


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
University of California • Berkeley



David R. Brower

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVIST, PUBLICIST, AND PROPHET

**Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library**



DAVID ROSS BROWER
1979

Photo by G. Paul Bishop

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

Sierra Club History Series

David R. Brower

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVIST, PUBLICIST, AND PROPHET

With Introductions by
Ian Ballantine
John B. Oakes

An Interview Conducted by
Susan Schrepfer
1974-1978

Underwritten by
The Robert O. Anderson Foundation
The Sierra Club
and The Sierra Club Foundation

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Sierra Club Legend Dies

Environmentalist was uncompromising steward of the planet

By Alex Barnum and Glen Martin
CHRONICLE STAFF WRITERS

David Brower, the most influential figure in the American environmental movement since John Muir and Theodore Roosevelt, died Sunday of natural causes in his Berkeley home. He was 88.

As the first executive director of the Sierra Club, Brower led the conservationist charge in some of the most acrimonious environmental battles of the 20th century, including those centering on Colorado

River dams and management of Yosemite National Park.

Craggy and wry-humored, he was also mercurial — by turns charming, acerbic, gracious and combative. His toughness inspired respect from his adversaries and exasperation from his colleagues. He was perhaps best described as utterly uncompromising on the stewardship of the planet.


"No words here can adequately express our loss, nor the overwhelm-

► **BROWER:** Page A11 Col. 1

Environmental powerhouse, Sierra Club leader and Friends of the Earth founder David Brower was pictured at his Berkeley home in December.



David Brower, by turns gracious and combative, inspired respect from adversaries.



America's Most Influential Environmentalist Dies

► BROWER

From Page 1

ing influence he and his conservation activism have had on the environment," Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt said. "He was a tremendous force for nature and his accomplishments made him a well-respected visionary."

Brower was a man of many parts: writer and editor, mountaineer, administrator, soldier. But all his disparate qualities joined to create and support a vision that ultimately defined environmental activism in the United States.

"All our dinner conversation was about conservation," said Brower's son, Ken Brower, an environmental and nature writer. "He could subvert any subject. We were all converted, as he put it, to the 'religion.' He was a terribly persuasive guy."

Harold Gilliam, the longtime environmental writer for The Chronicle and a friend of Brower's for more than 40 years, said the conservationist's influence was felt worldwide.

"My wife once met a backpacker in the Alps who told her he was on his way to Rome to listen to a talk by David," said Gilliam. "When she said that she knew David, the guy almost fell off his log. (Brower) was a hero to him."

David Ross Brower was born in Berkeley on July 1, 1912, the third of four children. Brower's mother lost her sight after the birth of her last child. And Brower, who took his mother for walks in the Berkeley hills, said that having to serve as another person's eyes sharpened his appreciation of natural beauty.

Brower became an expert observer of flora and fauna and a collector of rocks and minerals. When he was 15, he discovered a new species of butterfly, ultimately named *Anthocaris sara reakirtii broweri*.

But Brower's natural curiosity was unable to sustain him through college. He dropped out of the University of California at Berkeley, and never obtained his bachelor's degree — always a sore point with him, even though he later received 10 honorary degrees. Later, he occasionally told people he was a graduate of the University of the Colorado River.

Around that time, Brower's interest in hiking and climbing grew. He joined the Sierra Club in 1933, sponsored by photographer Ansel Adams. Brower lost his first job at a San Francisco candy factory because of his chronic tardiness in returning from trips through the wilderness.

Brower quickly found a job better suited to him, working for the Yosemite Park & Curry Co. as its publicity manager. He earned a reputation as one of the best mountaineers in the park, making first ascents on 33 peaks in Yosemite and other parts of the High Sierra, including the east face of Glacier Point and Lost Arrow. His final global tally of first ascents was 70.

In 1941, Brower became an editor at the University of California Press, where he met fellow editor, Anne Hus. They were married two years later, just before Brower joined the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division. He instructed troops in climbing techniques, helped write a basic manual on mountaineering and saw combat in northern Italy.

Returning to the University of California Press after the war, Brower worked in his spare time writing the Sierra Club Handbook, which was first published in 1947 and was issued in five successive editions during the ensuing two decades.

Brower became the Sierra Club's first executive director in 1952.

In John Muir's day, the club was known for taking strong, unpopular positions, like opposing construction of the O'Shaughnessy Dam in Yosemite's Hetch Hetchy Valley. But a more conservative faction held sway at the club after Muir died; Brower ended this 40-year era of somnolence through his no-holds-barred environmental activism, using any means available to promote his issues.

Brower's premier conservation battle as the Sierra Club's first executive director was over a federal attempt to build dams in Dinosaur National Monument on the Utah-Colorado border.

The Bureau of Reclamation had developed ambitious plans for 10 big dams on the Colorado River, including two within Dinosaur, flooding more than 100 miles of pristine canyon. By arranging for publication of a book, conducting boat tours of the river and producing a documentary film, Brower was able to rally public opinion against any invasion of the monument.

But in defeating the dams at Dinosaur, Brower had made a strategic mistake that he would always regret. Conservationists had agreed not to oppose other dams on the Colorado that were outside national parks or monuments. Indeed, Brower had proposed in congressional testimony that a high dam be built in Glen Canyon instead.

At the time, few people, including Brower, had ever seen the remote Glen Canyon, 200 miles downstream from Dinosaur monu-

"His real legacy was in the heart he touched and the words he etched on the American consciousness."

CARL POPE,
executive director
of Sierra Club

ment. But when Brower saw the stunning riverine cathedral that was Glen Canyon, he pleaded with bureaucrats to forgo the dam — to no avail. He later told an oral historian that his congressional testimony was “the greatest sin I have ever committed.”

Brower then started a barrage of full-page newspaper ads against the dam-builders. Like his spectacular coffee-table books, provocative newspaper ads were a trademark Brower weapon in his battle to preserve America’s natural treasures and were widely copied in the environmental movement.

In the end, the Sierra Club stopped dams from being built in the Grand Canyon, an accomplishment that was generally regarded as the single greatest triumph in the history of the conservation movement.

Brower also was instrumental in other conservation campaigns, including the creation of Point Reyes and Cape Cod national seashores, Redwood National Park and North

Cascades National Park and enactment of the National Wilderness Preservation System.

Under Brower, the club’s membership swelled from 7,000 to 70,000 and its budget grew from \$75,000 to \$3 million.

But by the late 1960s, deep divisions had begun forming in the Sierra Club over Brower’s leadership. Critics, including past presidents, denounced him, saying he was prone to emotional and irresponsible statements. He was also criticized for neglecting the club’s financial welfare.

The jibes came to a head with the battle over the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant. To protect other parts of the California coast, some of the club’s directors persuaded Pacific Gas and Electric Co. to put the plant at the isolated San Luis Obispo County canyon site. Although

they later regretted the decision, board members felt they could not reverse themselves and still retain credibility. When Brower opposed the board’s decision, some directors viewed it as insubordination.

Brower also came under fire for overcommitting the club’s financial resources. Critics felt that his spectacular coffee-table books, while bringing wide public attention, were jeopardizing the organization’s solvency. In 1969, Brower resigned after 17 years as executive director of the Sierra Club.

Characteristically, he forged ahead, founding the environmental groups Friends of the Earth and Earth Island Institute. He was a co-founder of the League of Conservation Voters. And in ensuing years, he negotiated a limited rapprochement with the Sierra Club, serving three-year terms on the organization’s board of directors commencing in 1983, 1986, 1995 and 1998.

But he also continued in his confrontational ways, chastising the club’s leadership on issues ranging from population growth to a “lost sense of urgency.”

Carl Pope, the club’s executive director, acknowledged that he locked horns with Brower many times.

“I have no doubt he felt more positively about me at some times than at others,” said Pope. “He was a challenging and passionate person. But my view of him never changed. He was a real leader and an innovator. He left a legacy on the landscape, but his real legacy was in the hearts he touched, the minds he changed and the words he etched on the American consciousness.”

Characteristically, Brower was busy to the end.

“He wasn’t interested in talking to the doctors about his health, but he wanted significant life-support measures because he had so much work to do,” said Ken Brower. “The last thing he did was cast an absentee ballot for (Green Party presidential candidate) Ralph Nader.”

On the campaign trail, Nader paused yesterday to pay tribute to his fellow activist.

“The environmental movement has lost a champion, and I have lost a dear and valued friend,” Nader said. “David Brower was the greatest environmentalist and conservationist of the 20th century.”

In addition to son Ken and his wife, Anne, Brower is survived by his daughter, Barbara, sons Robert and John, and three grandchildren, David Brower and Rosemary and Katy Olsen. Memorial services are pending.

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PREFACE

The Oral History Program of the Sierra Club

In fall 1969 and spring 1970 a self-appointed committee of Sierra Clubbers met several times to consider two vexing and related problems. The rapid membership growth of the club and its involvement in environmental issues on a national scale left neither time nor resources to document the club's internal and external history. Club records were stored in a number of locations and were inaccessible for research. Further, we were failing to take advantage of the relatively new technique of oral history by which the reminiscences of club leaders and members of long standing could be preserved.

The ad hoc committee's recommendation that a standing History Committee be established was approved by the Sierra Club Board of Directors in May 1970. That September the board designated The Bancroft Library of the University of California at Berkeley as the official depository of the club's archives. The large collection of records, photographs and other memorabilia known as the "Sierra Club Papers" is thus permanently protected, and the Bancroft is preparing a catalog of these holdings which will be invaluable to students of the conservation movement.

The History Committee then focused its energies on how to develop a significant oral history program. A six page questionnaire was mailed to members who had joined the club prior to 1931. More than half responded, enabling the committee to identify numerous older members as likely prospects for oral interviews. (Some had hiked with John Muir!) Other interviewees were selected from the ranks of club leadership over the past six decades.

Those committee members who volunteered as interviewers were trained in this discipline by Willa Baum, head of the Bancroft's Regional Oral History Office and a nationally recognized authority in this field. Further interviews have been completed in cooperation with university oral history classes at California State University, Fullerton; Columbia University, New York; and the University of California, Berkeley. Extensive interviews with major club leaders are most often conducted on a professional basis through the Regional Oral History Office.

Copies of the Sierra Club oral interviews are placed at The Bancroft Library, at UCLA, and at the club's Colby Library, and may be purchased for the actual cost of photocopying, binding, and shipping by club regional offices, chapters, and groups, as well as by other libraries and institutions.

Our heartfelt gratitude for their help in making the Sierra Club Oral History Project a success goes to each interviewee and interviewer; to everyone who has written an introduction to an oral history; to the Sierra Club Board of Directors for its recognition of the long-term importance of this effort; to the Trustees of the Sierra Club Foundation for generously providing

the necessary funding; to club and foundation staff, especially Michael McCloskey, Denny Wilcher, Colburn Wilbur, and Nicholas Clinch; to Willa Baum and Susan Schrepfer of the Regional Oral History Office; and last but far from least, to the members of the History Committee, and particularly to Ann Lage, who has coordinated the oral history effort since September 1974.

You are cordially invited to read and enjoy any or all of the oral histories in the Sierra Club series. By so doing you will learn much of the club's history which is available nowhere else, and of the fascinating careers and accomplishments of many outstanding club leaders and members.

Marshall H. Kuhn
Chairman, History Committee
1970 - 1978

San Francisco
May 1, 1977
(revised May 1979, A.L.)

SIERRA CLUB ORAL HISTORY PROJECT
April 1980

Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library

David R. Brower, Environmental Activist, Publicist, and Prophet, 1980
Richard M. Leonard, Mountaineer, Lawyer, Environmentalist, 1976
William E. Siri, Reflections on The Sierra Club, the Environment, and Mountaineering, 1950s-1970s, 1979
Ansel Adams, in process
Edgar Wayburn, in process

Sierra Club History Committee

Elizabeth Marston Bade, Recollections of William F. Bade and the Early Sierra Club, 1976
Philip S. Bernays, Founding the Southern California Chapter, 1975
Harold C. Bradley, Furthering the Sierra Club Tradition, 1975
Nathan C. Clark, Sierra Club Leader, Outdoorsman, and Engineer, 1977
Harold E. Crowe, Sierra Club Physician, Baron, and President, 1975
Glen Dawson, Pioneer Rock Climber and Ski Mountaineer, 1975
Nora Evans, Sixty Years with the Sierra Club, 1976
Francis Farquhar, Sierra Club Mountaineer and Editor, 1974
Marjory Bridge Farquhar, Pioneer Woman Rock Climber and Sierra Club Director, 1977
C. Nelson Hackett, Lasting Impressions of the Early Sierra Club, 1975
Joel Hildebrand, Sierra Club Leader and Ski Mountaineer, 1974
Helen LeConte, Reminiscences of LeConte Family Outings, the Sierra Club, and Ansel Adams, 1977
John and Ruth Mendenhall, Forty Years of Sierra Club Mountaineering Leadership, 1938-1978, 1979
Ruth E. Prager, Remembering the High Trips, 1976
Bestor Robinson, Thoughts on Conservation and the Sierra Club, 1974
Gordon Robinson, Forestry Consultant to the Sierra Club, 1979
James E. Rother, The Sierra Club in the Early 1900s, 1974
In process, Ruth Bradley, Cicely Christy, Lewis Clark, Fred Eissler, Alfred Forsyth, Wanda Goody, Ethel Horsfall, Stewart Kimball, George Marshall, Susan Miller, Stewart Ogilvy, Sigurd Olson, Harriet Parsons, Raymond Sherwin, Walt Wheelock

California State University, Fullerton--Southern Sierrans Project

Thomas Amneus, New Directions for the Angeles Chapter, 1977
Robert Bear, Desert Conservation and Exploration with the Sierra Club, 1946-1978, 1980
Irene Charnock, Portrait of a Sierra Club Volunteer, 1977
J. Gordon Chelew, Reflections of an Angeles Chapter Member, 1921-1975, 1976
Arthur B. Johnson, Climbing and Conservation in the Sierra Club's Southern California Chapter, 1930-1960s, 1980
Olivia R. Johnson, High Trip Reminiscences, 1904-1945, 1977
E. Stanley Jones, Sierra Club Officer and Angeles Chapter Leader, 1931-1975, 1976
Marion Jones, Reminiscences of the Southern California Sierra Club, 1927-1975, 1976
Robert R. Marshall, Angeles Chapter Leader and Wilderness Spokesman, 1960s, 1977
Dorothy Leavitt Pepper, High Trip High Jinks, 1976
Roscoe and Wilma Poland, Desert Conservation: Voices from the Sierra Club's San Diego Chapter, 1980
Richard Searle, Grassroots Sierra Club Leader, 1976

University of California, Berkeley--The Sierra Club and the
Urban Environment

SAN FRANCISCO BAY CHAPTER INNER CITY OUTINGS:

Patrick Colgan, "Just One of the Kids Myself", 1980
Jordan Hall, Trial and Error: the Early Years, 1980
Duff LaBoyteaux, Towards a National Sierra Club Program, 1980
Marlene Sarnat, Laying the Foundations for ICO, 1980
George Zuni, From the Inner City Out, 1980

SIERRA CLUB OUTREACH TO WOMEN:

Helen Burke, Women's Issues in the Environmental Movement, 1980

INTRODUCTION by Ian Ballantine

David Brower's contributions to publishing are to be found in a number of books on the lists of various publishers. By setting high standards and by finding new ways to obtain superior results, Brower fathered a whole generation of books that might never have appeared if he had not been both an innovator with gloriously practical insights and a crusader for causes that are well served by the production of beautiful books.

David Brower created the Exhibit Format books for The Sierra Club. He obtained the photographs, he designed the books, he contributed to the texts, and he was instrumental in achieving the fantastically beautiful reproduction which revealed a world of beauty to be saved and preserved. At the start he got contributions of funds to subsidize the first volumes. When the membership of the Sierra Club and the book trade were able to see the beautiful finished product, sales justified the expense of manufacturing books which have never been equaled for quality and design.

Whenever there was a print run, David himself went down to Barnes Press, the printer of these landmark works, so that he could absolutely control the end result. He approved the color form by form and got the pressmen personally involved in the act of creating the most perfect product they could achieve. By inspiring and permitting a pride in craft, he got better work than mighty purchasers of printing who okayed sample sheets in their offices. David got the photographers to come to watch a press run so that they knew more about the best compromises to make in developing their own work. He took the practical step of ordering engravings of more subjects than would fit in a given book so that when the inevitable mediocre or unsatisfactory engraving that was not correctable turned up there were subjects in reserve. There was never, ever, any compromise with quality in the end result because, in the view of David Brower, these books had to show a world he wanted to save in such a way that the readers too must feel it was worth saving.

Our first business discussions were on the subject of large format paperbound editions of the Exhibit Format books. David saw the potential for the paperbound series, for the chance to reach many more people than the expensive hardcover editions could ever affect. The first book involved a big risk. If we produced a paperbound edition which held to Brower's standards of quality, would our cheap \$3.95 edition kill the sale of the \$25.00 edition? David saw that the small book, by being truly beautiful, could make a market for the large book. He agreed to start with his most salable title, In Wildness is the Preservation of the World.

David's confidence and his insistence on no compromise with quality contributed to the almost instant success of the first massmarket large format series to be published for the newsstand audience.

As a crusader, he found ingenious ways to use the paperbound editions and helped generally in publicizing the series. Once we had the series established, we broke additional new ground.

David had a copy of a homemade book that was hand lettered and which used everyday drugstore photography. It was titled On the Loose. With only one copy there was no way to sample salesmen's or booksellers' opinions; nor was there any sales record to go by. But the book articulated ideas of a strong appeal to young people, and it was obvious that the retail price of the hardcover edition had to be low. This objective was achieved by printing 50,000 copies for a relatively low unit cost. Only 15,000 copies were bound in hardcovers, the balance of the sheets being held for the paperbound edition to come. However, On the Loose was the tremendous success Brower thought it would be and because sheets were immediately available, the book became a bestseller without losing momentum--too often the fate of the hardbound book which just cannot be reprinted soon enough to take advantage of a bestseller scale of demand. The foregoing practical publishing invention was used during the current publishing season by half a dozen publishers.

With the Sierra Club books moving so well, we got interested in related material. Brower took to the idea of selling the promotional material for the books like a duck to water. Very late in the year we manufactured less than 15,000 of the first Sierra Club calendars and marketed the whole printing in the Bay Area. Although the test itself was uneconomic, it proved that the calendar was popular and hence, in more sensible quantities, could contribute sizeable revenue to the club and, incidentally, help the books. From this it was easy to see why beautiful posters from the books would also be popular and again serve to publicize the books.

At the same time that David Brower was providing the main spark for the development of large format paperbound book publishing, he saw the importance of rack size topical publishing. He turned his collection of mimeographed radio speeches by a Stanford biology professor, Paul Ehrlich, over to me with the request that I get Paul to write a book. Paul's book, The Population Bomb, has reached millions of readers.

When the opportunity to create an anthology on the environment occurred, David arranged to get most contributors together in San Francisco so that each of the writers was able to take into account what was in the rest of the book. (When one of the contributors failed to deliver Brower wrote the piece himself!) The Environmental Handbook has sold over a million copies--yet another seed book from the mind and heart of David Brower which has created whole new attitudes toward and new awareness of basic problems of our time.

David Brower kept looking for topical books that bore on the subject areas that concerned him. Not all the books were successful. Early warning books on defoliants and nuclear plants had only modest sales. Some titles were disastrous. But failure never stopped him. The message was too important. If one way didn't work, he'd try another. He never seemed to run out of inventiveness and kept on having good strong ingenious ideas for publicizing each new book, each new concept.

Most recently, a carton arrived with twenty Friends-of-the-Earth Whale Calendars in it, with a note from David asking that the calendars be sent to places and people where they would do the most good. This typically practical solution to the publisher's problem of calendars left unsold in the warehouse at the end of the year shows that David Brower is still in there applying the principles that he believes in to the benefit of everyone in publishing and--not to be grandiose about it--in the world. For the problems Brower has tackled and is still tackling are massive and worldwide. There is nothing small about this man. The younger generation especially owes him a debt--for the easy availability of new kinds of books, for those things of natural beauty that are preserved which might not have been but for his gut-sense and perseverance, for his ideas, for his awareness of the real problems that will beset future generations--but most of all, perhaps, for hope and the courage to believe in a future. May I say, in all honesty, that I am proud to be a part of David's crusade and to own him friend.

Ian Ballantine
President
Peacock Press

Bearsville, 1980

INTRODUCTION by John B. Oakes

It was the spring of 1955. The telephone rang in my office in the Editorial Department of the New York Times. An urgent, almost peremptory voice was at the other end of the line in San Francisco.

"This is Dave Brower--again," said the voice--which startled me as I had been speaking to him only a few minutes earlier. I had never met him personally, but we had had a telephone acquaintance since his appointment a few years previously as executive director of the Sierra Club, then a small, localized and rather narrowly focused organization hardly known outside the Western states. I had invariably found him to be both a provocative thinker and a reliable source of ideas and information on diverse controversial environmental issues that I was writing about on the editorial page of the Times and in my monthly "Conservation" column in the same paper.

"You mentioned to me that you were going out to Dinosaur next week to see for yourself what the argument over Echo Park Dam is all about," said Brower. "Well, I want to come along too. How about it?"

Slightly put off by the brashness of this self-invitation from somebody I'd never even seen, I said to Brower that it was okay with me if he could fix it up with the Department of the Interior, which had arranged the trip. When I got off the train at Denver, there was Brower, ready to drive with me over the Rockies a couple of hundred miles to Vernal, Utah, where we met up with the Interior Department brass for our float-trip down the Yampa. Early next morning, from a starting point well upstream, we embarked on an unforgettable ride on a rubber raft through the heart of Dinosaur National Monument, under the sheer rock canyons and craggy cliffs that would be all but drowned out by the dam-created lake, then past the prospective dam site and on to the fossil remains for which Dinosaur is named.

Dave probably didn't realize it, but it was not really necessary for him to work on me to counter the Department's propaganda in favor of the dam. I had long been convinced, from the three or four years' bitter debate that had already swirled about this project (a debate in which he had taken a leading part), that the proposed \$200-million, 700-foot slab of concrete across one of the most stupendous river canyons in America was the quintessential boondoggle, and could not possibly be justified on economic or any other grounds.

But it was characteristic of Dave, as I learned from that first meeting 25 years ago, that in his single-minded defense and pursuit of environmental quality wherever and however it was threatened, he would leave no stone

unturned, take no chances of missing an opportunity to expound his views, which he invariably did with brilliance and, thank God, still does. He would undergo any personal inconvenience, make any sacrifice of time or money (far beyond what he could afford), travel anywhere, do anything within the legitimate bounds of law and reason to advance the cause as he saw it. Sometimes he was so insistent, so abrasive, that he was accused--usually by those who disagreed with him anyway--of being counterproductive. But I don't think any environmental battle was ever lost by Dave for that reason. On the contrary, I believe some victories would not have been won without his persistence--and his insistence. Echo Park dam was one of them.

But eloquence and articulateness are only the least of the qualities that have led this extraordinary man to become the most effective environmental activist of our generation. Like Martin Luther King in another context, Dave Brower had (and has) a vision. It is a vision of a world in which humanity has come to terms with nature, treating it as a friend to be lived with in harmony and peace, rather than as an enemy to be degraded and destroyed. It is a world in which man at last recognizes that--for all his technological progress in the past and, prospectively, in the future--the development, even the very continuance, of our civilization is dependent on a decent respect for the natural resource base of this planet.

But, again like Dr. King, Dave Brower has never been content to rest on his vision of a sublime future. He wants to make it happen--now. And to do that, he has had to be much more than a philosopher of the environment. He has been an innovator, an activist, an aggressive and even uncompromising fighter for the supremacy of ecological values in almost every significant environmental battle of our generation.

Unafraid of the adverse reactions that nonconformist or radical ideas usually bring down on their author, Dave Brower has often been way ahead of the game. Long years ago, before most people had seen the connection, Dave was linking population control to environmental progress. Long ago, he was raising uncomfortable questions about the limits of growth. Long ago, almost at the very beginning of the Atomic Age, he dared to doubt the wisdom of unrestrained development of nuclear power without adequate consideration of its dangers, and especially of the totally unsolved problem of nuclear waste. Long ago, Dave Brower was pointing out that energy conservation was the most efficient and speediest source for "new" energy supply. And long ago, long before Government finally took notice, he had the perception to see that alternative and permanently renewable sources of energy, especially solar power, were the direction to go for the long haul. It was Dave Brower who was the principal sponsor, if not the discoverer, of Amory Lovins.

Long ago, Dave Brower perceived clearly what many of us were slow to realize: that ecological concerns cannot be confined to one country or even to one continent. Ours is a small planet, in which environmental degradation in one area--the seas for example, or tropical forests or the air over

industrial cities--has an inescapable effect in other areas. Brower's work with the Sierra Club and subsequently with Friends of the Earth has emphasized the point.

Whether the subject was pollution of air, land or water; strip-mining; Alaska; hydropower; land-use controls; the ozone; coastal preservation; nuclear energy; wildlife protection; parks; the redwoods, or practically any other of the dozens of controversial issues of environmental interest, Dave Brower for at least the past 30 years has been in the forefront of the struggle. And he invariably comes on with a formidable array of factual information, which not infrequently constitutes a devastating response to the often phony or trumped-up engineering or statistical data of his adversaries, especially the Army Corps of Engineers and the old Bureau of Reclamation. Though I may have thought at times that he was too uncompromising on a few specific issues, I don't believe I've ever found him to be factually wrong.

Uncompromising though he is on environmental issues--aggressive, even perhaps abrasive at times--Dave personally is one of the most soft-spoken, kindest, gentlest of men. However, when it comes to ecological principles, to defining the environmental ethic and to outlining the course of action that flows from that, he is a latter-day Savonarola.

In a letter outlining the principles of Friends of the Earth, organized by Brower in 1969 after his forced resignation as executive director of the Sierra Club, Dave with his usual eloquence and unusual succinctness described what he considered "the worst disease that has ever threatened the planet: accelerating degradation of the environment. It is the only environment that will ever sustain us and the other living things we need to share the earth with.... The degradation is more than a disease. It is a crime, the worst crime of all: grand larceny against the future."

If in our generation we succeed in curbing that crime, or even bringing it under a little better control, Dave Brower's passionate crusade in what he calls "the war against smugness and apathy" will have played a significant, even essential, part. Whether or not we make progress in that war, it will still have to be carried further by generations to come, to whom Dave Brower's prophetic leadership will stand as a lasting inspiration.

John B. Oakes
Former Senior Editor, Editorial Page
New York Times

March 6, 1980
New York City, New York

INTERVIEW HISTORY

My first three interviews with David Brower were done in 1974. They were recorded in Friends of the Earth's office on Commercial Street in downtown San Francisco and were interrupted by the demands of his staff and punctuated by the staccato of automobiles in the street and construction jack hammers. In summer 1974 I moved from the San Francisco to the New York area. Because of this and Brower's hectic schedule, the interviews were not resumed until March 1976, when we met at the Biltmore Hotel to record against New York traffic and, on one occasion, the St. Patrick's Day Parade. Brower's travels as president of FOE, with its world-wide affiliates, were so extensive during the late 1970s that arranging sessions in New York actually proved easier than scheduling them in the west had and freed him from the distractions of his office.

Because the eight interviews in this volume were spaced out over four years--not unusual for an oral history of this length--there were occasional repetitions. Some contributed expanded insights and were left. Others did not and necessitated cutting and reorganization, as evidenced in the guide to tapes at the back of the manuscript.

At the beginning of each of our eight meetings Brower reviewed for a few moments a list of the topics we had covered and those yet to be discussed. Beyond this, for reasons of time and temperament, he did not prepare for the discussions. The spontaneity of the sessions was increased by the fact that they were recorded amid telephone calls arranging book contracts and FOE policy debates on such matters as Japanese whaling. The high quality of this oral history testifies to Brower's powers of recall and to his willingness to confront posterity with little calculation.

Brower is remarkable for his candor. He depicts personal failings, especially those he feels contributed to his difficulties in the Sierra Club and the eventual loss of his position as executive director in 1969. More surprising perhaps is his narration of those points in his career when he failed to meet his own ever-increasing standards of militance in defense of the natural world. This lack of guile carried over from the tapes into the actual manuscript. Brower, his wife Anne, and Ann Lage of the Regional Oral History Office edited the typescript for style and organization, but he did not request that substantive changes be made in the text.

When Brower talks of his visits to Nepal and Alaska, it is obvious that despite his sixty-odd years he has not lost his wonder at the world and the experiences life has offered him. His openness to nature and people may well account for his continuing appeal to the young. It may also explain why some of his contemporaries persist in seeing themselves as older than he and why his removal as Sierra Club executive director carried an aura of generational conflict.

The interviews that follow demonstrate that his departure from the Sierra Club in 1969 did not lessen his intolerance for ideological and financial conservatism when the fate of wilderness hangs in the balance. The character of FOE shows that age has not made him less capable of outrage. Fortunately for the earth, Brower retains a passionate engagement with his environment.

Susan R. Schrepfer
Interviewer-Editor

21 March 1980
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

I CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH: FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES

[Interview 1: February 26, 1974]##

Avocations in the Out-of-Doors

Schrepfer: I wonder if you'd like to start and tell me where you were born and a little bit about your childhood.

Brower: I was born in Berkeley, in a house that's still there, in 1912, July 1st, and I'm a second generation native Californian. My mother was born in Two Rock Valley near Petaluma. When you're my age, it's hard to be a second generation Californian.

Anyhow, we lived on Carlton Street just above the Santa Fe tracks, the right side of the tracks as I try to put it. And I have just a faint early recollection of my babyhood there; I can hardly believe it and other people don't believe it, but I still remember seeing a Santa Fe train come by, silhouetting my older brother in his crib by the window with its glaring moving headlight. That's all I remember. We left that place before I was six months old so nobody believes me. I want to go back and look in the room and see if it's possible, but they've added on to the house so that window is gone.

We moved to Channing Way, to Parker Street, and then in 1916 to 2232 Haste Street. That was my permanent address until I was married in 1943. The early years are pretty accurately portrayed, I think, by John McPhee in the Archdruid.* In the course of the

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 336.

*John McPhee, Encounters With the Archdruid (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1971).

Brower: year of working on that book and the articles for the New Yorker he spent a lot of time with my family and checked into things about my past and portrayed it.

The thing that I suppose helped me be concerned about the out-of-doors was my mother's love of it, my father's love of it, too. As early as I can remember we went on trips into the hills. I remember, early on, a trip up Dwight Way hill in 1916 after there had been a slight snowfall in Berkeley. I remember being hit in the eye by my father with a snowball, which made me cry, but I got over it. And I remember also trips along that same hill, but only vaguely--I was possibly now four or five--where there was a little gentle spring we stopped by, and I was quite amazed by the fact that there was good water, drinkable water, and it came for free out in the hills.

I remember reaching a crest looking over to the far side and seeing the hills still went on, and I felt that was good news. I liked hills. There's not much need I suppose in dwelling at great length on that, except that I did like them and in school I remember I liked them well enough that one of the favorite programs we had was a natural science teacher who came around once a week with some little natural science course. I looked forward to that, and until this moment when I'm pressed to think of the name, I could remember her name [Miss Peroni], and it will probably come to me in the course of this recollection binge. That was such a delight--to see what was going on out-of-doors, to have an explanation brought in--that it marked me pretty well.

That, and then the trips that we took when the family went camping. John McPhee tells about them. It was in an old 1916 Maxwell fixed for camping trips. The roads then were, of course, quite basic. It took three days to get to Tahoe, at least the way we went, instead of the three hours that I made the trip in with John McPhee several years ago. The camping was to me a delightful recollection.

I do remember that in my early camping trips I was not enthusiastic about going very far on side trips...On the trail to Vernal Fall not even wanting to go across the bridge across the river below the fall. It was a log across the river with a rail on one side only. And I didn't have much use for that. I remember not wanting to climb up Sentinel Dome, but staying in the car; I'd been a little bit nauseated that day. I remember when we crossed Tioga Pass about 1918--on the old road where we had to push the car over a steep portion--that I didn't want to take the little climb up Gaylor Peak, which was just to the northwest of the pass. So my inclination to climb hadn't shown itself yet.

Brower: But I certainly liked to get out and camp and look at the streams. There in the Sierra, on little trips we would take nearby, and in my experiences (that McPhee didn't recount) on a farm in Two Rock Valley near where my mother had been born, I learned to appreciate what was going on out-of-doors, and I never got over it.

Schrepfer: He mentions that you talked to the chickens.

Brower: I think he made a mistake on that one. I talked to the horse, but talking to the chickens, I don't know quite where he got that note. I don't remember talking to chickens.

Schrepfer: Not very many families went camping at that time.

Brower: There weren't very many. Of course at that time, let's see, when I was in high school the population of California was only a quarter of what it is now; when I was born, in 1912, it was only two and a half million; in 1918, when we went on the early camping trips, it was just over three million. So there was a great deal of room, and there was not much pavement yet. We hadn't surrendered to the automobile at that point, but we were well along the way.

I don't know how much more of childhood you want--McPhee did get into my interest in entomology. It was a budding interest. It started about 1925. I'd had a mild one before that. Then I got deeply interested in it because among the people who moved into our apartment house in Berkeley that my father managed were two brothers, Al and Fred Furer from Honolulu, who collected butterflies. I got swept into that interest of theirs. They knew somebody in Berkeley, Hamilton McCaughey (whose father, John McCaughey, was with the Audubon Society for a while), who was also a collector.

The outdoor identification of things at a distance began to open my eyes to details, specific details outdoors. It's something that anybody can do, but not many people get into any activity out-of-doors, at least city people, that enables them to do this. I, as McPhee pointed out, was able to identify--I guess I still can--quite a few butterflies at a distance just by their flight patterns, their flight habits. It's the kind of identification of living things that is almost automatic in any people not so insulated from nature as city people ordinarily are. That sense leads the Eskimo to have--how many words is it?--to describe the various kinds of snow. Some tribes in Africa have many words for green, each one with an ecological identification--words that distinguish what is good, or edible, or ripe, and what isn't--all kinds of names we don't have to rely upon because we don't pay that much attention.

Brower: Entomology and my interest particularly in collecting butterflies interested me in that kind of identification and then in learning what the requirements for butterflies were, the food plants, the natural science, natural history of each of the species I could find something about. That all became an important part of my learning how to look more carefully than everybody is inclined to. And that turned out to be useful later on.

I didn't keep on collecting butterflies; I remember the last time that I did it was in 1933. I was in the Sierra, and I was on a long seven-week knapsack trip. I caught a few then. I had a collection, it was never much, that was totally destroyed by museum beetles so there's nothing left of whatever I did then except the printed record of a new orange tip I discovered April 16, 1928, on the ridge beyond Dwight Way hill--anthotharsis sara Reakerti, transition form Broweri (Gunder). The specimen went into Jean Gunder's collection in Pasadena. He paid me ten dollars for it.

Schrepfer: Dick Leonard collected butterflies when he was young.

Brower: He did? He also was interested in botany. He was good at identifying a lot of things. He was a chemist with a good background in botany and went into law. I'm sure that whatever the avocation is early in life, it's drawn upon in many ways later on.

Mistakes in McPhee's Archdruid

Schrepfer: How about McPhee's portrait of your personality?

Brower: I'm not as aware of what he was saying about my personality as he was. I can't comment on that too well. I didn't read it carefully enough to see what he was saying about my personality.

But so I can settle it once and for all, there are only two major mistakes he made, besides telling that I was talking to chickens--I may have said that, but I don't know in what context. There were times when I would say something with a touch of humor at the time, or at least what I thought was humor, and I think he may have misread one or two things. I marked up the series of three articles and sent them to him. We've talked several times since, but we never settled on some of these points.

Brower: One thing should be cleared here for the record. Where he said that Brower and the Sierra Club used exaggeration as a weapon, he was wrong. At least I think he was. We've made quite a point in the Sierra Club, and I made quite a point myself, to use exaggeration possibly in a humorous sense but always to be pretty careful to make sure that it was identified as humor. A great deal of humor does depend upon momentary exaggeration.

But, when it came to any of the difficult battles we got into, in both the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, the thing that I was interested in, and that the people I was working with were interested in, was getting to facts which were hard to get to--unearthing the facts that the government agencies, for the most part, or particularly self-serving corporations, were not willing to let out. We had to get the facts and expose them; exaggeration would do nothing but destroy our whole effort, and this is not what we did.

We did not exaggerate, and it is amusing that John McPhee's example of Sierra Club Brower exaggeration was an ad not written by Brower, not run by the Sierra Club. It was the ad run by the North Cascades Conservation Council relating to the North Cascades National Park and the proposed open-pit mine in the Glacier Peak Wilderness Area, where the sky head in the ad said "an open pit large enough to be seen from the moon." The concept came from Jerry Mander, who had written some Sierra Club ads, but this was a North Cascades ad. My own calculations are that to be seen from the moon, a pit on earth would have to be about seventy-five miles across, and if you put a pit in the North Cascades seventy-five miles across you haven't left very much North Cascades.

The other thing that was not, if you read it carefully, a description of me by McPhee, but was left with that implication, was Floyd Dominy's description of what he alleged was exaggeration in the Grand Canyon ad. I think John McPhee was more interested in the story's being well-written and having a nice bit of contrast in it than in adhering strictly to the facts. Dominy was describing me and what we'd said in our ads about the Grand Canyon. The constant accusation by our enemies in that battle was that we said the Grand Canyon would be flooded out. Well, we never said "flooded out" at any time. We said "flooded" and we said that the heart of the river would be flooded. We used the Bureau of Reclamation marked photographs indicating where the high water line of the reservoir would be to describe what kind of damage would be done. So the ad that Dominy objected to was illustrated with one of his own bureau's photographs.

Brower: Then Dominy went on to say that when he protested personally to me about that exaggeration, I replied, he said, "All is fair in love and war." Now that's all a total fabrication. I never had any conversations with him on that subject at all; the only conversation I'd had with Floyd Dominy prior to the time we encountered each other on the river was one at a hearing of the House Interior Committee. It was a crowded hearing on the Grand Canyon dams, and he said to me in the hall, "You ought to come down the river with me some time and see it." I said, "Well, save some of it." And that was the only conversation I had; that was the exchange. But that I should have said, "All is fair in love and war," to explain something I hadn't done was total fiction on Floyd Dominy's part, and I think it's understandable, if you know his ebullience.

McPhee did wrong by me in leaving that impression, that allegation by Dominy--even though I had said that it was not true to the publisher's facts editor and to McPhee--letting that stand because he wanted just the right form for his story there. He wanted Dominy to find all sorts of fault with me, but then when he finally said, "Would you go down the river with Dave Brower?" Dominy said, "Hell, yes," after having said everything he could to disparage me. That was building up a situation for McPhee's story form, and it left an impression that was damaging; that and the exaggeration that was alleged were both damaging. They were picked up in editorials in the Wall Street Journal and in an American Forest Products Institute full-page ad, and in some other places. They used it to illustrate a charge: "See, the conservationists are like that." So I think that there was damage done and that McPhee should have cleared it up, but he didn't think so and that's the way the book reads. Some day I will try to reply in a Department of Amplification piece for the New Yorker, if anybody cares.

Schrepfer: How about the place where he quotes you as saying that the figures feel right--the population figures?

Brower: What he was missing there I think was what I thought was the direction of my statement--that if you are in a situation where you are getting exponential growth or an exponential change in figures, whether you've got a figure that's twice as big or half as big is not going to be important for any significant time. For example, if I were saying--as I said because I got it from Lincoln Day--that six percent of the population was using sixty percent of the world's resources, then sixty percent or forty percent was not going to be important when whoever it was, in this case the U.S., was doubling its demand every ten to twenty years. All you need to do is to show

Brower: what the trends are and what can happen if that trend continues. If my figure were wrong, if the sixty percent was indeed wrong, then it would take a little bit longer to get to the same result, but the difference in time would not be significant; that is, what you've got to worry about is the direction you're doing more than the exact speed.

My figure six/sixty, therefore, was one I used for a long time, and I've quieted it down now to fifty percent. Six percent of the world's population uses half the world's resources. The precision is hard to justify. We use a great deal of the world's natural gas, and we use almost none of the world's betel nut, so that you get an overall average. Lincoln Day came up with the average of sixty percent. By a strange coincidence one day he was in the audience in the East when somebody asked me where I got the sixty percent. I couldn't remember and he reminded me where I got it from the floor.

Schrepfer: How about McPhee's portrait of you as very retiring and sort of retreating?

Brower: Well, I certainly was not a profound--what would I say? I was socially inept. In certain fields I wouldn't retire. I retired to my piano a great deal. I spend a lot of time trying to play the thing. I never played it well, but I spend a lot of time trying. I remember in my trips into the hills chasing butterflies, it was to me an embarrassing situation; that is, chasing butterflies is not a manly thing to do, and it looked as if I were far out. One of my defenses then, that McPhee didn't tell about, was that I would be whistling some of the popular tunes of the time so that people at least would know I was with it, if I knew what was popular in music. I was shy and still am, but I overcome it superficially.

Schrepfer: He said you didn't give up entomology, that you still collected butterflies.

Brower: I did continue to collect as I went to college, starting in 1929, a little bit in 1930 and a little in 1931 and that was it. I collected last in 1933, but I hadn't been serious about it, and I had changed my major from entomology to agricultural economics. That was the direction I was going to go. However, it was academic, or rather it was nonacademic, because I never got into any of the courses in my major before I was out and away.

I chased a few more butterflies with my then eight-year old son John on our family trip to Europe in 1961, and in June 1978 in Wisconsin I was able to persuade two to rest on my hand and sip

Brower: water I slowly placed there for them, until they were rested enough to take off. And I still try to catch butterflies with a camera, which lets them live. So I guess McPhee is right.

Introduction to Mountaineering and the Sierra Club

Schrepfer: And then, according to McPhee, you went into the mountains and then...

Brower: Our family was quite poor and I think that came out clearly in McPhee's book. We were hanging on hard, and there was always a threat of foreclosure of the mortgage and our being out in the street. The Depression was a rough one. In the period before that my father's earning capacity was never great, and he had to cut into it to try to help keep the household intact. Then we had to have, even though it wasn't expensive, help come in--either his mother (and this was hard on my mother), or for about two years a housekeeper from Winnipeg, Mrs. Newson. She was one we liked very much. (My mother lost her sight in 1920.)

In any event this all interfered with my father's earning capacity. He also maintained our two houses with eleven apartments in them. They did not provide much income when the occupancy ran as low as 50 percent, which it often did. The same two houses now are always full.

At that time it was pretty rugged. I had to make money when I could, and my jobs were various and not impressive. I delivered papers, gardened, and delivered telegrams briefly for Western Union. I worked for a candy company as the lowest clerk. I said I knew how to type, but I didn't, and I learned on the company's time. I learned hunt-and-peck and learned to type fast but not with the touch system. I operated Moon-Hopkins calculating machines for Bunte Bros. and Valley Express.

I would get tempted to go off to the mountains and so, for example, on the long trip I took in 1933 I asked for a leave of absence and had a little trouble getting back my job. The same thing in 1934. Then in 1935, when I left once more to go on an expedition to Mount Waddington, in Canada, my job wasn't there any more when I came back, which is understandable on the candy company's part. It's folded since anyway.

I then got a job operating a calculating machine in the accounting office of the Yosemite Park and Curry Company. That was the next phase, and I was almost three years there. I got



Grace Barlow Brower



Ross J. Brower



David Brower, 1935

Brower: out of routine work and became for about a year the publicity manager for the Curry Company, which was a turning point.

I had the chance to meet Ansel Adams, to learn to know him well, to go on trips with him, to order photographs that he had made for the company as one of its consultant photographers, to work with him on getting some films made for the company, and some booklets and folders which all became an important part of what I was to do later on. Even the trips that I took, the early trips, the long trips in the Sierra, that I took on reluctant leave from the candy company (the reluctance was the company's) had a great deal to do with my trying to write.

The first trip [Summer 1933] I wrote up for the Sierra Club Bulletin [June 1934] as notes for the mountaineering section. The second trip I wrote a long article that Francis Farquhar thought would be good as a main article in the 1935 annual Bulletin--"Far From the Madding Mules." He liked it well enough to spend a lot of time editing it. He edited it heavily and improved it a great deal, and thought that I had enough promise that he put me on the editorial board of the Sierra Club Bulletin in 1935. So that was my beginning, my initial exposure to Sierra Club publishing. From then my interest in books began and never left. It went on and on.

Schrepfer: You were with the Curry Company--what was the year?

Brower: In '35, the summer of 1935 to the summer of 1938, except that I was there in the summer of 1938 working for the Yosemite Transportation System, selling bus tickets and occasionally guiding a valley tour--telling them all about everything through an omega-phone.

Schrepfer: How did you first find out about the Sierra Club?

Brower: I first found out about the Sierra Club in my three years at the Berkeley Echo Lake Camp. A man who came up there as a guest, where I was a combination secretary-guide, told me I ought to check into the Sierra Club. It was in 1931 that I went by the Sierra Club office and started buying some of the Bulletins. My first interest was reading up on the history of the Sierra Club. My actual joining was instigated by Hervey Voge, whom I met in the Sierra in the summer of 1933 when I was scrambling around peaks without much technique--practically none. I had simply got a few admonitions from Norman Clyde about what one should do instead of what I'd been doing.

Brower: I was on that trip in 1933 with George Rockwood, who still runs a restaurant in Carmel. In the course of it, I was trying to climb The Thumb from the couloir on the northwest face. It's in the Palisade group. I left George Rockwood at the bottom of that climb because he didn't seem to have any interest in trying it, and I went boggarding my way up the chute and then up the wall of the chute. I was about seventy-five feet above the floor of the chute. It was kind of rugged, but I was swarming up it. I got a fairly good handhold--two handholds--on a rock that was good, it seemed to me. Then I put a knee on to scramble up higher and the whole thing came out. I reached up frantically with my left hand and with two fingers caught a little ledge that just happened to be up above it and hung by that and pulled myself on up to the ledge, which held. Then I moved more carefully up to the ridge and sat down to collect myself. The rock had gone screaming on down and made quite a noise. George yelled up, "Is everything all right?" I said, "Yes."

I very carefully climbed back down and didn't make any further attempt on The Thumb. We went back down to Glacier Lodge, and at that point met Norman Clyde for the first time. I recognized him--it could only be Norman Clyde. We had dinner with him at Glacier Lodge. I described my encounter, my close call, and he described to me the necessity of relying upon three-point suspension. If you were in anything that was difficult or exposed, then you moved only one limb at a time, with the other three staying in good solid places. I tried that soon after on the North Palisade, climbing from the glacier, I climbed solo on the wall of the U-Notch, an exposed piece, but I felt secure on it because I minded what Norman Clyde had said.

Enough for that early experience. I was climbing, rather scrambling, up various peaks. George Rockwood was not interested in the peaks. He liked the valley. In Humphrey's Basin we met someone who was going south. We, George and I, met and joined at the campfire Hervey Voge, who was traveling in the opposite direction. He told me I ought to come around and watch the Sierra Club Rock Climbing Section (RCS) at work. When I got home in early August, I went to Cragmont Rock, saw where they were climbing, and was quite impressed. If they could go up some of those cliffs, and they did, then I had something to learn from them.

So I came around to attend a couple of rock-climbing sessions. Dick Leonard took that occasion to sign my application for membership. It only required one sponsor at that time--two later. I joined in September 1933, so it's going on forty-one years now.

Brower: That means, therefore, that my interest was first in the books and the publishing and the history, but the impetus for joining was the RCS.

Literature, Religion, and Conservation Ethics

Schrepfer: This is kind of a difficult question to ask you. What did you read in this early period of your life?

Brower: In view of my wife's comment that I never read anything? I suppose that, outside my ordinary assignments in school, the books I liked best at that point were by Edgar Rice Burroughs! That shows the depth of my literary ambition. I had read the Mars books and the Tarzan books and beyond that nothing much. I read what I had to read in school. I did not particularly like reading Shakespeare; I struggled through it. I didn't get interested in much until, in my high school senior year, I got quite a charge out of genetics and particularly some of the writings of J.B.S. Haldane. I dug through library shelves to find out all I could about what happened in the evolutionary course of things. I don't remember anything except Haldane. I didn't read a great deal then, and I suppose, as my wife says, I didn't read deeply.

I omitted the Thornton W. Burgess bedtime stories, beginning with The Adventures of Bobby Coon, which my mother read to me, and ending with all the rest, which I read to myself. They pointed me outdoors. Thus imprinted, I was fully ready for Ernest Thompson Seton's Wild Animals I Have Known, and affected by it.

Schrepfer: How about Muir--when did you come in contact with him?

Brower: That was early, once I had learned more about the Sierra. I first read Stewart Edward White's books, The Pass, The Mountain, and some of the others. I picked up a few of the books that George Rockwood said were very interesting to read. Through the instigation of George Rockwood's mother, I read quite a bit of Mary Austin. I read and was quite impressed with several of her books.

I didn't read all of Muir by any means, but I was impressed by My First Summer in the Sierras. That really helped me see a good many of the things that I did see later in the Sierra. Before I had met Francis Farquhar, I had read Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada. I forgot how I stumbled onto Clarence King's

Brower: writing. Those two books were an important part of what built the delight I would feel whenever I'd start toward the Sierra. I described this in the foreword to Gentle Wilderness--the whole business of beginning to call the roll as you started up the west slope and to know that you were moving from zone to zone, delighted more and more as you got higher. This was all built into my appreciation of the Sierra by Muir and by King. I hadn't read any more Emerson than I had to in school. I hadn't found Thoreau. I didn't know anything about Joseph Wood Krutch. All this began to fall together much later.

Schrepfer: About when?

Brower: I suppose when I was starting to try to put Sierra Club books together or carry on the Sierra Club battles. This makes a big jump out of context. I'm trying to remember now where I read certain things that I could suggest to Nancy Newhall when we started putting together the exhibit, "This is the American Earth." She had read many things I hadn't read, and I had read a few that she hadn't, and we began to piece these together.

One of the things I had long since read by then was all the Sierra Club Bulletins. I had gone through all of it. I read that the way one would read the Bible, and I was certainly much taken by the writings of the early contributors to it. That included Muir, Bade, Bradley, David Starr Jordan, many of the early pioneers, certainly LeConte, and also Marion Randall Parsons. I was charmed by her writing before I met her. This is all now so totally scrambled I don't know what you want to do with the sequence.

Schrepfer: How about your religious influences?

Brower: As McPhee pointed out, I was christened Presbyterian. My mother belonged to the Presbyterian Church and that was instrumental in my being baptized a Presbyterian. I went to the First Presbyterian Church, now destroyed, at Dana Street and Channing Way. I went to the services occasionally and to Sunday School fairly often. Some of my good friends in McKinley Grammar School (that was not yet torn down) and Willard Junior High--some of my friends there were also friends in the Presbyterian Church, so that relationship, a peer relationship, was helpful.

There was in the Presbyterian Church a group of what was then called the Pioneers, which was the Y.M.C.A.'s--the Berkeley Y's--answer to the Boy Scouts. I joined that for a while and enjoyed it. We went on various camping trips through the Bay Area. Two I remember which are of some importance. I'll get back to religion if you remind me.

Brower: Once we went out to Point Richmond, which was not populated then, and slept on the beach: I never remember a colder night. There was no way to stay warm. We each had one blanket. We didn't have very much in the way of technique. I just couldn't get warm. Another was a trip over to Muir Beach, before it was a nudist spot. Our group went there, and in the course of that we did a round-the-clock hike. Our leader was Jimmy Whipple. We liked him very much. He helped us get there and back, but he overexerted us, and we didn't have much technique. I think quite a few people might have lost their interest in the out-of-doors that way, but mine was abiding. I remember coming back to Mill Valley absolutely exhausted. I didn't do that again until I got in the army.

The church, however, had that interest. My mother was interested in it, some of my best friends in school were there at the Sunday School, in the Pioneer group. Then my grandmother, my father's mother, came into the situation. She didn't have much use for Presbyterians--that kind of baptism was, of course, not effective, because what would a few drops of water on the head do? So I had to take the Baptist dunking later, at her instigation.

This disturbed my mother quite a bit, but there wasn't anything she could do about it in her situation then. She was blind and that was merely part of her problem; she was also deaf in one ear and had no sense of smell. All that went when she lost her sight at the birth of my younger brother in 1920, and continued until she died in 1939. So my mother didn't have much opportunity to influence my religious preferences, but she continued to be a member of the Presbyterian Church. I would take her from time to time, and she depended herself a great deal upon her religion. That was one of the things she could hang onto in all the rest of the adversities she was going through. That impressed me but neither that nor the Baptist Church stuck that well.

I found more and more that the patterns that were important to me were the patterns outside the church. I long ago began describing myself as a drop-out Presbyterian, and I so described myself when I was asked to go to a Presbyterian conference about 1969 at Ghost Ranch, New Mexico. There I was supposed to tell Presbyterians what I thought about the environmental concerns of the time.

The Presbyterians listened politely, and my remarks on that occasion used a device I've been using ever since in trying to put humanity in proper perspective. I thought I was one of many people to talk to this meeting about the environment. It turned out that I was not one of many outsiders to discuss the matter; I was the only one. The rest of the several-day conference would analyze what I had said and see whether it had any validity.

Brower: I was told by one of the insiders that the Presbyterians didn't think there was any environmental problem. Indeed that came out in one of the early comments, where one of the men of the cloth said that he didn't believe that God had any intention of seeing man, his creation, run into any environmental hardship. Man was the co-creator, and they weren't going to worry about it. They should walk in humility. God would take care of them. My counter comment was that I didn't see how one could, in humility, demand equal billing as creator. I felt that we ought to put into perspective what we've been doing and how briefly, compared to the history of the earth.

Thus I stumbled onto what John McPhee later called my sermon. It's simply a compression of the age of the earth into the week of creation, which I've used almost every time I make a speech. It seems to be a good device for putting things in perspective. In that perspective, in the week of creation--just the quick figures I use: creation began Sunday midnight; life began Tuesday noon; man didn't come on stage until about three minutes before midnight Saturday, the sixth day; Neanderthal man, eleven seconds before midnight; agriculture, one and a half seconds; Christianity, one-quarter of a second. We shouldn't extrapolate too much about the effect of our interest in Christianity, or even the whole Judao-Christian ethic. That's all extremely recent compared to the forces that we have to deal with, and it's good to have that in mind.

I left a note behind me at Ghost Ranch outlining what that perspective meant to me. It seemed to me that the church should begin to think of its role in view of what is a fairly unshakable chronology of how recent man is, how long the earth has been here, and how long the life force that man is dependent upon. The church should not continue to ignore, in trying to influence people, this basic newness of man or his interdependence on other living things. We should stop being so anthropocentric in our religion. I don't know what the effect was, but this is all part of my own religion. I think that I will still call myself a believer. Whatever the force was that made it all possible, I have the deepest admiration for it, and I continue to marvel at it.

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Brower: In any event Ken, my oldest son, often says, "Well there you go with your gee-whiz act." He's not being derisive, but he does warn, "You're getting carried away by this, aren't you?" And I do get carried away. It's easy for me to do that, and I'm not going to stop.

Brower: Learn a fact a day. This latest trip East I learned about the bombardier beetle. It has quite a defense system. If you tug on its leg, it will turn its rear end around at you and fire steam at you. Real steam. I had never heard about this before, but one of the things it has is hydrogen peroxide. I don't know what it mixes with it, but, whatever it is, when it gets out in contact with the air there's an instant reaction--it boils and you've got steam. Now that's one bit of beetle chemistry.

There are all kinds. The water beetle can exude something that destroys the surface tension of water so that a water strider will sink instead of staying on the surface. Another beetle can inject something into a frog which dissolves everything inside the frog to juice, which becomes a beverage for the beetle. Beetle chemistry in itself is something that can keep people busy for quite a while, since there are about 300,000 species of beetles--each of them chemically different.

I come back to the constant feeling that if you can't find the device worked out already in nature, you might as well forget it. There has been enough experimentation time for nature to have arrived at radar, sonar, and all the chemical formulations that will work. This, stated backwards, is pretty much what my religion is now. It's based on the final line in Pope's "Essay on Man," which was called to my attention not by my having read Pope, but my son Ken's having read him. He said, "Dad, I left the book open on the piano. You'd better look at it." The last line in the "Essay on Man" is "whatever is, is right." I've used that as a substitute for education ever since; that is, I use my interpretation of that line. If you encounter a natural phenomenon that has had a long period of perfection, uninterrupted by technology, prior to your having discovered it, you had better respect the design that went into it and the perfection of it. If you want to change it, watch out.

I've been able to apply this--I'm not saying this well--but I apply this almost in every basic ecological argument I get into. If you're trying to change something that was there already, watch out for the side effects. And you have no more important responsibility than to try to anticipate every side effect of your upsetting something that has been worked out that carefully, before you came around to meddle with it.

Two quotes fit this well: One is Aldo Leopold's, which I first used in the Sierra Club Handbook: the first test of intelligent tinkering is that you save all the parts. Which of course we don't. We tinker and throw the parts over our

Brower: shoulder, left or right--it doesn't matter--and forget them. That's an important admonition. The other is by Paul Sears, and begins to show the rightness of Pope; he writes that as we lengthen the chain of technology, we become more and more vulnerable to the failure of any link, and there are more and more links to fail. This is the situation that we're cleverly extending ourselves into. There are many other short quotations to inform us well, but those are two of the best.

Another one is Muir's, that when we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe. That was Muir's rewriting of something Thoreau had said. You can also find it, and I just did recently, in some early Chinese literature on the interconnectedness of things. This is the primary ecological fact of life, together with Garrett Hardin's ecological law that "efficiency and stability are incompatible."

Garrett Hardin goes on with another one I like, and this relates to the side effects I was talking about. If you bear in mind Pope's "whatever is, is right," and then keep in mind this new one, this one, Garrett Hardin's about side effects, you'll be ready to handle anything they throw at you. Garrett Hardin says a side effect is a surprise result, the existence of which you will deny as long as you possibly can. Now a combination of that wisdom with Loren Eiseley's reinforce me from day to day, battle to battle. End of religion.

II THE SIERRA CLUB IN THE THIRTIES AND FORTIES

Lessons from the Kings Canyon Campaign

Schrepfer: How would you describe the Sierra Club when you joined it?

Brower: To me, the Sierra Club I joined was primarily what I saw in my immediate context, the RCS. I was first named to a committee by Marge Farquhar. It was a locations subcommittee of the Rock Climbing Committee, our job being to plot the various climbs and the various rocks we practiced on, to describe them and to sketch them. The next I served, because of Dick Leonard, was the Committee on Mountain Records. Dick Leonard had started a compilation of who had climbed what in the Sierra, from Bond Pass, north of Yosemite, down to Walker Pass. On my second summer in the Sierra, I was busily trying to add to what records there were and make a few myself, along with Hervey Voge.

I was still primarily oriented toward the out-of-doors and the use of the Sierra as a place to enjoy wilderness, without being concerned particularly about what was happening to it. That was true until 1935 and that shows in my Bulletin article. The Sierra Club I was aware of was primarily outdoor oriented, except for what I learned reading its history, about some of the battles to get some of the early parks created. I had read what Muir had said about conservation. I was slightly aware of it, but I was not "saved" as a Sierra Club preservationist until 1936.

I was writing letters at that time to Bestor Robinson who was on the Sierra Club board then, advocating a tramway from the valley floor, near Mirror Lake, to the summit of Mount Hoffmann so that we could develop better skiing. I remember talking to Don Tresidder briefly; I didn't talk to him often, but I had a conversation with him on that, and he thought that there would be several Sierra Club directors who wouldn't be enthusiastic about that scheme.

Brower: I began to see the light under the aegis of Arthur H. Blake who should have been interviewed on some of his ideas about conservation. He had an important effect on my early Sierra Club conservation attitudes. When he somehow ran into my interest in this tramway, he slowly began to guide me into a better attitude toward what should happen in national parks and in wilderness. This was an important change and I should dwell on it.

Arthur Blake at that point was about to be, or then was, on the Committee on Mountain Records; that's where I first met him. He was several years older than I. He had been in World War I and had received some damage in that from being gassed that he never fully recovered from. He was interested in what was happening to redwoods, to conservation in the northwest, but particularly in what was happening in the impending battle to create Kings Canyon National Park. It was in working with him and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, and later the Sierra Club Conservation Committee and the Committee on Mountain Records and Place Names, that I began to develop my attitudes toward what should happen in Sierra conservation, to get an appreciation of what wilderness is about and to cool the early ideas I had about developing everything.

Art Blake was a conservative Republican, and my own politics at that point were conservative, so that didn't cause any great problem. I was a Republican, but got over it in 1969. It was Art who gave me one of the first requirements (one I have forgotten from time to time, I regret), that you shouldn't pass judgments on areas and what should be done about them, unless it's just to hang onto them and save them, until you have had a chance to see them, until you've been there, until you know what's at stake.

In the Kings Canyon battle--just to peek ahead so that I can say a little bit about Art Blake and what the Sierra Club was then --the Sierra Club had of course not been important in getting the first Sequoia National Park bill passed. It was in 1890, just before the Sierra Club was formed in 1892 that Sequoia was created, the intitial little park. The Sierra Club was instrumental in getting the greater Sequoia [in 1926], which was supposed to have included Kings Canyon National Park, but it didn't. There wasn't a chance at that time because of federal power dreams and reclamation dreams. The Kings Canyon battle was phase three of the completion of Sequoia National Park.

The Sierra Club, once it got into the battle, had to fight it over the opposition of the National Parks Association and the Wilderness Society, who did not want to see Kings Canyon added to the national park system because it omitted the two canyons they

Brower: thought were all-important--the South Fork Canyon and Tehipite. They thought that it would be a bad precedent to take into the national park system an area that had two important elements left out. The Sierra Club disagreed, knowing, because its members had been there, that beautiful though those canyons were, it was well worth the national park effort to save the High Sierra above those canyons.

The Sierra Club itself was slow getting into it--and this is something that I learned and I was just getting active in conservation when that happened--because the Forest Service was not ready to lose any of that land to the Park Service. They were giving show-me tours to the Sierra Club officers and directors, including Walter Starr and Joel Hildebrand, and pretty much persuading them that they should just go for a finer wilderness classification, a better protection of the wilderness in Kings Canyon under Forest Service jurisdiction and forget all about the national park idea.

It took a trip out to Berkeley by Harold Ickes, then secretary of the Interior and a good salesman, who as you probably heard from other sources, called the Sierra Club directors to meet with him. They invited him to a dinner at the Bohemian Club in San Francisco. There he put on the pressure and got the Sierra Club to agree to go for the Kings Canyon National Park.

Now that's where I came into the battle--the Sierra Club was just in the process then of saying, "All right, the Forest Service has a fine plan, but we don't like it. We want a national park." I was then between jobs. I was brought into the Sierra Club on a half-time basis at \$75 a month ostensibly to prepare a member's handbook. So I came in I guess in 1938 after I had been out of work for a while. I'd been doing little jobs that Dick Leonard and others could find for me, but things were rather tough. At \$75 a month for half my time I was pleased to put in all my time working for the Sierra Club for part of 1938, 1939, and into 1940.

I didn't concentrate on the work I should have done on the members' handbook. (This is one of the things that I've always had problems doing.) And I didn't concentrate later as I was supposed to do on the backpack manual [Going Light--with Backpack or Burro, Sierra Club, 1951]. My signal imperfections were showing early and clearly. Instead I got into the Kings Canyon battle.

I was much interested when the club's San Francisco Bay Chapter started the Yodeler in 1939, impressed by the success of Mugelnoos, the Southern California ski mountaineering-rock

Brower: climbing section publication. I became the first editor of the Yodeler and was in the thick of the battle for Kings Canyon.

Part of what I did on that was with Dick Leonard, making the Sierra Club's first movie, "Sky--Land Trails of the Kings," photographed in the course of the 1939 and 1940 High Trips. It had many many showings. It was a silent picture and I went around to meeting after meeting and talking with it (including two performances at Wheeler Auditorium [U.C. Berkeley]), God knows how many times. It went back to Washington and was shown by the Park Service to members of Congress. It was one of the things that helped get the park set aside--one of many. But this and my working with Ansel [Adams] and what he was doing in his great book, The Sierra Nevada: The John Muir Trail, which is one of the important instruments in getting Kings Canyon as a national park, were all part of the early conservation effort. Even then I saw the importance of publications in rallying public support, and it was that early training, that early marking, that I was never able to overcome. I still think that's an important thing to do.

Transitions in the Sierra Club

Brower: So the Sierra Club then, to answer your question, at the time I came into it was still primarily a Bay Area organization, with its primary interests in the Sierra, but with a history of interests that were far broader than that because of John Muir's international interests in conservation. I didn't see those in action in my early period in the club. I was pleased to see it take such roles as it did on parks and then later on the wilderness.

I was pleased to see it make the major change that it made. A 1928 bimonthly reported on Sierra Club board action urging highways over many of the Sierra wilderness passes. One, for example, was proposed up above Tenaya Lake to join with the Tioga Road; one up by Vernal and Nevada falls, to join it. They wanted one over Mammoth, Mono, Kearsarge passes, and the Lone Pine-Porterville Road too. They were for more roads to render the Sierra accessible, because that was part of the club's early admonition--"to explore, enjoy, and render accessible."

So I was glad to see shortly after I joined a very rapid switch from that "render accessible" to a serious questioning of the route of the Tioga Road and the high standards that were intended for it, and finally to a joining with the Wilderness

Brower: Society in holding the first Wilderness Conferences. For a while, wilderness appreciation had been absent from Sierra Club vocabulary, even though John Muir had lived and died it--the appreciation came back and began to flourish, so that the Sierra Club became, along with the Wilderness Society, the primary proponent of wilderness preservation. I was glad to see that happen.

Art Blake had this appreciation fully in mind. A few directors were holdovers who wanted roads, and there was a slow transition on the board to this new attitude toward wilderness. Some of the directors never did think that that was the direction to go. Will Colby was still quite worried about our stopping the road into Kings Canyon. Indeed, there would be no road in Kings Canyon National Park at all except for Colby's insistence upon an earlier agreement that at least the road would get to the South Fork of the Kings, so that Franklin Delano Roosevelt could see the park, come to its dedication, and for other reasons. Colby still had the "render accessible" in mind. He cited John Muir's delight when the automobile came to Yosemite Valley; until then too few people had been there.

Some of the early arguments, and bitter arguments I got into at times with some of the older directors were triggered by this change in attitude--that the coming of the automobile was good at one time didn't mean that it would always be good. So I became rather early one of the first pushers in that direction, my philosophy coming from Art Blake, as well as from my having read Muir and about Muir. They led to my being one of the conservatives who wanted to conserve what couldn't be replaced and to hang onto every possible bit of wilderness we could in the Sierra.

Schrepfer: Wasn't there a showdown between you and Colby over the Kings Canyon Road, where he resigned?

Brower: No, that isn't my recollection at all. We had a tie vote in Kings Canyon on where the road should go. The tie vote meant that we could not change the club policy set earlier by an agreement made with Fresno interests by Colby, Hildebrand, Starr, and others that the road would go into the South Fork Canyon, up to Cedar Grove, and beyond to Copper Creek.

So the Colby resignation came, I think, simply because Colby was getting weary. There was a difference of opinion on wilderness, but I don't think that triggered his displeasure. I think that he thought he was too old to continue. I remember board meetings where Colby would come through with some strong statements and then would fall asleep. Age was taking its toll.

Brower: He'd come through with ringing statements when subjects that were important alerted him.

My one big argument, besides the South Fork road, with Colby was on the matter of John Muir's geological interpretation of the origin of Yosemite Valley. He was an advocate of John Muir's interpretation. Dick Leonard, others, and I were strong adherents of the François Matthes calculations about how it happened. Then John Buwalda, down at Cal Tech, came up with actual seismographic measurements of the depth of the glacial fill in Yosemite Valley, which apparently was a great deal deeper than Matthes had calculated it could be.

Colby thought that this justified the earlier Muir hypothesis. There was a lot of argument and I, in my role on the Editorial Board, was dragging my feet on the publication of John Muir's Studies in the Sierra,* with an introduction by John P. Buwalda, and Colby was saying this proved that Matthes was all wrong. He was wrong about the valley's depth, but not its origin. We finally had a compromise; Fritiof Fryxell wrote a foreword putting the data in context. That was my major battle with Colby.

I'm quite sure that he forgave me for these differences of opinion. I had some good conversations with him. The last was, I remember, at his place down at Big Sur, after his leg had to be amputated. We had a good meeting down there, our last meeting. He was, I think, quite appreciative of what he perceived to be my integrity--I think I have it too--and realized that I was following what Muir wanted to see done and what he wanted to see done too. I don't know what earlier thoughts may be, or what others' interpretation may be; mine is that he resigned because he thought he was getting too old to carry on with all the battles that were then raging.

Conflicts Over Membership Policy

Schrepfer: We mentioned briefly, before we turned on the tape, the conflict within the club between the southern and the northern chapters. Do you recall anything about that?

*John Muir's Studies in the Sierra, William E. Colby, ed.
(Sierra Club: San Francisco, 1949).

Brower: The big North-South battle, I guess, reached its early climax--or whatever it reached--when Ansel Adams moved to suspend the Southern California Chapter because it had not wanted to admit to membership a black. [December 1, 1945] This started quite a battle. It's fortunately fuzzy in my mind now. It's one of the things, I suppose, that happens to many organizations. There was a basic intolerance at that time in Southern California toward what we were not intolerant of in, of course, ever superior northern California. [laughter] I don't think something like that would happen any more, but it certainly happened then.

It happened in part in one of the transitional steps the Sierra Club took to make sure its members all had a common purpose. There must be a sponsor. For a long time there was a sponsor necessary, who had known an applicant and could write some note or at least sign a name on the application.

We became worried, right after World War II, by the sudden influx of members who wanted low-cost skiing at Clair Tappaan Lodge. We were apprehensive of what a lot of skiers might want to do. Wilderness we had helped save was now threatened by a bunch of skiers in southern California who wanted to develop San Gorgonio. We worried about the change in club character if skiers who were more interested in building lifts and sliding down hills should outnumber the John Muir types. We stepped up the number of sponsors, therefore, to two. The sponsors must be twenty-one or over, must have known the member, and must write letters. That period was fairly severe.

The people in the Southern California Chapter--I don't think it had yet become the Angeles Chapter--picked this up and took it to heart. They were worried enough about the character of who should be joining the club that they added a stipulation for membership: that you should appear for examination; you should come to the Boos Brothers Cafeteria off Pershing Square in Los Angeles on Friday night, where there was a Sierra Club table and where the people who wanted to be members could be looked over.

There were people who didn't like that idea, including some very good people who did not think that was a stipulation they wished to adhere to. That became the cause of a little uneasiness. I know the Ski Mountaineers group in Southern California, which was a tolerant group, was not happy. And before it was over, the battleground had shifted so that the Ski Mountaineers became implicated in it on the wrong side. That is, they weren't on the wrong side; the battle was shifted to a confusing series of alignments. It got bitter. I'm glad I

Brower: don't remember any more about it than I do. It was that bitter. The Southern California Chapter was not abandoned. Somehow or other, a compromise was reached.* Today no sponsorship is required.

Schrepfer: Wasn't there some type of campaigning to make sure that the southern chapter didn't have many directors?

Brower: A southern California takeover was attempted. They tried to get eight directors--the full fifteen were voted for every year--and they were trying to get (thank you for reminding me because it gives me a one liner from a newspaper story) they would put eight directors up, vote a straight southern California ticket, and thus have a majority of the directors. As San Francisco columnist Arthur Caylor put it, they wanted to move the Sierra Club to Los Angeles "lock, alpenstock, and barrel!" [laughter]

Prior to that point, I think there had been two or three directors from southern California on the board. This attempt caused great outrage in northern California. Duncan McDuffie and a series of others sent out letters to the membership about this threat. The southern Californians hadn't counted well. Even if they had single-voted, they just didn't have enough votes to do it. They were smashed at the polls and left with one director. Better representation from southern California was regained later on. The attempt to take over was over. Those early days are better forgotten!

Schrepfer: And the next one on the list, if you would rather forget that one--

Brower: Well, the McCarthyism in the club--I don't remember it. The attempt to worry about Communists--I think that was part of the same thing, that they were trying to say that the black was--or that the people who were supporting him were Communists. That's dim in my mind now. I still remember McCarthy, however! I'll never forget.

*See Nathan C. Clark. Sierra Club Leader, Outdoorsman, and Engineer, Sierra Club Oral History Project, 1977, pp. 52-57.
--Ed.

Roots of Sierra Club Strength

[Interview 2: April 11, 1974]##


Schrepfer: How would you describe the character of the Sierra Club in the thirties and forties—the kind of people who joined, why they joined?

Brower: I made a little survey, back in the late forties, an informal, I suppose unauthorized, survey. I wanted to reprint volumes one through five of the Sierra Club Bulletin. Since those preceded the great fire and earthquake, there were few copies left. I wanted to find out what the interests were of the members and why they joined and why they stayed on.

I wish I had a better recollection of the numbers right now. The conservation motivation was high and publications were high. It was about a third for the outings and other activities, and the rest were primarily for the conservation and publication side of it. That provided the basis for my plunging ahead and reprinting five hundred sets of volumes one to five. I don't know how many are still left, but I'm glad it was done.


My own feeling was that, yes, there were a lot of people who did like to get out for the socializing of the trails. I thought then and I still think, that the Sierra Club of that period was following quite closely the precepts of Muir and Colby: get some people who like the mountains, who like the trails, and these are going to be the best defenders of what you want to save in the Sierra Nevada to start with. They didn't limit themselves to the Sierra Nevada. They wandered up the coast. They wanted the 1905 outing at Mount Rainier; the other places that Muir had interest in, they had interests in. The Sierra Club, long before I joined, went through the big split over Hetch Hetchy. I suppose splits will always hit organizations from time to time when there's polarization.

I felt the Sierra Club of the thirties and forties was a strong defender of what it was founded to defend. It wasn't hard to get, before long, that third element of the purposes—"to explore, enjoy, and render accessible"—it didn't take too long to get that "render accessible" out. It was needed initially. There had to be enough access to inform enough people to keep the resource from being exterminated. The club realized, about in the forties, that that "accessible" function had been met. From now on it was important to render not too accessible the mountain regions of the Pacific Coast and elsewhere. We realize that more and more now. William Colby brought that up



First ski ascent, Mount Clark, 1937
(Brower, Kenneth Adam, Kenneth Davis, Hervey Voge)

Nepal, 1976



Learning, Indian Rock,
Berkeley, 1934



High trip, 1939: Oliver Kehrlein, Will Colby,
Dick Leonard, Dave Brower

Photo by Cedric Wright

Brower: in his "Yosemite's Fatal Beauty," the Sierra Club Bulletin [1948]: if you bring too many people, you destroy the attraction that was bringing them; they might as well go anywhere else.

The Sierra Club, to sum up, was in the thirties and forties and beyond that, a strong conservation-oriented organization. I cannot think of any overall criticism that I would level at it. I thought then that the outings were an important part of the conservation effort, and that was one of the purposes for which John Muir got them going. Particularly on the High Trip, where you had to so organize the trip that you could take people of varying physical abilities--none could be just weaklings, but--you could take a good many people out into the country in such a way that it required a big wilderness to accommodate that kind of activity. As that activity diminishes, for varying reasons, there are fewer and fewer people who see the need for big wilderness. That is a loss.

Schrepfer: Where did the notion come from that many people echoed in the late sixties, when the question of the course of the Sierra Club was raised, that the Sierra Club had been a hiking organization at one time?

Brower: I think that the Sierra Club, for its first sixty years, was an organization that gained its solidarity from group familiarity with wild places, particularly the Sierra. Indeed, a third of the membership had joined for that purpose. That was a large nucleus of people who wanted to get out, who liked what they saw there, who would write about it in the Bulletin and elsewhere, who would have reunions and parties and would make them a social occasion. It was a vital part of their lives; somehow they managed to live between summers. Those High Trips were high points. I was on enough of them myself to know how vital they were.

That there was an organization that knew places that needed to be saved was a good thing. It gave the Sierra Club something none of the other organizations had. There were other organizations that were similar. The Appalachian Mountain Club had a lot of hiking experience, but they didn't have wilderness experience to speak of, because they didn't have wilderness. That gave the Sierra Club a function from the start that separated it from any other organization and gave it a unique strength.

I had an occasion to review all this when I did a piece for the Appalachian Mountain Club journal, Appalachia [June 1973], advocating that there be an Appalachian Mountain Club Foundation. I went through their early numbers and the Sierra Club's early

Brower: Bulletins to find out what had happened, and the difference is instantly apparent. The Sierra Club was not just a bunch of hikers, but people who were determined to save something they knew about and wanted to know more about. It was a good combination. Muir was right and Colby was right. Outings were an important function of the club.

That began to get diluted as the Sierra Club spread into areas where it was no longer possible for people far away to get so easily to the wilderness. It became a large organization. The conservation focus, then, was more and more emphasized. The accounts of where people had gone disappeared from the Bulletin. The outings became so numerous that you could no longer get the extra cohesiveness of a face-to-face relationship. If you have thousands of people going out every summer, the chances of meeting the same person twice is remote. The nucleus dissipates.

I'm not saying this well. I was wondering how I would sum it all up. What happened was appraised cogently by Galen Rowell in a piece he wrote for Mountain Gazette: "Look Homeward, Sierra Club." [September, 1973] He regretted the absence of people in the club who had strong roots in the mountains, and, in his case, on the cliffs. He noted that John Muir, Colby, Leonard, and others (he included me) got a lot of our training out in rough country, in wilderness, on steep places, and something came out of that that no longer is happening in the club. The Sierra Club mountaineering leadership is just about absent now, but it was certainly present earlier.

