadt and Jena, stated: "If the Prince of Portecorvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together; but the Emperor hopes that he will be already in the position assigned him at Dornberg." Bernadotte, as it happened, had not gone to Dornberg. He was with Davout. He determined, from the last clause of the order and from the word "may," that Napoleon desired him to be at Dornberg. To Dornberg he marched, and there he calmly waited within sound of the guns, while the battles of Auerstadt and Jena were fought. He was

2. Field Service Regs.

3. Morrison's Infantry Tactics.

4. Buddecke's Tactical Decisions and Orders.

useless both to Napoleon and to Davout. Indeed, he was seriously needed by Davout who, with 27,000 was opposed to 51,000 Prussians. Yet the error is attributable not to Bernadotte but to Napoleon, who meant to say, "You should march together; but the Emperor hopes that he has arrived," etc. Napoleon for once did not say what he meant. It is likely we may be found more wanting in this regard.

There is no error in the expressiveness of a field order which the analytical and synthetical study of English will not overcome. We must first learn by analysis to recognize mistakes when we see them. We must then try to manipulate our language so that those mistakes will not occur. Indeed, we must go further than the mere negative avoidance of mistakes. We must not be satisfied until we have made our expressions exert a positive force. The ways and means of so doing are found in the simple rules of rhetoric.

It is, perhaps, not too much to say that the American works against heavier odds than the European. The syntax of the inflected languages of Europe demands that the speaker pay a proper attention to the changes of number, gender, and case, if he would not appear ridiculous, whereas the English language, being almost without inflections, permits its speaker to toss his words about with an ease unknown to Continental speech, and still be intelligible. The result is that the European is trained to more care, and, therefore, greater exactness, than is demanded of the American. Moreover, the average American's commercial education does not include a careful, analytical study of an inflected language. His geographical aloofness from the rest of the world insures him also a linguistic isolation. The European, on the other hand, has an added advantage in that by traversing a territory no larger

than three or four of our big states, he will encounter a half-dozen languages, of all of which he must have some knowledge if he is to be a financial success.

The American, then, in writing orders is competing against a handicap. Von Kiessing, a foreigner, states that "the best of plans, the most skilful combinations, may fail, if the commander or his staff officers cannot express them properly"; and Buddecke, also a foreigner, insists that "a plan, promising success, may fail if it does not find correct expression in an order." If these men, schooled in language as well as in tactics, find admonition so emphatically necessary, how must we look upon the matter?

The form and composition of the order, if practiced now, ought to give us a certain amount of independence when we come to practical and strategical considerations later. For certainly, we shall be far ahead of our fellows who must try at once, and for the first time, both tactics and composition.

THE FORM OF THE FIELD ORDER

"To enable the will of the commander to be quickly understood, to secure prompt cooperation among his subordinates, and for ready reference, field orders are required to follow a general form. This form divides an order into sections or parts and assigns to each a particular class of information.

The parts of the field order are:

THE HEADING.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS (in certain orders).

THE BODY.

THE ENDING.**

* F. S. R., par. 90.

The only difference between the divisions of the field message and the field order, then, is that the latter contains in certain orders *The Distribution of Troops*.

THE HEADING.—The heading contains:

THE TITLE OR NAME OF ISSUING OFFICER'S COMMAND.

THE PLACE.

THE DATE.

THE HOUR OF ISSUE.

THE NUMBER OF THE ORDER.

THE REFERENCE TO MAP USED.

The *Title* or *Name* corresponds to the *Name* of Sending Detachment in the field message. But a title is the name applied to the temporary duty of a command, such as, "Advance Guard, Det. 21st Div.," whereas the name itself might be "162d Inf., Det. 21st Div." *The Place* does not need to be given so specifically as in the field message, because the command issuing a field order takes up much more space than a reconnaissance party. The *Date* and *Hour of Issue* are written as in the field message. Field Orders are numbered in sequence usually annually. The *Reference to Map Used* is placed immediately below the number. The Heading of a field order would appear thus:

Field Orders:	Det. 21st Div., 12th Corps,
No. 22	Leavenworth, Kansas,
(Geological Survey Sheet)	9 Dec. 28, 8-15 p. m.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.—"The distribution of troops shows the tactical components into which a command is divided (advance guard, main body, etc.) and the troops assigned to each. It is generally used in march orders and in the first field order applying to a command newly created or organized. In other cases it is usually more convenient to name the troops in the body of the order, where their duties are prescribed.

When a 'distribution' is used, it is headed 'Troops,' and in written or printed orders is placed on the left of *The Body*, occupying about one-third of the page. The tactical components are marked with lettered subheads (a), (b), etc., the troops listed under each performing the task prescribed in the similarly marked paragraph of the body of the order.

When orders are dictated or sent by wire or signals, the distribution of troops (if used) is given immediately after paragraph 2, without number."* In orders for a regiment and smaller bodies the *Distribution of Troops* is usually omitted.

The Distribution of Troops in a field order would appear thus:

Troops.

- (a) Independent Cavalry:
 - Col. Adams.
 - 1st & 2d Sqs. 1st Cav.
 - (less one troop)
- (b) Advance Guard:
 - Col. Byron.
 - 1st Inf., 1st Cav.,
 - Btry. B, 5th F. A.
 - Det. Co. A, Engrs.
 - Det. Amb. Co. No. 1.
- (c) Main Body, in order of march:
 - 1st Bn, 2d Inf.
 - 1st Bn, 5th F. A.
 - (less 1 btry).

* F. S. R., par. 92.

- 1st Brig. (less 1st
 Inf. and 1st Bn.
 2d Inf.).
 4th Inf.
 Co. A, Engrs. (less
 det.).
 Amb. Co. No. 1
 (less det.).
 1st F. Hosp.
 (D) Signal Troops:
 Lieut. Dash.
 1 plat., Co. A.

THE BODY.—The Body, of course, is the main part of the order. It contains the information and instructions for the command. It is to this part that Buddecke refers when he says: "*The order, which is to transform decision into action, is of the utmost importance.*"

The Sentence and the Paragraph, then, should be perfectly constructed. Each one of those elements should be tested to see that it is unified, coherent, and emphatic. *The examples herein given, or any set phrasing, should never be imitated.* Every leader must compose his own words, his own decision. He must give to his subordinates the language that best suits the particular occasion. Otherwise there will be no unity of structure and little likelihood of unity of action. Every military situation is a law unto itself, and the language of the field order should fit that law.

Nevertheless there are certain aids, as we shall see, in composing *the Body*. The topic of each paragraph is to be found in our Regulations. We must see that nothing enters the paragraph or subparagraph but that which belongs in the topic assigned. We must see, also, that all

of the matter belonging in a paragraph is placed there, and that every sentence in the paragraph is free from violations of Unity, Coherence, and Emphasis.

“Paragraph 1 contains such information of the enemy and of our supporting troops as it is desirable that subordinates should know.”

“Paragraph 2 contains the general plan of the commander, or so much thereof as will insure cooperation of all parts of the command.”

“Paragraph 3 contains the detailed tactical dispositions adopted by the commander to carry out the plan outlined in paragraph 2, including the tasks assigned to each of the several combatant fractions of the command. These tasks are given under lettered subheads (a), (b), etc., the leading fraction, or the one having the most important duty to perform, being generally considered first. For instance: In an attack order it is customary to consider the artillery first; in a march order troops are considered according to their position in column.”

“Instructions applicable to all of these fractions may be embodied in a sub-paragraph, letter (X), at the end of paragraph 3.”

“Paragraph 4 contains instructions for the trains, and may designate the position of ammunition distributing stations, dressing stations, and stations for slightly wounded.”

“The last paragraph, usually paragraph 5, shows where the commander can be found or messages may be sent. In orders of subordinate commanders, this paragraph also gives the location of lines of information, if any have been established.”

“If additional paragraphs are necessary, they are incorporated, properly numbered, after paragraph 4. Sometimes it is unnecessary to include instructions for the

trains; but whatever the number of paragraphs the last always shows where the commander can be found, etc.”*

Briefly, then, the paragraphs may be epitomized as follows:

1. Enemy (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).

Your own troops (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).

2. Plan (single paragraph).
3. (a) Task of the leading, or the most important, fraction of command.
(b) Task of next, or next important, fraction of command. (X) Anything which applies to all fractions of command.

4. Trains.

5. Location of commander or place to which messages are to be sent (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).

Location of lines of information (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).

The Body of a field order would appear thus:

1. The enemy's cavalry patrols have been seen north of KICKAPOO. His infantry and artillery are reported at ATCHISON. Our division is 8 miles south of LEAVENWORTH.
2. This detachment will march to-morrow to KICKAPOO.
3. (a) The independent cavalry will start at 5:30 a. m., covering the movement.

* F. S. R., par. 93.

- (b) The advance guard will clear the northern exit of LEAVENWORTH at 6 a. m., marching by the ATCHISON CROSS-FRENCHMAN road.
 - (c) The main body will follow the advance guard at 1,200 yards.
 - (d) The signal troops will establish a line of information along the line of march between the independent cavalry and LEAVENWORTH, one of the stations being at FRENCHMAN.
4. The field train, escorted by one company 4th Inf., will follow the main body as far as FRENCHMAN.
 5. The detachment commander will be with the main body until 7 a. m., and thereafter with the advance guard.

THE ENDING.—“The ending contains the authentication of the order and a statement of how it is communicated to the command. This statement is an important feature of a field order and is made by the officer signing the order, he being responsible that it is properly distributed.”*

* F. S. R., par. 94.

The ending then would appear thus:

By order of Brig.-Gen. Forse:

J. G. HAMILTON,
Lt. Col. 1st Inf.,
Act. Chief of Staff.

Copies to Colonels Adams and Byron, commanders of artillery and engineers, and to staff; to division commander by wire.

The various parts of the field order, when assembled, appear as follows:

Field Orders: Det. 21st Div. 12th Corps,
Leavenworth, Kansas,
No. 22. 9 Dec. 28, 8-15 p. m.
(Geological Survey Sheet.)

Troops.

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>(a) Independent Cavalry:
Col. Adams.
1st & 2d Sqs. 1st Cav.
Cav.
(less 1 troop).</p> | <p>1. The enemy's cavalry patrols have been seen north of KICKAPOO. His infantry and artillery are reported at ATCHISON. Our division is 8 miles south of LEAVENWORTH.</p> |
| <p>(b) Advance Guard:
Col. Byron.
1st Inf.
1 Troop, 1st Cav.
Btry. B, 5th F. A.
Det. Amb. Co.
No. 1.</p> | <p>2. This detachment will march tomorrow to KICKAPOO.</p> <p>3. (a) The Independent Cavalry will start at 5-30 a. m., covering the movement.</p> <p>(b) The advance guard will clear the northern exit of LEAVENWORTH at 6 a. m., marching by the ATCHISON CROSS-FRENCHMAN road.</p> |

- (c) Main Body, in order of march:
 1st Bn. 2d Inf.
 1st Bn. 5th F. A. (less 1 btry).
 1st Brig. (less 1st Inf. and 1st Bn. 2d Inf.).
 4th Inf.
 Co. A, Engrs. (less det.).
 Amb. Co. No. 1 (less det.).
 1st F. Hosp.

- (d) Signal Troops:
 Lieut. Dash.
 1 plat. Co. A.

(c) The main body will follow the advance guard at 1,200 yards.

(d) The Signal troops will establish a line of information along the line of march between the independent cavalry and LEAVENWORTH, one of the stations being at FRENCHMAN.

4. The field train, escorted by one company 4th Infantry, will follow the main body as far as FRENCHMAN.
5. The detachment commander will be with the main body until 7 a. m., and thereafter with the advance guard.

By order of Brig.-Gen. Forse:

J. G. HAMILTON,
 Lt. Col., 1st Inf.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Copies to Colonels Adams and Byron, commanders of artillery and engineers, and to staff; to division commander by wire.

There are certain

SPECIAL CAUTIONS

in regard to the writing of the field order.

1.—What is required in paragraph 3 of the *Body* is that the order be logical—coherent.*

* See 1st par., Appendix.

2.—An order tells a subordinate *what* to do but not *how* to do it.

3.—Conjectures, expectations, reasons for measures adopted, and detailed instructions for a variety of possible events, do not inspire confidence, and should be avoided.

4.—As a rule, an affirmative form of expression is used. Such an order as: "The supply train will not accompany the division," is defective, because the gist of the order depends upon the single word "not." It is far better to say, "The supply train will remain at so and so until further orders."

5.—Do not use such expressions as "attempt to capture," "try to hold," "as far as possible," "as well as you can." Besides being indefinite, they divide responsibility. You, for example, receive an order "to try to capture" a certain position. Immediately there pops into your mind the suspicion that the commanding officer did not believe that the place could be taken, or was not anxious about having it captured. The commanding officer by the very wording of his order has taken on himself a part of the responsibility in the event of a repulse. At least he has not placed all the burden of the undertaking upon you. In the latter case he has been guilty of improper subordination.

CHAPTER VII

PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD ORDER

After the plan of Trench of the English Service, we are going to take up the problems in the construction of the field order along the lines on which tactical situations naturally develop themselves during hostilities. We shall discover that the sequence will not only conform to actual conditions, but will lead from the more simple to the more complex. We shall, then, proceed with,—

- (1) The March Order.
- (2) The Attack Order.
- (3) The Order for Position in Readiness.
- (4) The Defense Order.
- (5) The Retreat Order.
- (6) The Pursuit Order.
- (7) The Halt Order.
- (8) The Outpost Order.

Emphasis will be laid upon the march and attack orders, because they are the most usual and the most critical.

In these problems all necessary data will be given. No attempt will be made to mislead in regard to fact. But every attempt will be made to mislead in regard to the expression of the fact. Crude violations and mixtures of rhetoric will therefore be found throughout.

In arranging his material the student should use his own style and should not attempt to copy phraseology from any military forms. *That which is most brief and most unmistakable is best, no matter who writes the order.*

Note.—The topographical data will not be found upon the map. The units for which a field order must be written

require an area larger than that which our limited sheet provides. The student, by reading over the problem two or three times ought, with the aid of his imagination, to perceive the will of the commander.

(1) MARCH ORDERS

1.—On June 12, 1925, you are Major General Abercrombie in command of the 16th Division of the 12th Army Corps. You wish your division, which is in the vicinity of Bruceville, to march over to Littlestown the next day. You want it to cover the base and line of supply for your troops. You want it to do all this because one of your flying corps lieutenants saw from a captive balloon about a division of the enemy pass through Chambersburg early in the morning. The enemy was marching east and according to the lieutenant was composed of infantry, cavalry, field artillery—in fact, all branches of the service. You finish with this your twenty-second order since January 1st at a quarter after ten at night. But just before you finish with your order a Colonel of Cavalry on your staff tells you that he personally saw cavalry in Gettysburg during the evening. You want your advance guard, which consists of the 1st Brigade, 1st Battalion of the 1st Field Artillery, Company A, First Battalion of Engineers, one section of a Signal Company, and the first ambulance company, to get past the bridge over Pipe Creek at precisely six o'clock and to go along the main road to Littlestown in its route. The advance guard is to be commanded by Brigadier General Black. Now the main body, you figure, will go along in column from front to rear,—one section of the Signal Company, the fourth regiment of Infantry, the Field Artillery Brigade without its combat train, the 2d Brigade without the 4th Infantry, the third Brigade, the Signal

Company (Company A) without its detachments, the first Battalion of Engineers without Company A, the Field Artillery Combat Train, and then the second, third, and fourth Ambulance companies.

You want this main body to start across the Pipe Creek bridge at half past six and you want it to go along keeping a distance of a mile behind the tail of the advance guard. You want to tell your troops, too, that you will be with the tail of the reserve of the advance guard. You intend to sign your order yourself and you want copies sent to Lieutenants Kingsley and Lawrence, and to Brigade Generals Black, Dare, Evans, Colonel File, Major Glad, Captain Hume and your staff. You want your trains to follow your main body in order from front to rear: field trains, ammunition columns, supply columns, field hospitals, medical reserve, and pack train. You feel that the man in command of your signal corps should arrange to have radio connection between your independent cavalry and the advance guard. That idea brings up another matter. Your independent cavalry, which will be commanded by Colonel File and which will consist of the 1st Cavalry and one section of the Signal Company, will have to reconnoiter all the roads which lead out of Gettysburg and which are between the York Pike and the Emmitsburg road. You want the cavalry to reconnoiter the York Pike and the Emmitsburg road, too. You want this cavalry to maneuver so that they will come in contact with the enemy as soon as practicable. Now you want the independent cavalry to do all this because you want it to cover the whole movement of your troops and you think it ought to start out promptly at five o'clock in the morning in order to accomplish its purpose best.

2.—On the tenth of August, 1928, you are Colonel Bruce commanding the 129th regiment of Infantry which

is acting as advance guard to the 5th Division. On the tenth of August at half past five in the morning at the Penitentiary of Leavenworth, Kansas, you sign your 27th field order. You have in reality dictated it to your officers, but you sign it as soon as you have finished. You have told them in substance that all but one squad of Troop A, under command of Captain Briggs, 21st Cavalry, would comprise the Advance Cavalry; that the first battalion of the 1st Infantry, one squad of Troop A, 21st Cavalry, and a detachment of Company A of the Engineers under Major Chittombly, would constitute the support; and that the Reserve would be Headquarters and 2d Battalion of the 129th Infantry, Battery B of the 5th Field Artillery, the third Battalion of the 129th Infantry, and a Detachment of Ambulance Company, Number 1. You assembled all the officers of your command when you dictated your order and you told them that the troops of the command would march in order as stated above. You told them that you would stay with the reserve and would march near its head. You stated that the field train would assemble at the first cross-roads to the south and there wait under command of Captain Phillips, the Quartermaster of the 1st Infantry, for the field train of the main body and would join that field train as it passed. The main body was to come along so that the head of it would be just a half mile behind the tail of the Reserve of the Advance Guard. The whole of the Advance Guard you want to march on Kickapoo, because the enemy which someone had reported to have camped near Atchison the night before, and is composed of all branches of the service, has cavalry patrols out which were seen in the vicinity of Kickapoo yesterday. You wish the point of the support to begin the march at a quarter to six in the morning. It is to go by the general route which marks

the turning points Atchison Cross, Frenchman, Kickapoo, along a continuous stretch of road. So that the Advance Cavalry will have time to get ahead, you want it to leave camp at once and march by way of Atchison Cross to Kickapoo. This proceeding is necessary because you want all the country west of the line of march to the extent of three miles very carefully observed. You want Sheridan's Drive to be observed carefully also. You want the reserve to follow the support so that there will be 800 yards distance between it and the tail of the support. You send a copy of the order to your Division Commander.

3.—On the thirty-first of May, 1931, you are Major General Perkins in command of the 16th Division, 22d Corps. War has just broken out and not any of your army has crossed the frontier as yet. However, it is going to do so on the next day, and the 22d Corps is going to march on Thurmont and Frederick. Your division has been ordered to cover the left of the whole army. Your independent cavalry in command of Colonel Frank and composed of the 11th Cavalry and the first radio section of the Signal Corps, is to be followed by the Advance Guard under command of Brigadier General Blood. The advance guard is composed of the first Brigade, the first battalion of the first field artillery, a company of the first Battalion of Engineers, the first Ambulance Company, and one radio section of the Signal Company. You sign your order at eight in the evening and send copies to Brigadier Generals Blood, Cook, Dean, Enfield, Colonel Frank, Major Good, Captain Harry, by officers. You also furnish copies to your staff. You decide to have your division march on Gettysburg in order to carry out your mission. Your main body is going to start at seven in the morning and will march in the following order: one section of the Signal Company, the first battalion of the 4th Infantry, all but

one battalion of the first brigade of Field Artillery, all of the second Brigade but the first battalion of the 4th Infantry, the entire third Brigade, all but one company of the first battalion of engineers, Signal Company A without certain detachments mentioned before, the field artillery combat trains, and three ambulance companies. You want the advance guard to be up and out of camp at half past six in the morning. It is to march by the Chambersburg Pike on Gettysburg and to be followed by the main body with a mile between the two units. The independent cavalry is to be up and out of camp by six o'clock in the morning. You want your trains to follow your main body five miles behind it and you want them to follow in this order: field trains, first section of the supply trains, ammunition column, the remainder of the supply trains, field hospitals, medical reserve, pack train. You want your independent cavalry to advance on Gettysburg. You want your independent cavalry to reconnoiter all the roads which run out of Gettysburg to the south and east and you want them to get in touch with the cavalry of the corps as soon as possible. You are going to march at the forward end of the reserve of the advance guard. When you have signed your order at Chambersburg where your troops are located, you have it telegraphed to Corps headquarters.

