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RELIGION AND LITERATURE.

SECOND SERIES.

LONDON

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ESSAYS
ON
RELIGION AND LITERATURE.

BY VARIOUS WRITERS.

EDITED BY ARCHBISHOP MANNING.

SECOND SERIES.

LONDON:
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ESSAYS
ON
RELIGION AND LITERATURE.

SECOND SERIES.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

By THE MOST REV. ARCHBISHOP MANNING, D.D.



THIS is the first time it has fallen to me to address the Academia since its lamented founder was taken from us. Last year it would have been my duty to open its proceedings, but I was out of England at the time of its first meeting.

I well remember the moment when, in his great illness in Rome, the Cardinal gave me commission to begin this work; and with what interest he watched over it, even when declining strength hindered his taking part in its acts. The importance of the Academia as a centre round which we may unite, and as a help to the formation and spread of sound Catholic opinion, becomes every year more evident; and I trust that we shall all do our utmost to sustain it and to promote its efficiency.

In opening the sixth year, it might seem needless to speak of the end for which the Academia was instituted, and of the subjects which are proper to it. I have indeed already once before endeavoured so to do.

Nevertheless, it appears to me that an opening address ought to be directed rather to the Academia itself than to any particular topic. Its aim is not so much to treat any subject as to excite others to write, and to suggest such matters as the circumstances of our times seem to require. Such I take to be my present office :

*Ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum
Reddere quæ ferrum valet, exors ipsa secandi.*

I hope that other members of the Academia, who have more resources and more leisure, will, for our future meetings, make a special study of such particular topics as bear upon our present religious and intellectual tendencies.

The end of the Academia is the maintenance and defence of the Catholic religion, both positively in itself, and in its relation to all other truth, and polemically, as against all forms of erroneous doctrines, principles, and thought. It is within its scope therefore to keep a note of the state of floating opinion, and of the contemporaneous intellectual movements both within and without the Church. I would suggest to the members to take some of the following topics for our future sessions :—

1. The present state and tendencies of religious thought among the Protestant Dissenters of England and Scotland.
2. The progress of Rationalism among English Protestants, noting their published writings.
3. The points of opposition between the Philosophy of Hamilton, Mill, and Mansell and the Philosophy of the Church.

4. A Catholic criticism of Buckle's book on Civilisation, of Froude's history of Henry VIII., and of Macaulay's account of James II., in its bearing upon the Catholic Church and the acts of the Holy See.
5. An examination of the principles of 1789, and especially of the pretended sovereignty of the people.
6. The political aspect of the Temporal Power of the Pope; its foundations in political right, and the public order of nations.
7. The office of the Temporal Power as the providential condition, not of the spiritual power, as some foolishly impute to us, but of the freedom of the spiritual office of the Pontiffs.
8. An exposure of the pretended donations of the Temporal Power by Constantine, Pepin, Charlemagne.
9. A treatment of the proposition that, 'Given the Christian world, the Temporal Power of the Pontiffs is the legitimate expression of the supremacy of the Christian law in both the spiritual and temporal order.'
10. The freedom of the Church in its Head as the condition of its purity in doctrine and discipline, illustrated by the heresies and schisms of the Greeks and the Protestants.
11. The propositions of the Encyclical.
12. The Baconian Philosophy in its relation to Catholic dogma.
13. Examination and refutation of the modern objections to the historical narratives of Holy Scripture.
14. The rise, formation, and characteristics of the Canon law, and its relation to the interior life of the Church.
15. The ancient Canon law of England, and its relation to the common and statute law of the realm in Catholic ages.
16. The rise, growth, and final outbreak of the rebellion to the authority of the Holy See from the Conquest to the Reformation.
17. The perpetual expansion of the Church proved by the history of the Catholic missions.

For the present, all I can do is to touch generally upon one point in the crisis of religious thought through which the Anglican religion is now passing, and on our duties towards it.

The three hundred years since the separation of England from the Catholic unity present two very remarkable tendencies in religious thought. Let us take as a starting-point the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, for until then the Anglican reformation had not obtained its last form. From that time till the early part of the last century, the positive doctrines of Christianity which survived in the Anglican religion were steadily declining. Notwithstanding the hierarchical development from the time of Bilson to the time of Laud, the recognition of episcopacy as of Divine institution was gradually but surely departing from the English people. The Revolution of 1688 greatly weakened its hold. It lived on for a while in the narrow body of the Nonjurors, and with them the higher and more spiritual perceptions of the Episcopal order passed away. A curious proof may be seen in the first leading article of the 'Times' of to-day upon the acts of the Archbishop of Canterbury in Scotland. The same decline is to be traced in the doctrine of sacramental grace, and of the operations of the Holy Spirit. The lowest time in the religious thought of England may be put at about the middle of the last century. The perfect outline of Faith had been broken at the time of the separation; but many doctrines, more or less truly understood and professed, still survived, not only in the books but in the minds of men,

through the end of the sixteenth and the whole of the seventeenth century. But after that time the warmth had departed from the body. There was a continual downward tendency until the pietistic revival which arose both in Germany and in England in the last hundred years ; then came a reaction.

From the middle of the last century the truths which had been lost began one by one to return. Religious belief began to reascend. It was like the first rising of the sap after the winter ; and the new life has continued to expand to this day. This resurrection of religious thought, and the return of Catholicism in England in our day, had its beginning in causes far beyond our time and country. It is the effect of no individual mind, and of no isolated event, but of a current which, like the Gulf Stream, has forced its way through the colder waters. The free-thinkers of George I. and George II.'s time produced a host of defences of Christianity ; these were followed by defences of the inspiration and truth of Holy Scripture ; these again by proofs of the doctrines of redemption, and of grace ; next, from 1790 to 1820, came the doctrines of justification, and of regeneration ; afterwards, from 1820 to 1830, the doctrine of baptism ; next, from 1830 to this day, the apostolical succession ; then of episcopacy, of tradition, of the Real Presence, of absolution ; then of unity and authority in the Church ; then of seven sacraments, of purgatory, of devotion to the Blessed Virgin, of the religious life ; then of vestments, and of ritual. I might go still further into detail, but this is enough. Bishop Warburton, in

writing the 'Divine Legation of Moses,' little thought that in a century men would be reading the 'Eirenicon;' nor when, as Dean of Durham, he threw off the copes which are there still shown in glass cases, that at this time a Church Congress at York would be exhibiting chasubles upon lay figures for the use of the Anglican clergy. I do not indeed believe that this current is a flood, but only a stream; it is not the sweep of the ocean, but only of a path in the waters. The population of England is steadily setting away from these things, but there is a broad movement of men's minds towards a more perfect faith and worship. It seems contradictory to say, that, with this return towards the truth, the hold of faith over the people has grown continually less; but it is most certainly true. The masses are moving away, but individuals in great numbers are returning upwards to the light of faith.

No one can have watched this, year by year, without a strong sympathy with those who are disengaging themselves from error, and trying to lift the Anglican system towards the truth. Their zeal and self-denial can be ascribed to no human power. Nothing but the Spirit of God can produce such a steadfast and uniform return towards the light. And though it is not possible to sympathise in many of their imitations of Catholic doctrine and worship, still less in their language and attitude towards the Catholic Church, we cannot but recognise in these strange and unprecedented phenomena the working of the Spirit of Truth, drawing men, step by step, out of the illusions and falsehoods of the Anglican separation into the unity of the only Church.

I can well remember how, at the time of Catholic Emancipation, it was thought impossible that the Catholic Faith should ever regain its hold in England. Men used then, as I well recollect, to say, the superstition of Romanism cannot revive in the light of the nineteenth century. This was the sincere belief of the majority of Protestants. They were so sure of their own position, the Catholic controversy had been for centuries so powerless, the number of Catholics had been so thinned by penal laws, that the Emancipation was conceded to Ireland for fear of civil war, to England for pity upon a helpless and pitiable handful, whom nobody cared to persecute because nobody thought of fearing. In those days it was believed that Romanism had nothing more to say for itself; that the great Anglican controversialists, whose works are to be found embalmed and forgotten in Gibson's 'Tracts,' had swept it away by overwhelming proofs of antiquity, Scripture, and reason. It was believed to be superstitious in its premisses, and inconsequent in its logic. Protestants were as confident against Catholics as Christians are against Mahometans. The Anglican Church described itself always as 'pure and apostolical,' and the Thirty-nine Articles were a mild form of the daily language used by preachers against the Church of Rome.

It was of no use then for a Catholic to write in defence of his faith. Nobody paid any attention; nobody would buy his book; nobody would read it, or, if read it, believe it. The clearness of it was only speciousness; the difficulty of answering it was only

proof positive of deceit. The whole world in England had settled that Protestantism was right, Catholicism wrong, and every house and all ears were closed against it.

Another remarkable feature of those times—not more than thirty years ago—was, that the Catholic Church was hardly anywhere to be seen. It existed in a few old families, and was represented by their chaplains. The mountain that filled the whole earth was here under a cloud. No man saw it, as now, rising above his head.

We can hardly conceive a more complete annihilation than the state to which three hundred years of penal laws had reduced the Church in England. It was neither visible nor audible. It had no literature, no influence on public opinion, no hold upon the legislature, no recognition in the country. It was tolerated because it was powerless, and permitted to go at large only because it was despised.

A more wonderful and visibly supernatural change than that which these thirty years have produced can hardly be found in history.

The Church in France was destroyed seventy years ago, and has risen again with an increase of vigorous life; but then the French people were a Catholic people; the traditions of the Catholic faith pervaded the whole population; and the Government by its public action restored the Church and its worship; and that too within a period so near to the original overthrow that the life had never been extinct. It was rather the passing of a delirium than a resurrection from death.

Not so in England. The Church had disappeared for three hundred years. The whole weight of the Tudor supremacy had crushed it, and still lay upon it. Some nine generations of Protestantism, with strange vicissitudes of terrible penal laws, had, as it is the fashion now to say, stamped it out.

Now, in estimating the present position of the Catholic religion among us, I make no parallel between the universality and visibleness of the Church in France and of the Church in England. In France it over-spreads and contains, or claims, at least, almost the whole population. In England it counts but one million upon twenty, and that million for the most part not of English blood.

The Hierarchy and the Priesthood are withdrawn from the public and even the private life of England; the churches are few and scattered, and with exception of a small number, are obscure and out of sight. Certainly nothing can be less imposing or less sensible than the Catholic Church in England. Its 'bodily presence is weak,' but its speech is not 'contemptible.' It has engaged the ear if it does fill the eye of English society. It has an influence upon public opinion, and upon private life, which cannot be shaken off. It is like a small garrison which will hold a city, or a column of occupation which retains its grasp upon a territory, not by a material presence everywhere, but by a moral force which reaches far beyond its cantonments.

Thirty years ago, any one who introduced religion into conversation caused a silence. He was a methodist, or a madman, or both. Nowadays there is hardly

a private house in which it is not uppermost, or any occasion on which it is not introduced. I will not say that art, literature, and poetry are become religious, but I may say that religious art, religious literature, and religious poetry, still more that all these in their highest Catholic forms are to be found throughout England. In families where a Catholic priest has never entered, Catholic books find their way; in others where Catholic books have never entered, Catholic engravings precede the faith. Even the newspapers have taken the infection. Eldad and Medad prophesy in the camp; Saul also is among the prophets. They describe all our doings; and thousands who would not for the world set foot in a Romish Church read photographic descriptions of high masses and requiems, and consecrations, and openings of churches, processions at Boulogne, pilgrimages in the Pyrenees, canonisations in St. Peter's. The air is full of it. Call it a plague of frogs, of flies, or of boils. It is upon man and beast. Throw ashes into the air, it comes down Popery.

I do not think I am exaggerating. Certainly I am not describing this as the achievement or the work of any individuals, nor even of the bishops and priests of the Catholic Church in England. Such a change in the intellectual and religious habits of society, and that too in spite of such inveterate prejudices of the intellect and persistence of the will, can be ascribed to nothing less than to an influence of the Holy Spirit of truth and peace, which is, after so long a time, cleansing again the eyes that were filmed, and opening the ears that were shut up. The intellectual and spiritual

sight of men is once more fixing itself clearly and calmly upon the illumination of faith. The disproportionate influence exercised by the Catholic Church in England upon society, when compared with the narrow material presence of the Church, and its signal disadvantages of poverty and obscurity, can be in no way accounted for but by the working of a Divine agency casting up the way by which the truth shall hereafter advance. It is like the warmth of spring coming before the summer—the harbinger of its approach.

And this sensible change which has passed over the surface of our country is only the early indication of a far deeper change which has passed upon a smaller number of minds, but with a greater depth. I have already said that the tendency to unbelief is wide and extending. Nevertheless, the reaction towards faith is also steady and constant. There was never a moment when, notwithstanding all contrary symptoms, the Dissenters were more inclined towards the Establishment, and never a moment when the Establishment was more inclined towards the Church. I speak of it as an inclination; for I neither expect that Dissenters will be absorbed by Anglicanism, nor Anglicanism by the Catholic Church. The tide, however, is in that direction; and it is a tide of which no law of sufficient force can be found except a momentum of the will and grace of God.

But the return of Catholic truth is not confined to this vague, popular, superficial, and æsthetic fashion of men's minds. It has taken a more definite and energetic

form. In the last thirty years there has sprung up in the Anglican Establishment an extensive rejection of Protestantism, and a sincere desire and claim to be Catholic. Ever since the Reformation, indeed, the writers of the Anglican Church have claimed to be Catholic, but none that I know disclaimed to be Protestant. They assumed that a Protesting Christian was *ipso facto* a primitive Catholic. Not so now. Protestantism is recognised as a thing intrinsically untenable and irreconcilable with the Catholic faith. The school of which I speak claim to be Catholic because they reject Protestantism with all its heterodoxies. In this school are to be found many Catholic doctrines, not exactly or fully expressed or believed—for such are not to be found either full or exact out of the Catholic Church—but more or less near to truth. For instance, the Church of England forbids the use of the term transubstantiation, by declaring the doctrine to be an error. The doctrine of the Real Presence, less transubstantiation, is like the doctrine of one God in three Persons, less the doctrine of the Trinity. Not only is the term rejected, but the conception is correspondingly inaccurate. This runs through all the Catholic doctrines which are professed out of the unity of the Church, and apart from the traditions of its sacred terminology. It is under this limitation that I go on to say that at this time the doctrine of the sacraments, their nature, number, and grace; the intercession and invocation of saints, the power of the priesthood in sacrifice and absolution, the excellence and obligations of the religious life, are all

held and taught by clergymen of the Church of England. Add to this, the practice of confession, and of works of temporal and spiritual mercy in form and by rule borrowed from the Catholic Church, are all to be found among those who are still within the Anglican communion. I must also add the latest and strangest phenomenon of this movement, the adoption of an elaborate ritual with its vestments borrowed from the Catholic Church.

On all these things I trust a blessing may descend. I see in them many things. First, they are a testimony in favour of the Catholic Church, which has always unchangeably taught and practised these things; secondly, a testimony against the Anglican Reformation, which has always rejected and cast them out. I joyfully recognise the zeal and piety of those (excepting exceptions) who promote them. I believe for the most part they are sincere, and that multitudes are in an ignorance which is invincible. I can say with the Apostle: 'Some, indeed, even out of envy and contention; but some also for good will preach Christ: some out of charity, . . . and some out of contention preach Christ, not sincerely. . . . But what then? So that every way, whether by occasion or by truth, Christ be preached, in this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.' *

I do not include in this, as I have already said, those few in number, I believe, who use these things as a stumbling-block to keep back souls from the truth, and imitate the Catholic Church with a formal servility,

* Phil. i. 15—18.

that they may pass themselves off as Catholics even to our Catholic poor. For such men we can have no sympathy, and little hope. Every parish priest happily knows how empty and foolish is the boast they make of keeping souls from conversion. The public facts of every day refute it. They may keep back the handful who surround them, and hide the truth from their own hearts, but the steady current of return to the Catholic and Roman Church throughout the whole of England is no more to be affected by them than the rising of the tide by the palms of their hands. Against their will, certainly, and perhaps without their knowledge, they are sending on numberless souls into the truth which they probably will never enter. But the number of those whose good faith is doubtful is not great. The multitude of those who are drawn by a natural and simple reverence to clothe what they sincerely believe with a becoming ritual, and who worship piously and humbly in churches which might almost be mistaken for ours—if it were not for the one great blank, the absence of life, which is like a beautiful countenance without sight—is very great, and is perhaps continually increasing. They are coming up to the very threshold of the Church. They have learned to lean upon it as the centre of Christendom, from which they sprang, and upon which their own Church is supposed to rest. They use our devotions, our books, our pictures of piety; they are taught to believe the whole Catholic doctrine, and to receive the whole Council of Trent, not indeed in its own true meaning, but in a meaning invented by their teachers. This cannot last

long. Such teachers are, as Fuller quaintly and truly says, like unskilful horsemen. They so open gates as to shut themselves out, but let others through.

Now, no one can have watched this wonderful movement, especially if he has ever been borne along by it himself, without a profound sympathy, and a desire to cherish and to direct it with tenderness and fidelity. He will not indeed sympathise with it as a superficial imitation of the profound and internal adoration of the Church of God, still less as a means of supplanting the Church, and deceiving the people to their hurt. All this is intrinsically evil. But dismissing this very restricted abuse, the movement as a whole can be regarded no otherwise than as an impulse of the Spirit of God, preparing the hearts of men beforehand for the advance of His Church.

And now, what attitude ought we to assume towards this aspect of the religion of England?

First, that of hope and kindness : of hope, that it may lead on to better things ; and of kindness, lest we should throw back those who are moving upwards and onwards painfully and doubtfully towards a perfect knowledge of the truth. It seems to me that souls are in more peril now than thirty, or twenty, or even ten years ago. They were then in a state of which we might presume that their ignorance was invincible. The great masses of the English people were either physically or morally unable to find the true faith and the true Church. The same may be said still of the poor, of children, and of those who, being under a domestic control and seclusion, are unable to obtain books or

teachers, or in any way to come in contact with truth. But such is no longer the case of the educated who have none to control them. No physical or moral impossibility keeps them from the truth. They are in contact with the Church, with its priests, with its writings. They oppose it face to face, and therefore can plead no ignorance which is not in itself culpable. The rise and expansion of the Church, the restoration of the Hierarchy, old friendships with those who have submitted to the Church, the conversion of kinsmen, even of children, and brothers and sisters—all these things bring the Church home to their dwellings, to their every-day life, and to their conscience. Every year the doctrine of invincible ignorance has a narrower application to the people of England; and for that reason we have need to be all the more patient, tender, and considerate. Thousands around us are in a crisis of life and death. If anything on our part ruffle or disturb the calmness of heart on which candour depends, we should have much to answer for. Sarcasm and ridicule are dangerous tools; they may make us feared, and win a literary name, but they do not draw souls to the truth. Jesus and His disciples never used these weapons. Let the use of them, together with all personalities, be with your adversaries. They are like the Carthaginian elephants, fatal to the ranks of those who use them. And in this I think a great advance has been made—the controversies of the day are direct, and hand to hand; but they are less personal, and more courteous. Here and there an exception, sadly conspicuous, may be seen—there must be a Thersites in

every camp—but these exceptions would not be so conspicuous if they did not stand almost alone. Our office is to help, to uphold, to fill up and to perfect the fragmentary faith of those who are out of the truth; and that is not to be done by a *theologia destructiva*, by controversial or polemical theology, but by a calm, a charitable exposition of the perfect truth which tells by its own light, and is its own evidence to sincere and humble minds.

2. But of this charity one high part is to be precise and clear in the full enunciation of Catholic truth. There can be no more pernicious mistake than the theory that truth is to be spread by fusion or accommodation. Truth only needs to be stated; but it demands to be stated in full. Anything less than its full outline is a suppression of truth, and *suppressio veri* is *suggestio falsi*. We have moreover the guidance of a Pontiff who has gone before us in every controversy of the day. What is there in respect to the sanctity, the dignity, or the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God, the temporal power of the Holy See, his own prerogatives as teacher of the faithful, the relation of faith to science and to society, which Pius the Ninth has not gone before and beyond us in asserting? Has any one enunciated on any of these topics anything which Pius the Ninth has not first declared? The most ultramontane assertions among us fall within the range, and therefore under the shelter of authoritative documents emanating from the Holy See. It is remarkable that such critics as the 'Times' newspaper and 'Blackwood's Magazine' clearly perceive the identity of what

is denounced as ultramontaniam and the teaching of the Sovereign Pontiff. The attempt to distinguish between the declarations of the Holy See and the mind of the Church is the animus of heresy. If England is ever to be reunited to Christendom it is by submission to the living authority of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. The first step of its return must be obedience to his voice, as rebellion against his authority was the first step of its departure. In dealing with souls the same is the only sure and solid method. We have had for a twelve-month before us a saddening example of vacillations, of alternate acceptance and rejection of the Council of Trent; at one time, Trent as the basis of unity, at another, not all its decrees, but Trent less the indissoluble unity of the Church, and the authority of the Roman pontiff. Then Trent with interpretations; that is, explanations which explain away: anything but child-like submission. All our anxious and charitable hope is that the author of these private fancies may find them to be illusions in the noonday light of the infallible Church of God. But we cannot fail to note with fear the eccentric movements of the private spirit which is carrying him and those who hang upon him, visibly back again into the old anti-catholic attitude and spirit. To believe the whole Council of Trent with interpretations and glosses of private judgment would not bring a soul into the Catholic unity.


Now, I have made these remarks as a ground for the assertion with which I shall conclude. The return to faith which we have traced from the middle of the last century, that is for now about a hundred years,

steadily ascending, doctrine after doctrine, first within the Anglican establishment, then reaching beyond it into the regions of antiquity and of Catholic truth, has now received its complement in the full re-entrance of the Catholic Church, and the authority of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. It is no longer a question of fragmentary doctrines or isolated truths; of a little more or a little less of this devotion or that opinion, but of the whole Catholic faith upon the principle of Divine certainty and of Divine authority through the Church and in its head. And it is visibly providential that at this moment the supremacy of the crown, which is the Reformation *in concreto*, has literally come to nought. From the beginning, Ireland would never submit to it. Scotland rejected it. In half a century after its usurpation England began to cast it off. Half the people of England formally reject it at this day. Of the other half the great majority know nothing of it; of the remaining minority the most enlightened only tolerate it as an obsolete law, explain it away, limit it on every side, write against it, speak evil of it, or reject it altogether. Still worse than this, its own lawyers curtail its pretensions; and, worst of all, it has lately pronounced its own acts to be invalid in a large field of its supposed jurisdiction, that is, it has died by *felo de se*. The providence of God has poured shame and confusion on the Tudor statutes. The royal supremacy has perished by the law of mortality which consumes all earthly things. And at this period of our history the supremacy of the Vicar of Jesus Christ re-enters as full of life as when Henry VIII. resisted Clement VII.

and Elizabeth withstood S. Pius V. The undying authority of the Holy See is once more an active power in England; the shadow of Peter has fallen again upon it. The people of England are as conscious—nay, more conscious, of the presence of the Catholic Church among them than of the Anglican establishment. The last thirty years have wrought a change of which human agencies can give no adequate cause. The expansion of the Church and the penetrating spread of the faith in the last fifteen years has been in geometrical progression. What the next thirty years may bring forth if the same forces and the same velocities continue to multiply, no one can venture to foretell. But one thing is evident. ‘*Sapientia edificavit sibi domum,*’ the Son of God has been again building His temple, and we shall best complete His work by following the order of His own procedure; and we shall best learn the plans of the Master-builder from the declarations of His Vicar upon earth.

ON INTELLECTUAL POWER AND MAN'S PERFECTION.

By W. G. WARD, PH.D.



ESSAY THE FIRST.

ON THE POSITION ASSIGNED TO INTELLECT IN THE CATHOLIC
AND ANTI-CATHOLIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT RESPECTIVELY.

I.

HOWEVER serious may be the mistakes into which Dr. Brownson has occasionally fallen, there is at least one counsel, urged by him of late with much prominence, which is, I think, undoubtedly both well-timed and very important. He has been exhorting Catholics to give much more attention, in their controversial works, to the errors specially characteristic of the present time, than to the comparatively exploded heresies of Luther and Calvin. And he says with much point, that if the most dangerous enemies of the Church hold really the same opinions now, which her most dangerous enemies held three hundred years ago, it would seem as though error possessed those attributes of permanence and unchangeableness, which we prize as the special characteristics of truth.

In expressing my agreement with this opinion, I confine my remarks to these islands ; having, unfortunately, no acquaintance with the course of thought elsewhere. And as to these islands, I am very far from meaning, that the more old-fashioned controversial works have now lost their importance. Great numbers are still more warmly attached to Lutheran or Calvinistic Protestantism ; and it is very desirable, therefore, that a Catholic should know how to deal with such men. But I think it will be admitted, on consideration, that no men of great power, vigour, originality of mind, are found in their number. I think it will be admitted, that at this time non-Catholics, possessed of power, vigour, originality, either expend their intellectual energy on matters wholly alien to religion, or else hold religious theories, which are not less than fundamentally at variance with what I may call the time-honoured forms of Protestantism. Lord Macaulay is an instance of the first kind ; of those who have expended their intellectual energy on matters alien to theology. He accepted, I suppose, without much question, great part of his traditional religion ; but it is plain to every one, that he had no real interest in its peculiarities, and that he employed his remarkable powers on matters of a very different nature. The same thing is true in its degree of very different men—men eminent in metaphysics and mental science—Sir W. Hamilton, M'Cosh, Calderwood : who seem to have clung faithfully, on the whole, to the creed in which they were educated ; but have most certainly never devoted their intellectual activity to an examination of its grounds, or an illustration of its doctrines. And

much more evidently this class includes the many, who have given themselves wholly to mathematical and physical science. On the other hand, Kingsley, Maurice, Jowett, Stanley, Goldwin Smith, Martineau, Carlyle, Buckle, Grote, Mill,—here are men who have applied their mind vigorously to the question, what shall be their religion, if any. Each name among them calls up its own separate associations, and they represent a considerable body. Many such men are earnest advocates of Christianity, in some sense of their own; many adhere at least to the great doctrines of Theism: while several, and a larger number (I believe) than is commonly supposed, are simply atheists. But none of them can be assigned to any traditional form of Protestantism.

In this brief review I have not considered the question, how far there are still men of vigorous intellectual power, in the Oxford school founded by F. Newman. But putting aside these, if there are such, I consider all other able and powerful thinkers, external to the Church, as appertaining to the present anti-Catholic schools of thought. These men, amidst all their very serious differences, agree with each other, while differing from those whose heart is with the older Protestantism, as in other important particulars, so also in their attitude towards the Church. The older Protestant schools regarded us with fanatical hatred; these men rather with supercilious contempt. Or if they do hate us, it is on totally different grounds from the older school. The old Calvinists and Lutherans abhorred the Church, as a crafty, powerful, malignant conspiracy,

banded together for the promotion of idolatry and immorality; and their abhorrence was in no small degree mixed with fear. But these new anti-Catholics, so far as they hate the Church at all, hate her on intellectual grounds; they hate her as teaching principles, which fetter the intellect and enslave the soul.

It will be naturally anticipated, that as these new schools are thus in accordance on their ground of opposition to the Church, so they will also be in accordance on various positive tenets. And this will be found the case: there is more than one important principle, on which they agree with each other, while differing both from the older Protestants and from the Catholic Church. Of these principles, there is none, I think, so important and fundamental, as that which I ask you to consider this afternoon. These later anti-Catholic schools of thought are in accordance with each other, and in widest variance from the Catholic Church, as to the position which they assign to intellect.

II.

But before entering on my argument, I must beg you to observe that this word 'intellect' is used in two most different senses. And it is the more important that we fully understand this, as from a confusion of these two senses, has arisen what seems to me the most mischievous possible misapprehension of one prominent particular in St. Thomas's Theology. In the theological and strict philosophical sense of the term, a man exercises his intellect, precisely so far as he contemplates real or apparent truth: in the ordinary and popular sense, in which I am here using the word, he exercises

his intellect, so far only as he busies his mind with philosophical and scientific processes. Now how widely divergent are these two senses, one single illustration will abundantly show.

Let me suppose, e.g., a man in the lower ranks of society, who has received, as we should say, no intellectual cultivation whatever, but who is deeply pious and interior; who fixes his thoughts through the day on the invisible world, or, as St. Paul would express it, lives by faith. He is constantly eliciting acts of faith; and it is a first principle in Catholic theology, that an act of faith is an intellectual act. If we use the word 'intellect' then, in its theological and strict philosophical sense, this pious rustic is exercising his intellect constantly through the day: nay, he is exercising it in its very highest exercise; for he is contemplating not apparent but real truth, not natural truth but supernatural. Yet it is precisely of such a man as this, that every one would say that he has not been exercising his *intellect* at all; that he cultivates his moral and spiritual nature indeed, but not his intellectual.

Let me say, then, once for all, that throughout this paper I use the word 'intellect,' *not* in its theological and strict philosophical sense, *but* in its ordinary and popular acceptance. I speak of a man using his intellect, so far as he is occupied with such processes as these: investigating evidence; analysing his various convictions, and exploring their grounds; contemplating scientifically the phenomena, whether of his own mind or of the external world; carrying premisses forward to their conclusions; viewing a large field of truth in the mutual relation of its component parts; and the

like. This, I say, is the ordinary and popular acceptation of the term. When we speak of intellectual discipline, we do not mean a discipline which shall train us in the habit of fixing our thoughts firmly and keenly on supernatural truth; but a discipline which shall train us in the habit of performing well such exercises as I have just recounted.

III.

I say, then, that intellect, using that word in its ordinary and popular acceptation, has a position in the modern anti-Catholic schools of thought, most different from that assigned to it by Catholic doctrine, and most different, therefore, from its true position. It seems to me so very important that we should distinctly recognise this fact, and make it familiar to our thoughts and imagination, that I will content myself in this paper with a very narrow range of subject. I will hardly attempt more, than simply to place this contrast before you as clearly as I can, and to show that reason is plainly and undeniably on the Catholic side in the controversy. I will then merely append one or two obvious inferences, and so conclude.

First, then, what is the exact place assigned to intellect by the Catholic Church? The two following propositions are beyond question implied in Catholic doctrine and practice.—(1) The perfection of man consists exclusively in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature; intellectual excellence forming no part of it whatever. (2) The intellect, however, can afford most important service, towards promoting the spiritual welfare of mankind.

IV.

It is the former of these two propositions, which is so violently opposed to the most cherished notions of our opponents. It is so elementary a part of our religion indeed, that it is expressed in the very second answer of the Catechism. 'Why did God make you? To know Him, love Him, and serve Him in this world, and to be happy with Him in the next.' And perhaps I should make an apology for detaining you, while I adduce proof that my proposition does express the one Catholic doctrine. But I have found, to my extreme surprise, one or two Catholics, who are not prepared to accept the statement. And besides, I am very confident that as time goes on, this one question will be more and more found to be the deepest point at issue between Catholic and anti-Catholic thinkers. It will be better, therefore, to be prepared in time for the combat, and to refresh our memory and convictions on the whole subject. Without further apology, then, I will place before you some few of the grounds, which make it so certain that the Church's doctrine is such as I have described; though any thing like a full exposition of them would, by itself alone, occupy far more time than we have at command.

Let me repeat my proposition. The perfection of man consists exclusively in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature; intellectual excellence forming no part of it whatever. I am now maintaining that this proposition is undoubtedly implied in Catholic doctrine and practice.

First, I appeal to the Foundation of St. Ignatius's Spiritual Exercises. It is difficult to imagine any pronouncement, short of a distinct dogmatical decree, more infallibly declaratory of the Church's mind than this Foundation. All religious and most priests yearly go through these Exercises, as the very basis of their whole interior life. And that to which I appeal, is no accidental or subordinate portion of these Exercises, but the one foundation on which the whole is built. If this foundation be rotten, the whole edifice falls to the ground. Or in other words, if the doctrine which I am about to recite be not true, the whole body of these Exercises, solemnly approved by Sovereign Pontiffs and adopted by the whole Church, is one complicated machine for instilling poisonous error.

Now for my quotation. 'Principle and foundation : ' that is, of the whole Exercises. 'Man has been created, that he may praise the Lord his God, and show Him reverence, and serve Him, and by means of this save his soul.' Now it will be admitted by all that man arrives at his personal perfection, in proportion as he achieves the end for which he has been created : according to St. Ignatius therefore, he arrives at his personal perfection, in proportion as he is more prompt and disposed to praise, reverence, and serve God. But he is more prompt and disposed to do these things, in proportion as he has more accustomed himself to live in the constant remembrance of God : or, in other words, in proportion as he has more sedulously cultivated his moral and spiritual nature. Hence, according to St. Ignatius, man arrives more nearly

to his personal perfection, precisely in proportion as he more sedulously cultivates piety and spirituality.

Presently St. Ignatius adds, that ‘we should not wish on our part for health rather than for sickness, wealth rather than poverty, honour rather than ignominy, and *so on accordingly in all other things (consequenter in cæteris omnibus)*; desiring and choosing those things alone, which are more expedient to us for the end for which we have been created.’ Now let me suppose any one to admit, that we should be indifferent between health and sickness, between wealth and poverty; he certainly will not deny, that we should be equally indifferent between great and small intellectual power. Or if any one *were* to attempt so strange a distinction, St. Ignatius’s words would preclude the comment; for he says that in *all* other things we are to act similarly, wishing and choosing those which more conduce to our true end. Intellectual power, I say, just as bodily health or temporal well-being, is to be desired just inasmuch, as it may be the means of our spiritual perfection.*

* I have translated from F. Roothaan’s edition, which is considered, I believe, the most authentic. The first passage runs thus: ‘Homo creatus est, ut laudet Deum Dominum nostrum, eique serviat, et per hæc salvet animam suam.’ And in a note on the words ‘per hæc’ F. Roothaan thus explains them: “Hæc agendo;” “his mediis:” Gallicè “moyennant cela;” nempè laudando, reverentiam exhibendo, et serviendo.’ The second passage runs thus: ‘Adeò ut non velimus ex parte nostrâ magis sanitatem quàm infirmitatem, divitias quàm paupertatem, honorem quàm ignominiam, vitam longam quàm brevem, et consequenter in cæteris omnibus; unicè desiderando et eligendo ea, quæ magis conducant ad finem ob quem creati sumus.’

You will object, that St. Ignatius does not lay this down as a precept. Of course not; no one ever thought he did: he lays it down as the one way of perfection, to aim at acquiring this indifference. Nor does my argument require more. It cannot be more perfect, to abstain from prizing for its own sake that which is an integral part of our perfection. But it is more perfect, according to St. Ignatius, to abstain from prizing for its own sake intellectual excellence: hence, according to St. Ignatius, intellectual excellence is not an integral part of our perfection.

From St. Ignatius I pass to St. Thomas, who will not be considered, I suppose, indifferent to the just claims of intellect. He tells us that the perfection of Christian life consists, essentially in love for God and man, instrumentally in practising the Evangelical Counsels. It will be abundantly plain to any one, who reads his discussion on perfection in the 2^a 2^æ, that the very notion of intellectual excellence having any kind of part in the matter, had never occurred to him, as we say, in his very dreams. And what is true of him, is true of all theologians, I believe, without a single exception. They do not expressly *oppose* the opinion which would count intellectual excellence as part of

And in a note on the words, 'consequenter in cæteris omnibus,' F. Roothaan gives the very same instance which is in my text: 'His verbis necessitas ista "exhibendi nos indifferentes" extenditur ad alia omnia, quæ fortè ad quatuor illa genera reduci non possunt: *et sanè sunt quamplurima*. Profectò indifferentiæ hujus exercendæ materia sunt etiam *talenta ac dotes naturales, plures, pauciores,*' &c. &c. See Essay the Second, pp. 87-88.

human perfection, simply because, to all appearance, they had never heard of, nor imagined, any such opinion.*

Thirdly, I argue from Catholic doctrine. It will be admitted (1) that those acts which God most approves in us, must be those which most lead to the end for which He created us; and (2) that those to which He has promised a Heavenly Reward, must be those which He most approves. Now, what are those acts to which He has promised a Heavenly Reward? Free supernatural acts of the will, and none others whatever. Let me suppose two Christian philosophers, who are both occupied in some theoretical speculation, and that for some good supernatural motive. Let me suppose that both have the same degree of Habitual Grace, and that both are aiming at the same supernatural end, with the same degree of efficacy. It is absolutely certain, that to both acts God promises an equal reward. Yet one of these philosophers may be originating the most true and profound speculations, while the other's theories are quite feeble and commonplace. I say that so long as this intellectual feebleness does not arise from the will's fault, so long as the will adheres in the same degree to its supernatural motive, the merit of the act is in no way affected. But if God promises an equal reward to both these acts, He equally approves them both; if He equally approves them both, they tend equally to the end for which He created us; if they tend equally to the end

* This argument, from the consent of theologians, will be found further developed in the second Essay, and in Note B.

for which we were created, they tend equally to our personal perfection. But they tend most unequally to intellectual excellence : hence intellectual excellence has no part in our personal perfection.

My fourth argument is but a development of the third. The Church has decided what kind of men they are, who have attained in most exalted measure their personal perfection ; they are those Saints in Heaven, whom she proposes for our veneration. Several of these have possessed most eminent intellectual attainments ; but who was ever so insane as to suppose, that these intellectual attainments constituted an integral part of their sanctity ? In what process of canonisation was an inquiry ever instituted, into the philosophical or other intellectual attainments possessed by the servant of God ? How far he was ready in understanding an opponent, and quick in answering him ; how far he was accurate in analysing the phenomena of his own mind ; how far he possessed vigorous powers of systematising and reasoning. You might just as plausibly say, that a man's strength of muscle or beauty of person will help him to canonisation, as that his intellectual power will have any such tendency.

V.

I have now brought forward as much proof as time will permit, for my first proposition : on my second, a very few words will suffice. Catholic doctrine and practice, I say, imply the proposition, that intellect can render most important service, in promoting the

spiritual welfare of mankind. This is most evident, from the ready welcome and earnest encouragement given by the Church in every age, to those who will employ the very highest intellectual gifts in her service ; in the analysis, illustration, and development of her doctrine, and otherwise in the promotion of her interests. Indeed, taking into account all the various successive ages of Christianity, so far as my own extremely narrow reading warrants me in having an opinion, the superiority of intellect on the Church's side seems to me most striking and conspicuous. I have difficulty in imagining, e.g., that any candid person would put even so profound a thinker as Kant, at all on the same intellectual level with St. Augustine, St. Thomas, or Vasquez ; and if I had any sufficient knowledge of Scotus, I could no doubt add his name to the number.

VI.

Now it is the first of these two propositions, which stands out in such striking contrast with the doctrine held by the later anti-Catholics. This doctrine may be stated at its greatest advantage, and, indeed, not without considerable plausibility, as follows. Man's nature, it may be said, is complex, not simple ; it consists not of will alone, but of intellect also and body, to mention no other constituents. Our perfection consists, not in the perfection of one part, but of every part : a well-disposed will is an element, no doubt, in human perfection ; but intellectual vigour is another element, and bodily well-being a third. Here, then, we see the

contrast which is to be considered ; and no one will say that I have stated it unfairly to our antagonists. Anti-Catholics regard our perfection as consisting in the co-ordinate perfection of the various parts of our nature ; Catholics place it in *subordination* of all the rest to one, viz, to the moral and spiritual part.*

VII.

My direct and immediate argument is concerned with that opinion only which regards *intellectual* excellence as an integral element in human perfection ; but I shall be able to lay a somewhat important foundation for that argument, if I first briefly refer to those, who have brought into special notice the claims of bodily well-being to be so considered. These, so far as England is concerned, are particularly the advocates of what is called by its opponents muscular Christianity.† Such men express or imply the principle just stated, in disparagement of the austerities practised by the Church's Saints. 'Is not the body,' they seem to ask, 'a part of human nature, as well as the soul? Perfection consists in the good condition of both. What right have you to sacrifice one, in the supposed or real interests of the other?'

Now it is very desirable, in regard to our opponents, not only that we should understand what is their position, and by what arguments they defend it, but also what are the peculiarities of character which lead them

* See the earlier part of Note A.

† See quotations from the *Edinburgh Review*, in Note A.

to it. I will first, therefore, consider, what are those precise views on religious matters, which lead these men to hate with so bitter a hatred the holy austerities of the Saints. I have not, indeed, had the advantage of reading so much as I could wish of their writings; and, of course, in the case of those who are avowedly eccentric, no general description can be given which will quite fully apply to all; but the notion which I have formed of them on the whole is such as this. They are men of singularly genial and hearty temperament; and it would certainly be most unfair to deny, that they have an earnest zeal for Christianity, according to their own understanding of that most vague term. Again, their conception of Christianity itself is far more faulty in what it omits than in what it contains. Daily reading of Scripture; certain short prayers night and morning; defending earnestly God's cause in the world; sympathising heartily and actively with the poor and afflicted (and that too with a deep sense of the equality which really exists among all men); labouring zealously in behalf of their fellow-men;—these things pretty well make up their whole notion of piety. As to those deeper exercises which, in a good Catholic, give their real value to such external performances;—the earnest desire for purity of intention, and emancipation from human respect; the incessant watch placed on the avenues of thought, lest unworthy motives should intrude; the constant communication through the day between the soul and its Creator;—such exercises as these they neither value, nor, in fact, comprehend: while the great doctrine of man's corruption, which

alone can furnish us with even a tolerably correct appreciation of human affairs, is alien from their whole range of thought. It results from all this, that their picture of the Christian character differs fundamentally from the Catholic. Catholics regard Christian virtue as consisting in the will's abject prostration before Almighty God : but these Christians condemn such an attitude of mind as degrading and unmanly ; and since they happen to be our fellow-countrymen, they further brand it as un-English.

I have said that these men not only do not value the exercises of Catholic piety, but do not even comprehend them. In fact they are not generally, I think, at all quick in understanding any view of things, which materially differs from their own. They are neither remarkable for depth of philosophy, nor of feeling ; indeed, I do not think that a genial temperament *is* generally accompanied by feelings of any great keenness or depth. From both these defects it follows, that they are quite unable even to imagine the process, which leads men, differently constituted from themselves, either to Catholicism on one side, or infidelity on the other. They look down with great serenity both on Papist and infidel ; yet it is the Papist who receives the largest share of their contempt : and those bodily austerities, which the Saints have so assiduously practised, afford special materials, whether for flippanit ridicule or grave denunciation. How can it be otherwise ? Consider the real nature of a Saint's aspirations ; consider that burning desire of interior perfection, which would make it a far greater suffering

to abstain from austerities than to practise them. Is it not plain, that many men of the class we are considering, can no more approach to the comprehension of such things as these, than a brute can approach to following the steps of a mathematical demonstration ?

On the other hand, a vigorous state of bodily health is regarded by them as singularly suitable to the true Christian : (1) as a means of more effectually benefiting his fellow-men ; (2) as more efficaciously securing influence over them ; and (3) as ‘preserving him,’ to speak in their own language, ‘from those sickly dreams and fancies, which lead to the horrors and superstitions of asceticism.’ And, conformably with this view, I believe the pattern characters in their novels are generally tall, well-proportioned, powerful, muscular men ; insomuch that if the days of barbarism were to return, and controversies were decided by blows, neither Papist nor infidel would have much chance.

Such, I repeat, is the notion which I have formed of these men ; but whether or no it be substantially correct, is a question in no way affecting the scientific value of their principle. ‘Human perfection,’ they say or imply, ‘consists in the coördinate perfection of body and soul ; and no one can rightly do what the Catholic Saints do, viz. sacrifice one to benefit the other.’ Now, in reply to such an argument, consider this remarkable fact, which has been urged in substance by Father Newman on many different occasions. Let us suppose for a moment, that there were no moral and spiritual nature at all ; let us suppose, e.g., that man simply consisted of body and intellect. Even so, we could not

possibly regard human perfection as consisting in the coördinate perfection of those two elements. Who would ever dream, that a man, devoted to intellectual pursuits, does well in aiming at the robust health of a fox-hunter? No; the well-being of his body should be promoted so far, and so far only, as may make it the best *instrument* for intellectual work.*

But let this once be conceded, and all force is gone from that anti-Catholic principle, which I recently enunciated. Once admit that the body is rightly treated as a mere instrument to intellectual excellence, and what follows? Why, you give up altogether the principle, that man achieves his perfection in the coördinate perfection of each individual part of his nature. If body is rightly subordinated to intellect, there remains no kind of *à priori* presumption against the Catholic doctrine, that both body and intellect are rightly subordinated to perfection of the will.

VIII.

Having obtained this important argumentative advantage, I now come to the consideration of my more

* When mention is made of *hard students*, who are conspicuous for pale cheeks and sunken eyes, they are ordinarily praised and admired, on the ground of their intellectual zeal and devotion; because they burn the midnight lamp, &c. &c. We never hear of 'Manicheanism' or 'unnatural superstition,' except when the said pale cheeks and sunken eyes are caused by a more constant and earnest meditation on God, or by the means taken to secure strength against temptation. It is surely not uncharitable therefore to infer, that it is not the *means*, but the *end*, which is really regarded as unworthy of a reasonable being.

immediate opponents. The whole body of non-Catholics, I have said, who think with any vigour and ability, unite in regarding intellectual excellence as a most important part of man's perfection. Or if there be an exception to this statement, such exceptional cases, I believe, are undoubtedly those of men, who are really following the guidance of grace, and tending to Catholicism. Nay, in regard to the great body of anti-Catholic thinkers, I cannot think it even true to say, that they regard intellectual and moral perfection as *coördinate* and *equally* to be sought: they place intellectual perfection in far the higher rank of the two.* In order, therefore, that we may rightly understand the position which they assign to intellect, it is necessary that we first form a correct notion on their mode of regarding *moral* perfection. For true moral perfection indeed, as embodied in the Saints of God, they feel simple contempt, or contempt mixed with detestation. No Protestant, I suppose, ever lived, who less wished to pain or attack Catholics, than Sir Walter Scott; yet he has no more respectful appellation for St. Francis of Paula, than 'an ignorant, crack-brained peasant;' and even in speaking of such a wretch as he describes Louis XI., he evidently regards it as the lowest point of his degradation, that he could have dealings with the Saint.†

* See, e.g., the quotations from Sir W. Hamilton, at the end of Note A.

† The passage is worth quoting; it is from the introduction to *Quentin Durward*.

'In his extreme desire of life, he' [Louis XI.] 'sent to Italy for supposed relics, and the yet more extraordinary importation of an

But it is not heroic perfection alone ; all moral perfection is odious and contemptible to these anti-Catholic thinkers. For those of us who have the lowest vocation, no less than for those who have the highest, one *kind* of means only is open, whereby we can become morally and spiritually better. Such means are those which I have already mentioned :—watching the avenues of thought ; labouring for purity of intention ; fixing our affections more and more on the invisible world ; struggling to live in a constant sense of abject dependence upon God. But such spiritual discipline as this, such increasing indifference to worldly and temporal ends whether personal or national, is regarded by these unhappy men as simply degrading and contemptible. The ‘Saturday Reviewers,’ e.g., are never weary of pointing to what they call ‘Roman Catholic asceticism,’ as the very ground and foundation of ‘Roman Catholic superstition.’

At the same time, there are certain qualities of the will, which our opponents *do* hold to be virtues, and which they regard accordingly with much respect and admiration : justice ; active benevolence ; courage ; patriotism ; and the like. How much of real virtue there

ignorant, crack-brained peasant’ [St. Francis of Paula], ‘ who, *from laziness probably*, had shut himself up in a cave, and renounced flesh, fish, eggs, or the produce of the dairy. This man, *who did not possess the slightest tincture of letters*, Louis revered as if he had been the Pope himself, and to gain his good will founded two cloisters.’

The reader will see with amusement, how self-evidently absurd and degrading Sir W. Scott considers it, to reverence any one who has no ‘tincture of letters.’ Yet surely Sir Walter is an unusually favourable specimen of anti-Catholic thinkers.

is in the qualities, when divorced from the exercises of interior piety,—is a question on which much difference of opinion is found among Catholics themselves. All, indeed, will agree, that there exists in them a *certain* virtuous element; and all, I suppose, will agree, that there is also a miserable admixture of worldly motives. For myself, I should call them rather the distortions and caricatures of virtue, than real virtues; but however this may be, they are undoubtedly regarded by our opponents as constituting man's *moral* perfection, and as such receive a considerable share of their homage. Here, however, I may be allowed for one moment to interrupt the course of my argument, for the purpose of making this remark. Just as I implied a few minutes ago, that those men have been most intellectual, who have had no idolatrous veneration of intellect, so much more in the case of these objective and external virtues: those have been immeasurably the most distinguished for works of justice, of true courage, of active benevolence, who have most absolutely built their love for man on the foundation of love for God. And the more candid of our opponents in some sense do us justice; they will really admire the disinterested self-devotion displayed by a sister of charity, even though it be found in connexion with that interior piety, which to them is so distasteful. But the more prejudiced shrink from this: the very contemplation of unworldliness is so odious to them, that they are unable to admire any qualities in one who conspicuously practises it; so that, by a startling opposition to Catholic doctrine, they really feel as though

moral virtue lost its virtuousness by being referred to God.

I have spoken here of our opponents as really valuing no virtues, except those which lead to the external service of our fellow-men. Yet I am far from denying that, by the more Christian of their number, qualities of a far higher and more evangelical stamp are regarded as virtues, and admired accordingly. I have both admitted this, and explained my meaning in the admission, when I was speaking of those who are called muscular Christians; though it is by no means these men alone, in whose favour the remark should be made. Still these more Christian anti-Catholics hardly yield to the most openly unchristian of the number, in their hatred and contempt of what they call the ascetical principle; that is, of genuine Catholic piety. Moreover, it is very plain, that what they conceive as moral virtue, can never wear a consistently heroic aspect. And from this cause, if it stood alone, the result would naturally follow, that these anti-Catholics feel much deeper reverence for intellectual than for moral excellence. The fact, at all events, seems to me certain. When speaking of those who are the choicest specimens of our common nature, who have most displayed its wonderful capabilities, who are to be the prominent objects of man's reverence and homage, it is to the great intellectual giants that they ordinarily turn. Lord Brougham, e.g., speaks thus, to encourage his hearers in the study of physical science: 'It is no mean reward of our labour to become acquainted with the prodigious genius of those, who have *almost exalted the nature of man above its*

destined sphere ; and who hold a station apart, *rising over all the great teachers of mankind*, and spoken of reverently, *as if Newton and Laplace were not the names of mortal men.**

Such is the foul and degrading idolatry, into which, by a kind of judgment, God may permit men to fall, who are never weary of sneering at what they call our idolatrous devotion to the Mother of God. And the contrast with Catholic doctrine is remarkable indeed. Let us suppose a mathematician and astronomer, possessing tenfold the combined intellectual power of Lord Brougham's two idols, Newton and Laplace. It is an elementary point of Catholic doctrine, that such power will not have the slightest tendency to save him from eternal torment ; and that if he has not occupied himself before his death with matters far more connected with his true end, his infallible doom will be the worm which dieth not, and the fire which is not extinguished, 'Laudantur ubi non sunt, torquentur ubi sunt.'

IX.

So extremely opposite is the position which Catholics and anti-Catholics respectively assign to intellect. And now I proceed to argue, that reason pronounces quite clearly on the Catholic side. Anti-Catholics say that intellectual excellence is an integral part of human perfection. Now the only plausible argument I have ever heard for this thesis, is that of which we have

* Quoted in Father Newman's Letters, signed 'Catholicus' (London, 1841), p. 6.

already disposed. 'Human perfection,' they say or imply, 'consists in the coördinate perfection of each various element contained in man's nature.' But I have already shown that they do not themselves hold this principle : for they do not venture on applying it to the relations between physical and intellectual well-being. It is not our business to answer their argument, for they have themselves withdrawn it before they come into court. Having no more to say, therefore, about *their* argument, let us proceed with urging our own. Reason, I say, abundantly shows, that human perfection consists in perfection of the moral and spiritual nature, and in nothing else. I would not maintain this, indeed, in the case of those who are both atheists and necessitarians. Truly it may well be thought, that in their holding these two errors—the error of atheism and the error of necessity—unreason has already reached its lowest point. At all events I would not deny, that those who are both atheists and necessitarians may consistently enough regard intellectual cultivation as equally desirable with moral, or even more so. But if either of those two doctrines be admitted which are contradictory to the above-named errors, and still more if both be admitted, the Catholic conclusion is at once reached.

Thus, let it be assumed that there is a God ; that we have been created by an Infinitely Holy Being, to Whom we owe absolutely and without exception every thing which we have, every thing which we hope, every thing which we are. The more we ponder on this truth, the more we shall regard it as a self-evident

maxim, that we reach our perfection, in proportion as we are more prompt at every moment of our life to obey His Commands and follow His Preference. But, as I have already urged in a different connexion, such promptitude is simply the perfection of our moral and spiritual nature; it is obtained by constant discipline of the will, and cannot possibly be obtained in any other way. Hence man's perfection is the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature.

Secondly, let us assume, against the necessitarians, that our will is free; or, as the expression runs, that it is a self-originating principle of causation. Let us assume, in other words, that acts of the will are originated by ourselves, in a sense quite different from that in which we can be truly said to originate any other acts whatever. It is plain that this fact confers on the will a dignity and importance, quite immeasurably greater than any other faculty can possess. It is plain that we shall achieve our highest perfection, in proportion as we shall have trained this so importantly endowed faculty, to put forth its self-originated operations in the right and true direction. But this we can only effect by moral discipline; or, as we Catholics have learned, by faithful coöperation with the solicitations of Divine Grace. Whether, therefore, our opponents admit the doctrine of Theism, or the doctrine of free will,—and still more of course if they admit both,—in any of these cases the Catholic conclusion follows, that man's perfection is perfection of the will.

X.

The ground which I have occupied has been very narrow, as I said at starting. Yet surely we gain considerable advantage, if we are able (1) to lay our finger on that precise point which is the deepest matter of difference between Catholic and anti-Catholic schools of thought; and (2) to show that *on* that point reason is most clearly with us and against our opponents. And now, before drawing one or two obvious inferences, it will perhaps conduce to clearness, if I briefly recapitulate by putting before you a skeleton of my argument. I began with two preliminary explanations. By the word 'anti-Catholic' I mean to express, not those who are still warmly attached to the old heresies of Luther and Calvin, but the vigorous and original non-Catholic thinkers of the present day. And the word 'intellect' I use, not in its theological and strict philosophical sense, but in its ordinary acceptation: I mean by intellect that faculty, whereby we carry forward scientific processes of thought. After these two explanations, I laid down two propositions, as most certainly implied in the Church's doctrines and practice. First, man's perfection consists in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature: intellectual excellence having no part in it whatever. I showed this proposition to be the one Catholic doctrine, by reference (1) to the foundation of St. Ignatius's Exercises; (2) to St. Thomas and all theologians; (3) to the Catholic doctrine on meritorious acts; and (4) to the Church's canonisation of saints. Proposition second. The intellect, however, is

capable of rendering most important service in promoting the spiritual welfare of mankind. And this I easily showed to be the Church's mind, by pointing out her constant appropriation of the highest intellectual gifts in her own service.

The former of these two propositions is that, which I wished to contrast with the anti-Catholic tenet. This latter tenet wears its most plausible shape, in the statement, that man's perfection consists in the coördinate perfection of the constituent elements of his nature. First in order I spoke of those, who lay stress on bodily well-being as an integral part of human perfection. And having given my own general notion of their opinions and tendencies, I examined their theoretical principle. I showed that they themselves in fact abandon it; that they themselves use the body as a mere instrument to the mind. From this special class of men, I turned to the anti-Catholic schools of thought in general; and to their universal doctrine, that intellectual excellence is a part of human perfection, and a part no less important than moral. I observed of these thinkers, (1) that *true* moral excellence is simply a matter of hatred and contempt to them, whenever they come across its exhibition; (2) that they feel, however, a real respect for those qualities which they *regard* as moral virtues; but (3) that they have a far *deeper* veneration for intellectual excellence. Having thus placed in broad contrast the position assigned to intellect in the Catholic and anti-Catholic schools of thought respectively, I proceeded to argue, that reason is quite decisive on the Catholic side, as against all

those opponents who are not at once atheists and necessitarians.

XI.

The first inference, which I shall draw from what has been said, concerns our controversy with these anti-Catholic thinkers. We must not over-estimate the advantage to be gained by overthrowing those particular arguments, which are the explicit ground of their unbelief. It is no doubt [most important for many reasons, that their arguments *should* be directly combated; but even when Catholics have been most successful in the combat, the chief difficulty remains. The Church's practical recognition of spiritual perfection as man's true end, is a fact unmistakably written on her very front. How strongly does F. Newman state this fact. 'I bear my own testimony,' he says, 'to what has been brought home to me so closely and vividly since I have been a Catholic; viz. that that mighty world-wide Church, *like her Divine Author*, regards, consults, labours for, the individual soul. . . . She knows no evil but sin; . . . she knows no good but grace; . . . she has one and one only aim, to purify the heart.'* Now this great and most glorious

* *Anglican Difficulties*, pp. 197-8. It may be well to append another passage. 'The Church . . . regards this world and all that is in it as a mere shade, as dust and ashes, compared with the value of one single soul. She holds . . . that it were better for sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions who are on it to die of starvation in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say should be lost, but *should commit one single venial sin*' (p. 199).

characteristic of the Church, is to these men a far stronger ground of antipathy, than is any definite objection which they may entertain, against this or that doctrine. Here is the real barrier between them and us, and it is well that we should know it. It would in itself be an interesting task, to consider what will be the best means of leading them across the barrier. So much at all events we may confidently say, that in ordinary cases spiritual means will be more efficacious to that end than intellectual. The Church, I believe, has no enemies so deadly and so desperate as these. Yet to God's grace all things are possible : and our best hope of promoting the operations of grace will be, the striving to speak home to their conscience, and awaken in them the conviction of *sin*.

XII.

The second inference which I would draw, concerns not externs, but those of ourselves who are called to an intellectual career. There is no occupation which takes so firm and deep a hold on any man given to it, as the carrying on of intellectual processes ; and that, because of the keen and constant pleasure which they afford. Now if intellectual excellence were a part of human perfection, these processes would be as simply conducive to our true end, as performing the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. But since both faith and reason teach a most opposite lesson, it becomes a question of extreme moment, what is the bearing of these intellectual processes on our moral and spiritual nature. And no

other audience can be so interested in the question, as that which I have now the honour of addressing : since we are all on the one hand Catholics ; and on the other hand, by our very membership, profess ourselves more or less interested in intellectual pursuits. I will express, therefore, my own humble opinion, that few modes of life can be found presenting greater impediments to spiritual growth, than a life consisting of energetic intellectual activity, animated by keen intellectual ardour and delight. This of course is no reason, unless we are faithless and cowardly, for shrinking from work, to which God calls us ; in which we may advance towards our own spiritual perfection ; and in which we may greatly benefit the Church : but it *is* a reason, and the strongest possible reason, why those of us who *are* so called, should, in common charity to our own souls, be peculiarly watchful and diligent in guarding the heart and cultivating interior piety. I might give many reasons for this special dangerousness of intellectuality : the one on which I will insist, is its tendency to pride.

Pride may be regarded in one sense as the special antagonist to spirituality. Piety, as I said before, shows itself precisely in self-prostration ; pride precisely in self-exaltation. Further, pride, if I may so express myself, is the least proud of all things ; for it will condescend to regale on the very lowest and coarsest food. An unspiritual man will plume himself on any accomplishment he possesses, however insignificant :—on high birth, indeed, if he has it ; on a well-filled purse, if he has it : but if he has not, then in other things ; on having a good voice for singing, or being clever at

skating. But, of course, if we take no special precaution, pride will assume more alarming dimensions, in proportion as the objects which gratify it are more impressive to the imagination. Now, for various reasons, nothing else is so impressive to the imagination, as the possession of intellectual excellence. First, it is far more intimately part of ourselves, than are its most powerful rivals; such as wealth, or high birth, or the praise of men. Secondly, it makes its power felt through almost the whole of our waking life. Thirdly, that power, so far as we possess it, is one which gives us constant temporal superiority over our fellow-men. And, fourthly, in other ways it exercises an influence which may fairly be called tremendous. Supposing, then, that we do not exercise some special watchfulness against the terrible encroachments of pride; and supposing that God does not mercifully visit us with some counteracting influence, in the shape of sickness or sorrow; how unspeakably intoxicating is the possession of rare intellectual excellence! If pride in an unspiritual man will rise to astounding proportions, though its objects be comparatively trifling and insignificant, what will be its dimensions, when based on the possession of such a power as this—a power so intimately part of ourselves, so constantly felt, so raising us from the level of our fellow-men, so vast, and I might almost say ultra-human, in its influence? It is not too much to say, that intellectual pride is an enemy, which unless we keep our eye fixed on his movements, and are ever repelling his insidious attacks, will ravage and lay waste our whole interior life.

And if there is such serious danger even to ourselves, surrounded as we are by the Church's holy influences, what madness of intellectual pride may we expect to find in those without! In many such men it may truly be called devilish. It is so, in the literal comparison implied by that word; for whereas the evil spirits are so characteristically *proud*, what is, or can be, the object of their pride, except simply their intellectual endowments; their extent of knowledge, their deep acquaintance with human nature, their comprehensive view of human affairs, their craft, their versatility? And here, indeed, we may add another concluding argument in behalf of the Catholic doctrine, which will be cogent at least against those anti-Catholics who admit the existence of evil spirits. Is it probable that intellectual excellence can be an integral part of human perfection, when the devils themselves possess it, and possess it in a degree which far exceeds the human? This is what we should say to ourselves when tempted by intellectual pride. What a ground for self-complacency! the possession of a gift, which is shared by the devils; and shared by them in a greater degree than by the ablest of us all!*

* It is remarkable how very strongly the 'Imitation' speaks on the dangers of intellectual activity. The author's words show that he regards such dangers as none the less serious, even though that activity be exercised on theology.

'Quid prodest tibi alta de Trinitate disputare, si careas humilitate?'

Opto magis *sentire* compunctionem quàm scire ejus definitionem (lib. i. cap. 1).

Scientia, sine timore Dei, quid importat?

XIII.

You may remember that I mentioned a second proposition, as being to my mind no less clearly implied in Catholic doctrine and practice, than that which we have considered to-day : it is that intellectual excellence can render most important service to the Church's end. If I should be called on (in the course of another year or so) to read again, I should propose to take that proposition for my theme. I would labour to illustrate these two points. First, there never was a time, when

Melior est humilis rusticus qui Deo servit, quàm superbus philosophus qui, se neglecto, cursum cœli considerat.

Quiesce à nimio sciendi desiderio ; quia magna ibi invenitur distractio et deceptio.

Hæc est altissima et utilissima lectio, sui ipsius vera cognitio et despectio (cap. 2).

Adveniente die judicii, non quæretur à nobis quid legimus, sed quid fecimus.

Quàm multi pereunt per vanam scientiam in sæculo, qui parùm curant de Dei servitio. Et quia magis eligunt magni esse quàm humiles, ideò evanescunt in cogitationibus suis (cap. 3).

Melius est sapere modicum cum humilitate et parvâ intelligentiâ, quàm magni scientiarum thesauri cum vanâ complacentiâ (lib. iii. c. 7).

Stude mortificationi vitiorum ; quia hoc ampliùs tibi proderit, quàm notitia multarum difficilium quæstionum.

Væ eis, qui multa curiosa ab hominibus inquirunt, et de viâ mihi serviendi parùm curant.

Ego sum, qui humilem in puncto elevo mentem ; ut plures æternæ veritatis capiat rationes, quàm si quis decem annis studuisset in scholis (cap. 43).

Natura appetit scire secreta et nova audire ; . . . sed Gratia non curat nova et curiosa percipere, *quia totum hoc de vetustate corruptionis est ortum . . . docet itaque . . . in omni scientiâ . . . Dei laudem et honorem quærere* (cap. 54).

intellectual power of every different kind was more clamorously called for in the Church's behalf, than the present. And, secondly, it will be impossible for us to perform any of the *more* important services needed from such agency, unless we contend with zeal and unremitting constancy against the intrusion of intellectual pride. I would maintain, that in proportion as we yield ourselves up captives to that most dangerous enemy, the practical ends which we value will be so utterly antagonistic to the Church's ends, that our counsels must, of absolute necessity, be mistaken and mischievous in the highest degree. Such are the conclusions which, at some future time, I hope to advocate. For the present, however, I have concluded.

ESSAY THE SECOND.

ON THE DANGERS TO BE APPREHENDED FROM INTELLECT,
WHEN NOT SPIRITUALLY REGULATED AND CONTROLLED.

I.

SOME six weeks ago I had the honour of reading a paper, which proceeded throughout on a certain definite view of the relations between spiritual and intellectual excellence. This view has been partially misapprehended by some who were present; and by others, who rightly understood my meaning, it has been encountered with objections of greater or less gravity. Now the question is one of extreme importance in itself; and it is one specially interesting to us members of the Academy, who, by our very membership, profess a desire of promoting intellectual cultivation in a true and Catholic spirit. I shall therefore make no apology for returning to the same ground in my present paper, with the purpose of elucidating and vindicating the main principles contained in my former. I had intended, indeed, a different subject for this occasion; but its treatment must have entirely depended on the very theory which has been called in question. I hope therefore this afternoon, in the first instance, to place in clear and unmistakable light the meaning, and the

certainty, of my original principle ; and then to occupy what remains of our time, in drawing out one or two corollaries, in addition to those deduced from it before.

II.

And first it has been thought, that I wished to discourage the vigorous cultivation of intellect. Far otherwise. I believe that intellectual exercises are capable of rendering very much more important services to the Church, than we are in general apt to consider. Those of us, therefore, who possess considerable intellectual power, have a sacred trust committed to our charge ; and in my own humble judgment, it is of most vital importance to the Church's welfare, that we duly cultivate and exercise that power. This was indeed the very subject which I had proposed for my second paper ; and had I been able to treat it, I should have shown how genuinely and earnestly I entertain this conviction. As it is possible, however, that I may not have the opportunity of recurring to it in the present paper, I must entreat you once for all to believe, how unforced and hearty is this expression of opinion.

III.

The second question which has arisen is a purely verbal one, though of considerable importance. It has been felt by some as a great cause of confusion, that I have used the term 'intellect' in a sense altogether different from that which it bears in theology and mental philosophy. Of course, those who criticise

any statements which I have made, are bound to understand the words of that statement in the sense which I avowedly affix to them : but they have the fullest liberty to complain of such a *modus loquendi*, as inexpedient and as tending to confusion. Such complaint has in fact been made ; and yet I hardly know how to make the matter clearer than I did before. Although however the explanation, which I now supply, must be in substance identical with the explanation which I then gave, I will at least express it in a somewhat different shape.

To avoid confusion as much as possible, in explaining the theological sense of the word I will Latinise it, and call it 'intellectus.' We are said then by theologians to exercise our intellectus, so far as we contemplate in any kind of way real or apparent truth. According to this sense of the word, intellectus is exercised in its highest perfection, in proportion as the truths which we contemplate are not apparent but real, not natural but supernatural. By consequence, if we use the word 'intellectus' in its theological sense, perfection of the intellectus and perfection of the will necessarily proceed *pari passu*. On the one hand, in proportion as we grow in perfection of will, we grow in perfection of intellectus ; for we apprehend supernatural truth more keenly and vividly. On the other hand, this keener and more vivid apprehension of supernatural truth reacts on the will, and renders its movements still more vigorous and efficacious. And this being the case,—viz. that intellectus and will proceed *pari passu* towards perfection,—a somewhat

interesting scholastic question arises ; but one of no practical moment in any shape, and at all events wholly irrelevant to our present theme. It is debated, whether intellectus or will be the higher power ; for instance, whether it be the higher act to contemplate God, or to love Him. One thing, however, is worth briefly mentioning, on this scholastic controversy. It is characteristic of St. Thomas's school, as opposed to Scotus's, that they follow Aristotle in regarding intellectus as a higher power than will ; yet St. Thomas says, no less expressly than Scotus himself, that in the case of God and other superhuman objects, it is a less high act to contemplate than to love them.*

Such is the theological sense of this word intellectus. But it is a sense most widely divergent from the ordinary and popular acceptance of the term intellect here in England, whether among Catholics or Protestants ; insomuch that the most extensive and incurable misapprehensions must arise, if in ordinary cases we give it any such meaning. Two instances will be as decisive under this head, as two hundred. Nothing would be more natural than for any of us to say, that some school or college is satisfactory enough in its moral discipline, but greatly defective in its intellectual. What would be our amazement if we were understood to mean, that it trains its pupils satisfactorily towards *loving* God, but that it trains them very defectively

* ' Quando res in quâ bonum est, est nobilior ipsâ animâ in quâ est ratio intellecta, per comparationem ad talem rem voluntas est altior intellectu . . . Unde melior est amor Dei quàm cognitio.' 1^a, q. 82, a. 3, 0.

towards *contemplating* Him! Yet such would be our precise meaning, if we had been using the word 'intellectual' in St. Thomas's sense. Or take for a second instance some contemplative nun, who even in her mental prayer has nearly ceased from reasoning processes, and is drawn by the Holy Ghost almost exclusively to contemplation. Suppose I were to remark, in a matter-of-course way—'How devoted she is to *intellectual* occupation! as compared with her, Newton and Laplace were babies in *intellectual* acquirement.' You would of course understand me to speak in jest or in irony. 'No,' I might reply, 'I am but using the word intellectual in its proper sense. It is a truism, not a paradox, to say, that this holy nun has her mind immeasurably better trained than Newton's or Laplace's, for the highest office of the intellectus, the contemplation of supernatural truth.'

It was quite impossible then to use the word 'intellect' in its theological sense, without being extravagantly misunderstood. And F. Newman plainly thought the same, when addressing an audience which in character very much resembled the present. I refer to his first course of lectures at Dublin on University education; in which he throughout uses the word intellect in the sense which I have adopted. I have only time to cite one passage, but it will be admitted as decisive. 'A truly great intellect—such as the intellect of Aristotle, or of St. Thomas, or of Newton, or of Goethe . . . is one which . . . possesses knowledge considered not merely as *acquirement* but as *philosophy*' (p. 214). A truly great intellect, you see,

according to Father Newman, is not one which is eminently fitted for keenly contemplating the supernatural ; but that which possesses knowledge considered as *philosophy*.

Whereas then it was perfectly out of the question to use the word intellect in its theological sense, it remained to ascertain its popular and ordinary acceptance. And I gave the following, as that to which the every-day sense of the word in England most closely approximates. 'I speak of a man using his *intellect*' I said, 'so far as he is occupied with such processes as these : investigating evidence ; analysing his various convictions and exploring their grounds ; contemplating scientifically the phenomena, whether of his own mind or of the external world ; carrying premisses forward to their conclusions ; viewing a large field of truth in the mutual relation of its component parts ; and the like.' And I may here further add, that, according to this sense of the term, intellectual *excellence* will signify that largeness, acuteness, penetration, grasp of mind, which is adapted to the successful performance of such processes as I have stated.

I think in fact that men, possessing high mental endowments, may be broadly divided into three classes : intellectual, poetical, and practical men. First, there are those whom we call intellectual ; who give themselves to philosophical and scientific pursuits, in the largest sense of that term. Under this head would rank theologians ; philosophers, whether metaphysical, psychological, or physical ; mathematicians ; and again historians. The second class contains men of poetical

temperament, or those well fitted for advancement of the fine arts in whatever shape. These men would be described in common parlance as possessing genius, imagination, fancy, sensibility, rather than *intellectual* power. Lastly, there are the men of practical ability : such was the late Duke of Wellington ; such has been many a statesman who might be named. Of these men it would be ordinarily said, that they possess great insight into character ; great aptitude for influencing masses of men ; great readiness in seeing instinctively their road to a practical end ; but that their *intellect* is not of high or rare quality. The Church has had many of all these three classes among her most valued servants. She has received most important contributions from every one of the fine arts ; and she has had her practical men, St. Gregory VII. or St. Thomas of Canterbury. But surely, when we are told of those who have served her *intellectually*, our thoughts do not turn to such as these, but rather to St. Thomas Aquinas and the schoolmen ; or to Petavius and the other promoters of historical theology. True, indeed, that several of her most illustrious names are eminent under more than one head ; but this very fact affords a further illustration of my argument. When we are told of the *intellectual* services rendered by St. Athanasius, St. Augustine, or St. Leo, our thoughts at once turn to the saint's theological or philosophical achievements, as *distinct* from those which were practical and administrative.

I cannot doubt, therefore, that in my use of the word *intellect* I have conformed myself to the ordinary

English acceptation. And you will have already observed, that I have F. Newman's authority distinctly with me. In giving instances of men intellectually eminent, he has named those only who have been given to scientific investigation; and he has stated it as the very distinguishing characteristic of a truly great intellect, that it possesses knowledge under the special form of philosophy.*

At last, however, this whole question is but of words: and I have only further to say, that throughout the present paper, as throughout the former, I shall undeviatingly use the word 'intellect,' in the sense which I have thus distinctly avowed.

* It would be impossible, within reasonable limits, to quote a title of the passages, in which Father Newman has implied the same sense of this word 'intellect' as that which I have given. Yet one or two may be serviceable.

In page 205 he uses the term '*intellectual illumination*' as synonymous with 'philosophy.'

In page 217 we have this striking passage. 'That only is true enlargement of mind, which is *the power of viewing many things at once as one whole*, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence. This is that form of universal knowledge, of which I have on a former occasion spoken, set up in the individual intellect, and *constitutes its perfection*. Possessed of this real *illumination*, the mind never views any part of the extended field of knowledge, without recollecting that it is but a part; or without the associations which spring from that recollection,' &c. &c.

Intellectual perfection, then, according to Father Newman's use of the term, is not perfection of the *poetical* faculty, or of the *practical*, but of the *philosophical*. On the other hand, that no amount of *knowledge*, merely as such, even tends to intellectual perfection, is most earnestly argued from page 214 to 216.

IV.

The two criticisms, which I have hitherto considered, are of a minor and subordinate character. But several, who fully understood my meaning, have criticised the thesis itself, which was the basis of my whole argument; and have wished that I should more fully illustrate and explain it. This I am the more ready to do, because its fuller explanation will but place in clearer light its undeniable, and I might even say its axiomatic, certainty. The thesis was this. It is implied, I said, in the whole body of Catholic doctrine and practice, that man's true perfection is the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature; intellectual excellence having no part in it whatever. In explanation of this thesis, I begin as follows: and if my earlier remarks seem at first to have little or no bearing on my subject, a very few minutes will show you, that on the contrary they imply the whole principle for which I contend.

The immense majority of mankind have no practical choice as to their way of life, except indeed within certain very narrow limits. Circumstances of external position, or of personal capability and fitness, are plain indications given them by God, as to the duties in which they are to serve Him. In very many cases it might appear, that if we were left to choose for ourselves, we might choose some vocation far more suitable to our spiritual advancement. Yet in this we should be mistaken: for from the very fact that God has marked out our path, we know that He has prepared for us the special graces suitable to that path; and our

only wisdom is, to labour faithfully in coöperating with those graces. What shall be our main duties, I say, is a question ordinarily determined for us by God; but it rests with *ourselves* how far we choose to make those duties so many instruments for spiritual discipline and growth. We act more perfectly, we are more personally perfect, in precise proportion as we thus comport ourselves; and here therefore let us briefly consider, in what kind of way this all-important work is to be accomplished.

The main characteristic of an aiming at perfection is, that a man aims, not merely at obeying God's actual Commands, but at consulting in every case God's Wishes and Preference. And our present question is, how will this aim develop itself, in making some duty to which he is called an instrument of perfection. I will mention four important particulars, as specimens of what I mean. First, he will consult God's Preference as to the particular mode of performing it. Supposing, e. g., he is called to the duty of personally educating his children. In determining the method of their education, he will not be content to follow his own fancy or caprice, or the mere example of those around him: he will take all the means in his power, by pondering on the circumstances of the case, and consulting with a spiritual director or other adviser, to discover which is the method more acceptable to his Creator. Secondly, the method having been determined according to which the duty shall be performed, from time to time he will apply his mind methodically to such questions as these. He will consider in the

presence of God, what are the spiritual dangers specially attendant on this duty; what are the most hopeful means for obviating those dangers; how far he is diligent and careful in adopting these means; and the like. Thirdly, he will labour specially at acquiring those two habits of mind, which may be called the two poles of an interior life, and which meet us accordingly at the very outset of that invaluable work, 'the Spiritual Combat;' I mean, diffidence in self, confidence in God. He will labour, I say, at uniting a practical sense of his own utter weakness in the warfare, with a loving and hearty trust in God's Power and Willingness to give him the victory. Now the fourth method which I will mention for making some given duty an instrument of perfection, differs from those already stated, in that it refers to every single instant of time which is occupied in the duty. He will be constantly contending, in God's strength, against the intrusion of those lower and unworthy motives, which will most assuredly effect an entrance, even without his suspecting their presence, unless he carefully guard the avenues of his heart. And here one caution is specially in place. God ordinarily attaches to each one of our duties a pleasure of its own, in order that we may practise it with more readiness and facility. But there is a constant tendency on our part, to turn this mercy of His against Himself, and make this pleasure our very end of action. Against this is directed a well-known phrase of the Thomistic theology: '*delectationes propter operationes, non contrà.*' It is our business to make use of these pleasures for the better performance of our duties: we

counteract the order of nature and abuse God's gifts, when we perversely allow these pleasures to be our very motives of action. Yet nothing, except earnest prayer and unwearied vigilance, will enable us to make head against this most subtle and most dangerous tendency.

These four particulars will suffice for my purpose, as specimens of what I mean. I have not entered at all into the question, in itself a most important one, how far we place our very salvation in jeopardy, unless in some degree at least we aim at perfection; for this question is irrelevant to my present purpose, which leads me only to consider what *is* perfection. Nor, of course, do I forget, how repeated and egregious will be our failures in the great combat; yet at last God knows our weakness far better than we know it ourselves, and the very wish and attempt at perfection is inexpressibly dear to Him. Finally I say, that even if we do *not* choose to attempt it, the fact is no less certain, that that course of action, from which we shrink, is nevertheless the more perfect course. And if we be not practically impressed with this fact, we simply bungle and make mistakes; just as when we are not practically impressed with any other truth which intimately concerns us.

Now that view of human perfection, which I have maintained to be implied by Catholic doctrine and practice, is comprised in the three following propositions. (1) Just as various men are called to other modes of life,—to be poets, or lawyers, or merchants, or clockmakers, or professional singers,—so some of us

are called to the occupation of intellectual activity in one or other branch of knowledge: in theology, or philosophy, or history, or physical and mathematical science, as the case may be. (2) Just as all other men act more perfectly and become more perfect, in proportion as they make their external work an instrument of interior perfection;—so those of us who have *this* vocation act more perfectly and become more perfect, in proportion as we make our *intellectual* exercises an instrument of interior perfection. (3) One man is more perfect than another, in precise proportion as he is more spiritually perfect. No one ever thought of saying that A tends to be more perfect than B, because he sings better, or makes better clocks; nor yet because he has more muscular power, or has worked more assiduously at its development: so neither does A tend to be more perfect than B, because he has greater *intellectual* power, or because he has worked more assiduously at its development. True indeed, A may sing, or make clocks, or practise gymnastics, from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention; in which case these exercises do so far increase his real perfection: and in like manner (neither more nor less) *intellectual* exercises, if practised from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention, increase his true perfection. But this is not because he possesses musical, or muscular, or intellectual, power; nor yet precisely because he exercises that power; but exclusively, because he makes such exercises his instrument for advance in piety. This therefore at last is the hinge of the whole question; our making intellectual exercises

an instrument for advance in piety.* Let me review then the four particulars just recounted, in their special reference to the occupation which we are now considering,—the occupation of intellectual labour.