There is a lot of nostalgia mixed into this, I suppose, but there is also something more important--well, no, not more important than nostalgia and the special function I see that nostalgia has. I think it's a basic part of a human being, that it's related to your own feelings toward your roots. Rootless people who have no respect for their birthplace, for their home, for the terrain that made them possible, are drifters. There's been some drift in the Sierra Club because of the increasing interest in conservation battles far afield, two or three steps removed from the terrain itself. I'm not blaming anyone for that change any more than I'd blame myself. We did move in from the trails to fight battles in between trail times. They took more and more energy. It winds up in my own experience; I finally left the real mountains and got surrounded by mountains of paper.

Schrepfer: So, that change was just inevitable?

Brower: I think it was inevitable as the pressures against wilderness changed--they're still changing--and it was one of the early manifestations of the evils of mindless growth we are now becoming conscious of.

Schrepfer: You mean the club is a victim of mindless growth?

Brower: Not mindless growth of the club itself, but the mindless growth that surrounded it.

We were thinking carefully about how the club should grow. I remember a meeting in Los Angeles shortly after I became executive director. I brought this question to the meeting. I wrote a long statement on the way to it. That was possible because we had trains then. I had a good eight hours to write this statement. We went down by the Coast Daylight: What should the Sierra Club do? What were its courses? What did the board want it to do? There was a good discussion, and it has never been written up adequately. My own statement is in the minutes; those minutes were quite complete.*

At that point Francis and Marge Farquhar thought the Sierra Club should stick to California--there should not be a Pacific Northwest chapter. Their judgment did not prevail. That post-war choice had a lot to do with the new shape of the Sierra Club. The Sierra Club could have been an elegant California Alpine Club or Contra Costa Hills Club, but it chose not to be. It became instead one of the most important conservation forces in the world.

The world had room for both, but if the Sierra Club hadn't taken its abilities to the broader arena, the world would be far worse off.

The High Trip and the Conservation Warrior

Schrepfer: What about the High Trips? I gather that you had some reservations in the beginning of that about mass assault.

*Board of Directors minutes, October 17, 1953. A brief of Brower's remarks, "The Sierra Club: National, Regional, or State" is included in the minutes.

Brower: My first reservation was revealed in either my first or second contribution to the Sierra Club Bulletin. In my first experience in 1933, George Rockwood and I were going along by ourselves, crossing knapsacking passes, with only ourselves to look at except for that brief encounter with Norman Clyde at Glacier Lodge. We came down towards Piute Pass as the Sierra Club was moving in.

It looked like quite a lot of people and it was. We were not too disturbed by it because they invited us to dinner. It was a practice in the Sierra Club High Trips. If the "horde," so called, bumped into somebody who was overwhelmed by it, they'd invite this person to dinner to try to make him feel better. We enjoyed dinner at the Hutchinson Meadow camp of the Sierra Club.

Next morning I first met Ansel Adams. He won't remember it, but I remember meeting him. He was wandering around, looking for clouds that were right. He complained that they were too fuzzy.

My overall feeling then was that it was nicer not to have such a big mob. I had the same feeling the following year, but not quite as intense, because I was now a member of the Sierra Club and understood a little about what the High Trips were doing. But I never began to get a good feeling about the purpose of High Trips until 1938, when Virginia Adams and I came in on horseback to visit a High Trip camp near Shadow Lake.

I understood more fully, beginning with 1939, when I became part of the commissary crew. I went along to help make the film on Kings Canyon National Park and also to help cook and guide on climbs up the peaks. I began to see what I wrote about subsequently in the Bulletin about High Trips, promoting them, seeing that they were an important part of saving the Sierra.

I still think the High Trip could be an important part, that it still is. Now the threat to the Sierra is from the number of footprints. That's one of the major threats. Other dangers remain and footprints hurt far less than logging does, far less than dams, far less than highways. In attacking the outings because they were an easy target--there were so many people they must be causing trouble--we have weakened a strong defense. Highways have won where they should not have won, and there have been further dams, and the logging persists. We still haven't stopped the logging encroachment upon High Sierra regions that should not be logged. The outings' function still needs to be taken care of better. Then, I'm a bit remote, not having been on

Brower: a Sierra Club outing as a leader, as part of the management, since 1956, which was a long time ago. I was on a little Base Camp about five years ago, and that was working well.

Schrepfer: I gather that when the question arose of eliminating the High Trips you concurred?

Brower: No, I didn't concur at all, as my prejudices will still show. The management was making the High Trip less and less possible. It was shifting people to the easier kind of trip. The Base Camp, nice though it is, can be held almost anywhere, but a High Trip, where you move from one place to the other, requires a large wilderness.

The knapsack trip is a fine use of large wilderness. At the time I was in the argument, the knapsack trip was pretty much for the people who were in good shape and whose attention span was short--young people, essentially. They would have a great time; they would get through the mountains well and enjoy them, then be off somewhere else, and not around to man the defenses when we got into the conservation battles. The High Trip was the best source of the conservation warrior, if you want to put it that way, and I will.

The financial feasibility of the High Trip was eroded rapidly by Base Camps and by the other kinds of trips. I wasn't against them. In fact, I first advocated the knapsack trips, the river trips, and the threshold trips. But something was lost.

The problem on the High Trips was that the stock use was heavy. I worked hard while in the High Trip management to reduce the stock use. We cut it to a half to a third of what it had been per person served. We began to limit the number of people who could go at one time. My own emphasis was to cut the impact per person, and I think that the High Trip was extremely good at that.

Possibly there are enough people now who like the Sierra for various reasons that there is an adequate defense force for it. We certainly don't have an adequate defense for other principal wilderness regions in the United States, and we're missing it. We're not saving the Brooks Range, the North Slope; we're not getting the force we need in Alaska. We haven't figured out how to get the long trips going--that's my feeling. The Wind Rivers are still not adequately saved.

Brower: We've lost the Oregon Cascades, essentially. The great idea that was advocated by David Simons shortly before he died--at the age of twenty-four, much too young--was lost, was muffed badly. The Forest Service attacked the idea of an Oregon Volcanic Cascades National Park. We wanted to organize trips that could run the length of that wilderness. There was a lot of wilderness there. Simon's idea was superb; the Forest Service attack was bitter; and the Sierra Club effort was blunted by the assumption that somehow we could save the Oregon Volcanic Cascades by saving Waldo Lake and saving the Mount Jefferson Wild Area. We didn't save either well enough, and we lost the chance to connect them in a park.

We lost because we didn't run the High Trip type of operation there, to have trips where we would use the continuity of the Cascades and demonstrate the importance of a large continuous wilderness there. We settled for trying to save little pieces and now have hardly saved even those. We needed the string for those beads. We forgot it, and lost the beads.

We didn't do well enough in the Northern Cascades either. We have a national park there, but we still have a major threat to the heart of that area, the Glacier Peak area, which is still under the Forest Service and still threatened by Kennecott Copper. They want to dig that big hole in the middle, in the best part of it.

So, the High Trip kind of operation still has a function. I would like to see more of that still happening, not so much in the Sierra because the Sierra gets enough traffic now, but in the places that don't have enough people to protect them, who know the importance of what is next to what is next to what, who know how important it is that wilderness have a beyond. When you come up to the pass you don't want that to be all; you want it to continue. That's what we're losing fast and I don't think we need to.

III MOUNTAINEERING AND EDITING

The "Golden Age" of Yosemite Rock Climbing

Brower: I suppose my mountaineering begins with a distaste for it. John McPhee pointed that out in Encounters with the Archdruid. I was not anxious to climb as a young child. I liked trails; I liked to get out a little bit and jump from rock to rock or play in the water--to build dams in streams and that sort of thing--

Schrepfer: Not dams! [laughter]

Brower: But the business of going up mountains didn't get to me. I remember that I still had a great distaste for heights as late as 1926 when I was fourteen. I took the eleven-mile trail from Glacier Point down to the valley, and I remember, after crossing Illilouette Creek, going up over the Panorama Cliff part of the trail, I was aware of this horrible cliff to one side. Even though it was out of sight and some two hundred yards away, I felt uncomfortable because there was so horrible a cliff so close.

Suddenly a change came over me; I'm not quite sure how. I went on various trips with my family, camping, but never did much in the way of climbing anything harder than Founder's Rock on the Berkeley campus. In 1930, the change began when I went up to the Berkeley Echo Lake Camp as the camp secretary and guide, spending spare time in the kitchen drying dishes and harmonizing with the singers of the kitchen crew. I spent the next three summers there, two months at a time, and took people up peaks several times: Mount Ralston, Pyramid Peak, Tallac, Dicks, Jacks, Freel, and Job's Sister--four of them in one forty-two-mile day.

Brower: I scrambled on Echo Peak, my first important scramble. I went up the usual route and came down the face solo climbing. That's not much of a face, but to me it was then. I did that in part because my father had done it in the early twenties, and his family had been anxious because he was so late getting back to camp that night. (We camped at the lower part of Echo Lake.) I wanted to see what sort of experience he'd had. I found it challenging.

I first went up Mount Lyell in 1931 with my father and older brother, Ralph. I liked the feeling on top. It is an airy place. It is not a difficult climb. Going up the final chimney was exciting then, and sitting up there on top, just as if you were in an airplane looking at everything else, pleased me very much. I was glad my father made it. He had a long day. It was about a thirty-mile round trip from Tuolumne Meadows up to Lyell and back, he had just driven up from Berkeley the night before in our old 1921 Willys Knight, so he was putting out. After I got back to camp I went back about two miles to find and reassure him, because he was dragging.

We tried climbing Mount Whitney that same summer, up the east side trail. I thought that was wonderful. At about the twelve thousand foot-level I was singing "I Love You California" feeling absolutely euphoric; about half an hour later I was losing all my breakfast, mountain sick. My father and brother went on to the pass, but not the top. I lost face--from the worst sunburn of my life.

I liked climbing peaks that were not difficult, but where there was some scrambling. I liked to take people up and watch their reactions. I liked to be the guide. It was all fun. I was ready in 1933 to try this first knapsack trip down in the southern part of the Sierra that I had only glimpsed from the top of Mount Lyell.

That seven-week trip had quite a bit of climbing in it. That included the climb on The Thumb that I alluded to, where I damn near got killed. And the advice from Norman Clyde about three-point suspension enabled me to do some other things that summer that were fairly good for the time in mountaineering history, when not much had been done with ropes in the Sierra, such as the North Palisade from the U Notch and a one-day traverse of Bear Creek Spire and Mounts Dade and Abbot.

The next year I came back with Hervey Voge for ten weeks. We had ropes and we made sixty-five climbs and thirty first ascents--something of the sort. That's when there were still

Brower: first ascents left. Not many were difficult, but some required some rope technique and a piton or two.

That got me going into the more technical climbing, most of which was in Yosemite Valley. But that was in the early days of Yosemite; that was what I would call the Golden Age of Yosemite Valley rock climbing. The present-day climbers have their own, subsequent Golden Age. I don't know what the next Golden Age will be, but mine was where there was little use of pitons for direct aid, and a lot of use of rope and pitons for safety, of good belays, of a lot of security. We got into places that we would not have dreamed of going to without this security.

My own Yosemite climbs were all--all but one--most enjoyable. The climb that was the most fun was probably the east face of Glacier Point when Dick Leonard, Raffi Bedayn, and I made the first ascent. After a little bit of trouble getting started, we found that God had designed that climb for perfect enjoyment. The belay positions were bombproof. When you belayed sitting in them, nothing could pull you out. There was running water along most of the route so we never got thirsty.

It was almost as much fun when Morgan Harris and I first climbed the Ahwiyah Gully, just northeast of Half Dome. The climb looked as if it might be difficult, but we never had to uncoil a rope; it was just good scrambling all the way.

The rope, the technique, the ability to use balance climbing, to keep an adequate margin of safety which we had learned about in our practice on the Berkeley rocks, made it possible to enjoy these Yosemite routes. I found about thirty ways out of Yosemite Valley that were unusual--not the usual trails.

The one I didn't like--and neither Morgan Harris nor I liked it--was our attempt on the Firefall Ledge of Glacier Point. We wanted to go up Glacier Point by the route the firefall came down, and we didn't do well. We got into a position that was extremely risky. We needed pitons and we couldn't get them in. I suppose the pathetic fallacy is particularly pathetic if you try to apply it to mountaineering. I will. We saw those cliffs scowl at us. It was the most uncomfortable day I've ever spent on a climb.

The most uncomfortable moment came later, on Stanford Point. It had been an interesting route, fun till I found myself on a long exposed lead, beyond my margin of safety. I was well above the belayer, Morgan Harris. Bruce Meyer and Alan Hedden were on

Brower: the climb too. I was sure I was going to peel off. I hollered, "Falling!" I was going to, and it was going to be a rough one because I was about twenty feet above my belayer. It would have been a long ride. But I didn't fall. I just found a little more glue in my fingertips and hung on, then led on. We got up.

The Yosemite climbs were the technical climax of my prewar mountaineering. The attitude that prevailed in the Rock Climbing Section at that time was good. We had wonderful arguments about theory and practice in climbing. We developed our rock climbing well enough that the same technique would apply in snow and ice. It did on Mount Waddington in 1935.

[Somehow Shiprock has been left out of this--the most famous climb I was part of. It rises some 2500 feet above flat and rolling desert, all Navajo country. It is an old volcanic neck, tempting to climbers, who, by 1939, had tried often but never succeeded. Coached by some cooperative predecessors who had failed, Raffi Bedayn, John Dyer, Bestor Robinson, and I made the top on October 12, 1939, in a four-day effort. In making the first ascent, we made the first American use of expansion bolts; we drilled holes and put them in for safety in four places.

John Dyer led the two most difficult pitches and I the rest, including the final scramble--all along a route that had principally been pioneered, on the basis of photographic reconnaissance, by the man who had to be elsewhere when we finally made the climb--Dick Leonard.

Because the Saturday Evening Post had carried an account of a failure on Shiprock, "A Piece of Bent Iron," (the iron being a piton that saved a man's life), I submitted our story to the Post. It was not acknowledged. Then one day I received a request for pictures to illustrate someone else's brief note on our climb, also submitted to the Post. I telegraphed, suggesting that they look in their in-basket for a lot of pictures and my full story. It was 12,500 words, I think. They published 7500 of them in February, 1940 as "It Couldn't Be Climbed."

Not too long after the first ascent the Navajos declared Shiprock off limits for religious reasons. There have been some 130 ascents since ours, all by our route except for one minor variation. Our toughest pitch, the Double Overhang, is bypassed by an exposed traverse--exposed to a thousand-foot sheer drop I should still prefer to avoid.--DRB, 9/17/78 (The forty-fifth anniversary of my joining the Sierra Club)]

The 10th Mountain Division: Sierra Club Contributions

Brower: We learned things about technique and equipment which we could apply, when World War II came up, to the training of mountain troops. I suppose that was where my mountaineering experience reached its ultimate usefulness, after which there was a steady decline. With Dick Leonard, Bestor Robinson, Einar Nilsson, Raffi Bedayn, and possibly one or two others--those were the key people--we began to develop equipment and technique for use in winter and summer and on snow and on rock for the U.S. mountain troops, or ski troops, and other foot soldiers too.

I had not been at all anxious to get into combat, but when it looked as if I must be, Dick Leonard kindly pulled what strings he could. When I finally enlisted (rather than being drafted), orders were on hand from the Adjutant General's Office that I should go to the mountain troops for my basic training, go to Officers' Candidate School, and then return to the mountain troops. That was all in my file to start with, and Dick Leonard helped that happen. There were some slips, and it almost didn't happen that way, but that's the way that it finally did work out.

In the course of my time with the mountain troops in basic training, and when I returned as an officer in the Mountain Training Center, the 10th Reconnaissance Cavalry and so on, and then, finally the 86th Mountain Infantry, I had a hand in working closely with the program of training some ten thousand troops to climb. The average course was about two weeks for each man. We had no fatal accidents in that heavy training program.

We further developed technique and equipment in close liaison with Washington, where Leonard and Bestor Robinson and Einar Nilsson were in the office of the Quartermaster General. Much of my instruction period was spent in West Virginia, where we had fine cliffs at Seneca Rock and Champe Rock. It was just a short train trip to Washington. So we would wander off to Washington to consult with Dick and Einar about what we needed next.

In that effort the Sierra Club's work on Cragmont Rock--Dick Leonard's pioneering work in developing technique, his further pioneering work, and Bestor's, in developing equipment --had a great deal to do with the success of the armed forces, not just in the mountain troops, but in training and equipping soldiers for rough terrain. It was an extraordinary contribution to grow out of what was put together by the Sierra Club on Cragmont Rock and in the Sierra--the outgrowth of John Muir's training and Will Colby's leadership.

Brower: It all came to a fruition in saving a good many lives that might otherwise have been lost, and in putting together a division in which I as a participant have a great pride. The 10th Mountain Division had an important role in Italy, even though it was a short one. I think it did help wind up the war. There had been [Axis] hopes to force a major diversion of Allied forces in Italy that wouldn't take much Axis effort to keep a lot of our forces tied up. But the 10th Mountain was able to break through and preclude the final plans Hitler had for hanging on hard in an Alpine redoubt. By the time Hitler was ready to do that--to retreat and carry on the war from that redoubt, it had already been well cut up. We had charged right into the middle of it from the south and the Japanese-Americans in the 44th Division from the north. There was no place for Hitler to go.

That's a prejudiced view of the importance of Cragmont Rock to World War II and the ultimate Allied victory! No one else will agree with it.

Schrepfer: Probably Dick Leonard! So, you were in Italy in the 10th Mountain Division?

Brower: Yes. We did have one mountain operation that was the key there to breaking through the German defensive lines of the North Apennines. It was made possible by our mountain training. There had been two previous Allied attempts to break through in the Mount Belvedere sector of the Apennine front, and other Allied outfits had not succeeded. We did succeed. We were able to attack up a major wall, Riva Ridge. Our 86th Regiment--but not my battalion--attacked at night, using fixed ropes. We arrived on top and quite surprised the Germans on the key position in the defensive line. That position provided observation, which in turn had provided the opportunity to direct massive artillery fire and to defeat the earlier Allied efforts.

Our effort led to a breakthrough. That was in February and March of 1945. We could have gone on. We had broken through the German lines. We so surprised supporting elements in the 5th Army, however, that they weren't prepared to follow up. So, we had to settle down where we were. Maybe it was just as well. That's all I need tell you of the war stories.

I kept climbing a little bit after that, but not much. I was still climbing a little in the Sierra Club outings. In 1956 I made my last serious attempt to climb anything--the North Face of the Grand Teton, with Phil Berry and Dick Emerson. But Phil put on such a show of youthful vigor that I had second thoughts at the bergschrund. I retreated. They succeeded.

Brower: My last mountain troop climbing was fun. I climbed a little in the Alps after the war was over. We were occupying a position on the Yugoslav border, and some of us could have weekends off. We would go tooling all over the Alps. We scrambled up the Cima Piccolo, in the Dolomites. Then I had a chance at the Matterhorn from the Italian side and succeeded in getting almost up with Dick Emerson and Leo Healy. But Leo got violently mountain sick. We went quickly down, not knowing whether he had acute appendicitis or what. He was dancing that night in Valtornenza.

We did a climb in the Chamonix Aiguilles--the Charmoz-Grépon Traverse. That was fun, and my last tough climbing. There was scrambling in the Sierra and Glacier National Park and the Tetons up until 1956. I didn't quite give it up, I just never had time for it. It was like skiing; I never intended to give it up, but there were always other things going on, and suddenly the snow was gone and the skiing season over. I feel a little wistful about it and have not given it up yet, I just don't seem to be doing it. But I did climb higher than ever--to 18,000 feet near the Everest Base Camp--on a four-week trek in Nepal in late 1976 with my daughter, Barbara, and youngest son, John.

Climbing Companions

Schrepfer: What about some of the men you climbed with? Do you have any recollections of any of them, anything outstanding?

Brower: The people I climbed with, primarily? There are not many. That happens in climbing. If you're going on anything difficult, you like to know whom you are climbing with. I knew well what Dick Leonard could do, and he knew what I could do, and we climbed well together and often.

I did more climbing in Yosemite with Morgan Harris than with anyone else because he was working in Yosemite the same time I was. That meant that whenever there was any spare time for him, I took off and we were off climbing something. We did a lot of dual climbing--just two men on a rope, which is a fast way to go. It is not the most secure, but each of us knew well what the other could do well, and we knew how to handle rope well. We were both reasonably good. So it didn't matter who was leading. We could romp up this and that, and did. Pretty good climbs by the standards of those days.

Brower: My only particular major snow climb was on Mount Waddington in 1935. Among the people on that trip were Bestor Robinson, who was leading it, and Dick Leonard. There were eight altogether, for three weeks. Dick Leonard and I had sharp disagreements with Bestor Robinson on the logistics of where we should camp and where we shouldn't. I think Bestor was wrong and we were right, and we never climbed the peak because, I think, of logistical problems.

Dick and I had a good time on that trip, applying our rock climbing technique to ice climbing, and felt quite secure about it. John McPhee, in Encounters with the Archdruid, recounts a Leonard view, which I should correct. Leonard was reported as saying I went snow-blind because I wouldn't wear dark glasses. The truth is that Leonard and I both went snow-blind, and we were both wearing dark glasses!

It was a strange long day on the ice, foggy with lots of light coming from all directions, but most devastatingly from the sides. We did not have side protection on our dark glasses. The light that came in from the sides for a full day out on this ice was enough to give us a light case of snow blindness. We could see, but we didn't want to open our eyes. It was just as if there was a carload of sand in them. So we stayed in our tent, where it was reasonably dark, and played chess for two days. So much for Dick Leonard's view of who was snow-blind, for what reason! [laughter]

I'll mention a couple of other names here. Raffi Bedayn and I were together for the Seneca experience in training troops. We had climbed some together and ski-mountaineered together in the Sierra. He was an extraordinary guy in many ways, especially as an operator. We needed some gravel once for a row of paramidal tents along the banks of the Potomac where we had our camp. He was able to get loads of gravel from a farmer by trading him a few flashlight batteries.

The two people I climbed and counseled most with in my mountain troop climbing were Leo Healy, who's now in Boston in the manufacturing business, and Richard Emerson, who went on two Himalayan expeditions, including the American Everest expedition in 1963, and is a professor of social psychology at the University of Washington. We three kept closely in touch in Seneca and in Italy, and still keep in touch. We failed on the Matterhorn because Leo got mountain sick and succeeded on the Charmoz-Grépon traverse because they were both such terrifically good climbers and Leo led up the famous Mummery Crack. I could go along as baggage.

Francis Farquhar and the Sierra Club Bulletin

Schrepfer: We might go on, then, to your work with Francis Farquhar and the Bulletin.

Brower: I may be overlapping or repeating what I said last time--I first met Francis Farquhar in the fall of 1933. I had been on my first knapsack trip, had written it up, submitted it to the Bulletin shortly after having joined the Sierra Club in September of 1933. That fall, Francis invited Dick Leonard and me and some others to his house in San Francisco (this was before his marriage) to discuss various matters, including looking over the forthcoming Starr's Guide to the John Muir Trail, which was then being assembled by Walter [A.] Starr, Sr. in memory of Walter, Jr., or Pete.

Francis kept a bridge going between his generation (if you could call it that and I guess it was a generation ahead of us) and the younger generation. He was good at that.

His interest in what I was doing, his putting me in the Bulletin that first year, led me to try hard to write up my next ten-week trip for the Bulletin. I wrote it in the course of commuting to clerical work in San Francisco on the ferry. It was a fairly long piece, "Far from the Madding Mules," which he accepted for the 1935 number. He had to edit heavily, but he left quite a bit of what I had written in there and thought enough of what I had put together to ask me to serve on the editorial board in 1935.

I was not of particular use to him in the ensuing two years; I was up in Yosemite most of the time and out of touch with San Francisco. But when I lost my job in Yosemite and returned to the Bay Area, and was looking for work, I did do some parttime paid work, and some volunteer work with the Sierra Club, particularly on the Bulletin. Starting in about 1938 I began to contribute quite a lot, first to the editing of the bimonthly numbers, and then the annual.

By 1939, I had a major role in both. I did much of the work on the 1940 and 1941 annuals and most of it on the 1942 annual. Francis was the editor. I became associate editor, learning a great deal from him about typography and how to work with authors and printers. The printers were then Taylor and Taylor for the annual Johnck and Seeger for the bimonthly--fine printing firms. Francis imposed high standards in graphic arts

Brower: on the Bulletin and on me. He suggested to his brother, Samuel Farquhar, manager of the University of California printing department and press, that I be considered for an editorial job there. I got it in May 1941.

I continued my work as a volunteer with the Sierra Club and on the Sierra Club Bulletin. My interest in publications grew and grew. I guess I haven't got over it yet. Francis provided the constant guidance and occasional bit of impatience as I moved in, somewhat aggressively, and tried to get things into the Bulletin that I thought were needed. I learned, in particular, about the importance of good reproduction of photography.

My early acquaintance with the Bulletin started with my buying copies before I joined the club. I was impressed with the photographs and how well they were reproduced, particularly with Ansel Adams's work. Francis, together with Ansel, achieved first-class reproduction of photographs in the Bulletin. The Bulletin had the finest reproduction of black and white illustrations then available in any journal in the United States. This led to Ronald Clark's describing the Bulletin as "that model of all mountaineering journals." It's not a mountaineering journal any more, but it was then.

Ansel Adams's own great curiosity, as well as his skill as a photographer, led him to experiment constantly on film, on printing papers, on what could be done in the printing process by gravure, letterpress, or offset. He was always poking around to see how things might be done better--and was getting them done better simply because he was never satisfied with what was presently the best. I think that probably goes on to this day, although I'm not so closely in touch with Ansel.

He had a great influence on my understanding of what needed to be done with photography and with reproducing photographs. Francis did the same, not so much with photography as with type and language. Added to that, I began to learn from an extremely good editor, who gave me my principal editorial background, Harold A. Small [1893-1973]. He was the editor of the University of California Press for many years. I also learned from the good editorial judgment of another editor at the press, Anne Hus, who for thirty years has been my wife. All this helped my own understanding of what the printed word and photograph might do for the conservation movement. That was the mix that became my own specialty. I still think it is an important mix. That's how it came about.

Schrepfer: What about Francis' philosophy of what the Bulletin should do?

Brower: Francis' philosophy, I think, was strongly tinged with the need for good historical presentations about the Sierra. He was a first-rate Sierra Nevada historian. I don't know that we had any major disagreements. He wanted to see some of the outings written up well, and they were, while there were still few enough outings that we could get something that was of fair importance to a large part of the reading audience. It became less and less important, and I guess that's one of the reasons the accounts and the outings disappeared.

He did, as I say; like the good photographs. He liked various presentations of the scientific importance of the Sierra Club's work. He picked up there, I think, from his predecessors in the Bulletin, and primarily William Frederic Bade, who had done good work for the Bulletin, and from some of the earliest editors. There was a good tradition in all those years of the Bulletin, and Francis kept it up and I tried to keep it up myself.

The disagreement we had was whether there should be a change in frequency. I wanted to see the bimonthly become a monthly, and finally that was agreed to. I wanted to see it change in size from the 6-by-9 inch format to 8 1/2-by-11, and add some color. He wasn't too happy about that. I think he thought that was beginning to change its character--and it did. I think that the promise of the 8 1/2-by-11 monthly was pretty good.

By that time, he had long since left his own direct interest in the Bulletin well behind. After the war was over, I came back. I was named the editor and, I think, was primarily responsible for what was in it for quite a while after that. Bruce Kilgore, when he came in, had a lot to do with content; August Fruge, as the chairman of the editorial board, had something to do with some of the annuals. During the war I had nothing to do with either. I do believe I was the de facto editor of the annual, with time out for war, from 1939 to 1968.

The thing that happened that still disappoints me is that when I left as executive director, the annual, which I thought was still an important part of the Sierra Club publication program, drifted away. The issue was not raised; it just wasn't published any more. I had put the question to the membership in one of the Bulletins: Should we forget the annual? The response was preponderantly, Don't forget it. So we tried our best to keep it up--I did--and it stopped.

Brower: I wish it could be resumed. I think that it is the record of the important things that the Sierra Club has believed and done. Its articles were written with more thought of permanence--as part of a lasting history rather than just what do you need to do this month. The annual Bulletin is needed in an organization of the Sierra Club's standing, and would inform people about what's behind the club a lot more than they find out now. So many members have come in so recently that they don't know what the club's background is, what its importance was, what its motivations were, and enough about those that are still valid to give them enough weight in their thinking.

A series of annuals that goes back to 1893 shouldn't be ended. There aren't enough things going on that have that continuity. Its interruption is a mistake that I hope can be corrected. It's a long lapse right now. In 1968 we put out a tri-annual that combined three years in one volume--for budgetary purposes. It had good material in it. That kind of material is available still and needs an outlet.

Schrepfer: Do you think that budgetary considerations may be the primary reason why it's been phased out?

Brower: That's one of the excuses. Throughout Francis' and my experience with the Bulletin, the directors, whenever there was an economy needed, would look first at what always cost a big chunk, the Bulletin item, and say, "Well, why can't we cut that?"

Francis fought that for the annual; I fought it; it hasn't been fought since. It takes somebody who cares about it to fight the battle at budget time, to keep the money in for something that's not ephemeral in the record of what the Sierra Club has accomplished. I guess the Handbook has gone by the way, too, at this point. Some things are part of an organization's cohesion, and it would be good if the club got them back.

IV THE SIERRA CLUB AND THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, 1930s-1960s ##

Politics of Preservation: Park Service vs. Forest Service

Schrepfer: Did you ever feel--either at the time of the Kings Canyon battle or later--that perhaps the Forest Service was a better administrator than the Park Service?

Brower: No, I've not felt that way for a long, long time. Let's see, when did I last feel that way? I remember in Yosemite when I was working there, going across the crest once or twice with Ansel on photographic trips. He would do the photographing and I would do the watching. One trip that was memorable was with Edward Weston--across the Sierra and over to the other side into the Shadow Lake- Lake Ediza country where we climbed the Minarets. Ansel photographed Morgan Harris and me on top of a very minor Minaret. It's in The Eloquent Light.*

On the occasion of one of those trips I remember Ansel's saying how much better he liked the country's look after he got out of the park because it didn't look so manicured. I felt that this was right. I tended to agree with him; the Park Service was being a little bit too fussy, I thought then.

My disillusionment with the Forest Service--which had begun in the Kings Canyon battle, when I saw what they had tried to do but was not aware of all their techniques--my disillusionment did not come until the Deadman Summit controversy in the Mammoth Lake area.

Schrepfer: You keep alluding to what you saw at Kings Canyon...

*Nancy Newhall, Ansel Adams: A Biography I. The Eloquent Light (Sierra Club, San Francisco, 1963), pp 137-138.

Brower: That was the Forest Service's attempt to tell the Sierra Club that the thing that you do was forget the Park Service idea.

Schrepfer: Yes. I understand that, but I mean was there something particular about their administration of the area?

Brower: What the Forest Service could not prevent was water development in national forests. They were not able to block reclamation development or development of power sites. One of the things that got a lot of support for the national park idea was the so-called Randall Report. The U.S. Corps of Engineers in the water plans they had for the Kings River High Sierra, contemplated all kinds of dams and penstocks. Every favorite meadow had a water development plan for it. That was one of the things that we released in the battle to show that, whatever you might have liked about the Forest Service, it had no power under the law to protect against this kind of development, whatever its protestations. It was important to save the higher Sierra from such a threat. How real it was I don't know. I think we all know that the Corps of Engineers, when it needs work, can build dams that aren't needed.

Schrepfer: This wasn't necessarily this time a criticism of the Forest Service, but of the fact that it had only limited powers?

Brower: It had limited powers. It also was trying to build any support it could for its own operation. It was working hard with the California State Chamber of Commerce and with the California legislature to block the park. It was working hard to get the Wilderness Society and other organizations to block the legislation. That was where we first found it at work.

There was a little organization called California Mountain-eers set up in the valley to help fight the park. I'm quite sure that was set up under Forest Service aegis--no direct connection, but they could work these things pretty well. That's where I first found them doing that sort of thing. San Gorgonio was next. Deadman's Summit finally broke the spell. I didn't think I could really trust them after that.

Schrepfer: You favor the Park Service over the Forest Service?

Brower: I favor the Park Service because its initial act, its whole purpose, is to preserve wilderness. The National Park Act reads that way. They are supposed to allow only such development as is necessary to permit the areas to be enjoyed in perpetuity as wilderness. The act can be read that way clearly; no development should be allowed that is incompatible with that protection.

Brower: The Park Service has been reading the act as a dilemma, saying they're supposed to protect it yet make it available for the millions. They misread the act and still do, so there's still need to do battle. Their function continues to be to preserve multiple uses of land that are consistent with its preservation as wilderness. The Forest Service seeks multiple uses consistent with its production of timber. This has led the Forest Service down many a primrose path.

Whenever we criticize the Park Service, as we need to, we ought also to criticize the Forest Service, which we need to. Otherwise the Forest Service gets to pick up the chips. The NPS gets reams of adverse comment for its misdeeds in Yosemite and Yellowstone, which are known to almost everybody, but where the sins affect only a few acres of wilderness. Meanwhile the Forest Service can, without much public notice, on little known national forests, let millions of acres of wilderness go down the drain, and is still doing just that.

The Forest Service has always manipulated public opinion better than the Park Service. The preservation of wilderness is a rather special occupation. It appeals to people who may not excel in administrative ability, or the ability to do the big public relations job. It's hard to get support for preservation. There isn't much money to be made out of preserving something, and there's a lot of money to be made from selling it. Therefore the Park Service needs particularly strong support to make it possible for it to go in the right direction against all the other forces wanting to develop what the NPS ought to preserve, can preserve, and does preserve.

Schrepfer: Do you think Interior has been more subject to political influence, as opposed to Agriculture?

Brower: No. In Congress the Forest Service is under the general guidance, for its policy, of the agriculture committees of the House and Senate, which have been concerned with corn, cotton, peanuts, and tobacco and don't care much about trees and care hardly a fig about wilderness. They're production-oriented. The Forest Service has been able to split its reporting function to the Congress between Interior, for its appropriations, and Agriculture, for its policy. Switching from one to the other gives it a nice pivot position.

The Park Service has been wholly under Interior. It could operate well if it hadn't been housed with the major development agency, the Bureau of Reclamation. The Park Service has an annual budget of a few million and the Bureau of Reclamation,

Brower: with many times that, can call the tune in the Interior Department, and has. I don't know the way out yet. When we found the Park Service fighting the Wilderness Bill and fighting the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Bill, when we found them unable to protect Dinosaur National Monument (where Dinosaur, in the words of Newton Drury, was a "dead duck") we wondered if the way to protect the parks was to have them under a special office in the White House. Nowadays [the Nixon-Ford years] you might think rather differently about that.

Harold Ickes and the New Deal

Schrepfer: What did you think about Harold Ickes and his reorganization proposal?

Brower: I didn't follow what he was proposing. I never met Ickes for one thing. I certainly admired the vigor with which he was getting some things done. We wouldn't have had Olympic saved the way it was; we wouldn't have got Kings Canyon National Park without the vigor of Harold Ickes. I'm sorry that he didn't stay in office longer so that we could have saved some of the Escalante region. His proposal for an Escalante National Park would have saved Glen Canyon. But he ran out of steam before that could happen.

I remember that there was some appreciation of Ickes on the Sierra Club board, particularly by the Democrats on it, and they wanted at one point a resolution praising Ickes for what he had done for Kings Canyon National Park. I remember Francis Farquhar's saying, "You don't praise a man for doing his job," so there was no resolution. The Sierra Club board was fairly strongly Republican, as this story suggests.

Not having met Ickes and never having voted for Franklin Roosevelt, I was not prepared to be wholly supportive of Ickes, and was not in a high-enough echelon while he was in power ever to have had any direct communication with him, but I think that he was a great secretary of the interior for all his faults.

Schrepfer: Do you think that in the years that you voted Republican that the Republicans were better as far as conservation and environmental matters?

Brower: I don't think they were. One of my problems was that I was not concerned about conservation at the time. Deep down inside I may have had strong views about what shouldn't be done to

Brower: certain places, but I wasn't following how scenic or environmental damage resulted from actions of Congress. I didn't become aware of that at all until late in the thirties; I didn't get into it until rather far into Ickes's regime--1940 I guess, when the Kings Canyon National Park finally got through. I was beginning shortly after that to get concerned.

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Schrepfer: What did you think of the federal government under the New Deal?

Brower: My feelings were mixed. I wasn't old enough to vote for Hoover, but I would have. I was a few months too young to get into that election. But, my own impression, which changed much later, was that loose promises were being made by the Democrats, and I was tired of their rhetoric. (We didn't call it rhetoric yet.)

The U.S. was addicted to dam building at that time, a lot of dams were built, and that was considered, I suppose, the epitome of conservation--you go out and build a dam and you save something. Certainly a lot of the dams had no opposition from the Sierra Club, or from me. It wasn't until later that we began to have to question what the big dams were doing. My opinions were not yet strongly set in any direction. I was young and just learning.

Schrepfer: What about Robert Sterling Yard?

Brower: I never met him and had no correspondence with him. Art Blake was in frequent correspondence with him, trying to bring him around to an understanding of what was needed in the Kings Canyon Park battle. Yard and others were not grasping the essence of the conservation need in the High Sierra. They were still thinking of two big canyons, Tehipite and South Fork, Yosemite-like, which must be saved at all costs. Forget those and you are doing a disservice to the national park idea.

Yard and the Wilderness Society, I think, at that time had a strong Forest Service orientation, and, for that reason, were reluctant to see an area taken from national forest and put into a national park.

The National Parks Association, as it was then called, was likewise under the influence of people who were making decisions about terrain they had not seen.

I suppose that was where I should have first learned that you don't do that; I made such mistakes myself later on. I would say, if there is any moral that is to be drawn out of my

Brower: total experience in conservation, it is, Don't pass judgment, and give in, on a place you haven't seen. Get there somehow!

Schrepfer: Yard seems to have been quite a fanatic.

Brower: I couldn't comment on that. I had not been aware of his fanaticism. Of course, I've seen a lot of good people called fanatics.

Schrepfer: What about the National Parks and Conservation Association now?

Brower: Right now I'm afraid it's under the domination of one man, Tony [Anthony Wayne] Smith, and I think that this impairs its usefulness. It's hard for most of the other organizations I know of to find the basis for cooperation with the association that used to exist and that ought to exist again. I think that this will be true whenever there is too much domination by one person. It's something that has to be guarded against. That certainly goes for any effect that I may have: if there is any excessive domination on my part over what's happening in my organization, then that's bad. There isn't enough chance for the rounding out of ideas, for balance in what happens. You can go a long way down the wrong trail by yourself.

Threats to Olympic National Park, 1947

Schrepfer: I don't have any other questions about Kings Canyon, but what about Olympic National Park during the forties?

Brower: I've got to brush up. When was the Olympic battle intense? I guess that was post-war.

Schrepfer: During the war.

Brower: During the war there was an attempt to get into the Sitka spruce. It was light and they thought they needed it for aircraft. It's nice we saved some; there's very little going into aircraft now. [laughter]

The major battle I had any part in was the attempt in 1947 to relinquish for logging a lot of the timber that had been set aside within Olympic National Park. Dick Leonard and I worked closely together on that one. We were helped by the regional office of the Park Service when Lowell Sumner, its Regional Biologist, and others showed us a series of photographs of what was proposed to be relinquished. The photographs did all the talking.

Brower: Lowell Sumner took them. He was one of the few people able to photograph well with one hand while driving an airplane with the other. He has taken many photographs of ecological importance. His series of photographs of Olympic were all Dick Leonard and I needed to know--the photographs were marked "Proposed NPS relinquish."

We went back to the Sierra Club's conservation committee and board meetings, where it was decided that nothing like that should ever happen. We put out a special issue of the Bulletin (June 1947) on that subject, using many of Lowell's photographs. That was one of the things that helped stave off the proposed relinquishment.

The next threat came when Fred [Frederick J.] Overly was superintendent of Olympic National Park. He was timber-oriented. If you could have a villain as a superintendent of a national park, he played the role fairly well. A great deal of timber was being taken out of Olympic National Park under the guise of sanitation, or salvage, logging [1950-1955]. The battle was separate from the relinquishment battle, yet it was an Overly way to do the same thing to the trees needed for setting.

As that battle heated up, I remembered a statement by Lyle Watts, just retired as a chief forester of the U.S. Forest Service. He spoke to a conservation meeting in the Northwest, defending a forest against what was happening to it. He said, "I could make a case for salvage logging in any forest at any time." This, he said, is not what you are supposed to do in a national park.

Walter Starr agreed. He had been a director of the Sierra Club, was its president at one time, a long time honorary vice-president, and Honorary President, until his death. He was with Soundview Pulp and Paper Company, which later became Scott. It was, of course, much interested in logging. But Walter was a staunch defender of the forests in Olympic National Park.

Finally, Pat Goldsworthy, Paul Shepard, and others got hot on the trail of Overly's salvage logging operation and threatened a suit and a scandal if this continued, and the conservation organizations were going to blow the whistle.

Conrad Wirth, then the director of the National Park Service, came out to a meeting of conservationists at the Seattle-Tacoma airport [1955]. I was present. We read the riot act. The man who provided most of the evidence was Paul Shepard,

Brower: who was a summer ranger-naturalist in Olympic National Park. His eyewitness story was devastating. I suppose Overly could have gone to jail for what he had done.

Wirth saw the threat. He and Lawrence [C.] Merriam, the regional director, stated strongly that this would indeed be stopped.

We asked at that meeting that there be no retribution against Paul Shepard for what he had revealed. Wirth promised that there wouldn't be. But the Park Service never hired Shepard again. That promise was broken.

That's about the highlight of what I know of the Olympic struggle. There's more to it, but I don't have that story. Someone should get the story of what was learned by the Mountaineers in one of the first Forest Service-Park Service battles, with respect to Olympic National Monument and Olympic National Park. The key person there was Irving Clark, now dead. His son, Irving Clark, Jr., is alive and would know a great deal about it. [He was fatally injured in a surfing accident in 1978.] The Mountaineers, in Washington, had quite a few papers on that. Pat Goldsworthy would know quite a bit about it. Carsty Lien was going to write a book on it for the Sierra Club. We spent a little money to get the papers ready for the book--but he kept moving to jobs that made him worth more and more, and it would have been too costly to try to divert enough of his time to get the book finished. It's a book that should be done. That's an Olympic story that ought to be recorded adequately and editorialized on and interpreted in various ways because it does reveal clearly how much we've lost in preservation in the United States because of the dominance of the timber-producing syndrome in Forest Service land management.

Schrepfer: Even though this was the Park Service? Even in the Park Service?

Brower: It is not pertinent to many people in the Park Service. Overly was one who was timber-prone and not preservation-prone.

[My response misses the point. The Forest Service, in the Olympic struggle, persisted in its agency-serving role begun when it opposed the Antiquities Act, the National Park Act, the Coolidge Administration recreation study recommendations, and a list of reforms that could go on and should. The Forest Service is still imprinted with the Pinchotism that everything in the national forests is for sale. The Park Service, when it remembers, is informed by Muir: national parks, existing and potential, are for what you find there representing natural succession, not

Brower: what you take there, or take away from there, or develop there in man's image because God's is somehow inferior. Development versus preservation was the source of struggle then, and continues to be, not only in the U.S., but globally as well, as we move from an empty earth to a full one. The earth, of course, was not empty, but humanity, not seeing enough of itself, has construed it to be empty. Forest Service thinking, in my prejudiced mind, epitomizes the mentality that measures usefulness preponderantly as what is salable now to Homo Sapiens. The national park idea tries to get the hubris out. Theirs is the far harder job, theirs the thin constituency, and theirs the mentality--when it reflects Muir's and Thoreau's perception--that can sustain a livable earth for the diversity that can include us.--DRB, 9/17/78]

Newton B. Drury: The Model Park Service Director

Schrepfer: What about Newton Drury's role in the earlier process where there was question of taking land out of the park?

Brower: At that point Newton Drury was the director [of the National Park Service], and I don't know what his role was. I wasn't good at looking behind the scenes and seeing who was motivated by what. I would suspect now, in my advanced years as I look back on all this, that Drury had probably said to Lawrence Merriam, "Get the Sierra Club in there and show them what we're being forced to do and see if they can't help build a backfire."

That would be my guess. I think that Drury was the finest director the Park Service had, by far, in what he wanted to do to preserve the parks. This showed up in what he'd done in the Save-the-Redwoods League and what he did later in the California state parks--he wanted the parks saved as the National Park Act required them to be saved.

Horace Albright used to make fun of this. I remember his remark to me that Newton Drury wanted things so natural in the national parks that he would like people to check their contraceptives at the entrance station. But Horace was development-minded and political. Newton Drury was preservation-minded. One of his best remarks is, "We have no money; we can do no harm." He was the only one that had that attitude, that I know of, among all National Park Service directors. It's too bad that it hasn't been pervasive.

Brower: What he was talking about is surely what Olmsted, Frederick Law Olmsted, pere, had in mind in his first report on Yosemite back in 1865, and what his son, Frederick Law Olmsted, fils, had in mind when he drafted the important paragraph of the National Park Act: parks were to be used in such a way as to preserve them unimpaired. Too many of the directors didn't read the qualification.

Newton Drury--for all the disagreements we've had--is the model National Park director. He should have been better assisted by people who like to do the politicking that's necessary on Capitol Hill. I don't think he liked to--this is the story I got.

That kind of retreat from the political world--a world that's necessary to enter to save national parks--seemed to extend to other key people in the National Park Service. An assistant director, who had been the superintendent of Sequoia, was said to have advised, "When things get too hot in the valley, go back up into the park until they cool off." What you need is a superintendent who will go down in the valley and cool things off.

Newton Drury, lacking perfection in political operations, was not as militant a defender of the parks as he might otherwise have been. That could explain his statement in the Dinosaur affair that "Dinosaur is a dead duck." He nevertheless did assist the conservation effort to save it. That's another story.

Schrepfer: Isn't that part of the reason why he was replaced?

Brower: I think it was. I remember the New York Times editorial about Mr. Drury's departure after he had been serving for eleven years. It looked as if he stood up for Dinosaur, and the Bureau of Reclamation, which had a lot more power in the Department of the Interior, had shut him up. There again, I'd have to get my notes and old clippings out to see what had happened and who was responsible. I think Oscar Chapman helped ease him out.

Roads in the Parks: Kings Canyon, Tioga Road, Mission 66

[Interview 3: April 16, 1974]##

Brower: You wanted to continue on the general subject of the relations between the Park Service and the Sierra Club?

Schrepfer: Right.

Brower: I noticed the dates you had down were the 1930s and '40s. In the thirties I was a spectator, until the tail end of the decade--the Kings Canyon battle. I came to the Tioga Road matter, the first major battle I had with the Park Service, in the twilight of the earlier Sierra Club position that roads were just peachy, that we must get more roads into the Sierra to get more people there.

That had been a Muir concept. His letter to Mrs. [Jeanne C.] Carr about roads in Yosemite Valley influenced Will Colby, and the club was still in that phase up through 1928. The new attitude about roads came late. The Sierra Club Bulletin piece (I think it was in 1933) about the rerouting of the Tioga Road was still tinged with the general philosophy, "We've got to get more roads, but let's get them in more scenic places."*

Shortly thereafter the idea of wilderness became more prevalent in Sierra Club thinking. That is, the concept of a John Muir Wilderness National Park (which became Kings Canyon National Park) could be talked about--to some extent the influence of the Wilderness Society on Sierra Club thinking.

The Wilderness Society was fairly new, but it was formed specifically to protect wilderness. John Muir had wanted to do this. He had been the father of wilderness protection and wanted national parks to be the highest form of wilderness protection. Ideas about the harm roads could do were evolving unsatisfactorily. As the Kings Canyon Park battle began, the attitude toward roads changed. One of the biggest struggles in Kings Canyon was to restrict the Park Service's wish to build more roads in Kings Canyon than even the Forest Service had wanted to. (We'll get

*"Relocation of the Tioga Road," Sierra Club Bulletin, vol. 19, no. 3, June 1934, pp. 85-88.

Brower: to Tioga in a moment.) At that time the Forest Service was bidding for wilderness support, which was now influential enough that they could plan to keep roads out.

In Yosemite, then, when Harold Bradley and I got into the Tioga Road battle late in the forties, we were trying to tone down the Park Service idea of putting a high-standard road across the Sierra. We could already see the implications of a high standard road. I wrote to the club from Italy about wilderness and about how little roads led to bigger roads and more development. I wrote in the post-combat period, and "How to Kill a Wilderness" was put in the Sierra Club Bulletin in 1945. So we came into the postwar period seeing a need for a complete change in Park Service attitude. We were defeated.

The Harold Bradley concept was that the old Tioga Road, which had steep grades and sharp corners in it, was a fine thing. There were troubles--you couldn't pass cars on it, particularly cars going your way; and bigger trailers were coming along. But he came up with a sound idea: keep the old road as a reminder of the old mining road that used to be there. Keep the standards difficult. Let people spend more time driving it, driving what amounted to a motor trail through the woods, that let you see the flowers alongside, let you reach out and practically touch the branches. Get the feel of the country from the car's traveling slowly. But make it into two simple one-way roads, the two grades separated, each a motor trail, each a minimum disturbance of the park.

The Park Service said that no such thing was possible. They couldn't conceive of the wisdom that Harold Bradley was espousing. Yet in less than six years after the battle was over and the damage done, they were doing in the Mariposa Grove of Big Trees exactly what Harold Bradley had proposed--using the one-way road concept. They have learned from highway departments all over the country how to build one-way roads, their grades widely separated, maybe separated for miles.

What the Park Service had been adamant in refusing to accept as a brilliant idea cost enormously in scenic damage in Yosemite. But it was the stubbornness of the director, Connie Wirth, and his strong feeling that the way to get support for the parks was to tie in with the American Automobile Association and the road construction people. He saw that power would come from money in the Park Service budget; the way to get a big budget was to get a lot of construction going. That's what we were up against.

Brower: The concept behind the destruction of the Tioga Road environs was the kind of thinking behind Mission 66, Conrad Wirth's idea --a ten-year program of heavy expenditure in the national parks. The battle on Tioga Road itself, then, was really the harbinger of the main battle against Mission 66, which, again, the Sierra Club lost.

The loss led to an extraordinary amount of national park damage. I don't know how long it will take the parks to recover from it. It was the concept that you could somehow get more people in and not suffer the consequences of overuse by the people who wanted to go to the parks but didn't want to spend effort getting to see them. Overengineering of roads removed the one filter that could protect the parks by making what was there something you had to earn and not just have it given to you, diminishing what you learned about what was there and what its importance was. It was a capitulation, to quote the words of William Colby, to the "fatal beauty of Yosemite," letting it become still more lethal, bringing more people to beautiful places and to overwhelm what they came to see. The battle still goes on.

We didn't have to fight that battle when Newton Drury was the director. His "We have no money, we can do no harm" concept has escaped all subsequent directors of the National Park Service, to the detriment of the parks. Somehow, they weren't willing to grab the thistle, to lead. They followed, and let the appeal for more and more access bring more and more visitation, which they were then less and less able to resist. That has cost the parks a great deal.

The Sierra Club has taken fairly strong stands on the question, but it has generally also been weak. One of my big battles with the Sierra Club board was on the early manifestation of this destruction in the realignment of the Tioga Road (1948 ff.).

Schrepfer: They didn't agree with you?

Brower: No. It was uphill work. Again and again, under the leadership of Bestor Robinson, with Dick Leonard going along, the club acquiesced, to what had been agreed upon in the mid-thirties in a different context. Then the club had not been concerned about overuse of the parks at all, or not much. Some of us saw what was about to happen, and that the Sierra Club board, at that point, was going wrong.

Brower: Harold Bradley and I were in the minority. We got beaten down regularly. When we wrote a long article for the Sierra Club Bulletin*¹, there was a strong objection to my putting it in. The piece should be brought up-to-date now, and be strengthened, so that we not forget what we lost because the Sierra Club was too timid to fight for the tenets of John Muir.

Schrepfer: Were they too timid, or did they—Bestor Robinson would have disagreed philosophically with you. How about the rest of them?

Brower: Bestor was the developer; he always was. That is, his role on the board, and I think it was clear, was to manipulate the people on the board. He was a good trial attorney. He could speak slowly and sonorously; he could pick a meeting up and carry it anywhere he wanted to. He enjoyed doing that.

One of my own early failures, which I never got over, was never being able to handle Bestor at a board meeting. He took the board down a primrose path again and again. There was nothing that appealed to him more than getting maps out and seeing what you could do to put something somewhere.

Bestor wanted the San Jacinto tramway, he wanted the development of San Gorgonio when he was president. He was for developing more roads, more huts. This got more people into less wilderness. He led the Sierra Club, I think on unwise courses and was able to persuade several people to go along.


Schrepfer: I had thought that the Sierra Club report on Tioga Road in 1934 had argued against the complete realignment.

Brower: They had argued for a different realignment from the one that brought about the heavy damage at Tenaya Lake. They had, I think, some ideas on the route that were far preferable to what was finally carved into the land.**²

* "Roads in the National Parks." Harold C. Bradley and David R. Brower, SCB, vol. 34, no. 6, 1949, pp. 31-54.

**[My twenty-five year old recollection is not very useful; it would have been far better if I had taken the time to refresh myself about items on Susan Schrepfer's agenda for me.-- DRB 5/29/79]

Illustrating the article "Tenaya Tragedy" by Ansel Adams, from Sierra Club Bulletin, November 1958



Harold Bradley

IN SEPTEMBER 1958 a sign like this stood at each end of the twenty-one miles of old mining road; but the tense was wrong, for only part of the twenty-one miles still remained and this part had lost its meaning. Progress had come through this part of Yosemite with no thought of changing pace.

One man suggested half-humorously that if the Park Service had kept the old road and charged five dollars for the privilege of driving it, people would have loved it. No one had argued seriously, however, that the road should remain exactly as it was. Modest improvement was necessary if the tail fins were to clear.

The Tioga Road and Tenaya Lake

T W E N T Y - T W O P H O T O G R A P H S

Schrepfer: How about somebody like Francis Farquhar?

Brower: Francis had been involved enough in the 1933 study not to want to see the major revision that Harold Bradley was calling for; that is, the completely new concept of two narrow, low-standard, one-way roads. I'm sorry that Francis didn't see the importance of carrying out the idea Harold Bradley persuaded the Park Service at least to think about--in having historic markers put on each end of the old road: "this is a historic road" (the wording of that marker is in a [November 1958] Sierra Club Bulletin article) to help travelers enjoy the uniqueness of that road and the details that could be seen along it. This was what Harold was hoping for. I was too.

I shot a lot of 16mm color footage for a two-roads film--the road that we should have had and the road that we got, and the kinds of damage that were undertaken to make the new road. It's still raw footage, unedited. Maybe some day, if it hasn't dried out too much, a film can be made. It could show the kinds of things that existed along the old road that are completely foreign to the new.

The prediction of Harold Bradley and others, including myself, was that if you build that road, you will then overload Tuolumne Meadows. That's happened. You'll lead to the requirement that the Tioga Road east of the summit of Tioga Pass be realigned. It was, with enormous destruction to Lee Vining Canyon. Now you've got a lot of trans-Sierra traffic over the Tioga Road, and rapidly passing scenery instead of a unique experience.

It was a great mistake and I'm still very sad about the Sierra Club's weakness. I think if the club had gone all out could have reversed what happened.

I remember something else that should be part of the record on the Tioga Road. We were in the final stages of trying to get at least some protection of Tenaya Lake to try to avoid that massive cut through the glacier polish. There the snow, in the early season, now avalanches and blocks the road; it's a cruel cut you can see from all over. We tried to avoid that in various ways. We had already seen the bad alignment in the

Brower: less important scenic areas along the Tioga Road, and (probably about 1957) Alex Hildebrand and I were to have a meeting in Yosemite with the director, who was ordered by Secretary of Interior Seaton to meet with us on this.

While we were there to meet with the director, to espouse the Sierra Club position that at least could try to save Tenaya Lake, Bestor Robinson was meeting with the engineers to try to work against what we were doing.

Schrepfer: Did he want to go through the glacier polish?

Brower: Yes. When Alex Hildebrand learned that Bestor was there in Yosemite at another meeting, he called over to try to straighten Bestor out: "What are you trying to do to us here?" Alex wondered, in effect, and I hope Bestor was embarrassed.

As Connie Wirth said later, "Well, we put a couple of wiggles in the road." That's all the club got out of a major, if belated, effort to save at least the last critical part.

Schrepfer: Was Connie Wirth willing to listen to you, willing to consider your position?

Brower: Not much. He was already committed. The Western Office of Design and Construction had the power; they had the budget. Whoever was the regional director of the Park Service could make his plea or protest, or the superintendents could, but WODAC could overpower them.

Connie [Wirth] gave them their power. He was looking for the kind of power that came from a big budget, and that meant design and construction. Preservation didn't have much of a clientele, much of a constituency--not enough to interest him.

On the Tioga Road matter, I remember a description of Connie Wirth by Jack Abbott, who was an assistant to Secretary [Fred A.] Seaton: "Connie Wirth is a stubborn Dutchman, and if he can walk through a door instead of opening it, he'll walk right through it." I'm Dutch in ancestry, too, and I have the same problem. But it was his adamant position that gave us little opportunity to succeed.

Schrepfer: So, he never came to you and asked your position?

Brower: He came in various attempts (and sent Horace Albright and others) to try to unload Brower from the Sierra Club. That's one of the things that Connie did. There was a special meeting

Brower: at Bestor's house--Connie Wirth and the directors--where they were trying to see what steps could be taken to get me out of my position as executive director. I was giving them too much trouble.

Schrepfer: This was in the early fifties?
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Brower: Yes. Other differences with the Park Service brought about the other attempts to unload Brower. The board rallied enough not to do it.

Schrepfer: What one are you talking about now?

Brower: About 1957 the Park Service made another attempt during the effort to have the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission established by law. In my testimony before Congress I attacked Connie Wirth for his attempt to block this legislation. I had fairly strong statements to make about that. He sent a wire to the Sierra Club board that he was appalled or astounded or stunned--one of those verbs--about what I'd been doing. Horace Albright came out to talk to the various directors individually to see if he couldn't get Brower off the Park Service's back and, I think, trying to block the Sierra Club's outdoor recreation review proposal. Alex Hildebrand was then the president and rallied the support of the board so that the attempt to oust me then didn't work.

That was part of the reaction, on the Sierra Club's part, to Mission 66, one of the Park Service's antiwilderness moves--even as the Forest Service's attempts to log wilderness had been antiwilderness moves that set me actively against them and them actively against me for the trouble I was causing them.

Park Service Administrators and the Olmsted Ideal##

Schrepfer: In the period from the late thirties to the early fifties, there would have been [Arno B.] Cammerer, Drury, and Wirth. Was there any difference in the relations between the Sierra Club and the Park Service in this period?

Brower: The Sierra Club was supportive of Drury. When I learned that Newton Drury had been named director of the Park Service, I was delighted. It was one of the finest things I thought could ever happen for the parks. He was the sort of man who believed what the National Park Act called for.

Brower: This I think is something we lost badly when he was forced out and a developer put in--a developer followed by one Mr. [George] Hartzog, who cared even less about wilderness, followed by one [Ronald Walker] who knew nothing about it whatsoever. So, it's been rather difficult these days.

I think one thing that should be inserted here, and I can't dig it up now without looking too long--is something that I believe should inform all park rangers, managers, superintendents, regional directors, and directors. That's the statement by Frederick Law Olmsted, père, in his long lost Yosemite report written in 1865. I know that when the work for Mission 66 was getting underway, I wrote an article for the National Parks Bulletin [January-March, 1958], later to become National Parks Magazine, then edited by Bruce Kilgore, calling for a Mission 65. I thought, rather than celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the National Park Service, there should be something to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the first major statement ever written about what the parks were all about.

Frederick Law Olmsted, père, had it all in his head. He was out West for a rest. He had a role in Yosemite for several months. He knew what landscape management was all about. He'd come from the struggle over Central Park and getting it going; he helped on campus plans for Berkeley and Stanford; he had envisioned what should be done for regional parks in our hills. He was the genius in landscape architecture and park planning.

Olmsted had the idea written out in his 1865 Yosemite Report, and it needs to be rescued. It was published in Landscape Architecture, 1952. Laura Roper helped discover it. She'd written a book and was writing various things on the Olmsteds. I've had it xeroxed from time to time.

The main idea is to preserve the natural scenery in a national park. If we permit the sacrifice of future visitors' interests to satisfy "the convenience, bad taste, playfulness, carelessness, or wanton destructiveness of present visitors,--we probably yield in each case the interest of uncounted millions to the selfishness of a few." He was looking ahead, and few of our managers have been able to look that far ahead since.

As Carl Parcher Russell, once a Yosemite superintendent, pointed out, there were two fires of genius, the father and son. Frederick Law Olmsted, fils, wrote the particular paragraph of the National Park Act that the Park Service seems studiously to ignore.*

*See "The Olmsteds: One Fire of Genius," Carl P. Russell, Sierra Club Bulletin, November, 1958.

Schrepfer: There have been strong recommendations on Yosemite recently-- study groups and this kind of thing. Are they responding at all to that?

Brower: Yes. I was critical of George Hartzog; I'll have to be complimentary about his role in reducing accessibility in Yosemite Valley to the automobile. If that concept had come with that kind of leadership two decades before, we'd be in good shape. He began to block off roads and to get buses to carry people so that there would be fewer private cars on the road. It was the right move.

It was not his idea; it was the idea, I think, of Tom Vint in the late forties or early fifties, who was a landscape architect [Chief of Development] for the National Park Service but whose advice was not heeded. Wirth was the stubborn Dutchman. He would not heed the advice of his chief biologist on what to do about DDT and spraying the needle miners in Yosemite's lodgepole pine forests. He wouldn't pay much attention to Vint. He was paying attention to the builders. He thought that's where the Park Service's future lay, not in the preservation that the park act calls for.

Schrepfer: Did Hartzog ever consult the Sierra Club on their opinion on various questions; how cooperative was he?

Brower: There was not a great deal of cooperation that I know of, but there was consultation.

Schrepfer: How about his personal attitude toward you?

Brower: I don't know. He was always a hale and hearty man. He had a powerful handshake. He'd look you in the eye--and forget about wilderness.

I suppose the epitome of his failure was what happened in Redwood National Park. He was the director. He and Stewart Udall, Connie Wirth in his final years, could have helped enormously in Redwood National Park. Because they did not work hard enough, they have left us, alas, with a Redwood National Park which meets the description Martin Litton gave: it reminds you of the places you missed when you shaved.

Schrepfer: Do you think that he was afraid of losing his job?

Brower: I think so. This happens to almost anyone. Connie Wirth would excuse himself, saying, "I want to live to fight another battle another day."

Brower: I think I told you the story that he told on the Tioga Road way back. He was ribbing me with the story about the two Salvation Army women who had come back in from their fund-raising and were taking a shower. One said to the other, "Sister Mary, what a large navel you have!" And Sister Mary said, "That does it. From now on you carry the flag and I'll beat the goddamn drum!"

The moral is clear: it is easy on the outside to beat the drum. You don't have to go through all the problems of keeping the flag up. It is always easy for the outsider who doesn't have to do the day-after-day job to moan, to bitch, and not quite to understand the circumstances in which decisions have to be made and fought out. It's, I guess, the constant failure in the environmental organizations--the Sierra Club, the Friends of the Earth, myself included--to forget to give the support when it's needed. We remember to criticize, but forget to praise.

V . WILDERNESS AND THE FOREST SERVICE

Internecine Battle: USFS vs. NPS

Schrepfer: Now go ahead with the Forest Service.

Brower: The Forest Service was always extremely jealous of the Park Service, and I think that everything has to start there. The Sierra Club was first on one side and then on the other in the course of the long internecine battle that was going on between the Forest Service and the Park Service.

The Forest Service, as I read it, began to object to the Antiquities Act of 1906. They didn't want land set aside that might be swept into the national parks. The national parks had started in Yosemite, in the 1864 reservation of Yosemite as a park for the nation, signed by President Lincoln. Congress said that California was to administer it. Yellowstone came in 1872 as number two, but it was called a national park, per se. The idea, as Hans Huth* has pointed out, was already perfected and in effect in 1864 in Yosemite, and Olmsted in 1865 understood it. Yellowstone was sort of a Johnny-come-lately, and was representative of the national park idea, as such; but it was the first reservation called a national park. Then the others came: Yosemite, Sequoia in 1890. So we had the parks getting on line and the army administering them.

Then the idea that there might be another category of land, like a national park--the national antiquities areas--primarily for historic or geological importance but also for scenic importance, bothered the Forest Service, and they fought that. They

*Hans Huth, Nature and the American: Three Centuries of Changing Attitudes (University of California, 1957). See also his earlier "Yosemite: The Story of an Idea," Sierra Club Bulletin, March, 1948.

Brower: fought the establishment of the National Park Service, and that comes out clearly in the hearings leading up to the National Park Act of 1916.

Following that, they began to look into the forest areas to see what they could do to present a rival kind of management, and came up with the primitive area idea, which was coincident with the National Recreation Study carried out under the Coolidge administration, which began to identify a good many areas that should be made national parks. A lot of those lay on national forest land, and the Forest Service couldn't stand the idea. They came up with their primitive area designation to try to stave off a switch in administration--go apply the park idea to lands within their own jurisdiction.

That primitive area designation had the support of Aldo Leopold. It was a good idea to give this kind of protection to the forests, but it was limited because, as I think James [P.] Gilligan pointed out in what may yet be an unpublished manuscript on the study of wilderness, the Forest Service looked upon wilderness as a temporary designation, to keep forests that might later be merchantable out of other hands and out of development inconsistant with logging until they were ready to log. That was Gilligan's analysis.

The Wilderness Society, Aldo Leopold, Bob Marshall, were all strong advocates of the opportunity of the Forest Service to give this kind of protection to the forests, hoping themselves, I think, that such protection could be made permanent, not really preparing to believe what the Gilligan supposition was, as manifested later. The upshot of it all was that every time the Park Service made a move to the national park system from forest land, the Forest Service came up with an antidote.

So, there was the fighting of the Antiquities Act, the National Park Act, the Forest Service movement under primitive area designation, and, then, in the time of Harold Ickes, when the Park Service was on the move again under his leadership, they came up with wilderness areas--not just land use, but land preservation. They kept each time trying to keep ahead of the Park Service by coming up with stronger preservation of the same lands under Forest jurisdiction. Then, as soon as they succeeded in that, they would waver a bit.

Which is what led to the Wilderness Bill. We wanted something that would give wilderness a stronger kind of protection than that which was represented merely by the signature of the secretary of agriculture, which could be wiped out by a succeeding secretary.

Brower: The secretaries are always, without exception, taking the advice of the Forest Service. The Forest Service would give the position, say what it wanted to do, the secretary would sign it. There was no appeal route. The purpose of the Wilderness Bill, then, was seen by Howard Zahniser of the Wilderness Society early in the game, somewhere in the forties (I learned about it at the tail end of the forties, the Sierra Club, too)*. Its purpose was to have what happened in wilderness be assured of further review than a hearing process and a secretary's unilateral decision. We wanted the matter paraded out in what Joe Penfold called "the goldfish bowl of Congress." We wanted the chance for the public as a whole to be heard.

The sudden need for the Wilderness Bill was underlined by the Forest Service's strange decision in the Three Sisters Wilderness battle in Oregon, where they went into some of the finest country and proposed a logging plan. Rather than put boundaries logically on ridges, where at least you would have skylines that were free of the scars of logging if you were within a wilderness area, they brought the boundary right down to Horse Creek so that one side of the stream would be wilderness, the other side logged.

There were other bad aspects of their plan, but the upshot of it all was that this triggered a lot of organizations across the country to decide that administrative protection alone was not enough. We had to have congressional protection of wilderness; we had to sweep in the wilderness not just in national forest areas, but also in national park areas, where the whole idea that the national park was all wilderness had been destroyed by Park Service administration. We wanted also to provide for a wilderness designation in the wildlife refuges and the Bureau of Land Management lands, and we wanted a National Wilderness Preservation Council with a certain power to try to coordinate the perception of wilderness on all federal lands, or wilderness wherever it might be. This stemmed from the failure of the Forest Service to follow out in practice what it was promising in its various attempts to keep the Park Service's hands off national forest lands.

*See also David R. Brower's foreword to New England's White Mountains: At Home in the Wild (Friends of the Earth, 1978) for an augmented view of the origin.

Multiple Use: Policy for an Empty Land

Brower: Professor Grant McConnell has seriously questioned the multiple-use policy of the Forest Service. David Pesonen questioned it; he said it wasn't really a policy, it was just a question, an enigma. Grant McConnell pointed out, in a good review of it, how the Forest Service multiple-use policy was simply a lack of policy, a refusal to come up with a statement. It was a misreading of what was too easily misread: "the greatest good for the greatest number," almost always forgetting to add, "in the long run," and never defining what the greatest good consisted of. You could not have the greatest good for the greatest number everywhere without sacrificing wilderness for all forever.

I saw the multiple-use policy of the Forest Service as a game of musical chairs of resource users. It was a device by which the Forest Service could pit all but one user against that user if he got out of hand: all of them against the wilderness advocate; or all of them, including wilderness advocates, but not miners, against miners, for example. Whatever user got out of line was to be put upon by the other four or five. That is the multiple-use policy. It is a political device.

Schrepfer: Is that necessarily bad?

Brower: I think it is necessarily bad in what has happened; it would not be bad if there had been a balanced judgment on the part of the Forest Service managers in the first place. But almost all of them, as I came into it, had been trained in timbering.

There was a publication out of Oregon State College Forestry School, published in 1952--a list of all the theses and dissertations in forestry. It went on over the period of the life of the Forest Service and all its key people and who wrote what. There was hardly a mention of wilderness; there was hardly a mention of anything except timber management. Multiple use, then, consisted of timbering plus whatever else didn't get in the way too much.

Schrepfer: So, was it the concept, or the application?

Brower: Well, the concept of multiple use was something that even Forest Service people said, "Well, that wasn't a good name; it should be 'coordinate use.'" Multiple use is a bigamist practice; no wife can be adequately protected. A bad analogy; there must be a good analogy, and I've had better ones in the past. It is an

Brower: escape from policy, and it is an escape from having to do what is best for the land. It is just a political device to get maximum support for what you wanted to do in the first place.

Schrepfer: How would you define multiple use as the Forest Service understands it?

Brower: I just defined it, I think: multiple use, as the Forest Service understands it, is to say on the signs, "land of many uses," and then to make sure, as the initial precept was, that everything in the national forest is for sale, to realize that the primary purpose of the Forest Service is the management of timber and to let nothing get in the way of that.

Schrepfer: But if they hadn't had that original bias toward timber, then perhaps multiple use would have worked?

Brower: Yes, that might be something else. I have said, myself, in various statements in writing and in the course of the acres of testimony on the Wilderness Bill, that wilderness is the highest form of multiple use. That's multiple use in perpetuity. You get a whole series of multiple advantages. You get protection of water; only wilderness can give you pure water; water that comes out of wilderness is good. It gives you recreation that is self-renewing. It gives you a wildlife habitat that is always there. It gives you a genetic reservoir that is always there. It is something that can continue to be managed by the force that brought it all the way from the beginning of life to today without any help from forestry schools or any other kind of latter-day discipline. This is the idea of wilderness. That is the multiple use where you go to learn, not to crop. That is my idea of the highest form of multiple use.

I've also been willing to accept that most forests have got to be logged. We're here; we're going to use the products. But certainly a substantial part can be kept in the bank. We can tithe; we can leave alone, as if it weren't there, large areas of wilderness. If we go through them, they're finished. We would then have to get on with alternatives to the kind of thinking that wiped them out because there would be no more to wipe out. So, why not get on with that kind of thinking, the change in direction, now, pretending that there's only 90 percent of the earth instead of 100 percent to exploit fully. That's part of my overall, constantly reiterated philosophy; leave that wildness for the questions we have not yet learned how to ask; to steal a line directly from Nancy Newhall [in This Is the American Earth, Sierra Club, 1960].

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Brower: The multiple-use concept, when it realizes the value of the lessons that are in natural things, will work. It will not work when the managers of lands on which the multiple uses are to be carried out are preponderantly trained in curricula that have to be designed to train people for jobs that exist. There are few jobs, so far, for people who understand what wilderness is all about, what the full meaning of ecology is, what ecological principles are. There is a dearth of that kind of training because there is a dearth of jobs for the people who would graduate from it.

In forestry schools throughout the country, you still have the problem that they've got to train people in forestry schools who will get jobs managing forests, and the jobs in managing forests are preponderantly in managing the timbering of forests. Therefore, the schools look to the people in industry for the kinds of things they want their future employees trained in, and give that kind of training.

They get the grants and support from forest industries to do that; they get the people who are trained to teach it; they teach the students to do it who go back out and rise up in the industry or forest management to do the same thing again. It's a closed circle. It is a closed circle that has wiped out most of the forests of the United States. It has wiped out the virgin forests, certainly. It has created the kind of nomenclature that calls a virgin forest "old growth," or some other denigrating terms. It talks about snags--whatever the nomenclature needs to be to justify taking a crop. It's the kind of thinking that says clearcutting is good simply because in their basic understanding they know clearcutting is cheaper, and nobody's going to have to pay the deferred costs that will show up a hundred years from now--nobody now making the decision.

Schrepfer: In all of these things with the Park Service and the Forest Service, it's all an economic issue. To change that, it seems to me, would be extremely revolutionary.

Brower: To change that is simply to be conservative, I think, and to stop radical land management. I think that it would be generally accepted in capitalist countries that it is radical to use capital as income--that you keep the capital investment intact, and you live off the income. This has escaped the land managers. They are still, to a man, living off the capital and not off the income. They are destroying the ultimate creator of the forest resource--the soil. The fertility of forest soils under Forest Service management is on a half-life basis.

Brower: They've gone to monoculture without any worthwhile studies at all of how you can make monoculture work in forests when it doesn't work in any other ecosystem. They refuse to face that. I challenge them year after year; they stubbornly refuse to accept the challenge, and they still train people to keep cutting into the capital, the soil fertility, the forest soils that could keep the forests really productive. They use practices that show up well on the year end's financial statement and would show up very poorly on the century's financial statement. But nobody will be here to answer at the end of the century for the failure of their managing what they inherited at the beginning of the century. And that's their escape.

They at least have tried to look ahead ten years at a time in their Timber Resources Review. It was the Timber Resources Review and the name of it that led me to suggest [in 1956] that there should be a Scenic Resources Review conducted on the same basis. That became the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review. But it was taken over by the people we were trying to defend the resources from. It hasn't done what it should do.

There should be a revised one in the new knowledge that we're getting in the context of the almost mid-seventies now, where we've got to address ourselves to managing, if we can, a full land. The policies the Forest Service and the Park Service are now following are policies applicable to an empty land. They haven't learned yet the importance of realizing that the earth is finite. This realization is coming rather rapidly. We've been preaching it--some of us--for a long time.

The year of the environment, 1970-71, really started hitting it strong. There was good progress made in understanding the changes that have to be made in managing resources, or perceiving their importance. The changes succeeded for a while until certain people saw threats to their old ways of thinking. They've recently cancelled a good many of the gains, and they're trying to cancel the rest of them.

The revival of an understanding of the finiteness of the earth is, however, under way. I think the Forest Service is out of touch with it, and so is the Park Service. I think that right now [April 16, 1974] they are primarily out of touch with it because they are working for an administration that doesn't have the foggiest idea of what it is all about; our present secretary of the interior, our present secretary of agriculture don't know what wilderness is.

Brower: President Nixon certainly doesn't. He has not appointed people who are capable of realizing the value of intangibles. That's the position we are in right now. I didn't think it was going to be as bad as it is. I thought that possibly Mr. Nixon had picked up the idea from that year of the environment. He enunciated it in one of his speeches--"it's now or never with environmental protection." I guess he's subsequently decided it's not going to be either, somehow; it's not working. So, that's our problem right now that we've got to work our way out of, in case anybody wonders.

Environmental Ethic for a Finite Earth

Schrepfer: You're asking somebody to be motivated by things other than economics?

Brower: Yes. What needs to happen globally is that we understand that the United Nations Environment Program is the most important program of all. It should have top priority. The environmental programs in the United States likewise should have because you can't even fight a war on a dead planet. Nothing is going to work unless we stop the destructive forces that man has unleashed.

I think we've got to realize three things: that we have only one earth, that it is finite, and that it is unmanageable. We've got to get that last idea through our heads. We are not able to grasp enough of the complex interplay of elements in the global ecosystem to be able to do much but harm. We've gone on somehow thinking that so long as we learn a little bit more about technology we can patch up the harm we just did. But we usually heal one wound by opening two. That's the problem right now. There are good lessons on earth on how to solve it. We've got to go back to look at the natural patterns: what worked? What worked for so long before we got so bright with all our new tools and all the energy to make them do mindless things?

Schrepfer: Gene Marine's book, The Engineering Mentality--man is the manipulator.

Brower: He is. I think that he is quite capable of manipulating himself right off the planet. He is forgetting one of the best bits of advice by Aldo Leopold--the first job of intelligent tinkering is to save all the parts. We are losing them all. We tinker and just forget where we put them or what order they came out in. He [Leopold] thought that the greatest discovery of the century was the complexity of the land mechanism and how it works, how important it is, how absolutely irreplaceable it is, and how we won't make out without it.

Brower: There have been good perceivers of the problem. Muir was one and Leopold was certainly another. There were others in between, and there have been a good many lately. They have not been heard well enough. The knowledge about how to get back into balance exists; the ability to listen to it doesn't.

Schrepfer: But how do they ever get the power to have people listen to them as long as the basic structure is predicated on economic motives?