4.—On May the eleventh, 1940, you are in command of the 8th Division of the 19th Corps. You are at Frederick, Maryland, and you want your division to advance toward Gettysburg and to be a protection to your main army which is going to come through the passes of the mountains in that vicinity. You are going to remain in Frederick until half past eight the next morning, and then you are going to go and be with the advance guard at its head. You want your main body to begin to move out when the head is at the first railroad crossing north of the town, and

at ten minutes to seven to follow a mile behind the advance guard which you are going to have march along the Emmitsburg Turnpike. The end of the column ought to be across the first railroad crossing north of the town at half past six in the morning. The enemy's main army is near Baltimore and Washington. You have heard from pretty good sources that a part of his army is in such a condition that any immediate movement is rendered out of the question, though you have reliable word that one of his divisions and possibly more are in fit condition to move toward the frontier. Indeed they may have done so, for already your frontier is being observed by all sorts and kinds of small detachments of the enemy. You want your field trains to come along and get together north of the town as soon as all of the troops have got out. You want them to be divided into two sections and you want the first section to be about two miles in rear of the troops and the second section to come along after the first section with a two mile distance. Your main body in order of march will be, one section of the signal company, the first battalion of the fourth regiment of infantry, the first brigade of Field Artillery without its first battalion, all but the first battalion of the second brigade, all but one company of the first battalion of Engineers, Signal Company A without its detachment, the field artillery combat train, and three ambulance companies. You want the river crossings of the Monocacy and the roads, railroads, and in fact all approaches to them from the east to be especially observed by the Advance Guard. That body will consist of the first brigade, the first battalion of the first field artillery, Company A of the Engineers, the first Ambulance Company and the first section of the Signal Company, all under command of Brigadier General Bates. The first section of the field train will have the following order:

field trains; one section of the supply column; one wagon company of artillery ammunition; and one wagon company of small arms ammunition. The second section: field hospitals, all but two wagon companies of the ammunition column; all but one section of the supply column; medical reserve; and pack trains. You are going to begin this whole march on the next day. Your independent cavalry, commanded by Colonel Fine, and consisting of the first regiment of Cavalry and one section of the Signal Company is to start out at half past five in the morning and cover your whole movement. You want this cavalry to scout around Taneytown and see what it can find on the roads which go off from the southeast from there. The whole army of which you are a part aims to take up an advance movement and it plans to get to Gettysburg on the eighteenth of May. This is the second field order you have issued in this campaign. You send copies of it by your aide Lieut. Kill to Generals Bates, Cutts, Dent, and Eaton; by Lieut. Link to Colonel Fine, Major Good, Captain Hall, and to the commander of the trains. You read the order to your staff, send a copy by mail to Corps Headquarters and telegraph a synopsis to the same place. You sign your order at a quarter after nine.

5.—On June 10, 1925, you are Brigadier General Stewart in command of a Detachment from the ninth division. You are lost. You can find out nothing about the enemy. Indeed you can get no wind of where your own troops are. You assemble all your officers and read at ten minutes after five in the morning an order which you have written at Bonnyville where you are located. You want your whole command to go by way of Whitehall and move toward Levere. You want your field train and ammunition wagon companies, on account of your

ignorance of the enemy to park near the western end of the town where the road runs out. They are to make this maneuver after half past six and are to be in readiness to move to the west or to the east. The advance guard under command of Colonel Dent, and composed of all of the second infantry but the third battalion, is to march on the road past St. Luke's Church and then on the same road toward Whitehall. It is to get past the road fork where the main road goes out of the town at the southeastern edge at twenty minutes to six. You are going to be with the advance guard. You will be up front with the reserve. Your independent cavalry is to march at half past four. It consists of the first squadron of the fifth cavalry under command of Major Curt. It is going to try to get in touch with the enemy. The main body is to come along after the advance guard so that it will be eight hundred yards from the tail of it. Your main body will march in the following order: third battalion of the second infantry, first battalion without the reserve, the third regiment of infantry, the first regiment of infantry, the artillery reserve, the first ambulance company and Signal Company A. Part of your main body is doing outpost duty, and you have told your officer when you issued your order that when the support of the advance guard reached St. Luke's Church the next morning the outpost would stand relieved, and that it would take its place in column after it had closed in to the road, when the troops came along.

(2) ATTACK ORDERS

6.—You are Brigadier General Greene commanding a Detachment of the 18th Division, and on June 11, 1965 you are at the headquarters of your division at St. Luke's Church. You receive reliable messages to the effect that the enemy is in your front about two and a half miles

away. You determine to attack the left of the enemy and to envelop that flank. You want the cavalry to cover your own left flank, and you want the cavalry also to send out patrols to keep a lookout on the right. First of all, though, you want the battalion of artillery to go south via the Newman farm and take a position north of the farm. You want the artillery to begin firing as soon as it arrives in the position designated. You have heard from other patrols coming in that the enemy is taking up a position on a hill in your front about the distance away you had previously estimated. You want the first infantry to form the reserve and you want it to follow in rear of the left flank of the third infantry. The third infantry will take up and follow over the same route as the artillery. After crossing Plum Creek the whole regiment will move to attack the enemy. The regiment will keep its left near the road which runs past Piper and Whitehall. The battalion of artillery when it is moving to its new position should move off the road whenever it is necessary to screen itself from hostile view. The second infantry will attack along the road it is now on. It should not, however, advance beyond the Whitehall School House until the artillery opens fire. It ought then to help along the attack in support of the third infantry. You sign your message at half past six in the morning. You want your first ambulance company to follow the reserve. When the company gets to Plum Creek, however, it should stop there and wait until further orders. You hear that your cavalry out in front has defeated the enemy's cavalry and that the enemy's cavalry is fleeing eastward. You wish to incorporate this fact in your order. You will have some one always ready to receive messages at the cross-roads at the Newman farm if you are not there yourself. You send a copy of this your sixth field order of the cam-

paign by Lieutenant Cost to Major Call. You read the order at half past six to your commanders of infantry regiments, artillery battalion, signal company, and staff officers. You desire the Signal Company to establish a line which will connect you with Bonnyville, and you should have a line to your support commander, who is the commanding officer of the second infantry.

7.—You, on September 1, 1922, are at Kolpatrick School House. You are in command of the 28th Brigade 3d Division, and you issue to your assembled officers by word of mouth the twenty-ninth field order of this campaign at ten minutes after nine in the morning. You send a copy to the Chief of Staff of your Division by an aide. You have just decided to attack a hostile detachment which has just been reported by an officer to be near you and to be about half your strength. In fact this detachment has taken a position on a ridge of long mountains about two and one half miles straight to the south of you. You wish to communicate to your troops, also, that the entire army of which your brigade is a part is engaged in a fight with the enemy; and that the right of the line of the army is near Two Taverns. You do not want the field train to move out and to accompany you in your movement. The third infantry you have decided to make your reserve. It ought to take up some kind of position to the right of the second infantry and in rear of it. The first infantry should move out and should follow the road leading south, and before any of the others of the troops it ought to attack the enemy in front. You want the first infantry to begin their movement right off and then later on to support the enveloping attack. The enveloping attack you have trusted to the second and third infantry regiments. The second followed by the third is to move out with the artillery on their left. The whole body is to

march along Brush Run under cover of a ridge of mountains on which you are located until it comes opposite to the Brush Run School House. The artillery, as you plan it, is then to go into position west of Brush Run School House, and to open fire on the enemy. The second infantry is then to deploy, and it is to deploy so that its right will be about five hundred yards to the left of the artillery's position. The second infantry is then to go right off into an attack on the enemy's right flank. While this body of troops is on the march (the second, and third infantries and the artillery), the commanding officer of the second infantry should see that the necessary precautions are taken against surprise or attack by the enemy. You have decided to be during the attack at the head of the column on the extreme left until it deploys. After that you are going to be with the reserve. The first squadron of the fourth cavalry under your command is going to cover your left in this movement. It should send out strong patrols to the right besides sending them to the left and get in touch with the right of the main army. The ambulance will go along with the third infantry. But when the third Infantry gets to Cedar Ridge, the ambulance company will not proceed any further.

8.—On the 6th of January, 1930, you are Brigadier General Hitt in command of the first Brigade, first Division. You are at Ode, Missouri. You defeated the enemy the day before. You have since heard that he is occupying the line which extends from Baldwin to the hill south of Eppley's Farm. You have an advance guard for your Brigade and you decide to take up an attack formation which will not necessitate the use of an advance guard any longer. The trains you feel should not be moved from where they are located, but the ambulance company ought to move toward, and take a suitable position near, Ode.

You decide to attack immediately, and you are going to do so in a way which will cause the enemy's left to be enveloped. You issue the 61st field order of the campaign at half past nine in the morning.

You understand from reliable sources, in fact from officers' patrols, that there is a large convoy of the enemy parked somewhere in Farley. You decide that the first infantry ought to take up the main advance against the enemy, and you think it ought to go in a general direction along the road which runs past Square Corners and Eppley. After the 1st Infantry has launched its attack it ought to support the attack of the 2d Infantry. The 3d Infantry is going to send the 2d Infantry a machine gun company, which you think you will have attached to the 2d Infantry. The 2d Infantry, you have figured out, ought to advance, keeping the ravine near Meas between itself and the enemy. After it strikes the ravine, it ought to go along it until the first part of the column approaches and comes up to a point where the ravine starts to bend south. When it has exactly reached that point where the ravine does bend south, it ought to start out on the enemy's left in an attack. The 2d Infantry ought to push this attack with all its might. The 3d Infantry will be known as a reserve, and it will be under your orders; until further orders it ought to take up a position in some sheltered place to the west of Square Corners. Before it starts out, however, it ought to send its machine gun company, without further delay, so that the company may report to the commander of the 1st Infantry as soon as practicable. You give all this order to your regimental commanders after they have been assembled—in fact, you read it off to them. With the regimental commanders have been assembled also Major Black of the 7th Field Artillery, and the officers in charge of the ambulance com-

pany, and the officers of your staff. You are going to send a copy of this order by the aide to your Division Commander. You are going to have a station at the reserve where you will be in touch with any messages that might come in—in fact, all the messages ought to be sent there. You want the cavalry to cover your left flank, and you want a strong patrol sent in the general direction of the west and also of the south. Before you finished writing this order you found out that the bridges over the Platte River were all destroyed. The Platte River runs along the rear of the enemy. All those bridges which are between Platte City and Farley you know are destroyed; you hear also that the enemy is at work repairing them. From all the messages and all sources of information which you can assemble, you estimate that it will require two or three hours to make these bridges safe for troops. You want the 1st Battalion of the 7th Field Artillery to move out straight to the south and to take up a position 500 yards south of where you are writing your message. When the artillery gets there, you want it to open fire just as soon as it can on the enemy's position wherever that might be. You want your artillery to make the enemy's artillery a target, and to develop that target as soon as possible.

9.—On the 17th of May, 1919, you are in command of the 1st Division of the 18th Corps. Your division is encamped near Mt. St. Mary's. You want your division to attack the enemy right away and you want him to go around so he will develop the left of the enemy. Your first ambulance company ought to follow the Field Artillery to where Hampton Valley starts, and it ought to stay there until further orders. Your second ambulance company you want to go along with and follow the 3d Brigade. This ambulance company ought to go as far as the crossing of Beaver Branch, and then it should stay there and

not go away until further orders. The third and fourth ambulance companies should not move out at all, but ought to park somewhere near the road near the place called Rodey. The field hospitals will not move out at all, but ought to stay until you send them orders to the contrary. In the place called Thurmont, there ought to be a collecting station for the slightly wounded. Your first artillery ought to move out at once down Hampton Valley and take a position somewhere near the road which runs through Emmitsburg and along past St. Joseph's Academy. The 2d Field Artillery should find a position and take it up somewhere near Motters. The 3d Brigade, which we found the second ambulance company was to follow, should move out and then go along by Motters and launch an attack on the enemy; the 3d Brigade ought to envelop the enemy's left. The left of the 3d Brigade ought to rest on the line which runs through the place called Motters, and also runs through Tom's Creek Church. The Brigade Commander of the 3d Brigade will have the general line of the Monocacy Creek under observation of mounted men. This line ought to be kept in under observation pretty well south—in fact, to the mouth of Hunting Creek. The main attack will be launched, as you figured, all along the front, which is determined by a line running through St. Joseph's Academy and also running through Long's.

The brigade commander of this brigade ought to detail a battalion of infantry; the special duty of this battalion will be to form an escort for the 1st Field Artillery which it will accompany. One wagon company of artillery ammunition will go down to the mouth of Hampton Valley. You have heard that there is a great party of the enemy, which has been estimated at say two-thirds of a division, and that this big force is assembling and concentrating in rear of the outlying timber. This fringe of timber ex-

tends from Tom's Creek Church all the way north to near Parkersburg. This hostile force averages about 50 yards south of this timber. The first cavalry you feel ought to cover your left. You feel that the reconnaissance that it ought to take up must be strong, dashing, and vigorous, and that it should reconnoiter east of the Monocacy. You write your order, which is the third one during the year, at 9 o'clock in the morning.

Your Signal Company will lay a line from the 1st Field Artillery to the road-fork, 500 yards west of Round Corners. A second line will be laid from the 2d Brigade to the same road-fork. Your leading wagon company of small arms ammunition should be placed just north of Riley. You want to state to the remainder of your trains that they are not to move out from there until they get orders from you. You send copies of this order to Majors Black, Cord, Darwin, Enfield, Colonel Forse, Major Good, and Captain Harrow. You report by telegraph to your Division Headquarters what you have said in your order. The 2d Brigade is going to be your general reserve; it should take up a position outside near the cross-roads. This cross-roads that you mean is 1,500 yards west of Motters. Any messages and reports which are going to come to you, you want to have reach you at the road-fork, which is about 2,000 yards west of the place called Motters.

10.—You are Brigadier General Aaron in charge of a detachment of the 1st Division. You are about to get out your fourth field order of the campaign, which you issued and signed at ten minutes to seven on the morning of October 6, 1918. Your Chief of Staff is Lieutenant Bean. The main body, of which you are a part, is engaged with the enemy at the present time. The two bodies opposed to each other, fighting strenuously, extend from near the

Belmont School House toward the north. You want the 1st Infantry to advance via the 530-618 road, and you want it to deploy whenever it is necessary for it to do so. You want it to deploy with its left flank touching the 548-618 road. After it has done this you want it to attack at the same time that the 2d Infantry does. Your artillery you want to move out by way of the road which runs through 542 and 550, and you want it to go so it will get a position somewhere near the Hill 608; it will be escorted by the 1st Battalion of the 2d Infantry. You want this artillery to support the attack in the best way it can. The 1st Battalion of the 2d Infantry should take up such formation and movement as will best provide protection for the left of your whole line. The whole of the 2d Infantry, of course, excepting the first battalion, will advance by 452. It will then take a cut across country and then by the road which goes by 546 and 548. The 2d Infantry will attack the enemy's right flank. The cavalry should cover the left of your own troops and make strong reconnoissance of the country to the north and also to the west. A troop of this Cavalry should be sent over to the right flank of our troops. The work of this troop should be to get into communication and keep communication with your main army by telegraph. You want the Signal Detachment to give you wire communications, or in fact, any kind of communications which will best keep you in touch with the 1st Infantry. You are at the cross-roads near Mt. Vernon School House when you write your order. You have learned that there is a body of the enemy, a rather large body in fact, which is going into some position selected near Granite Hill. You gain from reliable patrols all the above information, and also the fact that this detachment of the enemy is about one-half your own strength. You decide that you are going

to attack at once this detachment which is just spoken of, which is going into a position near Granite Hill. If it is going into position, and if it is now only one-half your strength, you can see that there are two reasons why you must launch your attack with the utmost vigor and celerity, because the enemy might gain reinforcements, or a good position in the meantime. You state in your order that you are going to be with the reserve all the time, and you send copies to all your officers, especially to Major Good who is commanding the cavalry, and you report what you have done by telegraph to the Chief of Staff. You decide to have the 3d Infantry be the reserve. If the 3d Infantry is the reserve and you are with it, it ought to be under your orders. The 3d Infantry will follow along behind the 2d Infantry until the latter regiment deploys.

11.—You are Major-General Plunkitt. On the 3d of September, 1923, you are near the town of Guldens. You are in command of the 4th Division of the 12th Corps. You issue a written order by your Chief of Staff, who is Lt. Col. Miley, at a quarter of eight in the morning of this day. You propose that your division shall make a vigorous attack upon the enemy, and that you will break through his outpost line. Your intention is to go on through with all speed to Gettysburg. You are going to be near the Plank Farm when this is happening. The two troops of cavalry who are now with your advance guard, or really have just been with your advance guard, are going to continue covering your left flank as they have been doing. The 3d Brigade will march from near the I. P. Plank Farm, and it will proceed north on the road which runs north from that farm. Now, it will keep going on that road until it gets to the woods and then it will advance to the northwest of the railroad, and go

against the enemy. The 2d Brigade and Engineer Battalion are going to make up the reserve. They are going to be under your orders directly, and they, in order to make this attack successful will take a position somewhere under cover northwest of Granite Hill. Colonel Field of your cavalry will cover your right flank with those of his regiment who are not covering the left. He ought to assemble his main body right now somewhere on the Harrisburg road. You are writing this 7th field order since the first of the year at a quarter to eight in the morning when information from officers' patrols comes in that there is only one division of the enemy in Gettysburg, and that he has lost heavily by casualties in the fight you have had with it the day before. You learn also at the same time that there is an outpost line of the enemy, which is extending from Body School House to McAllister Hill. This outpost line crosses the road you are on and your troops are on, at Hill 618; you find out also that Wolff Hill is full of the enemy. The artillery of your command you figure ought to take up some position to the west of Granite Hill, and that it should open fire on the enemy as soon as the enemy has been discovered. The Signal Company should connect you and your headquarters with all of the commanders of the first, third, and artillery Brigades. You send copies of all these orders by Lieut. Knight to your four brigade commanders, and also to the officers in charge of the first section of your train; you read it off to your staff, and you send a copy by an orderly to the second section of your train. Your ambulance companies are going to park near the right fork of 617, and you are going to camp east of this fork, which is northeast of Granite Hill. You want the first sections of your trains to go and park at Guldens, and you want the second section not to budge from where it is now stationed. Your

first brigade should continue its advance along the road you are on, and when it becomes necessary finally to deploy, they should deploy across this road. After they have deployed they ought to take up the attack at once and go forward with Hill 618 as their objective. There are about a thousand of your troops, you learn, who are wounded in Gettysburg; then, too, there are many wounded who are now held as prisoners of war in Gettysburg where a division of the enemy is stationed, and where it has lost heavily.

CHAPTER VIII

MORE PROBLEMS OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE FIELD ORDER

(3) ORDER FOR POSITION IN READINESS

1.—You are Major General Tuttill in command of the 10th Division of the 3d Corps, which is at Taneytown. On June 3, 1952, your division has been designated to keep a certain force of the enemy out of a battle which is going to take place with your whole army. This hostile force is directly in your front. You determine therefore to take up a position in readiness on the south side of Pipe Creek. You have been encamped with the outpost. You want this outpost and the cavalry which is attached to your command, to watch out for the retirement of your whole division to this position in readiness. After that, this whole outpost is to withdraw to Keymar. They are to get to Keymar by going over the road through Bruceville. The commander of the outpost will be notified when he will begin this withdrawal. The enemy, you have learned, is directly in your front and has gone into camp along Piney Creek near the village of Piney Creek toward the north. The third brigade is to start at 4 o'clock in the morning and is to march directly to Keymar, and the artillery brigade, all but one battalion, will start out at the same hour and will go around by Otterdale mill and will go to Montunion Church. The first brigade should march the very same hour with its destination to be near the vicinity of a small amount of woods, which are about 1,000 yards in a southerly direction from Trevanion. Your army on this very day crossed the Monocacy. During the ex-

pedition, they don't meet with very much opposition, so that they intend on the next day to attack the main body of the enemy which is somewhere in the vicinity of Mt. Ary. Your signal company should leave the third brigade. When the signal company gets to Keymar, it should connect up that place with the station of the first brigade; it should put in on this line a station for the artillery brigade. In addition, the signal company ought to keep up a line of communication with the outpost until the outpost is withdrawn. You, as the commanding general of this division want to notify all your troops about a certain fact which applies to every one—namely, that the staff officers should go along with the infantry brigade before mentioned, and should pick out and mark points which are to be entrenched. Your engineer battalion will start to march at the same hour as the other troops mentioned above. They are to strike then across to Middleburg and then they are to go to places which are to be picked out by the chief of staff, and when they get to those places they are to assist in the entrenching. You decide that you are going to go to Taneytown and stay there until the outpost is withdrawn. You want the field trains to start out at three o'clock in the morning, and these should go along and follow in the course which has been already designated for the respective units to which the field trains belong. These field trains are to cross the Pipe Creek and are to assemble at Woodsburg. All the other columns of the trains will start out at the same hour as the troops. The ammunition columns and the two field hospitals are to halt at Ladysburg; all the others halt at Woodsburg. You issue this order at 10 o'clock in the evening and you sign it yourself, and you send copies of this, your 10th field order of the campaign, to all officers who come to your headquarters to receive orders.

(4) THE DEFENSE ORDER

2.—You are Major General Standish. You have just received word that the enemy to which you are opposed has been very heavily reenforced and has now about two divisions in the town of Taneytown. Your main army is not going to leave until the 19th, and then it will get as far as Marshall probably. You are in command of the 21st division of the 8th corps, and you are south of Emmitsburg on the 17th day of May, 1945. You decide that you can't do anything else but take up a defensive position. You accordingly want to make your division occupy a position extending from McKee Knob to the northeast. You want the second brigade, which is going to be reenforced by the first cavalry and also by the 2d battalion, 1st field artillery to cover this movement, to take up a defensive position. General Calhoun of the second brigade has to put in place of the infantry of his brigade on the southern line of outpost, certain cavalry patrols. These cavalry patrols will come from two corps which have been sent to General Calhoun, or at least have been ordered to report to him at Motters at one o'clock in the morning. General Calhoun should relieve the outpost of the third brigade at two o'clock in the morning, and of the first at three o'clock in the morning. The first brigade, after its outpost is relieved, should immediately take up the march, going up the road which runs through Emmitsburg and Liberty Hall School House. It should halt when it gets northeast of 656. General Calhoun has to be placed in command in order to carry out his part of the situation as to certain other troops—in fact, the 2d battalion of the 1st field artillery, and the 1st cavalry, should now become a part of his command. The 2d battalion of the 1st field artillery is at the northeastern outskirts of the town of

Emmitsburg, and the 1st cavalry has its headquarters at Fairplay; he will begin to command these troops at two o'clock in the morning. You write, at 11 o'clock at night, your sixth field order and send copies by Lieut. Fright to Generals Byrd, Carr, Dale, and to Colonel Fink and Captain Hervey. You read the message off to your staff and report by telegraph to army headquarters what you have done. You decide to have your third brigade, after this outpost is relieved, march by way of Emmitsburg from Four Points. Then the brigade is to march by the road just east of McKee Knob to a position half a mile north of 587; there the brigade will halt. General Calhoun should delay the crossing of the river by the enemy. He should do this as much as he is able, but he should not become too closely engaged with the enemy. You decide that you will be at Emmitsburg until after 5 o'clock in the morning; then you are going to be at Liberty Hall School House. The signal company will take up what lines it has laid down after two o'clock in the morning. Then one-half of the company will report to Brigadier General Calhoun, and the remainder of the signal company will proceed to join the 3d brigade. You want your entire command to know that there is to be on no occasion any unnecessary noise and that this noise is to be avoided at all hazards. You do not wish a bugle call to be sounded before the sun rises.

