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Essays, Speeches, and Memoirs

UNIFORM WITH THIS VOLUME.

LETTERS OF FIELD-MARSHAL COUNT HELMUTH VON MOLTKE TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS BROTHERS.

Translated by CLARA BELL and HENRY W. FISCHER. Portraits and Illustrations. 8vo, Cloth, \$3 00.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870-71. By Field-Marshal COUNT HELMUTH VON MOLTKE. Translated by CLARA BELL and HENRY W. FISCHER. With a Map and Portrait. 8vo, Cloth, \$3 00.

MOLTKE; HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER. Sketched in Journals, Letters, Memoirs, a Novel and Autobiographical Notes. Translated by MARY HEERMS. With Illustrations from water-colour and black and white Sketches by MOLTKE. Portraits and Fac-simile Letters. 8vo, Cloth extra, \$3 00.

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ESSAYS, SPEECHES,

AND

MEMOIRS

OF

FIELD-MARSHAL

COUNT HELMUTH VON MOLTKE

THE ESSAYS TRANSLATED BY
CHARLES FLINT McCLUMPHA,
PH.D.; THE SPEECHES, BY MAJOR
C. BARTER, D.A.A.G.; AND THE
MEMOIRS, BY MARY HERMS

IN TWO VOLUMES

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It should be remarked that in this volume the terms mile, rod, etc., refer to the German scale of measurement, unless a different scale is expressly mentioned.

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HOLLAND AND BELGIUM.



PREFACE.

“HOLLAND and Belgium” is the first article which the Field-marshal had published¹ under his name after that he had been appointed second lieutenant on the general's staff. The Belgian Revolution, the immediate sequence of the July Revolution in Paris, seemed on the point of setting all Europe on fire, and even before it had been brought to a close the insurrection in the East also, in Warsaw, was started. It is obvious that these events must have interested the clever young officer in the liveliest manner. While he, eager for action, was yearning for the war which a long time was thought to be unavoidable, he was also searching for an explanation of the great events. And he found this explanation, as he mentions in a letter to his mother, dated the 24th of December, 1830, in the history of the Netherlands which he specially examined with a view to this fact. How he toiled in doing this, is gathered from this same letter, where he says: “I have read over a thousand pages in quarto and four thousand in octavo.”²

Afterwards, he had the work resulting from these studies printed as a brochure, and thus experienced the disappointments which every young author has to undergo. The next letter to his mother, describes in a pleasing manner what these are:—

“Berlin, 9th January, 1831.

“All the sorrows of a young author who is spoiling for a publisher have visited me. Thoroughly impressed by the value of our work, we are astonished to hear the booksellers talk of unsuccessful ventures, of the depressed condition of the book trade to which we had just purposed to add a new impetus by our manuscript. The ingratitude of the man whose fortune has probably been made by our treatise provokes us, and we would withhold our light from the world, did not an impetuous shoemaker, to whom we allotted a lodging-place in the hall of our memory, urge with scientific fervency the publication of so extraordinary a work, although the compensa-

¹ Berlin, Posen and Bromberg, printed and published by Ernst Siegfried Mittler, 1831.

² A second work also, the map of the new boundaries between Holland and Belgium, proves what unceasing interest he took in these events.

tion be only three ducats. Three ducats! I am ashamed to write it down. Three ducats for three hundred years of history, while I receive in journals superficial scribbles paid at the rate of two louis d'ors per sheet. Right humbling is it, indeed. Meanwhile, I doubt not for a moment but that five hundred copies will be sold for review, and I hope that you all will contribute your money towards it, so that a new bonus will follow. Anyhow, the hope of seeing one's self in print in a few days and of being had in all respectable bookshops for six groschen—that decides it, especially when there is a prospect of being further made illustrious by a cutting criticism.

“Yet it does not seem proper to speak of one's self longer than twenty minutes (cf. C. & K., for we authors like to cite authorities), and therefore I shall only say further that my immortal work (when I say work, I really mean a brochure of Gustchen's form), that it bears the title, ‘Holland and Belgium in Mutual Relationship, etc.,’ and is adorned with our illustrious name. . . .

“Yours, HELMUTH.”

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM

IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, FROM
THEIR SEPARATION, UNDER
PHILIP II., TILL THEIR
RE-UNION, UNDER
WILLIAM I.

WHEN a people of its own free will despises the blessings of peace, and renounces its own rights, while at the same time rejecting its obligations, when severing the bonds of society it returns to the primeval state of force, in a word when it launches itself upon a sea of revolution—whose course cannot be directed by any human intelligence, and for whose limitation mundane events must be united with the genius of the greatest men—then is it right for us to search for the causes which give rise to such extraordinary manifestations.

Indeed only the unavoidable necessity of the preservation of being and of unalienable human rights, and not hope, be it ever so alluring, not dissatisfaction, be it ever so well based, not example, be it ever so near at hand, can move a people, one would suppose, to expose itself to the incalculable casualties of anarchy, of civil war, of foreign tyranny, and of ruin. For the revolutions which in their time of duration have made even the worst government a thing to be wished for again have led quite as often to despotism as to freedom.

We seek in vain for the cause and the consequent result only there where not conviction, but passion, not deep-felt necessity, but interests are to a certain extent the springs of action which set the mass in motion.

The fields of Belgium drenched with blood for centuries, offer us to-day the spectacle of a people that takes up arms against its ruler and against its countrymen. The flames which mount the ruins of Antwerp, are now illuminating great catastrophes, and Europe looks for the decisions which are weighed in the councils of its courts.

The more unexpectedly the scenes are presented before our eyes, the less we see them conditioned by necessity, and so much the sooner do we direct our view to the period which preceded, and seek amid the history of the world for the key to events which seem apparently to be unrelated to the causes.

Space may be made here for a short sketch of the epochs which both neighbouring countries share in their internal interests, a retrospect of the events which have forcibly separated the peoples in their religious and political life, in their customs and in their civil and commercial relations, and which have given birth to that mutual hatred, irreconcilable even after sixteen years of peaceful government, and unmistakably participant in the present violent attacks. Without entering into an extended discussion of the events, it will be necessary to understand the principles underlying them, in order to explain the motives which gave so contrary a direction to the character of two peoples seemingly destined by their common origin, by their position in the world and by their lot to form one people.

The reign of Philip II. of Spain was the epoch in which the southern and northern provinces of the Netherlands were first opposed to each other, when their interests began to be separated and to be arrayed in decided opposition to each other.

This monarch united under his sceptre various Netherland provinces which had not been joined since Cæsar's time, and were not again until the time of Napoleon.

He acquired the sovereignty of this rich country in its most flourishing period, but in the eyes of such a monarch as Philip this wealth, this spirit of independence and arrogance produced by prosperity, and still more the liberty, under whose protection alone the former had sprung up in a mercantile state, were necessarily a limiting barrier to his despotism.

The chief trait in the dark character-portrait of King Philip of Spain was insatiable desire for power. Possession of territory, of which the Spanish so proudly said that the sun never set upon it, was not enough for him; he stretched his hand out also towards Portugal, England, France and Germany.

But Philip's greed for power went further. Not only over countries, but also over minds, over opinions did he purpose to reign. Therefore Catholicism was to him the surest pledge of unlimited power, the Reformation its most threatening enemy. To an unyielding fatality he opposed a still more unyielding will, and even if we find the motive by which he acted detestable, we cannot refuse to admire the consistency with which he acted according to this idea, and that too during a life of seventy years and a reign of forty.

But a people thoughtful by nature and prosperous must have soon felt the need of a better understanding of religious affairs, and civil liberty gave rise to an early desire for freedom of conscience. So great was the desire for this that already during the reign of Charles V. more than 40,000 men—heretics in the eyes of the authorities, martyrs in the eyes of a vastly greater host of secret sympathizers with the new doctrine—ended their lives upon the scaffold. Because of his greatness men suffered this monarch to do that which was no longer pardoned in his successor; the nation forgot their love for liberty in their love for the military glory which reflected from their emperor, their countryman, upon them themselves, and furthermore his political ascendancy secured innumerable advantages

to their business. With a smile did the emperor charm the people at Brussels, upon whose property he was laying his hands, and from the midst of whom he was choosing bloody sacrifices.

Not so with Philip. The Dutchmen demanded from the absolute sovereign of the proud Castilians respect for their mercantile privileges, for the chaotic state of their local rights and liberties, they demanded freedom of thought—the very thing that the Catholic king could least grant them. Despite all persecutions, the light of the new faith had already spread so far that King Philip believed that he must meet an evil so fearful with a fearful remedy. This was the Spanish Inquisition, the most despicable invention of human tyranny, if not the most horrible and most bloody.

But only by the aid of an army could such an institution be forced upon the people, that is to say, the Netherlands suffered one evil through another evil. Both were attacks upon their most sacred rights, and forced the power of the ruler to the very acme of despotism. The people rose in opposition.

Philip had purposely annoyed and repulsed the Dutch nobility. This time it was the noble who kindled the flame of rebellion. The compromise, the beggars' league, was first started by the nobleman, he protected the public sermons, and iconoclastic tumults themselves were his work.

So we behold the ruler of Spain, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, Milan, of a part of the Netherlands, and of kingdoms in America, more extensive even than Europe, in a contest with the peaceful inhabitants of a contemptible corner of the earth scarcely 1000 square miles in area. The son of Charles V. employed the victorious armies of his father, the greatest generals of his time, the treasuries of both Indias, the heroic youth of Spain and Italy, and the good fortune of his peoples for the smothering of this insurrection. He lost them all, and more, for the assassination of the

Prince of Orange rests upon his royal honour. Although nature fixed the limits of his days afar, yet he did not survive the issue of this struggle which embittered his whole life for almost half a century, and his successor inherited along with an unended war a debt of 500 millions which had already been squandered upon it.

But the point which we are to make especially prominent as a result of this great tragedy is the Union of Utrecht.

Ten years war devastated the Netherlands, which at one time had been so prosperous, without resulting in a decisive victory for either of the two parties, or essentially changing the condition of affairs. The history of all the transactions on both sides is like that of a city, which is besieged and opportunely relieved, or in case it falls, is retaken, because the army of the enemy has not been slain.

Indeed the Prince of Orange made two campaigns against the Spanish army. With one army of hastily collected and undisciplined troops, which was harassing the country round about, he challenged to battle the most victorious general and the best soldiers of his time. There was only need of a victory on open field, and everything declared itself against Alva the founder of the Blood Tribunal of the Twelve, and of the tenth-penny tax. The hostile castles and strongholds then voluntarily threw open their doors, and the war was decided with one blow perhaps. There was so much to win that the Prince of Orange could afford to lose one part of that rabble shrieking after pay, which a few days later, nevertheless, he had to give up, because there was lack of gold, and because the whole country was being devastated, while it had not rendered any services for its monstrous costs.

But the Duke of Alva surveyed his position just as thoroughly, and by avoiding the battle he earned all the advantages of a most complete victory.

The inhabitants defended their posts as vigorously as this army which had been enlisted under the flags of the Netherlands proved to be inactive on the open field of battle. Naarden's chastisement, and the unparalleled cruelties which were perpetrated there under the eyes of Don Frederic of Toledo, had left no hope to the dwellers in the cities, threatened with a like fate, and forced them to become heroes. Unprotected localities like Haarlem, Alkmaar and Leyden, withstand all efforts of the victorious enemy seven months; fleets are built for their defence, and the very sea created on which these should carry on operations.

Such was the state of affairs under Alva, and such they continued to be until the death of Requesens.

The death of this distinguished man happened so suddenly that he did not have time to appoint his successor in the office of chief stadtholder. Thereupon the Dutch council of state took possession of the government, and it was actually approved by the king for a time. Of course, the most influential members of this state council were for the Spanish, but these were removed by force from the Orange party, the states were convoked, and immediately a circumstance happened which had the most decisive influence.

One phenomenon peculiar to this war was the military insurrections, which greatly crippled the undertakings of the Spanish generals, being at the same time more pernicious to the loyal provinces. They were the natural results of several simultaneous undertakings by Philip, who little by little became involved in quarrels with half Europe, and thus, notwithstanding all silver fleets, drained his treasury to such an extent that the troops waging war in the Netherlands received their pay most irregularly, often being forced even to demand it for three years. A necessary outcome of such a state of affairs was that the soldier was

forced to live by extortions only, and from the property of the citizen whom he should have protected.

Meanwhile, matters came to such a pass that the average man began to murmur openly, to refuse to fulfil his services, finally to drive out the officers as a whole, and under the command of an "eletto" from his own resources to wage a predatory war, at his own cost, no matter whether against the subjects of the king, of the republic, or of the German Empire.

Neither the personal appearance of the Duke of Alva, nor the severity of the laws, was able to oppose the mutiny. He commanded a few of the dissatisfied corps to be surrounded by the loyal troops, and fifty of the rebels to be hung on the spot. But there was soon need of a second army in order to check the dissatisfied army. Indeed the discipline in the Spanish army, which had become the first in Europe because of it, and which had the severest military regulations of all, fell so low that among other things Haarlem, when hardly yet conquered, was offered by the triumphant rebels themselves to the Prince of Orange for forty thousand gulden. The city of Antwerp was forced to buy off its sacking with four hundred thousand gulden, and the troops being contented with this, returned to their duty for a time with redoubled zeal.

But after the death of Requesens the consummation of the evil came. Several thousand mutinous soldiers took Alost and from this centre spread pillage, fire and murder over all Brabant and Flanders.

There was now issued by the council of state a formal proscription against the Spanish army, and the people were called upon to take up arms and expel the soldiers as perjured traitors.

This manifesto, sent out in the name of the king, was undoubtedly the work of the states and of the Orange party. It organized the civil war which was then waged with the greatest fury imaginable, and it forced even the most peaceable citizen to take up arms

for a cause whose last place of refuge up to this time had been Holland and the sea. The whole nation now for the first time rose against the Spanish army, and the Union of Ghent was concluded (1576).

All the Netherland provinces, except Luxemburgh, entered into this alliance, and the Netherlands then seemed to be lost to the Spanish crown.

But although the provinces had been united in name at Ghent, yet the factions which continued to exist in them had by no means been reconciled. One is able to distinguish three chief parties at this period. First, the Spanish, to which belonged some members of the noblest families and which was supported by the formidable Spanish army; then a second, which can be called the Catholics, whose seat was chiefly in the Walloonian and Flemish provinces, and which counted as its members the numerous clergy and the more numerous host of those held under the guardianship of the clergy; finally, the Orange party, the smallest, but which had at its head the only great man that the Netherlands possessed at this period. In the midst of the chaotic complication of interests and events, William of Orange continued to be fully conscious of his purpose, and neither the military success of the Spaniards, nor their cunning policy, nor distrust of his own countrymen, no alluring prospect and no mishap ever removed him one single step from the path which he had irrevocably chosen for himself. This party, to a certain extent insured by the geographical position of Holland and Zealand, did not then perhaps know so well as its leader what it really wished, but it certainly did know what it did not wish; it combated less for freedom than for liberties and privileges, more for property itself than for the security of the same. The Hollanders did not wish so much to be their own masters as to protect themselves from the tyranny of their Spanish masters, and thus, without a definite plan they acted more consistently than all the other factions.

In consequence of such disunion very little can be said of unanimous resolutions. And the proscription declared by the council of state was by no means sufficient to terrify the most riotous military force. The affair of the insurgents of Alost had now rather become that of the Spanish nation, and all soldiers that up to this time had remained true to their flag joined themselves with them. They elected a leader, erected a gallows for transgression of discipline, and then with great reverence listened to a mass. Thereupon the whole furious band marched against Maastricht, at that time a place of twenty thousand inhabitants and a strong fortress. It was stormed, plundered, and almost literally razed to the ground. The foolhardiness of the revolvers went even further. Antwerp, the richest and the largest city of the Netherlands, the most important in European trade, a stronghold which soon afterwards withstood a thirteen months' siege, was, notwithstanding the defence of the horrified citizens, notwithstanding the Walloonian and German garrison, taken by storm in one afternoon, pillaged, burnt, and given up to the most fiendish atrocities and debaucheries.

And still the allied provinces could not unite upon measures to sweep from the country this gang of about fifteen thousand men. They sought rather to accomplish it by the recognition of Don John as the chief stadtholder, and by the treaty of the "Perpetual Edict," according to which it was specially stipulated that all Spanish troops should vacate the soil of the Netherlands.

And to please the state Don John did actually perform this military-political comedy, that is, the troops were sent away to be recalled in a few months.

The governments of the Prince of Orange, Holland and Zealand did not assent to the new treaty, and although the "perpetual edict" after three months had outlived its existence, yet it had essentially annulled

the Union of Ghent, the latter continuing, however, in its mere form. This happened furthermore because of the alliance of the Walloonian provinces—Artois, Hennegau and Douai—for the preservation of the Catholic faith. All this finally brought the negotiations long fostered by the prince to maturity, and the Union of Utrecht was concluded and announced in January of 1579. Holland, Zealand, Guelderland, Utrecht, Friesland, Overysse and Zutphen were joined in one inseparable union, and mutually coalesced to ward off any attack from without. The cities of Ghent, Antwerp, and Bruges entered into the alliance, and the Prince of Orange, indeed under great limitations, was placed at the head of this new state.

Thus the Netherlands were divided into two parts, one of which returned partly of its own accord, partly by force, under the Spanish yoke, while the other openly renounced its obedience to the king, which in fact for the past thirteen years it had not rendered him. Therefore it was no longer Spaniards who were contending against the common cause of the Netherlands, but Netherlanders of the Walloonian provinces or Flanders, who were making war upon their countrymen in Holland or Zealand, and in truth they soon acted with such bitterness that, for example, they murdered all the Zealanders who happened to fall into their hands while accompanying Prince Maurice to Flanders.

But besides the political attitude which all the provinces united at Utrecht had taken in opposition to the rest, there was also the religious difference which formed a chief cause of division among the people of the Netherlands. This difference was bound, of course, to have great influence at a period when religion determined not only the future salvation of the soul, but also the entire present destiny, when opinions were judged far more severely than actions by fire and sword, and belief was a matter both of conscience and honour.

In consequence of the multifarious modes of communication by which the Netherlands were united to other countries, by sea with England and Denmark, by navigable streams with reformed Germany and Switzerland, they could hardly remain closed to the doctrines of Luther and Calvin. Furthermore, in the sober sound sense of the people, the reformation found a reception as much more welcome as the immorality and ignorance of the Catholic clergy of the Netherlands and laziness of the monastic orders were hateful and contrary to the taste of the enlightened active citizen.

The violent measures which were used against the spreading of the heresy as soon as its surprising extension had been noticed amounted to nothing. The heroic courage with which many confessors of the new faith died for this teaching proved their godliness before the eyes of the multitude, and Philip himself, who preferred not to rule at all rather than to rule over heretics, found himself forced to change the public burning of these heretics to a private execution, because a hundred new converts sprang from the blood of one martyr of the new faith. The inquisition was too late to nip the bud of the evil against which its force had been directed, and the impossibility of executing its sentences of punishment upon half the nation, resulted in its soon becoming as much despised as it had been feared, and in its surviving only a short time its introduction.

However, it could not be but that the reformation enrolled many members among its converts who brought little honour to it. Excesses like the image-breaking, which in a few days despoiled the magnificent cathedrals of Flanders and Brabant, and which made insolent and criminal mockery of things regarded heretofore with reverence and awe, such excesses and errors of the reformed mass injured the new teaching more than all the fires of the Spanish inquisition. The crime of the individuals was laid to the religion which they professed nominally, and since the patience which is so essential a part of the reformation by no means

attended it in its first appearance, it is manifest that that part of the people which had remained true to the old faith became more closely united, and combined against a doctrine from which it had experienced such objectionable usage.

The greater part of the provinces of the Netherlands having relapsed under the sovereignty of the Catholic King, the reformation party needed the protection which William of Orange had granted the persecuted sect quite as much on grounds of conviction and for the sake of the cause itself, as for political reasons. His clear vision recognized in the reformation the security for the continuance of the new state established by him. The Spanish armies could tear from him cities and conquer provinces, but no power on earth, in defiance of better judgment, could again chain the spirit in fetters which it had severed once for all.

In Zealand and Holland the reformed religion was legally recognized, all churches were given up to it, and every other public religious exercise forbidden, without therefore persecuting anyone on account of his opinion. Moreover a vast number of people of all classes, having been expelled from Brabant and Flanders, by the intolerance of the Spanish rule, fled to the united provinces, whose national wealth they increased by their property, their industry and skill, or under whose flags they fought against their persecutors.

If under these circumstances politics and religion were of equally great importance in bringing about a separation in the interests of the north and south of the Netherlands, business affairs in like manner produced a still greater breach in the divided nation.

The history of Antwerp is in general that of the commerce of the Netherlands of this period. Perhaps there is no city which can point to such a tragic destiny and to so many horrible catastrophes, from the time of its wonderfully rapid florescence until its sudden fall, as

Antwerp, which has become so interesting because of a new incident, one joined to those already mentioned.

Antwerp's prosperity sprang from the ruins of the world-wide commerce of Bruges. Emperor Frederick III. had determined to give this latter city, from the very beginning famous for its revolts and rebellion, a chastisement which would thoroughly cure it of its mania for freedom. He was completely successful in this, and while he kept its harbour, Sluys, closed for ten years, the entire levantian and northern commerce had passed over to Antwerp, where the Hanseatic league at the same time opened its office. Antwerp now grew in an unparalleled manner. It soon counted two hundred thousand inhabitants, the luxury and the products of all parts of the globe poured into its bosom, and what Venice and Genoa had been, what Amsterdam and London were to be, that was Antwerp in the fifteenth century.

The greatest misfortune for the city was the reign of Philip II., the intolerance of this same monarch, the arbitrariness which endangered security and property of the individual, were destined to inflict upon a commercial city where everything depended upon public confidence, wounds deeper even than the terrible but transitory catastrophes which happened later. These in the meantime were not wanting.

The city had begged the government for the Prince of Orange as the only one who possessed enough authority to keep the three parties of Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists in check, while all, with equal ardour, hated and were ready to attack each other. But when the Prince of the office of Stadtholder was called to Brussels, the image-breaking broke out in the city the same evening, and ended in destroying and desecrating one of the most magnificent cathedrals of Christendom.

The two visits of the mutinied Spanish soldiers were hinted at above. The first time Don Requesens

betook himself to Antwerp, but by no means in order to support the defensive provisions of commander Champigny. He rather let the rebels in, and then offered the city the choice between plunder or payment of a compound tax. The vexed citizens consented to this latter demand, and the Stadtholder who had paid his troops in such a convenient way, announced to them in the name of the king a general amnesty; a solemn mass celebrated the festivity, and the soldiers having richly rewarded the churches and monasteries with gifts, marched to the siege of Leyden after a revolt of forty-seven days.

When two years later the mutinous soldiers had illustrated in their doings at Maastricht what they had in mind to do with Antwerp, the terrified citizens thought that nothing better could be done than to increase their German garrison by about forty companies of Walloonian troops. On the esplanade, opposite the citadel, they built fortifications of sacks of wool and corn, on which men and women were at work. When the report had spread abroad that the rebels of Alost had entered the citadel, the city opened up fire against the same.

Here Sancho d'Avila was in command, and under him five thousand Spaniards were gradually assembled. The desire to have a part in the rich booty of Antwerp had brought them together from all quarters. Such was their eagerness that, despite the long march, no one was willing to enjoy anything until the city, was taken. And the same afternoon the furious troop rushed from the citadel to the fortifications. The Walloonians and Germans hardly waited to shoot off their rifles, took to flight, and left the new walls to the enemy. But the inhabitants of the city which even then had one hundred thousand residents, and which was so dear to them all, fought and offered a desperate, though vain opposition. Half of the city, went up in flames, and all cruelties and excesses which

in that age were wont to attend the storming of a city were enacted here in their worst form.

The booty was immeasurable. The exchange was converted into a gambling-house, and in one evening common soldiers gambled away ten thousand florins in *Landsknecht*, even then a favourite game. Yet in order to keep a part of it, others had their cuirasses and stirrups made of gold. But this robbery was a death blow to the business of Antwerp. It was a national loss, and the effects were felt throughout Europe. A large number of prominent families, with the ruins of their property, emigrated and fled to Holland, where they did not have to fear such an encounter with the troops of their king.

When Don John of Austria removed the Spanish army from the Netherlands, Alva had to surrender the citadel of Antwerp to the Duke of Arschot. Too haughty to do this himself, he delivered the key by his lieutenant, and the duke swore by the hand of Don Escuvedo never to deliver the citadel to anyone except King Philip and his heirs, whereupon Escuvedo replied: "God help you so to do; if not, may the devil take you, body and soul!" All present said "Amen" to this. From bitter experience the inhabitants of Antwerp had learned what an ill turn Alva had done them, when he ordered this citadel to be built on the south side of the city, from which source devastation had already twice broken in upon them. Therefore they petitioned, and were allowed by the city council to raze this hateful scourge to its very foundation, a work which all classes, and even frail young girls, took a part in, the completion of which the citizens celebrated with grand banquets. But they were hardly through with this when the Duke of Parma, who thought that a citadel was very necessary for the city, caused the same one to be re-erected for them.

The experiment which the Spanish had twice so successfully tried against Antwerp, the French like-

wise (1583) desired to accomplish for their own advantage. The Duke of Anjou, whom the Netherlanders had selected as a new sovereign for themselves, and from whom they hoped better treatment than from their Spanish masters, this duke found himself embarrassed by the conditions to which he had taken oath at the beginning. Therefore, under plausible pretences, he assembled a few thousand Frenchmen at Bürgerhout, not far from the city, and under the pretence of a review, marched with a numerous retinue to the Kipdorf gate. One of the attendants of the duke halted on the bridge, as if he had injured his leg. "*Jambe rompue*," was repeated by many voices. Immediately the French charged, killed the guard, took possession of the gate and the walls, and penetrated into the city.

Several days before this a slight rumour of the duke's intention had been circulated in the city. "A gate¹ may be easily conquered this way!" cried out a voice from the crowd, when the duke rode out of the city, and it was noticed that the courtiers wore armour under their jackets. Now the citizens rushed by one by one. The streets were closed with chains, stones were hurled down from the houses upon the heads of those who had entered. The number of the armed Antwerpens grew greater and greater, for they, schooled by terrible experiences, prefer to die rather than willingly to suffer pillage again, or in truth a St. Bartholomew's eve. Soon the French were in the most frightful distress. The cannon from the wall thundered down upon them, terror and confusion seized them, and even their own troops which continued to march in through the gate they had taken hindered them from retreating.

¹ The German reads: "So liesse sich wohl ein Thor erobern." *Thor* means both *gate* and *fool*, hence the play upon the expression cannot be Englished.

After losing two thousand men, the Duke of Anjou was obliged to relinquish the attempt to extend his own power, and the residents of Antwerp celebrated their rescue by their own valour.

Alexander of Parma gave the city the last blow during the siege, or rather during the blockade in the year of 1584-85.

The attempt of the duke to besiege a place of eighty thousand inhabitants with ten thousand men, separated as they necessarily were by a stream twelve hundred feet wide and without bridges, men moreover dissatisfied and no longer to be depended upon, and this too at a time when Ghent, Bruges, Dendermond, Mecheln and Brussels were not yet subdued, and the fleet of Zealand was cruising in the Schelde without its being possible to produce one ship in opposition to it,—such an attempt, even in combination with the enormous activity and endurance of the Spaniards and their general, could succeed only because of the weakness of the defence.

The circumstances, however, of this remarkable siege are too well known to receive here more than passing notice.

After Antwerp again passed under Spanish rule, the rest of the trade of the Netherlands fled over to Holland, and Amsterdam became the centre of the commerce of the world.

In addition to the increase in wealth which the Hollanders received from the southern provinces, the commerce of Holland increased at an unparalleled rate in consequence of a decree of the cabinet of Madrid, the object of which was to annihilate the very existence of this commerce. Philip II. had long ago forbidden his subjects to have intercourse with the rebellious Netherlands, but this trade continued, under the observance of certain forms and feigned names, to be of immeasurable advantage to both parties. Finally, Philip III. put those prohibitive laws into execution and

thereby forced the enterprising commercial spirit of the Hollanders to seek at the very fountain-head the products of the East Indies, which Holland had previously gone to the Spanish markets to procure. Therefore the Hollanders were able to deliver these to northern Europe at a vastly greater profit.

In the year 1497, the Portuguese Vasco de Gama had discovered the way to the East Indies around the Cape of Good Hope, and in this way caused the ruin of Genoa and Venice. Twenty years later another Portuguese, Magalhaens, discovered the south-western passage about the south point of America. The Hollanders now wished to discover the supposed north-eastern way for themselves and to use it, thus shortening the whole journey by a half. An unsuccessful attempt of the English did not scare them away; three small expeditions were equipped for this purpose, and the undaunted Heemskerck penetrated as far as eighty degrees of north latitude. When these new Argonauts, who had passed a frightful winter in that sea, hitherto unseen by the eye of man, had indeed proved the probability of a passage around the north of Asia, they at the same time were thoroughly convinced that this passage was impracticable for commercial purposes.

The Hollanders now determined in spite of all enemies to trade by the same course as the Portuguese, who were then a part of Spain.

Nine merchants of Amsterdam fitted out four ships for this purpose. This was the beginning of that famous East India Company, which, a few years after its formation, held command over fleets and armies, subjugated kingdoms and held sway over boundless territory.

Certainly such successes were only possible because of the decided pre-eminence of the Hollanders on the sea; but even this is one of the most remarkable events of that era, so rich in extraordinary things.

Need and despair had transformed fishermen and

seamen into pirates, their boats in privateers, and these privateers a few years later were metamorphosed in turn into a navy which attacked the Spanish flag on the high seas, destroyed their proud galleons and even burned them in the Spanish ports, in which they were seeking safety in vain. The name of the beggars' league was uttered with terror, and the conqueror of the Ottoman fleet in the harbour of Lepanto, from the banks of the Schelde, witnessed the destruction of his ships by the squadrons of Zealand. The Armada, an undertaking the like of which had never been seen until Napoleon's equipment in the harbour of Boulogne, perished by no means merely by the fury of the elements, but chiefly through the opposition of the Batavian-English fleet. And even in the waters of the other hemisphere the ancient celebrated flag of Spain had to yield to the youthful mercantile sea-power.

If justice requires it to be said that an unprecedented obstinate fatality pursued the undertakings of Spain upon the sea, on the other hand one must grant that no other navy, not excepting the English, has ever been able to exhibit such a rapid and brilliant development and such a multitude of great military achievements with so few resources as did Holland at that period.

Holland, a daughter of the sea, was invincible so long as that element could not be wrested from her. It was her origin, the condition of her continuance, her protection, her plague and her supporter.

Among other circumstances, the siege of Ostend proves how truly this was the case. It held at bay the weapons of the whole Spanish army, even under the command of a Spinola beneath its walls, for three years and three months. What an inestimable advantage for the young and feeble state!

Though the results of the siege of Ostend are less important than those of Antwerp, yet the operation of the siege on both sides offers a far grander and more

interesting theme, and when one considers the progress in methods of attack and destruction, its fame justly joins that of Troy and Tyre. One important fact was that the Spaniards, in spite of their gigantic efforts to cut off communication by sea, did not succeed, so that there reigned not only an abundance of provisions in the stronghold, but also the entire garrison of the same was able gradually to be discharged.

Even for the first twenty months this siege cost the Spaniards several millions of money and eighteen thousand men. Two hundred and fifty thousand shots were fired from twenty and fifty-pound cannon against the city, which, in turn, lost eight thousand men and replied with one hundred thousand shots. Finally, Spinola, with the sacrifices which cost another nineteen months, secured the possession of a stone heap, whose defenders and occupants had saved themselves in a new home across the sea, and he at the same time lost Sluys, a place of at least just as much importance as the one that had been obtained with such painful offerings.

With the loss of the sovereignty of the sea the united provinces of the Netherlands were also lost to Spain, and after a war of more than forty years, it now required the labour of three years in order to procure, not peace, but only a truce of twelve years, which, in the meantime, was interrupted to continue the struggle for life or death despite the complete prostration and impotency of Spain.

But now how different was the civil state of the Spanish and the united Netherlands. The provinces that had voluntarily or by force returned under the Spanish rule presented a horrible picture of such misery as arbitrary and bad laws, revolution and war can spread over a country. Agriculture was completely abandoned, there being lack of workmen on account of the emigration, and no one was certain whether he should reap that which he had sown. This resulted in

a terrible scarcity of grain, and this caused new emigrations. Business was depressed after so many heavy blows. On the fall of Antwerp it veered almost wholly toward the north, where it dared hope to find protection, and the privateers of Holland which swarmed about all the estuaries of the Netherlands completely destroyed the little that was left. Of course all factories and manufactures stopped, since the demand for their products had wholly ceased, unless, perhaps, one might reckon the Spanish soldiers as customers.

Thus the boroughs and villages were empty, the cities, ravaged with pestilences and deserted by the Protestant inhabitants whom Spanish intolerance had expelled, were like open graves, and packs of wolves roved over the waste fields once so blooming.

A glance at the newly-established state of the united provinces reveals a very different sight, indeed the very opposite of this sad picture. Its population increased for the same reason and in the same proportion as that of the Spanish Netherlands melted away. The emigrations which impoverished the latter enriched the former, and the business which perished in Antwerp flourished in Amsterdam under the protection of the victorious fleet. Credit was strengthened by sensible laws, and still more so because these were enacted. In a word, the united provinces, in the midst of a war in which it was a question of their existence, enjoyed all the blessings of peace, all the prosperity of commerce, and in the midst of the storms which were raging about them they established their sovereignty over another part of the world.

In this way the political, religious, and mercantile interests of one part of the Netherlands were separated from the other and became decidedly opposed to them. The lamentable contrast of the civil condition in the Spanish provinces with that of the favoured people in the north must have aroused the jealousy of the

former, and this jealousy passed only too soon into hate which two centuries have not been able to wipe out.

From this period the destinies of both parts really travel two distinct paths. The history of the Spanish Netherlands is miserable, their political life almost extinguished, and they themselves are only a battlefield in which other powers fight out their deadly feuds.

The reason for this was both the political position of the provinces and the great number of fortresses which they had, to their own destruction, planted, and which did not aid them, but Holland only. These were the bulwarks on which the great and numerous armies must first break their force before they could reach Holland, which, itself without forts since the siege of Leyden, Alkmaar, and Haarlem, has not been trodden by the enemy's foot for centuries. By the Barrier Treaty the right to garrison the most of the forts in the provinces of the Netherlands was formally decreed to the united states, and these were very truly destined to become the arena of their wars. Therefore, indeed, there is scarcely a spot on the whole earth on which so much blood has been shed for two consecutive centuries, and which has been so devastated by war, pillage, fire and pestilence, by physical and moral oppression, as this unhappy country.

Too weak to defend itself against its powerful neighbours, its foreign rulers have lacked power to protect it. Futile therefore were also all attempts to renew its trade, that chief source of its prosperity. With extraordinary rapidity an East India Company flourished immediately after its establishment at Ostend, but the rivalry of England and of the states forced it to dissolve again. And thus all other attempts have been of no avail.

At that time statesmen considered these provinces,

formerly so rich and prosperous, with a population equal to that of kingdoms such as Denmark, Sweden and Portugal, only as a make-weight which, if laid upon this or that scale, would be inclined to preserve the equilibrium of the states.

It is true that the Flemish had the intention of shaking off the Spanish rule, which was now so powerless, and of constituting themselves a free state, under the protection of France and the states.

Negotiations were also begun between Louis XIV. and the state-pensioner de Witt, who proposed to take this opportunity to divide the rest of the Spanish Netherlands between themselves. But they were broken off and the project was discontinued principally because each wished to have much and all proposed to give little.

In the year 1691 the Spanish crown offered the Netherland provinces to the states, as theirs by right and inheritance, because the Spanish did not think that they could defend them against Louis XIV. But William III., then Stadtholder, declined the possession of these countries, chiefly because he foresaw in the religious differences an unconquerable hindrance to assimilation.

So the Netherland provinces passed from the Spanish government into that of Austria, without having even bettered their destiny by that move. And thus we behold Belgium in its depths of impotency, while we shall see Holland mount the very summit of its power.

The influence exerted by the united Netherlands upon the affairs of Europe since the twelve years' truce is very pronounced.

After the expiration of this armistice during which, however, the war in India was waging, war was again kindled between Spain and the states. But at that time the weakness of Spain was such that even a Spinola was no longer able to arouse energy in the course of proceedings against the revolted countries.

The military equipments of the states were also very slight, and in the year 1628 moreover the Prince of Orange did not once enter the field.

However, it was in the year 1648 that Spain first consented to acknowledge the states as sovereign countries, in the peace of Munster (Westphalia) which was a document written on mere paper, despite the value which the states placed upon the event, not on parchment, and only signed with *Yo el rey* (I the king).

This struggle had lasted altogether now eighty years. Whole generations had been born and had died without having any knowledge of peace (in their own country at least), except by hearsay. And yet the desire for this peace was so feeble, that the conclusion of the same on Holland's part met with great opposition.

We have shown how during the war trade and industry had been elevated to the highest pinnacle.

Moreover art and science also were flourishing. The universities of Leyden, Franeker, Utrecht and Harderwyck were founded, and the masterpieces of the Netherland School, which still form so essential a part of the wealth of the picture galleries of Europe, are offsprings of that stormy period and the one succeeding.

To be sure, the state was in debt, but individuals enjoyed immeasurable prosperity and luxury. For example, in the case of the flower trade, a most decided contrast to the mercantile solidity of the Hollanders, they sold and bought such perishable wares as the bulbs of tulips and hyacinths at five and six thousand florins a pound.

If war had not become a necessity to the Hollanders, it was however a custom; they waged it, of course, with their own money, but with foreign blood, on foreign seas and in foreign lands.

But peace lasted only four years, when the Netherland navy set sail against England, Portugal and Sweden.

England, at that very moment preparing itself for

the part which it intended to play in the monarchy of the seas, did not mistake the dangerous rival which it had in the young state across the channel. England was already a formidable maritime power, the united provinces would become such in the contest which was destined to preclude them from it. But in spite of the superiority which the number and greater size of their ships secured to the English, they were unable by two military invasions to vanquish the power of the provinces on the sea. Under commanders like Wassenaer, Ruyter and Tromp, this power kept its place everywhere, was just as oft conqueror as conquered, and it even dared at the close of this war to pass up the Thames as far as Chatham, where it partly captured and partly burned the royal ships lying there. At this crisis in London they did not know how to protect themselves from the visit of the Netherlanders unless by sinking their ships in the Thames.

But while the navy of the states was playing such a glorious part, their land force had fallen into such a decline that the Bishop of Munster was emboldened to invade them with an army, and while they were threatening the queen of the sea in her capital, they were forced to call upon France for aid against the ecclesiastical lord.

This total ruin of the land force was partly wrought on purpose, and the reason for it is to be found in the jealousy which the magistrates had of the Prince of Orange.

That is to say, this family had scarcely won for the country its independence, before the country began to fear lest it should lose this through the family. With a kind of distrust which evinced little of the gratitude owed by the states to William the Silent and his family, the most of its members having sacrificed their own lives in battle for the sake of these very states, they carefully excluded the descendants of the family from all posts and influence.

The opposition to the house of Orange was represented by two distinguished men, namely, Oldenbarneveldt, the pensioner of the Council of Holland, and his successor, de Witt. Both regarded it as very hazardous to give the warlike descendant of William I. any power in governmental affairs; they found it advisable to keep the supreme power in various degrees of modification for the states-general (that is, the deputies) of the provinces, but chiefly for themselves as representatives of the province which was by far the most powerful. The influential body of merchants especially agreed with them as regards this, for they, mindful of instances like those of all the reigns from the time of Charles of Burgundy to that of Anjou and Leicester, certainly had no cause to wish again for the government of a single man. A few violent measures of Prince Maurice and William II. had still further injured the cause, a project of the latter respecting Amsterdam had miscarried, and William III. during his minority lost all that distinguished him from a private citizen.

The attitude of opposition of the Orange house to the people of the Netherlands was an extraordinary one, and in order not to spoil everything there was need of great moderation and circumspection, which signally distinguished the acts of the princes of this house. Their claims for a higher position were never established by a convention or a resolution. They rested merely on the great services rendered the state, and were therefore only the more honoured.

Since the Union of Utrecht each of the united provinces formed a perfectly independent sovereign state in itself, whose regents were the deputies chosen from the whole body of the nobility and the cities and appointed states-general. For general affairs of all the provinces, such as war and peace, taxation, treaties, etc., there was a committee of the states, the members of which were called the states-general, and these were very much inclined, although unjustly, to regard them-

selves as the supreme power. Besides this actually highest power, there was wont to be moreover a seeming one, that is, the office of the stadtholder although there was no longer a foreign regent that he had to represent. But the stadtholder outwardly represented the state, and through the lustre of his ancestry and his own person it was intended that he should inspire esteem in foreign powers. Generally, beside the regency over several provinces he united also in time of war the offices of general and admiral, because it was found that by the centralization of the powers it was possible to act with more strength, and at that time his influence indeed was very considerable.

Now, at the very moment the high magistrates excluded the Orange family from these offices and to a certain extent had even abolished these offices, there existed a strong and wide-spread feeling in their favour. For them were the remembrance of distinguished services and a vast following among the people.

Certainly, a prince fond of war must have been more congenial to the nobility, although they felt that they were very much in the background, than the corps of high-mightinesses, and furthermore the common man, accustomed to his earls and custodians from by-gone and happier days, loved the brilliancy and pomp of a liberal, princely lord, who distributed honours and favours, while the states issued the writs only for taxes and duties. The Orange party, for reasons conceivable, had a following also in the army, so far as there was such a thing.

Since ties of relationship bound the interests of the house of Orange to the royal family of England, de Witt threw his whole influence upon the interests of France. For this reason the naval force had to be elevated to an imposing position, but the land force to be diminished as much as possible. In this policy the mercantile frugality of the states seconded him. The appointments of officers in the troops still remain-

ing after a series of reductions, were possessed by the cousins of the burgomaster, and their whole duty was to spend their incomes and be anti-Orange.

But the allied states were of themselves about to undergo an experience, with less pain to themselves, which they could have acquired from the example of others in history, namely, how dangerous is a division of the controlling power in the state, especially at a time when powerful neighbours are ready to enrich themselves through the weakness of others.

Such a restless neighbour had the states *par excellence* in Louis XIV.

This monarch believed that he had certain claims on the Spanish Netherlands. To ease his conscience he ordered his council and some of the clergy to investigate these claims, and both found that they were well established. Moreover Europe's criticism respecting these was, that they could be better confirmed by cannon than on legal grounds, and the king also determined to lend them the necessary strength by the help of a considerable army.

De Witt purposely shut his eyes to that which certainly was easy to see, but which was destined to carry with it the overthrow of himself and his regime. He stoutly opposed every advancement of the Prince of Orange, he reduced the army still further, and he regarded himself and the state, moreover, fully assured of the friendship of France, when the storm did burst forth which all men conjectured must end the existence of the united Netherlands.

France and England, then the two greatest powers in Europe, declared war with the states; Sweden and the Bishop of Munster, and the Crown Prince of Cologne joined in this with a great force, and the Netherlands, hard pressed, abandoned by their allies, and overwhelmed with warfare, had no other hopes than in their own strength, and in the possible aid of remote Spain and Brandenburg.

The states made the most humble remonstrances, but in vain. Their humility was so great that England was almost constrained to find an excuse for withdrawal. The future conquests were meanwhile distributed beforehand. An army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, and at that time men were not accustomed to such armies, under generals like Turenne and Condé, with the King of France at its head, advanced along the sea (1672). Gelderland, Utrecht and Overysseel were immediately lost, Friesland and Groningen were in the possession of the enemy, and the floods alone hindered the French from advancing into Holland. The fortresses fell one after another, even the strongest, almost without resistance. Ostend, for example, was surrendered to the king in just as many days as it had years withstood Spinola. Louis XIV. saw himself in the brilliant light of a great conqueror, and selected the right moment to return to Madame de Montespan.

During the time of this unparalleled success a formidable English fleet sailed up on the opposite side intending to land and conquer the last spot in Holland where the independence of the states had fled for refuge. And the states had nothing to oppose to all these threatening storms but twenty thousand bad, undisciplined men, under commanders who had neither courage nor knowledge of war. And besides there were quarrels, as usual, in the interior, and divided opinions with regard to the measures to be adopted. It actually required all the power of Louis XIV. and a miracle to prevent the annihilation of the state. A double ebb, which lasted twelve hours, and a hurricane immediately following it, prevented the landing. This incident was very rare in spring and autumn, but had never happened, as on this occasion, in summer. Finally those on land had to thank the presumption of Louis XIV. for what otherwise they had expected to thank his generosity. The excess of his demands

drove the despairing people back to their own strength, and from this they were obliged now to expect their own rescue.

De Witt and his party perished in the press of these circumstances. This distinguished man, who, in addition to a decided passion for power, possessed all the qualities of a great statesman, together with his brother, the meritorious Admiral de Witt, was murdered by the mob in a shocking manner.

Previous to this the Prince of Orange had been appointed by general acclamation as Stadtholder and Captain-General, and these offices were to be henceforth hereditary. Although many conditions had been stipulated on the part of France favourable to the Prince in the proposals for peace, yet he declared, when interrogated, that the proposals were in every respect unacceptable, and that one would rather perish than agree to them.

The army was made up anew, and organized, and if William III. was not successful in his undertakings with this new army, great honour is due to him for having warded off a disgraceful peace by his firmness, just as he it was also who later, as King of England, again destroyed, at least partially, the threatening increase of France's supremacy.

The relations continued to shape themselves, without much action on the part of the states, more and more favourably, especially because of the presence of the imperial troops; and thus the Netherlands emerged from a conflict in which the greatest victory was the preservation of their existence.

The Peace of Nimeguen (1679) restored the state of the United Netherlands.

From this time on this state waged no more wars with England. Both countries naturally united against the threatening supremacy of France, and just as William III.'s ancestor a hundred years before had broken the ascendancy of Spain, so William III. of

Orange seemed now destined to check the devastating torrent of French tyranny.

Therefore the Netherlands soon saw themselves involved in new wars. The first lasted seven years, and, according to the Peace of Ryswick, the states continued in possession of all that they had before. But the war cost them six hundred million florins.

The second lasted eleven years. It was the celebrated War of the Spanish Succession. William III. died without seeing the favourable issue which the united armies of Marlborough and Eugene won by fighting. This war achieved its purpose on the whole, so far as the humiliation of Louis XIV. was concerned, and it would have achieved much more had not a quarrel over a woman at the English Court overthrown Marlborough in spite of his battles, and had they been as skilful in concluding peace as in carrying on war.

According to the Peace of Utrecht, the Spanish Netherlands (1715) passed into the possession of Austria, and the United Provinces received, by the so-called "Barrier Treaty," the right to garrison several fortresses in the now Austrian Netherlands. But this was all that they gained from their almost excessive struggles for the common cause.

Since the time of the origin of the state of the United Netherlands by the Union of Utrecht until the Peace of Utrecht one hundred and thirty-four years had expired, and of these thirty were years of peace, but one hundred and four years of war. These years were, moreover, perturbed by continuous internal quarrels, by wars in East India, and by the services given to other states. These had required an outlay of forces which seemed to be wholly out of proportion to the size of the state.

In the year 1672 the united Anglo-French navy which set out against the states consisted of one hundred and one large warships; these were armed

with more than six thousand guns, and manned by thirty-five thousand men. The States opposed them with ninety-one warships, together with sixty-five fire-ships and pinnaces, and they won the battle.

These were the greatest navies which ever before or since have been seen on the sea. Each of them surpassed in size the celebrated Armada of Philip II.

In the year 1673 the Netherlands equipped seventy-five warships, forty-three smaller ships with forty-three hundred cannon, and twenty thousand men; and when William III. reorganized the army, they put sixty-six thousand men in the field.

This turbulent and active period in the history of the Netherlands is at once that of their greatest splendour and their florescence. The very debts of the government, and these were the only vestiges traceable in the country, of so many wars were profitable for individuals. The abundance of currency was so great and the credit of the government so little impaired that it could obtain at any moment in the country vast sums at a small interest. Gold was so abundant that they did not desire to pay up the state debts. Such wealth and the gigantic achievements and vigorous efforts of the states had procured for them a position and an influence in the political world which little accorded with the marked disregard with which other powers, and especially France, took care to treat the "Merchant State." And if they charged it to the states as an insult that the latter claimed on one of their medals "to have aided kings, protected and reconciled them, to have maintained the freedom of the seas, and to have restored the peace of Europe," then the only occasion for it was, very truly, that so small a power had dared to tell the truth.

But the political greatness of Holland was an exalted position, one which could not last. The peace which elevated the other states produced the overthrow of this one.

William III., who reigned in England under many limitations, enjoyed in the Netherlands the most marked respect, so that the French did not without reason call him the King of the Netherlands and the Stadtholder of England; but with him ceased the male issue of the Nassau-Orange house, and the parties used this circumstance to remove the rest of the members of the Orange house from high positions and to re-establish a government without a Stadtholder. The result of this was the total ruin of the army. It is true that the War of the Spanish Succession, that most successful of all Netherland campaigns, happened after the death of the Stadtholder, but it was conducted with the army and all the arrangements which he had called into being. How bad the condition of the military of the Netherlands became is demonstrated by the ease with which the French in the new war of the year 1747 took possession of their barrier towns. In this year thirty-five thousand men belonging to the troops of the state were French prisoners, that is, nearly their whole army.

Business also declined, and the principal reason for this was that other nations were now carrying on a commerce with the East Indies, their shops and manufactories stopped, and the Hollanders thus had to withstand enormous competition. It further happened that while the states, in order to render France's dangerous proximity less menacing, had bound themselves closely to England, England itself, a no less dangerous nation on the sea, had increased its own maritime power by the ruin of that of France to such an extent that soon the navy of the Netherlands was no longer a match for it.

Thus after a long period of peace the United Provinces had considerably fallen from their ascendancy, and they offer little that interests our observation, excepting the internal conflict between the Orange and anti-Orange parties. The origin of this opposition coincides with that of the State, and its continuance

during the whole duration of the same manifests itself at times in open combat, at times in secret intrigue.

At the death of William III., who died without issue, all influence of the house of Orange was again lost, but the French invasion about the middle of the eighteenth century brought William IV. again to the helm of state by the vote of the people. The great likeness of the destiny of this Stadtholder with that of his royal predecessor, William III., has been generally noted. The one, like the other, was born after the death of his father, and with an unusually tender and weakly constitution. During their minority they lost all rights which their forefathers had possessed. Both married daughters of English kings, and in consequence of unsuccessful wars threatening the state with destruction, as well as of popular uprisings which broke out both times in Veere, both were elevated to the same dignity in the United States, which position was henceforth declared to be hereditary in the male and female line.

Still the opposition party was not destroyed. Under William V. it lifted its head with new power, especially in the last quarter of the last century, and it really continued to be in possession of the greatest part of the actual power in the state. Holland and its powerful, wealthy, and arrogant Amsterdam were the chief supports of this faction, which applied to itself the name of the Patriots, so as to show by this that their opponents, the Orange party, are not Patriots, but the opposite. The most open acts of injustice and persecution were permitted against this party; the hereditary Stadtholder was attacked in the most dishonourable manner, insulted, and overwhelmed with calumnious writings. Indeed, it went so far as to take from him the command over the troops in the Hague, and this Prince could not defend himself from such unlawful attacks and insults without arousing a civil war. Incited by the aid of foreign powers, and fearful lest the party favouring the Prince in the states

assembly could yet win the upper hand, the Patriots of Amsterdam in April of 1787 determined upon measures of violence, they changed the council in the said city, in Rotterdam and Utrecht, and ordered their troops to march to the aid of their supporters in those cities.

At this moment the Prince of Orange came out with a final declaration, which encouraged his supporters to appear publicly, and then it became very manifest that the greater part of the nation was for the Stadtholder.

The Patriots, although whole battalions of them went over, put their trust meanwhile in their armed civil corps, and in the protection of France, since they supposed that France would not have expended sixty million pounds in vain, which, according to the calculation of Calonne, was the cost of the Netherland matter.

But a speedy end was brought to these intrigues by the invasion of twenty-four thousand Prussians. The Patriots had stopped the Consort of the Stadtholder, the Princess Wilhelmina of Prussia, sister of Frederick William II., on her journey to the Hague near Schoonhoven, and after delaying her thirty-six hours had sent her back without many ceremonies. The king, her brother, who had previously abstained from all interference, demanded satisfaction for this conduct, and when it did not follow after repeated summons, he granted its originators a limit of four days in which to explain themselves. When this set time had elapsed without conclusive answer, the Duke of Brunswick, September, 1787, advanced with three columns to Nymegen, Amersfort, and Zutphen. Not turning aside to visit a French camp of forty thousand men, which was said to have been located near Givet, the army was before the walls of Amsterdam in a few days, which for three centuries past had not seen an enemy. The opposition of the Patriots was just as feeble as their arrogance had previously been great.

Amstelveen, which showed signs of resistance, was stormed. An armed frigate anchored in the Lek was called upon to surrender by a single bugler, and was handed over to the Prussian Hussars, who in the whole of their glorious career in war had never yet been able to boast of the capture of warships.