The first particular mentioned was, that those who act more perfectly, will consult God's Preference as to the particular method of pursuing the occupation, instead of following their own fancy and caprice, or the example of others. So likewise, if we have considerable intellectual gifts, and wish to use them as means of perfection: in such case we shall pursue a very different course, from that of simply following our own taste and bias, as to the branches of knowledge which we shall cultivate, or the relative prominence we shall give to those respective branches. No: we shall take every means in our power to discover, which will be the particular course of study most acceptable to God. It would carry me quite too far, to discuss the various considerations which would lead us to a right decision on this head; nor of course do I dream of denying, that the very fact of our having some special taste and aptitude, is one very strong mark of our real vocation. But it is very obvious that if, instead of labouring to ascertain God's Preference, we indulge ourselves as a matter of course, without either question or restraint, in following our particular humour and inclination, we are wandering far from the road of perfection.

* Of course I admit without reserve, that intellectual power is capable of rendering immeasurably more important service to the spiritual welfare of mankind, than is musical or muscular power. See p. 68. But that is a totally different question.

The second particular which I mentioned was, that if we wish to make our external work a means of perfection, we shall from time to time consider methodically, its especial spiritual dangers and their appropriate remedies. Now there are various spiritual dangers, peculiar to this occupation of intellectual activity; and I will mention some few as a sample. We shall ask ourselves then, on such occasions, how far we labour, not merely by fits and starts, but regularly and systematically, at our intellectual work; regarding our mental power as a sacred trust, for the use of which we shall have to give account. We shall ask ourselves, on the other hand, how far we allow such labour to interfere unduly with other obligations; with prayer and spiritual reading, or social duties, or the necessary care of health. We shall ask ourselves again, how far we really pursue truth in our investigations; or instead of this, seek for evidence to confirm some conclusion, on which we have already determined. Or again, if engaged in controversy, how far have we really striven to understand our adversary's point of view? how far may pride have restrained us from admitting, even to ourselves, our own exaggerations or mistakes? how far have we kept in view, on the one hand, the interests of peace and Christian charity; on the other hand, the obligation of contending uncompromisingly for essential principles? Such questions as these originate in the very nature of the case. But further, as Catholics, we recognise a Church divinely privileged to teach infallible truth. Here therefore another series of questions is suggested, if our intellec-

tual investigations extend over that territory, which is under the Church's direct dominion. How far do we sincerely labour to discover the Church's real mind? how far do we make it our one end to find what she *does* teach, and not what, by some plausible device, we may imagine her to teach? or in other words, how far do we strive, not that the Church may be on *our* side, but that *we* may be on the Church's side? Or again, where she has not expressly pronounced, how far do we submit ourselves to her spirit and general tendency? In one word, how far do we comport ourselves towards her in that humble and reverential attitude, which alone is reasonable toward God's infallible representative on earth? Such questions as these, I say, we shall from time to time carefully consider in God's Presence; so far as we discover faults in our past conduct, we shall humble ourselves for those faults, and try to discover the most hopeful means for their correction; and then we shall from time to time further examine, how far we have been diligent and careful in practising these means.

The third particular which I mentioned, as helping us to make some external duty a means of interior perfection, was the labouring to unite diffidence in self with confidence in God. This diffidence in self will be singularly hard of attainment, if we have for some considerable time yielded ourselves unreservedly to intellectual excitement. It will be very hard of attainment, I say, because of the fearful pride to which intellect gives occasion, in those of us who have not most carefully guarded the avenues of our heart.

The fourth particular was, to strive against the strong tendency which exists, to make the pleasure of our occupation our end of action. If those of us, who are devoted to intellectual pursuits, enjoy good health, easy circumstances, and freedom from worldly trouble, we are quite sure (unless we adopt special precautions) to throw ourselves on our study with a kind of voracity, which is the intellectual man's gluttony. Hardly a pleasure can be named, which so unites keenness with long continuance, as that of intellectual excitement. If we allow ourselves, then, to make this pleasure our one end of action, all the time given to these pursuits will be spent (to say the least) in one protracted imperfection; since every high and supernatural motive, during this whole period, will be banished from our hearts.

V.

I have now enabled myself to obtain three important results. First, I have sufficiently explained what I meant in my former paper, when I spoke of intellect and our other faculties being subordinated to our will; and also what I mean in my present thesis, when I speak of intellect being spiritually regulated and controlled. Secondly, I can make clear the precise force of my proposition, that man's perfection consists exclusively in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature. I mean this: we are more perfect, not at all in proportion as we are more fitted for the performance of philosophical processes; but exclusively in proportion as we are more prompt and well disposed, towards

subjecting both our intellect and all our other faculties to spiritual regulation and control. Thirdly, I can show how unanimous are all good Catholics in favour of my proposition, when once it is understood: for all good Catholics will admit, that we are more perfect, in proportion as we are more assiduous in following such a course of life, as that which I have briefly sketched.

VI.

I said in my former paper, that I had only time for a brief selection from the various arguments, which make it so certain that my proposition is implied in the Church's whole doctrine and practice. I mentioned four arguments, however, any one of which, though it stood alone, would in my judgment be irrefragable. I argued (1) from St. Ignatius's Foundation; (2) from the consent of theologians; (3) from the doctrine of merit; (4) from the canonisation of Saints. I have nothing more now to add on either of these heads, except the second: consent of theologians. Some persons seem to have thought, that though my doctrine be sound, yet at least my mode of expression is novel. I assert confidently the exact reverse. Certain as I hold it to be that my doctrine is the one Catholic doctrine on perfection, it is even more obviously certain (because more on the surface of things) that my expression is the one Catholic expression on the subject. The words 'status perfectionis,' 'perfectio nostra,' 'viri perfecti,' are recognised theological phrases, and are treated in every complete corpus. Theologians discuss, how far

perfection is measured simply by the degree of charity; or partly by the practice of evangelical counsels; or partly again by our degree of moral virtue. But as to intellectual excellence having any part or parcel in the matter, they do not deny it, simply because the very notion never occurs to them. I have room for very few citations; but they will be sufficient. ‘Every thing is said to be perfect,’ says St. Thomas, ‘in proportion as it reaches its proper end. But it is charity which unites us to God, Who is the ultimate end of the human mind.’ Billuart adopts St. Thomas’s statement, word for word. Sylvius: ‘A thing is then said to be perfect, when it gains its proper end: but by charity it is that man in this life reaches his end; for he is thus joined to God, Who is our last End.’ Suarez: ‘Our perfection consists in union with God; but charity it is, which unites us to God.’*

* ‘Unumquodque dicitur esse perfectum, inquantum attingit proprium finem, qui est ultima rei perfectio. Caritas autem est quæ unit nos Deo, Qui est ultimus Finis humanæ mentis.’ 2^a 2^m, q. 184, a. 1, 0. Billuart repeats these words, *De Statu Religioso*, diss. 1, a. 1, dico. 2^o.

‘Unaquæque res tunc dicitur esse perfecta, quando proprium suum finem adipiscitur; eò quòd finis sit ultima rei. perfectio: per caritatem autem homo in istâ vitâ consequitur finem suum; conjungitur enim Deo, Qui est noster Finis ultimus.’—Sylvius *in locum Divi Thomæ*.

‘Uniuscujusque rei perfectio est unio ejus ad suum ultimum finem: noster autem finis ultimus est Deus, Qui nobis per fidem manifestatur; ergo perfectio nostra in unione ad Deum consistit: caritas autem est, quæ nos Deo unit.’—Suarez *de Statu Perfectionis*, cap. 3, n. 4.

See Note B for an answer to theological objections, and a somewhat fuller statement of the theological argument.

I only wish that this were a suitable opportunity for entering at greater length into the whole theological question.

VII.

It would only weary you if I attempted here to answer all the objections which have been made against my statement. I will here, therefore, treat those objections alone, the discussion of which will elucidate still more clearly the meaning of my proposition.

First, then, it has been objected, that my proposition is ambiguous, because I have not explained what I mean by perfection. I hoped I had made this sufficiently clear in my former paper; but I am most willing to speak more explicitly. In regard, then, to any creature, there cannot be a better definition of the word 'perfect,' than that given by St. Thomas, and those other theologians whom I have just cited. Every thing is more perfect, in proportion as it more nearly reaches its proper end; or to put the same thing in other words, in proportion as it more completely accomplishes its proper work, its *ἔργον* as Aristotle would say. A locomotive engine is more perfect, in proportion as it more combines strength, speed, and safety: the art of medicine is more perfect, in proportion as it enables the student more successfully to cure disease. And my proposition is this. Our body is more perfect, in proportion as we more combine health, strength, speed, and the rest. Our poetical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we possess a keener power of appreciating poet-

ical beauty. Our practical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we possess genius and fertility of resource, for devising and carrying out plans of practical action. Our intellect is more perfect, in proportion as we have a greater power (to use F. Newman's words) of grasping a large multitude of objects in their mutual and true relations. But we, as *persons*, as *men*, are more perfect,—have more nearly achieved our proper end, have more completely accomplished our proper work,—exclusively in proportion as we are more morally and spiritually perfect. This surely is a most definite and intelligible statement, whether you agree with it or no. And I maintain that no different statement can be made on the subject, consistently with Catholic doctrine.

Secondly, I have been asked whether I can deny that intellectual excellence is in itself a good, and may be lawfully desired for its own sake. I do not deny this; but I will simply recite the answer which Suarez gives to a similar objection urged against St. Ignatius's Foundation. Health and life, says Suarez, are real *goods*; and yet it appertains to greater perfection, that we should not love these goods except as instruments of virtue. And let this, he adds, be understood of all other goods, which *may* be used amiss.* I say, then,

* 'In principio seu fundamento Exercitiorum ea indifferentia affectûs humani commendatur circa res creatas non prohibitas, ut "non magis quæramus sanitatem quàm ægritudinem, nec vitam longam brevi præferamus." Statim verò occurrit objectio, quia salus et vita sunt ex his rebus, quas homo tenetur ex præcepto custodire et quærere mediis honestis ac decentibus: non est ergo lauda-

what Suarez says: It is no sin to desire intellectual excellence for its own sake; but it appertains to greater perfection, that we desire it only as an instrument of virtue.

Thirdly, it has been objected, that intellectual excellence may be made most useful for our advancement in spirituality. I most fully admit this fact, but cannot see how it constitutes an objection. Indeed, considering the very serious dangers with which I represent intellect to be fraught when regulated ill, it would be harsh indeed if I denied that it can render important services to us when regulated well. I will mention two in particular, as specimens of many more. First, by means of theological study we are able to obtain a surer and firmer grasp of supernatural truth; and secondly, we may derive great help from our intellectual power, in examining our motives of action more accurately; seeing our faults more clearly; devising more judicious means of spiritual improvement.

bilis indifferentia, non magis quærendi sanitatem quàm ægritudinem, &c.

‘Bonum vitæ et salutis est ex his quæ propter se appeti possunt; id est, quatenus per se sunt convenientia naturæ, et necessaria ad quandam ejus integritatem, propter quam honestè appetuntur sine respectu ad alium finem; et ideò *sine culpâ* potest affectus non esse omninò indifferens circa hæc bona secundum se spectata. Nihilominus tamen *ad majorem perfectionem spectat* (et hanc existimo fuisse mentem S. P. N. Ignatii) hæc ipsa bona non amare nisi ut sunt instrumenta virtutis. Quod dictum intelligatur *de omnibus bonis* quæ, licèt per se amabilia sint, *homo potest eis benè et malè uti*. In virtutibus enim, quibus homo malè uti non potest, illa indifferentia laudabilis non est.’—Suarez *de religione Societatis Jesu*, lib. 9, c. 5, dubium quartum.

Fourthly, I have been asked whether I represent an intellectual life as less hopeful than others for advance in piety. I have already in fact answered this question, by saying that ordinarily it is God Himself Who marks out our course of duty ; and Who prepares for us (as I may say) suitable graces along the whole extent of that course. If therefore we shrink back from it in alarm at its spiritual perils, we put ourselves out of the way of those special graces which our loving Creator has prepared for our sanctification : and our spiritual loss is of course incalculable. At the same time I do certainly think, that the intellectual vocation is one specially beset by temptations ; and those the more dangerous, because so subtle and so likely to be unsuspected. But here, as in other spiritual matters, to feel our danger is almost to be safe. Let us be the more earnest in imploring God, that we may have His light to see these temptations, and His strength to overcome them.

Lastly, the case has been put to me, of two men equally prompt to serve and obey God, but one of whom has far greater intellectual power than the other. Can I deny, it has been asked, that the former is the more perfect ?

I answer of course most confidently, that he is not the more perfect, unless he be more morally and spiritually perfect. But it is a question of some interest, whether he be *not* more morally and spiritually perfect ; and (though several Catholics differ from me) my own opinion is for the affirmative, with certain explanations and limitations. But before expressing this opinion,

let me do some justice to the opposite view. A comparison was instituted in this room, as you may remember, between St. Paul and a pious apple-woman : but would it not be fairer, to make the comparison between St. Paul and St. John ? Is there any reason in the world to suppose, that St. John possessed considerable intellectual cultivation ? that he had any great power, for instance, of rightly understanding some vast system of heathen philosophy ; and laying his finger on the precise points at issue between that philosophy and Christian Revelation ? Yet is there any one who would regard him as on that account less spiritually perfect than St. Paul ? However, as this particular case is complicated by the great fact of St. John's *inspiration*, let us take some two Saints of post-apostolic times : B. Benedict Labbrè, for instance, the beggar, and St. Antoninus, who wrote on Moral Theology. Supposing these two Saints were equally prompt to follow God's Wishes and Preference in every particular, who will say that St. Antoninus was the more holy because he was more powerful in reasoning from premisses ? or because he was more ready in solving casuistical questions ?

Nevertheless, I do think that in ordinary cases, if we suppose equal promptitude of will to God's love and service, the more intellectual man is the holier : and I proceed to explain my meaning. You individually and I individually are more perfect, in proportion as we have greater promptitude to serve and obey God. But it does not follow that, if you and I possess this promptitude in an equal degree, I am equally perfect with

you. You may be of a lively and active, I of a torpid and sluggish, temperament. We may be equally prompt to serve and obey God; but those *acts* of service and obedience to which you are prompt, will be more intense, more vigorous, more sustained, than mine. And now to apply this principle. We give to our imaginary apple-woman a thorough intellectual education. We expose her thereby to most serious dangers, from which she would be otherwise exempt; but we undoubtedly gift her with a far more vigorous and active mind. An educated person leads ordinarily a far longer life than another in the same number of minutes, because his succession of ideas is so far more rapid. If, therefore, by constant coöperation with grace, our apple-woman remains no less prompt to serve and obey God than she was before her intellectual cultivation, she has become much more spiritually excellent; because those acts of obedience to which she is prompt, are far more sustained and energetic.

You will ask, then, if this holds in ordinary cases, why not in extraordinary cases also? why does it not apply respectively to the interior acts of B. Benedict Labbrè and St. Antoninus? For this reason. Where the Holy Ghost gives those rare and most precious graces which lead to the higher paths of sanctity, He imparts all, and immeasurably more than all, that vigour and keenness of pious contemplation, which intellectual cultivation can possibly confer. Suppose that B. Benedict and St. Antoninus were equally prompt to obey God: the very notion is monstrous, that the holy

mendicant's acts of contemplation and love were in any one respect less intense and rapid, than those of the holy theologian.

There is a second sense, though a less proper one, in which it may be said that intellectual excellence renders a pious man more personally laudable. Suppose that you and I have in fact attained a precisely equal degree of perfection, but that you are far the more intellectually gifted. It may be said that you are more personally laudable than I: because you have achieved your work under circumstances of greater difficulty; because you have reduced into due subordination so unruly a faculty as intellectual power. Take these two virtues for instance: simplicity of faith, and docility to the Holy Ghost. Such virtues may be called far more personally laudable in you than in me; because you have had a far greater temptation than I have, to trust independently your own intellectual light, instead of submitting to the Church's decrees, and searching earnestly for the Holy Ghost's guidance.

VIII.

I will regard my proposition as now sufficiently established, and will proceed to express one or two important consequences, which result from its truth. If God has endowed us with a powerful intellect, the one use of it (we see) which He desires at our hands, is that we submit its operations absolutely and unreservedly to spiritual control and regulation: and I have explained in some detail what I mean by that expression. Now I would beg you to consider, how pro-

minent a place in our mental organisation is held by intellect, if it be at all powerful; and also what important influence over others is obtained by its agency. If then the place, intended for it by God, is one of abject submission and obedience to a higher part of our nature; and if on the other hand we allow it uncontrolled freedom of operation; we might be certain beforehand, that most serious evils would ensue, whether to ourselves or to others. In my former paper I specially adverted to one of these evils, the tremendous intellectual pride which will assuredly be generated. I will here beg you to consider another; and one which leads to more important results than at first might be supposed.

IX.

You will remember, that in the earlier part of this paper we spoke emphatically on the very serious evil of pursuing intellectual exercises, not for the sake of investigating truth, but for the sake of enjoying the pleasure afforded by those exercises themselves. And we maintained that this result must always ensue, whenever those of us who possess great intellectual power, neglect the assiduous practice of self-examination and other spiritual discipline. Now Sir W. Hamilton expressly declares, that such *is* the end pursued by himself and (as he maintains) by all scientific men without exception. He is speaking, as he tells us, of 'every votary of science.' 'It is not knowledge,' says Sir W. Hamilton, 'it is not truth, that the votary of science seeks; he seeks the exercise of *his faculties and*

feelings: and as in *following after* one' truth 'he exerts a *greater amount of pleasurable energy* than in taking formal possession of a thousand, he disdains the certainty of the many' which are certain, 'and prefers the chances of the one' which is uncertain. 'Science is a chase,' he adds; 'and in a chase the *pursuit* is always of greater value than the game:' and he quotes with thorough agreement the statement of various philosophers, that they would rather search for truth than possess it.* Well then, at length we understand you, gentlemen of the philosophical world, if Sir W. Hamilton may be accepted as your representative. You would claim honour at our hands, as the investigators and discoverers of truth; and yet it appears at last, that you are not desiring truth at all; that you would not possess it if you could; that what you seek, is not that truth which shall benefit mankind, but that intellectual excitement and titillation, which shall make *your own* lives pass with less weariness and monotony.

Can any thing be well imagined, more degrading to philosophy than this, or more contradictory to the true philosophic spirit? † And now further, all this miserable

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, pp. 10–13. The passage is quoted in full, and considered at some length, in Note C.

† Father Newman in several passages comments on this perversion of philosophy, and its antagonism to the true Catholic spirit. I may refer for instance to the 'aphorisms' of the anti-Catholic 'Truth Society' in *Loss and Gain*. Aphorism 4. 'Man's work and duty, as man, consists, *not in possessing but in seeking*' [truth]. 5. '*His happiness and true dignity consist in the pursuit.*' 6. 'The pursuit of Truth *is an end, to be engaged in for its own sake.*' 7. 'As philosophy is the love, not the possession, of wisdom, so religion is the love, not the possession, of Truth.' 8. 'As Catholicism begins with faith, so Protestantism ends with inquiry,' &c. &c. (pp. 361, 2).

degradation of philosophy arises simply from the fact, that philosophers in general have neglected interior piety, and have placed their end in creatures rather than in the Creator. I have fully sufficient ground for this statement, in the reason which Sir W. Hamilton himself gives for his own doctrine. His conclusion is substantially this : we may fancy ourselves to be seeking the possession of truth, but we are really aiming at the pleasurable excitement of its pursuit. And he expressly gives the following reason for his conclusion. ‘In life we always believe that we are seeking repose ; while in reality all that we ever seek is agitation.’ Most true, if we look for our enjoyment apart from God ; most false, if we will but seek that rest and peace, which arises from His love and service. ‘All that we really seek,’ says Sir W. Hamilton, ‘is *agitation*.’ How different is the language of Catholic theologians ! St. Alphonsus, quoting another great Saint, tells us how St. Francis of Sales specially pressed on the attention of sinners, the *peace* which is enjoyed by those who cleave to God. ‘Let care be taken,’ adds St. Alphonsus, ‘that the penitent may know of that interior peace, with which those are gifted who enjoy God’s friendship.’* But peace, I suppose, is very different from ‘agitation.’ Suarez teaches, that the beatitude of this life consists in the contemplation and love of God.† The contemplation and love of God is not ‘agitation.’ But no one has expressed the Catholic

* Quoted in my first volume ‘on Nature and Grace,’ p. 362.

† ‘Dicendum ergo est, beatitudinem hujus vitæ consistere in actibus intellectûs et voluntatis, quibus æterna felicitas vitæ futuræ maximè participatur. . . . Inquiri potest, quis sit actus intellectûs,

truth more beautifully than Father Newman; and that, in words written some time before his own conversion to Catholicism. 'The happiness of the soul,' he says, 'consists in the exercise of the affections: not in sensual pleasures, not in *activity*, not in *excitement*, not in self-esteem, not in the consciousness of power, not in knowledge. . . . This is our real and true bliss; not to know, or to effect, or to pursue; but to love, to hope, to joy, to admire, to revere, to adore. Our real and true bliss lies in the possession of these objects, on which our hearts may rest and be satisfied.'*

See then here the connexion of cause and effect. Putting aside Catholic theologians, a vast majority of speculative men have been utterly indifferent to the pursuit of inward perfection. From this, two results immediately ensue. (1) Such men are totally ignorant, I may say they are without the faintest suspicion, of that earthly bliss which is attainable, from the contemplation and love of God. (2) Since they keep no kind of watch against the intrusion of unworthy motives, they give themselves up, without reserve or

. . . qui principaliter requiritur ad beatitudinem hujus vitæ? . . . Dicendum est, hujusmodi actum esse actum fidei, . . . quo anima Deum Ipsum secundum Divinitatem Ejus contemplatur, et (quoad fieri potest in hâc vitâ) *simplici quodam intuitu intuetur et considerat*. . . . Addendum verò est, principalius consistere hanc beatitudinem in amore.'—*De Beatitudine*, disp. 7. sec. 2, nn. 3, 5, 9.

* *Parochial Sermons*, vol. v. p. 367. Compare S. Augustine's well-known sentence: 'Infelix homo qui scit illa omnia, Te autem nescit; beatus autem qui Te scit, etiamsi illa nesciat. Qui verò et Te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter Te Solum beatus est, si cognoscens Te sicut Deum glorificet, et gratias agat, et non evanescat in cogitationibus suis.' Conf. lib. 5, c. 4.

restraint, to the mere *pleasure* of their occupation ; and while believing themselves to desire truth, really desire their own pleasure and amusement. Then follows the last consequence of all. An influential philosopher of the day, and one learned almost beyond parallel, inspecting the records of past philosophy, finds that such has been the fact. He himself, not being a Catholic, nor (as would appear) having the least notion what is meant by interior piety, is destitute of the only key which can unlock the mystery. Instead, therefore, of mourning over this transformation of philosophy into a selfish intellectual gluttony, he endorses that transformation with his own eminent name. He for whom the dignity is claimed, of being a seeker for speculative truth, tells us plainly that with our present mental constitution ‘the full and final possession of speculative truth’ (I am using his own words) ‘would be *the last, worst calamity that could befall man.*’

X.

This fact alone surely deserves our most careful attention ; viz. that the absence of interior perfection involves so deplorable a degradation of philosophy. But still more important results are exhibited, if we apply what has been said to the particular case of Catholic thinkers. And first, as to those whose study is theological. There are certain great and fundamental verities, which have been revealed by God, that they may be our guide and our solace in the struggle for perfection, and that their pure and heavenly beauty may serve as an antidote to

the world's seductive and most delusive charms. The theologian who loves truth, will make it his principal aim to set forth these great verities: to make ever clearer the ground on which they rest; and (still more importantly) to introduce us into a far wider knowledge of their full extent; a far clearer view of their mutual bearing; a far deeper penetration of their true significance. But in proportion as the theologian loves mental excitement rather than truth, a most serious danger arises, lest his tendency should be very different from this. He may love to fish in troubled waters; he may give his chief interest to those minor and subordinate questions, which (from the very fact of their being minor and subordinate) are open and undecided, and which give, therefore, the larger scope for discussion. Learned men tell us, and I suppose with truth, that this was the special opprobrium of the more degenerate scholastics; and with many minds it has brought the whole fabric of scholasticism into most undeserved disrepute. I am far from denying, that these subordinate questions have an interest of their own; and that they often do much to illustrate the weightier matters of doctrine. But for that very reason, they will be far more satisfactorily treated by one possessing the genuine theological spirit; by one who takes an interest in them, *because* of their important relation to great truths; and who is altogether above the temptation of using them as the mere instruments of intellectual pleasure.

But there is a second and more serious danger, by which we are far more likely nowadays to be assailed, than by any undue refinement of scholastic subtlety.

Externally to pure mathematics, there is no conclusion, however solid, which is not open to ingenious cavil. A genuine theologian, however, who is earnestly in search for truth, will be able in a very large number of cases securely to recognise the object of his search: he will confidently decide, that such or such a doctrine is fully and sufficiently established. But the case will be very different, if we are seeking (not truth but) the pleasurable excitement of discussion. We shall have a vested interest, if I may so speak, in keeping questions open, in order that there may be more room for that discussion which affords us our favourite amusement. Considering such a tendency in that extreme state which is ultimately imaginable, one hardly knows what doctrine will be held as absolutely certain; there is hardly a definition of the Church (I doubt if there is so much as one) which under our skilful hands may not be stripped of its true meaning.

But this tendency may be more deeply and thoroughly understood, if we regard it from a slightly different point of view. Sir W. Hamilton, as we have seen, compares intellectual exercise to the pleasure of the chase. Take the case then of a foxhunter, with the dogs in full cry. If you step forward and shoot the fox for him, he will regard you as his enemy; for what he desires, is not the fox's death, but the delight of hunting him. And in the same manner, if a so-called theologian is not desiring truth but the pleasure of its pursuit, he will regard you as his enemy, if you deprive him of that pleasure by presenting him with truth ready found. Now the Church is precisely in that

situation. There is a large ground, over which human reason loves to expatiate, but which is strictly within *her* jurisdiction. If we are imbued with the true theological spirit, if we desire truth and not our own amusement, we shall aim at deriving from the Church the greatest possible amount of that truth which is so dear to us. We shall in the first place study most carefully each one of her definitions, which bears on the subject we are investigating, in order that we may derive from each the full instruction with which it is laden. Then further, by carefully combining various definitions and viewing them in juxtaposition, a far greater amount of truth is discoverable; and this also we shall eagerly appropriate. But again, there still remains a vast body of truth, which has not yet been expressed in formal definitions at all, but which nevertheless is clearly testified in the Church's mind and spirit. This precious treasure we shall also be eager to unlock; and we shall spare no pains in devising and adopting the most hopeful means for that purpose. But far different from this may be our course if, instead of desiring the *possession of truth*, we desire the *pleasure of investigation*. There is then most serious danger lest, instead of honestly seeking to ascertain what the Church does mean, we labour to find a minimum of what she need mean. There is great danger, in fact, lest we practically regard her, not as an instructress, at whose feet we are to sit, but as an obnoxious restraint, whose means of annoyance we are to reduce.

XI.

I have been urging, that if those of us who study theology neglect cultivation of the interior life, there is most serious danger, lest we give an outrageous prominence to our own philosophical reasonings, and be grievously wanting in docility to the Church's voice. The reason for this on which I have insisted has been, that we shall have far greater interest in the pleasurable excitement of investigation, than in the discovery of truth. But another equally probable cause of the same result, will be that overweening intellectual pride, on which I dwelt in my former paper; and which will greatly indispose us to abandon any private impression of our own, in deference to the Church's authority. And to avoid some possible misapprehension, I will briefly sum up the scope of my argument. Let me suppose that we possess a powerful intellect; and that we give ourselves up with zest and ardour to its appropriate pursuits, while we neglect all methodical or persistent labour in regulating our interior. It is perfectly certain, I maintain, that there will grow up within us a fearful amount of intellectual pride; and also, that ordinarily we shall be far more influenced in our studies by a desire of intellectual excitement, than by a desire of possessing truth. Finally, there is most serious *danger*, lest these two evil dispositions tempt us from due loyalty to the Church's teaching.

XII.

But the evils of such disloyalty are much more conspicuously displayed in other fields of thought than in theology proper. The Church, we must never forget, is our infallible guide, not in faith only, but in morals also; and every single proposition, of which right or wrong is a predicate, is under her direct jurisdiction. Consider for instance a thousand such questions as these. How far is this or that feature of character laudable, whether it be of national or of individual character? how far is such or such a course of conduct morally allowable, in a lawyer, or a merchant, or a voter for members of Parliament? how far, if at all, is the sense of honour (as it is called) a virtuous motive of action? in what sense, and to what extent, is patriotism to be admired? These are but samples, I say, of a thousand others. Or consider again such as these. The great mass of men who make up what is called public opinion in this Protestant country, or for that matter (I believe) in any country, are men who in no kind of sense can be said to live lives of faith and prayer: this I assume as a plain fact, which no one will dream of disputing. The doctrinal question then arises, how far can such men be morally virtuous? how far is their judgment on moral matters to be trusted? is public opinion therefore, on matters of morality, a guide which may be safely followed, or is it an enemy which must be boldly confronted? I have recited these two classes of questions, which reach to a vast extent into the region of philosophy, of history,

of politics. And both classes are as strictly under the Church's direct jurisdiction, as are those connected with the Trinity, or the Incarnation: no Catholic has a right to indulge in his own speculations on any one of them, until he have most carefully considered, what the Church may teach on the matter.

In order that I may keep my paper within limits, I will not here refer further to such casuistical inquiries as those which I have mentioned; though they are of much importance and deserve careful consideration. At present I will only speak of those broad principles, which must colour our whole view of human conduct in every relation and circumstance of life. It is really difficult to imagine a more startling contrast, than that between the standard of morality uphelden by the Church and by the world respectively. The world, in all its moral judgments, proceeds on such implied premisses as the following. I quote, with some little change, from a paper which I published about a year ago, on a totally different subject. The world, I say, awards praise or blame to human actions, on such principles as these.

Principle 1. If a man makes the main end of his life to consist in labouring to promote his own interior perfection and growth in God's love,—if he concentrates his chief energy in the performance of this work,—he must have a mean and contemptible spirit. Monasteries are the proper places for such as him: he is fit for nothing better.

Principle 2. Those who are worthy of our honour as high-minded and spirited men, have two main

motives ever before their mind: a sensitive regard to their honour, and a keen sense of their personal dignity. Good Catholics would express this by saying—they must be actuated by vain-glory and pride in an intense degree.

Principle 3. As their springs of action are worldly, so also are the external objects to which their action is directed. Some great temporal end—the exaltation of our country's temporal greatness or the achievement of her liberty—here is a pursuit well worthy of man's high aspirations. He who should regard godlessness and worldliness as immeasurably greater evils to his country than political weakness or subjection, is a poltroon unworthy the name of patriot.

Principle 4. Physical courage is a far greater virtue, at least in a man, than meekness or humility or forgiveness.

Principle 5. Of all modes of life, the most irrational is that, wherein a man or body of men separate from the world, that they may the more uninterruptedly contemplate their Creator.*

* 'The world believes in the world's ends as the greatest of goods; it wishes society to be governed simply and entirely for the sake of this world. Provided it could gain one little islet in the main, one fort upon the coast, if it could cheapen tea by sixpence a pound, or make its flag respected among the Esquimaux or Otaheitans at the cost of a hundred lives and *a hundred souls*, it would think it a very good bargain. What does it know of hell? it disbelieves it; it spits upon, it abominates, it curses, its very name and notion. Next, as to the devil; it does not believe in him either. We next come to the flesh; and it is free to confess that it does not see any very great harm in following the instincts of that nature, which, perhaps, it goes on to say, God has given. How could it be otherwise? *who*

I might most easily add to this list ; but I have said enough to indicate clearly what I mean. Such as these, I say, are the principles by which the world estimates human conduct ; by which Lord Macaulay measures facts of the past, and the ‘Times’ newspaper facts of the present. These principles are not even categorically stated in worldly literature ; they are treated as too obvious and undeniable to need explicit statement : and they underlie the whole award of praise and blame, expressed or implied by the mass of men, when contemplating the actions of their fellows.

The Church, on the other hand, has no office more important, than that of witnessing and upholding consistently and prominently a moral standard, in the extremest degree contrary to this. Those moral truths indeed which the Church witnesses, belong to the natural order, and are in themselves discoverable by human reason ; yet they have also been supernaturally revealed, and form an integral part of the Church’s depositum. And the reason commonly given for this fact is, that though reason in the abstract is adequate to their ascertainment and proof, yet in fact, the world around us being such as we see, they would certainly

ever heard of the world fighting with the flesh and the devil? Well, then, what is its notion of evil? “Evil,” says the world, “is whatever is an offence to me; whatever obscures my majesty, whatever disturbs my peace. Order, peace, tranquillity, popular contentment, plenty, prosperity, advance in arts and sciences, literature, refinement, splendour, this is my millennium, or rather my elysium, my swerga.” . . . Such is the philosophy and practice of the world: now the Church looks and moves in a simply opposite direction.’
—Father Newman on *Anglican Difficulties*, pp. 195, 196.

be overlooked or denied, were it not for the Church's prominent and emphatic witness. Suppose, then, that through our neglect of interior culture, we have allowed ourselves in such habits of mind as I was lately describing;—suppose that in theology proper, we have brought down the Church's authority towards its minimum point;—of course, in the region of history and politics, we shall neglect that authority altogether. Now let us imagine, that some malignant fever were raging violently on all sides of us; insomuch that its pestilential atmosphere penetrates the very chamber in which we live and in which we sleep: but that we had been favoured with a supernatural preservative against infection. What would follow, if we were mad enough to throw away that preservative? We should of course fall helpless victims to the prevailing epidemic. But no pestilential atmosphere of physical disease was ever, on the one hand in such close and constant external contact, on the other hand so fatally congenial to the inward temperament, as is that foul poison of worldliness, that breath of the old Adam, which ever since the Fall has overspread the whole moral world. Our one security from its infection, is to sit ever at the Church's feet, and listen to her voice, and make her utterances our one test and measure of human morality.

Nor is it at all necessary, if we wish to know the Church's voice on such matters, that we should become theologians, and study her various definitions. The books which she places in every one's hands for spiritual reading,—the 'Imitation,' the 'Spiritual Com-

bat,' or Rodriguez,—are all in deepest harmony on fundamental principles. The evil is not, that we can possibly be ignorant of the Church's standard; but that we do not choose to apply that standard, where it is rightly applicable. We often act, as though we held the Church's principles to be true for one half-hour, and false for all the rest of the day. We pass our due time in spiritual reading, and accept without question the holy lessons placed before us. Then, this special work of piety being over, we plunge into the records of the past, or think and write on the politics of the present: and in doing so, we measure the various facts which come before us, by a standard directly contradictory to those very lessons of piety which we have received. I wonder that we are not ashamed of this, as a mere matter of intellectual inconsistency. If the Church's principles are true in the morning, they are true through the day: if they are true to us, they are true to others; and those who have habitually and deliberately adjusted their conduct by different principles, are no fit objects for our admiration, but on the contrary (to say nothing else of them) have been blunderers and fools.*

* My meaning here is, I think, clear enough; yet it will be better perhaps if I add a few words to indicate it more explicitly. Take this then as one instance of what is intended. Some few Catholic writers express themselves, as though a man were worthy of our respect and admiration, who should devote the main energy of his life to advancing his country's temporal greatness; and of whom no one would even allege, that he is aiming with any consistency at interior perfection. I would beg those writers to consider such passages as the following from the 'Imitation;' which are but specimens of a consistent doctrine, pervading the whole work.

I say then, that unless by a careful effort we bring the Church's moral standard to bear on our whole estimate of human conduct, we shall without *any* effort imbibe the world's anti-Catholic and anti-Christian

‘Attende ad cœlestia bona, et videbis quòd omnia illa temporalia nulla sunt (lib. i. c. 22).

‘Sancti Dei et omnes devoti amici Christi non attenderunt quæ . . . in hoc tempore floruerunt; sed tota spes eorum et intentio ad æterna bona anhelabat (ibid.).

‘Vanitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas, præter amare Deum et Illi Soli servire (c. 1).

‘Stude ergo cor tuum ab amore visibilium extrahere, et ad invisibilia te transferre (ibid.).

‘Præter salutem tuam nihil cogites; solùm quæ Dei sunt cures (c. 23).

‘Serva te tanquàm peregrinùm et hospitem super terram, ad quem nihil spectat de mundi negotiis (ibid.).

‘Serva cor liberum et ad Deum sursùm erectum, quia non habes hic manentem civitatem. Illuc preces et gemitus quotidianos cum lachrymis dirige (ibid.).

‘O qui scintillam haberet veræ caritatis, profectò omnia terrena sentiret fore plena vanitatis (c. 15).

‘Natura . . . gloriatur de nobili loco et ortu generis; gratia autem . . . nec locum nec ortum natalium reputat, nisi virtus major ibi fuerit (lib. iii. c. 54).

‘Si vis beatam vitam possidere, præsentem vitam contemne (c. 56).

‘Omnem intentionem tuam ad hoc dirige, ut Mihi Soli placeas, et extra Me nihil cupias vel quæras’ (c. 25).

Are these principles true or false? If true, such a man as has been above described (taken as a whole) is not worthy of respect or admiration at all, but very much the contrary. If they are false, the ‘Imitation’ is a most dangerous and mischievous work; for it abounds in such. Are we to use a dangerous and mischievous work for our spiritual reading? or are we to abandon the ‘Imitation’? If the latter, which book shall we choose instead? of all those which the Church has approved, is there one which does not proceed on the very same principles? Are we then to give up spiritual reading altogether? Where is this to end?

principles. But there is a second reason why this result will ensue, in proportion as we may be spiritually defective. It is no mere accident, that such *are* the world's principles: on the contrary, they are the native product of the soil; and so far as any of us neglect interior cultivation, such weeds for certain will luxuriantly overspread our soul. All Catholics, of course, speculatively admit those great truths, which stand out in such violent contrast to the world's judgment; but it is only as we become more interior, that we either love or realise those truths. We all, *e.g.*, admit speculatively, that one additional grade of spiritual perfection is more valuable than the most aristocratic birth or the largest wealth. Yet we continually imply just the opposite to this, in the judgments which we form on the various events of every-day life; or in planning for our children's future; or in our own personal course of action; or in other practical ways. We explicitly hold one doctrine; our minds are unconsciously leavened with its contradictory. This is true, more or less, of all who are not saintly; nor is there any more important work given us on earth, than the labouring assiduously to bring our practical convictions into harmony with our speculative judgments. Those of us, therefore, who have not thus laboured, will tend, as a matter of course, to proceed on axioms which are contradictory to the Christian, in the moral judgments which we imply throughout the large field of history and politics.

Now three propositions are abundantly plain. (1) It is only in proportion as any ordinary Catholic familiarly

apprehends and realises the Christian standard of morality, that he can conform his interior conduct to the measure of that standard. (2) But he will never acquire such familiar apprehension of the true standard, by means of its abstract and theoretical statement: he will acquire it only so far as it is impressed on him in the concrete; in its application to the various circumstances of every-day life. (3) Let me suppose, therefore, that by our intellectual power we obtain an important influence over his convictions; and let me further suppose, that the moral judgments, which we express or imply on human events, are in fact measured by a standard opposite to the Christian. We shall have put ourselves, it is plain, into such a position, that we are not indeed blind leaders of the blind, but much worse; that we are blind leaders of those who, if left to themselves, are far more clear-sighted than we. I say, 'far more clear-sighted than we:' because they would measure human conduct by the standard of spiritual writers, far more faithfully at least than they do, if we did not lead them astray, by the brilliancy and ability with which we insinuate the anti-Christian view. God has given us this most important and responsible endowment, intellectual power; and we shall have used that endowment directly against its Giver. We shall have trained our fellow-Catholics, by its influence, towards preferring this life to the next; earth to Heaven; the creature to the Creator.

But I have not yet reached the climax. I have spoken on the tremendous evil of measuring the world's conduct by the world's standard: but what if we go

farther, and measure the *Church's* conduct by the world's standard? Yet this is by no means an improbable contingency. The Church enacts many laws, which so far cross the world's path, that they may naturally provoke our criticism, however small may be our interest in theology proper. She comports herself in this or that way towards the civil power; or she educates her priests, or her gentry, or her poor, after this or that method; or she imposes this or that command, in regard to the reading of unsound books. Now I am very far indeed from meaning, that on these respective matters there is but one legitimate Catholic opinion: on the contrary, the best Catholics may reasonably differ, on the various questions of expediency suggested by their recital. Nor again am I at all denying, that a private Catholic may most laudably state to the ecclesiastical authorities his opinion on such questions of expediency, and the reasons on which it is founded: if such statement be made under suitable circumstances, and in the spirit of dutiful loyalty and submission. My point, and surely an obvious point, is this. In order that we may have an opinion worth one straw on the Church's *means*, we must be in full harmony with the Church's *ends*. Now the Church aims simply at the salvation of souls. In her view, as in God's view, one single holy aspiration has more value than any imaginable degree of intellectual or temporal well-being: except, of course, so far as these themselves confer some spiritual benefit.* But let me

* See the quotation from Father Newman in page 92, note.

suppose that we measure human events on a most different scale: it is plain, that the more keen and sagacious we are in discerning the signs of the times, the more skilful in adapting means to ends,—so much the more mistaken and mischievous must be every counsel which we tender to the Church. Our powers of mind, let me assume, make it almost certain, that the methods which we suggest are admirably adapted to the ends which we have in view. Since, therefore, these ends are most different from the Church's ends, it follows almost as a matter of course, that the acceptance of our counsel would be injurious and disastrous to her dearest interests. There may be many Catholics, indeed, far inferior to ourselves in intellectual power, who yet may instinctively perceive this profound opposition of principle. Nor have we any right to complain of them, however unable they may be to answer our arguments, if they instinctively distrust any suggestion which we make, simply as *being* our suggestion; simply as coming from those, whom they feel to be thus absolutely out of harmony with the Church's spirit.

XIII.

A very plausible objection may be made against the practical conclusion to which my remarks tend. My practical conclusion, it would seem, is this: that none but interior persons should treat intellectually on matters which are under the Church's direct jurisdiction. But who, it may be asked, will dare to say or to think of himself, that he is an interior person? Or

rather, if any one do think so, is not the very circumstance of his thinking it, a clear proof that the case is otherwise? I make two replies to this objection. First, I have not spoken of those who *are* interior, but of those who *aim* at being so; and I drew out, in some little detail, the kind of mental exercises, which are implied in the having such an aim. Now the question, whether or no such exercises make up an integral part of our ordinary life, is a simple question of fact; on which we can no more be mistaken, than on the question whether at this moment I am reading and you are hearing me read. But, secondly, I have nowhere said, that those who do not aim at being interior will *for certain* be neglectful of the Church's teaching: I have only maintained, that there is most imminent *danger* of their being thus neglectful, *if* they are men of great intellectual power. Many of us may be proof against this danger, even though we do *not* aim at interior piety, through such causes as these: an intellectual recognition of the Church's just claims; or the feeling of reverence for her teaching, which has been implanted in us from our childhood; or our habits of faith and love, in that degree in which we possess them; or the fact, again, that our intellect does not rise above the ordinary level. And here, once more, arises a simple question of fact, on which it is surely impossible that we can be deceived. Is it or is it not the case with us, while we express or imply any moral estimate of human conduct, that our unfeigned aim in the whole matter is (1) the ascertaining in every possible way the Church's moral standard; and (2) the applying that

standard to every particular case which comes before us? If we cannot answer this question satisfactorily, we are in fact taking our side (little though we may intend it), not as the Church's servants, but as her enemies.

XIV.

And at this point, the space which I have occupied warns me to conclude; not without many apologies for having so long detained you. In this and my former paper, I have treated but a small part of a very large subject: yet I hope I may have done some service, if I have only been successful in drawing the attention of thoughtful Catholics to that subject as a whole. It is at all times a very interesting inquiry, and in these days of intellectual activity it has become one of very pressing importance, to investigate the relation which exists between intellectual and spiritual excellence. I hope that these papers may be accepted as humble contributions to this great inquiry.

NOTE A.

SOME FEW PASSAGES ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE PROTESTANT VIEW.

(See pp. 29-40.)

It has been alleged, that no anti-Catholics ever included bodily well-being in their idea of human perfection. But without seeking for individual citations, we may infer with certainty from a passage in Father Newman's 'Loss and Gain,' that the view stated in the text is beyond question a recognised anti-Catholic view. There can be but very few of my readers, for whose information it will be necessary to state that Carlton is a most favourable specimen of Protestantism; and that Reding is the chief character of the story, who is by this time far advanced on his road to Catholicism.

"Well," said Carlton, after thinking a while, "I have been accustomed to consider Christianity as the perfection of man as a whole, body, soul, and spirit. Don't misunderstand me. *Pantheists say body and intellect*, leaving out the moral principle; but I say, spirit as well as mind. Spirit, or the principle of religious faith or obedience, should be the master principle, the hegemonicon. To this both intellect and body are subservient; but as this supremacy does not imply the ill-usage, the *bondage* of the intellect, neither does it of the body. *Both should be well treated.*" "Well, I think on the contrary it does imply in one sense the bondage of intellect and body too. What is faith but the submission of the intellect? And as every high thought is to be brought into captivity, so are we expressly told to bring the body into subjection. They are both well treated, when they are treated *so as to be fit instruments of the sovereign principle.*" "That is *what I call unnatural*," said Carlton. "And it is what I mean by supernatural," answered Reding' (pp. 177, 8, first ed.).

In the next chapter, the author, referring to the conversation of

which this is a part, says: 'here he [Reding] was, a young man of twenty-two, professing *what were really the Catholic doctrines* and usages of penance, purgatory, counsels of perfection, *mortification of self*, and clerical celibacy' (p. 181). It will be further observed, that even so pious a Protestant as Carlton, who goes the length of admitting that 'intellect and body are subservient to spirit,' yet rejects as 'unnatural' the doctrine, that they should be simply so treated as to be made its 'fit instruments.' Lastly, Carlton gives it as the recognised Pantheistic tenet, that man's perfection consists in perfection of body and intellect, leaving out the moral principle altogether.

We will next append some passages, written by a violent anti-Catholic named Heine, which a friend has translated from the German. I deeply feel the disgust with which they must inspire every Catholic; but it is very important that we should understand the real drift of that view. The first series is from a work published in 1834, called 'Contributions to the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany.'

'I speak of Roman Catholicism, in whose leading dogmas is contained a condemnation of all flesh; and which grants the spirit not only a supremacy over the flesh, but *would mortify the flesh in order to magnify the spirit*. . . .

'But let us by no means deny the good which the Christian Catholic view did to Europe. It was necessary as a healthy reaction against the awful colossal materialism, which had developed itself in the Roman empire, and threatened to destroy all spiritual nobleness. . . . We recognise the wholesomeness of ascetic spiritualism, when we read Petronius or Apuleius; works which may be considered the "*pièces justificatives*" of Christianity. The flesh had become so saucy in that Roman world, that it required the Christian discipline to chastise it.'

At the Reformation epoch, 'perhaps the painters of Italy carried on more effective *polemics against priestcraft* than the Saxon theologians. The blooming flesh on the canvas of Titian' [he immediately speaks of Titian's 'Venus'] 'are far more solid theses' than Luther's.

'Artists plunged enthusiastically in a sea of Greek mirth, *from the foam of which the goddess of beauty once more emerged*.

'The immediate object of all our institutions (?) is therefore the *rehabilitation of matter*; its *restoration to its dignity*; its moral recognition; its religious consecration; its reconciliation with the spirit.'

The succeeding extracts are from a work by the same writer, on 'the Romantic School,' published in 1835.

In the medieval religion 'the world of soul is represented by Christ; the world of matter by Satan. Our soul belongs to Christ; our body to Satan. . . . The important thing is to renounce all the sensual joys of life; to *chastise our body*, which is Satan's fief, in order that our soul may soar all the more grandly into the bright heavens, the radiant Kingdom of Christ. This view, which is the proper view of Christianity, spread itself with inconceivable rapidity, like an infectious disease, over the whole Roman empire. . . .

'Some day, when mankind shall have fully recovered, when peace shall have been restored between soul and body, and they mingle in original harmony, the artificial strife which Christianity has sowed between them will be almost incomprehensible. Happier and fairer generations will smile plaintively at their poor forefathers, who. . . . by mortifying their warm and coloured sensuality, almost faded away into cold spectres. . . . I use the words spiritualism and sensualism, to signify those two modes of thought, one of which wishes to magnify the spirit by destroying matter, the other wishes to vindicate the natural rights of matter against the usurpation of the spirit.'*

We are sure that a writer, with so many good points as Mr. Kingsley, cannot read such sentiments as these without some disgust; yet he has himself used language, of which we cannot imagine any consistent interpretation that shall be substantially different. Thus in his introduction to the 'Saint's Tragedy,' he refers to the '*Manichæan* asceticism' of the medieval Saints; and in p. 19 he uses the same word '*Manichæan*' in a similar connexion. This seems to me an epithet literally without meaning, unless the author's implication be this: 'no one who believes that God created the body, can consistently hold, that body should be treated as the mere instrument of spirit.'

This word '*Manichæan*,' however, is not peculiar to Mr. Kingsley; it is a permanent part of the anti-Catholic stock-in-trade. A similar view is put forth by Dean Milman in his 'History of Christianity.' He is explaining (vol. iii. p. 291) the origin of that monastic spirit, which he so deeply disapproves. It originated in part, according to him, from 'the importance assumed by the soul,

* This was originally published long before Mr. Kingsley's attack on Father Newman.

now through Christianity become profoundly conscious of its immortality. The deep and serious solicitude for the fate of that everlasting part of our being, *the concentration of all its energies on its own individual welfare*, withdrew it entirely within itself.' This, one would have thought, is an amply sufficient foundation for the monastic spirit. But he regards this exclusive pursuit of spiritual perfection as so manifestly unreasonable, that some further explanation of monachism is required. He disparages (p. 323) 'the *selfish ambition* of personal perfection;' and in the present passage calls its pursuit 'a sublime selfishness.' He is led therefore to give a further explanation for the phenomena of monasticism; and refers them in part to 'the universal predominance of that great principle, *the inherent evil of matter*.' He therefore, like Mr. Kingsley, seems to think, that if the body were once admitted to be good and created by God, there would be a manifest opposition to reason, in using it as the mere instrument of the soul's welfare.*

We have said in the text, that, among English thinkers, it is Mr. Kingsley and his school who have urged most prominently the claims of bodily well-being. The following passage from the 'Edinburgh Review' will be illustrative of this statement.

'It ["Tom Brown's School-days"] represents . . . a school of feeling rather than of thought, which, though small, is becoming very influential in the hands of zealous and eloquent teachers. It is a school of which Mr. Kingsley is the ablest teacher; and its doctrine has been described fairly and cleverly as "muscular Christianity." The principal characteristics of' Mr. Kingsley 'are his deep sense of the sacredness of all the ordinary relations and all the common duties of life; and the vigour with which he contends for

* The passage runs as follows: 'Monachism was the natural result of the incorporation of Christianity with the prevalent opinions of mankind, and in part of the state of profound excitement into which it had thrown the human mind. We have traced the universal predominance of the great principle, *the inherent evil of matter*. This primary tenet, as well of Eastern religions as of the Platonism of the West, coincided with the somewhat ambiguous use of the term world in the sacred writings. Both were alike the irreclaimable domain of the Adversary of good. The importance assumed by the soul, now through Christianity become profoundly conscious of its immortality, *tended to the same end*. The deep and serious solicitude for the fate of that everlasting part of our being, the concentration of all its energies on its own individual welfare, withdrew it entirely within itself. A kind of sublime selfishness excluded all subordinate considerations.'

the merits of simple unconscious goodness; and *for the great importance and value of animal spirits, physical health, and a hearty enjoyment of all the pursuits and accomplishments which are connected with them.* We entirely agree with the first and last of these opinions; nor do we think that many persons would dissent from them, when stated categorically. *They are closely connected with the whole Protestant conception of life.*

* * * * *

‘The praise which Mr. Kingsley lavishes on athletic accomplishments is, we think, rather overdone.’ . . . The work criticised ‘is open to the objection, that, not content with asserting the value of bodily strength, it throws by implication a certain slur on *intellectual strength*, which, when all is said and done, is much more important. No doubt strong muscles and hardy nerves are of incalculable importance; but they *derive that importance from the mind of which they are the servants.*’ Jan. 1859, pp. 190–193.

It is evident, from the penultimate sentence, that the word ‘mind,’ at the end of this quotation, signifies ‘intellect’ in its ordinary English acceptation. The Reviewer himself, therefore, implies that intellect should be (to use Father Newman’s expression) the ‘hegemonicon’ in our nature. The notion of a higher principle, to which intellect, body, and other faculties shall be subservient, is contradictory to the whole drift of the passage.

We are bound to add the Reviewer’s qualification of his statements concerning Mr. Kingsley. He considers that that gentleman holds really the same opinion with himself, ‘and probably means his books to imply it;’ but he does not think ‘they would convey that impression to an ordinary reader.’ He also adds in a note, that Mr. Kingsley’s ‘Village Sermons’ appear to him ‘written in a somewhat different spirit’ from the novels.

It is said in the text (p. 51) that the great body of anti-Catholic thinkers, while stating or implying the doctrine that our perfection consists in the perfection of each part of our nature, lay far greater stress on intellectual than on moral perfection. We have just seen an instance of this in the ‘Edinburgh Review;’ and Sir W. Hamilton also, whose Lectures on Metaphysics happen for another reason to be in my hand (see Note C), affords an excellent illustration of the statement.

‘It is only in the accomplishment of his own perfection,’ says Sir William (p. 5), that man ‘as a creature can manifest the glory of his

Creator.' This, rightly understood and qualified, is a most true and Catholic proposition. But what does the author mean by 'the accomplishment of his perfection?' does he mean, what Catholics understand by the term, the acquiring an eagerness to know God's Will in every particular, and a promptitude to perform it? the acquiring an earnest and keen disposition towards God's love and service? the perfecting, in one word, of his moral and spiritual nature? Far indeed from it. Man's 'full perfection,' according to Sir W. Hamilton, 'consists' in the '*full and harmonious development of his individual faculties*' (p. 6). And he still further elucidates his meaning, in a passage which occurs a few pages later. 'Mental Philosophy,' he says (p. 14), is 'a mean principally, and almost exclusively, conducive to the *highest* education of our *noblest* powers;' 'by no other intellectual application,' he presently adds, are the mind's '*best* capacities so variously and intensely evolved.' He regards those, therefore, as our '*noblest*' powers, which receive their highest education from philosophical study; he regards those as the mind's '*best*' capacities, which by that study are variously and intensely evolved.

NOTE B.

ANSWER TO THEOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS, AND SOMEWHAT FULLER REMARKS ON THE CONSENT OF THEOLOGIANS.

WE WOULD beg the reader, before entering on this Note, to read what we have said in p. 27, on the meaning of our word 'perfection;' and it would be better, indeed, if he would look through the whole treatment of objections, as far as p. 38. I will also make the preliminary remark, that as this Appendix is to be theological, I will forbear as much as possible from using the word 'intellect,' as I have used it in the two Essays, in its ordinary and popular acceptation: I will rather adopt its Latinised form, 'intellectus,' and use that term in its theological and strict philosophical sense.

The passages quoted in p. 73, occur without exception where the respective authors are expressly treating on 'perfection;' nor can any thing be possibly clearer, than the conclusion which they indicate. Take St. Thomas. 'Every thing is more perfect, in proportion as it reaches its proper *end*: but it is *charity* which unites us to (God, who is) our last *End*;' therefore, of course, we are more perfect, in exact proportion as we have more charity. The other theologians quoted use the same argument; and when Suarez says that theologians in general agree with St. Thomas's doctrine, I suppose we may take for granted, that they also agree with the reason which he gives for that doctrine.* The later part of this Appendix will abundantly show, that objectors have been active in deriving, from every part of Theology, what they regard as difficulties in the way of my proposition: yet no one theologian has even been alleged as opposed to me, in any passage where he is formally treating of perfection, and has that question expressly and prominently in his thoughts.

* 'Theologi communiter, cum Divo Thomá, perfectionem vite Christianæ in solius caritatis perfectione constituunt.'—Suarez *de Perfectione*, lib. 1, c. 3. n. 3.

The following will be a second proof, how completely that which we have stated is the one recognised doctrine. No one will doubt, that 'the perfection of the Christian life' signifies simply moral and spiritual perfection. But theologians, in their whole treatment of perfection, invariably assume, quite as a matter of course, that the 'perfection of the Christian life' is simply synonymous with 'our' or 'man's' perfection. I will give a few specimens of this from St. Thomas; but no theologian will question the statement. Thus take the very passage just now cited. The one legitimate conclusion from St. Thomas's argument is 'our perfection is greater in proportion to our charity:' but he has himself expressed that conclusion somewhat differently; 'et ideò secundùm caritatem specialiter attenditur *perfectio Christianæ vitæ*.*' He assumes as a matter of course, that 'our perfection' is synonymous with 'perfection of the Christian life.' Again, the first article of this 184th question refers to 'perfectio vitæ Christianæ.' But in his short preface to the whole question, he expresses the same idea differently. He refers to 'the perfection of *this life*;' 'the perfection of *religious*;' 'the perfection of *bishops*;' 'him *who is perfect*;' 'those *who are perfect*.' † Indeed, this phrase, 'viri perfecti' is not at all uncommon in Theology; and (I believe) quite invariably signifies those, who have arrived at a certain state of *moral and spiritual* perfection. Take, almost at random, a passage which I found by referring to the index of Benedict XIV.'s works: 'martyres proculdubio *inter perfectos* sunt adnumerandi' (*de Canonizatione*, lib. 2, c. 31, n. 9). No one will attribute to the general body of martyrs the faintest or smallest degree of philosophical or scientific perfection; they are 'perfect' as being morally and spiritually perfect.

When we said in the Second Essay that St. Thomas does not seem even to imagine the notion of any intellectual quality being included in man's perfection, I was using the word 'intellectual,' of course, in the sense avowedly affixed to it, throughout the two Essays. I meant that the notion never occurs to him, of

* Why does St. Thomas add the word 'specialiter?' Suarez no doubt is correct in saying, that it has the same meaning, which 'essentialiter' has in article 3: '*essentialiter* consistit perfectio Christianæ vitæ in caritate, *instrumentaliter* in consiliis, quæ ordinantur ad caritatem.'

† 'Circa statum *perfectorum*;' 'De his quæ pertinent ad *perfectionem episcoporum* [et] *religiosorum*;' 'Utrùm *perfectio hujus vitæ* consistat in consiliis vel in præceptis;' 'Utrùm aliquis *possit esse perfectus* in hâc vitâ;' 'Utrùm quicunque *est perfectus* sit in statu perfectionis.'

including in man's perfection any philosophical or scientific power, whether natural or acquired. Indeed, if we look at his system as a whole, we shall be a great deal struck with the very inferior position which he assigns to such power: a circumstance deriving immeasurably greater importance from the well-known fact, that he is so unhesitating a follower of Aristotle, on all questions which he regards as purely philosophical. There is a certain enlargement and illumination of mind, which Father Newman most justly regards as constituting the perfection of 'intellect,' if that word be used in its ordinary and popular acceptation. See e.g. note to p. 62. This illumination of mind seems to me very much the same thing with what St. Thomas counts as the *virtus intellectualis* called wisdom: * let us consider, therefore, how high or how low a place he allots to this, among the various *habitus intellectuales*. He divides mental habits, whether of *intellectus* or of *will*, into four classes. First in excellence come the theological virtues: next he places the '*dona Spiritûs Sancti*;' which are habits disposing the soul to be readily influenced by the Holy Ghost: † lastly, the *virtutes intellectuales et morales*.‡ First in dignity, then, among *habitus intellectuales*, is that which, alone of the theological virtues, resides in the *intellectus*; I mean, of course, faith. Next in dignity, among these *habitus intellectuales*, come those four *dona intellectualia*, which dispose man to being easily moved by the Holy Ghost. All these five qualities, as is evident, are most intimately concerned with moral and spiritual perfection; they grow with its growth and strengthen with its strength: and these, in St. Thomas's system, take precedence of that *virtus intellectualis* which he calls wisdom. Nay, he denies that this latter can be called '*simpliciter*' a virtue at all; but only '*secundùm quid*.' §

* '*Sapientia . . . convenienter judicat et ordinat de omnibus; quia judicium perfectum et universale non potest haberi, nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas.*' 1^a 2^m, q. 57, a. 2, 0. '*Sapientia habet judicium de omnibus aliis virtutibus intellectualibus, et ejus est ordinare omnes, et ipsa est quasi architectonica respectu omnium.*'—q. 66, a. 5, 0.

† '*Oportet . . . homini inesse altiores perfectiones, secundùm quas sit dispositus ad hoc, quòd divinitus moveatur: et istæ perfectiones vocantur dona, . . . quia secundùm ea homo disponitur, ut efficiatur promptè mobilis ab inspiratione divinâ.*'—1^a 2^m, q. 68, a. 1, 0.

‡ '*Virtutes theologice præferuntur donis Spiritûs Sancti: . . . sed si comparemus dona ad alias virtutes intellectuales vel morales, dona præferuntur virtutibus.*'—1^a 2^m, q. 68, a. 8, 0.

§ '*Subjectum habitûs qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi voluntas, vel aliqua potentia secundùm quòd est mota à voluntate: . . . et hoc*

And here we shall make our point clearer, if we notice an objection, which has been urged against this proposition. One of the *bona*, as well as one of the *virtutes intellectuales*, is called wisdom; and it has been urged, that this donum is no other than that philosophical enlargement of mind, on which Father Newman insists. But nothing can be more express than St. Thomas's words, in opposition to any such idea. There is undoubtedly a certain correctness of judgment on divine matters, which arises from a perfect use of reason; but this, in St. Thomas's view, appertains exclusively to wisdom the *virtus intellectualis*. The correct judgment on them, inspired by wisdom the *donum*, is entirely that which arises from our personal charity and heavenly-mindedness.* Look again at Father Lallemand's beautiful description of this donum. 'The gift of wisdom,' he says, 'is such knowledge of God, His attributes, and mysteries, as is full of flavour.' † Surely no one will allege, that this gift is in

modo intellectus speculativus est subjectum *fidei*; . . . intellectus verò practicus *prudencia*.' 'Primi verò habitus [sc. intellectuales] non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, quia . . . non simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem; non enim dicitur simpliciter aliquis homo bonus ex hoc quòd est sciens vel artifex, sed dicitur . . . bonus grammaticus aut bonus faber.'—1^a 2^e, q. 56, a. 3, 0.

* 'Sapientia importat quandam rectitudinem iudicii circa res divinas. Rectitudo autem iudicii potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo *secundum perfectum usum rationis*; alio modo propter *connaturalitatem quandam* ad ea de quibus jam est iudicandum: sicut de his quæ ad castitatem pertinent, per rationis inquisitionem iudicat ille qui didicit scientiam moralem; sed per quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsam, rectè de eis iudicat qui habet habitum castitatis. Sic ergo circa res divinas: *ex rationis inquisitione* rectum iudicium habere, pertinet ad sapientiam quæ est *virtus intellectualis*; sed *rectum iudicium habere de eis secundum quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsas*, pertinet ad sapientiam secundum quòd *donum* est. . . . Hujusmodi autem compassio seu connaturalitas ad res divinas fit *per caritatem*.'—2^a 2^e, q. 45, a. 2, 0.

'Sapientia, de quâ loquimur, non potest esse cum peccato mortali.'—ib. a. 4, 0.

† 'The understanding,' he proceeds [*i.e.* the donum intellectus], 'only conceives and penetrates. Wisdom judges and compares; it enables us to see causes, reasons, fitnesses; it represents to us God, His greatness, His beauty, His perfections, His mysteries, as *infinitely adorable and worthy of love*; and from this knowledge there results a *delicious taste*, which sometimes even extends to the body, and is greater or less according to the state of perfection and purity to which the soul has attained

'It is to the gift of wisdom that *spiritual sweetnesses and consolations and sensible graces belong*. . . . The taste of wisdom is sometimes so perfect, that a person, who is possessed of it, on hearing two propositions, the one formed by reasoning, the other inspired by God, will at once *distinguish between the two*; recognising that which comes from God, "per quandam objecti connaturalitatem."

any respect the same quality with that philosophical enlargement of mind, which Father Newman most truly deems the end of liberal education *as such*; and of which he again and again declares, that it is wholly distinct from moral and spiritual excellence.

We have been the more desirous of enlarging somewhat on St. Thomas's doctrine, because some Catholics have a vague notion, that he attaches special value to 'intellectual exercises,' in our ordinary sense of that term; i. e. to exercises of a philosophical and scientific character.

And now, in returning to his doctrine on perfection, I make one further remark. I have already said, that the notion never occurs to him, of any philosophical or scientific power having any kind of part in man's perfection. Still no one can doubt that, according to his doctrine, various *habitus intellectuales* are most intimately bound up with it; that they ordinarily increase, in proportion as that charity increases, which is the essential constituent of perfection. This undoubtedly holds (1) of faith; (2) of the various *dona intellectualia*; and (3) of prudence. Yet it is truly remarkable how little he says about these habits, and how almost exclusively he dwells on charity and the evangelical counsels. Still more remarkable is it, that in treating of the contemplative life, he quotes with agreement the statement of St. Gregory the Great, that such life *consists* in charity.* It has only a remote bearing indeed on our theme (if it has any at all), to consider the relative excellence of intellectus and will; yet as we have come so near to that subject, we may be allowed a very few words concerning it. Let such facts as these be considered: facts admitted quite as fully by St. Thomas, as by Scotus himself. The highest of all virtues is charity, a virtue of the will. The will possesses freedom of choice, and is accordingly the one origin of merit; while the intellectus is necessitated in its various operations. On our will, and on no other of our faculties, depends our eternal destiny: on our will it depends, in what degree we shall coöperate with grace, and in what fullness we shall correspond with God's vocation. Let such facts as these be well considered, and I cannot

turalitatem." . . . 'Wisdom so fills the soul with a taste for goodness and the love of virtue, that it no longer feels anything but disgust for other objects.'—*Spiritual Doctrine*, principle 4, chap. iv.

* 'Propter hoc Gregorius constituit vitam contemplativam in caritate Dei; inquantum scilicet aliquis, ex dilectione Dei, *inardescit ad Ejus pulchritudinem conspiciendam.*'—2^a 2^m, q. 180, a. 1, 0.

but think that Scotus's doctrine will be accepted as the truer, which regards the will as a higher and nobler faculty than the intellectus. I suppose St. Thomas's deference to Aristotle was so absolute on philosophical matters, that he never even permitted himself to entertain the question; yet he is not unfrequently led, by the very exigences of Christian Doctrine, to use language which at least *appears* of very opposite tendency to Aristotle's. Thus, as we have already seen (see note to p. 58), he says (from Aristotle) that intellectus is higher than will; yet he adds (*not* from Aristotle) that it is a less high act to contemplate God than to love Him. Again he says (from Aristotle) that the virtutes intellectuales are more noble than the moral virtues; yet he adds (*not* from Aristotle) that the moral virtues are *simply* virtues, and that the virtutes intellectuales are only 'virtutes secundum quid.*' And other similar instances might be given.

We have now spoken sufficiently, on the consent of theologians in behalf of our proposition, that man's perfection consists exclusively in his moral and spiritual perfection. I have next to answer the objections, which have been zealously and ingeniously collected from various parts of theology, in antagonism to this proposition. One of them indeed has been answered a few paragraphs back; and the rest I will now proceed to consider.

Secondly, then, a passage of Billuart has been objected, in which 'perfectio naturæ quam Filius assumpsit' is stated to include perfectio intellectualis and a certain bodily perfection also. I have no doubt that the same phrase is to be found in very many theologians, with the same meaning; but a moment's consideration will show how irrelevant is the objection. Our Blessed Lord of course has, and can have, no other *Personal* Perfection (in the sense in which we have been using the term), excepting His Divine Perfections; since He possesses human nature indeed, but no human personality. Such a passage therefore is actually serviceable, in answering other imaginable objections; since it shows, that the phrase 'perfectio naturæ' is used by theologians to express, not personal perfection, but perfection of the various parts which constitute our nature.†

* Suarez says of these two statements, 'hæ duo partes conclusionis *videntur inter se pugnare*;' though he tries to explain away the repugnance.—*De Virtutibus*, d. 3, s. 2, n. 2.

† I am bound however to state, that my first Essay, as I read it, contained

Thirdly, it has been objected that our Blessed Lady, and also Adam before the Fall, were most highly endowed with excellences of the intellectus. Now, as I have already said, there are various excellences of the intellectus, which are most intimately bound up with moral and spiritual perfection: I mean the possession in a high degree of faith, of the four *dona intellectualia*, and of prudence. It is the *virtutes intellectuales* other than prudence, which are *not* thus connected with spiritual perfection. The question therefore is, whether these *virtutes intellectuales* are represented by theologians, as being in any kind of way an integral part of M^{ary}'s and of Adam's personal perfection. And it so happens, that we can give a most conclusive answer to this question; for Billuart quotes with agreement St. Antoninus's judgment, that Adam had them in a higher degree than Mary.* Consider the place assigned to Mary by Catholic theologians, a place so immeasurably exalted above that of any other creature; and estimate by that consideration the extravagance of supposing, that any of them could place Adam above Mary, in any particular appertaining ever so distantly to her personal perfection.

The fourth objection is founded on a doctrine, held by a large number of theologians, that if A's intellectus exceeds B's in perspicacity and vigour, and if both are gifted with the same degree of 'lumen gloriæ,' A will see God more perfectly than B. I will call this the Scotist doctrine: not as being peculiar to the Scotists; but because it originated (I believe) with Scotus and is universally held in his school, while it is universally opposed by the opposite school, the Thomistical. This Scotist doctrine, however,

in several places the expression 'perfection of our nature' or 'of human nature,' to express 'our perfection' or 'human perfection.' Against the use of these *phrases*, the objection before us is undoubtedly valid; as showing that they are used by theologians in quite a different sense. I had myself adopted them, merely to vary my expression; for the context in every case (which I have not altered in the slightest degree) will show, that the idea intended was simply that of personal perfection. My *language* is now in as complete accordance with theological authority, as my *thoughts* were from the first.

* 'Utrum Adam fuerit omnium hominum *sapientissimus*?

De B. Virgine posset esse dubium, quod sic resolvimus cum S. Antonino. Quantum ad notitiam rerum supernaturalium et theologiarum, majorem habuit B. Virgo quam Adam. Quantum verò ad notitiam rerum materialium et civilium, majorem habuit Adam quam B. Virgo; quia inter eas res plures sunt, quas B. Virginem scire nihil referebat, et *quæ in eâ fuissent superflue*.—*De opere sex dierum*, diss. 4, a. 2.

may imaginably develop itself into two different shapes, which are most importantly contrasted with each other. It may imaginably be thought, that if A and B have accumulated on earth equal merits, they will receive in Heaven equal lumen gloriæ, and that A (having the keener intellectus) will see God more perfectly than B. It may be urged with some plausibility, that the Scotist doctrine, *if held in this particular shape*, is inconsistent with the proposition which I have advocated through the two Essays. For on this view, supposing B's *will* to have exerted itself as excellently as A's will, and equal merits to have been thus obtained, the keener intellectus would obtain the greater beatitude; and it might appear therefore, that such natural keenness of intellectus is an integral part of human perfection. But the Scotist doctrine may also be held quite differently. It may be fully admitted, that if A and B have equal merits, they will see God with equal perfection; but it may be held that this equality will be preserved, by God giving less lumen gloriæ to the keener intellectus, or by some other analogous mode.* In this latter shape, the doctrine has been held by very many theologians, and every Catholic has the fullest liberty to embrace it: but then, if thus held, I cannot imagine what objection it furnishes against me. I will therefore confine my attention to the former of these two shapes, which the Scotist doctrine may imaginably assume.

The objection then will run thus. 'Some theologians maintain the thesis, that of two men with equal merits, he who possesses the keener intellectus will see God more perfectly. But this thesis contradicts the proposition, that man's perfection consists exclusively in perfection of his moral and spiritual nature. It cannot therefore be maintained, that this last proposition (whether true or no) is implied as *certain* by Catholic doctrine and practice.' I am now to argue against this objection.

And I at once reply confidently, that the thesis alleged is theolo-

* 'Aliqui . . . docent, intellectum minùs perfectum habere à Deo majus lumen . . . si merita sint æqualia, ut possint æqualem visionem habere. Alii . . . utrumque intellectum habere æquale lumen, sed intellectum minùs perfectum magis à Deo elevari extrinsecè, et sic visionem utriusque esse æqualem. Alii . . . Deum impedire, ne lumen collatum intellectui perfectiori causet visionem perfectiorem.'—Viva *de Deo*, disp. 2, q. 4. n. 16.

Scotus himself is express in maintaining this. 'Si in dispari intellectu reperitur habitus luminis æquè perfectus, *parem fore visionem utriusque*; quia perfectior intellectus non aget toto conatu.'—Apud Montefortino, 1, q. 12, a. 6, ad 4.

gically unsound; even if it do not deserve a still severer censure. My direct reason for this statement, is the singularly clear and unequivocal decree put forth by the Council of Florence. That Council teaches, that those men who gain Heaven 'intueri clarè Ipsum Deum, Unum et Trinum, sicuti est: *pro meritorum tamen diversitate, alium alio perfectiùs*' (Denz, n. 588). On two subsequent occasions, certain Easterns, desirous of admission into the Catholic Church, were required to use these very words, in their explicit profession of faith (n. 870, n. 875). No Catholic can be permitted, in defiance of this decree, to maintain that the superior perfectness in Heaven of one man's Vision over another's, depends on anything except superiority of merit.

But there is a second reason also, which proves the thesis before us to be theologically unsound; viz. the *sensus fidelium*. The great body of well-instructed Catholics have learned, quite as a first principle, that our reward will be simply proportioned to our merits. I doubt if there is any one Catechism, expounding doctrine in any degree of detail, which does not state this truth as a matter of course; as a most certain and unquestioned part of Catholic doctrine.

To all this it is replied, that certain theologians of name and repute have nevertheless maintained the thesis, and have not been censured for doing so. But, before rejoicing on this reply, we make two preliminary remarks. First, that those who maintain the thesis are extremely few in number. I ground this statement, not merely on my own personal impression, but on two facts. F. Compton Carleton S.J. speaks of theologians as being *unanimously* against it.* And Mastrius, a very able Scotist who maintains it, is only able to quote six names in its behalf; not one (I think) being of any conspicuous eminence: Faber, Smisingius, Gallus, Poncius, Hiquæus, Lusitanus: (in 1 *Sent.* disp. vi. n. 192). My second preliminary remark is, that the Council of Florence speaks exclusively of human beings; it states that one *man* sees God more perfectly than another, according to the diversity of merits.† But those few

* 'Hoc theologorum omnium sententiæ adversatur, qui planè renuunt concedere Deum, qui præmium reddit ex justitiâ et instar coronæ, dare meritis æqualibus inæquale præmium.'—Disp. 16, s. 2, n. 10.

† It speaks in the context of those who 'after Baptism have incurred no stain of sin,' and of those who, 'having contracted such, have undergone their full purgation.'

theologians who advocate the thesis, are in general thinking principally, not of a comparison between one man and another, but between a man and an angel. The only writers with whom I happen to be acquainted, who hold the thesis which I oppose, are Viva, Henno, Frassen, and Mastrius. Now of the three former at least, what we have said is obviously true. Viva, in stating his question, asks, whether, for instance, an Angel sees God more clearly than a man, if both have equal lumen: and he uses no other instance throughout his argument.* Henno states it as the 'vulgaris philosophorum sententia,' that all *human* intellectus are equal; and if this opinion be admitted, of course the question cannot relate at all to a comparison between one *man's* beatitude and another's. Henno himself however seems rather to doubt this 'vulgaris sententia.' Frassen's remarks are altogether similar to Henno's.† This circumstance enables us to account for a fact, which is otherwise perplexing. Both Suarez and Billuart (to mention no others) oppose this thesis altogether, as theologically unsound: yet neither of them quotes the Council of Florence in opposition. The reason of this is now manifest. The Council of Florence would only tell against the thesis, so far as it concerns a comparison between one man and another; but Suarez and Billuart, as their grounds of opposition show, maintain it to be unsound, even as it concerns that comparison between men and angels, which their opponents have mainly in view. Suarez says, that this thesis is *inconsistent with*

* 'Difficultas nunc est, utrùm visionum et beatitudinis inæqualitas unicò oriatur ex inæqualitate luminis elevantis, an etiam provenire possit ab inæqualitate intellectuum; ut proinde clariùs Deum videat angelus quàm homo, si uterque æquali lumine eleventur.'—*De Deo*, disp. 2, q. 4, n. 10.

And so throughout. Thus: 'ergo intellectus angelicus cum æquali lumine producit visionem perfectiorem quàm humanus,' &c. &c.—n. 11.

† 'Vult quidem Florentinum, quòd ubi sunt intellectus æqualis omninò perfectionis (*quales esse omnes intellectus humanos supponit vulgaris philosophorum sententia* et fortè etiam ipsum Concilium) &c. &c. . . . non tamen id definit, simpliciter, in supposito quòd intellectus sint inæqualis perfectionis: *quales sunt intellectus humanus et angelicus, et fortè etiam duo intellectus humani.*'—Henno *de Deo*, q. 4, disp. 9, concl. 2.

'Ad Concilium Florentinum dico, ipsum esse intelligendum de facto, et secundùm *vulgarem sententiam philosophorum*, asserentium substantias spirituales non habere majores vel minores gradus perfectionis; proindeque nullum intellectum esse *ex se* magis activum alio, sed tantùm ratione dispositionis organorum *dum corpori conjungitur.*'—Frassen.

the principles of faith; and Billuart, that it leads necessarily to a conclusion which is *worse than Pelagian*.*

It is urged that certain theologians of name and repute have nevertheless maintained this thesis, and have not been censured for doing so. Now I would first remind the reader of the 27th proposition, condemned by Alexander VII. ‘Si liber sit alicujus junioris et moderni, debet opinio censeri probabilis, dum non constet rejectam esse à sede Apostolicâ tanquam improbabilem.’ We most willingly admit, that the principle, which underlies the present objection, is very far from going the length of the condemned proposition. Yet surely it tends in that direction. And Viva, one of those writers whose opinion on the thesis before us I treat with disrespect, gives me very good ground for doing so, in his admirable commentary on the above proposition. Among other excellent remarks, are these :

‘Ut opinio aliqua ob solam auctoritatem extrinsecam dici possit probabilis, debet pondus auctoritatis esse grave, tum secundum se, tum etiam *comparativè ad auctoritates quæ stant pro sententiâ oppositâ* . . . *Experientiâ teste, auctores moderni non rarò hallucinantur, sicut etiam antiqui non semel hallucinati sunt; etenim pæne omnes proscriptæ propositiones, antequàm à Pontifice damnarentur, auctoritate non unius duntaxat aut ex modernis aut ex antiquis fulciebantur: et tamen doctores communiter, etiam ante condemnationem Pontificiam, damnabant illas ut improbabiles et falsas.*—n. 3.

‘Neque obstat, quòd libri, ante quàm in lucem prodeant, *sub oculos censorum cadant*. Sæpe enim librorum censors . . . non pollent eâ perspicaciâ quæ valeat opinionum laxitates taxare, et pondus rationum, juxta meritum, librare.’—n. 4.

It may be said, indeed, that though the thesis be not probable, we have no right on that account to call it unsound. Yet it is evident that neither Suarez nor Billuart had any hesitation whatever in doing so.

In these non-theological days, it is somewhat difficult to realise the unintermitting activity, with which, some two hundred years ago (not to speak of earlier times) a multitude of able men devoted their whole mental energy to an exploration of scholastic questions.

* ‘Respondent aliqui, non esse inconveniens, ut qui habet æqualia merita perfectiùs videat ex perfectione et activitate sibi connaturali . . . Sed hæc responsio est *parùm consona principiis fidei*: quia visio beatifica datur ut *merces filiorum Dei*, et idèò fieri non potest, ut aliquis absque pluribus meritis et majori gratiâ perfectiùs videat.’—Suarez *de Deo*, lib. ii. c. 21, n. 5.