3.—On the 4th of June, 1964, you are Major General Boswell in command of the first division of the fourth army corps. Your division is west of Gettysburg. You hear that the enemy in your front is at Cashtown and has been heavily reenforced. The troops for these reenforcements have come from his main army. This gives you the idea that you had better take up a defensive position; you had better take up this position astride the road which you

now are on and you must hold this position throughout the day. Your third brigade should start right away to make preparations for the defense. They should take up a line in their defense preparations extending from somewhere east of Seven Stars, and should continue this line to the southwest for about three-quarters of a mile. The first cavalry should send two platoons to report to the Major who commands the engineer battalion near Moonsburg. These should be sent if the enemy advance in force, and they should be sent with the patrol on your right flank. The main body of this cavalry should patrol the left of your line to cover it. The 2d brigade will prepare for defense a line extending from near Seven Stars northwest. It should extend this line until it reaches the farm road which crosses the ridge. The 1st brigade will be the reserve. They are going to be under your direct orders; they should therefore remain midway between Knoxville and 597. There is a road fork there where they should stay. The engineer battalion will go at once and prepare the high ground southwest of Moonsburg for defense, and in this defense which they will make at this point, they are to act as a right flank guard. The ambulance companies will be held near the north end of Herr Ridge. You have a second field hospital which you have established at Gettysburg and you want it to stay there. You want your first, third, and fourth field hospitals at the western outskirts of Gettysburg. You want these first, third, and fourth field hospitals to assemble by the road somewhere there. Company A of your signal corps you decide to have lay certain lines. All these lines should go from the position of the reserve to the second field artillery, and on this line there should be a station so that the commander of the second brigade could cut in, and then Company A also should lay a line from the first field artillery

to the reserve. On this line also, the commander of the third brigade should have a station where he can go. The signal company also ought to arrange to have receiving stations for flag signals for the engineer battalion, and ought to do the same thing for the cavalry on the left flank. Two wagon companies of small arms ammunition should be held near 585, and another wagon company of artillery ammunition near 587. You are going to be at Division Headquarters at 597. Your second field artillery should set out at once to the road leading southwest about half a mile from Moonsburg; it should move around the Moonsburg road to do this. It should then go by this road, which leads southwest, to an intersection of that road to the next farm road. The Colonel of the second field artillery should prepare a position in this vicinity which would be capable of supporting the entire line of defense when this line was attacked. The first field artillery should go about half a mile south of this camp; it should proceed around by the road parallel to the Chambersburg road, and should go as far as a point one mile south of Seven Stars. When it gets there it should select and prepare a position to support the defense. You want all the other trains which you have not mentioned not to move out from where they are, but want them to be ready to move in any direction at your command. You know that your main army is going to attack the weaker hostile force, which is in its front, on the very morning your order is issued. You also know that if your own army is successful in this attack, it will send you later some reenforcements if you really need them. You write this order at twenty minutes of five in the morning. You send copies of this, your sixth field order, since the beginning of the campaign, to all officers who have been sent under your order to receive them.

(5) RETREAT ORDER

4.—On May the 2d, 1919, at 4 a. m., you wish copies of this your 12th field order since the beginning of the year sent to the commanders of the first brigade, the artillery brigade, and the 10th cavalry by Lieut. Alber; to the commanders of the second brigade, the engineer battalion, the signal company, and the chief surgeon by Captain Cutts; to the commander of the third brigade, and to Major Quincy by Sgt. Donohue. Your name is Major General Slump. You are in command of the second division of the third army corps. Your division is at Platte City, Missouri. There are two divisions of the enemy who are coming down against Platte City from the north. You know this to be reliable information, and you know, also, that one division of the enemy went into camp last night before you found out that the outposts of that division were six miles north of Tracy on the road that runs through Tracy and Severn. The other division, you know, camped six miles further to the north. You give, in your order, the direction that the first brigade is to take up a position on the west end of the farm road which runs west from Nile. You want this brigade to be prepared to make all sorts of resistance—in fact, you want it to delay the enemy's advance, and to hold this position until you order it to retire further. You decide really that your whole division should go into a position west of the Platte river. Your idea is that it should hold back the enemy there, and should hold it back sufficiently until the trains can be withdrawn. When the trains are all withdrawn, then you ought to be able to make an orderly retreat in the general direction of the Nile. At the crack of dawn the next day, you figure that the cavalry ought to begin going out and looking for the enemy with all possible speed and vigilance. And then, too, you think that the cavalry

ought to look out especially for your left flank. Your second brigade should start out at ten minutes to five the next morning. It should go to "E" and should close up off the road near "E," and should march by the B-D road. This brigade is to be the second line and it should take up such a position and be in such a state as to hold back any movement of the enemy which should come in this direction. If it is going to be necessary, this second brigade ought to cover the troops of the first line who are withdrawing. The engineer battalion should be ready to march out at half past four; it ought to follow immediately behind the artillery brigade until the engineer battalion gets somewhere beyond Tracy. The signal company will be ready to march at twenty-five minutes of five and to follow the battalion of engineers until the signal company gets to the southeast corner of Tracy. The advance should move out in this way: the supply trains, the ammunition columns, the bridge train, and the field hospital will march at a quarter of four and they should march toward Leavenworth. They should go by the road that runs two miles east of Platte City through 56 and 54. The field train of the first brigade will clear "15" at 4 o'clock. The field train of the second brigade, the engineer battalion, the signal company, ambulance companies, and division headquarters, in the order named, will move out toward 56 at half past five in the morning. These trains just enumerated will follow the division trains. The baggage of the third brigade, and the artillery brigade will proceed to Leavenworth and will go by the road which runs through 56 and 54. The baggage will go any prescribed distance as far as 50; during this move it will follow the third brigade. You want Major Quincy to be put in charge of all the division trains—in fact, you want him to be put in charge of all the trains that join his column, and you want him

to regulate the march. You want messages sent to you between five o'clock in the morning and the time of the withdrawal of the first line to the small orchard which is between 13 and 15. After that time you want messages sent to you at "12." One section of your artillery ammunition, and one section of your small arms ammunition are to be at a point between 50 and 52 at six o'clock in the morning. All the other sections of the ammunition column will be on the road between Alexander and "50" after one o'clock in the morning. The ambulance companies will march at 5:30 a. m., and park by the road near "B." The road fork at "14" will be the collecting station for the slightly wounded. The artillery brigade will get into position as follows: one regiment about one mile north of "15," the other somewhere near a mile north on the road 1,100 yards northwest of 13. The artillery command should open fire as soon as the enemy is seen anywhere, or, in any strength, at any time.

(6) PURSUIT ORDER

5.—You are Major General Jervey in command of the 12th division 6th corps. You have just defeated the enemy, and you have defeated him so badly that he is retreating in great disorder in the direction of Gettysburg. You are near Cashtown when you issue your 12th field order of the campaign. It is twenty minutes to four in the afternoon, June 12, 1925, when you issue to your brigade commanders, and to Lt. Col. Miles, Colonel Forse, Major Good, and Captain Harrow copies of your order. You decide to pursue the enemy without any delay. You want your second brigade, which is now without the 6th infantry which ordinarily belongs to that brigade, to reform itself, and you want the second brigade at half past four to follow the third brigade in the general direction

of Gettysburg. The third brigade, which is under the command of Brigadier General Dunn, you think ought to advance at once. You are going to reenforce it, however, with the second infantry, the second field artillery, and the first cavalry. The third brigade ought, by all reasonable surmise, to drive the enemy inside of Gettysburg or even beyond Gettysburg. After the third brigade with this reinforcement has done so, it ought to seize the whole of the McPherson Ridge and hold it. Two companies from the second brigade ought to be detailed to report to the division surgeon there. They should assist him in policing all the field. You are going to be at Seven Stars as soon as you can get there and you are going to start at five o'clock. All but one squadron of the first cavalry will move out by the north of Gettysburg. You plan that it shall be the first cavalry's object to interrupt communication and delay traffic on the railroad there, and then it ought to reconnoiter in the general direction of the east. The first brigade you think ought to follow the first field artillery. The first brigade you figure should select two companies from its organization and detail them to report to the division surgeon. Those two companies should assist in policing all the battle field. The first field artillery will follow the second brigade: this regiment should detail an officer and thirty men, and this officer and thirty men ought to do the same thing as the two companies from the first brigade were detailed to do. The division will have entire charge of the policing of the field. A field hospital ought to be established at Cashtown. Cars will be available for the division surgeon by five o'clock at Ortanna. The evacuation of the wounded, therefore, should be through Ortanna. The whole of the first battalion of engineers will report to the division surgeon and go under his orders.

(7) **HALT ORDER**

6.—You are Brigadier General Short; you are in command of a detachment from the first division. You have just decided that your whole command should go into camp for the whole night. Your command is at Bonnyville. You want to let your troops know that your cavalry has come in contact with hostile cavalry, and that this attack was made near Whitehall. About an hour after the issue of your message your cavalry drove back the hostile cavalry toward Littlestown. You want the second infantry to camp in a field southwest of the town in which your division is now located. You want your first battalion of your fourth artillery to camp in a field northwest of the same town. You understand from a patrol which has just reported to you, that at noon a column of the enemy was on the march going west, and that at that time the advance guard of this column of the enemy was at Center School House. You decide to place the first infantry in a camp northwest of Sweet Home School House. There this first infantry is to establish an outpost. The outpost is to extend from Hill 627 on the north, along through St. Luke's Church up into a place called Coshun. You want to notify the first infantry of your command, that in case it is attacked, the line which has just been designated will be the one to be held. Your third infantry you want to have camp in a field north of the town in which you are. You want your field trains to join their organizations; that is, the organization to which they ordinarily belong, and you want this done right away. You yourself at your own headquarters are going to camp where the main street comes out of the western end of this town at which you are located. At one o'clock in the afternoon of June 2, 1930, you deliver this order verbally to your advance guard commander, to all your columns

of infantry, to your artillery commander, and all your staff; you send one of your aides with a copy of the order to Major Kline of the fifth cavalry, Captain Quigley who is in charge of the train, and to Captain Supple of the signal corps. This is the 7th field order you have written in this campaign. Signal Company A is to be camped west of the second infantry, and the first ambulance company is to be near the signal company. All the ammunition companies are to be camped near the farm house called Lawrence. The first squadron of the 5th cavalry ought, you figure, to camp somewhere near and west of the artillery.

7.—The enemy has been retreating; he is continuing his retreat. Your troops know that he has been retreating, but they do not know that he is continuing his retreat. In fact, he is retreating in great disorder. He is retreating in such great disorder that he is offering no show of resistance to any of your troops who are pursuing him. You are Major General Plight in command of the first division of the first army corps. You are on the Baltimore Turnpike near White Run. You decide to have your advance guard camp north of Two Taverns and to establish an outpost line. They are to have a line of observation and keep on the alert on that line of observation which will extend from Bonnyville through German-town to the cross roads at 568. The first brigade will come between the two branches of White Run, which are north of the road just mentioned. The artillery brigade, with one battalion gone, will camp along the road which runs through the western branch of White Run. The ambulance companies, you figure, should camp south on the road just mentioned and west of White Run. Your division headquarters you decide to have placed west of the farm house. This farm house is located west of where the

road you are on crosses over Rock Creek. You wish to tell your command that orders will be issued from these headquarters at nine o'clock. Your whole command, you decide, should halt for the whole night. Your second brigade should camp just north of the road where you are located, and just west of a road known by the name of Low Dutch. This 2d brigade should have a detached post which it will detail for outpost duty. Such a post should be in observation of the cross roads at 530. This cross roads is just west of the Mt. Vernon School House. The engineer battalion should camp south of the road you are on and east of White Run. The signal company should camp at a spot where the road you are on goes across Rock Creek. You want the signal company to lay a wire from there to the outpost, and you want the signal company to have a station on this wire or line at a place indicated by 489. You want your outpost to know that if they are attacked they will be supported by you. You give copies of this order to the officers who are sent from the various commands to get the orders. You issue the order at a quarter after two in the afternoon of June 2, 1935. They are the 77th field orders you have issued in this campaign. Your field trains ought to join their commands right off. You want the remaining trains to go into park on the main battlefield of Gettysburg. You decide that issues of supplies will be best made from the supply column and that these issues should be made at half past five in the morning. The place you decide from which such issues should be made is 523. Your supply wagons, which have been emptied, ought to proceed to Ortanna for the night. There they should fill up with supplies and come back and join early the next day.

(8) THE OUTPOST ORDER

8.—You are Colonel Fluke of the 99th infantry, and you are located near Bonnyville. You decide to establish an outpost, and you decide that your regiment should go into camp in the vicinity of Sweet Home School House. The outpost should extend from Hill 627 at the northern extremity, and then go on through St. Luke's Church, and should extend to the right fork at 587 at its southern extremity. This road fork at 587 is south of the Coshun place. You want the line of support to be held if you are attacked. Your line of support will be at one, two, three, four, and five, in order. Your support No. 1 will take a position near the road fork at 587, about a mile southwest of Bonnyville. This support will cover the sector from the stream on the west to the first stream on its east both inclusive. Frequent patrols will be made to the Baltimore Turnpike. You issue this, your first field order, at half past one on the afternoon of June 2, 1950. You deliver this order in person by reading it after you have assembled all your field officers, your staff officers, and your company commanders. You decide that you will be at the Sweet Home School House during the continuation of the outpost. Your cavalry on this very day came in contact with some cavalry of the enemy. About noon at Whitehall this occurrence took place. There your cavalry drove back the enemy's cavalry toward Littlestown. From reliable patrols you get a report that at noon, the very same time that this occurrence took place, a large column of the enemy was seen to be coming west. The head of the advance guard of this platoon of the enemy was then at Center School House. Your Support No. 1, in command of Captain Link, will consist of Company G and four mounted scouts. Support No. 3, you decide to go into a position near St. Luke's Church. It

ought to be responsible for the sector of ground which you designate to extend from the stream about 500 yards south of St. Luke's Church, on to a farm house 1,000 yards northeast from a point 500 yards south of St. Luke's Church. You wish to include both these extremities in the sector of Support No. 3. Support No. 3 ought to patrol the road which runs past Whitehall School House. The reserve ought to camp near the Sweet Home School House. Support No. 5 should take a position on the north slope Hill 627; the duty of Support No. 5 ought to consist of connecting with Support No. 3, and of covering by their observations the road forks of 601 and 598. Support No. 5 will consist of 2d Lieut. Prince and the first section of Company I. Support No. 4 should go and take a position at a point on the Hanover road. This point is the place where the Hanover road joins with the Bihl farm road. Support No. 4 will cover the ground around Support No. 3, and the road fork at 597. This road fork is north of Square Corners. Support No. 4 will include in its observations the points mentioned as the extremities of this section. Support No. 2 should take a position somewhere near the road fork of 617; this road fork is just about a mile and a quarter south of the camp where you are. Support No. 2 should cover the territory which is included in the ground around the stream, which is west on the road for 617, to a point 500 yards east of this road fork. The reserve should consist of the first infantry, of which five companies will already have been taken out, and also fourteen scouts. You want the wagons of the field trains to go ahead right away and join the organizations to which they ordinarily belong. Support No. 3 is to be under the command of Captain Nutt, and is to consist of Company H and six mounted scouts. Those wagons of the field trains, which belong to the companies

in support, will join the wagons of the regimental headquarters; they will do this by eight o'clock in the evening. Support No. 3, under the command of Captain Nelson, will consist of Company I, excepting the first section, and two mounted orderlies. Support No. 2, under the command of Major King, will consist of the second battalion, all except Companies G and H and will also consist of four mounted scouts. You want to tell your troops that your brigade to which your regiment belongs is about to go into camp in the vicinity of Bonnyville.

MARCH ORDERS WITH ADVANCE AND REAR GUARD

9.—On the 4th of September, 1956, you are Major Britton. You are in command of the fourth division of the 19th army corps and you are about to issue an order which will keep your division on the march on the next morning; you have been marching. At 10 o'clock at night you issue your order near Abbottstown, stating that you yourself are going to be at the head of your main body. You feel that you should march in the general direction of York on the next day. Your main body in this order of march will consist of the first infantry, of the second battalion of the 8th field artillery, of the third brigade, of signal company "D," and of the four ambulance companies. Your main body should move out so as to come along behind the advance guard, so that the tail of the advance guard will be 1,000 yards ahead of the head of the main body itself. Wagon trains should move out so that they in turn will come along behind the main body, so that the head of the lead horses will be 1,000 yards behind the tail of the main body. You are in such a position between two large forces of the enemy that you must have a rear guard. This rear guard will be in command of Major General Huff. It will consist of the first cavalry division, of the second brigade, of the 7th field artillery,

of the 4th battalion of engineers, and of the 1st, 2d, and 3d ambulance companies. You hear that the enemy has probably been reenforced and that this reenforcement probably consists of a brigade of cavalry. You also hear, just when you issue this, your 7th field order of the campaign, that there are some hostile infantrymen near York, say, about a brigade. The rear guard, you figure, ought indeed to keep the enemy in check. A rear guard of this nature ought to resist any advancement on the part of the enemy until your advance guard can open a road through York. The first cavalry division, you have knowledge, is bivouacking near where you are. It has, indeed, reported for duty in connection with the work of the division.

The idea of the last two chapters has been to put a jumbled military decision into good working form. The object has not been to solve tactical problems, but rather to put the ideas correctly expressed into their logical places.

CHAPTER IX

THE VERBAL FIELD ORDER

“The initial combat orders of a division are almost invariably written; those of the brigade are generally so. The written order is preferable and is used wherever time permits. Subsequent orders are likewise written either as field orders or messages.”* In chapters VII and VIII we actually practiced the expression of the field orders for the higher units. We illustrated to ourselves how difficult it was to express disordered and straggling thoughts in the most direct way. We did this work for two purposes: first, to gain facility in dealing with language, and second, to go through with a part of the mental process demanded of commanders in the field. We should have found out how perplexing it is to put the new-born decision into form.

We now progress in our development to a more difficult performance. We are going to discard our pencil. Just as we took up the practice of speaking a field message after we had been drilled in writing it, so here we are going to learn to dictate the field order after we have been schooled in composing it.

“The initial combat orders of regiments and smaller units are given verbally. For this purpose the subordinates for whom the orders are intended are assembled, if practicable, at a place from which the situation and plan can be explained. Subsequent orders are verbal or are in the form of verbal or written messages.”† The verbal field order, then, may be divided into two classes:

* Infantry Drill Reg. par. 378.

† Infantry Drill Reg. par. 379.

(1) The initial combat order.

(2) The subsequent order, in the form of a field message.

Number 1 follows implicitly the sequence of the body of the written field order. Number 2 follows the form of the written or verbal message.

What really happens in action is this. A regiment or battalion commander, after he has arrived at a decision by way of his estimate of a situation, assembles his subordinate officers. He recites to them his order. He points out on the map and on the ground the various places to which he refers in his order. He gives an opportunity, when he has finished, for his officers to ask questions. He then dismisses them.

The asking of questions is delaying. It mars efficiency; and it points either to faulty expression on the part of the commander or to inattention on the part of his audience.

After the subordinates have returned to their commands and have set out upon the accomplishment of the mission, it is of course impossible to reassemble them during the progress of the engagement. Often, too, the colonel or major desires to issue instructions to but one or two officers of the command at a time. Number 2, therefore, becomes the natural means of communication until the conflict is over or the situation is passed. When a new situation arises the commander assembles his officers as before, and the procedure throughout is repeated.

Let us suppose, now, that a colonel, faced with a new or changed situation, wishes to make his will known to his subordinates. When his officers are assembled he speaks as follows:

“It is reliably reported that two battalions of the enemy are entrenching on that hill (he points out the hill) one mile to the southeast of here. Their position extends from

the Jordan River to the Wellington Road, both inclusive. Our main body is at Tarrytown. (He points toward Tarrytown both on the ground and map.) We will attack at once enveloping the enemy's left.

The First Battalion will attack the hostile trenches from the Jordan River, exclusive, to the Darlington House, exclusive. The Second Battalion will attack the hostile trenches from the Darlington House, inclusive, to the west, and will envelop the enemy's right. The Third Battalion and machine gun companies, in reserve, will follow the Second Battalion. Ambulances and combat wagons will assemble at Main Station. Battalions will maintain semaphore communications with the reserve where I shall be."