Brower: The basic structure is predicated on economic power that is predicated on the ecosystem, without which there is no economic power. I think that there is a dawning realization now than an economy won't work without an environment, without an intact ecosystem. Economy must have ecological conscience or it won't continue to exist.

There are a few leaders in economic thinking and the number is growing, maybe about one a month, who are beginning to teach a little bit of the economics that John Stuart Mill understood a century ago. I think there are a few managers of corporations who are understanding that it is not working.

Schrepfer: Do you want to give any names?

Brower: One is Maurice Strong, who gave up his very lucrative economic practice as corporation manager to be executive director of the United Nations Environment Program.

There is Dr. Aurelio Peccei, high in the management circles of Fiat and Olivetti, who formed the Club of Rome and rallied some important people in industry as well as in academia. Reports that are instigated by the Club of Rome, by Professor Jay Forrester, and Donella and Dennis Meadows, Jorgen Randers, William Behrens, and others, have brought a major change in thinking.

There's been enormous resistance. The ability to be adamant and to resist change, possibly one of our virtues, at this point is not so. There are a few who heed; there need to be more. There needs to be an extraordinary patience on the part of the environmental groups in accepting a role that is more than they thought they had to play. In the past they have been understaffed and underfinanced, which will continue, and have seen that their major power was in the veto power. They could say "no" to something, they could complain about something, and then hope that somebody else would fix it.

It is easy to trip somebody up; you can always push somebody on his face if he is not expecting you to trip him. It's very hard to get somebody back up on his feet, pointed in the direction you want him to go, and have him continue that way.

Brower: The environmental organizations have to realize that there's an important obligation, which I think is of overwhelming importance these days. They've got to play the role of the boy scout leading the old lady across the street, or of someone able to lead an addled man out of a burning building. A lot of the management, the making of the decisions, is still in the hands of the old lady, the addled man, who have been making decisions in the ways they were taught and don't realize that the rules have changed while they were making those decisions. They haven't sensed the shift from empty land to full land.

A few people have seen that the rules are changing, and many more need to. Certainly the biggest challenge of all is to the younger people now who've got to live with the consequences. They've got to stop taking the vacation they've been taking for the last two or three years and come back to the job of preparing for a different kind of leadership. How do you lead in a full land? How do you manage an economy that cannot grow the way an economy has grown before, requiring for its growth the expenditure of nonrenewable resource capital. That's what growth, as we have known it, has come out of. There undoubtedly can be other kinds of growth. The natural pattern shows what it is. There can be new growth--there is every spring. Every fall something dies back. For what's new, for every birth, a death. For everything that blossoms, something must wither. Not all at once, but there is a constant area to be filled, and you cannot have things grow so much that they destroy the area they need to grow in.

Schrepfer: So, you would still have industry, manufacture--

Brower: I think we still have to have industry. We still have to have corporations. We've got a system, whether we like it or not, that has a corner on the best administrative and organizational ability, and we've got to use it. The people who have this ability, can, or at least heretofore have been able to, make things run.

The usual environmentalist, the academician, probably can't manage things that well. He can see; he can dream; he can imagine; he can point to errors; he can be the poet. (She can; let's stop this "he" stuff.) All this is possible, but it is going to take change in heart, in management, and I don't know what else.

Schrepfer: I try to envision what a society would look like. What about problems like unemployment?

Brower: I noticed when I was in Nairobi a month ago that there are a lot of people doing things we would not think of doing over here. If they want to work on a road, there are a lot of people with hammers breaking up rocks from big ones to small ones and putting them in place by hand.

Now this isn't exactly the kind of work we need to keep a lot of people busy, but it is the kind of thing that happens when you have people doing things rather than machines doing things. There is a lot of technological unemployment that has come about as we have devised machinery and fed it the energy to have machines do the work people did. A lot of that work is quite disruptive of environmental capital; it tears things up it cannot regenerate.

The opportunity to have people working on things that will heal the earth instead of disrupt it is an enormous opportunity. Step outside and walk around any block in any country, any city, and look at the things you wish could happen. If you wanted any given block in San Francisco to be better, what should happen there? You can begin to think of all kinds of things that could happen that would take human beings working on them.

You can start with the better handling of our waste, and you can go on with a better handling of our old, obsolete structures--not of historic importance, but just badly maintained. You can think of getting rid of the claptrap we put up and putting something that is beautiful in its stead. You can think of taking the overhead wiring and putting it under. You can think of all kinds of things that will keep people busy.

Right now people are kept busy producing a result they don't like, and the economy sustains it. It seems to me people should be kept busy doing things that they will like, and other living creatures as well.

Schrepfer: Would this necessitate a larger government, or a smaller government?

Brower: I don't think it would necessitate a larger government. I think it can be done with quite a bit of decentralization so long as you've got a strong enough leadership in communities to help correct the old habits.

The change is here. You see it. You see the spring of a new era, of a new renaissance, where we recognize not the limitlessness of the earth but the limits of it. We see it in Greenwich, Connecticut, where they turned down a Xerox plant.

Brower: Well, not everybody would turn down Xerox; Greenwich did. We see Petaluma [California] saying they don't want to grow; they've lost in court momentarily, but we'll have to help them win in court. We've seen Napa County [California] voting--given a chance for a plebescite to choose what kind of Napa County they want--and choosing the lowest-growth option. If there had been a no-growth option, they might have chosen that.

You see all kinds of changes here where people are beginning to sense the limits. You see the California Tomorrow plan. Do we want a California 1, which goes on the way we've been going, or do you want a California 2, where we think ahead?

You see John [N.] Cole outlining a new post-industrial-age town in Maine and starting to describe the scene and write about the action in such a town, where we begin to get back to a kind of self-sufficiency--not the self-sufficiency the president is talking about, where we become ignorant of the needs of our neighbors, but one where we try to get by without having to draw too much from the earth. The plan there is one that I hope he will complete and write a book about.

We see what has happened in England where thirty scientists got together and signed the Blueprint for Survival, showing that there are major changes we have to make and there are ways of making it.

We see the need right now, and you'll hear it, for people to stop talking at length in generalities, as I am, and start coming up with specific plans: all right, in this community, here is how you can start to change what you've been doing so that the community will be as attractive a place to live in when you leave as when you came, or even more attractive.

There are specific plans to be made. All I can do, I suppose, is say, "Let's get going on the plans, whatever your field is." If you're a city planner, how do you plan with ecological conscience? If you're going to put up shade trees, if you're going to put up barriers between highways to keep the headlights out of each other's eyes, why not look at the ecological rules.

To illustrate that second one, in the highway department in California, they were putting up between the two one-way highways just a very monotonous barrier of oleander. That seemed to be about the only thing they knew how to plant. Cicely Christy [Bay Area Sierra Club leader], who knows how to landscape, got after the highway department and asked why they didn't look around

Brower: California for the native plants that grow without any watering, that know how to get by with the climate as it is. What's the matter with putting ceanothus, for one thing, in between highway strips? What's the matter with taking a whole series of things that are natives and mixing them up so that one pest can't take them all down? Get diversity, use natives. The highway people are doing it; it's beautiful! We need this kind of application to whatever we're doing.

To make Berkeley get steadily better, we need to resurrect the streams that come out of the hills. Somehow along the line, if we have a master plan for Berkeley, we'll remember where Strawberry Creek used to run, where Codornices Creek used to run, Claremont Creek, and the rest of them. And we can follow the advice, belatedly, a century or two late, of Frederick Law Olmsted (the first) who advocated for the piedmont under the Berkeley-Oakland Hills that we make a park from the foot of the hills to the bay along every stream.

If we'd done that, we'd have a beautiful community. We wouldn't have just this coalesced, homogenized mess. Those streams were beautiful. Trees grew along them. The streams watered the trees--bay trees, oaks, buckeye, a whole series of natives that could handle themselves, poison oak, too. We could have had those as parks. We might begin to rescue those streams. Knowing where the creeks are, we can say, when a house must be replaced, "Don't replace it here." You have a real master plan when you start to build back beauty, to build back openness. You get rid of the Los Angelization that is sweeping the Bay Area.

Potential of the Young: Return to an Ecological Conscience

Schrepfer: What about the young people in the environmental movement?

Brower: The only thing that keeps me optimistic about the environmental movement is what happened, say, last night at San Jose. I make my speech, or something like my speech. Then there is a question period, and I see around a circle of bright young faces, some of them with dreams, some with rather tough questions. That's where the hope is.

I don't see as many as I would like to see, but there are people who, given a chance, given a chance to intern, given subsistence, given the promise of some kind of a job at beginning to put ecological conscience into any field, can make a difference.

Brower: I've seen specifically the people I'm in touch with in Friends of the Earth. I see, to start at home, what my own number one son has done. He's written a lot of books. Between the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth he's edited some ten of the large books. He's written some of his own.

I see what Mark Terry did at twenty-one, writing a book, Teaching for Survival. It didn't get all the distribution it should have had. It needs to be brought up to date so that teachers themselves can see how, in their own examples, they can bring an ecological conscience to the fields the students are going to be learning about.

One of the primary examples is Amory Lovins, who works for Friends of the Earth in the UK. I ran into him in England. He'd submitted a manuscript to us over here, and I liked his writing so much I wanted to meet him. I thought he'd be about forty-five. I met him; he wasn't forty-five. He was a don at Merton College, Oxford going after his D.Phil. in physics. He liked what we were doing in Friends of the Earth so much, he gave up that program. A sacrifice, because a doctorate from Oxford is a union card you can use for a long time, almost anywhere you want to go.

He has since completed four books for us. He's working on another. He'd done extraordinarily good work. He's been attending, as rapporteur and consultant, a good many of the international conventions of think tanks around the world; he has put together the best synthesis I've seen for world energy strategies. It's being picked up as advice all over the world.

I can give you an example; then I'll give the punch line: two years ago we were in Washington attending hearings--an obscure section of important hearings on nuclear reactor safety held in Bethesda, Maryland, and putting out an every-other-daily paper to try to interpret it. Amory Lovins had been leading a boy's group in the mountains of Maine, which he does every summer; he was on his way back to London to work for Friends of the Earth in London and stopped by Washington to help us out. In the course of stopping by, he went around to see some of the physicists he knew in town, settled down to the typewriter about eight or nine at night, wrote through the night. By eight o'clock the next morning, he had produced a ten thousand word analysis of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor proposal which was to be the Friends of the Earth position on it. It was most ably presented. I found, I think, two typographical errors. In the ten thousand words he wrote, I saw two or three places where he might have changed the phrasing a little. This just came out of him, intact in first draft. It was so good that the Bulletin

Brower: of the Atomic Scientists ran it, only slightly shortened, in a subsequent issue.

Well, I've been telling about Amory Lovins. He's now, having been working for us for quite a while, twenty-six. This kind of thing is happening.

We just came back, as I was mentioning earlier, from Nairobi. The U.N. Environment Program was meeting, the non-governmental organizations. Our own group from Friends of the Earth consisted of eight people from six countries. We saw that there was a great big hole in what the non-governmental organizations were expected to do there and wanted to fill it. We wanted a new working group to come up with some sort of a plan for a permanent non-governmental organization function for the United Nations Environment Program. We held the working sessions and came up with something that was listed finally as the most important achievement of the series of meetings.

This working group, which we called "working group zed," was conducted by Peter Hayes. The group had an average of, oh, twenty or thirty people in it, and people of widely varying ages, from many countries, in many colors. Many different crosscurrents of discussion and intent were going on, which Peter Hayes kept completely under control; that is, he sensed what was happening, he kept the whole meeting in good humor, and he kept it on course. He's twenty!

Now, the potential is there. I suppose that most young people don't quite think there's the chance to do what they can do. I keep saying that there is. They've been practicing for this. They're well trained by what they know intuitively. They shouldn't wait too long to take action that will be useful. They should, I think, follow Holly Whyte (that's William H. Whyte, The Organization Man Whyte)--his admonition that we practice retroactive planning, taking action now on what we know viscerally is right, and then conducting a study later to see whether we were right.

We're getting into a very pronounced tendency now to go in for another and another and another study to monitor what's happened. It is as if we were taking the biblical report, "not a sparrow falleth but your heavenly Father knoweth it," and rephrasing it to read, "not a resource falleth but some heavenly U.N. agency knoweth it and duly recordeth it in the resource obituary book." We have to do something besides count things as they disappear and die. We've got to act now to preserve the right for people later on to study.

Brower: This is the thing that I guess Allen Morgan had in mind a few years ago; late in the fifties he said, "What we save in the next few years is all that will ever be saved." Fifteen years later we see he was right. There's very little left to be saved, to study, to learn from of the natural heritage, the encyclopedia of wilderness, of wildness, that we are extirpating just as fast as we can.

So, the admonition to young people who would like to save a place and others is, "Even if we can only put some chairs around the boundary, let's do that to try to save what's inside till we figure out what to do about it sensibly." That's better than other admonitions that seem to have been governing the system too long, like "when in doubt, wear it out," or "cut and leave," or "rip-off a child today,"--"children that aren't born yet won't miss what you take."

The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After

Schrepfer: Now, is there anything else that you want to cover today? What about the results of the Wilderness Act? Was it what you expected?

Brower: Yes. Howard Zahniser and I agreed that if the Wilderness Bill were ever to pass, that would not be the end of a series of problems, but the beginning. It would be the opportunity, however, to encounter these problems. It was Howard Zahniser who used to say, "Let's not call them problems, let's call them opportunities." Pogo may have picked that up without knowing it came from Howard Zahniser when he said, "We're confronted with insurmountable opportunities."

Yes, there are hearings, hearings, hearings. The Park Service dragged its feet. The tenth anniversary of the Wilderness Act is coming up, and the Park Service has been dragging its feet. It has misinterpreted what the intention of it was. The idea, under the Wilderness Act for the national parks, was to have the national parks designate the corridors that they absolutely had to have in the national parks that would be non-wilderness.

The Park Service had been advocating that it did not need a wilderness bill because the national parks were all wilderness, to quote Connie Wirth. Well, we didn't think that the national parks were being administered by Connie Wirth as "all wilderness" at all. Mission 66 was going the other way.

Brower: We wanted to see a minimum of corridor designated--a look ahead to ask, if you want the parks to be all wilderness, what must you sacrifice to give people a chance to experience the key parts of a national park from a road or some other development? But then to say, henceforth and hereafter, that's the end of it. To say in essence, what they have said in spirit, at least, and have followed out in Kings Canyon --only one road. That road comes up into the South Fork Canyon. It goes to Copper Creek, and it stops. That's all. That's all they intend to build in Kings Canyon, and I hope they stick with it. They made that determination in a master plan that I think, has soundness behind it; it can get public support.

We thought that under the Wilderness Act they would indicate minimum corridors. But the Park Service had read it backwards; they took the negative of that. "What enclaves of wilderness shall we save?" asked George Hartzog. That would have left the rest open for development. That's one of the reasons Friends of the Earth was active in urging Mr. Hartzog's removal as director. His was a total misreading of the idea of the Wilderness Act.

The Forest Service has been similarly guilty of a total misreading. They said, "We love wilderness so much that we're setting our standards very high. We want perfect wilderness before we will set it aside." They define perfect in such a way that almost nothing qualifies to be set aside. That's been one of our recent battles with the Forest Service: to get over this requirement of the perfection that is the enemy of the good. I'd rather have a lot of good people around me than wait for one perfect person, who will not materialize.

So, the Wilderness Act, then, has called for a whole series of hearings. It's been uphill work to get the public to be anything but overwhelmed by the great number of hearings in all parts of the country. The Wilderness Society has done preeminent work in trying to keep public interest going, but it's hard to keep broad scale public interest up when there are so many little things going on. The organizing has been extremely difficult. The failure has been, perhaps, in not making some assignments, and saying: "You don't have to watch all of it; you watch this area and let us know if you're really in trouble. Others will watch the other areas. We'll get the people out on guard, and we'll not all try to do the same job at the same time."

Schrepfer: Would you have voted differently, knowing now what you know?

Brower: No, I wouldn't because I think that we wouldn't have anything to have hearings about if we hadn't had the Wilderness Act. At least this put the agencies pretty much on their good behavior--not enough, but otherwise they wouldn't have been on it.

Schrepfer: But, I mean, working out some other system--

Brower: I don't think there's any better system than to have the opportunity to take the battles to Congress, and to have the opportunity to persuade people that they can make a difference. To remind them that the price of liberty is still eternal vigilance. That goes for wilderness. You're never through with the battle.

But, without the Wilderness Act, the battle would have been over. At least the act provided a chance to keep the fight going. I don't know how else it could have been done. I should like to have seen it stronger. Wayne Aspinall certainly weakened it badly. The people in the Forest Service who fought the National Wilderness Preservation Council and got that deleted certainly weakened what it might otherwise have done.

Schrepfer: What was the Forest Service's reaction to the Wilderness Act?

Brower: The Forest Service reaction was bad from the word go. Howard Zahniser and I took mimeographed copies of the first draft of the Wilderness Bill around to the Forest Service for friendly review. We gave it to John Sieker, who was then head of the Division of Lands and Recreation--a friend, we thought. Within twenty-four hours it was in the hands of the principal enemies. That again was the Forest Service playing its musical chairs game. I guess that's the way they're taught. If he hadn't done that perhaps he'd have been fired.

That's a supposition, of course, entirely. But why else would a person you'd think was your friend, whom you asked for his personal reaction while you tried to get ready for broader scrutiny, why should he give it to the enemy? That's what the Forest Service did. And they tried to trip that thing up time and time again, which is one of the things that has disenchanted me with the Forest Service. I kept trying to like them, and they kept making it very difficult.

Forest Service Organization Men

Schrepfer: How about McArdle or certain individuals at the top? I get the feeling McArdle is sort of a figurehead.

Brower: I don't think any chief forester can be anything else. The organization is so tight that it is too good. The people who have wandered up through the training necessary to be ranger,

Brower: supervisor, regional forester, and Chief Forester have been worked over in the Procrustean bed. This is a bit facetious, but as Bob Golden of the Sierra Club used to say, "You can tell Forest Service men: they all hold their pipe in the same hand at the same angle. They all say, 'We're making progress,' spelled P-R-O-G-U-R-U-S."

They will go to a meeting and say, "We like you very much. We want to help you, but you've got to remember there are all these other users." It is their pat speech. They almost plug in a cassette and play it.

Schrepfer: What about Ed Crafts?

Brower: Ed Crafts was probably the brightest person they ever had. He was the man who was going to have been named the chief of the Forest Service following Richard McArdle. His extreme skills, his ability to maneuver, to work over Congress, his cleverness, his good footwork were so frightening that we were afraid that any attempt at preservation would be put back for a long, long time if he were made the chief of the Forest Service. I think that it was Justice [William O.] Douglas and I who blocked the appointment. Douglas arranged for me to see a man in the White House (whose name escapes me) who was in the position to okay or block, and blocked. McArdle doesn't know it; Crafts doesn't know it.

When Crafts' appointment was blocked, Ed [Edward P.] Cliff thereupon became the successor. Ed Crafts was quite disillusioned by the failure to get what he was sure was going to be his and was thus able to be available for Stewart Udall's selection as the first director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. Stewart Udall thought that was the best appointment he ever made.

Schrepfer: Well, how about as the first director of the bureau?

Brower: He's been very good, but there he had to fashion his own bureau and start making that as effective as he could. He didn't have the massive, terribly, frighteningly efficient machine of the Forest Service supporting him.

The Forest Service organization is really extremely tight. The book on the forest ranger by [Herbert] Kaufman, published by Resources for the Future*, describes the training that the forest ranger goes through that prepares him for this. He is the organization man's organization man. And if he isn't, he isn't going to make it.

My first startling example of that was what happened to Frank Craighead when he was brought into the Forest Service--to the delight of the wilderness lovers and other conservationists--to conduct a wildlife study for the Forest Service and a recreation study following the recommendation made by Sam Dana [Dean Samuel T. Dana].

*The Forest Ranger, A Study in Administrative Behavior, Johns Hopkins, 1960.

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Brower: He was put in a remote corner of the South Agriculture Building without secretarial help. We soon learned he had practically no budget for travel to get to the various conferences where his advice was needed and where he could seek information directly from the various organizations around the country.

I don't remember right now how long he stayed with it, continuing to hope that something would come of the appointment, but he soon concluded that it was primarily eyewash for the Forest Service and resigned. That was disappointing to the conservationists on the wildlife side of the conservation movement--that a man so good would be given that treatment.

I think that's probably the story of Frank Craighead. From there on we pick him up following grizzly bears all over under a different aegis.

Schrepfer: On the television I see. [laughter]

Brower: By telemetry. [A system the Craighead twins, John and Frank, used on grizzlies, by which temporarily tranquilized bears were fitted with radio transmitters and their peregrinations logged from a safe distance.--DRB, 5/24/79]

VI CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE FOREST SERVICE

Deadman Summit: The Final Disillusionment

Schrepfer: Would you like to discuss briefly the logging of the bristlecone in the Mammoth Pass area?

Brower: Yes. It was logging of the Jeffrey pine, not bristlecone. There was some careless treatment of the bristlecones after my attempt to get a Bristlecone National Monument in the White Mountains, east of the Sierra. The Forest Service headed it off. That's a separate story. I went to the Interior Department to try to get a national monument established [under the Antiquities Act]. The Forest Service thereupon moved rapidly to designate a Bristlecone Pines natural area set up at its own discretion.

The logging around Mammoth Pass, near Deadman Summit, that we were opposed to was the attack, for its limited timber resource, on the finest example of Jeffrey pine that existed along the entire stretch of Highway 395 [and probably anywhere]. There were once some good Jeffrey pine forests in eastern Oregon, but those were logged.

I remember at one point Herbert Stone, who was the regional forester for the northwest region, was praising our Mammoth Pass forest of Jeffrey pine and saying that it should be saved. But the California region had different ideas. So, that's where we got into a long controversy [in the early fifties], and that's the place my disillusionment with the Forest Service began in earnest. I had been apprehensive in the Kings Canyon Park battle, but here I saw just out-and-out distortion and trickery at work.

One of the people who was trying hard to save the Mammoth Pass Jeffrey pines was John Haddaway, who ran a small manufacturing business, making tiny pumps, at Mammoth Lake. He was intensively

Brower: interested in saving them, and proposed an Inyo Craters National Monument to protect the craters on the east side of the Sierra--the Inyo Craters as well as the Mono Craters--in a comprehensive recreational area with National Monument protection under the jurisdiction of the Park Service. He talked to Horace Albright about that and also to the Sierra Club.

The Forest Service was determined to provide the Inyo Lumber Company with enough timber that they could show their multiple-use program as succeeding in the Inyo National Forest. The scenic and recreational value of that forest is extraordinary. It was something that millions of people could drive through on Highway 395. There was the possibility for good recreational development and for saving these big old trees.

It was a fairly uniform aged stand. It exists because of the lowness of the Sierra crest at that point, around Mammoth; and the moist air comes through and waters them. If you fly over it you'll find that the rain shadow extends far east of Mammoth Pass. That rain shadow is well populated with Jeffrey pine.

The attempt to put in the roads and to take out the biggest and the most spectacular of the trees was something we resisted hard. The Forest Service was using every device they could to get into those trees and to cut them. It finally succeeded.

I remember in the early part of the Sierra Club study, about 1953, that I went at the invitation of the Forest Service on a show-me trip. They were to show me what their plans were for the Deadman Summit area. I went a day early, and John Haddaway, who had been telling us about some of the things that the Forest Service was doing, gave me a show-me trip the day before and let me see the destruction caused by the logging.

The Forest Service on the following day showed me some very modest little piles, very carefully worked over, and said, "This is what John Haddaway is complaining about." Of course it wasn't. It was something they had tidied up for the little show-me tour. It had nothing to do with the destruction, which they were not showing me at all.

In the arguments in the course of that trip, they found out that I didn't like what they were doing very well. So then they told other Sierra Club directors, "Dave Brower doesn't want any trees cut at all." I'd never said any such thing. I found out at that point what I had learned a little bit about them in the Kings Canyon battle and then shortly after that in the San Gorgonio battle--that they were good manipulators of public opinion. I've written quite a bit about that.

Brower: They conducted a war of personal attacks on Haddaway. We had a good story written up on the situation at Deadman Summit and the threat that was posed to it by the Forest Service. It was written for the Sierra Club Bulletin Annual by Hal Roth, who was quite on the Haddaway side and on the Sierra Club side in trying to preserve this forest. We had it set in page proof, and sent page proof to our supporting organizations.

I had not intended to run the article but saw this as a way to get some reaction. It was a stronger article than we might have run eventually. We got a strange reaction. It was immediately on the Forest Service's desk. About two or three of our friends [laughter] got it right over to the Forest Service. The conservation net was not as solid as we thought. It confirmed what I had felt: that the American Forestry Association was one of the outfits that was not going to be helpful to us in trying to get the Forest Service to treat this particular piece of land properly.

There were further show-me trips to other members of the Sierra Club board, particularly to Alex Hildebrand and to Harold Bradley. The Forest Service did persuade them, and the Sierra Club's position in opposition to this logging was eroded. The logging went forward, and the idea of a national monument dropped.

The forest has now been irrevocably damaged. It was a virgin forest, and it's no longer that. The promise of Forest Service recreational development was a false promise; it was not carried out. They were talking about how they had to cut these trees to control the infestations of pine beetles that were threatening. They of course naturally managed--as I was pointing out then--to cut the trees that were easy to get to, but they didn't cut the trees that were on the steeper slopes where there was just as much hazard from beetle infestation as anywhere else. It was just the usual well-tried and well-proved system for persuading people that a virgin tree was an ugly thing--that it was going to grow old anyway and was going to be a source of pests and a nuisance. It could fall on people and subject the Forest Service to tort claims, as well. So it must be cut and turned into lumber. The public relations program has been worked out for a long time.

It is certainly important to harvest trees. The argument is, Where do we harvest them and where do we leave the place alone to its own devices? I thought then, and I think still, that the superb examples of forest should be left as superb examples of forest, where you tiptoe in and tiptoe out. You don't take your logging roads and logging trucks in, and your chainsaws. You see what happens.

Brower: There need to be generous examples of this kind of forest left. We need to get our wood products from areas that are not of such scenic or ecological importance, where we can go back over the millions of acres that have been logged and have never been properly restocked and make a major effort in which the timber companies and the conservationists should join to get the forests restocked. It's several million acres on the West Coast here, about six or seven million acres that should be restocked. Those should be supplying the commercial timber, and not the last wilderness.

Schrepfer: Do you think the Forest Service really knows how to restock successfully?

Brower: Yes, I think they do, but it takes a budget. It's hard to get that kind of money. It's labor intensive and a good thing to do if we need a lot of employment. You put the trees out and then you've got to take some care because the whole ecosystem has been changed so drastically by the kind of cutting undertaken in the first place. That again is one of the troubles with clearcutting. You take the entire canopy away; you change the heat balance of the surface of the earth. There are things that cannot be done any more except gradually. You have to go through a long painful step, generation by generation, to build up enough cover that the trees can begin slowly over the centuries to restore what was clearcut.

Schrepfer: Why was the Forest Service so adamant about cutting these pines?

Brower: They, I think, wanted to have a financial balance sheet that looked good for every national forest and for every ranger district. The Inyo Forest did not have a major market. It did have the Inyo Lumber Company, which would take those beautiful Jeffrey pines and make apple boxes out of them. That gave them a bit of revenue for that district, which looked good. Every time the Forest Service office or the Department of Agriculture would ask for a better showing and more revenue from the Forest Service, they could always cut more trees and sell them a little harder and get a better balance sheet--measured economically, but not measured ecologically.

Schrepfer: So, they were victims of a bureaucratic setup?

Brower: I think they were. They were victims of the bureaucratic setup, and they were victims of the circular reasoning that goes on when the people who manage the forests are taught by the people who want them to manage the forest in a certain way; that is, to produce timber primarily. The support for the forestry schools and the grants for research come primarily from the industry.

Brower: There are no major conservation grants given to the Forest Service to study how to leave wilderness alone, how to control the selling of it, how to be restrained. There's no money to come from this in the short range. This does not generate grants; it does not generate chairs in forestry schools. So the circle doesn't get broken. The timber managers teach the timber managers to manage timber. The other uses get short shrift. You have but to look at the curricula of any of the forestry schools in the United States to find that the courses that would instruct you about the whole forest ecosystem are not required. But you do need to know a lot about forest engineering--how to get the roads in and the trees out, sparing damage as much as is economically feasible.

Schrepfer: Would you see this incident as a dividing point in the Sierra Club's history?

Brower: It was a dividing point, I think, in my history. It did disillusion me enough that I was looking hard at everything the Forest Service did ever after. That led into the next major battle. We were going to have battles about what happened on the Kern Plateau in the Southern Sierra, about the attempt the Forest Service was making to push through a road across Mammoth Pass so they could get more easily at the timber west of the summit, about the resistance of the Forest Service to extensions of national parks everywhere, particularly, because that was becoming quite traumatic in the North Cascades of Washington, and then, more particularly in the Volcanic Cascades of Oregon, and then in other regions.

The attempt of the Forest Service to precommit lands that were still wild, where there were still virgin wilderness forests left, by making early sales and getting right into the heart or near the boundary of some adjoining area and spoiling the attempt to make a good wilderness--that effort of the Forest Service to me is a very cynical thing. They were conducting a war in behalf of the timber harvest, and wilderness be damned.

As noted before, James Gilligan pointed out in his 1953 doctoral dissertation on national forest wilderness administration [University of Michigan]--that the Forest Service was merely using wilderness as a holding device, so that benign interests could not get into wilderness to make it more difficult and more expensive for them to commit it to timber when they were ready to. It was a cynical treatment of one of the most important resources the world has, and certainly one of the most important in the United States.

Brower: They have not retreated from that approach. They still treat wilderness as a nuisance. Right now one of our big battles in saving wilderness is the Forest Service's tactics and strategy on eastern wilderness where, in order to keep enough wilderness from being set aside they set such high standards of perfection that little qualifies.

Schrepfer: Aren't they getting worse?

Brower: They're certainly getting worse now. They're getting worse under the current miserable conservation leadership. The Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Butz, is a conservation disaster. I don't know of anything that really qualifies him for that office. He doesn't know enough about how to handle the fertility of the land, the agriculture that is so important now to the world, and he has never given any evidence that I know of of knowing what a national forest is about.

I'm making an extreme statement. I'm not into this as close as I used to be by a long way, but I've seen nothing encouraging emanate from Mr. Butz and the people that have been appointed in the current administration.

It is all obvious in what happened in the Timber Supply Act, where the administration urged getting into the national forests faster; so did the timber companies, the logging companies, the pulp companies, the Forest Service, and the Department of Agriculture. Congress voted it down two-to-one, but then by administrative fiat the president and all his agencies have reversed the will of Congress and the public. They're as bad as we've had.

Schrepfer: Let me ask you a question here about the Mammoth Pass incident. Didn't the Sierra Club take a position then?

Brower: It took a position that was too little too late. They came up with a forest policy which was about three years in the making. We went into meeting after meeting. One of the main problems was that Bestor Robinson, a very influential member of the board of directors, was also a member of the advisory board to the California region of the Forest Service.

It was his performance in that advisory capacity, as well as his performance when he was chairman of the advisory board on conservation to the secretary of the interior, that made me worry about the usefulness of advisory boards. I saw them as a device, through flattery, to take key conservation people, feed them a little private information, tell them not to spread it around, and make them support the agency rather than the organization.

Brower: that they were drawn from. This happened again and again with Bestor in the battles we got into, whether it was on the Dinosaur or Grand Canyon dams, or the San Jacinto tramway, or the San Gorgonio development for skiing, or the attempt to save the Kern Plateau, or the Mammoth Pass forest. It was always the same thing.

Schrepfer: Wasn't there a resolution passed by the Sierra Club?

Brower: The specific action let the forest be spoiled [see p. 85]. The ultimate club resolution was its national forest policy [passed in 1960], weakened in its structure because of Bestor Robinson's continued arguing against what should happen. We nevertheless came up with a fairly good series of criteria for forest management, but nothing ever came of it. We spent hours and hours of meeting time in getting the words right. Alex Hildebrand led in trying to get it to say the right things. It called for a major restriction of the Forest Service's freedom to operate without public hearings. We wanted not only wilderness, not only timber land, but we wanted some reserves, and we wanted some recreation areas set up not as a convenient excuse for logging, which was what was happening at Mammoth, but as a place where we would allow a certain amount of mechanized access not allowed in wilderness, but still save the setting.

The Forest Service regulations, then under regulation U3 for recreation areas, were weak and subject to the administrative whim, in effect, of the district ranger. That is, if he really wanted to do something, he could do it; he would get it ratified at each of the succeeding levels. So, the club's forest policy reads well but has had no effect so far as I can see, on the Forest Service; the Sierra Club has not gone back to it to govern its subsequent actions.

The Sierra Club has nevertheless done some other good things in litigation in trying to square the Forest Service away, and I wish them well.

The O and C Land Exchange and Attempts to Restrict Brower,
1959-60

Schrepfer: Didn't some people in the Forest Service feel that you were not nice enough to the Forest Service?

Brower: They felt strongly enough about my stands on trying to get some of the important scenic areas saved from the chainsaws that they tried to get me ousted. They failed, but they did succeed

Brower: [in 1959] in getting a very restrictive regulation through the Sierra Club board, where I was not supposed to criticize government agencies or individuals.* I had been criticizing them, and it was now against Sierra Club policy to continue. It was, nevertheless, all right to criticize the Bureau of Reclamation. But not the Forest Service. And not, too much, the Park Service. The Forest Service had done a lot of quiet lobbying on our board, particularly with Dick Leonard, Elmer Aldrich, and Bestor Robinson, which led to passing this gag rule. Also this resolution had in it certain restrictions on legislative activity, which hampered the Sierra Club. That's where some of the sharp differences began to develop.

This was the followup of a fairly dramatic effort that I dreamed up and Harold Bradley signed as Sierra Club president to have a massive land exchange between Interior and Agriculture. Interior was to give the Oregon and California forest lands in Oregon--the O and C lands, so called--to the Forest Service for administration and also certain of the Bureau of Land Management lands in Alaska and elsewhere, in exchange for areas of primary scenic importance under Forest Service jurisdiction, which would then go to Interior for consideration for national parks.

This was to include a North Cascades National Park of adequate size, an Oregon Volcanic National Park, so that Oregon could have something besides its Crater Lake postage stamp in the park system. It would include part of the Oregon Dune Seashore, which is under Forest Service inhibitions. It would have included a Sawtooth National Park and a Wind River National Park. It would have included enlarging Rocky Mountain National Park and also Grand Canyon, so that the forests on the North Rim would not be logged. They would be a part of what they should be--a part of that great exhibit.

That proposal got support from conservation organizations all over the country. The proposal was in the Sierra Club Bulletin at that time [February, 1959]. It was suggested that many national monuments could then be set aside by presidential proclamation, the process by which a good many national parks had been attained --the national monument route--and later, when Congress had time to do something about it, by Congressional action to designate them as national parks.

*See Appendix A for text of resolution.

Brower: There was pretty good support for this in the Interior Department. But the Bureau of Land Management did not want to see any of its land lost; that's a natural reaction. And the Department of Agriculture sort of panicked. They set then Assistant Secretary of Agriculture [Ervin L.] Peterson on the road to take this proposal apart and to call it a land grab; that is to say, that to have public land go from one agency to another in the interests of proper jurisdiction, or the best, most efficient jurisdiction, they chose to call a land grab.

It was in this situation that they undertook to get rid of Brower. I later came up with something that was pretty hard-hitting, very hard-hitting--what was known for a while as Outdoor Newsletter, no. 6 [August 22, 1960]. It may still be known as that. It was a Sierra Club publication. It was a major plea for a national park in Oregon. Oregon has fewer national parks than almost anybody, only Crater Lake, when it has an extraordinary array of shining mountains from Mount Hood to Mount Jefferson, the Three Sisters--quite an array--that we wanted to see treated better than Mount Shasta had been treated in California.

Mount Shasta was one of our great peaks, but it was practically skinned alive. They went right up to the timberline, and they wrecked it. The timber industry wrecked the chance of ever making a national park of Mount Shasta. It's a beautiful peak, and we could see that the plans were to repeat in Oregon, on each one of those great volcanic peaks, the disaster of Mount Shasta.

David Simons came up with a proposal. We were trying to get a good Oregon Volcanic Cascades National Park. The Outdoor Newsletter was a major presentation of the mistakes in forest practices and the brainwashing tactics of the Forest Service. It was a hard attack on the Forest Service, and it was brought up to Seattle for distribution before a World Forestry Congress then going on.

This put the foresters into quite a swivet, to have this attack on the Forest Service launched right on their doorstep, and Chief Forester McArdle wrote a hot letter to then president of the Sierra Club, Nathan Clark. But Nate Clark was totally supportive of this because we knew what the Forest Service by this time was up to, and we resisted their attack. The response from Nathan Clark to McArdle is quite a chapter in the history of the Sierra Club-Forest Service relations.

[The following was added in response to the editor's requests for clarification of dates and sequence: The problem on sequence is my problem. I take the blame. I did not have dates and

Brower: documents at hand in the widely spaced sessions and overlaps and misremembering of dates have resulted. My date machine got fuzzy and (or) rusty.

I now think, my memory partly refreshed, that this is the sequence:

February 1959 The Great Exchange Program. See February 1959 Sierra Club Bulletin (SCB)

October 1959 The Oregon Volcanic Cascades NP Proposal.
See October 1959 SCB

December 1959 The board of director's restrictive resolution.

1960: The Sierra Club Foundation finally formed to unstick our legislative restriction (December resolution).
The books pushed.

August 22, 1960 The Outdoor Newsletter No. 6 followed by a blistering letter from McArdle responded to by a strong defense by then Sierra Club President Nathan Clark --DRB 9/78]

I would like to see that all brought out in a publication of its own some day. All those details we thought were going to be important to have out and before the public in the course of our battles for the North Cascades and the Volcanic Cascades. We took a few prizes out of that whole effort, but very few. As I fly up and down the coast now, I can only regret that people of the determination of David Simons didn't keep on the job.

(David Simons died at the age of twenty-four in an army camp --hepatitis or worse--massive liver damage brought about by the army's spraying the barrack in which he lay ill.) We didn't have the single-focused energy of one person that is needed for almost any of these victories. Somebody has to be keeping the store. David Simons was the guy, I think, who could have saved the Cascades in Oregon.

As I fly over it now I regret anew that we lost him, and we lost the chance. You could still get a fairly good boundary set up, and perhaps in a hundred years, when some of the damage the Forest Service has done has started on its way to recovery, we'd be glad that at least we got the boundaries there. Right now I keep coming back to the same descriptive adjective--mangy mountains. Oregon's Cascades look as if they were diseased. It's just spots and spots of treeless, uncared-for places. It's sad what did happen.

Brower: "Vindictive cutting" is what I used to call it in my inflammatory way. They would go way in, far beyond where they needed to cut, just to pre-commit an area so that the park people couldn't make a park. It was a spoiler cut. So, you see, my bitterness is still here. I'm still sad that an agency that is supposed to be thinking of all the people--managing the forest for all of them--is still primarily interested in managing the forests for the timber industry.

Schrepfer: Do you recall if you ever impugned the motives of Forest Service officials?

Brower: I don't know if I ever impugned the motives. I certainly would have said, and do say now, that their motives are primarily stimulated by the desire to get timber out of the forests. If they're proud of it, they don't call it impugning; if they're not, they would say, "I've been impugned." But, I think that nobody can operate in any political situation, or any situation where he is trying to anticipate or influence what anyone else does, without trying to understand what that person does and why, without letting people know that this is the interpretation. I will impugn the motives of the oil companies about now. I think they want our money.

Schrepfer: Well, what I meant was more honesty or dishonesty.

Brower: I don't think that we ever charged them...Well, let's see; I'd have to go back. I certainly was very critical of the games they were playing--such blatant dishonesty as what they pulled in Mammoth Lakes, saying that John Haddaway had claimed they were doing something and they weren't because "look, here's where it is." And they simply avoided showing me what I had seen, that John Haddaway was talking about. It wasn't conceivable that they didn't know what they had been logging. That was, I think, blatant dishonesty. To claim that I had said that I didn't want a single tree cut was dishonesty. So, I guess I thought some of them--not all of them--were dishonest. There were some good people in the Forest Service, but they weren't high enough in the echelons to make the important decisions.

Schrepfer: That's in Region Five, too, and what I know of Forest Service Region Five is that people in it have been or become much more aware of recreational needs and watershed needs because there haven't been that many good logging opportunities in California.

Brower: Yes. There are still quite a few logging opportunities, and the Forest Service is still adamant about not saving enough of the Kern Plateau. They are still going into a forest that has a

Brower: very slow recovery rate, again to build part of the economy of a local mill or two at the deprivation of generations of people who will not know how beautiful that forest was.

The Kern Plateau, which is what Martin Litton called the gentle wilderness, does not have mountains standing on its head, but you can wander around there with little children. There are no streams big enough for them to drown in, there are no cliffs to fall over. It is a gentle wild place, and we need that sort of thing. Los Angeles needs it more than anybody, I think.

The North Cascades National Park Proposal

Schrepfer: Do you want to go on with the North Cascades?

Brower: All right, I guess we were almost there, weren't we?

Schrepfer: I don't know whether you want to talk about J. Herbert Stone as an individual or not, but he was the one, I gather, who originally outlined the Glacier Peak Wilderness proposal [February, 1959].

Brower: He made the first government proposal. The Mountaineers and the Sierra Club cooperated in making a Glacier Peak Wilderness proposal, and then David Simons came along, along with Grant McConnell, to come up with a North Cascades National Park proposal.

The Simons proposal--I'll call it that--was about a million acres and incorporated the good avenues into the North Cascades. The Forest Service was going along slowly before that in doing anything at all. It set aside a limited area, which meant they were just reserving judgment until later. When they came up with a proposal for what might be a Glacier Peak wilderness, it was what David Simons called the starfish wilderness, or wilderness on the rocks. It saved the peaks and ridges on which there weren't any trees and there was a lot of ice, but didn't do anything about the corridors coming in. It was the corridors that were the living space, that were the setting, where you would stay and live and enjoy yourself and look up at the peaks. Very few people wanted to camp up on top. So the Forest Service proposal was heavily ridiculed.

We had some difficulty in the Northwest getting some of the northern organizations, including the Mountaineers, to be for a Northern Cascades National Park. We had difficulty getting the

Brower: Sierra Club to do it with the Forest Service pressing on our directors. But we did finally get a Sierra Club resolution for a North Cascades National Park [January, 1963], and the National Parks Association joined.

There was still reluctance on the part of others, and certainly the Wilderness Society stayed back, because they were after the Wilderness Bill and didn't want to antagonize the Forest Service unnecessarily.

Schrepfer: Could you say that the change in position was caused by Stone?

Brower: Yes, Stone made it possible for the Mountaineers to support the park. His proposal was so ridiculous that they saw what they were up against. They didn't like what the Park Service was doing in lots of places. The Park Service had certainly allowed overdevelopment and was advocating overdevelopment in the Olympics, they thought and I thought, and on Rainier and in Yosemite and in other of the parks. So they were frightened by the Park Service, which seemed to have forgotten its role of preserving wilderness and to have taken on a role of getting big house counts instead. They were worried about what would happen to a national park in the North Cascades, with the Park Service probably wanting to put a road across Cascade Pass, or a road around Lake Chelan, or something of the sort that would overdevelop the whole place.

We tried to say that the alternative is not whether you have what you have now, or a park; it's what you're going to get if you don't have a park. It's going to be a sea of stumps where you don't want them. It's going to be a whole series of logging roads with pre-commitment of the land. Stone's proposal was the giveaway. All the promises that the Forest Service had been making were seen to be shallow at that point, with that starfish proposal.

To get quickly to the end, the Simons proposal for a national park is still what should be the national park. The North Cascades National Park we got has a little bit of what we needed, but not much. We were hoping that the northern part could be a North Cascades Primitive Area on up to the Canadian border, and that eventually we might get an overall international park combination of Manning Park in British Columbia, tied in with a jurisdictional understanding about what would happen in the North Cascades Primitive Area, tied in eventually to the Glacier Peak National Park. That would encompass that whole area and save, among other things, the principal scenic assets we thought, of the Glacier Peak region--Miners Ridge. There you have one of

Brower: those extraordinary experiences--what Ansel Adams would call "one of the great gestures of the earth."

The country north of that has some fine peaks, good challenges to mountaineers; and in Beaver Creek, which is threatened by the raising of Ross Dam, it has some extraordinarily beautiful scenery that I know about without having seen it. The area that David Simons was talking about is the area that still needs national park protection. Until it gets it, it's not going to have any safety at all.

Schrepfer: Isn't it in a wilderness area?

Brower: It's in a wilderness area, but it's not protected from the biggest threat right now, which is the proposed copper mine on Miners Ridge. The area is still susceptible to that encroachment, and there is nothing in the law to prevent it, at least until 1984.

Schrepfer: Before the national park was actually created, there was a series of study-team reports. That was a novel approach for Interior and Agriculture at that time to try to get together--

Brower: This was the result of the interest of Stewart Udall in the North Cascades and his trying to get something done about it.

Schrepfer: Is that the Treaty of the Potomac?

Brower: Yes. Before Stewart Udall became secretary of the interior, when he was still a congressman from Arizona, but when he was working hard to become secretary, I dropped in on him. He invited my support of his being named secretary, and I did the few things I knew how to do and tried to help and built a good relationship then that still exists.

I had been on the opposite side of Stewart Udall in the Colorado River Storage Project--the Glen Canyon Dam and all that. He was a strong advocate of dams in Echo Park and the Upper Colorado. But he was going through a change--hadn't gone through it yet.

He gave me a list he had received from Connie Wirth, of the Park Service, of the areas that Connie thought should be considered for parks for America's future. I said, "Well, there's just one big omission here, and that's the North Cascades." I had talked to the Park Service a great deal--we all had--about getting that as a park, and we thought that the Park Service was going to try to help us achieve it, but here was this list to the forthcoming secretary of the interior, and no North Cascades.

Brower: So, I began talking North Cascades to Stewart Udall intensively then. It was that that led him to work hard when he was secretary of the interior to get the Treaty of the Potomac, to get the Forest Service and the Park Service to sit down together under the auspices of Ed Crafts' Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. [loud noise from P.G.&E. substation behind FOE headquarters on Commercial Street, San Francisco] That's P.G.&E. making the noise; they're trying to undermine the interview! [laughter]

So, the team did carry out a study. Ed Crafts was taking evidence from both sides. He had lots of friends in the Forest Service. He knew the combination to all the safes there and had the keys to all the locks. Now that he was in Interior, he could, with special support from Stewart Udall, work hard on the Park Service.

The study team came up with a report [1965] that had some good things in it. It still missed the really important elements that David Simons's study had been talking about. I'm sorry that so much was missed and that we ended up on the compromise that didn't put enough in the park and left too much under the threat of Bear Creek Mining Company, the subsidiary of Kennecott Copper.

At least it was a good report. There were some dangerous ideas proposed, I thought, including those by Owen Stratton, a good guy, very helpful professor of sociology at Wellesley, who was on the advisory team. He wanted a lot of funicular access to the peaks as an antidote to roads. We didn't want either. I think we thought then, and still think, that one of the ideas in a wilderness national park is that you get to the edge, but if you want to get to the best of it, you've got to earn it. And if you can't earn it, well, just feel sorry for yourself and leave it for someone else, people who will have the ability to earn it on through the ages. That's what parks are about; that's what the park act contemplated. So, we were opposing a lot of Pete Stratton's ideas about what should happen. I think we still have to keep watching over such proposals. We're not through with it yet.

A great deal of the intensive interest in what happens there now, of course, is in the very capable hands of the North Cascades Conservation Council, of which Pat Goldsworthy has been president for a good many years. Phil Zaleski was president. I have been on its board ever since it started, and Grant McConnell and I helped it get started.

In the early days, Phil Zaleski was one of the people who didn't think the Park Service should have the North Cascades. He was very worried about the Park Service. He was one of the key

Brower: people who was persuaded by Herb Stone that we needed a national park.

Schrepfer: The report was better than the final product by quite a bit, wasn't it?

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: So, what happened to it?

Brower: What happened in the final struggles there I don't know too much about because, for all the interest I'd had in what was going on, I was getting into other major struggles. The Grand Canyon battle preempted a lot of my time, and then I was getting into other aspects where I was not watching that so closely, since the North Cascades Conservation Council and the Mountaineers were watching it. I was watching things that I thought needed attention more.

Schrepfer: What about some of the people who were involved? You mentioned Udall and Ed Crafts; how about Henry Jackson?

Brower: Henry Jackson held some hearings in 1966. He was doing, I guess, the necessary political job of hearing both sides and trying to keep everybody as happy as possible in what was happening. I think that he did want to see a national park created and without his support we would have found it difficult to get one.

Schrepfer: What do you think of Jackson as a conservationist?

Brower: I think he could do a lot better than he is doing, but he was good on the Cascades and the Grand Canyon, and quite a few others.

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Brower: He was helpful on the Wilderness Bill. But he was certainly bad on Vietnam, bad on the SST, bad on the Alaska pipeline. And, I think, without possibly intending to be bad, he is probably about to be bad on land use. He is one of the leaders on land-use legislation. But he spoke to a group recently in Spokane at the environmental symposium that was opening, Expo '74. He was telling them that in the next fifteen years or so we're going to have to build as much as we've built in all our previous history.

Whether it was fifteen years or between now and the year 2000, it doesn't matter. If anybody starts planning on that kind of future for the country and then takes steps to reserve the land for this kind of explosion of building, there cannot possibly

Brower: ...be good land-use planning. That's just an overcommitment to construction. That's too much of an attack on the natural systems that we do require to support us.

That is something that worries me, and it worried other people there. They didn't criticize the statement when it arrived from his lips, but later in the session one of the conservationists from England said, "You've heard Senator Jackson call for this much development by so many years from now, and I think it's utter nonsense." The audience applauded his appraisal.

And it is nonsense, but it's going to take a lot of persuasion on the part of people who think they know some things about the ecological facts of life to get Senator Jackson to change. It is this commitment on his part to this kind of development that has led to his commitment to allow Puget Sound to suffer the oil spills that would come from processing Alaska oil, to his support for the Alaska pipeline, and to other things that I think are, some of them, major environmental threats. But, that's on beyond; that's Jackson.

I said when I was up in Spokane that I would write a letter to him about this; I haven't written it yet. I still think I ought to.

Schrepfer: Are you friendly with him?

Brower: I think that he tries to be friendly. Anybody running for president tries to be friendly to as many people as possible. He saw me sitting in the front row after his speech, and he came on down to say hello and that he'd see me later. So, I should send him a letter and tell him about the applause for the person who said he was speaking nonsense, because I think he ought to know.

Schrepfer: The Pacific Northwest is not all that development-minded.

Brower: I don't think it is at all. I think that it, again, has a San Francisco syndrome at work. Seattle and freeways and San Francisco and freeways are getting the same message: this isn't the way you help your city; this is the way you destroy it.

Schrepfer: I don't think Los Angeles has gotten that message. [laughter]

Brower: No, poor communications. They're too far apart to talk to each other.

War: Environmental Causes and Effects

Schrepfer: You said something that is intriguing that I think right now we should at least try to follow up. You mentioned Jackson's stand on the Vietnam War. It seems to me that during the sixties the anti-war movement and the environmental movement ran a sort of parallel course and were closely intertwined. Do you think they had common elements, common roots?

Brower: I do. My own interpretation, my handy-dandy rule of what causes all the trouble, is that wars are caused by territoriality, by the scrambling around for resources. When resources are badly managed and preempted by people, other people get envious and start fighting wars. Now that sounds pretty simple, and I think that it is just about that simple.

Right now we're setting the course for the last scramble over what's at the bottom of the cornucopia. We've been using up so many things, we've had so much in the developed countries and in particular in the overdeveloped countries, chiefly our own, that we have done nothing but create a monstrous amount of envy all over the world. There's dissatisfaction with the inequity of it all, and that feeds war. It always has, and I think feeds it now, when we can't afford war any more. The tools are too good. (We never could afford it.)

It's not a very profound statement, but I do believe that there is an environmental cause for war--that you mistreat the environment, and you want to get somebody else's to substitute for what you had. You want control. You want a new kind of colonialism.

Right now our colonialism that we're trying to inflict on the world is technology. Our technology is demanding of resources. We need resources that other people should have for their own development and sustenance, but it's more important to us that we have it for our sustenance, and let them have less. That seems to be our whole philosophy. Right now we're in a hurry with supertankers and superports to suck the world's oil our way, to go on using a third or more of it.

Schrepfer: So then, both were revolts against preemption of material and dominion by the United States that many, particularly young people, were revolting against.

Brower: I think they were, and I think they probably still are. I don't know. Here you could get into whether the hypotheses are what happened. You need a philosopher, I suppose, not just an old

Brower: broken-down conservationist to tell you more about it. I saw a despondency grow about the time of the Kent State and Jackson State killings, where people tried to do things, and they weren't getting anywhere. In fact, they were getting killed for it, and there must be some other way to influence the way the government works.

I suppose that's what happened. It was a massive and sudden turn-off. It was a measure of what has always been present, I guess--the short attention span of young people and their native impatience. If you are interested in something you work for six months or a year at it, and it doesn't work, then there must be something wrong with it. The patience hasn't arrived yet; that comes later. And finally you get too much patience, and that's worse.

Schrepfer: After one of the Sierra Club Board meetings in 1969 there was a petition circulated against the war in Vietnam, and many of the board of directors--as a matter of fact, as I recall, none of the board of directors would sign it.

Brower: No, I think we had some directors on that; Phil Berry signed. I think so.

Schrepfer: I can't recall. But I know that the majority did not.

Brower: If we are recalling the same petition, this was Ecology in War. The Voter's Guide to Environmental Protection has that petition and the ad in which it appeared, reprinted in it. We could find in there who had signed; I'm pretty sure we could.*

If we were doing nothing else in Vietnam, we were conducting ecological warfare. What we've done is now becoming revealed. In the issue of Science before last, they've finally admitted what they were doing in weather warfare. We certainly know what they were doing in chemical warfare with their defoliants; the 2,4,5-T particularly, 2,4D and 2,4,5-T put out as "Orange," and whatever they wanted to call it, have done untold damage. We don't know when it will end.

Again, I think the United States is derelict here in not going along with the Geneva Convention on chemical and bacteriological warfare. We're just baddies on that one. We shouldn't be.

*See Appendix B.

Brower: It's bad enough--it's horrible--to drop napalm on people; it's horrible to do any of these things that happen in war, and particularly when you have such a mixed-up motivation. It's never good, and it can be worse than never good, and that's, I think, what we were into.

In Friends of the Earth, we publish the book, Defoliation, of Thomas Whiteside's articles in The New Yorker. What was happening in defoliation by 2,4,5-T, was that it included dioxin, which is about a trillion times more teratogenic than thalidomide. We were spraying that all over, and it's persistent; it stays there. There are indications now that if you have an underlying clayey soil, the 2,4,5-T will seep down to make a permanent toxic bond with it. It puts things out of action. It cuts lifelines that may not be restored. This is the sort of thing that you just don't do. But it is the kind of thing you do if you don't know anything more than the immediate results. We're pretty bad with what we've done with our chemicals, and we seem to be determined to do still worse.

The Benefits of Inter-Agency Rivalry

Schrepfer: Well, on that note, the Cascades look like a brilliant success, don't they? [laughter] Is there anything you want to add?

Brower: On the Cascades as a whole, I would still hope that in the Alpine Lakes area we can pick up the equivalent of what should be a national park, under other jurisdiction if necessary. It would then be a more carefully protected wilderness core and a recreational surrounding, which is what the park idea is all about, whether or not it's national park jurisdiction.

I'd like to see the Forest Service accept the feeling of the public, that it has a new role to play, that it's lived out its old role. It should be feeling tired in the role of timber manager now.

I would not want to see the Park Service take over all the scenic forest areas or vice versa. I think that the combination of the two agencies has been extremely good. They keep each as honest as possible. Just as it's necessary, I think, to have the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation as rivals in building dams. Their rivalry gives the public a chance. It gives the public a chance to be the swing man and lean this way or that.

Schrepfer: What do you think of the reorganization proposals?

Brower: I worry about the new conglomeration of power. I worry about anything that puts too much of the construction in one agency because the construction dollars have too much influence. That was one of the big things that went wrong, as we have discussed, in the Mission 66 program of the Park Service. Conrad Wirth, the director, made his peace with the American Automobile Association and the highway builders. There was a great deal of construction money over a ten-year period in the national park program. The sight of construction money and contracts, and the profit that would come from them, built part of the lobby that put Mission 66 through, to the consternation of a good many of the people, including the Sierra Club, who were more concerned with what you found in the parks than what you did to them.

The reorganization, what I've seen of it, has too many of the elements that get rid of the thing that we need--all of us poor people out here in the public--to have any chance to influence what happens. The monolithic bureau is too much. We have enough trouble even when you've got two of them fighting each other. Our little weight, on one side or the other, can let us prevail on behalf of the land.

I think I mentioned before that it was the beauty of that interagency struggle that saved the Grand Canyon from the Bureau of Reclamation and saved the Yukon from the Corps of Engineers. It was that interagency rivalry that gave us a chance to win both battles, and I'd be loth to see us lose that chance. I think it's been good every time the Forest Service has felt that its land was threatened by a Park Service takeover.

Each time the Forest Service has improved its wilderness concepts--although it forgets as soon as the threat dies down. Likewise the Park Service, when it sees the Forest Service handling wilderness in a way that is not manicured, but just a little bit rough and ready.

The kinds of people who gravitate to the two kinds of services need to have ports and storms in their own lives. You need the man who wants to study, who wants to know more about the theory of land, who wants to know how to identify various things; you need him in the Park Service. You need a place for him. But you need the person who is rough and tumble, who can get out and talk to the local rotary club and hit the local city councils and the county boards of supervisors, quietly if necessary; who has a good rapport with the press, to get to the people who create the problems in managing wild lands.

Brower: When it comes to the ultimate decision, I favor, as you can tell, the Park Service. They have in their act a requirement and a long history of paying more attention to the natural forces that are on the land than to the unnatural crops they want to develop there in opposition to what the land was going to produce. We need them both. So, there I am now, right in the middle--a very uncomfortable position.

Preservation and the Local Economy

Schrepfer: One of the things that was an issue in the North Cascades and, again you mentioned, in the Mammoth Pass area and some of the other wilderness areas was the problem of the local economy. In the North Cascades area, a good proportion of the local people were against the wilderness area. How much consideration should be given to the local economy?

Brower: Consideration has to be divided. One of the problems in getting enough preservation is that the local people, where the scenic area is, have scenery coming out of their ears. They think it endless, and they see no diminution in their own opportunity to get into wild country at the drop of a hat. Give them two hours off, and they can go and have a picnic lunch in a wild place. They don't see the need for it as the people in the megalopolis do.

The system is set up badly. It's skewed against the broad need. It's the cow county versus the city feller all over again. I see no way out except that there must be a subsidy that the city feller has got to pay his country cousin for keeping the country backyard beautiful. It's worth it, and it doesn't take very much per city feller to put up the money to make that possible. And it shouldn't all be put up through a local kiosk, a local McDonalds. There should be some other jobs for the local people besides just fleecing the tourists.

There should be, I think, major efforts, not only in our own national parks, but among the scenic areas of the world, to get the people who live there to be the teachers, to interpret, to learn through having to teach about their country what their country means, and to learn that way to love it themselves.

Hearings, as a rule, have been badly stacked by the administering agencies. You can almost guarantee that you will get a preponderance of industry if you carry hearings out in the immediate

Brower: area in mid-week. If you want to hear the public as a whole, or get a better cross-section of the citizen interest, then you've got to have it near a big city and on a weekend. It's hard to get people who are busy in other jobs to break away from them, to go off to a hearing somewhere, to sit through the hours of testimony to get a chance to say their few words, and then be told later on they'll be limited to a minute or five minutes. It's a discouraging process.

We still have to go on with it. I think we should continue to press for a chance for an equitable presentation, and that means that the hearing officers and the agencies and the industry people have got to be prepared to work weekends, rather than expect the ordinary citizen to cut away from school or work in order to be heard.

As the Cascades Park neared completion, we had a preponderance of park supporters up there in the Seattle area..

Schrepfer: In the urban area.

Brower: And of course people in the towns right near by could be completely swayed by the local industry. If logging was their industry and the park meant shutting the town down, they weren't going to be for it, because they couldn't see the transition from a logging town to the threshold town to a great place. It takes a bit of doing.

Schrepfer: We discussed the Three Sisters very briefly; I was wondering if you wanted to add to that.

Brower: I don't have much to say about it. I've never set foot in it. I've looked at the Three Sisters, the peaks, from both sides. I've talked to a lot of the people; I've been to some of the hearings.

The one I attended in the area was carried on by Richard Neuberger on the Three Sisters Wilderness and also one on the Wilderness Bill. I'm forgetting which, but Ed Crafts made a good statement--and often does. You've got to remember I was worried about Ed Crafts because his statements were so good. He was a good, staunch advocate of multiple use and not too enamored of wilderness. I think he probably considered we were more of a nuisance than useful as wilderness lovers.

Schrepfer: Did you read that interview with Ed Crafts?

Brower: I've seen little bits of it; I haven't read it all by any means.

Schrepfer: Well, I have a feeling that he was a man like Thomas Beckett--a man who totally accepts any role he gets into--that Crafts advocated whatever his agency wanted him to advocate.

Brower: That's probably true; but I also think that he would have had a great deal of influence in letting the agency know what it should advocate. He was a very persuasive guy, and if the Forest Service wasn't advocating the right thing, I think that it would soon find itself, under his own persuasiveness, learning how to advocate the right thing--or at least what he thought was the right thing.

I haven't seen him often lately. We share positions on a board right now--the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources.* It holds its meetings in Washington on rather short notice, and I have a hard time getting there. Since he's retired from other government jobs he's helping the CCNR.

Schrepfer: Everyone in the lumber industry still hates him. I don't think he has any friends there.

Brower: Perhaps not, but he has a very good friend in Spencer Smith, who's executive secretary of the Citizens Committee. Spencer's not about to do anything that Ed Crafts doesn't like; he has a strong feeling for him. I know that I could name a good many--quite a few anyway--conservationists in Washington circles, contemporaries of mine, who respect him highly. And I do. I respect him. I just happen to disagree.

Clearcutting and Other Unconscionable Forest Practices

Schrepfer: You mentioned clearcutting. Do you think clearcutting is always bad?

Brower: I think clearcutting is always bad. Of course, I've always taught myself never to say always, or [laughter] always to say never! If you spot either word in a sentence you know it's false. [laughter] Always! It's never true.

Schrepfer: The Forest Service now is beginning to discuss the good aspects of clearcutting. You don't believe it?

*Which ceased in October 1978.

- Brower: No, I don't. I believe it's an economic decision and it's not ecologically sound. If they weren't going to get money out of it they would come up with completely different answers. They have rationalized this from its beginning. It's an economic decision. It's the least expensive way to get the timber out, and then they can say it also gives us an even-age, one-species stand. That's bad in itself.
- You don't want an even-age stand. If they didn't have even-age stands of monoculture, they wouldn't be worrying about the tussock moth. They simplify something, and then they've got to go through all kinds of troubles and spend all kinds of energy to keep it simple. So, they're using energy where we don't need to. They're simplifying and losing things they haven't even identified yet.
- Clear cutting doesn't save the parts. It throws parts away recklessly that they cannot conceivably identify. They change the temperature of the forest soil, and they change it drastically in a way that it was not intended to be changed. Before the forest can climb back to where it was before, it's got to go through all kinds of evolutionary stages that take long periods that they didn't need to inflict upon it. Selective cutting wouldn't have caused that problem.
- Schrepfer: A friend was asking me if we really have the technological ability, or the soil culture knowledge, to reforest effectively many of these areas.
- Brower: We don't. Reforestation consists primarily of waiting to see what natural regeneration is. They saw that after they cut their Douglas fir, they'd get a natural regeneration of alder, and they called alder "trash." Who but a guy who's ignorant of what the function of a forest mechanism is, who but an ignorant person, would call it trash? What's it doing? It's fixing nitrogen. They exhausted nitrogen in prodigious amounts in taking down the forest and hauling it all away, so here God comes, here comes nature saying, "We've had a disaster here; we've got to build it back." And so they call the first effort to build it back "trash."
- You don't do that if you're brought up on a well-rounded education that doesn't put timber first; you just don't. They don't yet know--I'll say what Bernie Frank, who was long with the Forest Service, said years ago: "We don't begin to know anything about forest soils." That was one forester. And former Chief Forester Lyle Watts said he could make a case for sanitation salvage in any forest at any time.

Brower: You get these foresters in their cups, and they know they're not doing what they should be doing; they're doing what they're forced to do for economic reasons. You can't get them to confess it in public as long as they want to keep working, or as long as they want, when they retire, to go to work for some timber outfit--which happens again and again. A regional forester retires to become the head of some pine association. You know he's not going to make decisions adverse to that pine association, or another loggers' group, while he's the regional forester--if that's the job he's planning on after retirement.

Justice Douglas has pointed this out--that's one of the great abuses of what we do to ourselves by allowing this sort of thing to happen. It should be forbidden; you should not be making decisions in the Interior Department as an undersecretary that are going to be friendly to Con Edison if you're going to move, as Mr. Luce did, from the position of undersecretary of interior to a big job in Con Edison. That is wrong. And that's why we're getting some of these crazy answers on clearcutting. They're giving the answers that the people down the line who are paying a lot of money want. It's not bribery or anything we can call evil. It is normal self-interest and is important to the individual's economy. The retiree-to-be is not going to give the industries answers that they don't want. [The practice will end when the public is willing to pay the retirement costs that will permit outlawing it.--DRB, 5/25/79]

Clearcutting cannot be justified anywhere, I would say, unless it is an area that has no appreciable slope and so much cloudy weather that you don't have a chance to under-insulate the soil. I don't think you should count on such places' existing. There are some fairly flat places, but those are usually covered with cities or highways. Western commercial forests seem to be somewhere on a slope.

Robert Curry has pointed out, in spite of all the Forest Service denials, how rapid the loss of soil is when you start clearcutting. We are extremely wasteful of the soil.

Schrepfer: How about patchcutting, which is maybe a euphemism?

Brower: That's still clearcutting. How big a patch? "Well, for this first patch, let's clearcut Oregon!" [laughter]

Schrepfer: How do they use the concepts of allowable cut and sustained yield?

Brower: This they horse around with, they play with it unconscionably. If they don't have the right answer they go back to their computers or their adding machines and rework it. They will say, "Well, we just haven't counted all the inventory yet; we haven't counted all the volume in the little tiny trees that aren't loggable." Or "We haven't counted all the inventory way off in some wilderness that we hadn't intended to cut."

They keep reaching out to get a bigger base so that the allowable cut--say 5 percent if it's a twenty-year cycle--will allow them to cut all they want to somewhere else. There must be some good analogies. It's like diluting milk so much that when you take all the cream you are not taking too much of the whole. I don't trust their accounting methods at the moment.

The allowable cut is something that we will arrive closer to when we have better figures on what the long-term regeneration rate is. That doesn't mean just the regeneration of a lot of volume, but a lot of volume that is of the right quality. Take redwood. I think they still call second-growth redwood "trash" for about the first hundred years. It doesn't have the right strength in it yet. It hasn't really begun to reach redwood manhood.

Schrepfer: They only use it for pulp.

Brower: They're making a lot of decisions that are dependent upon the gross immediate benefit--the gross local immediate product. As Perez Olindo from Kenya was saying in Spokane, we have to think instead about the gross international benefit. Implicit in that is a time factor. That means not just now, but on and on and on. If we're going to have sustainable yield on any product, we should make sure that our recycling system is working, that we're not taking more than we are putting back.

Schrepfer: What do you think is the future of the lumber industry in the United States?

Brower: We're going to have to export less. That's been throwing us all out of kilter now--the exports to Japan primarily. We're going to have to stop wasting wood. When you want to tear a place down, a bulldozer must not be allowed near a wooden building. It should be taken apart; that wood should be reused--seasoned wood. We can't afford to just crumple it all and dump it in some so-called sanitary fill.

We need to build a lot less with wood, and I think we'll be building better for it. Wood has certain very good uses, but I think that they've demonstrated in Italy that you can build

Brower: quite well with very little wood. You build with stone. You don't have the air-conditioning problem, the stability problem, the noise and fire problem, and you have all kinds of advantages in durability, naturally, in building with stone. Then you use the wood as trim, as decoration, as part of the decor within it. But you certainly don't waste it the way we do. Certainly somewhere along the line we've got to be much less wasteful of wood products such as the pulp that goes into paper and packaging.

The future of the lumber industry is to recognize that our future in an ever-growing America is dismal indeed, and we need to look for some kind of equilibrium in that industry as well as in others. If the price has to go up, let it go up if it means that we then begin to use the resource sensibly and not just cash in, as we have been cashing in, on a resource that belongs to all the people on down the line--the forest soil. The ultimate victims are people in generations in the future who are going to need that soil's productivity and won't have it if current forest practices are not vastly improved.

Again and again we've seen what reckless cutting has done. All around the Mediterranean there were forests. There are just pitiful fragments left now. It was bad forest practice that led to that. The Eastern civilizations went because they lost their soil; we're losing our soil faster than they lost theirs. Right now you can do an instant replay of a thousand years or two and see where theirs went: ours is not going so fast that we see day by day what the enormity of the loss is, but it's there. Clearcutting is the greatest contribution to unconscionable loss of forest soil there is.

Give up?

Schrepfer: Yes!

VII DEFENSE OF DINOSAUR NATIONAL MONUMENT

[Interview 4: June 18, 1974]##

River Trips and the Club's Awakening Interest

Schrepfer: When did you first go to Dinosaur?

Brower: I didn't go to Dinosaur until 1953. That was the year the Sierra Club started to run river trips that were patterned after a river trip that Harold Bradley had taken his family on the year before. He went there to make a family film which he showed around. That was certainly one of the things that awakened my interest in what was there.

In earlier Sierra Club discussions, which had not been of much import, the only thing that I recalled was the opinion of Walter Huber, who was an engineer and had been an advisor to President Eisenhower on dams. He had helped in a lot of the conservation aspects of engineering, trying to tell us what was good and what was bad. He made his own estimate of Dinosaur and said that it was just canyons and sagebrush. There was nothing to be concerned about.

I don't think that he'd been down the canyons or he wouldn't have had that feeling. Walter Huber had a good appreciation of scenery; he was a good photographer; he was a president of the Sierra Club, a one-time treasurer. He helped me a great deal. (That may come out later on in this discussion of the Dinosaur battle.)

But the Sierra Club was not particularly interested in Dinosaur, and I certainly was not, until this trip by Harold Bradley, the picture he took, and the article that Steve Bradley wrote for the Sierra Club Bulletin: "Folboats through Dinosaur" [Sierra Club Bulletin, December, 1952]. Stephen was one of the seven Bradley sons.

Brower: The film did impress me. I got a feeling of being on the river. I wanted to go there. The Sierra Club had become interested--that's why Harold Bradley went--primarily because the Isaak Walton League was interested. Joe [Joseph W.] Penfold, then the Western Representative of the Isaak Walton League, was much interested in Dinosaur. Charlotte Mauk, who was assistant secretary to the club, was picking up interest. I was peripheral to it at that point. As I became executive director in the late part of 1952, I got deeply into what would be a major battle.

The concern with Dinosaur had been subsidiary to what was going to happen to the entire Colorado River. The Sierra Club, when I was on the board of directors, got into discussions of the Colorado and what was likely to happen far downstream from Dinosaur. The battle between California and Arizona over the Colorado's water was still in the courts, and not much was going to happen until that should be resolved.

In getting ready for the resolution we had long discussions in Sierra Club board meetings about what ought to happen. Bestor Robinson, then advisor on conservation to the Secretary of the Interior, was leading the board along a line of reasoning that we later voted down. But in the course of that early discussion in 1949, I was one of the board members who voted for Bridge Canyon Dam in the Grand Canyon, just so long as they would build the Glen Canyon Dam first to catch the silt. I had been taken in by Bestor's good salesmanship, and also his attribution to Frederick Law Olmsted, fils, a statement that the scenic resources would not be particularly hurt by reservoirs in those canyons.

As you probably know by now, I changed my mind. The Sierra Club began to change its mind and began to alter its position on the Grand Canyon. Bestor was trying hard to use his position with the Secretary and the Sierra Club's growing strength to bargain with the Bureau of Reclamation so as to cause as little damage and as much recreational value as possible in their development of dams on the Colorado.

One of my early comments in the Sierra Club Bulletin was an allusion to the Bureau of Reclamation's attempt to make the Colorado River a series of lakes to suit a Paul Bunyan on water skis. The San Francisco Chronicle thought that a clever line.

My own concern then began to develop rapidly as I became executive director of the Sierra Club. Charlotte was interested. Joe Penfold. And hearings were then beginning in Washington before congressional committees. On this occasion I first testified before a congressional committee. I was in Washington for the Mid-Century Conference of Resources for the Future.

Brower: My interest was now fully engaged. I thought that if Harold Bradley had made a good family film, we should try to make a professional film. We should try to get a lot of people down through Dinosaur to refute the claim that nobody ever could see it, and it was a very dangerous place. We arranged a series of river trips.

The first year, 1953, we arranged three that could take about sixty-five people each. No trip before had had any more than twenty, and people thought that it was not going to work out. But we applied what we knew from Sierra Club experience in handling large groups in wilderness. We got the services of Bus Hatch and his sons and his rivermen and put these three trips through.

On the first one, 1953, I went with my oldest two sons, Ken and Bob, who were then quite young. Charles Eggert was the photographer. We worked quite awhile trying to figure out what a script would be for a satisfactory film and went out to shoot it.

The upshot of this was that we began a series of very popular river trips through Dinosaur where a lot of people got to see what it was and how important it was, to know personally what was there, and because of their own personal stake in it, to be part of the battle troops fighting for it, just as had been worked out by John Muir and Will Colby in the earlier days of the club when the whole outing program started.

The film that was made was credited by the opposition as being the most important thing we did in offsetting the Bureau of Reclamation's propaganda; it was the hardest thing they had to fight. Of course, they didn't fight it well. Dinosaur doesn't have its dams yet.

That was at least the initial contact and it was impressive to me, in part because it's a beautiful place to drift through. I've never had a river experience like that before, and there was something special to going through there with Ken and Bob and watching their reaction to it.

Congressional Hearings: Challenging the Bureau of Reclamation

Schrepfer: In the course of the controversy you pointed out a series of errors that were made by the Bureau of Reclamation,

Brower: The hearings were prolonged, and the National Parks Association was going to take the lead in it. But they were fairly busy on other things. Leadership gravitated to the Sierra Club, with the National Parks Association, the Wilderness Society, and the Isaak Walton League being the key allies at the time it started. We also had the services of the entire Bradley family--all extant generations who knew something about it. They all made major contributions to the effort. To have had Harold Bradley--who was then over seventy--going down through the canyons and not being floored by them but enjoying them, gave the lie to the fact that only the rugged hair brained few would dare go through those wild places.

Schrepfer: He was seventy then?

Brower: He's ninety-five now, so we can figure backward. That was twenty-one years ago--he was seventy-four. So, he was seventy-three when he made the trip.

Well, anyhow, the hearings that I got into were a follow-up of hearings that had begun before--administrative hearings. There were various publications coming out of the Department of the Interior, primarily engineered by Mike Straus, was was then the Commissioner of Reclamation and a good promotional agent--also, a brother-in-law of Eliot Porter.

To fill in, much later we had drinks together on Great Spruce Head Island in Penobscot Bay which is in Eliot Porter's family's island. Mike Straus was there--yes, he would be willing to have drinks [laughter] with David Brower who had been a fairly hard-fighting contestant years before. He still thought he was right, and I still thought I was, and so did Eliot Porter. This was after it was all over; this was many, many years after the battle was over and shortly before his death.

In any event, the Bureau of Reclamation was doing its best to say what the figures were and why the development should be where they thought it should be, and they amassed the economic, engineering, hydrological, and other arguments for their position. General U.S. Grant, III, testifying the year before, had pointed out in administrative hearings--not legislative hearings--some of the errors the Bureau of Reclamation was making.

Brower: The thing that was going to be tough for us to combat was the Bureau of Reclamation's claim that if they built any of the alternatives to Echo Park Dam, it would lose in excess evaporation on the reservoir surfaces 300,000 acre-feet of water a year, which was enough for several cities the size of Denver, or something of that sort. That, in a water-scarce land, was a tough argument to meet.

But General Grant showed in his early testimony that the Bureau had made a mistake in its calculations--that, yes, they had added what the evaporation would be from the alternate reservoirs, but they had forgotten to subtract what the evaporation would be from Echo Park reservoir. So, the 300,000 feet was a gross figure, and it should be netted out by the Bureau's own calculations at somewhat lower--something like 100,000 feet lower.

When we got into the major hearings, there was a division of effort. The Wilderness Society was second in command. Howard Zahniser, as its executive secretary, became the man who was minding the store throughout the hearings, throughout the battle, while the rest of us would come and go in Washington.

In the course of that, I was repeatedly his guest at the Cosmos Club, which I never joined, and he was a member. It was there that we plotted the defense of Dinosaur National Monument and the Upper Colorado system, such defense as was devised. I think altogether I must have lived in the Cosmos Club six or seven months in the various phases of that battle as we tried to bring in the other conservation organizations, including some from the states of Utah and Colorado.

A major role fell to me in analyzing the data and talking about my own personal experience in having gone down the river. Again and again Congressman Dawson of Utah was asking people, "Well, have you been there?" A good many people would say that no, they hadn't been there, but they could certainly recognize a principle when they saw one. It slightly weakened their argument to say that they hadn't been there. So, we began to parade quite a few witnesses up there, including myself, who had been there and knew what it was like.

