




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QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY STUDIES

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DR. JOHN WATSON

IOHANNI . WATSON
QVINQVAGINTA . IAM . ANNOS
PHILOSOPHIAM
APVD . REGINENSES
STVDIIS . DOCTRINA . VIRTUTE
INLVSTRANTI
HAEC . OPVSCVLA
DONO . DICAMVS
AMICI

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Note

The first two essays may be taken as introductory. They treat of the philosophical background in Scotland and on this Continent fifty years ago, when Dr. Watson came from Glasgow to his chair in Queen's University.

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Meditatio Laici.

The philosophy of Edward Caird was an offshoot from the great systems of thought developed by Kant and Hegel, but as taught by himself and a group of eminent academic teachers who had been his scholars, it had its own formulas, its own characteristic applications and phrases, and of course its own way of encountering the new problems which are always coming up in philosophy. It had even, at least in the case of Caird and Watson, a well-defined public, whose needs and receptivities counted for something in the form which their teaching took. It had a true organic relation to its environment in this respect. A certain sobriety of speculation was impressed upon it by the need of adjusting its highest thought to a watchful and inquiring public which was not confined to academic circles. Even its language, apart from the necessities of technical exposition, tended towards the plainer usage, as something that was meant to reach a wider public. Caird and Watson were great Kantian scholars and profoundly influenced by the ideas of Hegel, but their thinking was moulded in a form which had little of the severely scholastic character of German metaphysic. They accustomed themselves to use a language which was as readable as that of Locke or Hume, only that it carried more of the natural refinement and complexity of modern thought.

My idea in this article is to give readers who may not be very metaphysical a definite idea of the work Caird did and the way in which he did it, and partly also of the place it has

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in the culture of our time. I would like also to give some idea of the intellectual and spiritual effort it involved. It is already saying a good deal when one says that Caird laid down the ground-lines of the work of the school. That means a fabric which has risen from some depth of thought and has been in many ways truly adjusted to the needs and the pressure of the time. His system was no pure product like Spinoza's of a solitary thinker reacting on world-thought alone. There was that element in it, of course, as there must be in anything worth calling a philosophy, but it bears in a greater degree the marks of immediate contact with its environment, contact which in the deepest sense was not unsympathetic, though on the surface there was a good deal of quiet struggle and conflict. But on the whole Caird's thought is conciliatory, benevolent, optimistic, and has but little suggestion of the work of a thinker who is struggling in an alien or opposed world, only of a world to be redeemed from illusions and elevated above its natural self.

His environment in his earlier days was decidedly theological. He grew up in the atmosphere of religious excitement and discussion created by the great secession of the Free Church. The eloquence of Chalmers and Guthrie and of his own brother, John Caird, already famous in the pulpit, and of other eminent preachers of the day were common, almost central, topics of discourse in the ordinary Scotch family of the middle-class. He himself had meant to enter the church, and during his undergraduate career had been studying Divinity, Church History and Hebrew at Glasgow and St. Andrews. In any case it was almost the only way in those days for one who looked forward to the contemplative life of the scholar and thinker, outside the two great English universities at least. In Scotland university appointments were then rare events, the Arts curriculum hardly requiring more than

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nine or ten professors, generally attaining longevity. The few assistants employed occupied only a temporary or hopelessly inferior position. Caird seems to have found nothing in the theological halls to awaken a deeper interest in him. The Higher Criticism had not yet begun to perturb the Presbyteries, and the professors were mostly drowsing comfortably over the old lines of Apologetics. Caird would occasionally speak of their grotesque eccentricities—that Professor of Church History, for example, who began his lectures with the Creation and ended them with a fantastic description of Og, King of Bashan.¹ The Universities are sensitive enough now to all currents of thought and even to popular opinion, but in that day professional theology in Scotland saw no movement on the waters worth noticing, such phenomena as Mill and Carlyle being evidently regarded as disturbances in an alien outer world.

But outside there was life enough in the religious consciousness, even a very exceptional vigour of life. The great Disruption of 1843 had stirred Scotland as no event of that kind is likely ever to stir it again. The question at issue was one of independence in church government, a question which, when once raised, was likely to move, as it had moved before, a people who loved their preachers to stern and decisive action. On this occasion it seemed to call back into being something of the spirit of Covenanting and Cameronian days. The new Free Church was born in a swell of enthusiasm which left its mark on Scottish life for many a day. Naturally the new church took with it the more fervent and militant type of evangelicism amongst the ministers, and for a generation at least there was a well defined difference of tone in the pulpits of the old church and the new. The mass of the following contained the true leaven of the old Scotch spirit. It was

¹*Life of Edward Caird*, by Jones and Muirhead.

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rather hard and formalistic in temper, always something of a laughing-stock to the laxer Southern temperament on account of its dogmatic intensity, its rigid Sabbatarianism and its contemptuous rejection of aesthetic accessories in worship. Scotchmen of that day will still remember types like Dr. Begg of Edinburgh who conducted the sternest of campaigns against the introduction of the organ into church services; 'a kist of whusstles was an abomination in the house of God.' In its later phases—under the leadership of Principal Rainy—it lived perhaps too much on Disestablishment politics, but at its best it was a vital reinforcement of Scotch character, shaping its spirit in a very firm mould. Its unquenchable faith in the very letter of the word gave a kind of glorification to the poorest existence that is not quite replaced by anything I see now, though there is a wider and more active interest in political life. The shoemaker in the little town or burgh who read his Bible and perhaps Josephus' History of the Jews, had the emotion, perfect at least as a sensation, of contact with the Absolute. In all the churches, old and new, the services were profoundly reverent and on special occasions, such as Communion-day, surcharged with a weight of spiritual feeling which pervaded every look and attitude. Yet the Free Kirk service had a tense quality of its own which is only describable as the superior consciousness of the elect. I remember when Principal Rainy came down—in the midst of a fierce Disestablishment campaign—to preach in the old Free Kirk of the Scotch burgh where I lived. He was neither a Guthrie nor a Caird in the pulpit, but preacher and congregation reached heights all the same on invisible wings. I belonged to the older church and felt very much as if I had got into a hillside meeting of Peden's. His text actually was, 'Ye are the salt of the earth', and the application did not need to be, and was not made too obvious.

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Of course there were plenty of influences at work even then modifying the severer form of tradition. There always had been in a political and intellectual sense, from the great days of Jeffrey and the *Edinburgh Review*. And new influences, of a more spiritually alterative kind, were beginning to penetrate. In literature Matthew Arnold and Clough were giving a fine, if somewhat plaintive, expression to the spiritual unrest of the time. The poetry of Browning was a great liberating influence and that of Wordsworth broadened and calmed, but neither, though the older poet was at his end, had come into its full rights with the general public in the fifties and sixties. Mrs. Browning with her vivid flashes of feeling and sympathy with social wrong and suffering, was still very generally considered a better poet than her husband. The great stimulating forces of that time, for thoughtful youth especially, were Tennyson and Carlyle. The former with his 'there lives more faith in honest doubt' and general temperate Anglican recognition of the claims both of the new and the old, had a wide appeal, all the more that his poetic form was a perfect popular expression of the new aesthetic chords that had passed into poetry with Keats and the aesthetic school. But the great intellectual stimulant of that time was Carlyle with his new idealistic treatment of life and fundamental questioning of the whole social fabric. The stirring pages of his *French Revolution*, the new and profound form of his biographic essay, connecting the surface of achievement with the deep stream of spiritual life in the man and reaching thus a fuller form of judgement, the vigorous criticism of society in *Sartor Resartus* for its lack of moral unity and its *laissez-faire*, and its commercialized spirit which had turned industrial life into a fierce scramble for wealth and made its religion a convention; all that, even partially understood and assim-

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lated amidst an undiscerning professional criticism from the Reviews, made Carlyle one of the cults of studious youth.

Caird had been, in early days, according to Professor Nichol, one of a circle of 'flaming worshippers.' 'The greatest literary influence of my student days,' Caird says of Carlyle in an address which he gave in later years to the students at Glasgow. That address is an ample recognition of Carlyle as a spiritual and moral force. In his calm judicial way he notes with unflinching discernment the fundamental qualities in Carlyle's work as a thinker and historian. No philosophic 'universal' in it, at any rate, is missed; his power of presenting the world as the manifestation of spirit, his new interpretation of history 'by what was almost a new kind of insight' into the inner forces of life, his true dramatic power of presentation, etc. He can even say that Carlyle, passing beyond the categories of ordinary historians, gave us that 'ultimate interpretation of events by that moral necessity according to which, as Schiller said, the history of the world is the judgement of the world (*das Welt-Gericht*).' Nevertheless, as Jones in his chapter on Caird notices, there is a certain reluctance in the appreciation. Even Caird's magnanimity could not perhaps — at this period — overlook Carlyle's disparaging phrases about metaphysical 'air-castles, in which no knowledge would come to dwell.' In particular he balked at parts of Carlyle's social criticism. The denunciatory manner of the modern prophet and his terribly candid way of referring to decent make-believes and pretentious official mediocrity were very alien to Caird's temperament. Caird was a true Liberal also, with all the optimism of Liberalism in the seventies and eighties, and Carlyle's contemptuous treatment of the great Liberal principles, extension of the suffrage, the use of the ballot-box, etc., as machinery which had in itself no virtue to produce good or wise govern-

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ment, while it contained a truth, was to Caird only the half truth which lies in negativity. Even Carlyle's criticism of *Laissez-faire*, which time was to show was a whole truth, would not find any sympathetic reception from a Liberal of the eighties. There was a cool period therefore in his attitude towards Carlyle. But, for all that, the unfailing sense of justice and the intellectual insight of Caird make the address a very comprehensive estimate. Later he warmed again considerably, I think, in this direction, recognizing how much akin after all, below all technical differences of thought, Carlyle's insistence on the spiritual values of life was to his own. His later writing is full of appreciative quotations from Carlyle.

One thing Carlyle did for him as for many others. He introduced him to German literature, the literature of Schiller, Goethe, Lessing and Herder, with its freedom of thought and new spiritual attitude. It meant a deeper and more comprehensive view of life than was to be found in the Diderots, D'Alemberts, Voltaires and Fontenelles who, though they might be very suspect to the British public in general, were still really the classic names in European literature—outside at least of what was then called *Belles Lettres*. Carlyle here had rung the bell for a new era with his usual vigour, and did really 'change the signals' for thinking British youth of that time. Caird, indeed, while he was still an undergraduate, went to Germany to see for himself how things were there. His attention there was chiefly given, according to Dr. Watson,² not to philosophy but to literature, especially to Goethe. What Goethe then meant to men is finely reflected in many a page of Caird, Matthew Arnold and others of that time.

²*The Idealism of Edward Caird, Philosophical Review, March, 1909.*

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When he went to Oxford in 1860, Caird came into close contact of course with new currents of thought. Oxford was a meeting place for them all, Philosophical Radicalism, Broad Churchism, Æsthetic Classicism, Tractarianism, or the relics of it. Caird's circle included, in its larger circumference at least, men like Bryce, Pater, Addington Symonds, Green, Dicey, Pater, Maurice, Nettleship; his tutor was Jowett, whose finely comprehensive spirit was equally at home with Paul or Plato or Thucydides. It was a high type of culture with fine moral and social poise, Puritan reserves of self-control, and a profound response to Greek thought, all of which obviously helped to determine Caird's course and bearing in the world. In most there was a decided and in some a very active interest in philosophical and religious speculation, but it generally rested on some characteristically Anglican form of compromise in thought, at bottom rather inconsistent. Caird was seeking for something more fundamental and does not seem ever to have given much attention to the philosophizing of Maurice, or Mansel, or the followers of Coleridge any more than he did to Sir William Hamilton's. The philosophic radicalism of Mill and Grote lay more outside, but was still the strongest current of the time. Caird could not approve of its philosophic basis and principles but he always was much in sympathy with its ideals of progress and practical reform, the extension of the advantages of civilization to the people, free education, women's rights, removal of clerical tests and restrictions and the like. The principle of Utility might be philosophically defective and often tending in practice to a deadly displacement of higher interests, but it was a very effective weapon in the fight for reform. The economic side of it was successfully pressed by the Free Trade School of Manchester and became practically the official policy of Liberalism. It was a genuine English product from the

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philosophic point of view, a practical English form of the French Enlightenment. Caird had much respect for its clear, logical, rationalistic mode of discussion in men like John Stuart Mill, Spencer and Huxley, and perhaps a thread or two from its discipline passed into him this way. But its philosophy was an empiricism which cut at the very roots of the religious consciousness, and Caird, for whom the religious consciousness was simply the necessary synthesis of all ethical and ideal values in life, had to consider upon what principles it could best be defended. He found his chief help here in the idealistic philosophy of Germany. The influence of Jowett and in particular that of Green seem to have been decisive in this direction. The latter at this period was a sort of fellow-worker with him, a philosophic brother-in-arms in the fight. But, as Dr. Watson notes,³ while Green began by a vigorous destructive attack on the principles of the empirical school, Caird with a characteristic avoidance of polemics began by an exposition of the philosophy of Kant which sought to show that Kant's cautious and critical analysis of human reason involved principles and points of view which led to Hegel's more idealistic view of the world. It was a much more significant work than such 'Examinations' usually are, perhaps not so much in the patient thoroughness with which he carried it out, as in the way in which he did it and the purpose he made it serve. For it constituted a sort of double base for his own work, and it was the bridge over which the whole school travelled to the higher form of Idealism.

'We are conscious of ourselves in relation to and in distinction from a world and therefore of a unity which is beyond this distinction.'

³*Idealism of Edward Caird, Philosophical Review, March, 1909.*

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'The parts of the intelligible world mean nothing except in the whole and the whole means nothing except as contributing to the parts.'

These are typical sentences in which Caird was accustomed to state his fundamental position. Of course, it is in the lowest or simplest form of experience, the act of perception, that most difficulty is encountered. There is a world of ambiguity lurking in any way of presenting such a truth as 'Things exist for us only as known.' To begin with, it seems to involve that distinction which he and Green drew so sharply between the consciousness of the individual as the empirical growth which psychology chiefly studies and the consciousness which manifests itself as the universal reason or mind 'within which all objects of knowledge are contained', as he wrote in the early article on Metaphysic in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, treated this unity with some boldness of language, as the eternal self-consciousness of the world which maintained 'the relations of fact' in the timeless unity of knowledge, and demonstrated in a brief but very vigorous and independent way the reality of its existence in the ordinary experience of life. Caird's process of approach here was long and elaborate, and shows the thorough manner in which he had sought to establish the truth for himself and the caution with which he introduced the new Idealism to his public. Taking Kant's system with its epistemological method as a basis, he follows its procedure step by step, explaining the growth and connexion of the ideas, criticizing, modifying and correcting, picking up deftly the filaments of thought, the unconscious dialectic, as he calls it, in Kant by which he can lead the whole up to his own Hegelian point of view. Kant's severe severance of scientific from moral truth had led him to present the truths of higher experience first as incapable of being connected with the world of fact in scientific form, and

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then to show what validity they might have from the point of view of a higher Reason. His system was thus an excellent methodology by which Caird could bring the problems of philosophy and the question of the limits of human reason before his public. Hegel's manner of presenting philosophy and his dialectical method were then impossible. Hegel was then, in spite of Hutchison Stirling's work, or perhaps partly because of it, a doubtful kind of Magus to the Scotch mind generally, and any affiliation with him then exposed a teacher at least to the danger of being misunderstood. Hegel's highly technical language, too, the very last word of a bold idealizing thought, was hardly fitted to win a hearing from a public accustomed to the comparatively plain speech of Hamilton and Mill. Kant's language, it is true, was technical enough also, but still his system was built up, so to speak, from the ordinary consciousness of things, and below the technical surface its general articulations and divisions were those of ordinary logic. In any case I doubt if there was much disposition in Caird to use the Hegelian dialectic. He could and did use it freely enough, as you see in his Letters, by way of short-hand illustration or argument, and necessarily, in his criticism of Bradley's system. But he was really nearer Kant in temper and intellectual ways, cautious and critical with all his idealism, and very careful always, it seems to me, in his way of expressing and encircling the great truth of the ultimate unity of being and knowing.

I have heard a good student of Caird's say that his *Critical Philosophy of Kant* was a harder book to read than the original *Critiques*. It is a work requiring very close thinking and the technical apparatus of Kant is at times oppressive. But even for a layman like myself there are brilliantly clear and comprehensive chapters in it, presentations from the Kantian point of view of man's relation to the universe, such as the

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chapters on Teleological Judgement and Natural Religion; with fine supplementary criticism from Caird showing how near Kant came to a view of Nature and History 'as the manifestation of a divine reason, trust in whom turns morality into religion.' Modern refinements of the idea of purpose, doctrines of 'conation' or 'satisfaction', or of the uniformity of nature as a guarantee of moral reality, of course lie outside the point of view, but the problem of reconciling the natural and spiritual aspects of man's being is brought fully before us with all the weight of thought and logical clearness characteristic of Caird. I can enjoy even the excursions with Pauline theology, which look a little old-fashioned now, but were very much in the mode of that time, one of Jowett's own lines of work, and relevant enough to Caird's conception of philosophy as 'a vindication of the religious consciousness.' The chapter on the Moral Will, Muirhead says, is not only abreast of the times but still, in some ways, a little ahead of them. It is very likely. The Moral Will is a very old thing, and Caird was as likely to see anything essential about it as most psychologists.

But though the *Critical Philosophy of Kant* is Caird's foundational work and a notable landmark, it seems to me, in British philosophy, it is in his small work on Hegel that his philosophical idealism finds free expression. Kant, as Caird held, had shown that the world is dependent for its objectivity on thought, but as he never got so far as to regard all the elements in knowledge as a unity, as a whole which could determine reality, the world in his system remained in phenomenal contrast with reality. In Hegel this separation of the elements of knowledge was corrected and the idea that the principle or character of the whole manifests itself in our knowledge received its clearest and fullest development from him. He showed Thought in the full concreteness of its movement as at one and the same time the distinction and the

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relation of things. Nothing exists in bare identity but contains from an absolute point of view its own negation and passage into something else. The principle of contradiction took a new meaning as a positive, dynamic aspect of thought and gave a logical form to the essential unity of things. The irreducible abstractions and antinomies of Kant disappeared. Thought, as Caird was fond of saying, could heal its own wounds. At any rate it got new wings for speculation; the merely ideal possibilities took on the form of reality. For Thought here meant not simply the function in consciousness which relates things and organizes experience into a systematic whole, but a consciousness in which the self and the world are bound together in a form of unity which involves the ultimate unity, the infinite element, in the consciousness of the finite. It is a difficult conception to reason out to the end in the face of the ordinary realistic consciousness, a conquest of idealistic thought at the height and in all the pride of its vigour in the three great successors of Kant. But the higher the form of experience is which you interrogate, the more clearly does some essential truth in it appear.⁴ The newer Idealism which denies it, has by inevitable logic to deny some of the most essential elements in our higher experience. For Caird it was a central principle, well worth the life's work he devoted to establishing it and interpreting it in the most important relations to experience, from its ambiguously simple form in perceptual judgement to its clearer forms in the moral consciousness and in the historical evolution of thought. He did not underrate the difficulties, he says in one of his letters. One of them was the difficulty of reconciling the conception of

⁴You can see Dr. Watson's firm logical way of leading up to 'the idea of an absolute subject-object' in chap. viii of his *Outline of Philosophy*, and compare the comprehensive third chapter in *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, Part II. Muirhead has also a careful chapter on the subject (Metaphysical Foundations) in the *Life of Caird*. See also his essay, *The Doctrine of the Concept*, for its logical aspect in Judgement.

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God as manifesting Himself in development 'with a conception of Him as eternally complete in Himself.' There is an 'ultimate antinomy' for him in the timelessness of the Absolute. So he writes to Miss Talbot. He does not seem to rely much here on the Hegelian dialectic of the Trinity and is evidently seeking for some logic of his own. In his treatment of Plotinus and Neo-Platonism in the later chapters of *The Evolution of Theology*, vol. ii, he seems to say all he has to say on the subject. Also on 'the maintenance of the individual life' he does not see his way to 'any positive conclusion from philosophical principles,' but tells his friend to 'wait in tranquillity and confidence in the justice of God, who has not made the world for nothing, or lighted the fires of spiritual life in order to produce nothing but ashes.' His letters to Miss Talbot are interesting as showing the way in which his Christian consciousness troubled the waters. He is candid enough to her on the Resurrection and such questions; a firm Kantian in his treatment of the temporal historical element in Christianity. He disclaimed 'cocksureness' in general for his philosophy, but it is evident he felt great security in his high doctrine of the self-consciousness and what it involved. There is almost a religious exaltation in the way in which he states it in his little book on Hegel—on this side at any rate there was a true affinity between them:

'The essential unity of all things with each other and with the mind which knows them, is the adamantine circle, within which the strife of opposites is waged, and which their utmost violence of conflict cannot break. No fact, which is in its nature incapable of being explained or reduced to law—no law which it is impossible ever to recognize as essentially related to the intelligence that apprehends it—can be admitted to exist in the intelligible universe. No absolute defeat of the spirit—no defeat that does not contain

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the elements of a greater triumph—can possibly take place in a world which is itself nothing but the realization of spirit.’

In Caird's volume of *Essays on Literature and Philosophy*, there is one on *The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time*. It was originally an address to the Philosophical Society at Edinburgh delivered in 1881. In it you can see very clearly the great pains he took to present his philosophy to the public, so that it could take hold of their traditional ways of thought and lift them to a higher level. It is also a complete expression of the point of view from which he regarded and organized his work as a philosopher. The point of view which he kept before his hearers was that philosophy ‘must to-day be a critical re-construction of belief.’ The harmony of our spiritual life, he told them, had been broken. Many of our scientific men had come to think, even if with reluctance, that the only real knowledge we had ‘belongs to the context of a finite experience’ and that all religious and metaphysical efforts to reach beyond the finite were attempts to think the unknowable. Even the literature of the time, much of it, gave the impression that such ideas were illusory. It was impossible in such discord, he declared, that our lives should be what human lives have sometimes been—impossible that we should rise to that sense of the infinite resources of the spirit that moves us, out of which the highest achievements of men at all times have sprung. The age of the simple intuitions of faith is past and some kind of philosophic reflection is needed to recover the harmony of life. And he illustrates his view with one of those large similitudes which he could apply very happily and which was in this case very well chosen for the audience: ‘As the builders of the Second Temple had to work with arms by their side, so, in our day, those who seek either to maintain, or to replace, the old

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Christian synthesis of life, must provide themselves with the weapons of philosophy.' We have a right, he tells them, to begin our task of criticism and reconstruction with a faith in the great work achieved in and by the spirit of man in the past; it can have value only as a continuation of that work. 'The hope of mankind for the future must be a vain illusion unless it can reasonably be based on a deep reverence for the past.'

His audience at Edinburgh would be a fairly critical one. The Edinburgh Philosophical Society was a great institution. There would be many well-known men at an inaugural meeting, some of more than local reputation, men like Flint and perhaps Cairns from the theological halls, judges of Session, university professors, lawyers and doctors for whom Edinburgh was famous, merchants of the thoughtfully religious type then common enough in Scotland, untarnished orthodoxy that sat under Candlish or Begg and moderates from 'little Macgregor of the Tron'; and no doubt a good many old pupils of Hamilton, with decided opinions about a philosophy which pretended to a knowledge of the Unconditioned; or of Professor Campbell Fraser, a quiet thoughtful man, whose position was not well understood, except that in general he defended the claims of 'the national philosophy of Scotland' against Kantian and Hegelian ideas; a fairly critical audience and sure to be very attentive to hear what the new apostle of the mysteries of German Transcendentalism had to say on the great problem. The old leaven was still strong enough in the Scotch spirit; but in the eighties the new movement in thought had begun to make itself evident. Within the Free Church itself the hard core had begun to expand and blossom in intellectual strength and breadth, and after the fierce heresy fight over Robertson Smith's higher exegesis, its new school of theologians showed great vigour and comprehensive-

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ness of reaction on the new thought and on the whole continued to keep in the lead.

Of course, Caird could not unfold in an hour's discourse the details of his system, but he manages to give a good general indication of his position and to combine it with some fine criticism of agnostic Science, sheathed however in a broad and sympathetic recognition of its truth-seeking spirit. The patient labour of men like Mill and Darwin, he said, was really 'an idealization of interests and objects which would eventually be a contribution to the idealism of life.' It was at this point that he made his criticisms of Carlyle and Ruskin as indeed prophets but with a denunciatory form of utterance which in Caird's view was no longer suitable to our hopeful and scientific age. Ruskin, if I remember rightly, had been at Edinburgh some time before, telling them that their architects did not know the first thing about windows.

The fundamental principle of Caird's philosophy was rather a difficult one to put before a popular audience. He presents it very judiciously, sometimes in phrases well known to his students: 'To rise from the finite to the infinite would be impossible, if the consciousness of the infinite were not already involved in the consciousness of the finite and developed along with it'; sometimes translating it into the language of religious experience: 'If we cannot, in the sense I have indicated, know God, we cannot know anything.' He even ventures on a brief technical explanation of the Kantian epistemology or theory of knowledge, bringing out of it the result that 'the objective synthesis of religion' was 'no illusion of a finite mind trying to stretch itself beyond its limits.' Hegel is not mentioned, but there is a clear expression of his point of view in a reference to 'the idea of truth as the ultimate unity of being and knowing.' Also there is the definite statement that philo-

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sophy in dealing alike with the secular and religious consciousness, 'is discharged from the absurd and impossible feat of finding its way into a transcendent region beyond all consciousness and experience', a sentence which would clear away any ambiguity in his use of the term 'infinite.' He sums up at the end in a passage which expresses perfectly the spirit and range of his work as a philosopher:

'Philosophy may therefore begin its work by a vindication of the religious consciousness—the consciousness of the infinite—as presupposed in that very consciousness of the finite, which at present often claims to exclude it altogether . . . And having thus taught us to regard the consciousness of the infinite as no mere illusion, but as the consciousness of a real object, an Absolute, a God, who has been revealing Himself in and to man in all ages, philosophy must go on to consider the history of religion, and indeed the whole history of man as founded on religion, as the progressive development of this consciousness.'

A glance at the resemblance of the speculative and religious situation in the time of Plato and the Sophists, and a fine illustration from Goethe's *Faust*, gave a very characteristic colouring to his address. There are many traces in it of the difficulties to be encountered in introducing a philosophy of the Absolute to the Scotland of that time. Some might even think that Caird had here abandoned the position of the philosophic truth-seeker for that of the Christian Apologist. But for him religion did not mean any dogmatic creed but the moral harmonizing of man's life by a view of it which brought all its elements into an intelligible unity. It is true he did not conceive philosophy as an abstract science of being, observing strict 'ethical neutrality' in its researches. The ethical interests of life also are part of the cosmic experience.

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In man the ethical interest is not a special product of this or that group of humanity co-operating against other groups. At the very least it is as fundamental as the instinct in a species to maintain its being, *in suo esse perseverare*, and in man this appears as a deep-seated consciousness of the claims of the whole of which he is a part, a sense that he must act with it and for it. From this point of view Mr. Russell's dictum that 'the presence of these ethical and religious motives have been a hindrance to philosophy'⁵ seems very disputable.

No doubt Caird's point of view tended to make him concentrate his efforts on the great ends of philosophy. To what extent modern psychology could really affect his logical substructure is no question for me. If he did not give much attention to some of its modern developments, it must have been that he considered his general position to lie beyond them. Either they were irrelevant to the question of mind, or they belonged to a doubtful half-imaginative construction of its growth in the individual. Caird owed much to Hegel as regards the manner of realizing some great truths and stating them in a philosophical form, but one must not forget that the truths themselves were in a sense his own, felt from the beginning in early studies from Plato to Carlyle, in his own life and in the history of man. As he wrote to his friend, 'the real evolution of history points to and guarantees a certain result.' (*Life*, p. 182). I imagine it was possible for him to regard the technical apparatus of proof, if need be, as a scaffolding which might be destroyed and leave the structure intact. But his critical examination of Kant shows the pains with which his technical system with its background of Kant and Hegel was articulated, and it certainly had the kind of completeness and breadth which could form a school. No doubt his personality did much to bring it into being.

⁵In his book *Scientific Method in Philosophy*.

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φρονιμώτατος καὶ δικαιοτάτος — soundest in judgment and justest in will — were the words which his disciples, a numerous and eminent company, placed on the memorial for him in the old class-room at Glasgow. Platform testimonies are not too often worth listening to, but the speeches on that memorial day are really good evidence, not only of some Socratic features in Caird's character, but also that there was something in the system he taught which had stood the strain of time and experience. On the whole I think it lay in the ease with which his doctrine could be related in general to the ideals of humanity and to what is great in the past, and in the way in which he showed it could be so related both for sympathetic interpretation and for criticism. The personal quality entered his system in this way, especially in his exposition of Christian ideals. Both he and Dr. Watson use the language of religious experience very freely as an aid to metaphysical thought. The system is not necessarily rigid in this respect, but it has a natural capacity of sustaining all reasonable values. Yet it is well to remember that broadly as Caird cast his net, it did not include men like Denney or Patrick. There was a good deal of the old leaven which responded faintly, if at all, to his teaching. Somewhere in the nineties I spent an afternoon with Denney, who was then pastor of the second Free Church in the small Scotch burgh I have mentioned. He was reading Plato's *Laws*, he told me. He had a class every week in which he lectured to some older women—one of them the strictest Calvinist I ever knew—with great acceptance, on the Lord's Prayer, sentence by sentence. It was a combination of voluntary work very characteristic of him.

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II

That the world is an intelligible system and not merely an aggregate of things which can be so treated by thought, and that its reality realizes itself actively in thought both in immediate experience and as completing itself in the process of civilization, was a general position in which Caird no doubt felt himself secure. Yet it was natural that there should be some commotion in the camp when Bradley's great book *Appearance and Reality* came out in 1891. It was a kind of attack from within very different from the coarse dualism of the old Empirical schools. There had perhaps been notes of a change, in Green's way of emphasizing the timeless consciousness as beyond the form of Thought, but in Bradley it took definite form as a system of a cosmic Absolute which is beyond Thought as it is beyond everything else, yet embraces all that is done or thought or felt in experience as an underlying and unknown reality. This Absolute Reality, since it is the thing, the one thing, that really *is*, is logically assumed to be perfect at least in the sense of self-consistency. Therefore, although strictly we have no knowledge of it, it may be conceived as supplying criteria of self-consistency, self-subsistency and complete individuality by which the appearances in the finite world may be estimated. In the finite world these criteria have as their correlatives comprehensiveness and coherence; and while from the point of view of the Absolute, the whole finite world as we know it, falls short alike of truth and reality, no possible truth being 'quite true,' yet appearance yields a relative truth, degrees indeed of truth and reality. The way in which Mr. Bradley applies the above criteria to measure or value the fundamental aspects of our knowledge is a new and in many ways suggestive analysis of experience, and does much to deepen our sense of the way in which it is

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organized. Many truths even which are not precisely new have the light of a new system upon them. But the general result may fairly be considered sceptical and as taking the nerve out of knowledge. The finite world shows itself as a mass of self-contradictions, because Thought itself is viewed as a system of relating things which cannot stand analysis, a relational form which never exhausts its basis and never reaches reality. His Absolute is an inert unknowable, which as such can never appear 'in the scale of existence' and therefore negates all its truth. Therefore Mr. Bradley has often to express himself in a rather pragmatist manner, from the point of view of the practical needs of life, and can tell us: 'Whatever ideas really are required in practice by the highest religion are true',⁶ a sentence which makes Mr. Schiller dance a sort of barbaric war-dance over Idealism *in extremis*. Rather irrelevantly, for the qualifying terms in that sentence mean something and behind all that is Mr. Bradley's ultimate intellectual standard which is not absolutely negative. It permits him to assert relatively at least the higher values: 'Higher, truer, more beautiful, better and more real—these, on the whole, count in the universe as they count for us. And existence on the whole must correspond with our ideas.' (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 550). One feels the weight of the system behind the words.

Caird found Bradley's book rather puzzling at first, as you may read in his Letters, and I remember some one telling me, with due reverence for the fact, that Mackenzie—a great scholar—was struggling with its mysteries. The new point of view was strange and disconcerting at first, but it is curious how such things unfold themselves with time into comparative plainness. Caird was inclined to regard the theory 'as a new Spinozism.' But it does not somehow give us the

⁶*Essays on Truth and Logic*, p. 433.

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large tranquillizing effect of Spinoza. It is Spinoza's Absolute with the sense of all the antinomies and discords of life in the foreground, decidedly increased instead of reduced, as in the Spinozistic simplification. And yet it leaves out of consideration just what is of most value to us in those finite discords, the historical process, the long struggle of man to realize his ideals, the evolution of humanity, or at any rate it deprives it of meaning. The idea of progress and the significance of human effort and achievement are greatly embarrassed in this system of the Absolute. Its timeless front transforms them and the conception of Humanity as a whole into mere appearance, with a low degree even of coherence. That the idea of good or excellency in the whole must be different from what is good or excellent for the part is an idea which brings disaster with it, when that Whole is conceived as a blank unknown. Progress as an end becomes 'a paradox,' and the poet's dream of a 'divine far-off event' a poet's nonsense. Man becomes 'the squirrel in the cage' revolving round the circle of his *imperfections*, and really, if I must choose, I would rather have the Absolute there. And I must admit I could never on this system extract much satisfaction from that vision of the Heaven of 'all reality' which Bradley describes for us in Chapter XV:

'It would be experience entire, containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present in a higher intuition; will would be there where the ideal had become reality; and beauty and pleasure and feeling would live on in this total fulfilment. Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of higher bliss.'

This reads almost like the exaltation of St. Bernard in *De Contemptu Mundi*.

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As Neale translates it:

And there from care released,
The song of them that triumph,
The joy of them that feast.

We are all mystics evidently, steering our craft over that ocean of fog and glancing lights which Kant pictures in his chapter on noumena. Caird also with his 'adamantine circle.' But on the whole that Hegelian light is the clearest break in the clouds. I understand that Mr. Bradley means that Heaven is an ideal fact now and always for us, only that we do not realize it and never can as finite beings realize it. I see too that some intuitionists, like Sophocles and Emerson and Barrie, must on the whole, by the criteria of comprehensiveness and individuality, come nearer to it in their being than most metaphysicians. But after that—the transmutation and re-blending in the Absolute; the will, the pleasure, the flame of passion in the Timeless! I cannot put all these together on this system, even if a kind of cosmic verity shines through it.

The logic of the new Idealism differs from Caird's epistemological system in recognizing a contact with an independent reality and a consequent severance between Thought and Reality, which involves a new treatment of the former in order to prove a correspondence between the two. 'Truth and thought,' says Mr. Bradley bluntly, 'are not the thing itself but of it and about it.' The question is thoroughly treated in the works of Mr. Bosanquet also, with a rich development of metaphysical logic. After conceding much to the new realistic psychology, he knits the severed elements together again in an 'objective world' in which the nature of knowledge is to be regarded as a physical and mental double, 'the distinction between reality as it is and as we apprehend it being after all ineradicable.' So he can maintain an ideal-

Mind and its Objects, p. 48.

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istic aspect of Thought as an organic system of knowledge, even if it is, as he says somewhere, an 'artificial' construction. He insists on the self-contradictions and 'want of stability' in all that we apprehend as immediate facts, and exalts Thought's constitutive power and metaphysical penetration of reality in language that would suit Caird. It is not only that which constructs and maintains the fabric of experience, but it has an 'intuitive aspect in which it remains within itself secure in the great structures of its creation.' Its ultimate tendency is not to generalize but to constitute a world. . . . There are concrete forms of thought which are equivalent to 'a creative *nisus*'⁸ But, for all that, from the metaphysical point of view, thought is severed from Reality; 'the contents of sense-perception are not transparent to finite thought, and so far it is a linking between contents which are not a unity for it.' Once made, that break, Caird used to insist, can never be made good. His technical criticism of the position may be given in Hegelian short hand, as it actually was given in a letter, I think, to Jones: 'The Other which Thought posits, is its own Other' but generally he continues calmly to encircle it in the wider epistemological treatment.

Mr. Bosanquet's Absolute then is formally the same as Mr. Bradley's. But it gets a more flexible and genial aspect in his hands. He emphasizes its connexion with the finite more. It is 'the pervading spirit of our world.' 'The Absolute should present itself to us as the finite at its best, not as its extinction.' The two aspects, the Absolute and the finite, are regarded 'as continuous and interwoven, not exclusive alternatives.' Hence the 'defects of the given not merely necessitate transcendence but positively indicate its nature.'⁹ He finds therefore that 'the general direction of our higher experience is a clue to the direction in which perfection has

⁸*Individuality and Value*, p. 7.

⁹*ibid.*, p. 255.

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to be sought.’¹⁰ This gives him a wide field of argument in which he moves with every kind of mastery, metaphysical subtlety, logical theorem, philosophic erudition and a fine flow of illustration as in those pages on Hegelian negativity, for these two, Bradley and Bosanquet, are Hegelians by birth, not merely by adoption, though they have left the house of their father and travelled into a far country.

A metaphysical system may be a great contribution to thought, and yet be too far from satisfying our sense of the actual values of life to be sound. Mr. Bosanquet’s softening treatment does not altogether conjure away the petrifying effect of the Timeless One on human values. Progress and evolution remain dubious possibilities within the individual and the historical process disappears as a ‘genuine’ form of experience. The wonderful fact, which alone can give depth and solidity to spiritual experience, that man lives not only in his own day and generation but can take record of his past and gather its spiritual values into his life, means little or nothing in this system of the Absolute. It does not come up to the standard of Individuality and self-contained existence. That is where the failure to find a real bond between Thought and Reality works with disastrous effect. Of course they recognize the fact as a factor in the Present; we see what Bradley makes of it in his *What is the real Julius Caesar*, but they do not admit its claims to any ultimate value, claims which even Kant, that cautious and critical sounder of the ways of the spirit, did not refuse to admit. It is Mr. Bosanquet who polemizes with the greatest vigour against the idea of the historical process as capable of revealing to us any ultimate truth or furnishing any evidence of an Absolute that moves in the evolution of humanity. He gives a careful list of what the characteristics of this real Individuality should be; it

¹⁰*ibid.*, p. 19.

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must be spiritual and inward, not spatial; in its higher form it will have 'more not less of logic', less laxity of connexion, less indetermination, less spontaneousness, less unaccountable new development, less urgency of exclusive feeling, less of the mere passion of mystic religion, more expansion of systematic necessity, more of the *Amor intellectualis Dei*.¹¹ Very good characteristics indeed; a sort of John Stuart Mill deified, or *Benedictus Spinoza*. But I think we had better have a little more of Shakespeare in it, or even Emerson, before giving it out on the authority of the Absolute. It is not quite clear perhaps how much of the authority of the Absolute is in it and how much of Mr. Bosanquet's. But you can see certain things are doomed as inadequate to reality, Bergson's evolution, Hegel's or Ward's view of history, etc. Nature, that 'independent non-psychical existence' which the system recognizes, barely escapes by means of hypostatization as a low type of individuality. 'Mechanistic science' of course fails to give us 'a satisfactory type of experience,' from the point of view of ultimate reality. Then Mr. Bosanquet asks if we can find such a type in history. His answer is an attack on history which was certainly a surprise to me, not only in its tone, which has a good deal more of the 'urgency of exclusive feeling' than the higher Individuality permits, but also as showing that Mr. Bosanquet's eyes are shut to the fact that history as an interpretation of human life has been undergoing a process of evolution very similar to that of philosophical thought—of course it is conditioned by the same forces—and with even clearer gains, I think, as a revelation of spirit. History, says Mr. Bosanquet, is 'a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any considerable degree of being or trueness' . . . a fragmentary diorama of finite life-processes unrolling themselves in time, seen from the outside . . . a tissue

¹¹*Individuality and Value*, p. 77.

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of mere conjunctions . . . contingent through and through . . . a doubtful story of successive events . . . a spatio-temporal externality, with some more very fine metaphysical Billingsgate of that kind.¹² You would think history was no more than it was for Guicciardini or Bentivoglio, though even Guicciardini, not to speak of Machiavelli, could make a fair scientific use of it for statecraft. There is also a sort of side suggestion in his argument that the 'philosophy of history' is something essentially different as a type of reality or 'individuality' from what history is for us in the best modern historians, with an indirect reference to Hegel's Philosophy of History. As if Hegel's use of material in his characterization of the Roman world, the work of the Scipios, the writings of Cicero, or the character of Caesar, involved an essentially different form of experience or reality from the characterizations of Roman or Greek events in Mommsen, or Grote, or Thirlwall. There may be some difference of individual insight in the universals each makes use of, but the thought-construction has the same infinite element in it. Even Hegel's universal is not quite that of the Absolute, nor can Mr. Bosanquet have the right of treating Thought *both* as a complete exponent of the Absolute and as an 'artificial' construction. With Mr. Bosanquet Thought has begun to write somewhat too legibly on the timeless front of Mr. Bradley's Absolute.

But yet not legibly enough for a Hegelian. 'History,' says Hegel, 'is the rational necessary course of the world-spirit.' This point of view of Hegel has an essential connexion with the fact that historical production, looked as at a whole, is a continuous and an ever more complete revelation of human life. We even know better now what the import and values of the Roman Empire, or of Greek and Hebrew history, are

¹²*Individuality and Value*, pp. 78-79.

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for human life than Romans or Greeks or Hebrews themselves. We can judge the work of Cromwell, Bismarck, or Peel better now than their contemporaries could. And the process continues. Every new page of history adds something to the fullness of our conception. It matters not how much the historians vary in their views. Grote differs from Thirlwall and Ferrero from Mommsen, but they only supplement each other. There is a steady evolution of the essential truth and meaning of the past.

There is much that seems to us irrelevant in the actions of men. There is a low contingent form of experience here as in nature, but this tends to disappear in any depth of historical view. Mind has learned to penetrate and clarify here, so that what once seemed 'measureless contingency' is taken up into the movement of reason. How does Macaulay bring the facts of English history before us? Largely by means of the universal of a Whig historian's point of view, which, supported by his knowledge and power of presentation, can do much to give relevancy to details. It may not be the deepest, but it is deeper than Gibbon on Attila and the stork at Aquileia, because Gibbon's universal is little better than contingency itself. And how does Carlyle make a letter of Cromwell's live, every sentence of it, as part of the movement of life and thought in that time; or make any rag of fact he gets hold of, Merlin of Douai's proclamation, an exclamation of Citoyen Amiral, anything, light up the streets of Paris under Revolution and the wild whirl of things there. By art? Yes, there is art enough there, to the full as much art, Mr. Bosanquet, as in the way Turner makes the morning light touch the spires of Lucerne, which could well be an inspired transformation of an accidental blotch from the palette knife. But that is not it. Carlyle's work here is not mere picture work. Thought has more than mere logical expression for its

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vehicle, elements of context and rhythm which make the vesture luminous and give the sense of the whole beyond the part. It is the power of revealing an infinite depth of intention in actions, of bringing all events within a movement of reason in which they take their inevitable place amongst things. Contingency is taken up into it and passes into a higher form. Carlyle's universal is far deeper than any optimistic or pessimistic, any Conservative or Radical theory of life. It is perhaps deeper even than Caird's view of it as an ultimate explanation of events by the moral necessity which lies in the history of the world, though that does express what was most conscious in it. The possibility here of taking contingency up into a rational view implies that, as Hegel said, 'the universal principle is implicit in the phenomena of history and is realizing itself through the doings of actors who are still unconscious of the purpose they are fulfilling.' But I think there is always something of the swell of its greatness or import in them. *Caesarem portas*. At any rate this tendency or purpose reveals itself ever more clearly in the process. There is an element of the Absolute working in it; it is the clearest form of its revelation to us; however you may explain it. Thought here gives everything in connexion from the totality of its world, but the necessity is not that of nature regarded mechanically, but that of Thought or Spirit itself in its self-evolution, the principle of evolution selecting its route. We see the connexion that it has made between 'the leader of a Greek colony in the eighth or ninth century and the establishment of Christianity.' But Christianity, we must hold, would have been born of Thought or the Spirit, though its 'spatio-temporal' form of manifestation had given us the New Testament in Latin or Etruscan instead of Greek. In this region the spontaneity of the individual is not incompatible with the law of the Spirit. In history more surely

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than anywhere else we can see how the Infinite is immanent in the Finite. A philosophical system which cannot take account of these things as a concrete form of experience, as 'genuine experience,' is at odds with the highest instincts of mankind.

As to the individual historian and his work, 'the doubtful story of successive events,' as Mr. Bosanquet characterizes it, there is no more significance in this view of it than in the view Mr. Lewes took of the history of philosophy as a mere series of doubtful and opposed doctrines. In the one as in the other the essence of the whole steadily unfolds itself. One would think in reading the chapter on the 'Concrete Universal' that history had unfolded no more of its ultimate values than it had in the day of Plato and Aristotle. Plato is great amongst the greatest. But still there is a progress in the fullness of experience which evolves new universals. That dialogue of *Ion*, which Goethe thought so little of, is deep enough, but it is only the first word on the subject, not the last; nor is the *imaginatio* of old Benedict either, who had mainly before his eyes the miraculous Hebrew story. It is difficult to realize that there can be any ultimate difference in the nature of 'experience' in philosopher, poet and historian, but only different degrees of exposure of dialectic, especially in the grand ontological and ethical assumptions. But even in the philosopher there is a hidden dialectic, which does not fully show itself. There is great value in the strict consistency which this exposure enforces, and the way in which it leads the mind to see new relations in things; but there is also a price to pay for that. As to the content, that is often more different in appearance than in reality. I think one could extract all Mr. Bradley says on the real and the imaginary from Browning; nor is it more assured, or Spinoza's treatment of pity would be of more value than Wordsworth's. There is

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something defective in Mr. Bosanquet's use of the principle of degrees of reality.

Caird's formal theory, I know, was that the function of poetry is 'pure expression for its own sake.' It was one of the relics in him of eighteenth century rationalism and Kantian separative analysis, and it had besides the support of Saintsbury and London circles. But he has no sooner stated it as his theory, and in very firm language too, than he proceeds to withdraw from it, to modify and define till he has reached precisely the opposite position, that the name of poet can be given only 'to him who can express the widest and deepest interests of human life; nay, only to him who is in sympathy with the progressive movement of mankind, and who can reveal to us new sources of feeling that have not before been touched.' You can read it all in his essay on Wordsworth.¹³ It is a case, like so many in his Examination of Kant, of 'pointing the way to a higher view'. Only Caird does a good deal more, he arrives at the higher view with full consciousness and on the same page. It was only, I think, in this aesthetic region that there was some limitation of insight or feeling which could show itself in such antinomies. His best formal logic said here, 'Form is the first thing in poetry' and his whole nature in its fullness said, 'Interpretation of life is the chief thing in poetry', and although he had treated that abstraction of the 'first thing' often enough in his philosophy, he gives both aspects here in their abstract opposition. He was quite aware of it, but his aesthetic theory could not solve form and matter in this case. It rested upon an opposition between immediate facts in poetry and deeper reality in philosophy, and, for once, he saw the 'difference' better than the unity. There is the same antinomy in his essay on Goethe. He begins by describing the material of

¹³*Essays on Literature and Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 153.

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poetry as that of immediate reality or appearances, denies it the right to become a criticism of life, and then goes on to show that Goethe's poetry was the most perfect criticism of life we possess. In the essay on Wordsworth he puts aside the well-known sentence of Matthew Arnold, (a master in this region), 'Poetry is essentially a criticism of life' as having no more meaning than 'there is a moral in the rose,' and yet he goes on to describe the value of poetry from exactly the same point of view as Arnold's. That is, he chose to take the term 'criticism' in the very specific sense of a philosophic effort to set the deeper reality of things against their superficial appearance. There is an idol of the den here that has frequently bothered me in reading the criticism philosophers make on the work of literary men. Some slight logical imperfection in the mode of statement, some artistic expansion or condensation of meaning in a word (as here in Arnold's sentence), some imaginative form of expression which does not immediately indicate its precise place in a system of thought; these things seem able to conceal from philosophers the real wealth of thought and truth in what I may call literary expression. Thought rests on logical expression for its meaning, no doubt, but it is easy to see that even the imperfect statement of a writer like Rousseau or Ruskin generally contains a deeper and more valuable truth than the criticism the logician passes on it. On the other hand it is true that few literary men give much attention to the metaphysic of their time or have any distinct idea of the fundamental clarifying of ideas of which philosophy is the centre. There is a rather stupid quarrel here which is an actual modern form of that older one between the philosopher and the poet.

It is instructive enough to see how Caird inevitably moves away from a formal theory of poetry which yet he does not

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reject. Literature, the select literature which he read, was a very vital thing in his life. His appreciation of its aesthetic side which he declares to be 'the first thing' was genuine, but, I think, limited, of conventional classical range and without full savour, but it was profound on the side of thought and essentially connected with his view of the historical process as giving the best guarantee of spiritual values. His essays on literature, expositions of Dante, Goethe, Wordsworth, Rousseau, Carlyle, etc., no less than his later works on the evolution of Religion and Theology, represent the way in which he sought to make this point of view effective.

Caird's last volume (*Evolution of Theology*, vol. ii) is a fitting close to his work. The question which had always most engaged his thought, the question how God could be conceived as manifesting Himself to man and in nature, is the theme. He treats it characteristically by a historical criticism of the conception of God as it developed itself in the course of Greek, Jewish and modern thought for the modern consciousness. For though the book is formally restricted to the period of Greek philosophy, modern solutions such as those of Spinoza and the German idealists are treated in their relevant connexion, and, under the rubrics of old historical controversies, contemporary theories are often noticed and criticized without any direct reference. There is a characteristic avoidance of polemics and of sensational challenges to current opinion; there is no attempt to win interest for the subject in that way. On the contrary an indifferent reader might think it was only the ordinary scholarly disquisition, of languid historical rather than actual interest, on obsolete early controversies, over the Logos Doctrine of Philo or the Demiurgus of the Gnostics. But under such ancient rubrics Caird is debating what is for him the question of questions. All his learning in ancient Greek philosophy is brought into play to show how the various solu-

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tions of the problem given from Anaxagoras downward lead up to or involve dialectically the one adequate conception of the Absolute as the self-revealing spirit that realizes itself in all the differences of the world. It is an exposition of the dialectical necessity in the historical development of the idea of God, and, as it is made quite from his own point of view of the supreme unity in the universe, it is done with a freedom of survey and a warmth of conviction rather different from ordinary historical exposition. Hence the space he devotes to the mystic Plotinus and the interest he finds in his philosophy, not only as furnishing an opportunity for criticism of the idea of a transcendent and unknowable Absolute, but as helping along with Jewish conceptions of an unapproachable God to determine the dogmas of the Church regarding Christ and other forms of external mediation by which the Supreme Being manifests Himself to men. Imperfect dualistic explanations of the self-revealing Absolute. Thus the 'way downward' which Plotinus finds from his transcendent Unity with its degrees of reality is criticized as factitious and obscuring the real truth of an immanent connexion between God and man and nature. The 'mystic presence' in the spiritual ecstasy of the Neo-Platonist is recognized as a truth for the religious consciousness, but not a truth outside of knowledge, not one negating intelligence, but only the realization of the deeper unity 'too great for any form of words' (p. 307). Here, too, the religious consciousness, properly understood, is but a form of the ordinary consciousness of things, the consciousness in which self, the world and God are bound up together. That is, the Divine element is everywhere the form of worth in the universe, and takes a cognizable form in Thought or Spirit, though the mind of man is dulled to its presence by familiarity and by the needs of an animal life which has also its rights.

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So Caird's teaching ended as it began with the endeavour to show that the consciousness of the Infinite is organically involved in that of the finite and that the evolution of philosophic thought can be viewed as leading dialectically to this conclusion. Regarded as a whole, it is a doctrine of the perfectibility of natural revelation, revelation being taken, as Lessing defined it,¹⁴ as that which takes place in the individual. Caird's method in this last work is also that which he adopted from the first. He avoids direct construction and presents his views as the supplementation or criticism of a historical system. It was a method by which he could express them without being forced to enter formally into contemporary polemics or, perhaps, to explain more than he could honestly explain.

JAMES CAPPON.

¹⁴*Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts.*

BEATI POSSIDENTES.

Omitting two or three obvious names of our older contemporaries, I suppose that we must still account Jonathan Edwards (1705-1758) the foremost figure in American philosophy. Nevertheless, we search vainly for him in the index to the most compendious American manual of the history of philosophy.¹ Thereby hangs not merely *a* tale, but *the* tale demanding our attention now. For, as the author of an earlier history said, catching the essential point, 'The theological school of Edwards has been succeeded by "schools" which, if less purely American, have been more truly philosophical.'²

Professor Watson himself has affirmed that 'the history of man is creative, in the sense that the present gathers up the meaning of the past and prepares for an advance beyond it.'³ Hence, while pauses must occur, they may well be pregnant, for the lines of communication between the generations of men are kept open by folkways which possess a stability all their own. The social, political, theological and, in a measure, even the literary history of the American continent furnishes an apposite case. Socially, we hear of New *England*, of the *Old South*. The presuppositions of political liberty harked back to the Roundheads, and Rousseau, while later the idea itself was affected profoundly by the French Revolution. In

¹Frank Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, 1914.

²B. F. Burt, *A History of Modern Philosophy from the Renaissance to the Present*, vol. II, p. 320, 1892.

³*The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, vol. II, p. 24, 1912.

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theology, the New England movement formed part of a 'world-phenomenon', characteristically Protestant.⁴ Similarly, the literary experiments supplied many reasons for Emerson's trumpet-call to independence,⁵ possibly, too, for 'a certain condescension in foreigners.' In short, till Professor Watson's advent at Kingston, America re-echoed Europe more or less in the higher things of the spirit: perhaps the one representative artist, Nathaniel Hawthorne, furnishes the single piece of cogent evidence to the contrary. I say 'perhaps', because I wish to record my plea for that brother artist, Herman Melville, whose wonderful masterpiece appeared a year after *The Scarlet Letter* (1850). But, in philosophy at least, certain symptomatic differences arose, and maintained themselves intact throughout, till the Era of Reconstruction after the Civil War. They challenge estimate, their subtlety notwithstanding.

Although the American colonies made instant provision for the things of the mind, founding Harvard (1636), William and Mary (1693), Yale (1700), and Princeton (1746), it may be said that, despite many men of power, like Thomas Hooker (1586-1647), John Cotton (1585-1652), Thomas Shepard (1605-1649), and Charles Chauncy (1705-1787), no notable intellectual achievements were accomplished before Jonathan Edwards and Benjamin Franklin. Ability there was and to spare, but clamant practical problems in life and politics absorbed it. Accordingly, when, one hundred and forty-seven years after the settlement of Virginia, Edwards's *Careful and Strict Enquiry into the modern prevailing Notions of Freedom of Will* appeared, and when, five years later, Franklin loomed large enough to receive the degree of LL.D. from the University of St. Andrews, isolation from the Mother Country had

⁴Cf. my *Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris*, p. 189, 1917.

⁵Cf. *The American Scholar*.

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at length induced a conscious sense of difference destined to evolve deeper and very natural emphasis, thanks to the events which forced the Declaration of Independence. And if the colleges ordered their houses deliberately *pro more Academicarum in Anglia*, native circumstances could not but reach even 'the politics of a higher region.' New preoccupations inbred their own results.

The 'practical' tendency of English thought has become proverbial. Take the great succession—Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume; they are men of affairs, immersed in the activities of national life, and the same holds of their 'empirical' successors from James Mill to Mr. Arthur Balfour. They suspect high-flown deduction; they treat epistemology as a 'previous question' exacting due settlement ere ontology can prosper; they think of 'normative' science as concerned with the means whereby ends must needs be reached rather than with the fundamental implications of ideals themselves; persons interest them somewhat to the exclusion of genetic ties between men; they hold that human experience is 'composed' from particular events which, in turn, issue from a few sources only too elusive for the puny efforts of 'finite' intelligence. With all subconsciously as with Locke consciously, it was 'ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little' for the masters who know how to do, who, with patience and prose, build sure 'natural' knowledge.⁶ Hence, in their dealings with human experience, they were apt to enlist all results for the immediate service of conduct. Of *Geist* they had little, so the Germans said; of logical keeping they had less, so the French insisted.

⁶Cf. the passage, with its references to Boyle, Sydenham, Huygens, and Newton, in "The Epistle to the Reader" prefixed to Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, vol. I, pp. 13-15 (Fraser's edition).

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Small wonder, then, that the application of philosophy to politics, to morals, and to theology attracted perhaps inordinately, while traffic with first principles from purely speculative interest languished. The disruption of the ecclesiastico-feudal order raised the whole question of sovereignty and the State, giving Hobbes and the Puritan theocratic democrats equally their opportunity. The national genius for action, a product of 'the spacious days of great Elizabeth,' so stepped from achievement to achievement that capacity to 'blunder through' despite knowledge took rank almost as an article of faith. Clues were attractive, not systems, because nothing succeeds like success, and here an ounce of personal initiative is worth a ton of general or 'abstract' theory. In the same way, to quote the Scots President of an American university, who had every reason to know *in propria persona*:

'Philosophy never attempted . . . to absorb theology into itself; but keeping to its own field, that of inductive psychology, it allowed the students to follow their own convictions, evangelical or rationalistic, but training all to a habit of skilful arrangement and exposition. It enabled and it led the theological professors to dwell on the relation between the truths of God's Word and the fundamental principles of human nature; to lay a deep and solid foundation for moral principle, to impart a moral tone to their teaching in divinity, and to expound, clearly and wisely, the arguments for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.'⁷

Not without obvious effect upon the preliminary philosophy. Chalmers's account of Dugald Stewart confirms neatly what one might infer from that worthy's remarks on Kant.

⁷James McCosh, *The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical, from Hutcheson to Hamilton*, pp. 268-269, 1875.

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'I attended his lectures regularly. I must confess I have been rather disappointed. I never heard a single discussion of Stewart's which made up one masterly and comprehensive whole. His lectures seem to me to be made up of detached hints and incomplete outlines, and he *almost uniformly avoids every subject which involves any difficult discussion.*'⁸

Now, generalizations are uniformly dangerous and, even if 'English thinkers display a greater similarity of intellectual vision than can be matched, for such a succession of first-rate minds, from the history of any other modern people,'⁹ it by no means follows that the judgement can be transferred *en bloc* to America. For, in the first place, a succession comparable either in power or in continuity did not, indeed could not, materialize. At the same time, we must emphasize a certain compensation. The cultural situation in the colonies, New England particularly, assimilated itself to Scotland rather than England. Two nations, one highly educated and in touch with ancient and contemporary thought, the other composed of ignorant 'outsiders' (note the symptomatic term) did not exist. Rudeness there may have been, as we now estimate. But the framework of the daily round was itself the issue of a lofty experience. Common life sustained an uncommon quality; for religious idealism, to say nothing of theological dialectic, controlled secular affairs and, this culture being diffused universally through farm, store, and workshop, most men served themselves representative of an entire order of ideas which gave colour not merely to thought and conduct, but also to the worth of all aims deemed fit for human devotion. Theological belief determined the political aspirations of the *average* citizen, who was thus made a freeman of the culture communal for the whole group. In the second

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 281. The italics are mine.

⁹*Philosophical Remains of George Croom Robertson*, edited by Alexander Bain and T. Whittaker, p. 40, 1894.

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place, 'dissent' from an established church, with every incidental quality and defect, could not reproduce itself. No matter how little they deflected intellectual currents there, the second careers of Paine and Priestley in the United States happen to be straws showing how the wind blew. Once more, their place of refuge and their associates, no accidental selections, intimate that the refugees found welcome in *one* 'section.' New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia formed enclaves; what held for one did not necessarily find favour with another. In short, sectionalism had its own mysterious ways. Finally, after 1800, the colleges came to dominate intellectual affairs more and more. Seeing that their chief office was to breed a race of preachers, seeing too that they never became national institutions, so called because frequented by a directing class intent upon the Public Services, a definite temperament arose inevitably. The cross-currents consequent upon these contrasts present several puzzling features.

Referring to Edwards's *Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended* (1758), Lecky objurgates: 'One of the most revolting books that have ever proceeded from the pen of man.'¹⁰ I fear that Lecky neither knew his man nor appreciated the circumstances of the time. Had he been acquainted with Locke's prescient and, in its day, somewhat subversive discussion of personal identity,¹¹ or had he suspected its influence over Edwards, he might have paused a moment. For, when all is said and done, Edwards was a complex being—part mystic, part dogmatist, part moralist, part saint, the least part metaphysician. Willy-nilly, Calvin or no, his philosophy drifted towards eclecticism. Overborne by

¹⁰*History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*, vol. I, p. 368, note, 4th edition, London, 1870.

¹¹*Essay*, Book II, chap. 27.

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his aims, he recked too little of the means. A long two hundred years after the *Institutio*, Genevan doctrine and, no less, Genevan practice had seen many vicissitudes. The ineffable transcendence of God in His sovereignty, the fathomless depths of human 'inability', and the consequent necessity for the gift of a Grace such as an omnipotent Being alone could bestow, indeed remained as normative positions. But, with a less ecstatic generation, the part played by men in rendering themselves receptive to Grace by 'faithful waiting upon ordinances', grew more conspicuous. Nay, if a man were 'diligent in attending on the appointed means of Grace', why should he suffer condemnation for lack of 'special and saving Grace'? And if so, why should not the divine Grace be universal, and 'election' conditioned by sound morality, nay, even by broad mental culture? Grant these contentions, and you have capitulated to Arminianism: therefore, as Whitefield, Edwards's friend, remarked, 'the Reason why Congregations have been so dead is because dead Men preach to them.'¹² This of New England! Edwards's self-imposed mission was to recall his countrymen to the more excellent way walked by the founders. Thus minded, he would withdraw two basal conceptions from the dangerous approach of 'private judgement'—the idea of God, and the doctrine of human nature. In other words, he came under bonds to proffer a 'first philosophy.'

While Edwards evinced a Platonism of the heart almost Berkleian, the truth is that, as a thinker, he excelled and suffered from being *the* representative man of his epoch in New England. Isolation left a deep mark. The circle of ideas characteristic of Hobbes, Locke, Hutcheson, Hume, and Home (Lord Kames); the controversies loosed by Daniel Whitby, Anthony Collins, Samuel Clarke, Isaac Watts, and Philip

¹²*Seventh Journal*, p. 40.