The Regimental Adjutant writes down this order immediately after its issue, gives it its proper heading and ending, and files it away. It thus becomes a written field order and a part of the records of the regiment. Copies of it are sent to higher commanders.

Let us imagine that the attack is well under way, and that the regiment is holding its own, but is not progressing as it should. The colonel decides to increase the size of the enveloping body. He therefore calls a staff officer to him and says:

"Go over to Major Swift, in command of the third battalion, and tell him to send K and L Companies to extend our right. Repeat."

The staff officer replies,—“I am to go to Major Swift, in command of the third battalion and am to say to him that the Regimental Commander directs him to have K and L Companies extend the right of our line.”

We must notice that the initial field order, when spoken, has exactly the same arrangement and brevity of expres-

sion as when written. Of course, the heading and ending are omitted. But the distribution of troops, if necessary for small units, would follow what would be paragraph 2 in a written order. The relation which exists between the verbal and written message holds true in principle for the field order.

In the following problems read over the matter several times. Put it in orderly arrangement in your mind before you speak. Then utter it in the most brief and unmistakable form.

Cautions.—(1) *Only oral solutions will prove valuable in working these problems. The student should make only such notes as will enable him to carry the problem in his mind. Proper notes would include the organizations, their present situations, etc.—things which an actual commander would know as a matter of course.*

(2) *Once begun on the order, the student should pay no heed to a false start, but should continue to the end. It is better to remake the entire order, than to patch the faults. He should not permit himself to change a previous statement, begin a new sentence in the midst of an unfinished one, or hesitate unreasonably. He must take care not only to express the matter in proper form, but also to enunciate so distinctly that any one within hearing may understand him.*

Intentional rhetorical errors will be found in the problems which follow. Watch for them.

PROBLEMS IN THE VERBAL FIELD ORDER

1.—You are Colonel Foote, halted with your regiment in Goldenville. You have previously sent out Lieutenant Lasker toward Gettysburg for information. He has just

sent you a message. You have made up your mind from the facts in his message that you will march south at once and that you will march in the direction of Gettysburg. You desire the first battalion and the Machine Gun Company to be the Advance Guard for your regiment. The remainder of the regiment will follow the first battalion in order as follows: second battalion, third battalion, band, and ambulances. The field trains are not to move out but are to stay behind until they get orders from you. They are to remain at Texas. The message from Lieutenant Lasker stated that about a regiment of the enemy was throwing up intrenchments north of Penn College. The message also stated that about half of the regiment of the enemy consisted of recruits. You want the main body of your regiment to follow the tail of the Advance Guard so that there will be a distance of a half mile between the tail of the Advance Guard and the head of the main body. You want to notify your troops where the Regimental Headquarters will march so that the troops will know where to send messages. You decide to have the Headquarters march between the Advance Guard and the main body. The Advance Guard is to march at once and it is to proceed south by way of the Hamilton Farm and the Boyd School House. You assemble your majors, their staffs and your staff, and you issue verbally the decision which you have just made. You issue it in the shape of a verbal order.

2.—You are Major Black in command of the Advance Guard mentioned in the preceding problem. It is now your mission, of course, to form the advance guard and to tell your captains that you are going to do so, and that you are going to be reinforced by the machine gun company. You ought also to tell them just where your regiment is going to march. You want Companies C and D and

the machine gun company to march in the order mentioned, and they are to follow Company B as soon as that company has got its distance. Company C will be the company which is to regulate the pace. Company A is to go out and act as a left flank guard. It is to move by way of the eastern branch of the Carlisle Road while it is on this duty. You ought also to let your captains know all the information about the enemy which has been given to you by your colonel. You want Company B to be the advance party; you want it to go ahead of the remainder of the battalion so that there will be four hundred yards distance between it and the main body. You want to attach Lieutenant Kay, the Battalion Adjutant, and his orderly, to Company B. You want to direct the march of the advance party so that it will know where it is to go. You decide that it shall go by the railroad to the Carlisle Road, and then by the Stock Farm, and on down to the Boyd School House. You are going to be right behind the advance on the march. You want the combat wagons to move out right away, and you want them to go by the cross-roads which is one-quarter of a mile west of Golden-ville, and then south on the Carlisle Road, and finally, to join the tail of Company D where the railroad crosses the road.

3.—You are the Company Commander of Company A of the preceding problem. You call your officers and non-commissioned officers together and you give them a verbal order. You tell them that your company is to march as the flank guard of the battalion to which you belong, and you tell them that the enemy possibly has about a regiment in Gettysburg; at least, that is the belief of the Regimental Commander. Your regiment is on its way to Gettysburg. The First Battalion and the machine gun company is going as the advance guard. You want to let your command know that all of the battalion, except yourselves is

leaving on the road to the west. You want Lieutenant Johnson, the Second Lieutenant of your company, and the Fourth Platoon, to act as the advance guard to the flank guard, which is the duty on which the company is acting. You want this platoon to march by the country road east of the knoll marked 651, and then you want it to march along the east branch of the Carlisle Road. The distance you decide upon for the advance guard to be in front of the main body is 500 yards.

4.—You are Major Simpson, and you are halted with your battalion at the cross-roads 621, near Goldenville. Your mission is, with your battalion, to act as outpost during the coming night for your regiment; you have the machine gun company attached to you. You are operating toward the south. You want company C and one of the platoons of the machine gun company to take station on the ridge north of the point where you are. This ridge has the figure 707 on it. It shall be the duty of this detachment to secure that sector between Goldenville and Five Forks, just a little off the map, about 1,500 yards west of the Carlisle Road. You want Company C to establish communication with Texas by signals on this hill, where they are to be located. If you are going to be attacked on that hill, instead of falling back, you want them to hold the ridge. You want a platoon of Company C to be sent over to Hamilton Farm to act as a picket there. You have received reports from Lieutenant Finley of your command that there are no detachments of the enemy or patrols which have come north of the Stock Farm at any time. You want to tell your captains that the remainder of the outpost is going into camp at Texas, and that the regiment itself is moving into camp just north of the Conewago. You want the rations and baggage of Company C to be sent up to the company, but you want the

wagons to be returned immediately after they have been there, to Texas for the night.

5.—You are in command of Company C which was to go to Hill 707 in the preceding problem. You want to notify your company what you are going to do; in other words, you want to deliver to them verbally your field order. For this purpose you assemble your officers and non-commissioned officers and the lieutenant who is in charge of the machine gun. You state that the outguards will be posted as follows: Corporal Browning, with his squad as No. 1, is to be posted at the Five Forks 679, three-quarters of a mile west of where you are; Corporal Martin, with his squad as No. 3, is to be posted at the road-fork numbered 621, which is on the Carlisle Road; Corporal Denton, with Privates Noonan, Ogden, and Prince will go as No. 4. His post will be posted at the railroad crossing in Goldenville. You, as Company Commander, deliver the information about the enemy which has been received through your major. Corporal Calhoun, with Johnson, Kelly, and Latham are to go as No. 2, and they are to be posted at the cross-roads 648, which is 500 yards west of the point where you are located—Goldenville. You state that this company and that a platoon of machine guns is to take station on the ridge to the north of the road on which you are located, and is to go as support to the outpost. Lieutenant Haskins will take the 4th platoon and will proceed as a picket down to the Hamilton Farm. This farm is a mile and a quarter south of here on the Carlisle Road. Lieutenant Haskins is to get some sort of flag communication with Hill 707. He is also to send small patrols down as far south as Boyd's School House. Corporal Roberts will go to the top of Hill 707; he will take four signalers with him. He will get in communica-

tion with Texas and keep in communication. He will do the same for each one of the outguards and he will also do the same for Lieutenant Haskins' picket.

6.—You are Major Perkins and you are in command of a squadron of cavalry. You are between Goldenville and the bottom of the map. You receive word that the enemy is somewhere to the north, and you get messages from your commanding officer stating that you are to go as independent cavalry for your brigade. Reports also come in to you that the enemy, which consists of about 1,000 men, is occupying Carlisle. You have assembled your captains, and you state to them that Troop A will make up the Advance Guard. You state also, that it will keep a small patrol about two or three miles to the front in the direction in which it is going. You tell Troop A, also, that its average rate of speed should be about four miles per hour, and that this rate includes halts. You know that your main body is going to march at 6 o'clock the next morning in the direction of Carlisle and you know that it is only going to advance 15 miles on that day. You know, also, that it is going by the Gettysburg—Table Rock—Center Mills—Carlisle Road. You want your main body to follow the advance guard, which you have already mentioned, so that there will be a distance between the advance guard and the main body of about a mile. The main body is to march from front to rear—Troops B, C, and D. You wish to inform everybody present that Lieutenant Butler and Sgt. Clifford are out with patrols and that these patrols are very far out to the flank of the line of march. You decide to ride in this march of the independent cavalry near the head of the main body. You want your officers to know that both of the patrols which you have just mentioned are going to send reports to you, and

that these reports should arrive at the squadron when the main body is about two miles north of the Conewago. You desire wheel transportation of all kinds to join the advance of the main body of infantry back near Gettysburg.

7.—You are Captain Small in command of Troop A of the preceding problem. You are to constitute, as you remember, the advance guard of the squadron of independent cavalry. You wish to tell your officers and non-commissioned officers, whom you have assembled, that Lieutenant Butler and Sgt. Clifford are out with patrols, and you want to give them the information you have got from your major in regard to your own troops and the enemy. You want Corporal Dillingham to take four men and to go ahead of the troop. He is to go at a rate of about six miles per hour until Conewago Creek is crossed; after that, he is to go about four miles an hour. When he gets about a mile north of Gettysburg he is to take the right-hand road which goes through Table Rock and Center Mills. He is to give quick and prompt warning of the appearance of any of the enemy or hostile troops which he encounters. He is also to report promptly any places in the road which cannot be crossed by troops or vehicles. In fact, he is to report any information which will interfere with the march of the squadron. You, as the captain of the troop, are going to march between the advance party and the support.

8.—You are Major Adams and you are in command of a squadron of cavalry which is mounted and ready for action at D-6. You see a squadron of the enemy in an open field to the west, about 600 yards west of the woods where you are located. You see the guidons mounted, and you see that the remainder of the men are leading their

horses into line or are saddling up. You note, also, through your glasses, that the guidons are facing in your direction. You note, also, that the wagons have left the camp and have gone around the woods just north. You call your captains together and you issue a verbal order—you have decided to attack the hostile squadron at once, and to attack that squadron while you are mounted. You want Troops D and C, commanded by Captain Denton, who is senior to Captain Clifford, to form the main attacking line. You want Captain Denton to take advantage of an opening in the woods which is about 150 yards to your front. He is to attack the enemy in close order, mounted, as soon as he has cleared the woods in which you are all located. You give to the captains the information which you have got through your field glasses. You also state that Captain Billings with his troop, Troop B, is to go in rear of Troops D and C and form the supporting line, keeping a distance of about 150 yards, and at the same time he is to look out for the right flank. You want Lieutenant Fink, who is the squadron adjutant, and who has seen the same things through his glasses as you have seen, to accompany Captain Denton with his two troops to the edge of the woods, where he is to point out to Captain Denton the enemy's position. You yourself are going to be with the reserve. Captain Andrews with his troop, Troop A, is to constitute the reserve. Captain Andrews with his command is to follow the attacking line at a distance of 400 yards. He is to echelon his command with the left flank. You want the whole command to move out at once.

9.—You are General Temple and you are 700 yards northwest of Hermans with your brigade when you receive a message from Lieutenant Kline, Aeroplane No. 7. The substance of this message states that the left of the enemy

has extended itself by a battalion from a regiment which is northwest of 501 cross-roads. He also states that there is another battalion from a regiment near 504, and that this battalion is moving toward Varney. He states that there is a regiment of artillery posted on Oak Ridge, and that there is another regiment of artillery which has its right flank at the Stock Farm and its left flank near 531 road fork. You assemble your regimental commanders and your cavalry commander; also, your artillery commander. You state that the artillery battalion which is with you is to go into a position near where you are and that it is to operate against the artillery of the enemy and the attacking infantry of the enemy. This your artillery battalion is to do at first, but later it will support your attack. The first battalion of the first infantry you want to have assigned as a support to the artillery. You want the first infantry, minus its first battalion which is going to go as support to the artillery, to advance in the direction of Herman's Farm House; then it is to deploy and attack. It is to attack so that the right of the regiment will pass through the J. Weaver Farm House. The third infantry is to be the reserve; it will be under your command and it will move out and go forward to the Good Intent School House. The first platoon of Troop A and the first cavalry will take a position on the hill which is designated by the figures 651. This platoon will cover your right flank and report immediately any changes which take place in the disposition of the enemy. Your station for the slightly wounded will be at Table Rock. You are going to be at the Good Intent School House, where messages are going to reach you. Of course, you give your officers whom you have assembled, the contents of the aeroplane message which you received. You want the infantry combat wagons to assemble at Table Rock,

and you want them to go there after all the troops have cleared the road. You want the second infantry to get under cover from the enemy and to go toward Hill 586; this hill is northeast of Varney. When they are deployed they will attack so that their left will pass through Hill 586.

10.—Major Quincy, in charge of the artillery battalion of the preceding problem, assembles the captains of his batteries and issues his instructions covered by the following data: he wishes Batteries A and B to attack the hostile artillery, and he wishes them to take up a position on the north end of the field near where the brigade is halted. He wants Battery C to go to Hill 592. From that point he wants that Battery to attack the hostile infantry. He gives to his commanders the information which was contained in the aeroplane message of the preceding problem. He also states that the enemy in superior force is attacking from the west. He points out also that between 3,000 and 4,000 yards to the southwest can be seen a long line of artillery of the enemy and that this artillery is in action. He also states that the first battalion of the first infantry, which is now marching down the road, which is the support of the artillery, will occupy Hill 592. Battery A's target is to be the further half of the line of the enemy's guns, and Battery B's target is to be the nearer half. He states to his Battery Commanders that he has already marked the position that they are to occupy with their commands, and he tells them that they are to occupy this position at once and prepare for immediate action. He tells Battery A that the adjutant will give them the firing data and they are to range by volleys. They are to report to him when ready, and they are to be on the alert and await his order to commence firing. He also states that the advance cavalry is on the Hill 651 south

of Goldenville, and that they are covering the right of the line. He wishes to tell his battery commanders that the infantry is marching in a general direction south, and that it is going from here to begin an attack against the left of the enemy. He wishes to tell them also that he is to be, during the action, on the left of Battery A.

CHAPTER X

THE OPERATION ORDER, ORDERS, LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION

Before August, 1914, the *Operation order* was the English term for our *Field order*. Both orders had the same functions and about the same form. At times, the term *operation order* was used by us to include only battle orders, but on the whole, the terms *Operation orders* and *Field orders* practically amounted to American and English designations of the same thing.

In the beginning of the present war, after a few weeks of open conflict, this kind of fighting in France gave way to a vast siege. The English found themselves, after some cross-country fighting, in the trenches. There the operation order which had provided for situations of march, halt, bivouac, and battle, was gradually made over to suit the peculiar needs of defenses, raids, and frontal attacks. The barrage fire, bombs, mortars, machine guns, and intricate lines of communication added to the number of details to be considered. Little by little the will of the commander expressed itself in such completeness that the former size of his operation order passed all bounds. It was natural, then, that although the scope and character of the English order steadily changed, its name remained the same.

When the Americans came to take part in the war, the operation order had during the previous years of struggle developed out of all resemblance to its former self. It was no longer a field order as we know the term. It was fully grown to meet the tremendous progress of English experience in the trenches. The consequence was that the

American, finding both the state of siege and the order to cover it beyond his experience, associated the English name with the novel warfare. Thus, today, the operation order is a term used in connection with the disposition of troops on the battle fronts of Europe.

We should bear in mind, then, that the operation order is nothing more than a field order fitted to trench conditions. We must not gain the idea that it has supplanted the order which goes with mobile exercises on open ground. Open warfare began this conflict, and will, provided it be ended by martial victory, bring it to a close. Open warfare has been the rule on the long Russian, Italian, Serbian, Turkish, and Roumanian fronts. We must not be led astray in our estimate of the proportions because the front in France and Belgium is the most vital one to us from a strategic standpoint. Field orders, which are the accompaniments of open warfare, should still form the larger part of our study.

Nevertheless, the operation order is the order next in importance to the field order. It must be framed with mathematical precision under fire.

It has the greatest conciseness, but is not brief. It goes into the minutest details, but its details are tersely put. In certain parts it is telegraphic like the field message; in others it has completed sentences like those of the field order. It has an orderly arrangement of paragraphs and brief and unmistakable language. If we are able to compose a good field message and order, we should find, after we have familiarized ourselves with the technique of the trenches, that the construction of the operation order will fall naturally into place in our minds.

Unfortunately, we are forbidden to place an example of one of our own operation orders upon these pages. But we may have the opportunity of viewing a German one,

which contains the principles of our own. The example given was issued by a regimental commander for a raid. The action actually took place near La Boisselle, April 11, 1916.

110th Reserve Infantry Regiment. In the field, 6th April, 1916.

REGIMENTAL ORDERS FOR A RAID ON THE SPION

1. The raid will probably take place at dusk the 11th of April.

2. *Organization of the raiding party*—
In command.—Captain Wagener, assisted by Lieutenant Boening, Assistant-Surgeon Wisser, one bugler and six stretcher bearers.

Patrol commanders.—Lieutenants Stradtman, Freund, Dumas, and Böhlefeld.

Raiding party.—50 men of the 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment and four Pioneers of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion.

3. Upon the day fixed, *the raiding party* will be assembled in Dug-outs Nos. 1-10, on the right wing of the left-hand battalion. Dug-out No. 9 will be used as advanced regimental command post.

The assaulting party must not exceed three officers and 30 men. The remaining officers and men will be at Captain Wagener's disposal for use as supports.

*Captain
Wagener's
Orders—*

Appendix 1. Shortly after dusk the assaulting party will leave the Blaue Stellung by Sap No. 3 with the object of breaking into the enemy's position in the neighborhood of the Süd

Spion, from which point the enemy's trenches will be cleared northwards, if possible, as far as the Spion. Unless prevented by the enemy's fire, the raiding party will return to our Blaue Stellung by the same way.

*Table of
distribution
of artillery
fire—*

Appendix 2.

4. For 25 minutes before the commencement of the raid, *the artillery* will prepare for the assault by shelling the enemy's trenches between Besenhecke and the Windmühle, and also the Weisse Steinmauer. During the raid the artillery will control by its fire all the enemy's trenches likely to prove a source of danger to the enterprise.

*Special
Orders for
feint
attack—*

Appendix 3.

*Special
Orders for
this bom-
bardment—*

Appendix 4.

5. In order to draw the fire of the enemy's artillery away from the spot to be raided, a *feint attack* against the enemy's position just north of La Boisselle Cemetery will start 15 minutes after the artillery opens fire.

6. In order that the registration of the objective by the heavy artillery and Minenwerfer shall not be apparent, on the morning of the day before the raid—probably the 10th April—a feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-79 will be carried out, combined with a mine explosion, *with the object of misleading the enemy*. The exact time will be fixed beforehand by the artillery commander, Officer Commanding Ersatz Abeiltung, 76th Artillery Regiment.

7. *The machine-gun officer* will arrange that, during the whole time of the raid, the

enemy's rear trenches in Target-sectors 76-81 are kept under a constant fire, with a view to causing him all possible loss, and, at the same time, to safeguarding our patrol against counter-attacks.

8. *The Officer Commanding 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion*, will arrange for a gallery of the left-hand minefield to be ready charged by the morning of the day before the raid, and for a gallery of the right-hand minefield to be ready charged by the evening of the raid. The former will be sprung at the conclusion of the feint bombardment, the latter as an introduction to the feint attack.

From today, the "earth mortars" (*Erdmörser*) will systematically cut the enemy's wire opposite the Blinddarm. On the day before the raid, they will coöperate with all other close-range weapons to assist in the feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-78. On the evening of the raid, they will assist in the feint attack by bombarding Target-sectors 76 and 77 (*see* Appendices 3 and 4).

Throughout the raid, the "*Albrechtmörser*," in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will heavily bombard the enemy's trenches in the Nordrondell. Particular care will be taken that the enemy's machine guns do not interfere with the raid from that quarter (*see* Appendix 1).

9. *The Officer Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company* will register the enemy's wire at the point of entry with one heavy and two medium *Minenwerfer* in the

course of the feint bombardment on the day before the raid. He will also take part in this bombardment and fire 30 medium Minenwerfer shells at the Weisse Steinmauer (*see* Appendix 4). On the afternoon of the same day, with both medium Minenwerfer mounted in the Minenwerfer Weg, he will cut the enemy's wire at 76y, and throughout the whole night and the following day will keep up a desultory fire.

On the evening of the raid, the wire in front of the point of entry of the raiding party will be cut on a width of 50 meters by the heavy and two medium Minenwerfer (*see* Appendix 1). Meanwhile, the two other medium Minenwerfer will take part in the feint attack against 76y (*see* Appendix 3). The light Minenwerfer at the disposal of the 228th Minenwerfer Company will take part in the feint bombardment and in the feint attack, in accordance with the orders (para. 8) issued for the close-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion (*see* Appendices 3 and 4). The Officer Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company will receive further detailed instructions from Captain Wagener.

10. On the evening of the raid, *battalions* will hold themselves in a state of readiness for an alarm. Arrangements will be made that, in the event of the enemy opening a barrage on our trenches, as may well happen, the number of sentries will be reduced to a minimum. Gas masks and other gas equipment must be held ready for use.