Rotterdam, Dortrecht, Leyden, and the Hague were occupied by Prussians, but the magistracy of Amsterdam had not yet thought of yielding. After the Duke of Brunswick occupied Oudekerk, and was prepared to bombard the city, he tried to gain time at least by means of deputation and negotiations.

After vain resistance, these men finally yielded to necessity, and by agreement the Leyden gate was occupied by the Prussians. The Amsterdamians enjoyed the strange spectacle of seeing foreign troops within their wall, for heretofore even Stadtholders on entering the city had been obliged to leave their feeble body-guard outside the gates.

So these disputes were settled with great moderation, and the power of the hereditary Stadtholder established on a basis so broad that it was hoped that his power in the future would anticipate such disastrous agitations.

But at the very time when the flame of revolution was kindled in Holland, there glowed a fire under the ashes in the Austro-Belgium Provinces. The rebellion which broke out a few years afterwards in this country was in many respects so analogous to that which to-day draws the attention of Europe, that a short description of the same from a practical point of view may well find place here.

Twice in the interval of a half century France has presented the great tragedy of a revolution, and both times Belgium has repeated these events on a small scale.

But it may be said that the Belgium copy was a negative, a revolution which was conducted, or at least designed, in a directly opposite manner.

What at the close of the last century France fought for, what it would destroy, was the very thing which men took up arms in Belgium to establish. The idea, the principle that toppled over the government in France, here sat on the throne; in a word, in France the people rose in opposition to the nobility and the priesthood which were then leagued with the monarchy; in Belgium it was the worldly and clerical aristocracy which opposed the emperor and people, although ostensibly only the former.

Can one who critically follows the events from the year 1787 to 1792 be in doubt by whom and for whose profit those agitations were started which devastated the country, and by whom they really were directed?

The changes undertaken by Joseph II. in his states, and these were soon called innovations, a term which has become odious, aimed to do away with bond service and compulsion of conscience by the introduction of a universal toleration. He improved the laws, the courts of justice, and all branches of the administration, presented his peoples the freedom of the press, abolished capital punishment, regulated the pensionary system and the police, encouraged agriculture and public instruction. He also severed the alliance of the friars with Rome, and suppressed those monasteries which had no schools, did not care for the sick, and whose monks did not preach; thus, in time, the number of monks and nuns in the Austrian state was reduced to about forty thousand. The final achievement of the French revolution after a long and bloody course, the great equivalent it offered Europe for those sufferings which it had heaped upon the world, that very thing this Austrian Emperor, to whom universal history still owes great honourable amends, desired to establish by the aid of his sovereign power.

And in a few years we behold the people in almost every part of his extensive empire rejecting with

armed hand those advantages which their ruler is holding out to them.

Joseph was forced to withdraw all that had been already effected and perfected by him in his reign; shortly before his death he destroyed his whole work, or rather he died because this had to be done.

It will be said that the time was too short, the people were not ripe, were not at the stage of development which is necessary for the transformation of a thing so long persistent in itself, and that is true, although but little development is required in order that a peasant should understand that it is better to be a landlord than a servant. And how was it possible, then, to raise the people to this stage except by this transformation? It will be further claimed that the Emperor, by the improvement of the system of the administration, concentrated the latter in his own hands; but was it not the people themselves that secured the most inestimable advantages in this way? It is obvious that the opposition came from that class which had to sacrifice a part of their privileges for the good of the whole, and when we see the so-called people blindly allied with this class against their benefactor, it so happened because revolution is almost in every case a surprisal of the popular will by a faction, and because that faction in Belgium consisted principally of the clergy. For this class in the Catholic Netherlands had known how to preserve for itself such influence as perhaps no country in Europe excepting Spain offered a counterpart, and which would be regarded as impossible at the end of the eighteenth century, were it not that we again find it undiminished at the beginning of the nineteenth.

The first tumultuous seditions broke out at Louvain in the newly-founded seminary, against the establishment of which the Archbishop of Mechelen had raised great objections. The young clergymen, regardless of their profession, broke windows and seats, violently

demanded better nourishment, among which was good beer, while others wished to have a purer spiritual nourishment taught.

Scenes of a serious aspect soon followed in Brussels, when the states of Brabant, on account of the infraction of the *Joyeuse Entrée*, their charter, to which the emperor had sworn at his oath of allegiance, had refused to pay the usual revenues. In a few places, it is true, the country folk had demanded that in the future their taxes should be paid directly to the emperor and no longer to the states, and, if one may judge from this, the average man was by no means so opposed to the new reforms as was claimed to be the case in Brussels. The result was, that the people were filled with a general indefinite mistrust both of the government and of the measures, to which latter those previously adopted were said to serve only as an introduction. Moreover, in many places this mistrust broke out in open resistance.

Nothing aided the originators and directors of these scenes so much as the remoteness of the emperor, who was at that time at the very extreme end of Europe; that is, in Chersonese. The Duke of Saxony-Teschen, Governor of the Netherlands, believed that it was necessary for him to yield to the general opposition, and he postponed the emperor's new orders until he should learn his decision more definitely.

When the emperor, on his return, received the first information regarding the things that had happened, his indignation and anxiety were not greater than his astonishment. He commanded the states to send a deputation to Vienna in order to explain the events that had taken place.

After a long struggle, the states were obliged to decide upon this embassy, but they wished it to be regarded merely as an act of politeness.

"In view of what has happened," the emperor said in addressing them, "mere coining of words is not

sufficient; there is need of deeds to convince one of the good intentions of those who have sent you. I daily furnish irrefutable proofs that the welfare of my people is the only object of my actions. How little I purposed to annul the constitution of your country you are probably convinced, when I assure you that you are to keep it at the very moment when you have committed so great a crime, when you have deserved my anger, and when I, notwithstanding, take no regard of the means which my power offers me."

At the close of the audience the emperor summoned the deputies to repair to him on such a day and in such numbers as they chose. "I wish," said he, "to inform myself, through you, and you will not refuse to hear me. One has never found me deaf to reasonable propositions; what you say will be without personal consequences to you, and so you may also regard that which I shall say to you."

At times the emperor approved the concessions of the General-Governor, but he remained unmoved in regard to the changes which he considered necessary for the country.

Indeed, if advancement is a necessary condition to prevent mankind from receding, so the institutions which exist for the present must not be reared for eternity. Just as nature rejuvenates itself from its own resources, so must human institutions renew themselves with the races, but this regeneration must issue from above, not from below. It must be the government which conducts the revolution in a lawful manner; not the mob, that play-ball of parties, that blind but cutting tool in the hand of passion. A government which recognizes and anticipates the needs of its people, whatever otherwise may be its form, will always be the most liberal of all governments, and stands, nowadays, at the head of the vast party of all reasonable people in all countries.

But because enlightenment serves only as a measure

for the strength of the parties where the people are very enlightened, so it happened that in Belgium the party of the classes had the control. At their head were two men who were at that time as celebrated as to-day they are forgotten, namely, Van der Noot and Van Eupen. The first, a man without talent and without merit, fled from Brussels because the government was dissatisfied with him. An accident brought him in contact with Pitt, and the interest which people took in the disturbances gained for him an audience in the Hague and at Potsdam. He promised his countrymen the support of foreign powers, which never came about, and he became the idol of the people through the blind favour of the crowd, without having justified this trust by a single act.

The second leader, Van Eupen, was a clergyman, who, more conscious of his aim, used the popularity of Van der Noot to advance his own interests. After playing out his own part, he was transported through the French to Guyenne; but his colleague died not far from Brussels in the year 1826, without the name of Van der Noot having again been mentioned, since his ephemeral appearance, during the following thirty-five years. The party composed of the classes now saw very well that the revolution was in their favour. From earliest times Brabant had been governed as a limited monarchy, composed of the sovereign, the people, and the classes. Therefore since the revolution now declared that the emperor, as Duke of Brabant, has forfeited his rights, the classes as middle-party, believe that they had become sovereign; thus the limited monarchy is changed into an absolute aristocracy.

But here they encountered the opposition of a second party, which, much smaller in numbers, counted as its members far more intelligent men. It was the party of the Vonkists, so named from their leader, Vonk, the lawyer.

Since this party demanded the old constitutional form of government with a new system of representation, in which the secular clergy, the smaller cities, the flat country, in short all classes of the people, should be duly represented, they announced themselves as deadly foes of the state party whose private interests threatened them still more than did the emperor.

Meanwhile, at the instigation of Vonk, an armed force of two or three thousand men was collected, whom Van der Marsch led in opposition to the Imperialists. Van der Noot, in constant hope of foreign aid, had rejected this procedure, and made it an object of ridicule. Notwithstanding, Van der Marsch drove the Austrian General Schroeder out of Turnhout with great loss, into which city people hastily followed after him; he also captured the guns on this occasion. Bruges, Ghent, and Brussels were gradually lost, and the rare sight was afforded, says de Pradt, of seeing the Austrian armies, which had as good a reputation as any in Europe, and which had been disciplined by the most scientific system of tactics, and in many places had been exhibited as a model, beaten by the Turks and monks on every side. The emperor found it hard to believe all these reports, and he could do nothing more than emphatically condemn the measures of his generals, "who," as he expressed himself, "attacked the dissatisfied as if they were Turks or Prussians."

Under the thunder of cannon and the ringing of bells Van der Noot, whom they called the Belgian Franklin, was conducted into Brussels. The procession passed under arches of triumph into the Gudula church, where the clergy scattered incense over this tool of their plans, and from there it marched to the theatre, where Van der Noot, in the box of the general-governors, was crowned with laurel by the actors.

But, however intoxicated such successes might make

the man of the people, he could scarcely fail to see the abyss which yawned at his feet.

The party of the states had always confidently counted upon the aid of foreign powers, but when every hope of such a nature finally vanished, this aristocratic monkish faction continued with wonderful persistence to deliver itself into the protection of France, which was destroying its aristocracy and clergy.

But France was willing to recognize the independence of the Netherlands only on condition that the states should be remodelled. Of course, this had so little to do with the plan of the plenipotentiaries that the matter was allowed to remain undisturbed. Despite all this, the press of circumstances led to new negotiations with France, although everything opposed the success of this step. The Belgians, who in the sedition were disposed to favour institutions which the constituent assembly was wrecking with consistent perseverance, believed that their natural allies were to be found in those who differed so greatly from them, and even the clergy themselves were constant in their belief that the French, who were then driving out their own monks, would offer protection to those in Belgium. Thus men are blinded by personal interest, and at this very moment we are amazed by an instance almost like it and accompanied by similar circumstances.

France, in agreement with the stipulations to which it had sworn at that time, submitted to the states the conditions upon which it was willing to grant them recognition. The first article contained the demand that they should elect a prince from the Austrian house, and this was sufficient to move the deputies of the people of Brabant to forbid an announcement of this same demand, "*sous peine de coups de bâton.*"

But the fact that after the death of Emperor Joseph, in February, 1791, his successor, Leopold II., offered conciliatory propositions to the states which were most favourable and agreeable, made it still worse.

The adherents of Vonk as well as every impartial person recognized the advantage that had been offered, and believed that it was a favourable opportunity for putting an end to so much evil.

Now, the more it became feared that these obviously simple reasons would carry their point, and common sense would get control, so much the greater was the demand that Van der Noot and his supporters should overthrow so formidable a rival, which began to be far more dangerous than the armies of Austria.

In doing this they now had excellent support in the clergy which absolutely ruled the wills of the people and which laboured with them, especially in view of this, the week preceding Easter. The Bishop of Mecheln declared that all those "whose wicked views smacked of the philosophy of the century" were enemies of religion and of the country. He blessed, on the other hand, in the name of religion, the stipulations which belonged to his regime.

Van Eupen proposed to have the volunteers of Brussels swear allegiance to the sovereign states. On the 9th of March, 1791, they were assembled in the market-place, and Van der Noot went there to take the oath. But three companies declared that they would swear allegiance only to the nation, and soon the rest of the companies went over to their side. All harangues, threats, stratagems, were in vain, and Van der Noot might have thought himself well off to have escaped under the protection of the Duke of Ursel. His arts were lost as soon as he encountered men with their own opinions, but this party was the smaller, and Van der Noot now sought refuge in the mob which he controlled.

The usual expedient was put into operation—a popular riot. During the night the houses of forty-one Vonkists were placarded, and on these placards it was written in verse that the houses would be plundered, burned, and their owners murdered.

The next morning the incitable rabble marched to the city hall, crying, "Long live Van der Noot!" where they were met by some members of the states council; and now, under the leadership of the capuchins and dominicans, they hastened to do the plundering, while their priests showed them the houses which were turned over to them in the name of religion and the fatherland. Abbé Feller sarcastically called this an exercise of the sovereignty of the people.

Meanwhile, the volunteers were assembled in order to put an end to these horrible scenes, but Van der Noot forbade them, in the name of the nation, to fire on their brothers, and when, notwithstanding this order, one company did scatter the mob, it was disbanded. The society of the Vonkists was from this time forced to disband. Since, however, these men were still feared by their opponents, the latter pardoned them for their having been willing to employ means to murder the Bishop of Mecheln, the states, the clergy, the volunteers, Van der Noot, and Van Eupen. All this was credited by the populace, and it was now only a question whether it was necessary to observe law in opposing the Vonkists.

The Jesuit, Feller, who has not unjustly been called an ecclesiastical Marat, believed "that this would be a ridiculous and cruel sophism," and that during a revolution no other law than *le cri public* could be valid. Still, the dissolution of the Vonkist party at Brussels did not end its existence; their principles were timidly announced by the officers at Namur. Meanwhile, the populace was kept in a good temper by the processions and wonderful sights that had been promised.

However, it will not be necessary to illustrate farther the sad picture of party strife, in order that he who has understood the recent events that have happened should be led to recognize the marked similarity in the origin and operations of both Belgian revolutions.

The Belgian demagogues up to this date had not deigned to answer the emperor's proposals for a reconciliation, and the clergy even spurned the intervention of the Pope. Abbé Feller found arguments for this action in the text of the sacred scriptures, according to which he protested that the house of Austria was in one of those epochs of decaying power, and the scriptures say of it: "*dominus locutus est super eam.*"

The congress of the allied powers (Prussia, England, and Holland) at Reichenbach, together with the proximity of an Austrian army, finally put a stop to the disorder. From this time on Van der Noot and Van Eupen buried themselves in oblivion, and the patriotic army disappeared.

But the Austrian rule, in spite of the greatest leniency and the most impressive severity, suited to the temporary demands, did not succeed in restoring perfect quiet, and the Netherlands, especially Brabant, were still in the most violent state of fermentation when the French armies marched across the frontier.

The Belgian people, which we have just seen engaged in a struggle against enlightenment and liberal institutions, could hardly have had an extensive intellectual kinship with their neighbours, the new French republicans.

But just as the term United Provinces, both in Belgium and Holland, had been in almost all periods of their history true only externally, so now also the provinces were wholly at variance with each other. For from the time of their existence these countries for whose conquest or preservation Spain, France, England, Austria, Prussia, and Holland had stood almost the whole time with sword in hand, used every moment to quarrel among themselves when no foreign powers were devastating their territory. At present Brabant took sides with the nobles and the monks, Flanders with the democrats, and Luxemburg was in favour of the emperor.

If this was the reason why the French drove out the Austrian army so much more easily, yet this could never have served as an invitation for them to annex themselves more closely to France. Still this plan was popular in the congress.

The deputies from several cities convened at Mons in February, 1793. Here a sermon was preached to them in the cathedral, and the speaker had hardly uttered the words, "Alliance with France," when the Jacobins, who surrounded the tribune, unanimously shouted, "Alliance, alliance." To be sure, a far greater number cried, "No alliance! Our own constitution!" But the Jacobins had been so foresighted as to arm themselves, and with their sabres and daggers they drove the evil-minded ones out of the church, and the vote for alliance was passed unanimously.

At Brussels also the deputies were now summoned to "consider" the alliance, an invitation which those concerned did not avail themselves of for good reasons, so that here the incorporation with France was concluded, and was proclaimed this same year by the congress.

Belgium, in company with France, ran through the whole scale of various forms of government, from the zero of anarchy up to the degree of military despotism.

Torn by factions like its southern neighbours, Holland also became an easy prey to France, for the anti-Orange party was only subdued, not exterminated.

France presented the Batavian Republic with a constitution for which it paid one hundred million florins, and which ceded the whole of Maestrich, Venlo, Dutch Limburg and Dutch Flanders, and lasted six years. Since, however, the Republic as a whole, in spite of all changes, was not successful, the regency of Louis Napoleon and finally incorporation with the empire were tried without bringing the Hollanders any cause to congratulate themselves upon

better times. Finally came the year 1813, with its historical events, so important in their results, and the entry of General von Bülow restored to the Netherlands liberty which they used to call back the Prince of Orange as their regent. In the year of 1815 the Vienna Congress formed by the union of Holland and Belgium the kingdom of the Netherlands.

The conditions under which the two parts of the new state were combined were very different.

During the time of the French influence, Holland had suffered inestimable losses. The Bank of Amsterdam, once so rich, was now almost ruined, its credit shaken, all sources of help on the state's part dried up, and the burden of debt monstrous. The Peace of Amiens was a misfortune to the country, and the Tariff of Trianon threatened to give the death blow to all that was left of mercantile life. The proud merchant of Holland did only a smuggling business with England. The invasion of the British and terrible floods seemed to complete the ruin of the unfortunate country, which, excluded from all the profitable trade of France, was obliged, however, to share in all its wars. Holland lost its colonies, its commerce, and its fleet, or, in other words, the sources of its prosperity and the means to make use of them.

And, indeed, Belgium also had to make great sacrifices under the rule of the French. The conscription, the heavy taxes of the *droits réunis*, were burdensome to the Belgians, and they were dissatisfied with the French rulers as they had been at all times with their own. But the union with France yielded great advantages to the class engaged in trade, and the Belgians also were not insensible of the military glory of that country, in which they too were participants.

So the defeat of Napoleon and his sovereignty was not unfavourable to them, but to Holland it was a necessity. What in the former case seemed desirable was in the latter a rescue from complete extermination ;

and thus the union of these two parts was viewed with very different feelings.

The Hollanders had elected from their midst a king for themselves, to whom they were closely attached by historical reminiscences and a common interest; and truly, if sovereignty is justly based upon legitimate inheritance or upon election, King William I. united both claims in his person. Belgium received its king from Europe, and from the first it regarded itself less as an integrant part of the new state than as one attached to the old state, and this very thing hurt its national feeling the more since it was greater in area and population.

Holland also was not without a party which wished to see the son of the last hereditary Stadtholder come into the possession of his father's place and under the same conditions. Only four hundred and seventy-five of the six hundred notables who were convoked for the adoption of the new constitution appeared, and many of these cast their vote only conditionally. Since, however, the conditions were not specified, the new regulation was passed by four hundred and forty-nine against twenty-six votes.

It is true that the title of king, as a title, could hardly be the object of strong objection, but what was most important from its very nature was this, namely, that each one who loved his fatherland and its history must feel how necessary it was to consolidate that highest power in such a way that it could ensure the country against the storms of party fury, storms that had so often and so long laid it to waste. But to those who feared danger from a too great extension of the supreme power, the new regent had already given an example of his sentiments when he it was that urged the adoption of a constitution by which all the rights of the citizens should be assured, and which he made the express condition of his acceptance of the sovereignty offered him.

When, now, Belgium was incorporated into the kingdom of the Netherlands, they extended the constitution, which was originally for Holland, with required modification to both countries. Sixteen hundred and three notables were convoked in order to vote upon the adoption of the fundamental law. Two hundred and eighty of these men, who had not been elected without governmental influence, stayed away, and seven hundred and ninety-six opposed the constitution; and of this itself the *Foreign Quarterly Review* says: "It is a liberal platform, and its mistakes, if they can be shown, are less what it defines than what it does not define." When one considers that the Belgians certainly had not been spoiled by constitutional treatment under the rule of the empire, these proceedings already give a proximate measure of the state of mind with which Belgium contemplated its *mariage de convenance* with Holland.

When, in consequence of this, the government crossed one hundred and twenty-six of the negative votes so cast on account of the religion of the head of the state, and then counted the two hundred and eighty non-voters as silently affirmative in order thus to secure a majority of eleven, it resorted to this strange kind of arithmetic only for the purpose of avoiding the public scandal incurred by a people that stubbornly rejected the liberty so generously offered them by the government itself.

The Belgians were greatly offended because they, who constituted two-thirds of the kingdom as regards area and population, should be represented by the same number of deputies (fifty-five) as Holland. Subsequently several bills were actually passed with a weak majority of two votes, in which one is pleased to see two Belgians in public service who, as the people at Brussels put it, were untrue to the interests of the fatherland. The Hollanders replied to this that the whole constitution was originally framed so that no

part should rule the other and be able to prescribe its laws, and thus the interest of the one should not be advanced at the cost of the other. Although Holland at the very beginning had voluntarily renounced a preponderance over Belgium, yet it would not have been wise for Holland to have surrendered to its new brothers that superior influence over it by allowing sixty-six Belgian votes against forty-four Hollandish.

We stated before that the national debt of Holland was enormous. It amounted to twelve or thirteen million florins. It is true Napoleon diminished (*tiercée*) a third of it by a stroke of the pen, but by this measure a multitude of individuals, of orphans, of the poor and minors lost all they had, and the king partly, too, in order to get credit for the new loans which were absolutely necessary, called two-thirds of this *dette morte* back to life. Now the debt of Belgium was very small, and when the Belgians saw that they must help to bear equally the Hollandish debt, they thought the unfairness of it the greater, when they declared that no equivalent for such demands could be found. The Hollanders, however, reckoned as such the indemnification of Sweden through the indirect surrender of several colonies and the abandonment of very considerable claims on several powers. They counted in this also Belgium's participation in Holland's colonial trade and the large sums which were applied for relieving the extremely depressed state of Belgian manufactures. The whole industrial and commercial business of this province was certainly elevated in various ways from the time of its union with Holland. Antwerp had attracted to itself so much of the colonial trade, that amongst other things the importation of coffee was almost equal to that of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Hamburg together; it imported almost twice as much cotton and exported the same amount of hides as Hamburg; and it was not without envy that Amsterdam saw the elder com-

mercial sister of the south, which had already once outlived its brilliant flower of youth, start up to carry off the palm of victory a second time. However, the Belgians themselves anticipated these fears, for they victoriously pursued business from their factories and trade from their cities. The state of their industry, which had been skilfully restored to a certain extent, was again terribly shaken, and the Belgian was right to expect great and bounteous results from the political renaissance, the coming of which had called forth such unspeakable misfortune upon his country, and moreover those who had forcibly led on that crisis were responsible for the compensation of their countrymen for such inestimable sacrifices.

Nor is it strange if Holland and Belgium believe they are equally justified in making demands on each other. If the dissolution of partnership of two commercial houses produces great complications, how infinitely much greater must these be when two great commercial states wish to separate their financial alliance from each other.

There was one other circumstance which contributed not a little in preventing a closer union of the two provinces, namely, that the lengthy separation of the individual parts, the continued influence of outside powers, and the lack of a mutual bond of national interests, had prevented the original native language from becoming the language of the whole people just as much as it had prevented the language of any of the neighbouring peoples from being more than partially used; and all interference on the part of the government in this respect, without the intentional opposition of certain provinces, was the more useless since such a union could only be the result of time.

Such were the conditions under which Belgium and Holland came together as one common state, and such were the seeds of dissension, which after this union caused an opposition to spring up against the govern-

ment, on the crest of which again figured an archbishop, the Archbishop of Ghent. For of all the obstacles opposed to the amalgamation of the two parts, there was indeed none so insurmountable as the difference of faith, an inexhaustible source of dissension, when one considers the mind and dependence of the layman and the lust for power and intolerance of the clergy in Belgium.

Forcible events, the result of those conditions, have at the present moment split the kingdom of the Netherlands again into two hostile parts, have destroyed the prosperity of these countries, just beginning to bud, and have again exposed them to all those devastations which have so often wasted them in the past. The torch of war which destroyed Antwerp again to-day threatens to set Europe on fire, and is restrained only by the sublime moderation of the monarchs, a moderation which appears the more brilliant in its glory, when it is opposed to personal feeling and family interests, when the sovereign controlling great armies, ready to strike, sure of his people's state of mind, nevertheless prefers the palm of peace to the laurels of victory.

Here no judgment ought to be passed upon an event which is so near to us in time, respecting which we cannot yet reflect upon the thoughtful appreciation of intelligent men of both parties, and in which, although there may be no trace of partiality, yet inherited principles may perhaps unconsciously be intermingled; upon such an event, we repeat, no judgment need be passed here. In case of historical events, the issue is a voice of criticism, and it is reserved for the future, perhaps the very near future, to reveal the result of the Belgian Revolution.



POLAND.



PREFACE.

THIS essay,¹ like that on Holland and Belgium, also owes its origin to the study of contemporary matters.

The field-marshal had special reasons for taking active part in the events that had agitated Russia in Poland since the latter part of the autumn of 1830. When a young officer he was on intimate terms with a noble Polish family, continuing the intimacy for many years, and again later, in 1829 and 1830, he also had the opportunity to travel, as topographer, through the exclusively Polish districts of the province of Posen in all directions and for months at a time. The strange life and customs of the Polish people, the tragic history of this talented nation, for which it has itself to blame, must have made an indelible impression upon this son of the German coast of the Baltic Sea, upon him who was the friend of whatever had come into existence through historical development, in the same manner as he, being a close observer of the peculiarities of the landscape, was certainly surprised and impressed by the melancholy monotony of the Sarmatian plains with their dark forests of pine. Besides this, the heroic struggle of the Poles against the Russians elicited his military interest, and Prussia itself had to send out four army corps under command of Gneisenan for the protection of its eastern boundary. These were reasons enough for absorbing his personal attention in the study of the literature treating of the country and the people—this literature has been superseded nowadays, of course. The views expressed by him in an article like this were the ones then generally promulgated and uttered by numerous personages who had acquired a very thorough acquaintance with Poland and its inhabitants, depending wholly on their own observation, previous to the year 1806, when a large part of Great Poland, together with Warsaw, was in the hands of Prussia for a decade.

One can summarize the whole result of his copious remarks as follows: that he purposed to show how all classes, all races, all religious bodies are ruined and bad fruits are borne under an unfortunate constitution, under a bad government, or under a government whose administration is hindered by a bad con-

¹ It was published by G. Fincke, in Berlin, 1832. In the year 1884 it was reprinted with omissions in the magazine "*Vom Fels zum Meer.*"

stitution ; but, on the other hand, how a good government and healthy conditions of state and society work for the ennoblement of all these constituent parts. Moreover, the occasionally severe criticisms in this article are to be explained by the point of view taken by the author, who wished to emphasize the differences between the relations existing in Poland and those at home.

Nor must it pass unsaid that the field-marshal has been moved to criticize this, his own work, forty years afterwards, on account of this same point of view. A prominent scholar of Polish history, Professor Caro, in Breslau, inquired of him in the year 1873 whether the book, "Representation of the internal relations of Poland, etc.," which he had discovered under the inexhaustible literary chaff heaped up upon the Polish question, was written by the field-marshal himself. The latter charily acknowledged his authorship, and added, "that he counted the article also among the inexhaustible chaff" ; it was mostly an excerpt from better works, and he should like to see it committed to oblivion.

If, in spite of this, the article is published again, it is because of the good reasons stated in the preface to this volume.

Moreover, the field-marshal himself in his earlier years was pleased with his work. In proof of this there is a letter of the 13th of January, 1832, written to his mother, which states that he is very much delighted on account of the favourable criticism passed by the critic upon his article : "He would not believe that this H. v. M. was a modest second lieutenant ; he thought it was a man who had already passed fifty years in looking about the world."

AN ACCOUNT OF THE
INTERNAL STATE OF AFFAIRS
AND OF THE
SOCIAL CONDITION OF POLAND.

IN no country has the character of the nobility proceeded so directly from the state, and nowhere else has the destiny of the state depended so much upon the character, the opinions and morals of the nobility as in Poland, because nowhere else have the nobility and state been identical.

At a period little accessible to history, when the Slavonic tribes flooded the plains of Eastern Europe and spread from the Black Sea and the Adriatic to the Baltic and the Arctic Ocean, hordes of Tartars poured in rapid succession from the regions abandoned by the Sarmates and forced this nomadic tribe to become a warlike people. Here, as everywhere, the men that had the means to procure a horse and weapons, and had the strength to use them, undertook to protect their newly-acquired possessions.

These possessions, the obligations imposed by them, and the personal authority which both imparted, became hereditary, for inheritance is as old as possession; both are closely related and are the first products of social communion. A class was thus formed which

one may call nobility or protectors, for in their derivation both words are identical. The protected became dependent on the protector, just as everywhere else; the latter grew to be the more powerful, he became privileged and influential, and entered into a republican relationship with his equals. Since, moreover, the military origin and the warlike purpose of this nobility necessarily demanded unity of command and of government, there originated that part of the monarchical principle which the constitution adopted later.

The nobles were in exclusive possession of all political rights; they alone formed the state. Poland was a republic composed of about three hundred thousand small sovereignties, each of which was immediately connected with the state, was subject to only the whole, and recognized no kind of liege lord relation or feudal dependence. No Polish nobleman was under the sovereignty of another. Even the servant, provided he was a nobleman, had the same political rights as his master, and the most insignificant among them entered the diet in the full enjoyment of that share of sovereignty which was equal for all without distinction. In this respect the Polish constitution differs essentially from the feudal states of the west as well as from the despotism of the east, and it is with amazement that we behold the earliest European constitution, that of the Celts, Franks, and Goths, continuing until our own time.

Those Slavonic tribes which, much later, of course, were known under the general name of Russians, received their first instruction, their religion, customs, and manners, their letters and a part of their language from the Greeks. The Poles, on the other hand, came in closer connection with the west of Europe, and at an early date both kindred peoples had taken a very divergent course, both in culture and development.

The idea underlying the mutual relations of the Polish nobility was that there should be perfect

equality for all and the greatest possible independence for each individual.

Starting from the principle that no free man can be taxed or governed contrary to his own declared will, all regulations of this nature, that is, all laws were required to proceed from the unanimous consent of all, but the objection of a few or of a single one was enough to prevent them.

One must, then, assume that those nations which submit to the decisions of the majority (and this is, of course, the case to-day, without which we cannot think of a state), that those, at least once in their history, unanimously determined to recognize¹ the majority as an authority, and that the abrogation of the necessary agreement of all must be the last act of this unanimity in order to seem to be justly established.

The Polish nobleman recognized his obligation towards the whole country; he submitted to the law, but the law had to be the will of all the nation. If he had yielded to the sovereignty of the plurality, he would have regarded himself as crushed by tyranny, and the principle of perfect equality was carried so far that the will of one outweighed the will of all, so that the "Yes" of an assembly of one hundred thousand noblemen in the election field was annulled by the "No" of a single one of their number, and the hand of one individual could seize upon the motive power of the machine of the state and bring it to a standstill.

We emphasize this right of the absolute veto (the *liberum veto*) primarily because, justifiable as it was in principle, dangerous in practice, and so disastrous in its abuse, it has at all times, nevertheless, seemed to the Pole to be the most sacred pledge of his independence.

But the more inclination and custom scattered the Polish nobility over its remote landed possessions, where each noble ruled independently in his own circle,

¹ J. J. Rousseau.

the more necessary was it to concentrate the common interests of the state in the person of a chief. But that same vigorous sense of independence allowed them to regard this supreme head, which in the last centuries had the title of king, and that, too, very figuratively, as the highest dignity, indeed, but by no means the highest power. Besides the splendour of the crown, the king had the right only to appoint officers, to distribute the possessions of the state, and to administer justice.

The occupation of the throne was dependent upon the election of the assembled nobles. If a few renowned families understood how to make the crown hereditary for more or less time in their family, the nation never delayed, on the extinction of these families, to make its claims good by election again.

Besides the elective king there was the perpetual senate, formed of bishops, woiwodes or palatines, and castellans, who, of course, were nominated by the king, but who (since Casimir the Great) could not be removed, and, therefore, have naturally preserved great freedom of power and independence.

The woiwodes (from *woy* = war, and *wodz* = leader) or palatines, were governors of a province or palatinate, and chief of the nobles of said province, whom they led at the assemblies, on the election-field, and in time of war. They had the right to fix the price of products, to regulate measures and weights, and they had their own courts.

Below the palatines were ranked the castellans, originally commanders of the royal cities and strongholds, non-hereditary burgraves. In their district they had the prerogative of the palatines, and represented them in their absence.

Originally the office of the castellans was transferred to the starosts. The starosts practised jurisdiction in the cities, and were invested with considerable grants of land as a reward for long services to the state

(hence the name). They were required to administer justice. But only one of the starosts, the one of Samogetia, had a seat in the senate, and this was an exceptional case.

This senate consisted of two archbishops, fifteen bishops, thirty-three palatines, eighty-five castellans; in total, one hundred and thirty-six senators.

The chief of the senate was the incumbent archbishop of Gnesen, as primate of the kingdom, the first in rank after the king, and even he himself was king during an interregnum, on which account he was also called *Interrex*. He was *legatus natus* of the papal see, and received princely honours, had like the king his own marshal, his own chancellor and numerous mounted lifeguards.¹

The king stood to receive the primate, and the latter had the right to remonstrate with him as to his government, and in case the king persisted in his course, he could renew these remonstrances in the convened senate, or in the imperial diet. By a bull of Clement VIII., the bishops were empowered, in spite of the maxim, "The Church abhors bloodshed," to vote for war, to sign death warrants, and to take part in all deliberations.

The senate provisionally passed sentence until the convention of the next imperial diet, shared the supreme power with the king, and never ceased to limit the rights of the crown, until the imperial diets deprived it of its own privileges.²

The whole tendency of the constitution was to make the important governmental dignities and offices no less elective than the throne was, and the oft-repeated attempts of powerful families to keep them hereditary were just as frequently defeated by the jealousy of

¹ Avec un timbalier et des trompettes qui jouent quand il est à table et qui sonnent la diane et la retraite. Histoire de J. Sobieski, par l'Abbé Coyer. Amsterdam.

² Solignac.

the entire body. This non-inheritableness of the palatinates, which may perhaps be compared with the more ancient ducal dignity of the Teutonic peoples, and of the offices of castellan and starost, made it impossible for an electorate, a peerage, or a higher rank of nobility, to be formed next to the kingship, and thus enable the kingship to fasten its root in the people.¹

It is true the king was the only distributor of the supposed many and important grants, but, inasmuch as he did not dare to remove again the men he had once chosen, the royal influence was actually felt less by those who were in possession of great dignities than by those who did not have them. Therefore the king was surrounded more by flattering courtiers than by dependent officials of the government; the former at any rate were linked to the interests of the crown by their expectations; the latter generally by gratitude. The important posts were gifts dependent upon the sovereign's will, to him who sought them, but property of the republic, in the eyes of him who had received them; and the bestowal of a post generally produced a hundred grumblers and one ingrate.

The ministers of the king were ten in number, and were ranked as follows :

The general of the crown for Poland, the same for Lithuania, the high chancellor for Poland, the same for Lithuania, the two vice-chancellors, the lord high treasurer, the marshal of the royal household for Poland, and all the same for Lithuania. These ministers had a seat in the senate, but without consulting powers.

The general of the crown was the third personage in the state, his power was almost unlimited, and was more extensive than that of the constables that have often been so formidable to the crown of France. In

¹ Rulhière, *Histoire de l'anarchie de la Pologne*. Paris, 1807, vol. i.

time of war the crown-general was wholly independent of the king, and was lord over the life and death of his subordinates.

However difficult it may seem under such circumstances, nay, however impossible, for a king ever to succeed in making an independent party for himself in the state, which might endanger the rights of individuals, yet the nation had believed it necessary to make itself safe against any such possible preponderance of power, and employed a method unknown in the history of any other people. This remedy was the "Confederation."

There is no mistaking that the oldest of all rights, the right of the stronger, that of might, continuously exercised its influence through the whole history of Poland, indeed it may be said it was legally established there in the sight of the people. We recognize its existence even in the execution of the sentences of the king, and these were executed by the armed noble upon the one condemned, who on his part seemed perfectly justified if he used force, influence and alliances, and if he summoned his retainers and lifeguards for the prevention of such execution. In fact, it had gone so far that if such a judicial campaign was repulsed three times, the case was allowed to pass for the time, and until the intervention of the republic.

We recognize this force no less at the assemblies of the nobility, in behalf of general councils or elections.

If on these occasions individuals or parties stubbornly dare to oppose their personal interests to the will of the nation, if persuasion, patience, and threats have no power, then it was by no means an uncommon occurrence, in case of the fatal *nie pozwolan* (I do not consent), to see a thousand sabres bared, and the opposition quickly ended by the overthrow of the daring opponents. This was the only method of procedure for the restoration of the absolutely necessary unanimity, but it was for the most part a salutary limitation upon the abuse

of the dangerous *liberum veto*, whose disastrous results were first brought to light during the last three hundred years, when these assemblies were represented by deputies, who refrained from such acts of violence. Thus the right of the stronger party is not so much an abuse as a necessary element of this peculiar constitution.

But the legal exercise of violence is seen in its highest potentiality in the confederation.

Unlike the established principle of other people, that regarded revolution as the greatest evil in the state, with this nation revolution was organized according to law. If in the republic any matter of interest was supported by a sufficiently large number, and it could not be carried because of the existing government, or because of the veto of single persons, those interested in it assembled in a confederation, solemnly joined themselves by an oath, elected a marshal, seized their arms and won their cause by fighting. The might of the confederation was their right, and, whatever was the issue of the undertaking, none of the participants could ever be punished or regarded as a rebel. At these confederations the resolutions of the majority were decisive, just as the confederation generally, was nothing else than a forcible carrying out of the will of the majority of the nation. The *liberum veto* was suspended during this dictatorship, which very often had no other object than the preservation of the *liberum veto*.

But in order that so violent a remedy for tyranny should not itself become tyranny, the length of the confederation was arranged previously, and at its expiration all its decisions became null; after it as before, only that which had been unanimously passed, continued to be legal, and each confederation ended with the convocation of an imperial diet.

Although the king and senate together exercised supreme power in the state, the real sovereignty

resided in the collective body of the nobility, which could make its will legally valid in opposition to both at the imperial diet, provided it was united in itself, or by means of a confederation (*rokosz*). In case the throne was vacant it recovered its transferred rights, examined the use of this power under the previous regent, and consigned it to a new ruler.

The assemblies in the palatinates or state diets preceded the imperial diet by six weeks, where those subjects were agitated and prepared which were to be decided at the general assembly of the nation. The most violent and most sanguinary scenes could hardly be avoided here where the judges of the two tribunals, and furthermore the provincial deputies, were nominated, and where each nobleman of the province appeared in person, armed and mounted.

The king was bound to convoke the imperial diet every two years. If he omitted it, the nation had the right to convene. The diet elected a marshal, who had great influence upon affairs. All deliberations took place publicly, or with open doors, and in this diet resided the highest legislative power, based on the condition of unanimity of votes.

The affairs of individuals, on the other hand, were settled by a majority vote, and by summary proceedings. Advocates and defenders were unknown. The interested parties presented their own case, and the decisions were made without delay or expense. It is characteristic that the same men deliberated in the senate, made the laws in the imperial diet, pronounced sentence in the tribunal, and wielded the sword on the battlefield. For the noble who possessed all honours and all privileges in the state, believed also that the whole protection of the same devolved upon him.

Poland is the only European state that even as late as the sixteenth century had no other military force than the armed and mounted nobility. The infantry was not worthy of consideration. The only distinction

was between hussars and mailed horsemen. The former were the more numerous, and young noblemen had to serve in this corps, in order to qualify themselves for governmental honours. Then, hussars and their armour were very different from what is at present understood by that name. They wore a helmet and cuirass, with a tiger skin thrown over it, carried lances fifteen feet long, adorned with a pennant, two pistols, and two sabres, one of which was fastened to the saddle. The hussars first exchanged the lance for the musket after Sobieski's time.

The cavalry was composed of the flower of the nobility, it was splendidly mounted, and numbered forty thousand men.

The mailed horsemen were somewhat inferior. They wore a shirt of mail made of scales or rings, and generally formed the life guards of the high officials, the bishops and archbishops.

All these soldiers called themselves *towarczycz*, that is, brothers, and they were so addressed by their kings themselves.

In times of emergency Poland exhibited an extraordinary spectacle; noblemen, numbering between 150,000 and 200,000, were mounted and formed an immense but disorganized army. Such meetings were called *pospolite ruszenie*.

A splendid characteristic of this military nobility was the simplicity of its life. Each noble passed the greater part of the year on his estates; there he spent his income, practised an extensive hospitality which seems to be of Asiatic origin, and kept himself remote from, and independent of the court. The wealth which the nobleman obtained from his subjects returned also to them. A few settles, tables, and carpets, formed the furniture of the richest palatines. The women were unacquainted with luxury, and held aloof from interference in political matters, which was afterwards by no means the case. Good armour and excellent houses

were the sole splendours of the men. Their dress had an Asiatic appearance. They wore long mantles trimmed with fur, with slashed sleeves and wide belt, fur caps, curved sabres and half boots. Like the Tartars they shaved off all their hair excepting a tuft which was left standing on the crown of the head.¹

The ancient Poles practised great tolerance. They took no part in all the religious feuds which devastated Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.² Calvinists, Lutherans, Greeks, Schismatics and Mohammedans long lived peacefully in the midst of them, and for a long time, and not without reason, Poland was called the "Promised Land" of the Jews.

Yes, the Poles made their kings swear to tolerate all sects in the *pacta conventa*. When Henry of Valois sought to avoid this oath, the crown-general declared to him frankly, "Si non iurabis, non regnabis."

However, the Poles were exceedingly strict in the observance of the external ceremonies of the Church. From the very beginning, Christianity seemed to them too gentle. They inflicted upon themselves severer privations, they added to the fasts of Fridays and Saturdays those of Wednesdays and Septuagesima. The popes themselves abolished some of the severe penances which the Poles practised.

In their intercourse with one another, the nobility manifested great cordiality and frankness, far removed from subordination to the more powerful or the richer.

Their needs were so few that poverty was not yet

¹ Cromer (p. 73) declares that this fashion was imposed by Pope Clement II., when he released the monk Casimir from his vow in order to place him on the Polish throne 1041, and from that time until this it has been conscientiously followed.

² La Pologne n'a vu dans son sein ni conspiration des poudres ni St. Barthélemi ni sénat égorgé ni rois assassinés ou sur un échafaud ni des frères armés contre des frères ; c'était le pays où l'on a brûlé le moins de monde pour s'être trompé dans le dogme. La Pologne cependant était barbare—ce qui prouve qu'une demi-science est plus orageuse que la grossière ignorance. (L'Abbé Coyer, Livre I.)

classed with dependence. All intercourse bore the stamp of the original equality of all noble men. The term of address was "Brother" (*brat*), and it is still employed. There were no titles¹ nor outward distinctions. The Czartoryiski, the Sangusko and Wisniowiecki were the only houses recognized as princely, which at the union of Lithuania with Poland came over to this republic, contrary to the spirit of the constitution. Orders and decorations of such a nature were arbitrary grants of the monarchs, which were introduced first under Augustus II. and Poniatowski and were never valued.² The position in the state alone showed the rank of the nobleman.

In consequence of these many excellent qualities of its citizens, the republic maintained, not only its existence in the very midst of states which were rapidly developing and were constantly being subjected to the will of their sovereigns, hence constantly, acting with greater unity; but by this primitive simplicity in its arrangements, by the unbounded respect for the rights of the individual and for the advancement of the whole, made necessarily difficult by this regard for the individual, it also reached a high degree of power, influence and distinction, and it may be claimed that in the fifteenth century Poland was one of the most civilized states in Europe. But, naturally, with a constitution so deficient and imperfect, as was this of the republic, the virtues of the citizens had to make up the great supplementary half and to supply good customs for a lack of good laws. Along with the advantages of higher civilization crept in also luxury, corruption and

¹ Les titres de marquis et de comte s'y sont introduits avec les cuisiniers français. Il n'y en a que pour des valets et de flatteurs. (L'Abbé Coyer, Histoire de J. Sobieski.)

² Augustus II., founded the order of the white eagle in the year 1705, during the war with Sweden. The order of St. Stanislaus, 1765, and of the Military Honour-roll, 1791, date from Stanislaus Augustus Poniatowski.

all the vices which seem to be inseparable from it, and the moment the administration of the government ceased to be based on the proper qualification of the individual, it necessarily followed that the incompetency of the laws and the difficulty of their execution, allowed monstrous abuses also to creep into all branches of the administration. The ancient laws continued, but the customs were changed, and as no law can be maintained in opposition to customs, these continued to exist only as forms to which a new interpretation was given, a misfortune for which the constitution had no remedy, because it abolished the constitution itself.

Contrary to the fundamental principle of the constitution, "The perfect equality of the rights of all the citizens of the state," there gradually grew up an immense difference in wealth, and thereby a real inequality among the possessors of the same.

The king's favour had often heaped upon one head important government positions and rich *starosties*, had often rewarded son and grandson with them, and thus single families had kept these properties for a long time, although not as inheritances. More or less careful economy, marriages, hereditary successions, in short, luck and cleverness had amassed in some families altogether disproportionate wealth, while others less fortunate sank to the lowest poverty through their own extravagances, or even their own virtues. Accordingly, wealth was no longer a mere reward to which the king elevated the most deserving, it was independent property which became hereditary.

There were Polish noble families which possessed estates far surpassing many a sovereignty in area at that time. Thus, centuries before, contrary to the spirit of the constitution, the Radziwills had established an entail in their family, so that the head of this house became the most powerful private individual perhaps in Europe. He had a retinue of some hundred nobles, possessed several fortresses and maintained six thousand

body-guard. The Oginski, the Czartorinski, the Tarlo, the Zamoyski, Lubomirski, Pototski and others were hardly less powerful and wealthy. When one reflects that the recognition of law must be accomplished by armed force, one understands that it was not an easy task to obtain justice from such citizens in the state.

The complication itself, attendant upon these immense fortunes in almost all parts of the country, tended to increase the influence of the wealthy families. The greater part of the landed estates were mortgaged for comparatively small sums. With the increasing value of the property and the constantly decreasing value of capital resulting from the interest on the money, the redemption of the mortgaged property would have been the greatest misfortune for the holder, and the payment of the sum would have caused his ruin. In this way a great number of smaller land-owners depended wholly on the nobles, and secured their own prosperity only by an unconditional alliance with the interests of the latter. But while a small part of the nobility amassed immense wealth, a far greater number lost all their possessions. These impoverished noblemen were now hospitably received by the chiefs of the powerful families. They made for the latter a princely household and, indeed, one thoroughly military, they received arms, horses, shelter and support from their liege lord, and in return they gave their vote at the diet and their support in many and almost uninterrupted quarrels.

This boundless hospitality was wholly commensurate with the immense wealth of the possessors. Moreover, the large number of poor, dependent *szlachcziz*¹ was of vast importance to the great lords, and frequently not only their influence, but also their welfare and their personal safety depended on the number and the bravery of those whom they commanded. They

¹ Noblemen.

were always needing this small army of valorous men who had nothing but their lives to lose. Sometimes it was to recapture a rebellious castle or a city, sometimes to evade the execution of a sentence; to-day a lengthy suit had to be settled by the shorter course, by force; to-morrow a restless neighbour had to be threatened. But more especially was it at the imperial diet, where the interests of the individual as well as those of the community were dealt with on the basis of wealth, power, and influence. There the retinue of noblemen derived a double importance through their vote and their sword, for this latter was almost always called upon at the last moment; and it was looked upon as a significant sign of the progress of civilization, that only ten nobles were killed at the assembly of the nobles in the year 1764.¹

Accordingly, in Poland a higher or lower nobility was never known, and one sees to-day, for the first time, Polish families assuming ducal titles which their fathers would have scorned and which are inconsistent with their whole national history. Power, distinction, and wealth established no political privileges or higher position, and the poorest nobleman relinquished none of his claims because of poverty. It reveals, rather, how stubbornly the poor nobleman had to hold on to a constitution which valued him according to his birth alone. The *liberum veto* gave weight to the least of them, and the imperial diet gave him the opportunity to make this good. Indeed, one instance is not wanting when such an insignificant, poor, and, what is more, hunch-backed *szlachczi*, to his own astonishment, saw himself elevated to the throne, because the powerful parties were unable to agree upon their candidates.

Therefore, however great might be the dependence of the poor noble upon his host or master, their positions coincide at this point, namely, in the least of his clients

¹ Rulhière, Histoire de l'anarchie de la Pologne.

the latter had to honour his equal whose personal opposition could be used against him and his entire party ; and in each individual of the people he had to respect the sovereignty of this very same people.

That wide gulf between the classes, that severity in the intercourse between superiors and subordinates had thus never been developed in Poland as in other countries. Even to-day, one recognizes in the humble, flattering politeness of the poor nobleman, who has been degraded perhaps to a servant, the suppressed feeling of his equality of birth, and in the dignified benignity of the great, a kind of patriarchal protection and recognition of even the most inferior. But this democracy of the nobility in Poland caused the monarchy to degenerate into aristocracy and the aristocracy into an oligarchy.¹

One of the primary causes of the fall of the republic was, furthermore, the continual decrease of the royal power in the state.

In all the countries of Europe royal authority has progressed more or less rapidly, but always continuously ; in fact, in some it has reached such a point that it has destroyed all other authority about it and has not balanced with the rights of the people, until the most violent reactions have occurred. The Polish regents, on the contrary, could never gain enough influence to preserve peace at home, much less to exercise influence abroad. It could hardly be otherwise with the election of monarchs. Concessions made for the benefit of the electors and not infrequently to the disadvantage of the community, but always at the loss of the one elected, were only too often the steps to the throne or the means to keep one's self upon it. For this throne, the only office in the state which could be filled by a foreigner, was from the very first the alluring prize for service, ambition, favour, and intrigues.

¹ Ferrand, Histoire du démembrement de la Pologne.

The influence which the Roman Curia under Boleslaw II., 1058, gained over the kingdom was already disastrous. Still more disastrously ended the fruitless conflict between Casimir the Great, in 1366, and the senate, which represented the pretensions of the nobility against the crown, in order that it in turn might be supported by the nobles. The nobility became more independent as the senate became more powerful. Both, however, could happen only at the expense, on the one side, of the kingdom, on the other, of the peasantry. Yet I shall speak of this afterwards.

The Jagellons had deserved well from the republic for uniting to it so valuable a province as Lithuania. This house also produced several distinguished men, and the throne was kept in the family, by election of course, for centuries.

At the death of the last Jagellon, however, in the year 1573, at the very time when Hungary and Bohemia allowed their elective franchise to be wrested from them by their kings, when Sweden renounced the same right in favour of its kings, Poland renewed the elective franchise in its fullest scope. At the very time when European monarchs were depriving the great feudal lords of the administration of justice, the Polish kings were deprived of this right by the nobles. And at the very time when the people in Denmark legally transferred unlimited power to their king, the nobles in Poland destroyed almost the last traces of royal sovereignty.

Henceforth no claimant to the throne had the favour of the multitude to such a degree that considerable opposition did not take place. The more violent the means used to destroy this or the more gigantic the sacrifices to gain it, so much the weaker and insecure the position of the monarch was sure to become. For the nobility began to regard it as a prerogative of their rank to make laws which they did not obey, and to appoint kings whom they did not serve.

The personal settlement of the law-suits was of itself impossible for the kings, because of the vastness of the country.¹ During the long wars of Stephan Batory, this right, or this duty, was lost altogether. The nobles made themselves arbiters of their own contests. Tribunals were formed to administer the laws, which lasted fifteen months, and since the members were not appointed by the king, but were elected by the nobility of the province itself, these courts were only too often made instruments for political purposes. As the position of judge imparted to the most insignificant vast influence over the affairs of the most powerful in the province, one conceives how these elections and the very privilege conferred by them must have become a wide field for intrigue and violence.

In the year 1578, the right to confer nobility was also taken from the kings and given to the diet.

The kings had no part at all in the legislation; in fact, the laws were made when there was no king in the land, namely, at the interregnum. As soon as the throne was vacant at the death of the monarch, and before the diet proceeded to a new election, the nobles of the province assembled, in order to examine the enactments of the king and the senate during the last regency. The arrangements that had been made during this time could be abolished, and new ones proposed, which were legal as soon as the diet passed them unanimously. This unanimity however was never easy to secure, and often only so when it abolished an enactment which might become specially dangerous to the individual rights or lessened the authority of the crown. For from the very first the Poles have been much more jealous of a power which sprang up in the midst of them than of a foreign one; and so it happened that the Polish noble still claimed his own personal independence, after that the freedom of the

¹ "Ils n'ont fait qu'un juge de moi," said Henry of Valois.

state had already been lost. Therefore, although a king might labour for the extension of his power, his successor always had to begin the work anew.

