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
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
An Essay



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








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AN ESSAY

ON THE

NATURE AND OBJECTS

OF THE

COURSE OF STUDY,

IN THE CLASS OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND

AND LOGIC,

IN THE

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

BY THE REV. JOHN HOPPUS, A.M.

“Sure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.”—LOCKE.

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AN ESSAY,

ETC.

It is the design of the following pages to explain, generally and in brief, the *nature* of those studies to which the attention of the Students will be directed in the Class of MENTAL PHILOSOPHY and LOGIC; and to point out some of the *practical advantages* which must result from these pursuits, if rightly conducted, as a prominent and essential branch of an enlightened and liberal education.

In the boundless field of knowledge which lies open to human research, there are some objects which are evidently adapted to gain more immediate attention than others, either by the direct appeal they make to the senses, or their obvious connexion with the necessities of mankind. It is with the world itself, intellectually considered, as with the infant: the latter is chiefly the creature of sensation, and time must elapse ere the enlargement of its experience has brought into exercise faculties of a different and more exquisite order. Antiquity was the infancy of the world; and it was natural that the sensible properties of things should first attract notice, and become the elements of the first rude attempts in science.

Hence the splendour, the beauty, and the motions of the heavenly bodies; the overflow of rivers; thunder and lightning; the changes of the seasons; together with the forms and qualities of plants and animals, the diseases of the human frame, the decomposition of animal and vegetable substances, the various agencies of fire, air, and water; and, in

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short, all the more striking aspects of nature, were the facts which in the early ages of the world awakened the curiosity of man, and formed the basis of Astronomy, Chymistry, Medicine, and other sciences.

These branches of knowledge, and all those which resemble them in being derived from similar sources, have, in a general sense, been denominated the *philosophy of nature*. This expression however, even in the most extensive acceptance in which it has usually been employed in modern times, by no means includes all the objects of scientific inquiry. There is another sphere of investigation, which, though less obtrusive to common observation, and to the superficial eye almost shrouded from view, is by no means less interesting, or less worthy to be explored. The most indisputable of all evidence, the evidence of our consciousness, assures us of the existence of certain powers and susceptibilities, or faculties, totally different from any which are exhibited by the mass of objects that surround us; and we feel that these faculties are peculiarly *our own*.

From this source, therefore, arises a new and separate department of knowledge, quite distinct from that which is derived from the wonders of mere sensible nature, comprising whatever relates to the operations of that still more wonderful instrument by which these wonders are surveyed; namely, *that which thinks*, or what we denominate MIND.

It requires nothing more than due reflection on that endless succession of thoughts and feelings, and their infinitely diversified combinations, which form the conscious existence of every day, to convince us that these mental phenomena are not less curious, or less determinate, than those of external nature, to which indeed they have a more intimate relation than we might in the first instance be ready to imagine. This self-inspection will not fail soon to reveal to the attentive inquirer some of the arcana of that world within, which, though on a cursory glance it appears so dim and shadowy, and will never cease, in common with all the other spheres of knowledge, to have its regions of mystery and

darkness, demands only to be patiently and carefully surveyed, in order to manifest that it is as truly subjected by its great Author to general and fixed laws as the material universe itself.

The consideration of these various facts in our sentient and intellectual nature; this survey of the mechanism, so to speak, of the inner man; this introversion, as it were, of the intellectual eye, with a view to the analysis of the mental operations, their arrangement, the order of their succession, and a variety of collateral topics, which it is at present unnecessary to detail, is what we mean by the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND, of which LOGIC may be considered as a part.

The view it is proposed to take of this branch of education in the Class, regards chiefly the mental powers and susceptibilities considered *in themselves*; or in other words, the various *states* of sensation, idea, or emotion, in which the mind, under the changing circumstances in which it is constantly placed, is found to exist. The *rectitude* of any of these states, as determined by the will of God, and right reason, or the nature and rule of moral excellence, constitutes a distinct branch of science, under the name of *Ethics*, or *Moral and Political Philosophy*; including whatever immediately relates to the philosophy of private, social, and public virtue.

The above aspect of the Philosophy of Mind, in which it is viewed principally as to its mere faculties or various actual states, has sometimes been termed its *physiology*; implying the doctrine of its functions simply, in allusion to that part of medical science which treats of the functions of the animal frame. It has also been called the *physics* of the mind; its mere properties and laws, apart from their moral relations, being viewed as an object of natural science. With what propriety these terms, which general custom has appropriated to other uses, may be applied to mind, is, in part at least, a question of nomenclature only; nor is it ne-

cessary that this question should now be entertained. Still more foreign to the present purpose would it be to hazard any remarks on the subject of the most philosophical division of which science in general may be deemed susceptible.

Though the appearances of external nature, from the strong and incessant appeal they make to the senses, were so much calculated, as above remarked, to become the earliest objects of scientific inquiry, it was nevertheless impossible that some of the more obvious attributes of mind itself could remain unnoticed, even in the utmost infancy of the history of man. Accordingly all languages are found to be furnished with words, or names, which designate the faculties of *memory*, *imagination*, *reason*, and the like, however little the possible analysis of these mental functions was regarded as an object of philosophical discussion. The literature of the earliest nations indeed, with the exception of the Hebrews, was so blended with the fictions of a poetical theogony, that little can be certified respecting any opinions that were entertained among them as to the analysis of the operations of the human mind; or rather it is sufficiently evident that this field of inquiry was almost entirely unknown as an object of science.

Till the time of Plato and Aristotle, scarcely any thing, we apprehend, that is definite can be gathered on this subject from the philosophical speculations that were current even among the Greeks, imbued and mystified as they were with the high colouring of the eastern polytheism. The philosophy that predominated previously to the rise of these brilliant luminaries of the ancient world was the Pythagorean; and though some of its principles, more immediately regarding the Deity, were more rational and consistent than those entertained by some of the schools that arose in subsequent ages, the chief philosophy relating to the human mind seems to have consisted in the favourite tenet of the transmigration of souls, of which the alleged metempsychosis of Pythagoras himself was accounted an example:

Ipsè ego, nam memini, Trojani tempore belli,
Panthoïdes Euphorbus eram.

Quoslibet occupat artus
Spiritus; èque feris humana in corpora transit,
Inque feras noster.—OV. METAM. XV.

The succeeding period in the history of Grecian philosophy, distinguished as it is by the genius of Plato and Aristotle, and by the schools that adorned the groves of Academus and the banks of the Ilissus, of which they were the founders, is universally allowed to have been its most illustrious æra. The time, however, was even yet far distant when the human mind, emancipated from the despotism of its own fancies, and the authority of names, was to acquire that high discipline in the pursuit of truth which was necessary to enable it to form a just and sober estimate of itself; and when it was to arrive at an intellectual self-command which should restrain it from that Dædalian flight, to which it was ever prone, into aerial regions of speculation, where its powers were consumed in an element unsuited to their weakness, as the fabled wings of Icarus were melted in the attempt to approach too near the sun.