11. I shall be at the regimental command post from the morning of the day before the raid. From 6 p. m. of the evening of the raid, I shall be in the advanced regimental command post in Dug-out No. 9 on the right wing of the left-hand battalion. Captain Wagener will maintain constant communication with me. The artillery liaison officer will also be with me.

(Signed) FRHR. V. VIETINGHOFF.

Distribution

	{	Headquarters	2
	{	3 Battalions	3
110th	{	12 Companies	12
Reserve	{	Labor Company	1
Infantry	{	1st Machine-Gun Company..	1
Regiment	{	2nd Machine-Gun Company.	2
	{	55th Machine-Gun Section..	1
	{	Captain Wagener	2
29th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment..			1
Ersatz Abeiltung, 176th Field Artillery Regiment			1
1st Abeiltung, 29th Regiment Field Artillery			1
1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion			1
228th Minenwerfer Company			1
Division			1
Brigade			1
109th Reserve Infantry Regiment			1
111th Reserve Infantry Regiment			1
Spare copies			5

APPENDIX I

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR THE RAID ON THE SPION

1. *Organization of the raiding party—*

Commander.—Captain Wagener; with him, Bugler Held.

Stradtman's patrol.—Lieutenant Stradtman and 10 men.

Dumas' patrol.—Lieutenant Böhlefeld and 10 men.

Supports, at my disposal—Lieutenant Freund and 24 men.

In addition to the latter party, at my disposal—Boening, and Assistant-Surgeon Wisner and six stretcher bearers.

2. *Dress and equipment.*—Attack order without greatcoat or cap, belts to be worn without pouches, gas masks to be slung and tucked into tunic.

The Stradtman, Dumas, and Böhlefeld patrols will each be equipped, half with rifles and half with pistols and wire-cutters.

The supports will carry rifles, five men will carry pistols, each man will carry two grenades.

As a distinguishing mark each man will wear a triangle of white linen sewn on the breast and back.

Minutes.

O'

The time of starting will be communi-

3. *Time table.*—*The artillery* will open fire with gas shells on the enemy's trenches on both sides of the point of entry and on the objectives opposite the southwest corner

cated, in good time, on the day of the raid. of La Boisselle, where the feint attack is to take place.

For a quarter of an hour, all the enemy's trenches likely to prove of importance to the raiding party will be brought under fire. At the same time, the *close-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion*, with the two medium and the light *Minenwerfer* of the *228th Minenwerfer Company*, will fire with maximum rapidity on the enemy's trenches opposite the southwest corner of La Boisselle.

7' The one heavy and two medium *Minenwerfer* of the *228th Minenwerfer Company* will open fire with the object of cutting the wire in front of the point of entry.

14'45" On the right flank of the minefield a *shallow gallery will be fired*.

15' *The artillery*, which was firing on the southwest corner of La Boisselle, will increase its range and shell the trenches in rear.

The close-range weapons will cease fire.

The machine guns will sweep communication trenches in this sector and in the Galgen.

15'30" In the *Blinddarm* and just south of the same, isolated groups of *dummies* will be exposed in order to make the enemy think an attack is pending. From now on, *artillery and Minenwerfer* fire will increase to its maximum intensity on the real objective.

The "*Albrecht-Mörser*" of the *1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion*,

in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will bombard the Nordrondell with the utmost intensity.

20' *The patrols* will leave their dug-outs and take up their positions in readiness, in accordance with direct orders received from me, in the Hohlweg by Sap No. 3.

23' *Stradtman's patrol* will leave the Hohlweg at "a" and crawl forward as far as "b."

Lieutenant Boening will post the *stretcher bearers* as connecting files between *Stradtman's patrol* and myself.

25' *The artillery* will lift its fire from the objective between Besenhecke and the Windmühle to the targets in rear, and will open a barrage on those of the enemy's trenches which may prove a source of danger to the raid.

The Minenwerfer will cease fire.

The machine-guns will open fire on positions in rear and on the communication trenches which lead to the objective from both sides.

The "Albrecht-Mörser" of the *1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion*, on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will continue to bombard the Nordrondell. *All close-range weapons and the artillery*, which from 0' to 15' had been bombarding the enemy's position opposite the southwest corner of La Boisselle, will reopen fire on these targets with renewed vigor.

25'15" *Stradtman's patrol* will break into the enemy's trenches at the Süd Spion and, at

point 1 (*see* Sketch No. 1), will defend the point of entry from the direction of the enemy.

On orders received from me personally, *Dumas' patrol* will follow *Stradtmann's* patrol and advance southwards along the enemy's trench as far as point 2.

On orders received from me personally also, *Bohlefeld's patrol* will follow *Dumas' patrol* and, once in the enemy's trench, will push on towards the Spion.

The stretcher bearers will act as connecting files between *Stradtmann's* patrol and myself.

The supports will hold themselves in readiness at 4, so as to be able to push on after the other patrols immediately on receipt of an order from me.

If the enemy opens a barrage on our position and on the *Hohlweg* before the patrols come out of their dug-outs, I shall either lead the patrol to the enemy's position by another route, or cancel the raid.

4. *Duty of the patrols.*—As many of the enemy as possible must be made prisoners; in addition, rifles, machine guns, rifle grenade stands, trench mortars, etc., as well as filled packs are to be brought back. Should it be found impossible to carry back all the booty owing to the small numbers of the raiding party, but if, as far as regards the enemy's fire it could be done, report will be passed on to me by *Stradtmann's* patrol.

5. *Return.*—On a signal given by Lieutenant Stradtman, or on the “Charge” being blown by my bugler, the raiding party will make its way back from the Sud Spion to the Hohlweg by the shortest way, and immediately make for the same dug-outs whence it started. In the dug-outs, I shall ascertain whether everyone has returned. Prisoners and booty will be taken into the dug-outs.

During the raid, if the enemy should open a heavy barrage on the trenches on the Schwabenhohe and on the Hohlweg, the raiding party will remain in the enemy’s trench and acquaint me of the fact by firing a red flare. I shall then endeavor to reach the party and lead them back by some other way. Should I not arrive, the senior officer present will lead the entire party.

6. Assistant-Surgeon Wisser will organize No. 1 Dug-out as a first aid post and will remain there until the conclusion of the raid.

7. Until the 15th minute I shall be in the advanced regimental command post; after that time in the Hohlweg, which will be connected by telephone with the advanced regimental command post.

(Signed) WAGENER,

Captain and Company Commander.

Verbally and in writing to
participants in the raid.

Copy to the regiment.

W.

To quote Appendices 2, 3, and 4 would take up too much space and would add very little to the purpose of the example. Number 2 consists of a five-page table of the kinds and time of fire, the batteries of fire, and the targets; number 3, of detailed orders for a feint attack; and number 4, for a feint bombardment.

The object of the quotation is to show the accuracy and detail of an operation order. Since the German subject matter and treatment are about the same as our own, we ought to gain from it a conception of the requirements of framing an operation order.

Note.—The meager space devoted to the Operation Order in this course of lessons should in no way reflect on its relative importance among military communications. Only because the treatment of our own examples is forbidden and because our experience is slight, do we leave it without further practice. Those who are armed with the confidential documents of the War Department may look into our own operation order more closely; and those who have conscientiously applied themselves to the work of the preceding lessons ought to have no trouble with its composition.

THE ORDER

Our Field Service Regulations state* that “orders in contra-distinction to field, general, and special orders, are used by commanders of divisions and separate brigades for regulating the movements and resupply of the field trains, fixing the position of distributing points (rations and forage), authorizing the use of reserve rations, providing for the refilling of combat trains after combat or a march, providing for ambulance or hospital service in camps, and for furnishing such other similar information or instructions as it is desired to communicate to troops. They also

* Par. 87.

include such instructions as may be sent to the commander of trains, relative to the movements and disposition of the trains and information with regard to the arrangements made with the line of communication relative to the positions of refilling, rendezvous, and evacuation points."

Thus, when separate orders are necessary for such conditions as cited, they are called simply *orders*. They may be transmitted as field messages between commanders or as more formal documents. In either case they are usually addressed to the person concerned.

Examples of *orders* follow:

51st Division, 9th Corps,
Gettysburg,
3 June '19, 6-30 p. m.

To Commander of Trains:

Have one wagon company small arms ammunition at cross-roads near EPPLEY at 8 p. m.

Have one wagon company artillery ammunition at north edge of McPHERSON RIDGE at 8 p. m.

Have 1st Section, supply, ready to issue at Central Square in GETTYSBURG at 8 p. m.

Have empty wagons return to LITTLESTOWN tonight to refill; have them report en route to Field Hospital No. 1 at the crossing of ROCK CREEK to carry back wounded. Have them well filled with straw or hay.

MABIE,
Chief of Staff.

Telegraphed to Commander of Trains.

Copies to Regimental Commanders.

19th Division,
Marysville,
5 Oct. '22, 6-45 p. m.

To Officer in Charge of Trains:

You will move with your trains at 3-45 a. m., by corduroy road JEPSOM-SMALLEY-SAINT MARYS.

Arrange your columns as follows: one section artillery ammunition, one section small arms ammunition, bridge train, supply column, field hospitals, remainder of ammunition column.

On reaching SAINT MARYS have the two sections ammunition turn north and, when they have cleared the road, halt and await orders.

Have the remainder of the ammunition columns halt beside the road between SAINT MARYS and ALEXANDER and await orders. Have the field hospitals park off the road near HILLIS.

On the march, as you overtake, or are joined by, the field trains of the troops, you will assume command.

Hasten your march until you are clear of JEPSOM.

SMITH,

Chief of Staff.

Copies to all Commanders.

By Lieut. Jones to officer in charge of trains.

Birmingham,

8 Sept. '25, 9-50 a. m.

To Captain Mott, commanding trains:

Our advance guard met at 9-30 a. m. two battalions hostile infantry at GARLINGTON.

Have trains keep well closed and follow main body without distance.

NORTON,

Colonel, commanding.

The first two examples are of the formal type. The third one is less so.

Verbal orders are usually transmitted by officers. However, if the order consists of a single sentence such as, "The trains will halt two hours at Bingham," it may be transmitted by an enlisted man.

Although there is more latitude in the form of written *order* than in that of the field order, the one should be as

brief and unmistakable in its construction as the other. The paragraph structure and sequence should be as logical and unified as English composition can make them.

With your book open at the extract from Field Service Regulations in regard to *the order*, compose enough imaginary *orders* to cover all the instances therein given.

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION

Letters of Instruction chiefly differ from orders, operation orders, and field orders in their lack of definition of specific tactical duties. They are truly instructions. They deal mainly with strategic considerations and general plans, because the writer is usually far away from, or not in direct command of, the units which are going to carry out the general plans.

At the beginning of campaigns *letters of instruction* enumerate the troops of the various commands and the corresponding leaders.

“In armies, combat orders will often be in the form of, or a part of, letters of instruction to the commanding generals in the field armies composing the army. But where the field armies are within supporting distance of each other and can mutually cooperate in the task assigned them, formal combat orders may be issued. Such orders are necessarily general in character and consist of a statement of the objective sought by the army commander, and of the part he expects each field army to play in attaining this objective. The army commander, either by means of letters of instruction or by personal conferences with his field army commanders, fully acquaints them not only with the immediate end in view, but also with so much of his future plans as may be necessary to insure thorough cooperation on their part.”*

* Par. 143, F. S. R.

In the illustration which follows, President Lincoln outlines a general offensive to the various armies. As commander-in-chief he issues the substance of a letter of instructions in the form of an executive order. In it we shall notice that he does not prescribe any specific movement of troops.

Executive Mansion, Washington, Jan. 27, 1862.
President's General War Order, No. 1.

Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.

That, especially,

The army at and about Fortress Monroe,

The army of the Potomac,

The army of West Virginia,

The army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky,

The army and flotilla at Cairo,

And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The following is a more usual form of letter of instructions. This time it goes directly from the commander-in-chief to the general-in-chief:

May 24, 1862.

From Washington, 24th.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—

I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shield's command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces under General Anderson, now opposing General McDowell's advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say you can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the twenty-first (21st).

A. LINCOLN,
President.

As you see, the above example does no more than suggest to General McClellan from a strategic standpoint certain

courses open to him. The general-in-chief on the spot is the one to make the decision.

To progress in our examples, let us take one issued by the general-in-chief to one of his subordinate generals.

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, Feb. 23, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler,
U. S. Volunteers,—

General:—You are assigned to the command of the land forces destined to cooperate with the navy, in the attack upon New Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief-of-staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engineers. The force at your disposal will consist of the first 13 regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan (old and good regiments from Baltimore).

The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and the 6th Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Monroe.

Two companies of the 21st Indiana, are well-drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island, will be sufficient for your purposes.

After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the conclusion that (2) two light batteries fully equipped and (1) one without horses, will be all that are necessary.

This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 680 artillery; total 15,255 men.

The commanding general of the Department of Key West, is authorized to loan you, temporarily, 2 regiments; Fort Pickens can probably give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000.

The object of your expedition is one of vital importance, the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance of Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case, you will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them to render them perfectly secure; and it is recommended, that on the upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some troops, be left at Pilot Station (at the forks of the river), to cover a retreat in the event of disaster. These troops and guns, will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts are captured.

Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault.

The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and cooperate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable, that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also, the eastern bank of the river above the city; it may be necessary to place some troops *in* the city to preserve order, but if there appears sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city.

After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will next claim your attention.

A feint at Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land force, should be accomplished as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after, or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city.

In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves.

I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition are: *First*, The reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches: then Mobile and its defenses: then Pensacola, Galveston, etc. It is probable that by the time New Orleans has been reduced it will be in the power of the government to reinforce the land forces sufficiently to accomplish all these objects; in the meantime you will please give all the assistance in your power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the fact, that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm retention of New Orleans.

I am, etc.,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Com'g U. S. A.

General McClellan goes more into detail than does the President. He is considering the situation on more technical lines. Yet he does not go beyond the limits of strategy in outlining the general plan. He still conforms to the principles of letters of instruction. If we were to follow General Butler in his journey to the Gulf, we should perceive in his orders the disappearance of the strategic and the appearance of the tactical idea. Later we should discover one of his brigade commanders actually issuing a field order.

Notice in the last example how, on account of its length, General McClellan has made a neat summary of the whole. Notice that in all of these letters the writers have adhered to the principles of rhetoric; and that they have given to the recipient a unified and coherent production. Why? Because the will of the commander is transmitted more quickly in that way.

We have now completed the consideration of the expression which directly affects troops in the field. We have written the *field message* which brings information to commanders and which helps them to make an estimate of a situation. We have framed the *field order* which grows out of that estimate and which transforms the decision into action. We have viewed the *operation order* which is no more than a field order made to fit trench warfare. We have seen *orders* which are issued in connection with combat so as to govern the movement of trains. We have read letters of *instruction* which are written by higher commanders in order to regulate in a general way extensive movements. All of these communications bear specifically upon the effort of troops toward success in battle—the ultimate object of all military training.

In leaving this most important part of our professional work, we might take with us this one idea. We can best

express ourselves in any of the communications we have studied by having all the thoughts of one kind together and the different kinds in an orderly arrangement. Whenever it is possible we should keep the paragraph sequence,

- (a) Enemy.
- (b) Own troops.
- (c) Plan.

CHAPTER XI

THE WAR DIARY—THE REPORT— ROUTINE ORDERS

We have heretofore considered those communications which aid combat. We now take up those which have no direct bearing upon the outcome of an engagement. We have seen how the *field message* makes possible by its fresh information the plan for battle, how the *field* and *operation orders* frame that plan for battle, how the *order* maneuvers the trains in connection with battle, and how *letters of instruction* issue general directions for a campaign of many battles. We now come to the place where the maneuver, enterprise, or undertaking is over. For a variety of future benefits we must have a record of those occurrences. *The War Diary* and *The Report* are the communications which perform that office.

THE WAR DIARY

Just as certain individuals keep journals of their lives, so the higher military units keep diaries of their existences. "The War Diary is a record of events kept in campaign by each battalion and higher organization and by each ammunition, supply, engineer, and sanitary train. Entries are made daily and should form a concise history of the military operations. A day comprises 24 hours covered by the date.

Each day's record will commence with a march table, or statement of the operations or location of the organization, including an account of weather, roads, camp, health of troops, etc., and a statement of the supply of ammuni-

tion, rations, and forage. This will be followed by a chronological record of events, including time and place of issue and receipt of orders and messages, with a copy or a synopsis of contents.

It is of especial importance that the exact hour and place at which movements are begun and ended, and orders or important messages sent or received be noted. After an engagement, the war diary will contain a report of losses and captures and will be accompanied by a sketch showing the positions of the command at the most important phases.

Each day's record will be attested by the commander or by the adjutant; and, with attached copies of orders and messages sent and received, will be forwarded daily to the next higher commander, who as soon as practicable, after the receipt thereof, will forward the war diary direct to the War Department.

Commanders of armies, or of units not components of a higher command, will forward their war diaries direct to the War Department.* Thus these documents become the authentic material for our military history.

To go into the War Diary more specifically, let us tabulate what we might actually state therein. We should start with the heading:

War Diary,
3d Battalion, 72d Infantry,
3 May, 1920.

The date in this case would cover the whole period from midnight May 2/3 to midnight May 3/4.

Since a march would most likely be the first happening of any note after midnight May 2/3, the diary would start with a march table.

* Par. 35, F. S. R.

Reveille, 3-30 a. m.

Breakfast, 3-45 a. m.

First call, 4-10 a. m.

Assembly, 4-15 a. m.

Head of column moved out, 4-17 a. m.

First Halt at SQUARE CORNERS, 5-02 a. m.

Second Halt at LIBERTY, 5-51 a. m.

Third Halt at MILES RIVER, 6-41 a. m.

Fourth Halt at SMITH'S FARM, 7-47 a. m.

Message from C. O., 72d Infantry; received 400 yards west HOPE FARM, 8-40 a. m.

Fifth Halt at Orchard near HOPE FARM, 8-47 a. m.

Extent of march: 13-2 miles.

Went into defensive position on SILERS RIDGE at 9-15 a. m. Right of I Company at SILERS FARM—Left of M Company at rail fence corner. Began building standing trench at 9-25 a. m. Dinner, cooked ration, 11 a. m. Finished trenches, saps, and entanglements 4 p. m. Supper, 4-30 p. m. Bivouacked 800 yds. in rear of trenches at 8 p. m. Enemy's harassing patrol wakened command at 11 p. m.; otherwise no activity.

Weather: clear and cool. Slight rain between second and third halts.

Roads: good metal roads entire march.

Camp: Bivouac grassy gentle slope—dry ground.

Water: Spring 200 yds. rear of center of position—capacity for regiment.

Health: Command generally exhausted after march with full packs and with 60 rounds per man, and especially after digging. On sick report—16; absent sick—8.

Ammunition: On hand, including amount on persons of men—118,200 rounds. 1 ammunition wagon returned to LIBERTY at 12, noon, for refilling.

Rations: 4 days' supply on hand.

Forage: 1 day's forage on hand. 1 wagon returned to LIBERTY at 2 p. m. to refill.

Losses: 1 private, K Company, killed by enemy's harassing patrol.

Captures: none.

Road and Position sketches covering day's operations enclosed.

Copies of battalion commander's march and defense orders, also copies of one message from regimental commander, enclosed.

By order of Major Jenkins:

H. E. BOTTOMLY,
1st Lieut., Bn, Adj. 3d Bn.

The original of the above is sent to the regimental commander and a copy is retained by the battalion.

The above data, supplemented with the sketches, messages, and orders enclosed, furnish a complete history of the battalion's doings for the day.

Blanks are furnished from the War Department from time to time to enable Adjutants (whose duty it is to keep the War Diary) to fill in the data more quickly.

REPORTS

Reports cover a wide range of subjects. When a leader is in doubt as to whether an event is important enough to report, he had better take the wise course and send in his description of what has happened. Very few occurrences in the military service are so unessential as to be rightfully ignored.

They may take either one of two forms: either they may be dated, headed "Report on so-and-so" (see example on following), and inclosed with a letter of transmittal; or they may themselves be in the form of letters addressed directly to the person or office for whom they are destined.

Reports may consist of expository description on the one hand or of a narration on the other, but they usually consist of a combination of the two.

Here is an example of highly expository description. It is the report upon the German raid which was given us under *Operation Orders*.

In the field, 12th April, 1916.

CAPTAIN WAGENER'S REPORT ON THE RAID ON THE EVENING OF 11TH APRIL, 1916

At 4 p. m. the raiding party marched from Martinpuich through Pozières, then by the Lattorf Graben—Regimentstrichter—Krebs Graben to the Appointed dug-outs on the left of Sap No. 3, where the evening meal was found ready prepared.

At 8 p. m. the artillery preparation commenced as prearranged. Shortly after fire was opened, the whole of the enemy's position from Windmühle to Besenhecke was wrapped in greyish-white smoke, which the wind drove back over Sap No. 3 into our lines.

By 8.10 p. m. it was impossible to remain in our trench east of Sap No. 3 without wearing a gas mask. This was still the case at 8.20 p. m., when the patrols moved forward from their dug-outs to the Hohlweg, in the order Stradtman, Dumas, Böhlefeld, and Freund. Lieutenant Boenig followed close behind Lieutenant Stradtman.

By 8.25 p. m. the party was posted ready in the Hohlweg. The clouds of gas and smoke, however, still hung so thick over the enemy's trenches that it was impossible to distinguish whether our own shells were still falling on the point of entry or whether our artillery had already lengthened their range.

At 8.27 p. m. Lieutenant Stradtman received the order to advance to the attack with his patrol. Lieutenant Boenig, with the six stretcher bearers, left the Hohlweg simultaneously and in rear of Stradtman's patrol, and posted connecting files, whose positions were marked by red signal lamps shaded to the front and to the sides.