‘Sequeretur [ex hâc sententiâ] aliquem gradum gloriæ non correspondere gratiæ sed naturæ; et hominem per naturalia se discernere in spiritualibus: activitas enim et perspicacia major intellectûs creati . . . est beneficium naturæ et non gratiæ. Atqui hoc est contra [Scripturam], immò, *ut advertunt theologî, est plûs quàm Pelagianum: pejus enim est,*’ &c.—Billuart *de Deo*, diss. 4, a. 8.

The number of theological conclusions (good, bad, and indifferent), which thus sprang up, is incredibly vast. One of these conclusions is fixed upon, which was advocated no doubt by theologians of name and mark, but by extremely few of them ;* which has been altogether confined to the scholastic arena, and never so much as heard of by the mass of well-educated Catholics. No one ever dreams of alleging, that it was ever brought before the Holy Father's notice. But because he did not, *motu proprio*, single it out and condemn it, we are desired to infer that it enjoys his tacit acquiescence ; and that this is ground sufficient, for our refusing the submission of faith to a direct definition of the Church, in its one straightforward and unequivocal meaning. We are very confident that no one on reflection will adhere to such a principle as this. Innocent XI.,—when condemning a third series of lax propositions, and dealing with a class of theories which for many years had occupied the most special attention of himself, of his predecessor, and of their theological examiners,—yet guards himself against being supposed to *approve* any proposition, which he does not expressly *condemn*.† But how vastly *more* unreasonable would it be, to suppose any kind of tacit approval in such a case as the present. I take my ground then on the definition of Florence.

And this ground becomes even stronger (if indeed greater strength were possible) by considering the strange shifts to which those theologians resort, who reject the plain sense of this definition. Let us repeat its words. The Council decrees, that the souls of men, after death or purgatorial suffering as the case may be, '*intueri Deum Trinum et Unum sicuti est: pro meritorum tamen diversitate alium*

* Ripalda has been objected to as holding the thesis in question ; but on a careful examination of the sections quoted, I find the case to be quite otherwise. He does not so much as allude to the comparison between one *man* and another, nor accordingly does he refer to the Council of Florence at all. His own statement of his subject is as follows. '*Quærimus an actus supernaturales angelici necessariò sint perfectiores humanis (quòd à facultate naturali procedant essentialiter perfectiori), etiamsi cætera paria sint.*'—*De Ente Supern.* disp. 37, proœmium. And even as to *this* comparison, he considers that if an angel and a man have equal merits, they are also precisely equal as to their beatitude, and as to the explicitness with which they see the Divine Nature ; though in certain other respects, the angel's act of Vision is superior to the man's.

† '*Non intendens Sanctitas Sua, per hoc decretum, alias propositiones, in ipso non expressas, et Sanctitati Suæ . . . exhibitas vel exhibendas, ullatenus approbare.*' Die 2 Martii 1679.

alio perfectiùs.' Viva replies, that the inequality of vision is proportioned to the inequality of merit, *so far forth as the Vision is a reward*; but that *materially* it also depends on the inequality of intellectus: to which of course the obvious rejoinder lies, that the word 'reward' is not contained in the definition at all. Henno and Frassen treat the subject altogether similarly with each other, Frassen but expanding Henno's arguments. They give two different explanations of the decree. First, they say, it proceeds on the philosophical hypothesis commonly received, that human souls, separated from the body, are equal to each other in natural power. We have already explained how completely we admit, that the definition of Florence applies only to a comparison of man with man, not of man with angel: but as Henno and Frassen are unwilling, even on the comparison of man with man, to accept unreservedly its obvious sense, they proceed to give another explanation. Unequal merit, says Frassen, is one cause of unequal Vision, but *only* one cause; unequal intellectus (for anything the decree says) may be another. A notable interpretation indeed! according to which it would follow, that I should not be contradicting the Council, if I maintained that our bodily health while on earth, our good family, our acquired wealth, are all so many causes of increased beatitude. But the most wonderful explanation of all is to be found in Mastrius: insomuch that were he not so considerable a theologian, we should be tempted to think he was indulging in a kind of jest. He quotes against himself Scripture, Fathers, and the Council of Florence; but replies, that those merits, on which the degree of beatitude depends, are partly indeed those of the beatus himself, but *partly those of Christ*. This, to explain not merely Scripture and Fathers, but the express words of Florence, '*pro meritorum diversitate alium alio perfectiùs*'!!!* Truly we may study to some extent in the past, that

* "Beati vident Deum inæqualiter pro diversitate meritorum, quatenus solum pro diversitate meritorum visiones, *in quantum sunt formaliter præmia*, sunt inæquales" concedo: "ita ut non possint esse *præmium materialiter inæquale pro diversitate intellectuum*" nego antec. et conseq. . . Ratio autem eus sic explicanda sint verba Concilii, est, quia hoc fert connaturalitas luminis gloriæ, quòd causet visionem perfectiorem eum intellectu perfectiori, verba autem conciliorum . . . explicanda semper sunt in sensu excludente miraculum, quoad ejus fieri potest.—Viva *de Deo*, d. 2. n. 16.

'Vult quidem Florentinum quòd ubi sunt duo intellectus æqualis omninò perfectionis, (quales esse omnes intellectus humanos supponit vulgaris philosophorum sententia, et fortè etiam ipsummet Concilium) unus altero perfectiùs Deum videat si majora sint merita, quia gloria datur proportionatè ad merita.

process of explaining away the Church's definitions, which I have prognosticated (pp. 47-49), as not unlikely to be attempted on a far larger scale in time to come. It is no exaggeration at all to say, that if such artifices were permitted, an Arian might subscribe the Nicene Creed, and a Lutheran accept the decrees of Trent.

We repeat therefore, that the Council of Florence requires at our hands the submission of faith, in its obvious and unequivocal sense; a sense contradictory to that thesis, which has been alleged in objection to my argument. We cannot indeed admit that, even were the thesis permissible, the objection founded on it would possess any force or validity; but the thesis is so indubitably unsound, that it would be useless to pursue the matter further.

It may be better to add, that I am very far indeed from wishing to speak with any *general* disrespect, of the four theologians whom I have noticed. Towards Viva and Mastrius in particular, I entertain the sincerest admiration and gratitude. But it is fully consistent with such feelings to say, that in this one instance at least, they have not been proof against the temptation (so specially seductive to a scholastic mind) of following too eagerly and unreservedly their private philosophical theories; and of not pausing fairly to consider, what the Church has really determined.

Non tamen id definit simpliciter, in supposito quò intellectus sint inæqualis perfectionis; quales sunt intellectus humanus et angelicus, et fortè etiam duo intellectus humani: quia hoc nihil faciebat ad ejus intentum; quod erat ostendere, majoribus meritis majorem reddi gloriam, minorem minoribus: quod et stat in nostrâ sententiâ.—Henno *de Deo*, disp. 4, q. 9, concl. 2.

‘Ad Concilium Florentinum dico, ipsum esse intelligendum de facto et secundum vulgarem sententiam philosophorum, asserentium substantias spirituales non habere majores vel minores gradus perfectionis; proindeque nullum intellectum esse ex se magis activum et vegetiorem altero, sed tantum ratione dispositionis organorum dum corpori conjungitur. Vel Concilium tantum assignare voluit causam sufficientem inæqualis beatitudinis, *non verò omnimodam*; sicut v. g. solito dicitur hominem clariùs videre altero, quia habet clariores et perfectiores oculos; licèt clarior visio nedum ex parte oculi vegetioris, sed etiam ex parte majoris luminis et præstantioris speciei visibilis interdum oriatur.’—Frassen *de Deo*, disp. 3, a. 7, s. 4, q. 2.

‘Urgent adversarii unum absurdum sequi, majus omnibus illis, quia secundum Scripturas et Patres visio datur ut merces meritis correspondens . . . quod confirmat Concilium Florentinum, dicens visionem esse perfectiorem pro ratione meritorum . . .

‘Opus non [est] ut tota visio respondeat *solis meritis propriis ipsius beati*, sed *vel propriis, vel Christi ex opere operato applicatis*.’—Mastrius *de Deo*, disp. 6, n. 202.

NOTE C.

ON A PASSAGE FROM SIR W. HAMILTON'S LECTURES ON
METAPHYSICS.

AN objector considers that in p. 82 Sir W. Hamilton's drift has been seriously misunderstood. The whole argument on which I have insisted, from that part of the Essay onwards, is altogether independent of the passage in question; and I might most easily therefore obviate the objection, by omitting the whole reference. But since a subsequent perusal has only confirmed our original opinion, that Sir William's meaning is most clearly and indubitably as we have represented it, we have thought it much better to retain our criticism and vindicate its justice. I will begin therefore by placing the whole passage before the reader, exactly as it stands in the original.

'In speculative knowledge, on the other hand, there may indeed, at first sight, seem greater difficulty; but further reflection will prove that speculative truth is only pursued, and is only held of value, for the sake of intellectual activity: "*Sordet cognita veritas*" is a shrewd aphorism of Seneca. A truth, once known, falls into comparative insignificance. It is now prized less on its own account than as opening up new ways to new activity, new suspense, new hopes, new discoveries, new self-gratulation. Every votary of science is wilfully ignorant of a thousand established facts,—of a thousand which he might make his own more easily than he could attempt the discovery of even one. But it is not knowledge,—it is not truth,—that he principally seeks; he seeks the exercise of his faculties and feelings; and, as in following after the one he exerts a greater amount of pleasurable energy than in taking formal possession of the thousand, he disdains the certainty of the many, and prefers the chances of the one. Accordingly, the sciences always studied with keenest interest are those in a state of progress and uncertainty: absolute certainty and absolute completion would be the paralysis of any study; and the last worst calamity that could befall man, as he is at present constituted, would be that full and final possession of speculative truth, which he now vainly anticipates as the consummation of his intellectual happiness.

"*Quæsitivæ cælo lucem, ingemuitque repertâ.*"

'But what is true of science is true, indeed, of all human activity. "In life," as the great Pascal observes, "we always believe that we are seeking repose,

while, in reality, all that we ever seek is agitation." When Pyrrhus proposed to subdue a part of the world, and then to enjoy rest among his friends, he believed that what he sought was possession, not pursuit; and Alexander assuredly did not foresee that the conquest of one world would only leave him to weep for another world to conquer. It is ever the contest that pleases us, and not the victory. Thus it is in play; thus it is in hunting; thus it is in the search of truth; thus it is in life. The past does not interest, the present does not satisfy, the future alone is the object which engages us.

[*Nulla votorum fine beati*]

Victuros agimus semper, nec vivimus unquam."

"Man never is, but always to be blest."

'The question, I said, has never been regularly discussed,—probably because it lay in too narrow a compass; but no philosopher appears to have ever seriously proposed it to himself, who did not resolve it in contradiction to the ordinary opinion. A contradiction of this opinion is even involved in the very term Philosophy; and the man who first declared that he was not a *σοφός*, or possessor, but a *φιλόσοφος*, or seeker of truth, at once enounced the true end of human speculation, and embodied it in a significant name. Under the same conviction Plato defines man "the hunter of truth," for science is a chase, and in a chase the pursuit is always of greater value than the game.

"Our hopes, like towering falcons, aim
At objects in an airy height;
But all the pleasure of the game
Is afar off to view the fight."

"The intellect," says Aristotle, in one passage, "is perfected, not by knowledge but by activity;" and in another, "The arts and sciences are powers, but every power exists only for the sake of action; the end of philosophy, therefore, is not knowledge, but the energy conversant about knowledge." Descending to the schoolmen: "The intellect," says Aquinas, "commences in operation, and in operation it ends;" and Scotus even declares that a man's knowledge is measured by the amount of his mental activity—"tantum scit homo, quantum operatur." The profoundest thinkers of modern times have emphatically testified to the same great principle. "If," says Malebranche, "I held truth captive in my hand, I should open my hand and let it fly, in order that I might again pursue and capture it." "Did the Almighty," says Lessing, "holding in his right hand *Truth*, and in his left *Search after Truth*, deign to tender me the one I might prefer,—in all humility, but without hesitation, I should request *Search after Truth*." "Truth," says Von Müller, "is the property of God, the pursuit of truth is what belongs to man;" and Jean Paul Richter: "It is not the goal, but the course, which makes us happy." But there would be no end of similar quotations.

'But if speculative truth itself be only valuable as a mean of intellectual activity, those studies which determine the faculties to a more vigorous exertion will, in every liberal sense, be better entitled, absolutely, to the name of useful, than those which, with a greater complement of more certain facts, awaken them to a less intense, and consequently to a less improving, exercise. On this ground I would rest one of the præminent utilities of mental philosophy. That

it comprehends all the sublimest objects of our theoretical and moral interest ; that every (natural) conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and the future destiny of man, is exclusively deduced from the philosophy of mind, will be at once admitted. But I do not at present find the importance on the paramount dignity of the pursuit. It is as the best gymnastic of the mind,—as a mean, principally, and almost exclusively, conducive to the highest education of our noblest powers, that I would vindicate to these speculations the necessity which has too frequently been denied them.’—*Lectures on Metaphysics*, pp. 10–14.

The first question to be answered is this: what does the author intend by ‘speculative knowledge?’ I reply, that he intends one or other of these two things; and it is quite immaterial to my purpose, which. He may possibly use the term in a larger sense, to include a scientific knowledge of physical facts. Or else (which is more probable) he may confine his meaning to metaphysical and psychological knowledge, in the largest sense of those terms; so far at least as such knowledge is derived from natural (as distinct from supernaturally revealed) data.* At all events, the pursuit of ‘speculative knowledge’ very prominently includes a study of that ‘mental philosophy,’ from which ‘every natural conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and the future destiny of man, is exclusively deduced.’ (See last paragraph of the above passage.) It is important to make this point clear, because of a paragraph immediately preceding the passage which I have quoted.

‘Knowledge is either practical or speculative. In practical knowledge it is evident that truth is not the ultimate end; for in that case knowledge is, ex hypothesi, for the sake of application. The knowledge of a moral, of a political, of a religious, truth, is of value only as it affords the preliminary or condition of its exercise.

‘In speculative knowledge, on the other hand,’ &c. as above.

A reader, unacquainted with Sir William’s system, might suppose that in this paragraph he is speaking of practical *philosophy*, as distinct from speculative. But nothing can be more alien from his drift, than such an interpretation. For this statement of mine (as it is essential to my argument that the point be made clear), I will give three different reasons, any one of which would be sufficient. First, in this very volume (p. 113), he ‘regards the division of *philosophy* into *theoretical* and *practical* as *unsound*.’ Secondly, in the paragraph just quoted, he speaks of a ‘moral’ and a ‘political

* My chief reason for thinking the latter sense more probable, is a passage in p. 121. ‘Science and philosophy are conversant either about mind or about matter. *The former of these is philosophy properly so called.*’

truth.' But 'moral and political *philosophy*' are expressly mentioned by him in p. 125 as branches of 'rational psychology;' which every one will call a speculative science, if there be such in the world. Thirdly, in the paragraph just quoted he also speaks of a 'religious truth.' But in the passage which I am mainly criticising, he includes 'mental philosophy' under the head of 'speculative truth:' and then expressly says, that from this mental philosophy, 'every natural conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and future destiny of man, is exclusively deduced.' So far, therefore, as religious truth is obtainable from philosophy *at all*, it is obtainable (according to our author) from *speculative* philosophy.

Sir W. Hamilton's meaning therefore, in the paragraph last quoted, is abundantly clear. He is not speaking therein of those who are investigating 'moral, political, and religious truth' *scientifically*; but of those who desire it for purely practical purposes, and seek to obtain it (as occasion arises) from any accessible source. Under the head of speculative knowledge, therefore (to repeat what I have already said), he is speaking either of all philosophical knowledge, or of all except physical science.

So much, then, having been determined, a second question arises: have I in my Essay correctly stated the author's doctrine? I cannot see much opening for doubt on the matter. He does not even take the trouble of stating,—he implies throughout as a well-known and familiar fact,—that philosophers (as a matter of course) are determined to the special direction of their investigations, simply by their own pleasure and intellectual interest. If his picture of them is to be accepted, they never dream of considering, what special line of investigation will be most pleasing to their Creator; they never dream of considering, what special inquiries will most redound to the glory of God and the best interests of man; they follow, with the blindness of an instinct, that one path, which promises them the greatest personal pleasure and amusement. Let us begin with the first paragraph, and see how simply this is implied throughout. I start from line 5. 'A truth once known is prized'—not because of any glory to God, or benefits to mankind, which may be derivable from its knowledge; but—'as opening up' fresh fields of pleasure to the inquirer. A 'votary of science,' by acquainting himself with 'a thousand established facts,' might do important service to God and man in their dissemination. But '*it is not knowledge, it is not truth, that he principally seeks;*' nor yet the inestimable benefits which

accrue from knowledge and from truth. No: he thinks, neither of God, nor of his fellow-men; but of himself. '*He seeks the exercise of his faculties and feelings*; and as in *following after* one, he exerts a *greater amount of pleasurable energy* than in *taking formal possession* of the thousand, he *disdains*' to aim at any other end than his own pleasurable energy. 'Accordingly the sciences *always* studied with keenest interest' are not at all those which promise the greatest fruit, spiritual, moral, or even temporal; but are those which, as being 'in a state of progress and uncertainty,' are thought likely to abound in intellectual excitement and titillation to the inquirer himself.

The second paragraph makes our author's meaning even plainer, if greater plainness were possible. Those portentously selfish heathens, Pyrrhus and Alexander, knew not God, and loved not man; they aimed but at selfish aggrandisement and selfish repose. Sir William is of opinion, that all philosophers resemble in this respect Pyrrhus and Alexander. And he then proceeds to imply, quite as a matter of course, that pleasurable excitement is as exclusively the one end desired in the 'search of truth,' as in 'play' or in 'hunting.' Indeed 'hunting' is a favourite illustration with him of the matter in hand: for he returns to it, and at greater length, in the third paragraph; and that with a drift entirely similar.

Sir W. Hamilton teaches indeed, as I most readily admit, that this pleasure is mainly or entirely derived from the exercise of our intellectual faculties: using that word 'intellectual' in its ordinary English sense. It follows, therefore, that philosophers, in seeking pleasure, necessarily cultivate those faculties, and thus (in his opinion) 'manifest the glory of their Creator' (p. 5). On the latter part indeed of this statement we have already commented at the end of Note A. But this statement is in no respect incompatible with the other, and he evidently expresses both. His position on the whole is this: that philosophers, in pursuing their intellectual pleasures, cultivate their 'highest' faculties, and thus '*manifest*' God's glory. But to say this, is as different as possible from saying that in their intellectual labours they *seek*, or *think of*, God's glory. It is imaginable no doubt in the abstract, that philosophers may seriously deliberate on the question, whether God's glory be most promoted by scientific *truth* or by scientific *self-cultivation*; and that, having decided for the latter alternative, they are animated in their studies by earnest zeal for their Creator. This, I say, is

imaginable in the abstract; but no one will say that Sir William's account of them has the remotest similarity to any such description. If we trust his picture of them, we shall consider that they are no more animated by zeal for God in their *researches*, than were Pyrrhus and Alexander in their *conquests*. He represents them as led unresistingly by the blind impulse of present intellectual gratification.

Two questions then have been answered; one more remains. How far is the author correct, when he cites certain grave authorities in confirmation of his view? And in one instance the question is vital; for if St. Thomas, a canonised Saint, really held such a principle, my condemnation of it recoils on my own head. But there is nothing more wonderful, in all this wonderful passage, than his appeal to St. Thomas. The more carefully we read over the few words which he ascribes to the Angelic Doctor, the more difficult we shall find it to understand what Sir William could have imagined to be their connexion with his theme. 'The intellect commences in operation, and in operation it ends.' Why, so far would St. Thomas be from implying any *philosophical* process by such words, that (in his doctrine) not only contemplation on earth, but the Vision of God in Heaven, is an 'operation of the intellectus.'* However, we need not trouble ourselves to consider what St. Thomas would mean by these words, for in point of fact he never wrote them. This Sir William's editors are obliged to admit; they add, however, that 'this is *perhaps* the substance of i. q. 79, a. 2 and a. 3.' I would only beg the reader to look through those two articles, and see what can be their possible connexion, either with Sir William's supposed analysis of them, or with Sir William's argument. I should add, however, that nothing can be further from my mind than the least suspicion of intentional misquotation. Sir W. Hamilton possessed most extraordinary erudition, and (I believe) very considerable memory; but the latter no doubt occasionally played him false, when he thought he could trust it.

Scotus is also quoted by our author, as supporting his views; and though Scotus is not a canonised Saint, yet his authority as a theologian is so extremely great, that it would undoubtedly be a most serious objection to my argument, if he could *truly* be so quoted. I quote the full passage, as supplied by the editors in a note.

* See *e.g.*, 1^a 2^a, q. 3, a. 2, 3, 4, 5.

‘Seire in actu est, quum aliquis cognoscit majorem et minorem, et simul eum hoc, applicat præmissas ad conclusionem. Sic igitur patet, quòd actualitas scientiæ est ex applicatione causæ ad effectum.’

I am quite unable to make any comment on this passage, or even to conjecture for what purpose it is adduced.

There is a third Catholic writer of some name, Malebranche, whom Sir W. Hamilton quotes. For the sake of Malebranche’s reputation, I sincerely trust that Sir William has as completely misconceived him as he has misconceived St. Thomas and Scotus. And I observe with pleasure that the editors are not able to quote from *him* any passage which contains the opinion in question; but only one from another writer, *ascribing* to him that opinion.*

As to that most overpraised man Pascal, it cannot be important for the Catholic cause to defend *him* against any imputation: though of him, as of every other human being, we should hope the best. Passages are quoted from him which undoubtedly seem to bear out Sir W. Hamilton’s statement.†

None of the other authors quoted by Sir W. Hamilton (I believe) even professed Catholicism.

* The editors’ reference is this. ‘Malebranche disait avec une ingénieuse exagération, “Si je tenais la vérité captive dans ma main, j’ouvrirais la main afin de poursuivre encore la vérité.”’—Mazure, *Cours de Philosophie*.

† ‘Rien ne nous plaît que le combat, mais non pas la victoire. . . . Ainsi dans le jeu, ainsi dans la recherche de la vérité. On aime à voir dans les disputes le combat des opinions; mais de contempler la vérité trouvée, point du tout. . . . Nous ne cherchons jamais les choses, mais la recherche des choses.’

ON THE MISSION AND PROSPECTS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ENGLAND.

By F. OAKELEY, M.A.



THE characteristic difference between the Catholic religion and all other forms of Christian belief, is indicated in the very terms popularly employed to denote the acts respectively of embracing and of rejecting it. The act of submission to the Church of the present time shares, with the corresponding act in the days of the Apostles, the name of 'conversion,' or is branded with that of 'perversion,' accordingly as it is described by Catholics or by their opponents; while, with the former, the term used to express the renunciation of the Catholic Faith is not 'perversion' but 'apostasy.' By well-meaning men, on either side, who have wished to bridge over the chasm which too really divides the Catholic from the non-Catholic, phrases have been sometimes coined with the view of taking off the sharp edges of the contrast. But such attempts have never been ratified by the public voice. The world persists in thinking that the Catholic and non-Catholic ideas

are in diametrical opposition, and that this essential contrariety will always remain even in spite of many apparent, and some real, approximations.

The fact thus attested by general consent is, that whereas the specific varieties of non-Catholic belief may be taken up or cast off without involving any more vital effect than is implied in changing a set of opinions on any other important subject, the adoption or rejection of the Catholic Faith carries with it an entire renovation of mind and character. The same conclusion is brought home to us by the remarkable coincidence between the phenomena of conversion to the Catholic Faith in later ages, and those of conversion to Christianity in the time of the Apostles; and this evidence is all the more convincing because it is involuntary. If the world were as desirous of proving the identity of the Roman Catholic with the Primitive Church, as she is eager in denying that identity, she could not adopt a method better fitted for the purpose than that which she actually takes, in the midst of the most vehement anti-Catholic protestations. She puts away the name of a disciple of the Church as evil, and forgets that she is thereby establishing his title to be accounted a disciple of Christ. Men who oppose persecution on principle, are often among the first to inflict the most grievous social and domestic penalties upon converts to the Catholic Faith; and they who are loudest in the profession of toleration and liberality, will not rarely admit the infidel, or the atheist, into their schemes of comprehension with a better grace than they will receive the Catholic.

Such are the original and essential differences between the Catholic and all other modes of Christian belief; or, to speak more correctly, that one many-headed system, springing from a common root, which is its antagonist. Nor is this inherent contrariety really destroyed by those material modifications which bring these two antagonist systems into something like apparent union. So far as they ever seem like one another, the effect is owing to one or the other having taken up some of the ingredients of the opposite system into solution. The Catholic may be less Catholic, or the Protestant less Protestant, than their respective professions; but no confusion in the concrete representation of the two systems can obliterate, or lessen, their abstract difference. That Catholic is less than a Catholic who permits his private judgment to overstep its legitimate province, but that Protestant is not less than a Protestant who accidentally receives portions of divine truth as the result of a congenial eclecticism.

This distinguishing attribute of the Catholic religion, its power of absorbing and transforming the whole moral and spiritual nature, is a subject intimately connected with the mission of the Church in this our own dear country; it lies at the root of some of our especial difficulties; and to understand the difficulties of a work, is the first step towards success in carrying it out. Now the difficulties incident to the work of the Church in this country arise very mainly from the fact that this work is not a conversion, but a re-conversion; and that its field of battle is not only the national

belief, but the national *mind*; a mind; not a mind like that of a child, unclothed with antecedent impressions, or pervaded only with those prejudices of the natural heart which indispose a heathen nation to the reception of Christian truth; but stiffened into an attitude of hostility to the Catholic religion in particular, and stored with traditional objections to it, which enlist that love of consistency which is often, and in this case certainly, the fruit of pride on the side of the hereditary belief. This peculiar obstacle to the restoration of a Faith once deliberately rejected, has induced some to apply to national apostasies those terrible words in which the Apostle represents the difficulty of re-converting individuals who have proved themselves insensible to the privilege of the heavenly gift. Let us trust, however, that the cases are not parallel; and that the law of Divine Providence, which involves posterity in the consequences of an ancestral sin, has its limit in the case of nations as well as of individuals.

If, however, the sin of this national apostasy be not judicially visited upon posterity, or directly propagated by inheritance, at least the transformation of character incident to it is apt to become more and more confirmed and indurated in the course of succeeding generations. A power so mighty as that of the Catholic Faith does not, all at once, lose its hold upon those whom it has at any time swayed. Like the glorious light of the sun, it does not pass into the darkness of midnight by sudden contrast, but by gradual declension. It was practically thus in England. The second, as compared with the first, Prayer

Book of Edward VI. denotes the progress of decline in doctrine and worship; the readiness with which so large a portion of the nation returned to the true religion under Mary, proved that the light was at that time smothered rather than extinguished. The mis-called Reformation was a limb badly set (to use Mr. Froude's expression in another sense than that in which those words were originally employed); it was left incomplete as a Protestant, not as a Catholic work; but the deficiency was supplied, and the weak limb strengthened, by Elizabeth and her successors, with the exception only of an occasional throb of uneasiness which gave evidence of the fracture. The muscles and fibres of the patched-up member continued to harden, and acquire tone. Fresh appliances were periodically used to repair the omissions of the original work; and, towards the close of the last century, it seemed to be almost forgotten that England had ever been Catholic. The semi-Catholicity of the Caroline era had been lulled for a season by the Great Rebellion. It afterwards revived to be only more effectually quenched by the Revolution; and the non-juring theology had taken its place on the library shelves as matter of history, rather than as a practical creed, when a century rose upon our poor benighted country which did not run through half its course without opening streaks of light in quarters of the horizon where they had been least anticipated.

During the greater portion of this dreary period, the mission of the Catholic Church in England was one of mere silent and passive protest. She testified to

the Truth, of which she is the guardian, by the heroic endurance of her priests and the consistent profession of her laity ; and won, by the uninterrupted oblation of her All-efficacious Sacrifice, those blessings which to the prophets and kings, the priests and nobles, of a former age, were all but wholly denied. The Church could prevail no more against the pervading errors than an army can deploy in the cell of a prison, or a whisper be heard in the roar of a tempest. Even had Catholics not been literally silenced by penal prohibitions of unparalleled cruelty, they would have been precluded by moral hindrances yet more powerful, from gaining the ear of the nation. The work of the great apostasy was now complete ; not only had it penetrated into every corner of the land, but it occupied every crevice of the heart. No rank of society, no function of government, no department of literature, no weapon of popular influence, but was subject to its intrusion and the worse for its effects. Into the dense mass of worldliness in which this really great and noble people were enveloped, not one ray of the ancient and discarded Truth could penetrate. Ambition, avarice, sensuality, with others in the apostolic catalogue of heaven-excluding sins, were not only rife (as, alas ! they are found to be at other times and in spite of Catholic influences), but reigned without any definite and consistent protest on the part of that Church which teaches moral as well as religious truth not merely by word of mouth, but by the power of her standing institutions. The very springs of the public health had been poisoned ; and preaching itself was too

commonly regarded as a mere vehicle of oratorical display, or an avenue to personal aggrandisement.

The spirit which is the parent of these evil fruits, if not each of its particular forms, may undoubtedly be traced to that great religious revolution which dethroned the Catholic Church from its ancient preëminence. In a nation which is debarred from the light of the Faith, it is not merely that vice and worldliness abound, as they are apt to do in all times and places, but that the true standard of right and wrong is not lifted up on high, or is so obscured by surrounding mists as to be practically invisible. In a Catholic country; or in a country in which, at all events, Catholicity can make itself seen and heard, the line of the world is continually crossed by lights which serve as warnings to the evil, and encouragements to the good. The voice of the Church cannot control the excesses, or check the perversion of human liberty; but she is at hand to point out the way of salvation whether men will hear or whether they will forbear. Saving truths enforced in spiritual retreats, high doctrine realised in popular devotions, the beauty of Catholic practice exemplified in domestic and social life, and above all, the life of holy religion brought under the eye as a practical witness against avarice, sensuality, and lawlessness, all the more expressive because embodied in action rather than set forth in words—these, and other such accompaniments of a living Church, form so many landmarks and lighthouses, which are the ordained safeguards of the spiritual course of such as choose to be guided by them. The Catholic Church is always, so to speak, in

the way of human wilfulness. She is the admonitory finger on the wall. She is constantly thrusting in her intrusive mementoes, when the world desires to follow her courses in peace. The sight of a Sister of Charity wending her way with placid look and active step towards some abode of misery; the notes of a *Te Deum*, or *Stabat Mater*, escaping through the open portal of a church into the busy street; the still light before the Blessed Sacrament descried through a window at night; much more, of course, the Blessed Sacrament Itself, met on Its way to the sick; these are sights and sounds which have ere now turned the steps which were bent towards some haunt of evil, or helped to kindle trains of thought which have ended in the conquest of the world.

To these difficulties in the way of conversion, common to countries which do not possess the Faith, must now be added, in the case of our own, those which come more immediately from the fact of having repudiated it. The act of the nation in a former age was the occasion of inaugurating a great tradition which acquired strength as it advanced. It is a tradition handed down from parent to child, and clinging to the mind through life with the tenacity of all early impressions. National pride, and love of consistency, are enlisted in its support. It sways the national judgment, is embodied in the national acts, and rings in the national vocabulary. The influence of language, indeed, is among its most powerful auxiliaries. What service, for instance, has been done to the cause of this tradition by such words as *Papist*, *Romanist*, and their cognates? Even the

holiest terms have contracted, through its power, a prejudice from which it is hard to disengage them. Such words as mass, priest, monk, Jesuit, and others which will readily occur to the mind, had acquired in the ears of Englishmen a sense which almost deterred Catholics themselves from the free use of them, and induced the habitual substitution of palliative synonyms hardly less injurious to the cause of truth than the prejudice which they were intended to obviate.

But it is the war waged by Protestantism against the idea of the supernatural, which has created the great barrier to the reception of Catholic Truth in the apostate nations. It is this which introduces a feature of difficulty into the work of their conversion, which does not exist in the case even of heathen countries. To eradicate the idea of the supernatural from the human mind, is a task to which common agencies are unequal. Our great poet meant to bear witness to an instinct of human nature where he says :—

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

It is curious to observe how this instinct, debarred of its legitimate direction by the effects of the great schism, found irregular outlets for itself in the superstitious practices of witchcraft and demonology which prevailed so extensively in England in the reign of James I., and were so largely adopted by that monarch himself. The Church has nothing to fear from the understanding of men when combined with the simplicity of children. It is not intellect, but the pride of intellect, which is her enemy. It was the leading prin-

ciple of the Reformation, however modified by accidental influences in this country, to arraign Divine Truth before the bar of human reason ; and, in subjecting the ancient creeds themselves to the evidence of Scripture, as collected by the private judgment of the individual, even the Anglican Church, while recognising in words the theory of dogmatic truth, undermined the correlative principles of faith and authority no less effectually than those religious bodies which attained the same end by a shorter road. It was a portion of this human spirit which substituted a merely historical view of Christianity, for that living representation of it which is denoted by the presence of the Church. Together with the idea of the Church, as a visible energetic institution, departed also from the minds of the people, all belief in divine miracles, excepting as facts of bygone history, necessarily becoming more and more evanescent in proportion as that which is supposed to be their proper and peculiar age recedes further into the distance. The belief in spiritual agencies, whether of good or evil, soon follows in the track of this vanishing procession. Some of us are old enough to remember the time when the belief of such agencies, as a religious principle, was so entirely obliterated, that it would have been regarded as a mark of fanaticism to dwell, even in a sermon, upon the personality of the Tempter as distinct from the moral impressions of evil. Under such a system, sin passes into vice, and vice into crime. The peculiar character of moral evil as an offence against the majesty and holiness of the Supreme Being, is gradually merged in that of its repugnance to the

natural instincts, or received attributes of virtue ; and at length comes to be measured by no higher a standard than that of human law. It is the plain teaching of the Scriptures, that Almighty God may be grievously offended by mental acts, which involve neither the evil of bad example, nor opposition to the highest worldly standard of right, nor immediate penal consequences of any kind to the individual. It may be safely said that the Catholic Church alone has, from first to last, done justice to this Gospel-teaching. Meanwhile, as the truths of the spiritual kingdom grow fainter and fainter in the absence of the presiding genius of the Church, this world is stealing, by giant strides, a march upon the next. Trade and commerce are eating into the heart with the love of gain ; literature is stereotyping the false standard which has begun to commend itself to the national mind ; the Fine Arts are absorbing and enervating the love of the beautiful to which the Church has ceased to present her ennobling attractions ; and human politics are foiled in the attempt to cure the social ills which are seen to grow up when luxury and refinement are not counterbalanced by their appointed correctives.

It would thus appear that the great religious convulsion of the sixteenth century had a twofold effect in crushing, for an indefinite period, the power of the Catholic Church. It initiated both a doctrinal and a moral revolution ; the latter being, of course, the consequence of the former. If the wreck of principle were less complete in this country than in others of the northern nations, it was only because the traces of the

ancient religion were less speedily effaced. Anglican divines, who consider that the chain of Catholic tradition was not snapped in this country by the great schism, are accustomed to say still, that the Church of England owes a debt of gratitude to the Reformation. It would be truer to say that the English Reformation owes this debt to the Catholic Church, or to those accidents which in this country clogged the wheels of the great movement in which the nation was involved. The poet, speaking of the Church of England does not say—

Most excellent, because reformed the best,
but,
The least deformed, because reformed the least ! *

I am afraid, however, that the responsibility of contributing to uphold this great fabric of error must be laid very principally at the door of the Established Church. True, that church has maintained a certain faltering witness to Catholic doctrine in preserving the name of sacraments, and the form of an established hierarchy ; in retaining portions of the sacred Liturgy in its service books ; in witnessing to the authority of the ancient creeds as a standing record of Apostolic teaching ; and in representing as a great political institution, the principles of order and good government. On the other hand ; as at all times the most powerful, so it was for a considerable period the only religious body which represented in this country the new tradition ; and which from a thousand pulpits has continually

* Dryden, *The Hind and Panther*.

preached up the dominant error. Whatever else of a more positive character it has taught or denounced, in one article of testimony it has never wavered ; namely, in its protest against the Roman Catholic Church. There is perhaps hardly on record an instance of less generous, and even veracious controversy, than that which has been consistently maintained even by the more Catholic of the Anglican divines, who, while verging upon the border of true Catholic doctrine, have found, in their very proximity to its source, a reason, not for dealing fairly with the Church, which alone has borne invariable testimony to that doctrine, but rather an excuse for fortifying themselves against the suspicion of sympathy with her by an exaggerated tone of invective. By the side of a policy so despicable, the ignorant though often conscientious bigotry of the sincere Puritan assumes an air of respectability.

We have fixed the latter part of the eighteenth century as the period at which the moral and spiritual darkness of this nation had reached its climax. It pleased Divine Providence, about that time, to raise up in a neighbouring country a terrible example of the ultimate effect of those principles of lawlessness which the mis-called Reformation had erected into a system ; and the example was not without its influence upon the minds of our own countrymen. The spirit which had deluged France with blood, and enthroned Reason in the place of God, happily found no lodgment in the hearts of this people ; and, upon the more thinking portion, it operated, like the exhibition of the drunken helot, in creating an abhorrence of the doctrines of

false liberty thus realised in their full development. Still, they knew not whither to turn for the true remedy of the evil whose magnitude they began to suspect. The Church establishment did her best ; and some of those whose enthusiasm found no congenial home in her bosom, were far more successful than herself in re-kindling the dormant embers of religion. The success of Wesley and his followers in gaining the ear of the people for more earnest views of religion than found their natural expression in the pulpits of the Establishment, served to create that powerful party which found itself able to combine the maintenance of those more earnest views of practical religion, with adherence to the communion of the Anglican Church. This party had its representatives in social and even political circles, as well as in the ranks of the ministry ; and probably did far more service in paving the way for coming triumphs of the Catholic Church by relieving religion of that corroding crust of formality which had hitherto overlaid it, than harm by its servile adoption into its popular language of the anti-Catholic conventionalisms of the time. The fire of opposition which the Catholic Church had so long been compelled to sustain single-handed, was now divided with what is called the High Church party in the Establishment ; indeed, that party was so far more conspicuous and tangible, as an object of attack, than the Church whose faith it was believed to favour, that it came in for almost an exclusive share of the hostility of which that faith was the object. The Evangelical section, as it is called, of the Establishment, especially in the days of

its earlier and more earnest life, was, if I mistake not, instrumental to an extent which has not always been fully appreciated, in smoothing the course of the Catholic Church in these latter days of her great and marvellous progress. Little as many of the doctrines of that party, especially their anti-sacramental doctrines, were in accordance with the teaching of the Catholic Church, a point of real contact with true religion is to be found in its greater appreciation of our Lord's personal claims upon the love of His children ; in its stern opposition to certain forms of the worldly spirit ; and, generally, in its view of religion as a question of practical moment to the individual believer, rather than as a mere instrument of social well-being. The contributions which this party has made to the number of actual conversions, seems to warrant such an estimate of its intrinsic character, at least in its earlier manifestations.

We have already spoken of the great French Revolution as an outbreak of evil which was overruled by Divine Providence to the moral and spiritual advantage of this country ; and, in this point of view, a prominent place must be assigned to that large immigration of the French Catholic clergy, which was one of its consequences. That generous spirit of hospitality, which is one of the beautiful features of the great English character, was thus enlisted on the side of those who not only professed the true religion, but illustrated its power by their faith and constancy. The hatred of the French Revolution, and of its effects as a political movement, contributed to the popularity of those who were its victims ; and even the University of Oxford

was induced to waive its hereditary prejudices against the creed of the illustrious exiles, and to treat some of the more eminent of them with honour and distinction. The cause of the Holy Father came to be identified in the eyes of England with that of order and good government, while it had been made evident, even at that time (as later events have more and more conspicuously proved), that the spirit of rebellion finds in infidelity its natural ally; and that the Catholic Church, as the consistent guardian of all authority, is the first object for the attack of that anti-Christianism whose predicted symbol is the contempt of law. By a dispensation of Providence, as marvellous as it was merciful, this nation was made to coöperate, as a political power, with the restoration of his temporal rights of the Sovereign Head of the Church, whose spiritual supremacy it had insolently rejected, and consistently disowned. Let us hope that the Divine selection of England for a share in so great a privilege, may be an omen of its eventual return to the Faith it has lost.

I have said so much on a former occasion of the character and religious influence of the great Tractarian movement, that I shall here advert but very briefly to that wonderful fact as an event in the ecclesiastical history of this nation. There is one feature of that movement which can never be too much insisted on as a token of its providential origin and tendency; I mean the purely external character of its testimony to the truth of the Catholic religion. It is not too much to say that with its rise and progress, up to a

certain time, the Church Catholic and Roman had nothing whatever to do in the way of any direct interference. That Church has, of course, in one sense everything to do with every stirring of hearts which ultimately centre in itself. But here I am viewing the question in a merely historical light; and from this point of sight I do not think that an honest chronicler of this remarkable epoch will be able to lay his hand upon one single fact whereby to establish any relation whatever between the Oxford movement, in its origin and earliest stages, and the direct action of the Catholic Church either abroad or at home. I repeat that I confine this remark to the movement in its origin and very beginning; for it had certainly not proceeded far before it was affected transversely, so to speak, by the power of the Church. But it arose, as we have been often and truly told, in the mere desire of arranging in a satisfactory manner the position of the Church of England as a national institution, seriously threatened at the time by the spirit of Erastian policy. No thought of adjusting the Establishment with the Catholic Church throughout the world, or of looking to any source external to itself for the reformation of its errors and anomalies, seemed to enter into the contemplation of the original Tractarians. They appear to have considered that the national Church contained within itself the seeds of its own restoration, and, in its post-reformation history, the types and precedents of its highest perfection. With a theory so narrow in its conception and aims, the great Catholic Church could, of course, have no sympathy even had she been cogui-

sant, as for a time she was not, of an agitation limited to a corner of the world. Yet it is not more certain that the great revival of religion, which now thrills in every nerve of this country, did actually take its rise from this beginning, than that the beginning itself was thus devoid of breadth and compass. In two ways, very different from each other, has the Tractarian movement contributed to the revival of true religion in this country. Its more direct consequence has been to form an outlet for a stream of conversions to the Church, of which none of us can foresee the end, or measure the importance. It has likewise turned the attention of all classes in this country to subjects which had wholly passed from the national mind except as matters of history. With its influence in this respect many other causes have coöperated; more especially the increased intercourse with the Continent of Europe occasioned by a long peace, and additional facilities of communication. It will be our object in this paper to survey briefly the changed aspect of the national mind upon questions affecting our religion, rather than to inquire into the causes to which the change is due.

What are called 'the principles of the Reformation' have received a long and searching trial, and have not proved adequate to their object. They have spun themselves to death by an internal process of development which has proved fatal to them, independently of the effect of pressure from without. Even men who had hitherto been their warmest advocates, and who have most strenuously resisted the influences of the

old religion from whatever quarter arising, have come to see that the world cannot go on without a reconstruction of the basis upon which the well-being of society is founded. Let us take the treatment of the poor as an example. The Scriptures told us long ago, under both Dispensations, that we must expect to have them always with us. Our Blessed Lord, moreover, has taught us in what light to regard their condition, and how to comport ourselves towards them; and in no single respect has the Catholic Church more faithfully represented Him, even her very enemies being witnesses, than in this department of the Gospel. The estate of poverty has not merely received her indulgence, but been graced by her highest favours. She has elevated it from the level of a penalty, or inevitable calamity, to that of a privilege which it is the highest vocation of her children to make their own by a voluntary act. It is impossible, I will not say merely to exaggerate the advantage, but to fathom the depths of the Religious Institute as a means of rectifying the human estimate of a condition which, apart from this safeguard of its dignity and blessedness, has never succeeded in conciliating towards itself any higher feeling than that of condescending and fastidious commiseration; and which, on the part of too many, has been compelled to bear with the consequences of a far more degrading estimate of its character. They who have embraced the estate of poverty, as a voluntary act, will be the last persons in the world to regard it with contempt in the case of those who are suffering from it by the dispensation of Providence. Hence it is that the

Catholic Church has always loved to entrust the poor to those who, by one of their religious vows, are bound to that estate ; while the light in which the poor are by them regarded, suffuses itself over the whole Church, which owns them for its foremost examples of Christian perfection. It was under the system whose character as a simple negation of all that is Catholic is denoted by its expressive name, that an opposite view of the state of poverty, and of the duties of the rich towards the poor, had grown up in this country, and produced those effects from which its very defenders are now beginning to recoil with horror, and to turn towards the Catholic Church for the lessons of a wiser as well as a more humane policy. They have learned from the echoes of Catholic teaching, though not at the feet of the Catholic Church, that a legal and compulsory provision for the relief of the poor, however necessary as a supplement to individual benevolence, is but a sorry substitute for that kind of charity which brings the rich and poor into immediate personal relations with one another, instead of interposing between the grace of the gift and the gratitude of the receiver a vast intermediate machinery of heartless and mere official administration. The sight of the interior of a workhouse, divested of the mitigating influence of eye service and human respect, has accidentally brought to the knowledge of the public the evils of a system which no mere apparatus of inspection, however conscientiously applied, can secure from effects incident to its very nature. Under this system every poor man, woman, or child becomes a 'pauper;' a word as

peculiar to the English language as the idea of poverty which it suggests is characteristic of our Protestant nation. Better views, thank God, have begun to break on the popular mind; and nothing is needed but the reception of the Catholic Faith in its plenitude, in order to convert those great natural virtues of the English character, which a withering prejudice had gone far to stifle, into the ground-work of those supernatural qualities of a Christian life of which they are but the earthly shadows.

The growing interest in the cause of the poor and suffering classes, which is one of the pleasanter features of our times, could not fail to lessen the odium with which the Religious Orders had been regarded in this country since the dissolution of monasteries and convents in the reign of Henry VIII. The same happy result has been promoted by the experience of recent wars, which have brought to light the devotion of the Sisters of Charity in the service of the wounded, and enlisted in the cause of their self-sacrificing labours those chivalrous feelings which have, on other occasions come to the aid of neglected religion. Let us hope that, by this representation of the Religious Life in its most popular form, a way will have been won for its introduction under some of those aspects which are still, more or less, repugnant to the spirit of a commercial and fastidious age. A victory has still to be gained for those contemplative orders whose work is carried on in silence and secrecy, and is therefore sure, in the eyes of those who measure good by its visible effects alone, to be depreciated and suspected. As our

countrymen come to learn that works of chivalrous benevolence, which they can see and understand, are best and most successfully carried out by those devoted persons of either sex who have foresworn even the legitimate attractions of domestic life, and purified their hearts by retirement and prayer for the service of others; they will, as we may trust, be taught by God's good Spirit to prize the state of those who give, wholly to the work of intercession, the time which the others divide between prayer and active duty. It is a most beautiful provision of the Divine Author and Guardian of the Church, which surrounds her interior life with such numerous varieties as serve, one with another, to attract even the natural man to a closer inspection of its wonders. There is no form of human misery, there is no department of salutary literature, there is no province of soul-stirring art, which has not profited, directly or indirectly, by the influence of Holy Religion. And thus, so many points of contact have been created between the Church and the world, which has been constrained to do homage to the result of which it knew not the hidden spring. The active orders have been thus, in some sort, the pioneers of the contemplative.

A still more remarkable victory of the Church over the world is to be found in the present partial (for as yet it is but the partial) disappearance of the prejudice against Auricular Confession. Those who have but little understanding of its character, as an essential part of a great Sacrament, are yet coming more and more to feel its value as an outlet of conscientious

burdens, and a safeguard to the interests of public justice. The very columns of the newspapers are often found to bear involuntary witness to the value of an ordinance which, in those same organs of public opinion has, perhaps, been denounced as an unwarrantable infringement of personal liberty, or domestic privilege. The intervention of the Catholic Church in procuring acts of restitution, is often made apparent by the very terms in which those acts are brought before the public, and is undoubtedly the medium through which injuries are repaired in multitudes of cases where that medium is concealed. The same world which is clamorous in its protestations against sacerdotal influence, where exerted in an unpopular cause, is only too glad to avail itself of that influence, where it can be turned to some popular account.

But the change of public opinion in matters relating to the Church is nowhere more conspicuous than in all which regards the true idea, and proper type of external religion. In this respect, the traditions of fifteen centuries were innovated on, and insulted, at the time of the great schism. That noble spirit of generosity in the consecration to the service of God of whatever is most precious in nature, or recondite in art, was exchanged for the niggardly policy of the traitorous apostle who grudged the bestowal upon his Divine Master of gifts requiring a denial of self on the part of the giver. The idea of a Sacrifice, in the principal act of Christian worship, was effectually obliterated from the minds of the people, not merely by unwarrantable innovations on the Liturgy of the Church, but, by the

withdrawal from the eye of every external circumstance which could betoken its presence. Common prayer, as it was called, became the substitute for intercessory action ; and common prayer thus divested of the intercessory character passed, by a natural transition, into a sort of religious oratory, as the people, or in modern parlance the ‘ congregation,’ came to occupy the place which in the Catholic type of worship is reserved for the court of heaven. There was no part of the new religion which appeared to have made its way into the public mind more thoroughly than this, and yet there is none which now seems more likely to yield under the power of the ancient rule. On the principle which is attested by the well-known words of the classical poet, those portions of the Catholic religion which address themselves to the eye, appeared to have a deeper seat in the popular prejudice even than its very doctrines ; and the time is not so far distant, when a riot would have been caused by the introduction of ritual observances less akin to our own than those which are now contentedly tolerated. In this department of our subject we are bound to acknowledge that good service may accidentally have been done to religion by a movement in the Established Church, which, in its principle, I think entirely indefensible. For I am quite at a loss to understand how conscientious men can bring themselves to feel that the semblance of sacrifice is an object more precious to God than the reality of obedience.

The word Protestantism has two senses, as the thing it denotes has two aspects. In the one, it may be defined the philosophy of unregenerate human nature ;

in the other, it is a religion of more or less definite form. As the first, it has no peculiar local whereabouts ; as the second, it varies indefinitely in different countries or in one and the same. But its different external forms have so great a tendency to run into one another, as evidently proves some common principle of coherence in them all. The Protestantism of the time of Henry VIII. was as different a religion from that of the following reign as is consistent with the fact of their both being protests against Rome ; yet the former passed into the latter so naturally as proves the original difference to have been one of degree merely, and not of principle. This is, of course, the true explanation of the impossibility of giving to Anglicanism the character of a real system, in contradistinction from the various sects which have broken off from it, or the popular Protestantism against which it has attempted to make its feeble stand. Hence also it is that no infusion of Catholic doctrine, or addition of Catholic ceremonial, can really unprotestantise a religion which is wanting in the essential element of Catholicity. What is that essential element? History no less than experience teaches us that it is the Supremacy of Peter. What was it which preserved France from falling into apostasy under the tremendous shock of the great Revolution? It was her adherence, as a nation, to the Holy See. What is it which makes it, to use a familiar expression, such up-hill work to Catholicise England? It is, that the repudiation of Rome, moved by the capricious sensuality of an infamous monarch, and too readily acquiesced in by an obsequious clergy, was at once

the cause, and, as we may say, the form, of the so-called Reformation in England. The religion of the time of Henry VIII. was a specimen, as perfect as was ever realised, of Catholicism without the Pope. Later attempts which have been made to carry that anomaly into practice are mere caricatures in comparison with it. Henry VIII. had refuted Luther with his own pen, and maintained Catholic doctrine to the end of his life. Dogmas for which a zealous party in the Establishment is now struggling; which they are able only to preach or publish under saving qualifications; and which are formally protested against by the great majority of their co-religionists, were then publicly professed by the whole nation under the sanction of the Royal authority. Public worship did not then consist of a form essentially Protestant, but disguised under an exterior of incongruous Catholic ceremonial, and even that mutilated ritual discountenanced by authority, and most partial in its extent of adoption. The Holy Mass, in all its unshorn splendour, was then the only rite in general use; and so imperfect a substitute for it, even as the first Prayer Book of Edward VI., which is now the object of hopeless aspiration in the Establishment, would then have been regarded as little better than an invention of heretical pravity. Yet, I repeat, how easily did the arch which had lost its key-stone crumble into fragments under the power of a more Protestant sovereign and his unprincipled advisers!

Many, and to all appearance contradictory, have been the phases of English religion since the rejection of the Papal Supremacy. It has been at one time as

Catholic as was consistent with its being essentially Protestant; at another, as Protestant in external form as, always, in its essence. Under Henry it was outwardly Catholic; under Edward it approximated by rapid steps to the doctrines and forms of Geneva; under Elizabeth it was consolidated into a great political institution accommodated to the supposed wants of the nation; under Charles it became the preacher of the divine right, and handmaid of arbitrary power; and shared the fate of a rebellion which employed against it the weapons by whose aid itself had been cut off from the centre of Unity. In the succeeding age it followed the fortunes, and was coloured by the shifting complexion of the State to which it had been tied. It was restored with the Restoration; then once more almost Catholicised; then thoroughly secularised under William of Orange and the sovereigns who succeeded him, with the exception of that portion of its members which adhered to the cause of the expelled family, and ceased to retain its distinctive character as the claims of that family gradually faded away from a subject of chivalrous enterprise into a theme of romance, and thence into a fact of history.

Our hopes of the eventual return of our country to Catholic Unity derive some ground of confidence from this review of the character of the religion which dates from the time of the great schism. Protestantism, as a positive religious system, has never been the genial offshoot of the English mind. It was not, as in some other countries, a hearty, however mistaken, protest against some alleged corruption, but the creation of

political circumstances. That which elsewhere was its motive, was here but its plea and pretext. The inconveniences of the Roman Supremacy might never have operated as a ground of the national schism, had they not pressed awkwardly upon the personal views of the king; the alleged abuses of the monastic system were employed as an afterthought, to justify a wholesale confiscation, the object of which was to increase the influence of the king, by enabling him to fill the coffers of his minions. Whatever of zeal was infused into the movement, beyond that which had its origin in selfish and sordid motives, was due to the influence of those who had no part in its earlier impulses, and whose spirit was alien to its own, except in so far as the principles of unregenerate human nature lay at the foundation of both. It would never have taken a deep root in England but for the friendly aid of Germany and Geneva. It might, at a later period, have tended back towards a purer faith, but for the preponderance of Scotch influences which held its more Catholic elements in check during the reign of James I., and overwhelmed them in that of his successor. On the other hand, the process by which Catholicism was literally stamped out in the reign of Elizabeth and James I., and so on down to the repeal of the penal laws, was one, which in its very nature seemed more likely to have present effect than final efficacy. That process is happily as clear of the possibility of repetition, as of that of retaliation. But it would be alike at variance with reason and with experience, that the religion whose power it attested, should ultimately bend to its bidding.

Again, that close dependence upon the secular power to which the established religion of this country has been indebted for an amount of stability which it could never have received from its own inherent vigour, must prove in the end its weakness, as hitherto its strength. So far as any such prediction may be safely ventured on, it appears certain that the time is not far distant when the Established Church will be more and more disengaged from State protection, and thrown upon its own resources. Its want of any consistent basis and substantial character will then hasten its dissolution, as its heterogeneous elements find their kindred attraction, on either side of the body in which they have been held in a superficial combination. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church, extricated from those restraints which have hitherto crippled her action, and confused her voice, will be free to circulate her divine message among hearers predisposed by various causes to receive that message with favour. The dearly-bought experience of three centuries, will not have been without its providential use in teaching the nation that the Holy Catholic and Roman Church holds the true key for the solution of many a political and social problem to which the wisdom of the world is unequal; that she alone can secure wealth from its dangers, and poverty from its degradation; that she alone is the true palladium of civil liberty, by providing, in a great central authority most comprehensive in its aims, most prudent in its counsels, most abundant in its charity, a support of national independence against the encroachments of arbitrary power; and that she alone, lastly, can guard

the intellect of man from extravagating into ten thousand forms of religious error, by confining it within the range of a dogmatic Faith, whose depths form the noblest subject of its researches, and the ordained measure of its speculations.

CHRISTIANITY IN RELATION TO CIVIL SOCIETY.

By EDWARD LUCAS.



PART III.

IN my two former papers on the present subject, the endeavour was made to establish two principal points : One, that the Christian society must be independent of the civil government ; the other, that the government of civil society is in a great measure dependent upon that of the Christian society. In order to maintain the former three things were pointed out, viz. ; first, that this society is the only entity of its kind, containing within itself every Christian in the world ; second, that it was founded to extend throughout the world and through all ages ; and third, that in order to fulfil the former conditions, and in view of the difficulties and dangers which it would have to encounter, the society in question must necessarily be organised, and that upon a very solid basis. The only limit prescribed for the society was the law upon which it was founded, and which was included in the revelation for the propagation whereof it was founded. The use of the word Church was avoided, and the argument carried on with the term ‘Organised Christianity,’ in the hope of securing to the arguments themselves the

approbation or the objection to which they are entitled, and of leaving no room to take exception to them on the ground that the claims set up on behalf of Universal Christianity were in reality intended for the Roman Catholic Church alone. Whether or no the principles upon which those claims were supported could fail to lead to the conclusion I had in my own mind, would not in the least affect the validity of the argument, or the truth of the principles themselves. I now propose to go a step further, and to prove that the action of the governing power of Organised Christianity, can never be at variance with the true interests of civil society, and consequently of the civil government. This subject will occupy several papers. The mode I am about to adopt on this occasion, will oblige me to go back to principles which lie very deep; at the root indeed of Christianity itself. Nor will this seem unreasonable when it is considered that the subject in hand concerns no less than the government of the entire world. The questions involved, and upon the solution of which all men are interested, come generally before them in the concrete form of contests for rights and privileges, and have to be settled as they arise, and as best they may. Mostly they are arranged for the time, and by way of compromise; frequently they lead to open ruptures, fatal in their results. But while the debates are pending one side is charged with arrogance, and the other with rebellion; allegations of usurpation are preferred against each; and men are led astray in their judgments for want of an accurate knowledge of the principles upon which the rights of each rest. It may

seem presumptuous to undertake to throw new light upon these questions, taking into account by whom, and in how complete a manner they have already been treated. All I pretend to do, however, is to bring forward old arguments, and to put them together in such a way as to appeal to a certain class of minds at present very numerous in this country.

At the various epochs of the great writers alluded to, society at large was under conditions differing altogether from those of this century. The works of S. Thomas or of Cardinal Bellarmine, for example, were not written for, nor if they were translated would they be read by, such a multitude as the reading public of to-day. The problem to be solved is, how to place dry abstract arguments before these readers whose attention one seeks to gain, in such a manner as, while retaining a certain not unscientific character, to impart to them the sort of interest which attaches to personal arguments. The old writers could not, of course, address themselves to the minds of a future age. What they have said, therefore, is in this respect, as well as in that of the language wherein they wrote, a closed book to this generation. How far I may succeed in opening some of these sealed pages it is for others to judge.

One of the great stumbling-blocks in the way of those men who habitually take the side of the civil government, in opposition to the Catholic Church, is a misapprehension as to the real character of that corporation. Now I do not set myself to remove that misapprehension; it is too deeply rooted, too securely fenced in by prejudice, to give me the least hope of

success in such an attempt. I shall keep to my original plan, speaking of nothing, and therefore proving nothing, except as regards that Society which Christ founded. Whatever be the test by which men are, in the eyes of God, seen to be members of that Society; whether sincerity be a sufficient qualification; whether contradictions on points which are held to be vital, by opposite parties, constitute any bar to membership on either side, I shall not inquire. Whether the law upon which the Society is founded be broad or narrow, I shall not pretend to decide. All who come within the law are members; all who do not are not members. To which of the two classes any individual or individuals may belong is beside the question as I propose to put it. I shall speak of those who, as a matter of fact known to God only, are within the pale. I shall exclude, or admit, no one. But, if the course of the argument lead to the conclusion that certain classes are admitted and certain others excluded, it will not be the fault of the argument, but an irresistible result of the nature of things, starting from admitted premises. I say admitted, because I am only replying to some objections, not to all. It does not, for example, enter into my plans to prove the creation of man, nor the fact of revelations having been made by God to him, nor the fall of Adam, nor the Divinity of Christ, nor the mission of the Apostles. All these are held by those for whom these pages are intended, and are therefore simply taken for granted.

Starting from the same point, I endeavoured in the former papers to establish, as just now remarked, the

Unity, the Universality, and the Organisation of the Society. I now proceed to the more exalted consideration of its Holiness. My aim will be, first, to show that, in order to accomplish the object for which it was founded, it must necessarily be Holy ; afterwards, that it actually comes up to the required condition. These will be the chief propositions ; the conclusion from them will be almost self-evident, viz. that the action of a society with the qualifications alleged cannot be at variance with the true interests of any other society, and therefore of civil society. But, in order to prove what qualifications must exist in the Regenerative Society, it will be necessary first to point out the defects which had to be remedied ; and this will be the subject of the present paper, which will show how the perverse will of man having been the root, and cause, and source of evil in the world, the Society, which has to restore the human race, must act by a Will superior to his both in power and in holiness.

It is said that mankind never entirely lost the primeval knowledge of the one God. Now however true that may be, and apart from all questions of intuition, I think it did not require even a faint recollection of that fact to enable men of ordinary reflection to perceive that the world could not have been brought into its present state by a perfect Creator. Perfection in the Creator involves the idea of a perfect plan in the creation ; a consistency, a coherence, and a correspondence of parts, so complete, that not only would means be exactly adapted to the ends in view, if rightly applied, but they would infallibly lead to those ends.

Whereas it is but too obvious that the world is in confusion ; order for ever struggling to evolve itself out of disorder ; death, in a never-ending war with all the varied forms of existence ; life, rebelling against the seemingly sovereign power of death and, as if in revenge, bringing new forms out of old decay ; everything wanting in some condition essential to the end of its creation. Such is the prospect if we look without. Looking within we find a still more puzzling appearance : virtue unattainable without suffering ; pure intention thwarted by erroneous judgments which lead to life-long misery ; unmerited wrongs ; love unrequited ; the good oppressed ; the wicked exalted ; pain and grief in a thousand shapes ; all the faculties and affections of the mind in such disorder as bespeaks rather a jumble than a plan ; the highest powers, not only subjected to the lower appetites, but actively engaged in their own degradation. So far is all this from perfection, that a revelation is more needful to reconcile the facts with the idea of a perfect Creator, than to show that they are not the work of such a Being. Even self-styled men of science —Pantheists are they in reality, who, without actually asserting the eternity and infinity of matter, nevertheless make all the phenomena of existence, from the remotest star to the smallest atom, merely the growth of a universal life ever tending to higher developments— even these men declare by their very theory not only the imperfection but the imperfectibility of the great unexplained whole. But to us, by whatever name we go, who acknowledge that God has revealed His will to man, both at the time of his first creation and since ;

to us, who admit the truth of the Christian revelation, and who differ only as to its true signification, interpretation, and working, the appearance of contradiction is readily accounted for and easily explained. We are about to travel over beaten ground; the objects we shall meet are familiar to most of us; but there are new points from which they may be viewed and from which they may acquire a new interest. It is not uncommon even among people who admit the great truths of the creation—the fall and the redemption of man—to find hesitation at accepting in its literal sense the Scriptural narrative of the second of those facts. It seems almost impossible to conceive that the cause assigned is sufficient to account for the stupendous results we all see and feel. And as to the redemption; while the incarnation and sufferings of Christ are freely confessed, the outward means of bringing their fruits to every man, and of making them applicable to all conditions and periods of life, seem as inadequate to produce alleged results as the single act to have produced the fall. Nevertheless, a little reflection upon the world within us and around us should be enough in both instances to remove all difficulties as such, and to throw doubting minds back upon the previous question of the evidence upon which our knowledge of the facts rests. Let me explain.

In contemplating the creation as a whole, the first thing which strikes one, I think, is its immensity; the next is the variety of its component parts; and then the wonderful interdependence of the latter. In endeavouring to realise its immeasurable extent, the mind

is driven back to consider the minuteness of the particles of which it is made up, and to perceive that it is as apparently infinite in its subdivisions as in their aggregation. Thus we represent eternity to ourselves as never-ending time, and, to make the impression more real, we speak of the moments of eternity; we think of the material world as formed of atoms; that is, of particles too small to be divided, yet we can imagine no particle so small but that it might be smaller. In this way we recognise that the all but infinitely great seems to depend upon the all but infinitely little. Then, by a natural transition of thought, we come to reflect upon the variety of the parts of creation, so utterly unlike in their natures; as time and light; heat and colour; cold and sound; life in all its forms from plants to angels; the perishable souls of animals; the sun and stars; water, air, rocks, numbers, language; the imperishable indivisible soul of man; fire, and a thousand things more; the contemplation of which brings us to that of their mutual dependence. Consider them all, so dissimilar that no analysis could discover the least resemblance in their elements. What, for instance, more unlike than light and a solid opaque tree of a hundred years! Light so subtil that it is held to be immaterial; the oak but little less gross than the rocks; and yet *that* subtil has been an important element in this gross, existence. The solid has absorbed the imponderable fluid, and, without diminishing its bulk, has added to its own weight. Or, again, how perfectly unlike are the dead substances which constitute the food of man to his living thought; the essentially material to the essentially

immaterial; yet their absence, or superfluity, or sufficiency, deadens, or changes, or gives life to the intangible operation of his soul. Or, again, wherein do moral causes in the least resemble physical effects? How does ambition, let us say, influence climate? One a condition of the impalpable soul, the other of the air we breathe. Yet ambition drives a few men to an unpeopled country, and forthwith forests are cleared, the surface of the earth is changed, and the unwholesome marsh becomes a healthy abode for man. Or, again, what greater difference, than between the analysis of numbers and of sound? Yet out of their union springs music, of which it is scarcely an allegory to say that it moves trees and rocks, albeit through its power over the human mind.

Thus we have physical causes producing physical effects altogether disproportioned to those causes; moral causes producing physical effects; and physical causes producing moral effects. But the closeness of the connection becomes more manifest when we reflect upon the possible derangement of parts. Suppose, for instance, what indeed cannot happen, for those portions of creation of which we have been speaking depend upon unalterable laws external to themselves; suppose, I say, that any of the great phenomena could and should, of its own power, withdraw itself from due subordination, it would go far to upset the economy of the whole scheme, vast as it is. Thus, were light to cease to shine, not only would colour and entire classes of living creatures go with it, but one of the senses of

animals would go too. Without cold no moisture would congeal upon the mountains, rivers would be dried up, and whole countries rendered uninhabitable. Without heat no physical life could continue; even man himself would cease to live. And if it be true that his end is to replenish in the courts of Heaven the vacant places of the fallen angels, it follows that the accidental glory which God derives from the service of beatified souls would suffer detriment by the withdrawal from nature of a force which results from the motion of the most material substances; that is to say, the economy of Heaven itself depends in part upon a purely physical cause; eternity upon time; the all but infinitely great upon the all but infinitely little, as I said above.

But if physical derangements would produce such wide effects, how vastly extended would these become if a power existed, not only able but willing to cause them! We know that light, heat, cold, the motions of the heavenly bodies, the growth of plants, the increase of animals, and all the outward world, are subject to fixed laws, from which they are without the means of the smallest deviation. But if a power could by any means arise, having the hope of being able to stop their action, not only would the results above pointed out ensue, but something far more momentous still, seeing that the power would be of a magnitude to dispute the laws themselves in opposition to Him who framed them. It would no longer be distant effects arising from remote causes; a power would exist standing in direct defiance of the Creator

both of phenomena themselves, and of the laws by which they are bound. In the contest every available means would be used to thwart His ends. And since such a power must have attributes of a very high order, and knowledge beyond our comprehension, we may easily imagine what confusion would arise from the perverse exercise of faculties so exalted.

I have preferred to present my argument in the foregoing manner, rather than run the risk of objections by reproducing a theory on the fall of the angels, which, while perfectly agreeable to reason, is yet incapable of positive proof. The idea presented will hardly be considered fanciful, because though no being having such a power actually exists, yet there is One who aims at realising identical results, although in a different way.

Now, in the fall of man two things are to be considered; first, that although he had not the powers supposed above, nevertheless, he was, in addition to his direct connection with the invisible creation, the head and chief of all the visible; and second, that his rebellion being essentially an act of his highest faculty, his perversion was as great as his capacity allowed. The taking and eating the apple was not a mere physical act. It was an act of positive rebellion against, and defiance of God and His command. It was an outward expression of an inward determination not to be bound by the Divine Law in that particular: and if he would not obey in that one matter, why should he in any other? Knowing God, he chose to have faith in Satan rather than in God. As in one

sense a sacrament is an outward sign of an inward spiritual work of a supernatural kind, so in this; the one being the work of God upon the soul, the other that of Satan. It was Satan's sacrament in another sense too; for it was a kind of oath of allegiance to him. It was an act wherein, as was mentioned in the first of these papers, and as will be shown more in detail presently, every single faculty was engaged, and especially the Will.

This being so, we should conclude in accordance with the foregoing argument, that the disorder caused throughout Creation by the rebellion of its Chief, and throughout the powers and faculties of man himself by that of the most eminent among them, would exceed any which could result from physical derangements, in proportion to the superiority of man over the irrational creation. How great his perversion really was may be seen not only by the comparison of his own nature now and before his fall, but also by reflecting both on the punishment his sin merited, and on the details of the Sacrifice by which reparation was made for it. In considering the punishment it matters little for the argument whether the death which was threatened were, if I may so speak, a new thing invented by God, as a just vengeance upon another new thing introduced into the world by man, viz. Sin; or whether in denouncing it, God merely revealed beforehand what would be the natural consequence of disobedience, as physical death is of a wound inflicted in a vital part. One thing, at least, is clear, that in making himself subject to death, man incurred a host of evils in addi-

tion to the mere fact of dying. He was not henceforth to continue a life of ease and comfort, and then at an appointed time to return without an effort to the dust of which he was made. He was, on the contrary, to become the victim of weakness, pain, disease, and unrequited daily toil. All these minor evils were included in the sentence, because they led up to that decay which was the prelude to dissolution. As the world and all things in it were, with one exception, created for his pleasure, it was strict justice, and besides, a kind of necessity, that when the sentence passed upon him, these ministers to his enjoyment should, while still sufficing to the requirements of his nature, become instruments of unhappiness and discomfort. It is by the ignorant use or the wilful abuse of the world, that pain, disease, and weakness are caused, and for what it affords, that daily toil is encountered. And these are increased by that tendency to decay which prevails in all around us; for were the world in a perfectly sound condition there would be nothing in it which could have the tendency to cause decay in man who was created a perfect being, not subject to death, which is manifestly an imperfection. So far, therefore, as the body is concerned, both the punishment of death and the change out of that state of immunity from pain into his present condition shows a perversion as great as we can well conceive.

It is, however, not with the physical disorder of which he is the victim, that we are immediately concerned. That has been referred to mainly for the purpose of introducing the subject of that greater disorder

of the soul for whose cure Christianity was established ; in order to bring more clearly to the mind the extent of those defects which had to be remedied ; for, as before remarked, it is only through a just appreciation of them that we can form a correct estimate of what the society must be which was to work out the remedy in question. And besides, the interdependence spoken of above has one of its most striking exemplifications in the close connection between the soul and the external world ; a connection far more intimate and detailed than appears at first sight, and more wonderful than that between light and the oak tree. Now, the death which was announced as the penalty of disobedience was the death of the whole man ; it concerned not the body only but the soul also, and as the death of the body is accompanied and caused by physical diseases, so that of the soul is accompanied and caused by diseases proper to itself. To understand what these must be it will be necessary just to glance at the nature of the soul. There was no need to enter into details in regard to the body of which we know enough by daily experience. But though our knowledge of the soul is not so much on the surface, yet I hope what I shall say about it will be sufficiently plain.

The soul, then, being a simple intelligent substance, possessing various attributes, faculties, and inclinations, is incapable of analysis, or of being reduced to elements. We cannot conceive of any way by which the soul could be divided. The body can be deprived of senses, or of members, and still remain a living body. The soul, on the contrary, cannot be deprived of any of its

attributes, faculties, or inclinations. The divisions usually ascribed to the mind, of Will, Understanding, and Memory, are really inseparable the one from the other. For Intelligence is the first essential characteristic of the soul; the first and absolutely necessary act of the soul or of mind is that it thinks; and thought is the act of that division called the Understanding or Intelligence. But the Understanding can only be exercised with the consent and by direction of the Will. In like manner, the use of the Memory, which is but the recalling to mind of what the Understanding has previously perceived, is merely a certain exercise of the Understanding, of which the Understanding would be incapable without the coöperation, passive or active, of the Will. Again, the Judgment and the Imagination although spoken of as distinct divisions of the mind, are only modes in which the understanding exercises itself; and the affections are simple inclinations of the soul arising from the previous use of the Understanding acting judicially, but always with the consent of the Will. On the other hand, the Will cannot act till the Understanding has furnished it with matter upon which to act. The Understanding perceives, and the Will acts in reference to the thing perceived, the two processes being quite inseparable. Thus it will be seen that it would be as incorrect an expression to speak of the Soul being *composed* of Will, Memory, Understanding, and the rest, as it would be to say of the body that it is *composed* of beauty, motion, or the desire for food. And as we can imagine no power but a direct act of the Creator which could deprive the Soul of any one

of these faculties, it is obvious, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the death of the Soul must be something altogether different in kind from the death of the body, which is nothing but a natural dissolution into its original elements. The Soul has no elements into which it can dissolve. There can be no physical death of the Soul. But the death which it incurred was, as we said, accompanied and caused by diseases proper to itself; and Christians have always held that it consists in eternal banishment from the presence of God. For man was created after the image of God, and destined to a life of happiness in the Divine Presence. He was placed in Paradise, with a perfect knowledge of God's Will concerning him, and by the act of disobedience he deprived himself of the reward which would have been due to perseverance in the Supernatural Justice and Sanctity wherein he was created. He was on his trial, and when he failed the ultimate object of his creation was so far at an end. He refused to obey the Supreme Ruler. He was in rebellion against the Governor of the Universe; and thenceforth it depended upon a new act of the Divine Will to allow him to be restored to the Divine Favour, and unless this new act were elicited, he was in a condition of everlasting banishment from the Divine Presence. He could not recover the position he had lost. He had, so far as his capacity extended, put out of joint and disarranged the scheme of the Universal Creation, and in so doing he had incurred the just anger of God; for the plan of Creation concerned not only the happiness of man himself, but likewise

that glory which God proposed to receive from the service and homage of a creature so endowed as to be able to withhold that homage; whereas one who refused to give it could not be fit to be brought into closer relation with Him to whom the refusal was made. Had he been so constituted at the time of his creation, that his life should be only a prolonged natural life, in which he was ignorant of God's Will regarding him, and this might well have been the case, there could have been no disobedience, and consequently no punishment. Man could not have been said to be banished from a presence which he was never intended to enjoy. But there was added to this nature, to this merely natural condition of existence (as we see clearly even in his present fallen state) something supernatural, a tending towards, a striving to attain, a more perfect state, and this was to result in a close union with, and intimate knowledge of, the Divine perfections.

When, therefore, this union was rendered impossible by his own act, and when he had incurred the penalty of which he had full warning, it was only necessary, in order to make the death of his soul a true and real death, that it should be kept for ever from the presence of God. Had the delay in arriving at the Divine Presence been of a temporary kind, there would have been no death. He was already, by the very condition of his being, withheld from the Presence of God for a time indefinite, and had this period been merely prolonged in punishment of his sin, it would not have been said to him that he, the whole man, should surely

die. On the other hand, if disobedience were to be followed by the annihilation of the Soul when the body came to die, there would have been little terror in the threat, because there is implanted in the Soul such a desire for knowledge, that annihilation even might well be incurred in the pursuit of only a temporary gratification. And moreover Divine justice would have fallen short, had it allowed a creature gifted with the Godlike consciousness which has been bestowed upon man, to mar the plan of the creation, which, I repeat, concerned not him only, but the angels also and God Himself.

These are some of the considerations which occur to me as showing the reasonableness of the universal Christian doctrine on the death of the Soul, and the necessarily tremendous results of the one act of disobedience.

But, repeating again what has already been said, as bodily death is not a mere painless ceasing to be, but is caused and accompanied by bodily imperfections, and by the derangement, more or less complicated, of bodily functions and organs, so the death of the Soul proceeds from the subversion of its attributes, faculties, and inclinations. Particular attention is called to this part of the argument, because upon what is now about to be said, the proposition with which we started, and which it is the object of this and subsequent papers to prove, viz. that the action of the government of organised Christianity can never be at variance with the true interests of the civil government, will be found mainly to depend. We may seem to be long in coming

to the point, but I hope to show that there has been no unnecessary digression to subjects which may appear at first sight to have but a remote bearing upon what has to be established.

We may say, then, speaking in a wide sense, that the only disease of the Soul is injustice, in other words a conscious departing from the end of its creation. Such a departure entails, as an inevitable consequence, the subjection of superior to inferior faculties. Justice being the maintenance of the necessary relations established between the different parts of the entire creation by the Will of God, injustice must be the disturbing of those relations, the putting of them out of order ; the reversing of the positions of inferior and superior. Now the first effect of such disturbance will naturally fall upon the disturber himself ; because in order to be a disturber he must be conscious of the nature of his act, he must know that he is breaking the harmony which up to that moment exists between the Divine Will and his own. And as any act of his cannot affect the Divine Will above him, and can by degrees only come to affect the physical creation beneath him, he himself must become the first victim of his own injustice.

When, therefore, Adam ate the fruit of the tree, the act was of a manifold nature ; it comprised, so to speak, a multitude of acts whereby his faculties were not only collectively but individually affected. Every one of them was engaged in the disobedience. In the first place all his bodily senses participated : the hearing, sight, touch, and taste, most unquestionably, and with-

out doubt the sense of smell was not excluded; then the appetites or those bodily desires to attain and become possessed of what is good for the body, and which arise without mental process; next the affections, which correspond in the Soul to the appetites of the body; the imagination, which pictures to the mind objects, whether mental or physical, which are desirable or to be avoided; the reason, which supplies motives for or against a particular choice; the judgment, which decides between various motives; the memory, which provides matter for the reason, the imagination, and the judgment to act upon; the conscience, which approves or condemns a decision both before and after action; the understanding or intelligence, of which the imagination, reason, judgment, and memory are faculties; and lastly, the Will, which has the power to allow or refuse to any one of these faculties to exercise itself on a particular subject. The Will, therefore, it was which permitted the other faculties to rebel; which they could not have done without the sanction of the Will. So long as Adam remained in a state of justice or obedience to the Divine Law or Command, his bodily, were in strict subjection to his mental, powers. Whatever desire presented itself, was without effort made to conform to the dictates of his reason, which was in harmony with the Divine Will. In other words, he was, to use a theological expression, free from concupiscence. If this be true of his lower nature, it is equally so of his mind. It was necessarily the case by the very nature of his constitution. He came from the hand of his Creator formed not only for a natural end, but that he

might attain to that supernatural and glorified life with God which is promised even to us. The perfection of the Divine work required all to proceed with ease and harmony towards the ultimate term proposed, and for this purpose every portion of his being was of necessity adapted to fulfil the end in view. It could not be otherwise. Anything in the shape of contention or struggle between the various faculties would have proved imperfection in the design. It was this very perfectness of subordination which enhanced the turpitude of the disobedience. To disobey required an effort, to obey required none. And it was the Will which made the effort. For the superiority of man is not confined to that excellence of the understanding by which he is enabled to compare one portion of the creation with another, to look before and after, and to comprehend the Will of the Creator concerning himself. It was not in the possession of reason alone that Adam surpassed all other beings in the world. The Will was a higher faculty yet, without which he could not be said to be made after the image of God ; without which there could be no disobedience ; which was the crown of his intelligence, the means by which he was raised from a barren knowledge of the perfections of God into an active condition of using that knowledge for the glory of his Creator ; which man holds in common with the angels, and which corresponds to that attribute of the Deity whereby He has conferred different degrees and kinds of perfection upon the multitudinous universe.