The Wilderness Society, incidentally, was interested in what should happen. They had already, through Howard Zahniser, come forward with a proposal for a national wilderness preservation system, and that proposal Howard Zahniser was willing to sidetrack to take a major part in the role to save Dinosaur. If we couldn't save the wild canyons of Dinosaur as part of the national wilderness system, we would start out impaired. So, the Wilderness

Brower: Society was in this vigorously from the beginning. Its vigor preceded the Sierra Club's vigor, and then we came in with all four feet--or whatever it was--and got vigorous afterward.

Hearings were coming up in 1954 before the House Interior Committee. I thought it would be a good idea to be there throughout the hearings and to hear everybody, and that meant I was there hearing the testimony of the Department of the Interior, of the secretariat, and that included Under Secretary Ralph Tudor. I was amazed to find in his testimony that, although he had some different figures for evaporation and had some new alternatives listed, differing from those that the bureau had listed in the administrative documents before and in their House Document 364, he came up with the same kind of error that had been made before and that General Grant had detected.

I made copious notes at the time, and went to the transcript of the hearing immediately after (the transcript is published by the next morning), and copied out what he had said. Later on, he changed his testimony, trying to correct some of the errors he made before it went into print. I found out that what he had said and was in the transcript--what I copied out--was an error that we were to make a great deal of. When he corrected his transcript, he still left some errors in it. These were simply errors in subtraction.

Schrepfer: He made the corrections before you testified?

Brower: No. He made the corrections that appeared in the printed record. The record was not printed until after I testified. But my testimony relied on the figures that he had actually given orally and that were in the first draft of the transcript. So that my testimony had his figures and attributed to him what he had said, which is proper.

Schrepfer: Can you correct the transcript after you've said it?

Brower: An awful lot can be done, particularly if you're at the cabinet level and say, "I'm sorry, there's a little error here, and I don't want that in here." So, I was alluding to errors in his testimony that in the printed record are not in his testimony, but they were in his oral testimony.

As was customary then, they required the presentation of testimony in several copies before you gave it. That is, they wanted something like twenty-five or fifty copies of your statement the day before. I started my testimony one afternoon and had submitted it all earlier that day, but when I came on the next

Brower: morning they had Mr. [C.B.] Jacobson*, the Bureau of Reclamation project engineer, on hand to refute what I had said.

Schrepfer: I was wondering if they had called an early adjournment because that comes right in the middle of where you were listing the errors? [laughter] It sounds like they just adjourned it because you were making everybody uncomfortable so that the next day they could bring in somebody.

Brower: No, I think they adjourned because it was getting late. That was my recollection and I haven't gone back to check that.

In any event, there was Mr. Jacobson with a blackboard. I put some of my calculations on and showed what I thought ought to happen, and then he came up to do the Bureau of Reclamation's snow job. It was commented later that the ridiculousness of trying to challenge the Bureau of Reclamation with ninth grade arithmetic was proved at the hearings, so that the opponent Congressman (and I forget just who it was that made that statement) defused what I had said at that point, and it didn't have the impact on the committee that it might have had if there had not been the Jacobson snow job.

Well, I went to work on that still further, and one of the Bradleys, Richard, also went to work on it. He carried on some correspondence with Floyd Dominy, who was then an assistant commissioner (he later became the Commissioner of Reclamation) and got from Dominy a letter that admitted errors and had some still different figures. This whetted my appetite so that I then went after all their figures and found out all kinds of ridiculous things they were claiming and paraded them out in testimony. Then people would laugh and say, "Well, are you an engineer or aren't you?"

I think I've mentioned already the big reward was after the battle was over, when the Regional Commissioner of Reclamation, Olie Larson, in Salt Lake, was awarded the rubber slide rule for stretching the truth.

Schrepfer: By whom?

Brower: By his friends in Salt Lake. It was just a big joke ceremony. Somewhere in the Sierra Club files the picture is there of a big rubber slide rule being awarded. I would like to find that, but I've never been able to dig it out. It's probably buried fairly deeply now and very yellowed.

*Engineer in charge of Colorado River Storage Project Studies.

A Faulty Concept of Colorado River Development

Brower: That was one of several hearings because it went on for quite a while. The errors in evaporation turned out to be only a minor detail in what needed to be challenged in the whole bureau concept of development of the Colorado. As I began to look at it with just an editor's mind, not an engineer's, but with help from home (because I had a father and a brother who were engineers) and from Walter Huber, who had checked some of my calculations, we found they were doing some very haywire things in their whole program.

The main thing I found was that they were overdeveloping the entire river. They were putting twice as much development on it as was needed. As Luna Leopold and Tom Maddox, an engineer, were later to point out, the bureau was violating the law of diminishing returns. They were trying to build so many dams to hold over storage from the wet years to the dry years that in the period it was held over it would have an enormous amount of evaporation and the water benefit would be negative.

In the course of my own argument in that first year, I was advocating an alternative, for purposes of comparison, of a higher Glen Canyon Dam. I was saying that if they'd add thirty-five feet, or fifty feet, (Now, I'm not sure, one or the other) to the height of Glen Canyon Dam, that would store all the water that they were planning to store at Echo Park and Split Mountain dams within Dinosaur National Monument, and there would be a saving of 25,000 acre-feet of evaporation per year if they would use that system instead of the system they'd proposed. Rather than the 300,000 excess evaporation from the Dinosaur dam that they'd alleged in the first place, there would actually be a net savings if they used the alternative I was talking about.

At the time I advocated the higher Glen Canyon Dam, the response from the Interior Department was that they had serious questions about the foundations at Glen Canyon anyway, and to make it that much higher would complicate the protection of Rainbow Bridge. This was to spite us all later on, because I was advocating a higher Glen Canyon Dam, having written off Glen Canyon. Since they were going to build that dam anyway as the big money-maker, allegedly, in the whole project, then they might as well make it a little higher while they were at it. But I was giving away Glen Canyon without knowing one cotton-picking thing about what was there.

Brower:

There were some people in Salt Lake, including Dr. Ellingson and others, who were trying to get a Glen Canyon National Park, and they were quite disturbed by my saying we should make a still higher Glen Canyon Dam. They were talking about places like Music Temple, the Crossing of the Fathers, and Tapestry Wall--places I knew nothing about.

I suppose we can jump way ahead to what happened later on that Glen Canyon disaster, but maybe I should wait on it just to say what did happen on the Echo Park effort.

In the course of two years of hearings before the House, my statements got longer and longer and my documentation got more and more complicated. We were building excellent opposition to the whole project because its economics were now being shown to be faulty. Its hydrology--its engineering of the river--was becoming transparently faulty.

We were joined, not because we wanted to be joined, but because they wanted the water down south, by the southern California water interests. The Colorado River Board of California and people in southern California were quite anxious not to have development upstream that would start intercepting water or lowering the quality of the water they wanted downstream. They were arguing that since they were first in right because they were first in time, which is the synopsis of Western water law, they didn't want to see their own major investment downstream impaired by diversion of water for development upstream.

That was an argument that I didn't go along with; I thought that it was quite important that there be decentralization of development and that the Colorado should not be devoted to watering cotton, smog, and votes in southern California. That was my own position, which was a good one to have and I believed it, particularly because they began to suspect in the upper basin, and Utah particularly, that I was just one of the tools of the southern California water thieves.

Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah made a particular point of that. In the first year's hearings before the Senate I was on the stand for an hour and a half, and the only committee was Senator Watkins. What he was trying to do in any way he could was to prove that I was just the patsy of southern California. I was at that point trying to demonstrate that the whole river was being overdeveloped. The transcript of that goes on and on.

As I've said playfully later, he was practicing for Senator McCarthy at that point. [laughter] And we couldn't all be that mad at Mr. Watkins because of what he did later on in going after McCarthy. But he was certainly after Brower in the first place!

Brower: That was my first experience in being on the stand that long. It was, I suppose, good training for what happened next time I was before a Senate hearing when I was on for two hours and fifty-seven minutes without a break. Senator [Clinton] Anderson was then the chairman of the meeting. Senators would go off to the library, back to their office. They would switch around. Senator Watkins was there and Senator [Eugene] Millikan. They were questioning me quite hostilely for that whole period. So while they went out to have refreshment, I was up [laughing] getting this third-degree.

It was so tense for Senator Watkins that he had to leave. I had quite a marshalling of data, and Watkins wasn't prepared to handle those data.

Millikan was then getting pretty old and was already a bit shaky. I deferred to him every time he wanted to question me. I could see that he'd bring his hand up, shaking a little bit, trying to say that he'd like to ask me a question, and he'd deliberately ask me a question that he thought would shake my argument, but I think they didn't. I remember he was saying, "They're not going to flood any mas-to-don bones [said with drawl]." Well, we never said they would. They weren't going to flood any dinosaur bones either.

I was trying to get them to use the coal alternative, which again, was to come around and smite us at this time in our lives--in the years of the early seventies. But it seemed to me that in making comparisons of what the alternative cost of getting power and revenue was, they were taking the Bureau of Reclamation's highly inflated figures of what the cost would be to get power from coal-fired utility plants.

They designed their own coal-fired utility plant and put the price on it that they wanted so that it would make their water power price look better. But right there in their own city of Salt Lake they were having a price that was about 2 1/4 miles less per kilowatt hour than the Bureau of Reclamation was using as a yardstick. The power price established by Utah Power and Light was 5.1 mills per kilowatt hour. The Bureau was plugging in an overall cost of 6 mills for their Upper Colorado project. So, what they had to do was to construct an alternative that would cost more--in their head--so that under the alternative justifiable theory of cost allocation their project would look good. They contrived a model where the price was 7.3 mills. That made their project look very good.

Brower: It was fun to go after their economics on that basis. I wish I'd known more about it, but it was easy to show, and I did it at great length in some of the more protracted testimony that I gave before the House and Senate, that they were really after an extremely crazy project.

Developing Allies: Southern California, Labor, Conservatives

Brower: We were building great support for our position on the Hill. By the time we got the public interested in the conservation issue--should we do this to a unit of the national park system--we were getting good support from all over the country. We think we had in the House of Representatives something like two hundred votes that were ready to go our way because of that conservation issue and because of the mail that had been generated.

The then Congressman Clair Engle, was telling a National Wildlife Federation meeting how the legislative process worked. He told them that if you were in a district where twenty-five of your people had taken the trouble to write in saying, "Don't vote for Echo Park Dam," and your friend from Utah said, "I'd like to trade a vote with you; will you please vote for Echo Park Dam?" the man who was hearing from his constituency would say, "No, I'm sorry, I'm getting a lot of heat from the district and I can't do it."

This was the kind of pressure that we were building up, thanks to the film, thanks to other things that were happening.

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Schrepfer: Let me ask you: who was your support in Congress?

Brower: We had as our principal supporter in the House committee John P. Saylor of Pennsylvania. Strangely enough, we also had a strong support for other reasons from Craig Hosmer of California, who is now retiring and has been bad lately on environmental matters but was good on this one.

He was good on the Colorado River project because he was against the whole thing. He was representing Long Beach and the southern California interests, was a member of the committee whom I paid quite a bit of attention to. I paid a lot to Saylor, but also to Hosmer. It turned around later. In the Grand Canyon battle he was fighting us hard. But in Echo Park he was working hard on our side.

Schrepfer: Did the southern California water interests approach you?

Brower: I'm not sure whether they approached us or I approached them. We certainly saw that we were together. We'd read each other's papers; we'd hear each other's testimony. I know that Northcott Ely called Mike Ely for short, who as an assistant attorney general in California and was the leading attorney for the California Colorado River Board, made some very impressive testimony and did talk to us and did try to get us to do some things that we didn't elect to do.

He was the man that Arthur Watkins was trying to say that I was in collusion with. Indeed, we had had meetings. We would join anyone [laughter] who could help us save Dinosaur.

Schrepfer: In the end, when the decision was made to okay the project as long as the national parks and the national monuments were protected, within a short time over one hundred votes swung to support of the project.

Brower: Yes, once we had released the conservation hold on the people who were going to vote against the whole project until Echo Park was out, once we retreated from our position of arguing against the project, as some of us were (we had all been showing how crazy the whole thing was), then with those two hundred votes going the other way, the situation was clear. I encountered Raymond Matthews, who was the engineer for the Colorado River Board with whom I had compared a lot of my notes--who said of some of my figures, "Well, at least you've added to the confusion."

I saw him looking pretty grim in the House corridor, I guess he was, and he said, "We're beaten badly." That was before the vote, but he knew how to sense votes. He could take his own roll call. He knew that without the conservationists, the other elements of the coalition against the project were nowhere.

Schrepfer: What other elements were there besides the southern California interests?

Brower: There were the people who didn't want to see a lot of U.S. money spent on reclamation projects in the West. That was one thing.

The people who were getting energy from coal didn't want to see hydro projects go. People who were just looking for lower taxes, the various tax councils and so on, were against it.

Schrepfer: What about labor?

Brower: Labor, through the work of Anthony Wayne Smith, Tony Smith, now the president and general counsel of the National Parks Association, was on our side. At least the CIO was, for quite a bit of the battle. They could see that the jobs in dam building were not that important; that there were other jobs that that kind of money could support. So, Tony Smith did help get CIO support for us. They backed away from that position later on.

Let's see, who else? There was a conservative block that didn't like to spend money if they could avoid it. And Raymond Moley, for example, was coming out periodically with articles saying that it was a bad thing, that they were proposing to spend up to \$2500 an acre to bring land into production and that was a big capital cost. You could get better land in production in Tennessee and water it with rain, if you just put \$200 an acre in reclaiming it. They could do it for \$175 an acre in Holland. All those kinds of figures came to the fore in asking why this big subsidy should go to the West for crops we didn't need.

One of the things we did avoid was arguing against the crops, and we didn't argue against the need for power. We were saying that there will be enough growth in the demand for power that any power they make can be used, any crops that can be grown will be used. So, we weren't using that argument. We were using the economic argument, the alternative argument, and the scenic resource argument.

So far as we were concerned the whole thing before the public hinged on the scenic resource argument. It was the scenic resource, the national park idea, that was at stake, that got the public excited about places that they might never see, but at least they belonged to the public as a whole, and that wasn't what you do with them.

Schrepfer: How did you swing this hundred and some votes at the end?

Brower: We went up and down the corridors. We lobbied. We all had the names of people we wanted to see. We'd have our periodic little re-assemblies at the Cosmos Club or elsewhere and see who had done what and what the general sense was--who needed to have a little bit of work done on him.

That's where I learned first that what counts is letters coming in from the constituents. We had a lot of urging of letter writing going on out to the public as a whole. The Sierra Club did it right out-and-out before the Supreme Court decision [of 1954 on the Lobbying Act]. Then we passed a lot of

Brower: that direct advocacy to Trustees for Conservation, which would write saying, "Write your Congressman and send us money."

We did get a lot of mail in--a great deal of mail. And then the constant showing of the movies, the constant lectures, the articles in the various publications, the interviews in papers--we got a lot of press--engendered a substantial interest.

Editorial Support from the New York Times##

Brower: There is a story that fits in here somewhere that was interesting to me and amusing and very rewarding. Through Larry Davies, the New York Times correspondent here in San Francisco, the New York Times became interested in Dinosaur. John Oakes, who was part of the owning family of the Times and is now the editorial page editor and one of the chief policymakers for the paper, was then doing a monthly column on conservation for the Times. It would appear in the travel section once a month.

He had received enough material from the Sierra Club and particularly from Brower, who was loading the mails with it and running up enormous telephone bills and everything else to try to get the national coalition clicking on this. He called me to say that he'd been invited to Dinosaur country to go through Echo Park, see the river, see some of the reclamation developments, and he wanted to know whom he should see while he was there. I gave him a list of people, including of course Joe Penfold, and then did a double take after I'd hung up. I called him back and said, "I think you ought to see me too."

He said, "Well, I'll have to see if that can be worked out." This was a trip being arranged by the Bureau of Reclamation for John Oakes. He called up the Bureau of Reclamation, and Ottis Peterson, the Bureau's public relations man, said, "Oh, oh, sure, that's all right, let Brower come along." They were later wishing they hadn't agreed to that. I heard later that that was one of the big mistakes they made.

So, I got to Denver and met John Oakes for the first time in the Brown Palace Hotel. There we started our tour around through the dam areas. We went up to see the Colorado Big Thompson project. The Reclamation regional commissioner from Denver, Mr. Spencer, and Mr. Jacobson, the project engineer were along, and other reclamation types. I was the token

Brower: environmentalist. We didn't even call ourselves environmentalists then. The token conservationist. John Oakes was seeing what he could see firsthand.

The thing that pleased me most, and I think it may have amused John Oakes, was that time and again he would be asking the project engineer for various details of the project: "How deep will the reservoir be here?" or "What's the evaporation figure?" or "What happens next?" And Mr. Jacobson would turn to me for the answer. I had boned up on that; I knew more about the Colorado River than I ever want to know again. about anything! It was coming out my ears. That was amusing.

Ottis Peterson was along too. He was the public relations man for Michael Straus and then stayed with the bureau as an assistant commissioner for public relations. It was he who wrote the lines that Michael Straus spoke about conservationists in their air-conditioned caves in New York City who were trying to pass judgment on what happens out in Utah.

Peterson was a good PR man. I remember after we had ridden the boats from Castle Park, with Bus Hatch as the boatman, down to Echo Park and were wandering around in Echo Park. We were going to take a car back out and go see something else. We were wandering down the road; John Oakes and I were ahead of Ottis Peterson, who was walking by himself. He caught up with us, and he said, "Don't quote me, but if there's any other possible way to do this, the dam shouldn't be built here."

John Oakes and I were impressed by that.

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Schrepfer: Did he change his public position?

Brower: No, no, he never changed his public position; I guess has not to this day. He was quite amused later on when I did come out for a Bureau of Reclamation dam proposal on the Clark Fork River up in the Columbia Basin, but that's another story. That was the only dam I was ever for, once I got into the conservation movement, and for reasons that I thought then were good and still think are pretty good.

But in any event, back to the Echo Park struggle. We got to Salt Lake after this. We had gone to see various other Bureau of Reclamation installations, including Strawberry Reservoir and its impressive engineering. It was a nice show. Then we stopped for lunch in Provo. Let me stop for dinner first in Vernal. We stopped for dinner in Vernal because this was the

Brower: community nearest to Echo Park Dam, and it was bucking for it hard. It was a community that claimed unless they got Echo Park Dam, they themselves would block the entire Upper Colorado River Storage Project.

They wanted it because the Central Utah Basin people, Salt Lake and all, were going to divert the good fresh pure water streams of the Uinta Mountains and take those off to central Utah, and they were going to give to the Uinta Basin, by exchange, water that would be pumped out of Echo Park Dam. They wanted it out of Echo Park Dam because Echo Park would mix the water of the Green River and the Yampa River, and the Yampa had pretty good water and the Green, although its water then was, and still is, pretty good, by the time of ultimate development of the Upper Basin was going to be poor water.

Indeed, as we look at it now and see the strip-mining plans for Wyoming and the coal gasification plans and the oil shale plans you can see that there's going to be absolutely untouchable water coming down the Colorado River below those developments if they're allowed to go ahead.

It all has led--and it will be relevant to what I'm about to say--to what has just happened currently, where you've seen that President Nixon has on his desk and possibly will sign a bill for an expenditure of about \$120 million for a water purification system on the lower Colorado, to offset the damage done by the Bureau of Reclamation with its projects upstream in Arizona and also way on up into the Upper Basin. In order to make the water that's now in the Colorado River something better than the salty soup Clair Engle said we were giving Mexico, they are now spending this amount in the initial estimate--and you can bet it will cost twice that much when it's built--to undo the damage done upstream. And, of course, none of the people benefiting from the program upstream are paying for this effort. This is just all on U.S. taxpayers as a whole; they're paying a pro-rated share.

So, at dinner in Vernal we were discussing the need for Echo Park Dam and why they needed to have it for the Uinta Basin. Among the people there was the state senator from Uinta County, was was asserting that they, Uinta County, could block the entire Colorado project if they didn't get Echo Park. The Bureau of Reclamation didn't like that discussion because they had already said that they did not contemplate pumping water out of Echo Park, which was the only way they could get it to the Uinta Basin. If they applied the energy necessary to pump the water out, then the project would not be economically

Brower: feasible. So they said they had no intention to. They had initially planned on it, but they cut out that intention, at least for public release. I think it was still in their intention.

John Oakes asked, "If you're worried about the quality of water that will be going to the Uinta Basin, then is there any validity to the concern of the southern California water people, who are worried about the quality of water down in the lower basin if you build all this project?"

"Oh," he said, "no, that's not relevant," and dismissed it. But of course it was relevant and is to this day and it ties into the water purification plant. And this is before there has been really full-scale development of the water of the Upper Colorado. In fact I think it's going to turn out that there's not going to be full-scale development because they cannot afford to bring the water that way.

Once it's been collected in any quantity down in the canyon, they can't afford the energy to bring it back up out of the Colorado canyons to where they need it. They've got to intercept it high, and they've done practically all the feasible high interception they can do. Any further interception deprives all the downstream users, and particularly Mexico.

Well, back to Provo and lunch there, where we'd now been through all these encounters which John Oakes had seen for himself. He excused himself from lunch and came back and said to me privately, "Don't tell them, but I just filed my editorial opposing Echo Park Dam." So, that was a trip that I was glad I went on.

Building a Nationwide Audience: the Book, Film, and Full Page Ad

Brower: The first of the really out-and-out conservation books was put out during the Dinosaur campaign. The title of the book was This is Dinosaur: Echo Park Country and Its Magic Rivers. [Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1955] Wallace Stegner agreed to edit it. I got all the contributors together, I got the photographs together, got the editor--worked with him in laying it out--and also got a publisher, Alfred Knopf, who was interested in national parks, to be the publishing house and then helped him sell quite a few of his copies. I wrote some of the promotional folders (I think we wrote better folders than they did) and moved a lot of copies.

Brower: It wasn't a big edition--about 5,000 copies, but it was useful. We sent it to every member of Congress along with a brochure, a hard-hitting brochure put in the book at the bindery. It was probably the most potent brochure I ever put together. It had quite an impact.

Schrepfer: Dinosaur is important in conservation history.

Brower: I think it is. At least it was important to the Sierra Club. It was important to a lot of the conservation organizations. They took on the establishment and stopped it. Whatever led Newton Drury to say, "Dinosaur is a dead duck," was a force that was reversed, and it was reversed with a battle that had a nationwide audience. All the organizations got into it. The South wasn't into it very much; we hadn't really known how to organize the South very well. But there was a lot of support from the rest of the country, and we persuaded a good many of the people whose voices were heard in Congress. You find the leaders and get them to move and you're in good shape.

There was one other thing that worked well in our lobbying effort: that was the lowest budget film on record. That was the one I did on "Two Yosemites." The budget was five rolls of Kodachrome film and my own time. I did the editing, wrote the script, and then recorded it. It's an eleven-minute film. The total budget was about \$500.

We made six copies of it. I showed it in a good many places. It had quite an impact, showing what had been done to Hetch Hetchy, and all the claims that were made of how beautiful a lake it would be and how great a recreational resource. Of course it wasn't, and isn't; it wasn't necessary. The parallel with Dinosaur was so beautiful that we worked on that constantly,

Howard Zahniser got a little trailer from the basement of the House Office Building and found a projector in which he could load that film, and he'd just wheel this trailer in and open it up. While he was opening it up, Congressmen would be so interested in the mechanics of opening it up, they wouldn't resist it. Then Zahniser would say, "You've got to see what this does; it's only eleven minutes" and turn it on. He already had them conned into it. A few of the staff and the Congressmen would be there and see this eleven-minute film. It was a continuous projector; once that was done, you didn't have to rewind. It was ready to go again next time.

Later Zahnie said, "So, we showed it to Gracie Post," She was from Idaho, and she was on the Interior Committee. He added, "It made her cry." Other people cried too. Zahnie was

Brower: always doing something like that. He could crash a basketball game; he could get out of debt by buying a new, expensive car; he could do all kinds of remarkable things. It was quite noble of him to do this because at that point he had had a coronary, and he wasn't supposed to be doing a lot of hard work. But he would haul the film around and take it easy.

He's the guy who really minded the store in that battle. Brower was out running around on a mountain somewhere enjoying the West; Zahnier was in there in a sticky, hot Washington summer, plodding around while the rest of us were having a ball somewhere else. He was the guy who was dependable, who never failed. I had some of the glamorous part. He was the guy who made sure everything got sewed up and the details agreed upon. He was my coach. ##

The upshot of it was that we did have the conservation block of votes, of about two hundred, which added to the votes that were a coalition to support the southern California position or to support the conservation position of "How much money do we want to spend on reclamation to produce more crops when we have too many crops already, with this vast subsidy of public money from all over?" That coalition was strong itself. So, we had them beaten hands down on the entire project.

When the argument became so strong on our side that our opponents saw they were beaten, the Council of Conservationists ran the first full-page conservation ad in the Denver Post [October 31, 1955].

Schrepfer: I've never seen that.

Brower: That council consisted of Fred [Frederick M.] Smith, who organized it, and Zahniser, Ira Gabrielson, Joe Penfold, and I. We were the executive committee. Leroy Provens and then later Carl Gustafson were also helping Fred Smith.

The financing for this effort came from Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., of Mallinckrodt Chemicals, who'd been a long-time member of the Sierra Club, and through Francis Farquhar and Joel Hildebrand and others wanted to know how he could contribute to using the known techniques of public relations to help win this battle. The Council of Conservationists was revived for this purpose. It had earlier been put together by Mallinckrodt to fight Panther Mountain Dam in upstate New York, which was near a place that he liked very much, where he spent summers, out of Saint Louis.

Brower: Fred Smith wrote the ad and ran it in the Denver Post so that it would appear at a time that there was a strategy meeting of the Upper Colorado Basin development groups--all of them: the river boards of Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Wyoming. We ran that so that they had it in front of them saying if they didn't take Echo Park Dam out of this project, or any secret hopes of Echo Park Dam out of the project, we would continue our opposition and there would be no project.

They gave in. They took Echo Park out. That is, they accepted the conservation proviso in the Upper Colorado Storage Project Act, which had been written by Howard Zahniser. The first part was the intent of Congress that no dam or reservoir of this project shall lie within any national park or monument. The second conservation proviso was that the Secretary of the Interior shall take the necessary steps to protect Rainbow Bridge.

When those two provisos were duly acceded to by the proponents, we accepted their promise as valid, and the principal organizations in conservation who had been opposing the whole project because Echo Park and Split Mountain dams were in it withdrew their opposition.

Tragic End to Victory at Dinosaur

Brower: I made a major effort to have these organizations keep their opposition up because the project was so devastating to what we're now seeing were important scenic resources elsewhere in the Upper Basin, and the project was not necessary. It was a water-wasting project, and it was a scenery-wasting project. There were alternatives that were better. So, we wanted to keep up the opposition and keep the conservation votes in there and to join those with the other votes in opposition to the Upper Colorado project.

I was in Washington at the Cosmos Club at the time. I had made a big plea to the Sierra Club executive committee to stay in there. The Sierra Club alone, if it had stayed in there, could have kept the coalition, enough of it, together. The Executive Committee of the Sierra Club Board of Directors met in San Francisco while I was in Washington, and I got a wire instructing me to withdraw opposition.

I should have flown home immediately and asked for an emergency meeting of the board to try to persuade them to go the other way. One of my mistakes was that I didn't.

Brower: That position stood. I was then not able to go ahead to oppose the whole project. A good many of the congressmen, particularly the senators who were ready to cut the whole thing down--that included Senator Paul Douglas, Senators Neuberger and [Wayne] Morse, and others--said to Spencer Smith, who was then of the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources, that the conservationists were out of their heads to withdraw their opposition to that project.

But, we did and the project went through. Glen Canyon Dam was thereupon authorized, and some of the other projects were begun. The thing went through in early spring. I guess it was March of '56, and that October President Eisenhower pushed the button that blew down the first part of the walls of Glen Canyon to signal the building of Glen Canyon Dam. So, the victory had its tragic ending.

The construction was begun of an unnecessary dam, that was solely serving the purpose of catching sediment and generating power until it was filled up with sediment and was wiping out some of the finest scenic resources on earth. It had within its side canyons and its main canyon the equivalent of several Dinosaur National Monuments. There could have been ten national parks, that would have been accepted by standards of national parks in other states and other countries, in what went under when 186 miles of the Colorado River became part of the impoundment area of the Glen Canyon Dam.

I'm rusty on the figure now--something like 180,000 acres of primary wilderness was slated for destruction and have now been destroyed. My own bitter lesson there was that you don't give away something that you haven't seen; you don't suggest alternatives until you've been there and know whether you want to suggest such alternatives.

Schrepfer: So, you had the Dinosaur battle fairly well sewed up before the decision was made not to fight on Glen Canyon?

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: So the question wasn't, as I had understood, that the reason for not fighting for Glen Canyon was that they were afraid that then they'd lose the entire battle, and they'd lose Dinosaur. They believed the forces weren't strong enough to save both canyons.

Brower: There were some people who probably thought that. I think that the people who wanted to get out of the battle wanted to primarily because they got into it to save a unit of the national

Brower: park system; they were there for the principle. That was particularly true of the National Parks Association; they were fighting for the principle that a unit of the national park system does not have a dam put in it. The Wilderness Society was fighting for the principle of wilderness preservation. Both these organizations were primarily concerned with areas that had been dedicated; they did not want the dedication violated.

I shared that; that was my opinion at the beginning. Then as the project went on, and I learned more and more about what was happening downstream and what was going to be lost, even though I hadn't seen it, I was anxious to stop the whole thing. ##

Schrepfer: When we were talking about the Sierra Club's executive committee, you said some people also believed that they might lose Dinosaur if Glen Canyon dam were also opposed. Are you implying that some people had other reasons?

Brower: I don't think that there were any other reasons. I think that they were just again going along with the principle that we were fighting to save a dedicated scenic resource; if we have a promise that it will be saved, our reason for being in the battle has ceased to exist.

However, before that happened, the Sierra Club had passed a water policy, a general policy, that did provide for the continued opposition to this project because it was a major threat, for the purposes of generating hydroelectric power, to a major scenic resource. The Sierra Club had, after careful consideration, come to this policy decision. When the executive committee decided to pull out of the battle, and not to oppose Glen Canyon dam, they really reversed their own water policy decision.

Alex Hildebrand had been the leader in arriving at that water policy decision. He, incidentally, had been extremely helpful in the battle in doing an analysis of the costs of the fossil fuel fired alternatives to hydroelectric power. He was with the California Research Corporation, a subsidiary of Standard Oil. He'd been in Arabia. He knew a great deal about secondary recovery in oil fields and knew a great deal about the economics of fossil fuel generating plants. His data on that were important in our own Sierra Club arguments about these ridiculous economic analyses the Bureau of Reclamation was trying to sell.

Walter Huber had been particularly helpful in going over my various figures on evaporation losses, the comparative losses. He being an engineer and knowing the bureau quite well and never

Brower: trusting the federal bureaus too much (if he trusted any he trusted the Corps of Engineers more than the Bureau of Reclamation) would go over my data. He didn't want his name used at the time because he was at that point the president of the American Society of Civil Engineers. He was willing to check my data but not to have his statement attributed to him. His engineering firm would go over various drawings I would make including an analysis of Glen Canyon Dam and the strength of it and the design of it--which in itself was faulty and I don't think it was the design they followed in actual construction. It was too skinny a dam, and they made it a skinny dam, I think, to get the right cost estimate so that it would look feasible. What finally happened is something else.

But that kind of thing kept happening. I would go to an engineers' group: I would go to Raymond Moley; I would go to other people who would give me data that they did not want attributed to them--the Engineers Joint Council particularly. They'd say, "You're fighting the right fight and you're on the right course, but don't bring us into it because too many of the people in the Bureau of Reclamation, too many of their engineers, are members of the Engineers Joint Council, and we don't want to antagonize them."

That happened again and again. It was sort of part of my education I guess: that you go where you can for expertise; you try to get the information you can, realizing that there are magnificent inhibitions hanging over the heads of a lot of people who should talk and can't. That is still the problem today, when you get into nuclear energy or almost any of these problems. The government agencies have within them people who know what the facts are but cannot keep their jobs if they reveal them. We need what Ralph Nader calls a Valhalla for the people who are willing to blow the whistle on their own departments when they know they're involved on a bad course--one that's against the public interest.

Schrepfer: Would the Bureau engineers lie?

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: They knew they were lying?

Brower: I don't know what's going on in their heads. I'll use the General Grant line: "I am forced to infer" that they knew they were lying. I don't think that they could otherwise have been so stupid. I could say, as one of my friends said, "Engineers are too one-sided to cast a shadow!" That isn't quite true. I'm sure they knew.

Brower: The man who put the mistake in Ralph Tudor's testimony was Mr. Jacobson, who confessed that to me later. He thought that some of my arithmetic was way off, but I don't think it was; I don't think it is. The project is still a ridiculous one.

Schrepfer: Did he concede that he had made the errors?

Brower: Yes. They later conceded the errors, and that pretty much blew their case in the House Interior Committee.

Schrepfer: But, I mean, he conceded to you.

Brower: Yes, but it was quite a while before he did. And then of course, to get ahead of our story, the promise was violated on Rainbow Bridge. Both conservation provisos have been violated, and our attempt to go to court to get a correction of that has not succeeded, so Rainbow Bridge National Monument has a lot of reservoir water in it, and steps to protect Rainbow Bridge were not taken. Again, that is quite a long story in itself.

Compromise Within the Sierra Club

Schrepfer: To get back to the Sierra Club, were there people within the club at that time who didn't want to fight Dinosaur?

Brower: There were a few people I know. Any members we had in Utah would probably be compromised. We know the Wasatch Mountain Club could not join the battle to save Dinosaur because it would have split them down the middle. It would have destroyed their organization probably.

In the Sierra Club, the opposition to the Sierra Club position came from Bestor Robinson. One of the things he came up with that was embarrassing to the Sierra Club was his proposal while he was chairman of the advisory committee to the Secretary of the Interior on conservation. He advocated a compromise that only Split Mountain Dam be built and not Echo Park dam. Split Mountain Dam would be a lower dam, it would not flood so much canyon; that was rough water anyway.

But it was a proposal that made absolutely no sense because the thing that would make Split Mountain Dam usable was a big storage tank above it. Split Mountain Dam was simply a re-regulating reservoir. You had to spill a lot of water to get power when you wanted to get it out of Echo, and then you'd

Brower: hold that in Split and run that at another time. It was not a major structure. It could have some function with major regulation upstream at Flaming Gorge and at Cross Mountain. (Flaming Gorge Dam has been built; Cross Mountain hasn't been. Maybe it will not be.) That would have supplied some upstream storage, but there was just a long, long stretch of water in between and that re-regulating function doesn't work well at that much distance.

We did not fight, for example, the Flaming Gorge Reservoir. Once we pulled out of the whole battle we had to stop fighting that. Of course that's too bad too, because that again is one that isn't needed. Water is not used out of that for the area itself. It's just a storage reservoir for downstream benefits, to provide a paper engineering regulation of the river.

As I've said of Glen Canyon Dam, it's a costly device to make sure that water will run downhill. The storage in Glen Canyon could take place, all that is necessary, in Lake Mead. Lake Mead has not been used to capacity since Glen Canyon went in. When both are used to capacity there is far too much water being wasted by evaporation--it would be enough to supply a couple of New York Cities--just to produce hydroelectric power.

In any event, the upstream storage is part of a compact that the Upper Basin states thought they needed, to have any leverage at all in what was happening to the water. They could have worked out a different kind of compact that would not have required any of those upstream storage tanks.

Flaming Gorge as a storage tank has changed the whole character of Flaming Gorge itself and of Lodore Canyon in Dinosaur National Monument. People still want to ride down that as a river trip because it is a beautiful trip, starting at the gates of Lodore and going down to Echo Park. It has extraordinary scenery in it. With the control of water upstream at the Flaming Gorge Reservoir, river travelers are purely at the mercy of the Bureau of Reclamation. Mr. Jacobson would say, "Oh, we'll flush you down now and then," which is about what goes below Glen Canyon now, because they control the flow of the water in the Grand Canyon, and it adds to the difficulty of going through Grand Canyon. It stretches the season, but at night you've got to make sure that your boat is parked high because the water may suddenly be five feet higher in the morning than it was the night before.

How did I get off on that? We were just looking to see who the other opponents were. It was Bestor Robinson, primarily, who was for the Grand Canyon dams in 1949 and later on was arguing very strongly for Marble Gorge Dam in the Grand Canyon

Brower: for the Bridge Canyon Dam, for the Coconino Dam, the Split Mountain, Glen. He made my life more interesting than I wanted it to be throughout my career as executive director of the Sierra Club and throughout my serving as a member of the board before that.

That affected the Tioga Road--we've gone into that-- San Jacinto, San Gorgonio, where as president he was advocating the ski development himself with an anonymous letter he had me put in the Sierra Club Bulletin. He was difficult. He wanted the highway broadened through the coast redwoods. Almost whatever it was, he wanted it, and we had to fight him. He wanted the development of the Kern Plateau. He stymied the Sierra Club's chance to oppose that. I would say that Bestor was the anti-conservationist force on the Sierra Club board. He would say that I was over pure and had no political judgment on these matters.

Schrepfer: Did you consider coming back to talk to the board about the Glen Canyon?

Brower: I don't think I did. It's a little hard to--I was just crushed at that point. I'm not quite sure what happened next. Let's see, that was 1956. I suppose that what I did next was to come out and take part in leading some of the Sierra Club High Trips. That was my last year of taking part in any of those. I was the ostensible High Trip manager in summer; that was part of my income still. I had trips to mind in the Sierra and then up in the Tetons and also the North Cascades. We were getting into that battle.

So, I didn't do what I should have done. If I were to live that over again, I would have flown right back that afternoon and called a meeting. It might not have succeeded, but I would certainly have tried. The precedent I would have had was the support I got from the board at the only other time I had called for an emergency meeting of the board. That was in 1954 when there had been a panic in the conservation movement at the action of the Supreme Court on the federal anti-lobbying act and the backing away from conservation lobbying by the historic conservation organizations. I felt it was important that we get something going to offset that and therefore had a hand in calling an emergency meeting of the board to engineer the setting up of Trustees for Conservation, the lobbying ancillary organization to work shoulder to shoulder with the Sierra Club in ostensible lobbying.

Brower: I had had a hand likewise in helping organize the same sort of thing in Washington, in the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources and also was in with the executive committee of the Council of Conservationists in New York. All three of these were then going to be lobbying. We had hoped that that would work.

None of the three ever got enough money, and that's why the next course was to suggest that we go the other route. I suggested we have a Sierra Club Foundation. Let that be the non-lobbying group, dependent on large grants. Let the Sierra Club itself, with its membership dues, its publications program, its outings, and the rapidly increasing amount of revenue coming in from that, support the lobbying program.

That gets into the Grand Canyon battle. Thinking about getting this done in the late fifties was what had the Sierra Club Foundation idea ready when the club did lost its tax status in 1966.

VIII DAMS IN GLEN AND GRAND CANYONS

[Interview 5: June 25, 1974]##

Glen Canyon: A Bitter Lesson

Schrepfer: We had talked about Dinosaur [National Monument] during our last interview nearly two years ago, and I think it's logical if we go on further into the Glen Canyon controversy now, and then, of course, Grand Canyon.

As I understand, originally you were willing to go along with the idea of not fighting the Glen Canyon dam, with the idea of protecting the Grand Canyon, in the very first years of the subject, particularly I guess in the mid-fifties.

Brower: It began in the late forties; that is, the Colorado River controversy and I got together. I suppose that I should say that I went to the University of the Colorado River; I was a drop-out in Berkeley, but my education continued, I think, as I look back over all these years, the thing that I learned a great deal from was from the Colorado River controversy, starting with the Dinosaur battle and going on to this day, when the controversies are not yet over. I found it extremely valuable to seek out information and to be able to acquire and remember information that would in any way be used in the controversy. This might be related to agriculture, to hydrology, to structure, sedimentation, to city development, to growth, to the use of alternative energy--all this came in the various courses, and the lower division [laughing] and the upper division of the Colorado River were tied to controversy. I learned a great deal from the river, and I'm indebted to it. Dinosaur, of course, began this.

Brower: I suppose my first national notice, and the fact that I became the chairman of the Natural Resources Council of America and got the National Parks Association Award all came from what I had done on the Colorado River system and Dinosaur up to Echo Park. It was at that time that the Glen Canyon controversy was overlooked in my own being enamored of Echo Park itself. I was anxious to save Dinosaur because it was part of the national park system; we didn't want a bad precedent for the exploitation of the parks for alien uses. I had heard from people that Glen Canyon was beautiful, but it was not part of the national park system; it was a scenic resource that I didn't know. I was able at that time to make the horrible mistake of being willing to sacrifice Glen Canyon in order to save Echo Park, simply because I didn't know what was in Glen Canyon. The thing that really hurt was when I first went down and looked at Glen Canyon and saw, at long last, what I had been willing to compromise before I looked at it. That was one of the bitterest lessons I ever had.

The wind-up in the Glen Canyon project was that (and I may have said this earlier, but I'll say it again now; I may be more succinct this time, who knows?) because of the position of leadership I was thrust into in the Upper Colorado Project controversy, I more than anyone else had a chance, which I did not use, to stop the Glen Canyon dam.

The conservation movement, with the leadership of the Sierra Club, had developed enough political pressure in the House of Representatives to have something like two hundred votes, which were the controlling votes. It wasn't until the Sierra Club agreed to stop its opposition to the project that it could get through. As I remember, this was in June, 1956. I was in Washington at the time, staying at the Cosmos Club as the guest of Howard Zahniser, as I had for so many months in the aggregate, and got a wire from the Sierra Club, whose executive committee had met. It said since Echo Park Dam had been removed, we would withdraw our opposition to the Colorado River Storage Project.

Several of our friends in the Senate said, "Why are you doing this? We've got the whole thing killed!" Senator Clinton Anderson, according to Spencer Smith, had said that if the sponsors didn't get it approved this year, they'd never get it approved. The Sierra Club gave up, and the opposition to the whole project thereupon collapsed. The other groups--people interested in taxes and interested in keeping water in Southern California--the other organizations just faded away. The Sierra Club was the keystone in that, and the keystone was pulled out and the arch collapsed.

Schrepfer: Did anybody care about Glen Canyon?

Brower: Quite a few people did. There was a committee to save Glen Canyon, a committee for a Glen Canyon national park in Utah (a Dr. Ellingson and a Dr. [William R.] Halliday). There were other groups. I'd heard from Wallace Stegner that Glen Canyon made Echo Park look rather ridiculous; it was so much more beautiful. I'd heard that from a few other people. [fire siren and police siren] (New York is noisier than some other places.)

The Sierra Club removed its opposition because it was in on the principle of protecting the national parks. My horrible mistake at that time was to have stayed in Washington, instead of to have grabbed the next plane back and called for an emergency meeting of the executive committee or the Sierra Club board to argue why we should have stayed in the battle and stopped the whole thing. We should never give away Glen Canyon or anything else yet till we knew more about what was there. And this I did not do.

Schrepfer: Did it cross your mind?

Brower: It crossed my mind; it didn't cross it effectively enough to move me. I had at that point, I think, enough influence over the board that if I'd done it, and had a long meeting and told them all I knew, that we could have prevailed, and Glen Canyon Dam would not have been built. I didn't make the right decision on that June day.

Schrepfer: There's a difference between, perhaps, giving up Glen Canyon because you believed you were forced to compromise or because you just wanted to save the national parks and weren't worried about anything else, or whether you actually believed that perhaps some of the dams in certain situations should have been built and were willing to give the lesser area for the dam.

Brower: In this case, no, I have no defense at this point.

Schrepfer: I don't mean you; I was thinking of Bestor Robinson's influence.

Brower: His influence was still fairly strong, and Alex Hildebrand was fairly strong. But at that point, we had a Sierra Club policy that related not only to the national parks but also to scenic resources. The policy at that point said that we would not sacrifice scenic resources for energy production, because we thought there were plenty of alternatives for energy, and that included the expanded use of fossil fuels. That's something that, as we look back now from 1976, was a passing phase. We

Brower: just didn't see, and I didn't see, what we were getting into when we made that suggestion of the alternative. But that could nevertheless have been academic.

The point was that the river development, as accomplished by Hoover Dam and Lake Mead, and the dams down below at Parker and Davis, was adequate for the river, was indeed more than adequate. The rest was just an engineering, job-making project and a money-making machine, theoretically. Knowing only that, we should have stuck with our policy, our new policy. It was formulated at that time. I could have argued that this was a good time to stick with it, and we should never give one inch of Glen Canyon until we've looked at it.

The Conservationist Role in Selecting Alternatives

Schrepfer: The issue of selecting alternate sites has been one of the biggest ones in the Sierra Club's history in the sixties. Did Glen Canyon affect, then, your reaction to Nipomo Dunes and the idea of Diablo Canyon?

Brower: That certainly had an effect on me, that we should never give away anything we hadn't looked at, and the Sierra Club had not looked at Diablo Canyon. No director had seen it, except the absent director, Martin Litton, who was in Baghdad when the decision was made.

Schrepfer: So the two times that you picked alternate sides, Glen Canyon and Bridge Canyon, both turned sour.

Brower: Yes, and in both it was a matter of picking them without having seen what was there. Once I had gone down through Glen Canyon, I knew that there was nothing there that I would ever be willing to compromise. The same thing happened in Grand Canyon later. I look back now, with the perspective of the seventies, at the alternative that we would use fossil fuel, which was abundant; and I was giving the figures of how much fossil fuel existed in the Upper Basin (which is now one of the things we're fighting--we don't want strip mining). So we were giving away the fossil fuel as an alternative, because we hadn't foreseen the consequences.

Earlier, in the Echo Park thing, I was citing the alternative of atomic power. Atomic power could have come and saved Hetch Hetchy if it had come soon enough. So I was advocating that.

Schrepfer: Are there any instances in which conservationists could wisely help select alternates?

Brower: There are. I'm still always looking for alternatives to the courses that we think are inadequate. This is the essence of the National Environmental Policy Act now--that we should look at the social and environmental consequences and have alternative sources of action when we come up with a new project. This is a good exercise; we ought to. We don't do it very well.

The alternative I talk about now, as I'm always looking for alternatives, is to have a new look at growth. We don't want atomic power, we don't want more hydroelectric power, we don't want a lot of strip mining, we don't want to use up the fossil fuels which are, as someone has described it, the earth's life savings of energy. What is causing us to do that is just a mindless addiction to growth, which is a recent addition, where we think we must have more and more people, more and more appetite for resources and things. There is no way to save anything except to get over that addiction! The alternative is to kick the fix, the growth fix. Out of that kind of thinking I've come up with my handy definition of economic growth as presently practiced as being a sophisticated device for stealing from our children. I believe that. So my own thinking has evolved a long way away from finding the handy geographical alternative to something; the alternative is inside our own heads: Stop demanding so much for ourselves now, at the cost of all the other people who are ever going to show up and all the other living things.

Sierra Club Reversal on Marble Gorge Dam

Brower: The Grand Canyon battle, of course, started a long, long time ago. I mentioned earlier, in talking about Dinosaur, that I was into it in the late forties and in it on the wrong side, that I began to get on the right side in the course of the Dinosaur battle. I remember going to the office of the Bureau of Reclamation in Page, Arizona, when we were beginning to try to see if we could save Rainbow Bridge and delay the completion, or at least the filling, of Glen Canyon.

I remember seeing in the office of the director of the project the photograph of the proposed Bridge Canyon dam down in the Grand Canyon. The Bureau was getting all its forces in line to move right ahead with its ultimate development--indeed, its ultimate overdevelopment--of the Colorado River that it had been planning.

Brower: By the time the Dinosaur battle had been well gotten into, we knew that the two dams for the Grand Canyon--one at Marble Gorge and one at Bridge Canyon, later called Hualapai to placate the Indians or to try to enlist their support--we knew that those two dams were bad and should not be built. We began gathering statistics for it.

There was a major battle in the Sierra Club before the board of directors. Bestor Robinson had been making one of his persuasive presentations and had the Sierra Club about ready to favor the Marble Gorge Dam: the club should make best use of its giving in on the dam, by getting an agreement from the Bureau of Reclamation to handle their recreational development in certain ways--to provide access for boating and all that sort of thing.

I was feeling depressed at that point because I had been beaten by Bestor often in arguments before the board. I was staff, and he was board, and there was a peer group thing going on. Martin Litton, who was on the board, got up and so devastated Bestor Robinson's arguments that there was applause from the audience, and the board voted to oppose the Grand Canyon dams.
[May 4, 1963]

Stewart Udall: A Balanced Assessment

Brower: The battle was a long one. I suppose I should not try to talk about the entire battle at this point, but maybe the important elements were that we were trying to get the Secretary of the Interior to listen to the arguments against the Grand Canyon dams. He had already taken a position. The Southwest Water Plan, that included the Grand Canyon dams, was trying to have a little bit of everything in it for everybody, so that it was sort of a Colorado Christmas tree, with projects for all the states that could possibly vote and trade votes.

The Southwest Water Plan documents were shocking to look at because they were tied in with the California Water Plan that would have dams almost anywhere you could think of up and down the state. The Grand Canyon project, as we later found out, was a major diversion of funds, that would otherwise return to the general treasury, to build a bankful of money for a major import of water from the Columbia River. The Grand Canyon dams themselves were in the \$1- to \$2 billion dollar class, if I remember, but the Columbia import would get up to around \$15 billion.

Brower: The California Water Plan itself, of course, was going to be quite large. Part of the requirement of the Southwest Water Plan was that yes, California wanted some water out of the Colorado River, sure, but they were going to make a big attempt to use their own water. The Colorado River flow is about 15 million acre-feet a year--that was a virgin flow figure--and the California rivers had about 70 million acre-feet. The Upper Basin states of the Colorado River thought that it was appropriate that California, before making excess demands on the Colorado River, should use its own, which was a logical thing if all you were thinking about was that the way to improve a country was to develop all its water and forget everything else.

Udall had a major press conference for the Southwest Water Plan at the time I was cooling my heels in his outer chambers, waiting to get to him to try to stay the closing of the gates at Glen Canyon. I had a good presentation of why that should happen, but I was not allowed to see him. I was allowed to join the press conference, however, and listen to the presentation of the Southwest Water Plan. That was early January 1963, on the day they closed the gates at Glen Canyon and started its destruction. So, I was starting out unhappily in this first major encounter.

Schrepfer: Did you know him then?

Brower: Yes. He thought that I had helped him get appointed, and indeed I did try to get him appointed. I think I mentioned earlier on the North Cascades struggle that I had tangled with him rather often in the hearings on Dinosaur. He was an advocate of the Echo Park Dam proposal and was one of the committeemen who was for the Colorado Storage Project, and I was a staunch opponent. He was never rough, on the committee, when he was questioning me or when I was speaking, but he was certainly not our champion at that point.

But he had begun to do some good things. I remember sharing a platform with him in Arizona at the tail end of the Eisenhower administration. He was flattering in what he said about me on the platform, then talked to me later. He said, "I'd like to be Secretary; I wish you'd help."

I searched my soul for a while before I decided to do anything about it. Then I thought, well, the guy does have some good things that he wants to do. Not that I could help much, but I put in my two cents worth, and I think I persuaded the New York Times to carry an editorial in favor of this, although they said they were ordinarily reluctant to do that.

Brower: So, he thought that I had helped him to get appointed, or at least he told me that, and we had then and I think still do a good rapport. He and his wife, Lee, and my wife, Anne, and I were in Jyväskylä, Finland for an international conference in 1971 and were together a great deal of the time, exchanging recollections of the old battles and having a good time there. He was making the best speeches that were being made at that conference. He developed quite well in the process of being exposed to a lot of conservation battles, a lot of responsibility, and the good persuasive influence of Wallace Stegner, Don Moser, and Harold Gilliam, in their particular role there. I kept trying to persuade him too.

Just to say one more bit about Udall, I remember that he spoke at two of the Sierra Club wilderness conferences; the first one [1961] he spoke at was an impressive thing. It was the first time that a wilderness conference had drawn big names from around the country. We had Justice Douglas and Secretary Udall. They both made good statements. They're both on tape, and they're impressive. The Douglas speech should be on the permanent record, and Udall's too.

In the beginning of his speech, he was asking that we give him a little elbow room as the new Secretary. Later on we were asking, "What's Stewart Udall got going on in his elbow room these days!" [laughter] The elbow room became a legendary spot.

In any event, in that speech he said that he had a lot more that he wanted to say, but instead he wanted to read a letter written to him by Wallace Stegner. This letter had been elicited by David Pesonen, who was doing part of the work by the Wildlands Research Center at the University of California under contract to the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission with respect to the meaning of wilderness. David Pesonen asked Wally for a letter on his beliefs, and Stegner wrote this letter. It's in the Sierra Club's wilderness book on that conference.* It is also in the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review wilderness volume. It's in the Sierra Club book because Udall said he wanted to throw away his speech and read that letter. He thought it was the most impressive thing he'd ever read. That's been quoted and quoted again and again, some of those paragraphs of Wally Stegner's. Just absolutely superb.

*Wilderness: America's Living Heritage, David Brower, ed.
(Sierra Club, San Francisco, 1961) pp. 97-102.

Brower: That Stewart Udall would see the beauty of that and make that his speech was a tribute to Wallace Stegner--and to Stewart Udall. It led to his wanting Wallace Stegner later to be his literary aide. He made a subsequent speech--the first was an evening speech but at the next wilderness conference he made the luncheon speech--where he came out strongly against mindless growth. Population growth and development, development, development. When do we stop was the question he began to ask.

He was the first public official in any high place who ever did that that I know of, and no one has done it since. So, we need a Stewart Udall back in that high office to do what he was doing then. This is to say that, although I was quite irked with what he was doing in the Grand Canyon and Glen Canyon, I had a great deal of admiration for what the potential was, and I still do.

Engaging the Emotions: Grand Canyon Ads

Brower: The Grand Canyon battle got hotter and hotter. The main success was that we did elicit a lot of public support from the ads that came out of Jerry Mander and Howard Gossage for the Sierra Club. Those ads were potent. One of the things that Howard Gossage had said was that there's no point in writing an ad unless it's going to be talked about. It can't be just an advertisement; it must be an event. It must do something.

As I summarize it, the first ad on the Grand Canyon lost the Sierra Club its tax status: it did something! [laughter] He was right. It was annoying to the Sierra Club. Some people thought that I was guilty of having brought this about and having allowed the ad to be so blatant as it was. I think I've explained earlier, but I'll explain in context here, that I didn't like the ad as much as Jerry Mander did. I thought it should be a different ad. I therefore wrote my own.

Schrepfer: Is this the Sistine Chapel ad?

Brower: No, the Sistine Chapel came later. In the Sierra Club book, The Grand Canyon of the Living Colorado, the ads are reproduced in the back of the book.

There was a split run of the earliest ad. The "Who Can Save Grand Canyon?"--an open letter to Secretary Udall--was the ad I wrote. "Now Only You Can Save Grand Canyon From Being Flooded..."

Brower: For Profit" was Jerry Mander's ad. We arranged to have a split run on the ads. I thought that my ad was saying the right things and he thought his was saying the right things.

The New York Times had never split a run before. I wanted them very much to do that. They printed the New York Times then on six presses. I didn't see why on three presses they couldn't put one form and on another three presses put another form. Why couldn't they split the run? Well, they'd never done it before. So, I called John Oakes, and he told me whom to call in the advertising department. I called, and he was at the theater; so I called again when he got back from the theater, and I poured on all the persuasion I could. He agreed to split the run. They'd never done it before; I don't think they've done it since. But half the New York Times had one, and half had the other. The same thing I think happened on the Washington Post. I think we had no trouble getting the Chronicle to split a run, or the Los Angeles Times.

The upshot of it all was that Jerry Mander's ad outpulled mine two-to-one. So, I conceded that the professional knows what he is doing, and the amateur doesn't. Also, his ad was what the IRS cited, when they said why they were clouding the Sierra Club's tax status.

That clouding was one of the most important parts of the campaign because it brought all kinds of editorial criticism, not of the Sierra Club, but of the Internal Revenue Service. We got editorials; we got headlines all over the country. Why were we losing our tax status? Because we were trying to save the Grand Canyon in the public's behalf. The papers over the country were irate, and the public was irate on this thing. It was an important move toward saving the Grand Canyon.

We did other things too. We put out the Eliot Porter book, The Place No One Knew. Certainly we didn't want this to happen downstream; we put out Time and the River Flowing, the Grand Canyon book, François Leydet doing the writing. That had an impact. We got that around. We got a lot of attention in the media because of what we were doing with advertising and with publications. With the editorial comment, the separate articles, the interviews, and everything else that all that led to, we got an enormous amount of public attention, and a lot of letters came in.

I think the stimulus there was primarily that this is the Grand Canyon, it is your Grand Canyon. Do you want them to flood this for their special purposes; do you want them to flood the heart of it?

Brower: The ad--both Jerry Mander's and mine--used the same photograph. I used the photograph larger, and his smaller, but the photograph is a Bureau of Reclamation photograph showing exactly what part of the canyon would be flooded by the proposed dam. The Bureau of Reclamation immediately and thenceforth called foul. They said, "We're not going to flood out the Grand Canyon."

Nobody said they were going to flood it out. We said, "Do you want them to flood the Grand Canyon?" Then we showed the picture showing exactly where it was going to be flooded. They kept harping on that, saying, "We're not going to flood it out." Which is one of the techniques of people who have a bad case.

It was as it had been in Dinosaur, where the Bureau of Reclamation was saying, "We're not going to flood the Dinosaur quarry," and where Senator Millikan said, "They're not going to flood the mas-to-don bones [drawled]."
[laughter] So, in the Grand Canyon they were saying, "We're not going to flood out the Grand Canyon. It's just that little bit way down in the bottom of that great big canyon."

It's going on nowadays that the people who are advocates of nuclear power and reactors are saying, "The one thing we've got to make clear--these people who are worried about atomic reactors keep worrying that they're going to blow up like an atomic bomb. They're not going to blow up." Well, nobody said they were. It's the sort of thing that gets picked up as a constant theme to harp on to indicate that the poor preservationist people are nuts, and they're not well informed.

The emotional appeal that was in the ads--there was an appeal to an emotion, to a personal attachment to a great place--was an important part of the battle. The emotional argument was epitomized in the later Grand Canyon ad, which is the one most people remember--the one with the headline, "Should we also flood the Sistine Chapel so tourists can float nearer the ceiling?" That was a line suggested by a Sierra Club member living in Princeton (whose name I now forget); we adjusted a couple of the words, but it was his idea. Jerry Mander jumped at it. People still laugh at that line, years later; and it's still the one that people remember, as I go around the country speaking. But that had the other values that are important: ideas of what people think are right.

I think that the emotional appeal was what stimulated people to acting, to writing the letters, to coming back, to getting into the hearings, to do what they could.

Challenging Economic and Engineering Facts: The MIT Trio

Brower: We had all kinds of people coming back to Washington at their own expense to testify, and we had, in particular, three people--the MIT trio. There was Jeff Ingram, a mathematician; Alan Carlin, an economist with Rand Corporation; and Laurence I. Moss, a nuclear engineer. They were all in their early thirties, and they had been trained at MIT, and they went after the facts hard and brought their assorted expertise to bear.

Larry Moss was looking at the nuclear pump storage alternative and what the figures would be for that. Jeff Ingram was analyzing the payout systems. Then Alan Carlin went over the benefit-cost analysis, and just shot it full of holes.

In their analysis of the bureau's [Bureau of Reclamation] figures, which were just riddled, the Bureau of the Budget (which subsequently became the Office of Management and Budget) was much impressed. There were meetings with these people, and they saw that the Bureau of Reclamation was putting together a fiction, not actual figures. They were showing the Grand Canyon dams as something that was going to be economically important for the full development of Western waters, and that this would be supplying the funds to help divert the Columbia River and bring that on down to the thirsty part of the West.

Schrepfer: Why were they lying?

Brower: They were, I suppose, setting the pattern that has been followed ever since by government agencies that seem to have a great ability to lie; they haven't got over it yet. They are uniformly susceptible to temptation, to protect the bureau rather than the resource that they were founded to protect; to keep the bureau working, they must keep new projects.

What they did in the Grand Canyon campaign was to pretend that the Grand Canyon dams were necessary for this development of the West's water. But when you put it under analysis, you found out that what was going to put the money into the project fund was the revenue from Hoover, Parker, and Davis dams after they'd been paid out.

It was that diversion of funds from dams that were built at a much greater efficiency and lower cost that was going to make the Grand Canyon dams look like winners and was going to put money in the bank for the Columbia diversion and other development.

Brower: This disclosure, principally by Jeff Ingram, was devastating to the Bureau of Reclamation. They'd put all the figures together--and said the whole project was necessary. Our MIT Three took them apart and said, "This is where the money is, and these are totally unnecessary for what they're talking about." That was the economic, the engineering argument.

I myself concentrated on the emotional appeal and on the sedimental story--that is, the sedimental journey in the Grand Canyon, what the silt deposit rate would be and how long the dams would last and how inadequate the figures were on this. It was a fairly potent piece, I think, tht I put in the Bulletin [October 1967]. Dominy attacked it. I used it also in my testimony.

Another person who was extremely invaluable in this was Hugh Nash, who is the senior editor now of Not Man Apart*, who was at that point the editor of the Sierra Club Bulletin. He can write extremely well, analyze very well, and was tireless when it came to getting material ready.

As part of our battle as we prepared for the hearings--we would assemble in the Du Pont Plaza Hotel, and have people come in, pound on a couple of old beat up typewriters, and sleep on the floor. I remember one time I asked Morris Udall, who was a staunch advocate of the Grand Canyon dams, to come by and see what our lobby looked like. He came in, and saw this bunch of devoted people working hard to beat his dams. I think he was impressed by that.

There were other places where we were working, depending on which hearing it was--the hearings went on and on. We probably bugged the proponents no end because while most of the people would be sitting at the hearings, we would be standing, right at the end of the horseshoe of the committee hearing table in the House, making notes on all kinds of things. We were attending everything they said, and if they made a mistake, we went right after it.

IRS Response: Clouded Tax Status

Brower: The story we got when the Sierra Club had its tax status clouded was that the night the Sierra Club ad appeared Mo Udall met with an assistant commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in the old Congressional Hotel at the bar.

*Not Man Apart is a monthly journal published by Friends of the Earth.

Brower: Udall, as I understand it, said, "How the hell can the Sierra Club get away with this?" The next day in Washington I had wired to me from San Francisco the copy of a message the Sierra Club had just received from the Internal Revenue Service district office here in San Francisco clouding the Sierra Club's tax status. I got that story to the press right away, and there was some digging, and the meeting between Udall and the IRS became part of the story.

Schrepfer: I thought he publicly denied it.

Brower: There was quite a swivet about that at the time. Orin Beatty, who was an assistant to Stewart Udall, then the Secretary [of the Interior], thought that I was besmirching Stewart Udall's name as well as Mo's in wondering which Udall had done it (because they were both in a position of advocating the dam at that time) and he hasn't spoken to me since. Mo I don't think ever publicly admitted this, but he did tell me that he thought it was the greatest mistake he had made in the Grand Canyon battle, because the threat to the Sierra Club was headline news all over the country. People who didn't know whether or not they loved the Grand Canyon knew whether or not they loved the IRS. [laughter] So we were all going to save the Grand Canyon.

There was an exchange between Mo Udall and me that I recall, one that he has spoken of since. We got into a discussion of compromise. He was questioning me in the House hearing, and he was asking me, "Wouldn't you compromise; wouldn't you take just a teeny weeny little dam down there at Bridge Canyon?" I said, "No, the Grand Canyon wasn't mine to compromise."

I think that that's all I ought to say about the Grand Canyon, since the battle doesn't seem to be over yet. Here we are now [June, 1974] with the opening of the ad I'm drafting here. Now all I've got to do is find some money for it. It's not a full page ad because that's getting expensive, but we think we can afford maybe a two-thirds page ad. Only eight years ago the Sierra Club ran this ad and lost its tax status; the opportunists are at it again. I'll just run the Jerry Mander ad that lost the tax status, just the top of it, and go on to tell you about the new threat. That's one of the things I'll be doing today, trying to clean that up.

Schrepfer: Did you think the IRS ruling was fair?

Brower: From the IRS? Oh, not at all. The IRS still hasn't come to what I think is an equitable decision on what to do about the privilege of deductibility. Right now, a corporation that wants

Brower: to lobby can take most of the expense right off the income before taxes. The citizen takes his deductible contributions off way down on the bottom of the form, not up at the top (which is of greater benefit) and cannot take it off if there's substantial lobbying involved. So the corporation is grossly favored and the citizen grossly unfavored, and the public interest in the long run is sacrificed by the IRS's drive to produce income that can be taxed and thus support the government, which is understandable. But this is a short-range philosophy that needs some correction.

Schrepfer: Doesn't it tend to be a value judgment who they decide to collect it from? Not only just corporation versus nonprofit organizations, but also some nonprofit organizations being favored over others.

Brower: This depends. Yes, there are still value judgments, and I suppose that will never be avoided.

Schrepfer: Or the National Rifle Association.

Brower: They've just lost it, two days ago. [March, 1976]

Schrepfer: Didn't it take a long time?

Brower: It took a very long time.

Schrepfer: And even the Wilderness Society--such a long time after the Sierra Club.

Brower: They have not lost it.

Schrepfer: But they have questioned it, haven't they?

Brower: Yes, they've been under audit and have been looked at very closely. It is basically unfair, and reform is needed. But reform is hard to bring about in this field. I suppose the radical but sensible view is to just drop deductibility and tax people based on their total income so that you avoid this inequity. But I'd be mixed on that myself. I think that what does happen with foundations to a certain extent, although they are probably more often than not used by corporations as a device, is that at least they are set up as different organizations that have a chance to second-guess the government. It's part of our pluralism that I think is an important part, in one of the few remaining democracies.

Schrepfer: Okay. So your success on the Grand Canyon led to the loss of tax status.

Brower: Yes. Or vice versa--the loss of tax status led to success in the Grand Canyon. I really think it did.

Schrepfer: Well, yes, that's what you said--both ways.

Brower: The Howard Gossage line was that an advertisement wasn't really worth running unless it got talked about, and that one got talked about. And then, as I liked to say later, one of the great Freeman, Mander and Gossage ads lost the Sierra Club its tax status, another one lost it its executive director. [laughter] They were both talked about.

Schrepfer: That's right.

Genesis of the Sierra Club Foundation

Schrepfer: One of the things that surprised me when I talked to some of the people among the directors is that some of them anticipated the loss of the tax status and didn't feel it was bad, even at the time; they didn't blame you for it.

Brower: Well, some didn't. Dick Leonard blamed me. In the late unpleasantness when he was working hard to get me out as executive director, he blamed me--that was in the statements he was making--for losing the Sierra Club its tax status. Phil Berry, who was also working to get me out, said that if we had our tax status and had to lose it again to save the Grand Canyon, we'd be glad to lose it.

We had prepared for the loss because we had seen it coming. I will say I did. I prepared or I thought I was doing it, in urging that the Sierra Club Foundation be established. Here I saw what was not happening effectively enough with Trustees for Conservation. I did not think that there would ever be enough money for legislative purposes got from these few fund appeals, to the Sierra Club members principally. It was difficult to get other organizations to let us use their lists in Trustees for Conservation. They all had their own funds to raise. Only the Sierra Club could be counted on every time, and that wasn't raising that much money.

It seemed to me that we were going to need to fund the legislative battles far more generously than we were, and it seemed to me totally reasonable to make the switch, to let the Sierra Club lose its tax status, go right ahead and let it be

Brower: as vigorous as it had always been before the Supreme Court decision of 1954. If it lost its tax status, be ready; have a Sierra Club Foundation ready and funded.

The Sierra Club Foundation could get its money from grants and deductible gifts. No member would care whether his dues--then, I guess, nine dollars--were deductible or not, and the outing fees were not deductible, and the Sierra Club had resources that it could use from the outing program. The money people spent for publications was not deductible to them, but that brought money into the Sierra Club, and it also brought a whole avenue of access to the media and to public opinion.

So, as I was arguing it then, of the entire Sierra Club budget, which was by 1960 nearing a million dollars a year, only about one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand of that would have to answer the criteria of a deductible organization. The rest would come in to support an organization that could be legislatively active. That's what I wanted to see happen.

I proposed it, and Dick Leonard and Bestor Robinson argued vociferously against it. I enlisted Phil Berry, who was then a law student. He went to Professor [Phil C.] Neal, with the law school at Stanford, and they worked out some language that I then brought to the executive committee. They saw that they had a skilled lawyer against them; the arguments they had been using were not valid. They had been trying to use some law arguments against it, and since the head of the Stanford Law School said that was nonsense, they gave up and passed the resolution that the Sierra Club had no objection to Dick Leonard's forming a Sierra Club Foundation.

Schrepfer: What did they have against it prior to that?

Brower: It was my idea.

Schrepfer: That does happen. [laughter]

Brower: At that point they were quite anxious, as I remember it now, to curtail me. I had been rough on the Park Service and rough on the Forest Service. The Park Service criticism I'd weathered quite well, even though Horace Albright came out on a mission to try to get me fired. But the Forest Service worked more skillfully; and although they didn't fire me at that point, they passed a resolution that severely curtailed my own activity--the Leonard resolution, I think, of 1959.

Schrepfer: July 4th and December 5th, 1959, against impugning public employees' motives, reaffirmed in 1963. Is that the one?

Brower: Yes. Beyond that, there were also words that related to legislative activity. This is what I was trying to find a way around; the publications program was a way around it: If I couldn't do it this way, then I would do it with books, and I would try to get a foundation that would free them from feeling so inhibited that they didn't want to impugn public officials' motives. Of course, nobody wants to, but you can question them. They didn't want this kind of risk to the Sierra Club's tax status. This was involved in that resolution.

Schrepfer: I thought they just thought it was impolite. They were worried about the tax status also?

Brower: They were worried about the tax status. And they were worried about the attack on the Forest Service because Elmer Aldrich, Dick Leonard, and Bestor Robinson had been talked to by Forest Service leaders who were accusing me of trying to make a massive land grab of national forest lands to round out the park system. There was a strong attack that I was waging then on multiple use.

Schrepfer: And on Mission 66?

Brower: Mission 66 first, and then on the Forest Service's various attempts to set up all kinds of devices to avoid saving wilderness--that evidence that came out of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review and David Pesonen's work. In any event, the Sierra Club Foundation was set up in 1960, so that the Sierra Club had an institution ready and waiting should the Sierra Club itself lose its tax status.

The initial thing that I did then was to put out a hundred letters asking for one hundred dollars each, against such time as the deductibility decision would arrive, so that we would have a kitty. I was hoping that would bring in about ten thousand dollars. My wife and I sent in the first one hundred. We got about sixty-seven hundred dollars out of that effort. That was the first funding that came to it, and that's why it was in existence and ready to go, but not as well funded as it might have been had Dick Leonard not been a Save-the-Redwoods League national park proponent. But some money was there; it was in existence and ready to do things for the general Sierra Club program.

One of the things I had proposed in the Sierra Club Foundation was that its board of directors should be the former presidents of the Sierra Club. I thought that was the logical way to keep the Sierra Club policy running through the Sierra Club Foundation's activities. I should have known better because that isn't the way things work.

Schrepfer: The way past presidents work! [laughter]

Brower: One of the reasons that time moves on and people come and go is that some people get a little bit too set in their ways and should be relieved of having to make the same decisions they've always made. There should be somebody else, who's going to have to live with the consequences longer, making decisions. At this point, at my own age, I can realize the value of that. It's awfully good to have fresh ideas; it's nice to have a mixture.

Professionalism in the Sierra Club--The Turning Point? ##

Schrepfer: To return to the Grand Canyon campaign, I had the feeling at the time that it was the turning point in the environmental movement's becoming a national issue with rather wide popular support and was crucial in transforming the club. I know normally it's said that Dinosaur is the turning point. But somehow the Grand Canyon, in the mass environmental movement, seems to be the turning point.

Brower: I would still put it back in Dinosaur. I think this is the time, as Howard Zahniser appraised it, that in the course of Dinosaur--and in the course also of forming the coalitions that I suppose should be mentioned--that the Sierra Club looked to more professionalism in its work. So that they had an executive director who could be told to go places and could be places and look for things that had not been looked for before.

Schrepfer: There have been many people in the club--Dr. Hildebrand, for instance,--who were quite expert in their fields. Even William Colby used a lot of his expertise in mining.

Brower: Here again, it was a matter of skilled work. Of course, what I don't know is what was happening before I was old enough to be aware of all that was happening. I became aware of what some of the experts were doing at the time of the Kings Canyon battle, and I didn't know about any of the conservation battles, to speak of, before that. But at that time I was aware of where some of the expert opinion was being applied, and I became aware of how it was being manipulated. Certainly if I'd been Colby's contemporary, I'd have known what kind of expertise John Muir and he drew upon in the Hetch Hetchy battle, when they were also bringing in the American Planning Association, the Appalachian Mountain Club, and the Prairie Club in Chicago. The Sierra Club had reached out at that time. Of course, it was quite small.

Brower: We went into the Dinosaur fight with fewer than seven thousand members. We were not big. But we were then traveling back and forth, getting to a lot of the hearings, and not just making perfunctory or brief statements but getting involved in coalitions with other organizations, having strategy meetings. I think, going beyond what had happened before, we also had coalitions to work with: the Natural Resources Council of America had started in about 1950 and was there to be used. It had not existed before, or anything quite like it. So we had a national group to join and, as it turned out in this one instance, to lead.

Schrepfer: The Natural Resources Council has not been as effective, or in the sixties didn't seem to be as effective as it might have been.

Brower: It has varied a bit. There was an attempt, I know, when I was chairman, to broaden it and to move it away from the preponderant influence of the timber-cutting and the wildlife-managing organizations. We succeeded for a while in getting a change. But that is now lost, and there's a great deal of influence in NRCA (as it's now called) on the part of the companies that fund the organizations that are into wildlife and into forestry. The meetings are no longer so interesting.

Schrepfer: I remember I was surprised to learn that you had been one of the early officers, because it seemed at the time when I learned about it rather at the opposite pole from your position.

Brower: Yes. At this point, we are finding in Friends of the Earth's work and the Sierra Club's and the Wilderness Society very little assistance from the Natural Resources Council; we have new ties. We tie with each other and with some of the newer organizations, such as Environmental Action and various coalitions that are put together at the time, and Joe Browder's Environmental Policy Center (that was an offshoot that there will be other remarks about later that don't cheer me at all; nevertheless, they are one of the lobbying groups and they are younger).

The others primarily in the Natural Resources Council that are dominating it are getting into cronyism, I think, alas.

IX CAMPAIGN FOR A REDWOOD NATIONAL PARK

Which Redwood Park? Split in the Conservationist Ranks

Schrepfer: What can you recall of the people who were the first ones to bring the issue of the redwoods up again?

Brower: The Save-the-Redwoods League ranks high in my recollections from childhood as an outfit that was out to do something for redwoods. I know that my family was interested in it. We had Save-the-Redwoods photographs up on our walls, and we were much concerned.

When the park proposal was revived I had not seen many redwoods myself. I'd been up the Redwood Highway, briefly, and I'd been to Muir Woods, and I'd been down in Big Sur country, but I'd never become an expert and am not now an expert on redwoods themselves. I just wanted to see them saved.

The revival of interest and the intense conservation interest in my Sierra Club experience came from Newton Drury. He was talking about the time bomb that hung above some of our finest redwoods because of bad logging practices up above the superb forests that were saved in the state parks.

Bull Creek came into my lexicon early and for that reason. Newton Drury spoke well of it and of the importance of completing the redwood park system in California. I also knew a bit about the threat to redwoods that was coming from the proposed realignment of the coast highway--the Redwood Highway.

In all this, Newton and Aubrey Drury were potent people. They rallied the troops.

Brower: As the time came to fulfill the earlier idea that there be a redwood national park, Newton Drury was again the man who thought there should be one. But the thing that changed things was that as far as I was able to determine, Newton Drury was not aware of the superlative quality of the redwoods in Redwood Creek. That is one of the things that neither he, nor the Sierra Club as a whole, nor the Park Service, knew about.

The person who did know about them was Martin Litton. As travel editor of Sunset, he had been all over any part of the world that was worth traveling to, practically. He could fly his own plane and photograph while he flew. He did a lot of personal surveys of where things were. He knew that Redwood Creek at that time was the superb example of what should be protected in Redwood National Park.

My understanding is that Newton Drury, not knowing of the existence of Redwood Creek's superb forest, had designed the Save-the-Redwoods League plan to round out the state parks and then somehow accommodate those in a redwood national park. That was where the conflict began between the Sierra Club and the Save-the-Redwoods League. The conflict carried over into the Sierra Club board because we had people in the Sierra Club leadership who were quite active in the Save-the-Redwoods League. That included Horace Albright, Newton Drury, Walter Starr, and Dick Leonard.

Dick Leonard at the time was a powerful person on the Sierra Club board, possibly the most powerful by several degrees. He had good influence with Drury and Albright and, with his Conservation Law Society, was building a good series of tools for getting the conservation work done that he thought was most important.

He was active in the Sierra Club, on the board of the Save-the-Redwoods League, and in a position to bring a great deal of weight to bear. He also became the first president of the Sierra Club Foundation, and part of the difficulty in the Sierra Club Foundations' coming into effectiveness earlier was my own disagreement with the foundation and Dick Leonard about where the redwood national park should be.