The king saw himself excluded from the administration, and the most urgent circumstances were not sufficient to justify his own independent action without the advice of the senate. This senate¹ deprived the king of the right to declare war and conclude peace. An offensive war was contrary to the constitution, and was actually almost an impossibility, according to the organization of the state. By law the nobles were not allowed to be under arms longer than three weeks, nor to bear them further than three hours over the boundary. In case of a hostile invasion there was war, of course, but it was waged by the woiwodships most concerned in it on their own account, and often without aid from the crown. Afterwards Poland was forced to maintain a standing army like all its neighbours, and this was not under the immediate command of the king. He nominated a crown-general for Poland, and one for Lithuania, but he could not remove them. Nor were they by any means obliged to fix a definite part of the state's revenues for the support of this army; the subsidies were granted from one diet to another, and were most irregularly paid. Therefore the troops continued to be on the lowest grade of mediocrity, and they were less inclined to give support to the kings, since many a noble at times had more life-guards than the crown had soldiers.

If we add to this the measure passed after the year 1572, by which the elections were no longer to be held by the deputies of the palatines, but by a personal meeting of all the noblemen, thus becoming dependent on bribery and violence; by which all taxes were abolished for a definite duty on property-owners, and the king was not allowed to retain any starost's

¹ Compare Ferrand, Histoire du démembrement de la Pologne.

offices for himself, but had to confer them all for life and irrevocably, it becomes manifest that a king excluded from legislation, without domains, without private property, and without fixed revenues, surrounded by permanent government officers and removable judges, in short, without any real power, could not exercise any influence in his own state except by means of bribery, intrigue, and party-spirit.

The senate¹ also was deprived of its sovereignty, and the deputies of the nobility took to themselves the supreme control. The ascendancy of the nobility kept increasing gradually. The nobles alone occupied all the government offices, the high religious benefices were reserved for them, they filled exclusively the judicial positions, and were perfectly free from all taxes, duties, revenues, etc. The nobleman seized upon the jurisdiction over the peasantry, and wrested from the crown the statute: *Neminem captivabimus*," according to which no nobleman could be arrested without being first convicted; a law assuring him perfect freedom from punishment. It is not surprising that murder was at first not very severely punished in a country like Poland. Every nobleman wore the sabre, and knew too that he wore it to protect himself. Murder was paid for by a fine, life-money (the *Mandebode* of the Scandinavians). For a nobleman the fine was sixty marks (about nine hundred Rhenish florins); for one not long ennobled, thirty marks; for a magistrate or soldier, fifteen marks; for a peasant, ten marks, six of which went to the widow and children, four to the master. (Const. 1547, Vol. i. fol. 7.) This valuation was only according to birth. The murder of

¹ What Blackstone says of the long parliament is perfectly true here: When the houses assumed the power of legislation, in exclusion of the royal authority, they soon after assumed likewise the reins of administration, and in consequence of the united power, overturned both church and state, and established a worse oppression than any they pretended to remedy.

a priest, although he were a bishop, according to these conditions could be atoned for by only ten marks. But when one considers that this law and these taxes for human life were continued until the year 1768, one conceives that a Polish nobleman with a fortune like that of the Radziwills or Oginskys could enjoy seeming impunity for murders. It is true that Matthias Corvin had declared capital punishment to be the penalty for murder, but Casimir the Great had it again abolished. In Lithuania also capital punishment was decreed, but the murder had to be proved by six witnesses, two of whom were nobles.¹

They utterly bound the hands of the regent at last when they made him swear to the *pacta conventa* to which a new limiting article was added at every interregnum.

Another chief evil which injured the republic was the misuse of the *liberum veto*, a thing always dangerous in itself, which had become a law since the year 1652 and was called by the Poles *unicum et specialissimum ius cardinale*, a law presupposing that every individual knew what was right and desired to do it.

In early times there were few occasions when it was necessary for the corporation of nobles who joined the nation to assemble.

But the more the republic increased in size and importance, the more it came in contact with the outside world the more frequently such necessary decisions upon general matters of interest had to be made. And when at last Poland yielded to the necessity of maintaining a standing army, though unwilling permanently to set aside the sums required to keep this powerful instrument of unlimited power always dependent upon

¹ Jekel, Part III.: and besides this punishment for murder, there was among others a law: Whoever reproaches anyone for not being noble (that is, for having pretended nobility) without being able to prove it, shall be flogged in Lithuania, and lose his head in Poland. (Const. 1633, Fol. 806.)

it, then a more frequent convocation of the nobility became urgently necessary.

In the year 1467, for the first time, this obliged the imperial diet to be represented by provincial deputies, *Landbote* (a custom which had been general in the rest of Europe for more than two hundred years), but the nobles reserved the right to be personally consulted upon important affairs. The unanimity of all was also made a fundamental principle in the transactions of this assembly of representatives.

The provincial deputies, as already stated, were elected at the petty diets (*Landtage*) which the king convoked by a printed circular-message at definite places in each district six weeks before each imperial diet. And on the appointed day the nobles of the whole district met there, elected a marshal of the petty diet and gave a hearing to the royal deputies upon the transactions of the imperial diet. After the nobles had departed they proceeded to the election of the provincial deputies, whose instructions had to be determined by unanimous vote. Therefore, of course, many of these petty diets were broken up, and the number of the provincial deputies at the imperial diet was never complete, which, however, was not thought to be necessary. Remarkable is that law by which the deputy who broke up the petty diet by his veto was to be punished with a half year's imprisonment in the tower and a fine of three thousand marks; yet this was not enacted till the year 1764.

The provincial deputies were exempt from arrest four weeks previous to and after the imperial diet, and whoever seized one of them was punished for high treason.¹ At first only resident and landed nobles could be elected for provincial deputies, but later it was enough to be related to such a noble.

¹ All intercession of the court was not able to save the life of a Saxon prince who, under Augustus II., had taken vengeance on a provincial deputy for an insult inflicted on him by the latter.

The place where the petty diet met could not be occupied by the military. No one dared carry fire-arms into the assembly, and it was also customary not to sharpen the sabres.

In ancient times the imperial diets were held in Lublin, Parczow, Piotrkowa and Lomza ; after the year 1569 Warsaw was settled upon as the place for them, yet, in order to satisfy the Lithuanians, every third imperial diet convened at Grodno. At the time of an interregnum exceptions were made in the case of the convocation—election and coronation—diets which were always held in Warsaw.

The regular time was two days after Michaelmas, every two years, but in urgent cases the king could summon the imperial diet earlier and at other places. Its duration in that case was only fourteen days instead of six weeks. In no case could this time be shortened or lengthened, nor was it permitted to deliberate at night time.

On the first day the marshal of the imperial diet was elected, and the titles of the provincial deputies were examined. Then, under the direction of the marshal, followed the reception of the king by the provincial deputies at which the *pacta conventa* was read aloud. Then the propositions by the throne were presented. The senators voted upon the measures of the imperial diet in the presence of the provincial deputies, in order to show them what was beneficial for the state. The administration of the ministers was next investigated, and hereupon the provincial deputies retired from the senate, in order to draw up the laws of the diet, the chief object of which was to be public safety.

The last five days were called the great days. Both chambers united again, the marshal of the imperial diet read the laws of the diet to which all the provincial deputies had agreed before the assembled imperial diet, and it was still possible for anyone to exercise his veto. Only that was legal which was now adopted before all.

It is true that these representatives honoured their inviolability as regards themselves, and did not now, as in former times, secure the required unanimity by the massacre of their opponents. But that evil had thus become so much the worse.

The deputies, after election, could never regard themselves as men who dared to attend to the interests of the country, to act according to their own conscience and understanding. They never dared place the good of the country above the advantage of their province. They received from the province full and definite instruction as to what they should demand and concede, and upon their return, in the petty diets legally established in the year 1589, they were placed in a most responsible position towards their constituents. It is natural that an assembly of four hundred men, each of whom was a member of a complete corporation, could be far less yielding than if each represented only his own personal rights. If stubborn opposition at the imperial diet formerly exposed the bold man to the danger of being killed, compliance now meant the same, for yielding would cost the deputy his life at the hands of those whose authority he had transgressed. The same necessity which once enforced compliance and was the only check upon anarchy became at present a reason for not yielding under any pressure.

In vain the kings opposed this disorder with patience, persuasion, persistency, and bravery. When King Wladislaus was unwilling under any circumstances to dissolve an imperial diet before it drew up a resolution, though it, on the other hand, was not allowed to continue the deliberations at night, they concluded to spend the night together, and the world witnessed the spectacle of a sleeping diet under the presidency of a sleeping senate, and of a king asleep on his throne.

There was yet one step to take in order to make this agreement impossible and to organize the anarchy formally. It was taken when a few palatines charged

their plenipotentiaries to oppose all consultations until their own proposals had been heard and adopted. When it happened that several deputies came with the same instructions, the imperial diet was broken up before it was opened.¹

Other deputies refused to give their consent to any propositions, unless those offered by their woiwodeships were also accepted, and thus the veto of one deputy in a single transaction could bring about the dissolution of the whole imperial diet, that is, he suspended all exercise of sovereignty for two years. The veto of one deputy was the magic word which, though hardly uttered, caused the republic to sink back in a deathlike sleep. No law could be enacted, no resolution adopted, the army remained unpaid, the enemy devastated some provinces without the others coming to their aid, justice was delayed, money matters were in confusion, in short, Poland was stricken from the list of states for the next two years.

And the rupture of an imperial diet was regarded as a public calamity as often as it was repeated. The name of the deputy who caused it, as well as that of his family, was handed down to posterity as a curse. In order to insure themselves against the general indignation, such deputies were accustomed to submit their protests in writing, and then, under burden of general detestation and overwhelmed by the curse of the nation, they roved about for years at a time, unsettled and unknown. Yet they proceeded still further in the art of making fruitless the endeavours of all upright patriots. In the year 1652, the voluntary absence of a member was declared to be sufficient cause for the dissolution of the imperial diet.

Added to all this harm were finally the religious

¹ In the years 1695, 1698, 1701, 1720, 1729, 1730, 1732, 1750, 1754, 1760, 1761, and 1762, the imperial diets were broken up before the election of the marshal; that is, in sixty-seven years, twelve diets.

differences, which were necessarily dangerous in a country so full of fermentation. For a long time Poland surpassed all the rest of Europe in toleration. Also after the great division in the Church, in the sixteenth century, everything continued to be quiet in Poland. *Inter nos dissidemus*, said both Catholics and Protestants, and both parties were dissenters. It was not until after Jesuits and foreign emissaries had kindled the flame of religious discord, that this name designated the Protestants alone. Poland, which was so accustomed to violent insurrections since the opposition of the minority was so important, and which always furnished new causes for dispute and division in the many and necessary conventions of the nobility, this same Poland was obliged to suffer terrible convulsions because of the new rupture among its own nobility. Now for the first time the imperial diets became useless. In the thirty-six years between 1536 and 1572, seven diets were dissolved, and under King Augustus III. the nation convened in vain for thirty years.

The dissenters became a dangerous wound to the state; although their number was comparatively very small, yet subsequently they furnished a pernicious excuse and basis for foreign interference.

In reviewing the causes which led to the downfall of the republic, we must not pass over the condition of the peasant, who vanishes from the history of Poland at an early date.

When the Polish nobleman or his historians declare that the peasant was from earliest times subject to his landlord by right of legacy and possession, or was wholly a serf, it is false, and may be proved to be so. This relation of eleven million men to not even a half million lords is an abuse of two hundred years, but was preceded by one thousand years of wretchedness.¹

¹ v. Grävenitz, *Der Bauer in Polen*. The following extracts

Originally the noble had no jurisdiction at all over the peasant; this power was exercised by the royal castellans and was granted to certain individual noblemen only, exceptionally, for some distinguished services.¹

The inheritance of a peasant, though dying without issue, passed to his relations without a grant of leave from the authorities.² If a peasant left the farm illegally, it could not be given over to another until the fugitive had been summoned three or four times to return, and in consideration of a land-tax of two groschen *pro Lahn* the peasant was free from all further public taxes, supplies, relays, etc.³

These enactments of Casimir the Great, the Henry IV. of Poland, won for him the noble nickname of the "Peasant King."

Those peasants were free who were land-owners, according to German law, they did not serve in socage, but paid rent. The imperial diet at Thorn, however, in the year 1520, regulated the services for the Polish peasant on this plan, that from each *Laneo* he should pay weekly one day's work with horses. The *Laneo* or *Lahn* is by correct reckoning equal to at least a hide of land of thirty Magdeburg acres which, according to the old Polish trefallow system, yields on an average ten Berlin bushels of winter seed. This established the obligation of fifty-two days' work with horses per year, still leaving the peasant, according to approximately correct calculation and expert valuation, the half of the produce of his estate. The tithes were convertible into an equivalent payment of seed or money.

from records are also taken from this excellent little article, which we cite on account of the importance of the subject, without claiming, however, that we have derived them from these sources themselves.

¹ Donation records of the monastery of Tyratz, 1286, and other places. Boleslaw grants the Rusezyn jurisdiction 1252.

² Statute, Casimir the Great, 1347.

³ Statute of Wladislaus Jagello, 1420 and 1433.

As regards the personal condition of the peasant, it may be said that according to German law, only the landed ones were free, and such as had hitherto cultivated and occupied waste lands.¹ It was owing to the great land-owners' need of labour, that the rest of the peasants were bound to the soil and could not leave the estate without the lord's permission. But the peasant never belonged to his landlord, he could not be sold. The property could pass into other hands, but the peasant did not have to leave his farm. That there never was a true servitude is principally based upon his ability to possess land and soil.

But even the bondage to the soil was lightened by the Polish laws.² Two families could move annually and without hindrance from each village, the father of several sons could allot one to service abroad, and arts and sciences were declared free.³ There were indeed conditions where all subjects were free to move, namely, when secular or ecclesiastical punishments of the power in authority fell upon the community also, or when a female subject was violated.

The provincial police law of John Albert, in the year 1496, speaks plainly regarding the condition of the peasant. "He trespasses his bounds," it states, "he indulges in extravagant clothes and lives high, and he causes himself to be arrested for debt by the town people." It defines in this reference how in the future the citizen is not to evade the tribunal of the peasants, but to bring his actions there. Therefore the peasant was prosperous, he could involve his own possessions in debt, and had a systematized administration of justice.

If we summarize how the law and justice of that date fixed the condition of the peasant, we find that he had possession of house, farm and field, that his

¹ Statute of Jagello, 1420.

² Strzetusky prawo polityczne narodu polskiego.

³ Statute of Alexander, 1501.

bondage to the soil was humanely limited, that he was liable to fairly apportioned services, moderate state and church taxation.

But this happy condition of the peasant ended when the nobility, at the cost of the crown and the peasantry, began to extend its ever growing and powerful influence upon the extinction of the Jagellons. It is remarkable that the Polish peasant enjoyed such liberties¹ at a time when bondage extended over all the rest of Europe, and that his servitude began when it ceased in other countries. For in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, bondage had disappeared in Germany (except in the provinces of Mecklenburg, Pommerania, Lausetia, etc., formerly Slavonic). In France Louis X. abolished it in 1315; in England Elizabeth was still giving serfs their freedom; in Bohemia and Moravia serfdom existed in the year 1781, till the time of Joseph II.; in Poland it first began with the sixteenth century. The kings were made to promise that they would no longer grant any peasants letters of protection against their masters.² For the future all masters had the right to punish disobedient subjects according to their own best judgment.³ Also the axiom, "Air gives possession," was extended to all foreigners who resided one year in a village.⁴ And thus, without abolishing any of the laws which were in favour of the peasant, it was enacted as a fundamental law of the constitution, "That henceforth the peasant should not have any legal hear-

¹ F. J. Jekel is inclined to assume that there was a state of bondage in Poland before the eleventh century, yet he himself confesses that history gives us no satisfactory answer to the questions, "What were really the peasants? To what were they bound? Under what laws did they live?" *Polens Staatsveränderung*, 3 part, page 87. It is enough, then, that history, as far as it reaches, shows us no slaves, but only *glebæ adscripti*.

² 1505, Alexander; 1543, Sigismund I.; 1588, Sigismund III.

³ Fourth Article of the Religious Union of 1515.

⁴ Statute of 1633.

ing against his lord in any secular court on earth, be his complaint concerning property, honour or life."

The peasant was thus exposed to an arbitrariness which had no more limitation than that which excess of evil imposes on evil. Every nobleman was an absolute despot on his own estate; the peasant had no support on earth to hope for except the grace of his lord or his own despair. Thence arose the terrible revolt of the peasantry which now made the nobility tremble with fear. This too was the cause of the great deterioration of landed property, and the drying up of those very fountains from which the nation had drawn its prosperity and its strength.

How extreme became the misery of the Polish peasantry, one learns from such decisions as those of the statutes of the imperial diet of 1768, articles 18 and 19, according to which "the full power and proprietorship of the nobles over land and people are to be maintained in their entirety, but right over the life and death of the peasants is no longer to rest in the hands of the lords." In the year 1791 it had to be enacted for the first time that "if from this time on landlords agree with their serfs upon a legal matter in proper form, this action shall establish a contract and shall be valid."

If we inquire of Polish contemporary historians¹ concerning the condition of the peasants, we hear "that the peasant lived without rights and judge, without law and king, that he was forced to labour Sundays and holy days, since in many places every hide of land was taxed with five workdays with horses."² This disproportion of service sometimes made it almost impossible to find a rule for adjustment. The peasant³ was regarded as a non-entity,

¹ It is necessary to cite these in order not to be charged with exaggeration.

² Warszewicki.

³ Nicolaus Zalaczewski.

he could not appear in court without the consent of his lord, therefore he had no judge to oppose his lord. Once there were ordinances enacted for his welfare, but they had long been forgotten. Nowhere did the peasant find law against oppression. Long was the landlord lord over life and death.¹ Poland is the only country where the common people are stripped of all rights of human beings.²

Notwithstanding this, a middle-class had never been formed in Poland to bridge over the terrible gulf yawning between lord and serf, between nobleman and peasant. Industry and commerce³ were unable to flourish there where the government was not able to give it encouragement nor protection, where arbitrary and violent attacks endangered the safety of property and credit, which latter, before all things, is necessary to trade.

This is the only explanation why a country could continue to be poor which had thirteen thousand square miles of territory and eleven and a half millions of inhabitants, which was watered by great navigable rivers leading both to the Black and Baltic Seas, which possessed abundance of corn, wheat, wax, honey, hops, fish, furs, numerous herds of the finest cattle, the most excellent horses, an inexhaustible supply of salt, and immense supplies of timber for ships and houses.

From all this wealth domestic industry did not know how to produce anything but coarse linen, sail-cloth, rope, potash, and ship timber; all other productions were wrought outside of the country.

Only a seventh part of the land was cultivated, and if, in spite of this, Poland exported considerable corn, and cattle for slaughter, this was only possible because the great part of the nation, the oppressed

¹ Vincent Rozituski.

² King Stanislaus Leszczyński, *Observations sur le gouv. de Pologne*, liv. c. p. 9.

³ J. Jekel, *Polens Handelsgeschichte*. Wien, 1809.

peasantry, had to deprive itself of such products, had to live poorly upon bread, just as to-day upon potatoes, having meat to eat barely three times in the year, and because this manner of life reduced the number of men.

All other exportations were unimportant, and not at all proportional to the expensive luxuries which, notwithstanding all the laws against luxury, were more and more demanded and imported.

The lead mines at Olkusz were all in ruins, and even the inexhaustible supplies of rock-salt at Wieliczka and Bochnia and the salt-springs of Red Russia were neglected to such an extent that not only this rich product was not exported, but the whole province of Prussia had to be supplied with foreign sea-salt, at an enormous loss to the crown.

The balance of trade consequently gave a profit to all the nations that had business relations with Poland, and at a great loss to the latter country.

In the year 1777¹ imports amounted to 47,488,876 Polish florins; exports amounted to 29,839,238 Polish florins. Therefore in this year the imports exceeded the exports by 17,649,629 florins. Of these Prussia gained over five millions, Austria almost eleven, Russia and Turkey one and a half.

In the year 1776 the imports were 48,640,679 florins, the exports were 22,096,360 florins. The difference amounted to 26,544,380 florins for this one year. The money which was still in circulation was derived principally from the sale of the crown.

Notwithstanding all the internal resources, the treasury of many a European city surpassed that of the republic, and, indeed, two or three Amsterdam or London merchants derived a greater income from trade than the domains of the king produced. In the midst

¹ J. Jekel, *Polens Handelsgeschichte*, Part II., p. 87. The more exact expenses.

of its wealth, the wealth which nature had generously bestowed upon it, Poland was poor. The abundance of its produce was of no aid to it, it had no highways by which to carry it away, no ships to transport it, nor factories to work it up, nor trade to make use of it.

The whole commercial history of Poland is almost entirely comprised in the history of the city of Danzig.

When in the thirteenth century the most important cities of Germany came together, in order to protect themselves mutually against despotism and the attacks which they were unable to oppose single-handed, in order to open avenues for themselves which a hundred castles of robber-knights and countless toll-gates barricaded, and in order to uphold laws among themselves which princes were not able to grant them, when, in a word, the Hanseatic League was formed which ruled the commerce upon two great seas with unlimited power for whole centuries, Danzig was soon compelled to recognize the immeasurable advantages which would accrue to it from a union with this league.

The inhabitants of Danzig were of German origin, they were governed by German laws (the saxonlage) and by their own constitution. For a long time they were subject to the Order of Teutonic Knights, and when they afterwards acknowledged the supremacy of the republic they kept themselves, nevertheless, as remote and independent as possible. The citizens of Danzig fortified the city at their own costs and upon their own responsibility, also by their own forces they defended their independence not only against foreigners, but also against Poland.¹ They refused the Russians entrance into their walls when Poland no longer dared to resist this foe.

After the republic had lost the Black Sea, Danzig was the last and soon the only port by which Poland

¹ In the year 1576, against Stephan Batory, in 1733, against Augustus II., etc.

had intercourse with the outer world, and it attained to a very high degree of prosperity and importance.

When the royal cities in Poland received the Magdeburg Law, a number of industrious foreigners immigrated into Poland and would have speedily introduced industries and commerce. Moreover, Thorn, Culm, Elbing, Königsberg, Braunsberg, and Krakow joined the Hanseatic League. Since, however, these cities did not know how to preserve their independence, they yielded to the power of the nobility, which was continually being increased, and the descendants of those foreign immigrants led a very miserable, poverty-stricken existence.

All the other cities were desolate and without walls, for they contained nothing but want. Their inhabitants were farmers, and one would hardly have ventured to seek the commonest of all mechanics among them.

For whatever was not noble lived in the cities as objects to be despised, or dwelt oppressed in the villages, and there was really no citizen class in Poland.

All the rest of the business of Poland was completely ruined. The merchant could not gain anything from the peasant who himself had literally nothing. Likewise there was little to be gained from the nobleman. The rich and influential, that is, those who could have traded most with the merchants, received their wine and luxuries duty-free in return for the wood, grain, etc., which they sent to Danzig. How could merchants sell or buy profitably in a country where the most affluent class of citizens imported or exported the very same articles duty-free on which the merchants in either case were compelled to pay duties at public and private custom houses? Finally, the wretched condition of the laws, especially the difficulty in executing them, made it almost impossible to give anyone credit. It was also impossible to get a noble as a partner, for trade was followed by the loss of nobility. At first Poland enjoyed the advantages of a commission trade by

buying up at Breslau, Leipzig, and Danzig, wares indispensable to the Russians and transporting them by land. But after Peter the Great opened up to his nation the Baltic and Black Seas this branch of trade also disappeared.

The Jews should be thanked for the little business that was still left in Poland.

It cannot be denied that this people, so frugal and anxious for its maintenance, formed the only well-to-do class in the country. All the business activity which carelessness or pride made the nobleman despise, and which the stupidity, the ignorance, and the oppressed state of the peasant made inaccessible to him fell to the lot of the Jews, who, if they became later a national misfortune, were simultaneously a national necessity; first, as the result of the bad measures of the government, for it was everywhere an easier thing to burn the Jews than to make good citizens of them; second, because they hated the Jews and envied them of their riches, without imitating the industry by which the Jews had acquired the same.

We must¹ glance at this remarkable people, little understood and yet so important, which, banished from its home, has continued to grow and has gradually made its way into other countries until it has encircled the globe, just as ivy-vines do the trunk of a tree on which and upon which they continue to live even when their roots are torn from the soil they first sprang from. Trodden down at all ages by despotism and violence, we find this nation ever springing up again by means of craft and perseverance. Persecuted and extirpated by fire and sword, we behold it returning once again or being replaced by others. Robbed and despoiled repeatedly, it is ever possessed of all wealth.

¹ *Tableau de Pologne ancienne et moderne par Malte Burn, refondu par Leonard Chodzko. Paris, 1830.*

With a wonderful fusion of external weakness and hidden strength, humble and prostrate before the more powerful, imperious and cruel towards dependents, this people, oppressed and abused as a whole, exercises through certain members a kind of individual tyranny over its oppressors. For just as man in his degradation still preserves a memory of innate nobleness and a sense of his oppression, so the Jew also resists violence and enmity with hatred and contempt, feelings which must be rooted much the deeper in him the more cautiously he has been forced to conceal these feelings in himself.

Notwithstanding their dispersion, the Jews are closely bound together. By an unknown supremacy they are consistently guided to common aims. After residing a thousand years in one country they behold themselves as strangers there, they regard the soil on which they are born not as their own home; the people with whom they have grown up, as their constant foe. Since they refuse all attempts of governments to nationalize them, the Jews form a state in the state, and in Poland to this very day they are a deep and unhealed wound in the country.

The political standing of the Jews, as well as their own laws, excludes them from possessing land, from political service, from offices, dignities, in short from all public enterprise. With them the national welfare could never be the goal of talent, knowledge, or industry. For them love of country, ambition, enterprise, in short, all the mighty forces which elevate the career of man had no room to be developed in. Repulsed on all sides with contempt, the Jew was thrown upon his own resources, and self was and had to be his only object of consideration.

The highest point to which the Jew could attain in his own land was that of becoming a rich man. But wealth itself procured for him no greater civil respect, it did not protect him against the insult of open hate

and detestation, and the Jew had to conceal his wealth or enjoy it at his own danger.

Even gold was no longer a source of happiness to the Jew, and so it became merely an end in itself. Wealth was the only aim for all the efforts of each individual, and all avenues leading to this goal, this only goal, were legitimate in his opinion, and at the same time were a means of vengeance on his oppressors. Brooking every mortification, enduring every insult, ever abstinent, frugal, and penurious, availing themselves of every advantage, not disdaining fraud, usury, and perjury, was it indeed a wonder that all the wealth flowed into the hands of these immigrants, and that the oppressors gradually became dependent upon the despised strangers?

The first Jewish settlers were exiles from Germany and Bohemia.¹ They fled to Poland about the year 1096, where at that time reigned much greater tolerance than in all the rest of Europe.

This emigration of the Jews was a result of the cruelty and covetousness of the first crusaders. They maintained that the Jews were the natural, native enemies of Christ. In Mayence alone fourteen hundred Jews were burned. In Bavaria twelve thousand were sacrificed. Women killed their children, and men killed themselves, in order to escape baptism and the baptisers. All the Jews emigrated from Bohemia. They were forced to leave all their property behind, for "since they had brought no riches from Judea with them they must depart from Bohemia poor as they had entered it."

The love of Casimir the Great for the beautiful Esther, a Jewess from Opoczno, procured for the Israelites a few civil privileges and liberties, such as a king in Poland could confer, and which should be

¹ Compare Leonard Chodzko's edition of the *Tableau de Pologne par Molte Brun*.

advantageous to the country ; but as early as the reign of Louis of Hungary, 1371, they were totally banished from the country. Yet, in the year 1386, we find them again scattered all over Poland. The Christians at that time were forbidden, on pain of excommunication, to have any intercourse with Jews, or to buy from them. In all cities where they settled, they were compelled to live together in particular suburbs. Usury was forbidden, and John Albert suddenly destroyed all the registers of mortgages by means of which they were about to acquire the greater part of the estates of the nobility, these having been mortgaged for the payment of the armaments for war. Yet the loan was said to have been repaid with legal interest.

The *Privilegium* of Boleslaw the Pious, 1505¹ is very characteristic. It shows that the kings were forced to protect the Jews from the general hatred and oppression of the Christians. Among other things it states : " Corpses of Jews can be carried away without duty. For desecration of a synagogue the Christian shall pay the woiwode a fine of two stones of pepper. No one shall put up at a Jewish house. It is false that Jews use human blood. If a Jew is charged with having kidnapped a Christian child, he must be convicted by three Christian, and three Jewish witnesses. If he is not convicted the accuser shall suffer the penalty which the Jew would have had to suffer. If a Jew is maltreated at night time, and cries for help, Christians are bound under penalty to render him assistance," etc.

Many a decree of the diet, many a law, which would have ruined their business completely, many a storm stirred up by fanatical priests against them, the Jews knew how to conjure away by the power of their gold (Miczynski says by their "magic"). This guaranteed them high patrons at all times. A few writers declared, on the contrary, "God blesses those who persecute the

¹ Compare Jekel, *Polens Staatsveränderung*, 2 part.

Jews," and they mentioned several Polish families as proofs.¹

In consequence of the inferior external condition of the Jews, they assumed in their writings a daring ascendancy over the Christians. Just as the Russian Jews had once attempted to convert Wladimir the Great to Judaism, so the Polish Jews published an immense number of articles in which they ridiculed the ritual of the Catholic Church, and invited the Poles to submit to the law of Moses, believing that this country would become a second Idumæa. Emboldened by the extension of their alliances, and by the greatness of their wealth, they are said to have been always in league with the Turks in order to obtain their assistance in subduing the Poles.²

According to the statement of the Jews themselves, there were, in the year 1540, only 500 Christian against 3200 Jewish merchants, and 9600 Jewish goldsmiths, and other manufacturers in the country. The wealthy Jews had begun to dress like the Polish nobles, they even surpassed them in magnificence. Characteristic in this connection is a decree of King Sigismund, I., which forbade them to wear golden chains, armorial rings and sabres set with precious stones. The Jews held their own imperial diets; each province sent its deputies to Warsaw, where they formed by themselves a great council and nominated a marshal who was confirmed by the government. In short, next to the nobility, the Israelites were the most affluent and powerful body in the country.

¹ Ziechowski states in his *Oglos Processu*: "since the Jew Alexander did not confess infanticide on the rack, his judges should not have been satisfied with burning him alone, they should have burned his shadow also, for it was very possible that the devil, out of love for the Jew, had substituted a phantom on the rack and that the shadow was the real Jew." Even in the year 1783 the Bernardine Monk, Tyszkowski, charged Jewesses with witchcraft. Jekel, *Polens Staatsveränderung*, 1 pt., p. 44, and 3 pt., p. 14.

² This was mentioned in the synods of 1420 and 1672.

Especially disquieting was the incredible increase of these strangers, for it is asserted that it was almost three times as rapid as that of the native inhabitants. Inasmuch as the Jews, favoured by their wholesome way of living—and this is required of them by their law—knew how to shirk all public burdens and duties, Sigismund Augustus determined, despite their remonstrances, to levy a poll-tax on them, according to which each individual had to pay one florin, at that time worth one-and-a-half dollars. At the same time he intended in this way to ascertain their real number: It was estimated then that there were, at least, 200,000 souls, but by this tax only 1600 florins were collected.¹

The Jews gained still more power under John Sobieski, to whom they had formerly prophesied that he would ascend the throne. This monarch favoured the Jews so much that, in the year 1682, the senate formally entreated him to consider the welfare of the state, and not to let all the favours of the crown pass through the hands of the Jews.

The laws prohibiting the Jews from trading with the peasants, from keeping inns and retailing brandy—and this prohibition was renewed almost under every new government, and even its transgression was punishable with death—show that the Jews had not ceased to use this branch of business, so profitable to them and so ruinous to the peasantry. The Jews never at any time regarded an oath to a Christian as binding. In case of a quarrel between one of their number and a Christian, they always made it an affair of their nation. If it was a matter for furthering some mutual interests, a general

¹ "Dites-moi," said King Sigismund to the Bishop of Cracow, "vous qui ne croyez pas aux sorciers, ou que le diable puisse se mêler de nos affaires, dites-moi comment il se fait que 200,000 Juifs ont pu se cacher sous terre pour ne paraître que 16,598 aujourd'hui qu'il s'agit de payer la capitation." "Votre Majesté sait," answered the Bishop, "que les Juifs n'ont pas besoin du diable pour êtres sorciers."

fast-day was decreed, and then each person, under the penalty of one of the three Jewish curses,¹ had to remit the cost of a day's sustenance for himself and family. In this way single cities and provinces have often supported others far distant with large sums of money.

Until the present time each city has its own judge, each province its Rabbi, and all are subject to an unknown head residing in Asia, who is bound by the law to wander continuously from place to place, and they call him the "prince of slavery." By thus preserving their own government, religion, customs, and language, by obeying their own laws, they know how to avoid those of the country they dwell in or to prevent their execution. Having thus become closely leagued together, they reject all attempts that have been made to amalgamate them with the nation, both because of their religious faith and because of their self-interest.

We have now considered the opposing elements which combine to form the state. There was a powerless king; a powerful democratic nobility, which itself was divided because of its interests and religious opinions; a middle class flourishing in the state without belonging to the state; and the peasantry, forming the mass of the nation, without political or human rights, and sunk to the lowest depths of misery.

But what a picture of chaos does the inner part of this country also present! In former times Poland had attained a certain height of culture, but after that the nobility had robbed the government of all power, in order to preserve its own independence, after that the people themselves had taken away the powers of jurisdiction by legal procedure, it came to a dead standstill. While for centuries all its neighbouring states continued to progress, Poland remained just as many centuries behind.

It had actually come to such a pass that there was

¹ Niddony, Gherem, and Schamatha.

a cessation of legal exercise of all sovereignty. The mint had been closed since the year 1685, and inasmuch as Polish coin had a greater value than that of the neighbouring states, it had disappeared from circulation or was counterfeited. In this way the entire Polish currency is said to have been twice recoined outside the country. Foreign coinage, on the other hand, had an arbitrary value. This confusion finally became so great that king Augustus II. ordered Saxon money to be coined in Warsaw, on his own responsibility, without even being empowered by nation or senate to do so, for during his long reign no imperial diet met that could have given him authority.

Thus absolute necessity compelled not only the kings, but also all eminent government officers, to appropriate to themselves a power not theirs by right and far overreaching that which an unlimited sovereignty would have bestowed. Forced to violate his powers, in order to satisfy the most pressing demands, each ruled absolutely and without restraint in his department, each necessarily exercised a power over the multitude, which could have brought him to justice on account of one abuse, and each successor had to seize anew upon this same abuse of power.

The republic sent no ambassadors to foreign courts; the country was without defences, without a navy, it was destitute of highways and of military equipments, was without a treasury and even without a fixed government revenue. The army was small, neglected, undisciplined and was often unpaid, so that the troops were forced to form a confederation, and to encamp before the meetings of the imperial diet, in order to add to their legal claims so illegal a weight.

Outwardly, therefore, the whole strength of the state consisted in the confederation. But the kings, regarding with anxiety a power surpassing their own, always sought to counteract these alliances, and to prevent them, or, if they, in turn, formed the confederation, the

nation was hindered by mistrust from joining it. Moreover the Polish nobility, once so valiant, was weakened and degenerated by luxury and wantonness, and this was partly promoted by the government itself. Nearly all great estates were overwhelmed with debts, and lawsuits. The greater number of nobles had neither weapons nor horses, and still formed only a tumultuous assembly without order, discipline, and guidance.

On the other hand, they did not dare to arm the mass of the people for the defence of the fatherland. To the peasant who had nothing more to lose, in the strictest sense of the word, landlord and foe were one and the same thing. Every promise, every outlook towards improvement, even for a change in oppression, was destined to make the peasant a formidable enemy of his lord, if the enemy granted him the opportunity. The mere possibility of an insurrection of the peasantry accompanied by such cruelties as only the most vivid imagination can picture, and such as more than once devastated great provinces of the country, kept the noble and his household troops away from the defence of the republic, for who would have dared to have left his house and barn, wife and child, to the mercy of the unbridled fury of the slaves?

And thus Poland was internally held together only by usurped violence, externally by its very weakness.¹ For to attack Poland with an army was to wish to conquer it, and that had long been prevented by the mutual jealousy of the neighbouring powers.

The royal elections and the religious disputes were the joints through which foreign influence first penetrated into the republic.

In 1697 an army of 10,000 Saxons procured for its electoral prince, Augustus II., the crown of this country, against the will of the greater part of the

¹ Polonia confusione regitur.

Polish nation. For this very reason, however, Augustus always needed this army, in order to defend his crown against the nation.

While Poland, as we have seen it, was too weak to protect itself, however, it preferred to remain unarmed in the midst of neighbours equipped for war rather than to tolerate the army of the king in the country. Solicitous for the rights of individuals and jealous of the royal power, the imperial diets emphatically urged the removal of the Saxon troops, preferring to endanger the freedom of the state rather than the prerogatives of their body.

The king was unsuccessful in the wars which he now waged in order to be allowed to retain an army, for this alone assured him a place of influence in the republic. It was Swedish arms and again not the will of the nation that crowned Stanislaus Leszczyński, in the year 1704.

After the misfortunes of Charles XII., Augustus appeared again in Poland with an army, in order to regain the throne. But when, now, this monarch desired to accomplish what had been from the first moment his actual object, namely, the establishment of royal power in the state, the confederation opposed him so emphatically, that Augustus was forced to seek Russian intervention and Russian protection in order to support his position, thus setting his successors the destructive example which caused the ruin of the state.

Augustus III. ascended the throne of his father, not by means of the arms of a Saxon army, but under the influence and protection of Russia; and, in order to maintain himself on his throne, he became most dependent on this state. But the means of his ascension were at the same time the instrument of his downfall.

The armaments of Augustus II., for the purpose of gaining his throne twice by force, his wars, and still more his luxury and the bribes, by which he began to subjugate the nobility of the nation, when he was

unable to do it with arms, finally, the limitless extravagances of Augustus III. exhausted all the resources of Poland and Saxony. These rich territorial inheritances were also finally lost in the Seven Years' War, and thus Augustus, once a powerful electoral prince, became the weakest of all kings.

The demise of Augustus III. was the crisis which the parties at home and abroad had awaited in order to put in motion all their strength and all their plans for their own purposes. Politics, patriotism, treason, ambition and venality, intrigue and force struggled with one another and aroused a fearful tumult in the republic.

During this confused struggle, let us observe these parties more closely which sought to employ the new royal election for the improvement of the social condition of their country.

Many Poles, it is true, regarded this as a masterpiece of statesmanship. They gazed with pride on individual rights, unmindful that nine-tenths of the nation were sunk into the lowest degree of servitude and that even the independence of the nobility was far from being freedom. The weakness of the state, proceeding from this very thing, could not be a guarantee for the stability of the constitution, because it gave no guarantee for the existence of the state. These men, always solicitous on account of the misuse of power, never saw the danger of the misuse of liberty, and they had to be schooled in a long period of misfortune, in order to be convinced that an alteration of the constitution had become inevitable.

And, meanwhile, men were not wanting who recognized grave mistakes in this constitution.

"All our deliberations," said the primate in his address before the convocation diet, "result in nothing. The imperial diets are without result, and few of us dare boast of having known a diet where freedom of consultation was respected. We regard ourselves a

nation, but we are under the yoke of servitude, under the terror of swords. We all feel the misfortune of our dependence, but we lack the wisdom to counsel for ourselves, and the strength to improve our lot, nevertheless we rush blindly to our own destruction.

“All our sufferings are the results of our own transactions. We languish in the fetters of our own fear, we who have nothing upon which to fix our hopes, neither the counsel of wisdom nor the support of strength. We have no fortifications, for they are all in ruins, no garrisons, for they are weak and without ammunition, neither fixed boundaries nor an army to defend them. Let us confess that this kingdom is like an open house, a dwelling devastated by storms, a building without an owner which would be precipitated upon its shaken foundations, did not Providence still hold it up!

“Let us glance at abuses which surpass all belief. The laws, degenerated and dishonoured, are unenforced; the tribunals which ought to judge crime are suspended; perjury is tolerated at the expense of the salvation of soul and of country! Liberty is enthralled by violence and absolutism; the royal treasure is squandered by the introduction of foreign and debased monies; the cities of the country—the most beautiful ornaments of a kingdom—are depopulated, and the advantages of commerce are robbed by the Jews. In the cities we must seek for the city, so deserted are the markets, the streets, and the fields.

“A period of fifty years has wrought this transformation. And why? Because we live contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of brotherly love, without concord, without confidence, and without probity. Let us consider how we burden our conscience by such action; how hard it is to restore that which we destroy; how great will be the punishment of the Judge which we bring upon our heads. Let us consider our debt of responsibility to God and to the

country, when we subject our provinces on the borders to the danger of being conquered.

“At the present time, when our freedom surrenders itself to the wildest licentiousness, unchecked and unlimited, there is nothing so necessary for it as fetters, in order to keep it from excesses which lead it to destruction, to servitude. Liberty like ours is merely licentiousness. Its pernicious influence extends to even this assembly, and makes it necessary that we should subject it to rule, to law. This diet is the place where the madness of freedom must be chained, which leads to our destruction, which injures us and oppresses us, which overturns our laws, hinders justice and destroys public trust.”¹

Although such words were merely an echo to the multitude, or were not esteemed by those who were interested in the continuation of the anarchy, yet there were many intelligent men who were cognizant of their truth. There was, on the whole, no time when Poland lacked men who were ready to sacrifice themselves for the country; and although the decayed, thousand-year-old building of the republic threatened to bury under its ruins the man who jolted it, yet this did not terrify the bravest from destroying the old foundations with a hand of strength, and replacing them by new ones.

But even these attempts to introduce a better state of affairs must be termed the final causes of the final downfall of this republic.

Among the parties purposing to effect a change in the government, we mention first the court itself.

In the general confusion, in the distress of the country, and in the degeneration of the nobility, proceeding from its own body, the court hoped to establish a greater independence on its own part. The important offices were given away to the most sub-

¹ Ferrand, Histoire du démembrement de la Pologne.

missive and most agreeable; the nobleman had degenerated into a courtier, and the solidity of the nation was purposely undermined. The excess of evil was said to be the dawn of a happier condition. The majority of the nobility had become extremely poor because of the excessive luxury which it had copied from the court; and while, perhaps, one hundred palatines, bishops, and starosts united French fashions, in their households and their dress, with the opulence of the Orient, a far larger number of noblemen hired themselves out as servants.¹ Many of them wished to enter into business in order to escape from this servile state, and they would in this way have rendered most substantial service to their country. The diet of 1677 was unwise enough to declare that business deprives a nobleman of all his privileges, it being unfit for him. And yet this Polish nobility which had formerly been sought by foreign princes was now regardlessly flung away. A Jew who left the faith of his fathers became by baptism a Polish nobleman; and, as the newer nobility is almost everywhere the most arrogant, it is understood that these converts made a much greater noise in the diets than the blue blood of the Jagellons.

The abject humility, the servility of the expressions which we recognize even to-day in the usual greeting: "*Upadam do nog!*"=(I cast myself at your feet) is derived from this dependence of the debased noble; and this among the inferior classes is accompanied at the same time by such an act, or at least by an obeisance, the hand touching the ground.

Of course such a humiliated noble must be easier to subdue than the free-minded, independent old landlords.

But in the whole state no one was less able to

¹ Le gentilhomme sous la livrée fait-il une faute, le cantchou le corrige. Mais on lui met un tapis sous les genoux par respect pour sa généalogie. Histoire de J. Sobieski par l'Abbé Coyer.

establish a predominant power than its representative of supreme authority, the king. The *liberum veto* was the boundary beyond which no efforts of this party extended.

The Pototski (Potocki), one of the most important families of the land, formed another stronger faction. At its head were two Pototski brothers, one a primate of the kingdom, the other crown-general. The transactions of these men were managed with all the care that is duly involved in an undertaking which places the existence of the state in jeopardy. The regeneration of Poland was said to proceed from Poland itself, and through its own strength. Its great aim was the abolishing of the *liberum veto*, which had become altogether untenable, but which was so clear to the majority. But in consequence of the degeneration of a great part of the nobility, the Pototski perceived in that same greatest evil the only limit to a despotism which was becoming liberal. Before they dared to destroy this, they thought that they must deprive the crown of the dangerous instrument by which it subordinated a nobility, dependent on the favour of the court, namely, the power to distribute honours and offices. For this purpose they wished to establish a commission which should bestow the investitures of court favours as rewards for merit.

But these reforms affected the interests of the crown and the poor nobility to such an extent that they would have encountered the most violent opposition.

The Czartorinski (Czartoryiski) and their party stepped forth more boldly and with more irresistible energy.

The disastrous efforts of the Pototski at the diet of 1742, had shown that the Polish constitution had nearly reached a remarkable stage, a stage where stability proceeded from anarchy itself, where it was impossible for the constitution to develop organic improvements, and that Poland glided along on the

rapid stream of universal history, like a boatman who has voluntarily thrown away his helm. The very evil of the constitution made it unassailable. There was no power in the state able to rise up against it, for, though all had the means to prevent action, yet none had the power to act. As long as there was a state, the constitution was inviolable; to wish to change it, was to overthrow the state. The very mistakes that made a reform necessary prevented a reform. All authority in the state was levelled in such a way that no power could be elevated, and the complete equilibrium of all parts hindered all movement. These are important reasons which should not be passed unnoticed, when we roundly abuse those who sought the centre of the necessary revolution outside of the very country in which it had become impossible to find it.

The family of the Czartorinski, already elevated above republican equality by its illustrious descent from the Dukes of Lithuania, for centuries ennobled with the first honours of the country, and moreover recently possessed of great wealth by marriage, this family beheld the two brothers, Michael and Augustus, at its head—the former Palatine of Polish Russia, the latter Lord High Chancellor of Lithuania.

If, on the one hand, it was the intention of the Pototski to establish the political power of important families at the cost of the throne and by means of its few remaining privileges; the party, on the other hand, at whose head were the Czartorinski, wished the very opposite thing, namely, to establish this political power by giving greater authority to the kings, by the limitation of the power of affluent families, and by the assertion of the rights of the majority. They wished this the more, perhaps, since they, the scions of the Jagellons, felt that they had the strength to mount this very throne, and because in them patriotism and family-spirit were united. Meantime the Czar-

torinski recognized the impossibility of effecting the reform of the nation through the nation only, and their eyes were directed abroad in order to borrow the strength which they needed.

Poland had always believed that it beheld in France a naturally ally, and certainly a sound policy would have supported with vigour such a reform as the Czartorinski intended. Only thus could Poland become a state that had the power to act abroad, and France, while it preserved its friendship by a substantial act of beneficence, would have secured to itself an ally in the East just as powerful as it was faithful. Although history enumerates a multitude of factions which French intrigue knew how to stir up and support in Poland, yet we behold these at the critical moment just as frequently abandoned and surrendered, inconsistencies which are to be explained only by the frequent change of mistress-sovereignty at the court of Versailles. In earlier as in later times, France often used Poland for its own ends without ever doing anything for the benefit of the nation. No country like France has had the destiny of Poland in its hands, and none ever deceived it so greatly.

There was, besides, at that time, that alliance between France and Austria—the strange creation of Prince Kaunitz—so that Poland had no reason to expect much aid from the French.

Austria and Prussia had just come from that bloody war, after which Prussia entered so gloriously the circle of European powers, by means of the lustre of its arms, and the greatness of its kings. Prussia had fought against Europe, and Austria against Prussia. It is customary to measure the strength of states by their victories and prosperous campaigns, but certainly no country furnishes a higher opinion of its power, of the inexhaustibility of its resources than does Austria by its defeats. After a series of misfortunes we behold it still unconquered.

Peace was concluded, but both powers had not yet laid aside their arms. Armies of 200,000 men stood ready on each side to renew the battle, if necessary, and each jealously watched the movements of the other.¹ Yet both states needed and desired peace, and continued armed only in order to maintain peace.

Certainly Poland could not expect support from either of these powers. The help of one would be war with the other, the ancient sceptre of the old empire was as threatening as the sword of the young kingdom. Meanwhile both Austria and Prussia had to agree that they would prefer to see the old anarchy of the republic, rather than to offer their aid to form a powerful monarchy out of this best of all neighbours which would be dangerous to all adjacent states.

The Turks also seemed to be forced to take active interest in the fate of Poland, and, indeed, in later times the wars that continued to occur more frequently and to end more disastrously, and with which Russia infested that kingdom, might have led it to support an opponent of that arch enemy.

But the belief of the Divan in fatalism made it divide all Christian powers into enemies that had fought it and such as had left it in peace. Since the Sublime Porte had no ambassadors at any court, it regarded affairs only in the light that ambassadors of foreign powers took care that it ought to regard them. Absolute ignorance of all political matters was united, in the Divan, with religious doctrines, and the most sublime contempt of all opponents with the greatest personal inability. Since the Turks no longer "encamp in Europe," but reside there, since they have ceased to subjugate their neighbours, they have also lost the power to defend themselves against those neighbours. All the institutions by which they once became so formidable have been essentially changed,

¹ Compare Dohm's *Denkwürdigkeiten seiner Zeit*, etc.

and feebleness has transformed the Turks from a war-like people into a peace-loving state. The Janizaries were no longer an *élite*, made up of kidnapped Christian boys, who, without wife and child and home, followed the gleam of the crescent, and lived solely for fame and booty. This corps was now formed chiefly of effeminate Turks, native burghers who appropriated to themselves the great prerogatives of the Janizaries, without having even once had their weapons in their hands. It is true the Spahis had not yet wholly fallen from the height of their ancient renown, but their enemies had meanwhile progressed, and they now encountered two barriers which even their fanatical, almost insane bravery could not vanquish—these were the Spanish “*chevaux de Frise*,” (spiked fences)¹ and the artillery. The remainder of these armies, numbering hundreds of thousands, which the Porte thought it had to arm for each campaign, was a mob which deserted before it had hardly been levied, in order to be levied again. After the loss of a battle, eighty thousand of these men could be seen fleeing towards Constantinople, where the Sultan had to give them provisions and ships to convey them to Asia Minor, merely in order to remove a riotous rabble from the capital city.

To call for the aid of such an army was, in the words of the Bishop of Caminiec, “to set fire to the house in order to drive out the vermin.”

Now since Poland had nothing to hope from its friends in Europe, the Czartorinski boldly determined to make use of their enemies for their own purposes, not doubting but that they could again, at the proper time, destroy the power which they would create for themselves, and shatter the dangerous tool when it had

¹ Spanish spiked fences, *chevaux de Frise*, are beams provided with six rows of pointed pales, forming a parapet nearly four or five feet high, which the Russian infantry carried with them everywhere in the Turkish campaigns, and on which the furious attack of the cavalry was bound to be dashed to pieces.

served their purpose. With a profound contempt for semi-barbarous Russia, they wished to avail themselves of its material strength for the regeneration of Poland, in order to use this new strong Poland to rebut the presumptions of Russia, which already rested heavily on the republic. But this task was begun during the feeble reign of Peter III., and when it was finished, Catharine's mighty arm already swayed the sceptre of Peter the Great, and the spirits of destruction that had been so boldly summoned were not to be banished by any form of incantation.

Russia's development has been thoroughly Asiatic. Although the sun of Christianity a thousand years after its rising had cast its rays of light upon these deserts, yet it has not made gentle manners or customs, sciences and commerce to flourish. At an early period the independence of the people passed into servitude,¹ that of the nobility into the unlimited power of the princes, and that of the princes into the greater governments which were in Kiew, Nowgorod, Moscow, and finally in St. Petersburg. The will of the individual disappeared more and more in the will of the state, or rather of the chief executive officer, who in his person combined the highest secular and ecclesiastical power, as in no other European state. Hence the unity and power in the transactions of the state, hence the rapid development of the same, for despotism is the best form of government for barbarians. Therefore Polish history is also the history of great men,

¹ In the code of Jaroslaw, 1050, it states: "A man sold in the presence of witnesses becomes a bond-servant or a slave—if he is not able to pay his creditor,—if he hires himself unconditionally as a servant,—if he marries a female slave, etc."

"A horse-thief shall be delivered to the prince, and shall lose all his civil rights, freedom, and property."

"No life-money shall be paid for a slave, but whoever kills him without cause must pay to his lord the value of the slain man."

Karamsin, *Geschichte des russischen Reiches*, 2 vol., 3 article—Kriminal-Gesetze.

Russian that of a great state. In the former we witness the virtues of individuals struggling with the faults of the whole multitude, in the latter the talent of a line of hereditary princes shattered on the badness of those who were summoned to support them.

The progress of Russia was shaken by a series of disturbances, for revolutions are more frequent when there is less freedom. The hatred of a despotic sceptre is joined with its destruction. And, therefore, it is only a step from dissatisfaction to revolution, for it is less dangerous to overthrow the government than to complain of it.

For centuries Russia was perfectly isolated and separated from the world. The mighty streams bursting forth from its endless forests led to a sea with no outlet or to regions of eternal ice. Unbounded wildernesses separated it from the rest of the inhabitants of the globe, and although the territory of the new Russian state might be immeasurable, yet Russia was by necessity bound to make an even greater extension of the same, if it was ever to leave that state of isolation.