Were we not aware how late it was in the history of the world before the true inductive philosophy—the philosophy of fact and reason—broke the spells of imagination and romance, and decidedly obtained that dominion which it now possesses over the whole empire of natural science, it might appear surprising that whatever related to the mind and its faculties should so long have presented to view nothing but a rude and indigested series of wild and visionary speculations. What is more familiar among the phænomena of mind than that under certain circumstances that condition of it which is termed *sensation* is produced; and that under other circumstances another state of consciousness arises, which we term *having an idea*? The moon is in the sky; our eyes are open, and are directed to that part of the heavens in which she is shining; we have a sensation of

sight; we *see* the moon. She has now run her course, and is no longer visible in our hemisphere; but the word *moon*, if it even accidentally reach our ear, is sufficient to call up the moon's spectre, so to speak, in the mind; and we are conscious of having an *idea* of the moon, which, though less vivid than the previous sensation, is still perfect in its kind, and which we feel to be as truly a part of our consciousness as the sensation itself. It was some two thousand years, however, from the time that these facts seem to have engaged the attention of philosophers, before it was conceived they might probably be ultimate elements in man's sentient and intellectual nature; that is, facts of which no explanation can be given.

It was always supposed that the mind did not perceive the objects of sense directly and immediately; but that some kind of filmy and ethereal representations of them must intervene, which were termed *phantasms*, *shadows*, *forms*, or *images* of the real objects. In conformity with this ideal philosophy, Plato, in the seventh book of his "Republic," compares the mind to a person in a dark cave, and so situated as to perceive the shadows only, and not the realities, of the objects that are passing without. These shadows or "*ideas*" were said to be but copies of their true antitypes and originals, which were affirmed to exist in the Divine Mind as the only real essences.

Aristotle, though he is immortalised by his Science of Logic, if more minute on the subject of perception than his scarcely less renowned preceptor, was by no means more happy, or more satisfactory, in his speculations. He, and his followers, maintained that these images, or *forms*, were impressed on the organs of sense; and in this stage of their progress they were termed *sensible species*: by some refinement, which they subsequently underwent, they became objects of memory, and were now called *phantasms*; by a still more subtile and refining process, they were fitted to be objects of knowledge; having at length arrived at a rank, which it is

presumed will not now be very readily conceded to them, namely, that of *intelligible* species.

The long reign of Aristotle and his commentators in the schools, was equally unfavourable both to natural and mental science. It was a millennium of slumber to the human intellect, during which the fantastic dreams of imagination usurped the province of reason; and notwithstanding all the warfare of disputation, in which a claim was laid to the universal domain of truth, the faculties of the mind, so far as all useful purposes were concerned, made but feeble achievements, and laboured under a kind of paralysis. The scholastic sect of philosophers, which arose principally from the prevailing fashion of commenting on Aristotle, rendered Logic ridiculous by perverting it to the support of the most absurd quibbles and the most unfounded hypotheses, and left on the very name of "Metaphysics" a lasting odium.

Ludovicus Vives describes these philosophers of the middle ages in terms which claim for them at least *some* of those imposing titles that were conferred on them by their admiring disciples. Of these doctors, who, if not "seraphic" or "perspicuous," were, it must be allowed, not unfrequently "*most resolute*" and "*invincible*," he thus speaks: "I have seen the combatants, after having exhausted their stock of verbal abuse, proceed to blows; nor was it uncommon, in these quarrels about metaphysical terms and ideas, which neither party understood, to witness the combatants first employing their fists, then their clubs, and finally their swords, by which many were wounded, and some killed." It was unfortunate for mental philosophy that, by being associated with the pursuits of the scholastics, it should have been identified with so much that was absurd, unintelligible, and useless; and thus have been exposed to the neglect or contempt of those who find it easy to depreciate what they do not understand, and who are either unable or unwilling to distinguish the ontology and dialectic folly of the schools, from the Inductive Philosophy of the Human Mind, and the practical Logic of the *Novum Organum* of Bacon.

The last named illustrious reformer of science, meriting, as he is generally allowed to do, the honourable appellation of Father of the Experimental Philosophy of Nature, was fitted to give that impulse and direction which he did to the labours of his successors, principally by the genius he possessed for rightly estimating both the powers and the limits of the human mind. His philosophical writings in general, and especially his work *De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum*, abound in trains of thought which are admirably calculated to lead to more proper views than any that had previously been entertained of the scope and aim of intellectual science. Notwithstanding the tincture that is to be found in his works of ancient hypotheses and habits of thinking, from which indeed it was too much to expect that he should at once practically deliver himself, his accurate delineation of the chief erroneous associations of ideas, or prejudices, under which the human mind is wont to labour, the innumerable important hints he has thrown out on some of its operations, and the perpetual demand he enforces to have every subject of inquiry submitted to the test of the inductive logic, entitle him to the highest rank among the contributors to a just intellectual philosophy. His genius resembled the morning sun, which, though many shadows of the night may cling around his orb, has power to dart his rays through them all to the remotest objects, and holds forth, at his rising, the pledge and promise of a brighter day.

Descartes, who flourished at the beginning of the 17th century, and was contemporary with Bacon, has the praise of more clearly stating, probably, than any one of his predecessors, the necessity of studying the human mind simply on the evidence of *its own consciousness*, and of avoiding, as much as possible, being misled by those analogies, borrowed from the properties of matter, which are liable to prove so great a source of error when applied to phænomena which are of a nature so totally unlike any of those we witness in the material world. “What am I?” asks Descartes. “I

am a being susceptible of thought—but what is this being? a being that doubts, understands, affirms, denies; that is willing and unwilling, etc. I am convinced, therefore, that none of the things that are comprehensible by the imagination, things corporeal, can give me the knowledge of myself; and the mind should be carefully abstracted from these, that it may have a distinct conception of its own nature.” The victory which these and similar passages seem to indicate their author to have gained over the strongest prejudices of sense, at a time when the light of the new philosophy had only begun to dawn on the idealism of the schools, has induced Mr. Stewart to pronounce that these views, “when first given to the world, formed the greatest step in the science of mind ever made by a single individual; and when Descartes,” adds this distinguished writer, “established it as a general principle, that *nothing conceivable by the power of imagination could throw any light on the operations of thought*, he laid the foundation-stone of the Experimental Philosophy of the Human Mind.”

It is a remarkable illustration of the slow progress of the human faculties in the practical attainment and use of truth, that Descartes, though meriting such an encomium as the above, should have so completely abandoned, as he did, his own fundamental principle, in his theories respecting the connexion and communication between the body and the mind. The soul, he affirms, has its seat in that part of the brain called the *pinical gland*, or *conarion*; and he details, as if stating an indisputable fact, the process by which the “*animal spirits*,” by progressive and retrograde motions, keep up a perpetual communication between the mind and every part of the body; a doctrine which contributed to furnish the muse of Prior with materials for one of its happiest efforts:

“Alma, they strenuously maintain,
Sits cock-horse on her throne, the brain,
And from the seat of thought dispenses
Her sovereign pleasure to the senses.”