Martin Litton, Ed Wayburn, and I, I think, were the principal advocates of what we would call the "right" national park. Russ Butcher, Russell D. Butcher, son of Devereux Butcher of the National Parks Association and editor of the National Parks Bulletin from years ago, was working for the Save-the-Redwoods League and was trying his best to persuade Newton Drury that

Brower: Redwood Creek and the Sierra Club approach was the right one. He was relieved of his duties, in due course, because of that. Still, he kept helping us any way he could.

The difficulty between the Sierra Club and the Sierra Club Foundation, then, was Dick Leonard's espousal of the Drury proposal versus the Litton-Wayburn-Brower advocacy of the Redwood Creek proposal. The Sierra Club Foundation needed to raise funds, and as the guy who initiated the idea of the Sierra Club Foundation, I wanted to see it succeed. But I, myself, was not anxious to see a lot of funds go to the Sierra Club Foundation so long as Dick Leonard was there to use those funds to help counter the Sierra Club's goal. That didn't help the feelings between Brower and Leonard particularly, but I remained adamant on that, and he remained adamant.

I know that as we thought of the book on the redwoods, The Last Redwoods, I had difficulty getting it through the Publications Committee. Francis Farquhar didn't want the Sierra Club Publications Committee to do anything that Newton Drury wouldn't approve of. We wanted to make quite sure that The Last Redwoods would indicate where the park ought to be and what the key elements were. We were in a bind in this position because we didn't want to identify too clearly what was needed at a time when it lacked protection, for fear that it would lead to rapid logging, as punitive or vindictive logging. The operations of the lumber companies since then have justified all those apprehensions, times about an order of magnitude.

I did persuade the publications committee to go ahead with The Last Redwoods. It was one of the less successful of the early Exhibit Format books for two reasons. One, we did not get it out of the printers until early December. A book with that investment in it needs to be out some time in September to have a full play in bookstores so the investment in books is turned around into money. I remember going myself along Fifth Avenue with some copies of the book in a taxi, taking them to New York bookstores where I hoped that they would at least be exposed during the Christmas season. We didn't sell, therefore, as many as we might have.

The other reason we didn't--as I have said again and again in analyzing what happened to the various books--was that people didn't want that much carnage on their coffee tables. There was a lot of redwood devastation in that book. There were some beautiful photographs, but there were some that show a lot of horror, and it's not pleasant at the cocktail hour to have to look at what has happened to redwoods that should still be standing.

Brower: So much for the book. It did come out. It had, I think, quite an effect. I remember that Ike Livermore and I got into an argument, and he accused me of being dishonest for using the title The Last Redwoods because there were lots of redwoods. I didn't think that 5 percent was very much. [laughter]

Schrepfer: It's less than 5 percent.

Brower: It's less now, but it was about 5 percent at that time when we had a chance to pick. The loggers, of which Ike Livermore was one, had already got 95 percent.

Schrepfer: There's 4 percent of it saved today.

Brower: So, I still had a feeling of unhappiness toward Norman Livermore at that point. He had been mixed up with the lumber company that helped spoil the chance to have an adequate Butano State Park.

Schrepfer: Pacific Lumber Company?

Brower: Yes, Pacific Lumber Company was bad at that point. They jockeyed around selling the trees from one company to another until they ran the price out of sight, and then cut them at leisure. What is saved is not anything like what should have been saved.

Schrepfer: What do you mean they jockeyed around?

Brower: Just that. They exchanged. He told me that they could manipulate the price so that the state could never touch it. That's what happened. There were some sales made that would raise the appraisal values way beyond what funds the state had to apply to get an adequate park at Butano. We got a few ridge tops. I've never been in it, so I'm not an authority on Butano either.

I say now, to get the record straight, that I have not been in the Redwoods National Park either. Sorry about that. I did go up to the dedication, but as I understand it, the dedication was not within the park. We had Presidents Johnson and Nixon and their families there, and Billy Graham, and the rest. We were within earshot of the chain saws that were wiping out a slope not too far away from this little dedication platform.

The Club Embarks on Major Conservation Advertising, 1965

Brower: The National Geographic Society's interest in the redwoods was, of course, quite important. When they told about the tallest tree--they got excited about the tallest tree--they were not, however, willing to get into a legislative effort. The National Geographic Society in its history had been active in national park creation, particularly, I think, with respect to saving part of Giant Forest. But then they were so successful without being advocates that they liked their formula for success, and in the redwoods were not fighting for the park that we thought they should be fighting for.

They were also, we think, quite strongly under the influence of Laurence Rockefeller, Newton Drury, and Horace Albright, who were closely intertwined in the redwood battle. It was this close liaison that Newton Drury had built up with Horace Albright, who was always, or almost always, close to Laurence Rockefeller, who managed to be close to political circles and legislative decisions without being an ostensible lobbyist, that had a great deal of influence over Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall.

It was this group--this redwood power group who wanted to round out the state parks that Newton Drury wanted to see rounded out on his schedule before thinking about anything else--that called for a conference in Washington--you list it as a White House conference; I thought it was in the Interior Department, but I was not there [December 1965]. The Sierra Club was carefully not invited.

Schrepfer: To the White House conference. But the Save-the-Redwoods League wasn't either.

Brower: No. Dick Leonard was. Now you've got me quite mixed up because Dick Leonard was back there. I don't know whom he would be representing except the league. He was not representing the Sierra Club.

Schrepfer: The league said they had no representative.

Brower: Well, I would have to go back to notes or something of the sort. I would be quite certain that Dick Leonard was there to represent the interests of the Save-the-Redwoods League.

Schrepfer: That's only something that would have to be in his mind, wouldn't it, if he was there?

Brower: In his mind? He was one of their officers.

Schrepfer: Yes, but he was a director of the Sierra Club, too.

Brower: Yes, but he was not representing the position of the club, and he knew that.

Knowing what was coming up, or sensing what was coming up at this conference of foundations and other supporters that might help us, this meeting is the meeting that led me to dream up the Sierra Club's first full-page ad.* I mentioned, in talking about Dinosaur, that the Council of Conservationists used a full-page ad effectively to help save Dinosaur. The idea then was Fred Smith's to do a full-page "cause" ad, but then I took that idea to apply to the situation we found ourselves in with respect to the redwoods.

I arranged to have the Redwood National Park ad run simultaneously in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Los Angeles Times and, within a few days, the Sacramento Bee. This was a fairly major investment. Dick Leonard complained that all I was trying to do was embarrass the Save-the-Redwoods League and Newton Drury. All we were trying to do was save the right redwoods. The argument continued for quite a while.

That's what led to the Sierra Club's embarking on major conservation advertising. It was fairly impressive, if not so much to Stewart Udall as it was to the advertising salesmen for various agencies, who began to troop by the Sierra Club office to see if we wouldn't like to advertise through their agencies too.

This is a parenthetical addition, but at that point I remembered that if I were going to go to an advertising agency, I would like to go to Howard Gossage, who had written an article on advertising and what he didn't like about advertising, which included an attack on Smokey the Bear. Since we shared this hatred of Smokey the Bear, I thought it would be nice to go over to talk to Howard Gossage. That's what led to the tie-in between Freeman, Mander, and Gossage and the Sierra Club.

Schrepfer: Why did you hate Smokey the Bear?

*"An Open Letter to President Johnson on the Last Chance Really to Save the Redwoods," December 15, 1965.

Brower: Because I thought Smokey the Bear was a pious-looking bear who had no understanding of the importance of fire in the construction of a forest. That's a long story. But we have trees with fire cones; we have a whole series of mechanisms that go on in the forest that are badly endangered if there aren't periodic fires. Smokey was the epitome of the overprotection of forests from one of the most important forces in constructing an enduring forest.

The whole controversy about whether the Indians were right or not in the controlled burning they did back in the early days gets into it. John Muir thought the Indians were wrong on that, and some foresters thought they were right. I know that my wife's grandfather, Colonel John P. Irish, who was a Yosemite commissioner at that time, was quite irked with John Muir for his uncritical attitude toward fire in the forests--without having called it ecological. The general argument then, which is still quite valid, is that if you have too much protection you get an enormous buildup of fuel, and then when a fire does come, you lose everything.

That was the digression, and that's why I did not like Smokey the Bear. He didn't know a damn thing about forest ecology, and all he tried to do was make people practice conservation through feeling guilt. Howard Gossage disapproved of conservation through guilt. He would rather have it come from higher motives. In any event, that did start an important series of ads. I think it had something to do with rallying forces together to help save the redwoods.

Newton Drury: Key Opponent of Redwood Creek Site

Brower: I wish that the Save-the-Redwoods League-Sierra Club battle had not gone on. I wish the Save-the-Redwoods League had given us its support, so that the park proposal combined the completion of the state parks with Redwood Creek, rather than get into the delays that happened because of the internecine warfare between the two organizations.

There were not many people ready to say the Save-the-Redwoods League was wrong; they'd been hearing about the Save-the-Redwoods League since the twenties. There were also a lot of people who believed that Newton Drury was right, and the Sierra Club was right. This divided the forces that I think could have worked to save the whole thing, instead of the fragment we have left.

Schrepfer: You never considered giving up your plan, knowing that the league would never give up theirs?

Brower: No. We thought that we could somehow get enough power factors together to require the league to save the most important redwood stand. That was what we thought was quite important.

Schrepfer: Did you, or, to your knowledge, Wayburn or Litton ever approach Drury directly?

Brower: Oh, we approached Drury directly, indirectly, any way we could. We tried to reason with the Save-the-Redwoods League and get Newton Drury to recognize the importance of something he hadn't himself been aware of in time, which had led to this difference of opinion.

Now, what I'm saying here is of course secondhand, and it comes primarily from Martin Litton. I think you should try to get in the oral history series somewhere Martin Litton's recollections of the battles for Grand Canyon and the redwoods. He is extremely well informed, and he has been one of the most potent and vociferous of conservationists. When I would waver in various conservation battles, he would put a little starch in my backbone by reminding me that we should be not trying to dicker and maneuver; we should remember what we were trying to do basically. We wanted to save something. He was a good warrior, and I guess I got some of my extremism from Martin Litton, and I'm grateful for it.

Schrepfer: I think you were aiming at Martin Litton's opinion of why Drury...

Brower: Yes. Martin Litton was the man who told me and told the Sierra Club and Wayburn where the best redwoods were; and Newton Drury didn't know it. Martin was also on the Save-the-Redwoods board at that point, and he was trying to get Drury to move. But it's sometimes very hard to move people out of plans they've had for a long time.

Drury certainly had saved a lot of redwoods, and he is, I think, the superb example of the preservationist. I have great admiration for everything that Newton Drury did, except on the Redwood National Park issue. If you agree with everybody on everything it gets dull; we have to disagree on what should have happened for Redwood Creek. I'm a strong backer of what he tried to do in the National Park Service, and what he did for the state parks when he was the director here, and what he did for the Park Service before that.

Brower: I remember when I picked up the front page story that Newton Drury had been named director of the National Park Service. I was just --I'll use the word now, I don't use it often--I was thrilled. I don't think anything ever thrilled me more. That is, I don't get "thrilled," but I was so damned delighted I could hardly stand it. Here was the guy that I had admired very much, in what he had done in the state parks. I think that the kind of approach epitomized in what he had done in the treatment of Point Lobos is something that has not been written up properly yet. This man was the primary leader. I wish a lot more of what Newton Drury forgot had rubbed off on Connie Wirth, who never remembered it, nice though he may have been.

Schrepfer: You should read my dissertation sometime. I go into every thought Newton Drury ever had. [laughter]

Brower: Then I won't disappoint you at least except on disagreeing with him on Redwood Creek.

Schrepfer: I don't mean I was totally uncritical of him. I tried to be objective, if that's possible. Martin Litton did say some very strong things against Newton Drury.

Brower: I think those strong things were against Newton Drury primarily, were they not, on the redwoods. I think that I would reserve a little criticism, but not much, for Newton Drury's having said "Dinosaur is a dead duck."

The criticism we would hear of Newton from Horace Albright, his very good friend, was that Newton Drury didn't like to get over to the Hill and lobby the way a National Park Service director should, and that Connie Wirth loved the rough and tumble, and Newton didn't. Well, that may be, but he could certainly operate well using the great talents he had, without running up and down the Hill. I wish he had run there more, but I don't know that I'm too delighted about what happened to the national parks when Connie Wirth did come in and run up and down the Hill, and got all that money for Mission 66. We haven't got over that yet, and probably never will.

Schrepfer: I was not there, but from talking to Dick Leonard and the league, they relayed an incident where Martin Litton said publicly that Newton Drury had been responsible for the death of more redwoods than any number of people.

Brower: I didn't hear that remark. If I heard it, I don't remember it. But I think that Martin Litton had a basic suspicion of the Save-the-Redwoods League's operating policy of cooperating enough

- Brower: with the lumber companies that they could get a lower price. That is, "We won't fuss about that if we can get the right price on this." I think that that may have been--this is just pure supposition on my part in trying to recollect what I can of a good many hours of discussion with Martin Litton. One thing--he does have a photographic memory as well as being a good photographer. He uses it almost any time he calls you up on the telephone. If you get off a telephone call from Martin Litton in anything less than forty-five minutes, you're ahead.
- Schrepfer: Why did Rockefeller favor Mill Creek?
- Brower: I think it was Newton Drury's influence on Horace Albright's influence on Laurence Rockefeller.
- Schrepfer: You think it all came from Newton Drury?
- Brower: I think it all came from Newton Drury, in that Horace listened to Newton on this and that Horace Albright stayed extremely close to Laurence Rockefeller. He was a principal conservation adviser to Laurence.
- Schrepfer: I was wondering if it had originally come from the Rockefellers?
- Brower: I don't know. I was never close to the Rockefellers- and I'm quite sure that the battle on redwoods made it not easy for Laurence Rockefeller to be overenamored of David Brower. I think he was able to keep me off various things such as the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission and other little details.
- Schrepfer: He's not somebody you want to anger in conservation circles!
[laughter]
- Brower: I felt that he didn't understand the meaning of wilderness, so we didn't get together much on that. The Sierra Club and Laurence Rockefeller were never close. I think he liked things a little bit more genteel; we had a tradition of Muir, and he didn't. Muir was a fighter, and the Sierra Club, I think, has had that rub off on it early and has never stopped fighting. It wouldn't fight all the battles I wanted it to fight, at the time I wanted it to fight them [laughter], and in the way I wanted it to, but the club has been a potent force throughout.
- Schrepfer: You know, from talking to the league a little bit, I get a feeling that some of the reason they wouldn't go along with Redwood Creek was that they felt that everybody was ignoring them and acting as if they were experts on the redwoods, when the league regarded itself as an expert. A lot of times it felt as if it wasn't included in meetings or ignored in other ways.

Brower: My recollection there will have faded a bit. Newton Drury, of course, was always invited to Sierra Club board meetings as an honorary vice-president. In the private meetings--the conservation committee meetings--his interests I think were represented any time Dick Leonard was there, whether or not Newton Drury was there.

I think when it began to be apparent that he was not going to dilute his effort by considering Redwood Creek that we began to be selective in how we worked out our strategy. We thought at that point that we had an out-and-out opponent in the Save-the-Redwoods League. I guess we'd given up on that kind of cooperation, but there was certainly a great deal initially.

The first big spread we had on the Bull Creek redwoods was Drury-inspired. Then the rest of it is sort of hazy, unless you can freshen me up!

Schrepfer: How about the freeways, did they contribute at all? The sixties is the period where the freeway had been built through Bull Creek, or right near Bull Creek, through the heart of the redwood parks. Fern Creek and Jedediah Smith state parks were threatened with freeways. Did that contribute to the feeling that the federal government could protect the redwoods better than the state?

Brower: I think that must have been one of the forces, but now see how inadequate my memory is at this point. Certainly the State Park Commission had a devil of a time trying to fight off the Highway Commission. They weren't the big spenders. There was an enormous amount of political pressure in the highway building syndrome from one end to the other. Our own Sierra Club problems on that, you remember, I'm attributing to Bestor Robinson, who thought we shouldn't have these killer trees* along the road. That's one of the constant differences that some of us had with Bestor. He liked development and some of us didn't. We'd rather have people drive slowly, and if they wanted to go fast, go up the valley.

I can vaguely recall that this was certainly one of the factors. We would have a much better chance with a national park of telling the State Highway Commission to go somewhere else.

*["Killer trees" being the highway proponents' name for large redwoods on highway shoulders that could indeed kill careless drivers and their passengers.--DRB, 5/26/79]

Martin Litton: First Advocate of Redwood Creek

Schrepfer: I gather from you that Martin Litton was advocating Redwood Creek even before the National Geographic Society went in?

Brower: Yes. That would be an interesting thing to get from Martin because I think he would have pretty good data on that somewhere along the line. I don't know that you have any plans for that, but you might go to Martin for some footnotes on things. I think it would be useful.

Schrepfer: He's not in the Bay Area now.

Brower: No, at the moment he's in Washington, D.C., saving the Grand Canyon. He called me last night in Chicago on the way, and he called me after he arrived. He was talking to me for about an hour from Washington about a proposed Grand Canyon ad that I've got drafted here. He finally went to bed at two in the morning--I think! But that's Martin, back there because he feels it's terribly important that he get in there and talk to some of the members of Congress, trying to prevent the giveaway that's now proposed [June, 1974]--about a third, the heart, of Grand Canyon National Park, to the Havasupai Indians. There are about four hundred and fifty of them, and I don't think they need two hundred and fifty thousand acres from the heart of the Grand Canyon. But people are so sensitive to Indians these days that they have not put up the battle they should. There are alternatives. Anyhow, that's not redwoods.

Schrepfer: So then, the inspiration for the Redwood National Park came independently from the Sierra Club and the National Geographic Society at about the same time?

Brower: Yes. I wish I could remember better how long Martin knew about where these redwoods were before the society did. I think I'm correct on that.

Schrepfer: You don't recall any contact with the society? Let me see, they went in in 1963 and made their survey of the redwoods, when they discovered the tallest tree.

Brower: I remember the special issue of the National Geographic and the unfolding tree. The rest of this chronology is not in my head.

Schrepfer: All of the people I've talked to never seem to identify where the first impulse came from.

Brower: I think Martin is right in there at the beginning.

Stewart Udall's Two Lost Conservation Opportunities

Brower: One of the things that helped, and I wished it had helped a little more, was that early in the Redwood National Park battle, we had meetings with Stewart Udall. I could have arranged some of them myself, but Wallace Stegner was then an assistant secretary for literary purposes to the Secretary of the Interior. Harold Gilliam served that way and Don Moser and a man from Sports Illustrated preceded. Secretary Udall used this device to get things together for the books that he was to write. He wrote them himself, I'm sure, but he got good spade work done for him by competent people.

Wallace Stegner was there, and I remember his line about what we should be doing in the redwood battle at that point: "Walk softly, break no twigs." That, again, was the need not to disclose enough about what we really wanted to save and in that way invite the chain saws to have a picnic in that area.

Schrepfer: What about Udall's role? He reversed his position.

Brower: His role was one of, I guess, consecutive tentativeness. He helped at times, but he certainly left office without doing what should have been done. He had an authorization to round out part of the park, and he didn't do it. I suppose this is part of an overall disenchantment, the elements of which I can't identify.

There were things that Udall did that we liked very much. He reversed himself on Grand Canyon. He certainly spoke well on population and on growth. He was bad on the Storm King case on the Hudson, and he was certainly bad at the beginning on the Grand Canyon, bad on Glen, bad on Rainbow Bridge, good on many other things. I still think he's one of the two great Secretaries of the Interior, but he could have been the tops.

The collapse came near the end when I think the park could have been rounded out. That is, he could have used what the legislation provided him an opportunity to use, had it not been for growing controversy between himself and President Johnson. There I don't have any direct information, just part of it being that the naming of a stadium after Robert Kennedy, which is what Udall did, annoyed President Johnson no end.

Brower: That and a couple of details led to the final flareup, where we lost the greatest conservation opportunity of the century; where because Udall was working hard on it, the Sierra Club was working hard on Udall, Udall on the president, we were about to, as he went out of office in his closing days, reserve something like seventeen million acres in Alaska and the lower forty-nine for national park and preservation purposes. That all went down the drain that last day.

Schrepfer: The very last day?

Brower: The last day. There was a press conference called for Udall's office, and all the press kits were ready with maps of all the things that were going to be included in the seventeen million acres, I went over there to the press conference, arrived at the C Street entrance to the Interior building, saw the guard--it was Saturday morning--who said the conference has been called off.

I asked if the Secretary was there. He said yes. So, I called up: could I come up? I came up. We commiserated over this great loss that we had worked so hard on, and he particularly. Just down the drain. There were the maps of this extraordinary thing.

One of the big stumbling blocks, of course, was Wayne Aspinall, who pled with the president not to use the authority given him under the National Antiquities Act of 1906, but to go in an orderly manner through Congress. Aspinall promised that he would introduce all this legislation, and didn't. That was one of the reasons we were delighted to help retire Wayne Aspinall through the League of Conservation Voters.

Schrepfer: I was wondering if, in the redwood situation, Udall had a choice once the administration came out for Mill Creek? Could he have opposed the administration?

Brower: I think he could. He could have found ways for our side to bring a lot more pressure. This is a device that works.

It was difficult, I think. Udall was not at all sure that he was going to have his second four-year term, and it took a little bit of lobbying of the president on a part of a good many to make this work. He had to be aware of the politics of the situation. He could push for some things and not for others. I could not be too critical, never having been in a position like that. I've always preferred to stay outside where I could just holler at will. When you're inside you can't do that; you've got to work well with the organization.

The Lumber Companies and Ike Livermore

Schrepfer: How would you describe the lumber companies?

Brower: Despicable. [laughter]

Schrepfer: There was some division between the lumber companies. Didn't the Sierra Club try to make use of this?

Brower: Well, Ed Wayburn would have that better in mind than I, certainly. At that point, when we were trying to maneuver as well as we could, Ed Wayburn was taking over a great deal of the generalship of it, and I was allowed to do very little. [Ed Wayburn did not want an alternate star.--DRB, 5/26/79] We had rented a teletype for the Sierra Club, and I walked into the office one morning to find on our teletype a message that had been sent to us by Georgia Pacific. There were fourteen inches of teletype message telling us they were going to sue us for what we had said. We said, "Lots of luck; go ahead." They didn't.

Schrepfer: How about the labor unions? Did they play any role?

Brower: Here again, I see that in your notes and I can tell you how close I was by not knowing. [laughter] We did, I think, have a good division of effort. We had to divide the responsibility for various kinds of battles. It was no longer necessary to work on the wilderness battle at that point because we were just ending that one. The Grand Canyon was coming on strong. My principal effort was Grand Canyon. On redwoods I was an incidental member of the team. Ed Wayburn took that.

Schrepfer: Did you ever talk to Ike Livermore about the state of California's strategy--Reagan's role in Redwood National Park?

Brower: I think I never have. There was a bit of an exchange briefly on the redwood thing where, I mentioned before, Ike Livermore hit the press with a statement that was personally critical of me--accused me of not being truthful. I did not respond in kind. I guess I was gentler then.

His brother, Put Livermore, who was quite active in Republican leadership in the state, called me to thank me for not striking back. He was a little sorry that Ike had spoken the way he had, and he was glad that I didn't come back charging him the way I might have. But I wasn't really able to. I've known Ike too long, and he must have been tense that day.

Brower: We still will probably disagree a bit more than we agree these days, but when it comes to some important things, we don't. That is, he would like to cut redwoods, and I don't like to see them cut redwoods, but he certainly wanted to save the Sierra wilderness and worked hard on it. I give Ike Livermore full credit for getting Governor Reagan to protect the Mammoth Pass area from the proposed trans-Sierra road. I hope that there is the same kind of advice to Governor Reagan's successor. I don't think it's likely.

I don't like the sound of some of the environmental roles of either of the contenders for the governor's chair. [Interview date, June 25, 1974, preceded California's gubernatorial election of 1974. Ed.]

Livermore could continue, I think, only in a Republican administration. He's been Republican since they built the city of Livermore, I guess--named after his grandfather.

Schrepfer: Newton Drury was one of the only Republicans under a Democratic administration.

Lost Chances to Save the Redwoods?

Schrepfer: Did you ever consider at the time you were running the ads--particularly that ad that said, "An Open Letter to President Johnson on the Last Chance Really to Save the Redwoods," did you ever feel that perhaps this pushed the league into a position where they couldn't change their stance?

Brower: I don't know. I think not. They were already in a position where they were to bring their stand into effect; that is, they were having this meeting with all the foundations that were going to put up the money and they were going to put it up for their own place, I think. Now maybe it was a tactical mistake, but I don't think so. I think that if we hadn't done that we would never have got any of the elements in train that saved even part of Redwood Creek, or that certainly gave us a chance to save quite a bit. The larger part could have been saved if Udall had come through with the leeway he had in acquisition.

Schrepfer: Do you think Congress would have voted that amount of money? That was one of the league's basic positions--that it was too much money and you wouldn't get it.

Brower: No, but we also added the Michael McCloskey idea of "instant taking" which helped in that matter.

Schrepfer: Oh, is that who thought of that idea, really?

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: I've asked a few people and no one knew.

Brower: I'll give full credit to Mike. I'd never thought of it. Maybe he got it from somewhere, but I never knew of his getting it from anywhere but his own head. He was pretty bright in looking for ways of doing things. I was very pleased when he did that.

Schrepfer: Yes, it worked out very well. How about the park as it was completed?

Brower: Here again, all I can say is that I share the disappointment that many people do. It seems to me that one of the great tragedies is that the lumber companies went ahead the way they did and the government did not go ahead the way it could.

Virtues of Bold, Comprehensive Planning

Schrepfer: Let me ask you one last question on the redwoods. I've developed a slide program on the history of the redwoods based on my research, and I show it at various places. You know my dissertation was on redwoods. I'd like to add chapters to bring it up to 1968, if possible.

The problem I'd like to address myself to is why there was a split between the league and the Sierra Club. My conclusion was that it came down largely to a question of size--that Mill Creek was too small to satisfy the Sierra Club's ideas of a wilderness park and that in the league's mind, Mill Creek has always been a superior stand. I don't think there is too much question that the trees are very large at Mill Creek--larger than at Redwood Creek, if you exclude the tallest trees. So, I get this issue of wilderness versus the league having more of a museum piece--a very small, high-quality stand.

Brower: I think you're probably right. As you refresh my memory, I remember the really comprehensive plan that we wanted. The Litton plan was one that was going to preserve a lot of watershed and was going to hope for restoration once the exploitation

Brower: of that watershed had stopped. It was going to give a river experience; it was going to give all kinds of things.

It did seem to us at the time, at least I went along with this idea, that if you're going at long last for a Redwood National Park, then pick up the idea of Burnham--make no small plans because they don't have the power to inspire people; make bold plans. This should be a bold plan that would get lots of excitement going. A bold plan in the right direction, as bold as Connie Wirth's plan was for Mission 66: Don't keep chipping away at budget after budget. Say, "look, in ten years we're going to need this, and we're going to have to do the following things." Mission 66 was a great big program, and it got a lot of attention; it produced the wrong results.

The big, bold plan for a Redwood National Park, I remember now, is one that captured our imagination. It had to be compromised in our presentation of it, for the reasons that Wallace Stegner alluded to when he said, "Walk softly, break no twigs." The possibility of permanently destroying the chance was too easy if too many people knew what we hoped to see happen.

I'm wandering away from your question. But this is what happens so often: if you try not to have enough people know about it, then sure enough you don't get it. If I were to play it over again, I would try a different system. I would try for the big park, the comprehensive one, and I would try to see that something was built into the effort for the people who wanted to make money chopping up the chance of having that park, to make money on something else around it. That is, the Central Park syndrome. Central Park, in being kept as open space, has made a lot of money for a lot of people who rent or sell the buildings around it.

That concept needs to be applied speedily in other places--the Georgia Coast, up in Maine--in a good many other places--to get while we still can some good comprehensive zoning, some big mapping out, say, of the California viticultural reserve or whatever it may be to stop this everlasting chipping away and the inroads, the mothlike corrupting that goes on, the vindictive cuts and developments that go right in the middle of something that might be nice, to spoil it.

The only way to stop that is to take the people who have that attitude and give them a chance to make their money from keeping the inside beautiful, instead of going inside to mess it up to make their money. I think we need a major approach at the last chance we have at wise land use that incorporates that

Brower: attitude. If we try to exclude the profit motive, we're not going to have the energy we need to get these things through because it's going to require too much change in human nature.

Schrepfer: Somebody said to me once that no Redwood National Park would have been created if the lumber companies hadn't finally backed it because they so wanted the cash they got out of it. [pause] That left you speechless! [laughter]

X MINERAL KING: SYMBOL OF CHANGE IN THE SIERRA CLUB
[Interview 6: March 25, 1976]##

The Club's 1947 Position

Schrepfer: Can we go on to Mineral King?

Brower: Yes, I think that's good enough. On to Mineral King.

Schrepfer: Obviously, I guess, the biggest question is why did the Sierra Club change its position between 1949 and 1965.

Brower: The Sierra Club changed its position because of Martin Litton, period. [laughter] One person. I will never forget the board meeting when I had made a semicaving statement, and Martin Litton came on strong. I reversed myself in the course of that same meeting and got back on the right course. It was a temptation to find an easy way and to appear reasonable and to compromise something that wasn't ours to compromise.

Schrepfer: This was 1965?

Brower: That's when he pulled the switch. I can almost remember the room in which it happened.

Schrepfer: Not everyone agreed in '65.

Brower: No, no. And I guess Bestor Robinson and possibly Horace Albright are still on the advisory council to the Walt Disney interests, still advocating that Mineral King be developed. I don't know why I wobbled as much as I did, but I certainly wobbled. I thought maybe a modest development--if they had a lot of ski touring--would be good. Then I began to look at it the other way and finally saw that this was one of the really extraordinary thresholds to wilderness and that it should remain semiprimitive

Brower: --one of its most important aspects. You should have to know how to drive reasonably well before you get there; it is part of your having to earn it. We don't have any places like that to give away any more. That little valley in itself is not equalled anywhere in the Sierra; its elevation, its surroundings, its primitiveness and the wilderness all around it make it an appropriate part of Sequoia National Park.

I hope before I leave the planet, whenever that may be, that Sequoia is finished; that we get Mineral King and that we get all we possibly can of the Kern Plateau. That is what should be there. I suppose it would be fair enough to hope that the Sequoia could be completed, say, in the first century since it was started (from 1890 to 1990 would probably be a fair growing period). And tell people that it's a good thing to be patient, and keep building.

Schrepfer: I have written an article on Mineral King and, as a result, read what other people have said about the Sierra Club's change in position. The dominant opinion has been that the club sacrificed Mineral King, was willing to sacrifice Mineral King in the 1940s to save San Gorgonio and Yosemite and any other areas that were threatened. Then once San Gorgonio--this is almost a quote from Glen Robinson's book [The Forest Service: A Study in Public Land Management, Johns Hopkins, 1975, p. 131] and a couple of the other ones--once San Gorgonio was safe in wilderness in 1964, then the Sierra Club moved to save Mineral King. Of course, it implies the Sierra Club chose 1964, which it did not. But, in any case, is there any truth in that?

Brower: I can't say whether there is or not. I don't think so. I do know that I was involved in an article in the Sierra Club Bulletin along with Dick Felter on the California ski terrain survey.* We were looking at the various places that might be developed for skiing. We were all enthusiastic skiers, and I wasn't too far removed from the age at which I was advocating a ski lift from the Yosemite Valley floor to the summit of Mt. Hoffman [laughter], which was about 1935 or early '36, until Arthur Blake straightened me out. With a little help from Don Tresidder.

I was only twenty-four at the time, and since skiing was so exciting, it seemed to me that people ought to be able to ski somewhere besides in the red fir forest at Badger Pass. They

*David R. Brower, Richard H. Felter, "Surveying California's Ski Terrain," Sierra Club Bulletin, March, 1948 (Vol. 33, #3).

Brower: ought to be able to look at the High Sierra. I used all the standard arguments for opening up wilderness so more people could enjoy it. Sure. But for how long and at what cost? I learned to ask later.

Therefore, at the time of the California ski terrain survey, I was looking at the China Peak photographs that Dick and I think some others took--Lowell Sumner may have helped photograph from the air. I looked at the Cordtland Hill Survey of Mineral King and saw there were certainly some great possibilities of developing downhill runs with some drop to them. At Badger Pass, I'd been quite disturbed that the best we had was Rail Creek and Strawberry Creek where you could drop only about two thousand feet. The rest of it--there wasn't enough to make it worthwhile skiing it. All you could do was three or four turns, and you were finished!

We needed something that was more like Europe, and we didn't want Sun Valley to take it all away from us. There was this competitiveness. I was an ardent skier; I wasn't very good, but I loved it. I was therefore susceptible myself to looking to the places that could be more alpine than what we'd developed so far.

But I also was quite aware of the avalanche danger in Mineral King. That sobered me from the start; that was not the kind of thing you should go into carelessly. I remember the last time I was there, looking at some of the old avalanche tracks, where trees were snapped off about two or three feet in diameter and about twelve or fifteen feet up. These tracks are predominant all around the place.

Schrepfer: Yes, it comes out in the reports of '47 and '49 that you made--the avalanches.

Continuity and Change in the Sierra Club

Schrepfer: If I can just say what my conclusion was (and maybe see if you agree)--the club didn't just advocate Mineral King in '49 to save San Gorgonio. That was the primary reason, but there was also the fact that they were not too opposed to the idea, particularly with the leadership of Bestor Robinson. Also Hildebrand was a very big skier.

Schrepfer: But then, in 1965, the club had changed very dramatically. It wasn't the same club as it had been.

Brower: If you look through the attitudes toward wilderness and go back to 1928 when Sierra Club was advocating roads across practically every pass in the Sierra, and up by Tenaya Canyon, by Vernal and Nevada falls, Mammoth Pass, Piute Pass--you name it, they wanted a road over it.

Schrepfer: So nice to hear you say! That's exactly what I said in my article.

Brower: Then suddenly the ideas began to change. Ike Livermore had quite a bit to do with some of the changing of the ideas. But Howard Zahniser I think was key there. Somehow, in his function as executive secretary of The Wilderness Society, he saw the importance of getting off the individual organization's ego trips--each running in its own little sphere and not wanting anybody else in there--to invite others to come in and to take key roles.

It was Howard Zahniser that told the Sierra Club--and here he was the executive secretary of the Wilderness Society--"You should hold the wilderness conferences biannually." You'd think the Wilderness Society would do that; you'd think it would have proprietary rights to the name. No. Zahnie gave it to the Sierra Club, and the Sierra Club held them and became itself, out of this effort, a champion of wilderness. Finally, before too long, alas, it [the Sierra Club] began to become so self-centered in it that they would forget to invite Howard Zahniser to come to speak. (This was near the end, and I was saddened about that.)

So, the wilderness attitude evolved in great part because Howard Zahniser knew more about what John Muir had in mind than a good many of the Sierra Club directors at that time.

Schrepfer: Is it possible the Sierra Club was far more radical and purist in its early years and then lapsed for a period and then came back? I remember so often it was said, "Well, you know, the new Sierra Club as opposed to the older Sierra Club, which was just a hiking organization." This was used by some of the people who were on your slate in the election of 1969.

Brower: That was just a mistake. I happen to have been mentioning that at lunch today too. It was something I should have weeded out of the big brochure that was put out in the final Brower battle that I lost--talking about "companions of the trail." This was a false scent; it was a red herring; it was wrong.

Brower: The Sierra Club was never a hiking organization. Hiking was incidental to it, and a lot of members came in for the outings. But that was the idea right in the beginning, when Robert Underwood Johnson said, "Get your mountain friends together--form a mountain club." When Colby came in, "Get the outings going. Get people out so they know what they're talking about."

But the Sierra Club had hardly had the ink dried on its charter when it was in a legislative battle, and it kept on. It had different goals from time to time, and it certainly got a little bit timid after the tax decision of the Supreme Court in 1954. But it was in legislative battles all the way along.

The first lobbyist I remember knowing about was Francis Farquhar, who went back [in 1921] to argue before Congress on a federal power commission act and what was going to happen in Kings Canyon. They started right out from the beginning. I got into that, writing a little piece for the Appalachian Mountain Club, trying to get them going; I was comparing the relative histories. [See pp. 25-26 in transcript] The AMC is a hundred years old this year [1976]; the Sierra Club is substantially younger (1892 instead of 1876). And the AMC was never into the legislative program. They were doing something else, and it was a good thing to have done. It was, in their own way, a conservation by private organization, where the government didn't know how to function. They were doing this by themselves; they were running their own huts and trails. I'm not going to kick that, except that it was a completely different thing from the Sierra Club goal.

The Sierra Club did hike, but it was not a hiking club. I'm sorry that piece of information ever got out and muddied the issue of the various attitudes about whether you catch more flies with vinegar or honey. That sort of argument was legitimate--should we be bold or should we be diplomats? I thought private diplomacy belonged in the Bohemian Club, but it didn't belong in the Sierra Club. We were trying to get the public to move, and the Bohemian Club-type of operation is trying to get the leaders to move. You do that quietly, and apparently they do it effectively. But if you're trying to get the public to move, you've got to let the public know what's happening, what the issues are. You've got to be interesting, and there has to be controversy because people are interested in controversy. They've got too many other things to do if you don't have that good a show.

I do think the Sierra Club did have various goals. I know about the shifting of my own on nuclear, on the alternatives of using coal instead of hydro, on Glen Canyon versus something else.

Brower: I was making mistakes then myself that I don't make now, as I become, as everybody is now, aware of the limits to the earth. You didn't have to worry about wilderness so much when there was so much of it.

Schrepfer: There is a change from, say, 1950 to 1965. But it is not anywhere near as dramatic as would be implied by the "companions of the trail" charge.

Brower: No, I think it wasn't. The club was working on some things very hard. I was making more noise than the club had made because they didn't have somebody who was paid full-time to do it. I was rubbing a good many people the wrong way because I thought I had to.

Reflections on Volunteerism, Centralism, and the Schism in the Club

Brower: Also, the club was going through a change in life where they were depending some upon professionals. One of the big arguments became then--and it's not dead yet--are we a volunteer club or are we a bunch of staff? So it was staff versus volunteers, as if you could have one or the other instead of needing both.

I argued not too long ago at a board meeting I attended, when I saw some things I thought weren't going too well; I said that I couldn't get too excited here because I could be objective now since I was so far removed from Sierra Club's ruling circles. But I couldn't fail to observe what happened in Friends of the Earth, Limited. One year after it was formed in England, with a separate board of directors (I was a guarantor and helped found it, but I'm not in any other way attached to it), it was described in the [London] Times as the most effective environmental organization in the United Kingdom. One year! And there were lots of organizations--the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. You name it. They had it, and dozens and dozens. They were all volunteer. Friends of the Earth started right out with a paid staff; they started right out not to look for a charity status, if that was going to inhibit what they did, but to forego charity status so they could be more active. In those two moves--getting a paid staff and foregoing charity status--it immediately became effective.

Brower: The same thing happened in Sweden, where Jordans Vänner is now, having drawn in a lot of people who were in the other organizations because it is doing both these things: it has a paid staff and is working hard. And also it has a good nuclear policy.

This is one of the things that I thought was important. I still think it's important. I think the Sierra Club is still a little bit mixed up on that issue. Very easily Friends of the Earth could do the same thing; other organizations have the same temptation. You have to know how to mix volunteers and professionals. I think the important thing is to remember the limits to volunteerism; that a volunteer has a great independence and may or may not show up at a critical time. If you've got staff that doesn't show up at a critical time, you can change staff. It's the complementarity that's important.

Schrepfer: There is one difference that I noticed. In FOE, members do not vote and control the policies as much as they do in the Sierra Club. Is my understanding correct?

Brower: Yes. In the Friends of the Earth we do what a good many other conservation organizations do. There's a slate, and there's a proxy vote. We have an annual meeting in New York (this year for the first time it will be in San Francisco); the vote will be by proxy, given to three proxy holders. The nominating committee will have come up with a slate, and that slate will be the people who are put in.

What we want to do to get more participation of the membership as a whole is this time, at Stewart Ogilvy's urging, to appoint the nominating committee chairman at this annual meeting which comes up in a few weeks, so that there is a good chunk of a year for the nominating committee to hear from members and to review the qualifications of people.

I'm not saying the Sierra Club system is wrong, except that there is a lot of problem in that system. I don't think the club has always come out with as good a board as it might have come out with. Neither system is perfect. So far, because Friends of the Earth is pretty young and small, it hasn't become bureaucratized, as it will as it gets bigger and older. And the Sierra Club is bigger and older.

Schrepfer: One of the things that sometimes occurs in the club, when there are significant issues involved more than usual, is a shift in the boards of directors' policy; that is, it's a little bit harder to maintain continuity.

Brower: It's quite hard to maintain continuity in the Sierra Club at this point because there's hardly anybody who remembers what happened in the club's past. At this point, I think we have only Ed Wayburn on the board who knows anything about the roots, and he is really fairly recent.

The club did have a great deal of continuity before. Possibly it had too much. I think that organizations who had very little continuity have not had the power the Sierra Club had because of continuity. They didn't have to go through and review all the preliminary pages before they read the next chapter; that was implicit.

One of the things that makes the comparison unfair is that Friends of the Earth is still new. I founded it, and people who came to it, came to it because they believed in what I was advocating. It's pretty easy, at least initially, for an organization that has this much centralism in it not to have too much trouble figuring out what it wants to do.

But I don't imagine for a moment that that will go on much longer. New people come along, they have ideas that are different, and they're younger. They're going to have to live with the consequences longer, and I should move aside at that point. But right now, it's sort of easy. The Friends of the Earth policy is pretty much what I've grown to believe; there will be some differences of opinion but not much. I don't think that honeymoon will last much longer. I wouldn't want it to.

Schrepfer: Dick Leonard said something to the effect that you and he had acted like "young Turks" in opposing William Colby and the road into Kings Canyon. But then later he was put into Colby's position on some of the nuclear questions, where he was now being more conservative than the dominant voices. Is there an element of a generation gap or a generational change involved in the Sierra Club's "schism?"

Brower: There wasn't that much difference in age between Dick and me. What is it? Four years.

Schrepfer: No, there wasn't, although sometimes Dick Leonard refers to you still in ways that would indicate he thinks you're quite a bit younger than he. [laughter] But no, I'm not saying with individuals necessarily. But certainly the staff was younger.

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: And they tended to side with you, as I recall.

Brower: That's one of the things, I think, that happens in environmental organization staffs. For the most part, the organizations are poor, and you can only hire young people who can put up without having too much money. That gravitates toward having a young staff. Friends of the Earth staff is very young.

I said the other day that we argue about whether we should take the Eskimos and the Micronesians into a cash economy rather than the subsistence economy they've lived with. I said, well, we're doing it the other way in the lower forty-nine; we're starting a subsistence economy, and it's led by the employees of environmental organizations. [laughter] Which is true.

The generation changes, I think, really do happen. I think my ideas are still fairly new, but I would be the last person to know whether they were new enough. I try to be reasonably susceptible to the reasoning of others, and I try to see that there's a lot of delegation, that Not Man Apart puts out what Not Man Apart wants to put out. I don't think I have much to say about what happens, or that I say very much very often.

That means that the things aren't covered that I wish were covered, but we also end up with a very good environmental paper; the people who believe in it are making the decisions and having to come to decisions that are good because they're not counting on being second-guessed; they're counting on having to be as right as they can be. That helps them grow and it helps the paper be good.

That happens in the Washington office, for the most part, and with our field reps [representatives]. It's possibly the wave of the future, where organization--the ability to organize--is becoming one of the world's limitations; it's getting so complex that nobody can keep track of it now. It has to go back into little parts again--which is, again, something I always thought was going to be bad. I thought centralism was important; now I think decentralization is important. So I've been evolving there.

I had a cliché I made up: There isn't enough statesmanship to go around to each state, and so we must concentrate this in Washington. I don't think that's all that right anymore.

Schrepfer: You mean such as what Reagan has proposed?

Brower: If Reagan is for it, I'll have to re-think. [laughter] But certainly, as we get into the energy question these days, I think that to have further centralization of big generating plants is just getting worse and worse; it's not going to work. In big conglomerations and bigger and bigger cities, we find it not working. It's putting too many people where they can't do what they really would like to be doing with their lives, and taking them away from where their lives were better and, because of that, taking hope away from people. If you take hope away from people, watch the crime rate rise. That's exactly what's happening, I think. The overcentralism, the lack of ability to handle things that can be handled in the smaller units (the basic unit, I suppose, being the individual, and the next, the family). And you get--well, I'm getting beyond my field, here, but I've got strong feelings developing.

Schrepfer: That's okay! What's wrong with it? Do you think it's possible that one day people might feel that the Sierra Club's decision to go national was wrong? That part of its strength stemmed from its intense identification with California?

Brower: I suppose Galen Rowell has already suggested that; at least, I think he did in Mountain Gazette (September, 1973), in which he was urging the Sierra Club to remember its roots--that it grew in mountains. I think that those were good roots. For all of the differences of opinions Dick Leonard and I have had, I think we still respect those roots. I think we will still fight for wilderness--possibly in different arenas, but there will be, I think, almost total concord in what we should be saving; there will be difference of opinion in how we go about it.

Schrepfer: One of the interesting things in looking at the issue is that Dick Leonard is very difficult to deal with simply. Bestor Robinson is easy to deal with because he has--well, for obvious reasons--but actually, Dick Leonard, philosophically, was closer to you than he was to many of the people who were supposedly on his side in 1969.

Brower: This becomes a matter that I think you would have to get psychiatric help on--why did this rivalry between Dick Leonard and me get set up? There was, I think, something a lot more than just conservation in it. That is, I was looked at as the younger person who had been helped and who was not properly appreciative of the guidance I had received. That started rather early when he thought because he had helped me and I didn't want to go on doing certain kinds of work that he had got for me when I was quite poor, that I was just unappreciative and was

Brower: just looking for things (and these are his very words in a letter) "that were easy, interesting, and glamorous." And that was what was wrong with me, whereas he would take things that were hard and might be dull, and certainly glamour would be the last thing he'd think about.

I don't think it was a totally accurate appraisal, but I'm sure there's some truth in it. I don't think that I go for the things that are easy, but I certainly will concede that I go for things that are interesting. And I suppose I don't mind a little glamour, or I wouldn't be consenting to an oral history.

Storm King and Mineral King: The Rights of Nature

Schrepfer: There is, I think, one last element of Mineral King that we might discuss, and that is the implications of the Sierra Club's suit in terms of standing in court. The decision was made to try to obtain standing on a matter of principle. Do you think the principle was that significant, was worth the money that went into it?

Brower: Oh hell, yes! Very much so. Both Kings are related here--Mineral King and Storm King--in an evolution that is one of the most important things that is happening right now. I really hope that it goes on developing.

I got into a discussion of this at rather great length on Mount Hood a couple of weeks ago at a conference on wilderness and individual freedom. The young people there--and I would guess the average age was about twenty-four for 120 people (and I skewed the age badly with my sixty-three)--expressed resentment that they couldn't have wilderness experience that they wanted, that there are now regulations and that there are professionals getting in and taking people down rivers, that they were getting priorities on reservations, and the individuals should have all the rights. I wrote a stirring piece on that, scolding them a bit, as my wrap-up that I gave in writing after I'd left, because I got sick (lost eleven pounds in one day).

In any event, in one of the small workshops that was going on, we got into a long discussion on the question, "Does Nature have rights?" I remember Bestor Robinson claiming that Nature has no rights. I remember Emanuel Fritz saying that Nature never does anything right. [laughter] Both these are to me infuriating.

Schrepfer: It sounds so much like Emanuel Fritz.

Brower: Yes. So I was commenting to these people that Nature does indeed have rights, that Nature has all the rights. They are derived from natural law, which is a complicated mechanism, the intricacies of which we have just begun to perceive. Nature had all the rights until lawyers came along (that was recently), and lawyers began to carve some out for themselves. It was like the laity's carving out the role of being co-creator with the divinity. I think that the lawyers and men of the cloth both have serious problems when they try to do this.

When we think that we are going to be smart enough to manage Nature, one of the first things we should do is to figure out how photosynthesis works, without which we wouldn't be anywhere (and we don't know how it works, for all our brilliance); and then next, as a little exercise, design just one eye--not two--for just one person and figure out how to get together 120 million rods and put them all right side up and all in the right direction and hook them up with the brain so that we can behold Creation; and then figure out how to replicate that by wrapping it up in DNA, with all the other things that must be carried in DNA. Now, as soon as we feel that we've got all the rights and we can handle that, we can then take over the management. Otherwise, we should probably all enroll in a course in Humility 1A.

Back to Mineral King and Storm King. Thanks to David Sive and friends in the Scenic Hudson Preservation group and the Sierra Club, the Storm King case was carried on. For the first time, that I know about, there was a change in attitude in the court to give standing to something beside just the economic interest. The thing that I like as my personal footnote on that was that I was scolded for spending money out of my executive director's discretionary fund to keep David Sive on the case. It's nice to look back at that and to realize that that case was the foundation for all the environmental litigation that's gone on since.

That we move from there to what's happening at Mineral King, where the court thought there'd better be some individual concern here too, is interesting. And now the new suit for Death Valley, where Death Valley is one of the plaintiffs against the Park Service, is a nice concept.

This is a rapid evolution that's coming along, and I think it is going much further, and I hope it does. If it doesn't, we're going to have a lot of bad decisions that don't protect the rights of what we don't understand, which is Nature, or the rights of individuals who aren't born yet who've got to live with the consequences of our action too. So it's a new look, here--that the unborn have rights and that the environmental organization is one of the few institutions that's concerned about this.

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Brower: [After we ran off the end of the tape I was saying something about Justice William O. Douglas. I cannot remember what, but it must have been an accolade of sorts. It was he who long since was advocating a Wilderness Bill of Rights, and his reasoning certainly affected me. I was delighted when I was able, along with others, to persuade him to serve on the Sierra Club board, which he did briefly. He left in part, perhaps, because he told me he thought the board sometimes was a cross between a mourner's bench and an old ladies' sewing circle. He could have probably accommodated that problem easily. More difficult was the likely conflict of interest that would have become an issue, had he remained on the board, when some matter should come before the Court on which he might have participated as a director. Besides meeting with him in his offices, at board meetings, and in a wilderness conference, I walked with him on the C. and O. Canal once to discuss our mutual concerns about the Forest Service (Grant McConnell, Charles Reich, and David Brinkley's dog were the other companions on that walk). I walked there again on an anniversary of his first walk, but this time with five hundred others. And I enjoyed a several-day pack trip into the Mammoth Lakes--Minarets region of the High Sierra, when he, his wife Mercedes, Dr. Ed Wayburn, Judge Ray Sherwin and others were devising means of blocking the Forest Service drive for a road across Mammoth Pass.

Whatever nascent ideas I may have spoken of about the rights of nature were most certainly strongly influenced by a man I consider to be one of the great Americans, and one still needed on the Supreme Court.

What William O. Douglas had put in our minds is what I think the club was trying to see reinforced by adjudication in the Mineral King effort, so the suit stressed this aspect.--DRB, 5/26/79]

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Brower: Bill Douglas was very good, and his opinions have been extraordinary on this. He's certainly, I think, the leader in the matter.

Schrepfer: When the Supreme Court denied the Sierra Club's standing in the Mineral King case, it said, "The courts cannot decide value judgments, and they cannot allow plaintiffs to come in merely on questions in which they do not agree--where their values disagree with the action being taken. There is no room in the courts for those kinds of decisions."

Brower: The courts here are evolving also, and my own hypothesis is that the courts do write law in the form of interpretation that evolves. That the court has moved as far as it has, is important.

The Sierra Club book on Storm King was supposed to have been Storm King and the Rights of Nature. David Sive never got around to writing it. When Dr. Stone came up with Should Trees Have Standing, * it was a derivative of what was going on earlier.

The courts are still hung up, a lot of them, on decisions that were made as much as a century ago and are looked upon for precedent, and a court without a precedent doesn't know where to move, I suppose. But the courts have had this problem before, and they have a new reading of precedents as the years go on. To paraphrase Dan Luten's dichotomy here, the courts are now required, as the years come on, to relook at their older decisions in the context of a full land--decisions that were made for an empty land. What has happened to the land itself requires a new think, and it requires it, I think, sternly enough that we'll get a new think, even by the courts. Every courthouse has a weather vane.

Schrepfer: My reaction was, in the Mineral King case, that all the people who are favorably disposed toward the Sierra Club voted for standing; all the people who weren't, voted against it. Therefore, the split was exactly on the question of values. So they had not escaped values whatsoever.

Brower: [laughter] Very good point. I know the Sierra Club, if I understand it correctly, stuck very closely to wanting standing on the basis of the resource. They shaped their case that way. Friends of the Earth came into it and helped in writing an alternate route that I think is what has kept the case alive. If they came back in with concern for the resource, but also concerned as a user of the resource who was affected by mismanagement of it, then there would be another look. (I think I'm remembering that correctly.)

Schrepfer: They would stand for the public and the object. One of the things that came out in the Mineral King case was the lawyers from Stanford--the law group whose name escapes me at the moment--one of them said, "If the courts do not respond, there's only going to be one place left to go, and that's the streets." I was

*Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing: Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects (William Kaufmann, Inc. 1974)

Schrepfer: just wondering what your reaction was to the connection between this change in the club and some of the broader implications of the sixties.

Brower: I don't think anybody in a leadership position should overlook the possibility that there will be action in the streets or wherever it is. It would be folly and complacency to overlook this possibility. You can remember Munich, and you can remember the shooting up of airports and so on--violence wherever it comes. If there's desperation finally, people will not behave rationally. They will take very irrational moves. They may blow up reactors; they may do all kinds of things. No one should forget that power relation, which is the great leveler.

I would think, however, that before a wrong court decision would lead people to go to the streets, they would find that, yes, they've exhausted the route of adjudication; so they'd better go back and write some new law to be adjudicated. Jim Moorman had said, with respect to the trans-Alaska pipeline suit, "Yes, we can hold off, we can get a temporary restraining order, we can do things like this. But that's only for the time being; if you want something different done, you've got to get the law changed.

No one should think that there is any substitute for going back and getting some new law written and getting some support for it and getting it changed and getting that adjudicated. It's still a system that works, better than any other system I know of. The people who discourage this and make it too difficult for that system to work are the people that put their own interests and the country's interests in peril. That system should remain open, and the necessity for change should be heeded and respected and helped.

The oil companies certainly knew this. When the court ruled against them on the Alaska pipeline, they went to Congress and got the law changed--got the law changed to such an extent that I think it illegally, unconstitutionally, requires that the court should have no further role. If we had stuck together--Environmental Defense Fund, Wilderness Society, and Friends of the Earth--I think we could have gone back and won that case. But at that point we were exhausted, and there weren't any new troops. There wasn't enough money to keep after it. It's hard for three little organizations to fight the great big oil boys; the "seven sisters" have got a lot of muscle!

XI NUCLEAR POWER AND POWER PLANT SITINGS

A Perspective on Point Reyes

Shcreper: I don't know whether Point Reyes really should come next.

Brower: I think that Point Reyes and nuclear power are consecutive there [on the outline] not by any accident. Although you're not supposed to impugn the motives of people according to the 1959 resolution [laughing], I think you certainly should try to figure out why people are doing what they're doing. I think that anybody who doesn't is being naive. If you have to choose between being naive or paranoid--I don't think there are any other choices [laughter]--I guess I would rather be paranoid. Naive people look so simple-minded.

Why was there the sudden support, by the people who were putting in so much support for a Point Reyes National Seashore? Why was there a resistance or a willing move from Nipomo Dunes to Diablo Canyon? Those two questions are related because there needs to be a lot of space around a reactor in case anything goes wrong, and P.G.&E. wanted space without development downwind from reactors. So they didn't want any development in the Point Reyes area. And therefore, we had two people who are close to P.G. & E. (more than two) working hard on the Point Reyes National Seashore and getting support from surprising places.

Well, we needed the Point Reyes seashore for its own reasons, and if that was the reason for the extra support for it, why, I suppose it's an ill wind downwind from a proposed reactor that blows nobody good [laughter] or something like that. But in any event, I think that was one of the things that helped get the Point Reyes National Seashore set aside, and I'm glad that it was.

Schrepfer: Okay. I was reading the last session we had, and the last question I asked you was, "Don't you think that maybe, in the last analysis, the reason the Redwood National Park went in is that some of the lumber companies decided that, yes, having all that cash would be just fine?"

Brower: Yes. Well, that certainly could be possible. Of course, then you need to ask Martin Litton about Save-the-Redwoods League. [laughter]

Schrepfer: I hope to do that sometime.

That's an interesting idea; it never had occurred to me on Point Reyes.

Brower: It's Bob Golden's idea, and I must confess that I see some very interesting little spiders in the woodpile here. I think that it's a good point.

Schrepfer: Do you think any of the conservationists knew that?

Brower: I don't know. I think that some of them did, yes.

Schrepfer: Conservation Associates?

Brower: I think Conservation Associates very much knew it.

Schrepfer: Martin Litton at one point accused Doris Leonard of being almost in the pay of P.G.& E., as I understand. Is that accurate? I mean, is that accurate that he said that?

Brower: I have never heard him say that. I certainly know that there was a closeness between the Leonards and P.G.& E. that was documented in a letter which Jeff Ingram lost. There was a letter from Dick Leonard to "Dear Sherm" (Sherman Sibley, president of P.G.&E.). I don't know why Jeff lost it, but he apparently lost it. It probably exists somewhere else.* But in any event, this again, I think, is part of the Bohemian Club circuit. I don't think for a minute there's any question of anyone else being in the pay of anyone else. But there are ways for influence to be carried out other than through pay.

*Doris Leonard is now on the P.G.& E. Board of Directors.
DRB, 5/26/79

Disarming the Conservationists

Brower: I think that one of the things that worked well on a good many Sierra Club directors--and all those with whom I differed, of course [laughter]--came from their susceptibility to flattery. They were going through what happens in the advisory council syndrome: "We would like you to be on our advisory council so that you can, ostensibly, tell your organization about what we're doing so we don't have to talk to all of them, and so that we can give you some of our private information that you can't tell them, so that your knowing this can disarm your organization so they won't bother us."

This I think happens again and again; an advisory council is one of the political ways of dealing. There's another way of finding, if there's a problem in an organization, the directors who are more susceptible to "reason" than the others, and "reasoning" with them, and looking for the people who use the word "realistic" often. These are the people you start "reasoning" with. Pretty soon, you've taken an organization's sound position, and you've shaken it a bit. The foundations are not quite so firm as they were, and finally the position changes.

That would happen, and I think it did happen, on the national forest matters. It didn't happen in the attacks against the Bureau of Reclamation because the bureau didn't have any really good way to get to any of us in the Sierra Club, except, I think, through flattery of Bestor Robinson when he was on the advisory council of the Secretary of the Interior.. I think he was flattered there, and I think he was flattered rather often by the Forest Service when he was on their advisory council; and I guess flattered by Disney, being on their advisory council for Mineral King.

So, it doesn't take money, but you like to have your advice sought. And it's tough. If you don't give your advice, then what are you? You're just an oddball, you're a loner. There is no easy answer.

Schrepfer: To associate with the enemy can be dangerous.

Brower: Yes, it's catching. I think it's fairly certain.

Schrepfer: From talking to Bestor Robinson, I got the idea that he does have principles that he believes in, and that they agree with the Forest Service. He disagrees with you in principle, as well as what you're talking about (the question of flattery).

Brower: Well, if you were to divide the world into two kinds of people, there are some who like to preserve and some who like to develop. Bestor likes to develop. I think he has some very good ideas for development; he just simply has too many! Bestor is happy if you've got a map that you can lay out on a table, and you can begin to look at things that you're going to do on that map: We'll put the lodge here, and we'll put the road there. Then he's happy.

Schrepfer: You mentioned Martin Litton and Newton Drury. As I recall, he was very insulting to Newton Drury at various times (I suppose that's a good enough word); in other words, he didn't agree with Newton. How would you describe Newton's philosophy?

Brower: I would do it this way. First, I think Newton Drury--I've said this before--I think that he's number one in the history of this country in preservation. He's done more to think this thing through and think of the importance of it than any other person I know of. I've disagreed with him often. I do think that he saw a pattern that was going to work, piece by piece. That was in the Point Lobos reserve, with his thinking in that--what he wrote about it, what he said about it. It was in his finding the superb examples of redwood that he knew about--he didn't know about Redwood Creek--and taking steps that would use the force of the people who owned the redwoods, by whatever route, to get them to agree to help save some; to get them at least to do some tithing. He saw this as a system that would work, and he made it work quite well.

If, in looking for tithing, you also ask the person who is tithing to give you the other ninety percent, you probably will not succeed. He was succeeding. I think that he resented the application of other ideas that interfered with his grand plan for saving redwoods. That's where the problems were. I think that Dick Leonard, in siding with Newton and Horace Albright and Laurence Rockefeller and the others, was just too rigid about what else might be done, especially when there was a last chance--when there was a chance to get a major contribution by the public as a whole and quite beyond the admirable system of getting the small, private contributions. Finally, if things are going too fast, you need the whole public to come in. Ten cents a person from every person in the country is \$20 million, and you can buy a lot with ten cents from everybody.*

*So we waited too long and had to take \$2 from everybody.
Moral: acquire first; argue later.--DRB 5/26/79

Brower: This is the kind of shift that needed to be made. But it was not consonant with what Newton had in mind, and the Save-the-Redwoods League. That's what set up the problem, and that's where the Sierra Club/Save-the-Redwoods League problem was.

I was quite unhappy with the Save-the-Redwoods League--Newton, Horace, Laurence, Dick, and others. So was Martin. I think that it was too bad that they would not accept the additional support and go along with the kind of support the Sierra Club was then offering. That's too bad; we lost a lot of redwoods because of that organizational difference and, I think, a bit of jealousy.

Schrepfer: Do you think maybe that, if I can say, "your side" missed the bet by not flattering (to use your word) the league? In other words, did Martin Litton--for as much as I know he's contributed--make a constructive contribution by criticizing Newton in this situation?

Brower: I don't think he criticized until Newton refused to concede that there was a great big chunk of beautiful redwoods that he hadn't known about. It's too bad that other people didn't know. It was too bad that Martin was the guy who flew his own plane and took his own pictures and knew a great deal about the state of California and also other parts of the world, because of this combination of ability to write, photograph, and fly his own plane. It's too bad that the Redwood Creek resource was not known in time.

Yes, looking back over it, I suppose all kinds of other things could have been done to win over the Save-the-Redwoods League: "Yes, we want help here; we want help in your name. But, for god's sake, let's save all these redwoods! Let's stretch your plan to make it bolder. Carry the flag, but let some other people get in here and help you get the redwoods saved in big chunks while we still have this one last chance."

I know that Francis Farquhar was fighting the publication of The Last Redwoods as a book. Dick Leonard, because of his difference with me, primarily on the Save-the-Redwoods League/Sierra Club controversy on redwoods, would not let the Sierra Club Foundation, which he had taken over, put any money into what the Sierra Club was doing while I was there.

Schrepfer: Not let the foundation put money into the club?

Brower: Yes. It wasn't until I left that the foundation began to give the club support. This is primarily the redwood battle that started that, and then the nuclear battle later. But the redwoods

Brower: battle was the big split. The foundation didn't have much money, but they had some. I think the first contribution was by Anne and me.

Sierra Club Stand on Bodega Bay, 1962-64

Schrepfer: You mentioned nuclear power. I guess that one of the first manifestations was the fact that you had to fight rather hard to get the club to side with David Pesonen and to agree with your position on Bodega Bay.

Brower: I had to fight the club, and I lost. In other words, David Pesonen was on the staff, working as an assistant editor, primarily helping Ed Wayburn. The Sierra Club policy at that time was that no scenic resource on the coast--no state park or potential state park--should be sacrificed to a power development. Dick Leonard said, at this executive committee meeting, "That's our policy, but we're not going to do anything about it."

That's the judgment that prevailed. When it did prevail (I think Bestor Robinson was part of that; it was a split vote, but I can't quite remember who was voting how, and I'm not sure that that's a recorded vote). The upshot of it was that if David Pesonen wanted to protect Bodega Head, he could not work in the Sierra Club staff. So he left, and founded his society to preserve Bodega, and did it on his own.

Schrepfer: I read that in the minutes. I've got Robinson at least leading the debate against Pesonen. But at least the club came out on the right side on Bodega Bay, if not on Pesonen specifically. Isn't that correct?

Brower: Well, they didn't fight to preserve it. It would not have been saved except for Pesonen. The club didn't do it.

Schrepfer: They didn't oppose it, anyway.

Brower: The story--and this may be a repetition here--was that I didn't know initially what was going on. I did know that we wanted, and the State Park Commission wanted, Bodega Head as a state park. The University of California wanted a marine laboratory there. Starker Leopold called me up to see if I could find out what the trouble was, because suddenly the higher-ups in the state were telling the University and the State Park Commission to

Brower: forget it. It turned out that it was Pacific Gas and Electric that was going to build a power station there. They didn't mention nuclear. Then later they mentioned nuclear.

I was a little uncomfortable about David's sort of showmanship--releasing balloons and showing where radioactivity would drift if it drifted. I didn't think that that was going to be important because I thought that if they built something there, at least they would build it well. At that point, I was still for nuclear power, but I was against the use of the wrong sites, as I saw them. That was still my position on Diablo. I was for nuclear power in the Echo Park controversy; I was still for it in the Bodega and Diablo controversies. I was arguing only about sites.

Schrepfer: According to what I have, it was Robinson and Leonard and [Randal F.] Dickey who were against Pesonen and wanted to bargain with P.G.&E. perhaps to save some other areas, and to give up Bodega as a compromise measure. Does that ring a bell?

Brower: The aspect of the compromise I'm not so sure I remember. I know there was a little dickering going on with P.G. & E.; that if we did the right things in the Sierra Club on the coast, that we might get a better shake on wilderness designation in the north fork of the Kings [River]. That was one of the little compromises in mind. Then the Point Reyes thing may have been there. But then they may have known it; I didn't piece that together myself. I certainly noticed a great deal of hard work on the part of Conservation Associates on Point Reyes and Nipomo Dunes. Great hard work.

Schrepfer: The two tie together very closely.

Brower: They do. As I remember, the only friend I had on the executive committee at all on this one was George Marshall. He sent up a little money to help pay for David Pesonen's booklet on the nuclear park idea, A Visit to the Nuclear Park. I put a little money into that myself. That was a nice little booklet and very helpful.

Schrepfer: Yes, I remember reading it. Why, even up to the bitter end, were they absolutely unwilling to associate with Pesonen? Was it a philosophical difference? He was too radical or something?

Brower: He may have frightened them a bit. I think that they realized, as P.G.&E. later realized, that they're up against a tough customer. David Pesonen was living up to his Finnish ancestry, and he was not going to cave easily for anything he didn't believe he should

Brower: cave for. He was tough then, and he still is. I suppose the Pacific Gas and Electric Company wishes his father had stayed in Finland [laughing].

I'd like to put it this way. I used to describe the victory of Bodega as something due entirely to one man who learned his information well. He was initially a forestry major and then shifted to English and, after this experience, finally went into law. But he got his facts straight and stuck to his guns and frustrated the reactor plans of the P.G. & E., the second biggest utility in the world. He was able to do this thanks in part to the San Andreas Fault. Then I finally realized that it was the San Andreas Fault that owned thanks to David Pesonen because it was already there; it didn't seem to have much influence on Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and still doesn't seem to have much influence on P.G. & E.

Schrepfer: I guess they're holding up the opening of--

Brower: Diablo is apparently in trouble. I don't know how deep, but I think it's probably in fairly deep trouble. They did not build the containment structure, and possibly other parts of it, to withstand the kind of acceleration it could have from the Hosgre Fault.

Schrepfer: Did you feel initially that you opposed Bodega because of the scenic reasons, even before the question of the fault arose?

Brower: Yes, that's the reason I was on the side I was on; I was on it for the same reason the Sierra Club policy was for protecting the place.

Schrepfer: So, in a sense, David Pesonen was more radical than you were because he assumed that what they were doing was very possibly wrong.

Brower: I don't think he was more radical (I don't know; I suppose I'm sensitive to the word "radical"); I think that simply he was right, and I wavered. That was a time when I could have been tougher; I could have said, "If Pesonen goes, you're going to lose another David too." I didn't have the guts to say that. I'm sorry I didn't, because it might have had some effect at that time; later on, they'd say, "Well, lots of luck!"

Schrepfer: [laughter] Do you think the P.G. & E. was deliberately secretive in not announcing the atomic nature of it?

Brower: Yes, I do. I think they've been deliberately secretive many, many times, and probably will go to their death that same way. To me, it's part of a kind of general, corporate stupidity that we see in many places; that in trying to keep information from getting outside, they also kept information from getting to themselves. That included the information on the fault threat there, also later at Mendocino, and then, as we now see it, Diablo. The problem seems to be hexing Con Ed [Consolidated Edison] on the east coast, where they seem to be a little bit closer to a fault than they thought, and it happens to the Virginia Electric Power Company down the line. The enthusiasts for reactors are a little slow to understand for how long the place a reactor is has got to be absolutely stable. We just stumble into knowledge rather late. It's too bad that they were so anxious to have secrecy that they avoided the adversary process, avoided the critique of their own moves; it could have saved them an enormous amount of money.

I think if the Pacific Gas and Electric Company should for any reason fail, it will be in large part due to the stupidity that they didn't invite criticism. Criticism isn't welcomed, but it's good medicine and certainly prevents some stupid ideas from moving forward. So, you can see what I think about P.G. & E. at this point: I wish they were brighter.

Schrepfer: Do you think that some of the scientists who, particularly at an early date--not so much today, but certainly in the mid-sixties--tried to talk against nuclear power were suppressed?

Brower: Oh, I know they were! Those that I know about started with Ernest Sternglass. The AEC put John Gofman and Arthur Tamplin on Sternglass to find out what was wrong with his numbers, to discredit Sternglass. Gofman and Tamplin didn't like Sternglass's numbers very well, and the AEC didn't like Gofman's and Tamplin's very well. So then they started to discredit them.

I haven't done a lot of personal investigation of this. But certainly the things I've read, and what I've read that Kenneth Brower has dug up on this--he's written quite a piece on Gofman and Tamplin on radiation and what they've gone through--that there was this attempt to suppress. I suppose it's standard; people like congenial data and they don't like uncongenial data. That goes for the Bureau of Reclamation, the Forest Service, the Park Service, it certainly goes for the old Atomic Energy Commission; it goes for our utilities and reactor vendors.

Brower: And it goes for me--I don't like criticism very much either, and I would rather find data that I enjoy than the data I don't. I'm not under the pressure they are to have to stick to bad data or find they're wrong, because I'm on a different side of the endeavor. I'm not doing what I'm doing for me; I'm in a business, one of the few businesses, where you're doing something for somebody else. It isn't that I'm trying to pretend to any extraordinary purity, but that's just what the environmental business is.

Schrepfer: One of the issues that's plagued the Sierra Club was that of changing its mind, particularly on Nipomo. Then, changing your mind is not an inconsistency, but rather it's being open-minded. Is that your reaction to the criticism of changing the policy?

Brower: I think Jeff Ingram gave the best line there. He says, "Just because you're wrong, you don't have to stay wrong." There are a lot of people who would just rather not admit mistakes. And somehow--I don't know why people do that--the people who persist in error really get into trouble. That is, they hang stubbornly on, they get deeper and deeper into it, in deeper and deeper trouble. It didn't hurt Kennedy to say he'd made a mistake at the Bay of Pigs; people liked him better for saying, "I was wrong."

The Issue at Diablo Canyon

Schrepfer: I just have I think two questions on the Nipomo Dunes-Diablo Canyon controversy. You might want to add something. Didn't you and Litton know that there were negotiations going on between Doris Leonard and others, with P.G. & E over Nipomo Dunes, prior to that vote in May, 1966, in which Diablo was sacrificed?*

Brower: I'm pretty sure I knew about that and that a good many people knew that--for example, Dorothy Varian had paid to have Phil [Phillip] Hyde come down and photograph the Oceana [Nipomo] Dunes, and Ansel [Adams] had been down there photographing it. Ansel was part of the group that thought those dunes were an important scenic resource. And George Collins and Doris did, and Dorothy Varian. That was the nucleus. Will Siri [Sierra Club president, 1965-1966] came down next, and he was running

*Sierra Club Board of Directors vote, May 1966, to accept Diablo Canyon as a satisfactory alternate to Nipoma Dunes for a P.G. & E. nuclear power plant site.

Brower: through the dunes in a dune buggy. He finally made his own unilateral agreement with P.G. & E. that then needed to be ratified--

Schrepfer: Siri did?

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: I did not know that.

Brower: --that needed to be ratified at this meeting.

Schrepfer: I didn't know that he had actually made it. Okay.

Brower: I don't know just how this took place, but that's my best recollection of it now. That was why there was this adamant position, and the refusal at the board meeting to postpone the vote until somebody had been to see Diablo. But Kathy Jackson had described it as a treeless slot.

No one on the board had seen it. I thought somebody should see it. Martin Litton, as I mentioned earlier, was in Baghdad, and he was the only director who had seen it. He had a fit when he learned that they had given this away in exchange.

Schrepfer: So you really weren't prepared for the vote at all?!

Brower: I wasn't prepared for that vote. Or if I'd known that was coming up, I would have made some attempt to get down there and look myself.

Schrepfer: Was there any deception involved that they were doing it so quickly without giving proper notice to everyone?

Brower: Well, I think there probably was some. If you don't let people know too much, you don't have too much trouble getting something done. This is the standard procedure--don't excite the opposition until you've got enough momentum going so it doesn't matter when they oppose.

Schrepfer: I gather from what you've said (and tell me where I'm wrong) that you actually felt that the Nipoma Dunes should be saved, but there was just a question that there should not be a suggestion of an alternative made by the club.

Brower: Yes. I thought the dunes should be saved. I didn't know whether Diablo was or was not a good site. If it was an essentially undeveloped piece of coast, I didn't see why we should lose any

Brower: of that. So I was thinking, well, we've got Humboldt, which is already upset, we can develop that--we've got developed places around the Bay; we've got Moss Landing; we've got Morro Bay; we've got the Harbor Plant area on the southern coast--In all these places, you're out on the coast, you've already disturbed it, you've got transmission lines, you're not going into some unspoiled country (or relatively unspoiled) and messing it up. You're making better use of where the development already is.

My point was not to fight the reactor, but to say, "Put it where you should--in a place that will not spoil any more of our coast." P.G. & E. knew, and Fred Eissler knew at that time, why Diablo was being put in a remote place. He tried to tell me and tried to wake me up to this, saying, "Have you ever seen the evacuation plans? Do you know what they're going to do if something goes wrong--what they've got to do?" I said, "Fred, don't worry about this. These guys will build a safe plant." That was in my naive stage.

Schrepfer: Eissler and Litton both were opposed to the nuclear aspects?

Brower: They were opposed to the nuclear aspects. I know that Eissler was. I think that Martin was probably against nuclear reactors as such, but I can't say for sure that he was as of then. I know that he was very much irked with Pacific Gas and Electric Company --didn't like what they were doing.

Evolving Opposition to Nuclear Power

Schrepfer: Can you date fairly specifically when you changed your attitude toward nuclear power?

Brower: I'm not able to date that. I'll have to go over some notes, I suppose, in some of my old journals to see if I've got some revealing evidence. I was still, in the Grand Canyon battle, going along with Larry Moss in urging that we use the nuclear alternative for purposes of comparison. The Bureau of Reclamation was saying that their Grand Canyon project had a good benefit-cost ratio compared to coal-fired stations built by private capital. Then I was saying that since the technology for nuclear is coming along, somewhere along the line the thing that's going to give the dams a very poor benefit-cost ratio--in fact, a negative benefit-cost ratio--is to compare it with nuclear power and pumped storage, that combination. We had a lot of good data from Laurence I. Moss on that (who's a nuclear engineer and later

Brower: the president of the club). I was at that point close to Larry Moss on this matter and on what we did about national forests on Kern Plateau. I got a great deal of my understanding of what the nuclear opportunities were from him, but was uneasy in the Grand Canyon battle, as I'd not been in the Dinosaur battle, in talking about the nuclear alternatives. So I said to myself, we are willing to use this as a yardstick, but I don't really think we ought to build this alternative.

I began, still with the Sierra Club, I think, to be opposed in 1968 to Brock Evans, when he was the Northwest representative, in his using the nuclear alternative to save Hell's Canyon; I said we shouldn't do that. So that was when I was beginning to make my transition. I was becoming increasingly worried about the waste storage problem. There seemed to be no solution to that. Larry I. Moss (and I have to keep putting the initial in because of Larry E., who is somebody else) was saying that the nuclear waste would be concentrated, wrapped in glass or ceramic, and put in a salt mine.

I got a strong feeling of something reading "tilt" on that subject when, in August 1969 (and this is fairly close to one of the key dates), I attended in Chicago what I call a nuclear reactor salesmen's convention put on by people from the Argonne National Laboratory for Atomic Energy. We were surrounded by nuclear people. AEC Commissioner James Ramey made a speech, a long speech castigating the opponents of nuclear. I had the prepared copy of his speech in my hand, and when he got to the question of waste management, he skipped over two pages on that. I said, "Oh-oh! Why's he skipping this?" So that I was ready to be more and more worried about what was happening in waste.

It happens that they still say they're going to concentrate it, and wrap it in ceramic, and stick in in the salt mine, except they now can't find the salt mine, and they haven't concentrated it, and they haven't put it in ceramic. They're still just talking about it, all these years later!

Then I was able to remember my testimony before Clinton Anderson's committee in the Senate in 1955, where I was quoting Kenneth Davis, who was then with the Reactor Division of the Atomic Energy Commission and now vice-president of Bechtel for helping sell reactors. He had said in 1955 that in a minimum of ten years and a maximum of twenty, atomic power would be competitive with other sources, and by "competitive" he meant that it would be cheaper than the others.