I said it was the crown of his intellect ; it was more, it was the master and controller of all the

powers of the mind and of those bodily powers which do not come under fixed laws; while the Will was the cause of specific action in all the other powers of the soul: while their operations were effects of the action of the Will as a cause, the action of the Will itself was without causation of any kind. Whatever motives might be presented to it, however strong the inducements on one side or the other, it was free; its freedom was the gist of, and gave the meaning to, the Divine command and the threatened penalty. Had the Will not been free itself, or had the other faculties been free from the control of the Will, there could have been no more responsibility than there is in the sensations of hunger, or of heat and cold, and therefore no penalty, nor any confusion of powers arising from the conscious subjection of the Will to lower appetites or affections. Even if we were not conscious, on every occasion of doubt in the performance of a particular act, that we could take another course, the command would prove it; because if there were no freedom, the act of Adam must have been a necessary act; that is, an unavoidable result either of the Divine Will or of some unchangeable law known to God; so that in either case God would have been commanding an impossibility—a supposition which is itself impossible. The fact of doubting proves the freedom of the Will, because necessity excludes the possibility of doubt.

But this Will, free as it was, was created with a natural tendency and disposition to select, among all the variety of objects presented to its choice, such only as would be pleasing to God and in harmony with the

Divine scheme. As a natural consequence, the depth of its fall, should it occur, would be exactly in proportion to the height of its aim.

When, therefore, Adam elected to disobey, it is clear that in strict justice, and judging by human reason, his Will merited the loss of that freedom which it so grossly abused. But to have deprived him of freedom would have been to destroy his moral being, whereas God had other designs. On one hand, the glory which He was to derive from the perfect homage of man was to be made up in another way, or rather, God was not to be defrauded of it ; on the other hand, the plan by which this was to be brought about had a merciful reference to man himself. The freedom therefore was retained, although the Will itself was in a terribly shaken condition. Having rebelled against its Creator, it was subjected to the rebellion of all the subordinate faculties. It had broken the harmony of the Creation in its highest relation with the Creator, and from that moment, as a natural consequence, a permanent state of discord prevailed among its lower relationships. A general weakness came to pervade the whole aggregation of faculties. Each and all suffered a loss. Before the rebellion they were a mutual support and strength to each other ; afterwards, the strength of each being impaired, there was a mutual action and reaction in a contrary direction. Thus the affections having lost their perfect tendency towards God, drew with them the memory and the imagination, which henceforth busied themselves rather upon objects of sense than with the Divine Perfection ;

the intellect, feebly aided by the now wandering memory, lost in great measure its knowledge of God; the reason and the judgment had their own proper weakness increased by the loss which the intellect had sustained; while the enfeebled conscience gave but a poor support to the Will, which, reduced in strength as it was, vainly strove to compel an obedience which even the Divine command had failed to secure from itself. But it was not only the powers of the mind which rose against the authority of the Will, those of the body were equally rebellious. Supported in opposition to the Will by the imagination and memory, they acquired a force which it demanded incessant vigilance on the part of the Will to overcome. The Will had thus much more than a double task to perform. With a diminished vigour and deprived of the assistance of Divine grace, it had to coerce the faculties of both orders. What wonder if it did not succeed, and if its reduced power became still more lessened by repeated failures; and what wonder if the understanding, the reason, and the judgment, wanting the efficient support of the Will, succumbed to the increased vigour of the irregular bodily appetites, for in proportion to the mutual decline was the growth of force in these appetites as against the mind. But the highest faculty was naturally the one which suffered the deepest fall.

Such is a slight sketch of some of the consequences of his disobedience upon the soul of Adam himself. This is that derangement of which we spoke, from which proceeds the death of both soul and body. That its effects are far more extensive than the disordering

of the material forces of nature could produce, is clear, not only from the nature of the soul itself, and from the death which it suffers, but also (to bring the matter more vividly before the imagination), from the fact that even while men were still alive who had been born more than 200 years before the death of Adam, and when it might be supposed that the primeval knowledge of God which he possessed was still fresh in the world, the powers of both mind and body had become so thoroughly disorganised that it was necessary to destroy almost the entire race from off the earth.

Thus the effects, following the analogy of the physical world, were not confined to Adam. In addition to the consequences purely personal to himself, two others have to be dwelt upon. One, the change produced in his relation with God; and the other, the transmission of the effects of his sin to future generations. We will take them in order of importance.

But before entering upon that part of the subject, let us, as before suggested, in order more thoroughly to realise the derangement above described, to fix it more indelibly on the mind, to prove that the description given is in no degree exaggerated; let us, I say, run over shortly the history of the Sacrifice which was to atone for the sin which produced the disorder. I am not about to write a sermon. But as men are apt to think of the Fall only in its general results, passing over the details, and not troubling themselves to work out the manifold meaning of the word, so also do they with the Redemption. If we take the facts as we have them in Scripture, and dwell upon them a little, we

shall find they contain a philosophy of surpassing beauty, so beautiful, indeed, that one is almost tempted rather to dilate upon it than to keep to what has to be shown, the exact correspondence between the guilt and the atonement, and the proof which the latter affords of the magnitude of the former. We have seen how the sin included every corporeal and spiritual faculty of man. Had it not, there would have been no need for the sacrifice to have done so. How remarkably this was the case a slight effort of memory will suffice to remind us. To you, members of the Academia, all this is familiar; to most of you, for many more years than it has been to me. Excuse me, therefore, if I repeat what you know so much better than I. But there are others, not of the household of the faith; my dear friends; whom I would fain see within the one fold; and, as I sit down to write at the very hour of the very night when, after that Last Supper, our Lord was in His agony in the Garden of Gethsemane, I pray God that that Sweat of Blood be not in vain for them.

To return. Let us look first at the body of Christ: all His senses suffered. Thus, His eye paid with quite another sight for the goodliness of the fruit which tempted Eve. It is even said by some that a thorn of the cruel crown pierced His eyeball. For Eve's listening to the soft words of Satan, He heard blasphemies; for the sweet scent of the fruit, He had Golgotha; for its sweet taste, gall; for the touching of it, scourges, thorns, blows, nails. He suffered in His head, His face, His beard, His cheeks, His mouth; in His shoulders as He carried the cross; in His

knees as He fell beneath it; in His hands, His feet, His flesh, His nerves, His sacred heart; He shed every drop of His precious blood; He suffered hunger, thirst, nakedness, weariness. Then as to His soul: knowing what should happen to Him, His imagination caused the Bloody Sweat; He was betrayed by one familiar friend, denied by another, abandoned in His utmost need by all. On His way to Calvary He met His Mother, and saw her stand beneath the cross. What wounds to His affections in every circumstance! Then, again, the derision to which He was exposed, together with the accusations of blasphemy, false pretence, and untruth, were penalties paid by His reason, judgment, and intellect, and His entire submission to all these tortures was a most complete subjection of His Will in payment for the rebellion of the Will of Adam. And, lastly, He paid by death the penalty of everlasting death.

But of all this anguish, both mental and bodily, though many circumstances appeal more to the imagination; the head and crown of all was the subjection of the Will. This cannot be too strongly impressed upon the mind. As it was the perversion of the Will which caused all the confusion, it was most fitting that the Will should pay the penalty. And it is quite manifest that had not the Will of Christ so willed, not one of His sufferings would have been permitted. I wish to dwell upon the perversion of the Will, because upon this depends the whole argument. It is for this I have entered into so much detail. And it seems to me that whatever proof is required of the greatness of that perversion, is furnished by the single fact of the

voluntary submission of the Will of the Creator to that of his own rebellious creatures, by way of reparation.

So far, then, as to the effect of the sin upon Adam himself.

Let us now proceed to consider the change in his relation with God. Nothing can be plainer than this; that God being infinite and eternal, i.e. without limit of extent or duration, the disobedience was of as infinite and eternal effect as it was possible for a finite being to make it. It was unlimited by time and space. As it was a disobedience against the infinite Creator, it extended wherever the infinite Creator is. As it was against the eternal Creator, it is always present to the eternal Creator. Nothing that Adam could do afterwards, no repentance, no sacrifice, no future obedience, however perfect, no lapse of time, could blot it out or alter its character. Even if we could imagine that one who, in spite of God's favour and grace, had been guilty of such an act, could when that favour was withdrawn lead a life of perfect obedience, we cannot conceive how he could claim a restoration to favour as regards the past act. A perfect life is always due, and to lead a perfect life is only to pay from moment to moment a debt due from moment to moment. He would still stand a debtor for the irretrievable past. His past act would be for ever present between himself and God; it would accompany him and go before him into the unending future. Therefore as God had given him full warning of the penalty, eternal justice required an infinite and eternal punishment. So that until God

was pleased to provide a means by which Adam could be restored to the favour he had lost, he was in a perfectly helpless condition of disfavour. There cannot be more than one supreme ruler in any society or government; and in the government of the universe to have allowed any creature to set at naught the rule of the Creator would be for the Creator to abdicate His character of Supreme Ruler. God had, so to speak, no option in the matter. Unless His very nature changed, He could not abandon His eternal purpose. And as that purpose in creating man was, that his soul should be immortal, He could not destroy Adam. But He could provide a remedy; He could furnish a method of restoration to the favour which had been rejected; He could supply Adam's poverty with the means whereby to repay the debt of his sin. But if the means were to bear any sort of proportion to the sin, they must be as infinite as the sin. I speak according to human reason, which in this respect is in perfect agreement with the Divine will.

Now, since all that man has he has received from God, all that he returns to God already belongs to God. So that when God revealed to Adam the future incarnation of the Second Person of the Divine Trinity, He announced the bestowal of a gift, which was like all other gifts, natural and supernatural, in this respect, that, if he chose so to do, Adam could accept it, and while so doing could, with a free will, hand it back to the Divine giver. And, moreover, the gift, being infinite, was sufficient to repay the debt owing. So that, while Infinite Justice was satisfied, the eternal purposes

of God were maintained and man was placed in a position to recover his pristine holiness. But, till the remedy was placed within his reach, Adam and, as we are about to see, all his descendants, were simply in a condition of estrangement from God. Surely the Society founded by Christ to put an end to this alienation, to bring this remedy within the reach of mankind throughout the whole world and throughout all time; to restore man to his original sanctity, must itself be in a real sense holy. Is it not true that among thinking minds the necessity for some power of restorative capability is universally felt? that it obtrudes itself upon them in the daily, the hourly, difficulties and wants of life? and is it not obvious that such a power, created for such a purpose, must grow with the growth of society at large, that it must spread with the expansion of the human race, that—as remarked in the first of these papers, when speaking of the Universality of the Society—its action must embrace the entire nature of man? And is it not equally obvious that, in order to raise human nature itself out of a state of sin into a state of holiness, the power in question must be holy? It would appear undeniable, if the existence of a society founded by our Lord be admitted at all, and if its functions be what I say they are, that one of the attributes, or characteristics, or marks of that society must be holiness. Because it is simply impossible for any being, physical or moral, to produce an order superior to itself; the Creator Himself cannot produce a superior nor even an equal. To speak of so doing is a contradiction in terms. So that this principle is not only

universal, but of absolute necessity. And this brings us to what has to be said touching the transmission of the effects of Adam's sin upon all his posterity.

When he caused that derangement in his own system and in the relations which previously subsisted between himself and God on the one hand, and the rest of creation on the other, of which we have been speaking, it became, according to what has just been said, an impossibility to produce offspring less disordered than he was himself. And, therefore, although it be true that each soul of every descendant of Adam comes direct from the hand of God, and does not in itself, and up to the moment of being joined to the body, fall under this principle, yet, from the very instant of its junction, it suffers the deterioration which attaches to the previously existing body. And this is perfectly reasonable and in conformity with the principle here laid down. Because although it is, no doubt, within the power of God, on the occasion of creating each new soul, to interfere with the imperfect body and to raise it to the perfection of the newly created soul, in place of allowing the new soul to become degraded to the level of the imperfect, sinful body; yet such interference would be at variance with the law which we see to be in force, with one single exception, in all other cases. And, moreover, it would have but a transitory effect upon beings endowed with free will. For then there would be perfect men born into a world of fallen men. Innocence would be lost, while men would remain doubtful of their real condition. Or, rather, unless some test of obedience similar to that

which was imposed upon Adam were left for each individual, no one would know how far the scheme of redemption applied to himself; there would be no means of bringing home to individuals that law for making the redemption available to each, which still it would have been necessary for each to keep. Indeed the whole plan of the government of the world and of the redemption of mankind must have been remodelled. But men of every denomination of Christians admit that the redemption is a necessity for all; they speak of the fallen nature of man as an acknowledged fact; they do not deny that his *nature*—that is, those conditions of existence which are common to the entire race—is in a state of imperfection. They seem only to stagger at the fact when it is described by the theological title of original sin. For what is this original sin, other than that state of disorganisation to which Adam reduced himself, repeated and reproduced in every member of the species of which he was the common father?

Now, flowing from this disorganisation, this state of imperfection, this weakness of the higher faculties, accompanied by increased and irregular vigour in the lower appetites, is the inability, without the direct assistance of God, to avoid sin; that is, acts of disobedience to known laws; for in one sense sin is nothing but disobedience. But, like things in the physical creation, sin has a growth of its own; and being once implanted in man by the conditions of his birth, it naturally increases and multiplies itself in every direction; and as the roots of a tree seek out and appro-

priate to themselves those particles in the soil which are proper to its own nourishment, so does sin, not only in the soul, but in the body of man also. Disobedience, then, having reference to every power of the soul, to every faculty of the mind, to every function of the body, it follows that unless it be restrained by some virtue external to the disorganised nature of man, sin will find support and nutriment in every one of those powers, faculties, and functions.

But if every individual be thus disorganised in himself, so must be all societies or aggregations of individuals. If the parts be corrupt so must be the whole. No union of imperfections can constitute perfection. These are truisms, but they require to be stated in reply to those who ridicule the idea of organised Christianity acting as an arbitrator between, and controller over, the different societies of which the family of man is composed. It is, however, unanswerable, that if individuals be corrupt so must be their relations with each other, and with all societies or collections of individuals. And in the same way, if all societies or collections of men be corrupt, so must be *their* relations with each other. If each Will be perverse, so must be the united will of men associated together. If the individual Will require regeneration, so must the Will of every society. There are among others two principal points wherein the analogy between individuals and societies holds good, viz. in the liability to decay, and in the possession of a will, and it is from the perverse use of the will that this liability is in both cases incurred. Societies cannot be said to have memory, appetites, nor

senses. But they have a will, and it is in obedience to this will, however expressed, that they act. But the public will is only the united will of individuals. Every successive society, therefore, comes under the penalties which original sin entails upon individuals, due allowance being made for the difference of their respective natures. It follows that without some power able to raise societies from the degradation to which they must needs fall in the fallen condition of their individual members, there is no excess to which any individual can go, to which we may not fairly expect societies to descend likewise.

Such is the theory, such the conclusion to which an abstract argument conducts us. And the facts of history perfectly agree with the theory. Nor would it be difficult to demonstrate that the excesses of the worst monsters, and of the most corrupt societies, are but the natural results of the first disobedience—sin, carried to its logical conclusions. But historical illustrations in proof of this remark, form no part of my design just now; they may easily be found elsewhere, and especially in the admirable volume on the Formation of Christendom, by Mr. Allies, who read the chief part of the papers before the members of the *Academia*. Suffice it to say that the history of mankind at the epoch of Our Lord's Incarnation, and of pagan countries at the present day, discloses a disturbance in the moral world comparable to what would follow in the physical, were the perfect light of day withdrawn and in its place only the doubtful light of night left.

We see, then, how the wonderful interdependence

of all the parts of creation noticed in the beginning of this chapter is chiefly exemplified in the single act of Adam's disobedience. By that one act not only did he thrust himself out of God's favour, but he entailed upon his posterity the same disabilities which he had himself incurred; and as a necessary consequence not only does every individual man suffer in his own proper person, but in all his relationships likewise. Not only was every element in the human organisation displaced and disproportioned, but the organisation of society too. Not only did Adam lose his lofty station, but every combination of men came to contain a jumble of elements. Thus, immense as is the world both in itself and in all that it contains, as well as in its connection with the visible and invisible worlds beyond, and vast as is the variety of its parts; one moment of time, one atom comparatively speaking, one motion of the body, one act of the will, sufficed to disarrange and disorganise the whole. Even in the material forces of nature a disruption took place whose effects are still patent alike to the eye of mind and to the bodily senses.

Such was the condition of things which had to be remedied. The work to be accomplished was a stupendous one; a work mighty in proportions but most minute in detail. It was not merely to retain man in his first perfection that was now requisite. The time for that was past. He had fallen from his position, and the weight of sin lay upon him and upon the whole world. A power had to be exerted or called into being able to raise him from his prostrate position beneath the load, and to place him upon a pinnacle

higher than that from which he had cast himself; a power able to restore the lost balance of his faculties; a power which, taking hold of the individual, should remould the entire man, not into his former shape, for that was impossible, but into such perfection or approach to perfection as his nature mingled with sin permitted; a power which should guard every moment, every atom, every motion of the body, every minutest act of the mind and of the will, for it is out of moments, atoms, and single acts that the world and the life of man are made up; a power able to re-arrange the disordered relationships among men themselves, and between men and God; a power which should watch the interests and acts of societies with a care and detail equal to that exercised over individuals; a power capable of combating the rebellious passions; and, on one side, of protecting men of good will against the temptations of Hell, whether operating directly on the mind, or indirectly through the agency of other men or of society; and on the other side, of defending societies against the machinations of perverse members; a power which must exercise control over the different societies into which the human race is divided; and therefore over the rulers and governments of these various societies.

Now, of what nature or kind soever that power might be, and God could have decreed any one of a thousand ways for its action; it was of absolute necessity that it should have this characteristic, viz. of perfect conformity to the Will of God. It was one act of non-conformity which had produced confusion. Nothing short of complete conformity could re-establish order.

The power required must therefore be incapable of swerving. It was the free will of man which had given way and broken down. What was wanted therefore was a will superior to his—immoveable, not subject to temptation, but steadfast under all circumstances, even unable to choose disobedience. And since the effects of the first dereliction were to last as long as the human race, so must the power. And God was pleased to establish that power in the form of a Society or Church of which Christ is the Head, which is therefore indivisible and unending, as I tried to prove before; and moreover holy, as I hope to prove more fully hereafter. We shall have to consider in due time the sense in which this attribute of holiness is to be understood; how a Society formed of and administered by men imperfect in themselves can restore the lost equilibrium of the world; regenerate not only themselves but mankind at large, and demand from governments an obedience and recognition of authority such as was claimed for it in the previous papers. The reply to this question cannot yet be proceeded with; there are other matters of a practical character which must be gone into in the meantime. I will only, therefore, here add, in order to avoid even for a moment any possible misconception, that it is an imperfect description of the Society to speak of it as formed of men alone. So far is this from being the case, that even Dr. Whately, in his comments upon Lord Bacon's Essay on Unity in Religion, obliged to admit the Unity of Christian Society, and unable to deny that the Head of the Society is in Heaven, is driven to the curious

assertion that it 'is only One when considered as to its future existence.' If Dr. Whately could perceive that the Society is not confined to this world, so much the more clearly must we, who are daily accustomed to repeat 'Credo in Sanctorum Communionem.'

PART IV.

THERE are, outside the Catholic Church, two classes of men who exalt the powers of the human intellect almost into a kind of worship. Both, admitting the unity of truth, demand for the human mind the freest exercise in its investigations of every science; and both make the human reason the last court of appeal upon that science which is at once the most abstruse and the most necessary to be understood by men of all capacities. Both are wisely equal in ridiculing the fear that natural truth may run counter to supernatural truly so called and if such really exist; and both repel, with equal indignation, the remotest charge of want of logic. The first of these classes comprises the philosophers and the philosophically minded, of whom not a few are without religion and have no belief in the supernatural; to the second belong those religious men who are striving to build up in their own minds systems of religion consistent, at the same time, with the teachings of their childhood and with truths which they have themselves worked out, or which have been presented to them in later years by others. With the

deniers of the supernatural I have nothing *here* to do. But to the religious men of both classes I say, 'in judging of the facts and arguments about to be laid before you, remember your own principle; truth in one direction cannot contradict truth in another; go forward, then, without hesitation and without fear; if what is advanced be true, embrace the necessary conclusions, and mind you are logicians; cavil not, then, at small defects in method, while refusing to be bound by the great inevitable consequences of reasoning, no step of which you can refute. Bear in mind, the matter concerns yourselves chiefly. And never forget that man of acute mind whom Dante saw in the Inferno, and who had come there by having allowed himself to be reasoned into the commission of a mortal sin. 'Ah,' says the wretched soul, 'how I started when the Black Cherubim seized me, saying to me, "May be thou didst not consider that I was a logician." You cannot afford to stifle the logic upon which you pride yourselves, lest perchance you be judged out of your own mouths.'

We, gentlemen of the Academia, have a just claim on the class I am addressing for sympathy and support against those increasing numbers who require that every argument touching Christianity shall begin by proving the object of its foundation. As if, at the end of eighteen hundred years, *that* could be open to doubt or question. But even these men cannot deny, I think, that the individuals who were instructed by Christ, and who were, either as individuals or as component parts of an organisation, to diffuse throughout the

world, and to transmit to the latest ages, the truths they had been taught, must themselves have taught in conformity with the will of Him from whom they learned.

A certain critic, writing in Fraser's 'Magazine,' who regards ridicule as an unchristian weapon in our hands, has endeavoured to cast what he can upon the arguments by which, in two essays published in our former volume, I endeavoured to establish the necessity for Christianity to take from the first the form of an organisation. His remarks having had a wide circulation, invite a reply. The only one I will give him, however, will be to request him to read carefully the foregoing pages and those which are about to follow, and then to say candidly whether any conceivable amount of instructions on 'morality, repentance, and prayer,' on any 'mystical union between God and the soul' short of a miraculous one perpetually repeated, and such as the critic himself would be the first to refuse to St. Francis, to St. Philip Neri, or to St. Theresa; whether, I say, any instruction whatever, or any such union as he can admit, could possibly enable individuals to meet and overcome the daily difficulties which will be pointed out in the course of this paper, to say nothing of the estrangement from God referred to at length in the preceding one. I am about to show the practical necessity which existed in the early ages of Christianity for the Christian Society to be holy both in doctrine and in discipline. Hereafter it will be requisite to consider the various modifications in meaning of which the word Holy is susceptible. Here it

will be employed in the sense of being absolutely conformable to the Divine Will, and it will be so used in reference to the threefold character of that state of things which the Christian organisation was established to remedy.

Now, if what was brought forward in the last paper be true, and I think there is not much room for persons really calling themselves Christians to cavil, it should be plain that the Society had firstly to adjust the relations between man and God; secondly, the discordant elements of man's own nature; and thirdly, all the relationships of men among themselves, affected as they are by the individual imperfection produced by the Fall of Adam. The effects of that act of disobedience have already been treated at sufficient length. And it would seem self-evident that a Society which was to repair the injury done to the Divine Honour, must be in the highest and most absolute sense holy. The only question which arises is, how can the work be said to be accomplished by any Society at all? The injury having been in one view infinite, an infinite reparation was necessary, and this reparation was provided by the Incarnation. A humiliation and a submission to the Divine Majesty as infinite as the Divine Majesty would alone be proportionate to the offence, and this humiliation and submission consisted in the single fact that the Infinite God became man, and subjected Himself to his own creatures; thus offering the required submission and raising human nature in the person of Christ out of the depth into which it had fallen in that of Adam. Here, then, was a reparation

which outbalanced the injury (which was after all bounded by the finite nature of him by whom it was committed, whereas the reparation was strictly, and in every sense, infinite). What, then, could any society of men have to do with the matter? The sacrifice was Divine. In what way and with what reason could any organised society interfere? The answer is—that as there were two persons concerned in the disobedience, God who was disobeyed and man who was the disobeyer, so the same two persons must be concerned in the reparation, viz. God who furnished the means and man who should avail himself of them. God owed no debt to His own honour. It was man who owed the debt, and without his cooperation the debt could not be paid. It was not enough that human nature in the abstract should be sanctified by its intimate union with God in Christ, nor yet that human nature in the abstract should repay the debt due to God by its intimate union with God on the Cross. An individual sanctification and an individual repayment were necessary, the necessity being based upon the fact of original sin attaching to every descendant of Adam. And since, according to the ordinary laws of nature, the knowledge of the means of repayment could only come to the entire race through a human agency, God was pleased to establish that agency in the form of a Society, which should carry the knowledge to the ends of the earth and to the consummation of time. Of this Society Christ was and is the Head; without Him it would be quite powerless. And without the bond which the obligation to Him of every individual sup-

plies, there could be no union among men more powerful than that transitory one of civil society which is constantly subject to disruption. Whereas the union among themselves of men who are united to God must be incapable of disruption. There is therefore no question of any mere human society interfering between individuals and God. The Society only exists in virtue of the Headship of Christ. So that when the Society steps in, it is the whole Society which does so. It is God made man in union with men, who comes between disobedient man and the just anger of the Divine Trinity. Here, then, is an answer to the question raised, and here is a sense in which the Society is holy, and in which it is capable of repairing the injury, and at the same time of averting the wrath of God.

But there is another point from which to view the Society in its function of regulating relations between man and God. It is a point whose existence even is unconsidered by vast numbers of people professing to be Christians. Nevertheless, both theory and history agree in proving it to be a position of vital importance. In the conduct of human affairs it is a matter of the very first moment for administrators to understand the characters of those with whom they have to deal. A man may be possessed of quick insight into principles, but unless this be combined with judgment of character such an one will be looked upon as a theorist rather than as an administrator. At the time (early in 1865) I am writing, almost the entire periodical press of this country, and very many continental journals teem with attacks upon the Holy Father, for what they call his

stupidity in not understanding the temper of modern society, and the tendency of modern civilization. He is pronounced unfit for his position, since he is, according to them, damaging his own cause. But if an accurate knowledge of individual character and of his epoch be essential to the success of the statesman, how much more is this the case in administering the affairs of God. Now, to teach the duties of man to God is to administer the affairs of God, and demands therefore an accurate knowledge not of man only, but of God also. It follows that the Society whose end is to teach these duties, must be possessed of an intimate knowledge of the Divine Nature. But the idea of any man or society knowing much about the Divine Nature is held to be absurd. I hope, nevertheless, very shortly to prove that the absurdity is on the other side. Thus, the first and at the same time the most striking duty we owe to God is worship. From the earliest ages this has consisted chiefly in two things—sacrifice and prayer. And at the time of the foundation of the Christian Society, the Roman world was covered with temples for the performance of both. These sanctuaries were the scenes of revolting profligacy for which the gods were responsible. Public worship was attended with games, processions, and exhibitions, in which the forces of nature were honoured under the names of various deities. These deities were declared to be subject to human vices, and their vilest acts were represented upon the stage before the whole population, who by their presence took part in the supposed honour. In some countries human sacrifices were held

to be pleasing to the gods. In others more subtle notions of the Divine character prevailed, and have been transmitted to our own times. In Persia, for instance, the Unity of God being unknown, a theory based upon the conflict between good and evil in the world, and known as the dualistic theory, was invented. Worship was accorded to two divinities: the God of good and light, and the God of evil and darkness, between whom there was a continual warfare. This idea, seeming to account, as it does in a plausible way, for the contradictions which the world of nature presents, is still a form of doctrine in the East. In India, again, the place of God was taken by an abstract principle which after some way launching into existence a trinity whose functions were to create, to preserve, and to destroy, thenceforth became an inert substance having no connection with man, demanding from him no recognition, and whose existence has since fallen into oblivion. Then, again, the Epicureans ascribed to the Deity, supposing the Supreme Ruler to be one, or to the gods, supposing them to be many (for these philosophers had no definite notions on the subject, and continually contradicted themselves), the Epicureans, I say, ascribed to the gods a repose so perfect as to exclude them from any care whatever for the affairs of the world. The Stoics, on the other hand, held that the Divinity is simply the soul of which the universe is the body; then, again, there was the esoteric and exoteric theory of religion, and that other idea which made religion a mere affair of statecraft.

Now, it is obvious that the whole question of sacrifice

and prayer, and it may be added, of manners also, is raised by these conflicting theories. A Society, therefore, presenting itself before the world with the claim to be divine, must be able not only to assert but to demonstrate the falsity of the popular notions of the truth of its own. It must be no new Academy, declaring all knowledge on these subjects to be doubtful, nor must it, in the words of Cotta, profess, 'I cannot so easily conceive why a proposition is true as why one is false.' It must not only pick to pieces opposing fallacies, but it must be able itself to stand that severest of tests, the Socratic mode of dissection. While answering the dualistic disciple of Zoroaster, it must establish its own Monotheism. While maintaining the Unity of God, it must show that the Divine Unit is no mere abstract principle like the Indian author of Brahma, Vishnu, and Schiva; nor yet the unity of universal nature. But in establishing this doctrine of unity a thousand questions would arise beyond the single fact. For example, if the government of the universe were in the hands of one God, whence the estrangement from him which all men acknowledged? Wherefore the necessity for propitiating His favour? Would human sacrifices propitiate Him? How could the Divine Providence and Justice consist with the prosperity of the wicked? Does He watch over the affairs of men? If not of what avail is prayer? Does His felicity consist in activity or in repose? How is repose compatible with the government of the world, with the preservation of the courses of the stars and seasons, and with the task of accommodating the things of earth, air, and sea, to

the advantage and necessities of man? But, perhaps, He entrusted all these things to intermediate created powers; to gods inferior to Himself, superior to men.

These are not imaginary questions, but such as actually arose; and I say that a Society asserting a divine commission to teach the duties of man to God *must* have been able to reply convincingly to all of them, and in order to do so, must have had an accurate knowledge of the Divine Nature.

Then, again, arising out of the nature of God, is the great fact upon which rests the Redemption of Man, the fact of the Incarnation. The manner in which this is accomplished must of course agree with the nature and attributes of God, and must be so explained as to reply to the fables of other religions. Of these there were many which had the idea of Divine incarnations and Divine sacrifices for the redemption of our race. The expectation of the advent of a saviour of mankind was familiar in the East long before our era. Many Divine manifestations were said to have occurred in various parts of the world. Men believed that the will of the gods was conveyed to them by means of prodigies and portents, by omens and dreams—the supernatural was constantly present to their minds, so that when Christ was announced as the Incarnate God there was nothing startling in the declaration as such. What men stumbled at was the Cross, not the Incarnation. But the claims set up for Christ demanded, and all the more imperiously because of the ignominious death on Calvary, proofs which it was impossible to reject. Here was no semi-divine Incarnation like the Indian

Avatars ; nor was it that one of an intermediate race of gods, holding a place between the First Principle and man, had assumed the likeness of man, and had visited a certain country in order to give wise laws and a new form of government. Nor was it the unbinding of Prometheus and the diffusion of brotherly love among mankind. There was something infinitely above all this, infinitely more sublime, infinitely more complete. I am not about to enter into the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation. The fact may be taken for granted as being held by everyone professing Christianity, and it is plain that upon a correct knowledge and understanding of the fact will depend the performance of men's duties to God in reference to it. Let us take two suppositions, and anyone will at once perceive that our obligations must be absolutely different in kind according as the truth lies on one side or the other. Suppose then, in the first place, that in the doctrine of the Incarnation we are to recognise the mission of a man born after the manner of nature, but yet sanctified by the infusion into his soul of an extraordinary amount of the grace or spirit of God. It is clear that such an one being a creature could, while calling upon us for a very high respect, admiration, veneration, and love, be entitled to no tittle of adoration. He would be at the utmost a corrupt scion from a corrupt stock purified by the presence of Divine grace, and as such, would have no right to any divine honour whatever. His sacrifice would be of the same kind as, though far higher in degree than, the divinely appointed sacrifices under the Mosaic Law. He would

be a creature propitiating the Creator on behalf of fellow-creatures. It would be the finite making reparation to the Infinite for an all but infinite transgression. The payment would bear no proportion to the debt owing. It is true God might, by an act of His will, receive such sacrifice in full of all demands. But that would be to condescend to the impotence of his creatures, not to obtain payment of the debt. But suppose, in the second place, that by the Incarnation we are to understand the personal union of God Himself with human nature in the form of a certain man, in such a way that the human nature should not only have at no time suffered the least taint of corruption, but that it should actually be raised to a Divine condition without losing its human character. It is clear that such an One, being God Himself, would have a most just title to the highest adoration, and being man, human nature which had fallen, as before explained, in Adam, would in Him be more than restored to the sanctity it had lost. The sacrifice of such an one would be not only perfect in holiness, but at the same time Infinite. It would be in every way worthy of Him to whom it was offered, and a perfectly adequate repayment of the debt due by human nature to the Infinite Deity.

Now between these two suppositions there is the widest conceivable difference. There is all the difference between the creature and the Creator. If one be true the other must be false. One has been held, the other is at this moment held throughout the world. There is a congruity in the one, a reasonableness, a simplicity

which, notwithstanding the mystery it contains, and which is quite unexplainable, commends it to the mind, as being the true doctrine. In the other there is an incompleteness, an insufficiency, a sort of stopping half-way, which is inconsistent with our ideas of the Divine character. Nevertheless there are the two doctrines, and according as one or the other is true must our duty vary. But on whichever side the truth lies, it is evident that the Society charged with regulating the performance of the duties of men to God must be thoroughly informed in order to teach, and divinely strengthened in order to be capable of holding its ground against the adverse doctrine. On this point it must be absolutely conformable to the Will of God; that is, it must be holy, otherwise there is no reason why the men of whom it is, in this world, composed, should not err from the truth, and so the truth, on this most important question be lost or distorted.

Indeed, the allegation is, that they have so erred; and that no possibility of knowing the truth for certain any longer exists. But that proposition is so absurd when looked at in reference to a question which involves, as this does, the commission or the avoidance of idolatry, that it only requires to be stated to carry its own condemnation with it. So far, then, as to the homage due to God and to Christ, and as to the character of the Society which has to render that homage. In close connection with the subject of that which is due to Christ, arises the question of the other relation of man to God, viz. the estrangement of man, and the recon-

ciliation or redemption of which he stands in need. A few words on this point will suffice.

Two doctrines have been and continue to be held upon the dogma of the Redemption. One, that the propitiatory Sacrifice through which it comes was offered on behalf of all men ; the other, that some only are predestined to partake of its effects. Now I laboured in the last paper to show, not the fact only, but also how it comes to be the fact, that the Fall of Adam was not a merely personal Fall, but that it had a double character, being the Fall of human nature, as well as of the man Adam. This being so, and unless there be some gross flaw in the argument by which were explained the effects of the disobedience both upon Adam himself, and through him upon all his posterity, it would seem that the Redemption must have an equally double character ; viz. the Redemption both of human nature and of the individual man. But after the increase of mankind upon the earth, the Redemption of human nature could only be made complete by rendering it applicable to every member of the species. Now how clear soever this may appear to us, it would seem otherwise in pagan Greece and Rome, where slaves were supposed to be of a nature different from that of freemen. Nor are there wanting at the present time persons who entertain a similar notion respecting the African races. So that the argument used just now may be repeated, that whichever view be the true one, the very fact of the other's existence proves that the Society which is to uphold the true must be in a posi-

tion to decide conformably to the Will of God, that is, that it must be so far a Holy Society.

And this brings us to the second division of the subject: to the consideration of that function of the Society which consists in the readjustment of the discordant elements of man's own nature.

I have before remarked, and may here repeat, that to be able to remodel the nature of man the Christian Society must have every portion of that nature completely and wholly in its own hands.

Now human nature may be regarded from three points of view: from the first we may survey his spiritual nature; from the second his physical; and from the third the two united.

First, then, as to his spiritual nature. It is true to say that in the readjustment of mental faculties the object of the Society was not simply to exalt any one of them, or all of them together. It neither professed as its end to impart genius nor judgment, nor to strengthen the affections, nor the memory, nor the will. Not but that a faithful adherence to the laws of the Society will result in the consummation of such desirable ends. But the foundation was not *ad hoc*. The intelligence, the subtilty, the prudence, that is, the judicious application of means to ends, and the strength of will possessed by men like Homer, Aristotle, Cæsar, and Socrates have not been surpassed in Christian ages. No doubt by some secret which Christianity has to impart, the stupid Albert becomes Albertus Magnus, the timid maiden an heroic martyr, the impetuous Ignatius a man of coolest judgment. But these are

collateral effects, not the results which the Society was established to bring about. The aim was of quite another kind. It was, among other things, to restore the lost balance of the faculties, to regulate their relative forces in such a way as to make all work together in harmony towards the ends for which man was created—the knowledge, the love, and the service of God. But in order to accomplish this, the rulers of the Society must have attained, in some way, to a knowledge of the nature of the soul. As it is true that to worship God aright we must know something accurate of His nature, so is it in regulating the soul and mind of man. What had to be done was this: to teach him how so to employ every faculty, that while occupied with the world of sense and of experience the occupation should have for its ultimate aim to conform perfectly to the Will of God, and for this purpose to give every minutest act a direct reference to this ultimate aim. To do this with anything approaching to perfection, the mind must be drawn out by even steps, and trained to self-knowledge, so that no faculty should run before the rest, all being kept under the enlightened control of a purified will; i.e. of a will fixed on reaching the true end of its being. In the natural order and for the attainment of natural ends, the training was already so far perfect that no vast progress has been made since. I do not mean that in the course of Christian ages the accumulation of observations on the external world, and on mental phenomena, has not led to some remarkable discoveries, though even in this respect the advances of science are

probably far less than we like to fancy. But this progress concerns only the few. The bulk of mankind, they who live by the sweat of their brow, know only what affects their daily life, and the circle of their facts is little wider to-day than in ancient times ; while as regards the higher class of intellects, it is by exercise that the mind receives benefit, and this is had at least as well in the study of Homer, Pliny, Thucydides, or Aristotle, as in that of Shakspeare, Cuvier, Gibbon, or Bacon. And though it be true that these studies are now more widely diffused among the people of some countries, yet the training itself is the same in character, and its effect is confined now as then to the natural order. But the Society had to direct the mind to something beyond the world of nature, whether mental or physical ; to place before it a supernatural object as its Final Cause, and to point out the method of arriving at the desired end. Now at the first preaching of the Gospel some men had with infinite pains succeeded in demonstrating the fact of the soul's immortality ; but the very difficulty of the process and the paucity in numbers of those who admitted or were capable of appreciating the justice of the reasoning by which it was proved, shows of itself that the natural exercise of the mind on the very highest subjects was powerless to ameliorate the condition of mankind even in this life, while for purifying the soul and reconciling it with God, here was something which no study could reach, and which was left absolutely untouched by the greatest efforts of the intellect, until a supernatural power came to its aid. The Society then had far more in this con-

nection to do than to teach the immortality of the soul. It had to define its nature, to show men of what they were capable and how they had failed ; in a word, to remould the whole aggregation of faculties ; and this could only be effected by a power which was not only thoroughly master of the work it had to accomplish, but perfectly acquainted with the materials on which it had to operate. The conclusion is obvious ; such a power must needs be itself supernatural. But the Society is so, solely in virtue of the fact that Christ is its head ; and since without Him it would be no divine Society at all, it would be wanting in the one condition required for success in readjusting and restoring the spiritual nature of man. As regards man's spiritual nature, then, the teaching of the Society must be conformable to the Will of God, that is, it must be holy. Let us pass on to the consideration of his physical nature.

An inevitable concomitant of disbelief in the soul's immortality is the breaking down of all moral restraints. Irresponsibility and unrestrained licence are convertible terms. Whether it be that carnal sin precedes or is caused by the darkness of the intellect, certain it is that both proceed together ; and where want of faith in the punishments as well as in the rewards of a future life has become general, a frightful degradation of body will also exist. No wonder, then, that a corruption which is absolutely appalling should have pervaded the whole Roman world at the epoch of the Incarnation. It was a corruption of which we in these days can form no sort of conception. Nor is it well that we should. To acquire anything like an adequate notion of it would involve the groping in a mass of filthy details too dan-

gerous to be encountered except under an overwhelming sense of duty. In order therefore to avoid any further reference to disgusting facts, I will rather take a philosophical view of the operation of Christianity upon man's corporeal nature.

It is obvious that disbelief in the resurrection of the body must necessarily accompany disbelief in that of the soul; and this remark is of equal force in regard to that other prevalent opinion, of the absorption of the soul after death into that of the Creator, or of the world-soul, in such a way as to destroy the individuality, while retaining the life, of the human soul. Now, disbelief in the immortality of the soul was very widely spread, and even where a belief in this truth was held, the conviction was faint in the extreme, and in many minds was mixed up with the idea of absorption. No wonder, then, that the resurrection of the body was universally ignored in those times. Since, then, the body was regarded as a mere thing of this world, to be used and when worn out to return for ever to the dust, it naturally lost the chief part of that dignity which must attach to an organisation destined for a life of unending continuance. It is becoming that a body intended to enjoy an eternal existence in the presence of its Creator, and in evident personal contact with Him, should be preserved with all imaginable care from any defilement. Whereas if no such intimate relation were contemplated, there would, so far as the body is concerned, be no reason for such careful preservation. The ground for abstaining from breaches of that part of the Divine Law which con-

cerns the body, would in that case have reference only to the soul. Supposing the immortality of the soul to be granted, there would exist reasons enough for keeping it free from blame. But the body would be uninfluenced by either the adherence to or the breach of the Divine commands. In the absence of the hope of a beatified future, wherein the body should participate in the happiness of the soul, it might be left to the practice of its own uncontrolled desires, and the infringement of known laws would be visited simply upon the Soul acting through the perverse Will. Apart from this the object of keeping the body pure would be entirely wanting, unless indeed we take into account the question of bodily health, with which, however, we have nothing to do in this place.

If, therefore, we were informed of any society wherein the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body were denied or practically forgotten, we should be prepared for a moral condition of a very depraved kind. Nothing which the imagination could conceive, the will command, or the bodily powers execute, would seem too gross to look for in such a society. Unless some leaven remained to prevent the corruption of the entire mass, we should expect to see renewed a state of things similar to that which led to the flood. Now this is a fair description of society in the Roman world at the time of our Lord's Incarnation. In the midst of surpassing depravity, there were some men who had kept the whiteness of their souls and bodily purity, and to some of these were confided the propagation and administration of the Society which He founded.

The modification of manners necessarily following from the cardinal doctrine of which we have been speaking, and which the Society was charged to promulgate, is a practical illustration of a remark made in the first of these papers, on the inseparable connection of doctrine with discipline. I here call attention to this truth because here the inseparableness cannot be denied. The subject will be returned to at length in a future paper, when the principle involved will be found to be of great importance.

At present the point to be borne in mind is this: that the filthiness of manners demanded more than a demigod to cleanse the world from their accumulated foulness; that universal history proves the unfailing tendency of man when left to himself to fall into such depravity; that therefore the cleansing power must be a perpetual one; that the only efficacious mode of purification, was by bringing home to the mind the true character of that dignity which the body was intended to enjoy hereafter; that to convince men of a fact so opposed to manners universally prevalent, the power in question must be able to prove its Divine commission; and finally, that a Society which could furnish this proof must really be Divine. But to be Divine is to be conformable to the Will of God, which is the definition we have given of the word Holy.

We have now viewed human nature from the two first points proposed in this division. It remains to examine the operation of the Society upon that nature in its entirety, as consisting of a spiritual and a physical nature combined. The remarks I have to make,

although somewhat at length, will be found, before they are brought to a conclusion, to be very practical.

The impression seems to be widely prevalent among Protestants, that the Christian, is little more than a moral, law. According to modern notions it hardly touches dogma, which is almost reduced to opinion; it leaves the mind free to wander unrestrained among all the objects which the imagination, the memory, and the senses present before it; and it allows the senses a liberty devoid of control within limits which are rather fixed by the usages of society, than by the one revealed law. Let me explain. I do not know whether there exists elsewhere, but outside the Roman Catholic Church I never heard of, what is familiarly known within that Corporation as the custody of the senses. Yet it must be plain, on a little reflection, that it is through the senses that the commonest and most powerful temptations enter. However the first temptation assailed the mind of Eve, the eye certainly was tempted; and since then the mind has lost and the senses have gathered strength in relation to each other. So that now with the great majority of men temptation chiefly enters through the senses. That being so, it would seem that the Christian Law must of necessity take hold of the senses and prohibit that free use of them which endangers the infringement of positive explicit commands. There should be no difficulty in admitting this much. But to bring the idea more home to the mind, it will only be necessary to remember that eighteen hundred years ago it was impossible to pass a week, or perhaps a day, without having

exhibited before the eye objects unmentionable, which were actually offered to the homage and veneration of the whole population; that at the religious shows and games, acts were perpetrated of so foul a nature that, even in the midst of that depravity, the actors were accounted infamous, and the presence of the female sex prohibited; the daily conversation, too, was such as no chaste ear could listen to, and that among men the most refined. Let not, says St. Paul, those things which are done by them in secret be so much as named among you, as becomes holy men. But they were done in public too. And unless the Law of the Society interfered, taking charge of ear and eye, and commanding restraint in their use, what hope could there be of enforcing a morality worthy to be in any sense called holy.

Now if the senses could not be allowed to rest without control upon outward objects, still less could the memory be permitted to recall and the imagination to picture them unchecked. Were the imagination like a mirror, which reflects without taking impressions, and is therefore not sullied by the things which pass before its surface, it might remain unharmed in any presence. But the imagination is powerless without the memory; it reflects only what the memory presents and reacts upon it with a force increased by custom, so that the purity or impurity of both proceed together. But the actions of the body are the results of mental operations, and there is therefore no perfect external life but what springs from a holy inner life. From this it follows that unless the intellect thinks truly of the duties of

these two faculties, the Will will allow them an unholy licence. But in order to think truly, the intellect must be perfectly instructed as to the duties of all the mental faculties, and especially as to those of the Will, because upon the powers possessed by the Will depends the ability or inability to resist the inclinations of the inferior faculties of both mind and body. But this knowledge is to be found nowhere except in the One revealed Law of Christianity. Everyone who has studied the subject, even a little, knows that before the Revelation of this Law no pretence existed to anything higher than opinion on these questions. Men were as much at sea about the human mind as about the Creator Himself. And if what I have just said be true, and it seems almost self-evident, that outward acts depend upon a mental appreciation of their bearing, and this appreciation upon the estimate formed of the nature of the mind itself, it will be true likewise that the new law sent into the world to correct morals and to restore them to their first purity, must necessarily contain, in germ at least, an explanation of the nature of the human mind. So that upon this the teaching of the Society charged with enforcing the Law must be not only holy, but absolute, and therefore on these matters intolerant of opinion, which was the very thing requiring correction.

Let us keep to ancient times, and let us bear constantly in mind what has been said just now, and we shall be forced to recognise as valid the Society's claim to an absolute control over the whole domain of thought. But let not this last sentence be quoted

against me without giving at length the whole of the preceding paragraph. I am not saying that thought was not free within certain boundaries; but it rested with the Society to define those bounds, which were wider than the human mind could ever hope to fill, as I will show. To do this satisfactorily, however, and in view of arguments which will occur in a future portion of the entire subject, I must go back to a remote period, some centuries before the Incarnation, only hoping that the remarks I am about to make will not seem too discursive. I am aware the subject demands a severe style and close reasoning; but so many objections are raised, and that by opponents who take such different grounds, that one's progress is stopped at every moment; one has, as it were, to fight one's way through a host of assailants.

The development of the Greek mind is something unique in the history of mankind. This intellectual movement took its rise at a period when the knowledge of the primeval world, and of the truths concerning the creation of man and the universe which God had imparted to Adam, had become nearly obliterated, and when the moral government of creation was supposed to be conducted by a host of deities purely human in character. In a few generations, the mind of Greece, with no very great external assistance, emancipating itself from the recognised religion, which had a firm hold on the hearts of men, gave birth to a philosophy which eventually led its adherents to the very threshold of the temple of Christ. The process by which this immense result was brought

about is remarkable, and has in it something of a very providential character. It was necessary that the old superstitions should be weakened, that no new superstition should take its place, but yet that a sense of religion should be upheld and cherished in the popular mind till the true religion came to satisfy the cravings of all hearts. To the accomplishment of all this no other known national character would have sufficed, and I can conceive no different sequence in mental expansion so perfectly adapted to this object. It required, moreover, a freedom and independence of intellectual action, unsurpassed by the most irreligious theorists in later ages, and a hardihood in scientific speculation in the presence of which modern investigation appears feeble indeed. For we must remember that the earliest philosophical efforts to account for the great fact of existence were creative and constructive, proceeding upon a set of ideas altogether different from those of the earlier poetic theogonies, which had nothing whatever of abstract or scientific; whereas, within a hundred years of the first Greek records, the Ionic philosophers set themselves to discover at the same time the primordial something, out of which, as they thought, the whole universe must, in some way, have grown, and physical primary causes for the immense variety of visible phenomena. In this way abstract ideas went hand in hand with practical scientific observations. Both were pushed to the very limits of human capacity, and both went to upset the existing popular mythology. Nevertheless, the latter retained its hold upon the people, and was, as we know, in full

vigour centuries later. But the results of these investigations, though put forward with a kind of dogmatism, did not satisfy certain minds, more bent on testing the soundness of predecessors than on constructing theories of their own. And it was out of this disposition that arose the dialectic method, the application of which culminated in Plato and Aristotle, and which has continued to exercise so patent an influence on all philosophy since, even in Christian times. These investigations embraced all manner of questions, and were of a subtlety which would be ridiculed by modern enlightenment. Witness the celebrated sneer of Gibbon, in speaking of the Arian controversy. Consider, for example, Euclid's definitions of a point and of a line. They are so purely abstract as to be really impossible. Nevertheless *we* take them for granted and are satisfied with them, because, impossible and merely ideal as they seem, long experience has proved that they are a sure basis upon which to build the most exact and practical of all the natural sciences. 'Position without magnitude' sounds like a contradiction, and no wonder if the definition led to numberless discussions, as it is said to have done. But this is only a sample of the subtlety with which every question, physical and metaphysical, was debated. These philosophers, when books were scarce and travelling difficult, heaped together and committed to memory a prodigious number of facts and arguments, before which the information acquired by pretentious moderns is almost trifling. Take, as one instance out of many, and that by no means the most remarkable, the author of the original atomic

theory, Democritus, who, we are told, besides works on that theory and its application to cosmogony and physics, wrote others on geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, optics, geography, zoology, botany, medicine, music, poetry, grammar, history, and ethics. These men were perfect encyclopedias of knowledge and giants in intellect, and their keenness was transmitted to the period of the great Eastern heresies, as we shall see hereafter. To us, who know the shape of the earth and are persuaded we have the true theory of the sidereal system, it may be natural to smile at the mistaken guesses of these old investigators. But, since it is to their numberless failures that we owe much of our knowledge, ridicule is neither just nor generous; no more than it would be against a Palissy or a Tyndall, whose experiments—in other words, whose failures—on one phenomenon alone are counted by tens of thousands. I am anxious to impress on the reader's mind the greatness of those ancient intellects, in order that the effects of their theories, not only upon contemporaries but upon successive generations, may not be undervalued, and also that it may be abundantly clear with what mighty minds the Christian organisation had to cope. Now, so long as these men confined their theories to such questions as the shape of the earth and the material of the heavenly bodies, revealed truths would in all probability be little affected. Whether the earth were flat or spherical, whether the sun were a meteoric aggregation fed by exhalations from the earth, or a mass of iron heated and rendered luminous by the rapidity of its rotation, might not

matter in the least. But when philosophy and science, acting in concert, went on to theorise upon the beginnings of all things, and to derive them from an Infinite Something whence all substances proceed, and into which all must relapse; or when they declared man to be a mere product of the earth acted on by the sun, and itself acting under the stimulus of fire; man being only one in a series of formations of which plants were the first; or when they conceived that the human mind was composed of two positive elemental influences, Light and Darkness; or that all knowledge and perception came through the pores, so that plants perceived and possessed knowledge in the same way, and of the same kind as, though in a less degree than, man; or when they maintained that the air was the source of the life, the soul, and the intelligence of man, and that in it the Reason resided; or when they identified the soul and mind of man with heat and fire, and said that both soul and mind were composed of certain atoms, and that thought was the effect of atoms from without acting upon the thinking atoms within; so that mind did not work spontaneously, but was put in motion by external corresponding atoms, one of whose attributes was eternity of motion. When, I say, the Divine Society came across any one of these theories, it must either give up its doctrine of the creation of man, or of free will and its consequent moral responsibility; or of the eternal individuality of the soul when once created; or of its indivisible nature; or of original sin; or of some other fundamental doctrine, the abandonment of which would be the giving up of Christianity itself;

or else it must call upon these prodigies of genius, of subtlety, and of information, to bring all their treasures of intellect and of knowledge, and lay them at the feet of the Christian authority.

It did not take away from the freedom of the human will that men were under the control of God ; nor was man's intellectual freedom less because he could not infringe the laws of arithmetic or mathematics without suffering the penalty of confusion in all his calculations. Nor again, was man's freedom curtailed because the One Perfect Law warned him to guard the smallest use of his senses lest carelessness should lead him into criminal acts ; nor because it laid down a definite code as to men's duties on a host of ethical, social, and political subjects, like those discussed with such depth of insight in the dialogues of Plato, or in the more wonderful writings of Aristotle. It was, indeed, the positive teaching of the Christian Law alone which could furnish complete and satisfactory solutions to all those unanswered questions which Plato asked and which Cicero repeated. Upon many of these questions, as we have already seen, and upon others which we are about to consider, it was essential to the object for which the Society was founded that its teaching should be distinct, precise, and unyielding. The Gospel, then, did not take away man's freedom. On the contrary, it made that freedom the very ground and basis of responsibility. Far from crushing free will and consequent free intellectual action, the Gospel continually asserted man's possession of the gift. But it said, 'This is the Law, and here is the Truth : obey ;

but there is no coercion. I only set before you the penalty and the reward.' And if men grew angry and persecuted the preachers, they proved their freedom while they incurred the penalty; but there was no logic in their anger. The fact is, that in those days no one thought that Christian teaching dwarfed the intellect or narrowed the sphere of its exercise. How could they? Christianity presented to them an Infinite Personal Creator, and a personal relation between Him and every man; it raised all men to an equality before Him by the sacrifice of the God-man; a sacrifice which it declared to be for all alike. It opened to the intellect literally an infinite expanse through which to soar; together with an Infinite God and the infinite perfections of God; it showed relations with God and with His perfections as infinite as the innumerable circumstances and acts of man's life and of all around him modified by every phase of thought; the memory, the reason, the imagination, the understanding, the affections, the judgment, were furnished in the Life and Passion of Our Lord with an inexhaustible supply of materials upon which to work. The Law of Christ did not stunt mental growth; what it did was to give men the clue which should lead them along the intricate paths of the labyrinth of life to that centre where dwells the supreme good which all seek; teaching them to avoid the obstructions which ignorance, blindness, passion, and self-will put in the way of their progress to the desired end. It came to them with a science more universal and higher in interest than all other sciences: the Science of God, of man's origin and being, of his

relations to all men and things around him, and to all corporations and societies of men. The wisest among the philosophers had long before recognised how small is the bearing of the physical sciences upon our real interests in comparison with such topics as these. And the fact that the doctrine taught was positive and definite could in no way limit the freedom of the mind. The teaching guided but did not curtail mental action. Men might deny the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, and continue to pay divine honours to deceased heroes if they so pleased, just as they might give a free rein to their imaginations or passions, but such a course was taken at their own peril and did not in the least bar the authority of the Christian Corporation, nor remove from the Society the mark of holiness which it plainly exhibits in this connection.

These remarks may suffice upon the restoration and regulation of the discordant elements of man's own nature. We will proceed shortly to consider the holiness of the Society, as a logical necessity arising out of that function which consists in bringing into harmony the relations of men among themselves.

These relations, though manifold, may be divided into four chief classes: 1st. Those within the family. 2nd. Those with individuals beyond the family. 3rd. Those of individuals with the civil power. 4th. Those of individuals with the government of the Christian organisation. This last class will be considered in another paper. Let us take the other three in order, and we shall see in each case how necessary it was that that Society should be holy which had to regulate the

relations under consideration ; the reason being, that in all the concerns of life, public as well as private, the obligation of obedience to the one perfect revealed law of the Society immediately brought men into collision with other laws in every one of these relations.

First, then, as to the action of the Society upon the family. I shall speak only of marriage, and of the authority of parents, and the consequent duty of children. I shall continue throughout to draw all my illustrations, as before, from ancient history, thus keeping the argument entirely beyond the realm of prejudice as far as in me lies ; and I shall select only such facts as are open to everyone to verify who will take the trouble to investigate even a little.

Now the whole social edifice being based upon the family, it follows that the details of the family relations must be regulated with a precision in proportion to the results which grow out of them. It would be impossible for these details to be left to the caprice of individuals. The social structure must possess symmetry in order to have solidity. But symmetry is not the growth of caprice. To obtain it fixed laws must be observed, and they must be of general application. In this way, the two essential characteristics of the social fabric go hand in hand. But these laws must emanate from some legislative power. You cannot conceive laws without authority to make them ; and to ensure obedience, the authority to legislate must be acknowledged. It follows that in defining the powers of parents and the consequent duties of children, if the recognised authority be vicious, so will be the laws,

and, by consequence, not only the immediate relations within the family, but the superstructure will be so too. Unless, therefore, the Society which is charged with the regulation of relations of men among themselves have both the authority to enact or declare perfect laws, and the means of causing its authority to be recognised, there can be no possibility of anything but a vicious family and social condition. It would no longer depend upon wills endowed with power of choice, to produce a social state more or less perfect. The authority being vicious, so must be its laws, and the only freedom would be in the choice of evils. I am speaking of what was actually the case when our divine Society was founded, and of what continues to exist at the present day over half the world. Two thousand years ago the relations between parent and child in the Roman Empire were altogether incompatible with Christian ideas. Under the Laws of the Twelve Tables the head of the family had the power of life and death over his children; and although this condition of things had ceased in the sixth century, yet even at *that* late period the power of citizens over children was extremely despotic. This power extended to adopted children, but singularly enough did not apply to the case of children born out of lawful wedlock. Now wedlock was only lawful, unless by express permission, between Roman citizens. Marriage between Romans on one side and Latins or aliens on the other was not lawful except by permission, and between Roman citizens and adopted children or slaves it could not be legalised. But of this more shortly. From what has been already said, it becomes

apparent that the most binding of marriages had for effect to place in the hands of parents a civil right directly opposed to the very idea of law, and therefore of the Divine Law ; and further, that marriages sanctioned by Christianity, such as those between freemen and slaves, were condemned beforehand by the civil code.

I say directly opposed to the Divine Law, because though society may have the right to delegate its power of life and death to individuals according to fixed laws binding upon the delegates, it can have no right to confer this delegation upon persons who are to be judges in their own cause, for this would be to make law subject to passion, not to restrain passion by law ; but this injustice was perpetrated by Roman law. Nor was the power given to parents by this law barren of results, as the history of Virginia proves. Here, the father's act was one which, while it excited horror on some grounds, nevertheless elicited the applause of fellow-citizens, none of whom, in all probability, regarded it in its true light of a murder ; nor could it have been punished as such, even if the disorder of the time had not rendered punishment out of the question. I do not here insist upon this view of the act of *Virginus*. I only say that a question naturally arises upon it, and that according to the answer a fundamental rule of Roman society would be confirmed or condemned ; that if condemned a conflict would inevitably arise with the civil power ; that, to meet the opposition of the civil government, the Christian organisation must be Divinely sustained, and that it

must have the most absolute certainty of the truth of its decision, because without such assurance it could have no reason to brave persecution in defence of its doctrine; and that the reply of the Society, which being charged with the regulations of the relationships of men among themselves, has to give the answer, must necessarily be conformable to the Will of God; that is to say, the Society must be holy in this respect.

The consideration of the powers of parents brings us to that of the duties of children; and that again to the subject of Marriage. Now under the Roman law the paternal power included the absolute disposal of children in marriage, which might be contracted in several ways; and it depended on the father to determine in which of the ways he would dispose of his child of either sex. There were two forms by which the wife passed into the family of the husband, and thenceforth stood to him, even as to life and death, in the relation of daughter; and these were, with a trifling exception, the most perfect forms of marriage; that is, the forms by which the wife took a rank most like that under the old Jewish and under the Christian law. But it rested with her parent or guardian to consent to such a handing her over into another family. We can quite understand, therefore, how affection for a daughter might make a parent lean rather to a form which consisted simply in the two parties living together as man and wife, with liberty to separate at any time. Now in a society governed by such laws as those just described, it is obvious that when Christianity came to be established, all sorts of questions would arise as to how

far Roman customs were reconcilable with the Decalogue, which was an initial letter of the Christian law. Parents would want to know their rights and children their duties; the relations of citizens to aliens or to slaves, or to freedmen and women, would lead to complications which the administrators of the Christian organisation would be continually called on to settle; and unless the Society could speak with the most unerring certainty, stumbling-blocks would be thrown in the way both of converts to the Christian faith and of those seeking the truth; and thus the growth and operation of the Society would be impeded, not to say brought to a standstill. On the other hand, the action of the Society in these matters would bring it into collision with the civil government, and unless the Society were sustained by something more than opinions, the terms of the combat would be so utterly disproportioned, that the weakest could not fail to succumb. But a Society which could speak with the positive certainty demanded, and which was upheld by a power capable of giving it the victory against such odds, could not be less than divine, and if divine, then holy.

Let us pass on now to the next head: the relations among themselves of individuals beyond the family. We will consider only the relations of master and servant. But this falls into several subdivisions. A servant may be a mere servant independent of his master, as in the greatest part of modern Europe; or he may be a vassal; or he may be attached to the soil; or he may be a slave. Now the duties of master and servant arising from these various relationships

differ materially. As regards the first three subdivisions, they are capable, indeed, of conflicting explanations, but they do not present so striking a picture to the mind as does the great question of slavery; and to this I shall confine myself.

Now the question of slavery is one which goes to the very root of man's nature; of his fall; and consequently of the whole scheme of redemption. It was a common opinion at the time of our Lord's Incarnation, when by far the largest portion of the populations which made up the Roman Empire were slaves, that these wretched beings were of a nature altogether inferior to that of free men. Aristotle, in the well-known discussion on the treatment of slaves in his book on Politics, bases his argument upon this idea, which he frequently repeats. He speaks of them as defective in mind, and consequently with a moral responsibility only a degree superior to that of the brutes. Plato declares them to be by nature as inferior to their masters as the body to the soul. Nor were these two philosophers by any means exceptional in their opinions, and Roman practice agreed with the Greek theory. But if this were true, the doctrine of original sin, flowing from a single act of our first parents, must be abandoned, and with it the Redemption of mankind by the Single Sacrifice of Calvary. Because if there be two natures, there must be two falls, and this the Christian revelation never taught. Here at once, then, organised Christianity came into collision with the world around it in a hundred ways. A new state of relations arising out of the equality of all men before God had to be in-

sisted on ; duties had to be made to take the place of supposed rights ; and if men who became Christians were disposed to require reasons for these changes, as they certainly would, the Society must be ready with its answer. Among the new questions of duty would be one familiar enough to us all in these days : I mean that of manumission. When it is considered, therefore, that the whole social economy rested upon the idea of slavery ; that the possession of slaves entered very largely indeed into the distribution of property ; that single owners held as many slaves as there are miners in a colliery or operatives in a cotton-factory ; and that servile wars and other facts had rendered the treatment of slaves a question of the greatest anxiety with all statesmen for many ages before—it is easy to see that here again, in the midst of so many dangers, unless the Christian organisation were Divinely enlightened as to principles, and Divinely guided as to the application of them, it would break down in its attempt at reformation ; and instead of the regeneration of society, it would produce the most dreadful confusion. The civil government would step in, in self-defence, and a permanent state of conflict would be produced. As a matter of principle, either it was obligatory on every slave-owner to manumit his slaves the moment he came under the Christian law, or he was at liberty to exercise prudence and to take time in so doing. In the one case a tremendous additional obstacle would be thrown in the way of conversions ; in the other, the essential unlawfulness of slave-holding could not be insisted on, for delay in abandoning a sin is itself a sin. The Society,

then, must either forego prudence itself, or it must allow the exercise of it to individuals. That is, it must either absolutely condemn the practice, or it must in giving individuals protracted time to act, admit the lawfulness in principle, even while inculcating that Christian charity which cannot fail sooner or later to put an end to the holding of slaves. The interests at stake were enormous. The choice lay between what must have become sedition, and what philanthropists in these days declare to be essentially unlawful. Had the Christian organisation taken this modern view and acted upon it, it must have met the charge of seditious demagoguery which would have been a true charge, besides all the false charges against which it had to contend. But whichever doctrine the Society had to lay down, its judgment must have been conformable to the Divine Will; and to be conformable is to be holy. It will be unnecessary to go more in detail into this question. All I am concerned, at present, to prove is, that the Society which has to teach and enforce the duties of neighbours must be holy, and the illustrations I have given so far will probably be considered sufficient practical confirmation of the theory whose truth I am engaged in upholding.

We have next and lastly, briefly to consider the holiness of the Society in connection with the relations of individuals to the civil power.

I believe it is true that every nation which has exercised an important influence on the history of the world, has made the public practice of religion the groundwork of its civil constitution. This was pecu-

liarly the case with the government of Rome, as is proved by many well known facts. The worship of the gods was a matter of public concern. The augurs had the power to stop the passing of laws, and even the movements of armies in the most critical junctures. The sacred privacy of religion, as it has been since called, was unknown in those times. The Senate took under its control the licensing of new gods, and Cicero lays it down as a necessary and commonly understood maxim that the worship of new gods and private gods should not be permitted without legal sanction. When, therefore, the Christian religion began to spread and to make a noise in pagan society, it is easy to conceive in how many ways individuals would come into hostile collision with the civil government. The worship of Christ and the refusal to sacrifice to the national gods could not fail to bring down the severest punishments. That the Christians should suffer frightful persecutions is no cause for surprise, and scarcely for indignation. It was in the natural order of things that the religion under which Rome had marched to her universal dominion should be defended and avenged by her patriotic sons. The observation of Neander the Jew seems to me just, when he says, that the severity of the persecutions proves religion to have had a strong hold on the minds of men, and that the absence of persecution would have argued an indifference on this all-important subject. Men who were capable of maintaining and of acting up to strong convictions were wanted to combat the world and to carry the Christian religion to victory; but minds in which religion has been extin-

guished, for the most part, have not this capability, for they lack matter upon which to found powerful convictions. I am not forgetting that by the grace of God the weak are made to confound the strong; but God performs most of His wonders and miracles by natural agents. The future welfare of the Christian Organisation was, therefore, bound up as it were, and inseparably connected with the unyielding conservatism of the Roman rulers and people. Observe, I am not defending, nor excusing, nor even palliating inhuman cruelties, nor the envy or other base passions of those who stifled conviction, and wilfully shut their eyes as did the Jews when they wanted to kill Lazarus, as if his death could efface the previous miracle, or cancel the Divine mission of Him who wrought it. I am only drawing attention to the inevitableness of the fact that the Society must pass through a period of persecutions, during which individuals would continually find themselves in the grasp of the civil law. During such a period rules of conduct would be required; men would want guidance at the hands of the Society; and nothing less than divine wisdom could possibly suffice to lead individuals through the midst of the perils which threatened them on all sides; and, at the same time, to save the Society itself from falling away, a danger incurred equally by too strict or too lax a method of dealing with its members.

Imagine the position of a Christian when called upon to acknowledge the pagan gods. If required, without alternative, to sacrifice to the idol, his course would be clear enough. But if from motives of humanity or

affection, or dislike to being defeated, the judge proposed to make matters easy for him, so that at once the dignity of the law might be maintained, and the conscience or the obstinacy, or the whim, of the Christian be humoured, and if for any one of these ends the judge were willing to be satisfied with the Christian's eating the meat of a sacrifice, or with his offering incense, or swearing by the genius of the Emperor, having all the while an *arrière pensée* that he was swearing by nothing; or if he were willing for a bribe to give a certificate that the Christian had done any one of these things; and if there were added to all these temptations the appeals and tears of parents, or the sight of children about to be deprived of their protection, together with terror of the most dreadful tortures, frequently renewed upon bodies worn down with imprisonment in the horrid Roman dens; how could it be left to individual judgment to decide at what point either firmness or pliancy would become criminal? If the questions arising out of such circumstances had been left to the individuals interested it is quite certain that that corruption which is said to have gradually made its way into the Catholic Church would have destroyed the Christian Society in a very short time. A very convincing illustration and proof of this occurred on a large scale in the time of Attila's invasions, and of Pope S. Leo the Great, when the Persian king Izdegard II. by name, undertook a deliberate persecution of the Armenian population, with a view to making them adopt the religion of Zoroaster.

The Society, then, was charged with enlightening

individual consciences on their duties to God, to parents, to children, and to themselves, in the presence of the civil infidel power. To have left men to themselves in these matters would have been to make them judges in their own cause, which is, as already remarked, contrary to any idea of law, and consequently of the one universal perfect law. It would have been to make the perfect law subject to opinion; that is, to make opinion the test of justice, so that two contrary opinions might be just; that is, both conformable to the perfect law, which is absurd. Moreover, opinion is not enlightenment; unless, therefore, the Society could do more than offer an opinion it could not enlighten; error is compatible with opinion—not with true enlightenment; truth alone can enlighten; but the Society has the truth: as we said before, any body of men which has not or does not teach the truth, is not the Society or any part of it; but to teach the truth is at once the end of the Society's existence and to be conformable to the will of God, that is to be holy. This will be enough to say at present on the holiness of the Society in regard to the relations of men among themselves.

Here, too, it will be convenient to pause, in order to recapitulate shortly what has been said, and to see what progress has been made in proof of the theses with which the last paper began, and which has been kept in view throughout, namely, that the action of the Christian Organization can never by any possibility be at variance with the true interests of civil society, how much soever the Christian government may seem to oppose the rights of the state.

The last paper, going to the root of the matter, treated the question by way of showing into how complete a state of confusion human nature was thrown by the disobedience of our first parents, and in what way the confusion was brought about. We analysed the effects of the disobedience upon Adam, and we traced those effects upon all his posterity, demonstrating at length, the reasonableness of the Christian doctrine on this subject, both by the analogy of the physical world, and by the argument that no power can produce a greater than itself. The soul of man was made the subject of a short analytical examination, whose result was to prove that the will is the ruling faculty of the soul; that, therefore, while all the faculties were engaged in the disobedience, and while all continue to suffer in consequence, the will was the chief agent in the fall of man; and that being so, that the power which was to restore man to favour with God must possess a will superior not in power only, but also in holiness, to that of man. But the Christian Society is the power in question. The will of civil society was declared to be only the aggregation of corrupt individual wills, whereas the Christian Society being, as was proved before, an Unit of which Christ is the Head, has a will which must needs be holy, and therefore competent to the task which had and has to be accomplished.

In the present paper we have seen that the Christian law and doctrine brought not only the administrators of the Society but every member of it at once into conflict with the manners, the prejudices, the interests, and

the mind of the other society in the midst of which Christianity sprung up; that a host of questions arose as to parental authority, marriage, slavery, public and private worship; as to the use of the senses and of the spiritual powers; as to problems in physical philosophy of the highest import, such as the origin of the universe and of man; as to the natures of the human body, of the soul, and of God; and as to numberless modifications of duty arising out of these questions. We have seen also that the Christian teachers must have been able to reply to these questions with the most absolute certainty, and since the object of the Society's foundation is to reconcile man with his offended Creator, the answers which it must have given must have been conformable to the will of God; in other words, that the Society must have been holy in doctrine.

In the next paper I propose to bring forward illustrations of both doctrine and discipline taken from remote countries in modern times, and I now conclude, merely remarking that if any portion of the above seems wanting in direct bearing upon the argument we are pursuing, there is no part which is not intended to be used hereafter, and which will not be found of importance to the conclusion sought to be established.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIANITY.

By ALBANY J. CHRISTIE, M.A. S.J.



In considering the Philosophy of Christianity we shall have—

- (1.) To STATE OUR SUBJECT.
- (2.) To DECLARE THE MODE OF ARGUING WHICH WILL BE MOST SERVICEABLE IN DISCUSSING IT.
- (3.) To DIVIDE OUR SUBJECT.
- (4.) To CONSIDER ITS DETAILS.

(1.) STATEMENT OF THE SUBJECT.

1. There exists in the world a Philosophy which embraces within its circuit all the objects of knowledge which man, in his present state of existence, is capable of apprehending. It welcomes facts and truths from whatever quarter they come, and incorporates them into itself. It obtains its information through the senses of man and his intellectual faculties; and besides, it admits communications of a higher order than that of mere human reason. The objects about which it is concerned are the sensible world, intellectual beings

and God, and all that has been known about them by natural or by supernatural means.

2. There exists also in the world a narrower system, which has for its objects a part only of the objects of the philosophy just described. It rejects all those facts and truths which are learned by communications higher than natural, and confines itself to those objects which can be reached through the senses and intellectual powers. The objects about which it is concerned may be stated in the same words as have described the objects of the wider philosophy spoken of above, namely, the sensible world, and intellectual beings and God; but if the meaning of these words be scrutinised, it will appear that it is limited to such knowledge regarding these three objects as may be derived by merely natural means.

3. Of these two systems, the former comprehensive system is called Christian Philosophy; the latter, partial, system is called Natural Science.

4. It is evident from this statement that Christian Philosophy is the noblest of all sciences, and that, in particular, it is far nobler than mere Natural Science; its aim is far higher, its field is far more extensive.

5. The act by which the Christian philosopher apprehends the supernatural objects of which he is cognisant is an act of faith. Common parlance in general confines the use of the word Faith to the supernatural order, and we willingly adopt this use of it. By these acts of faith and by the habit of faith the Christian philosopher is distinguished from the merely scientific man.

6. It is our object as members of the Academia of the Catholic Religion to elevate mere Natural Science to the dignity of Christian Philosophy; to illuminate mere human knowledge by the Divine brightness of Faith, and while we desire to be ourselves the pupils of God, to make our brother-men sharers in the same privilege. They are indeed already in some sense God's pupils, for it is by the use of means which He bestows that they acquire that limited knowledge which they possess; but the knowledge which He bestows supernaturally is so far higher than all mere natural science, that in its presence natural science dwindles into insignificance.

7. There is a difficulty which presents itself at the outset which it will be well to remove. Men speak sometimes as though Faith implied a submission derogatory to the dignity of man as an intellectual being. The answer is plain: we may truly say that in all knowledge, natural no less than supernatural, God is our Teacher, and we acquire knowledge by submission to Him. The means by which God teaches us are indeed various, but still, as He is the Creator and Archetype of all things that are known, so it is He who is the Author of those various means by which they are known. It is He who gave us our Senses, it is He who gave us our Intellectual Powers, it is He who provides us with the Teacher of supernatural knowledge. In every case, the man who learns anything may truly be said to submit to the teaching of God; he submits to be informed by his senses, and the man who refused the evidence of his senses, would be

condemned by his fellow-men for this want of submission to the order of God's providence; he submits to accept the ideas discerned by his intellect, and to refuse to do so would be, in the judgment of his fellows, an ill-placed scepticism towards the Giver of Reason; in like manner he submits to the appointed teacher of supernatural truth, and refusal to such submission would be a rebellion against God no less than in the two former cases. In every case there is a submission of self to God, but this submission is no degradation; on the contrary, it is the only road to man's elevation and perfection, for how else can man attain to knowledge even in the natural order? And as submission to God's teaching in the intellectual order elevates those who have submitted to be taught by sensible things, so the acceptance of supernatural truth is so far from being a degrading act of humiliating submission, that it is the real means of true progress and of the ultimate perfection of man. It must needs be so, since it is to listen to the Infinite Wisdom while He teaches us truths beyond the reach of our merely natural faculties. The Senses bring before us the footprints of God in Creation, the traces of His Power, and His Wisdom, and His Love; Reason infers the existence of God, and is able to discover some of His attributes, but it is impossible for the Creature to exhibit the perfect image of God, or for Reason to gather knowledge of Him beyond a certain point; then in His goodness, and for purposes of highest moment to man, God lifts up a little more the veil which hides Him from His creatures, and makes known things concerning Himself

beyond the comprehension of intelligences far higher than man. Man may accept or he may reject this gift of higher knowledge offered to him by God. If he reject it, he remains, at best, in the class of mere men of science, only he has incurred the serious responsibility of having refused a gift of God ; if he accept it, he is raised to the knowledge of things which transcend the reach of his unassisted powers, he is elevated above himself, and may become a Christian philosopher. There is, then, a true sense in which a man may be said to submit his reason to the teaching of Revelation, but it is a submission which brings honour, and progress, and perfection ; if it is a submission, it is a submission like that of the poor man who submits to be made rich, it is the submission of the ignorant student who submits to be enriched with knowledge. The beggar who refused a rich inheritance would, for want of submission, remain in his poverty ; the student who refused to pay heed to his professor would, for want of submission, remain in his ignorance. In like manner the mere man of science, for want of submission to the Teacher of supernatural Truth, must continue to grovel in merely natural things, and be confined to the dim twilight of mere natural religion.

(2.) AFTER THIS STATEMENT OF THE OBJECT OF OUR ENQUIRY, SOMETHING MUST BE SAID ON THE MODE OF ARGUING, WHICH WILL BE MOST SERVICEABLE TO US IN PURSUING IT.

1. In Christian Philosophy the argument from Analogy holds a prominent place, at least when the existence

or details of Christian Philosophy are made the subject of discussion with the merely scientific man. Were the Christian philosopher and the merely scientific man distinguished from each other only by different views on the natural order of things, the argument from analogy would be of less service than that of syllogism; but while the merely scientific man confines himself to the order of nature, the Christian philosopher believes and maintains that there is another order of things higher than that which is the object of our experience. Now, syllogism regards things that are in the same order; analogy regards things which are not in the same order, but those which are in distinct though similar orders. By syllogism we infer of the separate individuals of a class, that which we have learned by the powers of the intellect to predicate of all the class; by analogy, we go out of the order with which we are acquainted, and from our knowledge of it we draw inferences with more or less probability with regard to another order with which we are less acquainted or unacquainted. For example, there are many kinds of animals extant with ascertained habits: some are carnivorous, some herbivorous, others insectivorous, and others omnivorous; some terrestrial, some aquatic, some amphibious; the organisation of each class is suited to its mode of living: the anatomy, the teeth, the eyes, the organs of locomotion, the covering, of each, are all regulated according to its manner of life. If, then, a scientific man finds imbedded in some stratum of the earth's crust the fossil bones of an extinct animal, he will be able by analogy to reconstruct the

organism and reproduce the original form ; from his knowledge of a species extant before his eyes, the man of science may argue, by analogy, to the knowledge of creatures belonging to another extinct species, distinct but similar.

The proof of an assertion by means of syllogism has been compared to three concentric circles, of which the outermost contains the innermost, because it contains the middle one in which the innermost lies ; analogy may be compared to parallel lines in which each point in one corresponds with a point over against it in the other. Analogy, too, is compared to the principle of Proportion in Arithmetic or Geometry, by which the fourth term may be discovered from the three that are given.

2. Christian Philosophy consists distinctively in the recognition of a supernatural order to which as Christians we belong. There is a natural order, and there is a supernatural order ; the natural order is matter of experience, the supernatural order is matter of faith. The mere man of science admits the natural order, he rejects the supernatural order ; the Christian philosopher admits both. When, therefore, the Christian philosopher argues with the mere man of science, we might reasonably expect that the argument from analogy would form an important element in carrying on the controversy. Here are two orders of things, the natural and the supernatural : both of them have reference to man, to his life, and training, and end ; both must needs proceed from the same author, God, and be the effects of His Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Good-

ness; and because God is the author of both, and in every case the author of a thing (so far forth as he is its author) impresses his production with his own character, we shall find in both orders the impress of the power, and wisdom, and goodness of God.

3. The argument from analogy may be applied to the discovery of what is unknown, to the confirmation of what is proved from other sources, and to the removal of difficulties.