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Doddridge, set his limits, furnished his point of departure. Nor can we forget that scholastic methods lingered. On the whole, Edwards was not an accurate scholar. He made no study of Hobbes, and missed completely the thrust of Hume. The deists, in so far as he knew them, the vacillations of Whitby, the flaccid goodwill of Watts, and the concessions of Doddridge—'a trimmer and double-dealer'—to the Arminians, aroused *emotions* of intellectual antagonism. As a result, he gave himself to rehabilitation of the Five Points¹³ in his three most significant works—*Freedom of Will*; *Concerning the End for which God created the World*; and the *Nature of Virtue*. The last exerted immediate and pervasive influence over the New England Theology, the second appealed to professional theologians and left no trace otherwise, while the first became perhaps the dominant issue in American philosophy till nigh the time of Professor Watson's immigration. The enthusiastic estimates of Sir James Mackintosh, Dugald Stewart, Robert Moreland, Thomas Chalmers, and Isaac Taylor, testify to its reputation overseas. Calvinism received fresh impetus, because, as the younger Edwards said, his father would not 'bow in the house of Rimmon, and admit the *Self-Determining Power of the Will*.' On the other hand, the rise of Unitarianism was rendered inevitable.

For these reasons, theological interest eclipsed philosophical. The new presbyter was worse than the old priest, and speculative thinking remained ancillary. Despite knowledge of Locke, Edwards evaded primary metaphysical difficulties. For instance, God is the author of all things; men are born in utter depravity; but depravity is excepted from God's authorship! So, too, in his treatment of cause, Edwards never faces the issue raised by Hume, and falls a prey to hopeless

¹³Election. The extent of the Atonement. Divine Grace. Freedom of the Will. Perseverance of the saints.

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contradiction. Similarly, it does not occur to him that he must needs confront his account of the will with his insistence upon moral responsibility. Successful against contemporary opponents of theism, his victory is won at the price of implicit agnosticism; indeed, he presages most curiously some of John Stuart Mill's later positions. The fact was of course that, heterodox or orthodox, all accepted the same metaphysical axioms. Thus, with splendid merits of heart and head, Edwards remained a dogmatist, setting out from notions mediated so surely by feeling that he would not, or could not, examine them. Accordingly, he shut his eyes to the drift of Deism, failing to detect his own *particeps criminis*. In sum, then, he confirmed American philosophy in its theological mood which, other influences assisting, was enthroned for a century and a quarter.

Melioristic doctrines, suggested by the divine attribute of Benevolence, and by the happiness of mankind as a mundane final cause, always lay in wait to correct Calvin's overstress upon Original Sin. They formed an essential factor in the climate of opinion peculiar to deistic optimism. But Deism never attained full naturalization in America. For, although the early English phase, seen in Herbert of Cherbury, Sir Thomas Browne, and Charles Blount, was paralleled by Charles Chauncy and many others; although Franklin differed little from the full expression of the movement in Collins, Shaftesbury, and Tindal; and although Paine vulgarized the subtleties of Hume, the drift towards mediation was so strong that no transformation of philosophy resulted.¹⁴ Whatever may have been the indirect influence upon political prepossessions in the United States, fundamental thought went on its serene way because, after all, even the deists reverted to

¹⁴I take this to be the real inwardness of Mr. John M. Robertson's surly pronouncement. Cf. *A Short History of Freethought*, chap. xv, London, 1899.

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theological considerations. The convenient division of labour between 'natural' and 'revealed' theology, and the 'beauty' of the evidence of 'design', proved of overwhelming attraction.

Franklin may well have had his tongue in his cheek when he inscribed his *First Principles*, or his *Information to Those Who would Remove to America*—only to forgo this impediment to free speech when he did in Paris as the Parisians did; 'another Voltaire', as John Adams wittily remarked! But even Voltaire, while insisting that 'we abhor all Superstition,' was no less insistent on the need for a God when it came to the government of five or six hundred peasants! Negative in the extreme, ironical to a degree, his ideas were beset by theological preoccupation. And Jefferson himself, that 'White House infidel,' when he quit ploughing with Priestley and the Gallic *philosophes*, felt bound to refer to the trusteeship of the professor of Ethics:

'The proofs of the being of a God, the creator, preserver and supreme ruler of the universe, the author of all the relations of morality, and the laws and obligations these infer . . . to which adding the development of these moral obligations in which all the sects agree . . . a basis will be found common to all sects.'

Here we have the 'practical' application of philosophy to morals and theology with a vengeance. And, as for the theoretical, 'the secret American deism of Paine's day was decorously transformed into the later Unitarianism.'¹⁵ True, so far; but Unitarianism was to have an important sequel, as we shall see.

Meanwhile, however, yet another movement from overseas was to intervene, stressing for the third time dogmatic presuppositions in philosophy, and gaining popularity by appeal to

¹⁵Robertson, *loc. cit.*, p. 382.

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the self-esteem of the average man, so congenial to a nation of 'sovereign citizens.' The Scotch and Scotch-Irish descended upon the Middle States, blocking off southern deism and French sensualism, bringing a philosophical gospel well calculated to enlist even self-sufficient New England.

Speaking with the superior intimacy of the native-born, McCosh¹⁶ remarks pointedly that the French disciples of Reid misjudged the perspective. Victor Cousin, Theodore Jouffroy, and the Comte de Rémusat had eulogized the philosophical systems, detecting in them 'the peculiar strength of the Scottish nation.' With some justice, McCosh retorts that 'this is to be found in its religion, of which the high moral tone of its philosophy is but a reflection.' It is true that Reid lay under no illusions about Hume's historical significance—his was *theoretical* scepticism following from dogmatic presuppositions; it is true that he glimpsed the universality of Reason as something beyond 'the consent of ages and nations, of the learned and unlearned,'¹⁷ because it is true that he held a personal cosmology in which the derivative characters of the universe and man were recognized. Even so, one must infer these views or, as the manner of some is, read them into the text; Reid indicated rather than elaborated them.

They afford no sufficient justification for the *sancta simplicitas* of Buckle who, with the typical simplifications of rationalistic prejudgement, dismisses all Scottish thought as deductive.¹⁸ His great pamphlet, tragically athwart the facts, hits nearer the mark when Reid's assumptions come under review,¹⁹ and when it asserts that 'Reid, notwithstanding the

¹⁶*loc. cit.*, p. 303.

¹⁷Cf. Essay VI. *Works*, vol. I, pp. 413-441, seventh edition, edited by Hamilton, 1862.

¹⁸*History of Civilization in England*, vol. I, pp. 245 f. (New edition), London, 1867.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 357 f.

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clearness of his mind and his great power of argument, had so little of the real philosophic spirit, that he loved truth, not for its own sake, but for the sake of its immediate and practical results.'²⁰ Nay, perfected by many shots in the air, Buckle hit the bull's-eye at last with: 'It is one of the most curious things in the history of metaphysics that Reid, after impeaching the method of Hume, follows the very same method himself.'²¹ Not at all! Like the French, Buckle abstracted Scottish philosophy from the cultural influences whence it arose, because oblivious of the profound changes which overtook the outlook with the appearance and eventual rule of the Moderate party, under the leadership of the sagacious Robertson, in the second half of the eighteenth century.

It is a pity that Buckle did not mark John Hill Burton's *Life of Hume* (1846), there to learn that the genial sceptic was on terms of intimate friendship with the Moderate clergy, and to digest Reid's gay letter. 'Your friendly adversaries return their compliments to you respectfully. Your company would, although we are all good Christians, be more acceptable than St. Athanasius.'²² It is a thousand pities that he could make no study of the *Autobiography* of the Rev. Alexander ('Jupiter') Carlyle, the life-long friend of that refined moralist Tobias Smollett, there to learn the character of the contemporary clergy,²³ or to stumble on the eulogy of Hume. 'He had the greatest simplicity of mind and manners, with the utmost facility and benevolence of temper I ever knew . . . the intimacy of the young clergy with David Hume enraged the zealots on the opposite side . . . he gave both elegant dinners and suppers . . . and, which was the best of all . . .

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 350-351.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 355.

²²Vol. II, p. 155.

²³Chap. VI. (American edition, Boston, 1861).

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assembled whosoever were most knowing and agreeable among either the laity or clergy':²⁴ indeed, Hume was the most popular citizen of Edinburgh. Better still had Buckle pondered Carlyle's judgement of Witherspoon,²⁵ a hint of material import to our present purpose. Witherspoon belonged to 'the zealots on the opposite side,' with so much zeal, too, that his successor in the Princeton Presidency records, he 'must have made Scotland somewhat too hot for him, the more so that the law was against him, and the church party opposed to him increasing in power and in imperiousness.'²⁶ As we now know, Witherspoon gave short shrift to the Berkleian 'heretics' who awaited him in New Jersey. His way with Hume was even more summary.

'About this [cause] and some other ideas, great stir has been made by some infidel writers, particularly by David Hume; who seems to have industriously endeavoured to shake the certainty of our belief, upon *cause* and *effect*, upon *personal identity* and the idea of *power*. It is easy to raise metaphysical subtleties, and confound the understanding on such subjects. In opposition to this, some writers have advanced, with great apparent reason, that there are certain *first principles* or dictates of *common sense*, which are either simple perceptions, or seen with intuitive evidence. These are the *foundation* of all reasoning, and without them, to *reason* is a word without meaning. They can no more be proved than you can prove an axiom in mathematical science. These authors of Scotland have lately produced and supported this opinion, to resolve at once all the refinements and metaphysical objections of some infidel writers.'²⁷

²⁴pp. 222, 224.

²⁵p. 55; cf. pp. 79 f.

²⁶McCosh, *loc. cit.*, p. 186.

²⁷*Lectures on Moral Philosophy*, etc., pp. 50-51, Philadelphia, 1822.

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Only this and nothing more! Verily, great is the potency of italics!

Even at its best, in Reid, the Scottish philosophy suffered manifest limitations. Although Hume had stripped every disguise from the problem, the consequent implications were not taken seriously enough. Haste to 'pluck the unripe fruit of wisdom' resulted in unprofitable counter-assertion. Indeed, appeal was taken, not from thought to thought, but from reflection to practice. This may have been inevitable, considering the nature of the audience. In any case, preachers and 'ingenious gentlemen', accepting the philosophy at its face value, proceeded to use it, if not as a guide of life, then as a very present help against 'inconvenient doubts.' They asked: Does it square with customary beliefs? The question of its fundamental, defensible truth scarcely occurred to them. Scotland relapsed into this phase—for Reid saw farther—during the Evangelical reaction, when Thomas Carlyle, Hutchison Stirling, and T. H. Green, to name no others, were refused philosophical chairs, because their 'orthodoxy' lay under suspicion.²⁸ Now, in the United States, the Moderate party never gained foothold. From Witherspoon down, the Evangelicals had things their own way, thanks partly to a curious paradox—the absence of those opportunities for difference of opinion guaranteed by a State church! Hence it came to this: 'Not only was the Scottish philosophy of Reid, Stewart, Brown, and Hamilton in harmony with the practical note of the country, but it was also an aid to faith, a safeguard to morality as against the skepticism of Hume and the Voltairians.'²⁹ Recollect, the idea that a 'sceptic' is

²⁸An illuminating account of the pitiful intrigues, possible eighty-seven years after the *Critique of Pure Reason*, may be found in Donald Macmillan, *The Life of Robert Flint*, pp. 171 f.

²⁹Woodbridge Riley, *American Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism*, p. 119, 1915. Cf. the whole of chap. v.

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necessarily a 'profligate' still met universal acceptance. So, the atmosphere and intent proper, possibly, in 'theological seminaries', pervaded the colleges. And, outside the college, philosophy was sadly to seek.

A foreign observer, calm yet friendly, sensed the sequel in the late thirties.

'I think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States. The Americans have no philosophical school of their own; and they care but little for all the schools into which Europe is divided, the very names of which are scarcely known to them.'³⁰

Put thus bluntly, the judgement might seem sweeping and, as his manner was, De Tocqueville safeguarded himself immediately. 'The Americans then have not required to extract their philosophical method from books; they have found it in themselves.'³¹ On the one hand for political reasons, on the other, because 'religion gave birth to Anglo-American society,'³² an implicit philosophy reigns. Even at this, he deals in generalities, leaving particulars to take care of themselves. What particulars? To begin with, Edwards had rendered Unitarianism inevitable, as we have seen. Within twenty-five years of his death, King's Chapel, Boston, under James Freeman, had 'gone over.' In 1801, Old Plymouth Church, the original home of the Puritans, followed suit. With the appointment of Henry Ware to the Hollis Professorship of Divinity, Harvard was lost in 1805. While, in 1819, Channing set forth, at Baltimore, the full-throated

³⁰Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. II, p. 1, trans. by Henry Reeve, new edition, London, 1862. The preface is dated *March*, 1840.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 3.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 5.

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'Unitarian Declaration of Independence.'³³ Nigh fifty years of mild fermentation ensued, with meagre results for philosophy, the brain and character of the land becoming more and more absorbed meanwhile in the politico-economic controversy which was to threaten the very existence of the nation.³⁴ Here it must suffice to mention a few of the intellectual phenomena almost at random.

Unitarianism brought numerous repercussions. Nathaniel Taylor fulminated from Yale, seeking such support as he could derive from Butler and Leibniz. T. C. Upham, long a light at Bowdoin, wrought in the spirit of a liberalized Scottish school. C. S. Henry, in the University of New York, had the temerity to introduce Cousin's eclecticism, only to be trounced vigorously by the Princeton stalwarts. Francis Wayland, at Brown College, and Mark Hopkins, at Williams, made a profound personal impression upon their pupils. But the former at least—so the late President James B. Angell informed me—taught little more than the casuistry which, in protestant attenuation, appears to have had considerable vogue. Probably both contributed to the decline in popularity of Paley's texts. The controversy about the Will went its voluminous way, for no one had ever heard tell of Vatke (1841). There was widespread 'reconciling' of natural with revealed religion, of geology with *Genesis*, although the curious *Analysis of the Human Intellect* (1865) in which that 'original', James Rush, elaborated the suggestions of his more distinguished and sensible father, left no mark, despite (or on account of) its challenge to 'spiritualization.' More hopeful,

³³Cf. *Smith College Studies in History*, vol. VI, no. 3, p. 196, note 6, *et passim* (*Letters of Ann Gillam Storrow to Jared Sparks*, ed. by Frances Bradshaw Blanchard).

³⁴There is some analogy between this and the contemporary ecclesiastical controversy in Scotland, and in the consequences for philosophy, too.

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thanks to some reckoning with Kantian thought, L. P. Hickok's gigantic performance³⁵ fell short of its promise. Scenting 'heresy'—mysticism as a matter of fact—in the continentals, it found their standpoint 'wholly within nature. It transcends the phenomenal in sensation, truly and philosophically, and such is its deservedly great praise; but to it the supernatural is darkness. . . . And here it becomes highly important to note, that some of the strongest entrenchments of skepticism both in philosophy and religion—some of the most elaborate defences of all Infidelity—are now in process of erection upon this high ground. Whether named Liberalism, Neologism, Rationalism, or Transcendentalism; its foundation is here, and the superstructure is going up on this basis.'³⁶

The traditional *arrière pensée* persisted; and so, on a broad view, the ferment left much 'insipid fluid.' To wit, the common texts were Locke, Reid, Stewart—sometimes 'made over'; Butler, Paley, and various native manuals of 'moral science'. They furnished good mental exercise. But, even the best of them, seeing they originated from a spirit that had grown conventional, could effect nothing to induce rethinking. Rhetoric, or elegant expression, took precedence over philosophy. There was a silent conspiracy 'to stand aloof from all extremes in doctrinal speculation' and—the issues destined to culminate in civil war were absorbing many minds.

Nevertheless, so early as 1829, James Marsh's study of Coleridge had drawn attention to the Romantic movement³⁷ and, ere long, Emerson was to speak out. In a word, Unitarianism performed an invaluable office by exorcising fear of 'isms', a fear, as it then was, of the unknown. But its

³⁵*Rational Psychology: or the Subjective Idea and the Objective Law of All Intelligence*, large 8vo, pp. xi+717, Auburn [N.Y.], 1849.

³⁶pp. 75, 83.

³⁷Cf. James Murdock, *Sketches of Modern Philosophy, especially among the Germans*, chap. xiv, 1842.

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influence upon philosophy was sporadic.³⁸ For, despite Emerson himself, Channing, Margaret Fuller, George Ripley, Theodore Parker, and Andrews Norton, nay, despite the more distinctly technical work of the Frothinghams,³⁹ and C. C. Everett,⁴⁰ the strange limitations of Bowen,⁴¹ so late as 1877, told tales about the real condition of philosophical *Wissenschaft*.

When we pause, to look north of the International Boundary, many contrasts with, however, a certain family likeness in general result, proclaim themselves.

Almost twenty-five years ago, I told a colleague—a great traveller—that I thought of prospecting ‘old’ New England. He replied: ‘why, *old* New England is now to be found only in the valleys of Nova Scotia.’ The suggestion struck me, and its essential accuracy is interesting. At the time of the American Revolution, the United Empire Loyalists, who betook themselves to Halifax, represented and retained the best traditions of New England culture. Hence, the means of higher education were soon arranged. King’s College, Windsor, on its foundation in 1787, had for president William Cochrane, professor of Classics in King’s College, New York City; men like Samuel Blowers, the Chief Justice, and Sir John Wentworth,⁴² both Harvard graduates, sat on the Board of Trustees. Its liberal policy at first bade fair to entrench it as the centre of intellectual life. Unfortunately, this gave place to ecclesiastical reaction after 1802, with the result that

³⁸Cf. *Ibid.*, chap. xv.

³⁹*Philosophy as an Absolute Science*, 1864.

⁴⁰*The Science of Thought*, 1869.

⁴¹*Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann*. As to limitations, cf. *e.g.*, p. 156 (on Kant), p. 359 (on Hegel), or the complete failure to detect the significance of the ‘pessimists’ in the evolution of romanticism.

⁴²Cf. Lawrence Shaw Mayo, *John Wentworth, Governor of New Hampshire, 1767-1775*, 1921.

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Scottish forces organized Dalhousie in 1818. The sectarian differences thus perpetuated led to enfeeblement of the colleges of the Maritime Provinces, and proved barriers to transitive leadership. Thus, the riper culture imported by the Loyalists lost impetus, and opportunity was not to knock twice. Its monuments remain in the literary work of Thomas Chandler Haliburton,⁴³ in the journalistic and political career of Joseph Howe, 'the Canadian Burke'.⁴⁴ At Montreal, the English-speaking element found itself a small and therefore 'colonial' minority, dependent upon the Mother Country in the things of the spirit; reproducing in McGill College (1821) the ideals of the Scottish universities.⁴⁵ In Ontario, where no high bred immigration came to aid,⁴⁶ the tragic unwisdom of King's College was paralleled by the policies of Bishop Strachan. Accordingly, here again, the chief monument so far is the romantic fiction of John Richardson.⁴⁷ Once more, Queen's College, Kingston, founded in 1841, had just opened its doors when, characteristically, the ecclesiastical explosion (1843) in Scotland almost closed them. In addition, as Sir John Bourinot pointed out (1893), the influence of the universities and colleges upon the national mind is very recent.⁴⁸

On the whole, then, we find Puritan persuasions in the Nova Scotia of the eighteenth century, where the evangelism of Henry Alline was reinforced later by immigrant Scottish Highlanders. For the rest, the engrossing, exhausting tasks of a new land postponed reflection, the more that the 'spiritually indispensable' could be, and was, imported readily. The

⁴³Sam Slick, 1837-1843. Cf. V. L. O. Chittick, *Thomas Chandler Haliburton: a Study in Provincial Toryism*, Columbia Univ., Pubs.

⁴⁴Cf. W. L. Grant, *The Tribune of Nova Scotia: a Chronicle of Joseph Howe*, 1915.

⁴⁵Cf. Cyrus Macmillan, *McGill and its Story*, 1921.

⁴⁶Toronto had nothing that could be called a library till 1837.

⁴⁷Wacousta, 1832; *The Canadian Brothers*, 1840.

⁴⁸*Proc. and Trans. of the Royal Society of Canada*, 1893.

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division of labour between 'natural' and 'revealed' theology, with stress upon the argument from design, were familiar, of course. So, likely enough, the first stir, presaging 'the terrible seventies' in England, came by way of local accident. Canada offered a virgin field to the geologist, and Logan's classical work⁴⁹ placed the capstone upon a whole series of investigations.⁵⁰ 'Reconciliation' with *Genesis* was an inevitable outcome and, of this, Dawson's *Archia* (1860) is an excellent example. Otherwise, thought had remained quite 'colonial', taking its *queues* from Britain; conventionality abounded, originality lagged. Immediate practical affairs of every kind, coupled with sectarian prejudgements, set the perspective. And as south of the Boundary, so here, we find a tendency to 'make over' European thinkers for academic consumption. So late as 1870, for instance, such a book as Clark Murray's *Outline of Hamilton's Philosophy* offers pertinent illustration.

It would betray gross misunderstanding of many sincere, able, and cultivated men, were one to allege that their 'policy . . . was to turn out safe minds content to mark time in the old way.'⁵¹ Yet we deal no injustice when we call them *Beati Possidentes*, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world, where political experiment lent a sense of superiority, commercial success a feeling of finality. Seventeenth century Dualism, reasserted in face of Hume; one of the ideas of the French Revolution conventionalized as 'representative government'; and the persistent theological background, typified in Hugh Miller—'a theologian studying geology', as Spencer has it—furnished a solid dwelling wherein all could take their ease. The very 'rationalists', however they might scoff at the atmosphere of the house, took care not to stray beyond the

⁴⁹*Geology of Canada*, 1863.

⁵⁰*e.g.*, J. Bouchette, 1815, 1831; A. Gesner, 1836.

⁵¹Woodbridge Riley, *loc. cit.*, p. 135.

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garden walls.⁵² Rumours of new things remained rumours for the most part. Hume was an 'infidel'; Buffon, if known, was known to have recanted; the reception of Kant was summarized by Spencer;⁵³ Hegel fell under ban, because responsible for Strauss and other miasmas; Erasmus Darwin, being a poet, might have indulgence; Lamarck and Karl von Baer had not penetrated, although Lyall, whose *Principles of Geology* sold like the proverbial hot cakes,⁵⁴ gave fresh impetus to the 'reconciliations' of revealed, fresh evidence for the 'design' of natural, theology.

At last, the 'controversy over Darwinian evolution' burst like lightning from a clear sky. Under the circumstances which we have tried to review, lamentable dogmatism—to say nothing of evil temper—was inevitable on both sides. We are prone to forget that theological protests of the kind 'which should be bound in good stout asses' skin',⁵⁵ had parallels not a whit less absurd in 'the naïve philosophizings of Haeckel, Huxley, and Spencer.'⁵⁶ As a result, the *parti pris* of the *Popular Science Monthly*, 'a propagandist organ' (the phrase is Spencer's own),⁵⁷ was of widespread influence by comparison with that of Fiske's serious study.⁵⁸ Moreover, the vogue of both captured laymen rather than philosophers *von Fach*.

⁵²Note, e.g., the symptomatic titles of some books: Rowland G. Hazard, *The Adaptation of the Universe to the Cultivation of the Mind*, 1840; F. Bowen, *Metaphysical and Ethical Science applied to the Evidences of Religion*, 1855; F. H. Hedge, *Reason and Religion*, 1865.

⁵³'When twenty-four I met with a translation of Kant and read the first few pages. Forthwith, rejecting his doctrine of Time and Space, I read no further' (David Duncan, *Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer*, vol. II, p. 146, New York, 1908).

⁵⁴Between 1830 and 1872, eleven editions were called for in England alone, the putative theological implications being largely responsible.

⁵⁵Huxley's characterization of some remarks by Samuel Wilberforce, Bishop of Oxford.

⁵⁶Roy Wood Sellars, *Evolutionary Naturalism*, p. viii, 1922.

⁵⁷Cf. my *Life and Work of G. S. Morris*, p. 129.

⁵⁸John Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, based on the Doctrine of Evolution, with Criticisms of the Positive Philosophy*, 2 vols., London, 1874. Although this is one of the few first-rate works which decorate American philosophy, note its publication in England!

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Meanwhile, when the regnant philosophy was 'nibbling at the little end of things,' as W. T. Harris said, referring to his Yale course, a new movement, one sequel to the abortive German revolution (1848), began to formulate itself at St. Louis, Missouri, then a sprawling country town. The association of H. C. Brockmeyer with W. T. Harris, A. E. Kroeger, D. J. Snider, Thomas Davidson and, a little later, G. Stanley Hall, may not detain us now. But, in December, 1867, it produced *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. The Preface, written by the editor, Harris, 'gives one furiously to think.'

'We, as a people, buy immense editions of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Comte, Hamilton, Cousin, and others; one can trace the appropriation and digestion of their thoughts in all the leading articles of our Reviews, Magazines and books of a thoughtful character. If this is American philosophy, the editor thinks that it may be very much elevated by absorbing and digesting more refined aliment . . . For after all it is not "American *thought*" so much as American *thinkers* that we want . . . Our province as Americans is to rise to purer forms than have hitherto been attained, and thus speak a "solvent word" of more potency than those already uttered.'

We find that within four years of his arrival 'on the old Ontario strand',⁵⁹ Professor Watson had associated himself with this group.⁶⁰ What did these things signify?

First, and with an emphasis brooking no evasion, they intimate that history of philosophy must be taken in dead earnest. Childlike amazement, wide-eyed in a pantechmicon where assorted wares lie around loose for casual inspection or care-free choice, goes by the board. Nor can commonplace

⁵⁹Cf. Dedication to Professor Watson by Dr. T. R. Glover, Public Orator of the University of Cambridge, of his *Studies in Virgil*, 1904.

⁶⁰Cf. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. x, p. 17, 1876.

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antiquarianism avail aught, seeing that the spiritual and the abstract belong in quite different galleries. There is a whole within which the parts develop; there are methods that invite failure—foreordained failure; great epochs have thrown their books open to examination like firms trading on imaginary capital or genial, lazy goodwill. It were needless to dredge the dark depths of an opaque past for examples. They are nigh unto us. Hume was no brawling infidel, fertile in superfluous ideas, but an accountant who, having revealed a dire state of affairs, uttered final judgement. The Kantian system may be spoken of as 'a monumental ruin'. One does not thereby relegate it to the vasty lumber-room of overpassed standpoints. Rather, careful study shows that it persists significant for ever, because its nature came

Between the pass and fell-incensèd points
Of mighty opposites.

At such portentous assizes the severest labour of thought, illumined by the driest light of insight, alone avails.

Very true, 'philosophy can begin anywhere.' Yet it reverts invariably to a few ultimate problems. Gloss them at your peril. Their history indicates where we are, above all, whither we cannot go. Hence, ability to handle the original sources becomes a prerequisite essential to competence and, no less, to advance. What has been said matters little, nor how, nor by whom. Denunciation and fear are to be fled like the plague. The question is: With what validity? And, to assess this, all the evidence must be in. But, even with such equipment, so difficult of acquisition, more difficult in use, the factor of personal synthesis still demands footing. For, we are men of our age, face to face with pregnant life, feeling the stress of the particular differentiations exhibited by contemporary problems. Here, despite our full commerce with history, we encounter a second significance, significance of the subtlest moreover.

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None of Professor Watson's students or other debtors but know his masterly command of history. Let me add a word concerning personal synthesis, as I have termed it.

Habituated to a universe of endless vistas in space, of illimitable processes in time, inheriting a mechanistic naturalism prone to disguise ultimate difficulties, or a vitalistic animism flattering caprice; being thus delivered mysteriously out of the maw of universals by the illusion of 'progress', the younger generation preserves little, if any, memory of the ruin into which Professor Watson and his coevals were ushered. Sure of themselves on a tiny earth ringed with millennial horizons, the *Beati Possidentes* outstayed their welcome. The philosophers had done their work right well—they had made 'practical' men conspicuous participants in the greatest happiness of the greatest number. One need not cite the feminizing Utilitarians. Take Cobden. 'God is over all, and Providence will right wrongs and check wickedness without our help.' Dear soul, he did not suspect that he might just as well have mumbled decently and beneath his breath: 'Every man for himself and God for us all, as the elephant said when he danced among the chickens.' This, when the idea of development had been abroad for nigh two generations, and a decade after the *Beagle* had sailed fatefully forth from Devonport, Darwin aboard! Carlyle and Emerson had indeed prophesied before stiff-necked peoples, to find all too seldom that response of 'passionate admiration and reverence, such as is felt by the young only for a great teacher who meets and answers the questions which they are led by the spirit of the time to ask.'⁶¹

The full stress, passing 'the flaming bounds of place and time', overtook the youth in the late sixties, when Professor

⁶¹Edward Caird, *Essays in Literature and Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 235, 1892.

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Watson matriculated at one of the two universities where it seethed most powerfully. Menacing questions crowded from every side, current answers gave no guidance. Can any aspect of experience be withdrawn from normal conditions, to receive exceptional treatment? Can an appeal to a transcendent 'something' be other than irrational? Is not 'revelation' to the human spirit and, therefore, *from* it in kind? How about the relation between the so-called *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements in knowledge? What are we to say concerning 'design' or purpose in face of the evidences for evolution? Are the transcendence of the theologians and the immanence of the naturalists mutually exclusive? If, as seems highly probable, unity presses upon us, making the most unexpected bed-fellows, how dare we interpret it? In short, all oppugnant claims recognized in every protean shape, is it possible, proceeding without futile controversy, to uncover a reasonable principle of internal cohesion?

If the younger generation, to whom I have just referred, enjoy a freedom rare or impossible fifty years ago, if it find plentiful tools ready to hand, if it be thrilled by the conviction that every sort of circumspect work must contribute to the great end, let it pause, to return thanks for the patience and courage of men like Professor Watson. For these elder brethren have taught us that the light of our little day shines with the brightness of permeable and penetrating rationality. Better still, looking to the 'triumphs of physical and biological science', they have indicated that the age-old microcosmic antithesis between 'subject' and 'object', reborn in these latter days under the macrocosmic guise of 'thought' and 'reality', is no bare grammatical play

Where entity and quiddity,
The ghosts of defunct bodies fly,⁶²

⁶²Cf. John Watson, *Kant and his English Critics, a Comparison of Critical and Empirical Philosophy*, p. 396, 1881.

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but portends the involution of a unity which, its proliferating kinds despite, offers the sole clue to possible import. 'Intelligence exists only in and through its specific modes, and it is useless to attempt sublimating it by isolating it from those modes: instead of elevating we merely degrade it. The categories and the particulars of knowledge are therefore simply the various real relations in which intelligence manifests its activity, and builds up for each of us the fair fabric of nature.'⁶³

At the close, permit me, in retrospect, to cut thirty-five years from Professor Watson's remarkable fifty at Queen's University. Then or thereabouts, in his customary casual way, Edward Caird asked me whether I would care to go to Kingston as Professor Watson's colleague. Domestic plans at the time rendered impossible even second thoughts about the proposal. Untoward circumstance! For, what better fortune could have befallen a young cub than the daily example, stimulus, and advice of a passed master so learned, so incisive and, withal, so kindly. Nay, fortune was to smite me further, condemning me to mediate alone my life between two cultures and two continents—*ignotum per ignotius*. Small wonder I revert wistfully to that interview in the Glasgow study which Professor Watson and I knew so well, to ponder what might have been! As if in small compensation, I rejoice, after these many eventful days, to salute the indefatigable torch-bearer of Kingston, rising

In open victory o'er the weight
Of seventy years, to loftier heights.

R. M. WENLEY.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 402.

MORAL VALIDITY:
A STUDY IN PLATONISM

That human judgement upon moral issues is liable to error, has only to be stated in the Platonic dialogues to meet with universal acceptance. The fact of conflict and dispute, whether we consider the direct recognition of this fact by Euthyphro or Glaucon, or whether we note its exemplification in the sharply divergent opinions of Socrates on the one hand, and, on the other, of such thinkers as Calicles or Thrasymachus, is so obvious, that human fallibility in questions of moral valuation forces itself upon our attention and constitutes a genuine problem.

Moral judgements, then, in some cases are certainly and beyond doubt invalid. In other cases, they may possibly be accepted as valid. Upon what conditions does their validity or invalidity depend? Are there any tests which a careful thinker might apply in order to determine their degree of validity?

For Plato, the answer to this question is largely a matter of discovering a moral criterion or standard in the form of the moral law, the law accepted by the perfect moral judgement. This ideal law furnishes a standard, comparison with which sufficiently indicates the extent to which a particular moral judgement approximates to, or falls short of the law, and thus serves to measure, with a fair degree of accuracy, the validity or invalidity of the moral judgement in question (*Rep.*, 472c). If we ask what the ideal principle accepted by the perfect moral judgement is, we have, in various passages, various answers, *e.g.*, universal assent, written law, quantity of experienced pleasure, expediency, self-sufficiency, consistency, objectivity. If we then proceed to examine these

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answers, we find that in the end they all resolve themselves into a single answer. The final standard of value, in every case, turns out to be objectivity, or the degree to which a proposed course of action, or other subject proposed for moral approval or disapproval, is patterned upon the ideal principles which, for Plato, constitute reality. These principles are expressions of a single ultimate principle, the Idea of Good, that is, the principle of ideality or value as such, value and ideal reality being identified. A character or an action thus comes to have value, precisely to the degree in which it is based upon, and tends to realize the principle of value itself. Understood in the light of this final principle, that is to say, as expressions of ultimate value or of the essence of reality, universal assent, written law, expediency, consistency, etc., can safely be used as proximate standards, by which to measure the value of actions and characters in particular situations and from particular standpoints. It is in this sense that they are used by the Platonic dialectician. But apart from such transvaluation in the light of this principle, they belong to the region of 'opinion,' the region of twilight and moral blindness, and cannot safely be used as moral standards at all. It is insight into reality, or the ideal and its principle, alone, which enables the philosophic judge to make value-judgements which are reliable and valid.¹

From a more psychological point of view, the moral judgement can be considered as representative of a certain quantity and quality of experience, and if we consider its evolution in the case of the perfect moral judge, we construct the ideal of a judgement so comprehensive and so profound as to transcend the sensory experiences of a single individual, and eventually to represent the concentration, upon the ques-

¹For a detailed study of the evidence upon which these conclusions depend, see Lodge, *Plato and the Moral Standard*, *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. XXXIII, Nos. 1 and 2, 1921-22.

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tion at issue, of the whole of human experience, refined and idealized as far as is humanly possible. The elements which enter into the moral judgement are thus the elements which have truly entered into the self of the perfect moral judge. These are the physical, moral, and mental elements discussed in the Platonic theory of education, the instincts, habits, and intelligence, so trained and ripened by social and educational influences as to have taken on the form and pattern of the ideal world, and to have become, so far as this is possible in an organism which retains to the end something of its animal origin, the human habitation and embodiment of the ideas of manliness, self-control, justice, and wisdom, in the full harmony and unity which comes with attainment of the Idea of Good also. What actually does the judging is thus the whole nature of the individual man, together with all the influences which have made his nature what it has come to be, the influence of literature, art, science, and religion, the history, traditions, and aspirations of the community, the whole welded together and transmuted into an adequate reflex of the Experience which we designate as Absolute. The judgement of such a man represents, then, not the chance reaction to a chance stimulation, but the rich experience of the whole race, sublimated and idealized until it represents, in human form, the complete experience which is the life and thought of God. This ideal furnishes a standard, comparison with which shows with reasonable clearness how far a particular moral judgement approximates to, or falls short of its completeness and organized concentration.²

In both cases, the ideal judgement of the perfect moral judge is understood, epistemologically, as a sufficiently valid apprehension of the nature and structure of ultimate reality,

²For detailed study of the evidence upon which these conclusions rest, see Lodge, *Genesis of the Moral Judgement in Plato* (*Int. Jour. Ethics*, vol. xxxiv, No. 1, 1922).

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whether that reality is conceived rather as a system of laws and values, or chiefly as an ideal experience. It is thus ultimate reality which furnishes the final touchstone for human value-judgements. So far as the human judgement corresponds to the nature of *what is*, the human judgement expresses the nature of reality, expresses the Divine judgement to which it has, by grace and training, gradually become responsive, and so far the human judgement is metaphysically valid. So far, on the other hand, as it falls short or diverges from the path, it deviates necessarily into insignificance and futility, and so far as it goes further and contradicts the nature of *what is*, it not only stultifies itself, but invokes against itself the higher forces of the universe. The ultimate standard, then, of the validity of the moral judgement is furnished by comparison with the structure of ultimate reality.

The evidence upon which these conclusions rest has been investigated elsewhere,³ and it has been admitted that Plato's position is at least formally satisfactory. The structure of ultimate reality would undoubtedly furnish an ultimate standard for testing the validity of our human attempts at moral judgement, at seeing as God sees. From the standpoint of God, one could judge finally and without appeal. But while this is formally correct, a further question at once arises, as to the substantial and material correctness of the view of ultimate reality which is furnished by Plato. The structure of reality provides the touchstone for moral judgement. Well and good. But what precisely, in principle and, if possible, also in detail, is the structure of reality? How, if at all, can we be assured of the soundness of the Platonic theory of reality? It is of vital importance to know this, and to realize clearly how far Plato's teaching on this point can be accepted,

³See Lodge, *Reality and the Moral Judgement in Plato* (*Phil. Rev.*, vol. XXIX, Nos. 4 and 5, 1920).

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and how far it has its limitations. The investigation of the validity of the Platonic metaphysic of morals is thus the object of the present study.

Reality, according to Plato, consists of entities of a peculiar kind, the Ideas or conceptual essences, and the structural pattern of reality is thus, it would seem, constituted by the relations of these entities to one another, a relatedness controlled by a single ultimate principle, the Idea of Good, *i.e.*, the principle of ideality or essentiality as such. We shall therefore begin our investigation by making out a roughly classified list of the entities which constitute these conceptual essences, and shall then proceed to study the interrelations of these essences, including in our examination, not only their relations to one another, but also their relation to the highest principle, the principle of essentiality. Having in this way discovered, so far as possible, the nature and structure of ultimate reality, as Plato conceives it, we shall then proceed to determine the validity of his conception in relation to possible human experience.

The entities definitely recognized in the Platonic writings as Ideas, that is to say, as conceptual essences which in some sense constitute the ultimately real, fall naturally into groups, representing the essences of:

- (1) natural phenomena, *e.g.*, hair, clay, dirt, water, fire, etc.;
- (2) organisms, *e.g.*, man, ox, etc.;
- (3) artefacts, *e.g.*, bed, table, shuttle, etc.;
- (4) goods of the body, *e.g.*, strength, weakness, good looks, etc.;
- (5) social and political goods, *e.g.*, high or low birth, wealth or poverty, private or public station, the ideal state, tyranny, etc.;
- (6) goods of the mind, *e.g.*, cleverness, dullness, knowledge, ignorance, etc.;

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- (7) aesthetical ideals, *e.g.*, beauty, ugliness, etc.;
- (8) moral ideals, *e.g.*, good, evil, justice, injustice, temperance, wisdom, all virtues and their opposites;
- (9) categories and ideas of relation, *e.g.*, one, other numbers, many, identity, difference, likeness, unlikeness, greatness, smallness, equality, motion, rest, being,
- (10) the Idea of Good.

The above ten groups are intended to cover the whole field of Being, from the realities inadequately exemplified in the world of sense-perceivables to the realities more adequately expressed in the realm of moral, aesthetical, and religious valuings, and more adequately apprehended by non-sensuous, intellectual processes, culminating in the apprehension of the Idea of Good, the key-stone of the arch. Nothing which *is*, is intentionally omitted from the list,⁴ and it may consequently be regarded as, at least in intention and in principle, complete.

Before proceeding to discuss the relations of group to group, it is advisable to consider briefly each group by itself, in order to discover clearly and unambiguously upon what grounds it is reckoned by Plato among the conceptual essences in which reality consists.

(1) The first group, of natural phenomena, is considered in relation to a distinction between absolute Ideas and the phenomena which 'partake of them,' the Idea being consistently regarded as transcendent or 'apart from' the phenomena. The question is raised, whether there is an absolute essence of such natural phenomena as fire or mud, etc., distinct from and 'apart from' the actual phenomena with which we come into sensory contact, or not. The Platonic Socrates expresses a certain doubt and hesitation. On the one hand, he is inclined to attribute to sensuous phenomena none but a phenomenal existence, a reality purely sensuous, fluctuating and relative

⁴Cf. *Phaedr.*, 247e, 277b, *Rep.*, 484c f., 532a, 534b, *Parm.*, 135a-c.

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to our sense-organs, and entirely devoid of ideal essence (*Parm.*, 130d, cf. *Rep.* 529c). On the other hand, when he reflects further, he is inclined to believe that nothing which has any kind of existence can be without an Idea, in which case even sensuous phenomena would partake of some kind of ideal essence, would be the appearance of some underlying reality. The sequel to this discussion seems to indicate that, in spite of the Socratic hesitation, the second view is, on the whole, accepted by Plato.⁵ Our general conclusion, then, regarding this group is that there are absolute, transcendent Ideas of natural phenomena, such notions as water-as-such, clay-as-such, fire-in-itself, as distinct from actually experienced concrete examples of water, clay, fire, etc., which only partially and imperfectly represent the ideal nature of such objects—much as a physical experiment, intended to ‘demonstrate’ the law of the conservation of energy, falls short of its complete ideal.⁶

(2) The second group, which includes at least all organic bodies, is considered partly in the same context. Socrates expresses a certain indecision as to whether, over and above all actual human creatures, and ‘apart from’ them, there is such an entity as man-as-such. Here also the sequel appears to imply with reasonable certainty that, in spite of the Socratic indecision, Plato himself would decide the question in the affirmative. This is supported by the discussion, in another context, as to the existence of such entities as man-as-such, ox-as-such, etc. It is there implied, with sufficient

⁵*Tim.*, 51b f. Cf. Lodge, *Int. Jour. Ethics*, vol. xxxii, No. 2, pp. 200 f. Against this, cf. Lewis Campbell, Intro. to *Sophistes*, p. lxix, note.

⁶Cf. *Phaedo* 79a, *Rep.*, 510 f., *Phileb.*, 17b f. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, developing further a hypothesis suggested by Lewis Campbell and accepted by Natorp, suggests that the *Parmenides* merely contains material for practice in dialectic within Plato’s school, and that the views towards which Plato himself had been gradually working his way are more definitely expressed in the relevant passages of the *Timaeus*, which seem to justify the position taken in the text.

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clearness, that such entities retain a permanent core of individuality, 'apart from' changes in the realm of generation and destruction.⁷ Here also, then, our general conclusion must be that of organisms such as man, ox, etc., there exists, as expressed in the class name, a principle which holds the class together as a unity, a conceptual unity distinguished from and contrasted with the multiplicity of sensuous particulars in the phenomenal world (*Rep.*, 507b).

(3) Concerning the third group, which consists of at least the Ideas of artefacts, *e.g.*, objects such as beds and tables made by the carpenter, Plato is very definite. The Ideas of such objects are given as examples of unity-in-multiplicity, a group which includes all artefacts, and indeed extends far beyond them (*Rep.*, 596a-b, cf. 480a). Wherever there is a collection of phenomena, a 'many' which can be grouped together as examples of a common principle, there is also the principle of organization, the 'one' or the Idea which is at least partially expressed in every member of the group. This is more than a mere class-name. It expresses rather the ideal partially realized in the concrete embodiments which can be touched and seen. It is the ideal table and the ideal bed, whose patterns are laid up in heaven, the principle of tableness or bedness, which the carpenter endeavours to realize in wood or iron, and which the true artist should also endeavour to portray in his own medium, instead of contenting himself with copying the product of the carpenter's art. It is sharply distinguished from the particular concrete objects which, in the phenomenal world, only partially and imperfectly express the ideal nature.

(4) The fourth group, representing what Plato frequently classes together as 'goods of the body,' *e.g.*, health, strength,

⁷*Parm.*, 130c, *Phileb.*, 15a. *Parm.*, 133e has the Idea of Mastery and Slavery, which would seem to presuppose the ideality of 'man'.

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good looks, and their corresponding opposites, are nowhere in so many words stated to be transcendent, absolute Ideas, constituents of ultimate reality. However, in view of the undoubted facts that (1) they come under the one-in-many principle just explained, *i.e.*, represent the common principle in terms of which many individuals can be grouped together as 'healthy,' 'strong,' 'good-looking,' etc., and (2) they constitute ideals for human choice, and are thus 'patterns' strikingly similar to the two great patterns of choice in the *Theaetetus*—which are certainly absolute Ideas—it seems reasonable, at least tentatively and unless we discover reasons which might incline us to take the contrary view, to regard them as Ideas (*Rep.*, 618b f., *Laws*, 733 f., *Theaet.* 176b). The case of pleasure presents, however, at least at first sight, a certain difficulty, inasmuch as it is at times apparently regarded as a *genesis* rather than an *ousia* (*Phileb.*, 54a f., *Rep.*, 584a f.). But further investigation shows that this is a temporary, not a permanent point of view, and in view of the facts that (1) pleasure is frequently referred to as a typical life-ideal (*Protag.*, 353b ff., *Rep.*, 506b, *Phileb.*, *passim*), (2) the question is seriously discussed whether or not pleasure is to be identified with 'the good'—which is quite certainly an absolute Idea, (3) the 'Ideas of pleasure'—*i.e.*, subordinate type-forms of pleasure—are discussed and to some extent subjected to the analysis of the dialectician, whose function is largely to analyse and synthesize Ideas (*Phileb.*, 20a), and (4) the unity-in-multiplicity principle seems to apply to it, inasmuch as pleasureableness is the element common to all the various examples of the pleasure-experience—in view of all these facts, it seems necessary to recognize a certain ideality about pleasure also, especially, perhaps, in its purer forms. Taking, then, the class 'goods of the body' as a whole, we shall in what follows, at least provisionally, regard the members of this class as constituting ideal patterns which

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have a genuine existence, which may be distinguished from and contrasted with the particular concrete experiences of healthiness, pleasure, etc.

(5) The fifth group, which is constituted by social and political goods, is also nowhere as a whole stated to belong definitely to the world of absolute Ideas, as opposed to phenomenal realities. But, so far as wealth, power, etc., are concerned, the same arguments apply which we found convincing in the case of the fourth group. (1) Each of these entities is a one-in-many, as wealthiness is a characteristic common to all members of the class 'wealthy,' (2) wealth, power, etc., constitute typical life-ideals or patterns of choice, and (3) the interrelations and consequences of the members of this group, in their effect upon human character, constitute the subject-matter of moral science (*Phaedr.*, 277b f., *Rep.*, 476a, 618c-d), *i.e.*, form part of the study of the dialectician, and are thus certainly to be regarded as Ideas. *E.g.*, the life of the tyrant, as contrasted with the life of the philosopher-king in respect of happiness, is even represented mathematically, *i.e.*, as an Idea, for all numbers possess ideal quality (*Theaet.*, 185c-d, *Rep.*, 526a-b, 587c-e); and the political ideals, which are somewhat similarly contrasted with one another, are also presumably to be taken as possessing ideal quality, for it is definitely stated of one of them, the Platonic ideal city, that there exists a pattern of it set up in heaven, *i.e.*, that it is a transcendent Idea (*Rep.*, 520c, cf. 592a). We shall therefore, at least provisionally, regard this group also as consisting of conceptual essences apprehended as ideal type-forms underlying the various phenomena of social life, and as contrasted with the particular lives actually lived.

(6) The sixth group is in a somewhat similar situation. The various qualities of mind exemplified above constitute a portion of the subject-matter studied by the moral scientist, who, whether as a departmental scientist, or as a dialectician

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who has realized the final vision of the Idea of Good, presumably only studies Ideas.⁸ Knowledge, again, is subjected to a thorough-going dialectical analysis, and the results of the analysis, *i.e.*, subordinate types of knowledge, are definitely referred to as Ideas, and frequent attempts are made to define its nature or essence, so that we appear to be justified in regarding it as possessing ideal quality.⁹ These qualities of mind also come under the one-in-many principle, and furnish one of the typical life-ideals, the life of knowledge, the contemplative, philosophic life, so that, in spite of the unquestioned fact that Plato nowhere refers directly and unambiguously to this group as a whole as a group of transcendent Ideas, it seems reasonable, at least at the present stage, to regard this group as furnishing conceptual essences or ideal type-forms, which are apprehended as underlying the various phenomena of the intellectual life, exemplified perhaps to an especial degree in the life of the ideal philosopher, and more or less adequately realized in the actual lives of educated individuals.

(7) Concerning the seventh group, there can be no possible doubt. Good and evil, justice and injustice, temperance, wisdom, and all the virtues and vices are referred to, again and again, individually and collectively, as absolute Ideas.¹⁰ They are contrasted sharply with the realm of phenomena perceptible by the senses, as being unitary, permanent, intelligible, as opposed to the manifoldness, transitoriness, and the fluctuating quality of sense.¹¹ In a word, they are one and all transcendent essences, ideals of reason, infinitely superior to the actual, concrete experiences of sensation, instinct, and habit.

⁸Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.*, A, 990b 11-13.

⁹*Phaedr.*, 247d, *Theaet.*, *passim*, *Soph.*, 247a, *Phileb.*, 20a-c, etc.

¹⁰*Phaedr.*, 277d, *Rep.*, 507b, 520c, 540a, *Theaet.*, 176a, e-177a, *Soph.*, 247a, *Phileb.*, 15a, etc.

¹¹*Phaedr.*, 247c f., *Phaedo*, 65d f., 75c-d, 76d f., 100b, *Rep.*, 529b, *Theaet.*, 185, *Polit.*, 285e.

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(8) So too of the eighth group, which consists of aesthetical ideals, from the beauty or ugliness of personal appearance, through the beauties of science and conduct, to the ultimate science of beauty everywhere, with its ennobling influence upon human life (*Symp.*, 210, etc.). Here also there is no shadow of doubt. Beauty is referred to, again and again, as an ideal essence far transcending the particular examples which may be observed in the phenomenal realm. It is the essence of beauty as such, the principle, participation in which makes all particular beautiful things beautiful, but is not exhausted, or even adequately expressed, in any particular object, or in any group of particular objects. It has the higher kind of reality, the 'greater share of pure being' which belongs to the ideal as such, and is sharply contrasted with the meaner realities, such as they are, which can be touched and seen (*Rep.*, 472d f., 529b-c, 585b f.).

(9) So far as the ninth group is concerned, the very nature of the objects referred to is such that no one could possibly confuse them with sense-perceivables. Unity, duality, oddness, evenness, likeness, identity, etc.—such entities are obviously apprehensible only by intellect. They are of the mind, mental, and are used by the intellect in organizing sensory phenomena into systematic groups, groups characterized, *e.g.*, by some underlying 'identity' of sense-quality, which is 'different' from 'identity' of sense-quality underlying some 'other' group. Each of these identities, again, is 'one,' and taken together they are 'two,' and, while different, they may be either 'alike' or 'unlike,' and whether alike or unlike, they are one and all 'equally' 'beings.' Plato expresses their nature by saying that these entities are universal elements common to all sense-perceivables, and apprehended, not by sense, but by 'the mind herself,' *i.e.*, by reason or intellectual intuition.¹² They

¹²*Phaedo*, 74a f., 78d, 100b, 102b f., *Theaet.*, 185d-e.

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represent what we should call categories and ideas of relation, and are plainly ideal in character, *i.e.*, are non-sensory elements apprehensible only by the intellect. They have also the characteristic of being one-in-many, or universals.

(10) Concerning the Idea of Good, it is perhaps not necessary to state much here. It is the highest of all Ideas, and is apprehended last of all, after a very special training, and even then only with a great effort. When apprehended, it is recognized as the ultimate principle which makes clear every object of spiritual aspiration, and leads to a certain transvaluation of what was previously, in every department of experience, accepted as valuable. From the standpoint of science, it is the clear vision of truth, the adequate realization of the true form of knowledge, transcending the limitations of the special sciences and pointing the way towards their final unification in a single, purely intelligible system of Ideas. It is the principle which makes knowledge possible for the individual knower, the supreme law of thought. It is also the principle which makes objects knowable, the supreme formal principle of things, the ideal of perfect logical consistency, expressing the cognitive interrelationship of all knowable entities in the light of a single ultimate principle (*Rep.*, 508d f.). From the standpoint of conduct, it is the ideal of perfect social living, the formal principle which expresses the co-operation of every element in the social group in such a way that each element contributes its all to the complete well-being of the group as a whole, and in so doing finds its own completest and most harmonious development, its own perfect well-being and final satisfaction (*Rep.*, 462 ff.). From the standpoint of art, it is the realization, in the medium of rhythmic movements expressed, it may be, in tone and colour-patterns, of the ideal elements everywhere underlying our experiences, the 'science of beauty everywhere' which does so

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much to transform our living and make it more nearly what it might be, a thing of beauty, a universalized aesthetic joyousness (*Symp.*, 210, etc.). So too from the standpoint of religion, the Idea of Good is the supreme object of worship, the supreme principle of reality conceived, not as an impersonal principle, but as a living God, the Father of all, to whom men endeavour reverently to assimilate themselves, the living ideal of the God-like life, inadequately depicted in the various religious creeds of the world, but the true and ultimate source of whatever meaning those creeds possess (*Theaet.*, 176, *Rep.*, 613b, *Laws*, 716b, f.). That is to say, the Idea of Good, in general, is the principle of ideality, the principle which gives value and significance to our experiences, the principle which lifts them above the level of passing phenomena, changes devoid of meaning, and endows them with something of permanent abiding import, something of its own reality. As such, it is a transcendent, absolute Idea, contrasted with the impermanence, the fluctuation, and the insignificance of particular, sensory experiences.

By 'Idea' then, in general, Plato understands the one as opposed to the many, the universal as opposed to the particular, the intelligible as opposed to the sensory, the absolute as opposed to the relative, the meaningful as opposed to the insignificant, the ideal as opposed to the actual, the ultimately real as opposed to the phenomenal. The true life of the spirit is the life which rises above the barren trivialities of instinct, habit, and convention, to the full realization of the potentialities of humanity, the realization which comes with the development of reason, of the apprehension of the ideal, the permanent and abiding elements of value within experience. This is the realization of man's co-partnership with God in transforming the actual into the semblance of the ideal, in making real upon earth the ideal city whose pattern is laid

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up in heaven, the city in which science, art, and religion combine to enlighten conduct and thus to bring about the salvation of humanity from within, so that men at last come to live lives which are truly real, elevated above the particular, the mechanical, sensory, and trivial, to the true home of the free spirit, the dwelling-place of the Ideas, the City of God.

So much, then, for what Plato understands by the Idea. That there are everywhere within experience ideal elements pointing beyond the limitations of our immediate experience, and that there arises inevitably before the eye of the soul the vision of a transmuted, ideally complete experience, in which every element of value finds its place, all tending towards the living development of the whole, and each realizing its full potentialities in complete harmony and fellowship with all the rest—this vision of the ideal life has furnished forth the substance of the faith of philosophers, of the interpreters of the thoughts of humanity throughout the ages, and has been the comfort and inspiration of leaders in art, science, and religion, and concerning its general value for humanity there can be little serious question. Our immediate inquiry, however, for the present is as to how Plato fills in the outlines, how he views the interconnexion of the ideal elements in experience, what kind of pattern he weaves as his final expression of the structure of absolute reality.

That the various Ideas recognized by Plato must have *some* relation to one another, will be apparent from a glance at the list we have given above. Some of the Ideas, for example, fall into one and the same group. The Ideas of hair, dirt, and clay, etc., fall into the same group of natural phenomena; the Ideas of temperance, justice, wisdom, etc., fall into one and the same group of moral ideals; the Ideas of identity and difference, likeness and unlikeness, etc., fall into one and the same group of Ideas of relation. So too each of the depart-

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mental sciences studies all that falls within the scope of some one general Idea; but what it studies, even in relation to sense-perceivable phenomena, is always Ideas. *E.g.*, it is the ideal diameter, the ideal square, etc., which the mathematician studies by means of his sense-perceivable figures,¹³ so that it is a group of Ideas which, as studied from the standpoint of a particular science, fall within the scope of the general Idea of that science. It is, then, at once evident that certain of the Ideas have something in common, in virtue of which they come under a wider, more inclusive Idea.

A further glance at the list will reveal the widespread presence of another relationship, the relationship of opposition. Though falling within one and the same group, certain members of the group are sharply distinguished from and opposed to other members of the group. Thus goodness, temperance, and justice are sharply distinguished from and contrasted with evil, intemperance, and injustice, although these 'opposites' are also recognized as Ideas and as falling within the same general group of moral ideals (*Rep.*, 476a, *Theaet.*, 176a, e f., *Soph.*, 257c f.). So also identity, likeness, greatness, and being are opposed as logical contraries to difference, unlikeness, smallness, and not-being, respectively; and yet, though 'opposites,' they are explicitly recognized as Ideas and as belonging, just as much as identity, likeness, etc., to the same group of ideas of relation (*Theaet.*, 186b, *Parm.*, 129a, d-e, 131a-d, *Polit.*, 284b f.). So also in the Platonic view of scientific investigation, it is usually and normally maintained that 'opposites' fall within the scope of a single science, *i.e.*, fall under a single general Idea. And a further

¹³*Rep.*, 510d, with Adam's notes, and Appendix I to Bk. VII, esp. pp. 159 ff. I take it that the 'mathematical square' is a generalization which still contains empirical elements, the lower level of the Idea as contrasted with the same generalization when, after its formal element has been emphasized in relation to the ideal of complete consistency, the empirical content is transcended and only the strictly logical or ideal content remains. Cf. *Int. Jour. Ethics*, vol. xxxiii, No. 2, 1922, p. 202.

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glance at our list of Ideas will show that this kind of difference and opposition is sufficiently evident in the other groups also.

The relations just noted, relations of identity and difference, or as Plato is sometimes translated, sameness and otherness, fall within the field of some one of the ten groups which compose our list, considered apart from the other nine groups, in reference only to its internal organization. But it will also be sufficiently obvious that the groups themselves, when considered in relation to one another, either as wholes or as aggregates, are also related by way of identity and difference. By way of identity—for as Ideas, *i.e.*, as examples of the principle of ideality, whether in direct relation to the Idea of Good or in relation to the diverse phenomena which they sum up and whose meaning they express, the groups as wholes, and also all examples of each group, have certain formal elements in common. They are, *e.g.*, *one* as opposed to many, *universal* as opposed to particular, *conceptual* as opposed to sensory, etc. By way of difference—for the group expressing Ideas of relation is clearly different from the group of social goods, or of goods of the body, or from natural phenomena or artefacts. Formally, then, all Ideas whatever, whether considered as individual Ideas or as groups naturally falling together under a single 'higher' Idea, are to some extent interrelated. Is it possible to go further and to urge that, just as the individual ideas which fall under one and the same higher Idea—as justice, temperance, wisdom, etc., fall under the higher Idea of virtue—are related in respect of content as well as of general form, so also some of the groups are related to one another in content as well as in general form?

All the above points of relationship are noted incidentally by Plato, and the question of the general interrelationship of Ideas and groups of Ideas is definitely discussed in the *Sophistes*. There it is declared that the dialectician who has

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learned to analyse correctly, that is, following lines of cleavage established in the nature of things (*Phaedr.*, 265e, *Soph.*, 251d ff.), will discover:

- a. One form pervading a scattered multitude;
- b. Many forms, existing only in separation and isolation;
- c. Many forms, knit together into a single whole and contained under a single form;
- d. Some classes having communion with only a few other forms;
- e. Some classes having communion with many other forms;
- f. No reason why there should not be some classes which have communion with all forms.

A brief study of these distinctions is necessary, in order to ascertain what Plato has in mind. The first division (*a*) is apparently a description of the general function of the Idea as such. Each and every Idea is a one-in-many, a single form pervading and uniting an otherwise scattered multitude of particular examples, as *e.g.*, 'furniture' might be regarded as a general term pervading and uniting miscellaneous particular specimens of furniture in an auction sale, or as the medical term 'bile' or 'biliousness' serves to unite under a single head many symptoms which, in appearance, at any rate, seem diverse and disconnected (*Tim.*, 83c).

The second division (*b*) seems to give rise to a serious difficulty, for if the separation and isolation of the Ideas in this division is taken absolutely, we have a clear contradiction to the division of the universally pervasive forms (*f*), and there is also a lack of harmony with the well-known Platonic position, maintained in this dialogue also, that the isolation and separation of conceptual elements is the negation of all discourse and all reasoning (*Theaet.*, 161e, *Parm.*, 135b-c,

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Soph., 259e f.). But in actual fact, if we may judge by the sequel, the separation and isolation are understood as relative, as motion and rest, for example, logically exclude one another, or as identity and difference logically exclude one another. The distinction is, then, a relative distinction, and is not intended to imply that Ideas can be absolutely isolated, separated into metaphysically water-tight compartments.

The third division recognized by the dialectician (*c*) would be exemplified by any of the departmental sciences, *e.g.*, by geometry, which studies such ideal elements as the point, line, surface, diameter, square, etc., in their interrelations, as coming under a single comprehensive principle and thus as being knit together into a single whole (*Rep.*, 510c f.). Another example would be the grouping together of such Ideas as greatness, smallness, equality, identity, difference, similarity, etc., so as to constitute a single class, included within the higher, more comprehensive notion of 'universals apprehended as common to all sense-perceivables,' or as the discussion in the *Sophistes* and *Parmenides* indicates, common also to many Ideas. Yet a third example would be furnished by moral science, which investigates the interrelations of such Ideas as noble birth, wealth, high station, etc., and studies their effects upon character, according as they are variously combined in varying circumstances, thus knitting together into a complex totality all these Ideas (*Rep.*, 476, 618c f.). An even more common example in the Platonic writings would be the case of the various 'parts of virtue', *viz.*, justice, piety, temperance, courage, etc., each of which is certainly regarded by Plato as an Idea, but all of them are certainly regarded, in spite of difficulties, as linked together under the higher and more comprehensive single Idea of virtue (*Laws*, 963c ff.).