Brower: Clinton Anderson's response was, "I know Kenny Davis too, but we're having a few problems with waste." Ten years later we were still having problems with the waste. In 1969, Ramey was skipping the solution in waste; and then I began to find out that we weren't having a solution to waste. Of course, we're finding more and more out about that. So that waste was what moved me.

The radiation danger from leaks or operations or mistakes--mishaps--began to move me a little bit also, particularly when we had our first international meeting of Friends of the Earth at the Forêt de Rambouillet just outside Paris. Esther Peter-Davis was there, and two of her women friends who were going around France fighting the Fessenheim reactor proposal, and others. At that point, they got through our meeting a resolution that had Friends of the Earth against nuclear reactors--no new reactors--until the waste problem had been solved. I still thought that waste was the key thing to worry about. Then radiation and genetic damage. It was women who could feel that more strongly than men. Women are more concerned about genes because they're much more closely related to children and what happens next. That's I think a simple-minded but reasonably accurate estimate.

The next bit of my own evolution was in my contact with Henry Kendall. He had been supportive of my work in the John Muir Institute, so I had occasional meetings with him. Early in '72, I became adamant in my opposition to nuclear power when I found out what he had learned through the Union of Concerned Scientists and had testified to before the licensing group within the Atomic Energy Commission, on an aspect that he thought was critical and of more political importance in getting changes made in a nuclear program than the problem of waste management. He was concerned very much with the emergency core cooling system and all the uncertainties about it, the failures of the tests (and all tests so far have failed), and that's when that aspect began to worry me. I read this testimony and was shocked at what the AEC had done to stifle criticism from its own scientists.

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Brower: I was shocked particularly when the testimony that Kendall and others in the Union of Concerned Scientists had prepared for the reactor licensing group, revealed how much had been hidden from the AEC licensing people of what the AEC scientists knew and that Henry Kendall was then getting ready to know. His feeling about the emergency core cooling system was that it had the political impact of letting people know that they were in danger now; that is, if there were a meltdown, according to UCS evidence, the disaster would be unprecedented in peacetime. The countryside as much as 500 miles downwind could be put out of action;

Brower: thousands or hundreds of thousands of people could be killed. And this is something unlike the waste problem, which is just a bother to people way on down the line. (Who's going to know about that? Somebody will solve it.) This is an immediate problem.

And as I say, I haven't wavered since. My position is now that I will be for atomic power as soon as we can be assured of perfection in design, construction, operations, dismantlement when in time it is necessary, and freedom from war, sabotage, terrorism, or acts of God. As soon as all those are assured, then all right, but until that time, a nonnuclear future is what we must strive for.

Schrepfer: Do you know of a man by the name of D.O. Calsoyas?

Brower: No.

Schrepfer: He is a nuclear scientist at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, who lost his job and his reports were evidently suppressed.

Brower: The story of suppression is rampant throughout all this. What happened with respect to Henry Kendall and the Union of Concerned Scientists was that he was financially independent, an atomic physicist, knew his subject well, was a careful scientist, and was able to call the shots as he saw them. Retribution was not going to affect him. There were, I am assured, attempts to punish him by punishing MIT and withholding AEC financing for projects at MIT. But they did not cave, nor did he.

Once he had started making some of these things known and became this nuclear speck of dust around which the moisture could accumulate as in a randrop, then information began to come. It first began to come in plain envelopes from people with and in the AEC, the scientific community who knew what else was going wrong. Then finally, as more of that became anonymously revealed, other people began to get more courage. Some people would speak up and let their names be associated with the criticism, and some of those people got into instant trouble. This has been widely reported, but not widely enough. Some of it was reported well by Robert Gillette in a series of articles in Science.

Certainly I know what happened to Gofman. I don't know Tamplin, but I have met Gofman, and I know from his own evidence and from what Ken Brower has dug up how hard they went to work to do a little character assassination on him. I've seen the AEC do the same kind of stuff. They first try the route of derision, "they" being members of the atomic energy establishment, as if laughter and derision could solve the problems of criticism. It has made

Brower: me totally disrespectful of the agency. One of the things that we thought should happen was that it should be split, and its salesman's role separated from its police role. Indeed it was separated, but there seems to have been a mitosis, and the bad characteristics have gone from the parent into both offspring. The sales syndrome prevails.

They are not building reactors as fast anymore, though. The surprise ally has finally been the economic factor. There is the sudden revelation that the economic feasibility and the net energy gained are far less than expected. The capacity factor is far less than expected. The costs have gone up faster than they thought. The uranium resource is far scarcer than they thought. The alternative of going to liquid metal fast breeders so that they could do perpetual motion and end up with more fuel than they started with is fraught with costs and technical difficulties that they had not foreseen. The specter of handling plutonium economy, and accepting or not accepting the Faustian bargain that Alvin Weinberg was talking about, is riding herd.

The inordinate requirements of capital are beyond their expectations. There is a new Bechtel study showing that for the next ten years 75 percent of the newly forming capital will be necessary for new energy generation as opposed to the 25 percent we have been spending. What that means to other human activities, education, health, transportation, housing, industrial development--the capital for these is just soaked up in the making of the kilowatts. It's becoming a blind alley, and I think that the people who are close to where capital is invested are the people who will blow the whistle now. It will not be so necessary for environmentalists to carry on the role. People who invest heavily in nuclear are simply not going to get their money back, and when people who control capital application sense this, and they are beginning to, we in the environmental business can think of something else to do.

Henry Kendall was asking me the other day, "What are we going to do when we win? What will we do to keep busy?" I said that we still seem to have a lot of plutonium around in weapons and other places, and the atomic physicists have a long job ahead of them trying to figure out how to disarm that. He agreed.

XII INTERNAL CRISIS IN THE SIERRA CLUB, 1960s

Strains from the Burgeoning Publications Program

Schrepfer: Would you like to begin discussing the internal affairs of the club? It's hard to know where to start. I gather that the differences between the people who ultimately opposed you and your allies start as early as 1959, with the question of criticizing public officials. Even financial differences date back as early as '59. Certainly by '62 there is definite evidence that you are dragging them along, on the Washington office, on publications, on Bodega Bay--

Brower: I didn't drag them very far on Bodega Bay. I didn't get them anywhere. As I think I have mentioned, the 1959 resolution* was the direct result of the criticism of the Forest Service [see pp.89-92]. The criticism of the Park Service did not upset them. There was strong support by Dick Leonard on my criticism of Connie Wirth and the Park Service, and by Alex Hildebrand, then the president, when I testified against Mission 66 and criticized the Park Service for opposing the Outdoor Resources Recreation Review. I came on with some strong testimony pointing out all the nonsense the Park Service had been up to, saying that they had slipped into the development syndrome, that they had been perfectly willing to stop defending Dinosaur National Monument so long as the Bureau of Reclamation would budget \$21 million for them to develop the recreational resources around the reservoir. All this in testimony before Congress.

*It would be good to reproduce that [December, 1959] resolution here. It was a milestone resolution--a milestone on the trip down the wrong road for the club.--DRB, 5/24/79. [See Appendix A for text]

Brower: Connie Wirth sent a wire saying, "I am stunned by what Brower has done." Alex Hildebrand sent a wire right back saying, "We're not," that this was necessary and we were together on this. Horace Albright, when he came out to try to get me fired, got nowhere.

But, as I have said before, when I was getting really weary of the nonsense going on in the Forest Service particularly during the battles to get a national park in the North Cascades and the Volcanic Cascades in Oregon, then Dick Leonard, Elmer Aldrich, and Bestor Robinson were the primary targets of Forest Service protests.

Schrepfer: It is ironic they would be closer to the Forest Service than the Park Service.

Brower: They didn't like what the Park Service was doing, and the Park Service response was Connie Wirth coming out swinging--Connie and his stubbornness. Connie was development-minded, and the Sierra Club board, except for Bestor, was not. Bestor was getting pretty well isolated, at that point, in wanting to develop things in the parks. In the national forests, he was not that fully isolated, and the Forest Service was much smoother in its operation. It did not come out swinging, and was smooth in talking to people it wanted to reason with, "You are a reasonable person; why are you letting Brower be so unreasonable and give the Sierra Club this bad name by trying to round out the park system using national forest land, and criticizing logging methods, and so on?"

I had been battling with the Forest Service and its strange and underground methods on all the battles I have mentioned plus the battle on the Wilderness Bill, where the Forest Service stabbed us in the back. At that point I think I felt about as much warmth toward the Forest Service as Horace Albright did. That was one place where we could agree at any time. The Forest Service was a powerful bureau, but they were not very helpful to conservation, and they were one of the greatest menaces to wilderness, as long as it had trees in it.

Schrepfer: The next issue that comes up is in '63 on the question of the Washington, D.C., office.

Brower: I wouldn't think we were without problems all that time, were we? What was I doing all that time?

Schrepfer: It was '62, I guess, when you were proposing a Washington office and the board was saying, "You're spending too much money."

Brower: The Washington office objections I hardly remember. But I do know that the next thing that hit hard was on publications.* There had been support for bringing out This is the American Earth, which came out at the end of '59. I had helped, along with Ansel and others, to find the money and get some co-publishing assistance to get it out. It had been extremely successful. I thereupon wanted to bring out the next book in the series, Words of the Earth. There was an immediate concern about what my plans now were for the publishing program. That I wanted another book and that I had still further books in mind was disturbing and led to a meeting of the board at Bestor Robinson's, where they set up a Publications Committee to control my publishing desires and make sure somebody was watching what was happening. At that time Joel Hildebrand was quite hostile in a statement he made.

Schrepfer: A significant faction didn't want publications from the beginning, then?

Brower: They liked This is the American Earth. There weren't many other publications before that that got into the kind of expenditure we were talking about with This is the American Earth, which became possible when we got a \$10,000 grant and a \$15,000 interest-free loan. We didn't have any such support for the Cedric Wright book, Words of the Earth. This was going to take some of the Sierra Club's portfolio of investments and a transfer, as I saw it, from investing in stocks to investing in books. The money would come back, and the message would get out.

So they got a Publications Committee set up, but Ansel was still very much for the Wright book and helped me work hard in getting the support for it. We brought it out, and also the third, These We Inherit, which was a reworking of an earlier book of Ansel's. As we got into the more expensive concept with In Wildness Is the Preservation of the World, Eliot Porter, in color, at an enormous cost, then the resistance began to grow. Francis Farquhar, for example, was on the Publications Committee and thought we had no business publishing on the subject of New England wildness. That was not our field at all, and we should stay out of it. He liked our special role of keeping to the West and, particularly, to the Sierra. So that was uphill work.

I am forgetting quite a bit of that struggle, but there was a great deal of it. The project became successful when Kenneth Bechtel made a grant of \$20,000 and an interest-free loan of \$30,000. He was making that through the Belvedere Scientific Fund, which was essentially Bechtel money. On the board of the Belvedere Fund he had Francis Farquhar. When I told him that

*See Appendix C.

Brower: Francis was opposing it on the Publications Committee, he said, "Well, we'll take care of Francis." We got the book through. Francis was against it, but he was outvoted.

Someday, if anyone is ever interested, I'll go through a list of the books and tell about the uphill battle on almost every one of them. There are a few that were exceptions. One was the Grand Canyon book. Francis was very much for the Grand Canyon and helped get that resolution through.

Schrepfer: So you don't think there would have been any books past the first one or two if you hadn't fought hard.

Brower: Yes, it took a lot of fight. The story that is more poignant than some of the others is On the Loose, by Terry and Renny Russell. (Lowell Sumner was their stepfather.) This was one that I thought was an important book. The Publications Committee thought that it was not the sort of thing the Sierra Club should be publishing. But then I made the first arrangement with Ballantine Books for small paperbacks of the Sierra Club big books, In Wildness and This is the American Earth. I brought back a check for \$20,000 as an advance against royalties. Chuck Huestis, who thought that On the Loose wasn't a Sierra Club book, nevertheless said, "Well, you've got all this money. Go ahead and spend it in trying On the Loose." I don't know what the sales are now, but probably about 80,000-90,000 in hardback and about 600,000 in paperback. It's a nice number and a useful book. It's still selling and should be translated into a good many other languages.

That's part of the publications story, which led to other problems. I went into publications to get the message out because that seemed to be an alternate route when they were stultifying the other attempts I had made.

That 1959 resolution provided that there could not be criticism of the government agencies. It was such a severe restriction that that was the main thing that drove me to the publications program. I couldn't do what I was doing in speeches and articles, and I tried to get this general attitude out in books.

Schrepfer: I don't think I ever heard you make that point before, about going into publications for that reason.

Brower: That was one place we could get the point of view I was trying to make clear, out where it could stand on its own and be referred to, be carefully checked before it was out, so that it would be less assailable than the occasional speech or the article or testimony.

Brower: The Galapagos battle--if you read the minutes on that, it is a story in itself. [see p.226]

Schrepfer: Did you feel they gave you enough of an okay on that book to go ahead, and then later they backed down?

Brower: As I look back on it, I think that what I had to do on all these books was to get them far enough along so they could see what the book was going to be like. Merely describing the idea and showing a box of pictures and a rough manuscript gave them no concept of what the Exhibit Format books were going to be when they were designed and completed. So I would go ahead on speculation, taking all the steps I could to assure the possibility for success, trying to leave no stone unturned for that. If they finally said no, the book would be dead. What finally happened on all of them was that they agreed, and there was an ex post facto justification. But that was the only way I could get any of them going. With one or two exceptions there was an adamant refusal that it was a good idea until they could see it out in front of them.

Personalities and Styles: Background to the Conflict

Schrepfer: So you don't think they were opposed in principle to the books?

Brower: Some of them were. There were always some who were opposed in principle to some of the books. One of the finest of all, Not Man Apart, was approved only because there was a Publications Committee meeting held at the San Francisco airport in which we won by one vote; one of the opposing votes wasn't there. It is still one of the most successful of the club's books. There wasn't an understanding of it.

There were various things going. I think that Francis didn't want to see the publications program of the Sierra Club go so far beyond what he had envisioned. It was like Newton Drury's idea of redwoods. He had a plan and that was enough. Francis had a plan for a nice annual Bulletin and an occasional nice book printed elegantly by Taylor and Taylor and that was enough.

August Frugé, who became chairman of the Publications Committee early on, didn't really like to see the Sierra Club publishing program having a bigger gross than the University of California press. He admitted some jealousy in this matter.

Schrepfer: He was your most bitter opponent at times.

Brower: He became a bitter opponent. I think he is feeling better now.

Then I can remember moments of utter stupidity on my part, or brash statements, thoughtless statements, unkind ones that caused trouble. One that really did it with Dick Leonard was at a board meeting very early, when Einar Nilsson was trying to say we can't spend all this money; we've got to cut back. We've got to have a year that's operating in the black. We can't assume we're going to have this money because it isn't here yet.

And I said, "It's never there until the year is over. People don't pay their dues until they are due. We assume that this is what is going to happen." We would get into big arguments about money. And Dick Leonard said, "All we're trying to do is protect you." My response, "You protect me with the back of your hand," was very abrasive on my part. It really cut him. His face just fell. It was quite a shock to him that I would say something like that. It kind of shocked me that I had said it, but I was upset. I would get badly upset at some of the meetings. I'm afraid that if there were tapes of them you would hear a strident voice. That was thoughtless and unkind. My diplomacy had not begun to develop. It will develop when I grow up. [laughter]

Now the wounds are healing. There was a pleasant New Years Eve this last time with the Leonards and Kimballs and Bedayns, all of whom had been against the Browers, and I've had some nice correspondence exchanges with Ansel. August Frugé has joined Friends of the Earth. Dick has been a member of Friends of the Earth. He sends me a birthday card every year, very kind, says nice things. Sends cards from overseas.

It was a very difficult time, a bad time, lots of wounds. I wish I could say that they were all wrong at all times. I led them a merry chase. I felt that I had to, that there were a lot of things that needed to be done, and if I took the risk, I would rather do it than not.

I took my counsel in my own behavior from August Frugé. Somewhere along the line, in some bar or other, we were discussing what needs to be done in human affairs. He ran his finger along the edge of the table and said, "You've got to be out here at the edge. You may fall off, but if you're back towards the middle, it's too safe. Nothing happens." So I went over to the edge of the table, and I fell off. [laughter]

Schrepfer: It may be difficult to generalize about it, because it seems that each one of the men had his own peculiar reason. I'm thinking of Phil Berry, who was on your side for a long time and then voted against you.

Brower: I think Phil got ambitious. We have a good rapport, have built it back again, but he was going through an ambitious phase. This was one of the things that I think destroyed his first marriage too; something was happening to him. In Phil, I saw two Phils, one when he was under the influence of his mother and one when under the influence of his father. If he'd stayed under the influence of his mother, he would have gone to Stanford Medical School. He went to Stanford Law School instead; his father's influence finally prevailed. He kept both courses open right until the last possible moment, and then went into law. It did things to his whole attitude toward life. When he was thinking as a doctor, he was thinking of racial equality, he was thinking as a conservationist. When he was thinking as a lawyer, he was thinking as a schemer and a politician. That's my own appraisal of Phil.

There was also in Phil, and I think that Mrs. Brower could point this out, a fairly strong feeling of sibling rivalry. He did not get along too well at times with my children, whom he felt he was a sibling of in a way. This was in part because of what happened early in his life, when his parents were divorced, and he was for the most part with his mother. On his first Sierra Club High Trip, I had to give my permission that he go. He was around our house a great deal. He showed us every new girl friend he had. We had a good rapport--sort of like one of the sons. He was pretty mean to Bob, my middle son, and he tried to get Ken, my oldest son, in trouble in the Army Reserve unit they were in together, Phil as an officer.

So that was the strange streak in Phil. He could describe the strange streaks in me.

Schrepfer: Do you think that there was some element of jealousy about the fact that you had become so important and were so well known? I had just moved to San Francisco at the time and become involved with the environmental movement. I didn't know anything, but I certainly knew who you were, and I didn't know who any of the others were.

Brower: Yes. There wasn't a very low profile. "Here's a guy getting paid, and he's getting his picture in the papers, and articles and profiles here and there. Here we are working for nothing. It's crazy." I guess I didn't know what to do about it. I just



In the Grand Canyon (ca. 1965)

Photo by Martin Litton



Executive Director, Sierra Club (ca. 1967)

Photo by Joe Munroe



David, John, Anne, and Barbara Brower, with Isabelle, 1966

Brower: made the most of it. I had been very shy, and I didn't know what to do about it. I liked to see the profile in Life. I didn't mind running around with McPhee--John McPhee--as casting director.

The Question of Authorization ##

[Interview 7: January 20, 1977]

Schrepfer: Let's turn now to the period primarily of 1967 through '68 and take some of the issues that were particularly dominant in the club's internal problems during that period. There were several attempts in these two years by some of the directors of the club to have you dispossessed, particularly I think in early '67 and then again in the fall of '68.

One of the issues that comes up again and again is the question of authorization. I thought we might cover authorization --that is, what your understanding of the board of directors' authorization was, and cover that chronologically from about late '66 through the early part of '69.

I think one of the first ones that comes to mind is the question of contracts. In September of '66 the board of directors made several administrative procedural changes aimed at getting more control on behalf of the volunteers--the directors, the publications committee, the finance committee--of contract and agreement procedures, changing procedures that I guess you had followed for many years up to that point.

Why suddenly weren't the procedures that had been used for some fifteen years workable? How significant were these changes that were made in the fall?

Brower: The period that has passed since then--ten years plus--has certainly dulled the specifics of my recollections of all this. I can remember more of the context than the details and the dates. I remember the first major attempt--and I've gone over this before--to curtail the authority that the board had given me and written into my initial job description as executive director, meaning that I was supposed to direct and be the chief of staff and inform the directors under their general supervision.

Brower: There was a continuing contest over how much they wanted to delegate of what they had delegated, in fact, in their first job description and the way the job worked out in the earlier years. We reviewed before what I think led up to the major curtailment--the board resolution in December, 1959. With that resolution, they undertook to see what might be done to curtail my operating flexibility, as we have discussed before. [pp. 89-92, pp 208-209]

Other curtailments were just, I think, largely a matter of differences in personality. Ed Wayburn, as president, always wanted to be on top of things. He wanted to play cards close to his vest. He didn't want decisions made without their being carefully reviewed. He didn't want the back page of the Sierra Club Bulletin covering subjects that were to be acted upon immediately, done without Wayburn's approval.

Will Siri, on the other hand, was quite willing to delegate. Alex Hildebrand was a major advocate of delegating authority. So, to a certain extent, was Nathan Clark. There were varying attitudes about how much authority the executive director should have, and how much review over detail there should be (considering that the legally responsible executive was the president).

Wayburn was the one who wanted to delegate practically nothing; he didn't want me to be the executive director. That's my view, looking back over these years. He wanted me to be an administrative assistant to him.

The difficulty with Wayburn--who is a capable man who has accomplished a great deal--were underlying most of my problems in my final years with the Sierra Club. He did not want to delegate. I remember, for example, in a North Cascades park proposal, we wanted to run a full-page ad, the way we'd been running ads on the Grand Canyon and the redwoods. Draft after draft were prepared, and he was going over all the various words.

About a year went by, and it was not done. It just never got cleared. It wasn't quite right for the time, it wasn't time to run it, the wording wasn't right, or the emphasis wrong. Headline after headline was reworked, and then we never ran it at all. Finally, the ad that was run had to be run by the North Cascades Conservation Council and signed by Pat Goldsworthy. The Sierra Club never ran one at all.

But those are the difficulties and personality differences that a man with a better political sense and astuteness and ability to manipulate people than I have, or ever will have,

Brower: could have handled. But I didn't. I was not properly trained, somehow, in working carefully with people and smoothing the way ahead of time, letting them know what I was up to in advance, checking at least with a few key people--the way anyone with political sense would do.

I was always concerned more with my own counsel that with trying to bring people along. Alex Hildebrand had warned me, "Don't get so far out ahead. Bring us along with you." I realized he was right, but I would be busy and papers would pile up, and I thought, "Well, I would rather risk myself than risk the battle."

I would excuse it on the grounds that there were just so many things to do that I couldn't cover all the bases. They should wait until I made a major mistake and worry about that, rather than worry about clearing all the details in advance. That flexibility was an important part of what I thought would enable the Sierra Club to move fast enough to be effective.

My arguments, for the most part, prevailed. We had a flexible administrative system. The executive committee carried most of the burden, the board not so much. Then we had a conservation administration committee that consisted of the president, the conservation committee chairman, and myself.

In case of need to act quickly, we would get on the telephone and clear something and move it. This is part of a long answer to your question about authorization. I do not believe there was any time when I exceeded an authorization of the power that was delegated to me by the board. There was a great deal of argument about that by Sill and by Leonard when they made their charges in September, 1968, and sprang them at me. At that meeting David Sive (whom I have just recommended for head of the EPA) protested that this was an entirely unethical method of bringing an attack, to spring something on a person in a meeting, read the charges in public, without having given him a chance to get any defense prepared in advance.

The upshot of that was that the charges were not sustained. This was lost sight of in the controversy that ensued--that the charges that they made were not sustained and the board voted against them. I remember the action. They did not sustain the charges at all.

Now Ansel Adams's concern--and he was the first one to call for my removal--was another matter. I was stunned when it came up first, because I didn't think that the friendship we'd had for so long had deteriorated to that point. He had been sort of my

Brower: father confessor. I would take all my troubles to Ansel, as we were working over various books. We worked over the books he had a part in, This Is the American Earth; he helped with Words of the Earth and These We Inherit, which was the reworking of an earlier book; and then with the effort to do the two parts of The Eloquent Light. My trips to Ansel's--first in San Francisco, and then later down to Carmel--would consist of a lot of creative work, and then a lot of my moaning about what wasn't going right, and all the people who weren't letting me do the things I wanted to do as fast as I wanted to do them.

That, I think, led up to the story about one board meeting that I tell rather often. I think it was a far more important story than I ever realized at the time. We'd put out several books already. That included two of Eliot Porter's, In Wilderness Is the Preservation of the World and The Place No One Knew: Glen Canyon of the Colorado.

Those two books had been most successful, and I made the tactless remark in the presence of the directors, including both Ansel Adams and Eliot Porter, that Eliot Porter was our most valuable property. I was alluding to the amount of money that the books had been earning. The Eliot Porter books had sold very well at that point.

I'm sure that offended Ansel no end, because Ansel had been the one who taught me about everything I knew about photography to start with, and who had helped with the books and helped get everything started. It offended him because I think he may have believed that he was the most valuable property. It had offended Eliot because he didn't believe he was a property. [laughs] So, with one fell swoop, I antagonized two good friends.

Ansel would probably say, "Oh poof, I don't even remember it," or something of the sort, but I think it must have had quite an effect on him.

The other thing is that he was a close neighbor of Bill Webb, who was one of the book salesmen who was carrying our books around. Bill Webb is not an optimist and never will be. He's a photographer himself, and I think a good book salesman. But he has a very great talent for looking at the dark side of things. He too was telling Ansel all his troubles about the books that weren't out on time or some things that weren't going well.

Ansel I think was concurrently very aware, although he may not have known the financial background of it all, of how much capital was being invested into the book program, how much of the

Brower: club investment portfolio was being switched to books. I think he had a better sense than I did at that time of how a rapid growth in a new department, such as the publication department's was, in the sale of books, was even more heavily demanding of capital. The more successful you are, the more new capital you have to have to finance inventory and to finance the accounts at the bookstores while they wait to pay you, which bookstores almost always do late.

I think that he foresaw that a too-rapid growth and a failure to meet with schedules, combined with inadequate organization on my part, could lead to a major financial disaster for the Sierra Club. I'm interpreting that myself, but I think that may have been one of the things that motivated him and some of the others. I learned more about the needs of capital as the years went on. There was a real need for new capital, and I think the board was supportive of it.

The slowness of our getting the new capital, of our finding ways to raise the funds for it, the unwillingness of the Sierra Club Foundation, which was then beginning to acquire capital, to let me have any--owing to the contest of the Sierra Club and the Save-The-Redwoods League over the redwood park, which Dick Leonard didn't want to see aided on the Sierra Club's part--were preparatory to the problems that I finally got into with the contracts.

I think the contract issue was not a real issue at all. It was just brought in as one of ways that they seemed to think they could find vulnerability and attack.

As I look back over the years--and I've said this quite often in speeches around the country--the kinds of incompetence I had were constant. I was always poor at getting my letters answered. I never seemed to be able to either delegate enough to secretarial help or to stop taking on more than I could adequately handle, to appear to be an administrator of any capability at all. There was a gross incompetence there.

But again, I repeat, that that was constant, all the way through my employment. In the beginning, that was reflected in a lot of things that piled up on my desk while I was fighting for Echo Park. But at that point, the board was supportive, fully supportive, and they waded in and did the things that I couldn't do while I was carrying on such leadership as I did in the Echo Park battle. They were delighted, apparently, to do it. They put their shoulders to the wheel and filled in and answered letters. Dick Leonard has highly praised what happened at that time.

Brower: It became quite a different story when I was attacking the Forest Service instead of the Bureau of Reclamation, and somewhat of a different story when I was attacking the Park Service. I had essentially good support on the board when I attacked the Park Service for what Mission 66 was about to do to the national parks.

Diablo Canyon: The Key Issue

Brower: The thing that did more harm than anything else was the Diablo Canyon controversy. I think that the problems that came to the fore and led to my final separation were almost entirely the result of that controversy--the split that developed on the board and my clear identification with the side that did not want the reactors built at Diablo Canyon. It's quite amusing to look back on that now, but it wasn't amusing at all at the time, to see that we were split over not whether there should be reactors, but simply where. I wanted the reactors in a place that was already developed, instead of taking a relatively unspoiled piece of coast.

The Pacific Gas and Electric Company knew then what I didn't know then, that the Atomic Energy Commission would not permit them to build reactors in any developed area, because the safety is not adequate. That's still true. They cannot build reactors in developed areas. They have got to be remote. In case of accident, there has to be an evacuation plan.

Schrepfer: What about Indian Point?

Brower: Indian Point is far too close to New York City, but they didn't know quite how far it should be. They didn't then have enough data from the AEC's Brookhaven Report, or the subsequent update of it, on how lethal a major reactor accident could be, how far away. That is, a major reactor accident when the wind's right at Indian Point could essentially wipe out millions of people or cause millions of direct deaths and then slow deaths out of radiation sickness, because Manhattan obviously cannot be evacuated. People can't even get out in the rush hour, much less a panic hour.

But that is the side issue that I didn't understand at that time. Fred Eissler was trying to tell me about this, but I was not listening. I thought that he was just being too excitable, that Pacific Gas and Electric Company had the experts, and they would take care of the safety matters. They shouldn't be allowed, however, to bother unspoiled country. They should build near to

Brower: where the existing transmission system was--such as Moss Landing, Morro Bay, further installations down at San Onofre, more up at Eureka--but they shouldn't go into new areas.

That was a long time ago, and it was a few years before my doubts finally overcame my faith and the once-bright hope [of nuclear power] faded in my eyes too. At this point, today, neither the Sierra Club, nor the Friends of the Earth, nor I, nor most leaders of the club, want to see reactors anywhere. Some of the board, I think, are still reactor-prone, but not many of them. The Sierra Club position has gone very strongly for holding back on nuclear development.

But at that point, every time my own interest became intense, Will Siri and Dick Leonard would lead the counterattack to weaken my position on anything else I was doing. Will Siri was a staunch defender of the budget and even the deficit budget that seemed to be necessary to carry on our conservation work. He made great speeches before the board on that when I was being quiet on the Diablo matter. But on the two occasions when the Diablo controversy lit up, then the attack and counterattack lit up. I heard, subsequent to all that, that the public relations man from Pacific Gas and Electric Company told Joe Browder, according to Joe Browder, that they [P.G. & E] arranged for the organization of the chapter opposition to get me out, that led to the big vote to get me out. But I'm ahead of myself, and I'm ahead of your outline.

Schrepfer: That's okay. We can go on with that.

Brower: This, I think, if you wanted to put the finger on it, is the key point. My wife recognized that at the time before I did. But then it became clear to others too that as soon as I was coming in strong on the Diablo Canyon decision, then the opposition on the part of the majority of the board--and it wasn't a big majority--stepped up. The Diablo controversy was one that I went into without knowing much about it. I did know when we first brought the matter up that we didn't want to see a reactor built at Oceana [Nipomo] Dunes; it was a beautiful bit of scenery.

Some people worked hard on getting P.G. & E to move from the Dunes. That included Dick Leonard and Conservation Associates--Doris Leonard, George Collins, and Dorothy Varian, who had lots of money. Ansel Adams was quite interested in it too, because he'd photographed the Oceana Dunes and felt quite strongly about their beauty. When they persuaded Pacific Gas and Electric Company to move its primary site up to Diablo Canyon, they considered that a victory. They didn't want to upset it.

Brower: I think there's another minor point there that I may have alluded to before [see page 192], of close cooperation with Pacific Gas and Electric Company. The Point Reyes Seashore, I think, was aided in its creation by the strong wish of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to have this land dedicated for non-occupancy. That is, to have the seashore would mean that there wouldn't be a lot of building there. That would be a buffer between their proposed Bodega Head reactor and any great concentration of the population.

There was a closeness between the Leonards and Collins and the Pacific Gas and Electric Company at that time that I think also was related to their closeness down at Oceana Dunes. It was to the advantage of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to have the Point Reyes buffer zone, and they were willing to do a little trading with the conservationists in trying to get to a place that was not that precious, down south. They never gave up. The last I have heard, they never have given up their intention to add reactors at Oceana Dunes too, later. Their ultimate growth plans, at one time at least, called for many, many reactors along the coast where there's an abundance of essential cooling water.

The main vote on Diablo Canyon, in May, 1966, took place in the absence of anyone who had been on the site. Kathy Jackson, I think, had been there (she was not on the board), and she described the site as a treeless slot. The one director who had been there and knew the country happened to be in Baghdad at the time. That was Martin Litton. I felt that it was wrong for a decision to be made on that area and on that important a scenic resource without the directors or somebody at least having seen it and testifying about the problems, pro and con.

I urged that the decision be put off to the executive committee so that that could be done. I lost. That was the beginning of the controversy.

Schrepfer: In the middle of '67 there was the membership referendum on Diablo Canyon--do you think P.G. & E had any part in the outcome of the referendum?

Brower: Well, I believe they did indirectly. Now, the story that Joe Browder told came to me secondhand. When I went to him directly on it, he had forgotten the details of it. He told the story directly to Gary Soucie who said I should get it from Joe Browder. I kept trying to get it, and finally when I did get it, it was watered down by him. I have since had reason not to believe that Joe Browder would be too accurate a reporter on

Brower: matters of this kind. I found him rather careless with the facts. I don't know that this meeting ever took place over drinks, where the P.G. & E. publicity man allegedly told Joe Browder that they'd undertaken to get rid of me, and that he'd better be careful about how he operated, because they had that power. That was the essence of the story. So it's just an allegation. It may have been totally contrived. I don't know. But I do know the closeness of some of the P.G. & E. key people to the people who were leading my ouster. That includes Dick Leonard.

Schrepfer: One of the issues that came up, as I recall, in connection with the referendum was the one about a half-Bulletin, in 1967.

Brower: This is quite a bit later. The Diablo controversy that led to a first flurry of criticism, severe criticism, came from what I did following that vote, when I was voted down when I wanted to see the executive committee get direct testimony on Diablo Canyon.

Schrepfer: In other words, in '66?

Brower: Yes, when Martin Litton came back, he started to have fits about what had happened, because he knew what Diablo was like. Then he began to give me information and photographs of what was there. I saw that it was a gross mistake, and I began to argue strenuously against it. We didn't have enough votes on the board initially to make much difference; then we had an election where a director, Phil Berry, got on because he was going to support Brower.

Phil Berry turned out to be the swing vote in the election of 1968, or whatever year that was when Phil came in. He had generally agreed that he would vote against the Diablo Canyon site. He switched his vote, which gave the Siri and Leonard group the majority of the board, so the Sierra Club could not then properly continue its opposition as a club stand.

I continued to gather data on it, and to persuade--to get as much data as I could from my friends on the board and off the board, primarily Larry I. Moss, who was a nuclear engineer who was giving me the primary key technical argument for using some alternate route.

Schrepfer: I think Berry was elected in spring of '68. Nineteen sixty-seven was the referendum, and then '68 the issue was brought up again.

Brower: My recollection here can be quite faulty, as an awful lot has happened since then. I know I've got at least a box and a half of papers--that's a pretty thick box of material that was going on in the controversy. I just call it the "Pox Box," because I've

Brower: closed it up and I haven't looked into it [laughs]. It includes all the friendly and the nasty letters that were written and the attacks and the counter-attacks and the great waste of effort that went into that battle.

Schrepfer: Just to carry Diablo through to the sort of the end of the issue, do you think that it affected the final vote in '69? In other words, there was quite a move to bring it up again in '68--particularly in the fall, as I recall--a strong effort made by certain directors like Berry to get the original decision reversed. Then there was a lot of propaganda in the press, as I recall from the time--is the club going to be wishy-washy, reverse itself, and all of these things.

Do you think the publicity, the issue, all of it affected the outcome of the April '69 election?

Brower: Oh, I'm quite sure that it did. The outcome I think was in large part a result of the denial to me, to our side--the ABC slate of five directors--of the means of getting in touch with the membership. We were not about to use the chapter net. I was on temporary suspension during the election period. The Bulletin would not carry our side. That began with the great controversy over the half-Bulletin [February, 1967], where Will Siri just refused to meet a deadline, so Hugh Nash put the Bulletin out without any Siri material. I don't know what should have been done instead. I suppose something different.

But the loss of the opportunity to communicate with the club members through the chapters, through the Bulletin, through the chapter newsletters, was a major contributor to the vote as it came out, I'm sure of that. The only way I could get to the membership at all was to get a lot of money together--I forget just how many thousand dollars it cost to make the one mailing we did make. I remember the terrific blow that came when we had carefully weighed all the paper and everything else and got to the post office and found we had only half enough postage. The difference was something like \$3,500.

It was difficult to find the financing to carry on that sort of effort when the club was fighting at the opposite side out of its budget. It's the sort of thing, in a way, that was repeated in a recent election in California, and in the nuclear initiatives that happened in other states. Once the money gets in, and really absorbs most of the information channels, you don't have much chance.

Brower: To bring the current example into focus, just before I went off to Nepal this autumn, before the elections--that was about two weeks before--the polls that were being taken in these various states were showing a public preponderantly in favor of curtailing nuclear power, in ratios of something like sixty for curtailment, forty for continuing. With about one week solid saturation television advertising, those ratios were reversed.

Something like that happened in the Sierra Club Diablo Canyon elections. There was a saturation of the information channels by the people who wanted the Diablo Canyon reactors built.

Schrepfer: Does this explain a phenomenon I noticed at the time and since--that it was primarily the people who supported you, from I would say even '64 on, who advocated and pushed for open elections and electioneering. Leonard and the other people were trying to stop electioneering and campaigning and as a matter of fact, did vote against it at one point, and even by a slim margin managed to reaffirm this in '68, whereas your group was the first to make a publicly paid advertisement, which I guess was in the San Francisco Chapter's schedule of outings.

Brower: I'd forgotten that. [laughs] Yes, I'm quite sure that that campaigning issue was all a part of the Diablo controversy.

Schrepfer: But did you find the need to go into this kind of campaigning because the normal channels of communication in the club were cut off?

Brower: Yes, they were cut off. That's what was happening.

Schrepfer: So the other side didn't need to campaign, because they already had--?

Brower: They had their chapter newsletters, which I think with possibly one exception were all pro-Diablo.

Schrepfer: What do you think then, if not P.G.& E., caused this intense opposition from the chapters? Did they oppose you because of Diablo, or did they oppose you because of the conflict between staff and volunteers? Which came first?

Brower: I think that the Diablo controversy was the trigger of all the other things. The way to get after Brower was not to go after the Diablo arguments and the facts, but to kind of muddy the issue and to smear. That's what it came down to before they were through.

Schrepfer: Why would the membership at large have been pro-nuclear reactors in Diablo?

Brower: I don't think the membership at large would have taken a position on that if the issue had been put squarely to them. But as I remember back to some of the high points in the controversy, one was that the Diablo issue was to go to the membership on the basis of a petition, which stated the question I think fairly. The board, under Siri's and Leonard's leadership, distorted what the petition said, so that it was not clear what the vote would do. So the members did not know quite how they were voting or what the petition had called for in the first place.

Schrepfer: So that was the referendum of '67--it was the way the issue was stated.

Brower: Yes, right. I'd have to go back to my own papers, wherever they are, just to find out what specifically happened. But I know there was a long controversy.

Schrepfer: While we're on the subject of papers, did you take personal papers out of the club involving all these issues when you left?

Brower: I have my Brower papers. Those are essentially just boxed up, and I took them home.

Schrepfer: Sometime you might think about contributing them to some worthy library.*

"The Great Galapagos Controversy," A Question of Administrative Discretion

Schrepfer: If we could go back to the question of authorization and pick it up on the issue of the Galapagos Island books and the London office, which comes up again and again in your opponents' insistence that indeed this was not authorized. I am struck by the fact that you were feeling that it was authorized and that you had been working on it for years and discussing it for at least several months before the charges in mid-'68 come to the fore.

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*Now at The Bancroft Library.

Brower: The Galapagos story was one I remember in my papers. I went into great detail and excerpted the minutes. Certainly as you go through that, you can see where there was initially a big move to have us stop considering the Galapagos matter entirely. It wasn't, some thought, in the club's sphere. Over a period of many meetings of the publications committee, we finally got that reversed, so that there was authorization. I'm forgetting now quite a bit of the detail, though I certainly could refresh myself on it if I could find out where in that pile of papers that part of it is gone into in great detail.

Schrepfer: Well, if it's in the papers we really don't need to have it on tape. But you generally felt when you authorized the London office and the books that you had definite authorization for them.

Brower: Yes. We didn't have a motion specifically authorizing the thing, just as we didn't have motions specifically authorizing a great many steps that I took. There were things that I was able to do under what I felt was my administrative discretion. For example, the Washington office. There were fusses about that. There were things that I did pending determination of whether or not the board liked it.

I had the--now, I guess, notorious--executive director's discretionary fund. It was argued by Siri vehemently when he was on my side that the idea of a discretionary fund was basically to be used at the discretion of the person who administered it, not for personal purposes, not for foul purposes [chuckles], but for any purpose that he felt was correct, so that I had it at my complete discretion to be used for Sierra Club purposes. With this fund, I could get things done without authorization from anybody. Then I would take it, after it was done, back to the board and see if they would like to restore to the fund what I had just spent, because they liked what it was doing.

There were many controversies on that. One of the things I did out of the executive director's discretionary fund was to pay fifteen hundred dollars that David Sive felt he needed to have to stay in the Storm King case. The Storm King battle became the keystone of the subsequent environmental litigation that's been going on ever since. The battle's not over yet. But I was scolded for that.

Another one that I was scolded for was that I used my discretionary fund to get Paul Brooks and Philip Hyde up to the Yukon River. (I'm remembering the discretionary fund expenditures that prove my point, and I'm probably forgetting all the others.) The Yukon River trip with Paul Brooks and Philip Hyde was one of

Brower: the important parts in the defense of the Yukon against the Rampart Dam. I think that, in historical perspective, those are two of the best things I did with the discretionary fund. I was criticized by George Marshall for the first and by Dick Leonard for the second.

But this was part of what I was operating on. If I had a discretionary fund and the board had gone into a great deal of discussion about what it should do, what I should be permitted to do with it--and I did have authority to spend it at my discretion--that would include the authority to spend it on a London office and to go back and see whether they wanted it or not.

The reason that I spent it on the London office was that we got an anonymous contribution that amounted, when converted, to \$77,000. It was in blocked sterling, meaning that it could not be spent except in England. The idea that we could just go over there and get the Galapagos books printed in England and then ship the books out wasn't something that the Bank of England would accept as a proper use of blocked sterling. There had to be some commitment to continue in England, something besides just take their sterling, buy books, and take the books over to the United States. You might as well take the sterling over. That wasn't what they wanted. The Bank of England wanted some further commitment. That's one of the reasons that I thought we'd better get the London office going, and we did. That enabled us to get the \$77,000 and to apply it. The rest of the operation was that we saved, all in all, something like \$125,000, if I remember correctly, by printing it in England instead of New York.

Schrepfer: Despite the problems that developed with the publisher and the delays?

Brower: Yes, in spite of all that, there was still a major saving. I wish I could remember all the figures now, but there was a saving of something like \$25,000 on paper alone, maybe more than that. But we lost a little of the color quality, because they didn't know how to print quite as well as New York did, but it was adequate. In any event, that was lost sight of in the great Galapagos controversy. It was still coloring what led finally to some further problems, when I was trying hard to make sure that the Galapagos venture would sell, would work, because we had an enormous investment in it, including the gift. Fifteen thousand copies of a two-volume set that would retail at fifty-five dollars meant a great deal. I wanted the thing to succeed as a major part of the Sierra Club venture into international conservation.

Brower: The Galapagos effort had been fought by Francis Farquhar in part; but also by Bob Miller, head of the California Academy of Sciences, who thought that the Galapagos was their terrain, and not the Sierra Club's business; and by August Fruge, who was getting a bit skittish about how successful our publishing program was becoming.

I wanted a major promotional effort for the Galapagos books in the Sierra Club Bulletin, and Ed Wayburn stopped it. So the only way I could get the word out was to revive The Explorer, which I had already started some time before. So I got out a new issue of The Explorer.

Schrepfer: This was in the fall of '68.

Brower: Yes. So that could tell a great deal about the publishing, to clear up some of the problems that were happening in publishing, accounting, and the distortion of both.

Schrepfer: Because you couldn't advertise any other way--?

Brower: I couldn't put an article in the Bulletin. Ed Wayburn just sat on that. He'd seized control of the Bulletin, and he wouldn't let Hugh Nash run what he wanted to. Everything had to be cleared with Wayburn. It was important to get the Christmas sales on that book and to get the membership support. It was also important to follow up--this is just a side note on it--with the major investment we'd made on promoting that book. A book of that kind has a big promotional budget. Any publisher would know that if you want to move that kind of an effort, you've got to spend a lot of money to do it. As I recall it, we had about a \$70,000 investment in a direct mail piece that we had sent out. It had tested well, and it indicated that if we followed out the test, then we could sell out the edition.

In this period of hostility, they wouldn't allow that to happen, because they didn't put up the money to follow out this test. They blocked the effort to advertise it in the Bulletin, and I was getting desperate for some way to get the public and the Sierra Club members to know exactly what they were supporting in this.

Schrepfer: Did you know or feel that they didn't want you to get out The Explorer?

Brower: No, I didn't at that time, because The Explorer had been one of the promotional devices that we'd worked out. One of the things that became quite controversial was the use of second-class postage matter. If I were to play that over again, I would have explained very carefully what we were doing to everybody, including Phil

Brower: Berry, ahead of time. He misunderstood that completely. It's hard to understand the second-class technique. If you want to have second-class matter, you have to print the notice that it is second-class matter on what you send out, and then after you've done that, a representative of the post office decides whether or not they'll let you be second class. But you have to take that step first. It's not logical, but then the post office is not too bothered by logic.

But in any event, The Explorer is something that I started right after This Is The American Earth was put out, back in 1960 or '61. I think we put out three issues. It was a smaller format.

Schrepfer: You did not have any opposition?

Brower: No opposition. They thought it was a very good promotion. I got good compliments on it.

Schrepfer: So you don't feel that it is what you did, but how they looked at you for other reasons that they got mad at this Explorer?

Brower: Yes. A big success in publishing would have inhibited their attempt to curtail me in other ways. We were headed for a smashing success in Galapagos. The next point was that part of that was the now rather famous ad for Earth National Park [January 14, 1969]. That ad came out to explain why we were concerned about the whole world and not just the Sierra Nevada or Storm King. It was a beautiful ad, and I think exceedingly well written by Jerry Mander. Part of it was to announce the Galapagos volumes and our efforts to save the earth's wild places, a series starting in the Sierra Club.

That again was within my discretion. That was part of the promotional budget I had. The thoughts enunciated in it were essentially what the Sierra Club was working for in all its fields. It wasn't anything new there, except that it was the Galapagos.

It got complicated in the signatures on it. I could have cleared it and gone through this step by step with Wayburn, but he'd already blocked the Bulletin, and he'd taken a year on the Cascade National Park ad, and we never got that out at all. I could see a further disaster here if we didn't have some kind of major promotion to move these books. We had, as I said, fifteen thousand sets. That represented a major investment. I wanted that converted back to cash. What happened because of this combined series of adverse steps was that we were left with something like eight thousand sets. That was disastrous.

Brower: That Earth National Park ad was one of the things that was alleged to have been unauthorized. I was skating on fairly thin ice, I've got to admit. At this point, the only director who saw the ad ahead of its running was Larry Moss. He said, "Go ahead and run it." Of course, he didn't have the authority, but he advised me to go ahead. It could not have run if I'd asked for Ed Wayburn's specific approval. I would bet you ten to one on that. It had been set and looked over carefully and skillfully, and it was within my authority to do it.

The sad error was that I was back in New York the morning it was to run. The night before, I called Jack Schanhaar, who was the sales and promotion manager, to put onto him the ugly task of telling Ed Wayburn that the ad was running and would be in the morning Times. He didn't do it. So the first Ed heard about it was when the reporters started calling up asking about this ad. Well, that was not a formula for instant success, I can tell you. I still think it's one of the great ads that's ever been put together. It's excellent copy to this day, except for the book-selling part, which is a little out of date. But the rest of it all is still right on target.

That was one of the authorization questions. It was one of the rather flagrant differences between Ed Wayburn and me.

Schrepfer: I think people have assumed that Ed Wayburn and you were closer or that there was less disagreement between you and Wayburn than there was, for example, between you and Ansel Adams or you and Dick Leonard. But what I gather you're saying is that you see Wayburn as more your enemy than either Leonard or Adams.

Brower: Wayburn did not have the power to influence the rest of the board that Dick did. Dick was a power in the Sierra Club for a long time; he is now an honorary president and still has an influence. Wayburn was fighting an uphill battle for his own power sector in the Sierra Club. I remember when he was the Conservation Committee chairman, he was fighting uphill almost all the time. He was laughed down by Bestor [Robinson] and the others on the board--not quite laughed down, but he had a tough time getting his conservation points across, which were good points.

It was just his way of operating; he did want to be clearly in charge of everything when he was president. He certainly has accomplished some good things, but we had this sharp difference. I still feel uncomfortable in Ed's presence, because of this general feeling. I feel less uncomfortable in Dick Leonard's presence, at this point much later.

The Financial Problem: More Control or More Capital?

Schrepfer: I think that this question of the Galapagos and the Earth National Park can bring us very nicely into the question of finances. It's been maintained that you were irresponsible in finances, that indeed you brought the club to the brink of bankruptcy. I guess what I want to ask first is, do you think the club was indeed in serious financial trouble and if so, what caused it?

Brower: The club was in financial trouble and still is. I think most environmental organizations are, and any environmental organization that isn't, to paraphrase Dale Jones, isn't doing its job.

We did transfer part of our portfolio from stocks and bonds and cash in the bank to books. I think that was a sound environmental step to take. I've drawn up the figures that I was beginning to develop them, and at this point, the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth together have got something like twenty million people to spend forty million dollars to read their message. That's a good way to get the message out--package it well enough that the people pay for it, instead of having it foisted on them and putting it aside.

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Brower: In my final years at the club, our best analysis of the new membership was that 40 percent of them were coming in because of the books. I still hear about the books, and they still call Friends of the Earth books, "those Sierra Club books."

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Brower: I think this has been recognized. It is probably the one thing I did that exceeds any other thing I was able to do in conservation, to put the conservation message in print in a forceful and attractive way and get it out, and get it commented upon, and have it affect what other people were doing. I feel that, anyway.

Mrs. Brower doesn't always share my views. I still have this book addiction. If you want to get the word out, the first thing to do is to get it out responsibly. You can get a half-hour on television; you can get a TV special that hits a lot of people, but you can't refer back to it. You can do an article in a journal, but people can't find the journal, although it's a good place to have things. What's in the newspaper is always believed, but it's usually highly inaccurate. A book has got to be accurate. There are bound to be mistakes, but it's got to stand on its own for a long time and be well documented. So I still think it's good. I still think the way we spent money to

Brower: get extraordinarily good reproductions of photographs was good. I learned that from Ansel and Francis, and I think I learned it well. They were good teachers.

The move from static stocks--which were really, in effect, money in the bank, because it was a good portfolio--to active books was something that I thought was a good switch in the club's finances. There was a lot of resistance to it, but there was also a lot of support for it. Without support, it wouldn't have been done. I didn't go down and write the checks. I had no check-signing authority in the Sierra Club, so that any money that was spent was spent on the authorization of people who did have the money.

Schrepfer: Even when it involved your discretionary funds you did not sign the check?

Brower: No, I didn't sign the checks. Everything had to go through channels. There were differences of opinion about whether I should have spent it or whether I should not have.

Schrepfer: Who signed the checks, then?

Brower: The controller signed most of them. If they are above a certain level, then the controller and the treasurer had to sign it.

Schrepfer: So then they must have known about some of these things.

Brower: Well, I would incur the obligation, which went on the invoice, and when the invoice came I would say, "Charge this to such-and-such." I would give the indication of what I thought the allocation ought to be. But then that was always subject to the review of the financial advisory committee, the treasurer, and the controller.

My memory may be overconvenient here, but I think that the Sierra Club stopped having years that were in the black when I stopped having control of the finances, such control as there was. When they brought in a Mr. Maryatt as the business manager, I at that point had my control eroded, as I was not responsible further for the budget. I kept trying to get the budget together, but I was not responsible for how the accounting was done or the control over expenditures and the reporting of them. That was separated from me. Elmer Maryatt was chosen by Dick Leonard and Cliff Heimbucher. From that point on, we did not have the coordination in our financial management that I think we had before.

Schrepfer: Do you know approximately when that was?

Brower: That was about 1960, as I remember. It was that date when Elmer Maryatt came and went right to work with his sleeves rolled up, counting the money that was coming in from sales of This Is The American Earth, which was quite a success.

That's not exactly an aside. There was a great deal of support for the publishing program and for the allocation of money for it. There was a realization by Will Siri and Charles Huestis when Huestis was treasurer and the chairman of the financial advisory committee, that we did need new capital. Indeed, there was a meeting where we decided we would make up a team that would go out and hit the Ford Foundation or others to get this new capital. They said at that point that we had, and I had, a good track record in this effort, and it deserved that kind of support. The support fell away, however; it crashed on the Diablo Canyon rocks. Otherwise, I would have gone ahead, and we would have found the new capital.

I cannot help but be a little bit amused by what happened when I left. They changed the fiscal year so there could not be a direct comparison. That's my interpretation of why they did it. They changed the amount of money they were allocating to overhead and publishing. They dropped it way down from what it had been. I was trying to get equal allocations of overhead among the various activities--outings, Clair Tappaan Lodge, publications. Publications were carrying extraordinarily high overhead, and by juggling the overhead charged against it, they could easily make it look as if it were a loser. Further, as soon as I left, they wrote down the inventory in my final year, so that it would add to the loss in my year and show as a profit in subsequent years.*

They also unloaded the Sierra Club property. First they gave it to the Sierra Club Foundation, and this changed the balance sheet quite a bit.

Schrepfer: You mean Tuolumne Meadows?

Brower: Yes, and some other pieces. They got quite a bit of money out of that. I'd advocated that they carry it on the books as something of value and they declined to do that. I remember shortly after I left--about a year or two after--Larry Moss said that now the Sierra Club had a negative net worth. In spite of those steps, they had not recovered the basic problem of trying to fight conservation battles with too little money.

*See Appendix D.

Schrepfer: Was that a problem far larger than any issue of publications or books coming out late or--?

Brower: Or fiscal responsibility or anything else. We could have done better if I'd been given the authority to do what I wanted to do. The thing that could have ended that year of '68 with just flying colors would have been the lack of interference with normal, proper, logical promotion of the Galapagos books and the rest of them.

To put that into numbers, if they'd sold the other eight thousand copies, with an average return of about 60 percent of retail price, or thirty dollars a set, the club's income would have been roughly a quarter of a million dollars. That would have been there to help finance a lot of the other club efforts. They wouldn't have had that inventory sitting there with the money tied up in it. They would have freed it.

Schrepfer: There was some question about the money that was held from lifetime memberships.

Brower: That's the permanent fund. There's an argument about how that should be sequestered. It was the money that under the bylaws was to be put in a permanent fund and only the income used. The controversy was over what the fund should be invested in. Do you want to invest it, or do you want it to turn into gold and put it in Fort Knox, or do you want to invest it in stocks and bonds, or do you want to use it as collateral for borrowing from the bank? Do you want to take the permanent fund and invest it in inventory? This is what the argument was about, and there were various sides to that. The Sierra Club did not raise a great deal of money outside for its books. It was using, as I said earlier, a transfer of its assets from stocks to book inventory.

Schrepfer: They just didn't hold on to the inventory long enough? They remaindered it all?

Brower: No, no. The point of an inventory is that you would like to turn it over as fast as you can. That is the point of the game. That is, if you can turn the inventory over twice a year, that's fine.

Schrepfer: After you left, I gathered that they remaindered some of the books.

Brower: They did remainder some, but what they did first was to write down the inventory value of some that they thought might not move fast. That meant that they devalued their own assets arbitrarily, possibly logically, but I think slightly out of mischief.

The Galapagos books cost us about fourteen dollars a set, before the application of the subsidy. If you say, "Well, we don't think we're going to sell them; we're just going to pretend they're worth seven dollars," and you have eight thousand copies, you mark down the inventory fifty-six thousand bucks. Therefore your assets for that year are fifty-six thousand lower.

Now if you sell them, and you're still selling them for the same price, you begin to recover that write-down, so that you make one year look bad and you make another year look good. That was what I think they were up to.

Schrepfer: So they wrote them down for 1968 or 1969?

Brower: At the close of that year (1968), they wrote quite a few things down, and then they wrote some more down in '69. Subsequent to that, they began to remainder some. I don't know too much of the story about that, because I didn't get too many of the reports for a few years.

Schrepfer: So you think that the publications would have made it with proper advertising, accounting, and a follow-through?

Brower: If they were using then the accounting system they're using now in the publications program, it would have shown a handsome profit in all my years, and a very big one in the year '68.

Schrepfer: One of the issues that came up on a couple of occasions--for example, people would say, "You should get us more copies of contracts earlier," or "You should get the books out on time." You commented in your defense, in the minutes, that you were understaffed. Was that true? Do you think they deliberately kept you understaffed?

Brower: I think they did. I would put in a request for various kinds of help, but I would also, in their defense, first point out that I think it's just my nature always to be understaffed. If you gave me enough staff to do a certain number of things, then I'd go out and find something else to do and then be short of staff to do that. It's an addiction.

Brower: I think that I was badly understaffed and underpaid in relation to the people who were doing similar work in the other organizations. But the thing that bothered me, I suppose more than anything, is that if we got more help, it was always in the accounting end. They'd always get more people to do the administrating, count the money, but not people to do the creative work. It's easy to sell that. That means we have better financial control or we have more controllers. So they now have about three layers of controllers--though I don't know too much about the system now. That was one of my complaints at the time.

Schrepfer: I know that Hugh Nash at one point asked for an editorial assistant, and some of the directors maintained that he should make greater use of volunteers, rather than be given a paid assistant. Was there difficulty in using volunteers for certain types of activities?

Brower: There was. There was then and there is now this big difference between what you can get out of a volunteer and out of staff. I wrote back in one of the early Sierra Club handbooks my interpretation of what happened when the Sierra Club hired an executive director and began to get a professional staff over and beyond what they had with Virginia Ferguson and then Charlotte Mauk. They made a shift where they could get things done. They could say, "We want to be represented at the hearings on Dinosaur National Monument" and go! Before that, they said, "We ought to be represented at these hearings, and can we find anybody who can spare the time to go?" Again and again, we were not represented. It wasn't until we got a professional staff that we began to be able to count on being in various places, because orders could be given to be there instead of hope being expressed that someone might show up.

Now when the volunteers can show up, there's an extra power in the volunteer. He's very clearly not doing it for anything except public good--you'll find exceptions to that, but that's the general rule--whereas the staff is just doing a job. I've been mindful of this all through the years, since I was named executive director. The Sierra Club was, I think, able to take off because it made the decision to get a staff, and then the staff grew and it's continued to grow, and the power of the Sierra Club has grown proportionately. The volunteers are important, and the club would not be what it is without the enormous amounts, huge amounts of volunteer time, which if priced at what it is ordinarily billed at, would make the club quite rich. We would be really handling something.

Schrepfer: You've said on several occasions in correspondence to people like Wayburn that staff are people too. Did you feel that sometimes the staff were poorly treated or looked down upon by the volunteers?

Brower: That began to happen. I think Ed Wayburn did that more than anyone else; that is, he made the staff feel like lackeys the way none of the other presidents did. Before that, I don't think there was any particular contest. The staff versus volunteer thing was just fanned to a white heat in the Diablo Canyon struggle. But before that, there was no major problem that I remember.

Schrepfer: But you don't think that was the issue? The issue was Diablo?

Brower: Yes, the issue was Diablo. The staff question--did you want a staff-run organization or did you want a volunteer-run organization --was brought up as one of the ways to attack.

Schrepfer: Who do you think fanned the flames?

Brower: I think Dick Leonard was the acknowledged leader of the ouster. He sat up on the fifteenth floor and did a lot of careful planning. He's a careful planner. He thinks of everything.

Administrative Reorganization Proposals

Schrepfer: Let me ask this question and then I'll change the tape and you can perhaps think about your answer, because it's a big one. There was a committee on publications reorganization, headed by Charles Huestis. He made several proposals, for an executive vice-president and administrative vice-president as two positions, a stronger publication committee, a full-time president, a suggestion of divorcing the publications from the rest of the club. Would you comment on that report and also perhaps indicate what happened to the recommendations, because I'm not sure that the record makes a clear picture about why they weren't instigated or exactly what the fate of the proposals was.

Brower: Chuck got into the Sierra Club ruling circles through Will Siri. They were very close. Chuck Huestis was the financial manager for the American Everest expedition, and that's where the closeness developed. It may have preceded that. But Chuck Huestis was essentially Will Siri's man, and the two of them were planning together what they needed to do. When Siri and Huestis were not adverse to Brower because of the Diablo thing, they were strongly supportive. When Brower started going the wrong way on Diablo, their strength was applied in other directions.

Brower: The committee on reorganization had only one friend of mine on it--I think maybe two. Warren Lemon I think was on it, if I remember correctly. I consider him neutral and sound. Ted Waller was going to be my champion on it, but he consistently managed to miss the meetings, not always, but almost always. Therefore I had no champion on it.

The reorganization of the top levels was an attempt to get around Brower, I think primarily. Will Siri came to my house one morning--I guess just before the board meeting of May of '67--to say that they'd had a meeting the night before. I'd passed by Dick Leonards' and looked in the window, and I saw that the board was meeting there in secret session. Siri asked if I wouldn't like to go to New York to head the publications program, because he had the votes to make sure that I did that.

Well, they didn't quite have the votes.

Schrepfer: You said, "No, thank you"?

Brower: Yes, I didn't want to go because I thought I was a little bit too old even then to pull up roots that had sprung up in Berkeley. My family was there; and everything was there; I didn't want to go to New York. I wanted to travel to New York from time to time, but Berkeley was where I wanted to operate. And I didn't want the publications program to be separate from the club. I wanted it to be an integral part of how the club operated. That kind of separation I thought wouldn't be good.

The votes Siri thought he had, in any event, evaporated. That was the meeting in which I got a unanimous vote of confidence. Will Siri wanted to make the motion, and Ansel seconded it, or something like that.

Schrepfer: It was the May 3, 1967, day meeting at which you got the--

Brower: --vote of confidence. The votes that he had to move me out evaporated. It took them two more years to do it.

Schrepfer: That's the meeting at which Dick Leonard stated, as I recall, that the club was in a state of bankruptcy, that there was a cash flow problem and all of these things. So Siri and Leonard were working together?

Brower: Yes, they were working together at that meeting. Then they nevertheless had this unanimous vote of confidence in Brower. The story of my imminent departure had been leaked to Herb Caen, and that was becoming sort of a front-page story about that time. A lot of public response came into the club.

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Schrepfer: What did you think about the role of the Examiner and the Chronicle during this whole thing? They must have had a significant impact on the election results.

Brower: I think they did. In which year?

Schrepfer: In '68 and '69. It struck me that they supported you quite a bit in '67, but maybe less so in '68 and '69?

Brower: In '68 I was still getting support, but then it began to evaporate following that election, with the seating of the new board [in May, 1968]. I guess that's when the switch in the [Phil] Berry vote came, and the reversal of position that we expected was going to happen didn't happen.

Schrepfer: On Diablo Canyon?

Brower: Yes. That's when I came up with the idea that the way to get the switch was to run for the board. I remember making my telephone call to Stewart Ogilvy telling him that that's what I thought I would do. He thought that was a brilliant decision. Stewart was about to show up to watch the inauguration.

Schrepfer: How did you decide to run?

Brower: That was it. I thought that it was fairly important for the chief executive officer of the club to be at meetings, and to have the power to make motions. You could never carry them--it took all the rest of the votes to carry them--but again and again I saw things go down the drain because most of the board would be sitting there. It would be either Bestor [Robinson] or Alex [Hildebrand] who would make the motion, but the rest of them were just not movers.

There were a lot of seconders, but no movers. I thought that one of the ways to get these things done would be to be there and to make a presentation to the board, and to move what I thought would accomplish it, and then just hope for a second. Then it could be discussed. That was one of the reasons I wanted to be on the board. That was, I guess, the only reason.

I wanted an end to this business of having the motion put by the person who wanted to eviscerate what I wanted to do. There should have been a little school in parliamentary procedure for the rest of the directors to tell them how to make a motion, how to start writing them down on pieces of paper, and don't just sit there like lumps, waiting for Bestor to make them. That's a strange little recollection that I have, but it's one of the important things that moved me into running for the board.

Brower: The other point was that if Berry was going to switch and cave and not do what he said he was going to do before he was elected--he ran on a campaign supporting Brower and then didn't--then we'd better get some directors who'd go into the slate and this time clearly outnumber them, and make the change once and for all on the Diablo position, and go on from there.

Schrepfer: Now does the reason that Berry changed have anything to do with the question of the 10 percent royalty?

Brower: No. He dreamed that up later. That 10 percent royalty thing was one of the things that he should be ashamed of. I sent the contracts over to him to see if there was anything wrong with them, and he said nothing about what was wrong with them and then sprang this on me quite later.

Schrepfer: You sent them over--

Brower: --to Phil Berry. He was a legal adviser, to see if the contracts were all right.

Schrepfer: Before they were signed?

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: I had no idea why Phil Berry caved in.

Brower: Why did he cave in? I don't know, but I have some ideas. We discussed earlier our personal relationship and his ambitious qualities. [see page 214] I think that he began to realize--as Ed Wayburn had--that the power lay in the person who was not predictable, whose vote could swing either way and tip it in such a way that it would go wherever he stepped. That is, he wanted to be the pivot man at the fulcrum, or whatever the current cliché may be. He moved for that position, because that's the politically powerful position.

As Will Siri told me, the morning he told me I was going to be moved to New York, the general criticism of me was that I was too predictable. Of course, predictability is a bad aptitude among people who want to be politically effective. If they know what you're going to do, they don't even bother with you. They spend all their time courting the swing vote. Phil Berry wanted to be a swing vote man, and that's where the power lies. But it's not where the principle lies.

Schrepfer: So it doesn't have anything to do with P.G.& E. or Diablo?

Brower: No, I think not. He could be equally strong in either direction. You just weren't going to know until he voted how he was going to vote. And that's the way you get a lot of attention.

Schrepfer: Let me ask a question about the council's role. Is it possible that there was a conflict not just between the volunteers and the staff or the San Francisco people and the people who were in the outskirts, but perhaps a power play between the council and the board of directors?

Brower: I think there was such a power play. The council was not my idea. It developed in ways I thought were wrong. It began to make the club move toward being a federation of smaller groups, rather than a unity, a homogenous unity.

Schrepfer: It has become a federation since. That is a long-term development that's continued.

Brower: I wasn't sure that that was going to be a good thing. I'm not sure right now what is. Friends of the Earth is not so monolithic as the Sierra Club was. I've got different thoughts now from what I had then. I thought that the council was going in the wrong direction. I did want to see the council serve a function of intermediate step in the regionalization of the club. There should be a lot of chapters, and there should be some chapters that would be put together in various regions. Those regions would then have representatives that would help, just as that table of organization would help authority and coordination, all the things that regions ostensibly do.

Instead, it got into a contest of wanting to be an alternate board of directors, looking for more and more authority. They knew, I think, in the council that I wasn't very happy about what was happening there. I kept trying to balance the chapter representation on the council with representation from the club's principal committees, so that the club-wide view would be balancing the regionalization and the splintering.

I'd seen what happened in the National Wildlife Federation, and it still happens there. I didn't want to see it happen in the Sierra Club. The Wildlife Federation had the state affiliates. The National Wildlife Federation will not take any action that is counter to what the state affiliates want to do, unless a great big uprising takes place. On some occasions, that happens. But otherwise, it won't.

Brower: Therefore, the National Wildlife Federation was against the Redwood National Park, against saving the condor refuge from the Bureau of Reclamation, against the Cascade National Park, against saving Grand Canyon from dams, against saving the Great Smoky Mountains National Park from a road across it--they've made mistake after mistake because the local affiliates could be captured by local pressure interests, where the national could not.

I didn't want to see that repeated in the Sierra Club. I saw the council moving in that direction, and I began to try to take steps to block it. The council didn't appreciate it.

Schrepfer: What changes would you have made in the administrative structure of the club, other than the council? In other words, perhaps a chief of staff or some other changes, instead of the ones suggested by the reorganization committee?

Brower: I don't remember now what I had in mind, but I didn't want a division of authority that I thought would weaken the club and get within the staff two competing organizations. I didn't like the way they were setting that up. I thought that there would be just too many battles between the money people and the conservation people.

Schrepfer: You mean the publishing people?

Brower: The money people would be the accountants, the controllers. I'd argued, I think, for an independent line of communications from the controller to the treasurer to the executive committee. I wanted to make sure that I knew what was going on as the executive director. If Cliff Rudden, the controller, wanted to complain about something, I wanted him to complain to me. If he couldn't get satisfaction out of me, then I wanted him to complain to the board, and we would take our two views together. That was what they were trying to get around, trying to avoid. They were making life difficult, I think, for Cliff Rudden, in requiring him to move around me and not let me know until rather late what was going to be sprung. He was very uncomfortable in that position. I didn't want to increase his discomfort. But he was going to be made far more uncomfortable by what they proposed to do, if Chuck Huestis's reorganization plan had gone through, as I recall now. Cliff saw that it essentially debilitated him.

Schrepfer: What was in that McMurray report?

Brower: That was a management consultant firm--headhunters. Management consultants have a usual system. They'll study over a firm and then end up putting the man who studied it into the job. That happened more often than not. [tape turned off and restarted]

April 1969 Board Elections: Defeat and a New Start

Schrepfer: Oaky, let's turn to the April 1969 elections. I suppose that a very logical question to ask you would be, were you surprised by the results?

Brower: I was surprised by the outcome of the election. I thought that I was well enough known that that alone would have gotten me on the board, and to find that big margin against me was quite a surprise.

In looking back over it, I realized that Ed Wayburn was a little bit disappointed to have been left out of our slate, which sounds a little strange, when you remember what I've been saying earlier. If we had been astute enough to include his name in the slate of five, it might all have come out differently.

Schrepfer: You mean he might have sided with you?

Brower: Yes, I think that he would have. He, again, was one of the people who liked to be slightly unpredictable and would not commit himself until he'd heard lots of the arguments, which was a fair way to come to a reasonable conclusion, you must admit, rather than having reached a conclusion ahead of time, as I so often do.

He felt, and he told me--he sounded just a little bit disappointed and a little hurt that there was a slate of five and he wasn't on it. The constituency of the slate was determined in Greenwich Village.

Schrepfer: Perhaps you could talk about the formation of the ABC group, and how these people were selected.

Brower: I can't talk very much about it. We were trying to think of a name for the group, and ABC sounded rather simple. It was a little bit too simple-minded. "Active, Bold and Constructive," or something of the sort. All the positive names.

Schrepfer: Brower, yes--

Brower: No, that was in a previous election, where B was for Brower.

Schrepfer: Oh, that's right.

Brower: There was quite a bit of discussion about whom the slate should contain, from time to time. The final decision was made down at Perry Knowlton's house on Bethune Street, in New York City.

- Brower: Quite a few of us were down there. I don't remember clearly--I think we considered Wayburn's name for a while, and then after it had been kicked around for a bit, he wasn't listed. Right now I would be hard put to remember all the names on it. We had George Alderson, Polly Dyer, Fred Eissler, David Sive, and me on it.
- Schrepfer: Do you think that there were perhaps geographical implications in the election? For example, I noticed that your slate contained people from out of state, and that there was a definite emphasis in your campaign upon the club's going into national conservation.
- Brower: The emphasis in the campaign, so far as it was contained in that document, that one mailing we put out, was a bit unfortunate. Again, this was written by Jerry Mander. The business about "companions on the trail," as opposed to the bold conservationists who were concerned about broader things, was not a fair comparison. The Sierra Club was far more than just companions on the trail, as we have discussed earlier [page 181 in transcript]. It was an effective group. That was, I think, the wrong emphasis to have made there. The Sierra Club was already quite firmly into national conservation activities. I don't think there was any effort to pull back from that on the part of the opposition. We participated in Cape Cod National Seashore, Fire Island, getting that going. We were worried about a good many things that were happening on the east coast. The Grand Canyon wasn't exactly west coast, although it was certainly west. I think we were broadly concerned at that point. Nobody was proposing that we pull back out of that.
- If we had Fred Eissler and me as part of the ABC slate, why we certainly had two Californians there anyway. Polly Dyer was from Washington; David Sive from New York; George Alderson from Washington, D.C. I don't think the regional factor was important. The mailing may have lost some votes just because that was an implication; we had ostensibly misread what these people were interested in, and members who were called companions on the trail were not willing to be called that and probably resented it.
- Schrepfer: What do you think accounted for the wide margin?
- Brower: I think it was just the grabbing of the information channels by the other side; there wasn't any way beyond that one mailing that I could get to the members of the club. I made a few talks here and there to small groups and got into some debates, but you can't cover many people that way. Further, I didn't have the budget to go wandering all over the place hitting the campaign trail.
- Schrepfer: How did you manage to pay Jerry Mander?

Brower: No, he contributed that. And then quite a few members did send in some money. I forget how much we raised. The rest of it came out of the Brower savings (most of this Anne's contribution) and a major contribution toward the unexpected postage bill by Margo Tollerton.

Schrepfer: Did they send it to the--?

Brower: The ABC. Don Aiken was the head of that group. I think, in looking back over it, that Don was too busy to carry on the job of being chairman of it as effectively as he might. And that's an understatement.

Schrepfer: How about age? Do you think that age was a factor? You hear repeatedly references to older-style conservationists like Dick Leonard, the old guard, the San Francisco establishment. It's almost a cliche now. They were Republicans, the newer ones were pro-labor, pro-Democrat. You hear this dichotomy.

Brower: I don't remember now whether that was featured anywhere in the stories of the time.

Schrepfer: Well, I'm not saying that it was something that was said in either of the campaigns, but I had heard references since to these people, like Dick Leonard, being part of the power elite of San Francisco establishment. As a matter of fact, I've heard that phrase in Not Man Apart.

Brower: We alluded a great deal, I remember at that time, to the fifteenth floor. That was primarily Dick Leonard, Clifford Heimbucher, and Francis Farquhar. The skill with which Dick Leonard elicited the aid of all the former presidents was a great skill. He did it and did it smoothly and got them all--"Well, these people are signing against Brower, why don't you?" Finally all of them did, and that was a devastating array to be faced with.

I remember that one of the reporters who came down from Canada to interview me on something else shortly thereafter knew all about it. He said he thought the most devastating thing of all was Wallace Stegner's letter to the Palo Alto paper, "Bitten by the Worm of Power." They reproduced that letter in their counter-Brower campaign all over. It was a letter that quite saddened me, because I thought that Wally Stegner would never do anything like that.

My son Kenneth wrote a letter to him that pretty much told him off, and never got a response. Then my wife wrote a letter saying that Wallace Stegner, the writer of fiction, had won out

Brower: over Wallace Stegner, the historian. He didn't know nearly enough about how the inner workings of the club went to pretend that he did. He was quite on the fringe of things. I think that he must still be suffering a little bit for what he did then. It was dirty and not accurate.

Schrepfer: So in other words, you would say that the election outcome was a result basically of the position taken by certain people on Diablo, and put over, with a communications monopoly, onto the membership without focusing on Diablo, with other issues as the center of attention.

Brower: Yes, that's what I think. At least that's the way I've cleared it all up in my edited recollections.

Schrepfer: Right after the election, I guess at the meeting following the election, you made a sort of gesture of compromise. You wrote a letter from London saying that these are the restrictions I might be willing to work under. I don't think they're fair restrictions, but--Was this a gesture or was it a move which you thought might possibly be accepted or acceptable?

Brower: I thought it might be. I can't remember now too much about it. I didn't know that the letter was from London. Maybe it was. I remember working over it in the Sierra Club apartment here in New York.

Schrepfer: Maybe it was from New York. I know it was from out of town.

Brower: I had gone through some various drafts, and Max Linn looked at one and said that he thought that this was going in the wrong direction. I edited that a bit.

Certainly what happened at the meeting was not a surprise, because I knew before the meeting itself took place that the resignation was going to be necessary. I noticed John McPhee, in writing about it, had thought that I still was expecting something else to happen, but I wasn't at all. My farewell speech was all written ahead of time. I knew that the attempt by Martin Litton and some of the others to get a different vote was not going to succeed; all the votes had been counted.

Schrepfer: Do you have any other comments on the internal crisis?

Brower: No, I don't. I was pleased when the board elected me an honorary vice-president. I was unhappy that Ansel thought that that required that he not accept being elected honorary vice-president. Ansel and I are not frequently in communication, but it seems that quite a bit of the wound is gone there.

Brower: Possibly out of rationalization, as I look back over it, I can feel pleased that it happened. I certainly didn't want it to happen at the time, but it did make possible the formation of another organization. The two organizations have learned how to work together quite well. I think they complement each other and are rarely in conflict. There is now another strong voice that is possible in conservation activity.

One of the things that I enjoyed and I remember was a review of what had happened in Life magazine, shortly after that. They referred to Stewart Udall and to me, that both of us were going in other activities, and it would be a stronger movement because there were that many more places for us to be active. The Sierra Club certainly went on and grew faster after I left than it had been growing when I was there, fast though that had been.

But Friends of the Earth, in its first year, became well known and was quickly listed among the major conservation organizations in the country. That was satisfying. That the organization spread out to other countries was, again, I think something that could not have happened under the Sierra Club aegis with anything like the speed that it happened with a different name. It's hard to try to get a Sierra Club going in London or in France, but it's a bit easier to get a Friends of the Earth going there and beyond.

I guess that's about the end of my appraisal of it all.

As an honorary vice-president, I'm still a member. Anne and I are patron members of the club. Unless they vote to vote us out, we're life members anyway. [laughs] As an honorary vice-president, I'm aware, because I get the minutes, of the complexity of the Sierra Club now, in its present size of 165,000 members. It's enormously complex. I read the minutes with a sense of relief that I'm an outsider. It is so complex that it's just staggering. I remember about two years ago, after some frustrating meeting that I had attended for a while, Mike McCloskey just said he didn't know how I'd stood it as long as I did.