But in the south insurmountable mountains and endless steppes hostilely opposed it, in the east a people numbering nine hundred million souls, and civilized centuries ago, in the north an unconquerable natural obstacle.

At last Peter the Great with an iron hand shook his people out of the sleep of barbarism, but was not able to elevate them to a high grade of civilization, which must be the work of time, and is not to be reached by any momentary efforts however gigantic. But when he opened to Russia the Baltic Sea he built the first channel for the political life of his country, and when he turned from the riches of the East to the arts of the West, he gave Russia the first impulse which made Russia a European state.

From that time Poland was destined to become the

mark always in view of the rulers of Russia, and this republic, one of the oldest of European states, beheld with terror its position between two of the youngest monarchies of this part of the world, whose aggressive development was completely blockaded by its geographical location.

Since the last century Poland had become accustomed to seeing Russian armies within its boundaries, sometimes to protect the so-called oppressed dissenters, sometimes to take care of the rights of the nobility, once to preserve the freedom of the nation, that is, the anarchy so necessary to the neighbour, another time to keep the *liberum veto* in force, for after public opinion had condemned it Russian arms continued to restore it. Sometimes it was to protect the house of Saxony on the throne, sometimes to expel it from the same.

During the Seven Years' War Poland had to grant passage and winter quarters to one hundred thousand Russians, and—as a passive witness of their excesses and oppressions—to feed and clothe them. Even after the final declaration of peace, twelve thousand Russians remained in the country under the empty pretext of guarding a magazine in Graudenz because it could not be disposed of profitably. The few fortifications possessed by Poland besides Danzig, which protected itself, were in the hands of Russians, who, with even a much smaller army, would have been able to rule in a country where the authorities had no common basis of action; for the confederation itself became in the hands of the Russians a most terrible means of subjection.

The Russian arms, which had already half subdued Poland, now became the instrument by which the Czartorinski wished to liberate their fatherland.

This family had so long enjoyed all the favours of the court that the disfavour of the same could no longer be harmful to it; it was wholly independent

of this court and had become its formidable enemy. A name, associated with memories of great historical events and extended through family alliances, assured the Czartorinski an important influence over the most powerful houses of the country. Boundless wealth, a hospitality corresponding to this wealth and the spirit of those times kept a very great number of poorer noblemen dependent upon them. Finally, the extensive privileges of the high offices which they filled caused their favour to be sought by all those who desired to advance through official positions. Yet all this power and all this popularity were not sufficient, when the time came, to deprive the democracy of nobles of those rights which gave it the sole weight in the state.

In order to promote their own affairs, the Czartorinski had caused their nephew, Poniatowski, to be sent to St. Petersburg as an ambassador of the republic. But this young man had his own ambitious plans in view.

An incident that borders on the miraculous had already prophesied a crown to him while yet in his cradle, and this prophecy itself contributed not a little to bring about its own fulfilment. His parents, having become accustomed to extraordinary things in consequence of their own unique history, regarded nothing as impossible, gave their child the significant names Stanislaus Augustus, directed the education of the boy wholly with a view to this extraordinary end, and did not hesitate to initiate the youth at an early age into the secret of their daring hopes.¹

During his residence in St. Petersburg the personal attractions of this youth had the good fortune to win for him the favour of the young grand duchess of Russia, afterwards Catharine II. This affection became a passion, when, at the request of the grand duke,

¹ Rulhière, *Hist. de l'anarchie de Pologne*, Tome I.

Poniatowski was recalled from St. Petersburg, and Catharine promised to fulfil the prophecy regarding him.

Indeed, when she seized the sceptre of her ill-fated husband and when the throne of Poland was vacant, she prepared to fulfil her promise either out of a romantic attachment to her lover, or out of a vain desire to give away a throne. Did she really think of a marriage and of an alliance of both Slavonic countries or was she ambitious to gain a powerful influence over the political affairs of Europe?

Meanwhile her own position in a country like Russia, on a throne so frequently disturbed, which she had just ascended by means of a new revolution, was by no means so firm, that she could have dared to take any important steps towards a nation which was still accounted powerful, without having assured herself of a strong party in this nation.

Here now the princes Czartorinski advanced to meet her; they seemed willing to lay the nation in bonds, in order to make it tractable for the purposes of the empress.

Unmindful of the two laws which pronounce him outlawed who, in an interregnum, calls foreign troops into the country, and which annul all enactments made for this purpose, the Czartorinski demanded the entrance of a Russian army. Consent was given to this, for both parties were working energetically, each determined to work for itself and to use the other only as a tool for its own purposes.

The important influence of the princes Czartorinski had already manifested itself in the diet of 1762, when it was found necessary to take measures against Courland by means of Russian troops. Most violent scenes were the result, and this diet, like all its predecessors, was dissolved; indeed, all the princes, who were designing to place supreme power in the hands of the monarch did not hesitate to bring to notice the distribution of the offices by a national commission, and to

protest against the present appointment of the same. They thus intended to gain a larger following among the poorer nobility and at the same time to drive their most powerful foes, namely, the young princes Radzivil, from their offices. After the death of Augustus III., at the convocation-diet which was expressly intended to consider necessary reforms in the administration of the government, these very Czartorinski agreed to that proposition. Although they intended shortly to make the greatest of all reforms, yet they feared only the more to do this and to arouse suspicion among the nobles until they were in their power. Experience had taught them that they would accomplish none of their plans so long as the nation was free.

Finally, the decisive crisis for Poland, the new royal election, drew near, decisive, not so much on account of the election of one or another individual to the throne, but on account of the conditions under which he was to ascend this throne.

In order to have at hand the funds necessary for this imperial diet, Catharine had stopped all payments in the empire, even the pay of the military.¹ The Russian money, by which Polish deputies were to be bought, was brought into Warsaw under a strong military escort; 12,000 Russians encamped in front of the gates of the city, or were brought by forced marches to it. A Russian army of 60,000 men was stationed on the frontiers of the republic. The princes of Czartorinski brought 2000 of their household troops, and through the influence exercised by them at the elections of deputies, they were sure of finding a great number of friends or supporters among the members of

¹ Les soldats n'en murmuraient point, espérant bien s'en dédommager par le pillage des provinces polonaises, habitués depuis longtemps à regarder le choix d'un roi de Pologne comme un droit que leurs souverains exerçaient avec quelques efforts. Rhulière, Tome II. livre 2.

the diet, the more so since they had distributed money with the greatest profusion.

But if the Russian party was equipped on its side, the republican, which, for the moment, had coalesced with the Saxon against so formidable an enemy, had taken no less precautions, and the more imminent the danger the more determined were they to brave it. A sum of fifty thousand ducats which had been paid them by Saxony revived the courage of the multitude for a cause in which money had now for a long time exerted its weighty influence.

Branicki and Mokranowski were the two men upon whom the republicans had their eyes directed. The former was honoured for a long life, full of glory, the latter was the hope of all, because of his unshaken honesty and courage which seemed to assure him an illustrious future.

The army of the republic could not be assembled. However, its number did not exceed four thousand undisciplined soldiers.

The aged crown-general, therefore, marched with his entire body-guard to Warsaw, leaving his own property unprotected against the pillage of the Russians. The nucleus of his small army consisted of Hungarians, Janizaries and Tartars. Radziwill joined him with his troops, proudly conscious that no one would dare to assail the freedom of the republic until he himself had perished. The Oginski, Massalski, Malachowski, Lubomirski, and many other celebrated names were mentioned among their followers.

Despite the weakness of this party when compared with their opponents, its leaders did not despair, even in face of the Russians, of preventing a free diet, or, if that should be impossible, of annulling the diet under Russian protection. Mokranowski undertook the dangerous task of breaking it up by his *veto*.

About this time the ambassador of Prussia entered also under the protection of a squadron of hussars.

Warsaw at that time presented perhaps the most brilliant and most wonderful sight of any city in Europe. Besides a multitude of natives and strangers, whom secret commissions or personal interests had brought hither, the city walls enclosed all the great, influential and noble men that Poland had to exhibit. The enormous sums which bribery had amassed here, and which being easily earned were as easily squandered, enlivened trade in an unprecedented manner. The brilliant shops shone with the luxury of both hemispheres, the costly clothes of Armenia, the dear baubles of Parisian fashion, the pearls of India, the native horses—all these found their purchasers, however expensive. Heavily laden ships sailed up the stream, and, in the busy streets, Christians, Jews, and Mussulmans thronged promiscuously. The turban of the Janizary appeared side by side with the fur cap of the Pole, and the dolman of the Hungarian. The bow and arrows of the Tartar were seen beside the carbine of the Prussian and the bayonet of the Russian, and the languages of two divisions of the globe were resounding in the air. From the crowded festivals and spectacles, from the active bustle and the beauty of the women, from the gayness of their dress, one could have fancied that all these were assembled for a great national celebration. But the residences of the nobles were surrounded by their household guards. Poniatowski had ordered his palace to be machicolated, and cannon were mounted in the Court of the Russian Embassy. All were armed, and although they all circulated peacefully among themselves, yet everyone trembled lest an accident, a quarrel, might become the spark to start a most terrible explosion in a place where personal passions and intense interests were strained to the highest pitch, and where it was almost impossible to avoid the most violent outbreaks.

Thus the seventh of May, 1764, arrived, the date appointed for the opening of the imperial diet.

All the guards were doubled, strong detachments of cavalry marched through the streets, five hundred grenadiers guarded the palace of the Russian ambassador, Von Kayserlingk, and the Russian army was drawn up in line of battle before the city, ready to enter it at the first command. The supporters of the Czartorinski, distinguished by a cockade of the colours of this house, marched with strong escorts to the house of assembly. This was surrounded and filled with Russian soldiers, who were to be seen even in the seats of the deputies. When the marshal of the diet, Malachowski, entered with Mokranowski, the attention of those present in the assembly was worked up to the highest pitch of expectancy. When the latter had taken his seat as deputy, he addressed those present in the following words:—"Since liberty has vanished from among us, since Russian troops have made their way even into the assembly of the republic, and since the representatives of the country wear the livery of a family, in the name of twenty-two senators and of forty-five deputies, as well as in my own, I declare the diet annulled and dissolved."

A fearful uproar arose at these words. They cried to the marshal of the diet, standing in the centre of the hall with his staff lowered, to raise it as a sign that the diet was reopened. But this veteran of eighty years replied: "You cannot take counsel in the presence of the Russians. You may cut off this hand, but it shall never raise the staff so long as we are enslaved. A free nation entrusted it to me, and only a free nation can take it from me. I demand permission to leave the hall."

A general tumult had begun, all swords were drawn and the bold men were surrounded. The Russians rushed down upon them from the galleries, but the Czartorinski themselves gathered round them and shielded them with their own bodies, horrified at the disgrace with which the murder of two citizens, so

universally respected, would have overwhelmed their enterprise. The two actually escaped from the wrath of the crowd, and Malachowski bore away the marshal's staff before the eyes of the Russians, the deputies and the people.

The following morning the republicans left the city. They had been requested not to pass through the camp of the Russians. "I do not inquire where the Russians are," answered Branicki, "but I shall take the usual road." Silent, and in battle array, the republican army passed by the Russians—no greeting, no challenge nor shout was heard, and, with tears in his eyes, Poniatowski saw many a valiant friend of the fatherland withdraw from his cause.

The Czartorinski had foreseen all these events, and had fully prepared for them. Neither the fury of the people nor the abhorrence of the honest patriots, neither the appearance of treachery nor the danger of subjection must be allowed to disturb them, if they wished to attain their highest object—the reconstruction of Poland. It was time that the diet should be legally dissolved by the protest of Mokranowski, but from the very beginning it was illegal because of the presence of a Russian army, and because the Russians had prevented the election of the Russian nobles, as deputies, at Graudenz. In this case might had to take the place of right, and the princes Czartorinski did not let the power lie unused which they had usurped after such great sacrifices.

The few remaining deputies, who were not wholly dependent upon the Czartorinski, were outvoted or deceived. The princes occupied the people with important discussions or sacrificed the demands of the dissenters to their fanaticism, so that the latter saw themselves placed on an equality with the protected Jews, so far as their rights were concerned. It was not till the greater part of the time fixed for the diet had expired, that they brought forward the most

important matters, concealed in ambiguous phrases, and discussed with such haste, that the majority hardly knew what was the question under discussion. The foreign ambassadors had opposed the abolition of the *liberum veto*, but the princes, although they had to yield to this point, knew how to evade this law almost entirely by means of new measures.

The high officials in the departments of justice, finance, war, and police, had heretofore been so many sovereigns. These men, the natural opponents of the proposed reforms, were deposed in a body, and Michael Czartorinski, as Chancellor of Lithuania, voluntarily laid aside his office. To each of these departments were appointed colleges having sixteen members. In these the members had to be appointed by the diet, and only while the diet was not in session did the king have the right to make such appointments. But as it was very evident that no diet could end its session so long as the *liberum veto* existed, this formidable *liberum veto* served to prolong the power of the king.

It was also resolved that all proposals and business affairs which referred directly to the welfare of the republic, should be decided at the very commencement of the diet, and, what is more, by legal form, that is, by a majority vote. This expression was vague enough to allow all possible kinds of matters to come under its head, and it was little less than the practical abolishment of the *liberum veto*, if Poland could become strong enough to hold its own against foreign powers.

Moreover a number of resolutions restored order in all the departments of the administration. The war department was empowered to care for the extension, instruction, discipline and maintenance of the army, which itself was to be increased. In the judicial department a court of justice was to be once more granted to the peasants. The power of the nobles was broken, the offices which were almost independent of

the king were abolished, the arbitrary power of the nobles over their subjects was restricted, the privileges of the great cities, of the provinces, and of the religious sects were abrogated, and all were placed under the direct control of the government.

On the seventh of September, 1764, Stanislaus Augustus Poniatowski ascended the throne which his uncles had strengthened and provided with such important privileges. The four regiments of guards were placed under his immediate command, the postal service and the mint were entrusted to his control, and he was allowed to choose for himself four of the most valuable domains which belonged to the nobles.

Thus the Chancellor of Lithuania succeeded in transforming the whole anarchical administration into an actual monarchy. Under the guise of improving a few branches of the administration, the entire structure of the government had been actually reconstructed. But in order to preserve before foreign powers the appearance of the old constitution and even of the old abuses, and, at the same time, in order to force the nobility to submit to the new order of things, and to be armed against foreign foes, the diet was changed at the end of the session into a confederation, at the head of which was placed a Czartorinski.

Never before had an undertaking involving greater difficulties been more boldly planned, more skilfully executed, and, apparently, more happily accomplished than this governmental reform of the Czartorinski.

The presence of foreign enemies had forced those at home to remain quiet. The ravages and acts of violence wrought by the Russians had been a powerful weapon in the hands of the princes. Their arms restrained the nobility, and the confederate nobles were enabled to protect the new constitution with the means which created it.

But not only the Russian arms, but also the passions of their empress had been of service to the princes.

Since their pride had caused the sacrifice of a crown, since they had renounced the splendour of an unstable throne, they were certain that they would be able to retain the exercise of all their rights in the newly-formed monarchy. Those who had helped Poland did not observe that it had received a new constitution, that the basis of a powerful monarchy had been laid, until this incredible event had become an actual fact.

The new sceptre of Poland wanted nothing now but a strong hand to wield it, but Stanislaus Augustus was not equal to this difficult task. He was terrified at the thought of a war with Russia, and a revolution among the dissatisfied nobles. When he separated his interests from those of his uncles, he gave up their creation and Poland, and when he placed all his hopes on the generosity of the Empress of Russia, he became the victim of her policy.

The downfall of the republic, and the final division of its territory, were the natural consequences of the entire internal condition of this state, whose continuance had become impossible. We are only astonished that it could have existed so long. It is true that the constitution of the third of May, 1791, made one more attempt to preserve the existence of the country by a regeneration of its institutions. A reasonable increase of the power of the king, and the hereditary right of the same, the abolition of the *liberum veto*, the emancipation of the middle class, and some few advantages made for the welfare of the peasants,¹ were the chief purposes of a wiser constitution which Poland ought to have made to flourish after a

¹ As regards the insufficiency of this constitution, the difference between what it was intended to do, and what it actually did accomplish, we may say with Mably:—"On ne peut attaquer directement les abus les plus considérables sans effaroucher les citoyens qui trouveront un avantage à les conserver. Cette multitude innombrable se liguera, elle conjurera contre la patrie, et ses efforts réunis empêcheront sans doute qu'on ne pût fixer les principes

long schooling in tribulation. But this attempt was made a hundred years too late, and it had no effect on the internal life of the state.

The dismemberment of the republic was fated at last to cause its destruction, and with sadness Poland beheld her own sons in the ranks of her enemies.

There was another reason why social reforms could not take root in Poland, and even combined in ruining the republic, that is, because those classes of society for whose benefit the reforms were intended had themselves not yet been brought into existence; at least, they were on so low a stratum of culture and power that the new order of things could not have hoped to find in them a support and a defender.

Finally, one must not fail to observe that Poland by its very geographical position was altogether in the way of two neighbouring states, both of which had in the last hundred years made rapid and unparalleled progress, and in their speedy development were bound to ruin themselves or to annihilate all barriers opposing them. The formation of the land itself brought the Polish nation into collision with Prussia, and this became obvious the very moment these peoples emerged from their barbarous isolation.

After that Russia had taken the Black Sea from the Polish republic, all the latter's rivers and ways of communication led through Prussia. Prussia cut it off from the sea and from the world beyond. The Vistula was the last great artery of life left to Poland, and Prussia was in possession of the mouth of this river. Indeed, one cannot well understand how Poland is to remain independent without Prussia. One is unwilling to claim that this may be secured by the possession of Danzig or by free navigation on the Vistula. Woe to

du gouvernement. Combien de législateurs n'ont pu réparer la faute qu'ils avaient faite de montre rou de laisser entrevoir toute l'étendue des projects qu'ils méditaient."

the people whose existence is to depend on a title-deed for which it does not hold the guarantee by its own strength! Sooner or later Prussia must have become Polish, or Prussian Poland, or the republic must have ceased to exist. In this connection it is interesting to reflect what might have been the probable fate of this state if it had called to its throne the house of Brandenburg instead of Saxony.

The threefold partition of Poland did not end the long series of convulsions, and this unfortunate land continued to be the scene of revolutions after it had been dropped from the roll of nations.

Many Poles emigrated after the catastrophe at the end of the year 1795 which decided the fate of the country, and those capable of bearing arms were gradually enlisted under the flag of France. It is well known how valiantly these men helped to make all those glorious campaigns which elevated France to her supremacy, a supremacy soon to rest heavily on all Europe.

And now all the Poles, who regarded their new rulers as oppressors and the restoration of their country as their salvation, centered their hopes in France, their oldest ally, their natural friend for whom they had just fought more successfully than for themselves. Napoleon, the arbitrator of the destinies of the world, who had founded so many new empires on the ruins of those he had destroyed, why should he not reunite the fragments of one of the oldest powers, one that had been his most faithful ally?

And when the peace of Tilsit gave him the power to make a present of one half of Prussia and to crush the other, he actually did form an independent state out of that part of Poland which had belonged to Prussia and called it the Duchy of Warsaw.

This new Polish duchy received a French constitution and a German regent, the King of Saxony. The diets were newly organized and divided into two

chambers, the French code was introduced and bond service abolished.

Let us consider for a moment what happened at this time and what aroused the enthusiasm of the multitude. An area of eighteen hundred square miles, with a population of four million Poles, had been constituted an independent duchy, and the new state was only too soon to feel the whole weight of its political existence. The proximity of Russia and Austria made it necessary to maintain an army which was disproportionate to the population of the country. It is true that an esteemed and paternal ruler had been assigned to Poland, but Saxony was not of itself sufficiently important to save the country from the oppression of Napoleon. The military levies for the French armies by means of the forcible system of conscription, robbed the land of its strength. The civil list, which had been planned on a grand scale, and the endowments of the French marshals exhausted its revenues. But the "Berlin Decrees" did more than anything else to destroy the sources of wealth from which such great advantages could have been gained. All commerce ceased, and Poland suffered great want in the midst of its many products. And now to these great sacrifices was added the conviction, which forced itself upon all thinking people, that the duchy was fated to be the scene of the first war between France and Austria or Russia, and that it would then be deserted by France, even by its own troops. For the army which was maintained by the country with extreme difficulty was not even at hand for the protection of the country, but was distributed in the Prussian fortresses or was fighting in Spain.¹

Although it was truly an oppressive burden for all governmental arrangements and obligations to be

¹ Compare "Mémoires sur la Pologne et les Polonais," by Mich. Oginski.

apportioned wholly disproportionate to the size of the duchy, yet many believed that in this they had a surer pledge that Napoleon had only formed the framework of a new state in which subsequently all Poland should be reunited. The greatness of the sacrifices which this nation made for France seemed to authorize expectations not less great. Napoleon himself had plainly expressed his intention of restoring Poland, at Berlin, Posen, and Warsaw, he had received the Galician deputies, and he himself had sent emissaries to Lithuania.

On the other hand, a few Poles began to think that they had little to expect from the generosity of the emperor. The readiness with which, at the Treaty of Tilsit, Bialystok had been ceded to Russia, led them to think that Napoleon would have sacrificed the rest of Prussian Poland if it had been in his interest to do so. He demanded money, arms, men, and horses, and he exchanged for them hopes for the future and indefinite promises. It seemed to them as if Napoleon had a high opinion of the Poles as soldiers, but a poor opinion of them as citizens.

Kosciusko might have had the same opinion, for a word from him to his fellow countrymen would have been worth an army to the emperor. But the most faithful friend of his fatherland remained silent, and the most splendid promises of Napoleon could not induce him to take part in the new creation of that Polish duchy.

If the more cultured class, the one influenced by the sentiment of nationalism, love of country, and hope for its welfare, if this class already felt itself deceived, the citizens and peasants felt only an increase of their misery. There is no need of proof to show that the high taxes, the "Berlin Decrees," and the instability of the country's political existence were disastrous to trade. It resulted in the partial ruin of

the newly-built shops and factories on which Prussia had expended millions.¹

The peasant had been proclaimed free. The principle for which France had fought so long and so successfully, did not allow its ruler to perpetuate the slavery of a nation. He therefore announced with great ostentation the total abolition of all bondage. "The services and burdens of the peasant could only depend on a contract. House, farm, land, cattle and implements belong to the lord, but the peasant is absolutely free."

The result of this law was that the peasant could be annually deprived of his place, and it had to be surrendered without any kind of compensation.² Of course, he had the right to emigrate, and, outside of his own country the labour of his hands would have provided him with a comfortable existence in the lowest grade of society. But habit, poverty, ignorance, and his native tongue bound the unfortunate man quite as much to his own home; and the only use he could make of his freedom was that he could leave a place where things went wrong with him, in order to betake himself to another where he was not destined to be better off. Compared with such freedom, bondage was a boon. The wretchedness of the peasantry now first reached its highest point, and the saying of the peasant, "nothing is mine but what I drink up," was both a proverb and a terrible truth, for life assured

¹ It is estimated that in the year 1800 there were 1,200,000 sheep in South Prussia, that is, in a country where everything had to be imported at first. The district of Warsaw produced this same year 4000 stones of wool, that of Kalisch 12,000, the department of Posen 42,000; and yet the number of the newly-founded cloth factories was so great that this supply of wool was not sufficient for them. In the year 1802 they finished 145,000 pieces of cloth.

² V. Grävenitz, "Der Bauer in Poland." "It was the freedom of the bird on the roof, which flies away if anyone throws stones at him."

him no other joys than the delusions of intoxication, and no hope save that in another world which the priests had promised him.

When in the war of 1812, which Napoleon called the second Polish war, the general confederation at Warsaw proclaimed the reconstruction of Poland, much was wanting to make the enthusiasm universal. Lithuania had seen too well the example of the duchy. Its nobles had been kindly treated by Russia, they saw themselves flattered, their customs honoured. Alexander also inspired them with hopes for the reunification of all Poland, in a peaceful manner, under the sceptre of Russia. France gave their peasants freedom and demanded the greatest sacrifices. Its armies, collected from ten nations, were devastating the land, sacking towns and villages, castles and huts, in order to keep themselves from starvation, and they were half forced to commit the greatest deeds of violence.¹

The duchy had made tremendous efforts.² It had raised and equipped an army of more than 60,000 men.³ The expenses exceeded one hundred millions. The annual revenue amounted to only forty millions. The deficit of the year 1811 was twenty-one millions of unpaid taxes, which had to be paid in natural products. It is true that for the past five years the richest harvests had been garnered, but the country no longer had any export. In the north the "Berlin Decrees" had closed Danzig; in the south the Turkish war had shut off Odessa. In the year 1812, on the other hand, there had been a complete failure of crops. The taxes were doubled, but no duties were paid in, and many landowners made their estates over to the

¹ Compare "Histoire de Napoléon et de la grande armée," by Count de Ségur.

² Compare "Histoire de l'ambassade en Pologne," by Mr. de Pradt.

³ "Je n'ai vu personne!" said Napoleon on his return to Warsaw.

treasury commission, because the taxes could not be raised. The civil officers were not paid, and the contractors had fled.¹ The payment of seven millions which France owed for supplies was withheld with worthless excuses. The salt mines of Wieliezka were already mortgaged for twelve millions. Napoleon had advanced the pay for the army for the month of June, in the month of July it was stopped entirely, and afterwards no payment was ever made.

Meantime the French armies marched through the country, robbed the inhabitants, and carried off the peasants and horses. Their number was increasing. Well or sick they had to be fed, clothed and provided with everything. Warsaw was the capital, the magazine, the hospital, and the ammunition depôt. When the Durutte division entered the city, rations for 64,000 men were served out daily, and there never had been less than 6000 dealt out.²

Considering the history of Poland, as we have, with regard to its internal and social condition, the episode of the duchy of Warsaw had to be cited, not because it was an event which promoted or established the development of that condition, but because it was an interruption which hindered and partly retarded the same, while at the same time it destroyed much that Prussia had created at great sacrifices.

While the Polish nation was in the power of three such different states as Austria, Russia, and Prussia, its lot was naturally a varied one. Whatever we may think of the political act which divided the state, it

¹ A review, which was fixed for the first of November, 1811, could not take place, because the soldiers had no shoes.

² Yet Poland recovered more quickly than Lithuania. "Les habitans de la Russie Blanche et de la Lithuanie sont les seuls encore (1819), qui réduits à la misère à la suite de la campagne 1812, n'ayant ni manufactures, ni commerce, ni argent, attendent tout de la providence et de la bienveillance de leur souverain."—Michel Oginski, "Mémoire sur la Pologne."

is certain that in one respect the greater part of the nation received immeasurable benefits as regards administration, police, and commerce, since it was immediately subdivided into states which were far in advance in all these departments. And it is certain that it was forced into a position which the constitution of the third of May, 1791, had it been carried out and actually continued, could never have secured to it.¹

But, of course, no one likes to be forced, not even to be happy, and how often, indeed, an idea has been valued more than a real advantage.

Moreover it was impossible to plan a measure for the public good, which did not in some way oppose the interests of the nobles, and for the simple reason that these nobles were already in possession of all the advantages. Therefore, in case of any of these changes the noble could only suffer for the time being. But these changes, which were inevitable, not only opposed their interests, they also diminished their privileges, which had become hallowed by two hundred years of undisturbed possession. And those who now suffered by the abolition of privileges usurped by their ancestors were not guilty. In addition to this the downfall of the country was keenly felt by the nobility, the only educated class in Poland, though perhaps only by it, and the interest and patriotism of the noble was deeply wounded, for his feeling of nationality was uncommonly intense.

It was a difficult task, therefore, for that government to watch and hold in check this numerous, powerful, and influential class of citizens, and at the same time to act on liberal principles; and we believe that these facts must never be disregarded when one is inclined to criticize what happened on the part of the administration and the opposition which it encountered secretly or openly.

¹ Compare F. J. Jekel's "Analysis of the Constitution of May 3rd, 1791."

In order to give an idea of the way in which the different governments strove to solve this problem, let us next cite the following measures referring essentially to the Austrian part of the country, which at the same time throw full light on the state of affairs existing in the interior.

First of all, the nobles were ordered to remove all cannon and ammunition from the country, on pain of confiscation (Law of April, 1776). The sale of the estates of nobles could only be made after an emigration tax of ten per cent. (September, 1781), and strangers not naturalized could not buy estates in the country. Permission to travel in foreign lands was granted to those who had reached their twenty-eighth year. Those subjects who did not spend half the year on their estates in Galicia had to pay double taxes, (Law of 1783, repealed 1790). The landowners were compelled to lend their peasants corn for sowing; where this was not done the peasant was provided with corn by the state, and this loan was at once paid by sequestrating the lord's land (April, 1787). The estates had to be surveyed at a great expense, and a fixed part of the costs was apportioned to each village by a rural tax, and the landowners sub-collected it from the peasants. The landlord was responsible for this tax as well as for all oppression of subordinates by his tenants and officers (June, 1784), etc.¹

It cannot be denied that many of these measures, while beneficial for the whole, must have been severe upon privileged individuals, especially when they attacked personal liberty, and that the nobles, too, could find no compensation, although the woiwodes and starosts were raised to the rank of counts, and the deputies of the districts to the extensive order of Austrian barons.

What the government did for the aid of commerce

¹ Compare F. J. Jekel "Polens Staatsveränderung," etc.

and industry, both of which had sunk so low, can never be misinterpreted. Already in the year 1809 two hundred and fifty miles of roads were constructed in Galicia alone. The wholly ruined mining industry was put into active operation. The salt-works of Wieliezka, which under Polish rule had produced 6,000,000 hundredweight, under most favourable circumstances, produced in 1809, 17,000,000 hundredweight of salt,¹ and the smelting furnances of Jakubeny annually produced more than 4000 hundredweight of iron. The breed of horses was also improved by excellent studs, which supplied not only the cavalry of the greater part of the Austrian monarchy, but large numbers also were allowed to be sold abroad. In 1817 Galicia had over 311,000 horses.²

Trade and commerce were still mostly in the hands of the Jews, who, as we described them before, have continued to be what they were in former times. For this reason and on account of their enormous increase this race necessarily became the chief object of concern to the governments, especially to Austria and Russia.

As the Jews marry when they are scarcely out of their teens they are soon surrounded by a numerous family, and an opportune bankruptcy is nothing less than a rare expedient in order to establish the sons-in-law. Their number has increased therefore incredibly, and we may assume that in every census of the population it is put too low, because the Jews still try in every way possible to avoid being counted.

The following statistics³ will convince one of the extent of their increase, especially in the cities.

¹ It has been estimated that these salt-mines have produced the enormous amount of 550,000,000 cwt. of salt from the time of their discovery till the year 1812.

² But it had only 400,000 sheep. The Prussian part of the country had 1,200,000 of them.

³ "Géographie de l'Est de l'Europe," published in 1825 at Breslau, by Stanislaus Plater.

Posen contains 25,000 inhabitants, of these 5000, that is one-fifth of the entire population, are Jews.

Warsaw, with 130,000 inhabitants, had in the year 1807 about 9000 Jews, in the year 1822 these had already increased to 27,000, and likewise formed one-fifth of the population.

Lemberg, with 50,000 inhabitants, has 15,000 Jews, thus making almost a third of the population of this city.

In Wilna, 30,000 of the 50,000 inhabitants are Jews, that is three-fifths; and in Brody 17,000 of its 25,000 inhabitants, that is two-thirds of all its number are Jews.

In the open country, to be sure, the Jews are not so numerous, yet in proportion to the population of the provinces their number is remarkable.

The province of Posen has 980,000 inhabitants, of these 70,000 are Jews, that is one-fourteenth of the population. Galicia counts among its 4,000,000 inhabitants 300,000 Jews, that is one-thirteenth. The kingdom of Poland numbered 3,700,000 inhabitants, of whom one-ninth, 400,000, are Jews. Lithuania, Samagitia, Volhynia, White Russia, Ukraine, and Podolia have 8,800,000 inhabitants, of whom 1,300,000, or one-sixth, are Jews.

The total population of the above, formerly Polish territory, is as follows: 17,480,000 inhabitants, of whom 15,410,000 are Christians, 2,070,000 Jews.

According to this the Jews form more than the eighth part of the Polish population, and considerably exceed the number of inhabitants of kingdoms like Wurtemberg, Saxony, or Denmark. In those provinces where the Jews are least numerous every fourteenth person is a Jew, in others every ninth; in the most important cities of the land, on the other hand, every fifth man, at least, is a Jew, while in a few cases two of every three inhabitants are Jews.

If these strangers were formerly made to reside

outside of the cities in the suburbs, they have now made the suburbs the city.¹ Their district is marked by a kind of gate consisting of two posts which are joined by an iron bar, and often the stone synagogue proudly towers above the wooden church, showily decorated within, but completely ruined. In the cities the houses of the Jews are also wretched huts, yet they are better than those of the Christians. Their costume is the same throughout the country, and is quite Oriental, flowing black garments fastened as far as the waist with many hooks and extending to the ankles, high fur caps, worn even in summer, and under them a black cap, their heads shaved excepting two long ringlets on each side, and an unshorn beard. They always wear slippers except when travelling. This costume, the great poverty of the masses, their uncleanliness and the death-like pallor, characteristic of the whole race, make their appearance more striking than pleasant.

All Jews, even those yet in Lithuania, speak German, a circumstance which is of great convenience to foreigners who are rarely acquainted with the different languages of the country. The greater part still speak Hebrew, and this ability to criticize in the presence of the lower classes, without being understood, gives them a certain kind of superiority.

The stranger is amazed at the number of these people who sit idle before their doors in the sun and converse with a liveliness of gesture and expression peculiar to themselves. Thousands of them are to be found at any time without employment, and yet they all live.

Those Jews who are artisans have gained possession of the easiest and most profitable trades. They are tailors, upholsterers, cabinet-makers, carpenters,

¹ "Le plus gros endroit habitué par des chrétiens et des paysans n'est jamais réputé qu'un village, 'wiesz.' Il suffit au contraire d'une douzaine de familles juives pour en faire un 'miasteczko,' petite ville."—Leonard Chodzko, "Les Juifs en Pologne."

rope-makers, weavers, millers, etc., but above all they are watch-makers and jewellers. In the large cities they crowd round the travellers and hire themselves as agents, a kind of hired servant, who most punctually transact all commissions for the very smallest compensation. They know or find out everything, provide all that is asked for, and though their obtrusiveness is excessively annoying, they are altogether indispensable.

The inn everywhere belongs to the Jews. The Polish traveller with his excellent horses, of which he usually drives five, makes very long journeys and is without choice as to a place of stopping when night overtakes him. The rich man takes his own cook with him, his silver service, his Hungarian wine; everyone takes his supper, several cushions and carpets which are to be his bed, and he takes even his forage. None of these things, of course, are to be found in the inns, and the foreign traveller who does not happen to be equipped in this manner would run actual risk of starving, if every manor-house did not offer him a hearty, hospitable reception, which can everywhere be counted on.

But far greater profits flow into the hands of the Jews from their being the first to put the value upon the produce of the land, which they manage for the landowner, or turn into money. The mills, distilleries, and public-houses are their inexhaustible sources of wealth, and the entire produce of the estates passes through their hands. The Jew who rents the public-houses in the village, is the one from whom the landlord derives his chief income. He surrenders to this Jew, whom he knows he can abuse ill-humouredly with safety, by whom he knows himself to be cheated, and with whom, however, he cannot dispense—to this one he surrenders the management of his peasantry without mercy, and without regard for the oppressions which such a man will practise for his own advantage.

Through the Jew the landlord also makes all his purchases, ignoring all Christian merchants who, of course, are unable in any way to compete with the money-genius of this race. And almost all the cash is in their hands, and the nobleman goes in debt for it upon the best part of his estates. Because of the multitude of Jews, and the important position held by this people in the country, criticisms made by travellers and writers upon their moral condition actually terrify one. All methods are the same to them as long as they serve their purpose. In the campaign of 1812, the spies were Jews, who were paid by both parties, and who betrayed both parties. In Wilna they practised the most revolting cruelties on the unfortunate survivors of the French army.¹ In nine lawsuits out of ten a Jew is sure to be the plaintiff or the defendant. Since they are acquainted with the interiors of every house and every family, they are the informers throughout the whole country.² It is very rare that the police detect a theft in which a Jew is not involved as an accomplice, or as a receiver of stolen goods.³ It is the Jews who smuggle and arm the peasants to do it by force, etc.

The Karaites are a notable exception; they reject the Talmud and hold to the text of the Scriptures. They engage mostly in agriculture and keep themselves wholly apart from the rest of the Jews, who are their greatest enemies. There are between four and five thousand of this sect, who live chiefly in Lithuania and Volhynia.

Much has recently been done for the moral elevation of the Jews. Emperor Joseph believed that this race was naturally no more depraved than any other, that it was unwilling to adjust itself to social and civil life,

¹ Ségur "Histoire de Napoléon."

² Joseph Rohrer's "Gemälde des österreichischen Staates."

³ Malte Brun, "Tableau de Pologne."

and to fulfil these duties, chiefly because it had been deprived of all the privileges and advantages of the same.¹ Normal schools were built, which, despite all opposition, even the girls had to attend. Without a certificate of the normal school no youth was allowed to be instructed in the Talmud, no marriage could be contracted, and no apprentice be freed. The religious customs of their ancestors were perfectly free, yet no men were allowed to marry under eighteen, no women under sixteen. All jurisdiction was taken from the Rabbis and they were not allowed to excommunicate anyone. Fourteen thousand Jewish families were settled as agriculturists, and the entire Jewish community paid the costs of the purchase of the land and the agricultural implements, as well as of the farm buildings.

In 1792 an important law was repealed, namely, that no Jew could dwell in the country who was not a farmer or a mechanic. However, they were forbidden, on pain of banishment, to buy from the peasants the unharvested corn, the unborn cattle and the unshorn wool, things which were usually sold for drink beforehand in the taverns. In Galicia the Jews are liable to military service, but they are employed in the baggage-train, unless "one voluntarily wishes to use a gun." In the wars of 1813 and 1815, over fifteen thousand Jews served under the Austrian flag.

By Ukas of April, 1827, the Russian Jews were made liable to military service; the Prussian, since 1817.

The most important enactment in favour of the peasant in Galicia was when Emperor Joseph, April 5th, 1872, abolished bondage. Those subjects who had no houses were permitted at once to leave their

¹ Compare v. Dohm "Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden," and on the other hand, v. Kortum, "Ueber Judenthum und Juden."

master, and were no longer obliged to do "orphan service." Compelled services (*Roboten*) were continued, but they were subjected to exact limitation and arbitrament, June, 1786.

The immaturity of the peasant is best illustrated by the regulations passed for his benefit. It was prohibited to lend him more than three florins (12 groschen). No one was to give him brandy on credit. Henceforth peasants were not obliged to buy a certain quantity of brandy from their masters, and an attempt was made to lessen the consumption of brandy by establishing breweries.

In Prussia such special laws were not enacted for Polish subjects; the regulations enforced for all the provinces were extended to these also, a thing that could be done sooner, since the number of Poles under Prussian rule was comparatively small.

Since the establishment of the kingdom of Prussia this monarchy has been chiefly characterized by its continuous though peaceful progress, by its unceasing development and cultivation of its internal state of affairs, without leaps and without revolutions, methods which have given Prussia a place in the front of reformation, of enlightenment, of liberal institutions, and of a reasonable freedom, at least in Germany.

Thus Prussia now received a heterogenous element in the annexation of Poland, and the more this addition became necessary to the country's local requirements the more necessary was it to seek to amalgamate it with the whole. The determined effort of all the Poles to preserve their nationality even amidst the dismemberment, and to see therein the only and last guarantee of a possible reunion, brought them, therefore, at once into conflict with the natural tendencies of the administration.

The institutions which in Prussia have proceeded from the development of the people themselves, were in the new province called into life at one stroke.

They found, therefore, neither the spirit nor the mind of the people ready for them. Wherever enlightenment had not prepared the way for them, they caused surprise, and the extension to Polish subjects of the laws made for the monarchy was for them a veritable revolution.

The equality of all classes before the law, and the protection of the law for the very lowest class were natural results of the union with Prussia. Moreover this offered the oppressed peasant protection from excessive abuse. But as the Prussian country-law only provides for the abatement of existing burdens when a diminution of the income has recently taken place, for example, when fields are flooded or sanded, etc., but a diminution is only possible when there is still an income, the condition of the peasant who had nothing more to lose than his life, was not thereby essentially bettered. Such a great evil could not be alleviated by ordinary measures.

Still this was absolutely necessary, for the condition of the peasant and the state of agriculture had sunk to the lowest level.

Since the customary "three-field system" robbed the land of its strength annually, even under the management of the owner, how much more must this have been the case with a farmer who rented the farm for a year, and who was, besides, a new hand on the place.

As the fields became wastes, so the dwellings also became ruins. The peasant did not lift his hand to prop up the hut, which threatened to fall in upon his head, and in which he no longer had any right of ownership. It is true that there was abundance of wood, straw, lime, and stone everywhere, and that nature had scattered building materials in the fields also surrounding the wretched villages, but it never occurred to the peasant to pick them up, for he was uncertain whether he would not be obliged to leave

without compensation at the end of a year's time what he had built to-day. No fruit orchard, no garden surrounds his house, for before the fruit ripens he who planted it is perhaps driven away, and there are no hedges nor ditches nor fences, because there is nothing to protect or to enclose. Even the animal world became stunted and crippled, under the curse of serfdom. Nowhere were there worse horses than those of the peasants in Poland, once celebrated for its fine breeds. This is easily explained, for the common peasant harnesses the horse when two years old, overworks it daily, leaves it uncared for, and gives it only the worst kind of fodder. If the cattle of the peasant dies, the landlord has to replace it, because he otherwise could not do the work which was due to his master. The landlord had to do everything; he had to build anew the buildings which would have stood a long time with slight repairs on the part of the occupant, he had to replace things that would have lasted a long time with a little care in using, he had to protect things which the peasant had no interest in protecting. Bread, it is to be remembered, was a rarity for the peasant in the great granary of Europe, and potatoes were his sole nourishment. They furnished him with his daily food, and, unfortunately, his only drink. When the potato crop is exhausted, usually early in the year, then the peasant expects that his landlord shall miserably support him. He begs everything from his lord's kindness, medicine for his sickness, boards for his coffin and mass for the salvation of his soul. And such is not the Polish peasant as he was in the middle ages, but as he lives at this hour in all villages, even under Prussian rule where the emancipation has not taken place,¹ of which we are about to speak.

¹ Whoever has been in Poland, will not find this description overdrawn in any respect. The truth demands it to be said, however, that most of the landlords do not abuse the extent of their

The period of Prussia's deepest external humiliation was that of its highest internal development, and from the very time it was hardest pressed by its French neighbour, national and liberal institutions sprang into existence.

One of the most important laws of that epoch was the edict of September 14th, 1811, the regulation of relations between landowner and peasant, which was extended to the province of Posen, after it was retaken, and which has already effected a complete transformation in the condition of the peasant, and must continue to do so. We must, therefore, present the fundamental principles of this edict.¹

According to the general principles of public law and political economy the right of the state to ordinary and extraordinary taxes and dues is paramount, and the dues to the landlord are subject to this limitation, that he must leave the peasants means to exist, and to satisfy the state.

In case the taxes and dues to the landlord do not exceed one-third of the entire income of a hereditary estate, their ability to do this is taken for granted.

Therefore the rights of the landlords were never greater, nor would they have been allowed to be so by law.

While the above edict gave all peasants, small farmers, cottagers, holders of a hide of land, etc., full right of ownership over two-thirds of the land hitherto used by them and freed them from all services and statute labour, which up to this time were connected with this use, it gave at the same time the landlord one-third of these lands as equivalent compensation. The new owners had to renounce all claim to the obligations hitherto fulfilled by the landlords, namely, the repairing

authority, and that many treat these subjects so dependent upon them with a truly patriarchal kindness.

¹ Compare "Code for the Royal Prussian State," Part I., p. 281.

of buildings, the providing of agricultural implements, the liability for public taxes and dues, and various kinds of relief measures; they assumed the payment of taxes for their property and the present and future communal taxes. For the purpose of rounding off and enclosing the landlord's estates, things very important for economy's sake, he was allowed to transfer his peasantry to other farms, provided he dealt out estates of equal value and the necessary new buildings.

Instead of giving one-third of the estate for compensation, which was regarded as the most advantageous where farms exceeded fifty acres, a settlement could be effected, in case of the smaller estate, by means of capital or rent, the latter by payment of one-third of the entire sum in grain or in money.

Finally, such an estate not hereditary, which had been leased by the landlords, for certain services or dues, a fixed number of years or for an indefinite time, was handed over to the temporary possessors as their property after one-half had been ceded to the landlords as a compensation for the same.

A space of two, three, or even six years, was fixed for agreement upon such matters. Provided no understanding had been reached at that time, the settlement was to be made by a committee of referees on the part of the state.

Such were the principal features of this remarkable law which, of course, underwent numerous modifications in its execution and was attended necessarily with great difficulties, especially so in the Polish provinces. The taxes were exceedingly varied, in some places they did not equal one-third of the income of the estates, in many they exceeded this proportion. Since the regulation of service, the land had often been made decidedly better or worse, or new soil even was cultivated, and the obligations of the landlords differed greatly and were changed to suit time and place. In the case of more involved matters the more desirable

an amicable agreement, the less was the willingness to have it.

The landlords naturally looked upon the whole measure as harsh and injurious, especially when they gauged it by their former privileges. "They compensate us," they said, "with what is already our property; they increase the size of our fields which are already too large, and deprive us of the hands which were found to till them for us. Even if we were willing to consider the cession of one-third and one-half of the peasant lands generally as a compensation, it cannot be compared with what we lose. The fields are badly cultivated, and, therefore, of little value. The laziness and idleness of our peasants will make labourers scarce, wages high, especially since they must be paid mostly in money, which is hard to raise. We were not burdened by the duties from which we are freed; our extensive forests furnished us the means to meet them. The surveying of the estates, and the special commissions, cause us great expense, and we are exposed to the exactions of subordinates who are always inclined to take sides with the peasantry against us, and this too in a matter where our property depends on the insight, impartiality and uprightness of these commissions.

"But this reform will be of no avail to the common man, at least not to our poor peasants.¹ In consequence of the tutelage in which he has always lived, the dangerous right which has been granted him of encumbering his property with debt and of selling it will bring about his ruin; yes, even now the mere prospect of this right induces the greater part of them to mortgage their farms to the Jews, and it will result in their being entirely lost to the owners, and placed in

¹ It is true that it was necessary in some places to compel the peasants to take possession of their new property. But this proves nothing against the case. The same thing occurred in France under Louis IX. The serf cannot value freedom before he knows it.

the hands of a class of men who will not husband them, but convert them into an article of merchandise."

As we have described the relation of the peasant to the lord, we think that we need not add anything in general about the necessity of giving him assistance, or about the justice of the measures that have this object in view. But with regard to their utility it would be well to determine the point of view from which to judge the reasonableness or unreasonableness of those complaints.

Until now the great landowner had to have his immeasurable fields cultivated by forced labour; the labourer took no interest in the success of his day's work; the produce passed through the hands of subordinates, therefore it was not possible for the land to be as valuable to him as to the small owner who ploughs, sows and gathers in the harvest, and does not allow the smallest piece of land to be unused. He alone can offer the highest price for the land, he can offer four times the amount it yields to the great landowner. From this it is obvious how much the cultivation of the land must be increased by decreasing the extent of the property, and by increasing the number of proprietors, especially in a country like Poland, where the produce of the fields can be increased so greatly, where endless woods, which bring in nothing, cover the finest soil for wheat, and where only labourers are needed to make this available.

Agriculture—and in this it differs wholly from industry—can be brought to such a height of perfection that it cannot be improved upon, and this height has actually been reached in several provinces of the Prussian kingdom. In Poland, on the other hand, industry and activity have still the greatest conquests to make.

The distribution of property was the surest way to reach this. The peasant was now certain that he was

working for himself and his family, that every improvement, even if he did not live to see its result, was for the benefit of his children, among whom he could divide his property at will. It was no longer a question of getting the greatest possible profits out of the land in a short time, not caring whether its fertility would thereby be injured, but chiefly of keeping the property in a good condition. Though day labour cost more than forced service, the former was incomparably better. Agriculture gained more labourers, and the greater exertions of these labourers did more work than formerly.

The right, naturally accompanying the lease of property, to divide or transfer it, had the great advantage of freeing inherited farms from the burden of debt, as the shares to be paid out could be acquired by the sale of single estates. It was the means to keep the estates free from debt. For by selling a part every owner could hold his stock for the other part. Estates which would have degenerated in the hands of a poor, indebted owner, passed by purchase into the possession of a prosperous man, who could keep them in proper condition.

The state finally obtained a numerous and valuable new class of landowners who, because their interests bound them to the government, were trusty and faithful subjects, a circumstance not to be overlooked in this connection. A revolution could bring only loss to the new proprietors, and, as they formed the bulk of the nation, they were at the same time increasing their power to such an extent as was bound to furnish the best guaranty to the government.

Nowhere does the comparison between the old and new condition become more manifest than in the very province of Posen, where the contrasts meet, and where a few hundred steps bring the observer from villages, such as one would never expect to find in Europe, to others where clean houses surrounded with

gardens and orchards, and fenced in with proper care, delight the eye.

In this manner, within a few years, the Prussian government will effect complete enfranchisement of the peasants, and the conversion of a great part of them into proprietors, an undertaking which was long thought to be theoretically impossible,¹ and which undoubtedly would have been impossible for centuries in independent Poland. For where in Poland would the power of the state have been derived to encounter the opposition of selfish interest, though a misconceived interest? where the dominating authority which would have restrained the unbridled passions? Only under the sovereignty of a state firmly established and already far advanced, like Prussia, could such a measure be accomplished without involving the country in a revolution and in the most violent reactions.

So much was done in Prussia for the peasant. Schools were founded to educate the people, shops and factories established to encourage commerce, and new impetus was given to trade by the abolition of the restrictions upon trade.

Neither Russia nor Austria was able to venture

¹ Mably (in his work, "Du gouvernement et des lois de la Pologne") and J. J. Rousseau ("Sur le gouvernement de Pologne"), planned a constitution for the nation, in which they forgot the nation. Of the peasants, that is, of $\frac{2}{3}$ of them, the latter says: "Je ne crains pas seulement l'intérêt mal entendu, l'amour propre et les préjugés des maîtres, je crandrai les vices et la lâcheté des serfs." Mably calls them "une classe d'hommes abrutis et malheureux." Stanislaus Leszczyński judges his fellow-countrymen differently: "qu'ils (les paysans) jouissent d'une partie de nos immunités, l'état n'aura peut-être point de membres plus utiles. Qu'ils puissent s'unir entre eux par un trafic mutuel, qu'ils n'ayent plus à craindre les vexations de leurs maîtres, les insultes des soldats, le mépris, les outrages de la noblesse, qu'ils ayent des morceaux de terre des maisons où ils puissent vivre en sûreté, qu'ils puissent laisser à leurs enfans les acquisitions qu'ils auront faites—alors nous croirons vivre dans une autre terre et sous un autre ciel."

upon so thorough a reform as the enfranchisement of the mass of the people in their Polish provinces, both on account of the grade of development of these states themselves, and of the principles which their governments pursue, and on account of the numerical proportion of Polish subjects to their own. For while the population of the Prussian state amounted to twelve millions, that of Poland was scarcely one million. In Austria, on the other hand, which had about twenty-eight million inhabitants (of whom, by the way, only five and one half millions were German) the four million Polish subjects made one-seventh of the entire population. In Russia thirteen million Poles¹ were added to the forty million souls that form the population of Russia in Europe, that is, the

¹ The disposition not to count the Lithuanians, minor Russians, etc., among the number of Poles, does not seem to be sustained by history.

Both Russians and Poles are branches of the Slavonic main trunk, and this kinship is recognized also in their languages. But throughout Poland proper, the same language is spoken by all the people, even by the common people, for there is no dialect or patois, and genuine Polish is the same in all Poland. One universal Russian language, on the other hand, which would be spoken throughout the country, exists no more than one Slavonic language. The prevailing language, the one commonly understood by Russians, has a Slavonic origin, and sprang from the fusion of Slavonic settlers with Ostiaks, Petscharians, Tartars, etc., about the year 1114. It has thus become essentially different from its half sister, the Polish. Slavonic by origin, moreover, are the rest of the dialects which are spoken in the White, Red, and Black Russias, and as they remained unmixed, they are much more like the Polish than the Russian, and must pass as dialects of the former rather than as branches of the latter.

As for the Lithuanians, they were originally as little related to the Russians as to the Poles, for they were originally Herulian. During the thirteenth century this race was subdued in Prussia by the German knights; in Livonia, by the knights of the order of the sword; only Lithuania remained independent, as it joined itself closer to the Slavic races, and so the Lithuanians also soon adopted the Polish language, and moreover the common people the dialect of the White Russians, the educated the pure Polish. Even the old

Poles form one-third of the entire population, and in comparison with Russia they occupied a small territory, and, excepting their government, they were a step in advance of the Russians.

names of the rivers and cities were exchanged for new Polish names (Wilna, for example, was once Neri).