The fourth and fifth divisions (*d*, *e*) become much clearer if we consider concretely, in relation to definite examples, what

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appears to be meant. Artefacts, *e.g.*, bed and table in the ideal sense, have 'communion with' other Ideas, *i.e.*, have certain points of contact which link them up with other groups of Ideas, but only to a limited extent. The Idea of bed has certain points of contact with the Idea of wood or metal, and even with such Ideas as hair, dirt, water, fire, etc. But such connexions are obviously superficial, unessential. So again, the Idea of bed has some points of contact with the group constituted by Ideas of organisms, *e.g.*, with the Idea of man. It has superficial and unimportant points of contact with the Ideas grouped together as goods of the body or with the social goods class, points of contact at least equally superficial with the goods-of-the-mind class, or with the moral-ideals class. To the aesthetical-ideals class it bears a slightly more recognizable relation, and has a number of relations to such Ideas as greatness, smallness, motion, rest, etc., and is of course connected with the Idea of Good. Such an Idea as bed or table may accordingly be regarded as an example of the fourth division (*d*). On the other hand, as examples of the fifth division (*e*), such Ideas as the mathematical Ideas, and such Ideas as likeness and unlikeness, seem to have a more universal connexion or, as Plato expresses it, have communion with many other forms. These examples indicate, briefly but perhaps adequately, what appears to be meant by the intercommunion of forms, which furnishes so much of the subject-matter to be investigated by the dialectician.

The sixth division (*f*) is exemplified, in the discussion which takes place in the *Sophistes*, primarily by such 'higher Ideas' as motion, rest, identity and difference (here treated as 'relative being' and 'otherness,' respectively), and also, perhaps, by such Ideas as absolute being and the Idea of Good. The upshot of the discussion appears to be that motion and rest are not strictly universal, for they are mutually exclusive,

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but identity and difference—or relative being and relative not-being—belong to each and every example of ideality, the notion of absolute being, which is perhaps to be identified with the Idea of Good, apparently falling outside the discussion. It will be noted, however, that the universals which remain within the discussion have all only a 'relative' being, *i.e.*, have meaning and reality mainly in relation to one another. As good and evil are correlated in the *Theaetetus*, so likeness and unlikeness are correlated in the *Parmenides*, and sameness and otherness in the *Sophistes*. The notion of absolute being, however, *i.e.*, of ideal being, the form or principle of Being itself, which is presumably to be equated with the Idea of Good, is apparently to be understood as a single form which has communion with all forms, precisely so far as they are forms, *i.e.*, on their formal side, as the principle of formality or ideality which necessarily underlies each and every form or Idea.

So far, then, we have discovered that, from the ideal standpoint, the whole of reality is akin. The ideal qualities apprehended by the dialectician as everywhere underlying our experiences, constitute an interconnected totality, a single ideal system. But as soon as we attempt to look more closely into the system and probe into the interconnexion itself, we come upon a certain difficulty. This difficulty is disguised, perhaps, rather than elucidated by the statement that there is an 'intercommunion of forms,' and that it is a large part of the dialectician's task to investigate this intercommunion, with little more to guide him than the formal certainty that some forms are universally present, others less universally—in a word, that he may expect to discover any and every degree of intercommunion, from totality to zero.

In this difficulty let us, for the moment, leave the text of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* and construct, out of what we have

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learnt from the other dialogues, the general ideal theory, in order to see if it will throw any light upon the precise significance of this difficulty of the interrelatedness of the ideal qualities discovered by the dialectician.

Each and every Idea, as such, is, as we have repeatedly observed, in the first place an empirical generalization, *i.e.*, is a group of sensuous experiences so analysed and synthesized as to have become telescoped, concentrated, idealized, raised to a higher, supra-sensuous power in the form of a concept. For example, the conception of ideal bed-quality arises out of a number of empirical bed-experiences, by processes of abstraction, comparison, etc., resulting in a certain symbolization and standardization of the experiences in question, and giving us, in the 'bedness' concept, something which the mind can grasp as an intelligible unity, something elevated above the sensuous flow of consciousness, a conceptual essence or meaning, colourless, shapeless, intangible, as Plato puts it.

In this process, nothing of genuine importance has been omitted. The fluctuation, impermanence, uncertainty, and chaotic plurality of the sensuous experiences are gone, but every element of ideal quality anywhere contained in those experiences has been extracted by the dialectician and taken up into the final concept. The meaning of the sensuous experience, and the meaning expressed in the concept, are not two meanings. They are identical, with however this difference, that in the concept the meaning finds expression in a clear-cut form which can not merely be felt vaguely, as a part of the living stream of conscious experience, but, while still felt, can also be known, distinctly apprehended by the intellect, the 'pilot' of the soul.

Suppose, now, we take a second ideal quality, the Idea of comfort,¹⁴ and assume that this concept has been obtained

¹⁴This Idea is not mentioned in Plato, but is used here for illustrative purposes. The conclusions thus reached are verified by comparison with the 'virtues' which overlap in a somewhat similar way.

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from a number of empirical experiences, partly of beds, partly of chairs, partly of clothing, etc., in such a way that the bed-experiences, at any rate, are identical with the bed-experiences in the first case considered. This concept also is obtained by abstraction, comparison, etc., resulting in an intellectualized, colourless, shapeless, intangible essence, which is not merely felt as part of the living process (*erlebt*), but is also grasped distinctly by the intellect.

If we proceed to compare these two Ideas, in order to investigate, in the dialectical manner, how far they have 'intercommunion,' we discover that in a certain regard they are not different from one another, but are identical. Both arise from sensuous experiences which are analysed, synthesized, condensed and run together in such a way as to omit the fluctuation, impermanence, and uncertainty inevitably bound up with the sensuous mode of experiencing. Both retain in consistent and harmonious interrelationship within the limits of a single ideal unity, all the elements of meaning-value which could be extracted from the original, relatively more sensuous experiences. And further: this, which both have in common, is common to all Ideas without exception. One and all, they represent attempts at extracting from sensuous experience all relevant elements of meaning-value, and at interrelating these elements in such a manner as to secure harmony, consistency, unity, and the maximal development of ideal quality within the limits of the conceptual totality, the Idea, which results from these operations.

That is to say, all Ideas without exception are examples of one and the same law, the principle of Ideality, the demand that every conceptual unity, as such, shall exhibit the maximum of ideal quality which is capable of being extracted from sensuous experience and expressed in consistently organized, systematic unity. But this principle of Ideality is,

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as has been pointed out elsewhere,¹⁵ what Plato calls the Idea of Good, so that every particular Idea is a particular determination of the Idea of Good, is, on its ideal side, identical with the Idea of Good, taken, however, not universally, in its full and final sense, but as being limited by being applied to a particular, limited group of sensuous experiences.

Let us consider briefly, but more precisely, what this means. The Idea of Good is, from a logical point of view, the principle of completeness and consistency, the scientific ideal of including within one and the same consistent system every element of positive knowledge-value within experience. From the ethical and social point of view, it is the ideal of a social organism which calls out the complete development of every member, in harmony with the complete development of every other member, each contributing its all to the common good. From the metaphysical point of view, the Idea of Good is the conception of an ideal reality in which the positive significance of each element which exists is fully brought out in harmonious relationship with everything of positive significance throughout the rest of existence. It is the conception of an ideal existence consisting of the fullest and richest development of the potentialities of the universe in a single, self-supporting system, with a complete absence of conflict, waste, privation, and negation.

Let us now take a particular Idea, *e.g.*, the Idea of bedness, and compare it with the Idea of Good. The Idea of bedness represents an attempt to extract from certain sensuous experiences everything which has bed-quality, and to organize the elements so extracted into a single harmonious system, representing the complete systematic development of all relevant elements of meaning-value. That is to say, it is the principle of the Idea of Good, applied, however, not to the whole

¹⁵Cf. *Int. Jour. Ethics*, vol. xxxii, No. 2, 1922, pp. 193-5, 202-3.

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universe, but to a particular section of sensuous experience. The difference, then, between a particular Idea and the Idea of Good, is the difference between the more particular and the more universal, *i.e.*, more comprehensive and more thorough-going, application of one and the same principle, the principle of ideality. Every Idea is, then, in principle identical with the Idea of Good, the principle of ideal or ultimate reality. But, as being narrow and without comprehensiveness in its application, or as being superficial rather than profound, *i.e.*, with the process of idealization only partially carried through, as at the level of 'opinion' it falls short of being a complete expression of the ideally transmuted experience which is ultimate reality.

In the final analysis, then, there is only one Idea, the Idea of Good, the absolute or Divine Experience. But between this and the lower limit which is almost wholly sensuous, there are to be found various stages of human attempts at idealization, such as are noted in the theory of the 'four stages of intelligence' in the *Republic*. Some of these empirical generalizations at the level of opinion, are hardly to be called Ideas at all, as they are more closely related to sensuous than to intellectual experience. But they pass, by imperceptible gradations, into Ideas at the higher level of opinion or lower stage of knowledge, which is represented by the generalizations studied in the departmental sciences (*Rep.*, 533b-d, 534c). These need to be still further idealized, by abstracting from their sensuous basis and gradually making them over in accordance with the formal demand for the complete and systematic development of all that is positive in their content until they are truly permeable to intelligence and have become transformed from proximate into ultimate reality. They are then Ideas in the strict or final sense. It is with the ideal vision attained in this way, *i.e.*, with the vision of the complete

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idealization of human experience, the transmuting of all its baser elements into elements of beauty and glory, each realizing itself in its true place as related to the other elements which together make up the absolute totality, that the philosopher-guardian proceeds to make over the whole of our experience. With this vision in mind, he works into our social institutions the principle of the Idea, and elevates our experience gradually, and so far as is possible in working with an experience which retains to the last, elements of human imperfection, to the level of insight at which we become co-partners with God in the real work of the world, the full development of potentiality, and the onward march of humanity towards the progressive realization of the Idea.

We are now in a position to ask how, upon these premises, one Idea is related to another, *i.e.*, how certain sensuous processes partially idealized are related to certain other processes partially idealized, or to the same processes idealized from a different point of view, *e.g.*, how the Idea of comfort is related to the Idea of bed, or how temperance is related to courage. The answer depends primarily upon the standpoint of the questioner. From the standpoint of opinion or ordinary education, Ideas, though all admittedly ideal and thus resembling one another, are, on the whole, rather sharply distinguished from one another, and even a thinker like the Socrates of the *Parmenides* has not adequately realized the gap which separates an empirical generalization such as 'likeness,' 'unlikeness,' 'greatness,' 'smallness,' etc., from an Idea in the full sense. From this standpoint, it is assumed that each Idea is itself, and is sharply distinct from every other Idea, and it is not understood that an element of 'difference' or 'multiplicity' is retained in every such generalization. This position is not quite consistent with the belief expressed in the *Sophistes* that the Ideas 'intercommu-

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nicate', *i.e.*, that, in spite of each Idea being distinct from each other Idea, they possess certain elements in common, so as partly to overlap and coincide; for if they possess certain elements in common, they cannot possibly be quite as distinct as is assumed in the *Parmenides*. In fact, a great part of the purpose of the *Parmenides* as a dialogue appears to be, to convince 'Socrates' that in the Ideas as he understands them there is contained a fringe or margin of difference or multiplicity, analogous to the diversity and manifoldness which he recognizes as present in sensuous experience, and that accordingly, in the empirical generalizations which he accepts as complete idealizations, there is much of the contradictoriness and fluctuation which is, to his mind, as much a paradox in the ideal realm as it is a commonplace in the realm of sensation (*Parm.*, 129 ff.). That is, the truth emphasized by 'Parmenides' in this connexion is, that the Socratic 'Ideas' are not Ideas in the highest sense, not complete idealizations, but retain, in that portion of their content which has been only imperfectly abstracted from its empirical beginnings, a mass of experience which remains sensuous, unidealized, and admitting of all the logical difficulties which are freely accepted as the inevitable attributes of untransmuted sensuous experience.

At this level then, which appears to correspond to the 'third stage of intelligence,' Ideas seem to be sharply distinct from one another, and a question may well be raised as to their interrelationship, as in more modern times a conflict has been recognized between groups of experience organized under such headings as 'science' and 'religion,' or 'art' and 'morality,' or between such organizing principles as 'mechanism' and 'teleology,' and the interrelations of such pairs of Ideas have been subjected to prolonged and systematic investigation. It is, in fact, largely to this method, *viz.* of investigating the

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interrelations of such comprehensive generalizations, that the Platonic dialectician looks for success in rising out of and beyond the third stage of intelligence into the fourth, *i.e.*, to the realization that these generalizations are not complete or final idealizations, and to the discovery of the unhypothetical first principle which underlies experience in general, and especially experience as partly reorganized in these wide generalizations (*Soph.*, 253b f.).

When this final stage of philosophic insight has been reached, it becomes sufficiently clear that each Idea—*e.g.*, science, religion, art, morality, etc.—now represents the whole of philosophic insight turned in a particular direction, and it becomes plain that, whatever the direction, it is one and the same insight which is represented in each case, so that the difference and conflict which was noted at the lower stage of reflection ceases, at the higher standpoint, to have any meaning. The complete harmony in which the various aspects of experience now interpenetrate and throw light upon one another has so transformed them all, that there is now only one continuous experience. In this single experience, the different Ideas such as art, morality, etc., represent different directions of thought, different reference-points for the concentration of the whole of experience, and are related to one another as different lines of interest, with the freest possibilities of overlapping, interlacing, etc. From this higher standpoint the dialectician is made free of the whole intellectual realm of Ideas, and can pass at pleasure from any one direction of thought to any other, secure in the insight into the Idea of Good, which illumines each pathway and enables him to surmount what, at the lower stage of reflection, constituted serious obstacles for his thought, obstacles opaque and impermeable to his intelligence (*Rep.*, 511b-c, 532 ff.).

If we now proceed to inquire what, from the standpoint thus attained, is the structure of ultimate reality, we discover that

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the question has little meaning. The difficulties concerning the interrelation of Ideas which appeared distinct and opposed to one another, vanish of themselves when it is realized that such difficulties subsist only between incomplete idealizations, *i.e.*, at a stage of philosophic reflection lower than the one now reached. From the new and final standpoint, reality is envisaged as completely intellectualized, completely ideal, and consequently as possessing only the structure which belongs to the nature of the intellectualized and ideal, as such. That is to say, ultimate reality is identical with the Idea of Good, and its structural form is consequently nothing more or less than the form of organization. It is the ideal of unity-in-multiplicity applied upon the widest possible scale, *viz.*, to the whole of experience. It is the ideal of comprehensiveness and consistency, the ideal of a totality of harmoniously interpenetrating contents, the ideal of a single richness which is experience itself, raised above the sensuous to the intellectual level and completely idealized, expressed in the form of a single, all-comprehensive and all-expressive, judgement, in which every content of possible experience finds its true and final place in relation to all other possible contents, and all differences, conflicts, and oppositions which at the lower, more empirical level are so painfully apparent, are transcended. They are overcome in the transmutation effected by the new unification, the bringing of all experiences into a togetherness, an interpenetration in the name of the single supreme principle of totality (*Laws*, 903b f.).

This, then, is the Platonic view of ultimate, ideal reality. In order to make sufficiently clear its concrete application as a criterion in questions of moral evaluation, we shall follow Plato's example, and shall begin with the individual writ large, *i.e.*, with the community organized into a city-state, before passing on to consider the moral judgements of the individual

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citizen as such. The first characteristic of the ethical state which is to be noted, is its unity. Made up, as it is, of different individuals and classes, a strong natural tendency of the social group is towards disruption, towards the development of group-interests, of class-consciousness and class-legislation, expressing itself in the life of political faction which was so marked a feature of civic living in fourth-century Greece (*Laws*, 712e f., 714b ff.). Such groups, as Plato never wearies of pointing out, constitute, not one community, but a plurality of cities, related to one another by way of hostile neutrality if not of open warfare, and their notions of justice and virtue are simply unmeaning (*Rep.*, 422e f.). But disruption, in every shape and form, is 'the enemy,' and, in opposition to this state of things, the ethical community aims at true spiritual unity, in spite of the diversity of civic activities. Nay, in and through that diversity itself, it unites the members of the state in the common bonds of social service and co-operation in citizenship.

Each citizen is to realize his full potentialities. The cobbler is to make shoes and to turn himself into a better cobbler. The farmer is to cultivate the soil and make two blades of wheat grow where one grew before. The potter is to turn himself into a better potter, the weaver into a better weaver, each realizing his Idea (*Rep.*, 420d f.). But this is not to be understood in a too narrow and technical sense. The ethical community does not consist of a loose federation of diversely-interested, competing groups, of farmers concerned only in the production and sale of wheat, of carpenters concerned only with the ideals of a carpenter's trade union, etc., of manufacturers of agricultural implements concerned only with the production and sale of their specific wares, each competing against all the rest for higher wages, better working conditions, etc. On the contrary, it is only as genuinely

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interrelated, as belonging to a wider totality which unifies all its members, that the farmer, carpenter, and the rest realize their full potentialities. It is as citizens of one and the same community, as workmen who perform all that they do, in the spirit of service to the common-weal, that they participate in true co-operation, the spirit without which their highest development as farmers, carpenters, etc., is impossible. The highest civic good is a certain community of feeling, a sense of belonging together for good or ill, not a matter of cold, logical or economical calculation, but a warm, living sense of unity, such as is found in the best kind of family life (*Rep.*, 462 ff.). This is realized with peculiar clearness in the case of the guardian caste. For this is welded together by a certain morale developed by the common work, common play, common social living, and common aspirations of a select group of community leaders. But right through the commonwealth runs a bond of unity which binds together leaders and followers, the agreement, namely, as to which shall lead and which shall follow, the civic virtue of temperance or self-determination (*Rep.*, 431d f.). And throughout the whole group runs the living sense of community, of belonging together, the herd-instinct idealized into the social virtue of justice, so developed that each citizen contributes his best to the common stock, secure in the realization that each of his fellow-citizens is doing the same. This applies, not only to guardians and auxiliaries, but also to farmers, weavers, and potters (*Rep.*, 421c, 434c). All alike are linked together in spiritual brotherhood, in virtue of their habitual sense of the whole to which they belong, the ideal state in which they have their being, and to whose service they owe their full development as individual citizens.

So far as a social group exhibits the characteristics of unity and full, harmonious development of the most diverse abilities in the service of the community as a whole, we have

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a phenomenon which corresponds to the Idea of Good, *i.e.*, the ideal conception of ultimate reality. So far, on the other hand, as we have groups which exhibit diversity, as when the central ideal pursued is not the well-being of the community as a whole, but the amassing of wealth, the enjoying of sensuous pleasure, or the expressing of an anarchic sense of 'freedom'—we have a manifest falling away from the ideal. When considerable masses of citizens organize against their fellow-citizens in order to secure a disproportionate share of the wealth of the community, or when large numbers of the well-to-do refuse to regard themselves as belonging to the group as a whole and thus as bound to serve its interests, but insist that they should be 'free' to get from the service of others whatever appears to their narrow, anti-social egoism to be desirable, the community ceases, in fact, to exist. We have no longer one city, but rather a plurality of cities, not at peace among themselves, but competing for goods which they cannot enjoy in common, and riddled with conflicts, oppositions, and contradictions. Faction-torn, divided against themselves, an easy prey to assaults from without and the forces of disruption within, they lead, by clearly marked and inevitable gradations, to the last and most miserable state of any social group, complete and tyrannical despotism.

It is in some such way as this, that the Platonic view of ultimate reality can be used as a criterion or standard, by comparison with which we can decide whether a given constitution is making for unity of civic spirit, for an idealism which will develop each citizen to the full, and will bring to the community as a whole the free, ungrudging, joyous service of every citizen, or whether, on the other hand, self-seeking, the egoistic grasping after power and opportunity, the futility of party strife, and a cynical disregard of public good, is slowly but inevitably tearing the group to pieces and unfitting it to

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contribute anything free, noble, and worthy towards the onward march of humanity.

As with the state, so with the individual. Each one of us consists of a number of tendencies which are at war with one another and threaten to disrupt the personality. Along with the sense for law and order which distinguishes human beings from the other animals (*Phileb.*, 26a-b, *Laws*, 672c-d, 673d) and furnishes the basis for so much that is characteristically human in our lives—*e.g.*, art, law, morality, science—goes what Plato designates as a lawless, wild-beast element which, even in the better-regulated personalities, peers out in the dream-life, disregarding our most sacred conventions and rejoicing in trampling upon our most cherished social convictions (*Rep.*, 571b f.). This 'concupiscent element' is usually at daggers drawn with the more rational elements of our nature, seeking satisfaction for its instinctive needs with an absolute disregard for anything but the immediate satisfaction of those needs. It is especially and peculiarly opposed to the virtue of temperance or self-control, whether at the instinctive level or at the more rational levels of opinion and philosophical insight, and endeavours to convert reason itself into its minister, so as to make money which will procure satisfaction for its lawless desires, and by force and fraud to seek power in the community, in order, not only to discover means to its ends, but also to indulge its appetites with impunity (*Rep.*, 553c-d, 574 f.). Its last and final aim is to induce a self-sophistication of the reason, which poisons our religious intuitions at the source, by spreading the belief that out of the gains of systematic wrong-doing in the service of 'desire' the Gods themselves can be bribed into acquiescence (*Rep.*, 364b ff.). This spirit of materialistic self-seeking is thus a strong, lawless tendency, directly opposed to our ethical, religious, and rational impulses, and the source of a fundamental conflict in our nature.

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Into this conflict a third element of major importance may enter, the 'spirited element,' with its tendencies towards pugnacity, vigour, and 'character.' This is capable of taking sides with either party, and of acting energetically either against the concupiscent impulses or against our more rational tendencies (*Rep.*, 439d ff.). It is more naturally on the side of reason, but is liable to perversion. And even as some sort of moral organization begins to develop, all kinds of conflict tend to make their appearance. Thus the dispositions (1) towards pugnacity and (2) towards tender-mindedness, quietness, and sobriety are opposed, not only at the level of instinctive or unreflective disposition, but also at the level of opinion, *i.e.*, even after they have taken on something of the nature of the two virtues of courage and temperance (*Polit.*, 306 ff.). And finally, our intellectual nature itself, rational though it is, may be perverted so as to serve ends mutually contradictory, as with the burglar or the rascally lawyer, whose intelligence is an instrument of evil, as opposed to the philosopher-guardian, in whom it is an instrument of good (*Rep.*, 409c f., *Theaet.*, 173a-b).

Thus we see that our human nature contains a multiplicity of impulses which are at variance with one another, so that the individual is naturally and almost inevitably at war with himself, not one man but two men or more, with diverse interests and diverse characters, oscillating between different and opposed lines of conduct, unstable equilibrium personified, swaying now towards reason and philosophy, now towards poetry and the fine arts, now towards wealth and grasp of power, and now towards sensuous enjoyment, a many-sidedness scintillating and dangerous, fascinating, dazzling, peculiarly Hellenic (*Gorg.*, 491e f., *Rep.*, 557c, 561b f.).

Amid these conflicting impulses, however, there tends to arise in the individual some dominating group, some complex

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of impulses which acts together as a unit and functions as a kind of nucleus, introducing its own type of organization among the other impulses and eventually converting them all into more or less reluctant ministers to its own type of satisfaction. In certain cases, the ruling complex consists of those impulses which are concerned with the acquisition of wealth. When this complex becomes dominant in an individual, it converts every other impulse in his nature into a means for making money, or at least into something which is not a hindrance to that pursuit. Thus, in respect of the various bodily appetites, he will, of deliberate choice, satisfy only such as are indispensable for the support of life, and these too only in such ways as assist in strengthening him in his pursuit of riches. For example, so far as hunger and thirst are concerned, he will satisfy these 'necessary appetites' with plain fare such as bread, meat, and water, rather than with the costly viands sometimes seen at the rich man's table. This is partly because he shrinks from paying out money, and partly because simple food is better for his health, and leaves him free to work hard (*Rep.*, 558d f.). It must not be supposed, however, that he has no craving for tasty and expensive dishes. On the contrary, he lusts after any and every kind of satisfaction, and does not hesitate for a moment to gratify his desires, provided that someone else will pay the cost. His self-restraint is exercised only when gratification would cost him money, and his motives are entirely sordid and ignoble. Appetites which are not essential to the maintenance of life and, so far from being of assistance in money-making, are actually a source of considerable expense—these he will keep down by violent constraint, because and in so far as they contradict his dominant motive of spending nothing himself. The constraint is unreasoning, a battle between opposed lusts, between which there can be only a patched-up truce, temporary at best, as questions of virtue and reason do

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not enter into the conflict at all (*Phaedo*, 68e f., *Rep.*, 554). Again, from a civic point of view, he is entirely devoid of public spirit, and not only steadily refuses to compete for distinction and office, for fear of encouraging his own expensive appetites under the stimulus of rivalry and the struggle for civic victory (*Rep.*, 555a-b, *Laws*, 831c-d), but evades the payment of taxes, impoverishes his fellow-citizens by the practice of usury, and in general devotes his great powers of work always to profit and hoarding, making mean and petty savings, from any and every source (*Rep.*, 343d f., 555e f., *Laws*, 743b f.).

His mode of living carries with it fatal consequences. The appetites which he refuses to gratify at his own expense are, indeed, expelled for the time being, driven, as we should put it nowadays, below the threshold of consciousness. But as there is no attempt to alter or educate them, they remain beyond the threshold, craving satisfaction. Eventually they tend to become unified in virtue of their common expulsion, and thus gradually and inevitably build up a rival complex, which in the end tends to get control of the organism, and thus finally destroys the well-organized but narrow complex of parsimonious impulses. The effort at dominance on the part of the wealth-seeking impulses thus results, after a temporary ascendancy, in the creation of a powerful rival which ultimately succeeds in overthrowing it, and the individual tends to lapse into an unrestrained and chaotic satisfaction of diverse appetites, one after another, a condition which differs from the original state of the individual mainly in that the lack of restraint now tends to be deliberate (*Rep.*, 560 f.).

Let us consider, as a second example of one-sided development of character, the case in which love of 'freedom,' of lack of restraint, becomes dominant. In this case, the function of the dominant complex is the somewhat neutral one of allowing

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free play to any and every impulse without distinction. In fact, the organizing complex equates all impulses in respect of satisfaction-value (*Rep.*, 561c), and restricts its regulatory function to seeing that no one impulse, whatever its strength, succeeds in dominating the others for longer than a brief period. Like Dryden's Zimri, such an individual is an epitome of all sorts of men and is deliberately devoid of unity, everything by starts, and nothing long. First, all for music, then for gymnastic training; now he idles, now he throws himself into philosophical investigation. Now he devotes himself to public life, adopting a political or military career; now he turns trader, and worships commercial success which can be measured in cash, and displays a marked tendency to make light of the laws and of all constituted authority (*Rep.*, 561d f.).

To the individual who lives this highly sophisticated kind of life, it appears to be, not one-sided, but many-sided, as he allows free play to every side of life in turn, as chance stimulates now this interest, now that. But as it is a matter of chance rather than of rational control, and as, in the kaleidoscopic changes and alternations of interest, all tendency towards permanent organization of character is deliberately eschewed, the controlling complex gradually deteriorates in power, and the individual, thus self-weakened, falls inevitably under the dominion of some one of the 'terrible appetites' which, whatever its relative satisfaction-value, is more than equal to the other appetites in strength, and, once firmly in the saddle, is not easily unseated. Among appetites which, when once released and entirely loosed from moral and rational control, develop to such a terrible extent, Plato names sex-desire, the craving of intoxicants, and other tendencies which he classes together as definitely pathological (*Rep.*, 573a-c). The deliberate purpose of maintaining neutrality and setting free any and every impulse without distinction,

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results in its own negation. For it inevitably delivers the individual, with diminished powers of resistance, into the hands of some one of the great demons which it has succeeded in unchaining, so that the path to freedom *via* many-sidedness leads to slavery and one-sidedness after all (*Rep.*, 577d f.).

By disorganization, then, and sophistication it is not possible to realize true freedom and the development of every natural impulse. Let us proceed to consider, not complexes motivated by ambition or lust of power, which, after a brief and hectic ascendancy, similarly fall victims to the rival complexes which their one-sidedness has called into being, but the attempt at organizing character in terms of reason and virtue. The training here consists, not in violent constraint, as in the case of avarice or anarchism or ambition, but in reasoning, in appealing to the rational element inherent even in our appetites (*Rep.*, 554d). We seek to convince appetites *A, B, C, . . .* that it is to their own advantage, as appetites which seek their own satisfaction, to give up the irrational method of internecine rivalry and to substitute for this senseless and suicidal struggle a consistent attempt at rational co-operation, at the development of a harmonious life-ideal, and so to find room for every impulse which tends to create and enrich a comprehensive personality. Where an appetite needs to be restrained in the interest of the totality of which it thus forms a part, it is possible to appeal to our sense of the part-whole relationship (*Laws*, 903b), and thus to persuade an appetite that it is to its own interest to accept and impose upon itself a certain degree of restraint. This kind of training not only welds together our various impulses in harmonious co-operation, but welds them together in terms of the rational element which is common to all of them and considers what is, upon the whole, for the advantage of each. In a life-ideal so formed, not only is there no permanent conflict of interests,

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but the rational element rules, and rules over willing subjects, which are themselves rationalized and fully taken up into the strongly organized rational personality which represents their ideal result.

Their union thus constitutes, not a loosely organized federation of interests essentially competitive, a union external and liable on any occasion to disrupt and lapse into open conflict, but an inner spiritual unity, in which each element, originally separate to some extent, has grown together with the others into a single closely organized nature, which acts as one, feels and thinks as one, and *is* a genuine, living, spiritual unity (*Rep.*, 462c-d). Each of the elements originally separate, with a separateness capable of accentuation in the competitive struggle and one-sided development described above, comes to lose its one-sidedness and exclusiveness, and takes on something of the nature of the other elements which are all growing together in the interest of the personality as a whole. An instinctive impulse, originally capable of developing into a 'terrible appetite,' if it co-operates with the other impulses in rational living, becomes transmuted into an organic portion of the forces which are gradually building up a strong personality fit to take its part in the onward march of humanity and thus to reflect the nature of the ideal which is by these means being realized.

In this transmuted form, it is precisely in the higher type of personality, so organized upon ethical and spiritual principles as to take on the nature of ideal reality, that every human impulse and appetite comes to realize its own highest potentialities, and thus attains to true inward freedom. The organization which develops by taking up into itself what is of positive value in every element in our nature, is not something which acquires an external and temporary ascendancy at the expense of creating some rival complex which will

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eventually conquer and enslave it. On the contrary, it grows stronger, more liberal and free, more permanent and assured, with each forward step it takes towards realizing the ideal, until at last each element has freely contributed its best and highest towards building up the personality of the philosopher-king, the strongest and most valuable personality possible for a human being, which reflects the whole value-experience of the race in its long upward struggle, and worthily assumes the position of leadership in the community.

The development of a personality of this type is definitely to be regarded as a gradual approximation to the nature of ultimate, ideal reality. This may be clearly seen in two ways. In the first place, as representing the utmost possible development of the potentialities of the individual thus harmoniously attuned to social service, it approximates to the nature of the Idea as such, to the Idea of Good which constitutes ideal reality. In the second place, a study of the genesis of the highest type of character from birth to the age of fifty sufficiently shows how the natural organism gradually becomes responsive to the Ideas of courage, temperance, justice, beauty, holiness, and wisdom. By taking these up into its nature, it furnishes a human habitation for the highest Ideas, and then fills in the outlines under the influence of the best literature, art, science, philosophy, and religion. Literature depicts in worthy form the noblest traditions of the race, while art in general fosters the growth of insight into the ideal which everywhere underlies the actual, and thus transforms our sensuous experience into the symbolic apprehension of the highest realities (*Phaedr.*, 249e f.). It possesses the further function of training our habits of feeling and thinking along the noblest lines until the ideal has sunk into the inmost recesses of our being (*Rep.*, 376e, 396c f., 399, *Laws*, 814e ff.). Science disengages the intelligence from its sensuous envelope

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and prepares it to traverse the intellectual realm of Ideas from one end to the other (*Rep.*, 533b f.). Philosophy enables the trained scientist and dialectician to raise his intellectual vision to the contemplation of the Idea of Good itself; and finally religion enables the living spirit of man to realize its kinship with the living Spirit which is the universal ideal, the God and Father of all, and, in the illumination which comes of this fusion of living faith and knowledge, to live the new life of assured blessedness, the peace and joy (*eudaimonia*) which come to those who have found their true and assured place in the bosom of reality, as co-workers with their divine Archetype.

The development of a personality of this type represents, then, an approximation to ideal reality. Other types of personality, which exhibit the dominance of some particular impulse-complex, such as the thirst for wealth or honour or power, appear, in the light of this comparison, as one-sided perversions, tragically beside the point. So also the entirely mistaken endeavour to be just to every natural impulse by equating the claims upon our good-will of each and every desire, and permitting each impulse to dominate in turn, as chance stimulates it into activity, giving up all positive attempt at central guidance and control,¹⁶ represents a distinct falling away from the ideal. For in these cases, in place of completeness, we have one-sidedness, overdevelopment here, underdevelopment there. In place of harmony, we have discord open or concealed, culminating in the futility of self-contradiction. In place of steady, forward growth, we have a period of ascendancy followed by conflict, disruption, and the ascendancy of some rival complex. In place of peace and joy we have uneasiness, scheming, unrestrained savagery in

¹⁶The negative kind of control remains, consisting in not permitting any one impulse to encroach too long upon the 'equal' rights of other equally egoistic impulses (*Rep.*, 561b f.).

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victory and abject fear in defeat. Of these one-sided tendencies, some are more orderly, more organized than others, and thus come nearer to the ideal. Others are more definitely weak, more obviously a prey to the blind forces of chaos, and are thus further removed from the ideal.

The consideration of such comparisons indicates with sufficient clearness how the conception of ideal or ultimate reality in Platonism is used as a criterion or standard, by which to test the value of the individual personality (*Rep.*, 472c-d, 498e f.). It remains to make clear how the conception is used in moral judgement generally, and thus to discover upon what the metaphysical validity of moral judgements, in general, depends.

Moral judgement consists in asking, in the case of a character or an action presented for evaluation, how far does it approximate to this ideal standard? That is, does the action in question do full justice to the situation, does it bring out the maximal positive harmonious development of the organism in the service of the wider social and physical whole of which the organism constitutes a portion (*Laws*, 903b f.)? That is to say, does the action or character in question, as a microcosm, reproduce the structure of the ideal macrocosm which is reality? So far as it does, the action under consideration approximates to the ideal and is judged to be morally valuable. So far, on the other hand, as it exhibits looseness of organization, onesidedness, contradiction, tendencies towards disruption and anarchy, it fails to exhibit the essential characteristics of the Idea, and is judged to be morally inferior, out of touch with the ideal reality of things.

So much for the technical nature of moral judgement. But if we are to penetrate to Plato's full meaning, we must look deeper, and realize that a moral judgement is always the decision of the moral judge. Not any and every person is

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capable, immediately and without a long process of development, of applying the moral standard in a way which will be valid. The moral judge,¹⁷ ideally speaking, is always understood by Plato to be a person born and trained under ideal moral, social, physical, and intellectual conditions. His training gives him the mental and moral outlook of the finished administrator and dialectician, with a personality which adequately reflects the ideal nature of ultimate reality, so far as this is possible for a human being with the mechanism provided by the normal animal organism. The judgement of such a personality sums up all that has gone into his training, and thus represents the concentration, upon the point at issue, of the whole of human experience, organized and refined, idealized and transmuted, until it approximates to the judgement of God. Such an individual realizes fully his own kinship with reality, and appreciates the spiritual significance of reality with every fibre of his being. His judgement is thus no external, coldly intellectual comparison between (a) a formal statement of the nature of the moral ideal and (b) an action or character submitted for judicial investigation, for an investigation which would take the form of cold intellectual analysis, methodical and complete, unsparingly impersonal. On the contrary, his judgement represents, so far as humanly possible, the warm personal appraisal of the action or character in the light of a complete experience, an experience which is not technically narrow or amateurishly superficial, not merely sensuous or emotional, not merely intellectual, but broad and deep as humanity itself. And it is not merely comprehensive. It is an organized spiritual experience, as completely unified as may be, and reflects in its judgements the judgement of humanity as a whole, at its highest and best, in an idealized form which approximates to the living

¹⁷For detailed study of the evidence upon which these conclusions rest, see Lodge, *Int. Jour Ethics*, vol. xxxi, No. 1, 1920.

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Standard of value, the Supreme Ideal of Experience which we designate as Absolute, as God.

We should now be in a position to sum up the result of our investigations and give a sufficiently clear and definite answer to the question which furnished our problem. Our question was, given the diversity of moral opinions, and given the demand that comparison with the nature of reality shall decide as to the validity of these opinions, upon what does the validity of the specifically Platonic theory of reality and of its application to questions of moral value depend? To answer this question we shall re-state the results of our inquiries in two forms, (1) starting from the empirical, human side, and (2) starting from the transcendent, absolute side, so as to make our answer as clear, concrete, and adequate as possible.

On the empirical side, every human judgement represents the concentration, upon some subject of interest, of the relevant experiences of the individual. Experience concentrated in intellectual form is generalization, *i.e.*, a certain stage in the development of what Plato calls an Idea. Judgement is thus the study of some subject of discourse in the light of an Idea, *i.e.*, of the experience of the individual concentrated and raised to the intellectual level which omits the fluctuation, vagueness, etc., of sensation and emotion, but retains the full conceptual essence of the experience in question. A moral judgement thus always represents the acceptance or rejection of some proposed action, or other object of moral approval or disapproval, in the light of the idealized experience of the individual judging. The Idea used in moral judgement is thus never a cold, bloodless category, but always the full, living experience of a personality.

Moral judgements on one and the same issue differ, according as the idealized experiences of different individuals

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differ, or possibly as a single individual makes a hasty, superficial judgement, instead of bringing to bear, in condensed form, *all* that is of significance in his relevant experiences. Empirical, reflective comparison of such differing judgements in respect of their strong, as well as of their weak points, gives rise to the ideal of an experience which shall be comprehensive and adequately concentrated rather than superficial. For example, an experience which could sum up the history of humanity and be representative of the sum of human wisdom would be wider, more comprehensive than the hasty judgement of the moment, and also more profound, more highly concentrated, more nearly expressive of the nature of the Idea.

When we further remember that, for Plato, all experience is experience-of-reality,¹⁸ we appreciate the Platonic position that reality enters into our experience in more certain and unmistakable form, according as we leave the hasty, superficial, fluctuating and vague level of sensuous and emotional experience, and enter into the more concentrated, higher reaches of experience which are expressed as Ideas apprehended by reason. Reality enters into all our experiences, even the most superficial. But it enters more comprehensively and more profoundly, when that experience has been purified of irrelevant and misleading elements, and raised more nearly to the ideal level which expresses adequately the nature of reality. In its most ideal form, we think of experience as being fully responsive to reality, pulsating with the pulse of reality, in the closest and most intimate interactivity.

So far, then, as reality is in this way taken up into our experience, it follows that it is reality itself which passes judgement, accepts or rejects proposed courses of action, etc.

¹⁸For discussion of the evidence, see *Int. Jour. Ethics*, vol. XXXII, No. 2, pp. 200 ff.

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So far as our experience, in the light of which we judge, has become widened and deepened, idealized until it takes on something of the character of Absolute, Ideal Experience, the moral judgements which we pass express the final nature of reality, the knowledge and wisdom of God, and are metaphysically satisfactory. Elevated as such an ideal is, concerning its concrete and empirical, human *status* there can be no doubt, as no item in its content is other than strictly a matter of human experience.

Let us now approach the question from the more transcendental side. Absolute or ultimate reality is regarded by Plato as God or the Idea of Good, the living essence of ideality and value, the supreme pattern of the ideal world, an ideal expressed in determinate and limited form in every concrete Idea and ideal, but not, of course, exhausted in any one such determination. From the transcendental standpoint, each Idea is itself absolute, *i.e.*, represents the concentration, in a single determinate direction, of the whole, completely organized, absolute Experience, experience organized to infinity. We can obtain a symbolic conception of what is meant, if we compare various human Ideas with the absolute Idea representing the 'judgement of Zeus.' Consider, *e.g.*, the concept of a city. Human concepts, derived from our limited and imperfectly organized experiences of cities, represent the civic idea as a balance of diverse interests, held together by common needs, common fears, and a strong government. Such government we regard as representing powerful interests, and as furnishing, in its great opportunities for self-aggrandizement, an object of envy to all would-be supernien (*Gorg.*, 466b, 468e, *Rep.*, 344, etc.). In such a community political faction, organized continuous group struggles, in addition to sporadic individual efforts to obtain the chief power, may well appear inevitable. A certain amount of

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crime, a great deal of futile, energy-consuming and time-wasting conflict, endless misunderstanding, hatred, and malice, seem inextricably bound up with such an existence. With concrete knowledge of actual constitutions, such as the Spartan, Theban, Athenian, and Cretan, it is possible, after comparison, to work out the main lines of an 'ideal constitution.' If we imagined the whole experience of the human race concentrated and brought to bear upon the problem in idealized form, the result would presumably be more satisfactory. But even in that case, there would still arise before the eye of the soul a formal demand for something yet more satisfactory, for something which should do more than approximate to the ideal, a demand for the ideal itself. Such a final ideal, representing the judgement of ideal Omniscience, is what is understood by the absolute or transcendental Idea, the Idea of the City which is 'laid up in heaven.'¹⁹ The absolute Idea, then, in every case, is the Idea of Good, the living principle of absolute value, in some especial and particular reference, and thus furnishes inevitably a final and absolute standard, a highest and last court of appeal for judgements which involve reference to ideals.

It is misleading to regard the individual absolute Idea as 'a thought in the mind of God.' Such a formula is at once too narrow and too subjective. To adopt the language of the formula, God's Mind does not, for Platonism, consist of a plurality of thoughts. It is one thought, supremely complex but also supremely organized, supremely one. Each Idea, the Idea of bed or of city, for instance, taken in the absolute sense is the whole of God's Mind. That is why it is theoretically possible for the finished dialectician to pass from one Idea to another, once he has, by adequate contemplation of the Idea

¹⁹In *Rep.*, 592 this distinction is not applied to the ideal city, but the distinction is indicated frequently in the Dialogues, e.g., *Parm.*, 133b ff., *Tim.*, 28e f., etc.

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of Good, become free of the whole intellectual realm. But the formula is not only too narrow. It is also too subjective. A Platonic Idea is never a mere thought. It is objective reality, entering into and giving significance to the mental processes of sifting, comparing, concentrating, etc., which have resulted in the human generalization (*Phaedr.*, 249b, *Polit.*, 277e f.) which corresponds to the Idea. But the Idea itself, absolutely regarded, is reality in its own living essence, supreme reality, the *ens realissimum*, an entity which has, indeed, full cognitive quality, but is far more than merely cognitive. It is fully spiritual and also fully objective, real in the realest sense conceivable. It is the ideal element in existence, and indeed may be said to transcend existence, being, as it is, the supreme essence, of which existence is a more or less empirical copy (*Rep.*, 509c, *Tim.*, 27e ff.). As such, it constitutes, always and inevitably, the final pattern to which a judgement wishing to be of objective significance, in spiritual contact with reality, will seek to conform and assimilate itself. When, therefore, the philosopher-guardian, with a personality which has been developed until it presents a human analogon to the Divine Personality, passes moral judgement in the form of laws establishing civic, judicial, and educational institutions, it is ultimately the Divine Personality, that final reality to which he has gradually made every fibre of his being, flesh, sinews, heart, and brain, organically responsive, which is passing judgement, and, through the instrumentality of his legislative activities, passes over into the world of concrete human institutions, the empirical realities of our social living.

Upon what does the validity of this view rest? Its first appeal is to experience, ordinary, human experience, and it cannot be denied that the appeal is upheld, not only by our hopes, but also by the evidence of our senses in actual, every-day experiencing. We try, each one of us, to make

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sense of life by generalizing, by comparing and abstracting the more universal elements in our experience and regarding these as more fundamental, more essential, more trustworthy guides to action than the fluctuating sensations and emotions of the moment. We see in experience the working of general, universal laws and principles, and the only hope we have of making life better, setting it upon a more secure basis, is in the scientific manipulation of our experiences, the methodical sifting which results in verifying and substantiating our tentative hypotheses about the nature of these fundamental, universal, permanent aspects of experience. The hope that by such investigation we are gradually coming into closer contact with reality, and learning to take up reality into our lives to a greater degree than without such inquiries, is amply substantiated by the appeal to experience. This becomes plain, not only if we reflect upon our own individual sensuous experiences, but even more clearly if we glance at the history of scientific discovery within the last three generations. The improved means of transportation, of lighting, of mechanical power, of intercommunication, and also of destruction, which have resulted from scientific investigation of the more universal elements in human experience, have transformed, and are in process of transforming the daily lives of each one of us, affecting us, as they do, at so many points, economic, social, religious, moral, that human living has become infinitely more complex. It has become vastly more able to develop its resources and hidden potentialities, so as to be able to devote the results to the enrichment of humanity and the forward march of the civilized nations of the world. It is true that the moral, political, and religious development still lags behind the more technical advances; for these depend upon the use of discoveries which have been made, for the most part, not by ourselves, but by a very few outstanding individuals. It is, however, to be supposed that improvements

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in general education will follow which, in their turn, will also develop these potentialities for civilization, for better social living, to the utmost. The appeal to every-day, sensuous and emotional experience, then, largely supports the Platonic contention.

The second appeal is to logic, *i.e.*, to experience, no longer accepted at the sensuous level, but refined, standardized, formalized and raised to a level which admits of intellectual proof and disproof, a level at which inconsistencies can hardly remain hidden from the scrutiny of the trained investigator. Here also the appeal is evidently upheld. The identity in principle between all actual stages of human generalization on the one hand, and the ideal of generalization on the other, is sufficiently evident. The ideal is to extract from the experiences generalized every element of positive content, and so to synthesize these elements in relation to each other that they come to constitute a true, harmonious unity, in which each element supports and is supported by each other element, all working in one and the same direction, the direction of that totality which they help to form. The Idea of Good, the aspirations of humanity, and the generalizations from sensuous experience, from the highest to the lowest, are logically akin, and are clearly recognized as such by the Platonic dialectician.²⁰ From the logical standpoint, then, as well as from the standpoint of sensuous experience, the Platonic metaphysics of morals appears to be justified.

One difficulty remains, a difficulty clearly and sharply emphasized by Plato himself. Human logic, after all, is itself only generalized experience, and between (*a*) the ideals constructed by our intelligence in conformity with logical standards, out of the materials with which we first become acquainted in sensuous perception, ideals which inevitably

²⁰For references, and a discussion of their significance, see *Int. Jour. Ethics*, vol. XXXII, No. 2, 1922, pp. 193-199.

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retain a certain empirical tincture, and (b) the absolute Ideas which Platonism conceives as constituting the essence of ultimate reality, a reality which lies partly within, and partly beyond our narrow human experience, there is a certain hiatus. So far as reality enters into our experience, both sensuous and logical, we can deal with it in a way which, from the human standpoint, is satisfactory enough. But the absolute Idea which furnishes, as we have seen, the last and highest court of appeal, the ideal Experience which we conceive under the form of God, the Father of all, transcends our experience, even at its best and deepest. Our experience enters into the ideal Experience and draws from it whatever significance our human thought and life come to possess; but it does not, and cannot exhaust the significance of the ideal Experience. The absolute ideal, on the one hand, and its highest reflection in idealized human experience, on the other, remain, in the last resort, disparate (*Rep.*, 472b f., 508e f., 517b-c, *Parm.*, 133b f.).

It is the recognition of this which makes the philosopher, at times, tend to despair of his task, the task of embodying the Idea in human institutions. He has himself a correct grasp of the Idea, correct, *i.e.*, so far as it goes. But while formally correct, it is, and can be, correct in content only as far as the content of human experience reaches, and this has not, he seems to think, reached far enough. Our modern sense of the value of evolution, and our expectation of indefinite progress, of indefinite development in approximating to the Idea, of building up a science and a civilization which shall know no final limitations, makes us still, in the main, hopeful. But Plato himself has not our historical perspective and our faith in the continuity of historical progress. He seems rather to think that the highest points are reached by a few highly trained individuals in each generation, and cannot be passed in subsequent generations. Of that continuity,

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whereby later generations can so build upon the heritage of the past as to advance still further, he appears to have no real sense. He therefore tends, at times, to despair and to magnify the importance of the gap which, no doubt, exists and has never yet been completely bridged.

Containing, however, as it does, an at least sufficient admission of the existence of this gap between the humanly realizable and the nature of the absolute Idea, an adequate recognition of the substantial identity of human generalization and the fundamental nature of reality, and an insistence that only by founding our thinking and acting upon this reality in methodic, scientific fashion can the highest moral development of the potentialities of humanity be attained—this view, the Platonic metaphysic of morals, must be regarded as satisfying, not only our aspirations, nor merely our logic, but also our every-day experience, sensuous, emotional, and practical. That is to say, from every standpoint which seems legitimate and relevant, his theory appears to be, fundamentally and in principle, valid.

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE.

PLATO AND THE POET'S ΕΙΔΩΛΑ.

λόγος ἔργου σκινή.

* Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς
ῥηθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διάνοιαν εἰδυῖαν τὸ
ἀληθές ὧν ἂν ἐρεῖν πέρι μελλῆ;

Phaedrus, 259e.

I.

In the tenth Book of the *Republic* the poet who imitates is said to produce images or εἶδωλα, and Plato excludes him from the commonwealth. What are these images, and what was the precise ground for this 'outing' of the poets? Plato's arguments have, I believe, suffered in the interpretation from two sets of barely relevant considerations. On the one hand his criticism is softened down by the suggestion that the bad poets of his day and the unstable emotions of Athenian contemporaries were his real quarry.¹ Though it is true that the *θεατροκρατία* was in his eyes a burden and a danger², he legislates here for the Kallipolis, not *in faece Thesei*; and he strikes full on the shield of the greatest poets, with regret and compunction indeed, but driven by the necessity³ of the law-giver to safeguard his flock. His severity here cannot be offset by the fact that he permits the guardian children to hear poetry; still less is it relevant to suggest that the two discussions of poetry are so inconsistent with one another as to belong to different editions. Why should a thinker and artist be less stringent with himself in his second draft than in his first? In the earlier books existing poetry, duly purged, was an instrument for humanizing the young, in whom reason

¹This is contradicted by *Rep.*, 605d and 599a.

²*Laws*, 701a.

³*Laws*, 660a.

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was not yet the master, under the direction of an *ἐπιστάτης*. But was poetry, was the stage, free from the control of the lawgiver, an equally valuable instrument for moulding and directing the opinions of men? Or was it not, after the democratic man and the tyrant had given place to the philosopher-king, his chief and most insidious rival? Reason ruled the ideal state; but here within its very bosom remained an incalculable force that might share or dispute with the guardians the leadership of opinion. The seeds of instability and decline would still be active in the perfect community, a threat to the authority of the law. After the psychological discussion in Book IV, where *ὁμοδοξία* of the various elements in man is stated to be the ideal, Plato sets out to discuss the four vices that divide and ruin man and the state, but postpones the argument till he has described the nature and training of the guardians. These four perversions dismissed in Books VIII and IX, he again casts off from Book IV to deal with the remaining menace that threatens even the aristocratic state from within. If we are to understand the trend of Plato's argument, we must bear in mind the competition of poetry with law.

Here emerges the second line of interpretation, which is not, I think, relevant to Plato's thesis. Does he sketch a *Poetics* in Book X, hinting at the true nature of the art? It is tempting for a modern, who would fain have so great an artist think more nobly of art, to see in Plato's argument less the precautions of a lawgiver than an account of the reasons why poetry is autonomous. Typically, such a vindication would take the form of showing that poetry has a sphere of its own, its own rightness (*ὀρθότης*), and its own special objects. The poet's state would be identified with the elusive *εἰκασία* of the Line—do not both deal with images?—and the state of the carpenter who is compared with him

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would be *πίστις*. It is then but a step, though a long step, to infer, as some have done, that the very elementary description of the form in Book X covers *both* the higher sections of the Line. So in the account of the poet's 'making' one may, though with difficulty, discern the outlines of the cognitive processes that are believed to be described in the analogy of the Line.

By far the most interesting theory of *εἰκασία* and of the poet's mind has recently been advanced by Mr. H. J. Paton.⁴ He argues (1) that the states in the Line are defined by their objects and their functions; (2) that *εἰκασία* is a faculty of images, covering not only the natural images named in the Line, but dreams, day-dreams, hallucinations, the high dreams of the artist, and finally 'appearances'; (3) that *εἰκασία* is 'the first ingenuous and intuitive vision of the real', which makes no distinction between the different levels of reality. 'It is cognitive and has an object, but it does not affirm or deny: that is, it does not claim to be true. Truth and Falsehood, Reality and Unreality, Fact and Fiction, these are distinctions which have not yet arisen.' It may be called 'Imagination or the cognition of images, or again Intuition or the mere looking at objects.'⁵ Once the character of *εἰκασία* is established, it can be said that 'there are no limits to the objects of art except that Art is satisfied with making clear a mere appearance or shadow and does not ask about its truth or reality.'⁶

This view differs from others with the same presuppositions by its bold account of the differentia of *εἰκασία*, an account at once attractive and suspect because of its affinities with modern aesthetic theory. It is clear that a special interpretation of Book X is fundamental for *εἰκασία* so conceived, and

⁴*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1921-2, pp. 69-104.

⁵*op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁶*op. cit.*, p. 101.

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that it stands or falls by the justifiability of making images into a single homogeneous class, and then extending the class to include all 'appearances.' One difficulty in interpreting Plato is that, in the absence of the fixed sign-posts of a technical vocabulary, we must trust to the trend of the argument itself to save us from specious parallels. The difficulty is less that he uses different words for the same thing out of his abundance than that the same word may apply to different things, just as the context demands. Now the attempt to assimilate the account of the poet and the carpenter to the Line rests, I shall argue, on such superficial verbal similarities. Both places deal with images; both with *πίστις*. But to identify them is to confuse different logical categories and to give the argument in Book X a turn that obscures its individuality. The case for a faculty of *εἰκασία* depends upon a fusion into one category of the very varied senses of *image* and *dream*, senses literal and metaphorical, that occur in Plato. If, for example, it is said, 'the *φιλοθεάμων* is a dreamer', this may be taken as a metaphysical statement or an implied comparison. If it is a comparison, then the only point at stake is why Plato, in this specific context, says that the lover of sights is *like* a dreamer. If it is taken as metaphysical statement, then both are supposed to be at one level of apprehension; a formula for the level must be devised; apparently similar objects will accumulate within the class and the *δύναμις* over them will insensibly change as the probability that other objects fall under it increases. Is it more feasible to make a metaphysical category of Plato's images and dreams than to form flowers of rhetoric into a botanical order?

But there is one sense of *image*, or rather image-making, that has a definite meaning in Plato. It is a fixed metaphor for certain human activities at the level of opinion, and this

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fact, if used with precaution, will help us to interpret the state of the poet. My thesis will be that Plato does not here, even by implication, admit the autonomy of the poet's insight. He is concerned, as a lawgiver, with its instability, and places it, like the rhetorician's and sophist's art, low in the scale of truth and practice. The argument in Book X really turns on one point, the right of the poet to guide opinion. This is a matter of the truth or falsehood of his opinions. It is a subtle fallacy to suggest that the poet's vision being far from truth is equally far from falsehood. Plato does not allow the claim that the poet is removed from the jurisdiction of truth; he but places him with other enchanter's far from her throne.

As it is argued that one power [*δύναμις*] differs from another according to its different objects and different function — ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ δ' ἀπεργάζεται, it will be convenient to begin by asking whether Plato indeed recognizes a class of images and dreams so uniform in character that one power can exercise its single *function*—the important test—over them. Have *εἰκόνες*, *εἰδῶλα*, *φαντάσματα*, *φαινόμενα* much more in common than *spectres*, *spectra*, and *spectacles*? Until it has been established that the objects are used in the same sense and with the same purpose (their relation to a special function of cognition), it may be fallacious to reason from them to a *δύναμις*, and then through its supposed function to still other objects. As we may even question whether Plato took the metaphysical status of images, as such, seriously,⁸ it

⁷Paton, p. 70.

⁸When Mr. Paton (p. 69) rightly criticizes Dr. Shorey for asserting that in the Line *εἰκασία* and *εἰκόνες* are playfully thrown in for the sake of symmetry, and then (p. 77) proceeds to show that *εἰκόνες* have metaphysical importance by adding largely to the original natural images, does he not really share Dr. Shorey's assumption: that they possess cognitive significance or are insignificant? The real question is why Plato mentioned only images cast by the sun.

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is better to begin with the mark of every image—its relation to an original.

Things either have their own essence to themselves or are relative to something else. An image is such a relative, because it is of another, its like, not of itself or having its own essence to itself.⁹ Plato's use of this relation, both literal and figurative, is as wide as the relation of any ultimate or superior thing or system to its derivative and inferior. But the relation may differ according to the nature of the image, or according to the use made of it.

Since an image is *of* its original, it is a sign of that original, other but like. The good image is thus a clue to the thing itself, which it copies. This is a convenient metaphor to express the relation of any dependent to that on which it is modelled (e.g., space or a sensible thing)¹⁰ or the attitude of a man who stops short of more complete experience, like the mathematician or the φιλοθεάμων.¹¹ (Plato also frequently uses the metaphor of dreaming to express such an incomplete grasp of reality). But even when *image* appears to be used literally, as of natural reflections, it may still be an explicit symbol, its relation to its original representing a parallel relation between the things to which both are said to be an analogy. This I believe to be true of εἰκασία, which is simply analogous to διάνοια, so that when the mathematician is later said to grasp at an image Plato repeats in metaphor what he has already stated formally in symbol. If this is true, there is no starting point for a theory of εἰκασία. However that may be, *image*, because of the suggestiveness of its rela-

⁹*Tim.*, 52c and *Rep.*, 438d. See Cook Wilson, *On the Interpretation of the Timaeus*, pp. 107-10.

¹⁰*Tim.*, 52b; *Parm.*, 133d (ὁμοίωμα).

¹¹*Rep.*, 534c and 476c.

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tion to the original, constantly enters into another relation, figurative or analogical, so that it then achieves only what we may call an adjectival status, illustrative, not real.

We have seen that through the limitation or fault of the user, the image may be made a *substitute* for its original, so that it appears, contrary to its nature, to have an essence all to itself. But an image may be designed by men to have that effect. It may be a deceptive fabrication, formed to supplant its real original. Here we touch the multifarious arts of image-making (*εἰδωλοποιϊκή*), which are fundamental to the understanding of Book X. The arts, or rather *ἐμπειρίαι*, of rhetoric, sophistry, politics, and—must we not add?—poetry, profess universal competence without knowledge of the things they deal with. When Plato investigates their claim to guide opinion, he treats them as *arts of production*, and asks what kind of product they make. These look *as if* they were true, semblances of truth rather than resemblances, and Plato calls them *εἶδωλα* because they are unsound and deceptive, and their makers enchanters and magicians. This metaphor is used of all for the same reason. Such arts produce misleading opinions, which are the *counterfeits* of knowledge, driving out the genuine coinage. It is sufficient to note at present that imitation too produces *εἶδωλα*, which may be true copies (as when a word is made with knowledge of the thing) or illusive semblances like the poet's images.

After this general account of *image*, let us examine some particular passages that, taken together, appear to bear upon the poet's images and dreams. They are said to be the similes of the Line and Cave, and certain places in the *Sophist*. As I have already argued at length that the similes have been misinterpreted and that *εἰκασία* and *πίστις* are purely an

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analogy illustrating the respective clearness of the propaedeutic education and the dialectic, the same ground need not be traversed again.¹² But it is instructive to observe the difficulties that Mr. Paton faces upon his assumption that the state of the prisoners in the cave is *εἰκασία*, and that *εἰκασία* is intuition or imagination.

¹²*Plato's Simile of Light: Part I, The Similes of the Sun and the Line, Classical Quarterly*, vol. xv, pp. 131-152, 1921; *Part II, The Allegory of the Cave, ibid.*, vol. xvi, pp. 15-28, 1922.

It may be convenient to outline the reasons why *εἰκασία* cannot be the poet's state. In the Line and Cave the crucial test is that Plato mentions no images but those created by light, because they alone serve the specific purpose of the analogies. The core of the allegory of the Cave is the striking opposition between the shadow-play made by the fire, a human device, and the divine *θεωρία* in the sunlight. The shadow-play is the whole world of the prisoners, all that they believe and admire and seek (515c). It is but an unnatural substitute for reality, produced by the *εἶδωλα* of the showmen and warping those who believe in it. These prisoners are 'turned the wrong way and look where they ought not to look' (518d). The whole mechanism of the cave is designed *by men* to produce shadows or images, and it may be described as the place where wisdom and arts are directed *πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων* (533b, cf. 493b). A conflict is needed to rescue the prisoners from the whole atmosphere of the cave, and then in a changed light, the sunlight that represents truth (532b), they enter on the path to the Good in place of the apparent goods of the cave (e.g., 520c-d, 521a). They have passed from a factory of *εἶδωλα* to a divine *θεωρία*, the knowledge of the forms, and the stages of their intellectual progress, represented by natural shadows and their originals, are the propaedeutic and the dialectic. Few will deny that the lights and objects are just as much symbols as the warped bodies are symbols of diseased souls. Now the shadows and originals of the Line are identical with those *outside* the cave, and the ratio of the Line tells us precisely what we wanted to be sure of, that the intellectual means of rescue from the cave (after what we may call the protreptic of the rescuer) is mathematics and then dialectic. This gives the unmistakable reason why none but natural images are mentioned in the Line. They are purely illustrative of *διάνοια*, and they depend on sunlight because the simile of the Sun, itself a simile of light, made the sunlight the symbol of truth and more obscure light the symbol of opinion. The Line simply says: as gazing at natural images of things is less clear than seeing their originals directly, so the method of mathematics is less clear than that of dialectic; that appears to be Glaucon's interpretation (511c), and there is no mention of any other purpose. If this is so, Plato never contemplates four 'grades of intelligence' or 'faculties of objects' with objects corresponding to them. *Εἰκασία* is not a 'faculty',

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The allegory of the cave is said to appear to 'suggest that most men are always in *εἰκασία*',¹³ and Mr. Paton allows that this can hardly be so, since 'all men do go behind appearances to actual animals, plants and manufactured things and are, therefore, in *πίστις*'. Setting aside the assumption that a separate faculty is attached to animals, etc. (since *πίστις* here is simply the certainty of direct vision), surely it is true that the prisoners are in a state of mere *δόξα*. The reason why they must be rescued, if at all, by arduous effort is that they believe their shadow-play to be *true*, truer than anything else.¹⁴ Again it is suggested that when the prisoners 'not merely look at present appearances, but remember past appearances and guess at future ones', this is consistent with the theory that they are in *εἰκασία* 'if Plato means a mere pleasant exercise of the imagination about what may happen in the future', but that 'if it involves any claim to truth, it is really *πίστις* and we must put it down to the difficulty of making an allegory exact.' But the rewards and honours of the cave are sought and won

but a nonce-word with no metaphysical significance—'specular' or indirect vision—and *πίστις* is 'immediate or direct vision.' The one is 'speculation', the other certainty. It is then as little possible to fuse the shadows of the fire with the shadows and reflections in the Line as it would be to fuse them with the *same* suncast shadows and reflections outside the cave. Neither is a real class of objects, and each symbolizes different things. Consequently *εἰκασία* has no metaphysical status; it cannot be identified with the state of the prisoners or the state of the poet. If we must define it as a *δύναμις*, we must see in it, not a real faculty of objects, but the *δύναμις* of sight which, contemplating natural images, 'imitates' the *δύναμις* of *διάνοια* contemplating mathematical objects (532a).