At 8.28 p. m. Dumas' and Böhlefeld's patrols advanced. Following the line of connecting files, they reached the point of entry, to find that Stradtman's patrol was already in possession of 16 yards of trench, and had captured three prisoners. The latter had come out of their dug-outs just as Lieutenant Stradtman appeared in front of the enemy's trench. They carried hand grenades and rifles with bayonets fixed, but were immediately disarmed by Lieutenants Boenig and Stradtman.

Dumas' patrol immediately turned to the left down the trench, and, in a few steps, came upon a half-destroyed machine-gun emplacement. Reservist Nadolny, of Stradtman's patrol, was already occupied in digging out the buried machine gun. Lieutenant Dumas penetrated further along the enemy's trench, and soon reached the communication trench which runs, roughly along the dividing line between Target Sectors 79 and 80, towards the Weisse Steinmauer. At this point a large dug-out had been wrecked, apparently by a direct hit. Lieutenant Dumas had previously sent three men of his patrol along behind the enemy's trench; they reached the communication trench about 11 yards behind the front line trench. A few Englishmen, who came out of this communication trench, endeavored to reach the parapets of the front line trench, whence they evidently intended to defend it. They were, however, surprised by our three men and bayoneted.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Dumas, with the rest of his men, forced his way further along the trench, and just north of Besenhecke reached the communication trench which leads to the brown prolongation of

the Weisse Steinmauer (white stone wall). They passed another wrecked dug-out, in which dead bodies were seen. Adjoining the above-mentioned communication trench, another large dug-out was found, which the patrol intended to clear. As, however, a number of Englishmen advanced upon Dumas' patrol from the communication trench and alongside it, a *mêlée* ensued with grenades, rifles and pistols, in the course of which the enemy, after suffering evident loss, either retreated or surrendered, while none of Dumas' patrol received wounds of any account.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Böhlefeld advanced along the enemy's trench to the right of the point of entry, and, in a few yards, came to three large dug-outs, of which one was wrecked and full of dead and wounded. At his summons, the enemy came out of the others and surrendered without more ado. Lieutenant Böhlefeld sent back the prisoners and asked for reinforcements in order to clear the dug-outs, undertaking, meanwhile, to hold the enemy's trench with two men.

At 8.30 p. m., as no noise came from the point of entry, or from the right of the same, while from a point some 65 yards to the left shots and reports of grenades could be heard, I ordered Vice Sergeant Major Elb to advance with five men and reinforce Dumas' patrol. Lieutenant Erb, the regimental adjutant, attached himself to this party. He was wearing an oxygen-breathing apparatus and had been waiting in the Hohlweg. Shortly after, the sounds of fighting ceased on the left, and the first batch of prisoners was brought back from the enemy's trench. I had come to the conclusion that we had the upper hand everywhere, especially on the right, and with a view to exploiting fully our success, I ordered Lieutenant Freund to cross the enemy's trench at the point of entry with 15 men of the supports, and to attack the Spion from the rear. At the same time, I sent forward Vice-Sergeant Major Wölffe with 4 men to reinforce Lieutenant Böhlefeld.

In order to have a reserve in hand for meeting all eventualities, I ordered up the commanders of the two groups on the flank of the 12th Company, which was stationed immediately to the right of Sap No. 3. The groups had been warned in the afternoon and given the necessary instructions. Whilst Vice-Sergeant Majors Elb and Wölffe, with their men, went in search of Dumas' and Böhlefeld's patrols, Lieutenant Freund dashed across the enemy's trench at the point of entry and followed it along to the right as far as the communication trench which leads into the front line trench near the Spion. Freund's patrol leapt into the enemy's front line trench on both sides of the communication trench, captured 10 men almost without a struggle, and secured several rifles and articles of equipment. A few Englishmen who offered resistance were bayoneted; Volunteer Herrmann, of the

7th Company, and Lance Corporal Haufler, of the 4th Company, particularly distinguished themselves. A few Englishmen attempted to get away, but were shot dead.

Volunteer Herrmann further discovered an extemporized trench mortar. The latter could not be carried off, however, as it was securely built in. Vice-Sergeant Major Wölfe, who arrived on the scene shortly after, destroyed the trench mortar as well as he could with hand grenades and pistol shots.

Böhlefeld's reinforced patrol had accompanied the advance of Freund's patrol along the trench, and came across three or four more wrecked dug-outs, which were filled with dead. Individuals standing about in the trench were killed by the patrol or made prisoner. During this affair, Under Officer Nössler, of the 11th Company, repeatedly distinguished himself.

Whilst our party was breaking into the enemy's trenches or perhaps even before, a party of the enemy, approximately 25 to 30 strong, succeeded in getting away from the front line trench and making their way back to the Weisse Steinmauer, but were again driven back by our artillery fire, and now came running towards Stradtman's patrol. The latter, apprehending a counter-attack, opened fire. Ersatz Reservist Walzer, of the 11th Company, followed by Under Officer Staiger, of the 10th Company and others, raised a cheer and charged the Englishmen, bayoneting two of them. Those who did not put up their hands and surrender, were killed.

Lieutenant Erb had soon caught up Dumas' patrol and took part in the subsequent fighting, which was practically continuous, for almost every one of the enemy offered resistance. With hand grenade and pistol, Dumas' patrol killed more than 20 of the enemy, besides wounding a large number. In this fighting Volunteer Hees, of the 6th Company, particularly distinguished himself. Always to the fore, he alone accounted for several Englishmen. On our side only one man was slightly wounded.

In consequence of the events described above, Dumas' patrol remained in the enemy's trench considerably longer than intended. When all the other patrols had returned to the Hohlweg, the Dumas-Erb patrol was still missing.

Hereupon, Lieutenants Boenig and Stradtman, with several non-commissioned officers and men, went back to the enemy's lines and searched the trench to the left until they met the Dumas-Erb patrol on its way back. Here again Under Officer Nössler, of the 11th Company, 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment, distinguished himself.

At 8.50 p. m., the last men of the entire party had returned to the Hohlweg and went back to their dug-outs.

At 8.51 p. m., the first shell fell on the front line trenches east of Sap No. 3.

At 8.57 p. m., the artillery commander was informed that the artillery fire could be gradually broken off.

At 9 p. m., a heavy battery near Albert dropped a few shells near Sap No. 3.

At 9.05 p. m., the conclusion of the operation was reported.

The following were captured: 24 unwounded and 5 wounded prisoners, 1 Lewis gun, 1 rifle with telescopic sights, 20 ordinary rifles, and a large number of steel helmets, belts with ammunition pouches, packs, haversacks, and gas helmets.

Our casualties consisted of one man slightly wounded in the forehead by a splinter from a hand grenade. He was bandaged in the advanced dressing-station and immediately returned to the patrol.

(Signed) WAGENER,

Captain and Company Commander.

40 copies, as appendices to the Report of the 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment on the raid of the 11th April, 1916.

A more narrative form of report is represented by the following extract from Gen. Bragg's report during the Civil War:

"To meet our successful advance and retrieve his losses in the front of his left, the enemy early transferred a portion of his reserve from his left to that flank, and by 2 o'clock had succeeded in concentrating such a force on Lieutenant General Hardee's front as to check his further progress. Our two lines had, by this time, become almost blended, so weak were they by losses, exhaustion, and extension to cover the enemy's whole front. As early as 10 a. m. Major-General Breckinridge was called on for one brigade, and soon after for a second, to reinforce or act as a reserve to General Hardee. His reply to the first call represented the enemy as crossing Stone's River in heavy force in his immediate front; and on receiving the second order he informed me they had already crossed in heavy force and were advancing on him in two lines. He was immediately ordered not to wait attack but to advance and meet them. About this same time a report reached me that a heavy force of the enemy's infantry was advancing on the Lebanon Road about five miles in Breckinridge's front. Brigadier-General Pegram, who had been sent to that road to cover the flank of the infantry with the cavalry brigade (save two regiments, detached with Wheeler and Wharton), was ordered forward immediately to develop such movement. The orders for the two brigades from Breckinridge were countermanded, whilst dispositions were made at his request to reinforce him. Before they could be carried out, the movements ordered disclosed the facts that

no force had crossed Stone's River; that the only enemy in our immediate front there was a small body of sharpshooters, and that there was no advance on the Lebanon Road.

"These unfortunate misapprehensions on that part of the field (which, with proper precaution, could not have existed) withheld from active operation three fine brigades until the enemy had succeeded in checking our progress, had reëstablished his lines, and had collected many of his broken battalions."

The above example, in addition to its value as a narrative report, illustrates the dependence of a commander upon proper information.

ROUTINE ORDERS

Routine Orders preserve their normal tenor in peace or war. They have to do with the administration of the military service, so that a state of campaign has very little influence upon their character.

They consist of	{	General Orders.
		Special Orders.
		Circulars.
		Bulletins.
		Memoranda.

General Orders "include generally, (1) all detailed instructions necessary in carrying out certain general regulations or orders issued from superior headquarters; (2) all standing instructions, to the end that frequent repetitions may be avoided; and (3) proceedings of general and special courts-martial."

General Orders are issued by commanders of armies, field armies, corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, separate battalions, posts, departments, and districts.

"When necessary, *orders* are used by commanders of battalions forming parts of regiments, and for smaller units and detachments, for the same class of instructions as are promulgated by higher commanders in general

orders." In other words *orders* is a term used to designate those instructions issued by commanders of divisions and of separate brigades in regard to trains, and also a term used by battalions and smaller units to designate those instructions corresponding to general orders for higher units.

Here is an example of a General Order from the War Department.

GENERAL ORDERS,

WAR DEPARTMENT,

No. 2

Washington, January 4, 1917.

1. An examination of majors, captains, and first lieutenants of the Regular Army, with a view to their selection for appointment to fill vacancies in the grade of major in the Judge Advocate General's Department, will be held at the headquarters of the Eastern, Central, Western, Southern, Hawaiian Departments, the headquarters of the United States troops in the Panama Canal Zone, the headquarters of the Philippine Department, and the headquarters of the 15th infantry, Tientsin, China, beginning at 8 a. m., on May 10, 1917, or as soon thereafter as practicable. No officer who has not served as a commissioned officer of the Regular Army for at least eight years will be regarded as eligible to take the examination.

2. Eligible officers who desire to take the examination will make application to the commanding officer of that one of the commands mentioned in the preceding paragraph in which they are stationed, and each of such commanding officers is authorized to issue the necessary orders to assemble applicants at his headquarters on the date set for the examination. * * * *

3. The examination will be supervised at each headquarters by the judge advocate or the officer acting as such. If the acting judge advocate shall apply to take the examination and is the only judge advocate present at such headquarters, the commanding officer of the command will detail some other suitable officer to supervise the examination.

4. On the day and hour set for the beginning of the examination, each candidate will deliver to the officer supervising the examination a signed statement including:

(a) A brief statement concerning the candidate's education and experience both legal and general;

(b) A list of persons who are familiar with the candidate's qualifications along legal lines, with the address of each person;

(c) One or more briefs or other law memoranda, not exceeding ten, prepared by the candidate and made use of by him in the solution of legal questions, whether moot or practical;

(d) A specific list, as complete as practicable, of general court-martial or civil court trials in which the candidate has participated either as prosecutor or counsel;

(e) Copies of or specific references to the applicant's published writings, whether of legal or other character, which he may desire to have considered;

(f) Outline of service of candidate since his entry into the military establishment;

(g) Any other matter the candidate may desire to present for consideration.

(2507125, A. G. O.)

By order of The Secretary of War:

H. L. SCOTT,

Official:

Major General, Chief of Staff.

H. P. McCAIN,

The Adjutant General.

Here is an example of a General Order publishing the result of a General Court-Martial.

GENERAL ORDERS,

WAR DEPARTMENT,

No. 3

Washington, January 5, 1917.

Before a general court-martial which convened at Nogales, Ariz., October 25, 1916, pursuant to Special Orders, No. 268, October 14, 1916, as amended in Special Orders, No. 273, October 19, 1916, Southern Department, and of which Lieut. Col. George A. Skinner, Medical Corps, was president, and Capt. Sherman A. White, 12th Infantry, judge advocate, was arraigned and tried—

Capt. John Smith, U. S. Infantry.

Charge I.—“Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in violation of the 62d Article of War.”

One specification.

Charge II.—“Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman in violation of the 61st Article of War.”

Two specifications.

To which charges and specifications the accused pleaded “Not Guilty.”

FINDINGS

Of the Specification, 1st Charge, and of the 1st Charge, “Not Guilty.”

Of the Specifications, 2d Charge, and of the 2d Charge, “Guilty.”

SENTENCE

“To be dismissed the service of the United States.”

The sentence having been approved by the convening authority and the record of trial forwarded for the action of the President under the 106th Article of War, the following are his orders thereon:

The sentence of dismissal imposed by the general court-martial in the foregoing case of Captain John Smith, U. S. Infantry, is hereby confirmed and will be carried into execution.

Woodrow Wilson.

The White House,
3 January, 1917.

Capt. John Smith, U. S. Infantry, ceases to be an officer of the Army from January 6, 1917.

(2495592, A. G. O.)

By Order of The Secretary of War:

H. L. SCOTT.

Major General, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. P. McCAIN,

The Adjutant General.

Here is an example of a *General Order* of a Territorial Department.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS EASTERN
No. 1. } DEPARTMENT,

Governors Island, N. Y., January 1, 1916.

This order supersedes General Orders, No. 1, Headquarters Eastern Department, dated January 1, 1915, and all amendatory orders thereto, together with all bulletins published heretofore.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WOOD:

EDWIN F. GLENN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

W. A. SIMPSON,
Adjutant General,
Adjutant.

The above order is the first page of an alphabetical list of general orders in force in the Department. Some of them have been originated by the Department Commander and some have been made to comply with War Department instructions.

The general order of a Department covering court-martial cases is the same as that of the War Department, with the exception of the caption which is given below.

General Court-Martial } HEADQUARTERS EASTERN
Orders, No. 6. } DEPARTMENT.

Governors Island, N. Y., Jan. 22, 1916.

Here is an example of a Post General Order.

Headquarters United States Military Academy,
West Point, N. Y., February 27, 1917.

General Orders, }
No. 7. }

1. A vertical filing system (the War Department Correspondence File, a subjective decimal classification for arranging and filing War Department correspondence) will be used exclusively in recording and filing correspondence at these headquarters and also in the offices of the Quartermaster and of the Treasurer on and after March 1, 1917.

2. The operation of General Orders, No. 92, War Department, 1909, as modified by subsequent orders, prescribing the card record system now in use generally at administrative headquarters, has been suspended by the War Department as far as these headquarters is concerned.

3. The name of the writer signing an original paper will be inserted on carbon copies that are forwarded. One carbon copy of all typewritten reports, letters, and indorsements (except short, routine indorsements), will be made on standard letter size paper (not perforated) for use in the records at these headquarters. Such copy will be distinctly marked "For Headquarters Records," and will not be withdrawn at subordinate offices.

4. Copies of the publication entitled "War Department Correspondence File" and Circular No. 1, War Department, March 24, 1914, explaining and giving instructions as to the operation of this system, will be supplied by The Adjutant General of the Army upon application direct.

By order of Colonel Biddle:

C. C. CARTER,
Major, C. A. C.,
Adjutant.

If a Post General Order covers a court-martial case tried by a general court, the order number will appear thus:

General Court-Martial }
Orders, No. 4. }

If it covers one tried by a special court, it will appear thus:

Special Court-Martial }
 Orders, No. 4. }

The separate battalion or company would issue *orders* on the same general plan as post general orders. The order number would appear thus:

Orders: }
 No. 6. }

SPECIAL ORDERS differ from *General Orders* in that the former refer to individuals.

Here is an example of a War Department Special Order.

SPECIAL ORDERS } WAR DEPARTMENT,
 No. 289. } Washington, December 11, 1916.

1. The leave of absence on account of sickness granted John J. Nobbo, First Lieutenant, 13th Cavalry, in Special Orders, No. 196, War Department, August 22, 1916, is extended three months on surgeon's certificate of disability, and upon the expiration of this leave Lieut. Nobbo will report to the commanding officer, Fort Riley, Kan., for examination as to his physical condition by the surgeon at the post.

* * * * *

These Special Orders then take up twenty different individuals in twenty paragraphs and end with,—

22. Capt. Alfred W. Perkins, Infantry, Detached Officers' List, will repair to this city and report in person to the Chief of Staff for duty in connection with the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and upon completion of this duty will return to his proper station. The travel directed is necessary in the military service.

(2503282, A. G. O.)

By Order of The Secretary of War:

H. L. SCOTT,

Major General, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. P. MCCAIN,
 The Adjutant General.

The separate paragraphs are also made up into extract copies as follows:

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
 No. 289. }

WAR DEPARTMENT,
 Washington, December 11, 1916.

Extract

* * * * *

3. Private Clifford H. Worthington, Military Academy Detachment of Field Artillery, West Point, N. Y., is transferred as private

second class to the Ordnance Department and is assigned to duty at that post.

* * * * *

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

H. L. SCOTT,

Major General, Acting Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. P. McCAIN,

The Adjutant General.

Departments, Posts, Regiments, Brigades, Divisions, Corps, Field Armies, and Armies follow the same scheme as above for their *Special Orders*.

CIRCULARS are issued seldom but have great force. They are signed directly by the heads of the War Department, Quartermaster Corps, Ordnance Department or of whatever bureau prints the circular.

Here is an example of a *Circular* issued by the War Department.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, January 24, 1917.

CIRCULAR:

The following resolution was adopted by the Senate on January 16, 1908, and is now one of its standing rules:

Resolved, That no communications from heads of departments, commissioners, chiefs of bureaus, or other executive officers, except when authorized or required by law, or when made in response to a resolution of the Senate, will be received by the Senate unless such communications shall be transmitted to the Senate by the President.

* * * * *

Chiefs of bureaus and others, in preparing communications for the signature of the Secretary of War, will please conform to the foregoing rules and instructions.

NEWTON D. BAKER,

Secretary of War.

Here is a *Circular* issued by the Quartermaster Corps.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Office of the Quartermaster General, U. S. Army,

Washington, D. C., August 27, 1917.

Circular, }
 No. 9. }

Purchases of Supplies

1. During the continuance of the present emergency the following regulations are prescribed under the authority contained in the act of March 4, 1915:

- (a) Where the time for delivery is not to exceed 30 days from date of acceptance of the award, irrespective of the amount involved, supplies may be procured by contract of brief form after the manner of proposal and acceptance agreement, in accordance with form to be authorized therefor.
- (b) The regulations prescribed by Circular No. 7, Office of the Quartermaster General, March 23, 1915, so far as in conflict with the foregoing, are hereby suspended during the continuance of the present emergency.

HENRY G. SHARPE,

10916—17

Quartermaster General, U. S. Army.

BULLETINS are issued by the War Department and territorial Departments. Their purpose is the publication of information. They are more numerous than *Circulars*.

Here is the first page of a Bulletin of the War Department.

BULLETIN }
 No. 18. }

WAR DEPARTMENT,
 Washington, April 6, 1917.

The following digest of opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, for the month of March, 1917, and of certain decisions of the Comptroller of the Treasury and of courts, together with notes on military justice prepared under the direction of the Judge Advocate General, and a compilation of Federal and State laws prohibiting discrimination against the uniform, is published for the information of the service in general.

(2526413 B-A. G. O.)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

H. L. SCOTT,

Major General, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. P. McCAIN,
 The Adjutant General.
 89793-17—1

Then follow twenty-three pages of the opinions of the Judge Advocate General.

Here is another first page of a War Department Bulletin.

BULLETIN } WAR DEPARTMENT,
No. 14. } Washington, March 12, 1917.

The accompanying tabulated statement shows the standing of organizations of the Coast Artillery Corps based on figures of merit attained at target practice during the year 1916, and the hits by calibers at various ranges in 1916.

Slight errors in the figures of merit have been corrected without returning the reports to the organizations concerned.

(2537101, A. G. O.)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

H. L. SCOTT,

Major General, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. P. McCAIN,
The Adjutant General.
83601-17-1

What follows for nine pages is a table of statistics on Coast Artillery firing records.

Territorial Departments issues *Bulletins* seldom. The pamphlets when they do appear, follow the same plan as those of the War Department.

MEMORANDA, are issued by posts, regiments, and separate battalions—by the smaller units. *Memoranda* deal with subjects which are not so important in a military way as the foregoing orders. They may be numbered, as in the following case, when they are of a permanent nature.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY,
West Point, N. Y., October 8, 1917.

Memorandum, }
No. 34. }

To prevent damage and danger from fires, parents and others will exercise great care in allowing children under age of discretion to have access to, or to handle matches, or in allowing them to burn leaves or other combustibles in any part of the Post.

(680.23)

By order of Colonel Tillman:

D. H. TORREY,
Captain of Infantry,
Adjutant.

They may be unnumbered, as in the following case, when they are of a temporary nature.

West Point, N. Y., February 27, 1917.

MEMORANDUM:

Residents of the Post are informed that a case of chicken pox exists at the Hotel.

The usual precautions against spreading the disease are enjoined.
(Tel. memo. Surgeon.)

By order of Colonel Biddle:

C. C. CARTER,
Major, C. A. C.,
Adjutant.

NOTE.—The War Department issues also certain *Special Regulations* for particular General Orders to which it wishes to call attention, and puts out in pamphlet form *Changes to Regulations*. Both *Special Regulations* and *Changes* belong to the class of the General Order, and, therefore, are not taken up separately here.