4. (j.) In the discovery of what is unknown, the argument from analogy is least secure. The limited character of our faculties may very often be the occasion of our imagining the existence of likenesses where they do not really exist, and consequently when we infer the real existence of facts from seeming parallelism, we may be drawing conclusions unwarranted by our premisses. Imagination is an obtrusive faculty ever looking for resemblances, and often inventing them; the man, therefore, who, from his knowledge of nature, would construct of himself a supernatural system, would be liable to fall into the most grotesque errors. In his particular way he would fall most probably into the extreme of unreason, through his abuse of the argument from analogy, as another man might fall into the extreme of unreason by his abuse of the syllogistic argument; or again, a third from an abuse of so-called inductive philosophy. Numerous are the errors in philosophy and religion which have proceeded from misapplied analogy. To this may be referred the mythological systems of Paganism, which attributed to God the passions of men; to the same cause may be

referred the blasphemies which have been promulgated regarding reprobation and free-will, blasphemies which have arisen from transferring the necessity of the laws of the material world to the laws of morality and grace.

5. (ij.) In the confirmation of that which has been proved from other sources, the argument from analogy is of great use. When the Teacher, who professes to have authority to make known to us supernatural truth, requires our acceptance of any particular supernatural fact or doctrine, it is a happiness to the willing hearer to find that the natural order, too, comprises facts which by their resemblance to the alleged facts are a confirmation of the truth of the latter. That such resemblance should exist falls in with the presumption that, if there is a supernatural order, it must proceed from the same Almighty, Wise and Good, who is the author of nature; and that the things which we see are images, however imperfect, of those which are revealed. When, for example, the Teacher of supernatural truth teaches as part of Christian Philosophy the doctrine of the Invocation of the Saints, it is grateful for us to be able to turn to the analogy of natural kindred and relationship: all Christians form a supernatural family; men on earth are collected into natural families, and we experience in the intercourse and mutual affection of members of the same family on earth an image of that intercourse which, according to the teaching of faith, exists among the members of that great family of which God is the father, and Jesus Christ the elder brother, and all we are brethren. Indeed, so numerous are the analogies which exist between

things natural and things supernatural, that we may venture to say that as soon as certain great fundamental doctrines have been taught and accepted—such as the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of the Incarnation, and the doctrine of the Blessed Sacrament—all other doctrines, such as Indulgences, Invocation of Saints, adoration of Jesus Christ in the Blessed Sacrament, and devotion to the Blessed Virgin, follow as a matter of course in accordance with Christian common sense.

6. (iij.) In the removal of difficulties the argument from analogy is of irresistible force, as may easily be shown. Let it be remembered that the question at issue is between two orders of things, both of which have the same Author. One of these is the natural, the other the supernatural: the natural is the object of our experience and senses, and of our unelevated reason; the other is beyond the reach of these, and is proposed for acceptance to our faith. Our adversaries, no less than ourselves, are capable of observing the circumstances of the natural order; as to the supernatural, while we on our part accept the teaching of Christ and His Church, they profess to find difficulty in accepting it. They say that these are difficulties against many alleged details in the supernatural order, and they therefore refuse to admit those details; and in consequence, since the whole supernatural scheme comes to us on the same authority as the details, the mere men of science reject the whole system with its details.

7. Now, difficulties may be of two kinds: they may

be merely imaginary, or they may be real. Imaginary difficulties are removed generally by a clear statement of the case; real difficulties—if they are not, from our ignorance or the imperfection of our knowledge, incapable of solution—will often be proved groundless by the argument from analogy.

8. An imaginary difficulty is such as the following. The doctrine of Indulgences may seem unworthy of belief, because it is inconceivable that God should countenance a scheme of religion which on the payment of a certain sum of money, allows its professors to commit sin, and gives them absolution beforehand. Or again: The adoration of a morsel of bread is idolatrous, and Catholics are therefore members of Antichrist, because they teach and practise the adoration of a wafer. Such difficulties as these are imaginary, and there needs nothing but the clear statement of the real doctrine of the Church on these points to solve them. If on our clear enunciation of the real doctrine of the Church on any point our adversaries still persist in thinking that they know what Catholics believe better than Catholics do themselves, there is no help for it.

9. But a difficulty may be real. (α) Sometimes a difficulty may be such as to baffle our comprehension and transcend all natural analogies. In this case the merit of faith is so much the greater because we confess the revealed truth simply on the word of God and His authority, though we see nothing in things around us to which it can be paralleled. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity may be considered one of these, for though seeming analogies may be adduced to illustrate it, they

are necessarily so deficient in parallelism, that they utterly fall short of the wonderfulness of the mystery. The Incarnation is another ; and Transubstantiation is a third. In truths of this kind, the Christian philosopher is as ready to say, 'I believe,' as the mere man of science is content without proof to admit that the whole is greater than its part, or that the same thing cannot at the same time be and not be. As also the mere man of science in his study of physiology arrives at natural operations which baffle all his scrutiny, as for instance, in the change of nutriment into the living flesh or nervous substance, so the Christian philosopher counts it no matter of objection if he find in the supernatural revelations concerning Almighty God, details which baffle his highest reason ; glad to confess that after all a religion would not be worth the having were its mysteries level to the littleness of his own puny intellect.

10. (β) Sometimes a difficulty in the supernatural order, or in that which is taught us by faith, admits of being paralleled by a difficulty existing in the order of nature. In this case, the argument from analogy is complete in removing the difficulty. The argument may be described as follows : The Christian philosopher says to the mere man of science, his adversary, You deny that there is a supernatural order, and that the knowledge of it has been communicated to us by revelation, because such and such details are taught which you conceive to be inconsistent with God's Providence and Attributes ; but now look at the order of nature, which you acknowledge to be the work of God,—which

meets your eyes and is subject to your experience and reason ; see in this natural order the existence of precisely the same kind of difficulty as that which staggers you in the supernatural order, and you are obliged to admit the compatibility of this difficulty in the natural order with the providence and attributes of God ; it follows therefore that the existence of the analogous difficulty in the supernatural order is no solid argument against the real existence of that order, or against the compatibility of that higher order with the same Divine Providence and Attributes.

11. To illustrate what has just been said, let the following example be taken. It is a truth of Christian philosophy that by virtue of the Communion of Saints, God in His mercy will, on certain conditions, accept the satisfactory works of our Blessed Lord, with which He is pleased to associate those of the Saints, the members of the mystical body of Christ, towards the payment of the temporal punishment which may be still due from the penitent after he has quitted his sin and received forgiveness and the remission of the everlasting penalty, through the Sacrifice on the Cross. It is a difficulty with the Protestant (and the Protestant, with regard to those points on which he refuses the Divine teaching, must be classed with the mere man of science), how one creature can help another under such circumstances, and consequently, to say nothing of other imaginary difficulties, the Protestant rejects the doctrine of Indulgences, and the system of which it is a part.

But turn to the Natural Order : see how in the natural course of the world the various members of the

human family help one another : how mutual help is a very law of our nature, and how a day cannot pass without our witnessing or hearing of numberless cases of this mutual help. One man undertakes to help another in the performance of a task imposed on him ; another man contributes his money to help his neighbour in liquidating a debt or in paying a fine ; the good services of a subject obtain from his sovereign the remission of a punishment decreed against a criminal ; the merits of a parent save a child from merited punishment ; the heroism of a child prevails on a monarch to pardon an offending parent.

Throughout the Natural Order, the Reversibility of punishment is recognised as a fact and admitted as a rule. All surprise therefore ought to cease at finding the same law of the reversibility of punishment existing in the supernatural order. It would not be correct to say that the proof of its existence supplied by analogy amounts to demonstration, but analogy proves demonstratively that its alleged existence has nothing unreasonable in it, and consequently that its alleged existence does not afford any solid ground for rejecting that supernatural order of things of which it forms a part. The difficulty is removed ; the ground is cleared ; and we have henceforth only to consider what positive grounds there are for admitting the doctrine. There is more than this : not only is the antecedent difficulty removed, but there is a positive advantage gained ; by dint of analogy, the doctrine comes now with a recommendation in its favour, since its analogue has been found to exist as a matter of experience and of fact in

a system—the Natural system—which has for its Author the same God who is the Author of the Supernatural.

12. So much has been said on the argument from analogy, because it is of special service in removing difficulties against Revelation and the doctrines which are made known to us by the Teacher of Revelation. It is obvious, however, that the argument from analogy is by no means the only argument which serves the cause of supernatural truth, and the Christian philosopher will of course avail himself of every mode of discussion and illustration, as circumstances and the nature of the case require.

(3.) DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

1. In discussing the subject that lies before us, it will be necessary to show (1) that the alleged existence of a supernatural order is credible and probable; (2) that the alleged fact of a revelation by which that supernatural order is to a certain degree made known to man is also credible and probable; (3) that the alleged manner of its promulgation is not less credible and probable; (4) that the alleged credentials by which its Teacher established his mission are such as might have been expected; (5) that the notes of authority contained in those credentials are clear, sufficient, and characteristic; (6) that there exists on earth a teacher designated by those notes; (7) that all other teachers are proved to be mere pretenders by their want of these notes, and the opposition of their teaching to that of the authorised teacher; and, finally, (8) that

the True Teacher is secured against the loss of these notes to the end of the world.

2. Thus far the character of the Teacher of the supernatural order would form the subject of inquiry. We must next consider the matter of the teaching: and it will be to the purpose to show (1) how, when certain supernatural facts or principles are admitted, other details of the supernatural order may be discerned as of necessity implied in them, and how credible it is that there should exist in the supernatural order facts analogous to the indemonstrable principles of Natural Science; (2) that these primary facts, though indemonstrable and undiscoverable by unaided reason, are admirable to the natural reason, and satisfy demands of which reason sees the existence, but which reason by itself could not satisfy; (3) that this character of such primary truths may be seen in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; (4) that the same may be discovered in the doctrine of the Incarnation; (5) that the same may be discovered in the doctrine of Transubstantiation.

3. After the consideration of these primary truths of the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, and Transubstantiation as truths, they should be considered also as motives to influence the Will, and as perfecting the Will no less than the Intellect; as inflaming the Will with charity towards God and God's creatures.

4. Our inquiries would then proceed to the contemplation of the secondary truths of the supernatural order discernible in the primary truths or facts, and which form a part of the revealed doctrine.

5. A further extension of our subject, and different in kind, would be the inferences deducible from the primary truths, or the developments of the same. Such inferences and developments, when made under the guidance and correction of the authorised teacher, may occupy an important place in the Politics, Economics, and Ethics of the supernatural order of the kingdom of God.

(4.) CONSIDERATION OF DETAILS.

I. THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPERNATURAL ORDER IS CREDIBLE.

1. Of the existence of an order of nature, and of an Author of nature, there can be no reasonable doubt. Our senses attest the existence of things around us, and observation and reason discover the laws of their existence, and the existence of the first Cause who gave them being and sustains them in their being.

2. There have indeed been men who, at least in words, have denied the existence of a Personal First Cause, or God. From their own incapacity they have judged of the capacity of God; and finding themselves unable to conceive how a personal God could act and energise in the minute details of the universe, they have argued themselves into the profession of Atheism, and the assertion of merely impersonal laws, to the exclusion of a personal Being, the Author and Ruler of created things.

3. But while these men have, in consequence of the existence of imagined difficulties, denied a personal God, they have professed a system subject to difficulties, infinitely more difficult of solution.

4. Of course, in holding the truth of the existence of a personal God, it is unhesitatingly admitted and maintained that He personally conducts the universe; that His action is not confined to merely looking on, as though creatures with the laws according to which they exist and change went on without His interference, as the clock when it is wound up by the clockmaker goes on without the interference of the clockmaker. Neither is His action confined to those creatures which we call great, and denied to those which we call little. If He guides Sirius round some common centre of the universe, He no less guides every individual mote as it floats in the sunbeam, directs its course as it is affected by this or that other current of air, bears it downwards to the earth, or raises it for a time, according as its gravitation prevails or is counteracted; He does this for every mote floating in the atmosphere, and for each one with the most perfect accuracy and obedience to the laws Himself has given, as though that one mote were the only one existing, or as though all the others were not cared for at all by Him. This minute care does not prove the impossibility of a personal God; it only indicates that the personal God is necessarily infinite, and as soon as we have ascribed infinity to Him, there is no unlimitedness of action to which He is not adequate. If the same finite creature can act at once in two different ways, as, for example, the same polished mass of metal can press down that on which it lies, and convey colour to the eye; the same infinite Creator can energise infinitely, and infinitely more abundantly than the finiteness of creation can give occasion for.

5. Not only is the assertion of a Personal God free from any well-founded difficulty, but the denial of His Personality involves difficulties which admit of no sufficient answer. The Atheist who is content with confessing the existence of abstract laws guiding the universe, and who denies a Personal God, proves himself to be the most credulous man in the world; so far from his boasted free-thinking and independence entitling him to the reputation of prudence and philosophy, he incurs the charge of a credulity below the superstitions of Pagan idolatry—a credulity, compared with which the superstitions such men are so fond of exposing in uncivilised countries, are real wisdom. For the disbelief in a Personal God necessarily implies belief in the most ridiculous fable conceivable; it implies a belief that this world and all that it contains, this fabric with all its marks of design and its disposition of means to an end, exists, whether by chance or by necessity, without requiring the pre-existence of a mind capable of adapting means to an end and of applying them. To believe this is the excess of credulity and the extreme of unreason. To believe that organism of the most consummate delicacy, arrangement of means to end so diversified and so minute as to require all the wit and penetration of the most skilful anatomists and physiologists merely to trace and understand it, so that at last all human wit and observation is baffled and left at fault; to believe that all this could be without a mind to contrive it, a power to bring it about, and a goodness to watch over it and preserve it, is a belief which, for that reason

alone, is not scouted as the very extreme of unreasonable credulity, because vice blinds men's understanding—vice, not necessarily in the way of ordinary immorality (however frequently this may be the case), for such men are not always robbers, or resentful, or unclean, but vice of the most hateful kind in the eyes of our Master and our God, the vice of intellectual pride, which, rather than be elevated by that which is higher than itself, will end by grovelling in principles and theories beneath its own natural dignity.

6. If it is the fool who has said in his heart, There is no God; it is part of man's wisdom to confess that God is, and that He is the Contriver and Framer of the universe. But this is not all. God is far more than mere nature can teach us. All that human reason can gather of the knowledge of God from the works of creation must fall infinitely short of that which can be known of God. There is therefore abundant room for Revelation. To make this clearer, let it be noticed that there is an essential difference between God as an Architect, and man. Both God and man make use of materials; both God and man avail themselves of certain powers and laws; but as regards God, both the materials and the powers and laws have God for their Author, whereas man finds them made to his hand, ready to be used. The consequence of this, as regards man, is that he is able to produce things in some or in many respects superior to himself, which God cannot do. Man may avail himself of the iron which he finds in mines, or the marble he cuts from the quarries, and raise a monument, or erect a pyramid which will last

far longer than the frail tenement of his body will hold together ; and so man's own production will, in this sense, surpass himself in duration. He may apply heat to water, and by availing himself of the laws of steam, he may set in motion mountains of machinery, or traverse a continent in a few hours ; and so his own production may surpass himself in active rapidity ; or he may watch and study the laws of beauty and form, and his chisel may cut the marble into a sculptured Moses, or his brush may produce on canvas a St. Michael, with an outline far more beautiful than that which he himself possesses ; and so his production will surpass himself in beauty. But it is not so with God ; the materials which He uses in the organisation of the universe are not found by Him, but made by Him ; the laws of heat and cold, of electricity and attraction, are not antecedent to Him, and found by Him, but they are the laws which He Himself has impressed upon matter. The human fabricator outdoes himself, because, in fact, he is not alone in his working, but is only a co-worker with another—with another more mighty than himself. The ignorant may call the mighty one with whom man works, Nature ; the philosopher calls Him God. The Divine Architect cannot outdo Himself, because all He works upon, all the rules according to which all that which He works upon exists, are the effects of His own Wisdom, and Power, and Goodness ; for ' Who hath forwarded the Spirit of the Lord ? or who hath been His counsellor and hath taught Him ? with whom hath He consulted, and who hath instructed Him ?'

7. These considerations bring forcibly on us the conviction that God is unspeakably exalted above all His creatures, and that Christian philosophy is right when it teaches us that His Attributes, His Power, Wisdom, and Goodness are Infinite. And the credibility of this doctrine is confirmed by the fact that one infinite attribute at least must evidently be ascribed to Him, namely, Eternity. For if He be not Eternal, He must have been preceded by some other who was from Eternity, and without beginning, and then that other would be God, and God would still be Eternal. God, then, is Eternal, and possesses an infinite attribute. If it should occur to anyone that the same argument might be applied to man, because man has an immortal soul, there needs only to suggest the essential difference between Eternity and Immortality to remove the misconception. It is true that man's soul will never die, but it is no less true that his soul will never actually arrive at an age of infinite duration. Immortality therefore is not an infinite attribute, but Eternity is; and since God possesses evidently this infinite attribute of Eternity, there can exist no difficulty in believing that He is in every respect infinite; rather, it stands to reason that the Infinity of God is credible.

8. More and more clear do these considerations render the fact that the visible creation does not exhaust the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God; and hence it follows that He who can create beings as widely different as the infusorial animalcule and man, can create beings as much above man as man is above the infusorial animalcule; He that can endow man with faculties

so different in kind from those possessed by the infusorial animalcule, can endow other creatures with faculties no less exalted above the highest perfection of mere human intellect; and if the animalcule is unable to raise itself to the knowledge of human things, it is reasonable to believe that there are things superhuman, to the knowledge or possession of which man cannot raise himself by his unaided faculties.

9. The two facts (1) that God created the universe, and (2) that God has not exhausted Himself in creating the universe, establish the credibility of the existence of a supernatural order. He has left the impress of Himself on the creation we see around us; and from the observation of His works, man can learn much respecting God. The philosophy of Christian faith assures us that God has manifested the knowledge of Himself in creation, for 'The Invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and divinity;' but the knowledge of God derived from nature has its limit, and there must be depths in the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, far beyond the utmost teaching of created things—mysteries, it may be, as reason must allow, connected with His nature and His being, beyond the utmost reach of human inference.

II. THE ALLEGED FACT OF A REVELATION, BY WHICH THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER IS MADE KNOWN TO MAN, IS CREDIBLE.

1. Since the knowledge of God is the highest knowledge, and since man's happiness as an intellectual being

must therefore stand in the more or less perfect knowledge of God, it would seem reasonable to believe that God might enlarge our knowledge of Himself, by making known to us some of those secrets or mysteries regarding Himself which reason alone cannot find out. That He has done so is believed by the Christian philosopher; and the method by which God has thus lifted up a little the veil which hides Him from mere reason is called Revelation. It is credible, therefore, and reasonable, to admit the existence of Revelation.

2. Let what has been said be illustrated by one or two examples. Reason, from the study of nature, teaches that God is, and that He is one and Infinite; Revelation comes in as a message from Heaven, and confirms the teaching of Reason, and does more. Yes! she says, God is, and God is one and Infinite; but there are wonders in God beyond your unaided reach, and I come to tell you; God is one, but His oneness is not a oneness of solitude; for the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; and the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are identically one and the same God; so distinct in Person, that the limited thought of man can imagine them only after human fashion, but at the same time so identical in substance, that no one Person is more recent or more ancient than another, no one more powerful or more wise than another.

3. Again, Reason, from the study of creation, teaches that God is good, and that in His goodness He constructed the earth and the universe for the service of men; and Revelation comes in again, and sets her seal

to the teaching of Reason, and tells something more of the goodness of God. Yes! she says, God is good; there is no end of His goodness; but the goodness of God as manifested in creation is a mere drop compared with the ocean of His actual goodness. Not only is it true that He created man to be happy, and furnished him with every means of happiness, but, when man rebelled against Him, instead of abandoning the worm to annihilation, He provided for his recovery; and He did this in so wonderful a way, that earth must be amazed, and the heavens filled with astonishment. Nay! the full account of it is so dazzling to mere human reason, that in early Christian times its fullness was hidden from the Catechumen, and those who after long preparation were made acquainted with it, were called by a name taken from the adepts in the solemn mysteries—the Initiated. What, then, is this goodness? It consists in the inventions of God's love for the restoration of man. It is not the place now to describe these Divine inventions of the Incarnation and Transubstantiation; it is enough to show the reasonableness of our being ready to receive them, when presented by Revelation to our faith as such manifestations of God's love as might be expected from a goodness which is not exhausted in creation; for what more reasonable than that the Infinitely Good should interfere in behalf of the work of His hands, to rescue it from the fatal consequences of its rebellion? What more reasonable than that God should make known His gracious purposes to His creature? And since Reason could not find out the way, what more reasonable than that a Revelation should be given that could make it known?

III. THE ALLEGED MANNER IN WHICH THE REVELATION HAS BEEN PROMULGATED, BY WHICH THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER IS MADE KNOWN TO MAN, IS CREDIBLE AND PROBABLE.

1. This section will include two points for consideration: (A) the credibility of the proof with which the Revelation was ushered in; and (B) the credibility of the means by which the Revelation was made known to men. The credibility of the proof will be shown by an examination of the question of Miracles; the credibility of the means will be shown by an examination of the nature of the Teacher from whom man is to receive the revealed truths.

(A)

2. It is alleged by Christians that there has appeared on earth a Teacher, professing to be the bearer of a message from God, and that this Teacher proved his mission by Miracles; it is further alleged that this Teacher, on the eve of quitting the earth, provided a substitute for himself, by which the teaching of the message which he brought has been continued hitherto, and shall be continued to the end of the world.

3. Now, if God is pleased to make a Revelation, it is most reasonable that it should be ushered in by miracles. For the man who professes to announce to his fellows a Revelation, is bound to prove his mission. He pretends to something supernatural beyond the range of experience; he may therefore be reasonably required to prove his claims by something supernatural

within the range of experience. Hence the reasonableness of Miracles; and hence, too, supposing the promulgation of Revelation successive, and that some parts of it were kept for a time in suspense and deferred; hence, too, the reasonableness of the particular kind of Miracle implied in Prophecy.

4. In considering the credibility of the proof by which the knowledge of the supernatural order has been ushered in, it will be to the purpose to examine—

(α) The subject of Miracles in general.

(β) The particular Miracle which eminently proves the mission of the Teacher of the Christian Revelation.

(γ) The special object proved by this particular miracle.

5. With regard to Miracles in general, it will appear that those to whom a Revelation is proposed would have a right to expect it to be ushered in by Miracles, inasmuch as Miracles would be that proper proof of the Divine intervention, which alone could require from man the acceptance of the supernatural revelation.

With regard to the particular Miracle with which Christianity was ushered in, namely, the resurrection of One from the dead, this will appear to be eminently satisfactory as the proof of the Divine mission of the first Teacher of the Revelation.

With regard to the special object proved by the Resurrection, it will appear to be most reasonable that it should not be, primarily and directly, the Revelation itself that is attested, but that it should be the Teacher of the Revelation, whose trustworthiness is guaranteed.

6. (a) *On Miracles in general.*

(j.) A teacher of Revelation professes to announce truths beyond the reach of the human intellect, and to lay open before his fellows facts or principles higher than any that could be gathered or inferred from the works of nature by the most perfect human reason. 'Flesh and blood' could not impart these truths in the first instance, but only God 'who is in heaven.' From the Supreme Lord of nature, then, the Teacher of Revelation must have received the message which he bears.

Now we cannot conceive God dealing with His rational creatures in an unreasonable way, and we see clearly that it would be unreasonable to require their assent to supernatural truths without the mission of the teacher of those truths being proved, since they would in such case have no fair means of detecting the imposture of any pretender to Revelation who might choose to lay claim to a Divine mission. It would not, therefore, be enough for the Teacher merely to assert that he had been sent by God to deliver the message he brings—he would be bound to prove it.

Again, any proof short of an evident intervention of Divine power, would seem to be insufficient to prove the certainty of the Divine intervention in the claims of the Teacher. Hence one Divine intervention is required to prove another; the Divine intervention which requires proof, and is beyond the reach of our natural faculties because it is beyond the reach of experience, requires for its proof a Divine intervention which is

cognisable by our natural faculties. The super-sensible miracle of Divine mission must be proved by the sensible miracle of some event or events which, by being opposed to the course of nature, attest the agency and intervention of the Lord and Master of nature.

(ij.) The reasonableness, then, for expecting a miracle as something opposed to the course of nature in preparation for the promulgation of supernatural truths, is made out.

(iij.) As, however, occurrences may be in various ways opposed to the course of nature, it will be to the purpose to examine more closely the character of a miracle.

(iv.) And, first of all, the very expression, 'course of nature,' and the idea for which it stands, are not so universally understood as to dispense with all explanation. By the course of nature is meant that succession of events throughout the material universe which follow each other according to that Law of Cause and Effect by which the universe is regulated. That such a Law of Cause and Effect exists is recognised by every healthy intellect. It is not arrived at by a process of reasoning, but it is apprehended by the intellect in the same way as the principle that, the Whole is greater than its Part, or any other first principle is apprehended, namely, as recommended by its own self-evidence to the healthy human intellect. The Law of Cause and Effect actually exists in nature, and the faculty by which it is capable of being apprehended is naturally possessed by man; as colour, too, exists in nature, and man possesses the natural faculty of vision

by which he perceives it. This account will at once approve itself by an example, for as it is an example which is the occasion by which the intellect becomes cognisant of the law in the first instance, so an example will illustrate the philosophical account of the manner in which the intellect receives it.

If, immediately on my thinking, How cold it is! I see an area which before was green with grass, or brown with gravel, suddenly covered with a layer of white, I do not connect my thought and the change as an instance of cause and effect, but I apprehend the later of the two facts as a merely accidental sequence. But if I see the snow descending, and then remark the change of colour, I apprehend here not merely a sequence but a consequence; I apprehend in the phenomena a relation between the descent of the snow and the change of colour; I apprehend the later fact as accounted for by the former, that is, I apprehend the relation of Cause and Effect; and the apprehension of this Law, discerned by the healthy intellect, gives the certainty that when any two facts are thus connected, the same cause under the same circumstances will produce the same effect.

The natural universe at any given moment is made up of an aggregate of facts, every one of which has resulted from some former fact as its cause in the preceding moment, and every one of which will in the next moment have produced a new fact as its effect. Man himself is among these facts, though he differs from others in being able to exercise his free-will in acting as a cause. Man can by his will support in his

hand a stone from falling, as a table can without will ; but both man and the table are parts of the natural order of the universe, and if the stone seems to refuse obedience to the Law of Gravitation by reason of the obstacle, there is not anything here really contrary to nature, but only a natural result, that when two natural causes are put in opposition, of which one is stronger than the other, it is only natural that the stronger should preponderate.

To thwart the natural succession of cause and effect requires supernatural power. Man can support the stone in his hand by opposing to the downward force of gravitation a natural muscular force of equal power in the contrary direction, but he cannot support it by opposing a weaker natural force. For a weaker natural force, or aggregate of natural forces, to overcome a stronger natural force, there must intervene another force which is not natural but must be supernatural. Were a man by a word to bid iron float on the water's surface, and were it to do so without the concurrence of any other natural forces, he would be overpowering the powers of nature, and exercising a supernatural sway in suspending or contradicting them. No man could do this without aid from a Being superior to the powers of nature.

(v.) By the word Miracle we mean to express such a fact as cannot be accounted for by natural causes, a fact opposed to the course of nature, and, consequently, a fact that requires the intervention of the Lord and Master of nature, God blessed for ever.

(vj.) This conclusion requires a word of further

explanation, if it be admitted—and it is a part of Christianity to admit it—that there are intermediate beings between the natural universe and its Author. This additional consideration will render it necessary to distinguish the intervention of the Lord of Nature into Action and Permission. Were there no such intermediate beings, His intervention would be of necessity always Active; the existence of such beings, whether good angels or evil, will introduce the possibility of this Permissive intervention of God. For, if such beings were able to modify in any way the material universe, as they would themselves be supernatural, so also would their interference be. But if such interference occur, it would plainly be unreasonable to suppose that it should be capable of being exercised arbitrarily, since the Author of nature would never abandon men to the caprice of unseen beings more powerful than mankind. Whatever license He might in His Providence allow them, He could not but retain the absolute power in His own hands, and the supernatural interference of such intermediate beings could only happen by His permission, and to the extent that He permitted.

It should be added, that supernatural events which are wrought by God through good agents are conventionally called Miracles, or *Prodigia*; those which are by God's permission wrought by evil agents, are called *Præstigia*. It should also be remarked, that it seems consistent with God's Providence that no interference of evil agents should be permitted before God had guaranteed the authority of His own messenger by

His own active supernatural interference. When He had once attested His message to man by Miracles, then man would be secured against the deception of evil agents. Miracles usher in the Revelation, and then the Revelation guards us against future deception. Hence we Christians could not be influenced now by any supernatural interferences called in to prove a false religion. We are forewarned and armed beforehand. Any supernatural interferences—as might be those of modern spiritism, or Jansenism, or the pretended gift of tongues—are at once convicted of evil, if they are wrought to recommend a teaching contrary to that of the Messenger whose authority has been proved by the series of miraculous interferences which began chronologically before them.

(vij.) A miracle should be carefully distinguished from a special Providence. In a special Providence there is nothing opposed to the natural course of things. In using this expression we mean that God not only in general directs the course of nature according to the Law of Cause and Effect, but that He has regard to the wants of each individual; and that, in His arrangement of the natural universe, He has so regulated creatures and the laws of their existence as to have regard to the particular necessities and the particular treatment of each.

For example, it is conceivable that at the beginning of creation God should so have arranged the order of things that when the time should come that the iniquity of Sodom and Gomorrha should be full, there should happen a terrible volcanic eruption, which should over-

whelm the Cities of the Plain. If so, the event, however startling, would have been perfectly natural, and not a miracle. There would have been the uniform succession of cause and effect from the first, and the retributive coincidence would have been provided for in the ordinary course of nature. But if there had been no such uniform succession, if without the causes physically necessary to produce a volcanic eruption, a volcanic eruption had notwithstanding taken place, this would have been a miracle and not a special Providence.

(viii.) And as, on the other hand, the strangeness of an event is not a necessary proof of its being miraculous, so, on the other hand, a true miracle may exist under circumstances where men might expect least to find one. Two classes of such miracles may be mentioned; in one of them, that wherein the miracle consists may be practically inappreciable by the senses; in the other, it may be wholly inappreciable by them.

First then, a fact may be a true miracle, which though sensible is practically inappreciable by the senses. This truth will show how an apparent trifle might be a perfect miracle; and such a miracle may be contrasted with those other startling events of which we have just spoken, and which we have seen to be void of miraculous intervention, and to be only Special Providences. The following is an example:

Watch that mote floating in the sunbeam. It is so minute, that if a cloud pass over the face of the sun it is lost to sight; it is so light, that it seems hardly able to sink earthwards. The slightest current of air changes its course; a variation of temperature arrests or quickens

its descent. It is fickle in its movements as the shifting breeze, and yet every motion is regulated by (naturally) immutable laws; and were its course to be altered the millionth part of a line in opposition to those laws, there would have been worked, a Miracle. It is obvious that a miracle of this kind could not serve as a proof, since, though within the range of sensible things, it would be practically unnoticeable.

The other kind of miracle to which reference has been made is not merely practically inappreciable by the senses, but absolutely so, and supersensible. The following is an example :

See that circular wafer of bread. The eye perceives its colour, the touch feels its resistance, the tongue appreciates its taste. See that mixture of wine with water in the chalice, and here again the senses are able to appreciate the 'accidents': these may be taken by the Priest of the Most High and set before him on the Altar; and at a certain point in the religious service words are uttered to which the Divine Intervention, transcending all natural laws, is pledged, and, in consequence, the substance which supports the sensible accidents of the bread is changed into other substance while the accidents remain unchanged, and the substance of the wine is also changed into other substance though its accidents also remain unaltered. The senses experience no change in their proper objects, the accidents, and indeed these remain as they were before, unchanged; but the intellect which before recognised under the accidents of bread and wine, the substances of bread and wine, which substances alone could naturally exist

beneath them, now illumined by faith, recognises the presence of substances which could not naturally be contained beneath those accidents. Here is a fact opposed to the course of nature; a fact, therefore, which is literally a miracle. It is obvious that such a miracle as this could not serve as a proof any more than the unnatural but inappreciable deviation of a mote in the sunbeam; it would be an invisible miracle, and would require to have its own existence proved as much as the Mission of the Teacher of Revelation would require proof.

(jx.) From what has been said, it is plain that the change of the rod of Moses into a serpent, or the change of water into wine at the marriage-feast at Cana, may be a greater miracle than the most tremendous catastrophes which might follow sin as its punishment, even though that catastrophe might be a deluge, for the latter might be indeed no miracle at all, but the effect of a Special Providence, whereas the physical constituents of a wooden staff may be utterly different from the physical constituents of a living thing, and the chemical components of water do not include the chemical components of wine.

(x.) As, then, it has been shown above that in case it should please God to make known to man some of those truths regarding Himself and His designs which transcend the discovery of unaided reason, it would be reasonable to expect that such a revelation would be ushered in with miracles as the proof of the intervention of the Lord of Nature; so now it has been shown what kind of miracle it would be reasonable to expect,

not, namely, such a one as would be practically or absolutely inappreciable by the senses, but one that should be within the range of human experience.

7. (β) *On the particular Miracle which eminently proves the Mission of the Teacher of Christianity.*

j. After having seen that it is reasonable to expect that a Revelation should be ushered in by miraculous proof, the reasonableness of the particular miracle alleged in proof of the Divine Revelation has next to be shown.

ij. It is alleged by Christians that from the very first there has been a succession of miraculous interferences, at first introducing the Divine teaching, and then accompanying its gradual progress in the successive revelations that have been made to man; and that when He at last came whose advent was the main object of the previous revelations,—that He, the Teacher of the final Revelation, by which God has made known to men truths regarding Himself which transcend human reason, died and rose again from the dead; and that by this stupendous miracle especially, He proved that He was the promised Teacher sent by God; that He had indeed worked other miracles before His death, but that His Resurrection was the crowning one of all, the miracle which ratified the truths of all His previous miracles, the miracle which guaranteed the truth of all He taught, and the certainty of all He promised.

ijj. It is of importance to remark the manner in which the first Christians regarded this miracle, and how prominently they put it forward as the mainstay

of their confidence. We find this described in the history of the first twenty or thirty years of Christianity after the alleged fact of the Resurrection had taken place. This history is called the Acts of the Apostles, and, if we were to regard it merely as a historical narrative, it would be difficult to find any other historical book (with the exception of the four narratives of the acts of Jesus Christ Himself) which possesses more distinct proof of authenticity and truth.

iv. Indications of the esteem in which the Resurrection of Christ was held as proof of His Divine mission are the following :

(a) Within fifty days after the Resurrection it becomes necessary to choose one who should succeed to the post which had been forfeited by the disciple who had betrayed his Master to the Jews: it was made an indispensable condition by the leader of the Apostles that he should be able to be a witness to the resurrection of Jesus.—Acts i. 22.

(b) On the fifteenth day after the Resurrection, the leader of the new Teachers declares to the Jews, assembled from all quarters to the Feast of Pentecost, that he and his fellows are all witnesses of the Resurrection of Jesus, and that He who had been raised from the dead was thus proved to be Lord and Christ.—Acts ii. 32, 36.

(c) Soon after, the same leader of the new Teachers announces to the Jews, assembled at Solomon's Porch, that the Author of Life, whom they had killed, God had raised from the dead, and that of this fact he and his companions were witnesses.—Acts iii. 15.

(*d*) Again, it is said that with great power the Apostles gave testimony of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ our Lord.—Acts iv. 33.

(*e*) When the same leader of the Apostles is sent to instruct Cornelius, and by his conversion to open the gate of the Church to the Gentiles, he declares to him how he and his fellows were witnesses of all the acts of Christ in the land of the Jews and in Jerusalem; how He was put to death by crucifixion, and how God raised Him up the third day, and gave Him to be manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses pre-ordained by God, ‘even,’ he says, ‘to us who did eat and drink with Him after He rose again from the dead.’—Acts x. 41.

(*f*) The same appeal to the Resurrection of Christ is made by the other Apostle, who is always associated with the Chief of the Apostles, and honoured with him. He was not an eye-witness in the same sense as the other Apostles, but while at Ephesus (Acts xix.) he teaches the Corinthians by letter how after Christ had died and been buried, He rose again, and was seen by Cephas or Peter, and after that by the eleven; again by more than five hundred brethren at once, of whom by far the greater number still survived, and who could testify to what they had seen with their own eyes; then again by James, and again by all the Apostles; finally, as though there could be no question about the death of Jesus Christ, and therefore his own sight of Him must necessarily imply the Resurrection, the author of the Letter to the Corinthians says that ‘last of all, He was seen also by me as by one born out of due time.’—1 Cor. xv. 8.

(g) Before this letter was written, we find its author on his first missionary expedition announcing to the Jews in the synagogue at Antioch in Pisidia how Jesus was put to death and buried, but ‘ God raised Him up from the dead the third day, and He was seen for many days by them who came up with Him from Galilee to Jerusalem, who,’ he adds, ‘ to this present are His witnesses to the people.’—Acts xiii. 30, 31. This example is a specimen of his usual instructions. In his second missionary expedition, when he came to Athens, he preached ‘ Jesus and the Resurrection’ (Acts xvii. 18), and used the Resurrection as the proof to all of the mission of Jesus Christ (31), so that when we read of his testifying at Corinth that Jesus is the Christ (Acts xviii. 5), we know that it is meant that he proved the Messiahship of Jesus by the fact of His Resurrection.

It may be remarked that after the Resurrection has served its purpose as a proof of the Divine Mission of Jesus Christ, it is used as the exemplar of our Resurrection at the last day, and the type of our spiritual Resurrection from sin, and so enters into the province of Christian morality and asceticism. Many instances of this occur in the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of St. Paul.

v. No more convincing proof could be given of the Divine mission of our Lord than that God should raise Him from the dead ; the demands of Reason could not therefore be better met than by supplying it. It is a miracle, for it is an event opposed to the course of nature, and it is a miracle fitted to be a proof because it is within the range of experience. To see that a man is dead is

within the range of experience ; and after having seen him dead to see him exercising the functions of life is, neither more nor less than the other, within the range of experience. There is no greater difficulty in seeing that a man is alive after death than before, the same testimony which would prove the one would prove the other. Imagination, indeed, may come in, and the strangeness of the phenomenon may delude us into the idea that a different kind of testimony is required, but to see a living man and to bear testimony to his being alive, requires just the same faculties, neither more nor less, whether that living man has passed through the state of death or not. Men ought, indeed, to be on the alert, and the more so as the consequences are more grave, to assure themselves of the honesty of the witnesses, but the testimony in itself does not require any peculiar faculty of discernment. Nay! a scientific man might stand under a disadvantage, for he might be unwilling to admit the plain testimony of his senses against laws which he deems—and rightly in the order of nature, deems—immutable ; while the simple narrative of an eye-witness like St. John, who in all simplicity states what passed before his eyes (St. John xix. 34, 35), and whose honesty is unimpeachable, would be free from prejudice.

vj. The reality of the miracle of the Resurrection requires of course the reality of the Death of our Lord, and the certainty of His having been seen alive subsequently. It is scarcely within the purpose of this treatise to enter upon either of these topics ; it is enough to show the antecedent reasonableness of the

proof supplied by the Resurrection to the Divine mission of the Teacher of Revelation. However, while the latter question, which has reference to the sufficiency of the witnesses, shall be dismissed, the former question, which regards the reality of the death of Christ, shall so far be discussed as modern science has thrown new light upon the matter.

vij. (a) The evangelist St. John writes that 'when Jesus was already dead, a Roman soldier drove his spear into His side, and immediately there came out blood and water.' That St. John regarded this event as something very extraordinary, is implied by the words which he subjoins, which contain an asseveration of the truth of his account: 'and he that saw it hath given testimony, and his testimony is true, and he knoweth that he saith true that you also may believe,' ch. xix. ver. 35. So strange, indeed, is this event that a dilemma has been put,—either our Lord at the moment His side was pierced was alive or dead: if He was alive, no water could have been effused; if He was dead, there could have been no outflow of blood.

(b) A supposition which would at once solve this dilemma, and harmonise wonderfully with the contemplations of the saints and the sympathies of Catholics in these days, and add a remarkable confirmation to the sincerity of St. John's historical authority, is that the physical cause of the death of our Blessed Lord was the agony which He endured for our sake, resulting in the Rupture of His Sacred Heart. Our inquiries, then, will lead us to the conclusion that our Lord died literally of a broken heart.

(c) In order that the most uninitiated may clearly understand the grounds on which this supposition is based, so much of Human Physiology shall be explained as is necessary for the purpose.

(d) It is true that the blood circulates in the living body through the action of the heart. The heart, after receiving the blood, closes round upon it and propels it in that direction which is not barred by the closure of the valves with which this great blood-vessel is supplied. Hence there is so far good ground for the difficulty urged above against the alleged outflow of blood from the side of our Lord. The movement of the heart ceases at death, and with it the movement of the blood. The blood therefore is not effused in the case of a wound inflicted after death.

(e) The blood, as it circulates in the body, is a red fluid, apparently homogeneous throughout; after death it separates itself into its two parts, which may particularly be designated, 'blood and water.'

(f) If healthy blood be taken from the living body, and received into a cup, it undergoes a change. At first it acquires a slight jelly-like consistency; this stage occupies at most some twelve minutes, after this time the jelly begins to contract, retaining its colour, and leaving a thin layer of light straw-coloured fluid between itself and the sides of the cup; the contraction of the red jelly-like mass may go on for a space varying from one to three hours, during which time there is more and more of the pale straw-coloured fluid squeezed out from the mass in consequence of the contraction. This process is called the coagulation of the blood.

It takes place more readily in a temperature corresponding with the standard heat of the blood, viz. at 99° of Fahrenheit.

(*g*) The explanation of this process is as follows :

Death in man is the separation of the rational soul from the human body. But after this separation there is not found utter lifelessness in the tissues of the body. They are found to have a kind of vitality, such as that which we witness in the growth of a plant, which lasts for a longer or shorter, sometimes for a considerable, duration. There supervenes, in fact, on the extinction of human life a vitality of the parts, whether solid or fluid, which, for want of a better word, may be called Textural Vitality. The blood is found to have a vitality of this kind, and its functions may be traced, whether before death the blood be drawn from the living body, and in this way the blood be deprived of its share in human life, or whether after death the results and products of its textural vitality be exercised in the blood-vessels.

(*h*) The coagulation of the blood is an act, and the last act, of its textural vitality, before the actual corruption and putrefaction of the blood.

(*i*) Healthy blood, though to appearance homogeneous, is composed of various parts which manifest themselves in the course of coagulation. Speaking roughly, it is composed of two parts—in the words of the Evangelist, St. John, of ‘blood and water’—there is the red-coloured clot, which varies in consistency from the most liquid jelly to considerable firmness ; and there is the serum, which is actually water holding a

number of chemical substances in solution, of a pale straw colour. The red-coloured clot is composed of colourless fibrine, and of the red corpuscles of the blood, which impart to it its colour. The fibrine and the red corpuscles are the parts which possess the textural vitality, which has supervened on the loss of human life. This vitality is manifested by the contraction of the fibrine throughout the whole mass of the blood subjected to coagulation. In the meshes of the contracted fibrine the red corpuscles are entangled, and consequently the colour of the blood goes with the clot and not with the serum. As the fibrine contracts, the serum oozes out from the red clot, which it in consequence begins to surround in gradually increasing quantity till the contraction ceases, and with it the textural life which is the cause of it. In proportion to the degree and activity of the textural vitality and the time given for it to exercise itself, the clot will be less or more consistent, and less or more incapable, consequently, of flowing. If therefore the vitality were low, as in the case of death accompanied by great exhaustion, the blood would present the appearance of only semi-coagulation, and the whole mass, the serum with the clot, would present an appearance which in unscientific language might naturally be called 'blood and water.'

(j) The words used by the Evangelist St. John, if translated into the language of modern medical science, would imply that on the withdrawal of the iron head of the Roman soldier's spear, thrust with brutal violence through the chest, there flowed down, out

of the gaping wound, a quantity of semi-coagulated blood.

(*k*) This could not have flowed out of the blood-vessels themselves, for not only (1) would the blood refuse to flow from its vessels after death in consequence of the cessation of the circulation, not only (2) at the utmost would an almost imperceptible quantity attach itself to the lance's head, but (3) coagulation does not even begin, while the blood is contained within its own vessels, before at least four hours after death, though outside its own vessels, being still contained within the body, it will begin to coagulate as soon as it would do if taken from the body.

The blood therefore which gushed forth under the appearance of 'blood and water' in some noticeable quantity, must have been blood which had escaped out of its own vessels, and been collected in some cavity in their neighbourhood. Such a cavity would be the bag in which the heart itself is contained, and which is called the pericardium; into this bag the blood would escape by the rupture of the heart. Such an event would explain not merely the state of half-coagulation in which the blood came forth, but also its quantity; for a case has been recorded in which about a quart of blood and water, or of blood separated, though indistinctly, into clot and serum, has been found in the pericardium; in another case the effusion amounted to five pints, and in another to three quarts.

(*l*) The following facts of the sacred narrative must be borne in mind, while we connect the experience of science with the history of the death of our Lord.

Our Lord gave up the ghost at three o'clock in the afternoon; by sunset, which, as the period of the year was the vernal equinox, was at six o'clock, the body must be in the sepulchre. Soldiers were sent to accelerate the death of the three crucified, sufficiently early for the bodies to be taken down from the crosses and buried before sunset; and soon after they arrived, the side of our Lord was opened.

The interval, then, between the actual death of our Lord and the outflow of semi-coagulated blood, or blood and water, was considerably less than three hours; it might have been two hours, or a little more.

(*m*) The circumstances of the history fall in with the supposition which has been proposed, viz. the actual Rupture of our Lord's Sacred Heart; the coagulation, the imperfect nature of the coagulation, the outflow, and the ultimate suddenness of our Lord's death.

(1) The coagulation is accounted for (α) by the escape of the blood out of its proper vessels into the pericardium, in consequence of the supposed rupture of the heart; (β) by the sufficiency of the time for coagulation, namely, two hours, more or less; (γ) by the favourable circumstance of the temperature of the interior of the body; for, as before intimated, the temperature most favourable to coagulation is 99° Fahr., the ordinary temperature of the living blood.

(2) The imperfect character of the coagulation is accounted for (α) by the shortness of the time that elapsed before the side was opened; it was long enough for coagulation to begin, and for a portion of the serum to

be separated, not long enough for the complete separation of the serum; if there had been full time for complete coagulation, the clot might have acquired too much consistency to follow the withdrawal of the spear, and had there been a delay of many hours the serum would have been diffused through the tissues of the chest: (β) the imperfect coagulation would also be the natural result of the state of exhaustion to which the sufferings of the Passion had reduced our Blessed Lord.

(3) The outflow—which could not be due to the movement of the heart, since the heart had ceased to beat—is accounted for by (α) the effect of gravitation, which would draw the contents of the pericardium downwards after the spear-head; and (β) by the pressure of the parts surrounding the pericardium, into which the blood had been driven.

(4) The ultimate suddenness of Our Lord's death cannot certainly be better accounted for than by a rupture of the heart, which necessarily entails immediate death. The loud cry uttered by our Lord has been appealed to as a proof that He had still strength, and His voluntary sacrifice was accomplished by His permitting the excess of agony to break His Sacred Heart.

(*n*) There is one physiological difficulty which has been urged against this supposition. It is this: though cases have occurred in which mental agony has culminated in a broken heart, all such cases have, so far as accurate examination has tested them, been accompanied with a diseased state of the muscular walls of

the heart or with external violence. Now, such external violence was not exercised in the case of our Lord, and the supposition of disease has no place.

The answer is at hand. It might indeed be said in reply that the mental agony our Lord endured was without parallel, and its vehemence might produce that effect which in other cases was facilitated by disease; it might be said that an agony which produced so rare an event as a sweat of blood might—when still more intensified in the last conflict, and attended with the constrained position which is enumerated by scientific men among the conditions favourable to the rupture of the heart—result in a rupture which evidently would differ from recognised cases of a like kind only in degree. But over and above this answer, it is to be remarked, though our Lord was free from disease, He was liable to exhaustion and the effects of exhaustion. He experienced ‘weariness,’ as St. John tells us, when He sat by Jacob’s Well, and weariness implies a certain alteration, by over exercise, of the muscular substance. Such alteration therefore in the muscular tissue of the heart would not be incompatible with our exclusion of disease from the body of our Lord; and such alteration would be the natural consequence of a life such as that led by Jesus Christ. In contrast to the Baptist, indeed, and in a certain point of view, He came, as He Himself said, ‘eating and drinking;’ but the true meaning of these words must agree with a life spent in watching, and mortification, and self-denial, and of continual suffering and grief of soul: there were the forty days’ fast, and the praying all night long on the mountain-

top, and the want of a place where to lay His head, and incessant journeyings and preachings: the natural consequence of such a kind of life might well be the weakening the tissue and muscular fibres of the heart, such as to take away all improbability from the supposition that the immediate physical cause of our Lord's death was the breaking of His Sacred Heart.

However, it must not be entirely omitted that cases of rupture of the Heart are recorded in which no change in the muscular tissue of the heart could be detected.

(*o*) To conclude, of all the signs of death there is none so absolutely and necessarily certain as the coagulation of the blood. The date of its commencement is the moment in which human life has ceased. Now it is plain that on the Cross the sacred blood of our Lord had undergone the commencement of this process, from the outflow of blood and water. The physical death, then, of our Lord is certain.

vijj. The certainty of His subsequent return to life is proved by the historical testimony of eye-witnesses, who proved their honesty by their sufferings. The remark that is sometimes made that men have been known to suffer and die for false opinions confirms instead of invalidating the witness of those who suffered and died in testimony of the Resurrection. Most certainly the obstinacy of those who have suffered for false opinions convinces us of the fact that they really held those opinions; and the patience of the witnesses of the Resurrection convinces us of the fact that they really had seen our Lord living after His death; only the fact of men's holding certain opinions does not

prove those opinions to be true, whereas the fact of men's having seen a man living after death does prove the truth of His Resurrection.

8. (γ) *On the special Object proved by the Miracle of the Resurrection.*

1. It is of the utmost importance to define clearly what that is of which the Miracles by which the Supernatural Revelation is ushered in are the proof; and it is of the utmost importance to understand that it is not the Revelation itself which is directly attested and proved by the Miracles, but the mission and authority of the Teacher of it. The Miracles prove that the person in whose favour they are worked is a Teacher sent by the Supernatural Lord of Nature, and commissioned to speak in His Name; it will of course follow, but as a more remote consequence, that the words of that Teacher are true, whether they are instructions or promises.

2. It would seem that among non-Catholics the contrary opinion is assumed to be true. Indeed, when we consider that the principle of authority has been so widely assailed outside the Catholic Church, it becomes a natural consequence that the same men who assail that principle should be disposed to regard the miracles which they admit rather as demonstrating the existence of a revelation of the details of which they might be themselves the judges, than as proving the presence of a visible authority commissioned to announce the revelation, and in God's Name to declare its meaning and enforce it.

3. It will not be difficult to show that the non-Catholic view is unreasonable, while the Catholic statement recommends itself as the only credible and reasonable one.

For it is not reasonable to suppose that if God has given a revelation, He should have withheld the means of knowing what it teaches; yet the opinion of non-Catholics that it is the Revelation, and not the Teacher of Revelation, that is guaranteed by miracles, leads to the practical impossibility of knowing for certain what the truths are that God would teach us.

This disastrous consequence was to have been expected beforehand, and facts corroborate the expectation.

Non-Catholics admit that a Revelation has been given, and that it has been proved by miracles. As to the meaning of that Revelation and the truths it teaches, they refuse to recognise the living voice of an infallible teacher, and upon grounds which we shall hereafter examine, they identify the Revelation with the contents of certain written documents, while they claim the right to refuse their assent to anything of which they cannot see the proof in those same documents. It is patent that this system gives full scope to great variety of interpretation, and that the natural result would be the stultification of the whole scheme of Revelation. It must issue in the opinion that while it has been proved that a Revelation has been made, there is notwithstanding nothing to determine the details of the Revelation, or, in other words, that while Christianity is true, there is no certainty as to what Christianity teaches. No

greater stultification of the scheme of Revelation could be imagined.

And we have only to look out into the world and see in undeniable facts the corroboration of such antecedent expectation. Compare the non-Catholics, who admit the proof of miracles as only the proof of a Revelation, with Catholics, who see in miracles the proof of the divine mission of the Teacher. The former admit the fact that Christianity has been revealed, but they vary, in multitudinous sects, as to the real meaning and the several truths of Christianity. Catholics, that is, those Christians of every clime and race who, however multitudinous in their nations and languages, recognise in Peter's successor the visible centre of the Christian hierarchy, speak with one voice the details of the Revelation, and without hesitation or misgiving are unanimous not only as to the existence of a Revelation, but also as to its meaning. Such unanimity it would on their principles have been reasonable to expect, and the existence in fact of such unanimity is, therefore, at the least, a probable argument in favour of their principles and, in consequence, of that exhibition of Revelation which stands before us so recommended.

4. And here let the truth regarding the use of miracles as a proof be briefly set down.

By miracles our Lord proved that He was the Christ promised from the beginning, and therefore that His promises were trustworthy. Among these promises was one by which He guaranteed that to the end of the world there should exist a Church teaching in His name, against which the powers of darkness and of

untruth should never prevail ; there exists therefore at present, somewhere in the world, this Divinely-appointed teacher, able to teach, and actually teaching, the truths of Revelation, by commission, as infallibly as our Lord, her founder, taught them while upon earth by His own authority, and as sent by the Eternal Father. Now there is in fact on earth only one claimant to this privilege, and that claimant is the Catholic Church, which recognises in St. Peter's successor the visible centre of Unity ; consequently it is the Holy Roman Church of which Christ says, This is my beloved Spouse, hear her, as at the Jordan the Eternal Father said of Jesus Christ, This is my beloved Son, hear Him ; and the Dove which descended on Jesus Christ is the sign of the Holy Ghost, whose continual indwelling in this Church, preserves her from all error, and teaches her all truth.

5. Let us dwell on this point a little longer. The miraculous proof which demonstrated the divine mission of our Lord is made up of the Prophecies in the Old Testament, of the Miracles which He wrought before His death, and of His Resurrection. His Resurrection was the crowning miracle of all, and set the final seal to all those miracles that had gone before.

These miracles proved to the first Christians that our Lord was a Teacher sent by God, and commissioned by God to teach. They proved that all that He said was worthy of credit, and to be received without gainsaying, even though He taught as truths doctrines which could not be found in or proved by Holy Scripture, that is, of course, by the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which were the only Scriptures then extant.

6. Let His own words be considered—words which are utterly opposed to and destructive of the non-Catholic system, but which are quoted over and over again by non-Catholics as their palmary argument in favour of their doctrine that the Bible, and the Bible only, is the rule of faith.

‘Search the Scriptures,’ are the words of our Blessed Lord, and they are cited on every occasion by non-Catholics in a sense utterly different from that in which our Lord intended them. This shall be made evident.

The Jews to whom our Lord was speaking did not admit His divine mission; they did, however, admit the Prophecies and the books of the Old Testament; that is, they admitted the sacred character and truth of the Scriptures, and this is the reason which our Lord gives for referring them to the Scriptures. *Search*, He says, *the Scriptures, for you think that in them you have life everlasting.* So far He has only given the reason of His being able to quote the Scriptures to those who listened to Him.

But now for what purpose did He refer them to those Scriptures which they admitted? It was because those Scriptures testified of Him; *the same are they that give testimony of Me*; as much as to say, Go, consult the Prophecies which have been recorded of the Messias, compare them with Me who speak to you, and you will find that it is I of whom the prophets spoke, as of one sent to deliver a message from heaven; that it is I of whom those Scriptures give testimony as of one authorised to teach not only the truths which they

contained, but other truths too which are not contained in them ; that I am the Heaven-sent Teacher of Revelation—of a Revelation containing Truths and Sacraments hitherto unknown. The words, then, of our Blessed Lord, *Search the Scriptures, for in them you think you have life everlasting, and the same are they that give testimony of Me*, may obviously be paraphrased thus : Search the Scriptures (since you admit their authority), for they prove that I am sent to teach you, and to teach truths which they do not contain.

7. Prophecies, then, and miracles, and, subsequently, the Resurrection, did not prove directly the Christian Revelation, but guaranteed Christ as the Heaven-sent Teacher of the Revelation ; and the special object proved by the miracle of the Resurrection was not the Revelation but its Teacher.

8. We shall see hereafter how the plan inaugurated by our Lord was continued after His Ascension ; how the Holy Roman Church has been appointed to continue the work of teaching the Revelation to the end of the world ; and how the proofs which serve for establishing the truth of the message brought from heaven, do not directly point to the Revelation, but to the Teacher of it ; while, of course, the proof of the infallibility of the Teacher, the certainty of the Revelation, and of all its details, is indirectly established.

9. And let the great reasonableness of this plan be considered. By it Truth, which is essentially one, is preserved in its unity. Had it been possible for the non-Catholic system to be true, that is, had it been possible to prove by miracle that the Holy Scriptures

of the Old and New Testament were in fact by themselves and exclusively the Revelation sent down from heaven, and had provision been made for the mere distribution of those Sacred Books in all lands without note or comment, the actual state, at present, of doctrinal disunion among non-Catholics would have been but a faint representation of what would then have been the reality; or, if a more systematic formula had been issued, and proved by miracle to be Divine, such as the Apostles' Creed, few years would have passed before men would have misinterpreted in numerous ways each of its twelve Articles. It is most unreasonable to suppose that such a plan should have been adopted by the Divine Wisdom. Even the Mosaic Law, confined to a small nation, needed from time to time the appearance of Divinely-inspired Prophets to remind their countrymen of the authority and meaning of the Divine oracles; and the reasonableness of this provision is evident. Equally reasonable is the statement of the Catholic Church with regard to the Divine deposit committed to her, and its interpretation; and the greater excellence of the means provided for Christians compared with the means provided for the Jews, is in harmony with the greater dignity of the Catholic Church over a national though Divine institution. By virtue of the Infallibility of the Church, which is the actual Teacher of Divine Revelation to the world, the unity of Truth is secured. Her infallibility rests on the promise of Christ, the first Teacher of the same Divine Revelation; and the authority He had to promise, and the power He had to fulfil His promise, are proved

by His Resurrection. Henceforth, from the principles laid down in the original deposit, the actual Teacher is able, without fear of error, to draw theological conclusions and practical applications; and henceforth too the actual Teacher is able infallibly to pronounce on the existence or non-existence of such or such a fact among the original facts revealed, and to draw out in clearer precision of outline what had indeed been taught from the beginning, but undefinedly and informally.

We have thus treated of the manner in which the Revelation—already proved to be matter of reasonable expectation—has been introduced into the world; and the alleged manner of its introduction, namely, by miracles, has been proved to be reasonable, inasmuch as the visible supernatural is the fitting proof of the invisible supernatural.

We have next to consider the manner in which the Revelation has been taught; who is the Teacher of Revelation? or, as we speak especially of the fulness of Divine Revelation which is called Christianity, who is the Teacher of the Christian Revelation?

The answer is: Jesus Christ was the Teacher while visibly on earth; since His departure, the Teacher of the Divine Revelation is the Catholic Church, under the visible Headship of St. Peter and his successors, and it will continue to be so to the end of the world. The reasonableness of this order of things will occupy our attention in what follows. Suffice it to say at present that with regard to any revealed fact the account of its being received by mankind ought to be this: I believe each and every one of these facts which enter

into the Christian's Creed because God teaches me, and God teaches me through the living voice of the Church ; I know that the Church teaches me the mind of God, because Christ promised that it should do so ; and I believe Christ's promise, because He rose from the dead.

ON MIRACLES.

THERE are a few points connected with the subject of miracles which, in a philosophical inquiry like the present, deserve consideration.

- (1) The assertion that, besides the principal miracles which usher in the Divine Revelation, other subordinate miracles have occurred from time to time, is reasonable.
 - (2) The expectation that, besides miracles by which the authority of the Teacher is guaranteed, and which may be called Proof-miracles, there should occur others by way of grace and favour, and which may therefore be called Grace-miracles, is reasonable.
 - (3) That there should be recorded legendary and supposititious miracles was reasonably to be expected, but that their falseness should be thought to invalidate all miracles subsequent to those worked at the outset in favour of the Revelation, is unreasonable.
 - (4) Subsequent to the proof by miracles of the Divine Revelation, the rejection of all other miracles as proofs of systems contradictory to the Revelation already proved, is reasonable.
- (1) *The occurrence of Miracles (by way of proof) besides those which ushered in the Divine Revelation, may reasonably be expected.*

God is charity, and therefore wherever charity requires an interference with the course of nature, it must be perfectly in harmony with reason to expect it. It is to no purpose to object that we are not capable of judging of the cases which demand such charity as

shall manifest itself in such interference ; we are at least able, when such an interference is exhibited to us as an effect of Divine charity, to understand the meaning of the statement, and to admit its truth with gratitude. When, then, God's charity led Him to enlarge the horizon of man's knowledge of God by means of Revelation, as it is in harmony with the government of the world that God should use man to teach man, so it was necessary that, in the first instance, the Divine mission of the messenger should be guaranteed by miracles. Christ proved by miracles, and, above all other miracles, by His Resurrection, that He was a teacher sent by God. With the created lips of our human nature He spoke the Message which He came to deliver. He died and ascended into heaven, but He left behind Him a Church, purchased with His own blood, which was to continue the work He had begun ; and He promised the gift of the Holy Ghost, so that the gates of hell should never prevail against her in the fulfilment of her office. As the charity of God had been exercised through the teaching of Christ, so now it was to be exercised through the teaching of the Church : through her missionaries the Revelation made by God to man would find its way over the face of the globe ; through her bishops and priests her children would be fed with the life-giving truths of that Revelation ; through her prayers the blessings of redemption would overflow her own banks, and reach even those who had never heard of the work of Christ's redemption. It is most reasonable to believe that subsequently to the outset of Revelation, there might arise occasions which would call for sensible proofs of the Church's mission similar to those which had proved her Author's mission and her own at the beginning ; on such occasions we might reasonably expect a repetition of similar miracles, though we should not expect them to be so illustrious in degree. That the miracles at the outset should throw into the shade any subsequent miracles, is only what we might reasonably expect, and is so far from throwing suspicion on them, that it increases their probability. Thus the Resurrection of our Lord, the most illustrious miracle that has ever happened, has not been reproduced ; but the raising another from the dead, as in the raising of Lazarus, of the widow's son, and of the daughter of Jaira, has been paralleled on various occasions in the history of missions, as, for instance, in the case of St. Francis Xavier, in India. When, therefore, we find that the preaching of Catholic missionaries has been accompanied by the working of miracles, there is nothing to surprise us. Just in pro-

portion as the countries and circumstances in which the missionary is engaged may be paralleled with the circumstances under which the Revelation was first promulgated, we may presume a like necessity for proof by miracle, and consequently a probability that miracles would occur.

It is, then, unreasonable to reject without examination every alleged miracle subsequent to the time of the first teachers of revelation; it is reasonable to expect this occurrence, and there can hardly be imagined a weaker cause than that of the Protestant who hesitatingly admits the certainty of the Gospel miracles, and as unhesitatingly denies the credibility of later ones.

- (2) *The expectation that, besides the Miracles by which the authority of the Teacher is guaranteed, and which may be called Proof-miracles, there should occur others by way of grace and favour, and which may therefore be called Grace-miracles, is reasonable.*

When once the reasonableness of admitting an interference with the course of nature has been understood, the fact of the occurrence of miracles becomes a legitimate object of proof by testimony like any other alleged historical facts; though it would at the same time be reasonable to demand stronger testimony for the reality of such extraordinary events, than for such as fall in with the ordinary course of things.

More than this, men once convinced of the reasonableness of miraculous events under certain circumstances, will feel it natural to expect their recurrence when such circumstances take place. If, for example, circumstances should arise in which special reason might exist for extraordinary proof in order to recommend the teacher of Revelation, the believers in that Revelation will be quite ready to admit the occurrence of miracles if alleged; nay, they might be disposed to think it strange, if there appeared no exercise of supernatural power, for the visible supernatural is the natural guarantee of the invisible supernatural.

But this is not all. So far we have seen how miracles are an instance of God's charity towards men who are ignorant of Him, and who cannot claim to be His children, though they are of necessity His creatures. If, then, when we were enemies, God has exercised His power in our behalf by interfering with the course of nature, it cannot be thought unreasonable that God should exercise the same power in behalf of His friends.

Here, then, we have reason to expect a class of miracles different from those which have hitherto occupied our attention. These are no longer intended to be proofs in order to guarantee the authority of the Teacher in favour of the unbeliever, but acts of grace and goodness in favour of the believer. One of the earliest Christian writers who has spoken of miracles, St. Paul, draws this very distinction between the two classes of miracles: 'Tongues,' he writes, 'are for a sign, not to believers, but to unbelievers; but prophecies, not to unbelievers, but to believers.' 1 Cor. xiv. 22.

God's charity, then, is not confined to miracles which prove the mission of a teacher of Revelation. By embracing Revelation we become His children, and as we are His children, there is good reason to think that on occasions He may show His special love to us; and the more devoted children some men may be, the more reason is there to expect manifestations of His special love in their behalf. Hence there is no Catholic who does not feel that he may possibly become the subject of a miracle; and hence, too, the reasonableness of regarding miracles, not indeed as the ground for canonisation, but as indicative of the existence of that perfect love for God and man which is the only real sanctity. For distinction's sake, we may call those miracles which guarantee the mission of the Teacher of Revelation Proof-miracles; this second class of miracles which may be regarded as the extraordinary caresses given by God to His favourite children, we may call Grace-miracles; such miracles are, we have reason to believe, constantly occurring. Perhaps there is no Catholic who has not experienced what possibly may be a Grace-miracle, though on the other hand possibly it may be only a special Providence; the difference between a miracle and a special Providence has been explained above. As an illustration of what has just been said,—were a man suffering torture from the toothache to have recourse to a relic of St. Stanislaus Kostka, and make with it the sign of the Cross over the point of pain, and were he to receive immediate relief, the event might be or might not be a miracle; it might be a special Providence, but there is nothing in reason to prevent its being an act of God's charity either in one way or the other.

Grace-miracles were, according to the narrative of the Evangelists, wrought by our Lord no less than Proof-miracles, though necessarily Grace-miracles must partake of the character of Proof-miracles, since they presuppose the truth of the System of which they form a part.

Those miracles which were accompanied with the injunction, 'See thou tell no man,' were rather Grace-miracles than Proof-miracles, though they would be Proof-miracles also to the persons on whom they were wrought. When, notwithstanding the injunction, they were noised abroad, their character as Proof-miracles became more extended.

The same authority, established by Proof-miracle, and by that chiefest Proof-miracle, the Resurrection, which has declared the existence of a Church to the end of time, has promised also the occurrence of Grace-miracles; and that Church, which Christ has pronounced to be the teacher of Revelation to the end of the world, has always recognised their occurrence from the time of the Apostles to the present day.

As might reasonably have been anticipated, men and sects who have separated from the Catholic Church have been led to deny the occurrence of these miracles since the time of the Apostles no less than that of Proof-miracles. Truth has, however, all along claimed her rights, and the opinions of Protestants on the time of the cessation from miracles have been as varied as their opinions on other topics. Meanwhile the promise given by Christ is categorical: 'These signs shall follow them that believe; in my name they shall cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay their hands upon the sick, and they shall recover.' St. Mark xvi. 17, 18. And should anyone object that, if this passage were pressed, every Catholic ought to be working miracles every day, the answer is obvious, namely, that not even were the Apostles working miracles every day, and that while the promise can be and is fulfilled by occasional manifestations of miraculous power, it certainly could not be fulfilled by the absolute non-existence of such power.

Nor should it be forgotten that Grace-miracles become in a degree invested with the character of Proof-miracles. They become confirmations of the authority of the Church, on whose members they are bestowed; and if a motive is required for the bestowal of the gift of miracles as proofs, it is found in the necessity of maintaining the authority of the one great bulwark against infidelity at the present day, namely, the Catholic Church, which is visibly one by adhesion to the See of Peter. If unbelievers ridicule the claim she makes to the privilege of miracles, they only follow the example of

those who rejected the miracles of Christ ; while at least the children of the Church are confirmed in their faith by the visible marks of God's favour bestowed upon them.

This subject should not be left without replying to an objection which is often urged, which sounds philosophical, but which is as really unreasonable as it is pretentiously reasonable. It sounds very philosophical to say that God's care of His creatures is shown by the regularity of the laws of nature, and that it is absurd to imagine that He should, for instance, suspend the law of gravitation to save a man's life ; but it is not absurd to think of Him who condescends to guide the mote in the sunbeam, and to feed the animalcule with its necessary food, that He should take delight in showing extraordinary care to those of mankind who love and serve Him with an extraordinary love. It is not a great thing for God to suspend the law of gravitation in a given case, for the law of gravitation is not a great thing with God, nor is it a little thing with Him to save a man from pain ; with Him who is infinite nothing is great, with Him who is infinite nothing is small.

(3) *That there should be recorded legendary and supposititious Miracles was reasonably to be expected, but that their falseness should be thought to invalidate all Miracles subsequent to those worked at the outset in favour of the Revelation, is unreasonable.*

When men, through the Revelation which they have accepted, have become deeply impressed with the sense of God's Presence, of God's interest in man, and of God's love for man, they would naturally grow into the habit of looking upon every event that happened to them, however trifling it might appear, as done or permitted by God. The almost spontaneous 'Thank God' which proceeds from the lips even of men who have abandoned the Catholic Revelation, is a remnant of Catholic faith, and it implicitly recognises either God's special Providence or His miraculous interference ; and if it be remembered what God's special Providence involves—namely, that God arranged the relation of cause and effect from all eternity, in order to bring about the coincidence which has elicited the expression of gratitude, or in other words, if the intimate interest which God takes in every one of His creatures be considered, and such intimate interest is involved in the very Infinity of His Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, less difficulty ought to be experienced by

Protestants in admitting even a miracle. There is no wonder that Catholics, reared up as they are in the consciousness of God's presence and fatherly charity, should as a matter of course ascribe the blessings they enjoy to His watchful care, and should sometimes mistake special providences for miracles. There were fewer in the Middle Ages to carp and criticise, and if the sentiment of religion led men sometimes into the error of imagining a miracle where there was none, it was not from hypocrisy but from charity, and this tendency would naturally be increased by the actual occurrence of events which were certainly Grace-miracles. It was not, as the opponents of Catholic truth are frequently heard to say, the design to introduce or promote a system that led men to invent false miracles, but it was the existence and living energy of a system accompanied with true miracles, that sometimes became the occasion of imagining a miracle where there was none. It is a common and very absurd mistake in non-Catholics to invert cause and effect in their misapprehensions of Catholicity. Alleged miracles in connection with the Blessed Virgin are supposed by them to have been invented for the sake of promoting devotion to her, just as it has been imagined by them that Isidore's Decretals were forged for the sake of increasing the power of the Holy See, whereas the truth is that it was the already existing love and devotion of Christians to her, whom they can never love and honour so much as her Son did, which led them to discern her frequent interference in their behalf; and, as regards the other case, whatever intimations there are of the authority of the Holy See in the Decretals, are only the symptoms of a system actually existing and in force.

Since, then, it can be easily understood how there should have arisen reports of miraculous events which, after all, might prove erroneous; and since it is shown that such reports would have been more likely to arise on the supposition of the actual occurrence of real miracles, it must be concluded that so far from supposititious miracles invalidating those which come to us on sufficient evidence, they rather confirm the sufficiency of that evidence, and prove the reality of the miraculous events so attested.

- (4) *Subsequent to the Proof by Miracles of the Divine Revelation, the rejection of all other Miracles as proofs of systems contradictory to the Revelation already proved, is reasonable.*

As there are real miracles which are Proof-miracles, and as there

are real miracles which are Grace-miracles, so we sometimes hear of alleged miracles which seem opposed to Christianity, and to act as proofs of systems contrary to the Catholic Church.

It will be to the purpose to show that it would be reasonable to expect such pretended miracles, and also that it is reasonable that the believer in the Divine Revelation should be unaffected by them.

As there is good reason to believe, even on merely natural grounds, that between man and the Creator there are orders of other beings, some good and some evil, so there is nothing contrary to reason in the belief that they may exert a spiritual agency in the affairs of the material universe. What may be the nature and operation of those spiritual agents who have fallen from their state of grace, and whose endeavour it is to draw men into the partnership of their sin and consequent misery, is to a great degree hidden from us. The assertion, however, that there are such agents of malice, is in perfect analogy with observed facts.

We experience the fact that there are men like ourselves, who have chosen evil instead of good, and who make it their business, notwithstanding the visible and in many cases the terrible effects of sin in the world, to seduce their fellow-men and involve them in their own miserable apostasy from God. There is, then, nothing contrary to the analogy of nature in the belief that there are beings, intellectual like man and immaterial like the good angels, who act as such men act; and then, considering the probable power of such beings compared with that of men, there is nothing unreasonable in believing that they may be able to produce marvellous effects which may resemble the Divine interference by means of miracles.

If such be the case, it is very obvious that men may be in danger of being persuaded to listen to the teaching of one whose inspirations come not from the good but from the evil spirit. What safeguard have we against such danger?

It should be remembered that they who possess and profess the true Revelation, have reason to expect the occurrence of such lying wonders. He who has proved His Divine mission by His resurrection from the dead has expressly told us to be on our guard against pretenders who should work wonders: 'There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders, inso-much as to deceive (if possible) even the Elect. Behold,' He says, 'I have told it you beforehand.' And one of the first teachers of

the Christian faith, himself converted by miracles and confirming his words by miracle, tells us of the Wicked One who shall be revealed, whose coming is according to the working of Satan in all power, and signs and lying wonders, and in all seduction of iniquity to them that perish.

The Christian, then, is not startled at the alleged miracles worked by teachers of superstitious and false religions; their occurrence is to him no temptation to believe in the false, it is a confirmation of his adherence to the true, religion.

But what is the account to be given of the phenomenon we are considering?

It is this, roughly stated: In the first instance, the miracle recommends the teaching; but afterwards the teaching recommends the miracle.

In the first instance, the visible miraculous intervention proves the authority of the teacher, and enforces our acceptance of his teaching whatever he may teach; for he teaches as God's envoy, and God will therefore keep him from teaching error.

But after the Truth has once been taught and established, for the future the orthodoxy of the miracle-worker becomes the test of the character of his miracles; however great and wonderful, however extraordinary his works, if his teaching be contradictory to the teaching already established as Divine, the works are to be ascribed, not to God's intervention, but to that of His enemy, not to God's agency, but to God's permission.

The fact of Christianity is this: By miracles beginning with the very origin of man, and continued in succession down to the present moment, a Divine Revelation has been taught to man. The seeds were sown in primitive and patriarchal times, and their development became more and more complete till the coming of the Messiah. Since the time of the Messiah there has been one uniform teaching of the Creed which He gave to His disciples, and no subsequent definitions of primitive facts have introduced anything contradictory to what had previously been taught. Miracles have thus immediately guaranteed the authority of the Teacher, and mediately proved the Catechism of Christian doctrine. This is the positive and affirmative Truth.

What, then, if men arise at any time with the reputation of the power to work miracles?

The answer is plain: Either such men hold and teach the doctrine

handed down in the way just described from the beginning, and contradict it in no one point, or their teaching is inconsistent with that doctrine. In the former case, in which the doctrine is sound, the alleged miracles may or may not be matters of fact, and done through the intervention of God; whether or not they be matter of fact can only be ascertained by diligently weighing the testimony in their favour; if on the contrary, as in the latter supposed case, the men to whom these miracles are ascribed, and whose authority they are supposed to guarantee, sustain tenets or systems contradictory to the Revelation already established, to the Revelation which has Prescription in its favour; if, that is, measured by the standard of the acknowledged revelation, they teach false dogmas or a corrupt morality, then it will be certain that even though the wonder wrought were really præternatural, it would be done not by the good spirit but by the agency of the spirit of evil, and only permitted by God for the trial of His elect.

Consequently the Catholic Christian is secure. Agreement with Catholic teaching is a necessary condition, the absence of which at once condemns the authority of the Teacher. The presence of such agreement does not of course necessarily prove the reality of the miracle, but its absence does prove that the alleged miracle cannot be the supernatural work of a good spirit.

There have been claimants to supernatural power who have appealed to their miracles in proof of their mission, and who have taught otherwise than the Church. They are impostors; and their wonderful works are either mere deceptions, or they are done through the coöperation of the enemy of God and the human race.

These remarks apply to such pretenders to Divine communications as Montanus, Mahomet, Swedenborg, the Jansenists, and modern Spiritists. They are prejudged and condemned. Their claims become nothing more than difficulties of easy solution urged against the primitive and authentic revelation; for, as miracles in the first instance prove the authority of the Teacher sent from God—otherwise God would not have given us the necessary protection against false teachers—so now the state of things is inverted and the doctrine taught is an infallible touchstone whether the alleged miracle can possibly be the work of God.

ON SOME EVENTS PREPARATORY TO THE ENGLISH REFORMATION.

By H. W. WILBERFORCE, M.A.

THE influence of the political and social events of the fifteenth century in preparing the way for the religious revolutions of the sixteenth, was impressed upon me, in considering some remarks of Lord Macaulay,* parts of which I will read. He says :—

‘The history of the Reformation in England is full of strange problems. The most prominent and most extraordinary phenomenon which it presents to us is the gigantic strength of the Government contrasted with the feebleness of the religious parties. During the twelve or thirteen years which followed the death of Henry VIII. the religion of the State was thrice changed. Protestantism was established by Edward. The Catholic Church was restored by Mary. Protestantism was again established by Elizabeth. The faith of the nation seemed to depend on the personal inclinations of the sovereign. Nor was this all. An established Church was then, as a matter of course, a persecuting Church ; Edward persecuted

* See Essay on Burleigh and his Times.

Catholics, Mary persecuted Protestants, Elizabeth persecuted Catholics again. The father of these three sovereigns had enjoyed the pleasure of persecuting both at once; had sent to death on the same hurdle the heretic who denied the real Presence and the traitor who denied the royal supremacy. There was nothing in England like that fierce and bloody opposition which in France each of the religious factions in its turn offered to the Government. We had neither a Coligny nor a Mayenne, neither a Montcontour nor an Ivry.' * * *

'It is absurd to suppose that if the nation had been decidedly attached to the Protestant faith Mary could have re-established the Papal supremacy. It is equally absurd to suppose that, if the nation had been zealous for the ancient religion, Elizabeth could have restored the Protestant Church. The truth is that the people were not disposed to engage in a struggle, either for the new or the old doctrines. * * In plain words, they did not think the difference between the hostile sects [so he called the Catholic Church and Protestantism] worth a struggle. There was undoubtedly a zealous Protestant party and a zealous Catholic party. But both these parties were, we believe, very small. * *

'We are very far from saying that the English of that generation were irreligious. They held firmly those doctrines which are common to the Catholic and to the Protestant theology. But they had no fixed opinion as to the matters in dispute between the Churches.'

The phenomenon had often before been noticed. What is new is Macaulay's theory in explanation of it; and that is not only new but one which never could have

been thought of till our own times—in which, unhappily, there are multitudes who care nothing for the religious points of difference between the Church and the Protestant sects. Such men are common in nations in which Protestantism has run out its course; in which the fire of fanaticism has blazed till it has consumed the religious character of the people and has then died away into ashes. To suppose a Catholic nation in such a state is little less than a contradiction in terms. In Catholic countries there are too often many irreligious men, but their chief characteristic is hatred to the Catholic Church. The so-called Reformers hated the parts of the Catholic system which they rejected, to say the least, much more than they loved those which they retained. Religious men, on the contrary, in a Catholic country have always been found as zealous for those parts of the Catholic system which Protestants reject as for those which they retain. Neither could anyone suppose that this mixture of general religious earnestness with indifference on these particular questions has ever been a state of mind specially English. The fury of the periodical fits of no-Popery madness, which are a specially English disease, would of itself suffice to prove the contrary. It would seem, then, that the usual action of the national character on this subject must have suspended in the first half of the sixteenth century, by some special cause, which enabled the Tudor monarchs to succeed, in an attempt which none other would have ventured to make.