PRIOR'S ALMA.

The publication of Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding*, and its rapid and extensive circulation, may be regarded as constituting a new æra in the history of mental science. During fourteen years, its author lived to see it pass through seven editions; and though, like every other effort to benefit mankind, by holding up to them the torch of truth, and teaching them to rejoice in the light for its own sake, this great work excited the alarm and the opposition of those who were interested in preventing the intellectual and moral progress of the human race—nevertheless the philosophy of Locke speedily gained ground, not only in England and Scotland, but also in several parts of the continent of Europe; and, within half a century, it had even found its way into the fashionable coteries of the French metropolis. Whatever defects in the precise use of language, or other errors, the researches of subsequent labourers in the same field may have brought to light in this celebrated Essay, certain it is, that the sincere and ardent pursuit of truth, the originality of thought, and the constant appeal to reason, which characterize it, not to add the simplicity and energy of its style, were eminently calculated to impart a sympathetic tone to future inquiring minds, and to effect that salutary change in the general habits of thinking on the topics it treats of, which has followed in its train. It was, in short, the first grand, systematic exhibition of the spirit of the Baconian philosophy applying itself to the investigation of mind; and instead of being surprised that one individual should not have achieved every thing, we may rather admire the genius that had power, under the existing circumstances, to accomplish so much.

As it is by no means the intention of the present pages to detail the history of the Philosophy of Mind, or to dwell minutely on the respective merits of those who have written on it, but chiefly to give *some general idea of its nature and objects* to those to whom the subject may be new, and to glance hastily at the manner in which it has gradually assumed the form and consistency of a science, few only, even

of the names of those can be mentioned, who have contributed, each his portion, either toward clearing away the fabrics of error, or laying the foundations of truth. In this, as in every other branch of human knowledge, one philosopher has stood, as it were, on the pedestal reared by another; one has proceeded to fill up the outline, which was already sketched by a former hand; and each one has been more or less indebted for some new train of thought to the unwrought materials bequeathed to him by his less advantageously situated predecessor. Nor is it a fact peculiar to the history of this science, that some who have most successfully pursued certain topics of inquiry, have on others been the most completely led astray by the *ignis fatuus* of an undisciplined imagination. Kepler, who enriched astronomy with the admirable discovery of the laws of the planetary motions, was persuaded, from certain fancied analogies, that the planets must be precisely *six* in number; and he acknowledged that his first concern, on hearing of the discovery of the four satellites of Jupiter by Galileo, was, how he could save his favourite scheme, which was in jeopardy from this increase in the number of the planets!

In addition to the writers already noticed, who have contributed to intellectual science, the names of Hobbes, Berkeley, Hartley, and Hume, not to mention others, are among the most conspicuous; each of which philosophers may be regarded as, at the same time, a specimen both of the strength and the weakness of the human mind—as exhibiting the combination of that acute and patient research which has added many valuable facts and illustrations to the stock of our knowledge, with a devotedness to the most gratuitous or fanciful hypotheses, and in some instances, with worse than merely intellectual errors. Hartley's attempt to account for our sensations, ideas, and emotions, by mechanical vibrations in the nerves and brain, or Berkeley's argument against the existence of matter, is not necessarily connected with ill moral consequences; but Hobbes's denial of any other distinction between right and wrong than what de-

pende on the mere arbitrary will of the civil magistrate, and Hume's universal scepticism, are at variance with the happiness of mankind.

It is thus, however, that the Philosophy of Mind has gradually derived accessions from various sources, and, by the perpetual collisions of truth and error, has assumed the improved form which it exhibits in the hands of its more modern cultivators, especially in Scotland; a country in which, for nearly a century past, it may be affirmed to have met with more successful attention than in any other, and where it has had the good fortune to escape being identified with that mysticism and romance which have too much characterized it in some parts of the Continent.

Lord Bacon has remarked, that one source of error to the human mind is the tendency it often exhibits to imagine a greater uniformity in nature than actually exists; and the passion for *systems*, which has misled so many powerful minds, is nearly allied to such a bias. Little doubt can be entertained that to this cause may be traced much of the supposed *uncertainty* of speculations on mind. The fate, however, of successive systems, one perishing and another rising on its ruins, from which the argument of uncertainty is usually derived, militates *not* against the subject, but against the *method* of philosophy. When the phenomena of nature in general began to be studied simply by the light of observation and experiment, and the facts, whatever they might be, were carefully registered and compared, the whole aspect of physical science began to change, and to assume a definite and certain form; and the order and beauty of truth arose out of the chaos and darkness of the scholastic ages. This inductive method may safely be pronounced the only one that is suited to the weakness and limitation of the human faculties—the only sure guide out of the labyrinth of error; and in proportion as it is applied to the investigation of the laws of mind, will those laws, like any other facts in nature, become truly ascertained. It is, if we mistake not, principally to the circumstance of the spirit of the

inductive philosophy having more deeply imbued the minds of the Scottish writers than those of some of their cotemporaries in Germany, that the superiority of the Northern school is to be traced ; and that under such auspices as those of Reid, Stewart, and Brown, the genius of intellectual inquiry presents the aspect of a traveller, not arrayed indeed in the splendid attire of the “*Transcendental Philosophy* *,” but patiently toiling onward in the path which must ultimately lead to the temple of Truth, and claiming for his labours the name and dignity of Science.

In the Universities of Scotland, it is well known that Mental Philosophy and Logic form constituent parts of the general instruction of youth ; and in the course of education published by the Council of the University of London, to be pursued by the Students, it is made to occupy the same prominent and important place. In this Class their attention will be directed to every topic that can properly come under the denomination of the Philosophy of Mind, from its most simple and familiar states of sensation, in *smell, taste, hearing, sight, and touch*, to its most complex phænomena of thought and emotion. Hence the various orders of ideas, simple and complex ; the association of ideas ; memory ; imagination ; attention ; habit ; the artifices the mind employs to facilitate and abbreviate its operations in abstraction and generalisation, together with other uses of language ; evidence ; reasoning ; belief ; the will ; the passions, or emotions, viewed as states of the mind ; and a variety of other inquiries, both immediate and collateral, and too numerous now to be mentioned, will form the elements on which the student will be taught to exercise and discipline his faculties in the pursuit of truth : and this object will be promoted not merely by oral communication, but also by perpetual and various themes, exercises, and examinations.

Of the Philosophy of Mind, Logic, as before intimated, is properly a branch, since it has a direct reference to one of the most important of the mental operations. It may be

* Vid. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

viewed either as the *science* or the *art* of *reasoning*. In its stricter acceptation, as a science, it consists of the analysis of *that* process of the mind; while in its wider sense, as an art, it includes the practical rules on which all ratiocination is to be conducted, for the avoidance of error and the attainment of truth. Its principles are completely developed in the *Organon* of Aristotle; and, so far as relates to induction, its materials may be found, to a considerable extent, in the *Novum Organum* of Bacon, which embodies the spirit of that method of pursuing philosophical inquiries to which mainly is owing the rapid advancement of science in modern times.