CHAPTER XII

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE—EXPLANATIONS—LECTURES

Official Correspondence includes official letters, rolls, returns, estimates, requisitions, and routine reports.

The *Official Letter* includes (1) letters to persons in the military service, (2) letters to persons outside the military service, and (3) official telegrams.

Number 1 has its particular military form which must be precisely followed. It consists of

{ The Brief
The Body
The Ending
Indorsements
Enclosures

The Brief consists of the following in the order

given { The Heading
From Whom Sent
To Whom Sent
The Subject

An example of a *Brief* would be:

Hq. Eastern Department,
Governors Island, N. Y., May 21, 1940.

From: The Adjutant.

To: Captain James L. Douglas, 99th Inf.
(Through C. O. Madison Barracks, N. Y.)

Subject: Delay in submitting report.

Another example would be:

Company A, 99th Infantry,
Madison Barracks, N. Y., Jan. 9, 1940.

From: Commanding Officer, Co. A, 99th Inf.

To: The Commanding Officer.

Subject: Insufficiency of shoes.

Another example of a *Brief* would be:

Madison Barracks, N. Y.,

Jan. 10, 1940.

From: Captain James L. Douglas, 99th Inf.

To: The Adjutant General of the Army
(Through C. O. Madison Barracks, N. Y.)

Subject: Request for leave of absence.

The heading consists of the name of the office, place, and date. In the first example the name of the office was "Headquarters, Eastern Department." In the second, "Company A, 99th Infantry." In the third, there was no office named because the letter was written by an officer as an individual and not as an executive of an organization. The place is the post-office address of an officer's station in any case. "Indefinite expressions of locality, which do not indicate where the letter was written,"* should never be used. The date is written on the same line as the place, except where no office is designated; and it is written *not* as in communications dealing with combat, but in the ordinary way.

The "From" in the *From Whom Sent* begins one line (if typed, two lines) below the heading and at the left-hand margin. It is followed by the official designation of the writer, or in the absence of any official designation, the name of writer with his rank and regiment, corps, or department. The rank is written before the name; and the regiment, corps, or department after the name.

Directly below the "From" is placed the "To" in *To Whom Sent*, followed by the official designation or name of the person addressed. What follows "To" is written in the same manner as what follows "From."

* Par. 777, A. R.

Directly below the "To" comes the word "Subject" which is followed by an expression which will give the gist of the *Body* of the letter. This expression will be boiled to a minimum and will not exceed ten words.

The words "From," "To," and "Subject" will be immediately followed by colons, and the "F," "T," and "S" will be on the same vertical line.

The *Body* of the letter will comprise one subject only. A leave of absence and a decision, for instance, will not be requested in the same letter. Two separate communications will be written. This procedure is merely that of carrying out the principle of unity in the whole composition. A violation in this regard causes endless worry to the receiving office and a deserved rebuke for the writer.

When typewritten, the body of the letter will be single-spaced. Double spaces will be used between paragraphs. The body should begin on the second fold of the paper.

The paragraphs will be numbered, will each contain *one* topic, and will be arranged in a logical sequence of topics.

Thus if we were to write out the *Body* of the letter for the last illustration of the *Brief*, we should have it appear about as follows:

1.—I request a leave of absence for five months to take effect on or about February 1, 1940.

2.—My reasons for this request are very urgent at this time. I have had ten years of continuous service without a leave of any kind, and I feel the need of more than an ordinary rest. Besides, my private affairs are in such shape that the matter of straightening them out will require at least all of the period requested.

3.—My address while on leave will be care of Astor Hotel, New York City.

The Ending

consists of { The Signature.
 { The Rank.
 { The Regiment, Corps, or }
 { Department }

“Official communications will be signed or authenticated with the pen and not by facsimiles, and if written by order, it will be stated by whose order. Signatures will be plainly and legibly written. By virtue of the commission and assignment to duty, the adjutant of any command transacts the business or correspondence of that command over his signature; but when orders or instructions of any kind are given, the authority by which he gives the order must be stated.”*

“The *Body* of the letter will be followed by the *Signature*. If the *Rank* and the *Regiment, Corps* or *Department* of the writer appear at the beginning of the letter, they will not appear after his name; but if they do not appear at the beginning of the letter, they will follow under his name.”†

To illustrate fully what we have said, let us write the *Body* and *Ending* of the first illustration of the *Brief*:

The Department Commander directs that you submit without delay the report of your recent inspection of the Organized Militia of the State of New York, and that you also submit an explanation of your failure to comply with par. 6, S. O. 25, c. s., these headquarters.

J. L. Thurst,

Lieut. Col., 24th Cav.

One-half inch below the *Ending* of the letter comes the first of the *Indorsements*, and the succeeding *Indorsements*

* 779, A. R.

† G. O., 23, W. D., 1912.

follow one another serially, with a space of about one-half inch between *Indorsements*.

Letters in the military service are not answered in the sense in which we use the term in civilian life. In other words, the person who receives a letter does not retain it and reply thereto by another. Instead he states what he has to say in an *Indorsement*, which is put down in continuation of the original letter. Thus everything which has been written in regard to the contents of a letter appears as a part of the letter when it is finally filed.

When Captain Douglas' request for leave of absence, for example, reaches the headquarters of his regiment, it has added to it the Colonel's indorsement which appears as follows, provided the Colonel wishes the Captain to obtain the leave:

1st Ind.

Hq. 99th Inf., Madison Barracks, N. Y., Jan. 11, 1940—
To the Comdg. Gen., Dept. of the East.

Approved recommended.

E. F. Hush,

Colonel, 99th Inf., Comdg.

The serial number of indorsements, the place, the date, and to whom written, will be written as shown above. When typewritten, they will be written single-spaced, with a double space between paragraphs.

Should one or more additional sheets be necessary for the *Body* or *Indorsements*, sheets of the same size as the first will be added. Only one side of the paper will be used for writing.

Indorsements of a routine nature such as referring, transmitting, forwarding, and returning papers, will not be signed with the full name, but with initials.

When the letter of the Department Commander to Captain Douglas reaches the Commanding Officer, Madison

Barracks, N. Y., who is also Commanding Officer, 99th Infantry, the latter may do either of two things. He may simply forward the letter to Captain Douglas without comment, because he deems the letter sufficient for the purpose; or he may add a disciplinary word also.

In the first case the indorsement would appear as follows:

1st Ind.

Hq. 99th Inf., Madison Barracks, N. Y., May 23, 1940—
To Captain James L. Douglas, 99th Inf., Forwarded,
A. D. T.

In the second case the indorsement would appear as follows:

1st Ind.

Hq. 99th Inf., Madison Bks., N. Y., May 23, 1940—To
Captain James L. Douglas, 99th Inf.

For compliance.

By order of Colonel Maish,
A. D. Thomas,
Capt. 99th Inf.,
Adjutant.

The *Body* and *Indorsements* of letters are signed by the Adjutant when the letters are addressed to those lower in rank than the Commanding Officer. They are signed by the Commanding Officer himself when addressed to those higher in rank than the Commanding Officer. Letters are never addressed to adjutants.

In connection with indorsements it might be well to quote what Army Regulations say in their regard.

“Communications, whether from a subordinate to a superior, or vice versa, will pass through intermediate commanders. This rule will not be interpreted as including matters in relation to which intermediate commanders

can have no knowledge, and over which they are not expected to exercise control. Chiefs of War Department bureaus are intermediate commanders between higher authority and the officers and enlisted men of their respective corps or departments, who are serving under the exclusive control of themselves and their subordinates. Verbal communications will be governed by the same rules as to channels as written communications. When necessity requires communications to be sent through other than the prescribed channel, the necessity therefor will be stated.

Communications from superiors to subordinates will be answered through the same channels as received.

Except as provided above, all communications, reports, and estimates from officers serving at a military post, and communications of every nature addressed to them relating to affairs of the post, will pass through the post commander.

Officers who forward communications will indorse thereon their approval or disapproval, with remarks. No communication will be forwarded to the War Department by a department commander or other superior officer for the action of the Secretary of War without some recommendations or expression of opinion."

It may often be necessary to enclose other letters, certain documents, or even bulkier material with a letter. Such addition to a letter is called an *Inclosure* and is submitted as part of the letter. *Inclosures* to the original communication will be noted on the face of the letter at the left-hand margin opposite the signature, thus:

2 Incls.

J. L. Douglas,
Capt. 99th Inf.

The inclosures themselves will be numbered on the outside. The two inclosures of the above example would be marked 1 and 2.

If others are added when an indorsement is made, their number will be noted at the foot of the indorsement and upon themselves, as just described for the original communication.

If few in number or not bulky, inclosures may be kept inside the original paper; otherwise they should be folded together in a wrapper marked "Inclosures." If kept within the paper they lie between folds *a* and *b* below.

Now that we have discussed in order the different parts of an official letter to a person in the military service, let us see how the various parts appear when assembled.

2039 Company B, 40th Infantry,
Fort William H. Seward, Alaska, July 19, 1912.

a } From: The Commanding Officer, Co. B, 40th Inf.
To: The Adjutant General of the Army.
(Through military channels.)
Subject: Philippine campaign badges.

Inclosed are lists in duplicate of enlisted men of Com-
pany B, 40th Infantry, entitled to the Philippine campaign
badge.

2 Incls. John A. Brown,
Capt., 40th Inf.

b } 824 1st Ind.
Hq. Ft. William H. Seward, Alaska, July 19, 1912—To the
Comdg. Gen. Dept., of the Columbia.

2 Incls. S. F. Thomas,
Col., 40th Inf., Comdg.
(Stamp) Rec'd Western Dept., July 30, 1912.

8043 2d Ind.

Hq. Western Dept., San Francisco, Cal., July 31, 1912—To
The Adj. Gen. of the Army, Washington, D. C.

c } Arthur E. Green,
2 Incls. Col., Gen. Staff, in absence
of the Department Commander.

(Stamp) Rec'd A. G. O., Aug. 5, 1912.

1942286

3d Ind.

War Dept., A. G. O., Aug. 8, 1912—To the C. O., Co. I, 50th Inf., through the Comdg. Gen., Philippine Department.

1. Information is requested as to whether the records of the company show that Corporal Doe, Co. I, 50th Inf., served in the field against hostile natives on the Island of Panay during July, 1907.

2. The early return of these papers is desired.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Thomas H. Smith,
Adjt. Gen.

2 Incls.

(Stamp) Rec'd Phil. Dept., Sept. 14, 1912.

79935

4th Ind.

Hq. Philippine Department, Manila, P. I., Sept. 15, 1912—To the C. O., Co. I, 50th Inf., through the Comdg. Gen., Dist. of Mindanao.

2 Incls.

A. M. B.

(Stamp) Rec'd Dist. Mind., Sept. 24, 1912.

3467

5th Ind.

Hq. Dist. of Mindanao, Zamboanga, P. I., Sept. 25, 1912—To the C. O., Co. I, 50th Inf., Camp Keithley, Mind., P. I., through the Post Commander.

2 Incls.

S. V. B.

1132

6th Ind.

Hq. Camp Keithley, Mind., P. I., Sept. 28, 1912—To the C. O., Co. I, 50th Inf.

2 Incls.

E. F. H.

(Stamp) Rec'd Co. I, 50th Inf., Sept. 29, 1912.

512

7th Ind.

Co. I, 50th Inf., Camp Keithley, Mind., P. I., Oct. 4, 1912—
To the Comdg. Gen., Dist. of Mindanao, through the C. O.,
Camp Keithley, P. I.

1. Inclosed are extracts from the post orders and morning
report of this company, which contain all that there is of
record regarding the service of Corporal Doe referred to
herein. Inclosed also is affidavit of Corporal Jones as to
Corporal Doe's service.

2. It is believed that the records of the headquarters,
District of Mindanao, may contain the information desired.

(3 incls. added.)

Edward French,

5 Incls.

Capt., 50th Inf., Comdg.

(Stamp) Rec'd back, Camp Keithley, Oct. 5, 1912.

8th Ind.

Hq. Camp Keithley, Mind., P. I., Oct. 5, 1912—To the
Comdg. Gen., District of Mind.

5 Incls.

A. C. Douglas,
Maj., 50th Inf., Comdg.

(Stamp) Rec'd back, Dist. Mind., Oct. 6, 1912.

3467

9th Ind.

Hq. Dept. of Mindanao, Zamboanga, P. I., Oct. 12, 1912—
To the Comdg. Gen., Philippine Department.

There is nothing on file at these headquarters bearing on
the service of Corporal Doe referred to herein.

William Jones,

5 Incls.

Brig. Gen., Comdg.

(Stamp) Rec'd back, Phil. Dept., Oct. 23, 1912.

79935

10th Ind.

Hq. Philippines Department, Manila, P. I., Oct. 24, 1912—
To the Comdg. Gen., Dist. of Mindanao, with directions to
withdraw affidavit of Corporal Jones, it being proposed to
inclose an affidavit from Sergeant Blank, who is on duty
at these headquarters and who is prepared to furnish a
more complete affidavit than that furnished by Corporal
Jones. By command of Major General White:

Andrew Brown,
Adj. Gen.

5 Incls.

(Stamp) Rec'd back, Dist. Mind., Nov. 3, 1912.

3467

11th Ind.

Hq. Dist. of Mindanao, Zamboanga, P. I., Nov. 4, 1912—
To the Comdg. Gen., Philippine Department, the foregoing
directions have been complied with.

(Incl. 5 withdrawn.)

William Jones,
Brig. Gen., Comdg.

4 Incls.

(Stamp) Rec'd back, Phil. Dept., Nov. 15, 1912.

79935

12th Ind.

Hq. Philippine Department, Manila, P. I., Nov. 16, 1912—
To the Adjutant General of the Army, inviting attention
to the preceding indorsements and to the accompanying
inclosures.

(1 Incl. added.)

5 Incls.

Maj. Gen., Comdg.

(Stamp) Rec'd back, A. G. O., Dec. 23, 1912.

The dotted lines on page 1 of the model represent the creases between the folds *a*, *b*, and *c*. *a* contains the *Brief* in the relative position shown and is folded away from *b*, the crease between the two being toward the reader. *b* begins the *Body* and may contain it or only a part of it according to its length. *c* contains the continuation of the *Body* or the whole or parts of indorsements, as the case may be. *b* and *c* are folded toward each other, the crease between the two being away from the reader.

Page 2 contains the body or indorsements of the letter. All pages are folded as page 1 in three equal folds.

When foolscap is used instead of the ordinary sized letter paper as above, the only difference is that there is an extra fold. Imagine this fold to be tacked on to the bottom of page 1 in the example and to be marked *d*. *d* and *c* would be folded just as *b* and *c*. The page would contain a third crease and be a fold longer. Otherwise the letter would be the same as the first one described.

The number at the upper left-hand corner is the filing number of the office.

It will be noticed in the seventh indorsement that three inclosures have been added. The whole transaction is noted in the proper place. The eleventh and twelfth indorsements should be noticed in the same regard.

Where "stamp" appears in parenthesis, the word does not actually occur in letters. It indicates that the office which received the letter noted by means of a rubber stamp at that particular place on the letter the date on which the communication was received or received back. In other words, what follows "(Stamp)" was placed there by some one of the office force as soon as the letter was received in that office.

The writing on all pages should begin one inch from the top. The pages, beginning with the first will be numbered

serially. The number will be placed half way between the edges and one inch above the bottom of the page. In referring to an indorsement by number, the number of the page will also be given, thus: "5th Ind., page 3."

All ceremonial forms at the beginning and end of letters such as "Sir," "I have the honor," "I would respectfully," "Very respectfully" and the like will be omitted. In referring, transmitting, forwarding, and returning papers, the expressions "Respectfully referred," "Respectfully transmitted," "Respectfully forwarded," and "Respectfully returned," will also be omitted.

"An officer will not be designated in orders nor addressed in official communications by any other title than that of his actual rank."* Wherever appropriate the name should be supplanted by the title, such as "Commanding Officer, Co. A, 99th Infantry" in place of "Captain James L. Douglas."

"All letters and indorsements which are typewritten, excepting letters of transmittal, reports of taking leave of absence, periodical reports, and communications of a similar nature, will be made with two carbon copies. One copy will be retained for the records of the office in which the letter was written, and the other will be forwarded with the communication for the files of the first office in which a complete copy is required for the records, but such copy will not be regarded as an enclosure. It will be initialed by the person responsible for the communication."

"In official correspondence between officers or between officers and officials of other branches of the public service, and especially in matters involving questions of jurisdiction, conflict of authority, or dispute, officers of the Army are reminded that their correspondence should be courte-

*Par 780, A. R.

ous in tone and free from any expression partaking of a personal nature or calculated to give offense. Whenever questions of such character shall arise between officers and officials of other branches of the public service, and it is found that they cannot be reconciled by an interchange of courteous correspondence, the officer of the Army, as the representative of the interests of the War Department in the matter involved, will make a full presentation of the case to the Secretary of War through the proper military channels, in order that the same may be properly considered.

In order to reduce the possibility of confidential communications falling into the hands of persons other than those for whom they are intended, the sender will enclose them in an inner and outer cover; the inner cover to be a sealed envelope or wrapper addressed in the usual way, but marked plainly "Confidential" in such a manner that the notation may be most readily seen when the outer cover is removed. The package thus prepared will then be enclosed in another sealed envelope or wrapper addressed in the ordinary manner with no notation to indicate the confidential nature of the contents.

The foregoing applies not only to confidential communications entrusted to the mails or to telegraph companies, but also to such communications entrusted to messengers passing between different offices of the same headquarters, including the bureaus and offices of the War Department."

We have so far discussed in this chapter official letters to persons in the military service. We now come to consider the second form of official letter—the one to persons outside the military service. Often an adjutant or quartermaster is called upon to write to individuals or firms not conversant with the military forms. For a variety of reasons, the business form in that case is best.

In general the two forms present the following differences and likenesses. The headings are the same. The business form substitutes the *Address* of the *Recipient* and the *Salutation* for the *From Whom Sent*, *To Whom Sent*, and *Subject* of the military form. The *Body* in each case follows the principles of paragraphing, and unity and coherence of the whole, as set down for the military form. In the business form the paragraphs need not be numbered. The business form has a complimentary close before the signature, rank, and organization of the writer. Letters are retained by the recipient and answered by him with a new letter, the sender retaining a carbon copy. Indorsements are not used in the business form.

An example of a good business form appears below.

Office of the Quartermaster,

West Point, N. Y.,

August 7, 1930.

Messrs. D. C. Johnson and Company,

312 High Street,

Boston, Massachusetts.

Gentlemen:

In reference to your letter of the 5th inst., I desire to inform you that there is no need here at present for the roofing mentioned.

I regret that we cannot at this time become customers of your firm, but we shall hold you in mind when the necessity for roofing arises.

Yours very truly,

J. H. Smith,

Major, Q. M. Corps, U. S. A.

Quartermaster.

The entire *address* of the recipient had best be written before the *salutation*.

Other proper *salutations* are:

My dear Sir:

My dear Madam:

Ladies:

Other proper *Complimentary Closings* are:

Yours truly,

Your respectfully,

Stick close to the forms of the model above. A very slight departure will make you appear crude. For instance, to say

D. C. Johnson,

Boston, Mass.

Messrs.—

would be entirely wrong.

As to the *Body* of the letter, however, write it your own way so long as you use words, phrases, clauses, sentences, and paragraphs, of a kind we have striven to attain throughout this work. Do not make your letter telegraphic; complete your sentences.

The instructions given for the attainment of the proper forms in ordinary business communications are in no sense as rigid as those given for the military communication. Many officers now use the military forms for their correspondence with business firms, and, indeed, many of these firms have themselves adopted the military form.

The third type of official letter is that of the official telegram. It does not differ in principle from the ordinary telegram, and therefore does not require separate practice. Those who have conquered the field message should have no trouble in its composition.

It is written on an official telegraph blank which may be obtained from the Quartermaster. The blank is for the purpose of having the message go at Government expense. Army Regulations state that "telegrams will be

followed by official copies sent by the first mail in cases of financial transactions of more than trifling importance, and in cases in which chiefs of bureaus of the War Department may deem it necessary themselves to send, or to require officers serving under their immediate control to send them, such copies." It is a good thing in any case to mail a copy of a telegram.

The other kinds of official correspondence which need no letters to accompany them are *Rolls*, *Returns*, *Estimates*, *Requisitions*, and *Routine Reports*. A study of these forms of communication belongs properly to the subject of administration. They are, therefore, simply mentioned here.

The principal *Rolls* with which the novice in the military service is confronted are the *Musters* and *Pay Rolls*. The former is rendered every two months and the latter every month.* Full instructions as to what is required in each set of rolls are found on the last page of each form. On application to the Adjutant General of the Army, a list of *model remarks* for the rolls will be furnished.

The principal *Returns* with which the novice should become familiar are the *Ration*, *Clothing*, *Ordnance*, *Company* (monthly), and *Field Returns*.

Estimates and *Requisitions* are used most frequently by the Supply Departments. But organizations must prepare *Estimates* of what they will need, and must prepare *Requisitions* for the desired articles when needed. The *Clothing Estimate* and *Clothing Requisition* are two common and important forms.

Among the *Routine Reports* in the military service should be mentioned the *Morning*, *Inventory* and *Inspection*, *Sick*, and certain *Reports* in official letter form.

The form of *Routine Report* which is most common is the *Morning Report*.

See A. R., Par. 807.

EXPLANATIONS

As we took up in each case after written work pertaining to combat the similar verbal task, so now after we have discussed written correspondence we are going to dwell upon the ordinary verbal labor incumbent upon officers and non-commissioned officers in the military service.