¹³Paton, pp. 100-1.

¹⁴*Rep.*, 515d; in 516a τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ is contrasted by implication with τὰ τότε λεγ. ἀληθῆ (cf. 515c); 'κεῖνά τε δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκεῖνως ζῆν (516d)—a life of *δόξα*. But the decisive argument is the whole spirit of the allegory.

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by him who 'observes most acutely'¹⁵; this is the language of a political allegory, where the honours and the spoils are seized by the practical successful statesman—the Cleon who prophesies what will happen if *he* goes to Sphacteria—to the exclusion of him who knows the Good.¹⁶ This allusion to the standards of the ecclesia—no place for pleasant imaginings—is consistent with Plato's reference to contentings in the law-courts. It is, however, suggested that the latter are perhaps 'the purely imaginative pictures drawn by rhetoricians and politicians not so much from a desire to mislead—that would be mere lying—but from a desire to please and to work on the emotions of the Great Beast.' Is this consistent with Plato's well-defined doctrine? His count against the men of the courts as against the men of the ecclesia and the theatre¹⁷ is that they do speak *πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων*. The most fundamental antithesis in the *Republic*, seen at its sharpest in the allegory, is between the knowledge of the true statesman and the false and misleading opinions that corrupt mankind. The service of the Great Beast is a *σοφία*, which implies a *τέχνη* where there are goods but no Good. While truth and falsehood may be treated imaginatively, is there evidence that Plato regarded imagination as the character of this *σοφία*? A pleader goes to court to win his case¹⁸; he constructs a probable story, like truth but not the truth, in view of this practical end.¹⁹

¹⁵516c, τῷ ὀξυτάτῳ καθορῶντι, and d, δυνατώτατα ἀπομαντένομένῳ, which is not *εἰκασία*, but political divination without knowledge of the Good. Compare 519a, ὡς δριμύ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορα ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται. . . . ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσοῦτ' ἀπλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον with 519b 5; this is the difference between *δόξα* and knowledge in state affairs.

¹⁶492b, 519a.

¹⁷492b, cf. 604e.

¹⁸The claim of rhetoric is quite definitely to be a didascalical art, that is, to lay down standards of *ὀρθότητος* (*Gorg.*, 455a, and see Part II below).

¹⁹*Phaedr.*, 273a-d. Cf. 262c, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς.

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This story must consider the opinions and desires²⁰ of the jurors; but it must seem *like* the truth to them, an εἶδωλον, to use Plato's language. The suggestion that such an unnatural fabrication is mere imagining, out of the jurisdiction of truth and equally remote from error, is opposed to the whole mass of Plato's doctrine.

These are not secondary points, to be set aside because 'no allegory can be perfect in all its details.' The state from which the prisoners are rescued is the allegory, and wherever Plato enables us to test that state, it is ἀπαιδευσία,²¹ bad education with its perverted standards, δόξα, a belief in the truth of their standards so passionate that men will kill him who tries to change them.²² Εἰκασία, the simple gazing at natural images, cannot be taken literally, cannot be fused with the perverted δόξα of the prisoners, so that the faculty of images appears to be arrested at its growing-point, the fusion of the lower line with the cave. On the other hand, the counterfeit εἶδωλα of the cave may help us to understand the εἶδωλα of the rhetoricians, sophists and poets, because they compete with truth in the same field, the political and social life of the city-state.

We may now turn to the *Sophist*,²³ where at one stage in the hunt for the sophist a double division is made into products divine and human, into real things and images. There dreams and day-dreams, shadows of the fire and reflections, are

²⁰493a, τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσιν, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν; 493b, δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν; 493c, ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις.


²¹514a2. Ἀπαιδευσία καὶ κακὴ τροφή (552e) are the corrupters of standards.

²²517a; cf. 492d.

²³*Soph.*, 265-6, Paton, p. 77.

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grouped together as divine images, opposed to the multifarious images made by men. Is there ground for adding these to the



diverse images of the similes and using the whole group to interpret Book X? The part played by the lights in the similes warn us to beware of confounding categories. Why are fire-light shadows divine in the *Sophist*, human in the cave,²⁴ and why are natural shadows divine in both?²⁵ And does divine mean the same in both? Why are animals, plants and things fashioned by men (which is simply Plato's phrase for 'everything under the sun') grouped together in the Line and separated by the fundamental division of the *Sophist*? Is it so certain that in the *Sophist* these are indeed the objects of πίστις when the classification cuts across them? Can one tell a δύναμις simply by its object—or by what it does (ὃ ἀπεργάζεται) And is not the δύναμις involved in divine εἰδωλοποιική, if I may so speak, God's and not man's—God's making, not man's apprehension? Plato does not speak of dreaming, and the thought of its mental status is far from his mind. Note the

²⁴517d.

²⁵*Rep.*, 532c. In the *Republic* Plato uses θεῖος of man's divine activity of knowing the forms, as opposed to the human arts of the cave; here God's making and man's are concerned. Cf. *C. Q.*, vol. XVI, p. 17.

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precision of his language: τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις²⁶ and, even more significantly, φαντάσματα αὐτοφυῆ,²⁷ visions that come of themselves. We do not will or make them; according to old belief they are divinely sent, whether to help or deceive.

One cannot without more ado reason from objects to a δύναμις over them, particularly when objects that ought to be united under it are inexorably divided into opposed groups: animals and plants on one side, manufactures on the other; divinely sent dreams and shadows²⁸ over against all manner of human images. The classification in the *Sophist* is not of things, but of *making-things*, and that determines the nature of the δύναμις. As the analysis always goes to the right (264e), we may say that three divisions of the four are but formal stages in the narrowing circle that encloses the elusive sophist. A fairly close parallel to the general principle of the classification may be found in that more sophisticated place in the *Laws*, where nature and chance usurp the place of God,²⁹ and the class of man-made images, *having no great part in truth*, include those produced by painting, music and the allied arts.

If we cannot in this context draw inferences from the products of God to the status, whatever it may be, that they have for man's apprehension, the account of man's image-making does give a clue to the mind of the maker. Where semblances of truth that claim to be true are concerned,

²⁶We may quote τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι (*Rep.*, 383a) for Plato's meaning. Probably the phrase used of the painter's art—οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγρηγορόσιω ἀπειργασμένην (*Soph.*, 266c)—is used to suggest a parallel deception: they seem to be genuine but are not.

²⁷*Ep.*, VIII, 357c.

²⁸Plato's principle of selection is obvious: shadows by night and shadows by day, visions of the night and visions of the day.

²⁹889b-e; cf. the allusion in *Soph.*, 265c.

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idol-making is Plato's term for this *μίμησις μετὰ δόξης*.³⁰ The activity is within the sphere of false opinion,³¹ and the maker is a *θαυματοποιός*,³² who thinks that he knows what he only opines,³³ or, if a little more sophisticated, is extremely uneasy about it, and hides the flaw by verbal dexterity. This bears not only upon the cave, where the sophist (of whatever kind) manufactures *δόγματα* for the many, but also upon Book X, where another variety of imitation produces semblances of truth.

We have found that images will not coalesce into a class. As a rule they represent or misrepresent something else, and their relation to that determines their status. The very basis of the category of images contains only images of sunlight, which are purely illustrative, and these will not mix with the opposed images of the cave. Though the divine images of the *Sophist* are related only to a divine *δύναμις*, there are suggestive similarities between the human images and the images of the cave. These, however, point to the conclusion that a group of arts, formed with regard to the opinions of men, produce opinions that seem to be true judgements (see n. 94 below). As yet there is no evidence that dreams—another will-o'-the-wisp word—have a special status assigned to them, and we shall find none. Leaving the theory of a special state of *εἰκασία* as unproved, we turn to Book X with the presumption that the Line has nothing, the Cave and the *Sophist* something, to teach us about the poet's idols.

³⁰*Soph.*, 267e.

³¹*Soph.*, 264d.

³²This is the metaphor that inspires the drama of the Cave (514b). Cf. *Soph.*, 268d.

³³267e-8a.

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II.

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε γινώσκομεν, τὸδε δὲ ἴσμεν, ὅτι
ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοί τινες
ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσιν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν
ἐναντία οὔσαι ἐπ' ἐναντίας πράξεις, οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη
ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία κέῖται.

Laws, 644d-e.

A notable passage in Book VI describes the reciprocal effect of the many and of those whom they deem to be wise educators upon one another.³⁴ For these teachers fine and base, good and bad, just and unjust have but the meaning that the opinions and desires of the many give to them, and they do not know and cannot explain the true nature of good. A fell necessity broods over all these parasitic 'wisdoms', painting and music and politics and poetry, to pander to the anger and pleasures of the many, and this they call good and fine. Now the many recognize many fine or beautiful things indiscriminately, but never admit or acknowledge 'beauty itself.' The mob cannot be philosophic or admire the philosophers.

This distinction of standards is based upon the account of opinion in Book V, where it is laid down that men fitted by nature must study philosophy and guide the city, while others must not touch it and must follow the guide who has reason.³⁵ They are unworthy of education, though they pose as educators, and their brood of *διανοήματα* and *δόξαι* would ruin a city.³⁶

This is a more hopeful clue to the account of the poet than the analogy of the Line, into whose framework the classification of Book X cannot be pressed. Plato expressly bases his argument against mimetic poetry upon the analysis of the

³⁴492d—494a. See also n. 19 above.

³⁵474c.

³⁶496a.

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'kinds' of soul in Book IV, and we must combine that with its sequel in the account of opinion (Book V) to arrive at a principle of interpretation. The general principle of the psychological discussion in Book IV is that the same 'part' of the soul cannot think (*δοξάζειν*) contrary things about the same thing at the same time, and the argument about poetry is a deduction from this, an analysis first of the instrument that causes contrary opinions and then a description of the schism in the soul produced by it.

Considering the origin and nature of the argument, it is not easy to see why Plato should view poetry as intuition rather than as simple opinion. The psychological discussion in Book IV starts from the opposition between assent and dissent, affirming and denying, because reason and desire have opposite judgements³⁷ about the goodness of this and that. Now in Book V we may see the meaning of this. The lover and the ambitious man (types of desire and spirit) grasp indiscriminately at any object in the line of their desire. They are not dainty about beauty, for example, because the beloved is beautiful to them. But the philosopher has a principle of discrimination in truth. A mere insatiable avidity for all kinds of experience is not philosophic, and the undiscerning enthusiast for the drama and other spectacles is but a curiosity-monger. Now what classes the *φιλοθεάμων*³⁸ with the other men who follow their bent is that their standards depend on inclination. They cannot see beyond their admirations to fineness or beauty itself. The new beloved or the last play are 'fine'; they have many standards but no standard—and this is *δόξα*. Now it is the mind of the *φιλοθεάμων* that is

³⁷437b, 602e; cf. *Soph.*, 230b.

³⁸The sense of *φιλοσοφείν* was once much the same: to go out into the world 'for to admire an' for to see.' The *φιλοθεάμων* is not a listless type, acquiescent in conventions, but the Athenian eager to see or to hear some new thing.

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analysed in Book X; for there we see an art uncontrolled by τὸ λογιστικόν stirring up schism in his soul, so that the ὁμοδοξία of a well-tempered mind desired in Book V is sapped and destroyed. I confess that I should have taken this view of the φιλοθεάμων for granted had not Mr. Paton³⁹ suggested that the φιλοθεάμων, being a dreamer, was in a state of εἰκασία, and accordingly ^{he} faces the difficulty that 'dreaming—which we know to be εἰκασία—' is thinking '“that a thing which is like something is not really like it but is the same thing as that which it is like.”' I agree that the confusion is evident to those on a higher plane: the φιλοθεάμων does not *know* and then confuse. My own difficulty is that this place is the *locus classicus* for δόξα. The character of the φιλόδοξος (or of the φιλοθεάμων who is the selected type for δόξα) is that he is so satisfied with his own standards that he will believe nothing else to be true.⁴⁰ He is not pressed on to beauty itself by the mixed beauty and ugliness of his object—it is all fine

³⁹Paton, p. 99. The reference is *Rep.*, 476c. When it is suggested that 'most men are satisfied with the seeming good and don't go behind it' (p. 100), is not εἰκασία merged in δόξα? —the seeming good is just the many standards of the many about beauty, which is δόξα (see *ibid.*, p. 85).

Does Plato assert that the early education of the guardians 'was just a dream below the earth' (*ib.*, p. 78; cf. *Rep.*, 414d)? If this means that the education in poetry is εἰκασία, the text gives no ground for the inference. Plato wishes *all* men in the state, especially guardians, to believe a Phoenician tale, that men were formed and nurtured under the earth, and that their supposed training by men was a dream. They are to believe that they are naturally brothers. That is: they are to believe that the myth of their common origin is a fact, and that the fact of their common training is a myth. This pious fraud is not relevant to the nature of the education or to the status of dreaming. It is a manipulation of belief, like asking the English people to hold that the acts of ministers, parliament and judicature is a dream, and that the power of the Crown (our myth) really does all. 'Why did not Bent', asked Cecil Rhodes, 'say that the ruins found in Rhodesia were Phoenician in origin?' 'Perhaps he was not sure of the fact.' 'That is not the way that empires are made.' That is Φοινικικόν τι!

⁴⁰476b; 515c: the cave is the paradise of the φιλοθεάμων.

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for him just as the defects of the beloved become new charms for the lover—nor does he allow others to criticize his standards—*ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά* (506d). He confuses because in his blindness he will not discriminate further, not because he has discriminated and then failed to do so. Hence the *ἐρωτικός, φίλοιος, φιλοθεάμων, φιλότεχνος πρακτικός*⁴¹ are all simply *φιλόδοξοι*.⁴²

The argument about imitation falls into two parts, each with two sub-divisions. In the second, where the purpose of the whole argument is achieved, the effect of the product of imitation is shown upon men's souls (602b-607a), since the test of any product is the work that it does; in the first the reason for this flaw in the instrument is traced back to the mind of its maker (595c-602b). Plato proceeds from the poet's mind to the mind of the *φιλοθεάμων* who is the poet's votary. This division of the argument is preferable to the usual triple division into metaphysical, empirical, and psychological proofs, with their attendant difficulties—are not these high names *εἰς ὄγκον*?

1. The general form of the first argument is as follows: Plato analyses imitation as an art of production. For the Greeks an artist is a *δημιουργός* like the carpenter or the sophist or any man who produces an *ἔργον*. The poet is indeed by linguistic usage the 'maker' *par excellence*, and Plato uses the fact of language to the full.⁴³ Further, all men would

⁴¹These three are classed together in 476a.

⁴²480a.

⁴³*Symp.*, 205c. Cf. Pollux, IV 17, *ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ πολλῶν χρήσιν ἀμφίβολον*. The poet was probably called the 'maker' in contradistinction to the rhapsode who recited his works (Weil, *Études sur l'Antiquité Grecque*). So a man who wrote discourses for others to speak was *ποιητῆς λόγων*, and we talk of a composer as opposed to a musician. What the poet 'makes' is a 'myth'; but for reasons indicated below that is not relevant to this political discussion.

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admit that poetry and the allied arts are imitation.⁴⁴ Any productive activity ends in a concrete ἔργον, and Plato's problem is to estimate the ἔργον of poetry in comparison with other—and genuine—ἔργα. He first analyses imitation in general through the case of the artist. This is convenient both because the example is simpler and because we see the metaphor of image-making, which he is to apply to the poet, take its rise from a concrete case. But he is not content simply to infer from one example of imitation to another by probability.⁴⁵ he carries out an analysis for his real quarry, the poet. The whole argument must seem sophistical to a degree if we do not bear in mind that the real question is not what is poetry, much less what is art, but whether the poet is so sure a guide to life that he can compete with the men who know. The subject is Poetry and Life, and this is an account of the ψυχαγωγία⁴⁶ practised by the rhetoric of the stage⁴⁷ to the disintegration of men's souls.

(a) 595-601b. It will place the argument in perspective if we begin by noting the tests that Plato applies to the poet. If he is 'second from truth', like any genuine producer, where are his permanent memorials—in the field of statesmanship? He has not revolutionized strategy, or made a constitution, or founded a private society to make men better (like Pythagoras or Loyola), or even left a useful invention behind him like Anacharsis. The evanescent character of his influence is shown by the lack of an organized association to carry on his teaching—a very Greek touch! Any man would

⁴⁴*Laws*, 668b-c.

⁴⁵603b.

⁴⁶*Phaedr.*, 261a. The equivalent words for any parasitic art are γοήτεια, κήλησις, θανματοποιία.

⁴⁷*Gorg.*, 502c-d.

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prefer doing things to celebrating them, yet the poet has done none of these things.⁴⁸ The genuine ἔργον, in other words, must be concrete institutions or legislation maintaining a continuous life through the λόγος that is their principle. To us, who acknowledge the separate domain of the poet, this appears to be an odd test. But it has some relevance against the claim that the poet, as πᾶσσοφος,⁴⁹ should usurp the place of the philosopher-king. In an age of intense activity, practical and poetical, a poet could write:

What good is like to this,
To do worthy the writing, and to write
Worthy the reading, and the world's delight?

But Plato feared for his new instrument of government, feared that men who should live according to a right rule or law would follow competing rules that appealed to their passions.

This accounts for the conclusion of his analysis of poetry (601a). If Plato were indeed analysing the nature of poetry, he would naturally say that what a poet 'makes' are 'myths': so he says elsewhere⁵⁰ and so Aristotle says after him. But here his problem is how this 'maker' produces an ἔργον that deceives his votaries into the belief that he is a competent guide.⁵¹ Not because he really knows; but just as the painter gives an effect of illusion by line and colour, so the poet

⁴⁸I am glad to find that Professor G. S. Brett believes this to be the core of Plato's argument. He notes from Aristotle an interesting parallel to the danger contemplated by Plato: the popular tendency to put the actor before the dramatist.

⁴⁹We may compare the extravagant claims sometimes advanced for classical education, or the impatience of some scientists with literature and metaphysics. These conflicts occur when one discipline or art intrudes on the sphere of another, without recognizing its own limitations.

⁵⁰*Phaedo*, 61b, e2. Here, however, poetry is treated like rhetoric: it is *περὶ λόγους* (*Gorg.*, 449d).

⁵¹601a.

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deceives by the glamour of metre and rhythm and pitch.⁵² The whole argument, then, tests the claim of the poet to intrude into the sphere of politics and explains the source of a mistaken belief about his powers. This appears, at all events, to be an examination of nothing but the validity and usefulness of the poet's *δόξαι*. Let us now turn back to the simpler case where the illusion is more fully analysed.

This argument turns on the single claim that the imitator, in virtue of his facility, knows everything.⁵³ An artist's claim to universal competence, rivalling all craftsmen, is of no great political importance. It becomes significant because the general argument about imitation, elaborated for his case, is applied to the relation of poetry and politics. But the discussion of the artist is so striking and paradoxical to us that it has received most attention and has been placed out of focus. It is clear from the reference to the poet at a turning-point in the argument (597e), from the conclusion (598c-e), and from the immediate application of that conclusion to the poet (598d-e) that the competence of the poet, particularly as a guide of conduct (e),⁵⁴ is in question. If Plato's answer to that claim is that the imitator exercises a kind of cognition that does not involve judgements of truth and error, it is not explicitly stated. Indeed the hypothesis that Plato believes this depends upon the assumption that the imitator's objects, which are said to be 'appearances', belong to the supposed metaphysical class of images. But the imitator is tested by

⁵²601a; cf. *Gorg.*, 474d ff. This is the technique of the flattering and deceiving arts (*Gorg.*, 465b).

⁵³The parallels with rhetoric and sophistry are convincing: e.g., *Euthyd.*, 271c, 287c; *Protag.*, 315e; *Gorg.*, 456a, 457a; *Soph.*, 233b, e. Cf. 596c, d-e, 598c, d, e.

⁵⁴The argument about making turns at each stage into a discussion of *πρᾶξις*, because that is the real subject. See, e.g., 599a, 603d.

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the same standard of truth as the carpenter: he is third from truth as the carpenter is second.⁵⁵

While the application is carried out at the level of statesmanship, this preliminary argument simply compares two craftsmen, the carpenter and the artist, in respect to competence. The wonted method of the forms is used as a test of the genuineness of their products; but it is a mistake either to compare this passage with the exposition of the highly organized sciences treated in Books VI and VII or to argue that they are inconsistent with one another. That is to fall into the pit mentioned in the *Topics*,⁵⁶ namely, to discuss knowledge without defining whether you mean theoretical, practical, or productive knowledge. This passage is concerned with productive knowledge alone (to use Aristotle's language), the *λογιστικόν* of the carpenter, and the point of view shifts according to the standard of comparison. There is no contradiction in saying now that the carpenter knows in comparison with the artist, and later that the user knows in comparison with the carpenter. There appears to be contradiction only if it is supposed that the first argument is conducted at the theoretical level of Books VI and VII, and the second by some lower empirical standard.

Plato's method of showing that the wisdom of the artist is

⁵⁵I am not able to offer an explanation of the phrase *τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς* (597e). But it suggests distance, not nearness to truth. Hence the Dantean line,

Si che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote,

is no parallel. Dante means, after Aristotle, that art follows nature as a disciple his master, the reverse of Plato's sense. Leonardo's aphorism is nearer: 'Those who study only the ancients are stepsons and not sons of Nature, the mother of all good authors.' Perhaps we may guess Plato's meaning by recalling the ape that would be a king (Archilochus, fr. 82, 84). The artist claims to 'make' everything, like God.

⁵⁶*Top.*, 6, 6.

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a vain thing is to compare the truth and reality of three different products: ⁵⁷

<i>Maker</i>	<i>Product</i>
God	— Form of the bed.
Carpenter	— A bed.
Artist	— Image of the bed.

This classification of making has obvious points of likeness to that of the *Sophist*,⁵⁸ though here the nature of the argument about models dictates a lineal division. But the object of both is to 'place' εἶδωλα that deceive. As God's making is introduced to give a standard of truth and reality for the carpenter and artist, it is hardly necessary to discuss what metaphysical lessons can be drawn, or to strive to identify God with the Form of the Good in Book VI. This not only confuses a soul with a form and productive knowledge with theoretical, but assumes that God makes a form in the same sense as the Form of the Good causes its dependent forms.⁵⁹ Plato intends to convey the immense distance that there is between the grasp involved in making a genuine thing, whether a table or a constitution, and the shallow prodigality of impressions lavished by the artist. So he begins from what is absolutely real and complete, the form of the bed; God makes it one and self-complete, the bed in nature. To this standard the carpenter 'looks', and fashions the beds that are real, yet not fully real like the form of the bed. This is the simplest manner of stating the doctrine of the form, and it is instructive to recall that Plato uses the same expression to convict the rhetorician in the *Gorgias*⁶⁰ of ignorance in comparison with any craftsman. A craftsman does not proceed anyhow (εἰκῆ), but rightly (ὀρθῶς) with competent knowledge of the structure and function of the bed he fashions. If the

⁵⁷597a ff.

⁵⁸See p. 125 above.

⁵⁹See, e.g., Adam on 597b and e.

⁶⁰503e; cf. *Crat.*, 389a.

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carpenter looks to the model of the form, to what does the imitator look? A good imitation should be a *δήλωμα*, an indication or expression, of the thing copied, like a word of its object, and he who imitates must first know the essence of the thing.⁶¹ But this is impossible for the shallow versatility of him who 'makes' everything. He is dependent on the genuine artisan, whose product he copies as it *looks* from one aspect. So the artist produces the image of a *φάντασμα* or look of a thing, and the reason why the imitator 'makes' everything is that he grasps very little of anything, and that an *εἶδωλον* or image. Such an art can only deceive the young and foolish from afar. The conclusion then, applicable to the poet, is that he who meets a man who knows everything has met a magician⁶² and imitator. It would appear that this argument, like its application to poetry, examines the claim of imitation to make a genuine social product, and explains its versatility by its ignorance. Is not a prestigiator one who makes you *believe* that he knows and does what he does not do?

Plato's argument has, however, been obscured by superficial verbal resemblances, and his liveliest sallies toned down till their point disappears. The versatile artist has even been taken for God! And for some English writers the mere association of holding 'a mirror up to nature' has been too strong. The debate whether Plato would think Photography more accurate than Painting is as much beside the point as the apparent parallel with the Line. What he actually says in the description of the artist is that if versatility is the test, a mirror turned about in your hand can 'make' as many things just as smartly.⁶³ So one might give an ironic flick at some tourist snapshotting his ignorant way through Rome between

⁶¹*Crat.*, 423b, e, 433d,

⁶²This is the constant gibe against the deceptive arts: *Soph.*, 235a, 241b; *Polit.*, 291c, 303c.

⁶³596c-e.

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dawn and dusk. Here the influence of the Line has obscured the irony: for does not Plato speak of images in a mirror and animals, plants and things fashioned by hand, and where they are mentioned must not *εἰκασία* and *πίστις* be present to his mind? But note his tone. Here is a clever fellow who not only 'makes' furniture like the carpenter, *all* furniture and utensils, but *all* that springs from the earth and *all* living creatures, himself as well, yes, and earth and heaven and the gods, and *all* things in heaven and *all* things under the earth.⁶⁴ Well, but he is only a maker in a sense, not a very arduous making; it is done everywhere, and so *quickly*. Take a mirror, and *presto*, by a turn of the hand you *quickly* 'make' the heavenly bodies, as *quickly* the earth, as *quickly* yourself and all other living beings and things fashioned and plants and the whole catalogue of things named above, will you not? A looking-glass gives the *look* of things, not the things. That is the manner of maker your artist is!

This paraphrase will show that the passage turns merely on 'making everything quickly.' That is the manner of maker the poet is. Is it not impossible to extract any other sense from this piece of light irony than a figure for the superficial and effortless ease of the artist, an Aladdin who makes anything with a rub of the lamp, or to establish a connexion with that other figure of *εἰκασία* which stands for the mathematician's intellect? I reserve comment on the meaning of the objects of the artist, *φαινόμενα*, till all the evidence is before us.

⁶⁴This is Plato's way of saying 'everything in the universe', just as *ζῶα φυτευτὰ σκευαστά* simply means 'everything on earth'. Adam's suggestion (on 596a) that *σκευαστά* are less real than *φυτευτά* may be true on general principles; but it cannot be supported by reference to the *σκευαστά* of the cave, which are not genuine manufactured things, but fabrications, the visible symbols of the *εἶδωλα* produced by sophists and other bad teachers.

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(b) 601a-602b. So far, the product of imitation has been shown to be inferior in truth to a genuine product. But the art of production itself does not lay down the value (*ὀρθότης*)⁶⁵ of the thing it makes. The user has a better grasp of its function than the maker, and prescribes the plan for him to follow. He knows; and knowing directs. The maker follows his instructions, exercising *πίστις ὀρθή* or *δόξα ὀρθή*. As the imitator can neither direct nor produce a genuine thing, since he can be no judge of goodness or badness, he is a figure of fun where wisdom about standards of right and wrong are concerned. His standards are taken from the many, and tragedy must be confessed to be play, remote from the serious business of life.⁶⁶

The trend of this argument is clear. The value of any *ἔργον* is in its use, and the use of poetry, so it is claimed, is to guide life. But no maker can do that, much less a maker without knowledge. We must turn to some architectonic activity, which can lay down the end. Plato does not here, as in the *Euthydemus*, press the distinction through to its issue, that the man who finally lays down the end is the statesman. It is not necessary, because the discussion of the actual effect of poetry shows that the question really at stake is whether poetry makes men better or worse. This is a short and abstract discussion of the principle that gives an art the right to lay down standards of right and wrong.

⁶⁵It is the user who does this: see *Euthyd.*, 282a, *Crat.*, 390a. What is needed is an art *ἡγουμένη καὶ κατορθούσα τὴν πράξιν* (*Euthyd.*, 281a), and this is what poetry professes to do.

⁶⁶It is germane to quote the Platonic *ἐνδοξα* of *Ethics*, 1152b 18: *ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς.* Again note for Plato's insistence on the judge of *ὀρθότης* such a phrase as: *οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς δὲ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς λέγομεν* (1152b2), For *παιδία* cf. *Soph.*, 234b.

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The architectonic art is not only critical, but gives commands—it is epitactic. Thus a lawgiver or τεχνικός lays down the law about rightness; the subordinate arts that follow the δόγμα rightly take it on trust from that source. (Note that the conclusion of the argument is that the poet takes his δόγματα from the many). The doctrine of the right to command and the ground for obeying is the core of the passage, and we shall see it developed in the psychological analysis. Hence the text opposes ἀγγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ (the maker), ἐξαγγέλλειν, ἐπιτάττειν τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν, ἀκούειν, πιστεύειν — and πίστις.⁶⁷ The maker is the right hand, not the directing brain that provides the λόγος, and thus his activity has its rightness, derivative and dependent, just as the irrational part of the soul may have its λόγος because it acts in harmony with the rational part, like a son obeying his father. Hence the tragic poet who but responds to the multitude is outside the closely interconnected hierarchy of arts that build up the life of a community according to a standard of rightness. As we may see from the *Gorgias* (455b) the claim of the rhetorician to advise is likewise set aside by the special arts set over each activity, like architecture and strategy. Rhetoric is πειθοῦς

⁶⁷For the connexion of ἀγγέλλειν with ὀρθὴ δόξα compare *Rep.*, 429c, οἷα ὁ νομοθέτης παρήγγειλεν, with 430b. For ὑπηρετεῖν see Aristotle *passim*.

The λόγος or the νόμος is the right rule laid down by competent authority, and the natural phrase for obeying the precept is πιστεύειν τῷ λόγῳ or τῷ νόμῳ. Compare *Laws*, 890d, κατὰ λόγον ὀρθόν, ὃν σύ τε λέγειν μοι φαίνη καὶ ἐγὼ σοὶ πιστεύω τὰ νῦν, and *Rep.*, 424c, ὣς φησί τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι (quoted by Stallbaum on *Laws*, 890d).

Now the last stage of the argument carries on the conception of due subordination; the poet stimulates the passions against the λόγος or νόμος, and thus Plato uses such a phrase as τὸ.....λογισμῶ πιστεῦον (603a). For λόγος or ὀρθὸς λόγος ('a general rule formulable in words, and communicable by teaching') in Aristotle, see Prof. J. A. Smith, *C. Q.*, vol. XIV, p. 19.

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δημιουργός . . . πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον. Like poetry, it proffers an untrustworthy standard of ὀρθότης.

But this inquiry about the right to direct (who shall direct and who shall obey), illustrated as it is by numerous parallels both in Plato and Aristotle, is set out of focus by the attempt to identify πίστις ὀρθή and δόξα ὀρθή with the πίστις of the Line. Here πίστις ὀρθή is the virtue, part intellectual and part moral, of him who follows a right prescribed end under competent direction. This limits and defines his competence in relation to his superior: the one ἐπιτάττει, the other πιστεύει.⁶⁸ But in the Line it is πίστις that sets a standard of clearness and certainty compared with εἰκασία. This is *my* certainty because I see with my own eyes, not indirectly; it is not trust that the true end is given by the λογιστικόν of another. Let us waive for a moment our conclusion that πίστις in the Line is specially defined by its context, and consider how the assumption that there is a general δύναμις called πίστις works. One begins by assuming that the different objects imply different powers, and that the objects of πίστις are animals, plants and things made by man. So far the theory works because the account of the lower line simply turns upon direct or indirect sight of the objects. We have seen how impossible it was to extend the images of the Line as a metaphysical class or to detect εἰκασία wherever an image is mentioned. Similarly with πίστις, the power ceases to be defined by the group of objects at first placed under it; and finally under the influence of the *Theaetetus*, where δόξα has the specific meaning of *judgement*, πίστις is made to include 'all empirical sciences and all history as well as the ordinary judgements of the ordinary man—τὰ τῶν πολλῶν

⁶⁸601e-2a.

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νόμιμα καλοῦ τε περί καὶ τῶν ἄλλων'.⁶⁹ To sweep all into the net of πίστις obliterates the one distinction relevant to the argument here. The harness-maker and the rider deal with one object, the bridle: since the former executes what the latter specifies, he alone is said to exercise 'right belief.' It stultifies Plato's subtle and flexible doctrine of ends to give πίστις a sense that it can bear neither here nor in the Line. One can no more identify this πίστις with the πίστις of the Line than the πιστευτική of rhetoric.

Further, this extension of the sense of πίστις by reminding us of the nature of δόξα, nullifies, I think rightly, the special meaning given to εἰκασία as a faculty exercised by the artist which is intuition, not δόξα. Mr. Paton indeed makes one unnecessary difficulty for his theory by supposing that the poet can have δόξα ὀρθή about his object if he follows the right guidance:⁷⁰ it is the maker (ποιητής, e.g., αὐλοποιός) who is said to exercise that. Nevertheless the conception of intuiting is foreign to the nature of the argument. 'Plato', it is said, 'is merely leading us up to the conclusion that the artist imitates only appearances. He imitates a thing as it appears, generally, Plato suggests, as it appears beautiful to the many and the ignorant, but that even if it were true does not alter the fact that he is just imitating or creating an appearance and not judging it. In fact the reason why Plato is condemning him is just because he does not judge; he is blaming the artist for not being a scientist or an historian.'⁷¹

But does Plato not blame the artist because he does judge, takes his judgements from the many, and in turn disseminates them? The argument so far has turned on two points: the claim to be πάσσοφος and the claim to direct

⁶⁹Paton, p. 85.

⁷⁰*ibid.*, p. 99.

⁷¹*ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

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opinion about good and bad. In this the poet competes with the men who know and have a right to lay down the end. It would be highly satisfactory if Plato disproved this claim by showing that the poet does not judge: what he does show is that the poet is incompetent to judge or direct about truth or error. The hypothesis that Plato assigns to the poet a state that is not *δόξα* depends (so far as it does not rest upon the general assumption of a faculty of images) on two points: (1) that being far from truth he is equally far from error, (2) that 'appearances' involve no judgement. We are not here concerned with the truth of these statements as aesthetic theory, but with Plato's meaning.

As to (1) the imitator is third from truth just as the carpenter is second. It is suggested that the phrase *χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐάσαντες*⁷² politely bows the artist out of the realm of truth and error. But this is simply equivalent to *πόρρω προβεβηκότα ἀμαρτίας*⁷³ *far gone on the road to error*, used of the arts that go their own way recking nothing of the lawgiver who has a right to direct, or to that significant meiosis in the *Laws*: *παιδιάς τινας, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλὰ εἶδωλ' ἅττα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἳ ἢ γραφικὴ γεννᾷ καὶ μουσικὴ καὶ ὄσαι ταύταις εἰσὶν συνέριθοι τέχναι*.⁷⁴ The phrase itself is used in the *Phaedrus* (in close connexion with *οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν . . . δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων*)⁷⁵ of the rhetorician in the courts, because he makes a likely story that will persuade the many by its resemblance to truth. The *εἶδωλα* of the poet or rhetorician, in fact, are so called because they are false judgements (273c).

⁷²*ibid.*, p. 93. The reference is *Soph.*, 236a. The true interpretation is supplied by 234b-c (quoted in n. 94). What 'seems good' (236a) is no more an object of *εἰκασία* than what 'seems true' (234c).

⁷³*Laws*, 660c.

⁷⁴*Laws*, 889d.

⁷⁵273d-e.

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The second point concerns the meaning of *φάντασμα* or *φαινόμενον*, appearance. There is an ambiguity in the passage quoted above, where the 'thing as it appears' is the standard that seems to be right to the many, that is, the standards of *δόξα*.⁷⁶ But no other appearance than these standards and the judgements involved in them are now in question. The words *φαινόμενον* and *φάντασμα* here have a double aspect. They spring from the suggestion of the surface *look* of a thing in a mirror: the artist sees but the outside, not structure and function, and that outside he imitates. The look of the thing and the imitation of it are both *φαντάσματα* without truth. Does this mean that we can assume the 'appearance' to be the object of intuition? The answer to this depends upon the sense of *εἶδωλον*, which is equivalent to *φάντασμα*. When Plato accuses the poets (like the artists) of producing *εἶδωλα ἀρετῆς*, he does not mean that they represent virtues without judging, but that they take the many standards of the many about goodness and disseminate these counterfeits as if they were genuine. They give back to the audiences their own *δόγματα*. This is clear, not only from the references to image-making which we have analysed, but from Plato's own account of *φαντάσματα* so made and so used.

The *φάντασμα*, indeed, is what all arts that claim universal knowledge and the right to guide opinion really produce. The cardinal passage for its interpretation is in the *Sophist*.⁷⁷

⁷⁶This is, of course, in direct contrast to the standard set by the man who has a right to direct and followed by the maker.

ὁ χρώμενος	οἱ πολλοὶ
ὁ ποιητής	ὁ μιμητικός

The point is that a genuine epitactic art prescribes standards to its dependent arts, whereas mimetic arts, being parasitic, borrow their standards from those whom they seem to teach.

⁷⁷*Soph.*, 240d; see also n. 94.

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“Ὅταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτὸν ἀπατᾶν φῶμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶναι τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτοῦ, τότε πότερον ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φήσομεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτ’ ἐροῦμεν; The character of all these ‘doxomimetic’ arts is the same, and it will be convenient to gather here their marks in brief. To supply the full list of parallels would be wearisome, and, at this stage of the argument, unnecessary.

They are all—rhetoric, sophistry, politics, and poetry—attacked by the same arguments. ‘Discourse is a great lord,’ a *ψυχαγωγία*⁷⁸ that can outface the specialist and do anything without knowledge.⁷⁹ Its end (as in rhetoric or poetry) is to please;⁸⁰ and it acts upon the many,⁸¹ taking its standards from them⁸² and playing upon their angers and desires⁸³ by giving their opinions back, heightened by the form in which they are expressed.⁸⁴ Indeed this form itself is an evidence of the uneasiness felt by some of these teachers about their deficiency in knowledge.⁸⁵ The sophist is a rhetorician,⁸⁶ and poetry itself is the rhetoric of the stage⁸⁷—and what is the purpose of rhetoric but to persuade⁸⁸ what it has not the right, lacking knowledge, to teach?⁸⁹ But these *πάσσοφοι* do not exercise a genuine art. As they do not know, and can give no account of their ends, they flatter and deceive.⁹⁰ For a

⁷⁸*Phaedr.*, 261a, 271c 10. See n. 46 above.

⁷⁹See n. 53 above.

⁸⁰*Gorg.*, 462d, 502b; *Polit.*, 288c; *Rep.*, 606b, c, 607a.

⁸¹*Gorg.*, 454e, 457a-b; *Rep.*, 599a.

⁸²*Rep.*, 493a, 602b, 605a.

⁸³*Rep.*, 493a-d, 604e, 606d. The phrase *περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν κ. τ. λ.* seems to be echoed in *Ethics*, 1147a 15. There is another echo (of 604a) in 1102b 17.

⁸⁴601a-b. Cf. n. 52.

⁸⁵*Soph.*, 268a.

⁸⁶*Gorg.*, 520a.

⁸⁷*Gorg.*, 502c-d.

⁸⁸*Gorg.*, 455a.

⁸⁹See n. 53.

⁹⁰*Κολακική*—*Gorg.*, 466a; cf. *Rep.*, 605a. *Ἀπατητική*—*Soph.*, 240d; cf. *Rep.*, 598c. Cf. *γοήτεια* and *κῆλησις*.

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superficial art, claiming to be universal, has no end to which all the opinions it claims to teach can look.⁹¹ It is but an *ἄτεχνος τριβή* or *ἐμπειρία*.⁹² What it produces are *εἰδωλα*,⁹³ framed to be like truth and to be mistaken for it. This counterfeit money must, of course, be judged, like the value of the rouble, by what it claims to be, by truth, and not by the beauty of its form.⁹⁴ Hence the professors of these arts are all alike called impostors, enchanters, mimics, and jugglers, not because they exercise arts that are to be judged by standards intrinsic to them, but because their power lies in passing off an idol as genuine. Plato judges the poets by the standards of truth and rightness because they compete in the sphere of truth and rightness and are part of the great system of mutual deception in which the many and the men of discourse flatter and deceive one another. This system is a cave of idols, and in the allegory of the Cave we may see dramatized the process by which idols are produced and men believe them to be true. Let us next turn to see the production of such false opinions by the poets. The flaw in the instrument has been laid bare: Plato then shows it in action, shaping opinion.

2. (602c-607a). This second argument completes the placing of poetry by asking to what 'part' of man's soul the mimetic arts make their appeal. If 'third from truth' implies that the poem is beyond truth and falsehood, then it should

⁹¹*Soph.*, 232a.

⁹²*Phaedr.*, 260e; *Gorg.*, 463b.

⁹³The *locus classicus* is the last part of the *Sophist*, where the whole group of mimetic arts are discussed. See part I above.

⁹⁴The sufficient evidence for this is a comparison of, say, *Rep.*, 598c-d, with *Soph.*, 234c, especially: *τέχνην, ἣ αὐτὸ δυνατόν <ὄν>[αὐ] τυγχάνει τοὺς νέους καὶ ἔτι πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὄτων τοῖς λόγοις γοητεύειν, δεικνύοντας εἰδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἅπαντ' εἶναι.*

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make its appeal to a part of the soul with its own rights, however limited, and its own innocent soundness and wisdom. We might expect an analysis of the *φιλοθεάμων*, the dreamer, and some evidence that *εἰκασία* is bound up, say, with τὸ *ἐπιθυμητικόν*.⁹⁵ At any rate, we should not expect to find the discussion devoted, as it is, to a proof that the drama engenders opinions contrary to the accepted rule of life, a proof supported primarily by exhibiting the degeneration under its influence of the spirited part of the soul, which should in the normal man support the code. Just as the poet and the poem are far from truth, so the part of the soul that is stimulated by them is far from wisdom and health, because it is unnaturally released from due subordination to the rational part, and regard for the custom of normal men. *Φαύλη φαύλω συγγιγνομένη*—the false mingling with the unwise engenders an ignoble brood.

As 'contrary opinions' and their validity are in question, the whole argument is a deduction from the psychology of Book IV. The special character of the problem here is sufficient answer to those who complain that Plato has shifted his ground by substituting the distinction of the rational and irrational parts of the soul for the triple division into τὸ *λογιστικόν*, τὸ *θυμοειδές*, and τὸ *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. In the earlier books, after showing by example the distinction between the three 'kinds' of soul, Plato was content to trace their organization into virtues harmonious with one another because they are naturally controlled by reason, and finding each its proper function. The end was τὸ *ὁμοδοξεῖν*. But here the reverse process is examined, where justice and harmony are destroyed because the subordinate parts assert their claims and opinions in defiance of the rule—*παρὰ τὸν*

⁹⁵Paton, p. 100.

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λόγον. As they are both divisive, a distinction essential to the analysis of the normal man need not be explicitly maintained. This leads to a point of importance in estimating whether Plato had an aesthetic theory, in our sense. If poetry has a sphere of its own, the part of the soul of which it is the expression and to which it appeals has its own claims and rights. But the irrational part—and the whole argument leads up to this—has no rights, because it is *ἀνοητόν*, a rebel and schismatic.⁹⁶ It cannot simply be identified with *τὸ θυμοειδές* or *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*, because it is the breaking away of these parts to form an unnatural and independent system of acts and opinions, flouting the prescriptions of the code and of healthy custom. These parts have their rights and express their true nature in a state of *ὁμόνοια*. What rights can they have in *στάσις* and division? The spirited degenerates into the fretful and rebellious, the 'epithumetic' into mere pleasure-seeking. These irrationals have no sphere of their own, because they have become the unhealthy breeding ground of unstable opinions, untrue and unsound. Thus the cycle is complete: the drama does not penetrate beneath the surface; hence it adopts the current fluctuating standards of good and evil, though it presumes to direct opinion; in turn these standards, reinforced by powerful passions, engender injustice in the souls of the multitude from whom they were taken. This is the ethics of a social system contrary to the normal code, not an aesthetic. The poet is condemned, not because he does not judge, but because he does not discriminate.⁹⁷ The

⁹⁶In the *Magna Moralia*, 1208a9, it is asked what is the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*. The answer uses a Platonic point of view; one acts *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* *ὅταν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ κωλύῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐνεργεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν*, or again *ὅταν τὰ πάθη μὴ κωλύωσι τὸν νοῦν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἐπιτελεῖν*. See n. 67.

⁹⁷The claim of the poet is to be *διδασκαλικός*, and the *διδασκαλικός* is also *διακριτικός*. Cf. e.g., *Soph.*, 231b, *Crat.*, 388b.

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φιλοθεάμων is condemned because his want of discrimination is the sign of faction in his soul.

(a) 602c-605c. The first part of the argument determines the part of the soul to which the mimetic arts unnaturally appeal, and it turns upon the principle of contradiction: that contrary opinions imply different parts of the soul. Plato begins by observing that optical illusions may be corrected by the carpenter's rule and the balance. It is interesting to note, in view of the application, that some of these are human devices. Now the purpose of this argument is extremely simple. Your eye tells you that *this* is larger; the rule that it is smaller than something else. Which are you to believe? Clearly the rule, because it is the instrument of τὸ λογιστικόν, and equally clearly, by the principle of contradiction, that in you which desires to believe in the illusion is another part of the soul. The issue is not in the least whether the illusion can be set aside as mere 'appearance', exempt from judgement. The sole relevant consideration is that you *may* in your folly affirm the illusion to be true just as you may affirm that the rabbit did come out of the empty hat or that ectoplasm has a cantilever structure. Then you have a δόξα contrary to measurement and calculation. Without this interpretation the principle of ἐναντία δόξαι and the application to poetry are pointless. At the end of the argument on poetry Plato reverts to the same language: by appealing to the irrational in man through counterfeit images the mimetic poet makes him think the same things now great, now small.⁹⁸ Both states involve judgements; they are the fluctuating indiscriminate standards of opinion. It is instructive to recall that this language—that of the σκιαγραφία⁹⁹ or θανματοποιία—is used to characterize the rescue of the young from the toils of the sophist: what

⁹⁸605c.

⁹⁹Cf. a fragment of Aristotle in Iamblichus, *Protreptikos*, c. viii.

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they once thought great are now seen to be small, and the easy difficult.¹⁰⁰ This is a rescue from *ψευδῆς δόξα* to truth.

Plato then applies the principle of contrary opinions to mimetic poetry itself, not content to rest upon a probable argument from sight. This art imitates men whose actions, involuntary as well as voluntary, are thought by them to be good or bad, and are accompanied by pain or pleasure. The words *ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγένοι* are vital to this definition.¹⁰¹ For they mean that what the characters in the play think to be good or bad will be accepted by the audience, (the more because these opinions conform to the common standards), are rendered seductive by the form in which they are expressed and the passions accompanying them, and are delivered before the most unstable of human groups, the crowd. The only question that the argument attempts to settle is whether mimetic poetry does create a schism in the soul, and if so, to what part of the soul it makes an appeal. On the first count the earlier books leave no doubt.¹⁰² On the second there is as little doubt that drama fosters the more unworthy opinions.

The most striking aspect of this argument is Plato's treatment of the drama as a social force. We saw in the last argument how an architectonic art had the right to prescribe. Here we are less concerned with the *ὀρθὸς νομοθέτης* than with the principle in man's soul, which expresses itself in the *νόμος* that good and decent men accept as prescribing what should be done. This is the meaning of Plato's appeal to a man's fellows. The salutary support to one's better self given by

¹⁰⁰*Soph.*, 234d.

¹⁰¹603c.

¹⁰²The reference is to the concrete examples from the mimetic poets in Book III, not to Book IV. Logical consistency, as well as the supplement to Book III immediately added (603e), shows this to be so.

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social usage is counteracted by another influence working fitfully, amid crowds and excitement, and using those rebellious and unstable characters that are most easy to imitate. Self-control is a good; but will men who are moved by the sufferings of a Priam or Philoktetes believe it to be a good? The *ἄνοητον* will be drawn into denial (*ἐναντία δόξα*); and fretfulness, rebellion and repining will be reinforced by the lesson of the stage. So the *Ἄδικος Λόγος* finds his justification in Homer and Euripides. Here is one of those *φθοραὶ τῆς φύσεως* touched on in Book VI, where false teachers and turbulent crowds ruin the soul.¹⁰³ The epitactic rights of *λόγος* and *νόμος* are usurped by a *σοφία* which calls upon another part of the soul than the *λογιστικόν* to prescribe ends. In the last resort, the question is: who shall rule, the *ἡδυσμένη Μούσα* or *Νόμος*?

(b) 605c-607a. The second part of the argument need not detain us. Mimetic poetry appeals not only to the worst part of man, but to the best men. The tenor of this argument is clear from its parallel in Book VI, where the best are said to be the most susceptible to false teachers. It is this claim that the poets can give a standard for the conduct of life that leads Plato to exclude them from the Kallipolis, where there cannot be two kings. At this, the climax of the whole argument, there is room for but one conclusion: that Plato banished mimetic poetry because it was a product which made men worse just as the perverted constitutions made them worse. *Μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών, ᾧ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμία οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμελῆσαι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς. Σύμφημί σοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν.*¹⁰⁴ It is usually suggested that the argument

¹⁰³490e ff.

¹⁰⁴608b.

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about poets is a digression, hardly connected with the main body of the *Republic*. This conclusion shows that the banishment of the poets is of a piece with the verdict already pronounced against timocrats and oligarchs and other rulers of men. All of them represent vices in the soul which raise their heads against the body politic and against that inner polity in the soul of man. It is no wonder, then, that Plato uses the same kind of argument against all of them. In his eyes poetry has no special sphere: it acts *παρὰ τὸν λόγον*.

^cognitive

III.

Conclusion.

Book X is not a fragment *περὶ ποιητικῆς*, but the conclusion of a treatise *περὶ πολιτείας ἢ δικαίου*. The clue to Plato's mind may be found in the brief discussion about the nature of a 'master' art: what entitles a man or an art to prescribe an end? This is bound up with the question, so remote from aesthetic theory, whether Homer and the others did produce a genuine political instrument with lasting effect. The activity usually called *ποίησις par excellence*—so the argument runs—is no genuine productive art because its versatility is achieved at the cost of insight; much less is it epitactic, since the productive arts themselves have ends prescribed for them by architectonic arts—and this, so far from prescribing, follows the inclination of the ignorant. With this characterization of the mind and product of the poet all is in train for the main argument: that the instrument called mimetic poetry is no guide for men nor its makers leaders of men, since it stimulates into independent life those elements of the soul, even in good men, which should be subject to law and principle.

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It is no accident that such an argument ends with an appeal from the many standards of the many to the best Rule that all good men accept.

The affinities of this discussion are not far to seek. We saw that Plato stripped poetry of its enhancements of metre and rhythm less because he was attempting to define it in itself than because he tried to put his finger on the means by which the poet makes men believe that he knows. The problem is really that of the *Phaedrus*: whether ability to turn a sentence well dispenses a man from knowing what he is talking about.¹⁰⁵ This is the reason why we have been able to invoke at every turn parallel arguments against other teachers, rhetoricians and sophists, who practise arts that do not draw to being but are turned to the opinions and desires of men. Aesthetically no doubt this savours of Kronos, and it is true that Plato did not dissever the aesthetic from the moral and political problem. But why make him give an answer to a question he never asked? No writer has a more unflinching and subtle sense of relevance in argument or defines with more scrupulous precision the shade of meaning that he desires to express. Interpretation must follow where the whole argument leads, and define single phrases as that argument demands. Plato really does mean that the artists who disguise their ignorance by fine language are third from truth and do menace the spiritual unity of a people. He was concerned with one thing, the spring of authority in reason and law, and its relation to the fashions of thought, bred by interaction between the cultivated and the vulgar, that men easily adopt and as easily discard. This problem falls within the sphere of ethics and social psychology, and has not yet

¹⁰⁵*Phaedr.*, 259e, quoted at the head of this paper.

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lost its edge for writers on human nature in politics.¹⁰⁶ Historically the argument is a phase of the conflict between a culture based upon knowledge and experience and that general culture, sometimes shallow and sometimes with a genuine content, that does not observe its own limitations.¹⁰⁷

If the argument is so conceived, it falls into place within the scheme of the *Republic*. That dialogue images a state where the better rules the worse, and the multitudinous desires and pleasures and pains of the many are subjected to desires controlled by right reason.¹⁰⁸ Where this end is attained, in the state and in the soul, there is *σωφροσύνη*; where conflicting desires and opinions assert themselves, there is faction. This is bound up with the willingness of the many to accept the right teachers. After the psychological argument where the nature of this harmony and of this faction is made clear, the decisive point is the firm line drawn in Book V between the men who know truth and the *φιλόδοξοι*, who err knowing nothing of what they opine. From this arises the question of Book VI, itself closely connected with the will of the many to follow a leader: who then are to guide the city? From the philippic against corrupting teachers in pp. 491-4 there emerges that vital distinction between the arts that lead the philosopher to Being and the deceptive arts that are turned to the opinions of men. The similes of the Sun and the Line illustrate the former; the allegory of the Cave shows the votaries of the latter at grips with the philo-

¹⁰⁶It is interesting to compare the short shrift given to the romantic incendiaries of the study who ache to turn the pen into a sword, in the last chapter of Mr. C. E. Montague's *Disenchantment*. This is much in Plato's mood.

¹⁰⁷Compare a recent letter in the *Times* newspaper from Sir William Pope, who rejects the aid of literary men in publishing abroad the triumphs of science because they are not humble enough to know their ignorance.

¹⁰⁸431b.

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sophers. After it is triumphantly argued that the philosopher-king is the guide for men, it still remains to show how other rulers and guides set up conflict in the community and in the soul. The last stage of the argument, resting upon the same psychological premises, exhibits the relaxing of self-control and of courage under the influence of those teachers who call themselves 'makers'. Poetry, like wealth and honours, is a subtle solvent of unity and coherence because, in Plato's view, it had not made terms with law and law-givers.

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Note.

I have intentionally refrained from discussing whether the *αἴσθησις* of the *Theaetetus* is identical with *εἰκασία* and the poet's state, as Mr. Paton holds. For the hypothesis that permits the identification of *αἴσθησις*, *εἰκασία*, and the state involved in *μίμησις* with one another is that all of them represent a cognitive stage prior to judgement, so that apparent differences may be ignored in face of this common element. But the whole argument falls to the ground once it is seen that *εἰκασία* has no metaphysical status and that *μίμησις* is criticized because it implies error. At the very least there is a prior question which cannot be passed over. If, for example, Plato's account of *αἴσθησις* covers a wider area than *εἰκασία*, which is merely mentioned twice in a particular context, it is not possible to argue that *αἴσθησις* is *εἰκασία* described in its 'full extension and meaning' unless one is certain that the conception of *εἰκασία* does not preclude any enlargement of meaning.

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In general, is it not a question whether the assumption of elegant variation in the Platonic terminology can override the specific differences and qualifications in the arguments where the words supposed to be identical occur, and whether one is entitled to reason boldly from the mention of an object to a definite power or state over it? If the objects of *αἴσθησις* are called *φαντάσματα* in one place, and if the objects of *εἰκασία* are *εἰκόνες*, can one proceed to identify *αἴσθησις* with *εἰκασία* because *φαντάσματα* are associated with *εἰκόνες* in the *Republic* and with *εἶδωλα* in the *Sophist*? When it is said that *αἴσθησις* considered apart from thinking 'becomes simply what we should call a stream of separate unrelated images—i.e., what may naturally be described as *εἰκόνες* which are objects of *εἰκασία*' (p. 81), is this too more than a play upon the ambiguous and unanalysed term *image*? And finally, if a wagon is said to be the object of *δόξα* in the *Theaetetus* and manufactured things are the objects of *πίστις* in the *Republic*, can one say that wagons are manufactured things and that *πίστις* must therefore be identical with *δόξα*? Or should one not first consider that in the *Republic* the class of things seen is expressly separated off from the whole realm of *δόξα* for illustrative purposes and that a manufactured thing is simply more clearly seen than its shadow, whereas in the *Theaetetus* a wagon is introduced in a tentative distinction between the general idea we all have of wagon and the knowledge (if such it be) of all the separate elements out of which a wagon is made?

A. S. F.

REFLECTIONS
ON
ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF TRAGEDY.

I.

In all literature, ancient and modern, there are a few conspicuous passages which afford the perennial charm of mystery. Each generation of students looks on them, as Desire looks on the Sphinx; and one or another is drawn by magic into the maze of explanations which are the ghosts of former efforts. Such is the passage in which Aristotle once defined Tragedy, and if this essay achieves no final solution of the riddle, it may at least deserve the grace due to any honest venture which sustains the unfinished quest.

As this is not, in the words of the academic regulations, a contribution to knowledge, I have called it a budget of reflections. It represents in fact a voyage of the mind, a voyage of exploration directed more by desire than purpose and terminated by arrival at a stopping place rather than a final goal. The beginning of the quest was in the passage which defines the nature of tragedy (*Poetics*, 1449b 24) and more particularly in the word *κάθαρσις*. The way led naturally through a forest of explanations, all of them familiar to students of Aristotle, and left one uncertain whether this grove was not the one originally designated by the philologists as 'lucus a non lucendo.'

Thus far the journey had been uneventful and my experience seemed to coincide with the slightly pessimistic mood of

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Zeller. The right course seemed to be to acknowledge frankly that there was no real solution of the puzzle, or that life was too short for such quixotic campaigns. But in an age that substitutes 'becoming' for 'being' and admires process more than finality, there is no small excuse for the unambitious pilgrim who only desires to tell his story. Accordingly I will continue to explain why satisfaction was not felt, and how the quest proceeded. This will lead to a final statement that the most useful part of this study was the comparison of the different works from which material could be drawn, namely the *Politics*, the *Ethics*, the *Rhetoric*, the *Poetics*. The results can hardly claim to be novel or revolutionary, but some value may be discerned in a method which elucidates a topic by widening the scope of its significance.

II

The original topic is the idea expressed by the term *κάθαρσις*. This word has many shades of meaning, but we may follow the expositions of the editors and reduce them to three. Summarily stated these are (a) the religious, with the meaning 'lustration'; (b) the pathological, or medical sense of 'purgation'; (c) the moral, with the idea of 'purification.'

These three interpretations are clearly not exclusive; they do not form a true logical classification, because there is no single principle of classification and no way of determining the limits of each division. If, for example, religious purification is taken to include the relief of a burdened conscience, it includes one part of the medical significance: for 'purgation' is defined as producing relief and restoring a normal state in an organism whose equilibrium depends equally on physical and psychic factors: while the third meaning is a compound of the other two, since moral purification implies the objective

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ritual of 'lustration' and the subjective 'purgation' of the humours which corrupt body and soul. These three interpretations, therefore, differ only in emphasis.

This rather tame conclusion is, in fact, a significant point. If the student will read through Bywater's list of translations, beginning from Paccius in 1527,¹ he will see that they are different (when there is any difference) because their authors knew that the emphasis might be put on one or other of these three phases, but had no established principle on which to base their preference. Bywater² claims to have shown that 'the pathological interpretation of *κάθαρσις* was not unknown in Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries': as that was the time when the 'humours' were again made the basis for explaining character, temperament and the passions, this fact is not surprising. Bywater himself thinks this 'physiological metaphor' is the real explanation of *κάθαρσις*. His reasons are mainly philological, that is to say he relies on the uses of the word in Aristotle. He is prepared therefore to reject Lessing's view that 'the tragic purification of the passions consists merely in the conversion of pity and fear into virtuous habits of mind.' In addition to all other reasons for doubting this interpretation there is one of supreme importance; for Lessing obviously deduces his views of *κάθαρσις* from his view of Tragedy. To estimate the value of Lessing's view we should be compelled to discuss the whole question as to whether Lessing's idea of tragedy coincided with Aristotle's; and whether in any case the definition given in the *Poetics* states what Tragedy actually does, or gives an ideal definition of what it ought to do. But this discussion will be postponed indefinitely, because it is enough for the present purposes to recognize the profound difference which

¹Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry*, p. 361.

²*op. cit.*, p. 152.

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exists between a statement of actual psychological effects due to a specific art (*τέχνη*) and a theory of aesthetic values. Whatever means we adopt for establishing the exact sense of *κάθαρσις*, the argument must *not* take the form 'since tragedy ought to have a moral effect, therefore its elements must have a purifying effect.' On the contrary (as Bywater recognizes) we must first decide scientifically how passions are aroused and what phenomena are normal, leaving it to the 'politician' to make use of these facts if our science of poetry affords him the means to his own ends.

III.

The question of means and ends introduces a new phase of the subject. Aristotle is distinguished from his master Plato by his love of system; and this is not merely a love of divisions, subdivisions and titles; it is rather a love of order and relevancy by which he is perpetually driven to make fine distinctions and limit his topics. Knowing that this is Aristotle's very nature, we must not forget its influence even where it is not expressly shown. On the contrary we may assume that context, in the wide sense, is all-important: we may assume, for example, that the field of one treatise will differ from that of another in such a way as to alter the focus of all its constituent parts. On this assumption there will be good ground for making separate investigations into the different treatises involved.