In conducting his pupils through the fertile field of the Intellectual and Logical Philosophy, it will be the aim of the Professor to make their studies not only useful, but also interesting; in materials for doing which, if he mistakes not, many of the topics that will present themselves to their notice will by no means be wanting. The great object will be, to cause them to think for themselves; and the idea of *teaching*, rather than of merely lecturing, will constantly be kept in view. This, at all events, must be the case, in proportion as the Class shall be found to require elementary instruction, and to be formed to that close reflection on what passes within their own minds, and to those habits of mental analysis, which are rarely possessed by very young persons, and are never acquired without continuous and diligent efforts. In whatever manner circumstances, as they arise, may dictate any modification of the plan of teaching, the important object will invariably be aimed at, of rendering the course of instruction as efficient as possible, in promoting the practical ends of a liberal and useful education.

The extensive advantages resulting from the cultivation of mental and logical science in general, and the *practical utility* of devoting to it a portion of that valuable period of life which is allotted to the great purpose of acquiring elementary education, are too obvious to those who have paid any attention to this branch of knowledge to require the support of argument. Since it must be confessed, however, that this department of learning has not hitherto constituted

so prominent an ingredient as it merits, in the systems of education pursued in the southern part of Britain, though it has long held so distinguished a rank in the Scottish Universities, it may be proper to dwell somewhat at large on the advantages which attach to its pursuit. Preliminary to this, it will not be irrelevant to our purpose to glance at one or two of those erroneous notions which have existed with regard to the nature of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, and which, even in the present age, have not entirely subsided.

One of these, and to which allusion has already been made, is, that an *uncertainty* attaches to it, in consequence of its being supposed to rest on a footing *totally different*, with regard to our knowledge, from that of those sciences which have matter for their immediate object; whereas, in reality, the situation of both these general branches of knowledge is in this respect the very same. Nothing, indeed, can be more different than the two classes of phænomena which matter and mind exhibit to our observation; the one being known to us by its colour, extension, solidity, and other familiar sensible properties; the other, by sensations, ideas, volitions, and a whole train of feelings equally peculiar, every one of which is totally unlike any of the qualities we assign to matter: yet a little reflection is sufficient to convince us that our notions, both of matter and of mind, agree in this, namely, that they are not direct, but only relative. All we know of matter is, the properties that belong to it; and precisely the same is the case with mind itself. Whatever, therefore, can be truly ascertained as a fact or event, with regard to the affections of either, becomes as truly a part of our knowledge in the one case as in the other. What we ourselves are conscious of in the laws of mind, and what we witness of the operation of similar laws in the minds of others, we know as really as what we perceive in the laws of matter; both are alike known only by observation and induction. Any uncertainty that may attach to our conclusions in either case in any given instance, arises either from the difficulty of procuring sufficient *data*, or from our

deriving wrong inferences from the existing premises ; to both which evils some of the more complex mental phenomena, it must be allowed, are peculiarly liable. Neither of these sources of error, however, is confined to the science of mind.

It has also been contended, by way of objection to the Intellectual Philosophy, that as the inquiries connected with it are “not of the nature of *experiment*, but of *observation* merely,” the laws which Bacon has sketched out for the regulation of experimental induction are in this department “without authority.” It must indeed be acknowledged that mind cannot, like matter, be subjected to the crucible ; nor can its various states of sensation, thought, and emotion, be actually dissevered, and separately exhibited to view, like the rays of the prismatic spectrum : we have not here, in short, the same kind of command over the objects to be investigated, which matter often enables us, by its inertia and its divisibility, to acquire. The discoveries, however, which are brought to light by observation and by experiment, are precisely of the same kind ; both rest on the same ultimate basis, since experiment is nothing more than one form of the observation of nature. This objection, moreover, evidently tends to depreciate one highly important branch even of physical science, and one which is now considered as not yielding in the certainty of its conclusions to any part of human knowledge ; namely, astronomy. Surely Bacon never anticipated that this most exact of sciences would ever be regarded as less within the sphere of the inductive philosophy than any other ! It scarcely needs to be added, that the effects which astronomy has produced in navigation, geography, and chronology, sufficiently prove that *observation*, as well as direct manual experiment, may issue in an “increase of power,” and that it does not of necessity become a mere “gratification of curiosity.”

A prejudice, moreover, has not been wanting against Mental Philosophy, arising from its association with the term “*metaphysics*.” This word appears to have originated

with Andronicus of Rhodes, who was employed in editing the writings of Aristotle, when the manuscripts were brought to Rome by Sylla, after his conquest of Athens. Andronicus is said to have prefixed to certain books the title, τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, or “what immediately follows after the physics,” in reference either to the place which these books held in Aristotle’s original arrangement, or to that which it appeared to Andronicus they should occupy in the proper order of subjects.

In regard to the prejudice derived from this source, the following appropriate remarks occur in the Essays of Mr. Stewart, whose writings, almost unrivalled in the elegance of their style, have greatly contributed, during many years, to promote a more general attention in the reading world to the study of the philosophy of mind. Alluding to the fourteen books of Aristotle, to which Andronicus gave the name of “metaphysics,” this eminent author thus observes: “Notwithstanding the miscellaneous nature of these books, the Peripatetics seem to have considered them as all belonging to one science; the great object of which they conceived to be, *first*, to treat of those attributes which are common to matter and mind; *secondly*, of those things separate from matter. A notion of metaphysics nearly the same was adopted by the Peripatetics of the Christian church. They distinguished its two branches by the titles of ontology and natural theology. To these branches the schoolmen added the philosophy of the human mind, as relating to an immaterial substance; distinguishing this last science by the title of pneumatology.

“From this arrangement of natural theology and of the philosophy of the human mind, they were not very likely to prosper, as they gradually came to be studied with the same spirit as ontology, which may safely be pronounced to be the most idle and absurd speculation that ever employed the human faculties. Nor has the evil been remedied by the contempt into which the schoolmen have fallen in more modern times. On the contrary, as their arrangement of

the objects of metaphysics is still very generally retained, the philosophy of the mind is not unfrequently understood as a speculation much more analogous to ontology than to physics; while, notwithstanding the new aspect it begins to assume in consequence of the lights struck out by Bacon, Locke, and their followers, it continues to share largely in that discredit which has been justly incurred by the greater part of those discussions to which, in common with it, the epithet *metaphysics* is indiscriminately applied by the multitude."

Similar is the prejudice which has also been entertained against *Logic*, in consequence of its perversion, already noticed, to the purposes of scholastic disputation, during the reign of Aristotle in the schools. The science and art of Reasoning has, in the minds of the ignorant and the half-taught, unjustly shared in the discredit which is now most deservedly cast on the pedantry and jargon of the middle ages.