The last little note there, I suppose--I wish the Sierra Club well, and I keep mentioning them as one of the strong organizations in my talks. People compliment me for my Sierra Club books, and they will come up and say, "I've just joined the Sierra Club." "Maybe you'd like to join Friends of the Earth too," I say.

Brower: I still carry quite a bit of Sierra Club identity, even after these many years. The honorary vice-president thing was a little amusing. It's totally due to Larry Moss's [Laurence I. Moss] activity, and his insistence that I be elected an honorary vice-present. He wasn't going to let any others go through-- and it requires unanimous vote--until they did it. August Frugé, I hear, called it blackmail. But then they were nice, and they did it anyway. I'm glad to keep this identity with the club.

I get asked almost every time I make a speech anywhere, "How did you happen to leave the Sierra Club?" I say, "Well, I was fired. I had to walk the plank." I say what's happened to the Sierra Club since, and that it's doing well, and is certainly one of the strongest organizations, and I have particularly great admiration for what it's done in conservation litigation. It's an extraordinary record that it's built in litigation. I don't mind at all praising it, because I remember that it probably wouldn't have been built except for my fiscal irresponsibility in spending \$1500 in keeping David Sive on the Storm King case. I get a little humorous satisfaction out of that.

XIII FRIENDS OF THE EARTH: ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, OUTLOOK

The John Muir Institute

Schrepfer: Let's talk about the origins of Friends of the Earth. Wasn't there a relationship between FOE and the John Muir Institute?

Brower: Friends of the Earth and the John Muir Institute had to have an early divorce. That's a long and separate story. Max Linn made a quick berth available for me as soon as the Sierra Club fired me. I resigned in May, and I think that my work with the John Muir Institute started the following June. I was put on at the same salary I had been voted by the Sierra Club early in January of 1969, which had included a nice raise, but Dick Leonard managed to get that rescinded.

Schrepfer: They voted you a raise and then--?

Brower: Yes, they voted me a raise. I'd been getting \$20,000, and they raised it to \$24,000. Then Dick Leonard took action to get that rescinded and succeeded. But the John Muir Institute started me at that salary for sixty percent of my time, with the understanding that with the rest of my time, I could work with Friends of the Earth for nothing and not be in conflict with the deductible purposes of the John Muir Institute. Or I could lecture and from my lecturing and writing, make up to another \$12,000 and keep that. But beyond that \$12,000, I would split the rest of it fifty-fifty with the John Muir Institute. There was a little bit more to split, so it worked out quite well.

The John Muir Institute relationship began to fall apart when Max Linn thought that he would like to leave his work as information officer at Sandia Laboratories—he worked under contract with the Atomic Energy Commission—and work full time for the John Muir Institute and Friends of the Earth. As far as

Brower: I could discern, as soon as he made that decision, he began to take steps to make sure that his new job was secure and mine less so. He was active in trying to get me out--not only in the John Muir Institute, but at Friends of the Earth. We had a confrontation on that, which he lost. So he left late in 1972.

That deed also worked up an imminent insurrection in the Washington office of FOE and caused some trouble in Friends of the Earth. Finally, Joe Browder threatened to break the whole thing up, and to take everybody away from the Washington office and form another organization. He called me one December, just before he finally did. He said he'd been lying on the beach in Florida, had thought better of it, and was going to stick with the organization. Two months later, he left. Only George Alderson and one other stayed. We built a new Washington office out of that. That was part of the residue of the conflict between Max Linn and me, that developed unfortunately.

Schrepfer: That was purely a personal--?

Brower: It was a personal conflict. If he had stayed at John Muir and the Sandia Institute, I think we'd have got along all right. But then we had this strange relationship where he was the president, unpaid, of the John Muir Institute, and I was the paid director. I was the unpaid president of Friends of the Earth, and he was the paid executive vice-president. This was too strange an arrangement to succeed, I guess, no matter who the bodies were. It certainly didn't succeed the way we had it. The John Muir Institute went its way. It still owes me \$15,000 in nonreimbursed expenses.

I went to work for Friends of the Earth at less than I was paid by the John Muir Institute, because by that point, Friends of the Earth was getting into stringent financial straits. We started out with great optimism and grew very rapidly, right off the start. Then we arranged to have our expenses continue in ascending order the way we thought our income would, and indeed we did carry out our goals in spending, but we didn't carry out our goals in taking in income.

We were very quickly about \$400,000 in debt, which is a pretty big debt for a brand-new outfit that didn't have much income. But we survived that problem. The debt has been more than cut in half; we're slowly carving it away. We're not growing as fast as we'd like to, but I think we're finding ways to do it. We've got the foundation going to help the financing of the educational and informational parts of our work with deductible money. That got us going in 1972. The two of them together are slowly having an effect.

Brower: The effect is magnified, I think, by the success of the independent Friends of the Earth organizations in other countries. I think the name is a good name. Anne Brower thought it up, or I think she did. She's not so sure she did, but I remember that she thought it up, and that's where I got it. Then I found that twenty-five years before that, it had been founded in El Salvador. Just before our international meeting in Amsterdam this year, I learned who the man was who had founded it in El Salvador. I called him up to see if he could come over to the international meeting in Amsterdam. He said he could, if he'd heard about it a little sooner. His name is Francisco de Sola.

I'm not sure of the exact year that he founded it, but the general purposes have been the same as they are here. In El Salvador as in the United States, the purposes have sometimes been a little unpopular with the government. He was kidnapped by the opposition at one point, and quite a heavy ransom had to be paid--from his funds--to get him out. He differs from me. The founder of the imposter Friends of the Earth is not wealthy, but the founder of the real Friends of the Earth in El Salvador is.

The Earth's Wild Places Series

Schrepfer: While we're on the question of origins, who was the first person --perhaps there isn't only one person--who suggested the international purpose and pushed it? Was it your idea?

Brower: For the Sierra Club?

Schrepfer: Yes, going back a little bit.

Brower: The person who had the initial influence was John Milton, who was with the Conservation Foundation at the time. He had been a graduate student, I guess, at Michigan. He was an ecologist. I ran into him at a Sierra Club meeting here in New York in about 1965. We got into a conversation, and at the end of the evening thought that one of the things that he might do is lead a Sierra Club outing to Labrador.

Out of that conversation, and keeping in touch to see how the Labrador outing was coming along--it never did run--I learned a great deal more about what he had been working on. He was intensively involved in the Conservation Foundation's concern in other countries.

Brower: He himself had been down in Yucatan for about a year, and traveled a lot. He was interested in what was happening to the proposed Mekong River development. That was before the Vietnam War made such inroads. It was through John that I got most of the material that Jerry Mander worked into the Earth National Park ad. He was talking about the deleterious effects of the Aswan Dam, and the various things that had been done with the best of intentions around the world, but that were disasters because there had not been ecological understanding in the planning of it. That's still going on. John Milton helped on that. He also went down in the Galapagos expedition and wrote part of the book. We've been good friends ever since.

Schrepfer: As I recall, you started thinking about Galapagos as a book project several years before it came out. Is that correct?

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: Then it did not come out of the international series. It came along, and then the international series developed later?

Brower: The Galapagos book came about because that was the thing that Eliot Porter said he wanted to do. We'd done two books, and what he now wanted was to do a book on the Galapagos. He also wanted to do a book on the Brooks Range. He had various places around the world that he wanted to photograph. About that same time, I knew John Milton, who was also interested in the Galapagos, and knew about the Darwin Foundation's interest in it, and put me in touch with some of the people that could help us begin to get the clearances and the understanding necessary to get it going.

The only thing that made the Galapagos expedition possible was a strange series of events. The third book that Eliot Porter was going to do for the Sierra Club was on the Adirondacks, the Adirondack country. The text was going to be excerpts from the works of William Chapman White. For this I went to the Adirondack Museum at Blue Mountain Lake, and I met Harold Hochschild, who was president or chairman of the board of American Metals Climax (AMAX), and a wealthy man. He wanted to help subsidize the book.

In anticipation of the subsidy, I spent quite a bit of money getting some prints made. I guess we invested altogether about \$3500 in that project. Eliot Porter had got some photographs made, Ken [Brower] made the selection of text, and it was going along well. Harold Hochschild was objecting to some of the photographs. He wanted more photographs of a general view of the Appalachian Mountains, and the Adirondacks as seen from the windows of the Adirondack Museum or something.

Brower: I wrote a letter defending the artist's right to interpret the country his way. I thought that Eliot's greatness was in seeing the detail and the texture, and finding out how color should compose, not making the geographically-intact views, or the representative views, the head-ons. This irritated Mr. Hochschild quite a bit, so he didn't want to have anything more to do with the Sierra Club on that book.

So I backed up Eliot Porter's artistic rights in this matter, but Eliot Porter didn't back up his own rights. He caved. He got some of the general views. The book was subsequently published by Harper and Row, under the aegis of Jack Macrae, who was its president, who has since moved to Dutton.

But to get to the point of all that, Harold Hochschild at that point made an advance of something like \$10,000 to Eliot Porter on the book which was to be done. That was to help him do it. Eliot, out of a feeling of guilt for having caved when I supported him, made that available as a speculative loan to the expedition.

Schrepfer: To the Galapagos?

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: I do remember--he gave the money with the proposition that if the project fell through, the club would have to pay it back?

Brower: Yes.

Schrepfer: When you established FOE you carried on this international focus, and you also carried on your developing attitudes against nuclear power. You also chose birds and wildlife as a focus. I think these are the issues that I recall. Correct me if I'm wrong, but then how did you select these? By what process did you decide what the goal or mission would be?

Brower: One of the things I wanted to do was to protect the earth's wild places. You may have noticed, if you ever looked at the list of books on the verso of the endpaper, it lists the first eighteen books, and then it starts with a heading in small capitals under that, The Earth's Wild Places. Galapagos began the first two books in The Earth's Wild Places series. Indeed, the grant from the anonymous [Sally Walker] was given to the Sierra Club with the stipulation that upon the success of the Galapagos project, the grant should be reconstituted by the club and support other books on the islands of wilderness around the world. The Sierra Club did not honor that in my absence, so the money was just put to other purposes.

Schrepfer: She had no objection?

Brower: [She was never informed of the diversion, to answer the question DRB, 5/27/1
I wanted to see that series continued. We contracted for that
when I got into Friends of the Earth. We started it on July 11
of '69, and that October we had our contract with McCall.

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Brower: The contract called for twelve books in exhibit format to be published over, oh, three or four years. They would advance \$16,667 on each of the books, half of it on the signing of the contract for each title, and half of it upon its completion. That got us going quickly. The first book was on Maui, and the second one was on the Alps. Both books had been under way when I was in the Sierra Club, but then they came on over to Friends of the Earth instead. The books were conceived of while I was with the club.

The first one, Maui, was printed at Barnes Press in New York. I was interested to be down there at Barnes Press watching that book go through and the Sierra Club's first book under its aegis--the post-Brower book on the Everglades was going through. It wasn't totally a post-Brower book, because I'd been working on that while I was at the club.

The book on the Alps we thought we would do in Switzerland, because the McCall publishing company was owned by Norton Simon, who also owned a printing company in Lausanne. So the business went over to Imprimeries Réunies in Lausanne. In the course of that trip to Lausanne I remembered that during the Sierra Club unpleasantness, one of the letters that I got offering help was from Edwin Matthews.

I had met Edwin at his hotel, the Biltmore, downstairs in the Guard Room, for lunch at the time the Sierra Club was joining with the Fifth Avenue Association in suing to keep Huntington Hartford, I guess it was, from building a bar and restaurant in Central Park. Edwin was an attorney on the case for Tiffany and others. He worked for Coudert brothers, across the street in the Pan Am building. So I met with him to discuss how we'd go about this suit that the Sierra Club was joining. I guess we were both impressed with each other, and he wrote this letter offering help, which I remembered, because he was then in Paris when I was in Lausanne. So I called him up, just to see how he was getting on. He hopped on a train in Paris and came down, and we met in Lausanne.

Friends of the Earth International

Brower: In the course of discussions about what might happen in Friends of the Earth, Edwin Matthews came up with a good many ideas. He agreed to serve on our board. He agreed to be the European representative, unpaid, and began to set up a series of meetings in the Travelers' Clubs in Paris, London, and Stockholm and then a meeting in Rome at the Grand Hotel. We gathered together the leaders of some of the principal existing organizations and told them what we would like to do. We'd like to start Friends of the Earth in each country, and would like to do something that we thought would be different from what they'd been doing. We'd like to concentrate on conservation publishing, on legislative activity, activism, on litigation, and on an international accord. We thought that it would be a good addition to whatever they might be doing.

To a man, they objected to the name Friends of the Earth, or Les Amis de la Terre or Jordens Vänner or Freunde der Erde. They thought that they all sounded a little bit hokey. It does sound a little soft, Friends of the Earth. But they finally agreed that it was a pretty good name. If we had the wrong connotation for "Friends" in association with "Earth," those two words were nevertheless perfectly good words, and we'd better correct our connotations, but not change the words. The name is still sticking well in the countries where we started.

In any event, each one of these organizations said, "Well, why don't you just join us?" We said, "No, we want to be ourselves, and we want to work closely with you and not compete, but we want to do some of the things which you're not doing." It was thus that Les Amis de la Terre got started, and Friends of the Earth in the U.K., and then Jordens Vänner and later Freunde der Erde. We didn't get started in Rome until I guess this year. Finally, years later, it is just about getting going in Italy.*

The move, I think, was a good one. I've already mentioned what happened in England with the recognition in the Times. More recently, last year the New York Times was reporting on what was happening in the nuclear situation around the world, and gave Friends of the Earth credit for changing the attitude in England.

*[And the final reading of the oral history is being completed on my way back from Rome, where the most ambitious international conference by any of our organizations was held by Amici della Terra. DRB, 5/27/79]



Lennart Daléus (of Jordans Vänner) and David Brower,
Stockholm, 1972

(left) Debate with Herman Kahn, KCET (Los Angeles),
1973



Visiting Scholar, Case-Western University,
Cleveland, Ohio, 1974



Brower: Indeed, two of our people over there had a great deal of influence on the change of mind of the scientific advisor to the Parliament, and the changed attitudes of Sir Brian Flowers, and on the determination by the British Parliament that the American reactors were not safe enough to buy, Sir Brian Flowers having said that it is time in the nuclear program to stop and give it a new look, to rethink it.

In France, Friends of the Earth has not been that successful in changing the government's attitude, that is not ostensibly, but there is an undercurrent that I think will, very soon, show; the French government will change its attitude.

We were quite effective in Sweden, where the existing organizations began to lose membership to Jordens Vänner because we were taking a visible position against nuclear reactors, and the others weren't. It can be said fairly that Jordens Vänner had a great deal to do with the changing of the government in Sweden, when the pronuclear government fell, and the antinuclear government came into power. We had good luck, I think, in Australia, where Friends of the Earth unearthed the uranium cartel and the price fixing that had been going on.

It's interesting to see what happens. Earlier I had said that I worried what was happening in the National Wildlife Federation and its decentralization, where the states were independent and the national wouldn't go against them. Nevertheless, for all that apprehension with respect to the Sierra Club, in Friends of the Earth I saw that it was going to be important to have decentralization, and to look for the people who had, if possible, the right general idea, but then to give to them the responsibility of deciding how they would carry it out.

In Friends of the Earth organizations overseas, we saw early that we should most clearly make sure that the other countries were electing their own boards of directors, running their organizations without strings to the U.S., with an early severing of any umbilical cord, a wiping away--to mix my metaphors--of any U.S. fingerprints on the product, and letting them be themselves.

It worked out well. The organizations in these countries worked together well, but there was no umbrella organization telling anybody what to do. We have an ostensible Friends of the Earth International, but that exists only for technical purposes. If Friends of the Earth cannot be represented at some international meeting unless it's an international organization,

- Brower: that's our international organization. Friends of the Earth International becomes a member of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. Friends of the Earth International has consultative status at ECOSOC, and so on.
- Schrepfer: So in other words, if the French FOE decided to take a stand in favor of nuclear power--I realize that obviously this is not going to happen--is there nothing that any other FOE organizations could do ultimately, other than use persuasion?
- Brower: There is one other step. Friends of the Earth International issues licenses to use the name. If the name were used for a pronuclear purpose, the license could be removed.
- Schrepfer: And that would be by a vote of the international--?
- Brower: Yes.
- Schrepfer: But it would only cover very extreme things? They do not make recommendations?
- Brower: What's happened at such international meetings as we've had--I've been to four of them, but missed the latest one in Brussels--has been that we have not too rugged an agenda. We pass the chairmanship around so that two or three or four people will have it. We have a list of things that we want to discuss, and we agree upon that ahead of time. It got a little bit better in Amsterdam [in 1976]. We had some papers presented ahead of time on various subjects, so that there could be discussion of the presentations that have been made more carefully than we might make them just at a meeting. It worked out quite well. It was the Dutch who came up with that idea. It turned out to be a good two or three days' meeting, where we had this discussion, and then also had, in addition to the formal agenda, a lot of time for eating together or drinking together. Not sleeping together.
- Schrepfer: Does everyone speak English?
- Brower: Almost everyone does. So far, we've been fortunate, those of us who speak English as a mother tongue, that almost every other country knows how to speak several languages and can accommodate us. We can't return the compliment, which I think is too bad. I hope that some day we will be a little better on that than we are now.
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- Brower: At FOE's latest international meeting in Brussels [1977] four new countries came in, so that I guess we're now in seventeen countries, and trying hard for an eighteenth. One of the most

Brower: difficult to get going in is Canada, strangely enough. Canada's going through a strange part of its growth, its development, where it is resentful of the south, of the United States. I think they have a feeling of being tenant citizens, that their industries are largely U.S.-owned. They feel they don't have enough control over themselves. They're trying to sever that as fast as they can. They want the money, but they don't want the ownership and the direction. They assume that if a Friends of the Earth operation starts in the United States, then somehow it's going to be further ownership of Canada by the U.S. We're trying to get around that. It's not easy. We're having more trouble with Canada than anywhere else.

We haven't quite started in Japan, even though we have a Japanese representative there. The new countries are Spain, Greece, Mexico, and Italy. Japan, soon, and Canada soon. The places we don't know much about, the two places, are in Yugoslavia and Thailand. There they have to be fairly quiet.

Schrepfer: But you do have a chapter in Thailand.

Brower: They're not chapters, they're separate organizations. Friends of the Earth doesn't have chapters anywhere; we have branches. The Sierra Club has chapters. But we wanted to make certain that there was a complete independence in all these other countries, and that the things we did together, we did because we talked together and thought it would be a good idea to do it together, not because anybody could tell anybody to do it. I think that that's still essential, and it allows us to be the only multinational corporation I approve of.

One of the things that they do in some of the other countries is try to carry on a publishing idea. They haven't gone far in some of the countries, but Britain is doing well, and France, and Sweden. It might be interesting to know that Sweden, with eight million people, has been able to sell 34,000 copies of one of our books, Amory Lovins's World Energy Strategies, and in the United States with its 220,000,000 people, we've only been able to sell about five or six thousand. So we have great opportunities ahead of us.

Organization and Policymaking at FOE

Schrepfer: When you established Friends of the Earth, you did I thought take a few bits of advice from your Sierra Club experience, perhaps. I gather that you didn't want to establish chapters, but rather sort of task forces, project committees.

Brower: We didn't establish chapters, and I'm not quite sure now why we didn't. We certainly didn't want to try to make any direct parallel with the Sierra Club. We didn't have outdoor activities or outings scheduled. We weren't going to have chapters. We didn't want our head office to be in San Francisco, so we were a New York corporation and our head office was initially in New York City.

It went to San Francisco only when Max Linn and Joe Browder were plotting to close the New York office and the San Francisco office and move the operation of the whole organization to Washington, leaving me in San Francisco with the secretary. That failed by one vote in our executive committee. I cast the deciding vote, breaking a tie and moving the headquarters to San Francisco.

We didn't have chapters, and when we discussed the idea, Gary Soucie, who was then the executive director, wrote a good letter on the subject, a strong statement against having chapters; they were too likely to meet because it was Tuesday rather than because they had a problem. The letter is a classic, and quite humorous.

We did later determine to have branches. So that's what we had instead of chapters. We had about forty or fifty, but not many of them are active yet. The New York branch is active and effective. There's an effective one in Arizona. San Francisco is reasonably effective. The others have not gotten too far yet; I hope they will do better..

One of the things I didn't mention was that when Friends of the Earth was founded, one of its activities--part of it--was the League of Conservation Voters. The League of Conservation Voters was an idea that came to me (and you can easily see that it was parallel to the League of Women Voters) about ten years before that. The discussion I had was with Paul and Suzy Brooks --she'd been active in politics in Boston--and it occurred to me that there should be a League of Conservation Voters. I talked about it subsequently, particularly at a meeting of the Sierra Club Council in Carmel. I made a speech there, and the idea found a lot of favor. But we didn't do anything about it.

I made an attempt to start it with Dan Luten doing something about organizing, but he wasn't quite ready to spend the time on it. Phil Berry thought that he might do something about it, but he was immediately trying to make it a Republican device that he could use in support of Tommy Kuchel and get some advantages that way. That's what I saw coming. We never moved it far.

Brower: At the time that Friends of the Earth started, and I announced to the press, and in a press release on it, about what I wanted it to do. One of the functions we were going to have--part of Friends of the Earth--would be the League of Conservation Voters.

George Alderson, who was another member of the ABC slate, was our initial Washington representative to Friends of the Earth. He said that he knew somebody who, if we were going to start a League of Conservation Voters, had \$35,000 she'd like to put in to help it work. It was Marion Edey. She did put money into it and continued to put money into it ever since. I was on the steering committee, and she became the chairman of the steering committee.

What happened in the League of Conservation Voters seen subsequently, is important. It's easy to have an idea, but it's quite something else to make it work. I'd had the idea for years. Marion Edey made it work. She was brilliant about it, and she still is. She happens to have money in the family, and the family have wealthy friends. They help support the operation. It doesn't get a lot of broad financial support, but it gets some. It needs some more now; if you know anybody who wants to give a little bit of money to help the League of Conservation Voters, spread the word.

But it was her strategy initially to get into few contests, and get into those where we thought that the little weight that we had would be effective, and then celebrate what we did. It was her idea to keep score on the environmental records of the members of the House and the Senate. That's been very effective.

Schrepfer: And she's in Washington?

Brower: Yes, she's in Washington. Her mother, Dr. Helen Edey, is active in population matters. Her father, Maitland Edey, was editor of TIME-Life books. He's now retired.

She married Joe Browder. When Joe Browder took the Washington office people away from Friends of the Earth [January 1972] she went away too and took her League of Conservation Voters--which had now become hers because she'd done all the work--out from under Friends of the Earth's roof and put it under the roof of the new organization Joe Browder was founding, the Environmental Policy Center.

I was quite upset about that move, though I kept my cool. I was upset with what we then called the apostasy of Gary Soucie who joined this revolt. He had already resigned as executive

Brower: director of Friends of the Earth. When he was named president of the Environmental Policy Center, this troubled quite a few of us.

I was now getting older and mellower, and attended the next meeting of the LCV steering committee (early 1973, I believe), where I nominated Gary Soucie as the vice-chairman. I stayed on myself, and have been able to cooperate with them ever since.

The relationship with Marion Edey remained cordial. With Joe Browder--I was quite upset with him for a while, but we exchanged words, pleasantries. The marriage broke up between Joe and Marion. He's now married--his third--to Louise Dunlap, who was in our Friends of the Earth office and was one of the people that he took away.

The League of Conservation Voters also had to be separately organized. It was not legal to do, because of the Corrupt Practices Act, what we were proposing to do--get money and funnel it to candidates of our choosing. You cannot do that under the Corrupt Practices Act unless you happen to be Gulf Oil or someone like that. You may remember that they were caught having given a hundred thousand dollars to CREEP--the Committee to Re-Elect the President--whereupon they were fined five thousand dollars. So they had given a hundred and five thousand dollars.

Schrepfer: You did not have, as I understand, a board of directors for Friends of the Earth until fairly recently?

Brower: No, we had it immediately.

Schrepfer: Oh, you did? I thought you had an executive committee.

Brower: We started with the founders. On July 11, the people who signed the papers were, for the most part, the attorneys in David Sive's office who were stand-ins until we decided who was to be what. Then we just arbitrarily picked some directors, and assigned three, two, and one-year terms as precedent to the subsequent three-year terms, staggered, to which the twenty-four directors would be elected. It was first twenty-one, and then twenty-four [now twenty-seven]. We had an executive committee of the board, which conducted most of the business. The board would meet once a year at the annual meeting, and the executive committee would meet almost once a month.

Schrepfer: And then did you have some sort of vote among these founders, who became the directors, as to what the emphasis of FOE would be?

Brower: The first years were simply I guess an extension of what I'd been doing. The people who wished to serve on the board wished to support what I'd been doing in the Sierra Club already, so that it was a strange situation, where we didn't need to determine policy at that point. It was, if I may put it that way, my policy. What I wanted to do was what our policy was.

As the time went on, and we began to get more and more discussions of it, it began to evolve a little bit. This is going further now. At our recent meeting of the board, we spent a great deal of the time discussing policy. At our recent meeting of the executive committee, we spent a great deal of time discussing what we wanted to do and how to go about it, which is a proper evolution, because that's the only way an organization survives its founders.

In any event, that formula where the organization should be doing what I was doing was valid enough an explanation to hold up in court. When Friends of the Earth brought suit to stop the Trident base that the Navy wanted to build in Seattle--which is still in litigation--the Navy tried to get the case thrown out of court. When I was brought down here as a witness to give my deposition, they wanted to find out where in the minutes was the record of the authorization of our suing the Navy.

I explained how these decisions were made. On our board of directors were lawyers who gave us advice. What the organization did, primarily, is what the members and the directors joined to support me in doing. I realized that this was a honeymoon period that would soon end, but that it was still in effect, and was in effect at the time we decided to sue. We got on the telephone, and we decided we'd better get at it. The court accepted this description.

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Brower: Now, this is gradually changing, so that it is no longer just an outfit that consists of people who join primarily to support what I had stood for, what had been news in such notoriety as I'd gained, or what was said in the promotional letters by direct mail that I'd signed (written by others). My point was that a lot of people joined Friends of the Earth to support what I was standing for. What I was standing for was differentiated from what I had been standing for in the Sierra Club and was no longer permitted to. It was initially a personal following, so there was the honeymoon period. All honeymoon periods end, and mine certainly is ending. There are a lot of people participating in the decision-making now. I've been quite anxious to do in Friends of the Earth what I had tried to do in the Sierra Club too, and what didn't please everybody as much as they would like to be pleased.

Brower: I started in the Sierra Club with a line that I've used since-- if you want to work for Sierra Club, I'd like your job description, and the first and most important line in that job description is your name, because you're the only person that's ever going to have it, and you're going to be a good member of the staff if you realize yourself why you're working at it. I've been saying that ever since.

That means that you ask the person who is working on the staff, in the department in which that person is working, to make his or her own decision as if he or she were deciding for the organization as a whole. Think it out, check it with some other people, be as sure as you can that it's right, and then go ahead. If you've made a mistake, we'll talk about it later, and we'll try to see what the mistake was and if there should have been further checking or something of the sort. If I disagree with it, and we discuss it further, I may change my opinion from what you've had to say.

This is the way it's worked out. There have been practically no disagreements in nearly nine years that were not quite resolvable. There were a few. One of them led to Joe Browder's departure and his trying to take Friends of the Earth with him. That was a major disagreement there, and he wanted to not only make his own decisions, but he wanted me ruled out of any of the decision-making and to have the Friends of the Earth office moved to Washington. That was, I think, the exception.

I don't want to forget too many things, but I don't think I'm forgetting many. The delegation has worked; the people who have had this kind of responsibility and authority delegated to them have used it extraordinarily well. This has produced at an unconscionably low figure in money, the kind of results that we never would have otherwise got. If they don't get much money --that is, our average for some thirty-three full-time people is \$7700 a year; that's not very much these days--they do get a great deal of satisfaction in the work, and the chance to realize their own ambitions, each of them. (See what happens when you try to say "his" or "her," and you have "their"--the language is not ready for what the feminists have done, so properly.)

That is where the policy comes from. Not Man Apart is produced by the staff of Not Man Apart. Now and then I say I would like something in it, because I think it's important, and from time to time, I'm worried that there's a lot of coverage on something but not on something else. But I don't insist on reading the copy ahead of time. That happens in the Sierra Club. And I find therefore that each issue of Not Man Apart is news to

Brower: me. If my appraisal of what the balance should be is different from what it is, I am reticent about fussing about it. I like what the overall result is. I certainly like what that's done, the overall reputation. I heard last night from somebody that it's the best of the environmental publications. I've heard that again and again. From people who might just want to be pleasing me, but also from people who are experts in the field, including the most eminent environmental journalist I know, a Pulitzer Prize winner. I asked him, and he said it was the best. I said, "Can I quote you?" and he said no. So I won't give it for attribution. He didn't want to put others' noses out of joint, I guess.

In the Washington office, the people who run that office, for the most part, make the policy that Friends of the Earth is going to have as it goes about the various legislative programs there. Now, I have some arguments--sometimes a little attenuated, sometimes a little bit louder than normal over the telephone. They're not always right, and I'm certainly not always right. There's rarely anything that we get into that kind of discussion over. That delegation works. Jim Kowalsky in Alaska works out what he has to do there.

Schrepfer: So it would be possible for the Washington office to do something that might not agree with what--

Brower: The board might some day get quite upset by some of the things that the Washington office does. So far, they haven't. As a result of this delegation--and it may not all be good, and I'd like some of it to be different from what it is--a lot of the time of the board or the executive committee is spent worrying about the finances more than about the direction of the program or what we're standing for. I'm hoping that that will be corrected, because I'd like to see the board meetings bring a different kind of participation. We have good people on the board. I think it's a sophisticated bunch. They can make some good contributions. We'd like to see more of that, and I think we'll get more. But meanwhile, we've done well with this kind of delegation.

Schrepfer: Do they establish a list of projects and priorities, the board of directors?

Brower: We don't, in Friends of the Earth. The Sierra Club, I see, has tried to do that. But I think our failure to do that is not laziness, but it's just a recognition that we aren't in the driver's seat. Our problems are made by other people, not by us. We are, in a large part, firemen. When the bell rings,

Brower: whatever's burning, we've got to go and put the fire out as well as we can. It's nice to say in setting priorities that, "All right, if you're in Manhattan, we will fight fires in midtown and in Wall Street, but we will not worry about the Village or Harlem." If there's a fire in Harlem or in the Village, we'd better fight.

Schrepfer: Does the Board of Directors then approve the policy or a project or an issue, or vote on it at all?

Brower: They rarely vote on it at all. If they find something that displeases them, they talk about it, and we discuss that. We evolve out of that discussion a change of direction or a change of flavor of what we've been doing. Even that doesn't happen often. The people who have worked this out under the broad delegation work it out as if they were speaking for the organization, are careful about it, and think well. We have not had to go through all the bureaucratic steps of checking everything and having two or three reviews. We're lucky.

Schrepfer: There must be a fair degree of ideological unanimity then?

Brower: I think there is. I can just say that we're lucky. I don't know whether I can say much more than that. One of the things we're trying to do--and we did in this recent book, Progress As If Survival Mattered--is lay out a series of our concepts of how to get from where we've been to the postindustrial society with the least harm; to come up with positive ways that are still feasible, sustainable, to go to a better society. The book has not been out long. We're getting some good remarks on it, and we'll wait to see what the directors have to say, and the advisory council members and the public. So far, no static.

Schrepfer: But the directors do not actually have to approve a book?

Brower: No, they don't. That may come some day, if we get big, and we have so many people that the homogeneity is gone. Then we'll have the trouble that comes with bigness.

Books: Impact and Economics

Schrepfer: We were just talking about books. I gather your publications generally fairly well cover their costs?

Brower: Yes, so far they do, and they're doing a little bit better than that. It's hard to get a good clear accounting. I've been trying for some years to get a better accounting for our publishing program, even as I was trying to get the Sierra Club to get a better accounting system going. How well a program is doing depends a great deal on the philosophy of the accountant and what the results are that the accountant wishes to achieve. It's retroactive thinking.

For example, in the Sierra Club--I think I may have mentioned this--if they had used the present accounting system in my time there, they would have been worried about the profits.

Schrepfer: Do you have any trouble financing them?

Brower: Yes. One of our problems is that we never did start out with a nest egg, and the Sierra Club has its permanent fund. Friends of the Earth never had any money to start with, and quickly after that had a major debt, so that we were not bothered by capital, only by its absence. The first requirement then was that we arrange for co-publishing ventures, which we did with McCall Publishing Company, later the Saturday Review Press, McGraw-Hill, Herder and Herder, Ballantine, Ballinger, Simon and Schuster, and then some overseas.

That's how most of our books have been done. They were done in cooperation with others, and we were in essence the composite author and got a royalty for what we'd done. Always too little, because we were doing more than being a composite author. We were also the packager and quality supervisor and all that. We designed and did all the work a publisher does except pay the printer and sell the books.

We're trying now to move into something nearer to what the Sierra Club is doing, pulling ourselves up by our bootstraps, getting some books that will produce a little capital on their own, and then growing out of that, finding that if we do a book ourselves, and if we're careful about the books we take on and undertake, that we can do much better than the 10 percent composite royalty or rough equivalent we were getting from the co-publisher. We can get much more than that, two to three times as much out of it by doing it ourselves. Greater profit, greater risk.

If we watch what we take on, I think we'll come out all right. The Amory Lovins Soft Energy Paths book--now published in England and the U.S. and Sweden, with other editions in Germany, Japan, Chile, and France--is doing very well. I hope that our Progress book will do well. We're already into our second printing. We

Brower: hope that we can get the mass market rights for Soft Energy Paths and do much better than Ballinger has done.

We have other books that we would like to do, and I think we can. Now, in lieu of what the Sierra Club had in its own portfolio of investments that could be transferred into an inventory of books, I'm looking for loans. Since we have no credit rating, it would be guarantees by some of our wealthier members of loans to the publishing program that would be the capital. If the program is managed properly, it could pay better than the prime rate of interest, something corresponding to the risk the lender is undergoing. This would be the capital we need and would enable us to do something like what the Sierra Club did.

I have not yet got over my prejudice in favor of the book. I still think it's a basic tool, quite important to changes in opinion and to what happens in conservation. A book has to stand on its own. It, by its very format, indicates that there's been some careful thought. It's retrievable. It's catalogable. It's reviewable. It becomes a working tool for people who will carry on from there. I certainly saw that happen with the Sierra Club books and want it to happen to ours.

Schrepfer: Almost all of the figures I've ever seen of who joins conservation organizations say that they live on either the east coast or the west coast, and they're educated--I think the Sierra Club's record now is that well over 50 percent have degrees beyond A.B.s. It's a very specific group of people. Are you afraid at all that books appeal to people who are already quite susceptible to this issue, and that is only a small sector of the population?

Brower: To the extent that the books appeal to a small sector that may already agree with us, I'm not too regretful of that because it gives them reinforcement. They may otherwise have wished to waver, and this gives them something to stand on, to back up what they thought was right in the first place, if they operate out of prejudice, as I do.

Beyond that, we don't have that much consensus. There's a wide variety of opinion among the people who have A.B.s and better. They have strong belief in their own judgment and believe they can think a lot of things out themselves. They may or may not agree. Certainly some of the earlier Sierra Club books were aimed at an audience with which we could expect practically no agreement, except that they liked beautiful things. This is the American Earth was a beautiful book--still is. It was financed by the president of McGraw-Edison, who was an out-and-out capitalist who is not much interested in the kind of social

Brower: conscience that conservation has in it now. He was very deeply interested in beautiful places. That got on the tables of a lot of people who were moved by what Nancy Newhall had to say, in conjunction with Ansel's forty photographs and the forty others. The counterpoint of those two art forms had its own power, and it got through to people. I don't know whether Max McGraw would quite have approved of what finally happened, if he'd known that was going to happen.

I guess the nicest story was that it was reviewed three times in the New York Times, each time as if whoever was reviewing it didn't know that somebody else had done it already. First, it filled all of page two in the review section. Then John Oakes reviewed it, and finally someone else. It occupied the entire editorial page of a Kansas paper, a big one. Photographs, direct quotes from Nancy Newhall, editorial comments on what this book did, the importance to the American future of it. It really hit. No other book has had that response. A lot of them have had a lot of response. But that was the first big one.

Others, such as Eliot Porter's In Wildness Is the Preservation of the World didn't have a big argument going in it, but you couldn't get through that juxtaposition of Eliot's beautiful photographs and Thoreau's salty and witful thoughts without coming out a little bit different from the way you went in.

On The Place No One Knew: Glen Canyon, one of our ostensible enemies in the House of Representatives was Wayne Aspinall, who was chairman of the House Interior Committee, and he was one of the people who was the architect of the Colorado River Storage Project and didn't like our testimony and publicly called me a liar and a few other odds and ends. That book made Wayne Aspinall cry! I didn't get that news from him, I got it from Bill Zimmerman, who was able to be entrusted with stories like that. He was the Sierra Club's Washington representative.

So don't give up, I keep telling myself and my wife, when people say, "Why are you always so book-prone?" There is power in a book that is extremely well done--when you do the best thing you can do in it. If it costs more money, charge more for it. Students gave up their beer money to buy Eliot Porter's book. I was told that it would never succeed. There was a depression coming on, and no one would ever pay twenty-five dollars for a book, but about seventy thousand people did. And a half-million people later paid four dollars for the paperback. So people spent four million dollars on a book "that would never succeed."

Schrepfer: One thing I've wondered about those Sierra Club books now when I look at them--what would the cost be of producing them now? Costs are going up so much.

Brower: They cost quite a bit more. I know, because I have to struggle with that all the time. We're still trying to squeak by. The book that we could have done for twenty-five now looks more like thirty-five or thirty-nine-fifty. But you can handle this problem if you find the other routes around it, so that you're not trying to float the book on what it cost to get out your first printing. You're trying to anticipate and incorporate in your thinking subsidiary rights that will come up, some paperback rights and so on. Or the perpetual temptation of a publisher--many have gone down the tube because of it--to print more so the unit price comes out less. The arithmetic of that is fairly simple--that is, for a book like In Wildness, the rounded figure was that the first copy of the book cost forty thousand dollars, subsequent copies cost four. So it's good to make more than one copy.

You have to multiply the cost of the book at the printers by a factor of four or five to arrive at the selling price, if you want to come out even and have a little margin. Some publishers want a factor of six so they make a lot of money and support New York overheads. If you do ten thousand books, you can divide that forty thousand for the first book by ten thousand, so it's only four dollars a book as the "plant" cost for the first one, plus four dollars per book for "run'on" cost, for an eight-dollar total price. Multiply by four, and your selling price would be thirty-two dollars.

If you could somehow justify doing forty thousand books, then it's only a dollar for "plant" (forty thousand divided by forty thousand is a dollar per book) plus the four dollars for run on, totaling five dollars cost, and a twenty-dollar selling price. If you can properly count on selling forty thousand, you can put the price down to twenty dollars and you have a chance of selling that many and breaking even. If you can't, and you just do ten thousand, you're probably going to have a little problem selling ten thousand at thirty-two. So these are the struggles that you go through, and if you can do a paperback concurrently, or get a commitment to do a paperback or a foreign edition, then you can begin to do other things and thus juggle around and keep the price reasonably close to what it was when the Porter book came out.

Schrepfer: I noticed a lot of your books run about fifteen.

Brower: Well, those fifteen are reprint editions, and that's not the kind of thing that can be sustained. That happens throughout the publishing world. It's the effect of the cheap reprint or the remainder. The fact that you've spent the first forty thousand dollars is all over. So you don't have to do that again. And on the reprints, you can therefore just worry about the run-on costs, and forget to pay much for the author or photographer. The reprint publisher then makes the money. A little lesson in publishing accounting. You can put that in as an appendix. In very fine print.

Schrepfer: I gather that you regard conservation more as a philosophical or educational problem than an economic or political problem.

Brower: I don't think I would even limit it that much. It's also a bit religious. I suppose that it is my religion. Once again, it's a matter of stewardship. It's recognizing, as Nancy Newhall wanted people to recognize in This is the American Earth, that we are a brief tenant, and we should act that way, and not as the permanent landlord. Art Hoppe does the same thing in his occasional San Francisco Chronicle columns on conversations between the Lord and Gabriel.

Schrepfer: But in terms of trying to change the attitude of others, is it more the way people feel that is the basic problem, or the political-economic structure?

Brower: Well, I don't know. This is getting a little bit thin, I suppose, for me. I think that in my philosophy, if that's what you want, it starts with the way people feel. The way they feel will determine whether they want to put much of their own influence in what happens next. If they want to put their influence to work, then their political power materializes. The political feasibility comes from that interest and influence of the people who care because they felt emotionally about something. That's all theoretical.

Let's talk Grand Canyon. People who never saw the Grand Canyon felt that it was their Grand Canyon; it was the Grand Canyon. The idea that somebody might do something to it offended them. Dams in the Grand Canyon? I remember talking to a cab driver in New York. He saw on my suitcase the "Save the Grand Canyon" sticker and said, "What are they trying to do?" I said, "Put a dam there." He said, "Dam the Grand Canyon?" He was unbelieving, and then shocked.

Brower: We counted on that. We also then got the best data we could get, and did the best appraisal of the data other people had developed, because we didn't have much research budget. In the Grand Canyon battle we counted primarily on the public's being concerned. This isn't what you do to the Grand Canyon. It's part of the National Park system. It's part of the finest idea we have had on using a little restraint in this country. You don't want to throw it aside. The idea is a great idea. The place is unequalled anywhere in the world. Let's not let them rough it up.

That was the thing that got people's interest, I think, in large part. Then with that interest, we could say, "All right, not only shouldn't they spoil this place, but here are the technical reasons they shouldn't--economic, hydrological, engineering, resource planning about where you put people and where you put water. These are the reasons it shouldn't happen. This is where the Bureau of Reclamation is completely haywire. Here's where they're telling the truth and here's where, alas, they're not. So we could gather all these facts together as well as having the emotional attention of people, and could bring enough pressure to Congress and on the administration that we could win. Finally Lyndon Johnson said that, "If this bill goes through with the Grand Canyon dams in it, I'll veto it." Now that pressure came from various routes. There was the direct, "I know you and you know me, and this is what I think you ought to tell the man." Part of that story is what happened with Lady Bird Johnson, who had quite a bit of influence on it. She was influenced by the people who knew her pretty well.

Schrepfer: For example?

Brower: Oh, what was her name? She worked with the Wilderness Society and then she worked for Stewart Udall, and went over to the Beautification Office.. Her name escapes me. I may remember it later. [Sharon Francis] She had good influence. But meanwhile, here was this stir across the nation, and then there were such lucky bits as the IRS clouding the Sierra Club's tax status, and making everybody really mad. As I like to say, "They may not have known whether to love the Grand Canyon or not, but they certainly knew enough to hate the IRS." That led to Mo Udall saying that it was the worst mistake he'd made in helping this thing happen.

That is again, the specific example of the importance of the emotional effect.

On the SST, I think that people didn't want damage done to the atmosphere, and they didn't want it done to their eardrums to start with. The numbers then followed, a very good analysis of why it was an economic nightmare, an albatross, why it shouldn't be done.

Brower: Certainly this is happening now with nuclear. There are a lot of people who don't like the idea of something they can't see that could be damaging their genetic structure. They don't like it to be a threat to their children. They have this strong emotional feeling about it, and no amount of the industry saying, "This is clean and safe" can wipe out that unease. We have this to work with in the environmental movement. Does that make sense?

Schrepfer: Yes, yes. So a book may be more powerful than national land-planning. [laughter]

Brower: Of course, national land planning sounds pretty dull, or an economic treatise often sounds dull, and will be. But the specific thing to work with is the idea: That is a piece of the land, a piece of the earth. We're here once. We can pass it on as beautiful as we found it, or we can do what's been done to a lot of places that we'd like to see beautiful still. We can make it look like Los Angeles. Or we can make it stay beautiful. At least we can keep it as beautiful as Venice has tried to stay. There are good examples of where restraint has kept a place beautiful.

We can heed that clear statement from Garrett Hardin: "No architect should be allowed to practice his trade until he has lived a year in Venice and learned what a city is like when it is built to human scale." This kind of philosophy, releasing a useful attitude toward cities, toward open land, waving grass, waters, mountains, forest, is rewarding. It's the strongest weapon we have. People, when they think about it, care.

That vote against the Panther Mountain Dam in New York state: the dam went down three and a half to one--a three and a half to one vote in favor of saving trees that nobody in Brooklyn had ever seen. That's a measure of what people feel about the earth, given a chance to express it. Books give them a chance. Ads do. Books can inform the people that write the ads. It would be nice if they were even better informed than they are.

Social and Political Correlates of an Environmental Concern//

Schrepfer: We mentioned earlier the problem of getting certain sectors of the population--urban people, blacks, perhaps third world people more involved environmentally. That's always been sort of an Achilles heel of the environmental movement, leaving it open to charges of elitism. It reminded me that your fur campaign in the first months was attacked in the book, Radical Chic.

Brower: Yes, by Tom Wolfe I guess. The fur campaign was conceived of by Joan McIntyre. She was the founder of Project Jonah. She carried the campaign off beautifully. It needs another Joan McIntyre. It needs Joan's attention again, because the people are forgetting what they did. She got a lot of prominent people --including Joe Namath--to sign the pledge not to wear furs of endangered species, and some not to wear furs at all. The slogan that they used a great deal came from a nine-year-old girl. "Furs look better on their original owners."

Schrepfer: How much do you feel that you have managed to deal with this problem of elitism in dealing with third world people on an international scale, and urban people here, the poor sectors of the population?

Brower: We haven't done well enough, but I usually say, to the charge of elitism, that that just seems to be a fad, to call someone who disagrees with you an elite, an extremist, an elitist, or something of the sort. But you don't dismiss the problem by calling somebody a name, so let's get back to the subject. Or, as Garrett Hardin puts it, "Don't call me names; tell me where I'm wrong." But who suffers most if the environment starts to get degraded? It's not the rich people who suffer, the man who can get into his air-conditioned Rolls Royce in Scarsdale and step quickly over the smoggy threshold into his air-conditioned building on Park Avenue. He hasn't suffered a bit. But you suffer in Harlem.

When we try to clean up the air, we include cleaning it up for the people in Harlem who need it more than we do. When we try to stop Los Angeles from exporting its smog to Four Corners, we're helping the Navajos keep their atmosphere clean. So there's not much elitism here.

Schrepfer: You don't think there's any conflict between the goals at all?

Brower: There is a conflict between the goals of those who want to sacrifice the environment right now for immediate benefit. There's plenty of conflict, and that's the name of the conflict in conservation and it always will be. There is an immediate gain to be made from stopping your calculations at a convenient short time ahead: "If I do the following for the next ten years, I'm going to be in good shape." If you don't count what is going to happen in the ten years following that, you don't have to be troubled by conservation. But if you want to consider what's going to happen in the following ten or twenty years, then you have to think of the future effectively. You budget as the brief tenant you are--one who cares.

Schrepfer: The black movements of the sixties were not always very sympathetic to the environmental movement.

Brower: No. They would think, for example, that population control was genocide, that if you were trying to save condors, that "saving twenty-seven condors isn't going to feed my children." You would get various quick little quips.

Schrepfer: Well, until you would have a significant change in the distribution of power within the United States, limiting resource use would not affect the wealthy, who would still manage to get their sector of the resources. It certainly might, nonetheless, affect the poor people.

Brower: But to fail to conserve--my line that I use constantly now--is grand larceny, grand larceny against children. Economic growth as presently practiced is stealing from children, in a sophisticated way. When you start talking that way, people begin to understand that we'll always have children, and there may be inequity now, but if you wipe out a resource that can continue to renew itself, there's no break at all for the next generation, whether they're rich or poor. You certainly haven't helped the poor by degrading the environment, the working place, by not getting into the battles to protect them from the chemicals that they're exposed to, to get paid for their work, from asbestos fibers, or from dioxin or keponelor, whatever it is that's being inflicted on workers.

That's one of the things that Friends of the Earth got into right away. We got into the suit against Shell [in 1973], in support of the strike where the Shell people refused to clean up the working place. They wouldn't tell the employees what they were being exposed to. In the two speeches I've heard Leonard Woodcock make about environment and labor, I couldn't find anything to disagree with. Friends of the Earth was right down the party line, doing what he was saying should be done.

Schrepfer: Have you managed to establish any liaison with labor organizations?

Brower: Not nearly enough. We're trying to. One of the problems in the environmental organizations is that from Earth Day on, they had so much success that people were looking to them for success in fields that were not necessarily environmental fields. "Why do you spend time trying to save a park when we need the city saved?" A lot of shift has been made in the emphasis of the organizations now, and a lot of them are moving into thinking about some of the city's problems, so much so that there aren't enough left out watching for the wilderness. There are not enough organizations and not enough people supporting them to do all the jobs at once, so some of them suffer.

Schrepfer: The Sierra Club for years was Republican. Have you found a base of support in any particular party or political sector for Friends of the Earth?

Brower: Well, when I was with the Sierra Club, I'm afraid I had to agree with Republican Congressman John Saylor, one of the outstanding leaders for conservation in the House, that there wasn't much support from his party. There were some Republican members of the club, but I wouldn't say that it was a Republican organization, nor would I say that the Republican party was very helpful to the environment.

Schrepfer: No, I was just thinking of the fact that almost to a man at one point, I think that most everyone was Republican among Sierra Club leaders. You haven't found perhaps Democratic leanings among both your active members and your leaders in Friends of the Earth?

Brower: The membership, I don't know quite where it is, but I would be surprised if there was a director who was a Republican. I would be surprised if there weren't quite a few who were independent. I don't know. The League of Conservation Voters has been hard put to find enough Republicans to be supportive of. They have to lean over backwards to support Republicans, and they want to support Republicans as well as Democrats, so it won't look as if they're a Democrat trick. It's hard.

Schrepfer: In terms of cooperation with various political leaders, if you wanted to get a bill through Congress, who or what type of Senator or Congressman might you call? I don't mean right now so much, but in the first five years of Friends of the Earth.

Brower: I would call anybody that George Alderson said should be called. He would be the one who would have that sensing of who they were. Right now it would be Jeff Knight and people in the Washington office. But my own connections in Washington have been scarcer and scarcer. I don't go often. I used to go often with the Sierra Club. We've had a good Washington office with Friends of the Earth, and I don't go unless they say that I ought to, and they don't seem to think I ought to often. [laughs] They specialize in their various fields, and I can go in and speak glittering generalities, but they've got all the information. There are certain subjects that I'm fairly well versed on. But I know from experience in the two big battles I got into--there were four, I guess, the Wilderness Bill, the outdoor recreation resources effort, and Grand Canyon and Dinosaur--that you have to know your subject well or you're not that much good. If you know it well, then you can make a difference.

Schrepfer; I suppose that in talking about Friends of the Earth from 1970 to 1975, one very dominant question mark is, what do you think accounts for Nixon's peculiar kind of conservation record? I've been going over it in my mind. Some things he was very good on, like the Everglades, and some things he was very weak on, like the [Alaska] pipeline.

Brower: The pipeline thing I attribute to a story that Jack Anderson put into his "Washington Merry-go-Round," about Nixon's hotel in New York being the Pierre, the place where Robert O. Anderson, chairman of the board of Atlantic Richfield, also stayed regularly in New York. This story was denied. It was said that Jack Anderson had mixed up his Andersons. But I don't believe he had; Robert O. Anderson, whom I know, had a great deal of influence on the President. It was Atlantic Richfield that initially made the discovery at Prudhoe Bay and was making every effort it could to get its oil out.

I don't know what influenced Nixon--I don't know what you could say, how you would ever find out. Certainly there was a lot of oil money in his campaigns. We found that out. But I do have one bit of direct evidence that came out of the first conference we held at Aspen. The John Muir Institute held the conference there, and one of the people invited was John Ehrlichman. We had a discussion with him on various subjects. He was pretty arrogant and didn't show much experience himself in what conservation was about.

But the insight was on the population question. Nixon made the best speech on population, the strongest speech on the need for population control that any president has yet made. He said that we were on a collision course and something had to be done about it, but then he did what he usually did to please both sides, and he didn't want to do anything to displease any particular group, Catholics or Mormons. So he gave and he took away.

But the question is, what was the support from the public on that? I would ask this question of audiences, "How many people in the audience wrote the President either to criticize him for the speech or to thank him for it?" The ratio was one out of a thousand. Then I would go on with a similar quiz. There was a bit of legislation on what was going to happen in the national forests, the timber-supply bill. How many people wrote to Congress on that? A few had. Did anyone in the audience think--how many people think they need the SST? Practically nobody. How many wrote? Hands all over the place. "See what you did?" I would moralize.

Brower: Because in both the forest matters and in the SST, the establishment was totally in favor of overcutting the forests and building the SST. You've seen how many hands are here, particularly in the forest matter. There was the Agriculture Department, the President, the timber industry, the paper industry--they all wanted to cut more, and it didn't get through Congress. Just a few people out of this audience wrote, and this is a skewed audience. You came to hear an environmentalist. But if just that few, out of a skewed audience, can write and change the thing, look at the power you've got! Look what happened when nobody wrote to Nixon on population. When we met with John Ehrlichman, he said it was a dud at the box office. If you're in politics, one of the things you like to do is get re-elected. If you want to get re-elected, you watch the mail.

We failed. If I had been the president, I might have gone on again, but I wasn't politically astute, and he was. If you fail on something like that, you try something else. You do something that you're going to get a lot of support for.

So I would explain part of what happened to Nixon to be that.

Schrepfer: And that might apply to the Alaskan pipeline.

Brower: There was plenty of opposition to that, enough opposition that we won in the courts, and we won in the Senate, except for Spiro Agnew's breaking the tie. That was too close, but we had kind of gone toe to toe with the oil companies on it. We'd beaten them in court, and then they had to go to Congress to beat us. And they beat us in a way that we would not have lost had the Environmental Defense Fund not backed out on us.

The Wilderness Society and the Environmental Defense Fund and Friends of the Earth were the principal litigants. FOE was in moral support, not financial. EDF gave up. The Wilderness Society didn't discuss it with us, to ask what we should do. So they got tired. But we had sixty days in which to go to court to challenge what had happened. The challenge, so far as I was concerned, was how, if the Constitution sets up three branches of the government, can Congress write a bill and say that they're not going to let the court look at this one? That should have been tossed out.

Schrepfer: Was it probably that the Environmental Defense Fund became afraid because of the boycott and the prices of oil and the unpopularity of the issue also?

Brower: That would have certainly had some effect on the Wilderness Society and the Environmental Defense Fund. But then also there was plenty of evidence that the gasoline shortage was being contrived. Unpopular things are unpopular for a while, but the public changes its attitude. You hang in there, even if you don't have the public with you at the time being.

Schrepfer: Right. But I'm trying to understand why they--

Brower: I think they got tired. They'd been working on it a long time. I know that Jim Moorman, who fought the case for the Center for Law and Social Policy on our behalf and on the Wilderness Society's behalf, was brilliant. But you can keep up this kind of brilliance for a while, and here you are, one or two attorneys, and the Interior Department and the oil companies have got about ninety, and they can wear you down.

Schrepfer: When we talked before, you mentioned that in the 1950s and '60s, you became rather suspect of government, of the Forest Service, and the intentions of the Park Service and so on. Do you have any second thoughts about the fact that the environmental movement in the '60s and the '70s has led to an increasing bureaucratization, that we really haven't come up with any new government responses, other than to create new bureaucracies?

Brower: I don't know how you can avoid bureaucracies, unless you suddenly infuse perfection in the human gene at birth. As long as there's going to be any government at all, it's got to be done by the various branches of government. There will be bureaus. But remember what has happened that was different. We do have a Council on Environmental Quality, and we do have the Environmental Protection Agency. So every now and then if you get a new branch or a new bureau, new things can get done.

It takes a while before the people that are supposed to be regulated get the range and regulate the regulators. Now in due course, the EPA will lose its virility, and it's lost some already. It was easy to be critical of [William] Ruckelshaus when he was there, or [Russell] Train, until he was replaced by whomever his replacement may be. But it's extraordinary, on the other hand, to see some of the very brave moves that have been made, just to stay there and say, "You can't do this," and shut it down.

Schrepfer: Do you think that they could ever go through the same evolution as the Forest Service and the water conservationists have gone through?

Brower: I think so. I think I gave you 'way back in one of the earlier tapes that quote from Justice Douglas, where he told FDR that no government agency should be allowed to exist more than ten years.

Brower: After that, they are more concerned with their self-perpetuation than their functions. I have repeated that to President Carter--then Governor Carter--about the proposed reorganization that would bring us a Department of Energy and Environment. I used this old example in some of the worries that I had about this kind of shift.

Schrepfer: FOE, in the early '70s, asked for the dismissal of George Hartzog as director of the Park Service. Do you think it's only coincidence that the most blatant of the perhaps unprofessional appointments were Hartzog and [Ronald] Walker?

Brower: Well, at least Hartzog had been in the Park Service. Walker had managed Nixon's China tour, and that was the extent of his knowledge of parks.

Schrepfer: They both emphasized very strongly concessions and things. Do you think there was any shenanigans with donations to Nixon or Watergate-like activities?

Brower: I think that there were. That's what I think, and that's what I gathered from some people who were fairly well informed.

An Environmentalist in Alaska and Nepal

Schrepfer: Perhaps you might want to comment on a few of the more outstanding things that you've done very recently. For example, living in an Alaskan village?

Brower: Well, overnight.

Schrepfer: That's better than most of us.

Brower: That was a very pleasant experience. It was arranged by Jim Kowalsky, who was our Alaska representative. He wanted me to go about a year before, and I'd been overstrained and had to cancel on grounds of health. But they waited for me and welcomed me nevertheless when I got there a year later. It was a matter of flying into Anchorage and over to Bethel, Alaska, and then taking a small plane to the airstrip, the muddy airstrip at Chevak. We came in, and the pilot said, "Now don't think the plane's falling apart when we land, it's just a soft, rough airstrip." We did, and it was.

Brower: There was no air terminal, but you could get out of the plane and walk down a muddy little road to where there were some boardwalks, not so muddy, among the various shacks and little buildings ---nothing pretentious---that Chevak consists of. One of the things that we walked by was a series of rather tall oil tanks, big ones, that were supplying the energy to make the electricity for this little town. As I walked along the boardwalk, I noticed that in front of almost every one of the shacks there were two or three snowmobiles, some of them in a state of repair and some of them not. We got into a house, and in this particular house was David Friday, who was the leader of the town. There was a washing machine just inside, but there was nothing to hook it up to. There was a hi-fi, a little radio, a refrigerator--the Eskimos had been sold refrigerators.

We went down to the channel where the boats were, and they had an outboard with two outboard motors in it. Of course, it's a good idea to have two there, if you're going out in that country forty miles away and something goes wrong with one, you've got to have one to come back with. A very pleasant people--lots of affection shown. We got into the house, were offered seal meat right away, and I wasn't too sure if I wanted seal meat, but I couldn't be rude. I had a good time talking to the people, to David's father with David interpreting, learning a little bit about how life was. We did go out in the boat about forty miles. They wanted to see if they could hunt seal, but they didn't find any, which pleased me.

We came back that night and looked at all the color prints of the adopted daughters that the Fridays had--the senior Fridays. The mother I guess is eighty-one and the father is eighty-four and David is twenty-seven. I guess his mother broke all records for late bearing.

We looked through the adopted daughters' prints, and they were pleasant. One showed me her rock collection and her shell collection and then we watched "Star Trek" on color TV, in this remote village. I began to have to wonder how this all happened. Of course, the Alaska Native Claims Act made a settlement, and there was quite a bit of cash available. Some of it had to be invested. A lot of people invested in some things that they would like to have. I got to wondering what would happen when they needed replacements and the cash was gone, or if they needed maintenance and the maintenance man was gone. I asked about what the health maintenance was like. Of course, the doctor comes now and then, but he gets out of the airplane and diagnoses with one hand on the airplane door, then gets back in and flies on.

Brower: I began to worry about what would happen to these people and asked David's father: "Do you think there's enough continuity of education so that the people of this village will know how to take care of themselves when they don't have oil or electricity?" He thought they would, but he thought that it required bicultural education and a chance to see what it is like in our country down here and what it's like in their country there, and then their children can choose—a little of both, or mostly one.

Right now, the bicultural education is suffering because it's missing the Eskimo side badly. To describe what has happened: David had been out on the earlier trips to the camps, and so had his younger brother, who was sixteen. He'd been out in the winter camp and summer camp and spring camp and fall camp, and next summer's summer camp would be a different place from last summer's, so there was a rotation of the burden on the land. The whole family would go, including the older people--babes in arms, and babes in the oven. Everyone was there. They learned how to live in a different part of the environment and to get whatever you could get for that season to live on, and how to store it and all the other necessities. If you wanted a goose to come and fly closer to you, you'd wave a glove a certain way and the goose would come down and fly toward the glove. You need all these little bits of knowledge that you won't know much about unless you've had to live with them and subsist in that type of environment.

Right now, of course, the children don't get that kind of education. They can get out in summer camp, but they're losing the others. You can't subsist on just the techniques of subsisting in summer.

I was quite impressed with two stories. One was a comment by David's father. We were admiring, as we were about ready to leave, the wide-open country there. Indeed, in that part of the Yukon, in the Kuskokwim Delta, there's little interruption in the horizon. You've got a great sky, and you've got grassland or water, and those are the lines. And so you see and see and see, no matter where, a long way off.

David's father said he was glad we enjoyed it, and that he'd been to Fairbanks and to Anchorage, but he said, "If you go there, there's no place to look."

I did comment on their language. It's Yikat, and the dialect there is Chukit. I said to Jim Kowalsky, "It seems to me that this language is one that is designed to be spoken through blubber or something," because it's soft with subtle syllables and clicking sounds. I asked David Friday, "How does this work? It seems to

Brower: me that you've got to be pretty quiet to hear all the niceties of the language and the beauty of it, to understand it all. If there's somebody over there far away, can you shout this language?"

He said, "Well, no. If they're a long way away, we walk on over and talk to them there. There's plenty of time." That is the climax of my story.

They are beautiful people, and I would like to have this story told, of what they have and what they're getting, and what can be saved for them. One of the things that irritated the hell out of me is here they've got the big tanks of oil, and the oil is not going to last forever by any means. It's expensive and getting more expensive, so that such money as they have is stretched too thin.

They wanted to see if they could do something with wind energy, and the village put in for a grant from ERDA*to see what they could do about developing wind in that valley and using its energy. There's lots of wind there. But ERDA turned them down. I thought it would be nice if we could get a new administration's ERDA to get grants like that going, so they could find out how to get renewable energy sources.

Schrepfer: How about Nepal?

Brower: Nepal was an extraordinary trip. I'd always wanted to see the Himalayas. I think you're supposed to say "Hi-MAH-lay-a," but I like "Hi-ma-LAY-a" better. I like to mountaineer, and those are the big mountains, the biggest. I jumped at the chance to be the token environmentalist on this Friends of the Earth/Mountain Travel trip to Nepal. The leader was Peter von Mertens, who had been in the Peace Corps in Nepal--practically bilingual, knew the language beautifully. He had led several treks and taught there. I learned quite a bit by virtue of his knowledge of the people and his knowledge of their language and the conversations and the openness that resulted from his being there--that was great.

My youngest son, John, and Barbara, my daughter, went along too. They went along to see if their old man could make it, or if I was too over the hill to climb one. I had some doubts about whether I could, because I had not been keeping in the shape that I used to be when I was out on Sierra Club trips or rock climbing. The last serious rock climb I did was '56 in the Tetons.

But the trip was well scheduled, and we started slowly and worked our way up into condition. By the time I needed to be acclimatized, I was. I had worked all year trying to get into

*Energy Research and Development Administration.

Brower: better shape, watching my weight—I dropped about twenty-five pounds from the start of the year, and I'd watched my martinis. They'd stay on the shelf rather than come my way. That was gratifying. I would walk from my house on the hill down to the bus, which is about a mile and a half, dropping 750 feet. And then I would try to walk back up in the evening. It was good and that helped get me into some shape, so that it wasn't that hard starting to walk in Nepal.

I guess it was somewhere between 200 and 250 miles. I had thought that I might have to stop at Thangboche, the lamasery. It's about 14,000 feet and is one of the most beautifully situated settlements there could possibly be. Everywhere you look there's some great mountain display—Ama Dablam, Everest, the works. I thought if I had to stop there, that would be all right. I might get my correspondence caught up or finish a book or something. But it turned out that I didn't need to stop there, I could go right on up to the high camp. The high camp was at 16,000, and we wanted to go to 18,000, right in under Everest, and look at the north ridge and the west ridge.

I was much impressed, I guess, in part by my ability to get that high, which was 3,500 feet higher than I'd ever been. And I was much impressed, of course, with the mountains, which are all that I had expected and a great deal more. And then I was surprised and pleased beyond belief with the people. I found them just delightful. We had twenty-two people, dudes, on our trip, and forty-five porters on the lower part, up to about 14,000-foot elevation, whereupon it was too cold for their bare feet. They were substituted for by yaks—one yak can carry what two porters would—and fifteen Sherpas, who helped to set up camp and cook and more or less babysit us. They made sure we didn't get into trouble.

The general good disposition of these people—their judgment, and their country that they seem to reflect the beauty of—that was something pleasant to see. In a day you would pass a lot of people on the trail, and the greeting is "Na mastay—" that is, "I bow before you." They would say that and smile, and I did that and smiled and looked as if I wanted to enjoy them, and enjoyed their country, and was glad to be there visiting.

About ninety-nine out of a hundred would just open up with generous smiles, and most of them were very good-looking people. They'd smile back and say, "Na mastay, na mastay," and go on their way carrying their heavy loads—whether they were with us or not, that's the way you go. If you want to go somewhere, you walk. If you want to ship something, you put in on your back and carry it.

Brower: We walked eight days before I saw a wheel, and it was just one wheel, a little wheelbarrow that somebody had improvised. I walked the rest of the trip and didn't see any more, until an airplane took us off twenty-five days later. It had wheels, naturally. It was a great experience.

There were some environmental lessons I learned. There wasn't much inclination on the part of the people on the trip to listen to environmental speeches by me. We talked about environment in small groups. One of the things I saw was what's happening to Nepal because of the pressure of their own population. They're putting too many terraces in places that shouldn't have terraces. I saw also what's happening because there are so many trekkers. These big parties going through, like ours, with something like eighty people--all of whom aren't native to the place they're going through. That means you have people going through who don't have a feeling of close attachment to that immediate piece of land, and particularly to the firewood on it. The firewood is being obliterated. The Nepalese government is about to put laws in effect to require that natives cannot sell wood to the trekkers. That will be helpful. The trekkers had better bring in, in addition to other things, their own fuel--not wood, but concentrated. If it has to be fossil fuel for a while, at least that's far better than wiping out the forests and the residual timberland species that are there in Nepal.

There was an article in the Atlantic recently that loss of forests has been rough on the terrain. A lot of Nepal is being shipped down to India by water involuntarily because so much of the protective covering has been destroyed. It has just eroded. It's a human tragedy there. I came away with some good conservation ideas.

One of the things that I'm always thinking about is books. I thought it would be very good if we got a book out on that country, possibly two. I was carrying with me and reading on the site a manuscript by Tenzing Norgay, a Sherpa who went with Hillary to the top of Everest, as told to Malcolm Barnes, emeritus editor of Allen and Unwin in England. It's the story of what's happened to Tenzing after Everest. It's an interesting story. He's had a remarkable life. But it has an ending which has not yet been written--that Tenzing cannot go back to his own country. They don't like him there any more.

When he reached his great success on Everest, he allowed himself to be idolized by Nehru, went down to Darjeeling, started a mountaineering school, and was pretty much singing more of the praises of India, or seemed to be singing the praises

Brower: of India, rather than of Nepal and his own Sherpa people. So they felt deserted. I was trying to find out what the reaction would be to what Tenzing was suggesting that he would like to do. There's a little airstrip that we came out of, Lukla, which is pretty high, nine thousand feet. For short-takeoff-and-landing [STOL] aircraft. It is an eight hundred foot strip on a fifteen percent slope. You land uphill, and you take off downhill. That's the only reason it will work. Tenzing thought that it would be nice to have a mountaineering school up there, a small one. That's where I found out that they don't want it.

We saw Everest on various occasions. The very first two times we saw it, we also saw Sir Edmund Hillary. Since his great success on Everest, he has devoted the rest of his life to seeing what he can do to help Nepal, building schools, bridges, a little water system, and getting that airstrip built at Lukla, and also leading the people of Khundu, a little valley near the Japanese Everest hotel, to resist the attempt to build a new landing strip up there near the hotel. They didn't want any. He helped them resist it.

So I thought it would be a good idea, and so did Sir Edmund Hillary, if Peter von Mertens, who had great knowledge about what was happening here, would conduct a series of interviews with Hillary and make a book about that: After Everest by Sir Edmund Hillary. That would include what he had done, and also his answers to the question: if you had to do it all over again, what would you do differently?

Edwin Matthews, when I talked to him about this, said, "Why don't you make a set out of that? It would be After Everest: part one, Tenzing; part two, Hillary. It will be quite a combination, with photographs." And we may just do that. [Tenzing's part is now published elsewhere; Hillary's not yet written. DRB, 5/27/79]

XIV THE ISSUES OF THE SEVENTIES

[Interview 8: March 17, 1978] ##

Nuclear Power: "No More Important Issue"

Schrepfer: This is Saint Patrick's Day, March 17, 1978, and we're in New York with all the background noise. [laughs] I think that we can start talking about nuclear power, the technical aspects and some of the political and economic issues. I suppose the thing that comes most immediately to mind is the nuclear initiative in California [June, 1976, Proposition 15] that of course failed. To what extent do you think there's a chance at the state level? Or do you think that restrictions are going to have to come out of the federal government?

Brower: At the time of the nuclear initiative in California, there were similar things going on in five other states, and something like it in Missouri as well. In Missouri, the anti-nuclear forces prevailed, but that wasn't a direct confrontation. In the other states, we lost. In California, it was a mix. We didn't win on the initiative—we got badly beaten after having thought we stood a chance of winning, from the early polls. I think the strategy was not proper, that the name of the effort, the Nuclear Safe-guards Initiative, put us into a box right at the beginning. That assumed that it could be made safe. We weren't saying whether it was or not; we just wanted industry to prove what it had been claiming.

Nevertheless, as the strategy of the campaign developed, we found that because we did not want to come out and say what we were really were—which was against nuclear—we would get into equivocal positions. And it just didn't come over right, apparently, to the public. We could have used the opportunity to say, "It is not safe, we do not think there is a chance of it's being safe—and we don't need to worry about that because

Brower: there are such good alternatives, the first of them being conservation." But we were inhibited, on the whole in the state, from hitting that most important part, taking the opportunity when we had public attention, of saying that there were alternatives, good ones, and conservation could be put into effect immediately and give us time to get the others in place. So we lost.

Schrepfer: Wouldn't that have thrown you into what might have been considered by the mainstream a more radical position? That's what the opponents branded you with, charging you were going to stop all nuclear power.

Brower: We never made anybody believe we weren't trying to. So at least we did forego the opportunity of telling people that if it did stop, because the industry couldn't prove what it was claiming, we were going to be in better shape than ever, because we had all these alternatives. We never used our time to tell what the alternative was, and how good it would be. Nevertheless, for all that, there was enough pressure that attention was brought to the nuclear issue that would never have been brought otherwise; so that in failing, we got a great deal of public attention. We also got three strongly antinuclear bills through the legislature, just before the initiative went to vote. We could say that we might have gotten more votes for the initiative if those bills hadn't passed, so that rather defused our efforts, but there is no indication that that had a major effect then.

It is continuing to have a major effect now, and the three antinuclear bills are under attack by the industry, which supported them at the time, opportunistically. They are attempting to have them vitiated, or to have exemptions made from their requirements. That is the heat of a battle going on in California at the moment. Fortunately, the California Energy Commission has taken a good position, and Governor Jerry Brown is taking a good position. He is using what we have developed in California in the Proposition 15 effort, in the antinuclear legislation, and in our search for alternatives and wise energy use in the state. This kind of information can be brought together nationally, to put needed pressure on President Carter. He's been so overinfluenced by Mr. Schlesinger, who is a disaster environmentally, that he has not carried out some of the promises that were implied in his campaign.

Schrepfer: Do you think Schlesinger's the reason for Carter's turn-around?

Brower: I think Schlesinger is the reason. There's only one environmental organization I knew of, the National Wildlife Federation, that could tolerate the appointment. The rest of us argued against it

Brower: all we could. Mr. Carter was adamant and went ahead. The disaster we predicted I think is taking place.

Schrepfer: But couldn't Carter's appointment have been symbolic of a change of heart?

Brower: It could have been, if he'd appointed someone else. But he appointed a man who had been the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who had been the head of the CIA, head of the Department of Defense.

Schrepfer: That's what I mean. What caused Carter to appoint him? He must have had a change of heart before the appointment.

Brower: I don't know. I just can't get into what was going on in his mind. He had said in his campaign that nuclear would be the last resort, and Schlesinger immediately made it the first resort and began talking of plans for three hundred to four hundred reactors in the U.S. in the rest of this century, and more recently, is pushing very hard for the export of reactors overseas.

That is one of the things that I think is the dominant threat to the environment, to the earth, right now--the United States's posture on nuclear, using the fragile and strange excuse that we're seeking to improve our balance of payments. We're trying to sell reactors, which bring a billion dollars or more apiece. We have President Carter recently promising Iran six to eight, and trying to sell reactors in other countries--some of them shaky governments. The idea is perhaps a hundred reactors going overseas to people who, as I like to put it, can't read the labels. They become dependent on our technology and that's exactly what we don't need.

And when they get reactors, for all the reassuring talk we've mouthed, they will have quickly a nuclear weapons capability, so that the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] has predicted that, by the mid-nineties, some thirty-five or forty countries will have nuclear weapons and atomic war will be inevitable. Congressman Clarence Long of Maryland has said the same thing in a good statement that we have included in our recent book, Sun!, and I'm convinced that this is true.

The thing to do is to stop it. There's no more important issue in my life now than to do everything I can, and see that Friends of the Earth does everything it can, here and abroad, to stop the nuclear experiment before it's too late. There'll be no environment if we don't.

Schrepfer: Do we have any allies?

Brower: We have a good many allies, and we've had enough good allies in this country that we've been able to claim the nuclear industry is dead here, and will just fall of its own weight unless further massive government subsidies are given it. That is exactly what is being planned by the administration. You can't quite see it, but the World Bank will lend money to other countries to buy our reactors to create the illusion that we're getting an improved export business. This is a heinous way of fooling the public. We are trying to expose this and to show what the alternatives are.

Schrepfer: It seems to me that California is in the forefront of the nuclear question. The vote actually in some parts of California was quite close--the Bay Area, I guess, was very closely willing to pass Proposition 15. The Kern County vote also and the delay on the opening of the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant. Are any of these specific plans or issues that shed light on the problems?

Brower: These things have all been helpful. When Proposition 15 was voted, I think Berkeley was one of the few places that voted for it. San Francisco I think did. Los Angeles was against it three to one, and the overall vote was two to one. But the vote recently on nuclear, near Bakersfield at Wasco, was more than two to one against it. There were various elements in that vote. The nuclear proponents hastened to say that people were really voting no because they didn't want their water used to cool it. But I think they're also learning a great deal about what the nuclear costs are.

The dangers are one thing--I've quite often stressed those--and the long-range environmental effects are another. There's no solution so far, and I don't see how there ever will be one. Nobody in his right mind can conceive of a system that can guarantee segregation of these wastes for a quarter or a half million years. It's just dreaming.

But on beyond that, the bad economics have become one of our best allies. We have found out that the reactor costs go up and up, and the reliability does not, and the promises are becoming emptier and emptier. It is finally being seen by the people who control investment--and there's still a lot of control of what the society does in that--that nuclear is a bad investment.

Schrepfer: I've read rating systems that rate the nuclear power companies the highest--as a matter of fact, they seem to generally rate them the highest.

Brower: I can't understand those ratings. The people I've been talking to are realizing that they don't want to make the investment, and people aren't making the investment. That's why there haven't been any reactors sold in this country in the last year. The forecasts for nuclear sale were so cheery, and now it is a disaster unless it's massively subsidized.

One of the things that I think is getting through is that the nuclear route---what we call the "hard energy" route, using Amory Lovins's "soft path-hard path" dichotomy--requires far too much capital. As we discussed earlier, if we follow the nuclear hard path, new energy generation is going to take something like 75 percent of our newly formed capital for the next ten years. And people are beginning to realize--and we're trying to help them realize it--that if it takes 75 percent, that means there's going to be a general starvation of other things that are quite important to society. I think this is becoming slowly apparent, and is one of the reasons that we are winning.

I believe that we will win, but there's a lot of work to be done yet to make that happen. We won't win by what we've done so far. We do have to bring a lot of pressure on Congress, on the president, and on the heads of government and people in the labor movement overseas as well as here. There are a lot more jobs--I think it's true, and can be demonstrated, and it hasn't been demonstrated well enough--in going the soft-energy, decentralized, non-electric, not capital-intensive route than in going the hard path.

Schrepfer: So far, other than perhaps pro-labor Congressmen, labor itself has not been particularly cooperative.

Brower: There have been some elements of it that have been, and some that are not; there's a long tale in that. I think that the part of labor that has been uncooperative to the utmost has been the fossilized element of the labor movement, and that means Mr. Meany and friends. Certainly Jack Mundey of Australia had plenty of things to tell our labor movement. He was allowed over here to speak under the Ford administration. The Carter administration, under pressure from Mr. Meany, wouldn't let him over here, would not allow Jack Mundey into the country. We protested that and got a lame excuse. The president talks about world human rights and won't let a man who has this good message for labor to come into the country. So this is part of the puzzling aspect of Mr. Carter.