Margoliouth³ tells us 'every one agrees that the first clue is the passage near the end of the *Politics*, where there is a reference to the *Poetics* for further light.' This statement encourages us to expect a real solution of the problem, but in fact Aristotle says: 'the word *purgation* we use at present

³Margoliouth, *Aristotle, Poetics*, p. 56.

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without explanation, but when hereafter we speak of poetry, we will treat the subject with more precision! And Jowett adds, faintly in a foot-note, 'cp. *Poet.* c. 6, though the promise is really unfulfilled'!⁴ Apart then from what we read *into* this passage, we have little warrant for expecting any help from it. Yet the whole passage in the *Politics* is important, for reasons now to be considered.

The general topic in the *Politics*, Book VIII (Jowett's trans.), is education. The work as a whole being a handbook for statesmen, the subject of education is treated in a manner which is strictly 'practical'. We can imagine ourselves attempting to justify our ways to an inspector who asks, What are you educating them *for*? We prepare ourselves with a list of suitable answers—the useful, virtue, knowledge—but in fact we remain a little uncertain which answer is likely to turn away wrath: perhaps the best course is to survey what tradition makes us accept, and analyse the curriculum!

Some subjects are easily placed: reading and writing, of course, for all manner of obvious advantages: gymnastic for the body: 'music, to which is sometimes added drawing.'⁵ Alas! these 'extras' never seem quite well placed: the parents want them, but object to the fees: the Inspector worries about their utility: and some one in the smart set says that anyhow the flute will never do, it makes you look so funny!⁶ A musical genius, lacking in good taste, suggests that music is really quite valuable, something like sleep or intoxication;⁷ and when this shocking remark dies away, a solemn voice is heard pointing out that God plays no instrument!

What help are we to get from this abortive attempt to conciliate the Education Department. Frankly I should expect

⁴*Aristotle's Politics*, translated by Benjamin Jowett p. 314, 1905.

⁵*Politics*, 1337b.

⁶*Pol.*, 1341b.

⁷*Pol.*, 1339a.

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none save for the fact that Aristotle is trying to solve a really profound problem, the last great problem of the statesman—how to educate a nation to make right use of its leisure. This is the real 'problem' of education: the busy man is a slave; he runs after things which spring up automatically before him; but leisure is the activity which creates and creative activity has its place in civilization because a 'leisured class' appreciates it, encourages it, and may even practise it. This is the answer so far as music is concerned: we did not invent it, for it is natural: we did not make it pleasant, for it always had a curious affinity with our moods which makes us enjoy even a melancholy strain: we cannot neglect it, for people whistle and sing of their own accord, and classical music is really only the most refined way of 'playing with the rattle.'⁸ The elaboration of these phases would be a 'metaphysic' of music: our present scope is politics, and all we need to prove is that the good of the community requires its citizens to be good judges of musical performances: every one must be so far acquainted with music as to know what kind of music is being played and what its value is for the audience. A normal audience is simply a 'gathering', and music is a good 'entertainment' because it provides an occupation (hearing) in which all can share. There are also parts of audiences to be considered separately—the young, the extreme temperaments, the 'vulgar crowd composed of mechanics, labourers and the like.' Here too our statesman is justified. The experts tell us that there are 'ethical melodies, melodies of action, and passionate or inspiring melodies'⁹: and all the statesman requires to know is the results which the experts give him. So Aristotle passes on to his next point, that music should be studied for the sake of many benefits—namely education, purgation, intellectual enjoyment.

⁸*Politics*, 1340b.

⁹*Pol.*, 1341b.

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This is our climax, and its character should be carefully estimated. The state must keep music in its curriculum because it will in the future need at least three types of persons: (1) those who understand its use for education and become music teachers, either as being great performers or composers or theorists (exponents of the theory of music); (2) those who understand its use as a part of the medical treatment of the pathological emotions; (3) those who form the cultured audiences and are the genuine critics, who do not perform on instruments or practise on patients, but live the life of the just citizen made perfect.

In all this, finally, Aristotle says nothing specifically about purgation and nothing at all about tragedy: he only explains why music is to be a part of education as regulated by a state. Unlike Plato he seems to regard the question as primarily concerned with occupations. The highest occupation of man is the use of intellect, and this is shown in sound judgement. Drawing is to be studied because it produces sound judgement of the human form: and we may add that as such it will be useful in the criticism of gymnastics, for the citizen will disapprove of physical training if it tends to brutalize. Similarly music is to be studied because it produces sound judgement of melodies and rhythms, which are important because they increase and decrease passions, and so affect deeply the life of man, as being a mixed creature. It is significant that Aristotle provides 'popular' music for the masses: there are many degrees in a commonwealth and the 'animal' element in music is a sort of common denominator: it will not offend the cultured, for 'feelings such as pity and fear . . . have more or less influence over all', but they will regard it critically and judge its merits by the *λόγος* in themselves and the 'rule of art' which it embodies along with its 'sweetness.' Perhaps Aristotle understood obscurely why folk-songs and popular

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airs have been so often the essence of the greatest music: for nature creates them in the undiscovered depths of feeling and art recreates them for the mind that demands explicit rules of method (τέχνη) and intellectual enjoyment (διαγωγή).

IV.

The problem of means and ends, from which we reached the required parts of the *Politics*, will also lead into the *Rhetoric*. Here we shall find another phase of the questions concerning 'pity and fear and the affections of this class': we shall find also that Aristotle is thinking about politics again from a different angle, and rises to a view of the whole situation which, as a whole, seems to comprehend the real essence or genus of which politics, rhetoric, and poetics are distinct.

The art of Rhetoric arises as a 'variation' from Logic. Logic, dialectics and rhetoric are all arts occupied in providing proofs. In a perfect world, controlled by reason, nothing would be needed except logical proof: all sequences or connexions could be logically demonstrated and all persons would accept the conclusions as rational. But the actual world is very different. If we admit a sphere of true science, necessary and demonstrative, there is also the important sphere of 'probabilities.' In fact, human affairs and human interests are generally uncertain and probable; so much so that a moral scepticism springs up and even honest people believe nothing is really quite certain. In this atmosphere the orator grows into a shallow 'pleader', trained in all the tricks by which emotions can be utilized to secure verdicts. This occupation is so profitable and so debased that 'rhetoric' scarcely means anything else. But Aristotle would distinguish the different types: beside the pleading of the law court

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(δικανικόν) there is the 'consultative' (συμβουλευτικόν) argument: and this is the true type of 'rhetoric'.

This point must be scrutinized minutely; for the word 'orator' and the idea are alike too commonplace for the purpose; and it is easy to fail in estimating what seems to us utterly familiar. Yet we know that from Aristotle to Quintilian the great orator tended more and more to be the type of ideal citizen. This is not strange if we remember that the orator, as here defined, has practical judgement combined with the power of securing and controlling popular support. He is therefore a phase of the politician, fit to rule wherever government by persuasion is constitutional: and Pericles actually embodied the virtues which Aristotle assigns to the ideal orator. If we are to understand the teaching of Aristotle all ideas of oratory as merely an art of language must be relegated to the furthest background.

Yet of course nothing is more important than language in the equipment of the orator. Words are the means which he will employ and this class of 'sounds' will be his instrument, though we must not forget that he may write speeches not intended for delivery. For this reason Aristotle does not neglect the technical questions of oratory, questions of topic, style, rhythm and the like. But as these subjects are not important for the present discussion, no more attention will be given to them. The significant feature of Aristotle's treatise is that he considers the whole situation in which oratory has its function and realizes that speech is relative to hearing. If an argument falls on inattentive or disaffected ears, it is wasted. The orator must remember three things: (a) the logical method of proof, (b) the influence of his own presence according as his moral prestige (*ἦθος*) adds to or subtracts from the weight of his words, (c) the attitude of the audience who may be willing or unwilling to reinforce his

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arguments by a benevolent and unprejudiced attitude (*εὐνοια*). A convincing argument is therefore very different from a correct argument. The difference lies in the simple fact that an argument is only convincing if some one is convinced. Rhetoric as an art must combine with its formal or logical elements a psychological part, and this is the reason why the second book of the *Rhetoric* is so largely concerned with the emotions which an orator must control.

This second book of the *Rhetoric* is so important that it deserves to be analysed in detail, but as space will not permit so elaborate a treatment, the most important features must be selected as proofs of the argument here evolved. My thesis, briefly, is that Aristotle's view of the meaning of *κάθαρσις* is to be derived from this source; that the required link between the *Politics* and the *Poetics* is here supplied: and, finally, that if we understand how far the politician is an orator, the orator an actor, and the actor both orator and politician, we shall attain a right interpretation of the whole subject. This in no way excludes any technical medical statements about 'purgation', all of which may be true; but it implies that neither politician nor orator nor poet is required to know the medical facts, any more than a person who regards a blush as a confession of guilt need also know what inner mechanism produces the visible effect.

In the *Rhetoric* the emotions discussed are all those which produce changes in persons and so affect their judgements (*κρίσεις*). They are all states which induce pleasure or pain, and the examples are anger, pity, fear *καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα*.¹⁰ Anger is due mainly to the feeling that one is despised, and is expressed as resentment. The orator must remove this

¹⁰Others are actually discussed but the details cannot be given and this epitome, as given by Aristotle, is valuable as showing how pity and fear are uniformly selected to represent the whole group.

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resentment by first adopting the attitude of the resentful person and then showing that the objects of his anger are 'either formidable, or worthy of high respect, or benefactors, or involuntary agents, or as excessively afflicted at what they have done.'¹¹ These 'topics' will induce 'gentleness' (*καταπραΰνειν*) and what is then said in defence of the offender will be accepted without prejudice.

Let us suppose that the orator wishes his audience to feel fear (as might be the case if he were persuading them to be prepared for disaster or to refrain from some form of *ὑβρις*.) The *practical* orator will then make his audience 'think or feel that they are themselves liable to suffering: for (as you suggest) others greater than they have suffered: and you show that their equals are suffering or have suffered: and this came from such as they never expected it from: and when not expected.'

Pity is only possible to those who think they may suffer: men will not pity if they have already lost all, or deem themselves beyond the reach of all evil (i.e., *ὑβρίζουσιν*). Here follows a long list of the reverses of fortune which excite pity, and may therefore be regarded as proper 'topics.' Moreover, Aristotle here admits an element of 'acting' (*ὑποκρίσει*) to 'visualize' the facts (*πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιούντες*).¹² This is supplemented in Book III by the treatment of style (*λέξις*) or delivery. This subject has been neglected, says Aristotle; and the reason is that it came late into tragedy and rhapsody: yet declamation is an important part of rhetoric and poetic, and it is gaining more importance owing to the corrupt state of public life.

The relation between appeals to emotion by 'acting' and the 'corruption' of the commonwealth must be emphasized here.

¹¹Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, vol. II, p. 41.

¹²*Rhetoric*, ii. c. 8 § 14 (Cope, vol. II, p. 105).

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As the basis of Rhetoric is conviction (*πίστεις*) and this is presumably right opinion, the purest form is rational, closely akin to logic: but the practical orator always has to consider the weakness of the audience, which is also fundamentally a decline in public standards (*μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν*).¹³ Similarly in the *Poetics*, the use of appeals to emotion by extraneous arts is only justified by the weakness of the audience (*τῆν τῶν θεατῶν ἀσθένειαν*). Thus Rhetoric and Poetic have a common basis in the presentation of a plain unvarnished tale, which by its own virtue carries conviction: but the weakness of human nature requires the use of further appeals to the senses (of hearing in the case of sounds that reproduce expressions of joy or grief, of sight in the case of actions, gestures, or even mourning attire). Though these aids are practically necessary, they are not essentials, and it is therefore a matter for regret (*Rhet.*, iii. 1.) that the prizes are won by the actors rather than the poets, thus making the production more important than the play. All this, we can well understand, must have been very repugnant to Aristotle.

V.

The preceding sections are intended to clear the ground. They show that each treatise has a specific topic and deals with a group of ideas from distinct points of view. This is to be noted carefully, for any light we may hope to get on the subject of tragedy must be derived from this fact. Our thesis is, in brief, that some, if not all, of the difficulties vanish when we remember that Aristotle limits himself in the *Poetics* to the analysis of a form of art. If this is the case, we can deduce at once that no question of effects produced on the spectators enters into the definition of tragedy. On general principles it

¹³*Rhet.*, iii. 1. 5.

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seems to me almost impossible that Aristotle should include in a definition of an 'essence' anything that is extraneous or accidental: he would be far more inclined to assert that a tragedy remains a tragedy, though no one hears or sees it, just as virtue remains virtue though unrewarded, and a triangle is a triangle though embodied in no material form. But as this a priori argument will lead into many conflicts with existing views, I will present it purely as a working hypothesis.

Let us assume then that the actual definition of Tragedy involves no reference to any 'purgation' experienced by the audience, and that the purgation remains an essential part of tragedy. This view will be supported (a) by those who reject Lessing's 'moral' interpretation, (b) by Margoliouth in so far as he realizes that the passions would be excited and therefore increased rather than expelled, (c) by the shrewd comment of Bywater¹⁴ that this treatment would be so rare and intermittent as to be worthless. Special attention may be given to Bywater's point because it is almost the only sign I have found among editors that they appreciate the false subjectivity of modern commentators. Nothing can be achieved until the reader's mind is cleared of the notion that Aristotle is speaking of a modern theatre to which people can turn for relief six days a week, if they like; or that 'psychological appeal' is to be regarded as having any place in the ancient conception of an art.

But the most potent argument for our hypothesis is the fact that it is very difficult to find in Aristotle any reference to this 'purgation' of the audience. The original definition says nothing about it; at 1450b 16 Aristotle says 'the tragic effect is quite possible without a public performance and actors': and when the audience is mentioned it seems to be regarded

¹⁴p. 156.

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as having a 'weakness' which induces the writer of plays to aim at pleasure and corrupt his art (1453a 35). The 'spectacle' is excluded from the essence of tragedy, though it is a part of theatrical production (1450b 20), and Aristotle remains throughout more clear on this distinction between the play and its *χορηγία* than most of his commentators. In matter and in tone there is a striking parallel between these passages and the corresponding sections of the *Rhetoric*: the good speech is also a work of art, corrupted by any appeal to emotions and made perfect by the right union of logical proof, character (*ἦθος*) and diction. The actual outcome of successful oratory is a conviction. Perhaps the real work of Tragedy is to produce a type of conviction suited to the transcendent nature of its topics.

I would digress a moment to ask whether even Bywater's excellent translation is not really affected by his view of the function of tragedy, and actually distorted to maintain it. To show that this is the case I will consider what Aristotle says about the 'Fable or Plot' (Bywater, p. 23 *seqq.*). The Plot is the most important thing in Tragedy: it is by nature an organism, almost: its unity is logical, an inner bond of necessity: its incidents arouse pity and fear. What then should the Poet aim at? (*ibid.*, p. 35). What are the conditions of the tragic effect? Aristotle says: '(1) A good man must not be seen passing from happiness to misery, or (2) a bad man from misery to happiness. The first situation is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply odious to us.' (p. 35). So runs the translation, but there is nothing in the Greek about 'to us'! So again 'The second is the most untragic that can be; . . . it does not appeal either to the human feeling in *us*, or to *our* pity or to *our* fears.' But the text has no equivalent for any of these words underlined. Is it significant that Bywater puts them in and Aristotle leaves them out? I think it is, and

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without citing further evidence I will explain why the translator should avoid such additions.

I think Aristotle meant *ἐλεεινόν* and *φοβερόν* to stand by themselves as marks of real causes, things truly pitiable and truly fearful, whether any one actually felt pity and fear or not. There might always be a Jason to say, 'What's Hecuba to me?' but Hecuba is a tragic figure *ἀπλῶς*, not *πρὸς ἡμᾶς*. So in the *Ethics* we are told that the man who excused himself for killing his mother talked nonsense: there is no such excuse! But if no one feels pity and fear, what is the meaning of the remark? The answer is that Aristotle is making an analysis: the sequence of events in the drama is the point at issue. The plot is bad if the cause of fear is inadequate, because the *dramatis persona* who responds with the tragic horror is then merely ridiculous. The quality of the play depends on the just balance of action and reaction: to express fear when nothing is truly fearful is comedy: to be indifferent toward the ordinary causes of fear is merely to fail in sustaining the part.

The persons who ought to 'feel' what the situations involve are the poets (1455a 31): they must have the special gift, almost a touch of madness, to see that invisible world of thoughts and motives which will be reincarnated in the actors. The audience can be expected to feel pleasure, for there is a pleasure of tragedy (1453a 36), and it is wholly distinct from the 'pleasant ending' which is in character more comic than tragic. Tragedy requires to be serious, and therefore the pleasure it affords can hardly be a feeling of joviality: it must rather be a sense of satisfaction. If this is satisfaction with the divine order of the world, if tragedy thus 'justifies the ways of God to men,' we come back to the 'moral' view of its function. And this I think Aristotle would admit to be the actual result of the best tragic dramas, but I feel equally sure

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that he would not include this extraneous result in the definition of the *essence* of tragedy. In any case, the resulting satisfaction would not be a subjective mood of purified passion, but a function of judgement.

This argument can now be concluded. The definition of Tragedy is taken to be a definition of its essence: this essence consists practically in the nature of the plot, for the rest is really a matter of production in the technical sense, the 'staging': the plot of a tragedy (as distinct from comedy) is always concerned with situations which involve pity and fear: these are the two factors with which it works, and it ends in a resolution of the tension indicated by these emotions, a clearing up of the emotions which belong to its sphere. It is difficult to invent such situations, for the persons involved must be 'better than ourselves': the plane of tragedy is elevated, and a 'hero' must by necessity occupy a conspicuous position; so that the poet is easily tempted to over-reach himself and achieve that success which we call melodrama. Since the situation must be 'possible', and yet a marvel to all, Aristotle thinks the poets do well to use only the accepted subjects, such as '*The Oedipus*.' Clearly the audience was very *critical*; it might easily discount all the merits of a play by refusing to accept its plot: as Aristotle says, if a thing *has* happened, no one can dispute its possibility. The history of Greek drama certainly suggests that the audiences had no craving for novelty of subject: surprise was an element in the treatment rather than the choice of a subject. All this goes to show that the audiences must have been as a rule pretty well acquainted with the pitiable and fearful things they were to behold: and this familiarity would hardly increase the 'purgative' effect, or might even produce immunity.

As the actual 'histories' of Priam, Hecuba, Oedipus and others were well known, so the moral theme of *ὑβρις* is recog-

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nized as having become the focus of tragic drama. The sin has been committed somewhere at some time: God is not mocked: there is a cosmic tribunal where the Eternal Reason by the logic of cause and effect delivers its judgements: the prisoner at the bar is not a common criminal but something greater in scope, an inheritor of crime: he has no guilty conscience, but dark forebodings rise in the soul where memory (*ἀνάμνησις*) slumbers fitfully: as the coming doom draws near the indefinite suspicion becomes oppressive fear: in the climax the suffering is excessive, because the individual suffers for the sins of others and pays in his person for the guilt of his race: he is 'excessively afflicted' and therefore becomes truly pitiable.

If this is a correct outline of a typical tragedy as conceived by Aristotle it will show automatically why fear and pity are the chief emotional elements. Suffering is expressly included as an essential (1452b 10.). It is also significant that Aristotle says the chorus should be regarded as actors. This opinion must be due to the fact that the chorus tends to guide and control the development of the play on its emotional side: it emphasizes in words the emotional significance which the actors can only present symbolically. To put the matter a little crudely, the actor can only die physically: the chorus must add that he dies undeservedly or justly. Out of the welter of facts and emotions there should emerge a concrete idea of life, exhibited in an ideal type, showing why things must have happened as they did and why the verdict of time is reasonable. The merit of a work of art is to be convincing and this is its *κάθαρσις*.

VI.

By way of epilogue and conclusion I may refer to some points which otherwise might seem unduly neglected.

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Considerable attention has been paid in recent times to the medical terms used by Aristotle. One of the virtues of Greek thought is the grasp which it always retains on the idea of the whole organism. Whether the corporeal elements, the 'body' as flesh, are praised, tolerated, or condemned they are at least not forgotten. The emotions, the expression of the emotions, and the whole complex of typical characters were subjects of increasing attention. The 'characters' of Theophrastus may be regarded as word-pictures of types, which actors might profitably study. But we cannot on this account quote Aristotle's medical phrases to prove that tragedy is a kind of medical treatment. For this reason the reliance placed on the technical passages in the *Problems* seems to me an error: they furnish no proof of the point at issue—namely, that Aristotle regarded the production of these physiological changes as a function of tragedy.

The relation of Aristotle to Plato is an important topic which cannot be adequately treated here. Bywater's reference to *Republic*, Book X, seems to me important for reasons other than his. Bywater¹⁵ thinks that Plato regarded drama as harmful because it nourishes the weaker elements of our nature, the tendency to tears and laughter. This is truth but not the whole truth. The view I would suggest is that Plato and Aristotle agreed in thinking that the 'weakness' of the audience and the 'corruption of the constitutions' (quoted above) rendered the drama a source of danger. We might quote modern instances to show that a play involving a murder can inspire one of the weaker sort to commit murder. The fact is that susceptible people are affected *emotionally* and may therefore abstract from their context the emotional incidents of the play. The real justification of a play is in the appeal which it makes to judgement, not in the incidents

¹⁵Bywater, p. 153.

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which present the constituent events. While Plato sees an actual danger which can only be overcome by the production of the right type of spectator, Aristotle confines his attention to the nature of tragedy itself. So far as concerns the proper end of tragedy there is no reason to suppose that Plato and Aristotle did not completely agree in regarding it as an imitation of life with significance for those who understand. All art is removed from reality and has an element of illusion: but harm only results for those who forget this and are corrupted in their judgements.

There remains the haunting fascination of Aristotle's words—'through pity and fear achieving its catharsis of such emotions.' Are these words 'pity and fear' merely symbols of emotions, chosen at random, or is there a deeper significance in their appearance here? They suggest an antithesis and challenge attention by force of the reasons which must have made them prominent in Aristotle's mind. If nothing can be set down as certain, perhaps a benevolent hearing may be granted to one more speculative reconstruction.

Plato, as it seems, looked for a profound moral reform before the drama could be an aid to the good life. Aristotle here, as always, leans to a more gradual development, achieved through existing means. The beginning of life as action is the conative impulse (*ὄρεξις*): the end is contemplation. The young live by their feelings: years may bring the philosophic mind. The drama shows us life in a way which enables us to contemplate it: it presents a specimen of a class of lives so that it can be seen as a logical whole. In the slow movement of daily life we lose our sense of proportion: if we prosper, we think no harm can ever come to us: if we meet disaster, we think there can be no relief and justice is dead. Sometimes we forget God and are insolent: sometimes we

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despair and blame God. Margoliouth says that in their conduct 'every *dramatis persona* is hitting or missing an imaginary mark.' I am not sure that I understand this phrase in its context, but I will give it the meaning I should like it to have. The mark is the mean, as Aristotle describes it in the *Ethics*. Every actor shows us how the true mean may be hit or missed. Those who run to excess and over-reach themselves are to be reduced by fear: those who suffer are to find pity and relief in the working of 'poetic justice.' If this interpretation is narrowed and taken to refer to a single person, then the mean will consist simply in fearing what is greater and pitying what is inferior. In either case the terms 'pity and fear' may be taken to indicate the limits of passion in the two directions which are typically defect and excess: for pity corrects the tendency toward intolerance and inhuman conduct, while fear sets a limit to the ambition that o'erleaps itself. If this interpretation is accepted it indicates that Aristotle's definition was after all little more than a compact statement of the aims common to all the Greek tragedians. For the mean in human life is part of the order of the universe and the man who transgresses it will sooner or later bring into play all the forces that make for righteousness in the universe. The conflict between man's variable nature and the laws which rule him inexorably is the essence of tragedy. To present this concretely in action is to define it in terms of act and feeling, freed from all that is confusing and irrelevant. This will be the particular catharsis which tragedy achieves, and which the spectator will judge to be truth because his reason accepts what is clear and by intuition grasps the finality of the conclusion.

The reasons for the affinity between the *Politics*, the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* can be stated thus. In the *Politics* the question of education involves the development of char-

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acter, and music has a distinct place in the 'diet' which nurtures the soul: in the *Rhetoric* the *emotions* are to be considered as the irrational factors which affect judgement, and the result desired is a definite verdict for or against a particular act or person. Here the conclusion is on a relatively lower plane, because it is 'practical' and ends in the deliberate choice of action, a direction of desire in the sphere of things mutable. In the *Poetics* there is no question of future action, no pleading for a verdict: the scene is laid in the past, the events are therefore eternal and immutable: the spectator judges 'theoretically', that is contemplatively. As an aesthetic judgement this involves only aesthetic values, and perhaps Aristotle would not have rejected the idea that after the analysis of science and the analysis of the 'practical reason' he had in fact laid the foundations for a critique of 'judgement' in the Kantian sense. I would argue that failure to recognize these fundamental changes of viewpoint has been the chief error in interpretation and has obscured the fact that a term like *κἀθαρσις* takes its meaning from its context.

G. S. BRETT.

THE FUNCTION OF THE PHANTASM

IN

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.

The task that I put myself to work at was to try to find out what connexion there is between the intellect and the phantasm in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. What started me on this line of thought was that I could not see how we could have sensible phantasms for such ideas as unity, being, causality and the like. I used to be under the impression that according to scholasticism we derived our ideas from sense representations and once in possession of these ideas, which were purely intellectual, there was no further use intellectually for the phantasm. My problem then was, how can I have a sensible impression of the idea of being, or any of the other ideas like it. As I went into this subject, I found that my interpretation of the expression in Aristotle and St. Thomas, 'No idea without a phantasm', was wrong. I found it was not only true that there is no idea without a corresponding phantasm, but that furthermore the corresponding phantasm must always accompany the idea in consciousness. Whenever we are conscious of an idea, a sensible representation of that idea must be present also in consciousness. Why is this so? This is the question that naturally arises and it seemed to me worth while to try to find out what Aristotle's greatest interpreter held on this point.

Within the narrow limits of this paper is compressed a short survey of a large field. The paper attempts to show

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what is meant by saying that the intellect understands only universals. Then the text of St. Thomas is examined and it is seen that he finds from experience that the intellect cannot think without at the same time turning to the phantasms of the things thought, although that by which we think is the likeness of the object thought, which is in the intellect. Why the intellect needs to turn to phantasms, he tries to explain but in a most unsatisfying way. The main views opposed to his are then taken up and shown to be unsatisfactory. It is then shown that St. Thomas fits in better with the text of Aristotle and what is lacking in the former is found also lacking in the latter.

It should hardly be necessary to do so, but it may not be out of place to run over a brief summary of the theory of abstraction. The sensible object in the external world sets up a motion in the medium between the object and the eye. The medium conveys the motion to the eye. By the combined action of the motion and the sense organ, the sensation of sight results. After the removal of the object, experience tells us that a sense representation of the sensation remains in the imagination. According to the theory of St. Thomas, the intellect has the power of bringing this phantasm into contact with itself. It renders it intelligible. As the colour in the object is not visible without light and without the organ of seeing, so the phantasm is not intelligible except it be made intelligible by the intellect. The intellect, then, both makes the phantasm capable of being understood, of being known; and at the same time understands it and knows it. These two powers of the intellect are called the *Intellectus Agens* and the *Intellectus Possibilis*, the active and the possible intellects. The active intellect renders the phantasm capable of being understood. The possible intellect understands. The active intellect makes the phantasm intelligible by abstracting from

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it that by which it understands. Something, then, is abstracted from the phantasm and taken up by the possible intellect. This something is called the Species Intelligibilis and it is not the thing understood, not the thing known, but that by which the thing is known. There seems to be no doubt that this Species Intelligibilis is an intellectual likeness or representation of the thing understood. It is universal; it is equally representative of the universal form wherever it is found in the external world. When we know a bell, what we have in our intellect is applicable to all bells in the world and to all the bells that ever can be in the world. The Species Intelligibilis is the likeness in the intellect of the object outside by which we know the object outside. What is in the intellect is stripped of all individualizing qualities. The Species Intelligibilis in me is different from that in you for the same idea, different in number but exactly alike and an instrument by which I know the one universal existing in external objects.

The intellect directly knows universals and only by very obscure and complicated reasoning can Aquinas bring the intellect to know particulars. On meeting this at first, it strikes us as rather ridiculous to say that it is difficult to explain how man as an intellectual creature can know individuals. We think that we do know individuals. As a matter of fact, a little reflection will show that the real difficulty is to explain how even in sense knowledge an animal can ever know the individual. Aristotle says that the intellect grasps only the universal. No man since his time more perfectly assimilated this than Thomas Aquinas. One could wish that Aristotle too had considered a point of view and a very important one, on which he is silent.

It can be seen as follows what it means to say that the intellect grasps only the universal. Every word in a language

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is the expression of a thought in the mind. This gives us the mental word, *verbum mentale*. Every spoken word and consequently every thought in general is applicable to an indefinite number of spoken sentences or organized groups of thought besides the one in which at any time it happens to be used. If we say or think, 'Tom Vahey is six foot three in height', any one of the words can be used in an indefinite number of other sentences. This is what is meant by a universal. People of different tongues think the same thought when they think the same object, while the spoken and written words differ. French and German have the same thought in mind when they think the law of gravitation. They express it differently. The number of words in expression is not necessarily the same. We must be careful, then; there must be something in the mind to correspond to each spoken or written word. It may, however, not be simple but a compound. Even in the same language the same thought may be adequately expressed by one, two or more words. 'Immediately' and 'at once' may be good enough for examples. All words and all thoughts are universals. We can only designate the particular by a group of universals which occurs but once in nature. Even proper names are universals. There are many Toms, and even quite a number of Vaheys. There may be only one Tom Vahey and in that case the designation is sufficient. If there are more, we must add some other universal such as, 'the billiard expert.' If there are several Tom Vaheys who are expert billiard players, we may add 'of Toronto'. We can narrow down ultimately to a given position in space and time before we have the individual sufficiently separated from all others. Even the space and time positions taken separately are universals. There are many men living now and many men have lived even in the very space occupied by Tom Vahey now. All that can be said of an individual object, or thought of it,

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is a group of universal words or thoughts. Is this group individual? Aside from the combination of space and time marks, taken together, the group, however numerous the predicates or universals, could be found elsewhere at a different time or in a different point in space. Although this particular Tom Vahey occupies this particular point in space at this particular point in time, it was possible for another to be the one; and all that we can now say of this one, we would have been able say of the other.

If you define Tom Vahey as the six foot three man, etc., and go on to say 'who was in a certain part of a certain room at ten o'clock on May the 16th, 1922', you have a particular. This group of universal characters could never be predicated of more than one extended object at the same time. It is the only case where we can get the particular. Even in this case, we do not know the particular. We know that what we see now we see now and no other, but which one we see now we cannot know. Assuming a number of men exactly like the one described, and assuming that I see one of them at a given spot at ten o'clock, May 16, 1922, how can I know which one is present? There is something peculiar and individual to each concrete object in the sense that no other object possesses it or could possess it. But how can we know it? This is what Aristotle meant when he said that the intellect knows only the universal.

What Aristotle failed to notice, and St. Thomas after him, was the difficulty experienced in explaining how sense knowledge knows only particulars. At first sight this looks easier. A little consideration reveals a lot of trouble. When I go to my mother's home at intervals of weeks or months, I resume acquaintance with the family Irish terrier, Ginger. Ginger does not hide his light under a bushel when he is engaged in his great function of guarding the house against

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strangers. His savage bark, except for the favoured few, is well known around the neighbourhood. No stranger day or night can step inside the precincts without a hostile demonstration from Ginger. I can, after an absence of months, walk boldly, even on the darkest night, right to the door. If he feels like it, he will stretch himself and come quietly out for a silent greeting, or he may decide to remain in his kennel and wait till morning. He knows my walk. If a perfect stranger should walk just like me, would he not mistake him for me? Of course he would, and is it not conceivable that a number of men should walk like me? My walk is universal. He knows my face, my clothes, the look in my eyes, my voice. Another man comes who wears clothes like mine, the same shape, size, his face is just like mine and his voice, the look in his eyes, every movement of the body, every expression of the face, every word that he speaks is just as it would have been with me then. Would Ginger know the difference? Ginger could not possibly know. There could be a thousand men like me and how could either reason or sense know me, know the particular? If this is not what is meant by knowing the particular, then what does it mean? For me, at any rate, there is a real problem here. It surely seems that even sense can only say that this individual A is a member of a class. It is true that there may be no other member of the class, but it would be possible to have many members and then the sense knowledge of the animal could not tell the difference between them, and so how does it ever know the particular?

However, St. Thomas faithfully reproduces the doctrine of Aristotle when he claims that sense knows particulars, the intellect knows universals. He holds that the intellect knows universals by means of the species intelligibiles which it possesses. It is important to establish (1) that these species intelligibiles are likenesses in the intellect of the objects

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outside the soul which are known by them, (2) that these species are in the intellect quite apart from the phantasm and are preserved in the intellect even after the soul is separated from the body and consequently from the phantasms which are in the sensible imagination and perish with the body. Assuming that some may read this who would be frightened off from Scholastic Latin through unfamiliarity with it, I am going to take the liberty of giving St. Thomas in English and I am going to use the Dominican translation of the *Summa Theologica* and Rickaby's Translation of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. The English of the other passages is my own.

(1) In the *Opusculum De Unitate Intellectus*, St. Thomas says: 'But when this (Species) is abstracted from its individuating principles, it does not represent the thing according to its individual condition but according to its universal nature only. For there is nothing to hinder, if two qualities are united in a thing, that one of them can be represented even in sense without the other.' No comment is necessary to show that the species in this passage represents the concrete external object. Again in the *Opusculum De Natura Verbi Intellectus*, there are a couple of passages worth quoting: 'Just as in the beginning of the intellectual activity, the intellect and the species are not two but the intellect itself and the species intellectually illuminated are one, so also in the end one thing remains, namely the perfect likeness [of the thing]'. 'Intellection terminates in that very thing in which the essence of the thing is received, nay from the very fact that it is itself, the likeness of the essence.' 'For the mental word (that is the thought in the mind which is expressed by the spoken word) is not begotten by the act of the intellect, nor is its likeness nor even the likeness of that species by which the intellect is informed . . . but the likeness of the thing'.

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De Differentia Verbi Divini et Humani: 'From this we can gather two things concerning the mental word, namely that the word is always something proceeding from the intellect and existing in the intellect and that the word is the nature and likeness of the thing understood . . . the concept which anyone has of a stone is only the likeness of a stone but when the intellect understands itself, then such a mental word is the nature and likeness of the intellect.' The concept is not the species; but if the concept is the likeness only of the thing, then the species too is the likeness of the thing. *De Sensu Respectu Singularium et Intellectu Respectu Universalium*: 'All knowledge takes place through the fact that the thing known is in some way in the one knowing, namely, according to its likeness . . . the intellect receives in an immaterial and incorporeal way the likeness of that which it understands . . . it is clear therefore that the likeness of the thing which is received in the sense represents the thing according as it is individual, but when received in the intellect it represents the thing according to its universal nature.' *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 4: 'And although this nature understood has a universal side when compared with things which are outside the mind because there is one likeness of all, nevertheless according as it has existence in this intellect or in that, it is a definite particular species understood.' *Summa Theologica*, Part I, q. 85: 'The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act.' *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book II, c. 59: 'The understanding as apt to understand and its object as open to representation and understanding are not one. . . The effects of the active intellect are actual representations in understanding.' *De*

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Potentiis Animae: 'Therefore the substance of a thing is that which the intellect understands, but the likeness of that thing, which is in the soul, is that by which the intellect formally understands the thing outside.' 'So understanding takes place through the possible intellect as receiving the likeness of the phantasm, through the operation of the active intellect abstracting the immaterial species from the phantasm and through the phantasm itself impressing its likeness on the possible intellect.' *Summa Theologica*, Part I, q. 87, a, 1: 'As the sense in act is the sensible in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the thing understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood which is the form of the intellect in act.' *Ibidem*, q. 87, a, 2: 'Material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul and are said, therefore, to be known by their likenesses.' *Ibidem*, q. 78, a, 2: 'Knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as a kind of form thereof.' It seems to me sufficiently clear without further comment that according to St. Thomas, the intellect knows things outside by likenesses of them which are in itself.

(2) Let us now show that these likenesses exist whole and entire apart from phantasms. In the sixth and seventh articles of the seventy-ninth question in the First Part of the *Summa Theologica*, Thomas proves that besides sense memory, there is an intellectual memory which stores ideas. They are preserved in the intellect when not present in consciousness; but to obtain a clear-cut view, no better way can be found than by considering the case of the soul after death, when the body with all sensible organs including the imagination and its phantasms no longer exists. For an understanding of the psychology of Aquinas, his treatise *De Angelis* and the different places where he treats of souls separated from their bodies are invaluable. Separated souls understand not only

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as well as in this life and that without any phantasms to which to turn; but indefinitely better. The mode of understanding after death is different from the mode of understanding while the soul is united to the body. When the soul is united to the body, it can only acquire new knowledge through the sensible impressions conveyed in the phantasm and it can have no thought without a corresponding phantasm. After death the soul retains the species intelligibiles of all the thoughts which it had in this life but these in perhaps every case, certainly in nearly every case, form but a very small portion of the knowledge which the separated soul possesses. The new knowledge gained does not come through phantasms but by the direct infusion of species intelligibiles. A few quotations will suffice to establish this. *De Unitate Intellectus*: 'It is evident that the species are preserved in the intellect; for it is as the philosopher [Aristotle] had said above, the place of species, and again, knowledge is a permanent habit.' *Contra Gentiles*, Book 2, c. 73: 'Nor can those impressions formally received into the potential intellect have ceased to be, because the potential intellect not only receives but keeps what it receives.' *Ibidem*: 'He [Avicenna] says that intellectual impressions do not remain in the potential intellect except just so long as they are being actually understood. And this he endeavours to prove from the fact that forms are actually apprehended so long as they remain in the faculty that apprehends them . . . but the faculties which preserve forms, while not actually apprehended, he says, are not the faculties that apprehend those forms but storehouses attached to the said apprehensive faculties . . . hence (because it has no bodily organ) Avicenna concludes that it is impossible for intellectual impressions to be preserved in the potential intellect, except so long as it is actually understanding. . . So it seems (according to Avicenna) that the preservation of intellectual

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impressions does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul, but, on careful consideration, this theory will be found ultimately to differ little or nothing from the theory of Plato. . . . Intellectual knowledge is more perfect than sensory. If, therefore, in sensory knowledge there is some power preserving apprehension, much more will this be the case in intellectual knowledge. This opinion [of Avicenna] is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who says that the potential intellect is the place of ideas; which is tantamount to saying, it is a storehouse of intellectual impressions, to use Avicenna's own phrase. . . . The potential intellect when it is not considering them [intellectual impressions] is not perfectly actuated by them but it is in a condition intermediate between potentiality and actuality.' *De Anima*, a, 15: 'Separated souls will also have definite knowledge of those things which they knew before, the intelligible species of which are preserved in them.' *Ibidem*: 'We must say that separated souls will also be able to understand through the species previously acquired while in the body but nevertheless not through them alone but also through infused species.' *De Natura Verbi Intellectus*: 'For that which is understood can be in the intellect and remain in the intellect without being actually understood.' In the fifteenth article of his treatise *De Anima* in the *Quaestiones Disputatae*, he deals with the question whether a separated soul can understand. Twenty-one objections are given and the matter is treated thoroughly. There is no doubt in his mind that the soul can think as in this life only much better and without any phantasms.

There remains the real problem of this paper. If the soul retains in the intellect the intellectual impressions by which it knows things and if when separated from the body it can think and understand without turning to phantasms, why should it have to turn to phantasms every time that it thinks?

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St. Thomas anticipated us in asking this question. In the seventh article of the eighty-fourth question in the first part of the *Summa Theologica*, he asks: Can the intellect actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed without turning to the phantasm? The answer is, no: 'the philosopher says (*De Anima*, 3) that the soul understands nothing without a phantasm'. The intellect does not make use of a corporeal organ. If it did not use the body or the sensible part of the soul in some way, there would be nothing to hinder the soul from its activity in the intellect after the lesion of a corporeal organ. We know, he says, as a matter of fact that this is not so. In cases of frenzy, lethargy, loss of memory, a man cannot think even of the things of which he previously had knowledge. Again any man for himself can see that when he tries to understand something, he forms phantasms to serve him by way of example.

In a nutshell, then, the reason why St. Thomas holds that we cannot think without turning to phantasms is because we know from experience that it is a fact. Our own experience will bear him out in this when it is a question of the great mass of all thought. Whether it is so obvious with the more general notions, such as unity, being, good, etc., it is not so easy to say.

At any rate, we know that St. Thomas holds that to be conscious of any thought we must at the same time turn to the phantasm in our imagination in which is imbedded the particular representation from which that universal thought was drawn, and secondly the reason why he claims that this is so is because it is a fact of experience.

One might then naturally inquire, what is the explanation? Granted that it is true, why does the soul have to turn to phantasms? St. Thomas answers this too. His answer is

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not all that one could wish. It is proper for an angel, he says, to understand without phantasms, directly through intelligible species, because it is an intelligible substance itself and without any body. It is natural for man as united with the body to learn of individual objects through individual phantasms rendered intelligible by the intellect. We apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And then, he says, for the intellect to understand, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms.

To say that it is natural for the soul to understand without turning to phantasms, would be to run into Platonism and say that the union of body and soul does not benefit the soul but the body. This in his opinion is absurd. The union of body and soul is natural and therefore good for the soul. To turn to phantasms is natural and good for the soul. Such is his answer. Granting this, we should like to ask, in just what way is it done and how is it good for the soul? The question presented itself to him. 'But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best (and it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to phantasms) it might seem that God would so order the soul's nature as to make the nobler way of understanding natural to it, and not to level it down for that purpose to the body.' (*Sum. Theol.*, Part I, q. 89, a. 1).

The answer in substance says that the nobler way would not be suitable to the inferior nature of man. Nature comprises a minutely graded series of beings from lowest to highest and the nobler is not suited to the less noble.

In the seventy-third chapter of the second book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* we are so near the point that we become excited. '[The potential intellect] understands immaterial things, but views them in some material medium; as is shown by the fact that in teaching universal truths particular

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examples are alleged, in which what is said may be seen.' Note that this is a fact of consciousness. 'Therefore the need which the potential intellect has of the phantasm before receiving the intellectual impression is different from that which it has after the impression has been received. Before reception it needs the phantasm to gather from it the intellectual impression. . . But after receiving the impression, of which the phantasm is the vehicle, it needs the phantasm as an instrument or basis of the impression received.' An understanding of the last clause would answer the question of this essay. 'And in this phantasm the intellectual impression shines forth as an exemplar in the thing exemplified, or as in an image.' He seems to have exactly the same view as Aristotle. We must use particular examples when reasoning on universal truths. It is a fact and that settles it.

Such is the way in which Aquinas expounds Aristotle's philosophy of the activity of thought in so far as it is connected with the phantasm. There is another exposition of Aristotle's meaning, diametrically opposed to this, holding that there is nothing in the intellect. The intellect sees the universal in the phantasms and takes nothing out of them. Remove the phantasms and thought ceases.

The two opposing views are closely connected with the question of the unity of the intellect and immortality. If thought is looking at phantasms, when the body perishes and with it all phantasms, there is no possibility of an after life. The battle over Aristotle's meaning raged in the middle ages between the two sides far more than is the case in our day. Theophrastus' few remarks as preserved in Themistius and the interpretation of Aristotle by Alexander of Aphrodisias had immense influence in spreading among the Arabians the doctrine of one intellect for mankind. Avicenna held that the active intellect is common to mankind, Averroes that both

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intellects are common. In either case the intellect sees the individual, concrete being in the phantasm. Although immortality should logically be inconsistent with this view, many Arabians and scholastic Averroists, particularly in Italy, maintained the immortality of the soul.

The majority of modern scholars favour the anti-Thomistic view. Windelband accepts it without reserve. Zeller tries to hold it and at the same time is convinced that there is an intellectual something. He is most obscure. Trendelenburg is pretty much scholastic. Brentano, in spite of his scholasticism, seems to be influenced. Adamson, who in my opinion reaches the heart of Aristotle better than anyone else, says that the intelligibles are not really separable from matter and cannot be apprehended except in concrete things. Rodier maintains that the intellect is the receptacle of forms and that the concept and consequently the scholastic species intelligibilis is quite apart from the sensible image. All admit the impossibility of establishing with any degree of certainty the true meaning of Aristotle.

The reason for the importance attached in this essay to the anti-Thomistic exposition is, first, because it is the only alternative: either there are intellectual impressions in the intellect by which we know the original objects or there are not; secondly, because according to it the necessity of turning to phantasms when thinking is obvious and, on the other hand, taking the Thomistic side no reason appears for the need of turning to phantasms in thought.

The anti-Thomistic exposition, continued along lines kindred to the mediaeval Arabians, does not seem so consonant with the facts of experience or as much in the spirit of Aristotle's language. Before trying to prove this statement, a word or two on Grote might be appropriate. I cannot find myself able

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to follow him with any satisfaction at all. He presses hard Aristotle's analogy of a figure on paper.

There is not even a triangle in general in the mind in any way. As we receive the sense impressions of a number of triangles, we group them together in the imagination, and when we use the general term triangle, what we mean is 'one of those.' This is true of all general terms and consequently of all words in the language. They signify no more than that what we mean is 'one of those' in that particular group of impressions joined together by a common likeness. The weakness of Mill and his followers is a failure to analyse thoroughly the concept of like and unlike. To say that like impressions group themselves together and then to pass on is to ignore the most profound question in philosophy. What is the meaning of like and unlike?

Let us now attempt to see how far the anti-Thomistic opinion in general fits the facts of experience and is in agreement with Aristotle. By it the intellect sees in the phantasm (and only one phantasm of a species is sufficient) the universal nature of the thing or quality; sees it as universally applicable to other individuals.

We talk about the triangle ABC, about A and B and C, about AB, BC, CA, about angle ABC. We turn away from the board and talk about it; we rub it out and still talk about it. Besides the triangle on the board, there is the thought in the mind, the triangle in the mind. When we leave the outside, enter the mind and consider thought, how does the analogy work? The phantasm is present and the mind considers it. When one thinks, is there a thought separate from the phantasm? When the figure on the blackboard is absent, we talk about and think about the sensible representation in our minds. Within the mind itself, is there an intellectual representation separate from the sensible phantasm? Or is

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thinking merely the mind looking at different aspects of the phantasm, looking at the shape and ignoring all else, looking at the size and ignoring all else, etc., etc.? In that event, it would be analogous in sensible knowledge to pointing.

To make this clear, let us suppose two men with only one phantasm between them and that outside of both, as an external object, or a figure on a blackboard. There is no idea or representation in the soul of either man. Is not this a close analogy to the above interpretation of the use of the phantasm in thought? How would it work? If the external phantasm, or external object, consisted of two houses, how could one man communicate to another that one house is larger than the other? Thinking is talking to oneself. If one thinks, one can express his thought in language. One phantasm, and that outside the men, is taken so that we can get at what takes place in the soul. If there were a phantasm in each, in communicating each would mean his particular phantasm. If the same man both indicates and receives, talks and listens, he possesses only one phantasm. In our supposed case, the two are taken in order to see what takes place in one when one talks to oneself, that is when one thinks. The man comes to the decision that this house is larger than that. Is it not equivalent to saying to himself, 'this is larger than that'? How can he say that? With the two phantasms in him, or with one phantasm in him which includes the two, he says, 'this one is larger than that'. Consider the two phantasms as outside of him. He will say to himself or to another, 'this is larger than that'. He will not use words expressive of ideas whether vocal or signs, because, according to the theory, there is no representation accompanying the phantasm. Perhaps an easier example could be taken. I cannot think of an easy one. He could point to each phantasm. It would be rather difficult by pointing to indicate quantity and that one quantity is different

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from another. He might draw his foot around the extremity of each phantasm, thereby covering the shapes. One might infer that he meant that one object was circular and one square. It is vital to remember that there is no thinking apart from the pointing and that there is no inference back of it. If the man points to red and blue and red, what would that mean? It certainly would not signify that the first is like the third and unlike the second. Remember we are trying to analyse what goes on within the intellect. If for the present, we allow ourselves the use of some difficult 'words' like big, small, like, different, is, a, the, motion, space, time, and their modifications; if we take it for granted that we have phantasms for them, we might be able to illustrate knowledge according to this theory. To think, 'red is different from blue', the man would point to the phantasm red, put in from somewhere or other the difficult 'is' and 'different from' and point to the phantasm blue. Leaving aside for the moment the difficult words, this should give us some grasp of thought. It is hardly necessary to call attention to its inadequacy.

Even at that we are confronted by a further tremendous difficulty according to this theory. If one man is going to communicate a judgement to another, must he not be conscious of the judgement beforehand? I know that not only in animals, but in man too, a great part of our thoughts come automatically, mechanically. If I am making myself clear, there is a big difficulty. How can the man, before he selects the phantasm necessary for his judgement, know which one to select? According to our illustration, it is impossible to bring to bear on it any knowledge apart from the phantasms. Memory cannot give any help. Memory is a storehouse of phantasms. The phantasms of the distant past stand on the same footing, as far as this point is concerned, as the recent phantasm. There must be some power to draw from memory

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and there must be knowledge of what to draw. Thinking is an arrangement of phantasms, an orderly arrangement of phantasms. (I am avoiding the question of true and false.) What makes it orderly? There is no thought, no idea apart from the phantasms. They are the ideas or thoughts or whatever you will call them and there is nothing else except the power of looking at them, selecting them and arranging them in an orderly way. Is man so fortunate as to arrange them properly? I might add that this problem is not peculiar to the explanation of thought which we have now under consideration. Brentano sees the difficulty and says it is the will. Of course it is the will, but does that explain the difficulty? How is one to will to call up a phantasm which is not present and cannot be thought of until it is present?

For those who interpret Aristotle as giving to the phantasm the function of a figure on a blackboard, in the sense that there is no intellectual idea apart from the phantasm, all the difficulties here mentioned present themselves. It is hardly worth while criticizing on this point Grote's attempt to make Aristotle an English Empirical Philosopher. With the others who claim that the intellect can do its work with only one phantasm of a species before it, we have a view more in the spirit of Aristotle, but still with the same difficulties to overcome. As I read them, although they use such terms as 'the intellect grasping the universal', 'abstracting', 'separating', they use the examples of the visible geometrical figure and push it to the extreme limit; they emphasize Aristotle's insistence that the universal is only found individualized in the concrete objects of the species. This may be logical. It is another question whether Aristotle so thought. According to this interpretation, thought is the act of the intellect looking at the phantasm, or some quality of the phantasm. In sense knowledge, an animal sees an object and carries away a repre-

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sentation of it. In intellectual knowledge, the intellect sees a universal in the phantasm but carries nothing away, takes nothing out of it. In thinking, there is nothing in the intellect but the power of seeing the universal in the phantasm. Take away the phantasm and thinking goes with it. At once we are faced by the difficulties which the above-mentioned example was intended to illustrate. Thought is the arrangement and contemplation of phantasms or aspects of phantasms. A sentence or the organized group of thoughts of which it is the expression, would be like the eye looking at the different objects in a room in an orderly manner, if we could eliminate the conscious thought behind the eye. Perhaps it would be a better comparison, though still halting, to imagine first a number of words on a blackboard and something pointing to one after another in such order as to make sense.

What must be firmly grasped is, that there is no thought back in the intellect which looks, corresponding to the object seen. It is true that we know that we know and that this fact is hard to corner. What stands out above all is that there is no thought in the mind apart from phantasms.

It is true that Aristotle insists that the individual alone exists (that is, the concrete object), and so seems to lend support to this theory. In the next breath he says that in sense knowledge, the form enters without the matter. In the sense the soul possesses the identical object outside stripped of matter. According to his own words clearly stated and to be seen in a score of places, the form does exist apart from the concrete external object. The form, whether the individual form or the species form, is both inside the mind and outside the mind at the same time. With an understanding of immateriality, this presents no difficulty. When Aristotle is harping on the impossibility of Plato's Ideas being 'separate'

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from things in the world of sense and pressing hard that his Forms are in things, he was not thinking of the intellectual thought in the mind; he was fighting against the universal being set up as a separate metaphysical existence, presumably, independent of mind and sensible object. If sense knowledge is like the imprint of a seal on wax and if intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge, should not the impression of the phantasm, (in whatever way the sensible-intellectual chasm is spanned) leave an impression of some kind on the intellect, should there not be in the intellect a representation of the phantasm, as the phantasm is a representation of the object? Could it not be that the form, the essence, since it does exist at the same time in the object and in the phantasm, exists also, in a still purer form, in the intellect? True, the definition of Socrates which formed the basis for Plato's metaphysical Idea and for Aristotle's Form was expressible in words and it would seem that to be consistent, if we know the essence, we should be able to express our knowledge in words and the old question could be put, do we ever know the inner essence of things? Not completely, but we do define, classify and to that extent know the essences of things. It need not mean more than that the intellect would assign an object to a class. It might be asked, 'Why do you assign it to that class? Why do you say that that is its essence?' and the reply might be given, 'I cannot explain the reason why, but I know it is one of that class.' Is it not true that we do a lot of apparently mechanical work that way? If we knew more about the internal mechanism of the mind, we might find out that what we glibly call the laws of association of ideas are merely expressions of such operations. It is easy to say that like idea calls up like idea. How is it that like ideas become connected in the mind? They are not connected by a conscious, intentional operation. The mind by an uncon-

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scious movement classifies every object which it meets. This is a fact which needs no proof. To say that A is like B is to express the essence of A to that extent. The mind may do this consciously. It certainly does it unconsciously too. To classify is to define, to define is to give the essence. The mind unconsciously classifies like with like and thereby, it seems to me, shows that it grasps the essence. To know the essence in this manner, to grasp the essence, does not mean that the mind sees the complete inner nature of a substance with the eye of omnipotence. With all my books on the floor, I undertake to place them in the shelves. How do I go about it? I put the Greek books together, the Latin ones together, etc. They are all books; they belong to one genus. To classify the members of this genus into species, I take the books which are 'alike' which have a specific difference in common. To define the essence of this particular member, all that is necessary is to name the genus and that in which the members of its class are alike, e.g., the Greek language. To define, then, to express the essence, it is sufficient to know resemblances and differences. The mind does this as unconsciously as we assimilate food, every time it receives a new impression, grouping it with others which possess with it a common character. Any object or any event may be put in a number of different classes at the same time. The phenomenon is so ordinary, so universal that it fails to excite wonder. According to Aristotle's own words, then, the form enters the mind and is apart from the individual and the intellect can know this form, the essence.

Space does not permit of a very lengthy investigation into the text of Aristotle for the purpose of establishing how far the interpretation of St. Thomas agrees or conflicts with his master. It is hardly necessary to do so now. Trendelenburg, Adamson, Piat and Brentano,

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notwithstanding differences among themselves, agree that there is something intellectual in Aristotle's idea. They give no clue as to why the intellect should need the phantasm once it is in possession of the idea. Surely no apology is needed for saying that the case is not yet settled against the pure intellectual impression in the Thomistic sense.

It will have to suffice to examine briefly two passages in Aristotle, which strike me as two of the strongest against Aquinas' interpretation:

(a) τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ (*De Anima*, 431 b 2).

The sentence looks very much as meaning that the intellect sees the universal as it is in the phantasm and that there is never any intellectual impression of the object in the intellect. The word *νοεῖ* is the cause of the trouble. How would it be to translate: 'The intellect intelligizes the forms in the phantasms'? The meaning is not very clear. It is just as clear as the Greek. All our work is an attempt to establish what Aristotle meant by *νοεῖ*. If we knew that, we should know whether the universal is in the phantasm alone and in no way in the reason and we should know how the intellect uses the phantasm in thinking. Consequently we cannot use the word *νοεῖ* to prove that it means surveying universals which are in *φαντάσματα* and not in *νοῦς*, until we know the meaning of *νοεῖ*.

(b) ὅταν τε θεωρῆ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἀνευ ὕλης. *De An.*, 432 a 7.

I must admit that this passage shook my confidence in the interpretation of St. Thomas. It seems to do away with imageless thought. My objections still held but they were then objections to Aristotle. The word *θεωρεῖν* certainly does lend

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support to those who deny the intellectual impression apart from the phantasm. The case hinges largely on the word *ἄμα*. Without *ἄμα* the meaning would be that whenever a man contemplates an idea, he contemplates the phantasm and sees the idea in it. With *ἄμα* it means, whenever a man contemplates an idea, he must at the same time contemplate the phantasm. Are these two contemplations, one of the idea, which is apart from the phantasm, and one of the phantasm? Why it should be necessary for the mind to look at the idea, if it is separate, and then at the phantasm, I fail to see. Yet what is *ἄμα* doing there? We find ourselves in Aristotle facing the identical problem we are investigating in St. Thomas. No answer is afforded in Aristotle any more than in Aquinas but they do seem to agree.

And these are I think among the strongest passages favouring a difference between them. In all probability no explanation will explain all the difficulties of the subject. The theory which makes the intellect merely gaze at phantasms brings in its train insuperable objections; and, in spite of some passages which, taken in isolation, would lend themselves to support that theory, does not seem to be the mind of Aristotle.

Our results may be summed up as follows. The intellect, according to St. Thomas, cannot think without turning to phantasms. The intellectual impressions, the species intelligibiles, which the intellect gathers from phantasms, are in the intellect apart from phantasms, are preserved in the intellect when not in consciousness, and after death are sufficient for the exercise of thought, without turning to the phantasms. We know as a fact that we do turn in this life to phantasms when we think. We use examples to illustrate universal truths. We draw geometrical figures, particular ones, on the blackboard, and reason and talk of universal ones.

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But on the question, why this should be so, the answer is not satisfactory. A study of Aristotle and his commentators justifies one in holding that in this there is no opposition between 'The Philosopher' and his great admirer and greatest expositor. Aristotle, too, recognized as a fact that images accompany our thoughts, and that we use particular sensible examples to illustrate general truths. This led him to lay down that there is no thought without a phantasm, and he left it at that. St. Thomas went further than Aristotle in probing the difficulty. It may be that it cannot be solved and that he went as far as any man can go.

H. CARR.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGY

OF

MAINE DE BIRAN.

Qu'ai-je été? Que suis-je? En vérité, je serais bien embarrassé de le dire.—Stendhal.

In the preface to his recent work, *The Group Mind*, Dr. W. McDougall pays a striking tribute to the value of modern French psychology. If comparisons between national achievements are always apt to be invidious, it is none the less true that in psychology, as distinguished from metaphysics, the products of French thought have been pre-eminently brilliant and suggestive. Fouillée, observes McDougall, affords a source of inspiration not found in Wundt; and if a comparison is to be based on quality rather than on quantity, the psychological tradition of the future will be found, where it is not Anglo-American in origin, to derive from France rather than from Germany. If this contention be entertained, a study of French psychological sources is amply justified at the present time. The present article is written in the light of this consideration. While the writings of Maine de Biran have been submitted to intensive study in France, more especially by MM. Bertrand and Tisserand, the space devoted to them by English-speaking writers has been scanty.¹ This omission is the more surprising in view of the important character of the problems with which Biran is concerned. If his discussion of the nature of personality and will is subject to revision in the light of

¹The only detailed study of Maine de Biran in the English language with which the present writer is acquainted is N. E. Truman's *Maine de Biran's Philosophy of Will*, New York, 1904.

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later knowledge, there is much in his writings which may be of interest at the present day.

The 'Personal' Origin of Biran's Psychology.

The issue which forms the pivot of Biran's psychology may be stated in the question 'What can man do to obtain happiness?' Contained within this question is another, more crucial and fundamental—'What can man *do*?' It is therefore with the problem of freedom, of the genuine significance of the will and the self, that the author is concerned. 'I should like,' he wrote in his diary in 1794, 'if ever I am able to undertake a sustained inquiry, to determine the extent to which the mind is active, the degree in which it can modify its external impressions'² . . . 'Let us hope that a man accustomed to self-observation will some day analyse the will as Condillac has analysed the understanding.'³ If Biran was himself led to devote a life-time to the study of this question, the origin of his incentive must be sought primarily in certain problems presented by his own temperament. Endowed with that type of mental constitution which seeks happiness in the realization of an inward ideal, of a mental equipoise achieved solely by concentration of the will, he became conscious within himself of a neurotic instability completely beyond his control. 'I do not know,' he writes, 'if there exists a man whose existence is so variable as mine.'⁴ 'I am tormented,' he continues in another passage, 'precisely by this idea that everything changes, that I am myself in a perpetual flux and do not know where to find a sure basis for support.'⁵ To complete the picture which Biran here presents of his inner life, reference must be made to a number of similar passages contained in his diary. His self-confessed timidity upon

²*Maine de Biran, sa vie et ses pensées*, 3^e édition, p. 113. Publiées par Ernest Naville, Paris, 1877.

³*Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 305.

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public occasions,⁶ the feelings of mental obnubilation which he has himself described,⁷ his constant sense of the void of existence, coupled with his endless quest for an ideal goal in life⁸—all of these features supply a picture of the psychasthenic disabilities from which the author's inquiry sets out.

The relation in which these phenomena stand to Biran's discussion of personality and will is at once apparent. It is the automatic character of these impulsions, their obscure foundation in the organism, which renders them, in relation to freedom, a problem of the first magnitude. In the abrupt fluctuations of the coenaesthesia and its affective products, two features more especially attracted his attention. (1) The flux of these affective states proceeds from a point below the threshold of the conscious ego. The laws of their content and succession constitute a psychophysiological automatism of which the 'I' becomes the spectator, but is not the originating source. (2) The influence exercised by these states invades the whole realm of the personality, affecting both the intellect and the will. The psychology of Maine de Biran is therefore a study of the relation of the unconscious to the self-determination of the will. Before taking up his more mature conclusions upon this matter, a brief indication may be given of his earlier opinions.