Were we to limit the motives for inquiry into the intellectual part of human nature to those of rational curiosity and devout admiration, even these could not fail to prove highly advantageous, and would present the study of the philosophy of the mind as invested with attractions of no common order; for it must be acknowledged that, of all the familiar objects which display the power and skill of the Creator, the human mind, in many respects, stands the most conspicuous. Amidst all that is humiliating in the history of man, there exist in his intellectual nature sublime traces of his real greatness. This nature is the only object, in that part of the creation with which we are conversant, that bears even the faintest image of its Maker; and it is a monument of far more exquisite and costly workmanship than the whole material universe. By means of the intellectual endowments it is given him to possess, man is enabled in some measure to subordinate all visible nature to his convenience and enjoyment. The earth, his dwelling-place, assumes new forms and is clothed with new beauties at his bidding; and, under the guidance of his plastic genius, di-

recting his manual labour, the wilderness becomes a second Eden; and the creations of his fancy rise up to embellish it, like visions of enchantment, in the forms of "solemn temples," "gorgeous palaces," or "cloud-capt towers." The elements also are, to a considerable degree, brought under his control, and made to administer to his desires; and both the winds and the waves have become his servants. In vessels of huge bulk, and of the most surprising mechanism, he rides upon the storms of the ocean; and guided by that compass which he has invented, and which points out his course though sun and stars should be invisible, he is borne along even to the extent of the circumference of the globe.

Nor have the heavens above escaped the scrutiny of his research, nor the powers of his arithmetic. Confined as he is to this earthly clod, his genius has taught him to invent instruments for the gratification of his curiosity and the advancement of his knowledge, which have the same effect as though his locomotive faculties were extended to a wider sphere. The heavenly bodies, which appear situated at so hopeless a distance away from him, and of which some are invisible to the naked eye, he has viewed with all the advantage of a nearer post of observation: he has traced the planets in their wanderings through the mazes of the starry firmament; and stretching, as it were, his line and his compasses over the mighty void of millions and millions of miles, he has determined their times and motions, their distances, their magnitudes and densities, their mutual attractions, and their various irregularities. He has even extended his curiosity beyond the sphere that encloses the solar system, and penetrated into the immeasurable regions of the fixed stars; and by the new optics with which his ingenuity has furnished him, he has brought to light unknown strata of the universe, and new wonders of the power of the Eternal, which had been hidden from view in the abysses of the creation ever since their existence.

The human mind has sometimes, after seeming to lie for ages entranced in a dead sleep of inactivity, roused itself

afresh, re-asserted its claim to unlimited advancement in knowledge, and entered on a bolder and more excursive flight. It was thus that Bacon's genius emerged from the darkness by which it was surrounded, and taught his successors to remodel all philosophy; and it was thus that Newton regenerated astronomy, and with his contemporary, Leibnitz, bequeathed to succeeding philosophers a new, and a more sublime analysis than any before known, and by which the abstractions of infinity itself are submitted to mathematical calculation.

Nor do the various emotions and passions of which man is capable present a less interesting field of inquiry than the achievements of his intellect. These are the phases of the human mind, which have a more immediate aspect towards happiness, and which, according to their character and complexion, either shed the light of peace and joy on every object within their sphere, or cast a malign and disastrous influence over all that is around them, and produce the storms and desolations of the moral and political world. Such are the visions of hope; the terrors of fear; the workings of benevolence; the selfishness of ambition; the softenings of pity, and the complacencies of affection; or the contrary ebullitions of wrath and revenge. More than all—the insatiable thirst for happiness, of which man's intellectual nature is susceptible; the lofty conceptions of ideal excellence; the visions of perfection and of beauty, not to be realised in its present abode, and made up of the scattered fragments of all that is fair and all that is good, on which it is fain to linger; while they most exquisitely harmonize with that future destination which reason and religion conspire to pronounce the only object worthy of a lasting ambition, exhibit the human mind, not only as the most curious, but also as the most sublime of contemplations.

If we descend to the more immediate bearings of the Intellectual Philosophy, it is obvious that, considered as the great *instrument* of all our knowledge, *mind* becomes an object of general interest to all who are engaged in the pur-

suit of Truth, under every diversity of form which it can present. If it be important that the astronomer should be well acquainted with the construction and the uses, the powers and the defects, of those instruments on which the accuracy of his observations so much depends; or that the mechanician should rightly appreciate the strength of those materials of which his machinery consists, and be familiar with its adaptation to the ends which he proposes in employing it, surely mind, which is at once the universal engine, and the receptacle of all science, demands from us the effort, which cannot fail to repay itself, to ascertain, as far as possible, the laws which govern it, the extent and limitation of its powers, and the purposes to which they may be legitimately applied; in order that its energies may not, on the one hand, be wasted on objects beyond their reach, nor, on the other, be paralysed, by the despair of attaining what persevering labour, and a well-regulated conduct of the faculties, might enable them to achieve. “It is of great use to the sailor,” says Locke, “to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean;” a remark which may evidently be applied to the capacities of the mind.

As mind is the grand instrument we have to employ in acquiring knowledge, its philosophy is obviously *related to every other branch of literature and science*. It may be regarded as the focus in which they all centre; or rather as the diffused and pervading light in which they all stand forth to view, in their various relative connexions, harmonies, and proportions. Science can exist only in the mind; and it is nothing more than a certain modification and arrangement of the ideas derived from the given objects in each particular branch. It consists of those series of abstractions and classifications to which we subject the different states of consciousness which are produced in us by the presence of these objects, in order to systematize our knowledge, and throw it into parcels that will be more easily remembered, and will present more ready means of pursuing the investi-

gation farther in any given direction. Natural science, it is evident, is *not* the mass of external objects that surround us, which we may conceive as still existing, and as having the same changes which they now exhibit, even if no minds were employed in contemplating them. It is a registry and a comparison and arrangement of those mental affections and changes to which these objects give rise, and of which the latter are simply the occasions. Medical science, for example, does not consist in the mere parts and functions of the corporeal frame, either healthy or morbid; nor in the qualities of certain mineral, vegetable, or animal bodies, that may be employed as remedies in disease; for these all exist independently of our knowledge. Nor does Botany consist in the peculiar conformation and fructification of plants, or the various forms of their leaves and roots, and their diversified habits and local situations; for these all existed long before the science of botany was known. These, and all the other physical sciences, are nothing more than phenomena of the mind—certain changes within us, which, by the constitution of our own nature, we are led immediately to refer to those external things, which are therefore named the objects of each particular science.