What, then, was this cause? The common answer is, that the Tudors possessed a degree of absolute power

which no English king before or since has wielded. To this Lord Macaulay replies that theirs was, in fact, 'a popular government under the forms of a despotism,' and ingeniously contrasts it to that of the Cæsars, which was a military despotism under the forms of a republic. Elizabeth had no army. 'There was not a ward in the city, there was not an hundred in any shire in England, which could not have overpowered the handful of armed men who composed her household.' 'If a large body of Englishmen became thoroughly discontented, instead of presenting requisitions, holding large meetings, passing resolutions, signing petitions, forming associations and unions; they rose up; they took their halberds and their bows; and, if the sovereign was not sufficiently popular to find among his subjects other halberds and other bows to oppose the rebels, nothing remained for him but a repetition of the horrible scenes of Berkeley and of Pomfret. He had no regular army, which could, by its superior arms and its superior skill, overawe or vanquish the sturdy commons of his realm, abounding in the native hardihood of Englishmen, and trained in the simple discipline of the militia.'

There is in this answer something that is, and much that is not, true. The idea it presents is that of a nation of warriors like those who followed Clovis into Gaul, each of whom claimed to be equal, and regarded the king as little more than the leader of his peers. Such a state of things could not possibly be maintained in any large kingdom, still less in a large feudal kingdom. The feudal system no doubt was far from throwing into the hands of the king that enormous physical force

which is wielded by the sovereign in the great military monarchies of modern Europe. No feudal king could, like the Czar Nicholas, have set in motion near a million of men by ringing the hand-bell on his writing-table. But quite as little did it leave the force of the nation to be wielded by the nation itself. It was divided among a number of great lords, instead of being concentrated in a single sovereign. Here the contrast with ancient Rome is striking. Rome had its aristocratical party, but its aristocracy differed as much from that of England under the Plantagenets as the position and power of one of the Cæsars differed from that of Henry VIII. A Metellus, a Lentulus, or a Scipio, had great hereditary power; because he represented a family which had a sort of right to all the high offices of the republic; and because the conservative and traditional feeling of the nation (stronger at Rome than in England itself) made all respectable men desire to see him attain them, and especially all members of any family which had claims in any degree similar. He was wealthy too. But the lands from which his wealth was derived were cultivated by slaves, and gave him no political power, except as a million of money in the funds would give it in our own day. The old English noble, on the contrary, was upon his own estates a little king, and exercised an almost kingly authority. He wrote in the kingly style still maintained in our Queen's proclamations. Thus the wife of John Mowbray Duke of Norfolk, under Henry VI., wrote to canvass one of the chief gentry of the county for his vote and interest in a county election. Her letter begins:—

‘To our right trusty and well-beloved John Paston, Esq.’

Then comes, in a single line, the words—

‘The Duchess of Norfolk.’

The letter is without signature. It proceeds:—

‘Right trusty and well-beloved, we greet you heartily well, and forasmuch as it is thought necessary, for divers causes, that my lord have at this time in the Parliament such persons as belong to him and be his menial servants, wherein we conceive your skill and diligence shall be right expedient; we heartily desire and pray you, that at the contemplation of these our letters, as our special trust is in you, ye will give and apply your voice unto our right well-beloved cousin and servants John Howard and Sir Roger Chamberlayne to be knights of the shire; exhorting all such others as by your wisdom shall now be behoveful to the good exploit and conclusion of the same.

‘And in your faithful attendance and true devoir on this part ye shall do unto my lord and us a singular pleasure and cause us hereafter to thank ye therefore, as ye shall hold ye right well content and agreed; with the grace of God, who have you ever in His keeping.

‘Written at Framlingham Castle, the 8th day of June.’

We have many other letters of nobles in the same style. Perhaps no circumstance would seem in our days more remarkable than that the king’s army, even when commanded by himself in person, wore, not the royal livery, but that of the lords to whom each band were retainers, and were paid at his private cost. To

give one instance out of many (from a delightful book with which, doubtless, we are all familiar, 'Doyle's Chronicle of England'), the followers of the Earl of Oxford at the battle of Barnet bore a star, the device of the De Veres. This was mistaken by Warwick's men for the 'sun with rays' (the 'sun of York,' as Shakspeare calls it), the device of Edward IV. They, in consequence, directed their attack upon it, and to this fatal mistake Edward is said to have owed his victory.

It is plain, then, that the physical force of England under the Plantagenets was not really, as Macaulay supposes, any more in the hands of the people at large than in those of the king. It was wielded by a number, comparatively small, of leading nobles. If a few of these resolved upon civil war or rebellion, civil war or rebellion took place. If few or none of them stood by the king, the king was indeed without hope. If they stood by him, he had little to fear from any degree of unpopularity with those whose hands actually wielded the 'halberds and bows.'

We may see a proof of this in the very instances selected by Macaulay himself. Richard II. fell because Bolingbroke (who landed with only fifteen lances) was immediately joined by the powerful Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland with their retainers. His army grew like a snowball as he marched to London; doubtless by the accession not of mere peasants, but of great men and their followers. Such also had been the fall of Edward II. This indeed is plain from the very accusation against both these unfortunate kings.

It was that they had elevated men of humble birth over the old nobles of England. In these days, the political power of such men as Sir Robert Peel or Mr. Gladstone would have been esteemed a grievance.

What most strongly proves that under the Tudors the great nobles had already lost much of their power is, that their military retainers were gradually changing into modern tenants. Still the jealous caution of Henry VII. taught him that even in the actual state of England it was still the only power which the sovereign need fear. Hence the Act which (when the victory of Bosworth Field made him for the time absolutely master of England) he obtained from his first Parliament, forbidding any lord to give his livery to any but his menial servants; and hence his celebrated act of rapacity, recorded by Bacon, when the Earl of Oxford (to whose house the house of Lancaster was more indebted than to any other for the services and sufferings of several generations), having received the king at Henningham Castle, and having drawn up his retainers in his livery to do honour to the royal guest as he left the hospitable roof (Lingard, v. 336), was compelled to pay to the greedy monarch a fine of ten thousand pounds—a sum computed at the almost incredible amount of two hundred thousand of our money.

All through the Tudor reigns, and for some time afterwards, the military tie between the lord and his retainers was rapidly waxing looser and looser. Its last practical action was in the gallant stand made on behalf of Charles I. in his hour of danger, by so many persons of honour, a large proportion of whom had

heartily disapproved and condemned the unlawful exercise of his prerogative during the years of his prosperity. And if reason cannot regret the final disappearance of a system which put it at all times in the power of a few individuals to oppress their weaker neighbours, and even to involve their country in civil war, we must rejoice to see its end so glorious and honourable. The nobles of England at the head of their retainers could not break the iron ranks of Cromwell's disciplined soldiers, but they knew how to die nobly for the cause, to which (whatever else may be said of it) they felt their honour committed.

Two circumstances mark the final extinction of this tie of warlike feudalism, at the exact point at which I have fixed it. The well-known Act of the first Parliament after the restoration of Charles II. abolishing the tenure of lands by military service; and the establishment of a standing army (the most important and pregnant of all the changes in the political system of modern Europe), which began under Cromwell, and was continued by all the kings after him. Together with either of these the old feudal array could not have co-existed.

The strongest proof that the bond of the feudal military system was very far decayed before the Tudor period is the fact that a systematic depopulation, exactly analogous to that which took place in the Highlands in the times of our grandfathers, and to that still going on in Ireland, was in active operation in England, certainly for some time before the accession of Henry VII., and continued all through the Tudor reigns. This fact has been denied, but there are few

connected with these times so easy to prove, if time allowed me to undertake it. It is easily explained. The power of every great man had depended in times past upon the number of his retainers ; it was therefore his direct interest to attract population to his own estates. As they gradually ceased to become a source of strength, they were felt to be burdensome. Beasts of chase gave far more pleasure—sheep and oxen far greater profit. Hence Latimer (himself a peasant's son) complained in a sermon at Paul's Cross, under Edward VI., that sheep devoured more houses and churches than the dragon of Wantley. And hence depopulation is traced by all the writers of these times not to war, but to the process of *emparkment*.

What became of the evicted tenants is a question of painful interest. I believe there is no reason to believe that the town population gained any great increase ; and, unfortunately for the sufferers, emigration from England to America had not begun. But the Tudors felt bound to provide for them in their own way. Hume quotes from Harrison, who wrote under Elizabeth in 1577, an estimate that during the reign of Henry VIII. 72,000 persons were hanged as thieves and rogues (i.e. what we call vagabonds), besides all those executed for more grave offences. Still so many were left, that Rymer gives a proclamation (quoted by Lingard), made in 1595, in which Elizabeth declares that vagabonds were so numerous, that she orders Sir Thomas Wylford to receive from the magistrates the most notorious and incorrigible of these offenders, and 'to execute them upon the gallows, according to the justice of martial

law,'—words, as we all know, of formidable latitude, even in our own day. Whatever may have been the hardships of the evicted tenants of Ireland or the Highlands, the alternative of emigration to America was at least to be preferred to the manner of providing for those of England adopted by Henry and Elizabeth.

It is plain that all the evils of this system must have been multiplied tenfold by the destruction of the religious houses, and the transfer of their lands to men whose object it was to make the most of the rents. But it must be observed that we have the strongest testimonies to it as being in operation far and wide, long before the dissolution. What the dissolution did was to take away the chief alleviation of an evil which existed long before.

I believe no direct evidence exists as to the time when it commenced. Ross the antiquarian, a chantry priest at Guyscliffe, Warwick, proves that in the midland counties at least it had gone very far before the accession of Henry VII. : for he mentions by name, and in minute detail, sixty-five villages within a few miles of Warwick, which had been wholly or in great measure destroyed in his own time, and that not as the result of war, but from the process he calls emparkment. The churches, he says, had in many instances been destroyed. The system no doubt began noiselessly, and went on in this place and that, long before it attracted attention. Probably the demand for men in the continual wars of the fifteenth century both diverted attention from it and prevented its worst effects. There are traces considerably earlier of a commercial relation between land-

lord and tenant, quite alien to the spirit of the feudal system. Thus, for instance, on May 1, 1484, under Edward IV., the Duke of Suffolk had immediate occasion for three pounds thirteen and fourpence, which he had promised to pay 'upon our worship.' He writes, therefore, to Thomas Jeffreys, one of his tenants, to send him the money, binding his auditors to allow it at his next account. This letter he signs with his own hand, adding these words—'*Suffolk—and fail not on pain of losing your farm.*' That so great a man should have been obliged to draw thus urgently upon a tenant for a sum which may have represented some seventy pounds of our money, shows the inconvenience caused by the want of banks. In our days, the duke would have given his cheque. But the threat proves that his connection with his tenant must have been more that of a modern landlord than of a feudal superior.

The end of the depopulation can, I think, be fixed more accurately. Harrison states that the vagabonds executed under Elizabeth were only from 300 to 400 a year, while under Henry VIII. they were 2,000 annually. He complains of this as a laxity in the execution of the law. But I do not believe that her dealings with them were really more tender than her father's. The difference, therefore, seems to mark the diminution of the evicted population for which she had to provide. I believe, in fact, that it was somewhere about the year 1600 that depopulation ceased in England, and that the tendency to an increase of population began which has been in progress ever since.

I have enlarged on this depopulation of the rural

districts, because it so clearly marks the breaking up of the feudal system, and the vast diminution of the power of the great lords. Many other circumstances point in the same direction. Thus when the powerful Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland took up arms against Elizabeth in November 1569, they entered Durham at the head of only sixty armed horsemen. The rising, no doubt, was sudden, and only half prepared. Hotspur, however, a hundred and fifty years before, could at any moment have led to the field a much larger following.

On the whole, we may conclude that under Henry VIII. and his children the nobles had in a very great degree already lost the military power of their order. It is certain also that the mass of the people had not yet gained it. In fact, there was in our earlier history no attempt on their part to appeal to force, except the rising of Cade, and, two generations earlier, that of Wat Tyler, both of which were easily put down. Hence I infer that the Tudor monarchs must have thought without nervous misgivings of Berkeley and Pomfret. Neither was the time come for uneasy thoughts about Carisbrooke Castle and the scaffold before Whitehall.

Still, however diminished was their power, if the nobles had withstood either Henry or Elizabeth with anything like unanimity, they must have given way. But of this there was no chance.

First, as has often been observed, the great houses had been cut off in the Wars of the Roses; and those who held their lands were by no means successors to

their power. They would of course have much less than their own successors a generation or two later, for the existing generation of tenants must have been on the estate before they received it, and would look forward to another change of ownership. A new Tudor noble would hardly have the same hearty following as his descendant in the time of Charles I. As to the old nobles, between the twenty-ninth of Henry VI. and the first of Henry VII., only thirty-four years had elapsed: yet Dugdale shows that in that short interval most of the great houses had been swept away. Of five dukedoms only one remained, and this was held by a man whose father had in the meantime died on the scaffold. Three out of nine earldoms remained, but the former holders of all these had died violent deaths. Among the barons hardly any remained.

And yet, such as they were, the nobles would have been strong enough to hold the hand of Tudor tyranny, if they had been minded like those in whose seats they sat. There were several reasons why they were not so minded.

They were divided in religion, at that time the great cause of discord. That any of them indeed were what we mean now by 'religious Protestants' I am far from imagining. That strange state of mind (the possibility of which foreign Catholics and others, who have not had the opportunity of observing it closely, find it even now difficult to believe) could result only from an education which gave to the new religion all the advantages of a traditional system. But, many houses then powerful owed their greatness to the Abbey lands,

and were otherwise committed to the new system. Many of these must have been on one side, while many great men were undoubtedly on the other. The monarch had therefore the advantage of holding the balance, and keeping both parties in check.

Then (as it has been said), one man with a loaded pistol is a match for a crowd. He can only shoot one; but every man in the crowd feels that that one may be himself. Such would have been the position of any one nobleman who had begun opposition to the Crown, even if he could have been sure that his party was in the end the strongest.

But the main strength of Henry and Elizabeth was, after all, not so much in the military and political as in the moral weakness of their nobles. Upon them, I think I have shown, ought to be laid the disgrace of that submission to every religious whim of every successive tyrant, which Macaulay unjustly lays upon the nation. That even they deliberately believed (as he imagines) that the questions in dispute between Catholics and Protestants were unimportant, I do not suppose. But what the Earl of Pembroke boasted—that during every successive revolution he had retained life, dignities, and property, because he had been the willow, not the oak—seems to have been true of the class. How it came that during a generation or more the nobles of England were thus willowlike in soul: this is precisely the question, for the answer to which we must look to the events of the fifteenth century.

It had been a century of revolutions, and men bred up amid long-continued and often-repeated revolutions

have always had this character. This fact none was more bound to remember than Macaulay, for none has more strongly expressed it. Take one passage out of several :—

A period of revolutions 'is eminently favourable to the growth of quick and active talents. It forms a class of men shrewd, vigilant, inventive; of men whose dexterity triumphs over the most perplexing combinations of circumstances; whose presaging intellect no sign of the times can elude. But it is an unpropitious season for the firm and masculine virtues. The statesman who enters on his career at such a time can form no permanent connexions, can make no accurate observations on the higher parts of political science. Before he can attach himself to a party it is scattered. Before he can study the nature of a government it is overturned. The oath of abjuration comes close upon the oath of allegiance. The association which was subscribed yesterday is burned by the hangman to-day. In the midst of the constant eddy and change, self-preservation becomes the first object of the adventurer. It is a task too hard for the strongest head, to keep itself from becoming giddy in the eternal whirl. Public spirit is out of the question. A laxity of principle, without which no public man can be eminent or even safe, becomes too common to be scandalous, and the whole nation looks coolly on instances of apostasy which would startle the foulest turncoat of more settled times.'*

In another place, he contrasts the character of the

* Essay on Hallam's Constitutional History.

‘men who produce revolutions,’ with that of ‘the men whom revolutions produce’—the first distinguished for ‘fixedness of purpose, intensity of will, enthusiasm, which is not less fierce and persevering because it is sometimes disguised under the semblance of composure, and which bears down before it the force of circumstances and the opposition of reluctant minds.’ The other class, ‘by a peculiar levity, a peculiar inconstancy, an easy apathetic way of looking at the most solemn questions; a willingness to leave the direction of their course to fortune and popular opinion; a notion that one public cause is nearly as good as another; and a firm conviction that it is better to be the hireling of the worst cause, than to be a martyr to the best.’*

This is his estimate of the statesmen under Charles II., and, on the whole, it is correct. He attributes it to their having lived at a period when ‘inconsistency was so universal that it had necessarily ceased to be a disgrace; and when a man was no more taunted with it than he is taunted with being black at Timbuctoo.’ But, if we compare the Great Rebellion and the events which led to the Restoration with the fierce and sudden revolutions common in the fifteenth century, we shall be inclined to regard them as mild and constitutional party-struggles and changes of administration, hardly affecting more than the surface of society.

If we would trace those fierce revolutions to their origin, we must go back at least to the beginning of the horrible French wars. Their bad effect upon the lower

* Essay on Sir William Temple.

and middle classes was probably confined pretty nearly to the excitement of national pride. But in men of the higher class, they must have fostered an insatiable personal ambition and cupidity which but too well prepared them for the civil war which followed; and in which, as far as one can now judge, there really was, on either side, little or nothing of the high loyalty of the cavalier, or even of the enthusiasm of the round-head in our later civil wars. In the wars of York and Lancaster, almost every nobleman wavered from side to side, like men influenced merely by caprice or by their immediate interest.

In one thing it is impossible not to trace the righteous judgment of God. The Royal House of the Plantagenets, and the great families which were alike almost extinguished by the civil war, were the guilty parties in those shameful glories by which France had just before been so savagely devastated; and, to some extent, in the murder of the saintly heroine whom God raised up to deliver her. But upon this earlier part of the subject time forbids me to enter.

Let us begin then with the civil wars—that is, from the year 1452. The Duke of York—the heir presumptive—takes up arms to remove his enemies from power. He submits without fighting, and is committed to custody. His son, a mere boy, marches to the rescue with an army: and finally he is released uninjured.

Then comes the king's first illness. York (just before a prisoner in very considerable danger of losing his head) is Regent for nine months. Then the king's recovery puts an end to his power.

Next year he is again in arms. A battle is fought at St. Alban's, in which the king's chief ministers (and very few besides them) are killed. The king is wounded, and taken prisoner. York is again in power.

The king again falls ill. York is again Regent till his recovery. Soon after that it is again war. This time the Yorkists are beaten. The late Regent takes refuge in Ireland, and is attainted by Parliament.

War again. The Yorkists prevail, the king is a prisoner, a new Parliament reverses all the acts of the last. Eight years have now passed since York first took up arms; he claims the throne, and a compromise follows, by which he and his descendants are to succeed on the king's death, to the exclusion of the Prince of Wales.

War at once breaks out. York and his younger son are killed, and Henry falls into the hands of his friends. Three or four more battles follow. Then York's eldest son, aged only nineteen, is proclaimed king, and the bloody battle of Towton establishes him on the throne. Henry is a fugitive in Scotland.

In less than a year, war again. Henry is taken prisoner, and imprisoned in the Tower.

War again. Edward IV. is made prisoner by Warwick, to whom he chiefly owed his crown, and by his own brother. There were now two kings of England, and both of them prisoners. After a while Edward is set at liberty by his captors.

War again. Again it is Warwick and Clarence against Edward. He flies to the continent, and Henry is restored by those who had kept him for ten years out of his throne.

Half a year later Edward returns. War again; and he is again king, and Henry again a prisoner. Warwick is killed at Barnet. Two months later the hopes of the Lancasterians are at the highest, when they suddenly lose all at the decisive battle of Tewkesbury. (May 4, 1471.)

The war has now lasted, off and on, twenty-nine years since the first appeal to arms, twenty-six since the battle of St. Alban's.

England during these years had been a volcano; active eruptions had been frequent, and even between them (as in the four years and a half between St. Alban's and Bloreheath) there had been no real rest. It was perpetually interrupted by the rumblings of internal commotion, and rumours of immediate war. Still more was this the case between the beginning of the reign of Edward IV. and the battle of Tewkesbury, a space of ten years, hardly any of which were wholly without war.

The next actual fighting was twelve years later, when Buckingham, Dorset, the Courtneys, &c. rose against Richard III. This failed. But the battle of Bosworth, the death of Richard, and the accession of Henry VII. were only twenty months later. Henry's reign was twice broken by civil war, through the rising first of Lord Lovel, next of the Earl of Lincoln, who had been declared by Richard III. heir to the crown. The battle of Stoke, at which Lincoln fell, is commonly called the last battle of the wars of the Roses. They had then lasted thirty-five years.

Such a series of revolutions so long continued can hardly be matched in history, and yet the statement I have made gives no idea of the state of affairs as it must

have appeared to contemporaries. I would shortly observe:—

I. The perpetual ebb and flow of success. Time after time a king of one or other party obtains power; keeps it just long enough to call a parliament of his own adherents, and then falls.

II. The destruction of the nobility. It was the deliberate policy of Warwick—the great leader on the side of York—to cut off the chiefs of the opposite faction, sparing the common men. To the chiefs therefore the war was fatal from the very beginning.

III. The atrocity of the war increased continually as both parties became more and more embittered, and more desperate of obtaining mercy. In the earlier years (let it be said for the honour of our country) a moderation was shown, hardly equalled, as far as I remember, in civil war, in any nation, ancient or modern. When York first took up arms, although committed to prison, he was released merely on renewing his oath of allegiance. This may have resulted from the personal character of Henry VI. But the Yorkists shed no blood and passed no single attainder after their first victory at St. Alban's. Four years later, when they in turn were entirely broken, no one was executed. The first instance of brutal violence seems to have been after the Battle of Wakefield, when the head of York, crowned in derision, was set over the gate of the city whence he drew his title; after he and young Rutland, his son (aged only seventeen), had been killed (it is said in cold blood), as was the Earl of Salisbury the next day. This outrage is imputed to the rage of Lord Clifford at the death of

his father at St. Alban's. Others (as Shakspeare) make the queen equally guilty. Be this as it may, that day was the beginning of horrors. Thenceforth the Yorkists at least seem to have shrunk from no slaughter. The Lancasterians, when they regained power ten years later, contented themselves with a single execution (that of the Earl of Worcester, who was accused of special acts of gratuitous cruelty). The atrocity of the Yorkists seems to have been owing to the personal character of Edward IV. and his brothers. For Richard no one now says anything. It may be doubted whether Clarence was any better. Edward was a fit grandfather to Henry VIII., who was heir of his varied talents, his firm will, his unbridled lust, and his unsparing cruelty. At the Battle of Towton, when he was only nineteen years old, he gave special orders that no quarter should be given, even to the common soldiers. This was a new thing in the civil wars of England. The battle began, in a heavy fall of snow, at 9 a.m., on Palm Sunday. All through the night, the fight or at least the slaughter, went on, until the afternoon of Monday in the Holy Week. Young Edward wrote next day to his mother, a widow only three months before (we have the account from one who saw his letter), that twenty thousand of the Lancasterians were slain. This may well have been true. It does not depend on vague calculations, like those of the annalists, who habitually and grossly exaggerate numbers. The dead (of both parties) were actually counted by the heralds. The great men who fell are summed, by an account written the next day (in which, as was to be

expected, there were mistakes), as Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland; Thomas Courtney, Earl of Devonshire (beheaded after the battle); William Beaumont, V. Beaumont; John Clifford, Lord Clifford; John Neville, Lord Neville; the Lord Dacre; Lord Henry Stafford of Buckingham; Lionel Welles, Lord Welles; Anthony Rivers, Lord Scales; Richard Welles, Lord Willoughby; Sir Ralph Bigot, Lord de Malley; Sir Ralph Grey; Sir Richard Jenny; Sir Harry Bellingham; Sir Anthony Trollop, with 28,000 more. 'Here was a goodly fellowship of death' in one day (*Paston Letters*, ii. 120). The loss of the English and Hanoverian troops at Waterloo (described by the Duke of Wellington as *immense*) was returned next day by him as, killed, 2,432; wounded, 9,528, out of above 40,000.

At last, after the Battle of Tewkesbury, the Yorkists despised even the right of sanctuary, and the Duke of Somerset, and the Prior of St. John of Jerusalem, with thirteen knights and esquires, were dragged from the church and butchered in cold blood.

And yet no account of the actual battles gives any just idea of the revolutionary character of the times; for when no war was going on, revolutions never ceased, or at least were always expected. Thus, after the Battle of Tewkesbury there was no battle for twelve years; yet all through those years, all men felt that the government might any day fall, and be succeeded by its downtrodden enemies. And these expectations of change were repeatedly fulfilled. Thus, take the year 1483. Its first quarter passed over Edward IV. in the height of his prosperity and wildest pursuit of pleasure.

Numerous as had been the scenes of blood through which he had passed, he was only forty-one. He was then preparing for the invasion of France, and doubtless anticipating years of glory and power. In talents and experience, Europe probably had then no general who was his rival. He had commanded in many desperate fields, and never on any occasion had led his troops except to a decisive victory. On April 9 he died, after a few days' illness. His son, aged twelve years, was proclaimed; and the Duke of Gloucester, the next heir to the throne, swore allegiance, and marched reverently before him into London, 'cap in hand.' Yet on the 24th of the same month the young king's mother took sanctuary at Westminster; June 18 Lord Hastings, Edward's favourite, and the queen's nearest relations were beheaded without trial; June 26 Gloucester was king, chiefly by the open and unscrupulous management of the Duke of Buckingham. In August Edward V. and his brother were murdered. In September and October Buckingham himself and other lords were in arms against Richard, and his overthrow seemed likely. Before Nov. 2 Buckingham had been taken prisoner and had lost his head. A courtier who managed to trim his boat through that half year must have been dexterous; he was hardly likely to be inflexible.

Then, again, though Stoke is called the end of the Wars of the Roses, it is certain that for years afterwards a revolution was always impending. The very fact that the reigning king was wholly without hereditary right, and had gained his throne merely by the sword, was of itself the strongest conceivable encouragement to all

pretenders. Hence the perpetual plots and rumours of wars, against which all his wary cunning hardly sufficed to protect him; and hence the temptation to that foul crime (the thought of which pressed upon the heart of Katharine of Arragon, who felt herself its involuntary cause,) when he cemented his tottering throne by the innocent blood of young Warwick. Well might this successful adventurer have said, like his predecessor—

‘ Heaven knows, my son,
By what bypaths and indirect crooked ways
I met this crown. And I myself well know
How troublesome it sat upon my head ;
To thee it shall descend with better quiet,
Better opinion, better confirmation.’

There is no period of our history for which we have less contemporary authority than for this. What we have suffices to prove that men were always expecting some sudden change, and preparing to secure their own fortunes by recommending themselves to a new king and government. Thus we find in the ‘ Paston Letters ’ a letter written by Sir John Paston to his mother, just after the Yorkist victory at Barnet, to beg her to prevent a cousin of his own from taking too decidedly the Yorkist side. He says, in somewhat crabbed but intelligible terms: ‘ I beseech you, on my behalf to advise him to be well ware of his dealings and language as yet, for the world, I assure you, is right queasy, as ye shall know with this month. The people here fear it sore. God hath showed Himself marvelously like Him that made all, and can undo again when He list, and I can think that by all likelihood shall show Himself as marvellous again, and that in

short time. And as I suppose oftener than once in cases like.' . . . 'All this bill (i.e. letter) must be secret. Be ye not adoubted of the world (i.e. take care not to be suspected). I trust all shall be well. If it thus continue I am not all undone, nor none of us. And if otherwise, then, &c., &c.' One would wish the worthy editor had given this important letter in full, instead of ending with these tantalizing &c., &c. But what we have proves acknowledged hedging; and the same correspondence contains many similar hints. At a later period we find the writer hoping to make his fortune by marrying one of the near relations of Edward IV.'s queen. Perhaps he might have succeeded, but the sweating sickness seems to have put a sudden end to his ambitious hopes.

The modern history of England is held to begin with Henry VII.; all before being 'the middle ages.' The division is convenient enough. But we must not suppose (like some geologists in explaining the ancient physical changes of our globe) that the old race of men was swept away, and a new one created. Then as now, 'the child was father to the man.' Contemporaries did not suspect that they were living at the end of one epoch and the beginning of another. The events of each generation were the natural (I do not mean the inevitable) result of those which went before. It is therefore practically important to remember that Luther was born in that same year of revolutions in which Edward IV. died, and in which his sons were murdered. When Richard fell at Bosworth Field the tongue which lured so many to their ruin was framing its

first connected sounds, and his fond mother probably was convinced that he was showing talents and excellences such as the world had never before known. When Henry VIII. became king, every man of thirty must have remembered something of the civil war, and his parents must have lived through the whole of it. The Earl of Oxford, one of the few active leaders who survived the war, was still living. The Earl of Surrey, who fought for Richard at Bosworth, was born some time before the beginning of the civil wars, and died just before Henry's first divorce. When that divorce was first agitated, any man of seventy (that is, much younger than our present Premier) had been born in the very year in which the first blood was shed, was six years old when Edward IV. was declared king, and sixteen when Henry VI. was murdered in the Tower, and his son, Prince Edward, at Tewkesbury. Such a man must have been full of all the peculiar prudence inspired by periods of revolution. He would never have risked anything, we may be pretty sure, upon the stability of the fortunes of any sovereign or any dynasty. When Elizabeth ascended the throne, the Wars of the Roses were of course much more distant. They were, in fact, about as distant as the wars caused by the French Revolution are now; and her subjects must have heard from their parents enough of civil war to make them resolved, at all sacrifice, to avoid the least risk of it; as we find to be the case with all persons so educated in our own and other countries. But in addition to this, Elizabeth's subjects had been taught by another course of events,

the passing and transitory character not of revolutions only, but most especially of religious revolutions.

To judge from Macaulay's language, one would suppose that the choice between the Catholic religion and Protestantism had been put before them, and that they had come to the deliberate conclusion, that while either of the two was excellent, there was no great difference between them. He says—

‘The English of that generation firmly held those doctrines which are common to the Catholic and the Protestant theology. But they had no fixed opinion as to the matters in dispute between the churches.’ ‘The English people did not think the difference between the hostile sects worth a struggle.’

It is certain and notorious to all the world except a handful of people whose theory compels them to ignore it, that as a matter of fact Henry and Elizabeth founded a new sect, which, while imitating the Catholic Church in many respects, has always been her bitterest enemy, and when possible her persecutor. And it is therefore natural to assume, as Lord Macaulay does, that all who shared or consented to their acts, at least acquiesced in its formation. In truth, however, nothing could have been farther from the intention or wishes of those monarchs, or from the expectations of their subjects. They loudly repudiated the idea. A writer in their days who had dared, with Lord Macaulay, to contrast their Church and the Catholic Church as two ‘sects’ differing in doctrine, would have run an awkward risk of being either burned as a heretic or hanged as a traitor. There is no reason to question the sincerity of these

disclaimers, for what they professed to wish would have answered their purpose ten times better than the founding of any new sect. They wished that the Church of England should still remain in full communion with the Catholic Church, but that the Catholic Church itself should just so far modify its principles as to allow the English monarch to exercise the supreme spiritual authority in his own dominions. They could not bring themselves to doubt that the Holy Father (when he found that he could do no better) would concede as much as that, in order to retain in the Catholic Church so noble a nation as England, and so great a monarch as her king. And on this one condition they were content to forbid, under the most extreme penalties, the departure of any of their subjects from the Catholic Church ; nay, they would have left to the Holy Father himself the post of the highest honour, and very considerable authority. All that they demanded was a slight departure from the Divine law, in order to make a firm friend of a prince whom the Pope had no means of resisting. They expected that the quarrel would soon be made up, and that then all would go on smoothly. So far as they ever connected themselves with Protestants, it was only as politicians are wont to make a temporary coalition with a party which they hate, to gain support against a party which they fear. Indeed, wicked as they were, we may well doubt whether either of them (and especially Henry) would not have shrunk with unaffected horror from the guilt of founding a Protestant sect, such as we know it to be, if it had been possible for him to foresee what sort of thing it is.

But be this as it may. After all, the question is not about the monarchs, but the nation. Did their subjects consider that they had to choose between the old religion and a new one; between what Macaulay calls 'the two sects' or 'the two Churches?'

Assuredly not. It must be remembered that the kings of England had so often been in dispute with the Holy See, that such a state of things had almost come to be considered their normal condition. Many of these disputes had been pushed to terrible lengths. Yet none had ever issued in the setting up a new religion or a new Church. I cannot doubt that the great mass of Englishmen under Henry and Elizabeth regarded the series of events, which are commonly grouped together under the name of 'the Reformation,' as merely one such quarrel more. In its course, many of them had gained a great deal of wealth and rank in this world, and they hoped to see it made up on such terms as would enable them to keep these without losing the next. Those who were more religious, regarding it in the same light, saw it to be a grievous evil; but many, even of them, doubtless thought that they might wait awhile, and the evil would cure itself, without their suffering martyrdom merely in an unavailing protest against it.

And while they were in this state of mind, they heard read in ten thousand churches the royal declarations, by which the monarch encouraged these hopes by indignantly disavowing all idea of founding a new Church or favouring new doctrines. Such, for instance, was Elizabeth's famous declaration: 'Her

Majesty neither doth nor ever will challenge any other authority than that was challenged and lately used by the noble kings of famous memory, King Henry VIII. and King Edward VI., and *which is and was of ancient time due to the imperial crown of this realm*, that is, under God, to have the sovereignty and rule over all manner of persons born within these her realms, dominions, and countries, of what estate (whether ecclesiastical or temporal) soever they be, so as no other foreign person shall or ought to have authority over them' (*Lingard*, vii. 377).

The insular pride, which long before that had been the proverbial characteristic of our country, would only too much incline every Englishman to maintain against any 'foreign' authority the independence of England and the 'Imperial dignity of its crown,' a term which had in those days a definite meaning, and claimed for it something quite different from that of any other European sovereign except the emperor.

It was, moreover, an age in which there was a general cry for the reform of those abuses which had accumulated in the course of the middle ages, in which, from almost incessant war and many other causes, communication with the centre of unity had been in the highest degree difficult, and society very rough. Hence Müller's remark, that 'The Reformation was at first a reaction, not so much against Catholicism as against its mediæval mode.' The Supreme Pontiffs, as we all know, specially commended this reform to the holy Council of Trent. The council itself made it a chief object of its decrees; and the

Bull of Confirmation declares it to have been held, among other causes, ‘*ad corrigendos mores, et restituendam ecclesiasticam disciplinam;*’ unhappily, however, such a cry, however reasonable, exposes to great spiritual dangers all who join to swell it. It sets men thinking, each for himself, what reforms are needed, and produces a general spirit of unsettlement and presumption. At such a time the pretence of the monarchs, both in Germany and in England, that they desired only to remove abuses, not to change religion or to usurp the rights of the Church, doubtless long imposed upon many well-meaning people. Moreover, what was really taking place could not be known then as it would be now. The want of means for transmitting either letters or news, and the absence of pamphlets, reviews, newspapers, and the rarity even of books, would prevent the real state of the controversy from becoming known to the country in general except very slowly and very imperfectly.

These things considered, I cannot doubt that, whatever may have been the case with the monarchs, the mass of the nobles and people, and still more the clergy, under Henry and Elizabeth were as much duped and deceived as they were frightened into submission to what they regarded as nothing more than the extreme and violent temporary measures of a monarch, arbitrary by temper, and absolute owing to accidental circumstances. Temporary measures—for under both, but especially under Henry, it is plain that the quarrel was considered even by the monarch as only temporary. Thus, for instance, instead of obtain-

ing an Act to abolish Peter's pence, he obtained one enabling him to forbid the payment when he saw fit. This was intended as a threat, by which he hoped to obtain the acquiescence of the Supreme Pontiff in his lawless desires, not as the permanent introduction of a new system.

Under Elizabeth there were still stronger reasons for regarding the evil as temporary. Men still living had seen how quickly Henry's system had already been altered by the nobles who governed in the name of his son; and how theirs again had in a moment fallen before Mary. Elizabeth's next heir was a Catholic. She was herself proposing to marry a Catholic. Her system was obviously only temporary; and, as a temporary tyranny, it was submitted to with a shrug by thousands who sorely disliked it.

This is obviously the explanation of the allegation of Protestant controversialists (so far as it is true) that Catholics attended the churches of the Establishment for the first ten years of Elizabeth.

Surely, when seriously considered, the conduct of those who conformed in the confidence that Elizabeth's measures would prove, like those of her father, a mere transitory evil, carries an awful warning against the folly of small and temporary sacrifices of duty and principle, in the hope that the line of duty and right may soon become easier. For Providence, which had allowed only six years to her brother, and five to her sister, permitted the reign of Elizabeth to last five-and-forty years. The long continuance of peace, the vast increase of temporal prosperity, and still more the

attempted invasion of Philip II., gradually caused her and her system of government to be identified with the well-being, independence, and freedom of England, and earned for her a popularity which became a national sentiment, and which has not even yet been wholly forgotten. When she died, a generation and a half had been born and trained, had lived and died, under her system; and, to those who survived her, it already bore the sacredness of a tradition learned at their mothers' knees.

But, if it were only thus that a Catholic nation could become Protestant, by means of a very peculiar combination of force and fraud which could be brought to bear only at a certain epoch, and even then only in certain nations, we see a reason for what we all instinctively feel; that, whatever evils may be feared for other nations at other periods (as, *e.g.*, for Italy in our own day), there is no reason to fear the spread of Protestantism. A Catholic nation which should now become Protestant, would really do what Macaulay imagines to have been done by our fathers. For Protestantism is now a formed schism and heresy, and can approach no other nation as it did the English, holding out the olive-branch with assurances of its desire to maintain inviolate the Catholic religion. Now, men really have to choose between the two. The enemy is too wise to employ the same device in widely-different ages and different countries. He has for our day one which may be as dangerous, but cannot be the same.

Macaulay appeals, in confirmation of his views, to the drama of Elizabeth's reign. He says:—'The greatest

and most popular dramatists of the Elizabethan age treat religious subjects in a very remarkable manner. They speak respectfully of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. But they speak neither like Catholics nor like Protestants, but like persons who are wavering between the two systems, and who have made a system for themselves out of parts selected from both.* They seem to hold some of the Romish rites and doctrines in high respect. They treat the vow of celibacy, for example (so tempting, and in later times so common a subject of ribaldry), with mysterious reverence. Almost every member of a religious order whom they introduce is a holy and venerable man.' Then, after several other examples—'The partiality of Shakspeare for Monks is well known. In *Hamlet*, the Ghost complains that he died without extreme unction; and, in defiance of the article which condemns the doctrine of Purgatory, declares that he is

' Confined to fast in fires
Till the foul crimes, done in his days of nature,
Are burned and purged away.'

These lines, we suspect, would have raised a tremendous storm in the theatre at any time during the reign of Charles II. They were clearly not written by a zealous Protestant, nor for zealous Protestants. Yet the author of *King John* and *Henry VIII.* was assuredly no friend to papal supremacy.'

Let these last words pass. How well the rest agrees with the facts, as I have stated them, it needs no words to prove.

But, alas! no need to have waited till the time of

Charles II. to see the corruption of the national taste. In the fifteenth year of James I. the chaplain to a Catholic ambassador in London wrote hence:—‘The English deride our religion as detestable and superstitious, and never represent any theatrical piece, not even a satirical tragi-comedy, without larding it with the vices and iniquities of some Catholic churchman—which move them to much laughter and mockery, to their own satisfaction and to the regret of the pious spectator. As an instance, I may mention that on one occasion my colleagues of the Embassy witnessed the performance of a play, in which a Franciscan friar figured. He was represented cunning and full of impiety of various shades, including avarice and lust; and then the whole was made to end in a tragedy, for they beheaded him on the stage.

‘Another time the players represented the pomp of a cardinal in his identical robes of state, very handsome and costly, and accompanied by his retinue, with an altar raised on the stage, where he pretended to perform the sacred rites, ordering a procession; and then they produced him again before the public with a concubine in his arms. He played the part of administering poison to his sister, for a point of honour; and, moreover, of going into battle, having first solemnly deposited his cardinal’s robes on the altar, by the hands of his chaplains. Last of all he caused himself to be girded with a sword, putting on his scarf with the best possible grace.’*

* *Report upon the Documents in the Archives and Public Libraries of Venice.* By Thomas Duffus Hardy, 1865, p. 6.

This vile change in the tone of the public mind was brought about in the course of two generations, because men, instead of boldly meeting the evil of their own day, yielded to it as something merely temporary, which was to be deplored, but could not be resisted.

How different would have been the results, if the mass of those who sincerely held and loved the Catholic faith, whether among nobles, people, or even clergy, had not deemed it prudent to meet a transient storm in the attitude of the willow rather than that of the oak! How it came that a whole generation of Englishmen gave way to a prudence so ignominious and so rash I have attempted to show. But it is not to be forgotten, that however they were deceived, they would still have been safe, if they had not consented for a time to things which (little as they knew of their real nature) they knew to be wrong and uncatholic. How much wiser they who, like Fisher and More, were content to meet even a temporary storm as became Christians and Catholics, leaving it to God to settle how long He would permit it to rage!

ON THE INSPIRATION OF SCRIPTURE.

BY THE MOST REV. ARCHBISHOP MANNING, D.D.

THE two divine truths which reign, and will reign for ever over the whole kingdom of faith and of theology, are the infallibility of the Church, and the inspiration of the Scripture; or, in other words, the relation of the Holy Spirit of God to the Word of God written and unwritten.

These two divine truths, when contemplated as doctrines—or rather these two divine facts, when contemplated in the supernatural order of grace—have had, like other dogmas, their successive periods of simple affirmation and simple belief—incipient controversy and partial analysis—and will probably have their formal contradiction, their last analysis, and their final scientific definition.

The history of the infallibility of the Church and of the inspiration of Holy Scripture will then be written like as the history of the Immaculate Conception which has now been closed by the dogmatic Bull of Pius IX.

It is far from my thoughts to pretend to give here the history of so great and delicate a doctrine as

Inspiration, but it may not be unseasonable to trace a slight outline of a subject which has now fixed upon itself an anxious attention in our country at this time. The Protestant Reformation staked its existence upon the Bible ; and as Protestants have extensively denied or undermined its inspiration, no other subject can be so vital to their religion, or more opportune for us.

The Church of England has lately been thrown into much excitement, and public opinion has been not a little scandalised, by the appearance of works denying in great part the inspiration of Holy Scripture. And yet there is nothing new in the rise of such errors. Error has its periodic times. What is passing now has returned in every century, almost in every generation. It is not new to the Catholic Church to have to combat with the depravers of Holy Writ ; for there has been a line and succession of gainsayers who have denied the Divine veracity and authenticity, either in whole or in part, of the written Word of God. Even in the lifetime of S. John, the Cerinthians rejected all the New Testament except the Gospel of S. Matthew and the Book of Acts. In the second century, the Carpocratians rejected the whole of the Old Testament ; Marcion and Cerdon denounced it as the fabrication of an evil deity, and acknowledged only the Gospel of S. Luke and the Epistles to Timothy and Titus. In the third century the Archontici rejected the Old Testament ; the Apellitæ, the Severiani, and the Eucharitæ rejected most of the Old Testament and of the New. In the fourth, the Alogi, the Gnostics, and the Manichæans rejected the greater part both of the Jewish

and of the Christian Scriptures. Faustus the Manichæan, and others, against whom S. Ambrose and S. Augustine wrote in the fourth and fifth centuries, accused the Old Testament of immorality, contradiction, and intrinsic incredibility, as others have done since. The Apocryphi received only the Prophets and Apostles. In the eighth century, the Albanenses, Bajolenses, Concordenses—names known only to students—repeated the errors of Marcion. Herman Rissuich, in the fifteenth century, rejected the whole of Scripture as imperfect and useless: David Georgius revived this impiety in the sixteenth century. Luther and his followers rejected the Epistle of S. James, the Hebrews, the third of S. John, the second of S. Peter, and the Apocalypse. The Libertini held all the Scriptures to be fables. The Ambrosians, claiming for themselves divine revelations, despised both the Old Testament and the New. This brings us to the seventeenth century, in which modern infidelity began to appear, and the Rationalistic criticism to arise. In the eighteenth and the present century there is no book of the Old or New Testament which has not been rejected by some among the Rationalistic or Neologian critics of Germany. The author to whom the modern errors on the subject of Inspiration may be ascribed is Spinoza. He first reduced to a complete statement all the objections which can be brought against it. He was the father of the sceptical criticism which in the seventeenth century inundated Holland and Germany, and found its way over into England. It is a remarkable fact that Schleiermacher, whose writings have ex-

tensively propagated the Rationalistic movement both in Germany and in England, sacrificed a lock of his hair as a token of pious veneration on the grave of Spinoza.* After Spinoza, Le Clerc, in 1685, published his letters entitled 'Sentiments de quelques Théologiens de Hollande,' which excited a great sensation, especially in England. They were a mere reflection of Spinoza.

It is, therefore, no new thing in the history of the Church, nor, indeed, in the history of England since the Reformation. From the Deistical writers down to Thomas Paine, there has never wanted a succession of critics and objectors who have assailed the extrinsic or intrinsic authority of Holy Scripture.

So far it is no new thing. But in one aspect, indeed, it is altogether new. It is new to find this form of scepticism put forth by writers of eminence for dignity and personal excellence, and mental cultivation, in the Church of England; by men, too, who still profess not only a faith in Christianity, but fidelity to the Anglican Church. Hitherto these forms of sceptical unbelief have worked outside the Church of England, and in hostility against it. Now they are within, and professing to be of it and to serve it. Unpalatable as the truth may be, it is certain that a Rationalistic school imported from Germany has established itself within the Church of England; that its writers are highly respectable and cultivated men, and that though they may be few, yet the influence of their opinions is already widely spread, and that a very general sympathy with them already extends itself among the laity

* Lee on *Inspiration*, App. C. p. 450.

of the Anglican Church. This is certainly a phenomenon altogether new.

Before entering upon the subject of this chapter, it would seem, therefore, to be seasonable to examine briefly the present state of the subject of Inspiration in the Church of England, and contrast with it the teaching of the Catholic Church upon this point.

And first, as to the doctrine of the Church of England on Inspiration, it is to be remembered that though the Canon of Scripture was altered by the Anglican Reformation, the Subject of Inspiration was hardly discussed. The traditional teaching of the Catholic Theology, with its various opinions, were therefore passively retained. The earlier writers, such as Hooker, repeat the traditional formulas respecting the inspiration and veracity of Holy Scripture. Hooker's words are, 'He (that is, God) so employed them (the Prophets) in this heavenly work, that they neither spake nor wrote a word of their own, but uttered syllable by syllable as the Spirit put it into their mouths.'* Such was more or less the tone of the chief Anglican writers for a century after the Reformation.

Perhaps the best example of the Anglican teaching on the subject will be found in Whitby's general Preface to his 'Paraphrase of the Gospels.' His opinion is as follows. He begins by adopting the distinction of the Jewish Church between the 'Prophets' and the 'Chetubin,' or holy writers, and therefore between the 'inspiration of suggestion' and the 'inspiration of direction.'

* *Works*, vol. iii. p. 62. Ed. Keble.

He then lays down—

1. First, that where there was no antecedent knowledge of the matter to be written, an inspiration of suggestion was vouchsafed to the Apostles; but that where such knowledge did antecedently exist, there was only an inspiration exciting them to write such matters, and directing them in the writing so as to preclude all error.

2. Secondly, that in writing those things which were not antecedently known to them, either by natural reason including education, or previous revelation—*e. g.* the Incarnation, the vocation of the Gentiles, the apostacy of the latter times, the prophecies of the Apocalypse,—they had an immediate suggestion of the Holy Spirit.

3. Thirdly, that in all other matters they were directed so as to preclude error, and to confirm the truth whether by illumination in the meaning of the previous revelation, or by reasoning.

4. Fourthly, that in the historical parts of the New Testament they were directed in all that is necessary to the truth of the facts related, but not as to the order or accessories of such events, unless these things affected the truth of the facts.

5. Fifthly, that in relating the words or discourses of our Lord and of others, they were directed so as to preclude all error as to the substance, but not so as to reproduce the words.

6. Lastly, that the inspiration or divine assistance of the sacred writers was such as 'will assure us of the truth of what they write, whether by inspiration

of suggestion, or direction only; but not such as would imply that their very words were dictated, or their phrases suggested to them, by the Holy Ghost.*

In Bishop Burnet may be seen a somewhat less explicit tone. He says, 'The laying down a scheme that asserts an immediate inspiration, which goes to the style, and to every tittle, and that denies any error to have crept *into any of the copies*, as it seems on the one hand to raise the honour of Scripture very highly, so it lies open on the other hand to great difficulties, which seem insuperable on that hypothesis.' †

Such was the current teaching of the most respectable class of Anglican divines, men of true learning and of sound judgment, in the best century of the Church of England. But I need quote no more. Let us now examine one or two of the modern opinions on the same subject.

A member of the University of Oxford writes as follows:—'The Bible is none other than the voice of Him that sitteth upon the throne. Every book of it, every chapter of it, every verse of it, every word of it, every syllable of it, every letter of it, is the direct utterance of the Most High.' ‡ A member of Trinity College, Dublin, writes as follows:—'The opinion that the subject-matter alone of the Bible proceeded from the Holy Spirit, while its language was left to

* Whitby's *Paraphrase*, Gen. Pref. p. 5-7. Ed. London, 1844.

† Burnet, *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 117. Ed. Oxford.

‡ Burgon, *Inspiration and Interpretation of Holy Scripture*, p. 89, quoted by Dr. Colenso, part i. p. 6.

the unaided choice of the various writers, amounts to that fantastic notion which is the grand fallacy of many theories of Inspiration; namely, that two different spiritual agencies were in operation, one of which produced the phraseology in its outward form, while the other created within the soul the conceptions and thoughts of which such phraseology was the expression. The Holy Spirit, on the contrary, as the productive *principle*, embraces the entire activity of those whom He inspires, rendering their language the Word of God. The entire substance and form of Scripture, whether resulting from revelation or natural knowledge, are thus blended together into one harmonious whole.* Once more. Dr. Arnold writes as follows:—‘An inspired work is supposed to mean a work to which God has communicated His own perfections; so that the slightest error or defect of any kind in it is inconceivable, and that which is other than perfect in all points cannot be inspired. This is the unwarrantable interpretation of the word Inspiration. . . . Surely many of our words and many of our actions are spoken and done by the inspiration of God’s Spirit. . . . Yet does the Holy Spirit so inspire us as to communicate to us His own perfections? Are our best works or words utterly free from error or from sin?’ † Mr. Jowett, in his well-known Essay on the ‘Interpretation of Scripture,’ after reciting the commonly-received theories of Inspiration,

* Lee on the *Inspiration of Holy Scripture*, pp. 32, 33.

† Arnold’s *Sermons*, quoted by Stanley, *The Bible, its Form, and its Substance*, Preface, vii. viii. ix.

proceeds as follows :—‘ Nor for any of the higher or supernatural views of Inspiration is there any foundation in the Gospels or Epistles. There is no appearance in their writings that the Evangelists or Apostles had any inward gift, or were subject to any power external to them different from that of preaching or teaching which they daily exercised ; nor do they anywhere lead us to suppose that they were free from error or infirmity. . . . The nature of Inspiration can only be known from the examination of Scripture. There is no other source to which we can turn for information ; and we have no right to assume some imaginary doctrine of Inspiration like the infallibility of the Roman Catholic Church. To the question What is inspiration ? the first answer therefore is, That idea of Scripture which we gather from the knowledge of it.’* Dr. Williams says, ‘ In the Bible, as an expression of devout reason, and therefore to be read with reason in freedom, he [Bunsen] finds a record of the spiritual giants whose experience generated the religious atmosphere we breathe.’

I do not undertake to do more than recite these opinions of clergymen of the Church of England. It is not for us to say what is the authoritative doctrine of that body ; but it has been recently declared by the highest Ecclesiastical tribunal, that the views of Inspiration last given are not inconsistent with the Anglican formularies. Dr. Lushington expressed himself as follows :—‘ As to the liberty of the Anglican

* *Essays and Reviews*, pp. 345, 347.

clergy to examine and determine the text of Scripture, I exceedingly . . . doubt if this liberty can be extended beyond the limits I have mentioned, namely, certain verses or parts of Scripture. I think it could not be permitted to a clergyman to reject the whole of one of the books of Scripture.*

It is evident from the above quotations that the theory of Inspiration among many prominent men in the Anglican Church has been moving in the direction of the German Neology.

Let us now turn to the Catholic doctrine. The Catholic Church has expressed itself authoritatively on the subject of Holy Scripture and its divine character in the following points:—

1. That the writings of the Prophets and Apostles are Holy Scripture; or in other words, that certain sacred books exist in its custody in which the ‘*veritas et disciplina*’ of Christ is partly contained; ‘*perspicuus hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus.*’ †

2. That God is the author of these sacred books. It declares both the books and the traditions to be given to the Church, ‘*Spiritu Sancto dictante,*’ by God himself, and that He is the Author of all such books and traditions, both of the Old and of the New Testament: ‘*omnes libros tam Veteris quam Novi Testamenti quum utrisque unus Deus sit auctor.*’ ‡

3. That the sacred books are so many in number, and are such by name; that is, the catalogue or canon

* Judgment—Bishop of Salisbury *versus* Williams, p. 16.

† *Concil. Trid.* sess. iv.

‡ *Ibid.*

of the Old and New Testament. The canon declared by the Council of Trent is that of the Council of Florence in the fourteenth century, of Constantinople in the sixth, of Carthage in the fourth, and of the Pontifical declarations of S. Innocent and S. Gelasius.

4. That these books in their integrity, and with all their parts—‘*libros integros cum omnibus suis partibus*’—are to be held as sacred and canonical; that is, to be inspired, and to have God for their Author, which excludes the supposition that any part of such books is merely of human authorship, and therefore that falsehood or error can be found in them. This declaration, though made explicitly of the Latin version, called the Vulgate, applies *à fortiori* to the Holy Scriptures *objectivè sumptæ*. It is made also under anathema.

5. That the Latin version called the Vulgate is authentic, ‘*pro authentica habeatur.*’*

These five points are, I believe, all that the Catholic Church has authoritatively declared. To these every Catholic yields assent. But beyond these nothing is of obligation. And whatsoever I may add, belongs to the region, not of faith, but of theology, not of the Councils and Pontiffs, but of the Schools.

And first we will begin with the period of simple faith.

The Catholic Church, in inheriting the canon of the Hebrew and of the Hellenistic books from the synagogue, inherited with them the belief of inspiration current among the Jews, by whom the operations of the Divine Spirit were believed to extend to the whole

* *Concil. Trid. sess. iv.*

substance and form, the sense and the letter, of Holy Scripture.

Such was evidently the belief of the early Christian writers. The writings of the Fathers both of the East and West show that they extended the inspiration of the Holy Ghost to the whole of Scripture, both to its substance and to its form; so that it is altogether pervaded by the mind, voice, and authority of God.

For instance, S. Irenæus says, 'The Scriptures are perfect, being dictated by the Word of God and by His Spirit.'*

S. Marcarius says, 'God the King sent the Holy Scriptures as His epistles to men.' †

S. John Chrysostom says, 'What things the Scriptures promulgate, the Lord promulgated.' ‡ Again, 'All that is in Scripture we must thoroughly examine; for all are dictated by the Holy Ghost, and nothing is written in them in vain.' § Again, 'The mouth of the Prophet is the mouth of God.' || Again, the Divine Scripture declares nothing vaguely or without intention, but every syllable and every point has some mystery hidden in it.' ¶ Not an iota, not a point, in Scripture is there in vain.'** Again, 'Nothing in the Divine Scriptures is superfluous, for they are dictated by the Holy Ghost. These might be extended to any length. S. Basil says,

* *Contra Hær.* lib. ii. c. 47.

† *Hom.* XXXIX. p. 476.

‡ *Hom. De Lazaro*, tom. i. p. 755.

§ *Hom.* XXXVI. in *S. Joan.*

|| *Hom.* XIX. in *Acta App.*

¶ *Hom.* XVIII. in *Genesim.*

** *Hom.* XXI. et XLII. in *Gen.*

‘Let therefore the Scriptures, which are inspired of God, decide for us.’* S. Gregory of Nazianzum says, ‘But we who extend the diligence (*i. e.* the operation) of the Spirit even to every, the least point and line (of the Scriptures) will never grant, for it is not right we should, that even the least actions by them commemorated were written without intention.’† S. Gregory Nyssen says, ‘Whatever the Sacred Scriptures declare are the utterances of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, the holy Prophets filled by God are inspired by the power of the Holy Ghost, and the whole of Scripture is therefore said to be divinely inspired.’‡ I will only add one more. S. John Damascene says, ‘The Law, Prophets, Evangelists and Apostles, Pastors and Doctors, spoke by the Holy Ghost; so that the whole Scripture inspired by God without doubt is useful.’§

For the Latin Fathers, passages might be indefinitely multiplied. The following will suffice. S. Augustine says of the Scripture, ‘In it God Himself speaks.’|| ‘Holy Scripture is the handwriting of God,’¶ ‘the adorable style and pen of the Spirit of God.’** ‘The faith wavers if the authority of the Divine Scriptures is shaken.’†† ‘They are labouring to destroy the authority of the Holy Scripture, who ascribe to it any

* *Epist. ad Eustathium.*

† *Oratio Secunda*, sect. cv. tom. i. p. 60.

‡ *Orat. VI. cont. Eunom.* tom. ii. p. 605.

§ *De Fide Orthod.* lib. iv. c. 17.

|| S. Aug. *Confess.* lib. xiii. cap. 44, tom. i. p. 241.

¶ S. Aug. *Enarrat. in Ps. cxliv.* cap. 17, tom. iv. p. 1620.

** S. Aug. *Confess.* lib. vii. cap. 27, tom. i. p. 143.

†† S. Aug. *De Doct. Christ.* lib. i. cap. 41, tom. iii. p. 18.

falsehood.’* ‘In Scripture there is no place for either emendation or doubt.’ †

S. Gregory the Great says, ‘The Author of the book is the Holy Ghost. He therefore wrote these things who dictated them to be written. He himself wrote who inspired them in the act of writing. ‡ Whatsoever the Fathers declare in the sacred oracles, they declare, not from themselves, but they received them from God. §

S. Ambrose, speaking of the sacred authors, says, ‘They wrote not by art, but by grace. For they wrote those things which the Spirit gave them to speak.’ ||

Such are the statements of three of the four great doctors of the Church.

It is clear that these Fathers had no thought of error or uncertainty in the sacred text, but extended the dictation of the Holy Spirit to the whole extent of the books of the Old and New Testament as simply the Word of God. They may be taken to represent the mind of the whole Church in the ages which went before the period of controversy as to the nature of Inspiration.

The next period of the subject is that of analysis as to the nature and limits of Inspiration. But as I am not pretending to write its history, all I will attempt is

* S. Aug. *De Sanct. Virg.* cap. 17, tom. vi. p. 348.

† S. Aug. *contr. Faust.* lib. xi. capp. iv. and v. tom. viii. pp. 221, 222.

‡ S. Greg. *Mor. in Job*, præf. cap. i. sect. 2, tom. i. p. 7.

§ S. Greg. *Lib. iii. in prim. Reg.* cap. i. sect. 8, tom. iii. pars. 2, p. 115.

|| S. Amb. *Epp.* class. i. epist. viii. sect. i. tom. iii. p. 817.

to state the two opinions which exist among Catholic theologians since the Council of Trent.

1. The first is that of the older writers, who maintain that every particle and word of the Canonical books was written by the dictation of the Holy Spirit.

Such, as I have shown, was certainly the language—I will not say the opinion—of most of the Fathers both of the East and of the West. They spoke of the New Testament much as the Elder Church spoke of the Old. I say the language—not the opinion—because it is evident that they were occupied with the sole intention of affirming the Canonical books to be the Word of God, without entering analytically into the questions which a later criticism forced upon the Scholastic theologians.

This opinion is stated by Habert in the Prolegomena to his Theology as follows: ‘Tostatus on Numbers, chap. xi., Estius on 2 Timothy, chap. iii., and many theologians of weight, affirm that every word was inspired and dictated by the Holy Spirit, so that the composition and style of the language is to be ascribed to Him.’*

The faculties of Louvain and Douai censure the opposite opinion as a departure from orthodoxy. So in their censure they declare, ‘It is an intolerable and great blasphemy, if any shall affirm that any otiose word can be found in Scripture. All the words of Scripture are so many sacraments (or mysteries). Every phrase, syllable, tittle, and point is full of a divine sense,

* Habert, *Proleg. in Theol.* pp. 41, 42.

as Christ says in S. Matthew, “a jot or a tittle shall not pass from the law.” They go on to quote S. John Chrysostom, S. Augustine, S. Bernard, and the Fathers generally.

Melchior Canus is supposed to be of this opinion.* In his second book *De Locis Theol.*, after stating and refuting the opinions ‘of those who thought that the sacred writers in the Canonical books did not always speak by the Divine Spirit,’ he establishes the following proposition: that ‘every particle of the Canonical books was written by the assistance of the Holy Spirit.’ He says, ‘I admit that the sacred writers had no need of a proper and express revelation in writing every particle of the Scripture; but that every part of the Scripture was written by a peculiar instinct and impulse of the Holy Ghost, I truly and rightly contend.’ After saying that some things were known to them by supernatural revelation, and others by natural knowledge, he adds, ‘that they did not need a supernatural light and express revelation to write these latter truths, but they needed the presence and peculiar help of the Holy Ghost, that these things, though they were human truths, and known by natural reason, should nevertheless be written divinely and without any error.’

The same is also the teaching of Bañez, and of the Dominican theologians generally.

2. The other opinion, which is that of Bellarmine, —and I believe I may say, of the Jesuit theologians, and of a majority of the more recent writers on Inspiration,—is, that the whole *matter* of Holy Scripture

* Melchior Canus, *Loc. Theol.* lib. ii. cap. xvii.

was written by the assistance of the Holy Spirit, but not the whole *form* dictated by Him; or, in other words, ‘*res et sententias*’—the sense and substance ‘*non verba et apices*’—not every particular word or letter.

But, before we enter into the detail of this question, it may be well to give, in a few words, the history of a controversy which, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, promoted the analysis of the subject, and left it in its present form. It may be said to have arisen out of the excesses of the Lutheran Reformation.

The account given by Mosheim of the opinions of Luther and of the Lutherans is as follows. He says that Luther taught that the *matter* of the Holy Scripture—that is, the truths contained in it—are from the Holy Ghost; but the *form*—that is, the style, words, phrases, and construction—are from the writer. When Catholic theologians replied that this opened the way for error into the sacred text, certain followers of Luther went into the other extreme, and taught, as the younger Buxtorf,* that the Hebrew vowel-points and accents are inspired.

It appears also that Erasmus expressed himself at one time with very little caution. In his commentary on the 2nd chapter of S. Matthew, he said, ‘*Sive quod ipsi Evangelistæ testimonia hujusmodi non e libris deprompserunt; sed memoriæ fidentes, ita ut lapsi sint.*’ ‘Whether it be that the Evangelists did not draw their narratives from records, but trusted to their memory, and so fell into error.’ Eckius wrote to him, ‘*Audi,*

* Lee on *Inspiration*, Appendix C. p. 436.

mi Erasme, arbitrarisne Christianum patienter laturum Evangelistas in Evangeliiis lapsos? Si hic vacillat S. Scripturæ auctoritas, quæ pars alia sine suspicione erit? '* Erasmus was attacked by the Salmanticenses and other Spanish theologians. He afterwards explains himself, though not very firmly or frankly, but the objectionable words were erased from the next edition of his Commentary.

The next discussion on the subject of Inspiration, among Catholic theologians, arose during the Jansenist Controversy. In 1586, Lessius and Hamel, in their lectures at Louvain, taught the following propositions:—

1. 'Ut aliquid sit Scriptura Sacra, non est necessarium, singula ejus verba inspirata esse a Spiritu Sancto.' 'That a book be Holy Scripture, it is not necessary that every word of it be inspired by the Holy Ghost.'

2. 'Non est necessarium ut singulæ veritates et sententiæ sint immediate a Spiritu Sancto ipsi scriptori inspiratæ.' It is not necessary that every truth or sentence be immediately inspired into the writer by the Holy Ghost.'

3. 'Liber aliquis (qualis forte est secundus Machabæorum) humana industria sine assistentia Spiritus Sancti scriptus, si Spiritus Sanctus postea testetur nihil ibi esse falsum, efficitur Scriptura Sacra.' † 'A book (such as perhaps the 2nd of Maccabees), written by

* Lee on *Inspiration*, Appendix C. p. 437. *Erasmi Opp.* ep. 303, tom. iii. 296.

† See *Theol. Wirceburg.* tom. i. p. 23.

human industry, without the assistance of the Holy Ghost—if the Holy Spirit afterwards testify that nothing false is contained in it—becomes Holy Scripture.’

These propositions were at once assailed. The Archbishops of Cambrai and Mechlin sent them to the Faculties of Douai and Louvain.* They were condemned by both. The third was especially censured. Estius, who drew up the censure, in his ‘Commentary on the Epistles’ gives his own opinion as follows: ‘From this passage it is rightly and truly established, that all the sacred and canonical Scripture is written by the dictation of the Holy Ghost; so that not only the sense, but every word, and the order of the words, and the whole arrangement, is from God, as if He were speaking or writing in person. For this is the meaning of the Scripture being divinely inspired.’ †

Lessius and Hamel appealed to the Sorbonne. The Faculty of Paris did not approve either of the Jesuit propositions, nor of the censures of Louvain and Douai. The Faculties of Mayence, Treves, Ingoldstadt, and Rome disapproved the censures; but Sixtus V. imposed silence until the Holy See should pronounce. The subject has never been decided. The censures are given by D’Argentre, in his ‘Collectio Judiciorum de novis Erroribus,’ and the Jesuit propositions are defended by P. Simon, in his *Histoire Critique du Texte du Nouveau Testament.* ‡

About fifty years after, that is in A.D. 1650, Holden

* See *Theol. Würzburg.* tom. i. p. 23.

† *Estii Comment. in Ep. 2 ad Timoth.* cap. iii. 16.

‡ Simon, *Histoire, &c.*, ch. xxiii.

published his 'Divinæ Fidei Analysis,' in which he maintained a theory of inspiration which is certainly open to some, if not to all the censures which were directed against it. I hope, however, that his orthodoxy may be maintained, though somewhat at the expense of his coherence.

The passage which caused the censure of P. Simon is to be found in the fifth chapter of the first book, and is as follows:—'Auxilium speciale divinum præstitum auctori cujuslibet scripti, quod pro verbo Dei recipit Ecclesia, ad ea solummodo se porrigit, quæ vel sint pure doctrinalia, vel proximum aliquem, aut necessarium habeant ad doctrinalia respectum: in iis verò quæ non sunt de instituto scriptoris vel ad alia referuntur, eo tantum subsidio Deum illi adfuisse judicamus, quod piissimis cæteris auctoribus commune sit.' *

This, at first sight at least, would seem to imply that in all matters not of faith or morals the inspired writers were liable to err like any other pious men. Nevertheless, in three places Holden affirms that the books of Scripture are absolutely free from all error. In the first section of the same chapter he defines the Scripture as a document containing truth, and nothing 'a veritate quacunquē dissonam vel alienam.' In the third he says, 'Quamvis enim nullam complectatur Scriptura falsitatem.' In the third chapter of the second book he says, 'Quamvis falsitatis arguere non licet quicquid habetur in Sacro Codice, veruntamen quæ ad religionem non spectant, Catholicæ Fidei articulos nullatenus astruunt.' It is evident, then, that he

* *Divinæ Fidei Analysis*, lib. i. c. v. p. 48.

denied the presence of anything false or erroneous in Holy Scripture ; that if he limited the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit to matters of faith and morals, he supposed that the whole of the sacred text was written by such assistance as, in fact, excluded all error ; or, in other words, that if the sacred writers in other matters might have erred, they never did.

I notice this because it is well to show how little the name of Holden may be quoted by those who, at this day, maintain that the inspired writers, in matters not of faith and morals, did err ; and because even the writer in Bergier's Dictionary seems so to represent him, and, I regret to add, Père Matignon.*

We have now before us the main lines of opinion which have existed among Catholic divines on the subject of Inspiration. They have never been much modified to this day. The one affirms the inspiration both of the matter and the form of Holy Scripture ; the other, of the matter only, except so far as the doctrine of faith and morals, all error of every kind being excluded by a special and infallible assistance. To these two opinions some would add that of Holden as a third ; namely, that this special assistance is limited to faith and morals, all error being nevertheless excluded, though the assistance in other subject-matters is only of an ordinary kind ; but, I think, without sufficient foundation, for the reasons I have given.

In order to appreciate more exactly the reach of these opinions, it will be well to examine them some-

* *La Liberté de l'esprit humain dans la Foi catholique*, p. 187.

what more intimately, and to fix the sense of the terms used in the discussion of the subject.

(1) First, then, comes the word *Inspiration*, which is often confounded with *Revelation*.

Inspiration, in its *first intention*, signifies the action of the Divine Spirit upon the human, that is, upon the intelligence and upon the will. It is an intelligent and vital action of God upon the soul of man; and 'inspired' is to be predicated, not of books or truths, but of living agents.

In its *second intention*, it signifies the action of the Spirit of God upon the intelligence and will of man, whereby any one is impelled and enabled to act, or to speak, or to write, in some special way designed by the Spirit of God.

In its still more *special* and *technical intention*, it signifies an action of the Spirit upon men, impelling them to write what God reveals, suggests, or wills that they should write. But inspiration does not necessarily signify revelation, or suggestion of the matter to be written.

(2) Secondly, *Revelation* signifies the unfolding to the intelligence of man truths which are contained in the intelligence of God, the knowledge of which without such revelation would be impossible. Men may be the subjects of revelation, and not of inspiration; and they might be the subjects of inspiration, and not of revelation.

(3) Thirdly, *Suggestion*, in the theory of inspiration, signifies the bringing to mind such things as God wills the writer to put in writing. All revelation is sugges-

tion, but not all suggestion revelation; because much that is suggested may be of the natural order, needing no revelation, being already known by natural reason, or by historical tradition and the like.

(4) Fourthly, by *Assistance* is understood the presence and help of the Holy Spirit, by which the human agent, in full use of his own liberty and powers—such as natural gifts, genius, acquired cultivation, and the like,—executes the work which the Divine Inspiration impels him to write.

There are three kinds of *assistance*.

(1) First, there is the assistance afforded by the Holy Spirit to all the faithful, by which their intelligence is illuminated and their will strengthened, without exempting them from the liability to error.

(2) Secondly, there is the assistance vouchsafed to the Church diffused throughout the world or congregated in council, or to the person of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, speaking *ex cathedrâ*, which excludes all liability to error within the sphere of faith and morals, and such facts and truths as attach to them (of which relations the Church is the ultimate judge), but does not extend to the other orders of purely natural science and knowledge.

(3) Lastly, there is the assistance granted as a 'gratia gratis data' to the inspired writers of the Holy Scripture, which excludes all liability to error in the act of writing, not only in matters of faith and morals, but in all matters, of whatsoever kind, which by the inspiration of God they are impelled to write.

The Jesuits, in the 'Theologia Wirceburgensis,'

sum up the subject in the following way:—The authorship of God ‘may be conceived in three ways. First, *by special assistance*, which preserves the writer from all error and falsehood. Secondly, *by inspiration*, which impels the writer to the act of writing, without, however, destroying his liberty. Thirdly, *by revelation*, by which truths hitherto unknown are manifested.’ They then affirm, ‘that God specially inspired the sacred writers with the truths and matter expressed in the sacred books.’*

Perhaps it may be more in accordance with the facts of the case to invert the order, and to say that what we call Inspiration, in the special and technical sense, includes the three following operations of the Holy Ghost upon the mind of the sacred writers:—

(1) First, the impulse to put in writing the matter which God wills they should record.

(2) Secondly, the suggestion of the matter to be written, whether by revelation of truths not previously known, or only by the prompting of those things which were already within the writer’s knowledge.

(3) Thirdly, the assistance which excludes liability to error in writing all things, whatsoever may be suggested to them by the Spirit of God to be written.

From this follow two corollaries:—

1. That in Holy Scripture there can be no falsehood or error.

2. That God is the author of all inspired books.

The enunciation of these two axioms of Christianity

* *Theol. Wireceburgensis*, tom. i. pp. 15, 16.

has elicited in all ages a series of objections. It would be impossible to enumerate or to recite them all: I will, therefore, take only the chief categories, so to say, of the difficulties which are supposed to exist in Holy Scripture.

1. First, it was alleged by the Manichæans or Marcionites that the Old Testament was both evil and discordant with the New. S. Augustine wrote a book called ‘*Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*,’ in refutation of a manuscript said to be found at Carthage in a street, by the sea-shore, and read in public to the people, ‘*multis confluentibus, et adtentissime audientibus.*’ The sum of the book was that the maker of the world was evil, and the creator of evil; that he was cruel, because he inflicted death for trifling causes, as on the sons of Heli, also upon infants and innocents; that he could not be the true God, because he delighted in sacrifices: and that the Flood was not sent because of sin, because mankind was worse after it than before.* I need not give more examples: I quote these only to show that this form of objection is not new.

2. Secondly, it has been objected that the Evangelists are discordant with each other. This also was treated by S. Augustine, by S. John Chrysostom, and has produced a whole *Bibliotheca of Harmonies*.

3. Thirdly, that the Holy Scriptures contain errors in science, history, chronology, and the like.

This objection is chiefly of modern date. The late Dr. Arnold expresses himself as follows:—‘I would

* S. Aug. tom. viii. p. 550.

not give unnecessary pain to anyone by an enumeration of those points in which the literal historical statement of an inspired writer has been vainly defended. Some instances will probably occur to most readers; others are, perhaps, not known, and never will be known to many.* His disciples naturally follow the same line. The writers of the 'Essays and Reviews' are bolder and more explicit.

It is, however, with surprise that I find the Abbé Le Noir writing in these terms: 'There are in Holy Scripture faults of geography, chronology, natural history, of physical science—of science generally; in short, perhaps, also philosophical inaccuracies, and literary errors against real and unchangeable good taste.' These faults, he says, concern 'the idea itself,' that is, the *matter* of Holy Scripture, not the *form* only, 'and are not to be explained by errors of copyists.'†

4. Fourthly, that the Holy Scripture contains expressions of hope, uncertainty, and of intentions never accomplished; of advice declared to be simply personal, not of Divine suggestion; all of which are evidently of human authorship, and therefore liable to error.‡

* Dr. Stanley *on the Bible*, &c., Preface, p. ix.

† *Dictionnaire des Harmonies de la Raison et de la Foi*, pp. 921, 2.

‡ In order to show that the inspired writers did not always write by inspiration, and that what they wrote without inspiration they wrote only as men liable to error, a well-known writer has lately quoted such passages as the following, from the commentaries of S. Jerome on the words of S. Paul: 'Although I be rude in speech, yet not in knowledge' (2 Cor. xi. 6).

'Therefore, Hebrew of the Hebrews as he was, and most learned in his vernacular tongue, he was not able to express the profundity of

5. Fifthly, that much of the matter of Holy Scripture is intrinsically incredible. Passing over all other examples of this objection in the past, and in other countries, I will name only the works of Dr. Colenso on the Pentateuch.

6. Sixthly, that the text, by reason of innumerable variations, is uncertain, and that the authority of the Book is thereby shaken; for if the text be uncertain in

his meaning in a language not his own: nor did he much heed the words so long as the sense was secure' (S. Hierom. Com. lib. iii. ad Gal. cap. vi. tom. iv. p. 309).

Again, on the third chapter to the Ephesians he says: 'He, therefore, who committed solecisms in his words, and could not express an hyperbole or complete a sentence, boldly claims for himself wisdom, and says, according to the revelation the mystery is made known unto me' (Ib. ad Ephes. cap. vi. lib. ii. p. 348).

Once more, in the Epistle to Algasia on the words, 'Although I be rude in speech, yet not in knowledge,' he says: 'Paul said this not out of humility but in truth of conscience.' . . . 'He does not fully express his profound and recondite meaning by his speech, and though he himself knew what he said, I conceive that he was not able to transfer it in speech to the ears of others' (Ib. tom. iv. p. 204). These passages might be easily multiplied, and others also where he speaks as a man carried away by human infirmity (ad Gal. cap. v. ib. p. 293).

These passages not only fall short of the conclusion for which they are quoted, but overturn it. For S. Paul expressly affirms that though he was rude in speech he was not in knowledge, which S. Jerome interprets to be his consciousness of 'profound and recondite meanings,' and also of wisdom. But this excludes the supposition of all error. For solecisms in words and the limitations of a language not his own, did not cause the utterances of Divine truth to become erroneous. The Greek of S. John is not Attic, but his Gospel is free from all error. A Jew of Tarsus might speak Greek rudely, but the matter revealed to him was not thereby infected with human error. The above passages may indeed be quoted against the extreme theory of literal inspiration, but not to prove that the inspired writers were liable to error.

one part, we do not know that it is not uncertain in others.

I do not at all underrate the importance of meeting these objections, which has been already done again and again in past centuries. But error, as I have said, seems to have periodic times, and to return upon us; not, indeed, identical, nor in the same precise forms, but still the same errors under new aspects, and attaching to other portions of the truth. As I do not now attempt to discuss the large questions I have here enumerated, I will do no more than add one or two general reflections.

1. And first it is to be observed, that the Church in declaring the Vulgate Version to be authentic, does not declare that the existing text is free from uncertainty.

By *authentic*, the Church intends to say *authoritative* in the sense of jurisprudence, in which an 'authentic document' signifies a writing which is conclusive in evidence. Such writings may be of three kinds: 1. *Autographa*, or the original documents; 2. *Apographa*, or copies agreeing with the original; and, 3. *Translations* in versions which are called authentic in a wider sense, conformity of substance with the original being secured.

Again, authenticity is either intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic authenticity in *autographa* signifies that the writing is original, and in the hand of the writer; in *apographa*, or copies, and *translations*, that they are conformable to the original. Extrinsic authenticity is the external evidence by which the intrinsic authenticity is established.

Authenticity is again divided into absolute and relative. 1. *Absolute* authenticity signifies conformity with the original both in matter and form, and in things both of great and of light moment; in a word, in all things which constitute the perfection of the original, to the exclusion of fault or defect. 2. *Relative* or respective authenticity signifies conformity as a whole, but not to the exclusion of lesser faults or defects.

Now, by declaring the Vulgate to be authentic, the Church signifies that it is in conformity with the original Scriptures, and that it has not been vitiated either by the malice or the carelessness of the translators. But theologians of great weight interpret this declaration to signify, that the authenticity is not absolute, extending to jots and tittles, but relative or respective, extending to the substance and to all the chief parts of the text; that is, to the doctrine of faith and morals, and to all the histories, facts, and sayings which are contained in it.

In this sense the Council of Trent declared the Vulgate to be authentic; but in doing so it did not detract from the authenticity of the Greek or the Hebrew Scriptures.*

And this is the more evident from the fact that two editions of the Vulgate were published, the one by command of Sixtus V., the other of Clement VII., with numerous corrections of the text.

It is clear, therefore, that the Church has never

* *Theologia Wirceburgensis*, tom. i. p. 35.

pronounced any version to be identical in every jot or tittle with the sacred original.