It was in 1793 that Biran, according to his own statement, first entered upon a serious study of psychology. In the period which elapsed between this date and the publication of his *Mémoire sur l'Habitude* (1803), his attitude towards the mind-body problem was essentially that of materialism. After the fashion of Cabanis, whom he was studying at this time, consciousness becomes little more than a surface-illumination in which organic states are reflected. Like Biran's later views, this conclusion is based less upon a preconceived theory than

⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 197. ⁷*Ibid.*, p. 242. cf. pp. 170, 171. ⁸*Ibid.*, p. 297.

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upon an interpretation of immediate personal experience. 'I have sought,' he writes, 'what it is that constitutes my moments of happiness and I have always found that they attach to a certain physical state of my being, completely independent of my will.'⁹ . . . 'I conceive that to every state of the body there corresponds a certain state of mind and that everything in the organism being in ceaseless fluctuation, it is impossible to remain for a quarter of an hour in the same condition of mind.'¹⁰

If consciousness is thus reduced to an echo of bodily processes, what becomes of the self-determination which formed the author's goal in life? In the later development of Biran's psychology, although human experience is always represented as determined by the interaction of will with the blind *fatum* of the organism, a very clear distinction is observed between these two factors. At the stage under discussion this distinction had not yet arisen. If the affective instability of the author's temperament had not swept into the sphere of the will and the understanding, his early views upon the nullity of self-determination would not have been placed on record. But it is precisely this delimitation of affective from intellectual and volitional functions that his experience led him to deny. 'My power of inner perception and all my intellectual faculties,' he writes in relation to these obscure waves of sensibility, 'undergo the same anomalous variations.'¹¹ . . . 'At certain moments all my ideas are thrown into confusion; I no longer know the point to which I have advanced nor how to extricate myself from this entanglement. At other moments which are more rare, I show no trace of hesitation; my ideas develop themselves freely and I see right to the bottom of my subject.'¹² The issue which Biran sets

⁹*Op. cit.*, p. 118.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 171.

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 211, 212.

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forth here is more universal in its appeal than its reduction to a pathological occurrence might suggest. The will, as the author of the diary admits, is dependent upon the intellect and the emotions. But if the latter are determined by the fluctuations of the organism, in what sense is the will itself a free or self-determining agent? Can it, even in the moments of its apparent supremacy, be any more than an echo of the concert of physiological reactions? It is to this doubt, never entirely cast aside, that Biran succumbs at the period in question. 'Will reason,' he asks, 'always be powerless against the influence of temperament? Liberty—can it be anything else than the consciousness of a state of mind which is in conformity with our desires, but which depends in reality upon certain organic conditions over which we have no control; so that when we are as we would be, we imagine that our mind by its own activity has itself produced the modification in which it takes pleasure?'¹³

The answer which Biran gives to this question prior to the year 1812 is clear. As the will disappears when divorced from the sum-total of its organic conditions, so also in all its activities it does nothing but reflect the physiological integration of the organism. Personality disappears, reduced to the rôle of consciousness in Bayle's celebrated metaphor of the weather-cock. 'I recognize in my own experience,' he writes, 'that I am powerless against the passive forces of my being. I pass rapidly through a series of states of physical and moral well-being or unrest without any power of resistance.'¹⁴ With this conception goes the corresponding account of happiness which the writer puts forward at this period. It consists not in the alleged freedom of personality, but in 'that physical condition which I have found to be the basis of happiness.'¹⁵

¹³*Op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 285, 286.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 127.

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Biran's Relations to Condillac and Descartes.

At the time of adopting the above conclusions Biran was an orthodox disciple of Condillac and his school. 'It is to you,' he writes, referring to de Tracy and Cabanis, 'that I owe all my ideas, all that I am at the present stage of my intellectual life.'¹⁶ From the year 1803 and onwards, however, a marked divergence from the tenets of sensationalism is observable. This divergence, which increased during the next ten years to a point of complete severance, culminates in the *Essai sur les Fondements de la Psychologie* (1812), which is Biran's most important work. As an introduction to the conception of personality developed in this essay, reference may be made to the author's criticisms of Condillac and Descartes.

Condillac. In the *Rapports des Sciences Naturelles avec la Psychologie*, Biran accuses Condillac of replacing the human mind with an artificial phantom of his own creation. This result is attributed to Condillac's erroneous assimilation of the methods of psychology to those of natural science. Physical science owes its success to its abandonment of the mediaeval search for occult causes and hidden essences. It is no longer concerned with 'the relation of a transitory phenomenon to the *efficient* cause which produces it, but with the simple association in time of one fact with another which precedes it.'¹⁷ While accepting this conception of natural science, Biran denies its applicability to psychology. 'Every system of psychology,' he writes, 'which makes abstraction from the *conscium*, from the internal perception of the "I", is simply physics or logic.'¹⁸ Physical science can limit itself to observing the sequence of external events in time; 'but in

¹⁶*Lettres inédites*, cited by Alexis Bertrand, *La Psychologie de l'Effort*, Paris, 1889, p. 76.

¹⁷*Nouvelles œuvres inédites de Maine de Biran*, publiées par Alexis Bertrand, Paris, 1887, p. 139.

¹⁸*Pensées*, p. 322.

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psychology it is so little possible to make abstraction from the efficient cause of certain phenomena that the cause, so far as it identifies itself originally with the "I", becomes the whole subject of the science.'¹⁹ It follows therefore that the instrument of psychological discovery consists in a unique internal sense, the objects of which are wholly different from those of external sensibility and of the natural sciences. Hence the attempt to import the methods of the latter into psychology creates 'a fantastic world which has no analogy with anything either perceived within the self or presented in the external world.'²⁰

Yet it is precisely in this erroneous attempt that Condillac persists. Ignoring the inner perception of personality as an *agent*, he approaches the mind from without as an object the nature of which he seeks to determine by a play of external forces. The statue of which he speaks is passive. If it becomes 'the smell of a rose' and finally alludes to itself as 'I', its consciousness is throughout the product of external stimuli. It is with the character of the self here generated that Biran takes issue. If the consciousness of the statue is a passive product, though distinguished from the environment, it is still simply an aspect of the mechanism of nature. In what sense, therefore, can the statue truly be called a 'person'? Waiving this objection, how could personality come into existence under the conditions described by Condillac? At the occurrence of the first sensation in the statue, there is no 'I', but simply 'the smell of a rose'; but the personality which is not found in the first sensation cannot be conjured into existence by any formula of transformation out of a mere accumulation of such units.²¹ The criticisms which Biran

¹⁹*Nouvelles œuvres inédites*, p. 151.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 140.

²¹*Œuvres inédites de Maine de Biran*, publiées par Ernest Naville, Paris, 1859, tome III, p. 424.

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directs against Condillac may be summed up in the statement that professing to give a concrete analysis of consciousness, he replaces this method by a synthesis of artificial abstractions. The transformation of sensation is merely a fiction by which the lacunae in Condillac's account are ineffectually cloaked. The result is 'a fantastic being composed and dressed up after the fashion of imagination which can scarcely be taken as anything but the skeleton of the human understanding.'²²

Descartes. If Condillac thus replaces personality by a lifeless effigy, does Descartes, following an opposed method, give a satisfactory account of the self?

The error of Condillac lay in his starting-point. Instead of analysing the concrete fact of consciousness, he proceeds to construct it upon an imaginary basis of abstract sensation. The method of Descartes is of a different order. While Descartes abstracts from the material world and from the body in his account of self-consciousness, his starting-point lies in the concrete act 'I think'. His conclusions however, Biran maintains, are no more satisfactory than those of the sensationalists. While Condillac, preoccupied with a mechanism of sensations, never reaches the real subject of experience, Descartes setting out from the latter, quickly loses sight of it in the immobile depths of the 'soul.'

In supporting this contention, Biran advances an acute criticism of the Cartesian principle *je pense, donc je suis*. The intuition by which Descartes claims to unite the two parts of this proposition, involves a double transition. Thought implies the existence of a thinking subject; but in the interpretation which Descartes places upon his principle, the 'I' which is the subject of the premise is not that which appears in the conclusion. From the empirical self presented

²²*Nouvelles œuvres inédites*, p. 152.

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to consciousness in the 'I think', Descartes passes to the existence of the 'I' as a metaphysical substance or soul.²³ It is the validity of this transition, for which its author claims the character of knowledge, that Biran challenges. If the real nature of the transition escapes detection, it is none the less based upon a paralogism; if it is avowed, Biran charges Descartes, while keeping ostensibly within the boundaries of experience, with confusing a fact of internal apperception with an object of speculative belief. 'The soul,' he writes of Descartes' views, 'is identified in his mind with the self; he has taken an abstract notion for the primitive foundation of knowledge without seeing that this notion has its origin in an anterior relation which is itself the constitutive germ of consciousness.'²⁴ For this identification there is no valid basis. While the soul can only be conceived of as an object characterized by universal attributes such as immateriality or absolute duration, the 'I' is revealed in internal apperception as a subject which consists in a mode of activity unique or peculiar to itself. If this activity is later referred to the soul, it is only by a process of depersonalization in which a positive datum of self-consciousness is converted into the object of an abstract or speculative idea.²⁵

When the nature of the soul is further examined, the error of the proposed identification becomes still more apparent. If the soul and the self are identical, then it is by a paralogism that Descartes declares that the soul thinks always. That which is given in experience as a capacity for thought which becomes actual only in the historical determination of self-consciousness, is converted by Descartes into an eternal activity of thought. This assumption destroys the proposed identification of the soul and the self. The thought which

²³*Op. cit.*, pp. 192, 193.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 78.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 198.

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constitutes the subject of experience is empirical and intermittent in character. That which constitutes the soul is eternal or unceasing, and therefore independent of the concrete determination of self-consciousness. The soul therefore is other than the 'I' which exists only in the relative act of cognition by which it is revealed to itself.²⁶

Biran's Definition of Personality as 'Effort.'

If neither Descartes nor Condillac give a true account of personality, in what precisely does the self consist? If Descartes, Biran urges, had remained faithful to the inner intuition of self-consciousness, the interpretation of his principle would have been different. The act of inspection would have revealed the 'I' to itself not as a noumenal substance or soul, but as the activity or tension of a unique psychic force. In adopting this conclusion Biran is careful to distinguish his position from that of Leibniz. The force of Leibniz, being a category of universal application, is not equivalent to the fact of self-consciousness; it is derived, not from the data of internal apperception, but from certain objections advanced by Leibniz against the Cartesian conception of matter. 'He has no regard,' Biran writes of the author of the *Monadology*, 'for this experience of causal agency by which the "I" is constituted for itself, not as an absolute, indefinite, or universal force, but as a unique or personal cause.'²⁷ Conversely, the force with which Biran identifies personality is a cause which is *sui generis* and has no existence apart from the act of self-consciousness.

If this conception is brought into relation with Biran's attempted solution of the problem of freedom, a further step may be taken. Without freedom there is, he urges, no personality. Hence if the 'I' which is revealed in the act of self-

²⁶*Op. cit.*, pp. 193-195.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 218.

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consciousness is to be a genuinely significant fact, it is not sufficient merely to define it in terms of force. It is necessary that this force should be presented to itself in the act of self-consciousness as free or unconditioned in its operation. It is the epistemological status which Biran accords to this conception of self-determination that makes his account of personality unique. If the free causality of the self is no more than a speculative idea or object of faith, of what avail is this belief against the enslavement of personality by the organism? From the fatality of this domination there is, he assumes, only one surety of deliverance. If within the limits of the act of self-consciousness, there is revealed along with the force which is the 'I', an immediate intuition of its freedom, then only can the problem of personality receive a satisfactory solution.

From the peculiar form which this problem assumes for Biran certain conclusions are at once deducible. The 'I' which he seeks is neither the object-self of empirical psychology nor the unknowable being of a metaphysical ego or soul. Between these two, he asserts, is a third alternative. Less variable and superficial than the former, possessed of a concrete immediacy which does not belong to the latter, the living 'I' of actual experience has escaped consciousness just because it is itself the primordial fact of consciousness. At every moment of its activity, the subject of experience is revealed to itself, as the unconditional source of its own creative energy. It is this intuition, unique and *sui generis*, and the peculiar mode of internal apperception by which it is achieved that determines the direction of Biran's subsequent inquiry. In the philosophy of Kant, the subject of experience is conscious of himself only in relation to the world. Against this view Biran urges that if there is no pure perception of the self apart from the world, the freedom and

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independence of the 'I' are threatened. Instead of being a veritable agent, the self becomes a mere logical hypostatization of the unity of experience.²⁸ The conception by which Biran is guided is of a different order. 'If it could be shown,' he writes, 'that there is a real or actual mode of experience, unique in kind, and wholly comprised within the subject of experience which is made a subject by this very act; that this act can subsist and possess in itself the character of a fact of experience without being actually and indivisibly united with any passive modification of sensibility or any external representation; that in this act is contained, together with the consciousness of individual personality, the special origin of all the primitive ideas of cause, force, unity and identity of which our mind makes such constant and unavoidable use: Would not this discovery present a solution of the requirements set forth above?'²⁹

According to Biran, there is such a primitive act or mode of consciousness. 'There is a feeling or a perception of the self,' he writes, 'which is one, identical and permanent in all the succession and the variety of our sensible impressions, which remains distinct from all these impressions and confounds itself with none of them.'³⁰ This pure perception of the activity of the self is identified by the author with the sense of 'effort' which accompanies voluntary movement. In the discussion of the principle of personality which follows Biran emphasizes the following points: (1) While the self comes into existence with an act of will, it becomes a subject of experience only by relation to the felt opposition of the muscles to its activity. (2) The experience of voluntary movement supplies a pure inner perception both of the body and of the will which acts through it. (3) In the primitive

²⁸*Œuvres inédites*, tome I, pp. 167, 168.

²⁹*Ibid.*, tome I, p. 204.

³⁰*Ibid.*, tome III, p. 432.

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duality of volitional force and muscular resistance which constitutes self-consciousness, the 'I' is revealed to itself as the unconditional cause of the act through which it becomes known.

The reality of voluntary movement, Biran insists, is a fact of inner sense as evident as that of our existence. The problem of personality commences therefore, not with a denial of the sense of 'effort' but with an examination of its nature. In undertaking this investigation, the author points out that effort can be known only from within. As a blind man can never be made to understand the nature of colour by external description, a total paralytic, though versed in a knowledge of physiology, could have no real appreciation of voluntary movement.³¹ Any translation therefore of the primitive sense of effort into the external terms of physiology must necessarily be inadequate. For purposes of illustration, however, Biran contrasts the physiological conditions of voluntary action with those which determine reflex and instinctive reactions. The muscular contractions which characterize the latter are provoked by stimuli received either from without or from internal modifications of the body. The kinaesthetic sensations which accompany the ensuing motor reactions are therefore felt as foreign to the activity of the self. Conversely, voluntary movements are felt as activities of the self because the efferent impulses originate in a mode of cerebral innervation which has no physiological antecedent. The cause of voluntary innervation is found, not in any physical stimulus, but in the action of a hyperorganic force which 'like a central spring released within the brain may be said to enter into action of itself.'³² 'The will of man,' Biran adds, 'dwells in

³¹*Op. cit.*, tome I, p. 208.

³²*Ibid.*, tome I, p. 211.

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independence in the innermost being, beyond all reach of any excitation from without.'³³

The physiology of 'effort' presents two aspects. (1) The hyperorganic force which determines willed, as distinguished from reflex or instinctive, movements, acts upon the efferent nerves which terminate in the muscles. (2) The muscle then contracts and produces the corresponding kinaesthetic sensations. Biran denies that the consciousness of personal activity arises prior to the muscular contraction.³⁴ How then is voluntary action distinguished within consciousness from impulsive or instinctive movements? The specific irritability of the muscles is admitted to be the same in both cases.³⁵ The required distinction is found in the unique character of the kinaesthetic sensations attendant upon willed action. While those which result from instinctive or involuntary movements have a passive character which reflects the mode of their origination, the muscular sensations which accompany voluntary action take on a character of reduplication whereby they afford a consciousness (1) of the organic inertia of the muscles set in motion; and (2) of the free or unconditioned force which causes their contraction.³⁶

Since this force is known only in relation to the resistance of the muscles upon which it acts, there is no consciousness of the self apart from the body such as Descartes supposed.³⁷ Viewed internally as voluntary attention, effort is equivalent to the activity of thought; but thought itself, Biran insists, even where unaccompanied by overt movements, is known only in relation to certain diffused sensations of muscular strain. In seeking to reconcile this view with the exclusion of every element of passivity from self-consciousness, the

³³*Op. cit.*, tome I, p. 214.

³⁴*Ibid.*, tome I, p. 212.

³⁶*Ibid.*, tome I, p. 213.

³⁵*Ibid.*, tome I, pp. 211, 212.

³⁷*Ibid.*, tome I, p. 245.

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author draws attention to the peculiar character of active kinaesthetic sensation. The muscular resistance experienced in voluntary action exists as a fact of consciousness solely by relation to the active force which is personality; it is not therefore a fact presented externally to the self. Similarly the knowledge of the body which arises with active kinaesthetic sensation is of a purely internal order; it is determined not by the passive representations derived from the external senses of sight and touch, but by the effort put forth in the act of voluntary innervation. 'The essential character of the primitive fact consists,' Biran asserts, 'in this, that neither term of the primitive relation is constituted in necessary dependence upon impressions received from without. Hence the knowledge of the self can be separated in principle from that of the external universe.'³⁵

The consciousness of personality as a hyperorganic force is regarded by Biran, not as a hypothetical assumption, but as an immediate intuition supplied by the sense of effort. In voluntary action the 'I' is presented to itself, not as the product of a chain of physiological antecedents, but as the real or efficient cause of action. Active kinaesthetic sensation is therefore for Biran a mode of experience which is wholly different from the representations derived from the external senses. This distinction, he argues, has been overlooked by Hume in his criticism of the feeling of personal agency or power. Since there is no consciousness of the physiological processes which intervene between a determination of will and the ensuing muscular contraction, Hume asserts that the continuity of the sense of effort is broken and the feeling of personal agency is merely a perception of succession. This objection, Biran maintains, rests upon a confusion of the knowledge derived from external representation with that

³⁵*Op. cit.*, tome I, p. 216.

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derived from inner sense, of the language of physiology with the evidence of self-consciousness. The break in the sense of effort is not a fact of internal apperception, but it is inferred as a result of the attempt to subordinate the data of consciousness to a scheme of physiological explanation. It is because Hume approaches the experience of personal agency from the latter standpoint that he never seizes it from within, but reduces it to a mere relation of temporal succession.³⁹

The 'Unconscious' in Biran's Psychology.

Apart from the principle of personality there is no consciousness, properly so called. A fact, if it is to be known, must be brought into relation with the self. The life of consciousness or relation, therefore, comes into existence with the original internal apperception in which the force which is personality is presented to itself.

The animal, therefore, is not a subject of experience; in the absence of the principle of personality, the distinction between self and not-self, subject and object, does not as yet exist. Animal life is not, however, reducible to the principles of mechanism, as Descartes maintains. Between bare physiological automatism and the activity of will and thought, there is an intermediate region which may be called the 'unconscious'. As against Descartes, therefore, Biran asserts that the sentience which characterizes animal existence is conditioned by an extra-mechanical or vital principle.⁴⁰ This principle, he adds, has nothing in common with the creative force in which personality consists. While both principles coexist in man's dual nature, neither can be reduced to a form of the other.⁴¹

³⁹*Op. cit.*, tome I, pp. 259 *et seq.*

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, tome III, pp. 364, 365.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, tome III, pp. 405, 406.

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In Biran's epistemological theory the force which constitutes personality is the source of the active or synthetic elements in experience. That which remains when the activity of this force is removed is 'affection' or the pure matter of sensation. The sentience in which the latter consists is not, Biran insists, a logical abstraction but the actual mode of animal life. Since animal life is qualified in man by the opposed principle of personality, such a state of pure sentience is not directly observable. The elements of passivity and automatism which form its basis are however exemplified in dreams, reverie, and conditions arising from the pathological enfeeblement of the intellect and the will.⁴² When the tension of personality is relaxed as in states of reverie, the distinction between subject and object is confused, and consciousness becomes a series of images which unfold themselves by a law of succession of which the individual is the spectator, but not the cause. A further example of the automatic influences of the unconscious is found in the involuntary emotional colouring which diffuses itself through the data of sense-perception. 'Hence the refraction of feeling which displays nature to us, now under a smiling and gracious aspect, and at other times as though obscured by a funeral pall; so that the same objects alternately inspire hope and love, distrust and fear.'⁴³

The elements of passivity and automatism which are partially observable in man constitute the whole range of animal life. Devoid of the active principle of personality, the animal perceives neither its own states nor external objects. In the words of an expression which Biran repeatedly quotes: *Vivit et est vitae nescius ipse suae*. The impressions to which it is subject do not however remain merely physiological in

⁴²*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 11, 12.

⁴³*Maine de Biran: Mémoire sur les Perceptions obscures*, publié par Pierre Tisserand, Paris, 1920, p. 22.

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character; they are raised to the level of feeling by the principle of animal life. This vital principle is, for Biran, at once the profoundest and most obscure element in the unconscious. The object of a hypothetical induction, its reality is inferred from the sentience which is its product and which is unintelligible on purely mechanical grounds. In accounting for the diffused sensibility which thus arises Biran adopts a position similar to that of Leibniz. Each cell in the animal body is alive and strives after the manner of the organism as a whole to retain its vital equilibrium. The vague sentience which results, comparable to the coenaesthesia which survives within human experience, is a condensed expression of the general equation of cellular maintenance and destruction. Through the medium of a central vital principle a multitude of constituent impressions are fused in the common sensibility of the gross animal structure.⁴⁴

With the evolution of the special organs of sense an advance is made. The anatomical differentiation of the different senses renders necessary a specific mode of stimulation in each case which prepares the way for the discrimination and localization of sensations. This discriminative activity, however, remains in a nascent stage in the animal. The sensations received through the various channels are confused with one another, and with the general affective tone of organic sensibility. In this connexion Biran points out that the special senses are historically outgrowths of the more general type of animal sentience. The marks of this origin are observable in the affective tone which persists, even in man, as the background upon which the later presentative aspects of sensation are developed. The presentative functions of smell and taste, more especially, are apt to disappear

⁴⁴*Œuvres philosophiques de Maine de Biran*, publiées par V. Cousin, Paris, 1841, tome II, pp. 78, 79; cf. *Œuvres inédites*, tome II, pp. 12, 13.

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within the predominantly affective tone of animal life. Intimately associated in the animal with the nutritive system, these sensations remain confused or absorbed within the organic sensibility to which they contribute.⁴⁵

The senses of sight and passive touch present an exception to this relation of absorption. That which elsewhere remains a mere dust of affective sensations, becomes integrated here into two-dimensional presentations of coloured and 'tangible' space. This work of integration is explained by Biran upon anatomical principles rather than by any mode of active mental synthesis. Corresponding to the individual rays of light reflected by the contiguous points of a coloured surface, the retina of the eye exhibits a number of juxtaposed nerve-endings capable of simultaneous but independent stimulation. This correspondence of light-stimuli with the nerve-endings of the eye results in a co-ordination of the former into two-dimensional visual presentations.⁴⁶ The spatial presentations derived from passive touch are explained by a similar disposition of the nerve-endings. The animal therefore obtains what Biran designates as passive 'intuitions' of the surface-extension of matter. These intuitions, it is pointed out, are not perceptions. The judgements of depth and distance, of substantiality or thinghood, which constitute the complete perception of an object, have not yet arisen. The animal intuits only the surface-appearance of things; it lives in a world similar to that of man's dreams.⁴⁷

The memory of animals does not include the faculties of voluntary revival and of recognition. Voluntary revival implies the activity of a self. Similarly recognition, or the conscious assimilation of the present to the past, implies the association of the self with both of the modes thus assimilated.

⁴⁵*Œuvres inédites*, tome II, pp. 24, 25.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 26, 27.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 26; cf. *ibid.*, tome II, pp. 132, 133.

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But the animal has not a self; it is not a person. The memory of animals is therefore either purely organic or else restricted to automatic revival without recognition.⁴⁸ The affective states to which the animal is subject deposit traces which facilitate their recurrence independently of the original stimuli. The memory of the two-dimensional presentations of sight and touch is of a more advanced order. The images deposited by these 'intuitions' are capable of being revived either in the original order of occurrence or in the fortuitous combinations exemplified in the dreams of man. This revival is unaccompanied by any relations of recognition.⁴⁹ Biran notes finally that the organic memory which facilitates the recurrence of affective states applies also to the instinctive movements in which they issue; these reactions become, by repetition, spontaneous or independent of their original causes.⁵⁰ This motor spontaneity is not freedom; it has not the character of voluntary action. But as the passive intuitions of touch and sight mark the closest approach to knowledge of which the animal is capable, so also the facilitation of instinctive reactions by habit prepares the way for the voluntary action which is the distinguishing feature in man.

The Psychology of Human Experience.

In the foetal state and during the first years of its development, the child is not a person. It becomes so only when its movements cease to be purely instinctive, and assume the character of spontaneity alluded to above. At this point by a process which Biran does not further describe, the unique or hyperorganic force of personality enters the sphere of animal life. Voluntary action arises; and with it the self-consciousness by which the individual is revealed to himself

⁴⁸*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 33, 34.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 37.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 38.

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as an agent. From this point onwards the human being has a dual nature. The passive modes of animal sentience are brought into relation with the active principle of personality. The psychology of human experience therefore consists in the interaction of these two elements or in the progressive organization of matter by form. Biran traces three ascending phases in this development which are known as the 'sensitive,' the 'perceptive,' and the 'reflective' systems of mental evolution.

The Sensitive System. In the affective system of animal life the 'I' does not as yet exist. The animal therefore cannot form the judgement 'I feel pain' or 'I smell'. In order that these judgements may take place the passive modes of sensibility to which they refer must be appropriated by a self. It is with this elementary form of synthesis that the 'sensitive' system is concerned. In the phase of development which Biran has in view, the personality exhibits the minimal degree of tension which is compatible with this simple act of appropriation. The 'I' does not as yet constitute objects for itself by active perception. It remains a spectator of antecedent modes of sentience which it does not create.⁵¹

With this act of appropriation arises also the localization of impressions within the organism. Under the conditions of animal life the affective impressions received, although of local origin, are confused with the general sensibility of the organism. The localization of affective sensations is derived from the internal knowledge of the body which originates with the sense of effort. In active kinaesthetic sensation the individual obtains an inner perception of his body as occupying a private or 'organic' space.⁵² Biran furthermore maintains that, corresponding to the particular group of muscles set in action, there is an inner perception of the localization of the

⁵¹*Op. cit.*, tome II, p. 6.

⁵²*Ibid.*, tome I, pp. 234-236.

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limbs within this primitive space of the body.⁵³ The localization of affective sensations is effected by a judgement of coincidence in which these impressions are referred to a place within the body previously determined by the sense of effort.

The relation which thus exists between the capacity of voluntary innervation and the localization of affective impressions is illustrated by the nature of the coenaesthesia in man. While the self distinguishes itself from affective states of local origin, the coenaesthesia constantly tends to absorb the subject of experience in a state of impersonal sentience. This tendency is attributed by Biran to the vagueness of the conscious localization of organic sensations; the latter being in turn traceable to the low degree of voluntary control exercised over the internal functions of the body.⁵⁴ This confusion of the self with general affective sensibility does not extend, Biran points out, to the conscious appropriation of the two-dimensional intuitions of sight and passive touch. This is explained upon two grounds. (1) Sight and touch, being presentative rather than affective, are not subject to the violent degrees of intensity which reduce the personality to a pure state of feeling. (2) The extended character of these intuitions and their superior degree of distinctness leads the self to distinguish them from its own being. In the 'sensitive' system, the presentations derived from sight and passive touch are not substantiated into 'things'. The judgements of objectivity and distance, which depend upon an explicit act of attention, belong to a later stage of mental evolution. The self merely appropriates the two-dimensional intuitions derived from the system of animal life and becomes aware of them as a spectator.⁵⁵

⁵³*Op. cit.*, tome I, pp. 236, 237.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 43.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 46-49.

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The function of memory exhibits a similar advance. Since the 'I' becomes associated at this stage with the successive modes of sensibility derived from sentient life, conscious recognition is added to the automatic revival of the preceding stage.⁵⁶ Where the affective aspects of consciousness are concerned, this recognition is limited in degree. The life of feeling tends to identify itself with the present; the memory of previous affective states is therefore of that abstract or schematic order which permits only of the recognition of a present pain or pleasure as roughly similar to one experienced in the past. In the case of the presentative senses, recognition is of a more definite order. The images, more especially, which are associated with visual memory, are not vague or elusive like the feelings, but relatively detailed reproductions of the original intuitions. Recognition therefore is of a correspondingly specific order.⁵⁷

The feeling of personal identity does not depend upon the revival in memory of past modes of passive affection or sensibility. The relation is of an inverse order. The ability to recognize the contingent modes of present experience as similar to those of the past is itself conditioned by the primitive consciousness of personal identity. The pure memory which forms the basis of the latter is regarded by Biran as independent of every passive modification of consciousness; it is an intrinsic property of the 'effort' which constitutes the perception of personality. The idea of time therefore is not attributable to the order of external occurrences or of the passive modifications of the organism, but rather to the internal intuition of duration, which characterizes the pure act of self-consciousness. It is in relation to this inner experience of duration that the concept of objective time

⁵⁶*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 57, 58.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 59, 60.

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arises. Similarly the subject of experience recognizes the similarity of his successive contingent modifications because he has a pure or independent memory of his own identity.⁵⁸

The Perceptive System. The effort or activity in which personality consists is always qualitatively the same; but it varies in degree. In the 'sensitive' system the tension of personality is of that minimal order which is compatible with the bare fact of being awake.⁵⁹ In the scale of mental development the individual is at that point where the world is less than a solid reality yet more than a dream. The condition which Biran has in view may perhaps be compared to the twilight state of consciousness, which exists between sleep and waking. It is the state to which, by an inverse process of psychic declension, the individual is reduced in moments of abstraction and reverie.

In the 'perceptive' system which marks the next phase of development, the activity of the self takes on the character of a specific act of voluntary attention. The force of personality is at once intensified and defined by its application through the channels of the special senses.⁶⁰ In defining attention Biran takes up a position similar to that adopted by later psychologists. Attention clarifies rather than intensifies sensation by isolating it from coexistent elements in consciousness. A more distinctive feature is found in the account given of the motor conditions of the process. Attention consists in the voluntary innervation of the muscles connected with the sense-organs. It is not a purely mental activity to which the process of neuro-muscular accommodation is subsidiary; it is that process itself.

In the examples which he gives, the author claims to find a proof of this contention. The coenaesthesia eludes the grasp

⁵⁸*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 54, 55.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 83, 84.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 84 and 86.

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of voluntary attention by reason of the exemption from voluntary control of the organs which form its basis. A taste, or a smell, again, can only be brought within the focus of voluntary attention by an act of sniffing or sucking.⁶¹ It is however in the case of vision that Biran finds the chief illustration of his theory. By reason of the complex apparatus of voluntary muscular accommodation with which it is equipped, the eye is peculiarly fitted to become the instrument of the selective activity of attention. The discrimination which thus arises between different parts of the field of vision is accomplished by an increase in the activity of certain nervous elements in the retina, the action of the remainder being partially inhibited. In the act of voluntary attention this variation in the activity of different parts of the retina is effected by a free act of motor determination. The self, Biran adds, has no direct control over the retina as such, but affects it through the medium of the muscles associated with the eye. The outstanding fact is that here, as elsewhere, attention as a personal activity consists in a voluntary act of motor determination.⁶²

The discriminative activity of attention as applied to visual sensibility results in the distinction between the focal and marginal regions of the field of consciousness. This distinction however is still subject to the two-dimensional character of the visual 'intuitions' which form its material. The externality and solidity of bodies is not perceived by the sense of vision, but enters consciousness from a different source. This source is found in the experience of *active* touch or in the resistance which external bodies offer to the percipient's power of voluntary movement.

In accounting for the evolution of the perception of external

⁶¹*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 91-93.

⁶²*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 96-101.

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bodies, Biran seeks to determine the contribution made by each of the external senses viewed in abstraction from the others. In pursuance of this method he supposes an individual reduced to the power of voluntary movement and the sense of touch, but otherwise anaesthetic. By what steps would such an individual obtain a knowledge of bodies other than his own? In the absence of visual sensations, the author maintains that this knowledge is imparted by the perception of the resistance offered by external matter to voluntary movement. In explaining how this resistance is to be attributed to an external body rather than to an increased inertia of the muscular system, such as takes place in paralysis, a reference is made to the passive sensations of contact which accompany the obstruction of voluntary movement. It is out of the union of these two modes of experience that the perception of external bodies arises. While the perception of increased resistance to voluntary movement necessarily disappears when the effort to move is discontinued, the passive sensations arising from contact with the external body remain. In so far therefore as the feeling of increased resistance to voluntary motion and the accompanying sensations of passive contact are referred to a common cause, the latter is found, not in the individual's own body, but in an object which is related externally to it in space.⁶³

Upon the basis of this account Biran proceeds to characterize the essence of matter as force. By an induction which is spontaneous or intuitive, the self posits behind the resistance which external bodies offer to its movements, a force analogous to that which it perceives in itself.⁶⁴ The conception of external resistant force thus attained forms the nucleus around which the complex perception of objects is built up. While the attributes of externality and resistant force form

⁶³*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 107-110.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 374, 375.

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the basis of the perception of 'thinghood', external bodies also present themselves in experience as extended in space, coloured, and qualified by various tactual properties. The synthesis within consciousness of the tangible qualities and surface-extension of matter with its essence as external resistant force is explained by the association of experiences derived from passive touch with those of active touch. In accordance with Biran's previous account of tactual 'intuition', the tangible properties of matter are co-ordinated in passive touch into a two-dimensional continuum similar to that which obtains with colour. From active touch is derived the experience of matter as external resistant force, alluded to above. The combination of the two modes of touch-experience therefore results in the perception of the complex of external resistant force, extension, and tactual properties, which is called matter. The synthesis thus effected is assisted by the fact that the data derived from passive and active touch are associated with the same organ. The contents of the two-dimensional intuitions of passive touch are referred to a location in space identical with that at which the relation of resistance to the agent's movements is perceived.⁶⁵

The capacity for voluntary movement combined with the sense of touch therefore occupies a central position in Biran's theory of objective perception. Since the sense of vision does not involve physical contact with its object, it cannot invest its data with the property of resistance or solidity which is essential to the perception of bodies. If vision alone seems to afford such a perception, the latter is in reality an induction based upon a previous association of the data of active touch with those of sight.⁶⁶ By a similar process of synthesis or association, the remaining qualities of matter such as heat, cold, smell and taste are incorporated in the perception of

⁶⁵*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 110-112.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 112, 113.

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material bodies. In relation to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities Biran adopts the following position. While the essence of matter consists in resistant force, the attributes of solidity, inertia and impenetrability, are regarded as primary qualities immediately deducible from this definition. The attribute of extension is treated after the fashion of Leibniz. While it is excluded from the essence of matter, it may be regarded as objective in the sense that it is a *phenomenon bene fundatum*.⁶⁷ By a confusion which the author never clears up, the qualities of colour, tangibility, sound, taste, smell and temperature are alternately regarded as objective but variable modes of matter or as secondary qualities in the ordinary acceptance of that term.⁶⁸

The synthetic operation of the mind which results in the complex perception of external objects receives an extension in the faculty of comparison. Comparison, Biran points out, takes its origin from the act of attending successively to two or more perceptions. In speaking of the general ideas (*idées générales*) which result from comparison, the author advances a criticism of the class-ideas of formal logic. The relations of similarity upon which such ideas are based have reference in the main to the secondary or contingent aspects of matter. Since the essence of matter consists in force, the natural sciences which rely upon the method of classification are therefore restricted to a superficial rôle.⁶⁹ The class-idea, furthermore, is descriptive rather than explanatory. In the definition of species and genera no reasoned or necessary connexion is exhibited between the part-ideas included in the definition. The unity of the latter is resolved into a mere empirical enumeration of qualities. Finally the relations of similarity upon which class-ideas are based, are contingent or

⁶⁷*Op. cit.*, tome II, p. 267.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 129; *cf. ibid.*, tome II, pp. 134, 135.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 162, 163.

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dependent upon the sensibility of the individual. The general idea of red, for example, will vary according to the ability of different persons to distinguish different shades of red from one another. Similarly the class of red objects will not be the same for the colour-blind as for those of normal vision.⁷⁰

In the controversy between nominalists and realists, Biran adheres to the position of the former. The unity of the class-idea is reducible to the unity of a name. It is therefore only by a logical device that the class-idea is uniformly applied to the objects included in its extension. If the qualities S. M. N. P. and Q, constitute the definition of an animal, then a lion and a man by possession of these qualities fall under the predicate 'animal.' These qualities however, Biran objects, are realized in a different manner in the two cases. The power of movement in a man, for example, is not that which belongs to a lion. Committed to the principle of abstract identity, the logic of classification ignores these differences which break out within the chosen area of comparison. The uniform applicability of the class-idea is therefore based upon a supposition which either confuses or suppresses the individual differences of things.⁷¹

The Reflective System. In the reflective system which represents the highest phase of mental evolution recognized in the *Fondements de la Psychologie*, an account is given of the higher intellectual faculties of man. These are identified with reflection, reasoning, the power of voluntary recall or memory properly so called, together with language and its relation to memory and thought. In connexion with his theory of the nature of reasoning, Biran sketches an outline of rational psychology and gives an analysis of mathematical

⁷⁰*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 382, 383; *cf. ibid.*, tome II, pp. 159, 160.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 384-386.

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necessity. The *Fondements* ends with a dynamical-mathematical ideal of scientific explanation.⁷²

In the 'sensitive' and 'perceptive' systems of mental evolution, the activity of the self, though implied in every act of perception, properly so called, is not brought into clear or reflective consciousness; it remains obscured by the passive modes of sensibility and affection which it raises into consciousness.⁷³ The distinctive feature of the 'reflective' system consists in the separation, by an act of abstraction, of the pure perception of the self as activity or force from the contingent modes of experience with which it is associated. The function of reflection in relation to the consciousness of the external world, is of a similar order. While the essence of matter consists for Biran, as for Leibniz, in force, the conception of this force is obscured by the presentation of the secondary qualities derived from the external senses. The work of reflection therefore is to obtain a pure conception of matter as disjoined from its secondary or contingent modes.

The pure ideas of the self and of matter thus obtained are called by Biran 'idées abstraites réflexives', in distinction from the 'idées générales' of the preceding stage. The author emphasizes the distinction which exists between the two types of idea. While the abstraction which conditions the formation of general or class ideas involves a process of comparison, that which determines the abstract reflective ideas of the self and of matter is independent of this condition. It is not by comparison, but by immediate internal apperception, that the essence of the self as activity or force is presented; similarly the spontaneous induction which posits force as the essence

⁷²Biran's theories of ethics and aesthetics are omitted here, as being special developments which fall outside the scope of this article. For Biran's account, *Œuvres inédites*, tome II, pp. 177-219, and tome III, pp. 27-66, may be consulted.

⁷³*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 221-223.

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of matter is not based upon a comparison of successive contacts with external bodies, but arises instantaneously out of the first experience of increased resistance to voluntary motion. The abstract reflective ideas so formed also differ in the following respects from the class-ideas of formal logic. (1) While the latter are founded upon relations of *similarity*, the former apprehend the fundamental *identities* which constitute the essence of consciousness and of matter.⁷⁴ (2) While the unity of the general idea is merely logical or verbal, the abstract reflective ideas are at once individual unities and also genuinely universal in their application.⁷⁵

The reflective idea of the self as disjoined from all passive modes of sensibility is not, Biran maintains, a mere logical abstraction. An individual in whom every avenue of passive sensation was closed could still obtain a perception of his own activity through the medium of active kinaesthetic sensation. The defence offered of the abstract reflective idea of matter is of a similar order. The concept of matter as pure unextended force disjoined from the sensible qualities which normally accompany it, is reached only by an effort of abstraction. But this abstraction is within the limits of scientific justification. An individual, Biran maintains, deprived as above of normal modes of sensitive representation, on coming in contact with matter through the medium of a claw reduced to a mathematical point, would obtain the Leibnizian conception of matter as unextended resistant force. Since the conditions of this experiment are not beyond the bounds of empirical supposition, the abstract idea of matter as monadic force is a true scientific notion.⁷⁶

In explaining how the abstract or reflective idea of the activity of the self enters into clear consciousness, Biran

⁷⁴*Op. cit.*, tome II, p. 164.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 168-170.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 144.

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alludes to the power of voluntary articulation and its relation to the sense of hearing. In the perception of the external world, the perception of the self as the efficient cause of attention and consciousness is obscured by the contemplation of the objects with which consciousness is itself concerned. The peculiar relation which obtains between speech and hearing in the same individual arrests this tendency. While, in the act of speech, the individual is conscious of himself as the cause of vocal innervation, this perception of personal activity is not obscured but strengthened by the hearing of his own voice. The auditory sensations involved are perceived, not as passive data received from without, but as reflections of his own voluntary activity of articulation. For this reason speech in its relation to hearing may be said to be the origin of the faculty of reflection—as may be inferred from the dual meaning of the word 'entendement.'⁷⁷

The function of speech also furnishes Biran with a theory of memory, understood as the power of voluntary recall. In the 'sensitive' system of mental development, memory is restricted to the functions of automatic revival and recognition. In the 'perceptive' system, the author outlines a theory of voluntary recollection which is connected with his treatment of active kinaesthetic sensation. The perception of the shape or dimensions of a body may be accomplished, as in the case of the blind, by movements of the hand. The synthesis of the resulting kinaesthetic sensations gives a perception of shape independently of the passive data of vision. As the motor perception of shape is determined by movements voluntarily initiated by the subject, Biran maintains that the corresponding memories present a case of exclusively active recall. The hand can retrace at will, and in the absence of the object, the same series of movements which constituted the original

⁷⁷*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 227-234.

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perception.⁷⁸ This pure motor memory (which is in reality a renewed series of kinaesthetic perceptions) extends, however, only to the spatial aspects of objects. In the 'reflective' system the power of voluntary recall is extended by means of the symbolic function of speech to the remaining properties of objects. While the element of automatic revival is reintroduced in the associations which exist between words and the ideas which they symbolize, the voluntary command of speech or articulation gives the individual a practical control over the course of thought or ideation.⁷⁹

The abstract reflective ideas of the self and of matter form the basis of Biran's subsequent logical theory. Knowledge consists for him as for Descartes in the deduction from a primary intuition of a series of judgements which are related synthetically to this starting-point. The process of reasoning consists in exhibiting the necessary connexion of these new truths with one another and with the original intuition.⁸⁰ As by a process of immediate inspection Descartes derived the judgement 'I exist' from the premise 'I think', so also Biran claims to extract from the reflective ideas of the self and of matter intuitive judgements which serve in turn as the grounds for the synthetic deduction of new truths. Hence arise the two pure sciences which alone satisfy the formal requirements of truth and knowledge. The abstract reflective idea of the activity of the self issues through the medium of a series of reasoned deductions in a system of rational psychology. From the corresponding idea of matter as monadic force is derived the system of pure mathematics and the mathematical-dynamical science of the external world.⁸¹

In the account which Biran gives of rational psychology, so conceived, a series of judgements are said to be either

⁷⁸*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 145-147.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 245 *et seq.*

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 263.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 270-272.

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intuitively or deductively derived from the original act of self-consciousness. The pure activity of the subject, when abstracted from the passive modes of experience which accompany it, is seen to be the immediate ground of judgements such as 'I am a free agent in all those movements which are derived from myself'; from these, further judgements are deduced by a process of reasoning.⁸² Biran also attempts in this connexion what may be regarded as a psychological deduction of the categories. The notion of causality takes its origin from the original intuition of the self as an efficient cause. The further notions of unity, identity, freedom and permanence are referred to the same source. In reflecting upon its own essence, the self is carried forward to a series of judgements in which these notions are derived from its own perceived character. They are then generalized and employed as categories in the apprehension of external objects.⁸³ The author gives no explanation in the *Fondements* of the fact that the categories are used as principles constitutive of external experience prior to their reflective apprehension as notions. The epistemological validity of their external application is also passed over in silence.

The abstract reflective idea of the self therefore furnishes Biran with a system of rational psychology from which the fundamental categories of experience are deducible. The abstract reflective idea of matter as monadic force is treated in a similar manner. Upon the basis of this conception the author attempts to found a rational science of the material world in which the qualities presented in sensation are shown to be deducible from the primary conception of force. The attributes of solidity, impenetrability, and inertia are stated to be immediately deducible in this way.⁸⁴ The extended

⁸²*Op. cit.*, tome II, pp. 321-324.

⁸³*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 324; *cf. ibid.*, tome I, pp. 248 *et seq.*

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 127.

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appearance of bodies is accounted for in a different manner. Biran adopts here the position of Leibniz according to which *materia secunda* is not directly deducible from the conception of force. In terms of Biran's own hypothetical illustration, an individual coming in contact with matter through the medium of a pointed claw would obtain a perception of matter as unextended resistance. Such a perception of substantiality would be in itself complete. The added attribute of extension therefore is not directly implied in the perception of matter. Biran attempts to meet this difficulty by putting forward an independent theory of the rational deduction of space.

The idea of space is, for Leibniz, the product of confused perception. In Biran's system of rational deduction it arises as an ideal construction based upon the power of voluntary movement and the pure motor memory in which the latter results. In the system of Leibniz the point which symbolizes mathematical unity finds its archetype in the monad, which is thus the meeting-point of the dynamical and mathematical aspects of matter. Biran appropriates this suggestion and attempts to bring it into relation with his derivation of the monad from the experience of an organism in contact with matter through the medium of a pointed claw. Such an organism would perceive matter as a 'resistant point.' Upon the basis of this ideal supposition Biran proceeds to give a motor deduction of the idea of space and of the system of mathematical and geometrical relations which it implies. The Euclidian line is generated as a synthesis of the successive resistant points experienced in the voluntary movement of a limb across the surface of a material object. The surface is generated by a movement of the line. The various figures of geometrical construction represent the memory of different modes of co-ordination of successive points of resistance; these modes of co-ordination being themselves determined by

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the different directions which voluntary movement may take.⁸⁵ The numerical relations of mathematics are accounted for in a similar manner. For Biran, as for Locke, number consists in the repetition of the idea of unity. But this unity, in accordance with the common origin of mathematical and dynamical concepts, is founded upon an archetypal experience of unextended force.⁸⁶

The universality and necessity of mathematical truth is attributed by Biran to the homogeneous character of the elements involved. The line is a co-ordination of points; the figure, a combination of lines. Similarly all numbers are functions of a unity which produces them by the repetition of itself. This element of identity accounts for the synthetic and necessary character of mathematical deductions. The straight line remains identical in character in all the geometrical constructions into which it enters. The judgement therefore which is true of such a line in the abstract, will also be true of the side of a triangle. The proposition which states that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third, while expressing a new truth, is a necessary corollary of the fact that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points.⁸⁷

In concluding his account of the 'reflective' system, Biran outlines the conception of science to which the above views lead. The secondary qualities of matter are deducible neither from one another nor from the conception of matter as force. There is therefore no science of these aspects of matter.⁸⁸ The true science of nature is therefore restricted to the dynamical and mathematical concepts of matter. Two possibilities arise here. The noumenal science of matter which is conceivable only from the standpoint of God would envisage the world in

⁸⁵*Op. cit.*, tome II, p. 122; *cf. ibid.*, tome II, p. 144.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 305.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 311.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, tome II, pp. 353, 354.

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terms of unextended force. This is the ideal of Leibniz, which is not however accessible to human intelligence. The alternative method, which Biran accepts, is exemplified in the *Principia* of Newton. While the conception of force occupies a central position in Newton's science, this force is expressed through the mathematical formulation of the motion to which it gives rise. In Newton's system two points are especially observable. (1) No attempt is made to inquire into the inner essence of force or into the exact nature of the physical mechanisms which mediate its action. (2) From the expression of force in terms of motion, the mathematical formulae arise which render possible a prediction of natural events. Biran upholds the Newtonian conception of science in both of these respects. The ideal of science is rational prediction based upon mathematical deduction. On the other hand, while force remains an indispensable conception in scientific explanation, its nature, as it is inferred in the external world, is unknowable; it remains for human intelligence merely the cause which produces motion.⁸⁹ Finally, the inductive supposition of certain mechanisms, such as the vortices of Descartes, to explain the facts of motion results only in the formation of hypotheses of which there is no adequate proof. By introducing the theory of vortices into celestial mechanics Descartes obscured a science which later became clarified by the treatment of Newton.⁹⁰

The Soul as an Object of Speculative Belief.

In the *Fondements de la Psychologie*, Biran attempts to deduce the fundamental categories of experience from the primitive fact of self-consciousness. The notions of force, causality, unity, identity and permanence find their archetype in the reflective apprehension of the self as revealed in the

⁸⁹*Op. cit.*, tome II, p. 338.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 351.

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experience of effort. The ideas thus derived are then generalized and extended to the apperception of external objects and events. With this account Biran compares the procedure of Kant. The defect of Kant's method consists in his failure to give a concrete derivation of the categories; the latter are derived, not from the subject of experience as presented in self-consciousness, but from a noumenal self which exists outside knowledge.⁹¹ It is against this severance of the principles of understanding from the concrete apperception of the self that Biran protests in putting forward his own theory. As the 'I' which is revealed in the sense of effort is an experienced reality and not a transcendental supposition, so also the constitutive categories of experience arise out of the reflective apprehension of this self.

At the time of writing the *Fondements*, no suspicion seems to have entered Biran's mind as to the adequacy of this account. In the work entitled *Les Rapports des Sciences Naturelles avec la Psychologie*, a fundamental change of position is observable. This change is attributable to the author's recognition of two objections to his previous theory. (1) The categories are utilized as principles in the constitution of experience prior to the reflective apprehension of the corresponding notions. (2) The universality and necessity which attach to their operation, confers upon them an involuntary or impersonal character which is opposed to their empirical derivation from the self. In attempting to explain these facts, Biran concludes that it is necessary to assume the existence of certain categories or universal principles which are inherent in the mind in logical priority to the act of self-consciousness. The recognition of these principles and the distinction which is drawn between them and the 'notions' of the *Fondements* forms the central aspect of his later theory.

⁹¹*Op. cit.*, tome I, pp. 167-169.

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While the notions as contents of consciousness have no existence apart from self-consciousness, the categories are distinguished from the principle of personality by the unconscious or unwitting character of their operation.⁹²

In Biran's earlier account of the origin of self-consciousness, the conception of a transcendental foundation of personality is passed over in silence. 'We do not fear to lose ourselves in darkness,' he writes, 'by seeking how effort can begin to be willed, what the origin is of this primary action, of this free will which is the first condition of self-consciousness, and, therefore, of all other consciousness.'⁹³ In the *Rapports des Sciences Naturelles avec la Psychologie* the author's growing insight into the problem of knowledge compels him to break down this artificial limitation. 'All that we know or can know,' he writes, 'has a necessary foundation in that which we do not know.'⁹⁴ The categories are laws of psychic determination which the personality does not make and cannot alter; they are comparable to a kind of instinct which masters it.⁹⁵ In seeking the ground of the categories, therefore, Biran takes up the conception of the soul.

The soul is not the same as the self. While the latter is known in immediate internal apperception, the former lies outside the sphere of knowledge. The distant source of the categories which the self apprehends but does not create, the soul remains outside the grasp of self-consciousness. In attempting to characterize the idea of the soul, Biran takes up a position midway between the Cartesian dogmatism and the criticism of Kant. With Descartes he regards the soul as a substance; but while this substance is conceived of as a perdurable entity which persists in the absence of self-

⁹²*Nouvelles œuvres inédites*, pp. 162, 163.

⁹³*Œuvres inédites*, tome I, p. 217.

⁹⁴*Nouvelles œuvres inédites*, p. 166.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 202.

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consciousness, it is incapable of further determination within the system of knowledge. In terms of a distinction which Biran uses in this connexion the soul is an object of 'croyance' rather than of 'connaissance.' The error of Descartes lay in his failure to effect such a distinction between an indeterminate notion of a speculative order and the concrete intuition of the self in which personality consists.⁹⁶

The Last Phase of Biran's Philosophy.

The introduction of the soul, as distinguished from the self, into Biran's system profoundly affects his later theory. 'In order that the soul may give rise to the self,' he writes, 'it must determine freely and independently of man's organic nature a first relation or effort; the relative fact of consciousness has therefore its foundation or generative principle in the absolute.'⁹⁷ This admission renders untenable Biran's previous dogmatic assertion of the freedom of the self. As the force which is personality traces its origin to a source which is below the threshold of personality, every phase of its subsequent activity must be regarded as conditioned by similar unknown factors.

These doubts as to the reality of self-determination were reinforced in Biran's later life by considerations of a more strictly personal order. The record of the *Pensées* serves to show that with advancing age the author was increasingly subject to the nervous instability associated with his temperament. In the introspective analysis which he applies to these facts, attention is directed chiefly to the involuntary organic origination of the emotions and their allied trains of imagery. 'The images,' he writes, 'which trace their origin to this source are more powerful than the reason which takes cognizance of them and judges them without being able to

⁹⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 213.

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disperse them.’⁹⁸ At the time of writing the *Fondements*, Biran believed that he had discovered in the sense of effort a principle which raised the individual above the bondage of temperament. The accuracy of his own later observations led him to doubt this view. He recognizes that, even where will appears to control the impulses derived from the organism, it is impossible to separate it from its bodily conditions. Thus in speaking of the conflict of will with the lower automatic tendencies, he writes: ‘The question is to know if this struggle itself does not necessarily suppose a certain degree of animal vitality which we cannot confer upon ourselves and which depends on certain natural organic dispositions.’⁹⁹

The self, therefore, so far from being an independent agent, is rooted in the two poles of the unconscious which Biran calls respectively the soul and the principle of animal life. It is, therefore, derivative and conditioned in a sense which is incompatible with freedom. This conception forms the starting-point of the religious development which marks the author’s later years. Up to the year 1815, Biran accepted the doctrine of Stoicism as the ethical counterpart of his theory of effort; but in the light of later reflection Stoicism is abandoned on the ground that it falsely represents the will as an independent principle which is superior to involuntary fluctuations. The author denies that the point of vantage necessary for the attainment of moral freedom can be found in the will. ‘I feel more and more that it cannot lie within myself; it is found in the religious sentiment or the idea of God which I have too much neglected.’¹⁰⁰

In the work entitled *De la Morale et de la Religion* (1818) the existence of God is approached from the standpoint of

⁹⁸*Pensées*, p. 387.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 360.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, p. 291.

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speculative belief. The sense of efficient causality with which personality arises is carried over into the notion of God as the absolute cause of reality.¹⁰¹ In the *Nouveaux Essais d'Anthropologie*, a change of view is observable. The speculative belief in God is replaced by a mystical doctrine of divine grace and inner illumination. This changed attitude may be regarded as a product of Biran's experienced ethical needs coupled with certain mystical phases observable in his temperament. 'On two occasions especially', he writes in 1823, 'the sombre veil which has shrouded my mind and enveloped my spirit for some time past, has seemed to rise and I have had a quickening intuition of some of those truths which escape the discursive reason and which words cannot express.'¹⁰²

The religious direction of Biran's thoughts at this period led him to regard these momentary visions as being divine in origin. Upon the basis of this assumption, he traces in his last years the outline of a 'vie de l'esprit' to which the 'vie humaine' of the *Fondements* is regarded as a prelude. The fragmentary and contradictory character of the notes which form the author's extant treatment of this subject, precludes any attempt to give a consistent account of his position. While the doctrine of effort is made the basis of the psychology of the *Fondements*, this view is transcended in the *Anthropologie* by a supplementary theory of the absorption of the self in the divine essence. This final consummation constitutes 'the mystical life of enthusiasm which is the highest point to which the human soul can attain in identifying itself as far as possible with its supreme object and thus returning to the source whence it came.'¹⁰³ With this condition of ecstasy Biran compares the opposed condition in which the personality

¹⁰¹*Œuvres inédites*, tome III, p. 52.

¹⁰²*Pensées*, p. 356.

¹⁰³*Œuvres inédites*, tome III, p. 521.

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is absorbed by the passions of animal life. In both cases personality is absorbed or eclipsed; 'but in the one, it is to lose itself in God; in the other to destroy itself by descending to the level of the animal.'¹⁰⁴

Between these two extremes lies the normal state of personality of which self-consciousness and effort are the distinguishing features. While the lower forms of the suspension of the self are conditioned by blind passion or by pathological states of reverie, the ecstasy of religious feeling is regarded by Biran as due to an influx of divine grace. While the moments of ecstatic illumination are explained in this manner, the author regards the divine absorption of the self as conditional upon the fulfilment of a preparatory system of moral endeavour. In the moment of religious rapture, the personality or the sense of effort is destroyed, and the relative consciousness of the 'reflective' system is replaced by the absolute intuition of God.¹⁰⁵ But the 'vie de l'esprit' which is achieved in this state is rendered possible only by the self-discipline or effort which characterizes the preceding stage of the 'vie humaine.'

The solution of life's problem suggested to Biran by his religious needs does not escape his criticism as a psychologist. By prayer and meditation, it is assumed, the individual prepares the way for the divine illumination which is his goal. Biran however acknowledges that these preparatory activities are not always equally in the subject's power. The mental attitude which determines them is itself subject to the involuntary fluctuations of temperament as determined by the obscure vicissitudes of the organism. The reality of self-determination is therefore once again attacked at its basis. The author also appears to have been subject to doubts as to

¹⁰⁴*Op. cit.*, tome III, p. 516.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, tome III, p. 30.

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the real origin of the mystical states attributed to the life of religion. 'The intimate communication of the divine mind with our minds,' he writes, 'is a veritable psychological fact and not merely a matter of faith.'¹⁰⁶ Elsewhere, however, he suggests the possibility that these moments of illumination are due to the physiological states of the organism. 'The tranquillity, the calm, the serenity of mind which one experiences under the control of certain religious ideas, always leaves a doubt as to whether these spiritual sentiments are not the immediate results of certain organic conditions rather than the consequence of a spiritual cause.'¹⁰⁷ These doubts were never finally settled by Biran. Whichever explanation is adopted, he adds, the moments of ecstatic illumination are beyond human control. Whether they are attributed to a divine agent or to the inscrutable rhythm of the organism, the manner of their appearance is 'an impenetrable mystery, an insoluble riddle, of which the solutions offered are merely logical.'¹⁰⁸

Conclusion.

It remains to decide what is the significance of Biran's thought as a whole; and what aspects of it are likely to retain their suggestiveness for modern psychology.

Maine de Biran has not solved the problem of personality. The theory of 'effort', by which he is best known, is founded upon a method of abstraction similar to that of which he accuses Descartes. As against Descartes, he denies that the self can be known apart from the body; but his subsequent reduction of personality to a pure perception of activity throws him back upon the typical vice of the Cartesian theory of knowledge. As Descartes seeks to reject sensation

¹⁰⁶*Pensées*, p. 377.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 257.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p. 324.

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from the structure of reasoned knowledge, so also Biran attempts to eliminate every mode of passive sensibility from the content of self-consciousness. The operation of this tendency accounts for a typical error. Since the coenaesthesia, no less than the data of external sensibility, is of passive origin, he is forced to exclude from self-consciousness the organic sensations which form one of its chief constituents. The doctrine of 'effort' is also open to the criticisms urged by Hume, and in recent times by William James. Since the process of motor innervation has no immediate equivalent in consciousness, the continuity of the sense of effort is broken into two phases united only by a relation of temporal succession. Biran's objection that this criticism is based upon considerations drawn from an external knowledge of the nervous system rather than upon the evidence of inner sense, is rendered untenable by his own explicit references to the physiological mechanism of effort. But his anxiety to refute Hume's position is easily understood. If the unbroken consciousness of the muscular efficacy of will is denied, an element of physiological automatism is introduced into voluntary action which falsifies the alleged perception of the pure activity of the self. It is the presence of this alien element and Biran's fruitless attempt to get rid of it, which both destroys the theory of effort and also supplies a clue to the ideal by which he is guided. He seeks to establish in the sphere of willed action that which a perceptive understanding represents in the sphere of thought. A will which in the act of willing, creates the bodily structures and functions through which it gains expression, is the unacknowledged ideal which the author has in view. It is the attraction exercised by this ideal together with his imperfect understanding of the conditions of its fulfilment that accounts for the contradictory nature of the doctrine of effort.

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The vice of abstraction which Biran inherits from Descartes is further exemplified in his manner of conceiving will. No thinker has laid a greater emphasis upon the contrasted elements of freedom and automatism which go to make up experience. But this distinction, which is valid only when its relative character is recognized, is converted into a relation of abstract opposition. In his anxiety to safeguard the genuine autonomy of the will, he is led to exclude from its constitution the instinctive and impulsive components which determine animal life. His psychology of will and personality suffers accordingly from a characteristic defect. Will becomes an empty or formal activity of which no further account can be given, while personality is represented as a simple, unanalysable force. Biran's views therefore are opposed in this respect to those of modern psychology, which regards will and personality as the terminal products of a complex process of psychical integration.

When allowance is made for this defect, there is much in Biran's theory which remains of interest. While modern research has demonstrated the synthetic and derivative character of personality, the psychological concept of the unconscious outlined by Biran has gained increasing recognition. M. Pierre Janet especially is, by his own admission, indebted to Biran for many of the characteristic conceptions contained in his works.¹⁰⁹ The interpretation of many abnormal phenomena such as the echolalia of catalepsy and the various types of somnambulism, is admitted to-day to be dependent upon the existence of subconscious mental states. This conception is already clearly indicated in Biran's writings. Between complete consciousness and the Cartesian mechanism, he maintains, there is a place for beings who have sensations without personal consciousness, without a self

¹⁰⁹For references to Biran in this connexion, see Janet, *L'Automatisme Psychologique*, 6^e édition, pp. 6, 41, and 42.

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capable of perceiving them. The animal furnishes an example of such a being. It 'has no knowledge of its sensations because it is not a person capable of knowing or perceiving from within its individual existence.'¹¹⁰ Man is not normally in this condition, but may become so under pathological influences, for example when 'our intellectual grasp is enfeebled or degraded, when thought sleeps and will is annulled and the "I" is, so to speak, absorbed in sensible impressions, the moral personality being suspended'.¹¹¹ In the *Nouvelles Considérations sur le Sommeil, les Songes et le Somnambulisme*, this conception of dissociated automatism is further related to the facts of hypnotism as witnessed by Biran at the séances of Deleuze.