The actual effects produced by the state of intellectual philosophy on physical inquiries in general, are, it is well known, abundantly exemplified in the history of the world. The resuscitation of science was coeval with the progress of more correct views than had formerly prevailed, respecting the laws and operations of the human mind. If it be asked, why did so many ages pass away before this improvement took place? was it that there was a dearth of genius, or a want of industry, and ardour of pursuit, among those to whom mankind looked up as the oracles of nature's mysteries, and as possessing the key to her hidden treasures; and who were dignified with the name of philosophers? were Plato and Aristotle, for example, men of inferior intellectual stature to many who have succeeded them, at the remote distance of modern times?—this cannot be supposed. If these ex-

traordinary men did not attain to a true philosophy, or perceived truth only in the disguise of monstrous shapes and distorted images, it was not that their visual faculty was less acute than that of their successors, but that the atmosphere that surrounded them was misty and impure. That intellectual medium, through which all the objects of science must become known, required to be freed from its prejudices, and exorcised of its airy phantoms and chimeras. It was an essential preliminary to the regeneration of human learning, that the defective use which had previously been made of the very instrument that must incessantly be applied to it, should be clearly made known, and that this instrument should be cleansed from the rust of antiquity, and polished anew. "When we think," remarks Dr. Thomas Brown, "of the great genius of Lord Bacon, and of the influence of his admirable works, we are too apt to look back to his rules of philosophizing as a sort of ultimate truths, without referring them to those simpler views of nature, in relation to our faculties of discovery, from which they were derived, and without paying sufficient attention to the false theories of intellect which had led to these physical absurdities. But we must not forget that the temple which he purified was not the temple of external nature, but the temple of the mind; that in its inmost sanctuaries were all the idols which he overthrew; and that it was not till these were removed, and the intellect prepared for the presence of a nobler divinity, that truth would deign to unveil herself to adoration."

It is not however in physical science alone that the inductive philosophy of the human mind is adapted to exercise a salutary and guiding influence. Its effects may be equally traced in many of those branches of learning which are usually referred to *literature*, or which are of the nature of *literary arts*. Among these, *education*, beyond dispute, holds a foremost and distinguished rank: and here the influence of the Intellectual Philosophy is all-pervading; for what is education, it may be asked, or rather what ought education to be, but this philosophy reduced to practice?

All education may be divided into three parts; namely, physical, intellectual, and moral. The first of these includes the discipline which relates to the health and vigour of the body merely; as temperance, cleanliness, and gymnastic exercises: the two last comprise the gymnastics, so to speak, of the mind, or the art of training it to knowledge and to virtue. Education, in this sense, as vulgarly understood, is supposed to consist chiefly in the mere imparting of elementary instruction, together with the use of praise and blame, reward and punishment; but the true science of education may aspire to the accomplishment of much more. It is the province of *intellectual* discipline not merely to inscribe, as it were, certain characters on the blank tablet of the mind; not merely to inform its native ignorance, and to task it to the daily performance of some mechanical routine: its grand general object is to train the mind to the most efficient use of its own faculties, and to bring them to the highest degree of perfection of which they are susceptible; producing such a balance of all its powers, and such vigour in their exercise, that they may be directed to any given pursuit with the greatest possible advantage.

The intellectual varieties we often witness in children of the same family, and who have been subjected to the same circumstances of ordinary association, present indubitable evidence for the belief that there is a real difference in the susceptibilities of mind; a radical and original diversity of mental organization. Such a characteristic peculiarity, however, in each individual mind, it is obvious, by no means renders that kind of education unnecessary which is founded on a philosophical estimate of the human intellect, an analysis of its faculties, and an inquiry into the grand laws of their operation. Education, indeed, is rarely conducted with this constant reference to the leading elements of human nature; which principle can receive full justice only from parents themselves, under whose eye the first years of life are passed, and the earliest and most tenacious of the mental associations are formed. Nevertheless, imperfect as

education, thus considered, still is, it has often both supplied, in a great measure, the absence of superior natural endowments, and brought out into bold and prominent relief latent talents, which might otherwise have remained undeveloped, and unknown even to their possessor. Hence the lines of Gray are not more beautiful in imagery than true to philosophy, which speak of the "celestial fire" of genius, or of moral greatness, lying buried with some "mute inglorious Milton," who might have proved a master of the lyre; or "some village Hampden," who resisted the despotism of some petty rural tyrant, and thus indicated that, supposing him to have retained his love of freedom incorrupt, he might, under other circumstances, and with the advantages of education, have become a patriot, and resisted the misrule of an oppressed nation.

But knowledge to their eyes her ample page,
 Rich with the spoils of time, did ne'er unroll;
 Chill penury repress'd their noble rage,
 And froze the genial current of the soul.

Full many a gem of purest ray serene
 The dark, unfathom'd caves of ocean bear;
 Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
 And waste its sweetness in the desert air.

The still more important objects of *moral and religious education* are equally capable with that which is more immediately intellectual, of being assisted by the principles of the Mental Philosophy. If, in the conduct of intellectual education, the object be to generate and confirm habits of attention and activity, to rouse and to direct curiosity, to inspire a taste for knowledge, to cultivate memory, imagination, invention, and also to invigorate the faculty of reason; these, and all other intellectual exercises, may be rendered subservient to the higher purposes of morality, and of religion; apart from the prospects of which, education is destitute of every noble aim; and, indeed, all human pursuits, with whatever charm they may seem arrayed, become as insigni-

ficant and unmeaning as the fluttering of an ephemeral insect in the sunbeam. In this department of education, which should also, it is obvious, be instituted in the earliest years of childhood, a just acquaintance with the mental phænomena, and, especially, a careful attention to the associating principle, which exercises so wide an influence over all the operations of mind, cannot fail to be of the highest moment. To form strong associations between virtue and happiness, vice and misery ; to guard the avenues of evil ; to cultivate the heart, by regulating the domestic and social affections ; to inspire the universal love of truth and duty, though opposed to present gratification ; to allure the mind towards rectitude, by endeavouring always to present it in attractive colours ; above all, to adopt the best means of conveying just ideas of the relations, both natural and revealed, subsisting between God and the creatures he has made, and to lead the plastic mind to form such associations in connexion with the beauties of nature and the works of genius, as may tend to illustrate the divine perfections by pleasing images ; — these, which are some of the most important arts to be aspired to in moral and religious education, are, it is evident, of a nature to derive much advantage from their being attempted in connexion with enlightened views of the principles of man's intellectual nature.

While the philosophy of mind thus extends itself over every part of elementary education, its bearing on *other* literary arts is not less obvious. In *eloquence* and *poetry*, for example, the object in view is, to inform, to persuade, to convince ; to originate certain trains of thought ; to act on imagination ; to kindle a variety of emotions—as to awaken sympathy, to produce indignation or alarm, to inspire hope, and to convert all into the materials of pleasurable excitement, and of a certain course of action. All this is the contact of mind with mind ; and, supposing the natural endowments of genius to be the same, a circumstance, it must be allowed, not very easy to be estimated, it will be no small advantage surely, to the orator at least, to know somewhat intimately the powers and susceptibilities of that

which is at once the instrument and the object, the agent and the materials, which he is to employ.

The true art of *literary criticism* also is nothing more than the art of discovering the correspondences, or the unlikeness, which may exist between the delineations of truth and truth itself. The excellence of works of literary genius may be said chiefly to consist in their powerfully exemplifying the most natural successions of human consciousness, and in preserving unimpaired all the accordance of these successions with certain general and fixed laws which truly exists in nature, even in the most latent development of the principle of association, or the wildest and most abrupt bursts of passion. He who aspires to be more than a verbal critic must have a philosophical acquaintance with the human mind.