So in Lithuania the peculiar Herulian language was lost, and only traces of it are found to-day in a few small villages. Both it and chiefly the Samitian customs have been retained to a greater extent under German rule, that is, in Samogitia, and the Samites even to this day preserve an individuality differing from that of all their neighbours. One is amazed to hear the language of the Greeks and Scythians, of the Romans and Skandinavians re-echoing on the lips of a nation which hardly knows the world's history. The similarity of many words of the Samitian language as well as of their inflections to those of the languages already mentioned, is surprising, and almost the only possible explanation is the existence of an original language (Japhetese language) of which the Slavic, Germanic, Celtic, Romance, etc., themselves are only branches.

We cite a few illustrations from a large list (compare "Tableau de la Pologne," edition of Chodzko 1830, Tome I., chap. XIII. De la langue lithuanienne).

Lithuanian, menu ;	Greek, mene ;	Danish, maane (<i>moon</i>).	
„	ugnis ;	Latin, ignis (<i>fire</i>).	
„	wandu ;	Danish, vand (<i>water</i>).	
„	nactis	(<i>night</i>).	
„	sunus	(<i>son</i>).	
„	wiras ;	Latin, vir (<i>man</i>).	
„	ductie ;	Greek, thygater ;	English (<i>daughter</i>).
„	brotis ;	Danish, broder (<i>brother</i>).	
„	dantis ;	Latin, dens (<i>tooth</i>).	
„	nosis ;	Latin, nasus (<i>nose</i>).	
„	alminti ;	Danish admindel (<i>remind</i>).	

The remarkable agreement in declension with that of the classic tongue may be illustrated by the conjugation of the verb "to be."

Ach essu, <i>I am.</i>	mess essam, <i>we are.</i>
tu essi, <i>thou art.</i>	ius essat, <i>you are.</i>
ance ir (Danish han, er) <i>he is.</i>	ani ari, <i>they are, etc.</i>

Also the customs of the Samites, as they partly exist to-day, frequently recall those of the Greeks and Romans. To this day, for example, the bride is carried away by two friends of the bridegroom before the marriage is celebrated. On the wedding-day she is blindfolded, and conducted to each door of her house, honey is laid upon

At the Vienna Congress the part of the quondam duchy of Warsaw which fell to the share of Russia was raised to an independent kingdom, and after it was joined to Russia by a constitution it was to have its own government.

The chief objection of all the Poles to the creation of this kingdom was, that only three millions were united by it, while the unequal and greater number of their countrymen were ruled by ukases and were kept separate from the rest.¹

But if this establishment of an actual Polish state seemed to the Poles a thing too small, it was regarded

her lips, and wheat scattered over her. Girls cut off the hair of the new bride, and beat her as they lead her to her bridal bed. The funeral obsequies to which the spirits of the departed are invited, the interment in hills, and the name of the first deity, *Auxtea visa geist* (Danish *høieste vise geist*), supreme wise spirit, vividly recall the Skandinavian custom and language.

We have allowed ourselves to make this digression because it is a question whether Russia has three or thirteen millions of Polish subjects, and whether Austria rules over Poles or Russians in Galicia. If the Lithuanians are not at all related to Russia by ancestry, if not allied to the Poles by language, one does not understand why fifty years of Russian rule ought to have made them more Russian than four centuries' union with the republic of Poland made them Poles.

¹ It may be observed at this point that complaints about this, if they really were made, ought to have been louder in Lithuania than in Poland where utterance was given to them. Michael Oginski, however, explains this riddle, Tome IV., chap. VI. p. 234. During an audience given in November, 1815, hence at a time after the kingdom had been recognized by all Europe, he complained to the Emperor: "Qu'il n'est pas permis à Wilna de faire mention du royaume de Pologne. Personne dans la société n'ose prononcer le nom de Pologne ou de Polonais; et l'organisation du nouveau royaume est aussi peu connue chez nous, que si nous étions éloignés de mille lieues de Varsovie."

"Je ne savais pas un mot de cela," répondit l'empereur avec beaucoup de vivacité, "mais un trait de plume va changer," etc. "J'écrivais à Korsakow combien je suis étonné du secret qu'on garde et du secret qu'on fait à Wilna de l'existence d'un royaume que toute l'Europe reconnaît."

by the Russian party also as a thing too great. To the former it was far less a guarantee of their freedom than to the latter a hindrance which stood in the way of all the government's measures, even at times when it might sincerely have the best of intentions. One must not forget that Poland was indebted to the emperor for the retention of its name, its language, even its nationality, to that emperor against whom it armed itself up to the last moment; although it seemed that complete union or complete separation of all Poland would necessarily have been preferable to this middle course.

The union of Poland with another state revealed, as nothing else, the peculiar affairs of this state itself. Russia's ruler was the king whom they purposed to bind by a constitution which he had the power to violate at any moment, and often, of course, it was for his interest to do so. Russian noblemen still estimated their wealth according to the number of their bond peasants, and could therefore regard only with fear the approaching freedom of the peasant in the neighbouring state. In Russia itself the greatest reforms were necessary, and the development of this state delayed that of Poland. Finally, Russia could not grant Poland commercial advantages which it itself needed, for trade still depended upon Prussia, and the Augustow Canal could not take the place of the Vistula.

If at the very beginning governor and governed met each other with distrust and hostile reminiscences, the administration of the government by strangers or by officials who were supported by strange authority, aroused great bitterness. Attacks upon personal liberty and loss of nationality that had been conceded once by arrogant rulers, were deeply and universally felt.

As regards administrative affairs, Poland received from Russia those institutions which all other civilized countries in Europe had possessed for centuries, and

which had been held back only by the endless disturbances of the diets and the wars consequent upon them. These included a well-ordered system of finance, credit, and mortgage, a postal system, a well-organized army, constructed roadways and canals, a university and library at Warsaw, and several essential arrangements of the same class.

The establishment of shops and factories was encouraged, and, as the importation of foreign goods was forbidden, these soon acquired a considerable degree of prosperity and excellence. Indeed, Poland exported a large number of goods through Russia to China. By this means also the Pole bought at forty per cent. dearer at home than abroad,¹ which was more expensive for the landowner since the price of produce continued to be very cheap, both on account of lack of communication by land and water, and especially because a disproportionately small part of his produce was consumed at home. Industry was created through the colonization of foreigners, principally Germans, by no means did it proceed from the people themselves. The common people lacked the capital, liberty, and intelligence required for undertakings of that sort. Besides, great and oppressive privileges² were extant, which prevented the people from taking part in manufacture and trade, and made the manufactures dear and poor in quality. Moreover, a few prosperous manufacturers and merchants were unable to constitute the middle-class of a nation, and in this respect there was and continued to exist a want that was not supplied.

Nothing was done for the good of the peasant. He

¹ One frequently saw Polish landowners going twenty or thirty miles to purchase cheaper and better clothes in the frontier towns of Prussia.

² In return for a large loan to the government, for example, a rich Jew had exclusive right to sell tobacco in the whole kingdom, and brandy in Warsaw.

was, of course, nominally free, but in reality without property, bound to forced service, and, on the whole, in the same wretched condition as we saw him before. The only way to aid him was to loan him property, but this also was attended with the greatest difficulty. The government had to pause before giving the nobleman, already displeased with the encroachment upon his rights, so much cause for dissatisfaction, which, in this case, could easily have been transferred to Russia itself. Besides, the Polish peasant was not yet ready for proprietorship. Nothing but time and education could lend aid here, and the founding of schools was necessarily the first step and the chief aim of the government in order to gain for itself support among the mass of the people—and this the sooner since it seemed impossible to gain for itself the nobility of Poland.

Let it not be imagined that we intend to claim that the peasant of the duchy of Posen is more advanced in culture, and more prepared for proprietorship than the one in the kingdom. But with eleven millions of German subjects, who were connected to the person of their landlord by speech, customs, interests, a part of them by long acquaintance with the government, and all by a rare kind of confidence and universal love, with such an element of stability much could be undertaken that would have been a failure under other circumstances.

But, through the purchase of the national estates, the lot of the Polish peasantry in the kingdom was still worse, for the new owners, without government interference, deprived the peasant of the more important rights previously possessed by him upon these estates.

From the very moment when public opinion in Poland declared itself against the government, every avenue to participation in public matters was closed to the young Pole. Necessity alone forced him to serve as an officer in an army which he looked upon as an instru-

ment of oppression. Scientific instruction was avoided either because students were watched and guarded in a dishonourable manner, or because every position in the civil offices was looked upon as dependent upon a government, which from its very tendency did not allow itself to be united with proper sentiments towards the fatherland, and often because of a feigned patriotism at the bottom of which was distaste for solid, positive studies. The result was that the Pole felt a kind of contempt for any of their countrymen who accepted a position from the government, without considering that in this very way the country, should it once be left to care for itself, would by necessity be without good officers and useful business-men in all its departments.

Oppression at home drove the Pole to seek freedom abroad. Early years were passed in travelling, which otherwise are devoted to study, and Paris was the rendezvous where most of the young men of this nation received a superficial education, where they adopted lofty views corresponding to their condition and their age, and then, full of life and desire to work, they returned to their country and to perfect indolence.

The wealthy man sought at his country seat the only round of business in which he did not have to humiliate himself before a hated government, and where he had hopes of escaping its distrust and arbitrariness. There now he assembled a great number of poor fellow-countrymen, who had no bread because they filled no offices, and whose patriotism or incapacity gave them a right to the support of the rich. When—and partly, by this very means—the rich man himself became poor, and passed from the number of the hospitable to the number of those who live from hospitality, then Russia gained another new enemy glowing with rage, who never ceased to ascribe his ruin and every misfortune in general to the government and to the subjection of his country.

Thus from day to day increased the number of young men from the educated classes, who, full of attachment to their nationality, were fired with ardent hatred against Russia, men, who had much to win, and almost nothing more to lose. Perhaps it is more characteristic of the Poles than of any other people to let their ill-humour escape in talk. But now when an excessively severe censorship watched every written thought,¹ and numerous agents of the police guarded every harangue, when the Poles saw themselves surrounded on every side by spies, or thought so, they were actually driven into secret conspiracies, and, because they themselves did not dare openly to express an innocent thing, they committed the most guilty acts secretly. There was a general confederation of almost all Poles far and wide, not only at home, but throughout all Europe; dissatisfaction with the government and hatred of its officials, were the counter-sign of all of them; imprisonment on account of free speech became a martyrdom in the opinion of others, an act showing hate for the nation was of itself a merit in the eyes of beauty, and the favour of women spurred men on to resist the law.

Such was the state of affairs when on the twenty-ninth of November, 1830, a handful of students and subordinate officers started a revolt in Warsaw, which rapidly spread over all Poland, and a part of Russia, for an instant overthrew the government, and in a few days forced the Russian troops to leave the country.

If such an insignificant cause produced such a frightful result, it could be only because the action of these young students was nothing else than the spark that fell into a heap of combustibles of dissatisfaction,

¹ The Polish Revolution of 1830 is the only one of recent times to which the press cannot be charged with having given assistance, unless it be charged with excessive reticence. For since even the most moderate expression of dissatisfaction was forbidden, Poland passed directly from dissatisfaction to revolution.

and the explosion would have been caused just as easily, sooner or later, by any other accident.

Obviously the interests of mill-owners, manufacturers, and merchants, in short, of all those belonging to the middle class, were wholly opposed to such a revolution, and during its entire duration they were actually its opponents, but we have already seen that this middle class continued to be of little weight in Poland.

The peasant was a disinterested observer, but by no means unconcerned. Famine, disease, abuse, and devastation, were the lot which fell to him on this as on all similar occasions. But he had as little to hope¹ from the government as from his landlord, and did what man oppressed by slavery always does, he suffered patiently.

It was the nobleman that aroused this storm, and what he was able to do in a country where the educated class and the nobility are still one and the same, Russia now learned in the deadly struggle.

The fires of this revolt are at this moment being quenched with blood on the very fields of Wola, which formerly witnessed the elections of kings, the splendour and power of the Polish nation. Poland has been conquered with the sword in its hand, and it has no right to dictate conditions to the conqueror. But the same young emperor of whom history has to record such extraordinary deeds in the few years of his sovereignty, at whose ascendancy a terrible insurrection was suppressed by his personal stability, rather than by

¹ The Polish noblemen have been blamed for not having freed their peasants, in order to make the revolution national. But what was this freedom to consist of? Bondage did not exist; for the most part, the personal privileges of the lords were limited humanly by civilization itself. And if it will be imputed as sacrifice enough for the landlord to furnish the peasant with property at his own cost, it must be conceded that that moment when all bonds were loosed was the most unfavourable one for the government to perform an act which it had not dared to undertake even in a time of peace.

anything else, before whose presence the crescent in Persia as well as in Turkey is prostrated, who himself hastened to the infected capital city to aid his suffering people, this emperor has the power to make of Poland what it is to be in Europe in future time.

From the very beginning the most striking contradictions have marked the career of this people, among whom the republic was combined with the kingdom, the splendour of the throne with the impotency of the ruler. We find the officers of the state rich and the republic poor, the general of the crown powerful and the army feeble. Excessive luxury goes hand in hand with naked poverty. Wildest courage and noisiest resistance, schooled by necessity to yield, are changed into docile submissiveness and speedy reconciliation. Bribery, treachery and fraud are contrasted with the greatest bravery and patriotism, and the most heroic endurance of suffering. The history of the country shows us characters, that would have been resplendent in Greece or Rome, alongside of traitors and perjurers, it shows the noble, generous brother who is the law-giver and defender of his people, beside the fierce, savage brother who leads foreign armies against his own home; it shows a father, who drew upon himself the curse of his fellow-citizens and posterity, and a son who wiped away the guilt of the father with his own possessions, and his own blood. Yes, truly, inconsistencies are commingled in one and the same character, and we are amazed to behold men that have fought with great distinction among their confederates finally offering themselves as ready instruments of oppression. The same names which Poland honours as its protectors are enumerated among the number of its foes.

Excess of freedom, and excess of slavery have destroyed independent Poland, but in its very ruins it preserves the fusion of its resistant forces. A constitutional state whose king is absolute monarch of

forty millions of Russians, enormous wealth and overwhelming poverty, a fertile soil and untilled fields, magnificent palaces surrounded by the most wretched hovels ever inhabited by human beings, such we behold Poland, the state, which was founded upon perfect equality of all men, till this very day the land of inequality, of contrasts, and contradictions.



THE WESTERN BOUNDARY.



PREFACE.

THE following essay published in the second number of the "*Deutschen Vierteljahrsschrift*,"¹ 1841, theoretically discusses a question to which the author was to be called upon to help work out a practical answer thirty years later in so glorious a manner. This circumstance alone makes the essay valuable to the reader of to-day, but still more so the fact that much of the argument may be applied, in a really surprising manner, to the present itself as well as to the year 1840.

At that date, 1840, Thiers, as minister of King Louis Philippe, piqued by the defeat which France had suffered in the Oriental question, and through the quadruple alliance of the great powers for the protection of the Sultan, had openly declared that France must seek satisfaction from Germany, and must demand the left bank of the Rhine. The general patriotic indignation in Germany, which found popular expression in Becker's song of the Rhine: "Sie sollen ihn nicht haben," in combination with the peaceful inclination of Louis Philippe, caused the downfall of the minister. Once again, however, it became only too manifest how the French nation, which had rejoiced at the claims of Thiers, had allowed itself to be deceived in its desire for the German frontier. The present essay illustrates the vanity of this desire with inexorable logic, and a conscientious regard for historical facts.

¹ The review "*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*," was published from 1841 till 1870, by J. G. Cotta in Stuttgart and was one of the first of German reviews as long as it continued to exist. Among its contributors were the most famous scientists and prominent military leaders, like Moltke and Pönitz.



THE WESTERN BOUNDARY.

SINCE in France the claims on the boundary of the Rhine are traditional, and since these on every occasion and with the approval of all parties, are made to appear as if France has to recall an ancient valid privilege which Germany retains, to redress a heavy loss which Germany inflicts upon it, to restore the natural boundaries which Germany has broken through in an unnatural and unlawful manner; since this is the dominant conviction in France, and since not only ambitious ministers, like Thiers, and young republicans, but also loyal peers, like the Duke of Noailles, and gentle poets, like Lamartine, have loudly and equally *bona fide* given utterance to the same opinion, it is high time to submit these French claims once for all to a purely historical examination. We shall be as brief as possible, yet we must turn to the history of early times, pretty far back, in order to establish clearly the boundary relations of France to Germany.

The Gauls, who formerly inhabited the country now called France, were conquered by the great Cæsar about the middle of the first century before Christ, and their entire country was incorporated in the Roman Empire. For five hundred years they continued to be subjects of the Roman Cæsars, they accepted the language, customs, religion, science, and art of the Romans, and at the same time all the vices of the later period of the empire. In the same epoch in which Gaul was subjugated by the Romans, the ancient

Roman republic came to an end and the despotic and gradually degenerating government of the emperors began. At the end of this epoch Gaul shared the misery of slavery and the worst demoralization with all the other Roman provinces. Ecclesiastical and profane writers of that period, whose works have been preserved for us, vie with one another in giving us the most shocking descriptions of it. Especially do they complain of the Gauls' mania for the theatre, who, in the midst of the murder and the conflagration accompanying the migration of the nations, stand upon the ruins of their cities and continue to cry for plays. And the frivolity of their morals was such that all indulged in licentious desires without regard to age or blood-relationship. Every trace of political freedom and honour had disappeared to such an extent, that, at the dissolution of the empire, there was no class, no corporation, to be found which could or would have established a new political structure. There were only slaves left who were distributed among a few rich satraps.

We think that these facts should be mentioned first because the French, since the last century, have laboured under the delusion that they are the direct descendants and heirs of ancient republicanism. They maintain that their revolution is a restoration of that antique civil liberty, a reaction of democratic Romanism or Latinism against aristocratic Germanism, an emancipation of the ancient Roman-Gallic population from the yoke of the German conquerors or from the Franconian feudal lords. In this sense they have sought to banish all remembrances of the Franks, they have revived in their new republic the names of the ancient Roman republic, the senate, the consuls.

To this end Napoleon also acted when he, like the emperors of ancient Rome, gave back the conquered land the oldest names, such as Liguria, Cisalpinia, Helvetia, Belgium, Batavia, etc. Napoleon acted con-

sistently in doing this. But the republicans were certainly wrong in terming themselves the heirs of the freedom of ancient Rome, as Gaul had never known this very thing, nor did it come under Roman rule until after freedom had been carried to its grave.

By the Romans, the Gauls were robbed of all freedom; they were unnationalized, unnerved. They received their freedom back again first from the German conquerors, and their morals were improved.

While the Romans succeeded in a short time in completely subjugating the Gauls, they did not succeed in doing the same with the Germans. The Germans, or *Deutschen*, knew how to maintain their freedom and independence against all attacks on the part of the Roman Empire, and they struggled vigorously for five hundred years against the superior power of Rome, a period equally as long as that during which the Gauls were the slaves of Rome. At last the Germans conquered, destroyed the Roman Empire, and also gained a victory over Gaul.

The settlement of German conquerors in Gaul was equally as fortunate and salutary for the Gaul as that of the Romans had been unfortunate and harmful for them. Through the Romans they had lost their nationality, independence, freedom, good morals and healthy existence, Through the Germans these same were restored to them. It was first by the fusion of the slavish population sunken in vice with the free and strong Franks, Goths, and Burgundians that healthful life returned to the people of Gaul, a new national sentiment, a new popular morality, established upon honour, and a new state of justice, established upon freedom. The vanquished were treated with forbearance and received privileges which they had never possessed under the Romans. Soon they shared in all the privileges of the conquerors, and in the duties of government. They soon accustomed themselves to the new constitutional liberty which the Franks had

brought to them. Not only Franks, but Roman-Gauls also appeared upon the field of Mars and sat in the council of the constitutional kings bound by election and agreement. Therefore Montesquieu rightly says freedom is a gift which the Franks brought to Gaul from the Germanic forests. But the French of to-day are seeking to forget this beautiful and true saying of Montesquieu, and are unwilling to be reminded of it.

Gaul received still more benefices from the Germans. In the beginning of the eighth century the Mohammedans conquered Spain, and in innumerable bands they pressed beyond the Pyrenees. The new Frankish Empire in Gaul was not yet fully established. The Roman language was spoken so generally that Germanic ability was not yet able to vanquish all forms of weakness. Therefore, western France submitted to the crescent, and would have been completely subjected and converted to the faith of the Mussulman had it not been saved by the armed forces of Rhine-Franks, Suebians, Bavarians, and Thuringians.

In the ninth century Germany was separated from France as an empire under Lewis the German. France was made a kingdom by itself, under Charles the Bald. Now it is noticeable, and special weight should be placed upon it, that the German emperors, though far more powerful than the French kings, always preserved friendship with France, and never planned to disturb or to weaken it. How fortunate it was for France that it was always spared most on its weakest side by its strongest neighbour, and was at no time disturbed in its development!

It was natural that at that time, moreover, the little French kingdom should occupy a place subordinate to the great German Empire. The Germans were the lords of the universe. What were the Gauls to them? The Germans had shattered the yoke of Rome, they had opposed a brazen wall to Islamism, they had awakened new life in the ancient Roman provinces of

England, France, and Italy, they had laid a new foundation for state constitutionality, civil freedom, prosperity and honour. On the other hand, what had the Gauls done? They had as former slaves of Rome, as a vanquished people received only the benefits which the German conquerors had generously granted them. They remained passive, the Germans alone possessed the energy. Everything that was done to transform ancient, degraded, degenerated Gaul into new salutary and flourishing France, was done by the Germans. Under such circumstances, indeed, it could not have occurred to the Gauls to be willing to measure their strength with the Germans or to claim political equality. That the German empire must have been much greater and more powerful than the French kingdom was a matter of course. The Gauls enjoyed their new freedom and independence, in truth, only as a gift of the German victors.

Just as the complete transformation of the ancient world in the middle ages proceeded from the Germans, so there remained also with the Germans the power and the evidence of this very same, that is, the crown of the Cæsars. And just as the complete conquest of the Roman Empire proceeded from Germany, so the kingdoms of Burgundy and Italy remained incorporated in the German Empire. How could the Gauls have dared to complain of this extension of the German Empire, for they themselves had been vanquished by the Germans, and were emancipated merely by the favour of the same victors? Centuries must elapse before it could ever occur to the modern Frenchmen to measure themselves with the Germans, and to be willing to increase at their expense. The preponderance of the Germans was so well established naturally and historically, that it required a long lapse of time till French envy could dare to meddle with the majesty of the German nation.

Far into the thirteenth century, France continued to

be bounded by the Garonne, Loire, and Seine, and it was solely by accident that it also came into possession of the German earldom of Flanders, which had come under French fealty through Count Baldwin, the son-in-law of Charles the Bald. But all the rest of the Netherlands, Luxemburgh, Lorraine, the free earldom of Burgundy (*franche comté*), and the whole district of the Saone and Rhone (the old kingdom of Burgundy or Arelat), belonged to the German Empire. Excepting Flanders, the political boundary of our empire extended far beyond the limits imposed by the language, and this was natural, for since the fifth century all this territory, and even more, the entire early empire of the Romans, was a lawful conquest of the Germans.

The boundary made by the language seems to have been determined very soon after the conquest, and it has been retained with few changes up to the present day. Further west or south the settlements of the German conquerors were thinner and more scattered; nearer the old home in the east and north they were more dense. In the former case the victors accepted the language of the far more numerous vanquished from whom are derived the various Romance dialects of Spanish, Italian, and French. In the latter case the victors were superior in numbers, and the German language was retained. The boundary between the German and French linguistic districts begins on the North Sea at Calais, and thence runs almost directly east on a line north of which are the cities, Ypres, Courtrai, Renaix, Grammont, Enghien, Brussels, Louvain, Tirlemont, St. Trond, Tongres, Maastricht, and Aachen, and south are the cities, St. Omer, Lille, Tournai, Ath, Nivelles, Wavre, Jodoigne, Liège, and Verviers. From Verviers this boundary suddenly turns south southwest, passing through Malmedy, Salm, Houffalize, Bastogne, Rabay, to Virton. From this point it turns again southwest, and passes through Longwy, Thionville, (Diedenhofen),

crosses the Moselle at Metz, runs along the water-shed between the Moselle and the Saar, always keeping south, as far as the Vosges, meets the same at the sources of the Saar, runs on back of the Vosges, and strikes southwards as far as Altkirch, but from that point it bends somewhat easterly, nearly to the city of Bale, then again it turns directly south across the Jura, descends at Biel and thence follows the course of the Aar and Saone, as far as the High Alps, also mounts these, passes through the middle of Wallis, and still includes Monte Rosa in the province of Savoy, the mountain villages of which have recently attracted the attention of several travellers. From Oberwallis the boundary extends eastwards between the German and Italian border land of languages, and straight through the middle of the high mountains, with a preponderance of the German element, so far as more German is found to the south of the highest water-sheds than to the north of them. We will not follow it exactly since we propose here to speak only of the frontier opposite France.

All peoples west of the boundary line mentioned speak Italian or French, all east of the same German, and this boundary between the languages has been preserved almost unchanged for over a century, as far as the record of history extends. It is obvious then that the entire district along the Rhine, both on the left bank as well as the right, during this long era was, and still is exclusively occupied by the Germans.

For the reasons given before, the empire of the Germans still extends far beyond this frontier between the languages, and the claim upon its ancient conquests in the Roman territories cannot be disputed.

In the first place, in the thirteenth century when that most celebrated family of our emperor, the noble house of the Hohenstaufens, was defeated in that irreconcilable contest with the Roman hierarchy, France, in league with the pope, dared to meddle with the rights

and honour of the German Empire. That empire, without an emperor, disturbed by the intrigues of the pope, lacerated by civil wars could not attend to the attacks of its western neighbour. France seized the inheritance of the Hohenstaufens in Naples, and the kingdom of Burgundy on the Rhone (Arelat), and it was a French prince that ordered the last scion of the Suabian imperial house to fall under the executioner's axe.

When one remembers that Gaul owes its restoration and its new flourishing life to the Germans alone, and that Germany never hindered nor even disturbed it in its course of development, France's treatment of our Suabian emperor seems far from honourable. Germany had not deserved that from the hand of France.

We shall now only briefly state that France continued in its unjust measures, that it placed its princes both on the Neapolitan and the Hungarian thrones, in order to surround the German empire on all sides, that it first formed a league with the pope, and then soon made a complete slave of him, removed him from Rome to Avignon, kept him in honourable imprisonment, and gradually enforced measures which were eminently disastrous to the German empire. The whole reign of Emperor Lewis of Bavaria was a desperate struggle against the snares and intrigues of Roman-French league. The wisdom and perseverance of the emperors of the house of Luxemburgh first succeeded in dissolving this Roman-French alliance, by conducting the pope back to Rome, and by holding France in check, while at the same time the French dynasties in Naples and Hungary perished through their own vices.

Yet a branch of the royal house of France was firmly established between Germany and France. This was the new Duke of Burgundy, who had made important acquisitions at the cost of our empire, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, partly by

marriage, partly by inheritance, partly by stratagem, partly by force. Philip and his son, Charles the Bold of Burgundy, had by these means gained possession of Franche Comté, Luxemburgh, and the entire German Netherlands. Charles had already secured Alsace for himself by mortgage, then he planned also to conquer Lorraine and Switzerland, to control the entire left bank of the Rhine, and to assume the title of king. Had he been successful in this plan, the French spirit which held exclusive sway at his court would have acquired extraordinary influence at the expense of the German. Every one perceived that the Netherlands impatiently wore the yoke of the non-German prince. Bloody revolts of the Flemish, and of the citizens of Liege were suppressed only with difficulty. The German Oberland, however, prevented the danger. Alsace rose up in arms, and the provincial governor of the Burgundian ruler was executed by the people at Briesach. Switzerland rose up in arms, and the proud Charles was defeated in a few but very decisive battles. He himself was slain, and his whole inheritance, as far as it consisted of German imperial estates, including Flanders, also passed over to the Austrian house; the rest of the French possessions of the duchy of Burgundy returned to France. Should France, supported by such reminiscences, wish to make, notwithstanding, some historical claims on Flanders, Germany would be able to reclaim Arelat with even more justice.

The natural ascendancy of the German empire was restored. But France was unable to keep the peace. It could no longer resist the desire for unjust conquests and, as it did not dare to attack Germany itself, it turned against Italy, relying upon the usual slowness of the Germans, who would not hurry themselves to make an effort in Italy's behalf. France had not the slightest right in Italy, for its claim upon Naples, which it had illegally seized from the Hohenstaufens, had to be held by force as a legitimate one. But

France desired not merely Naples, but all Upper Italy. It started long, bloody and desolating wars, without any just cause, purely from avarice. It did not, however, attain its object. Its king was imprisoned and dishonoured at Paris. The German Emperor, Charles V., continued to rule in Italy as in Spain, which he had inherited. Yet he made his political mistake in dividing his great possessions, in tearing all the Netherlands and the free earldom of Burgundy from the German empire, and in giving them, together with Naples and Milan, to his son Philip II. of Spain, while his brother Ferdinand received only the rest.

Simultaneous with this began the great German reformation, and unfortunately the divisions which rent our empire soon gave France a new opportunity for brigandage. The Protestants were defeated in the Schmalkalden war. Prince Morice of Saxony, who, until now, had fought on the emperor's side against the Protestants, then committed his famous act of treason, and allied himself with France for the Protestant cause against the emperor. King Henry II. of France broke down the frontier of the empire, sending before him a revolutionary manifest, which proclaimed freedom for the Germans and was symbolically adorned with a liberty-cap and a dagger. Who gave him the right to summon the Germans to revolt against their emperor? The German emperors had never interfered in the internal affairs of France. To be sure, Henry II. was invited by Prince Morice. But is it international law to accept the invitation of a revolutionist, in order to disturb a neighbouring country? Henry II. wished to save the liberty of the Germans, moreover their religious liberty. But was he actually in earnest about it? He himself was Catholic, and continued to be Catholic, and such a fanatical one that he ordered all the converts to the Lutheran faith in France to be burned alive, and he was personally present at these *auto-da-fés*.

While he hoped to befool the Germans with a gross lie, namely, that he was acting for the rescue of their religious liberty, he intended nothing else than to make some conquests in German territory, which was powerless to oppose him because of the general chaos in the empire. By stratagem and force he gained possession of the three cities and bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun, and he was permitted to hold them, for the Germans were disunited and fighting with one another, instead of uniting their strength to oppose the enemy of the empire. Metz, till now a free German imperial city, subsequently became inclined to Lutheranism, lost its ancient freedom and was changed into a French provincial city. Also the religious liberty, for which the king feigned to contend, was wholly suppressed, the Lutheran confession of faith was forbidden on pain of death.

The deadly hatred of both church parties in Germany increased still more, and at last broke out in that long struggle, which, under the name of the Thirty Years' War, left such a direful record. Sweden and France took part in this great civil war of the Germans, both under the pretext of giving the Protestants assistance against the emperor, but really for the purpose of making conquests in Germany. Sweden can produce much to excuse its part. Recent historians of the Germans have been, indeed, too generous with their reproaches for the King Gustavus Adolphus. He desired to make conquests, he had, indeed, the bold plan to become German emperor. Very well, we do not doubt it. But if he had accomplished his plan, would it have been a misfortune for us? He was a prince of Germanic ancestry, he would have become so German, that Sweden would soon have been regarded only as a German province. Besides, he was in earnest in his struggle for religious liberty. He was born and bred a Protestant, and thoroughly convinced with the truth which at that

time was about to be suppressed. Was some political ambition intermingled with his sentiments? Who can declare that the piety of this noble king was merely a mask? It certainly was not. His memory must continue to be sacred to all Protestants.

Thus Sweden was justified in interfering in the Thirty Years' War, in assisting the hard-pressed Protestants. But France! What then did France wish? At the head of this kingdom stood a cardinal, and next to him a Capuchin, the notorious Father Joseph, who in the name of the king, not yet of age, held sway. A cardinal and a monk! Could they have meant honesty with the cause of the Protestants? And yet they did not hesitate to renew the jugglery of Henry II., and again to announce that they desired to fight for the religious liberty of the German Protestants. They had no other object than to rob Germany at a moment when it was too weak to defend itself. France acted like a thief that enters a burning city, not to extinguish the fire, but to steal. It had not the least right to interfere in German affairs. The people in Germany understood this very well, and made a great distinction between the Swedes and the French. It greeted King Gustavus Adolphus as a saviour, it cast itself upon its knees before him, and besought his blessing. In the so-called saviour, on the other hand, that came across the Rhine with French troops, in General Turenne, it saw only a robber and an incendiary. Thousands of public voices of that time, pamphlets, reports, and memorials spoke for the Swedes, not one for the French.

Wearied at last by the long war, the German empire finally had to surrender Alsace as booty to the French, with the exception of the imperial cities, particularly Strasburg, which at that time were still left to us, but were surrounded with French troops, and were exposed without protection to the pleasure of France. The flag of lilies was planted on the Rhine; the

Rhine, at least a part of the Rhine, was now the boundary of France. Can we call this then a natural boundary? In truth one does not need to belong to the German nation which was so injured, and so deeply wronged in its rights, in order to be convinced that France has come up to the Rhine only *per nefas*, that it never had a right either to make conquests in the German empire, or even to interfere in the affairs of Germany.

Germany was so worn-out that France was enabled to continue its wicked game with little trouble. France's conquests in Germany did not cease with the peace of Westphalia, but they were then first systematically begun.

While Germany was still only an empire in name, but in fact a hollow heap of discordant and feeble states, Louis XIV. in France brought all the provinces, classes and parties under his power, and created the absolute monarchy in which everything was subservient to one will. This enabled him to levy immense taxes and to raise enormous armies, an expenditure of strength with which the neighbouring states in their feeble condition could not compete. This transformation of France under Louis XIV. may justly be regarded as a Gallic-Roman reaction against the Germanic element which had always been in force in France, as a destruction of ancient Franconian liberties of the people, and of state representation, as a return to early Roman despotism, such as had been customary in Gaul for five hundred years, from the time of Cæsar until that of Clovis. This explains also the great revolution in taste, in art, and literature. The court of Louis XIV. was surrounded with memories of Roman antiquity, and with imitations of ancient art. Ancient mythology was brought to life again. Statues and pictures of ancient gods filled the palaces and gardens; the plays, operas and poems were fashioned after this model. It was the middle ages of

the renaissance, the second birth of the Gallic-Roman spirit.

But this spirit had none of the better pristine spirit of the Roman and Greek republics, everything was derived from the base spirit of the later Roman empire. It was godless, immoral and heathen, despotic and servile. The French court wallowed in all the vices of the ancient world, and presented a scene of shameless public life, of which the people had no recollections, but which was referred to by scholars as classic, and was palliated.

Unfortunately Louis XIV. also adopted the ancient Roman system of conquest, haughty contempt for all popular rights, and while he regarded himself as heir to the ancient Roman culture, it pleased him to see in the Germans again only "barbarians" that he had a right to subject to himself by stratagem and force, just as the Roman emperors had exercised the same right. It is true that the French kings before him had pursued this policy and never regarded the rights of their German neighbours, but Louis XIV. was much more systematic in this policy. The Conquest of the World and the establishment of a universal French monarchy were always the dominant scheme of the French cabinet and of the French nation.

Louis could inoculate the ancient Roman system into the body politic of Europe most conveniently, if he himself was the German emperor. He was all in a position which made it possible for him to remove Germanic institutions gradually from the German Empire, as he did in France, and in their place to establish Roman despotic institutions, to convert the German emperor into an ancient Roman one, without being perceived, and to date back the empire, which up to this hour was reckoned from the time of Charlemagne, to the time of Augustus. His influence in Germany was great; that of the house of Hapsburg had been enfeebled since the Thirty Years' War, and

the younger, and somewhat more inactive Leopold, did not seem to be an opponent against whom Louis should not have ventured to make this undertaking after the death of Ferdinand III. He did venture it. Although the circumstances were greatly in his favour at that time, yet he too failed at the imperial election, like all previous French kings. German princes often allowed themselves to be bribed by France, to be induced to commit open treason and revolt against emperor and empire, to accept pay in war, but they never surrendered themselves to favour France at the elections. In this respect they always preserved a certain pride, and displayed more stability than France expected. But they were not without perjury, for they first gave France reason to hope, and then deceived it. The intrigues at the election of Leopold I., by which his competitor for the German crown, Louis XIV., was excluded, are a web of the basest perjuries committed on all sides. In order to appease the anger of Louis XIV. on account of his disappointed hopes, Prince John Philip of Mayence, the imperial vice-chancellor, who conducted the election, and his still more talented minister, Boineburg, united the elective act favouring German interests with a political act most injurious to those interests—absolutely opposed to them, namely, the establishment of a Rhenish confederation against the German emperor and under the protectorate of France. Thus the diplomatic intriguers in Mayence hoped not to injure their cause either with the emperor or with France, and to keep their hands in the game. The weak emperor was satisfied with it, and he was very anxious to save the Mayence plotter. But Louis seemed to be extremely enraged, he terrified the electoral prince of Mayence, and forced him to cast himself unconditionally into the arms of France. Boineburg, however, was not excused. Whatever he had done for Louis in establishing the Rhenish con-

federation was ungratefully forgotten; that he had prevented the election of Louis at the imperial election was charged against him as the worst of crimes, and at the command of Louis XIV., John Philip, the German imperial vice-chancellor, ordered his minister, Boineburg, to be arrested at the sitting of the diet at Regensburg, and to be cast into prison.

Louis's influence became still greater when he bribed the princes of the Rhenish confederation with enormous sums of money annually, and almost all the princes of west Germany flocked hither in order to beg large, yes, even small sums. Indeed at the court of the emperor, minister Lobkowitz, who was absolute in power, was bribed with French money. The great electoral Prince of Brandenburg alone represented the honour and the interests of Germany, and reproached the other princes for their treachery and their feebleness.

Louis did not yet dare to attempt a direct attack upon the German empire, in order to make any conquests in it, lest he should terrify the princes of the Rhenish confederation, and again alienate them from him. He still needed them. In the second place it all depended upon being certain of both the flanks of Germany, namely, Switzerland and the Netherlands. If he succeeded in this, and he hoped to accomplish it by means of this very Rhenish confederation, he could then without further regard for the latter, fall at once upon the German empire.

Switzerland he gained, as he had the confederation, by bribery. An attack upon Switzerland would have been dangerous, and wholly superfluous. The Swiss offered themselves voluntarily to serve France, and in all his wars Louis had from twenty to thirty thousand Swiss in his pay, who were always foremost, and often alone decided a victory or prevented a defeat. Swiss diplomacy also served the French. The rulers of the Swiss confederation were bribed by France,

they did everything that France desired, hindered the movements of the emperor, opposed all demands of the German empire, acted altogether as if Switzerland were a French province. Zürich alone struggled against France. The Swiss had lost all sentiment for German nationality, and yet they are German. All their political foresight had gone. As republicans they served a despot; as neighbours they strengthened a power which itself was destined sooner or later to be equally dangerous to them, and to all other neighbours. Had the Swiss fought for the German cause with their strong armies, France would never had been so powerful. Never did France gain an advantage over Germany, except by German arms, by the assistance of Germans who denied their own country.

The Swiss were secured by cunning intrigue and money, and Louis now sought most of all to get possession of the Netherlands.

King Charles Stuart II., who had been reinstated after a great revolution in England, surrendered himself completely to the French policy, and undertook to occupy the vigilant Hollanders by a combat on sea. The Spanish Netherlands, supported neither by Holland nor by the German empire, were flooded with French armies and exposed their feebleness. The popular spirit had been impaired by the training of the Jesuits. Louis seized Arras, Hesdin, and a few other places from the Spanish Netherlands and united them to France. No one took any notice of it. It was not yet time to capture all the Spanish Netherlands, as Louis wished to have Holland first. If this country were in his power, the southern Netherlands would naturally fall into his hands of their own accord. But in order to conquer Holland he still had need of the Rhenish confederation which assured to him partly the alliance, partly the neutrality of the German empire. He let spring all the diplomatic mines. The confederation had to supply troops for him. The emperor himself was

induced by Lobkowitz to look upon the conquest of Holland peacefully, as the Hollanders, of course, were only Calvinistic heretics. The English also allowed themselves to be influenced by commercial jealousy to assist the French against Holland. Now Holland seemed to be lost, but the heroic uprising of the Hollanders and the skill with which they used their water power, opening the dikes and piercing the dams, as a protection against their foe, prevented the triumphant journey of the two hundred thousand men whom Louis had led to the Scheldt. At the same time the Great Elector, Prince of Brandenburg, was eagerly striving to arouse the empire to go to the assistance of Holland; the emperor finally bestirred himself, and his general Montecuculi, despite the prohibitive order of Lobkowitz, was decidedly anti-French in his feelings. Louis no longer dared to take any extreme measures, and he left Holland in peace.

But he revenged himself when he sent the Swedes into the territory of the Great Elector, and allowed the emperor to be annoyed by the Turks in the East. It is true that Louis called himself the Most Christian king, but he did not hesitate to enter into a public alliance with the Sultan. While the Great Elector and the emperor were busied in another quarter, Louis again seized the Spanish Netherlands and the Austrian possessions on the Upper Rhine, and, in order to prevent him from seizing more, the Spanish surrendered to him Burgundy (the free earldom, *franche comté*) and twelve important Netherland towns, Tournay, Lille, Courtrai, etc., the Germans surrendered the city of Freiburg in the Breisgau, which he converted into a French fortification. This happened at the Treaty of Nimeguen ("*Nimm weg*"—take away, people said it meant) in 1678.

The great feebleness evinced by this surrender on the part of the German empire incited the King of France to continue to make more impudent demands. He

established the notorious chambers of reunion, which were obliged to record all former alliances with the German provinces and cities conquered by him, all which he reclaimed at once as French property. The emperor being at that time sorely pressed by the Turks could not ward off these new French depredations. German traitors assisted the French, and thus Strasburg fell, which until the year 1681 had been the unassailable bulwark of Germany on the Upper Rhine.

Since German historians have troubled themselves very little with more detailed accounts of this lamentable affair, we think it ought to be related here. We closely follow the excellent work of Friese, who published his "History of Strasburg from the year 1791 to 1795," in the midst of the storm of the revolution, a work almost unknown in Germany, although it is written in good German spirit and with great care. It ought to be known that the citizens of Strasburg hated and feared to come under the rule of France more than anything else, that they had made the greatest sacrifices in order to fortify their city sufficiently, that they had frequently sought aid from the German empire, and from the Swiss, their old allies, that they had never allowed themselves to be ensnared or tricked by intrigues of Louis, that before their feet was laid the head of the lawyer, Obrecht, who had formerly planned to betray the city to France. But from all sides the French pressed hard upon Strasburg; they hindered its trade, they impoverished it little by little and drove it to despair. At the same time Obrecht junior, the son of the one executed, brooded over revenge upon the honourable, resolute German-minded chief-magistrate, Deitrich, who had principally led to the discovery and punishment of the former's father. Obrecht, with three hundred thousand imperial dollars, entrusted to him by Louis XIV. for this purpose, bribed the city secretary, Günzer, and a number of other men, and, while the most influential citizens of

Strasburg were absent visiting the fair at Frankfort, Strasburg was suddenly attacked by a large French force. Terrible threats on their part, the intrigues of the traitors, the absence of the best citizens, the impossibility of succour, the hopes of saving the ancient liberties of the city by a capitulation were effectual. The city was surrendered, and never since then has the German flag floated upon its walls. Obrecht became a Catholic and absolute governor of the King of France in Strasburg. The fate of the noble chief-magistrate, Dominicus Dietrich, is touching, and his memory ought not to have been so neglected, as is the case, for in what history of the German people has the tragic end of this patriot been mentioned? It is a hard lot to be a patriot in Germany, for he is—forgotten.

Dietrich was summoned to Paris, and was retained there lest a German party of opposition should be formed about him. Having detained him a long time they thought that he had become humble, and they attempted to bribe him, in order that upon his return to Strasburg he might preach French principles to his party. The notorious minister, Louvois, ordered him to be summoned, received him while reading his Bible, and said to him as follows: "The chief people of Antioch said to Mattathias: Thou art the most noble and most powerful in this city, and hast many sons and many friends, therefore enter thou first and do what the king has commanded as all lands have done, and the people of Judea that are still at Jerusalem: so shall thou and thy sons have a gracious king and be endowed with gold and silver, and great gifts." (I. Maccabees 2, 17-18.) But Dietrich, being a good Lutheran and well versed in his Bible, answered on the spur of the moment: "Then Mattathias said: Although all lands were obedient to Antioch, and every man deserted the law of his fathers, and consent to the command of the king, yet I, my sons, and my brothers, are not willing to desert the law" (the following verses). After that they

made short work with him and banished him to southern France, from which he was released when he had become an old man, and then in order to die in Strasbourg.

After Louis XIV. had acquired possession of this German bulwark, he was no longer in need of a Rhenish confederation, nor of the princes of western Germany. From this stronghold his armies could quickly invade the Palatinate and Suabia, and rob and rule after their hearts' desire. Discarding the old mask of friendship he carried death and desolation into the lands of the same princes, whom he had so long flattered as their beloved protector. He next desired to gain possession of the whole electorate of the Palatinate of the Rhine, for his brother Philip of Orleans, who had espoused the sister of the elector, Charles Lewis; and he did this with still greater arrogance, for the elector was still living, and legal heirs of the house of Wittelsbach were not wanting. A demon in human form suggested to the king that he would be most sure of securing his object if he frightened the feeble and discordant imperial princes of Germany; that they would consent to the most disadvantageous treaty, if he should terrify them as they had never before been. Therefore he ordered that the cities and villages of the peaceful and prosperous Palatinate, of the neighbouring electorate of Mayence, of the margrave of Baden, and even of the duchy of Würtemberg should be plundered and burned to the ground, the inhabitants robbed, abused, insulted, murdered as if Attila had returned with the Huns. They burned Worms, Spires, Frankenthal, Alzey, Andernach, Kochheim, Oberwesel, Kreuznach, Mannheim, Ladenburg, Weinheim, Gernsheim, Heppenheim, Oppenheim, Durlach, Bruchsal, Rastall, Baden, Bretten, Pforzheim, etc.; in the second invasion, Heidelberg, Hirschau, Calw, Neuenburg, Knittlingen, Marbach, Vaihingen, etc., not including numerous

hamlets and villages, were destroyed. And Louis XIV. did all this without having been injured in the least by Germany. And this king boasted of being at the head of civilization!

However, his plan did not wholly succeed. In Mayence General Thüngen bravely resisted him, a man whom our country's history has also ungratefully forgotten. The empire bestirred itself again. The emperor had just become master of the Turks in the East, and so Louis XIV., by the treaty of Ryswick (*"Reiss weg"*—tear away, as people then said) had to rest contented with what the treaty of Nimeguen secured to him, and with Strasburg and the imperial towns of Alsace which had already been most cruelly treated, and partly burned to the ground by him. But he did not get the Palatinate, and he was obliged to give back Freiburg in the Breisgau in the year of 1697.

To him Strasburg was far more important strategically, than Freiburg, and besides he founded the fortress of Hüningen, a cannon-shot's distance from Bale, in order to gain a broad basis for operation on the Upper Rhine. The Swiss murmured but he reconciled them, and bribed their regents by annual payments and military stipends, so that he was not at all apprehensive of them. They also were practically pleased with everything, they continued to furnish him with numerous regiments, and actually forgot that he had cut off their trade with Alsace and Burgundy. The policy of the Swiss confederation at that time is the most despicable that republics have ever had to be ashamed of. When Louis seized the free imperial city of Strasburg, a republic that had for ages been allied to the Swiss, and had often rendered them assistance in their combats, he was not only not opposed by the Swiss, but they sent their ambassadors to him, and courted him in the most servile manner, serving him at table in their official dress, and receiving presents of money from him.

Soon after that, just at the close of the century, the family of Philip II. in Spain died out, and the German line of the house of Hapsburg laid claim to his rich inheritance. But the elder daughter of the last of the Hapsburgs in Spain had been married to a grandson of Louis XIV., and this made good the female succession. Apart from the official and family importance of this matter of inheritance, it was very natural that France should necessarily fear a consolidation of Spain, the Netherlands, Naples, and Milan with the German empire, a restoration of the great monarchy of Charles V., quite as much as Germany had to be alarmed at an increase of French power through this Spanish inheritance. Policy also necessarily forbade a decision of this suit by the sword.

This time Germany had the advantage of having England on its side. Whenever England acted in union with Germany, France was overpowered. Moreover, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, who was at heart the best German of those times, took his place at the head of the imperial army, and wrought wonders in military art against the French, as he had done against the Turks. Then Louis, who was growing old, saw himself humbled at last, saw his arrogant generals and armies defeated, his treasures vainly squandered. But his cunning and good luck saved him. England broke from Germany, and left Prince Eugene in the lurch in the presence of the French, left the German diplomats in the lurch at the time of negotiations, and by its faithless policy caused us to lose again the fruits of such long and glorious battles. Yet France could gain Spain only, and Spain continued to be under the rule of Louis's grandson, a kingdom separate from France, while the Spanish Netherlands, Naples, and Milan passed directly over to Austria in the year 1713.

But all these advantages were soon swept away again, because Emperor Charles VI. had no son, and

in order to secure the succession for his celebrated daughter Maria Theresa, he purchased the consent of other states, especially France, with great sacrifices. For this purpose he surrendered Naples and Lorraine to France of his own accord. The important surrender of Lorraine was at that time still kept a secret, because Francis, the young Duke of Lorraine, who married Maria Theresa, received Tuscany instead of Lorraine, and Lorraine itself was provisionally given to the dethroned King of Poland, Stanislaus Tesczynski, who, however, had no son, and after whose death, 1766, France actually came into possession of the much and long desired Lorraine. Naples became an independent kingdom under a French king belonging to the house of Louis XIV., as did Spain.

In this manner France acquired what it still holds to-day, acquired it from Germany by robbery, by base robbery in the midst of peace, or by fraudulent use of our misfortune. It acquired the ancient kingdom of Burgundy, the valley of the Rhone from Geneva to Marseilles, at the time of our misfortune when the Hohenstaufens became extinct. It acquired the bishoprics of Lorraine at the time of our misfortune during the Reformation. It acquired Alsace at the time of our misfortune in the Thirty Years' War. At the time of our feebleness and in the midst of peace, it seized upon the earldom of Burgundy, a part of the Netherlands and Strasburg. At the time of our feebleness, and through the family compact of Charles VI., which was most injurious to all German interests, it won by a stroke of the pen beautiful Lorraine, so long loyal to the German empire. The family of Louis XIV. ruled now both in Spain and Naples.

All that France acquired, it acquired at the expense of Germany. The loss of the ancient kingdom of Burgundy and of Naples, also of the free earldom of Burgundy, of Italian Lorraine and of Italian Arras, etc., was a great political loss, if not a national one.

By the loss of Alsace and German Lorraine, moreover, we were deeply injured in our national interests. These fine provinces were severed like a sound limb from the living body of Germany, and were subjected to the influence of a foreign nationality. But the worst was, that by this example it was clearly proved that the German nation had lost its ancient precedence in Europe. Until this time Romance and Slavonic peoples had been subject to German masters. Now for the first time German people were subject to foreign masters. . What the Romance state in the west had done, that was also done now by the Slavic state in the East, and France had hardly taken Alsace from us when Russia also on the other side took from us German Livland.

As we were defeated by the French on the field, as we had allowed them unpunished to wrest German provinces from us, so also German spirit, as the result of this, was subjected to the French. The external losses kept pace with the internal degeneration of Germany. Was it the cause or was it the result, matters not; all feeling for German national honour and strength and loyalty, upon which the German had once relied for his nationality, died out when the French made their advances against Germany.

The German courts and the German nobility patterned after the court of Louis XIV., copied his despotism, his taste and his extravagances. They suppressed the old-German, the popularly traditional liberties both of the states and the cities. They eagerly adopted the system of Louis XIV., the new doctrine of absolute power, and they voluntarily served as organs of the great Gallic-Roman reaction against Germanism. We have already viewed the modern despotism of Louis XIV. as the result of that national reaction. This Romance element which had so long been vanquished, and which under the sacred flag of the Roman hierarchy had vainly battled against

the German element, and was again overwhelmed by the Reformation, now attained under the secular flag of French despotism an undisputed victory. Every popular right, every ancient form of popular representation was destroyed on German soil, or was degraded to an empty formality. All German governments adopted the French forms, the centralization of power, the bureaucracy. In the modern forms were now repeated the forms of the ancient Roman empire, with its vice-regencies and prefectures. Therefore the old Roman law, after having long clashed with the German provincial and civic laws, now first gained firm foothold in Germany, which never could have happened had the desire for absolute power not come to its assistance.

At the same time the courts and nobles in Germany adopted the French language, and were ashamed to speak their good old mother-tongue any longer. And so German literature was despised by the nobles, and French was introduced in its stead.

In the same way strict German morality was expelled from among the princes and nobles. They travelled to Paris to cultivate themselves, and they brought all sorts of fashions back to Germany with them. Numerous pleasure castles, even for the clergy, displayed to the astonished citizen and peasant in Germany the resurrected splendour and revelry of the Roman heathen festivities abounding in mythology and debauchery.