And this leads us to a train of thought very seasonable at this day. At this moment there exists in the Christian world an almost inconceivable multitude of copies of the Bible, in I know not how many tongues. The art of printing has multiplied them with a rapidity and a profusion which would be almost miraculous not only to a mediæval transcriber, but to Caxton and Aldus. As we trace this wide stream upward through the last three centuries, it becomes narrower and narrower, until we reach the time when printed volumes disappear, and a number of manuscripts—many indeed, but in proportion to the printed copies indefinitely few—is all that represents the written Word of God. If we trace this stream of written tradition upwards, it becomes narrower still. Without doubt, the copies and versions of Scripture were always numerous; and multitudes have perished by age and other causes: multitudes have ceased to exist since the art of printing rendered a manuscript an unwieldy and wearisome book. Nevertheless, the ancient manuscripts are still the chief criteria for the correction of our printed text. And of these none is to be found of an earlier date than the fourth century. Some twenty or thirty principal manuscripts in Greek, and about forty in Latin, are all that appear to remain to us of a trustworthy kind. Of course, I do not forget the texts which are incorporated in the works of the Fathers, and in the Lectionaries or Antiphonaries. But we are now speaking of texts or manuscript copies

representing the great and Divine Original, which is now, like the body of Moses, withdrawn by the Divine Providence from the custody of man. This is a wonderful fact; and wonderful also it is that we so little reflect upon it. In the heat of their controversies, men contend as if their Bibles were attested facsimiles, stereotyped or photographed copies of the autograph of S. John and S. Paul; utterly inconsiderate of the long tract of human agency by which the Scriptures have come down to them, and all the while refusing to believe in the Divine office of the Church, which has guarded and authenticated the written word of God to us by its unerring witness. The authenticity, intrinsic and extrinsic, of each particular writing of the New Testament, was known and guaranteed by those to whom the several inspired writers committed it. The Church, by the interchange of these testimonies, and by the collection of the books so attested, formed the canon, in which it recognised the revelation it had already received, and spread throughout the world, before the canon was collected. The Scripture corresponded with this great Original, as the Tabernacle corresponded afterwards, with the Pattern which was shown to Moses in the Mount. The Church is the sole judge of the intrinsic authenticity, and alone knows the hand-writing of the Author of the Sacred Books, and the autograph of the Spirit of God.

The next observation to be made is, that although, by the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the Church both knows, and at all times can declare with Divine certainty, the doctrine of faith and morals committed to its

charge; and although it can also declare, and has declared with Divine certainty, the existence of Holy Scripture, the catalogue or canon of the Sacred Books, the inspiration of the writers—their immunity, and therefore the immunity of their writings, from all falsehood or error,—nevertheless, it has hitherto only declared the Vulgate to be authentic, and that, as I have already shown, with the relative or respective authenticity, which does not exclude the errors of translators or transcribers. It has never as yet declared any text to possess immunity from the errors of translations or transcriptions, nor that transcribers or translators are exempt from the liability to err. The custody of the faith resides in the sphere of the Divine illumination, which pervades the Church with its active and passive infallibility. The custody of the material documents of Holy Scripture resides in the office of the Church, as a Divine witness to the facts of its own history, and of the Divine gifts committed to its trust. The Scriptures were indeed written by an impulse and assistance of God, and as such, are Divine endowments to the Church; but the material volumes, the manuscripts or parchments, were not a part of the deposit, like the Divine truths revealed to the Apostles, nor like the holy sacraments divinely instituted by Jesus Christ.

It follows from what has been said,

1. That whensoever the text can be undoubtedly established, the supposition of error as to the contents of that text cannot be admitted: but,
2. That wheresoever the text may be uncertain, in those parts error may be present.

But this would be not error in Scripture, but in the *transcription* or *translation* of the Scripture, and would be due, not to the inspired writer, but to the translator or transcriber.

That such a supposition may be entertained, is evident from the fact that the variations in the versions are stated by some writers at 30,000, by others at 40,000, by others at 100,000. That variations existed already in S. Augustine's time is evident from his answer to Faustus the Manichæan, to whom he says, 'If anything absurd be alleged to be there (*i.e.* in Holy Scripture), no man may say, The author of this book did not hold the truth. But (he must say), either the manuscript is faulty, or the translator was in error, or you do not understand it.'* In these words S. Augustine has provided an answer for our days as well as for his own. It would seem that these three suppositions suffice to cover the difficulties alleged against the historical character and intrinsic credibility of Holy Scripture.

1. First, it is evident that Holy Scripture does not contain a revelation of what are called physical sciences; and that when they are spoken of, the language is that of sense, not of science, and of popular not of technical usage.

2. Secondly, no system of chronology is laid down in the Sacred Books. There are at least three chronologies, probable and admissible, apparently, given by Holy Scripture. It cannot be said, therefore, that

* S. Aug., *Contra Faustum*, lib. xi. cap. 5, tom. viii. p. 222.

there are chronological faults in Holy Scripture, forasmuch as no ascertained chronology is there declared.

3. Thirdly, historical narratives may appear incredible and yet be true; and may seem irreconcilable with other history, and yet the difficulty may arise simply from our want of adequate knowledge. A history may seem improbable, and yet be fact after all.

The most certain and exact sciences have residual difficulties which resist all tests, and refuse all solution. The sciences most within our reach, of the natural order, and capable of demonstration, not only have their limits, but also phenomena which we cannot reconcile. How much more Revelation, which reaches into a world of which eternity and infinity are conditions, and belongs to an order above nature and the reason of man! It is no wonder that in the sphere of supernatural science there should be residual difficulties, such as the origin of evil, the freedom of the will, the eternity of punishment. They lie upon the frontier, beyond which, in this world, we shall never pass. Again, what wonder that the Holy Scriptures should contain difficulties which yield to no criticism, and that not only in the sphere of supernatural truth, but also of the natural order—that is, of history, chronology, and the like! To hear some men talk, one would suppose that they were eye-witnesses of the creation, observers of the earth's surface before and after the Flood, companions of the patriarchs, chroniclers of the Jewish race. The history of the world for four thousand years, written in mere outline, with intervals of unmarked duration—genealogies which cannot be verified by

any other record, events which are the *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα* of history—may well present difficulties, and apparent improbabilities upon the surface, and yet after all be true. The same historical event, viewed from different sides, will present aspects so different, that the records of it may be apparently irreconcilable; and yet some one fact or event not preserved in the record would solve and harmonise all. It may be from ‘intellectual obtuseness,’ or ‘want of the critical faculty,’ or ‘obstinate adherence to preconceived belief,’ but it makes little impression on me to be told that S. Stephen in Acts vii. 16, fell into an historical error in saying that Jacob was buried in Sichem. I confess that I cannot explain the difficulty, and that the explanations usually given, though possible and even probable, are hardly sufficient. Nevertheless, I am not shaken in the least as to the divine axiom, that Holy Scripture is exempt from all error. Whether it be a fault in the manuscript, or in the translator, or only a want of our understanding, I cannot tell; but an error in Scripture most assuredly it is not, and our inability to solve it, is no proof that it is. There it stands, an undoubted difficulty in the existing text—and not the only one; and yet all together will not shake our faith in the immunity from error which was granted to the sacred writers.

Nor, again, when we read in one place that King Solomon had 4,000 stalls for horses, in another 40,000; nor that king Josias began to reign at eight years of age, in another place at eighteen. I cannot explain it. But I can imagine and believe many solutions except

one, namely, that the inspired writers contradicted themselves, or that in this they were not inspired.

So likewise, when I am told that the history of the Pentateuch is intrinsically incredible;—that half a million of men could not be slain in one battle; that the people in the wilderness could not have survived without water; that to furnish the paschal lambs would require I know not how many millions of sheep; that, according to sheep-masters in Yorkshire and Natal, this would require I know not how many millions of square acres of grass; that the priest could not carry every day a bullock, with his head, and hide, and inwards, and appurtenances, six miles out of the camp, and the like;—I confess that it makes little impression on me. It reminds me of the Athenian, who having a house to sell, carried about a brick in his pocket as a view of the premises; and of another, who showed in his olive garden the well out of which his forefathers used to drink; to which his friend—testing history by mensuration, and yet believing—said, ‘What long necks they must have had!’ I do not profess to be able to understand all the difficulties which may be raised. The history shows to me afar off like the harvest-moon just over the horizon, dilated beyond all proportion, and in its aspect unnatural; but I know it to be the same heavenly light which in a few hours I shall see in a flood of splendour, self-evident and without a cloud. So I am content to leave, as residual difficulties, the narratives which come down from an age, when as yet the father of secular history had not been born. Why should we assume that we must render an account of

all difficulties in Scripture any more than in revelation, or in revelation any more than in science? Why should we be ashamed of saying with S. Augustine, ‘Let us believe and immoveably affirm that in Scripture falsehood has no place.’* ‘As for us, in the history of our religion, upheld by Divine authority, we have no doubt that whatsoever is opposed to it is most false, let the literature of the world say what it will of it.’† ‘We cannot say the manuscript is faulty, for all the corrected Latin versions have it so; nor that the translator is in error, for all the corrected Greek have it so. It remains that you do not understand it.’‡ ‘Even in the Holy Scriptures themselves, the things of which I am ignorant are many more than the things which I know.’§ ‘Adore in the Gospel what you do not as yet understand, and adore it all the more in proportion as it is now hidden from you.’|| These may be hard sayings to the nineteenth century; but they are the judgments of reason illuminated by faith, ‘which is yesterday, and to-day, and the same for ever.’

And if it should seem irrational and perverse to shut our eyes to difficulties, as men say, we can but answer—We neither derive our religion from the Scriptures, nor does it depend upon them. Our faith was in the world before the New Testament was written. The Scripture itself depends for its attestation upon the

* S. Aug. *Ep.* 82, *ad Hier.* tom. ii. p. 198.

† S. Aug. *De Civ. Dei*, lib. xviii. cap. 40, tom. vii. p. 522.

‡ *Ibid.* *Cont. Faust.* lib. xi. c. 6.

§ *Ibid.* *ad Inquis. Januar. Ep.* LV. tom. ii. p. 143.

|| *Ibid.* *Serm.* LI. *de Concor. Matt. et Luc.* tom. v. p. 285.

Witness who teaches us our faith, and that Witness is Divine. Our faith rests upon an order of divine facts which was already spread throughout the world, when as yet the Gospel of S. John was not written. Of what weight are any number of residual difficulties against this standing, perpetual, and luminous miracle, which is the continuous manifestation of a supernatural history among men ; a history, the characters, proportions, and features of which are, like the order to which it belongs, divine, and therefore transcend the ordinary course of nations and of men ? One of these divine facts, and that which is the centre and source of all our certainty, is the perpetual Voice of the Church of God. That Voice has declared to us that the Sacred Books were written by inspiration, and that whatsoever those books contain, howsoever it may surpass the bounds of our experience, and refuse the *criteria* of our statistics, and the *calculus* of our arithmetic, is simply to be believed because it is divinely true.

ON
CHURCH AND STATE,
OR, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SPIRITUAL AND
THE CIVIL POWERS.

BY EDMUND SHERIDAN PURCELL.

Classification of the Subject-matter.

THE relation in which the Church stands to the Civil Power in the various States of Europe to-day, cannot fail to be a subject of interest at a moment not only when the principles of Christianity are theoretically attacked, but an almost universal attempt is being made practically to divorce religion from politics, and to deny to the Church all participation in the education and moral government of Christian Society. From day to day the opinion is becoming more common, and more audacious in its expression, that the Church has nothing to do with the business of the world, has no right to check the vagaries of science or literature, nor to condemn any laws, however unchristian in their character, which the Civil Power may think fit to enact. Two elements, or forces, as I suppose I may term them, go to the making up of public opinion, or

what used to be called the public conscience; viz. the revealed will of God brought to the knowledge of man, or the supernatural order of things; and the dicta of the human intelligence as expressed in laws and customs, in public institutions and in letters. The relation in which these two forces, the supernatural and the natural, stand to each other, how far they combine, or how they oppose each other in the formation of the public conscience, is always an interesting subject of inquiry, but never more so than now, when public opinion is become so active, so overbearing an agent, so supreme and so irresponsible a guide in the affairs of men. Reduced to its ultimate analysis, public opinion finds its home in the mind of the individual; but the individual mind owes obedience to two powers, both of God, though different in the character of their origin, each distinct in its own sphere. The one presiding over the higher; the other over the lesser concerns of life; the one divinely guided in the knowledge of its duties and the appointed limits of its power; the other left to the dictates of conscience illumined by faith and the natural light of reason. What then, is the thought which naturally occurs to the mind, are the relations between these two institutions, both divine, though different in their origin, in their character, and in their government? This question points to the ultimate object of our inquiry—the relations which exist at the present day in Europe between the Church and the Civil Power. But before proceeding in this inquiry it is necessary, or at any rate in keeping with the design of bringing out the principle

which governs these relations, to trace in rapid outlines the historic development of the connection between the Church and the Civil Power. For the purpose of following the gradual growth of these relations it is useful to divide the subject-matter into four periods. The first period, from the preaching of Christianity at Rome to the conversion of Constantine, shows the pagan State persecuting the Church whose divine authority it refused to recognise. The second, from the conversion of Constantine to the accession of Charlemagne to the empire of the West, may be characterised as an epoch in which the Civil Power, though it gave legal recognition to the Church, yet exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction by interfering with ecclesiastical rights and by usurping authority over the government of the Church. In the third period, from the age of Charlemagne to the approach of the Reformation, the Civil Power was closely united to the Church, and the public law of Europe was subject to the Divine laws. Such a subordination of civil authority to the Spiritual was, to say the least, the most prominent characteristic of the period, for the conflicts between the Popes and the German Emperors mainly arose from attempts on the part of the latter to overthrow or put aside in practice the principle, universally recognised in theory, of the ultimate supremacy of the Church over every civil authority, from that exercised by the rod of the village schoolmaster, to that wielded by the iron sceptre of the German Emperor. The fourth period, from the Reformation to modern times, is best characterised as an epoch of revolutionary triumph, in which not only the

just relations of the State to the Church, were all but completely broken up, but in which the principle of authority itself was shaken to its base.

In countries which remained Catholic the civil power too often usurped authority over the Church and unlawfully abrogated its ancient rights and liberties. In Protestant countries the State in the name of religion proscribed and persecuted the Church.

During these four periods we come across three noteworthy errors concerning the relative position of the Church to the State, which cannot in these pages be passed over without comment. They shall, therefore, be briefly examined in their proper place. In estimating the nature of the existing relations between the Church and the Civil Power in the various States of Europe, it will be useful to apply four tests which, I think, will be conclusive as to their character. The four tests are these: the marriage laws, the laws on education, the legal observance of the Church's precepts, and the theories of labour as expounded or sanctioned by the civil power.

If space permit, it will be interesting under this head to compare the trade guilds of the middle ages with the mechanic Institutes and co-operative societies such as are now exciting so much attention, if not alarm, in France and Germany. The comparison will afford a striking illustration of the difference between Institutions similar in their purpose but founded on opposite principles; and it will also show how public institutions are affected by the character of the relations which subsist between the civil and ecclesiastical powers.

By applying these tests it will be easy to discover the distinctive character of the principle which to-day more or less governs the relations between Church and State in Europe, and it will lead naturally to a contrast between the respective effects produced on society by the Christian and the Modern State.

From a review of the changes which at various epochs have taken place in the relations between the Church and the Civil Power, so much at least appears certain that the decay of the old and the growth of the new is the invariable principle which shows itself in the manifestations of history. New forms are ever growing into life; new relations are ever springing up between things which must ever remain old. In the conflicts of history two contending parties are always to be found; the one clinging with tenacity and reverence to the past: the other rushing hopefully, madly forward towards the future. Two principles are struggling for mastery, the one to preserve things as they are; the other which aims at forming all things anew. But as essential principles can never be changed, and as truths must ever remain old, it is the part of wisdom to adapt new forms and necessary changes to old principles and truths.

To attack essential principles, to aim at overthrowing or modifying old truths, is revolution. Error lies in excess on the one side or the other, and leads either to stagnation or to anarchy. The Greek Church in clinging to dead and sapless forms, until life itself has almost departed from its body, fitly represents the one excess. And Protestantism, which in its restless pur-

suit of the new and the strange, sacrifices every established principle and forsakes every old truth, is a perfect illustration of the other.

As in the physical universe there is a law of antagonism, so there seems to be in human nature opposite or contradictory tendencies or elements. On the one side we see, for instance, in social man a tendency to fasten to the soil on which he is thrown, and to cast, like a plant, roots into the earth, which shall fix him for ever to the spot on which he has grown. But on the other, an opposite tendency rules—the wild desire to be ever on the move and the restless longing to wander away on strange lands beyond the seas, or, as Tennyson in his great revolutionary poem describes it,

Or to burst all links of habit, there to wander far away,
On from island unto island at the gateways of the day.*

In the mental life of man there is a similar antagonism, sometimes reason is ever ready to reconcile differences, to await with patience the course of investigation, to acquiesce in, or make the best of, difficulties; at other times it is disputatious, sceptical, and impatient, here prone to obey, there to rebel. Between these two points there is action and reaction; the intervening space is occupied by the ordinary movements and energies of the human mind. These opposite tendencies are mutually corrective. In social life they lead to a spirit of enterprise tempered by love of country and home; in the intellectual sphere they impart activity without rashness, instil a spirit

* Locksley Hall.

of inquiry far removed from scepticism. The just balance between the two is rare, but it is the height of wisdom.

All these opposite tendencies and contrasts are comprised in the universal law of opposition between the material world and the invisible world of faith, or considered, as we are now doing, in their concrete form, between the Church and the State.

This opposition is the clue to the conflicts which I am endeavouring to trace along the course of history. Since the chief object of the Divine government was the soul of man, it stands to reason that the Church must have multifarious relations, not only with the individual, but with the world and its government. What then, befel the Church when it first announced its divine mission is the point, I think, from which such an inquiry as this should start.

But before attempting to trace in the growth of Christian society, the historic development and the practical working of these relations of the Church to the Civil Power which are themselves consequences necessarily springing from the divinely established principle of the twofold government of society, it will be necessary to state at some length and with as much exactness as possible, what may be rightly called the Christian theory as to the relation between the spiritual and the civil powers. To the student of history the inquiry we are now pursuing was always of interest, but since Pope Pius IX. by his magnificent definition of principles, has electrified the thinking world, this dispute as to the relative position and

respective powers of Church and State has on the sudden exhibited a most immediate and intense interest. It is not only a topic of almost daily discussion by writers of the most opposite principles, both at home and abroad, but it offers at the present moment to the government of the revolutionary kingdom of Italy, on the threshold of its existence a problem, for which the heirs of Cavour's theory of a free Church in a free State, are unable to find a satisfactory solution.

I may perhaps be allowed the prefatory remark, that this inquiry was taken up not lightly nor on the spur of actual circumstances, but has long occupied my mind under its manifold aspects, as a subject of serious study.

The Theory of the Relation between Church and State.

The relation, then, between the spiritual and temporal powers has two aspects, it may be viewed either theoretically or historically ; but the historical examination is unsatisfactory without having a theory to work up to, a perfect ideal before the mind's eye to serve as a criterion to the judgment. Such an ideal is to be found in the character which Christianity gradually impressed on the civil power in its relation to the Church. After tracing out the true principle which governs these relations my object is to illustrate the theory by a rapid examination of those great facts and turning-points in history, in which the Church and the State, either in unity or in antagonism, played so conspicuous a part. In the beginning, indeed, the Church had to show that she could stand alone, that she had no need of king or

kaiser. Men had to be attracted towards her by her own inherent power ; kings had to learn that their rule stood in need of her sanction, their royal authority of her consecration. After three centuries of persecution the civil power stretched forth its hand, as I hereafter propose to show, not by way merely of reconciliation, but for a close and intimate alliance. The Christian theory of this intimate union between the Church and the Civil Power is in a great measure to be gathered from the teachings of the Popes themselves ; for this purpose I have consulted many of the most important of the Papal Bulls and Decretals, together with the critical comments of the annotators. The opinions, too of some of the most approved authorities of antiquity in support of this theory will be found either quoted or referred to in frequent notes. Among modern authorities I owe much to an eminent German Catholic writer on history and on canon law, whose learning and orthodoxy are beyond question, but on some important points, on which his judgment is, as it seems to me, in decided opposition to his own principles, I have not hesitated to differ from his views ; and, finally, to every statement quoted, after verifying it, I have given its proper reference. I say so much in order to avoid the appearance of making statements on so difficult a subject without at least such support as the quoted opinions of writers of authority, either ancient or modern, must ever needs impart.

If, then, the care of divine things, as is laid down by the greatest philosopher* of heathen antiquity, be

* Aristot. *Polit.*

the first business of the State, how much more is not a Christian entitled to claim religion as the primary basis of all government. Although with the Jews only God made His covenant, and though to His chosen people alone He gave the new promise, yet the law of God was written in the heart of the heathen, and the Pagan State prepared the way for the coming of the Church. The State, divine in its origin, preserved among the heathen nations the principle of authority and the idea of religion. Though distorted and confused, the primitive revelation was dimly visible in the laws and usages, in the oath and in the curse, in the prayer and the sacrifice* of the heathen world. Even in the human sacrifices the idea is reflected that the sin of man can only be redeemed by the blood of man. The image of God, then, though distorted and transmuted was everywhere visible in the heathen world. Cicero tell us that: ‘Ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est, neque tam mansueta, neque tam fera, quæ non, etiamsi ignoret qualem habere Deum debeat, tamen habendum sciat.’ † But wherever the idea of God existed there religion

* The traces of the primitive revelation in the heathen world, and the relation of the propitiatory sacrifice of the Greeks and Romans to that of Calvary, are pointed out with great learning by the late Professor von Lasaulx, of Munich, in a series of lectures which many years ago I had the advantage of following, and which are now accepted in Germany as authority on the subjects they treat of. A grave fault in this eminent scholar and most interesting lecturer was a tendency to exaggerate the value of the heathen religions. Still worse in some instances, he is not free from the reproach of having outstepped all bounds, and of having erred against Christian truth.

† Cic. *De Off.*

was a public institution. A State without religion, public life without a sacrifice and a sacrificial priest, was an idea unknown to the Pagan world. Such an idea is due to the fictitious enlightenment of the nineteenth century, and its practice is reserved to the United States, in the New World, and in Europe, as yet, to Belgium alone.

In some of the nations of antiquity, as in Egypt, the sacerdotal authority even absorbed the royal power; in the Roman empire, on the other hand, the high-priesthood was annexed to the Imperial dignity. But Christianity rejecting these two opposite extremes of error introduced just relations between the temporal and spiritual powers. The Church was not identified with the State, neither did it absorb the royal power. The two powers were united, but distinct. One of the first relations, however, of the Church to the State is its recognition of the divine origin of the civil power and its inculcation of the universal duty of obedience. But this obedience is not to be of a slavish character, but a willing and lawful subjection. It is the duty of the State on its side to protect the rights of every man and to provide for all a quiet and well-regulated life, and in this manner to co-operate with the Church, whose divine character it is bound to recognise, in the common end of leading men to salvation. The Church, on the other hand, in virtue of the power which she has received from God, has the right to require from the civil governor, as from the individual Christian, that he should receive from her hands the divine law, and act in obedience to her interpretation of its precepts.

In this obedience lies the basis of the relation between the Church and the Civil Power.*

The Church confirms civil authority by teaching that it is of divine right: 'Altogether by divine providence are the kingdoms of men founded,' says St. Augustine; † not that individual kings are immediately instituted by God, but that the power by which they rule is of God. Kings are the representatives of God, the executors of His will, but only when they are members of the Church can they have a right conception of their dignity, and of their duties. The Christian Emperors were conscious of the divine source of their power. Unreproved by the Church they applied to themselves the designation 'our divinity' ‡ they regarded their commands as 'divine precepts,' § their ordinances as 'divine favours' || and denounced disobedience to themselves as 'sacrilegious.' But these ideas of their own dignity in the Christian Emperors, unlike those of their heathen predecessors on the throne, were not that they thought themselves gods, but only in order that the divine authority might be the more honoured in them and in the ordinances which they issued on behalf of the Church. The imperial dignity was regarded from the same point of view, also in the Church. Pope Leo, the Great, in his letters to the emperors, without on

* Philipp's *Kirchenrecht*, vol. ii.

† Prorsus divina providentia constituuntur regna humana. Augustin. *De Civitate Dei*, v. 1.

‡ L. Decere. 3. para. ut autem. 4. Cod. d. summa Trin. (L. 1. Theodos. et Valentin.)

§ L. Decere 3 para. Quoniam. 3. i.

|| L. Sacrilegii, s. Cod. d. divers. resc. (I. 23.)

that account considering them priests in any way, spoke of their 'royal power and priestly zeal'* of their 'royal and priestly mind'† of their 'royal power and priestly knowledge'‡ In this sense the council of Chalcedon hailed Marcian as 'priest and emperor.' Constantine likewise, conscious of his position in regard to the Church, called himself 'episcopus ab extra.' In the same way, during the middle ages, the imperial dignity was looked upon as a priestly office; on solemn occasions the emperors, therefore, wore the deacon's robe, representing themselves thereby as the advocates of the Church.§ Though they were less than priests, they were more than laymen. They were the anointed of the Lord, the ministers of God's eternal justice. In this conception of their character there was, it is true, an obvious danger in the opportunity and temptation to encroach upon the domain of spiritual government. However that may be, human nature is so constituted that to attain its proper end it stands in need of external assistance, and since the end of this life is happiness in the hereafter world, so, as St. Thomas teaches, it is the business of the civil power so to order society as to be best adapted to the attainment of that end.|| But in this ordering of society it stands to reason that the civil power, since the end to be worked for is beyond its jurisdiction, must labour in

* Leon. M. Epist. 115. ad Marcianum, c. 1.

† Epist. 155 ad Anatol. c. 2.

‡ Epist. 116 ad Pulcher c. 1.

§ Philipp's *Kirchenrecht*, vol. ii. chap. x.

|| Thom. Aquin. *de princip. regim.* lib. i. c. 15.

subordination to the Church. Just in this respect the Civil Power is the servant of God; following the directions of the Church 'it helps,' as St. Gregory says, 'those who are inclined to good, it makes broader the narrow way, and thus the earthly serves the Heavenly kingdom.'*

Hence it follows that not only since the foundation of the Church but from the very commencement of social life two Powers were appointed to govern the world—the spiritual and the temporal, both of God, but different in the character of their institution. The civil power, though in itself instituted immediately by God was not especially communicated to an individual in this or that kingdom; † this is the primary difference between the two Powers, for the Church was not only constituted directly by Christ, but the supreme authority was conferred directly upon Peter as his representative on earth. The whole constitution likewise of the Church is divine; therefore the Prince like the individual Christian, falls under the universal obligation of submission to its authority. But, says Lactantius, in these two, the royal Priesthood and Secular royalty, inseparably united, the duty of man as well as all truth is contained. ‡ Christ, himself of a priestly and royal race, has allotted to each of these two powers its particular office. The priestly and the royal dignity, says an eloquent modern writer, are like the two columns of

* Gregor. M. lib. iii. ep. 65.

† Almainus *de potestate eccles. et laica*, 2. i. cap. i.

‡ Lactant. *div. Instit.* iii. c. 1: 'Et in his duobus inseparabiliter connexis et officium hominis et veritas omnis inclusa est.'

bronze at the gates of the temple, or like the golden cherubim, which stretching out their wings, cover the sides of the mercy-seat of God. Both powers, the spiritual and the temporal, rest upon Christ as upon a corner-stone; both serve the same Creator, and rule the same men.* From this identity of purpose follows the necessity of unity between these two powers. For, says the eminent German writer on canon law whom I have already quoted, they have a common end; the glorification of God and the well being of the human race. Or, as an ancient writer expresses it, never so great as may be the difference between the spiritual and the temporal powers, for the one may be likened to the soul, the other to the body, yet they nevertheless tend to one and the same end—the salvation of those subject to them.† The two powers are united by Christ, says Peter Damian, in a mysterious manner, and as it were sacramentally, for they both find in Him the Priest and King, their unity. They are taught to be of one heart and of one mind in the Lord.‡ He who bears the sword of civil power is bound as the servant of God to unite it with the sword of the Church. In such a sense our own king Edgar expressed himself to the bishops Dunstan, Oswald and Ethelwald. ‘Rival, O priests,’ he said ‘rival the ways of the Lord and the just doings of our God. It is time to rise up against them who break the law. I hold in my hand the sword of Constantine, you that of Peter, let us join our

* Philipp's *Kirchenrecht*, vol. ii.

† Isid. Pelus. lib. iii. *Epist.* 247.

‡ Petr. Damiani *Epist.* lib. vii. Ep. 3.

right hands and unite sword to sword and cast the evil-doers out of our homes so that the sanctuary of the Lord may be purged and the sons of Levi minister in the temple.' Again, these two powers are connected by the link of mutual support, kings stand in need of the Church for things divine, and the Church is protected by the laws of the State. If the warning voice of the Church fail to deter evil-doers from violence, the sword of the civil power is drawn on their behalf. Where the power of the one fails it is supplied by the other.* For though indeed they are two powers they form one Christian Kingdom. † 'O ye servants of the Church, and ye servants of kings,' exclaims Bossuet, 'why are you divided? Is the ordinance of God opposed to the ordinance of God? O why do you not remember that yours is a united activity; that to serve God is to serve the State, and that to serve the State is to serve God? ‡ This, as a terse exposition of the general principle, is true, provided it be understood as applying only to a State when it is acting in all things in conformity with the precepts of the Church.

In so far, then, it is true that the Church is in possession of both swords; the one she has in her own hand, the other is wielded in her behalf. Frederick II., Emperor of Germany, recognised this principle when he described the material sword as subsidised by the spiritual. From all that has been said, it follows that

* Gelas. Tomus de anathematis vinculo, apud Harduin.

† Richard archiep. Cantuar. epist. ad omn. episc. Angliæ, inter Petr. Blis. Epist. 73.

‡ Bossuet, *Sermon sur l'Unité de l'Église*.

the civil power was not merely bound to provide the necessary means of Divine worship, but to look upon the furtherance of the kingdom of God as its higher aim and its greatest privilege. 'But this was brought about,' says Professor Philipps, in his great work on canon law* 'by a well ordered legislation, which excluded from itself everything that might stand even in the slightest opposition to the divine law promulgated by the Church; by a legislation which with the weight of its authority helped out the ecclesiastical prescripts; † and this was especially the case by the employment of the secular penal power where that of the Church did not suffice.' Hence it was that the Church from the earliest times, especially in the matter of the assembling of Councils to decide doctrinal disputes, claimed the interference and support of the Civil Power; and the emperors themselves appeared in the Councils in order to see to the execution of its decrees. ‡

Occasions were not wanting for the employment of the civil sword in defence of the Church. 'Defend,' says Leo the Great in a letter to the Emperor Theodosius II., 'defend against the heretics the unshaken position of the Church, so that by the rights of Christ your kingdom also be protected.' § Thus the spiritual and the civil powers were so united as to make it im-

* Philipps's *Kirchenrecht*. Gegenseitige Hülfeleistung beider Gewalten.

† Can. certum est. 12. D. 10. In this Pope Gelasius recommends to the East Gothic King Theoderick, the observance of the Roman law, not only in secular but in spiritual matters.

‡ Philipps's *Kirchenrecht*, vol. ii.

§ Leon. M. epist. 43. c. 3. ad Theodos.

possible that rebels against the one should find refuge with the other. Hence, argues Professor Philipps, this principle follows; that neither the Church nor the State, whensoever they are united on the true basis of Divine right, have any cognisance of tolerance.† ‘Not the Church,’ he says, ‘because neither true peace nor true charity recognises tolerance. Not the State, because in accordance with its own principle it must not tolerate anything which does not agree with divine justice. Christ himself condemns tolerance when he says: “who is not with me is against me.” And the peace of Christ,’ continues Professor Philipps, ‘is very easily reconciled with the sword which he has also brought, by which father is divided from son, brother from brother. The peace of Christ, and therewith that of the Church, goes hand in hand with truth and justice, not with error and immorality; it goes hand in hand with unity but not with division. For the preservation of unity this peace calls for the sword to separate brother from brother, in order that brother might not separate brother from the unity of the Church.’ Moreover, the Church has the right, in virtue of her divine commission, to require of every one to accept her doctrine; whosoever obstinately refuses, or obstinately insists upon the election out of it of what is pleasing to himself, is against her. ‘But were the Church,’ continues Professor Philipps, ‘to tolerate such an opponent, she must tolerate another; if she tolerate one sect, she must tolerate every sect and thereby give herself up.’ So far Professor

* *Kirchenrecht*, vol. ii. p. 511. See also Muzzarelli, *Tolleranza*, in his *Il buon uso della logica*, tom. ii. p. 66.

Philipps. In the foregoing passages I have quoted from him verbatim, in order that there might be no mistake as to the meaning of so great an authority on the question as to the tolerance of errors in the matter of religion.

In a succeeding paragraph, however, the writer draws a distinction between the divine law and that positive human law which has developed itself in the course of history.

According to divine law, he says, every magistrate, whether spiritual or temporal, must in every respect take his stand on the principle of religious intolerance, but nevertheless this is not the principle of the law which has historically constituted itself. In this law many modifications are introduced by treaties which are to be held sacred, by constitutions confirmed by oath, and the like. Therefore according to positive human law that intimate alliance which is required by the divine law does not always exist between the two powers destined to rule the world. Unfortunately we all know too well as a fact the modifications which have taken place in the divine constitution of society, but what is so necessary to enforce, is the vast distinction between the respect for rights that have sprung up out of the compulsory modifications of a principle divine in its origin, and the entire or voluntary abandonment of that principle.

It must, however, be remembered that just now I am treating of what I have called the Catholic theory of the relations between the temporal and spiritual powers; I shall in the course of this paper or of the next have to come across the historical modifications

which have arisen in those relations and shall have to encounter, not only the modification but the partial destruction, and in some instances and for a time, the total abandonment, of that principle which Divine Providence has laid down as the basis on which the government of human society rests.

Lest I should seem just now to be giving too religious a character to this discussion, or rather to be taking too theocratic a view of the constitution of society, may I be allowed to recall the fact familiar to everyone that the State is coeval with the human race itself, that the knowledge of the Divine constitution of society is found in the remotest antiquity, and that after the rise and passing away of many an empire, traces of this great truth still remained deep and clear even in the mind of the heathen. The godless theory of the constitution of society is as shallow as it is modern. The older, the truer, the Catholic mode of treating this subject is therefore the only one that I can adopt or which you can listen to.

To complete this exposition of the Catholic theory of the relation between the Church and the Civil Power one question and that of the highest importance still remains, and that is the relative position in rank and authority of the two powers which govern the world. But before proceeding to this consideration I must briefly allude, at least for completeness sake, first to the difference in their immediate ends; and secondly to a certain qualified independence in the two powers of each other. The end for which the Church is instituted is the salvation of souls; the primary end of

civil governments is to ensure peace and confer temporal happiness on all under its rule. Such a difference in their more immediate ends would inevitably lead to a total separation between the two powers, were it not the highest duty of the civil power, as of society itself, of which it is the crown, so to act in the discharge of its functions as best to promote the only end for which mankind exists. 'The intrinsic end,' therefore, as a distinguished Catholic writer and thinker* has recently expressed it, which should be pursued by a civil governor in his political action, is the highest good of his people; and predominantly therefore, their moral and spiritual welfare, so far as he is cognisant of such welfare.' The whole subject as regards the intrinsic end of civil government and its relation to the spiritual power, has been treated in so thorough and masterly a manner by the able writer I have alluded to, as to render it impossible for me to add a word; I shall only observe that this identity in their ultimate ends is the surest bond of union between the two powers, a bond which even some Catholics of name and of high repute have done their worst to tear asunder.

As to the mutual independence of the Church and the Civil Power, it is true in the sense that both are free to pursue their course undisturbed in their allotted spheres and for their appointed ends.† The Church has not to mix itself up in civil matters nor the State to interfere with spiritual. The Church has not to take

* *Dublin Review*, No. i. (new series) art. iii.

† Taparelli, *Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale*, tom. v. p. 21, quoted by Philipps.

upon itself the political arrangements of kingdoms ; in these matters the Civil Power is supreme and independent of the Church, as long as the divine laws are in no way contravened. The Church is not empowered to inquire into the interior motive * of princes nor to judge whether their public acts, as long as they are confined within their allotted limits, are done for their own glory or for the honour of God. Nevertheless, if the king violate the divine or ecclesiastical law, he is subject, in the same manner as the individual Christian, to the penal jurisdiction of the Church, and is moreover, on account of the magnitude of an offence in one vested with such high prerogatives, justly exposed to the public reproofs of his ecclesiastical superiors. On the other hand, things which are divine are in no way subject to the civil power, † and all arbitrary assumption by the civil authorities of jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters is nothing short of robbery. ‡

It has been well observed that in all such assumptions of spiritual authority is contained something of the nature of heresy. § In all such attempts, St. Cyprian observes, ‘the Church must not yield to the Capitol.’ In a letter to Leo the Isaurian, Pope Gregory II. observes, the Pontiffs withdrawing themselves from political affairs are on that account placed over the Churches, and that the emperors, therefore, ought in the same

* Philipp’s *Kirchenrecht*, vol. ii. chap. 10.

† Can. Convenior. 21. c. 23. 2. 5. (Ambrose):—‘Ea quæ divina sunt, imperatoriæ potestati non esse subjecta.’

‡ Vide Manclerus de Monarchia, P. iii. lib. i. cap. 16.

§ J. Thomasius (Card.), Opusc. 16, quoted by Philipps, *Kirchenrecht*.

manner to abstain from interference with ecclesiastical matters.* It is needless to multiply authorities on this point. The most complete independence of all State control in ecclesiastical matters is an essential characteristic of the Church. It must, moreover, be remembered that inasmuch as all these relations are based on the divine law, and the interpretation of the divine law rests with the Church alone, it follows that to her belongs the right of adjudicating on all these relations, and on the Christian State lies the obligation of implicit obedience. The statement of this fact forcibly introduces the last question of principle which has still to be considered. What is the relative position and rank of the temporal and spiritual powers.? There are only three positions imaginable—either the Church and the State are completely co-ordinate, or the State is subordinate to the Church, or the Church to the State. In support of the last proposition the argument has been advanced that the State was anterior to the Church, that the Civil Power was of divine origin, and that the Church was included in the divine commands of submission to the higher powers. First of all it is clear, in answer to these allegations, that the Church herself was one of these higher powers † to whom all men are to be subject; moreover the obligation of subjection to the civil power is only in such things as are in its province. The fact that the State was anterior in its origin to the Church is no argument; so was morality,

* Gregor. II. P. epist. i. ad Leon Isaur.

† Bianchi, *Della potestà e della politica della chiesa*, tom. i. p. 487.

but morality is nevertheless subject to the Church.* The divine origin of the civil power alone, does not give it any preeminence over other institutions equally divine in their origin; episcopacy is of divine institution, and yet bishops are subject to the Pope.† And though, indeed, Pope Gregory the Great told the Emperor that he ruled not only over soldiers but over priests, the Pope did not in the least, as has been pretended, mean thereby to countenance the idea that the Church was subordinate to the State. On the contrary he takes the Emperor severely to task for exceeding the limits of his jurisdiction, and for desiring to reduce the Church to the position of a handmaid of the empire. ‘The emperor, in the audacity of his infatuation,’ says Pope Gregory the Great, ‘goes so far as to raise himself up against the Roman Church, the head of all the Churches, and arrogates to himself the right of earthly dominion over the mistress of nations.‡ If the Church, then, be not subordinate to the Civil Power, it might next be inferred that co-ordinate jurisdiction would be the natural relation between the two powers; and taking the Pope and the Emperor as the highest representative in either, it might be settled thus: Let, in spiritual things, the Emperor be subordinate to the Pope, and the Pope to the Emperor in temporal. It might further be argued that before he had acquired temporal sovereignty, the Pope was a subject of the empire, and that this co-ordination of power suffered only in the course of time, a modification from two historical facts

* Philipp's *Kirchenrecht*, vol. ii. chap. 10. † Ibid.

‡ C. 13. Gregor. M. opp. tom. iii. Col. 518.

—the acquisition of civil principedom by the Papacy ; and the immunity from civil jurisdiction obtained by the clergy. Were the pope to be deprived for a time of his temporal dominions, the clergy everywhere of its immunities—certainly possible contingencies—would there indeed then be a co-ordination between the spiritual and temporal powers? Or has indeed such ever been the case?

A complete refutation of this theory of the co-ordination of the spiritual and temporal powers is found in the decretals of the Popes themselves. ‘In these decretals,’ as Anthony of Aquino well observes, ‘the most important matters are treated ; dogmas of the orthodox faith decided ; heresies condemned ; laws of the Church established ; the unjustly condemned, restored. In them all things are contained concerning the government of the entire Church and of clerical discipline.’*

By the decretal of Innocent III. entitled ‘De majoritate et obedientia,’ it is laid down that the civil power does not rule the ecclesiastical, but is subject to it. ‘We do not deny,’ says the great pontiff, ‘that the Emperor excels in temporal things those at least who receive from him temporalities. But the Pope excels in spiritual things, which are as much above temporal things as the soul is accounted above the body.’ Innocent III. then alludes to the power of the Keys conferred by Christ on Peter and his successors, from which power none were exempt, not even Kings. All men were sheep alike entrusted to the shepherd of the

* Anton. Aquinat., Præf. ad Caraffæ edit. Epist. Rom. Pont.

one fold. He also calls attention to the fact that not to a king but to a priest, not to the descendant of a royal but of a priestly race, was it said in the Old Testament, 'See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to throw down, to build and to plant.' It is declared in this decretal to be the duty of the Sovereign Pontiff to entreat, to correct and to reprove, not only ordinary persons, but kings and emperors, and, whether it be agreeable to them or not, to lead them on to do that which is conformable to the divine Will. In this decretal also occurs the famous comparison in which the spiritual and temporal powers are likened to the two great lights in the firmament: The greater light—the spiritual authority—to rule the day, the lesser—which is the Regal power—to rule the night. And both were great, but one was the greater. In the firmament of heaven which God has made—that is in the universal Church—as great as is the difference between the sun and the moon is the difference between the pontiffs and kings.

Before Innocent III. Pope Urban II. had declared that the papal power was elevated above all royal power, inasmuch as the pope would one day have to render an account to God of the kings. Again in the famous Bull 'Unam sanctam,' Boniface VIII. speaks thus: Both the spiritual and the material sword are in the power of the Church; the one is wielded on behalf of the Church, and the other by the Church herself. One is in the hand of the priest; the other in the hands of kings and soldiers, but at the nod or call of the priest.

This preeminence was recognised also by the civil power, as will abundantly appear in the historical examination of the subject. The prince, however great his earthly power, is still only a layman and as such subject to the Church. He is not, as St. Basil said at the fourth council of Constance, a shepherd but a sheep of the sheepfold, or as it is expressed in the letter of the Archbishop of Canterbury to Henry III. of England, he is not a father but a son of the Church.

In the Bull 'Unam sanctam' it is expressly pointed out that in committing all men to the charge of Peter, Christ made no distinction of persons; all, then, are subject, princes as well as people, to the laws and to the canons of the Church, and are to be judged alike by the Supreme Pontiff.

Besides the argument from authority as to the subordination of the civil to the spiritual authority such a consequence seems necessarily to follow from the reason of the thing itself. First every individual Christian is subject to the spiritual power, and therefore the Christian prince. The prince has the performance of a public duty entrusted to him by God; in the proper discharge of his duty he must be guided by the divine Will. Every act which emanates from the Civil Power must be in exact conformity with the laws of the Church; any infringement of these laws is a violation of the essential principle on which all authority rests—conformity with the divine Will. But what is conformable to the divine Will the Church alone can declare; and to all such declarations the Civil Power must render unhesitating obedience. And

since laws are continually issuing from the Church affecting the government and well-being of all Christian peoples, the Civil Power is bound both to consult all such laws and to carry them into effect. And moreover since to the Church is entrusted the great end for which mankind was created, the State, to which the government of men is likewise given, must co-operate with the Church towards this end. But it can only rightly so co-operate by a complete conformity to the will of the Church. But to exercise such a conformity is in itself to place the civil power under the spiritual authority in precisely the same manner as is required by the great teachers of the Church.

And such a harmony between the dictates of reason and of authority is what I had to prove.

I will now make one step further and the last in the attempt to elucidate the theory as to the relation between the civil power and the spiritual authority; and this is to inquire into the principle on which the deposing power of the popes rests. On this subject some difference of opinion exists among Catholics, but it is difficult to conceive many things more important for the right apprehension of the position and conduct of the papacy in its relations to the State, to Kings and their subjects, during some of the most critical periods of history, than the source of the deposing power. If we throw ourselves into the life and strife of those times when the power of the Popes was at its highest; if we read the Papal Bulls; if we listen to the comments and watch the conduct both of the friends and the foes of the papacy, we are utterly unable to reconcile with

such a state of things the theory which some modern Catholic apologists, with Gosselin at their head, have set up to account for the existence of the deposing power of the popes.

I cannot for an instant believe that this power, so tremendous in its character, was conferred on the papacy by the Christian kings and peoples, or that it was the mere result of the peculiar condition and circumstances of Europe. The popes themselves did not speak of their power to depose princes as of a right derived from the will of kings and peoples. They had a far higher idea of the source of this authority. In issuing decrees which made the mightiest monarchs tremble, they never regarded themselves as delegates only of a political society. They were not mere umpires before whom the nations had agreed to come for judgment, but judges on a tribunal set up by no earthly arm. They were not the vicegerents of Christendom but of Christ. 'The Church is the mistress of nations,' says S. Gregory the Great, and in virtue of this supreme domination the vicars of Christ executed judgment on high and low, on the sovereign as on the subject. Judging from their actions and their words, such it seems to me was the conception which the popes had of their right to depose kings; and such at least was the opinion common to the times when this right was most freely exercised.

In modern times it is too much the custom to limit or explain away rights which were undoubtedly exercised by the popes in former days, in order to bring the papal authority into harmony with political ideas

which have too often nothing in common with Christian principles.

The only satisfactory explanation, it seems to me, of the history of the popes in the middle ages is the simple statement that the popes were responsible to God for the well-being of Christendom, and acting on such responsibility they deposed, by a right inherent in the papacy, kings who had forfeited their right to reign over a Christian people. If this right be denied to them, the greatest and holiest of the popes will be justly exposed to the reproach of having put forward false claims and of having usurped an authority to which they had no title. If, instead of being a part of the royal authority of Christ which they had inherited from St. Peter, it had been a mere gift or a delegated authority, from the princes of Christendom, it is notorious that many of the mightiest rulers of the world would have gladly revoked the power which the popes exercised over them. But the kings of Christendom showed by their acts as well as by their professions—that they believed in the divine origin of the deposing power. The whole position, however, of the Papacy in regard to the Christian State, as it existed in the earlier half of the middle ages, calls for a closer examination.

The State, so to speak, had its home in the Church; it lived in the House of God. It accepted the divine law as the condition of its existence. 'The Civil power,' says St. Thomas Aquinas, 'is subject to the Spiritual, as the body is to the soul; it is therefore no assumption for the Spiritual authorities to decide in

'such temporal matters in which the Civil Power is subject to them.'* Hence it follows if the prince rebelled in such temporal matters as were subject to the authority of the Church, how much more so if he fell into heresy ! he was not only excommunicated, but forfeited also his civil rights. It was simply impossible for a king, put outside the Church, to rule over a Christian community ; it would be an act in direct antagonism to the first principles of law and social order.

It was an axiom in such a condition of society—that kings to have the right to govern their people had to be Christian. Unless, therefore, the right of excommunication were denied to the Popes the right of deposition had to be allowed. Moreover the right of deposing kings is inherent in the supreme sovereignty which the Popes, as vicegerents of Christ, exercise over all Christian nations. By the very fact of being Christian, nations have accepted the divine law, and are bound by its remotest consequences, and the Church is responsible to God for the observance of the divine law by kings and peoples alike, but every responsibility involves a corresponding authority. Therefore this supreme sovereignty is vested in the Church. One of the attributes of sovereignty, however, is to execute judgment ; and the last punishment of kings is deposition. But the Church is also responsible for the highest welfare of the people, for whose good in the name of God kings reign. When kings renounce the name of God and lead their people to destruction, the Vicar of Christ, by virtue of his supreme responsibility and

* Thom. Aquinas : *Summa Theolog.* ii. 2: Q. 12, art. 2.

consequent sovereignty, deposes the godless king and absolves the people from their oath of allegiance. St. Thomas says 'that the Church can punish all those who fall away from the faith by such a sentence as shall deprive them of government over the faithful, because otherwise it might lead to a great perversion of faith.' St. Bonaventura has no hesitation in saying that 'the Popes for a cause can remove kings and depose emperors, as has often happened and been seen, when their malice warrants it and the necessity of the community requires it.' To depose kings and emperors is as much a right as to excommunicate individuals and to lay kingdoms under an interdict. These are no derived or delegated rights, but are of the essence of that royal authority of Christ with which His vicegerents on earth are vested. This sovereignty is in itself supreme in all times and over all men, at least over all men who are under the divine law. There cannot be, in the nature of things, two supreme authorities in one society. Christian society is one; it must, therefore, be under one Supreme Head, under one ultimate law, under one sovereign authority; but this ultimate law, this one supreme and sovereign authority is the Church, the fountain and source of all the authority which flows through Christian society. When, therefore, for the common good the Head of the Church exercises his supreme authority either by excommunicating individuals, by laying nations under an interdict, or by deposing kings, all Christian people are bound to obey his decree. How far the supreme pontifical authority extends over

such nations as have lost or have never received the Christian name, or who have rejected Christian baptism and the divine law is a question, not so much of principle as of the modification of a principle, and one which I cannot now enter upon. So much, however, is clear—that where, as in uncatholic nations, responsibility is less, authority is less. A question distinct from this, however, is the exercise of a right undoubtedly possessed. A man, for instance, may possess a right and yet be unable to exercise it, or consider it inexpedient even to assert it; yet this restraint under which he labours does not destroy his right. In a like manner the vicars of Christ possess the right to excommunicate kings by name or to depose them or to lay kingdoms under an interdict, and yet, owing to the altered state of Christendom, and because it would not now conduce to the public good, the sovereign pontiffs refrain from inflicting these terrible penalties on sacrilegious princes or on rebellious people; but it does not follow from this wise expediency that the popes of the present age are dispossessed of this supreme attribute of their sovereign power over the nations. Under circumstances the non-exercise of a right is no conclusive argument as to its non-existence. Writers have argued and nations have declared that popes have no power to depose kings, but no pope, that I am aware of, has accepted such arguments or endorsed such declarations, and therefore I will follow what the popes have said and done rather than the opinions of Gallican legists or the declarations of heretical parliaments.

In the earlier centuries, indeed, of the middle ages

the Christian State was so constituted as to be able to carry out almost in perfection the divine laws as to the public government of society. Instead of the antagonism which, to a greater or a less degree, has ever since existed between the spiritual and temporal powers, there was, on the whole, harmony and effective co-operation. Owing to this co-operation the conscience of Christendom in all public matters was instinct with the spirit of Christianity; and kings, who fell under the ban of the Church, were rejected and condemned at once by the public voice of Europe. The divine law was, in a word, the law of nations, and the pope was the supreme lawgiver on earth.

Such, at least, was the general result, in spite of many interruptions of the divine order of things, in spite of deplorable contests caused by the aggressive spirit and lawless violence on the part of many of the kings and emperors. Of such a nature were the relations of the Church and the Civil Power at the time when the great contest concerning the investitures was brought to a close, and when Innocent II. crowned Lothar, the duke of Saxony, emperor of Germany. Speaking of this period, Innocent II. says: 'When the sacred authority of the popes and the imperial power are inter-penetrated with true love for one another, homage ought in humility to be offered to God, for then only tranquillity and peace can flourish among Christian people. Nothing in this time is so glorious as the papal chair, nothing so dignified as the imperial throne; there is nothing which shines more splendidly than true fidelity among princes, or endures more imperishably than

genuine fear of God.' After these general observations the pope speaks of the emperor 'as having undergone many dangers, as having spared neither money nor lands nor his own person in the service of St. Peter.' But this period, midway between Charlemagne and the close of the middle ages, was the culminating point in the relations of the Church and the State. After the death of Innocent II. began that fatal decline which in the course of ages led to the almost entire alienation of the State from the Church. In a future essay I shall have to show what a salutary effect the Christian union of the spiritual and temporal powers produced on the progress of civilisation, on the laws and institutions, and on the habits and character of Christendom. I shall first, however, apply the test of an historical examination to the theory of the union of Church and State we have just been considering, and produce evidences of the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal power in the public acts and declarations of the popes themselves; in the acceptance of this supremacy even by such emperors and kings as were themselves most hostile to the Church's authority, and finally in the universal recognition this principle met with in the mind of Christendom. At the same time I trust there will be no difficulty in proving that the supremacy of the spiritual over the civil power was not the work of ambitious or designing pontiffs in a late period, as is asserted by the sceptical Mosheim or the anti-papal Hallam, but that it is simply the result of the Christian constitution of society. In tracing through their various vicissitudes the contests between the

popes and the German emperors during the later portion of the middle ages, we shall be led on to consider the deplorable state of things which but too surely prepared the way for the religious revolt of the sixteenth century.

That result, begotten by a long-grown and deep-seated insubordination in the hearts of kings and peoples, was the parent of a spirit of lawlessness which swept before it all that was grandest in the Christian State, all that was holiest in its relation to the Church and to society. The Civil Power usurped the functions of the Church and seated itself on the spiritual throne. The seamless robe of external as well as of internal unity was rent. Of Christendom, that great political creation of the Church, nothing now remains but the name and the memory. *Magni nominis umbra.* The shadow only is left to-day of that great Christian polity which was the pride and glory of civilisation. As in the history of the human race there was the fall, the flood, and the redemption, so in the relation of the Church to the State, we have had the great Apostacy of the sixteenth century, we are still suffering from the avenging flood of the French revolution; but none can tell whether now political redemption be at hand, or the final advent of that political atheism which Pius IX. has so emphatically condemned. If men are deaf to that voice of warning, if their eyes are blind to the legible handwriting on the wall, who shall tell how soon, impelled by those twin agents of evil—political atheism and philosophical rationalism—society may not be hurried on into a catastrophe more awful than has yet befallen the Christian world.

PART II.

Relation of the Church to the Civil Power.

IN speaking in the first part of this essay on the relation of the Church to the Civil Power in the middle ages, my aim was to show that such a relation was of a fixed, not of a fleeting character; that it was not a political accident like the Holy Alliance, or the balance of power, or universal suffrage, but a Divine purpose; and that the principle which governed the relation between the civil and spiritual powers was based not on common consent nor on human law but on the immutable will of the Creator and upholder of human society. The great principle which adjusts and harmonises the relations which necessarily arise in the twofold government of the world is then, in brief, that in the government of Christian society the lesser must always be subordinate to the higher interests, the temporal to the eternal end. Consequently since the things which affect the spiritual interests of man are primarily given to the guardianship of the Church, so must the Church, so far at least as such interests are concerned, be supreme over the Civil Power on whom God has bestowed as its more immediate object the custody of purely human affairs. Moreover the Church, from the nature of her commission and from her divine constitution, has alone the right of defining what matters affect spiritual interests, and consequently fall under her

supreme guardianship. The possession of such a right is in itself an attribute of sovereignty.

Again, I suppose I may lay it down as a general principle not to be gainsaid—for I am now laying the foundations for the after structure of my argument—that, since in the nature of things it is impossible for two supreme authorities to coexist, there must necessarily be in every society a culminating domination somewhere. Now it is to be found in a Divine revelation, now in moral, now in material force, and now dressed up under the guise of a fictitious public opinion. But wherever this power which is to exert a supreme binding force over the actions of men resides, whether in the law of God or in the self-will of man, its exercise is a necessary condition for the existence of society.

The question then is, Where in a Christian commonwealth does this power reside? what is the nature of this supreme authority in the last resort? and what is the permanent necessary relation of a power possessing such an authority to other powers in human society?

Such a question going to the very root of Christian society finds, it seems to me, I will not merely say its best, but its only true solution in that idea of the constitution of Christian society and of the nature of its government as was expressed in the normal relations, which subsisted in the middle ages, between the Church and the State.

These normal relations, the principle which governed them and adjusted the authority of the two powers divinely instituted for the government of the world, I have already stated at full in the preceding pages. With this theory of the indirect power of the Church

our temporal governments I will now, as briefly as the subject allows, contrast the various counter theories which since the seventeenth century—a period singularly prolific in errors as to the origin and nature of government—have been set up to explain the character of the connection between Church and State, first by men outside the Church and then by such Catholics as repudiated in a greater or lesser degree the principles which had theretofore satisfied the judgment and commanded the undivided homage of the most profound thinkers of the Church.

By such a process of exhaustion as is involved in the comparison of many fallacious theories with the true I trust to substantiate the conclusion that the relation, which subsisted in the middle ages between the temporal and spiritual powers, was the true and normal principle instituted by God for the twofold government of the world.

For the purpose of illustrating the character of the relation subsisting in the middle ages between the Papacy and the royal power I shall single out on some other occasion the most remarkable of the contests between the Popes, the German emperors, and the kings of France and England: but it is more convenient, I think, to put the historical consideration aside for the present. It will also be more in the order of my subject to deal first with such theories of Church and State government as in the most essential particulars run counter to the Catholic theory. For this purpose I shall select the views put forward on the nature of government by English Protestant writers of the highest

repute, whose works have had the greatest influence in the formation of English thought. And then I shall proceed with the statement of those theories originated by certain Catholic writers of modern times which, under various forms and for motives as various, stridge the rights of the Church or limit the authority of the Pope.

The first of these writers in time as in learning and repute is the author of the 'Ecclesiastical Policy.' Arguing against the Puritans of the sixteenth century, who were not more opposed to the principle of an established Church than they were loud in their denunciations of the Church of England, Hooker sought to vindicate not only the principle of an established Church but that also of the royal supremacy. The foundation of his theory is that the Church and the commonwealth are in England the self-same community, and 'therefore,' so quote his own illustration, 'as in a square triangle the base doth differ from the sides thereof, and yet one and the self-same line is both a base and also a side; a side simply, a base if it chance to be the bottom and underlie the rest, so albeit properties and actions of one do cause the name of a Commonwealth, qualities and functions of another sort the name of the Church, to be given to a multitude, yet one and the self-same multitude may in such sort be both.* Hence he argues that since there is no necessity of personal separation but only of natural, 'one and the same person may in both bear principal sway. Therefore and 'according to the pattern of the example of the ancient Jewish kings the like power in causes ecclesiastical is

* *Ecclesiastical Policy*, vol. iii. book viii. sect. 3. p. 324.

by the laws of this realm annexed unto the crown.' Opposing with great propriety the Puritanical theory of the complete and perpetual severance of things spiritual, and things temporal, this great Anglican writer contends that, such an error arose from the presence of the Church in such commonwealths as are opposite to true religion.' 'This,' he says, 'was the state of the Jewish Church both in Egypt and Babylon; the state of Christian Churches a long time after Christ; and in this case, because the proper affairs and actions of the Church, as it is the Church, hath no dependence on the laws, or upon the government of the Civil State, an opinion hath thereby grown, that even so it should be always. This was it,' continues Hooker, 'which deceived Allen in the writing of his Apology: "The Apostles (saith he) did govern the Church in Rome, when Nero bare rule, even as at this day in all the Church's dominions the Church hath a spiritual regiment without dependence, and so ought she to have amongst heathens, or with Christians."' * Since so fair-meaning a writer could not be guilty of misrepresentation, it is clear that he misconceived Cardinal Allen's argument, which was simply that neither in heathen nor in Christian commonwealths was the spiritual government of the Church to be dependent on the State as it was in England. According to Hooker's own argument on the Civil Power, Cardinal Allen drew, as every Catholic does, a pointed distinction between the relation of the Church to the heathen and to the Christian State; when the temporal princes are pagans, he says it is wholly sepa-

* *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book viii.

rate, but in Christian commonwealths joined though not confounded. So much, however, Hooker subsequently grants as Cardinal Allen's argument, 'who doth in this point a little correct his former judgment before mentioned. Howbeit,' he continues, 'afterwards his former sting appeareth again; for in a Commonwealth he holdeth that the Church ought not to depend at all upon the authority of any civil person whatsoever, as in England he saith it doth.'

Another argument which the writer of the 'Ecclesiastical Polity' makes use of to prove the identity of the Church and State is taken from the effect of punishment inflicted by the one on the other. This argument however strikes me as being singularly weak and the reasoning as somewhat forced. Excommunication, he contends, although it cuts off indeed from the Church and yet not from the Commonwealth, nevertheless operates in such a manner as to sever him, who before had fellowship with that society whereof he was a member as well touching things spiritual as civil, for a time from it only as touching communion in those things which belong to the same body as it is the Church. Then concerning civil punishments he says that banishment 'sith it casteth out quite and clean from the body of the Commonweal, it must needs also consequently cast the banished party even out of the very Church he was of before, because that Church and the Commonweal he was of, were both one and the same society: so that whatsoever doth utterly separate a man's person from the one, it separateth from the other also.' Such a view as this utterly destroys the idea of the uni-

versality of the Church by confining its operations to the natural boundaries of a kingdom ; and its absurdity will appear still more transparent if it be tested by actual experience. Take, for instance, the case of a conspirator, a Fenian, perchance, banished for treason beyond the seas ; who for a moment imagines that such banishment involves *ipso facto* excommunication ? Excommunication is a punishment inflicted by the spiritual power for spiritual offences, and although I am far from denying the moral guiltiness of the convicted conspirator, yet his is not necessarily, if at all, an offence bringing after it excommunication ; far less is the bare removal of his person beyond the natural boundaries of the kingdom correlative, as Hooker asserts, with his utter separation from the Church. I can put the case still more strongly, thanks to the testimony of a distinguished prelate* who was an eye-witness to the scenes and events which he so eloquently described in a paper which he read at a late meeting of the Academia.

Who, however wedded to a theory, could conceive it possible that certain women arriving, as described by the right rev. prelate, in Australia, under sentence of banishment for some comparatively trivial matter, guiltless of any grave moral or spiritual offence, and shrinking in horror, as we are told, on their outward voyage from contact with the guilt which beset them on every side, should find themselves on reaching their place of banishment under the terrible penalty of excommunication, simply on account of their exile from the Christian State in which they were born ? Or were

* The Right Rev. Dr. Ullathorne.

those eight criminals at Norfolk Island, whose contrite brokenheartedness was witnessed by the prelate I am alluding to, because they were cast out of the commonwealth, also cruelly cut off from the Church, whose repentant and forgiven children they were to the end? Nothing is so relentless as a theory; cast in its trammels the most acute intellects are often powerless to discern the plainest and the most fatal flaws in the system which they build up to their own destruction. The flaw in this eminent writer's theory, in this at least not judicious, if I may venture to contradict a judgment which is so common as to have become proverbial in English literature, was the confounding of two separate and distinct societies, on the ground that one and the selfsame multitude composed the members of both. It is not the difference of the subject-matter which constitutes the difference of the two societies, but difference in their origin and in their ideas, in their qualities, purposes and functions, and in all those things which express their highest life; it is such an essential difference in its highest expression which constitutes the life and confers its personality upon a society; and to personality belongs moral responsibility and a conscience. And though the same subject-matter, the 'selfsame multitude' as Hooker puts it, composes the members of the two societies, it by no means follows that such a fact confounds or destroys the essential and distinct life in each, or makes the two one. It is not impossible, for instance, to conceive that the members who compose the Royal Society of Arts are the same as they who compose the Society which charges itself with the care of

providing an asylum for idiots. But such a possible identity in the members conveys no conceivable idea of sameness in the two societies whose action and essential life are so radically distinct.

It was from such a confusion of idea as to what constituted the distinctive difference between the Commonwealth and the Church that the mistake arose which led the most learned and profound divine of the Anglican Church in the sixteenth century to declare that 'the Church and the Commonwealth are in the case of the country being Christian therefore personally one society; which society being termed a commonwealth as it liveth under whatsoever form of secular law and regiment, a Church as it liveth under the spiritual law of Christ.' Hence he is naturally led, nay logically constrained to declare that 'he whose power is greatest over the commonwealth may lawfully have supremacy of power also over the Church, and to dispose of spiritual affairs so far as the highest uncommanded commander in them.' In a society so constituted as this writer imagined it to be, religion forms, as it ought of course in all Christian governments, the chief object. 'In all commonwealths,' he says, and with this quotation I shall have done with this sixteenth-century theory of the relation of the Church to the State which for so long a period satisfied the English mind, 'in all commonwealths, then, things spiritual ought above temporal to be sought for; and of things spiritual the chiefest is religion. For this cause, persons and things employed peculiarly about the affairs of religion, are by an excellency termed spiritual.'*

* *Ecclesiastical Polity.*

rights of sovereignty in Christian States, says 'Of Hooker's work what was remarked of Barrow might have been as truly said, "that he left nothing for others to supply." And so stood the matter until men grew weary of walking in one track, and until one eminent divine who would never tread in any man's steps, professed to give a model of his own.* This was no other than the author of the 'Alliance,' and of the 'Divine Legation,' whom Coleridge has not inaptly, if somewhat severely, characterised as 'thought-swarming, idealess Warburton.' At any rate after the author of the 'Ecclesiastical Polity' he is the first of that brilliant galaxy of English writers whose balanced minds, whose varied and ingenious talents and trained political intellects, have been turned with ardour to the elucidation of a subject which still defies their utmost skill. Not to speak of Hobbes, whose ideas and principles of government are based on the denial of God's right over the world which He created, nor of Selden, one need only mention the names of Bishop Warburton, of Paley, of Coleridge, of Arnold, of Whately, and of Gladstone, to perceive that their failure must be ascribed, not to their want of genius or judgment, but rather to the peculiar system of Church and State under which they lived, and which they had to harmonise and account for. 'It is a shrewd presumption,' says a modern writer on ecclesiastical history, and none I think or few can avoid agreeing with him, 'that a system is ill-founded when its most intelligent friends are so

* *The Rights of Sovereignty in Christian States defended* (1821); quoted in Hanbury's *Introduction to Hooker's Works*.

much divided about it ; and in order to account for it recur to hypotheses so contradictory.*

The hypothesis which Warburton sets up is: that the care of civil society extends only to the body and its concerns, and the care of religious society only to the soul, 'the ultimate end of religion being the care of souls, and the ultimate end of civil society the care of bodies ;' † whence it follows that since the administration of each society is exercised in so remote spheres they can never meet to clash, so that no state of dependency can arise between the two societies, but each society is sovereign and independent on the other. Between these two sovereign societies he supposes a compact by which the Church surrenders her independency in return for establishment and protection against religious societies or sects not in alliance with the State. The great principle, Warburton himself says, of this theory is that religion is to be established and protected not as it is the true religion but for the sake of its civil utility. ‡ Hence the State, being without moral consciousness and acting on no principle other than civil utility, selects the strongest or the most numerous of existing religious societies for an alliance with itself to propagate the belief of a God, of his Providence over human affairs, and of the way in which that Providence is chiefly dispensed, namely by rewards and punishments in a future state. The next care of the magistrate, says Warburton, was for the support

* Dr. Campbell's *Lect. on Eccl. Hist.*, 1815, vol. i. lect. vii., quoted in *Introd. to Hooker's Works*.

† *Alliance*, Book i. chap. v. p. 54.

‡ *The Divine Legation*, Book ii. sect. v. p. 339.

of a religion so propagated, and this was done by uniting it to the State, taking it under the civil protection and giving it the right and privileges of an establishment. Accordingly we find that all States and people in the ancient world had an established religion which was under the more immediate protection of the civil magistrate in contradiction to those which were only tolerated.* But if the established Church, from failing influence or declining numbers, is unable to fulfil her part of the covenant with the State, namely her civil utility of promoting good order and giving support to civil jurisdiction, then the contract is void and the State is at liberty to ally itself with a more prosperous sect. Such he elsewhere describes as the natural dissolution of the alliance between Church and State. Not to perceive that it is the duty of the State to ally itself with Divine Truth and to aim at the moral good of its subjects is the capital vice of this degrading theory of Bishop Warburton's. Its chief principle that the true end for which religion is established is, not to provide for the true Faith, but for civil utility,† excited reprobation even in Paley, who says the making of the Church an engine or even an ally of the State, converting it into the means of strengthening or diffusing influence; or regarding it as a support of regal in opposition to popular forms of government, have served only to debase the institution and to introduce into it numerous corruptions and abuses.‡

As in Hooker's, so in Warburton's theory, though by

* *The Divine Legation, ut supra.*

† *Alliance*, Book iii. chap. iv. p. 240.

‡ *Moral Phil.*, Book vi. chap. x.

totally different processes, the result arrived at by each is to place the Church in a condition of helpless dependency on the State, to make her the slave instead of the mistress of nations. Is it not strange that Protestant divines so eminent as these I am speaking of, who each, though in an unequal degree, has left his mark upon the religious opinions and the literature of England, could conceive nothing more nor less of the mighty Church of Christ from the days of Constantine to the days of Edward VI. than as a spiritual function of the Civil Power or an instrument of police in the hands of the State? If in the days of England's intellectual prime so farseeing and judicious a mind as Hooker's was so iron-bound by the Protestant theories under which he lived, as not to be able to recognise the divine and independent office of the Church, shall we be surprised at the continuance of the Protestant tradition in these lesser days, which instead of ecclesiastical Politics gives us only injudicious and ill-informed Eirenicons?

In his idea of a Church, its constitution and relation to the State, Coleridge has suggested rather than elaborated a theory agreeing neither with the celebrated system of Hooker nor that of Warburton, which, as has been justly observed, under one shape or another have divided the opinions of thinking persons in Protestant England up to the present day.

The object of the State, according to Coleridge's theory, in so far agreeing with the idea of Warburton, is to make provision for the two great opposite interests in every nation, its permanence and its progression in wealth and personal freedom, in other

words, to reconcile law with liberty ; the object of the national Church is to secure and improve intellectual and moral culture, which is the necessary antecedent condition of permanent and progressive civilisation. And moral science in the course of things, will lead to the supernatural, to religion ; but, says Coleridge ‘ religion as understood in reference to a future state, and to the abiding essential interest of the individual as a person and not as the citizen, neighbour or subject, may be an indispensable ally, but is not the essential constitutive end of that national institute which is unfortunately, at least improperly styled the Church ; a name which in its best sense is exclusively appropriate to the Church of Christ. If this latter,’ he continues, ‘ be *ecclesia*, the communion of such as are called out of the world, that is in reference to the special ends and purposes of that communion ; this other might more expressively have been entitled *enclesia*, or an order of men chosen in and of the realm, and constituting an estate of that realm.’

In this theory Coleridge distinguishes the national Church from the Church of Christ in spiritual religion. The national Church in its primary intention is nothing more than the teacher of the liberal arts and sciences and of theology only as forming a part of the objects of knowledge. The theological order had precedence indeed, he observes, and deservedly, but not because its members were priests, whose office was to conciliate the invisible powers, and to superintend the interests that survive the grave, but because the science of theology was the root and trunk of the knowledge which

civilised man, because under the name theology were comprised all the main aids, instruments, and materials of national education; and lastly, because to divinity belong those fundamental truths, which are the common groundwork of civil and religious duties, not less indispensable to a right view of our temporal concerns, than to a rational faith respecting our immortal well-being. Not without celestial observations, he pointedly remarks, can even terrestrial charts be accurately constructed. The national Church, then, according to this system, makes use of theology only for terrestrial purposes. Among the primary ends of a State, Coleridge elsewhere remarks there are two, of which the national Church, according to its idea is the especial and constitutional organ and means. The one is to secure the chance to the subjects of the realm of material improvement; the other to provide for every native, such knowledge and attainments as are necessary to qualify him for the free subject of a civilised State. 'I do not mean,' says the author of this theory, 'those degrees of moral and intellectual cultivation which distinguish man from man in the same civilised society, much less those that separate the Christian from the this-worldian; but those only that constitute the civilised man in contradistinction from the barbarian, the savage, and the animal.* In the original division of land into heritable estates, a reserve should be made for the nation itself for the maintenance of the Church of the nation as long as it was true to its purpose, and the

* *Church and State: Past benefits of the National Church*, p. 76.

clergy as members of the permanent learned class performed their part as the immediate agents in the work of increasing and perpetuating the civilisation of the realm. 'And this work is,' to quote from the author's idea of the national Church, 'to form and train up the people of the country to be obedient, free, useful, organisable subjects, citizens and patriots living to the benefit of the State, and prepared to die for its defence.'

'The proper object and end of the national Church,' says the author of this theory, 'is civilisation with freedom.' Of the national Church the king is the head, as he is the protector and supreme trustee of the property reserved by the nation for the clergy.

But the peculiarity of this system is grounded on the distinction taken between the visible Church of Christ as localised in any Christian country, and the national or established Church of that country. According to Coleridge, then, the Christian Church is not a kingdom or realm of this world, nor a member of any such kingdom or realm. 'Christianity,' he says, 'and *à fortiori*, any particular scheme of theology derived and supposed by its partisans to be deduced from Christianity, is no essential part of the being of the national Church, however conducive or even indispensable it may be to its well-being.'

To avoid the risk of growing wearisome by a too minute examination into the fanciful speculations of theorists outside the Church, I must dismiss with a few words the theories even of such men as Arnold and Mr. Gladstone. Arnold adopts the theory that the

State has a moral end paramount to all others, and that as soon as it becomes Christian, it is at once fit to do the work of the Church perfectly. And giving to the State supreme sovereignty ; and believing that the end and object of a Christian kingdom or commonwealth is precisely the same with that of a Christian Church, he is unable to concede to the Church any office distinct from that of the State. 'Believing,' he says, 'with Dr. Whately, that there is in the Christian Church neither priesthood nor divine succession of governors, and believing with Mr. Gladstone that the State's highest objects are moral and not physical, I cannot but wonder that these two truths are in each of their systems divorced from their proper mates.' And accordingly, combining one half of Dr. Whately's theory with one half of Mr. Gladstone's, Dr. Arnold deduces from the two, the conclusion that the perfect State and the perfect Church are identical.

In his work, 'The State in its relation with the Church,' Mr. Gladstone professes his disagreement with the 'Ecclesiastical Polity,' as well as with Warburton's 'Alliance of Church and State.' The propositions of that work, generally, he says, are to be received with qualifications, and he argues with Bolingbroke that Warburton's whole theory rests on a fiction. As two extremes, which do not even, in his opinion, call for an examination, Mr. Gladstone regards the theory of Hobbes, which makes the Church and religion mere creatures of the State, and that of Bellarmine and of the 'Ultramontane Romanists,' according to which, the temporal power is wholly dependent on and

subordinate to the spiritual. In his own theory, he makes the Church and the State co-ordinate, which at the present day seems to be the highest pitch that Anglicanism can reach to. Yet in an earlier period, Hicks the nonjuring divine adopted, with extreme precision, in a set of forty-eight propositions, the Catholic theory of the relation of the Church to the State. Persecution may have quickened his vision, or given him greater time for meditation. Catholics, however, can cordially agree with this proposition of Mr. Gladstone's, that the propagation of religious truth is one of the principal ends of government as government. The idea of government as it is exhibited to us, he says, in the earliest records of Scripture, includes two great instruments, that of persuasion and that of control or coercion. From this it follows that the union of the Church with the State, is not an alliance of two several things, each perfect without the other, but the coalescing of two functions inherent in the first idea of sovereignty. So that both were imperfect until Constantine.

As false theories, such as these we have been considering, set up by men outside the Church, furnish an apology or a justification of the great apostacy of the Civil Power from the Church, and act as an inducement to all under their influence to acquiesce in that schism; so were principles, somewhat analogous to these, at least so far as regards the independence of the State from the control of the Church, themselves not among the least of the causes of the religious revolt of the sixteenth century. It was the assertion of this principle of independence which dictated to kings the idea of spiritual

supremacy; it was such a spirit of insubordination against Church authority which made so many parliaments and people willing to acquiesce in the assumptions of the civil magistrate. The germ of this evil is to be sought far back in the history of the middle ages; its growth was fostered by the conflicts of the German emperors with the Papacy, and its disastrous fruits were gathered as a rich harvest in the Reformation. But as I am now collating theories as to the relation between Church and State apart, as it were, from their active manifestations, a more methodical statement of the false systems, similar in their tendencies to those Protestant theories we have just been discussing, found in the post-Reformation period of the Church, is better adapted to my purpose; false systems I mean, propounded by men, who, whilst professing attachment and loyalty to the Catholic faith, were loosening the bonds which united the State to the Church and undermining its authority over the nations.

I am not now going to speak of the actual struggle between the Church and the Civil Power of which Gallicanism was one expression, for this falls under the head of the historic illustration of my subject, but simply of the principle of Gallicanism, as found in its own definitions, and of this so far only as it impinges on the temporal power of the Church over the State.

The essence of what I have termed the normal relation of the Church and the Civil Power in a Christian State consists in the subordination of the civil magistrate to the Church in its capacity of supreme moral Governor of princes and peoples. The Christian State of the

middle ages recognised in the Church three plenary powers : that of Teacher, Priest and King ; and under such an order of things, the Civil Power was anything but independent. Rebellion against this three-fold plenary power of the Church with which Peter was vested by Christ leads to heresy and schism ; but at the same time it emancipates the civil magistrate from the control of the Church. Hence the seductive influence which heresy or schism has ever exercised over kings. The spirit of insubordination so common in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries nowhere struck deeper root than in France. Not to speak here of the so called Pragmatic Sanction, nor of the Concordat of 1515, nor of the incessant and systematic invasions of the rights of the Church by the parliaments of France, and especially by that of Paris, let us glance at the theory set forth by Pierre Pethou in a treatise which he dedicated to the king, entitled ‘*les Libertez de l’Église Gallicane.*’ In this work, a source from which so many writers hostile to the Church have since too liberally drawn their supply of argument or misrepresentation, a survey of the so-called Gallican liberties is given in thirty-eight articles. And one of its two chief maxims is the following, which embraces the subject I am treating of : ‘In the lands and possessions which are subject to the sovereignty of the most Christian king, the Popes, in regard to temporal matters, have nothing to order or arrange, neither generally nor in particular.’* The Gallican liberties were described, not as privileges, but as the liberty common to all, but

* *Les Libertez de l’Église Gallicane*, art. 4.

which owing to the oppressions and assumptions of the papal power was everywhere else lost, and thus had become special in France: the Gallican Church, moreover, was described as the proper Catholic Church, as it should everywhere be. These Gallican liberties, in truth, were nothing less than schismatical propositions; and their effect was to hand the Church over, bound hand and foot, to the Civil Power. Fénelon denounced these Gallican liberties as a veritable slavery. In the declaration of the Gallican clergy as to the extent of the Papal power the first of the four articles was as follows: 'God has given to S. Peter and his successors the vicars of Christ and to the Church itself power only over spiritual things touching the salvation of souls but not over temporal and civil matters. Kings and Princes are not subject, therefore, in temporal things to any Church authority by the ordinance of God; neither directly nor indirectly can they be deposed by the power of the Keys belonging to the Church, nor can their subjects be relieved from obedience or absolved from their oath of allegiance.' Such a declaration against the temporal power of the Church, penned by Bossuet, enforced by the Civil Power, and accepted by the episcopate of France, attacks at the very root the theory which I have spoken of as normal in the relations between Church and State. But fortunately, the Civil Power, though supported by a local episcopate, and aided by genius and piety, cannot alter by a hair's breadth the decrees of the sovereign pontiffs, nor abridge by a jot or tittle the rights of the Church. The first breath of authority puffed this formidable declara-

tion to the winds. It was condemned by the Pope, it was withdrawn by the King, it was disavowed by the Bishops. At the feet of the Pope, the French bishops professed a grief, greater than words could express, for their acts so displeasing to His Holiness and his predecessors ; hence they declared that whatever in their recent synods might be considered as decreed concerning the ecclesiastical power and the pontifical authority should be, and should be held, as not decreed.

This exorbitant theory as to the rights of the State was, however, revived again with renewed extravagance a century later, but offered no new feature worth alluding to.