On the tendencies of intellectual science with regard to *other* important pursuits, the following observations of Mr. Stewart are too appropriate to be omitted. "It will be found, on a review of the history of the moral sciences, that the most important steps which have been made in some of them, even the most remote from metaphysical pursuits, have been made by men trained to the exercise of their intellectual powers by early habits of abstract meditation. To this fact Burke probably alluded when he remarked, that "by turning the soul inward on itself, its forces are concentrated, and are fitted for stronger and bolder flights of science; and in such pursuits, whether we take or whether we lose the game, the chase is certainly of service."

Adverting to the use of the term *metaphysical*, which has not unfrequently proved a bugbear to ignorance, and a convenient tocsin of alarm to selfishness and party feeling, Mr. Stewart proceeds: "But a few years have elapsed since this epithet, metaphysical, accompanied with the still more opprobrious terms of atheistical and democratical, was applied to the argument then urged against the morality and policy of the *slave trade*, and in general to any appeal that was made to the beneficent arrangements of nature, or

to the progressive improvement of the human race. Absurd as this language was, it could not, for a moment, have obtained any currency with the multitude, had there not been an obvious connexion between these liberal doctrines and the well-known habits of logical thinking which so eminently distinguished their authors and advocates. Whatever praise, therefore, may be due to the modern fathers of political economy" (alluding particularly to Adam Smith), "belongs, at least in part, to those abstract studies by which they were prepared for an analytical investigation of its first and fundamental principles.

"The influence of these studies may be also perceived in the philosophical spirit so largely infused into the best historical compositions of the last century. This spirit has, indeed, been often perverted to pernicious purposes; but who can doubt that on the whole both history and philosophy have gained infinitely by the alliance?

"Another instance of the practical influence of metaphysical science is the improvement which since the time of Locke has become general in the conduct of education both private and public. In our universities the studies of ontology, pneumatology, and dialectics have been supplanted by that of the human mind, conducted with more or less success on the plan of Locke's Essay, and in a few seats of learning by the study of Bacon's Method of Inquiry. In all this an approach has been made or attempted to what Locke so earnestly recommended to parents, 'that their children's time should be spent in acquiring what may be useful to them when they come to be men.' Many other circumstances, no doubt, have contributed their share in producing this revolution; but what individual can be compared to Locke in giving the first impulse to that spirit of reform by which it has been established?

"In consequence of the operation of these causes a sensible change has taken place in the style of *English composition*. The number of idiomatical phrases has been abridged; and the language has assumed a form more sy-

stematic, precise, and luminous. The transitions too in our best authors have become more logical, and less dependent on fanciful or verbal associations. If by these means our native tongue has been rendered more unfit for some of the lighter species of writing, it has certainly gained immensely as an instrument of thought and as a vehicle of knowledge.”

After what has already been advanced, it is unnecessary to dwell at any length on the actual benefits to be derived by the student of the Philosophy of Mind, from the direct tendency which it possesses to *discipline and invigorate* the mind itself. Whether his attention be turned immediately to the mental changes and sequences themselves, or to those external qualities of nature which are so perpetually originating new trains of these ever-flowing series, as colour, sonorous vibrations, figure, extension, hardness, motion; it will be at all times necessary for him to draw the materials of his reasoning from his own internal resources; that is, from his consciousness. It may reasonably be supposed that this habit of reflection, if once it become fixed, will be attended with a facility of withdrawing at pleasure from the world that is without to that which is within; and that an inexhaustible fund of intellectual amusement and benefit will be found, in carrying on those trains of thought to which the topics of the Intellectual Philosophy will give rise, even during those otherwise vacant remnants of time, which occur to every individual, apart from the apparatus of books, or the intercourse of society. Nor is this kind of contemplation a mere luxury of the mind, or even a source of intellectual improvement only, to the aspirant after learning: if *self-knowledge* be so important in its moral tendencies, that the exhortation of the Grecian sage, “Know thyself,” was deserving of the encomium of the Roman poet, who pronounced it to be a celestial inspiration *, surely those mental inquiries may justly be regarded as friendly to virtue, which tend to cherish an intimate ac-

* E cœlo descendit γνῶσι σεαυτὸν.—JUV.

quaintance with the various sources of human thought and feeling, and the various springs of human action.

It is equally unnecessary, after what has already been said on the subject of education in general, to enlarge on the bearing of intellectual studies on those departments of it which are *professional*. The *elementary* parts of a *complete* education, as recommended in the Statement above alluded to, published by the founders of the University, must evidently be the same in all cases; and the third year has been considered as a suitable period for attending the Class of Mental Philosophy and Logic. Some, however, it may be presumed, who may have received elsewhere their earlier institution, and who are designed either for the professions or for general life, may be inclined to avail themselves of the opportunity which is presented to them of being trained to an acquaintance with a branch of knowledge which is not to be regarded merely in the light of an elegant accomplishment, but as a diffusive principle, which may, most advantageously, exercise a presiding influence over all the active employments of human life.

It is probable that, in the course of time, not a few persons who are students of Theology in other Colleges of Learning, will be found availing themselves of some of the secular advantages afforded by an Institution which, while its prosperity rests on the basis of enlightened public opinion, is of no party; which is founded with a view of promoting every species of *human* learning, on the rational and equitable principle of declining all claim to a control over that sacred and inalienable right of private judgment in regard to Religion, for the exercise of which man can only be amenable to a higher than human tribunal; and which, even granting that it be perverted and abused to error, is incapable, from the very nature of the human will, of being restored to its proper use, by any civil privations or penal inflictions, which are alone the appropriate antagonists of whatever immediately tends to the disturbance of public security and social order.

The influence of the Philosophy of Mind on the sacred

avocations to which students in Theology are looking forward is peculiarly great and obvious. It is incumbent on them not to be satisfied with being the mere superficial organs of a popular and showy declamation, but to be intimately acquainted with human nature under its various and diversified aspects. As their appeal to mankind, moreover, must constantly proceed on the validity of the claims of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures to our belief, as invested with the authority of God, whatever relates to evidence and reasoning is an indispensable part of their mental furniture. It peculiarly belongs to those who are the professed votaries of truth *for its own sake*, to acquire the habit of close and patient thinking, to obtain an intellectual independence of character, which resists every thing that is merely of the nature of hypothesis, yielding at the same time a manly and implicit deference to the authority of fact, and adequate testimony, though this may not unfrequently involve consequences, which, in some of their bearings, may transcend the limits of the human understanding, and may not be the proper objects of its powers of comprehension.