In this way there vanished from the courts, and from among the nobles, ancient and beautiful costumes, and this new Parisian fashion was imitated in Germany, first by the nobles, then by the middle class. To a certain degree clothes make the man, so it was by no means a matter of little importance that Germany lowered itself and servilely donned the dismantled garments of the French. It is moreover remarkable that the new French fashions, though they

were constantly changing without cause, were never exchanged for beautiful fashions, but on the contrary always for ugly fashions, and altogether they were patterns of every possible form of unnaturalness, unwholesomeness, and ugliness. From extensive wigs, hoop-petticoats and ruffles of Louis XIV.'s time, down to frocks and big sleeves, all French fashions during those two centuries present nothing that could compare with the older national costumes for dressiness, elegance, beauty, and appropriateness. In this compliance of Europe to the legislation of the ugly, there is a remarkable example of the irony of universal history. At the same time this symbolically expresses the total unnaturalness of the French ascendancy.

Finally, French influence exerted a great power over German literature which had apparently remained independent of it, and had even taken up sides against it. It is true that a reaction on the part of German literature against the French began with Lessing, that the attack upon Gottsched, the leader of the French school, encouraged almost all the young minds contemporaneous with and following Lessing, and gave new impetus to German science and poetry. Although these minds were courageously and decisively repelling the direct influence of France, yet, without being conscious of it, they were subjected to its indirect influence. Without the example of French literature, as an illustration, German writers would never have departed so far from the Christian point of view, and so closely approached the heathen antique position, as they have done. And without the despotic forms of government derived from France, German writers would never have departed so far from a national and patriotic point of view, and been impelled to a position so completely individual on the one side, so cosmopolitan on the other, as actually was the case. After the passionate struggles of the Reformation, the religious mind of the

German schools also fell asleep, and nothing took its place, except classical studies and French fashionable literature. Therefore the young minds in Germany involuntarily accustomed themselves to heathen and un-German models, and hardly conceived the richness of German intellectual and artistic life, as it had been evolved during the middle ages. Although in their opposition to the French they began to become conscious of themselves, yet it was a consciousness felt only in order to compete with the French in the imitation of the antique, for they boasted that they understood the antique better than the French; and if they had a suspicion that that of itself was not sufficient, and that art blossoms would spring up again from the German root still more beautiful than those already produced in the hot-house of classicism, they did not yet know how to find this root in their native soil, and they borrowed all the implements for Germanic reaction from their kinsmen, the English.

The intellectual men of Germany were debarred from all participation in public affairs, they were excluded from all co-operation in governmental affairs, through despotic and aristocratic forms of government, they were appointed to poor scholastic positions or to pensions granted by the princes, they were intimidated by the outer world, and were driven to the world of imagination. They belonged to some independent province, but as yet they knew of the German empire as a whole only in the form of a caricature, which was even then a subject of ridicule. Therefore they studied only to gain some kind of a livelihood, to get a position in their province, and by this office to become cosmopolitans. While they were conscious that they were at one extreme of littleness, that their vocation was an exceedingly narrow and circumscribed one, they fell at the same time into the other extreme, and sought an unbounded circle of action for at least their intellect and their feelings.

They devoted themselves to the world (under the then favourite title of cosmopolitans, that is, citizens of the world) or to mankind, under the equally favourite name of humanity. About German nationality, however, and about the country's interests not a word was said. The narrow-minded provincialism of the common people did not rise to such a height, and geniuses soared far beyond them into the regions of the universality of mankind. That explains why even Lessing, during the Seven Years' War, interests himself in everything else excepting this war which was destroying his country. That is the reason why Goethe still later took no part in the great events of Germany, and felt only that they unpleasantly disturbed his poetic dreams. Even Schiller declares once in a letter to Körner, "patriotism is something limited, true genius can never be inspired for one nation, but only for all mankind." The enthusiasm which seized upon the youth of Germany in the latter half of last century, the so-called storm and stress period, was in reality only aimed at the emancipation of humanity, or the humane, and was by no means a national tendency. Nay, it was originally derived from France, it was only adopted from Rousseau.

King Frederick II. won immortal fame when he defeated the French at Rossbach, and turned the fear of them into ridicule. French policy, seizing every opportunity to rob Germany again, broke the agreement with Prussia, to which it was indebted for Naples and Lorraine, immediately after the death of Charles VI.; it did not recognize the beautiful Maria Theresa, as his heir, and it sent new armies to Germany. Meanwhile Prussia reconciled itself with Maria Theresa, and France went away empty-handed. With so much the greater eagerness did France now join the coalition of Austria, Russia, Saxony and Sweden, which was intended to conquer and divide Prussia. The infamous plot was devised in the heart of France, at

Versailles. If it had succeeded, France would have carried off a part of the booty, it would have gained a German district in the west. But the military genius of Frederick and the stable loyalty of Prussia frustrated the whole plan. The endangered state of Prussia came out of the Seven Years' War more gloriously than ever, and France again got nothing.

Yet by no means did Frederick use the humiliation of the French to teach the Germans a great political lesson, to explain to them the faithless policy of France, which never grew old, to excite their animosity against France, to tear away the bonds with which French thought and taste, French literature and fashion had bound them. On the contrary, he did everything to establish and extend the influence of those very French whom he had defeated on the field of battle, whom he had made even ridiculous, over German education and civilization. He preferred to read, speak, and write French, he despised German philosophers and poets (with a few exceptions hardly worth mentioning), and invited to his court only French scholars and poets, some of whom were the most demoralized characters. He immediately favoured the most perfect freedom of the press upon questions of morality and religion (but not upon political topics), and, as the young emperor, Joseph II., followed his example, Germany was soon flooded with translations and imitations of immoral and irreligious works with which France was then overflowing. After the death of Lessing, who had fought so valiantly against the earlier Gallic mania, a new, still fiercer mania broke out. It was time that the old French play, the beloved pastoral scenes, the obscene mythology, etc., were banished, but in their place appeared the new French philosophical romances which were consistently and intelligently planned for the complete destruction of all the moral and religious principles of society. Goethe and his new school, just then beginning to flourish, were unable to direct this influx of French

frivolity, nor did they wish to, but rather yielded to it in many respects, just as Wieland also had done still earlier (and in this respect he differed from Lessing), and just as the lesser but very popular poets were still doing, for example, the Nicolai School, Kotzebue, etc. French ideas, however, had the greatest influence upon the secret societies, among which that of the Illuminati had the definite purpose of causing the downfall of Christianity.

To such an unlimited extent did French culture prevail among us without any influence from Germany being felt in turn in France. At that time it was assumed to be a well-known fact that the French were the exemplary people of culture, and compared with the other nations of Europe just as the Greeks once did with the surrounding barbarians, Scythians, etc. The French not only affected an inexpressible scorn for the Germans, but they actually overflowed with it. In Germany the people were contented with this, for the great Frederick himself unconditionally recognized the superiority of the French. Even the more enlightened minds and prouder spirits of that time, though they censured much that was French, and were busily engaged in honouring what was German in turn, allowed themselves to be overawed by the fine language, and by the dazzling ideas of the then immensely popular French philosophers who, under the guidance of Rousseau, promised the renaissance of humanity the realization of an ideal government, the fulfilment of all the dreams of world-reformers. The philosophical school of Kant and Fichte, the rationalism in Protestant theology striving for supremacy, many inspired poets and historians shared in these sympathies. Although German scholarship and German thought made themselves otherwise felt in works of science and in poetry, in many ways independent of French influence, yet there was never at that time a genuine national party in Germany, there was nowhere a centre for national

opposition and reaction against the universal prevalent French ideas, nowhere a patriotic consciousness that resolutely headed itself against the stream.

Such was the position of Germanism to Gallic-Romanism, immediately preceding the French Revolution.

This great event has, as is well known, already been variously criticized. French philosophy has boasted that it had foreseen it, had prepared for it. But it is not so. The philosophy, the educated classes, and the press were not capable of improvising such a catastrophe. Only the bankruptcy of the government, and only the extreme poverty of the lower classes, of those very classes that troubled themselves least about philosophy and literature, that were not even able to read, these brought about the Revolution, and then, of course, all the noble and just passions of the educated classes intermingled in it. These last have been justly accredited with having had a great share in this terrible event, but it was only a share in the development of the same, not in its origin. Quite apart from the opinions and practices of the higher classes, the Revolution broke out as a physical necessity, and originated in the wretchedness and poverty of the provinces, not from the intellectual revelries of the capital. In truth one is bound to maintain, and this was not evident to people at that time, that the Revolution was a revival of the old Franconian, that is, Germanic element of popular freedom and popular representation, so long suppressed in France, a reaction against the new Gallic-Roman element of despotism that arose with Louis XIV. The people simply desired to recover the old Franconian, old Burgundian constitution, in a word, the ancient German institutions of primary assemblies, of military jurisdiction, of the imperial assembly. Hence the agreement of the new French constitution with that of the English, hence all the advantages of the representative system. Had the French

people been able to act for themselves when they began this Revolution, its Germanic character would have been still more clearly represented. But from the beginning the philosophers of the capital interfered with it, they latently falsified the original character of the Revolution, while they most eagerly gave their services to it, and obtruded themselves upon it as leaders. These philosophers, with their customary arrogance, now declare that the Revolution was by no means a reaction of freedom-loving Germanism against despotic Romanism, but, on the very contrary, a reaction of the Gallic-Roman people, long ago oppressed by the Franconian kings and nobles, against these same foreign usurpers.

But the French knew very well what they were doing when they devised this falsehood. They intended to rob the Germanic nation of the ancient glory of its institutions, and to ascribe to themselves alone the honour of having thus rediscovered liberty. One need not be amazed at it. Yet one cannot but be surprised to find that German historians and politicians credit and repeat it. The English also are guilty of this mistake. Jealous of France they (with Edmund Burke at their head) are wholly unwilling to grant that the French Revolution proceeded from a desire on the part of the unfortunate people for Germanic principles, for a constitution like that of the English, and they take pleasure in unanimously proclaiming this to be a fantastic imitation of ancient republics.

These same Jacobins of the capital who acquired control of the Revolution, and whose action, as is well known, naturally awakened opposition in the provinces, have also held fast to the Gallic-Roman principle chiefly because the French again planned conquests in Germany. A number of German Illuminati, cosmopolitans, and freedom-enthusiasts rushed to meet them. These men, in whom there was not a trace of national pride and patriotism, even begged them to come to Germany and

to introduce here the new French freedom. They vied with one another in offering them cities and provinces, and besought them, as if for a favour, to unite to France that basely betrayed Mayence, the last bulwark on the Upper Rhine after the loss of Strasburg. Even Georg Forster, the celebrated circumnavigator of the globe, one of the most respected scholars of Germany, was conspicuous in this embassy of Mayence citizens, traitors to their country.

All this was natural. Who was willing to get excited over it? Such consequences were unavoidable when once all the earlier events had taken place. We described above the feeling in Germany before the Reformation. The Illuminati and their friends, the admirers of French literature and philosophy, were legion, and unfortunately the people of Germany were so unused to freedom, especially scholars and writers had learned to take so little part in the political life of their country, that the novelty of freedom, the thought of possible co-operation in the affairs of state surprised, electrified, and inspired them with a manly, at the same time childish, desire for political activity. Now, since this was denied them in their own country, since at the very first notice of the outbreak of the French Revolution strict guard and police inspection were instituted in Germany, these people, intoxicated with freedom, emigrated to France, they betook themselves to Paris or waited here at least for the coming of the salvation.

The Jacobins of Paris received their German friends very well at first. They were afraid of Russia and Austria, they were attacked by these powers, they hoped to devise a diversion for these powers by a revolution in Germany, and in addition much weight was laid on the friendship which the German enthusiasts proffered them. They honoured the latter very highly; would one believe that a Prussian, Baron Cloots, became president of the Jacobin club, and a

Swiss parson, Göbel, became Archbishop of Paris? The latter solemnly laid aside his priestly canonicals in the national convention and forswore the Christian religion, an example followed by the entire French republic. But how greatly deceived were these enthusiasts when they fancied that they could make use of the French, for they themselves only were the instruments of the French! As soon as the Jacobins perceived that the support of the Illuminati in Germany was not great enough to revolutionize our empire in form, and since they, on the other hand, dared to hope for Prussia's separation from the coalition, they made short work with all those obtrusive German enthusiasts in Paris; and had them repaid for their good faith by scornfully cutting off their heads.

The policy of conquest was much dearer to the hearts of the French than liberty. The new republicans had no scruples against flattering a king, a German king, indeed, at the very moment when they had hardly ceased to assure the German people of republican liberty. They troubled themselves little about the principle if it had any profit in it.

And, unfortunately, Prussia entered into the treaty. It was jealous of Austria, and it believed that it was acting according to the wish of the great Frederick, who had recently died, when it formed an alliance with France against Austria. It surrendered itself to an extremely disastrous deception.

Prussia, the young state in which rested the future of Germany, had to do everything that served the universal German interests, it dare do nothing that imperiled the same. It had to represent the national honour in opposition to the old traditional foe of the empire, the overbearing neighbour. It did not dare to assume an ambiguous and, indeed, a hostile attitude towards the rest of Germany, it never dared to make a common cause with the enemy of Germany. Wisdom

had already forbidden it to confide in French friendship, for France had always defrauded its friends in Germany.

Prussia, having first outstripped Austria in a fierce contest, was now running after France, and took only a lukewarm part in the war; soon it stopped altogether, and finally concluded the one-sided treaty with France at Bale, 1795. By this means Austria was isolated, repulsed, defeated. The entire left bank of the Rhine and the Netherlands were lost to Germany.

By means of this well-devised treaty of peace with Prussia the French avoided the troublesome duty of keeping their promises to the people. That dangerous method of exciting the people was no longer necessary now, for the enemies of France were not to be feared after the separation of Prussia from the coalition. So they were no longer bound by the promise to liberate the people. Now they could again make conquests and rob the rich frontier lands of the German empire in the old-fashioned way without being the least ashamed of it. So the Netherlands, Holland, the Rhenish electorates, the Palatinate, and, soon afterwards, Switzerland, were not liberated by the brotherly league, as had been promised, but they were hostilely vanquished and overrun with a military and civil army of robbers, that plundered by force all the public and private wealth of the countries mentioned, or understood how to steal it away with the skill and trickery of financial magicians. The French commissioners thought of everything, took everything.

The Netherlanders and Hollanders and citizens of Treves protested in vain. The French had declared that they wished only to free them, to salute them as a free people, had solemnly promised them their autonomy, free elections, independence, republican honour, republican happiness—and now they treat them like conquered enemies, they take everything away, do not

allow free elections, brutally dictate to them and leave them nothing but blind obedience. If they had to exchange merely one form of tyranny for another and a bad condition for a worse, why did they promise them liberty?

After that the provinces of Germany across the Rhine were plundered of everything; they kept, of course, their political and civil institutions which, in comparison with the earlier state of affairs, must be looked upon as an improvement, as a salutary reform. However, people were deceived as regards the origin of these institutions. They received them as something altogether new, which could have been invented only by French ingenuity, or which were results of the ancient republicanism born again in France. But they were nothing else than old Germanic institutions, borrowed first of all from England, where old German liberty has been preserved in its purest and most ancient form. The jury, for example, was neither something new, exclusively French, nor something antique, but an English, originally a Germanic institution, which had formerly been developed among the Franks as among all German tribes.

The Swiss were the most miserable at that time. For centuries they had pursued an anti-national policy against Germany, they had wronged their German kinsmen in every way, the French they had favoured in every way. Hundreds of thousands of Swiss had fallen from time to time while fighting for France, in the wars of the Reformation, of Louis XIV. and XV. They had shed their life's blood to make France great. As Germans they had fought against Germans in order that France, laughing both to scorn, should alone succeed. Now they were earning their reward. In vain did they explain that they had long, long been free, ever since the time of William Tell, that it was not at all necessary that the French should come with the pretext of liberating them now for the first time.

They humbly prayed that the French would not liberate them. "Be silent," was the command, "you must let yourselves be freed." So the French came, conquered the country, ruled it by their own creatures, did not observe free elections, declared those null which had been boldly held, notwithstanding, and stole, stole like the ravens. With the millions which were seized here Bonaparte equipped the navy and army with which he went to Egypt, and Copts and Arabs tested the value of the old gold pieces of Bern on the foot of the pyramids.

As soon as France had assured itself of the conquest of the entire left bank of the Rhine and Italy, it ceased to be republic. Both events resulted from the same cause. The French people dissatisfied, passionately enraged against king and nobility, embittered with the intendants and financial frauds, were revenged by the death of the king and by the emigration of the nobles; the bankruptcy of the state had been averted, and besides, they had now conquered the neighbouring lands and had enriched themselves with the booty. So the people were now satisfied. What need had they now of the phantom of the republic? Napoleon blew it away by a breath. Napoleon alone was now the man of the nation, for he understood, as a French king before him never had, how to flatter the two chief passions of the nation, desire for fame and covetousness. He led them to victory everywhere, and he gave them the plundered booty of all countries.

The poor German empire! It had to behold all these changes in France and to suffer anew under each of them. Under how many false pretences, for what totally opposing principles had the French not come to us already, in order to rob under the mask of giving us assistance! That ancient kingdom of Burgundy they tore from us in the name of the pope and of the only saving church. The bishoprics of Lorraine and Alsace they tore from us in the name of the Reforma-

tion, as the protectors of the Lutherans. Strasburg and the republic of Holland they seized in the name of the absolute monarchy. Spain, Naples, Burgundy, and Lorraine they won in the name of legitimacy, and finally Holland, the Netherlands, the entire left bank of the Rhine, and Switzerland they united, or allied at least most closely with France, in the name of liberty and of the republican principle. Four times they changed that principle, but with each change they stole away land from us. And so it was at least certain that Napoleon no longer needed an excuse, that he discarded the hypocritical mask of principles and openly appeared as a robber, when he made interest alone answer the purpose of policy and despised no means to attain that end.

Napoleon stole into the hearts of the French, and he will always dwell there, not only because he was a great man, but still more because he most boldly expressed and accomplished what all the French think and desire, because by his very greatness he excused the odiousness of covetousness, which is the secret of their nationality. One may say what one will, but Napoleon has to thank his genius for the admiration of the French, but for their love he has to thank only his profound immorality.

In Germany this great military genius found half the work already done. The left bank of the Rhine, together with both our flanks, Holland on one side, Switzerland on the other, had already been torn from us, Prussia was already separated from Austria, and was neutral when Napoleon drove the steeds of his chariot of victory for the first time over the plains of Germany. Had he been half the great man that he actually was, he would have overpowered us. Our empire was not accustomed to valiant uprisings and popular summons, but, rather to the contrary, to cowardly fear, cringing obedience, and humiliation. No matter to whom it humbled itself. Warlike

Prussia did nothing for the rescue of the empire, it rather hindered it by its neutrality, which was almost equivalent to an alliance with France, and Austria alone had already shed half its life blood, having fought under the leadership of its ancient imperial house with the noblest endurance and loyalty.

The consequences are well known. The western part of the empire was formed into a new Rhenish confederacy like the former, under the protectorate of France, and with the special advantage to Germany, that even the last remnants of state and municipal liberty were destroyed, and a completely despotic form of government was introduced everywhere. Austria was robbed of its western and southern provinces. Prussia reaped the same gratitude from France that Switzerland had earlier; it was rewarded for its loyalty with abuse and insult; finally it was cast out and almost ruined.

If Prussia had not concluded the treaty of Bâle, had it rendered loyal aid to Austria, had it also encouraged the rest of the imperial allies, and had it used beforehand the abundance of men and money (among the nobler classes), then in the possession of Germany, for great united efforts against France, instead of letting this abundance soon afterwards fall into the hands of the French, France would have been conquered, perhaps; at least, it would have been forced to make a fair treaty of peace. But Prussia did nothing; and this right wing of the German situation quietly beheld how the left one (Austria) was broken. That Napoleon would also fall at once upon the right wing, which could no longer be aided by the broken left one, hence must be conquered, Prussia could easily have imagined. Will Germany, indeed, ever understand that it is always important for France to smite one half of Germany through the other or after the other, as it has never been able to manage the whole?

Meanwhile, although under the present circumstances

Napoleon easily got the better of Germany, an inner presentiment said to him, nevertheless, these obedient subjects, these amiable neighbours that suffer themselves to be beaten on both sides like drums, these phlegmatic Germans, and he was fond of honouring them with the title "*Dummheit*" (stupidity), are not to be wholly trusted, sometimes there can be a thunderstorm among them, and the lightning may strike him. Therefore, he not only took steps to divide the Germans, to estrange the various tribes of the same people from one another more than they had been, to flatter the one, to terrify the other, and on the whole to weaken them, to keep the German press under the strictest censorship, to check personal freedom by the police, an institution of this kind almost new in Germany, etc., but he also believed that a great European offensive and defensive alliance of Romanism and Slavism was necessary in order to hold Germanism securely down. Therefore he formed his close alliance with Emperor Alexander in the year 1807.

This alliance of the Romans and Slavs had been planned already between Louis XIV. and Peter the Great for the destruction of Germany. Only because the one took Alsace, could the other take Livland. Now the ruin of Germany was carried on about a century longer. The French ruled not only on the Rhine, but also on the Elbe, and the Russians already held Livland, Kusland, Eschland, and almost all Poland, and he also took Finland.

If this alliance had lasted longer, Germany would have been completely destroyed by it, for no one would have dared to oppose this coalition if it had declared, "Prussia has ceased to exist." Even Austria would have had to succumb. It is not improper for us to recall what humiliations befell our honourable, ancient, princely houses at Erfurt and Dresden, how insolently they were treated by the French, and no less by the Russians, for Alexander had not so much delicacy as to

be absent from the great hare-hunt which Napoleon had prepared in the battle-field of Jena, two years after the battle. One may and should, in truth, think of such insults, in order that one may recall also from time to time what there is to do to prevent their return.

The slow, gradual annihilation of the last remnant of independence possessed by the German princes and the German nation, which would have inevitably followed, if France and Russia had remained united for a time, was fortunately spared us; not, however, by our own merit, but by the miraculous dispensation of God—Russia and France begrudged each other the booty, and became enemies.

If this was a great stroke of good fortune for Germany for which we are not able to thank heaven enough, yet there is associated with it a reflection of the most painful nature. Never before, during the two thousand years that German history has been recorded, were *all* Germans subject to the will of a foreigner. Never had the Romans forced us to yield; Attila himself had subdued only a part of the Germans, the others fought under independent princes against him and conquered him. Now, for the first time, in the year 1812, were all Germans, without exception, obliged to serve a foreign master; all German states, without exception, had to furnish soldiers to a foreign lord, and to submit to the command of a foreigner, in order to fight for a foreign cause.

When this disgrace of a nation, which for two thousand years had been the sovereign of Europe, became evident, heaven itself seemed to find it unendurable, and gave its sign to remind men what they ought to have done even with its aid. Truly, those great natural terrors that announced the fall of Napoleon cause the German nation to be deeply ashamed.

Now, for the first time, the nation started up in wild rage, ardent for vengeance, terrible as nature

whose sign it had seen. But the enthusiasm came, indeed, somewhat late. We are obliged to ask, with amazement, why did the Germans now first do what they could have done long before? How many provinces, how many millions of money had the Germans allowed to be seized from them since the times of Louis XIV.? With the means, which they had negligently surrendered to the French, they could have pursued the latter even across the Seine more than a hundred years before. A union of the princes, a general summons of the people could have taken place much earlier, and would have had just as favourable a result as in the year 1813.

However, it is a natural characteristic of the German people that they take time in all matters. They completed the Reformation, too, after a long trial of patience. What necessity did was done at last, though tardily. The German princes united, the German people arose *en masse*, and more was not needed to conquer France's entire force and the hero of the century. The zeal and the talent of the German generals, the enthusiasm and bravery of the armies themselves were extraordinary, and especially so, indeed, because the war was waged by the entire nation as such. This gave it the emphasis, this the rare enthusiasm, and this sent that terror before the armies which nothing resists. When such a great people as the Germans become angered and arise in a body, France must tremble even though it had ten Napoleons.

People and army waged the war purely as a national war. At that time not only Napoleon was hated, but the French also. Since, however, the German governments did not conduct the war alone, though the German armies alone decided the issue, since Russia especially had great influence, and Russia was more afraid of an increase of German power, because the Germans were nearer, than the continuance of a strong

French state which was more distant and could be of future service to Russia against Germany; in the very midst of the war itself diplomacy was already planning not to allow the victory of the Germans over the French to go too far. This was expressed in the explanation that the war was not a national war, not a war against France, but only against the person of Napoleon.

Upon this understanding also the treaty was concluded. The opportunity was offered Germany to revenge with one blow all the injuries which it had suffered for centuries from France, to take back all the provinces that had been torn from the German empire. But this opportunity was not used. France kept not only Italian Burgundy and Italian Lorraine, but also German Alsace and German Lorraine. It kept Strasbourg, the key of Upper Germany. Also the potent messenger of conquered France sat in the congress of Vienna and in judgment over Germany, for example, over the division of Saxony, while no representative of a German principality was allowed to meddle with the matter of the new French constitution.

In the meantime the new constitution of France was made to copy the English; a constitutional king with two houses, etc., thus again essentially Germanic in its nature. After the great tragic comedy of the Renaissance, the antique republic and the antique despotism had been played out, a return was made to the original want which had caused the Revolution, namely, to the need of Germanic guaranties, of old Frankish popular representation according to the classes.

Germany had exerted all its force to win the victory, but not to employ the victory equally as well. However, the simple fact that the entire French force, all French pride, all the military genius of France were not a match for a popular call of the Germans, was well worth knowing. It demonstrated to the French what Germany was able to do if it wished. It instilled a

shyness into them, but it tempted us to dare. It taught their heads to reflect that if the Germans some time in the future should be inclined to make a general call against France once again, the victory would be just as little doubtful, but that afterwards this victory would be employed perhaps more to the advantage of Germany, and to the loss of France, than this first one.

It was equally dangerous to leave the French so much power, yes, indeed, to leave it in possession of German provinces and so important a military-political outpost as Strasburg. It was dangerous to make only Napoleon the scape-goat, and to heap upon him all the curse and to spare France itself, for history teaches that Napoleon only continued the wrong the French kings long before him had done us. Napoleon was not the first cause and France the second cause, but France was the first cause and Napoleon the second cause. Napoleon was a passing event, France was permanent. With France we had to do centuries before, and with France we shall have to do centuries to come. Hence it is not a question of the weakening of Napoleon, but of France.

Wholly apart from the internal political arrangement of the newly-established German confederacy, it was without doubt in the interest of all German states that France was weakened, that at least it did not retain Strasburg and the German provinces. As regards this boundary question it is quite immaterial how the union of the German states is arranged internally. Whether Germany is an empire or a confederation of many states, whether the form of government is an absolute monarchy or a constitutional one, is of no account, but it must always seek to insure itself against attacks from the neighbour on the west, and, once for all, to fix the western boundary which has been jeopardized so many times.

But, unfortunately, the external question has been

forgotten on account of the internal one. The contention over how Germany is to be constructed internally has taken the attention from that far more important contention over the boundary. They did not reflect that there is no lack of time in undertaking internal reforms, but that incalculable time will never replace the loss of frontier provinces which they now have and surrender again in an unexpected moment.

If, however, we turn from Germany and fix our attention upon France only, it becomes as manifest as daylight that France owes only gratitude to the German powers which, as conquerors, passed such a generous sentence upon it, and left it so many advantages at the cost of Germany. Never was a foe more kindly and sparingly treated than were the French at that time by the Germans.

But the French are unwilling to acknowledge this. The plain facts speak, but they are unwilling to hear anything. They behave as if a great wrong had been done them.

The French Revolution ended with the satisfaction of the want that had called it into existence. The foreign, especially German powers, were so generous as not to disturb this natural development in any way. France kept the Germanic legal guaranties which it had desired in the year 1789, a constitution, a constitutional king, responsible ministers, two houses, equality before the law, freedom of the press, public administration of justice, etc., as England has. It could be satisfied with these in 1815 also, and in 1830 they were continued. The July Revolution proved that these Germanic legal guaranties answered the actual need of the French people, for they survived it. The anti-Germanic Romance party did not succeed in overthrowing these, although it strived to do so in a double manner when it wished to restore by the decrees the despotic system of Louis XIV., and by the republican and Bonapartian uprisings, the convention

and the empire, those two ghostly regenerations of the old Roman world.

Meanwhile Romanism gave vent to its indignation in the free press everywhere. It first invoked national honour, the old need of fame and the warlike disposition in which this is rooted. Then it invoked the equally ancient covetousness of the nation, the lust to enrich itself with foreign possessions. Re-conquest of the left bank of the Rhine and of the Netherlands was the watchword of the "National," and from time to time was regularly re-echoed in the houses of congress also. The same idea was made the basis of numerous historical works and memoirs which were disseminated in France and over all Europe, and in which the deeds of the grand army and the majesty of the empire were recalled to the memory of the French with all the colours of an ardent imagination. By these means, which should have aroused national feeling, men fought at the same time against the foreign policy of the citizens' king and against the foreign land itself. Now they wished to warn, then to terrify.

But since the citizens' king was supported by the majority of proprietors, of fathers of the house and family with whom the need of the simple Germanic legal guaranties is greater than the Romance desire for war, Romanism pointed a special weapon against these citizens, namely, the republican weapon. In opposition to the constitutional monarchy, which is favourable to the citizen class, he demanded democracy, the political emancipation of the proletarian, in a word, the mob rule, as in the year 1793. He wished to destroy the government of the proprietors which dissatisfied him, by the revolt of the non-proprietors. In behalf of this he harangued the crowd with old cosmopolitan theorems in the new form of St. Simonism, with the ideal of the republic of workmen, etc., and he awakened at the same time the bloody remembrances of the reign of terror, partly in order to accustom the mob again

to cannibalistic appetites, to fill them with horrible passions, partly in order to make the peaceful citizens afraid.

Since furthermore a happy home-life and the sanctity of marriage are the chief supports of citizenship, Romanism pointed its weapons against these also, and declared open warfare against marriage and morals and at the same time, of course, against Christianity, just as it did before in the first Revolution. All the impiety and obscenity of the older Voltaireian school were rummaged up again, the immoral literature of the earlier times was scattered abroad in new publications, and was supplemented by numberless new books of the same kind. The theatre courted these Jacobin tendencies. Crime and lewdness were introduced upon the French stage, after the order of the day, just as in the pleasure writings.

Finally, as the internal revolutionary attempts and the oft-repeated murderous plots against the life of the king amounted to nothing, minister Thiers succeeded in bringing about a war with a foreign power, and although the breaking out of the same was hindered by the wisdom of the king, yet this event had necessarily started great activity among the neighbours, and especially in Germany. Despite the wisdom of the king the war cry was louder in France than ever, and men of the most diverse parties agreed in this matter. No longer did merely the "National," no longer merely the proletarian and beautiful-haired lounge-about-town of Paris desire the left bank of the Rhine, but a minister himself, honourable peers, extremely conservative deputies cried in the same tone. On the other hand was heard remonstrated—now is not the time to think of conquests in opposition to all Europe in arms, but not a voice was heard to lift itself against the right and morality of conquest. That France actually had a right to the left bank of the Rhine and that the Rhine was France's natural

boundary, was everywhere in France regarded as well known, as something that was a matter of course.

Even though peace is continued, the younger generation in France is bred to believe that it has a sacred right to the Rhine, and its mission is to make it, at the first opportunity, the boundary of France. "The Rhine boundary must be a reality," that is the theme for the future of France.

We think that we have sufficiently proved in the preceding historical discussion that France has not the slightest legal claim to the Rhine boundary. But we also know very well that all that has been said to the French about it has been like talking to the wind. They will not hear. The more plainly all the proofs of history and nature and all the arguments of reason and morals speak against them, the less are they willing to hear of them.

So it only remains to be seen whether Germany is strong enough, and will remain so, to reject by force the illegal claims of France under all circumstances. It is truly lamentable that after we have been neighbours of two thousand years standing, after we have received so many blows from the French and given them so many back in turn, they, notwithstanding, have not yet been able to bring themselves to understand their true position to us. The study of history flourishes in France as with us, a thousand means and avenues to intelligence are open, and yet such a blinded passionateness prevails among the French that they intentionally deceive themselves with an illusion and disdain to see the truth, even in its brightest daylight.

Thoughtful reflection, reason, justice, and fairness, which ought to be present in the intercourse of two such old and powerful neighbours, and which we are always ready to keep, are despised by the French. Only might shall decide; whenever they differ with us, they seize the sword. History must vanish in all directions before the passion of the moment.

Future dangers are despised just as past experiences are trampled under foot. Desire rushes upon its object in spite of everything, indifferent as to who will perish thereby.

Even though we are strong enough to drive away might with might, yet it is sad to see the darkness of rude, barbarous passion, and the domain of unreasonable force again impend threateningly over us, after so many experiences and in the century of the greatest enlightenment. But who warrants us that some weakness will not sometime come upon us, that we shall not be involved in some conflict of internal or external policy wherein our vigilance and our strength will be relaxed? What have we then to fear from a neighbour who knows no right but might, and who is not ashamed openly to confess that he, to-day even, as in the centuries of fist-combats, is only on the watch to find us once weak, disunited, or unguarded, in order to fall upon us again and rob us?

Therefore it is our task, if we cannot instruct the old wicked neighbour, to make our good right perfectly clear to ourselves at least, to bring the whole body of the German nation to consciousness. To no German must it be hidden or remain indifferent that if France and Germany ever come to settle with each other all debit is on his side and all credit on ours. We have to demand of France only what it has wrongfully torn from us. France, on the other hand, has nothing to demand of us, not a hamlet, not a tree. The Rhine is, as Arndt has said briefly and well, Germany's river, not Germany's boundary. If we argue from historical right, then everything that France has gained on its eastern frontier since the thirteenth century, has been robbed from Germany, then all Burgundian and Lorrainian lands are our old property wrongfully seized upon, and we should have accordingly still more to reclaim than the boundary fixed by the language. If we argue from the national point of view and make

the language the national boundary of the nations, then the entire Rhine belongs to us, its whole bank on the left and right, for German has been spoken in the whole river-district of the Rhine for fourteen centuries; accordingly, France would not have to claim the left bank of the Rhine from us, but we should have to claim Alsace and Lorraine from it. If, finally, we argue from positive right as it has been fixed by the last treaties, then France has sanctioned indeed its unjust possession of Lorraine and Alsace by means of these, but these treaties exclude France from every claim to the other parts of the left bank of the Rhine. But if France no longer recognizes the treaties of 1814 and 1815, the only legal titles that have secured to it its old theft from Germany, and which we have always honestly recognized, though they were very detrimental to us, if France itself breaks these treaties and begins war, then we ought to unite with the firm determination, as God wills and as He grants victory to the righteous cause, never again to make those treaties the basis of a new peace, and not to sheathe the sword until our whole right has become ours, until France has paid its whole debt to us.

Our task is further to educate more intelligently and more thoroughly the political sense which seems to return gradually among us, after that we have lost it for centuries, that is, to view all the questions of the day, be it the discussion of a principle or of some particular point of interest, from a higher national point of view, and never to forget the external policy because of internal differences. This forgetfulness alone has been the source of all our misfortune. Only because we Germans were quarrelling among ourselves about opinions, or about provincial interests and thereby forgot to protect our frontiers against external foes, could neighbours have robbed us and weakened us. Much has happened to prevent the return of such unfortunate quarrels in Germany for the future. The German

peoples no longer cherish that former unreasonable jealousy towards one another, or by no means to such a degree as formerly. The dynasties also are more closely connected, and they find their interest is much better protected in a policy of agreement than formerly in one of separation. Only the strife over opinions and convictions, over constitutional and religious questions, is still rife and has not yet reached a satisfactory solution. But has too much been asked of a nation so great, so ancient, so experienced, and thoroughly educated as the German, if one begs of it not to hostile itself within itself so long as so many foes threaten it from without? Whatever be the object about which we hostile ourselves, the result will always be that each of our inner quarrels will be used from the outside for our ruin. We must ever regard ourselves, even in the midst of peace, as a great army in camp and in sight of a powerful foe. In such a condition it does not become us to take our stand hostilely against one another, however natural and right may apparently be the occasion for it. We must always stand with our face towards the enemy without.

RAILWAY ROUTES.



PREFACE.

IN the year 1843 the following essay was published in the Review, "*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, under the title: "Welche Rücksichten kommen bei der Wahl der Richtung von Eisenbahnen in Betracht?" and signed with an *M.* We have reason to doubt that the publication of the essay, at that time, met with the appreciation which it deserved, in consequence of the uncertain opinion then prevailing as to the value and great importance of railways as well as to their future development.

In a letter announcing the reception of the essay, the Cotta company showed their appreciation of its importance and acknowledged the same to the author as follows:

"At all events permit us to send you in addition, as a small proof of the value which we place upon your contribution to our journals, a contribution to your library, which we pray you kindly to receive.

"Schiller's and Goethe's Works, with steel-engravings and wood-cuts, also Schiller's, Goethe's and Freiligrath's Poems *en miniature.*"

We are forced to admire the quick insight with which Von Moltke, then major on the general's staff, recognized the great importance of railways, their value to the state, and their significance in respect to public economy, at a time when the governments of nearly all the states did not regard it advantageous for them to construct railways with state funds, and to assume their management. Excepting a few intelligent and broader-minded men, public opinion was still little disposed towards railways. In this connection, we only need to recall the difficulties which the great national economist, F. List, had to overcome before he succeeded in calling the Magdeburg-Leipzig railway into existence.¹

Together with the keen penetration which is noticeable in his criticism of the value and importance of railways, technical knowledge

¹ "Leipzig-Dresden Railway, a work of Frederick List," by Dr. Niedermüller: Leipzig, 1880—*Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*. Annual series of 1880, number 5. Beginning of the construction, spring, 1838. Operation of the whole line for passenger trips, 18th August, 1840, and for regularly running goods trains 1st November, 1840.

and practical understanding are prominent, which go to show that the author is well instructed in a subject far removed from his own particular profession, information which discloses a perfectly accurate and technical study of the experience, derived from the construction and management of railways in other countries, especially in England, the cradle of railways. The exact description of the locomotive, its operation and efficiency, deserve special attention; a *savant* could not have given it more correctly. Furthermore, in this essay, are evolved the principles then followed in building and managing railways, which could give instruction to many a technologist; there is added, moreover, statistical material, relating to lines already built, so that one is justified in making the title read: Upon the building, and managing of railways."

The treatise contains an abundance of timely utterances, the truth of which was recognized only by a few at the time of their first publication, it also contains many important and sharp-sighted inferences.

Moreover it, like everything written by the Field-marshal, is briefly and decisively expressed, wholly comprehensible, and scientifically discussed. We must not omit calling attention to only the following words, which give a thoroughly correct judgment, as regards the future developments of railway traffic.

"Passengers are the most valuable goods, those for which the highest rates may be demanded, and on this account nearly all railways have been hitherto calculated for passenger traffic; the goods traffic, however, has been treated as a secondary matter. And yet the time is not far distant, when it will be seen that the transport of goods is the very basis of all railway operation, which will make the investment profitable, and that the actual national-economic use of the railways is to be sought in it."

And again it reads:

"People require numerous considerations in travelling, but goods require only punctual and safe transport."

These remarks, made almost fifty years ago, have all come true! What demands are now made of the railway companies by people, in order that they may be carried rapidly, comfortably, provided with ventilation, not too warm and not too cold, and yet cheaply. What enormous dimensions the transport of goods by railway has attained, and how appropriate was the remark, that the transport of goods would make the roads profitable. It cannot be exactly estimated, how great are the costs which fall exclusively to the share of passengers, and which to goods alone, yet it is undisputed that the chief earnings of the railways are to be credited to the transport of goods; indeed, in some parts it is maintained that passenger traffic not only earns nothing in consequence of the great demands made for the accommodation and carrying of passengers, but rather requires an extra outlay.

Major von Moltke, as can only be expected, also manifests his own great interest in the new mode of communication by personal co-operation in the building of railways. From a letter to his brother Ludwig, dated April 13th, 1844, it is learned that he belonged at that time to the managing board of the Berlin-Hamburg Railway,¹ and from other sources we know that he took an important part in its construction.

The passage in the letter referred to reads: "While France is still deliberating in the Houses, we have constructed three hundred miles of railway, and are at work on over two hundred miles. Among these latter is the Hamburg-Berlin line, to whose board of administration I belong. The greatest difficulty remaining for us to overcome is the Royal Danish Government, which wishes to compel us to keep the route along the Elbe through Lauenburg, which costs us two million thalers more than that by the way of Schwarzenbeck, as we chose. There is talk of sending a deputation to Copenhagen, in which I am to take part, yet perhaps the matter can be settled by diplomacy. Meanwhile we have begun to build, and intend to have it finished in 1846."

May 13th, 1844, he writes to his brother Adolf in regard to this matter:—

"The bearer of this letter is the director of the Berlin-Hamburg Railway, Herr Costenoble; ² his companion, Herr Neuhaus, one of the counsellors of construction, ³ is chief-engineer; and also Dr. Abendroth, from Hamburg, who is chairman of the committee of this company. You will find all three educated, able, and also pleasant gentlemen. They make this journey because of the difficulties which the Danish Government oppose to our undertaking. Their object is to make some acquaintances in Copenhagen, and although I have said to them that you are engaged in an altogether different business, yet they wish to make your acquaintancce, and hope that you will enlighten them in regard to personal matters."

At the close of the essay we note that the author even then saw what advantages there were for the State in the proper and judicious building of railways, in a planned network of Government roads, and in respect to military interests. We cannot but be amazed with the penetration—one might say, with the prophetic foresight with which Moltke so early recognized the great value of railways to his own department, his own profession. This knowledge afterwards brought him into a position, one that had been entrusted to him for the safety of Germany, to use the railways for military purposes, and

¹ In this capacity Major von Moltke was frequently associated with Moritz Robert-Tornow, Privy Counsellor to the Board of Trade.

² He was afterwards president of the Royal Railway Board of the Lower Silesian-Marcian Railway in Berlin.

³ He was builder of the Berlin-Hamburg Railway, and for many years he was president of its Board of Managers.

to do it properly. If this was evident already in 1866, we see it applied in a much more perfect and better-planned manner at the mobilization of the army in 1870, and in the war at that time, when the first victorious battles were made possible by the speedy mobilization of the troops. This same knowledge, in union with past experiences, also assisted him to employ this mode of communication in the military system, and to use it more extensively for military matters by taking routes which were well known on all sides to be important and necessary.

Thus by the supreme order of the Cabinet of January 31st, 1867, a Railway Department in the grand staff of the general was created; its head received his appointment as independent chief of the Railway Department¹ by the supreme order of the Cabinet, May 8th, 1871.

About the same time, a railway battalion for military purposes was formed by supreme Cabinet order of May 19th, 1871, which was increased December 30th, 1875, to a railway regiment, and on February 20th, 1890, to a railway brigade, which arrangements were at once recognized by other States, and were adopted by them.

Thus we can imagine what satisfaction the Field-Marshal must have felt upon finding the means of communication by railway, which he had welcomed at first with expressions of confidence, soaring to a height beyond his expectations, and upon being permitted to follow their development for half a century till the unforeseen results of the present were attained.

W. STRECKERT.

¹ Major von Brandenstein, afterwards chief of the engineer and pioneer corps, and general inspector of the fortifications.

CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CHOICE

OF

RAILWAY ROUTES.

MANY wise men believe that the railways, which so universally attract attention to-day, are a symptom of the sickly unrest and nervous impatience of our times, which are not able to do anything fast enough. Others regard them as a necessary evil, unavoidable as was the introduction of the spinning-machine among us, after that our neighbour had introduced it. The more general belief is, however, that these new means of communication, for which such great sacrifices have been made, and still greater will be, will somewhat satisfy the actually existing desire for the union of things intellectual and material.

He who recalls the condition of all kinds of communication in his youth might well believe that the age of Methuselah has now been reached by him, when he views the present condition of the same. And yet it was only thirty years ago when we ourselves were swallowed up in the bottomless sand or deep clay roads before the gates of the principal cities. A trip from Berlin to Potsdam required the preparation of a journey. Frankfort-on-the-Oder was two days' distant from Berlin. One took leave of his friends and equipped himself for all the inconveniences of bad storms, poor night-lodgings and over-timed carriages.

Droves of horses panted with their burdens over steep mountains and through deep valleys, over dangerous stone piers, with most lucky mishaps, and everywhere paviage, bridge-tax, and passage-money were levied. The highways of the Middle Ages were almost unchanged until our time, except that the robber-knights were supplanted by the legitimate way-laying of the toll-gates.

After the long, bloody battles inherited by our century from the preceding one, had ended, a complete revolution of the avenues of communication took place. Since the Treaty of Paris the energy of nations has passed from destruction to creation in every respect, and more has been done for ways of communication in the past thirty years than in the three centuries preceding. A net of highways between all more important points has been made, and in Germany alone the total mileage of artificial roads constructed during this period amounts to one-half of the earth's circumference. Yet the paved roads alone were not sufficient for the industry which had sprung up, and continued to develop more strongly, and the invention of the locomotive and railroads now first made it possible to meet the demands of the new state of affairs.

Although this invention of our days greatly busies the minds of men, yet it may be affirmed that a knowledge of the properties of the same is by no means generally spread abroad. Not that there is need of excellent works upon this subject; they are, however, for the most part comprehensible to the technologist alone, just as generally popular interpretations¹ follow after science has made the way. Therefore, before we discuss the particular object of our investigation, it will not be amiss to collect a few technical details,

¹ So far as we know, there existed, in 1842, neither a popular treatise upon railways nor a technical work upon their construction and management.—STR.

so that they will be comprehensible and clear to the layman.

It is well known that the railway is a way with tracks of strong cast-iron rails,¹ which, with the slightest possible deviation from the straight line (horizontally and vertically), that is, by the shortest route, and with as little ascent and descent as possible, are laid between the points to be joined. To answer these conditions, the railway will sometimes be cut through elevations as a narrow pass, sometimes pierce them as a tunnel; at times it must stride over the valleys as a pier, bridge, or viaduct, but often it has to pass around in gentle curves, when such surface difficulties cannot be overcome.

After that the plan or surface of the way has been laid out so that it corresponds as much as possible to the conditions just mentioned, the rails, which must be exactly parallel to each other, are carefully fastened on stone supports,² oftener on heavy wooden beams, by means of cast-iron supporters,³ or now mostly with headed spikes.⁴ The usual form of the rail resembles in a cross-section the figure of a T, over whose upper surface the wheels run. Its weight amounts to 14, 20, even 24 pounds for the running foot; its length

¹ Cast-iron rails, three feet or more long, were laid as longitudinal sleepers in the surface construction of the first English railways, and afterwards in the construction of horizontal sleepers until the middle of the year 1840. The first wrought-iron rails, fifteen feet long, and in the present usual form, were rolled in the year 1828, at a foundry near Durham.—STR.

² The stone cubes or single supports of the rails, which were mostly used at first, are still to be found on over 500 km. of main and side tracks of the German railways; over 300 km. of them are on the Bavarian lines, most of the rest on the Prussian.—STR.

³ The kind of rail-supports that have come to be generally used on English lines has been laid for about 800 km. on the German lines, and that, too, mostly in the Magdeburg division.—STR.

⁴ At present wooden sleepers are most generally used to fasten rails on.—STR.

averages 15 feet.¹ As it is well known that the metal expands with altogether irresistible force at every increase of temperature, it is necessary to leave a short space of about one-eighth of an inch² between every two rails.

Because, as was just said, the iron track is not sunk in an indenture, as is the ordinary road, but is elevated, it is necessary for the wheels of the carriage, which are to move over the same, to be provided with a small edge or tram on the inner surface, so that they cannot run off this rail.

One other peculiarity of these iron wheels is that they do not revolve on their axles, as is the case with wagons, but, since it is necessary to keep their gauge very exact, they sit fast upon the axles, and revolve simultaneously with them in the pedestals which are fastened under the carriages.³

In order to make as much room as possible, the carriage-top is made much wider than the track-way. For this purpose the box is placed over the wheels, not, as usually, between them, and therefore, to avoid the danger of upsetting, the wheels have to be built much lower than on ordinary vehicles, although large wheels would be a great advantage for railways also. They have tried to gain this advantage, on a new English railway, by increasing the width between the rails.⁴ The wheels could then be built higher without risk, and, of course, a much greater speed was attained ;

¹ At present the rails used on the main railways in Germany measure up to 12 metres in length, and weigh up to 52 kg. per metre.—STR.

² The space is determined by the length of each rail, and the greatest variation in temperature.—STR.

³ The chief difference in the movement of railway carriages and ordinary road carriages.—STR.

⁴ The width on several English lines, for example, the Great Western, is 2·135 metres (7 English feet), while on the Continent (with the exception of Russia and Spain) the normal width of 1·435 metres has been almost generally employed.—STR.

but other technical difficulties, not in order of discussion here, were met with, which caused the Continental roads to keep their usual width of track.

It is obvious that a carriage on a railway will be moved far more easily than on an ordinary roadway. The load which is drawn on a railway by one horse at the rapidity of two-thirds of a mile per hour, requires for the same speed on a granite track, like that of the "Commercial Road" in London, or those in Upper Italian cities, 4 horses; on a highway, from 8 to 16; on ordinary country roads, 33 to 66.

A whole row of heavily laden carriages are joined, therefore, on the railway, and in front of this train is attached one black magic horse, snorting out steam and belching out fire, called the locomotive, the nature of which we shall examine somewhat more closely. Certainly it is not our intention to give in detail the description of a machine so complicated as that of a locomotive, that triumph of human invention, but the essentials and generalities may be touched upon in this essay.

Between the wheels and upon springs there is placed a water-tank of wrought-iron, firmly constructed; it is called the boiler, almost like the form of a reclining cylinder, and takes up nearly the entire length of the carriage. At its rear, and almost surrounded by water, is the fire-box, in which a great fire is kept, from which the heat is conducted by means of a system of brass tubes, forty or fifty in number, in order to make the greatest possible surface of contact, through the water to a chimney standing on the fore end of the locomotive. After that the water which has been pumped into the boiler to a certain height, and has been brought to the boiling point, steam is generated upon whose elasticity depends the operation of all steam-engines. Steam's expansiveness increases with the height of the temperature by which it is generated, and the steam enclosed within the walls of the

boiler will, if it continues to expand, finally burst the boiler though it be very firmly made, unless an opening has been provided for it as soon as its expansion reaches a certain degree. Now this is done in case of the locomotive either by means of the cylinder, when the machine is in operation, or by the safety-valve, when it is at rest.

Steam is said to have an expansive power of 40, 50, 60 lbs., in case the force with which it presses upon the sides of the boiler from within is equal to 40, 50, 60 lbs. weight on every square inch of the boiler's surface. If one imagines, for example, that a piece on the top of the boiler one foot square is loose, then with 60 lbs. of expansion the pressure on it must be 8640 lbs. to prevent it from being blown into the air by the steam. If now the joined plates of which a steam-boiler is constructed endure only 60 lbs. pressure and actually no more, it is easily seen that a pressure exceeding this maximum limit would necessarily burst the boiler with a fearful explosion, for the steam confined in it would form under ordinary pressure a volume more than four hundred times as great. There, are, of course, openings in the steam-boiler to prevent this, and their covers are pressed down by a weight equivalent to 60 lbs. to the square inch, or, what is the same, they are held down by a spring proportionally strong. These are the safety-valves. As soon as the pressure within the boiler exceeds that resting on the valve, the latter is opened and we see a white cloud rush upwards which we usually call steam, though it is steam already compressed to water, for steam is invisible like the atmosphere itself. The force with which this surplus of strength escapes and which would suffice to gain the prize for the electro-magnetic machine, now gives us an idea of the efficiency of the locomotive. As soon as enough steam has escaped through the safety-valve to reduce the pressure to not more than 60 lbs., the valve sinks of itself and closes the boiler.

The cylinders in front on either side of the boiler form another way of escape for the steam. In the cylinder is a piston or ram which can be driven forwards or backwards. When, by means of a regulator, the steam is allowed to enter the front end of the cylinder by a certain passage, it drives the piston back with great force. But before the piston reaches the end of the cylinder the passage through which the steam entered is closed by means of a simple and ingenious arrangement, and an escape for the same is opened leading to the smoke-stack by which it passes out at once. Simultaneously an opening in the rear end of the cylinder is unclosed through which the steam from the boiler now slowly passes into the cylinder, but enters on the opposite side of the piston and drives it forwards until again the escape to the smoke-stack opens and the steam again presses into the forward end. The piston is thus continuously and rapidly driven forwards and backwards.

The entire apparatus of the steam-carriage rests on four, six, or eight wheels, and of these the driving-wheels must be distinguished from the guiding-wheels.¹ The latter are smaller and serve only to bear the weight of the machine; the former, far greater in diameter, are intended to drive it forward. The pistons in the cylinders, of which we have just spoken, are joined by connecting-rods to the driving-wheels, so that each movement, once forwards and once backwards, of the former result in a complete revolution of the latter.