The synthesis of the personality, as conceived of by modern psychology, is probably never completely abolished, but admits of all degrees of comprehensiveness, as exhibited respectively in normally unified experience, in twilight states, in the various grades of hypnosis and in profound catalepsy. In this way continuity is established between personality and the unconscious. Biran's clean-cut opposition between the two states precludes this continuity. The intensive fluctuations with which 'effort' is credited, enable him, however, to recognize the gradations of self-conscious experience. It is in this sense that the distinction between the 'sensitive', 'perceptive' and 'reflective' stages of human development must be understood. While these stages are plainly arbitrary in their attempted delimitation, they constitute a genuine recognition of the growing character of experience. If Biran's exposition fails to be entirely convincing, it is chiefly because he has attempted that most difficult of all tasks—a psychology at once dynamically and genetically conceived.

¹¹⁰*Œuvres inédites*, tome III, p. 397. Cf. *ibid.*, tome II, pp. 3, 4.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, tome II, p. 12.

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This brief review suggests finally an issue which bids fair to be *the* problem of future psychological research. The unconscious of Biran, like the dissociated states of recent psychopathological theory, while being psychologically conceived, is represented as a manifestation of the principle of automatism. Personality, on the other hand, is regarded as the citadel of freedom. In his anxiety to safeguard this distinction, Biran traces a fundamental dualism between the personal principle of 'effort' and the force which expresses itself in the unconscious. Modern investigators, while recognizing the divergent characters of psychological automatism and the superior psychism of the ego, regard the distinction as one of degree rather than of kind. It is all a question of the comprehensiveness to which the psychic synthesis attains. Similarly the primordial psychic force which actuates the synthesis is everywhere self-identical. In terms of Biran's nomenclature, the 'effort' which constitutes self-conscious personality is not discontinuous with, but simply a higher manifestation of, the vital principle which accounts for the existence of 'sensations sans perception.' While this conception eliminates Biran's dualism, it leaves outstanding his main problem—the reality of freedom. In the lower ranges of its subconscious operation, the psyche is ruled by a principle of automatism. By what process does its superior integration under the form of personality confer upon it this new attribute of freedom?

In discussing this question, M. Janet seeks a solution by effecting a thorough-going distinction between the automatic revival which characterizes the phenomena of dissociated states and the opposed creative synthesis of personal consciousness. Automatic revival becomes possible only upon the basis of a prior synthesis effected by the personality between the elements concerned. 'The automatic reproduction of ideas

is one thing, and the synthesis which forms the personal perception at each moment of life and the very idea of the Ego, is another.' ¹¹² Of this principle of personal synthesis, he adds: 'There is here a veritable creation, for the act by which the heterogeneous elements are united is not given in the elements.' ¹¹³ Similarly the judgement, as product of personal synthesis, is 'like consciousness itself, something undetermined and free.' ¹¹⁴ Finally, 'the nature of consciousness is always the same, and the child who for the first time constructs within himself the feeblest religious or artistic emotion accomplishes on his own account a discovery and a creation.' ¹¹⁵ If personal consciousness is thus everywhere 'a veritable creation ex nihilo', ¹¹⁶ the conclusion surely arises that scientific psychology extends only to the explanation of abnormal automatisms. The whole tract of normal or personal consciousness remains insusceptible to scientific, that is causal, explanation.

In order to avoid this conclusion, the freedom of personality has been, in other quarters, denied. The issue which thus arises derives its interest in the present connexion more especially from the fact that the current deterministic conception of personality is mainly traceable to two sources: (1) The assumption of rigid determinism in the explanation of the phenomena of the unconscious as known to psychopathologists; and (2) the allied doctrine, opposed to that of Biran, that personality is essentially a manifestation of primarily unconscious forces and is therefore amenable to the same principle of determination as the latter. A return to the Biranian solution of the problem of freedom along the lines of dualism is not to be expected. Determinism is

¹¹²Pierre Janet, *The Mental State of Hystericals*, (Eng. trans., 1901), p. 261.

¹¹³*L'Automatisme Psychologique*, 6^e édition, pp. 483-484.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 477.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 485.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 477.

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therefore likely to remain, at least provisionally, a favoured hypothesis in scientific psychology. On the other hand, psychology by no means satisfies all life-demands. The most consistent determinist is constantly committed to the assumption of freedom in ordinary ethical and social situations. The solution of this antinomy does not, fortunately, fall within the limits of the present paper. But the psychology of the future may rightly be expected, as a matter of intellectual sincerity, to reconcile these opposed demands within a theory which shall combine scientific merit with the age-long claim for freedom of the human heart.

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The field of philosophy, we are accustomed to think, is the whole of experience; the final synthesis of the philosopher must include every department and aspect of reality. To be sure, this, the philosopher's ideal is in a certain sense quite unattainable, since complete knowledge of every subject of scientific investigation has for long been impossible even to the most encyclopaedic human intelligence. All that the ideal can in reason be thought to require is a certain comprehensiveness of outlook and impartiality of judgement in giving due consideration to different and apparently conflicting types of fact. But it is just this breadth and impartiality that seems particularly lacking in philosophical theories and systems. The tendency to accept some one aspect of experience as normative for all the others is, apparently, irresistible. The student of philosophy begins the study of some one connected system of facts; as he gains knowledge of it his interest in it increases and it grows more and more important in his estimation, dwarfing other bodies of fact and reducing them to comparative insignificance. Thus philosophical theories become not so much interpretations of experience as a whole, as attempts to interpret the whole of experience in terms of some part or aspect that the philosopher believes to be fundamental.

Since philosophy is itself a product of reflective intelligence, depending upon the speculative interest of men and their capacity for purely conceptual formulation, we are not surprised to find many philosophers concerning themselves primarily with the procedure of systematic thinking. When the procedure of thought is thus investigated, rational infer-

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ence is found to be at once self-determined in its activity and objective in its significance. The single judgement proves to be determined by other judgements which disclose themselves as implicit in it and, ultimately, by the complete system of judgements of which it and all other single judgements are, in their isolation, imperfect and confused expressions. Thus thinking appears as the process of explicating inter-related differences within an organized system of meaning. And this process is, throughout, objective in its reference; the differences which reason defines through active analysis and synthesis are differences in reality. Reality thus reveals itself to human thought as a coherent system whose constituents are, through their qualitative diversity, joined in complete organic unity. In fact, reason is itself the principle of the whole active in every part; it is the impulsion of the part to manifest its membership in the whole and thus to establish, by right of this connexion, its own individuality. All relations prove to be at bottom internal because all determination turns out in last analysis to be the self-determination of the whole. When therefore as human individuals we think, we participate in those significant structures which in their infinite variety do but express the absolute unity of the real.

If the processes of perception rather than of thought are singled out as the special subject of philosophical investigation a prepossession will probably be created in favour of empirical and realistic instead of idealistic theories. For whatever may be true of the meaning of a perception—as an event in the conscious life of an individual, it is a response to an external object or situation. This, the control which the environment exercises over the nervous responses of the living individual, receives conscious acknowledgement in the external existence affirmed of the perceived object. The externality or independ-

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ence in question is not, at least primarily, a quality attributed to the perceived object, it is a status which it is acknowledged to possess relative to the power and freedom of the perceiving subject. On the side of meaning, the perception is an interpretation of the object in terms of the experience of the perceiver as a conscious subject maintaining its own identity in a changing world of sentient impression. The qualities attributed to existing objects in perception are therefore universals, i.e., they are distinctive characters by which conscious intelligence identifies external objects. But these qualities, all of them universals, fall into two classes, the so-called spatial or physical properties, and the diverse qualities that fall within the system of subjective interests and satisfactions. The spatial attributes of perceived objects, their location, size, distance, etc., project or body forth in terms of general import and applicability the outcome of incipient movements and bodily adjustments induced by the object acting as stimulus upon the human nervous system. They represent sense-objects and the human individual who perceives them, as belonging to the same physical system whose constituents are externally related and mechanically interacting. And if the qualitative differences that give meaning and value to the object of common perception find no place in such a system, why, these can also be reduced to terms of anticipated behaviour, of motor responses anticipated in their outcome and effect upon the psycho-physical organism as a system of vital activities. Thus a tactual quality like sharpness means when perceived 'will cut', the shrinking of the finger-tips from imagined contact, induced when light-waves of certain rates, etc., impinge upon the retina. A colour like the red of ripe fruit means 'can eat', incipient movements of grasping and biting, with preparatory tensions of the muscular mechanisms of chewing, swallowing, digesting, etc. Thus behaviourism leads to a new materialism

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in which the physical system is accepted as all-encompassing and ultimate.

Study of the actions by which the human individual adapts himself to the changing environment and transforms it to meet his future needs brings to light new principles and relations whose supreme importance is proclaimed by pragmatism and instrumentalism. Such action is primarily a sequence of movements which takes place in the physical world and thus falls within the sphere of mechanical determination. It is, in its way, a response to a physical stimulus, but is not, like the reflex, a mechanical response of uniform character, to a recurring stimulus. Rather is it a response to the stimulus reconstituted, that is to say interpreted in the light of the future interests of the conscious individual. This interpretation furnishes a plan for the guidance of action which promises to lead the agent through a series of motor adjustments into the presence of the conditions which he, in the existing situation, judges to be desirable. The interpretation, itself the meaning of the situation, brings out the bearing of the existent facts upon the system of interests with which the intelligence of the agent has identified his welfare. The action itself takes the form of intelligently directed experimentation. From the movements at the command of the agent (in view of the external conditions and his own established motor tendencies) at each successive stage, that one is selected which conforms to the plan, i.e., promises to lead towards the ideal objective. Thus the results of successive movements are 'checked' by the ideal plan: when an intended move proves impossible or leads in a direction contrary to that desired, it is abandoned and another is tried. These serial acts are to be made means to the preconceived end, but they also fall within the physical order and are subject to its laws of determination. An adjustment must be effected: physical events which can upon repetition be

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depended upon to follow their causes with mechanical uniformity must be included in the teleology of developing life. The action is successful in reaching its goal when it has so changed the existing situation that it presents the character which the agent anticipated as conformable to his own interest. Thus in intelligent action we behold actual existence transforming itself in the interest of an ideal good, we behold existing nature realizing latent possibilities of conscious life and satisfaction.

Finally, the experience of immediate realization or present fulfilment may be given greatest prominence and taken as the key to the nature of reality. When the end of action is, as we say, realized, when the agent comes into its actual presence, the movements at his command are no longer such as to exclude its qualities as previously imagined, but rather to maintain and reinforce, to intensify and amplify, them. The opposition between the aspirations of intelligence and the inexorable limitations of physical existence is for the time overcome and the self is at one with the object. This experience is most perfectly exemplified by aesthetic intuition. The beautiful object stimulates the perceptual faculties to lively and harmonious activity; it liberates the imagination and arouses in the mind of the subject a sense of power and freedom. The kindled fancy flashes new intimations of meaning which illuminate the object, causing added qualities to be perceived and appreciated. Here if ever, it seems to the intuitionist, we have the meaning of experience as a whole presented and realized through an immediate insight which transcends all differences and reconciles all oppositions.

Four different types of experience have, it appears, been singled out for special study and each has suggested to investigators impressed by its crucial importance a principle for the

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explanation of reality. The first is that of the self-determining system whose members are related internally because each acts only as an expression of the whole. The second is that of the mechanical order whose elements determine one another externally. The third is the process of active experimentation in which determinate existence is adapted to the requirements of a non-existent and self-constituting future. The fourth is that of the inner harmony and inexhaustible fertility which certain sensuous complexes reveal when immediately experienced. It is patent that the differences between these four principles all revolve around the fundamental opposition between the inner, the unitary, the self-determining, and the outer, the manifold, the externally determined.

Since each of these principles has an undeniable basis in human experience, the question arises: Would it not be better to acknowledge the validity of them all and be content with a confessed eclecticism than to centre upon one to the exclusion of the others and thus be condemned to a one-sided and partial view? To such a course the familiar objections will arise. Eclecticism in philosophy, we shall be told, is a recourse of third-rate minds; its general adoption would indicate the decline of constructive power in philosophical investigation, the decay of the philosophical spirit itself. What is eclecticism, we shall be asked, but an external piecing together of doctrines inconsistent with one another, resulting in an incoherent jumble of principles and ideas, a patchwork combination, intolerable to anyone capable of clear and consistent thinking. These objections are doubtless well-founded, yet something may be said on the other side. The combination of different principles attempted by an eclectic philosophy may be more or less external, may be more or less neglectful of consistency and the requirements of logical synthesis. It is not clear, however, why the attempt to unite different and apparently

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conflicting principles in a unitary world-view is more intrinsically objectionable from the standpoint of constructive intelligence than the attempt to bring different and apparently conflicting facts under one principle. And as to the eclectic tendency itself, it has not been always absent from constructive philosophy of the first rank: the eclectic motive was a dominant influence in the philosophy of Leibniz. There is reason to think, furthermore, that as philosophy advances, the need to elucidate and confirm the principles required for the explanation of particular aspects of experience will diminish and the demand for a synthesis of these principles themselves become more urgent.

Such force as the commonly received objections to eclecticism undoubtedly possess will be fully met if we admit that eclecticism, to be worthy of serious attention in philosophy, must not be content with a mere combination of different principles and points of view, superficially adjusted, but essentially antagonistic; it must rather achieve something like a real synthesis. What is required in the present instance is a synthesis of the four principles stated above as cardinal doctrines of idealism, realism, pragmatism and intuitionism. In looking about for the path that leads toward such a synthesis, the idea occurs that possibly some form of human experience can be found that includes and unites the four specific types of experience each of which is singled out as fundamental by one of these philosophies. I believe that such a comprehensive form of experience is to be found in purposive action, in rationally directed conduct. We shall see, I think, that purposive action not only includes thought, perception, action and immediate realization, but so correlates them functionally as to bring to light aspects in each which do not appear in their true importance when considered apart from the others.

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Purposive action is governed by an ideal objective which belongs to the system of meanings that the agent shares with other rational beings. It thus presupposes the work of intelligence in apprehending certain characteristic differences of quality and permanences of relation which hold universally. In its capacity of end it is a projection into the future of the self-identity of individual intelligence which selects from the medley of passing experience specific qualities or complexes of qualities as definite possibilities of realization. At the same time it is an expression of the unity of rational experience in the general or social sense, formulated in the system of accepted truth, communicated to the individuals through channels of 'social heredity.' In formulating his purpose the agent observes the requirements of logical coherence and consistency; in making his purpose intelligible to himself, he is bound to make it generally intelligible. In fact, every purposive or voluntary action is, in its way, a function of the organizing activity of universal intelligence which in the different fields of practice, intellectual, technical and aesthetic, strives ever to expand and enrich its own unity by the incorporation of a more varied and closely integrated content. But purpose has another aspect no less essential but often overlooked by those who recognize its relation to the system of meanings in the universal or comprehensive sense. It is also an expression of individuality in its unique and therefore exclusive character. The end as conceived or imagined is the product of experiences peculiar to the human individual who formulates or constructs it; it reflects the interests, preferences, and abilities which in their proportionate strength and interconnexion are peculiarly his own. While all human individuals participate in the same world of rational meanings each occupies his own point-of-view which he shares with no other one—and his purpose is an expression of this unique point-of-view. Do the consequ-

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ent originality and freedom of individual intelligence seem to contradict the fundamental fact just stated that the effect of purpose as an expression of rational will is to subject the varying and discrepant impulses and aptitudes of individuals to the demands of the common reason that unites them? The fact is that alike influenced by the demand of intelligence for a more comprehensive and coherent life, individuals select from their respective experiences which have been made intelligible by reflection, materials which they combine in new and original ways, and thus construct ends which appeal to them because they promise when realized to enrich the unity of experience by establishing or revealing a multitude of unsuspected connexions, a range of undiscovered harmonies. This is certainly a true account of all genuinely creative activity—of the invention of the artist or scientific discoverer, of the technician or statesman, and holds in a less degree of all purposive action.

But a purpose, no matter how clearly its meaning is understood, is, as a mere purpose, unrealized. It represents simply a possibility of realization and therefore has no place in present existence. The end which it proposes is in its contrast with present actuality merely ideal. This means that the perceptual responses which the external environment evokes from the agent are not such as to maintain and develop its characteristic qualities but rather to conflict with and to exclude them. As an ideal objective it is therefore maintained before the mind of the agent by an effort of his will. But while the objects of present perception are in their existence external to the consciousness of the agent, inasmuch as they exercise control over his motor responses, they are not in their content thus external. Even spatial attributes of perceived objects, while they map out possible movements of the percipient with reference

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to the object are themselves implicit universals, components in the percipient's scheme of spatial relations and as such capable of application to other objects and situations. And if this is true of spatial attributes it is even more obvious in the case of other features, colours, sounds, tastes, odours, etc., whose value for the living individual inheres in the distinctive satisfactions they promise or furnish. The colour of the fruit may signify ripeness and suggest the movements of approaching, grasping and eating, the taste may signify nourishing properties which provide energy for further movement. But the colour may be and frequently is a delight in itself. The fact that perceived objects may be enjoyed as beautiful and the further fact that other human individuals are objects of perception are sufficient to prove that perceptions possess meanings and value that cannot be reduced to terms of behaviour.

The agent thus confronts a world of externally existing objects whose character conflicts with and excludes the type of experience which his purpose contemplates. He has, through the instrumentality of his psycho-physical organism so to alter his actual situation as to bring it into harmony with his ideal objective. As we have seen, this is achieved through a procedure of effortful experimentation in which the agent selects from the movements which existing conditions permit such as promise to lead toward the purposed end, constantly altering his method of operation in accordance with the observed result as judged in the light of the preconceived objective. Now such a process of experimentation owes its rational and social significance altogether to the fact that the purpose which prompts it is an expression or extension of the universal system of meanings in which all conscious selves participate. Only so far as the purpose is thus generally or

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objectively intelligible can the series of acts be understood or described, by the agent himself or by others, as the attested means or method of attaining a definite result. Because and only because the purpose is a function of the comprehensive system of meanings, its realization has a significance which transcends the experience of the agent. Although it is itself the original and unique expression of individuality, its realization signifies an enlargement and diversification of the unity of rational experience in the inclusive social sense.

We now attain a true understanding of the culminating phase of purposive action in which the ideal end becomes present actuality. Seen in its wider relations the satisfaction which the agent experiences has import not as a passing state of agreeable feeling, but as a subjective reflection of the elaborate context of personal meaning which the objects of present perception acquire when they appear as the embodiment of rational purpose. The fault of intuitionism is that it takes this experience out of its place in the progress of rational self-realization, severs it from its antecedents in reason and will, and treats it as an independent and self-sufficient source of insight. Such a procedure is in a measure inevitable and justified in aesthetic appreciation, but just to that extent is aesthetic appreciation inadequate to the reality of our experience.

Thus purposive action not merely includes the four types of experience we have been considering, but, when taken as a principle of synthesis, brings to light certain features in each which indicate their underlying relationship. All thinking proceeds within the one comprehensive system of universally valid meanings, but this system unfolds from individual centres having each its own unique and exclusive point-of-view. Perceived objects are in their existence external to the conscious

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percipient, but in their qualities reflect the self-identity of intelligent consciousness. Intelligent action is a control of motor responses by their anticipated effects upon the future interest of the individual, but individual interest defines itself in terms of rationally significant and universally valid ends. Immediate realization represents the direct identification of subjective intelligence with objective presentation, but such identification presupposes the activity of rational will in transforming existent conditions so as to enlarge the scope of its own self-determined activity.

Clearly the procedure of purposive action hinges upon the relation of two factors, active intelligence or rational will on the one hand, and the external or physical world on the other. Does it not give more than a hint of their essential nature and real relationship? Each presents two opposing aspects, but by virtue of this very internal opposition common to both, the two work in complete functional unity. Intelligence is at once a form of infinite comprehensiveness containing by implication the whole social community, and at the same time exclusively individual, occupying a point-of-view subjective and unique. Matter is at once external to the self-developing system of rational purposes and common to the experience of all rational percipients. Their very opposition makes possible complete reciprocity of function. The purpose of the human agent is an expression of the self-organizing power of universal reason which in self-expression works out from individual centres. But, as long as it remains unrealized, it is significant only for the individual who appreciates it 'in idea' and in spite of contrary fact. The physical nexus, on the other hand, just because it lacks internal organization, acts uniformly and is equally available for all individuals. When, therefore, the sequence of motor adjustments is discovered which realizes

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the ideal end, then this end, originally an individual construction, is opened to the experience of all other individuals, who fulfil the determinate conditions. And since these conditions fall within the system of physical forces to which each individual through his bodily organism has access, they can be fulfilled by every other individual agent, allowing, of course, for limitations of position and circumstance. Thus the object becomes the property of social intelligence; its significance and value for the individual who originally projected or devised it is enhanced by other men's appreciation of its qualities communicated through the usual channels; it is generally accepted as the objective embodiment of rational will in the universal sense, and furnishes material for new constructions on the part of individuals. Thus the self-expansion of rational experience proceeds through a regular cycle. From the organized world of socially significant objects communicated to the individual by teaching and example, he imagines new possibilities of realization which promise to augment and enrich the unity of the whole. These ideal ends he realizes through physical instrumentalities and thus incorporates them within the objective order through which the rational will of man gains expression.

What we have in reality is therefore a society of individuals engaged in developing through the intermediation of physical agencies a common system of significant ends. The function of physical agencies and uniformities as media of conservation and communication between different individuals and successive generations is best illustrated by the progress of social culture and civilization. Man finds the objects of his natural environment interesting in the first place because of their appeal to his instinctive motor tendencies. Their perceived qualities suggest movements of approach and seizure, or with-

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drawal and escape, along with resulting satisfactions of characteristic quality. Thus the ripe fruit is perceived as an object that will have an agreeable taste if plucked and eaten, the fellow-clansman as the source of friendly help and useful information if accompanied and talked with, the strange animal as threatening pain and death unless escaped from, the child as responding with love and delight to the parental caress. But when these objects of instinctive interest become the ends of intelligent desire and are realized by means of deliberate and effortful action, they acquire a new significance, a personal meaning. The tree is then remembered as the one which when revisited provided the expected bounty of food; the lion is individualized as the animal hunted down and slain, the fellow-tribesman becomes the friend who was relied upon in time of trouble and proved a saving helper. That is, these objects become centres of qualities clearly conceived in connexion with the sequence of actions which brought them home to the agent in all their possibilities of satisfaction. Through them the rational will of the agent has gained expression; to their realization he has, through effort of contrivance and invention, made actual conditions subservient; to him they remain permanent possibilities of realization, in actual fact or in memory, according to the circumstances of the case.

But action from intelligent desire has a social significance which is capable of development through specific instrumentalities until it embraces the whole rational community. It is in fact personally co-operative as well as personally creative. The end, when it is conceived and planned for, is given place in the general system of interests and meanings which all individuals share in common. The agent by a mental necessity puts his ideas in words, the words which he has acquired through hereditary social transmission as the objec-

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tive embodiment and vehicle of his thought. Thus he has related it to the interests and ends that dominate the action of other men. He may and does talk about his purpose with his fellows; the result of this discussion is to enlarge his understanding of the objects which other men value, and the methods by which they realize them. And the action through which he realizes his purpose takes place in the world of common perception open to the observation of other individuals. They understand his actions in terms of the purpose he has disclosed to them or they in the light of their own experience imagine him to pursue. In his action, moreover, he makes use of the methods and accomplishments which he has acquired as part of his social inheritance, and also of the tools and instrumentalities, the custom and institutions, which are characteristic of his people and serve to correlate their activities. Finally when the agent realizes his purpose he expresses the satisfaction he feels in facial expression, in gesture, in laugh or song. These visible and audible expressions have a meaning for his fellows and if they join sympathetically in his rejoicing it is with a sense of its rational significance. When elaborated in art-forms, these emotional expressions become means of communicating both the fundamental personal experiences of the common human lot and something of the objective conditions and personal significance of these experiences in human life.

Thus there exist three media of intercommunication through which intelligently directed activities, carried on to meet the necessities of life, acquire an accumulating wealth of personal and social meaning. The first is language. Through the speech mechanism individuals exchange ideas and experiences, revealing to each other their beliefs, their preferences, their discoveries, and reaching a mutual understanding on the basis of

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a common intelligence which includes and incorporates different personal points-of-view. The second includes the tools and methods, the customs and institutions through which the external conditions of human existence, physical and biological, are made subservient to the rational uses of man. Through the tools and weapons they invent for industry and for war, through the methods and procedure they devise for social and political administration, individuals make socially available the products of their constructive effort and inventive skill in the field of action. These technical methods and contrivances when appropriated and employed by the group give to the individuals engaged that sense of increased power and practical solidarity which springs from the consciousness that the efforts of all are being made most effective through the agency of the established social technique. The third is art in its various forms. Man's ability to embody, or find embodiment for, his emotions in material media and sensible forms affords another means for realizing, conserving and communicating his significant personal experiences. Dependent upon facilities of perception closely correlated with mechanisms of motor adjustment peculiar to man, the ability to appreciate and create harmonies of form and colour and sound and movement has increased to an incalculable degree the meaning of the sense-world and the significance of sense-experience. Art has been an important factor in the social life of man from its first beginnings; through the song, the dance, the picture or carving, the individual could express his feeling of the deeper significance of things for which no words would be adequate.

If, therefore, we understand the rational will of man as an organizing agency which embraces by implication the community of intelligent subjects, we can see how it constructs out of the materials given in the world of perception ends which

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upon realization progressively expand and enrich the experience which it shares with other voluntary agents. Through the instrumentality of language, technical contrivance and art, objects that possess interest and actuality for the human individual because they evoke determinate motor responses and promise distinctive satisfactions, are invested with a rational significance that involves the whole social community. Through language his ideas are given place in the world of discourse, his experience is incorporated in the experience of humanity embodied in the social tradition and the accepted body of knowledge. His mental horizons are lifted to include past ages and places far distant; he re-lives in imagination the deeds of heroes and ancestors, is inspired by their example and thrilled by their achievements; he evaluates objects in the light of the satisfaction they have afforded to others and, in planning for their realization, relies upon the facts which his fellows have learned regarding the order of physical causes and the behaviour of natural objects. The use of industrial tools, methods, and mechanisms, the observance of political and moral customs and institutions, relate the acts of individuals to the controlling purposes of social life and so impart to them a universal meaning and value. When the individual exercises his own initiative and originality within the lines laid down, in the presence or with the knowledge of others who are likewise employed, his efforts have the significance of uniting him in working comradeship with his fellows. He is thus able effectually to identify his own will with the inclusive human purposes which these instrumentalities and institutions subserve; his work makes him one in spirit not merely with his fellow-labourers in the same social system, but with the inventors, organizers and reformers who have laboured in past times to perfect these methods and build up these institu-

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tions. From the activities of all in past and present his own efforts gain added power; he participates constructively in the great tasks of economic production and social organization. Aesthetic appreciation gives personal meaning to the endlessly diverse combinations of colour and sound which appear at first as signs or warnings of further effects organically beneficial or injurious, to be expected from objects. Their patterns and their harmonies so quicken imagination and stir emotion as to suggest those experiences of personal fulfilment or frustration that are fundamental to the lot of man in whom the infinite possibilities of creative intelligence appear to be negated by the limitations of physical existence. Social and moral progress mean that the organizing intelligence of man working through the agencies of language, technical contrivance and art has constructed from objects and activities which promised at best the passing satisfaction of prolonged natural existence, ends of universal import and inexhaustible interest: knowledge, whose field is the whole of rational experience; power, which involves the fellowship of all individuals in productive labour; and beauty which by refining the imagination creates universal human sympathy—ends for whose realization natural existence itself becomes but the means and occasion.

The relation of the two factors we have been considering, self-determining intelligence and physical causation, remains the central problem of philosophy. In the world of sense-perception these two factors meet—hence its baffling and self-contradictory character. The percipient appears in a double role, as active subject organizing its experiences so as to express the unity it shares with other subjects, and as living individual maintaining its own existence by acts of physical adjustment. The existence affirmed of the object in the act

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of perception is a conscious acknowledgement of the limitation it imposes upon the self-directed activity of the intelligent individual. But the qualities attributed to existing objects are distinctive characters by which self-conscious intelligence identifies external objects in terms of its own unity. But these qualities, all of them universals, fall into two classes, those that body forth the relations of externality and mechanical determination which hold between the self-activity of the percipient and the external conditions that limit it, and those that signify the relationship of qualitatively distinct elements within the system through which active intelligence expresses its own unity. Thus the world of sense-perception resolves itself upon rational analysis and conceptual formulation into two orders, the physical nexus or mechanical system and the 'realm of ends' or the teleological system. The issue between idealism and materialism concerns the adequacy of either of these intellectual formulations to reality as a whole.

The form of idealism most in harmony with the facts as they present themselves in the types of experience we have been examining is that which holds the physical system to be the phenomenal manifestation of the difference in point-of-view between an infinite number of subjective centres all realizing (in different stages of development) the same system of rational ends. It is an obvious consequence of this view that individual subjects do not affect by direct action one another's development; the development of each self-active centre is determined only by the system of which it is an expression and whose possibilities are latent within it. Nothing is therefore achieved by individuals which is not provided for in the purpose of the whole; there is no determination except teleological determination, the monads are in truth 'window-

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less.' Two fundamental features of the world as we experience it are in radical conflict with this general view. In the first place, intelligent individuals not merely reproduce or represent a system already organized as a teleological whole; they engage actively in its creation with all the uncertainty and chance of error and failure that this involves. And, secondly, individuals are not impervious to one another's influence, but directly and constantly affect each other's development both favourably and unfavourably.

We are forced therefore to maintain the reality of the physical system as a factor limiting the activity of intelligent individuals, yet through the uniformity and constancy of its processes serving as a medium for the communication and conservation of individual experiences and thus making possible co-operative human achievement. But if we grant that the physical system is thus in the full sense real, and if further we accept the evolutionary cosmogony of physical science, must we not admit that the realm of ends is epiphenomenal, an incidental and ineffectual by-product of mechanical forces? We remember that all qualitatively differentiated content is subjective because it depends upon the internal organization of consciousness. Where then was the 'system of significant differences' before consciousness came upon the scene? Or what reality will it retain after human intelligence has been extinguished in the inevitable sequence of cosmic processes? Shall we say simply that it was 'latent' in the physical system in the same sense that consciousness and intelligence were latent in earlier stages of evolution?

The view which our experience most strongly supports is that of reality as a system whose parts through interaction develop characteristic differences each of which implies, and in the course of the interaction unfolds, the whole system of

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differences in its distinctive way. So far as the constituents of the physical system are concerned, their position and activity are altogether determined by the action of other parts upon them—they exist in themselves and for the system to which they belong. But the system of significant differences exists, in all its individual expressions, for itself; it is self-objectified and self-realized. Hence if at an earlier stage of cosmical evolution the system of rational ends failed to express itself in the conscious life and inter-communication of intelligent individuals, it must have existed for a universal consciousness as a definite possibility of realization. But the realization of such a universal purpose would, of course, be contingent upon actual conditions embodied in the physical system itself. Thus we are forced to recognize an original dualism that conditions the evolution of reality so far as we have experience of it. The universal purpose projects a system of ends to be realized by a community of conscious subjects. But actual conditions limit the development of intelligent individuals through whose activity alone the universal purpose can be realized. Yet this dualism is in course of being overcome. For these very external conditions make possible a degree of mutual understanding, helpfulness and sympathy that could not otherwise be achieved and that enriches beyond measure the significance of ends in whose realization all participate.

H. W. WRIGHT.

SOME PRESENT-DAY TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY

It might appear strange or even ridiculous that one should spend one's time in discussing a question so often asked, and so often answered in the various text-books and treatises on philosophy, viz., 'What is philosophy?' For has not philosophy had a long and honourable career, and why should there be any question about the significance of her aims or the validity of her methods? But unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, the history of philosophy reveals much self-questioning, and many more or less contradictory answers all along the line of her development. And perhaps never has there been more self-questioning than there is at the present time. It is not so much the natural scientists, the traditional critics of philosophic method, who are sceptical of philosophy to-day, as the philosophers themselves. The natural scientists are busy with their own problems, puzzling over disturbing questions recently raised in regard to the validity of some of their own most cherished presuppositions and theories. They have discovered that, while they were strenuously attacking the metaphysicians, they were in reality metaphysicians themselves, and they have probably learned that, even in the pursuit of their own investigations, it will be difficult to get along without a metaphysic of some sort. In the same way the philosophers are looking toward, rather than away from, science, for a more satisfactory solution of their problems. And so it is not hard to detect an ever-growing sympathy between two schools of thought which have always been more or less antagonistic. There is humility on both sides accompanied by a growing sense of common purpose, and mutual good-will. It is this rapprochement which I wish

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to elucidate in this essay, particularly from the point of view of philosophy, and in the light of some present-day tendencies.

In 1892, Karl Pearson, in the introduction to *The Grammar of Science*, wrote: 'There is no short cut to truth, no way to gain a knowledge of the universe except through the gateway of scientific method. The hard and stony path of classifying facts and reasoning upon them is the only way to ascertain truth. It is the reason and not the imagination which must ultimately be appealed to. . . The poet is a valued member of the community, for he is known to be a poet; his value will increase as he grows to recognize the deeper insight into nature which modern science provides him. The metaphysician is a poet, often a very great one, but unfortunately he is not known to be a poet, because he strives to clothe his poetry in the language of reason, and hence it follows that he is liable to be a dangerous member of the community. The danger at the present time that metaphysical dogmas may check scientific research is, perhaps, not very great. The day has gone by when the Hegelian philosophy threatened to strangle infant science in Germany; that it begins to languish at Oxford is a proof that it is practically dead in the country of its birth. The day has gone when philosophical or theological dogmas of any kind can throw back for generations the progress of scientific investigation.'¹

There is no doubt much truth in Pearson's remarks regarding the metaphysician. But this applies more to the metaphysician of the older type. He usually was taken seriously. He usually took himself very seriously. When, as is reported, Hegel, lecturing on the history of philosophy, ended with his own system, and, describing a circle on the board, said: 'Gentlemen, the history of philosophy is completed,' he no doubt quite believed that the last word in

¹*The Grammar of Science*, pp. 17-18.

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system-building had been said. Perhaps, also, the Hegelian philosophy did to some extent interfere with the development of science for a time. But, as Pearson has himself indicated, things have changed. Metaphysical theories come and go without in any way fettering our minds. No one to-day who is disposed to be critical regards the 'élan vital' of Bergson as anything but the product of a poetic imagination, however it may appeal to certain minds on account of its suggestiveness, and however it may appear to be supported by scientific facts.

But let us endeavour to see the metaphysician's point of view, as he states it himself. In 1893, F. H. Bradley, in the introduction to his *Appearance and Reality* wrote as follows: 'I am so bold as to believe that we have a knowledge of the Absolute, certain and real, though I am sure that our comprehension is miserably incomplete. But I dissent emphatically from the conclusion that, because imperfect, it is worthless. And I must suggest to the objector that he should open his eyes and should consider human nature. Is it possible to abstain from thought about the universe? . . . when poetry, art, and religion have ceased wholly to interest, or when they show no longer any tendency to struggle with ultimate problems and to come to an understanding with them; when the sense of mystery and enchantment no longer draws the mind to wander aimlessly and to love it knows not what; when, in short, twilight has no charm—then metaphysics will be worthless. . . I think it quite necessary, even on the view that this study can produce no positive results, that it should still be pursued. There is, so far as I can see, no other certain way of protecting ourselves against dogmatic superstition. Our orthodox theology on the one side, and our commonplace materialism on the other side (it is natural to take these as prominent instances), vanish like ghosts before the daylight of free sceptical enquiry. . . Neither, as experience has

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amply shown, can now survive in the mind which has thought sincerely on first principles; and it seems desirable that there should be such a refuge for the man who burns to think consistently, and yet is too good to become a slave, either to stupid fanaticism or dishonest sophistry. That is one reason why I think that metaphysics, even if it end in total scepticism, should be studied by a certain number of persons.' ²

Without doubt, the metaphysician has a real service to perform. The unprejudiced historian will, moreover, not deny him a high place of honour in the development of thought. For he succeeded in effecting a transition from the older dogmatic theology to the modern critical point of view, without, however, as Comte maintains, destroying either theology or metaphysics. What he did was really to transform both. This critical attitude, moreover, has grown to such a degree that it dominates all metaphysical effort to-day, and has indeed also made itself felt in the field of scientific endeavour.

But Bradley is also careful to warn us against expecting too much of metaphysics. 'It is difficult,' he says, 'for a man not to think too much of his own pursuit. The metaphysician cannot perhaps be too much in earnest with metaphysics, and he cannot, as the phrase runs, take himself too seriously.' ³ But if one reads on, one finds that this is applicable not only to the metaphysician, but that 'the same thing holds good with every other positive function of the universe', and I am sure Bradley would not wish to exclude the natural scientist from the benefits of such excellent advice. And this is, I believe, the general attitude of mind toward which we have been drifting. For, since the passages quoted above were written, much has happened in both philosophy and science which

²*Appearance and Reality*, pp. 3-5.

³*Appearance and Reality*, p. xiv.

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has loosened up our minds and broadened our outlook. The result is that, while we have perhaps not ended in total scepticism, we have landed suspiciously near it so far as some of the traditional problems and methods of metaphysics are concerned. And to some extent the same is true in science. For never was the scientist so uncertain of himself as he is to-day, and he has begun to show a very considerable tendency toward and aptitude for metaphysical speculation within his own sphere. If one wishes to be convinced of this fact, he has only to refer to the theory of Einstein and the controversies connected with it; the researches of Rutherford,⁴ and Bateson's discussion of the present position of biology in regard to the theory of evolution⁵—to mention only a few of the most recent contributions to scientific literature. But this is by no means a scepticism of despair, which threatens to upset the whole world and undermine our faith in the very possibility of knowledge. It is more akin to a healthy sense of humour, which serves to chasten any idea of finality so far as our present knowledge is concerned. And in no sphere is a sense of humour more necessary. For it enables us to see the possibilities of further adventures into new and romantic worlds, which cannot fail to increase our interests and stimulate our efforts.

In speaking of these tendencies in science, I am far from suggesting the possibility of a return to the older methods of theology and metaphysics. In this connexion one cannot but agree with Bateson when he says: 'I have put before you very frankly the considerations which have made us agnostic as to the actual mode and process of evolution. When such confessions are made the enemies of science see their chance. If we cannot declare here and now how species arose, they

⁴*The Artificial Disintegration of the Elements; Nature*, vol. 109, No. 2740, and vol. 109, No. 2741.

⁵*Evolutionary Faith and Modern Doubts; Nature*, vol. 109, No. 2739.

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will obligingly offer us the solutions with which obscurantism is satisfied. Let us then proclaim in precise and unmistakable language that our faith in evolution is unshaken. Every available line of argument converges on this inevitable conclusion. The obscurantist has nothing to suggest which is worth a moment's attention. The difficulties which weigh upon the professional biologist need not trouble the layman. Our doubts are not as to the reality of the truth of evolution, but as to the origin of *species*, a technical, almost domestic, problem. Any day that mystery may be solved. The discoveries of the last twenty-five years enable us for the first time to discuss these questions intelligently and on the basis of fact. That synthesis will follow on an analysis, we do not and cannot doubt.'⁶ This, it would seem, is just the true philosophical attitude. For evolution, it is obvious, is not a scientific doctrine, which has been demonstrated to our complete satisfaction by the exact methods of science. It is an hypothesis which, in view of the wide range of facts to which it has been applied, and of which it attempts a true synthesis, is essentially speculative or philosophical in character. Darwin was a great scientist, but in the imaginative handling of the facts he observed and the hypothesis he formulated, he was also a great philosopher. For, after all, philosophy is to a large extent an attitude of mind. It is the expression of a desire to get beyond the one-sidedness of particular facts, particular investigations and particular interests, and to see them all in relation to life as a whole. There is no reason why the scientific student should not cultivate such an attitude himself. And perhaps no better way of doing so could be suggested than a sympathetic study of the history of philosophy and a detailed study of at least one of the great philosophers. Such a training would, without doubt, do much

⁶*op. cit.*

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in the way of accomplishing what Bateson asks for in the article from which I have quoted above—a closer co-operation between the systematist in science and the laboratory worker.

Most philosophers would concede the necessity of an adequate knowledge of the methods and results of science. In fact many of the great philosophers like Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant, were masters of the scientific knowledge of their day. It is always interesting and refreshing to remember that Kant, who originated the great movement that was so much objected to by scientists like Karl Pearson, anticipated by about forty years the theory of Laplace which threatened to overthrow completely both theology and philosophy. But the fact still remains that just as philosophers have not always been able to yoke their philosophical theories and their theological convictions together and drive them along the same road, so they have often failed in the same way in regard to their scientific knowledge and their philosophical speculations. Too often, moreover, philosophers have not sought to keep in close touch with the investigations of the scientist, so that in their speculations they have either ignored or run counter to these investigations. Sometimes, too, the philosopher, in his anxiety to make use of scientific facts, selects these uncritically, or interprets them too exclusively in the interests of his own theory. Bergson is an example of such a philosopher. He is so dominated by a great speculative idea that the facts of science as they are selected and interpreted just naturally fit into his scheme of thought. Drever's criticism of Bergson's theory of instinct, though perhaps not quite fair to Bergson, brings out this tendency very clearly.⁷ Bergson's treatment of the aphasias in connexion with his theory of memory is another example of an interpretation

⁷*Instinct in Man*, pp. 92-110.

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that the neurologist or scientific psychologist would, I fear, find it exceedingly difficult to accept.⁸

Such difficulties will be avoided only by a better understanding of science. The student in philosophy would do well to become acquainted with the history of science in order that he may become familiar with her spirit and learn to appreciate some of her great achievements. But he must do even more. In order to get an adequate understanding of scientific methods he must learn to *feel* the significance of these methods. This is possible only if he is able to use them in some form of independent research. In fact, I am inclined to think that some of the most permanent contributions of the future to philosophy will be made by scientists who, having mastered some particular field of research, will turn their attention to investigations of a more synthetic type. I am confident, moreover, that many of the problems, which in the past have been referred to the metaphysician, will be referred back to the scientist for further investigation and will be most completely handled by that type of scientific philosopher which I have just described. It would seem reasonable that before we can know reality as a whole, we should seek as adequate a knowledge as possible of the elements out of which it is composed. There is, moreover, reason to believe that new sciences with more highly perfected methods will develop in relation to such problems. In a recent address on Bohr's theory of the structure of the atom, Professor Bragg affirmed that a new science was growing up which could not be called physics or chemistry and which was more fundamental than either.⁹ Such new sciences will no doubt be more speculative than the present existing sciences but they will conduct their

⁸*Matter and Memory.*

⁹Reported in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 5th, 1922.

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investigations in accordance with the rules of scientific procedure.

So far, I have been speaking of philosophy as if it were to be identified with metaphysics and as if, moreover, metaphysics had to do with 'ultimate things' or with the 'Absolute' as Bradley puts it. But there has been so much discussion on the subject of 'relativity' recently that one is left with serious doubts as to the actual existence of 'ultimate things' or an 'Absolute' in Bradley's sense. Perhaps 'ultimate things' are only relatively ultimate and the 'Absolute' is only relatively absolute, which is the same as saying that these are only working hypotheses which we make use of to systematize our knowledge and our experience. What then of philosophy? For philosophy has usually assumed that the realities under investigation were something more than mental creations. I shall endeavour to discuss this question by referring to some contemporary movements.

Modern absolutism originated with Kant, who endeavoured to solve the problems raised by the scepticism of Hume, which seemed to leave the world without a metaphysic and indeed without a confidence in science, a condition to which, as I have already indicated, the present state of affairs mildly approximates. For my purpose it will be sufficient to discuss this movement as it was developed in England by two of its ablest representatives, Green and Bradley.

In his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Green sought to provide an antidote for the materialistic tendencies of the brilliant though perhaps over-confident scientific development which began in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Science threatened to invade certain realms which had hitherto been regarded as the exclusive domain of theology and philosophy. For had not Laplace confidently informed Napoleon that he

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needed no such hypothesis as God in his scheme of nature, and had not Darwin applied his theory of natural selection to the explanation of the mental and moral qualities of man? This naturalistic movement, together with the common-sense attitude of utilitarianism which was closely associated with it, found very favourable conditions for its development in England, and consequently those philosophers who saw the foundations of religion and morals threatened had to adopt strenuous measures to combat its influence. And so Green endeavoured to show that, so far from being able to explain the mental and moral qualities of man on a naturalistic basis, science could not explain even nature on that basis. For when we analyse any object whatever, we find that it resolves itself into an infinite number of relations which are intelligible only on the presupposition of a consciousness for which such relations exist and for which alone unity of such relations is possible. This consciousness is eternally complete in the sense that it is beyond time, of which it is the condition. It is in the same way beyond causality and all forms of finitude. All forms of reality, whether pertaining to man or to nature are manifestations of an absolute reality which is in essence spiritual.

This theory is developed to a higher degree of logical perfection by Bradley. Like Green he begins with the facts of experience which, when analysed, dissolve into a congeries of relations, the contradictory character of which necessitates their interpretation as appearances or manifestations of a higher reality which includes them in a harmonious unity. Even such aspects of experience as error and evil, which appear so hopelessly discordant, are transmuted and absorbed in such a way that they contribute richness to the harmony of the whole. When we endeavour to understand more precisely the nature of this all-inclusive unity, we find that we must

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define it in the forms of sentient experience. 'The Absolute is one system and . . . its contents are nothing but sentient experience. It will hence be a single and all-inclusive experience, which embraces every partial diversity in concord. For it cannot be less than appearance, and hence no feeling or thought, of any kind, can fall outside its limits. And if it is more than any feeling or thought which we know, it must still remain more of the same nature. It cannot pass into another region beyond what falls under the general head of sentience.'¹⁰ But if the Absolute is to be defined in terms of sentience, it is obvious such sentience must be beyond any particular form we know. For thought, feeling and volition are relational, and therefore appearance. We cannot then speak of the Absolute as mind, consciousness or intelligence. We must try to picture an absolute experience of an intuitional type which is essentially of the nature of consciousness, and yet transcends the contradictory elements involved in its relational character.

Long before the guns of the Allies had battered down the most persistent form of Absolutism in the country of its birth, there had been going on, at first intermittently, and later almost continuously, a bombardment at short and long range of the fortress which the absolutists had established for themselves in England, and from which they dominated for the most part the whole English-speaking world. This attack was conducted by certain allied groups of thinkers, the personal idealists, the pragmatists and the new realists who, though they had many internal differences, were able to concentrate very effectively upon the weak spots of their opponents' defences. They battled for a new democracy in philosophy, for the rights of the individual as against the autocracy of the Absolute which persisted in swallowing up

¹⁰*Appearance and Reality*, pp. 146-7.

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the individual without regard to his successes, his failures, his hopes and his fears. They protested, moreover, against the method of endeavouring to explain the simple every-day facts of experience in relation to an inaccessible and unknown Absolute, instead of using the ordinary methods of common-sense, with which it may be assumed human nature is fairly adequately endowed. I do not propose to go into the details of this struggle and to endeavour to give an estimate of the outcome. But one cannot fail to recognize that a great blow has been struck at methods of abstract metaphysical explanation. And it is not for the reason usually given by the personal idealists and the pragmatists—that Absolutism is too intellectual. It is true that one would search far to find a more brilliant piece of dialectic than *Appearance and Reality*. But this is really conducted in the interests of a certain type of mysticism which permeates the whole work. In short, Absolutism is more closely related to the needs of religion than to the necessity of scientific explanation. For religion seems to require some sort of spiritual interpretation of the world, which need is served, from an intellectual point of view, by the Eternal Consciousness of Green or the Absolute of Bradley.

But probably one of the most uncritical terms used in philosophy is the term 'spiritual'. For the absolutist, the spiritual character of the world is based on the assumption that it is a manifestation of some absolute form of mind or consciousness or sentience as above described. But the pragmatist, like the nominalist of old, has dealt rather harshly with some commonly accepted abstract terms. When James endeavoured to show that there is no such thing as truth as an abstract entity, that in fact only truths exist and, moreover, that these 'live for the most part on a credit system,' he reflected on the credibility of a large number of terms

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which had always been accepted without question on account of their age and familiar usage. And this is what happened to such terms as 'mind', 'consciousness', 'sentience' and the like. They are not to be regarded as entities but as processes, and therefore by their very nature they must exist in time and involve certain causal relations. They cannot, then, except by a violent process of abstraction which abolishes their real nature, be conceived of as eternally complete or as constituting an Absolute in the sense of Green and Bradley. This faith in mind or consciousness as an entity was first rudely disturbed by James's conception of the 'stream of consciousness.' But it has received its most telling blows from the more recent developments in psychology among which the behaviouristic movement is to be specially mentioned. I do not wish to discuss the validity of these theories, but merely to indicate that it must appear to be very precarious business to endeavour to oppose the naturalistic conception by setting up as an ultimate principle something like consciousness, when there is so much difference of opinion as to what consciousness is, and when there is, moreover, a very strong tendency on the part of certain influential schools of psychology to explain it on a naturalistic basis. It is difficult to see how, by this method, even with all the logic attached to it, the scientist can possibly be convinced that mind is the condition rather than the product of nature. And now, to complete the dethronement of mind as an ultimate reality, and at the same time to console to a certain degree the adherents of the spiritualistic view of the world, comes the very recent hypothesis of Bertrand Russell, whose speculations are always worthy of careful consideration. I quote from the preface of his latest work. 'This book has grown out of an attempt to harmonize two different tendencies, one in psychology, the other in physics,

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with both of which I find myself in sympathy, although at first sight they might seem inconsistent. On the one hand, many psychologists, especially those of the behaviourist school, tend to adopt what is essentially a materialistic position, as a matter of method if not of metaphysics. They make psychology increasingly dependent upon physiology and external observation, and tend to think of matter as something much more solid and indubitable than mind. Meanwhile the physicists, especially Einstein and the exponents of the theory of relativity, have been making "matter" less and less material. Their world consists of "events", from which "matter" is derived by logical construction. Whoever reads, for example, Professor Eddington's *Space, Time and Gravitation*, . . . will see that an old-fashioned materialism can receive no support from modern physics. I think that what has permanent value in the outlook of the behaviourist is the feeling that physics is the most fundamental science at present in existence. But this position cannot be called materialistic, if, as seems the case, physics does not assume the existence of matter. . . . The view that seems to me to reconcile the materialistic tendency of psychology with the anti-materialistic tendency of physics is the view of William James and the American new realists, according to which the "stuff" of the world is neither mental nor material, but a "neutral stuff", out of which both are constructed.¹¹

Without going into a discussion of the above-mentioned theories, which have tended to undermine the rule of Absolutism, one may come to certain general conclusions. There is growing up a freedom from religious and anti-religious leanings and prejudices of the familiar type, and a purely disinterested attitude toward truth, which one would imagine

¹¹*The Analysis of Mind*, pp. 5-6.

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ought to be fundamental to the highest form of religion. Here the metaphysician and scientist may meet on common ground and there will be a mutual gain from a proper understanding of each others' methods and aspirations. Here the speculative method will find its true significance; for that tendency of the human mind so well described by Bradley, towards metaphysical speculation, will not be discouraged, but rather properly directed. And perhaps no better discipline can be recommended in this respect than a careful study of *Appearance and Reality* itself. But it will always be necessary to remember that we are still very far from ultimate truths and that short cuts are possible only when we know the general direction. If this point of view be construed as scepticism, I must affirm that it is as healthy an attitude of mind as I can conceive, for it opens up infinite possibilities of research and infinite possibilities of achievement. And so, if we think of the Absolute as the totality of existence, it may be that the Absolute grows and develops and registers achievements, and the searcher after truth, scientist or philosopher, may play a real part in the way of making some contribution to this higher development of the world of values.

In concluding this part of my essay, I should like to reinforce my arguments regarding the general attitude of philosophy to science and to ultimate problems by means of a quotation from Professor Perry, one of the leaders of a school which is at present exercising very considerable influence on the direction of philosophy. It will be interesting to compare this quotation with those from Pearson and Bradley to realize what progress has been made along the lines of a true synthesis of scientific and philosophic endeavour. 'The realist . . . would seek in behalf of philosophy the same renunciation, the same rigour of procedure, that has been achieved in science. This does not mean that he would reduce philosophy

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to natural or physical science. He recognizes that the philosopher has undertaken certain peculiar problems, and that he must apply himself to these, with whatever method he may find it necessary to employ. It remains the business of the philosopher to attempt a wide synoptic survey of the world, to raise underlying and ulterior questions, and in particular to examine the cognitive and moral processes. And it is quite true that for the present no technique at all comparable with that of the exact sciences is to be expected. But where such technique is attainable, as for example in symbolic logic, the realist welcomes it. And for the rest he limits himself to a more modest aspiration. He hopes that philosophers may come like scientists to speak a common language, to formulate common problems and to appeal to a common realm of fact for their resolution. Above all he desires to get rid of the philosophical monologue, and of the lyric and impressionistic mode of philosophizing. And in all this he is prompted not by the will to destroy but by the hope that philosophy is a kind of knowledge, and neither a song nor a prayer nor a dream. He proposes, therefore, to rely less on inspiration and more on observation and analysis. He conceives his function to be in the last analysis the same as that of the scientist. There is a world out yonder more or less shrouded in darkness, and it is important, if possible, to light it up. But instead of, like the scientist, focussing the mind's rays and throwing this or that portion of the world into brilliant relief, he attempts to bring to light the outlines and contour of the whole, realizing too well that in diffusing so widely what little light he has, he will provide only a very dim illumination.¹²

There is another point of view which follows naturally from the conclusions drawn above. For just as the scepticism

¹²Perry: *The Present Conflict of Ideals*, pp. 367-8.

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of Hume in regard to the more speculative problems of science and philosophy was accompanied by a deeper interest in the problems of human life and an attempt to deal with them, not from a purely speculative point of view, but upon the more naturalistic basis of psychology, so, if one might sum up the trend of present-day thought, one might find ample material for a new *Treatise on Human Nature*. And this is, I believe, a very significant feature of present-day tendencies. For the philosopher is concerned not merely with the 'origin and purport of the universe,' as Pearson puts it, or 'a knowledge of the Absolute', to use the words of Bradley, but with the interpretation of the facts and purposes of every-day life. These facts are quite as interesting and important as those with which the scientist and the metaphysician deal, and cannot be explained either by the exact methods of the former or the purely speculative methods of the latter. For we do not need to know either the constitution of the atom or the nature of the whole universe to think deeply about those realities which are of most intimate concern in practical life. And if, as Huxley affirms, 'science is . . . nothing but *trained and organized common sense*,' and 'the vast results obtained by Science are won by no mystical faculties, by no mental processes, other than those which are practised by any one of us, in the humblest and meanest affairs of life,'¹³ surely we may see a place in the affairs of man where science and philosophy may co-operate in complete harmony.

The personal idealists have insisted upon the necessity of interpreting reality from the standpoint of human experience instead of from the 'visionary and impracticable standpoint of absolute experience.' Following the lead of such men as Poincaré who emphasized the tentative character of scientific

¹³*On the Educational Value of Natural History Sciences.*

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hypotheses, and Bergson, who sought to demonstrate the practical nature of intelligence generally, they were inclined to interpret all scientific laws in terms of human purpose. But the best of arguments may be carried too far. The personal idealists still accepted the spiritual interpretation of the world in the sense that nature is a manifestation of mind or minds. But the new realists, coming back to the common-sense point of view, maintained that, although the mind contributes certain elements to the world we know, there are nevertheless elements in that world which exist independently of our minds. It thus follows that, while we may succeed to some extent in making reality conform to our wishes, there is a very large fraction of it which goes its own way, and which the scientist endeavours to follow to the best of his ability.

There is then a realm of reality governed by human purposes, as distinguished from that realm which is governed by natural law. It may be that ultimately human purposes may be explained on the basis of natural law; but this has not yet been done; so we are justified in accepting the distinction, provisionally, at least. It is in this sphere of life, in which the minds of actual living human beings are at work, that the philosopher will find himself most at home. What methods will he find most effective for his purpose?

The critics of the older idealism—the personal idealists and the pragmatists—have endeavoured to eschew metaphysics of the purely speculative type. They have insisted upon the necessity of doing justice to the feelings and the will instead of attaching undue importance to the intellect, which they affirm is only a part, and that too a subordinate part, of personality. But while they have suggested the necessity of paying due attention to the facts of psychology and to the whole personality, they have not attempted a psychology of

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personality. They have in fact been as one-sided in the emphasis they place upon the feelings and the will as the Absolutists were held to be in the emphasis they laid upon the intellect. They even insisted that our philosophical theories are for the most part a product of our feeling and volitional nature. They have perhaps come too near the truth so far as many philosophical theories are concerned. But one would like to believe that philosophy should adopt as critical a point of view as possible, a point of view which like that of science must be predominately intellectual. They have, moreover, set up a formula for testing truths, forgetting that the standards in relation to which the 'practical working' of truths is to be judged, are very complicated and need analysis. In fact, they have for the most part been content to talk in general terms and, so far as their positive results are concerned, they are often quite as vague as the absolutists. Being also strenuously opposed to materialism they have contented themselves with propounding an alternative metaphysical theory. Thus, in order to discredit the one-sided optimism which seemed to be based upon the monism of the absolutists, they invented a new government of the world called 'pluralism' to serve as a metaphysical basis for a very attractive and invigorating doctrine called 'meliorism.' It is much like dethroning the old Jewish monotheism in favour of the Greek polytheism in order that the sterner view of life associated with the former should give place to the more humanistic attitude which seemed to be based on the latter—failing to recognize all the while that the conceptions of the Jewish God and the Greek Gods grew naturally out of the peculiar sentiments and aspirations of the peoples concerned rather than vice versa.

The new realists have emphasized the necessity of a closer co-operation with science in facing the problems of life, and

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they have discarded epistemological idealism for a moral idealism built up on the stern facts of life. 'Realism is essentially a philosophy which refuses to deceive or console itself by comfortable illusions. It prefers to keep its eyes open. But it is neither cynical nor embittered. It distinguishes the good from the evil, and seeks to promote it, not with a sense of assured triumph, but with the confidence that springs from resolution.'¹⁴ This is very fine so far as an attitude toward life is concerned, but the new realists, like the personal idealists and the pragmatists, have been so busy with their polemics against opposing schools of thought, that they have not got down to a study of the particular scientific facts which must be taken into account in the proper understanding of life. Moreover, in their metaphysical affiliations with the personal idealists and pragmatists, so far as the pluralistic doctrine is concerned, they suffer from something like the same lack of scientific detachment as has been noted above.

Is it possible then to avoid such metaphysical speculations as have usually been associated with philosophical investigations and subject the sphere of reality under consideration to anything like a strict scientific treatment? Can we hope to approach the problems associated with human values in something like the way in which the physicist or chemist approaches his peculiar problems? The nearest advance to such a method is, I believe, to be found in McDougall's *Social Psychology*, which would perhaps be better entitled *Psychology of Personality*. With this work one naturally associates Shand's *Foundations of Character*. In these works an attempt is made to study human nature from a truly psychological point of view. Of course McDougall leaves a place for metaphysics. He speaks with approval of Schopenhauer's 'will' and Bergson's 'élan vital', as suitable names for the life-giving

¹⁴Perry, *The Present Conflict of Ideals*, pp. 379-380.

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background of living beings, but he introduces this in the manner of what James calls an 'over-belief', and fortunately does not allow it to obtrude itself in any way into the general argument. He is willing to go a long way also with the behaviourists and admit that physiology can be of great value in psychological investigation, but just as physiology has methods of its own, and cannot be reduced to physics and chemistry, so psychology has methods peculiar to itself and cannot be reduced to physiology.

I am aware that there are at present many controversies connected with this movement in psychology, which attempts to arrive at a better understanding of the nature of personality on the basis of a more adequate analysis of the instincts and sentiments. But these controversies have to do with matters of detail rather than with method, and need not detain us here. The important point is that here we have a method which, without attempting to imitate slavishly the methods of the exact scientists, is at least on the way to being as scientifically exact as the facts under discussion will permit. It follows, moreover, the lines indicated by such thinkers as Hume, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, and is more in accordance with the older traditions of British philosophy. The failure of these philosophers was due to the backward state of the psychology of their day, which was too strongly committed to the hedonistic doctrine and the laws of association. But McDougall's theory of the instincts and innate tendencies is a complete refutation of hedonism from a psychological point of view. For according to this theory we find in man a large number of impulses which, in seeking to realize themselves, give rise to his various desires; and pleasure, instead of being the one object of desire, is an affective element incidental to the realization of these desires. Here we have a pluralism which is truly psychological in

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character and has to do with the laws of human nature rather than with the government of the universe at large. The theory of the sentiments has, moreover, effectively refuted the laws of association as adequate principles of explanation. For in the development of the sentiments we recognize the creative activity of mind—an idea which is of considerable philosophic importance. The harmonious organization of the sentiments in the light of a dominant sentiment or ideal might be regarded as the psychological counterpart of metaphysical monism. But it is a monism which represents a strictly human point of view and offers a unity of life which is fraught with infinite possibilities of effort and achievement.

I quite realize that I have not succeeded in giving anything like an adequate answer to the question with which I started. I have been content to point out a direction which would appear to hold out considerable promise so far as the future development of philosophy is concerned. For just as in the larger questions with which philosophy has always been concerned there is much to be gained by a closer co-operation with science, so in that sphere of human values in which the philosopher is bound to be more particularly interested, there is everything to be gained by a better understanding of the results and methods of psychology. The value of the psychological point of view has come to be recognized in the study of morals and religion, and there is a growing tendency to apply its principles and methods to every field of philosophic endeavour, as well as to such practical spheres as education, medicine, law and industry. For, living as we do in a world beset with so many practical problems to be solved and so many adjustments to be made, international and domestic, we have begun to realize that perhaps the reality which most baffles our understanding is human nature itself. In this field there is much to be done in the way of a better under-

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standing of human nature, and a better direction of human effort; and so we may hope that, just as we have learned to look to the scientific expert for the proper handling of our material problems, so we may in the future look more confidently to the highly trained psychologist and philosopher for assistance in dealing with the intricate problems which have to do with human relations and human aspirations.