Much of the intellectual discipline which has been referred to, may to some extent, be applied also to the professions both of *medicine* and *law*. In each of these, great accuracy of discrimination and patience of research are frequently demanded; and the most momentous conclusions often depend on a balance of probabilities, which it may require extreme attention and caution to view in their proper light and bearings. Hence the importance of that general preparatory discipline which the topics of the Intellectual Philosophy and Logic are fitted to afford: the nature, for example, of the different kinds of evidence; the subjects to which they are applicable, especially moral evidence, and its degrees; the proper limits both of doubt and of belief, together with the various circumstances by which they may be influenced; and other similar inquiries.—To the medical practitioner it is highly desirable, to say the least, that he should be a mental philosopher, when we consider the very intimate

though inexplicable union which subsists between body and mind, the aberrations incident to the latter, and their constant reciprocal effects and reactions, as often witnessed in disease ; not to mention the frequent importance of a certain tact, in manners and behaviour, tending to obviate excitement, and dependent, in a great measure, on the skilful avoidance of unnecessary painful associations ; in which, by the way, politeness in general, may be said chiefly to consist.

Finally, if *general business* be the object in which education is designed to terminate, it is needless to insist on the utility of that acquaintance with human nature, and that intellectual discipline, which are so well calculated to aid in the formation of those practical habits which are essential to the active pursuits of life.

In bringing these remarks to a conclusion, deferring a more detailed view of the Course till the meeting of the Class shall take place, the writer cannot refrain from stating, that, although he is not unaware of the arduous nature of those duties which will devolve on him as Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, he cannot but feel encouraged in reflecting on the success with which a similar field of labour was cultivated in the University of Glasgow, by the late venerable Professor Jardine ; many of whose students have been known to ascribe their progress in future life, in their several professions and avocations, in a great degree, to the early and effective discipline of their intellectual faculties, in the Class over which he presided, with so much popularity and usefulness, for more than half a century. If it be too much for those who tread in the steps of this distinguished Teacher to hope for all his success, it is at least competent to them in some measure to emulate his zeal.

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 A-Ship being-harassed by-fierce tempests, amid the-tears of-pas-
 sengers, and their fear of-death, suddenly the-day is-changed to a-calm
 tōrum, et metum mortis, subito dies mutatur ad serēnam
 aspect; she-began to-be carried safe with-favourable breezes, and to-
 faciem; cœpit* ferri tuta secundis flatibus, que extol-
 lere nautas nimiâ hilaritâte. Tum Gubernator,† factus
 elate the-sailors with-too-much jollity. Then the-Pilot, having-been-made
 sophus periclo: “Oportet gaudere parçè, et queri
 wise by-danger, says: “It-is-meet to-rejoice sparingly, and to-complain
 sensim;‡ quia dolor et gaudium miscet§ totam vitam.”
 guardedly; because grief and joy checkers the-whole of life.”

* This verb is here so long delayed, that we might almost have desired the substantive in the form of an ablative absolute; if the similarity of cases would not have created ambiguity.

† Gubernator (navis), “the governor of a ship,” is expressed by the single word “pilot.”—The predicate *sophus* is a Grecism.

‡ Sensim—The use of this adverb is rather singular, though perhaps not so anomalous as it appears from its usual English representative “in-sensibly;” it means here a cautious circumspection, as of a person *feeling his way*.

§ The singular verb is here very elegant, the two substantives constituting but one indivisible subject:—unless it be construed, by *hypallage*, “Life mingles grief and joy.”

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Δε ην πειθῆ μοι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπι-δείξω σοι πολλὰ ἔργα
 But if thou-be-persuaded by-me, first indeed I-will-display to-thee many works
 παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἀπο-αγγελοῦσα καὶ θαυμαστάς τε πράξεις καὶ
 of-ancient men, reporting both admirable actions and
 λόγους αὐτῶν, καὶ ἀπο-φαίνουσα (ὡς εἰπεῖν) ἐν-πειρῶν παντῶν.
 words of-them, and showing-thee, (so to-say) experienced-in all-things.
 Καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κυριωτάτων σοι, κατὰ-κοσμήσω πολ-
 And the soul, which part is most-masterly to-thee, I-will-adorn with-
 λοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς* κοσμημασι, σω-φροσύνῃ, δικαιοσύνῃ, ἐν-σεβείᾳ,
 many and good ornaments, with-temperance, with-justice, with-holiness,
 πραοτητι, ἐπιεικείᾳ, συν-εσει,† καρτερίᾳ, τῷ ἐρωτὶ τῶν
 with-gentleness, with-equity, with-prudence, with-fortitude, with-[the] love of-[the]
 καλῶν, τῇ ὀρμῇ πρὸς τὰ σεμνοτάτα. Ἰὰρ ταῦτα
 honorable things, with-[the] zeal towards the most-important things. For these
 ἐστὶν ὡς-ἀληθῶς‡ ὁ ἀ-κηρατος κοσμος τῆς ψυχῆς.
 are most-truly the unblemished adornment of-the soul.

* The phrase “many and good” is not intended to *distinguish* the ornaments from one another, as it might seem in English. The expression is only equivalent to “many good ornaments,” and might be rendered with the conjunction, — “many and those good.” The Greeks employ the particle between any two epithets.

† Συνεσις (from *συνεῖναι*, to comprehend) may here be translated by the general term *Prudence*, though in strict Aristotelian language, this term is rather synonymous with “penetration,” or “intelligence.”—All compound words are dissolved above.

‡ ὡς ἀληθῶς—here corresponds to the Latin form *quam verissimè*, “as truly as possible;” but Greek adverbs, as well as Latin, are generally used in the superlative, to convey this sense.

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Bě-rēashīth' bārā'a aēlōhīm' aēth ha'-shāma'yim
(1) In-the-beginning ²created ¹God — the-heavens
wě-aēth hā-aā'retz. wě-hā-aā'retz hāyēthāh' thōhū wā-vōhū
and — the-earth. (2) And-the-earth was without-form and-void,
wě-'hōshe'k oal..pēnēi thēhōwm wě-rūa'h aēlōhīm'
and-darkness was upon..the-face-of the-deep; and-the-Spirit-of God
mēra'he'pheth oal..pēnēi ha'-māyim. wa'-yō'amer aēlōhīm'
was brooding upon..the-face-of the-waters. (3) And-said ¹God :
yēhī* aōwr wa-yēhī..aōwr'. wa'-yar'a aēlōhīm' aeth..
Let-there-be light: and-there-was-light. (4) And-²saw ¹God —
hā-aōwr' kī..rōwv' : wa'-yavdōl' aēlōhīm' bēin hā-aōwr'
the-light that-it-was..good : and-²divided ¹God between the-light
ū-vēin' ha-'hōshe'k. wa'-yiqrā'a aēlōhīm' lā-aōwr' yowm
and-between the-darkness. (5) And-²called ¹God [to-]the-light day,
wě-la-'hōshe'k qā'rāa lā'yēlāh. wa-yēhī..oérev wa-yēhī..
and-[to-]the-darkness he-called night. And-²was..¹evening and-²was..
vō'qer yōwm ac'hād.
¹morning ²day ¹the-first.

English Version. Verse 1, heaven. 2, the Spirit of God moved.

* This word, and others of the same form, rendered imperatively, are properly futures—shall or will be, or impersonally, there shall be, &c.

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
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