In war or peace a military leader is useless without an effective tongue. We have demonstrated his uselessness in combat; we shall see that he is just as unsatisfactory in training men for combat.

The work of any military individual in command of men is not only that of *doing* but also that of telling others *how* to do. The *Explanation* of the efficient leader is a continuous process from morning until night. He is constantly called upon to make his words count. If he halts, he loses time. If he hesitates, he makes his men restless. He must speak straight through to the end in a clear-cut way, never hedging or repeating; and when he has finished, the listeners should feel that the subject has been completely covered.

If he does not form the habit of so talking, he forfeits his power of leadership. For what good is an intelligent or inventive officer, if he cannot put his intelligence or invention out through his lips? The military profession is one which depends upon quick instruction by word of mouth. The officer who does his own work and the work of his sergeants too, is plainly inefficient. He has avoided the harder task—that of teaching others how to carry on the work. He has done worse. He has lessened the value of his organization as an automatic machine. When he leaves it, it will either fall to pieces or place a weighty burden on the officer relieving him.*

*Compare "Winning and Wearing of Shoulder Straps"—a convincing treatment of this subject by Lt.-Col. Chas. F. Martin, Cavalry.

There is one caution which a military man should observe in his speech on the drill ground, in barracks, or in the field. He should not repeat unnecessarily. He should not allow his men to gain the idea that if they do not listen at once he will tell them later. It should be an understood fact that his *Explanation*, once stated, stands. Of course he may reiterate during his talk for the sake of emphasis. But he should by practice be so capable of telling everything so unmistakably the first time over that no reasonable question can be asked.

Good explanations make for attention on the part of his men, and attention makes for an increase of good work. Sooner or later the achievements of his organization contrast it favorably with other organizations and his brother officers say, "He has made a success." Much of that success has come to him because he has set for himself, and followed these simple rules:

(1) "I will try today not to say anything which is not exactly expressive of what I mean."

(2) "I will try whenever I write to make myself unmistakable."

(3) "I will try whenever I speak to make every word distinct from every other word."

(4) "I will try whenever I read to see how others express themselves so that I may at the next opportunity imitate that part of their style which says most in the simplest way."

(5) "I will make every good new word my own, because the vocabulary of my present life is limited."

(6) "I will do all this because by so doing I shall develop myself in my profession, and because I may some day fail that profession if I neglect that development now."

LECTURES

Lectures are but extended *Explanations*. Officers are more and more being called upon to appear before large audiences of educated people in order to give to the country military knowledge. Training Camps and war are increasing the necessity for the delivery of lectures.

Because the *Lecture* takes more time, it should be more carefully developed than the *Explanation*. The subject should be divided into its various parts in a logical way. It should be bound together coherently. And each part should have in it only what belongs there. This process is simply that of following the rules of English with which we are already acquainted. The purpose is speed and clearness.

There are other elements which enter into the betterment of a long talk. Since an audience is human, there is reason in helping it through a dry subject. The treatment of the *Lecture* may in this way, besides aiding the interest, make the points stick longer. Two qualities which help to attain this treatment are *Humor* and *Presence*.

Ordinarily the American does not need to be told to cultivate humor. He reeks with it. But there are some instructors whose minds work along so impassively that it is difficult for them to be wakened from their gravity. To them the conscious development of the short anecdote, homely illustration, and incongruous phrase is a splendid aid. The great majority, however, must be guarded in the use of humor. The quality itself may be overworked so that the proportion of matter in the *Lecture* is small in comparison to the witticisms. Humor is but a means to an end. Its sole object should be to lighten the talk in order to help the subject into the auditor's mind more easily. Fun should be incidental and made without effort.

As to *Presence* more can be said in its favor. It is an indispensable quality in a speaker. If his diaphragm is in his mouth during his delivery, or if his heart action is violent, the audience cannot be fooled. It will be made uncomfortable. A speaker should have such ordinary fluency of accurate expression through practice that he entertains no fears of obscure or halting language. He should be so familiar with the sensations of looking into a number of faces that he will feel at ease. He should impress his audience that he enjoys standing before them for the purpose of imparting interesting knowledge. Such *Presence* can be attained only by taking advantage of every opportunity for correct public and private speech. The military novice should enter every impersonal discussion he can find, and should urge himself to speak whenever possible to more than a dozen people at a time.

He must be more than an ordinary talker, for he must have speed and interest as ready agents of his ideas. To gain those qualities is a matter of constant attention to speaking and to writing exactly what he wishes to say.

We have now covered the territory of military communications. We have seen the necessity for correct expression, and the difficulty of its attainment. What we have done should be but a beginning. It may be a long struggle to gain brevity and clarity—the terse and the unmistakable. But achievement will come with practice and will repay us fully in future satisfaction, and increased worth in our profession.

APPENDICES*

APPENDIX

FORMS OF COMPLETE FIELD ORDERS

While the following forms are given for the convenience of officers in the field, and with a view of securing uniformity in the service, it must be remembered that no two military situations are the same. The sequence in paragraph 3 is not obligatory, the commander arranging the details according to his best judgment.

For an advance.

Field Orders No. — [Reference to map used] Troops	[Title] [Place] [Date and hour]
(a) Independent Cavalry: [Commander] [Troops]	1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops] 2. [Plan of commander] 3. (a) [Instructions for independent cavalry—place and time of departure, roads or country to be covered, special mission]
(b) Advance Guard: [Commander] [Troops]	(b) [Instructions for advance guard—place and time of departure, or distance at which it is to precede the main body, route, special mission]
(c) Main Body—in order of march: [Commander] ¹	(c) [Instructions for main body—distance at which it is to follow the advance guard, or place and time of departure]
(d) Right [left] Flank Guard: [Commander] [Troops]	(d) [Instructions for flank guard—place and time of departure, route, special mission]
(e) Signal Troops: [Commander] [Troops]	(e) [Instructions for signal troops—lines of information to be established, special mission] (x) [Instructions for outpost—when relieved, subsequent duties]
	4. [Instructions for field train—escort, distance in rear of column, or destination when different from that of main body, if disposition not previously covered in "Orders"]
[Instructions for sanitary, ammunition, supply and engineer trains, when necessary]	
5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]	[Authentication]
[How and to whom issued]	

*F. S. Regs.

¹ If a commander is designated for the main body, his name is inserted here.

For advance guards.

Field Orders	[Title]
No. —	[Place]
[Reference to map used]	[Date and hour]
Troops	1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops]
(a) Advance Cavalry:	2. [Plan of commander]
[Commander]	3. (a) [Instructions for advance cavalry—place and time of departure, roads or country to be covered, special mission]
[Troops]	(b) [Instructions for support—place and time of departure, route, special mission]
(b) Support:	(c) [Instructions for reserve—distance at which it is to follow support]
[Commander]	(d) [Instructions for flank guard—place and time of departure, route, special mission]
[Troops]	4. [Instructions for field train—generally to join train of column if not previously covered in orders]
(c) Reserve—in order of march:	5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent, location of lines of information]
[Troops]	[Authentication]
(d) Right [left] Flank Guard:	
[Commander]	
[Troops]	
[How and to whom issued]	

A halt for the night—Camp with outpost.

Field Orders	[Title]
No. —	[Place]
[Reference to map used]	[Date and hour]
1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops, including independent cavalry]	
2. [Plan of commander—to encamp or bivouac]	
3. (a) [Designation of commander and troops of outpost, ¹ general line to be held, special reconnaissance, connection with other outposts, if any]	
(b) [Instructions for troops not detailed for outpost duty—location of camp, designation of camp commander, ² observation of flanks and rear when necessary, lines of information, conduct in case of attack]	
4. [Instructions for field train—generally to join troops, though if near enemy, field train of outpost troops may be held in rear] ³	

¹ Where the advance guard is large the order may direct the advance guard commander to establish the outpost.

² Omitted when the chief exercises immediate command of the camp.

³ May be provided for in "order" issued subsequently.

[Instructions for sanitary, ammunition, supply, and engineer trains, when necessary]

5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]

[Authentication]

[How and to whom issued]

For outposts.

Field Orders

No. —

[Reference to map used]

Troops

[Title]

[Place]

[Date and hour]

(a) Advance Cavalry:

[Commander]

[Troops]

(b) Supports:¹

No.1 [Commander]

[Troops]

No.2 [Commander]

[Troops]

No.3 [Commander]

[Troops]

(c) Detached Post:

[Commander]

[Troops]

(d) Reserve:

[Commander]

[Troops]

1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops]

2. [Plan of commander—to establish outpost, approximate line of resistance]

3. (a) [Instructions for advanced cavalry contact with enemy, roads or country to be specially watched, special mission]

(b) [Instructions for supports—positions they are to occupy, and sections of line of resistance which they are to hold, intrenching, etc.]

(c) [Instructions for detached post—position to be occupied, duties, amount of resistance]

(d) [Instructions for reserves—location, observation of flanks, conduct in case of attack, duties of special troops]

4. [Instruction for field train if necessary]

5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent, location of lines of information]

[Authentication]

[How and to whom issued]²

It is sometimes necessary to issue two outpost orders; the first as above, containing general instruction; the second, issued after an inspection of the line, and containing more definite instructions or involving changes.

For positions in readiness.

Field Orders

No. —

[Reference to map used]

1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops]

[Title]

[Place]

[Date and hour]

¹ Numbered from the right.

² For small outposts it may be more convenient to write this order without a marginal distribution of troops.

2. [Plan of commander—to take up a position in readiness at or near —]

3. (a) [Instructions for cavalry—to reconnoiter in direction of enemy, special mission]

(b) [Instructions for artillery—position or place of assembly]

(c) [Instructions for infantry—position or place of assembly, points to be especially held, reconnaissance]

(d) [Instructions for engineers—position or place of assembly]

(e) [Instructions for signal troops—lines of information]

4. [Instructions for field trains, sanitary, ammunition, supply and engineer trains if not previously covered in orders—generally to halt at designated localities in rear, ready to move in any direction]

5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]

[Authentication]

[How and to whom issued]

For defense positions.

Field Orders

[Title]

No. —

[Place]

[Reference to map used]

[Date and hour]

1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops]

2. [Plan of commander—to take up a defensive position at or along —, for the purpose of —]

3. (a) [Instructions for artillery—position, target, intrenching, etc.]

(b) [Instructions for fighting line—division of front into sections and assignment of troops thereto, intrenching, etc.]

(c) [Instructions for reserve—troops and position]

(d) [Instructions for cavalry—usually to cover with its main force the more exposed flank, a detachment being sent to patrol the other; reconnaissance]

(e) [Instructions for engineer—defensive work, clearing field of fire, preparation of obstacles, opening roads, etc.]

(f) [Instructions for signal troops—to establish lines of information]

4. [Instructions for sanitary train—location of dressing stations and station for slightly wounded]

[Instructions for ammunition train—location of ammunition distributing stations]

[Instructions for field and supply trains, if not previously covered in orders]

5. [Place of commander of where messages may be sent]

[How and to whom issued]

[Authentication]

For an attack.

Field Orders

[Title]

No. —

[Place]

[Reference to map used]

[Date and hour]

1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops]
2. [Plan of commander—indicating the general plan of attack, usually to envelop a flank]
3. (a) [Information for artillery—position, first target, generally hostile artillery]
- (b) [Instructions for holding attack¹—commander, troops, direction and objective]
- (c) [Instructions for main attack—commander, troops, direction and objective]
- (d) [Instructions for reserve—commander, troops, position]
- (e) [Instructions for cavalry—generally to operate on one or both flanks, or to execute some special mission]
- (f) [Instructions for engineers—any special mission]
- (g) [Instructions for signal troops—to establish lines of information between the commander and the main and secondary attacks, artillery, reserves, etc.]
4. [Instructions for sanitary train—location of dressing stations and stations for slightly wounded when practicable]

[Instructions for ammunition train—location of ammunition distributing stations]

[Instructions for field and supply trains, if not previously covered in orders]

5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]

[How and to whom issued]

[Authentication]

Note.—In war it is not always possible to issue a complete attack order like the above, disposing of an entire command. In unexpected encounters, for instance, orders must be given as the situation develops.

For a retreat.

Field Orders

[Title]

No. —

[Place]

[Reference to map used]

[Date and hour]

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| Troops | 1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops] |
| (a) Leading Troops: | 2. [Plan of commander—to retire in direction of —] |
| [Commander] | |
| [Troops] | |

¹The term "holding attack" as used in this form is for convenience only; it is never used in actual orders, as the vigor of an attack might be lessened if the troops knew it was "holding" only.

- (b) Main Body—in order of march:
[Troops] 3. (a) [Instructions for leading troops—place and time of departure, route, special mission]
- (c) Rear Guard:
[Commander] (b) [Instructions for main body—place and time of departure, route]
[Troops] (c) [Instructions for rear guard—distance from the main body or place and time of departure, special mission]
- (d) Right [left] Flank Guard:
[Commander] (d) [Instructions for flank guard—place and time of departure, special mission]
[Troops] (e) [Instructions for signal troops—lines of information]
- (e) Signal Troops:
[Commander] (x) [Instructions for outposts—when relieved, subsequent duties—usually forming the rear guard]
[Troops]
4. [Instructions for field and divisional trains—place and time of departure, route, escort; these trains are generally some distance ahead of the column]
5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]

[Authentication]

[How and to whom issued]

For rear guards.

Field Orders

- No. — [Title]
[Reference to map used] [Place]
Troops [Date and hour]
1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops]
- (a) Reserve—in order of march:
[Troops] 2. [Plan of commander—mission of rear guard]
- (b) Support:
[Commander] 3. (a) [Instructions for reserve—place and time of departure, or approximate distance from main body, reconnaissance]
[Troops] (b) [Instructions for support—place and time of departure or distance from reserve, any special reconnaissance]
- (c) Rear Cavalry:
[Commander] (c) [Instructions for rear cavalry—place and time of departure, road or country to be covered, special mission]
[Troops] (d) [Instructions for flank guard—place and time of departure, route, special mission]
- (d) Right [left] Flank Guard:
[Commander] 4. [Instructions for field train when necessary—usually to join the train of main body]
[Troops]

5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent—location of lines of information]

[Authentication]

[How and to whom issued]

MARCH TABLE

In movements of large forces on several roads, it is sometimes desirable to prescribe the daily marches of the various columns for two or more days. In such cases the order may often be simplified by appending or incorporating a march table usually in the following form, each column providing its own security.

March Table.

——— Army, from ——— [date], to ——— [date].

[Reference to map used.]

Date	——— Division	——— Division	Army Hq.
	Location of main body or of advance guard at end of each day's march, and line of march, if necessary.	Location of main body or of advance guard at end of each day's march, and line of march, if necessary.	Location at end of each day's march.

APPENDIX 2

Abbreviations

FIELD MAPS AND SKETCHES

The following abbreviations and signs are authorized for use on field maps and sketches. For more elaborate map work the authorized conventional signs as given in the manual of "Conventional Signs, United States Army Maps," are used.

Abbreviations other than those given should not be used.

Abbreviations.

A.	Arroyo.	L. S. S.	Life-Saving Station.
abut.	Abutment.	L. H.	Lighthouse.
Ar.	Arch.	Long.	Longitude.
b.	Brick.	Mt.	Mountain.
B. S.	Blacksmith Shop.	Mts.	Mountains.
bot.	Bottom.	N.	North.
Br.	Branch.	n. f.	Not fordable.
br.	Bridge.	P.	Pier.
C.	Cape.	pk.	Plank.
cem.	Cemetery.	P. O.	Post Office.
con.	Concrete.	Pt.	Point.
cov.	Covered.	q. p.	Queen-post.
Cr.	Creek.	R.	River.
cul.	Culvert.	R. H.	Roundhouse.
d.	Deep.	R. R.	Railroad.
D. S.	Drug Store.	S.	South.
E.	East.	s.	Steel.
Est.	Estuary.	S. H.	Schoolhouse.
f.	Fordable.	S. M.	Sawmill.
Ft.	Fort.	Sta.	Station.
G. S.	General Store.	st.	Stone.
gir.	Girder.	str.	Stream.
G. M.	Gristmill.	T. G.	Tollgate.
i.	Iron.	Tres.	Trestle
I.	Island.	tr.	Truss.
Jc.	Junction.	W. T.	Water Tank.
k. p.	King-post.	W. W.	Water Works.
L.	Lake.	W.	West.
Lat.	Latitude.	w.	Wood.
Ldg.	Landing.	wd.	Wide.

Tactical organizations:

3d Div.	Third Infantry Division.
1st Cav. Div.	First Cavalry Division.
1st Sep. Brig.	First Separate Brigade.
8th Brig, 3d Div.	Eighth Infantry Brigade of Third Infantry Division.
2d Brig. 1st Cav. Div. ..	Second Cavalry Brigade of First Cavalry Division.
4th Brig. F. A.	Fourth Brigade of Field Artillery.
5th Hv. A.	Fifth Regiment of Heavy Artillery.
4th M. A.	Fourth Regiment of Mountain Artillery.
1st Pon. Bn.	First Ponton Battalion.
1st Aero Sq.	First Aero Squadron.
3d Inf.	Third Regiment of Infantry.
2d Cav.	Second Regiment of Cavalry.
3d L. A.	Third Regiment of Light Artillery.
6th H. A.	Sixth Regiment of Horse Artillery.
1st Bn. Engrs.	First Pioneer Battalion of Engineers.
1st Bn. mtd. Engrs.	First Pioneer Battalion of Engineers, Mounted.
1st Bn. Sig.	First Field Battalion Signal Troops.
1st Bn. Sig. cav.	First Field Battalion Signal Troops, Cavalry.
1st Tel. Bn.	First Telegraph Battalion.

Trains:

C. Tn.	Combat train.
F. Tn.	Field train.
B. Sec. F. Tn.	Baggage section field train.
R. Sec. F. Tn.	Ration section field train.
Am. Tn.	Ammunition train.
Sp. Tn.	Supply train.
Sn. Tn.	Sanitary train.
1st Amb. Co.	First Ambulance Company.
2d F. Hosp. Co.	Second Field Hospital Company.
1st Med. Res. Co.	First Medical Reserve Company.
Engr. Tn.	Engineer train.

Columns (1 of c):

Am. Col.	Ammunition column.
Sp. Col.	Supply column.
Sn. Col.	Sanitary column.
Engr. Col.	Engineer column.

*Fractional Organization.***Infantry:**

- 3d Div. (less cav. and 1 bn. F. A.)
- 2d Brig. (less 1 regt.)
- 1st Inf. (less 6 cos. and M. G. Co.)
- 1 bn. 6th Inf.
- 1st Bn. 6th Inf. (less 1 co.)
- Co. A 1st Inf. (less 1 plat.)

Cavalry:

- 1st Cav. Div. (less 1 brig.)
- 2d Brig. (less 1 regt.)
- 3d Cav. (less 1 sq. and M. G. detach.)
- 1 Sq. 4th Cav.
- 1st Sq. 4th Cav. (less 1 tr.)
- Tr. C 4th Cav. (less 2 plats.)

Artillery:

- 4th Brig. F. A. (less 1 bn.)
- 3d L. (less 1 bn.)
- 1 bn. 1st L. A. (less 1 btry.)
- 1st L. A. (less 2 btries.)
- Btry A 6th H. A.
- 5th Hv. A. (less 1 bn. 6" How.)
- 1 Bn. 4.7" How., 5th Hv. A.
- 1 Btry. 4.7" gun, 5th Hv. A.

Engineers:

- 1st Bn. Engrs. (less 1 co.)
- Co. A Engrs. (less 1 sec.)
- 2 Secs. Engrs.
- 1st Pon. Bn. (less 1 co. heavy equip.)
- 1 pon. co. light equip. (less 2 bridge div.)

Signal:

- 1st Bn. Sig. (less 1 wire plat.)
- 1 rad. Co. Sig.
- 1 wire Co. Sig.
- 1 rad. sec. pack, Sig.
- 1 rad. plat. wagon, Sig.
- 1 wire Sec. Sig.
- 1 wire plat. Sig.

Miscellaneous:

- Adj. adjutant.
- Adm. Sec. G. S. administrative section, general staff.
- A. D. of Ry. assistant director of railways.

Am.	ammunition.
Adv. Gd.	advance guard.
Adv. Sec. L. of C.	advance section, line of communications.
Asst. C. of S.	assistant chief of staff.
Base Sec. L. of C.	base section, line of communications.
Brig. Gen.	brigadier general.
Capt.	captain.
C. G.	commanding general.
C. G. L. of C.	commanding general, line of communications.
C. O.	commanding officer.
Col.	colonel.
C. of S.	chief of staff.
Comdg.	commanding.
Comb. Sec. G. S.	combat section, general staff.
Detch.	detachment.
D. of Ry.	director of railways.
E. O.	engineer officer.
F. O.	field order.
F. S. R.	field service regulations.
Gd.	guard.
Gen.	general.
G. O.	general order.
Insp.	inspector.
Int. Sec. G. S.	intelligence section, general staff.
Inter. Sec. L. of C.	intermediate section, line of communications.
J. A.	judge advocate.
L. of C.	line of communications.
Lt.	lieutenant.
Lt. Col.	lieutenant colonel.
Lt. Gen.	lieutenant general.
Maj.	major.
Maj. Gen.	major general.
M. P.	military police.
N. C. O.	noncommissioned officer.
O. O.	ordnance officer.
Q. M.	quartermaster.
S. A. Am.	small arms ammunition.
Sig. O.	signal officer.
S. O.	special order.
Surg.	surgeon.

Army Changes

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