J. M. MACEACHRAN.

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Spencer in his *Data of Ethics* treated his subject from several successive standpoints entitled, The Physical, The Biological, The Psychological, the Sociological. He also attempted to co-ordinate all these various stages into what he termed a Synthetic Philosophy. This would give a fifth standpoint, the Philosophical. These five terms might be used to describe several different types of evolutionary theory. Let us note how these arose, that is, let us trace the evolution of evolutionary theory.

Physical Evolution. Early Greek speculation was dominated by this standpoint which found its culmination in the Atomists. Among these Empedocles is noteworthy. He is quoted in the article 'Evolution' in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* by J. Sully and T. H. Huxley.

After a general Cosmology dealing with the formation of the Cosmos from the four original elements, fire, air, earth, water, by love and discord (attraction and repulsion) he proceeds to treat of the first origin of plants and of animals including man. As the original elements entered into various combinations there arose curious aggregates, heads without

¹During the years between 1891 and 1900, in connexion with the University Extension Course in the University of Toronto, I gave a series of lectures under the title 'Eras of Doubt and Triumphs of Faith', in which I traced five great turning points in human civilization, showing the connexion of these upheavals with speculative thought, viz., The Sophists and Socrates; Stoicism, Epicureanism and Christianity; Mediævalism and The Renaissance; French Materialism, The French Revolution and the beginnings of Modern Democracy; Evolution and Development. During the Session of 1905-1906, the lecture on Evolution and Personality was given at Queen's University, Kingston, before the Philosophical Society, Professor John Watson presiding. I have added a few footnotes. James Gibson Hume.

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necks, arms without shoulders. These got strangely combined. Men's heads on oxen's shoulders, heads of oxen on men's bodies, etc. Most of these combinations could not survive and so disappeared. Only in the rare cases where the several parts that contingently came together were adapted to one another did they survive.

As man, lower animal, and plant, are all composed of the same elements in different proportions, there is an identity of nature in them all. They all have sense and understanding.

It is quite easy to trace here the early outlines of our modern theory of evolution. Already we have the assertion of the identity of nature in man, lower animal and plant, the participation of all in sense and understanding—the survival of those suitably 'adapted.'

It was the attempt to level down a theory of knowledge to this account that guided or misguided the Sophists and awakened the critical or sarcastic comments of the great Socrates.

What is suggested in Socrates as a substitute for the Sophistic naturalism is built upon and extended in Plato and Aristotle. In Aristotle we have a comprehensive 'synthesis' that might be termed philosophical, and as it was opposed to the naturalism it might be termed philosophical development rather than philosophical evolution.

It is obvious that there is a direct antagonism between the evolution of the naturalistic and sophistical writers and the development in Aristotle's idealistic constructions, and this antagonism between these two types can be traced through all succeeding speculation and it persists to-day. Unfortunately many people uncritically confuse evolution and development or imagine that if development is conceded or

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affirmed 'evolution' is admitted or affirmed. Furthermore as in Aristotle, so now, the opposition between these is not equally balanced. For Aristotelian development is wide enough to include evolution in nature within it as a part of the whole system, but evolutionary naturalism must exclude idealistic development or else level it down to naturalism. Development is tolerant, evolution is intolerant.

After the Atomists the interest shifts from the physical cosmos to the moral and religious puzzles for which Aristotelianism was more suited. And throughout the middle ages the chief interest is in the moral and religious situation. Christianity utilizes Greek idealism in combating naturalism and eventually so divided matters that a moral dualism arose, nature seeming to fall under the domain of the Prince of Darkness, as in the legend of Faust.

Perhaps some of the popular prejudice against physical science, as also some of the enthusiasm for it, may in Christian countries have some root in the survival of the party spirit engendered in this old mediaeval dualism.

But with the rise of humanism and the new learning there is not only a revival of Greek literature but also a return at least to some extent of the Greek spirit of impartial inquiry and innocent wonder, and this allowed an opportunity for the rise of science. Now though Science and 'Naturalism' are not identical, the student who concentrates on physical science is more apt to be impressed by the theory of naturalism, and we soon find a recrudescence of the naturalistic theory side by side with the early scientific discoveries.

Very notable was the discovery of the circulation of the blood by the Englishman, William Harvey, in 1628. Although in 1651 Harvey tried to teach a form of Epigenesis, this was not welcomed, but what was then called evolution was pre-

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ferred, because as evolution was then defined it was more simply, more mechanically conceived than Epigenesis. By this early evolutionary theory growth was merely the expansion of a miniature plant or animal into its full size.

Life itself was to be mechanically stated, mechanically explained; that is, we now have a 'physical evolution' theory in the ascendant among the scientists. Descartes under the sway of this view eagerly dissects animals and after an ingenious mechanical account of the origin or conformation of the Cosmos from its original matter and motion, audaciously suggests that life in the animal is merely heat and expansion causing the blood to circulate, and that this heat arises naturally as in the fermentation of wet hay. Descartes, however, calls a halt when he comes to what he calls the 'reasonable soul' in man. Here he turns to Dualism to save the situation, and he believes that the only way to get the soul, or to secure its immortality after he does get it, is to insist on an absolute separation between matter and spirit. This is doubtless the real source of his 'dualism', though he later claimed to derive it from 'clear and distinct' thought. Descartes' dualism grew out of a mechanical starting-point and a mechanistic method—it became a great puzzle.

Thomas Hobbes, however, has an easy way out of the difficulty. The soul is a body that thinks (occasionally) is all he could see in Descartes' 'Cogito ergo sum.' At bottom, in last analysis, everything is *Motion*. Hence when the so-called object 'worketh on the eyes, ears and other organs of a man's body and by diversity of working produceth diversity of appearance', this 'appearance' in consciousness is and must be motion, for 'motion produceth nothing but motion.' The original 'inner motion' is sensation, the parent of all the progeny that later appears. Imagination is 'decayed sense'

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or retarded motion, memory is decayed sense or inner motion almost stopped. Reason consists in trains of imagination or combinations of inner motions. Volition is an inner motion reappearing as an outer motion. Aristotle's celebrated deliberation is merely a conflict of inner motions.

But even Hobbes, in the onward march of his consistent and relentless materialism has intervals of repentance, or shall we call them deeper insights where he can assert that *truth* is not an attribute of *things* but of speech, and so though 'nature cannot err' man does run into error. Also, though nature cannot err, yet 'passions unguided are mere madness', and life under mere nature or natural passions is one in which the life of man becomes 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, short', and so Hobbes sets out to find 'laws of nature' or of reason, to take control of 'rights of nature.'

The French Materialists, borrowing what suited them from Hobbes and from some portions of John Locke where he speaks of the mind 'for the most part passive', and still more relying on those parts of Descartes in which animals were treated as machine-like automata, took the bold step of declaring that man too was merely a machine-like automaton, without any so-called 'reasonable soul' being required. This is most clearly expressed in La Mettrie's 'L'homme Machine.'

The confidence in this plan of explanation became arrogance in the French Encyclopaedists, who could scarcely believe a man could be a scientist unless he were also a pronounced materialist. This probably marks the culmination of confidence in 'physical evolution' as a materialistic theory. For Bishop Berkeley began to ask a few questions about the meaning of 'matter.'—What does 'matter' mean? How do we know it? Do we know it at all? The Materialists found it exasperatingly difficult to answer these simple and seem-

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ingly quite reasonable questions. Could it be that they, the leaders of enlightenment, were dealing in mysteries more occult and inscrutable than those taught by the theologians and mystics?

Even those who found it most convenient to answer Berkeley by kicking stones or by grinning felt in their hearts that Berkeley's destructive criticism of 'matter' could not be grinned away, let them grin never so wisely. It thus soon came about that we find a remarkable, a sudden, a startling right about face on the part of the materialists. They cannot prove a 'materialistic' substance, but they can sarcastically refer to the impossibility of knowing an 'immaterialistic substance.'²

The older, cruder materialistic doctrine, now gives place to a milder doctrine; it becomes transmuted into a 'Psychological Naturalism' following the lead of David Hume's psychological 'gentle force that commonly prevails' elaborated by Hartley, Priestley, the Mills, Spencer, Bain, into the Association theory, the bulwark of the new naturalism, or what we shall call 'Psychological Evolution.' David Hume with the fear of Berkeley before his eyes is frankly agnostic about 'substance.' Herbert Spencer's 'unknowable' is already writ large in David Hume. David Hume proceeds to diminish

²That Berkeley anticipated this counter-attack on 'immaterial substance' and had an answer is shewn in Dialogue III:

'Hylas: Words are not to be used without a meaning, and as there is no more meaning in spiritual substance than in material substance, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.

Philonous: How often must I repeat that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour; that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound, and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But I am not in like manner conscious of either the existence or essence of matter.'

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Causation by the method of Procrustes until it fits the dimensions of his 'customary conjunction.' J. S. Mill continues the amputations, and Logic and Mathematics are also suitably diminished. It soon becomes admitted by the psychological naturalistic evolutionists that they by their method are precluded from knowing reality as substantiality or truth as causality or mathematical certainty. Now if they would not, like the dog in the manger, try to prevent other methods being tried, surely no one could find fault with them for confessing their own lack of power.

While naturalistic 'psychological Evolutionism' was thus running into agnosticism and failure, Leibniz was trying to construct a very ambitious philosophical system, admittedly borrowing from Aristotle, but believing that he had reconciled materialism and idealism in his 'Monadology.'

There are many brilliant things in Leibniz, but instead of really discovering a new constructive method, he merely hitches up together in a double team empiricism and rationalism—and only God is able to drive this team.

It is Kant who sees the situation clearly—David Hume's Empiricism ending in scepticism—Leibniz's system an external compromise. Kant gives credit to David Hume for 'waking him from a dogmatic slumber'. He was, however, not a heavy sleeper. David Hume points out how impossible it is to derive Causation by mere deductive analysis, but he tries something quite as unsatisfactory when he tries to reduce Causation to 'customary Conjunction'. It is both interesting and somewhat saddening to find how very near indeed the brilliant Scotchman came to stating the problem of Causation as Kant later stated it. David Hume in his 'Treatise', Part III, Sec. 3, says 'since it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning that we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause to every new

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production, that opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience. The next question, then, should naturally be *How experience gives rise to such a principle.*'

This question if followed up might have led to Kant's discovery of 'Causality' as a 'condition of the possibility of experience', but unfortunately David Hume does not follow it up. The next sentence is a disappointing abandonment of the problem and the substitution of something quite different and much simpler, viz., how we as a matter of fact pass from a particular cause to a particular effect in our ordinary experience and how we are led to an expectation of something similar. And putting the cart before the horse he concludes that because an expectation arises from the rule being found to obtain, the rule is derived from the expectation.

Kant, however, keeps at the central problem which had been abandoned by David Hume. He reconsiders Experience more carefully and critically to try to discover the place, function and significance of causality *within* experience. Let me quote from Morris in his Introduction to Kant:

'This is one of the oddities of the history of speculation, namely, that philosophic materialism with its mechanico-sensible theory of knowledge (what I have termed psychological evolution in David Hume and his successors) being always suicidal, not able to defend itself, turning all its ontological science into nescience and changing the real material universe it set out to magnify and defend into a spectre, has at last to turn for protection or for its relative justification to another doctrine, apparently the precise opposite of itself. It is spiritualistic idealism alone which finding in knowledge something more than mechanical sense, rescues the material universe for us as a sense of objective though dependent reality.'

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Though Kant believes that he has proved the validity, truth and reality of 'substance' and 'causality', he also believes that these are true *within* experience and are not the *whole truth* about experience. Substantiality and Causality are true within what Kant calls the phenomenal, that is the *experienced* world. They have no 'absolute' reality apart from such world.

We now turn from physical and psychological naturalistic evolution to the rise of the question of evolution or development—one or the other within the realm of sociology and biology, and here we find the idealistic development theory first attempted in Sociology, then the evolutionary (naturalistic) theory being introduced into Biology, and then the whole situation, viz., whether in a total synthesis or philosophical interpretation we shall follow naturalistic evolution or idealistic development, being keenly debated.

Leibniz by his theory of higher and lower grades of monads had a kind of premonition of later evolutionary methodology; but Kant, as we have seen, distrusted Leibniz's method. While Kant succeeded in substituting a synthetic constructive theory of the principles of physical science, he stops short at efficient Causality. It is only after he has written his *Critique of Practical Reason* and returned to the *Critique of Judgement*, that the question of design or purpose within nature becomes an issue.

So though Kuno Fischer finds much 'development' in Kant, I confess that I do not discover it so widely. Nevertheless, Kant's treatment of the teleological judgement and definition of organism is a valuable contribution towards a re-instatement of something like Aristotelianism and does not rely on Deism and dualism as some of Kant's positions elsewhere do. And of course one must admit that in spite of the extreme

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individualism in the formulation of Kant's ethics, nevertheless he adds to his great maxim to 'treat personality in your own person and in the person of others as an end, never as a means', the further organic or social command that we should seek a 'kingdom of ends', and this obviously would involve persons being means as well as ends in mutually assisting one another within the 'kingdom'.

But it is not Kant, but his disciple Hegel, who consciously sets to work to extend the organic or social implications in morality and in society as moral. Hegel quite consciously and explicitly carries over the Aristotelian conception of development into the domain of sociology. Continuity and progress is asserted as being found even through the discordant variations and successive controversies in History of Philosophy, and in Philosophy of History a great providential purpose is traced or at least attempted in his well-known summary of the significance of the various epochs of civilization.

Hegel published his *Phenomenologie* in 1807 and outlined this method of treatment. Fifty-one years later appeared Darwin's *Origin of Species*. D. G. Ritchie writes an illuminative comparison between Hegel and Darwin and with the Hegelian contempt for mere chronology entitled it *Darwin and Hegel* instead of *Hegel and Darwin*. Hegel always asserted that History must be more than description. It must undertake 'the hard work' of interpretation. Hence whether his interpretations were valid or otherwise he never tried, like some naturalistic evolutionists, to palm off a mere description of an effect as the elucidation or discovery of its cause.

Herbert Spencer some time later applied the method of 'naturalistic evolution' to the problem of sociology, and had made considerable headway along this line in this field, when

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everyone was startled by the irruption of this evolutionary explanation within the field of biology by Darwin and Wallace in 1858. That is, if we may now be permitted a retrospect, the method and theory of evolution was not first proposed by Darwin in biology and then taken up in other realms. On the contrary both as evolutionary naturalism and idealistic development it had been attempted in all the other realms except biology. Biology, instead of being the first to try this method of explanation, was in reality the last, and Darwin's work instead of making a beginning was rather a master-stroke as a finishing stroke.

Indeed the controversy between naturalistic evolution and idealistic development had occurred and persistently recurred, and just when the idealists had congratulated themselves on their extension of development into philosophy, history and sociology, the naturalistic evolutionists went them one better by having a naturalistic evolutionary system simply presented, ably applied in biology by a master workman, an outstanding man in science. Darwin himself was an extremely cautious writer. He had no ambition to write an all-comprehensive theory of evolution like Herbert Spencer. One thing he knew and knew thoroughly—biology, and one thing and one only he attempted, namely, to give an account of biology along these lines.

Darwin was much like Wellington in the Peninsular war; he had too his 'Torres Vedras'; this for Darwin was biology. It is true he ventured at times a slight distance beyond his stronghold. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these excursions was in his attempt to throw light on the social instincts in men and lower animals. He tries to explain the possibility of 'remorse' occurring in animals by a hypothetical case of a bird yielding to the migratory instinct to the neglect of the

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brooding instinct and later when too late recalling her dereliction. Here without doubt Darwin was putting forth a suggestion of how to lift up the lower animal consciousness so as to give it a rudimentary conscience, and some of his followers by a similar interpretation of instincts tried to lower the level of the human conscience to a naturalistic basis. Darwin himself seemed to be quite aware of the uncertain and hypothetical character of this whole explanation but his followers greedily seized on the suggestion. Especially timely was this suggestion of a social-instinct conscience, for the empirical writers most inclined to naturalistic explanation had been compelled to exercise much ingenuity to get over the great transition from egoism to altruism, but with a semi-altruistic social instinct to start with, half their troubles disappeared.

Darwin, then, besides rewriting biology gave a tremendous impetus to 'naturalistic evolution' in every realm.

Spencer is the man who most widely exploited and applied the general principle in all directions, and though as attempting to co-ordinate all sciences into one great synthesis, he may, according to his own definition of philosophy, be marked as a philosophical organizer, he was scarcely to be ranked as a critical philosopher, and it soon appears that a kind of 'psychological evolution' is his fundamental solvent of all difficulties.

It can scarcely escape a careful reader that of all the grades and stages and transitions with which he busies himself Spencer's chief attention is focussed on the problem or difficulty of bridging over the seeming gap or chasm between the lower animals and the human animal. And the chief effort to bridge this gap is directed towards the attempt to secure a continuous unbroken psychological account that would begin

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with lower animals and by slight and imperceptible gradations pass over to and end in human psychological experiences.

Now Spencer's work was made very much easier for him by the fact that before he began to level up sub-human experience in lower animals his predecessors from Hobbes through David Hume had spent a tremendous amount of ingenuity in levelling the human experience downwards towards the lower animals.

David Hume had claimed it as a special merit for some of his psychological principles that they could be equally well applied to lower animals and to man. Indeed when Darwin started levelling up the bird consciousness of remorse there was a danger that the birds would secure consciences after human beings had lost them.

Without following the details of the well-known controversies that raged so fiercely for a time, let us simply call attention to the inherent inadequacy and fallacy involved in 'psychological evolution' as a naturalistic doctrine.

In so far as this is restricted to descriptive treatment of various aspects in human or sub-human experience, it is not only not reprehensible, but most helpful both for science and philosophy; but when psychological descriptions of lower animals are foisted upon human beings as an adequate statement of human experience, that is neither science nor philosophy. Human experience must be directly examined, not fitted into moulds borrowed from studying lower animals. And psychological descriptions of lower animals or higher animals or men as description is one thing, as a philosophy it is another. It is, as philosophy, an interpretation or theory and must there stand the tests applicable to all theories or interpretations. Descriptions can take limited areas and stop there, but philosophy must always link up part with part into a coherent view.

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The usual supposition that prevailed for a while that because lower animals are less complex and have a simpler experience, they should be more easily studied and the study of them should precede human psychology soon had to admit that however complex and difficult human experience may be it is more directly accessible to human investigators.

In the field of interpretation or explanation the earlier evolutionists, including Spencer (though there were keen controversialists and debaters among them such as Huxley), were, however, very trustful about the adequacy of several principles assumed from Darwin, and only after the polemical dust cloud cleared away were they ready to reconsider their own principles critically. One fallacy they fell easily into was to use the term evolution quite ambiguously. The difference between naturalistic evolution and idealistic development was a refinement too subtle for most of them. Hence wherever development was conceded, it was supposed that naturalistic evolution must be conceded. Professor Watson in his book, *Comte, Mill and Spencer*,¹ has directed much pertinent criticism against the misuse of the term 'design' by the evolutionists. He specially charges them with making ostensibly a direct attack on all use of the conception of Design. It turned out that they were really attacking the Deistic external design such as was advocated in Paley; but later theological writers (who were theistic, not deistic) had an indwelling design, and the evolutionists, though they thought they had discarded design altogether, were soon found themselves advocating an immanent design.

It by no means follows that the inner design held by theists is identical with the immanent design taught by the evolutionists, but the evolutionists were fighting a past system when

¹The later edition is entitled *An Outline of Philosophy*.

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fighting Paley—they were not meeting up-to-date theological views at all.

When one comes to think of it, it is somewhat amusing when we remember that the extraneous Deistic view of design that the evolutionists attacked, and so gleefully discarded, was in reality objectionable just because it was so naturalistically, even mechanically conceived. It had been borrowed by Paley from current science and utilized in his theological construction. Now the new immanent design to which evolutionists were committing themselves was measurably nearer to the philosophical view of design as it had been long before expounded even in Aristotle. In popular or semi-popular misconceptions about what 'evolution' is and means, we still find a continuation of the original confusion. That this confusion needs clearing up is obvious. But we must diagnose before we can prescribe. Let us try to bring out the confusion or contradiction that is quite widespread in talking about 'evolution'. Let us like Berkeley, then, ask the question, what is meant by 'the natural law of evolution'? That phrase will cover what many people mean by Evolution. Now to get matters still more clearly focussed let us ask what we mean by the term '*natural law*' and by '*of evolution*'.

Natural Law? We must exclude many meanings often given to law when we use the term natural. We do not mean civil law, for instance, nor what was meant during the middle ages when 'natural law' or 'law of nature' meant a Stoic principle of reason inherent in nature. We mean a law of nature as nature is now understood, but how is it now understood? Nature is understood as the objective realm from which volition or the artificial is excluded. In this field everything is supposed to occur with a species of necessity or compulsion and this is usually called Causation. When the

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causes or sum of conditions are given the effect must follow. Furthermore, it is still usually supposed that in this effect there is nothing beyond what is included in the sum of conditions; that is, there can be nothing additional in the effect. That would be quite miraculous and quite unaccountable or quite impossible.

Of Evolution. But now turn to the usual conception attached to 'of evolution' and quite a new attitude of mind is found asserting itself. Now we are asked to think of a process extending over a longer or a shorter time—if any difficulty arises in the shorter time, it is usually supposed that this will all disappear if we lengthen the time. So on the whole it is safer to speak always of long times rather than short ones if you are to avoid awkward questions. At the end of this period of time something is supposed to emerge which instead of being equated with what we started from at the beginning is triumphantly declared to be far in advance, far beyond, quite superior to what was at the start. Sully and Huxley in the article *Evolution* to which I have previously referred make this quite explicit.

Not only is an advance asserted by 'evolution' but this advance is an improvement, an increased value. 'At the same time, inasmuch as conscious and more particularly human life is looked on by the evolutionist as the highest phase of all development, and, since man's development is said to be an increase in well-being and happiness, we do not greatly err when we speak of evolution as a transition from the lower to the higher, from the worse to the better.'

'Evolution is thus almost synonymous with progress, though the latter term is usually confined to processes of development in the moral as distinguished from the physical world.'

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Now if we put together our results we find Natural Law—of Evolution—breaking into two quite discordant parts. In so far as we stress 'natural law' we think of physical nature and assume that the end will be on the same level as the beginning. But when we say 'of evolution' we slip away from the 'physical world' and its equivalence in cause and effect and we run over into the moral world of progress and take this in, and here we assert a 'progress' or advance. But carrying over our view of necessity from the physical into the moral we have a necessary progress.

Altogether it is a great situation and most interesting. I am reminded of what used to be an old debating subject among the Canadian Scottish pioneers: 'What would happen if an irresistible force met an immovable object?' In 'natural law' we have the immovable object, it cannot be budged beyond what was originally given in its sum of conditions, but in the 'of evolution' we have the irresistible force that must prevail in spite of all obstructions and gives us 'progress'.

Now most evolutionists alternate back and forward between the 'immovable object' and 'the irresistible force' in their views about naturalistic evolution. By the way, if the Naturalism is stressed can evolution ever escape the 'immovable object' standpoint? For instance, try to conceive a fatalistically naturalistically compelled progress without volition or choice, and yet evolutionary writers toy with this folly whenever they try to write out a deterministic evolutionary ethics.

It is true that Sully and Huxley, wandering over the whole field in their article, recognize as one kind of 'evolution' the development theories. But though certain limitations and difficulties are admitted as still confronting evolution, no hint

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is given towards coming to terms with these two fundamentally opposed philosophical interpretations.³

Kant, however, has given some glimpses at this 'antinomy'—and though Kant's solution is not thorough-going, he provides for an irresistible force in his theory of duty and freedom—and it would seem that when the 'irresistible force' of duty meets the 'immovable object' of impulse, desire or nature in any of its forms, it was the object that was alleged to be immovable that had to move—or in other words, nature and natural law is a hypothetical imperative and as such subordinated to or instrumental to the 'categorical imperative' of the subject or spirit as moral.

Instead of frankly facing the dilemma in their contradictory conceptions of a 'natural law of evolution' later 'naturalistic evolutionists' dodge the issue by deriding philosophy. They are scientists and so can slip in whatever aspect suits each case they are dealing with. But this is the ostrich plan of hiding the head in the sand.

Let me now briefly sum up wherein naturalistic evolution as a philosophical explanation or complete world-view has failed all along the line.

1. *Physical Evolution as Naturalism Fails.* Because instead of maintaining the reality of its basis, the physical universe, it found itself in its account of knowledge on its

³Sully and Huxley under Metaphysical Systems note Dualism and Materialism and Pantheism, then Spinozistic parallelism and a 'double aspect' curve, materialistic on one side, pantheistic on the other. But they never come in sight of constructive idealistic development, possibly because in terminology they use evolution and development as synonymous; and when in theory they get a glimpse of idealistic development, they regard it as a subordinate aspect of naturalistic evolution. As a matter of fact naturalistic evolution as a lesser aspect might get included within the greater constructive idealistic development, but we cannot include a greater under a lesser. In short, they pluck the feathers off the peacock and think they have changed it into a jackdaw, then they stick the feathers on a jackdaw and think they have changed it into a peacock.

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own psychology compelled to abandon the validity of both substantiality and causality and had to fall back on the weak substitution of 'the unknowable' for substance and the 'customary conjunction' for Causation.

Idealistic development in Kant has to rescue the validity of substantiality and of causality and thus save the 'naturalistic' evolutionists from committing suicide.

2. *Biological Evolution as Naturalism Fails.* It runs into contradiction and failure in its treatment of design. It attacks design, but this turns out to be an attack by biology on physics. It turns out that after it gets rid of physical mechanical dualistic design it slips in without any acknowledgement, an implicit, immanent design.

It is constructive idealistic development which faces this issue and agreeing with the naturalistic biological evolutionists that mechanical, physical design is inadequate also shows that merely biological explanations of design also fall short of the whole sweep of immanent design as it is found not merely in biology but also in psychology and sociology.

3. *Psychological Evolution as Naturalism Fails.* It lends itself to explaining away logic and mathematics without which science ceases to be science. If everything is reduced to the level of merely contingent sequences we have neither science nor coherent experience. The mechanical bias, or atomistic tendency misled the psychological evolutionist into reducing experience into atomistic experiences.

It is constructive development which shows us that experience is not a mere aggregation of experiences, and endeavours to trace the principles inherent in and valid for experience; thus restoring psychology to its honourable place as a contribution to the upbuilding of both science and philosophy instead

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of becoming a mere negative dissolvent as it became in the hands of the naturalistic psychological evolutionists.

4. *Sociological Evolution as Naturalism Fails.*

For in so far as the naturalism prevails we run back to the immovable and static and so must deny human freedom and personal initiative. But there can be no human society with a significant ethics in civil laws, or political organization, where all is mechanically accounted for.

It is constructive idealistic development which gives us a coherent statement of the principles involved in significant ethics, political progress and the realization of purposes, the significant 'designs' in human society.

Summing up, Naturalistic theory as philosophy appearing in various shapes as 'physical evolution, biological evolution, psychological evolution, and sociological evolution, in every case runs into bankruptcy and failure, and in each case the rescue is made by constructive idealistic development.

Let us now turn to our second problem: the bearing of these two types of explanation or theory, naturalistic evolution, or idealistic development on the problem of personality.

II.

Personality.

According to the view of naturalistic evolution we can very simply solve this problem. The answer is easy—there is no such thing as personality. If we accept naturalistic evolution we must simply drive out personality as St. Patrick drove the snakes out of Ireland. But is there not another alternative? A Frenchman who heard the story about St. Patrick is said to have exclaimed: 'Vy did he not leave the poor snakes alone and drive out the Irish instead?' So we may hesitate whether to drive out personality by naturalistic evolution or drive out

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naturalistic evolution by personality. Naturalistic evolution may have to mitigate its intolerance. When we recall how one principle after another had to be 'driven out' to satisfy 'naturalistic evolution', it will not seem strange to us that personality too must go if we hold to naturalistic evolution, and just as we had to turn to constructive idealistic development to rescue and restore other principles and actualities, so it is not unlikely that here too we may have to turn to constructive idealistic development if we are to maintain anything of the nature of personality. If we look back over the long history of philosophical polemics we shall always find that only in the case of constructive idealistic development have we any really serious attempt to strive towards, stumble towards, search for personality.

But here we need to pause to distinguish very carefully between two tendencies both often called 'Idealistic' but totally unlike. We need to distinguish carefully between constructive organizing development idealism, and deductive analytic rationalistic idealism.

The latter is probably at bottom quite as intolerant of personality as naturalistic evolution ever was, and so we must follow the pathway of constructive idealistic development assailed on one side by naturalistic evolution and on the other by rationalistic formalistic idealism. Let us note and contrast these in earlier speculation. In Greek speculation, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were 'constructive idealists', asserting development and referring to a person who possessed regulative reason and deliberative will.

But in the Stoics we have a type of analytic formal rationalism in which personality is forced violently into ready-made moulds. The Stoics speak mainly about laws of nature or laws of reason, but the levelling process is everywhere in evidence.

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The Stoics kept speaking about 'law', 'law'—sometimes this 'law of nature' or 'law of reason' means merely physical mechanical law, sometimes it means mathematical law involved in physical happenings, sometimes it means logical law involved in our experience of physical happenings in their mathematical relations and sometimes it means moral-social law or the order that should ideally obtain in our human experiences, however they may be related to physical nature with its mathematical aspects. Nevertheless, there is a steady drift of the 'should be' of the moral into the 'must be' of the logical-mathematical physical. Ultimately the necessity becomes explicit fatalism, and though the Stoic began bravely, even heroically, with the assertion of a proud even defiant will, gradually this will is hemmed in, circumscribed more and more, till at length it remains if at all only as mere resignation.

Now what happened long ago with Stoicism becomes repeated over and over again with later rationalistic pantheistic systems. If personality ever seems to get a footing it always ends in mere resignation. The fact is that both Naturalism and Pantheism start at the wrong end. They have no use for Kant's 'Copernican revolution'.

Naturalism: Nature, or the world as a whole is impersonal. Man is a part of nature, therefore he is impersonal. Q.E.D.

He thinks he is personal—then let him read our demonstration and he will see he is mistaken, that is all.

Or Pantheism: The Universe as a whole is impersonal, man is a part of this Universe, therefore he is impersonal—Q.E.D. Man imagines he is personal, well let him read our demonstration and correct his foolish imaginings, that is all.

Now at the outset, constructive idealistic development repudiates the method employed by both Naturalism and

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rationalistic Pantheism. They start wrong, they reason wrong, they end wrong. But again and again, constructive idealistic development is misconstrued and it is supposed to be refuted by arguments that are really directed against analytical rationalism.

David Hume for instance thought he was once for all settling those who believed in a self, by claiming that he could never catch a particular state self, nor a substance self. Well, what of it? The particular state self is the empirical naturalistic misconception; the abstract substance 'I know not what' is the rationalistic misconception about the self. Locke who did believe in a 'something we know not what' immaterial substance, self, nevertheless in his chapter on personal identity did really come in sight of a truer view of a persisting principle through varying experiences, co-ordinating them into a coherent experience. And Berkeley replying to the claim that both material substance and immaterial substance were exploded, clearly stated the self as the 'one individual principle' who perceived both colour and sound and yet was not identical with either colour or sound.

Kant does not hesitate to accept David Hume's criticism of an 'immaterial substance' self, 'something we know not what'. But Kant gives suggestions towards a constructive idealistic view of a self, especially in his development and proof of the synthetical functioning underlying or involved in all experience; in his insight that synthetical unity underlies and renders possible the shallower 'analytical identity' and Kant discovers the self not merely in knowledge but in conduct, where he sees that duty is an undeniable experience wherein 'I ought' involves 'I can.'

Hegel though at times swinging towards a pantheistic rationalism, on the whole is a keen critic of this fallacious

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procedure. He insists that 'subject' is a more ultimate principle than 'substance' as usually understood, and that the formalistic method of the 'mere understanding' is the parent of countless errors and misconceptions in philosophy. Fortunately for us who have the great heritage of British speculation, the personal is seldom long forgotten. The Oxford scholars who have so treasured Greek literature with its fine suggestiveness, easily grasped and extended hints taken from Kant and Hegel towards modernizing and extending the tendencies already dimly foreshadowed in Aristotle, and these so-called Neo-Hegelians, or Neo-Aristotelians, T. H. Green, the Cairds, Ritchie, Watson, along with the later constructive Scottish school thinkers, have gone a long way to develop the principles of constructive idealistic development and have all perceived how central, how fundamental personality must be in a constructive idealistic development theory.

Now if we may be permitted to indicate directions in which we may further extend their work and insight bearing on personality, we should be inclined to make the following suggestions:

First: We need to scrutinize very carefully our psychological foundations. Many early attempts to grapple with the problem of personality were baffled or nullified because they ran against a prevailing psychology which was really incorrect but which claimed a scientific ultimateness to which philosophy must submit. There are two erroneous tendencies that easily creep into and pervert scientific psychology. Though claiming to describe and state facts of experience as they find them, one set of psychologists can never find anything but what they have pre-determined to find, and they pre-determine to find experience all broken up into the ultimate atomic elements, a psychological atomism, that easily lends itself to materialistic philosophical manipulation, ending with utter

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loss of vital principles and of course inevitably losing 'personality' in any attempted reconstructions. The earlier 'rationalistic' bias carried over into psychology led to a discovery of 'faculties' separate, distinct and independent. Later psychologists have pretty well riddled these separate distinct and independent faculties, but they have run over to the other abstraction of separate distinct and independent ultimate elements of a simple kind like the ancient atomists, and they scarcely realize that this is a variation merely of the old mistake. What is greatly needed at the present moment is not less but more psychology, psychology which while claiming not to philosophize will not slip in false philosophy, but truly describe the actual living, actively working, concrete consciousness. The believers in constructive idealistic development are quite willing to base their philosophical interpretations on a valid impartial and complete psychological foundation, but as philosophers they prefer to do their own theorizing, make their own constructions, formulate their own interpretations.

Let me very briefly note how personality will appear within any serious attempt to interpret human experience fairly and without explaining it away in favour of some preconceived misconceptions or assumptions.

1. *Consciousness.* To begin with, as Descartes long ago suggested, instead of our deriving or deducing consciousness from something else which is supposed to be more real or better known, we should really discover that consciousness itself is what is most directly, most certainly known, and until we have some test of what constitutes reality, we must assume consciousness to have some kind of reality, and in any case we will need consciousness both to discover and to prove reality wherever or however we claim to reach such reality. Kant's 'Copernican revolution' consists in his clear statement of the necessity for beginning with actual concrete human

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experience as the basis and starting-point of all our investigations, reflections, and conclusions. If it turns out upon critical re-consideration that objects and subjects are indispensably involved in this actual concrete human experience, that will constitute the proper proof of the validity and reality of such objects and subjects.

2. *Self-Consciousness.* A predominant amount of investigation has centred on these objects involved in human experience, but we desire now to concentrate on the subjects also as certainly and indispensably involved and to try to state just what subject means; and reflectively reconsidering the actual experience, our human consciousness, we discover that the human conscious subject may become self-conscious: that is to say, it is characteristic of human consciousness that it may rise to an explicit awareness of the content of its own conscious life—the knowing subject may dispassionately, even critically, view or review the known content within its consciousness, what Kant calls the ‘Empirical Ego’. In this dispassionate critical evaluating survey the human subject rises to the possibility of morality for there begins the power of discriminating between temptation and sin, and from this distinction we may rise to the emphasis or preference whereby one is endorsed and retained, the other condemned, opposed and eliminated.

3. *Self-regulative Consciousness.* At such stage and exercising this function consciousness becomes self-regulative of the content of its accepted life-filling—by approval holding fast to what it regards as good and lovely, by disapproval reacting against or trying to shun or escape what it views or regards as unworthy or undesirable. And this approving and disapproving is no external re-arrangement of a foreign field extraneous to the self, it rather constitutes a building up

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or destroying of the conscious life itself. This activity modifies the actor.

4. *Self-modifying Consciousness.* By its selective emphasis the character of the approving, disapproving self becomes modified. It advances or recedes, it is improved or is degraded. If the choice is of the unsuitable or unworthy, the self suffers loss and self-destruction or self-degradation; but if on the contrary the selective approval is in accordance with what is fitted for the subject, is what we term wise or well-considered, or right or good, we find the self issues after its choice in a self-developed increase.

5. *Self-developing Consciousness.* The normal or hopeful or proper tendency should be, we assume, self-development, so much so that many writers find it almost impossible to state coherently how it is possible for a self to commit suicide, except perchance by inadvertence and misconception, and hence self-development is more easy to formulate than self-degradation, nevertheless there is one kind of choice that seems to enter not abnormally or viciously or pathologically but normally into self-developing consciousness, this is the paradoxical choice and action termed self-sacrifice, namely, that to save our life, we must lose it, in some manner.

6. *Self-sacrificing Consciousness.* Not alone in some of the great crises of life but in its lesser moments and ordinary routine, self-sacrifice seems to enter in some way as an integral factor within the normal moral developing active consciousness. For whenever the consciousness first comes in sight of a line of action or an ideal of conduct that surpasses what formerly it had sought, the higher nobler way if approved or adopted will seem to come into conflict with the plan of life or content of life with which the self had previously identified itself. There will seem to arise a conflict between

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the old lesser ideal and the new greater, higher ideal. Thus every acceptance of a higher level will seem to involve a struggle or require a sacrifice of the lower in favour of the higher, a sacrifice or seeming sacrifice. Hence therefore we meet what seems to me a perverted and false view of this sacrifice taught by many ascetic writers. Those writers turn all the attention on the negative aspect in the transition which they represent as a rejection or casting out of the lower level, but as a matter of fact in a real advance from a lower to a higher level what we need to stress is not the giving up of the lower level, but the *taking up* of the effort towards the higher level and with this the inclusion of the good in this higher level as our good, which if secured and obtained and incorporated will end in self-fulfilment not self-loss, in *any* sacrifice of self in that sense. The self, as it were, dedicates itself to this new purpose or ideal and if this is really nobler it must if followed and attained bring real self-fulfilment.

7. *Self-dedicating fulfilment of Consciousness.* When we follow up this new line of investigation, it soon turns out that as a rule such self-dedicating fulfilment is usually when we turn from a purpose or plan which while bringing some pleasure or advantage to us does it unduly at the expense of other selves. So that this level cannot be discussed or understood without implicating a social reference or reference to other selves—self-deciding fulfilment then means co-operating with others in a good that they can share with us, this is the field Kant referred to as a 'kingdom of ends.'

8. *Co-operating Consciousness — or selves mutually assisting.* This is the point where we reach special difficulties. At first ethical investigators could only represent the one as benefiting at the expense of the other, and one set of writers advocated that others were means to the one self, who should

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seek his own welfare. Others advocated 'benevolence' in sacrifice as a plain duty. But if our analysis of self-sacrifice be correct as a positive including a wider content, then we are not really asked to give up altogether the legitimate demand of the individual for self-maintenance of welfare, but we widen the content of welfare to the self.

It must be in this widening social co-operative moral consciousness that we get the key to the religious life with its marvellous uplift and completion of the moral consciousness. So it will not surprise us that some writers advocate a giving up of the human self, to the Divine, but may we not rather speak of this momentous transition in the moral consciousness as an including or taking up in our approval and well-being, the association with and acceptance of the Divine person as necessary for the realization of our self-hood?

It will be seen that I now have reached a point where the moral consideration reaches the religious, where human personality touches on Divine personality. I do not propose to follow further. But I have gone far enough to indicate that the religious life so intimately vital in human experience involves and implies a personal Divine good being, who should be explicitly accepted in the moral experience of human persons.

As to the proofs of the existence of such a Divine personality, I can merely add that this to me means more than the usual proofs of existence given in some discussions. It is God as person that I am interested in, if there be such a person, as I believe there is. It is quite true that since Kant refuted the ancient 'proofs' many have regarded it as vain and foolish to attempt any proofs of God's existence. But as a matter of fact what Kant showed was that the usual rationalistic deductive method and the usual empirical method are alike

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incapable of proving God's existence, but many forget that Kant has shown *ad nauseam*, that these two methods are equally incapable of proving anything whatsoever. And if Kant found other methods, constructive methods, for proving other things, might not these same constructive methods be used in dealing with the question of God's existence? As a matter of fact we may point to some of these attempts.

Royce's book, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, while it rejects the abstract formal ontological proof, turns attention to the meaning of truth as truth, as always a truth for an adequate or trustworthy judge of truth.

T. H. Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* rejects the old cosmological argument because of its narrow and extraneous conception of Causality. But basing his views on the Kantian view of substance and causality in a phenomenal world, Green argues to the 'eternal consciousness' as the implied basis of the phenomenal world.⁴

The defenders then of design or purpose have long ago abandoned the extraneous design as a proper statement of nature. Even naturalistic evolution has been compelled however to slip in an indwelling tendency in nature, and in spite of the former scorn heaped on the 'anthropomorphism' of those who assumed that nature had some purpose fulfilled in mankind, Sully and Huxley admit the following:

'In a sense it may be said that the theory of evolution helps to restore the ancient sentiment toward nature as our parent the source of our life. It is well to add, however, that the theory of evolution, by regarding man as the

⁴While Green rejects the extraneous 'design' argument, in his ethical writing, he tries to justify a belief in an indwelling purpose, and points as a 'condition of the possibility' of our moral 'self-realization' or moral development, our affinity with, our co-operation with, our dependence on, a 'spiritual principle' that possesses in actuality what is in us as yet possibility or partially developed actualization.

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last and highest product of nature, easily lends support to the idea that all things exist and have existed for the sake of our race. This seems, indeed, to be an essential element in any conception we can form of a rationally evolved universe.'

This is indeed far from meeting the whole case but it certainly tends towards the persistent claim of idealistic development that we cannot level man down to physical nature.

But to discover God as implicated in man as well as physical nature we must pass from physical descriptive science to the moral experience of mankind and what is implicated in man's power of choice and moral aspiration, and moral advancement.

When we take into account not merely our sentient life but also our intellectual, artistic and social activities, and especially our moral distinctions and moral actions and moral ideals, it would seem to be more reasonable to say 'God is our parent and the source of our life,' than to say with naturalistic evolution 'nature is our parent and the source of our life.'

Naturalistic evolutionists in recent times have somewhat abandoned their allegiance to Herbert Spencer's formulations, which so closely followed Hobbes's 'inner motion' determinism and David Hume's 'customary conjunction' with some 'unknowable' in the agnostic abyss, and have turned more to the new explanations set forth in Pragmatism. In so doing they have made appreciable progress away from materialism and agnosticism and towards constructive idealism. William James's many jibes and merry quips at rationalistic formalism and intellectualism may have some pertinence against formalistic pantheistic rationalism, they do not touch constructive idealistic development. Then when James insists that from the outset psychological experience has in it unity and coherence essentially and not accidentally or artificially or by

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some subsequently superimposed logical relatings, this too rejects the rationalistic theories but is quite in harmony with Kantianism and modern constructive idealistic development. Only of course James thinks this unity is an ultimate fact, yet a fact in some vague way accounted for by the sentient organism in relation to the world. Here he merely glances at an explanation that does not explain. Then when James repudiates the implicit fatalism in rationalistic theories and passionately pleads for an indeterministic even arbitrary volitional action or will in man, he does not oppose constructive idealism, but he not merely by this rejects rationalism, he also overturns the whole naturalistic evolutionary psychology and ethics from Hobbes through Hume and Mill up to Spencer and Bain. All the naturalistic expositors were determinists in their account of volition, and James has gone over to the ranks of the constructive idealists, who have long before him developed the significance of volition and moral freedom much more fully and adequately than James has done.⁵

And lastly when James proposes to test the truth of their theories by their serviceability for life, though this is somewhat vague and looks more like corroboration than proof, yet it is a test that will never stagger a believer in the appeal to actual concrete experience. In short all James's emendations are really abandonments of naturalistic evolution as materialistic. They are distinct approaches towards a constructive idealism.

Our claim is that the theistic hypothesis or interpretation, if we so call it, is a more adequate and satisfactory explanation of the facts and all the facts of human experience than the

⁵William James revolts against Pantheistic fatalism, and in place of its monism puts dualism, pluralism, Deism—he does not rise to Theism. Bergson in *Creative Evolution* seems to be reviving Schopenhauer's ingenious attempt to describe a creation without any Creator.

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hypothesis or theory of materialism or the hypothesis or theory of Pantheism.

If we add James's practical test as to how each theory when applied in practice would work out on 'a further life', we may remind ourselves that Christianity, though often crudely expressed by pantheistic or mechanically minded expositors, is quite clearly a theory of life that assumes human responsible personality and a Divine Person. As to the effects of this theory on life and conduct we can see that where it has been accepted and life has been governed by principles in accordance with this theory, civilization has advanced. To me it seems beyond controversy that personality in man is the only reasonable inference to draw from human experience and any theory like materialism or pantheism that ignores this or explains away the personality in man because it does not harmonize with their preconceived ideas is guilty of making assumptions take precedence over facts. If we speak at all or think at all of human antecedents as 'parentage' we will need to look for such parentage higher than some impersonal naturalistic principle or some impersonal pantheistic principle.

Christ's teaching that God is our Father, we are His children, seems to be the interpretation that would best explain the stubborn facts.

JAMES GIBSON HUME.

EMERGENT REALISM.

I.

I feel it an honour to have been asked to contribute to a volume in celebration of the golden wedding of Professor John Watson and the Chair of Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston. I happen with him to belong to the now rapidly thinning ranks of the generation that knew in the flesh the remarkable group of thinkers, who taught in Oxford and Glasgow in the 'seventies and 'eighties of last century, and were the founders of the modern Idealist tradition of which, among active teachers, he is the most distinguished living representative. It is, therefore, with the greatest pleasure that I hail him across the ocean and congratulate the University on still retaining him on its staff. Others who, though happily younger than I, belonged to the same generation are writing in this volume of the rise and progress of the type of thought for which Idealism stands. I propose in what follows to try to illustrate its method by applying it in criticism of another, in name at least, antagonistic to it. I propose to confine myself to two points, on the one of which it seems to me that Realism has something important to teach latter day Idealism, on the other of which it likewise seems that it has something to learn from it.

No writers have contributed more to what Dr. Peter Wust has called the 'Resurrection of Metaphysics' in our time than those of the new School of Realists. But Realism, and even 'New Realism' is a wide word. There is the Realism which has come to be known as 'critical', which, so far as I understand it, while insisting on the dualism of mind and its object,

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hesitates to commit itself to any theory of their ultimate nature and relation to each other, and would perhaps have been better named 'Agnostic.' There is the more thorough-going sort that, starting from the world of objects as known to physical science, proposes to dispense with the subjective factor altogether, and work out a philosophy in which mind appears as a 'cross-section' of the nervous system. We might call it 'monistic' Realism, but that some of those, who accept it as a method, would probably disown any idea of treating the world, with its endless plurality, as referable to any simple unifying principle. Lastly (to mention no other varieties) there is the form which has been recently developed in England by such writers as Professor Lloyd Morgan and Professor Alexander, the distinguishing feature of which is the union of the dualistic method of treatment of mind and its object with a theory of evolution that recognizes the emergence of new levels of existence, constituting a hierarchy in which life and mind take their place as correlated with a certain degree of complexity in the basal conditions. In an article like this any review of these various forms is obviously impossible. I have elsewhere¹ attempted an estimate of the stability of the general attitude of mind known as Realism. Here I propose to confine myself to the last, which seems to me to have most to teach Idealism both by its agreements and disagreements. Fortunately it has recently been developed with great speculative power in Professor Alexander's Gifford Lectures on *Space, Time and Deity*. Here Realism has come to its own in an erudite and comprehensive metaphysic the manifest relation of which to Plato gives it a peculiar interest for Idealists. It is in view of this relationship that I wish to approach it, not so much in the spirit of

¹*Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, chapter on 'Idealism and Recent Thought.'

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the maxim '*fas est et ab hoste doceri*', as of the Proverb 'Iron sharpeneth iron, so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend.'

II.

There is no doctrine so distinctive of Realism in all its forms as that of the independence of reality upon the knowing mind—of object from subject. Yet the doctrine thus generally stated is full of ambiguity. Naïve or non-metaphysical or again pluralistic Realism may find itself free to assert an absolute independence. On the other hand to a metaphysical Realism like Alexander's, founded upon the unity of the Space-Time substance, all statements of the independence of any of the elements of reality must be taken as only relative. Mind, or the fact of being known to mind, is to make no difference to the object known or contemplated. On the other hand, mind is to be an attribute or perfection of the reality known and we are tempted to ask if a thing's attributes or perfections make no difference to what it does. But we shall be told that this is only a verbal point. What is meant by independence is an epistemological not a metaphysical fact. What is asserted is the actual objective existence of everything that is 'contemplated' or presented in knowledge, independently of the act of knowing. Being known is only one of the relations into which the object enters, something that happens to it in its life-history, but that makes no difference to it. Wherever we have an object of knowledge, something contemplated as contrasted with the process of contemplating or living through the experience of it, we have something *there*, existing in its own right (in the last resort, it is usually added, something physical, though we need not trouble about this here) and owing none of its characters to the knowing subject. *Prima facie* the doctrine seems only a formal statement of common sense belief. But

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in the attempt to carry it out consistently it turns out to be full of paradox. Secondary qualities, images, illusions are only a few of the difficulties it has to meet. To anyone in the present generation who cares for philosophy as an experimenting with ideas, instead of as the 'finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct', nothing has been more exhilarating than the courage and freshness with which this old problem has been handled by the representatives of the New Realism in dealing with these difficulties—by none more acutely than by Professor Alexander. That some have been led to short-cut the argument by eliminating the subjective element altogether and treating the 'knower' as only a cross-section of the physical system seems, as Alexander has said, quite 'natural.' Perhaps also, as he says, it is true that no one who has not felt the attraction of this simplification is competent to have an opinion upon it. While rejecting it himself on grounds with which Idealists at least can have no quarrel,² in his doctrine of the 'compresence' of knower and known he has asserted as uncompromisingly as any the fundamental doctrine of the independence of object and subject in the sense explained.

Heroic as is his attempt to work this thesis out in detail, it has resulted only in bringing home to the reader the inherent impossibility of success. In the end we are driven back on the hypothesis, which Idealists share with critical Realists as the only one that meets the facts, namely that the form under which objects are presented to us in knowledge depends not less on physiological and psychical than on physical conditions. But this is not the end of the matter and there remains an element of truth in the realist doctrine of independence, which it is of vital importance to assert in view of

²*Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. iii, ff.

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the direction that idealist thought in some of its leading representatives has recently taken.

Idealism is in no danger of reverting to a subjectivism of the Berkeleyan type. It is no part of it to make capital out of 'sensations' and 'ideas' as subjective data. In all its modern forms Idealism takes its start rather from Kant's doctrine of the synthetic activity involved in all knowledge and everywhere speaks in the language of Act. But we recall that historically the dualism by which Kant sought to 'save appearances' was superseded by Fichte's attempt to sum up all reality in the act of the Ego. Those who have followed closely recent developments of idealistic philosophy must have been struck with the repetition they threaten of this history. In the name of a purely formal conception of freedom and in the supposed interest of morality, progress and all the idols of Liberalism, the new Idealism seems ready to risk all that was of essential value in the old. With Pragmatism perhaps we need not concern ourselves. It has had its day—brilliant but brief. But its place is being taken by a form of doctrine even more attractive to the modern mind because more deeply informed with the moralistic and historical spirit, which is so marked a characteristic of the present time. The main outlines of the 'New Pragmatism' of Croce³ and the 'creative' or 'actual Idealism' of Gentile,⁴ are by this time familiar to English students of philosophy. This is not the place for criticism of them. It is sufficient to point out the ambiguity that, from the point of view of the older Idealism, must attach to any philosophy, which, in the interest of the reality of History and Progress conceives of itself as pledged to the denial of any reality, *sive Natura sive Deus*, that transcends the time-process. This is not merely in Bradley's

³*Philosophy of the Practical*, Eng. Tr., p. 304.

⁴*Discorsi di Religione*, p. 72.

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phrase to part company with all considerable religions but to empty history and progress themselves of all significance. If History does not mean the actualization of something that has eternal reality beyond change in time, if it does not mean in Russell's realistic phrase bringing more of God into the world, it is difficult to see what it means. In contrast to any such pale water-colour sketch⁵ of idealistic teaching the uncompromising assertion by Realism of the existence of an infra- and a supra-mental world comes as a breath of life. If the choice were between an Idealism which finds all reality summed up in the time process (however spiritually it interprets the act which fills the moment) and a Realism which conceives of the spiritual act as only a mode of a non-spiritual reality which manifests itself in it there could be little doubt, I think, which is the more spacious hypothesis. But this is not the only choice. The question at issue between the Idealism of the great tradition and the new Realism is not whether the world is *mind-created* in this narrow sense, or *revealed to mind* for what it is independently of the mental act. All sound philosophy must hold by revelation. The real issue concerns the ultimate nature of the world which is revealed. Is it possible to interpret it in terms that exclude all reference to that which we first know in mind—that to the nature of which, therefore, the life of the mind gives the only authentic clue? It is the bearing of the philosophy before us on this question to which I desire now to turn.

III.

There is a familiar form of Realism which as we have seen has no use for mind. The world we can *know* is a mechanico-chemical system of physical reactions for the description of which all reference to ends or values whether immanent or

⁵The phrase used in this connexion is Santayana's.

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transcendent is irrelevant. But this is not Alexander's theory. On the contrary, his whole metaphysical philosophy centres in the theory of the *nisus* which is immanent in things, and it is on the view we take of what this theory is and implies that our ultimate estimate of it must depend.

True the *nisus* comes before us as only a feature of the Space-Time substance in which Alexander finds the matrix of all reality, and an idealist might be expected to preface any allusion to this side of the theory with a heated disclaimer of so abstract and empty a conception. I am sorry to say the subject leaves me quite cold. The question of the *primordia rerum* or ultimate constituents of the physical world seems to me altogether a matter for physicists. The controversy between those who hold to an ethereal base and those who hold that a space-time or motional continuum is all that need be presupposed makes the subject an exciting one to physicists at the present time. To the lay intelligence an ether in which we are told there is no motion, but only strains, and a space-time or a motion which is a motion of nothing, are both conceptions which are sufficiently paradoxical. If one may judge from the present trend of thought in relativist writers like Einstein, it looks as though Alexander's hypothesis of space-time substance were in the ascendant. If so, it is another instance of the anticipation of scientific theory by speculative philosophy, and we may join in congratulating the author. But this to philosophy is not the interesting part of the discovery. According to Alexander space-time is not merely motion. It is motion endowed with a *nisus* or creative urge not only towards ever new but towards ever 'higher' forms of existence material, vital, psychical. It is the emphasis laid on this feature that distinguishes the theory before us from other kinds of Realism and raises doubts about the form its author has given to it.

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Recent philosophy, both realist and idealist, is strongly imbued with the idea of a *nisus*, *élan* or immanent drive in things. Considering the part this idea is called upon to play, it is rather surprising to find how seldom it is subjected to analysis and criticism. The word clearly means more than motion, though motion is involved in it. It may be said to stand to motion as evolution or progress stands to change. As progress involves the presupposition of some objective to be realized, something that is to be accomplished through change, so there is implied in the idea of a *nisus* the direction of the 'motion' to something which is more than motion, something that can best perhaps be described as ideal as contrasted with the real or actual. The difference is that, while in 'progress' the emphasis is upon the actual process, in '*nisus*' it is upon the inward urge that guarantees the progress. The whole question turns upon the way in which we are to conceive of this inward urge. If we keep to experience, we may say at once that we know nothing of it as a property of space and time in the abstract. If we extend the idea to them it is only on the analogy of what we know of it in the concrete world of mechanical or chemical attraction (as in the formation of a planetary system or a crystal), of the tropisms and growth of plants, the instincts of animals, and the purposes of men. In all of these we have to conceive of it (if we are to remain true to the spirit of science) not as a second entity distinct from the material parts and somehow like the vitalist's entelechy added to them from without, but simply as an aspect or attribute of the particular constellation in which it appears. What prevents the recognition of this in vitalist writers is the fear of finding themselves committed to a materialistic or merely mechanical interpretation of the world. As a matter of fact, the recognition of the principle of *nisus* as a universal attribute of things is all that is required as an escape from the

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merely external determination that mechanism is thought to imply. But this leaves us still with the question of the way in which we are to conceive of this fundamental feature in the space-time substance. Idealistic philosophy from the time of Plato has conceived of it in terms of reason or *λόγος*, interpreted as the principle that works towards organization, whether in knowledge under the form of wisdom⁶ or in practice under the form of love. In both it is a creative energy, a *λόγος σπερματικός*, as fundamental and essential to things as the *ἕλη* or medium in which it works. Modern science and philosophy with the bugbear of 'Design' and theological apologetics before their eyes fight shy of the idea, but we have to work in these matters with the empirical facts and the analogies that lie nearest to our hand, and we are wholly within our right, as Professor Alexander himself urges in connexion with causality and other categorical elements, in seeking for light on the attributes we contemplate in nature in the experience which we enjoy. It is on this principle that Hegel uses such terms as thought and idea to express the teleological principle in things, and that writers like Caird and Bosanquet insist on the idea of an indwelling logic in human life. This manner of speech may be a little lower than that of the angels, but until we become as they, knowing things (it may be) from the inside, instead of, as we know them, only from the outside (to this extent at least behaviourists), we may be content to leave it there.

If then we return to the Space-Time continuum we seem to have one of two things: either we must interpret it strictly in terms of motion or Space-Time substance, in which case the question of a *nisus* and of 'emergency' does not arise, or we endow it with an attribute of anticipation of what is not yet, but has the capacity of becoming, which transforms it into

⁶Cp. the hymn to Wisdom in Prov. viii, esp. 22-31.

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something quite other than the Space-Time either of common sense, of physical science, or of Alexander's philosophy. We can understand the hesitation of one group of what we might call the niso-genic writers, to speak with Hegel of the principle as Spirit, lest they should be committed to an untenable form of Theism; of another to speak of it with Green as 'timeless' through fear of the 'block universe' of the absolutists; but what it is difficult to understand is a philosophy which, admitting the element of nisus, yet stops short of the principle it implies: namely, that the beginning must be interpreted by the end, not the end by the beginning, and that the beginning of things must somehow be not less than their emergent perfections. What this philosophy seems anxious to avoid is on the one hand a starting point other than physical science would admit, and on the other a closed universe which should exclude the possibility of higher perfections than we know in the mind of man. We have already noted the limits of the deference to physical science. With regard to the other; Idealism, at least, can have no quarrel with a doctrine which conceives of the universe as the possessor of unsearchable riches and as having new perfections in store, which, in comparison with human achievements, we may very well describe as angelic or divine. Its quarrel is with the mysticism that refuses to accept the clue that the last perfection of self-conscious reason puts into our hands for the interpretation both of what goes before and of what will be hereafter. While admitting and even insisting on an element of discontinuity in the different levels of existing matter, life, etc., it holds that a linear discontinuity such as Alexander maintains is one thing, a plurality of elements within an all-embracing whole, as of members in an organism, is something quite different. The first reduces everything to mystery; the second holds the torch that lights up the chamber in which we

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find ourselves, to explore the darkness of the passage by which we have come. Dark though much of this may remain, the future course lies open in the reason's ideal of a life which is more fully what our present life partly is. Alexander apparently holds that it is through faithfulness to these ideals⁷ that we will further the coming of the next perfection; but by conceiving of these ideals as merely mind-made and as without immanent relation either to the beginning or end of the process he surrenders the ground for such a faith and severs the connexion between morality and religion.⁸

It is hardly surprising that this whole side of his philosophy should have been suspected by otherwise sympathetic writers as alien to realistic methods. Idealism from the time of Socrates has been ready to acknowledge that we know not what we shall be, but it has always added, with Socrates, that we know enough to say that we shall be more fully what is required of us by our nature as participants in the ideas of beauty and good. On such a view Deity is not some unknown, apparently unknowable, perfection coming somehow so far as we at any rate are concerned *ἔξωθεν*, but the fullness of that which in our experience we know fragmentarily and momentarily in every act that truly embodies these ideals. My argument in this paper has been that while Idealism can afford to go all lengths with Realism in asserting the objective reality of what is known, this is not the end of the matter. Granted that knowledge is

⁷ 'Deity is on the side of goodness.' 'Goodness or good will is material on which deity is built, and deity is in the line of goodness not of evil.' (vol. II, p. 413).

⁸ See the interesting passage, vol. II, p. 405, ff., where Dr. Johnson is quoted: 'A wicked fellow is the most pious when he takes to it. He'll beat you all at piety.' Alexander consistently enough refuses to apply to religion in particular the principle which he rejects in general, though implied as I have maintained in the *nisus*—of interpreting the beginning by the end, the confused pietism of early religion by that which demands of us 'to do justly and love mercy, and so walk humbly with God.'

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the revelation of an 'independent reality,' it is the revelation of a world that only becomes intelligible to us when interpreted as one in which ideals in themselves timeless or, more generally, *values* are realized. If, as I believe, Alexander is right in maintaining that values imply soul or mind, any view which involves (as I think with Dean Inge⁹ that Idealism does) the ultimate identity of reality and value asserts *ipso verbo* the dependence of reality in some sense upon mind. Whether by this route we come back to the older idealistic doctrine of the essential relativity of subject and object is a further question which I have not space to enter on here. I have said, I hope, enough to show that a Realism which accepts the doctrine of 'emergency' seriously is not so far from an Idealism that lays (as that which Professor Watson represents does) an ever-growing stress on 'evolution' as their names might indicate. Its most outstanding feature is the summons it contains to go back for our true bearings not to Kant, but to Plato. If, as I believe, this is the path also of a sound Idealism, there may be found here a ground for the friendly meeting of what Bosanquet has called 'extremes in contemporary philosophy.'¹⁰

JOHN H. MUIRHEAD.

⁹'The ultimate identity of existence and value is a venture of faith to which speculative Idealism is committed.' (*Outspoken Essays*, p. 271), where he clearly means reality, not existence in time.

¹⁰See Bosanquet's book with this title.

APPENDIX.¹

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¹Compiled by Miss Mary Rayson.

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