Van Espen in his great work on Canon Law, lays down as the normal relations of the Civil Power to the Church principles so akin to the Gallican liberties and so derogatory to the rights of the Church as to have drawn down on his head the condemnation of the Holy See. Thus every theory which emancipates the Civil Power from the control of the Church, or shifts the Christian basis of the union of the two powers, never fails to meet, as we see, with correction or condemnation. The theory of the great Dutch canonist as to the extent and character of the Civil Power was taken up with ardour by one of his disciples, Nicholas von Hontheim, Bishop of Treves, who, under the assumed name of Febronius, gained an unenviable notoriety as the author of a system which went far beyond the Gallican theory. In this system the main feature is the displacement of the sovereign power of the Church ; in it the power of the Keys is made to reside radically and essentially in

the body of the faithful, its usufruct only appertaining to the bishops. The Pope is no longer even primate over the Church, but only in the Church and over individual bishops. This theory which disperses the sovereign power, and shifts the basis of authority, must needs seek to supply a binding unity to keep the Church together. After having destroyed the divine rights of the Papacy and its supreme sovereignty, no central power was to be found other than that of the State sufficient for the purpose. There was no help for it but to bestow the supremacy on the State, and let the Civil Power play the part of the Pope. The necessary consequence of such a system would be the complete slavery of the Church, and the dissolution of its divine unity into national Churches under the subjection of the Civil Power. Such was the Febronian system as far at least as concerns the relations between Church and State. This theory was condemned in 1764 by Pope Clement XIII. as well as a worse scheme, entitled ‘*De statu Ecclesiæ et legitima potestate Romani pontificis liber singularis ad reuniendos dissidentes in religione Christianos compositus*,’ put forward by Febronius, for the reunion of Christendom. The whole-plan was visionary in the extreme where it was not perverse or malicious; it was based on false assumptions and it sought to attain its object by toning down Catholic verities, or by putting forward uncatholic principles, especially in regard to the extent of the Papal authority both in its relation to the Church as well as to the State and Civil society. This unhappy Catholic ‘Eirenicon’ of the last century was to the full as derogatory to the Papal

authority as its recent successor, put forward by an Anglican divine in still greater ignorance, it is to be hoped, of the divine rights of the Papacy.

In what I may call for my purpose the Febronian age, false theories concerning the relation of the Church and State abounded in Catholic countries, more especially perhaps in those subject to the sway of the Bourbon kings. Some of these theories were formally elicited by the Catholics of England who, at the request of Mr. Pitt for the purposes of the Catholic Relief Act, put certain queries as to the nature and extent of the Papal authority in temporal matters to the Faculties of Divinity in the Catholic universities of Paris, Louvain, Douai, Salamanca, Alcalá, and Valladolid.

These queries are so pertinent to the subject I am speaking of, and elicited answers so formal and so far-going, that I have put down here the queries sent to the University of Paris and its reply: This is the answer of the Sacred Faculty of Divinity of Paris to the queries proposed by the English Catholics:

‘The Dean and Faculty of Divinity in the University of Paris to all who shall inspect these Presents, send greeting. Certain queries, the tenor of which is as follows, have been transmitted to us from England, in the name of the Catholics living in that Kingdom: “1st, Has the Pope, the Cardinals or any body of men, or any other person of the Church of Rome, any civil authority, civil power, or civil jurisdiction or civil pre-eminence whatsoever, in the Kingdom of England, by reason or by virtue of any authority, power or jurisdiction or pre-eminence, inherent in or granted, or by any

other means belonging, to the Pope or Church of Rome?

. Can the Pope, the Cardinals, or any body of men, or any person of the Church of Rome, absolve or release the subjects of the King of England from their oath of allegiance?"

'They beg us to give our opinion in a solemn instrument upon these questions. Bound,' say the doctors of the Sorbonne, 'to satisfy every person who asks our opinion on doctrinal matters, and never having entertained any doubts upon the points in question, we opine, determine and judge as follows.'

Then follows a direct negative to both the questions put, and the Faculty of Paris, not content with answering a specific question regarding England under the actual circumstances, makes its answer general, applying it to every kingdom, and under all circumstances. In its answer, by way of proof, it cites a censure which was published in 1626 against the following propositions extracted from the treatise of Santarellus: 'De Hæresi Schismate Potestate Summi Pontificis in his delectis puniendis.' The propositions which the Gallican Faculty of Paris had the audacity to censure, and which, with perhaps the exception of the last, perfectly correspond with the normal relations of the Church to the State in a Christian nation are as follows:—

'The spiritual power of the Church entrusted to its prelates, extends indirectly even to temporals, to the end that it may conveniently help the faithful to their spiritual end, and supply the defect of the temporal power, if the temporal power should be negligent in the

execution of its duty, or abuse its power, which is particularly true with respect to the crime of heresy.

‘The Pope can inflict temporal punishment on sovereigns for heresy, and deprive them of their kingdoms, and free their subjects from obedience.

‘The Pope has both temporal and spiritual power by Divine right.

‘The Pope has, at least indirectly, a power over princes in temporals, inasmuch as temporals may prove an impediment to his direction of the sheep of Christ to their supernatural end.

‘The Pope has a directory, and consequently a compulsory power over princes who do wrong.

‘If for the common good of the Church, wisdom and sound reason require that temporal punishment should be inflicted on disobedient or incorrigible princes or even that they should be dethroned, the Pope has a right to punish them in that manner.

‘The Apostles were subject to their sovereigns, *de facto* but not *de jure*.’

The doctrine contained in these and similar propositions were condemned in the severest terms by the Faculty of Divinity in 1626, and in this censure the other faculties of the University of Paris, and several other universities in France, as Toulouse, Valence, Bourdeaux, Poitiers, Caen, and Rheims, concurred with great applause. The articles laid before Louis XIV. in 1663, by the Sacred Faculty agree with the above censure. By them it is declared, says the University of Paris, ‘That it is the doctrine of the Faculty that the King of France neither acknowledges nor has in

temporals any superior but God ; that this is its ancient doctrine from which it will never depart. Moreover, that the Faculty has always opposed, even those who were of opinion that the Pope had in temporal concerns an indirect authority over the King of France.'

The Gallican professors and divines who propound for the benefit and instruction of some English Catholics such strange and subversive theories of the power of the Church in its relation to the State, then refer to the notorious declaration of the French clergy in 1682 with which they completely identify themselves, thus falling under the condemnation of the Holy See, which had formally censured that declaration. By such an act we see the value which ought to attach to the teaching and theories of the Faculty of Paris. But to quote its words so that there may be no doubt as to its deliberate intention to set at defiance the condemnation of the Holy See—'Ever since 1682,' it says, 'it has been the will of the Sacred Faculty that this doctrine should in the very words of the declaration be taught in her schools : and it is a law and uninterrupted usage of the Faculty that :—all the Bachelors before they take their degree of Licentiates should maintain it in their public theses.' In reply to the query as to the deposing power of the pope as given above, after giving a direct negative with a general application the Faculty of Paris refers with approval to the answer of the Doctor of the Sorbonne to the Catholics of Ireland in 1775, which is as follows : 'The doctrine of the right of the popes to depose princes excommunicated is heretical, ma-

terialiter (as it is termed by the schools) that is, contrary to the very word of God.'

On this alleged material heresy all I venture to suggest now is that a Faculty of Divinity which adopts as its own, propositions condemned by the Holy See, as those contained in the declaration of the Gallican clergy were, can lay claim to no authority.

The answers returned by Louvain, the Catholic University of Flanders, were more terse but not a whit less adverse than those of Paris, to the rights of the Holy See. It could hardly be otherwise, seeing that the university was subject to the control of Joseph II. of Austria—a master in the art of Febronian government. After meeting the queries as to the indirect temporal power of the Church, exercised by virtue of her spiritual rights, and as to the deposing power of the popes with a direct negative, the Faculty of Louvain observes that: 'It is not ignorant that, in the middle ages some things were done not reconcileable with the doctrine here laid down,—the modern doctrine,—and that the contrary doctrine was favourably heard by the Court of Rome, and even found its way into the councils of Kings, with some restrictions, however, as appears from the saying of St. Louis upon the proceedings of the council of Lyons. But to Bellarmine, the champion of these proceedings, we must answer in his own way: "These things have been done: for their justice let the doers of them be answerable."' It concludes with some most unjust and extravagant comments on the alleged detriment which the doctrines it condemns had caused in the middle ages to the Church and Republic of Christianity.

The opinion of the Spanish universities, applied to on the Catholic theory of the relation of the Church to the State, was to the same effect as that of Paris and of Louvain. In order to appreciate at their just value opinions so detrimental to the rights and dignity of the Holy See, and so contrary to the supreme sovereignty of the Church, I wish to direct special attention to the following declaration of the university of Valladolid: 'Not only the university of Valladolid, but all the universities in the Spanish dominions, are even commanded by royal authority to maintain this doctrine' (namely, the false doctrine on the authority of the Church forced on the universities of Europe, by the State absolutism of the last century). The manner in which this doctrine was fostered and maintained was as characteristic of the times as it was of the Bourbon kings who then ruled over nearly the half of Europe. In all the Spanish universities every Professor in order to qualify himself for any academical degree or for obtaining any Professor's chair was obliged to take the following oath:—'I, N. call God to witness, and swear by the Cross which I now touch, that I will never directly nor indirectly promote, defend, or teach any opinions contrary to civil authority and the King's Regalia.' The rector, the chancellor, and all the university authorities were bound by oath to the same observance. From universities so constituted, and from professors of divinity so appointed, and admitted to their Faculties only on such conditions as are imposed by the above oath, what opinion other than one favourable to the encroachments of the royal authority on the rights of the Church was to be expected?

The university of Salamanca, while condemning the opinion as to the deposing power of the pope as fatal to kingly government, yet observes: 'that it is a truth which must not be called in question that kings as well as the faithful of inferior rank are so far subject to the power of bishops that by them they may be separated from the communion of the Church, and delivered over to Satan if their crimes provoke such severity, although it would perhaps be more expedient and more discreet never to apply such desperate remedies to the wounds of those who are invested with sovereign power. Yet excommunicated princes,' it continues, 'have still the same right to govern and their subjects are bound to pay them equal obedience, unless they insist that their subjects shall join them in the guilt for which they are deprived of ecclesiastical communion, for in that case we must never lose sight of the divine commission that "God is to be obeyed rather than man."'

I trust that I have not exhausted the patience of my readers, I confess I almost have my own, in noticing the sentences of these Gallican universities, couched in terms as arrogant as they are unjustifiable, on the extent and character of the temporal authority of the papacy. What warranty had these universities of France, of Spain, of the Netherlands, to pronounce a judgment limiting the papal power? Was it their office to define the supreme rights of the Church? Wanting the confirmation of the Holy See was the binding force of their united sentences stronger than the pack-thread round that memorable despatch which

conveyed to the expectant hands of some English Catholics the long-hoped award of the Sorbonne. The pope, who is the alpha and omega of the sovereign power of the Church, has alone to be consulted, has alone to decide as to the rights of the papacy. To appeal from the pope to the judgment of an inferior tribunal, or to seek at the hands of a lesser authority a decision which would be refused by the highest, is constructive heresy. But taken merely as expressions of opinion, what value is to be attached to the sentences of these universities? When we reflect on their constitution, and remember how completely in the age of Febroniansm and Gallicanism even the Faculties of Divinity depended on the Civil Power, and that they were but too often made use of as the most deadly weapons against the rights of the papacy, no real Catholic, I imagine, can estimate their opinion at too low a figure.

Moreover, the Faculties of Divinity, no matter in what university, have no right, without the concurrence of the pope, to define the limits of the Church's authority or to circumscribe its jurisdiction. They are only subordinate teachers subject to the control or correction of the Holy See. Their definition of Catholic doctrine to have binding force needs papal confirmation.

The declarations of the doctors of the Sorbonne and of the other universities, consulted by the desire of Mr. Pitt as to Catholic teaching on the subject of the temporal power of the Church, were embodied in a protestation which was signed by a large number of

English Catholics. In this document the doctrines condemned by the six universities were disclaimed 'as dangerous to society and totally repugnant to political and civil liberty.' An oath framed on the precise terms of this most obnoxious protestation was presented by certain English lay Catholics to Parliament for the purpose of obtaining the Relief Act. But on communication with the Holy See, and in consequence of its injunctions, the oath was condemned in 1791 by the four Vicars-Apostolic in England. They asserted in their encyclical letter that the authority to determine on the lawfulness of oaths touching doctrinal matters resides exclusively in the bishops.

In a rescript issued on June 23, 1791, by the Cardinal Prefect of Propaganda, and addressed to Dr. Troy, archbishop of Dublin, speaking of the ancient calumny that the Catholic religion was incompatible with the safety of kings and states on account of the great authority with which the Pope was vested as Father and Master of the Catholic world, the Cardinal Prefect says that in this controversy it is necessary very carefully to distinguish between the veritable rights of the Holy See and those which for the purposes of calumny are imputed to it. The See of Rome, he contends, has never taught that faith was not to be kept with heretics; that an oath taken to kings separated from Catholic communion could be broken; or that it was permitted to the pope to invade their rights and their temporal dominions; or that an attempt on the life of kings and princes under the pretext of religion was not to be considered as a horrid and detestable

crime. But the rescript of the Cardinal Prefect of Propaganda gives no sanction nor semblance of sanction to the detestable opinions set forth with such pomp and circumstance by the six universities as Catholic doctrine.

It is as curious as it is instructive to observe that in the elaborate replies given by the Faculties of Divinity in six universities after long consultation, much study, and the most patient researches, the names only of two popes are adduced in supposed support of the theory of the independence of the State from the indirect temporal authority of the Church. The observation of one pope only is quoted : to see how far it is from corroborating the opinion of the Faculty of Paris, we need only compare the two opinions : the Sorbonne declares that neither the pope nor the college of cardinals nor any other person of the Church of Rome has any civil authority, civil power, civil jurisdiction, or civil preeminence whatsoever in any kingdom, by reason or virtue of any authority, power, jurisdiction, or preeminence, by divine institution inherent in, or by any means belonging to the pope or the Church of Rome. And as affirming with his high authority such a limitation of the Church's sovereign power, the Faculty of Paris quotes the following sentence from a letter of Pope Gelasius to the Emperor Anastasius. 'The government of the world,' writes the pope, 'acts on two things ; the sacred authority of the bishops, and the power of the kings. Each is chief, each supreme, nor do the duties of the one interfere with the duties of the other, so far as belongs to the order of public discipline ; the bishops of the Church recognising the

sovereignty conferred upon you by the authority of God, obey you;’—and who denies, or rather which of us does not affirm, that sovereignty is bestowed on the civil power by God, that the civil power is chief, is supreme in its own exclusive sphere—and what more does Pope Gelasius assert?

But the pith of the question is: what is the sphere proper to the State in which it tolerates no control, from which it has a right to exclude the Spiritual Power? To begin with, the State is not competent to determine of its own authority its proper range and sphere; these are shaped out for it by the action of the Church. The Church lays down the lines and the limits of its own domain and claims the submission of the Civil Power to its judgment. By such an act of authority the Church assigns, at least negatively, to the State the boundary of its dominion, though it leaves to the Civil Power in its allotted sphere complete independence and liberty. This supreme power, in itself an attribute of sovereignty, of defining its own boundaries accrues to the Church from the end for which it was instituted. To the spiritual power necessarily belongs, from the nature of its commission, an unlimited sway over the objects entrusted by Christ to its charge; in the pursuit of these objects it has the right to range at will over every domain unhindered; every means also proper to the attainment of its ends belongs of right divine to the Church. The residue only of those domains unoccupied by the Church falls to the share of the civil magistrate, and in these also he is ever bound, by reason of the moral responsibility attaching

to his office, so to act as best to conduce to the glorification of God. The State also derives its power from God, but on entering into the Christian Church its natural rights and its range of action are adjusted and limited by the superior claims of the supernatural order of things it has submitted to. The civil magistrate has entered into the house of God, and must sit at the footstool of the vicar of Christ. When the kings of the earth put on the livery of Christ they must obey their Master's orders. This glorious livery is their best robe of State; such a servitude is true liberty. When once they come under the jurisdiction of the Church kings cannot at their good pleasure withdraw from its authority; they may forfeit their privileges, but they cannot regain their natural liberty nor forego the obligations of their Christian character. All such things, however, as after proper adjustment and subordination of inferior to superior claims fall into the hands of the State, the State holds and rules independently of all spiritual control. Into such exclusive province of the State the Church has no business to enter. On the ground occupied by the Church the State, on the other hand, has no right, on the pretext of promoting public good or of preserving public tranquillity, to intrude. Yet from such unjustifiable intrusions, if I may be allowed for a moment to drop from theory to fact, arose all those disastrous conflicts which broke up the political system of the middle ages and prepared the way for the religious revolt of the sixteenth century. The State, absorbing like a huge vampire into its own system every independent right,

sucked the life-blood out of the body politic. The victory of the State over the Church was the defeat of public liberty. The century in which we are living is a witness against State-omnipotence. The bloodshed in which it commenced was a cry to Heaven for vengeance against this hideous evil; conspiracy, anarchy, revolution, in so many countries of the continent are the protests and reproaches uttered against the Godless Absolutism of the last century. Since its revolt against the temporal power of the Church the State has so outgrown its boundaries, is become so bloated by the absorption of rights foreign to its nature, that men are almost startled out of their propriety when they see it even in theory reduced to its proper limits. It is astonishing how small in a Christian community, after performing its office of preserving life and property, is the space rightfully left to the exclusive domination of the Civil Power; not that therefore it is left with hands idle in the great work of the moral and spiritual amelioration of mankind; it feeds the hungry and visits the sick, for such is a portion of its proper work, but it not only builds almshouses and hospitals, it founds schools, builds churches and monasteries, and endows episcopal sees. The Christian prince also takes a seat at the synod of the bishops, or at a general council; as the anointed of the Lord he enjoys an ecclesiastical character, yet, as Charlemagne said of himself, he sits not as a teacher but a learner.

The Civil Power moreover enforces the laws of the Church, it restrains evil-doers and punishes heresy. Such works it carries out for the moral or spiritual

good of its subjects, but in so doing it is acting in a subordinate capacity and with a delegate authority as the helper only, the servant, of the spiritual power. The domain, however, in which the State, after defending society and punishing evil-doers, has supreme and exclusive power, is in reality very limited; it levels roads and builds bridges; it calls men to arms and launches its fleets on the sea; it raises money and spends it without consulting any will but its own; but when it begins to take a wider range it already feels, I will not call it the shackles but the guidance of a superior authority. The State enacts a law, but it must see that it does in no way contravene the higher laws of the Church; it endows a school, but it must not prescribe the course of education, for the child, says the divine law, belongs to the parent, not to the State, and the Christian parent is bound to educate the child according to the direction of the Church. The State says 'I alone am empowered to witness, regulate, and enforce every contract.' 'No,' says the spiritual power, 'marriage is a contract but it is also a sacrament; it affects spiritual interests; to me alone belongs the supreme right of forbidding, or of sanctioning, or of enforcing this sacred contract.' In fine, in all civil matters affecting spiritual interests, according to the principle already stated, the Church is predominant. To put an extreme case, to which I wish to come. The election of a prince in a Christian community, inasmuch as temporal government deeply concerns the spiritual welfare of a people, cannot be put in the category of a purely civil act. If therefore an heretical prince is

elected or succeeds to the throne, the Church has a right to say ' I annul the election or I forbid the succession ; ' or again, if a king of a Christian nation falls into heresy he commits an offence against God, in whose name and by whose authority he reigns ; and against his people, for whose spiritual as well as temporal good he governs.

Therefore it is in the power of the Church, by virtue of the supreme authority with which she is vested by Christ over all Christian men, to depose such a prince in punishment of his spiritual crime and to preserve his subjects from the danger of being led by his precept and example into heresy or spiritual rebellion. The right in the Church to exercise such acts of sovereign power is surely not the result of a tacit understanding or of an open agreement between the princes and peoples of Christendom, nor is it a political accident which like the balance of power governs for a time and by general consent the affairs of Europe, but, on the contrary, it springs from the principle of that divine sovereignty which the Church possesses in all times and over all Christian peoples.

The principle of the deposing power of the Popes on this theory will bear the closest examination.

What is the ultimate object of all government, temporal as well as spiritual, but the salvation of souls ? and over this work and over the means to this end in whom is sovereign power vested but in the Church and in its Head on earth—the Vicar of Christ ? When kings enter the Christian Church they make a partial surrender of their natural rights, in such sort as the individual

when he enters upon a civilised State foregoes somewhat of his natural liberty. Such a surrender is a primary and needful condition of their new character ; by baptism the Prince comes under the jurisdiction of the Church. In other words, the State, which is no abstract idea but a moral person, the highest expression of a nation's life, by being impressed with the Christian character incurs new obligations. The State, whether Christian or heathen, was always charged with the duty of looking after the moral welfare of its subjects. Only whereas before the introduction of Christianity the State was its own master, and since that time it has given up the supreme direction of the highest end of its existence to the spiritual power, and with the end necessarily the means conducive to that end. Consequently if the deposition of the civil magistrate be a means necessary to the end, namely the spiritual safety of those subject to him, such deposition on the part of the Spiritual Power is simply an exercise of the Supreme sovereignty with which it was endowed by Christ.

The entrance of Christianity upon the world has even abridged the natural rights of the heathen. Although the Church has no jurisdiction over the unbaptised, yet in so far as it has a dominion over all men, it has the right to call upon them, under pain of eternal punishment, to accept the Gospel at its hands. It may do more, it can call for the destruction of idolatrous temples as an offence against the primeval revelation and as a hindrance to its divine commission. The unbaptised prince has, since the introduction of Christianity, lost his natural right to regulate the worship of his domi-

nions and forbid the entrance of new teachers. A new and divine commission has gone forth to teach all nations. The natural rights of the heathen king must yield before the supernatural rights of the Church. If such be the case even with the heathen, how much deeper and wider are the Church's rights over those of her own body! If therefore a prince in a Christian country lapses into heresy he does not fall back on his natural rights, he cannot escape the Church's jurisdiction. As a Christian sovereign he had entered into relations with the Church and with his subjects, and he cannot of himself destroy or lessen his responsibility; he must be judged on the Christian basis. If his apostacy, therefore, endanger the salvation of his subjects for whose souls the Church is responsible to God, the pope as the vicegerent of Christ upon earth cuts him off not only from the communion of the Church but excludes from him the Christian community, and absolves his subjects from the oath of allegiance as no longer binding on the conscience, since the perjured prince has violated his trust and perverted to evil the authority which he received from God.

It is not my business in this part of my subject to prove the historical fact which I have all along assumed—and than which, I suppose, nothing is more indisputable—that in the middle ages the Church exercised indirect power in temporal matters. The authority of popes over kings, says de Maistre, was disputed by none except by those whom it judged. There never therefore was a more legitimate authority, because there never was one less disputed. What is there certain among men, he asks, if usage, especially undisputed, is not the

mother of legitimacy? There was possession on one side; consent on the other.

The only question then is, what is the nature of the right on which this common usage was based?

The object of the first part of this paper was to show that this universal practice was based on a right inherent in the Church to control all such temporal matters as affect spiritual interests. This power is termed by the chief writers on the subject such as Bellarmine, Suarez, and St. Thomas Aquinas, the indirect temporal power of the Church. The direct temporal power is a theory held only by a few, which places all power, temporal as well as spiritual, in the hands of the Church, and makes the civil magistrate the delegate merely of the spiritual power.

The Gallican theory, as we have seen, denies to the Church all power, preeminence, or jurisdiction whatsoever in civil matters.

Between the indirect temporal power attached to the Church by divine right and the Gallican theory there is a middle term which recommends itself to many minds as being equally hostile to the Gallican and to what modern writers term the Ultramontane theory.

This middle term, which is esteemed by some as a golden mean able to reconcile the past with the present, the practice of the middle ages with the principles of to-day, denies with the Gallican writers that the indirect temporal power was of divine right, yet affirms that it was conferred or forced on the Church by the exigencies of the times and sanctioned by the constitutional law of the middle ages. This power, then, ac-

according to the theory of Gosselin, for he is its ablest and fullest expounder, owed its origin to the condition of society during a portion of the middle ages, and as it was called into being by one set of circumstances so it passed away with another ; it ebbed and flowed according to the tide of human needs ; like the course of trade, it was subject to the law of supply and demand. This power, wielded by so many a pope in the interests of religion and by virtue of what they held to be the supreme sovereignty attached to their divine office, was, as interpreted by Gosselin, a mere human power delegated to them by the authority of princes and the consent of peoples.

Power, which terrified evil-doers though they wore the purple robe and held the Imperial sceptre, was nothing better or worse than a political accident, beneficent as long as it was willingly conceded, hurtful and unjust when asserted as a right annexed, as Bellarmine describes, to the papal chair.

According to Fénelon, who I believe was the first writer of note to accept this theory of Gosselin, or who at any rate was its mildest expounder, this power of the Popes was not a power of temporal jurisdiction founded on the divine law, but it was a directive power of divine institution and a power of temporal jurisdiction of purely human institution. Such power of human jurisdiction, he goes on to say, is founded on the usages and maxims of constitutional law which grew up in the middle ages.

This system, which takes its stand-point and makes a boast of so doing, on purely historical considerations, is,

it seems to me, justly open to the charge of attributing that as a cause which was in reality but an effect.

For instance, to explain what I mean, the constitutional law of the middle ages was not the cause, as is assumed, or the creating agent of the temporal power of the Church, but itself the direct effect of that power which inherent in the Church was working in the formation of Christian society. Constitutional law recognised this existing right of the Papacy, took it up into the body of the law, gave it a human sanction and a civil currency, but did not found or create it. It is a common occurrence for the human law to embody the divine law; for confirmation we need only refer to the code of Theodosius.

The Saxon law, of course, in a still higher degree, shows in its spirit and in its letter, the presence and co-operation of the divine law. The usages and constitutional maxims of the middle ages grew up under the all-penetrating influence of the Church; for it must never be overlooked that the Church and the Civil Power formed one commonwealth, in which the rights of the Church and the divine laws served not only as a basis for civil institutions at their rise, but gave an impulse and direction to their growth and development.

The theory, which imputes no offence to the Church in the use of an indirect temporal power, and yet denies its possession thereof by divine right, which allows, nay even highly approves of, in certain conditions of society, the controlling power of the Church over civil governments, yet abjures in a period of greater enlightenment all such interference of the spiritual power, unless in a

merely directive form, wears a large and liberal look, which recommended it to many minds of the past as well as of the present century. A theory, which, while absolving the Spiritual Power from the scandalous imputations cast upon it by the Gallican theory and estimating, even at the highest, the beneficial action of the Church on society in the middle ages, yet enables men to disclaim in the present age all spiritual interference in civil matters, seems to reconcile the past with the present, and at any rate removes from Catholics the supposed stigma of holding principles at variance with the spirit of the age.

Overjoyed at the discovery of this golden mean, which, like the magician's wand, transmuted an impassable barrier into a convenient bridge, the advocates of this theory overlooked its inevitable tendency to evoke a spirit, ever too ready to rise, of independence and of self-assertion. The Church deprived in such a system of its inherent right to exercise a supreme though indirect control over temporal governments, would soon lose its hold on civil society altogether. The scientific as well as the political world would not be slow in putting in its claim of complete independence, and then as far as the two great agents of active life are concerned, the supreme ruler of the Christian world would have no more authority over them than the sacristan of a village church, or than the merest scribbler in the daily press. Men, who began by declaring that the power of the Church over civil governments was well enough in the infancy of society and in a barbarous state of things, ended by condemning

spiritual interference in the affairs of life, such as legislation, politics, science, and education, as totally unfit for the intellectual Frenchman, the learned German, and the cultivated Englishman of the eighteenth or nineteenth century. There are two prominent vices in this theory : one is that it is an afterthought, an attempt to reconcile antagonistic principles ; the other that it is a concession to the spirit of the age, and in its consequences unwittingly fosters the two great evils of modern times, Rationalism and Revolution.

In defending its sovereign power over Christian nations, as a portion of its divine inheritance, no one dreams of asserting that the Church ought to attempt to enforce its supreme authority in temporal matters, unless it be for the spiritual or moral good of mankind. But, if instead of remedying ills such an exercise of its authority should create scandal, or provoke resistance, in withholding its hand the Church shows its enlightened wisdom. On account of weakness of faith in the nations, and because the State is cast adrift from the religious principle, and not surely for want of cause, have the popes, in modern times, forborne to lay kingdoms under an interdict, or to excommunicate princes by name, or to depose kings. In the present day, the Church exercises an economy in her rights, and there is no fear, I was going to say, alas, there is no hope, that Popes to-day will feel justified in exercising their plenary power. But this is no state of things to be rejoiced over ; it is no beneficent liberty that Christian princes should escape a visible and immediate punishment for their public crimes against faith, and the moral

government of their people, or that nations should be left to their own insane devices ; it is no glorious epoch opening up for the Church, but simply a token of the decay of faith in Christendom. It is not too much to say, that in the ratio that the temporal power of the Papacy is recognised, faith abounds ; it is the flag that shows the triumph of the Cross, as its lowering too surely betokens that the bark of Peter is exposed to wild tempestuous seas.

If I may be allowed to make the comparison, I would say that what the State was to the heathen the Church, in a certain and in a higher sense, is to the Christian. The State was the highest social product of antiquity, and love of this polity was the highest and noblest feeling which the antique man was capable of. The love of his country or rather of his State was a religion ; it was the only common good for which the selfishness of the individual was sacrificed ; it was the morals and the asceticism of antiquity. But with a new society, new politics had arisen. The Church inspired a deeper love than the State, and gave a higher unity to mankind. The narrow and exclusive idea of nationalities was remedied by a larger Christian charity. Under the vivid and vigorous influence of the Christian idea, the first half of the middle ages recognised no virtue in nationalities, either in the ancient sense or in the spirit of modern times, which aims at restoring Pagan notions. Western Christianity united all nations, and formed that great Christian commonwealth—under a twofold government, the theory of which we have been contemplating—and in

which was comprised a vast variety of tribes and races. In such a system nationalities found their proper place, and, united by one bond, and grouped round the centre which God had set up, lived together in peace and amity.

Such a system, said one of the most thoughtful political writers of our day, is the greatest social and political conception mankind is capable of. This political system was not the creation of an individual pope, however great, nor was it the long result, as Protestant historians like Mosheim and Hallam are but too prone to affirm, of a profound and deep-laid scheme by a series of bold and ambitious pontiffs. It was rather the result of the Divine constitution of the Church acting in a happy moment under the superintending direction of Providence, on a society which was like wax in its hands. Only after the Christian State was practically at work, governing and controlling mankind, turning events as they arose to the best account, and making use of the genius of individuals to bring its work to perfection, only then did theory step in, gathering and comparing, arranging and distinguishing existing facts, and deducing from things the principles which govern them.

But history never repeats itself: we have done with the middle ages and its bygone political constitution; with its public Christian conscience as well as with its wild and barbarous feuds, its spirit of lawlessness, its private wars, its rapine and plunder, and the too often ungodly living or disobedient spirit on the part of some of its prelates. We live in our own day and under

conditions other far than those when the Christian State of the middle ages was the means under Divine Providence which the Church made use of to propagate and protect its work—the Christian civilisation of the modern world. The Church belongs not to the middle ages but to all times; all forms of civil government as long as they are based on Christian principles are capable of administering to the work of God, and it is the duty of the Church to make the best of things as they are. Principles alone remain, forms may vary. Hence it is that whilst accepting in Christendom every form of civil government, it is only against the godless theories of modern times that the popes wage such incessant and untiring warfare. With evil principles of government there is no possible truce.

The last of the theories as to the ground which the Church should take up towards the modern State, propounded not by enemies of social order or by unbelievers, was that of Lamennais and his disciples in their journal, the 'Avenir,' a theory which was condemned in 1832 by Gregory XVI. in the Encyclical *Mirari vos*. Lamennais advocated in the supposed interests of Christianity itself the total separation of Church and State; he argued that the alliance with the State deprived the Church not only of its liberty of action but also of the support and sympathy of the people. He urged the clergy in impassioned terms to come out of the State churches and cathedrals, to build osier tents in the fields, and to throw themselves in their freedom and their poverty on the generosity of the people. He foresaw a glorious epoch opening up for

the Church in the midst of modern society, in which the Church, the rival and opponent of the godless State, should play the part of popular advocate, and gain a triumph over its rival, or suffer persecution and martyrdom, but in either case win, and hold in its hand the hearts of the people. But Lamennais, in his extravagant views in favour of liberty, never reflected on the place which the Church holds in the State as public Teacher of truth. To desert such an office, confided to it by God, on account of the difficulties which it had to encounter from an irreligious government, or from the partial loss of some of its liberties, savours more of moral cowardice than of apostolic zeal. The State is of God, and as long as it retains in principle, however faintly or faultily, the Christian idea of its origin and purpose, it is the bounden duty of the Church, according to the Christian theory of the two-fold government of society, to associate itself as intimately as circumstances permit with the State, to be always present with its divine teaching, and ever so to act as to confer as far as possible on the government a religious character, and to uphold public faith in the nation. The union of the State with the Church is a national recognition of Christianity; it involves a public observance of the divine laws, and enforces respect for the rights and prerogatives of the Christian Church. But Lamennais, carried away by his theory of absolute liberty, saw no such place and office for the Church in modern society; he looked upon the State as utterly reprobate. He was prepared to cut it adrift from the Church, to sacrifice the Christian character of the

State in order that the Church might enjoy the largest amount of liberty possible. Lamennais even went so far as to declare that the Church and the State were natural enemies. This theory of the separation of Church and State was referred to Rome, and condemned by the infallible authority of the Pope. In his Encyclical *Mirari vos*, Gregory XVI. declared that the union of Church and State 'had always been favourable and salutary both to religion and to civil authority.' The old Christian theory as to the twofold government of society was thus again in modern times solemnly reaffirmed by the decision of the Holy See.

An ingenious German writer* has likened the three most noteworthy errors as to the relations of the Church and State to the three great heresies regarding the person of our Lord. Thus he compared the absorption of all civil authority by ecclesiastical government to the Eutychiean heresy; Erastianism, or the assumption of ecclesiastical authority by the State, to Nestorianism; and the godless theory of the separation of Church and State to Arianism.

After having considered the theory of government in Church and State in various lights and from opposite stand-points, contrasting the true with the false systems, the divine principle which unites opposites and harmonises differences with the antagonist principle, which carries in itself the germs of disunion and of final dissolution: and after having traced the effect of this principle, though briefly, yet, I trust, sufficiently, even

only so far as we have gone, to note its practical operation on the well-being of society, I may perhaps be allowed to conclude this portion of my subject by taking a more comprehensive or philosophical view of these conflicting principles.

There are two opposite tendencies in human nature implanted by God and consequently within certain limits free to range at will; the one prompts to an independent course in thought and action, and is possessed of an originating power and of an impulsive force which is a law to itself and its own limit; the other is prone to contemplation, takes up with the past, and enlarges in the old lines of thought, is obedient to the law and sympathetic with its spirit, and receives rather than gives an impulse and a direction. The extreme of one tendency is license, and its end is a violent dissolving of all bonds and of all obedience; the extreme of the other is apathy, a mental and moral inertness which finds its proper conclusion in a life-in-death existence. To restrain the boundless license of human thought, on the one hand, and to quicken, on the other, the inert mass of moral and intellectual sloth into healthy life, was the work of Christianity. Both these tendencies in the human mind found in the Catholic Church their highest unity. The energy of liberty served as a lever to the dead weight of law, and the weight of law acted as a counterpoise to unbalanced liberty. Each was necessary for the preservation or for the vitality of society. It is the combined action of the spur and of the curb which produces such

an even and sustained pace as soonest leads to the journey's end, to the goal, or the winning-post.

It is the Church's office to leave the utmost liberty to the individual will consistent with the utmost deference to the law of God. To speculation she leaves within the limits of the Christian domain a wide and open space to move about in at will. To step over these boundaries is not liberty but license ; it leads not to knowledge but to confusion, to darkness not to light. Hers is the hand to appoint the paths and the boundaries ; hers the controlling will, and hers is the infallible judgment to allow the more or the less, to separate the sound from the unsound, to define the true or the false. Her infallibility is man's security ; it is not so much a yoke to the will as a light to the reason.

Under the regulating action of the Church the two opposite tendencies in human nature blend in harmony and out of discord make perfect music. But it is not only the harmony of order or the beauty of completeness, which is due to their action, these two opposite tendencies do far more ; they give its movement and its vital energy to all moral and intellectual life. Following such a train of thought in an earlier portion of these papers, I showed how the Church and the State, after a sort, gave a concrete expression to these two tendencies. There is a proclivity in the State to gather up into itself all that is new, to push onward and off from the beaten track, to take up fresh methods, to give ear to strange doctrines. The Church, on the other hand, abides by the divine law, restrains and corrects, is slow to move,

and in manner or method is ever averse to change. The result of such action is an evidence of the divine wisdom which guides her councils. The union of the Church and the State in such a sort as to leave the supreme guidance to the spiritual power acted upon society in much the same manner as the two opposite tendencies under the direction and control of divine faith act upon the individual—as the harmonious action of the two opposite tendencies in man give, under proper control, the highest development to his nature, so did this constitution of Church and State I am speaking of show a condition of things, in which the freedom implanted by God in human nature, admirably harmonised with the divinely appointed subjection under the law, thus reconciling independent action with perfect obedience, liberty with law.

But when this harmonious action ceased; when in these opposite tendencies of the human mind, action and reaction no longer kept up a regular balance and beat, when the allotted space between the two opposite poles of thought was rejected as being too narrow for the play of the mind or for the wilfulness of the will, then set in that wild stir of individual opinion, and of independent action which broke down every barrier, ranged over every field of speculation in inexplicable confusion, and shivered to atoms the restraining and uniting power.

When unity was lost, the process of dissolution was rapid; contradictions arose as to first principles, and systems came to pieces like a bundle of sticks when the cord which binds them is cut. Man again, as of old, be-

came a riddle to himself. In unbounded liberty he had lost light, he had gone beyond his reach and had fallen into darkness whence there was no return, or if he did return by his own unaided reason, it was not into light but only into darkness made visible. As the loss of the idea of God dissolved all unity in the moral world and so disturbed the balance in the human mind as to leave it in a state of hopeless incoherence, so in the political world the rejection of the divine authority of the Church not only broke up the unity of Christendom but disarranged all ideas of authority and of obedience, disturbing the first elements of social life. Law stiffened and hardened into an absolutism which crushed all movement and energy out of the mind; and liberty, in its self-assertion knowing no bounds and no control, degenerated of necessity into revolution. Such a process of dissolution has been going on for three hundred years; but it has been dangerously quickened by the impetuosity and self-assertion of our own times. The unconditioned freedom of the individual Will leads to isolation, to divisions and subdivisions innumerable, until there are even, as to first principles, as many opinions as there are minds. Such a state of things is the exact opposite of divine unity and therefore a contradiction of truth itself. Unconditioned freedom in political life leads to unconditioned equality; but unconditioned equality is an attack upon the rights of society, as unconditioned freedom of reason is a denial of God.

This new principle, which began by denying the rights of the spiritual power over civil society, has

ended almost everywhere in destroying the Christian relations of the State to the Church. The power inherent in the papacy of exercising supreme temporal control over the nations was the first of these rights to disappear, to the misfortune of mankind, before that terrible revolution which, long foreshadowed by the growing insubordination of society, burst upon Europe in the sixteenth century, split up Christendom into pieces, isolated nations and divided the minds of men. This new principle not only rejected the spiritual sovereignty of the Church, but by denying the divine origin of society attacked the fountain-head of all authority. This terrible visitation has left a permanent weakness upon Europe. Henceforth there is no principle of unity in history. Everything tends to division and isolation and to the unloosening of all bonds between society and the Church, between reason and faith, between man and God. But this separation, this isolation, this godlessness which is now so universally being set up as the governing principle, not only in the relation between Church and State, but in every department of knowledge, in every relation of life, forms the third division of this subject, to be treated of in a future Essay.

REMARKS ON THE VALUE OF CERTAIN SACRIFICIAL WORDS USED BY ST. PAUL.

By MONSIGNOR PATTERSON, M.A.



My object in the following remarks is to endeavour to meet certain objections often urged against the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice, from the alleged silence of St. Paul on that doctrine; and especially to show that this silence is not absolute, as is pretended, but that, on the contrary, in the writings of St. Paul certain words are used in reference to the Eucharist, and certain deductions to be legitimately drawn from them, which ought to be regarded as a sufficient answer to the negative argument alleged, viz., that St. Paul is silent on the sacrificial nature of the Holy Eucharist.

The method I propose to follow in this attempt is this:

I. I shall endeavour to show that the language in which St. Paul wrote is a peculiar language, having, as we know from other sources, its own special character and force. II. Then I shall weigh that character and force in relation to the words or terms in question; and III. I shall endeavour to corroborate my argument by some antecedent considerations bearing, as I conceive, with great weight upon it. And

I. As to the language in which St. Paul wrote, it will

be necessary to the right appreciation of this part of my theme to touch, as concisely as is consistent with clearness, on the condition of the civilised world at the time when Saul of Tarsus first saw the light in that metropolis of Cilicia, and when at Gamaliel's feet he sat and learnt, in Jerusalem, the 'truth of the law' of his Jewish 'fathers.'* A Roman citizen—for Cilicia was a Roman province, and its metropolis the seat of Roman government—by birth a Jew,† and knowing the Hebrew tongue, yet writing his inspired Epistles in Greek, the great apostle of the Gentiles seems in his own person to exemplify and, as it were, to epitomise, the exceptional and, as we know, the providential condition of civil society at that momentous epoch. The policy of Imperial Rome, so graphically described and well illustrated by the sacred historian‡ of the first Jewish league with the mighty republic two hundred years before, had then achieved its end, and though only with the limits of the known world, found the term of its great career of centralisation. Province after province, and nation upon nation, was absorbed into the unity of material civilisation, and either by force of arms, or by the arts of a sagacious policy (the growth of many generations' experience in government), peoples and tribes the most diverse had been coerced or coaxed into one polity, and had become joint members of the great Latin Empire; probably the sublimest result of merely human energy and wisdom which the world ever has seen. In its wider sense the province of Cilicia afforded an instance of the two kinds

* Acts xxii.

† Ibid. xxi. 40.

‡ 1 Mac. viii.

of action I have just attributed to Roman aggressive policy. 'Cilicia,' and 'Judæa' (the former including Pamphylia, Pisidia, Lycaonia, and the Island of Cyprus), in the east, like 'Hispania,' Spain, and 'Gallia,' in the west, were partly held as Roman governments, and partly as ethnarchies presided over by native princes, nominally independent, but really subservient, and often tributary. In these provinces such parts as were distinguished by natural advantages or other geognostic features giving them a commercial or a strategical importance, were subjected to the immediate rule of a Roman governor, and were held as conquered countries in the strict sense of the term ; while in other portions, in which no such objects were to be attained, but where a less happy soil, or the resistance partly of nature and partly of the indigenious race, rendered such occupation inexpedient, that species of alliance which can exist between the powerful and the comparatively weak was maintained ; and the native king or prince was trusted, as far as he was seen to merit trust, in the exercise of delegated government. In our case (as generally in Asia Minor) the limits of these two kinds of government were so often and arbitrarily shifted at different times, that it would be no easy task perhaps to lay them down very accurately at any given epoch. It is sufficient for our present purpose to say that the Eastern or *Flat Cilicia* was governed by a Roman, appointed by the Senate, or by the Emperor, immediately ; while the Western, or *Rough Cilicia*, which extended over the rugged spurs of the Tauric range (here advancing even to the sea), was occupied by a spirited

and half-savage race—the Isaurian brigands and pirates, denizens of mountain strongholds and of rocky creeks, whom Pompey the Great found it no easy task to dislodge.

You perceive that in such a condition of things as that which I have tried to instance, we must expect to find a mixture of various nationalities, occupying in different proportions the cities, the plains, and the mountain districts of these Roman provinces and tributary states; and presenting (so far) a not inaccurate parallel to the state of things existing at this moment in the vast heterogeneous empire acquired to the crown of these realms within the last hundred years, and forming altogether what we conveniently call *British India*. Neither the Isaurian countryman nor the more civilised citizen of Tarsus and of Pompeiopolis were Roman or Greek either in their own person or in their origin. The influences of Greek civilisation from Alexandria and from Antioch came on such races like what agriculturists call a ‘top dressing,’ spreading letters, philosophy, art, and corruption, in one specious flow, over society, and leaving a new and as it were factitious alluvium on the surface, while the old substratum remained more or less intact below. Above the whole, like the upheaved basaltic monuments of forcible convulsion, towered the great might of Imperial Rome. Often cruel and unscrupulous, sometimes indulgent and conciliatory, always wise and successful with the wisdom and success of this world, the vast material traces which she has left of her once mighty sway—her gigantic theatres, her frequent forums and

harbours, her long-drawn, massive aqueducts, and the inexorable straightness over hill and vale of her military ways, at once typify, and bear witness to, her empire over the whole world. The arts and sciences which she had learnt from her own captives, the fair campaign, or the subservient seas, over which she ruled directly, or the natural barriers, which she guarded herself or allowed her humbled allies to guard in her name—all these she protected, ruled, or respected for her own ends; but Rome alone was the name of law, and might, and government, as now it is the name of *truth, of right, and of moral force.*

You see at a glance the bearing of this state of things upon our immediate question, viz., that of language. When, some fifty years before St. Paul's birth, a new Roman proconsul took up his residence at the seat of his government in Cilicia, he found there a native population, still partly speaking their own tongue; a community of Greeks forming, as we should now phrase it, the 'society' of the place; men talking philosophy, science, art, trade, pleasure, or news, in the language of Athens, or at least in that of Antioch, Alexandria, or Sybaris; and though he probably, nay, certainly, despised them socially, and ignored them politically, the Roman proconsul must have known that amidst these various elements was a third, the dispersion of Israel, some of the scattered Hebrew tribes, who even in their fallen state knew how to gather round them, there as elsewhere, proselytes from every creed and from every race. It seems to give an emphasis to this variety of tongues when we recall that

the Roman proconsul of whom we speak was himself the exemplar and type of pure Latin (the official language of his government)—*Marcus Tullius Cicero*. In his Cilician letters he gives us a picture, as graphic as it is interesting, of his government: he travels with an interpreter, for Latin is the language of office, of administration; he is surrounded with a court of Asiatic Greeks, useful and adulatory; and he writes to, and exchanges courtesies with, now a Roman governor in adjacent provinces, and now a native but tributary prince.*

The half century which elapsed between that time and St. Paul's birth could not have greatly altered the features of his native place. What then was the language of his childhood? Latin it certainly was not; was it Hebrew, or Greek, or any dialect of a local character? Supposing we had no knowledge of any writings of his, what would our antecedent idea be of his speech? To answer this question we must further enquire into the then state and condition of the scattered Jews.

Their dispersion from their own Judæa began (as we know), early. First the Assyrian exile, when Rome was building, and then the Babylonish captivity, which brought Daniel to Babylon, and Ezekiel to the river Chebar, left their traces among the Eastern monarchies. And that these were not periods of uniform oppression we gather from history both sacred and profane. While Salamis and Marathon were fought, Hebrews were the

* Conybeare and Howson, *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. i. chap. i.

minister, the lord steward, and the wife, respectively of a Persian monarch ;* and when Cyrus gave the Jews permission to return to their own land, the majority preferred to remain in Babylon, a large and thriving colony. With the Hebrew colonies spread throughout the further East, and even to the borders of China—we need not be concerned, but we must dwell for a moment on their settlements in Western Asia, and what we now call the Levant. Jews had settled in Syria and Phœnicia before the time of Alexander, but it is to the policy in their regard of the Seleucidæ that they chiefly owed their more recent position. Seleucus, when he founded Antioch, gave them equal rights with the other citizens. One of his successors (Antiochus the Great) established 2,000 Jewish families in Lydia and Phrygia; hence they spread through Galatia and Pamphylia, and along the western coast from Ephesus to Troas; while we trace them in the islands, such as Cyprus and Rhodes, led thither, doubtless, by the trading tendencies which then already characterised them. In Africa, Jeremiah and the sacred histories tell us (2 Kings xxv.; Jer. xliii., xliv.), they were early captives, and then colonists; but here again it was the Greek Alexandrian dynasty who were their great patrons and encouragers. Alexander himself brought them to his famous city from Samaria, and from Jerusalem, and the first Ptolemy brought many more. The quarter of the Hellenistic Jews at Alexandria becomes well known in history, nor was their influence confined to Lower Egypt; they spread east-

* Ib. ch. ii.

ward and westward to Ethiopia, 'Queen Candace's' country, and to the 'parts of Libya about Cyrene.' In Europe also they spread, probably chiefly led by mercantile enterprise. Philo mentions Jews in Thessaly, Bœotia, Macedonia, Ætolia, Attica, Argos, and Corinth. The allusions to them in St. Luke's Acts of the Apostles at Thessalonica, Beræa, Athens, Corinth, and Rome, are in all our memories. What then was their language?

All their antecedents as dispersed Hebrews, but still Hebrews clinging to *their religion* and its ordinances with the tenacity of God's own people, to their country with the ardent love at first sight so incongruous with their migratory and colonising tendencies (just as we see it now in the Highlander or the Swiss), would lead us to suppose that they spoke and wrote the old sacred idiom in which God Himself delivered, and Moses wrote, the ten decrees of Sinai; but history is inexorable, and assures us, without the possibility of doubt, that not only was their language the κοινὴ διάλεκτος, the common current Greek of the whole Levant, and of the west, so far as they then dwelt in it, but also that in their wanderings and sojournings among the Gentiles the Chaldean of their former captivity was as completely absorbed in their Greek tongue, as their primeval Hebrew had once been in the language of Nineveh and of Babylon!

We know that those Jews who availed themselves of Cyrus' permission, and returned to Judæa, had so forgotten their native tongue, that they required the aid of a running *spoken* paraphrase or commentary in

Chaldean to enable them to understand the Sacred Text when read to them in their synagogues; and though it may be doubted whether this exposition, or 'targum,' had taken a *written* form before the coming of Our Lord, it is yet certain that two, at least, of these paraphrases are of a date not much, if at all, posterior to the first Christian age.

But, perhaps, the strangest part of the history of the Hellenistic Jews, of whose language we are speaking, is that on which this part of my argument is greatly based. Not only was the sacred literature, so to call it, of these Jews *not written* in the original sacred tongue, but *even the very text of Holy Writ itself*, which they guarded so jealously and so practically, that in all their vicissitudes they kept their religion, and (as we know from every page of the Acts and Apostolic Epistles) drew their Gentile neighbours more or less perfectly to join it—even the Sacred Text, I say, was no longer in the original tongue, but in that very Greek dialect of which we are speaking.

It would make this paper, already too diffuse, still more so were I to attempt to enter into the much controverted point of the history of this version: enough for our purpose to say, that which all will concede without difficulty, that the Septuagint version of the Old Testament was not only THE text in use among the dispersed Hellenistic Jews, but that they actually held it in such veneration as to believe it inspired equally with the original Hebrew. It will be sufficient to give as the minimum date, in point of recentness, for the parts supposed by some critics to be

translated or written after the main bulk of the text, the year 130 B.C. in the reign of Ptolemy Physcon. To elucidate my point, I must here advert to that which you all know already, viz. that the Jews, at the time of which we are speaking, were divided into two great and even opposed sections. The colonies of Jews in Babylonia and Mesopotamia remained in friendly intercourse with their brethren who had thence returned into Palestine and Syria; they held to the ancient Hebrew text, interpreted it by the Chaldee targums, or commentaries of which we have spoken, and both spoke dialects of that same language of Aram, whence they take their common name of Aramæan Jews. These two dialects were the Eastern or Chaldean, and the Western or original Syriac, now, like its parent, a dead language, though still used liturgically. At the time of Christ the Aramæan was the Hebrew of daily life in Palestine; not the oldest or purest, but its colloquial representative; not the tongue of Moses or David, but at least that of Ezra and Nehemiah. On the other hand, the Jews dispersed among the Greeks, or where Greek civilisation had taken the lead, had learned to speak Greek and to think in Greek; and to them the targums were scarcely less unintelligible than the original Hebrew text which they expounded. As we have just said, it was to the Hellenistic, not to the Aramæan Jews, that St. Paul belonged by his origin and his birthplace. Of these Hellenistic Jews Philo and the Alexandrian schools are the literary representatives, and the Septuagint is their sacred and inspired text.

The question of language, however, was not the

ultima ratio of this great division. The reason why the Aramæan Jews disliked and reprobated the Hellenistic, was because they regarded their *theology* as neologic, and subversive of that *exclusive* spirit which they believed to be an essential characteristic of their faith. The theology of the Alexandrian and Levantine Hellenistic Jew was based on the principle, that it was right to commend the Jewish truth to the Gentile world around them by an elimination of all that was local and political, as distinct from the *purely* religious elements which it presents. Hence it followed, that while the natural result of a sojourn among Greeks was to make the Jews of Alexandria, or Antioch, or Tarsus (for we know, from Strabo's declaration, that in literature and philosophy the fame of Tarsus exceeded that of the former cities) both Hellenistic in speech and Hellenisers in theology, yet, by a natural reaction and the force of family tradition, some among these Greek Jews would be only the more rigid in their adherence to their traditional Jewish tenets, and more studious to preserve them in proportion as they were immersed in the Hellenising influences of their adopted homes. That such was the case in St. Paul's family, there is the strongest evidence. He gives his Jewish adversaries again and again to understand that, whereas they accused him of being one of the Hellenising innovators, the fact was quite the contrary: 'Are they Hebrews? so was he; are they Israelites? so was he;' 'a Pharisee of the Pharisees;' 'a zealous observer of his paternal traditions;' 'a Pharisee, and the son of a Pharisee.' Nor can we look upon his

education in Jerusalem at Gamaliel's feet, and his fluency in the Hebrew tongue, but as precautions taken by his father to secure him against the Hellenising influences of Tarsus.

I sum up then (passing over a profusion of interesting corroborative particulars for brevity's sake) by answering the question—what, supposing we had no writings of St. Paul to guide us, but only what we know of his personal history, should we antecedently suppose his language to have been? And I say that, looking at his birthplace, looking at the time when he was born, looking at his citizenship, and looking at the whole career of the Apostle of the Gentiles, we can have no doubt that the language of his childhood, his *mother tongue*, was the κοινή διάλεκτος, as spoken by the Hellenistic Jews; a language whose *differential characteristic* is the application of Greek words and Greek idiom to render the inspired Hebrew text and the Hebrew religious ideas intelligible to themselves and to their proselytes—in a word, the Greek of the LXX. Version of the Sacred Scriptures.

Here we cannot but pause to adore the wonderful Providence of God, 'qui fortiter et suaviter omnia disponit,' and to reflect on the way in which the three languages, and the three races which they represent, were all used in harmonious accord, though so diverse and antagonistic, to prepare the way and exalt the triumph of the Crucified. The immense material results of the Roman rule, its forcible centralisation of the Jewish and Gentile civilised world; and on the other hand, the mutual leavening of each other by the

Greek and Israelite, and of both by the Latin power—breaking down, materially and intellectually, that ‘wall of division’ which severed the ancient Church from the heathen world without—made that gathering of both into the Fold of Christ possible, which otherwise, humanly speaking, could not have been so; and of this great work of God St. Paul was the exponent and chief instrument. His race and education made him ‘beyond measure zealous’ as a ‘Hebrew of the Hebrews,’ and ‘according to the strictest sect a Pharisee;’ his birth at Tarsus, and his childhood among the Greeks, gave him theirs as his mother tongue, emphatically the *common* dialect (*κοινὴ διάλεκτος*), and their culture; while his Roman citizenship, not ‘bought’ but his ‘birthright,’ gave him the *ποῦ στῶ*—the fulcrum on which to rest his leverage for the conversion of the world, and was the direct means, by his right of appeal to Cæsar, of bringing him to Rome itself as co-founder with Peter of the Apostolic See. The epigraph of the Cross was written in Hebrew, and Greek, and Latin; and St. Paul, ‘preacher of the truth to the whole world,’ wrote on the hearts of the men of those three races the same words—‘Jesus of Nazareth, King’—lifting up before their minds none but ‘Jesus Christ, and Him crucified,’ and so ‘drawing all men to’ Him.* Let us now address ourselves to the *ipsissima verba* of the Apostle.

* It will be perhaps needless, save to avoid the charge of plagiarism, for the writer to acknowledge here his free use of the learned and accurate researches of Conybeare and Howson (*Life and Epistles of St. Paul*) in the composition of this part of his paper.

II. When we speak of his mother tongue as Hellenistic Greek, the very language of the Septuagint, we must not be understood to mean that every word of this language was used in a different sense from that which the classic Greek of the age of Pericles bore. It is an evident exaggeration to say, as some have done, that Demosthenes or Plato would not have understood a single phrase of the Hellenistic Greek. I am disposed to think that the Greek of Alexandria (for instance) bore the relation to the pure Attic that our colloquial, or newspaper, English of this day bears to the 'undefiled' vernacular of Shakspeare, rather than that of Spenser, or still more of Chaucer. We may, if this be so, look, first, to the ordinary general rules of Greek philology in estimating St. Paul's language; but, secondly, we must look to the Septuagint for a clue to his peculiarities, and those of the other authors of the New Testament. And we must estimate his words and those of the Septuagint as a *common category*, differenced from the current Greek of the epoch by the religious ideas common to both. It will perhaps make my idea plainer if I illustrate it by the following comparison. We will suppose that any educated Englishman writes a book in the English tongue of this time. Exceptions (such as Mr. Carlyle's Anglo-Teutonic style) apart, it is obvious that the work would bear on it the stamp of this epoch like any other book written at the same time. Taking any standard author from Addison to Newman as the type, no marked divergence of idiom or verbal meaning would appear. The critic of a later age would, how-

ever, see almost in every page divergences of these kinds from the English of the Elizabethan period ; new idioms and new meanings of old words, sometimes even *reversing* their sense,* and he would in such cases estimate their force by an appeal to parallel passages in contemporary writers. Let us, however, further suppose the writer in question to have a *speciality* ; let us suppose him to be a Catholic theological writer, for instance, and it becomes obvious that he will use at once current words in their current sense, and also current words in a special sense ; and if we wish to judge of this sense we must not merely ask it of writers in general, but we must go to the literature of contemporary Catholicity — theological, liturgical, ascetical, historical Catholicity—for the value of these words. A number of words occur to you at once as illustrations of what I mean : the ‘tabernacle,’ the ‘religious,’ the ‘penitent,’ the ‘contrition,’ the ‘justice,’ the ‘mortal,’ the ‘venial,’ the ‘satisfaction,’ the ‘celebrate’ of the Imperial dictionary are words more or less distinct, in meaning and value, from the same words in the mouths and in the writings of Catholics.

Similarly New Testament Greek is the *κοινή διάλεκτος*, differenced by word and idiom from the Greek of the age of Pericles, and (besides this) by a whole category of words and idioms from that dialect itself by their special current theological meaning, to be found in the pages of the Septuagint, and in the writings of Hellenized Jews : as an instance, take the words *κοινός* and *ἀκάθαρτος*. *Κοινός* is good Greek for ‘common,’ ‘public,’

* *E. g.* the word ‘prevent,’ in the Elizabethan prayer book, &c.

‘familiar,’ but it is Hellenistic also, and biblical Greek to signify ‘impure’ or ‘profane,’ as opposed to ‘holy’ and ‘clean :’ ἀκάθαρτος, again, is hardly classical—it is used in a technical (medical) sense by Aretæus, and given by Suidas, but in the pages of the Septuagint and in the New Testament its meaning is precise—‘unclean’ as opposed to ‘clean,’ in the provisions of the Levitical law. We will now notice what I call the Sacrificial words and phrases used by St. Paul, in the order in which they occur in his writings, and apply this canon to them.

1. There is the passage in Rom. xv. : εἰς τὸ εἶναί με λειτουργὸν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, ἱερουργοῦντα τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα γένηται ἡ προσφορά τῶν ἐθνῶν εὐπρόσδεκτος, ἡγιασμένη ἐν Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ. The words λειτουργόν, ἱερουργοῦντα, προσφορά, ἡγιασμένη, are all familiar sacrificial words in the LXX. In the thirteenth chapter of the Acts, the Apostles are said to have been λειτουργοῦντες Κυρίῳ καὶ νηστεύοντες—ministering sacrificially to the Lord, and fasting. So here the Apostle calls himself a sacrificial minister of Jesus Christ for the Gentiles. In classical Greek no doubt λειτουργεῖν has the more etymological meaning of administering some public service by deputation for and from the people; but in the LXX. it is used to mean the ministry of religious worship by sacrifice. ἱερουργέω has the precise meaning of performing a sacred action, *i. e.* a sacrifice, and his ministry of the Gospel to the Gentiles is thus described by the Apostle, the object being moreover that the oblation (προσφορά, again a sacrificial word) should be accepted, being sanc-

tified—*ἡγιασμένη*, also a technical sacrificial word—by the Holy Ghost; for *ἀγιάζω*, like *ποιέω*, when used transitively with an accusative susceptible of the meaning, indicated an offering and sanctification of a material thing consecrated to God. When the Apostle speaks of the ministry to the faithful, his attendance and care for their spiritual wants, he uses the word *διακονία*, and in this very chapter he uses that word in this sense, not only of himself but of the work of Christ Himself—*λέγω δέ, Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν διάκονον γεγενῆσθαι περιτομῆς*—while, on the other hand, to designate the *offerings* of alms from Macedonia and Achaia for the poor at Jerusalem, *λειτουργῆσαι* is the word used.

2. Next comes the passage in the tenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Here St. Paul's argument is briefly this: he forbids his readers to partake in the meats and drinks sacrificed to idols, because such eating and drinking of the meats and drinks offered in sacrifice makes them idolaters. He alleges that (as they knew) this communion was the way in which the Levitic law enabled the laity to partake in its sacrifices; and he concludes that it is not competent to them at the same time to hold communion by thus eating and drinking, on the one hand with demons, and on the other with Christ. The whole argument, therefore, hinges on the assumption, that as the meats of the Levitic offerings were sacrifices, and as the meats of the Gentile offerings were sacrifices, so also the Bread and Chalice of Benediction, as he calls the Eucharist, are also a sacrifice; for the charge of idolatry rests on no other ground (here) than that of communion through

eating an idolatrous sacrifice ; and its incongruity with communion in Christ's Body is altogether pointless unless that communion stands in the same relation to Christ that the communion of the meats and drinks of the idolatrous temple stand in to the idols, viz. the relation of sacrifice. So far the argument is of immense controversial importance ; it turns not upon words, but upon ideas. No one can pretend that it would ever occur to a Protestant of the ordinary kind to combat the participation in public feasts held in the temples of idols on the meats, &c. offered in sacrifice, on this precise ground that such a participation was a glaring and flagrant contradiction to a *similar rite* among Christians, viz. a sacrifice with consumption of the thing offered, and thence a derivation of union with the Being to whom it is offered.

But our precise point is not the force of this argument, but merely the force of the *words* which occur in setting it forth. Let us consider them. In fact they show an intimate connection with those ideas.

3. τὸ ποτήριον, the 'chalice' or cup, is the word used by the Evangelists in their narrative of the institution of the Eucharist, and by our Lord Himself, as we know from the next chapter of this Epistle. This word is used sacrificially by our Lord when he said τοῦτο ποιεῖτε, not only of his body, but also (in the same way '*simili modo*,' as St. Paul says) of the chalice, in the Eucharist. Ποιεῖν, when joined with a noun signifying anything capable of being offered to God, constantly has this force ; in no less than thirty-four places in the Septuagint it is so used ; viz. Exod. xxix. 26, 38, 39 ;

x. 25; Lev. iv. 20; vi. 22; ix. 7, 16, 22; xiv. 19, 30; xvii. 9; xxiii. 12; Deut. xvi. 1; 1 Kings viii. 64; xviii. 23, 25, 26, 29 (not in the Heb.); 2 Kings x. 21, 24, 25; 2 Chron. xxx. 1, 2; xxxv. 1; Ezra vi. 19; Numb. ix. 2; Josh. v. 10; 2 Kings xxiii. 21; 2 Chron. xxxv. 17, 18, 19; Ps. lxxv. 19; Baruch i. 10.

Now, in the sentence

4. τοῦτο ποιεῖτε ὁσάκις ἂν πίνητε, τοῦτο is the relative to ποτήριον, but it is also the subject of ποιεῖτε as well as of πίνητε. Literally, therefore, the sentence would be ‘do this chalice,’ as well as ‘drink this chalice.’ To drink the chalice presents no difficulty, but that which precedes absolutely requires a paraphrase—and no other can be imagined but that which the word ποιεῖν, as we have seen, admits, viz. ‘do that which I do now, offer sacrificially this chalice, which you shall then consume by “drinking it;”’ thus St. Paul’s ποτήριον is a sacrificial chalice of libation, analogous, as we have seen, to the chalice offered sacrificially to ‘demons,’ and contrasted only *because* analogous.

5. He calls ποτήριον δαιμονίων, the chalice of sacrifice or libation to demons; the other, ποτήριον Κυριοῦ, the sacrificial chalice or libation of the Lord.

6. τραπέζῃ. Here again the word is sacrificial (τράπεζα). In the forty-first chapter of Ezekiel the prophet is shown in prophetic vision the temple of God. Among other differences between this vision and the existing temple is that the altar is of wood, and the angel who shows it to the prophet says, ‘this is the Table before the Lord.’ It was an altar, but *because* an altar, ‘the table before the Lord.’ In the forty-fourth

chapter the same expression is used ; the altar of sacrifice is called by God ‘my table.’ Indeed, the use of that word by adaptation springs almost spontaneously from the fact that the far greater portion of the Levitic sacrifices were to be consumed by manducation, while in that sacrifice which both chronologically and numerically stands alone as even a more excellent type of Christ’s sacrifice—I mean the Passover, the whole victim or sacrifice was thus to be consumed. These two passages in Ezekiel, and the two in Malachi, are the only ones in the LXX. in which this word is used, and in all they mean the altar of sacrifice under its aspect of oblation to God of those parts which were to be consumed, whether by fire, by manducation, or in any other way. In the celebrated passage of Malachias (1. v. 7, 12) the words *τραπέζη*, ‘table,’ and *θυσιαστήριον*, ‘altar of sacrifice,’ are used indifferently of one and the same altar. The whole passage speaks of the sacrifices of the law, and the condemnation of the Jews lies in the fact which they are reproached with, not that they ate, but that they offered, on the altar or table of the Lord, worthless and blemished victims. Hence the logical connection with the substitution in the future of that ‘sacrifice’ and ‘clean oblation’ in the universal church of the Gentiles, to which the prophet passes ; thus the contrast between *τραπέζη Κυρίου* and *τραπέζη δαιμονίων* in the text, is verbally, as well as in idea, a contrast between the sacrifice of the Lord, *i.e.* the Eucharist, and the sacrifice of demons. Finally, I notice that the Apostle proceeds in this passage to draw the distinction between the eating of meats which had been

offered and were exposed for sale in the shambles, which he allows, *secluso scandalo*; and the eating of them in the temples, which he has just condemned, whence follows again that it was the actual sacrifice to idols then and there, which rendered the participation illicit; and by his argument *a pari* the Eucharist is a similar sacrifice as the partaking of it has a similar result: BOTH communions are sacrificial.

7. We now come to the passage in which St. Paul gives his account of the Institution of the Blessed Sacrament. It is differenced from that of the three Evangelists who record it also, by the use of two expressions on the part of our Lord: *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε*, 'do this,' twice repeated after the offering of His Body and of His Blood; and *εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*, 'for the commemoration of me.' The force of *ποιεῖτε* we have considered in connection with the word *ποτήριον* in the previous passage. *ἀνάμνησις* is a word of not unfrequent occurrence in the Septuagint; it is used in the ordinary sense of recalling to memory, but also in the sense of recalling by a material object. In Numbers v. 15 we have a *θυσία μνημοσύνου ἀναμνησκούσα ἁμαρτίαν*, 'a sacrifice of remembrance, recalling sin.' In the Book of Leviticus xxiv. 7, cakes are ordered to be made and placed *εἰς ἀνάμνησιν*, for a remembrance, on the altar. Ch. i. the portion of the oblation cakes, or flour, oil, and incense, placed on the altar, is itself three times called the *μνημοσύνη*, or 'memorial.' Two of the Psalms (xxxvii. and lxi.) are inscribed *εἰς ἀνάμνησιν*, for a memorial. The force then of St. Paul's (or rather of our Lord's expression, rendered by him in his own tongue)

is, that the act he has performed is to be repeated as His memorial; on the one hand to remind us of His own sacrifice; on the other, as our memorial, to remind Him of our need. In the language of the LXX. it is not only a remembrance but a thing commemorating His Passion. If then, which no one denies, His passion was an offering or sacrifice, that thing which commemorates it must be a sacrifice too, and such the word ἀνάμνησις indicates.

8. Next we come to 1 Tim. ii. 1, δέησεις, προσευχάς, ἐντεῦξις, εὐχαριστίας. St. Paul exhorts by these expressions to various acts of prayer. From the eighth verse it appears that it is public prayer of which he speaks. The expression in the first verse πρῶτον πάντων, κ.τ.λ. is therefore to be rendered, with St. John Chrysostom, not ‘first of all I desire,’ but ‘I desire that first of all’ other prayers, *these* public ones shall be offered. These prayers are all expressed in liturgical terms; δέησεις are supplications, such as the *prayers (oremus)* of the Mass; προσευχαί are solemn invocations, like the ‘Gloria in excelsis;’ ἐντεῦξις are the liturgical addresses and advances to proclaim the gospel, to summon and dismiss the people, such as ‘Dominus vobiscum,’ ‘Orate,’ ‘Humiliate capita vestra,’ ‘Oremus,’ and so forth, of which there were so many more in the early liturgies, because of the imperfect knowledge of the catechumens, who required constant directions for their conduct. Finally, εὐχαριστίας is the consecrated sacrificial word of the new law. As we have seen, and as no one doubts, the ‘Chalice of blessing, and the Bread which we break’ of St. Paul means the Eucharistic Feast. Our question is

whether the words he uses are such as indicate a sacrifice. He says, τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας ὃ εὐλογοῦμεν, 'the chalice of blessing which we bless.' What is the force of εὐλογία and εὐλογίζω? 'The learned,' says Johnson ("Unbloody Sacrifice"), 'are agreed that these words are absolutely equivalent to εὐχαριστία and εὐχαριστέω.' Our Lord is said in Matt. xxvi. to have eucharised the Chalice and to have eulogised the Bread. St. Luke (xxii.) and St. Paul, as we have seen, 1 Cor. xi., say that He eucharised the Bread and 'similarly' the Chalice (ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ποτήριον), hence the words are absolutely equivalent, and bear one and the same sacrificial or oblatinal meaning; the Chalice of Eucharist or of Eulogy is therefore thus again declared to be a Sacrificial Chalice; and is used (by metonymy) for the libation or oblation of the liquid part of the sacrifice. Again, etymologically these words signify the ascription of praise and thanks, and we ascribe thanks by *offering*, not by *impetration*; that the Body and Blood of Christ is thus designated is therefore an evidence that it is not only, as all admit, an excellent, and *the most* excellent, form of prayer, but also an excellent, and the most excellent, form of offering, or sacrifice, of praise. And by this of course we do not restrict the offering to the mental act of the offerer, but include the material thing offered.

9. We come now to the Epistle to the Hebrews. In this we have to consider first the parallel pointed out by the Apostle between the Priesthood of Our Lord and that of Melchisedec. The argument of the whole Epistle may be briefly thus described. The writer

declares the superiority of Christ's Priesthood over that of the Law in various particulars, such as the nature of His Sacrifice, the Innocence of the Priest, His eternal ministration, etc. In the passage we are to consider he adduces as another argument of this superiority the fact that that mysterious King and Priest of Salem, of whose mode of Priesthood the Psalm,* quoted by the Apostle, says, that it is the very mode or 'order' (τάξις) of Christ's Priesthood, blessed Abraham, the progenitor of the whole Priestly race of the Law. But he says the greater blesses the less, therefore Christ's Priesthood is more excellent than the Priesthood of the Law. He urges on his readers certain evidences that Melchisedec's Priesthood was indeed a type and likeness of Christ's; as that he, like Christ, has a mysterious origin, no predecessor nor successor in his dignities; that the meaning of his name interpreted is, 'King of Justice,' and that of his title 'King of Peace'—titles which are those of Christ, etc.

On this narrative St. Paul lays great stress, and it is only fair therefore to admit that the total omission of so striking a point of similitude as the identity of the offering which characterises the Priesthood of both, requires some explanation. It may be fairly said, 'If this is really the case, viz., that Christ offers a sacrifice under the form of Bread and Wine, as you Catholics say, and that Melchisedec did the same, how do you account for the fact that St. Paul, eagerly insisting on the similarity of their priesthood, says no word on so capital a point as this?'

* Σὺ ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, κ.τ.λ. Ps. 110.

I pass over for brevity the arguments which prove that the 'order' of Melchisedec's Priesthood lay chiefly in this mode of oblation, as distinguished from the inactation of animals; and I say first that it being notorious to the Hebrews to whom this Epistle is written that priests offered both bloody and unbloody sacrifices, it follows that Melchisedec's Priesthood would acquire no new proof to them by allegation of the nature of his sacrifice. Secondly, that we fully admit that a great part of the likeness to Christ's Priesthood lay in the fact that Melchisedec's was a *personal*, not an *hereditary* one. Thirdly, that there is in St. Paul's writings, as in all primitive writings, a great reserve in regard to the subject of the real Presence in the Divine mysteries. Thus St. Jerome expressly says that St. Paul's silence in this passage is referable to this principle. Fourthly, there is reason to think that the Apostle quoted habitually from memory. See Tholuk (*Studien u. Kritiken*, v. viii.). Out of eighty-eight quotations from the Old Testament, Koppe gives grounds for thinking that forty-nine are cited from memory. Bleek thinks that *all*, without exception, are from memory. If so, one would expect that the *main point* would be touched, and not necessarily subsidiary ones, as is manifestly the case when he quotes the sense and not the phrases of certain passages.

(I do not think it likely that St. Paul had his LXX. with him in his journeys; but even if he had, it would not follow he should refer to it for things familiarly present to his mind. Our Lord's quotations also from the LXX. are *seldom textual*.)

Lastly, we have to consider the declaration of St. Paul in the thirteenth chapter of this Epistle, *ἔχομεν θυσιαστήριον, ἐξ οὗ φαγεῖν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν οἱ τῆ σκηνῆ λατρεύοντες*, ‘we have an altar whereof they have no power to eat, who serve the tabernacle.’ Here the word *θυσιαστήριον* is the name of the altar of sacrifice throughout the LXX. It is, however, literally ‘place of sacrifice ;’ and it is to be noted that in all the writers, sacred and profane, the root *θύω* and its derivatives are used sacrificially, not by any means exclusively to signify mactation, but also any other mode of offering to a superior power. What this altar is we alone can declare ; for that it was a material altar, and stands here for the sacrifice placed on it, is evident from the remainder of the sentence, in which it is said, that that sacrifice is to be consumed by eating by Christians only. In the next verses the Apostle says that the sacrifices of the Law had their blood alone taken into the holy place by the High Priest, their bodies being burnt without the camp ; and pursuing the thought of our sacrifice, he says, that this (*διὸ καὶ Ἰησοῦς*) was so ordered, because it represented the sacrifice of Christ without the wall of Jerusalem, while His Blood, by implication or parity, is offered (in the Sanctuary) to sanctify His people (*ἵνα ἀγιάσῃ τὸν λαόν*) as was theirs. Such is the express and inferential force of this sentence, which no explanation can mitigate ; for though we may allow, with Estius and St. Thomas, that the primary meaning is an antithesis between the Bloody Sacrifice of the Cross and those of the Law, the introduction of the altar and the eating of the victim is so gratuitous

as a mere supplement, that we are forced to admit that it alludes to a distinct doctrine, viz., that of the Christian Sacrifice of the Eucharist in which the Divine Victim is thus consumed.

III. It is time now to conclude, which I will do by rehearsing briefly two or three considerations calculated to re-enforce the end to which I have endeavoured to lead. I observe, then—

1. That it is a notorious fact, that when Christianity came into existence as a religious system, no known religion was without sacrifice in some form or other; thus the idea of a religion without a sacrifice, visible and material, is one which would have required to be inculcated in express terms, and the mere silence of the New Testament Scriptures on such a point would be quite inadequate to prove its abolition. Accordingly the cessation of the Jewish religion is always spoken of in Scripture under the name of the cessation of Sacrifice, and its supersession by another religion under the name of the substitution of another Sacrifice, as in the prophecy of Malachias and so many more. That in these places the sacrifice of Christ once for all upon the Cross is not a sufficient explanation, follows from the terms used, such as that the new sacrifice is to be *offered in every place*, etc.

2. Next we find the apostolic Fathers, who use the very same sacrificial words which we find in St. Paul's Epistles, unanimous in applying them to the Eucharist, and in assigning to it a sacrificial character, a proceeding unaccountable unless we admit that this was the doctrine of the Apostles themselves. Thus the text of

Malachi is used in the second age by Justin Martyr and Irenæus, the one almost a contemporary of St. John, the other a disciple of St. Polycarp, his disciple ; in the third age by Tertullian, Zeno Veronensis, and St. Cyprian ; in the fourth by Eusebius, St. John Chrysostom, St. Jerome, and St. Augustin, and so on. Nor was this their *private* doctrine ; for in some Liturgies, as in that of Alexandria, commonly called St. Mark's, this text is incorporated as having no other meaning in the preface of the Mass.*

3. We find in the same writers a remarkable reserve in speaking of this Christian sacrifice, corresponding to the scanty manner in which St. Paul alludes to it. On this it may be objected that if, as we allege, these writers are explicit enough to prove our point, they must also be too explicit to admit the theory of reserve (the *disciplina arcani*) of which we speak. I answer, that in the subject of the Eucharist two things are plainly distinguishable—the external rite and the internal reality, that it is quite possible to allude to, or even to describe (though I think I am right in saying that such description is hardly to be found in the primitive writers), the one, without betraying the secret of the other. If it is objected that St. Paul explicitly states what passed at the Institution of the Eucharist (as we have seen), it may be fairly answered, that this description is precisely addressed to those who, on the one hand, knew of the external rite, and therefore were not to be ‘taught’ it then and there ; and on the other,

* Mede's *Christian Sacrifice*.

showed by their outrageous indecency of conduct that the meaning of it was not yet clear to them. Such conduct in those who were already admitted was one reason for the very reserve of which we speak.

The last corroborative argument which I will advert to is one used, I think, by our late Cardinal, but my memory does not serve me so far as to say in which of his works. It is this. In the Apocalypse St. John beholds our Lord '*standing*,' and yet '*as slain*,' under the form of a Lamb on the celestial altar, and surrounded by all the adjuncts with which the Catholic Liturgy makes us familiar. If we suppose, as we may well do, that the form of his vision was suggested by that very sacrificial worship whose existence from the Apostolic age we are maintaining, then our point is allowed. If, on the other hand, that worship is a copy of a celestial vision which was directly and objectively presented to the mind of the Apostle, then we need no further warrant for our great sacrificial rite, for what can surpass the authority of that which is enacted in heaven itself? And then, as Moses was shown the 'pattern in the Mount' of the whole ritual of the law, so, on this hypothesis, the beloved disciple was made to see in heaven itself the prototype of the unceasing sacrifice which the Church militant offers upon earth. Either hypothesis gives a sanction to our belief, the more weighty because not direct, for in either case God Himself is responsible for a form of which the substance can be no other thing than a sacrifice, living, perpetual, supreme; and such, and such *alone*, is the Eucharist, *i.e.* sacrifice of the New Law.

I sum up by submitting that my argument proves—
1, that St. Paul's writings are in a given and peculiar tongue; 2, that certain expressions used by him are instances of a *technical* use of this peculiar language; 3, that, though insufficient to prove the doctrine that the Eucharist is a sacrifice if taken by themselves, they are sufficient to show that his silence on that doctrine is not so absolute as is pretended; and hence, 4, that they form an indirect corroborative testimony to the doctrine—which is proved *aliunde* from Scripture, the testimony of tradition, the writings of early authors, the monuments of antiquity, primitive liturgies, and theological reason—*namely*, that the Eucharist is the true and proper sacrifice of the New Law.

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
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