Schrepfer: He was denied a visa?

Brower: Yes, He had a lot of good messages.

Schrepfer: Meany didn't want him to come?

Brower: Meany didn't want him to come, and Meany had the ear of the president, so Mundey didn't come. We just hope that he can write a book—he needs a lot of help before he can write one, but there could be quite a bit that he could tell. He had the Green Ban going in Australia, where labor would strike projects if they were environmentally unsound. Mr. Meany didn't want our workers to hear that.

The Oil, Atomic, and Chemical Workers are on our side. Some others will be. In fact, I just learned today there was a press conference where they had labor and various industrial interests, all telling how well they could go into an alternate path. It couldn't get a line in the papers. Everybody who was there was just shut out. That can make one tend to get a little paranoid.

Schrepfer: You said that before. One has to be either paranoid or naive.

Brower: The new one is "the paranoids are after me." But the upshot of this is that the United States—it's Amory Lovins's point, and I agree with it fully—the United States and only the United States can lead the world back from the nuclear brink to which we led it. And we can't wait much longer to do this. Every year we go on with the present Schlesinger policy makes it less and less possible for us to lead the world back. Instead, there's a greater and greater competitiveness—the others want to build the breeder reactor before we do, and now we're talking more about how we catch up in that race.

As long as that goes on, as long as it seems to be talk—nice words and protest against nuclear proliferation, but sell it on the side as we're talking—nobody's going to believe us. Until Mr. Carter comes off that track, until we get somebody besides Mr. Schlesinger to advise him, until the public brings enough pressure that he sees it's politic to reverse himself, we're in trouble.

Schrepfer: What does FOE intend to do next, having lost Proposition 15? Are you going to continue to work on the state level or focus on the federal level?

Brower: We're focusing on both, and beyond. Since we are headquartered in California, we have had quite a bit of influence there. One of the people that is back with us was with the Energy Commission --that's Jim Harding. He has done some extremely good work,

Brower: along with Amory Lovins, who's been working around the world on this, and the other FOE groups. We are setting a good pace in California--we hope to keep that one up. The opportunity right now for our Governor Jerry Brown to give the needle to Mr. Carter every time he makes a nuclear mistake is one that we are anxious to see continue. I think that will have an effect. Mr. Carter may not want to pay much attention to environmentalists, but he certainly pays a great deal of attention to what Mr. Brown is saying.

Schrepfer: He seems, according to the media, very frightened by Brown.

Brower: We would like to make the most of this. Mr. Brown is not one with whom we've had total satisfaction, but there have been some good things. I think that with Carter, as with others when they do some good things, we've got to remember to thank them for it, to show support when they do the things we want done and not just flak when they don't. We're not good at that. I said earlier on that I used to ask audiences what they had done about Mr. Nixon's bold population-control speech. Only one out of a thousand responded, which I think led to a lot of un-support of the environmental question by Mr. Nixon. Why do it, when there's nobody out there to help you shield off the flak?

The same thing happened after Mr. Carter vetoed the breeder reactor. I was asking audiences--and any audience that comes to hear me is a skewed audience--how many had written to thank Mr. Carter for what he did on the breeder reactor? One out of a thousand. So part of our problem is our unwillingness to say thank you.

Schrepfer: Too busy writing letters protesting! All right, I don't have any other questions on nuclear; I think you've covered the economic, the political, and the question of the fate of man as this goes on. You said you have allies. Aside from some help from labor, what other allies have you had?

Brower: The one that I was alluding to, I think, was the help from investors, and we are hoping to improve that. We would like to make use of the elements of the law that require disclosure of risk, as well as benefits, when people look for investors' money. The opportunity is there, if you can find enough people to demand it, to haul into court any utility or any reactor salesman who asks for public money or public subscriptions through prospectuses and does not reveal the dangers that they're dealing with. This could be done. We need some more lawyers to work on it.

Brower: Suppose your friendly local utility asks for \$75 million in new capital, and you look at their prospectus and find that they want to invest a lot in nuclear. If you also find they are not talking about what happens to their investment if the Price-Anderson Act's nuclear insurance subsidy is deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and that they don't reveal the lack of reliability in reactors, they can be hauled up before the Securities and Exchange Commission and be required to withdraw their offer and restate it, revealing the risks to investors they forgot to mention.

We know this, and this is an opportunity that should be pursued. We have not so far had the resources to pursue it. We've been making an effort to require people who want investments in new projects to reveal the environmental impact. We've had some impact on the SEC, with respect to that, not enough. These are opportunities to use the present system more effectively in protecting the widows and orphans and others who invest.

The other thing is simply to warn investment advisors that if they are party to this misapplication of capital, in violation of what the fair investment practices should be, they too have a liability. That's one new route we're about to take.

So far, just be talking with some of the investors, we've been able to let them understand how bad nuclear is. We don't have to do any threatening or anything else, just show how enormously high the nuclear costs are. Let them see figures such as Amory Lovins is able to show them, to document that to go the nuclear route now and to add new generation that starts with a uranium mine and ends with nuclear electricity running your toaster, to put that whole installation in costs a hundred times as much as it costs to supply the electrical generation on which we've built our present society. That, again, is repeating with different numbers, the words I was saying earlier --the enormous demands upon capital, the enormous price that then begins to attach itself to energy, as you roll in these new, extremely high prices upon what was a reasonable price that enabled us to have all the goodies we have now at not too high an energy cost. The energy costs of the future are going to be huge.

We can avoid those by taking immediate steps toward conservation while we use such brilliance as there is in humanity, and there is a lot, to find the alternative methods of going back to renewable energy, the sun. That's our theme now. If we don't have nuclear, we'll have delights instead, not hardship.

An Environmental Perspective on World Peace and Politics

Schrepfer: Do you have any fears about advocating solar energy? After all, once nuclear power looked like the way to save the mountain valleys.

Brower: The thing that would be a problem with solar is if we started to try to use solar with the staggeringly complex engineering technique that is necessary to make nuclear even look safe. If we try to put satellites in the heavens to send us energy all around the clock, because it's up in the sun, and we try microwave transmission and all the new technology, it will take an enormous amount of capital. It's something that becomes available only to those who have a lot of capital and have a lot of technological skill. It increases the inequity among the peoples of the earth, and if we haven't learned about the leveling agencies that exist on earth, we should learn soon.

In the headlines the last two days, in Italy and Israel we see terrorism easily unleashed, and it's as hard to defend against as drug traffic. The primary fuel for terrorism is inequity. They see that it's hopeless to get a fair shake any other way, and they go the violent route.

We should have enough sense to start moving toward more equity around the world. You're not going to do it if you take what could be equitably distributed all around the world—solar energy—and then interpose devices that give the great benefit to the people that have the most money and the most technology. That just goes right on doing more of what we've already done too much of.

So we don't go to that highly sophisticated or highly capital-intensive, technologically perfected devices for solar energy. We use things that are simpler. We still have to use our heads, and to do good things with our technology, but we don't have to do the exclusive things that just favor us.

There's nothing against bringing back windmills. They can be improved. The wind is almost everywhere. We don't need to have a lot of solar electricity--that's been one of the problems, I think. People have been conditioned to expect too much electricity. That's all the nuclear salesmen have to sell; their reactors. They must be too remote (for safety) to allow them to sell their massive amount of waste heat. But we do not have to do the same sort of thing with the sun and make a lot of electricity with it. The United States can get by with only

Brower: 5 to 10 percent of all its energy as electricity. We're making much more than that now--far more than enough to run our motors, our lights, our televisions--the things that need electricity. Instead, we'd use other forms of energy to match the requirement of the other energy uses. That's again the Lovins thesis. The ideas are all there--he put them together.

Schrepfer: Some of the European countries are much further ahead of the United States, and others behind it, in terms of our position on nuclear power. Do you think that it's possible to have environmentalism, through organizations like FOE, that might transcend the Iron Curtain?

Brower: We've just tiptoed to the Iron Curtain in Yugoslavia. I guess Tito was never really quite behind it, but he wasn't far in front of it either. I would hope that soft-energy ideas will soon get through. I've always thought that there should be some international accord, that there's an opportunity for all of us to treat the earth better, regardless of our political system. If we're able to hook up in space, we ought to be able to hook up on earth. I'd like to see the environmental movement come forward with a greater contribution toward world peace than it's made so far.

It's interesting that recently, in the Development Forum, a U.N. periodical from Geneva, Lester Brown had a major piece that I hope we can reprint in Not Man Apart--pointing out the fallacy of our trying to attain security by building more and more arms. Both sides do it, and the chances of disaster increase rapidly as we do. His emphasis has always been on food, and he thinks that we should spend a great deal more of our effort towards security in providing people with the security of freedom from hunger. He developed it well--I'm not developing it here well. But certainly, the freedom from the exchange of pollution should help. There should be much better allocation of resources globally. I'm hoping that we can go into an international solar decade and around the earth, share the ways of going from nuclear to solar, from hazard to safety, from nonrenewable to renewable, and move away from the threats to peace, and toward equity.

Schrepfer: I think implicit in what you're saying might be an interpretation of what causes wars, that it is rivalries for food and resources--

Brower: I've thought that the greatest threat now is this competitive race for what's left in the bottom of the barrel. People are getting edgy about it. I can understand it. The world is getting crowded, and survival seems to depend upon grabbing a lot

Brower: for yourself. That means we do all kinds of destructive things. The strong, with lots of money and lots of weapons, can try to sequester more than their share of resources. I'm afraid the United States has been trying to do that.

Then there are the leveling forces: all of the weapons didn't make much difference in Vietnam. As Clarence Long, the Congressman from Maryland, has pointed out, the opportunities for leveling are getting frightening; an atomic war, he points out, could be started, and we wouldn't know who started it. If somebody left an old ship, pulled it into a harbor, or drove something not much bigger than a Volkswagen, an old Volkswagen, and left it with a timing device with a nuclear weapon in it--we could have massive destruction of principal cities, and we wouldn't know who did it.

I can just envision the president on the hot line--"Hey, did you send that over?" and the Russians would say, "No, we didn't send a thing." "Can I believe you?" "What choice do you have?" You can imagine absolutely mad scenarios of what would happen.

That gets back to the inequity that is troubling me a great deal.

Schrepfer: You don't think man is naturally aggressive?

Brower: I think we're naturally aggressive, but we also have a great ability to cooperate, and that's happened too. As you look back through history, we've done both. I guess we've been aggressive when there wasn't enough room. I suppose the people who have been making the primate studies know this. They can see there are also ways of getting along without bloodshed.

Schrepfer: Some of the biologists are emphasizing a lot more the cooperative aspect of nature, what with the competitiveness that Darwin emphasized. You would go along with that?

Brower: I think so. I was reading a book done by the Bishops--John Bishop of California and his wife Naomi. They were over in Nepal studying the langur monkeys. I wish I could quote verbatim how they avoid conflict. There are plenty of opportunities to go after each other, but a few gestures, and a way of looking somewhere else instead of in confrontation, with a threatening look--they get by. You'll see that again and again in the wilds. Over-aggression isn't necessary. What is necessary is that they not wipe each other out. This is getting into a philosophy that I'm not well versed in.

Schrepfer: FOE is moving into areas like Thailand and Yugoslavia and you are perhaps connecting Friends of the Earth with a general left-wing philosophy. Do you think that's a problem at all, particularly in terms of the United States, that environmentalism is linked with the left?

Brower: There's certainly that danger, but that's the danger that I think needs to be accepted. The goal is to have the earth treated better, and if it isn't, none of us will be here, the left or the right or the center. That's a simple-minded approach to it, but if there's ever going to be any accord at all on earth, and I suppose it's still a worthwhile goal, we have to find ways to achieve it. So we've tried linking up in space, we've tried it in the arts, and we might as well try on earth and the environment, understanding how the earth works and joining internationally, over what had heretofore been hostile borders, in trying to share the resources and share them better and louse them up less.

Schrepfer: I can see a movement that perhaps your career has epitomized very well. Conservation has moved from a relatively conservative position, that is, Republican and relatively mainstream America, into association with more traditional left-wing politics. That is, conservationists in the 1920s probably were not strongly pro-labor, most of them, only minimally pro-labor. Whereas now, something like FOE has come out in the last year and a half advocating some fairly left-wing politics, in terms of getting into areas of unemployment questions, labor questions--

Brower: Well, I wouldn't think that employment or unemployment were left-wing or right-wing. [Barry] Commoner believes that the accent on productivity means that we are substituting machines for people, and that I suppose could be called a right-wing thing--

Schrepfer: A little bit Luddite.

Brower: But what I worry about is your use of the word "left-wing." That immediately colors it, and you get away from what the objective is, not to go right or left or even just to go to the middle. It's just to seek a kind of progress that's defined as progress as if survival matters, because we want to be here. I think that the corporate leaders as well as the labor leaders have got to find ways to get along with the earth's systems, to learn about them.

It's neither left nor right, it's simply correct, and something that you can survive with, in the right sense. We are "right," in the environmental movement, to the extent that we

Brower: have made an attempt in pursuing ecological principles to understand what natural law is. We didn't invent the law. We had nothing to do in the environmental movement with inventing the second law of thermodynamics, or inventing the law of gravity. We had nothing to do with the speed of light. These are things that we have to learn to live with.

We accept the speed of light as a limit. We're not trying to speed that up much, but we have not accepted some of the limits that made it possible for life to be here. The toxic metals had to be pretty much out of action; radioactivity had to be sealed in rocks before it was possible for life to progress. It's good to recognize that, and not try to break the seal and to free all these things that we can't handle, that the life force can't handle.

That's part of the natural law, to learn--which I'm just learning now, about the second law of thermodynamics, and what happens to entropy--and to adjust your civilization to accommodate this. It is rather important. We haven't done this. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen has been good on this; Barry Commoner's picked it up; the new economists are getting wise to it, and the old ones haven't learned about it yet. The traditional economists--including those that are doing most of the writing in the financial pages, and most of the thinking in Forbes, Fortune, and Nation's Business--still think that resources are limitless, that anybody who thinks they aren't is being naive. And naivete is on the other foot.

They aren't understanding this, and I think they shortly will, but they were confronted with it, and resented being confronted with it, in the studies on the limits to growth, and they found every way they could not to face the fact of limits. We would try to remind them that that's one of the natural laws--there are limits. That's, again, neither right nor left, it's just one search, one direction toward truth. Well, that sounds like a long speech.

Schrepfer: The support you'd get in Congress, for example, has moved from what would be defined as conservative to a more liberal sector.

Brower: It's a mix. Preservation of parks, I think, fared fairly well in Republican circles. Preservation of wild rivers fared fairly poorly in Democratic circles--that is, most of the dams were built by Democrats. They seemed to think that that was the mark of the conservationist, for a while. But that's being changed now. Strange things have happened in our various parties.

Brower: An evolution is taking place. The League of Conservation Voters had something to do with that, and will have more to do with it, as it continues; it's new.

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Brower: We had in Friends of the Earth, Sweden--Jordens Vänner--enough political activity that the government changed. Palmo's pronuclear went out, and Falldin, who was antinuclear, came in. He had to do some political adjusting since then, unfortunately, but at least Friends of the Earth made the nuclear issues so important there that it changed the government.

In France, it's not quite so easy to do. But in France, Les Amis de la Terre have been in politics. They have been running for office. They started a party. Not too long ago, they started the Paris Ecologie group, the Greens. They had Friends of the Earth people running in every arrondissement for the city council of Paris. They got overall about 12 percent of the vote. The same sort of thing was happening in other cities.

In any event, in France, in the recent election, the runoff will be Saturday or Sunday, but so far the Ecology party has gotten something like two and a half percent of the vote. René Dumont ran for president on this party two years ago--he got 1.3 percent. So there's almost a hundred percent increase in the ecological vote. In France, that's not insignificant. It's just beginning.

They made it a point, in the Ecological party--it was Friends of the Earth people who were speaking there, not just Friends of the Earth alone--that they were not after a big vote. What they were after was trying to influence the other parties as well. Giscard d'Estaing did come up with what was described as the perfect environmental speech. Correct--a hundred percent party line, all the way down to the end, except, as Alain Hervé put it, at the last line where he said he was not going to do anything about it. But at least it's a way to have a new kind of influence for conservation and for the environmental forces to get into politics. That indeed is what we're trying to see happen.

That's in one of our new books, Progress As If Survival Mattered. We were initially wanting to call it a platform book--Politics As If Survival Mattered. We thought that "progress" would sell better than "politics," because politics is still considered to be, well, sort of a nasty thing to be in. We try to change that. We say that it's not a nasty thing; it's the way the public does its business, and there's no other way, so it's good to get into it.

Eskimo Culture and the Bowhead Whale Controversy

Schrepfer: We might talk about the Tokyo conference, when you were an advisor to the U.S. Commissioner on Whaling.

Brower: Yes. I had hoped to go to the international meeting of Friends of the Earth in Brussels, and it turned out that it seemed wiser--though I didn't like the idea--that I go to Tokyo to a meeting of the International Whaling Commission. I was part of the U.S. advisory group to the U.S. commissioner, which was a new experience for me, and one in which, while I was over there, I felt about as powerless as I've ever felt in my life. Things were going wrong, and there was nothing I could do about it.

The reason I went was derived directly from the controversy over the bowhead whale. Friends of the Earth took a position that was unpopular with some of the wildlife groups. The principal organizations I think finally came into general support of what we were doing. We realized as well as others did that the bowhead whale is endangered, and the International Whaling Commission meeting in Canberra, Australia, the previous June had voted a zero quota for the taking of bowhead whales. The International Whaling Commission was set up to govern commercial whaling, and in this way, it was moving into what had amounted to subsistence whaling, and it was worried, as the United States should have been.

The bowhead take was rapidly rising. The thing that I think excited most people was that there are a good many bowhead whales that have been struck but lost by the Eskimos. The Eskimos have been after bowheads for a long time. That's part of their culture, and has enabled the coastal villages to survive. There's a long story on that.

What bothered Friends of the Earth was that there was no adequate consultation with the Eskimos to find out what the alternatives were or how they themselves could help preserve the whale species on which they were dependent. I don't think there is an inclination on the Eskimos' part to want to drive out of existence something they're dependent upon. But we wanted, and fought for, an Eskimo role in the decision. We wanted a transition from what they were doing, which was endangering the species, to a phasing-down to something that was sustainable.

As far as I'm concerned, I would hope that in due course the Eskimos could find something beside bowhead whales. I don't like to see any whales killed at this point. I'm pro-whale and anti-whaling. I am sure than on Nantucket and on Martha's Vineyard

Brower: and out on Long Island they once thought that they had to go on with their whaling, but they stopped.

The Eskimo subsistence culture has gone through major changes and will continue to go through changes. There's nothing fixed about a subsistence culture. It does evolve. We think that it should evolve in due course not to require bowhead whaling. But that's not going to work unless the Eskimos participate in the change. This is what we wanted to make sure would happen. I think that we were right in doing that. Although they didn't come out quite so out-and-out as we did, the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society joined in that general feeling. The Defenders of Wildlife did not. The National Wildlife Federation was a little bit mixed, but I think that they finally saw some of the wisdom of what was happening. Greenpeace is still against what we did.

Our argument is primarily that the threat to the whales is one that should be recognized by the Eskimos, and reduced by them, or there is no way or monitoring it. You can't send the Marines out to tell the Eskimos what to do, because the Marines are apt to stay indoors and keep their fingers and hands warm while the Eskimos are out doing what they knew what to do anyway.

Moreover, the great threat was not the Eskimos, but Exxon and the other oil companies that are now rushing to do offshore drilling in northern waters, in the Beaufort Sea and other places. A massive blowout or two up there could do more damage to the bowhead whale than a lot of Eskimos could ever do. So we would like the Eskimos to join with us in protecting the environment around the whaling waters, finding out how they themselves can limit their own use of the bowhead, and if that happens, then there's a chance of saving the bowhead whale. Otherwise, all we've done is have a good exercise and feel virtuous, leaving the bowhead still in trouble.

Schrepfer: Are the Eskimos getting to be bad hunters, that they hit the whale and then don't take them?

Brower: That's one of the things that was happening. I've learned quite a bit more about whaling. In the process of going over to Tokyo, I at long last read Moby Dick, at which point I learned all about whaling. I learned the difficulties they have. They had been using primitive methods, sophisticated primitive methods, if you will, because the Eskimos have been bright in how they've handled their culture for thousands of years. Then they got suddenly a lot of our boats and our weapons. They had harpoons with explosive heads, and they were learning how to use them, but they were not using them as carefully as they should.

Brower: The other thing that is happening I have alluded to before, in the village of Chevak on the Kuskokwim Delta. There's a population problem. The Eskimos did not quite realize it. When I talked to David Friday about that in Chevak, he said well, he didn't see how they could go around telling their women how many children they should have. At that point, I suggested, "I think it would be a good idea, don't you, to look at the productivity of the range where you've living and see how many Eskimos it can support." He thought that was a good idea.

The same thing pertains to the bowhead whale. There is a rapid growth in the Eskimo population. Our own commissioner was briefly arguing that we had to have a higher bowhead take because the population had risen. This doesn't help the Eskimos if it helps them to so outnumber the bowhead whales that they get rid of the bowhead whale.

Schrepfer: Why is the population increasing?

Brower: Because they don't have the grim reaper coming by the old route, starvation. That's part of the old Eskimo stories. They're sad, where the children will wait for the father to come home, and blood on the boots is a good sign because there had been a successful hunt. If that didn't happen, then people would starve. There's an awful lot of starvation in the Eskimo history.

Now food can be flown in--of course, it's not what they like, it's not part of the tradition, but it's part of the rapid change that we have caused. We must take responsibility for it because we threw so much money into Alaska, to the Eskimos. We got them doing other things, forgetting how to work with dogs, learning how to work with snowmobiles, picking up the bad habits --drinking too much. All of the things that we brought in there, with our missionary zeal--lots of money, lots of change, a disruption of culture, possibly a severing of it. This is part of the problem.

Schrepfer: Do you think there's any hope of maintaining a viable culture that has a degree of authentic evolution?

Brower: I think so. And I think what has to happen--and David Friday's father thought so--is bicultural education, teaching children both cultures. Then let them choose. I think that has to happen in our other original cultures, that is, the Indians too, the Navajos. That is one of the ideas of the Rough Rock School, to teach both. In the Rough Rock School, they wanted to teach the Navajo children how to speak Navajo first, then English, and to go through their old rituals, their old knowledge of how the world worked, their own religion, and then pick up ours.

Brower: I don't know what will happen. It's hard to tell. But you can't dissuade people around the world--and there's some two thousand small unique cultures that are still here--that Coca-Cola and Hondas aren't good. It's the sort of thing that they like to imitate. The one thing that I would hope they would realize is that what we have built out of our rapid use of resources won't last, and they may be the people who have to carry the humanity torch on, but we just wipe ourselves out by losing almost all touch with the earth.

My own simple example is that I wouldn't know how to light a fire without a match. I didn't have any scouting, so I didn't know how to rub the sticks together. We need a lot of people on earth who know how to rub sticks together, and to get along within the limits of the earth, who know, as Jerry Mander put it, about the "islandness" of things. If you exceed the limits of your island, there's nowhere to go; the island Earth is all of it.

Schrepfer: Do you agree with Loren Eiseley that there's no hope in space?

Brower: I certainly do. It's fun to go out there and see what you can see. The remote sensing is teaching us a lot. It's quite satisfying to realize that we were smart enough to go to the moon, or something of the sort. It's a nice place to visit, but let's not try to live in a space colony. The only thing I don't like about space is that it's being used by people as an excuse: you don't have to take care of here because you can go there. That's one of the faults of the Judeo-Christian ethic, that you don't have to take very good care of the earth because you're only here for a little while anyway, and what really counts is your doing whatever you need to on the earth to assure yourself in the hereafter. Gerry O'Neill's space colony is a new kind of hereafter that doesn't help us perform better while on earth.

Schrepfer: Do you consider yourself a Christian?

Brower: I don't quite, because my feeling on religion is something else. I'm a dropout Presbyterian, a dropout Baptist, and I think that the example of Christ is a good one. I also have severe worries about any form of religion that is so anthropomorphized. The idea of God creating us in his own image is simply a reverse expression of our own ego: We are creating a God in our image, and in my scheme of things, mankind, humanity, is far too recent an arrival on earth to have any right to arrogate so much to itself. That's part of my sermon: If you squeeze earth history into the six days of creation, then eleven seconds before

Brower: midnight on the sixth day we had Neanderthal man, and a quarter of a second before Christianity. There are a lot of other things that antedate that. I have great respect for the force that created and kept it all going. But I have trouble with literal reading of any of the religions.

Schrepfer: So you think that the Christian notion of man's superiority and a hereafter is not particularly viable and not particularly beneficial?

Brower: Yes, I think so. I go along with Lynn White on that. It's caused a lot of trouble--go to church every Sunday and you will be successful in business. That is not what Lynn White said, quite, but--

Schrepfer: No, no. Actually it's what he said between the lines. You're referring to Lynn White's talking against a view of the world in which man is at the top.

Brower: Yes.

The SST: Economic and Moral Madness

Schrepfer: We did not talk before about the SST, which of course is one of the environmentalists' big triumphs. Perhaps you might like to add something on that.

Brower: The SST is back in the news again, I see. That seems to be the current explanation of the mysterious explosions being heard off the Atlantic coast. It's apparently being correlated with the flights into Dulles by the Concorde. One of the things that I think was unfortunate about the recent permission to allow the Concorde to land, in Dulles and now in Kennedy, is that we've put so much emphasis on the sonic boom that we began to forget the other things that the Concorde was typical of. I'm sorry that we did put too much emphasis on the sonic boom--the noise at takeoff and landing. We shouldn't insult our ears that much at Kennedy or Dulles; we certainly shouldn't insult the ears of everybody traveling on or under the Atlantic's surface, including all the wildlife there, with sonic booms as often as the Concorde does.

I think we can rejoice, if at all, in having flagged down the SST business in the United States, and having helped demonstrate that it's economic madness in France and in Britain. I think that it will fall of its own weight, and it richly deserves to.

Brower: We don't need any more symbols of waste such as that. One Concorde in its daily rounds uses so much more fuel than the 747, for the number of passengers carried, that if that difference of carrying those people on the Concorde as opposed to the 747, in fuel requirements, were transferred to using that same fossil fuel to make fertilizers, to increase food production, it could feed an extra twenty million people. Just one Concorde, in that complicated figure of speech, takes the food of twenty million people.

Schrepfer: For how long?

Brower: One Concorde, for its day, that's twenty million people per day per Concorde for a day. That's one of the things I should like to have seen dramatized. As you can see, it's a complicated idea to get through, especially when you compose a sentence as badly as I did. But that, plus the damage to the ozone, plus the extension of inequity--everyone else's inconvenience for a few people who want, as the ads for the Concorde said, "the gift of time." "The gift of time" to them--a tiny difference--at everybody else's expense. The SST is immoral, that's all.

Schrepfer: It didn't turn out to be as loud as everyone thought it was going to be. What happened there?

Brower: I don't know. I haven't heard from the people who were carrying on the battle right up to the last, here in New York, on that. One of the things I would like to know is who is doing the measuring, and where are they putting the instruments? And what does it do to the attempt we are making to cut down airport noise instead of letting it increase? I see that the EPA is now working on cutting down motorcycle noise. At least they're going after the little guys. I'd like to see them go after the Concorde.

Schrepfer: There was some talk that they were banking high, coming in very sharp, rather than coming in low over the populated areas. They'd come in high and then bank and go down fast.

Brower: Well, that could be. I've gotten so far off into nuclear side-tracks now that I haven't kept up on the SST.

Schrepfer: Is there anything about the original SST battle that you wanted to add?

Brower: I would simply add this, that when my wife and I were over in Verona almost six years ago, six years ago this coming summer, '78, we were in discussion with the president of Mondadori Publishing Company, who print our color books. Enzo Angelucci

Brower: bet me that in five years, the United States would be rushing to build an SST. He bet me a case of champagne. I'm just waiting to go back there with my wife and have a great big party in Verona, and we'll drink it on the spot. We'll let him come to the party, and the others who have made our books beautiful.

DNA Experimentation: Another Uncontrollable Genie?

Schrepfer: You mentioned that you wanted to talk about DNA.

Brower: Yes. The recombinant DNA issue is one that came to our attention recently, and it's been a major controversy only recently. A lot of parallels are drawn between the threat from DNA research and the threat from nuclear research that we were letting a genie out of the bottle that we couldn't get back in. That's still an apprehension that we have in Friends of the Earth. We are actively advocating through legislation and litigation an improvement in the control over DNA research.

One of the first issues was that the National Institutes of Health had guidelines which we thought were not adequate, and indeed could not be adequate so long as they were merely guidelines. Guidelines are not law. The NIH, in applying those guidelines, is able to apply them only to the people who receive its grants. If they violated the guidelines, then they could cut off their grants. Harvard and the University of California at San Francisco did violate them. The grants were not cut off. They're thus toothless guidelines, at best.

They have no effect on the corporate research on recombinant DNA, and that is one of the problems. The corporations and the big pharmaceutical houses have enormous budgets. They don't need NIH grants. If they want to carry on and patent these various experiments in trying to create new life forms, they can do it under the present law. Their cooperation need be voluntary only, and we think that's wrong. So we're going to go to court, somewhere along the line on this. We've got one suit in the works now and another in the warming oven to apply. I hope that there will be others helping us in it.

We do not pretend to be wise all alone in this at all. What's happened in our thinking is that we are aware of the limits of technology, of the ease of getting something out which you can't get back. I have some fairly humorous examples that come to mind of what might happen: the people who say they

Brower: can control things are probably the same people who helped get the rabbit to Australia and New Zealand, the mongoose to Hawaii, the wild oat to California, and strange wild grass to Alaska, without knowing what the consequences would be. This happens again and again.

Our race thinks it knows what it is doing, and finds that it has left some important steps out. When I was in Australia, for example, I found that there was an attempt in a small national park to reconstitute the original ecosystem. It was a very small park, and they were not having any success at all. One of the things they were trying to do, I noted, was to apply herbicides on some of the weeds that had come in. I asked them, "When you put the herbicide on, what are you doing to the parts of the ecosystem you haven't identified yet? Are you wiping out something that is part of the original ecosystem that is still there? Why don't you get children to pull the weeds? Then you'll know what's happened."

I noticed an interesting thing in Australia. When I walked among the eucalyptus forest, underfoot the eucalyptus leaves that had fallen were returning to the soil. There were various elements in the microbiota that were taking the eucalyptus apart and making it part of a cycle. I noticed, when I looked at the leaves of the eucalyptus, that there were things that eat them. There were little bites out of them. In California, there aren't. When you walk under a forest of eucalyptus trees in California, it's just a trash pile. The eucalyptus drops a defoliant of its own, other things can't grow and the bacteria or other microbiota that would help to return the eucalyptus to the soil are not there. So we brought the tree; we didn't bring what kept it in balance.

We have that great capability almost everywhere we touch something, from the mongoose to the introduction of mammals in New Zealand without their natural enemies, so they have an opossum epidemic, a mongoose epidemic in Hawaii, and lantana all over the place. Again and again, we have brightly tried to change some natural system and found we've forgotten to consider the side effects. To repeat Garrett Hardin's words, "A side effect is the surprise result, the existence of which you will deny as long as you possibly can."

I see the same kind of thinking going on in the people who advocate DNA research. Again, my training is still minor. I was a sophomore dropout, but I did learn a little bit about trying to understand how natural laws work, and see what we've done and what we haven't done, and as in the nuclear controversy, find some solace in seeing that there are experts on both sides.

Brower: There's a sharp division among people in the same field. When the experts disagree, then obviously the decision has to go back to the society as a whole.

For example, there was one man at Stanford who was very active in recombinant DNA research, Stanley Cohen. He was quite cross with us because of the position we had taken. But in being cross with us, in writing letters on it and making his speeches, he neglected to point out that some of his peers sharply disagreed with him, and that he was in a corporation that was going to make a lot of money if his DNA work went on. One should be objective enough to admit a controversy that exists, and to admit a personal interest in it. He didn't, so that worries me. Patenting this process enables his corporation to possibly make an enormous sum. The patenting process has its own threat. If you're doing work that you want to patent, you exercise your proprietary rights while you're undertaking it and you don't want anybody to know what you're doing. How is anybody going to regulate something that you are constrained not to let them know anything about? Once you patent it, yes, they can learn what you've done. But while you're preparing it, you're going through all kinds of activities that could be quite a peril.

We certainly know that there is a lot of improvement needed in containment facilities for recombinant DNA research. We don't have enough assurance its being improved. We do have assurance that there's a lot of money to go to the press to say there's no problem, and to go to Congress and ask for weaker guidelines, not for strengthening them or passing an adequate law. So we think there is a major threat here, and we would pursue it; we want to help the public understand it.

Two stories I like--one of our friends, who is in medicine in Colorado, and very good on antinuclear matters, was suggesting that maybe he'd like to see some of this go on, since you can't regulate it anyway. People would carry it on in their closets if you prohibited it. Then he talked about hoping that there might be some life form invented that could hasten the change in lignin, which is one of the carbohydrates that is the most enduring part of wood.

I said, "Well, it would be all right if it just stayed, if you invented this little thing, and didn't let it escape. But if it escaped, and got out into the environment as a whole, you would see your house go limp and the trees fold up." And if these people who were trying to develop a form of life that would eat up oil slicks looked into the consequences, they might find that once they've got the organism, and after it has eaten up

Brower: the oil slick, it might go on to something else, if they hadn't quite designed the right thing which would not only eat oil slicks, but instead move on to the oil source, you can just imagine this little thing saying, "I can't believe I ate the whole thing!"

These examples are of course ridiculous. So once were apprehensions about the nuclear consequences we're now faced with. The genie we let out of the bottle may be our ultimate undoing. If we cannot control the nuclear experiment, it will control us. I think that the DNA experimentation may have this hazard in it. I'd like a lot of public discussion with the best minds there are working on it, and not having people with self-interests or a special kind of arrogance that is given to scientists, even to environmentalists, making public decisions without the public's having more knowledge about it.

Schrepfer: So you're not against the research, but you want it very strongly controlled?

Brower: Certainly strongly controlled, and possibly we should be against the research. That is, if the public sees that the danger is too great for the benefit and the risk, then the public can say, "Let's cut it out." The public may not; the public may.

Schrepfer: Do you have a fair amount of faith in the public?

Brower: I don't know what else to have faith in. The benevolent environmentalist I guess.

Television and the Public Interest

Schrepfer: We have been talking about some of the issues involved with FOE more recently; would you describe the connection between environmental conservation and the truth-in-advertising campaign?

Brower: We got into court to try to straighten out the Federal Communications Commission, I believe, on the thought by some of our legal advisors that in television and radio commercials, primarily television, if controversial subjects were covered in advertisements, then the same audience should be exposed to the other view.

In the course of time we prevailed, but it has not made much difference. To make the most of the court's decision requires a lot of monitoring: a lot of our members watching what

Brower: is happening, telling us about it, so that we can make the request that equivalent audiences be exposed to the other view. Not that we ourselves would present it, but that we would point out that it needed to be presented, and that we would be willing to help present it.

I'm not quite sure what's happened since then. I think that there have been some different rulings. I cannot comment intelligently on what has happened since, but it's certainly something that needs to be followed up, because again and again we find that the environmental view is inundated in the counterview that comes from industry's self-serving wishes to go on doing what they've been doing all along.

But the need is still there to get the other view presented. We find it more and more true as public broadcasting becomes more and more the servant, we fear, of the people who are giving the grants that make the programs possible. So the programs that are on educational television that should have had a lot of content are having less content and more entertainment; they increasingly resemble the commercial broadcasting that they were supposed to complement and not duplicate.

The problem is major because we know that television has enormous power over the voters. Going back to an earlier discussion today, when we talked about the nuclear initiatives, we know that up until about two weeks before the nuclear initiative was voted in California, there was a two to one vote in favor of it, according to some fairly competent polls. With something less than two weeks of saturated television advertising by the pronuclear forces, those numbers were reversed. It was two to one against us.

Somehow, something better needs to be done in getting a better use of the public's air in the public interest. That's one of the opportunities ahead of us that has not been seized by any means yet. I'm hoping that one of the products of a recent book by Jerry Mander--that's his book Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television--will have something to do with changing this situation. One of the things that encourages me is that the television audience, according to polls, has been dropping. I think that people are getting more annoyed and bothered and bored by what I would like to call "junk television." There's a lot of it. The idea of seven commercials at the time breaks--some of them done well and brilliantly, most of them just dullsville, just real junk, interrupting what may have been a train of thought, and interrupting a train of thought or a program in sometimes the most ludicrous or offensive ways--it needs to be changed.

Brower: Jerry Mander's book came out of his long experience in the business of advertising and his growing apprehension about what it was doing to the public, his concern about his own role in that, and his reversal in his own life style to begin to try to tell the public what should happen instead. He devoted about three years to it. There was a foundation grant or two that came through the Friends of the Earth Foundation to help it.

Schrepfer: Was he the Mander who was involved with the advertisements for the club?

Brower: Yes. He wrote most of the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth advertisements that I signed. I would advise. We'd have long sessions and go over and over the material. But he did the writing with the basic formula that he learned from Howard Gossage: if you're writing advertising, you've got to be believed, you've got to be interesting. As soon as you write a sentence that's complicated enough that somebody doesn't want to go back and read it again, the page turns and your audience is gone! I remember when some of the long advertisements appeared (some of them were quite long, hundreds of words of copy) I would be riding whatever we were using for mass transit in those days, and I'd watch people turn to the page where the ad was and read it all. He had a way of grabbing public attention. Certainly the early ads on the Grand Canyon and the Redwoods had an enormous effect. Certainly there was one in the Earth National Park ad.

I would like to see his book affect the television industry and get them to straighten themselves out, to realize that they have some responsibility to themselves, to their own place in history other than just putting junk before the public on the tube.

Schrepfer: Do you really think they might self-police?

Brower: I would like to think so, thanks to Jerry's incisive criticism, his refusal to go on television to discuss his book. He says that television is not capable of covering a subject. They have to do everything in so few minutes that you never know what subject has content. That was one of the things he's disgusted with. They are not willing to put enough thought or time into anything. They're so wrapped up in expense and schedule that they can't cover a subject anymore.

If you would analyze almost any of the television news programs, you would see what he's talking about. They say almost less in a television news story than the Wall Street

Brower: Journal puts in the series of little ladderheads up at the top of the story, and then they are on to the next subject. I think that one of the very effective critics of television is also "Doonesbury," if you've been reading "Doonesbury" lately. By the time he's done a few of these parodies of the television broadcasters, you see how lacking in content they are.

I think Jerry is coming along at exactly the right time. He has gone a little farther than I would go, but that's his right. He's tying most of the ills of television to capitalism, but I think that there are other ills in TV too.

One other thing has impressed me with television. I've watched quite a bit. It helps me go to sleep when I'm too worried about other things; my wife will testify that if I start watching television, in about three minutes I'm fast asleep. You sit there, practically inanimate, a nonparticipant, and the material keeps flowing by. It is so easy within a few minutes, not to remember what passed through your eyes and on out your ears or whatever happened. There is so little residue. I would hope that something better could happen. There isn't enough participation. Jerry Mander worries about that and about the erosion of the mind that sits in front of the box too long. He worries about the physiological problems of what this kind of radiation does. I think there are some points there that require a lot of research.

Schrepfer: You mean from the color televisions?

Brower: The color television and also the black-and-white. He cites some studies of plants put in front of a television. The plants didn't make it. It's alarming. Now how valid the study is, I don't know. I saw a film Jerry sent us of some of the studies of what light was doing to people, including various kinds of light, including the kind of light that comes from a tube.

Certainly we've found that there is enough radiation from some televisions to be damaging. We don't know how well it's been monitored. We know the vigor of industry's defense against criticism. There is the instant denial of any danger in what they're doing. I'm probably too suggestible, but I remember holding my hand up in front of our own color television within just a few inches of the screen--and I was sure I felt something about it. My skin felt different for quite a while afterward. That might have been autosuggestion. It may not have been.

I remember how long children were allowed to look at their moving bones through those x-ray machines at shoe stores before somebody said stop. We're learning now about the almost lethal

Brower: doses that people get in a g.i. series when they get x-rays. The doctors weren't warning us against those. The manufacturers weren't. It was somebody else saying, "I wonder what's happening here," conducting the research, and finding out that what was happening was pretty bad. But somebody may finally get on to the radiation coming from the screen and may find that there are things there that we haven't even thought to measure that aren't good for us at all. Those little microwaves getting into our brain. Now, I don't want to sound strange on this, but I do want to sound as if somebody had better look a little harder.

George Dyson, a young friend of mine up in Vancouver, was babysitting a dog that belonged to a friend of his, who George said was now apparently unable to take care of that dog. He was just spending hour after hour after hour in front of the television and seemed not to have much wit left. I wish Jerry Mander good luck in shaking an industry up, in trying to enliven in it the ability to be self-critical and to reform of its own volition. Otherwise I think the public had better insist.

Schrepfer: All right. Now what you're saying is--to come back to the original issue--there's a way of perhaps getting the environmental position into the media?

Brower: Yes, I think there must be a better way, and we'll find it, soon I hope. We could start by seeking more truth in advertising, and more independence of it, in all the media.

[We need a better balance between the public interest and the private interest, and to attain this we need to be more interesting than we are in what we have to say, to be able in various amusing ways to say that what is good for the public is good for General Motors.

I don't think anything would help us more than to have the most talented people in the advertising world volunteer to write for us, being assured of the safety of anonymity in exchange for the opportunity thus to assuage their guilt over their past sins in copywriting. Whoever thought up the series on Exxon's theme, Energy for a Strong America, for example, could under an assumed name produce an antidote series, Energy for a Brief America. In due course, advertising could achieve its full educational potential, and the backward media would no longer need to be so far behind those that now keep the public interest up front. DRB, 5/27/79]

The Economics of Peaceful Stability

Schrepfer: I suppose that one of the biggest questions in environmentalism is that of the compatibility between capitalism and environmentalism, the growth question. And ever since about 1959, I guess you've been advocating what you call the economics of peaceful stability. Do you want to elaborate on that, how you look at that issue now, almost twenty years later?

Brower: I'm trying to remember where I was influenced on this. I think it was a book by Sam Ordway* that I've been trying to look up and have not found. He was once president of the Conservation Foundation. He was questioning growth and led me to question growth. I did it in this piece that came out [in the Sierra Club Bulletin, December 1964, p. 9] advocating that there be studies on the economics of peaceful stability. Those words were Bob Golden's.

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Brower: They were in response to the request of Justice William O. Douglas, who had been a dinner guest of Mr. [John Jay] McCloy of the Ford Foundation, who had asked the justice what the Ford Foundation's conservation policy should be. They wanted to re-evaluate it. One of the nice little letters I have that will go on to the Bancroft is the letter I have from Justice Douglas. It said that this is what his problem was, what should I say? [laughs]

So I went to work on that, with Bob Golden and Dan Luten, and we came up with a letter that we thought he might pass on to the Ford Foundation. He worked it over so that it was in his own words and sent it in. Then later he said that it would be all right for me to follow up. So I followed up with what I said in the first place, augmented a bit. It was later published in one of the wilderness conference books, and then in the Sierra Club Bulletin advocating, among other things, a re-interpretation of nature, a Center for the Advanced Study of Ecosystems, and so on.

The economics of peaceful stability point was one of the five that the Ford Foundation did nothing about. They did something about all the others, not with friends of the Sierra Club, but with programs going in other directions. I'm glad of that.

*Samuel H. Ordway, Resources and The American Dream, Including a Theory of the Limit of Growth (N.Y., Ronald Press Co., 1953).

Brower: It is just too bad that in the early sixties the Ford Foundation didn't undertake such studies, even as it is now too bad that when it undertook an energy study, it made various projections of what the future would be if we followed the energy use habits of history, took the historical growth curve, or if we did sort of a halfway modification of that, or if we headed toward what the Ford Foundation calls zero energy growth, which wasn't zero energy growth, it was still a slow increase leveling off.

I had urged, but too late, that they also put in a negative energy growth curve so they could get a good projection of the four alternate scenarios and see which they would rather have followed, years ago. They didn't and therefore there is no adequate study before the country, after all these years, of what would happen if we used less energy each year, a little bit less. I happen to think that it would be a very good thing if we did, and if we used a little bit less oil each year and a little bit less of everything else, and do a cooling-off period in our attack on the environment.

Similarly, there should have been a study back in the early sixties on what would happen if we tried for stability in overall economic growth--just cool it. Would that lead to a better chance of world peace? I think it would have. But no such study was undertaken. Here we are, all these years later, and we still don't have the kind of data at hand to help us judge what would happen if we didn't grow, grow, grow the way we've been able to grow since the close of World War II.

That's what we were attempting to suggest in rhetoric, if not in numbers, in the book Progress as if Survival Mattered. What would it be like if we took the following steps, in each of these fields of human activity, to cool the attack on the environment? I think it would be good. It would be nice if we had a lot of blue-ribbon groups who were saying the same thing, so that we would have the credibility that environmental opinions don't yet have.

It would be useful to the people who are addicted to capitalism, as I guess I am in a modest way. I still think that it will work. I don't think it matters so much whether you are a capitalist, socialist, communist, or a peoples' republican or a king. Whatever form of government you have, whatever form of reaching social decisions, will be much better if there is the assumption to begin with that the earth is limited and that the network, the environment that you inherit should not be impaired while you are the steward of it. Capitalists, socialists and communists all have the opportunity to be good stewards. The emphasis that I would like to see is not on the party or the kind of government, but on the attitude towards the earth.

Brower: For example, people who are in corporate leadership can find ways to make money-making things look better, rather than make them look worse. Certainly they've been making money in Sweden and in Denmark. They live in northern climes in beautiful places, produce beautiful things and do beautiful planning. They have not loused up the environment nearly as much as others. In the same latitude in Alaska, we take a beautiful place and rip the hell out of it. It's the attitude that's different, not the form of government. Denmark and Sweden and the United States are not governed that differently. They are more socialistic than we are, but they've got people who try to make a lot of money.

I would like to see the impetus of making a profit--or, if you don't like the word profit, enjoying, as somebody said, "the sweet smell of gain" from doing better by the environment. I don't care if you come out ahead in your social standing and your rank in society if you've done it. I'd like the motivation to continue that seems to be what gets people to do good things--that is, their self-interest. It's a very strong thing. It always has been, and I think it will continue to be. I'd like to see that self-interest directed so that when it's enjoyed or followed out, it makes a better-looking earth.

It can happen. We've seen this sort of thing happen. I'd like to have readily at hand a lot of examples of it. There are not as many as there could be. Last night I was with a friend of mine, Charlie Komanoff, who has been in the past working with the Council on Economic Priorities, and his friend Steve Moody, who's still with it. We were talking about what might happen with a cooler economy, one without the growth. Steve Moody had been talking in Japan to the Japanese who are intent on growth. When I was over there a year and a half ago, they wanted an 8 percent annual growth in GNP, which isn't sustainable very long. We had some good arguments about that. I pointed out, extrapolating some exponential numbers, how impossible it was. They replied, "We aren't going to keep growing that long." I said, "If you're going to stop some time, why don't you stop while Japan is still beautiful?"

Steve Moody had the same sort of question put to him: "What would it be like if we stopped this economic growth." He said, "You shouldn't be asking Americans that. You have an old society and culture here, and you can tell yourself that," and went on to tell them that the most beautiful man-made place he'd ever been to was the temple and the gardens just outside of Kyoto. The tea ceremony didn't take much energy. They made sure that everything around them was touched with a loving touch. They were surrounded with beauty. Nature kept things going, but human

Brower: hands made it possible for those things to grow and be beautiful. Whatever was made by hand was made with loving hands, and wherever you looked, it was beautiful.

On beyond the temple, the air is getting worse and worse because Kyoto has not followed the temple's example. But that is something that people can do something about. They can have a new reverence for the beauty that was there in the first place. In my own philosophy, I conclude that if something is beautiful, it's probably right, and we are recognizing it's rightness intuitively without quite knowing why. If it's ugly, we've done something wrong to it. I don't know whether I can sustain that conclusion, but it's fun coming to it.

What I'm thinking of primarily now is, what are the opportunities? How can we make people accept the transition that we think is essential? One of my friends pointed out that if you want to take a dangerous toy from a child, you don't just fight with the child to get it away, you divert the child and offer something more attractive and then pick up the razor blade while the child reaches for the apple. I think we have to do that with ourselves. We have to tempt ourselves with something that is more attractive than what we have. There are plenty of things that the environmentalists are thinking about that are more attractive. It's important to avoid frightening people who fear that if you force them to take the steps you want them to take, they'll be destroyed. So it's better to show a step-at-a-time route to a saner society.

I was suggesting a couple of Sundays ago in Sacramento that there be new job descriptions for some of our agencies. If we try to close them down, they'll fight to the death. But if you give them new jobs, more attractive, they might not. So I was suggesting to the Army Corps of Engineers, for example, that they build no more dams until it is necessary to replace present dams because they've filled up or worn out, that they entertain the idea of taking some dams down, that they keep their engineering skills alive by putting the railroads back to work. Forget building dams. We certainly need trains, and they have the political muscle to put them back on the track--if we can just get them started.

I would like to see the Bureau of Reclamation, for the first time in its life, really to reclaim something and not just flood it. We have millions of acres in the United States that have been abused. I'd like that bureau, in all the states, not just the western states, to devote itself to reclaiming land that has been destroyed, so it can be brought back into production

Brower: of the things we need and the rest of the world needs. If the Forest Service can't learn to plant trees as well as it's learned to cut them, then leave it to the Bureau of Reclamation, as a friendly rival, to show the Forest Service how to reclaim forest land.

I suppose beyond that, what I've enjoyed is seeing what people themselves want to do--and particularly the young people I seem to be exposed to more than others in the audiences I've talked to--seeing what they have in mind.

I was at Kent School in Connecticut about three weeks ago, and did what I've done not often, but it's fun. It was a small group and it was not speech time but seminar time. I asked, "What kind of world do you want to grow up in, and do you want your children to grow up in?" Then we went around the circle and they responded to that question and to each other. It's interesting what these fifteen people did. One was from Japan, and his language was not very adequate until I started talking about what I'd seen in Tokyo and Kyoto, and then he began to respond about what he thought ought to happen in Japan.

The last to respond was the teacher, who was the son of one of the people who was in the Mountain Troops with me, Jim Goodwin. Peter Goodwin was teaching the class. He said, "The kind of world I would like to grow up in is the kind you and my father grew up in."

Strangely, most of them wanted the city. They liked the open space around Kent, because they have a beautiful valley there; it's a little town with lots of open space. But they also liked the big city and what it offered. They wanted both, and I don't see any reason we couldn't have both if we don't overcrowd either.

As I go around speaking, I often use an illustration that we have in our new book Progress that we found in the National Geographic bicentennial issue. It was from a series of population computer diagrams developed by MIT, showing needle-like peaks where the population was densest all over the country--little mounds two centuries ago, crags one century ago, and then a forest of needles for our bicentennial. So I show it and ask, "What would you like the country to look like in 2076?" Obviously we can't go on doing what we've been doing. I then editorialize: "Two hundred years ago I doubt that we were draining anything from the rest of the world to sustain us. We were exporting instead. All these peaks we now have in the United States have been made possible because 6 percent of the population represented in these peaks, with this

Brower: great big one soaring up at Los Angeles, are using up some 30 to 50 percent of the world's resources. We can't keep doing that, because other people don't like that idea. What do you think it ought to be?"

That brings up the whole idea of population, which is something that people have been forgetting lately. It's not just an earthful of people, it's going to be an earthful of dull people with dull vistas. It won't work. They'll be scrabbling all the time. That can be cruel.

What's most fun of all is to talk to these younger audiences and see people respond to questions like that, or to my usual diatribes, yet be bright-eyed about it, and to come up and ask, "What can I do?

I say, "Whatever your field is, just check what we're doing any time you have a chance, and try to put more conservation conscience into your own field."

Schrepfer: You seem to get the best reception of all and to be quite open to young people. I guess in the sixties too.

Brower: It still works pretty well. It's kind of fun.

Schrepfer: Do you ever think about dropping out? [laughter]

Brower: Yes, every now and then I get discouraged and say, "Well, why don't I go back and look over my papers?"

Schrepfer: Oh, I meant dropping out of civilized society--after all, you lead a very civilized life, with telephones and airplanes and offices.

Brower: It's not very civilized, but it's certainly exciting. It's not dull. There are some periods of frustration, but they don't last too long. They're pretty well interspersed with periods of quite a bit of delight.

One of the lacks of delight is something I bring into my speeches from time to time. My parents were each one of four, and I was one of four, and each of my children was one of four. None of them wants any children at the moment. They don't feel entitled to bring people into a world that is this cockeyed. I hope their attitudes will change. I didn't want to not be a grandfather at all. No pressure, but it could be nice if someone thought it would be good to continue the line. There's always that sort of wish, a personal kind of immortality, to watch the gene flow go on.

Brower: However, that simply puts the thought back where I suppose it belongs--what can I do before I check out to overcome some of the mistakes made by my generation and the generation that's still younger. I don't think the blame can go any farther back because earlier we never had any inkling of what was happening. There were so few people and so much world enough, so much time enough, that if you failed here you can always go there and try harder somewhere else. There was a way in the world then, and the world has lost its way. There isn't any any more. We have to deal better with where we are. I know I sound moralistic. Then I think we can find a way again. So I end up optimistic, but guardedly so.

Transcribers: Joan Annett, Leslie Goodman-Malamuth, Lee Steinback
Final Typist: Marie Herold

APPENDIX A

**Sierra Club Board of Directors Resolutions
December 5, 1959**

18. Relations with Government Agencies

MSC (BR, EA): The resolution on relations between government land-administering agencies and the Sierra Club, passed at the meeting of the Board of Directors on July 4-5, 1959, is reaffirmed as follows:

The Sierra Club stresses its belief that it can best serve its basic purposes by independence in its field of action. In implementing Sierra Club policy the Club and its representatives shall

(a) offer cooperation with public officers in development of plans and policies in their initial stages,

(b) urge adoption of Sierra Club policies, and to that end privately or publicly criticize public policies and actions in an objective and constructive manner.

In the opinion of the Board, objectivity and constructiveness of criticism are to be fostered as follows:

a. No statement should be used that expressly, impliedly, or by reasonable inference criticizes the motives, integrity, or competence of an official or bureau.

b. In publications, objectivity can best be achieved by presentation of both sides of a controversy.

c. If any doubt exists as to compliance with the policies set forth in the resolution, review should be secured from an appropriate Sierra Club official.

MSC (EA, BR): Copies of this resolution are to be sent to appropriate agencies concerned by this motion and also to chapter officials who have the responsibility of carrying out Sierra Club policies with respect to publication and public contact work.

19. Internal Revenue Service: Tax Status of the Sierra Club

MSC (RML, BR) (Ayes: AA, LFC, CVH, HSK, RML, BR, WS, RCY; Noes (because of Item d.): EA, GM, CEM, EW): The Board adopted the following policy directives:

a. The Sierra Club, its officers, and its staff shall continue as vigorously and effectively as possible to support the basic public purposes of the Sierra Club for preservation of the scenic resources of the United States.

b. The Sierra Club's primary and major support of these charitable public purposes shall be through the long-term scientific, literary, and educational efforts which have proven so effective over the past two-thirds of a century.

*See page 323 for explanation of initials used.

c. It is realized that from time to time isolated bills pending before a variety of legislative bodies may seriously involve or affect the public preservation principles which the Sierra Club is dedicated to support primarily through educational means. In such individual cases, as a minor and insubstantial part of the over-all long-term public program of the Sierra Club, the staff is authorized to support those principles as vigorously and effectively as possible within the law.

d. None of the publications of the Sierra Club shall take "action" with respect to legislative matters by urging Sierra Club members or the public to contact members of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation. Members may be reminded, however, of their constitutional right to petition or to write to Congress, as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

e. The Sierra Club and all its chapters are hereby prohibited from participating in or intervening in (including the publishing or distributing of statements) any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.

MSC	= Moved, Seconded, Carried
AA	Ansel Adams
EA	Elmer Aldrich
LFC	Lewis F. Clark
CVH	Clifford V. Heimbucher
HSK	H. Stewart Kimball
RML	Richard M. Leonard
GM	George Marshall
CEM	Charlotte E. Mauk
BR	Bestor Robinson
WS	Will Siri
EW	Edgar Wayburn
RCY	R. Clifford Youngquist

APPENDIX B

Friends of the Earth Advertisement
Ecology & War Petition, 1969

(Ecology & War)

"....The need is not really for more brains, the need is now for A GENTLER, A MORE TOLERANT PEOPLE THAN THOSE WHO WON FOR US AGAINST THE ICE, THE TIGER AND THE BEAR. The hand that hefted the ax, out of some old blind allegiance to the past, fondles the machine gun as lovingly. It is a habit man will have to break to survive, but the roots go very deep." (*Loren Eiseley*)

This is the best statement we have seen relating ecology to the war and other social issues. It was to have been run as an ad in the *New York Times* and other major papers if money had been available.

Following this statement we are presenting the Society of Friends' analysis of voting records on these issues.

THIS ADVERTISEMENT is being placed by FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, a conservation group, but it concerns the war in Southeast Asia, and also wars in general.

Until recently conservationists have been thought of as content to fight the tragedy of a dam, the outrage of pollution, the spread of ugliness and environmental degradation, and also the economic and political solutions to that sort of mindless destruction.

Wars have been someone else's problem.

It has been as though war is not as destructive as dams. Or that an air pollution hazard in Los Angeles is a more significant danger to life than bombs landing upon non-combatants in a war, or the laterizing (turning to rock) of thousands of square miles of formerly living soil by widespread use of napalm. It is as though DDT in *our* vital tissues is worse than wartime chemical defoliants in the tissues of pregnant women.

It is not true. They are all of equal order, deriving as they do from a mentality which places all life and its vital sources in a position secondary to politics or power or profit.

Ecology teaches us that everything, *everything* is irrevocably connected. Whatever affects life in one place—*any* form of life, including people—affects other life elsewhere.

DDT on American farms, finds its way to Antarctic penguins.

Pollution in a trout stream eventually pollutes the ocean.

Smog over London blows over to Sweden.

An A-bomb explosion spreads radiation everywhere.

The movement of a dislodged, hungry, war torn population affects conditions and life wherever they go.

It is all connected. The doing of an act against life in one place is the doing of it everywhere. Thinking of things in any other way is like assuming it is possible to tear one stitch in a blanket without unraveling the blanket.

Friends of the Earth, therefore, its Board of Directors and staff, wishes to go on record in unanimous support of the recent telegram to Mr. Nixon, signed by the leaders of the nation's conservation organizations, reproduced below.

We would further like to urge readers of this ad to become involved in supporting the several resolutions now in the Congress which will hasten our withdrawal from Southeast Asia, as follows:

- 1) The Cooper-Church amendment which requires the withdrawal of all American military from Cambodia by June 30;
- 2) The Repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, used as the "legal" basis of the Vietnam involvement;
- 3) The McGovern-Hatfield Resolution, which requires total American disengagement by 1971.

Please write your congressmen and senators. In particular, write letters, or postcards or send wires to the list of senators who, at this time, have not gotten off the fence on this issue. [See coupon below for their names.] It is as significant an ecological act as blocking the SST, or turning in a car, or *not* buying a fur coat, or getting the lead out of gas. It is an act in favor of life.

Thank you.

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
30 E. 42nd St., N.Y.C.—451 Pacific Ave., San Francisco
David Brower, President; Gary Soucie, Executive Director

On May 14, many of the nation's leading conservation figures joined in sending a telegram to Mr. Nixon. The telegram, and its signatories, are shown below. (Most signatories acted as individuals. Organizations are shown for identification).

"We call upon the administration, the Congress and the people of the United States to do whatever is necessary to bring about an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops in Cambodia and a quick end to the war in Southeast Asia. There is no way in which the world can extricate itself from pressing problems of over-population and pollution without first halting the destructive drain on human and natural resources now demanded by the war. The time has come to recognize the war in Southeast Asia for what it really is—an ecological disaster that ultimately destroys both the land and the people it purports to protect.

The United States will survive neither as a political nation nor as an ecological unit if it persists in expanding its vital energy in irrelevant armed conflict. The great danger to the nation today lies not in our ideological or political differences but rather in our uncontrolled ability to destroy our common support system, the planet.

The war in Southeast Asia has legitimized total destruction as a strategy and is destroying the very ability of the land itself to support life in the future. The accepted policies of the war have included:

—The chemical defoliation of more than one-fifth of the forest area of South Vietnam—more than 5,000,000 acres. Beyond this disruption of life systems that promises to affect the future food supply of Vietnam, and the destruction of all other forms of life, this policy has accelerated rapid leaching of tropical soils and in some cases may cause permanent soil sterility.
—The systematic saturation bombing of entire land areas, square mile by square mile, to destroy all vegetation that might conceal or otherwise support the adversary.

—The destruction of entire crops—despite all evidence that military forces will always be fed first,

leaving children and the aged most likely to suffer.

"We believe that when an American commander can state (and believe) that 'We had to destroy the village to save it,' we face a danger to the earth of more immediacy than any other now being discussed.

"We believe that ecology, the study of the *interdependent* relationship of all things on earth, indicates the increasing penalty that will result from the needless destruction of life in any form. Our world has seemed so large for so long that horrible excesses in one place or another could be absorbed, and the earth counted upon to heal its wounds. But that is no longer true. The world is made smaller by our power, and the excesses are now so much greater.

"The natural balance is so delicate and complex that it seems to us that now is a time to encourage the diversity of life in all its forms and styles, and to replace the mentality that divides the world simplistically between 'us' and 'the enemy' with one that recognizes and celebrates diversity. We ask for a new, ecologically oriented foreign policy, one which places its emphasis on the needs of the ecosphere and not on the politics of nations. Such a policy may seem outrageous to those who consider conservation to be concerned only with strewn beer cans rather than strewn bodies, and with saving a recreation area rather than saving a planet. But a planet is at stake, and to save it we must begin by giving up the policy of destruction that leads with relentless logic to a My Lai—and to a widening of war in the interest of 'shortening' it.

"We cannot destroy Vietnam, or the world, in order to save it."

Donald Aitken, *Scientific coordinator, John Muir Institute*; Phillip Berry, *President, Sierra Club*; Raymond Balter, *Director, Ecology Center*; David Brower, *President, Friends of the Earth*; Harrison Brown, *California Institute of Technology*; David Challinor, *Smithsonian Institute*; Roland Clement, *Vice President, Audubon Society*; Eugene Coan, *Zero Population Growth*; Mrs. Kay Corbett, *Portland State*

University—Environmental Teach-In Coordinator; Garrett de Bell, *Editor, The Environmental Handbook;* Alvin Duskin; Dr. Paul Ehrlich, *President, Zero Population Growth;* Brock Evans, *Northwest Representative, Sierra Club;* Richard A. Falk, *Millbank Professor of International Law, Princeton University;* Francis Farquhar, *honorary President, Sierra Club;* Mrs. Francis Farquhar; Hans Feibusch, *San Francisco Tomorrow;* David Forbes, *Grace Cathedral;* Harold Gilliam, *Conservation writer;* Garrett Hardin, *University of California, Santa Barbara;* Dennis Hayes, *National Coordinator, Earth Day;* Alfred Heller, *President, California Tomorrow;* Cliff Humphreys, *Ecology Action;* George Leonard, *author and editor;* A. Starker Leopold, *President, California Academy of Sciences;* Max Linn, *President, John Muir Institute;* Martin Litton, *Board of Directors, Friends of the Earth and Sierra Club;* Mark Lappe, *University of California, Berkeley;* Daniel Luten, *University of California, Berkeley;* Michael McCloskey, *Executive Director, Sierra Club;* Stephanie Mills, *Editor, Earth Times;* John Milton, *The Conservation Foundation;* Margaret Owings, *Save-the-Redwoods League;* Nathaniel Owings; Mr. and Mrs. George Plimpton; Eliot Porter, *photographer;* Douglas Scott, *The Wilderness Society;* Kevin Shea, *Science Editor, Environment;* Will Siri, *President, Save San Francisco Bay Association;* Gary Snyder, *Poet;* Dwight Steele, *Sierra Club;* John Fell Stevenson; Carl F. Stover, *Consultant, Washington, D.C.;* Stuart Udall, *Former Secretary of the Interior; President, Overview;* Richard A. Watson, *Washington University;* Kenneth Watt, *Institute of Ecology, University of California, Davis;* Robert Wenham, *Friends of the Earth;* Thomas Whiteside; Willard Wirtz, *Former Secretary of Labor; Chairman of the Congress on Population and Environment;* Lawrence Williams, *Executive Director, Oregon Environmental Council;* Mrs. Maradel K. Gale, *President, Oregon Environmental Council;* Dr. Richard Gale, *Chairman Eugene group Pacific NW Chapter, Sierra Club;* Harvey Manning, *Editor, The Wild Cascade;* Dale Jones, *Editor, North*

West Conifer; Hon. Mrs. Maurine Neuberger, Former United States Senator; Dr. Donald McKinley, *Director, NW Environmental Defense Center;* William A. Nordstrom, *Wilderness photographer;* Mrs. Elizabeth Ducey, *Secretary, The Oregon Roadside Council;* Patrick D. Goldsworthy, *Former Director, Sierra Club.*

Mr. David Brower, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
30 East 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Mr. Brower:

I have sent letters urging support of anti-war bills to the following U.S. Senators who are as yet undecided on these measures.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. George Aitken | <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Jacob Javits |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Edward Brooke | <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Warren Magnuson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Quentin Burdick | <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Joseph Montoya |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Clifford Case | <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Frank Moss |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Allen Ellender | <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Charles Percy |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Albert Gore | <input type="checkbox"/> Sen. Stuart Symington |

I would like a copy of DEFOLIATION by Thomas Whiteside. I am enclosing one dollar. (Includes tax.)

Please enroll me in your organization. I am enclosing \$_____ for membership. (\$15 regular, \$5 spouse, \$5 student, \$25 supporting, \$50 contributing, \$250 life.)

I would like to work on the war task force of Friends the Earth.

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

APPENDIX C

BOOKS PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF DAVID BROWER

For the University of California Press:

Manual of Ski Mountaineering (two editions), by David R. Brower
Up and Down California, by William H. Brewer
100 Years in Yosemite, by Carl P. Russell
Marin Flora, by John Thomas Howell
The Incomparable Valley, by François Matthes and Fritiof Fryxell
Sequoia Album, by François Matthes and Fritiof Fryxell
Mammals of the Sierra Nevada, by Lowell Sumner
Yosemite Bibliography, by Francis P. Farquhar
California Place Names (paperback), by Erwin Gudde

For the Sierra Club:

Exhibit Format Series

This is the American Earth, by Ansel Adams and Nancy Newhall (1960)
Words of the Earth, by Cedric Wright (1960)
These We Inherit: The Parklands of America, by Ansel Adams (1962)
"In Wildness is the Preservation of the World," by Eliot Porter (1962)
The Place No One Knew: Glen Canyon on the Colorado, by Eliot Porter (1963)
The Last Redwoods: A Vanishing Scenic Resource, by Francois Leydet and Philip Hyde (1963)
Ansel Adams, Volume I: The Eloquent Light, by Nancy Newhall (1963)
Time and the River Flowing: Grand Canyon, by Francois Leydet (1964)
Gentle Wilderness: The Sierra Nevada, by Richard Kauffman (1964)
Not Man Apart, Photographs of the Big Sur Coast, Lines by Robinson Jeffers (1965)
Wild Cascades: Forgotten Parkland, by Harvey Manning (1965)
Everest: The West Ridge, by Thomas F. Hornbein (1965)
Summer Island: Penobscot Country, by Eliot Porter (1966)

Navajo Wildlands: As Long As the Rivers Shall Run, by Philip Hyde and Stephen C. Jett (1967)

Kauai and the Park Country of Hawaii, by Robert Wenkam (1967)

Glacier Bay: The Land and the Silence, by Dave Bohn (1967)

Baja California and the Geography of Hope, Photographs by Eliot Porter, Text by Joseph Wood Krutch (1967)

Galapagos: The Flow of Wildness, by Eliot Porter (two volumes), 1968)

Central Park Country: A Tune Within Us, Photographs by Nancy and Retta Johnson, Text by Mireille Johnston (1968)

For the Sierra Club:

Historical and Regional Studies

Island in Time--The Point Reyes Peninsula, Photographs by Philip Hyde, Text by Harold Gilliam (1962)

The Peninsula--A Story of the Olympic Country, by Don Moser (1962)

John Muir's Studies in the Sierra, William Colby ed. (1960)

Ramblings Through the High Sierra, by Joseph LeConte (1960)

François Matthes and the Marks of Time: Yosemite and the High Sierra, by Fritiof Fryxell (1962)

John Muir and the Sierra Club, by Holway Jones (1965)

Wilderness Conference Books

Wilderness in a Changing World, Bruce Kilgore, ed. (1966)

Tomorrow's Wilderness, François Leydet, ed. (1964)

Wilderness: America's Living Heritage, David Brower, ed. (1961)

The Meaning of Wilderness to Science, David Brower, ed. (1960)

Wilderness and Recreation: Report on Resources, Values and Problems, Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (1962)

Voices for the Wilderness: from the Sierra Club Wilderness Conferences, William Schwartz, ed. (1969)

Wilderness Exploration Guides

A Climber's Guide to Yosemite Valley, by Steve Roper (1964)

A Climber's Guide to the High Sierra, Hervey H. Voge, ed. (1965)

A Climber's Guide to the Teton Range, by Leigh Ortenberger (1965)

A Climber's Guide to Glacier National Park, by J. Gordon Edwards (1960)

Belaying the Leader: An Omnibus on Climbing Safety, by Richard M. Leonard (1956)

Manual of Ski Mountaineering (four editions, including Ballantine paperback), David Brower, ed. (1961)

Starr's Guide to the John Muir Trail (revised editions), by Walter Starr, Jr.

The Mammoth Lakes Sierra, by Genny Schumacher (1964)

Deepest Valley, by Genny Schumacher (1969)

Exploring Glaciers--With a Camera, by A.E. Harrison (1960)

Going Light--With Backpack or Burro, David Brower, ed. (1962)

Illustrated Guide to Yosemite, by Virginia and Ansel Adams (1963)

For the Sierra Club (continued):

Other

On the Loose, by Terry and Renny Russell (1967)

Grand Canyon of the Living Colorado, by Ernie Braun, Rod Nash, ed. (1970)

Almost Ancestors, by Theodora Kroeber and Robert F. Heizer (1968)

The Population Bomb, by Paul Ehrlich (1969)

The Sierra Club Wilderness Handbook, David Brower, ed. (1967)

Aldabra Alone, by Tony Beamish (1970)

Nature Next Door, by Robert C. Stebbins (1962)

Ascent (a mountaineering periodical)

For Friends of the Earth:

Resource Books on Energy

Soft Energy Paths Toward a Durable Peace, by Amory B. Lovins

Progress As If Survival Mattered, edited by Hugh Nash

Sun! A Handbook for the Solar Decade, edited by Stephen Lyons

The Energy Controversy, by Amory Lovins and others, edited by Hugh Nash

ECCS Hearings, by Dan Ford and Henry Kendall

World Energy Strategies: Facts, Issues, Options, by Amory Lovins

Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy Strategy, by Amory Lovins and John Price

Frozen Fire, by Lee Niedringhaus Davis

The Energy and Environmental Bibliography, prepared by Betty Warren

For Friends of the Earth (continued):

Earth Island Books (Earth Island Ltd. was founded in London in 1971 by David Brower and specialized in international co-publishing of books devoted to Friends of the Earth goals.)

The Toxic Metals, by Anthony Tucker

Openpit Mining, by Amory Lovins

Did We Save the Earth at Stockholm?, by Peter Stone

Only One Earth, by Amory Lovins

Nuclear Reactors, by Walter C. Patterson

The Limits to Growth, by Donella Meadows et al

River of Tears, by Richard West

Concorde, The Case Against Supersonic Transport, by Richard Wiggs

The Earth's Wild Places Series

Return to the Alps, by Max Knight, photographs by Gerhard Klammet

Earth and the Great Weather: The Brooks Range, by Kenneth Brower

A Sense of Place: The Artist and the American Land, by Alan Gussow

Micronesia: Island Wilderness, photographs by Robert Wenkam, Text by Kenneth Brower

Eryri: The Mountains of Longing, by Amory Lovins, photographs by Philip Evans

Guale, the Golden Coast of Georgia, photographs by James Valentine and John Earl, edited by Kenneth Brower

Maui: The Last Hawaiian Place, by Robert Wenkam, edited with Kipahulu sketches by Kenneth Brower

The Primal Alliance: Earth and Ocean, photographs by Richard Kauffman, selections from John Hay

New England's White Mountains, by Brooks Atkinson and W. Kent Olson, photographs by Philip Evans and others

Wake of the Whale, photographs by William R. Curtsinger, text by Kenneth Brower

Headlands, photographs and lithography by Richard Kauffman, selections from Robinson Jeffers

Celebrating the Earth Series

Song of the Earth Spirit, by Susanne Anderson

Only a Little Planet, photographs by Martin Schweitzer, lines by Lawrence Collins

Of All Things Most Yielding, photographs by John Chang McCurdy, selections from Oriental literature by Marc Lappe

For Friends of the Earth (continued):

Other titles

How to be a Survivor, by Paul R. Ehrlich and Richard L. Harriman

Diseconomics of Growth, by H.V. Hodgson

Low-Level Radiation, by Ernest Sternglass

Does One Way of Life Have to Die so Another Can Live?, by Yupiktak Bista

Cry Crisis! Rehearsal in Alaska, by Harvey Manning

Voters Guide to Environmental Politics, edited by Garrett DeBell

Nuclear Dilemma, by Gene Bryerson

SST and the Sonic Boom Handbook, by William A. Schurcliff

Defoliation, by Thomas Whiteside

Teaching for Survival, by Mark Terry

Wilderness and Plenty, by Sir Frank Fraser Darling

Environmental Law Handbook, by Norman T. Landau and Paul D. Rheingold

User's Guide to the Protection of the Environment, by Paul Swatek

Books from Other Publishers, endorsed, sponsored, or distributed
by Friends of the Earth

The Environmental Handbook, edited by Garrett De Bell

Diet for a Small Planet, by Frances Moore Lappe

The Silent Bomb, by Peter Faulkner

Rush to Destruction, by Graham Searle

The Unviable Option, by John Berger

The Unacceptable Risk, by McKinley Olson

Other:

Principal editing, Sierra Club Bulletin annual magazine, numbers, 1942-1969
(except 1943-1945, World War II years)

Principal editor FM 70-10, Mountain Operations, U.S. War Department, 1944

Narratorial editor, Remount Blue: The Combat History of the 3d Battalion,
86th Mountain Infantry, Berkeley, 1948

"Producer," This is Dinosaur: Echo Park Country and its Magic Rivers, Wallace Stegner (ed.), Knopf, 1955. (Gathered authors, photographers, editor, and publisher.)

Earth Law Journal, Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law

ECO, a newsletter initiated at the United Nations Conference on the Human environment in Stockholm, 1972, published at important national and international conferences.

APPENDIX D *

SIERRA CLUB
PUBLICATIONS FUND ANALYSIS **
(Dollars in Thousands)

Year	Surplus (Deficit) W/O Subsidies	General Overhead		Subsidies	Fund Balance Per G/L	\$ 17.5	Gen. O/H Not Charged % Amount	Fund Balance W/Gen. O/H
		%	Amount					
1/1/64	\$ [26.1]		\$ N/A	\$ 9.0	0.4			
1964	[15.7]		N/A	-	[15.3]			
1965	[31.3]	34.9	[87.8]	-	[134.4]			
1966	54.2	35.0	[121.5]	3.8	[197.9]			
1967	71.2	30.0	[177.6]	36.4	[267.9]			
1968	[151.2]	28.0	[96.7]	7.5	[508.3]			
FY '70	12.3	18.6	[87.6]	19.5	[564.1]			
FY '71	[143.7]	25.4	[162.3]	74.2	[795.9]			
FY '72	[64.9]	-	51.6	[809.2]	25.4	\$[174.7]	\$ [983.9]	
FY '73	18.4	-	99.4	[691.4]	20.0	[122.7]	[988.8]	
FY '74	[40.0]	-	86.6	[644.8]	20.0	[130.5]	[1,072.7]	
FY '75	7.3	-	112.6	[524.9]	20.0	[132.0]	[1,084.8]	
FY '76	110.4	-	93.9	[320.6]	20.0	[172.7]	[1,053.2]	
FY '77	13.4	-	157.4	[149.8]	20.0	[174.7]	[1,057.1]	
FY '78	<u>110.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>159.2</u>	<u>119.4</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>[178.9]</u>	<u>[966.8]</u>	
Totals	\$[75.7]	\$[733.5]	\$ 911.1	\$ 119.4	\$ 11,086.21	\$ [966.8]		

*See page 335 for Brower comments.

**From Cliff Rudden, 8 February 1980.

Comment on Sierra Club Publications Fund Analysis

All suggestion of control over Sierra Club publishing ended for me at the end of the calendar year 1968. No subsidies were provided until then by the Sierra Club Foundation, and overhead was charged at an average of about 33%. Had Sierra Club Foundation and other subsidies been withheld 1969-1978, and had overhead been charged at the rate charged during my administration, the fund balance at 1978 year's end would not have been \$119,400 as this table shows, but instead would be about \$2.6 million in the red.

Or, conversely, if Sierra Club Foundation subsidies had been forthcoming in my years as executive director, and overhead not charged (as it wasn't 1972-1978), my years would not have been shown \$267,900 in the red, but about \$1,250,000 in the black.

David R. Brower
February 11, 1980

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