Friction is produced whenever two bodies in immediate contact move over each other. It is this that obstructs motion in all machines, first lessening it and finally stopping it altogether. Yet the use of loco-

¹ The locomotive built by George Stephenson which received the prize given for the best and most rapid machine on the Stockton-Darlington Railway, near Rainhill, on October 6, 1829, had four wheels.—STR.

motives for moving loads depends on this very same friction. The elasticity of the steam generated in the boiler drives the piston backwards and forwards in the cylinders, as we have seen, and this motion is next imparted to the driving-wheels, which thus receive the power to revolve. Because they find resistance, generally called adhesion, on the iron rails on which they rest, and this prevents them from revolving unobstructed on their axles, they drive this axle forwards, that is, they roll forwards and draw the load attached along with them.

When locomotives were first placed on iron rails the flanges or fellies of the wheels were provided with teeth which were made to fit into corresponding indentures in the rails.¹ This was accompanied with great inconveniences, and it was a long time before it was believed that there was a great amount of friction between turning wheels and rails almost smooth, and that thousands of hundredweights could be moved by means of this useful friction, and that too up very steep grades.

The obstructive friction, on the other hand, is that which is found in cases of all wheels between the axles and the wheel-caps, and, in a less degree, between the fellies and the rails, finally, between the inner parts of the machine itself. This resistance increases proportionally to the weight which rests upon the axles.

If the total resistances exceed the greatness of adhesion the locomotive and carriages stop, and the driving-wheels, grinding on the rails with a great amount of resistance, turn on their own axles.

Many experiments have shown that the force

¹ In 1804 coal-trains were run by machines on the ascents of the Merthyr-Tydvil line in South Wales, by R. Trevethick, into the wheels of which were driven nails, outside of the running surface of the rails, and the heads of these nails caught into the wooden longitudinal sleepers. In 1812, on the Middleton coal-line, a train was moved by a locomotive built by Blenkinsop, by means of a rack lying along the line and by cog-wheels.—STR.

necessary to overcome the resistance, and to set in motion a wheeled vehicle on a hard and level surface, is about equal to one three-hundredths of the weight¹ of the object to be moved; in other words, a hundred-weight on a cord passing over a roller would move a wagon of about 300 cwt. (not counting, of course, the stiffness of the cord and the friction of the roller).

But as soon as the road ascends, and consequently the load to be moved is said to be increased, the power necessary to overcome the resistance must be still increased by new power. This is constant throughout, nor can any part of it be removed; it is the same for the worst field-way and for the smoothest railway, the same for a steep and for a gentle ascent.² If the road has to be conducted, for example, over a hill twenty feet high, the power required to draw the load up the said hill would be quite the same whether it be necessary to ascend a grade of $\frac{1}{300}$ or $\frac{1}{1000}$, with the only difference that in this case unequal amounts of power are employed for equal amounts of time, and, of course, in the given case these amounts of power would be proportional to each amount of time as 300 is to 1000. The sum total of all the amounts remains, however, the same, and is equivalent to the weight of the entire load to be moved.

Let us imagine a stretch of railway with a $\frac{1}{300}$ ascending grade, up which a load of 300 cwt. is to be carried; we need first 1 cwt. to overcome the friction, next $\frac{1}{300}$ of the load, or a second 1 cwt., to move the load, a total of 2 cwt., or twice the amount

¹ Wood estimates $\frac{1}{333}$, Macneil $\frac{1}{300}$, Pambour $\frac{1}{330}$ to $\frac{1}{300}$, and under favourable circumstances still less.

² The gradient of the railway is usually designated by a fraction, whose numerator tells the height, and the denominator the length of the inclined plain. If a road 300 feet long ascends about one foot it is said to have an inclination of 1·300 or $\frac{1}{300}$. Should it ascend or descend about one perch for 1000 perches, the gradient is designated 1·1000 or $\frac{1}{1000}$.

necessary to move it on a horizontal plane. Again, for the ascent of a grade of 1·150 there is need of 1 cwt. of power to overcome the friction, but for the moving of the load are needed $\frac{3 \cdot 0 \cdot 0}{1 \cdot 5 \cdot 0} = 2$ cwt., hence a total of 3 cwt., or three times the amount necessary to move it on a horizontal surface; with a grade of 1·100, four times the amount, and with grades of $\frac{1}{8}$ and $\frac{1}{7}$ four and one-half and nine times the power are required. Yet grades of the last kind are found on English lines and are traversed by locomotives. If a locomotive drawing the greatest possible load with its greatest speed on a horizontal line and with its greatest generation of steam reaches the slightest grade, although it sloped only at the rate of $\frac{1}{1000}$, and if it is desired to travel further with the same speed and load, there is nothing to do but to attach a second (assistant) locomotive.

If time or power is lost by the ascension of steep surfaces, the same, on the other hand, is regained to a certain degree by the descent of the same grade. The weight of the load also increases the speed of the same, as it overcomes the resistance of the friction. On a grade of 1·224 up to 1·300 the weight of the load is equal to the friction. The carriages, therefore, will slowly roll down of themselves.¹ If the incline is more gradual, gravitation in union with steam power assists in increasing the speed none the less; but only when the grade is considerably greater than $\frac{1}{300}$ does this cease to be a favourable circumstance, because one cannot travel with less than zero steam power, and because, in order to avoid a too rapid and dangerous descent, the wheels must be locked, which is harmful to both rails and carriage.

It is obvious that, in the descent of a steep and smooth surface, which inclines at the rate of 1·300, a

¹ Since gradual declines are not dangerous for the descent of carriages, it is permissible to locate stations also on descending grades of 1·400.—STR.

dangerous velocity must necessarily be acquired at last, provided the incline is very long. For, according to the universal law of gravitation, the motion, though primarily slow, increases in velocity at every new division of time, and so on to infinity. But another obstacle simultaneously opposes this velocity, and the experiments recently made on the Liverpool-Manchester line and on the Grand Junction line have furnished data quite as important as they are astonishing. A long distance was taken, extending horizontally fully half a German mile, so that a train of eight or twelve heavily-loaded goods-vans could be moved on it with great velocity to the edge of a steep descent, which inclined at the rate of $\frac{1}{96}$ for a third of a German mile. The wagons were allowed to descend this incline unobstructed. They stationed several men every fifty perches along this declivity, who observed the exact moment by watches indicating the seconds, when the train passed by them. They thus ascertained the time which the wagons had to take in running through each of the equidistant spaces. From a series of fourteen observations it was shown that, during the first seconds of time the load acquired an increasing velocity, but that this soon became invariably constant. Under the stated conditions, the speed amounted to $5\frac{3}{4}$ up to $8\frac{1}{2}$ German miles per hour. Since the resistance of the load only, not of the speed, is determined, the resistance of the air must in this case be the element to arrest greater velocity. This resistance of the air is proportioned, not only according to the front surface of the moving object, but also according to the upper surface which, by its movement, comes in contact with the air, and its resistance increases according to the square of its speed; that is, if a wagon travels at 2, 3, 4, 5 times greater velocity, the resistance will be 4, 9, 16, 25 times greater. It increases, therefore, by rapid progression, and the velocity produced by the descent is arrested as soon as a certain degree of velocity is reached.

Those who are less acquainted with these proportions may imagine that the descent of 1.300 is a precipitous declivity, and, therefore, it is not superfluous to make the observation that, with a $\frac{1}{300}$ ascent to every perch, an elevation of half an inch is not attained, and that an unpractised eye would easily be doubtful whether a surface, inclining at the rate of $\frac{1}{300}$, ascended or descended on this side or that. And yet this very incline, which the floor of a room may have, without being noticed by the occupant, is a steep declivity for railway business, necessitating double the amount of power, and demanding at the same time an increase of running expenses.

We intend to illustrate still more closely the efficiency of the locomotive by a definite example. Let us imagine a steam locomotive with cylinders twelve inches in diameter, the pistons of which offer to the steam a surface of $226\frac{2}{7}$ square inches, and this equals a pressure of 13,579 lbs. (with an expansion of 60 lbs. per square inch). The force then put upon the circumference of the driving-wheels is in proportion to that given above as the length of the piston-stroke to half the circumference of the wheels; that is, with a 16-inch beat, and driving-wheels 5 feet high, it bears the ratio of about $16 : 94\frac{2}{7}$. The force with which the locomotive strives to move itself and the load attached to it amounts, therefore, to—

$$\frac{16}{94\frac{2}{7}} \times 13,579 = 2304 \text{ lbs.}$$

It has been proved by experiment that such a locomotive requires 110 lbs. to move itself, which, deducted from the above figures, leave 2194 lbs., or about 20 cwt. of drawing-power for the load. Yet a part of this must also be deducted in overcoming the internal friction of the machine, which is equally proportional to the mass of the load attached, and, therefore, cannot be determined once for all.

As has been stated, the result of many accurate experiments is that a load on wheels in a horizontal line in good condition may be moved by $3\frac{1}{10}$ to $2\frac{1}{8}$, and under less favourable conditions to $2\frac{1}{2}$, of its own weight. Let us base our calculations upon the second of these figures. If, then, $2\frac{1}{5}$ cwt. be deducted from the above 20 cwt., for the overcoming of the internal resistance of the machine, the power left would suffice to move about $17\frac{4}{5} \times 280 = 4984$ cwt. If we deduct from this still the tender of 100 cwt., the remainder shows that a locomotive of the given construction on a horizontal line will set in motion the enormous load of a train of wagons weighing 4884 cwt.

Next to this maximum of load we have to notice the maximum of speed.

The speed depends upon the amount of steam which the machine is able to generate each time. If, after that the steam reaches an expansion of 60 lbs. pressure to the square inch, and the train has been put in motion, the generation of steam is suddenly interrupted, the motion itself would decrease at once and finally stop. For a part of the bulk of steam escapes at every stroke of the piston; the faster the locomotive travels, the more piston-strokes it makes each time, the more steam escapes, and the faster, therefore, must the latter be generated if its effect is to remain the same.

The generation of steam, however, depends upon the size of the heated surface in contact with the water contained in the boiler; it is thus determined by the original construction of the machine. If the locomotive is able each time to generate just as much steam as it loses through the piston-strokes, the motion will then be constant, all things being equal. If it generates more than the cylinders absorb, the surplus escapes by the safety-valve or is again condensed into water, and this, therefore, determines the maximum of speed for each machine, which cannot be exceeded without lightening the load, unless the expansion of steam be

increased by loading the valves and thus adding the risk of bursting the boiler.

A machine, like the one before our mind's eye, is constructed so that it generates in one hour steam from 38 cubic feet of water¹ with an actual pressure of 60 lbs. to the square inch, which, under the ordinary pressure of the atmosphere, occupies 16,350 cubic feet, and the whole is to issue through the cylinders. We may thus estimate the number of piston-strokes, the revolutions of the driving-wheels, and thus the distance traversed in one hour. The result shows that the greatest working power of our engine is as follows: it moves a load of 4884 cwt. on a horizontal way 5161 perches, or roundly $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, in one hour.

If the load is lessened, then pressure on the pistons is lessened, and both pistons and wheels will move faster, that is, a greater distance will be travelled in the same time. The speed thus acquired would be limited in the first place, if the heating surface of the boiler were unable to generate as much steam as the cylinders absorb. But in order to avoid danger it is necessary that the motion should be measured by a regulator long before this happened.

The greatest speed is made, of course, when the machine with full force descends a down grade, when, for example, it descended the $\frac{1}{96}$ grade near Rainhill, with a speed of $63\frac{3}{4}$ feet per second, or 10 German miles per hour, or again when the load is reduced to a minimum, namely, when the locomotive goes alone. The distance from Potsdam to Berlin was once traversed in this way in $17\frac{1}{2}$ minutes, that is, more than one German mile had to be travelled in five

¹ Locomotives for fast service evaporate 60 cubic feet of water in an hour, or about one pound of water every second. The volume of steam generated in one second would be under the pressure of the atmosphere like a pillar whose basal surface would be 6 feet long, 6 wide and 1000 high.

minutes, which, of course, cannot take place without danger and involves a great destruction of material.¹

And again, if a locomotive draws a load not so heavy with great speed, the load can be increased by lessening the speed. For the pressure on the piston increases with the load and thus produces a higher expansion of the steam in the cylinder which tends to equalize the expansion in the boiler. This, however, has its limit. If the pressure on the pistons is greater than the pressure on the safety-valves, they will open and let the steam escape. If the load continued to be increased the locomotive and wagons would finally stop, and if the generation of steam is kept up, the driving-wheels would revolve on their own axles with great force. In this case the pistons are to be regarded only as greater safety-valves of the steam-boiler. The increase of speed, therefore, beyond a fixed point, cannot produce greater power of locomotion. The locomotive power and speed are reciprocally conditioned, but within certain limits. These depend on the original construction of the machine, and moreover, the former, on the expansion of steam which the boiler can contain, and on the diameter of the cylinders; the latter, on the amount of water that can be heated and evaporated and on the size of the driving-wheels.

We thus find here also the well-known fundamental law of all mechanics confirmed, namely, that what is gained in time is lost in power, and what is saved in power is spent in time; for the mechanical effect remains quite the same, one may move ten pounds one foot or one pound ten feet in a given length of time. And this law is only modified to a greater degree in a machine put together like the steam engine.

The results ascertained by calculation and verified

¹ The greatest speed that can be made on German railways amounts to 90 km. (12 miles) per hour.—STR.

by experiment show that a locomotive of the above dimensions with a speed per hour of

12,571	rods	or	about	$6\frac{1}{2}$	miles	draws	986	cwt.
8,217	"	"	"	$4\frac{1}{4}$	"	"	2,465	"
4,777	"	"	"	$2\frac{1}{3}$	"	"	5,539	"

Thus the various rates of speed are to the rates of weight as $6\frac{1}{2} : 4\frac{1}{4} : 2\frac{1}{3} = 1 : 2\frac{1}{2} : 5\frac{1}{2}$; that is, if the machine moves about one-third as rapidly, it draws more than five times the load.

Another engine with cylinders only $10\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide and wheels 4 ft. 10 inches high at a speed of

17,348	rods	or	about	$8\frac{3}{4}$	miles	draws	493	cwt.
11,135	"	"	"	$5\frac{1}{2}$	"	"	1,478	"
5,841	"	"	"	3	"	"	3,982	"

Here the various rates of speed are to the weights almost as $3 : 2 : 1 = 1 : 3 : 8$; that is, one-third the less speed gives eight times the greater weight.

But by a very much greater decrease of speed, it will not be possible to move a still greater load, because its pressure on the pistons would then cause the adhesion or "seizure" of the driving-wheels on to the rails.

It is therefore obvious why lighter locomotives with small ten-inch cylinders are used for passenger traffic, where the chief object is time, but heavy locomotives with large cylinders (as much as thirteen inches)¹ and small wheels for goods traffic, where the greatest possible load is to be moved. The wheels are often doubled in number so that a greater share of the weight of the engine rests on the driving-wheels, thus decreasing the adhesion. Such locomotives are built as heavy as 236 cwt., in order to seize firmly on the rails.²

¹ At present cylinders with diameters as great as 650 millimeters are used.—STR.

² The weight of the heavy locomotives and tenders used on German railways amounts to 55 tons (1100 cwt.) when they are not loaded with water and fuel.—STR.

They move slowly and with greater power, and thus require much less repairing.

We have already hinted at the effect of the grades of a railway upon the management, when the load must not only be drawn but also lifted. We have just seen that a heavy machine, its own weight included, draws the enormous load of 5539 cwt. in a straight line at a speed of fully $2\frac{1}{2}$ German miles per hour. The engines are generally constructed for less speed, namely, two miles per hour, in order to have a greater horse-power; but there is always a certain surplus of power necessary to overcome incidental obstacles, such as wind, bad condition of the rails, irregularities of the same, etc.

The state of the weather has greater influence than is generally supposed. When the wind¹ opposes the direction of motion, it delays it; and still more so if it comes from the side, for it then presses the wagons, forming a broad surface together with the wheel rims against the rails, thus causing a great amount of friction. Under such circumstances, in September, 1839 (on a gentle incline between Bruges and Ostend), three locomotives were needed to take a train of only eleven wagons, and even then twice the amount of time was spent in traversing this distance.

The adhesion of the driving-wheels is diminished in case of slippery ice or foul rails. According to the experiments made in England the amount of adhesion, under most favourable conditions, is equal to one-seventh of the weight resting on the driving-wheels, but under unfavourable conditions it is decreased to one-twenty-seventh.² In the first case the adhesion and the maximum horse-power of a locomotive weighing 236 cwt., of which about 140 cwt. rest upon the driv-

¹ Experience proves that the effect of the wind upon the motion of a train is not an unimportant item and is often the cause of delays.—STR.

² It is generally estimated from $\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{7}$.—STR.

ing-wheels, would be $= \frac{140}{7} = 20$ cwt. (as was computed above), but in the second case only $\frac{140}{27}$, or less than 5 cwt. American engineers compute the adhesion, under most favourable conditions, to be $\frac{1}{6}$, and under most unfavourable $\frac{1}{15}$, hence considerably higher, but this circumstance remains to be well examined, for it is specially important to roads which have heavy grades.

The grades are for the most part of greatest importance to railways, and we have observed above that undulations on the surface, hardly perceptible to the eye, can become great obstacles in the laying-out of a road. We must examine this more closely.

In the experiments made in England on the Liverpool-Manchester and Grand Junction railway, a train weighing 1463 cwt. was made to travel from Birmingham to Liverpool and from Liverpool to Birmingham, and, as already described, at every quarter of an English mile its speed in ascending and descending the various grades was taken, as well as on the horizontal stretch. If then the time required for ascent and the time for descent are found to give also the average of speed in a horizontal line, then it must follow that the present ascents and descents of the road result in no delays, as far as the speed is concerned, and that no more time is required to move the roads than if they were perfectly horizontal. The results of this investigation are to be seen in the table on opposite page.

The differences of the mean velocities are here shown to be so slight that the ascending and descending grades are equalized up to $\frac{1}{177}$. When the train ascended the grade 1.330 it lost time, and travelled only twenty-five English miles per hour instead of 30.93 miles which it would have made on the horizontal line; but when it descended the same it gained time and made thirty-seven miles per hour. The loss

in the one direction therefore was as great as the gain in the other.

Gradient.	Speed of the train on this decline per hour in English miles.		Mean velocity.
	In ascending and descending.		
1·177	22·25	41·52	31·78
1·265	24·87	39·13	32·06
1·330	25·26	37·07	31·16
1·400	26·87	36·75	31·81
1·532	27·35	34·30	30·82
1·590	27·27	33·16	30·21
1·650	29·03	32·58	30·80
Horizontal	30·93	30·93	30·93

It might be supposed that more fuel would be consumed in making the ascent, but this is not so. As soon as an engine ascends a grade it undergoes a greater resistance, and hence works more slowly. There is, therefore, with the same generation of steam a greater expansion of steam in the boiler and in the cylinders, consequently a greater pressure upon the piston and a stronger pulling-power, without a greater consumption of fuel than on a level. As far as fuel is concerned it is a gain generally to attach the heaviest possible load to the engine. In the experiments made by Cambour on the Liverpool-Manchester line the locomotive Atlas, for example, required 697 lbs. of coke to draw 493 cwt., and only double the amount of coke to draw 3745 cwt., that is, almost eight times as heavy a load. But in this respect such an ascent equals an increase of load. The steam that rushes out of the cylinders into the smoke-stack, operates like a bellows on the furnace. While the piston-strokes become less frequent, the fire also burns itself away more slowly

and consumes less coal. In making the descent almost no fuel is needed or, at least, only as much as is necessary to keep up the fire, for a new force is added, that of weight, which at a $\frac{1}{300}$ grade is just enough to overcome the friction.

But if neither time nor fuel are lost in case of grades, so far as they counterbalance each other, this is by no means so with the power that is to be employed.

Steep grades on a railway lengthen the distance, increase the running expenses, decrease the speed, increase the wear and tear, and possibly endanger the profits of the entire enterprise. Railways, therefore, and especially those expected to have a heavy goods traffic, must seek, as far as it is feasible, to take a direction verging little from the level.

The engine which under favourable conditions will draw 5539 cwt. on a level at a speed of two and a half miles per hour, will on grades of $\frac{1}{1000}$ draw only 4327; on grades of $\frac{1}{300}$ draw only 2865; and on grades of $\frac{1}{96}$ draw only 1192.

If on a railway level spaces alternate with such grades two things may be done: either the load may be regulated equally according to the steepest of these ascents; that is, if grades of $\frac{1}{300}$ occur, the locomotive will have only a load of 2865 cwt. attached, or the train is actually laden with the full load and is assisted up the steep places by an auxiliary locomotive. The former method is used, for example, on the Darlington line, where the grades, to be sure, are not very steep, but are so frequent that an auxiliary locomotive cannot be placed on every one of them; the latter, on the other hand, for the goods trains on the Liverpool line, where occur grades of $\frac{1}{96}$ and even $\frac{1}{39}$.¹ The passenger trains are moved there without auxiliaries, because these are not calculated to have a full load. The weight of the passengers amounts, perhaps, to half the gross

¹ Adhesion-roads have been built with grades of $\frac{1}{14}$.—STR.

weight, and as the locomotive itself at grade of $\frac{1}{300}$ is still able to draw 3000 cwt., this makes it possible for every train to carry about 700 passengers, which as an average means a very large traffic, such as is very seldom reached. On the Belgian lines, in the year 1839, the average number of travellers for each train was only 107.¹

Passengers are the most valuable goods, those for which the highest rates may be demanded, and on this account nearly all railways have been hitherto planned for passenger traffic; the goods traffic, however, has been treated as a secondary matter. Yet the time is not far distant when it will be seen that the transport of goods is the very basis of all railway operation, which will make the investment profitable, and that the actual national economic use of the railways is to be sought in it.

People require numerous considerations in transport, goods only punctual and safe conveyance. The former wish to be carried rapidly, at least from four to five miles per hour, so that the rails, and especially the locomotives, are used up with the fearful speed. In England, it is estimated that there is one locomotive in service for every English mile.² The goods transport allows a moderate speed of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ or 2 miles per hour,³ and thus saves the running stock. On the Belgian lines, at the end of the year 1841, there were 17 per cent. of passenger carriages and $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of goods wagons undergoing repairs.⁴ The passenger traffic is

¹ In the year 1889-90, the total number of persons carried on the railways of Germany amounted to 376,825,006. There are for every 10,000 inhabitants 8.41 km. of railway lines, and for every 100 square km. 7.37 km.—STR.

² On the German regular-gauge railways there are, on an average, 3.27 locomotives to 10 km. of railway in operation.—STR.

³ The goods trains on the main railways of Germany run at an average speed, including the stoppage at stations, of 15 km. per hour, and express goods trains at an average rate of 26 km.—STR.

⁴ On the regular-gauge railways of Germany at present 20 per

subject to the greatest fluctuation. In a favourable season, at the time of festivities or chance occasions, there is an enormous press, while at other times the trains run half empty. But full loads may always be counted on in case of the transport of goods, for these do not, like the traveller at the moment of his arrival, demand to go farther, but their departure may almost always be delayed till the next transport. They do not require frequent and expensive inspection of the lines, and the running expenses are not essentially greater, though the quantity of material to be transported may be doubled or many times increased.

It has been learned from the Belgian railways that in case of a very great reduction of fares for passengers, the number of travellers does not at all make good the loss which the increase of business produces, and which, instead of relieving the necessary journeys, often provokes travelling back and forth, a thing injurious from an economical standpoint, at least wholly useless. The greatest possible reduction of rates on goods, on the other hand, is advantageous to all classes of society, to producers and consumers; it enhances the whole wealth of a nation. The Belgian report for 1840 rightly says that the transport of heavy goods furnishes the chief income of the business, without requiring a proportionally great expenditure for the same. But if, then, the lightening of the goods traffic is the chief object both for the income of the enterprise and for an important economical reason, the construction of the roads with the least possible grades becomes a matter of essential importance. For, although the passenger traffic of a road admits of light grades, yet disadvantages enter at once in the case of goods traffic, where it is a question of moving as many hundredweight as possible with the same train.

cent. of locomotives are undergoing repairs; 15 of passenger carriages; and 6 of goods wagons; that is, of all the rolling-stock of this class.—STR.

On a railway having $\frac{1}{300}$ grades, with a given number of locomotives in operation, either only half as much tonnage can be moved as on one equally long, but level, or the same tonnage only with twice the number of locomotives. Since for this purpose the auxiliary locomotives are employed, which must be kept ready for future use by each road, the management of the former line will not only cost exactly double that of the latter, but its expenses will be very much greater. But in the case of most of the great railways, the lay of the land makes it by no means easy, not even everywhere possible, to avoid the grades. The following table, giving the steepest grades of the most important railways in Europe, shows to what an extent irregularities of the earth have had to be overcome:—

GERMANY.		Steepest Grade.
Brunswick—Vienenburg		1·283
Munich—Augsburg		1·280
Cologne—Aachen		1·264
Tannusbahn		1·250
Leipzig—Dresden		1·200
Vienna—Raab		1·137
Berlin—Frankfort		1·114
BELGIUM.		
Mons—Jurbise		1·317
Waremme—Ans.		1·303
Tubize—Braine le Comte		1·223
Liege—Prussian Frontier		1·100
FRANCE.		
Paris—St. Germain—Mulhausen		1·100
Thann—and Strasburg—Bale		1·125
ENGLAND.		
Southampton		1·202
Manchester—Bury		1·200
Leeds—Selby		1·166
Newcastle—Carlisle		1·160
Manchester—Leeds		1·150
London—Brighton		1·147
London—Croydon		1·100

ENGLAND (<i>continued</i>).	Steepest Grade.
Grand Junction	1·100
Dublin—Kingston	1·100
Liverpool—Manchester	1·089
Birmingham—Gloucester	1·037

This last distance is traversed, notwithstanding the grade, and that, too, with American locomotives. Generally, grades of $\frac{1}{300}$ can be regarded as unavoidable on long lines.¹ Although the level or a line deviating very little from it is advantageous, yet it is evident that there is a limit beyond which the expense necessary to be made to secure this advantage would be so great as to be out of proportion with the results to be gained. An illustration will make this manifest.

If between two places, which are two miles apart, there is a hill 80 ft. high, and precipitous on both sides, a railway with a grade of $\frac{1}{300}$ will mount the same without any further surface correction. But should it be desired to reduce the grade to 1·1000, it would be necessary to make a cut two miles longer, and 56 feet (80 - 24) deeper in the middle. And to complete this, perhaps, it would be necessary to make a tunnel; at all events, the earth work would require an expenditure of several hundreds of thousands. The following facts may be given here in order to give an idea of the expense required for such works.

A cut, such as the one mentioned, would require at least 800,000 rods of earth to be excavated. On German lines that have been constructed with the least expense the average cost of excavation has been $1\frac{1}{2}$ thalers (Prussian currency) per rod; this cut, therefore, would cost about one million thalers. The cuts on the lines mentioned were not more than 30 feet deep. But, apart from the still greater number of rods of earth which

¹ The steepest passable grade on the main railways of Germany is limited to $\frac{1}{50}$, and in exceptional cases is said not to be greater than $\frac{1}{40}$.—STR.

would have to be removed in the cut proposed, the expense of excavating increases greatly according to the depth from which the earth has to be taken. Should there be no place to deposit the earth, should the ground be sandy and loose, so that the slopes would have to be kept more even, the expense would be increased so greatly that it would be better to construct a tunnel.

On the Cologne-Aachen line the construction of the tunnel cost 150 thalers per foot; on the Leipzig-Dresden line, 183 thalers; on the London-Birmingham (the Kilsbury tunnel) 300 thalers, or, on an average, every quarter-mile cost one million thalers.

One of the most important questions to be asked in the building of every railway is: How much shall the surface be corrected in order to secure a better gradient? in other words, How much shall be expended in construction in order to save in running expenses? The former, a sum paid out once for all time represents capital, the latter, one recurring annually, represents income.

This question can by no means be answered generally, but it must be ascertained specially for each concrete case. But we shall attempt to lay down the principle upon which this depends.

On one side of the account is placed the estimate of the line's cost in positive figures with sufficient exactness, providing the maximum of the grading is fixed at $\frac{1}{1000}$, $\frac{1}{300}$ or $\frac{1}{150}$. Estimations are no longer exceeded by twice the amount, or even four times the same, and from our present experience the estimate must very nearly equal the cost of construction, so that essential changes do not make them incorrect afterwards. It may be stated with sufficient certainty that the line in the first case will cost eight millions, in the second seven, and in the third six.

But the second part cannot be answered with equal definiteness. It may be inferred that the travel be-

tween two cities connected by a railway must be increased to a great extent. In this respect the result has always surpassed the greatest expectation.

There travelled, for example, daily:—

	Before the construction of the railway.	After.
Between Liverpool and Manchester ...	400 people	1620
„ Stockton „ Darlington ...	130 „	630
„ Newcastle „ Carlisle ...	90 „	500
„ Arbroath „ Forfar ...	20 „	200
„ Brussels „ Antwerp ...	200 „	3000

Hence the travel was increased about four, five, ten and fifteen fold.¹

The goods traffic cannot, of course, be estimated in this manner, for it is governed by altogether different conditions, by a fixed law of demand and supply. But both increase likewise when the tariff decreases, and speed and safety of transport become greater. But in all such matters the quantity cannot be ascertained, but this quantity is a very important thing to know.

The surface correction from a gradient of $\frac{1}{300}$ to $\frac{1}{1000}$, in the example given, has cost one million thalers. It may further be ascertained that the mere transport expenses on the first grade will cost seven silver pfennige per hundredweight and per mile, on the second four pf., because on the former the power must be increased or the load decreased. This increase in running expenses on one mile of grade, each way, provided six million hundredweight of goods are carried, would amount to eighteen millions silver pfennige or fifty thousand thalers, which must be renewed annually, and therefore, at four per cent. it represents a capital of $1\frac{1}{4}$ millions. Thus, if one could have anticipated such

¹ Estimating Germany's population at $40\frac{1}{2}$ millions, each person makes 9·3 journeys on the regular-gauge railways in Germany.—STR.

a traffic or a still greater one, it would have been justifiable to expend one million for a cut through the hill, and there would be gained for all time the net profits of the undertaking. If, on the other hand, the goods traffic were not so great, if there were only four or five million hundredweight to be transported annually on the line, the interest on the capital expended in the correction has been lost then for all time. Large surface corrections must, therefore, be thoroughly considered. But, on the other hand, a later increase of traffic through increase in business, through conjunction with other lines is very possible, while a supplementary correction interrupts the entire traffic and involves the loss of almost all former expenditures.

We hardly need to say that we have selected very extreme cases for illustration and that it is seldom necessary to make a cut costing one million. It is almost always possible to make a circuit and avoid such a correction of surface.

If the direction of a railway is changed it is done by turning the course very gradually. If a train is being pulled in a straight line and is made to change its course by means of a curve, the power of inertia inherent in every body causes the flanges of the wheels to press against the outer line of rails, so that there is not only much more friction, but also in consequence of the narrow radii and the great speed, great danger lest the locomotive should jump the rails or the axle should break. Since, moreover, on every curve the outer of the two parallel lines of rails must be longer than the inner, the wheels have to travel a greater distance on this outer one than on the inner. But both wheels are fastened to the same axle, so that one cannot revolve faster than the other, the outer wheels are forced, therefore, to slide, and thus again increase their friction.

Several very ingenious arrangements have been

planned to remove this difficulty, but the result has not yet been satisfactory. The fellys of the wheels, for example, have been made conical, so that the outside diameter of the wheel was less than the one inside. If on a curve turning towards the right the centrifugal force drives the wagon against the outer rail, the left wheels revolve on the inner and greater diameter, the right on the outer and smaller one,¹ so that the former travels a longer distance in the same length of time, the latter a shorter. But the conical form of the wheels has the great fault of producing a swaying motion on even a straight line, and such a heavy sidewise oscillation (*mouvement de lacet*) is greatly increased on those wagons that are quite a distance from the locomotive.

Another plan was to arrange the rails in such a way that the outer wheel, when on the curve, would not run on the felly, but on the flange, and thus necessarily prevent it from sliding off. This sliding would have to be hindered by a special rim on the rail. But such an arrangement would be possible only when all the curves on a line are described with a very short radius, and then only in case of the usual and necessary height of the flange.

Moreover the wagons have been supplied with four pairs of wheels,² every two pairs of which are put as closely together as possible and are so joined together that the axles continue to be parallel with the wagon but in such a way that they can be slightly turned from their regular position. In case of the engine this is disadvantageous, as the wheels cannot be joined together, and thus the weight on the driving-wheels, consequently the adhesion, is diminished, while with the wagons this adhesion becomes very great, which

¹ It has not been proved generally that the replacement of the conical running surface on the wheel-tires with a cylindrical one will answer the purpose.—STR.

² Wagons with so-called truck-frames are of late used on the German railways (with four and more pairs of wheels).—STR.

also causes many inconveniences. The usual remedy is to lay the outer rails a little higher than the inner so that when the centrifugal force drives the wagons outward, their weight will draw¹ them inwards again, whereby, of course, the sliding of the outer wheels has not been overcome.

All these remedies are unable to answer the purpose completely, as may be inferred from what has been said, since the centrifugal force is a variable one, which increases and decreases with the rate of speed, while the weight is altogether constant. It is always safest to construct the curves with a very large radius, or to moderate the speed at the sharper curves.

Experiments made in England have shown that on curves described with a radius of $\frac{1}{2}$ an English mile = 213 rods, the speed of the train is equal to that on a straight piece of the line. Nor was it possible to observe the slightest decrease of speed, and these experiments were made frequently and under different conditions, so that the final result cannot be doubted. On the railways that have been built in Germany there are curves² described with radii from 300 to 100 rods; in France with radii from 300 to 100 rods; in Belgium with radii from 300 to 100 rods; in England, indeed, with radii from 100 to 70 rods.

Although these conditions are more or less perfectly analagous, yet indirect courses are deviations from straight lines horizontally projected just as grades are from vertically projected lines. The latter require that the original power be increased; the former, that it be employed a longer time. If you cannot avoid the hill, which you are unwilling to cut through, in

¹ The elevation of the outer rails on curves is determined by the length of the radius of the same and the speed made by the trains.—
STR.

² The smallest admissible radius of curves on German railways of regular gauge is 300 metres, and in exceptional cases 180 metres.—
STR.

any other way than by a circuit of three-fourths of a mile, the final expense will be about the same. For if the mere running expenses on the level amount to four silver pfennige, the circuit of three-fourths of a mile makes an additional cost of three silver pfennige, which for six millions hundredweight also amounts to 50,000 thalers annually.

Six millions hundredweight, as stated before, is an assumed amount, which cannot be easily realized on one German line,¹ and this example was chosen merely in order to show that circumstances themselves justify making a very great increase of invested capital. In order to determine the value of a circuit more exactly by figures, let us base our calculation upon the proportions given by the Belgian and the Leipzig-Dresden lines.

In the year 1840 the total number of miles travelled on the Belgian roads was 156,801. The whole expenses during this time were as follows:—

	generally. francs.	per mile.		
		thlr.	s. grosc.	pf.
For employés, for maintenance, buildings, supplying of materials, etc.	630,812	1	2	—
Running-power, maintenance, repairs and supply of rolling stock, illumination of rails, coke - furnaces, workshops, water-stations, etc.	1,835,772	3	3	8
Direction, inspection, management, import and export of goods, etc.	530,526	—	27	—
For each mile travelled by a train		5	2	8

¹ The following shows how greatly the goods traffic has increased : in the accounts of the year 1889-90 on regular-gauge German railways there were carried 212,093,339 tons (4,241,866,780 cwt.) of goods of all kinds for tariff, and besides 1,473,282 tons of goods for the service ; but 136,150,937 tons (2,723,018,740 cwt.) for tariff was the portion carried by the Prussian government railways and by railways controlled by the Prussian State.

In the same year 46,868 miles were travelled on the Leipzig-Dresden road.

The expenses were	generally. dol.	per mile.		
		thlr.	s. grosc.	pf.
Keeping of the road	54,656	1	5	—
Running of the road	50,559	1	2	4
Firing and repairs on locomotives, maintenance and rebuilding of coaches, wagons, etc.	119,622	2	16	7
Management	23,391	—	14	11
Total for each train per mile ¹ ...		5	8	10

Moreover (if the number of miles travelled annually be divided by the number of miles in the road) the daily travel on the Belgian roads was more than nine times their entire length, on the Saxon more than eight times. If we use only the last quantities given in our illustration, we find that the travel on a road making a circuit of three-fourths of a mile amounts daily to $\frac{3}{4} \times 8$ or 6 miles, hence an additional expense of about 31 dols. daily, or annually of more than 11,000 dols., hence the circuit of one mile costs more than the interest on half a million dollars for running expenses, not counting in the cost of construction.

Circuits, however, are preferable to heavy grades, for they expose the management to less casualties, they are not so destructive to the running stock, and, if they save a great amount of engineering, they generally require less expense to maintain them.

The detours are the second important question to be discussed in determining the character of a railway.

However great an influence grades and the length of

¹ A comparison of the expenses of a train per mile with the statistics quoted here for the same cannot be made, for the trains do not remain on one line, but run on others also. The running expenses on the regular-gauge German railways amounted to 16,801 marks per kilometer of the average length of line in operation.—
STR.

a road may have upon the amount of capital invested and cheapness of operation, the commercial relations, however, are under all circumstances the determining factor in the direction of railways (at least with private enterprises). No one will build a railway over a barren desert, merely because it is level and because it can go straight ahead. On the contrary, we see some of them prospering in the most unfavourable locations, provided only they answer the actual demands of commerce. For this reason railways ought to adopt the old route of trade established in a country, for they do not create a new trade in and for themselves, but they only multiply that which already exists. The railway ought not to be the absolutely shortest line between two termini, but, as far as possible, touch manufacturing cities and prosperous country districts. A poor locality will not become rich because long goods trains rush across its fields, nor a city a commercial centre with great invested capital and outside business connections because a railway leads to it.¹ The railway will succeed and bring success only there where the need of quick and cheap communication has been present. Detours therefore are justifiable to a certain extent, and the commercial relations determine the direction of a line in this latter case more than the lay of the land.

The railway ought, therefore, to consider not merely the interests of the two termini, however important these may be, but also materially that of the country lying between them and the smaller cities.² The travel

¹ The great amount of business which trade and industry have received by means of railways has not infrequently made unindustrious cities and poor localities centres of commerce and industrious cities, especially the places that became junctions on busy railway lines.—STR.

² This requirement is now being taken into account by the building of lines of secondary importance, while the main lines serve almost exclusively in making the shortest connection between the chief stations (commercial and industrial cities).—STR.

of these parts, the so-called inner traffic, is much more important than is generally inferred. In the year 1840 the half of the whole Belgian population, namely $2\frac{1}{4}$ millions of people, had travelled on the 45 miles of the Belgian lines, and, according to the inquiries that were made, every one of these people had travelled on an average only $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles. In the year 1841, on the Magdeburg-Leipzig line, each traveller had gone on an average $5\frac{1}{10}$ miles; on the Leipzig-Dresden, $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Thus it is by no means the through communication, from terminus to terminus, which supports the road, but chiefly the travellers of short distances, from intermediate station to intermediate station, or from one of these to the terminus.¹ But if a line does not touch towns forming such intermediate stations, it loses this important traffic.

The question whether a detour of so many thousand rods shall be made in order to touch this busy city, or that productive district, depends solely on a proper consideration of the increased cost of construction and the additional operating expenses for said thousand rods, in comparison with the anticipated increase of traffic, which latter, however, can be determined only approximately.

The statement is generally true that active, busy traffic allows and demands a more expensive and more perfect railway-plant, a less organized state of trade and industry are satisfied with a less perfect medium, and only such a one makes it profitable.² Hence the enormous and yet admissible expense of the English lines, hence the necessary cheapness of the German.

In England, for example, the London-Greenwich line, only a little over three-fourths of a mile long, cost 5,480,000 thalers, but, of course, for exceptional reasons,

¹ This statement holds true to-day; on the regular-gauge German railways each passenger travels on an average 26.99 km.

² In earlier years railways were almost all built alike, but in the last decade those lines which had to expect less business have also been built and equipped more simply.—STR.

as this line is built the whole distance on arches of masonry, and one-third of its distance lies in the city of London itself. The mere property indemnification cost more than two millions of dollars.

The following are the costs per German mile :—

	Thlr.
In England—London—Croydon.	2,302,000
Manchester—Bolton	1,890,000
London—Birmingham	1,560,000
Liverpool—Manchester	1,880,000
Great Western	1,340,000
Manchester—Leeds	1,260,000
Grand Junction	720,000
Preston—Lancaster	716,000
North Union	704,000
Leeds—Selby	544,000
Glasgow—Garnkirk	378,000
York—North Midlands	306,000
Arbroath—Forfar	216,000
Arbroath—Dundee	210,000
In France—Etienne—Lyons	592,000
In Belgium—The first thirteen sections, which for about three-quarters the distance have only a single track ¹	304,000
In Germany, with single track—Cologne—Aachen	500,000
Dusseldorf—Elberfeld	500,000
Berlin—Potsdam	400,000
Leipzig—Dresden (double track).	360,000
Baden	370,000
Tannus	320,000
Hamburg—Bergedorf	375,000
Munich—Augsburg	270,000
Berlin—Frankfort-on-Oder.	250,000
Berlin—Anhalt	210,000
Berlin—Stettin (narrow “crown wide”) Magdeburg—Leipzig	184,000
Kaiser Ferdinand—Nordbahn	209,000
	164,000

Railway lines which had to overcome such enormous irregularities of surface, as the Cologne-Aachen and

¹ The line from Liege to Verviers, which is still building, will be, however, much more expensive, in fact the most expensive on the Continent.

Düsseldorf-Elberfeld, cannot give up any proportion of its commerce, nor likewise those that had to pay a big apprentice's fee for the novelty of the thing. It may be assumed that the railways in Germany can be rebuilt for one-fourth of a million on an average per current mile.¹ Accordingly the expenses of a railway increase about three-quarter millions for each mile of detour, if the increased running expenses be added as half a million of capital to the average building-capital of a quarter a million, and these three-quarter millions ought to be overbalanced by the anticipated increase of traffic gained by the detour.

We have seen how both the surface of the land and business matters compel railways to deviate from the straight line; it remains to allude in a few words to the political and territorial relations.

It is natural that the position of a railway should lead commerce to take a certain direction for a long time and from a wide territory. One would, therefore, have supposed that governments would have put themselves at once at the head of these undertakings, in order to control the directions of the roads for the interest of the community. But this was not the case.

In England, to be sure, everything could be entrusted to the partnership of private individuals. There seemed to be no undertaking too great or too expensive for their surplus of capital, for the people's spirit of enterprise, and for the highly developed industry and commerce; and there were no political boundaries

¹ The building-capital expended on the construction and equipment of the regular-gauge German railways amounts to 252,268 marks for one kilometer in length of operation. The total cost of the city line in Berlin, including the shared costs for the reconstruction of the Silesian station in Berlin, and for the new station at Charlottenburg, amounted to a round 68,140,000 marks for 11½ km. of length, of which 33,412,000 marks were paid for property indemnification, and the latter would have demanded much more, if the line had not passed long distances over fiscal property, and had not touched the outer parts of the city of Ackerland.—STR.

within the entire kingdom, washed on all sides by the sea, which placed barriers in the way of construction, or elicited feelings of jealousy. But it was different on the Continent, especially in Germany. Yet the Belgian Government was not long the only one that undertook to build railways for the whole country upon a plan predetermined, and for the interest of the state as well as of individuals. The results have already shown how successfully it has done this.

In choosing the route for railways in Germany it is not a question whether this or that inland town should be touched, but very often whether universal commerce ought to take its course through a kingdom or avoid it. Yet all this was entrusted to the enterprising spirit of private people, and let it be said in their honour that Germany became through their courage and insight the richest country in railways on the Continent, Belgium excepted, before the Government gave them any assistance.¹ Of course passenger traffic was the main object, only the most lucrative lines were constructed, and routes were taken which would not be satisfactory for a system of railways planned by the government.

But it soon became apparent that the government could not be separated from such great undertakings.² Then the postal system conflicted with the railways, which would be a substantial gain for the administration if in its hands, and which, as private property, became a competitor that could not be overcome. Necessity; the furnishing the less favoured provinces with a readier market for their produce; the uniting the more distant parts of the country with the main part; finally, the military interests; in fact, everything

¹ The total length of regular-gauge German railways, exclusive of branch lines to manufacturing concerns, etc., at present amounts to 41,879 km., and that of narrow-gauge to 1051 km.—STR.

² Legislation upon the railway enterprises in Prussia, from the 3rd of November, 1838.—STR.

urged the building of roads in those places, even where they could not immediately pay a profit, and the state alone was able to do this.

Nearly all the German Governments have gradually undertaken of themselves the construction of railways under various conditions, or have supported or guaranteed such operations.¹ Prussia took this step at last, but in the most splendid style, for a guarantee was given at once for two hundred miles of railway, and the problem which we have tried to throw light upon will, therefore, be abundantly discussed here in the near future.²

¹ Order of the Supreme Cabinet of November 22nd, 1842, concerning $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. bonds to be taken up on some railway concerns in need of help, in Prussia.—STR.

² According to the law of December 7th, 1849, the first railways built in Prussia by the state and the Saarbrücke line were opened, 1850, the first of the eastern line (Ostbahn), 1851.—STR.



THE EASTERN QUESTION.



PREFACE.

THE five shorter essays that follow were published between the years 1841 and 1844 in the *Augsburger Allgemeinen Zeitung*. These are : "Germany and Palestine," 1841 ; "The Country and People of the Kurds," 1841 ; "The Military and Political Situation of the Ottoman Empire," 1841 ; "Reshid, Izzet, and the Porte," 1842 ; "The Mouth of the Danube," 1844.

These essays, according to their contents, may be grouped together under the title "Essays upon the Eastern Question," and although the second discusses it from an ethnographical standpoint, and the fifth from a geographical one, yet all five treat primarily of the political and military events in the East, that have often greatly agitated Europe in the past and continue to do so at present.

Late in the autumn of 1839, Moltke returned from Turkey where, during his four years' residence, he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the country and the people, and had collected various and valuable stores of information. He could thus be well regarded as one of the most authoritative, most efficient critics of the East.

After his return from the battlefield of Nisib, there was a momentary pause in the long years of contentions between the Sublime Porte and its rebellious vassal, Mehemed Ali of Egypt, when it seemed as if the decaying power of the Turks would be completely crushed. The Sultan, Mahmoud III., who had begun to reform his empire with an iron hand, but with little success, had died a short time before the terrible news of Nisib had reached Stamboul. His successor was Abdul Mejid, a weak lad of sixteen. He found his empire without army or navy, for the traitorous Kapudan Pascha had taken the latter to Alexandria to Mehemed Ali ; he found all Syria in the hands of the Egyptians, to whom the way to the Bosphorus was open. But Mehemed Ali was not able to reap the benefits of the success he had won, and when Reshid Pasha, who had an European education and favoured progress, entered the ministry at Constantinople, those European powers that were inclined to support the integrity and temporal development of Turkey, began to lay hold upon stronger measures. The Hattis-cherif of Gulhane, which was executed by Reshid (2nd November,

1839), was most influential in producing a favourable impression on the powers. This decree of the Sultan insured to all his subjects, both the Faithful and the Rajah, security for their lives, honour and property, equal taxation, and a systematic collection of the taxes; he thus meant to take a far more important step on the road of reform. The ministry of Thiers in France alone still continued to support the bold demands of Mehemed Ali, so that the rest of the great European powers formed a quadruple alliance for the protection of the Porte (July 15th, 1840), and made military advancements against the rebellious vice-regent, who had relied upon the aid of France which had not been actually given. An Anglo-Austrian fleet and a Turkish land-force attacked the Egyptians in Syria, and after Beyrout, Akka, and other coast towns had fallen, and the inhabitants of Syria had taken up arms for the Sultan, Ibrahim Pasha, the son and general of Mehemed Ali, vacated the country and led his army back to Egypt in a manner that soon resembled flight. In the meantime an English squadron appeared before Alexandria, and Mehemed Ali was again forced to beg for peace, which was granted him upon acknowledgment of the inheritance of his dynasty (in the beginning of 1841).

But soon after these events Reschid Pasha left the ministry, and a short time after Izzet Mehemed Pasha was appointed his successor. Izzet was one of the most influential leaders of the old Turkish conservative party, and his entrance into office was the signal for a complete rupture in the endeavours for reform. But there were so many influences brought to bear upon the weak young Sultan that Izzet also remained a short time in the ministry, and the government at Constantinople continued to be agitated for a long time by opposing factions, nor was it able to become master of the internal difficulties during the time in which the following articles were written. Rebellions in Crete, complications in the government of the Lebanon, a serious quarrel with Persia, disturbances in the Danube principalities, all combined to make the condition of the Ottoman Empire insecure for years, and a menace to the peace of the world.

It seemed necessary to preface the following essays with this cursory historical review, for the purpose of informing the reader of to-day.

1841

ESSAYS

UPON THE

EASTERN QUESTION.

GERMANY AND PALESTINE.

A LITTLE company of Europeans has brought the Syrian question, which was long unsettled, to a speedy issue by means of a forcible and successful mode of action. Acre fell under the thunders of an Anglo-Austrian fleet, and the phantom of an Egyptian-Arabian power vanished of itself. Lovely Syria was conquered a second time for the padishah, the bold vassal who had so long defied his authority till he was humbled in the dust—but is the Eastern conflict now settled by this means? Hardly anyone will answer this in the affirmative if he has travelled through the Turkish provinces and is able and willing to recognize the truth.

The complete extinction of military spirit among these races that were once so warlike is manifested on every new occasion. If it was in the interest of the English to lay stress upon the strength and boldness of the action of the Turkish army against Ibrahim, the peaceful and impartial witnesses and associates, on the other hand, declare that they saw just as little display of brilliant fighting as a year before at Nisib. The Europeans have done everything. From the moment

that they left the scene, when their fleet sailed away from the Syrian coast, the Turkish army had scarcely taken a step farther, and yet there was required only a last push to effect the complete destruction of the decayed structure of might and barbarism. The Porte was unable to conquer the rich country between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean Sea, and it has as little power to hold these provinces, had they been presented to the Porte. It is not able to keep the Syrians in subjection by a strong form of government, as the military despotism of Ibrahim had been, nor can it gain that country by a just and faithful administration of laws, because the very first element necessary for such an administration, honest officers, was wholly wanting, and the Hattischerif of Gulhane could not produce it by magic. If the Ottoman Government desired to set aside a rich salary for its governors, they will continue to make the usual extortions in addition to the salary. The Turkish pashas will return with their farming of taxes and selling of offices, with their force-sales and bondage, in short, with their old despotism and oppression, and Syria will rise in arms against its new rulers, just as it has always done in times past against former rulers, because it has always been abused. Small revolutions will arise among the mountaineers and in the big cities. Then a war will be waged, just as the Reschid Pashas and Hafis Pashas fought against the unfortunate Kurds, when they slew women and children, and burned down the beautiful villages in order to rule a short time over an exhausted and desolated country which, however, they could not retain for a long time. Certainly, there is no need of foresight to prophesy that, even if there is no attack made from without, the Turks will again be driven out of Syria in one or two years.

But this shock will not fail to come. The fact that one of the strong powers withdrew from the European Areopagus, which had undertaken to solve the

Syrian problem, has, indeed, not been able to set back its measures, though its absence has perceptibly influenced the results of this same. A few *broad-sides* from the line of British ships commanded by the brave Napier would have frightened the Arabian *garde nationale* from their wretched batteries in front of Alexandria, and the flames of a general revolution would have broken out in Egypt which had been fearfully and long oppressed. Instead of this, and out of regard for France, the Grand-Seignior was forced, or what is equivalent to the same, was most politely invited by the quadruple alliance to sanction a part of the usurpation of his vassal. The heir of the caliphs, the multiplier of the inseparable empire, is to bestow a part of this very empire upon a rebel as an inheritance. But what is meant by inheritance in the dynasty of the Arnauts? Whoever is acquainted with the state of affairs in the East knows also how loose the family ties are there. The sons and daughters of Mehemed Ali are the children of his wives, and part of them are so little related that they could intermarry. Ibrahim, for example, is only the stepson of the Governor of Egypt. The Ottoman Empire itself was not held by right of primogeniture but by right of seniority. The right of primogeniture of a minor could not be made good against the might of an uncle, and in doubtful cases secret executions, putting out of eyes, or other acts of violence, were always necessary to help along the uncertain succession. Just so it would be now if the offspring of the reigning house were not raised in the "princes' coop," if they commanded provinces and armies, and if they had the power and of course the disposition also to fight among themselves for the rich inheritance. Finally, the descendants of the Arnautian guncharger are not encircled with that religious nimbus which hallows the descendants of Osman, and even the most distant relatives, the Tartar Khans at Rodosto, in the eyes of the Mussulmans. Foreign rulers also will

stretch out their arms for a part of the great inheritance of the venerable Vice-regent, at the moment when he departs from the scenes of his long and active life.

> If it is possible to regenerate the Turkish Empire as such, it can proceed only from a generation which must be educated to it, and that, too, from Mussulman roots. All proselytism and attempts at Europeanization, all hostile attacks, as well as friendly interpositions, lead only to complete dissolution. The Porte became weaker because of the protection of Russia than it had been after the fall of Varna; it is weaker to-day when England presents it with Syria than when it lost the battle of Nisib. The marasmus of total indifference has seized the mass of the people, and the government, acting only by the impulse that foreigners have given it, has sunk into a state of impotency which offers every lucky adventurer a prospect for the success of his ambitious plans. The complications of the years 1830, 1833, 1839 and 1840, will be renewed and at shorter intervals. Is the peace of Europe to be exposed each time to the serious danger in which it now is?

> Till now, European diplomacy has sought only to delay the crises; it has not undertaken to remove the causes which give rise to them. Of course, important and well-established objections can be made against every remedy which has been proposed, but with mere negation nothing is done.

A few voices have dared to declare that there is no real life inherent in the body of the Turkish state; that Islam permits neither progress nor change; that reform has broken Mussulman strength, and it cannot be replaced by foreign institutions; that a great, helpless, and defenceless country having entered into the circle of European powers is a continual source of jealousy, of terror, and of contention; that whatever cannot exist naturally must perish; that Turkey must be divided.

Such a step is contrary to moral right, with which

policy by no means accords, though it strives to do so more and more; while, on the other hand, it is opposed by the warning example of a former division, the results of which will not be forgotten by Europe for a long time to come. Finally, the division of Turkey will be like the division of a diamond ring; the question is, Who is to possess the most precious of solitaires, Constantinople? Who will be satisfied with the worthless remainder, with the extensive stretches of land which are occupied by semi-Arabic races? Other voices have advised that certain portions of the Turkish territory be surrendered to European civilization, as has been done with Hellas.

An enthusiastic desire for the land where the Redeemer was born, where He lived, taught, and suffered, once caused millions of pious Christians to give up their homes and suffer unspeakable hardships in order to tread the consecrated ground of Palestine. The flower of western knighthood shed its life-blood in order to wrest the holy places from the dominion of the infidels. How greatly this religious feeling had cooled, when, just eight hundred years after the first crusade, the great general of the very nation bearing the title of Protector of the Catholic Faith in the East, could say drily enough, after the conquest of Egypt, "Jérusalem n'entre pas dans ma ligne d'opération!" The present feeling lies between these two extremes, and the thought of placing Palestine under Christian protection does not seem to be given up in Europe. However, religious feelings alone dare not decide the point in politics. Palestine as a Christian principality must, in its first step towards fulfilment, contain also the possibility of its continuance. Should it be desired to make Jerusalem with the holy places about it one state by itself, as was done with Cracow, it would be a state in a deserted, barren district, cut off from the sea, far from its protectors, surrounded by Arabian bands of robbers, threatened by Mussulman neighbours, and rent internally by furious

Isra

Napo

hatred among the sects. Such a state would certainly be a very unfortunate creation. Truly it is a fortunate thing that the tolerant Mussulmans had the power in their hands, and not one of the sects which have so completely forgotten the doctrine of gentle toleration and brotherly love at the grave of the Redeemer, that we blush before the infidels. From the very beginning this much is apparent, that the new creation must have a more extensive territory, a part of the sea-coast, that it must be fortified. Why should the fine harbour and the strong walls of Acre be surrendered into the hands of the weak Turks, which they would lose again the next instant?

It may be further claimed that the control of the new state ought to be handed over to a sovereign prince of the German nation and of genuine tolerance. The exclusive supremacy of any Christian church would disseminate seeds of destruction at the very beginning of the state's existence. We said a German prince, because Germany has the negative advantage of not being a maritime power, while it has the nearest commercial road to the East through the navigation of the Danube and the Austrian ports on the Adriatic. Finally, we said a sovereign prince, because only this form of government is fitted for a semi-barbarous state of affairs, because it is the best of all forms in the hands of a just, wise, and energetic regent, and because only such a ruler can make anything out of the new creation.

The Greeks had fought for and gained their independence, not, indeed, without the help of Europe, but principally through their own exertions. They are a nation of their own, and therefore had a right to demand that their administration, their army, their officials, and their sovereign should be Greek. But here lies a great difficulty in the way of the progress of the Greek state, for the people destined to provide these elements is itself as yet in a state of semi-civilization. The case would be far different with the in-

habitants of Southern Syria. They would be freed from the Turkish yoke, but as they have not yet reached even the Greek stage of civilization, it would be most likely that the Europeans, so superior to them in morality, knowledge, and energy, would supply the nobility, the privileged class and the officials. But, of course, these Europeans ought not to be the deserters from the other nations, as is the case in Turkey. [The state which gives Palestine a prince must, beside making him an allowance, provide him out of the number of her military and civil servants with a body of tried men, whose services would be absolutely indispensable.] For without prudent, active, and above all, honest officials, no administration, and certainly no colonization, is conceivable. As to the army of a ruler of Palestine, it is easy to see that it would necessarily be very small, in order not to be a useless burden on the country. Its nucleus would be a few battalions, squadrons, and batteries, with European soldiers and officers, in which, however, vacancies might occasionally be filled by natives. By the side of these there should be gradually introduced a kind of general armament, after the pattern of the Sipahi or the Austrian military frontier. This last system is so admirably suited for a rising colony, that it is inconceivable why in Algiers all other means, even the Chinese wall round the Metija, were proposed rather than this. The fleet would consist simply of a few corvettes to protect the commerce against the pirates of the Mediterranean. Provided with such means of defence, the country would be safe from the neighbouring tribes of Arabs, as well as from Turkish and Egyptian encroachments. In case of a more serious danger, the protecting powers would have to intervene.

Internal administration would provide government with the largest field for its activities in a country like this, where everything has still to be created, but where all requisite materials are to be found in such

abundance. There would be no difficulty in attracting settlers and capitalists to this rich soil, to live under this bright sky, as soon as they saw that they would find protection for their property and persons, security for their industrial and commercial enterprises, impartial justice and complete religious toleration. The influence of such model government amongst nations, which have hitherto had only extortioners for their rulers, would be immense. [Palestine would be a wall of protection for Syria against Egypt] and if the latter should ever be governed by any other hereditary dynasty than the Ottoman it would afford the best security against Turkish aggression. As Palestine is situated on the direct route of communication between India and Europe, the ports along the coast and the highways through the country would be filled with the treasures of two continents, and, by the deliverance of the Holy Sepulchre, Christian Europe would obtain a satisfaction which has been withheld from her for generations.

We candidly confess our belief in the idea, on which so much ridicule has been cast, of a general European peace. Not that long and bloody wars are to cease from henceforth, our armies be disbanded, and our cannon recast into nails; that is too much to expect, but is not the whole course of the world's history an approximation to such a peace? When we look back to the earliest ages, do we not see the hand of everyone raised against his neighbour? And even in the middle ages, did not knights and barons, castles and towns continue to fight with each other till stopped by the princes, who claimed the monopoly of war for themselves? And to-day! Is a Spanish war of succession, or a war "pour les beaux yeux de Madame," possible in our times?

Would Holland be allowed to disturb the peace of Europe for the sake of a province, Naples for the monopoly of sulphur, Portugal for the navigation of

the Douro? It is for a very small number of powers that the possibility of setting the world ablaze is reserved. Wars will become rarer and rarer because they are growing expensive beyond measure; positively because of the actual cost, negatively because of the necessary neglect of work. Has not the population of Prussia, under a good and wise administration, increased by a fourth in twenty-five years of peace? and are not her fifteen millions of inhabitants better fed, clothed, and instructed to-day than her eleven millions used to be? Are not such results equal to a victorious campaign or to the conquest of a province, with this great difference, that they were not gained at the expense of other nations, nor with the sacrifice of the enormous number of victims that a war demands? and is there any European country that has not made similar conquests, though in most cases they have been on a smaller scale? When we consider the milliards which Europe has to spend every year on her military budget, the millions of men in the prime of life who are called away from their business in order to be trained for a possible war, it is not hard to see how these immense powers might be utilized and made more and more productive. May we not hope that Europe will, in the course perhaps of decades, perhaps of centuries, agree upon a mutual disarmament, and show us the reverse of the picture presented to us to-day by France, who wishes to sell her coat for a suit of armour?

It has been said that with the cessation of war, men would lose their moral energy and unlearn the virtue of sacrificing their lives for an idea, whether honour, loyalty, glory, patriotism, or religion. This fear may not be altogether without foundation, and the rarer war becomes in Europe, the more necessary will it be to find a field of activity for the surplus energy of the rising generation. England has found in every continent and on every ocean scenes of action, where the

younger sons of her nobility are provided for, where the martial courage of her youths is tried, where new channels are opened to her commerce and new markets for her industry. France has sought an outlet for the often morbid excess of her energy in Algiers, and if her attempts at colonization have so far met with little success, we wish her endeavours the best results in the interest of civilization. But should not Germany gladly seize the opportunity of extending German civilization and energy, industry and honesty beyond the German frontier, when such an opportunity presents itself?

1841

THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE OF THE KURDS.

THOSE who are interested in the *dénouement* of the tragedy in the East will be surprised to hear a report of new risings in Kurdistan, at the moment when everybody believed the affairs of the Turkish Empire settled by the interference of the four great European powers. And yet the insurrection is only a consequence of this interference. With the battle of Nisib the sovereignty of the Padishah over the newly defeated Kurds, who, however, were never completely subdued, had ceased. We felt that we had no power over the mountain tribes, and so they were left alone. But now that English and Austrian cannon have left the Porte free to act, she demands as before taxes and the *corvée*, money and recruits, and thus causes the insurrection which must come before long even if it has not broken out already. The phenomenon reminds us of a mighty stream which flows onwards with unruffled surface, until it is opposed by rocks, when it reveals for the first time, by the surging and roaring of its waters,

the force with which it moves. The province had already renounced its allegiance, and the first attempt to recover it called forth open insurrection. In giving a short sketch of the people and the country which at the present moment may well attract the eyes of all Europe, we will not begin with Xenophon, but simply mention that the "Karduches" are to this day the terror of all intruders, and that they still construct those houses with little towers of which the Greek general tells us; we will not vainly attempt to clear up the long and dark history of this people, nor stay to inquire whether they are a tribe of Tartar immigrants, or the descendants of the old Medes and Chaldæans whose language is preserved in the Bibles of those villages on the Persian frontier which have remained Christian. We wish rather to describe the Kurds and their home, as they appear to-day to observers, who had an opportunity of spending some time amongst them, travellers who, ignorant of the language, and surrounded by a thousand dangers, real and imaginary, hurried over these mountains by the perilous passes of Bitlis and Djinlamerik.

If any nation is bound to the soil, it is the Kurds. Heirs of an ancient agriculture, they live in the valleys of the Armenian table-land, shunning the plains where the brooks of their native mountains are dried up, and though the winters are severe, they enjoy long and beautiful summers. Among them are a few wandering shepherds, but for the most part they are an essentially agricultural people, to this extent nomadic that when the heat in the valleys becomes oppressive and the rays of the sun free the mountain pastures from the snow, they drive their herds a step higher, for a time exchanging their houses for tents of black goat-hair.

Quite in accordance with this manner of life is the fact that in the district inhabited by them we find nothing but villages, detached farms are nowhere to be

seen, nor yet towns of any size. The latter are not in Kurdistan but round it. If a line be drawn from Diarbekir, cutting through Mardin, Nisibin, Djesêreh-Ibn-Omer, Van, Mush, Paluh, Derindeh, Maresh and Andiaman, it will encircle Kurdistan proper, in the interior of which only very small towns such as Tacho, Bitlis, Soort, Hassu-Keffa, Thiro, Portek, Troglu, etc., are to be found. The population of these is principally Kurdish, and it is only in the plains of Karput and Malatia that we find the two towns with these names, places of importance, it is true, but decidedly not Kurdish. In all these towns there is a wonderful mixture of nations, languages and religions. The Christians, the older part of the population, are the descendants of the ancient Assyrians and Chaldæans, mixed with Armenians who immigrated at a later period. The former are for the greater part Jacobites and Nestorians, who are sharply divided by the difference of their opinions; the latter, with the exception of some proselytes gained by the Propaganda at Rome and St. Lazaro of Venice, belong to the Greek Church. These Christians intermarried with the neighbouring Kurds, and over the population thus formed passed the wave of Saracens which the Crusaders were here compelled to resist, leaving a sediment everywhere behind it of greater or less amount. Finally the Turks obtained the supremacy, and the Jews, who are distributed over the world as universally as iron, are not wanting.

In the south the home of the Kurds is sharply bounded by the mountains. Beyond their range the Arab villages cease; agriculture is unknown, and it is only in a few walled towns that the inhabitants are safe from Arab raids. The Kurds who inhabit the Sindshar mountains form an isolated outpost, this mountain chain rises steep and wall-like from the immense steppe of Mesopotamia. In the north and east, however, the Kurds are mixed with the Armenians, and it is only in

the wooded mountains north of Palu, which attain a great height and are almost inaccessible, that they possess an exclusive domain, into which neither the Turkish army nor the inquisitive traveller has ever penetrated. The subjugation of this last refuge of Kurdish independence had been planned by Hafiz Pasha,¹ when the Egyptian war broke out. This district, therefore, remained closed to European exploration, and will very likely remain so for a long time to come.

Within the limits we have indicated, the Kurds inhabit the zone which extends from the region of the fir-tree and the Palamut oak down to that of the olive and pomegranate, from the steep rocks and snow-covered peaks whence the streams gush noisily forth, down to the valleys and rice-fields, through which the same streams flow with gentle windings. Agriculture is limited to this zone, for the peaks above are covered with snow and masses of ice, even when the sun has scorched up all the vegetation in the treeless steppes below.

The Kurdish villages afford a pleasant prospect. As the traveller approaches them, he beholds, while still far off, groups of walnut-trees, under whose shade the houses lie hidden. Near the spring or brook, which is never absent, there stands, as a rule, a plantation of poplars, which are indispensable for the building of the cottages. As they are well watered, and exposed to the life-giving heat of the sun, these trees reach an extraordinary height in an incredibly short time; they grow as thickly as the blades in a corn-field, and the trunks are slim and straight like reeds. The villages are surrounded by vineyards, olive plantations, gardens, or cornfields, according to the altitude, but only very few of them can boast of a minaret, which the

¹ Hafiz Pasha was Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army in Syria in 1838 and 1839; he lost the battle of Nisib.

smallest Turkish villages possess. The outer walls of their dwelling-houses are built of a kind of air-dried brick, which is made of clay and crushed straw without any wood; instead of windows, there are only a few narrow openings, which are placed rather high, and are not closed, as neither glass nor paper is known in these districts. The entrance is guarded by a strong oaken door. The ceiling is made of a layer of poplars placed at intervals of nine inches; over these branches are laid, and the whole is covered with clay and gravel to a thickness of about one or one and a half feet. This platform is used by the family as a sleeping-place during the summer, and is often surrounded by a parapet about four feet high. The houses of the wealthier people have two storeys, and are sometimes built of stone; they are generally provided on one side with a square tower. Everything is arranged with a view to defence in their intestine feuds.

Besides the small apartments where the women are kept in the strictest seclusion, there is, in the interior, a larger room, which is the same as the *selamlık* of the Turks. At the upper end is the fire-place or hearth, on a level with the floor; on both sides is a low divan with cushions, and the wealthier people have a carpet on the floor. This is all the furniture that the room contains.

The paths which connect the different villages are most precipitous, and cannot be passed even on mules without risk; to the unaccustomed rider the effect is appalling. Each community keeps to itself, and neither needs nor desires intercourse with the others. The principal occupation of the women is weaving the cotton and mixed silks, the red and black striped materials for the wide trowsers, the black mantles of goat-hair, which, together with sandals and white felt caps, compose the dress of the men. With the aid of a few sticks set upright in the ground, they weave the beautiful and durable carpets which are the

chief luxury of their homes. The men till the fields, tend their flocks, and smoke, or go out to fight.

It would be very difficult to give even an approximate idea of the number of the Kurds; in any case it exceeds half a million. The greater number are Moslems; on the Persian frontier there are Christian Kurds, and on the Sindshar and the Southern boundary live the Yezids, whom the Turks believe to be devil-worshippers, and who are, therefore, allowed to be sold as slaves. The Armenians, who live amongst them in considerable numbers, are all Christians of the Greek Church. All Kurds have a certain national likeness. Their skin is not any darker than that of their neighbours the Turkomans and Armenians; they are generally tall and stalwart, their noses are aquiline, but their eyes are set very close together, which sometimes gives them the appearance of squinting.

They show great dexterity and practical knowledge in the works they construct for purposes of irrigation. Without the use of any levelling instruments they conduct the water from the springs and streams for leagues along the mountain sides to the point where they are in need of the element which is here indispensable for all vegetation. The mountain slopes are often cut into terraces up to an astonishing height, just as in our best cultivated vine districts, in order to gain a few feet of productive soil. Plantations, fields, and aqueducts are the principal features of Kurdish agriculture.

Such is the home and the climate to which this race is so deeply attached. When, in the year 1838, Hafiz Pasha had driven the inhabitants of Karsann-Dagh with fire and sword into their highest and most inaccessible hiding-places, and when, now that they were surrounded on all sides, food began to be scarce, a deputation of their elders appeared before the tent of the conqueror to implore his pity. The Pasha knew of no better means of transforming these people into faithful subjects of the Porte than that of transplanting

them from their inaccessible mountains into the plain. There he promised them ten times the property they possessed at their homes (on such occasions his generosity knew no bounds), freedom from all taxes and military service for three years, and pointed out to them in bright colours the riches which they would be able to gain by the cultivation of the silkworm and by horse-breeding, instead of mulberry-picking and sheep-rearing. But one might as well offer to build a nest for a fish. Mournfully the old men looked up to heaven, promising everything they were asked; they then returned to their families, loaded with presents, and reported how they had been received. Thereupon women and children took up arms, the skirmishes were renewed, and did not end till the insurgents were entirely defeated; but the project of a colonization in the plain had to be abandoned.

Kurdistan is an aggregate of single communities without any bond of union. Sometimes, but very rarely, an old castle may be seen, perched on a lofty and inaccessible mountain-top, or hedged in between perpendicular walls of rock. These castles are used by some of the Beys, not as residences, but as places of refuge in times of danger. None of these small princes exercise permanent authority over any great part of the country, and it is only in times of danger and distress that men like Revandus Bey, Vedehan Bey, and Sayd Bey have been able to gather any considerable body of their countrymen round their standards. But, even then, these armies melted away in a very short time, and each soldier refused to defend more than his own hearth. This is where the weakness of the people lies. They would be unconquerable if they were united, but none of them have ever attempted to lend a helping hand to their neighbours, and while Rêshid and Hafiz Pasha were invading one district, the others rejoiced in their temporary safety till it was their turn.

From the Arabs, who present a complete contrast to this people, the Kurds have been protected by a natural frontier since their last settlements in the plain were destroyed by troops of horsemen from the desert. The Arabian lion cannot harm the Kurdish falcon in these mountain clefts, and on the other hand, the latter is powerless against the former, so long as he remains in his own element.

Persia would be the most dangerous enemy of the Kurds on account of her nearness, if she had not sunk into total impotence. They did succumb to the Pashas of Bagdad and Diarbekir, but principally because at that time a large army of 50,000 men could be employed against them, which the Padishah was obliged to maintain in that remote region for quite a different purpose, that is, to keep a watch on Ibrahim. The Porte herself knows best what sacrifices of men, money, and material are required in order to occupy Kurdistan for the space of a few years. She was, however, compelled to make these sacrifices, as without the help of Kurdistan it would have been impossible for her to bear the burden of the "status quo" for seven years. Her artillery, which was conveyed into these mountain valleys with immense exertion by camels or by human labour, provided her with a weapon far superior to anything which the Kurds could bring against it, and yet castles with garrisons of from forty to eighty men resisted all their attempts for thirty-two and even forty days.

Meanwhile famine and disease made dreadful havoc among the besiegers, and if Hafiz Pasha's last expedition came speedily to an end, it was principally owing to the fact that Kurds were fighting against Kurds. The same men who had fought so badly in the plain, under the Turkish flag, were now seen storming intrenched caverns, villages, and strongholds, or defending them with the utmost daring. The love of plunder and the love of home were powerful motives on one

of these occasions, but on the other they were absent.

The nature of the soil seldom permits the Kurds to fight on horseback. Their cavalry, who ride excellent horses, are generally armed with bows and arrows, or with long lances of bamboo, the upper ends of which are ornamented with thick pads of ostrich feathers; for defence they still carry their little round shells of wicker-work covered with skins. But the long gun which the foot soldiers carry, with its Persian barrels of damaskeened iron, still often provided with a matchlock, is a terrible weapon in so perilous and difficult a country. All this shows that there is a strong defensive element in the Kurdish nation, and one must not imagine for a moment that the Russians would not meet with an extremely obstinate resistance, if they ever attempted the conquest of this country. Here they would find the same fanaticism and the same difficult mountain warfare, so uncongenial to the Russian soldier, that they have been compelled to face in the Caucasus, where, spite of the sea and the nearness of the country to their own, their efforts have hitherto been in vain.

But the same considerations show that the Kurds are not much to be feared when they assume the offensive. The large towns outside their territory are perhaps a temptation to them, but though they may plunder them now and then, they do not care to possess them or shut themselves up within those walls, which glow with the heat of the sun. In particular Mossul and Bagdad lie quite out of the sphere of their operations. Nor are we inclined to regard their latest insurrection as a matter vitally affecting the continuance of the Turkish Empire. Kurdistan has never been assimilated into it, but has only been for a time mechanically mixed with the other provinces. In its present condition it is not to be regarded as a corroding cancer, but as a dissevered member of that great political body of which so many limbs have already perished. It is also

quite possible that the Turkish army now available for use in Asia may, by once more marching through these lovely valleys, burning the villages and trampling down the crops, force a few Kurdish districts into renewed obedience to the Padishah. But the fact, that it would be necessary to repeat the same bloody work again and again, and that every levy of recruits or collection of taxes would demand a similar display of power, suggests serious considerations as to the state of the Empire, which Europe is at present so interested in preserving by her fleets and her armies.

1841

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

THOSE who follow the development of events in the East with any attention, cannot fail to see that the Turkish Empire is rushing more and more rapidly down the steep road to ruin. [Since Navarino and Adrianople the Padishah has fought no battles against other than his own subjects.] The nations who had been hostile to him for hundreds of years, suddenly became as many friends and, before long, protectors. Help and advice were pressed on him from all quarters, more liberally as it seemed to him, than his case required, and each interposition in his favour left him weaker than he had been when confronted by the danger from which such interposition had been intended to deliver him. And now that the English and Austrian cannon have helped him to regain the long coveted prize of Syria, the vast stage of the Ottoman Empire presents us once more with the spectacle of discontent and mutiny on the one side, of confusion and weakness on the other.

We read in the newspapers that the insurrection in Bulgaria is put down. Hussein, the Pasha of Widdin, the destroyer of the Janissaries, a gouty old man, almost ninety years old, has succeeded in pacifying the country. The old cut-throat has let loose his Arnauts against the discontented Rajahs. His greedy hirelings swoop down upon the ill-armed hosts of Bulgarian Christians, burn their villages and crops, drag women and children into captivity, and drive the remnant which escapes slaughter into the mountains, where the men who have been thus abandoned to hunger and misery, form themselves in their turn into bands of robbers. By this means the difficulty is postponed, the only method, it would appear, by which questions affecting Turkey can at present be solved.

It is doubtful whether in our survey of the Turkish Empire we ought to include those principalities in which no Turk is any longer allowed to live, and where the Turkish Government cannot convey its orders without sending its Tartars on board Austrian vessels, and allowing them to be put up in quarantine for a fortnight. Meanwhile we see one royal chamberlain after another arrive in Servia, and none of them is able to put an end to the confusion there. Old Milosh Obrenovitch watches events from across the Danube, as if thinking that a time will come when he will be able to rejoin his old companions in arms, remind them of the glorious fight of their younger days, and free his country for ever from the Moslems.

The provinces of Albania and Bosnia from which the Porte drew, or rather bought by the offer of high pay the means of pacifying Bulgaria, are in a state which is far from satisfactory. Yet it is thought at Stamboul that fortune has been specially propitious whenever the Divan succeeds temporarily in making its power felt among these mountains. Ali Pasha of Zanina is no more, and if things came to the worst, the Austrian frontier soldiers would restore order, however

much they might dislike meddling with the affairs of a foreign country.

Graver faces will be seen at Pasha Kapussi when the determined attitude of the "Romans" in Thessaly is discussed. The formation of an independent kingdom out of a territory of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by Greek Rajahs, was a greater grievance to the Porte and a more bitter personal affront to Sultan Mahmoud than all the other losses. This fact, and the obvious example of a state whose progress in spite of all difficulties is undeniable, while under the administration of the Pashas everything retrogrades, can hardly be lost upon the neighbouring Greek Christian population of Thessaly. There is no need to stimulate the fermentation from outside; the principal seat of the intrigues is to be looked for on Mount Athos, which is almost exclusively inhabited by monks, and the whole question becomes all the more critical, the more it assumes a religious complexion.

Discontent has asserted itself much more openly in Crete, which is ablaze with the lurid flames of insurrection. Among her highest officials, the Porte possesses but a very small number of men of proved efficiency, for those nonentities who continually succeed each other in the Seraskeriat, and who are in turns Ministers of Marine, are entirely out of the question when important commissions are to be assigned. One of these few is Tahir Pasha, an orthodox Turk, with an iron will endowed with many-sided knowledge, and practical utility, but hard, cruel, and full of hatred against the Christians and the European Cabinets, whom he has never forgiven the day of Navarino. This man is charged with the pacification of the island. Though the result of his enterprise can by no means be foreseen with any certainty, it is probable that he will drive the rebels from the field with his artillery, against which they have nothing to oppose, and that he will restore Turkish rule in the towns. But that he will

penetrate into the mountains and repeat the scenes of Karsann-Dagh,¹ we may be permitted to doubt. Here again we see an indefinite adjournment of the situation.

Nothing has been heard lately of the disturbances in Kurdistan, but without doubt only because the Porte allows matters to take their own course. But as soon as Turkey finds herself compelled, in her hour of need, to enforce her claim to draw upon the resources of this province, a reaction will certainly set in, and the newspapers will once more report disturbances in the Taurus and in Mesopotamia.

Whereas in a former article the opinion was expressed that the Turks would hardly be able to retain the recovered province of Syria longer than a year, this prediction seems likely to be fulfilled in a still shorter period. [In Syria there is only one real and permanent power, that of the Emir Beshir,] who has shown his rare sagacity by allying himself with the Egyptians against the Turks, and with the Turks against the Egyptians, and it is very possible that this Emir, or the heir of his policy, may look down from his mountains upon more than one change in the plain. But it is very problematical what increase of power the Porte would gain from the renewed possession of the rich coast where the greater part of her available forces would be as entirely absorbed after as before the conquest. The memory of so many thousands of the noblest men of Germany, France and Italy, of so many millions of devout Christians, who willingly sacrificed their property and their lives in order that they might set foot on the consecrated soil of Palestine, drink from the waters of Jordan and behold the holy city—all this has hitherto counted in the calculations of the European Cabinets as so much empty moonshine. Jerusalem and the grave of the Redeemer, Syria and the fate of the Christian population have been once more abandoned

¹ Compare p. 283.

to the Infidels, and the reins of government placed in trembling hands, from which they threaten to fall again every moment. Meanwhile there is time to reconsider the matter, for we may depend upon it, that before long Syria will be for the second time as much at our disposal as it was after the victory of Acre.

While the Anglo-Austrian victories have been far from giving back to Christianity her holy places, the heir of the Califs is just as far from regaining his by them. At present Arabia obeys neither the Pasha nor the Padishah; new prophets arise there and, according as they belong to the fanatical or to the Puritanical sect, prophesy the fall or the purification of Islam, but allequally reject the authority of the Sultan.

Egypt is more independent after her defeats, than she ever was before. Though deprived of one part of his possessions, Mehmed Ali has obtained in respect of his diminished territory the recognition and, to a certain extent, the guarantee of the European powers. One claim of the usurper, to which Sultan Mahmoud would never have dreamt of assenting, that his authority should be hereditary in his family, has been allowed by Mahmoud's son. The tribute has been lightened, and to the order for the reduction of his army, the old Pasha has replied with all humility and submission by new levies of troops. Though far from believing in the hundreds of thousands of regular troops and national guards, or in the possibility of reconquering Syria with this rabble, we yet cannot help thinking that Mehmed Ali will in future be able to choose at his pleasure between the friendship and protection of France, England, and Russia.

To whatever direction the young Sultan may look from his palace on the Bosphorus, he sees himself surrounded by dissatisfaction, insubordination and revolt. Let us now examine the means which are at his disposal for the maintenance of his authority and rights.

Reschid Pasha, without doubt the most eminent man in Turkey, has been obliged to relinquish his office as prime minister. This incident however will trouble him little, for he will probably be soon recalled to his old post, because he is in fact indispensable. But this man, who is sincerely anxious to benefit his country, cannot but be pained to see the most important reforms which he has introduced in the administration, rejected as impracticable. One of these is the attempted separation of the military executive power from the administrative power, and the direct collection of taxes for the exchequer. This scheme, which would be as advantageous to the tax payers as to the Government, fails partly on account of the distracted condition of the provinces, in which it is impossible to raise taxes without a display of power or the intervention of the military governors, and partly for want of honest officials, an evil which has been in operation for hundreds of years. Throughout the empire therefore, a return has been made to the old system, by which the Government received the amount of the taxes from the Pashas in advance, and they for their part borrowed it from Armenian bankers at enormous rates of interest, and afterwards recouped themselves by the aid of the military power placed at their disposal. The Turkish translation of a French *Charte Gulhane* has evidently not increased the moral power of the Sultan and has happily remained without any consequences. From a philanthropic point of view it is all very well for the descendant of Osman, Bajazid, and Suleiman to proclaim the equality of the Rajahs and the Moslems, but it is absolutely fatal to Turkish rule, which is principally based upon the sovereignty of the Faithful over the Infidels. The celebrated *Hattischerif* has drawn the attention of one part of the subjects of the empire to the rights of humanity they are entitled to claim, and of another to the privileges of ascendancy they are on the point of losing. This latter warning refers principally to the

Ulemas, the most powerful, the best educated and the most influential class, and its effect is to loosen the only tie which unites the Padishah with the different nations of his vast empire which are only held together by community of faith. When that is gone nothing remains but physical force, the power of the army.

Since the defeat at Nisib the Porte has been able to do little for the development of her army. It is only in the department of the artillery, no doubt the most effective portion of a modern Oriental Army, that the employment of Prussian officers and sergeants has led to the attainment of a perfection far in excess of anything which at Constantinople had ever been thought possible. The employment of Turkish soldiers against foreign enemies has long been out of the question; this possibility is so far from entering into the calculations of the divan, that even the strongholds on the frontier, Rustchuk and Silistria, Shumla and Varna, are without any garrison of regular troops, and consequently the country from the banks of the Danube to the walls of the capital is unprotected. The Turkish Nizam would be quite equal to putting down insurrections at home wherever their numbers were sufficient, and wherever the nature of the ground did not give their opponents too great an advantage.

[Yet the Government has never, since the peace of Adrianople, been able to raise a standing army of more than 75,000 men, without calling out the Rediffs or militia, who, however, can only be kept together for a few weeks or months if this measure is not to lead to catastrophes like the desertion of the corps of Izzet Pasha and Osman Pasha in the year 1839.] At the present moment the Porte has at its command hardly more than 50,000, or at the most 60,000, regulars, and even this comparatively small number is a great drain upon the country. As everything necessary for the equipment of the troops must be supplied from Belgium, Austria, and England, this equipment, bad as it is, costs

more than double as much as that of any other European army ; but the greatest difficulty is the recruiting. Abundance of food, together with deficient physical exercise, the crowding in the vast barracks (some of which contain quarters for 8000 men), the total want of physicians and medicines, and, in addition, the repugnance of the people to compulsory life-long service, produce a mortality amongst the soldiers, of which we can form no idea. Plague, typhus, dysentery, and desertion are continually thinning the Turkish lines, and we may assume without exaggeration, that apart from skirmishes and battles, [the number of recruits annually amounts to about a fourth or a third of the total forces.] It is a well-known fact that polygamy causes decrease of population ; if in addition youths who have barely reached the age of manhood are dragged into the celibacy of military service, it is easy to understand what disproportion there must be between the Mohammedans and the steadily-increasing Rajahs, especially the vigorous Armenians. [But how can 50,000 men suffice to repress the universal disorder in an empire which reaches from Bagdad to Belgrade, from Ararat to Lebanon] and that, too, in a country where communication is so difficult, that for every movement of troops, a special road must be constructed ? How can they possibly perform their allotted task of presenting a firm front to Egypt at the very time that they are expected to restrain the turbulent population of Syria in their rear, scale the mountain hiding-places of the Kurds, pursue the flying Arab through the desert, re-conquer Crete, curb the seditious spirit rampant in Thessaly, Albania, Servia, and Roumelia, and, simultaneously with all this, guard a capital of half a million inhabitants, upon whose tranquillity and order the existence of the whole Empire depends ? There is one remedy which might help to treble the Ottoman forces, that is the arming of the Rajahs. If the Porte had united the

interest of her Christian subjects with her own by a good administration, or, to be just, if she had been able to do so, this expedient would have saved her. Before Nisib this measure was proposed, and might, with precaution, perhaps have been partially executed. As things are to-day, it must be owned that the remedy would be worse than the evil.

The reports concerning the young Sultan's health are far from satisfactory. None of Abdul Mejid's numerous marriages has as yet provided him with a male heir, and should he die without one, the sole remaining representative of the ancient house of Osman would be a boy fourteen years of age; who, to judge from his appearance, is no stronger than his elder brother. If anything were wanted to make the dreadful confusion complete, it would be the extinction of the dynasty, so sacred in the eyes of the Moslems, of the founder of their Empire.

But even apart from the possibility of such an event, [the continuance of the Ottoman Empire is only conceivable on the condition of its being contracted within its natural boundaries.] In Europe these would only include Constantinople and the Thracian Isthmus with Adrianople; but in Asia the large and rich district, which is washed by two seas, and which is bounded on the south by a line which would retain Erzerum, Mush, Malatia, Kaisariah, and Konieh for the Turkish Empire. All the rest, however legitimate may be the Padishah's claims for it, is no longer to be held, and even Bagdad, Diarbekir, and Orfa are mere islands in a strange Arabic-Kurdish sea.

If we consider the incalculable consequences which would flow from the sudden disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, from the universal concert of nations, it is not to be wondered at that European statesmanship tries to postpone such a catastrophe to a distant future. But has not the dismemberment of the Empire already begun? Does not the tricolor wave in Algiers

and the palm branch on the Nile? Has not Russia's frontier advanced from the Don to the Pruth, from the Pruth to the Danube, and beyond the Caucasus? Is not Morea free? and do the principalities obey the firmans of the Padishah? Did not all this happen through the action of those very powers who proclaim the integrity of the Empire and the legitimacy of her ruler? And would it not be advisable to prop up other separate portions of the old rotten building, in order that when the threatened collapse occurs they may remain standing, and not cover Europe with their ruins?

But, unfortunately, we see the dissevered provinces and countries under the influence of Russia, France, and England, but not under that of Germany. It is a striking fact that in Turkey we always hear of these three powers, but never of Austria, and yet the latter should be held in greater regard there, for it is Austria's sword which will some day be thrown into the scale to decide the fate of this Empire. All the fleets in the world can neither execute nor prevent the division of Turkey; Austria's armies may do the one, and can certainly do the other. How much of the noblest German blood has been shed in fruitless expeditions to Rome? How often has the glorious double Eagle been carried over the Alps only to be repulsed on the Italian soil, which it was so difficult to reach? Austria has always directed her attacks against the West, whilst in the East she only defended herself. She turned her sword to the West, her shield towards the East. This policy seemed to be justified, as on the one side there were all the treasures of civilization heaped together, while on the other there was nothing but desolate regions with barbarous inhabitants. But to-day Austria has her share in the Hesperian gardens; the principalities which are struggling for emancipation, especially Servia, throw themselves upon her protection only to be repulsed. Is Russia to find there an open field for the still further extension of her influence?

What German heart is not filled with sorrow at the sight of the long processions of our countrymen, who, with their wives and children, their goods and chattels, go to seek a new home on the other side of the ocean? Wallachia is a country wide enough to receive them all, and even by the poorest can now be easily reached in a few days at small expense by the new road along the Danube. There they would find a rich soil, nor would they miss the forests, the murmuring streams, and the mountains or plains of their homes. They would find a Christian Government and the beginnings of order, which indeed would be greatly promoted if the privilege of hereditary authority were conferred on the Hospodars, a privilege which the cut-throat on the Nile has extorted for his own family in the midst of his defeats. By concluding treaties with the philanthropic Prince Ghika, by abolishing the present consular system which makes all immigration a burden on the Government, by appointing an embassy armed with the powers of the higher law-courts and charged to uphold the interests of the colonists with the government of the country, industry and diligence would be ensured that safety which is requisite for prosperity under the most favourable conditions. Then German industry need no longer flee to the noxious swamps and the glowing sun of other continents, and while the German language would be heard on the banks of the proud Danube, German civilization would stretch from the Swabian Mountains to the mouth of the Sulina.

1842

RESCHID, IZZET, AND THE PORTE.

THE fall of Izzet Mehmet Pasha, the embittered opponent of the Christians, has excited a hope in many quarters that the Porte will now introduce a new

system of Government, which may end the precarious state of things in the East. But for Turkey there are really only two systems, and Reschid and Izzet are their representatives. As the present state of affairs did not seem to contain in itself any guarantee of its continuance, those two men, though working by opposite methods, were both attempting to make it more durable. The one strove to advance towards the institutions under the influence of which he had seen the Christian nations in the West become great, powerful, rich, and far superior to his own. The other wished to return to the principles on which a succession of powerful monarchs, from Sultan Orchan to Suliman the law-giver, had governed the East victoriously and happily. Reschid is, without doubt, the best educated statesman, in the European sense of the word, that Turkey has possessed up to the present time, and it is to be lamented that this honest, zealous architect did not work along with the strong but ill-advised destroyer Mahmoud. No government which was not strong at home could undertake to declare the gradual emancipation of its Christian subjects, but at the moment of greatest weakness the hattischerif of Gulhane could not pass beyond the walls of the palace without awakening the discontent of those to whom the rule of the believers over the Rajahs was both a precept of religion and a maxim of government, without calling forth defiance, opposition, and mutiny among the Christians who for three hundred years had been sorely oppressed and maltreated. But these plans were never executed; the most important act of Reschid was indisputably his attempt to raise the state revenues directly, which would not only have doubled the revenue of the Government, but would have been an enormous relief to the taxed. If this enterprise had succeeded, it would have been possible to win all classes of subjects so completely that the step might have been ventured upon of inviting the Christians to share the

heaviest of state burdens, military service. By this means the military position of the Empire would have assumed an entirely different aspect, and the emancipation of the Rajahs would have followed as a matter of course. But this noble intention was not realised. The Government was dismayed by the financial losses which evidently would have been incurred by the transition from the old system of anticipating the revenues to the new one; the governors of the provinces and their satellites had a common interest against this arrangement, and while they accepted the higher pay, they allowed the old extortions to be continued; in short, the project was found impracticable even during the ministry of Reschid himself, principally because there was a lack of honest officials, who cannot be created by any governmental decree, but can only be trained with a new generation.

The views of Reschid would never have been listened to at the *Divan* if Turkey had not been in such a weak condition after the defeat at Nisib, the falling away of the fleet, and the death of Mahmoud. As soon as Syria had been conquered by the Christians and given to the Turks, the Egyptians humiliated, and in consequence Europe herself threatened with a quarrel amongst her great powers, the Porte quickly passed over to a new system.

It cannot be disputed that with Izzet and Tahir Pasha, two of the ablest and most powerful men of the old school, came into office, but it is just such men as these that the Porte does not require in that place, because they entangle her in quarrels with her own and foreign countries, to which this weak government is not equal; and that was what happened when the hopes which Reschid had fostered in the Rajahs were disappointed by his successors. Mildness encouraged opposition, severity led to the revolt which blazed out in Candia, in Lebanon, and in the Balkans. To this was added the difference with the Greek Government,

this thorn in the side of all Mohammedans, this dangerous example of a successful insurrection of Christian subjects, where not even outward appearance was kept up as with the bastard states on the Danube. It is true that Izzet tried to reform the finances by curtailing the salaries, which in Turkey are very high, but very few officials receive salaries at all; those who can, pay themselves at the expense of the subjects. No other result, therefore, was to be expected from this measure beyond the discontent of a few magnates at Constantinople. But the fall of Izzet was principally due to his misunderstandings with the high diplomacy at Pera, which troubled the Porte much more than the revolt of a few provinces, a chronic malady to which the Empire has long been accustomed.

The attempts which Reschid and Izzet made on opposite principles have effected no improvements in the internal condition of the country, but, on the contrary, the impotence of the Government has become more evident, the complaints of the Osmanli louder, and the defiance of the Rajahs bolder. It would be quite in accordance with the character of the *Divan* to abandon such attempts for the present, let matters go on as they are, and trust Allah for the rest. Without doubt, we shall shortly see such combinations as Halil and Sayd Pashas, Rauf and Akif Pashas—and whatever may be the names of other nonentities—succeed each other in office according as favour and intrigue may decide. As for old Chosrev, we have racked our brains to know whether he was for reform or for reaction, for Russia or for France. The truth is that he has no opinions at all on these subjects, except that he himself must gain power and keep it. His extensive connections in all parts of the Empire make him fitter than anyone else to maintain the internal tranquility which the Porte so much needs, nor does this old man of eighty lack either the energy of character or the ruthless severity which this task requires. In short, Mehmet Chosrev is the

very man for the circumstances, and we should not be at all surprised to see him again in the *seraskeriat* before long.

But what a state of things! The existence of the Porte depends upon the conservative principles of Europe, and, yet, she herself tramples upon these principles in Servia without understanding that she is undermining her own ultimate foundations. The Empire will fall to pieces as soon as the European powers cease to agree concerning its continuance or come to an agreement concerning its end. The first contingency might arise suddenly and unexpectedly, a complication, like that in Servia, might be the cause, but the consequence would, in such a case, be beyond all calculations. The second contingency would depend on the voluntary action of the European cabinets, and the consequences could in their main outlines be foreseen, weighed, and regulated. At all events this is a catastrophe which, we may assume, must come. The only question is whether to put it off indefinitely and allow ourselves to be taken by surprise, or to look the danger in the face and hasten on the crisis in order to remain master of the situation.

We have already drawn attention to the fact that on Asiatic soil there are still to be found many germs of life favourable to the continuance of Ottoman supremacy. Though the Turkish population is here, too, continually decreasing owing to well known causes, yet it is still numerous. The extensive Armenian population is faithfully devoted to the Porte, averse to all revolt, and patient in suffering and labour. Except for their religion, these Armenians are, in manner, custom, habit, inclination and views, real Turks, so much so, that they speak Turkish more than their own language. At Brussa or Koniah the Padishah may be able to reign for another century by his pashas and mutselims, by farming out the taxes, raising forced loans or firmans, and by relying upon the Ulemas and

the Rediffs. But Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Adana, Arabia and Kurdistan, Roumelia, Bosnia, and the Danubian principalities are already slipping from his grasp. All these countries will, without fail, pass into strange hands, or become independent under foreign protection.

It may be said that we are shaking the bearskin before killing the bear; but we are convinced that the Porte will have few objections to urge against a migration to its native soil of Asia as soon as an Austro-Russian army appears in Bulgaria, or an Anglo-French fleet in the Sea of Marmora. The difficulty does not lie in the conquest of Turkey, but in the division of the conquered territory, especially as Constantinople is the jewel of this rich crown, which, itself indivisible, is of greater value than all the rest. In our opinion the only natural and possible solution of this problem is the formation of a Christian Byzantine Empire at Constantinople, the re-establishment of which has been already begun in Hellas by the will of Europe. Whatever the view we take of the new Greek State, no one will deny its growth and progress, while Turkey is decaying and almost dead. The eyes of the Greeks in Thessaly, Macedonia, and the islands of the Archipelago are turned towards Hellas, and there is no reason why the Slavonic population of Bulgaria itself should not prefer to join a Russo-Greek rather than a Byzantine-Greek church, should not rather obey the Czar than the Sultan. As we have already seen, whenever the reconstruction of Eastern Europe takes place the ruins of the old edifice will suffice to compensate both those who have armed for the fight, and those who have taken no share in it, "*Il y en a pour tous,*" but to make the partition is not part of our present purpose. Thus much, however, we think we are entitled to assert, that when the sword of Eyyoub has been carried over the Hellespont back to the land whence it came; when the dome of St. Sophia is once more surmounted by that cross for

which it was built; when the shores of the two Straits are no longer obedient to one will, and that a weak one; and when the two inland seas are opened to the flags of all nations; then, and not till then, will the peace of the East be assured for a long series of years.

1844

THE MOUTH OF THE DANUBE.

THE attention of the reader of this newspaper¹ has, several times lately, been drawn to the importance of the Danube, as the principal means of communication between the heart of Germany and the East, as well as to the obstacles which impede free navigation at the mouths of our greatest stream, and the hope has been raised that the latter might be avoided by the construction of a canal in the neighbourhood of Trajan's wall. We cannot share this hope, as personal observation has confirmed our conviction of the total impracticability of the enterprise. From Widin the Danube flows for almost thirty miles in an easterly direction through the wide valley and plain between the Carpathian mountains and the Balkans. At Rassova, at a distance of only seven miles from the Black Sea, the stream suddenly changes its normal course, though opposed by nothing more than a gently rising tract of land with an even and sandy surface. But more than this, a number of shallow lakes and a stream with a very slight fall seem to continue the immense Danube valley to the east as far as the Euxine. Even where this valley ends, at a distance of not more than 3000 paces from the sea, and half a mile from Port Kustendje, there rise no mountain cones or rocky walls, but the valley and banks become flatter and flatter till they end in a

¹ Compare Preface.

gently undulating plain. It is undeniable that on the map this district presents the exact appearance of a branch of the Danube which has been choked up by sand, where the lakes are due to the remnant of the chalk formation, and the marshy depressions mark out the old river-bed.

From Rassoava the Danube flows due north and almost parallel to the coast of the Black Sea for twenty German miles, as far as Galatz; thence it flows for about the same distance through the reed-covered delta, through which it sends three arms. As, for the present at any rate, the steamers of the Danube Navigation, that splendid achievement of private enterprise, proceed in the first place to Constantinople, they are compelled after leaving Rassoava, to perform a journey of seventy miles through the Sulineh mouth before passing Kustendje, which is separated from Rassoava, or, more accurately, from Boghas-Kjöi, the Tchernavoda of the maps, by a distance of no more than seven miles. No wonder then, that there is a wish for a canal here and would be even if there were no other difficulties than those presented by the Sulineh mouth.

In constructing a canal, the first difficulty to be considered is, whence to draw the water to feed it. Now the Danube, even as far down as Isaktchi, has a considerably rapid fall, and a very natural suggestion is to provide the new channel with the necessary water from the rich store of the main river. In this case locks would be needed in order to prevent the water rushing too powerfully into the sea; for though the Danube near Isaktchi has but one, and thence to the mouth but two feet of fall per German mile, yet thirty-five feet of total fall distributed over seven German miles, would still produce a considerable current. But in order to feed the canal with the waters of the Danube, a necessary condition would be that its bed should run without any rise, but rather with the necessary fall, from the level

of the Danube near Boghas-Kjöi to the level of the Black Sea, at a depth sufficient for navigation. This would necessitate cutting through all the intervening heights down to the level of the canal-bed. These heights rise gently, but without interruption for almost seven German miles, for their culminating point lies near the sea, not more than a quarter of a German mile distant from it. The ground slopes towards the sea for a short distance, and then suddenly ends in perpendicular cliffs, sixty to eighty feet in height, whose bases are washed by the Euxine. The texture of this mass of chalk-mountains, and its continuity which is nowhere broken through its whole thickness, and which forms the foundation of the whole of Dobrudsha and Bulgaria, shows distinctly that there can never have been a mouth of the Danube in the neighbourhood of Kustendje, but that the stream has been diverted along the glaciis-like western slope of a low range of hills, the eastern inclination of which has in the course of centuries been for the greater part submerged by the sea.

The height of the culminating point has been carefully measured from the shore.¹ The lowest part of the ridge, about half a German mile west of Kustendje is $166\frac{3}{10}$ Prussian duodecimal feet above the level of the sea. From that point the valley of Karasu descends to the west, first like a shallow ditch, then between rocks which become steeper and steeper, but without water for three and a-half German miles to Allakapu. Below this point the marshy surface of the valley does not slope perceptibly towards the Danube, and at high water it is flooded by the stream. On the east the descent towards the sea is much more rapid. The only place within a short distance of Kustendje, where the sea is not bounded by an uninterrupted wall of chalk, lies

¹ This interesting work was executed by Major Baron Von Vincke in the year 1838.

three-quarters of a German mile south of this little town. The ground is there hollowed into a shallow cavity, and the precipice, still fifty feet high, is formed of layers of loam and clay. No continuous indentation in the mountain ridge or interruption in the foundation of the chalk rocks is to be perceived even here.

It is clear, from what has been said, that this ridge 161 feet high, would have to be excavated to a depth of ten feet below the lowest water-mark of the Danube. But now imagine a cutting, whose length from Allakapu to the sea would be three and a-half German miles, whose greatest depth would be 171 feet deep, and whose upper width at this deepest part would need to be at least 600 feet, excavated too, at least for the greater part, out of the solid rock!

For these reasons no objection on the part of the Russians to the draining off of the waters of the Danube from Rassova need trouble us much.

There are canals as, for example, the Trollhätta in Sweden, which surmount higher hills than those which are the cause of the circuitous course of the Danube. But in those cases there must be on the heights themselves large reservoirs or considerable supplies of water sufficient to fill the canal and to make good the loss which is incurred by evaporation and the use of the locks through which in this case the vessels ascend or descend step by step. But the lakes of Tchernavoda and Karasu lie almost at the same level as the surface of the Danube near Boghas-Kjöi, the tributary stream, which is quite insignificant, and on the heights themselves there are for miles and miles neither brooks nor ponds nor lakes. The Dobrudsha, though surrounded by water on all sides, is a district most scantily supplied with water. During the summer there is not a drop of it in the valleys, every trace of watercourse disappears, and in the villages which lie at great distances from one another, the drinking water is drawn up from the wells by ropes of from sixty to eighty feet in length.

It is not impossible that there may be a point on the ridge lower than the one measured, somewhere to the south of it, and forming the head of a valley, deviating from the Karasu Valley near Umurdsha Saya, in the direction of Lascale and the Tekirajol, and it would be interesting if this region too could be carefully levelled. So much is certain, there is no real gap in the mountain ridge there, and very probably, what was saved in the depth of the excavations would be lost again owing to the considerable increase in length.

But next to the construction of a canal, hopes have been raised by the project of a railway in the direction of Trajan's wall. Travellers can be taken on an improved road from Rassoava to Kustendje in four hours. By rail it would be done in an hour and a-half less. But in a journey from Vienna or Pesth to Constantinople a saving of two hours and a-half is of no great importance, and it would require a much greater increase in the goods traffic than there is at present any reason to expect, to stand the expense of a double trans-shipment. The construction, maintenance and working of a railway in this out-of-the-way and desolate district would be very expensive. Add to this the bad condition of the harbour of Kustendje, which is shallow, narrow and quite unprotected from the eastern and southern gales. The little town has lain in ruins since 1829, and was in 1838 only inhabited by forty families. Everything there would need to be created from the beginning. Therefore it would be better not to harbour delusions and unfounded expectations, but to look for the real difficulties where they are to be found, that is, in the nature of the navigation through the Sulineh mouth. The local obstacles there are much smaller than is generally supposed¹ and far less important than those encountered in the middle course of

¹ Compare "Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839."

that stream, which are described in an interesting article published in this paper not long ago. They could be overcome with the tenth part of the expenditure that a railway or a canal from Boghas-Kjöi to Kustendje would entail. But to tell the truth it is not these difficulties of which people are afraid but the real or imaginary encroachments of Russia, the quarantine-stations on both sides of the Sulineh, provided with cannon and situated in a boggy lowland of ten miles, which, according to the treaty of Adrianople, is to be left uninhabited, the attempts to subject Austrian steamers to a visitation, and similar drawbacks.

In case of a war Trajan's wall will not be sufficient to stop the Russian armies or to cover the much discussed new commercial road. The Dobrudsha is a deserted district with an absurdly thin population. It is flanked on one side by Wallachia and on the other by the sea, both of which are dominated by Russia. Hirsova, Isaktchi, Matchin and Tuldsha have been razed. Before Kustendje are the opening Russian mines, looking as if they had been blasted but yesterday. It seems as if the Porte meant to rely for her defence on the Balkans, on Varna and Shumla. She will occupy the places on the middle course of the Danube as advanced posts, but certainly will not keep an army to hold the Dobrudsha. However, in time of peace we must and may hope that Austria will protect the rights and future of the Danubian countries, and that Germany in the end will succeed in liberating the mouths of her great rivers.

THE END.









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